LITTORAL COMBAT 

SHIP

Deployment of USS 

Freedom Revealed 

Risks in Implementing 

Operational Concepts 

and Uncertain Costs

Report to Congressional Committees

July 2014

GAO-14-447

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-447, a report to 

congressional committees

July 2014

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Deployment of USS Freedom Revealed Risks in

Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain 

Costs

Why GAO Did This Study

The LCS was intended to be a low-cost 

surface combatant that uses innovative 

operational concepts, such as minimal

crew size, to lower operations and 

support costs. In 2013, the Navy 

deployed USS Freedom, one of two 

LCS variants, to Singapore to “prove 

its concept,” demonstrate operational 

capabilities, and collect data on the 

ship’s manning, training, maintenance, 

and logistics needs. 

The House report accompanying the 

National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2014 mandated that GAO 

analyze the Navy’s sustainment plans 

for its LCS program—including lessons 

from the USS Freedom deployment. 

This report addressed (1) the benefits 

and limitations of the operational data 

that have been collected on LCS ships;

(2) the extent to which the Navy has 

evaluated risk in its operational support 

and sustainment concepts for LCS;

and (3) how LCS life-cycle cost 

estimates compare with those for other 

surface-ship classes. GAO analyzed 

documents from the 2013 deployment,

and LCS and surface-ship life-cycle 

costs, and interviewed program 

officials and USS Freedom crews.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is emphasizing its prior 

recommendations that, before buying 

more LCS ships, the Navy (1) conduct 

and consider the results of a risk 

assessment and (2) collect additional 

data and update cost estimates. The 

Department of Defense expressed 

concerns that its life-cycle cost data 

are not comparable across ship types. 

GAO believes the analysis provides a 

reasonable comparison using the best 

available data from the Navy, as 

discussed in the report.

What GAO Found

The USS Freedom deployment provided beneficial data on operational support

and sustainment concepts for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), but these data 

have limitations, and the Navy still lacks key data on LCS ships and concepts. 

The USS Freedom deployed for 10 months with a surface-warfare mission 

package, and the Navy collected data on items such as systems reliability and 

crew sleep hours. However, several factors limited the operational lessons 

learned. For example, mechanical problems prevented the ship from spending as 

much time at sea as planned. Further, the Navy continues to lack operational 

data for key operational and warfighting concepts, such as deployment with the

other mission packages—mine countermeasures and antisubmarine warfare—

and data on the other LCS variant which, under current plans, will comprise half 

the ship class.

Although the Navy is adjusting some operational support and sustainment 

concepts, it has not yet addressed risks that remain in executing key concepts. 

• Manning: The crew experienced high workload and fell short of the Navy’s 

sleep standards despite adding personnel for the deployment.

• Training: Gaps remain in fully training LCS sailors prior to deployment.

• Maintenance: The Navy is adjusting maintenance requirements and has not 

yet determined the optimal mix of contractor and crew workload to perform 

preventative maintenance.

• Logistics: The Navy is reallocating duties among crew and shore support, but 

the infrastructure needed to support both variants is incomplete. 

Without fully analyzing risks in key concepts, the LCS may have operational 

limitations, deficits in personnel and materiel readiness, and higher costs.

The Navy has produced life-cycle cost estimates for the LCS seaframes and 

mission modules. Although those estimates contain uncertainty and there are 

inherent difficulties in comparing the life-cycle costs of ships with differing 

capabilities and missions, the best available Navy data indicate that the annual 

per ship costs for LCS are nearing or may exceed those of other surface ships, 

including those with greater size and larger crews, such as frigates.

Annualized Life-Cycle Cost Estimates of LCS and Navy Surface Ships

View GAO-14-447. For more information, 

contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or 

pendletonj@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Letter 1

Background 5

USS Freedom Deployment Provided Some Data on LCS 

Operations, but the Navy Still Lacks Key Operational Data on 

LCS Ships and Concepts 7

The Navy Has Not Yet Fully Addressed Risks to Its Operational 

Support and Sustainment Concepts That Were Identified by the 

USS Freedom Deployment 17

Available LCS Cost Data Are Limited, but Annual Per-Ship Costs 

May Be Approaching Those of Other Multimission Surface 

Ships with Larger Crews 20

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 26

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 29

Appendix II Littoral Combat Ship Plan of Action and Milestones, as of 

March 2014 35

Appendix III Remaining Risks in Implementing Littoral Combat Ship Operational 

Support and Sustainment Concepts 37

Appendix IV Overview of Navy Surface Ships Used in Life-Cycle Cost 

Comparison 51

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense 54

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 56

Related GAO Products 57

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Tables

Table 1: USS Freedom Underway Time in 7th Fleet Area of 

Responsibility 11

Table 2: Key Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Systems and Concepts 

Demonstrated during USS Freedom Deployment to 

Singapore and Those That Require Future Overseas 

Deployments for Demonstration 16

Table 3: Summary of Risks to Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 

Operational Support and Sustainment Concepts and Navy 

Actions to Address Observations from USS Freedom

Deployment 18

Table 4: Summary of USS Freedom Crew Discussion Groups 33

Table 5: Status of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Plan of Action and 

Milestones Action Items as of March 2014 36

Figures

Figure 1: USS Freedom in Singapore 8

Figure 2: USS Freedom Deployment Operational Area and 

Selected Events 9

Figure 3: USS Freedom Operational Activities in 7th Fleet Area of 

Responsibility 12

Figure 4: Independence Variant Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 14

Figure 5: Life-Cycle Cost Estimates of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 

and Various Navy Surface Ships in Constant Fiscal Year 

2014 Dollars 25

Figure 6: Extent of Overlap in Billets between Littoral Combat Ship 

(LCS) Core Crew and Mission-Module Crews 40

Figure 7: USS Freedom Sailor Conducting Engine Maintenance 

during Singapore Deployment 46
Page iii GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

LCS Littoral Combat Ship

LCS Squadron LCS Class Squadron

NAVMAC Navy Manpower Analysis Center

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Page 1 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

July 8, 2014

Congressional Committees

For over 10 years, the Navy has been refining the concept of operations 

for its newest class of surface warship—the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). 

The LCS was intended to be a comparatively low-cost surface-combatant 

ship that could operate in the shallow waters close to shore, known as the 

littorals. Its design concept consists of two distinct parts—the ship itself 

(seaframe) and the interchangeable mission modules it is expected to 

carry and deploy (i.e., surface warfare, mine countermeasures, and 

antisubmarine warfare). In early 2013, the Navy deployed its first LCS—

USS Freedom—to Singapore to “prove its concept,” demonstrate

operational capabilities, and collect cost and other data on the ship’s 

manning, training, maintenance, and logistics needs in the actual 

overseas environment in which it is expected to operate. The Navy 

recognizes that the LCS program faces distinct challenges as it continues 

to assess a number of operational support and sustainment concepts—

such as reliance on shore support and the use of flyaway maintenance 

teams (i.e., contractors flown to the ship to conduct maintenance)—to 

determine whether they can be used together to minimize crew size and 

lower operations and support costs over the long term. As we previously 

reported, the Navy’s acquisition approach to the LCS program involves a 

significant degree of concurrency; that is, the Navy is buying the ships 

while key concepts and performance are still being tested.1 The Navy is 

procuring two seaframe variants of different hull types from two different 

contractors.2

 1

GAO, Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue 

Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost, 

To date, the Navy has committed to procuring 24 

seaframes, 12 of each variant, and plans to contract for up to 8 additional 

GAO-13-530 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 22, 2013).

2

This report refers to LCS 1 and the other odd-numbered seaframes as the Freedom 

variant, and LCS 2 and the other even-numbered seaframes as the Independence variant.
Page 2 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

seaframes—while still testing the operational concepts it will use to 

employ the vessels.3

In prior reports, we identified numerous challenges related to the 

acquisition of LCS seaframes and mission modules and the 

implementation of their unique operational concepts. In February 2010, 

we reported several potential risks in implementing the new operational 

concepts for the LCS.

4

In its report accompanying HR 1960, a bill for the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, the House Armed Services

Committee mandated that GAO review and analyze the Navy’s 

operational support and sustainment

In September 2013, we issued a For Official Use 

Only report and found deficiencies in the Navy’s LCS life-cycle cost 

estimates, noting that uncertainty exists in these estimates because they 

were developed without actual operational and cost data. We 

recommended that the Navy conduct and consider the results of a risk 

assessment to identify operational limitations if the Navy’s approach to 

personnel, training, and maintenance cannot be implemented as 

envisioned and that the Navy collect additional operational data and 

update its cost estimates before contracting for additional ships. The 

Navy partially concurred with the risk recommendation and concurred 

with the operational data and updated cost estimates recommendation, 

but has not yet completed implementation of these recommendations.

5 plans for its LCS program.6

 3

The Navy had planned to contract for up to 28 additional seaframes, but on February 24, 

2014, the Secretary of Defense announced that as part of its fiscal year 2015 budget 

proposal the Navy would contract for no more than 32 LCS—instead of the 52 ships 

previously planned—until the Navy evaluates potential courses of action, including the 

current LCS program and provides a report to the Secretary of Defense, which is due by 

July 31, 2014. The Navy has not specified which variants it will procure in the future.

For this 

report, we addressed (1) the benefits and limitations of the operational 

data that have been collected on LCS ships; (2) the extent to which the 

Navy has evaluated risk in its operational support and sustainment 

4

See GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates 

and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts, GAO-10-257 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 

2, 2010).

5

For the purposes of this review, operational support and sustainment for LCS includes 

manning, training, maintenance, and logistics—both onboard and shore-based support. 

6

H.R. Rep. No. 113-102, at 115-116 (2013). We provided a preliminary briefing on 

February 26, 2014.
Page 3 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

concepts for the LCS in the areas of manning, training, maintenance, and 

logistics; and (3) how LCS life-cycle cost estimates compare with those 

for other surface-ship classes.

To address the benefits and limitations of the operational data that have 

been collected on LCS ships, we analyzed and compared USS 

Freedom’s planned deployment schedule with its actual executed 

schedule. We reviewed documentation related to USS Freedom’s 

operational activities while it was deployed, including execution orders, 

concepts of operations, and exercise briefings. We also interviewed 

forward-deployed crew members in Singapore and Navy officials 

responsible for the ship’s operational employment at 7th Fleet in Japan to 

discuss the successes and challenges of the deployment, including any 

limitations. Further, we analyzed the operational activities of USS 

Independence and interviewed Navy officials to determine what 

operational data have been collected on the Independence variant. 

Finally, we reviewed and analyzed the LCS wholeness and warfighting 

concepts of operations to identify any additional LCS operational and 

warfighting concepts that still need to be demonstrated in an operational 

environment.

To assess the extent to which the Navy has evaluated risk in its 

operational support and sustainment concepts for the LCS in the areas of 

manning, training, maintenance, and logistics, we reviewed relevant datacollection and analysis plans and mid-point and final reports on the 

Freedom 2013 deployment to Singapore from the Commander Naval 

Surface Forces Pacific, 7th Fleet, and the Center for Naval Analyses. We 

also interviewed officials from organizations responsible for collecting and 

analyzing data from this deployment. We reviewed the LCS wholeness 

concept of operations, the life-cycle sustainment plans for the LCS, and 

various other Navy documents associated with LCS manning, training, 

maintenance, and logistics, and interviewed USS Freedom crews who 

participated in the 2013 deployment to obtain their perspectives on the 

implementation of these concepts.

