12274 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 44 / Monday, March 7, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

for the 8(a) BD Program, call or e-mail 

LaTanya Wright, Senior Advisor, Office 

of Business Development, at (202) 205– 

5852, or LaTanya.Wright@sba.gov. If 

you have questions about registering or 

attending the tribal consultation, please 

contact Mr. Marcus Grignon at (202) 

401–1455, or marcus.grignon@sba.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

On February 11, 2011 (74 FR 55694) 

SBA issued a Final Rule, publicly 

available at http:// 

frwebgate1.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/ 

TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=kkdLxk/1/1/ 

0&WAISaction=retrieve. In that 

document, SBA made changes to the 

8(a) BD Program regulations, its small 

business size regulations and 

regulations affecting Small 

Disadvantaged Businesses (SDBs). Some 

of the changes involve technical issues. 

Other changes are more substantive and 

result from SBA’s experience in 

implementing 8(a) BD Program 

regulations. One such change is the 

addition of reporting requirements 8(a) 

Participants. Specifically, the final rule 

requires those 8(a) Participants owned 

by ANCs, tribes, NHOs, and CDCs to 

submit overall information relating to 

how 8(a) participation has benefited the 

tribal or native members and/or the 

tribal, native or other community as part 

of each Participant’s annual review 

submissions, including information 

about funding cultural programs, 

employment assistance, jobs, 

scholarships, internships, subsistence 

activities, and other services to the 

affected community. 

SBA received several comments 

recommending it delay implementation 

of any reporting of benefits requirement 

to allow affected firms to gather and 

synthesize this data. In addition, these 

commenters encouraged SBA to 

establish a task force, comprised of 

native leaders and SBA, to further study 

how this requirement could be best 

implemented without imposing an 

undue burden on tribes, ANCs, NHOs or 

CDCs, or on their affected 8(a) 

Participants. SBA agreed and delayed 

implementation of new § 124.604 for six 

months after the effective date for the 

other provisions of the final rule. These 

tribal consultations are for the purpose 

of developing best practices for 

collecting and utilizing the data. SBA 

expects that two Participants owned by 

the same tribe, ANC, NHO or CDC will 

submit identical data describing the 

benefits provided by the tribe, ANC, 

NHO or CDC. 

II. Tribal Consultation Meeting 

The purpose of this tribal consultation 

meeting is to conform to the 

requirements of Executive Order 13175, 

‘‘Consultation and Coordination with 

Indian Tribal Governments’’; to provide 

interested parties with an opportunity to 

discuss the 8(a) BD Program regulatory 

changes; and for SBA to obtain the 

comments of SBA’s stakeholders on 

approaches to tracking community 

benefits. In addition to general oral and 

written comments about 8(a) BD 

program provisions, SBA is requesting 

oral and written comments on 

approaches to tracking community 

benefits as required by the 8(a) BD 

Program regulations. SBA considers 

tribal consultation meetings a valuable 

component of its deliberations and 

believes that this tribal consultation 

meeting will allow for constructive 

dialogue with the tribal community, 

Tribal Leaders, Elders and elected 

members of Alaska Native Villages or 

their appointed representatives. 

The format of this tribal consultation 

meeting will consist of a panel of SBA 

representatives who will preside over 

the session. The oral and written 

testimony will become part of the 

administrative record for SBA’s 

consideration. Written testimony may 

be submitted in lieu of oral testimony. 

SBA will analyze the testimony, both 

oral and written, along with any written 

comments received. SBA officials may 

ask questions of a presenter to clarify or 

further explain the testimony. The 

purpose of the tribal consultation is to 

discuss changes to the 8(a) BD Program 

with the tribal community, Tribal 

Leaders, Elders and elected members of 

Alaska Native Villages or their 

appointed representatives and to seek 

their comments on approaches to 

tracking community benefits. SBA 

requests that the comments focus on the 

new regulatory changes as stated in the 

Agency’s Final Rule. SBA requests that 

commenters not raise issues pertaining 

to other SBA small business programs. 

