i

What Democracy for Afghanistan? 

An Analysis Utilizing Established Norms and Five 

Non-Western Case Studies 

Charles L. Barry and Samuel R. Greene 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University 

September 2009 
ii

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ and do not reflect the official policy or 

position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified 

materials. 

Charles Barry, a Senior Research Fellow at CTNSP and President of Barry Consulting 

Inc., is a retired Army officer with extensive experience in joint and multinational 

operations as well as political-military affairs. His areas of study include transatlantic 

relations, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, and U.S. military strategy. He 

also researches command and control concepts, joint organization interoperability and 

network integration. Dr. Barry is a graduate of Loyola University-Chicago and holds a 

doctorate in Public Administration from the University of Baltimore. 

Samuel R. Greene is a doctoral candidate in politics at Catholic University in Washington 

D.C. and a research assistant at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

at the National Defense University. He holds a master’s degree in international relations 

from the University of Cambridge. 

Acknowledgments 

The authors would like to acknowledge Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann, David Garner, 

Linton Wells II, Ali Jalali, Jordan Wilcox, and A.J. Nolte for their helpful comments on 

all or part of earlier drafts. Any errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the 

authors. 

Defense & Technology Papers are published by the National Defense University Center 

for Technology and National Security Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. 

CTNSP publications are available at <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html>. 
iii

Contents 

Foreword............................................................................................................................. v 

Executive Summary.......................................................................................................... vii 

A Vision of Democratic Governance in Afghanistan......................................................... 1 

Conclusions......................................................................................................................... 2 

Policy Recommendations.................................................................................................... 2 

What Does Establishing Democracy Mean?....................................................................... 5 

How the World Identifies Democratic States ..................................................................... 5 

Tasks and Time to Achieve Democracy: A Comparative Perspective............................. 10 

A Comparative Examination of Post-conflict Democratization ....................................... 10 

Security versus Insecurity................................................................................................. 13 

The Penalties of Corruption.............................................................................................. 14 

Including Enemies in Government ................................................................................... 15 

The Current State of Democracy in Afghanistan: Assessments and a New Metric Set for 

Measuring Progress........................................................................................................... 17

Key Challenges Facing Democratization in Afghanistan................................................. 25 

The Taliban Insurgency and the Significance of Local and National Identity ................. 29 

Religious influences in the Insurgency............................................................................. 29 

The Composition of the Insurgency.................................................................................. 30 

Local Identity and National Identity within Afghanistan ................................................. 32 

Insights for Afghanistan from Case Studies ..................................................................... 36 

Nicaragua .......................................................................................................................... 36 

Mozambique ..................................................................................................................... 38 

Colombia: Turning Insurgents into Political Participants................................................. 40 

Indonesia and Malaysia: Muslim-Majority Democracies................................................. 41 

A More Realistic Vision of Afghan Democracy and Priorities for Progress.................... 47 

A Vision of Democracy in Afghanistan............................................................................ 47 

Priority Areas of Focus to Achieve Afghanistan’s Vision of Democracy........................ 48 

Recap of Central Findings ................................................................................................ 53 

Policy Recommendations.................................................................................................. 55 

Maps.................................................................................................................................. 58 

1.Ethnic Composition of Afghanistan............................................................................... 58 

2. Number of Growing Days............................................................................................. 59 
iv
v

Foreword

In 2009 the Obama administration and NATO allies have scaled back expectations for a 

democratic form of government1

 in Afghanistan, at least for the time period in which the 

international presence might be sustained at its current level.2

 A growing number of 

policy analysts and academic experts agree.3 Nonetheless, despite renewed emphasis on 

security and a downplaying of Afghanistan’s prospects for democracy in 2009, intense 

preparations for the August 20 presidential elections demonstrate that the international 

community has not discarded its intent to leave behind at least the seeds of participatory 

government.4 Yet the juxtaposition of lengthening and costly commitment and a new 

sense of realism raise the question, what level of democracy is possible in Afghanistan 

before international support wanes? 

This study looks at democratic governance and what might be expected to take root in a 

society such as Afghanistan. More than 7 years into the presence of the United States and 

the UN, and more than 5 years into NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, it is worth 

analyzing the state of governance in that country and examining how—and to what 

extent—the goal of democracy might be achieved. Key research questions are: 

• What can the international community hope to leave behind in terms of 

democracy? 

• What will it take in terms of time and resources? 

• What related tasks must be achieved for democracy to take hold and flourish? 

• What are the realistic prospects for success? 

• What are accepted criteria for knowing when we get there? 

Our analysis attempts to answer these questions. It sheds light on what is necessary, as a 

minimum, for democracy to take root. It also suggests replacements for goals that may be 

simply unattainable, such as an Afghan democracy held to an unrealistic Jeffersonian 

standard. Finally, it aims to impart a sense of what can be accomplished before 

international political will runs out. 

Afghanistan’s political history, compartmented geography, underdeveloped 

infrastructure, diverse tribal-ethnic makeup, and persistent insurgencies suggest the need 

 

1

 By “democratic form of government” we mean a system that provides for public participation to carry out 

societal decision-making. Such participation may take the form of a Western representative democracy, a 

form of direct democracy, a consensus-based system of group deliberation found, or some combination of 

these practices. We consider democratic government and “participatory government” to be synonyms in 

this paper. 

2

 See for example Karen DeYoung, “Obama Seeks Narrower Focus in Afghan War” Washington Post,

February 4, 2009; Peter Walters, “No Western-style democracy in Afghanistan: Angus Houston” The 

Australian February 26, 2009; “NATO can't beat Afghan insurgents alone: Harper” The Canadian Press

March 1, 2009 

3

 J Alexander Thier, ed., The Future of Afghanistan (Washington, DC: USIP, 2009); Kenneth Katzman, 

“Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance (Washington, D.C.: CRS, May 2009). 

4

 Results will be announced by September 17. In the event that no candidate receives at least 50 percent of 

the vote, a runoff will be scheduled for early October. http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canadaafghanistan/progress-progres/elections.aspx?lang=eng 
vi

to lower our expectations for a blossoming of democracy in the near term. However, 

while a western style democratic system seems distant, we find strong participatory 

themes in Afghanistan’s longstanding informal institutions of governance. This suggests 

that in order for a modestly democratic national government to be relatively successful, it 

should share resources and decisionmaking power with participatory local institutions. 

That is, a participatory government should be designed to rely upon rather than replace, 

parry, or weaken the existing authority held by the leadership at the village level, through 

informal community institutions such as Jirgas and Shuras that already have a 

representative character. 

Such government would embrace a robust degree of autonomous local authority. The 

central government should provide broad national services, including national security, 

trans-province public goods and services, monetary and fiscal management, law making, 

international relations, and internal rule of law, exercised in coordination with provincial 

and village authorities. Kabul, in coordination with local leaders, should determine what 

services it can reliably provide and what authority it can successfully exercise. It should 

set out to do both most credibly, and with greater transparency and far lower levels of 

corruption than at present. The rest of governance should be carried out in conjunction 

with subordinate entities, particularly at the local level, with Kabul serving in a 

complimentary role. Such a system has the best chance of becoming a sustainable Afghan 

government that meets the international community’s norms of participatory governance 

within the window of finite international engagement. In the longer term, as the central 

government becomes more capable, greater centralization may be warranted and 

desirable by mutual consent of the governed. 
vii

Executive Summary 

Well into its eighth year, two assumptions about the conflict in Afghanistan have become 

accepted wisdom. First, the goals of Afghanistan and its international supporters cannot 

be achieved by military force alone; effective, civilian-directed elements of power are 

also needed in abundance. Second, both the political goal of establishing a viable 

democratic government and the military objective of defeating the Taliban and other 

insurgents may have to be more modest than heretofore declared. This study examines 

the stated goal of creating basic democratic or participatory governance in Kabul in light 

of internationally accepted measures of success and five possible models from the 

developing world. It concludes with findings and policy recommendations to help answer 

the important question being asked by leaders and policymakers: what type of 

government is possible in Afghanistan? 

A prominent goal of the international intervention in Afghanistan has been to see some 

level of representative government flourish as the system of choice for the Afghan 

people.5 The Bush administration linked a democratic Afghanistan to NATO collective 

security interests.6 It has been suggested that the Obama Administration’s March 2009 

strategy for Afghanistan deemphasizes democracy in favor of security goals.7

 However, 

the prominent place of the recent presidential and upcoming parliamentary elections in 

Obama’s treatment of Afghanistan suggests that while expectations may have been 

lowered, putting in place at least the rudiments of participatory governance remains the 

end goal for Afghanistan’s government. If international withdrawal from Afghanistan 

anticipates leaving such a democratic Afghanistan behind, what minimal political 

progress and achievements are required to constitute a democracy in Afghanistan, and 

how can the international community foster such progress with reasonable prospects for 

success? 

This paper examines the internationally recognized core elements of democratic 

governance as might be created in any state, and assesses progress toward those criteria 

in Afghanistan. The assessment considers the particular challenges facing Afghan 

democratization, and highlights gaps between the end goal and the current state of 

Afghan democracy. In sketching a path from today to a successful democracy, our 

research applies case study lessons from other attempts at post conflict democratization 

and the melding of democracy with Islamic values. The final section outlines what 

aspects of democracy can realistically be achieved in Afghanistan. 

Our research shows that, measured against recognized criteria and the scholarship of 

experts, Afghanistan is far from a minimal democracy today. It clings tenuously to initial 

attempts at the most basic representative activity: its first presidential election in October 

2004 and subsequent parliamentary elections in September 2005. These outward signs of 

representative government have not been followed by lawful administration and effective 

 

5

 Riga Declaration, Article 4; Bucharest Summit Declaration, Article 6. 6

 George W. Bush, “President Bush Discusses Progress in Afghanistan, Global War on Terror” Address at 

AEI, Feb 15, 2007. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070215-1.html 7

 See for example “Widening Afghan mission, Obama narrows goals” AFP March 29, 2009 
viii

provision of even the most basic services. Public confidence in Kabul has ebbed to a low 

level for two reasons: an inability to provide security throughout the country and an 

almost epidemic level of government corruption. These are inextricably interwoven 

problems. Unless the government can deal with both in the near term, Afghans will look 

elsewhere for some sense of order: even though the Taliban are disliked by most of the 

population, they are increasingly seen as an alternative to gross corruption and 

dysfunctional bureaucracy. Presidential elections scheduled for August 2009 and 

parliamentary elections in 2010 might help to get Afghanistan back onto the right track. 

However, democracies in particular demand much more than periodic elections. Their 

constituents expect lawful, responsive, and participative government. 

As a fresh group of leaders around the world assume positions that will influence both 

Afghanistan and the mission of the international community, the international community 

should reflect on what a viable democracy in Afghanistan could look like, and what 

steps—on the part of Kabul as much as its international supporters—will be required to 

succeed. Whatever the choice, closing the gap between the current Afghan state and a 

minimal working democracy is destined to take a significant amount of time. 

Comparative studies suggest that successful development of a minimum level of 

democracy in post-conflict states without a democratic history on average takes 7–10 

years. And much of Afghanistan has not yet achieved a post-conflict environment. Even 

when successful, young post-conflict democracies tend to be fragile and subject to 

reversal. As one classic work on democratic transitions suggests, political democracy “... 

emerges from a nonlinear, highly uncertain, and imminently reversible process.”8

The Obama administration’s review of American policy in Afghanistan has rightly 

focused on setting attainable goals that advance the core U.S. mission in Afghanistan: “to 

disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their 

return to either country in the future.”9

 In order to achieve the objective of preventing the 

return of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, Afghanistan must be successful in establishing a 

stable, working, and at least rudimentary democratic government. This it can do within its 

declared framework as an Islamic republic. 

In considering what Afghanistan’s democracy should look like, what goals are attainable 

given the challenging environment? What models should Afghanistan try to emulate? In 

examining the realistic prospects for grafting democratic principles onto an Islamic state, 

we should look more broadly for models to follow. The most familiar Western models of 

democracy found mainly among NATO members are of little relevance to Afghanistan. 

Rather, for lessons on transitioning from conflict to a semblance of democracy, the 

imperfect experiences of states in the developing world such as Nicaragua and 

Mozambique may be more instructive. Lessons on emerging from conflict to establish 

democracy under the curse of illegal drugs as a national crop can be found in the recent 

experience of Colombia. For insight into melding Islamic customs, beliefs, and laws with 

democratic principles, what has been achieved thus far in Indonesia and Malaysia may 

have more to offer than Western theories. These cases, described in this paper, rather than 

 

8

 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 

about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 70. 9

 Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “White House Debate Led to Plan to Widen Afghan Effort” New York 

Times March 27, 2009. 
ix

Western models, are where new ideas can be found. In Afghanistan it is not a question of 

modifying the state’s Islamic identity but a question of how to wed democratic principles 

to the diverse understandings of Islamic law and customs held by the mainstream of 

Afghanistan’s many communities. Some respected scholars assert this cannot be done. 

We take exception based on recent but reasonably successful experiences. Afghans 

should seek advice from those who have preceded them. 

Kabul must guard against overly high expectations, especially in the near term, and 

concentrate on delivering the most needed services effectively to as much of Afghanistan 

as it can. Achieving an atmosphere of general public security and the rule of law for most 

and eventually all of Afghanistan should be the top priority. An important second goal 

should be to involve as many minorities and opposition groups as possible in the political 

process, including reconcilable members of the Taliban. Historical experience shows that 

a military defeat of an insurgency alone is unlikely to result in lasting success. Yet 

negotiations with disaffected militants are most likely to bring results when offered from 

a position of strength that makes political tools more appealing than violence. 

Equal to the provision of public security and political inclusiveness, as the third leg of a 

triangle, is the need to reverse the abysmal administrative performance of the current 

Afghan government. Successful post-conflict democracies retain grave problems, but all 

our case studies show marked progress in ridding themselves of the greatest excesses of 

official corruption. Afghanistan will have to move from a situation where corruption 

controls all levels of government with impunity toward a system that, while flawed, 

places some effective sanctions on corruption and restricts the subversion of state 

functions by personal graft. Similarly, while the bureaucracy of post conflict democracies 

always remain in need of significant improvement, key Afghan institutions will have to 

establish an acknowledged degree of competence and working systems that provide 

requisite services. 

Finally, the Afghan state must develop a structure of government that takes into account 

the primacy of local identity in Afghanistan. In a country long accustomed to autonomous 

local authority over much of Afghan life, and with a population infused with a complex 

set of overlapping identities, any attempt to impose a strong central government that 

seeks to direct most domestic policy without a good measure of freedom for and the tacit 

cooperation of informal institutions at the local level is unlikely to succeed. Instead, the 

national government should focus on effectively providing security and a focused set of 

essential, nationally defined key public goods. Inasmuch as local leadership at the village 

and sub-district level accepts a division of authority between the national government and 

local leadership, shuns the Taliban, and plays by a set of basic norms, local communities 

should be given greater discretion to determine how local government is organized and 

given broad control over local issues. Regional authorities appointed by or under the 

authority of Kabul, from the level of provincial governments to officials at the district 

and sub district levels should work in coordination with local authorities, and villagelevel institutions accountable to local populations should be given financial resources and 

responsibility for local projects. For projects at the village and district level, local 

leadership should be given responsibility for allocating funds 

The government in Kabul should concentrate on being lean and effective, and commit to 

performing a clearly defined set of functions that local authorities cannot perform for 
x

themselves. The government should exercise a monopoly on the use of force and provide 

for the security of all its citizens directly and often indirectly in close cooperation with 

existing local authorities.10 The central government should provide for all groups to have 

an assured, legitimate political voice, seeking to include all but the most irreconcilable in 

its government. It should worry less about extending control over all facets of governance 

to every corner of Afghanistan. It will have to attack corruption within its own house, 

particularly among the police and the judicial system. Beyond these challenges, it will 

also have to begin to provide limited essential public goods in the form of infrastructure, 

economic regulation and human services such as health and education. 

What the government does matters; it must perform these tasks at an acceptable level of 

performance. What the central government does not do also matters. Rather than 

attempting to replace local autonomy with unfamiliar and untested policies and structures 

of a national government, Afghanistan’s democracy should include local authorities by 

offering them broad latitude in matters not related to the core responsibilities of the 

central government. Working with institutions that exist in Afghan society, such as tribal 

authority structures, village councils, and local notables, the government should allow 

locals to direct the course of local life in the many areas outside of the mandate of the 

central state. Government directives that must be promulgated should be compatible with 

local customs to the greatest extent possible, and it may not be wise or necessary to 

standardize solutions for all locales alike, but allow for the particular circumstances of 

Afghanistan’s diverse population of local communities. Government at the provincial 

level should not be a place for local groups to compete for patronage from the central 

government, but rather a platform for integrating local cooperation. The result will be a 

government less dominated by its center on domestic issues, at least initially, and in that 

respect at least, the model of the early United States will be useful. 

These changes will still leave Afghanistan far from a first-rate democracy. However, they 

represent a path by which to achieve “the end of the beginning” of the democratization of 

that country. It will be the first step toward a democracy that may be possible. If 

achieved, it would vastly improve the chance of a successful state taking hold in 

Afghanistan.

 

10 Concern over the autonomous power of regional warlords is a serious matter. Internal conflict between 

the private militias of warlords certainly contributed to the resurgence of the Taliban (See Ahmed Rashid, 

Descent Into Chaos (New York: Viking, 2008), 125-144). However, housing police power in the hands of 

the national government, which should restrain to some degree the ability of warlords to size control of 

parts of the country, does not require centralization of all facets of governance to the same degree. 

Assisting local authorities at the village and sub-district level is not the same as helping regional warlords 

to carve out separate spheres of influence. 
1

A Vision of Democratic Governance in 

Afghanistan 

Afghanistan’s leadership and its external supporters should agree to a vision of future 

democracy that is rooted in existing formal and informal local institutions, and imported 

only insofar as relevant cases studies provide true models on which Afghans can draw. 

The central government should preside over a government that delegates more authority 

to local and regional entities that it regards as partners to be served and supported. The 

degree of central control should be harmonized with the views and requirements of lower 

echelon leaders, some of which may be strong while others are weaker. Therefore, the 

level of central engagement need not be the same from one region or locale to another. 

The guiding theme should be for Kabul to provide essential and carefully limited 

government service, and to do so dependably, free at least of the most egregious, overt, 

and visible corruption. 

Five areas related to governance should receive the highest priority and emphasis in the 

investment of international resources: strengthening security; building a path for current 

enemies to become political participants; fixing dysfunction in key institutions; taming 

the worse and most visible corruption across the central government; and developing a 

workable, mainly decentralized form of government. The absence of economic 

development from this list in no way suggests that we believe that economic development 

is not a vital task in Afghanistan, but rather that, given that economic development is not 

directly connected to developing participatory governance, an extensive treatment of 

development is beyond the scope of this paper. Much of the conflict resolution literature 

has rightly argued that economic development is essential to developing lasting peace in 

post conflict situations. In the case of Afghanistan, economic opportunity is essential to 

long-term peace.11Measured according to our democracy metric, the current situation in 

Afghanistan fails to rise to the level of even a mediocre democracy. Numerous obstacles 

stand in the way of meaningful participation, insecurity is high, institutions are feeble, 

and corruption is rife. Our comparative study of moderately successful post conflict 

democracies offers several conclusions and policy recommendations for a way forward. 

 

11 See Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) and Ashraf Ghani and 

Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (Oxford,: Oxford 

University Press, 2008). For a discussion of Afghanistan in particular, see Ali Jalali, “The Legacy of War 

and the Challenge of Peace Building” in Robert Rotberg, ed., Building a new Afghanistan (Cambridge: 

World Peace Foundation, 2007), 48-52. However, it is important to note that even states with poor 

economies and widespread unemployment have successfully developed participatory governance. See 

Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) for 

an early formulation of this position. 
2

Conclusions 

1. Democracy takes a long time to develop—policymakers must be realistic about 

what can be achieved in Afghanistan, particularly while conflict has yet to be ended. 

