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93–176 PDF 2015

S. HRG. 113–554 

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 12, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

PETER K. LEVINE, Staff Director 

JOHN A. BONSELL, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

MARCH 12, 2014

Page 

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN ............................................................................ 1 

Dunford, Gen. Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Commander, International Security 

Assistance Force ................................................................................................... 3 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 47 

(III) 

(1) 

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:06 a.m. in room SH– 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson, 

Manchin, Shaheen, Donnelly, Kaine, Inhofe, McCain, Chambliss, 

Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Graham, Vitter, and Lee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. We welcome today 

General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, to hear testimony on the security situation in Afghanistan. We thank you, General Dunford, for your decades of great 

service to our Nation. 

This committee has held regular hearings on Afghanistan over 

the years. More than 2,200 Americans have given their lives there, 

and thousands more have been wounded. Despite those sacrifices, 

and despite the fact that Afghanistan harbored the terrorists who 

attacked our Nation in 2001, a recent Gallop poll showed that for 

the first time, a plurality of Americans believe that sending our 

forces to Afghanistan was a mistake. 

I do not share that view. More importantly, neither do the Afghan people. A recent public opinion poll in Afghanistan shows that 

a large majority of Afghans believe the conditions in the country 

have improved over the last decade. 

Our troops in Afghanistan, working with Afghan Forces and the 

forces of other coalition countries, have taken critical steps to deny 

safe havens to terrorists and ensure that Afghanistan does not 

again serve as a sanctuary for terrorists seeking to harm the 

United States. Indeed, there are a number of encouraging signs of 

continued progress in Afghanistan. During last summer’s fighting 

season, Afghan Forces prevented the Taliban from seizing control 

of any urban area or district center. A report this month by the 

independent Center for Naval Analyses concluded that, ‘‘For a force 

that is very much still in its infancy, the Afghan Security Forces’s 

performance last year—judged on its own merits—should be considered a success.’’ In a poll released last month, large majorities 

of the Afghan people expressed confidence in their army and their 

national police. 

2 

Better security has meant improvements in Afghan society and 

the economy as well. More than 8 million Afghan children are now 

in school, eight times as many as in 2001. Under the Taliban, virtually no Afghan girls received an education; now 2.6 million girls 

are in school. In 2001, Afghanistan had 20,000 teachers, all male; 

today there are 200,000 teachers, including 60,000 women. U.S. assistance has helped build or refurbish nearly 700 schools across Afghanistan. Maternal and infant mortality has declined dramatically. The average Afghan has a life expectancy now of 62 years, 

compared to 45 years under the Taliban. Only 7 percent of Afghans 

support a Taliban return to power. 

Now, how is it that a large majority of the Afghan people think 

that conditions in Afghanistan are improving when most Americans do not? Unfortunately, the American people rarely read about 

positive developments in Afghanistan. Instead, the media focuses 

almost exclusively on negative incidents, depriving the American 

people of the sense of accomplishment that they would receive if 

they were provided a balanced view. As a result, our troops have 

not received the recognition for the positive changes in Afghanistan 

for which they and their families have sacrificed so much. 

The positive developments are not the whole story, of course. 

Real and daunting challenges lie ahead. Taliban terror attacks will 

continue and will be the focus of the media. The improving Afghan 

military has proven its willingness to fight, but is still in the early 

stages of building the support functions, such as logistics, maintenance, intelligence, and air power that are necessary for combat 

troops to do their jobs effectively. 

A bilateral security agreement (BSA) providing the protections 

for our troops is essential if even a modest number of our forces 

are to remain in Afghanistan. President Karzai has refused to sign 

a BSA that he negotiated, and that received the strong support of 

the loya jirga that he convened. President Obama has rightly decided to look beyond President Karzai to the next Afghan president 

following elections in early April. Each of the Afghan presidential 

candidates has indicated a willingness to sign the BSA, and any of 

them would likely be a more reliable partner than President 

Karzai. 

Much continues to be at stake for our national security, for the 

security of our friends and allies around the world, for regional stability, and, of course, for the Afghan people. A recent letter by Afghan Parliamentarian Fawzia Koofi highlighted the extraordinary 

changes of the past decade, particularly for Afghan women like herself. She points out that 12 years ago Afghan women’s participation 

in public life was prohibited and the prohibition was enforced 

through harassment and abuse. Ms. Koofi was nearly abandoned at 

birth, simply because in the Afghanistan of that time, a female 

child had no future. 

In the post-Taliban Afghanistan, she became a senior leader of 

the Afghan parliament. Ms. Koofi wrote: ‘‘It has been a difficult 

journey, marked by blood and violence, but we have made significant gains and achievements, which would not have been possible 

without the generous support of the international community, especially the American people.’’ 

3 

The Taliban have announced their intention to disrupt the April 

5 election. They won’t succeed. The Afghan people will stand up to 

their threats. They do it every day. Only if President Karzai and 

the Afghanistan Government permit or perpetrate fraud will the 

election fail to be credible. 

All in all, we mustn’t lose sight of our accomplishments in Afghanistan or we will risk losing them. If we don’t maintain a moderate level of support in the years ahead, we will also risk losing 

the gains that we have made at such high cost. 

Senator Inhofe. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was in Afghanistan in February and I observed the same thing 

that you did, so I won’t list those things that the public just doesn’t 

know about. There’s one thing I would mention that was on my list 

that wasn’t on yours, and that is in going through the Kabul Airport there was not one empty gate. That’s usually an indication. 

You can see what’s happening. 

There’s a lot at stake right now. We can’t repeat the mistakes 

of the administration in Iraq, where the abrupt drawdown resulted 

in a deteriorating security situation, an increase in violence, the resurgence of the al Qaeda-linked groups, and the growth of terrorists. We must ensure that decisions about the future of our mission 

in Afghanistan after 2014 are based on sound strategy and the 

facts on the ground. To do that we must trust our military commanders on the ground who have told me two things just a month 

ago: One, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) has made 

great progress and is now bearing the overwhelming majority of 

the brunt of fighting against the Taliban; and two, we need to continue to support the development of the ANSF, especially in the 

critical areas of developing enablers and fighting terrorists. 

In Afghanistan, President Karzai’s refusal to sign the BSA despite support by the Afghan people has cast a doubt about the future of Afghanistan security and stability. But Karzai’s irresponsibility in not signing the BSA doesn’t really matter. The will of the 

people, including through the explicit endorsement by the elders, 

the tribesmen, and the loya jirga, make it clear that the next President will sign this. So we’ll tough this one out until that takes 

place. 

I really appreciate, General, the personal time you’ve spent with 

all of us to give us the information on what’s really going on there. 

I only wish, as I told you yesterday, that the public were aware of 

what we’re aware of. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator Inhofe. 

General Dunford. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE 

General DUNFORD. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Ranking 

Member Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify this morning and to represent the 

men and women of U.S. Forces Afghanistan. Their courage, comVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Feb 10, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\DOCS\93176.TXT JUNE
4 

mitment, and performance are a direct reflection of your support. 

I’m confident that no force has ever deployed better trained or 

equipped. 

We are now in the final year of the combat mission in Afghanistan, a mission to deny safe haven to al Qaeda terrorists who attacked our Nation on September 11, 2001. We recognize that our 

vital national interests are best served by a stable, secure, and unified Afghanistan, an Afghanistan that is a capable and willing 

partner in the war against terrorism. 

We’ve accomplished much in pursuit of those ends. Since September 11, our forces have placed extraordinary pressure on al 

Qaeda and extremist networks in Afghanistan. Today, as a result 

of those efforts, al Qaeda terrorists are focused on survival rather 

than on planning attacks against the West. Since September 11, 

and with increased emphasis beginning in 2009, we’ve focused on 

developing ANSF. Today, as a result of those efforts, capable and 

confident Afghan Forces are securing the Afghan people and the 

gains that we have made over the past decade. 

Since September 11, we’ve worked to improve the daily lives of 

the Afghan people. Today, as a result of those efforts, as the chairman and the ranking member outlined, Afghans have increased access to clean water, electricity, new roads, and education. But more 

important than any sign of progress in Afghanistan, the Afghan 

people have something today that they did not have in 2001. They 

have hope for the future. 

We’ve paid the price for those achievements. The chairman mentioned the over 2,200 Americans that have been lost and thousands 

more Afghans and members of the coalition have also made the ultimate sacrifice. We vow to give their sacrifice meaning and never 

to forget them or their families. 

Some people have questioned our progress and pointed out that 

the overall security situation in Afghanistan didn’t really change 

between 2012 and 2013. That’s true, and when put in perspective, 

it’s also extraordinary, because security remained roughly the same 

with the Afghans assuming the lead and with over 50 percent of 

the coalition redeploying during that period of time. 

After watching the Afghan Forces respond to a variety of challenges since they took the lead in June, I don’t believe the Taliban 

insurgency represents an existential threat to the Government of 

Afghanistan or to the ANSF. I’m also confident that they can secure the upcoming presidential election and the Nation’s first 

democratic transfer of power. 

Yet, to make our progress enduring, work remains to build longterm sustainability of the Afghan Forces. Although the Afghans require less support in conducting security operations, they still need 

assistance in maturing the systems, the processes, and the institutions necessary to sustain a modern army and a police force. They 

also need continued support in addressing capability gaps in aviation, intelligence, and special operations. To address these gaps, a 

train, advise, and assist mission will be necessary after this year 

to further develop Afghan self-sustainability. 

A continued counterterrorism mission will also be needed to ensure that al Qaeda remains focused on survival and not on regeneration. Without continued counterterrorism pressure, an 

5 

emboldened al Qaeda will not only begin to physically reconstitute, 

but they’ll also exploit their perceived victory to boost recruitment, 

fundraising, and morale. 

In closing, it’s fair to ask if we’re winning in Afghanistan. I believe the answer is yes and several facts allow me to say that with 

confidence. First and foremost, our efforts in Afghanistan have 

pressured the terrorist network and have prevented another September 11. 

Second, we have built the ANSF that, with increasingly reduced 

levels of support, are capable of providing security and denying terrorists safe haven. 

Third, we’re providing a stabilizing influence in the region that’s 

providing the time and space for a wide range of complex issues to 

be addressed. 

Finally, as a result of our efforts, the Afghan people face a decade of opportunity within which they can determine their own future, free of the brutality and the intolerance of the Taliban. Despite all the skepticism surrounding our mission, that looks like 

winning to me. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear this morning. I 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Dunford follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC 

Afghanistan: What We’ve Achieved 

I. WHERE WE ARE—STATE OF THE CAMPAIGN

In the final year of the military campaign, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR–A) 

and our coalition partners have not forgotten the objective that brought us to Afghanistan more than 12 years ago: to prevent the country from once again becoming 

a safe haven for al Qaeda and international terrorism. Since 2001, our presence in 

Afghanistan and the extraordinary efforts of both conventional and special operations forces have prevented another September 11. Today, USFOR–A forces continue to place constant pressure on terrorist networks. Concurrently, troops from 

the 49-nation International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) continue to develop 

credible and capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)—forces that can secure Afghanistan in the long term and prevent the re-emergence of safe havens from 

which al Qaeda can launch attacks against the United States and her allies. 

Last June, coalition forces achieved a major milestone in the military campaign 

when the ANSF took the lead for security operations nationwide. Progress was further made when the ANSF emerged from the 2013 fighting season as a confident 

force capable of securing the Afghan people. With the ANSF in the lead, ISAF forces 

transitioned to a support role and began a train, advise, and assist mission initially 

focused on further maturing ANSF combat capability. Currently, ISAF advisors are 

re-orienting their focus away from developing combat skills to now developing the 

capabilities and institutions needed for the ANSF’s long-term sustainability. 

The 9 remaining months of the ISAF campaign will have a decisive impact on Afghanistan’s future. We will be focused on supporting the ANSF as they prepare for 

the fighting season, political transition, and security transition in December, when 

they will assume full responsibility for Afghanistan’s security. ISAF will also continue to posture the force in preparation for NATO’s post-2014 Resolute Support 

train, advise, and assist mission that will address gaps in capabilities that are necessary for the ANSF to become self-sustainable. 

II. WHERE WE ARE—STATE OF THE ANSF

Today, Afghanistan is being secured by a confident ANSF with limited coalition 

support. The only unilateral operations ISAF is conducting are for our own force 

protection, sustainment, and redeployment. As a result of the ANSF’s new lead role 

and the coalition’s new support role, our Afghan partners are bearing the brunt of 

enemy attacks, although their cohesion remains strong. American and coalition casVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Feb 10, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93176.TXT JUNE
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ualties have significantly dropped, with casualties in 2013 being nearly a quarter 

of what they were in 2010. 

The transition to Afghan Forces leading security operations in the summer of 

2013 was a marked change in the campaign, which had coalition forces leading combat operations for the previous 12 years. Despite ISAF’s early recognition that Afghanistan’s security would depend on indigenous forces and coalition efforts beginning in 2002 to build an Afghan Security Force, progress was slow. In 2009, enabled 

by the U.S. troops surge ordered by President Obama, the coalition made a conscious effort to first grow ANSF numbers (quantity) and get them into the fight. 

This was then followed by an effort—which continues today—to develop ANSF 

enablers and professionalize the ranks (quality). As a result of this plan, the ANSF 

have grown to a force of nearly 350,000 soldiers, airmen, and police today. These 

forces are augmented by an additional 26,000 local police forces. 

In 2010, coalition and Afghan Forces began conducting partnered operations, 

which developed combat capabilities and leadership skills from the tactical level on 

up. As a result of the ANSF’s progress, President Obama and President Karzai 

agreed in January 2013 that Afghan Forces would take the lead for security nationwide at the Milestone 2013 ceremony on June 18, 2013. As the Afghan Forces 

stepped into the lead role for counterinsurgency operations, ISAF forces stepped 

back into a support role. This new role had coalition members serving as combat 

advisors to Afghan units to further develop tactical fighting skills and the integration of combined arms, such as artillery, mortars, and attack helicopters. 

2013 Fighting Season 

In their first fighting season in the lead, the ANSF proved capable of securing 

the Afghan people, fighting their own battles, and holding the gains achieved by 

ISAF over the last decade. Like the coalition forces who led operations the year 

prior, the ANSF successfully maintained control of all key terrain and populated 

areas. Today, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) remains in control of its 34 provincial capitals and all of its major cities. The majority 

of violence continues to take place away from populated areas, and polling shows 

the vast majority of Afghans hold a favorable view of their soldiers and police. 

The ANSF consistently demonstrated tactical overmatch against the Taliban-led 

insurgency, and proved resilient in a tough fight. They independently planned, led 

and executed combined-arms operations. They improved cooperation across the Ministry of Interior (police), the Ministry of Defense (Army), and the National Directorate of Security (intelligence service). They generated an impressive operational 

tempo as they secured the Afghan people. 

The ANSF’s improving capabilities were demonstrated in large and complex combat operations across the country. In July, the ANSF launched Operation Semorgh 

in eastern Afghanistan. It was the largest Afghan air assault in history, followed 

by a two-pronged attack into the Azrah Valley. The 3-week operation—which involved the Afghan air force, the 201st and 203rd Army Corps, the 111th Capital Division, special operations, and police—began with Mi-35 attack helicopters escorting 

Mi-17s helicopters as they inserted 250 Afghan soldiers and 13,000 pounds of supplies. Afghan helicopters provided fire support and casualty evacuation while Afghan artillery and mortars provided surface fires in support of the ground force’s 

movement through difficult, mountainous terrain. Despite insurgent attacks, bad 

weather, and the soldiers’ fasting for Ramazan, the ANSF successfully cleared the 

valley of insurgents and secured the district center, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and voter registration materials. Once the operation was complete, 

Afghan police remained in the valley to provide for its long-term security. The 

ANSF independently planned, executed, and sustained the operation; ISAF only provided enabler support, such as close air support, casualty evacuation, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 

Throughout the rest of the summer and winter, each of the six Afghan Army corps 

planned and executed multiple complex operations throughout the country with the 

support of the Afghan air force, special operations, and police. Highlights include 

the 205th Corps’ Operation Chamtoo in southern Afghanistan, where they cleared 

almost 300 villages in 14 days with minimal casualties; in the process, they discovered and confiscated 1.5 tons of homemade explosives and more than 1,000 IEDs 

and components. The 207th Corps’s Operation Abu Nasr Farahi in western Afghanistan cleared insurgents along Highway 1, protecting the Afghan people and securing 

a vital road for commercial and military needs. The 209th Corps’ Operation 

Hindukush in northern Afghanistan cleared insurgent safe havens in the Warduj 

Valley. The 215th Corps’ Operation Oqab in southwestern Afghanistan took the 

fight to insurgents in Sangin, demonstrating strong combined arms capabilities during clearing operations to deny insurgents safe haven. 

7 

The ANSF’s growing capability was particularly evident during the Loya Jirga in 

November, when 3,000 Afghan leaders from around the country met in Kabul to discuss the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). Despite concerted efforts from the Haqqani Network and other insurgents to disrupt the Loya Jirga, the 

ANSF successfully secured the event without incident. This accomplishment was the 

result of extensive planning and integrated operations in Kabul, other major urban 

centers, and the key routes connecting them by the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the National Directorate of Security for weeks leading up to 

the event. This performance reflects a degree of coordination between the three different security pillars that simply didn’t exist in early 2013. 

Despite the ANSF’s successes throughout the fighting season, they also faced several challenges. Due to existing capability gaps and shortfalls, the ANSF relied on 

ISAF for enabler support, particularly in the areas of close air support, casualty 

evacuation, logistics, counter-IED, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The ANSF also suffered high casualties and instances of poor leadership, but 

impressively remained a cohesive and resilient fighting force. 

On balance, after watching the ANSF respond to a variety of challenges over the 

past year, I do not believe the Taliban-led insurgency represents an existential 

threat to GIRoA or the ANSF. However, while the ANSF’s performance shows they 

require less ISAF assistance in conducting security operations, they do need a great 

deal of help in developing the systems, the processes, and the institutions necessary 

to run a modern, professional army and police force. 

ANSF Capability Gaps 

ISAF forces are in the process of re-orienting from combat advising at the unit 

level to functionally-based advising at the Afghan security ministries, the six army 

corps, and the police zones. In this new role, advisors are focusing on tasks that 

will build the ANSF’s long-term sustainability to make the progress that has been 

made to date enduring. 

At the security ministries, advisors are focusing on building ministerial capacity 

in planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition. Advisors are also working to 

improve integration between the different security pillars—army, police, and intelligence service—at all levels. In the fielded force, advisors will focus on capability 

gaps like the aviation, intelligence, and special operations. They will also focus on 

developmental shortfalls in areas like logistics, medical, and counter-IED. At all levels, our advisors will work to improve Afghan transparency and accountability of 

donor resources, and reduce casualties and overall attrition. In total, our shift to 

functionally-based advising is putting the ANSF on a path to sustainment. 

