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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 113TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

S. PRT. 

2014

113–29 

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION: 

U.S. CIVILIAN PRESENCE AND 

ASSISTANCE POST-2014 

A MAJORITY STAFF REPORT 

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

OCTOBER 27, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v 

Executive Summary and Recommendations ......................................................... 1 

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 5 

I. Enhanced Accountability for U.S. Assistance ................................................... 7 

The TMAF as a Mechanism for Incentivized Assistance .............................. 7 

Improving Afghanistan’s Capacity to Budget and Collect Revenue ............. 8 

Enhancing Women’s Political, Economic, and Social Rights ........................ 9 

Renewed Efforts to Address Corruption and Stem Afghanistan’s Illicit 

Economy ......................................................................................................... 9 

The Afghan National Security Forces and Protection of Human Rights ..... 10 

II. A Refined U.S. Civilian Assistance Approach ................................................. 12 

Sustainability of U.S. Investments ................................................................. 12 

Direct ‘‘On-Budget’’ Government Assistance .................................................. 13 

Lessons Learned and Interagency Information Sharing ............................... 14 

Monitoring Program Implementation ............................................................. 15 

New Silk Road Initiative .................................................................................. 16 

III. Robust U.S. Diplomatic Posture and Civilian Presence ................................ 17 

Civilian Staffing ................................................................................................ 18 

The Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program ................................................... 18 

Promoting Regional Connectivity: The New Silk Road Initiative; Office 

of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP); 

and USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs ......................... 19 

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC, October 27, 2014. 

DEAR COLLEAGUES: This report by the committee’s majority staff 

examines the U.S. assistance and diplomatic approach to Afghanistan amid the security and political transitions taking place in the 

country. As we enter this new phase, it is critical that the United 

States reexamine its presence in Afghanistan to ensure that assistance is provided in the most efficient, cost effective, and sustainable manner possible. 

The U.S. has sacrificed greatly in Afghanistan in terms of blood 

and treasure. Our policy and programming objectives moving forward should focus on sustaining the measurable developmental 

gains we have achieved, and ensuring that the new Afghan government effectively continues on a path of self-reliance and democratic 

development. 

Later this year, international donors will meet with the new Afghan government to discuss assistance to the country. This report 

is meant to inform those deliberations and other engagements with 

the new Afghan government to combat corruption and bolster efforts to ensure that U.S. tax dollars are spent wisely. It is equally 

important that the benchmarks for strengthening rule of law and 

women’s rights are reinforced by the Afghan government and the 

international community. 

This report examines increasing accountability for U.S. assistance, refining the U.S. assistance approach, and creating a more 

robust U.S. diplomatic posture and civilian presence, and offers a 

series of recommendations for the U.S. Government as it engages 

the new government in Kabul and contends with the remaining security and development challenges across the country. 

Sincerely, 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

Chairman. 

(V)

(1) 

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION: U.S. CIVILIAN 

PRESENCE AND ASSISTANCE POST-2014 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As the international community draws down its forces, Afghanistan will experience historic political and security transitions that 

will set the course for the country’s future. The political unity government established by President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and 

CEO Abdullah Abdullah creates a framework for progress, and 

both leaders must work to fully implement all elements of the deal. 

While the 2014 presidential election process was contentious and 

difficult, there is reason for optimism as the new Afghan government takes steps to establish credibility with its people and international partners. The immediate signing of a Bilateral Security 

Agreement with the United States was an important first step in 

the right direction, but many important challenges lie ahead. 

The political and security transitions provide an important inflection point to reexamine how the U.S. resources its efforts in Afghanistan. This report examines increasing accountability for U.S. 

assistance, refining the U.S. assistance approach, and creating a 

more robust U.S. diplomatic posture and civilian presence, and offers a series of recommendations for the USG as it prepares to engage the new government in Kabul. 

I. ENHANCED ACCOUNTABILITY FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE

U.S. political support for assistance to Afghanistan has diminished in recent years, even though precipitous cuts in funding could 

have a destabilizing effect on the country. To maintain support for 

future funding, key accountability measures must be strengthened. 

The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), despite its 

shortfalls, provides a foundation for dialogue with the new Afghan 

government on reform and accountability for international assistance. The U.S. must now work with the new Afghan government 

to refocus the TMAF hard deliverables in ways that will best position Afghanistan to address its long term challenges. The U.S. 

should also condition a higher percentage of its funding: if done 

properly by ensuring Afghan buy-in, conditioning U.S. assistance 

can improve the accountability of our aid, strengthen reformers and 

institutions in the Afghan government and result in better development outcomes. Finally, increasing reports of abuses by the Afghan 

National Security Forces (ANSF) are a worrying trend. With fewer 

U.S. personnel on the ground and with tremendous amounts of 

U.S. assistance going to the ANSF, the U.S. must identify new 

ways to ensure that any security force abuses are properly investigated, documented, and prosecuted. 

2 

Recommendations 

• Increase Incentives: A higher proportion of U.S. assistance 

should be conditioned based on specific reforms by the Afghan 

government. The U.S. should make clear to the new government that the appointment process factors into how the U.S. 

allocates assistance. 

• Refocus Reform Priorities: The U.S. has set aside $100 million 

in a reform incentive fund for the Afghan government. The following reforms should be prioritized in conversations with the 

Afghan government: 

Æ Enhanced Budgeting and Revenue Collection to include: 

◊ Developing uniform and consistent methods to collect and report data on customs collection; 

◊ Fully deploying electronic payment systems at all 

customs collection locations; and 

◊ Swiftly implementing a value added tax and improving the transparency of contracts in legislation 

regulating the mining sector. 

Æ Support for Women’s Political, Economic, and Social 

Rights to include: 

◊ Fully implementing the Elimination of Violence 

Against Women (EVAW) law and the National Action 

Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA), as well 

as reforming laws that discriminate against women; 

◊ Committing to developing the capacity and empowering the Ministry for Women’s Affairs (MOWA); 

and 

◊ Creating a more robust shelter system for Afghan 

women. 

Æ Renew Efforts to Address Corruption and the Illicit 

Economy to include: 

◊ Adopting pending anti-corruption legislation; 

◊ Appointing genuine reformers to positions within 

key ministries; 

◊ Recovering stolen Kabul Bank assets and prosecuting those responsible; 

◊ Strengthening the Afghan Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC); and 

◊ Curbing poppy cultivation and production. 

• Security Assistance and Protecting Human Rights: Robust 

U.S. support for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 

will be contingent on respect for human rights. The State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 

(DRL) must be actively engaged at every step in the process of 

determining the suitability of security assistance recipients. 

Economic Support Fund assistance for Afghanistan should include at least $10 million for DRL grants to Afghan organizations for conducting oversight of the security sector. Given the 

scale of assistance and concerns about robust oversight, this report also recommends an interagency review mechanism to address reported rights abuses. 

3 

II. A REFINED U.S. CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE APPROACH

In 2011, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff 

released a report on civilian assistance to Afghanistan that called 

upon the USG to implement assistance programs that were necessary, achievable, and sustainable. This recommendation holds 

true today, and though the USG has taken a more strategic approach, several concerns remain. First, given Afghanistan’s limited 

resources, sustainability of development projects is an ongoing and 

significant challenge. Second, a comprehensive interagency effort to 

assess lessons learned from stabilization projects must take place 

in short order. Third, there is an imperative to support the capacity 

of the Afghan government, but serious corruption continues to 

hamper progress and support for direct assistance to ministries. 

Fourth, with the military drawdown, it will be more difficult to 

monitor development projects. Finally, Afghanistan’s future lies in 

good economic relations with its neighbors. While the U.S. Government is focused on a ‘‘New Silk Road’’ initiative to help build critical economic links between Afghanistan and its neighbors, there 

have been modest resources committed to this task, particularly in 

Central Asia. 

Recommendations 

• Sustainability: The State Department and USAID should 

produce detailed plans for the sustainability of assistance programs in Afghanistan, without which Congress cannot make 

fully informed funding decisions. If there is not a clear plan for 

how program activities—especially infrastructure projects—can 

eventually be sustained by Afghans, USAID should not implement them. 

• Lessons Learned and Interagency Information Sharing: There 

must be an interagency assessment of the efficacy of U.S. funded large-scale infrastructure projects and stabilization programs, including whether such programs achieved their stated 

goals, the challenges associated with civilian-military cooperation, and the unintended consequences of such programming in 

a conflict environment. The Department of Defense and USAID 

should also establish criteria whereby information on development projects implemented by the military can be safely transferred and included in the Afghan Info database. 

