US Interagency Regional 

Foreign Policy Implementation

A Survey of Current Practice and 

an Analysis of Options for Improvement

Robert S. Pope

Colonel, USAF

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
ii

Project Editor

Jerry L. Gantt

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Pope, Robert S., 1969-

US interagency regional foreign policy implementation : a survey of current practice and an analysis of 

options for improvement / Robert S. Pope, Colonel, 

USAF.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN ISBN 978-1-58566-232-6

1. United States—Foreign relations administration. 2. United States—Foreign relations—Decision 

making. 3. National security—United States—

Administration. 4. National security—United 

States—Decision making. 5. Interagency coordination—United States. I. Title. II. Title: United States 

interagency regional foreign policy implementation. 

JZ1480.P657 2014

353.1’30973—dc23

2013045865

Published by Air University Press in June 2014

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed 

or implied within are solely those of the author and do 

not necessarily represent the official policy or position of 

the organizations with which he is associated or the views 

of the Air Force Research Institute, Air University, 

United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or any 

other US government agency. This publication is cleared 

for public release and unlimited distribution.

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iii

Contents

Foreword vii

About the Author xi

Preface xiii

 1 Introduction 1

 2 Current Practices—Military 9

Military-Led Interagency Coordination Mechanisms 9

Political Advisors 9

Joint Interagency Coordination Group 10

Joint Interagency Task Force 14

Interagency Structures at the Geographic 

Combatant Commands 15

US Central Command 16

US Pacific Command 21

US European Command 25

US Southern Command 27

US Africa Command 32

Summary of Current Structures at the GCCs 35

 3 Current Practices—US Civilian Agencies 45

State Department Structures for Civil-Military 

Coordination 45

Undersecretary for Political Affairs—Regional Bureaus 47

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 48

Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations 48

US Agency for International Development 50

US Embassies 53

US Regional Missions 54

The National Security Council 55

Other Interagency Structures 57

Department of Homeland Security 57

Office of the Director of National Intelligence 57

National Centers 58

Presidential Special Representatives 59

Summary of Nonmilitary Interagency Structures 60
iv

CONTENTS

 4 The Need for Improvement 67

Security Cooperation 67

Counterterrorism Engagement 71

Response to Disaster or Humanitarian Crisis 73

Complex Contingency Operations 75

Vietnam (1964–73) 76

Panama: Operations Just Cause and 

Promote Liberty (1989–90) 79

Haiti: Operation Uphold Democracy (1994–95) 80

Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom

(2001–Present) 82

Iraq: Operations Iraqi Freedom and 

New Dawn (2003–11) 86

 5 Options for Improvement 95

Reform Options at the Regional Level 96

A Regional Integrated Interagency Organization 96

State Leads at the Regional Level 102

Military Leads at the Regional Level 104

A Parallel Regional Structure 107

Reform Options at the Country Level

during Crisis Operations 109

An Integrated Interagency Structure 111

State Leads 113

Military Leads 114

A Parallel Structure 115

 6 Analysis and Recommendation 121

Objectives 121

Analysis 124

Crisis Operations Models 125

Regional Models 128

The Recommended Reform Model 132

Applying the Model 133

Implementation Considerations 136

Bureaucratic Resistance 136

Diplomatic Endorsement 138

Locating the US Regional Missions 139

Regional Boundaries 140

Cost 141
v

CONTENTS

Personnel and Culture 143

Congressional Support and Legislation 144

What If There Is No Appetite for Interagency Reform? 148

Appendix Interagency Reform 

at the National Level 153

Abbreviations 169

Bibliography 175

Index 193

Illustrations

Figures

 1 JFCOM standard model for interagency coordination 12

 2 CENTCOM structures for interagency unity of effort 16

 3 PACOM structures for interagency unity of effort 21

 4 EUCOM structures for interagency unity of effort 25

 5 SOUTHCOM structures for interagency unity of effort 28

 6 AFRICOM structures for interagency unity of effort 33

 7 Department of State organizational chart 46

 8 USAID organizational chart 52

 9 MACV-CORDS organizational structure 77

10 Past and current US organizational structure

in Afghanistan 86

11 Regional interagency model—the regional 

interests bureau 99

12 Regional state-led model—the regional 

interagency mission 104

13 Regional military-led model—the interagency COCOM 106
vi

CONTENTS

 14 Regional parallel structure model—the regional chief

of mission 109

 15 Integrated interagency crisis task force 113