Democracy such as we experience in the United States or its NATO allies is not the 

most immediately relevant model for seeding similar participatory governance in 

Afghanistan. 

2. State security as well as public security—law and order—are both essential to any 

lasting democracy. 

3. In order to achieve security, political as well as military solutions are necessary. 

Workable solutions require involving opposition groups. It may also require 

compromise on some aspects of democracy, at least in the near term. 

4. Key institutions must be stood up and function effectively. This is a lengthy 

process. Competency in public safety and justice is vital for a functioning state. 

Therefore developing competent law enforcement and a strong judicial system are 

critical priorities. 

5. Corruption must be contained. Afghans, like many cultures, experience and tolerate 

some corruption, however the extent of corruption emanating from the central 

government in Kabul is unacceptable. In spite of their past atrocities, it triggers 

support for alternatives such as the Taliban. 

6. Non-Western models of transition to democracy after conflict, in particular, states 

with a majority Muslim population, provide the best roadmap and lessons for 

Afghanistan. There are several such examples but they apparently are not being 

utilized by either international planners or Kabul. 

7. The initial years of transition to democracy often do not look very good—uneven 

performance is to be expected. However, this must not become an excuse for abysmal 

governance, failure of institutional establishment, or a lack of security. 

Policy Recommendations 

Controlling Violence 

1. NATO ISAF and U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom forces must be strong enough 

and capable of focusing sufficiently on insurgents to check their advance and inflict 

telling damage on their military capacity. Afghanistan needs a respite of 2–3 years 

from attacks to develop and consolidate governance. In military operations, avoiding 

the adverse impact of collateral civilian casualties must continue to receive the 

highest command consideration. 

2. The Afghan National Army should press hard to establish and maintain the highest 

quality, especially among core cadres at every organizational level. It has to weigh 

the pressing need for a larger ready force against the patience and careful selection 

processes required to engender professionalism. It will be easier to set and maintain 

quality than to reverse unacceptable performance later. With this proviso, every effort 

should be expended to put in the field the most capable forces as soon as possible. 
3

3. The first responsibility of the Afghan National Police should be public safety and 

security. The ANP must be free of egregious visible corruption and capable of 

gaining public trust. In addition to responding to local civilian authorities, it must be 

capable of teamwork with the military when necessary. The ANP should include 

some highly responsive an robust paramilitary elements in order to reinforce local 

police units when military force is inappropriate or not immediately available 

4. Pakistani forces operating from the Pakistan side of the Durrand Line are also 

critical to controlling violence inside Afghanistan. Government of Pakistan 

cooperation with the ANA might best be effected via international intermediaries, and 

take the form of military-to-military contacts, information sharing, and cooperation 

aimed at mutual confidence building. These initiatives should be fostered whenever 

the possibility is present. 

5. International intelligence sharing should be pursued to allow collaboration as much 

and as often as possible in locating and targeting insurgent forces. Governments and 

militaries should seek opportunities to learn from each other’s operations in order to 

improve the overall effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations. 

Incorporating Enemies 

1. Any reconciliation effort requires advances in counterinsurgency—opponents of a 

regime would not agree to join in if they are winning. The ballot box has to present a 

more likely chance of success than the battlefield. 

2. Alongside successful counterinsurgency operations, past efforts of offering 

amnesty must be improved. A systematic, national program that offers a chance of 

meaningful political involvement must be developed alongside military advances. A 

wholesale “us against them” approach must be avoided. 

3. Careful attention should be given to the resolution of local grievances in recruiting 

militants and ex-militants. 

Corruption and Institution-Building 

1. The national government should remove corrupt officials found in the national 

government at high levels whenever possible, rather than the current practice of 

moving them around. Cleaning house should be made public. Restoring confidence in 

government institutions should be a top priority 

2. Local leaders can be rewarded with patronage for “good behavior.” Appearance of 

fairness as well as promulgation of “the rules of the game” is appropriate on a 

judicious scale. However, while a small advantage for cooperative leadership is one 

thing, corruption cannot be gross and must not extract from the property of citizens. 

3. Wages for police, judges, and other key administrative officials should be 

sufficient to provide a living for officials without obliging them to resort to extortion. 

4. The United States and the international community should clearly cast their support 

for individual officials as being wedded to the Afghan national interest, as 

demonstrated by performance, and specifically, to honest expended effort. 

Unreasonable goals of success are counterproductive, but often-limited progress in 

the provision of services adds to public trust and confidence in Kabul. 
4

Centralization and Local Relevance 

1. Notwithstanding provisions of the 2004 constitution that call for centralization, 

informal arrangements that provide more space for local governance as well as more 

provisions for local control over some resources should be established. This would 

not require any explicit change in the constitution, but it should result in a change of 

emphasis on the part of the government in Kabul as well as its international 

supporters. The formal structure of government in Afghanistan has been described as 

“one of the most centralized states in the world.”12 Such centralization is not the best 

fit for Afghanistan. The national government should refocus on a more limited 

portfolio of essential functions, and gradually win the support of the populace by 

working with local authorities on other issues. 

2. More autonomy should be given to village and sub-district level informal 

institutions. These are often representative councils that govern well, shun the Taliban 

and are averse to poppy cultivation and drug labs. More autonomous local councils 

should quickly realize positive effects in terms of public support and in their working 

relations with the central government. Local accountability will also improve the 

administrative performance of government projects. The Community Development 

Councils formed through the current National Solidarity may be a useful model of 

local autonomy.13 

3. The central government must determine a few priority service areas that it can 

execute well in the near term. Law and order are critical but are not enough. Steady 

progress toward infrastructure expansion and reliable delivery of services, most 

critically road, power, and telecommunications, will demonstrate competence over 

time.14 Clean water, medical facilities, economic development programs that bring 

jobs, regulation of trade, and facilitating education are appropriate priorities as well. 

4. Knowing what can be achieved and what international norms consider a working 

democracy are essential in crafting policies to succeed in Afghanistan. The twin 

pillars of growing a democratic Afghanistan are: 1) security and 2) a capable central 

government working in tandem with existing village, district and provincial 

authorities. Democracy should not seek to replace Afghanistan’s existing authorities 

and informal institutions, but rather work with local authorities and the seeds of 

democracy present in traditional Afghan culture. International assistance will be 

needed for a long time for such an enterprise to succeed. However, within a number 

of years it should within our collective means to quell insurgent attempts to kill off 

representative government before it can take root. The rest will be up to the leaders in 

Kabul and the resilience of the people of Afghanistan. 

 

12 Sarah Lister and Hamish Nixon, “The Place of the Province in Afghanistan's Subnational Governance” in 

Rotberg ed., Building a new Afghanistan, 206. 13 Ehsan Zia, Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, “Development in Afghanistan: The 

National Solidarity Plan and Beyond” presentation at CSIS, Washington D.C, February 26, 2009. Projects 

administered through local leadership have reduced levels of corruption. 

14 Some initial successes has been achieved in infrastructure projects, such as significant progress on the 

ring road and power initiatives importing power from Uzbekistan to Kabul and from Iran to Heart, with the 

assistance of international donors. 
5

What Does Establishing Democracy 

Mean? 

How the World Identifies Democratic States 

In both academic literature and the policy realm, the criteria used to identify a particular 

state as democratic varies significantly. Even when similar definitions of democracy are 

adopted, the classification of a particular nation often depends on the classifier. For 

example, Article III of the Charter of the Council of Europe requires states to adhere to 

democratic principles, listing respect for the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental 

freedoms as mandatory for members.15 Freedom House, a think tank best known for its 

yearly assessments of freedom in the world, gives a similar set of expectations for states 

it classifies as free. Yet in 2001, the Council of Europe admitted Azerbaijan at the same 

time that Freedom House downgraded its assessment of the country due to a boycott of 

elections by the opposition and increased governmental repression of independent media 

outlets.16 The Azerbaijan example highlights the importance of developing a careful set 

of standards across several organizations. Our own assessment attempts to make progress 

toward that goal by synthesizing a set of metrics from criteria used by leading academics, 

organizations, and think tanks to define and measure democracy. 

Two groups produce widely consulted rankings that seek to measure the quality of 

democracy in given countries. New York based Freedom House issues its annual 

Freedom in the World report, which ranks the level of freedom in each nation based on 

scores for political rights and civil liberties developed from a series of indicators. 

Freedom House gives the following list as necessary elements for a democratic society: a 

competitive political system with more than one party; universal adult suffrage; regularly 

contested elections conducted by secret ballot, with a secure voting process that honors 

the choices of the electorate; access for all major political parties to voters through media 

access; and an open political campaign.17

The Polity IV index, a project housed at the University of Maryland, has developed a set 

of indicators that places each country on a 21-point “regime authority spectrum.” The 

Polity IV user’s manual offers the following definitions of a democracy: “[a] mature and 

internally coherent democracy, for example, might be operationally defined as one in 

which (a) political participation is unrestricted, open, and fully competitive (b) executive 

recruitment is elective (c) constraints on the chief executive are substantial.”18

Freedom House develops its “freedom index” of all states by first assigning them a value 

between 1 and 7 in two categories, political rights and civil liberties. From this, a 

composite score is determined between 2 (most free) and 14 (not free). “Free” or 

democratic states have scores between 2 and 5, countries classified as “partly free” score 

 

15 Statute of the Council of Europe, Article II, section 3. Available online at 

http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/001.htm 16 Freedom House, “Azerbaijan” in Freedom in the World 2002, available online at www.freedomhouse.org 17 Freedom House, “Methodology” http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2006 18 Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual, 14. Available online at 

www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2007.pdf 
6

between 6 and 10, and states with a rating between 11 and 14 are “not free.” The Polity 

IV index ranges from a low of minus 10 to a high of 10. A democracy scores between 6 

and 10, scores between 5 and -5 represent a middle (partly democratic) score, and 

authoritarian or non-democratic states score between -6 and -10. The Polity IV index also 

scores states in the midst of disorder or under the control of a foreign power as 

unclassifiable. Table 1 shows the ranking of Afghanistan and key states on both scales. 

Table 1. Rankings of Selected States 

Freedom House (2007) Polity IV (2006) 

United States 2 United States 10 

Norway 2 Norway 10 

Brazil 4 Brazil 8 

Nigeria 8 Nigeria 4 

Afghanistan 10 Afghanistan N/R

Russia 11 Russia -1 

China 13 China -7 

Syria 13 Syria -7 

Source: FH www.freedomhouse.org; IV http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 

In the latest ranking schemes show above, the United States and Norway both rank 

nearest the best possible scores. Brazil represents a less solid democracy. Nigeria and 

Russia are indicative of states in the middle, with Nigeria closer to democracy and Russia 

ranked as a more authoritarian state. Syria and China are both firmly in the authoritarian 

camp. On the Freedom House scale, Afghanistan is closest to Russia, suggesting a 

political system that has only a minimal degree of freedom, closer to authoritarianism 

than democracy. Notably, the Polity IV criteria rates the level of unrest in Afghanistan 

and extent of foreign control of government so significant that the country cannot be 

properly evaluated. 

Among the plethora of academic authors who have treated democratization, the 

contributions of two figures deserve special consideration.19 The criteria of Robert Dahl, 

a Yale political scientist considered to be a founder of democratic theory, are frequently 

cited within the literature as a starting point. Dahl proposes five process-based criteria in 

his classic work On Democracy. Dahl’s criteria are: a democracy should allow for 

effective participation and equal voting by all citizens; all citizens should have access to 

information; citizens should have “final control over the agenda,” that is, the final ability 

 

19 The focus here is on “thin” rather than “thick” definitions of democracy; thus, we have not selected 

definitions which seek to lay out criteria for an ideal democracy, but rather a working definition for a basic, 

or minimally functional and reasonably enduring democracy. Other important authors in the literature 

which have influenced our thinking include Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, Samuel Huntington, Guillermo 

O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Adam Przeworski. Summaries of most of the key arguments presented 

by these authors can be found in the Journal of Democracy. 
7

to set the politics of the state; and finally, the electorate should include all, or at least 

most, adults.20

The late Colombia University sociologist Charles Tilly identifies state capacity as a key 

factor that shapes the course of a democratic transition. Tilly finds that low state capacity 

limits the development of a democracy beyond minimum levels.21 This is an important 

contribution, as state capacity and the quality of institutions are often omitted in 

discussion of democratic quality. State capacity is particularly crucial in terms of postconflict democratization; University of Ottawa professor Roland Paris has made a 

compelling argument that democratic reconstruction without a minimum level of 

institutional capacity tends toward instability and failure.22 

Discussions of state legitimacy frequently refer to the state as providing representation, 

security, and welfare. Democratic theory often considers these factors as disparate, 

directly addressing only principles of representation. However, representation with a 

populace terrorized by insecurity or unable to meet its basic needs is unlikely to last.23

Thus, by “state capacity” we mean the ability of the state to provide security (does the 

state have a monopoly on violence, per Max Weber’s requirement), and provide an 

environment in which the populace is able to meet its basic needs (does the state fulfill a 

social contract, as proposed by Locke and others).24 In addition to a state’s ability to 

provide security, state capacity refers to the quality of the institutions of the state.25 It is 

not enough, for example, for a court system to exist in the constitution. Rather, a court 

system must play a role within a functioning justice system. Clearly, establishing such a 

system is a lengthy endeavor. In the case of Afghanistan, success in establishing 

democracy does not anticipate prefect institutions; however we expect functioning 

institutions in key areas such as the judiciary and police, as well as limits which constrain 

the ability of high level officials to appropriate public funds. 

In addition to think tank and leading academic definitions, it is instructive to consult what 

international agreements on Afghanistan (table 2) say with regard to democracy and what 

(if any) timelines these agreements set for goal achievement. A number of such 

agreements codify the goal of establishing a democratic government in Afghanistan. In 

addition, elections have been held and future elections are scheduled under the auspices 

of the international community. While elections alone, as we shall see, are only the most 

rudimentary indicator of democratic potential, the fact that they have been a high priority 

underscores the international community’s interest in leaving behind a democratic 

Afghanistan. 

 

20 Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998) 37-39. See also Dahl Polarchy 

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). 21 Charles Tilly, Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 22 “Towards more effective peace building: a conversation with Roland Paris” Development in Practice 

15:6 (November 2005); See also Roland Paris “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” 

International Security 22 (Fall 1997): 54-89; Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 

23 Abraham Maslow sets out this theory, known as the hierarchy of needs, in his classic article “A Theory 

of Human Motivation” Psychological Review (50): 370-396 24 Sarah Lister, “Understanding State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan,” 2. 25 Samuel Huntington makes the classic formulation of this argument in Political Order in Changing 

Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). 
8

The 2001 Bonn Declaration, held under the auspices of the UN (Special Representative 

of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan), the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, co chaired by 

the UN and the United Kingdom, and the 2008 Paris Conference all express the 

expectation in their text that Afghanistan will become a democracy in their text. 

However, democracy is vaguely defined in all three documents, and accompanies a long 

laundry list of expectations. The portion of the Afghanistan Compact dealing with 

“governance, rule of law, and human rights,” for example, listed accomplishments in the 

following areas to be achieved by 2010: Public Administrative Reform, Anti-Corruption, 

Census and Statistics, National Assembly, Elections, Gender, Rule of Law, Land 

Registration, Counter-Narcotics, and Human Rights. Advances that strengthen the quality 

of institutions are seen as important, but the connection between democracy and other 

related benchmarks is unclear. The lengthy list of promises is both too broad, because it 

promises rapid achievements in many areas with prioritizing, and too narrow, because it 

fails to explain what a democracy is beyond elections. 

Table 2. International Agreements on Afghanistan 

 Bonn Agreement 2001 Afghanistan Compact 2006 Paris Conference 2008 

Statements 

Directly 

Addressing 

Democracy 

“Acknowledging the right 

of the people of 

Afghanistan to freely 

determine their own 

political future in 

accordance with the 

principles of Islam, 

democracy, pluralism and 

social justice” 

“Democratic governance 

and the protection of 

human rights constitute the 

cornerstone of sustainable 

political progress in 

Afghanistan.” 

“We underlined the 

importance of the holding of 

elections in 2009 and 2010 as 

a crucial step to consolidate 

democracy for all Afghans. 

The international community 

pledged its strong support to 

help make the elections free, 

fair, and secure.” 

Related 

Provisions 

1964 constitution will 

serve as model (except for 

portions pertaining to the 

King) 

Related benchmarks 

include advances in public 

administrative reform, anticorruption, census and 

statistics, national 

assembly, elections, 

gender, rule of law, land 

registration, counternarcotics, and human 

rights. However, these are 

not explicitly identified 

with a democratic 

Afghanistan 

Additional goals of 

development, infrastructure 

investment, strengthen 

government institutions, 

combat corruption, improving 

human rights and rule of law 

etc. However, these are not 

explicitly identified with a 

democratic Afghanistan 

Indeed, in his first congressional testimony under the administration of Barack Obama, 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates contended that the international community’s 

expectations for a democratic Afghanistan were too broad and demanded too much of 

Afghanistan in a short period of time. Gates instead insisted that the United States and the 

international community need a set of limited, realistic goals linked with security and a 

legitimate government.26 

 

26 Thom Shanker “Gates: Modest Goals, More Strikes” New York Times January 27, 2009 
9

From the above we have seen that criteria used to determine if a state is a democracy 

varies widely. However, a combination of different norms can be used to develop a 

robust framework for analyzing the quality of a state’s democracy and understanding 

credible goals for a post-conflict democracy. In the following section we develop a 

democracy matrix from a synthesis of the criteria presented above, and apply these 

criteria both to Afghanistan and other post-conflict democracies. From this analysis we 

can develop a small set of realistic goals in line with the experiences of successful post 

conflict democracies. 
10

Tasks and Time to Achieve Democracy: A 

Comparative Perspective 

A Comparative Examination of Post-conflict Democratization 

This section considers the possible results of post-conflict democratization, referencing 

“best cases” and evaluating the extent of progress in these countries against our metric. 

Using data on intrastate conflicts and democratization from the Correlates of War Project, 

the Polity IV Regime Trends data set, and Freedom House, we found 17 nations that 

experienced a transition to a more democratic form of government following the 

cessation of an intrastate conflict that ended between 1980 and 1997. 

Tables 3 and 4 on the following pages provide data that considers the current progress of 

states that successfully transitioned to democracy. Table 3 outlines basic details about 

these transitions to democracy and shows key criteria that distinguish successful 

democratizing states from states that fail to democratize. Table 4 displays how these 

states fare when evaluated by our matrix. This data provides a comprehensive reference 

on what relatively successful post conflict democracies have been able to accomplish, in 

terms of the length of transition, state capacity, and democratic quality. 

Note that the category of political participation—the holding of elections—is rated as 

“good” for all democratizing states, suggesting it can often be invoked early in the 

democratization process, as it has been in Afghanistan, but follow through to reach real 

democracy is inherently more difficult. Other criteria may be more telling with regard to 

progress over the long view; elections are a necessary but insufficient component of 

democracy. 

The average length of time between the end of a conflict and the arrival at a baseline 

level of democracy suggests that establishing a democracy takes a significant amount of 

time after the end of internal armed conflict if a state is not already a democracy. Of the 

17 countries, eight of the states had not met the minimum standard of a democracy by 

2006, when the Polity IV data set was collected.27 Of the nine remaining states, three had 

already met the criteria for democracy by the time they began transitioning from 

intrastate conflict, suggesting democratization had already begun during the lead up to a 

peace accord.28 Of the remaining states, the average time to reach a minimum level of 

democracy was 9.5 years. These latter nine states represent the best case for 

democratizing after internal conflict such as in Afghanistan, given that the other eight 

countries did not achieve a democracy during the entire time studied. 

 

27 This chart follows the Polity IV definition of democratic of state ranging from 6-10 on their Polity scale 

which ranges from -10 to 10. 

