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i 

89–512 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–119] 

UNMANNED CARRIER–LAUNCHED 

AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE AND STRIKE 

(UCLASS) REQUIREMENTS ASSESSMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 16, 2014 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, July 16, 2014, Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) Requirements Assessment ................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, July 16, 2014 ....................................................................................... 41 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 2014 

UNMANNED CARRIER–LAUNCHED AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE AND 

STRIKE (UCLASS) REQUIREMENTS ASSESSMENT 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................................. 1 

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Subcommittee on 

Seapower and Projection Forces ......................................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Andress, Mark D., Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance .................................................................................................... 26 

Brimley, Shawn, Executive Vice President and Director of Studies, Center 

for a New American Security .............................................................................. 9 

Grosklags, VADM Paul A., USN, Principal Military Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisitions, Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 24 

Guastella, Brig Gen Joseph T., USAF, Deputy Director for Requirements 

(J–8), Joint Staff ................................................................................................... 25 

Martinage, Robert, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments ..................................................................................................................... 5 

McGrath, Bryan, Managing Director, FerryBridge Group, LLC ......................... 10 

O’Rourke, Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service .......................................................................................................................... 3

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Brimley, Shawn ................................................................................................ 73 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 45 

Grosklags, VADM Paul A., joint with Mark D. Andress and Brig Gen 

Joseph T. Guastella ...................................................................................... 101 

Martinage, Robert ............................................................................................ 61 

McGrath, Bryan ................................................................................................ 86 

McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................... 50 

O’Rourke, Ronald .............................................................................................. 51 
Page

IV 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 111 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 112 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 115 
(1) 

UNMANNED CARRIER–LAUNCHED AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE AND STRIKE (UCLASS) REQUIREMENTS ASSESSMENT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 16, 2014. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. We want to welcome you to this hearing this afternoon. I apologize at the beginning; we are going to have a vote series that takes place, but we will be back. It is an important hearing and we want to go as long as it takes to get this done. 

Today the subcommittee convenes to receive testimony on the 

Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike 

(UCLASS) program. 

Our first panel of distinguished guests testifying before us are 

Mr. Ronald O’Rourke. He is a specialist in naval affairs, Defense 

Policy and Arms Control Section for the Congressional Research 

Service; Mr. Robert Martinage, former Deputy Under Secretary of 

the Navy; Mr. Shawn Brimley, Executive Vice President and Director of Studies for the Center for a New American Security; and Mr. 

Bryan McGrath, Managing Director of FerryBridge Group, LLC. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for being here. 

Collectively, this bipartisan group has advised the United States 

Congress and Presidential campaigns, commanded a Navy largesurface combatant, drafted the 2007 maritime strategy, served as 

Under Secretary of the Navy, served on the National Security 

Council staff, and worked at various distinguished think tanks. 

Given their diverse background, I am confident that this bipartisan group of witnesses will be able to provide a detailed perspective of this committee’s continued work on the UCLASS program. 

Our second distinguished panel, which will immediately follow 

this one, includes Navy and Joint Staff leaders, including Vice Admiral Paul A. Grosklags, Principal Military Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisitions; 

Mr. Mark Andress, Assistant Deputy Chief of Operations for Infor-
2 

† Mr. Forbes corrected his remarks for the record and recognizes General Guastella’s correct 

title, ‘‘Deputy Director for Requirements (J-8), Joint Staff.’’ 

mation Dominance; Brigadier General Joseph Guastella, Director of 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Department of Defense.† 

Gentlemen, once again, we thank you for being here. 

We have called this hearing to discuss the Navy’s UCLASS program. But before we proceed, I want to be clear from the onset that 

I am a strong supporter of a future carrier air wing that is comprised of both manned and unmanned aviation assets. The F/A–18 

Super Hornet, the F–35C, the EA–18G Growler, the E–2 Hawkeye, 

and the UCLASS program will all be integral to ensuring our carrier fleet can continue to project power throughout the globe. 

I believe the fundamental question we face is not about the utility of unmanned aviation to the future air wing, but the type of unmanned platform that the UCLASS program will deliver and specific capabilities this vital asset will provide the combatant commander. 

Given the likely operational environment of the 2020s and beyond, including in both the Western Pacific Ocean and Persian 

Gulf, I believe strongly that the Nation needs to procure a UCAV 

[unmanned combat air vehicle] platform that can operate as a longrange surveillance and strike asset in the contested and denied A2/ 

AD [anti-access/area-denial] environments of the future. 

Unfortunately, in its current form, this committee has concluded 

the UCLASS air systems segments requirements will not address 

the emerging anti-access/area-denial challenges to U.S. power projection that originally motivated creation of the Navy Unmanned 

Combatant Air System program during the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] and which were reaffirmed in both the 2010 

QDR and 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. 

It is my determination that the disproportionate emphasis in the 

requirements on unfueled endurance to enable continuous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] support to the carrier strike group would result in an aircraft design that would have 

serious deficiencies in both survivability and internal weapons payload capacity and flexibility. 

Furthermore, the cost limits for the aircraft are more consistent 

with a much less capable aircraft and will not enable the Navy to 

build a relevant vehicle that leverages readily available and mature technology. 

In short, developing a new carrier-based manned aircraft that is 

primarily another unmanned ISR sensor that can operate in a 

medium- to high-level threat environment would be a missed opportunity and inconsistent with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, which called for the United States to maintain its ability to 

project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate 

are challenged. 

But the question of UCLASS is not just one of design and capability. It is also about the roll and responsibility that Congress has 

in cultivating, supporting, and protecting military innovation. 

Like with the shift from cavalry to mechanized forces, sailing 

ships to steam-powered vessels, the battleship to naval aviation, or 

adopting unmanned aerial vehicles in the late 1990s, ideas that ini-
3 

tiate difficult changes and disrupt current practices are often first 

opposed by organizations and bureaucracies that are inclined to 

preserve the status quo. 

I believe the Congress has a unique role to help push the Department and the services in directions that, while challenging, will ultimately benefit our national security and defense policy. 

I therefore intend to use this hearing today to explore not just 

the UCLASS program, but the broader utility a UCAV can have on 

the Navy’s ability to continue to project power from the aircraft 

carrier and the implications for the power-projection mission in the 

future if we proceed down the current course. 

Again, I thank our two panels for being here to testify and look 

forward to your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

Mr. FORBES. And with that, I turn to my good friend, Mr. 

Courtney, for any comments he might have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CONNECTICUT, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the panel for being here. Given the time squeeze, 

I am going to be very brief. 

Reading the testimony of both panels, I actually think that—you 

know, really, I think everyone is trying to get to the same end result here, which is a carrier-based unmanned air wing. I think 

there is important discussion that needs to take place about sort 

of the path in terms of moving forward. 

And, again, I think, even though we are sort of walking a tightrope here a little bit because we are talking about a classified process, so we really can’t fully flesh out, I think, all aspects of that 

path at this hearing because it is a public hearing, not a classified 

hearing. Again, I look forward to the testimony. 

Again, Mr. McIntyre had some brief remarks which, again, for 

the record, I would ask that they be entered. 

Mr. FORBES. Without objection, we will put any comments that 

Mr. McIntyre has in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McIntyre can be found in the Appendix on page 50.] 

Mr. COURTNEY. With that, I will yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Joe. 

And, with that, Mr. O’Rourke, we would love to hear any comments that you might have. 

STATEMENT OF RONALD O’ROURKE, SPECIALIST IN NAVAL 

AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today to testify on the UCLASS 

program. 

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit my 

written statement for the record and summarize it here briefly. 

Mr. FORBES. And, without objection, all the statements of our 

witnesses will be submitted for the record. 
4 

Mr. O’ROURKE. As requested, my testimony identifies some 

issues the subcommittee might consider in assessing operational 

requirements for the UCLASS program. 

My statement presents six such issues. The first is whether we 

are currently undergoing a shift in strategic eras. 

World events since late last year have led to a discussion among 

observers about whether we are currently shifting from the familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20 to 25 years to a new and different strategic area characterized by, among other things, renewed 

great power competition. 

The shift from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era led to a 

reassessment of assumptions and frameworks of analysis regarding 

defense funding levels, strategy and missions that resulted in numerous changes in U.S. defense plans and programs while leaving 

other programs unchanged. A shift from the post-Cold War era to 

a new strategic era could lead to another such reassessment. 

Current requirements for the UCLASS program reflect analyses 

that were done between 2009 and 2011 and then updated and revalidated from 2012 through April 2013. This activity predates the 

events starting in late 2013 that have led to the discussion over the 

possible shift in strategic eras. 

Potential questions include the following: 

First, are we undergoing a shift from the post-Cold War era to 

a new strategic era? 

Second, if we are undergoing such a shift, should that lead to a 

reassessment of assumptions and frameworks of analyses relating 

to defense funding levels, strategy, and missions? 

And, third, if there is such a reassessment, what effect, if any, 

might it have on UCLASS requirements? 

A second issue the subcommittee might consider is how requirements for the UCLASS program might affect cost, schedule, and 

technical risk. 

On the issue of cost, the Navy explained to me that the program’s affordability KPP [key performance parameters] is based on 

the UCLASS AOA [analysis of alternatives] update and Navy discussions with industry about potential costs for the UCLASS program as currently defined, plus lessons from the UCAS–D [Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstrator program] effort. 

Defining the affordability KPP in this manner can help ensure 

that the affordability KPP is realistic for the program as currently 

defined. 

At the same time, in the context of a debate over requirements, 

this approach can produce a definition of affordability that can be 

viewed as circular, to some degree, because it can be understood as 

saying, in essence, what is affordable is the program with the current requirements. 

A definition of affordability that is, to some degree, circular in 

nature in relation to requirements has the potential for being invoked as a rhetorical device for discouraging or closing down debate on requirements. 

A third issue the subcommittee may wish to consider is how requirements for the UCLASS program might affect estimated outcomes in future operational scenarios. 
5 

The specific tactical situations that were examined in the 

UCLASS AOA are related to the program’s current requirements. 

Assessing alternative requirements could involve examining potential outcomes in other tactical situations, and a broader analysis 

might examine how changes in requirements might affect estimated outcomes in campaign-level force-on-force situations rather 

than in specific tactical situations. 

A fourth issue the subcommittee might consider is how UCLASS 

requirements relate to assessments of potential future adversary 

capabilities, for example, how sensitive are requirements for the 

UCLASS program to changes and assessments of potential future 

adversary capabilities and how much uncertainty or potential for 

changes is there in these threat assessments. 

A fifth issue the subcommittee might consider is how requirements for the UCLASS program might affect potential technology 

paths for future systems and capabilities, for example, what effect 

might UCLASS requirements have on opening up, preserving, or 

encumbering potential pathways for achieving the Navy’s current 

long-term vision for naval aviation or potential alternatives to that 

vision. 

A sixth issue the subcommittee might consider is how requirements for the UCLASS program might affect the behavior of other 

countries. For example, what impact might UCLASS requirements 

have in terms of imposing costs on potential adversaries or persuading potential adversaries—dissuading potential adversaries 

from taking certain courses of action or reassuring U.S. allies and 

partners regarding U.S. intentions and resolve. 

These six issues are by no means the only ones that might be 

raised, but considering them might help in forming a framework of 

analysis for assessing UCLASS requirements. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks, and I look forward to 

the subcommittee’s questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Rourke can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. Martinage, we look forward to your comments. Thank you 

for being here. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT MARTINAGE, SENIOR FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 

Mr. MARTINAGE. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, 

and members of this distinguished committee, first off, thank you 

for the opportunity to share my views on system performance requirements for UCLASS. 

I would also like to express my appreciation to the committee for 

taking an active interest in what is one of the most important force 

development issues facing the Department of Defense and the Navy 

in particular. 

I really don’t think it is much of an exaggeration to say that 

what is at stake here is not just the operational relevance of the 

carrier air wing in the future, but, really, the strategic relevance 

of the aircraft carrier for decades to come. 

I would like to highlight four themes from my written statement: 

first, how to think about UCLASS requirements broadly; second, 
6 

the opportunity cost of unnecessarily high unrefueled endurance; 

third, some thoughts about payload requirements; and, fourth, 

what a more balanced UCLASS design might look like. 

So, first and foremost, an assessment of UCLASS requirements 

should begin with a very simple question: What is the core operational challenge that UCLASS should be designed to solve? 

The dominant answer within the Navy currently and reportedly 

reflected in the UCLASS draft request for proposal, or RFP, is that 

UCLASS is needed to maintain continuous maritime domain 

awareness around the carrier strike group as well as to identify 

targets for attack by relatively short-range manned fighters. 

An alternative view, and one that reaches back to the initiation 

of the program by OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and 

then the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] Roughhead in 2009, is 

that the more pressing problem is maintaining our ability to 

project power from the sea when, one, carriers are compelled to 

stand off a considerable distance, perhaps 1,000 miles or more, 

from an adversary’s territory due to emerging anti-access and areadenial challenges, like anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise 

missiles, wake-homing torpedos—and the list goes on and on—and 

then, second, when it is necessary to find and attack fixed and 

relocatable targets that are defended by modern innovative air defense systems. 

If you believe we need more capacity to generate maritime domain awareness around the carrier strike group than what will be 

available when more than 60 MQ–4C Tritons, formerly BAMS 

[Broad Area Maritime Surveillance], enter into service, along with 

MQ–8B/C Fire Scouts that can operate off any air-capable ship in 

the fleet, then the current draft RFP, at least as reported in the 

press, is probably about right. 

If you believe we need even more capacity for persistent ISR and 

light strike in low-to-medium threat environments, beyond the several hundred aircraft and the Predator, Gray Eagle, and Reaper 

fleets, then the draft RFP for UCLASS is probably on track. 

If you believe instead that UCLASS should be the next step in 

the evolution of the carrier air wing and must be able to provide 

sea-based surveillance and strike capacity in anticipated anti-access and area-denial environments, then the Navy is aiming well 

off the mark, which brings us to theme two: The opportunity cost 

of the current threshold requirement for unrefueled endurance. 

Driven by the perceived need to maintain continuous maritime 

domain awareness around the carrier strike group, including overnight while the deck is closed, the draft RFP reportedly contains 

a derived threshold requirement for an unrefueled endurance of 

about 14 hours. 

The opportunity cost of that 14 hours of unrefueled endurance, 

however, are permanent aircraft design trades that reduce survivability and payload carriage and flexibility, the exact same attributes that are needed to perform ISR and precision strike in an 

anti-access/area-denial environment. 

I would like to stress that these reductions in survivability and 

payload cannot be bought back later or added to future UCLASS 

variants. 
7 

Similarly, claims that threshold growth or objective requirements 

will place competitive pressure on industry to enhance survivability 

and payload attributes are mostly smoke and mirrors. They may 

appear compelling, but they are misleading. 

As a matter of physics, absence breakthrough in engine technology, it is impossible to achieve 14 hours of unrefueled endurance 

with an air vehicle sized to operate from the aircraft carrier without making changes to its shape and propulsion path that negatively impact radar cross-section reduction, a.k.a [also known as] 

stealth, and reduce internal weapons carriage capacity, meaning 

both numbers and types of weapons that the air vehicle can carry. 

Simply put, meeting the threshold requirement of 14 hours of 

unrefueled endurance necessarily results in sacrificing survivability, weapons carriage/flexibility and the number of weapons you 

can carry, and growth margins for future mission payloads. And, 

again, there are no technologically viable growth paths for restoring these attributes later. 

Perhaps this opportunity cost would be acceptable if there was 

a compelling operational justification for 14 hours of unrefueled endurance, but there is not. 

And the aircraft with 8 to 10 hours of unrefueled endurance flying at high subsonic speeds would have roughly three times the 

combat radius of F–18E/F or the F–35C. 

So to put that into operational perspective, that same 8- to 10- 

hour endurance aircraft could launch from a carrier positioned 

1,000 miles away from an area of interest, which happens to be the 

range of the Chinese DF–21D anti-ship ballistic missile, loiter on 

station for 3 to 4 hours, then recover onboard the carrier still with 

gas in the tank. 