 16 State-led interagency task force 114

 17 Military-led interagency task force 115

 18 Parallel structure—the interagency task force 117

 19 Recommended regional- and crisis-level 

interagency structure 134

Tables

 1 Analysis of crisis-level reform models 125

 2 Analysis of regional-level reform models 129

 3 Analysis of national-level reform models 164
vii

Foreword

In today’s ever-changing world, the United States depends upon a 

complex, multiagency structure to plan, synchronize, and execute its 

foreign policy and ensure its national security. The public servants 

who work to advance US interests and values overseas and keep our 

citizens safe at home and abroad invariably strive to coordinate with 

other agencies, the US military, and the intelligence community. But 

effective communication and coordination within and among the national security and foreign policy bureaucracy can sometimes nevertheless become a casualty of the exuberance and enthusiasm with 

which many managers and action officers go about their respective 

missions.

In some ways, the working atmosphere among federal agencies today is similar to what the armed services experienced after the implementation of the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986: a steep 

learning curve on how to work with fellow military officers raised in 

a different bureaucratic culture. Even if an Army officer and an Air 

Force officer are superficially more similar than, say, a military officer 

and Foreign Service officer, it’s hard to dismiss the shock that the sudden “jointness” brought to the services—even though it’s equally hard 

not to be impressed with the joint service culture that now prevails at 

the Department of Defense (DOD). 

Today, officials at all levels of State and Defense are going through 

the same process, albeit more gradually, in learning to speak the other’s language. After overcoming a previous Pentagon leadership’s exclusion of State from involvement in postwar Iraq, military officers 

and diplomats went on to build a strong mutual respect on the ground 

in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. This positive trend continues today. Communication between Defense and State—in Washington 

and around the world—is as strong and regular as I have seen in my 

30 years working on political-military issues. 

In places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, not to mention the 

Middle East and the Horn of Africa, we have learned anew—and 

sometimes the hard way—that the US government must present a 

solid and united front in its dealings with other nations and its execution of operations in various regions around the world. Strong regional interagency coordination is critical to the success of security 

cooperation, counterterrorism and counterproliferation engagements, and complex contingency operations, as well as—perhaps 
viii

FOREWORD

most importantly—how foreigners perceive the United States on a 

day-to-day basis. Globalization and instantaneous, around-the-clock 

media coverage have only served to underscore this requirement.

In a thoroughly researched and well-documented study, Col Robert Pope has analyzed how we have achieved regional interagency 

coordination in the past, how various organizations are presently 

structured toward this goal, what works and does not work, and how 

we can improve on the system. Enabled by a National Defense Fellowship at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in 

Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, he applied his 

diverse experience as a career Air Force officer to examine various 

organizational structures—past and present—and analyze them 

against an exhaustive reading of public policy and administration literature relevant to his subject matter.

By statute, the State Department is the lead agency for US foreign 

policy. In theory, its merit-based, professional diplomatic service is 

indispensable to its formulation and implementation. However, in 

practice, the much larger and better-funded DOD exercises an everincreasing role in the conduct of US foreign policy activity—sometimes with insufficient coordination with the State Department, overseas embassies, or other relevant agencies. 

Over the past two decades, the military’s geographic combatant 

commands have taken an increasing lead in planning and executing 

foreign policy activities around the world. This trend has often effectively put a military face and voice on US foreign policy, sometimes 

to the detriment of broader goals and relationships. The key message 

we seek to send—that security depends upon both strong civilian and 

military institutions—is often obscured. For example, few recipients 

of US military assistance are aware that it is provided from the State 

Department budget because the aid is “delivered”—with high visibility—by the regional military commander.

