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i 

89–509 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–116] 

CRUISER AND DESTROYER MODERNIZATION AND LARGE SURFACE COMBATANT 

FORCE STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 10, 2014 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

KATIE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, July 10, 2014, Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization and Large 

Surface Combatant Force Structure Assessment .............................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, July 10, 2014 .......................................................................................... 31 

THURSDAY, JULY 10, 2014 

CRUISER AND DESTROYER MODERNIZATION AND LARGE SURFACE 

COMBATANT FORCE STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................................. 1 

McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), RADM Thomas S. Rowden, USN, Director, Surface 

Warfare (N96), Office of Chief of Naval Operations, and RDML Lawrence 

E. Creevy, USN, Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA 21) ............................................................................ 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 35 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., joint with RADM Thomas S. Rowden and RDML 

Lawrence E. Creevy ...................................................................................... 38 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 51 

(1) 

CRUISER AND DESTROYER MODERNIZATION AND 

LARGE SURFACE COMBATANT FORCE STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, 

Washington, DC, Thursday, July 10, 2014. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:00 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. I want to welcome our members and our distinguished panel of experts for today’s hearing focused on our large 

surface combatants, and particularly our cruisers and destroyers. 

We have testifying before us the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, the 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Rear Admiral Thomas Rowden, 

Director of Surface Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations; and Rear Admiral Lawrence Creevy, Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare, Naval Sea Systems Command. 

I want to thank each of the three of you for being here, for your 

service to our country, and also for your patience with us on these 

votes, and we are sorry for the delay in getting started with the 

hearing. 

Before we begin, I wanted to congratulate Rear Admiral Rowden 

on his selection as the next Commander, Navy Surface Forces, and 

his assumption of command later this month. 

Admiral, we thank you for that service and for what you have 

done for our country. We have appreciated your advice and counsel, 

and I am confident the Navy will be in good hands when you assume command. 

As to this hearing, I appreciate having received a copy of the 30- 

year shipbuilding plan. We continue to have reservations about the 

optimism that is built into the shipbuilding plan and believe that 

the administration is disingenuous in their sincerity to apply resources toward our Nation’s shipbuilding efforts. 

This year I believe that our committee was able to provide additional resources to the shipbuilding account and start to change the 

negative shipbuilding trend lines. But revitalizing American seapower cannot be done in just 1 or 2 fiscal years. It will take a generational commitment from those sitting in this room today and 

others to follow. 
2 

As to the administration’s proposal to place 11 cruisers and 3 

amphibious ships into layup status, I continue to question how putting these ships into long-term layup status improves our national 

defense. Let me be clear, the term ‘‘phased modernization’’ that has 

been used by the Navy to describe its 10-year plan is a misleading 

one that asks Congress to agree to take half of our cruiser fleet out 

of service with the hope that one day, in the 2020s, these ships will 

all be returned to our fleet. 

The Navy has indicated that the 306-ship Navy is required to 

meet combatant commander requirements. The last independent 

QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] indicated a force structure of 

346 ships was required. Despite what number you choose, we are 

still significantly less than the force structure, both in terms of capacity and lethality, that we need to meet even the minimum requirements. That is why it is perplexing to me that this administration, one that has now produced a Defense Strategic Guidance 

and QDR in the last 2 years that prioritizes seapower as a central 

enabler of our defense strategy, has proposed to lay up some of our 

most valuable and lethal surface combatants. 

With the decrease in available assets, we will undoubtedly increase our deployment times of our ships, burning out the sailors 

and ships that support our national security. I reject any notion 

that we should lock into place the negative consequences of sequestration and vigorously oppose any reduction of some of our most capable surface combatants to the altar of fiscal frugality. If the U.S. 

Navy needs more resources to meet its baseline requirements, then 

this Congress and the Department of Defense should begin a serious discussion about how to rebalance the budget resources available to fully fund our national seapower priorities. 

I am also concerned that the administration may already be placing some of these cruisers and amphibious ships into a layup status in contravention to congressional direction. I would note that 

the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2014 prohibited the retirement or layup of certain cruisers and amphibious 

ships. I would encourage our witnesses to carefully review the 

readiness ratings and deployment schedules of these ships to ensure that they continue to serve our Nation. Taking action that impacts the fleet prior to final congressional direction should be rigorously avoided. 

With regards to the overall force structure of the Navy, I understand that the Navy has decided to continue and count ships that 

the Navy has proposed to lay up for some cruisers that would not 

be readily available to deploy. I also understand that the Navy 

counts hospital ships and patrol ships as ships to meet our force 

structure. I consider these approaches as a mask to the true plight 

of our Navy and believe these efforts only serve to cover the true 

extent of the reductions in our Navy. 

Let’s be honest today, according to the historical accounting 

rules, in fiscal year 2015 the Navy will have just 274 ships in its 

fleet. This is an unacceptable figure that is the result of two decades of neglect. I am fully committed and I think most of the people in this subcommittee are fully committed to reversing this 

trend. 
3 

As to our destroyer fleet, I believe the Navy is on the right track 

with introducing an advanced radar on the next series of destroyers, also known as DDG Flight III. I still have concerns with regards to the multiplicity of combat system suites on our destroyers. 

These varying capabilities have significant problems on the fleet’s 

ability to properly train and support our sailors, and I hope that 

we will be able to receive additional information on this important 

issue. 

And with that, I turn to my good friend and colleague, the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mike McIntyre, for any remarks 

he would like to make. 

Mike. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NORTH CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. And thanks 

for holding this important hearing and for the continued excellent 

leadership you give us and the very valid and concerning points 

that you have raised. 

This is an important time for our cruiser and destroyer fleets, 

and critical that during these challenging budget times we find creative ways to ensure the Navy’s entire fleet of large surface combatants remain relevant and reach their expected service lives. 

With regard to the remaining 22 guided missile cruisers in the 

fleet today, we continue the examination of what the most costeffective plan is for modernizing these ships and ensuring that they 

will reach all of their expected service lives. 

The Navy has presented Congress with a Phased Modernization 

Plan that would upgrade these ships with the latest technological 

advances in combat systems and maintenance improvements, while 

also reducing personnel on the ships and moving them to critically 

gapped billets. The Navy has estimated this plan would save $3.5 

billion in the next 5 years and a total of $4.7 billion overall. 

We know the destroyer fleet continues its modernization, and upgrades are planned to reduce the workload and total ship class 

ownership costs and to provide enhanced warfighting capabilities. 

The Navy has continued its attempt to modify the modernization 

schedule in an effort to provide the greatest capabilities to the 

fleet. We know that we must ensure that we have the most capable 

and combat-relevant ships as possible and that they all reach their 

expected service lives. 

These are challenging times, given the fiscal environment that 

we are in. We know it is absolutely critical we find creative ways 

to ensure that we have a modernized and relevant fleet of large 

surface combatants and also provide flexibility when possible. And 

I do share the chairman’s concern that we have as many ships as 

necessary as well. I know that is an ongoing concern of our subcommittee, as well as our full committee. 

Thank you to the witnesses for your service. Thank you for your 

commitment to our Navy, to our country’s armed services and our 
4 

national security, and thank you for your time today and for your 

patience with our delayed voting. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Congressman McIntyre. 

And now we would love to hear your opening remarks. And as 

we have mentioned to you, we are going to give you all the last 

word at the end of all of this so that each of you will have an opportunity, if you have misstated anything or we haven’t asked you 

a question you think is important, we will make sure you get time 

to put that on the record. 

So, Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding you are going to start 

off, and so we look forward to your comments. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION), RADM THOMAS S. ROWDEN, USN, DIRECTOR, 

SURFACE WARFARE (N96), OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, AND RDML LAWRENCE E. CREEVY, USN, DEPUTY 

COMMANDER FOR SURFACE WARFARE, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS 

COMMAND (NAVSEA 21) 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address cruiser and destroyer modernization. With the permission of the subcommittee, I propose to provide brief opening remarks and submit 

a separate joint statement for the record. 

Mr. FORBES. Without objection, all of your full statements will be 

made a part of the record. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Thank you, sir. 

Earlier this year in testimony before this subcommittee, the 

Navy described how we had reshaped our shipbuilding, aviation, 

and tactical vehicle plans to reflect the priorities of the defense 

strategy as impacted by sequestration in fiscal year 2013 and constrained by the Bipartisan Budget Act in fiscal years 2014 and 

2015. 

In total, the Navy-Marine Corps budget request in the Future 

Years Defense Plan falls $38 billion below the level planned just 

1 year ago and is further threatened by sequestration in 2016 and 

beyond. To minimize the impact of this reduced top line we have 

leveraged every tool available to drive down cost. We have tightened requirements, maximized competition, and capitalized on 

multiyear procurements for major weapon systems. We have attacked our cost of doing business from headquarters billets to service contracts so that more of our resources can be dedicated to making warfighting capability. 

In this context, in balancing resources and requirements we have 

placed a priority on forward presence, near-term readiness, stability in our shipbuilding program, and investment in modernization and those future capabilities critical to our long-term technical 

superiority. In the end, however, the impact of a $38 billion reduction across the Future Years Defense Plan [FYDP] has a real impact on our programs. These impacts are exacerbated when, as 
5 

made clear in our shipbuilding report recently delivered to Congress, you overlay the budget required to recapitalize the Ohio seabased strategic deterrent in the out-years and when you consider 

the effects of sequestration in 2016 and out. 

