J. S71009/15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

RHONDA L. BRILLA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

WILLIAM M. BRILLA, : No. 2063 WDA 2014

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Order, November 14, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County

Civil Division at No. 2002-1648-CD 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN AND OTT, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 1, 2016

William M. Brilla appeals, pro se, from the order entered 

November 14, 2014, by the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County, 

finding him in civil contempt for failing to make payments to his ex-wife 

Rhonda L. Brilla as required in the trial court’s April 12, 2013 order. We 

affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history as follows:

The present appeal is the latest in a long series 

of appeals in a divorce and custody matter. To say 

that this case is litigious grossly understates the 

matter. The initial divorce complaint was filed in 

2002, and has now grown to include more than three 

hundred and thirty three docket entries, and multiple 

appeals to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. So 

voluminous is the file, that it cannot be maintained 

with the rest of the files in the local Prothonotary’s 

office. Indeed, this file has its own shelf.
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It is unnecessary, if not impossible, for the 

Court to recite the entire factual and procedural 

history of this case. Suffice it to say that this time, 

[appellant] is claiming that the Court erred in finding 

him in contempt on November 13, 2014 for failing to 

make payments in accordance with an Order entered 

on April 12, 2013. The [a]ppellant has alleged eight 

errors on the part of the Trial Court in his Concise 

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. 

However, they are mostly duplicative or irrelevant, 

and can simply be summarized as the Appellant feels 

that the Trial Court abused its discretion in failing to 

find him unable to comply with the Court’s Order of 

April 12, 2013.

In an Order of January 28, 2010, the Court 

ordered that both parties share an equal fifty percent 

share of the marital debt at the date of separation. 

Therefore, the [a]ppellant was ordered to pay 

$14,363.00 in monthly installments of $400.00 

beginning in April of 2010. Brilla v. Brilla, 100 A.3d 

309 (Pa.Super.Ct. 2014) (table). Appellant failed to 

comply with the January 28, 2010 Order; upon 

[a]ppellee’s petition, in an Order dated April 12, 

2013, [a]ppellant was found in contempt.

In the Order dated April 12, 2013, judgment 

was entered against the [a]ppellant in the amount of 

$15,363.00[,] plus the statutory interest rate of 6% 

per annum. At the time of the Order, the [a]ppellant 

was unemployed and struggling financially, so the 

Court did not Order him to make any payments on 

the judgment until he secured employment. Upon 

obtaining employment, the Order then required 

[a]ppellant to make payments of $250.00 per 

month. Not only did the Court not require the 

[a]ppellant to make payments while he was 

unemployed, but the $250.00 per month amount he 

was required to pay once he obtained employment 

was a significant reduction from the $400.00 

monthly amount he was originally ordered to pay per 

the January 28, 2010 Order.
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In any event, the [a]ppellant successfully did 

secure employment. However, he only made 

nominal payments; most of which were less than 

twenty dollars. Consequently, in October of 2014, 

the [a]ppellee brought a contempt petition against 

the [a]ppellant.

At the contempt hearing, the Court reviewed 

the [a]ppellant’s payment history regarding the 

April 12, 2013 Order, as well as financial information 

offered by the [a]ppellant, and other evidence 

presented by the parties. The financial information 

offered by the [a]ppellant himself, reveals that he

had ample funds available to make payments in 

accordance with the April 12, 2013 Order. This is 

particularly true when the Court disregards obviously 

inflated and irrelevant expenses such as $100.00 

monthly expense for an “Animal,” $100.00 monthly 

expense for “Kristin,” and $35.00 monthly expense 

to pay for his paramour’s fine. The [a]ppellant made 

payments ranging in the amount from $1.00 to 

$25.00. These payments are not in compliance with 

the Court Order. Rather, these payments appear to 

be meant to antagonize the [a]ppellee.

Simply put, the Court heard testimony from 

both parties at the contempt hearing, considered all 

of the evidence presented, and found that 

[a]ppellant was able to comply with the April 12, 

2013 Order. However, for whatever reason, the 

[a]ppellant chose not to comply. Therefore, the 

Court found him in contempt.

Trial court opinion, 4/23/15 at 1-4.

Appellant frames his statement of questions involved as follows:

1. Did the trial court demonstrate partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will toward the 

[a]ppellant?

2. Was the trial courts [sic] order of 

November 14, 2014 unreasonable when 

viewed in light of it’s [sic] own order of 
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September 23, 2013, finding that the 

[a]ppellant was complying “consistent with his 

financial situation”?

