[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 18-11842

____________________

JOHN DAVID WILSON, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, 

WARDEN, (Respondent Superior), Warden, ZCI, 

T. VANANTWERP, Law Librarian, Mail Room Supervisor,

CORIZON HEALTH CARE SERVICES, 

Prisoners Health Care Provider, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

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____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:15-cv-01207-CEH-AAS

____________________

Before BRANCH, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

BRANCH, Circuit Judge:

Since 1873, Congress has protected veterans’ benefits from 

claims by creditors, tax authorities, and even judicial orders. See 

Porter v. Aetna Cas. Co., 370 U.S. 159, 160 n.2 (1962) (collecting 

the various statutes Congress enacted to protect veterans’ 

benefits). Those protections are presently codified in 38 U.S.C. 

§ 5301, which provides, in part, that VA benefits “due or to become 

due . . . shall not be assignable . . . shall be exempt from taxation, 

shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be liable 

to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable 

process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary.” 

John Davis Wilson Jr., a veteran currently imprisoned by the 

state of Florida, sued prison and state officials under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, alleging that they violated his rights under § 5301 by taking 

his VA benefits from his inmate account to satisfy liens and holds 

stemming from medical, legal, and copying expenses he had 

incurred in prison. Wilson also sought to enjoin a Florida 

administrative rule requiring that inmates have their VA benefits 

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18-11842 Opinion of the Court 3

sent directly to their inmate accounts for prison officials to honor 

the funds’ protected status, which Wilson contended violates 

§ 5301, thereby running afoul of the Supremacy Clause of the 

United States Constitution. 

Wilson claims that prison officials violated § 5301 in two 

ways. Initially, Wilson had the VA send his benefits to an outside 

credit union, which would then transfer the funds into his inmate 

account. Prison officials placed liens on Wilson’s inmate account 

and satisfied them with the funds transferred from the outside 

account, which included VA benefits. Second, Wilson 

subsequently directed the VA to send his benefits directly to his 

inmate account. After Wilson requested copies of medical records, 

he signed an inmate payment form authorizing payment for those 

copies from his inmate bank account. Because his inmate account 

was nearly empty, prison officials placed a “hold” on the account.1

After his VA benefits were deposited directly into the account, 

prison officials paid Corizon Health for the requested copies with 

those funds.

After dismissing some of the defendants, the district court 

granted qualified immunity to those remaining. It also found that 

Wilson lacked standing to challenge Florida’s administrative rule 

directing inmates who receive VA benefits to have the VA send 

1 A hold is satisfied when sufficient funds become available in the inmate 

account regardless of whether those funds contain VA benefits. 

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4 Opinion of the Court 18-11842

payment directly to the inmate’s prison account or risk losing their 

funds’ exempt status because he failed to allege sufficiently a threat 

of future injury. 

After careful consideration and with the benefit of oral 

argument, we agree that the prison officials are entitled to qualified 

immunity for the alleged violations of § 5301 and that Wilson lacks 

standing to challenge Florida’s administrative rule. Accordingly, 

we affirm.2

I. Background 

(a) Factual Background 

Wilson is a Florida inmate and veteran who receives 

monthly VA disability benefits. Before August 2012, the VA would 

send Wilson’s disability benefit payment to his account at Navy 

Federal Credit Union, which, at Wilson’s direction, would then 

issue and mail checks to the Florida Department of Corrections’s

(“DOC”) Inmate Trust Fund address, at which point prison officials 

would deposit the checks in Wilson’s inmate account. 

Before August 2012, the DOC put multiple liens on Wilson’s 

inmate account for medical copayments and legal copying 

services.3 Prison officials then collected on the liens with the funds 

2 Wilson’s appeal presents various other issues, but, as explained below, our 

decisions on qualified immunity and standing resolve the appeal. 

3 An account supervisor at the DOC attested that the prison applies liens to 

the accounts of inmates receiving VA benefits. Unlike a hold—which is 

automatically satisfied when sufficient funds become available—a lien is not 

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sent to Wilson’s inmate account from the credit union, not 

realizing the money consisted of VA benefits.

In November 2011, Wilson filed a written grievance with the 

DOC asserting that prison officials used his VA benefits to satisfy 

liens on his inmate account “in violation of” 38 U.S.C. § 5301, 

which provides, in relevant part, that

[p]ayments of benefits due or to become due under 

any law administered by the Secretary shall not be 

assignable except to the extent specifically authorized 

by law, and such payments made to, or on account of, 

a beneficiary shall be exempt from taxation, shall be 

exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be 

liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any 

legal or equitable process whatever, either before or 

after receipt by the beneficiary. The preceding 

sentence shall not apply to claims of the United States 

arising under such laws nor shall the exemption 

therein contained as to taxation extend to any 

property purchased in part or wholly out of such 

payments. 

38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1). The DOC responded in writing to Wilson’s 

grievance by acknowledging that VA benefits are exempt from 

attachment, levy, or seizure under federal law, but claiming that 

Wilson’s “veterans benefit checks ha[d] not been touched.” Wilson 

appealed this denial to Julie Jones, the Secretary of the Florida 

automatically satisfied because of the risk that some (or all of) the nowavailable funds are protected VA benefits.