Presenters may provide a written copy 

of their testimony. SBA will accept 

written material that the presenter 

wishes to provide that further 

supplements his or her testimony. 

Electronic or digitized copies are 

encouraged. 

The tribal consultation meeting will 

be held for two hours. The meeting will 

begin at 1 p.m. and end at 3 p.m. 

(Pacific Standard Time). SBA will 

adjourn early if all those scheduled have 

delivered their testimony. 

III. Registration 

SBA respectfully requests that an 

elected or appointed representative of 

the tribal communities that are 

interested in attending please preregister in advance and indicate 

whether you would like to testify at the 

hearing. Registration requests should be 

received by SBA by March 10, 2011 at 

5 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time). Please 

contact Mr. Marcus Grignon in SBA’s 

Office of Native American Affairs in 

writing at marcus.grignon@sba.gov or by 

facsimile at (202) 481–2740. 

If you are interested in testifying, 

please include the following 

information relating to the person 

testifying: Name, Organization 

affiliation, Address, Telephone number, 

E-mail address and Fax number. SBA 

will attempt to accommodate all 

interested parties who wish to present 

testimony. Based on the number of 

registrants, it may be necessary to 

impose time limits to ensure that 

everyone who wishes to testify has the 

opportunity to do so. SBA will confirm 

in writing the registration of presenters 

and attendees. 

IV. Information on Service for 

Individuals With Disabilities 

For information on facilities or 

services for individuals with disabilities 

or to request special assistance at the 

tribal consultation meeting, contact Mr. 

Marcus Grignon at the telephone 

number or e-mail address indicated 

under the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT section of this notice. 

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 632, 634(b)(6), 636(b), 

637(a), 644 and 662(5); Pub. L. 105–135, sec. 

401 et seq., 111 Stat. 2592; and, E.O. 13175, 

65 FR 67249. 

Dated: March 2, 2011. 

Clara Pratte, 

National Director for the Office of Native 

American Affairs. 

[FR Doc. 2011–5118 Filed 3–4–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8025–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 27 

[Docket No. SW024; Special Conditions No. 

27–024–SC] 

Special Conditions: Bell Helicopter 

Textron Canada Limited Model 206B 

and 206L Series Helicopters, § 27.1309, 

Installation of a Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. 

Autopilot/Stabilization Augmentation 

System (AP/SAS) 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 44 / Monday, March 7, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 12275 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the modification of the Bell 

Helicopter Textron Canada Limited 

(Bell) model 206B and 206L series 

helicopters. These model helicopters 

will have novel or unusual design 

features when modified by installing the 

Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. (Hoh) complex 

autopilot/stabilization augmentation 

system (AP/SAS) that has potential 

failure conditions with more severe 

adverse consequences than those 

envisioned by the existing applicable 

airworthiness regulations. These special 

conditions contain the added safety 

standards the Administrator considers 

necessary to ensure the failures and 

their effects are sufficiently analyzed 

and contained. 

DATES: The effective date of these 

special conditions is February 25, 2011. 

We must receive your comments by May 

6, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: You may send your 

comments by e-mail to: 

mark.wiley@faa.gov; by mail to: Federal 

Aviation Administration, Rotorcraft 

Directorate, Attn: Mark Wiley (ASW– 

111), Special Conditions Docket No. 

SW024, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort 

Worth, Texas 76137; or by delivering 

your comments to the Rotorcraft 

Directorate at the indicated address. 

You must mark your comments: Docket 

No. SW024. You can inspect comments 

in the special conditions docket on 

weekdays, except Federal holidays, 

between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., in the 

Rotorcraft Directorate. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Mark Wiley, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations 

and Policy Group (ASW–111), 2601 

Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 

76137; telephone (817) 222–5134; 

facsimile (817) 222–5961; or e-mail to 

mark.wiley@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Reason for No Prior Notice and 

Comment Before Adoption 

The substance of these special 

conditions has been subjected to the 

notice and comment period previously 

and has been derived without 

substantive change from those 

previously issued. It is unlikely that 

prior public comment would result in a 

significant change from the substance 

contained herein. Further, a delay in the 

effective date of these special conditions 

would significantly delay issuance of 

the design approval and thus delivery of 

the helicopter, which is imminent. 