28 Both Nicaragua and the Philippians experienced events that brought their countries somewhat closer to 

democracy in 1984.The classification of El Salvador as a successful democracy during the 90s is likely a 

instance of erroneous coding; several students of El Salvadorian politics have argued that the quality of 

democracy during the 90s has been overstated. See for example Elisabeth Wood, “Challenges to 

Democracy in El Salvador” in Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring ed. The Third Wave of 

Democratization in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
11

Table 3. Attempts at Post-conflict Democratization, 1980–200629

State 

End of 

Conflict 

2007 

Polity 

Score 

2008 

Freedom 

House 

Score 

Years to 

Democracy 

(Polity IV) 

Years to 

Democracy 

(Freedom 

House) 

Level of 

insecurity 

(World 

Bank/ 

Foreign 

Policy)30 

Level of 

Corruption 

(TI 2008) 

Institution 

Quality? 

(World Bank) 

Angola 1995 -2 11 N/A N/A High V. High Low 

Bosnia 1995 5 7 N/A N/A Med Med Low 

Cambodia 

1993/ 

1997 

2 11 N/A N/A Med High Low 

Congo-Brazzaville 1997 -4 11 N/A N/A Med High Very Low 

Croatia 1992 9 4 11 8 Low Med Med 

DRC-Kinshasa 1997 5 11 N/A N/A High V High Very Low 

El Salvador 1992 7 5 0 5 High Med Med 

Ethiopia 1992 1 10 N/A N/A High High Med 

Guatemala 1984 8 7 14 N/A High Med Med 

Liberia 1996 6 7 11 N/A Med High Low 

Mozambique 1992 6 6 3 N/A Low High Low/Med 

Nicaragua 1990 8 6 0 N/A Low High Low 

Peru 1995 8 5 8 6 Low Med Med 

Philippines 1992 8 7 0 4 Med31 High Med

Rwanda 1994 -3 11 N/A N/A Med Med Med

Serbia 1992 7 5 10 10 Med Med Med

Sierra Leone 1996 5 6 N/A N/A Med V. High Low 

Bold text denotes a country that successfully democratized by either the Polity IV or Freedom House 

criteria. 

 

29 Degrees of change vary from author to author. Morton Halperin and his coauthors argued for one point of 

movement in The Democracy Advantage (London: Routledge, 2004), while other scholars have argued for 

as much as six points of movement. We used a cutoff of a two-point advance on either scale following the 

end of a conflict as evidence of a move toward democratization 30 The World Bank political stability and violence indicators and the 2007 Foreign Policy Failed State 

Index were used as the foundation for this column but final judgment for this column is that of the authors. 31 The continued insurgency in the south of the Philippines is largely confined to islands in the south, thus 

accounting for the Philippines’ rating. 
12

Table 4. The Democracy Matrix Applied32

State 

Is political 

participation 

open to all 

adults? (FH, 

Polity IV, 

Election 

reports from 

electoral 

studies) 

Are citizens 

allowed 

effective 

participation 

in national 

and local 

political 

processes 

through 

competitive 

elections 

and access 

to relevant 

information? 

Does the 

political 

process 

respect 

the rights 

of 

minorities 

and outgroups? 

Are citizen 

decisions free 

from arbitrary 

interventions—

do the 

decisions of 

the populace 

rather than 

some other 

factor 

determine the 

political reality 

of the nation? 

Does sufficient 

state capacity 

exist to provide 

for security, 

rule of law, and 

the 

implementation 

of state 

projects, as well 

as ensure the 

basic welfare of 

citizens? 

Do 

important 

elements of 

society have 

disincentives 

to 

participating 

in the new 

government? 

Have former 

enemies 

become part 

of 

government? 

Are the 

institutions of 

government 

primarily 

responding to 

the will of the 

governed as a 

whole rather 

than to 

individuals or 

groups who 

influence 

officials illicitly 

with money, 

favoritism or 

threats? 

Afghanistan Good Poor/Fair Poor/Fair Poor Poor Poor Poor 

Bosnia Good Good Fair ? Good Fair ? 

Croatia Good Good Fair Good Good Good Good 

El Salvador Good Fair Good Fair Poor Good Good 

Guatemala Good Fair Fair Fair Poor Fair Fair 

Liberia Good Fair Fair ? Fair ? Fair 

Mozambique Good Fair Good Fair Fair Good Good 

Nicaragua Good Fair Good Fair Fair Fair Fair 

Peru Good Good Fair Fair Fair Fair Fair 

Philippines Good Good Fair Fair ? Fair Fair 

Serbia Good ? ? Good Good Poor/Fair Fair 

Data from Freedom House suggests a slightly faster time of transition; democratizing 

countries averaged just less than 7 years to consolidate a democracy after the cessation of 

conflict. However, the Freedom House data is more restrictive in what countries it 

considers to be democratic; only five of the 17 states in the sample meet Freedom 

House’s standards for a classification of “free.” This confirms the traditional 

understanding that democratization in a post-conflict environment is a lengthy and 

 

32 To develop this chart, the authors have consulted numerous indicators, including the Work Bank 

Indicators, Quality of Governance Indicators complied by the University of Gothenburg 

(http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/) and the SPIRI database at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 

(http://www.sipri.org/databases). We have also utilized accounts of elections and political systems in the 

journal Electoral Studies, as well as work by area experts. Ultimate responsibility for these judgments lies 

with the authors. 

Good denotes acceptable quality, fair indicates an area with significant difficulties, poor indicates a very 

low level of performance, a question mark indicates that insufficient information exists for an assessment 

or contradictory information makes a judgment hard to render. A score of good should not be considered 

evidence of the best possible practice, but merely as an indication that the standards of minimal 

acceptability have been met. 
13

complex process that requires both a secure peace and time to achieve even modest 

success.33 

Security versus Insecurity 

Our research suggests that successful democratizing states make important advances in 

this 7–10 year period of transition. A reduction of the level of insecurity, the performance 

of key institutions, the extent of corruption, and the inclusion of former enemies in the 

political system set successful post-conflict democracies apart from other states that have 

tried but failed to establish a democracy. A high level of insecurity threatens to 

undermine both the public’s ability to participate in a democracy and necessary levels of 

trust in government and society. Our matrix suggests that the ability of citizens to 

participate effectively in shaping their polity is central to a democracy. Violence inhibits 

the ability of citizens to participate in a democracy; in effect it turns participation into a 

lie. In a society where violence is rampant, local political life and the daily reality of 

public life is decided by local groups of armed men who are unaccountable to a 

constitution, justice system, or parliament. Elections may be “free and fair,” but 

participation makes no practical difference at either the national or the local level. Such 

“democracy in name” marginalizes citizen’s participation despite a democratic structure, 

because force rather than government decides public policy.34 Violence reduces trust in 

institutions, and increases in-group solidarity and mistrust of others, leading to a 

xenophobia that makes building democratic society in a multi-ethnic environment very 

difficult.35 Low levels of trust in other citizens and in the government tend to retard the 

development of a democracy with staying power.36

Further, when a government is unable to protect the lives of its citizens, not to mention 

their liberty or assets, citizens are disinclined to support it. Such a government risks 

losing legitimacy. Even an advocate of absolute monarchy such as Thomas Hobbes 

argued that a government that cannot protect the safety of its people does not warrant 

allegiance.37 In the contemporary failed states literature, the inability of a state to control 

its territory, and the lawlessness that results from such failure, is a key example of a 

failed state.38 The national government appears feckless and unworthy of loyalty. 

It is thus unsurprising that most successful democratizing states have relatively low levels 

of insecurity. In Guatemala and El Salvador, the two cases of democratization where high 

levels of insecurity remain, the insecurity is considered by area experts to fundamentally 

 

33O’Donnell and Schmitter, 70; Roland Paris “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism” 

:54-89. For a contrasting perspective see Leslie Anderson and Laurence Dodd, Learning Democracy

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 

34 See for example Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter, “What Democracy Is... and Is Not,” in Marc F. 

Plattner and Larry Diamond, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 1993). 

35 Ronald Inglehart, Mansoor Moaddel, and Mark Tessler, "Xenophobia and in-Group Solidarity in Iraq: A 

Natural Experiment on the Impact of Insecurity" Perspectives on Politics 4 (2006):495–505. 36 The classic formulation of this theory is Putnam’s theory of social capital put forth in Making Democracy 

Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 37 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Collier: New York, 1962), 110–111. 38 Robert Rotberg ed. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

2003), chapter 1. 
14

threaten the tenure of the state’s democracy.39 While insecurity in both of these states is 

significant, it does not approach the level of violence in the south and east of 

Afghanistan. Establishing and maintaining a reasonable level of security is vitally 

important for the longevity of a democracy emerging from conflict. 

The Penalties of Corruption 

Most democratizing states have made some gains in the areas of governance and 

institution-building. The only state in our chart that has relatively low levels of corruption 

and relatively strong institutions, and has not democratized, is Rwanda. These gains are 

typically modest. States that do not have endemic levels of corruption retain a significant 

amount of corruption; countries with a medium level of quality in their institutions still 

have a long way to go toward effectiveness. In terms of corruption, while corruption at 

high levels lingers on, successful young democracies criminalize corruption and establish 

procedures for prosecuting corrupt officials. In Nicaragua, for example, Arnoldo Alemán, 

a former president, was prosecuted for corruption. The inability of the system to convict 

Alemán and his inner circle, due to political intervention, demonstrates that the system is 

still in need of significant improvement. But the fact that charges were publicly made and 

public figures were tried and in some cases convicted is an example of progress.40 

When the courts and the police force in a state are organized to enrich officials rather 

than serve the public, such wholesale rapacity can undermine essential public support for 

a government. Judicial and police corruption is not equivalent to a routine cost in 

obtaining government services, such as the payment of a small bribe to expedite a service 

that government is obliged to provide. While the prevailing trend in corruption research 

holds that corruption is usually detrimental to overall economic performance,41 petty 

corruption, when it remains at an affordable level, can at least motivate service within an 

indifferent bureaucracy.42 

Police and judicial corruption, however, are purely extractive. Further, far from serving 

as a routine cost, corruption in law enforcement adds unpredictability and terror to daily 

existence. When the judicial branch gives decisions based on bribes and influence, it 

undermines both public confidence in government and the ability of the government to 

secure order. Corruption in the long term is never desirable, but the effects of corruption 

in law enforcement and the judicial system serve to undermine both confidence in the 

state and the capacity of the state to provide order and fundamental services. 

 

39 See Wood, “Challenges to Democracy in El Salvador,” 194-197; José Miguel Cruz, “The Nature of the 

Political Transition” in Cynthia J. Arnson, ed., El Salvador’s Democratic Transition Ten Years After the 

Peace Accord (Woodrow Wilson Center: Washington, DC, 2003), 23. 40 See Samuel R. Greene, State Donors and Grand Corruption in Nicaragua (M.Phil Thesis, University of 

Cambridge, 2006). 

41 Pranab Bardham, “Corruption and development: A review of issues” Journal of Economic Literature 35 

(1997): 1320-1346; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 1999 

42This is Samuel Huntington’s argument in Political Order in Changing Societies, 69. See also Silvio 

Borner, Aymo Brunetti, and Beatrice Weder, Political Credibility and Economic Development (London: 

Macmillan, 1995), 58-60. 
15

Similarly, highly visible cases of unpunished corruption by high-ranking officials tend to 

diminish public support for a government, particularly when coupled with ineffective 

public services. The symbolic power of the mansions of government officials, which the 

public knows cannot be acquired by public pay or other legal means, goes a long way 

toward engendering cynicism. This is certainly evident in Afghanistan, where the 

monthly rent of many mansions recently built by high-ranking government officials cost 

more than twice the monthly salary of Afghanistan’s president.43 

While successful democratizing states still struggle with high levels of corruption and 

institutional weaknesses, in comparison with states that have not succeeded in 

democratizing, they have made important first steps. In particular, most states have 

strengthened their police forces and courts, as well as reducing the amount of corruption 

faced by their citizens in their everyday lives. 

Including Enemies in Government 

Finally, in all of the successful democratizing state on the list except for states which 

arose out of a partition (the Balkan states)—El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia, 

Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, and the Philippines—groups that had opposed each other 

with guns now sit together in a legislature. In some cases one player was forced to 

acknowledge defeat or an inferior military position, while in other cases both sides 

negotiated from a position of equals, but in every case elements that had worked to 

destroy the government became a part of it. This suggests that winning a military conflict 

is not sufficient. Rather, the end state of a conflict must be managed to allow most former 

combatants to be become participants in the society.44

Including former insurgents in a participatory government is a difficult undertaking. 

However, the perceived justice of the place for former rebels inside the political system is 

often the determining factor that explains if a peace agreement holds or unravels. The 

contrast between Portugal’s former provinces in Southern Africa is instructive. In 

Angola, UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) leader Jonas 

Savimbi believed that elections were unfair and the government had no intention of truly 

including his movement in government. Savimbi returned to the bush to continue his 

guerrilla war, and the ensuing civil war derailed the Angolan peace process for nearly ten 

years. In Mozambique, by contrast, the RENAMO (National Resistance of Mozambique) 

leadership, despite some irregularities in the electoral process, believed that the 

FRELIMO (National Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) government was taking 

adequate steps to include them in the political system of Mozambique.45 The difference 

between these two states in table 4 is significant. Mozambique has been able to develop 

some working institutions and has established a reasonable level of security, while 

Angola has made little progress. 

 

43 Dexter Filkins, “Bribes Corrode Afghans’ Trust in Government” New York Times January 1, 2009. 44 Many former enemies, ranging from Hizbi Islami to former communists, sit together in parliament. 

However, peace also requires some success integrating the government’s most recent opponents. 45 See Martin Meredith’s discussion of this in The State of Africa (London: Simon and Schuster, 2005) 600-

616. For a detailed discussion of Mozambique, see Carrie Manning, The Making of Democrats (New York: 

Palgrave, 2008). 
16

All of the states in table 4 have achieved better results on our inventory than Afghanistan. 

Most successful democratizing states have limited the amount of violence in their society 

and made modest improvement to their public administration. Their governments allow a 

reasonable form of participation. They are far from perfect, but provide a starting point 

from which a better state can eventually be achieved. The following sections consider 

how far the current situation in Afghanistan differs from the situation in successful 

democratizing states, as well as the specific context of democratization in Afghanistan. It 

then turns to specific cases that offer suggestions for how Afghanistan might move 

forward in each key area we have identified. 
17

The Current State of Democracy in 

Afghanistan: Assessments and a New 

Metric Set for Measuring Progress 

The current state of democracy in Afghanistan is assessed in recent detailed reports by 

the two widely used sources we have referenced thus far, Polity IV and Freedom House. 

In 2006, Polity IV evaluates Afghanistan as a state in transition, giving Afghanistan a 

classification of “interregnum,” reflecting the intervention of a foreign power (U.S.-led 

Operation Enduring Freedom) that removed the previous government in 2001. The Polity 

IV data manual notes that an interregnum score indicates a period of breakdown: “The 

identification of an ‘interregnum’ period is especially important in the identification of an 

abrupt or disruptive regime transition, described below. Interregnal periods are equated 

with the collapse, or failure, of central state authority, whether or not that failure is 

followed by a radical transformation, or revolution, in the mode of governance.”46

Freedom House scored Afghanistan as a 14 in 2001, the worst score possible on its index. 

By 2005, Afghanistan’s Freedom House score had risen to 10, the bottom rung of the 

“Partly Free” category, the same score as the troubled states of Yemen and the Central 

African Republic. The score indicates democracy in Afghanistan, while making limited 

progress until 2005 (see table 5), has stagnated since then at the lowest measurable level 

of partial freedom by global criteria. 

Table 5. Afghanistan on the Freedom House Scale, 2001-2007 

Changes in Freedom 

House scores of 

Afghanistan: 2001-2007 

Countries with Freedom House score of 10 in 2007 

2001 14 Bahrain 

2002 12 Central African Republic 

2004 11 Djibouti 

2005 10 Ethiopia 

2006 10 Togo 

2007 10 Yemen 

Source: www.freedomhouse.org 

Though the most recent Freedom House numbers in Afghanistan have improved relative 

to 2001, its narrative report offered a gloomier assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, 

suggesting a downward trend in freedom of government. According to the 2008 country 

report, “little progress was made on various governance issues, including attempts by the 

central government to combat corruption, improve transparency, and strengthen the 

judicial and law enforcement services. In a prevailing atmosphere of impunity, numerous 

human rights abuses—including attacks on aid workers, political and social activists, 

 

46 Polity IV Project, Dataset Users’ Manual, 17. 
18

journalists, and schools, as well as systematic violations of women’s rights—were 

reported during the year.”47

The conclusion these two indexes suggest is that even the limited progress toward 

democracy thus far may have stalled. One report concludes that external international 

controls coupled with disorder inside Afghanistan renders the state too unstable to allow 

for a true evaluation of Afghan democracy, while the other concludes Afghanistan is in a 

stalled or possibly deteriorating situation, barely clinging to the lowest rung on the ladder 

toward democracy. 

Expert assessments of Afghanistan by policymakers and academics similarly suggest that 

democracy in Afghanistan is tenuous and weak. In written testimony at her confirmation 

hearing, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton described Afghanistan as a “narco-state” that is 

“plagued by limited capacity and widespread corruption.” Richard Holbrooke, the 

President’s special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, also delivered a lengthy list of 

criticisms in his assessment of the performance of Afghanistan’s democracy: “It is weak; 

it is corrupt; it has a very thin leadership veneer; it is internally divided; it has never 

arrested any major drug lords.”48

Recent academic works by experts from the United States,49 Pakistan,50 and Great 

Britain51 reach similar conclusions. Journals with as diverse perspectives as the leftleaning French publication Le Monde Diplomatique52 and Foreign Affairs, a journal of 

the Washington policy community,53 have called the viability of the current government 

into question. Reports issued in 2009 by the USIP and CRS also called for modest 

expectations about the quality and authoritative reach of Afghanistan’s central 

government.54 Many Afghan voices concur. Several former government leaders have 

described the situation in terms like that of former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, who 

stated “this government has lost the capacity to govern because a shadow government has 

taken over.”55

The net assessment from this diverse collection of voices is a pessimistic report. The 

following section examines the reality of Afghanistan today against the goals set by the 

international community as assessed by our democracy metric. This assessment provides 

a more detailed explanation of why the current democracy in Afghanistan is performing 

poorly. 

Evaluating the Status of Democracy in Afghanistan Against the Democracy Metric

Drawing on the democratization literature previously reviewed, we have developed the 

following series of questions with which to measure emerging democracies in detail. 

 

47Freedom House, “Afghanistan” in Freedom in the World 2008. www.freedomhouse.org 48 “Clinton signals new line on Kabul” Financial Times January 16, 2009. 

49 See as one example the work of NYU scholar Barnett Rubin, Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition from 

Turmoil to Normalcy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2006). 50 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Recovering the frontier state : war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan, (Plymouth: 

Lexington, 2008); Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos (Viking, 2008). 51 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop (New York: Colombia University Press, 2007). 52 Chris Sands, “Afghanistan: chaos central” Le Monde Diplomatique Feburary, 2009. 53 Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, “From Great Game to Grand Bargain,” Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec 2008 54 J Alexander Thier, ed., The Future of Afghanistan (Washington, DC: USIP, 2009). 55 Dexter Filkins, “Bribes Corrode Afghans’ Trust in Government” New York Times January 1, 2009. 
19

Figure 4 presents a chart outlining the questions asked by this metric, and the 

performance of successful post conflict democracies according to these questions. The 

metric will be used to evaluate Afghanistan’s performance in depth and to highlight gaps 

by considering its performance in the following areas: 

• Is political participation open to all adults? 

• Are citizens allowed effective participation in national and local political 

processes through competition between at least two political parties56 and access 

to relevant information? 

• Does the political process respect the rights of minorities and out-groups? 

• Are citizen decisions free from arbitrary interventions—do the decisions of the 

populace rather than some other factor determine the political reality of the 

nation? 

• Does sufficient state capacity exist to provide for security, rule of law, and the 

implementation of state projects, as well as ensure the basic welfare of citizens? 

• Do important elements of society have disincentives to participating in the new 

government? Have former enemies willing to participate in the political process 

become a credible part of government? 

