Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1608-JT-1869 | March 16, 2017 Page 1 of 21

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Donald J. Frew

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorney General

James D. Boyer

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Termination of the ParentChild Relationship of:

A.K.G. (Minor Child),

and

S.M.H. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

March 16, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

02A03-1608-JT-1869

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable Sherry A. Hartzler, 

Judge Pro Tempore

The Honorable Lori K. Morgan, 

Magistrate 

Trial Court Cause No.

02D08-1507-JT-87
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1608-JT-1869 | March 16, 2017 Page 2 of 21

Appellee-Petitioner.

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] S.M.H. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to A.G. 

(“Child”) upon the petition of the Indiana Department of Child Services 

(“DCS”). Mother presents a single issue for review: whether the trial court 

committed clear error when it held that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

was in Child’s best interests. 

[2] We affirm.

 Facts and Procedural History

[3] On November 5, 2012, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child, born on 

February 7, 2005, was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) because 

Mother’s then-boyfriend/later-husband (“Stepfather”) had struck Child in the 

face, leaving welts and a handprint on her cheek. The trial court adjudicated 

Child a CHINS and Child remained in Mother’s home under DCS supervision. 

The State charged Stepfather with battery and obtained a no-contact order as to 

Stepfather and Child. Stepfather later pleaded guilty to the battery charge and 

received a two-year sentence, suspended to probation.
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[4] The trial court ordered Mother to refrain from criminal activity, maintain 

appropriate housing, cooperate with service providers, maintain contact with 

DCS, provide child-appropriate clothing, and cooperate with all rules of DCS 

placement. Mother was generally compliant with services offered by DCS. 

However, she and Stepfather twice violated the no-contact order. Therefore, on 

September 30, 2013, DCS removed Child from Mother’s home and placed her 

in foster care, and Stepfather was sent to prison to serve his previously 

suspended sentence. During Stepfather’s incarceration, Mother divorced him 

and obtained independent housing. However, after Stepfather was released 

from prison, he and Mother reconciled. They contacted DCS to request 

services for Stepfather and he began individual counseling based upon a DCS 

referral.

[5] Child was in a series of foster home placements, one with a maternal aunt in 

Arizona. In December of 2014, the aunt determined that she could not handle 

Child’s behavioral issues and Child returned to Indiana.1 DCS again placed 

Child in foster care. 

[6] On July 17, 2015, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights.2 The 

trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the termination petition. 

 

1

 It appears that long-term foster care placements for Child were made more difficult by Child’s tantrums 

and smoking. Also, Child had reportedly learned how to access pornography on home computers and had 

attempted to share sexual information with some of her foster siblings.

2

 DCS also petitioned to terminate the parental rights of D.C. (“Father”). Father is not an active party to 

this appeal.
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Child’s DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”), Child’s therapist, and the 

Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) all testified that Child should not be around 

Stepfather, even though the no-contact order had expired by the time of the 

termination hearing. FCM Tamra Powell said DCS required that Stepfather 

only have visitation with Child with a licensed therapist present, but Mother 

failed to comply with that requirement by allowing him to violate the nocontact order twice. The FCM also said that, although Mother had maintained 

contact with DCS, completed recommended services, and requested referrals 

for additional services, Mother failed to comply with the requirement that she 

have stable housing with enough room for Child. The FCM testified that 

Mother had reported that Child had watched pornography on an iPad while 

Child lived with Mother and Stepfather.

[7] Child’s therapist, Kristen Matheson, M.S.W., testified that Child suffered 

trauma due to Stepfather’s battery of her and that it was not healthy for Child to 

be around Stepfather. She also testified that Child disclosed in therapy that 

Child had been sexually abused by one of Mother’s friends. And the GAL 

testified that termination of parental rights was appropriate because Child 

“deserves permanency” after years in foster care and should not have visitation 

with Stepfather without the approval of Child’s therapist. Tr. at 193.

[8] At the termination hearing, Mother, who had completed parenting classes and 

had been generally compliant with home-based services and psychological 

therapy, testified that she was living with Stepfather in a studio apartment at an 

extended-stay hotel that consisted of one room with one bed and a couch that 
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could turn into a bed. Mother also testified that she was employed at Wal-Mart 

as a greeter with nearly full-time hours, bringing home approximately $200 per 

week. Mother intended to look for a larger apartment if Child could live with 

her again, but Mother could not afford such an apartment without also relying 

on Stepfather’s monthly Supplemental Security Income and Social Security 

Disability checks. 