When factoring in aerial refueling, which is typically available in 

wartime, the 14-hour unrefueled endurance requirement is even 

more nonsensical. With refueling, that same 8- to 10-hour endurance aircraft could remain aloft for 24 to 48 hours or longer. 

I would like to shift now to the third theme, payload requirements. I am not aware of any mission or campaign-level analysis 

that supports a payload requirement of 1,000 pounds for a carrierbased strike aircraft. Certainly that is not the case with either the 

F–18 or the F–35. 

Put more plainly, 1,000 pounds of payload, which equates to four 

small-diameter bombs, is clearly inadequate for saturating an adversary’s short-range air defenses and neutralizing a wide range of 

very relevant target sites, such as coastal defense cruise missile 

sites, air defense radars, missile launchers, even enemy service 

combatants. One thousand pounds of strike payload per aircraft 

just isn’t enough. 

In addition, scant consideration appears to have been given to 

the types of weapons that UCLASS should be able to accommodate. 

Even a stealthy UCLASS in the future will need to stand off 

from some classes of defended targets. So it should be able to carry 

weapons such as the Joint Standoff Weapon, the Long Range AntiShip Missile, or LRASM, and/or a Joint Strike Missile. All of these 

things need more consideration. 

So now, for my fourth and final theme: What would a more balanced UCLASS design look like? A more balanced carrier-based un-
8 

manned air vehicle would, first, achieve the minimum level of signature reduction required to locate priority targets and engage 

them with available weapons without being destroyed by modern 

air defenses or, put another way, needs to be able to find and hit 

targets without being shot down. That is a minimum precondition. 

Second, it needs sufficient unrefueled endurance to reach target 

areas when carriers are forced to stand off 1,000 miles or more. 

And then, third, once those two conditions are met—it can find 

and hit targets without being shot down, it has a meaningful operational combat radius—the next thing is maximizing the amount of 

payload it can carry and as many types of weapons that it can 

carry while still fitting on the carrier deck. 

So using that approach, a carrier-based UAS [unmanned aircraft 

system] in the future could have, for example, an unrefueled endurance of 8 to 10 hours, which translates to a combat radius of 1,700 

to 2,000 nautical miles, either from a carrier or from a tanker; 24 

to 48 hours of mission endurance with air-to-air refueling; broadband/all-aspect, radar cross-section reduction matched to the anticipated threat environment of 2025 and beyond; and the ability to 

carry 3- to 4,000 pounds of strike payload internally, roughly what 

an F–35C can carry, including their variety of direct and standoff 

weapons. 

With those attributes, a balanced UCLASS could serve as an 

independent, long-range surveillance and striking arm of the aircraft carrier in anti-access and area-denial environments. 

With aerial tanking support, it could respond globally to shortnotice aggression, regardless of the carrier’s initial location, and 

contribute to a sustained extended-range precision strike campaign 

against an adversary’s fixed and mobile target as part of a joint 

force. 

So to conclude and to just foot-stomp a few points, first, the opportunity cost of 4 to 6 hours of additional unrefueled endurance, 

so 14 hours vice 8 to 10, is a dramatic reduction in strike capacity 

and flexibility, a significant increase in air vehicle vulnerability 

and reduced growth potential, meaning lower margins for space, 

weight, power, and cooling. 

Second, be very skeptical of growth paths that promise to increase survivability and payload later. Yes. There are band-aid solutions and some workarounds, but the core design trades made to 

achieve 14 hours of unrefueled endurance involve the air vehicle’s 

shape and propulsion path, and they cannot be reversed, period. 

There is no question that the Nation needs a carrier-based unmanned aircraft. The relevant question is what kind of aircraft. 

The air vehicle called for in the UCLASS RFP appears to be optimized for sustaining persistent maritime domain awareness—— 

Mr. FORBES. I am going to have to interrupt you there because 

we have got votes that are called. We will let you wrap up very 

briefly when we get back and then go right to Mr. Brimley and Mr. 

McGrath. 

We apologize for these votes. Unfortunately, we are looking at 

probably about 3:45 before we will be back. So we are going to 

stand in recess until that time. 

[Recess.] 
9 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you once again for your patience. And we 

apologize for these votes. 

Mr. Martinage, I think you were finishing up. If you could take 

about 60 seconds and wrap up, and then we will move on to Mr. 

Brimley. 

Mr. MARTINAGE. As I was saying, there is no question that the 

Nation needs a carrier-based unmanned aircraft. The relevant 

question is what kind of aircraft. 

And, in my view, the air vehicle called for in the UCLASS RFP 

appears to be optimized for sustaining persistent maritime domain 

awareness and ISR coverage in relatively benign threat environments. 

And, in my view, that is redundant with aircraft in service or 

soon to be in service in the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force. 

And, most critically, it does not address the core operational 

problem facing aviation: The intensifying anti-Navy threats that 

will push the carrier farther away from target areas and network 

air defenses that will make non-stealthy aircraft increasingly vulnerable to detection and attack. And that is the problem we need 

to look at. 

And I look forward to your questions and discussions later on. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Martinage can be found in the 

Appendix on page 61.] 

Mr. FORBES. Well, thank you for your comments. 

Mr. Brimley, look forward to your comments. 

STATEMENT OF SHAWN BRIMLEY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR A NEW 

AMERICAN SECURITY 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member 

Courtney, for the opportunity to testify. 

I want to acknowledge my co-panelists, whose work I very much 

admire. 

I see the issue of how the Navy approaches the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike program, or 

UCLASS, as an important indicator of how serious the Department 

of Defense is in ensuring America’s long-term military technical advantage. 

I am concerned that the current program does not fully exploit 

the opportunity the Navy has, in my mind, to lock in what could 

be a decisive advantage in future warfare, the ability to employ 

long-range, stealthy, unmanned strike platforms from the aircraft 

carrier. 

As a former civilian who worked national security policy at both 

OSD, the Office of Secretary of Defense, at the White House, I typically approach design procurement—defense procurement and design issues through the lens of a policymaker and I ask the following types of questions: 

Number one, will the platform provide a future Commander in 

Chief better military options during a crisis? 

Two, will it help address pressing gaps in U.S. defense strategy 

and planning? 
10 

Three, does it enable forward U.S. forces to present a stronger 

conventional deterrent and, if necessary, help ensure U.S. forces 

can defeat a plausible adversary? 

Number four, will the program help underwrite the confidence of 

our allies and partners? 

Five, does it reflect measured judgments regarding mid- to longterm requirements for U.S. defense? 

And, six, does the program help ensure America’s military technical dominance in an increasingly competitive environment? 

Having followed as best I can the debate surrounding UCLASS 

program, I am concerned that the answers to most of the questions 

I just outlined are ‘‘no.’’ 

The specific requirements in the current draft request for proposals, in my mind, having read as much of the open-source material as I can, will result in a platform that, one, fails to add any 

real striking power to the carrier air wing; two, duplicates many 

of the ISR systems already available to the Navy; three, does nothing to address the major threat facing the aircraft carrier, the need 

to operate from longer ranges due to improvements in anti-ship, 

ballistic and cruise missile design; four, and most problematically, 

vectors the Navy down an investment path that will waste precious 

time and money, in my view, risking our ability to integrate longendurance, strike-capable unmanned systems into this country’s 

most important power-projection asset, the aircraft carrier. 

I think the strategic implications of a failure to push hard now 

to develop carrier-launched unmanned combat aerial vehicles could 

be significant. Budgets are tight and hard choices must be made, 

but this is an area where I don’t think we can afford to get it 

wrong. 

To do so will end up costing more money over the long term and 

increase the risk that the U.S. Navy and the broader joint force 

will be ill-prepared for important plausible future contingencies. 

In this respect, I fully endorse, Mr. Chairman, what this committee did in requiring the Secretary of Defense—and I think it is 

important it be the civilian leadership of the Department—certify 

the requirements for this program before further substantial funding is committed. 

This committee adjudicates issues involving programs much larger and far more costly than the UCLASS program, but I think this 

is one of those rare decisions regarding setting requirements for future capabilities that could have a major impact on how tomorrow’s 

joint force might fight a future war. 

It is critical, in my view, to take the time to ensure that we get 

this right. I appreciate being invited to speak today and look forward to the discussion. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brimley can be found in the Appendix on page 73.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Brimley, for your comments. 

Mr. McGrath. 

STATEMENT OF BRYAN MCGRATH, MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

FERRYBRIDGE GROUP, LLC 

Mr. MCGRATH. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member 

Courtney. Thank you for the opportunity to be with you today. 
11 

Thank you for your leadership in sustaining the competitive advantages of American seapower and for the leadership that you have 

exerted thus far in exerting pressure on the Department of Defense 

to ensure a truly capable Unmanned Carrier-Launched Surveillance and Strike system. 

It is an honor to be on the panel with the three gentlemen here, 

who are also good friends. Bob Martinage, Shawn Brimley, and 

Ronald O’Rourke are among the smartest thinkers on the scene 

today and to be counted among them is humbling. 

And while Mr. O’Rourke’s background and employment preclude 

political or ideological identification, I think it is noteworthy to 

note the presence of two Obama administration political appointees, Mr. Martinage and Mr. Brimley, alongside me, and myself, the Navy policy team co-lead for the 2012 Romney for President Committee. 

The fact that the three of us are in solid agreement on the need 

for continued congressional oversight of the Navy’s UCLASS acquisition is notable. 

Specifically, there appears to be consensus on the need to ensure 

the Navy does not pursue a largely duplicative system that does little to advance the striking power of our Nation’s primary forwarddeployed power-projection system, the aircraft carrier strike group. 

I believe we have reached a ‘‘for want of a nail, a kingdom is 

lost’’ moment. The aircraft carrier has been—its demise has been 

predicted for 60 years. And that demise hasn’t happened because 

its air wing has evolved to pace the threat throughout its history. 

It is agnostic to the weapons it projects. 

If the air wing of the future does not evolve in a way that enables the kind of unmanned strike that a truly capable UCLASS 

would bring, the aircraft carrier might indeed become obsolescent. 

If it becomes obsolete, the preponderant Navy that we field today 

that is the primary—in my view, the primary sustainer of the global system that is in place today will become far less powerful. Far 

less powerful and influential Navy means a far less powerful and 

influential United States. 

This is not a small question. It is a large one. And I appreciate 

your leadership on the subject. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McGrath can be found in the Appendix on page 86.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. McGrath. 

And now we would like to—I am going to defer my questions 

until after Mr. Courtney. 

So, Mr. Courtney, I will let you go first if you have any questions. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, again, I think this is an important hearing. Obviously, it 

was something that was part of the House Defense Authorization 

bill. 

I feel a little bit like we are shadowboxing here, though, because 

we are talking about a classified RFP process. 

And, again, I think the latter two witnesses—your remarks were, 

I think, at a level that I think comport with that because you are 

talking about, you know, the long-range mission—or goal of this 
12 

program, which is—again, I think it is great to have that discussion. 

You know, Mr. Martinage, I mean, some of your comments were 

really focused on very specific, you know, components. I mean, the 

1,000-gallon fuel item that you mentioned a couple of times in your 

remarks. 

And, I mean, again, just for the record, I mean, from a process 

standpoint, we are in a place right now where there is, again, a 

classified RFP that is going to be going out in the next few months 

or so. 

Have you seen any of those documents that, you know, provide 

the basis for your testimony today? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. I have not seen the final draft RFP or the most 

recent RFP. I have been paying very close attention to the materials that are out about the draft RFP in the public domain as well 

as the KPPs and KSAs [key system attributes] discussion, which 

has been pretty extensive in the public domain. 

And I think the issue—I don’t know—which is the central one, 

I think, in my testimony, about the 14 hours of unrefueled endurance is clearly a parameter that is out there in the public domain. 

And the opportunity cost of that 14 hours of unrefueled endurance clearly has an opportunity cost in both survivability and payload, and that is just a matter of physics. 

It is not a classification issue. It is not a sensitivity issue. It is 

an aircraft design issue. And given where we are with engine propulsion technology, you just can’t get to 14 hours unless you do 

things to the shape of the aircraft and the propulsion path that 

compromise stealth and payload. 

And that is why I think the current path we are on is not a balanced design. And if you relaxed that threshold requirement for 

unrefueled endurance, you could dramatically improve payload and 

survivability, and that is my point. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So, Mr. O’Rourke, I mean, in the past, I mean, 

we have had weapons platforms—excuse me—and systems that 

have started out looking one way and then, over time, have evolved 

or adapted to different capabilities and different—maybe you could 

just give some historic perspective in terms of other programs that 

adaptation and evolution has occurred. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Yeah. To just pick a few examples that come to 

mind in the area of carrier-based aviation, the F–18 is probably the 

largest single example. 

It went through multiple versions, from the AB to the CD and 

then to the larger version, the EF, the Super Hornet, and off of 

that they also then developed the EA–18G. 

Another example would be the E–2 Hawkeye and how it has 

evolved from the E–2C to the Hawkeye 2000 to the E–2D Advanced 

Hawkeye with its new radar. 

A third example would be the P–3 that has evolved a number of 

times since the 1960s through a series of updates. And the Navy’s 

plan right now is to procure the P–8 Poseidon multi-mission maritime aircraft with an incremental or step upgrade in mind. 

So right now that plane exists at something called Increment 1, 

but there are plans to build it in a new version called Increment 

2 that will implement three different engineering change proposals 
13 

over the next few years and then move on beyond that to something called Increment 3. And all these things are supposed to 

[achieve] IOC [initial operating capability] between fiscal year 2014 

and fiscal year 2020. 

In general, it is worth noting that spiral development, which I 

think is the idea that you are getting at here, is established as an 

acquisition pathway for DOD programs. And, in fact, there was a 

push several years ago to make it the default approach to acquisition for DOD programs. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Right. 

And, I mean, even other sort of non-aviation—I mean, DDGs 

[guided missile destroyers] have also kind of changed their look 

over the years. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. That is right. 

In the area of shipbuilding, there are additional examples. You 

mentioned one, the DDG, which has moved from the Flight I to the 

Flight II, from there to the Flight IIA, and now we are planning 

on shifting to the Flight III. 

The 688-class submarine went through a number of changes, and 

the 688s we built at the end of that program are quite different 

from the early ones. And the Virginia class is going through a block 

upgrade. 

So, yes, this same idea is well established in shipbuilding as well. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So, I mean—so I guess—and I don’t have much 

more to ask right now. 

Is that—I mean, that is sort of the question of the hearing, you 

know, really, whether or not, you know, this is a fork in the road 

that is irrevocable and, you know, permanent, forever, or whether 

or not, you know, that we can follow other precedents in the past. 

And certainly, when the next panel comes up, that certainly 

would be my question that I would certainly want to pose to them. 

And, you know, I may have some other written questions afterwards. 

But, you know, with that, Mr. Chairman, I would just yield back 

to you. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

Also, we have a number of our Members who would like to submit written questions who couldn’t be here because of the votes. 

I would like to walk through a series of questions, if I could. 

And, Mr. O’Rourke, I would like to start with you because you 

are kind of the closest we have to a historian in looking at this 

from the Congressional Research Service. 

Do you see any shift in the international security environment 

that might warrant the Navy pursuing a different path on the 

UCLASS program than what it is currently pursuing? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. That is the first of the six issues I raise, whether 

we are undergoing right now a shift in strategic eras. There are a 

number of people who feel that we are undergoing such a shift. 

My own personal view, as an analyst, is that, yes, I think we are 

experiencing a shift in strategic eras. Right now I am watching 

that situation and have been for a number of months. 

Mr. FORBES. Could you give me a couple of examples of the world 

situation that would justify you making that comment? 
14 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Well, I think what caught the attention of the 

people who have written about this potential shift in strategic eras 

are two sets of developments. 

One are those in the Western Pacific, and that has to do with 

a series of actions by China starting late last year that appear intended or aimed at gaining a greater degree of Chinese control over 

its near-seas region. 

That included the announcement of the air defense identification 

zone toward the end of November, the incident with the Cowpens 

in December, the imposition of the fishing regulations in January, 

and then most recently the movement of the oil rig to the Paracel 

Islands starting in May. 

So that is one-half of the situation that I think a number of these 

observers were noticing. 