• Are the institutions of government primarily responding to the will of the 

governed as a whole rather than to individuals or groups who influence officials 

illicitly with money, favoritism or threats? 

Is political participation open to all adults? 

By law, political participation is open to all adult Afghans, both in terms of voting and 

standing for office. A gender representation law requires 20% of elected officials to be 

female. However, in practice, several factors inhibit participation, most notably: 1) the 

poor security situation can cause potential voters to be dissuaded by intimidation, either 

from the Taliban or other anti-government forces or a particular local power center. 

“Night letters” from insurgents backing the Taliban warned that voters who participate in 

elections would face deadly consequences.57 2) Many Afghan women are forbidden from 

voting, let alone standing for parliament, by their husbands; in a survey conducted by the 

Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium, 38% of Afghan woman who did not 

register to vote ascribed their abstention to a lack of permission from their husband.58 

Political participation is frequently manipulated by local notables, particularly in remote 

areas. Many groups at tribal and clan level are almost entirely autonomous, and have 

carved out an existence largely free from the oversight of a national government.59 Given 

that local leadership is often in de facto political control over their areas, and given 

 

56 At the local level of tribal Jirgas or Shuras, competition would not require formal competition between 

parties, but rather a choice of candidates. 

57 Declan Walsh, “'Night letters' from the Taliban threaten Afghan democracy” The Observer September 

19, 2004 

58 Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium, “Take the Guns Away,” 15. Available online at 

http://www.afghanadvocacy.org/documents/TaketheGunsAwayEnglish.pdf 

59 For one example, see M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, The Kirghiz and Wakhi of Afghanistan : adaptation to 

closed frontiers and war (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002).
20

Afghanistan’s scant transportation and communications infrastructure relative to its harsh 

geography, guaranteeing political participation is quite difficult. Local decision-making 

bodies such as Community Development Councils, used to administer aid at the village 

level, have had some success at involving Afghans at the local level.60 Further, during the 

Jihad period and follow-on civil war, local villages largely resumed governing 

themselves because the central government essentially failed. 

Are citizens allowed effective participation in political processes? 

Competitive elections in 2004 and 2005 have been largely free from overt manipulation. 

Presidential elections are scheduled in August of 2009 and parliamentary elections in 

2010. The cumbersome single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system of voting has 

rendered parliamentary elections needlessly complex. Under SNTV, voters choose a 

single candidate from their district rather than a party. Each electoral district elects a 

number of candidates. In Afghanistan’s multi-candidate districts this can result in 

victorious candidates elected with a small percentage of the popular vote. Further, voters 

must choose purely based on the identity of candidates rather than by party platform. 

When voters are presented with a complex list of candidates, many unknown to them, 

without party information, their ability to make meaningful choices is limited. Thus, 

SNTV may have inhibited the development of an effective parliament by stunting the 

growth of political parties and weakening the development of a robust political system at 

the national level. Voting on largely ethnic lines might have been prevented by a better 

electoral system. The resulting parliament has been roundly criticized as ineffective, and 

some analysts have concluded the body does not have a structure that allows for the 

bargaining and compromise necessary in a democratic system. 61 

Perhaps more importantly, in much of the country, decisions made at the level of the 

national government have little impact on the daily lives of citizens. About 60% of the 

country is estimated to be under the control of local authorities of various shapes and 

sizes.62 The relationship between democracy and local government, both formally and via 

informal institutions, must be reconciled. If the national government’s de facto 

jurisdiction is limited to Kabul and provincial and district capitals, state capacity cannot 

come solely from the national government. Formally, Kabul’s authority extends to most 

small municipalities, including district centers where sub governors are appointed from 

the capital. In practice, working arrangements must be made with local institutions, rather 

than a one-way top-down model driving policy from Kabul. 

Access to the information a population needs to make political decisions is limited by 

several factors. Low literacy rates and lack of experience outside a person’s immediate 

area of residence is a problem in this regard. Afghanistan’s geography and poor 

 

60 Ehsan Zia, Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, “Development in Afghanistan: The 

National Solidarity Plan and Beyond” presentation at CSIS, Washington D.C, February 26, 2009. 

61 Andrew Reynolds, “The Curious Case of Afghanistan” Journal of Democracy 17 (April 2006); 

International Crisis Group “Afghanistan’s New Legislature: Making Democracy Work” Asia Report 

N°116, May 15, 2006 

62 Deborah Tate, “US Official Says Afghan Government Controls Only 30 Percent of Country” Voice of 

America News, February 27, 2008 http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-02/2008-02-27-

voa67.cfm?CFID=33832939&CFTOKEN=42290926 
21

infrastructure limit many rural Afghans from connections with the rest the country.63 This 

also reflects the point made above about the reach of the government beyond Kabul and 

provincial capitals. Further, the ability to effectively campaign and participate politically 

is constrained by the security situation. Participants in the political process have been 

warned to desist, intimidation is common, and prominent political figures have been 

assassinated. 

Does the political process respect the rights of minorities and out-groups? 

Insuring that the Pashtun population believes it has a role in the new government is vital. 

Rasul Bakhsh Rais argues that American support for members of the Northern Alliance 

in the new government, which was (and remains) mostly comprised of Tajik and Hazara, 

was perceived by many Pashtun as an ethnic bias in the composition of the new 

government. While Pashtun who have committed atrocities connected to the Taliban were 

excluded from government, members of the Northern Alliance with dubious records of 

murder and criminal behavior were included.64 President Karazi’s nomination of 

Marshall Fahim to serve as 1st Vice President continues this trend. As well, an imbalance 

in the Afghan National Army (ANA) exists in favor of Tajiks; more than 50% of officers 

and NCOs are Tajik.65

In many areas a perception exists among minorities that their political rights are still 

being compromised far too often. Members of the Hazara Shi’a population, for example, 

have contended that their political representation at the national level does not match 

their numbers in the overall population.66 Lack of a proper national census encourages 

claims of under-representation from many ethnic groups 

Are citizen decisions free from arbitrary interventions? Do the decisions of the populace 

rather than private or privileged influences determine the political reality of the nation? 

Depth of political participation is frequently controlled by local notables. Legislation 

passed by the national assembly often fails to affect the local level. The cultural structure 

of Afghan society places local identities first. A democratic government must be 

meaningful in terms of local realities. This makes establishing a centralized government 

extremely difficult in the decentralized Afghan society. Rory Stewart, describing his 

travel through Afghanistan shortly after the fall of the Taliban, observed that “the 

villagers I met were mostly illiterate, lived far from electricity or television, and knew 

very little about the outside world.”67 Stewart noted that within the distance of only a few 

days travel on foot, he found a plethora of different forms of local organization and 

attitudes toward government, ranging from a feudal village controlled by a local headman 

to villages organized on Iranian lines. Stewart recognized that “these differences between 

groups [are] deep, elusive, and difficult to overcome. Village democracy, gender issues, 

 

63 One area which shows improvement is radio communication. However, the Neo-Taliban have also used 

radio, CDs, and other methods of communication to spread their message. 

64 International Crisis Group “Afghanistan’s New Legislature: Making Democracy Work” Asia Report 

N°116, May 15, 2006 

65 Giustozzi, 187. 

66 Chris Sands, “In Kabul, rituals highlight progress” The National January 08, 2009; Minority Rights 

Group International, “Hazaras” in World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, 2008. Online at 

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49749d693d.html 

67 See Rory Stewart’s account in The Places in Between (Orlando: Harcourt, Inc., 2006), 246. 
22

and centralization would be hard-to-sell concepts in some areas.”68 Afghanistan’s 

National Solidarity Strategy has enjoyed some success in involving local communities in 

governmental processes by convening assemblies of leading local citizens to determine to 

course of development projects, which was the typical process prior to the war in the 

1970s.69 

Corruption is endemic; Transparency’s 2007 assessment placed Afghanistan at 172 out of 

179 countries evaluated while the World Bank Governance Indicators placed Afghanistan 

in the bottom 10 percentile.70 Worryingly, the Afghan courts are considered to be the 

most corrupt institution in the country.71 The Afghan National Police are also high on the 

list of most corrupt institutions; the police are undermanned, undertrained, and receive 

inadequate pay. The Dutch government threatened to slash funding for police training 

unless effectiveness improved.72 New York Times journalist Dexter Filkins reported that 

Sherpur, one of the most exclusive districts of Kabul, is full of government officials who 

have become wealthy off their positions. “What is perhaps most remarkable about 

Sherpur is that many of the homeowners are government officials, whose annual salaries 

would not otherwise enable them to live here for more than a few days.”73

Does sufficient state capacity exist to provide for security, rule of law, and the 

implementation of state projects? 

One metric of a sovereign state, following Weber, is the existence of a state monopoly on 

the use of legitimate force in its territory.74 One way to assess effective governance of a 

government over a state is the degree of control it exercises over its national territory, 

particularly in terms of exclusive use of legitimate force.75 The level of violence means 

that the central government in practice controls little of the country. Director of National 

Intelligence Michael McConnell estimated in testimony before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee that only 30% of the country is under government control.76 The 

government’s ability to project itself in the south and east of the country is increasingly 

limited.77 University of Ottawa professor Roland Paris describes the situation in 

Afghanistan as an attempt at peace enforcement rather than peace building.78

 

68 Ibid. 

69 See Frederick Barton, et al, “Afghanistan and Pakistan On The Brink” CSIS Report, February 21, 2009. 70 The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index is available online at 

http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2007/cpi2007/cpi_2007_table and World Bank indexes 71 71 UNDP, Afghan Human Development Report (Islamabad :Army Press, 2007) 61. 72 Ed Johnson, “Afghanistan's Future Threatened by Poor Police, Balkenende Says” Bloomberg June 9 

2008 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a2ASs6.BS7Mc&refer=home 

73 Dexter Filkins, “Bribes Corrode Afghans’ Trust in Government” New York Times January 1, 2009. 74 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization Trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: The 

Free Press, 1947), 154. 

75 This should certainly not be taken to equate effectiveness with democracy. A state such as China has 

relatively efficient institutions but is in no way democratic. 

76 Deborah Tate, “US Official Says Afghan Government Controls Only 30 Percent of Country” Voice of 

America News, February 27, 2008 http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-02/2008-02-27-

voa67.cfm?CFID=33832939&CFTOKEN=42290926 

77 Carlotta Gall, “Taliban Gain New Foothold in Afghan City” New York Times August 26, 2008 78 “Towards more effective peace building: a conversation with Roland Paris” Development in Practice 

15:6 (November 2005). 
23

The security situation in much of Afghanistan has significantly worsened. For example, 

IED (Improvised Explosive Device) attacks increased by more than 70% from 2006 to 

2007, reaching a total 2,615 incidents.79 In addition, international aid workers have pulled 

out of much of the south and east of the country,80 and many Afghans find it impossible 

to live normal everyday lives, let alone participate politically. According to the Asia 

Director of Human Rights Watch, “Security is the first pillar of the compact, but tens of 

thousands of Afghans don’t feel safe enough to lead normal lives. Life is so dangerous 

that many Afghans are unable to go to school, get health care, or take goods to market.”81

As Gen. Barry McCaffrey succinctly put it, “Afghanistan is in misery.”82

In addition to the poor security situation, the institutions of the Afghan government are 

still exceedingly weak. The justice system and enforcement of the rule of law are limited, 

even in areas under government control. The Afghan Human Development Report 

reported that many Afghans believe that the formal legal system is“...designed to oppress 

and exploit the powerless whenever they came into contact with it.” Much of the public 

believes that the politically connected act with impunity, and corruption and favoritism 

mar the legal processes.83 

The basic needs of much of the populace are unmet. In 2005, unemployment was 

estimated at 40%.84 Food shortages were widespread, and as much as 80% of the 

population was without any access to electricity.85 In Kabul, the Boston Globe reported 

that residents received an average of three hours of electricity per day, while international 

businesses paid monthly bribes for continuous power.86

Does the public support democracy? Is support for government divided along regional or 

ethnic lines? 

Democracy is supported in theory by a strong majority of the opinion polls. The Pashtun 

are the most skeptical but a majority supports a theoretical democracy. The insurgency 

draws overwhelmingly from Pashtun population; however, as the government has been 

unable to provide basic services such as electricity, even in urban areas, support has 

precipitously declined among all ethnic groups.87

 

79Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” June 2008. 80 Nick Meo, “Leaked aid map of Afghanistan reveals expansion of no-go zones” The Times of London

December 5, 2007. 

81 Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Slow Progress on Security and Rights” January 29, 2007. 

http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/01/29/afghan15223.htm 82 Gen. Barry McCaffrey, Presentation at West Point, July 30, 2008, page 3. 

http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mccaffreyafghanistanaarjuly2008.pdf 83 UNDP, Afghan Human Development Report, 42-43. 84 CIA World Factbook, “Afghanistan” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/af.html; Paul Garwood, “Attacks, unemployment plague Afghanistan” Washington Post May 

9, 2006. Washington Post May 9, 2006. 85 Jason Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro, “Afghanistan Index”, 29 

86 Jason Straziuso, “Kabul gets 3 hours of electricity a day” Boston Globe January 27, 2008 87 Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007”, 79, 84 http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/20; World 

Public Opinion “WPO Poll: Afghan Public Overwhelmingly Rejects al-Qaeda, Taliban” January 30 2006. 
24

Do important elements of society have disincentives to participating in the new 

government? 

Afghans profiting from the drug trade have a significant incentive to oppose the creation 

of an effective government. Mosis Naim argues that widespread criminal activity can 

completely undermine the infrastructure of a state. This is a particular problem when 

criminal activity is linked with an anti-government insurgency.88 Links between the 

Taliban and drug trafficking are clear.89 More worrying are links between members of 

government and the drug trade, suggesting that the danger of a state capture, which 

occurs when the apparatus of government functions primarily to seek rents for officials, is 

high. Ashraf Ghani (the former finance minister) has described Afghanistan as a “narcomafia state.”90 A short growing season and inhospitable terrain encourages the production 

of easy to grow crops such as poppy rather than food staple crops (see map 2 in 

appendix). Some trends are encouraging—alternative production of wheat has increased 

significantly, and the difference in profit between wheat production and opium has been 

reduced from 10:1 to 2:1.91 The development of high revenue agriculture for export also 

shows promise—NBC suggests that pomegranates may be more lucrative than poppy for 

some Afghan farmers.92 Afghanistan has good potential in other high value horticultural 

crops such as raisins and fruits; in the 1960s and 1970s, such products formed nearly 50% 

of Afghanistan’s export revenue.93 However, the CIA still ranked opium as Afghanistan’s 

most important export, illustrating the depth of the problem 94

The equitable distribution of honors and recourses among sub-groups is also an important 

calculus. Groups that feel unrepresented or underrepresented in government are less 

inclined to cooperate with it. In some cases this has caused significant consequences. At 

both the national level, where many Pashtun have expressed a feeling of exclusion from a 

government dominated by other interests, and the local level, where a delicate calculus of 

local balances can be easily upset, preserving a sense of fairness is an important task.95

In the following section we explain in more detail why Afghanistan remains far from a 

democracy by considering the particular challenges facing democratization in 

Afghanistan. By examining specific difficulties in areas such as insecurity, corruption, 

out-group involvement, and decentralization, we set the stage for a set of realistic 

recommendations, informed by the hard-won experience of similar post-conflict 

democracies and the context of Afghanistan’s fragmented, rural state. In the spirit of 

Secretary Gates’ criticism that the international community has tried to do too much, we 

focus on the art of the possible. 

 

88 Moisés Naím, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy (New 

York: Doubleday, 2005). 

89 Fisnik Abrashi, “UN: Taliban could clear $500M from 2008 drug trade” AP Nov 28, 2008. 

90 Dexter Filkins, “Bribes Corrode Afghans’ Trust in Government” New York Times January 1, 2009. 

91 UNODC. “Drugs finance Taliban war machine, says UN drug tsar” November 27 2008 

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2008-11-27.html 

92 Lester Holt, NBC Nightly News “Cash Crop” February 21, 2009. 

93 FAO, “Profile: Horticulture” http://www.fao.org/world/afghanistan/prof_hort_en.htm 

94 CIA World Fact Book, “Afghanistan” 

95 Giustozzi, 19-21, 187. A sense of exclusion among Pashtuns may come from their traditional dominance 

of Afghanistan’s government, leading a lack of control to be equated with exclusion. 
25

Key Challenges Facing Democratization 

in Afghanistan 

Many factors, ranging from Afghanistan’s unforgiving geography to her ethnic 

composition, present unique challenges to establishing a working government, especially 

one where a strong central authority aims to dominate governance of many aspects of 

society. The following section first outlines ten important challenges, and then provides a 

more detailed analysis of key issues. 

• Afghanistan’s multiplicity of ethnic identities and linguistic divisions makes 

forging a national democracy a particular challenge. Afghanistan’s population of 

32.7 million96 includes two major ethnic groups: Pashtun, comprising about 40% 

of the populous and Tajik, between 25 and 35%. The Hazara and Uzbek ethnic 

groups each accounts for over 5% of the remainder (some estimates put the 

number of Hazaras as high as 20%), while the final 10-20% is made up of many 

smaller ethnic groups (See map 1 in the appendix for a graphical breakdown of 

Afghan regions by ethnic group.)97 In addition to the two national languages of 

Pashto (spoken by Pashtuns) and Dari (the native language of the Tajik, spoken 

by most residents of Kabul and Afghans in the North and West), several other 

languages are recognized as official in parts of the country. Baluchi, Pashai, 

Nuristani and Pamiri, which are all distinct from Pashto and Dari, are recognized 

as official languages in areas where speakers make up a majority of the 

population.98 While it is not uncommon for minority speakers of these languages 

to speak Pashto or Dari, some speakers either do not speak a language of wider 

communication or are illiterate in that language.99 

• Pashtuns, particularly in the south, feel marginalized in spite of Karzai himself 

being a Pashtun. Indeed, many Pashtun see Karazi as a figurehead president 

representing external rather than Afghan interests. Correcting this sense of 

exclusion is a vital challenge.100 The high portion of government positions filled 

by Tajiks and other non-Pashtun causes many Pashtun to view the new 

government through an ethnic prism, likely because they traditionally dominated 

the government.101 In effect this means that Karzai’s political support base 

includes many groups who either distrust or oppose the government he leads.102

The Pashtun/non Pashtun dynamic has historical undertones. Historically the 

 

96 The CIA’s estimate may be high. Some estimates are as low as 26 million; due the lack of a definitive 

census, these figures should be considered an estimate 

97 CIA World Factbook, “Afghanistan” 

98 See Article 16 of the Afghanistan Constitution 

99 See for example Ju-Hong Yun, “Pashai Language Development Project: Promoting Pashai language, 

literacy and community development” http://www.sil.org/asia/ldc/parallel_papers/ju-hong_yun.pdf 100 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Recovering the frontier state: war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan, (Plymouth: 

Lexington, 2008), 212. 

101 S Frederick Starr, “Sovereignty and Legitimacy in Afghan Nation-Building” in Frances Fukuyama ed. 

Nation-Building : Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005) 109-110. 102 Rais, 210-212. 
26

Pashtun had the greatest amount of power; this changed with the new order 

following the fall of the Taliban government. However, it is important not to cast 

Afghanistan’s insurgent conflict solely in ethnic terms—many Afghans identify 

first of all with a local tribe or sub-tribe, rather than the overarching ethnic 

community.103 Further, a quarter of Pashtun believe that their economic 

circumstances have declined since the fall of the Taliban, while only 28% believe 

their circumstances have improved. Forty % of Afghans of other ethnicities, by 

contrast, believe that the fall of the Taliban has made them more prosperous, 

while only 8-14% believes they have become less prosperous.104 Thus perceptions 

of economic prosperity reinforce an ethnic understanding of the new government. 

