In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 19-1308

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY SHOCKEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:15-cr-00016-RLM-MGG-1 — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.

ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019

Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Anthony Shockey appeals from the

district court’s order revoking his supervised release and

imposing a 15-month prison sentence. The district court found

that Shockey not only used methamphetamine but also

possessed it, a Grade B violation of one of his supervisedrelease conditions. Shockey challenges this classification.
2 No. 19-1308

Because the district court reasonably could infer possession

from use, we affirm the judgment.

While on supervised release for possessing a firearm as a

felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Shockey tested positive for methamphetamine, which he later admitted using. Because Shockey

violated the condition that he not use a controlled substance,1

a probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervision. The

officer prepared a “Summary Report of Violations” charging

Shockey with a Grade B violation for conduct constituting an

offense punishable by a prison term exceeding one year.

See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2). 

At his revocation hearing, Shockey asked the district court

to find that he had merely used methamphetamine, rather than

possessed it. (Use is a less serious Grade C that does not

mandate revocation. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1)). His conduct, he

argued, violated the requirement of his supervised-release

condition to refrain from using drugs—a violation that is not

a felony, but instead merely a Grade C violation of “any other

condition of supervision.”

The district court rejected Shockey’s argument. It found

that the Guidelines could not be “reasonably read to make this

a Grade C violation”; the violation had to be “either a Grade A

or a Grade B.” The court implicitly accepted the government’s

reliance on United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir.

1

 Condition 3 stated: “The defendant shall not unlawfully use any controlled

substance, including marijuana, and shall submit to one drug test within 15

days of the beginning of supervision and at least 2 periodic tests after that

for use of a controlled substance.” 
No. 19-1308 3

2001), which held that marijuana use supports an inference of

marijuana possession. The district court thus found that

Shockey had both possessed and used methamphetamine—a

Grade B violation that corresponded to a sentencing range of

21 to 24 months in prison. The court sentenced him below that

range to 15 months, acknowledging the need for a “significant

period of incarceration” but recognizing that Shockey had

stayed sober for 7 months before using methamphetamine and

committed no other crimes. 

On appeal, Shockey maintains that the district court erred

in classifying his violation as Grade B without finding that he

violated any law prohibiting possession of a controlled

substance that was statutorily punishable by more than a year

in prison. Although it would have been good practice for the

court to cite a specific statute, Shockey was entitled only to fair,

written notice of the alleged conduct underlying his Grade B

violation. See United States v. Lee, 795 F.3d 682, 686–87 (7th Cir.

2015) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)). Here, Shockey was

notified before the hearing by the probation officer in writing

that he was alleged to have violated § 35-48-4-6.1 of the Indiana

Code (titled “Possession of methamphetamine”), and that this

constituted a Grade B violation because the offense is punishable by more than one year in prison. Moreover, in the district

court Shockey did not dispute that possession of methamphetamine is punishable as such. Because the report plainly

identified the statute that Shockey was alleged to have violated

and the district court resolved all issues of fact on the record,

no error occurred. See United States v. Tapia, 610 F.3d 505, 513

(7th Cir. 2010).
4 No. 19-1308

Shockey relatedly argues that his use of methamphetamine

did not require a finding that he also possessed methamphetamine. But he misapprehends the district court’s ruling. The

court did find that he possessed methamphetamine, which in

Indiana is punishable by more than a year in prison. See Ind.

Code §§ 35-48-4-6.1, 35-50-2-7. The district court reasonably

could infer possession from use. See United States v. Barnes,

883 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Trotter,

270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 2001). “Inferring possession of a

drug from the consumption of that drug is just as sensible as

inferring, from the statement ‘I ate a hamburger for lunch,’ that

the person possessed the hamburger before wolfing it down.”

Trotter, 270 F.3d at 1153. 

AFFIRMED