Competing domestic priorities in an emerging era of renewed fiscal discipline will likely make what critics see as the creeping militarization of foreign policy difficult to sustain. That is mostly a good 

thing. While certain parts of the military are skilled at retail diplomacy, the effective conduct of US foreign policy requires greater interagency coordination at all levels and a greater role for the State 

Department as America’s lead agency for foreign policy. 

Colonel Pope’s book examines current interagency structures, 

with a particular focus on the regional level, to describe and analyze 
ix

FOREWORD

several current or recent shortfalls in interagency unity of effort. He 

considers not only military operations but also nonmilitary US government responses, often in concert with other nations, to natural 

disasters around the world. While the US military is often best 

equipped to be the first agency on the scene with the greatest resources, it may not always be the most appropriate agency to run the 

show, particularly in regions where the appearance of US military 

“intervention” would be less than welcome.

Based on his own analysis of existing organization models and critiques presented in the literature, Colonel Pope analyzes several potential reform proposals and recommends a bold new model: a State 

Department–led regional interagency headquarters. This US regional 

mission would lead all US foreign policy activities within a region, 

including those of the relevant geographic combatant command and 

US embassies. The US regional mission would conduct country-level 

or subregional crisis operations by creating interagency task forces, 

which would be headed by a leader from the department or agency 

most appropriate to the mission. 

Sir Winston Churchill once remarked, “You can always count on 

Americans to do the right thing—after they have tried everything 

else.” While numerous organizational structures have been tried, 

with varying degrees of success, Rob Pope’s insightful analysis seeks 

to get regional interagency coordination right. He applies more than 

a dozen goals to his model. These include sensible objectives such as 

providing a nonmilitary voice and face for US foreign policy, achieving unity of effort in execution by leveraging the unique assets of each 

agency, establishing clear and authoritative leadership in the region 

through a well-defined chain of command, balancing responsibilities 

between State and Defense, and developing interagency expertise 

among working-level personnel. 

As bold as he is in proposing a new model, Colonel Pope is also 

forthright in describing the obvious (and not so obvious) obstacles to 

its achievement. He recognizes the need to minimize the financial, 

personnel, and material costs of his proposal and agency culture 

shocks resulting from that reform—that’s important given the magnitude of the reorganization he is proposing. Superimposing a Stateled regional interagency headquarters constitutes a form of shock 

therapy that could lead to questions about the role of traditional vehicles of US diplomacy such as State, the US Agency for International 

Development, our embassies, and other agencies.
x

FOREWORD

Change does not occur rapidly in Washington or in the vast bureaucracy that flows outward from its many headquarters. Power 

struggles will not become any less intense as agencies compete for 

their portion of an ever-shrinking national budget. US foreign policy 

becomes more complex and crucial by the moment as tensions rise in 

multiple regions, the balance of power fluctuates, and state authority 

continues to erode, causing both friends and foes to ask about the 

future US role in the world. The same factors that make a return to 

diplomacy conducted (at least in large part) by diplomats so vital also 

make reforms difficult to implement. How Washington and its myriad outposts respond to Col Robert Pope’s analysis and recommendations remains to be seen, but he has made a valiant contribution toward worthwhile and needed change.

TOM COUNTRYMAN

Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of International Security 

and Nonproliferation 

US State Department
xi

About the Author

Col Robert S. Pope, USAF, is deputy chief of the Security Cooperation (SC) Division, Directorate of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J-5) 

at Headquarters US Central Command (CENTCOM), MacDill AFB, 

Florida. In this position, he helps direct military-to-military cooperation and Phase Zero activities in 18 countries across the CENTCOM 

area of responsibility. Since June 2010, he has served in two previous 

positions within CENTCOM/J5-SC, most recently as chief of the 

South Asia Branch and prior to that as deputy chief of the Policy, 

Plans, and Programs Branch.

Colonel Pope’s previous assignments include Air Staff duty as chief 

of Research and Assessment for the Directorate of Public Affairs and 

Directorate of Strategic Communication, Office of the Secretary of 

the Air Force. He has served on an Air Force major command staff as 

the chief of Long-Range Strategy and Policy and chief of Counterproliferation Plans and Policy at Headquarters, US Air Forces in Europe 

at Ramstein AB, Germany. His interagency experience comes from 

three years as the special advisor for nuclear counterproliferation operations at the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington, DC. Other 

assignments include a tour as a directed-energy weapons analyst at 

the National Air Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 

and chief of development in the radiochemical division of the Air 

Force Technical Application Center’s Technical Operations Division, 

developing new scientific procedures to support US monitoring of 

nuclear weapons treaties.