Therefore, the FAA has determined that 

prior public notice and comment are 

unnecessary, impracticable, and 

contrary to the public interest, and finds 

good cause exists for adopting these 

special conditions upon issuance. The 

FAA is requesting comments to allow 

interested persons to submit views that 

may not have been submitted in 

response to the prior opportunities for 

comment. 

Comments Invited 

While we did not precede this with a 

notice of proposed special conditions, 

we invite interested people to take part 

in this action by sending written 

comments, data, or views. The most 

helpful comments reference a specific 

portion of the special conditions, 

explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. 

We will file in the special conditions 

docket all comments we receive, as well 

as a report summarizing each 

substantive public contact with FAA 

personnel about these special 

conditions. You can inspect the docket 

before and after the comment closing 

date. If you wish to review the docket 

in person, go to the address in the 

ADDRESSES section of this document 

between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive by the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We 

may change these special conditions 

based on the comments we receive. 

If you want us to let you know we 

received your mailed comments on 

these special conditions, send us a preaddressed, stamped postcard on which 

the docket number appears. We will 

stamp the date on the postcard and mail 

it back to you. 

Background 

On July 13, 2009, Hoh submitted an 

application to the FAA’s Los Angles 

Aircraft Certification Office (LA ACO) 

for a supplemental type certificate (STC) 

to install an AP/SAS on the Bell model 

206B, 206L, 206L–1, 206L–3, and 206L– 

4 (206L series) helicopters. The Bell 

model 206B and 206L series helicopters 

are 14 CFR part 27 Normal category, 

single turbine engine, conventional 

helicopters designed for civil operation. 

These helicopter models are capable of 

carrying four passengers with one pilot, 

and have a maximum gross weight of 

between approximately 3,200 to 4,450 

pounds, depending on the model. The 

major design features include a 2-blade, 

teetering main rotor, a 2-blade antitorque tail rotor, a skid landing gear, 

and a visual flight rule (VFR) basic 

avionics configuration. Hoh proposes to 

modify these model helicopters by 

installing a two-axis AP/SAS. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under 14 CFR 21.115, Hoh must show 

that the Bell model 206B and 206L 

series helicopters, as modified by the 

installed AP/SAS, continue to meet the 

14 CFR 21.101 standards. The baseline 

of the certification basis for the 

unmodified Bell model 206B and 206L 

series helicopters is listed in Type 

Certificate Number H2SW. Although the 

Bell 206B, 206L, 206L–1, and 206L–3 

were certificated under Civil Air 

Regulations (CAR) 6.606, the Bell model 

206L–4 was certificated to § 27.1309; the 

applicant has voluntarily agreed to 

comply with § 27.1309 as part of the 

certification basis for this STC for all of 

these models. Additionally, compliance 

must be shown to any applicable 

equivalent level of safety findings, 

exemptions, and special conditions, 

prescribed by the Administrator as part 

of the certification basis. 

If the Administrator finds the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(that is, 14 CFR part 27), as they pertain 

to this STC, do not contain adequate or 

appropriate safety standards for the Bell 

model 206B and 206L series helicopters 

because of a novel or unusual design 

feature, special conditions are 

prescribed under § 21.101(d). 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, Hoh must show compliance 

of the AP/SAS STC-altered Bell model 

206B and 206L series helicopters with 

the noise certification requirements of 

14 CFR part 36. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38 and 

they become part of the type 

certification basis under § 21.101. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The Hoh AP/SAS incorporates novel 

or unusual design features, for 

installation in a Bell model 206B, 206L, 

206L–1, 206L–3, or 206L–4 helicopter, 

Type Certificate Number H2SW. This 

AP/SAS performs non-critical control 

functions, since this model helicopter 

has been certificated to meet the 

applicable requirements independent of 

this system. However, the possible 

failure conditions for this system, and 

their effect on the continued safe flight 

and landing of the helicopters, are more 

severe than those envisioned by the 

present rules. 

