F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

F L O R E N C I O J O S E D O M I

N G U E Z , Petitioner-Appellant

,

v

.

S C O T T K E R

N A N , Secretary

of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

Respondent-Appellee. N o. 18-55209

D.C. No. 3:14-cv-02890- B AS-RB B

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Cy nthia A. B a shant, District J u dg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted J une 8, 2018 Pasadena, California

F iled October 23, 2018

B efore: Ray

mond C. F isher and Morg an Christen, Circuit J udg e s, and Edward F . Shea, District J udg e. *

O pinion by

J udg e F isher

* T h e Ho n o rab le Ed w ard F

. Sh ea, U n i ted States District J u d g e f o r th e Eastern District o f

W ash i n g to n , sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 2

SUMMARY * *

Habeas Corpus

The panel vaca ted the district court’s dismissal o f F lorencio Doming uez ’ s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 hab eas corpus petition asserting that the state of California’s second prosecution of him violates the Double J eopardy Clause, a nd remanded.

Doming uez was charg ed with murder. After his trial ended in a hung jury

, th e t r i a l court dismissed the c ase a nd the state filed a new complaint, charg ing Doming u e z w i th murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Doming u ez filed

a demurrer, arg uing the second prosecution violated his rig hts under the Double J eopardy Clause and California law, but the trial court overruled his demurrer, and Doming uez was tried and convicted. Doming uez then a sserted his double jeopardy claim in the § 2254 petition. While that p etition was p ending

, the state trial court vacated Doming uez ’s c o n victions under B r a d y v. Maryland

, 373 U .S. 83 (1963), and the state h a s elected to retry him on the c harg e of cons p i r a c y to commit murde r

. The state placed Doming uez in pretrial custody

, where he remains. Citing the state court’s decision vacating the earlier convic t i o ns, the d istrict court dismissed Doming uez ’s federal habeas petition as moot.

The panel held that D oming uez ’s petition is n o t m o o t. T h e p a n el ex plained that the p etition continues to present a live controversy because he remains in custody

, continues to

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 3

claim he is in custody in violation of t h e Constitution of the U n i t ed States, and c ontinues to present precisely the sa m e leg al claim that he presented w h en his petition was filed

– that the state’s second prosecution of h im, which remains
ong oing

, violates his f

ederal constitutional rig ht not to be twice placed in jeopardy

for the same offense.

The panel also held that because Doming u e z ’s detention is no long er attributable to a state court judg ment, proceeding under § 2254 is no long er appropriate, and he is free to seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) and (c)(3) instead.

The panel held that, to proceed under § 2241, Doming uez is not required to dismiss h i s § 2 2 5 4 petition and f ile a new petition u nder § 2241. T h e panel held that just as a court may convert a § 2241 petition to a § 2254 p etition when a pretrial detainee is convicted while a petition is pending

, a court has the authority to convert a § 2 254 pe t i t i o n i nto a § 2241 petition when, as here, a petitioner’s convictions a re vacated during the pendency of the petition an d t he petitioner has become a pretrial detainee. The pane l i nstructed that the di s t rict court on remand shall, e ither upon Doming uez ’s request o r at the court’s initiation but with Doming uez ’s consent, convert the p etition to one arising under § 2241. The panel instructed t h a t i f D oming uez elects not to convert the petition, the district c o u rt shall dismiss the petition without prejudice.D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 4

COUNSEL

Matthew J

. Speredeloz z i (arg ued) and Patrick Morg an F o rd, San Dieg o, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Kevin Vien n a (arg

ued), Deputy Attorney General; Daniel R og ers, Supervising D eputy Attorney General; J u lie L

. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Xavier B ecerra, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, San Dieg o, California; for Respondent-Appellee.

OP INION

F I SHER, Circuit J udg e :

F lor encio Doming uez w as charg ed with murder. After his tri al ended in a h ung jury

, the trial court dismissed the

case under California Penal Code § 1385. The sta t e filed a

new complaint, charg ing Domi n g uez with murder a nd conspiracy to commit murder. Doming uez filed a demurrer,
arg uing the second prosecution v iolated his rig h ts under the Double J eopardy Clause and California law, but the trial court overruled h is demurrer, and D oming uez was tr i e d and convicted. D oming uez th e n a s serted h is double jeopardy claim in a federal habeas petition unde r 28 U.S.C. § 2254. W h ile that petition was pending , the state trial court vacated Doming uez ’s convictions under B rady v. Maryland

, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the state h a s elected to retry him on the charg e of conspiracy to commit murder. The state placed Doming uez in pretrial c ustody

, where he remains. Citing the
state c ourt’s decision vacating the earlier convi c t i o n s, the district court dismissed Doming uez ’ s f ederal habeas petition as moot. Doming uez appeals.D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 5

W e hold D oming uez ’s petition is not moot. I t continues
to present a live controversy because h e remains in custody

, continues to clai m he is in custody in violation of the C o n stitution of the United States and continues to pre s e n t precisely the same leg al claim that h e presented when his petition was filed – that the state’s second prosecution of him, which remains o ng oing

, violates his federal constitutional rig ht not to be twice p laced in jeopardy for the same offense.

W e hold, however, that Doming uez is no long er r equired
to proceed under § 2 254. Sect i on 2254 limits the g eneral
g rant of habeas authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by placing

a d d i t i onal obstacles in the path of a person seeking h abeas

r e l ief when h e is “in custody pursuant to the judg ment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Where a petitioner is not challeng ing c ustody attributable to a state court judg ment, his custody d oes not bear a presumpti o n of validity

. Section 2254 therefore does not apply

, and he is free to seek habeas relief under § 2241(a) and (c)(3) instead.