• Opposition to the government is mainly centered among Pashtun citizens of 

Afghanistan, and the Taliban insurgency has been able to make its strongest 

inroads in Pashtun territory in Afghanistan’s East and South. However, the 

majority of Afghans from all backgrounds oppose the Taliban, including Pashtun 

opponents of the current national government. In spite of this anti-Taliban 

sentiment, Afghan skepticism about the ability of the national government to 

govern as an honest broker and improve their lives causes many, especially 

Pashtun, to either sit on the sidelines or sometimes to passively support the 

Taliban. 105

• Low literacy rates inhibit the dissemination of knowledge necessary for 

democratic participation. Optimistic estimates put literacy at about 40%; female 

literacy is below 20%. Pessimistic estimates suggest that the national total of 

literate adults may actually be around 20% of the populace.106

• The harsh geography of much of Afghanistan, combined with an urban/rural split 

of about 25-75%, means that much of the population lives in isolated rural areas.

107 National elections to a distant assembly in Kabul may mean relatively little to 

much of the population, given that many Afghans in rural areas have not traveled 

a significant distance from their birthplace in their lifetime.108 

• Afghanistan has a very limited history of liberalizing reforms. Tentative steps 

toward democracy at the national level were undertaken in 1949 and 1964. The 

1964-1973 period resulted in a minimal level of democracy, with an elected 

parliament that Zahir Shah used for consultation. The 1964 constitution, 

suspended by the 1973 coup, provides only a minimal basis for the potential to 

nurture democracy in Afghanistan. 109 However, in practical terms any nascent 

democratic institutions of that time at the national level have long since collapsed. 

 

103 Ibid. 104 Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People,” 40. Available online at 

http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2008-poll.php 105 The Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007: A Survey of the Afghan People, September 2007.” 106 CIA World Fact Book, “Afghanistan” 107 UNSD Demographic Statistics, “Population by sex and urban/rural residence.” Available online at 

http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=POP&f=tableCode%3A1 . This dynamic is changing as unemployed young 

people move to the urban areas. 

108 See Stewart, especially 245-248. 

109 Astri Suhrke, CMI Working Paper, “Democratization of a Dependent State: Afghanistan,” 3. 
27

• The quality of the first parliament after the fall of the Taliban government is 

marginal. A significant number of figures with ties to excesses during the 1990s 

are members. International Crisis Group argued that the parliament has more 

warlords and criminals than democrats. Even many pro-American figures have 

unsavory pasts which suggest a suspect commitment to democracy.110

• Narco-trafficking, resource plundering and other crime is widespread. 

Afghanistan’s national government is rife with corruption; Afghanistan’s 

performance on anti-corruption indicators is among the worst in the world; 

Transparency International ranked Afghanistan 176 out of 180 states,111 Some 

analysts have suggested that the average Afghan spends 1/5th of his budget on 

bribes.112 Pay for judges and police are inadequate.113 The amount of opium 

produced in Afghanistan in 2007 was greater than the total amount of opium 

produced in the world the previous year. In the south of the country, opium 

harvesting is the main industry; 70% of Afghanistan’s opium is produced in the 

south. 114 Thomas Schweich, formally Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau 

of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, charged that 

Afghanistan was becoming a narco-state due to the complicity of government 

officials, including President Karzai.115 Ahmed Wali Karzai, the President’s 

brother, has been implicated in drug smuggling.116

• Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly Pakistan, exert significant influence over the 

politics of Afghanistan. Pakistan has long viewed Afghanistan as part of its sphere 

of influence, and Pakistan’s Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 

sponsored the establishment of the Taliban in the mid 90s and has repeatedly been 

accused of aiding insurgents in Afghanistan.117 Pakistan’s relationship with 

Afghanistan is complicated by support for the Taliban or complicity among many 

Pashtu tribes along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, and the inability or 

unwillingness of the Pakistani army to control the border and the Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) inside Pakistan near the Afghanistan boarder. 

Most of this area was under de facto control of the local tribes, and some parts of 

it—particularly North and South Waziristan—now seem to be effectively under 

the control of the Pakistani Taliban 

 

110 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s New Legislature: Making Democracy Work” Asia Report 

116, May 15, 2006. 

111 Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index is available at 

http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 112 Nathaniel Fick and Vikram J. Singh, “Afghans Are Losing Their Trust in Their Government” New York 

Times October 5, 2008 113 Laura Barnett, “Afghanistan: The Rule of Law” Canadian Parliamentary Information and Research 

Service http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0717-e.htm 114 UNODC, “2008 World Drug Report,” 228. 

http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/WDR_2008_eng_web.pdf 

115 Thomas Schweich, “Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?” New York Times July 27, 2008 116 James Risen, “Reports Link Karzai’s Brother to Afghanistan Heroin Trade” New York Times October 4, 

2008. 

117 “Afghanistan ‘holds Pakistani spy’” BBC Tuesday December 19, 2006. For an extensive account of the 

formation of the Taliban, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). 
28

• Violence and disorder across Afghanistan are widespread. The security situation 

in Afghanistan has deteriorated to the point that a 2007 UN map suggests that 

nearly half the country is a ‘no-go’ zone for NGOs.118 The absence of safety for 

much Afghanistan’s population has numerous consequences, among which is an 

obvious weakening trust in democracy.119

 

118 Nick Meo, “Leaked aid map of Afghanistan reveals expansion of no-go zones” The Times of London

December 5, 2007. 

119 This is a common theme of Chris Sands’ reporting in the The National. See for example Sands, 

“Afghans missing Taliban justice” The National November 24, 2008. 
29

The Taliban Insurgency and the 

Significance of Local and National 

Identity 

Religious influences in the Insurgency 

The description of anti-government insurgents as “the Taliban” can sometimes lead 

Western analysts into the mistaken understanding that the insurgents form a monolithic 

group with unified beliefs and motivations.120 In truth, even elements of the insurgency 

linked to the former Taliban government, frequently referred to as the Neo-Taliban in the 

literature, have changed significantly since the removal of the Taliban government by 

Allied forces. Understanding different motivations among insurgents for opposing the 

government can help explain how a particular group might be convinced to become part 

of government. 

The Taliban, both during their government and as insurgents, follow a revivalist strain of 

Sunni Islam within the Hannafi school known as Deobandi Islam. Deobandi Islam is, 

broadly, a universalist movement championing a very conservative interpretation of 

Sharia, with the goal of a return to traditional values and a strict rejection of 

modernity.121The Taliban did not necessarily seek an ethnic government, although most 

Talibs were Pashtun. However, their interpretation of Islam is an absolutist 

understanding, which views other understandings of Islam with suspicion. Many students 

of ethnicity in Afghanistan find a correlation between the Taliban ideology and a Pasthun 

understanding of the world, particularly in rural areas. This is not to say that most 

Pashtun prefer precisely the same sort of order and same interpretation of Sharia as the 

Taliban government practiced, but that a strong sense of shared values from a school of 

traditionalist interpretation of Islam predisposes Pashtun to sympathize with a 

conservative Islamic regime. As one student of ethnicity in Central Asia puts it, “In 

traditional Pashtun society, Islam is practiced more or less as a way of life...The Pashtun 

population in general supported the Taliban for its religious fervor as well as for being 

close to the fundamental values of their society.”122

Many other Afghans, no less Islamic according to their own traditions, found the 

Taliban’s appeal as a religious movement unconvincing. “The non-Pashtuns, some of 

them equally Islamists on their own terms, did not accept the Taliban’s self-projection as 

an entirely Islamic and non ethnic movement.”123 The values of the Taliban frequently 

clashed with other ethnic groups. In particular, their puritanical strain of Islam viewed 

Afghanistan’s Hazara Shi’a as heretics, and persecuted them during their rule. Thus while 

 

120 The insurgency is clearly more complex than simply being a Taliban vs. Government conflict. Other 

groups, notably the Hizb-i-Islami, are important, as are outside actors, particularly the situation in Pakistan. 

The Taliban, however, remain central to the insurgency. 

121 Barbara Metcalf, Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs (Leiden: ISIM, 2002), 

1-3. 

122 Rais, 76. 123 Rais, 46 
30

the Taliban tried to style themselves as Afghan rather than Pashtun leaders, religious 

differences magnified ethnic tensions.124

Indeed, the particular Deobandi understanding of the Taliban is at odds with much of the 

Sunni mainstream, even among conservative Islamists. Much of the Northern Alliance, 

particularly Jamiat-i-Islami, was also Islamist. As one commentator noted, while “[many] 

Islamists strongly advocated women’s education and political participation (with the 

condition of wearing a veil and attending single-sex schools), the neo-fundamentalists 

want to ban any female presence in public life... They are the heirs to the conservative 

Sunni tradition of fundamentalism, obsessed by the danger of a loss of purity within 

Islam through the influence of other religions.”125

The Composition of the Insurgency 

The amount of cohesiveness within the current insurgency is much debated. Within the 

insurgency, Antonio Giustozzi notes that basic rules created by Taliban leadership 

governing operations are largely followed down through various echelons. However, 

local commanders have significant autonomy, and forces in a given province are usually 

recruited locally and interested in local issues. Further, different camps within the Taliban 

leadership, based in different provinces, have clashed over both tactics and ideology. 126

Different area commands also reflect differences. The eastern front is comprised of many 

foreign fighters, while the insurgents in the northeast of Afghanistan form a more 

cohesive group. Finally, the Taliban rely on support from tribes and sub tribal groups; 

while many of these Pashtun tribes are sympathetic to a conservative, traditional 

interpretation of Islam, their motivation tends to be grounded in their local reality. Some 

former members of the Taliban government have joined the government; prominent 

defections include Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil, the Taliban government’s erstwhile 

foreign minister, and Mullah Abdual Salam Zaif, who served as the Ambassador to 

Pakistan.127 Elements of the Taliban have also splintered from the main insurgency. 

However, the command structure of the movement is largely unified. These fissures have 

done little to impair the effectiveness of the insurgency, 128 

Nonetheless, while the Taliban command is a largely unified structure, its area command 

and manpower comes from regional and local organizations, who may not be motivated 

by the Taliban’s ideology.129 Thus, some successful bargaining should be possible at the 

local level, by addressing the particular circumstances of local issues. This is particularly 

relevant to the situation among insurgents in the South, who are comprised almost 

exclusively of recruits drawn from local populations and enjoy the support of local tribes, 

in contrast to the important role of foreign fighters, largely from Pakistan but including 

 

124 Rashid, Taliban (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). 125 Olivier Roy, “Neo-Fundamentalism” Available online at http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/roy.htm 126 Giustozzi, 83-85 127 Robert Crews, “Moderate Taliban?” in Robert Crews and Amin Tarzi eds. The Taliban and the Crisis in 

Afghanistan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 266-271. 128 Giustozzi, 83-86. Some analysts suggest that evidence exists of a coalescing of interests between the 

Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, and perhaps with Al Qaeda. 

129 Seth Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Sana Monica: Rand, 2008), 41.; Gen. David McKiernan, 

speech at the Atlantic Council, November 18, 2008. Available online at 

http://www.acus.org/event_blog/general-david-d-mckiernan-speaks-councils-commanders-series/transcript 
31

Uzbeks, Chechens, and others in areas in the east between the Pakistan/Afghanistan 

border and Kabul. While local fighters remain important in all theaters, foreign troops 

tend to be more influenced by ideological motivations. In theory, with skillful use of 

theological differences, it might be possible to help split the Taliban on assorted doctrinal 

lines. 130 It is important to understand that many elements that are cooperating militarily 

with the Taliban do not fully identify with their ideological goals or form an explicit part 

of their command structure. Their reasons for preferring the Taliban to the Afghan 

government are manifold. Ethnic solidarity provides one answer. Inter-tribal dynamics 

also play a role; a sense that other tribal or sub-tribal groups are receiving unfair 

advantages from the government may push some groups to opposition. Finances also 

motivate low-level Taliban fighters; the Taliban has at times paid young Afghans two to 

three times the daily wages of an ANA soldier in exchange for harassing NATO or 

government forces.131 Anger at the conduct of government officials can motivate local 

leaders to throw their lot in with the insurgency, particularly when government forces are 

seen as more rapacious than the Taliban.132 Civilian causalities, particularly from ISAF 

air strikes, can also push locals toward support for the Taliban; anti-American protests in 

response to civilian casualties allegedly caused by air strikes in Farah are one such 

example.133 In such cases, locals support the insurgency not out of abiding support for 

ideological goals, but rather due to pragmatic reasons. 

This suggests that insurgents have a complex variety of reasons for opposing the 

government. Therefore attempts at negotiating with elements of the movement at the 

local level are possible, even if leadership at the upper echelons remains intransigent. In 

time, a deteriorating strategic situation, combined with important defections on the local 

level, might both diminish the importance of the Taliban leadership, as has occurred with 

the FARC in Colombia, and increase the willingness of the Taliban, or elements within 

the Taliban, to compete politically rather than as insurgents. 

The Afghan government has made several attempts to cooperate with various elements of 

the insurgency, and has been met with mixed success. As a result of a 2002 amnesty 

effort, a few relatively high profile persons who had been affiliated with the Taliban 

government or widely regarded as fellow travelers switched sides. However, such 

defections did not create serious fractures within the insurgency.134 

In 2007, President Karzai signed a controversial “National Stability and Reconciliation 

Act” which provides sweeping amnesty for most crimes committed by actors on all sides 

from the time of the Soviet invasion, in an attempt to encourage insurgents to join the 

government and heal the wounds of a quarter century of conflict.135 

 

130 Interview with senior U.S official and American expert. Giustozzi addresses this topic on page 52-55. 131 Jones, 41-43 132 See Filkin’s account in “Bribes Corrode Afghans’ Trust in Government” New York Times January 1, 

2009. 

133 Fisnik Abrashi and Rahim Faiez, "US ambassador vows to limit Afghan civilian deaths" AP May 19, 

2009. 

134 Crews, 238-273. 135 Dad Noorani, “Afghanistan: Amnesty Law Condones Warlords' Past Abuse” IPS March 23, 2007 

http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=37056 
32

The Columbian example (see chapter 6) suggests that significant military success on the 

tactical level is required before cooperation will be successful. Insurgents are unlikely to 

join a government when they are convinced that they can achieve their aims through 

force. However, in addition to success on the battlefield, specific care must be taken to 

develop a realistic path for rebels to become part of the political system. 

The admission that no parties in Afghanistan’s nearly 30 years of conflict are blameless is 

important. However, along with this symbolic gesture, Kabul and the international 

community should address local grievances ranging from government corruption to 

civilian casualties from airstrikes, which have caused Afghans to oppose the government. 

Local Identity and National Identity within Afghanistan136

A second important factor in the development of a democratic state is identity. Unlike the 

citizens of well-established, more homogeneous traditional nation-states, Afghans have a 

complex layer of identities which start at the sub-clan or family level. Loyalty then 

follows a chain, starting with family and reaching the state only after several other ties 

are in place. The following is one common progression of identity: family-local 

leadership-tribe-ethnic group-state. Two experts on identity in Afghanistan put it this 

way: “A person’s sense of self and place in the world works from the family outwards 

through ties of kinship... Beyond the confines of the family is a web of complex 

relationships, and from these spring the nitty-gritty of politics...In Afghanistan you know 

a person first by where they come from and to whom they are related, not by their work 

or claim to a particular social class.”137

An Afghan living in a village in Kandahar province, for example, would first have ties to 

his local leadership, and series of interconnected ties to his tribal group (often first a sub 

group, for example, Popolzai, and then a larger tribal group, for example Durrani) to his 

ethnic group, Pashtun, and finally to the state. Among the Pashtun, a myriad of tribal 

groups and sub tribes within these groups exist. Two prominent tribes among the many 

include the Durrani, (who provided Afghanistan’s leaders from 1747 through 1978), and 

the Ghilzai, often considered to be largest Pashtun tribe. Many sub tribes are quite large; 

some estimates suggest that Popolzai number about 3,500,000.138

Behavior codes form an important part of identity for many Afghans. Pashtunwali, a 

tribal code of behavior, governs the behavior of many Pashtun. It is a complex set of 

values that gives rise to expectations of hospitality, revenge, and honor. The idea of 

hospitality has led Pashtun tribes to shelter fugitives, from the days of British colonialism 

to the present. Revenge and honor govern family and community life.139 Traditionally, 

 

136 The section has greatly benefited from the input of American and Afghan experts-their contributions are 

reflected in the text. 

137 Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace (London: Zed, 2004). 30-31, 35. In 

interviews some experts have suggested that the national identity of many Afghans has been significantly 

strengthened during the war, giving it greater significance vis-à-vis identity with an ethnic group (e.g. 

Tajik). 

138 Library of Congress, “Ahmad Shah and the Durrani Empire” in Afghanistan: A country study For a 

detailed account, see Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan (London: I.B Tauris, 2004). 

139 Victoria Schofield, Afghan Frontier (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 116-120. 
33

decisions (related to the honor code) are made by local jirgas, assemblies of tribal elders. 

In some cases this is understood to mean the entire community.140 

In urban areas such as Kabul, practice of Pashtunwali is less central to Pashtun identity 

than in rural areas. Further, practice also varies in different areas of the country. In areas 

where authority has been concentrated among local leaders, Pashtun identity may be less 

strong.141 In considering the importance of Pashtunwali among the Pashtun of 

Afghanistan, it is important not to consider it a monolithic system of values that leads 

every Pashtu to belief and act the same. Rather, like much of Afghan identity, local 

factors are paramount. 

 While much attention has been given to Pashtun values given their position in the 

conflict zones in the east and south of Afghanistan, other ethnic groups and sub groups 

also have important value systems. Rory Stewart describes the various local beliefs and 

systems of social organization that he encountered in travels throughout central 

Afghanistan as a myriad of beliefs and social structures that varied greatly even in the 

course of a few miles distance.142 

Struggles for influence between different sub-groups, and a desire for fair or favorable 

division of offices and patronage, are important factors which shape the political 

landscape. In Kandahar, local loyalties below the tribal level strongly affect the political 

situation.143 Some Durrani tribes had supported the Taliban government in Kabul, 

including the Alekozai, Eshaqzais, and Norzais. Mullah Naquibulla, an Alekozai leader 

who had been part of the Taliban, switched sides to support the new government and in 

2001 became the first governor of Kandahar. Two other prominent leaders who 

represented important populations in Kandahar were given positions of leadership in the 

province: Gula Agha Shirzai, a Barakzai, and Ahmad Wali Karzai, a Popolzai leader and 

the brother of the President. Much of the power struggle in Kandahar over the following 

years can be understood as part of a complicated calculus of tribal and sub-tribal 

maneuvering. An attempt to balance interests was not fully successful. The rise in 

influence of Wali Karzai, at the expense of the others led Naquibulla to withdraw for a 

time from his role in government, with disastrous consequences for security. Alekozais, 

the largest provider of security forces, were not inclined to support a government 

perceived to be biased in favor of the Popolzai. Only in the disastrous circumstances of 

2006 were Wali Karzai and Naquibulla able to come to an agreement which brought 

Naquibulla back into government.144

The example in Kandahar is just one picture of the patchwork of identities and interests 

that pull on Afghan’s loyalties and operate outside the national government. Indeed, the 

United States has facilitated the independence of local power centers, both among non 

Pashtun groups and key Pashtun leaders, through providing weaponry, intelligence, and 

other assets. Though strengthening local strongmen was undoubtedly not the goal, the 

United States’ assistance to local and provincial leaders has strengthened local power 

 

140 Willem Vogelsang, The Afghans (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 24-26. 141 Schofield, 116-120; Vogelsang, 24-26. 142 Stewart, 58, 245-248. 143 Giustozzi, 19-21 144 Ibid. 
34

centers that are unlikely to disappear.145 Successful democratization must take local 

identity and local strengths into account. Perceptions of “fairness” in the distribution of 

material benefits and honors between various local interests, both within a local district 

and at the provincial and national level, should become a key calculus in American 

decisionmaking. 

