IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-0016

Filed November 3, 2021

JONATHON LANGERMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JOAN MOHR, Administrator of the Estate of Jerry Dean Mohr,

Defendant,

and

PAMELA MOHR,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Osceola County, Don E. Courtney, 

Judge.

Pamela Mohr appeals the trial court’s declaration Jonathon Langerman is 

an heir of Jerry Dean Mohr. AFFIRMED.

Angie J. Schneiderman and Coyreen R. Weidner of Moore, Corbett, 

Heffernan, Moeller & Meis, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellant.

John L. Sandy of Sandy Law Firm, Spirit Lake, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Schumacher, JJ.
2

BOWER, Chief Judge.

Pamela Mohr appeals the trial court’s declaration Jonathon Langerman is 

an heir of Jerry Dean Mohr.1 She contends the court improperly considered 

anonymous letters in determining Jerry recognized Jonathon as his son and there 

is not clear and convincing evidence Jerry recognized Jonathon as his son. 

Finding no abuse of discretion or error of law, we affirm.

I. Background Facts.

Jerry, an Arizona vascular surgeon, died intestate in Arizona in 2011. He 

was married to Pamela at the time of his death. He and Pamela separated in 1994 

but never divorced. 

Amy Langerman attended Occidental College at the University of California 

before attending law school. She practiced law in Arizona beginning in 1983. 

Although she is still licensed to practice law in Arizona, she moved to California in 

2002 and is currently a special education consultant working with children with

disabilities.

Amy met Jerry through a mutual friend and, although she knew Jerry was 

married, she knew he was not happy in the marriage. They became “friends with 

benefits” sometime in 1990 or 1991. In 1994, Jerry and Amy engaged in planned 

sexual relations for the express purpose of conceiving a child. Amy had already 

had a child conceived in this manner with a different man. From the time she 

learned she was pregnant until the day she delivered the child, whenever she saw 

 

1 Because a number of participants in this litigation share last names, we will refer 

to them by their first names.
3

Jerry he acknowledged her growing belly and referred to the child as “my Baby 

Zygote.” In December 1994, six-weeks premature, Amy gave birth to Jonathon.

Jerry moved to Flagstaff, Arizona in March 1996 where he lived and worked

until his death in 2011. At the time of his death, Jerry was in a long-term 

relationship with another woman, Beth Cairns.

Amy learned of Jerry’s death when a friend who worked at the Maricopa

County Medical Hospital and knew that Jerry and she were friends contacted her 

to tell her that Jerry had died. She hired a probate attorney to file an action for 

paternity on Jonathon’s behalf in Arizona. Paternity was established by obtaining 

tissue samples from a hospital where Jerry underwent surgery and submitting 

them for DNA testing. An Arizona court determined Jonathon is Jerry’s biological 

child.

At issue here is whether Jonathon is an “heir” under Iowa Code sections

633.3(22) and 633.222 (2017), which would entitle him to share in the proceeds of 

the sale of Iowa farmland in which Jerry had an interest when he died.2

 

2 The litigation road to this appeal is long and winding. See Mohr v. Langerman, 

No. 13-1422, 2014 WL 5243364, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014) (Mohr I); In 

re Estate of Mohr, No. 16-1474, 2017 WL 3067435, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. July, 

19, 2017) (Mohr II). In Mohr I, this court affirmed an Iowa court’s finding Pamela 

had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence Jonathan was not an heir. 

2014 WL 5243364, at *10 (“We further conclude the district court correctly 

determined Pamela had the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, 

that Jerry did not recognize Jonathan, and did not err in concluding that Pamela 

failed to carry her burden.”); see also Mohr II, 2017 WL 3067435, at *4 (“The 

probate court, in subsequent rulings, did not rule Langerman is Jerry’s heir. In its 

March 23, 2016 ruling on the administrator’s motion to amend inventory, the court 

specifically stated the ‘Motion to Amend the Initial Inventory does not require the 

court to make a final determination on the status of Langerman as an heir entitled 

to take. That question remains open and subject to subsequent challenge.’”).
4

Jonathon, represented by Amy as his attorney in fact and an Iowa attorney, 

sought a declaratory ruling he was Jerry’s heir. His proposed exhibits included 

anonymous letters Amy received in early 2012, advising Amy of Jerry’s death and 

stating Jerry was proud to have a son, had shared that sentiment with close friends, 

had shown pictures of his son with the author, and wanted his son to have money 

for college and his future. In one of the letters, the sender enclosed a number of 

correspondences and photos Amy had mailed to Jerry.

