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© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

“There is a strategic 

paradox of supporting armed 

groups which impacts the 

ability of the host state or the 

international community to 

protect the local population by 

maintaining law and order.”

May 13, 2013

Armed Groups Maintaining 

Law and Order

Dealing with Reality

Summary

•	 In some situations armed groups engage in law and order functions and tasks.

•	 In situations where local communities have no access to official law and order, communities sometimes must rely on armed groups to protect them from crime. In such cases the

international community must decide what their relationship is to be with the armed

group and how best to manage that relationship.

Bruce ‘Ossie’ Oswald

E-mail: b.oswald@unimelb.edu.au

peaceBrieF146

Atanyonetime,armedgroups1mightexisttosupportgovernments,tofightagainstgovernmentsoreach

otherasrebelgroups,ortoconductcriminalactivities.Arecentstudyonpro-governmentmilitiasfoundthat,

between1981and2007,therewereatleast331pro-governmentmilitiagroupsfunctioningin88countries.2

Anotherstudy,conductedbytheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),concludedthatinplaces

wheretheICRCoperatestherewerearound170activearmedgroupsengagedinavarietyofconflicts,

rangingfromperiodsofsporadicviolencetocontrolofterritory.3 Thosenumbersdemonstratethatthe

existenceofarmedgroupsisarealitythatmanycommunitiesfacearoundtheworld.Confrontingthatreality

createsafundamentaldilemma:Whatshouldtherelationshipbetweengovernmentsandtheinternational

communitybewitharmedgroups,andhowmightthat connectionbemanagedresponsibly?

Thereareatleastthreecontextsinwhicharmedgroupsengageinlawandorderfunctionsortasks.The

firstiswhennationalgovernmentsortheinternational communitysupports,eitherformallyorinformally,

anarmedgrouptomaintainlawandorder.Examplesincludethe‘SunniAwakeninginIraq,’andtheFrench

interventioninMali.Thesecondcontextiswhenarmedgroupsundertakelawandorderwheretheyare

fightingagainstgovernmentforcesorotherarmedgroups.TheconflictsinbothSyriaandLibyaprovide

examplesofthat context.Thethirdiswhenarmedgroupsengageincriminalactivities,suchasthedrug

trade,kidnappingsorextortions,butnonethelessactasalawandorderauthorityintheterritoryinwhich

theyfunction.ExamplesofthisexistorhaveexistedinAfghanistan,theBalkans,theDemocraticRepublicof

theCongo,andIraq.Ineachofthosecontexts,therearebothpolicyandlegalissuesthatariseconcerningthe

managementofrelationshipsbetweenthegovernmentandthearmedgroups.

The Relationships

Atthestrategic level,engagementsbetweengovernmentsandarmedgroups canleadtotheendofconflict,

provideameanstodealwiththeinterestsandgrievancesofthewidercommunityrepresentedbyamilitia,

andmaintaininternationalpeaceandsecurityby,forexample,preventingaconflictfromspreadingmore
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

Armed Groups Maintaining Law and Order

page 2 • PB 146 • May 13, 2013

widely.Atthelocallevel,thereislittledoubtthatwheregovernmentsareunwillingorunabletoact,armed

groupscananddoprovidesomelevelofprotectiontothelocalpopulation.

Thereisastrategicparadoxofsupportingarmedgroupswhichimpactstheabilityofthehoststateorthe

internationalcommunitytoprotectthelocalpopulationbymaintaininglawandorder.Theparadoxarises

becauseeithersupportingornotsupportingmilitiastoundertakelawandorder canleadtoquestionsof

legitimacyandaccountabilityforthehostgovernmentortheinternational community.Alliedtothisparadox

isthefactthatanyformalrecognitionof,orengagementwith,suchgroupsislikelytoraiseconcernsabout

thelegitimacyoftheactionsofthestateortheinternationalcommunity.Forexample,supporttoanarmed

groupmightlegitimizeittotheextentthatthenationalgovernment’sauthorityorinfluenceisadversely

impacted.

Therearesomepotentiallynegativeimplicationsofengagingwitharmedgroupsandlocalcommunities

maybearthebruntofthese.Therisksofsupportingarmedgroupsincludethepotentialthattheycould,in

fact,worsensecurity.Theymightcommitgrosshumanrightsviolations,becomecriminals,refusetodisarm,

orfurtherweakenformalgovernmentstructures.Inrelationtoweakeninggovernmentinfluence,militias

couldmakeitmoredifficultforformalruleoflawinitiativesthatreinforceaccountabilityandtransparency

fromemerging.Furthermore,groupsthatrule‘bythegun’aresometimesunwillingtosurrendertheirpower

evenwhenotherformalorinformalmeansandmethodsofdisputesettlementareoptionsthatthelocal

communitywouldsupport.