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Department of Corrections (the “Secretary”). The Secretary 

denied the appeal, explaining that “VA checks must be directly 

deposited into your [inmate] account in order to be considered VA 

payments.” In denying Wilson’s appeal, the Secretary relied on 

Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-203.201(2)(b), which provides 

that, 

[i]n accordance with 38 U.S.C. 5301, Veterans 

Administration (VA) benefit checks are exempt from 

attachment, levy or seizure. The Department shall 

not deduct payments for liens on the inmate’s trust 

fund account for medical co-payments, legal copies, 

or other Department generated liens from VA 

benefits checks mailed directly to the Bureau of 

Finance and Accounting, Inmate Trust Fund Section, 

Centerville Station, P.O. Box 12100, Tallahassee, FL 

32317-2100.

Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 33-203.201(2)(b) (the “Florida Direct 

Deposit Rule”) (emphasis added).

Following the denial of his administrative appeal, Wilson 

directed the VA to mail his benefits to the address associated with 

his inmate account. Consequently, Wilson had two addresses on 

file with the VA—one for his VA benefit checks at the Inmate Trust 

Fund department and another for all other VA correspondence at 

his prison. He claims, however, that because he had two addresses, 

the VA mistakenly sent correspondence to the address associated 

with his inmate account in the spring of 2013 and that the ensuing 

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confusion caused him to miss unspecified deadlines and receive 

several disability checks months late. 

Despite Wilson’s initial issues with receiving mail, the new 

arrangement appeared to work for a couple of years. But on 

February 20, 2015, Wilson signed an “Inmate Payment Agreement 

for Copy of Protected Health information” authorizing the DOC 

to “bill [his] account” for $37.95 for “a copy of [Wilson’s] mental 

health record,” and indicating that he had “requested” the copy. At 

the time, Wilson’s inmate account had a $0.03 balance, and, on 

March 4, 2015, prison officials placed a hold on it to pay for the 

medical copies. On April 14, 2015, eight days after Wilson received 

his monthly VA benefits, $37.95 was paid from his inmate account 

to Corizon Health, a private subcontractor for the prison.

After these funds were removed from his account, Wilson 

filed multiple grievances, complaining that Corizon Health 

unlawfully seized his VA benefits and seeking the return of the 

$37.95 that had been extracted from his account. The prison 

responded to one of his grievances by requesting additional 

documentation. Instead of providing it, Wilson appealed the 

prison’s response to the Secretary’s office, which subsequently 

denied his appeal because “[t]he withdrawal was done at [Wilson’s] 

request.” 

(b) Procedural History 

On May 15, 2015, Wilson filed this § 1983 action in federal 

court, asserting that Florida officials and Corizon Health violated 

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his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by 

seizing his VA benefits in violation of 38 U.S.C. § 5301. In his 

amended complaint, Wilson asserted claims against the prison 

warden, the prison law librarian, the prison mail room supervisor, 

Corizon Health, Secretary Jones, and then-Attorney General of 

Florida, Pam Bondi. Wilson alleged that the defendants violated 

38 U.S.C. § 5301 by seizing his VA benefits to pay for, among other 

things, legal and medical copying services and medical 

copayments. He sought “return of all seized funds” derived from 

his VA benefits, appointment of counsel, litigation costs and 

attorney’s fees, nominal damages for emotional injury, and to 

enjoin the Florida Direct Deposit Rule to the extent it exempts 

from seizure only VA benefits mailed directly to a prisoner’s 

inmate account. 

The district court sua sponte dismissed Attorney General 

Bondi as a defendant. Wilson then filed a motion for summary 

judgment, describing (for the first time) the harm caused by 

keeping two mailing addresses with the VA—namely that he 

missed important correspondence and received VA checks late. 

The district court struck the “premature” motion for summary 

judgment because the defendants had not yet had a chance to 

conduct discovery, let alone respond to the amended complaint. 

Corizon Health then filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 

arguing that Wilson failed to state a claim against it because the 

Florida DOC—not Corizon—seized the money from Wilson’s 

inmate account to pay for his $37.95 in copying costs. In response, 

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Wilson pointed to his inmate account statement, which listed 

Corizon Health as the “payee” of the $37.95 withdrawn from his 

account. 

Secretary Jones, the prison warden, and the law librarian 

also moved to dismiss Wilson’s action under Rule 12(b)(6), 

contending, in part, that the warden was not liable as a supervisor 

because respondeat superior liability is unavailable in a § 1983 

action; that the statute of limitations barred claims for 

reimbursement of funds extracted from Wilson’s inmate account 

to satisfy liens before May 19, 2011; that the defendants were 

entitled to “Eleventh Amendment immunity” to the extent Wilson 

sought money damages from them in their official capacities; and 

that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from 

damages in their individual capacities. 

In a consolidated order, the district court granted Corizon’s 

motion to dismiss without explanation. It also granted, in part, the 

other defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that: (1) Wilson “failed 

to allege any facts showing a causal connection between the 

warden and the alleged violations”; (2) Wilson’s claims arising 

before May 15, 2011 (the day Wilson filed his initial action in this 

case), were barred by the statute of limitations; (3) the Eleventh 

Amendment barred Wilson’s monetary claims against the 

defendants in their official capacities; and (4) the defendants were 

entitled to qualified immunity for withdrawing funds from his 

prison account to satisfy liens before August 2012, and for 

withdrawing $37.95 from Wilson’s account on April 14, 2015, to 

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satisfy the account hold because “the court cannot say that 

defendants were plainly incompetent or knowingly violated 38 

U.S.C. § 5301.” However, the district court found that the 

defendants failed to address Wilson’s contention that the Florida 

Direct Deposit Rule conflicted with 38 U.S.C. § 5301 and allowed 

Wilson to proceed against Secretary Jones on that claim only. 