Pamela filed a motion in limine, asking the court to prohibit the admission 

of the anonymous letters, asserting a lack of authentication and foundation; even 

if foundation could be shown, the letters contained “multiple levels of hearsay, of 

which no exception can apply.” The court allowed the exhibits subject to the 

objections and stated it would rule on the objections if it relied on the letters.

In its written ruling, the district court made these factual findings:

In support of her position that the court should find that [Jerry] did 

recognize Jonathon as his child, [Amy] testified that in her first 

trimester of pregnancy her oldest child was exposed to Fifth disease. 

She took the child to the doctor and after the doctor diagnosed and 

assured her that the child would be fine she inquired if she should be 

concerned about her pregnancy because of her exposure[.] She was

told to consult with another doctor. She contacted Jerry and he came 

over and they both got on the phone and called the Center for 

Disease Control (CDC). Jerry asked to speak to a geneticist and he 

introduced himself as a surgeon and that his girlfriend was having 

their baby and that she was exposed to Fifth disease. “Can you tell 

me the morbidity and mortality for intrauterine exposure to Fifth 

disease?” They found out that it’s not a great thing to be exposed to 

but if something was going to happen, it would happen on its own 

and she would miscarry before [twenty] weeks. So they decided that 

there was no necessity to terminate the pregnancy and that she

would carry it through and hope for the best.

On another occasion she had an ultrasound-guided 

amniocentesis and Jerry asked to attend with her. He came to pick 

her up and on the way she asked him “How do you want me to
5

introduce you?” He said, “How about Dad?” When her doctor came 

in she said, “Rick, this is Dad. Dad, this is Rick”.

After Jonathon’s birth he would come around on occasion to 

see his son and ask “How’s my boy? How’s my baby?” and kiss him.

One day he shows up and her father is there. She answered the 

door and told him that her dad was there but he wanted to come in 

and said “I want to meet my son’s grandfather.” Amy testified that 

“We went in and I said to my dad, “Dad, this is my friend Jerry Mohr.

Jerry shook his hand and said, “Hello, Mr. Langerman. I’m pleased 

to meet my son’s grandfather.” She also testified that Jerry told his 

mother about her grandson when she was dying from lung cancer.

[Amy], after [Jerry’s] death, also received letters written by an 

anonymous friend, which Plaintiff relates bears directly on [Jerry’s]

state of mind relative to his son. These letters are subject to 

authentication and hearsay objections, which will be addressed later

in this ruling. The deposition of Dorothea Wagner Riley was 

introduced and admitted. She resides in Cornville, Arizona, which 

she describes as a suburb of Sedona, Arizona. She is widowed and 

is [eighty-two] years old. [Jerry] was her and her husband’s doctor 

and friend. She had a vivid dream and in the dream she dreamed 

about this little boy with blond hair and blue eyes. So she asked 

[Jerry], “Jerry, do you have a son?” And he said, “Yes.” She also 

attended a Celebration of Life for Jerry. At some point she learned 

that Amy Langerman was the mother of Jerry’s son.

Amy and [Jerry] maintained their relationship up until the time 

that Jerry moved to Flagstaff. But the contact between the two of 

them continued to be consistently inconsistent. She would send him 

a letter with cards, pictures, and on one occasion a videotape of 

Jonathon on Father’s Day. They would speak with each other on the 

phone maybe twice in one week and then not for four or five months. 