To assess how LCS life-cycle cost estimates compare with those for other 

surface-ship classes, we modified a framework used in a similar 
Page 4 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

comparison published by the Congressional Budget Office in 2010.7

We conducted this performance audit from September 2013 to July 2014 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

To 

do this, we reviewed cost estimates in the current LCS Seaframe 

Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate (2011) and the LCS Mission Module 

Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate (2013). Although the Navy to date has 

not updated these life-cycle cost estimates to reflect changes in the 

program, the Navy adjusted the estimates for inflation to fiscal year 2014 

dollars. Using these data, we calculated an annual per ship life-cycle cost 

estimate for the combined LCS seaframes and mission modules to 

account for differences in the number of ships and mission modules and 

their respective expected service lives. We also obtained life-cycle cost 

data in fiscal year 2014 dollars from the Navy for five surface ships, patrol 

coastal ships, mine countermeasures ships, frigates, destroyers, and 

cruisers, and used these data to calculate an annual per ship life-cycle 

cost estimate for each of these five surface ships. We then compared 

these data with the data we calculated for the LCS seaframes and 

mission modules. We analyzed and assessed these data and found them 

to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting the estimated lifecycle costs of these surface ships. We selected the non-LCS surface 

ships used for our comparison because cost data were readily available 

and they all conduct at least one mission that the LCS is also expected to 

perform. A more detailed-description of our scope and methodology is 

presented in appendix I.

 7

In 2010, the Congressional Budget Office completed a preliminary study of LCS life-cycle 

costs and compared them to the costs of other ship classes in the surface fleet. This 

analysis included Navy data on operations and support costs for mine countermeasures 

ships, frigates, destroyers, and cruisers and other life-cycle costs components, and 

compared those costs to projections for each LCS seaframe variant—excluding mission 

modules. We modified the Congressional Budget Office’s analytic framework to conduct 

further analysis using additional and updated data for the LCS, its mission modules, and 

other surface-ship classes. See Congressional Budget Office, Life-Cycle Costs of 

Selected Navy Ships (Apr. 28, 2010).
Page 5 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

The LCS was intended to be a comparatively low-cost surface combatant 

that could address the challenges of operating U.S. military forces in the 

shallow waters close to shore, known as the littorals. The ship is designed 

for three principal missions: surface warfare, mine countermeasures, and 

antisubmarine warfare—to address threats posed by small surface boats, 

mines, and submarines, respectively. Its design concept consists of two 

distinct parts—the ship itself (seaframe) and the interchangeable mission 

modules it is expected to carry and deploy. These mission modules 

consist of containers carrying various unmanned systems, sensors, and 

weapons that provide different combat capabilities for the ship’s three 

principal missions. These mission modules are intended to give the Navy 

the flexibility to change equipment to meet different mission needs while 

forward deployed. The mission modules, when combined with the 

mission-module crew and an aviation detachment—consisting of an MH60 helicopter and its flight and support crew, as well as vertical takeoff 

unmanned aerial vehicles—make up a mission package. The LCS is 

designed to embark with only one mission package at a time.

The Navy envisioned the LCS as a ship that could operate with a much 

smaller crew size than other surface combatants, with preventative 

maintenance duties performed primarily by contractors. This concept 

would in turn lead to lower operations and support costs, which 

traditionally account for about 70 percent of the total cost over a ship’s 

lifetime. The Navy planned the LCS to have a core crew of 40 sailors and 

mission-module crews of 15 to 20 sailors—far fewer than the crew of 

approximately 170 sailors for a frigate and approximately 250 sailors for a 

destroyer. To meet its operational, maintenance, support, and 

administrative needs with these reduced manning levels, the Navy is 

developing a new maintenance and support concept.8

 8

Details related to unique LCS operational support and sustainment concepts are found in 

the U.S. Fleet Forces Command, LCS Platform Wholeness Concept of Operations 

Revision D (Jan. 9, 2013), the Navy’s high-level document summarizing manning, training, 

equipping, and sustaining concepts for LCS seaframes and mission packages.

Unlike other ships, 

the LCS would have no onboard administrative personnel and a limited 

ability to conduct maintenance at sea; instead, it would rely heavily on 

shore-based support, including flyaway maintenance teams made up of 

contractors flown in to conduct scheduled maintenance. The Navy also 

opted to use a rotational crewing concept, whereby three crews rotate 

between two ships, one of which is forward deployed. The Navy has used 

Background
Page 6 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

a different form of rotational crewing on ballistic missile submarines for 

years but has not used it widely on surface combatants.9

As of July 2014, the Navy has accepted delivery of four LCS seaframes—

two of each variant—and has already contracted for 20 more seaframes 

(10 of each variant). The Navy plans to award contracts for up to eight 

additional seaframes.10

Several Navy organizations and commands have responsibilities for 

managing the LCS program, overseeing training, and maintaining 

readiness of LCS ships:

Twelve seaframes are currently in production, and 

at the same time the Navy is in the process of incrementally developing 

and procuring the three mission packages.

• The Program Executive Office Littoral Combat Ship provides a single 

program executive who is responsible for acquiring and maintaining 

the littoral mission capabilities of the LCS class—from procurement to 

fleet employment and sustainment.

• The LCS Class Squadron (LCS Squadron) oversees LCS seaframes, 

mission modules, and their crews for numerous functional area 

requirements including, among others, administrative, personnel, 

operational, maintenance, logistics, training, and facilities.

• The LCS Council—established by the Chief of Naval Operations in 

August 2012 to ensure the successful introduction of the LCS into the 

fleet—created an LCS Plan of Action and Milestones to address 

program challenges and continues to use this tool to monitor progress 

 9

GAO, Force Structure: Ship Rotational Crewing Initiatives Would Benefit from Top-Level 

Leadership, Navy-wide Guidance, Comprehensive Analysis, and Improved LessonsLearned Sharing, GAO-08-418 (Washington: D.C.: May 29, 2008). The Navy uses 

rotational crewing on mine countermeasures ships and patrol coastal ships. 

10The Navy had planned to contract for up to 28 additional seaframes, but on February 24, 

2014, the Secretary of Defense announced that as part of its fiscal year 2015 budget 

proposal the Navy would contract for no more than 32 LCS—instead of the 52 ships 

previously planned—(a further reduction from the original 55-ship plan), until the Navy 

evaluates potential courses of action, including the current LCS program and provides a 

report to the Secretary of Defense, which is due by July 31, 2014. 
Page 7 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

across the program.11 Our September 2013 report contains a 

description of how the council tracks progress through the LCS Plan 

of Action and Milestones, and a status update on the LCS Plan of 

Action and Milestones can be found in appendix II.

The USS Freedom’s deployment to Singapore was an opportunity for the 

Navy to learn lessons about the feasibility and sustainability of unique 

LCS operational support and sustainment concepts in an operational 

environment. The Navy was able to collect data during the deployment on 

items such as systems usage and reliability and crew sleep hours. 

However, several factors, such as mechanical failures during the 

deployment, limited the operational lessons learned and the extent to 

which they are projectable across the LCS class. Additionally, the Navy 

continues to lack overseas deployment data for the Independence variant 

ships and for additional operational and warfighting concepts—such as 

overseas mission-package swaps and deployment with the mine 

countermeasures and antisubmarine-warfare mission packages.

In March 2013, the Navy deployed its first LCS—USS Freedom—to 

Singapore with an increment 2 surface-warfare mission package for the 

first-ever overseas-based operational deployment of an LCS.12

 11In March 2013, the Chief of Naval Operations expanded the duties of the council to 

include responsibilities for the Joint High Speed Vessel and added a Rear Admiral, 

Commander of the Military Sealift Command, to the renamed Littoral Combat Ship and 

Joint High Speed Vessel Council. See U.S. Navy, Littoral Combat Ship and Joint High 

Speed Vessel Council Charter (March 2013). 

Navy 

officials saw the deployment as an opportunity to examine the feasibility 

of LCS manning, training, maintenance, and logistics concepts in an 

operational environment including, among other things, using a minimally

sized crew, swapping out one crew with another while forward deployed, 

and maintaining the ship primarily with private contractors. Although the 

Navy concept of operations envisioned 40 sailors in the LCS core crew, 

the core crew was increased to 50 for the Singapore deployment as a 

pilot program to address crew fatigue and workload concerns that the 

12There are three mission packages (surface warfare, mine countermeasures, 

antisubmarine warfare), and nine different capability increments within these three 

packages. All carry different crews and equipment and operate differently from one 

another. Increment 2 of the surface-warfare mission package does not include the 

surface-to-surface missile that is planned for increments 3 and 4. 

USS Freedom

Deployment Provided 

Some Data on LCS 

Operations, but the 

Navy Still Lacks Key 

Operational Data on 

LCS Ships and 

Concepts

Deployment to Singapore 

Intended to Examine 

Operational Concepts
Page 8 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Navy was already aware of before the deployment. USS Freedom

deployed for 10 months and conducted one crew swap midway through 

the deployment, operating in 7th Fleet’s area of responsibility and using 

Singapore as a logistics and maintenance hub (see fig. 1).13

Figure 1: USS Freedom in Singapore

 13U.S. Navy 7th Fleet, a Navy component command, had operational control of USS 

Freedom across the 7th Fleet area of responsibility which covers more than 48 million 

square miles and spans from west of Hawaii to the western coast of India.
Page 9 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

During its 10-month deployment to the 7th Fleet area of responsibility, 

USS Freedom participated in joint exercises with regional partners, 

maritime security operations, and disaster-relief efforts in the Philippines 

following Typhoon Haiyan. Figure 2 provides an overview of the 

operational area for the USS Freedom deployment and shows the sites of 

selected events.

Figure 2: USS Freedom Deployment Operational Area and Selected Events

The ship and crew implemented some of the LCS-specific operational 

support and sustainment concepts, including a crew swap that took place 

USS Freedom

Deployment Provided 

Some Useful Data on 

Operational Support and 

Sustainment Concepts, 

but Several Factors 

Limited the Lessons 

Learned
Page 10 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

in August 2013 as well as the use of contractor teams for scheduled 

maintenance periods in Singapore.14

• The Freedom deployment demonstrated the LCS’s ability to 

participate in theater security-cooperation activities, such as joint 

exercises with regional navies, and helped carry out the Navy’s 

forward-presence mission in Southeast Asia—thereby freeing larger 

multimission warships to carry out other high-priority Navy duties.

Additionally, several commands and 

organizations responsible for analyzing lessons learned from the 

deployment—including the Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific, the 

Naval Warfare Development Command, and the Center for Naval 

Analyses—collected data during the USS Freedom deployment on 

equipment reliability rates and crew-reported sleep statistics, among other 

things. For example, the Freedom crew provided daily reports on the 

amount of time they spent sleeping, training, and completing preventative 

and corrective maintenance. After USS Freedom returned to San Diego, 

nearly every LCS stakeholder—including the operational commander of 

the ship in Singapore (Commander, Destroyer Squadron Seven) and 

each of the USS Freedom crews—produced lessons-learned summaries. 

According to Navy officials, they were able to learn some operational 

lessons from the 10-month deployment. For example:

• Navy officials are implementing a condition-based maintenance 

system on the LCS, whereby sensors provided some useful data on 

system usage and reliability.15

Navy officials reported that data and lessons learned collected during the 

USS Freedom deployment will be used to develop and refine the concept 

of operations for the USS Fort Worth (Freedom variant) deployment and 

the LCS wholeness concept of operations. USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) is 

For example, medium-pressure air 

compressors had seen high casualty rates on USS Freedom prior to 

the deployment. However, Navy officials reported that USS Freedom

did not experience significant failures of these compressors during the 

Singapore deployment because they were constantly monitored by 

sensors and were replaced before they could fail.

 14The USS Freedom blue and gold crews executed a crew turnover in August 2013 in the 

port of Sembawang in Singapore.

15Condition-based maintenance is the process of scheduling maintenance based on 

actual need through analysis of data from the seaframe’s equipment. The data is obtained 

in real time or near-real time from sensors embedded in seaframe components or 

systems, and then monitored and analyzed ashore.
Page 11 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

scheduled to deploy to Singapore in late 2014, and the next revision of 

the wholeness concept of operations is scheduled for completion in 

November 2014.

Although the Navy collected some useful data from the deployment, 

mechanical issues reduced time at sea with 55 total mission days lost, 

limiting the operational lessons learned. The operational effect of these

lost mission days was that the ship had to cut short its participation in two 

joint exercises and did not complete at least two of its planned presence 

operations.16

Table 1: USS Freedom Underway Time in 7th Fleet Area of Responsibility 

Our analysis of USS Freedom’s actual executed schedule 

showed that these mechanical failures contributed to limiting the ship’s 

underway time to 35 percent of its deployment in the 7th Fleet area of 

responsibility (see table 1). Underway time includes all time the ship 

operated outside of port in the 7th Fleet area of responsibility including 

time spent transiting to and from Singapore.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. | GAO-14-447

Note: Underway percentage is calculated using USS Freedom executed schedule and includes all 

time the ship operated outside of port in the 7th Fleet area of responsibility (i.e., under way), including 

transit to and from Singapore.