Legal Concerns

Oneofthedifficultiesforhoststatesandtheinternational communityindealingwithsomeofthepolicy

concernsidentifiedaboveistheextenttowhichinternationallawapplies.Forexample,whichinternational

lawgovernstheactivitiesofmilitiagroups,andtheirinteractionwiththatcommunity?Whileitis clearthatin

allthreecontextsdescribedabovetheprimarylawapplicabletoarmedgroupsisthelawofthehoststateitis

lesscleartheextenttowhichinternationallawappliestosuchgroups.Itistruethatinternationallawprohibits

statesfromsupportingrebelgroupsinanotherstate.However,itisquestionablewhethersuchaprohibition

shouldapplywhenarebelgroupisfightingagovernmentthatviolatesfundamentalhumanrightsorthe

groupistheonlyauthorityprotectingthelocalpopulationfromthecompletebreakdownoflawandorder.

Forexample,itisthecasethatinSyriasomemilitiagroupshavesetupprisonsandcourtsystemstomaintain

lawandorderintheir communitiesbecausethereisnootheroptionavailable.4

Internationalhumanitarianlawandinternationalhumanrightslawaddressthe involvementofstates

intakingandhandlingindividuals accusedof committingcrimesduringarmedconflict,butthere is

disagreement astothe extenttowhichthose areasoflawapply specifically tonon-state actorssuchas

armedgroups.5 So,for example,whatinternational legalstandards apply toa rebelgroupdetainingan

individualforlootingor committinga sexual assault?Ahumanrightsbasedapproachrequiresthatthe

detaineebe‘broughtpromptlybefore a judgeorotherofficer authorisedby lawtoexercise judicialpower

and...be entitledtotrailwithina reasonable timeortorelease.’6Andinternationalhumanitarianlaw

providesthatno‘sentence shallbepassedandnopenalty shallbe executedonapersonfoundguiltyof

anoffense exceptpursuanttoa convictionpronouncedby a courtofferingthe essentialguaranteesof

independence andimpartiality.’7 Ina communitywhere there arenoofficials authorizedby laworthere

are seriousquestionsofindependence andimpartialityofofficials, isthere a slidingscaleofobligationthat

wouldbepermitted? 

Internationallawisalsogenerallysilentontherequirementtovetandtrainarmedgroups.Furthermore,

thereislittleguidanceonthelegalframeworkthatshouldapplytoensureappropriategovernancestructures

areinplaceforsuchgroups.Finally,whilethedoctrineofstateresponsibility;internationalcriminallaw;

andgeneralprinciplesofinternationalhumanitarianlawandhumanrightslawgoverntheaccountability

ofstates,andtoavaryingextentstheaccountabilityofinternationalorganizationsandindividuals,thereis
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

Armed Groups Maintaining Law and Order

page 3 • PB 146 • May 13, 2013

littleinthoseareasoflawthatspecificallyholdthestateinwhichtheconflictisoccurring,interimgoverning

councils,theinternationalcommunity,orindividuals,accountableorresponsiblefortheactsofarmedgroups

thattheysupport.

Managing the Reality 

Accepting that in some circumstances armed groups might be the only form ofsecurity for the

local population, itseemsreasonable to expectstates and the international community to have

policy frameworks, concerning when support is given, whatsupport isreasonable to provide, the

scale ofsupport provided, and what accountability mechanismsshould be in place when providing support. For example, U.S. military doctrine states:

If adequateHN[host nation]security forces are not available, unitsshould consider hiring and

training local paramilitary forcesto secure the cleared village or neighbourhood.Not only do the

members ofthe paramilitary have a stake in their area’ssecurity,they also receive a wage. Providing jobsstimulatesthe economy.Having a job improves morale and allowslocalsto become a

potential member ofthe local government process. 8

If one readsthe reference to‘secure the cleared village above’to include maintaining law and order

then one reflection that arisesis whetherthe operational approach taken by the U.S. military should

be translated into strategic policy.