She would contact him whenever there was something medical he

should know about. Between 2006 and 2007 she spoke with him 

more frequently because he was having problems with his 

partnership in Flagstaff and he would ask her for advice because of 

her experience as an employment lawyer.

The court addressed the admissibility of the anonymous letters as follows:

[Authentication.] Authentication is satisfied by evidence 

sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the 

proponent claims. Iowa R. Evid. 5.901(a). Under the identical 

federal counterpart, all that is needed is for the party authenticating 

the exhibit to “prove a rational basis for that party’s claim that the 

document is what it is asserted to be.” Jones v. Nat’l Am. Univ., 608 

F.3d. 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 2010). Even anonymous correspondence 

may be sufficiently distinctive in its “appearance, contents, 

substance, internal patterns or other distinctive characteristics” 
6

within the meaning of the identical federal rules of evidence, to meet

the authentication requirements. United States v. Bello-Perez, 977 

F.2d 664, 671 (1st Cir. 1992) [(citing] United States v. Ingraham, 832 

F.2d. 229, 236 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 (1988) 

([noting] authentication of telephone call and anonymous letters

based on caller-authors “peculiar obsession with [and approach to] 

the same obscure litigation,” amounting to an idiosyncratic 

“signature”))]; see also United States v. McMahon, 938 F.2d. 1501,

1508–09 (1st Cir. 1991) (authentication of unsigned note based on 

circumstantial indicia of authorship); United States v. Newton, 891 

F.2d. 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1989) (authentication of unsigned document 

based on internal references to defendant’s girlfriend, wife, lawyer 

and aliases). Ultimately, the requirement of authentication is 

designed to ensure that the court has enough indicia of 

trustworthiness that the document is what it purports to be—

authentic. Id.

To authenticate an item of evidence, Federal Rules of 

Evidence 901(a) provides that “the proponent must produce 

evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the

proponent claims it is.” “Proponents of evidence may authenticate 

an item through several methods including, ‘[t]he appearance, 

contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive

characteristic of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.’” 

United States v. Young, 753 F.3d 757, 773 (8th Cir. 2014) (alteration 

in original) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4)). The contents of a 

writing may be considered in the authentication of the writing, and 

the proponent of the evidence may also use circumstantial evidence 

to satisfy the authentication standard. Id. “Notes . . . may be 

admitted despite the author’s anonymity, especially when the

writings demonstrate the author’s intimate familiarity with the events 

in question.” Id. Once this threshold is satisfied, the jury determines 

any further questions as to the evidence’s authenticity. Id.; Kaplan 

v. Mayo Clinic, 653 F.3d. 720, 726 (8th Cir. 2011).

Ultimately, this court concludes that the requirement of 

authentication is designed to ensure that the court has enough 

indicia of trustworthiness that the document is what it purports to 

be—authentic. This court concludes that exhibits 20, 21, 22 and 23 

[letters and enclosures] have been authenticated and they are what 

they purport to be, letters from a colleague and friend of [Jerry].

[Hearsay.] The court has studied the parties’ arguments as to 

whether exhibits 20, 21, 22 and 23 contain hearsay. This court 

concludes that the statements contained in the letters are admissible

not to prove the truth of the matter but to prove that the decedent 

recognized Jonathon Langerman as his son. See Iowa R. 

Evid. 5.801(c). This is a non-hearsay use. The court further agrees 

with Plaintiff’s argument contained in Plaintiff’s trial brief that even if 

the statements of [Jerry] were hearsay, they are admissible under 
7

Iowa R. Evid. [5.]804(4)(b). That rule provides that if a declarant if 

unavailable, including because of his death, statements he made 

concerning the relationship by blood of another person are 

admissible if the declarant was related by blood to the other person. 

Declarant’s declarations of decedent, asserting and denying 

paternity, are admissible in evidence. Pike v. Standagel, [175 N.W. 