The 7th Fleet concept of operations for the USS Freedom deployment 

stated that the ship should spend more time outside of Singapore (i.e., 

greater than 50 percent) than in port in Singapore. However, during its 

 16Specific equipment failures resulting in lost mission days are sensitive information. 

There is disagreement within the Navy on how many mission days were lost due to 

mechanical failures. The LCS fleet introduction program office provided us with 

documentation showing that 55 days were lost; other Navy offices stated that 28 days 

were lost, but they did not provide documentation for how this number was determined.

Activity Number of days Percentage of time

Underway 53

In transit under way to/from Singapore 40 

Total underway days 93 35%

In port in Singapore 155 

Other port time 17 

Total time in port 172 65%

Total days in 7th Fleet, including transit 265 100%
Page 12 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

10-month deployment, USS Freedom spent 58 percent of its time in port 

in Singapore (see fig. 3). According to 7th Fleet officials, other ships 

deployed to the 7th Fleet area of responsibility typically spend about 20 

percent of their time in port. LCS program officials explained that the 

unique LCS maintenance concept—USS Freedom returned to port every 

25 days to undergo a 5-day preventative maintenance availability and 

every 120 days for more-intensive 2-week intermediate maintenance—

resulted in a rigid deployment schedule with more port time than other 

deployed Navy ships. However, Navy officials acknowledged that the 

mechanical issues on this deployment extended the ship’s time in port. 

LCS program officials told us that while equipment problems limited 

operational lessons learned, the Navy gained experience conducting 

emergent repairs overseas and putting stress on the LCS maintenance 

concept.

Figure 3: USS Freedom Operational Activities in 7th Fleet Area of Responsibility

a

In-transit time includes stops in Guam, Philippines, Brunei, and some taskings from 7th Fleet (e.g., 

tracking vessels of interest).

Additionally, some Freedom systems, such as several water-jet 

components and the satellite communication system, are unique to that 

hull, and their performance data cannot be generalized even to other 

Freedom variant ships. USS Freedom is different in several respects from 

later (follow-on) ships of its own variant, since some major equipment has 
Page 13 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

been changed. As a result, learning about these systems’ performance 

during deployment cannot be directly applied to predict how the 

replacement systems might perform on other ships of the Freedom

variant. According to the Navy, improving these systems should mean 

that future deployments of other ships from the Freedom variant will not 

incur the same number of equipment problems as USS Freedom did. 

However, as the Department of Defense’s Director of Operational Test 

and Evaluation noted, no formal operational testing has been conducted 

to verify and quantify the effect of these changes, so further deployments

or additional underway time, or both, will be necessary before the effects 

of these improvements on ship availability can be determined.17

The Navy continues to lack operational data, specifically overseas 

deployment data, on the other LCS variant—the Independence variant—

which, under current plans, is expected to comprise half of the LCS ship 

class (see fig. 4).

 17Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Fiscal Year 2013 Annual Report (January 

2014).

The Navy Continues to 

Lack Operational Data on 

the Other LCS Variant
Page 14 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Figure 4: Independence Variant Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

In September 2013, we reported that the Navy had not scheduled an 

overseas operational deployment for an Independence variant LCS and 

therefore would not have comparable actual data and lessons learned for 

this variant. We recommended that the Navy collect actual operational 

data on this variant and the Navy concurred, stating that it would identify 

the actions and milestones needed to collect additional actual operational 

data on the Independence variant. However, the Department of Defense’s 

Director of Operational Test and Evaluation noted in January 2014 that 

the core combat capabilities of the Independence variant seaframe 

remain largely untested and that equipment reliability problems have 

degraded the operational availability of USS Independence (LCS 2).18

While the Navy deployed a Freedom variant LCS to Singapore for nearly 

all of 2013, our analysis found that, over the same period, USS 

Independence spent about 8 months, or 65 percent, of 2013 in port or dry 

 18Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Fiscal Year 2013 Annual Report.
Page 15 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

dock maintenance periods, limiting any operational data that the Navy 

could obtain when operating the ship out of its homeport in California. In 

addition, according to Navy officials, from October 2012 to December 

2013, USS Independence spent only 44 days under way.19 Navy officials 

told us that an Independence variant LCS needs to deploy to Singapore 

to determine whether the LCS operational support and sustainment 

concepts will be feasible and effective in supporting this variant, since not 

only does it have different systems than the Freedom variant that require 

different logistical support, but Singapore presents unique environmental 

conditions such as high humidity and warm ocean temperatures. At the 

time of our review, the Navy stated that it has notional plans to deploy an 

Independence variant LCS sometime before 2017. Navy officials also 

noted that an extended test period is planned in 2014 for the mine 

countermeasures mission package for USS Independence. This testing 

will take place in the Gulf of Mexico near Florida, and the ship will use 

Pensacola to exercise the maintenance concept outside of homeport.

LCS operational and warfighting concepts that require demonstration in 

an operational environment include overseas mission-package swaps, 

deployments of the mine countermeasures and antisubmarine warfare 

mission packages, and tests of warfighting concepts in exercises related 

to operational plans, among others.20

 19During this period, USS Independence underwent major safety-related modifications 

that required lengthy time either in port or in dry dock. LCS program officials said that in 

2011, the USS Independence spent 5 months under way completing mine 

countermeasures mission package testing, but they acknowledged that recent operational 

data are limited. They added that since the ships have been delivered, USS Freedom has 

spent 29 percent of its time under way, while USS Independence has spent 26 percent of 

its time under way. 

According to the 7th Fleet USS 

Freedom deployment concept of operations, the Freedom deployment 

was intended to support validation of warfighting and wholeness 

concepts. However, the deployment largely focused on sustainment 

concepts, and key warfighting concepts were not demonstrated. Table 2

shows the key LCS systems and concepts demonstrated during the USS 

Freedom deployment to Singapore and those that require future 

deployments to demonstrate their feasibility.

20Operational plans refer to any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in 

response to actual and potential contingencies. 

Additional LCS Concepts 

Need Operational 

Demonstration
Page 16 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Table 2: Key Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Systems and Concepts Demonstrated during USS Freedom Deployment to Singapore 

and Those That Require Future Overseas Deployments for Demonstration

System/concept

Planned for and 

demonstrated during 

deployment

Not yet 

demonstrated during 

a deployment

Mission package Surface warfare  c

Mine countermeasures 

Antisubmarine warfare 

Wholeness concepts Shore-based maintenance concept in Singapore a 

Overseas crew swap 

Core crew size of 50 

LCS rotational crewing strategyd 

16-month deployment 

Shore-based maintenance concept outside of Singapore 

Warfighting concepts Theater security cooperation b 

Exercise related to operational plans 

Overseas mission-package swap 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data. | GAO-14-447

a

Concepts found in U.S. Fleet Forces Command, LCS Platform Wholeness Concept of Operations 

Revision D (Jan. 9, 2013).

b

Concepts found in classified warfighting concept of operations.

c

USS Freedom deployed with an increment 2 surface-warfare mission package. Four total increments 

are planned for this mission package.

d

The LCS rotational crewing strategy consists of three crews rotating between two ships, one of 

which is forward deployed.

To date, none of the mission packages have been completely developed, 

tested, and deployed.21

 21The Navy is pursuing an evolutionary acquisition strategy for the mission packages. This 

means that it plans to deliver improving levels of capability over multiple increments (four 

for surface warfare, four for mine countermeasures, and one for antisubmarine warfare). 

The Navy’s threshold performance requirements as currently defined in LCS requirements 

documentation will be met only when the final increment of each package is completed, 

and not by each individual increment. See 

There are nine different capability increments 

within the three mission packages. USS Freedom deployed with an 

increment 2 surface-warfare mission package. There are two other 

mission packages for the LCS—mine countermeasures and 

antisubmarine warfare—neither of which has yet deployed. The three 

mission packages each require different crews and equipment and 

GAO-13-530.
Page 17 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

operate differently from one another, and the manning for each package 

differs in skill sets. This can alter the extent to which the mission package 

crew will be able to support the seaframe crew; to determine this, each 

mission package will need to be deployed. Navy officials said that the 

USS Fort Worth deployment beginning in late 2014 will address some, 

but not all, of these gaps. For example, Fort Worth will utilize the 

rotational crewing strategy, deploy for 16 months, and implement the 

shore-based maintenance concept outside of Singapore. However, Fort

Worth will not swap mission packages while deployed. Navy officials also 

noted that additional war gaming is required to refine the operational use 

of the LCS seaframe and mission packages. The Navy held an 

operational war game in March 2014 to try to understand how well the 

LCS would support the Navy’s needs and operational plans in various 

phases of operations in a Pacific theater crisis, but it has not yet released 

any formal reporting on the results of this effort.

In September 2013, we recommended that the Navy collect actual 

operational data on the Independence variant prior to contracting for 

additional LCS ships in 2016. Our work shows that the Navy still lacks key 

operational data needed to refine its concepts and develop more-reliable 

cost estimates. We believe our 2013 recommendation is still valid.

Although the Navy is adjusting some operational support and sustainment 

concepts based on data collected and lessons learned during the USS 

Freedom deployment, it has not yet addressed some risks that remain in 

executing and sustaining key manning, training, maintenance, and 

logistics concepts. Federal standards for internal controls state that 

decision makers should comprehensively identify risks associated with 

achieving program objectives, analyze them to determine their potential 

effect, and decide how to manage the risk and identify what actions 

should be taken.22

 22GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

This is an ongoing process, since operating conditions 

continually change. In 2010, we reported that the Navy faced several 

risks in implementing new LCS concepts for manning, training, and 

maintenance necessitated by the small crew size, and recommended that 

the Navy conduct and consider the results of a risk assessment to identify 

operational limitations if the Navy’s approach to manning, training, and 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

The Navy Has Not 

Yet Fully Addressed 

Risks to Its 

Operational Support 

and Sustainment 

Concepts That Were 

Identified by the USS 

Freedom Deployment
Page 18 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

maintenance cannot be implemented as envisioned; develop possible 

alternatives to these concepts; and make policy and process changes to 

reduce risks to the LCS program.23

Table 3: Summary of Risks to Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Operational Support and Sustainment Concepts and Navy Actions 

to Address Observations from USS Freedom Deployment

At the time of this review, the Navy 

had not fully addressed our prior recommendation, although Navy officials 

told us that they have undertaken a number of activities to manage risks 

in the LCS program. For example, the LCS program office convenes a 

risk-management board on a regular basis to identify potential program 

risks. As the program attempts to manage and mitigate these risks, the 

maiden deployment of USS Freedom identified additional issues with the 

manning, training, maintenance, and logistics concepts that have not 

been fully addressed by the Navy. Key observations from the deployment, 

the actions the Navy has taken to address them, and the outstanding 

risks that still remain in further implementing LCS operational support and 

sustainment concepts are summarized below in table 3.