Despite our advisory efforts in 2014, four capability gaps will remain after the 

ISAF mission ends. I assess that without the Resolute Support mission, the progress 

made to date will not be sustainable. A limited number of advisors will be required 

in 2015 to continue the train, advise, and assist mission. These advisors will address 

gaps in: (1) the aviation enterprise; (2) the intelligence enterprise; (3) special operations; and (4) the security ministries’ capacity to conduct tasks such as planning, 

programming, budgeting, acquisition, and human resource management so they can 

provide tactical units the support they require to function. These advisors will put 

the Afghans on the path to sustainment that the Afghans can further develop after 

Resolute Support concludes. 

In summary, although clear challenges exist along the security line of effort, I believe the physical capabilities and capacities of the ANSF will be sufficient to secure 

the election, to achieve transition in December, and—with a post-2014 advising mission—to provide for Afghanistan’s long-term security. These collective efforts are 

hardening the Afghan state and giving it needed time to develop and mature. These 

efforts are also reducing the insurgency’s operating space and incentivizing its participation in the peace process. 

III. WHERE WE ARE—STATE OF THE THREAT

ISAF and Afghan Forces remain focused on denying safe haven to al Qaeda and 

keeping pressure on the extremist network to limit the operational ability of al 

Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, and other transnational and foreign military groups 

inside Afghanistan. 

Sustained counterterrorism operations have prevented al Qaeda’s use of the country as a platform for terrorism. Operations have restricted their permanent presence 

to isolated areas of northeastern Afghanistan and have resulted in only a seasonal 

presence in other parts of the country. These efforts have forced al Qaeda to focus 

on survival rather than on operations against the west. Counterterrorism pressure 

placed on al Qaeda—as well as the elimination of fighters and facilitators—has preVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Feb 10, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93176.TXT JUNE
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vented another attack on the homeland. Yet, continued operations are necessary to 

prevent al Qaeda from regenerating degraded capabilities. 

Challenges remain despite this success, as the extremist network within Afghanistan has become more complex over the last decade. Where at one time al Qaeda 

could be isolated—as we intended to do in 2001—extremist networks have now expanded in the country. Increased cooperation and coordination can be seen between 

al Qaeda and other extremists like the Haqqani Network, Tahrik-e Taliban Pakistan, and Lashkar-e-Taiba. 

The Haqqani Network remains the most virulent strain of the insurgency, the 

greatest risk to coalition forces, and a critical enabler of al Qaeda. The Haqqani 

Taliban also shares the Afghan Taliban’s goals of expelling coalition forces, removing the Afghan Government, and re-establishing an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. 

They lead the insurgency in three eastern Afghan provinces (Paktika, Paktiya, 

Khost) and have demonstrated the capability and intent to launch and support high 

profile and complex attacks against the coalition across the country. In response to 

several dangerous threat streams against coalition and Afghan personnel, ANSF 

and U.S. Special Operations Forces have expanded their security and counterterrorism operations. These operations have successfully disrupted several dangerous threats streams that sought to inflict significant casualties on the force and 

break the coalition’s will. 

The Afghan Taliban also remain a potent and resilient threat. At the beginning 

of the 2013 fighting season, they outlined their operational objectives: seize and hold 

district centers, increase violence across the country, conduct insider and high profile attacks to garner media coverage, and crush the will of the ANSF in their first 

fighting season in the lead. 

Despite their continued efforts, the Taliban made very limited progress in achieving these objectives and in exploiting ISAF’s reduced troop presence to generate 

operational or strategic momentum. The Taliban were not able to hold terrain, crush 

the ANSF’s spirit, or increase insider attacks and violence levels from 2012 when 

coalition forces led security operations. However, the Taliban were able to project 

violence into urban areas from rural safe havens, threaten freedom of movement 

along major highways, and contest government control in some areas. They were 

also able to conduct high profile attacks that negatively influenced Afghan and 

international community perceptions about security, and capitalize on the existing 

uncertainty surrounding the coalition’s post-2014 mission. Despite these successes, 

recent polling data shows the Afghan population continues to widely reject the 

Taliban, challenging their ability to expand influence. 

As we look to the remaining months of the ISAF campaign, we can expect the 

Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and other extremists to attempt a higher operational 

tempo than in previous years to disrupt the political process and prevent the signing 

of the BSA. They will seek to increase propaganda, assassinations, and high profile 

attacks to create a perception of insecurity and weaken coalition cohesion. In response, ISAF will continue to support the ANSF as they continue a high rate of security operations to mitigate these threats. 

While insurgent and terrorist threats have proved resilient, ISAF and ANSF operations have kept these groups at bay. Continued pressure will be required to prevent al Qaeda from regenerating degraded operations with the support of groups 

like the Haqqani Network. Continued pressure will also be required to address the 

broader extremist network in Afghanistan, which threatens the stability of the Nation as well as the broader region. The long-term solution to this challenge remains 

a capable and sustainable security establishment and responsive institutions of civil 

governance that together can secure the Nation and prevent the re-emergence of al 

Qaeda safe havens. Continued international support in both of these areas will be 

essential to GIRoA’s long-term capacity to govern and serve as a security partner 

in the region. 

IV. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Strategic Partnership with GIRoA 

Despite political challenges, the fundamental partnership between ISAF and the 

ANSF remains strong. Coalition and Afghan leaders retain a positive day-to-day relationship and continue to work together in pursuit of shared strategic objectives. 

Afghan Government, civil, and military leaders demonstrate a growing appreciation 

for the coalition’s efforts; these leaders are genuine in their gratitude for our shared 

sacrifice over the last decade. I have also seen our Afghan partners develop a growing sense of ownership and pride in their army and police force. Over the last year, 

Afghans have begun to realize that they have credible security forces that can protect them. However, the Afghan people still desire continued and broader interVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Feb 10, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93176.TXT JUNE
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national support, as evidenced by the Loya Jirga’s endorsement of the BSA and 

widespread popular sentiment among Afghans for a signed BSA. 

Narrative 

Uncertainty continues to exist throughout Afghan society and within the ANSF 

about the United States’ and the international community’s commitment to Afghanistan post-2014. Absent confidence and hope for a brighter future, many Afghans are 

planning for the worst. Numerous reports cite the depreciation of Afghan currency, 

plunging real estate prices, capital flight, and young, well-educated Afghans trying 

to emigrate. This uncertainty, and a subsequent fear of abandonment, spurs hedging behavior by Afghan power brokers. Uncertainty also spurs hedging by regional 

actors. These behaviors have a corrosive effect on Afghan confidence and the broader campaign, and they distract attention from issues important to Afghanistan’s future, such as good governance and economic development. 

The Taliban continue to capitalize on these challenges and leverage the information environment to advance a narrative of coalition abandonment. In fact, the 

Taliban’s failure to achieve their operational intent in 2013 was partially offset by 

their effectiveness in negatively influencing public perceptions about security and 

the future. In addition to undermining Afghan confidence and advancing a narrative 

that they are chasing coalition forces out of Afghanistan, the Taliban ranks continue 

to gain strength from their belief that all coalition forces will depart Afghanistan 

at the end of the year. 

I believe a signed BSA and NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) will address the Afghan people’s concerns and damage the Taliban’s confidence. These documents—combined with clarity on the post-2014 mission and associated financial 

commitments from the Chicago Summit and Tokyo Conference—will significantly 

enhance Afghan confidence and erode our enemy’s will. While the information environment is a challenge today, I believe it can be turned around. 

In the meantime, we are working to mitigate the risk that uncertainty poses to 

the relationship between the ANSF and the coalition. We are communicating our 

commitment through both actions and words, and are expressing our confidence in 

the ANSF’s ability to secure the election and the Afghan people post-2014. We are 

also working to ensure they know how proud we are of our relationship—a relationship built on trust and a common vision for a stable, secure, and unified Afghanistan. 

Insider Threat 

Although insider attacks against ISAF forces in 2013 declined sharply from 2012, 

they remain a focus area for our force protection. Thus far, these attacks have not 

significantly affected the strong relationship between coalition and ANSF personnel, 

particularly in the field where they face a common enemy every day. ISAF is cautiously optimistic that the mitigation measures applied over the previous year are 

working. These measures have reduced, but not eliminated, the threat. We remain 

vigilant to prevent future insider attacks. 

Attrition 

A high attrition rate, particularly in the Afghan National Army, continues to pose 

challenges to force development. The main causes of attrition are assessed as high 

operational tempo, sustained risk, soldier care/quality of life, and leave issues. Afghan casualties have also increased since the ANSF took the lead for security last 

June. 

While combat losses comprise a relatively small percentage of ANSF attrition 

numbers, reducing ANSF casualties remains both a top moral and operational priority for ISAF and ANSF leaders. Several factors in addition to enemy action contributed to casualties in the 2013 fighting season, such as shortfalls in medical care 

and casualty evacuation. We are aggressively addressing these shortfalls in several 

ways: the introduction of combat lifesaver skills and medical kits so soldiers can 

give self aid and buddy aid at the point of injury, the use of Mi-17 helicopters for 

casualty evacuation, and improved Afghan medical capabilities and long-term care. 

Reducing casualties also depends on the ANSF’s warfighting capability, which 

ranges from a commander’s competency to a unit’s ability to integrate combined 

arms. ANSF leaders are working hard to improve these areas. 

Although the overall attrition rate is high, it has not impacted combat readiness, 

as the ANSF remains sustainable in numerical terms due to robust recruitment. 

However, if the current attrition rate persists, it could have an adverse effect on 

the long-term quality of the ANSF. Urgent action is therefore being taken to address the root causes of attrition beyond combat casualties, and to develop a culture 

of accountable leadership in the ANSF. In particular, ANSF senior leadership has 

10 

established a Joint Attrition Working Group and an Absent Without Leave Prevention Committee to identify and mitigate its causes. 

Af-Pak Military to Military Relationship 

Security within Afghanistan and Pakistan remains interdependent, and requires 

a cooperative effort between the two nations. Cooperation is necessary to address 

the common threat of extremism, mitigate the risk of violence on the Afghan-Pakistani border, and give Afghans and their neighbors confidence in the future. Another challenge involves enemy sanctuary in Pakistan, which is a major factor preventing ISAF’s decisive defeat of the Afghan insurgency in the near term. To advance stability, ISAF continues to play a facilitator role in pursuit of a constructive 

and effective relationship between the Afghan and Pakistani militaries. 

In the past year, positive political developments have provided space for the Afghanistan-Pakistan military relationship to grow. These developments include visits 

between President Karzai and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, their participation in tripartite meetings in London and Ankara, and Pakistan’s support to an 

Afghan-led reconciliation process. As a result, ISAF was able to facilitate trilateral 

engagements at the senior military level that augmented a growing bilateral relationship at lower levels. However, progress remains fragile. Minor issues—as demonstrated by a border incident in December—can quickly stall gains in the bilateral 

relationship. However, the absence of publicity and unhelpful rhetoric during the 

December incident reflects a change to the status quo and signals the potential for 

continued progress. 

Stewardship of Resources 

Stewardship of taxpayer dollars is a priority for USFOR–A, and is critical to keeping the trust and confidence of the American people. Yet, war is an inherently inefficient and challenging endeavor, and despite the dedicated efforts of many, cases 

exist over the years where American resources were not spent as efficiently as possible. USFOR–A takes seriously our obligation to protect taxpayer dollars, and is 

working hard to ensure both wise spending and the identification of areas for cost 

savings or avoidance. 

In 2013, USFOR–A developed a 5-step process to increase checks and balances 

and improve the planning, execution, and oversight of resources. This process mandates a continuous and rigorous review of all requirements (e.g., Afghan Security 

Force Funds, Military Construction, Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund, Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program) based on changes in the mission and operating environment. Requirements are scrutinized and subsequently validated, de-obligated, or 

rescoped based on input from relevant stakeholders. In fiscal years 2013 and 2014 

(to date), these efforts have resulted in cost savings and avoidance of more than $5 

billion. USFOR–A has also welcomed and incorporated into our processes independent agencies’ recommendations for improvement, which have proven most helpful when released in time to effect change. 

USFOR–A will continue to scrutinize every dollar spent to ensure spending is necessary to mission success and results in the desired effect. This approach applies 

equally to post-2014 ANSF funding that was committed at the Chicago Summit. 

V. MILESTONES AND MAJOR EVENTS

Presidential Election 

ISAF is decisively engaged in supporting the ANSF as they plan for the security 

of Afghanistan’s presidential election on April 5th. The presidential election will 

serve as a defining moment in the campaign, as it will usher in the Nation’s first 

democratic and peaceful transfer of power. ISAF understands that an election process that is inclusive, transparent and credible will be critical to the long-term partnership between Afghanistan, the United States, and the international community. 

Successful political transition will also be critical to meet a precondition for continued donor resources, as outlined in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. 

To ensure a secure environment that will both encourage and facilitate voter participation, ISAF is supporting the Ministry of Interior, which has lead responsibility 

for election security, and the Ministry of Defense and the National Directorate of 

Security, which are in support. ISAF assistance involves planning, logistical and 

operational support requested by, and in coordination with, GIRoA and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). ISAF is also prepared to provide in extremis 

security support if needed. Throughout the election process, ISAF will remain a neutral player. 

To reduce the risk of an election delay, ISAF is currently supporting the movement of election materials throughout the country. While the IEC and ANSF are 

transporting election materials to 98 percent of election locations (e.g., regional 

11 

hubs, provincial centers, district centers, and polling centers), the Afghan Government has requested limited assistance from ISAF due to security conditions, weather conditions, and the volume of election materials that need to be moved. ISAF assistance includes providing enablers—such as intelligence and air support—to the 

Afghan Forces as they transport materials to 19 locations. ISAF is also directly moving materials to 4 regional distribution hubs, 5 provincial centers, and 17 districts. 

During air and ground movements by ANSF and ISAF forces, election materials 

have been and will remain under IEC control and custody. 

My confidence in the ANSF’s ability to secure the election is based on several factors. First, the ANSF have already facilitated a successful, nationwide voter registration process. Their performance during the fighting season and the Loya Jirga 

also serves as a positive indicator for the election. Second, there will be more forces 

providing security than during the 2009 election. Then, there were approximately 

250,000 coalition and Afghan Forces securing the election. In April, there will be 

approximately 425,000 troops, of which 375,000 will be Afghan. Third, ANSF planning efforts are well ahead of where they were in 2009 and include several rehearsal 

exercises to prepare for the historic event. 

Posturing the Force 

As ISAF looks to December, two campaign imperatives guide our actions. First, 

we are taking steps to reduce risk and ensure a smooth transition to the Resolute 

Support mission. We are also focused on maintaining simultaneity in the campaign 

by building ANSF sustainability while providing support to the ANSF as they prepare for the election and the fighting season. 

To focus our efforts, ISAF has divided 2014 into three phases with specific outcomes. On March 1, we completed our first phase. This phase saw us continuing to 

transition from combat advising to functionally-based advising, and working with 

the ANSF to disrupt high profile threats. Concurrently, we executed 50 tasks to increase Afghan readiness, such as improving vehicle maintenance and stocking ammunition supplies. These tasks will help the ANSF operate throughout the election 

and fighting season without taking an operational pause or reaching a point where 

their operations are disrupted or halted due to lack of logistical support. 

In the second phase of 2014, from now to July, we’ll complete the transition to 

functionally-based advising. This will facilitate the arrival of ISAF’s final troop rotation in July and will begin what we conceptually view as Phase 0 of Resolute Support. In the third and final phase, from August to December, we’ll finish posturing 

the force to ensure a smooth transition to the post-2014 mission. 

ISAF’s retrograde and redeployment efforts remain on track or ahead of schedule. 

U.S. troops in theater number fewer than 34,000—well below the 100,000 U.S. 

troops at the height of the surge. By December 31, U.S. Forces will be at the post2014 number decided by President Obama. As forces have redeployed, ISAF has 

closed, descoped, or transferred tactical infrastructure—ranging from large bases to 

small combat outposts—to the Afghans. Coalition bases and outposts now number 

less than 90, from a height of more than 850 in 2012. In December, we’ll be at our 

Resolute Support number. In terms of materiel reduction, fewer than 10,000 U.S. 

vehicles not needed for the post-2014 mission will be returned to the military services. This is down from a high of more than 40,000 vehicles in June 2012. To provide 

context, during the summer—and in the middle of the fighting season—we moved 

6,000 vehicles. 

Post-2014 Mission 

In anticipation of a signed BSA and NATO SOFA, ISAF continues to plan for the 

Resolute Support train, advise, assist mission. This mission will focus on the four 

capability gaps at the operational/institutional and strategic levels of the ANSF that 

will remain at the end of the ISAF mission: (1) Afghan security institution capacity; 

(2) the aviation enterprise; (3) the intelligence enterprise; and (4) special operations. 

In accordance with NATO guidance, ISAF is planning on a limited regional approach with 8,000–12,000 coalition personnel employed in Kabul and the four corners of Afghanistan. Advisors will address capability gaps at the Afghan security 

ministries, army corps, and police zones, before eventually transitioning to a Kabulcentric approach focused on the Afghan ministries and institutions. Due to delays 

in the completion of the BSA, and at the recent direction of NATO, we will begin 

planning for various contingencies in Afghanistan while still continuing to plan for 

Resolute Support. 

VI. WHAT WINNING LOOKS LIKE

Despite the remaining challenges in the campaign, we remain focused on winning 

in Afghanistan—as defined below. Its key components include: 

12 

• The transition of security responsibility to a confident, self-reliant and 

sustainable ANSF capable of protecting the population and securing a legitimate Afghan Government; 

• An operationally ineffective al Qaeda deprived of safe haven from which 

to plan and conduct operations outside the area; 

• An acceptable political transition following an election viewed as inclusive, transparent, and credible by the Afghan people and the international 

community; and Afghan Government adherence to the Mutual Accountability Framework; and 

• A constructive Afghanistan-Pakistan military to military relationship. 

On December 31, we will reach the end of the ISAF combat mission. Until then, 

USFOR–A and ISAF will be focused on maximizing the time left to advance the 

campaign. While work remains after 2014—such as building ANSF sustainability– 

the components of winning can largely be achieved by the end of the year. I am confident in our ability to effect full security transition in December. I am certain that 

counterterrorism operations by American and Afghan Forces will continue to deprive al Qaeda of safe haven. I am optimistic that political transition will successfully take place. I believe we are on track to develop a constructive military to military relationship between the Afghanistan and Pakistan militaries that can be a 

foundational element in a broader partnership between the two countries. In the remaining months of the campaign, American and coalition personnel will work to 

achieve these goals. 