Throughout Afghanistan’s history as a discrete political unit (typically dated from 1747), 

her rulers depended on kinship links, personal authority, ties via marriage, and other 

traditional links for authority. Attempts to impose centralization caused resistance, and 

leaders of the central government were unable to overcome local autonomy. As one 

expert of Afghan history put it, “most political conflicts in modern Afghan history...have 

stemmed from the attempts of dominant communally based elites to accomplish a high 

degree of centralization of power with the help of foreign patrons.”146 

 Some commentators have suggested that despite Afghanistan’s rural and tribal history, 

her experience in the 1900s, particularly the 1960s and 70s prior to the Soviet invasion, 

provided a strong foundation for a centralized democratic government. Afghanistan’s 

half-century of relative peace did allow the development of some amount of a national 

identity. This identify may have been strengthened through the experience during 

diaspora of many Afghans who fled the country throughout the 80s and 90s. Many 

students of Afghanistan have noted that Afghans possess a stronger sense of Afghan 

national identity than many neighbors, including Pakistan, despite Afghanistan’s myriad 

of ethnic identities. 147 

However, Afghanistan’s first “democratic experiment” (1964–1973) had a limited 

duration and scope, and did not lay a solid foundation for a centralized representative 

state. The “opening” of parliament following the promulgation of the 1964 constitution 

lasted only until 1973, when the King, Zahir Shah, was deposed by a coup. Further, the 

government under the 1964 constitution was essentially a monarchy with a token 

parliament. Zahir Shah and his advisors and senior members of the Royal Family pulled 

back from any substantive reform. Further, many gains from the 1960s and 1970s were 

subsequently swept away in more than 20 years of violence that followed (1978–2001. 

While the national government did expand its formal control of much of Afghanistan 

prior to its nearly quarter-century of civil war, it did so by supplementing local authorities 

rather than overriding them. The lack of capacity of the Afghan national government 

meant that, while some national institutions were established, the depth of such 

institutions was modest. Following Afghan tradition, its government worked with local 

traditional authority, particularly in areas with significant tribal influence, leaving local 

formal and informal institutions intact. 

The period of war from 1979 until the overthrow of the Taliban destroyed national 

institutions and the legitimacy of the national government. National institutions were not 

 

145 Rais, 141-143. 146 Saikal, 1-15, quoted on page 9. 147 Interviews with American and Afghan experts in Washington, June and July 2009 
35

replaced; instead, the conflict empowered warlords with access to arms, financial 

resources, and patrons outside Afghanistan.148 

Thrice since 2004 Afghans have voted overwhelmingly to establish a strong national 

government in hope of avoiding further fragmentation at the hands of regional 

powerbrokers. However, the historical Afghan experience is not reflected in the current 

structure of Afghanistan’s over centralized government, a top down organization in 

which authority is exercised from Kabul through the Provincial Governors down to the 

district and sub-district level. The current government does not enjoy the full allegiance 

of many Afghans due to its poor performance. Neither does it recognize the persistence 

of local authorities, despite the challenges of civil war, in much of the country. 

Indeed, the formal process of Afghanistan’s government today is one of extreme 

centralization. Budgets are determined and appointments are made by ministries in Kabul 

down to the sub-district level, and separate national ministries exercise official control 

over local and regional programs in areas that fall under their jurisdiction from Kabul.149

While many Afghans would prefer a central government that has sufficient capacity to 

provide both quality and quantity of services, the current reality in Afghanistan suggests 

that traditional local institutions are most likely to administer programs well at the village 

and sub-district level We concur with the analysis of two authors in the New York Times, 

who argued that “central authorities in Afghanistan [should] focus on providing services 

of national scope: an army and police force, roads, electricity, a postal service and the 

like..”150 Local institutions should be strengthened after their disruption by conflict and 

fragmentation, and be given more resources to address local matters. Further, the 

interface between truly local governance at the village level and the district and 

provincial levels of government needs to be strengthened. Rather than simply serving as a 

funnel to direct funds from Kabul, regional government should be a place for different 

local groups to cooperation, through the mediation of representatives of the national 

government. 

Identity in Afghanistan is a complex mix of ties, many of them local. Afghanistan shares 

the characteristic of many developing states of strong informal institutions at the local 

level but weak formal institutions at the national level.151 Understanding the variety of 

local identities and working to ensure that various interests are treated equitably, and that 

national government does not work against entrenched local institutions and values, is of 

vital importance in the task of developing a robust government. 

The importance of the local “voice” must be reflected in participatory governance in 

Afghanistan. Local and national governance need not be exclusive. If the formal 

institutions of the national government develop greater cooperation with local and district 

institutions, a degree of decentralization can help increase the legitimacy of the national 

government. 

 

148 Good accounts of the previous paragraphs can be found in Saikal, Modern Afghanistan and Rashid, 

Descent into Chaos. 149 Lister and Nixoni in Rotberg, 206-211. 150 Nathaniel Fick and Vikram Singh, “Winning the Battle, Losing the Faith” New York Times, October 6, 

2008 

151 A classic account of this phenomenon is Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 1988). 
36

Insights for Afghanistan from Case 

Studies 

 A closer examination of two cases, Nicaragua and Mozambique, helps outline a typical 

course followed by democratization after internal conflict, and the challenges such states 

face. An examination of democracy in Nicaragua, considered one of the most successful 

post-conflict democracies152, highlights many of the limitations facing even the strongest 

post-conflict democracies, providing a realistic outline of what might be accomplished 

and what problems might remain. An assessment of Mozambique outlines what that state 

achieved in transitioning from civil war to a democratic government. Studying 

Mozambique’s achievements will help to paint a picture of the process of establishing a 

democracy.153 We also underscore why these cases had more auspicious conditions to 

build a democracy than Afghanistan has possessed. 

We will also briefly examine Colombia, which was omitted from the previous table 

because the conflict there is still underway, and because Colombia has a lengthy, if 

imperfect, experience with democracy. Colombia is often cited as a good comparison for 

Afghanistan, given a complex security environment with multiple insurgent groups, 

extensive narco-trafficking, and areas of sanctuary for anti-state actors. Our examination 

focuses on the improving security situation in Colombia and what lessons it might have 

for Afghanistan. 

Finally, we consider the experiences of Indonesia and Malaysia as models for Muslimmajority democracies. Though the democratic progress in both states is incomplete, the 

blend of Islam with democracy in both countries has important lessons. 

Nicaragua 

Nicaraguan democratization is often considered a success story. After a lengthy war 

between the revolutionary Sandinista (FSLN) single-party government and the right-wing 

Contra guerilla movement sponsored by the United States, a peace agreement provided 

for internationally monitored elections in 1990. Following a return to democracy and the 

upset victory of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro’s UNO coalition over the FSLN 

government of Daniel Ortega in the election, Nicaragua has successfully elected three 

new presidents. A combination of international and citizen election monitoring has 

ensured that voting is largely free and fair, certainly a good result for a country of its 

income level.154 The military, intensely politicized at the time of the 1990 transition to 

 

152 Anderson and Dodd, 31-35. 153 While this assessment will not dwell upon the many flaws in Mozambique’s democracy, we do find that 

the ranking of the Polity IV index which places Mozambique at lowest possible score for a democracy, to 

be largely accurate. 

154 The Carter Center, “2006 Post-Election Statement” http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/ 

nicaragua_preliminary.html 
37

democracy, has become a largely apolitical institution, and citizens now have a good deal 

of confidence in the military.155 

In the 2006 elections, power shifted away from the right-leaning Liberal (PLC) party and 

back to Ortega’s FSLN through a largely transparent election without significant 

violence. Perhaps most remarkable is the enduring low levels of violence after the 

tumultuous 80s. In 2004, Nicaragua’s homicide rate was only 12.8 per 100,000. By way 

of comparison, homicides in the United States were 5.6 per 100,000 in the same period. 

Nicaragua’s rate was lower than many countries with equivalent or superior levels of 

human development; her homicide rate was less than Mexico’s and close to the rate of 

the Baltic nations in Europe.156

Two well-respected students of elections claim that Nicaragua challenges theories which 

suggest that democratization necessarily requires a long amount of time to become 

established. Instead, they suggest that high levels of electoral participation and 

sophisticated decision-making among the electorate are evidence that Nicaraguan 

democracy now functions at a mature level.157 

Yet significant problems remain. Nicaraguan institutions remain weak. Courts and the 

justice system are widely regarded by Nicaraguans as corrupt; and the last attorney 

general had his visa to the United States revoked because of participation in corrupt acts. 

The tribunal which accredits political parties has made a number of bizarre, partisan 

rulings against political parties which are not represented on the board. We have seen that 

Nicaragua has attempted to prosecute high level corruption, but has achieved little 

success. However, reform has had some success on the local level; only 8% of 

Nicaraguans reported either themselves or a relative had experienced an act of corruption 

in the previous 12 months, a much better rate than the Latin American average of 15%.158

Within the key institutions of the judiciary and police, 34% of Nicaraguans reported that 

they believed bribing a member of the judiciary or police would have a good chance of 

success. While these responses are better than the Latin American average, they suggest 

that important institutions remain prone to abuse by official functionaries.159 

Nicaragua has made some strides at developing a professional bureaucracy, including the 

development of a professional civil service law, but even relatively professional 

organizations with capable leaders are subjected to political interference in their 

operations.160 60% of Nicaraguans were unhappy with the provision of basic services that 

is the primary responsibility of the bureaucracy.161

 

155 “Informe Latinobarómetro ,” 2008. Available online in Spanish at 

http://www.latinobarometro.org/docs/INFORME_LATINOBAROMETRO_2008.pdf 156 UN Human Development Report, 2007-2008. 157 See Anderson and Dodd, chapters 8-9. 158 “Informe Latinobarómetro 2008,” 47. 

159 Ibid, 49. 160 Greene, State Donors and Grand Corruption in Nicaragua . For current information in Spanish see 

Revista Envío, www.envio.org.ni 161 “Informe Latinobarómetro 2008,” 44. 
38

 Leading Nicaraguan political leaders routinely collude with each other for corrupt 

gain.162 The country’s democratically elected president is attempting to undermine the 

constitution and tradition of free elections.163 Close to twenty years after Nicaragua’s 

transition, the ability of Nicaraguan citizens to effectively participate in the political 

process has improved, however decisions made via elections as well as codified law are 

still subject to arbitrary intervention and manipulation. 

Nicaragua has successfully established a political system in which violence is not used to 

resolve political differences. However, like many post conflict democracies, Nicaragua 

has not advanced beyond this accomplishment to develop a strong democracy. 

Institutions have improved from the time of an authoritarian state. However, while 

citizens report lower levels of corruption than the Latin American average, the level of 

corruption remains a serious problem. Key institutions, particularly the judiciary, remain 

subject to manipulation, and many functionaries still use public offices for personal gain. 

Thus, one of the best successes of post conflict democratization still has serious 

weaknesses along with its modest successes. 

Mozambique 

Mozambique has many similarities to the situation in Afghanistan including: low rates of 

literacy, many different ethnicities and languages, significant poverty, and a legacy of 

both a colonial and an internal war. FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de MoçambiqueLiberation Front of Mozambique), a leftist revolutionary movement which took power in 

Mozambique after decolonization by Portugal in 1976, was opposed by RENAMO 

(National Resistance of Mozambique), a rightist insurgency sponsored by the United 

States. Civil war ravaged Mozambique for fifteen years; the end of the cold war 

encouraged both sides to agree to a settlement in 1992. 

Michel Cahen argues that the development of democracy in Mozambique since the peace 

accord has been marginal; institutions are weak and politics corrupt. “The great success 

of these past fifteen years was the transition from a state of civil war to one of peace.”164

Other assessments of Mozambique such as Carrie Manning’s work are guardedly more 

positive.165 All treatments agree that the quality of the democracy, both in terms of 

political involvement and the quality of institutions, needs significant improvement. 

Many citizens do not participate politically. Both major political parties are controlled by 

small party elites, limiting the scope of political participation. The quality of many 

institutions is questionable, including important functions such as police; while 

professionalization of the police force has made some advances, 17 percent of 

Mozambiquans reported paying a bribe to avoid trouble with the police, 7 percent 

acknowledging paying a bribe “frequently.”166 The court system is considered to be 

largely independent and responsible, and is relatively well regarded by the populace. The 

 

162 David Close ed., Undoing Democracy: The Politics of Electoral Caudillismo (Lanham: Lexington, 

2004). 

163 Revista Envío “Sin ningún borrón y con muchas cuentas nuevas” January 2009. 164 Michel Cahen, “Mozambique: Peace is not Enough” Enjeux-internationaux 11 (2006). 165 Manning, The Politics of Peace in Mozambique (Westport: Praeger, 2002). 166 Afrobarometer 2005, “Mozambique,”32. 

http://www.afrobarometer.org/Summary%20of%20Results/Round%203/moz-R3SOR-19jan07-final.pdf 
39

confidence in the courts system is significant for the region.167 Some progress has been 

made in improving the quality of government institutions through public sector reform. 

Corruption and maladministration remain problematic.168 However, the Central Office for 

the Fight Against Corruption (GCCC), a body created by the national assembly, has been 

relatively successful. The body assisted the Public Prosecutor’s Office in prosecuting 

officials accused of corruption and released detailed statistics on the prosecution of 

corruption to the public. This level of transparency is an important example of an 

advance in combating corruption.169 The picture here is thus one of modest gains; serious 

problems remain, but some initial steps give reason for some confidence in the future. 

On, the other hand, the peace agreement and resulting level of security have provided a 

foundation for future progress. The negotiated settlement in Mozambique has provided 

RENAMO (National Resistance of Mozambique, which had launched a lengthy guerrilla 

war against the FRELIMO government, with a central political role in the future of the 

state. Despite an authoritarian political structure, RENAMO has attracted some members 

of the educated elite disaffected with the current path of government, and has had at least 

some amount of success at not being merely a negative force but rather an active political 

participant.170 The integration of a guerrilla movement into a political actor and the end 

of violence stemming from the lengthy civil war is Mozambique’s greatest achievement. 

This period of peace has allowed the state to consolidate modest administrative gains. 

More importantly, the peace processes has provided a chance from Mozambique to 

consolidate a peaceful political system. Strikingly, despite RENAMO’s poor showing in 

three elections against FRELIMO, RENAMO has not seen violence as a solution to its 

electoral difficulties. As Hermino Morais, a senior leader of RENAMO's military wing 

during the civil war put it, “there's no room for going back to war...we have to invest in 

permanent dialogue."171

As with Nicaragua, a period of peace has allowed modest improvements in important 

areas. Corruption is still a problem, but some visible improvements have been made. In 

comparison with the lawlessness and arbitrary justice of the civil war era, Mozambique 

has made significant progress. 

The lesson Nicaragua and Mozambique has for Afghanistan is one of modest 

expectations. Both states have succeeded in making political participation the only 

legitimate method for seeking power and resolving disputes. At times this participation 

bends the established rules of the games—political influence and manipulation of the 

government infrastructure are fall backs if elections fail, while electoral victory can be an 

excuse to extract rents. But political maneuvering is surely preferable to civil war. 

 

167 CIRI 2007; Global Integrity Report, “Mozambique: Corruption Timeline” 

http://report.globalintegrity.org/Mozambique/2007/timeline 

168Ralf Lanwehr, “Tax evasion, fines and corruption in Mozambique” 

http://www.transparency.org/content/download/4826/28533/file/Part%203_19_26_Research%202.pdf;

“Doadores questionam modelo de crescimento económico do país” Maputo, May 4, 2007 

http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/pics/d76978.doc 

169 “Mozambique: 31 Corruption Cases Tried This Year” allafrica.com September 4, 2008 170 Manning, 64-71. 171 “Mozambique: ‘No Alternative’ to Dhlakama”allafrica.com January 12, 2009 

http://allafrica.com/stories/200901121516.html 
40

Both states have also made improvements to institutions. Both states have improved their 

delivery of services from when the country was rent by civil war. However, important 

institutions remain fragile and susceptible to corruption and maladministration. Both 

states outperform Afghanistan, but more than fifteen years after peace, both states remain 

a work in progress. That these states are among the brightest success stories of post 

conflict democratization outside of Europe should temper unreasonable expectations. 

However, at the same time, both states speak to the possibility of establishing enough 

inertia to take a young state down a path where future conflict is unlikely. Persistence 

institutional problems notwithstanding, the public safety record of both states are 

important successes. 

Colombia: Turning Insurgents into Political Participants 

The Colombian case serves as an example of how a state can go about turning anti-state 

actors into political participants. Unlike the post conflict democracies we considered 

earlier, Colombia has had a long tradition of democracy, with a history of representative 

government dating from the early 1830s. However, the scourges of civil war and the 

influence of narco-trafficking in government during the 80s and 90s threatened to 

undermine the state. 

Much attention has been paid to the military successes of the Colombian Army and police 

under Alvaro Uribe against the FARC and organized crime. These successes are certainly 

an important part of Colombia’s increased security; however, several other components 

of the Colombian government strategy were vital to the improved security situation in the 

country. First, the government has offered various amnesty and reintegration programs to 

both leftist insurgents and rightist paramilitary groups. These offers have typically 

included an admission of guilt and some element of punishment. However, punishment 

was usually far less than if the case had been tried under the normal criminal code, 

leading human rights groups to criticize the process.172

Some of the criticism is well founded, particularly the focus on the ties of the Colombian 

government to some right-wing paramilitary groups involved in targeting noncombatants. 

However, reintegration initiatives have gone a long way toward sapping the fighting 

strength of both leftists and rightist groups. In particular, a significant stream of 

defections from the FARC, including both some highly placed militants and many rankand-file guerillas, despite the intransigence of FARC leadership, suggests that such 

outreach can be effective.173 It is also an important implicit acknowledgement that all 

parties to the conflict have taken part in atrocities. In both Colombia and Afghanistan, 

there are few truly white knights; many American allies have ugly résumés which rival 

the Taliban’s for brutality, murder, and human rights abuses.174 If searching for a solution 

to the conflict, actors must recognize that in most cases of successful post conflict 

democratization, political forgiveness is essential even if personal forgiveness will never 

 

172 Human Rights Watch, “Breaking the Grip” November 17, 2008. 173 Merle D. Kellerhals Jr. “Colombia's FARC Terrorist Group Faces Devastating Reversals” 

www.America.gov 23 July 2008 

174 International Crisis Group “Afghanistan’s New Legislature: Making Democracy Work” Asia Report 

116, May 15, 2006 
41

be forthcoming. Further, failure to provide a path toward reintegration for both leadership 

and the rank-and-file risks an endless cycle of conflict.175

We have previously seen that the government of Afghanistan’s attempts to negotiate with 

insurgents has met only limited success. Some high-profile defections occurred, but this 

did little to dampen support for anti-government activities. The United States has been 

ambivalent about such efforts, particularly Karzai’s 2008 announcement that he was 

willing to negotiate with Mullah Omar. As jailing much of Afghanistan’s current 

leadership for their past would be untenable, even senior members of the Taliban should 

not be excluded from such a program, provided they are willing to play by the rules of 

democratic participation. An amnesty program conducted at the same time as an 

aggressive military and police action against anti-government elements is a potent 

method for separating incorrigible anti-government elements from those who might be 

willing to participate politically. Defections tend to occur when a chance exists for 

reintegration in the political system. Negotiation is not a partition plan, but a roadmap for 

political participation and reintegration.176

Further, the Colombian government has highlighted the effect of abuses on everyday 

citizens. By placing a spotlight on the worst atrocities committed by anti-government 

forces, particularly the killing of civilians, the Colombian government has been able to 

undercut popular support for rebels. Anti FARC rallies in the summer of 2008 are 

indicative of how successful the change has been; while the FARC originally had 

significant public support, most of the populace has been alienated by their attacks 

against civilians and their kidnapping campaigns, as evidenced by the anti-FARC rally in 

Bogota attended by more than 500,000 people.177 Military and police forces should focus 

on reducing the operational capacity of anti-government forces, not eliminating the threat 

entirely. The goal is not annihilation of the opposition, but rather creating the conditions 

for a favorable settlement. 