F inally

, we h o ld that, to proceed under § 2 241, Doming uez is not required to d ismiss his § 2254 petition a nd file a n ew petition under § 2241. J ust a s a court may convert

a § 2241 petition to a § 2254 p etition when a pretrial d etainee is convicted while a petition is pending

, we hold that a court has the authority to convert a § 2254 petition into a § 2241 petition w hen a pe t itioner’s convictions are vacated during the pendency of the petition and the petitioner has become a pretrial detainee.

W e vacate th e judg ment and r emand for proceeding s consistent with this opinion.D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 6

BACK G ROUND

Doming uez w as c harg e d with murder in 2010 ( San Dieg o County Superior Court N o

. SCD225579). H is trial resulted i n a hung jury

, and the state trial court dismissed the c a s e under California Penal Code § 1385. 1 The state refiled the criminal complaint (San Dieg o County S u p e r ior Court No. SCD230596), charg ing Doming uez ag ain with murd e r and adding a new charg e for cons p i r a c y to commit murder. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 182(a)(1), 1 87(a). Doming uez filed a demurrer, arg u ing the second prosecution was barred b y double j e o p a rdy and California Penal Code § 654. 2 He

1 See Cal. P en al Co d e § 1 3 8 5 (a) (“ T h e j u d g e o r m ag istrate m ay , eith er

o f h is o r h er o w

n m o tio n o r u

p on th e ap p l icatio n o f th e pro secu tin g atto rn ey , an d in f

u rth eran ce of j u stice, o rd er an actio n t o b e d ism issed

. T h e reaso n s f

o r th e d ism issal sh all be stated o ra l l y o n th e reco rd

. T h e

co u rt sh all also set f

o rth t h e reaso n s in an o rd er en tered u p on th e m in

u tes if req u ested b y eith er p arty o r in an y case in w h ich th e p ro ceed in g s are n o t b ein g reco rd ed electro n ically o r rep o rted b y a co u rt rep orter. A d ism issal sh all n o t b e m ad e f

o r an y cau s e th at w ou ld b e g ro u n d o f d em u rrer to th e

accu sato ry

p lead in g .”).

T h e trial co u rt d ism i ssed th e case on th e g ro u n d th at th e p ro secu tio n h ad f ailed to estab lish Do m in g u ez h ad p u l l e d t h e t r ig g er: “ T h ere m ay

co m e a t im e in th e f

u tu re w h en s o m eo n e else co m es f o rw ar d t o say [it

w as] eith er th e d ef

en d an t o r so m eo n e else. B ecau se th e def en dan t, if h e d id n ’ t pu ll th e trig g er, h e k n o w s w h o did

. He’ s stan d i n g rig h t th ere. It

m ay b e so m eb o d y else, b u t b ased on th e cu rren t state of th e ev id en ce, th at

can ’ t be pro v en

. A n d so at th i s p o i n t t h e m a t t er is dism issed w ith o u t p rej u d ice.”

2 S ee Cal. P en al Co d e § 6 5 4 (a) (“ A n act o r o m issio n th at is pu n ish ab le in d if f eren t w ay s b y d i ffe r e n t p ro v isio n s o f law sh all b e p u n i sh ed u n der th e p ro v isio n th at p ro v id es f o r th e lo n g est p o ten tial term o f im p riso n m en t, b u t in n o case sh all th e act o r om issio n b e p u n ish ed u n d er m o re th an on e p ro v isio n . A n

acq u ittal o r co n v ictio n

an d s en ten ce u n d er an y

o n e b ars a p ro secu tio n

f o r th e sam e act o r o m issio n u n d er an y o th er.”).D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 7

contended the state trial court’s dismiss a l u nder § 1385 amounted to a finding of insufficient e vidence that operated

as an ac q u i t t al for purposes of double jeopardy

. See BravoFernandez v. United States
, 137 S. Ct. 352, 364 (2016) (“F o r double jeopardy purposes, a court’ s e v aluation o f the evidence a s insufficient to conv ict is equivalent to an acquittal and therefore bars a second prosecution for the same offense.”). The state trial court overruled the demurrer.

The second prosecution p r oceeded to trial, and Doming uez was convict e d on both charg es. Doming uez appealed the convictions, a r g uing a g ain that the second prosecution violated double jeopardy

. I n a reasoned decision, the California Court of Appeal denied r elief, disag reeing with Doming uez ’s c ontention that the 2010 dismissal constituted

a finding of insufficient evidence. See People v

. Dominguez
, No. D060019, 2013 WL 3362112, a t *8– 1 0 (Cal. Ct. App. J uly 5, 2013). The California Supreme Court denied review.

Doming uez then filed a fe deral habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, renewing h is double jeopardy challeng e to the second p rosecution. Doming uez arg ued “the second trial

was barred under the F if th Amendment” and asked the district court to “remand the c a se back to trial court directing it to g rant [ his] demurrer on Dou b l e J e o pardy g rounds.” A federal mag istrate judg e recommended the district court g rant the w rit, a g reeing with Doming uez that the 201 0 d i s missal
op er a t e d as an acquittal, and concluding that the California Court of A p p e a l ’ s decision to the contrary was both an

“ T h e D o u b l e J eo p ard y Clau se o f th e Fif th A m en d m en t, ap plicab le to th e States t

h ro u g h th e Fo u rteen th

, p ro v i d es t h at n o p erso n sh all ‘ b e su

b j ect f o r th e sam e o f

f en ce to b e tw ice p u t i n j eo p ard y o f lif e o r lim b .’ ” Bro w n v. Oh io , 4 3 2 U.S. 1 61 , 1 64 (1 9 7 7 ) (q u o tin g U.S. Co n st. am en d . V).D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 8

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent under § 2254(d)(1) and based on an unreasonable determination o f the facts under § 2254(d)(2).