Secretary Jones subsequently moved for summary 

judgment, arguing that Wilson lacked standing to challenge the 

Florida Direct Deposit Rule because the VA was now sending his 

benefits directly to his inmate account (and hence, the benefits 

were protected under the regulation), and that, in any event, the 

rule was consistent with § 5301 and was not invalid under the 

Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Wilson disagreed, 

contending that he had missed deadlines and correspondences in 

the past because of his dual addresses, and that he was likely to face 

similar harm in the future. The district court agreed with the 

Secretary that Wilson lacked standing and granted her motion for 

summary judgment. Wilson timely appealed.4

II. Discussion 

(a) Qualified Immunity 

4 On appeal, Wilson does not contest the district court’s determination that 

“to the extent [Wilson] seeks monetary damages against Defendants in their 

official capacities, his claim for monetary damages is barred by Eleventh 

Amendment immunity.” In addition, Wilson does not challenge the district 

court’s dismissal of Attorney General Bondi as a defendant. 

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On appeal, Wilson challenges the district court’s conclusion 

that the Florida officials were entitled to qualified immunity for 

withdrawing funds from his prison account to satisfy liens before 

August 2012, and for withdrawing $37.95 from Wilson’s account 

on April 14, 2015, to satisfy the account hold. “We review de novo 

a district court’s decision to grant or deny the defense of qualified 

immunity on a motion to dismiss, accepting the factual allegations 

in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

the plaintiff’s favor.” Davis v. Carter, 555 F.3d 979, 981 (11th Cir. 

2009).

As an initial matter, the parties do not dispute that § 1983 

provides a means for Wilson to enforce § 5301 against the state and 

that the prison officials here acted within the scope of their 

discretionary authority.5 Therefore, we turn to whether the 

Florida defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Because the 

defendants were acting within the scope of their discretionary 

authority, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified 

immunity is not appropriate.” See Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 

849 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). 

5 We note that the parties dispute whether the prison warden has supervisory

liability for the prison officials’ conduct in connection with Wilson’s VA 

benefits. As explained in more detail below, because we conclude that, even 

if the warden was vicariously liable for the other officials’ conduct, she would 

be entitled to qualified immunity, we do not address the supervisory liability 

issue. 

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“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government 

officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson 

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). An official enjoys qualified immunity 

unless: (1) the plaintiff alleges facts establishing that “the 

defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right”; 

and (2) the violated right was clearly established at the time of the 

defendant’s alleged misconduct. Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 

1291, 1305 (11th Cir. 2009). We have discretion in deciding which 

of these two prongs to address first “in light of the circumstances 

in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. While 

some courts might find it beneficial to analyze these elements in 

sequence, see, e.g., Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 

2009), it is not necessary to decide both prongs where it is plain that 

the right is not clearly established, Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236–37. 

That is the case here. The statutory right that Wilson alleges has 

been violated was not clearly established.6 Accordingly, we begin 

with the second prong. 

6 Our colleague in dissent agrees with our ultimate conclusion that defendants 

are entitled to qualified immunity—but for a different reason. We conclude 

that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the right at issue 

was not clearly established. In the dissent’s view, however, defendants are 

entitled to qualified immunity “[b]ecause the officials were not aware that they 

were handling VA benefit money.”

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The “dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is 

clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable 

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 

confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), overruled 

on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. We therefore 

confine our inquiry to “the facts that were knowable to the 

defendant officers” at the time they engaged in the conduct at issue. 

White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017) (per curiam). “Facts an 

officer learns after the incident ends—whether those facts would 

support granting immunity or denying it—are not relevant.” 

Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017). Accordingly, 

government officials “will not be liable for mere mistakes in 

judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law.” See 

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).7

A plaintiff can show that a right is “clearly established” for 

qualified immunity purposes in three ways: (1) pointing to a 

“materially similar case” decided by the Supreme Court, the 

Eleventh Circuit, or the Florida Supreme Court that clearly 

establishes the statutory right, see Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 

1324 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted); (2) showing that “a 

7 The Supreme Court stated this rule in connection with the mistakes of 

“[f]ederal officials,” but it applies to state officials just the same. See Pearson, 

555 U.S. at 231 (noting, in a case involving state officials, that “[t]he protection 

of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official’s 

error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed 

questions of law and fact” (quotation omitted)). 

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broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or 

case law . . . clearly establishes [the] constitutional right”; and (3) 

demonstrating that the defendants engaged in “conduct so 

egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in 

the total absence of case law,” Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 979 

(11th Cir. 2015). 

As we explain further below, the officers are entitled to 

qualified immunity on both of Wilson’s claims, albeit for different 

reasons.

1. The pre-August 2012 liens 

Wilson argues that his rights were “clearly established” by 

the text of 38 U.S.C. § 5301, as interpreted by the Supreme Court 

in Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co., 370 U.S. 159 (1962).8 The 

defendants respond that Porter was insufficient to put officials on 

notice because it did not involve funds deposited first into an 

outside bank account and later transferred to a prison inmate 

account. 

For the reasons explained below, we hold that the 

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for their debiting of 

Wilson’s inmate account to satisfy liens prior to August 2012 

8 In Porter, the Supreme Court explained that the test to determine whether 

VA funds retain their exempt status is “whether as so deposited the benefits 

remained subject to demand and use as the needs of the veteran for support 

and maintenance required” and “actually retain the qualities of moneys, and 

have not been converted into permanent investments.” Id. at 161–162. 

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because he has failed to show that the officials violated his “clearly 

established” rights under § 5301. 