[9] Mother testified that she intended to continue living with Stepfather for the 

foreseeable future and that she would be comfortable with having Child live 

with her and Stepfather. When asked if she had any concerns about Child 

being around Stepfather, Mother testified that: 

there’s always going to be in the back of my mind or is 

this . . . something that is a risk I’m willing to take and yes 

because I know in my heart and I know in my mind that that 

incident was one time and he hasn’t done it since and he 

hasn’t . . . never had a history of abusing a child or hitting a 

child just this one time. 

Tr. at 67. 

[10] On July 18, 2016, the trial court entered its findings of fact, conclusions, and 

order terminating Mother’s parental rights. In relevant part, the trial court’s 

order provides:

Although she “successfully” completed homebased services in 

July of 2014, the mother still did not have stable or appropriate 

housing. Lack of stable and/or appropriate housing has been an 

issue since the underlying CHINS proceedings began and said 

condition has not been remedied despite the provision of services 
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to address the issue. During the course of those proceedings, the 

mother . . . resided in at least 5 different residences. There were 

approximately 4 other adults residing in one of those residences 

and the mother was evicted from one of the residences for nonpayment of rent. Currently, [Mother] is residing with 

[Stepfather] in a studio apartment which is not an appropriate 

home or living environment for the child . . . .

During the course of the underlying CHINS proceedings, the 

mother has not had stable employment or other income with 

which to sustain herself and the child. At the time of the trial, 

she was employed by Wal-Mart as a greeter. She had previously 

worked in the delicatessen at Wal-Mart, however, [she] was 

terminated from that position and offered the position as a 

greeter. The mother had been employed in approximately 5 

other jobs throughout the history of the proceedings, however, 

[she] was unable to maintain a job for any substantial period of 

time.

At trial, the mother argued that she is substantially compliant 

with the orders of the court. While that assertion may be true, 

the Court found in virtually every Court order after the order of 

April 10, 2013, that[,] despite her compliance with the orders of 

the court, she had not benefited from services provided. . . .

* * *

Throughout the course of the underlying proceedings, the mother 

demonstrated that[,] despite the provision of services, she is 

unable to provide a safe, suitable or stable home environment 

and is otherwise unable to provide for the basic necessities of a 

suitable home for the raising of the child. She has been unwilling 

or unable to remedy the reasons for removal and reasons for 

placement of the child outside of the home. The Court finds that 

the DCS has proven by clear and convincing evidence that there 
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is a reasonable probability that the reasons for removal of the 

child from the mother’s home and the reasons for continued 

placement outside of the mother’s home will not be remedied 

and/or that continuation of the parent/child relationship poses a 

threat to the well-being of the child.

* * *

At the time of the initiation of the proceedings in the underlying 

CHINS case, the mother’s housing was inappropriate in that 

[Stepfather] was residing in the home with the child and he had 

battered her and left his hand print on her face.

* * *

During the course of the underlying CHINS proceeding, the 

mother failed to protect the child from [Stepfather] . . . . Despite 

the No Contact Order that had been entered in the criminal 

proceedings, on at least 2 occasions[] she permitted him to have 

contact with the child which resulted in his incarceration. 

* * *

At trial, [Mother] testified that she is aware that the professionals 

who are treating [Child] are not comfortable with the child being 

around [Stepfather]. Despite being aware of their concerns, 

[Mother] testified that she is not concerned with [Stepfather] 

having contact with [Child] and that having him around the child 

is a risk that she is willing to take. There are significant concerns 

that the mother is unable to see the impact that the battery, 

exposure to pornography and potential molestation have had on 

the child and thus, is unable to attend to her emotional needs 

and, further, is unable to protect the child from further abuse 

and/or harm.
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The mother was molested as a child and believes that the child 

may have been molested by her father, the maternal grandfather. 

Additionally, she informed the DCS at a Child and Family Team 

Meeting that the child may have had access to pornography in 

the home in which she resided with [Stepfather] from February of 

2012 to October of 2013. The child has disclosed to her therapist 

that she was sexually abused by one of her mother’s friends in a 

home in which she resided with the mother.

