Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1414 | November 13, 2018 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Derick W. Steele

Deputy Public Defender

Kokomo, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Christopher S. Goble,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

November 13, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-1414

Appeal from the Howard Superior 

Court

The Honorable William C. Menges, 

Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

34D01-1603-F6-247

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1414 | November 13, 2018 Page 2 of 7

Case Summary

[1] Christopher S. Goble appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and 

imposition of his previously suspended sentence. He asserts that the trial court 

lacked the statutory authority to revoke probation or, in the alternative, that the 

evidence is insufficient to support revocation. Concluding that the trial court 

had authority and that the evidence is sufficient, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In March 2016, the State charged Goble with level 6 felony unlawful possession 

of a syringe, level 6 felony attempt to obtain a controlled substance by fraud or 

deceit, level 6 felony forgery, and class A misdemeanor theft. Pursuant to a 

plea agreement, Goble pled guilty to level 6 felony unlawful possession of a 

syringe and class A misdemeanor theft in exchange for the dismissal of the 

remaining charges. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent, suspended 

sentences of 931 days for the level 6 felony (with 122 executed/credit days and 

791 days suspended to supervised probation) and 365 days for the class A 

misdemeanor (with 122 executed/credit days and 243 days suspended to 

supervised probation). 

[3] On November 20, 2016, the State filed a petition to revoke Goble’s probation. 

The parties subsequently entered into a plea agreement, whereby Goble 

admitted to violating his probation by being arrested for a new crime and failing 

to notify his probation officer. The parties agreed that Goble would serve 365 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1414 | November 13, 2018 Page 3 of 7

days of his previously suspended sentence. The trial court entered its order 

accordingly on February 7, 2017. 

[4] The State filed a second petition to revoke Goble’s probation on January 24, 

2018. Among the violations, the State alleged that Goble failed to report to 

probation as required after his release from jail, and further that Goble 

committed and was charged with a new crime, level 6 felony theft, on January 

23, 2018. Goble moved to dismiss the petition to revoke claiming that he was 

not on probation at the time of the alleged violations. The trial court 

subsequently denied the motion to dismiss. Following a factfinding hearing

held in March 2018, the trial court found that Goble violated his probation and 

ordered him to serve the remaining 426 days of his previously suspended 

sentence. Goble filed a motion to correct error which the trial court denied. 

This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[5] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which 

a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind.

2007). It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine the conditions of 

probation and to revoke probation if those conditions are violated. Heaton v. 

State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). A person’s probation may be revoked if 

“the person has violated a condition of probation during the probationary 

period.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a)(1). Probation revocation is a two-step 

process. “First, the court must make a factual determination that a violation of 

a condition of probation actually occurred. If a violation is proven, then the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1414 | November 13, 2018 Page 4 of 7

trial court must determine if the violation warrants revocation of the 

probation.” Vernon v. State, 903 N.E.2d 533, 537 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citations 

omitted), trans. denied. Once a trial court has concluded that probation has 

been violated, it may continue the defendant on probation, extend the 

probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original period, or 

order all or part of the previously suspended sentence to be executed. Ind. Code 

§ 35-38-2-3(h).

Section 1 – The trial court had statutory authority to revoke

Goble’s probation.

[6] Goble first argues that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to revoke his 

probation because he was no longer on probation at the time of the January 

2018 alleged violations. Specifically, Goble asserts that his probation was

terminated during the February 2017 prior revocation proceeding, and thus the 

January 2018 alleged violations did not occur during a probationary period. 

The trial court disagreed, and so do we.

[7] Goble complains that the court’s February 2017 oral revocation sentencing 

statement is inconsistent with its written sentencing statement which caused 

confusion regarding whether his probation was terminated or continued. As 

noted by Goble, the February 2017 oral and written revocation sentencing 

statements were entered by a senior judge and not by the current trial judge. 

Where, as here, the trial court makes a determination on a paper record, this 

Court is in as good a position as the trial court to determine the force and effect 

of the evidence, and under those circumstances, our review is de novo. In re 
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Adoption of C.B.M., 992 N.E.2d 687, 691 (Ind. 2013). Because the trial judge in 

this case neither viewed Goble’s February revocation hearing firsthand nor 

personally drafted the resulting written orders, its conclusions regarding the 

senior judge’s intent are based on the same paper records now before this Court. 

Therefore, we are in as good a position as the trial judge was to determine 

whether the senior judge intended that Goble’s probation be terminated. Upon 

such review, we determine that the senior judge did not intend that Goble’s 

probation be terminated.

[8] “When oral and written sentencing statements conflict, we should examine 

them together to discern the intent of the sentencing court.” Walker v. State, 932 

N.E.2d 733, 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “Rather than presuming the superior 

accuracy of the oral statement, we examine it alongside the written sentencing 

statement to assess the conclusions of the trial court.” Dowell v. State, 873 

N.E.2d 59, 60 (Ind. 2007) (quoting McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ind. 

2007)).

[9] Here, both the oral and written revocation sentencing statements (as well as the 

abstract of judgment) revoked and ordered executed precisely the same 365-day 

previously suspended sentence. However, the statements are conflicting 

because the oral statement indicated that probation terminated upon 

completion of that sentence, whereas the written statement indicated that 

probation continued. Notably, both statements fail to specifically account for 

the remaining balance, which was quite large, of Goble’s previously suspended 

sentence. Contrary to Goble’s assertion, the balance of his suspended sentence 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1414 | November 13, 2018 Page 6 of 7

did not somehow just disappear. Indeed, nothing in Goble’s revocation plea 

agreement or the revocation proceedings provides for a modification of Goble’s 

original sentence. As a practical matter, because his original sentence was 

never modified, the balance of his suspended sentence would certainly remain 

upon completion of his executed sentence. Having examined both sentencing 

statements and the totality of the circumstances presented, we believe that the 

clear intent was that Goble remain on probation with regard to the balance of 

his suspended sentence, and thus the January 2018 alleged violations occurred

during a probationary period.

1

 Accordingly, the trial court had statutory 

authority to revoke Goble’s probation.

Section 2 – Sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s 

revocation of probation.

[10] Goble maintains that insufficient evidence supports the revocation of his 

probation. An alleged probation violation need be proven only by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Pitman v. State, 749 N.E.2d 557, 559 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2001), trans. denied. Moreover, violation of a single condition of probation 

is sufficient to revoke probation. Id.

 

[1] 1 Despite this belated claim of confusion regarding the status of his probation, at no point did Goble alert the 

trial court to the conflict between its oral and written sentencing statements and request that the statements be 

clarified and reconciled. We note that “it is in the best interests of all parties that sentencing errors be 

immediately discovered and corrected.” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 786 (Ind. 2004). In general, such 

errors are most appropriately presented in a motion to correct error or in a direct appeal from the sentencing 

judgment. Id.
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[11] Here, among other things, the State alleged that Goble violated the rule of 

probation which states, “You are required to report [to] the Probation 

Department as directed.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 55. The record indicates 

that Goble was released from jail on July 24, 2017, and failed to report to 

probation. Indeed, probation officer Laura Rood testified that she had no 

contact with Goble between July 2017 and January 2018. This evidence is 

sufficient to support the revocation of probation.

[12] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.