Colonel Pope was commissioned in 1991 through the Air Force 

Reserve Officers Training Corps program at Michigan State University, where he received a bachelor of science degree in physics. He 

also holds a master of military operational art and science degree 

from the Air Command and Staff College as well as a master of science degree in nuclear weapons effects physics and a PhD in physics 

from the Air Force Institute of Technology. Colonel Pope is an inresidence graduate of the Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College and an Air War College graduate by correspondence. In 2009–10, he served as a National Defense Fellow in the 

International Security Program of the Belfer Center for Science and 

International Affairs in Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, where he prepared the manuscript for this book.

xiii

Preface

The United States has a complex multiagency structure to plan, 

synchronize, and execute foreign policy. In national security issues, 

the most significant agencies are usually the Department of Defense, 

the State Department, the many agencies of the intelligence community, and the national security staff at the White House. Dedicated 

professionals in each of these organizations are trying hard to develop interagency policies for the tough foreign policy issues we face 

today including US goals for Afghanistan and Pakistan after 2015, 

our reaction to the Arab Spring, and what to do about the murderous 

regime in Syria and a government in Iran apparently intent on developing nuclear weapons. I have had the honor to work with these dedicated professionals from across our government, particularly while 

detailed to the Central Intelligence Agency from 2000 to 2003—a 

time that spanned the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the beginnings of the 

wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—and at US Central Command (CENTCOM) from 2010 to 2013. There, I have spent much of my time focusing on representing CENTCOM’s views to the interagency as the 

United States formulated policies for Afghanistan and Pakistan. This 

book is dedicated to the professionals across our US foreign policy 

apparatus who work very hard through a system of drafting policy 

papers and seeking interagency consensus through an assortment of 

formal and informal interagency meetings.

I would like to thank the Air Force for giving me a year to research, 

think, and write about this issue; the International Security Program 

at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs for giving me an academic environment in which to 

do this work; and Dr. Edwina Campbell at the Air Command and 

Staff College and Dr. Meghan O’Sullivan at the Harvard Kennedy 

School for their advice along the way. Most of all, I thank my wife for 

her constant support, patience as I worked on this project, and many 

helpful comments as she proofread the manuscript.

ROBERT S. POPE

Colonel, USAF

Chapter 1

Introduction

The United States has a complex multiagency structure to plan, 

synchronize, and execute foreign policy and national security. By 

statute, the State Department is the lead agency for conducting US 

foreign policy. However, in practice, the much larger and betterfunded Department of Defense (DOD) conducts much of the nation’s 

foreign policy activities—from peacetime engagement to postwar 

state building and counterinsurgency (COIN)—often with little coordination from the State Department or other relevant agencies. 

This is particularly true at the regional level—between agency headquarters in Washington and embassies in the various countries—

where only the DOD has an effective presence via the military’s geographic combatant commands (GCC). This book argues that a more 

effective US foreign policy requires greater interagency coordination 

at all levels and a greater role for the State Department as the lead US 

agency for foreign policy.

The Department of Defense has attempted to improve interagency 

unity of effort at the regional level through creation of several interagency entities at the GCCs, such as the combatant commanders’ political advisors (POLAD) from the State Department, joint interagency coordination groups (JIACG) to attempt to produce regional 

interagency unity of effort from within the combatant command 

(COCOM), and joint interagency task forces (JIATF) to bring together several federal agencies to work together at the regional or 

country level below the COCOM headquarters. However, these 

mechanisms have only brought the key foreign policy and national 

security agencies a short way toward true unity of effort and have 

done little to put a nonmilitary, diplomatic face and voice on US foreign policy.