• On-Budget Assistance: The U.S. must increase efforts to bolster 

the capacity of Afghan governing institutions through direct 

on-budget assistance to Afghan ministries. USAID should also 

enhance the capacity of government watchdog organizations 

that can further scrutinize the work of government ministries 

receiving on-budget assistance. 

• Tiered Monitoring: The State Department and USAID should 

provide regular reports to Congress on the challenges of monitoring assistance programs in insecure environments. Programs that cannot be sufficiently monitored should be terminated. 

• The New Silk Road Initiative: The State Department should 

invest more sustained senior level engagement and funding to 

realize the goals of the New Silk Road initiative, including utiVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:38 Oct 27, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\TOPIC-ISSUE 
4 

lizing up to $150 million in Afghanistan Economic Support 

Fund assistance to bolster economic connectivity between Afghanistan and its neighbors in the region. Planning for Fiscal 

Years 2015 and 2016 should be reviewed to ensure the dedication of adequate resources towards these objectives. The State 

Department and USAID should also look to better integrate 

the NSR initiative with its democracy and governance goals in 

the broader region. 

III. ROBUST U.S. DIPLOMATIC POSTURE AND CIVILIAN PRESENCE

Through these transitions, the U.S. must maintain a robust diplomatic and assistance presence in the country, despite being hindered by bureaucratic structures that could impede policy goals. 

U.S. implementing agencies continue to face the loss of institutional knowledge due to a high turnover rate among diplomats and 

aid workers and the loss of critical Afghan expertise due to the 

Special Immigrant Visa program. In addition, while the State Department touts the importance of regional economic integration and 

development through the New Silk Road initiative, Afghanistan 

and Pakistan remain bureaucratically separated from the South 

and Central Asia Bureau at the State Department and the Asia 

Bureau at USAID. Finally, the USG’s long term vision for engagement in Afghanistan and the broader region remains unclear— 

maintaining support for sustained U.S. engagement requires that 

the administration clearly state and make the case for U.S. interests in Afghanistan and the broader South and Central Asia region. 

Recommendations 

• Communicating the Policy: The U.S. Government should clearly state the critical national security interests in Afghanistan 

to the American public and work to generate support for continued robust engagement. The USG should work to reassure 

Afghanistan and our allies in the region that the U.S. remains 

committed to the security and economic prosperity of South 

and Central Asia. 

• Personnel: The State Department and USAID should institute 

staffing measures that ensure more continuity in diplomatic 

and assistance engagements, including more incentives for diplomats and aid workers to serve extended tours. 

• Special Immigrant Visas: As the drawdown of U.S. troops continues, the State Department should accelerate the SIV process 

to prevent any unnecessary backlog of applicants. The U.S. 

Congress should expand the number of Special Immigrant 

Visas offered to Afghan staff that have worked for the U.S. and 

extend the program through the end of 2016. Future authorizing legislation on SIVs should also allow for newly arrived 

SIV recipients to work in the U.S. for the State Department, 

USAID or other agencies working to support U.S. interests in 

Afghanistan. The USG should identify creative ways to ensure 

that SIV recipients’ knowledge and expertise is captured to ensure continuity of effort. 

• Promoting Regional Integration: The State Department should 

continue its efforts to integrate the Office of the Special RepVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:38 Oct 27, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\TOPIC-ISSUE 
5 

resentative for Afghanistan and Pakistan into the Bureau for 

South and Central Asian Affairs and USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs into the Asia Bureau. 

INTRODUCTION

A stable, democratic, and secure Afghanistan is a U.S. 

national interest; it will be a bulwark against al Qaida and 

other dangerous extremist groups and a partner in the effort to prevent those groups from using Afghanistan to plan 

and launch attacks against our people and our allies . . . 

[who have participated in] a truly extraordinary international civilian campaign to help heal the scars of decades of war and years of life under a system of government 

that made the cruel commonplace.—Ambassador James 

Dobbins, former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) 1

In 2014, Afghanistan is experiencing political and security transitions that will mark an inflection point in the country’s history 

and the international community’s role. Decisions made during 

these transitions and beyond will impact Afghanistan’s security, 

politics and development for decades to come. In the 1990s, U.S. 

disengagement from Afghanistan proved disastrous for the country, 

the region and the international community. Today, the U.S. must 

avoid making the mistakes of the past and take steps to ensure the 

strength and sustainability of U.S. assistance spending, diplomatic 

posture, and regional strategy. 

These goals will resonate through the country’s political and security transitions and the U.S. has a strong base of accomplishments upon which to build. Afghanistan has made substantial development progress since 2001 in education, health, and infrastructure. According to the Afghan government, 7.3 million students are 

attending school, more than one third of whom are girls, compared 

to only one million children in 2001, almost all of whom were 

boys.2 Life expectancy has increased from around 40 to 60 years 

old, and infant and maternal mortality rates have been cut in half. 

Since 2001, Afghanistan’s GDP increased from $2.4 billion to more 

than $20 billion today.3 From 2001-2012, Afghanistan had the 

highest Human Development Index (HDI) growth in the world, 

which combines measures of education, health, and income. Largely due to the progress made in these key areas, the Afghan people 

broadly support continued engagement with the U.S. and the international community. The strength of this support will be a significant bulwark against Afghanistan again becoming a safe haven for 

extremist groups. 

Democratic institutions have also made strides in Afghanistan 

since 2001, and Afghanistan now lays claim to vibrant civil society 

groups and an independent media sector which could never exist 

under Taliban rule. Organizations representing the rights of Afghan women have been particularly effective in advocating for social change, though they have a long road ahead. And the 2014 

presidential election, while deeply flawed, demonstrated the determination of the Afghan people to participate in the democratic 

process. Afghanistan’s democratic institutions are still fragile and 

6 

vulnerable to fraud and abuse, but its civil society groups are well 

positioned to advocate with the new administration for more political space and an enhanced role in the years to come. Following 

this contentious election process, both President Ghani and CEO 

Abdullah have a responsibility to bolster democratic institutions in 

the country and build trust with the Afghan people. To that end, 

President Ghani should work closely with Dr. Abdullah on the full 

implementation of all elements of the political unity deal brokered 

by Secretary Kerry in August 2014. As part of its oversight responsibilities, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will monitor the 

implementation of this agreement as it considers future assistance. 

Afghanistan still faces significant institutional challenges that 

could roll back the considerable progress made. A stubborn insurgency will continue to threaten security, and the capacity of the Afghan government to provide goods and services remains very weak. 

The economy will likely face significant budget shortfalls in the 

coming years, due to a decline in revenue collection and a diminished international presence. As security costs increase, the Afghan 

portion of the budget dedicated to development efforts will likely 

decrease. Illicit poppy cultivation and opium production is on the 

rise. Perhaps most challenging, corruption remains rampant: 

Transparency International ranks the country as one of the most 

corrupt in the world. Amid these challenges, the U.S. relationship 

with Afghanistan deteriorated significantly towards the end of 

President Hamid Karzai’s term, which has eroded support in the 

U.S. for continued engagement. 

Critical to a successful transition in Afghanistan is maintaining 

support in the U.S. for a sustained diplomatic, assistance and security engagement with the new Afghan government. The administration should clearly state U.S. interests in Afghanistan and make 

a strong public case for the importance of remaining focused on the 

region. Amid competing interests around the world, sustained senior level attention to the region will be critical to safeguarding 

hard-fought gains throughout the transition. 

Those gains have been made possible through the sacrifices made 

by the U.S., our coalition partners and the Afghans over the last 

13 years. The Afghan and American people owe a profound debt of 

gratitude to our armed forces, diplomats and aid workers who have 

been instrumental in Afghanistan’s positive trajectory. The U.S. 

has lost more than 2,300 servicemembers in Afghanistan and many 

thousands more have returned home with grievous injuries, both 

visible and invisible. The State Department, USAID and their partner organizations have lost more than 400 people. We honor the 

memory of those who made the ultimate sacrifice in Afghanistan, 

the sacrifices made by their families and those who will bear the 

lifelong wounds of war. 

7 

I. ENHANCED ACCOUNTABILITY FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE

As resources become more limited, prioritization and improving efficiency and effectiveness of aid in order to maximize the benefits of development outcomes become crucial.—Joint report of the Government of Afghanistan and 

the international community4

Given ongoing budget constraints in the U.S., it is unlikely that 

assistance for Afghanistan will increase in the coming years, making the accountability of funds even more important. A strong and 

clear framework for accountability can both ensure that U.S. taxpayer funds are spent wisely and bolster support for continued assistance. This requires a more focused use of existing accountability 

tools like the TMAF. 