Discussion 

The effect on safety is not adequately 

covered under § 27.1309 for the 

application of new technology and new 

application of standard technology. 

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12276 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 44 / Monday, March 7, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

Specifically, the present provisions of 

§ 27.1309(c) do not adequately address 

the safety requirements for systems 

whose failures could result in 

catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major 

failure conditions, or for complex 

systems whose failures could result in 

major failure conditions. 

To comply with the provisions of the 

special conditions, we require that Hoh 

provide the FAA with a systems safety 

assessment (SSA) for the final AP/SAS 

installation configuration that will 

adequately address the safety objectives 

established by the functional hazard 

assessment (FHA) and the preliminary 

system safety assessment (PSSA), 

including the fault tree analysis (FTA). 

This must ensure that all failure 

conditions and their resulting effects are 

adequately addressed for the installed 

AP/SAS. The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, 

and FTA are all parts of the overall 

safety assessment (SA) process 

discussed in FAA Advisory Circular 

(AC) 27–1B (Certification of Normal 

Category Rotorcraft) and Society of 

Automotive Engineers (SAE) document 

Aerospace Recommended Practice 

(ARP) 4761 (Guidelines and Methods for 

Conducting the Safety Assessment 

Process on civil airborne Systems and 

Equipment). 

These special conditions require that 

the AP/SAS installed on a Bell model 

206B or 206L series helicopter meet the 

requirements to adequately address the 

failure effects identified by the FHA, 

and subsequently verified by the SSA, 

within the defined design integrity 

requirements. 

Applicability 

These special conditions are 

applicable to the Hoh AP/SAS installed 

as an STC approval, in Bell model 206B, 

206L, 206L–1, 206L–3, and 206L–4 

helicopters, Type Certificate Number 

H2SW. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features for a Hoh 

AP/SAS STC installed on one model 

series of helicopters. It is not a rule of 

general applicability and affects only 

the applicant who applied to the FAA 

for approval of these features on the 

model helicopters listed in the 

‘‘Applicability’’ section. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27 

Aircraft, Aviation safety. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572, 49 U.S.C. 

106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701–44702, 44704, 

44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the Hoh 

Aeronautics, Inc. (Hoh) supplemental 

type certificate basis for the installation 

of an autopilot/stabilization 

augmentation system (AP/SAS) on the 

Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited 

(Bell) model 206B, 206L, 206L–1, 206L– 

3, and 206L–4 (206L series) helicopters, 

Type Certificate Number H2SW. 

The AP/SAS must be designed and 

installed so that the failure conditions 

identified in the Functional Hazard 

Assessment and verified by the System 

Safety Assessment, after design 

completion, are adequately addressed in 

accordance with the ‘‘failure condition 

categories’’ and ‘‘requirements’’ sections 

(including the system design integrity, 

design environmental, and test and 

analysis requirements) of these special 

conditions. 

Failure Condition Categories 

Failure conditions are classified, 

according to the severity of their effects 

on the rotorcraft, into one of the 

following categories: 

1. No Effect—Failure conditions that 

would have no effect on safety; for 

example, failure conditions that would 

not affect the operational capability of 

the rotorcraft or increase crew workload; 

however, could result in an 

inconvenience to the occupants, 

excluding the flight crew. 

2. Minor—Failure conditions which 

would not significantly reduce rotorcraft 

safety, and which would involve crew 

actions that are well within their 

capabilities. Minor failure conditions 

would include, for example, a slight 

reduction in safety margins or 

functional capabilities, a slight increase 

in crew workload, such as, routine flight 

plan changes, or result in some physical 

discomfort to occupants. 

3. Major—Failure conditions which 

would reduce the capability of the 

rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to 

cope with adverse operating conditions 

to the extent that there would be, for 

example, a significant reduction in 

safety margins or functional capabilities, 

a significant increase in crew workload 

or result in impairing crew efficiency, 

physical distress to occupants, 

including injuries, or physical 

discomfort to the flight crew. 