And the other was Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea, 

which was a landmark event regarding the division of territories 

within Europe since the end of World War II. 

And the observers who have looked at that have said, in essence, 

that we may be shifting to a new strategic era, that the unipolar 

moment, as it were, is over and that we are entering a new age 

that is perhaps characterized by, among other things, a greater degree of great power competition and challenges to fundamental aspects of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since 

World War II. 

Mr. FORBES. So I wouldn’t be changing your words if I were to 

say that, based on the world situation, developments that have 

taken place within the last 12 to 18 months, that, in your view, 

that could suggest that the Navy should at least relook the direction that they are heading with this UCLASS program? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I can’t make a recommendation, as you know. 

But what I can say is that, with other people out there—and I am 

not asking anybody to accept—— 

Mr. FORBES. I understand. 

Mr. O’ROURKE [continuing]. My own judgment about whether we 

are entering into a new strategic era, but a number of other observers are saying that. 

And it is enough to tee the issue up for the committee and the 

Congress as a whole to make its own decision as to whether we are 

entering that era and, if so, whether we should then have a reassessment of defense plans and programs. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Mr. Martinage, I would like to clarify something Mr. Courtney 

asked and—just to make sure that we heard you correctly. 

When you talked about the 1,000-pound element, you were not 

talking about 1,000 gallons of fuel, I don’t think. You were talking 

about a 1,000-pound payload. 

But correct me if I’m wrong, I mean, because I could have heard 

it wrong. I just want to make sure that question—— 

Mr. MARTINAGE. That is correct. 

Mr. FORBES. And, based on that, Mr. Courtney is exactly right. 

We have a lot of classified information on here. He is perfectly correct on that. 
15 

But it is your understanding, as I take it from your testimony, 

that you believe the requirements out here would relate to a 14- 

hour endurance requirement in the air? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. That is correct. Yep. 

Mr. FORBES. And a 1,000-pound payload max. Is that correct? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. That is my understanding from what is in the 

public domain. 

Mr. FORBES. Now, if that is accurate and if we have flexibility 

to add additional—would we have flexibility, in your opinion—if 

you have those two requirements or one of those two requirements, 

can we add additional payload capability to this platform? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. Meeting the 14-hour unrefueled endurance requirement I think would likely preclude a significant increase in 

payload. 

You could probably increase it some and trade off some endurance, for example, by putting fuel in the bomb bay or something 

like that or putting external weapons carriage and reducing survivability and reducing some endurance. 

If I could, I would like to build on a comment that was asked 

about the evolving and adapting over time, if—— 

Mr. FORBES. Please. 

Mr. MARTINAGE. I think that is important for this aircraft design 

to be able to evolve and adapt over time, but you need to get the 

shape and the propulsion path right or you are stuck forever in 

terms of the payload and the survivability. You can’t undo those 

things. 

You can. You can build a new jet. But if you get the shape wrong 

at the start and you get the propulsion path wrong at the start, 

you really can’t go revisit those things and add payload and survivability later. 

So driven by that 14-hour unrefueled endurance choice, choices 

are being made on the shape and the propulsion path that really 

can’t be undone, and they will lead to an evolutionary dead end for 

the aircraft. 

And that is why I am concerned. I think having a spiral development approach is a good one and you could do that with a balanced 

design. 

So you could take that aircraft that ultimately has 8 to 10 hours 

of endurance, 3- to 4,000 pounds of payload, a very low signature, 

and 24 to 48 hours of refueled endurance, and you don’t have to 

get there all at once. 

You could field the basic shape and propulsion path. Over time 

you could add more advanced edges and coatings to get the survivability. Over time you could add additional weapons that it can 

carry. Over time you could add sensors to it. 

But, again, it is fundamental to get the shape and the propulsion 

path right at the start. And right now that is being driven by the 

14-hour requirement, and you have to ask yourself why 14 hours. 

Mr. FORBES. Now, let me ask you about that. 

Assuming your testimony to be correct and we have a 14-hour 

endurance figure and we have the 1,000 payload max, what does 

that limit me from using in terms of payload? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. Well, the devil is in the detail, sir, and I don’t 

know yet because we haven’t seen the designs. 
16 

But one is you won’t be able to carry enough weapons to saturate—say you were going after a surface combatant with shortrange air defenses like a Luyang II or Luyang III in the case of 

the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] Navy. 

You would want a lot of individual weapons to saturate their 

point-defense and then to take out, to neutralize the ship. Four 

SDBs [small diameter bombs] is never ever going to do it for you. 

I think it is instructive that we don’t think about 1,000 pounds 

of payload under the F–35 or the F–18. Why would you think about 

it on UCLASS? 

The other thing is what types of weapons. And that gets to not 

the weapons carriage, you know, how much it can carry, but, rather, the volume of the bomb bay. And that is just unclear. That is 

something that needs to be looked at. 

But in order to go after some of these types of targets that are 

defended targets, you would want some standoff capability. And it 

is unclear, as I read what is available, whether or not those types 

of weapons will fit in the bomb bay of this current design. 

Mr. FORBES. Now, if I can take the advocate’s role for a moment 

and if we are already planning to procure 80 to 100 long-range 

bombers, is there a need for a UCLASS program focused on the 

strike mission? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. I would say, (a), we are a joint force and it is 

good to have multiple options for the Commander in Chief to pursue. 

Aircraft carriers don’t need basing, and they can respond quickly 

to crises wherever they are without having to ask for permission 

for basing and access. They complicate an adversary’s defensive 

challenges because you can come from multiple directions that they 

might not anticipate. 

And then I would ask back: If the carrier doesn’t have a longrange strike capability, what is the point? It is supposed to be the 

major power protection arm of the U.S. Navy. If we can’t project 

power where and when necessary, why do we continue to invest in 

it? 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Brimley, if I could ask you to, one, describe for 

the committee, if you would, cost imposition strategies. 

And if you could give us your thought as to whether or not pursuing the current course, as you understand it to be for the Navy 

for UCLASS, would impose any cost imposition on any of our competitors. 

And if we pursued another course, would that have any cost imposition aspects to it? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think, for me, the most instructive case is just to look at what 

is going on in the Western Pacific. I mean, since the late 1990s, I 

think China and the PLA have gone down a path of imposing costs 

on us. 

Well, what does that mean? I think they have spent the preponderance of their defense budget over more than a decade or more— 

you know, close to two decades now, trying to literally push us farther away. You just have to look at their development of increasingly long-range and precise anti-ship ballistic missile technology 

and, also, anti-ship cruise missile technology. 
17 

This is the fundamental problem, as my colleague Mr. Martinage 

talked about. If we can’t project—we don’t have a capability from 

the aircraft carrier to project much farther than 1,000 nautical 

miles, then it is very hard for us to be able to deter behavior. 

And I think that, were we to invest in a platform that could actually project power over that distance or longer, you could significantly complicate our adversaries’ calculus and impose costs on 

them, as well. 

The other way I tend to think about this, too, is, you know, our 

allies and partners in the region are looking to us to be able to be 

with them in moments of crisis and moments of tension, and if we 

have a threat that forces the power-projection hub, the central 

power-projection platform of the U.S. military, to stay well, well 

outside the first island chain, for instance, it could really undermine U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy with our allies and partners. 

Mr. FORBES. A more ambitious UCAV program would likely cost 

more. 

Can you tell me a little bit about your opinion of what the value 

proposition would be for this? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Mr. Chairman, yes. You know, I can’t give you specific cost estimates. I am sure the Navy and elements of the Pentagon could give you that. 

But I would just suggest that going down what I called in my 

testimony a strategic UCLASS cul-de-sac—I mean, if we invest all 

this money and all this time to get a system that provides perhaps 

some better maritime demand awareness around the carrier strike 

group, but doesn’t buy down any sort of risk regarding our ability 

to project power, then, in my mind, it is a waste of money and it 

is a waste of time. 

So even if—I mean, let’s just assume for a moment that a more 

ambitious UCAV could cost, say, 20, 25, 35 percent more than the 

equivalent number of systems of a less capable, less mission-centric 

capability that can’t project power. To me, as a civilian, as a policymaker, that is a trade worth making. That is an investment worth 

making, in my view. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. McGrath, can you put the UCLASS program in 

an historic context, as you look at it, and maybe tell us how you 

see it fitting into a broader U.S. defense strategy both in Asia and 

more broadly. 

Mr. MCGRATH. I will take the second part of the question first 

and maybe an answer to the first part will reveal itself. 

Our geography is not going to change appreciably in the near future. This Nation depends on its Navy and its Marine Corps to a 

large degree for much of peacetime-shaping and presence missions 

and transition-to-war duties around the world where our far-flung 

interests are. 

That capability is something no other nation on Earth has, and 

it is a capability that a nation with our geographic constraints has 

to have if we wish to be influential, thousands of miles from our 

shore. 

Because of the nature of the threat and the obvious desire of 

strategists around the world to try and keep naval forces from 

being able to generate significant power near their shores, because 
18 

they are trying to keep the carrier away—further away, as Mr. 

Brimley was talking about, we have to counter that. 

If we do not counter that in a way that continues the relevance 

of the aircraft carrier as our Nation’s primary power-projection 

platform, we either have to acknowledge the end of American naval 

dominance or we have to figure out some way to replace that power 

projection. 

I don’t know what that is. I don’t know—I don’t know another 

platform or series of platforms or ensemble of platforms in the 

Navy that could—for the amount of time that an aircraft carrier 

can generate power that could match it. It is one of the reasons we 

build them and operate them, is because they are very efficient 

producers of combat power. 

I don’t have a good answer for you on the first part of your question. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Langevin, like Mr. Courtney, has spent a lot of 

time looking at this issue and other naval issues, and we would 

like to recognize him now for 5 minutes 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 

witnesses for being here today, and I apologize with the votes and 

all that. I may have, some of my questions, I hope they are not redundant, but I need to have these answers, and I would appreciate 

any insight you could give us. Again, thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the committee’s attention to this 

very important program, and I thank you for the attention that you 

have given to this, and I, again, thank our witnesses for their insights in appearing before us this afternoon. As you highlighted in 

your testimony, this is a debate not about a program really but 

about the future of carrier-based aviation. The overall pattern of 

unmanned systems has been initially the description, the substitution of such systems for the three Ds—the dull, the dirty, and 

dangerous—if you will. And certainly persistent ISR is dull, though 

vitally important, which is why, of course, we have Global Hawks 

and Reapers and Predators, Fire Scouts, and other systems focused 

on that ISR mission. So my concern is that unless the Navy asks 

industry for the right capabilities, we could preclude right at the 

outset UCLASS’s ability to stand in for manned aircraft for future 

dangerous missions such as ISR, denied environments, or initial 

strikes to take down integrated air defense systems and heavily defended targets. 

We are here today to make sure what could be a truly revolutionary capability for the future air wing achieves its full potential. 

So my first question is, could you talk to the subcommittee, could 

you talk us through the design tradeoffs that will be necessary 

should the current unrefueled persistence requirement stay as is, 

and what options would be available to air vehicle designers if it 

was lowered? I will start right down the line. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I will just make a general comment that any one 

platform exists within an envelope of tradeoffs and that there are 

certain characteristics that can be achieved only to a certain degree 

in the presence of other characteristics, so range and endurance 

would be one. Payload would be another. Stealth and survivability 

would be a third. And cost would be one. And that and maybe one 

or two other attributes would establish a zone or an envelope with-
19 

in which you would make these kinds of tradeoffs. I am going to 

stop right there and let the other witnesses answer it in more detail. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. MARTINAGE. I like to think about the design trade for carrier-based UCAV to really be driven by one—in all cases, it has to 

be able to operate off the carrier, which constrains its size. 

But beyond that, think of a triangle, where you have unrefueled 

endurance on one corner, payload, mission payload, including 

strike payload, as another corner, and then survivability as a third 

corner. Anything you do to any one of those affects the other two. 

So when you say 14 hours of unrefueled endurance as one of those 

three parameters, you necessarily have to reduce what you might 

otherwise do in terms of survivability, and mission and strike payload. So the implication, to directly answer your question, sir, is 

the 14 hours of unrefueled endurance forces reductions or increases 

signature or reduces stealth and reduces payload in all its forms, 

including volume. 

If you relaxed that 14 hours of unrefueled endurance, you could 

significantly improve stealth, which would get us into a classified 

conversation which we can’t go into, but there is a lot more you can 

do there. And you could probably triple or quadruple the payload. 

And that payload doesn’t have to be all used at once. That can also 

be your growth for the future in terms of size, weight, power, and 

cooling for new mission systems, new sensors, new weapons that 

you might want to integrate into the airframe in the future. But 

if you don’t have that margin built in, in terms of mission payload 

capacity, you can’t grow the aircraft in the future. I hope that answers your question. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. BRIMLEY. I would just add, Congressman, I very much agree 

with my colleagues’ statements. I would just say the number one 

operational challenge facing force planners, defense planners, the 

Commander in Chief, is do I have the option to penetrate an adversary’s anti-access/area-denial network and hold that risk, their capabilities. And so as a civilian policy analyst, that is the number 

one operational challenge that I would ask the Navy to prioritize, 

and I think if you do that, you prioritize strike capacity, stealth, 

payload. Probably the last priority is really unrefueled endurance 

because that forces you to make all sorts of other compromises. 

So I would ask, perhaps in your next panel with our Navy colleagues, you know, what kinds of design benefits could there be if 

you prioritize the strike side, the strike and stealth aspects of this 

design? I think that would open up all sorts of other possibilities 

that, frankly, would give better options to civilian leaders if we 

were actually to engage in some sort of conflict, or at the very least 

pose a more credible deterrent capacity overseas. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. MCGRATH. Mr. Langevin, I cannot improve upon those answers. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. My time is expired. I do have other 

questions, but I guess I should submit those for the record, Mr. 

Chairman? 
20 

Mr. FORBES. If you don’t mind, Jim, we are going to submit a 

group of them for the record, and we would love to have your questions in there. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good, Chairman. 

And I thank our witnesses for their insight and testimony. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Courtney, did you have—— 

Mr. COURTNEY. Just really quickly. One of the tradeoffs if you 

give up unrefueled persistence and reduce the thousand pounds to 

a lower weight, you are also creating another sort of challenge, 

aren’t you, in terms of needing to have a refueling capability, which 

I guess the question is are we good to go as far as having that for 

unmanned air systems? I mean, that sounds like a whole new set 

of challenges, isn’t it, in terms of making that work? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. Well, the first thing I would say is 8 to 10 hours 

of endurance is still a long combat radius, so somewhere around 

1,700 to 2,000 nautical miles, which is roughly triple every other 

aircraft on the carrier deck. So that is a pretty big operational 

reach improvement for the carrier air wing. 

In terms of unmanned air-to-air refueling, that has been demonstrated already by surrogate aircraft as part of the UCAS–D program. Air Vehicle II is plumbed to do air-to-air refueling. It was 

originally part of the UCAS demonstration program. I don’t know 

if the Navy is going to go forward with that, but I would say the 

technology is pretty mature and has been demonstrated with surrogate aircraft already. 

Mr. MCGRATH. Sir, there was an open source report earlier this 

week, and I have it referenced in my written testimony—I don’t remember exactly where it was—but where the Northrop Grumman 

program manager for UCAS says that they are prepared to demonstrate it during summer testing on board USS Theodore Roosevelt, and the UCAS Navy program manager indicated that if—excuse me. The contract has a provision in it, a clause in it, to do 

this. Northrop Grumman says they are ready to show it. The Navy 

program manager indicated that they were looking at trying to get 

to that, so we will have answers to these questions probably this 

summer, this coming summer. 

Mr. FORBES. And if I could just end with one question, kind of 

a follow-up on what Mr. Courtney’s is, I don’t think there is a question that we have the capability to refuel, but the problem that I 

think Mr. Courtney may be getting at, too, is you would need a 

tanker or something to do it, which means we would have to have 

another asset there to do that, which is at least a question for us 

to raise. 

But if you look at this triangle that, Mr. Martinage, you correctly 

raise between endurance and payload and stealth, if we had to pick 

a priority between those three things, what would the priority be, 

one? And, number two, if we continue in the direction that the 

Navy is heading, which is primarily an ISR asset, does that provide 

any additional capability than what the Navy already can do? And 

I would love to hear your responses on any of the four of you if you 

could address either of those two questions. 