Concept area

Observations from Freedom

deployment

Navy actions to address these 

observations Remaining risks

Manning Freedom crews averaged 

about 6 hours of sleep per day 

compared to the Navy 

standard of 8 hours

Core crews augmented by 

mission-module crew and 

contractor ship riders, which is 

not part of the manning 

concept

Navy is conducting a manpower 

study to validate the size and 

composition of Freedom core crew 

and surface-warfare mission-module 

crew; expected completion in 2015

Navy has not yet conducted further 

manpower studies to validate Independence

variant core crew and other two missionmodule crews

Manpower studies do not account for the 

issue of core crews relying on missionmodule crew and contractor ship riders to 

assist with their core crew functions

Training Not all core crew members 

were fully trained prior to 

deployment

Sailors were training while 

deployed, which is not part of 

the LCS concept of operations

Sailors widely reported the 

inadequacy of the training they 

received 

Navy is training late-addition ensigns 

and “plus-up” personnel to minimize 

training while deployed

Navy is developing simulator-based 

training to replace current vendor 

training

Navy is making some improvements 

to existing training based on crew 

feedback

Training time during deployment not 

accounted for in LCS work day

While new training is being developed, sailors 

will still require training while under way

Gaps in training may exist until 2019, when 

the LCS training curriculum is expected to be 

fully implemented

 23GAO-10-257. 
Page 19 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Concept area

Observations from Freedom

deployment

Navy actions to address these 

observations Remaining risks

Maintenance Freedom had a limited range 

due to its rigid maintenance 

schedule

Lack of continuity in contractor 

personnel conducting 

maintenance was an issue

Crew said that some 

maintenance would be 

performed more efficiently by 

contractors while some should 

be executed by crew

Future deployments will have a 

longer, more-flexible interval for 

scheduling maintenance

Navy is continuously reviewing 

maintenance requirements and the 

mix of contractor- and sailor-executed 

workload

Navy is implementing a pilot 

condition-based maintenance 

program to increase maintenance 

efficiency

Navy is still working to manage the scope of 

who is executing the work and establishing 

baseline tools to ensure accountability

Navy may utilize its maintenance contractors 

and LCS crews inefficiently until it determines 

the most-appropriate timing and number of 

planned LCS maintenance checks and the 

optimal mix of contractor- and crewperformed maintenance

Logistics Distance support reporting 

process not followed, resulting 

in duplication of effort among 

the crew and shore support 

personnel

Several limitations of LCS 

support infrastructure such as 

poor pier-side Internet 

connectivity

Navy is revising instructions for the 

LCS Squadron’s Forward Liaison 

Element

Some reporting that was originally to 

be completed by shore support will be 

conducted by the crew

Navy is exploring options with the 

host-nation government to improve 

pier-side support

The logistics infrastructure needed to support 

four LCSs in Singapore and at other planned 

forward operating stations has not been 

completed

LCS crews may be burdened with additional 

reporting requirements not factored into their 

workday

Additional lessons may be learned on 

supporting Independence variant ships when 

deployed

Source: GAO analysis of Navy and Center for Naval Analyses data. | GAO-14-447

Our work shows that the Navy has not fully identified, analyzed, and 

mitigated the risks associated with LCS concepts. Having such a risk 

assessment would enable decision makers to identify and assess the 

operational effects if these concepts cannot be implemented as 

envisioned; alternatives to mitigate these risks; and information to link the 

effectiveness of these new operational concepts with decisions on 

program investment. If the operational concepts for manning, training, 

maintenance, and logistics cannot be implemented as desired, the Navy 

may face operational limitations, may have to reengineer its operational 

concept, or may have to make significant design changes to the ship after 

committing to building most of the class. The 2013 deployment of USS 

Freedom to Singapore highlighted that these risks remain. Therefore, we 

continue to believe that our 2010 recommendation is valid.

For additional details and information on our observations from the 

deployment, actions the Navy has taken to address them, and the 

outstanding risks that still remain in further implementing LCS concepts in 

the areas of manning, training, maintenance, and logistics, see appendix 

III.
Page 20 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Although the Navy’s life-cycle cost estimates for the LCS seaframe and 

mission modules contain uncertainty, they indicate that the annualized 

per ship costs for the LCS may be approaching those of other 

multimission surface ships with larger crews. The Navy planned to use 

data collected during USS Freedom’s deployment, particularly data on 

maintenance costs, to update and improve the life-cycle cost estimates 

for the LCS seaframe. The Navy collected cost data during USS 

Freedom’s deployment to Singapore; however, Navy officials explained 

that much of the data may be of limited usefulness for projection across 

the LCS ship class. We reported in September 2013 that a lack of 

operational data had prevented the Navy from developing life-cycle cost 

estimates for the LCS seaframe above a relatively low confidence level. 

Although the Navy’s LCS cost estimates contain uncertainty, especially in 

regard to operations and support costs, and there are inherent difficulties 

associated with comparing the life-cycle costs of various surface ships 

with differing capabilities and mission sets, we found that the per ship per 

year cost estimates for the LCS program are nearing or may exceed the 

costs of other surface ships, including multimission ships with greater size 

and more crew members, such as guided-missile frigates and destroyers.

During the course of our prior review, Navy officials explained that they 

planned to update and improve life-cycle cost estimates for the LCS 

seaframe, in part by using data collected during USS Freedom’s

deployment to Singapore. The deployment provided additional data 

associated with actual operations and support costs specific to USS 

Freedom, including maintenance and emergent repair costs. However, 

according to Navy officials, much of these data may be of limited 

usefulness for projection across the LCS ship class. In early 2014, Navy 

officials said that they were evaluating the deployment data but that firsttime deployments on any ship class include costs related to issues that 

are not representative of the entire ship class and will therefore limit their 

ability to update the LCS life-cycle cost estimate for the seaframes. Two 

such factors are described below:

• Certain problematic engineering systems that required emergent 

repairs and increased the overall deployment cost figures have been 

or will be replaced on future LCSs.

• The fuel capacity and efficiency of USS Freedom will differ from other 

Freedom and Independence variant ships.

In September 2013, we recommended that the Navy identify actions and 

milestones to collect additional actual operational data on the 

Available LCS Cost 

Data Are Limited, but 

Annual Per-Ship 

Costs May Be 

Approaching Those of 

Other Multimission 

Surface Ships with 

Larger Crews

Usefulness of USS 

Freedom Deployment

for Updating LCS Cost 

Estimates May Be Limited
Page 21 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Independence variant and to update operations and support cost 

estimates for both variants.24 Navy officials said that an updated life-cycle 

cost estimate for the LCS seaframe would likely be available in the fall of 

2014. However, based on the Navy’s LCS deployment schedule, this 

update will likely not include additional overseas deployment-related cost 

data for either LCS variant; USS Fort Worth will not deploy until late 2014, 

and the Navy has only notional plans to deploy an Independence variant 

LCS sometime before 2017.25 Navy officials explained that the Navy will 

not have a life-cycle cost based on actual deployment data for the LCS 

until it is operating multiple LCSs from a forward location such as 

Singapore in accordance with employment and operational concepts.

The Navy estimated in 2011 that operations and support costs for the 

LCS seaframes would be about $50 billion over the life of the ship class. 

In 2013, it estimated that operations and support costs for the mission 

modules would be about $18 billion. Both of these estimates were 

calculated in fiscal year 2010 dollars.26 However, as we reported in 

September 2013, the seaframe estimate is at the 10 percent confidence 

level, meaning that there is 90 percent chance that costs will be higher 

than this estimate.27

 24We recently reported that more-comprehensive and more-complete cost data can help 

the Department of Defense improve the cost-effectiveness of sustaining weapons 

systems. GAO, 2014 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, 

Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits,

We reported that those estimates were at a low level 

GAO-14-343SP

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2014). 

25According to the Navy, the exact deployment date of the Independence variant is 

classified, but it is notionally planned to deploy before 2017. Navy officials said that an 

extended mine countermeasures mission-package test period is planned for the USS 

Independence in 2014 in the Gulf of Mexico near Florida, which will likely allow the Navy 

to update some cost data associated with that variant.

26See LCS Seaframe Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate (2011) and the LCS Mission 

Module Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate (2013). A Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate 

document provides a detailed explanation of the program’s cost components including 

research, development, test, and evaluation cost, along with operations and support costs, 

such as maintenance and system improvement, among others. Aircraft accompany LCS 

and commonly accompany other Navy surface vessels, but their operations and 

sustainment are funded through the Naval Air Systems Command rather than being 

included in the ships’ operations and support costs. 

27The confidence level is an output of the statistical risk analysis of the parameters and 

assumptions used to build the point estimate. Cost-estimating experts agree that a 

confidence level of between 55 percent and 65 percent is desired to set a program’s 

budget, recognizing that the tendency is for costs to overrun in a program’s early phases.

LCS Life-Cycle Cost 

Estimates Contain 

Uncertainty
Page 22 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

of confidence due to overall lack of operational data on both LCS 

seaframes and operating concepts that are unique among the surface 

fleet. In lieu of actual LCS data, the Navy used operations and support 

data from other surface ships, such as frigates, and modified them to 

approximate LCS characteristics (referred to by the Navy as modified 

analogous data) to build the LCS cost estimate. For example, 

maintenance cost estimates were calculated by modifying analogous data 

from frigates and destroyers, among other ships, even though the 

maintenance concepts for these ships differ from those for the LCS.28

Moreover, since the time when the Navy developed the seaframe 

estimate in 2011, it has made several programmatic changes to LCS 

concepts that will increase the overall cost to operate and sustain the ship 

class.29

• The number of shore personnel to support the ship has more than 

tripled—from 271 to 862—since the estimate was developed in 2011, 

as support requirements have become better understood.

For example:

• The Navy has increased the total number of core crew members 

onboard each ship from 40 to 50 in order to better address workload 

and watch-standing requirements.30

As the Navy continues to better understand the work requirements 

associated with the ship class, the required numbers of shore support and 

ship crew have risen. Navy officials explained that such changes are 

necessary for the success of the program and acknowledged that those 

changes would increase the overall costs of the LCS and should be 

included in future LCS life-cycle cost estimates.

 28The LCS Seaframe Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate (2011) provided estimates for all 

levels of maintenance—organizational, intermediate, and depot—for both variants. 

29Operations and support costs traditionally account for about 70 percent of the total cost 

over a system’s lifetime.

30The Navy increased the core crew size from 40 to 50 for USS Freedom’s deployment to 

Singapore, and this number is now the class standard across both variants. Additionally, 

Freedom deployed with three ensigns as part of a pilot program seeking to increase the 

junior officer ranks within the LCS community, and officials said the Navy intends on 

continuing and expanding this program to attach four ensigns to each LCS crew.
Page 23 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

From the outset of the program, the Navy has described the LCS as a 

low-cost alternative to other ships in the surface fleet, yet the available 

data indicate that the per year, per ship life-cycle costs are nearing or 

may exceed those of other surface ships, including multimission ships 

with greater size and larger crews. The LCS consists of two distinct 

parts—the ship itself (seaframe) and the interchangeable mission 

modules it is expected to carry and deploy. These mission modules 

consist of various unmanned systems, sensors, and weapons that 

provide different combat capabilities for the ship’s three principal 

missions. Many LCS cost estimates only refer to the acquisition cost of 

individual seaframes rather than the total life-cycle cost of the seaframe 

and mission modules. The operations and support costs for the LCS 

seaframe that are included in the life-cycle cost estimates are 

significant—due in part to unique LCS operational concepts—while the 

LCS mission modules that provide each ship with operational capability 

account for a significant component of the costs for the ship class. As we 

noted above, the cost estimates for both the seaframe and the mission 

modules contain uncertainty; however, we believe that when combined 

they provide the best available estimate to date of the overall life-cycle 

costs for the LCS program. Moreover, because the Navy has 

acknowledged it has made several programmatic changes to LCS 

concepts that will increase the overall costs to operate and sustain the 

ship class, it is likely that the per ship, per year life-cycle costs for the 

program will be higher than this current estimate.31

We analyzed the Navy’s life-cycle cost estimates for LCS seaframes 

(2011) and mission modules (2013), which the Navy adjusted for inflation 

to fiscal year 2014 dollars, and used updated Navy life-cycle cost 

estimates provided in April 2014 by Naval Sea Systems Command for 

patrol coastal ships, mine countermeasures ships, frigates, destroyers, 

and cruisers.32

 31While the Navy told us that material selection changes may increase the reliability of 

select systems and therefore decrease short-term emergent repair costs, the effects of 

these changes on long-term operations and support costs is unknown. 

These ships were selected for comparison because they 

32In 2010, the Congressional Budget Office completed a similar and preliminary study of 

LCS life-cycle costs and compared them to the costs of other ship classes in the surface 

fleet. This analysis provided us with a framework by which to conduct further analysis 

using additional and updated data for the LCS, its mission modules, and other surface 

ship classes. For additional information see Congressional Budget Office, Life-Cycle 

Costs of Selected Navy Ships.