4. Hazardous/Severe-Major—Failure 

conditions which would reduce the 

capability of the rotorcraft or the ability 

of the crew to cope with adverse 

operating conditions to the extent that 

there would be: 

• A large reduction in safety margins 

or functional capabilities; 

• Physical distress or excessive 

workload that would impair the flight 

crew’s ability to the extent that they 

could not be relied on to perform their 

tasks accurately or completely; or, 

• Possible serious or fatal injury to a 

passenger or a cabin crewmember, 

excluding the flight crew. 

Note 1: ‘‘Hazardous/severe-major’’ failure 

conditions can include events that are 

manageable by the crew by the use of proper 

procedures, which, if not implemented 

correctly or in a timely manner, may result 

in a catastrophic event. 

5. Catastrophic—Failure conditions 

which would result in multiple fatalities 

to occupants, fatalities or incapacitation 

to the flight crew, or result in loss of the 

rotorcraft. 

The present §§ 27.1309(b) and (c) 

regulations do not adequately address 

the safety requirements for systems 

whose failures could result in 

‘‘catastrophic’’ or ‘‘hazardous/severemajor’’ failure conditions, or for 

complex systems whose failures could 

result in ‘‘major’’ failure conditions. The 

current regulations are inadequate 

because when §§ 27.1309(b) and (c) 

were promulgated, it was not 

envisioned that this type of rotorcraft 

would use systems that are complex or 

whose failure could result in 

‘‘catastrophic’’ or ‘‘hazardous/severemajor’’ effects on the rotorcraft. This is 

particularly true with the application of 

new technology, new application of 

standard technology, or other 

applications not envisioned by the rule 

that affect safety. 

Hoh must provide the FAA with a 

systems safety assessment (SSA) for the 

final AP/SAS installation configuration 

that will adequately address the safety 

objectives established by the functional 

hazard assessment (FHA) and the 

preliminary system safety assessment 

(PSSA), including the fault tree analysis 

(FTA). This will show that all failure 

conditions and their resulting effects are 

adequately addressed for the installed 

AP/SAS. 

Note 2: The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, and 

FTA are all parts of the overall safety 

assessment (SA) process discussed in FAA 

Advisory Circular (AC) 27–1B (Certification 

of Normal Category Rotorcraft) and Society of 

Automotive Engineers (SAE) document 

Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 

4761 (Guidelines and Methods for 

Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on 

Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment). 

Requirements 

Hoh must comply with the existing 

requirements of § 27.1309 for all 

applicable design and operational 

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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 44 / Monday, March 7, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 12277 

aspects of the AP/SAS with the failure 

condition categories of ‘‘no effect,’’ and 

‘‘minor,’’ and for non-complex systems 

whose failure condition category is 

classified as ‘‘major.’’ Hoh must comply 

with the requirements of these special 

conditions for all applicable design and 

operational aspects of the AP/SAS with 

the failure condition categories of 

‘‘catastrophic’’ and ‘‘hazardous severe/ 

major,’’ and for complex systems whose 

failure condition category is classified 

as ‘‘major.’’ A complex system is a 

system whose operations, failure 

conditions, or failure effects are difficult 

to comprehend without the aid of 

analytical methods (for example, FTA, 

Failure Modes and Effect Analysis, 

FHA). 

System Design Integrity Requirements 

Each of the failure condition 

categories defined in these special 

conditions relate to the corresponding 

aircraft system integrity requirements. 

The system design integrity 

requirements, for the Hoh AP/SAS, as 

they relate to the allowed probability of 

occurrence for each failure condition 

category, and the proposed software 

design assurance level, are as follows: 

• ‘‘Major’’—For systems with ‘‘major’’ 

failure conditions, failures resulting in 

these major effects must be shown to be 

remote, a probability of occurrence on 

the order of between 1 × 10¥5 to 1 × 

10¥7 failures/hour, and associated 

software must be developed to the 

RTCA/DO–178B (Software 

Considerations in Airborne Systems 

And Equipment Certification) Level C 

software design assurance level. 