12, 13 (Iowa 1919)]. The court also concludes that the statements 

[Jerry] made to his colleague and friend that he was proud of his son 

are also separately admissible as evidence of declarant’s then 

existing mental condition. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(3)[;] Westway 

Trading Corp. v. River Terminal Corp., 314 N.W.2d 398[, 402] (Iowa 

1982) ([finding] evidence contained in a letter was admissible as 

circumstantial evidence of the state of mind of the declarant and is 

thus not hearsay).

Therefore the court concludes that exhibits 20, 21, 22 and 23 

have been authenticated and are admissible because of the reasons 

cited by the court.

The district court concluded there was clear and convincing evidence Jerry 

recognized Jonathon such that Jonathon would be considered an heir in Iowa. 

Pamela appeals, contending the trial court improperly admitted the anonymous 

letters. She also asserts there is not clear and convincing evidence of recognition

to support the court’s declaration.

II. Scope and Standard of Review. 

Generally, we review the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. 

State v. Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Iowa 2009). “‘A court abuses its discretion 

when its ruling is based on grounds that are unreasonable or untenable.’ A ground 

is unreasonable or untenable when it is ‘based on an erroneous application of the 

law.’” Andersen v. Khanna, 913 N.W.2d 526, 535–36 (Iowa 2018) (citations 

omitted).

“Our review of an appeal from a declaratory judgment action is determined 

by how the case was tried in district court.” Clarke Cnty. Reservoir Comm’n v. 

Robins Revocable Tr., 862 N.W.2d 166, 171 (Iowa 2015). We review de novo a 
8

declaratory action tried as an equitable proceeding. Davidson v. Van Lengen, 266 

N.W.2d 436, 438 (Iowa 1978). We give weight to the findings of fact made by the 

trial court, but are not bound by them. Id.

III. Discussion.

A. Anonymous letters. Pamela asserts the court abused its discretion in 

finding the anonymous letters sufficiently authenticated to be admissible. She 

argues the identity of the author must be demonstrated. But she cites no rule or 

case law to support this assertion.

“Authentication or identification represents one component in the relevancy 

determination with regard to certain types of evidence, such as the contents of a 

document, telephone call or other exhibits.” Laurie Kratky Doré, 7 Iowa Practice 

Series: Evidence § 5.901:0 (Nov. 2020 update) (footnote omitted). Iowa Rule of 

Evidence 5.901(a) states, “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating . . . an item 

of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding 

that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” The authentication burden is not 

high, it need only allow a reasonable factfinder to find the evidence is authentic. 

See United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014) (discussing

Federal Rule of Evidence 901). The district court has the discretion to determine

whether a party has established a proper foundation. State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 

734, 750 (Iowa 2006).

The court properly observed, “The contents of a writing may be considered 

in the authentication of the writing, and the proponent of the evidence may also 

use circumstantial evidence to satisfy the authentication standard.” In Young, the 

Eighth Circuit court observed:
9

Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) provides that, to authenticate 

an item of evidence, “the proponent must produce evidence sufficient 

to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” 

Proponents of evidence may authenticate an item through several 

methods including, “[t]he appearance, contents, substance, internal 

patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken 

together with all the circumstances.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4).[3] A 

proponent of evidence may use circumstantial evidence to satisfy 

this standard. Once the proponent satisfies this burden, the 

[factfinder] determines any further questions as to the evidence’s 

authenticity. The contents of the writing may be considered to 

authenticate it. Notes and other documents may be admitted despite 

the author’s anonymity, especially when the writings demonstrate the 

author’s intimate familiarity with the events in question.

753 F.3d at 773 (internal case citations omitted); accord United States v. RamirezMartinez, 6 F.4th 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2021).

Here, there is sufficient evidence in the record from which the trial court 

could determine the letters were what they purported to be—letters from a close 

friend of Jerry. The writings demonstrate the author’s intimate familiarity with Jerry;

Jerry’s lack of a will and his assets; the ongoing filings in the Arizona litigation; and 

Jerry’s relationships with Pamela, Beth, and Amy. We find no abuse of discretion 

in the court’s authentication ruling.