When the men and women of USFOR–A and ISAF depart Afghanistan this December, they will depart knowing their hard work and sacrifice—and that of those 

who came before them—have not only built a capable Afghan Security Force, have 

not only given the Afghan people the opportunity to determine a future of their own, 

but have also enhanced our collective security and kept the American people safe. 

That is what winning will look like. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much for your testimony and 

again for your service, and for all those with whom you work. 

We have, I think, six votes scheduled at 10:30 a.m. We have 

asked if they can be delayed. Another committee is in the same situation. We don’t know that that will be the case. So what we’ll do 

is we’ll have a 6-minute first round to get as many of us in as possible before the vote. But there will still be many of us who will 

have to work around these votes, as we did, I believe, yesterday or 

the day before yesterday, and we did it very successfully. So we’ll 

all do the best we can. Let’s start with 6 minutes. 

General, what is the latest date that we can wait in order to find 

out if there’s going to be a BSA, in other words, the date that we 

must actually begin to implement a total withdrawal if there’s not 

going to be a BSA? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, I’ll address that first from just 

the military perspective. Whether there would be a withdrawal at 

the end of 2014 or whether we would maintain a mission across Afghanistan in a regional approach at the end of 2014, I wouldn’t do 

anything different between now and July. We’ve stabilized the force 

to support the elections in April and we have plenty of flexibility 

to be able to adjust to either eventuality in July. 

Beginning in July, we have manageable risks during the months 

of July and August, and then I would assess the risk of an orderly 

withdrawal begins to be high in September, and that’s simply a 

function of the tasks that have to be accomplished and how many 

days it needs to accomplish those tasks. 

But I would quickly add that what concerns me most about the 

delay in the BSA is not the physics of the retrograde or the redeployment of forces. It’s the uncertainty that exists inside of Afghanistan with the Afghan people, the uncertainty with the Afghan 

Forces, the hedging behavior that we see in the region, and as imVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Feb 10, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93176.TXT JUNE
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portantly, and I think something we need to be very attentive to 

in the coming months, the coalition cohesion and ensuring that at 

the end of these several months of uncertainty we still have a coalition going into 2015. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

General Dunford, I understand you’ve presented a range of options to the White House for the size of a post-2014 military presence of our forces as part of a coalition to train, advise, and assist 

the Afghans. Can you tell us what range of U.S. troops you would 

be comfortable with for a post-2014 military presence? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, for over a year we’ve used the 

guidance that we received at the defense ministerial in the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in February 2013 as our primary planning guidance. That guidance called for a force of 8,000 

to 12,000 NATO forces to provide train, advise, and assist at the 

Afghan corps level. I’m comfortable with that range and our ability 

to accomplish the train and advise mission with that allocation of 

forces. Then over and above that, we have always assumed on the 

U.S. side that there would be additional thousands of forces to conduct counterterrorism operations. 

Chairman LEVIN. You’re talking about an additional few thousand, is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. That’s correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Of the 8,000 to 12,000 NATO range, two-thirds 

of them would be U.S. Forces? 

General DUNFORD. As a general rule, Mr. Chairman, we have 

provided two-thirds of the NATO force. 

Chairman LEVIN. You’ve already characterized the performance 

of the ANSF in 2013. Can you give us your overall assessment? 

You said that they were able to maintain the security that had 

been present in the previous summer when we were mainly in control and they did that, although they were now in control in 2013. 

Would you say that that control was successful? How would you 

give a general military characterization? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, I’d start with the summer 

itself. The Taliban came out in the spring and articulated their objectives for the spring, and we can say at the end of the summer 

that the Taliban were unsuccessful in accomplishing their objectives as a result of the performance of the ANSF. 

But there’s been a couple of recent events that really highlight 

the ability of the Afghan Forces and the progress that they have 

made over the last few years. The loya jirga that was conducted in 

November is a good example, where thousands of people met in 

Kabul from around the country. The city was locked down. The 

event was conducted without a single security incident, and we 

know that the Taliban and the Haqqani network, in particular, had 

every intent of disrupting that particular event. 

Just last week, there was an event in Ghasni Province with over 

6,000 people celebrating the Islamic festival. People from throughout the region came. The Afghan Forces coordinated their efforts. 

The Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense conducted 

that event without a security incident as well. We also know from 

the intelligence that the enemy had every intent of disrupting that 

event. 

14 

What we have seen increasingly is Afghan Forces that are capable of assuming the lead. We no longer conduct any unilateral operations except for our own security, our own sustainment, and retrograde. All other operations in Afghanistan are conducted by ANSF. 

But I would say that the most significant thing that I’ve seen 

since I’ve been there is the sense of responsibility and accountability of Afghan leaders, and also the pride and the confidence 

that the people of Afghan have in their ANSF, and I think that’s 

been one of the biggest second order effects as a result of the transition that took place last June. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

A recent independent study by the Center for Naval Analyses 

concluded the following about the size of the ANSF that would be 

needed, and their assessment is that, based on the likely security 

conditions after 2014 in Afghanistan, the security forces should be 

maintained near their current size of around 374,000—that includes army, national police, and the Afghan local police—at least 

through 2018. Do you agree with that assessment? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, I do, and that Center for 

Naval Analyses study is consistent with some work that we’ve done 

over the last 2 or 3 years with the Center of Army Analyses and 

also our own internal assessments. 

Chairman LEVIN. I do, too, and I think it is really important that 

we provide that support. It’s different from what was decided on at 

NATO a year or 2 ago. It’s higher. But your testimony on that, I 

think, will help us to maintain a force of that size. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dunford, yesterday in my office you talked about the difference between transition and withdrawal. Would you like to 

share that with us? 

General DUNFORD. Senator Inhofe, we’re in the process now of 

transitioning to ANSF assuming full responsibility for security at 

the end of 2014. In my mind that gives us the best prospects for 

success and allows us to achieve the ends that we outlined some 

years ago and which are articulated in my opening statement. 

A transition to me means finishing the job of allowing the Afghan Forces to assume responsibility and supporting the political 

transition that will begin in earnest with the elections this April 

and obviously continue to the parliamentary elections in 2015. A 

withdrawal in my mind means abandoning the people of Afghanistan, abandoning the endeavor that we’ve been on for the last decade, and then providing al Qaeda the space within which to begin 

again to plan and conduct operations against the West. 

Senator INHOFE. Would it be very similar then as the Iraq situation? 

General DUNFORD. I think that’s fair to say, Senator. 

Senator INHOFE. One of the difficult things that’s so intangible 

is when we talk about what would have happened if we hadn’t 

done what we’ve done. I’m thinking a lot of the times the National 

Security Agency information will be directly linked to something 

that was planned in this country, like the New York City subway 

stuff and the jet storage field. We can identify that. You and I 

talked about this. Just from a military perspective, from your obVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Feb 10, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93176.TXT JUNE
15 

servation, would you say that our actions could have prevented another September 11 type of attack on this country? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I don’t think there’s any doubt that 

al Qaeda has an intent to once again attack the West and to use 

the Afghan-Pakistan region from which to make that attack. I also 

don’t think there’s any doubt that the pressure that we have had 

on the network over the past 10 years in particular has prevented 

them from doing that. 

Senator INHOFE. I believe that, but a lot of the people don’t. I 

think it’s important that we, and that you in the military, talk 

about observations, what could have happened and what are we 

doing that is perhaps not as noticeable today as it should be. 

I can remember in the beginning with the Afghans, because it 

happens that one of our Guard units, the 45th, was over there 

helping in the training, so I’ve watched them as time has gone by. 

The statement that has been made that the ANSF is very effective, 

but is not fully developed, what does that mean, ‘‘not fully developed’’? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, today the Afghan Forces are doing 

the fighting. They’re providing security to the Afghan people. What 

they don’t have are the systems, the processes, and institutions 

that allow them to be self-sustaining. At the ministerial level that 

includes things like planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition. It’s simple things like getting parts distributed, pay systems, 

fuel, overseeing contracts. We call that the functions that allow 

them to be self-sustaining. 

So we’re providing a degree of advice and assistance today that’s 

different than what we were doing in the past. When the Afghans 

were not in the lead, we were partnering with them or we were 

providing combat advising. Now we’re helping them develop those 

systems and processes that allow them to be self-sustaining when 

we reduce to a much smaller presence. 

Senator INHOFE. We’re doing that without putting our people in 

harm’s way, as it was in the past when we were having to take the 

lead. 

General DUNFORD. In a far different way, Senator. Clearly we’re 

still in a combat zone and our people are in harm’s way, but the 

risk is increasingly being assumed by ANSF. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, for your service and the service of the forces 

that you command. 

A great deal hangs on this election that is forthcoming. Can you 

give us an indication of the ability of the ANSF to protect the election process in April, and also whether there will likely be a runoff? 

When will the election process conclude? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks for that question. Months ago 

the ANSF began to plan security for the elections and they’re probably 5 or 6 months ahead of where they were in 2009. I think one 

of the best indicators for what we’ll see for security at the elections 

took place last summer when the Afghans were in the lead, during 

16 

the registration process. I mentioned the security they provided to 

the loya jirga. I also mentioned the security they provided to the 

Islamic festival. Those are all indicators of the capability of the Afghans to actually provide security. 

One interesting statistic is that during the elections of 2009 

there were about 250,000 people in uniform. That’s a combination 

of coalition forces and Afghan Forces that were providing security 

during that period of time. On the 5th of April of this year, there 

will be 425,000 forces providing security for the elections, 375,000 

of which will be Afghan. So I think that’s a very strong indicator, 

not only their performance over the past several months, but also 

just their inherent capabilities that will be on display on the 5th 

of April of this year. 

If there’s a runoff, our best assessment is that we would have a 

new president in August 2014. 

Senator REED. So that falls within that period of time when 

you’re still capable of making a transition or going from several options. Operationally, you still have that flexibility? 

General DUNFORD. We do, Senator. 

Senator REED. You’ve indicated several times in testimony about 

the positive public opinion and support for the ANSF. Can you give 

us an indication of why, if that’s the case? Also, will that translate 

to support of the Government of Afghanistan? There are situations 

where armies might have support or security forces, but it doesn’t 

translate. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we really began to see the change 

back in June when we celebrated what was known as Milestone 

2013. That’s when the ANSF assumed the lead. I can remember in 

particular one conversation I had with former Defense Minister 

Wardak, a big burly man who had been a jihadi. You probably have 

met him. During that ceremony he leaned over to me almost with 

tears in his eyes and he said: ‘‘General, you have no idea what it 

means to once again be responsible for the security of your own 

country, and I want to thank you and the American people for 

making this possible.’’ 

We have seen through the summer as the Afghan people saw 

their young men and women providing security, increasing pride. 

We set out last spring; we laid out our campaign objectives. We 

said we wanted to emerge from the summer with confident and capable Afghan Forces, but as importantly, credible in the eyes of the 

Afghan people. The polling data certainly indicates that, where 

consistently over 80 percent of the Afghan people have a positive 

assessment of the ANSF, the army in particular. 

Just recently, we had a pretty sad incident take place in the 

Kunar Province where 21 Afghan Forces were killed. That negative 

was turned into a positive in the wake of that event. The outpouring of pride and support for Afghan Forces, the desire to take 

care of the families of the fallen, the outrage that the Afghan people felt that their soldiers had been attacked by the Taliban, was 

actually a great indicator of the developing nationalism inside of 

Afghanistan, the pride that the Afghan people have in their country, but as importantly, the pride they have in the Afghan Forces. 

That clearly has had a positive effect on the Afghan Forces themselves, because if the people are proud of them and what they do 

17 

and they appreciate and recognize what they do and the sacrifices 

they make, they’re more encouraged to actually do that. 

So, Senator, as I mentioned a minute ago, there’s a lot of things 

we can point to physically in terms of Afghan capability development. We can look at helicopters, we can look at Mobile Strike 

Force Vehicles (MSFV), we can look at weapons systems, we can 

look at their tactics, techniques, and procedures. All those things 

are positive. But the human factors are as important, and what I 

have seen again in the leadership is a sense of pride, sense of responsibility, sense of accountability. But amongst the Afghan people what I’ve seen is a sense of ownership of Afghan Forces. 

You ask, does that translate into support for the Afghan Government? Interesting enough, about 80 percent of the Afghan people 

have confidence that the Afghan Government is heading in the 

right direction, and 52 percent of them actually believe that things 

over the last year have improved. That’s high when you look at, I 

think, a comparable statistic, in the United States right now is 

about 37 percent. So there’s actually a greater degree of confidence 

that they’re moving in the right direction inside of Afghanistan 

right now, and we’re encouraged by that. 

Senator REED. General, my time is all but expired, but for the 

record if you could indicate to us your estimate of how long the residual force will stay, if there is a BSA concluded to the satisfaction 

of both sides? Unless you can give a very brief answer, you can 

take that for the record. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, it’s a little more complicated, so I’d 

like to take that for the record. 

Senator REED. Then take it for the record, sir. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

With the strategic partnership between the United States and Afghanistan reinforced with a bilateral security agreement (BSA), I am confident the bulk of our residual force would return home by the end of 2016. This additional 2-year period 

will allow us to ensure our years of support are reinforced with a focused train, advise, and assist effort, as well as enhanced development of the Afghan Security Ministries. The BSA will demonstrate our mutual commitment and advance our efforts. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Reed. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I thank you for your service. A great source of pride to 

all of us is your service and that of your predecessors in Afghanistan and Iraq, and we appreciate your incredible service. 

General, we’ve heard from several officials from the Department 

of Defense (DOD) attempting to characterize the status of al Qaeda 

in Afghanistan, the region, and worldwide. We’ve heard words like 

‘‘metastasizing’’ and ‘‘persistent.’’ How would you describe al Qaeda 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, today, and because of largely our 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the pressure that we have put 

on the network over the last few years, I would characterize al 

Qaeda in Afghanistan as in a survival mode. 

Senator MCCAIN. General Allen stated last year that he would 

need 20,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014. Now, as I understand it, we’re down to 10,000 plus a few thousand NATO 

18 

troops. Could you state how many troops we need and for how 

long? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I’m comfortable with that range that 

we talked about earlier in terms of the NATO 8,000 to 12,000 for 

a train, advise, and assist mission, with another mission over and 

above that that would conduct counterterrorism. That would be a 

U.S. mission only. I think what’s important when we start to talk 

about numbers is what we expect those forces to do has evolved 

over time as the Afghan Forces have increased their capability. 

What we’ll be doing in 2015 largely is addressing the self-sustainability of the Afghan Forces. They will clearly be in the lead in the 

fight and the only operations that I would envision us conducting 

in 2015 against an enemy would be counterterrorism operations, 

again a U.S. mission. 

Senator MCCAIN. But it is your view it would be 10,000 plus several thousand NATO troops? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I’m comfortable with the range of 

forces, that 8,000 to 12,000 NATO mission plus a counterterrorism 

mission on top of that. 

Senator MCCAIN. According to a Wall Street Journal report from 

January 21, it cited a senior DOD official stating, ‘‘The new plan 

would start with 10,000 American troops at the beginning of 2015, 

but the number would decline sharply under a 2-year drawdown 

schedule. The number would be close to zero by the time Mr. 

Obama leaves office in early 2017.’’ 

In your professional military opinion, does this course of action 

entail a level of risk to our mission that you would find acceptable? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we have provided the President with 

a range of options. All those options have articulated conditions 

that would have to be met over time and the risk associated with 

not meeting those conditions. 

Senator MCCAIN. Would you say it’s a very high risk if we had 

a ‘‘sharp decline,’’ ‘‘sharply under a 2-year drawdown schedule,’’ so 

it would be close to zero by the time Mr. Obama leaves office in 

early 2017? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that would depend on the progress 

of the ANSF and the environment within which they’d be operating. 

Senator MCCAIN. So you are not willing to state whether there 

would be an increased risk or not? 

General DUNFORD. There would be increased risk, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

I can only speak for myself, but if that’s the plan, that we would 

be close to zero by the time Mr. Obama leaves office in early 2017, 

I would not support keeping troops behind, because it would be a 

needless risk of American lives. 

We all know that you can’t deal any further with President 

Karzai, right, on the BSA? 

General DUNFORD. I think that’s fair to say, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. But we also know that all of the presidential 

candidates favor a BSA and say they would sign it; is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, all the candidates do and the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people also support the BSA. 

19 

Senator MCCAIN. You are capable and ready to make plans for 

the signing of that BSA sometime after the presidential election? 

You are capable of adjusting to that eventuality? 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. But it would be much harder if there’s a runoff? 

General DUNFORD. It would be much harder if there’s a runoff. 

If we have a new president by August, I’m comfortable that we’ll 

be able to maintain the options through that period of time without 

any difficulty. 

Senator MCCAIN. It’s very disturbing to me to hear the President 

say that the longer Karzai waits the lower the number of troops 

will be. I don’t get that connection. Why would Karzai’s intransigence dictate the number of troops and missions that we would 

want as part of the residual force? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can’t talk to that. 

Senator MCCAIN. I’m sure you can’t. 

So are we able to get out all the equipment that we need to get 

out of Afghanistan on schedule? 

General DUNFORD. I’m absolutely confident we’ll be able to do 

that, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Even if the Russians cut off one of the avenues? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, Senator. Due to the great efforts by U.S. 

Transportation Command and U.S. Central Command, we have resilience in the system and I’m not concerned at all about a loss of 

the Russian Northern Distribution Network, the Russian piece of 

that. 

Senator MCCAIN. Are you confident with the level left behind of, 

say, 10,000 plus some NATO forces, that the Afghan military will 

have capability such as air evacuation, close air support, and especially intelligence capabilities? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, two of the things you mentioned are 

actually gaps that will exist in 2015. The Afghan Air Force won’t 

be fully developed. The intelligence enterprise won’t be fully developed. Their special operations capability won’t be fully developed. 

They’ll still have gaps in their ministerial capacity. Those are the 

four main areas we’ll be focused on in 2015. 

Senator MCCAIN. So in your view, if we left Afghanistan with no 

residual force, we could see a replay of the Iraq scenario? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, if we leave at the end of 2014, the 

ANSF will begin to deteriorate. The security environment will 

begin to deteriorate, and I think the only debate is the pace of that 

deterioration. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, General. I just want to say again, 

you’re in a long line of really outstanding leaders and all of us are 

very proud of the service that you have rendered and continue to 

render to our country. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

Now Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General Dunford. Again, as everyone has alluded to, 

we’re very appreciative of your service. 