The US military views the world through a three-level hierarchy: 

strategic, operational, and tactical. At the top level, the government 

determines strategic objectives and develops broad policy and plans 

to achieve these objectives. At the operational level, plans are formulated to translate strategic objectives into tactical actions. Finally, the 

tactical level focuses on planning and executing individual activities 

or engagements to achieve operational or strategic objectives.1

 All US 
2 │ INTRODUCTION

foreign policy agencies operate at the strategic level in Washington, 

and many function at the operational and tactical levels in individual 

countries through US embassies, but only the military has a substantial operational presence at the regional level—between Washington 

and the country level.

The regional level is important for both organizational and operational reasons. Organizationally, a regional-level entity facilitates more 

manageable spans of control for key leaders. National-level structures 

cannot achieve sufficient day-to-day control over all subordinate foreign policy activities around the globe. On the other hand, countrylevel structures cannot integrate US activities and messages across 

multiple countries and cannot effectively share resources between 

countries. Operationally, a regional-level organization assists US foreign policy planning and execution, because the United States must 

increasingly deal with regional groups and issues in addition to traditional bilateral relationships. While the United States maintains bilateral diplomatic relations with nearly 200 countries, more than 800 

intergovernmental organizations (IGO) around the globe shape issues at a regional level, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union (AU), the Organization of American 

States (OAS), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN), as well as thousands of nongovernmental organizations 

(NGO) which frequently operate in more than one country.2

 Additionally, many threats and challenges to the United States exist at a 

regional level, including transnational terrorist, criminal, and narcotics organizations. According to the Hart/Rudman Commission’s 2001 

report, “Regions will become more important in the emerging world 

of the 21st century. State borders no longer contain the flow of refugees, the outbreak of ethnic violence, the spread of deadly diseases, or 

environmental disasters. Humanitarian and military operations will 

often depend on access rights in many different countries.”3

As US foreign policy activities have become increasingly regional 

in nature, the military’s GCCs—in the absence of any regional-level 

State Department or other interagency presence—have taken the 

lead in planning and executing both military and nonmilitary activities in regions around the world. This has often effectively put a military face and voice on US foreign policy, and this trend has increased 

since the 9/1l attacks. According to Washington Post investigative reporter Dana Priest, “Long before September 11, the U.S. government 

had grown increasingly dependent on its military to carry out its for-
INTRODUCTION │ 3

eign affairs. The shift was incremental, little noticed, de facto. . . . After September 11, however, the trend accelerated dramatically. . . . 

Without a doubt, U.S.-sponsored political reform abroad is being 

eclipsed by new military pacts focusing on anti-terrorism and intelligence sharing.”4

The primacy of the geographic combatant commands in regional 

US foreign policy leads to overmilitarization of foreign policy. The 

commanders of the military’s GCCs are four-star generals or admirals with a career-long military outlook and a predominantly military 

toolkit, leading them to define most problems—and often their solutions—in military terms. Ambassador Robert Komer, who led interagency COIN pacification and development efforts during the Vietnam War, stated, “military men are naturally going to give primary 

emphasis to the military aspects,” and former secretary of defense 

and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director James Schlesinger 

stated that the military leadership “of course, by definition are for 

military solutions.”5

 Though Komer’s and Schlesinger’s observations 

are perhaps less true today after more than two decades of expanding 

interagency thinking by senior military leaders, it is still true that the 

GCCs are first and foremost military officers and not primarily professional diplomats.

With the military in the lead for regional foreign policy and the 

GCC as the public face of US policy, the United States loses the ability 

to engage many governments, actors within states, NGOs, and IGOs 

that do not wish to be publicly associated with the US military.6

 A 2006 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigation concluded, “There 

is evidence that some host countries are questioning the increasingly 

military component of America’s profile overseas.”7

 Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs John Hillen stated in 2005, 

If we subvert, however unintentionally, our ability for the lead foreign policy 

agency of the US government [the State Department] to deliver credible and 

consistent messages—in the field and at all levels—to those actors whose behavior we are trying to shape and change, we will lose influence and legitimacy. Especially when those messages are inherently about democracy, political pluralism and compromise, the rule of law, civilian control of the 

military, the importance of institutions in civil society, legitimacy and governance gained through peaceful means and processes, and diplomatic exchange and negotiation as the preferred way of solving differences. These are 

not inherently military messages, needless to say, but today it is most often the 