This subcommittee is keenly aware of these extraordinary challenges posed to Navy shipbuilding and modernization, and made 

most clear by this year’s budget submission, which unfunded the 

2016 refueling complex overhaul of the USS George Washington. We are today making every effort to replan near $7 billion required 

across the FYDP to refuel the carrier, plus maintain its air wing, 

manpower, and support. We have released the balance of advance 

procurement funding for 2014 to continue planning efforts in order 

to best maintain our options and retain skilled labor at the shipyard, while we await determination by Congress regarding sequestration in 2016. Yet, this also increases the pressure on other programs. 

With particular regard to Navy shipbuilding and fleet maintenance and modernization, we remain on track towards our objective for a 300-ship Navy by the end of this decade. In total, 43 

ships are under construction across 8 ship classes in shipyards and 

weapons factories stretching across the country. 

Of equal importance to our plan is our ability to maintain and 

modernize the in-service fleet to ensure each ship in the plan possesses those capabilities required by the combatant commanders 

and to ensure each ship in the plan meets its expected service life. 

In fact, for many of our major combatants, more than merely meet 

the expected service life, which by itself is a reversal of past history, we need to extend their service life. And this is only made 

possible by rigorous planning and execution of both maintenance 

and modernization of these workhorse ships. 

With specific regard to the surface combatant force, the limitations of our budget have driven us to a dual-pronged approach to 

modernize both the Arleigh Burke destroyer and Ticonderoga cruiser classes. Across the 2015 to 2019 period, in total the Navy has 

programmed $5.6 billion towards Aegis ship maintenance and modernization, which in this budget environment is a strong statement 

regarding our commitment to these ships. 

Eighteen DDG–51 destroyers are programmed for midlife modernization, including Flight I, Flight II, and Flight II Alpha ships. 

Eight of these ships will receive upgrades to combat capabilities, 

including ballistic missile defense, with the balance completing necessary hull, mechanical, and electrical [HM&E] system upgrades 

and repair to enable full or, in the case of the two Alpha ships, extended service life. 

Regarding the Ticonderoga class, the Navy has 22 Aegis cruisers, 

which are principally responsible for performance of air defense 

commander duties in support of our carrier battle groups. Today, 

the oldest 11 cruisers, CG–52 through 62, have been modernized 

and will deploy with carrier battle groups until their end of service, 

which commences in 2019. 

The Navy plans to modernize and extend the service life for the 

remaining 11 cruisers, CG–63 through 73, through an extended 

phased modernization program. And the elements of the program 

are that we will commence in 2015 with inspection, planning, ma-
6 

terial procurement for repair and modernization of hull, mechanical, and electrical systems for all 11 cruisers. The work will be 

scheduled to ensure efficient execution, and to the extent practical, 

to provide critical stability to the industrial base. 

Once complete the HM&E phase, these cruisers will be maintained in the modernization program until completion of their subsequent combat systems modernization, which will be aligned with 

the retirement of the first 11 cruisers. 

This Navy plan is made affordable by drawing down manpower 

and operating costs during the extended modernization period, a 

cost avoidance of $4.7 billion. Further, the Navy plan sustains the 

critical air defense commander capabilities of the cruiser force beyond its current retirement in 2029, well into the 2040s. 

The reality is that the Navy will be unable to recapitalize this 

critical capability throughout the period of construction of the Ohio 

replacement submarine, and without this Phased Modernization 

Plan we will be unable to ensure our fleet possesses an air defense 

commander capability throughout the decade of the 2030s. 

This plan also retains flexibility, if needed, to accelerate completion of the modernization, should the security demands dictate it, 

subject to funding and training of additional crews. Alternatively, 

if, as directed by the House-passed version of the 2015 National 

Defense Authorization Act, we are precluded from executing this 

Phased Modernization Plan, then the $4.7 billion costs otherwise 

avoided by the plan will be paid in the near term, depleting the 

ship’s maintenance, operation, sustainment, and support fund and 

reducing resources for our fleet readiness, then reducing our force 

structure and its capabilities in the long term. 

In summary, in response to the cumulative impact of sequestration in 2013, the BBA [Bipartisan Budget Act] level funding in 

2014 and 2015, and the reductions across 2015 through 2019, the 

Department has been judicious in controlling cost, reducing procurements, stretching developments, and planning modernization. 

Many of these actions add cost to our programs and risk to our industrial base, and add risk to our ability to meet the requirements 

of the Defense Strategic Guidance. However, they represent the 

best balance of readiness, capability, and affordability for the budget in hand. 

The course set by our Phased Modernization Plan is an example 

of the balancing act required by the fiscal environment. Absent an 

increase to our budget, changing this course will increase our costs 

and therefore our risk to the Navy and to the Nation. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today, and we look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley, Admiral 

Rowden, and Admiral Creevy can be found in the Appendix on page 

38.] 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for your remarks. 

And, Admiral, we look to you now for any comments that you 

would like to offer. 

Admiral ROWDEN. Mr. Chairman, I have no additional remarks, 

sir, and I am standing by for your questions, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

Admiral. 
7 

Admiral CREEVY. Mr. Chairman, I have no additional remarks either, and I am standing by for your questions. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. Well, gentlemen, thank you so much for coming and being with us today. 

I am going to start. I normally defer my comments until the end, 

but since basically we are here today challenging a provision of the 

defense authorization bill that was passed by the House, I am 

going to start with a few questions and then hopefully come back 

with some at the end. 

Mr. Secretary, you can respond to this or either admiral can do 

it, so it is not trying to put anybody on the spot. So whoever wants 

to respond is okay. But we hear from time to time a concern we 

have with the Navy and our combatant commanders that in 2007 

we were able to meet 90 percent of their requirements. And this 

year, it is my understanding, we are going to meet somewhere less 

than 50 percent or somewhere in that area. And the pushback we 

always get is that our combatant commanders always ask for much 

more than they really need. 

But when I come today, I want to ask you guys how many ships 

does the United States Navy believe, not that we want, not that 

our combatant commanders just think we need to have, but how 

many ships do we actually need in the United States Navy? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me go ahead and start, and I 

will turn to Admiral Rowden to add on to that. 

Not a simple question. There is not a number on a wall that you 

go towards. You referred to the 306-ship number that is associated 

with our force structure assessment that was completed at the end 

of 2012. That number has not changed. 

That force structure assessment is targeting a 2024 period of 

time. It is not saying that today we need 306; it is looking out 

ahead out at 2024 and saying we need to build a force structure 

of about 306 ships, a balanced force structure that has 11 aircraft 

carriers, 88 submarines, 88 surface combatants, 33 amphibs [amphibious assault ships], 29 auxiliary ships, and 33 support ships, 

right on down the line. And I don’t want to leave out my Ohio-class 

and Ohio-class replacement, a dozen Ohio-class replacement submarines, as well the four SSGNs [cruise missile submarines]. 

So the force structure assessment lays that out. Today in terms 

of how many ships that we require, we respond to the combatant 

commanders’ demand as you highlighted. Today’s force structure, 

by ship count 289, by the current number counting 283, by the previous ship counting rules that we had in place, today’s force structure produces about 100 ships on deployment consistently around 

the world. That is true today, that is true this year. And if you go 

back to 2007 and you look at the number of ships that the Navy 

had deployed, it was true in 2007. It has been very consistent, 

about 100 ships deployed, responding to—— 

Mr. FORBES. Secretary, when your admirals come to meet with 

us, they tell us that when they look at this overall mix, it is not 

just the number of ships we have deployed, it is the number of 

ships we have ready in case we have a surge or we need those 

ships there. Is that an accurate statement or are the admirals misleading us when they tell us that? 
8 

Secretary STACKLEY. No. A hundred ships meet our presence requirements, the surge addresses major combat operations demands 

or events of the day where there is demand to increase the number 

on deployment. 

Mr. FORBES. So when I look at you telling me that you need 306 

ships in the Navy, is that a figure that you have established from 

an analysis somewhere that has been done to say that is what 

needed, or is that just something that we are basically pulling out 

of the air and saying, we think that would be a good goal to push 

towards? 

Secretary STACKLEY. No, sir, that is a thorough analysis that 

went behind the force structure assessment that was conducted by 

the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], completed in December 2012, 

and delivered to the Hill. 

Mr. FORBES. So then, if we said that we needed 306 ships and 

that is the plan that you have at least submitted over to us—is 

that a fair statement in the 30-year shipbuilding plan—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. How many cruisers do we need? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Okay. So in that plan we don’t break out 

cruisers separate from large surface combatants. 

Mr. FORBES. But there is a comment in here based on the 2012 

assessment of the number of cruisers we need. Is that a fair statement? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me, yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Please. 

Secretary STACKLEY. We break out 88 large surface combatants. 

Today we have 22 cruisers. So in terms of how many we need, air 

defense commander, that role, we need an air defense commander 

with deploying battle groups. So if you assume 11 carriers, 11 carrier battle groups, 11 air defense commanders. Today we have two 

cruisers per carrier battle group, which gives us flexibility, gives us 

redundancy, it gives us the ability to adjust based on ship operating schedules, so we are not pegged to a one-for-one ratio. 

Mr. FORBES. When I look at your 30-year shipbuilding plan, and 

help me if I am misreading it, there is an assessment that says 

that the 2012 assessment said we needed 22 cruisers. Is that incorrect? 