* * *

Given the mother’s inability to benefit from services provided 

and to ensure the safety and protection of the child . . . , the 

Court finds that the DCS has proven by clear and convincing 

evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the 

child’s best interests and that the DCS has a satisfactory plan for 

the care and treatment of the child which is placement of the 

child for adoption. 

Appellant’s App. at 31-32, 34-35. This appeal ensued. 

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[11] Mother maintains that the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights was 

clearly erroneous. We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that 

“[t]he traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” 

Bailey v. Tippecanoe Div. of Family & Children (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the 

interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances 
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surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re 

K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child 

relationship is proper where a child’s emotional and physical development is 

threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one’s own child should not be 

terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental 

rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or 

her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[12] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS 

is required to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the 

reasons for placement outside the home of the 

parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, 

been adjudicated a child in need of services.

* * *

(C) [and] that termination is in the best interests of the child . . . .
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Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2016). DCS need establish only one of the 

requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) before the trial court may terminate 

parental rights. Id. DCS’s “burden of proof in termination of parental rights 

cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. 

(In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-14-2).

[13] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cty. Ofc. of 

Family & Children (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. 

denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that 

are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial 

court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s 

judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. 

Judy S. v. Noble Cty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1999). trans. denied.

[14] Here, in terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court entered specific 

findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court’s judgment 

contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of 

review. Bester v. Lake Cty. Ofc. of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 

2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, 

second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. 

“Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to 

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 
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102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s 

decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[15] Mother contends that the trial court erred in both its findings of fact and in its 

conclusions thereon. As to the latter, she does not challenge the trial court’s 

conclusions that she has failed to remedy the conditions that resulted in the 

child’s removal or that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of 

the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child. 

Rather, she alleges only that the trial court erred in concluding that termination 

is in the best interests of Child. 

Trial Court’s Findings of Fact

[16] First, Mother appears to contend that the evidence did not support the trial 

court’s following findings of fact: (1) she failed to benefit from services; (2) her 

home and cohabitation with Stepfather at the time of the termination hearing 

was not appropriate for Child; (3) and she failed to see the impact that Child’s 

exposure to pornography had on Child. However, the first two findings are 

supported by the evidence, and Mother’s assertions to the contrary are simply 

requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. There was ample 

evidence that, although Mother had engaged in the services offered by DCS, 

she also failed to benefit from those services. For example, Mother complied 

with homebased services, yet the evidence shows that she had failed to 

maintain stable and appropriate housing throughout the CHINS proceedings. 

There was also ample evidence that her home was inappropriate at the time of 

the termination proceeding; not only was Mother residing in a temporary 
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location that did not have a separate bedroom or bed for Child, she was also 

living with the man whom Child’s treatment professionals believed should not 

be around Child except in the presence of a licensed therapist.

[17] There was also evidence that Mother failed to see the impact that Child’s 

exposure to pornography had on Child. Mother herself informed DCS that 

Child may have had access to pornography in the home in which she resided 

with Stepfather in the past, but Mother was still unconcerned about Child living 

with Stepfather in the future. However, even assuming the court’s finding 

regarding pornography is clearly erroneous, the decision of the trial court is 

supported by the remainder of the findings and the portion challenged by 

Mother may be treated as surplusage. Lasater v. Lasater, 809 N.E.2d 380, 397 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Moreover, Mother has shown no prejudice from the 

finding regarding pornography that would warrant reversal of the court’s 

judgment on appeal. Id.

Best Interests

[18] In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a 

child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. 

Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 

“A parent’s historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and 

supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a 

finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best 

interests.” Castro v. State Ofc. of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2006), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an 
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important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the 

testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in 

the child’s best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. 

[19] Again, Mother’s contentions on this issue amount to requests that we reweigh 

the evidence, which we will not do. The trial court found Mother had failed to 

protect Child, was unable to appreciate the impact of Stepfather’s battery of 

Child, and was unable to provide “safe, suitable or stable home environment.” 

Appellant’s App. at 32. Those findings are not clearly erroneous, as there was 

ample evidence that Mother did not have suitable housing for Child at the time 

proceedings were initiated, during the proceedings, or at the termination 

hearing. There was also evidence that Mother intended to have Child live with 

her and Stepfather, even though all of the professionals treating Child said that 

it would be harmful to Child to live with Stepfather or have any contact with 

Stepfather other than visitation supervised by a licensed therapist. 