The TMAF as a Mechanism for Incentivized Assistance 

In 2012, international donors and the Afghan government agreed 

to the TMAF, which included a pledge by donors to provide $4 billion per year from 2012-2015 and to sustain assistance at or near 

the same levels of the past decade through 2017. In return, the Afghan government agreed to benchmarks related to democracy and 

governance, public finance and revenue generation, and economic 

development.5 At the center of the TMAF agreement was a commitment by the international community to provide a higher percentage of funding directly to the Afghan government, or ‘‘on-budget.’’ 

On-budget funding helps the ministries develop administrative capacity and pay for operations, personnel, and development initiatives.6

In 2013, the U.S. announced the U.S.—Afghanistan Incentive 

Fund,7 which incentivized up to $175 million in funding through 

the World Bank Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund’s ‘‘recurrent cost window.’’ 8 In early 2014, the U.S. released $15 million 

after it assessed that Afghanistan had completed benchmarks on 

electoral reforms, and another $15 million in recognition of the Afghan government’s adoption of a provincial budgeting policy, which 

will be essential for the sustainability of decentralization efforts. 

Lack of progress in the areas of rule of law, human rights, women’s 

rights, and public and commercial finance resulted in the U.S. 

withdrawing $45 million from the incentive fund, to be reprogrammed for use in other U.S. assistance programs in the country.9

By reducing the amount of funds available for on-budget assistance, the U.S. demonstrated the consequences of the lack of 

progress made by the Afghan government. The remaining incentive 

funding has been set aside pending discussions with a new Afghan 

government on reform priorities. 

Donor countries and Afghan officials have committed to meeting 

before the end of 2014 to review the TMAF, and the U.S. must 

clearly state that assistance will be subject to increased scrutiny. 

The TMAF need not be completely renegotiated, but the incentive 

structure should be strengthened and funding should be tied to improving Afghanistan’s capacity to collect revenue, enhance women’s 

rights, address corruption and stem the illicit economy, and protect 

human rights. USAID should also enhance the capacity of non-govVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:38 Oct 27, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\TOPIC-ISSUE 
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ernmental watchdogs that can scrutinize the work of government 

ministries receiving on-budget assistance. 

Improving Afghanistan’s Capacity to Budget and Collect Revenue 

The Afghan government will face severe fiscal shortfalls for 

many years to come and will require long-term support from the 

international community. Overall, the incoming government should 

work to establish realistic plans for budgeting that include 

prioritizing expenditures and improving budget execution. The government should also prioritize revenue collection as a means towards bolstering the country’s long term economic stability, while 

also building the confidence of the international community.10

Early in its tenure, the incoming government can take four immediate steps to improve revenue collection: First, it should fully deploy electronic payment systems at all customs collection locations. 

Second, it should develop uniform and consistent methods to collect 

and report customs data. Third, it should work to improve the 

transparency of contracts in current law regulating the mining industry and pass legislation establishing a value-added tax (VAT). 

Any relevant U.S. assistance programs should support these revenue generation objectives and provide technical assistance to the 

government, where possible.11

Customs revenue collected by the Afghan government accounts 

for nearly 50 percent of the country’s overall revenue, but the process is riddled with corruption, especially at key border crossings.12

While corruption at customs collection points is difficult to quantify, USAID and Afghan customs officials estimate that a significant reduction in corruption could potentially double Afghanistan’s 

customs revenue, essentially increasing overall government revenue by one-third.13

The U.S. has spent at least $198 million to develop the capacity 

of the Afghan government to assess and collect revenue.14 A key 

component of one USAID program to increase customs revenue is 

the technological capability to electronically transfer custom fees, 

which improves efficiency and diminishes the possibility for corruption. According to a 2014 report by the Special Inspector General 

for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the employment of this 

electronic payment system has been ‘‘delayed, due in part, to a proposal by an Afghan official to allow only one Afghan bank to process all of the electronic customs payments.’’ 15 Despite a decline in 

customs collection in recent years, the Afghan government has not 

yet moved forward with this critical technology. 

SIGAR has also raised concerns about the reliability of the revenue data produced by the Afghan Customs Department (ACD), including the lack of consistent data related to border closures, which 

compounds Afghanistan’s revenue challenges and creates more opportunities for corruption. The U.S. should prioritize the above 

issues with the new Afghan government. 

Increased revenue collection will not immediately solve Afghanistan’s fiscal challenges, and the country will continue to be reliant 

on the international community for assistance. Nevertheless, if the 

new Afghan government cannot show a strong political commitment to revenue collection in its first year, then the U.S. taxpayer 

9 

should not be expected to contribute the same levels of robust funding. 

Enhancing Women’s Political, Economic, and Social Rights 

Afghan women are concerned that hard-fought gains for their 

rights and freedoms will erode as the international community 

draws down troops or as the Afghan government negotiates a peace 

deal with the Taliban. With respect to women’s rights, the TMAF 

focused only on the implementation of the Elimination of Violence 

Against Women (EVAW) law and the National Action Plan for the 

Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA). The relevant benchmark required the Afghan government to publically report on incidents of 

violence against women across the country. The government did 

not meet the deadline in releasing the report so the U.S. withdrew 

$15 million in incentive funding. 

In determining funding incentives, the U.S. should prioritize efforts which seek to protect the most vulnerable women in Afghan 

society, ensure that women are actively engaged in the political 

process, and guarantee that their perspectives are taken into account in the peace and reconciliation process. Lasting peace and 

prosperity in Afghanistan will require an inclusive political settlement which not only respects the rights of women, but also includes them as active participants in the process. Similarly, any 

TMAF benchmarks regarding women’s rights should be negotiated 

in close consultation with women leaders in Afghan civil society. 

The U.S. and other international donors should pressure the incoming Afghan government to make substantial and measurable 

commitments to supporting women’s political, economic and social 

rights in Afghanistan. First, international donors should reiterate 

the importance of the full implementation of the EVAW law and 

the NAPWA, as well as amending or repealing laws that discriminate against women. Second, the international community should 

tie funding to measurable gains in the capacity and empowerment 

of the Ministry for Women’s Affairs (MOWA). With provincial offices spread across the country, MOWA is well placed to represent 

and protect the interests of women at the local level, but it remains 

weak relative to other government ministries. Finally, although the 

State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement supports Afghanistan’s most vulnerable women 

through funding of women’s shelters, more should be done to ensure stable, predictable, and long-term assistance for shelters, perhaps through incentivizing a portion of funding based on improving 

the capacity of shelters, increasing their number, and ensuring that 

they are performing their expected duties. 

Renewed Efforts to Address Corruption and Stem Afghanistan’s Illicit Economy 

The great challenge to Afghanistan’s future isn’t the 

Taliban or Pakistani safe havens or even an incipiently 

hostile Pakistan. The existential threat to the long-term viability of modern Afghanistan is corruption. For too long 

we’ve focused our attention solely on the Taliban as the existential threat to Afghanistan. They are an annoyance 

compared to the scope and the magnitude of corruption 

10 

with which (Afghanistan) must contend.—Former ISAF 

Commander General John Allen16

The influx of security and development funds into Afghanistan 

after 2001 helped create an environment susceptible to corruption. 

While decreased levels of international funding and enhanced U.S. 

accountability measures may mitigate the impact of corruption, the 

new Afghan government should address corruption through legislation, personnel appointments, and capacity building. 

First, the government should adopt long delayed anti-corruption 

legislation which the U.S. established as a benchmark for its Incentive Fund. The U.S. should again tie assistance to this benchmark, 

and if the new government fails to achieve it, the U.S. should use 

those funds to bolster the work of anti-corruption Afghan civil society groups. 

Second, the incoming government must appoint genuine reformers to positions within key ministries; these reformers can be empowered by strong TMAF requirements which they can use to advance reforms. The new government will indicate its degree of seriousness in tackling corruption with these appointments. 

Third, the new government has taken steps to address the Kabul Bank scandal which resulted in the theft of nearly $900 million. 

The government should continue this focus, work to recover lost 

funds and prosecute those responsible. 

Fourth, the government should bolster its own internal capacity 

to confront corruption. The government auditor, the Monitoring 

and Evaluation Committee (MEC), should be enhanced with political and financial support from the Afghan government and continued financial and capacity-building assistance from the international community. 