LCS Costs May Be 

Approaching Those

of Other Surface Ships 

with Larger Crews
Page 24 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

have been in the surface fleet for decades and historical cost data are 

readily available, and they all conduct at least one mission that the LCS is 

also expected to perform. We calculated the life-cycle costs on a per ship 

annualized basis to account for differences in the number of ships and 

expected service life of each class. As shown in figure 5, we found that 

per ship life-cycle costs per year for the LCS program are nearing or may 

exceed those for other surface ships, including guided-missile frigates 

and multimission destroyers.

We are providing a descriptive comparison of annual life-cycle costs per 

ship using available data and are not assessing the relative benefits and 

capabilities of these various ship classes. Navy officials point out that the 

below estimates may not include the full costs of developing, 

modernizing, and sustaining software and combat systems installed on 

the surface ships we use for comparative purposes (e.g., Aegis ballistic 

missile defense system used on cruisers and destroyers). Additionally, 

officials stated that the acquisition costs presented are not to be 

interpreted as replacement costs since a replacement value for the 

specific ship would have to take into account changes in productivity, 

design specifications, and legislative and contracting environments. 

Despite the inherent difficulties associated with comparing the life-cycle 

costs of various surface ships with differing capabilities and mission sets, 

and at different points in their respective service lives, we believe this 

analysis is useful because it provides a framework for comparing the lifecycle cost estimates of various surface ships on a per ship, per year 

basis, thereby accounting for variations in expected service life and the 

number of ships. For an overview of the surface ships used in figure 5, 

including their missions and crew sizes, see appendix IV. We used the 

Navy’s expected ship service lives of record, although the Navy has made 

decisions to retire vessels before they’ve reached their expected service 

lives in some instances and has extended the service lives of other 

vessels, such as destroyers.33

 33See GAO, Military Capabilities: Navy Should Reevaluate Its Plan to Decommission the 

USS Port Royal,

For LCS seaframes, the Navy used a 25-

year expected service life to calculate life-cycle costs, which is an 

average of the 20-year service-life threshold and 30-year service-life 

objective outlined in key performance parameters.

GAO-14-336 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2014). 
Page 25 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Figure 5: Life-Cycle Cost Estimates of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Various Navy Surface Ships in Constant Fiscal Year 

2014 Dollars

Notes: Numbers may not add due to rounding. Life-cycle cost estimates for patrol coastal ships, mine 

countermeasures ships, frigates, destroyers, and cruisers were calculated by Naval Sea Systems 

Command in April 2014 in fiscal year 2014 constant dollars. For these ship classes, research and 

development costs are derived from class Selected Acquisition Reports. Procurement costs are 

derived from the Naval Sea Systems Command Historical Cost of Ships database. Multiyear historical 

averages for operations and support costs are derived from the Navy Visibility and Management of 

Operating and Support Costs database. As of April 2014, the Navy reduced its planned number of 

LCSs to 32 from an original requirement of 55 ships. The Navy created its Program Life Cycle Cost 

Estimate in 2011 based on the original requirement of 55 ships and has not updated this document to 

reflect the Navy’s plan for 32 LCSs. We did not independently validate the underlying data for the 

Navy’s estimates.

a

LCS seaframe life-cycle cost estimates are based on the purchase of 55 seaframes. The seaframe 

cost estimates are calculated in fiscal year 2010 constant dollars, and Naval Sea Systems Command 

adjusted them for inflation to fiscal year 2014 constant dollars using the appropriate Navy inflation 

factors in April 2014 for the purposes of this table. The seaframe estimate is at the 10 percent 

confidence level meaning there is a 90 percent chance that the costs will be higher than this estimate.

b

LCS mission-module life-cycle cost estimates are based on the purchase of 64 mission modules. 

The mission-module cost estimates are calculated in fiscal year 2010 constant dollars, and Naval Sea 

Systems Command adjusted them for inflation to fiscal year 2014 constant dollars using the 

appropriate Navy inflation factors in April 2014 for the purposes of this table. The mission-module 

estimate is at the 50 percent confidence level. 

c

The patrol costal class acquisition strategy was a nondevelopmental item. The United States bought 

the design specification from Vosper-Thornycraft, with Bollinger Shipyards (Lockport, Louisiana) 

designated as the U.S. Licensee. Therefore, there is no research and development cost for the patrol 

coastal class.

d

Other includes costs of disposal and, for LCS mission modules, the costs of technology replacement 

and upgrades. Naval Sea Systems Command noted that end-of-service-life disposition is variable; 

ships in some classes are sold to other countries; current market conditions support disposal on a 
Page 26 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

“sales basis,” yielding revenue for the United States. Therefore, no disposal costs are shown for the 

other surface ship classes.

e

We calculated the life-cycle costs on a per ship annualized basis to account for different ship 

numbers and expected ship service lives.

Although the LCS has been identified by the Navy as a low-cost 

alternative to other surface ship classes, the available data indicate that 

the costs of the LCS may exceed or closely align with the costs of other 

multimission surface ships with larger crews. Without comprehensive lifecycle cost estimates, the Navy may be hindered in its ability to evaluate 

the merits of investing in LCS ships compared with other alternatives, 

conduct long-term budgetary planning, or determine the level of 

resources required to implement the program in accordance with the LCS 

concept of operations.

In 2013, we recommended that the Navy collect actual operational data 

on the Independence variant and update operations and support cost 

estimates for both variants prior to contracting for additional LCS ships in 

2016. Our work shows that the Navy still lacks operational data and that 

life-cycle cost estimates are still not comprehensive. We continue to 

believe that the Navy should have greater clarity on the performance of its 

operational concepts and greater confidence in its cost estimates before it 

enters into contracts for additional LCS ships.

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) noted it is concerned with the conclusions drawn from the analysis 

of life-cycle cost data across ship classes. DOD added that due to known 

gaps in existing ship class cost data, the available data do not allow for 

an accurate comparison of the life cycle costs among LCS and other 

existing surface ship classes. DOD’s comments are summarized below 

and reprinted in their entirety in appendix V. DOD also provided technical 

comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.

In its comments, DOD noted differences in the scope of cost data across 

the ship classes and differences in life-cycle phases among the ship 

classes included in our life-cycle cost analysis. For example, DOD

commented that there are gaps in the Navy’s record keeping for 

operations and support costs, so that some potential costs may not be 

captured in the estimates the Navy provided us, such as system 

modernization, software maintenance, and program startup, which could 

understate the costs of the other surface ships. However, these data are 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 27 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

the most comprehensive operations and support cost data that the Navy 

could provide us. As we noted in the report, the Navy also has used these 

data from other surface ship classes to build its LCS life-cycle cost 

estimates. Moreover, we discussed in the report the known limitations to 

comparing the life-cycle costs of these ship classes, including that the 

estimates may not include the full costs of developing, modernizing, and 

sustaining software and combat systems installed on the ships, as well as 

past acquisition costs not aligning with what current production costs 

would be, and the ships being at different points in their service lives. 

Despite the known limitations, we believe our analysis uses the best 

available data to provide a reasonable comparison of the life-cycle costs 

across the ship classes. Consequently, we have made no revisions to the 

report, as suggested by DOD. 

Finally, DOD provided us with additional information to clarify that the 

Navy’s mission-module program life-cycle cost estimate is at the 50 

percent confidence level. We verified this information and updated the 

report to include this confidence level. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy. In 

addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-3489 or at pendletonj@gao.gov.

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to 

this report are listed in appendix VI.

John H. Pendleton

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 28 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 29 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

To address the benefits and limitations of the operational data that have 

been collected on Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), we analyzed and 

compared the planned USS Freedom deployment schedule with the 

actual executed schedule. We reviewed documentation related to 

operational activities while deployed including execution orders, concepts 

of operations such as the 7th Fleet USS Freedom deployment concept of 

operations, and exercise briefings. We also analyzed operational data 

from the deployment, including readiness data and equipment casualty 

reports. We interviewed forward-deployed crew members in Singapore as 

well as Navy officials responsible for the ship’s operational employment at 

7th Fleet in Japan to discuss the successes and challenges of the 

deployment, including any limitations. Further, we analyzed the 

operational activities of USS Independence and interviewed Navy officials 

to determine what operational data has been collected on Independence

variant ships. Finally, we reviewed and analyzed the LCS wholeness and 

warfighting concepts of operations to determine any additional LCS 

operational and warfighting concepts that still require demonstration.1

To assess the extent to which the Navy has evaluated risk in its 

operational support and sustainment concepts for the LCS in the areas of 

manning, training, maintenance, and logistics, we reviewed relevant datacollection and analysis plans and mid-point and final reports on the 

Freedom deployment to Singapore in 2013 from Commander Naval 

Surface Forces Pacific, 7th Fleet, and the Center for Naval Analyses, and 

we interviewed officials from organizations responsible for collecting and 

analyzing data from this deployment. We reviewed the LCS wholeness 

concept of operations, the life-cycle sustainment plans for the LCS, LCS 

manpower estimate report, LCS training plans, and various other Navy 

documents associated with LCS manning, training, maintenance, and 

logistics, and interviewed USS Freedom crews who participated in the 

2013 deployment, to obtain their perspectives on the implementation of 

these concepts. We also reviewed the extent to which the Navy has 

analyzed the costs and benefits associated with the use of contractor 

flyaway maintenance teams. Finally, we discussed with LCS program 

office officials and other LCS stakeholders any actions that were being 

taken to analyze potential risks or mitigate them for future LCS 

deployments.

 1

U.S. Fleet Forces Command, LCS Platform Wholeness Concept of Operations Revision 

D (Jan. 9, 2013) and classified warfighting concept of operations.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 30 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

To assess how LCS life-cycle cost estimates compare with those for other 

surface-ship classes, we modified a framework used in an earlier and 

similar comparison conducted by the Congressional Budget Office.2

 2

In 2010, the Congressional Budget Office completed a preliminary study of LCS life-cycle 

costs and compared them to the costs of other ship classes in the surface fleet. This 

analysis included Navy data on operations and support costs for mine countermeasures 

ships, frigates, destroyers, and cruisers and other life-cycle costs components, and 

compared those costs to projections for each LCS seaframe variant—excluding mission 

modules. The analysis provided an early glimpse into the seaframe costs of the LCS 

program and provides a useful framework by which to conduct further analysis using 

additional and updated data for the LCS, its mission modules, and other surface-ship 

classes. See Congressional Budget Office, Life-Cycle Costs of Selected Navy Ships (Apr. 

28, 2010).