• ‘‘Hazardous/Severe-Major’’—For 

systems with ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

failure conditions, failures resulting in 

these hazardous/severe-major effects 

must be shown to be extremely remote, 

a probability of occurrence on the order 

of between 1 × 10¥7 to 1 × 10¥9 failures/ 

hour, and associated software must be 

developed to the RTCA/DO–178B 

(Software Considerations in Airborne 

Systems And Equipment Certification) 

Level B software assurance level. 

• ‘‘Catastrophic’’—For systems with 

‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions, 

failures resulting in these catastrophic 

effects must be shown to be extremely 

improbable, a probability of occurrence 

on the order of 1 × 10¥9 failures/hour 

or less, and associated software must be 

developed to the RTCA/DO–178B 

(Software Considerations in Airborne 

Systems And Equipment Certification) 

Level A design assurance level. 

System Design Environmental 

Requirements 

The AP/SAS system equipment must 

be qualified to the appropriate 

environmental level per RTCA 

document DO–160F (Environmental 

Conditions and Test Procedures for 

Airborne Equipment), for all relevant 

aspects. This is to show that the AP/ 

SAS system performs its intended 

function under any foreseeable 

operating condition, which includes the 

expected environment in which the AP/ 

SAS is intended to operate. Some of the 

main considerations for environmental 

concerns are installation locations and 

the resulting exposure to environmental 

conditions for the AP/SAS system 

equipment, including considerations for 

other equipment that may be affected 

environmentally by the AP/SAS 

equipment installation. The level of 

environmental qualification must be 

related to the severity of the considered 

failure conditions and effects on the 

rotorcraft. 

Test Analysis Requirements 

Compliance with the requirements of 

these special conditions may be shown 

by a variety of methods, which typically 

consist of analysis, flight tests, ground 

tests, and simulation, as a minimum. 

Compliance methodology is related to 

the associated failure condition 

category. If the AP/SAS is a complex 

system, compliance with the 

requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘major’’ may be shown by 

analysis, in combination with 

appropriate testing to validate the 

analysis. Compliance with the 

requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

may be shown by flight-testing in 

combination with analysis and 

simulation, and the appropriate testing 

to validate the analysis. Flight tests may 

be limited for ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

failure conditions and effects due to 

safety considerations. Compliance with 

the requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘catastrophic’’ may be 

shown by analysis, and appropriate 

testing in combination with simulation 

to validate the analysis. Very limited 

flight tests in combination with 

simulation are used as a part of a 

showing of compliance for 

‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions. Flight 

tests are performed only in 

circumstances that use operational 

variations, or extrapolations from other 

flight performance aspects to address 

flight safety. 

These special conditions require that 

the Hoh AP/SAS system installed on a 

Bell model 206B, 206L, 206L–1, 206L– 

3, or 206L–4 helicopter, Type Certificate 

Number H2SW, meet these 

requirements to adequately address the 

failure effects identified by the FHA, 

and subsequently verified by the SSA, 

within the defined design system 

integrity requirements. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on February 

25, 2011. 

Kimberly K. Smith, 

Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2011–5103 Filed 3–4–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–0960; Directorate 

Identifier 98–ANE–09–AD; Amendment 

39–16620; AD 98–09–27R1] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Rolls-Royce 

plc RB211–Trent 768, 772, and 772B 

Turbofan Engines 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are rescinding an existing 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. The existing AD, 

AD 98–09–27, resulted from aircraft 

certification testing which revealed that 

stresses on the thrust reverser hinge 

were higher than had been anticipated 

during engine certification, and the 

United Kingdom Civil Aviation 

Authority, issuing AD 008–03–97. Since 

we issued AD 98–09–27, we discovered 

that its requirements were duplicated in 

airplane-level AD 2001–09–14, issued 

by the FAA Transport Airplane 

Directorate. We proposed to rescind the 

engine-level AD. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective April 

11, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: The Docket Operations 

office is located at Docket Management 

Facility, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., West Building Ground 

Floor, Room W12–140, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Alan Strom, Aerospace Engineer, Engine 

Certification Office, FAA, Engine & 

Propeller Directorate, 12 New England 

Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; 

e-mail: alan.strom@faa.gov; telephone 

(781) 238–7143; fax (781) 238–7199. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with RULES