20 

This war has defined a whole generation of Americans and we 

have reached a decision point in the conflict, and we owe the American people an awful lot of explanations. I know Senator McCain 

was just talking about the transition that’s going on and you talked 

about the amount of time that you would need if there is a new 

elected president and going in a different direction. 

It doesn’t look like Karzai’s going to release his hold whatsoever. 

So he remains to be a force for a long time. I don’t see how anything would ever change, knowing his intentions and being 

telegraphed as well as they are. Do you acknowledge that? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I acknowledge President Karzai’s intent to remain influential in Afghanistan. But I also look at all the 

presidential candidates who have very strongly and very publicly 

articulated the need for a U.S. coalition presence after 2014, but 

am actually more encouraged by my day-to-day engagement with 

the Afghan people and the polling that we have done, where 80 

percent of the Afghan people recognize that their future is inextricably linked to a presence of coalition and U.S. Forces. 

Senator MANCHIN. It has the appearance of a Russia-Putin 

model. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that may or may not be President 

Karzai’s intent. I don’t know. But I’m not sure that reflects his capability. 

Senator MANCHIN. Let me speak to this, then. I’ve been very critical about the amount of contractors we have, and I understand 

right now we have 78,000 contractors in Afghanistan and only 

33,000 troops. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, a number of the contractors also support the NATO force of about 45,000 total forces. 

Senator MANCHIN. Can you tell me that contracting with those 

forces will be reduced relative to the combat forces? 

General DUNFORD. We would be over time reducing. In fact, 

we’re in the process now of reducing contractors. I think we’ve reduced them some 50 percent over the past 12 months. 

Senator MANCHIN. The other thing, I understand we have about 

2,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles in Afghanistan at $1 million apiece, $20 billion worth of MRAP vehicles? 

General DUNFORD. We still have on the ground 2,000 MRAP vehicles that are being used. Are you referring to the ones that we 

have declared excess? 

Senator MANCHIN. It’s hard for people in West Virginia, and for 

me to go home and explain to them how we can build something 

that costs that much, take it over there, and just disregard it like 

it wasn’t any value at all. There has to be value somewhere. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we’re not discarding 2,000 MRAP vehicles. We have about 1,200 right now that the Services have declared as excess to their requirements. 

Senator MANCHIN. What will happen with those? 

General DUNFORD. We’re in the process right now of seeing if 

there are any of our allies that can use those vehicles. The Services 

are also going back to review those requirements. I’ve put a stop 

on any destruction of vehicles except those that are battle damaged. 

21 

One of the challenges, Senator, is that if we want to give them 

to somebody they have to accept them as is, where is. So it’s very 

expensive for countries to take those vehicles from Afghanistan. It 

costs us less than $10,000 to destroy a vehicle. It would cost us 

over $50,000 to move a vehicle to another location. So in order for 

us to give it to somebody else, we’d have to invest a significant 

amount of money to move the vehicles. 

Senator MANCHIN. But if we’re drawn into another conflict, we’d 

have to spend a million dollars to replace it. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, the Services again have identified 

the requirements that they believe they’ll need for future conflicts, 

and the majority of the MRAP vehicles that we purchased are already back in the United States, not in Afghanistan. 

Senator MANCHIN. Sir, can you honestly tell the American people, can you tell the people in West Virginia, that we should be in 

Afghanistan and stay in Afghanistan, it’s our purpose to do that? 

Our mission was to fight al Qaeda, to fight the terrorists, not to 

rebuild that nation or change the culture of that nation. 

I have trouble explaining to West Virginians, and we’re a very 

hawkish State. We like a good fight and sometimes if there’s not 

a good fight we’ll fight each other just to stay in practice and get 

ready for the next fight. This one makes no sense to any West Virginian at all, not anywhere I go in my State. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would assess that if we don’t stay 

there, continue the job of growing the Afghan Forces so they can 

replace us in providing security in Afghanistan, we’ll actually have 

a good fight. 

Senator MANCHIN. What’s the casualties right now between 

green on blue? 

General DUNFORD. We had 14 incidents of insider attacks during 

2013. We had 48 in 2012. 

Senator MANCHIN. Sir, it’s unbelievable. I attended a Wounded 

Warrior dinner and talked to a young man. It didn’t look like he’d 

been injured. I thought he was one of the support staff. He was 

very distant, and when I started talking to him he began to engage 

more. His story, it tore me apart. He says: ‘‘I was shot, I was shot 

by the person I trained for 6 months.’’ 

They live in this constant fear, and you’re saying it’s going to get 

better and we have to get them to a higher level? I don’t think 

we’re ever going to change that mentality. I don’t know, sir. I have 

all the respect in the world, but I don’t know how we answer these 

types of questions. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, when I look at where we were in 

2009, the very first trip I made to Afghanistan, there was 10 of us 

to 1 member of the ANSF. The ratio now is completely inverse. 

With a very small presence that we have today and we continue 

to have after 2015, we’re going to ensure that the investment that 

we have made in blood and treasure over the past 12 years actually 

results in us achieving our objectives of a stable, secure, unified Afghanistan from which we cannot be attacked. 

Senator MANCHIN. Let me just ask one final question, sir. Are we 

to tell the American people, and I’m to tell the West Virginian citizens, that we have to maintain a constant presence from now into 

22 

perpetuity, as we have done in Korea? Is this what Afghanistan is 

turning into? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I wouldn’t assess that to be the case. 

Senator MANCHIN. So you think there’s a time that we can exit? 

General DUNFORD. I absolutely do believe that. 

Senator MANCHIN. I’m saying if 13 years haven’t done the job, 

how many more years do you think it’ll take? That’s the question 

I cannot answer. We’re just basically saying, if you can’t do the job 

in 13 years, you’re not going to get the job done. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would assume because we have 

vital national interests in the region that the United States would 

be engaged in the region for a long period of time to come. The nature of our engagement and the nature of our presence would, of 

course, change over time. 

Senator MANCHIN. Again, sir, thank you so much for your service. I just would respectfully disagree. Thank you, sir. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Manchin. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. General, thank you for your service. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your service, too. 

It’s not hard to understand how my friend from West Virginia 

could have the view that he has. I must say that I disagree most 

vigorously with the point of view that he has just set forth in his 

questions. I think it’s remarkable, and I hope people listening 

today in the United States, on Capitol Hill, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and any place where we have interests, I hope people are listening to the chairman of this committee, who made a profoundly 

remarkable opening statement, which I’d like to refer to. 

Frankly, I’d say to my colleagues who have a different view, 

there’s a frustration on the part of our chairman that the American 

people haven’t been given a balanced view about the success we’ve 

had in Afghanistan and a balanced view about the American interests that we will continue to have, regardless of what the decision 

of this administration is going forward over the next few months. 

The chairman in his opening statement today regrets that a plurality of Americans believe that sending our forces to Afghanistan 

was a mistake. General, I don’t think we should forget what happened in 2001. We went into Afghanistan by a virtually unanimous 

vote of this Congress. I was in the House of Representatives at the 

time. There was one dissenting vote in the House of Representatives, and as far as I know, Mr. Chairman, it was unanimous here 

in the Senate. 

Now, I’m not going to say that every decision that has been made 

since we went in in early 2001 has been correct. But I do think it’s 

remarkable, as the chairman has pointed out, a recent public opinion poll in Afghanistan shows that a large majority of Afghans believe that conditions in the country have improved over the last 

decade. 

While the American people are not being given the entire picture 

of the success story there, the Afghan people see it on the ground. 

I think that’s reflected by the vote of the loya jirga. 

Tell me, General, is the loya jirga some sort of elite group that 

represents only a section of the country or is it pretty much of a 

23 

cross-section? Enlighten the committee about how many factions, 

tribes, and ethnic groups were represented by the loya jirga? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, it was over 2,000 participants from 

all of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan. All the tribes were represented. I think it’s fair to say it was a representative sample of 

Afghan leadership. 

Senator WICKER. What was their view about the importance of 

continued American participation and involvement in the stability 

of this region after this presidential election? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, they unanimously endorsed the requirement for the BSA and a continued U.S. and coalition presence 

after 2015. I’d also most importantly point out that the loya jirga 

is representative of the sentiment of the Afghan people, where at 

the lowest 67 percent, at the highest 80 percent in the polling that 

we have done, support the BSA and a continued presence. 

The one thing I’d also like to say, Senator, is that just 10 days 

ago I met with nine members of the Afghan parliament, basically 

the oversight committees of the ANSF. I asked them what message 

I should come back and deliver when I came back for testimony. 

They also, all of them overwhelmingly, said: ‘‘Don’t let one individual speak for Afghanistan. The Afghan people appreciate what 

the American people have done and recognize that their future 

here in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to continued presence.’’ 

Senator WICKER. So it’s not the view of the loya jirga and not the 

view of the polling that the United States has invaded this country 

or that the United States of America wants to occupy Afghanistan 

over the long haul? That’s not their view, is it? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that’s not at all the feeling of the Afghan people at this time, and we certainly have no intention of 

doing that. 

Senator WICKER. I believe you mentioned in your testimony that 

this is a feeling of Afghan Government officials, civil leaders, and 

that there’s a growing appreciation of the coalition’s efforts; is that 

correct? 

General DUNFORD. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator WICKER. I just wish—and I have to underscore—I wish 

this message were getting through. I have to underscore what our 

distinguished chairman has said on the second page of his testimony: ‘‘Unfortunately, the American people rarely read about the 

positive developments in Afghanistan. Instead, the media focus almost exclusively on negative incidents, depriving the American people of the sense of accomplishment they would receive if they were 

given a balanced view.’’ 

I appreciate your being here today, General, to give us a balanced view. I think it may be incumbent upon us on both sides of 

the dais, not as Republicans and Democrats, but as Americans, to 

say the troops that have sacrificed, the American taxpayers that 

sacrificed over more than a decade, has resulted in tangible positive accomplishments for the people in this region, and also that affect the American interests in a positive way. 

I just hope we don’t lose our resolve. I think we can decide as 

a body politic to lose this war nonetheless. We could do it if we try. 

But we are at the point of having a success, and if we don’t send 

to the Afghan people a signal that we’re abandoning them, that 

24 

we’re once again going to look another way and get interested in 

something else, we don’t send that signal, we can have an historic 

partnership that can leave us there with a very small footprint, 

with the United States still looking out for its national interest, but 

doing, as you so successfully have done, General, and your comrades, turning this fight over to the locals, but having us there as 

partners who are sending a signal that we’re not going to forget 

about them once again. 

Thank you for indulging me, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, 

thank you for your profound statement which tells the truth to the 

American people about the success of our troops in this area. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Personally, let me thank you for your steadfastness also along the way 

here. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Wicker, I can’t imagine the press ever focusing on negative and controversy. [Laughter.] 

General Dunford, thank you very much for being here this morning and for your service to the country. 

One of the things that has impressed me on the trips that I have 

made to Afghanistan has been the close relationship between what 

happens in Afghanistan and what happens in Pakistan. I wonder 

if you could assess the kind of role that you think Pakistan can 

play post-2014, and also if you could speak to the efforts in Pakistan to engage in talks with the Taliban and how that might affect 

what’s happening in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks for that question. I find it difficult to envision success in the region without cooperation of Pakistan and without an effective relationship between Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. Over the past year I’ve been encouraged on a couple 

of fronts. One is, I believe, that Pakistan also recognizes the existential threat of extremism to their own security, and they also recognize that it’s not in their best interests to have anything other 

than a stable, secure, and unified Afghanistan. 

Since August, the Heads of State have met four times, which I 

think is very positive. That hadn’t happened in quite some time. 

With Prime Minister Sharif has come new resolve to improve the 

relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The two areas 

that they have identified for cooperation are important to point out. 

One is to have a common definition of extremism and to cooperate 

on dealing with extremism. The other is to come up with a broader 

border management framework that would address the political 

issues, the economic issues, as well as the security issues between 

the two countries. 

Our role is to work on developing a constructive military-to-military relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. I’ve met with 

the new Army Chief of Staff, General Raheel Sharif. He’s indicated 

strong resolve to improve the relationship between the ANSF and 

the Pakistani army, as have his Afghan counterparts, and we’ll 

spend a lot of time over the next several months doing that. One 

of the things we want to accomplish by the end of the year is to 

have a constructive bilateral relationship between Afghanistan and 

25 

Pakistan. Heretofore, over the last few years, it’s actually been trilateral. We have played an important facilitating role. We hope 

over time to work ourselves out of that role, certainly maintain effective bilateral relationships with both countries, between the 

United States and Pakistan, and the United States and Afghanistan, but play less of a role in the important relationship between 

those two countries. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Can you speak to efforts to engage in talks 

with the Taliban on the part of Pakistan? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we’re watching that very carefully. 

To be honest, we don’t have any insight into exactly the status of 

those discussions. What we have seen recently is continued violence by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani 

Taliban, if you will. We’ve also seen some limited military operations, particularly in the North Waziristan area, against the TTP. 

But what we know is what you know, and that is that Prime Minister Sharif and the leadership in Pakistan are committed to try to 

find some peaceful resolution. That’s certainly in Pakistan and as 

well as in Afghanistan what needs ought happen in the long term. 

It’s just not clear to me today if the conditions are set for constructive peace talks between the TTP and the Government of Pakistan, 

but it’s clear that they’re working to that end. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

We had a few minutes to chat before the hearing started and one 

of the things you commented on were the number of women who 

are volunteering and signed up to help with the elections in April. 

For the first time since the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund was 

established, money was explicitly authorized last year for recruitment and retention of women in the ANSF. Now, obviously, that’s 

a separate issue from the elections, but I think it speaks to the empowerment of women in Afghanistan. 

I wonder if you could talk about how that dedication of that fund 

to help assist with recruiting women and keeping them in the services in Afghanistan will work and whether we’re seeing any of the 

benefits of that yet. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks for that question. It’s clearly 

a very difficult issue. There’s a strong cultural bias against women 

participating in the security forces, in the army or the police. 

There’s a stated goal of 10 percent and we’re at about 1 percent. 

There are some signs of progress. We just recently saw the first 

woman appointed as a police chief in Afghanistan and there’s a second now that is in line to become a police chief. That’s a positive 

sign. There are some general officers both in the Ministry of Interior Affairs and in the Ministry of Defense, so there are some role 

models coming up. 

In the case of these 13,000, it’s interesting. There’s 13,000 female 

searchers who have been identified. That in itself was difficult 

again because of the cultural bias. But in a conversation with the 

Ministry of Interior Affairs which I think you’ll find encouraging, 

Minister Daudzai, he plans to use these 13,000 as a pool from 

which to recruit policewomen. So as he gets women that identify 

themselves as willing to step up and do something as important as 

be a searcher at the elections and facilitate the transition that’s 

going to occur subsequent to 5 April, he also recognizes that that’s 

26 

an eligible pool of women who would probably make good policewomen and he plans to use that. 

He has a stated goal of increasing the numbers of policewomen 

in Afghanistan by 5,000 in the next 24 months and then 10,000 by 

2017. My sense is he’s very committed to that. My sense also is 

that the cultural challenges that exist are very real and it’s going 

to take some time before that happens. 

But certainly if you would look at the plight of women today and 

the prospects for their participation and success in the security 

ministries, it’s certainly much higher than even 2 or 3 years ago. 

Senator SHAHEEN. My time is up, but if I could just make a follow-on comment. That is, to the extent that we can encourage that 

sentiment to continue as we look at the new administration taking 

over in Afghanistan, certainly that’s something that all of us here 

support. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you, General Dunford, for your steadfast leadership in such an important time. I know all of us admire your leadership and your service to our country. I want to thank you for the 

sacrifice that your family’s been making during your service in Afghanistan as well. 

I want to ask you, General, if we were to withdraw from Afghanistan this year, what happens to the women in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think the plight of women would 

be pretty dire if we were to withdraw at the end of 2014. I think 

the support we’re providing in security, the support we’re providing 

for political transition, actually creates the climate within which 

women and other members of society can actually flourish and 

achieve their own goals and objectives. 

I would say again the prospects are not very good if we were to 

withdraw at the end of 2014 for women. 

Senator AYOTTE. I don’t think any of us will ever forget the images in the soccer stadiums with the Taliban and what they did to 

women. As we look toward the importance of our commitment in 

Afghanistan, let us not forget what you just said, that if we leave 

and we abandon the work that we have done in Afghanistan, that 

we could send women back in those soccer stadiums, and I don’t 

think that’s acceptable to any of us. Would you agree, General? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would. I think it’s probably important for me to share with you that I didn’t provide you a minute 

ago with my own assessment in isolation. That’s the feedback that 

I received from the Afghan women that I’ve spoken to. So I’m actually voicing on their behalf their concerns about 2015 and beyond 

were we not to maintain a presence. 

Senator AYOTTE. If we don’t maintain a presence, what happens 

with al Qaeda? Also I would ask you, how quickly would this happen? We talk about—when I hear, for example, why does it matter 

in terms of people at home if we were to withdraw this year, what 

happens with al Qaeda and how quickly does this all unravel? I 

think this is important for people to understand, that we’ve made 

great success, but if we suddenly pull back what happens and how 

quickly? 

27 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks. First of all, I think the deterioration of the Afghan Forces begins to happen fairly quickly in 

2015. That’s because, again, where we are today in the campaign 

is we’ve focused on quality of the force, building battalions, building brigades, building corps. What’s now our focus is building the 

systems and the processes that allow those tactical units to sustain 

themselves. 

So things that would happen almost immediately after we would 

leave in 2015 is units would run out of fuel, pay systems would not 

be completely operable, spare parts would not be available for vehicles. So we’d start to see decreased readiness in the ANSF and obviously their operational reach would be less. 

We also would not be able to complete our work with the Afghan 

Air Force, which really is 2 or 3 years away. We’re still in the process of actually fielding the Afghan Air Force. 

With regard to al Qaeda, again my assessment is that the pressure that we put on al Qaeda virtually every day in operations by 

our SOF in cooperation with their Afghan partners is what has 

kept the al Qaeda from reconstituting. We know from intelligence 

that they have every intent of continuing to operate from Afghanistan and Pakistan. They would view it as a great victory were we 

to withdraw and were they to then have the space within which to 

conduct operations against the West once again. Again, I think it 

would not only be a physical reconstitution, but a huge moral factor 

for al Qaeda as a movement were we to withdraw from the region 

in 2015 and allow them to once again establish preeminence in the 

region and become the vanguard for the al Qaeda movement from 

the region. 

Senator AYOTTE. So the vanguard for the al Qaeda movement 

and a risk to the United States of America again, correct, General? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I don’t think there’s any question 

that eventually there’d be a risk to western interests, including the 

United States. 