Secretary STACKLEY. In the 30-year shipbuilding plan? 

Mr. FORBES. Yes, sir. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Eighty-eight large surface combatants, 22 

cruisers, 66—— 

Mr. FORBES. But it did say 22 cruisers? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir, but they go away. 

Mr. FORBES. What do you mean they go away? 

Secretary STACKLEY. They retire over time. 

Mr. FORBES. So when it says that we needed 22 cruisers, what 

time period did we need the 22 cruisers for? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Twenty-two cruisers is what we have today. 

The force structure assessment was targeting a 2024 timeframe. 

Our CG–47 class starts to retire in 2019, and it is on a steady retirement path to the end of the 2020s decade. What we need to do 

is we need to recapitalize those ships with a future ship class, either an upgrade to a DDG–51 [USS Arleigh Burke], a Flight IV 
9 

type of ship, or a cruiser. We do not have the ability to do that during the period of construction of the Ohio replacement. 

Mr. FORBES. You are talking about if you don’t, if you have the 

dollars that you currently have. But when we look at the 22 cruisers that this assessment says that we have, why don’t we just get 

rid of the 11 cruisers? 

Secretary STACKLEY. We need that air defense commander capability, which goes beyond—— 

Mr. FORBES. Do we need all those 11 cruisers? 

Secretary STACKLEY. We need 11 cruisers pegged to our 11 carrier battle groups. 

Mr. FORBES. I understand, but we have 22 now and you say we 

need 11. Why don’t we just get rid of those 11 cruisers? 

Secretary STACKLEY. 2019 we will be down to 10, 2020 we will 

be down to 9, 2021, and by 2026 we will be done. We need to sustain that cruiser capability, that air defense capability. 

Mr. FORBES. But why put them in the layup and hope that you 

are going to modernize them? Why not just get rid of these 11 

cruisers? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, we can’t afford to get rid of the cruisers. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, last year you came in with a proposal to get 

rid of seven cruisers. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Why were you going to say that we could get rid of 

seven cruisers, but this year you say we couldn’t get rid of those 

cruisers? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Two things. At no point in time has the 

Navy wanted to get rid of our cruisers. Last year when we had proposed to decommission early 7 of the 22 cruisers in our plan, there 

was a future flight destroyer that we had anticipated we would be 

able to recapitalize that capability. You don’t see that in this year’s 

30-year plan, because we know we cannot afford to recapitalize 

those cruisers during the period of the Ohio replacement. 

Mr. FORBES. When you look at this thing you called a phased 

modernization—and by the way, Congress has not prohibited you 

from doing modernization, what we are doing is prohibiting you 

from doing the layup. Because there are no funds in this 30-year 

plan and you don’t have any projected funds to do the build-out 

that you need in this 30-year plan, do you? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The budget requirements that go with that 

30-year plan, when you look at, again, the period of the 2020s 

through about 2034, that exceeds any shipbuilding budget that we 

have seen since. 

Mr. FORBES. And that would be true even if you didn’t have the 

Ohio-class replacement. Isn’t that correct? 

Secretary STACKLEY. It exceeds what we have budgeted over the 

last 10 years during that period, but it does not reach the level 

that we reached back in the buildup of the 1980s. 

Mr. FORBES. I understand that. I wish we were back in the 

1980s. But I am talking about over the last 20 years when we have 

cut down our ships, so far in the 1980s we built them up to 600- 

and-some ships, we have been taking them down. And what I just 

want to ask you is, I am looking at a 30-year shipbuilding plan, 
10 

and I am asking you that, based on the dollars you have had over 

the last 20 years, can you build this 30-year shipbuilding plan? 

Secretary STACKLEY. No, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Can you do the modernization of these cruisers with 

the dollars that you have and still meet this shipbuilding plan that 

you have submitted to Congress based on the dollars that you have 

been allocated over the last 20 years? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The key to us being able to modernize those 

11 cruisers, as we have laid out in our plan, which allows us to reduce the manpower, pull them out of operation and sustainment 

during an extended modernization period so that we can replace 1 

for 1 the first 11 cruisers. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, Mr. Secretary, my question is the dollars. Do 

you have the dollars to do that? And can you certify to this committee that you have the dollars, if you get the same dollars you 

have had over the last 20 years per year, can you do that modernization and do the shipbuilding plan that you have submitted 

to Congress? 

Secretary STACKLEY. That plan, with the letter that accompanies 

it, certifies through the FYDP. It does not portend to certify budget 

levels outside of the FYDP. 

Mr. FORBES. I understand, and your modernization goes outside 

the FYDP. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. So what my question to you is, can you tell us that 

based on the dollars you have had over the last 20 years, if the 

Navy got the same dollars, and you are suggesting they may get 

less, but if they got the same dollars they had, can it do that modernization and also do this 30-year shipbuilding plan? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The only way we could execute that shipbuilding plan and the modernization that is in that plan that modernizes those cruisers, the only way we can do that, assuming that 

we have the same budget that we had in the last 20 years, is 

prioritizing that modernization of those ships and that construction 

over—over—the rest of our budget. 

Mr. FORBES. So, Mr. Secretary, I don’t want to argue with you, 

I just want to find out. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. We are actually in very—we are in 

strong agreement here, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Yeah. But I just want to make sure we are clear. 

If you have the dollars you had over the last 20 years—and I have 

asked you, I have asked the Secretary, do you have any scintilla 

of hope of where you are going to get additional dollars—so if we 

assume you are going to get the same amount of dollars you have 

had over the last 20 years and let’s say we can hold that and you 

don’t decrease, my question is, would you have enough dollars to 

do the modernization that you are talking about and do this shipbuilding plan that you have submitted to this Congress? 

Secretary STACKLEY. As stated right in that report, sir, as laid 

out clearly in that report, the funding requirements over the period 

of 2020 through 2034 exceed the budget that we have had for the 

last 30 years. 

Mr. FORBES. Then why would you suggest to us that we should 

have a confidence level? When the Navy came in and told us last 
11 

year it wanted to get rid of seven cruisers, this year it now says 

it wants to have this phased modernization, which means laying 

them up until you can get more dollars to come back and do the 

modernization. If you don’t have the dollars necessary to do that 

modernization and to do this shipbuilding plan, give me the comfort level of how you are going to build these ships and do that 

modernization and take those ships out of layup. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. So it starts with the funding that we have in hand. We have approximately $2.2 billion that has been 

set aside and we brought more money inside the FYDP to go towards the modernization plan, and rather than sit on the ships, 

our proposal is that we commence in 2015 with the execution of 

that modernization program and we get through the HM&E upgrades that are required to extend the service life—— 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, you don’t have the money to do that. 

You wouldn’t have the money to do this plan you have submitted 

to us and do that modernization. Isn’t that a fair statement? 

Secretary STACKLEY. We have the funding in the FYDP to execute—— 

Mr. FORBES. I am talking about the 10-year period of time that 

you have talked about this phased modernization, this phraseology 

that you all brought in here. Really what you’re talking about that 

you can guarantee us is you can lay them up, but you can’t guarantee me today that you can do the modernization and put them 

back out again, can you? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I can tell you what the requirement is—— 

Mr. FORBES. I know what the requirement is. 

Secretary STACKLEY [continuing]. For the balance of the work in 

the next FYDP, the 2020 through 2024 FYDP. I can’t certify what 

a future Congress or Department of Defense is going to do—— 

Mr. FORBES. But what you can tell me is, based on the last 20 

years, if you get those same dollars you can’t meet this plan, can 

you? 

Secretary STACKLEY. There are two parts, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Secretary STACKLEY. The shipbuilding program—that report 

talks to the budget requirements for the shipbuilding program as 

opposed to the modernization program. We don’t try to look back 

over the past and project in the future specifically the modernization program. 

As it relates to the cruisers, the funding requirement inside the FYDP for the cruiser modernization program is about $3.5 billion 

and most of that funding is in hand and the balance is in our program plan. The remainder outside of the FYDP is about $5.5 billion, $5.3 billion. We know that is the requirement. I cannot certify to you today 

that a future Department, a future Congress is going to lay that 

money in, but our program plan for executing it as it is laid out 

is only made affordable if during this period we are able to reduce 

the costs associated with manpower and operating the cruisers during the phased modernization period so that we can pay the balance. Otherwise, we have just doubled the reach. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, the last thing I will just ask you before I turn it over to Mr. McIntyre is this. When you are looking 
12 

at the number of ships that the Navy requires, their requirements, 

we are talking about the number of ships that are capable of being 

deployed, isn’t that correct, not the number of ships that are laid 

up? 

Secretary STACKLEY. We are talking about the number of ships 

that the Navy needs in order to produce what we have historically 

deployed with, which is about 100 ships on deployment. 

Mr. FORBES. And when we took our missile defense systems out 

of Europe and put them on the back of the Navy, can you tell me 

if the Navy even knows what the requirements are today that we 

need to do the missile defense capabilities that the country needs? 

Secretary STACKLEY. We get our requirements from the combatant commanders. 

Mr. FORBES. All I am asking is, do you know those requirements 

today of what we need for that BMD [ballistic missile defense] capability? Does the Navy know that? 