To 

do this, we reviewed cost estimates in the current LCS Seaframe 

Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate (2011) and the LCS Mission Module 

Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate (2013), both prepared by the costestimating division of the Naval Sea Systems Command, and determined 

that these are the latest estimates available from the Navy. Although the 

Navy to date has not updated these life-cycle cost estimates (which were 

estimated using fiscal year 2010 dollars) to reflect changes in the 

program or the number of ships to be purchased, the Navy adjusted the 

estimates for inflation to fiscal year 2014 dollars. Using these data, we 

calculated an annual per ship life-cycle cost estimate for the combined 

LCS seaframes and mission modules to account for differences in the 

number of ships and mission modules and their respective expected 

service lives. We also obtained life-cycle cost data in fiscal year 2014 

dollars from the Navy for five surface ships (patrol coastal ships, mine 

countermeasures ships, frigates, destroyers, and cruisers) and used 

these data to calculate an annual per-ship life-cycle cost estimate for 

each of these five surface ships so as to account for differences in the 

number of ships and their expected service lives. We then compared 

these data with the annual per ship life-cycle cost data we calculated for 

the LCS seaframes and mission modules. We analyzed and assessed 

these data and found them to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

reporting the estimated life-cycle costs of these surface ships. The five 

non-LCS surface ships we used for our comparison were selected 

because historical cost data were readily available and they all conduct at 

least one mission that the LCS is also expected to perform. Further, we 

interviewed Navy LCS program officials and cost estimating officials to 

determine the extent to which data from the USS Freedom deployment in 

2013 may be used to refine future life-cycle cost estimates.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 31 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

We interviewed officials, and where appropriate obtained documentation, 

at the following locations:

Department of the Navy

• Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

• Naval Sea Systems Command

• Program Executive Office Littoral Combat Ship, Fleet Introduction 

Office

• Cost-Estimating Division

• Program Executive Office, Ships

• U.S. Fleet Forces Command

• Naval Warfare Development Command

• Navy Manpower Analysis Center

• Southwest Regional Maintenance Center

• LCS Class Squadron

• Operations

• Training

• Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

• Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

• Naval Supply Systems Command

• U.S. 7th Fleet

• Operations

• Logistics

• Warfare requirements

• Training and exercises

• U.S. Pacific Fleet

• Commander, Logistics Force Western Pacific

• Maintenance

• Logistics

• Commander, Destroyer Squadron Seven

• Navy Region Center, Singapore
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 32 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

• LCS Class Squadron Forward Liaison Element

Other Organizations

• Congressional Budget Office

• Center for Naval Analyses

We conducted group discussions with USS Freedom blue and gold crew 

officer and enlisted personnel who participated in the 2013 Singapore 

deployment. The discussions involved small-group meetings designed to 

gain more in-depth information about specific issues that cannot easily be 

obtained from single or serial interviews. Our design included multiple 

groups with varying characteristics but some homogeneity—such as rank 

and responsibility—within groups. For example, with few exceptions we 

met with officers separately from enlisted personnel and we met 

separately with personnel from each major ship department such as 

engineering, combat systems, and operations. Most groups involved 

three to five participants. Participants were selected based on their 

availability by USS Freedom commanding and executive officers in 

Singapore and the LCS Class Squadron in San Diego to ensure we had 

at least three members from each major ship function. Discussions were 

held in a semistructured manner using a broad list of discussion topics to 

encourage participants to share their thoughts and experiences related to 

the crew-swap experience, crew integration, maintenance, systems 

reliability, training, logistics support, quality of life, and overall satisfaction 

with the LCS experience. We assured participants that we would not link 

their names to their responses.

To gain a broad perspective of crew experience during the USS Freedom

deployment, we conducted 17 small-group sessions with USS Freedom

officers and enlisted personnel across all ship departments. Table 4

provides a summary of the composition of the group discussions held by 

GAO analysts in Singapore (during deployment) and in San Diego 

(postdeployment). All discussions were held aboard USS Freedom.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 33 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Table 4: Summary of USS Freedom Crew Discussion Groups 

USS Freedom department Blue crew Gold crew

Operations ● ○ ○

Engineering ● ○ ○

Combat systems ● ○ ○

Supply ○ ○

Surface-warfare mission module ● ○ ○

Department heads ○

Junior officers ○

Commanding officer and executive officer ● ○ ○

Legend:

● During deployment

○ Postdeployment

Source: GAO. | GAO-14-447

Note: For two discussion groups, we combined Freedom blue and gold crew supply department and 

mission-module personnel, respectively, for logistical purposes.

Our group discussions were not designed to (1) demonstrate the extent of 

a problem or to generalize results to the entire USS Freedom crew 

population or to other LCS variants, (2) develop a consensus to arrive at 

an agreed-upon plan or make decisions about what actions to take, or (3) 

provide statistically representative samples or reliable quantitative 

estimates. Instead, they were intended to generate in-depth information 

about the discussion group participants’ attitudes and reasons for their 

attitudes toward specific topics and to offer insights into the range of 

concerns and support for an issue. The generalizability of the information 

produced by our discussion groups is limited for several reasons. First, 

the information represents the responses of USS Freedom officers and 

enlisted personnel from the 17 groups described above. Second, while 

the composition of the groups was designed to assure a distribution of 

Navy officers, enlisted personnel, seniority, and ship departments, the 

group participants were not probabilistically sampled. Third, participants 

were asked questions about their specific experiences on the Singapore 

deployment. The experiences of other USS Freedom personnel who did 

not participate in our group discussions may have varied. Because of 

these limitations, we did not rely entirely on group discussions, but rather 

used several different methodologies to corroborate and support our 

conclusions.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 34 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

We conducted this performance audit from September 2013 to July 2014 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Littoral Combat Ship Plan of 

Action and Milestones, as of March 2014

Page 35 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

In 2012, the Chief of Naval Operations received the results of four internal 

studies he requested to assess, among other things, the Littoral Combat 

Ship (LCS) across aspects of manning, training, and maintenance to 

assist in preparing the USS Freedom for deployment in March 2013. Two 

of the four studies were independent Navy studies—one conducted by 

the Board of Inspection and Survey (the Navy’s ship-inspection entity) 

and one conducted by the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. These 

two studies identified concerns with, among other things, LCS manning, 

training, and maintenance, and recommended steps to improve aspects 

of the program. The other two studies were two war game reports, which 

identified findings and made recommendations on LCS operations and 

sustainment. All four of these reports identified numerous operational 

support and sustainment issues, such as insufficient manning of ships 

leading to crew fatigue, inadequate training of crews, incomplete 

maintenance plans, and insufficient shore support, and culminated in 

about 170 recommendations for improvement.

The LCS Council developed a Plan of Action and Milestones document 

as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations to address the findings and 

recommendations from the four internal Navy reports. The Plan of Action 

and Milestones is organized around lines of operation (e.g., fleet 

introduction and sustainability, platform and capabilities evolution, and 

developing and aligning concept of operations and other documentation) 

and has over 1,000 action items and milestones—many directly 

addressing operational support and sustainment issues. Each of the lines 

of operation has subordinate action items, with a stakeholder assigned 

responsibility for each action item, and both a start date and expected 

finish date for the tasking. Table 5 below provides an update on the 

number of discrete (nonrecurring) subtasks that the Navy has completed 

as of March 2014.

Appendix II: Littoral Combat Ship Plan of 

Action and Milestones, as of March 2014
Appendix II: Littoral Combat Ship Plan of 

Action and Milestones, as of March 2014

Page 36 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Table 5: Status of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Plan of Action and Milestones Action Items as of March 2014

Line of operation

Fleet introduction and 

sustainment 

Platform and capabilities 

evolution 

Concept of operations, 

doctrine, and policy

Lead stakeholder

Commander, Naval Surface 

Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations, Surface Warfare 

Directorate U.S. Fleet Forces Command

Number of nonrecurring action 

items

261 168 70

Scheduled completion dates for 

all action items

9/2018 9/2018 11/2017

Nonrecurring action items 

completed by March 25, 2014

171 91 34

Percentage of nonrecurring 

action items completed as of

March 25, 2014

66% 54% 49%

Number of nonrecurring action 

items overdue

9 5 0

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data. | GAO-14-447
Appendix III: Remaining Risks in Implementing 

Littoral Combat Ship Operational Support and 

Sustainment Concepts

Page 37 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

The Navy is adjusting some operational support and sustainment 

concepts based on data collected and lessons learned during the USS 

Freedom deployment, but it has not yet addressed some risks that remain 

in executing and sustaining key manning, training, maintenance, and 

logistics concepts.

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) manning concept calls for a relatively 

small crew to operate the ship. The minimal crew size drives many of the 

other LCS concepts, since LCS sailors are expected to spend most of 

their time operating the ship rather than performing training, maintenance, 

or administrative functions. The last revision of the LCS wholeness 

concept of operations, approved in January 2013, called for a core crew 

size of 40 and mission-module crews of 15 to 19 sailors.1 The maximum 

number of core crew members allowed by LCS key performance 

parameters is 50.2

 1

The core crew operates the LCS seaframe, with sailors organized into four departments: 

combat systems, engineering, operations, and supply, overseen by the ship’s 

commanding and executive officers. A separate crew operates the mission module

deployed with the seaframe, in addition to the aviation detachment crew responsible for 

the MH-60 helicopter and vertical takeoff unmanned aerial vehicles that are part of each 

LCS mission package. 

To add berthing spaces for additional crew members 

beyond 50, the ships would require significant design changes. A number 

of internal Navy reports issued in 2012 raised concerns about the 

adequacy of a 40-member core crew size, with crew fatigue and overwork 

2

Key performance parameters are system characteristics that are considered critical or 

essential to the development of an effective military capability. Failure of a system to meet 

a validated key performance parameter threshold brings the military utility of the 

associated systems into question, and may result in a reevaluation of the program or 

modification to production increments. The Navy established these LCS manning 

parameters in 2003. 

Appendix III: Remaining Risks in 

Implementing Littoral Combat Ship 

Operational Support and Sustainment 

Concepts

Manning Risks and 

Navy Actions to 

Address Them
Appendix III: Remaining Risks in Implementing 

Littoral Combat Ship Operational Support and 

Sustainment Concepts

Page 38 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

as potential negative effects of this manning concept.3 In response to 

these concerns, the Navy added 10 sailors to the USS Freedom core 

crew deploying to Singapore as part of a pilot program. Navy leadership 

determined early in the deployment that these additional crew members 

were helpful in performing maintenance and watch-standing duties, and 

decided to permanently increase LCS core crews to 50 sailors. The Navy 

also added three ensigns to the Freedom crews prior to deployment, and 

intends on continuing and expanding this program to attach four ensigns 

to each LCS crew.4

Despite the addition of 10 sailors to the core crew and contractor support, 

data collected from the Freedom’s deployment show that sailors’ sleep 

hours did not increase compared to the sleep hours reported in studies 

that examined LCS with 40-member crews; this suggests that the Navy 

has not fully addressed crew fatigue issues by increasing crew size.

In addition to the core and mission-module crews, 

contractors were also onboard during the course of the deployment to 

assist with equipment troubleshooting and repair.

5

 3

Two of the studies were independent Navy studies—one conducted by the Board of 

Inspection and Survey (the Navy’s ship-inspection entity) and one conducted by the office 

of the Chief of Naval Operations. These two studies identified concerns with, among other 

things, LCS manning, training, and maintenance, and recommended steps to improve 

aspects of the program. Two other studies were war game reports, which identified 

findings and made recommendations on LCS operations and sustainment. All four of 

these reports identified numerous operational support and sustainment issues, such as 

insufficient manning of ships leading to crew fatigue, inadequate training of crews, 

incomplete maintenance plans, and insufficient shore support, and culminated in about 

170 recommendations for improvement. In September 2013, we issued a For Official Use 

Only report that assessed the extent to which the Navy addressed these 

recommendations. 

Specifically, the Center for Naval Analyses found that Freedom crews 

averaged about 6 hours of sleep per day compared to the Navy standard 

of 8 hours; some key departments, such as engineering and operations, 

averaged even fewer. While Navy officials told us that sailors do not 

realistically expect 8 hours of sleep while they are under way and may 

choose to have more down time rather than sleep, the LCS must adhere 

to Navy manpower standards, including those for crewmember fatigue 

4

Ensign is the junior commissioned officer rank in the United States Navy. Navy officials 

explained that the ensign program will be helpful in building an officer corps for this 

relatively new ship class.

5

The Center for Naval Analyses compared both crews’ sleep hours during the deployment 

against those collected during a 2010 sleep study and Rough Water Trials conducted in 

2011. 
Appendix III: Remaining Risks in Implementing 

Littoral Combat Ship Operational Support and 

Sustainment Concepts

Page 39 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

levels and workload hours found in Navy standard workweeks. These 

standards are set to minimize potential adverse effects on morale, 

retention, and safety.6

Additionally, we found that core crews depended heavily on sailors from 

the surface warfare mission-module crew to perform watch standing, 

training drills, and engineering maintenance over the course of the 

deployment. This is a departure from what was envisioned in the concept 

of operations, and creates a situation that may not be sustainable under a 

different pace of operations or with a different mission module deployed. 

Officers and enlisted sailors from both core and mission-module crews 

told us that mission-module sailors were heavily leveraged to help 

complete core crew functions and that the crews were fully integrated. 