Senator AYOTTE. So there’s no doubt it’s so important that we get 

this right. One of the things that I’ve been encouraged by is that 

all the presidential candidates support a BSA. Karzai’s gone, right? 

With all due respect, he’s made a lot of troubling comments that 

I think all of us disagree with. But he’s gone. He’s gone because 

there’s going to be a new election, and all of the candidates that 

are running have committed to signing the BSA, if elected, correct? 

General DUNFORD. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. I know that you said as long as the runoff goes 

in August, the United States would have adequate time for planning going into 2015. How important is it that we announce our 

follow-on commitment, that the President do that, with regard to 

the timing of the runoff in August? So what’s the timing there and 

how important is that timing in terms of us making a commitment 

on behalf of our country as to what our follow-on force will be? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, again, there’s several issues. If you 

don’t mind I’d like to just touch on all of them very briefly. To me, 

the delay in the BSA, part of it is the military campaign, and I 

mentioned that it begins to be high risk if we don’t make a decision 

by September; we have a high risk against an orderly withdrawal. 

That’s simply because of how long it takes to get all the equipment 

28 

out, all the people out, and to transfer all the facilities. We start 

to run into a situation where there are as many tasks to do as 

there are days to do those before December 31. So that’s why I 

characterize that as high risk subsequent to September. 

I think the real challenge with the delay in the BSA and the 

delay in certainly post-2015 actually starts in Kabul with the leadership, the Afghan people, and the ANSF across the country. I 

think it is also fair to say that currently the uncertainty about 

2015 affects the behavior of regional actors, to include Pakistan. 

Those nations are hedging, not certain what will be, what the facts 

on the ground will be in 2015. 

Then the other issue that I’m concerned about in terms of how 

long this uncertainty would last would be the willingness and the 

ability of the coalition to maintain cohesion and actually participate. I think it’s very important to point out that the contribution 

of the coalition has been significant, and I assess that in a future 

mission it would be very important for us to do a future mission 

also as a coalition. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, General. I know that my time is up, 

but I would just say this. We know that Karzai is going, that the 

newly-elected president, whoever comes out of this, is willing and 

is committed to signing the BSA. I would hope that our President 

would make an announcement to give certainty to the situation in 

Afghanistan as to what our follow-on commitment will be and to 

make that announcement to ensure that the Afghan people know 

that we are committed to following through here and that we are 

going to ensure that Afghanistan does not, for example, become a 

safe haven for al Qaeda, all the things that you just talked about. 

So I hope that Mr. President will come forward and really give that 

certainty. 

I understand and respect that that is contingent on the BSA 

being signed and protection for our troops. But I believe the President could make that contingent upon that signing. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dunford, it is good to see you again. I enjoyed our visit 

in July and I appreciate your service. I echo the comments that 

Senator McCain made. 

I also want to underline points made by the chairman in his 

opening statement. The American role in improving the life of Afghans has truly been massive, and the more we do that the more 

we inoculate against extremism. The mission is about training the 

ANSF, but it is also about making Afghans understand that they 

don’t have to go back to what they had. 

Just one bit of evidence that I just find staggering: Since the 

Taliban fell in Afghanistan, life expectancy in Afghanistan has improved from 45 years to 62 years. Now, in a country of 30 million 

people, if you can improve life expectancy by 17 years in about a 

decade that’s an additional 500 million years of life for the current 

Afghan population that has been a result of the work that the 

United States and other nations have done. It has largely been 

29 

done by public health investments that have reduced child mortality. 

You tell me that the polling suggests that Afghans like the 

United States. If you can reduce the risk of my children dying 

young and increase life expectancy in my country by 17 years, I’m 

going to like the United States too. I’m going to like the partnership. I’m not surprised at all that the polling results are so strong. 

I think we do have to explain. Maybe our citizens are not thinking that the investment that we should be making should be about 

the improvement of life expectancy in Afghanistan, but this is inoculation against extremism. This is the kind of real life tangible 

evidence that Afghans can see that will help them not fall backward into the Taliban, al Qaeda, or other extremists. 

So I want to associate myself with the comments made earlier 

that the comprehensive nature of the investment by the United 

States and its partners in Afghanistan has made a significant difference and that bodes well going forward. 

I met in Bahrain in December with the Foreign Minister of Iraq, 

Foreign Minister Zebari, and he is now very public about this: ‘‘I 

wish in Iraq we had worked out an acceptable BSA with the United 

States and the United States had stayed.’’ He says this publicly. He 

says: ‘‘We made a mistake by not being willing to work out a BSA 

with the United States and we now regret it.’’ He has even indicated that he has said that directly to Hamid Karzai: ‘‘Do not make 

the mistake that we made in Iraq, because what’s happening in 

Iraq now is tragic, could have been avoided.’’ 

But for all the good that we can do, we shouldn’t stay unwanted. 

We shouldn’t stay if we can’t work out a BSA. We’re not interested 

in being occupiers. We’re interested in being partners. I’m happy 

to hear your testimony, General, that the Afghan people want us 

to be partners. 

A couple of questions about the election. These are very important. It’s hard to fathom. Here it’s March 12 today, and these elections are going to happen in the next 31⁄2 weeks. You have indicated that all the presidential candidates support a BSA with the 

United States. I know I’m saying this for the record. I know the 

answer to this. This isn’t like private support, where they’ve said 

to us: ‘‘Hey, we’ll sign a BSA.’’ They’re taking this position publicly 

in the midst of an election campaign and telling their voters, their 

electorate, when asked: ‘‘We want the United States to stay and we 

want to work out an acceptable BSA.’’ Isn’t that correct? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that’s correct. This is the very first 

time they’ve had a very public campaign process, to include televised debates. So these comments have been made in the context 

of televised debates and public appearances, which included media 

engagement. So it’s absolutely their public position. Clearly they 

wouldn’t be saying that if it didn’t reflect the electorate. 

Senator KAINE. Right. I’m sure they’re as responsive to the electorate as we are. They can read polls just like we can. But this 

issue of U.S. presence is not a minor little issue in the presidential 

campaign. There are other issues certainly, but I imagine, and from 

the press I’ve read, it suggests that the continuing U.S. presence 

and the working out of this deal is a major piece of the public dialogue and debate in the run-up to these presidential elections. 

30 

Therefore, the result of the elections will be a mandate from the 

Afghan public in terms of their desire about this continuing relationship, correct? 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, Senator. I believe that whoever 

the next President of Afghanistan will be, he will come into office 

with a mandate to enter into a partnership with the United States 

and the coalition. 

Senator KAINE. Now, I know that that creates some real anxiety 

in the Taliban, and they have just recently done very public calls 

for violence to disrupt the elections. Those elections were disrupted 

to some degree on election day with violence a number of years ago. 

But, General Dunford, you indicate your belief that the increased 

size of security forces, the ANSF, should be sufficient to protect 

against significant violence marring these elections. That is your 

thought today? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, it is. It’s based on my assessment 

not only of the Afghan performance day-to-day, but again the major 

events that have occurred in Afghanistan over the last year where 

the enemy has had a demonstrated intent to disrupt those events. 

Again, the Islamic festival that I mentioned, the loya jirga itself in 

Kabul, where they locked down the entire city, really demonstrated 

to me the ability of the ANSF to create a climate within which inclusive elections could take place. 

I would not say that it’ll be violence-free. There will certainly be 

high-profile attacks and the enemy will have a concerted effort to 

disrupt the elections. But at the end of the day, I’m confident that 

they will be unsuccessful in their efforts to disrupt the elections. 

Senator KAINE. That is good to hear, General. Thank you very 

much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Kaine. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to add my compliments to the chairman for his opening 

statement. I just can’t believe you’re leaving the Senate in mid-life 

like you are. Very disappointing. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Thanks for the ‘‘mid-life’’ comment. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator GRAHAM. From the South Carolina point of view, you’re 

just getting started. [Laughter.] 

Thank you for coming, General. I remember when all these rows 

in the room were full, with people carrying bags and everybody was 

hanging on every word about Afghanistan. I’m just here to say that 

the decision we’re about to make as a Nation regarding Afghanistan is probably the single most important decision we’ll make in 

the 21st century in securing our Homeland other than the Iranian 

nuclear program. I can’t think of a more important decision for 

America to make than how we transition in Afghanistan. There 

may not be a lot of interest in the room, but to the members of the 

committee, thank you; you’ve acquitted yourselves well. 

No BSA, no troops, right? 

General DUNFORD. That is correct, Senator. 

31 

Senator GRAHAM. So to the Afghan people: If we don’t have a 

BSA, not one troop with my support will be left behind. We’re not 

going to put our young men and women in that situation. 

The good news is most Afghans want us to stay, right? 

General DUNFORD. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Maybe what you’re telling us, if we’re smart 

and we end this well, we can construct a scenario where the Afghans will help defend America. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, if you look back at the nations that 

we helped in the 1990s, many of them are actually on the ground 

with us in Afghanistan today. I’d point out Georgia as one of the 

examples. 

Senator GRAHAM. But what’s in it for us is a fair proposition for 

us to be exploring. What’s in it for us to me would be an Afghanistan willing to fight the terrorists and help defend our Nation from 

attack. Do you agree with that? 

General DUNFORD. I agree, a partnership with Afghanistan in 

the fight against terrorism is absolutely where we’re trying to go. 

Senator GRAHAM. You want to help women in America make 

sure al Qaeda can’t kill a bunch of us here in the Homeland, right? 

General DUNFORD. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. It’s just not about Afghan women; it’s about 

American women, about American men. So we have an historic opportunity to turn a country that’s been isolated in history into an 

ally and can be a front-line defense against al Qaeda. Do you agree 

with that? 

General DUNFORD. I agree with that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. So the goal is to keep the enemy away from the 

Homeland and to build partnerships. Isn’t that the general goal in 

how to win the war on terrorism? 

General DUNFORD. It is, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree that Afghanistan is the central front in that battle, because this is where it all started? 

General DUNFORD. I do, and particularly in South Asia, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. So if you believe this is the place it all started 

and we can leave behind a scenario where it ends well, the question is the cost-benefit analysis. Before September 11, on September 10, 2001, how many troops did we have in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. We didn’t have any troops on the ground. 

Senator GRAHAM. How many ambassadors did we have in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. We did not have an ambassador. 

Senator GRAHAM. How much money did we give to Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. We didn’t give any, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. So we’ve tried that and it didn’t work. 

How much has September 11 cost us in terms of dollars? 

General DUNFORD. Billions of dollars, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. A lot more than the presence in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. That’s fair to say, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. So if you looked at the cost to the country in 

terms of financial costs, going to the model of ‘‘leave them alone, 

they’ll leave us alone,’’ did not work. To our folks in West Virginia: 

It cost us a lot more to ignore Afghanistan than it has to be involved. 

32 

Now, the 6,000 lives plus lost in Afghanistan and Iraq are heartbreaking, but these were soldiers that signed up and were willing 

to defend the Nation. 3,000 civilians died in the blink of an eye on 

the Homeland. 

Do you believe that if we ignore the threats coming from that 

part of the world that the next attack on the United States could 

be greater than it was on September 11? 

General DUNFORD. I absolutely believe there will be another attack. Whether it will be greater or not, I don’t know, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree with me the capabilities that 

are beginning to be available to terrorist organizations are greater 

than they were before September 11? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. So Karzai is an outlier, let’s just leave 

it at that, right? He happens to be the president, but he doesn’t 

represent Afghanistan’s view of what to do regarding the U.S.-Afghan relationship; is that a fair statement? 

General DUNFORD. It is, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. The Afghans don’t see us as the Russians or 

the British occupiers because they could kill us all tomorrow if they 

wanted to, couldn’t they? How many people are in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. 25 to 30 million. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. How many are there of us? 

General DUNFORD. Right now there are 33,000 Americans. 

Senator GRAHAM. How long could 33,000 survive if 25 or 30 million saw us as an occupier? 

General DUNFORD. It would be a difficult circumstance to find 

yourself in, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. I wouldn’t want to be there. 

So the point is, you have green on blue. That happens in every 

war. But I’m here to tell you, if they didn’t want us, we wouldn’t 

be there. It offends me when people suggest that we’re the British 

Empire of a long time ago or the Russians. We’re not, not in the 

eyes of the Afghans. 

So you have two choices. One choice is to go back to the pre-September 11 nobody there, no money there. The cost of staying: How 

much would it cost the American taxpayers to maintain a 350,000- 

plus Afghan army? How much would it cost to maintain 10,000 to 

12,000 troops? Compare the benefit we would achieve from that investment versus leaving, nobody left behind, and see where the 

smart play is at. Can you run us through that quickly? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, the cost of ANSF at about 352,000 

in 2015 would be $5 billion. Our coalition partners have committed 

to pay $1.3 billion of that. Afghanistan will pay approximately $500 

million of that. So the cost to the United States would be somewhere on the order of $3 billion. 

We’re still working the cost figures for our actual presence overall right now, but certainly far less than the cost that you just outlined. 

Senator GRAHAM. So you put that in one bucket. The other bucket is the cost if we leave, and you’re telling us the cost of leaving 

is far greater than staying under the configuration you’ve just indicated; is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, sir. 

33 

Senator GRAHAM. A final thought. Is it fair to say that our national security interests are not going to be judged in history by the 

day we left Afghanistan, but by what we left behind? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think it’s how we leave, absolutely, 

not when we leave. 

Senator GRAHAM. It’s how we leave and what we leave behind. 

You’re here to tell us as the commander of our forces in Afghanistan, if we’re smart and we do this right, conditions-based withdrawal, we can leave behind a stable country that can help defend 

the American Homeland, or, we can leave behind a disaster that 

will haunt us for decades? 

General DUNFORD. I believe that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Graham. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

Thank you, General, for being here today. I want to talk a little 

bit—I know I sound sometimes like a one-note chorus here—about 

the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

(SIGAR), reconstruction efforts, and accountability for that money. 

What I’m really concerned about in the coming months is that the 

SIGAR, Mr. John F. Sopko, has indicated to you that no more than 

21 percent of Afghanistan will be accessible to civilian oversight 

going forward. 

Now, that’s a 47 percent reduction since 2009. So we had eyes 

and ears on the majority of Afghanistan during a time period that 

hundreds and hundreds, and, in fact, billions of dollars of American 

taxpayers’ money was being spent to build things. We’re only going 

to have eyes and ears in 21 percent of the country right now. Do 

you agree with that assessment, that our ability to oversee any 

kind of ongoing work is going to be severely curtailed and limited 

under the current scenario? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I may be able to make you feel a little bit better about that. I’ll speak from the DOD perspective. We’ll 

have 32 projects ongoing in 2015. All but five of those projects will 

fall in areas where we will be able to provide proper oversight. Five 

projects will fall outside of that range, and what we’re working 

with the Department of State (DOS) now is to ensure that we have 

Afghans that can help us provide oversight and ensure that we provide the kind of stewardship that I know you’re addressing. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I haven’t seen, none of us have seen, the 

Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. Of those 31 

projects that you’re going to be working on in 2015, is there going 

to be any more money requested for any of that work in this coming OCO budget? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, it will be in 2015. Some of that is 

2015 money. So, yes, part of those projects would be there. The 

projects in total are somewhere between $600 and $700 million. 

These are the last 32 projects that were part of the original program of record for Afghan Forces. So when I talk about projects, 

they’re virtually all either Afghan National Police or Afghan National Army projects that are again the back side of the program 

of record that was outlined a couple of years ago. 

34 

Senator MCCASKILL. So there have been no new projects started 

this calendar year? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there are no projects now that we’re 

starting that aren’t part of the program of record, that’s absolutely 

true. No new starts. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. Before I move on to another area, 

quickly, I think it’s really important that we get a clear-eyed assessment of how well this works. There has just been an assumption from day one, and I have great respect for General Petraeus’s 

guide for counterinsurgency effort, but I’m not aware that there 

has ever been any data or analysis that has really said that the 

military getting involved in large-scale infrastructure projects 

works in terms of the counterinsurgency. 

It may have helped along the margins in Iraq, but most of that 

money was wasted, because most of those projects are not operating now. The health care centers never opened. The water park 

is in crumbles. A lot of the grid was blown up during the process. 

This notion of building major infrastructure during a conflict and 

the security challenges we have—and we know some of our money 

went to the bad guys for guarding that one highway we were building, and the whole blurring of the lines between DOS and DOD as 

to whose job this is and when and how—I really think we need to 

do a clear-eyed assessment, now that we have both Iraq and Afghanistan to look at. 

If you read the Special Inspector General for Iraq final report, 

there’s some real work to do here, I think, on the part of the military. I want to know, is there some discussion about that, that 

there will be a reevaluation of the effectiveness of this strategy? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there is, and I did hear General 

Dempsey’s comments the other day and I’d associate myself with 

those. I think at the end of a decade of war it’s fair to say that it’s 

very important that we go back and take a look at the lessons 

learned and make sure we document those now while they’re fresh. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We have some problems with property accountability in Afghanistan. We know that we have 26 open investigations for missing property that include weapons and weapons 

systems with a total of almost $590 million, that the Inspector 

General (IG) has found all these problems over there in the two 

places where we’re trying to retrofit and account for all the equipment. Do you feel like you’ve gotten a handle on that? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do. We have spent the last year, 

and frankly even before I arrived, trying to ensure that. Again, this 

is part of lessons learned from even the Iraq experience. As we conducted a retrograde and redeployment in Iraq, I think we learned 

a lot of lessons, and I believe we’re applying those lessons learned 

now in Afghanistan as we get accountability in the retrograde and 

redeployment process. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I’ll have some specific questions for the 

record about what has changed since the IG took a look. It’s a little 

worrisome to me since I’ve been at the yards that did the same 

thing in Iraq and I thought we had really turned the corner on 

that. I’m disappointed that the IG would find these kinds of problems after what we did learn in Iraq. So I’ll follow up on that. 

35 

Finally, I just want to mention detainees. I understand the Afghan Government released individuals with ties to attacks to coalition forces. Does the BSA enable our forces to continue to detain 

and remove dangerous individuals from the battlefield should the 

United States keep an enduring presence in Afghanistan? It’s very 

troubling to me they released those people, and I think it’s something that we should all be very worried about. I want you to tell 

me you are comfortable that if you catch people that are trying to 

kill our men and women in battle that we can keep them captured 

and that the Afghanistan Government does not have the ability to 

let them go. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, first, I share your concern with that. 

Clearly, protecting the force is my responsibility and I take that 

very seriously. I was greatly concerned with the release of those 65 

individuals. I would say that the viability of our presence post-2014 

is going to be determined by a number of factors, one of which will 

be an effective regime to address detainees, not only to ensure that 

those individuals that are a threat to the force and to the Afghan 

people are kept off the battlefield, but also that we would have access to the intelligence associated with those individuals in order 

to again protect the force and conduct effective counterterrorism 

operations. 