Mr. O’Rourke is looking at you, so I think he is—— 
21 

Mr. MARTINAGE. I will start. I will start. In terms of the triangle, 

sir, I would, frankly, push back and say I wouldn’t pick any one 

of the three. I would pick all three. And I would pick a balance of 

the three that allow it to perform the operational mission that I 

mentioned at the beginning, which is projecting power from range 

from the carrier, ISR and strike, in anti-access and area-denial—— 

Mr. FORBES. So then maybe if I could rephrase my question, not 

to compound it but to get an answer, you would say that the number one mission that you believe the UCLASS needs to be doing is 

the projection of that power through A2/AD defenses. Is that fair? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. That is fair, and I would say the way I would 

prioritize it is that first thing, the aircraft needs to be able to go 

find and hit a target without being shot down. So what that means 

fundamentally is you need a certain level of stealth and the right 

weapon to hit the target and the right sensor to find the target. 

That is one. 

Then, two, I want to have enough operational radius from a 

tanker or a carrier that I can do that from some reasonable range. 

I think 1,000 miles would be a good figure to put down. And then, 

third, I would want as many weapons and as many different kinds 

of weapons as I could fit into that aircraft. So that would be my 

hierarchy: find and kill targets without being shot down, do it at 

range, and have has many weapons in the magazine and different 

kinds of weapons as possible. 

To answer your second question, sir, about what additional 

would this type of aircraft provide, it would provide the carrier 

strike group commander a long-range, long-persistence ISR asset 

for maintaining maritime domain awareness around the carrier 

battle group and then potentially finding targets for the manned 

air wing. 

Mr. FORBES. That they could not do today? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. No. No. I think that the MQ4C Triton, which is 

land-based, could do that mission, but that carrier strike group 

commander would tell you that is not organic to me. I can’t control 

it, so I want something that I can control. 

Mr. FORBES. That is a fair statement. 

Mr. MARTINAGE. And then the other option that the Navy could 

pursue is things like MQ–8B/C Fire Scout off of any air-capable 

ship, so including all the destroyers and so forth; that has a potential of 8 to 12 hours endurance, and it could do maritime domain 

awareness around the carrier battle group that way. To me, that 

would be a much more effective and affordable way to get that ISR, 

rather than dedicating what really should be an integral part of 

the carrier air wing in the future for ISR and strike. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

Mr. Brimley. 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Sir, I would just step back for a second, and if I 

could just make a broader strategic comment. Of course, the primary decision calculus here and for this committee and for the 

Navy and for the Pentagon ought to be, how can we make sure that 

the carrier strike group is relevant in the conflicts of the future? 

But I think the broader strategic dynamic is concerning. We are 

only at the beginning stages of a revolution in unmanned, in increasingly autonomous systems. More than 75 nations are now in-
22 

vesting in this kind of technology. And the proliferation dynamic is 

happening, and it is happening quick. As an analyst, what concerns 

me is if we spend 5, 6, 7 years walking down this path of making 

marginal improvements via an unmanned system to organic ISR 

for the carrier, that is time and money we are not spending in 

maintaining our military technical dominance and advantage in 

these early stages of what I think will be a very disruptive shift 

in the global military balance of power. 

So I see this as a window of opportunity, and it is a finite window of opportunity. I am not a technical expert, but it strikes me 

that we ought to make sure that we spend the time necessary to 

get these requirements right before we start walking down a path 

that will close doors for us potentially and potentially undermine 

our military technical power. 

Mr. MCGRATH. Chairman Forbes, any strike group commander 

would love to have more ISR around his or her strike group. I 

mean, it is security. It is safety. It is knowing what is around you. 

The question is, do we have an adequate supply of platforms to 

provide that today? Especially when you have zero platforms today 

that can penetrate at the ranges we are talking about that make 

them operationally relevant in a contested A2/AD environment. 

This argument that the Triton and the P–8 aren’t organic is interesting, but neither is most of the fuel that strike group commander 

is going to use in a campaign. It comes from the Air Force and 

tankers that fly and are in tanker tracks. I mean, there is some 

tanking on board the carrier, but a good bit of that campaign-level 

tanking will come from somewhere else. So I am not sure why the 

ISR coming from somewhere else is that big of an issue. We need 

the strike. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, thank you so much for sharing your 

thoughts with us, helping us to create the questions we need to be 

asking and those answers, and we appreciate your time. Again, as 

we have apologized to you for these votes that delayed us, but we 

look forward to picking your brain in the future. And as Mr. 

Langevin pointed out, we have a number of Members who have 

some questions they will be submitting to you if you don’t mind 

submitting those back for the record. 

And with that, this panel will be—do any of you have any comments that you would like to briefly offer for the record? 

Mr. McGrath. 

Mr. MCGRATH. I would just like to deal with one of the counterarguments, and I hear this from very serious people. And that is 

if you want another acquisition nightmare—and they compare it to, 

you know, you name it—go down the path that you are headed in, 

that we want to go in. And what bothers me about that is there 

is this implicit sense that we cannot do hard things well anymore. 

I think that is just not true. I think hard things are hard, and we 

cannot rush to a mediocre set of requirements out of fear that we 

can’t do better. And I think this committee’s leadership on this and 

continued pressure to try to ensure that we do better is required. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Just two quick comments. Returning to Representative Courtney’s earlier question about refueling, the solution 
23 

that we reach, whatever it is, is something that I do think we need 

to consider in relation to the current refueling burden on the carrier. The carrier’s own organic refueling ability does influence the 

range at which it can operate, especially in situations where it 

might be far away from land-based refueling. And I don’t know 

what the impact is of various decisions on UCLASS in terms of the 

net burden on the carrier’s organic refueling ability, but more than 

one of the people that briefed me from the Navy and industry did 

bring this up. So that is, I think, a factor that needs to be considered in the overall situation. And that’s neutral as to the outcome 

of UCLASS, but from a system of systems point of view, what is 

the net impact on the refueling situation of the carrier, which influences its combat radius. 

And the second, Mr. Chairman, goes to your question about the 

triangle and where we should be inside of it. I tend to think of it 

as a square rather than a triangle, because I think cost is the 

fourth factor. If you freeze the money that is available at a certain 

point and take it out, then you are possibly constraining the ability 

to imagine what the plane might be or what you might be able to 

achieve. So I see the trade space as having four corners, the fourth 

corner being a variable relating to the funding that is available for 

the program. And in terms of where you wind up inside that trade 

space, it is my hope that the six questions that I outlined at the 

outset will help people to think that issue through. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. I am sorry. 

Mr. Martinage. 

Mr. MARTINAGE. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to follow up on 

a point Mr. McGrath made, and that is a point that has sort of 

been implicit to a lot of this conversation, is that a more balanced, 

more capable UCAV is somehow going to be more expensive and 

higher risk. I would just like to push back on that. When it comes 

to stealth/low-observables, it is more a choice about shape and propulsion path than it is about cost. Yes, there are marginal costs 

with the edges and coatings and sensor integration, but they are 

marginal. The big choice is where you go with the shape and the 

propulsion path of the aircraft. And that affects aerodynamic performance and other things, but it is not so much a cost driver. You 

tend to pay for these aircraft by the pound, regardless. 

And the second thing is the technologies to achieve a balanced 

design, from low-observables and stealth to the payload capacities 

we have talked about to the combat radiuses that we have talked 

about, are all low risk. They have all been demonstrated. So if others come in here and say, Well, this type of LO [low-observables], 

or this type of LO across this frequency spectrum hasn’t been demonstrated, it is just not true. 

Mr. FORBES. And, Mr. Brimley, we will let you have the last 

word. 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Well, sir, I guess on behalf of my colleagues, thank 

you for holding this hearing. I think there are—at least most of us 

I am sure agree, this is probably one of the top three to five defense 

design strategy procurement issues that are facing the Nation and 

the joint force writ large. Thank you for identifying this and zooming down on it. 
24 

One final point, as I think most of us outlined in our written testimony, the need to be able to pose operational challenges, to be 

able to penetrate anti-access and area-denial networks, is something that has been consistently enumerated since at least the 

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. So it is not as though this requirements debate is new. It is not as though this challenge facing 

the Nation and facing the joint force is in any way new. So I think, 

at least from my perspective, I find myself being able to draw on 

a pretty rich history in terms of the need to be able to set design 

requirements to be able to posture the joint force to be able to succeed in the future security environment. 

And finally, just to echo what my colleague just said, you know, 

that plane that landed on the aircraft carrier last year was a certain shape and a certain design specifically because in the very beginning of this program, those kinds of design features were 

prioritized. And so I think, even from a joint force-Navy perspective, not so long ago, the three of us and our views, that was the 

view of the Pentagon. That was the view of the U.S. Navy. So I 

don’t think that we are advocating sort of a technological fantasy 

or some kind of argument that isn’t well within the mainstream of 

where force designers and planners have been for a long period of 

time. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, thank you so much again for your time. 

And with that, we will recess for the next panel. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, if you would have a seat. 

I am sorry to detain you for these votes, but thank you for your 

patience. We have already given our opening statements earlier. 

We won’t bore you with having to listen to those again, so we are 

going to go right on to your opening comments, any that you would 

like to provide, and I take it we will go in the order that you are 

seated, so with that, Admiral, we will turn it over to you. 

STATEMENT OF VADM PAUL A. GROSKLAGS, USN, PRINCIPAL 

MILITARY DEPUTY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 

FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITIONS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Thank you Chairman Forbes, Representative Courtney. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 

today to talk about the Navy’s UCLASS program. 

I need to start just by saying that the Navy is fully committed 

to the development and rapid fielding of an affordable persistent 

intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting, or IRS&T 

system, with a precision strike capability. The system will be based 

on an air vehicle design which ensures that we meet our threshold 

capabilities while being optimized to enable future mission capability enhancements, particularly in the areas of sensor payload 

modularity, weapons payload, and mission effectiveness, sometimes 

put under the moniker of survivability. The UCLASS key performance parameters and key system attributes, as defined and documented in the Service Approved Capabilities Development Document, remain consistent and stable. 

That document was signed over a year ago by the Chief of Naval 

Operations and has not changed. The accompanying UCLASS ac-
25 

quisition strategy requires offers to be compliant with all the 

threshold requirements defined in a CDD [Capability Development 

Document] at a not-to-exceed cost per orbit, while incentivizing industry to propose systems and solutions that enable those future 

improvements and enhancements. More specifically, those proposed 

air vehicle solutions will be required to show basic design parameters that support the future growth, designs that can be affordably 

modified and enhanced over time to meet the future multi-mission 

needs of both the Navy and the joint force without major aircraft 

redesign. 

We are on a path to achieve this growth capability without sacrificing the affordable near-term persistent ISR capability. We have 

had 4 years of very close engagement with industry, including technology maturation contracts which have culminated in the recently 

completed preliminary design reviews for four candidate solutions. 

This close engagement has provided the Navy with significant insight into industry capabilities which results in our confidence that 

affordable, technically compliant UCLASS design solutions are 

achievable within the targeted timeline and which take into account the plan form, the air vehicle plan form shape, and propulsion path characteristics that are needed to ensure that we can 

grow to the capabilities mentioned earlier. 

It is also important to note that UCLASS will be a complementary and enhancing part of our carrier strike group. As part of the 

air wing, it supports the joint force and the Navy across our full 

range of military operations. UCLASS will make our carrier strike 

groups more lethal, more effective, and more survivable. I looked 

forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Grosklags, General 

Guastella, and Mr. Andress can be found in the Appendix on page 

101.] 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, thank you. 

Mr. Andress. 

Mr. ANDRESS. I am going to let General Guastella go next if that 

is all right, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. I think that would be a wise decision. General. 

STATEMENT OF BRIG GEN JOSEPH T. GUASTELLA, USAF, 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR REQUIREMENTS (J–8), JOINT STAFF 

General GUASTELLA. Chairman and Representative Courtney, I 

appreciate the opportunity to come and testify today as well. I work 

for the Vice Chairman. I facilitate the JROC [Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council] process. And as many of you know, the JROC 

establishes requirements for our warfighting needs. The UCLASS 

requirements have been established by our most senior warfighters. They are the individuals that are responsible to organize, 

train and equip, not just their services but the entire joint force. 

All the services are represented at the JROC. 

They established the UCLASS requirements not by looking 

through the lens of just the UCLASS system, but they evaluated 

the entire joint portfolio of ISR and strike assets to set these requirements, and certainly the JROC highly values carrier-based or 

sea-based ISR and strike platforms. 
26 

So I would like to read a sentence or two from the JROCM [Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum], written on the 

19th of December of 2012: And the requirement for UCLASS is for 

an affordable, adaptable platform that supports missions ranging 

from permissive counterterrorism operations to missions in low-end 

contested environments to providing enabling capabilities for highend denied operations as well as supporting organic naval missions. Essentially that requirement strikes a balance between affordability and performance. 

And like I mentioned earlier, you cannot look at the UCLASS requirement through a single lens, but only as you look at it how 

does it fit into a joint portfolio of assets, from permissive airbreathing to more advanced air-breathing assets to include spacebased assets. Where is its role in there? And that is how those requirements were derived. While this is an open hearing, sir, if you 

need us to come by later and discuss some of the other systems or 

performance parameters, we are happy to do that. Sir, pending 

your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Guastella, Admiral 

Grosklags, and Mr. Andress can be found in the Appendix on page 

101.] 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. 

Mr. Andress. 

STATEMENT OF MARK D. ANDRESS, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF 

OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR INFORMATION DOMINANCE 

Mr. ANDRESS. Yes, sir. Thank you for the invitation to speak. As 

the resource and requirements sponsor for UCLASS, it is very satisfying to be here and see such strong advocacy for one of our programs. I would say it is even beyond just the advocacy for unmanned sea-based ISR and strike. It is a desire for more. It is a 

desire for more weapons payload. It is a desire for more unrefueled 

or lower unrefueled range. It is a desire to add non-organic tanking 

to those requirements, and it is a desire for greater stealth. All 

these are great capabilities that we have captured and assessed 

through our requirements review process over the last 4 years. 

I am perhaps more appreciative of the subcommittee’s desire to 

look for answers that balance this demand for increased growth on 

a program, which we can talk about tradeoffs in performance and 

capabilities, but those tradeoffs in performance and capabilities in 

and of themselves have to be balanced by cost, schedule, and technical risk. I believe the answer that we are seeking for is that the 

Navy, working with the Joint Staff, have balanced not only the capabilities tradeoff desired, but balanced these capabilities against 

the cost, schedule, and technical risk we need to succeed. 

As I go into the rest of my opening testimony, I want to highlight 

that I am going to only be able in an open hearing to talk to you 

about the process we use as we go through requirements building, 

and I will be happy to come back and talk to you more about specific threats, sensors, and others that are rolled into the requirements capabilities. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Andress, could I ask if you could suspend your 

opening remarks for just 1 minute. 

Mr. Courtney, do you have any questions that—— 
27 

Mr. COURTNEY. I just found out my appointment just cancelled. 

Mr. FORBES. I am sorry. Mr. Courtney was going to have to 

leave, and I wanted to make sure he got his questions. 

Mr. Andress, I am sorry to interrupt you. Please go ahead. 

Mr. ANDRESS. No problem. So, as General Guastella has pointed 

out, I am going to go into the requirements and how we float the 

requirements from start to finish. I am going to talk to you about 

the missions that those are trying to achieve, and I am happy to 

follow up with more specifics on the threats and the parameters 

that we are trying to target with UCLASS. 

So UCLASS will be permissive ISR and strike in the near term 

as we have prioritized getting this initial capability to the fleet and 

operating off a carrier in a technically viable, timely, and affordable 

manner. But the overall system must be able to operate in a contested environment and support high-end operations in the 2020s 

and beyond to pace the threats we believe will be present as part 

of the larger carrier air wing. 