The statute at issue—38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1)—sets forth a 

clear rule: VA benefits “due or to become due . . . shall not be 

assignable . . . and such payments . . . shall be exempt from 

taxation, shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not 

be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure . . . .” Under this provision, 

VA benefits are neither assignable nor subject to seizure or 

attachment, even before the veteran receives the funds. The 

statute does not, however, tell us what happens to VA funds’ 

exempt status after they are deposited into an account or 

transferred between a series of accounts. 

The Supreme Court subsequently addressed one aspect of 

this open question in Porter. See 370 U.S. at 161. In Porter, the 

plaintiff’s VA funds were deposited into a federal savings and loan 

association account that had various restrictions associated with it, 

including a 30-day demand requirement for withdrawing funds. Id.

at 159–61. Holding that the VA funds retained their exempt status 

after being deposited in the account, the Court stated that the 

relevant test is: “whether as so deposited the benefits remained 

subject to demand and use as the needs of the veteran for support 

and maintenance required.” Id. at 161 (citing Lawrence v. Shaw, 

300 U.S. 245 (1937)). The Court explained that VA benefit funds 

are protected “regardless of the technicalities of title and other 

formalities” if they “are readily available as needed for support and 

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maintenance, actually retain the qualities of moneys, and have not 

been converted into permanent investments.” Id. at 162.

To be sure, like Porter, this case involves the deposit of VA 

funds into an account, where they do not lose “the qualities of 

money” and are not “converted into permanent investments.” See 

id. at 162. But Porter focused on whether, under the Supreme 

Court’s precedent, VA benefits lose exempt status after a veteran 

places them in a certain type of savings account (i.e., a savings and 

loan account with specific withdrawal requirements). It did not 

address what happens when VA benefits are transferred between 

two accounts, arriving in the second one as a “money order” or 

credit union check with no indication that VA benefits were 

included.9 

Because the text of § 5301 does not address this situation and 

Wilson has not pointed us to any “materially similar case” from the 

United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the Florida 

Supreme Court, he has failed to show that his rights under the 

statute were “clearly established” when prison officials satisfied 

9 As discussed above, before August 2012, Wilson’s VA benefits arrived at the 

prison in the form of a credit union check or money order, and the inmate 

account statements for the relevant period merely list the deposits as “Money 

Order” and name the “remitter/payee” as “Wilson, John,” “Navy Federal,” or 

“Unknown.” The record before us contains no copies of the credit union 

checks, and, consequently, we cannot know whether they listed “VA benefits” 

or something similar on the memo line. Instead, there is nothing in the record 

to indicate that a reasonable prison official would have known that the credit 

union checks contained VA benefits. 

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liens on his inmate account with VA funds transferred from the 

outside credit union.10 

10 Our dissenting colleague disagrees that § 5301 “did not protect” Wilson’s 

VA funds “in the first place.” The dissent emphasizes that the funds deposited 

in Lawrence were labelled “deposits in bank,” and thus “facially nondescript 

bank deposits made up of VA funds are exempt under § 5301” despite lacking 

any indication that such funds were VA benefits. Accordingly, “[l]abeling does 

not matter.” The dissent contends that we are wrong to consider the 

significance of the transfer of funds because, under Lawrence, “however VA 

funds are stored, they are protected” so long as “they remain ‘subject to 

demand and use as the needs of the veteran for support and maintenance 

require[].’” The result, according to the dissent, is that § 5301 protects 

Wilson’s benefits despite the transfer of the VA funds from one account to 

another because “all that transfer did was make the VA funds nondescript . . . 

just like in Lawrence.” 

Indeed, we seem to agree that if the question at issue were whether 

§ 5301(a)(1) applies to an inmate checking account, such as Wilson’s, 

Lawrence and Porter would certainly answer “yes.” However, Lawrence and 

Porter leave open the operative question in this case; namely, whether it was 

clearly established that unmarked funds transferred between liquid accounts 

retain their protected status after the transfer so as to foreclose the availability 

of qualified immunity to the defendants in this case. 

Because Lawrence and Porter are silent on this issue, they are not “materially 

similar” to this case and, accordingly, cannot “clearly establish” Wilson’s rights 

under § 5301. See Echols, 913 F.3d at 1324; Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 979 

(11th Cir. 2015) (identifying “case law with indistinguishable facts” as a means 

of showing clearly established law) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted)); see 

also City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2021) (“We have repeatedly 

told courts not to define clearly established law at too high a level of 

generality.”).

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Wilson contends, however, that he can still show that his 

rights were “clearly established” because § 5301(a)(1) applies with 

“obvious clarity” to his case. It is true that a right may be “clearly 

established” even in the absence of on-point case law. “General 

statements of the law . . . are not inherently incapable of giving fair 

and clear warning.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 

(1997). Therefore, in some instances, a rule “already identified in 

the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific 

conduct in question, even though the very action in question has 

not previously been held unlawful” in a judicial decision. Id.

(quotation omitted) (emphasis added).11 Obvious clarity is a 

“narrow exception,” however, Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1199 

(11th Cir. 2002), and such cases “will be rare,” Coffin v. Brandau, 

642 F.3d 999, 1015 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 

Wilson’s argument centers on language in § 5301(a)(1) 

exempting VA benefits from “attachment, levy, or seizure,” which 

he says applies with “obvious clarity” and renders his rights “clearly 

established.” We disagree. Wilson’s obvious clarity argument fails 

because the officials had no way of knowing that the funds 

transferred into Wilson’s inmate account from the credit union 

were VA benefits. The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear 

that officials “will not be liable for [a] mere mistake[] . . . of 

11 We also use the “obvious clarity” descriptor for cases where a right is clearly 

established because the conduct involved “so obviously violate the 

constitution that prior case law is unnecessary.” See Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 

F.3d 1203, 1208–09 (2017) (quotation omitted). 