Secretary STACKLEY. We know what the demand is today and we 

are meeting today’s demand. But, sir, we don’t look at just today’s 

requirements, today’s demand. We have got to meet an increasing 

demand over the next 5 to 10, 15—— 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, I just don’t want to take up any more 

time. But my point is I understand that. But you come in here 

when you talk about combatant commanders’ requirements and on 

the one hand you say, we don’t listen to them because they are too 

big. Yet, you were meeting 90 percent of them in 2007, we are 

meeting less than 50 percent this year, you know, and you say, 

well, that is because they ask for everything. 

Then on BMD my question is this: Does the Navy know what our 

BMD requirements are today? I understand we need to look at 

them tomorrow, 5 years from now. Do you know what they are 

today? 

Secretary STACKLEY. We know how many ships we need on station in the Sea of Japan, we know how many ships we need on station in the Mediterranean, and we know what we need to accompany our carrier battle group. 

Mr. FORBES. Do we have a gap in our BMD requirements today? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I wouldn’t say we have a gap today. What 

I would say we have a very stressed force trying to meet the—— 

Mr. FORBES. Let me ask you this, and I want you to be very clear 

about how you answer this. Can we meet the BMD requirements 

we have today? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir. We can put the ships on station where 

they are required with BMD capability, but you know as well as 

I do that the—I don’t want to go classified here—— 

Mr. FORBES. I don’t want you to. 

Secretary STACKLEY [continuing]. You know as well as I do what 

the threat is and where we need to be heading. So it is not a simple 

matter of the number of ships. 

Mr. FORBES. But when we pull these cruisers out, some have 

BMD capabilities on them. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. When they are laid up we will have less of those 

requirements met, not more. Isn’t that correct? 
13 

Secretary STACKLEY. Four of the cruisers have the earliest baseline of BMD capability, that is correct, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

And Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just a couple of brief questions. What is the—if you can, just so 

that we are all on the same page here—the difference between a 

cruiser and destroyer in the important roles they play within the 

carrier strike group? And after you delineate those differences and 

their role, what would be the impact to that carrier strike group 

if there were no cruisers available to fill the air defense or air warfare commander role? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. I would 

be happy to address this. 

Today our cruisers are commanded by a captain, with a more 

senior staff on the ship, and more individuals dedicated to the 

planning and execution of the air defense mission for the carrier 

strike group. In addition, the physical plant on our cruisers allows 

for dual transmitters, one forward and one aft, adding redundancy 

to those ships, and a greater number of cells available for surfaceto-air missiles for the execution of the air defense mission. 

In addition, they have increased command-and-control capability 

over the guided missile destroyers. The guided missile destroyers 

are commanded by a commander with a less experienced, though 

perfectly capable staff underneath that commanding officer to ensure that they can execute the missions that have been assigned 

to that ship. And, typically for carrier strike groups that we are deploying, the air defense commander role will be assigned to the 

cruiser commanding officer associated with the cruiser that is going 

to be deploying for that ship. And so that is really how we drive 

the requirement for the cruisers and the air defense commander on 

the ship. 

The guided missile destroyers will typically operate in support. 

All of these ships are multi-mission ships—capable of executing air 

defense, capable of executing anti-submarine warfare, and anti-surface warfare as well. And, typically, we will deploy more destroyers, anywhere from three to five, typically, with a carrier strike at 

this time. 

Given the threat that we have currently experiencing today and 

the way we are deploying our ships, typically we will keep the 

cruiser with the aircraft carrier, and we have the luxury of being 

able to send those destroyers off on other missions. But we always 

keep the air defense commander’s ship with the aircraft carrier operating in that air defense commander role. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. The second part of the question was, 

what is the impact to the carrier strike group if there were no 

cruisers available to fill the air defender commander role? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir. The air defense commander, Alpha 

Whiskey, assigned to air defense commander, the secondary role or 

the secondary commander, the redundancy within the strike group, 

is assigned to typically the most senior commander on a guided 

missile destroyer. 
14 

Mr. MCINTYRE. So that is where it would go if you didn’t have 

a cruiser? You would go to that most senior commander on a destroyer? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. And what is your comfort level with that? Because you mentioned a minute ago you had less experienced staff 

on those destroyers. 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir, typically the department heads, the 

supporting staff on a cruiser will be second to department heads, 

whereas they will be first to department heads on a guided missile 

destroyer. And as a consequence we leverage the experience that 

those department heads have learned, typically in their DDG [guided missile destroyer] command, as they execute their responsibilities in the air defense commander. 

Obviously, if the role falls of the air defense commander to a 

guided missile destroyer, we would have to increase the amount of 

training that we have and perhaps start to increase the level of expertise on those guided missile destroyers in order to be able to get 

the capability into those ships in order to be able to ensure that 

we are executing the air defense commander job properly. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Thank you. I think that is an important 

distinction to keep in mind, and I am glad that you have stated 

that. I want to make sure we have that on the record in terms of 

what would need to be done. 

Could the reduced modernization of the Flight I and II destroyers 

be a precursor to early decommissioning of some of these vessels? 

Admiral ROWDEN. No, sir. I don’t believe that is the case. The 

Flight I and II guided missile destroyers are, given the fact that 

they are ballistic missile defense capable ships at this time, are 

some of the most stressed ships that we have in the inventory. 

They are playing a vital role across the force in the execution of 

the ballistic missile defense capability. And I believe you are referring to our phased modernization—or, I am sorry, the accelerated 

modernization of our Flight IIA DDGs. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Yes, sir. 

Admiral ROWDEN. And understanding that the plan that we are 

executing is designed to increase our ballistic missile defense capacity and increase our ballistic missile defense capability as we 

proceed through the remainder of the decade by ensuring that we 

maintain the relevance of the guided missile destroyers, by increasing, by upgrading their ballistic missile defense capability, commensurate with the capability that we will be installing in the 

Flight IIA DDGs. So I think that those ships will remain as vital 

as they are now, given the modified destroyer modernization plan 

that we have. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Would you agree with that assessment, Mr. 

Stackley? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Absolutely, sir. We are investing on average 

over $100 million per ship in the Flight I’s and II’s to modernize 

them. That is not a precursor to decommissioning them. 

Chairman Forbes made reference to the number of baselines that 

we are managing, too many. And this reflects a 30-year build program across Aegis that that is just the evolution of the technology. 

But to the extent practical we need to raise the earlier baselines 
15 

for both the cruisers and destroyers to get them to a position where 

they are not just more capable, but we can continue to upgrade 

them through the balance of their service life. And that is what we 

were able to do with the Flight I’s and Flight II’s. But it comes at 

a price, and that price is not a precursor to decommissioning them. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Conaway is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Stackley, in the written document, your testimony, you talk 

about the Phased Modernization Plan for the CGs [guided missile 

cruisers] precludes the Navy from having to increase overall end 

strength by about 3,400 people, which would otherwise be required 

to fill the critical shortfalls in our training pipelines and fleet manning of the cruisers. 

Can you walk us through what that actually means in the real 

world? And what are the risks? And how long is it, if you had to 

actually have those 3,400 people, how long could it take you to get 

them into place? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. So today a cruiser has about 330 

to 340 officers and enlisted as part of the ship’s complement. In 

this Phased Modernization Plan, recognizing that the first 11 are 

going to start decommissioning about 2019, the intent is that we 

sustain a steady state, steady flow of 11 ships worth of manpower 

dedicated to cruisers out to the retirement of the last cruiser. 

What that means is, for the second 11 that go into phased modernization, you pull the 330, 340 per ship off and you are reducing 

the manpower requirement by about 3,400. Then, when CG–52 

(USS Bunker Hill) retires and CG–63 (USS Cowpens) replaces it, 

you actually keep a steady cruiser manpower in there. 

The savings per year associated with those manpower reductions, 

or it is a cost avoidance, is what helps to fund or fuel the cruiser 

modernization. I don’t know, does that address—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. It does. But the risks associated with that 

though—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Okay. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. Are assuming that if for some reason 

you decided you can’t—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. You can’t decommission one of those 

cruisers, then you actually have spare 340-man crews just handy 

to come into the ether and just put them in place? How much risks 

are we taking by reduction in manpower. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. So if we are on the execution of the 

modernization program and we have reduced the manning on those 

ships and we determine at some point in time that we need to accelerate those ships out of modernization and get them back to the 

force, well, then if you are, say, halfway through and maybe we 

have 5 cruisers that we are going to attempt to accelerate out, then 

we have to produce 1,500 to 1,700 trained sailors to man those 

ships. Some of those will come out of shore billets from other portions of the Navy and some are going to have to be trained to take 

over their respective responsibilities. 
16 

Mr. CONAWAY. Assuming you don’t come from a standing start 

with 330 to 340, what would be the normal training time to get up, 

from scratch kind of thing, where you start taking from other surface ship folks and put it together, how long would it take to put 

a crew together? 

Secretary STACKLEY. We don’t have an exact answer, but our estimate is about 2 years. 