The crews added that the surface warfare mission module is uniquely 

qualified to help with core crew functions, since these sailors’ billet 

structure—their mix of skills and expertise—completely aligns with that of 

the core crew. For example, there are engineers in the surface-warfare 

mission-module crew to operate and maintain the motors on the module’s 

rigid-hull inflatable boats. Since these boats are not part of the 

antisubmarine warfare mission modules, there are no engineers in those 

crews. Sailors from the core crews’ engineering department told us they 

depended on the qualified mission-module engineers to assist them and 

were at a loss as to how the engineering department would function 

effectively if deployed with the other mission modules. Figure 6 shows the 

extent of overlap between the core crew billets and the three missionmodule crew billets.

Crew members told us that their sleep hours 

decreased significantly during major equipment casualties, particularly 

those affecting the ship’s diesel generators and other engineering 

systems. Navy officials said that follow-on ships have been outfitted with 

different systems that are supposed to be more reliable than those on 

Freedom, which should decrease the amount of corrective maintenance 

required, and thereby decrease crew fatigue on future deployments. 

However, as previously discussed, these systems have not been fully 

tested or operated on the LCS, and their reliability has yet to be proven by 

actual experience.

 6

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 1000.16K Change Transmittal 1, Navy 

Total Force Manpower Policies Procedures, Encl. 1, App. C., paras. 1.b. and 4.a. (Oct. 4, 

2011).
Appendix III: Remaining Risks in Implementing 

Littoral Combat Ship Operational Support and 

Sustainment Concepts

Page 40 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Figure 6: Extent of Overlap in Billets between Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Core Crew 

and Mission-Module Crews

a

The Navy has increased the core crew from 40 to 50, but it is still determining the billet structure for 

the 10 additional sailors.
Appendix III: Remaining Risks in Implementing 

Littoral Combat Ship Operational Support and 

Sustainment Concepts

Page 41 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Core crews also relied heavily on support from the maintenance 

contractors embarked during the course of the deployment.7

The Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) is in the ongoing 

process of analyzing the workload of USS Freedom’s core and surfacewarfare mission-module crews.

Program 

officials and crew members cited these contractors’ expertise with 

engineering systems and said they were of great assistance, essentially 

becoming additional highly experienced engineers always on watch in the 

engineering space. Engineering department crew members told us that 

the ship would not have gotten under way if not for these contractors. 

Program officials do not yet know whether contractors will always be 

embarked during future LCS deployments, but they said that the Navy 

utilizes contractors on other surface combatants when they are deployed 

and underway. Navy officials noted that USS Fort Worth, deploying in late 

2014, will have two contractor personnel onboard.

8

 7

As many as six contractors were aboard USS Freedom during its transit from San Diego 

to Singapore with a minimum of two contractors onboard at any given time.

The Navy expects the analysis to be 

complete by February 2015, and it will establish the manning requirement 

for Freedom variant core crews and surface-warfare mission-module 

crews. NAVMAC’s analysis produces a Ship Manpower Document, which 

establishes the required number and composition of personnel on the 

ship. The ship manpower document is developed by analyzing the ship’s 

required operational capabilities, projected operational environment, and 

concept of operations as a starting point and building an independent 

assessment of the required number and composition of the crews, based 

on Navy standards and observations of operations. However, the 

NAVMAC analysis uses as its baseline LCS program concepts that 

delineate work between independent and separately operating core and 

mission-module crews, so it does not account for the significant 

leveraging of mission-module crew or for embarked contractors to 

perform core crew functions. Additionally, the analysis may not fully 

account for some additional work that crews are performing that is not 

included in the concept of operations, like training while under way. 

NAVMAC officials said that they collaborate with program offices and type 

commanders early in a ship’s acquisition phases so that initial crew 

projections and manning concepts are feasible and realistic, but they said 

8

NAVMAC leads the manpower requirements-determination process, which identifies 

multiyear manpower requirements to support the budgeting process.
Appendix III: Remaining Risks in Implementing 

Littoral Combat Ship Operational Support and 

Sustainment Concepts

Page 42 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

that they expect some changes to the LCS manning structure based on 

their initial observations.

Manpower requirements for the other variant and mission modules have 

not yet been validated. A similar study to determine the requirements for 

Independence variant crews is scheduled to begin in 2016. Since the 

mine countermeasures and antisubmarine warfare mission modules are 

still being developed, validation of their crews has not been scheduled. 

Without validating the optimal crew size and billet structure for all LCS 

crews and without accounting for the full scope and distribution of work 

performed by sailors across all ship departments, the Navy risks that crew 

fatigue will exceed Navy standards and could negatively affect crew 

members’ performance as well as morale, retention, safety, and ultimately 

the operational readiness of the ship class.

The LCS training concept calls for sailors to report to a core or missionmodule crew qualified to stand watch and carry out their other duties. 

Most LCS training is conducted off the ship in a classroom or simulator 

setting as operational demands do not allow sufficient time for training 

during operational periods. Crews are expected to be fully trained 

(qualified and certified) prior to deployment, and there is no training 

department embedded within the crew and no training required while 

under way.9

During discussions with Freedom crews, we found that not all sailors had 

completed training prior to deploying to Singapore. The 10 sailors added 

to the crew as part of the “plus-up” pilot program were identified in the 

months leading up to the March 2013 deployment date and did not 

undergo LCS-specific training or complete their qualifications prior to 

deploying. Some of these 10 additional crew members were junior sailors 

and told us they had limited sailing experience but were ultimately able to 

earn their qualifications over the course of the deployment. Moreexperienced core crew members who completed LCS training were in 

 9

Train-to-qualify is the process of training an individual in an off-ship environment in the 

knowledge, skills, and abilities required to competently perform tasks associated with a 

designated ship-board watch station or position. Train-to-certify is the advanced training 

for a team once qualification has been achieved by individuals. It is achieved through 

demonstrated proficiency in operating equipment and completing scenarios as a team, 

and also relies heavily on shore-based training.

Training Risks and 

Navy Actions to 

Address Them
Appendix III: Remaining Risks in Implementing 

Littoral Combat Ship Operational Support and 

Sustainment Concepts

Page 43 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

part responsible for instructing and training these additional 10 sailors, a 

collateral duty not accounted for within the standard LCS workday or 

envisioned in the LCS concept of operations. The Navy is in the process 

of reviewing and defining training needed for the 10 additional sailors, but 

since the training pipeline for LCS service can take about 2 years to 

complete, the Navy risks repeating this situation on upcoming 

deployments.10

While the Navy is reviewing training for the late-addition ensigns and the 

10 “plus-up” sailors, it considers the training process to have been 

validated by the Freedom deployment, since no major training omissions 

or deficiencies were identified. However, we found that in addition to the 

10 “plus-up” sailors not receiving all training prior to deployment, sailors 

from the original 40-person crews were training over the course of the 

deployment as well. The Center for Naval Analyses found that more than 

half of the qualification and instructed training that occurred during the 

deployment was for the original core crews, not the crew plus-ups. The 

Center for Naval Analyses added that sailors will train no matter what—at 

times out of necessity but also to maintain proficiency and in support of 

career development and well-being—and that time must be made 

available for training during deployments. The Center for Naval Analyses 

calculated the average amount of training conducted by all crew members 

over the course of the deployment to be about an hour a day. However, 

this hour is unaccounted for in the Navy’s expected LCS workday and 

detracts from the time a sailor could otherwise be resting or performing 

other collateral duties. The most common reasons for performing training, 

drills, and underway instruction while deployed were to cover training that 

was not provided prior to the deployment or to maintain proficiency. LCS 

program officials explained that much of this training was planned to be

conducted during the deployment, and that underway training will likely 

continue until the new curriculum is fully implemented over the next 

several years. However, requiring LCS sailors to train while deployed was 

not envisioned in the LCS wholeness concept of operations, and it can 

exacerbate crew fatigue levels and negatively affect performance, morale, 

retention, safety, and the operational readiness of the ship.

 10In February 2010, we reported that the Navy faced risks in its ability to identify and 

assign LCS personnel given the time needed to achieve the extensive training required. 

See GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates 

and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts, GAO-10-257 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 

2, 2010).
Appendix III: Remaining Risks in Implementing 

Littoral Combat Ship Operational Support and 

Sustainment Concepts

Page 44 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

In addition to sailors not being fully trained prior to deployment, we heard 

concerns about the quality of the training the sailors received. The Navy 

is aware of this and is investing heavily in virtual reality–based training 

simulations and a curriculum to prepare sailors for LCS service as 

envisioned in the concept of operations. Specifically, the Navy has 

budgeted for construction of another LCS training facility in Mayport, 

Florida, and awarded several contracts valued up to $300 million to 

develop training simulations. While the final LCS training infrastructure is 

being developed, the program is training sailors through a combination of 

classroom instruction, vendor training (whereby contractors or originalequipment manufacturers train sailors on how to operate certain 

equipment), shore-based trainers, and very limited on-hull “school ship 

periods” to complete the qualification and certification process. Enlisted 

sailors from both core crews across ship departments expressed general 

dissatisfaction with the LCS training they received prior to the 

deployment. Some cited the obsolescence of vendor training and the 

limited utility of the 3-week LCS Academy in preparing them to serve on 

the LCS, and others stated that insufficient training left them ill-prepared 

to deal with contingencies on the deployment. Freedom officers said that 

it will take time for training to adapt to the needs of LCS sailors, but that it 

would make sense to cut the training that is not proving useful to LCS 

sailors in the short term until a more-tailored curriculum is developed. 

Navy training officials told us that they are aware of some of the quality 

issues with the current training and are attempting to make reasonable 

improvements that are cost-effective, but they pointed out that this interim 

training will be phased out over the next several years. While the program

seeks to have useful and applicable training available for sailors 

progressing through the training pipeline now, the officials added that it 

would not be prudent to make major investments to overhaul temporary 

training.

Navy officials told us that they are in the process of reviewing a revised 

LCS training plan that should be released in 2014. The training plan will 

lay out the schedule and process for replacing current training with the 

new simulations being developed. While this plan was not released early 

enough for inclusion in our review, earlier versions of LCS training plans 

did not include measures of effectiveness or training effectivenessevaluation plans. In light of crew feedback on the inadequacy of current 

training, and unless the Navy acts on this feedback and builds 

effectiveness measures into its new training plan, it risks making 

significant investments to develop training that will not meet LCS sailors’ 

training needs. Additionally, the Navy risks deploying LCS crews that are 

not properly qualified and certified, which in turn could negatively affect 
Appendix III: Remaining Risks in Implementing 

Littoral Combat Ship Operational Support and 

Sustainment Concepts

Page 45 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

the crews’ ability to operate and maintain the ship and perform warfighting 

duties as expected.

Because of the relatively small size of LCS crews, the maintenance 

concept calls for contractors to perform most preventative maintenance 

during regularly scheduled in-port periods. During the Singapore 

deployment, USS Freedom executed this concept, returning to port every 

25 days to undergo a 5-day preventative maintenance availability and 

every 120 days for a more-intensive 2-week intermediate maintenance 

availability. Flyaway maintenance teams of about 30 contractors were 

flown to Singapore for the 5-day maintenance periods, and about 60-70 

contractors for the 2-week periods. Because of the regular returns to 

Singapore for maintenance availabilities, the USS Freedom had a 

somewhat limited range in theater, and Navy officials noted that this rigid 

maintenance periodicity limited operational flexibility. Navy officials 

explained that this was a deliberate decision and that future deployments 

will have a longer, more-flexible interval for scheduling in-port 

maintenance. During the maintenance availabilities, there were some 

maintenance checks that could not be completed because the needed 

parts, tools, or equipment were not prepositioned by the contractor in 

time. The Navy attributes some of these issues to changing the 

maintenance schedule without enough lead time for the contractor to 

adequately respond. The Navy notes that contractor execution rates 

improved over the course of the deployment, and the Navy has 

established an improved maintenance scheduling process that should 

help prevent this problem on future deployments.

Although contractors reportedly improved their positioning of materiel in 

time for the scheduled maintenance periods, Navy officials and Freedom

crews said that lack of continuity in contractor personnel is an issue. They 

said that it is not unusual to see different contractors sent every month to 

perform scheduled maintenance. This presents a problem, since there is 

a learning curve associated with new maintainers coming onboard to 

execute their assigned maintenance checks. Freedom sailors told us that 

the burden of teaching new contractors how to complete their checks 

often falls on them, as does the task of repairing any equipment broken in 

the course of an inexperienced or unqualified contractor trying to maintain 

it. While Navy officials said that quality-assurance provisions will be 

included in the maintenance contracts expected to be awarded later in 

2014, officials acknowledged that these provisions may not address this 

problem.