Anotherissue isthe extentto which a state’sstrategic policy should take into accountthe factthat

‘partiesto an armed conflict bearthe primary responsibility to take all feasible stepsto ensure the

protection of civilians.’9 Might ensuring the protection of civilians be enhanced by using armed groups

in some conflict or post-conflictsituations? Clearly, one concern in using armed groupsto protect civiliansis ensuring thatthere are appropriate frameworks, including legal frameworks,to be confident

that armed groups will not commit gross violations of human rights.

In relation to legal frameworksspecial agreements, unilateral declarations, deeds of commitment

and codes of conduct have been used by the international community to seek the commitment of

armed groupsto fundamental norms.The use of Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment for Adherence to 

a Total Ban on Anti-personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action as a meansto ensure respect of

humanitarian normsthrough monitoring,reporting and verification is one example ofthe international community engaging with armed actors.There is no similar deed of commitment concerning

armed groupsthat carry outfunctionsrelated to maintaining law and order.

In a number of cases armed groups have developed codes of conduct as a means of increasing their

membersrespectforthe law. A recent example ofsuch a code isthe rebel Free Syrian Army’s code

of conduct, which requiresits membersto adhere to fundamental principles of international human

rights.10 Such codes appearto be developed on an ad hoc basis and there islittle research concerning

matterssuch monitoring and adherence to them.

In the interest of considering how states orthe international community might best manage their

relationship with armed groupsitis worth reflecting on the extentto which states and the international community should develop:

(1)	A general policy framework concerning issuessuch asthe conditionsforsupporting armed

groupsto maintain law and order and the types ofsupportthatshould be provided; and

(2)	A generic code of conduct, orsome othersimilarlegal mechanism, which describes both

realistic standards of behavior expected of armed groups and fundamentalrules which

armed groups must adhere to.
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Armed Groups Maintaining Law and Order

page 4 • PB 146 • May 13, 2013

About This Brief

This Peace Brief is based on the 

author’s research concerning armed 

groups in places such as Afghanistan 

and the Democratic Republic of 

the Congo. Bruce ‘Ossie’ Oswald 

is an associate professor of Law at 

Melbourne Law School and Jennings 

Randolph senior fellow (2012-2013). 

Oswald’s interest in armed groups 

stems from his military service in 

places such as Rwanda, East Timor, 

Iraq, and Afghanistan. His academic 

research interests are in international humanitarian law, international 

human rights law, and post-conflict 

state-building. The author would 

like to thank Erica Gaston, Vivienne 

O’Connor and Beth Wellington for 

their very helpful comments on earlier 

drafts of this brief.

Endnotes

1.	 The term“armed group”as used here refersto civilians who are both armed and organized;

and have the capacity to carry outsustained violence within a state so asto further a political,

religious or cultural agenda.They are not professional fightersin the same sense as members

of a state’s military.They act outside formalstate law and order authoritiessuch asthe military

and police. Armed groupstherefore mightinclude pro-government militia, civil defense groups

(sometimes also referred to as village self-defense forces), and armed opposition groups. Forthe

purposes ofthis paperthey do notinclude private military companies or organizationsthat have

a purely criminal agenda.The terms militias, non-state armed actors, and paramilitary are often

used to referto the category of armed groupsthatisthe focus ofthis paper.

2.	 Sabine Carey,Neil Mitchell andWill Lowe,“States,the Security Sector, and the Monopoly of

Violence: ANew Database on Pro-Government Militias”(2013) 5(2)Journal of Peace Research

249-258, 251.

3.	 Vincent Bernard: Editorial: understanding armed groups and the applicable law (2011) 882 IRRC,

261 at 262.

4.	 “Syrian rebel courtsrestore order of life in Aleppo.”TheDaily Star, Lebanon, April 13, 2013 at www.

dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Apr-13/213532-syrian-rebel-courts-restore-order-tolife-in-aleppo.ashx#axzz2QYrvh7GR.

5.	 See for e.g. A. Clapham,“Weapons and armed non-state actors”in S. Casey-Maslen (ed)Weapons

underInternationalHuman Rights Law, forthcoming in 2013.

6.	 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1976) art. 9(3).

7.	 Protocol Additionalto the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection

ofVictims ofNon-International Armed Conflicts(1977) art 7.

8.	 U.S. military manual,Tacticsin Counter-Insurgency (2009), para. 3-125.

9.	 Security Council Presidential Statement, February 12, 2013.

10.	 RDominic Evans and Mariam Karouny,“Syrian rebelssign battle-field code of conduct,”Reuters.

August 8, 2012.