And, Tom, you want to go ahead? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir. One of the important parts of this 

plan is when we reduced the manning on the ships, we didn’t take 

all 340 billets and eliminate them from the force. And so, in order 

to be able to execute a reconstitution should it be required, we actually retained the 35 most senior billets on the ship and distributed them throughout the Navy. So in the event that we have to 

return the ship to operational status—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. I got that, but those folks with those skill sets, 

4 years into this deal, they are not automatically going to step back 

into the role they would have had on that ship the day they came 

off of it. How do you keep refreshing that second term or second 

tour guy that needs to go in there when they have moved off to 

other career paths? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir. The career paths are still executed for 

the enlisted men and the officers and they maintain their rotation 

from sea to shore. And so, obviously, there would be a time that 

we would have to re-form the crew, get the crew trained, and get 

the crew out to sea. However, the plan, as we have laid it out, since 

we have retained the billets, the men and women that man those 

billets are distributed to other areas, whether it is regional maintenance centers or within the Afloat Training Group or other areas 

on the waterfront, we would then pull those people into the ship. 

The remainder of the crew, we would be able to form them in a relatively short period of time through new accessions in order to be 

able to form the crew and then get that ship out. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So if some terrible thing happened and we had to 

put those boats back in the water it is a 2-year window. The risks 

are—the lack of flexibility of whatever is a 2-year window to get 

that team back in place? Is that what I heard you say? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, I would agree with the Mr. Secretary, 18 

months to 2 years. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

So, Mr. Stackley, we have certainly heard a lot of the challenges 

that exist with implementing the plan that the administration suggested. But let’s talk about for a second if we go with the House 

defense authorization bill, which again, your testimony—I just 

want to make sure I got this clear—is that the difference in terms 

of cost, if we don’t do the phased modernization and just sort of 

keep the entire 22 cruisers operational, is about $10 billion altogether. Is that sort of your analysis? 

Secretary STACKLEY. No, sir. The difference in cost is about $4.7 

billion. Specifically, absent the ability to de-man the ships for this 

extended period and take them out of the operational cycle and use 
17 

those savings or cost avoidance to go towards funding the program, 

it’s about a $13.5 billion program to modernize the cruisers. 

Through this phased approach it is about an $8.8 billion program, 

the delta being about 4.7. 

Mr. COURTNEY. All right. And that $4.7 billion, if it is an added 

cost that you, the Navy, has to absorb, it would seem to me put 

even more pressure in terms of trying to achieve the shipbuilding 

plan with historic levels of spending as we have been sort of using 

as a baseline. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. The CNO in his testimony was 

very clear. The reason we are doing this is because of the budget; 

the reason we are doing this is because of the budget. It is a constraint. It is a constraint for us. Given that, this approach seems 

to be the right balance in terms of holding onto that force structure, getting those ships modernized, getting additional service life 

on those ships, sustaining 11 air defense commander capable ships 

beyond the current plan, out into the 2035 to 2041 timeframe. So 

this is trying to strike the best balance with what is a difficult 

budget environment. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And when we talk about the budget, again using, 

as the chairman said, sort of historic levels of shipbuilding as the 

budget. Again, the Budget Control Act, which creates a whole separate level of pressure, I mean, the good news about that is it just 

expires by law in 2021. So historic levels of spending and shipbuilding over the last 20 years or 30 years, as you alluded to, I 

mean, the fact is, is that there are a whole range of programs that 

are going to be challenged throughout the whole 30-year shipbuilding plan. Isn’t that correct? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Absolutely. I will keep stating it, the 2020 

through 2030 timeframe, when the Ohio replacement comes along 

and we are still building a carrier every 5 years, we have got to 

recapitalize the LSD 41 class [USS Whidbey Island], we are building big deck amphibs [amphibious assault ships], 4-year centers, 

we are trying to sustain two Virginia classes per year, the destroyers, that budget requirement during that period of time, and that 

major recapitalization, the last time we saw those types of budgets 

was during the 1980s. And so, to be able to say, to be able to certify 

that we will are going to be able to hit those numbers, no. 

What that report does, that report defines the problem, makes it 

black and white for everybody to see. We today can’t make the decisions that are going to change that, but today we have to start taking the actions, making the effort to address it so that it is not beyond everybody’s reach when we get out there. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, certainly it is an additional reason, Mr. 

Chairman, why our effort to have the Deterrence Fund set up in 

the defense authorization bill, I mean, is even more underlined, 

and I think highlighted by the testimony that we are hearing here 

today. 

I guess the other question is, you talked about the fact that if 

this Phased Modernization Plan was adopted that the availability 

of these cruisers would actually get pushed out into the 2030s. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Is that correct? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 
18 

Mr. COURTNEY. As opposed to if we go with the status quo or the 

House bill version. Talk to me about that for a second. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. I mean, when do we lose those cruisers if we just 

continue along with the House bill and figure out a way to come 

up with the $5 billion. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. So today the service life, the expected service life of the cruisers is 35 years. They start aging out 

in 2019, and they will age out at the same rate at which we built 

them. So by the late 2020s they are all retired. What this plan does 

is, one, through the modernization we are going do the necessary 

hull, mechanical, and electrical repairs and upgrades to buy back 

some additional service life, buy back an extra 5 years service, and, 

frankly, during that period, this phased modernization, this extended period when they are out of the operational cycle, we are 

not burning up the service life. So what that does, that gives us 

the ability to extend the cruiser class out into the late, as I was 

saying, 2035 through 2041 timeframe during which they would 

then retire. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Stackley. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Stackley, Admiral Rowden, Admiral Creevy, thank you so 

much for joining us today. 

Secretary Stackley, I want to talk about the 11 cruisers that 

would be assigned minimal caretaker crews versus full crews during the reduced operating status. So now you have 11 of those 

ships. The question would be is, if you have a contingency and they 

need to be brought back up to full operational status, the question 

is, is how many of those 11 ships and how quickly could they be 

brought back up? And if the answer is less than 11 could be immediately brought back up, should all 11 be counted in the fiscal year 

2015 30-year shipbuilding plan as fully capable ships available for 

duty? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. So clearly the number depends on 

where you are in the modernization plan. First, the way we have 

this structured is we want to go after the HM&E package first, we 

want to hit it hard. 

A couple of things. We have to inspect the heck out of these 

ships. They have been driven, they are at a stage in their life that 

we are going to uncover a lot of things when we do open and inspect. So step one, get in, open and inspect, assess the material 

condition, get material in order, get them into the depot to do the 

hull, mechanical, and electrical upgrades that give you the service 

life that you need to get it out to 40 years. 

At that point in time, when those ships are in a depot, it is just 

like any other ship that is in a depot, it is not available for tasking. 

It is going to depend on how fast can you complete that work and 

get it going again. 

So in the early phase, when they are going through depot maintenance, maybe half will be materially available to get them going 

again, maybe half. Now, the issue then is not their material condi-
19 

tion or their readiness, the issue is going to be the crew, and it is 

what we just discussed. It is going to be pulling the senior enlisted 

and officers from other shore billets and then bring in the balanced 

crews and getting them trained and integrated onto the ship. 

So I put out a 2-year estimate there and that is based on new 

construction experience. If you look at what we do today in terms 

of crew phasing and training, integrating the crew with the ship, 

getting them certified and ready for deployment, about 2 years. 

After the HM&E upgrades, now have you ships that are in a 

very good material condition. They don’t have the most current 

combat system baseline, which we want to ultimately get to, but 

they are in very good material condition. And then it becomes a 

matter of strictly the crew. And the first one will be ready for operations faster than the last one because we will be surging crews to 

the ships. But I think the 18-months to 2-year rule still applies, 

and then the next phase going into the combat systems modernization. 

Well, now you are already in the active phase of bringing the 

crews to the ships. And so, again, depending on where you are, 

some of the ships are already going to be out on deployment. By 

2019 the first of the cruisers are back out on deployment and we 

have crews that are surging and moving to the ships just like in 

new construction so they would be able to complete their certifications and ready for tasking faster. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, it still appears then through phased modernization that there wouldn’t be all 11 ships that would be battle 

force ships available at that particular time. You would be having 

them available in this wave status. 

But let me ask you, let me go to your question concerning crews, 

and that is a concern. Today we are in a very, very high operational tempo. We are pushing things in significant areas, and I 

know the combatant commander requests have been significant. 

How do you expect to maintain the same forward presence with 

fewer assets? And would you expect to come back in future years 

and announce additional FDNF [Forward Deployed Naval Forces] 

assets as a way to achieve that? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. I am going start this and ask Admiral Rowden to finish it. But first you hit on the forward deployed 

ships. That is a very important key to the Navy’s ability to sustain 

presence without driving our ships at the same OPTEMPO [operations tempo], because we get to cut down on a lot of the transit 

time to theater. 

So the FDNF ships are an important point to increase our operational availability of ships, and that, frankly, helps us to compensate for cruisers being pulled out. But the high OPTEMPO 

issue today, I am certain and I think you are, too, that 10 years 

from now it will be worse and it will be more demanding. 

And an important part of this is, where is the risk? Is the risk 

higher in the 2020s or today? And when we look at not just the 

budgets associated with recapitalizing and modernization, but 

when we look at the risk associated with the threat, part of this, 

what this plan does is, it accepts more risk today in terms of cruisers that are operationally available today, but then it buys down 
20 

the risk in the out-years when, frankly, the threat is increasing 

both in terms of the fiscal threat and in terms of the adversary. 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir. And to piggyback on Secretary 

Stackley’s comments, clearly to get increased forward presence 

with X number of ships you either forward deploy those ships or 

you increase the length of deployments. And certainly the funding 

available to execute those would be required in order to ensure that 

we maintain the readiness levels on those ships. And certainly 

ships are built to put X amount of water underneath the keel, and 

the more you are operating those ships, the more you have to fund 

those appropriately in order to ensure that you can maintain the 

material condition as you bring those ships back to depot. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Than you, Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today. 