B e f ore the district court could rule on the mag istrate judg e’s r e commendation, a state trial court g ranted Doming uez post-conviction r elief on an independent g round, vacating his murder and conspiracy convictions under Brady

v. Maryland

, 373 U.S. 8 3 (1963). 3 The trial court vacated the judg ment and ordered the state to either retry Doming u ez or release him. The state has e lected to retry Doming uez , but it is p roceeding solely on the con spiracy c harg e. Doming uez remains in state custody

pending trial. 4

W h en the district c ourt learned of the state court’s decision vacat i n g the c onvictions, it ordered the parties “to show cause as to why [ the f ederal pe t i t i o n ] should not be dismissed as moot.” The state urg ed the court to dismiss the petition, arg u ing that, “[ b] e c ause Doming uez is no long er in custody for the murder conviction, h e rece ived the relief he
soug h t in this Court.” Doming uez opp o s e d d ismissal, arg uing his petition continued to present a live controversy because he “remains in custody f

acing retrial” and th e retrial would “violate dou b l e jeopardy on the ex act same g rounds Doming uez claims in this [ petition] .”

3 In Bra d y , t h e Su p rem e Co u

rt h eld th at a s tate v io lates a d ef en d an t’ s rig h t to d u e p ro cess w

h en it su p p resses ev id en ce f

av o rab le t o an accu s ed th at is m aterial to g u ilt o r p u n ish m en t. S ee Co n e v

. B e l l

, 5 5 6 U.S. 4 4 9
, 4 5 1 (2 00 9 ).

4 Un l i k e Do m in g u ez’ s f

irst an d seco n d trials, w

h ich occu rred in

tw o d istin ct c a s e s , h is seco n d trial an d h is p en d in g th ird trial are part o f a sin g le p ro s ecu tio n in a s in g le case, San Dieg o C o u n ty Su p erio r Co u rt No

. SCD2 3 05 9 6

.D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 9

I n a J anuary 2 018 order, the d istrict court ag reed with the state and concluded Doming uez ’ s petition was moot:

Doming uez filed this p e t ition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to c halleng e his conviction f o r first-deg ree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. B ut the state court has since vacated this conviction. I n d o ing so, it

ex ting uished Domin g uez ’s two claims under § 2254. His claim that

. . . hi s s e c ond prosecution violated the Do u ble J eopardy Clause

. . . does not present a live controversy

. H e i s no long er in custody pursuant to th e

c o n v i c t i o n p r o c u r e d b y t h e s e c o n d prosecution. Moreo v e r, unlike cases where petitioners have completed their sentences but

are still per m i tted to challeng e their convictions because the convictions cause collateral cons e q

u e n c es, there is no conviction here f o r Doming uez to seek to set aside. At this p oint, opining on the constitutional condition of Doming u ez ’s second prosecution would b e advisory

. T herefore, the two claims raised in Doming uez ’s § 2 254 petition a re moot.

The court also declined to treat Doming uez ’s petition a s a “pre-t rial custody petition” u n der 28 U.S.C. § 2241,

ex p laining t h a t d oing so would require the court to address three undeveloped issues: Y ounger abstention; ex h a u stion;D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 10

and the merits of Doming uez ’s double jeopardy claim. 5 The
court dismissed D omin gu e z ’ s petition as moot a nd declined to issue a certificate of appealability

.

Dom i n guez timely appealed, and w e issued a certificate of appealability “with respect to

. . . whether the district court erred by dismissing t h e p etition as moot, including whether the p etition should b e construed as a petition under 28 U .S.C. § 2241.”

5 Y o u ng er v. Ha rris
, 4 0 1 U.S. 3 7 (1 9 7 1 ), req u ires f ed eral co u r t s t o ab stain f ro m in terf

erin g w ith p en d in g state c r im in al p ro ceed in g s

. A

co lo rab l e claim th at a state p ro secu tio n w ill v i o late th e Do u

b le J eo p ard y Clau se, h o w ev er, p resen ts an ex cep tio n to Yo u n g er : “ B ecau se f u l l

v in d icatio n o f th e rig h t n ecessarily req u ires in terv en t io n b ef o re trial, f ed eral co u rts w ill en tertain p retrial h ab eas p etitio n s th at raise a co lo rab le claim o f d o u

b le j eo p ard y .” Ma n n es v. Gillesp ie
, 9 6 7 F.2 d 1 3 1 0
, 1 3 1 2 (9 th Cir. 19 9 2 ). B ecau se Do m in g u e z h as p resen ted a co lo rab le d o u b le j eo p ard y claim , w e h o ld Yo u n g er ab sten t io n d o es n o t ap p ly

.

W i th resp ect to ex h au stio n , th ere is n o d isp u te th at Do m i n g u ez p r e sen ted a d o u

b le j eo p ard y ch allen g e to h is s eco n d p ro secu tio n at a l l th ree lev els of th e Calif

orn i a co u rts, b u t th e st a t e m ain tain s Do m i n g u ez

c h a l l e n g ed so lely h i s re- p ro secu tio n f o r m u rd er, n o t h is p ro secu tio n f o r

co n sp iracy to co m

m it m u rd er, t h e so le rem ain in g ch arg e. D o m i n g u e z

co n ten d s h e ad eq u ately

ex h au sted th is claim

.