I want to make sure that you understand the depth of requirements analysis that has gone into this very high-level requirements 

statement. The fundamental gap that the program is bringing 

came from a capabilities-based assessment looking across not only 

the future carrier air wing of 2025 and beyond, but we also looked 

at the carrier air wing operating in a joint environment. The gap 

that was most prevalent from running multiple scenarios is persistent ISR and strike from the sea base. That capabilities-based 

assessment led to what we call an initial capabilities document. 

This document is endorsed by the Joint Staff, and it specified a 

range of tactical scenarios in which we will need this program to 

operate. These scenarios have been reviewed and endorsed repeatedly over the last 3 years. They have not been static. They have 

been revisited not only from the standpoint of the threat scenario. 

They have been revisited with the Intelligence Community to look 

at what is the evolving threats that it must face? What are the 

ranges? What are the frequency bans? What are the distance we 

must be at? So that has not been a static process. It has been a 

recurring process leading up to this RFP. 

The scenarios, and we call them design reference missions, begin 

with permissive ISR and strike and then move into contested ISR 

and strike against littoral threats. Think of this as small boat 

threats to naval forces. Next is contested ISR and strike against 

coastal land-based threats. Think of this as coastal defense cruise 

missiles, other emerging threats. And finally, anti-surface warfare 

scenarios. Think war at sea against near-peer adversaries. These 

design reference missions also include the need to both give and receive aerial refueling. 

These scenarios which are based on how the COCOMs [combatant commands] intend to fight and win in the next decade, drove 

the right balance of endurance, sensors, weapons, and self-protection for UCLASS as a member of a carrier strike group that in this 

timeframe will include Joint Strike Fighter, E2D, and Growlers 

equipped with next-gen [generation] jammer capabilities. The Navy 

made the decision to field these capabilities in increments primarily based on cost, schedule, and technical risk. Through extensive engagement with industry, we believe the incremental ap-
28 

proach can be achieved while maintaining relevance against the 

threats to carrier air wing in 2025 and beyond. Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Andress, Admiral 

Grosklags, and General Guastella can be found in the Appendix on 

page 101.] 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Courtney, I am going to yield to you in case you 

have to leave. I appreciate you staying to ask your questions. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your 

courtesy again. That conflict evaporated. So I want to thank the 

witnesses for your testimony. 

Admiral, I think I counted the words ‘‘modification,’’ ‘‘enhancement’’ and ‘‘growth’’ probably about four or five times during your 

remarks and echoed in the other witnesses, and that, as you may 

have heard from the prior panel, I mean, was sort of a big focus 

of the discussion, which is just, you know, some of the witnesses 

were sort of posing the next step as almost this irrevocable decision. And, you know, I just wonder if you could just sort of maybe 

talk about that a little bit more about whether or not you think 

that the persistent non-refueling priority is something that is going 

to lock us into, you know, a system that can’t sort of achieve sort 

of the goals of strike capacity that I think everybody agrees would 

be good for the country. So, again, I was wondering if you could 

comment on that? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Yes, sir, and I will probably ask the requirements officer, Mr. Andress, to tag in as well. 

And we have been very, very careful as we have built the request 

for proposals and flowed the requirements from the capabilities description document or development document down into a detailed 

specification to try and ensure that industry understands that we 

need a solution that can grow to future mission roles over time, 

should the Navy and the joint force decide to implement those. It 

is technically achievable. We have seen the designs that industry 

is likely to offer us through the preliminary design review [PDR] 

process. That report out of the PDR process that is required by 

NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] language from a couple of years ago I believe you will see if not late this month, early 

in August. It does certify that those PDRs were complete. They 

were in accordance with the process. But the net result of that, 

from our perspective, was along with 3 years of very close observation of what industry can offer, we know that there are technical 

solutions out there that provide us the capability to grow to a more 

survivable—read low-observable—platform if we decide to go down 

that path. 

There are things that we need industry to bring on day one in 

order to ensure that that is possible. We have seen that in their 

designs already, so we are comfortable that we can get there. We 

have also asked them to look at additional payload in terms of 

weapons, and we have asked them or required them to bring to us 

on day one additional capacity opportunity beyond, and I don’t 

want to go into too much detail of source selection criteria, but additional capacity beyond the 1,000 pounds that was talked about 

earlier. The threshold requirement remains that 1,000 pounds on 

day one. That is our early operational capability. It is also important to point out that the aircraft is required to have two external 
29 

3,000-pound hard points which can carry fuel for refueling other 

aircraft. They can carry other weapons. They can carry other sensor pods for a variety of missions. We are ensuring that all of these 

capabilities or enhancements for growth capability are built in on 

day one. We don’t intend today to implement all of those because 

we don’t know where the requirements of the future will necessarily take this platform, but we want to ensure that it is not a 

dead-end solution for the carrier or for the joint force, that it is a 

very adaptable solution that can be incrementally grown in capability into the future, and we believe the requirements support that 

and our acquisition strategy that industry will see through the request for proposals reflects that as well. 

Mr. ANDRESS. I could add to that from the requirements. We 

spent a lot of time in the analysis of alternatives looking through 

unrefueled persistence. We analyzed 8-hour. We analyzed 10-, 

12-, 14-hour, and 24-hour endurance models. We viewed these, all 

the time we view these through those design reference missions. It 

is against the targets they have to kill, where the aircraft needs 

to be, how far it needs to be from the carrier, et cetera. And we 

assessed that against mission effectiveness, but we also looked at 

technical risk and cost. And so while I will need to be able to come 

talk to you about 8 and 14 hours from the mission effectiveness in 

a more classified setting, I can certainly talk to you in this setting 

about cost, which was a huge driver in the AOA, and some of the 

technical risks. 

Twenty-four hours of endurance is, while the most cost-efficient, 

introduced unacceptable technical risk to one of our top performance criteria, which is carrier suitability. This is mostly driven I 

think by wingspan, payloads, and things like that. Eight hours endurance introduced by far the highest lifecycle cost of all the alternatives by a margin of over four to one. Fourteen hours, when you 

looked at the difference between 8 and 14 hours from a development standpoint and introduced negligible technical or cost risks, 

so the 14-hour requirement facilitated the optimal balance to 

achieve two 24 by 7 orbits at 600 nautical miles from the carrier 

or one orbit at 1,200 nautical miles from the carrier or a single 

strike mission—that is an orbit, persistent, 1,200 miles—or a single-strike mission at over 2,000 miles from the carrier. So we are 

very comfortable with the unrefueled requirement as it sits and 

that it doesn’t limit our ability to grow to objective requirements 

across the other balances of weapons, survivability, et cetera. 

Mr. COURTNEY. One other question. Again, obviously the House 

has acted with the Defense Authorization Bill for 2015 and, again, 

had the additional review that was included in the language. I 

mean, at this point the classified RFP is, I mean, that is imminent. 

Right? Is the game plan pretty soon in terms of when that is going 

out? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Yes, sir. In fact, the Defense Acquisition 

Review Board that was planned to make the decision for the release of that document was scheduled for next Monday. The Deputy 

Secretary of Defense asked for a precursor meeting, and because 

several of the principals were out of the country this week, that 

meeting and the subsequent DAB were postponed until next week. 
30 

It is our expectation they will both happen next week, and the RFP 

release would follow that second meeting. 

Mr. COURTNEY. I mean, at this point, if the law or the bill passes 

as written by the House—I mean, there is assessment requirement. 

I mean, is that something that you will just have to—I mean, obviously, it is the law. But I mean, it doesn’t conflict necessarily with 

that RFP already having been released. Right? You are just going 

to have to comply with it as written. 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. No, sir, it does not conflict with releasing 

the RFP. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

Admiral, I want to come back. Mr. Courtney was exactly right. 

We heard three words, ‘‘modification,’’ ‘‘enhancement,’’ and 

‘‘growth,’’ by everybody, but there was another word we heard from 

everybody, too, which is ‘‘affordability.’’ Could you help me with the 

definition of affordability, because that seems like something you 

guys really want to get across, affordability? Between an aircraft 

carrier and an LCS [Littoral Combat Ship], which one is most affordable? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. I am not sure I can crisply answer that 

question. 

Mr. FORBES. And the reason you can’t answer it is because it depends on the mission that you want to accomplish. Isn’t that true? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. So if you are looking at a UCLASS, we can get a 

very cheap UCLASS platform if we just reduce down the requirements. The key for us is making sure we get the right mission that 

we want the UCLASS to accomplish. Is that a fair statement? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Yes, sir, I think it is important that we get 

the correct requirements upfront, and that is where this program 

started, with the correct requirements. 

Mr. FORBES. Can you help me with this part, too? You indicated 

to us that this document was signed a year ago or longer. Is that 

fair? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. The capability development document, or 

CDD, was signed in April of 2013 by the CNO. It is a Navy document at this point. 

Mr. FORBES. The reason I ask that is because we had testimony 

by several individuals in our previous panel, including Mr. 

O’Rourke, who we put a lot of credibility in as kind of the historian 

that we look to for the CRS [Congressional Research Service], who 

says that there have been world events that have developed in the 

last year, including China’s actions, the Russians and Ukraine, 

that perhaps would give a pause to look and see if the strategic 

look that we had at this program a year ago might not have 

changed in the event of world events. Do you think Mr. O’Rourke 

was wrong in his analysis? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Not having seen his entire analysis, I don’t 

think he is incorrect in that we have an obligation, frankly, to continue to look at our requirements over time to see if they are, in 

fact, evolving or need to evolve to meet any new threats. 
31 

Mr. FORBES. Would it be fair of this committee or subcommittee 

if we were to simply say that we have had certain events that have 

taken place in the last 12 months that have dramatically changed 

some of the ways that we look at our strategic goals around the 

world? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. I would say that is correct. I would also 

comment that we have continued to look at the—while they have 

not changed—we continue to look at the requirements for the 

UCLASS program. And, again, one of the key aspects is that we 

are building in that ability to adapt this platform to missions of the 

future, regardless of what they may be as long as they fit in the 

earlier discussion that we had. 

Mr. FORBES. And I want to address those. I want to also then 

come back to what you just said. You don’t fault this subcommittee 

for saying that, based on those changes, since you have just said 

that you need to continually be looking at those requirements, you 

don’t fault this subcommittee saying before we pour the concrete 

and start heading down this very expensive program, that we 

should perhaps measure twice and cut once to make sure we get 

it wrong—right, and to make sure that the Secretary of Defense 

has a second look at it? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Sir, I will let the requirements folks talk to 

that specifically, but I believe we have measured at least twice. We 

continue to measure, and in fact, over the last weeks, the Joint 

Staff and the Navy have continued to look at these requirements 

and, frankly, from my perspective, continue to validate what we 

have. 

Mr. FORBES. I am going to give you plenty of opportunity to respond to that. First of all, I want you to know, I don’t want you 

to talk about anything that is classified, and we know we have got 

all of that in our logistics. But we have heard the previous panel 

talk about this 14-hour time period. 

Mr. Andress, I think you just mentioned that, and you said there 

was no technical risk or cost difference if we went from 8 hours to 

14 hours. Did I understand that? Or marginal, maybe your word 

was ‘‘marginal.’’ 

Mr. ANDRESS. No. You misunderstood. The cost risk of going 

from 14 to 8 is dramatic. It includes both cost from fuel, cost from 

fuel burdens for tankers. It includes costs for additional integration. Now, remember, you are an unmanned system, so now you 

have to integrate the system that you will refuel with in the unburdened tankers. All those now have to map to those tankers. 

Mr. FORBES. So the cost of having 8 hours versus 14 hours. 

Mr. ANDRESS. Is enormous. 

Mr. FORBES. Much more expensive. 

Mr. ANDRESS. Dramatically. Like I said, it is more than four 

times. 

Mr. FORBES. So that is why you would like to lock into the 14 

hour—— 

Mr. ANDRESS. That is not the only reason, sir. Cost was one factor, and we locked in the 14 hours at both threshold and objective. 

It doesn’t need to change to achieve our contested high-end operations that we get at the objective requirement. It does not need 

to be 8 hours refueled when combined with those other capabilities, 
32 

which are weapons, sensor, sensor range detection, survivability, et 

cetera. So I highlighted lifecycle cost because it drove a lot of the 

analysis of alternatives as we look to where and when this thing 

needs to operate in the dependencies. 

Mr. FORBES. I think that is fair. Just like our LCS and carrier 

example, it is much more expensive to operate a carrier. Since we 

now have 14 hours that we are talking about, and we can at least 

talk about that figure, would you also agree that if you do lock into 

that 14 hours, that you have significantly limited the amount of 

payload that you could expand to at a foreseeable time given the 

platform that you would have? 

Mr. ANDRESS. No, sir. We are not limited by the payload, the 

growth in the platform as we go from threshold requirements, permissive to the contested and high end. 

Mr. FORBES. So then you would say that when we talked about 

that 1,000-pound payload factor, you would say that is inaccurate, 

that you could go much higher than that 1,000 pounds and still 

have that 14-hour endurance requirement? 

Mr. ANDRESS. Absolutely, sir, and that is specified in the threshold to objective requirements that Admiral Grosklags has testified 

we would be able to achieve. 

Mr. FORBES. Ok, now let me ask you this. If you look at in light 

of what I at least understand to have senior level guidance about 

the growing need to project power despite A2/AD challenges in the 

past four QDRs and in the Presidentially approved Defense Strategic Guidance, why did the JROC change UCLASS requirements 

away from the A2/AD last fall? 

Mr. ANDRESS. I am not aware that the JROC changed the requirements away from it. 

Mr. FORBES. Were the requirements changed? I am sorry. I didn’t 

mean to interrupt you. 

General GUASTELLA. Sir, the requirements have grown over the 

3 years. They have been looked at. Actually, the JROC, in terms 

of your question before about measuring how many times, the 

JROC has looked at the UCLASS requirements six times over the 

last 3 years. Sir, most recently, the 4th of February it was looked 

at again, so very recently, especially in light of current events. 

And like I mentioned before, sir, and as you have said, the world 

is more dynamic now possibly than even when the platform was 

first envisioned. The budget pressure, however, is more acute than 

ever, and a trillion dollars over 10 years is what we face. And so 

I think that the JROC is aware of that fiscal reality and ensured 

that it has been able to make—been forced to make performance 

and tradeoffs—— 

Mr. FORBES. And, General, that is my point. You need to help us 

with what we need as what the mission should be because we have 

also had the Navy come over here and say they want to park 11 

cruisers. And we said, We disagree with you. We have had the 

Navy come over here and say, We don’t want to do another carrier. 

And we felt that was wrong. So when you tell me that we looked 

at different requirements and we looked at budget requirements, I 

am asking you the strategic requirements because, as I understand 

it, one of—the previous panel would just disagree with what you 

think the ultimate mission might be for the UCLASS. They think 
33 

that one of the most compelling needs that we are going to have 

with this platform is to be an integrated part of our carrier wing 

that can penetrate A2/AD defenses. What I hear you saying is that 

it needs to be the sophisticated ISR capability. 

And so as I looked at the senior level guidance, we have heard 

over and over again their need to project these same kinds of A2/ 

AD defenses. And so I guess my question is, not just based on 

budget or fiscal restraints, but what is it that caused you to change 

the ultimate mission goal that you had, or did that change? 

General GUASTELLA. Sir, I think it is best to say that no asset 

serves a single purpose. And almost every asset in DOD serves the 

joint fight. 

Mr. FORBES. Fair. What is the primary purpose? Would you 

agree with me that I am making choices between a primary purpose of an ISR capability or of a platform that is capable of penetrating A2/AD defenses? 

Mr. ANDRESS. I will take it. I want to go back to the questions 

about the strategic. And it is very important to note that UCLASS, 

the CDD was signed last year by the CNO, and we have looked at 

it again through the JROC just a few months ago. The implications 

are that we have a shift from this post-Cold War permissive only 

mentality and that UCLASS has missed that in its requirements. 

And what I want to assure the committee is that the design reference missions that I spoke of—spoke of, follow, first—follow the 

Defense Strategic Guidance, speak to both the permissive environment as a threshold capability but have the requirements and objective capability which they will grow to to get at the contested 

and supporting the high-end A2/AD environment. Those were 

thought through, and the specific locations where the threats, the 

surface-to-air missiles we must face, the enabling factors to A2/AD 

were factored into the mission performance that UCLASS needs to 

meet. 