Secretary Stackley, if I could just start with you, going back to 

the shipbuilding program and our ability to meet our shipbuilding 

needs. With the actions that the HASC [House Armed Services 

Committee] has taken with respect to Ohio replacement and the 

subsequent action that the SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee] has taken, in terms of moving to take the Ohio replacement 

program out of the shipbuilding budget and treat it as more of a 

national platform with a separate funding mechanism, what will 

that do to the 30-year shipbuilding plan? And will it still leave a 

gap? Or to what degree does it significantly close that gap to help 

us meet our shipbuilding needs? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me first say that the actions 

taken by both the HASC and the SASC in that regard, I am calling 

it a great first step. By establishing the Strategic Sea-Based Deterrent Fund we are creating a vehicle to help us finance our shipbuilding program during that extremely stressing period. It does 

not change the picture in terms of dollars required for constructing 

new ships during that period. 

So the fund is a great first step, one that identifies we have got 

a problem here. It starts to set up a framework. The dollar demand 

is unchanged. And that is where I think we need to work together 

to identify how can we in fact not just identify the fund, but fill 

the fund without it coming out of shipbuilding. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Admiral Rowden, if I could turn to you. As you may know, I have 

been a very vocal proponent of ONR’s [Office of Naval Research] 

Solid-State Laser Technical Maturity Program that plans to test a 

high-powered, mature integrated weapon system at sea in late 

2016. 

My question is, what impact will the testing of this laser weapon 

system on the USS Ponce this year and this subsequent solid-state 

laser test in 2016 have on surface combatant modernization? And 

is the integration of high-energy weapon capabilities planned already with Ponce and SSL–TM [Solid-State Laser Technology Maturation Program] in forming final decisions or are the Ponce and 

the SSL–TM being used as development gates? 
21 

Admiral ROWDEN. Sir, thanks for the question. I think, to answer 

your second question first, I think we really have to wait to see 

what the results of the testing that we have, that we are going to 

execute on Ponce is, in order to understand how to further integrate that into future weapon systems. But I do think—and I am 

not an expert by any means on this particular weapon system, but 

I can say in general in the development of weapon systems certainly the at-sea testing that we execute for any weapon system 

that we are going to field is going to be absolutely essential to understand exactly what it is we have to do. 

And so I think that certainly it is a good first step to get the 

weapon systems out on ships like Ponce in order to be able to understand not only what needs to be done to marinise the equipment 

and to properly support it in execution of operations at sea, but 

then also to understand how to start to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures, and the concept of operations in order to 

go employ those weapons effectively. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral, for that answer. 

And I again want to applaud the Navy for the aggressive work 

that they are doing to try to get this directed energy weapon systems out of the lab and actually into the field. 

So with that, let me just turn to Admiral Creevy. With the Destroyer Modernization Plan combining two modernization periods 

into one, what is the opportunity cost in terms of hull, mechanical, 

and electrical or system upgrades? 

And other than conducting the combat system upgrades near the 

end of the availability, how will the Navy ensure that these destroyers are ready to rapidly integrate the latest technologies, particularly those in support of electronic warfare and high-energy 

weapons? 

Admiral CREEVY. Thank you for the question, sir. I would like to 

answer the second part of your question first. 

I think Admiral Rowden has got it right. We are going to learn 

a lot when we go do at-sea test. And that is the benefit of getting 

it out there to test, so we can learn about the integration challenges, the power challenges, and those kinds of things that we 

need to do. 

In the meantime, we have put into our modernization program 

as much as possible in the way of upgrades to support future requirements. And combining those availabilities into one saves us a 

significant amount of time in modernizing those ships and keeps 

them from being offline for much less time. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, gentlemen. I have some other questions that I will submit for the record. 

But thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Langevin, thank you for your work on this and 

on the funding source, too. You have done a great job on that. Mr. 

Courtney has as well. 

Mr. Courtney recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And again I want to thank the witnesses for your great testimony here today. 

Secretary Stackley, I think one of the reasons why I think there 

was resistance to the proposal from the administration was to some 
22 

degree, given the proposal a year before, which was to just decommission seven ships, frankly, I just think a lot of people had some 

confidence issues about whether or not this phased modernization 

was just a decommissioning by another name. And, again, I think 

your testimony today has been very, I think, convincing in many 

respects. 

But I guess I thought before you leave that if you could just kind 

us walk us through (a) what changed, and (b) what reassurances 

can you really state for the record that the Navy really will sort 

of follow through on this different type of approach? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. A couple things have changed that 

are critical here. 

First, the Congress established the Ships Maintenance Overhaul 

and Sustainment Fund, SMOSF. You all put $2.2 billion into a 

fund to let us move forward past the budget hurdles that we had 

to modernize the cruisers. That was the first key. 

Second is the manpower issue. The SMOSF fund will be consumed by manpower, operation, and support faster than we can 

modernize these cruisers, particularly in this budget environment. 

So we coupled the two. We looked at the funding that we have 

in hand, and we want that money to go towards the modernization 

to give us the capability and extend the service life that we need 

on the cruiser. We didn’t want to run out of gas along the way. And 

so we looked at the other costs, the manpower and the operation 

and sustainment costs, and we looked at the phasing of the decommissioning of those first 11 cruisers. And we arrived at this plan. 

We arrived at this plan that says we can minimize, we can almost 

self-finance this plan, at least on the front end, by pulling the manpower off and recognizing that we are going to bring our cruiser 

force structure down to 11, 1 for 1 with our carriers, but then be 

able to extend that longer. 

So the key was getting the SMOSF funding in place and then 

looking at offloading the costs associated with the manpower and 

operating and support during the period of modernization, and 

then coupling the decommissioning of the first 11 with the completion of the modernization for the back 11. And it just balanced out 

in terms of the budget that we’ve got, the force structure that we’ve 

got, and then the requirement that we’ve got to modernize the 

cruisers. 

Mr. FORBES. Secretary, let me take you back, because you left 

out one very important item when Mr. Courtney said, what 

changed? What changed was Congress said you couldn’t do it. In 

other words, when you came over here, you fought us tooth and 

nail with that. And when we tried to put the provision in there, 

the Navy still came over here and fought us tooth and nail to try 

to decommission those seven cruisers. 

And what really changed was when Congress looked at it and 

said, that’s a crazy proposal to do. We have got useful life left on 

these cruisers. And then Congress said, Navy, you can’t do that. 

And we put the fund in. 

But you could have come over initially instead of saying, we are 

just going to cut these cruisers out, and said, hey we need the 

cruisers, and we just need the funds to do it. 
23 

And I am not faulting you. I am just saying we need to compare 

apples to apples. And when you guys come over here and you basically salute and say, this is all we need, this is good, and then on 

the other hand you come back over and say, this is because of the 

budget, we need to know which is which. Are you doing this because of the budget? Or are you doing it because of the needs? And 

basically the reason those cruisers are still floating today is because the United States Congress said, we are not going to let you 

do it. 

Now, I come back and I want to ask you this question, because 

I had a hard time getting it, I want to make sure everybody else 

could get their questions in. Based on this report and what I understand you saying—and any of you guys can answer, so I am not 

putting one person on the spot—on this shipbuilding plan, which 

I am holding up here, Mr. Secretary, you tell me, this is the number of ships we need in 2024, 306 ships. Is that a fair—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. Fair assessment? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And I take it when you say we need 306 ships, you 

are not talking about 50 ships that are laid up in dry dock and we 

can’t use, that you need 306 ships that could be deployed. Is that 

a fair statement? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, we need 306 ships to produce the number of ships that we have to deploy. 

Mr. FORBES. I understand. I understand. But you are not talking 

about ships that take 2 years to get out of dry dock. Isn’t that true? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Well, there are exceptions. Because you 

know that a cruiser—— 

Mr. FORBES. So then what you are telling me is that in 2024 you 

don’t need 306 ships that are operable, you just need 306 ships 

somewhere, even if it takes you 2 years to get them out and get 

them going again? Is that what the requirements are? And I am 

not trying to trick you. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. No. 

Mr. FORBES. I am just trying to find out what the answer is. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Two parts. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Presence and response to major combat operations. 

Mr. FORBES. I understand both of those. But at some point in 

time there is a number. Let me just tell you why. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral Locklear comes to us, and we have a lot of 

respect for him, just like we do all three of you, and he says, if we 

keep moving the direction we are and we get down to 255 or 260 

ships, we cease to be a superpower. We become a regional power. 

Is he correct or not correct? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I agree with him. 

Mr. FORBES. If he is correct, then, he is talking about at some 

point in time 260 ships. He is not talking about 100 ships that are 

capable of being forwardly present, he is talking about 260 ships 

in the United States Navy. 
24 

And my question to you is, when we look at this and I fast forward out to 2024, and you guys are meeting over at the Pentagon 

somewhere, and then you are coming over here and telling Mr. 

Courtney, Mr. Langevin, me, the Speaker of the House, and the 

other members here, we need 324 ships, are you talking about just 

324 hulls somewhere or are you talking about 324 ships that are 

capable of being used in the United States Navy? 

Secretary STACKLEY. It is 324 ships. Well, that report refers to 

306 ships. 