So within the new administration, I think that’s something that 

has to be arranged and it has to be very much a part of the BSA 

and the other arrangements that we have with the next government. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But we don’t have it now? 

General DUNFORD. We have an arrangement, Senator, but the 

Government of Afghanistan did not observe that agreement. 

Senator MCCASKILL [presiding]. Very disappointing. Thank you. 

Senator Levin had to leave and I am going to now defer to Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General, first I want to thank you for everything you’ve done 

there. It’s been an extraordinary tour of duty. You’ve done amazing 

work. As I mentioned to you once before, I have family members 

who have a history with St. Michael’s and everybody there is extremely proud of you and everything you’ve done. 

I want to mention in regards to the MRAP vehicles. I served in 

the House for a little bit too, and when we were coming and creating MRAP vehicles and trying to get those in the field as fast as 

we could, we weren’t worried about whether or not we were going 

to be able to get them home or what ship they were going to come 

home on or whether all the dirt was going to be cleaned out from 

under the tires. We were worried about saving lives. That was the 

whole purpose of the MRAP vehicles. 

I think if you had talked to anybody in the House or in the Senate at that time, if you had said, ‘‘Look, we can get these, but do 

you want to worry about how they come home?’’—we obviously 

want to get them all taken care of, but that in a list of about 100 

things was about 101—I think number one was telling families in 

Indiana, Ohio, Wisconsin, and New York that their sons or daughters would be in the safest vehicles possible and that they could 

come home safely. 

36 

So I just want to tell you that my opinion is get them back if you 

can, but the most important job they have had to do they’ve been 

doing. 

I want to ask you about improvised explosive devices (IED) a little bit, General, and the progress we’re making in that area. I 

know there’s been testing on fertilizers as well. We’re trying to 

come up with a formula that is non-explosive. I wanted to hear how 

things are going in regards to fertilizer-based IEDs and what are 

the biggest IED challenges you have right now and how we’re 

doing overall in that area. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks for that question. We’ve 

worked very closely with Pakistan. Particularly the Joint IED Defeat Office (JIEDDO) has done a lot of great work over the past 

year. Because of that existential threat to Pakistan that I mentioned earlier, the Pakistanis are very focused on the IED challenge, as are the Afghans. So we’ve had a number of sessions with 

them and there is cooperation with the producers of—— 

Senator DONNELLY. I think you know one of the real bright 

things that we see is the cooperation on this and that we’re actually going to do testing here in the States as well. 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, Senator. The efforts that certainly 

the committee and again JIEDDO have done have actually paid 

dividends. 

The greatest IED challenge today, of course, is to Afghan Forces. 

They have increasingly borne the brunt of that, including Afghan 

civilians. In our focus, I feel comfortable with the equipment that 

we have, the training we have for our forces. Our focus on IED’s 

now is equally to make sure that the ANSF are capable of dealing 

with that challenge, and a lot of the equipment that we bought 

over the last 2 or 3 years now is finally arriving, finally being integrated, and their capabilities are improving. 

But I think the real bright spot and the potential for improvement here in the coming months is that cooperation between the 

Government of Pakistan, the Government of Afghanistan, and the 

tripartite arrangement that we have to work on this particular 

issue. 

Senator DONNELLY. How are we doing in terms of catching the 

threat before it happens, being able to protect our vehicles on the 

roads? We are way up from where we were, aren’t we? 

General DUNFORD. We’ve made significant improvement, Senator. But this is one of those force protection issues that I’d never 

appear before the committee and tell you that I’m comfortable with 

where we are. 

Senator DONNELLY. Oh, no, not until they’re all gone. 

What is the material of choice now that the terrorists are using? 

General DUNFORD. We still see ammonium nitrate. Probably 60, 

80 percent of the IEDs contain some type of homemade explosives. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thanks for your effort on that. That obviously has torn families and units apart. Like you said, we will not 

be satisfied until there are no more. We appreciate everything 

you’ve done. 

In areas like Kunar, Nuristan, and in other parts, what happens 

even if our forces remain behind, which obviously we hope we get 

a BSA? But what do those areas look like post-2014? 

37 

General DUNFORD. There is still safe haven for al Qaeda in that 

region and, frankly, a complex arrangement of extremist organizations—al Qaeda, TTP, Afghan Taliban, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The list goes on of individuals that use that area. We 

have largely, again, kept them from planning and conducting attacks from that area, and they largely are focused on survival. 

They expect that we will leave at the end of 2014 and they expect that after we leave they’ll have the opportunity to once again 

expand their safe haven in the region. My expectation is that, 

again, as we grow a partnership with the ANSF and we grow their 

counterterrorism capability, that a combination of our train, advise, 

assist, and counterterrorism capability, combined with the ever-increasing counterterrorism capability of the Afghans, will ensure 

that those individuals again focus more on their own survival than 

they do on attacks against either the Afghan people or against us. 

Senator DONNELLY. After December 2014, for U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) and provincial reconstruction 

teams (PRT), will they have the ability to still be able to go out and 

put forward efforts, put forward projects and programs and be in 

a situation where they will feel safe or secure? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there won’t be any PRTs in 2015. 

USAID right now is with the embassy as a whole and we’re certainly participating in discussions on this. I think largely their 

project oversight will be conducted by Afghans, except where it 

happens to fall in, within what we call our operational reach. In 

other words, where our forces are and there’s a casualty evacuation 

capability and a quick reaction force capability, we’ll certainly be 

able to support USAID and other DOS employees. But in those 

areas where we don’t have that kind of coverage, my expectation 

is that we will not have DOS employees and USAID. 

Senator DONNELLY. It would not seem that without that they 

could be in an environment where they’re going to be safe at all? 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator DONNELLY. I just want to thank you again. You’ve done 

an extraordinary job under very difficult circumstances and the Nation owes a huge debt of gratitude to you. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you. 

Senator INHOFE. Madam Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. 

I have seen some disturbing things, General, that I am concerned 

about, having to do with the inspector, SIGAR. At the end of January, your staff was accused of preempting and undermining audit 

reports of SIGAR after a series of audits. 

Now, let me ask you maybe three questions here. How do the 

SIGAR personnel get to audit locations, such as construction sites 

in southern Afghanistan, and how do they get access to the data 

that they need for the military organizations and the Afghan ministries? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we provide that support. 

Senator INHOFE. One of the statements that I recall was SIGAR 

has said—and this is a quote—‘‘No more than 21 percent of Afghanistan will be accessible to U.S. civilian oversight personnel by 

38 

the end of 2014.’’ Do you think that’s true and how important is 

that to their mission and to yours? I don’t think it’s true. What do 

you think? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think it’s important. What the 

SIGAR really is referring to there, I assume, is that 21 percent of 

the country will be covered by U.S. Forces footprint or coalition 

forces footprint. That’s true because we’re reducing the force so 

much. But I also think that percentage is actually irrelevant, because what’s most important is what’s the coverage of those areas 

where there are actually projects ongoing. 

There’s only going to be 32 projects from a DOD perspective in 

2015, and all but five of those projects will actually fall within our 

ability to provide proper oversight with U.S. Forces. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, then it’s not correct. 

General DUNFORD. That’s right, Senator. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. I read a lot of these things and it appears to me—and I don’t know that this is true—that they go in 

there, they find out things, they go to the newspapers. You see a 

lot of headlines in very high-profile media outlets. As the commander charged with making the military campaign in Afghanistan successful, what do you consider the most important role as 

it’s supposed to be of SIGAR, and have they been focused on that 

role? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I welcome SIGAR and any other organization. In fact, during my time at U.S. Forces Afghanistan I’ve 

requested inspectors to come over to look at projects. I think, first 

of all, we take stewardship very seriously. I realize I have a responsibility to American taxpayers to make sure that every dollar that’s 

spent in Afghanistan results in capability development and advancement of our interests. So we take that seriously. 

What I’m most interested in is the investigator’s ability to tell me 

how I can save U.S. Government money, what decisions I’m making in the future, as opposed to what might have happened in 

terms of lessons learned. I’m not dismissing lessons learned. Those 

will be important to some future conflict. But for me today as a 

commander, I’m much more interested in the decisions I’m making 

today and the decisions I’ll make tomorrow to make sure those are 

good decisions and make sure they reflect good stewardship. That’s 

where I think the investigators can help me the most. 

Senator INHOFE. Some of the headlines I’m referring to, I’m sure 

you’re aware of them. Do you think they’re all accurate? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think that in many cases they’re 

sensationalized. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, I think they are, too. Does that make your 

job easier? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, it makes it more difficult. We’re in 

the 21st century, the information age, and I think the narrative is 

very important. If there’s a narrative of pessimism, if there’s a narrative of abuse, if there’s a narrative that we’re not good stewards, 

I think that affects our mission. 

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate it and I agree. 

Let me say one thing. I identify with the remarks that Senator 

Graham made about the chairman. In fact, I tried to say that in 

39 

my opening statement, but not nearly as eloquently as Senator 

Graham did. 

Thanks for your great work. 

Senator Graham is recognized. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. Thank you, sir. 

Detainees. I really appreciate the stand you took against the 65 

detainees being released by President Karzai. We have a resolution 

in Congress condemning that action. Do you believe it would be 

helpful for Congress to send a signal that we object to what President Karzai did? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Senator, and I’d like to thank you for 

what you’ve been doing over the last several weeks to ensure we 

sent a very clear message to the Afghan Government. 

Senator GRAHAM. Let the Afghans know that economic aid will 

be cut off if they continue this. 

Could you send the committee a report on the status of detainees—give our guys in the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 

(CJIATF) 435 something to do. I’m sure they’re bored out there. I 

wanted to just shout out to the CJIATF 435. Thank you for all the 

hard work out there. A report on the status of detainees, third 

country nationals. Give the committee some indication of the problems we face between now and July with detainees, so we can 

make informed decisions to help you. Could you do that? 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, Senator. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

INTRODUCTION

Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) 435 has developed a strong collaborative relationship with our highly capable partners in the Afghan National 

Army Military Police Guard Command (MPGC), the National Directorate of Security 

(NDS), the Attorney General’s Office, and members of the court at the Justice Center in Parwan (JCIP). As an integrated justice center, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) entities demonstrates the ability to conduct 

pre-trial confinement, law enforcement investigation, criminal prosecution and posttrial incarceration in accordance with Afghan law and to international standards. 

Though the MPGC still experience challenges in sustainment and some administrative processes, the institutional culture and tactical performance is strong and enduring. Additionally, the JCIP, a secure and reputable court co-located with the 

Parwan detention facility, will soon exhaust its case load of former U.S. captures, 

but has begun processing Afghan detainees captured through primarily partnered 

operations. Continuing logistics and mentoring support is essential to mature this 

important counter-terror court. 

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of this partnership has been hampered since July 

2013 by the troubling behavior of a small number of Afghan political leaders empowered by the GIRoA presidential administration. This behavior has resulted in 

the release of high risk detainees, restrictions to investigative processes, initiation 

of facility transition plans that could precipitate the closure of the Afghan National 

Detention Facility-Parwan (ANDF–P), and the attempted barring of new intakes of 

Afghan detainees subject to Afghan rule of law at the ANDF–P. Most recently, a 

President-ordered commission investigating foreign-operated detention facilities also 

needlessly complicated relations between GIRoA and its allies. These actions call 

into question the commitment of certain Afghan leaders to our enduring partnership, and are detrimental to the security of Afghanistan, the United States, and coalition forces. 

This period of the campaign can be characterized by our attempts to preserve reconciliation space with the future Afghan administration, to maximize the opportunity to establish an enduring National Security Justice Center at Parwan. Despite 

the aforementioned political friction, the Afghans have made steady progress in 

managing detainees since the transfer of detention operations to their authority, to 

include the intake, investigation, and prosecution of detainees. CJIATF 435 provides 

continued assistance to GIRoA for facility operations, security, sustainment planVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Feb 10, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93176.TXT JUNE
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ning, and full-spectrum prosecution and judicial support in order to maintain acceptable standards of secure and humane treatment of detainees and prevent extra 

judicial killings or gross violations of human rights. 

CJIATF 435 currently conducts Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) detention of approximately 50 Third Country National (TCN) detainees at the U.S.-controlled portion of the ANDF–P. We should determine and act on the final disposition of all 

TCN detainees by 31 July 2014 in order to meet retrograde timelines and complete 

disposition instructions prior to the expiration of detention authorities on 31 December 2014. 

The response that follows addresses current challenges associated with the Afghan Review Board’s (ARB) extra-judicial releases of dangerous detainees, the announced transfer of the ANDF–P from Ministry of Defense to Ministry of Interior 

control, the advantages and requirements associated with preserving the JCIP to act 

as a Central National Security Court, and the need to rapidly determine the disposition of TCN detainees. 

AFGHAN REVIEW BOARD EXTRA-JUDICIAL RELEASE OF DANGEROUS DETAINEES

A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on 25 March 2013 between the 

United States and GIRoA established the ARB, a committee designed to transfer detainees from LOAC detention authority to the Afghan constitutional authority, and 

formalized GIRoA’s commitment to continued internment of those detainees designated as Enduring Security Threats (EST). ESTs are defined as detainees assessed to have both the capability and commitment to pose a severe and enduring 

threat to the security of Afghanistan and coalition members, whether inside or outside of Afghanistan. GIRoA Presidential Decree #5 appointed the three ARB members (one of which did not participate). In total, between June 2013 and February 

2014, the United States transferred 890 detainee files to the ARB, but to date the 

panel has used its discretion to order the release of 678 detainees without referral 

to prosecution and judicial review. 

Many of these release decisions were made despite strong incriminating evidence 

against the detainees, showing the earliest indicators of the political, rather than 

security-focused nature of the panel. CJIATF 435 disputed 93 release decisions and 

conducted several key leader engagements with the ARB leadership and other justice sector leaders. When it became evident that the ARB would only change their 

decisions in 5 of the 93 disputed releases, CJIATF 435 recommended that the Commander of International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) exercise the final option provided in the 25 March 2013 MoU, a bilateral exchange of information and 

views with the Minister of Defense. After COMISAF’s engagement with the Minister 

of Defense, GIRoA forwarded all 88 remaining disputed files to the Attorney General for a senior level review, resulting in 65 releases and 23 referrals to prosecution 

in February 2014. We believe some of these released individuals have returned to 

the fight. With no legal consequences, future released detainees will continue to fill 

the ranks of the insurgency. 

These disputed releases and the clear political influence under which the ARB operated fundamentally altered our relationship with a small number of Afghan National Army leaders. It did not, however, damage our strong and growing partnership with most of our Afghan MPGC and Justice sector partners. 

On 23 February 2014, the President of Afghanistan issued a decree nullifying existing agreements with the United States regarding detainees. While the decree announced that the ARB would conclude after reviewing 58 remaining files, it did not 

address the Afghan commitment to continued internment of ESTs. Of the 58 remaining files, 41 are ESTs. CJIATF 435 will dispute the release of any EST, but 

holds little leverage or influence over the ARB and the current administration if 

they remain committed to using detainee disposition as a political tool. Based on 

the current political state, and passage of time since the 65 releases, we believe 

GIRoA could initiate release of a significant portion of the remaining 58 ARB detainees. 

TRANSFER OF ANDF–P FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

The 23 February 2014 President of Afghanistan Decree also announced the transfer of the ‘‘Ministry of Defense (MoD) detention facility at Bagram,’’ the ANDF–P, 

to the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The presidential announcement appears to have 

caused hedging behavior by both MoD and MoI, as MoD sought to keep the MPGC 

within MoD, and only transfer the facilities (i.e., ANDF–P and the ANDF at Pol e 

Charkhi), and MoI has sought to take the facilities, personnel and resources. This 

impasse between ministries could potentially result in an inactive facility, jeopardVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Feb 10, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93176.TXT JUNE
41 

izing both our ability to transfer captures resulting from partnered or counter-terrorism-related operations, and GIRoA’s use of the JCIP. 

Despite the continuing uncertainty regarding the timing of the transfer, CJIATF 

435 is poised to partner with either Ministry to facilitate the eventual transition, 

and ensure the continued confidence in the ability of the Afghans to detain the most 

dangerous security threats to GIRoA and coalition forces, while ensuring humane 

care, custody and control of all detainees in accordance with International Laws. No 

matter which Ministry conducts the pre-trial confinement and post-trial incarceration, NDS stands ready to conduct investigations and the Attorney General’s Office 

to conduct prosecution at the JCIP. 

APRIL 2014 DETENTION FACILITIES INVESTIGATION

On 19 April 2014, the GIRoA President ordered a probe regarding the alleged 

presence of prisons run by foreign soldiers at the Kandahar International Airport. 

The high-level commission included the two members of the ARB, and was led by 

the Commander of the MoD Detention Operations Command. A week later, the commission claimed to the media to have uncovered secret prisons on two coalition 

bases. In truth, every facility that the United States uses for detention is well 

known not only by GIRoA, but also by the International Committee of the Red 

Cross. 

We believe the Presidential order and the commission’s findings are aimed at creating a public perception that the United States and United Kingdom operate illegal 

and secret detention facilities, consistent with the long running theme of Afghan 

sovereignty. 

PRESERVING PROGRESS AT THE JUSTICE CENTER IN PARWAN

Separately, but integral to the Rule of Law, the Afghans continue to make considerable progress at the JCIP. The JCIP, an Afghan court with Afghan judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and investigators has tried more than 6,500 cases with a 

74 percent conviction rate as of April 2014. The JCIP operates inside a secure facility free from the security concerns of many provincial courts. CJIATF 435 and Department of State (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs) 

continue to provide prosecutor mentorship and document lessons learned to encourage and support the use of evidence-based operations and prosecutions throughout 

Afghanistan. 

CJIATF 435 leadership strongly recommends that the strength and synergy of the 

MPGC confinement capabilities, NDS investigative capabilities, and prosecutorial & 

adjudicatory capabilities of the JCIP must be preserved in order to serve as an enduring National Security Justice Center. Many senior Afghan MoD, NDS, Attorney 

General’s Office (AGO), and judicial officials have expressed a significant desire to 

continue the operation of both the JCIP and ANDF–P beyond the ISAF mission, ensuring the proper pre-trial confinement, investigation, and prosecution and posttrial incarceration of individuals who commit terror and insurgency-related crimes. 