Afghanistan’s illicit economy and drug trade will significantly 

hamper its political and security transitions. SIGAR has expressed 

concern that the international community’s military and civilian 

drawdowns will result in a loss of ‘‘critical manpower at precisely 

the time that poppy cultivation and drug trafficking is expanding.’’ 17

The drivers and consequences of this illicit economy could serve 

to shatter the fragile gains that Afghanistan has made over the 

years. Given the growing scale of this problem and diminishing resources, the U.S. faces extreme odds in making progress in countering narcotics. This has been a very sensitive issue to confront in 

the past given the impact that eradication can have on poor Afghan 

farmers. There was little mention of counternarcotics in the original TMAF negotiations. But this issue should be addressed in new 

TMAF negotiations, and the U.S. should take the lead in tying assistance to efforts by the new government to confront the illicit 

economy. 

The Afghan National Security Forces and Protection of Human 

Rights 

In recent years, the ANSF has made steady progress in recruitment and in its ability to conduct operations against insurgents. 

During the 2014 election season, the ANSF were instrumental in 

protecting voters and candidates from insurgent attacks. Continued 

robust international security assistance is essential to the viability 

11 

of the Afghan state and the U.S. should abide by its pledged commitments. 

But the U.S. must also maintain the highest standards in ensuring that security assistance recipients do not violate human rights. 

With the NATO drawdown, international forces will have diminished opportunity to mentor and monitor the work of ANSF troops 

in the field. Alongside this drawdown, the United Nations and 

international human rights organizations have expressed concerns 

about reports of rights violations by elements of the ANSF.18

The Afghan Local Police (ALP), which were stood up by the U.S. 

military and mentored by U.S. Special Forces, deserve special scrutiny. In 2013, the United Nations reported that 121 civilian casualties, as well as documented cases of torture, were attributed to the 

ALP. Working with the Ministry of Interior, which has jurisdiction 

over the ALP, the U.S. should propose measures to integrate ALP 

units and functions into the Afghan National Police. 

Currently, U.S. security assistance to Afghanistan is provided 

through the Department of Defense (DoD), not the State Department (as is normal practice).19 U.S. planners do not expect to transition security assistance in Afghanistan from the DoD to the State 

Department in the near future. While the complications associated 

with such a transfer of responsibilities are prohibitively high at the 

moment, the State Department should regularly brief Congress on 

how and when this transfer will eventually take place. The uniqueness of the current arrangement necessitates a pro-active role by 

the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 

Labor (DRL) in ensuring that statutory human rights vetting of the 

ANSF is rigorous and held to the highest standards. 

If found complicit of serious human rights violations, American 

support for the ANSF could diminish significantly and rapidly. The 

USG should therefore take several steps to enhance oversight of 

the ANSF. 

First, the U.S. should stress to the new Afghan government that 

continued robust support for the ANSF is contingent on respect for 

human rights, a commitment that the Afghan government made at 

the Chicago NATO conference in 2012. The ANSF should take 

measurable steps to improve internal accountability by strengthening the capacity, independence, and power of its Inspector General (IG). The U.S. could be instructive in sharing techniques and 

expertise from its own IGs working at different levels in Afghanistan, especially SIGAR and the DoD’s IG. 

Second, DRL should be actively engaged in determining the suitability of security assistance recipients and assisting DoD with its 

extended vetting efforts.20 Given the scale of assistance and concerns about robust oversight, this report also recommends an interagency review mechanism to address reported rights abuses. 

Finally, to maintain the highest standards of human rights vetting, the U.S. will need more sources of information and more 

‘‘eyes-on’’ the ANSF. In many countries, domestic civil society 

watchdog organizations are able to play this critical role. Afghanistan’s civil society has proven its ability to conduct oversight of the 

parliament, advocate for women’s rights, and observe elections. In 

the future, U.S. assistance to Afghanistan should include at least 

12 

$10 million for DRL to provide grants to Afghan organizations to 

conduct oversight of the security sector. 

II. A REFINED U.S. CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE APPROACH

The USG’s civilian assistance transition strategy seeks to reinforce and expand gains made in health, education, women’s empowerment, agriculture, infrastructure, governance, and private 

sector development.21 With these goals in mind, the U.S. assistance 

approach in Afghanistan should be refined in six key areas: sustainability, capacity-building, lessons learned and information sharing, oversight, and regional integration. 

Sustainability of U.S. Investments 

In 2011, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) majority 

staff produced a report that analyzed U.S. assistance in Afghanistan and recommended a re-evaluation of the performance and impact of stabilization programs in conflict zones as well as an enhanced focus on the sustainability of U.S. assistance programs. The 

report also emphasized that U.S. assistance programs should be 

necessary, achievable, and sustainable. In large measure, the State 

Department and USAID have taken on the recommendations laid 

out in the 2011 SFRC report, but several concerns remain, especially regarding sustainability. 

According to the World Bank, the United States, and other international donors fund more than 60% of the Afghan national budget 

as well as several reconstruction projects that operate off-budget. 

The IMF and the World Bank estimate that Afghan maintenance 

of donor-supplied infrastructure—roads, buildings, utility, and 

equipment—will cost 15% of Afghanistan’s GDP.22 In some circumstances, local authorities lack the ability to keep projects running and revenue shortfalls may force Afghanistan to abandon 

some development initiatives. 

For example, according to SIGAR, the operation and maintenance costs for a USAID program called Partnership Contracts for 

Health Services, which helps fund hospitals, clinics, and other medical facilities, far exceed what the Afghans can sustain. It remains 

unclear how these costs will be covered in light of diminishing assistance levels, though the Ministry of Public Health is reportedly 

working with the World Bank to develop operations and maintenance policies and budgeting, as well as asset registries.23

USAID has taken significant measures to promote sustainability 

in its programming, including the June 2011 ‘‘Administrator’s Sustainability Guidance for USAID in Afghanistan.’’ In addition, the 

FY 14 foreign operations appropriation law requires that the Secretary of State certify, prior to the obligation of funding, that funds 

are used in accordance with this guidance. According to USAID, all 

major infrastructure projects are subject to a sustainability audit.24

Certain U.S. assistance projects, such as infrastructure for hydroelectric power and electrical grids, have helped put Afghanistan on 

a path towards self-sustainability. The Afghan national power company, DABS, collected $220 million from the sale of electricity in 

2012, an increase of 67 percent from 2010. According to USAID, for 

the first time in 70 years, DABS was able to contribute $25 million 

to the government’s coffers to help fund the national budget.25

13 

Yet concerns in other program areas remain. According to a recent State Department IG report, ‘‘most current International Narcotics and Law Enforcement programs cite the goal of building sustainable Afghan capacity, however, the degree to which sustainability is incorporated into program design and performance measures vary considerably.’’ 26 According to the IG, a range of factors— 

including political will, management systems, finances, and human 

capacity—are not always included in planning programs. The 2011 

SFRC majority staff committee report on Afghanistan highlighted 

significant concerns about the sustainability of INL programming. 

INL should renew its efforts to implement sustainable programming, in accordance with the USAID sustainability guidelines. 

The importance of sustainability has only grown with the drawdown of U.S. military and civilian personnel, a decrease in assistance funds, and domestic fiscal constraint. During this period, the 

USG must increase its focus on sustainability to ensure that U.S. 

investments are not lost and that Afghans can and will maintain 

the important gains made. The State Department and USAID 

should produce detailed plans for the sustainability of assistance 

programs in Afghanistan, without which Congress cannot make 

fully informed funding decisions. If there is not a realistic plan for 

how program activities—especially infrastructure projects—can 

eventually be sustained by Afghans, USAID should not implement 

them. 

Direct ‘‘On-Budget’’ Government Assistance 

On-budget assistance is an essential element in building the sustainability and capacity of the Afghan government to administer to 

the needs of its citizens. Yet, given the high U.S. standards for disbursing funds and the low capacity of the Afghan government, this 

type of assistance is very difficult to implement. For example, at 

the prompting of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 

USAID conducted independent evaluations of 16 individual ministries to assess their suitability to receive U.S. funding. Only 

seven ministries were found eligible and received on-budget assistance.27

On-budget programming has not been without controversy. In 

January 2014, SIGAR issued an audit of on-budget funding provided to Afghan ministries and asserted that USAID had not required the ministries to address most of the risks identified 

through USAID’s evaluations.28 While SIGAR acknowledged that 

USAID had measures intended to mitigate some risks associated 

with on-budget assistance, it expressed concern that these measures did not address all of the most serious problems. USAID responded that the ministry weaknesses highlighted in the SIGAR 

audit were not addressed by USAID risk mitigation measures because they were not relevant to USAID funding streams and the 

implementation of relevant programs. 