Strategically, your question was, where does UCLASS fit in on 

that? The capabilities-based assessment says that UCLASS provides ISR and strike at longer range from the carrier, ranges I just 

spoke to, two orbits at 600 nautical miles, one orbit at 1,200 nautical miles, and single strike missions at 2,000 nautical miles. That 

strategic mission hasn’t changed. The requirements have not 

changed. Our path to get there is consistent and is balanced. The 

capabilities are balanced against cost, schedule, and technical risk. 

Mr. FORBES. So, Mr. Andress, can you provide us the assurance 

that this RFP will create a platform that will meet those threshold 

objectives? 

Mr. ANDRESS. Absolutely, yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. What about the objective requirements? 

Mr. ANDRESS. Yes, sir. I think your question is, will the RFP address threshold requirements, and will it enable a path to objective 

requirements. Is that your question? 

Mr. FORBES. No. Will it meet the objective requirements? 

Mr. ANDRESS. This RFP is not designed to meet the objective requirements. It is not a part of our acquisition strategy, not when 

you balance it against cost, schedule, and technical risk of carrier 

suitability. 
34 

Mr. FORBES. Now, let me just ask you a couple final questions. 

Is the Navy abandoning the precision landing system developed 

and successfully tested during the UCAS–D effort for the UCLASS 

program? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Sir, our long-term plan is to utilize the 

Joint Precision Approach and Landing System [JPALS], which is a 

separate Navy-run, Navy-managed program of record. A couple of 

advantages in doing that: The first is the UCAS–D precision landing system is a very proprietary system that was designed specifically for this demo program. It would require significant modifications to enable it to operate long term in the carrier environment 

operationally. 

Alternatively, with JPALS, what we get is a solution that we are 

not only going to use for UCLASS but also for the Joint Strike 

Fighter. A Joint Strike Fighter also requires a precision landing 

system, and JPALS fits that need for both the F–35Cs on board the 

aircraft carrier and the F–35Bs for the Marine Corps on board our 

large-deck amphibs [amphibious assault ships]. So that common 

program serves multiple platforms for the Navy. 

Mr. FORBES. Last question I will have for you. Could the 

UCLASS air vehicle described in the draft RFP operate in the 

South China Sea against the Chinese SAG [Surface Action Group]? 

Mr. ANDRESS. Our most stressing design reference mission dealt 

with SAG capabilities, and I am happy to come by and show you 

what that exactly entails, what that threat is, where that threat 

is located. 

Mr. FORBES. And when you do, could you also talk about the Taiwan Strait and the Black Sea and how that would operate there 

if you don’t mind? 

Mr. ANDRESS. Yes, sir. I would be happy to do that. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Courtney, did you have any follow-up questions? 

Mr. COURTNEY. Just a quick follow-up. 

Mr. Andress, you mentioned again sort of some of the, I don’t 

know what the word is, constraints or just realities that you have 

to kind of deal with in this whole process, and you talked about 

technical risk being one of them. Again, the prior panel, we had a 

little colloquy regarding the issue of refueling. If you were going to 

lower the fuel amounts on board, that obviously that would create 

an immediate requirement to have tankers be able to do this. 

Again, that is one of those technical, I don’t know if the word is 

‘‘risk,’’ but challenges. I mean, tankers aren’t really doing that 

right now in terms of refueling unmanned systems. Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. ANDRESS. Not to my knowledge, no, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So, again, when people sort of talk about well, 

let’s lower the fuel capacity and that way we can add more strike 

capability, and if you are going to do deep strikes, it almost makes 

refueling, you know, mandatory. I mean, that is a whole another 

set of challenges that you have to deal with. Right? If you were trying to jump to that system right away. 

Mr. ANDRESS. Yes, sir. It would be if we were trying to jump. We 

would not necessarily—remember the sea base is always mobile, 

and it is able to gain accesses that land bases do not always give 
35 

us the luxury to enjoy. So when we talk about a threshold capability of 2,000 miles for a single-strike mission, that is a significant 

strike unrefueled. So no fueling requirement, no tanking along the 

way. That is significant. And in the threshold capabilities is where 

you get into where that strike mission—I mean, the objective capabilities that you run against those missions get into how much 

more difficult that strike mission would be. But at threshold on objective, we will have unrefueled tanking to support a 2,000 nautical 

mile strike. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Right, pretty good range. 

Did you want to comment, General? 

General GUASTELLA. Sir, if I could, an absolutely valid question. 

The JROC’s approach is—if you look at it as a strike asset, it 

falls into a family of strike assets. And so, if there is very longrange targets, maybe that would be something more suited to different assets. 

And so what we will do is tailor targets that are associated to 

the UCLASS’s capability range to it and then assess other targets 

to different platforms. 

And together, though, as a family of systems, it is how we feel 

we are best presenting a joint force for our country. 

Mr. COURTNEY. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, General, in that regard, too, we have a family 

of systems for ISR as well and a lot of other capabilities that we 

are using for that. 

And what we are looking at here is the Navy capability from a 

carrier platform because the big concern we have is the A2/AD defense is pushing our carriers out further and further. 

So if we weren’t worried about the Navy doing that, we could 

rely on our bombers or whatever might be involved in that family 

of assets. 

Mr. Andress, just one last thing I want you to clarify again. And 

I think you have done this, but I want to make sure. 

You said that cost was a huge driver in the analysis of alternatives. What alternatives did we take off the table because of 

cost? 

Mr. ANDRESS. Sir, I spoke to the analysis of alternatives of different endurance ranges, from 8, 14, to 24. We took 24 off the table 

as we did the analysis both on mission cost and technical risk. 

We then took off—as we went from the AOA, we saw that those 

two were still viable. Then you started to look at—from cost, it became the 8-hour mission as compared to mission effectiveness, and 

we went with the 13.6 hours. 

Mr. FORBES. So you didn’t take off additional payload or anything like that based on your cost analysis? 

Mr. ANDRESS. Could I take that for the record to make sure? 

Mr. FORBES. Sure. If you could just bring that over when we—— 

Mr. ANDRESS. It is a complicated mix of tradeoff analysis. I want 

to make sure I get you the right answer. 

Mr. FORBES. And we can talk about that when we get into the 

classified setting. 

Mr. ANDRESS. Absolutely. 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Sir—— 

Mr. FORBES. Oh, please. Please. 
36 

Admiral GROSKLAGS [continuing]. On that question, two other 

things that were taken off the table because they were looked at 

as part of that analysis of alternatives—and I believe they were 

mentioned earlier—was the Fire Scout—that was looked at as a potential solution for this mission requirement of ISR&T from the 

carrier—as was Triton. 

And those were taken off for obviously different reasons, but the 

determination was neither one of them could meet this requirement for something that supported the carrier, wherever it happened to be around the world, real-time. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

I had promised all three of you that I would give you any time 

you needed for a wrap-up. And so I want to offer you that now. 

And maybe, Admiral, if we could start with you and—— 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. All right, sir. First, I want to clarify something that was mentioned today just so we are crystal-clear. 

You had asked a question about 14 hours and, if we add additional ordnance or mission systems to the aircraft, was that 14 

hours still achievable. 

I think the answer to that is it depends. We will find out from 

our vendors once we get the actual proposals back whether—as we 

add additional weight to the aircraft, typically that will reduce 

their endurance capability. We will find out whether, with additional payload, they can still meet 14 hours. 

But the specific requirement for the day-one capability—and, 

again, this is the near-term day-one capability—is 14 hours 

unrefueled with a single laser JDAM [Joint Direct Attack Munition]. That is the basic requirement to get out there, perform the 

ISR&T mission with a precision strike capability. 

We acknowledge in this specification, as they bring more weapons to the table, just like any other aircraft, be that manned or unmanned, that the endurance, the range, the performance of the air 

vehicle will decline over time. 

Mr. FORBES. But, Admiral, help me with that, then, because I— 

you know, I just want to make that clear. And thank you for clarifying that. 

Because I thought it was your statement—not yours, but maybe 

Mr. Andress’—that you could add that additional payload and continue to have that 14 hours. 

And you are not saying you couldn’t do it. What you are saying 

is you will have to check to see if you could do it. Is that a fair 

statement? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Yes, sir. I just wanted to make sure you 

were clear on that. 

Mr. FORBES. No, because that does help me. 

Because if, in fact, the previous panel was correct in saying that 

they didn’t believe you could do that and if, in fact, when you come 

back, your conclusion is we could not increase that 1,000-pound 

payload and continue with the 14 hours, then it becomes very important for us to ask what are we taking off the table by not being 

able to use more than 1,000 pounds of payload. 

And if I could just ask one more thing. I am going to let you respond all you want. 
37 

Because the previous panel would suggest that there are a lot of 

those targets that Mr. Andress was talking about that you cannot 

handle with 1,000 pounds of payload. 

So now please clarify for me to make sure I am not missing any 

of those points. 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. No, sir. You are accurate. 

And as the mission roles of this aircraft develop over time, what 

we are trying to ensure is the operational commander, whether 

that be the carrier strike group commander or a COCOM or a joint 

force commander in the area of operations, has the flexibility to 

make that decision: Do I want this 14-hour aircraft with a precision strike capability, albeit somewhat limited, or am I willing to 

give up a little bit of that endurance for a particular mission where 

I want to carry more ordnance or I want to carry a different sensor 

package or I might want to take additional fuel on my external 

hard points? 

Those decisions, long term, we want to leave to the operational 

commanders. So we are trying to build an air vehicle that is adaptable to that situation. 

I mean, I heard some earlier comments about an 8- to 10-hour 

aircraft that could carry 4,000 pounds and could not be seen by 

anybody. And, frankly, that doesn’t exist. It does not exist, and it 

is not technically achievable today. 

We have looked at the tradeoffs very, very carefully between all 

the mission roles, all the mission capability, weapons, low observability, endurance, cost, manpower to sustain: How does it fit on 

the carrier? How does it blend in with the rest of the carrier strike 

group? How does it blend in with the joint forces, as the general 

mentioned? And the 14 hours for that particular mission set at 

EOC [early operational capability] was really the sweet spot. We 

melded all those things together. 

Mr. FORBES. And, Admiral, as you come back to us—and I don’t 

expect you to have the answers today—it is night and day difference between what you said and what I maybe misunderstood 

from Mr. Andress, in that, if we are, in fact, saying that, if we lock 

into a requirement of 14 hours, we don’t know for sure if we can 

increase this 1,000-pound payload—I am just—I am sorry. Go 

ahead. 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Yeah. I just want to be clear. 

When we write requirements for any aircraft or, frankly, any system, we will have a baseline requirement that we can test them to. 

Okay? 

So the baseline requirement for the fielding of this aircraft is to 

be able to comply with that 14-hour endurance requirement, the orbits that Mr. Andress talked about with a defined payload. 

If we or the operational commander in the future chooses to 

change that mission payload, then we don’t hold industry to provide us an aircraft that continues to meet all the other parameters 

that are encompassed in that baseline capability. We have to have 

something to measure them against initially, and that is what that 

14 hours is. 

Mr. FORBES. And I understand that, and I appreciate that. 

I guess what I am trying to also say is that what the previous 

panel, I thought, was indicating to us is it might be more impor-
38 

tant for you to be able to have that increased payload as opposed 

to that endurance if, in fact, your goal is penetrating those A2/AD 

defenses. 

And one of the things they would at least suggest is that you 

can’t just come back and modify this platform quite as easy as it 

is being represented to be able to do. 

In other words, it is not some modular thing that a commander 

in the field just says, ‘‘Okay. Today I would rather have 8 hours.’’ 

You see what I am saying? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Yes, sir. It is not that simple. 

We know that when—based on the design solutions we have seen 

to date, we know that industry will be able to bring us something 

that has a greater weapons payload than what is in that initial requirement. 

We also know and have been clear with the industry that, if they 

bring us that additional weapons payload, in that operational context, they will not be required to meet the 14-hour endurance requirement. 

Mr. FORBES. And, if I could—again, I appreciate your clarification—that is the essence of what we have been saying. 

If we lock into a requirement on this 14-hour provision because 

of affordability, because of whatever we are looking at, we just 

want to make certain that we are not going down a route that is 

going to take other options off the table which could be incredibly 

important, if, in fact, you view this UCLASS as important not just 

for ISR, but for penetrating an A2/AD defense. 

And if you also say, for it to do that successfully, it has got to 

carry more than a 1,000-pound payload, then we are starting off in 

the wrong place at the beginning. And that is just what our concern is, and maybe that is a discussion we have to have in a classified session. 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. I think part of it would be easier in a classified setting. 

However, as we discussed earlier, we have seen through the preliminary design reviews that industry has design solutions that 

cannot only enable us to grow to a more mission-effective capability 

in terms of low observability without major modifications to the 

airframe that we are going to see on day one, we also have seen 

the capability to carry additional weapons in those same designs. 

So, again, the 14-hour requirement is for that early operational 

capability single mission. That does not constrain us specifically 

from adding additional weapons capability to the aircraft. And, in 

fact, we have seen designs that carry considerably more than that 

1,000 pounds. But we will not hold the providers of that to 14 

hours with those additional weapons. 

So, again, it gives us the flexibility in the future to decide, ‘‘Yes. 

We want to carry more weapons on a particular mission.’’ We have 

to go through, you know, the process for certification for those 

weapons. So it will take a little bit of time, not day one. But it 

gives us that flexibility in the future to go there. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. And thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. Andress. 

Mr. ANDRESS. Yeah. I just wanted to build on that, and maybe 

I can offer some clarity. 
39 

Our threshold requirements for the 1,000 pounds and 14 hours 

and that has to be tested against, it doesn’t change as we go from 

threshold to objective requirements. The requirements remain 14 

hours endurance. The requirement for weapons grows beyond—it 

goes to greater than 1,000 pounds. 

I think what Admiral Grosklags was pointing out that hasn’t 

really been highlighted is, even at threshold requirements, this 

thing is going to have 1,000 pounds internal carriage and two hard 

points with 3,000 pounds. 

So if the commander makes the decision to strap 3,000 pounds 

of weapons on the outside and the 1,000 pounds of internal carriage, you wouldn’t expect it to still test to the 14-hour requirement. Does that make sense? 

Mr. FORBES. Yes, sir. It does. 

Mr. ANDRESS. I just wanted to make sure that was very clear. 

Mr. FORBES. It does. 

Mr. ANDRESS. And I think it will be very helpful for you when 

we show you the specific design reference missions at threshold 

and at objective that we need to achieve. 

Mr. FORBES. I think it would. Thank you, Mr. Andress. 

General, any? 

General GUASTELLA. Sir, I appreciate the opportunity to testify 

today and realize it is an unclassified forum and it is difficult to 

present some of the analysis that JROC uses and how the UCLASS 

fits into that joint portfolio, but happy to come back if you have additional questions, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

Well, gentlemen, thank you so much for your patience and for 

being here to help us. We thank you for your service to our country. And we look forward to getting together again in that classified 

session to be able to talk further about it. 

And, with that, Mr. Courtney, if you don’t have anything else, 

then we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 16, 2014 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 16, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 16, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. How does this platform fit into current or anticipated operational 

plans? Specifically, which mission is it most important that this platform be capable 

of performing? Are we seeking UCLASS to be a naval force multiplier or focused 

for deep strike? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Persistent sea-based Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (ISR&T) with precision strike is the most critical gap that 

UCLASS will fill. This was reinforced in a combined USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM 

and USSOCOM Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON), in which UCLASS was 

deemed a suitable solution. UCLASS will fully integrate with the Carrier Air Wing 

to support a myriad of missions from permissive counter-terrorism operations to 

missions in low-end contested environments, to providing enabling capabilities for 

high-end denied operations, as well as supporting organic naval missions. The 

UCLASS initial Concept of Operations (CONOPS) includes long dwell surveillance 

and targeting for extended range weapons, and precision strike against time sensitive targets. 