[20] The professionals treating Child testified that Mother did not have appropriate, 

stable housing for child at the time of the termination hearing and that Child 

should not be around Stepfather. Yet Mother stated she intended to have Child 

living with her and Stepfather for the foreseeable future, and she that she

intended for Child to live in a one-room studio apartment at an extended-stay 

hotel without her own bedroom or bed. This led Child’s GAL to testify that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s best interests. Given the 

testimony of Child’s treatment professionals, in addition to evidence that Child 

needs permanency and stability that Mother cannot provide, we hold that the 
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totality of the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination is 

in Child’s best interests. The trial court did not err when it terminated Mother’s 

parental rights to Child.

[21] Affirmed.

May, J., concurs.

Bailey, J., dissents with separate opinion.
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I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Termination of the ParentChild Relationship of:

A.K.G. (Minor Child),

and

S.M.H. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

Court of Appeals Case No.

02A03-1608-JT-1869

Bailey, Judge, dissenting.

[22] Our Indiana Supreme Court has succinctly stated:

Few liberties are as central to our society as the right of parents to 

raise their children. Our General Assembly has thus set a high 

bar for terminating parental rights – requiring a termination 

petition to allege four defined elements and commanding 

dismissal when DCS fails to prove each element by clear and 

convincing evidence.
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In re Bi.B. and Br.B., No. 54S01-1612-JT-630, slip op. at 1 (Feb. 17, 2017). I 

cannot agree that the “high bar” was met in this case.

[23] I acknowledge that a judgment terminating parental rights will be set aside only 

if it is found to be clearly erroneous. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). 

However, the reviewing court may also consider the statutory requirement that 

in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the findings must be supported by 

clear and convincing evidence. Id. Thus, we review the judgment to determine 

whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the 

findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. Id. Termination of 

parental rights is a “last resort” to be implemented when all other reasonable 

efforts have failed. Id. at 631. Here, if there was a “failure of all other 

reasonable efforts,” it was because the DCS set the measure of success at an 

unrealistic bar. A single mother, capable of working retail or service jobs, was 

to obtain housing without any dependency upon her former spouse, who had 

shown very poor judgment in the past but made extra-ordinary efforts to atone. 

[24] Sometime before the November 5, 2012 CHINS petition was filed, Stepfather

intervened in a sibling argument and struck Child in the face, leaving a mark. 

Stepfather was charged with battery and made subject to a no-contact order as 

to Child. He later pled guilty to the battery charge and was given a two-year 

sentence, suspended to probation. Mother and Stepfather twice violated the nocontact order. Admittedly, this is not appropriate parental behavior.
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[25] In the following three years before the termination decision, Stepfather paid his 

debt to society and took parenting classes and anger management classes in 

prison. Upon his release, he immediately began taking steps toward a goal of 

co-parenting Child. He requested, and received a DCS referral for, individual 

mental health counseling. The slap or strike appears to have been an isolated 

incident, as Stepfather has no other documented history of violence. Curiously, 

however, DCS caseworkers steadfastly maintained that Stepfather was not and 

would not be an appropriate step-parent – even while facilitating counseling. It 

seems odd to allocate resources toward activities predetermined to be a lost 

cause. 

[26] Meanwhile, Mother maintained contact with the DCS, was generally 

compliant3 with home based services, completed parenting classes, participated 

in psychological therapy, and obtained employment as a Wal-Mart greeter. She 

asked to be allowed to have additional services. Nonetheless, Mother was 

never perceived as having adequately benefitted from services. Marisela 

Barrientas testified that Mother had been “very diligent” and “very 

cooperative” except that she did not have “success” in obtaining housing. (Tr. 

at 170, 172.) Using the same benchmark as the DCS, the trial court reasoned 

 

3 There was some suggestion that Mother had been “non-compliant as of late.” (Tr. at 174.) It appears that 

Mother called DCS to re-schedule services without the 24-hour notice preferred by DCS. In such 

circumstances, a call – although made – would be noted as a no-call/no-show. I find it significant that 

Mother does not work in a 9 to 5 position. In retail, she may not always have ample advance notice of 

schedule changes. It appears that Mother must have been cooperative with her employer’s needs, as would 

be expected by DCS, in that she was receiving more and more hours until she was nearly full-time as of the 

termination hearing. 
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that, despite Mother’s efforts, she had not “truly benefitted” from services. 