Upon review of the USAID evaluations and the SIGAR audit, 

SFRC majority staff found that USAID had developed a sufficient 

system to deliver assistance while taking steps to implement safeguard measures and mitigate against the effects of institutional 

weakness. Nonetheless, significant concerns remain about the capacity of Afghan ministries to absorb assistance. For example, the 

14 

World Bank found that only three Afghan ministries with development budgets of more than $50 million (the Ministries of Health, 

Finance and Rural Development) were able to execute more than 

20 percent of their budgets.29 As a result, there are significant 

pipelines of direct on-budget U.S. funding from past years that remain unspent. 

Ministerial capacity to disburse development funds will continue 

to be a significant challenge in the years to come, and the U.S. 

should not lower its oversight standards in providing on-budget assistance. There have been positive examples where USAID has 

shifted course based on capacity concerns. For example, USAID decided to discontinue elements of its on-budget assistance to the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) 

when the ministry determined that it did not have the capacity to 

process the funds. Implementing assistance too quickly can sometimes do more harm than good by distorting local economies and 

facilitating corruption. 

The U.S. should continue to increase the capacity of Afghan governing institutions through a gradual and calibrated expansion of 

direct on-budget assistance. Given the complexities associated with 

this type of assistance, USAID should provide regular reports to 

Congress regarding on-budget programming, ministry by ministry. 

USAID should also make every effort to address the capacity weaknesses identified by SIGAR within the Afghan ministries that receive assistance. 

Lessons Learned and Interagency Information Sharing 

Alongside the military surge, stabilization programming in the 

form of small-scale, quick-impact projects rapidly increased. Because of the urgent need for these programs, a baseline assessment 

was not conducted, making evaluation of project results difficult. 

The 2011 SFRC majority staff committee report asserted that too 

much aid could have a destabilizing effect on the local economies 

of these communities. While stabilization programming may have 

had a short-term impact in some cases, there is scant evidence that 

these projects won over local populations over the long-term.30

USAID is conducting a study to better understand the impact of 

stabilization programming and how lessons learned can be applied 

to future programming in unstable environments. Unfortunately, 

the assessment does not extend to all government agencies that 

have implemented stabilization assistance in Afghanistan. Without 

a comprehensive and centralized assessment, the USG will not 

have a clear picture of the impact of its programs, nor will it have 

a comprehensive set of lessons learned that could be applied in the 

future. 

USAID and all other U.S. assistance providers, including the 

DoD, should conduct an interagency assessment on the efficacy of 

all U.S. stabilization programs in Afghanistan (including the Commander’s Emergency Response Program) to determine whether 

they achieved their stated goals. This assessment should also examine the challenges associated with civilian-military cooperation 

and the unintended consequences of such programming in conflict 

environments. 

15 

Beyond stabilization programming, the USG can improve information sharing on its full complement of development initiatives in 

Afghanistan. Proper planning, monitoring, and evaluation of future 

programs needs to be done with a clear and complete understanding of U.S. assistance programs implemented since 2001, including those conducted by the military. USAID stores data related 

to its programs in the Afghan Info database, which captures various tiers of data and initial analysis.31 Afghan Info also serves as 

a useful tool for facilitating interagency cooperation and information sharing. The Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, and several State Department bureaus and offices, including International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Political Affairs, Public Affairs, Rule of Law and Population and Resource 

Management, have contributed to the database.32

Yet USAID’s IG found that, due to concerns about security classification levels, Afghan Info does not include data related to DoD assistance programming.33 As a result, there is no way to ensure that 

future USAID assistance decisions take all past DoD efforts into 

account. While recognizing that interagency communication and coordination already occurs between the two agencies at some level, 

DoD and USAID should still establish criteria whereby DoD assistance programming data can be safely transferred and included in 

Afghan Info. 

Monitoring Program Implementation 

The drawdown of U.S. military forces and civilian personnel combined with the tenuous security environment in Afghanistan will 

impact the ability of the U.S. to monitor and evaluate projects. Corruption and low government capacity heighten the importance of, 

and make more difficult, sufficient oversight of U.S. assistance. 

USAID has taken several measures to enhance oversight of its programs in Afghanistan, including the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan (A3) initiative, which seeks to ensure that development 

funds are not diverted to nefarious actors. It has also established 

a tiered monitoring system to verify the implementation of development projects that, for security reasons, cannot be physically monitored by U.S. personnel.34

USAID has experience conducting monitoring and evaluation in 

insecure environments with little or no U.S. security presence. 

USAID asserts that its current tiered monitoring program in Afghanistan is similar to those used in other countries like Colombia, 

Iraq, Pakistan, and South Sudan.35 Yet Afghanistan poses a unique 

set of challenges: its assistance levels are higher than any other 

country, it is one of the most corrupt countries in the world, and 

parts of the country remain active conflict zones. As a result, 

SIGAR has expressed serious concern about programs which fall 

outside areas that can be directly monitored by U.S. personnel.36

The State Department and USAID should provide regular reports to Congress on the challenges posed by indirect monitoring 

of assistance programs and on the methodology of such monitoring. 

The tiered monitoring system37 is a creative method, but also creates significant risks and will be subject to ongoing scrutiny by 

Congress. In a time of shrinking budgets, programs that cannot be 

16 

sufficiently monitored should be paused until security conditions 

improve or, in other cases, closed down completely. 

The State Department’s policy on monitoring and evaluation directed agencies to establish ‘‘specific trip wires for deciding when 

projects should be postponed, put on hold or terminated.’’ 38 Congress should be fully briefed on these ‘‘trip wires’’ and any ongoing 

challenges related to program monitoring. USAID should also regularly brief Congress on programs they have postponed, paused, or 

terminated because of poor monitoring conditions. USAID should 

similarly inform Congress of its efforts to coordinate with other 

international donors on tiered monitoring efforts. 

USAID works in a very difficult environment in Afghanistan. 

While it should be held to the highest standards of accountability, 

operating in a conflict environment is inherently and uniquely 

risky. USAID cannot be expected to operate completely risk-free 

programs. However, USAID should regularly inform Congress on 

the nature of the risks involved to help it determine whether the 

costs are worth the benefits. 

New Silk Road Initiative 

The New Silk Road (NSR) is an ambitious and worthwhile initiative to help Afghanistan build better economic interconnectivity 

with its neighbors. Countries in South and Central Asia have significant barriers to inter-regional trade which the NSR hopes to 

overcome. The NSR’s long-term vision comes amid substantially increased investment and engagement in the region by China and 

Russia. In recent years, China has made large investments in infrastructure in Central Asia, particularly in the energy sector. Russia has also increased its engagement in Central Asia through the 

launch of the Eurasian Customs Union and has increased defense 

ties with several countries. The NSR’s proposed North-South trade 

routes complement growing East-West connections across Eurasia, 

creating additional economic opportunity for Central Asian states. 

While progress has been made with limited resources, more robust 

U.S. diplomatic and financial investment in Central Asia is needed 

to make substantial progress towards an Afghanistan that can freely trade with its neighbors. There are also significant opportunities 

for the USG to facilitate economic connections between Pakistan 

and Central Asia via Afghanistan, particularly on energy and trade 

issues, which can help promote needed stability in Pakistan and 

the greater region. 

Between FY 2010 and FY 2014, the State Department asserts 

that it leveraged more than $2 billion from international financial 

institutions and donors ‘‘including the Asian Development Bank 

and the World Bank, in support of energy transmission lines, hydropower plants, and energy-sector reforms.39 Notably, the U.S. 

has dedicated $15 million to supporting the CASA1000 regional 

electricity project, which will result in the export of much-needed 

electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan and Pakistan.40 Afghanistan and Pakistan recently signed a pricing agreement paving 

the way for CASA1000 to move forward. In September 2014, the 

State Department and USAID reprogrammed an additional $15 

million in funds appropriated for Afghanistan to focus on projects 

that enhance regional economic connectivity. The NSR initiative 

17 

has improved customs and border operations and corresponding 

legal frameworks throughout the region, easing the cost and time 

associated with transporting goods. It has also enhanced people-topeople ties, particularly among business people.41

While these efforts have clearly yielded some initial results, the 

administration could do more to bolster its commitment to the NSR 

initiative. First, it should dedicate more sustained senior level engagement with other governments to break the diplomatic logjams 

that inevitably emerge among the countries of South and Central 

Asia. In addition, there should be more interagency cooperation 

across the Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia directorates, as 

well as the National Security Council. 