A s to th e m erits, th e p arties d i sag ree o v er w h eth er D o m in g u ez’ s claim ed acq u ittal o n th e m u rd er ch arg e preclu des h is re- p ro secu tio n o n th e

co n sp iracy ch arg e. Do m in g u ez arg u es th e co llateral esto p pel asp e cts of d o u b le j eo p ard y ap ply

, s e e A sh e v. S wen so n , 3 9 7 U.S. 4 3 6 (1 9 7 0 ), an d h en ce th at th e co n sp iracy p ro secu tio n

to o is co n stitu

tio n ally b arred

.D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 11

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“W e review de novo the district court’s dis missal of a habeas petition on the g round of mootness.” Zegarra-Gomez v. INS , 314 F .3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).

D ISCUSSION

A. Dom inguez’s P etition Is Not Moot

“[ A] case ‘becomes moot o nly when it is impossible for

a court to g rant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party .’” Chafin v. Chafin

, 5 68 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (quoting Knox v. S erv. Emps. I

nt’l Union, Local 1000
, 5 6 7 U

. S. 298, 307 (2012)). “As long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litig ation, the case is not moot.” Id. (quoting Knox
, 567 U.S. at 307–08).

Here, Doming uez ’s p etition continues to present a live controversy , a

nd it remains possible f

o r the district c o urt to g rant him effectual relief. 6 I n his federal habeas petition,

6 “ On ce th e p etitio n er su stain s h is b u rd en o f d em o n stratin g

en titlem en t to f

ed eral h ab eas relief

, th e d i strict co u rt h as w id e d iscretio n in ch o o sin g t

h e ap p ro priate rem ed y .” B rian R

. M e a n s , F ed era l Ha b ea s M a n u a l § 1 3:5 (2 0 1 8); see a lso 2 8 U.S.C. § 2 2 4 3 (“ T h e co u rt s h a l l

su m m arily h ear an d d eterm i n e th e f acts, an d disp o se o f th e m atter as law

an d j us t i c e req u ire.”); Hilto n v. Bra u nskill

, 4 8 1 U.S. 77 0
, 7 7 5 (1 9 8 7) (“ Fed eral h ab eas co rp u s p ractice, as r e f lected b y th e d ecisio n s of th is Co u rt, i n d icates th at a co u rt h as b ro ad d iscretio n i n co n d itio n in g a j u d g m en t g ran tin g h ab eas relief .”); 2 Ran d y

Hertz & J am es S. L ieb m an , Fed era l Ha b ea s Co rp u s Pra ctice a n d Pro ced u re § 3 3

. 1 (7 th ed

. 20 1 7) (“ In g en eral . . . , in cases in w h ich a p etitio n er h as estab lish ed a rig h t to relief f ro m s o m e u n law f

u l asp ect o f ‘ cu sto dy ’ in th e bro ad sen se, m o dern f ed eral h ab eas co rp u s p ractice h as m o v ed to w a r d s f u ll realizatio n o f th eD O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 12

Doming uez arg ues his second prosecution is barred by double jeopardy and asks the d istrict court to “remand the case back
to trial court directing it to g rant [ his] demurrer on D ouble J eopardy g rounds.” Domin g u ez ’s second p rosecution is
ong oing

, and he continue s t o arg ue his second prosecution violates the Double J e opardy Clause because his first trial end e d i n a n acquittal. W ere the d istrict court to g rant Doming uez the relief he seeks, he would no long er b e subject to prosecution in state court.

The d istrict court concluded Domingu e z ’ s p e tition was moot, but it did so because it viewed the pe t i t i o n a s challeng ing only “his c onviction for first-degree murder a nd conspiracy t o commit murder.” The court reasoned, “B ecause h is conviction has b een vacated, his two c laims targ e ting it under § 2254 are moot.” To the ex tent Doming uez ’s petition challeng es t h ose convictions, the petition is indeed moot, because those convictions h ave been vacated, and no collateral consequences flow from them. See Spencer v

. Kemna
, 523 U. S

. 1, 7–8 (1998); Carafas v

. LaVallee , 391 U.S. 234, 237–38 (1968).

The d i s trict court e rred, however, by c onstruing Doming uez ’s pe t i tion a s a challeng e solely – o r even p r i m a r i l y – to h is convictions rather than to his second
pros e c u tion g e nerally

. Properly understood, Doming uez ’s petition continues to present a live controversy because he is still in custody

, he c ontinues to challeng e his prosecution on the same g round and h is prosecution is ong oing

. The vacatur

statu te’ s ‘ law an d j u stice’ co m m an d an d h as reco g n ized a w id e v ariety of
ap p ro p riate rem ed ial o rd ers.”).D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 13

of Doming uez ’s convictions chang es the procedural p osture of the case but does not render the petition moot. 7

I n S hute v. Texas , 117 F .3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 1997), for

ex a mple, the p etitioner filed a federal petition challeng ing his

s e c o nd indictment on d ouble jeopardy g rounds. W hile his petition was pending

, the s ec o n d indictment was dismissed for technical reasons, and the state secured a third indictment. See id. The F ifth Circuit rejected the sug g est i o n t hat dismissal of t h e second indictment rendered the petition
moot:

I n federal court, Shute soug ht a writ o f habeas corpus o n do u b l e jeopardy g rounds. This entailed two requests: (1) a n order o f

7 Do m in g u ez’ s d o u

b le j eo p ard y rig h ts are n o t d im in ish ed by th e f act th at h e is n o w a pretrial d etain ee rath er th an a co n v icted p riso n er. A s th e Su p rem e Co u rt h as lo n g reco g n ized