3. Was the [a]ppellant denied the right to 

respond to the trial courts [sic] allegations of 

“obviously inflated” and “irrelevant 

expenses” contained in its Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(1) opinion? (emphasis in original)

4. Does the evidence and testimony presented by 

the [a]ppellee show that the [a]ppellant was 

attempting to make some sort of payment 

“consistent with his financial situation” and 

keeping them informed regarding his financial 

situation?

5. Does the evidence and testimony presented by 

the [a]ppellant show progress made on the 

issue of his mortgage, and that a settlement, 

in compliance with the trial courts [sic] order 

of April 12, 2013, was imminent?

6. Was the evidence and testimony given by the 

[a]ppellant, and his witness, presented to the 

trial court without objection or refute?

7. Did the trial court deliberately disregard a 

possible settlement proposed by the [a]ppellee 

for an amount less than $250.00 specified in 

the April 12, 2013 order?

8. Did the [a]ppellee present any evidence or 

testimony at the November 12 [sic], 2014 

hearing that demonstrated the [a]ppellant had 

any ability to strictly comply with the trial 

courts [sic] order of April 12, 2013, or show 

that he acted with wrongful intent? (emphasis 

in original)

9. Did the trial court dispute any of the evidence 

or testimony presented during the 

November 14, 2015 hearing?
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Appellant’s brief at 5-6.

At the outset, we note that pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), the trial 

court ordered appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained of 

on appeal. (Order, 3/17/15; R.R. at 376.) In his concise statement, 

appellant set forth the following two issues:

1. The [c]ourt erred in finding the [appellee] not 

in contempt and dismissing [appellant’s] 

complaint.

2. The [c]ourt’s decision appears to stem from 

bias and ill will directed toward the [appellant].

Concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, 4/6/15; R.R. at 318. 

Clearly, appellant’s Rule 1925 statement does not raise, or even hint at, 

issues 2 through 9 raised in his brief, and we find these issues waived. 

Moreover, his Rule 1925 issue alleging error by the trial court in not finding 

wife in contempt and dismissing his complaint does not relate to the 

November 14, 2014 order that is the subject of this appeal. The only issue 

preserved for our review is appellant’s first issue which alleges prejudice and 

bias on the part of the trial court.

In considering an appeal from a contempt order, we place great 

reliance upon the trial court’s discretion. Bold v. Bold, 939 A.2d 892, 894-

895 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted). As such, appellate review of a 

contempt finding is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. Id. (citation omitted).
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Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with 

law on facts and circumstances before the trial court 

after hearing and consideration. Consequently, the 

court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue 

for decision, it misapplies the law or exercises its 

discretion in a manner lacking reason. Similarly, the 

trial court abuses its discretion if it does not follow 

legal procedure.

Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, we will reverse an order granting or 

denying a civil contempt petition only upon a showing that the trial court 

misapplied the law or exercised its discretion in a manner that lacked 

reason. MacDougall v. MacDougall, 49 A.3d 890, 892 (Pa.Super. 2012) 

(citation omitted). Moreover, we defer to the trial court’s credibility 

determinations with respect to witnesses who have appeared before it 

because that court has had the opportunity to observe their demeanor. 

Habjan v. Habjan, 73 A.3d 630, 644 (Pa.Super. 2013).

Generally, in civil contempt proceedings, the complainant bears the 

burden of proving that the defendant failed to comply with a court order. 

MacDougall, 49 A.3d at 892 (citation omitted). To sustain a finding of civil 

contempt, the complainant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that (1) the contemnor had notice of the order that she alleges the 

contemnor disobeyed; (2) the act constituting the alleged violation was 

volitional; and (3) the contemnor acted with wrongful intent. Id. (citation 

omitted).

Here, appellant does not dispute notice, volition, or wrongful intent. 

Moreover, he does not contend that the trial court misapplied the law or 
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exercised its discretion in a manner that lacked reason. Rather, appellant 

complains that the trial court had already formed its conclusions regarding 

contempt prior to the hearing. (Appellant’s brief at 14.)

However, our careful review of the record finds no indication of any 

partiality or bias on the part of the trial court. It is clear that the trial court 

was aware of the long and litigious history of this case. The court gave 

careful consideration to appellant’s ability to pay the judgment owed and 

even modified its original order of April 12, 2013, to allow appellant relief 

while he sought employment. The court reviewed appellant’s financial 

circumstances and payment history before entering this order on appeal, 

and we find its exercise of discretion free of any prejudice against appellant.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/1/2016