Mr. HUNTER. What sort of ordnance do you see a strike oriented solution carrying? What types of targets do you envision it striking? Are these missions already 

within the F/A–18 or F–35C capability? How would a strike oriented UCLASS compliment or overlap with capabilities offered by those platforms? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Given the projected speed of UCLASS and most probable 

target sets, the weapons most valued by fleet requirements are the 500-pound class 

Laser Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and the upgraded Small Diameter 

Bomb (SDB II). The internal weapons capacity requirement of greater than 1000 

pounds of ordnance at threshold was determined to address specific classified scenarios and compliments the Carrier Air Wing capability. An objective growth criteria for 2,000 pounds of LJDAMs and/or SDBIIs is also specified. Additionally, the 

UCLASS Air Vehicle will have a minimum of two external hard-points each 

provisioned to carry 3,000 pounds, suitable for most weapons currently employed by 

the Carrier Air Wing. 

Mr. HUNTER. Do UCLASS budget estimates provided to Congress this year envision a low-cost, affordable acquisition strategy or do they envision development of 

a presumably more expensive, highly stealthy platform? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. The UCLASS budget profile, as outlined in the President’s 

Budget for FY 2015, provides adequate funding to achieve the Early Operational Capability with growth capabilities outlined in the current acquisition strategy. Affordability is a key component of the UCLASS acquisition strategy. 

Mr. HUNTER. What is your specific endurance requirement for UCLASS? Can you 

have it all—long endurance and high stealth—or is there a tradeoff? What considerations need to be weighed between a 14 hour endurance solution with little or no 

strike capability and a 10 hour endurance solution with significant strike capability? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. The endurance requirement, as part of the Persistence Key 

Performance Parameter, is to provide two unrefueled orbits (24/7 coverage) at a radius of 600 nm from the aircraft carrier, or one unrefueled orbit at 1200 nm per 

UCLASS system, or for each air vehicle to fly an unrefueled maximum range profile 

(out and back) to 2000 nm to perform strike missions. 

The designs of aircraft which can meet the UCLASS requirements are driven by 

unrefueled endurance/range; senor payload weight/volume; weapons payload; low-observable characteristics; in-flight refueling provisions for both fuel give and receive; 

and, as important as any of the preceding, the constraints of operating from an aircraft carrier including consideration of such things as structural loads for launch/ 

recovery, landing area (width), and deck spotting factor. Even with all of the above 

design constraints, through two years of close engagement with industry, the DoN 

is very confident that affordable UCLASS aircraft with 14 hours of unrefueled endurance and a high degree of low observability are possible and will be proposed 

by industry in response to our forthcoming request for proposals. 

A 14 hour endurance UCLASS will be able to carry 1000 to 2000 pounds of internal weapons. One thousand pounds is the minimum requirement and the potential 

to attain 2000 pounds at EOC will be determined by specific vender proposals. This 
112 

payload is sufficient to meet mission requirements as defined in the UCLASS Design Reference Missions. In addition the UCLASS will have a minimum of two 3000 

pound external hard-points capable of handling the majority of weapons in the current CVW inventory. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Looking at the vast array of ISR assets available to a carrier 

strike group commander—space, airborne both from land and sea, and undersea— 

what would be the ‘‘secret sauce’’ that an ISR-centric, 14-hour UCLASS would bring 

that an 8–10 hour UCLASS could not? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. In preparation for the hearing, I received briefings on the 

UCLASS program from the Navy and from each of the four firms that are currently 

competing for the program. The Navy stated that its analysis of alternatives (AOA) 

for the UCLASS program concluded that an 8-hour UCLASS would have effectiveness comparable to a 14-hour UCLASS in three of the four tactical situations that 

were examined in the AOA, and somewhat less effectiveness than a 14-hour 

UCLASS in one of the four tactical situations. The Navy stated that the AOA concluded that an 8-hour UCLASS would have a higher life-cycle cost than a 14-hour 

UCLASS. Life-cycle cost, the Navy stated, included development, production, and 

operation and support (O&S) costs. Based on the briefings I received from industry, 

my sense is that some in industry might agree (or at least not disagree) with these 

findings, while others might disagree or argue that the AOA did not examine the 

right set of tactical situations. In my prepared statement for the hearing, I stated 

that: 

The specific tactical situations that were examined in the UCLASS AOA are related to the program’s current operational requirements. Assessing alternative operational requirements for the UCLASS program could involve examining potential 

outcomes in other tactical situations that may not have been considered in the AOA. 

A broader analysis might examine how changes in UCLASS operational requirements might affect estimated outcomes in campaign-level, force-on-force situations, 

rather than in specific tactical situations. (Statement of Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist 

in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Before the House Armed Services 

Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, on Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) Requirements Assessment, July 16, 2014, pp. 5–6.) 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Looking at the vast array of ISR assets available to a carrier 

strike group commander—space, airborne both from land and sea, and undersea— 

what would be the ‘‘secret sauce’’ that an ISR-centric, 14-hour UCLASS would bring 

that an 8–10 hour UCLASS could not? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. The short answer is that there is no ‘‘secret sauce’’ that a 14- 

hour UCLASS would bring that an 8–10 hour UCLASS with significantly enhanced 

survivability and strike capacity could not. The Navy’s rationale for 14 hours of 

unrefueled endurance centers on its stated requirement for 24-hour intelligence, 

surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support of—or ‘‘maritime domain awareness’’ 

around—the carrier strike group (CSG). Putting aside survivability and strike capacity issues and looking narrowly at just the MDA mission (which, I would argue, 

is the central problem with UCLASS requirements), the only ‘‘advantage’’ conferred 

by 14 hours of unrefueled endurance is the ability to bridge the closed or ‘‘overnight’’ 

period of the canonical 12 hour ‘‘deck day’’ without land-based airborne tanker support. 

If the deck day were extended by three to four hours, or if aircraft were arranged 

on the flight deck at the close of normal air operations to support one or two overnight recoveries, then this so-called advantage vanishes. Of course, if land-based 

aerial refueling is available, which is axiomatically true during joint combat operations, the 8–10 hour air vehicle could be ‘‘tanked’’ during the night rather than recover to the carrier. It is essential to note that if the carrier is supporting power 

projection operations in anti-access environments anticipated in the 2020s, which is 

when UCLASS would field, it would likely be standing off some 1,000–1,500 nautical miles (or more) from an adversary’s coast. In which case, the only practical way 

to sustain persistent ISR-strike operations would be to refuel UCLASS inflight from 

Air Force tankers operating several hundred miles closer to the battlespace, just 

outside the range of adversary air interceptors and surface-to-air missiles. A nonrefuelable UCLASS, even one with 14 hours unrefueled endurance, would offer marginal utility in such scenarios. 

Equally important to note is that the Navy already has two other UAS programs 

of record underway that will yield overlapping, multi-tiered (strategic- and tactical- 
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level) persistent MDA in support of CSG operations. Indeed, the MQ–4C Triton, a 

marinized version of the Air Force’s RQ–4 Global Hawk strategic surveillance UAS 

with over 30 hours unrefueled endurance, was designed expressly for the ‘‘broad 

area maritime surveillance’’ mission (hence, its previous ‘‘BAMS’’ moniker). And 

while the Navy is currently planning to acquire some 68 Tritons, it would take just 

three of these aircraft (two operational, one spare) to sustain 24-hour MDA in support of a CSG. Triton is complemented in the MDA domain by the MQ–8C Fire 

Scout, an unmanned helicopter with over 12 hours unrefueled endurance capable of 

operating from any air-capable surface combatant (e.g., carriers, destroyers, cruisers, littoral combat ships). Together, Triton and Fire Scout will arguably generate 

a surfeit of MDA capacity over the near-term. Thus, it makes little sense for the 

MDA mission—much less the readily dispelled notion of an MDA ‘‘capability gap’’— 

to drive UCLASS requirements. 

The more important issue this question raises is the opportunity cost of that 14- 

hour endurance in terms of reduced payload capacity and flexibility, survivability, 

and growth potential. The cost of 14 hours of unrefueled endurance is most likely 

about 1,000–3,000 lbs of weapons (or other mission payloads), the inability to carry 

stand-off weapons both currently in the inventory and in development, and a significant increase in presented radar cross section at relevant threat frequencies. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Looking at the vast array of ISR assets available to a carrier 

strike group commander—space, airborne both from land and sea, and undersea— 

what would be the ‘‘secret sauce’’ that an ISR-centric, 14-hour UCLASS would bring 

that an 8–10 hour UCLASS could not? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. The short answer is, no secret sauce would be provided from an 

ISR-centric, 14-hour UCLASS. As discussed during the hearing, the types of permanent design decisions that would be required to field a 14-hour UCLASS would preclude the kind of payload and limited stealth that would be required to provide a 

meaningful increase to the striking power of the carrier air wing. As I described 

during the hearing, I am not a former naval officer and I am not an aircraft design 

expert—when I engage in a requirements discussion my perspective is that of a civilian defense strategist. That is to say, I concern myself with several threshold 

questions, including: 

1. Will the platform provide a future Commander-in-Chief better military options 

during a crisis? 2. Will it help address pressing gaps in U.S. defense strategy and 

planning? 3. Does it enable forward U.S. forces to present a stronger conventional 

deterrent and, if necessary, help ensure U.S. forces can defeat a plausible adversary? 4. Will the program help underwrite the confidence of our allies and partners? 

5. Does it reflect measured judgments regarding mid- to long-term requirements for 

U.S. defense? 6. And finally, does the program help ensure America’s military-technical dominance in an increasingly competitive environment? 

I don’t think a very limited system designed to provide ISR to the carrier meaningfully addresses any of the above questions. Far and away the most pressing challenge facing the U.S. Navy is finding ways to project and sustain combat power in 

the face of adversary ballistic and cruise missile technology that could hold at risk 

our aircraft carriers well beyond the unrefueled range of their strike aircraft. The 

original requirements for an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) date back to 

the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. I believe the original conception of harnessing the unmanned revolution to provide an asymmetric and disruptive capability that would ensure the combat relevance of the carrier air wing to a plausible 

high-end challenge were correct. We need a system that has broadband, all-aspect 

stealth, is capable of automated aerial refueling, with an integrated surveillance 

and strike capability. My argument is that these original requirements were largely 

correct, and the recent deviations from this to a more limited ISR role reportedly 

described in the draft UCLASS RFP are not wise given the projected security environment. 

Finally, as we talked about during the hearing, it is not as if several of my colleagues and I were arguing for a capability that is well outside the realm of the 

possible. We all observed the multiple recent successful tests of the Navy’s X–47B, 

a stealthy flying wing design that will likely succeed in air-to-air refueling tests as 

well. I am confident that we can build and field the kind of system that the Navy 

will need to give a future Commander-in-Chief real deterrent and carrier-based 

strike options that I believe he or she will need in the years ahead. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Looking at the vast array of ISR assets available to a carrier 

strike group commander—space, airborne both from land and sea, and undersea— 

what would be the ‘‘secret sauce’’ that an ISR-centric, 14-hour UCLASS would bring 

that an 8–10 hour UCLASS could not? 

Mr. MCGRATH. Thank you, Representative Langevin, for your continuing interest 

in this matter and for this excellent question. 
114 

You correctly list a number of ISR sensors to which a Strike Group Commander 

has access. The array is considerable, and in some respects, overlapping. To the extent that there is any ‘‘secret sauce’’ available, it all revolves around the question 

of ‘‘who controls the asset?’’ If the CSG Commander had a 14 hour ISR privileged 

UCLASS at his disposal and UNDER HIS COMMAND, it gives him additional operational flexibility versus assets ‘‘owned and operated’’ by some other commander. 

Under current Command and Control (C2) schemes, the CSG Commander must request assets from others to fill this mission, and this is something no commander 

enjoys. Having instant and untrammeled control of a capability is always better 

than ‘‘access’’ to someone else’s asset. 

This said, the CSG Commander relies on others to provide him with a lot of capabilities. He does not own the P–8’s or MQ–4’s that provide him with support. He 

does not own satellite assets that give him support. He often relies on inorganic 

tanking from USAF refueling assets. The point is, the aircraft carrier deck is already a crowded place, so taking up valuable real estate simply to provide the CSG 

Commander with an asset solely under his control—the opportunity cost of which 

is moving more slowly and ineffectively to combat capability in a contested environment—seems imprudent when there are a plethora of other ways to get the desired 

information to the Strike Group. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Why is air-to-air refueling not a threshold requirement? What effect would having the ability to refuel have on the requirement—for instance, would 

the endurance requirement come down in a CONOPS where a UCLASS platform 

was able to refuel after takeoff, like current manned missions? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. The UCLASS Air Vehicle will be required to be provisioned 

for aerial refueling at threshold. All vendors are required to meet the requirements 

set forth in the Persistence KPP which call for two 600 nm 24/7 orbits or one 1200 

nm 24/7 orbit or one 2000nm strike; all of which must be conducted unrefueled. Due 

to the compressed test and evaluation period and requirements outlined in the affordability Key Performance Parameter, aerial refueling, which includes both giving 

and receiving fuel, would not be achievable by the 2020 Early Operational Capability (EOC) deployment and will be implemented in the future based on Fleet requirements/demand. Complete implementation of aerial refueling at threshold would 

not affect current threshold endurance requirements. Additionally, including air-toair refueling at threshold would add technical difficulty and cost to the development 

process making the program unaffordable. The tanker fleet would also require additional development and test, adding cost and time to the program. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I’m sure each of you are aware of the public reports of several nations developing advanced radar systems and radar networks specifically designed 

to defeat low-observable platforms. Given the pace of development and the proliferation of air defense radar systems in the past, how confident are you that the levels 

of low-observability across key frequencies that the Navy is planning to require 

would be sufficient for UCLASS to conduct the full range of envisioned missions 

through the life of the platform? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. When developing the Air Vehicle survivability specifications, 

a broad range of current and future threat systems were evaluated. This assessment 

looked at a full range of scenarios including shore based and maritime A2AD 

threats. The Early Operational Requirement threshold capabilities, future growth, 

requirements, and objective criteria were based on this assessment and the Concept 

of Operations which utilizes UCLASS as part of a fully integrated Carrier Air Wing/ 

Carrier Strike Group. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Can you give us an example of a mission that a 14-hour endurance 

UCLASS could accomplish that a 8–10 hour vehicle or other assets, whether sea, 

air, or space, could not? 

General GUASTELLA. Persistence is a key attribute for the Unmanned Carrier 

Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system. Based on extensive 

endurance and aerial refueling analyses, a 14-hour vehicle is the most cost effective 

approach to meet operational requirements. UCLASS must integrate into the standard carrier (CVN) flight cycle, and while an air vehicle with 8–10 hour endurance 

may have the same surveillance and strike capabilities, the shorter endurance will 

require costly aerial refueling to integrate into CVN operations. Avoiding the reliance on aerial refueling provides a cost advantage and reduced operational risk. A 

14-hour unrefueled endurance allows 24-hour coverage within a standard fly day 

and the greater persistence and range translate to greater operational flexibility for 

the Carrier Strike Group and operational commanders. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Why was 1,000 pounds chosen as a threshold strike capability? 

What does that translate to as far as weapons capabilities, including standoff weapons? How does the weight relate to volume requirements? And what requirement 

is this strike capability designed to address? 
115 

General GUASTELLA. The Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and 

Strike (UCLASS) Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) examined several performance recommendations that drove the development of the Key Performance Parameters 

(KPPs) outlined in the draft Capabilities Development Document (CDD). The internal weapons capacity of > 1000 pounds at threshold was determined by several factors including endurance, survivability, carrier integration and, most importantly, 

targets serviced. Based on this analysis, UCLASS’ precision strike capability will be 

designed to address specific classified scenarios for both today’s missions and future 

threats. In these scenarios, the 500-pound class Laser Joint Direct Attack Munitions 

(LJDAM) and the upgraded Small Diameter Bomb (SDB II) are the weapons of 

choice. Each of these weapons enhance ‘‘maneuverability’’ when employed against a 

moving target like a ship or vehicle, and SDBII provides a significant standoff capability. The threshold requirement of 1000 lbs internal, with objective growth approaching 2000 lbs allows for 2–4 LJDAM or 4–8 SDBIIs. This number of weapons 

provides sufficient precision strike capability to service the target sets outlined in 

the AOA. Additionally, the UCLASS air vehicle is planned to have at least two external hard-points, provisioned for additional 3000 lbs of carriage each, to carry a 

majority of the weapons currently employed by the Carrier Air Wing. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I’m sure each of you are aware of the public reports of several nations developing advanced radar systems and radar networks specifically designed 

to defeat low-observable platforms. Given the pace of development and the proliferation of air defense radar systems in the past, how confident are you that the levels 

of low-observability across key frequencies that the Navy is planning to require 

would be sufficient for UCLASS to conduct the full range of envisioned missions 

through the life of the platform? 