, “ th e Do u b le J eo p a r d y C lau s e p ro tects

an i n d iv id u al ag ain st m o re th an b ein g su b j ected to d o u

b l e p u n ish m en ts. I t is a g u aran tee ag ain st bein g tw i ce p u t to trial f o r th e sam e o f

f en se.” Ab n ey v. Un ited S ta tes , 4 3 1 U .S. 6 5 1
, 6 6 0

– 6 1 (1 9 7 7 ). If t h is rig h t is n o t

v in d ica t e d b efo re tria l

, a v itally im p ortan t asp ect o f th e g u aran tee is f o rev er lo st. A s th e Co u rt ex p lain ed in Ab ney , b ecau se it “ f o cu s [es] o n th e

‘ risk ’ o f co n v ictio n , th e g u aran tee ag ain s t d o u b le j eo p ard y assu

res an in d iv i d u al th at, am o n g o th er th in g s, h e w i ll n o t b e f o rced

. . . to en d u re th e p erso n al strain

, p u

b lic e m b arrassm en t, an d ex

p en se o f a crim in al t

rial

m o re th an on ce f

o r th e sam e o f

f en se.” Id

. a t 6 6 1

. “ Ob v io u sly

, th ese asp ects of th e g u aran t e e ’s p ro tectio n s w o u ld b e lo st if th e accu s ed w ere f o rced to ‘ ru n th e g au n tlet’ a seco n d tim e b ef o re [th e pro secu tio n co u ld b e

c h a l l en g ed ]; ev en if th e accu sed is acq u itted

, o r, if co n v icted

, h as h i s

co n v ictio n u lti m a t e l y rev ersed o n d o u b le j eo p ard y g ro u n ds, h e h as still b een f o rced to en d u re a trial th at th e Do u b le J eo p a r d y Clau se w as d esig n ed to p ro h ib it.” Id

. at 6 6 2

. Here, Do m in g u ez i s a p retrial detain ee, f acin g trial o n w

h at m ay am o u n t to th e sam e ch arg es th e state p u rsu ed in h is f irst tw o trials. His d o u

b le j eo p ard y

claim th eref o re is n o t m o o t.D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 14

relea s e from custody and (2) a n injunction
ag ainst state prosecution. . . .

. . . .

O n ce the state secured the Third I ndictment, b oth forms o f requested relief

were live a g a in. Shute still w ant ed release from c ustody and still wanted a n injunction
ag ainst prosecution. Althoug h a ny state prosecu tion would be under a different indictment from the one attacked before the district court, this cannot make a difference

. I f the district c o urt had g ranted the injunction
ag ainst state prose cution under the Second I ndic t m ent, prosecution under the Third I ndictment would b e barred as we ll. Otherwise, the state alway s could defeat a federal double jeopardy habeas ruling b y dismissing an indictme nt a nd immediately securingan identical one.

Shute’s request for

. . . relief f rom custody

. . . r emains a live controversy a s long as he is imprisoned.

Id. at 237.

Similarly

, in W

arnick v. Booher

, 425 F .3d 842, 843 (10th Cir. 2005), the petitioner f i l ed a federal habeas petition challeng ing the loss of 155 g ood-time c r edits as a v iolation o f double jeopardy

. W h ile the petition was pending

, the prison restored the 155 credits b u t subtracted another 53 credits. The Tenth Circ u i t held the claim was moot a s to theD O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 15

155 c redits but that t h e c a s e continued to present a live controversy a s to the loss of 53 credits, noting that the petitioner’s objection to the loss of 53 cre d i t s was based on the same the o ry that “the subtraction o f any credits after his reb i l l date violates double-jeopardy principles.” Id. at 846. The petitioner therefore was n ot required to pursue a new habeas petition. See id.

W e hold Doming uez ’s § 2254 petition is not moot. The district court erred by

ruling otherwise. 8

B. Dom inguez Is No Longer Required to P roceed Under § 2254

Apart f rom the issue of mootness, we g ranted a certificate of appealability on “whether the petition should be construed

as a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” W e hold that it should be.

Section 22 4 1 establishes the g eneral authority of the federal courts to issue habeas r elief. I t provides that “ [ w] rits of habeas corpus may be g r anted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district c ourts and any circuit judg e within their respective juris d i c t i ons,” 28 U.S.C. § 2 2 41(a), and it

8 A l ead in g h ab eas treatise ex p lain s th at d ou b le j eo p ard y claim s “ are

n o t m o o ted b y co n v ictio n b ecau se th ey ch allen g e n o t o n ly th e leg ality o f th e p retrial d eten tio n b u t also t h e leg ality o f th e p o stco n v i ctio n d eten tio n .” 1 Hertz & L ieb m an , su

pra , § 8 .2 n .1 3 . T h e sam e p rin cip le ap p lies h ere, alth o u g h in t

h e o p p osite d ire c t i o n : Do m i n g u ez’ s d o u b le j eo p ard y

co n tin u es to presen t a liv e co n tro v ersy becau s e it ch allen g es n o t o n ly th e leg ality of h is p o st- co n v ictio n d eten tio n b u t also th e leg ality o f th e seco n d
p ro secu tio n g en erally

, i nc l u d in g , th eref o re, th e leg ality o f h is p retrial d eten tio n

.D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 16

specifies five circu m s t a n c es in which a petitioner may be
g ranted relief:

(1) He is in custody under or by c o l o r of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or

(2) He is in c u stody for an act done or omitted in p u rsuance of an A c t of Cong ress, or an order, process, judg ment or decr ee of a court or judg e of the United States; or

( 3) He is in custody in v iolation of t h e Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States ; or

(4) He, being a citiz en of a f oreig n state a

nd domiciled therein is in custody for an act d o ne

or omitted u nder a ny alleg ed rig h t, title, authority , privileg e, protection, o r ex emption claimed under the commission, order o r sanction of any f

o reig n state, or under color thereof, the validity a

n d eff e ct of which depend upon the law of nations; or

( 5) I t is necessary to b r ing h im into court t o testify or for trial.