Mr. FORBES. I am sorry, 306 ships, I apologize, 306 ships. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir, 306 ships that are capable for 

being used in the United States Navy, some number of which are 

in depots, some number of which just got back from deployment 

and are in a surge status, some number of which are training up, 

getting ready to go on the next deployment. So it is an entire cycle. 

That is the force structure that we need to produce today about a 

hundred ships on deployment or a different mix in response to a 

major combat operation. 

Mr. FORBES. If that is true and we can look at 2024 and say we 

need 306 ships, how many do we need today? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Okay. I will reflect back on the CNO’s and 

the Commandant’s testimony at their posture hearing. We need 

more ships. We need more ships. It is that straightforward. 

Mr. FORBES. But I can’t do that, Mr. Secretary. I mean, I am 

fighting for you. And you come over here and you tell me, no, we 

can get by with this. I need to walk into the other Members of Congress and tell them. If you are telling me, we are good to go, we 

only need 250 ships, or we need 260 ships, they are going to go 

with that. 

I need you to tell me, does the United States Navy know today 

how many ships they need today? You know what you need when 

you look out in the distance at 2024. Can you tell me how many 

you need today? This is 2014, this is 10 years earlier, where you 

don’t have to have a crystal ball. You know. How many ships do 

you need today? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, we need to produce about a hundred 

ships deployed today. And what is happening today at today’s current number of 289 ships is that the operational tempo of those 

ships is higher than where it needs to be. So, in fact, we do have 

ships that are on 8-month deployments. That is starting to stress 

the ships materially and stressing the crew. 

Mr. FORBES. I understand. And, Mr. Secretary, I have enormous 

respect for you. 

Admirals, can you all give me a number? I mean, does the 

United States Navy, if it walks over here and I have a checkbook 

that I can open up, can you guys tell me? You tell me you can predict out a decade from now how many ships we need. Can we predict out 12 hours from now and say this is how many ships I need 

tomorrow morning? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Mr. Chairman, I think there are a significant 

number of variables in that equation. 

Mr. FORBES. But there can be variables in 2024. At some point 

in time I have got to be able to get my hands around some number 

somewhere. I can’t just be saying, oh, it depends. I mean, how do 
25 

you come up with a definite number a decade from now and you 

can’t tell me a number today? That is what I am just scratching 

my head and trying to figure out. 

Admiral ROWDEN. Sir, I think what it comes down to is it comes 

down to understanding in determining what the number of ships 

that we have to have is, the ability to assume away or assume specific variables on this particular date is a very difficult thing to do. 

I think Mr. Secretary is exactly right in saying it is about a hundred ships deployed. 

Mr. FORBES. But, Admiral, do you understand my frustration? 

When you guys can come over here and give me a shipbuilding 

plan that the Secretary of Defense is certifying, saying this is how 

many ships I need a decade from now. And I am just asking you 

a simple question. I am not asking you to predict where China is 

going to be or Russia is going to be or any of those things a decade 

from now. I am just saying, today, when I walk over to the appropriators or anybody else and I say, this is how many ships we need, 

how many ships do we need? 

And I am really frightened if the United States Navy can’t tell 

me a number. I mean, be one or two off, but just give me a number 

somewhere. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, we don’t have the luxury of telling you 

how many we need absent of the budget that we are dealing with 

and absent of the number that we have got today. So what we can 

describe is what the OPTEMPO is of the force that we have got 

today, we can talk about the combatant commanders’ demands and 

what it has taken to meet those when there are shortfalls. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Stackley, when the testimony we have from admirals that we respect enormously says, if we meet the combatant 

commanders’ requirements we would need 400 to 500 ships in our 

Navy. So we take that off the table. And what we are getting at, 

we are not appropriators, we are authorizers. I need you to tell me 

how many we need so I can go fight and say this is how many 

ships we need. 

If the United States Navy doesn’t even know how many ships 

you need today, how in the world can we fight for you to get those 

numbers? And how can I with a straight face go to the American 

people and say, wait a minute, we know a decade from now how 

many we are going to need, we just don’t know how many we need 

today? I mean, I just don’t understand that. You all have got to 

help me with that. 

Secretary STACKLEY. I will give you an example. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Secretary STACKLEY. I am going to go back to the posture hearing because I think both the CNO and the Commandant were very 

clear. We would like to have 50 amphibious ships today to answer 

all the demands. Those are workhorse ships. We don’t have 50, we 

have 29. And our plan is to build up to 33 because that is what 

we can afford. 

I don’t know if that is a requirement, what we need today. But 

when we look at all the tasking that we would choose to fill if we 

did not have a constraint in terms of what the force structure is 

today, what our budgets are today, we would be a much larger 

Navy. 
26 

Mr. FORBES. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. But can you just 

appreciate a little bit of my frustration when I am just looking at 

you guys, who I trust, who I respect, I am saying you guys think, 

you plan, you do strategies over there. At some point in time do 

you not ever say, this is how many ships we need in the United 

States Navy, and we are short? Or we have more than we need? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I would tell you that we need about 300 

ships. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Now, if we need 300 ships, what I want to— 

and I will take that. Okay. 

Secretary STACKLEY. That is the best number that we have got. 

Mr. FORBES. That is okay. Be off some. 

But then when I look at this shipbuilding plan, this shipbuilding 

plan says today’s battle force count is 289. Fair? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And it says that. But then on the back it has that 

based on the accounting rules we have used for a decade or 

more—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. 283. 

Mr. FORBES. All right. What is this 274 figure in here? Look at 

the back. I don’t know if you have the 30-year shipbuilding plan. 

If not, I will have it brought to you. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Today we have six ships in the ship count 

that a year ago were not in the ship count. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Six ships more. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And if you take the cruisers out—I am looking, it 

says fiscal year 2015, it says total naval force inventory, and there 

is a figure of 274. Where does that come from? I am just trying to 

understand. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. You see where I am at least referencing? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And explain that. This is your plan. I am just reading it. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Okay. The numbers I am quoting you are 

2014, today’s numbers. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Secretary STACKLEY. What happens over the next year is we decommission a large number of frigates, which is identified earlier 

on in the report. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. So it gets worse then. So next year, instead 

of 289 or something, based on the previous count, I would be at 274 

ships. Fair? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. So I am going down. And you say, I need 300 

ships. Admiral Locklear is warning us that if we get to 260 we become a regional power, and you agreed with that. And you say, 

next year we will be down to 274. 

I am getting scared that I am heading in the wrong direction. I 

am heading closer to 260 than I am to 300. 

And then here is my question. Our plan for modernization of 

these cruisers would require that two of them actually be fully 
27 

modernized next year, in fiscal year 2015. That is our plan. That 

is the House plan. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. So we know we would have two more cruisers at the 

end of next year. Your plan would not require any be modernized, 

fully modernized next year. 

So my question to you is, do we have any contingency plan—Admirals, maybe you can address this—anywhere on the globe where 

we say that when we count the number of ships we need that we 

have 2 years to get those ships out and get them over for that operational plan that we would have? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The answer is no for major combat operations. But when you look at the requirement for our force, the 

numbers driver is presence. 

Mr. FORBES. Got you. But here is my worry, and I am just going 

to end it on this. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. I worry because of today—first of all, let me compliment you on at least heeding what Congress has said about our 

aircraft carrier and putting the money to do that. And thank you 

guys for doing that. I think that is important for us to do. 

Secondly, though, what I walk away with today, enormous respect for you guys, you know that, I am not arguing with you, I 

am just trying to get my hands around the fight. Because I believe 

that over the next decade or two, so goes the United States Navy, 

so goes the national defense of this country. 

And when I am looking at you, who I respect enormously, all 

three of you, and you say we need 300 ships, and then I wave this 

plan around that says, look, this is what we are going to have, we 

are going to have 306 ships in 2024, but all of us, everyone in this 

room knows there is no money to build all these ships over that 

time period, that we will have about a $4 billion shortfall each 

year, then I put that aside. And then I ask you this. I said, we need 

300 ships, based on what you said, and I do not doubt your word, 

but I am heading next year down to 274, based on the way we have 

always counted them. And Admiral Locklear is warning me, if I get 

to 260, I become a regional power. 

Do you see why that makes me nervous? And I am not interested 

in coming out and settling and telling the American people what 

our budget says we have to get to. I am more interested in knowing 

what we have to have so I can go fight for that on the House floor. 

And then the last thing I will just tell you is, every one of these 

operational plans we have, when we look at the ships we need and 

what we have, none of them give us 2 years to go pull these ships 

out of dry dock and get them manned up to do it. And so that is 

the frustration we have. 

And I come back to what Mr. Courtney said. When you all came 

in here last year and said you just wanted to dismantle these seven 

ships, if we had not stepped up and done what we did, those ships 

would be gone. 

And I fear the same thing is going to happen with these cruisers. 

If we don’t step up to the plate, at least I know with our plan we 

will have two of them next year that will be modernized. And then 
28 

I hope Congress will step up to the plate and get the money to do 

them because we need those ships in the United States Navy. 

And I have said this before, and I will end on this. I don’t think 

this is a Phased Modernization Plan. I think it is a phased euthanasia plan. Because I think when those ships go into dry dock, we 

have no guarantee that they are ever going to be coming back. 

But with that, I am going to let each of the three of you have 

the final word on whatever you want to say. And thank you guys 

for your service to the country. And thanks for being over here. 