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fact . . . .” See Butz, 438 U.S. at 507. And confining our inquiry to 

“the facts that were knowable to the defendant officers,” as we are 

required to do, see White, 137 S. Ct. at 550, we cannot say that 

§ 5301(a)(1) applies with “obvious clarity” to a situation where a 

reasonable person would not have known VA benefits were 

implicated. 

In sum, Wilson has failed to show that officials violated a 

“clearly established” right under § 5301 when they withdrew the 

VA funds transferred from Wilson’s credit union account to his 

prison account to satisfy liens before August 2012. Accordingly, 

the officials are entitled to qualified immunity. 

2. The March and April 2015 account hold and withdrawal 

Wilson argues that prison officials violated his “clearly 

established” rights by placing a hold on his inmate account until 

they could withdraw later-deposited VA funds. He points to a 

Ninth Circuit decision12 that purportedly placed prison officials on 

notice that his written agreement to pay for the medical copies out 

of his inmate account was an unenforceable “assignment” of VA 

benefits, and that subsequently withdrawing the VA funds to pay 

for his medical copies was a prohibited “seizure” under § 5301. 

We turn first to Wilson’s argument that his instruction to 

prison officials to bill his nearly empty inmate account was an 

unenforceable “assignment” of VA funds. The text of § 5301(a)(1) 

12 See Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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says that the “[p]ayments of benefits due or to become due . . . shall 

not be assignable.” (Emphasis added). A later subprovision 

“clarif[ies]” that a prohibited assignment is “an agreement with 

another person under which agreement such other person acquires 

for consideration the right to receive such benefit by payment of 

such compensation, pension, or dependency and indemnity 

compensation,” including by “deposit into a joint account from 

which such other person may make withdrawals.” 

§ 5301(a)(3)(A).13 Accordingly, the kind of “assignment” prohibited 

13 We note, in passing, that the plain meaning of another subprovision, 

§ 5301(a)(3)(B), which provides an exception to the general prohibition on 

assignment, is consistent with our reading of the statute. Section 5301(a)(3)(B) 

says “nothing in this paragraph is intended to prohibit a loan involving a 

beneficiary under the terms of which the beneficiary may use the benefit to 

repay such other person” as long as the beneficiary repays the loan through 

separately executed periodic payments or a preauthorized electronic funds 

transfer (“EFT”). § 5301(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). Far from simply clarifying 

that veterans may use their benefits to repay a loan, this subprovision exempts 

a certain type of agreement that would otherwise be prohibited by the statute 

because it identifies and transfers the right to future VA payments: loan 

agreements “under the terms of which” the beneficiary is entitled to use VA 

funds to repay the loan. § 5301(a)(3)(B).

The dissent appears to read § 5301(a)(3)(B)’s exception differently. According 

to the dissent, Congress provided this exception to “allow[] veterans to use 

electronic funds transfers to send loan payments” generally. And so, the 

dissent argues, because “an EFT transaction draws from the sender’s bank 

account regardless of the source of those funds, [§ 5301(a)(3)(B)] would be 

unnecessary if the statute only banned agreements that mention VA funds.” 

The dissent argues, therefore, that we should not “carve a new exception out 

of § 5301” for agreements that make no mention of VA benefits at all. But 

§ 5301(a)(3)(B)’s reference to EFT relates solely to making payments pursuant 

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18-11842 Opinion of the Court 21

by the statute is an assignment of “the right to receive” VA 

benefits.14 Id. (emphasis supplied). 

to the exception discussed in the preceding paragraph, i.e., a loan agreement 

“under the terms of which” the beneficiary may use VA funds to repay the 

lender. It is not a freestanding provision permitting veterans to make EFT 

payments generally. Rather, as explained above, pursuant to § 5301(a)(3)(B), 

a veteran has two repayment options under the loan agreement exception 

contained in § 5301(a)(3)(A): execute separate agreements for each periodic 

payment or repay the loan through a preauthorized EFT. § 5301(a)(3)(B). The 

dissent is correct that an EFT payment draws funds from the sender’s account 

regardless of the source of those funds, but the EFT payments contemplated 

by this statutory exception occur only as part of a loan agreement “under the 

terms of which” a veteran agreed to repay the loan with future VA benefits. 

14 That an assignment necessarily involves the transfer of an identifiable 

right—in this case the right to receive future VA benefits—to another person 

is confirmed by the Restatement of Contracts. The Restatement says that “an 

assignment of a right is a manifestation of the assignor’s intention to transfer 

it by virtue of which the assignor’s right to performance by the obligor is 

extinguished in whole or in part and the assignee acquires a right to such 

performance,” and requires that “the obligee manifest an intention to transfer 

the right to another person.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 317(1), 

324. As both § 5301 and the Restatement make clear, an assignment requires 

a manifestation of the intent to transfer a right—in this case the right to receive 

VA benefits “due or to become due”—to another person. So, contrary to our 

dissenting colleague’s assertion otherwise, we are not inventing an exception 

for “vaguely worded assignments.” The consent form Wilson signed did not 

mention VA benefits nor did it evince Wilson’s intent to transfer his right to 

them to anyone. Indeed, it is difficult to see how a consent agreement 

containing no mention of VA benefits could “manifest [Wilson’s] intention to 

transfer” his right to such benefits to the defendants. The words “VA benefits” 

are not “magic” at all, as the dissent correctly contends. Rather, where it is 

not evident from the four corners of an agreement, such as the one at issue in 

this case, that a veteran intends to assign his right to future VA benefits to 

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22 Opinion of the Court 18-11842