The current JCIP jurisdiction includes former U.S. LOAC cases, and has been expanded to include new captures. This approach gives Afghanistan the ability to effectively prosecute and dismantle terror networks, which will improve regional security. When the United States loses its detention authorities at the end of 2014, a 

centralized facility where the most dangerous individuals are detained, investigated, 

and prosecuted remains the most efficient means by which to track, access, and 

prosecute individuals captured in partnered or counterterrorism related operations. 

CJIATF 435 has already resourced a multi-disciplined and functional team that will 

provide continued mentoring to the ANDF–P and JCIP into the Resolute Support 

Mission. 

An Afghan-led Training Team session at the JCIP in April 2014 exemplifies 

JCIP’s enhancing the legitimacy of Afghan Rule of Law. This training enables 

GIRoA to export excellence from its operations at the JCIP to the rest of Afghanistan. Several key Afghan Justice Actors participated including the Director of NDS 

Department 40, the Chief Administrator of the Afghan Supreme Court, the, Chief 

Primary and Appellate Judges of the JCIP, and the JCIP Chief Prosecutor. Also 

over 24 students from NDS, MoI and the Attorney General’s Office participated. 

This training will surely improve Provincial Rule of Law efforts. 

The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is withdrawing personnel in direct support to the JCIP over the course 

of the summer, but intends to fund JCIP sustainment cost through the remainder 

of 2014. Continued U.S. support and funding beyond 2014 is essential for preserving 

and nurturing a robust Central National Security Court. 

42 

DISPOSITION OF THIRD COUNTY NATIONAL DETAINEES UNDER U.S. CONTROL

CJIATF 435 has custody of approximately 50 Third Country Nationals (TCN) 

from over 10 countries at the U.S.-controlled portion of the ANDF–P. CJIATF 435 

is working vigorously with Office of the Secretary of Defense and Department of 

State to resolve the lawful disposition of these TCN cases by 31 July 2014. CJIATF 

435, responsible for coordinating and conducting TCN movement, transfer, and repatriation missions, is scheduled to conclude its mission on or about 1 October 2014, 

and the detainee guard force will depart Afghanistan in early December 2014. Additionally, U.S. authority to detain individuals in Afghanistan under LOAC expires at 

the end of 2014, eliminating any flexibility in shifting disposition deadlines. 

CONCLUSION

Despite political pressure to close detainee facilities, the United States’ and Afghanistan’s best interests are served by keeping the JCIP and ANDF–P functioning 

through 2015 and beyond. CJIATF 435 continues to focus on long term solutions to 

improve the Afghan ability to operate according to the Rule of Law, with a goal of 

Afghan self-sustainability by 2016. The centerpiece of this effort is an enduring and 

robust National Security Justice Center at Parwan capable of pre-trial confinement, 

investigation, prosecution, and post-trial incarceration of National Security Threats. 

There are also critical short-term issues that must be addressed, including the 

continued detention of ESTs and the rather urgent need to obtain dispositions for 

the remaining TCN detainees. In light of the key detention and Rule of Law issues 

outlined above, Congress can greatly assist with both security and justice in Afghanistan by: (1) providing sufficient funding and support for the JCIP in order to bolster 

Afghan security and public confidence in the Afghan judicial system; (2) clearly communicating its desires regarding the proper disposition of ESTs; and (3) providing 

timely review and approval of TCN dispositions. 

Senator GRAHAM. Finally, as to the war itself. This is an ideological struggle, do you agree? There’s no nation state to conquer. 

When it comes to radical Islam, there’s no capital to conquer, 

there’s no air force to shoot down, there’s no navy to sink. We’re 

in an ideological battle with radical Islamists, right? 

General DUNFORD. I agree with that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. When I say ‘‘we,’’ it’s most of the Muslim 

world. It’s not just us. Most of the Muslim world is in a battle with 

these guys. 

General DUNFORD. Our coalition partners as well. 

Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely. So what you’re trying to tell us is 

that the best way to keep this war away from our Homeland is to 

have lines of defense throughout the world. These lines of defense 

would be places like Afghanistan that had a stable government, 

stable, improving economy, and security forces willing to fight the 

radicals. That’s part of America’s defense strategy, do you agree 

with that? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Senator. Terrorists thrive in ungoverned 

spaces and that’s what we’re trying to do in Afghanistan, is ensure 

it’s not an ungoverned space. 

Senator GRAHAM. So I don’t know when the war will end. Radical 

extremist movements are marginalized over time, would you agree, 

by better education, better economic opportunity in the areas they 

operate? The biggest blow really to the Taliban and al Qaeda is 

girls going to school. 

General DUNFORD. I agree with that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. People making their own choices. I know that’s 

complicated and frustrating for us, but if we will invest in the people who are willing to fight the terrorists along our side, in their 

back yard, I think we would be smart. 

43 

Now, Afghanistan under Taliban control and 30 years of previous 

civil war was a devastated nation, is that fair to say? 

General DUNFORD. It is fair to say. 

Senator GRAHAM. What happened in 2001, a year later when we 

cleaned out the place, was a devastated society, absolutely no infrastructure. 

General DUNFORD. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. I remember going to Kabul and there were just 

a very few lights. You go today, it’s almost like Myrtle Beach. I like 

Myrtle Beach. It’s a very vibrant place. 

Lots of challenges, but there’s two ways to look at Afghanistan, 

where we started and where we are today. Would you agree with 

me, in many ways it’s amazing they’ve come as far as they have? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I absolutely believe that. I think if 

just a few years ago we would have described Afghanistan in 2014, 

I think very few people would have believed we would be where we 

are today. 

Senator GRAHAM. I would be among those few. 

Now, there’s two ways to look at this, what they haven’t done 

and how far they’ve come and what they’re capable of doing. I believe the capability of the Afghan people is fairly unlimited when 

it comes to reforming Afghanistan. It’s just going to take time. Do 

you agree with that proposition? 

General DUNFORD. I do. Given the opportunity, Senator, I’ve seen 

them accomplish an extraordinary amount in a short time. 

Senator GRAHAM. The key ingredient here is will and desire. 

General DUNFORD. This is a clash of wills, there’s no question. 

Senator GRAHAM. The Afghan people have the will and desire to 

move out of the darkness into the light; is that a fair statement? 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, Senator. It reflects in the popularity rate of the Taliban, where they probably get somewhere between 11 and 15 percent at the highest in terms of the numbers 

of Afghan people who actually support the Taliban ideology. 

Senator GRAHAM. How does al Qaeda poll? 

General DUNFORD. We don’t have an al Qaeda poll, Senator, but 

I suspect it would be much lower. 

Senator GRAHAM. Probably like some percentage below that, yes. 

So the bottom line here is that the ace in the hole for America 

is that most people in Afghanistan do not want to go back to the 

dark days of the Taliban. They want to go forward. They want a 

different world. It won’t be like America. This is not Jeffersonian 

democracy. But it can be representative government. They can be 

a good ally. Don’t you believe that? 

General DUNFORD. I believe that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. So from the American people’s point of view, 

I hope you understand that we’re trying to build defenses abroad 

and let armies abroad do the fighting with minimal help from us, 

to keep the enemy at bay from attacking us, because the goal of 

al Qaeda is not just to control Afghanistan, it’s to drive us out of 

the region, right? 

General DUNFORD. That’s exactly the plan for transition. 

Senator GRAHAM. To drive us out of the region and leave that 

part of the world in their hands, and the economic chaos that that 

would create would be unimaginable. Do you agree with that? 

44 

General DUNFORD. I do, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. From an economic perspective, the United 

States has a great interest in making sure that that part of the 

world is stable. 

General DUNFORD. I think if you look at the cost of September 

11, you can make that argument very easily. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you also agree that if you’re wanting to 

deter the Iranians from acquiring a nuclear capability, if we abandon Afghanistan, that’s the worst possible signal you could send to 

the Iranians about our resolve regarding national security matters? 

General DUNFORD. I think it would have a destabilizing effect on 

the region. 

Senator GRAHAM. The Iranians would be one of the biggest winners of an unstable Afghanistan. 

General DUNFORD. I believe so, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you and all of those under your command for extraordinary service. You’ve done a great job. We’re inside the 10-yard line; do you believe that? 

General DUNFORD. We are in the red zone, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. We’re in the red zone and we can score if we 

don’t call the wrong play. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Senator Levin will be back shortly, so we will stand down until 

he gets back. 

[Recess from 10:48 a.m. to 10:54 a.m.] 

Chairman LEVIN. General, thank you for your patience here. I’m 

not sure that any of my colleagues are coming back. I just have a 

couple of additional questions for you. I hope that if the staffs are 

aware of any Senators that are coming back they would let us 

know. I don’t think there are, in which case we could end fairly 

promptly. 

I talked to you in my office about a couple of incidents that occurred fairly recently during military operations. I think it’s important when these incidents happen, some of which are truly tragic, 

that there be a prompt response on the part of our military. 

The first is that radio station raid in Logar Province. Allegedly, 

our SOF scaled the walls of a compound, seized the owner of a 

radio station, and then beat and threatened him during an interrogation. What can you tell us about that raid? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that raid is under investigation. I actually would prefer not to talk about it publicly now, but could in 

private. I reviewed the draft report of the investigation last night, 

actually after we spoke. I got the initial results from the commander, our SOF commander. I think some time in the next couple 

of days we’ll have the facts out. 

Chairman LEVIN. That was on the radio station? 

General DUNFORD. That’s on the radio station. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, there was also a friendly fire incident in 

eastern Afghanistan where it was reported that a NATO air strike 

resulted in the friendly fire deaths of five Afghan army soldiers, I 

think also in Logar Province. Can you tell us about that incident? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that was clearly an incident of what 

we call blue on green. It was our aviation capability and there were 

45 

Afghan soldiers that were unfortunately killed. Again, the investigation is just about complete, so I can’t speak publicly about that. 

We’ll have the facts here in a couple of days, but in all honesty, 

Senator, something happened that should not have happened. 

Chairman LEVIN. We’ve been working with the Afghans on that 

to try to remedy the losses to the extent that we can? 

General DUNFORD. Very closely working with the Afghan leadership, to both investigate and also to take care of the families of the 

fallen. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

46 


312ful1.eps
47 

Chairman LEVIN. General, I had a chance to chat with a number 

of my colleagues running back and forth to vote and they unanimously, everyone that I spoke to, react the way I do to your service 

and your testimony. Most importantly, your testimony is compelling, your service is truly extraordinary over these decades. We all 

feel that way, and we just want to thank you. We want to thank 

your family. I know that we had a chance to spend a few minutes 

with your wife last night. We hope you also had an opportunity to 

spend a few minutes with your wife. In a few days, maybe you can 

find a few hours with your family, away from your huge challenges 

in Afghanistan. But we are deeply grateful to you and to all the 

men and women with whom you serve. Thank you. 

With that, we will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:59 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

1. Senator REED. General Dunford, could you indicate if there is a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) concluded to the satisfaction of both sides, your estimate of 

how long the residual force will stay in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. With the strategic partnership between the United States and 

Afghanistan reinforced with a BSA, I am confident the bulk of our residual force 

would return home by the end of 2016. This additional 2-year period will allow us 

to ensure our years of support are reinforced with a focused train, advise, and assist 

effort, as well as enhanced development of the Afghan Security Ministries. The BSA 

will demonstrate our mutual commitment and advance our efforts. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

AFGHAN LITERACY PROGRAM

2. Senator NELSON. General Dunford, in your estimation, how important is the 

Afghan Literacy Program (ALP) to the viability of the Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF), with or without U.S. presence in 2015? 

General DUNFORD. The ALP is fundamental to the professionalization of the 

ANSF. This program is requisite for the training and education system for targeted 

career paths, service progression, and professionalization within the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). As such, the ALP is fundamental to the long-term viability of the ANSF. As the ANA conduct advanced 

training on more complex tasks and equipment, a targeted literacy program will be 

essential for future professional development. Furthermore, literacy is the underpinning of the ANP’s basic execution of rule of law. The ANP must be functionally literate to enforce the law, investigate crime, and report findings. 

The current ALP, funded by coalition forces, will conclude by the end of 2014, having trained most of the ANSF to Literacy Level 1, but no more than 20 percent to 

Level 3. In order to progress to future professional force with appropriate levels of 

literacy, institutional literacy training is essential for targeted specialties of incoming ANSF. Additionally, the ANSF require a Train-the-Trainer (T3) program, to develop an organic literacy training capability. An ongoing literacy program, led by the 

Afghans, is the key to enable the ANSF to be self-sufficient and eventually become 

independent from foreign support for increasing and maintaining their literacy capabilities. Regardless of U.S. presence in 2015, the ALP is critical to the 

professionalization of the ANSF. 

3. Senator NELSON. General Dunford, if the BSA is signed, would you support 

dedicating additional resources to the oversight of the ALP? 

General DUNFORD. In December 2013, Afghan Barez HR Services Company was 

contracted by NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM–A) for the Literacy Oversight Inspection Activity to ensure the existing quality and quantity of ongoing ALP 

for the ANSF. The key inspection task of this oversight instrument is to monitor 

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stan. The oversight mission will also ensure that NTM–A’s literacy programs are 

in compliance with the Afghan Ministry of Education (MoE) developed standards 

and literacy curriculum. Until now, this oversight contract and the onsite inspections of NTM–A’s advisor teams have provided sufficient quality control for the current ALP. Shifting the focus to institutional literacy training from country-wide to 

centralized training at training centers will further improve oversight quality. Additionally, there is increased interest in providing ANSF tashkil positions for ANSF 

literacy instructors, increasing literacy site visits, and developing a literacy-level 

tracking system. As a result of the demonstrated progress and continued program 

management initiatives there is no need to dedicate additional resources to the oversight of the ANSF ALP. 

4. Senator NELSON. General Dunford, in its recent report to Congress, the Special 

Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction cited an abuse of the system from an 

unidentified contractor who billed for ‘‘multiple classes at one site that could have 

been combined into one class.’’ To the best of your knowledge, were these poor practices conducted by one, some, or all of the literacy contractors? 

General DUNFORD. The old literacy training contracts allowed OT Training Solutions, Inc., Insight Group, and Higher Education Institute of Karwan to bill for each 

class where instruction was provided rather than for the number of hours taught 

in each class. Additionally, the contracts did not clearly define a minimum class 

size. This lack of clarity in the tasks order allowed one contractor to bill for multiple 

classes held at the same location that logically could have been combined into a single class. The new contracts currently in place establish a minimum class size and 

include more strict oversight controls to safeguard available fiscal resources. 

5. Senator NELSON. General Dunford, can you provide recommendations for addressing these concerns in future contracts? 

General DUNFORD. Based on past experience and lessons learned, we have significantly revised the ongoing ANSF training provided in the literacy and language program by updating the task order awards under three current contracts, which are 

valid until the end of 2014. The new contracts are now of shorter terms, have a narrower spectrum of application, and include a more strict metrics framework. As an 

example, contractors are now paid a fixed amount for measurable performance and 

we established a 10 student minimum for class size in order for contractors to be 

paid. This has already resulted in substantial savings and higher confidence that 

the ANSF are receiving the literacy training that donor nations have paid for. Finally, we observed all applicable rules and regulations in the awarding of these latest contracts to include the conduct of background checks on the contractors. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

NO CONTRACTING WITH THE ENEMY

6. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, last year you testified that it is critical to 

expand No Contracting with the Enemy authorities to the Department of State 

(DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Is that still 

your view? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. 

7. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, why do you believe it is important that 

other Federal agencies, including DOS and USAID, are given No Contracting with 

the Enemy fiscal year 2012, section 841, authorities? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. 

8. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, on March 6, General Austin testified that 

these authorities have been used to save taxpayers $31 million and have prevented 

those funds from going to our enemies. Is that your understanding as well? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. 

9. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, when was the last contract terminated in 

Afghanistan using these authorities? 

General DUNFORD. The last time we used section 841 authorities to terminate a 

contract in Afghanistan was January 2013. This was the last time that a contractor 

that was determined to meet the statutory criteria was involved in an active contract or bidding on a new contract supporting our operations. Since then, in addition 

to developing 841 actions, we have used our vendor vetting process to assess thouVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Feb 10, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93176.TXT JUNE
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sands of relevant contractors and their key personnel, and to preempt a specified 

subset of such contractors from being considered for contracts, fully consistent with 

the intent of section 841. 

10. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, how many cases are pending? 

General DUNFORD. We have eight potential section 841 cases that we are currently conducting extensive research as part of the process. 

11. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, how long have they been pending? 

General DUNFORD. The proposals have been in coordination for a range of 3 to 

6 months. The variations, and the timeline itself, have been driven by intelligence 

updates and the recrafting of the coordination process (see answer to question 10 

for more details). 

A–10

12. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, at the November 7, 2013, sequestration 

hearing before this committee, General Odierno said regarding the A–10 that, ‘‘I believe it is the Department of Defense’s best Close Air Support (CAS) platform.’’ At 

the same hearing, he also said, ‘‘Our soldiers are very confident in the system as 

it goes forward. It’s a great CAS aircraft.’’ How has the A–10 performed in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. The A–10’s performance in Afghanistan has been very effective. 

13. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, the Air Force has said the A–10 has a 1 

to 2 minutes faster re-attack time than other aircraft. In a danger close situation 

in which American soldiers or marines are about to be overrun by the enemy, can 

1 to 2 minutes be the difference between life and death? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. 

14. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, is the A–10 particularly effective at performing some kinds of CAS missions in Afghanistan—such as missions involving 

danger close engagements, bad weather, rugged terrain, and moving targets? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. 

15. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, from January 1, 2002, to January 1, 2014, 

in Afghanistan, how many mission reports have been filed by A–10s? 

General DUNFORD. Mission reports are collected by the Coalition Forces Air Component Commander, therefore this question would be best answered by U.S. Central 

Command (CENTCOM). 

16. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, from January 1, 2002, to January 1, 2014, 

in Afghanistan, how many CAS employments with nine lines? 

General DUNFORD. The joint force air component database does not delineate CAS 

missions by nine-line provision. Additionally, the database only contains Operation 

Enduring Freedom (OEF) kinetic attack data since 2009. For Afghanistan CAS missions, a comparison of targets struck by kinetic munitions provides the best approximation of nine-lines provided, though nine-lines are also provided for targets which 

are then addressed by non-kinetic means. Between January 1, 2009, and December 

31, 2013, there were 7,599 kinetic events. For targets where kinetic munitions were 

employed, A–10s attacked 24 percent of these targets while other aircraft attacked 

76 percent of these targets. 

17. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, from January 1, 2002, to January 1, 2014, 

in Afghanistan, what percentage of the total number of CAS employments with nine 

lines did the A–10 carry out? 