Id. § 2241(c) (emphasis added).

Section 2254, in turn, states:

The Supreme Court, a J ustice thereof, a circuit ju d ge , or a d istrict court shall entertain anD O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 17

appli cation for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a p e r son in custody pursuant to the judg ment of a State court o nly o n the g round that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the Unite d States.

Id. § 2254(a).

S e ction 2254 has b een understood as limiting t h e authority g ranted by § 2241 rather than supplementing it. A s the Supreme Court has ex plained, “[ o] ur author i t y t o g rant habeas relief to s t a t e prisoners is limited by § 2254, which specifies the con ditions under which such r elief may be
g ranted to ‘ a person in custody pursuant to the judg ment of a State court.’” Felker v

. Turpin
, 518 U.S. 6 5 1
, 662 (1996) (quoting 2 8 U.S.C. § 2 254(a)); see a l s o W h ite v. Lambert

, 370 F .3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2004) ( “I n contrast to s ection 2255, section 2254 does not create an a l t e r n ative to the habeas corpus remedy provided in sectio n 2 2 4 1; rather, it imposes limitations on this remedy .” (quoting Eric J ohnson, An Analysis o

f the A ntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in R elation to State Administrative Or ders: the State Court Judgment as the Genesis of Custody

, 29 N ew Eng

. J

. o n C r i m. & Civ. Confinement 153, 168 (2003))), overruled

on other grounds by Hayward v

. Marshall

, 603 F .3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Greenawalt v. Stewart
, 105 F .3d 1287, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The Supreme Court has instructed us that the authority of the f e deral courts to g rant habeas relief
to state prisoners under § 2241 is limited b y 2 8 U .S.C. § 2254.”).

Th u s, “a p risoner proceeding under § 2254 is subject to obstacles a prisoner p roceeding under § 2241 is not.” B ry anD O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 18

R. Means, Postconviction Remedies § 5:2 (2018). Section 2254, for ex ample, provides that “an application for a writ o f habeas corpus in behalf of a p erson in custody pursuant to the j u dg ment o f a State court only on the g round that he i s i n custody in violation o f the Constitution or laws or treaties o f the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis a d d e d ). I t further provides that “[ a] n application for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf o f a person in custody pu r suant to the judg ment o f a State court shall not be g ranted unless it
appears th a t

. . . the applicant has ex hausted the remedies available in the courts of t h e S t ate.” Id. § 2254(b)(1). 9 Sect i o n 2244, moreover, provides that “ [ a] 1-y ear period o f limitation shall apply to an applic ation for a writ of h abeas

c o r p u s b y a person in custody pursuant to the judg ment of a State court,” id. § 2244(d)(1), and it places a limit on “second

or s u c cessive” § 2254 petitions, see id. § 2244(b). Perhaps
most sig nificantly

, the Antiterroris m and Effective Death Pena l t y A ct of 1996 (AEDPA), provides that “[ a] n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in c u stody pursuant to the judg ment of a State court” may not be g ranted unless the state court’s adjudication of that claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable a

pplication o f,” Supreme Court precede n t o r “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” Id. § 2254(d).

Cong r ess placed these a dditional limits on petitions under § 2254 because a state court judg ment “carries a heig htened presumption of leg itimacy .” J ohnson, s u pra , at 171–72. B ecause a state court judg ment “is presumptively leg itimate,”

9 Ev en i n c a se s b ro u g h t u n d er § 2 2 4 1
, ex h au stio n is req u ired

. S ee La in g v. Ash cro

ft

, 3 7 0 F

. 3 d 9 9 4
, 99 7 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 4 ). T h is ex h au stio n req u irem en t, h o w ev er, is j u d icially created , n o t statu to ry

.D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 19

moreover, so too is custody attributable to that judg ment. See id. at 172. Cong ress therefore concluded “it was a cceptable
to p lace obstacles in the paths of prisoners” who a re challeng ing custody attribut a ble to a state c ourt judg ment. See id.

B e c a u s e § 2254 limits the g eneral g rant of habeas relief under § 2241, it “ is the ex clusive vehicle for a h abeas petition by a stat e p r i s o n er in custody p ursuant to a state court judg ment, e ven when the petit ioner is not challeng ing his

un d erlying state court conviction.” W hite

, 370 F .3d at 1009–10. “B y contrast, the g eneral g rant of habeas authority in § 2241 is available for c halleng es by a state prisoner w ho is not in custody pursuant to a state court j u d g ment – for

ex a mple, a d efendant i n pre-trial detention or awaiting

ex tradition.” Id. at 1006. 1 0

Here, Doming uez p roperly broug h t his double jeopardy claim under § 2254 when he filed his petition. At that time, he was in custody p ursuant to a state court judg ment and was challeng ing h is custody attributable to that judg ment. W e a re persuaded, h owever, that Doming uez is no long er required to proceed u n d er § 2254. W e r each this conclusion for two independent y et related reasons.