Second, the U.S. administration should review its FY 15 and 

FY 16 planning to ensure that adequate resources are requested for 

the NSR Initiative. In the FY 14 appropriations law, Congress authorized the State Department to use up to $150 million in Afghanistan Economic Support Fund assistance to bolster economic 

connectivity between Afghanistan and its neighbors in the region. 

Given the low U.S. assistance levels in Central Asia, the administration should follow the guidance of this authorization and invest 

more funding in the NSR initiative. Additional funding appropriated for Pakistan could also support regional economic initiatives to connect Pakistan to Afghanistan and Central Asia, which 

would directly support U.S. national security interests in Pakistan.42

While primarily a tool to build economic connectivity within the 

region, the State Department and USAID should also look to further integrate the NSR initiative with its democracy and governance goals, particularly in Central Asia. As the potential of Central 

Asian markets increases, international investors will increasingly 

demand legal frameworks that are fair, transparent, and enforceable. The NSR initiative should coordinate with USAID’s Rule of 

Law programming in these countries. Alongside this push to enhance economic interconnectivity, the USG should also do more to 

develop the capacity of domestic NGOs and watchdog organizations 

capable of holding their governments accountable. Second, the USG 

should expand efforts to connect civil society groups in the region, 

especially businesswomen and non-governmental organizations 

that promote women’s rights and empowerment. 

III. ROBUST U.S. DIPLOMATIC POSTURE AND CIVILIAN PRESENCE

The U.S. continues to face significant challenges in conducting 

diplomacy and providing assistance in Afghanistan, ranging from 

an insecure environment, corruption in Afghan governing institutions and limited Afghan government capacity to reform and implement development programs. These challenges will likely grow 

throughout this critical transition period, which will only increase 

the need for sustained diplomatic engagement, vigorous oversight, 

renewed focus on strategic objectives, and commensurate 

resourcing in terms of personnel and assistance funds. To face 

these challenges, the USG should consider several measures with 

respect to its U.S. civilian staffing, Afghan employees, and bureaucratic structure. 

18 

Civilian Staffing 

The Administration’s FY 2015 appropriations request includes $961 million to support embassy and consulate operations. As of 

August 2014, the State Department plans to maintain diplomatic 

facilities in Kabul (embassy) Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat (consulates), Kandahar (a regional diplomatic facility) and Bagram (a 

liaison office with the DoD and NATO) to include nearly 700 direct 

hires, as well as 1,100 locally-employed staff and 3,400 contractors.43 The U.S. diplomatic and assistance presence will only grow 

in importance with the drawdown of U.S. troops, heightening the 

need for sufficient levels of staff and infrastructure, as well as 

maintaining continuity and institutional knowledge.44 State Department diplomats generally serve one-year deployments with the 

option to extend; USAID has maintained the same practice. The resulting frequent turnover of U.S. personnel in Kabul has created 

challenges in the quality of analytic reporting45 and in establishing 

and maintaining relationships critical to diplomacy and development efforts. Anecdotal reports from U.S. officials indicate that by 

the time an officer gets a firm handle on their position, it is already 

time for them to move on. 

To address the loss of institutional knowledge and expertise, the 

State Department IG recommended that the USG expand off-shoring and outsourcing of certain responsibilities, as well as increase 

the use of more long term ‘‘temporary duty’’ staff (officials who temporarily leave their U.S.-based jobs for stints abroad).46 The State 

Department and USAID should also consider enhanced incentives 

for those who agree to deploy for two or more years. Incentives 

could include additional financial bonuses or expanded shelter-inplace benefits (allowing families to remain at the diplomat’s last 

overseas post). This is not a new challenge to the Foreign Service 

but is one that continues to bedevil U.S. contingency operations. 

The State Department and interested parties within the foreign 

service, including the American Foreign Service Association, should 

cooperate in developing a plan to address this issue. The OIG also 

recommends establishing a pilot program that would allow eligible 

family members at other overseas posts to apply for short-term employments at Embassy Kabul.47

The State Department should also conduct a review on how it retains staff knowledge and captures lessons learned. Due to security 

concerns, some departing American staff do not overlap with their 

successors in Kabul and do not have the chance to personally 

transfer tasks and knowledge. The USG should consider requiring 

that departed U.S. staff dedicate some time in their new post to 

regularly communicating with their successor in Afghanistan to ensure a smooth transition. This effort should include creative use of 

technology to record lessons learned. 

The Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program 

The SIV program in Afghanistan provides visas to Afghan nationals and their families who are under threat because of their 

work for the U.S. military, State Department, USAID or U.S. contractors. The SIV program is critically important to protect Afghans who have worked and sacrificed to advance U.S. interests in 

Afghanistan, and the U.S. has a profound obligation to ensure the 

19 

security of these courageous individuals and their families. In 2009, 

Congress passed the Afghan Allies Protection Act, authorizing up 

to 7,500 Special Immigrant Visas. There was a significant backlog 

of thousands of applicants over the course of this program, which 

has only recently begun to be addressed by the State Department.48 In July of 2014, the U.S. Congress voted to expand the 

number of SIVs by 1,000 in FY14 and the measure was signed into 

law. Congress should extend the program through the end of 2016 

and expand the overall number of SIVs available to 4,000 per 

year.49 The USG should also consider further reforms to streamline 

the overall SIV process while still maintaining high security standards. As the drawdown of U.S. troops continues, the State Department should accelerate the SIV process to prevent any unnecessary 

backlog of applicants. 

The GAO reports that a majority of USAID’s foreign national 

staff have applied for SIVs.50 Coupled with the high rotation rate 

of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan, the loss of locally-employed staff 

has also diminished the USG’s institutional knowledge of development programs, relationships with local actors, and understanding 

of Afghan culture. 

At a time when U.S. implementers are not as able to deploy to 

the field, local Afghan expertise is needed more than ever to assist 

U.S. efforts.The State Department should take further steps to ensure that institutional knowledge of outgoing SIV recipients is better captured. 

First, U.S. employees rotating to Afghanistan should be able to 

easily identify and communicate with Afghans who had previously 

worked on their portfolios but have since relocated to the United 

States under the SIV program. 

Second, future authorizing legislation on SIVs should also allow 

for newly-arrived SIV recipients to work in the U.S. for the State 

Department, USAID or other agencies working to support U.S. interests in Afghanistan. 

Third, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul must also take steps to maintain institutional knowledge among its Locally Employed Staff 

(LES). The State Department reports that it works to ensure overlap among incoming and outgoing LES and uses Portfolio Continuity, an IT-based program which seeks to maintain institutional 

knowledge.51 While essential, this system cannot compensate for 

the critical relationships and experience accumulated by seasoned 

and experienced Afghan staff. The Embassy should make every effort to connect outgoing and incoming LES members by videoconference or telephone to ensure institutional knowledge is maintained and there is continuity of effort. 

Promoting Regional Connectivity: The New Silk Road Initiative; Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan 

(SRAP); and USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs 

In 2009, the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan was formed to lead diplomatic and development efforts in both countries. At the time of the military and civilian 

surge into Afghanistan, and an increased emphasis on governmentto-government ties with Pakistan, this arrangement was a worthVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:38 Oct 27, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\TOPIC-ISSUE 
20 

while and important indication of American commitment to the region. 

The U.S. administration has repeatedly asserted that the longterm economic sustainability of Afghanistan will be determined by 

its enhanced integration within the region, driven by the New Silk 

Road initiative. The USG’s foreign policy bureaucratic structures 

should reflect this assertion. The FY 14 Appropriations law called 

for the State Department to begin planning for the reintegration of 

Afghanistan and Pakistan into the SCA bureau. The State Department and USAID should continue to normalize the diplomatic and 

assistance approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan by reintegrating 

both countries into the SCA bureau at the State Department and 

the Bureau for Asia at USAID. 52 Given the strategic importance 

of both countries and their significant aid packages, this change 

should not mean precipitously diminishing the level of senior engagement associated with both countries. However, to achieve the 

administration’s overarching objective of regional integration, the 

State Department and USAID need better bureaucratic alignment. 

In recent months, several steps have been taken to improve communication and coordination between the SRAP office and SCA, including ‘‘dual hatting’’ senior officials in both places as well as increasing regular interaction among those at a working level. These 

efforts are welcome, and the State Department should continue 

this glide path toward full integration of SRAP in the SCA Bureau. 

Notes 

1 Ambassador James Dobbins Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 10, 2013. 2 USAID Response to question from SFRC staff, September 15, 2014. 