The agreement Wilson signed instructing prison officials to 

“bill [his] inmate bank account” for copies of the mental health 

records he had requested was not an assignment prohibited by 

§ 5301. Wilson did not, in any way, assign his VA benefits within 

the meaning of the statute, having never made an “agreement” 

under which the prison officials “acquire[d] for consideration the 

right to receive . . . by payment,” his VA benefits. See 

§ 5301(a)(1)(A). The consent form made no mention of VA 

benefits at all. Nor did it mention the possibility of officials placing 

a “hold” on Wilson’s account if the funds were insufficient. Far 

from an assignment of VA benefits, this agreement merely 

indicated Wilson’s consent to prison officials billing his inmate 

account to pay for the copies he requested, thereby authorizing the 

prison to take $37.95 from Wilson’s inmate bank account, without 

consideration of how those funds got there in the first place. The 

form gave Wilson two options to pay for the medical copies, 

stating, “[y]our inmate bank account can be billed for these charges 

or a bill can be sent to your family requesting payment. Please 

check the box below to let us know how you will pay for the copy.” 

Wilson checked the box labeled “[b]ill my inmate account.” Such 

an agreement—one that does not mention VA benefits nor indicate 

another, we decline to deem such an agreement an unlawful assignment. For 

that reason, and for the reasons articulated above, Wilson’s voluntary 

agreement to pay for his mental health records from his inmate bank account, 

was simply not a prohibited assignment of VA benefits under § 5301, despite 

the fact that the account was funded in part by Wilson’s VA benefits.

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18-11842 Opinion of the Court 23

any intent to transfer Wilson’s right to them to anyone—is not a 

prohibited assignment of VA benefits under § 5301. 

We turn next to Wilson’s argument that the defendants—

either the prison officials or Corizon Health—unlawfully “seized” 

his VA benefits by transferring $37.95 from his account to Corizon 

Health when the VA funds arrived. This argument likewise fails. 

Section 5301(a)(1) states that VA benefits “shall not be liable to 

attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable 

process whatever.” (Emphasis added). Although the statute does 

not define “seizure,” in 1935 (when Congress added the word to 

the statute protecting VA benefits),15 “seizure” meant the “[a]ct of 

seizing, or state of being seized,” and “seize” meant, among other 

things, “[t]o take possession of, or appropriate, in order to subject 

to the force or operation of a warrant, order of court, or other legal 

process.” Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English 

Language 2268 (2d ed. 1935).

When $37.95 was debited from Wilson’s account to pay for 

his medical copies, the defendants were merely carrying out 

Wilson’s instruction as embodied in the February 2015 

authorization form. In that agreement, Wilson authorized officials 

to bill his account, and when sufficient funds existed in the account, 

prison officials did just that. Acting on an agreement to pay a 

specified sum (i.e., $37.95) by a specific means (i.e., “bill my inmate 

account”) surely is not a “seizure” within the meaning of 

15 Act of Aug. 12, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-262, § 3, 510 Stat. 607, 609. 

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24 Opinion of the Court 18-11842

§ 5301(a)(1). Wilson’s only response on this front is that his 

authorization to “bill [his] inmate account” was an unenforceable 

assignment under § 5301. But as discussed previously, Wilson’s 

authorization was not an assignment of VA benefits under § 5301. 

So the defendants did not seize Wilson’s funds when they 

withdrew $37.95 from his account. 

Wilson has therefore failed to show that the defendants 

violated his rights under § 5301 for the March and April 2015 hold 

and debit. Accordingly, the officials are entitled to qualified 

immunity. 

In the alternative, assuming arguendo that the consent form 

was an unenforceable assignment of VA benefits, Wilson has failed 

to show that a decision from the Supreme Court, our Court, or the 

Florida Supreme Court put officials on notice of his “clearly 

established” rights under § 5301.16 See Echols, 913 F.3d at 1324. 

16 If the hold placed on Wilson’s account and the prison official’s subsequent 

withdrawal of funds did not constitute a prohibited assignment or seizure 

under § 5301, we need not decide whether the district court properly dismissed 

Corizon Health as a defendant. Wilson’s only allegations against Corizon 

Health stem from the account hold and debit, which, as a matter of law, did 

not violate § 5301. 

We note, however, that under our alternative reasoning—that the prison 

officials are entitled to qualified immunity because Wilson has failed to show 

the violation of a “clearly established” right—we must address whether the 

district court erred in dismissing Corizon Health because private contractors 

are generally not entitled to the protections of qualified immunity. See, e.g., 

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18-11842 Opinion of the Court 25

Wilson argues that officials were on notice because a district court 

in our Circuit, in an unrelated case, cited the Ninth Circuit’s 2001 

decision in Nelson v. Heiss. See Purvis v. Crosby, 2006 WL 

1836034, at *8 (N.D. Fla. June 30, 2016) (citing Nelson v. Heiss, 271 

F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2001)). In Nelson, our sister circuit held that 

prison officials violated § 5301 when, after an inmate authorized 

Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999) (declining to extend 

qualified immunity to a privately employed prison physician). 

But even under this reasoning, the district court did not err in granting 

Corizon Health’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. We review de 

novo a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim. See 

Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control & 

Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010). For a claim to survive a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff’s allegations “‘must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). In assessing the 

plausibility of a claim, we may also consider exhibits attached to and 

referenced in the complaint. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 

551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). 