General GUASTELLA. We are confident that the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council (JROC) survivability requirements for the Unmanned Carrier Launched 

Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program are sufficient. The Joint unmanned aerial system portfolio includes systems with various levels of performance, 

survivability, basing options and missions. The UCLASS will play a key role in providing carrier-based, persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and precision strike capability within this portfolio. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

Mr. LARSEN. To what degree have you reviewed the Navy’s UCLASS draft RFP 

and classified addenda? Are there aspects of the Navy defined survivability requirement or other requirements you find insufficient and why? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. I reviewed earlier drafts of these materials while serving in the 

Department of the Navy. Questions about survivability cannot be adequately addressed at the unclassified level. 

Mr. LARSEN. Since the Navy and OSD/Joint Staff vetted the UCLASS requirements, has additional information come to light to warrant a change to those requirements at this stage of the acquisition process? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. Countering emerging anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) challenges 

was OSD’s original motivation for both starting Navy UCAS/UCAS–D in the 2006 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and for providing the additional $2 billion in 

the FY11 Program and Budget Review. The need for a longer range, survivable, carrier-based air vehicle for ISR and strike in contested airspace was articulated 

throughout the 2010 QDR and affirmed in testimony to Congress on several occasions by senior Navy official in 2010 and 2011. 

The current key performance parameters (KPPs) emerged from a highly contentious—and still unsettled—debate with DOD over the past two years. Among the 

competing schools of thought are those who seek a lower-end, carrier-based UAS optimized for counter-terrorism missions as a hedge against the potential loss of landbases for armed UAVs such as the MQ–1 Predator and MQ–9 Reaper; those that 

believe a capability-gap exists with respect to maritime domain awareness (MDA) 

around the carrier strike group (CSG); those that are willing to dilute UCLASS requirements to reduce bureaucratic and cultural resistance within the naval aviation 

community to ‘‘get something’’ onto the carrier deck; and those, like myself, that fervently believe that a stealthy, air-refuelable ISR-strike UAS is needed to maintain 

the operational relevance of the carrier air wing in the face of emerging A2/AD 

threats. The latter would offer ‘‘pan-conflict spectrum utility,’’ meaning that it would 

be equally capable of the counter-terrorism, MDA, and counter-A2/AD power projection missions. 

What has changed since this debate was first joined is a growing awareness within DOD and the national security community of the probable scale, scope, and pace 
116 

of the unfolding A2/AD challenge. Meanwhile, the feared loss of land bases to support counter-terrorism operations in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa has 

not materialized and there are no signs that it will. While it is difficult to say 

whether counter-terrorism will be as prominent in the mid-2020s when UCLASS is 

scheduled to field as today, current trends suggest that the U.S. military will retain 

a wide range of options for basing long-range UAVs such as the extended-range 

MQ–9 Reaper and RQ–4 Global Hawk. In contrast, threats to the aircraft carrier 

and its embarked aircraft are clearly intensifying. 

Although several countries around the world are fielding A2/AD capabilities, the 

pacing threat is China. In its most recent Annual Report to Congress on Military 

and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China, DOD highlights 

myriad threats to the aircraft carrier including air-, sea-, and submarine-launched 

anti-ship cruise missiles; wake-homing torpedoes from a growing and increasingly 

capable submarine fleet; and long-range, anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). It 

states: 

China is fielding a limited but growing number of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the DF–21D anti-ship ballistic missile 

(ASBM). The DF–21D is based on a variant of the DF–21 (CSS–5) mediumrange ballistic missile (MRBM) and gives the PLA the capability to attack large 

ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean. The DF–21D has 

a range exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with a maneuverable warhead. (pp. 

5–6.) 

In addition to the carrier being potentially pushed well outside the unrefueled 

combat radius of its embarked fighters, the F–18E/F and F–35C will also confront 

increasingly deadly land- and sea-based integrated air defenses (IADS). Not only are 

modern IADS diffusing widely around the globe, they are also growing more lethal 

owing to several synergistic trends: more sensitive radars operating over wider frequency bands, increased resistance to electronic attack (e.g., jamming and spoofing), 

increased interceptor range, more advanced signal processing, and high-speed networking. Variants of the Russian-made S–300 (SA–10/20), for example, are already 

in service in about a dozen countries, including Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 

Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Slovakia, and Venezuela. Both Iran and Syria have repeatedly attempted to procure the S–300 from Russia. China has already fielded a 

dense, networked IADS. As the most recent Annual Report to Congress on Military 

and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China states: China’s ground-based air defense A2/AD capabilities will likely be focused on 

countering long-range airborne strike platforms with increasing numbers of advanced, long-range SAMs. China’s current air and air defense A2/AD components include a combination of advanced long-range SAMs—its indigenous HQ– 

9 and Russian SA–10 and SA–20 PMU1/PMU2, which have the advertised capability to protect against both aircraft and low-flying cruise missiles. China 

continues to pursue the acquisition of the Russian extremely long-range S–400 

SAM system (400 km), and is also expected to continue research and development to extend the range of the domestic HQ–9 SAM to beyond 200km. (p. 35) 

Prospective adversaries are also investing in more capable air superiority fighters, 

outfitted with modern sensor systems and armed with beyond-visual-range (BVR) 

air-to-air missiles. These aircraft can be vectored—in some cases, in large numbers—to intercept U.S. aircraft based on rough targeting tracks developed by 

ground-based early warning radars. U.S. tanker aircraft will need to honor both the 

unrefueled radius of adversary fighters, and also the range of their BVR missiles, 

when establishing aerial refueling ‘‘tracks’’ (rendezvous points) for penetrating U.S. 

aircraft. Against a nation such as China, which has a growing force of air interceptors with unrefueled radii between 600–900 nautical miles, this would require U.S. 

tankers to stand off as much as 750–1,000 nautical miles. It is critical to note that 

this standoff distance exceeds the unrefueled radii of the F/A–18E/F, F–22 and F– 

35A/B/C; and thus, would effectively preclude a penetrating offensive role for the entire U.S. fighter force. No fact more vividly underscores the need to shift emphasis 

within the attack capability area from short-range, manned fighter aircraft to penetrating, long-range, manned and unmanned ISR-strike systems. 

Responding to this growing appreciation of the intensifying A2/AD threat around 

the world, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stressed the need to improve 

U.S. power projection capability in contested environments. Consider the following 

excerpts from the QDR: 

In the coming years, countries such as China will continue seeking to counter 

U.S. strengths using anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) approaches and by 

employing other new cyber and space control technologies. Additionally, these 

and other states continue to develop sophisticated integrated air defenses that 

can restrict access and freedom of maneuver in waters and airspace beyond terri-
117 

torial limits. Growing numbers of accurate conventional ballistic and cruise missile threats represent an additional, cost-imposing challenge to U.S. and partner 

naval forces and land installations. (pp. 6–7) 

As the Department rebalances toward greater emphasis on full-spectrum operations, maintaining superior power projection capabilities will continue to be 

central to the credibility of our Nation’s overall security strategy. (p. 19) 

The Department’s investments in combat aircraft, including fighters and longrange strike, survivable persistent surveillance, resilient architectures, and undersea warfare will increase the Joint Force’s ability to counter A2/AD challenges. (p. 36) 

This recognition of the need to adapt U.S. power projection capabilities to address 

current and emerging A2/AD challenges was re-affirmed recently in the independent 

review of the QDR conducted by National Defense Panel created by Congress. That 

panel, chaired by William Perry and John Abizaid, unanimously concluded that: 

We believe it is also critical to ensure that U.S. maritime power projection capabilities are buttressed by acquiring longer-range strike capability—again, 

manned or unmanned (but preferably stealthy)—that can operate from U.S. aircraft carriers or other appropriate mobile maritime platforms to ensure precise, 

controllable, and lethal strike with greater survivability against increasingly 

long-range and precise anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles. (p. 43.) 

To conclude, the current UCLASS requirements as endorsed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) appear increasingly misaligned with DOD’s own 

threat assessment and articulation of the Nation’s overall security strategy in the 

QDR (as well as in the Defense Strategic Guidance previously approved by the 

President). 

As I stated in my testimony, an assessment of UCLASS requirements should 

begin with a very simple question: what is the core operational challenge facing carrier-based power projection? Although the Navy and the joint force more broadly 

have multiple means of providing MDA around the carrier strike group and to identify targets for attack by relatively short-range, manned fighters in low-to-medium 

threat environments, that is the focus of the JROC-approved KPPs. In my view, the 

far more pressing challenge will be projecting power effectively when the carrier is 

compelled to standoff at considerable distance (e.g., 1,000–1500 nm) from an adversary’s coast, and then find and engage targets defended by modern IADS. UCLASS 

requirements should be adjusted now to address that extant and intensifying challenge. 

Mr. LARSEN. To what degree have you reviewed the Navy’s UCLASS draft RFP 

and classified addenda? Are there aspects of the Navy defined survivability requirement or other requirements you find insufficient and why? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. I have not reviewed the UCLASS draft RFP or addenda, both of 

which are classified. I base my opinions on the open-source reporting that I have 

confidence in, including official statements from Navy officials—all of which describe 

requirements for an ISR-centric platform. As we discussed during the hearing, I believe an ISR-centric capability will do little or nothing to address the main challenge 

facing the carrier air wing and the carrier strike group more broadly, which is the 

need to provide persistent combat strike power over long ranges in the face of adversary systems designed to target our aircraft carriers well outside the unrefueled 

radii of the air wing. Addressing that capability gap, rather than add a redundant 

ISR capability, strikes me as a more prudent way to invest limited taxpayer resources. 

Mr. LARSEN. Since the Navy and OSD/Joint Staff vetted the UCLASS requirements, has additional information come to light to warrant a change to those requirements at this stage of the acquisition process? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. The requirement for a stealthy, refuelable unmanned carrier-based 

strike aircraft was relatively constant since the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, 

which directed the Navy to ‘‘develop an unmanned longer-range carrier-based aircraft capable of being air-refueled to provide greater standoff capability, to expand 

payload and launch options, and to increase naval reach and persistence.’’ Since 

then, both the 2010 QDR, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, and the 2014 QDR 

all restated the need to develop capabilities that are relevant to an anti-access/areadenial environment. I think it is very prudent to ask the Navy exactly how they 

took this guidance and produced a draft RFP that seems to deviate quite substantially from the strategic guidance that has been on the books for years. From what 

I can gather via open sources and official statements, there seems to be a view that 

organic ISR is the capability gap that can best be addressed by an unmanned system. I totally disagree with that argument. Given what we know about China’s modernization path, its stated strategy to deter our forces with long-range and increasingly precise anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, and given our clear lack of long- 
118 

range and persistent combat strike power from the aircraft carrier, it seems to me 

the role of civilian policymakers in this process is to ensure that taxpayer dollars 

are spent wisely. As several of my colleagues and I discussed at the hearing, we 

believe that applying the disruptive characteristics of unmanned aircraft to the 

striking power of the carrier air wing is the kind of investment path the Navy badly 

needs to walk down before it is too late. 

Mr. LARSEN. What is the Navy’s approach to growth in the draft RFP and what 

kind of roadmap do you envision going forward? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Growth beyond threshold capability, which provides an affordable path to ensure system effectiveness against future threats, is a vital part 

of the UCLASS acquisition strategy. Specific areas of growth, identified and 

prioritized by Fleet input, include Sensor Payload Adaptability/Modularity, Weapons 

Capacity, Orbit Capacity, Mission Effectiveness (Survivability), Sustainability, and 

In Flight Refueling. While some specific growth provisions are required, the RFP 

also ensures the above growth priorities are adequately prioritized and incentivized, 

enabling the offerors to propose their best value solutions. 

Mr. LARSEN. The first panel expressed concerns with how the Joint Staff, OSD, 

Navy and Operational Commanders determined the requirements for UCLASS. 

Please describe the detailed process and reviews that have led to the defined requirements in the UCLASS draft RFP including the organizations involved and the 

general timeline. 

General GUASTELLA. The Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Navy 

and Operational Commanders have been involved in requirements definition process 

for the UCLASS system since 2010. UCLASS has adhered to the Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process and has received JROC validation of the UCLASS Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) in June 2011 and the 

Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) in October 2012. Additionally, several JROC memorandums (JROCM) have been issued further refining requirements and priorities. 

The JROC is legislated by Title X U.S.C sec181. Voting members include the Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Council chairman) and one general or admiral 

from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Advisory members include, but 

are not limited to, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and the 

Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. 

The following list captures the history of requirements oversight that has led to 

the currently defined UCLASS requirements. 

June 9, 2011—JROCM 087–11. Approved UCLASS ICD. Directed the AOA address incremental capability growth options and trades to ensure affordability & 

rapid delivery. 

August 11, 2011—Material Development Decision Defense Acquisition Board. Approved AOA commencement stating ‘‘UCLASS is an essential step in the evolutionary integration of unmanned air vehicles into the Carrier Strike Group.’’ 

June 8, 2012—JROCM 086–12. Revalidated UCLASS ICD, prioritizing cost & 

schedule for an affordable platform in three to six years. Proposed Joint Emerging 

Operational Need (JEON) for sea-based Intel Surveillance and Reconnaissance not 

validated. 

October 1, 2012—UCLASS AOA Assessment. Director of Cost Assessment and 

Program Evaluation certified UCLASS AOA for future acquisition decisions. 

December 19, 2012—JROCM 196–12. Established refined requirement (e.g., 2 x 

24/7 unrefueled orbits at 600 NM, 1 x 24/7 unrefueled orbit at 1200 NM, 2,000 NM 

unrefueled strike) for an affordable, adaptable platform that supports missions 

across permissive counter-terrorism and low-end contested environments, enables 

capabilities for high-end denied operations, and Navy organic missions (Navy incorporated into draft CDD). 

April 5, 2013—Draft Capability Development Decision (CDD) reviewed by Navy. 

Chief of Naval Operations approved Navy UCLASS draft CDD (incorporated 

JROCM guidance). 

April 19, 2013—JROCM 089–13. JROC reviewed overall Joint Unmanned Aerial 

Systems (UAS) portfolio and refined UCLASS requirements. Approved updated ICD 

changes since June 2011. 

May 21, 2013—JROCM 105–13. Endorsed UCLASS AOA and requestd program 

update to JROC by 30 Nov 13 to evaluate program against JROCM 196–12 (19 Dec 

12). 

June 7, 2013—Technical Development Strategy Approved. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) approved UCLASS 

acquisition strategy. 
119 

June 10, 2013 Congressional Certification. Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(VCJCS), Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research Development and Acquisition (ASN RDA) and USD (AT&L) certified to Congress UCLASS need, program viability, affordability, and compliance with statutes. 

October 18, 2013—Executive Requirements and Resources Review Board. Navy 

leadership reviewed baseline system thresholds, prioritize growth capabilities (i.e., 

payload adaptability, survivability, weapons capacity, air refueling, sustainability). 

October 30, 2013—Force Application Functional Capabilities Board. Navy provided Joint Staff, OSD, Combatant Command, and Service representatives the 

UCLASS program overview, draft key performance parameters/key system attributes (KPP/KSA), cost, schedule, risks. 

November 14, 2013—JROC. Program review of KPP/KSAs, cost, schedule, risks. 

February 4, 2014—JROCM 009–14. Endorsed November 2013 review of UCLASS 

program; established UCLASS Early Operational Capability (EOC) 4–5 years from 

contract award; emphasized affordability and earliest possible delivery. Directed 

program update to JROC within 60 days of contract award. 

May 22, 2014—Navy update to VCJCS. Program status and draft request for proposal (RFP). Per JCIDS requirements, the UCLASS draft CDD will be revised following technology development and submitted to the JROC for validation prior to 

Milestone B. 

Æ