Maintenance Risks 

and Navy Actions to 

Address Them
Appendix III: Remaining Risks in Implementing 

Littoral Combat Ship Operational Support and 

Sustainment Concepts

Page 46 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Although contractors perform much of the preventative maintenance on 

LCS, the crews are still responsible for performing limited checks 

between scheduled maintenance periods. Sailors are largely responsible 

for performing more-frequent daily or weekly maintenance checks, and 

contractors for those that are required monthly or quarterly. During the 

deployment, the Center for Naval Analyses reported that Freedom sailors 

performed both scheduled and corrective maintenance actions each day 

(see fig. 7).

Figure 7: USS Freedom Sailor Conducting Engine Maintenance during Singapore 

Deployment

However, crew members told us that unexpected levels of maintenance 

activities impacted crew fatigue levels. Navy officials stated this 

maintenance effort reflects the materiel reliability issues that they say 

have been remedied for follow-on LCS ships. Yet crew members told us 
Appendix III: Remaining Risks in Implementing 

Littoral Combat Ship Operational Support and 

Sustainment Concepts

Page 47 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

of several instances where some of their preventative maintenance 

responsibilities would be better suited to contractors and other examples 

of how some routine maintenance activities could be shifted from 

contractors to crew. For example, members of the combat systems 

department crew reported that approximately 90 percent of combat 

systems spaces are sensitive and therefore require the presence of LCS 

crew members in the workspace while contractors complete maintenance 

on department systems. Crew members must essentially “shadow” 

contractors as they perform such basic tasks as changing batteries and 

cleaning filters. Each maintenance activity has a tag that specifies the 

amount of time it should take to perform the check, and crew members 

voiced frustration over having to watch contractors take the full amount of 

time to perform the check even if they could have performed it in a 

fraction of the time specified on the tag. 

A major action item in the LCS Plan of Action and Milestones calls for 

developing an integrated and coordinated plan for the planning, 

executing, tracking, reporting, and quality assurance of planned 

maintenance between the ship’s force, shore sailors, the LCS Squadron, 

and contractors on both variants. However, this broad action item, as well 

as another action item calling for the continuous review of maintenance 

requirements, extends out to December 2015 for completion. Program 

officials said that the current process for refining maintenance 

requirements—where changes in the frequency or responsibility for 

maintenance actions is reviewed and approved by the Navy’s in-service 

engineering agents or through maintenance effectiveness reviews—is 

adequate, but added that the program is still working to develop a tool 

that would allow better management and coordination of maintenance 

activities.11

 11Maintenance requirements are established and managed by the Navy’s in-service 

engineering agents who must approve shifts in the responsibility of a maintenance check 

from a contractor to a crew member or vice versa. Maintenance checks are permitted to 

be conducted more frequently than what the requirement calls for, but in-service 

engineering agent approval is needed to extend the periodicity of a check (e.g., changing 

a required check from being performed monthly to quarterly).

For example, greater visibility into the full scope of planned 

maintenance work performed by both crew and contractor personnel 

would allow program managers greater foresight into how and when 

certain parts should be repaired or replaced.
Appendix III: Remaining Risks in Implementing 

Littoral Combat Ship Operational Support and 

Sustainment Concepts

Page 48 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

The Navy is implementing a pilot condition-based maintenance program, 

whereby sensors installed on ship systems collect usage and reliability 

data, with the intention of conducting maintenance based on the condition 

of the equipment rather than according to a predetermined schedule. As 

more data are collected on equipment failure rates by condition-based 

maintenance sensors and as knowledge of LCS systems grows, the Navy 

intends for some maintenance requirements to be eventually phased out 

without increasing the risk of failure or sacrificing reliability. For example, 

there are a number of shut-off valves on the Freedom variant with a 

scheduled maintenance requirement to check them every month. These 

could be continuously monitored by sensors rather than being checked by 

a contractor or crew member on a monthly basis. The LCS program office 

has plans to expand the condition-based maintenance program on other 

LCS ships; for example, USS Fort Worth is being fitted with additional 

sensors in preparation for its late 2014 deployment.

The maintenance concept for LCS may be changed in the future. The 

LCS program office requested that a business-case analysis be 

conducted to develop a sustainment strategy that will provide the most 

cost-effective solution for providing LCS maintenance outside the 

continental United States. The analysis, completed in April 2013, 

compared five alternatives to the current contractor-based maintenance 

approach and recommended shifting responsibility from contractors to 

shore-based Navy personnel to achieve cost savings and other 

improvements. The Navy is exploring options to enact this 

recommendation under different scenarios and plans to do so as more 

LCSs are deployed to more forward operating stations. For example, the 

Navy plans to use reservists to conduct some LCS maintenance in lieu of 

contractors and intends to shift more maintenance responsibility to shorebased Navy personnel. However, program officials said that they may be 

somewhat limited in carrying out the recommendation by statutory 

maintenance requirements that govern how maintenance is performed 

abroad for ships, such as the LCS, that are homeported in the United 

States.12

 12Section 7310 of title 10 U.S.C. states that a naval vessel homeported in the United 

States or Guam may not be overhauled, repaired, or maintained in a shipyard outside the 

United States or Guam, other than in the case of voyage repairs.

The Navy is planning to award 5-year maintenance contracts 

later this year, and officials said there will be enough flexibility built into 

the contracts to allow experimentation with different maintenance 

alternatives.
Appendix III: Remaining Risks in Implementing 

Littoral Combat Ship Operational Support and 

Sustainment Concepts

Page 49 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Shore-based support networks perform LCS logistics functions such as 

administrative tasks, emergent repairs, and management of ship support 

needs. Primary support is provided by the LCS Squadron in San Diego. 

For the USS Freedom deployment, several entities based in Singapore 

provided additional support, including the LCS Squadron Forward Liaison 

Element—12 LCS Squadron personnel sent to Singapore for the course 

of the deployment to provide local support and coordination on 

maintenance activities and ship reporting—and the Commander, Logistics 

Group, Western Pacific—7th Fleet’s principal logistics group stationed in 

Singapore, which was responsible for emergent maintenance on USS 

Freedom.

13

We found several additional limitations of the LCS support infrastructure 

over the course of the deployment. For example, the Navy noted that 

existing Internet resources ashore were insufficient for managing 

maintenance, and the Navy continues to explore options with the host

nation for improving connectivity. Another issue still being resolved is 

finding adequate providers for facilities maintenance and ship cleaning, 

as the services contracted for Freedom’s deployment were not up to 

Navy officials noted several command and control–related 

challenges associated with this distance support concept during the 

Freedom deployment. For example, the ship’s crew did not follow 

established distance support processes to address emergent 

maintenance needs, resulting in significant opportunity costs and 

duplication of effort. The LCS Squadron is revising its written instructions 

to resolve this issue for future deployments. However, some of the 

reporting duties that were supposed to be performed by shore support 

teams under original distance support concepts—such as reporting of 

equipment casualties—have now become crew responsibilities. Officials 

said the time difference between San Diego and Singapore was creating 

a lag in reporting and response times and cited this as a reason for 

shifting some reporting duties back to the crew. As mentioned earlier, 

adding additional responsibilities to an LCS sailor’s already-full workday 

may exacerbate crew fatigue and may require reallocation of workloads 

or other revisions to the LCS concept of operations.

 13Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific, principal logistics agent for the 7th Fleet, 

located in Singapore, is responsible for emergent maintenance and replenishments for 

ships throughout 7th Fleet including USS Freedom during its deployment. Emergent 

maintenance is unplanned need-based maintenance, for example, repairs required by an 

equipment casualty or malfunction. Emergent maintenance is defined in Office of the Chief 

of Naval Operations Inst. 4700.7L, Encl. 8, para. 9 (May 25, 2010).

Logistics Risks and 

Navy Actions to 

Address Them
Appendix III: Remaining Risks in Implementing 

Littoral Combat Ship Operational Support and 

Sustainment Concepts

Page 50 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

sailors’ expectations. The Navy would also prefer to have LCS hulls 

cleaned while deployed and is in the process of determining a costeffective way to execute this task in compliance with statutory 

maintenance requirements.14 Finally, USS Freedom required nearly three 

times as many underway refuelings as were scheduled.15

Additionally, Navy officials acknowledged that the logistics footprint 

needed to support four LCSs in Singapore by 2017 must be defined and 

expanded over the next several years. The Navy is in the process of 

determining the final logistics requirements to support additional ships at 

Singapore and other forward operating stations; these efforts are 

scheduled to be completed by April 2014.

Navy 

logisticians in Singapore scheduled seven at-sea refuelings for the 

deployment but 18 were eventually required. LCS program officials say 

that this was a scheduling error rather than an indication of higher-thanexpected fuel burn rates. As the Navy gains more operational experience 

in an overseas environment, it expects to learn additional lessons about 

more-accurately scheduling LCS refuelings.

16

 14Section 7310 of title 10 U.S.C. states that a naval vessel homeported in the United 

States or Guam may not be overhauled, repaired, or maintained in a shipyard outside the 

United States or Guam, other than in the case of voyage repairs.

Currently, there is only a 

temporary tension-fabric structure in Singapore to house spare parts, 

tools, and working space for maintenance contractors, but this temporary 

structure does not have adequate space to house support elements for 

four LCS of both variants, according to Navy officials. Permanent support 

facilities have not been built in Singapore or other potential forward 

operating stations, and the lack of operational data on the Independence

variant limits the Navy’s ability to accurately plan for logistics support 

when both variants deploy. Without a clear understanding of the logistics 

needs of both variants, the Navy risks being underprepared to support 

both while forward deployed.

15USS Freedom has the least fuel capacity of existing LCS ships. Navy officials noted that 

Independence variant ships have at least 50 percent more fuel capacity and additional fuel 

capacity has been added to follow-on Freedom variant ships. 

16See LCS Plan of Action and Milestones.
Appendix IV: Overview of Navy Surface Ships 

Used in Life-Cycle Cost Comparison

Page 51 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Appendix IV: Overview of Navy Surface 

Ships Used in Life-Cycle Cost Comparison
Appendix IV: Overview of Navy Surface Ships 

Used in Life-Cycle Cost Comparison

Page 52 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship
Appendix IV: Overview of Navy Surface Ships 

Used in Life-Cycle Cost Comparison

Page 53 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship
Appendix V: Comments from the

Department of Defense

Page 54 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Appendix V: Comments from the

Department of Defense

Note: The Department 

of Defense provided 

comments and a 

security review on a 

draft of this report. 

DOD deemed certain 

technical information 

to be sensitive but 

unclassified, which 

GAO omitted from the 

report to allow for 

public release.
Appendix V: Comments from the

Department of Defense

Page 55 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 56 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Suzanne Wren, Assistant 

Director; Steven Banovac; Kristine Hassinger; Joanne Landesman; Carol 

Petersen; Michael Silver; Amie Steele; Sabrina Streagle; Grant Sutton; 

and Chris Watson made key contributions to this report.

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Page 57 GAO-14-447 Littoral Combat Ship

Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship 

Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost. 

GAO-13-738T. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2013.

Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship 

Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost. 

GAO-13-530. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2013.

Defense Acquisitions: Realizing Savings under Different Littoral Combat 

Ship Acquisition Strategies Depends on Successful Management of 

Risks. GAO-11-277T. Washington, D.C.: December 14, 2010.

Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat 

Ship Program. GAO-11-249R. Washington, D.C.: December 8, 2010.

Defense Acquisitions: Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the 

Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities. GAO-10-523. 

Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2010.

Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost 

Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts. 

GAO-10-257. Washington, D.C.: February 2, 2010.

Defense Acquisitions: Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy 

Shipbuilding Programs. GAO-07-943T. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2007.

Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to Demonstrate 

Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships. GAO-05-255. Washington, D.C.: 

March 1, 2005.

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