In his amended, pro se complaint Wilson alleged that “Corizon Health Care 

seized §5301(a)” VA benefits “that are federally and state protected from 

seizure,” citing “Exhibit C” in support of his claim. Exhibit C of Wilson’s 

amended complaint is a copy of the account statement covering the hold and 

subsequent debit of $37.95 from his inmate account. It lists “Corizon Health” 

as the “payee” for the $37.95 debited from Wilson’s account. This exhibit 

merely shows that Corizon Health received the payment. It does not 

demonstrate that Corizon Health actually seized the funds, had any access to 

Wilson’s inmate account, or did anything beyond passively receiving money. 

Therefore, Wilson has failed to state a plausible claim that Corizon Health 

“seized” his VA benefits. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

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26 Opinion of the Court 18-11842

the prison to withdraw money from his account, prison officials 

placed a hold on his account due to insufficient funds and 

subsequently withdrew the overdrawn amount from the inmate’s 

VA benefits. See Nelson, 271 F.3d at 895. The prison officials 

argued that they did not violate the statute because the inmate 

consented to the withdrawal of funds. The Ninth Circuit rejected 

this argument, concluding that “consent to a taking of future 

benefits” is an invalid assignment under § 5301. Id. The Ninth 

Circuit granted qualified immunity to the prison officials, however, 

because, given the inmate’s consent to the hold, a reasonable 

official might have thought taking the later-received funds did not 

violate the statute. Id. at 896–97.

Although Nelson involved a similar factual scenario to this 

case, it is not a decision from the Supreme Court, our Court, or the 

Florida Supreme Court and is therefore insufficient to place prison 

officials on notice that the hold and withdrawal violated Wilson’s 

“clearly established” rights. The fact that a district court in our 

Circuit cited Nelson is irrelevant. See Echols, 913 F.3d at 1324. 

Accordingly, the officials are entitled to qualified immunity.17 

17 Because we conclude that the state officials are entitled to qualified 

immunity, we need not reach two additional issues raised on appeal: (1) 

whether the prison warden was vicariously liable for the actions of the other 

prison officials and (2) which of Wilson’s claims in connection with the credit 

union transfer and liens fall within the four-year statute of limitations. First, 

we need not decide whether the warden is vicariously liable because she 

would be entitled to qualified immunity even if she was subjected to 

supervisor liability. Second, it is irrelevant which liens fall within the statute 

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18-11842 Opinion of the Court 27

(b) Standing 

We now consider whether the district court erred in 

granting summary judgment to the Secretary as to Wilson’s claim 

that Florida’s Direct Deposit Rule violates § 5301 and the 

Supremacy Clause. The district court found that Wilson lacked 

standing to challenge the rule because he did not allege a “sufficient 

likelihood that he will suffer injury” from complying with the rule 

in the future. Florida’s Direct Deposit Rule provides that

[i]n accordance with 38 U.S.C. [§] 5301, Veterans 

Administration (VA) benefit checks are exempt from 

attachment, levy or seizure. The Department shall 

not deduct payments for liens on the inmate’s trust 

fund account for medical co-payments, legal copies, 

or other Department generated liens from VA 

benefits checks mailed directly to the Bureau of 

Finance and Accounting, Inmate Trust Fund Section, 

Centerville Station, P.O. Box 12100, Tallahassee, FL 

32317-2100.

Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 33-203.201(2)(b) (emphasis added). 

Consequently, under this rule, Florida will respect the protected 

status of VA benefits pursuant to § 5301 only if the funds are sent 

directly to an inmate account. 

We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de 

novo, “applying the same legal standards used by the district 

of limitations period because the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity 

as to all of them. 

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28 Opinion of the Court 18-11842

court.” Yarbrough v. Decatur Housing Auth., 941 F.3d 1022, 1026 

(11th Cir. 2019). And when standing is raised in a motion for 

summary judgment, “the plaintiff[] can no longer rest on their 

allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific 

facts which for the purpose of summary judgment will be taken as 

true.” Wilson v. State Bar of Ga., 132 F.3d 1422, 1427 (11th Cir. 

1998) (quotation omitted). 

Wilson argues that he has standing to challenge the Florida 

Direct Deposit Rule because he sufficiently alleged a threat of 

future harm from having to keep separate addresses for VA benefits 

and VA correspondence in his opposition to summary judgment. 

Wilson claimed that after changing his address, he was late in 

receiving several VA benefits checks. He attached an account 

statement reflecting that he missed at least two payments in April 

and May 2013. Wilson now claims that because he is forced to keep 

two addresses, it is “inevitable” that he will miss a VA benefit check 

or important correspondence in the future.

The Florida officials respond that there is no real immediate 

threat of future injury to Wilson because Wilson’s VA benefits are 

sent directly to the DOC, so “[t]here have been no issues or 

complaints for approximately seven years.” 

A party has standing to sue for injunctive relief “where the 

threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct.” Davis v. FEC, 554 

U.S. 724, 734 (2008). Accordingly, Wilson must show a “real or 

immediate threat that [Wilson] will be wronged again,” or, in other 

words, a “‘likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable 

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18-11842 Opinion of the Court 29

injury.’” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) 

(quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)). 

Accordingly, the threat of injury, to suffice for prospective relief, 

must be imminent. Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 

2006); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 

(1992) (noting the Court’s insistence that “the injury proceed with 

a high degree of immediacy” to establish standing to seek 

prospective relief). 