3 World Bank Development Indicators 

http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx# 4 Joint report of the Government of Afghanistan and the international community 

presented at the January 2014 Special Joint Coordinated Monitoring (JCMB) meeting. Full report can be found here: 

http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/sites/default/files/documents/ 

Special%20JCMB_Joint%20Report_28%20Jan%202014.pdf 5 The TMAF benchmarks cover five main areas of focus: 

• Area 1: Representational Democracy and Equitable Elections • Area 2: Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights • Area 3: Integrity of Public Finance and Commercial Banking • Area 4: Government Revenues, Budget Execution and Sub-National Governance • Area 5: Inclusive and Sustained Growth and Development 

Within each area, the TMAF charted out a series of specific goals and 16 indicators. The Joint Coordinating and Monitoring Board (JCMB), the main group of 

international donors, agreed to meet on a regular basis to measure progress against 

the TMAF indicators. These indicators ranged from the relatively subjective (ensure 

respect for human rights for all its citizens) to the very detailed (improve budget 

execution to 75% by 2017). 6 TMAF donors have committed to increase incentive funding provided through 

mechanisms like the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) to 10 percent 

by 2014, and up to 20 percent by 2024. 7 The U.S. also supports incentive programs offered by multilateral institutions 

including the Incentive Program of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, and 

conditions included in the Expanded Credit Facility provided by the International 

Monetary Fund. 8 The recurrent cost window is an on-budget funding mechanism that provides the 

Afghan government with some flexibility in covering budget shortfalls in paying salaries or covering operational costs. Specific budget line items associated with this 

21 

mechanism are the most visible elements of U.S. assistance in Afghanistan that is 

tied to tangible macro-level reforms implemented by the Afghan government. 

USAID also has stringent conditions built into bilateral on-budget assistance provided to Afghan government ministries. The reforms required under these programs 

however are narrower in scope, relevant to the specific ministry and do not have 

the same macro-level reach of the conditionality attached to the TMAF hard 

deliverables. 

9 The U.S. also tied $15 million in funds to Afghanistan passing mining legislation, which it did. However, the legislation missed the April 2014 deadline set by 

the U.S., and it was not determined that the law met international standards, as 

required by the deliverable, so the funding was not released. This funding was reprogrammed to activities that enhance regional economic connectivity. 

10 After years of steady and incremental progress, revenue collection by the Afghan government has steadily declined over the past few years: 11% of GDP in 

2011, 10.3% of GDP in 2012 and 9.6% of GDP in 2013. The State Department cites 

a number of factors which contributed to this downturn, including a slowdown in 

economic growth, the early collection of some 2013 taxes in 2012 and rent-seeking 

by officials who engaged in ‘‘corrupt behavior as they contemplated the possible loss 

of their government positions post-election.’’ (Response by Special Representative 

James Dobbins to a Question for the Record submitted by Senator Robert Menendez, December 10, 2013) The World Bank blamed the shortfall on ‘‘leakages and 

weakness in administration, particularly in customs.’’ These recent shortfalls in revenue collection will require the Afghan government to raise revenues by 1% of GDP 

from 2015-2018 in order to meet its fiscal targets. (World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update, October 2013. 

http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/ 

10/24/000442464_20131024131051/Rendered/PDF/ 

820120WP0WB0Af0Box0379855B00PUBLIC0.pdf) 

11 Afghanistan has made revenue commitments through several international 

mechanisms. The TMAF includes benchmarks that call for revenue to be 17% of 

GDP by 2025. Afghanistan has also committed to reform its customs collection practices to align with the World Customs Organization’s Revised Kyoto Convention and 

to comply with required steps to gain admittance into the World Trade Organization. The international community should continue to hold Afghan officials accountable for these commitments. 

12 SIGAR Report: ‘‘Afghan Customs: U.S. Programs Have Had Some Successes, 

but Challenges Will Limit Customs Revenue as a Sustainable Source of Income for 

Afghanistan.’’ April 2014. 13 Ibid. 14 USAID has funded at least three programs that seek to improve Afghanistan’s 

capacity to improve revenue collection, including two Trade Accession and Facilitation for Afghanistan programs (TAFA I and TAFA II). These programs generated 

some success—for example, improvements in the efficiency at key customs locations 

resulted in savings of $39 million for the Afghan government and importers. Currently, USAID supports the Afghan Trade and Revenue Project (ATAR) which seeks 

to improve Afghanistan’s ability to collect revenues by focusing on the collection of 

taxes and customs fees. This program works to develop the capacity of the Ministry 

of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry ′′to improve customs and 

border procedures, use improved procedures and technology to reduce corruption, 

complete Afghanistan’s accession to the WTO and build fiscal capacity.′′ (SIGAR Report: ‘‘Afghan Customs: U.S. Programs Have Had Some Successes, but Challenges 

Will Limit Customs Revenue as a Sustainable Source of Income for Afghanistan.’’ 

April 2014.) 15 SIGAR Report: ‘‘Afghan Customs: U.S. Programs Have Had Some Successes, 

but Challenges Will Limit Customs Revenue as a Sustainable Source of Income for 

Afghanistan.’’ April 2014. 16 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee hearing ‘‘A Transformation: Afghanistan Beyond 2014’’ April 30, 2014. 

http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Allen_Testimony.pdf 17 Testimony of John Sopko, Special Inspector General, Afghanistan Reconstruction, before the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control Hearing on 

‘‘U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,’’ January 15, 2014. 

http://www.drugcaucus.senate.gov/hearing-1-15-14/ 

SIGAR%20John%20F%20%20Sopko.pdf 

22 

18 In February 2014, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) issued 

a report which expressed concerns about credible reports of human rights violations 

by some Afghan security forces during their ground operations in 2013. UNAMA received credible reports of beatings of civilians, property destruction and theft of personal property, including motorcycles, money, jewelry and valuable items. (UNAMA, 

Afghanistan Annual Report 2013 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2014) 

http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC-report_2013-Full-report-ENG.pdf 19 The State Department is usually the lead implementer of security assistance 

in order to ensure that such programs are aligned with U.S. foreign policy priorities 

and that program recipients are vetted in accordance with human rights requirements in U.S. law. 20 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), contains a provision 

extending the prohibition on any support or training where a gross violation of 

human rights occurred to ‘‘any training, equipment, or other assistance for the 

members of a unit of a foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible 

information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.’’ 21 The administration’s total FY 2015 foreign assistance request for Afghanistan 

is $1.595 billion, a 29% reduction from the FY 2013 appropriation. According to the 

administration, this request keeps the U.S. on track to meet commitments made at 

the 2012 Tokyo donors’ conference, but adjusts for a new implementing model due 

to fewer staff, uncertain security environment and a shift to more technical assistance. In March 2014 congressional testimony, USAID laid out a transition strategy 

that includes the following elements: 

• Maintain and make durable the gains made in health, education, and the empowerment of women; 

• Mitigate the economic impact of the drawdown through a robust focus on the 

agricultural sector, private sector development, the operations and maintenance 

of infrastructure investments, and the future potential of the extractives industry; and 

• Foster improved stability by supporting legitimate and effective Afghan governance, including the 2014 presidential election. 22 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 30, 2014, pg 6. 

http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-07-30qr.pdf 23 Response by Special Representative James Dobbins to a Question for the 

Record submitted by Senator Robert Menendez, July 11, 2013 24 Response by Special Representative James Dobbins to a Question for the 

Record submitted by Senator Robert Menendez, July 11, 2013 25 USAID Frontlines Publication, January/February 2014 

http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/frontlines/energy-infrastructure/powering-afghanistan 26 State Department Office of Inspector General ‘‘Inspection of Embassy Kabul, 

Afghanistan’’(ISP-1-14-22A) August 2014 27 USAID Assistant Administrator Donald Sampler outlined the layers of protection to mitigate the risks associated with providing on-budget assistance. These 

measures include: 

• requiring the establishment of a non-commingled, separate bank account for 

each project with USAID; 

• disbursement of funds only after USAID has verified that the ministry has 

achieved a performance milestone or USAID has verified incurred costs; 

• an annual audit by a USAID OIG-approved firm; 

• substantial involvement and oversight by USAID staff in procurement processes; 

• independent management, monitoring and evaluation of services; and 

• technical assistance through other projects to increase the capacity of ministries 

while addressing any vulnerabilities or weaknesses identified in the assessments 

(U.S. House Oversight and Government Reform Hearing April 3, 2014) USAID 

also provides technical assistance to ministries to develop the capacity of ministry 

officials and staff. 28 SIGAR 14-32 Audit Report ‘‘Direct Assistance: USAID Has Taken Positive Action to Assess Afghan Ministries’ Ability to Manage Donor Funds, but Concerns Remain’’ January 2014. 29 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update, October 2013 