Pamela also asserts the court erred in finding the anonymous author’s 

statements were not hearsay. However, she does not specify which statements in 

the letters are hearsay, i.e., statements offered for the proof of the matter asserted. 

See Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(c). Consequently, we have nothing to review.

 

3 The Iowa evidentiary rule is identical. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.901(a), (b)(4). It is 

appropriate to look to federal decisions applying the identical rule for guidance. 

See Paredes, 775 N.W.2d at 561 (“Our rule of evidence is identical in all relevant 

aspects to its federal counterpart . . . . As a result, interpretations of the federal 

rule are often persuasive authority for interpretation of our state rule.”). 
10

B. Sufficiency of the evidence of recognition. The district court correctly set 

out the relevant law, admittedly with some faulty citations, which we have corrected 

below:

Iowa Probate Code section 633.222 relates to the rights of 

biological children and establishes how a biological child can 

establish “legitimacy” for purposes of inheritance in Iowa. That 

provision currently provides:

633.222 biological child—inherit from father

Unless the child has been adopted, a biological 

child inherits from the child’s biological father if the 

evidence proving paternity is available during the 

father’s lifetime, or if the child has been recognized by 

the father as his child; but the recognition must have 

been general and notorious, or in writing. Under such

circumstances, if the recognition has been mutual, and 

the child has not been adopted, the father may inherit 

from his biological child.

A contested heir must show heirship by clear and convincing 

evidence. Recognition means “to admit the fact, truth or validity” of 

a matter. [In re Estate of Evjen, 448 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa 1989).] In 

the context of heirship, it means the father admitted or acknowledged 

the paternity. Id. Recognition need not be universal or so general 

and public as to have been known by all. Id. If the father denies 

paternity, as opposed to openly acknowledging it, recognition is less 

likely to be found. Id. In the absence of written recognition, 

“recognition must have been general and notorious.” Iowa Code 

§ 633.222. “Recognition is a mental process . . . made manifest by

overt acts or speech.” [Trier v. Singmaster, 167 N.W. 538, 541 (Iowa 

1918).] Recognition may occur even though there are efforts to 

conceal the facts from some. Id. “It is generally held that recognition 

need not be ‘universal or so general in public as to have been known 

by all’; need not be continuous, ‘covering the whole period up to and 

including the time of the death of the putative father.’” [In re Wulf’s 

Estate, 48 N.W.2d 890, 894 (Iowa 1951)]. “A general and notorious 

recognition does not necessarily mean a continuous recognition 

covering the whole period up to and including the time of the death 

of the putative father. A recognition clearly shown to have been once 

deliberately and publicly made, made under circumstances that 

revealed no apparent motive to conceal, meets the requirements of 

the statute.” [In re Clark’s Estate, 290 N.W. 13, 30 (Iowa 1940) 

(quoted in Mohr II, 2017 WL 3067435, at *4)).]
11

While Jerry did not reveal his parenthood to Pamela or Beth, there is clear 

and convincing evidence of a general and notorious recognition of Jonathon as his 

son. Jerry’s close friend was enlisted to safeguard correspondence from Amy and 

the enclosed pictures of Jonathon. We observe

the letters indicate that Jerry was proud to have a son and that he 

shared that with close friends and colleagues. He shared pictures of 

his son with the author of the letter and others. Jerry had told the 

author of the letters that he wanted to make sure his son had enough 

money for college and possibly a little for the future. The author of 

the letters informed Amy that Jerry talked about his son more than 

you will ever know and that Jerry had told him that Amy was the 

mother of his child and that was where and how he knew to send the 

anonymous letters.

Jerry told Dorothea Riley, a patient and friend, he had a son; and, Dorothea 

learned this was known by others at Jerry’s memorial. Pamela herself (after Jerry’s

death) learned it was “common knowledge” at the hospital Jerry worked that he 

had fathered a child with Amy. Further, the district court found the mother in this 

case to be credible. Amy testified to extensive contact and recognition of Jonathon

as his son. We therefore affirm the court’s declaration Jonathon is Jerry’s heir.

AFFIRMED.