Wilson lacks standing because he has failed to show a “real” 

and “immediate” threat of future injury from complying with the 

Florida Direct Deposit Rule, pointing only to injuries in the distant 

past. Although it appears that Wilson initially suffered concrete 

harm when he transitioned to keeping two addresses on file with 

the VA (i.e., receiving VA checks several months late in the spring 

of 2013), that harm occurred only in the immediate aftermath of 

the address change—over nine years ago. Wilson tells us that it is 

“inevitable” that he will miss VA correspondence and benefit 

checks in the future—despite nine years of complying with the 

direct deposit rule without issue—but he says little else on the 

matter. In cases where a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, pointing 

only to past injuries and speculating that such harm will 

“inevitabl[y]” occur again is insufficient to establish standing. See 

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102 (“[P]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not 

in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive 

relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse 

effects.” (quotation omitted)); Bowen v. First Fam. Fin. Servs., Inc., 

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30 Opinion of the Court 18-11842

233 F.3d 1331, 1340 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a “perhaps or 

maybe chance” of future harm is “not enough” to establish 

standing for a claim seeking injunctive relief from an arbitration 

agreement (quotation omitted)). Because Wilson has not shown a 

“real or immediate threat” of future injury from keeping two 

addresses to comply with the Florida’s administrative rule, he lacks 

standing to challenge it. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111.

 AFFIRMED. 

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18-11842 GRANT, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part 1

GRANT, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority that the prison officials who 

executed the pre-August 2012 liens are entitled to qualified 

immunity. The checks from Wilson’s personal bank account 

(though made up of VA funds) gave “no indication that VA benefits 

were included.” Op. at 16. And we must confine the qualified 

immunity “inquiry to ‘the facts that were knowable to the 

defendant officers’ at the time they engaged in the conduct at 

issue.” Op. at 13 (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 

(2017)). For purposes of § 1983, then, we consider only what the 

officials knew about the checks when they received them—that 

they were personal checks. Because the officials were not aware 

that they were handling VA benefit money, they are entitled to 

qualified immunity.

Still, I respectfully disagree that 38 U.S.C. § 5301 did not 

protect those funds in the first place. See Op. at 14–19. Facially 

nondescript bank deposits made up of VA funds are exempt under 

§ 5301. Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245, 250 (1937). In Lawrence 

v. Shaw, where the Supreme Court established this rule, a veteran’s 

VA funds had been deposited into his bank account labeled only as 

“deposits in bank.” Id. at 247. The missing VA identifier did not 

strip the funds of their exempt status. Id. at 250. So too here.

The majority says this case is different because Wilson’s 

personal-check deposits involved another step, one the Supreme 

Court has never addressed—a transfer between two bank accounts. 

Op. at 16–17. But all that transfer did was make the VA funds 

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2 GRANT, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part 18-11842

nondescript, reducing them from labeled VA funds to “deposits in 

bank”—just like in Lawrence. Labeling does not matter—the rule 

is that however VA funds are stored, they are protected if they 

remain “subject to demand and use as the needs of the veteran for 

support and maintenance require[].” Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 

Co., 370 U.S. 159, 160–61 (1962). I see no reason that Wilson’s 

benefits would not be protected by § 5301 simply because he 

transferred them to a new account.

I must also respectfully disagree with the majority’s 

conclusion that veterans can sign away VA funds through consent 

forms like the one Wilson used here. Op. at 22–23. Section 5301 

prohibits nearly all assignments of future VA benefits, including 

any agreement where a veteran relinquishes his “right to receive” 

VA benefits. 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1), (a)(3)(A). The consent form 

here is plainly an assignment. Wilson signed over $37.95 from his 

inmate account—a commitment that included future deposits of 

VA funds. Prison officials treated the agreement as an assignment, 

and the Ninth Circuit has also held that this exact kind of inmate 

agreement is an unlawful assignment. See Nelson v. Heiss, 271 

F.3d 891, 895 (9th Cir. 2001).

The opinion appears to hold that § 5301 applies only to 

agreements that use magic words like “VA benefits.” Op. at 23. If 

this interpretation is correct, § 5301 is impotent—any assignment 

of VA benefits can easily be written with general language. I would 

not carve a new exception out of § 5301 for artfully drafted 

assignments of future VA benefits.

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18-11842 GRANT, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part 3

In my view, the only straightforward reading is that the 

statute bans agreements exchanging a specific kind of 

consideration: future VA benefits. “Payments of benefits,” 

§ 5301(a)(1) says, “shall not be assignable.” Only veterans may 

spend these funds—they are also exempt from taxation, creditors’ 

claims, attachment, and seizure. 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1). None of 

those prohibitions consider wording or phrasing; they broadly 

target acts that deprive a veteran of her benefits. The same is true 

for assignment of future VA benefits.

And “if Congress wanted to create exceptions” to § 5301, “it 

knew how to do so. In fact, it did provide for some.” Nelson, 271 

F.3d at 896. Section 5301(a)(3)(B), for example, allows veterans to 

use electronic funds transfers to send loan payments. When a 

veteran authorizes an EFT, he permits a company to automatically 

withdraw money from his bank account. See 15 U.S.C. 

§§ 1693a(7), (10). Given that an EFT transaction draws from the 

sender’s bank account regardless of the source of those funds, this 

exception would be unnecessary if the statute only banned 

agreements that mention VA funds. In contrast, an exception for 

vaguely worded assignments is nowhere to be found.

* * *

I concur with much of the majority’s opinion. But I part 

ways on these two important points. We should not deprive 

veterans of the protections Congress provides them. It has long 

been established that VA funds are protected by § 5301 even if they 

are not so labeled. And any agreement by which a veteran signs 

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4 GRANT, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part 18-11842

away future VA benefits is prohibited by § 5301. On these grounds, 

I respectfully dissent.

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