US military that delivers them on the ground.8
4 │ INTRODUCTION

One of the major reasons for the overwhelming influence of the 

military in foreign affairs is the massive resource imbalance between 

the Departments of Defense and State. The State Department is much 

smaller in terms of both budget and personnel than the Defense Department. The DOD has an annual budget of about $660 billion and 

a workforce of approximately three million people, while State has an 

annual budget of about $50 billion and a workforce of fewer than 

60,000 people, of whom only 6,400 are Foreign Service officers 

(FSO).9

 FSOs are commissioned officers of the US Foreign Service. 

They are the State Department’s professional diplomats and fill most 

of the leadership roles at the headquarters in Washington and at US 

embassies abroad, including about two-thirds of US ambassador positions (the other third are political appointees). FSOs are selected 

through a competitive written and oral exam process called the Foreign Service Exam.10

After the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols DOD reorganization, which 

created today’s joint military, the GCCs expanded in size and importance. Around the same time, Congress cut the State Department’s 

operating budget and personnel by 20 percent, forcing closure of 

more than 30 overseas missions.11 The 9/11 Commission concluded, 

“State came into the 1990s overmatched by the resources of other departments and with little support for its budget either in Congress or 

in the President’s Office of Management and Budget.”12

However, instead of being fixed, this imbalance has continued to 

expand, causing Washington to increasingly rely on the military to 

execute foreign policy. Assistant Secretary Hillen stated in 2005, “The 

resources that [combatant commanders] bring to bear in their theaters, in terms of people, money, and logistics support, far outstrip 

the foreign assistance programs that ambassadors and their country 

teams can routinely deliver to host governments.”13 Hillen cautions, 

“When [military-to-military] relationships bear more and better fruit 

than political relationships can deliver, we run the risk [of] sacrificing 

our larger foreign policy goals to the exigencies of military priorities 

with shorter horizons.”14 One US ambassador echoed this, noting, 

“Foreign officials are ‘following the money’ in terms of determining 

which relationships to emphasize.”15

While it would seem the Defense Department is the bureaucratic 

“winner” in terms of obtaining the majority of operational resources 

and funding, many in the DOD would prefer to see the State Department receive additional resources so the two departments can both 
INTRODUCTION │ 5

carry out their core missions abroad. Former secretary of defense 

Robert Gates several times noted the resource imbalance between the 

Departments of Defense and State and has argued for increased funding for the State Department. In June 2008, Gates warned against the 

“creeping militarization” of foreign policy and advocated for more 

funding for the State Department: “America’s civilian institutions of 

diplomacy and development have been chronically underfunded for 

far too long relative to what we spend on the military, and . . . the responsibilities our nation has around the world.”16 In July 2008, Gates 

said, “Our diplomatic leaders . . . must have the resources and political support needed to fully exercise their statutory responsibilities in 

leading American foreign policy.”17 Continuing this theme in testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on 30 April 2009, 

Gates said, “I believe that the challenges confronting our nation cannot be dealt with by military means alone. They instead require 

whole-of-government approaches—but that can only be done if the 

State Department is given resources befitting the scope of its mission 

across the globe.”18

In addition to the resource imbalance between the DOD and other 

US agencies involved in foreign policy, another significant challenge 

in today’s system is how to obtain interagency unity-of-effort without 

unity of command. For the military, the Goldwater-Nichols Act created a direct chain of command from the president to the secretary of 

defense to the GCCs, creating both unity of command and unity of 

effort for the joint military force.19 However, in the interagency foreign policy arena, no one below the president can direct the efforts of 

all executive branch agencies or settle disputes among them. Congress created the National Security Council (NSC) in the National 

Security Act of 1947 to assist the president with interagency coordination and unity of effort in foreign policy and national security, but 

the system rarely produces true unity of effort. Interagency working 

groups in the NSC or under a lead agency can set policy but cannot 

enforce compliance across the interagency. Since the president has no 

way to delegate his authority over these agencies, issue management 

for interagency foreign policy is overly centralized in the White 

House, and the president and his advisors must spend time on crisis 

management and dispute resolution, leaving little time for the formulation of strategic policy.20