F irst, as noted, a p etitioner who is “in custody pursuant to the judg ment of a State cou r t” is subject to additional limitations because the judg ment, and the cu s tody attributable
to that judg ment, carry a heig htened presumption of leg itimacy

. Here, Doming uez ’ s judg ment has been vacated.

1 0 A p retrial d o u

b le j eo p ard y ch allen g e, f o r in stan ce, “ is p ro p erly b ro u g h t u n d er § 2 2 4 1 .” S to w v. Mu ra sh ig e , 38 9 F.3 d 8 8 0 , 8 86 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 4 ).D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 20

H e i s not in custody pursuant to a judg ment of a state c ou r t

. He is a pretrial detainee, and his detention bears no presumption of validity

. He should, therefore, b e p laced on

an equal footing with other pretrial detainees, who may avail the m s elves of habeas relief under § 2241(a) and (c)(3) without reg ard to the additional requirements imposed on petitions under § 2254. See Stow , 389 F .3d at 888.

Second, § 2254 applies to prisoners c halleng ing “custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court ,” and Doming uez is

no longe r challeng ing such a judg ment; he is now a pretrial detainee.

Section 2254 (a) “deploy s the term ‘in custody ’ twice.” Bailey v. Hill

, 599 F. 3 d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 2010). I t states that “a district court shall entertain an application for a wr i t of habeas corpus in behalf o f a person [ 1] in custody pursuant to the judg ment o f a State court only on the g round that he is [ 2] in custody in violation o f the Cons t i t u tion or laws o r treaties of the U nited States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

As to the first use of the w ord custody

, we have h e ld that

a person is “ in custody pur s u a nt to the judg ment of a State court” when “the source of the petitioner’s custody ” is a state court judg ment – i.e., when “‘the prisoner’s custody is

a t t r i butable, at least in part,’” to such a judg ment. W hit e , 370 F .3d at 1007–08 (quoting J ohnson, supra , at 162).

W ith respect to t h e s e cond use of the word custody

, we have not y et addressed w het h er it too must be “pursuant to the judg ment o f a State court” – i.e., whether there must be a

nex us between “the ju d gm e n t of a State court” and the “custody ” the petitioner contends is “in violation of theD O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 21

Constit u tion or laws or treaties of the United States.” Rulemakers, c ourts and commentators, h o w ever, have all assumed that this nex us is required.

The Rules Governing

2254 Cases, for ex ample, state:

These rules g o v e rn a petition for a writ o f habeas corpus filed in a United States district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by :

(1 ) a person in custody under a state-court judg ment who seeks a determina t ion that the custody violates the Constitution, laws, o r treaties of the United States; and

( 2 ) a person in custody under a state-court o r f e d e r a l

- c o u r t j u d g m e n t w h o s e e k s a determination that future c u s t o dy under a state-court jud

g m ent would violate the Constitution

, laws, or treaties of the United States.

R u le 1, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U n i t e d States District Courts, 28 U.S.C.A

. foll. § 2254 (emphasis added). A leading

habeas treatise likewise states:

To invoke habeas corpus review by a f e deral court, the petitioner mu s t satisfy two jurisdiction al requirements

– (1) the status requirement that the p e t ition be “in behalf o f

a person in custody pursuant to the jud g ment of a S t ate court”; and (2) the substance requirement that the petition challen ge the leg ality of that custody on the g round that it isD O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 22

“in violation of the C o n s t itution or laws o r treaties of the United States.”

1 Hertz & L i e b m an, supra , § 8.1 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). As the Seventh Circuit noted in W a lker v

. O’Brien
, 216 F .3d 6 26 (7th Cir. 2 0 0 0 ), “§ 2254 [ is] the

ex c lusive vehicle for prisoners in c u stody pursuant to a state court judg ment who wish to challeng e any thing affecting that custody .” Id. at 633 (emphasis added).

I n lig h t of the l a n g u ag e , history and purpose of § 2254,

we conclude § 2254 r equires a nex us between “the judg ment of a State court” and the “custody ” the petitioner c ontends is “in violatio n o f t h e Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” The custody the petitioner challeng es must be “attributable, at least in part, to a judg ment of a State court.” W hite

, 370 F .3d at 1 007–08 (quoting J ohnson, supra , a t 162).

This does not mean that a § 2254 petition must present a challeng e to the underly ing state court j u d g ment. “[ T] he

essence of habeas corpus is a n a ttack by a person in c ustody
upon the leg ality of that custody ,” Preis e r v

. Rodriguez

, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973), n ot n eces sarily a c halleng e to a judg ment. S ection 2254, therefore, applies not only to challeng es to a conviction or sentence but also to c halleng e s to the “ ex ecution of a c ustodial sentence.” Bailey , 599 F .3d

a t 982; see, e.g. , Preiser
, 411 U.S. at 476–77 (§ 2 2 5 4 challeng e to the loss of g ood-time credits); Spencer
, 523 U.S.
at 7 (§ 2254 c h alleng e to the revocation of parole); W hite

, 370 F .3d a t 1005 (§ 2254 challeng e to an administrative decision transferring the p etitioner from one p r i s o n to another). W hat matters is that the custod y c o m p l a ined of is attributable in some way to the under l y i ng state court judg ment.D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 23

Here, there is no nex us between Doming uez ’ s n o w vacated judg ment and t h e c u stody he contends violates the Double J eopardy Clause. B ecause his pretrial detention is not attributable in any way to a state co u rt judg ment, his double jeopardy claim does not fall under § 2254. 1 1

I n sum, w e h o l d Doming uez is no long e r required to proceed under § 2254. He is no long e r “ in custody pursuant to the ju d gment of a State court,” a nd the c ustody he is challeng in g i s not attributable in any w ay to a state court judg ment. Doming uez , therefor e , is free to proceed under § 2241( a) a nd (c)(3), without satisfy ing the additional requirements applicable to § 2254 petitions.