Indonesia and Malaysia: Muslim-Majority Democracies 

The 2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy declares that, by 2020, 

Afghanistan will be an “Islamic constitutional democracy at peace with itself and its 

neighbors, standing in full dignity in the international family” and by the same year 

Afghanistan will also be “a tolerant, united and pluralistic nation that honors its Islamic 

heritage and the deep seated aspirations toward participation, justice, and equal rights for 

all.”178 Moreover, Afghanistan’s 2004 constitution describes Islam as the state religion, 

mandating that no civil law may contradict the beliefs or provisions of Islam, and 

specifically identifies Afghanistan as an Islamic state.179 However the assertion that Islam 

 

175 Jonathan Morgenstein, Consolidating Disarmament: Lessons from Colombia’s Reintegration Program 

for Demobilized Paramilitaries, USIP Special Report, November 2008, 217. 176 Ibid. 177 “Colombians in huge Farc protest” BBC February 4, 2008 178 “Afghanistan National Development Strategy, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 1387-1391 (2008-2013), 

A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction.” 

http://www.afghanistanembassy.no/Doc/About%20Afghanistan-ANDS%20summary.pdf 

179 Chapter 1, Articles 1-3. In 1:7, the 2004 Afghanistan Constitution obliges the state to follow UN 

charters, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See 

http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/af00000_.html for an English translation 
42

and democracy can cohabitate has been met with skepticism by some scholars such as 

Sanford Lakoff, who have suggested that Islam, at least as it is commonly practiced, is 

incompatible with democracy. The debate has produced a volume of scholarly literature 

assessing the merits of the so-called theory of “Muslim exceptionalism.”180 While the 

brand of Islam followed by the Taliban in governing Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 

would be incompatible with principles of democracy, there are good reasons to believe 

that anti-democratic views are peripheral among Muslims, and that a state can be both 

Islamic and democratic. 

Notable scholars of Islamic law and civilization have found a place for democracy in the 

practice of Islam. Noah Feldman’s study of both the history of Islam and public values in 

Muslim societies finds that Islam is by no means incompatible with democracy.181 John 

Esposito and John Voll argue that concepts of consultation and consensus provide a 

framework within Islam that can lead to a democracy consistent with Islamic values. 

They conclude that it is important not to conflate Western values with democracy. In 

particular, Western societies are highly individualistic, and therefore Western 

democracies place a premium on the liberal values of individual freedom. Islam 

emphasizes community, thus Muslims are likely to adopt a form of decision making 

based on community consensus that may weigh against the individual.182 Such an 

exercise of democracy may not be liberal, but it is not necessarily undemocratic in terms 

outlined by leading scholars of democracy.183

Further, opinion polling throughout the Muslim world indicates that widespread support 

exists for democracy. Contrary to arguments advanced by scholars such as Sanford 

Lakoff that the Muslim mainstream does not support democracy, polls conducted by the 

Gallup World Poll find that large majorities supported not also a democratic form of 

government but also values such as woman’s rights.184 Dalia Mogahed, in a work based 

on polling data from the Muslim world, notes that respondents to the Gallup polls 

expressed both a preference for democracy and acceptance of a place for Sharia, a system 

used to derive Islamic law based on the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, as a source 

of law in a democratic state. Esposito explains that such an interpretation does not 

involve any incoherence. Sharia does not refer to a single tradition of law, but rather a 

series of principles used to derive religious rulings. As former Indonesian president 

Abdurrahman Wahid’s Libforall Foundation argues, among the diversity of 

 

180 See for example Bernard Lewis, “Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview,” Journal of 

Democracy 7 (1996): 52-63, and four replies; Abdou Filali-Ansary, "Muslims and Democracy," Journal of 

Democracy 10 (July 1999); Sanford Lakoff, “The Reality of Muslim Exceptionalism” Journal of 

Democracy 14 (2004.):133-139; Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson “Arab, Not Muslim, 

Exceptionalism” Journal of Democracy 15 (2004): 140-146 181 Noah Feldman, After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus 

and Giroux, 2003).

182 John Esposito and John Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 183 See fn 9 and 20. Indeed, James Ceaser has noted that a tension exists between liberal individualism and 

republican values. See Ceaser, Liberal Democracy and Political Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1992). 184 John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks For Islam: What a Billion Muslims Really Think (New 

York, Gallup, 2007), 29-63. 
43

interpretations of Sharia that exist, a strong majority of Muslims favor a moderate 

interpretation that does not contradict the formation of a democracy.185

Real-world models exist that show what an “Islamic democracy” might look like in 

practice. Both Indonesia and Malaysia are representative examples of possible endpoints 

(or at least guideposts; their own democratic evolutions continue) for an Islamic majority 

democracy.186

Table 6: Rankings of selected states including Indonesia and Malaysia 

Freedom House (2007) Polity IV (2006) 

United States 2 United States 10 

Norway 2 Norway 10 

Indonesia 3 Indonesia 8 

Brazil 4 Brazil 8 

Malaysia 8 Malaysia 3 

Nigeria 8 Nigeria 4 

Afghanistan 10 Afghanistan N/R

Russia 11 Russia -1 

Indonesia demonstrates that a country that is overwhelmingly Muslim can achieve a 

relatively successful transitioning democracy. Under Suharto’s authoritarian rule 1967 to 

1998), Indonesia followed the ideology of Pancasila, a “middle way” between secularism 

and Islamism.187 Under Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia’s first elected president 

following Suharto, who served as president from 1999-2001, Indonesia continued this 

course, despite the dual position of Wahid as the leader Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), one of 

the largest Islamic groups in the country. Wahid has become one of the foremost Muslim 

theorists arguing for a moderate interpretation of Islam compatible with a democratic 

government.188 While some Islamicist hard line parties want to reverse Wahid’s position, 

Indonesia has largely resisted the implementation of Islamic laws at the national level. 

The poor results of Islamist parties in 2009 national elections have reinforced this 

moderate position.189

Pancasila is an attempt to find a path between secularism and Islamism. It is a theistic 

ideology without adhering to any particular brand of Islam. Indonesia can be said to be a 

bad model because the Islam practiced there is vastly different from the orthodox Islam 

 

185 Libforall Foundation, “A Wide Spectrum of Cultures and Beliefs” http://www.libforall.org/backgroundislamic-diversity.html 

186 Senegal is also an interesting case of a Muslim majority state; while Abdoulaye Wade’s election in 2000 

marked the start of a transition, his party has dominated the state’s political system to a significant degree. 

Nonetheless, its Freedom House score of 5 suggetsprogress has occurred. The example of Turkey is less 

useful due to the role of the military as long time guarantor of Turkey’s status as a secular state. 187 Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance (London: 

Routledge, 1995), 184-202. 

188 Bret Stephens, “The Last King of Java” The Wall Street Journal April 7, 2007 

189 Norimitsu Onishi, “Indonesia’s Voters Retreat From Radical Islam” New York Times April 24, 2009. 
44

of Afghanistan. However, Indonesia actually has a great variety of practice, as well as a 

Christian minority. Pancasila was originally developed by Suharto, who wanted a state 

ideology that did not depend on a conservative form of Islam. Indonesia’s variety of faith 

traditions is similar to Afghanistan’s variety of Islamic traditions, ranging from strict 

Debondali Sunni Islam in parts of the South and East to Sufi orders in Herat. The 

flexibility in Pancasila thus provides a useful example for a flexible state identity that 

does not privilege any one brand of Islam, and in particular avoids puritanical 

interpretations of Sharia. 

In practice, Pancasila and the many iterations of Islam in Indonesia means that Indonesia 

does not follow any specific Islamic creed at the national level. However, at local levels, 

local authorities in Muslim areas have mixed Muslim law and practice as well as local 

traditions with local administrative law to fit local ethos.190 Decentralization allows 

significant local autonomy. 

Indeed, decentralization is an important reason for Indonesia’s relative success. Gerry 

van Klinken has argued that Indonesia’s flexibility has played an important role in 

preserving its stability. Autonomy encourages locals to act responsibly, in terms of 

playing within the rules of the established state, rather than encouraging separatists to 

mobilize against the government.191 In Indonesia this has encouraged relatively moderate 

leaders and practices at the local level, because the political system rewards moderate 

politics with significant autonomy.192 

Thus, Indonesian practice has two important lessons for Afghanistan. First, a vague theism of 

an Islamic verity which does not promote any of the many ideologies in Afghanistan as a 

national mobilizing force, has the potential to serve as a useful state identity without 

providing a legitimacy for the mobilization of extremes. It is important that such an Islamic 

identity be flexible and not allow radical interpretations of Islam to use the national 

constitution as justification for a national universal appeal to fundamentalism. Second, a 

degree of decentralization can encourage moderate behavior, particularly in relation to which 

groups take political power at the local level. 

Malaysia, a state that, like Afghanistan, is explicitly Islamic in its constitution, also 

developed a functioning electoral system, though recent assessments have downgraded 

the quality of her democracy due to increasing authoritarianism. Malaysia’s democracy 

should thus be regarded as a quite imperfect or partial democracy.193

Malaysia's constitution identifies Malaysia as an Islamic state. Its constitution also 

guarantees freedom of religion. In practice, Malay Muslims are governed by a mix of 

Islamic and secular law, while religious minorities are not subject to the interpretation of 

Sharia held by most Malay Muslims. Human rights groups have complained that Malay 

 

190 Acha is an exception; the peace negotiations have allowed the Achense to explicitly apply Sharia law. 

191 Gerry van Klinken, “Big States, Little Independence Movements” in Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and 

Stephen Shalom ed., Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 209-225. 

192 Acha is an exception, but in this case local movements had a longstanding radical ideology that predated 

decentralization. East Timor is also a case in which autonomy could not allow the realization of Timorese 

goals. 

193 See Karl and Schmitter, op cit. 
45

citizens must be Muslim and are not allowed to convert.194 The identification of the 

Malay ethnicity with a brand Islam is a weakness of Malaysian democracy not found in 

Indonesia. 

Indonesia and Malaysia practice a system of community-based guarantee of rights, which 

respectively protects religious minorities in Indonesia and in Malaysia allows both nonMalay Muslims and other ethnic groups acceptable political space. Such communitybased systems have the advantage of allowing local groups to follow their customs and 

interpretations of religion and law. However the system is far from ideal in either 

country. Some local authorities in Indonesia have contravened guarantees of rights found 

in the national constitution and attempted to impose a strict form of Islamic law on nonMuslims. In some areas of Malaysia, religious conservatives have attempted to impose a 

hard line form of Sharia on both non-Muslims and non-Malay Muslims. 

Nonetheless, the relative success of both states in blending civil laws with an 

accommodation of principles from Islamic law points to a possible initial path for the 

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, wherein democratic principles at the national level can 

still allow for collective decision making at the local level derived from a mix of Islamic 

thought, community values, and democratic principles. 

Pashtunwali, a behavior code considered by many Afghan Pashtuns to be a core part of 

their identity, has been held up as an obstacle to democracy by some students of 

democracy. However, the concept of the jirga, a council that make decisions at the 

village level, is not necessarily opposed to some form of democratic governance. Indeed, 

this idea means that a model of representation and consent at the community level has 

long existed in Afghanistan—many of the features of a New England town hall meeting 

are present in a jirga. A system that takes local institutions into account should allow a 

form of democracy to take root.195

It may be possible that even a deeply conservative Muslim society can practice a form 

democracy. Such a government would likely not embrace some of the Western liberal 

values related to individual autonomy. Instead, as Esposito has argued, it would be 

inclined toward a form of democracy rooted in communitarian values. Nonetheless, such 

a government could still meet the criteria presented in our democracy matrix for a 

functioning democracy. A democracy rooted in communitarian values could readily open 

political participation to all adults, allow all citizens effective participation in political 

processes, and free citizen decisions from arbitrary intervention. 

Respecting the rights of minorities seems to be the most problematic factor. However, 

with the exception of a minority of universalist strands of Islam such as that espoused by 

the Taliban, the majority of Islam is community oriented. As such, an arrangement that 

indentifies particular religious or ethnic communities, and guarantees their rights in a 

 

194 Freedom House, “Malaysia Country Report,” in Freedom in the World, 2008. 

http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2008&country=7440 

195 Christian Brose has made this point; see 

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/02/12/the_pashtun_sources_of_democracy . Certainly jirgas 

have notable limits, but it is important to remember that colonial representation was often limited to male 

Caucasian holders of property. 
46

communitarian context, is compatible with much of Islamic values.196 Such an 

arrangement would allowed Afghanistan’s diverse set of local communities to develop a 

mix of secular and religious law that fits the values of different individual communities. 

Both Indonesia and Malaysia offer imperfect visions of how this might play out in a 

future Afghanistan. 

Summary 

The cases of Nicaragua, Mozambique, and Colombia provide important micro-level 

examples of advances within reach of troubled democracies. Nicaragua and Mozambique 

both are comparable to Afghanistan, as young democracies with little previous 

experience attempting to build a democracy after a civil war. While both states still have 

significant problems, their advances in governance and key institutions are important 

indicators of their relative stability. As well, both states have reduced the level of 

violence and incorporated former insurgents into government. Colombia provides an 

example of how to bring former enemies of the state into government, through a 

combination of military success and political overtures. Indonesia and Malaysia 

demonstrate that it is possible for a democratic government to take root in a Muslimmajority country. That is encouraging news for the Afghan state. By following the 

examples of these states, Afghanistan can make important advances which will aid her in 

developing a democratic state with staying power. 

 

196 On the liberal/communitarian question, the work of Will Kymlicka provides a useful introduction. See 

especially Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford 

University Press, 2001). 
47

A More Realistic Vision of Afghan 

Democracy and Priorities for Progress 

For the seed of democracy the international community has labored to plant in 

Afghanistan to take root it will have to be wedded to Islamic customs and laws as well as 

existing regional and local authority and customs. In essence, it must be adopted by what 

constitutes legitimate government today at all levels. It has to flower as a home grown, 

Afghan version of Islamic constitutional democracy. Even if genuine democracy takes 

hold, it can be expected to grow slowly for a long time as it melds with past concepts of 

governing, present customs and religious principles. The international community should 

re-appraise what aspects of democracy can take hold within the time, resources and 

prospects for change at hand, both for the Afghan people and with regard to the 

commitment of the international community, which is finite. 

After almost eight years, a refined vision of what type of democracy can be achieved in 

cooperation with local authorities is the foundation on which the UN, WB, NATO, EU 

and other international players can clarify priorities for civilian and military assistance 

that will bring progress toward eventual completion of this part of their mission in this 

ravaged land. 

A Vision of Democracy in Afghanistan 

Afghanistan’s leadership and its external supporters should agree to a vision of future 

democracy that is rooted in existing formal and informal local institutions, and imported 

only insofar as relevant cases studies provide true models on which Afghans can draw. 

The central government should preside over a government that delegates more authority 

to local and regional entities that it regards as partners to be served and supported. The 

degree of central control should be harmonized with the views and requirements of lower 

echelon leaders, some of which may be strong while others are weaker. Therefore the 

level of central engagement need not be the same from one region or locale to another. 

The guiding theme should be for Kabul to provide essential and carefully limited 

government service, and to do so dependably, free at least of the most egregious, overt, 

and visible corruption. 

Services that the central government should provide exclusively include protection from 

adversaries at home and abroad, the conduct of foreign and economic affairs, the 

provision of air and surface infrastructure and traffic control, trade and markets, the 

provision of electric power, telecommunications and mail services, oversight of public 

media, a federal penal systems and judiciary, authority over monetary and fiscal policy, 

including the printing of money, and provision of the ultimate court of appeals for 

individuals. The elected government should begin to stand up a professional bureaucracy, 

educated and capable of providing honest public administration. The emphasis must be 

on quality over quantity of government services. The government must also have the 

power to levy appropriate taxes to provide essential services. 
48

Authority over all manner of policy not explicitly agreed to belong to the central 

government should be allowed to reside with existing local authorities, principally at the 

village level, so long as they do not oppose the Kabul government by force or advocate 

blatant and sustained rejection of Afghan national laws. Provincial government should be 

a framework for local cooperation rather than a middleman for the disbursement of the 

central government’s funds. The nature of the mix between civil and Islamic law could be 

determined flexibly in accordance with local and regional traditions. As with any 

government system, national laws need not address every, or even most legal matters. 

Most matters should be left to local authority and afforded wide latitude. 

The goal should be to seek local embrace of a nationally elected central government that 

operates as much as possible in a nascent Afghan version of democratic political 

principles. The central government concentrates on providing the services local 

authorities and the people want from a central government, relatively effectively and 

without excessive corruption. A successful central government will refrain from 

encroachment on existing local prerogative. It will also refrain from pressing to extend its 

authority to communities for its own sake, and from seeking to remake Afghanistan in an 

external, foreign tradition of democracy. Such an arrangement, which draws upon 

existing participatory institutions native to Afghanistan, is the best the chance to start 

Afghanistan out on what will be a very long road toward an open, democratic form of 

government at the national level. Democracy at the national level can gain credibility 

only if it accounts for itself well in what is does initially, and waits patiently for greater 

acceptance and opportunities to grow over time 

Priority Areas of Focus to Achieve Afghanistan’s Vision of Democracy 

Five areas for investment of international energies should receive the highest priority and 

emphasis: strengthening security; building a path for current enemies to become political 

participants; fixing dysfunction in key institutions; taming the worse and most visible 

corruption across the central government; and developing a workable, mainly 

decentralized form of government. 

Strengthening Security 

Much has been written from a military strategy perspective on improving the security 

situation in Afghanistan. Our contribution relates the importance of security to 

developing a resilient government. Simply, the central government in Kabul has to hold a 

monopoly on the use of deadly force by armed groups throughout the country. Violence 

in the enforcement of laws, exercised proportionately by police or lawful local militias 

controlled by legitimate regional or local governments will not undermine the central 

governments claim as the sole lawful authority exercising use of force. This is no 

different than any sovereign state. 

In Afghanistan, insurgents challenge Kabul’s monopoly on the use of force in many 

regions of the country. Until the central government can assert its authority over the 

insurgents, defeating them or co-opt them into the lawful political process, it cannot 

impose its own authority and political system, democracy or any other, on the country. A 

combination of tools must be employed, but military and political, to end the insurgency 
49

against the central government. Without success in this endeavor, the international 

community cannot achieve its stated goal of a democratic Afghanistan. 

Counterinsurgency warfare is unique and requires military as well as civilian skills 

notably different from conventional combat. NATO, as the primary military assistance 

force, should excel at counterinsurgency operations across the spectrum, including 

special operations, stability operations, training of local Afghan forces and other 

activities essential to defeating insurgents. However, NATO’s military actions have to be 

closely matched by a public relations campaign to win over the populous, as well as 

government activities that demonstrate it is a far better alternative to the Taliban. 

Security is also linked to a strategic communications campaign to immediately counter 

insurgent messages and to ameliorate lost credibility when military operations result in 

the loss of civilian lives. This campaign is perhaps one of the most overlooked in terms of 

resources. However it is one of the most critical to strengthening security. 

Turning Insurgents into Political Participants 

Anti-government forces that have little chance of winning a military conflict might still 

elect to fight if political participation is impossible. Therefore, outlier groups such as the 

Taliban should be given a genuine chance at political participation. Long ago, Sun Tzu 

noted the wisdom of provided the enemy a way out, lest he choose to fight to the death in 

the absence of alternatives.197 Conflicts are rarely won unless a significant number of 

revisionists can be convinced to participate in the political system. A majority of the 

successful cases of post conflict democratization involved a transformation of antigovernment forces from purely military actors to a political force. Only in cases where 

the opposition was marginal portion of the populace, such as the Sendero Lumino in Peru, 

did eliminating capacity via force alone find success. Even in that case, members of the 

group reemerged as unsuccessful political actors following their military defeat. 

In Afghanistan, anti-government elements divide into neo-Taliban elements and less 

ideological tribal elements. Much of the core Taliban leadership is likely irreconcilable. 

However, our examination of Afghan identity suggests that local circumstances are prime 

motivators of many insurgents, just as they are for most Afghans. Much of the rank-andfile of various insurgent groups allied with and among the Taliban have been recruited at 

the local level and are motivated by local causes.198 Can these causes be answered by the 

political process rather than the gun for Afghans outside the small core of Taliban 

loyalists? 