23 

http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/ 

10/24/000442464_20131024131051/Rendered/PDF/ 

820120WP0WB0Af0Box0379855B00PUBLIC0.pdf 30 Alongside the military drawdown, stabilization programming has diminished 

significantly in scale, but will remain in some form for the coming years. USAID 

has also expanded the scope of stabilization to include more focus on local decisionmaking and governing bodies. Today’s USAID stabilization programming is perhaps 

better characterized as ’democracy and governance’ programming. 31 USAID Written Response to SFRC Majority Staff Question, December 2013 32 Ibid. 33 USAID reports that ‘‘there are interagency coordination mechanisms currently 

in place like the Deputies-level Executive Working Group, regular field level coordination and close cooperation between working level project teams at USAID, State 

and the Department of Defense (DoD) that ensure development-type projects implemented through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF), and Task Force for Business Stability Operations 

(TFBSO) are coordinated and not duplicative.’’ (USAID Written Response to SFRC 

Majority Staff Question, December 2013) 34 According to USAID, some of the approaches used under A3 include: 

1. Limiting the number of sub-contracting tiers; 

2. Implementing a robust vetting system of non-U.S. companies and key individuals, at both the prime and sub-contractor level, and establishment of the 

Vetting Support Unit; 

3. Enhancing financial controls on project funds, such as using electronic 

funds transfers in lieu of cash payments, using independent audit firms to 

verify appropriate usage of funds, reviewing of recipients’ claims prior to payment, and performing 100% audits of locally incurred costs; and 

4. Implementing robust oversight of all USAID projects in Afghanistan 

through a five-tiered monitoring approach, encompassing monitoring information gathered from USAID and other U.S. Government staff, USAID implementing partners, other donors, Afghan civil society and beneficiaries, as well 

as independent monitoring contractors. 

(http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/USAID-Donald-Sampler-Testimony.pdf), 35 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing ‘‘The Transition in Afghanistan’’ December 10, 2013 http://www.foreign. senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Sampler_Testimony.pdf 36 John Sopko letter to Secretary John Kerry, October 10, 2013 http:// 

www.sigar.mil/pdf/alerts/SIGAR_14-4-SP.pdf 37 USAID’s current monitoring and evaluation program is broken out into five 

tiers of entities that can be involved in data collection process to include: 

• Tier 1: USG representatives 

• Tier 2: Implementing Partners 

• Tier 3: Government of Afghanistan representatives and other donors from the 

international community 

• Tier 4: Civil society groups and beneficiaries 

• Tier 5: Independent Monitoring Contractors 

In March 2014, USAID issued a Request for Proposals to conduct a remote monitoring program to evaluate whether programs in the field have been implemented. 

The RFP calls for the use of several monitoring methods, including third party monitors, time-stamped photographs, use of Global Positioning Systems (GPS) technology and other forms of data collection. USAID has established an Implementation Support Team (IST) in Kabul ‘‘to centralize and analyze project performance 

and security information relevant to USAID activities.’’ The IST will integrate security and portfolio-level monitoring data, provide monitoring data and facilitate relationships between the Afghan government and other donors with the USAID Contracting Officer Representatives (COR) and Agreement Officer Representatives 

(AOR) who manage day to day oversight of programs. Based on the integration of 

this information the IST will be able to make programmatic recommendations to decision-makers for current and planned projects. (USAID presentation for Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, February 2014) 38 Response by Special Representative James Dobbins to a Question for the 

Record submitted by Senator Robert Menendez, July 11, 2013 39 Response to Question for the Record by Deputy Assistant Secretary Fatema 

Sumar, April 30, 2014 

24 

40 The U.S. has spent more than $1.7 billion on energy programs in Afghanistan 

since 2010 and has helped add 1,000 megawatts to Pakistan’s power grid. Source: 

http://www.state.gov/p/sca/ci/af/newsilkroad/ 

41 Some people-to-people regional initiatives include USAID’s Central Asia Trade 

Forums, the Central Asia and Afghanistan Women’s Economic Symposium (WES) 

and the South Asia Women’s Entrepreneurship Symposium (SAWES). 

42 The State Department and USAID have committed $24.3 million in regional 

Central Asia Economic Support Fund assistance from FY 12-FY14 for programs that 

increase trade and investment, improve transit, advance cooperation on energy 

trade, promote effective natural resource management, and support civil society exchanges. USAID has also leveraged bilateral resources from the Regional Economic 

Cooperation (REC) project in Central Asia, the Afghanistan Trade and Revenue 

(ATAR) project and Pakistan Trade Project (PTP) to contribute to connectivity efforts. Source: Response to Question for the Record by Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Fatema Sumar, April 30, 2014. 

43 GAO Briefing for Congressional Committees. ‘‘Afghanistan: Status of U.S. Planning for Post-2014 Civilian Presence’’ August 2014 

The OIG reported that, ′′The Foreign Service staffing process optimally requires 

U.S. missions to make staffing decisions one year in advance, which means Embassy 

Kabul has to establish much of its summer 2014 Foreign Service positions in mid2013 based not on actual post-2014 programs and operations but based on its own 

assumptions and resulting transition plans.′′ (‘‘Audit of the Department of State and 

Embassy Kabul Planning for the Transition to a Civilian-Led Mission in Afghanistan’’ U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, (AUD-MERO-14-15) December 2013) 

44 In 2011, Embassy Kabul began planning for the 2014 security transition with 

two offices which were consolidated into a single ‘‘Transition Office’’ in May 2013. 

Seeking to learn from the challenges posed during the rushed transition in Iraq, the 

State Department said that it purposefully sought out veterans of the Iraq transition to fill key positions in the Department and at USAID overseeing the transition 

process in Afghanistan. (Ambassador James Dobbins ‘‘Question for the Record’’ Response following Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 11, 

2013.) This effort involved a State Department led ‘‘Transfer of Tasks’’ exercise 

which ‘‘helped to inform the U.S. Embassy and USAID Mission on how to responsibly transfer development-related activities undertaken by ISAF to other U.S. Government entities or to the Afghan government.’’ As this ‘‘right-sizing’’ initiative continues, Congress will monitor the planning associated with the necessary office and 

residential space for the U.S. Embassy in Kabul to ensure that it appropriately correlates with the amount of personnel in country. (‘‘Audit of the Department of State 

and Embassy Kabul Planning for the Transition to a Civilian-Led Mission in Afghanistan’’ U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, (AUD-MERO-14- 

15) December 2013) 

45 State Department Office of Inspector General ‘‘Inspection of Embassy Kabul, 

Afghanistan’’(ISP-1-14-22A) August 2014 

46 Ibid. 

47 State Department Office of Inspector General ‘‘Inspection of Embassy Kabul, 

Afghanistan’’(ISP-1-14-22A) August 2014 

48 According to the State Department, more than 9,000 SIVs have been issued to 

Afghans in FY 2014, including over 3,400 to Afghan principle applicants and over 

5,600 to their family members. 

49 Background and history on the SIV program can be found on the State Department’s website: http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/immigrate/types/afghanswork-for-us.html as well as the Iraqi Refugee Assistance Project: http:// 

refugeerights.org/ 

50 U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security, Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform, Statement of Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 

Government Accountability Office, March 13, 2014 http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/ 

661700.pdf 

51 Response to Question for the Record for Secretary John Kerry, April 8, 2014 

52 While the principle deputy in SRAP is dual-hatted as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of South and Central Asia Affairs (SCA), it is unclear of this 

has led to enhanced policy coordination. 

(25) 

IN RECOGNITION

U.S. and Afghan civilian personnel have operated in a very dangerous and challenging environment in Afghanistan. These individuals should be commended for their courageous work and sacrifices 

made in support of the U.S. mission and national interests. Since 

2001, at least 435 individuals working for USAID partner organizations have been killed and at least 768 have been wounded. U.S. 

civilian agencies have lost three direct-hire American personnel in 

violent attacks: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service Advisor Steven 

Thomas Stefani, IV; USAID Foreign Service Officer Ragaei Said 

Abdelfattah; and State Department Foreign Service Officer Anne T. 

Smedinghoff. These individuals and their Afghan and international 

partners who have lost their lives embodied the values, courage 

and determination needed to make Afghanistan a better place. The 

committee honors their work and their sacrifice. 

Æ