11 W e r e c o g n ize t

h e Su p rem e C o u rt h as h eld th at th e “ in cu sto d y ”
req u irem en t o f § 2 2 54 (a) m u s t b e satisf

ied on ly at th e tim e th e p etitio n is f iled

. S ee Sp en cer , 52 3 U.S. at 7 (“ Sp en cer w as in carcerated b y reaso n of th e p aro le rev o catio n at th e tim e th e p etitio n w as f iled

, w h ich is all th e ‘ in

cu sto d y ’ p ro v isio n o f 2 8 U.S.C. § 2 2 5 4 req u i r e s

. ” ); Ma len g v. Co o k

, 4 9 0 U.S. 4 8 8, 4 9 0 –9 1 (1 9 8 9 ) (p er cu riam ) (“ W e h av e i n terp r e ted th e statu to ry lan g u ag e as req u irin g th at t h e h ab eas p etitio n er b e ‘ i n cu sto d y ’

u n d er th e co n v ictio n or s e n t en ce u n der attack at th e tim e h is p etitio n is f iled .”); Ca r

a fa s , 3 9 1 U.S. at 2 3 8 (“ [W ]e co n clu d e th at u n d er th e statu to ry sch em e, o n ce th e f

ed eral j u risd ictio n h as attach ed in th e District Co u rt, i t is n o t d ef eated b y t

h e release o f th e petitio n er p rio r t o co m pletio n of
p ro ceed in g s o n

su ch ap p l icatio n .”). T h ese cases, h o w ev er, stan d f o r th e lim ited p ro po sitio n th at, w h en a p etitio n er is in cu sto d y at th e tim e th e p etitio n is f iled

, “ th e f

ed eral co u rt m ay p ass o n t h e m erits o f

th e p etitio n

ev en th o u g h th e p riso n er i s u n co n ditio n ally released b ef o re t h e p etitio n is acted u p on , p ro v id ed th at th e p etitio n er still su f f ers co llateral

co n seq u en ces f

ro m th e co n v i ctio n .” 1 7 B Ch arles A lan W rig h t & A rth u r R. Miller, Fed

era l Pra ctice a n d Pro ced u r e § 42 6 2 (3 d ed

. 2 0 1 8 ). W e are

n o t aw are o f an y au th ority s u g g estin g th at a p e t i t io n er m u st co n tin u e to p ro ceed u n der § 2 2 54
, rath er th an § 22 4 1
, w h en th e cu s to d y h e cu

rren tly is ch allen g in g is n o t a ttrib u tab le in an y w ay to a j u d g m en t, an d h en ce b ears n o p resu m

p tio n o f leg itim acy

.D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 24

C. Dom inguez’s P etition May Be Converted to § 2241

Doming uez , moreover, is not required to dismiss his § 2254 petition and file a new petition under § 2241.

Courts and commentators have recog niz ed that, “[ i] f the petition is file d b y a pre-trial detainee u nder § 2241 who is subsequently convicted, the federal court may convert the § 2241 p etition to a § 2254 petition.” Means, Postconviction Remedies

, supra , § 5:2 (citing Y ellowbear v. W

yoming Att’y Gen.
, 525 F .3d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 2008); Jackson v. Coalter

, 337 F .3d 74, 79 (1st Cir. 2 003)). W e now hold that the same rationale applies where, as here, the opposite situation arises. W h ere a petition is filed b y a post-conviction d etainee under § 2254 and the conviction subsequently is vacated, the federal
court has the authority – at the petitioner’s request o r with the petitioner’s consent – to convert the § 2 2 5 4 petition to a § 2 2 41 petition. Cf. Stow
, 389 F .3d a t 885 (holding the petitioner’s pretrial double jeopardy challeng e , filed under § 2254, should be treated as a petition under § 2241).

D. Rem aining Issues

The district court cited two additional potential obstacles
to Domin gu e z ’s double jeopardy claim: (1) whether Doming uez has a dequately ex h austed the claim; a nd (2) whether the Double J eopardy Clause bars his prosecution

on a charg e o f conspiracy to commit mu r d e r w hen his previous a cquittal a

p plied, if a t al l, solely to the charg e o f murder. As the district court n oted, these a dditional issues

were n ot adequately d eveloped, and the district court did not reach them. W e leave them for the district court to a ddress in the first instance.D O M I N G U E Z V

. K E R

N A N 25

CONCLUSION

W e hold Doming ue z ’ s federal habeas petition c ontinues
to present a live c ontroversy challeng ing his ong oing second prosecution as a violati on of the Double J eopardy Clause. W e further h old Doming uez is no long er required to proceed under § 2254. F inally

, we hold a district court has the authority to convert a § 2254 petition into a § 2241 petition where the petitioner’s circumst an c es chang e during the pendency o f the proceeding s. We vacate the judg ment of the district c ourt and remand for proceeding s consistent with this opinion.

B e cause Doming uez ’ s detention is no long er attributable
to a state court judg ment, p roceeding under § 2254 is no long er appropriate. O n remand, the district court shall, either
upon D oming uez ’s request or a t the court’s initiation but with Doming uez ’s consent, convert the p e t i t i on to one a rising

u n d e r § 2241. I f Doming uez elects not to convert the petition, the district c o u rt shall dismiss the petition without prejudice.

Costs of appeal are awarded to Doming uez

.

VACATED AND REMANDED.