And, Mr. Secretary, we will start with you. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me start by simply stating that 

neither the Phased Modernization Plan nor the prior 2 years when 

the Navy walked over proposals to decommission the cruisers are 

done as a preference. Those are done facing the realities of where 

we are with the budget. And it is not something that we can overlook as we put together our program. And so we have to take the 

resources that we have got and strike the right balances between 

our requirements, the funding that we have, and then lay it before 

Congress. 

Now, in every scenario we have described that we need more 

ships. So there is no debate here on that. And the report that we 

deliver to Congress that lays out not just the force structure that 

we need and the plan to build it, but lays out the budget requirements for that, that is sending a very clear signal to Congress and 

to the public that in order to meet our 306-ship requirements the 

funding that is needed greatly exceeds what we have had for the 

past 20 years. And we can’t march up to it slowly and wait until 

the FYDP arrives, when the Ohio replacement program is ongoing 

at the same time the carrier recapitalization, right on down the 

line, and then deal with the problem. We are identifying this problem years in advance so that we collectively have the opportunity 

to work on it. 

The 306-ship plan is under great budget stress. One of your concerns and one of your comments, and we take it on board, is that 

don’t allow the budget to dictate what your requirements are. Well, 

in fact, the budget that we have submitted to the Hill, the 2015 

through 2019 budget, goes right by the Budget Control Act [BCA]. 

It doesn’t disregard it entirely, but it doesn’t allow ourselves to be 

constrained. 

So what we have tried to do is put Budget Control Act aside, but 

then responsibly try to arrive at what is the minimum funding requirement beyond the BCA that meets a measure of capability that 

we have got to have to support the defense strategy. 

So we are trying to again strike that right balance without being 

constrained just by the BCA, but then not just submitting a budget 

that is beyond all reach. Maybe we don’t have it exactly right, but 

we are trying to hit that balance. 

Our concern is not just the challenge associated in those outyears, our concern is sequestration, because the plan that we have 

just laid out that we are critiquing here and the concerns that are 

being raised, those are only exacerbated if in 2016 we show up with 

the same budget that we told you we were going to come forward 

with this past year and it gets sequestered. It just compounds the 

problem. 
29 

So we are trying to articulate what our requirements are. It is 

about 306 ships. We have been consistent for the last several years 

in terms of the mix of ships and what the budget requirement is 

in terms of new construction and, in this case, in terms of modernization. And we are trying do the best government that we can 

in terms of responsibly managing the resources that we have got 

to produce that amount of warfighting capability. 

We might not have it exactly right, but what I am confident of 

and I am sure of is if in the end we do keep those cruisers, those 

11 cruisers in an operation and sustainment fashion and continue 

to deploy them to meet the demands of today, and we have to live 

inside of a sequestered budget or otherwise, we are going to have 

less resources available to recapitalize our fleet, because it will become a zero-sum game. 

So I entirely agree with you in terms of identify the requirement, 

identify the budget needed to requirement, give Congress the ability to go in and fight for it. And we are there with you in that fight. 

But we also have to be prepared to address the impacts of living 

under a BCA. And we can’t wait until we are in the middle of that 

scenario to then start to address it. 

We have done the best we can to lay out a balance—it is above 

BCA—a balance in terms of requirements and resources to get us 

to that 306-ship Navy. It is not perfect; it is not where we want 

to be. But we are trying to strike that right balance, not just for 

the taxpayer, but for the warfighter. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, you are a good man. You have got 

a tough job, a hard job. We want to work with you, and we want 

to help you on that. End of the day, we want to get you where you 

need to be, even if it is not where you want to be. So thanks for 

all do you. 

And, Admiral. 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Again, I appreciate the 

opportunity to appear before you today. 

In the execution of my responsibilities as the Director of Surface 

Warfare Division, one of the things that is front and center in my 

brain is that carrier strike group commander that is going to be deploying in the late 2020s and into the 2030s timeframe. 

I had the honor and the privilege back in the 2009 to 2011 timeframe to command two carrier strike groups out of San Diego, California. I came to rely heavily on all of my warfare area commanders and especially on my air defense commander that was assigned on the USS Chancellorsville and was assigned on the USS 

Mobile Bay. 

I think about the men and women that we are going to be deploying at that timeframe, and I think about the capabilities that 

we must deliver. As I sat down with the team in N96 [Surface Warfare] to look at what had changed, as Secretary Stackley talked 

about, in generating savings and the cost to own and utilizing the 

money that was put into the SMOSF fund, I wanted to figure out 

how we could best get through the 2020s and into the 2030s and 

take care of those strike group commanders that are going to be 

deploying at that period of time. 

The purpose-built air defense commander ships that we have 

today, upgraded and modernized, will deliver the capability that 
30 

those individuals need in order to be able to do the Nation’s bidding at that time. 

This is not a perfect plan, as Secretary Stackley said, but it is 

a plan that I think we can live with, I think we can stick to it, and 

I think we can execute it. These are superb ships today, and they 

will be superb ships in the future. And I look forward to working 

the plan and to ensuring that we have the funds and the fortitude 

in order to continue to press forward with that. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, thanks for being there. We appreciate all 

that you do and the men and women that serve under you. 

Admiral. 

Admiral CREEVY. Chairman Forbes, distinguished members of 

the subcommittee, thank you again for allowing me to appear today 

before you regarding our Navy surface ship program. SEA 21 

[Naval Sea Systems Command] is committed to the efficient planning and successful execution of our critical modernization programs. This will help ensure, as Admiral Rowden says, that our 

sailors have the required capabilities to meet the operational commitments. 

Force structure, ship count, and budget discussions aside, what 

I hope in the plan that we have presented in the PB [President’s 

Budget] 2015 budget demonstrates our commitment to the CG Mod 

[Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization] program and communicates 

some level of comfort that we are committed to executing. 

I think what is important to note there is that our current plan 

brings all these ships into the HM&E avail in the first 3 years of 

the program, demonstrating commitment, buying the service life of 

those ships up front so that we know they can go the distance and 

makes us able to pull them back into service more quickly and 

again demonstrates our commitment. 

My biggest challenge, as the guy who has to execute whatever 

program is eventually approved, is the uncertainty in the churn. 

And that is definitely my most difficult challenge. If I can lock 

down a plan in advance, I know I have the team, I have the processes, I have the discipline. I think the Navy has proven through 

the Aegis programs, cruisers and destroyers, and our associated 

modernization programs that they are very strong programs, very 

successful. And I know if I can lock down a plan, I can execute it. 

That is all I have, sir. Thank you very much. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, thank you. 

And, gentlemen, thank you so much for all that you do for our 

country. Thanks for your patience and being here with us. 

And Joe, Jim. 

With that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 10, 2014 

(51) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I appreciate your statement regarding the benefits of the phased 

modernization plan. As we modernize the capacity and capability of these cruisers, 

could you comment on their post-modernization ability to field high-energy systems? 

Secretary STACKLEY. There is currently no plan to field high-energy systems on 

the CG 47 Class ships. However, as research and development efforts continue in 

the field of high-energy systems the CG 47 Class ships, post modernization, could 

receive consideration for the fielding of high-energy systems. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. With the destroyer modernization plan combining two modernization periods into one, what is the opportunity cost in terms of HM&E (Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical) or system upgrades? Other than conducting the combat system upgrades near the end of the availability, how will the Navy ensure that these 

destroyers are ready to rapidly integrate the latest technologies, particularly those 

in support of electronic warfare and high-energy weapons? 

Admiral ROWDEN. The combined HM&E and Combat Systems (CS) availabilities 

provide a fully modernized DDG in 64 weeks vice 171 weeks with split availabilities. 

The ships will continue to receive the full HM&E and CS modernization upgrades 

in an integrated work package enabling fully modernized DDGs to be available to 

the Fleet sooner, including the combat systems testing completing at the end of the 

availability. There are multiple efforts in progress to develop more energy efficient 

systems and to accommodate the integration of future electronic warfare and highenergy weapons. The integration of these technologies would be supported within 

the plan to conduct combined destroyer modernization availabilities. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What effect will the decision to descope the Flight I/II Arleigh 

Burke destroyer upgrades have on maintenance and training, given that there will 

be a permanent diversity of software and hardware capabilities across the destroyer 

fleet? What sorts of additional costs will be incurred by the decision to support these 

multiple lines of software and hardware throughout the life of the ships? 

Admiral CREEVY. The descoping of the Flight I/II Arleigh Burke destroyers modernization package will have a minimal impact on training costs due to student 

throughput and instructor requirements remaining virtually the same for all baselines and the costs to maintain current Flight I/II training equipment being less 

than the cost to procure new training equipment for new baselines. The one exception to this is the Navy/Missile Defense Agency (MDA) PB15 plan to install Ballistic 

Missile Defense (BMD) 4.X on additional Flight I/II DDG’s which increases annual 

training costs by approximately $800K per year, $4.0M over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). 

Aegis Baseline 5.3.9 remains the most stable and best supported Aegis baseline 

from both the standpoint of parts support and training. The training infrastructure 

is in place and fully supported and funded. While this may be viewed as a ‘‘permanent diversity of software and hardware capabilities across the destroyer fleet,’’ the 

end result will be a more rapid reduction of the several baselines found in the Flt 

IIA ships, as they are replaced with Advanced Capability Build (ACB) 12/BMD 5.0 

at near their midlife thus reducing overall lifecycle costs. 

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