(App. at 32.)

[27] In short, Mother achieved compliance with the goals set for her with the 

exception of obtaining a residence for Child independent of Stepfather. She and 

Stepfather were residing in a studio apartment, and had obtained funding for a 

larger unit, but elected not to sign a lease pending the outcome of the 

termination petition. Admittedly, Mother could not afford a two-bedroom unit 

from her own employment income; she needed to supplement it with 

Stepfather’s disability income. This circumstance was not likely amenable to 

change based upon referrals. Simply put, no amount of DCS services and 

parental cooperation will cause an entry-level retail position to pay enough for a 

single mother to obtain suitable housing all on her own. 

[28] This is not to say that a parent should subject his or her child to danger because 

an economic contribution is needed. Here, I find it very significant that Mother 

did not reconcile with Stepfather until AFTER he had completed anger 

management and parenting classes. Again – if these classes are to no avail –

why are there programs funded for incarcerated individuals that are, 

presumably, on a path to rehabilitation? 

[29] As Mother and Stepfather availed themselves of services, Child was moved 

from foster home to foster home. At the time of the termination hearing, no 

pre-adoptive home had been located for the pre-teen diagnosed with ADHD 
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and oppositional defiant disorder. Child wished to maintain a relationship with 

Mother and Stepfather; Mother and Stepfather wished to parent Child.

[30] Kristen Matheson, M.S.W. (“Matheson”), Child’s therapist, testified that 

Mother was fully cooperative and “supportive” as a parent and that it was 

“important to [Child] to build a relationship with Mother.” (Tr. at 145.) 

According to Matheson:

She’s always concerned about homework and school and 

[Mother’s] expressed wanting to build a relationship with her 

daughter and develop more trust with her.

Question: And do you think that’s something that needs to 

happen?

Matheson: I would like to see it happen for [Child’s] sake I mean 

it’s important to [Child] she loves her mom.

Question: So obviously if that needs to happen it’s not there 

right now?

Matheson: Correct.

(Tr. at 145.) Clearly, Matheson’s goal was sustenance of the parent-child 

relationship. 

[31] Matheson also addressed Child’s feelings toward Stepfather. She described an 

encounter during a joint session with Mother and Child; when Mother inquired 

as to whether Child was fearful of Stepfather, Child defiantly replied: “I don’t 

give a crap if he smacked me I still love him.” (Tr. at 143.) Explaining that 
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children can remain bonded after abuse but the relationship is complex, 

Matheson opined that “right now” it was not healthy for Child to be around 

Stepfather. (Tr. at 147.) I perceive “right now” to be limiting language, not a 

professional opinion that Child should never be around Stepfather.

[32] Without doubt, Child was traumatized in the past. However, I am not 

convinced that an isolated incidence of violence is automatically a “last resort” 

event portending termination of parental rights regardless of the willingness of 

the parents to do what is reasonably asked of them. Child has not found 

stability in foster placements. Meanwhile, she is bonded with both Mother and 

Stepfather and desires relationships with them. They desire to provide a home 

for Child and have taken significant steps toward that end. Child’s therapist 

described the mother-child interaction approvingly. Nonetheless, despite 

Mother’s remarkable cooperation with services, her benefit from services was 

assessed in terms of her detachment from Stepfather. Curiously, although the 

DCS referred Stepfather to therapy, caseworkers appeared to be convinced that 

Stepfather would always pose a threat to Child. However, after an incidence of 

violence, Stepfather appeared to pursue all avenues available to him to diminish 

the probability of such conduct in the future. He took parenting classes and

anger management classes, and – at his own initiative – commenced individual 

therapy. Even Child’s therapist did not suggest that Stepfather should be 

prohibited from all future contact with Child. In sum, the trial court’s findings 

as to Mother’s past conduct and her current unwillingness to separate from 
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Stepfather do not demonstrate clearly and convincingly that termination is in 

Child’s best interests. 

[33] I would find that the evidence in this case does not meet the heightened burden 

of clear and convincing.