Maulana Fazlur Rahman, a leading Taliban supporter in Pakistan, argued that Taliban 

could participate in elections in Afghanistan “so long as they were not labeled as 

terrorists [in the political process].” Even some hard-line Taliban supporters have 

distanced themselves from al-Quada.199 Few terrorist and guerilla movements are truly 

irreconcilable, desiring nothing short of the complete destruction of their adversary. Most 

groups have particular goals tied to place as well as goals related to access and policy. 

 

197Sun Tzu, The Art of War Trans. Lionel Giles (N.C.: Wilder, 2008), 45. 

198 Amin Tarzi, “The Neo-Taliban” in Crews and Tarazi, 306-307. See also David Kilcullen, The 

Accidental Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 

199 Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, “From Great Game to Grand Bargain” Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 

2008):30-44 
50

Negotiations that afford excluded groups a path into the legitimate political process in 

exchange for ending the violence have a reasonable chance for success in such 

circumstances, though the process can be uneven and long. 200 Yet insurgent groups have 

little incentive to negotiate when things are going well. As Robert Crews suggests, 

amnesty and political integration have not worked because “for many Pashtuns, the 

insurgencies straddling the Afghan-Pakistan border and sweeping across southern 

Afghanistan had become far more effective means to shape Afghan politics.”201 In both 

Nicaragua and Mozambique, negotiations were successful when insurgents accepted that 

military victory was unlikely in the short term. 

Achieving an environment wherein most elements opposed to the government are willing 

to try to shape the political system through participation rather than through violence is 

the essence of success. This requires both the ability to negotiate from a position of 

strength and making democracy meaningful at the local level. The cost of continued 

violence has to increase in parallel to the widening of opportunities to come into the 

process and achieve genuine results. Thus, along with the current increase of Allied 

military forces in Afghanistan, rank and file members of the Taliban must be brought into 

the political process. 

Including the Taliban may seem inconsistent when the Taliban persist in espousing non 

democratic goals. Some orchestration of process, timing and the release of information to 

the public is required for the desired result to be achieved. Once able to pursue their 

interests politically, anti-government forces-turned-successful-political-groups tend to 

discard violent methods. Including the Taliban does not mean accepting their brutal form 

of Islamist government.202 However, it would mean giving members of the Taliban and 

their sympathizers a chance to articulate their vision of Afghanistan, within the 

framework of a representative democracy.203

Their arguments will initially gain little support, as the Taliban remain deeply unpopular. 

However, a party based on conservative Islamic values within the context of a democracy 

could become a credible and popular political player.204 Many of these values articulated 

by such a party will not resonate well with Western values, or some members of the 

westernized Afghan elite, however they will resonate with many Afghans. As a reporter 

for the Christian Science Monitor put it, “in a place free of the prying eyes and culture 

police of the Taliban, I don't see any women not in burqas. It turns out it's a way of life 

for a conservative tribal society.”205 The acceptance of democratic rules, rather than any 

adoption of Western values, should be the only prerequisite for political participation. 

In nearly every case of successful post conflict democratization, anti-government forces 

virulently opposed to the existing order became important players in a political process 

with their onetime foes, either by becoming an important political party or by joining an 

 

200 Carrie Manning argues this point in The Making of Democrats. 201 Crews, 273. 202 Rubin and Rashid: 30-44. 203 Sources with a good knowledge of the Afghan government have suggested that the government is 

considering such an approach. 

204 Hizb-i-Islami, the erstwhile party of Gulbideen Hekmatyar, is an example of such a party. It is 

informally represented both in the Executive Branch of Government and in Parliament. 

205 Mark Sappenfield, “Backstory: An Afghan road less traveled” Christian Science Monitor March 2, 2007 
51

existing political actor. This has included a diverse set of actors in the cases we have 

examined, ranging from committed Marxists in El Salvador to ultra-conservative rightists 

in Mozambique. Long-term success in Afghanistan requires a system where many of the 

committed opponents to the Afghan government become participants in the political 

processes rather than disruptors of this process. 

Dispelling Rampant Corruption and Institution-Building: Lessons of Mozambique 

and Nicaragua 

Much of the corruption literature suggests that incremental change is more likely than a 

swift change from a society where corruption is widespread to a society where corruption 

is acceptable to minimal. In the United States, corruption peaked in the 1870s, and then 

slowly declined through a period of over 60 years.206 Even in the most advanced 

societies, some level of petty corruption tends to remain.207 National corruption tends to 

disappear more quickly than corruption among local and provincial leadership.208 

If successful governance programs will not eliminate corruption, what should 

improvement look like? Success should limit spectacular corruption at the highest levels, 

eliminate the routineization of corruption (in which citizens always experience 

corruption), and reduce corruption that compromises public safety and justice. 

Nicaragua and Mozambique both continue to suffer from significant levels of corruption; 

however, both states have improved their performance in key areas. High level corruption 

is a problem in both states. We have seen that Nicaragua’s attempts to prosecute corrupt 

officials have been met with significant difficulties, and political influence still remains 

in the justice system when luminaries are involved. Nonetheless, visible attempts to 

prosecute corrupt officials are an important break from impunity. 

A second important difference is the performance of institutions connected with public 

safety. In Afghanistan, the court system is considered to be the most untrustworthy 

element of Afghanistan’s government. Indeed, many respondents to opinion polls 

maintained that they would prefer justice administered by the Taliban to the cumbersome 

and corrupt process. Judges had minimal training, and salaries ranging from $35-50 per 

month—insufficient to support a family.209 Confidence in police is likewise limited; the 

police are seen more as parasites that extract resources from citizens rather than 

providing important services.210

In this regard, while Nicaraguan and Mozambiquen courts and police still are a long ways 

from excellent, they are not actively undermining public support for their government. 

 

206 Edward Glaeser and Claudia Goldin, “Corruption and Reform: Introduction” in Edward Glaeser and 

Claudia Goldin eds., Corruption and Reform (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 10-15. 207 Paula Tiihonen, “Good Governance and Corruption in Finland” in Seppo Tiihonen, ed, The History of 

Corruption in Central Government (Amsterdam and Oxford: IOS, 2003), 101-102. 208 The experience in the United States provides compelling evidence in this regard. See Greene, Grand 

Corruption and State Donors in Nicaragua. 209 Barnett, section 6. 210 Andrew Wilder, Cops or Robbers (AREU, 2007). 

http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=&task=doc_download&gid=523Chris 

Sands, “We want the Taliban back, say ordinary Afghans” The Independent, April 8, 2007. 
52

Indeed, the police in Nicaragua are considered more trustworthy than political parties and 

most government ministries.211 

Political will has been vital to the establishment of institutions designed to combat 

corruption and the strengthening of existing structures such as the police and courts.212 In 

Nicaragua, political will in the executive was an important element in many anticorruption programs. Mozambique has also seen significant success in its judicial sector, 

developing a system with a reputation for relatively strong independence and impartiality 

In Afghanistan, we question the political will of the Karazi government to address 

corruption and fundamental problems. Many figures close to Karazi, including his 

brother Ahmed Wali Karzai, have been linked to drug trafficking. The record of the 

government in dealing with the drug trade at high levels is abysmal. The government also 

has a record of simply moving corrupt officials from post to post. Political will cannot 

create norms or excellent prosecution by itself. But will is the difference between no anticorruption efforts and some. 

Corruption at the provincial level and below is high among local strongmen and others in 

positions of power. While problematic, such illegality is not likely to undermine public 

support for the central government unless it is linked to national ministries and 

employees. Unfortunately, the system of enshrining local leaders in government roles has 

involved the central government in the further corruption of provincial leaders. The 

government should separate essential government services from funds presided over by 

local leadership. Joel Midgel notes that one of the most dangerous failures of limited 

states is the cooption of government officials at the province level by local strongmen. 

For a flexible system to work, the defined instruments of the national government must 

be free from the manipulation of a particular regional interest.213 At the same time, the 

most democratic of Afghanistan’s institutions, local Jirgas and Shuras, should be given 

greater responsibilities in the allocation of government resources for local projects, as 

leadership at the village level is less prone to corruption.214 

As Hamilton remarked of the much weaker American federal government at the time of 

the republic’s foundation, transfer of allegiance from the local to national will only occur 

over a significant period of time, and only if the national government proves itself more 

effective than then local leadership.215 

Decentralized Government 

Finally, a democracy in Afghanistan must work with the reality of local indemnities and 

local structures of governance. We have previously seen that Afghanistan is comprised of 

a diverse population with a complex set of identities and interests, most of them at the 

 

211 “Informe Latinobarómetro,” 2007 and2008. 212 The election of Daniel Ortega as president in Nicaragua threatens to undermine the gains Nicaragua has 

achieved, as Ortega previously worked with Arnoldo Alemán to circumvent the country’s anti corruption 

legislation. 

213 Midgel, Strong Societies and Weak States. See especially chapter 7. 214 Ehsan Zia, Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, made this point in conversation after a 

presentation. 

215 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 17 
53

local rather than national level. An Afghan democracy must recognize this reality both in 

developing support for the government and in building a system that works. 

The primacy of local interests among most Afghans, including many opponents of the 

government, provides an opportunity to bring some militants into political participation. 

At the same time, the government must carefully balance competing local interests and 

the recognition of existing power structures. 

Centralized government is not the only option available to a democratizing country. 

Indeed, some studies of democracy have suggested that in societies with diverse local 

populations of different ethnicities and languages, a system with greater autonomy results 

in both better performance and greater satisfaction among the populace.216 A federal 

system, in which the national government performs tasks related to security and the 

provision of public goods, while local leaders had a great deal of autonomy in regulating 

the affairs of their communities, looks quite similar to the United States of the 1700 and 

early 1800s.217 

One encouraging example of such governance is the National Solidarity Program. By 

working with a group of local notables chosen by populations at the village, known as 

Community Development Councils, the government can make wise aid dispersal 

decisions. By respecting local wishes and interests in development planning, the 

government is able to address local concerns through community involvement, rather 

than governing through a top-down mandate. Because of local participation, corruption at 

the province level is significantly reduced. Such active partnership between the national 

government and local government should be expanded, with local villages being given 

autonomy on matters not related to security and other essentials and control over 

sufficient resources to administer local initiatives.218 

At the same time, the national government must be seen as an honest broker between 

competing regional and national interests. Care must be exercised when rewards and 

honors are dispersed by the central government or the international community at the 

district and provincial level. The government must not create a perception of bias, or 

provide an ethnic or tribal group with sufficient resources with which to damage a rival. 

This is particularly important when plans are made to arm locals under the auspices of the 

national government. 

Recap of Central Findings 

Measured according to the democracy metric (page 20-26), the current situation in 

Afghanistan is far from even a mediocre democracy. Numerous obstacles stand in the 

way of meaningful participation, insecurity is high, institutions are feeble, and corruption 

 

216 See for example Arend LijphartPatterns of Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). 217 Ehsan Zia, “Development in Afghanistan: The National Solidarity Plan and Beyond” presentation at 

CSIS, Washington D.C, February 26, 2009. Alexis de Tocqueville’s description of the primacy of the local 

in Democracy in America is a key example. 218 Zia, “Development in Afghanistan: The National Solidarity Plan and Beyond.” See also Seema Patel 

and Steven Ross, “Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan” CSIS report, March 29, 2007, and 

Frederick Barton, et al, “Afghanistan and Pakistan On The Brink” CSIS Report, February 21, 2009
54

is rife. However, our comparative study of successful post conflict democracies offers 

several conclusions and policy recommendations on a way forward. 

1. Democracy takes a long time to develop—the United States and NATO allies must be 

realistic about what can be achieved in Afghanistan during their tenure, particularly when 

conflict has yet to end. Democracy along the lines of the United States or its NATO allies 

is not the best model. 

2. State security and public security—law and order—are both essential to any lasting 

democracy 

3. In order to achieve security, a political as well as military solution is necessary. 

Workable solutions require involving opposition groups. It may also require compromise 

on some aspects of democracy, at least in the near term. 

4. Key institutions must be stood up and function effectively. This is a lengthy process. 

Competency in public safety and justice is vital for a functioning state. Therefore 

developing competent law enforcement and a strong judicial system are critical priorities. 

5. Corruption must be contained Afghans, like nearly all cultures, experience and tolerate 

some corruption, however the level of corruption emanating from Kabul is intolerable. 

Such blatant graft triggers support for alternatives such as the Taliban, in spite of their 

ruthless past. 

6. Non-Western models of transitioning to democracy after conflict, in particular, those 

states with a majority Muslim population and declared state religion of Islam, provide the 

best roadmap and lessons for Afghanistan. There are several such examples but it does 

not appear they are being utilized either by international planners or by Kabul. 

7. The initial years of transition to democracy often do not look very good—uneven 

performance is to be expected. However, this can not be an excuse for abysmal 

governance, failure to establish appropriate institutions, or a lack of security. 

Given the above conclusions, it is important to be realistic about what Afghanistan will 

look like in ten or fifteen year’s time. Developing a democracy in a post conflict situation 

takes several years after hostilities have largely ceased. And that often the principal 

accomplishment of such democracies is preventing the reemergence of conflict among 

constituent groups. The institutions, quality, and capacity of the Afghan government are 

quite weak, and its inability to establish security demonstrates that conflict is not yet at an 

end. An Afghanistan with characteristics similar to a Nicaragua or a Mozambique would 

be a remarkable achievement. Establishing security and establishing real capabilities in 

essential institutions such as police and the judicial system are challenges of the first 

order. Basic services such as electrical power, communications, water supply, and 

infrastructure are other important indicators of a functioning government. As well, 

current opponents of the government should be constructively involved in the political 

process. 

If a post conflict democracy can establish security and a basic level of competence in 

institutions, as well as include much of the opposition in an electoral framework, 

Afghanistan will be considered a success in the eyes of the world. A return to conflict 

will then be unlikely. This does not mean an end point to the need for international 

assistance, but it will bring a change in focus. Improving an imperfect democracy 
55

requires a different type of assistance than providing security. Security would allow much 

of the NATO military mission to leave. Such an Afghanistan would not be an ideal 

democracy, but it would be the type of Afghan-tailored democracy achievable in the next 

ten to fifteen years. 

Policy Recommendations 

Controlling Violence 

1. NATO ISAF and U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom forces must be strong 

enough and capable of focusing sufficiently on insurgents to check their advance 

and inflict telling damage on their military capacity. Afghanistan needs a respite 

of 2-3 years from attacks to develop and consolidate governance. In military 

operations, avoiding the adverse impact of collateral civilian casualties must 

continue to receive the highest command consideration. 

2. The Afghan National Army should press hard to establish and maintain the 

highest quality, especially among its core cadres at every organizational level. It 

has to weigh the pressing need for a larger ready force with the patience and 

careful selection processes required to engender enduring professionalism. It will 

be easier to set and maintain quality than to reverse unacceptable performance 

later. With this proviso, every effort should be expended to put in the field the 

most capable forces as soon as possible. 

3. The first responsibility of the Afghan National Police should be public safety and 

security. The ANP must be free of egregious visible corruption and capable of 

gaining public trust. In addition to responding to local civilian authorities, it must 

be capable of teamwork with the military when necessary. The ANP should 

include some highly responsive an robust paramilitary elements in order to 

reinforce local police units when military force is inappropriate or not 

immediately available 

4. Pakistani forces operating from the Pakistan side of the Durrand Line are also 

critical to controlling violence inside Afghanistan. Government of Pakistan 

cooperation with the ANA might best be effected via international intermediaries, 

and take the form of military-to-military contacts, information sharing, and 

cooperation aimed at mutual confidence building. These initiatives should be 

fostered whenever the possibility is present. 

5. International intelligence sharing should be pursued in order to allow 

collaboration as much and as often as possible in locating and targeting insurgent 

forces. Governments and militaries should seek opportunities to learn from each 

other’s operations in order to improve the overall effectiveness of 

counterinsurgency operations. 

Incorporating Enemies 

1. Any reconciliation effort requires advances in counterinsurgency—opponents of a 

regime would not agree to join in if they are winning. The ballot box has to 

present a more likely chance of success than the battlefield. 
56

2. Alongside successful counterinsurgency operations, past efforts of offering 

amnesty must be improved. A systematic, national program which offers a chance 

of meaningful political involvement must be developed alongside military 

advances. A wholesale “us against them” approach must be avoided. 

3. Careful attention should be given to the resolution of local grievances in 

recruiting militants and ex-militants. 

Corruption and Institution-building 

1. The national government should remove corrupt officials found in the national 

government at high levels whenever possible, rather than the current practice of 

moving them around. Cleaning house should be made public. Restoring 

confidence in government institutions should be a top priority 

2. Local leaders can be rewarded for ‘good behavior’ with patronage. Appearance of 

fairness as well as promulgation of ‘the rules of the games’ is appropriate on a 

judicious scale. However, while a small advantage for cooperative leadership is 

one thing, corruption cannot be gross and must not extract from the property of 

individual citizens. 

3. Wages for police, judges, and other key administrative officials should be 

sufficient to provide a living for officials without obliging them to resort to 

extortion. 

4. The United States and the international community should clearly cast their 

support for individual officials as being wedded to the Afghan national interest, as 

demonstrated by performance, and specifically, to honest expended effort. 

Unreasonable goals of success are counterproductive, but often limited progress 

in the provision of services adds to public trust and confidence in Kabul. 

Centralization and Local Relevance 

1. Notwithstanding provisions of the 2004 constitution that call for centralization, 

informal arrangements that provide more space for local governance as well as 

more provisions for local control over some resources should be established. This 

would not require any explicit change in the constitution, but it should result in a 

change of emphasis on the part of the government in Kabul as well as its 

international supporters. The formal structure of government in Afghanistan has 

been described as one of the most centralized states in the world.219 Such 

centralization it not the best fit for Afghanistan. The national government should 

refocus on a more limited portfolio of essential functions, and gradually win the 

support of the populace by working with local authorities on other issues. 

2. More autonomy should be given to village and sub-district level informal 

institutions. These are often representative councils that govern well, shun the 

Taliban and are averse to poppy cultivation and drug labs. More autonomous local 

councils should quickly realize positive effects in terms of public support and in 

their working relations with the central government. Local accountability will also 

improve the administrative performance of government projects. The Community 

 

219Lister and Nixon, “The Place of the Province in Afghanistan's Subnational Governance” Rotberg.., 
57

Development Councils formed through the current National Solidarity may be a 

useful model of local autonomy.220 

3. The central government must determine a few priority service areas that it can and 

will execute well in the near term. Law and order is critical, however it is not 

enough. Steady progress toward infrastructure expansion and reliable delivery of 

services, most critically road, power, and telecommunications, will demonstrate 

competence over time.221 Clean water, medical facilities, economic development 

programs that bring jobs, the regulation of trade, and facilitating education are 

appropriate priorities as well. 

Knowing what can be achieved and what international norms consider a working 

democracy are essential factors in crafting policies to succeed in Afghanistan. 

Realistic goals should be articulated, and this research should help policy makers in 

doing so. The twin pillars of growing a democratic Afghanistan are security and 

measured, capable central government working in tandem with existing local 

authorities. Democracy cannot replace Afghanistan’s authorities, but rather must be 

built into it by Afghans as they are able to accept the tenets of a new political 

philosophy. International assistance will be needed for a long time for such an 

enterprise to succeed. However, it is within our collective means within a number of 

years to quell insurgent attempts to kill off democratic representative government 

before it can take root. The rest will be up to the caliber of the leaders in Kabul and 

the resilience of the people of Afghanistan. 

 

220 Zia, , “Development in Afghanistan: The National Solidarity Plan and Beyond.”. Projects administered 

through local leadership have reduced levels of corruption. 

221 Some initial successes has been achieved in infrastructure projects, such as significant progress on the 

ring road and power initiatives importing power from Uzbekistan to Kabul and from Iran to Heart, with the 

assistance of international donors. 
58

Maps 

1.Ethnic Composition of Afghanistan 

Source: The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 

October 2001-March 2003
59

2. Number of Growing Days 

Source: FAO (UN)