General DUNFORD. The joint force air component database does not delineate CAS 

missions by nine-line provision. Additionally, the database only contains OEF kinetic attack data since 2009. For Afghanistan CAS missions, a comparison of targets 

struck by kinetic munitions provides the best approximation of nine-lines provided, 

though nine-lines are also provided for targets which are then addressed by nonkinetic means. For targets where kinetic munitions were employed, A–10s attacked 

24 percent of these targets while other aircraft attacked 76 percent of these targets. 

50 

IRANIAN ACTIVITY IN AFGHANISTAN

18. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, has Iran provided assistance, weapons, or 

training to insurgents in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, we believe Iran provides measured assistance, weapons, 

and training to insurgents in Afghanistan, likely since at least 2002. Iran has historically backed Tajik and Shi’a groups opposed to the Afghan Taliban, but tensions 

and enmity with the West have driven Tehran to provide measured support to insurgents in Afghanistan. Over the years, coalition forces have seized several large 

weapons shipments near the Iranian border that were almost certainly of Iranian 

origin. Iran likely is also training insurgents inside Iranian territory. Iran calibrates 

the size and scope of the lethal aid it provides the insurgency, likely so the insurgents can target International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and coalition forces 

more effectively. 

19. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, what role is Iran playing now in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Iran likely is pursuing a multi-tiered strategy in Afghanistan. 

Iran is improving relations with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) while supporting the insurgency to hinder coalition efforts. Tehran’s 

outreach to Kabul is centered on diplomacy and economic aid, in an attempt to minimize western presence and influence in Afghanistan. Iran’s President Rouhani, who 

assumed office in August 2013, has used softer rhetoric than his predecessor to try 

and improve bilateral relations and outreach to Afghan Shia communities. In December 2013, Tehran and Kabul announced they will sign a bilateral ‘‘Friendship 

and Cooperation’’ pact to bolster security cooperation, trade, and cultural exchanges 

and further solidify their relationship. This agreement is still in negotiation. 

20. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, what is Iran doing in western Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Iran and Afghanistan have a long, shared history of cultural, 

linguistic, socio-economic, and religious ties. Tehran considers western Afghanistan, 

especially the city of Herat, as an integral part of Iranian territory within its natural sphere of influence. Iran is trying to develop better relations with GIRoA 

through the use of diplomacy and economic aid, likely in an attempt to minimize 

western presence and influence in western Afghanistan. Since 2001, Iran has provided likely hundreds of millions of dollars to support Afghanistan’s reconstruction 

and economic development, primarily in western Afghanistan and Herat Province, 

where Iran maintains a diplomatic consulate. 

AFGHAN DETAINEES

21. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, on February 13, 2014, the Karzai Government released 65 detainees from the Afghan National Detention Facility at Parwan. 

Have some of these detainees resumed terrorist activities? 

General DUNFORD. While it is possible, at this time, we do not have any credible 

indications that any of the 65 detainees released from the Afghan National Detention Facility on February 13 resumed terrorist or insurgent activities. 

22. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, I understand there are an additional 23 

detainees of this type still being held by the Afghan Government at the Parwan facility. Do we know what the Afghan Government plans do with them? 

General DUNFORD. It is our understanding that the additional 23 detainees have 

been referred for prosecution at the Justice Center in Parwan and are pending 

criminal trial. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE LEE

POST-2014 MISSION

23. Senator LEE. General Dunford, is it correct to say our military leaders believe 

we need a residual force in Afghanistan because the Afghan Government and the 

ANSF are currently unable to defeat insurgents and maintain stability in the country without international assistance? 

General DUNFORD. The ANSF’s improving capabilities in 2013 and the first quarter of 2014 were demonstrated in large and complex combat operations across the 

country. Due to existing capability gaps and developmental shortfalls, the ANSF relied on ISAF for enabler support, particularly in the areas of close air support, casVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Feb 10, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93176.TXT JUNE
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ualty evacuation, logistics, counter-improvised explosive device (IED), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. On balance, after watching the ANSF respond to a variety of challenges over the past year, I do not believe the Talibanled insurgency represents an existential threat to GIRoA or the ANSF. However, 

while the ANSF’s performance shows they require less ISAF assistance in conducting security operations, they do need a great deal of help in developing sustainable systems, processes, and institutions necessary to run a modern, professional 

Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI), army, and police force. Absent 

that support, I believe the ANSF and security conditions will deteriorate. 

24. Senator LEE. General Dunford, would you characterize a post-2014 mission in 

Afghanistan as one that is focused on stabilizing Afghanistan from internal and regional threats, or one where our forces are engaged against terror organizations that 

are plotting against the United States? 

General DUNFORD. Our objective for Afghanistan beyond 2014 remains developing 

a sustainable, inclusive, and increasingly stable political order committed to and capable of denying safe haven to al Qaeda. Our post-2014 mission will be focused on 

developing ANSF sustainability so they can deny sanctuary to terrorists in Afghanistan. 

25. Senator LEE. General Dunford, what strategic goals would a residual force be 

tasked with accomplishing? 

General DUNFORD. A residual force would be tasked with preventing the enemy 

from attacking the homeland and continue to build sustainable partnerships that 

would protect national interests from potential threats from the region. By investing 

in the stability of the Afghan Government and the ANSF, we create another layer 

of defense against those whom try to bring harm to the United States. The reductions in ungoverned spaces that exist limit the enemy’s freedom of movement and 

action. A stable Afghanistan can contribute to the reduction of those spaces and contribute in the aggregate to denying enemies access to the homeland and ultimately 

neutralizing terrorist networks. 

26. Senator LEE. General Dunford, what are the direct threats to U.S. national 

security currently in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Although weakened and pressured by U.S. counterterrorism efforts, al Qaeda and its affiliates, especially the Haqqani Network, continue to operate in Afghanistan and the region. Al Qaeda still holds ambitions to attack the 

United States and its interests. Due to constant pressure from counterterrorism operations, al Qaeda is now focused on survival. While they have been reduced to 

numbers much smaller than those before September 11, al Qaeda still remains a 

threat to the United States. Without continued pressure, al Qaeda will regenerate 

and once again directly threaten the United States and its interests. 

27. Senator LEE. General Dunford, generally speaking, how will any mission beyond 2014 be different than the mission that we are executing there today? 

General DUNFORD. We will transition from conducting operations and combat advising to ensuring the current progress is enduring by building the long-term sustainability of the Afghan forces. Although the Afghans require less support in conducting security operations, they still need assistance in maturing the systems, the 

processes, and the institutions necessary to support a modern ANA and ANP. To 

address these areas, a train, advise, and assist mission will be necessary after this 

year to further develop Afghan self-sustainment. ISAF are re-orienting from unitlevel combat advising to functionally-based advising. At the security ministries, this 

means improving capacity and institutionalizing transparent planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition processes. In the fielded force, advisors will focus 

on specific capability gaps in aviation, intelligence, and special operations enterprises. At all levels, our advisors will work to improve Afghan transparency and accountability of donor resources, and development of the ‘‘connective tissue’’ which 

ties the ministerial level to the operational and tactical level. A continued counterterrorism mission will also be needed to ensure al Qaeda remains focused on survival and not on regeneration. Without continued counterterrorism pressure, an 

emboldened al Qaeda will not only begin to physically reconstitute but they will also 

exploit their perceived victory to boost recruitment, fund raising, and morale. 

52 

MINISTERIAL DEVELOPMENT

28. Senator LEE. General Dunford, how are we measuring the progress of the Afghan Government and the ANSF to determine if they still need international assistance? That is to say, what accomplishment or achievements would lead you to say 

we no longer need to have forces there? 

General DUNFORD. The ISAF advisory networks within the MoD, MoI, and the 

ANSF measure progress based on eight essential functions: 

1. Plan, Program, Budget, and Execute; generate requirements, develop a resource informed budget, and execute a spend plan 

2. Internal controls to assure Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight 

3. Civilian governance of the Afghan Security Institutions (ASI), including adherence to the rule of law 

4. Force generate; train, retain, manage, and develop a professional ANSF 

5. Sustain the force through effective facilities management, maintenance, medial, and logistics systems 

6. Plan, resource, and execute effective security campaigns and operations 

a. Inter-ministerial and joint coordination 

b. Command, control, and employ Ground, Air, and Special Operating Forces 

7. Sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes 

8. Maintain internal and external strategic communication capability 

ISAF forces are re-orienting from unit-level combat advising to functionally-based 

advising. Focus has shifted from building the force to building ASI long-term sustainability. At the security ministries, this means improving capacity, and institutionalizing transparent planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition processes. At all levels within the different security pillars—army, police, and intelligence service—advisors are working to improve integration. In the fielded force, 

advisors will focus on specific capability gaps in aviation, intelligence, and special 

operations enterprises. They will also focus on developmental shortfalls in areas like 

logistics, medical, and counter-IED. At all levels, our advisors will work to improve 

Afghan transparency and accountability of donor resources, and development of the 

‘‘connective tissue’’ which ties the ministerial level to the operational and tactical 

level. 

Assuming Chicago Summit resources and limited advisory support, our mission 

would be successful when the ASI and ANSF can execute and integrate the eight 

essential functions in order to meet Afghan security objectives and serve as an effective counterterrorism partner. 

INSURGENT AND AL QAEDA THREAT

29. Senator LEE. General Dunford, what is the goal of insurgent groups who are 

fighting against our forces in Afghanistan? Do they seek to overthrow and replace 

the government, carve out and control certain territory, or attack the United States 

and other western targets? 

General DUNFORD. The overall goal of the Taliban-led insurgency is to eject foreign forces, remove the democratically-elected Afghan Government, and reestablish 

the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate. Most of the other insurgent groups in Afghanistan, 

while also pursuing localized interests, largely support this goal. This includes the 

Haqqani Network, which we assess will seek control over the Paktika, Paktiya, and 

Khost areas of Afghanistan under a Taliban-led government. We have no indications 

the Taliban insurgency has the intent or plans to attack the United States or other 

western targets outside of Afghanistan, and we assess they will remain Afghanistan-focused post 2014. 

30. Senator LEE. General Dunford, can you give me details about how insurgent 

groups are recruiting and training fighters to fight against Afghan and international 

forces, including the insurgency’s make-up according to nationality and if the numbers of insurgents are increasing or decreasing? 

General DUNFORD. Insurgent fighters are largely locally Afghan-based, and join 

the Taliban-led insurgency for a multitude of reasons, to include: pressure to join 

out of tribal or family affiliation; a sense of religious or national pride to remove 

foreign forces; money, power, or a position of power; a sense of disenfranchisement 

with the current government; or they simply have no other options available to 

them to provide for their families. Other recruits come from religious schools or 

madrassas, some of which are located in Pakistan, where they are inculcated with 

insurgent values and perceptions. Most of the training for these recruits occurs in 

the insurgency’s Pakistan sanctuary along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border over the 

53 

winter months, where they learn basic small unit tactics and IED construction and 

emplacement. While the insurgency is overwhelmingly Afghan in nationality, ethnic 

Pashtun and Baloch Pakistani nationals have contributed recruits. We lack insight 

into definitive numbers of fighters in the insurgency, hindering our ability to accurately assess whether recruiting is increasing or decreasing to any significant degree. However, we expect a successful election and the transition from ISAF to Resolute Support (and the corresponding decrease in visibility of foreign forces) will remove several key motives for Afghans to join the insurgency. 

31. Senator LEE. General Dunford, what efforts are being made by coalition forces 

and Afghanistan to fight the recruitment and training efforts of insurgent forces, 

and have they been successful? 

General DUNFORD. The primary efforts to fight recruitment of insurgent forces are 

Afghan led with media campaigns highlighting the ANA and ANP to underscore 

that these are good Afghans and therefore provide a stark contrast to the Taliban 

recruiting efforts. The supporting coalition efforts are generally classified. The results are captured quarterly through national surveys that ask about Afghans’ opinions of the Taliban. In March 2014, 76.5 percent indicated that it would be bad if 

the Taliban returned to power, up from 74.9 percent in December 2013. 

REGIONAL CONCERNS

32. Senator LEE. General Dunford, is Pakistan working in a way that helps or 

hinders the mission in Afghanistan, and do you expect their behavior to change any 

as we draw down our troop strength? 

General DUNFORD. Pakistan both helps and hinders the mission in Afghanistan. 

Prime Minister Sharif’s government assumed office in mid-2013 and has sought to 

increase engagement with Afghanistan, to include multiple direct meetings between 

President Karzai and Sharif. Islamabad has publicly declared its support for GIRoA 

and the ISAF mission. Further, Pakistan is cooperating on ISAF retrograde operations and some counterterrorism activities targeting al Qaeda. Pakistan has made 

some progress interdicting and disrupting the production of IED components, but 

still falls short on stemming the flow of these components into Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Islamabad allows al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and the Haqqani Network 

sanctuary inside Pakistan. The Taliban and Haqqani Network use this sanctuary 

to launch attacks into Afghanistan targeting U.S., coalition, and GIRoA forces. 

Cross-border incidents and lingering mistrust remain points of tension in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations and both countries continue to question each other’s commitments to advancing a political settlement in Afghanistan. 

33. Senator LEE. General Dunford, what is your assessment of the relationship 

between the Government of Afghanistan and Iran, separately the relationship between the Taliban and Iran, and the influence of Iran in the country? 

General DUNFORD. I believe this question would be best answered by CENTCOM. 

34. Senator LEE. General Dunford, do you believe the influence of Iran in Afghanistan is undermining U.S. security efforts, and does the relationship between the Afghan Government and Iran put our servicemembers in danger? 

General DUNFORD. At the strategic level, Iran’s influence in Afghanistan is not 

substantial enough to undermine U.S. security efforts. Iran provides calibrated lethal aid and training to insurgents, which in turn allows insurgents to threaten U.S. 

and coalition forces at the tactical level. However, Iran is likely unwilling to provide 

enough insurgent support to challenge GIRoA or the U.S. overall security efforts. 

Iran’s support to insurgents is likely part of Iran’s traditional practice to provide 

support—monetary, lethal, and political—to a variety of parties, thus ensuring influence in any future Afghan Government. Iran’s relationship with the Afghan Government is likely driven, in 2014, to curtail or minimize the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. While any support Iran provides to the insurgency sustains violence against 

ANSF and ISAF, Iran’s relationship with Afghan Government does not put our 

servicemembers in any greater danger beyond the established insurgency and insurgent Pakistani Taliban. 

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

35. Senator LEE. General Dunford, are we fully accounting for the proper use and 

maintenance of these projects, and much like the ANSF, will the Afghan Government eventually be able to financially sustain this infrastructure on their own? 

54 

General DUNFORD. Over the course of a decade, the United States and its coalition 

partners initiated $8.5 billion in new construction projects to provide the ANSF adequate facilities to protect the Afghan people. Last summer, the ANSF assumed lead 

for Afghanistan’s security allowing the coalition to vacate hundreds of temporary facilities. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR–A) remains committed to being a good 

steward of taxpayers’ dollars. In the last year, USFOR–A’s actions have saved between $600 million to $800 million in planned funding, in part, by offsetting new 

construction with the transfer of these existing coalition bases. 

The long lead times in construction have not always kept pace with the changing 

security environment and operational needs of the ANSF. As a result, the coalition 

has completed construction on some infrastructure projects that the Afghans are not 

fully utilizing. Just as requirements, priorities, and funding levels evolve, USFOR– 

A constantly reevaluates and adjusts the ANSF infrastructure program to meet current basing needs and provide the flexibility to meet a range of likely future requirements. 

Our current focus is on helping our Afghan partners develop and execute strategies to sustain all these facilities in an affordable manner. This Security Force Assistance effort includes building the ministerial processes and capabilities of the Afghan security institutions, particularly in resource management and facilities 

sustainment. With coalition advisors assistance, our Afghan partners are determining sustainment, restoration, and modernization requirements. We will continue 

to advise our efforts as they prioritize these requirements and make hard choices 

of what capabilities they will fund in a fiscally constrained environment. 

AFGHAN ELECTIONS

36. Senator LEE. General Dunford, President Karzai will be out of office by the 

end of this year. How closely are you and other military and diplomatic leaders 

working with the candidates who could potentially become the next President? 

General DUNFORD. The U.S. Embassy has been working very closely with the candidates. 

37. Senator LEE. General Dunford, do you perceive the transition of power to 

cause much disruption of the day-to-day military cooperation between U.S. and Afghan forces? 

General DUNFORD. Every transition of power requires careful attention to continuity. There will be turnover in ANSF leadership as a result of the election, although the specifics of that turnover are unclear at this time. However, I do not 

anticipate any major negative impact on day-to-day military cooperation. By word 

and deed we have consistently communicated to our Afghan partners that we are 

entirely agnostic about the outcome of the election, our sole objective being a secure 

and inclusive election for the Afghan people. In turn, the ANSF have, to date, taken 

as their duty the very same objective. Because of well-established working relationships, based on mutual trust with our Afghan partners at all levels, we will continue to meet our challenges together while Afghanistan’s higher-order political dynamics play out. At the same time, indicative of their increasing professionalism, 

the Afghans are developing depth in their leadership, so that even with turnover, 

allowing for adjustments on both sides, I anticipate maintaining continuity in military cooperation. 

FUNDING

38. Senator LEE. General Dunford, I asked Secretary Hagel last week if Overseas 

Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for Afghanistan would be reduced proportionally to the number of troops that remain. He and Secretary Hale answered that 

OCO funding would be reduced, but not at a proportional level because of equipment that needs to be retrograded and modernized from the conflict. How much do 

you estimate the removal of this equipment from the Afghan theater and the necessary retrograde work will cost? 

General DUNFORD. It will cost approximately $1.52 billion (from the date of the 

question until December 31, 2014) to retrograde remaining U.S. equipment from Afghanistan, in accordance with current planning assumptions about enduring force 

presence, size, and disposition. This estimate does not include Service-specific costs 

for reset of equipment, second destination costs within the continental United States 

or modernization costs. All of these costs would have to be provided independently 

by the Services and are not estimable by USFOR–A. 

55 

39. Senator LEE. General Dunford, what proportion of equipment coming out of 

Afghanistan needs to be modernized for future use? 

General DUNFORD. Service-specific modernization needs for equipment coming out 

of Afghanistan would be best answered by the Services and are not estimable by 

USFOR–A. 

40. Senator LEE. General Dunford, how much has the activity of Pakistan over 

the past several years, such as the closure of the Ground Lines of Communication 

in 2012, increased the cost of equipment retrograde? 

General DUNFORD. I believe this question would be best answered by CENTCOM. 

41. Senator LEE. General Dunford, can you provide me with a comprehensive 

analysis about the increase of costs due to Pakistan? 

General DUNFORD. I believe this question would be best answered by CENTCOM. 

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