In the more than two decades since Goldwater-Nichols created the 

joint military and increased the effectiveness of the DOD, hundreds 
6 │ INTRODUCTION

of authors have examined the problem of interagency unity of effort 

and offered various proposals for reform. Some have advocated comprehensive, Goldwater-Nichols type reforms. Military authors and 

defense-centric think tanks have often focused more narrowly on interagency solutions to the challenges of “complex contingency operations”21 or postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, 

largely arising out of the challenges the US military has faced in operations over the 21 years from US intervention in Panama to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This book reviews the current interagency structures established 

by the military, State Department, and White House; describes several cases of shortfalls in interagency unity of effort in peacetime engagements, humanitarian operations, and military operations; surveys the interagency reform literature; and finally, analyzes potential 

reforms and recommends a new model, focused particularly on the 

regional level.

Focusing below the national/strategic level considers interagency 

reform at two levels: operationally across a region and operationally 

in a subregion or country during crisis operations. Within each of 

these two levels, the universe of reform proposals can be grouped 

into four major categories: a military-led organization, a State Department–led organization, an integrated interagency organization, 

or a parallel structure with no single leader or organization in charge. 

This book argues that an improved interagency structure needs to:

1. Provide a nonmilitary voice and face for US foreign policy.

2. Produce fully coordinated planning.

3. Produce unity of effort during execution.

4. Be more efficient and effective than agencies working alone.

5. Give leaders authority commensurate with their responsibility.

6. Provide legitimacy to leaders’ decisions.

7. Enable leaders to access necessary resources.

8. Provide a clear chain of command to the president.

9. Avoid overburdening the president with operational or crisis 

matters.
INTRODUCTION │ 7

10. Balance the power and prestige of the Departments of State 

and Defense.

11. Develop interagency expertise among working-level personnel.

12. Minimize the financial, personnel, and material costs of reform.

13. Minimize agency culture shocks resulting from the reform.

Based on the understanding developed from review of current interagency structures, the shortfalls in unity of effort in several current 

and recent operations, and the goals for reform above, this book recommends a new structure with a State Department–led regional interagency headquarters. This US regional mission would lead all US 

foreign policy activities in the region, including those of the geographic combatant command and US embassies in the region. Each 

US regional mission would conduct subregional contingency operations by creating interagency task forces headed by a leader from the 

department or agency most appropriate to the mission.

Notes

1. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 17 September 2006 (incorporating change 1, 13 February 2008), II-1–2.

2. MAJ Brett G. Sylvia, USA, “Empowering Interagency Capabilities: A Regional 

Approach,” monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 25 May 2006), 25.

3. US Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart/Rudman Commission), Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report, 15 

February 2001, 62, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf.

4. Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 14.

5. Sylvia, “Empowering Interagency Capabilities,” 40.

6. Ibid.

7. US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Embassies as Command Posts in 

the Anti-Terror Campaign, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 15 December 2006, Senate Print 

109-52 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 2006), 2.

8. John Hillen, “The Changing Nature of the Political-Military Interface,” remarks, Joint Worldwide Planning Conference, Garmisch, Germany, 30 November 

2005), http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/58492.htm.

9. Louis J. Nigro Jr., “The Department of State and Strategic Integration: How 

Reinforcing State as an Institution Will Improve America’s Engagement with the 

World in the 21st Century,” in Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security, 

ed. Gabriel Marcella (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008), 258–

59; US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Insights and Best Practices: Interagency, 
8 │ INTRODUCTION

Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Coordination: A Joint Force Operational 

Perspective, Focus Paper no. 3 (Norfolk, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, July 2007), 2, 

http://jko.cmil.org/file/109/view; Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “President’s Proposed Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2011 for the Department of State and 

Foreign Operations,” testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on 

State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, 24 February 2010; and White 

House Office of Management and Budget, “The U.S. Department of Defense 2010 

Budget,” fact sheet, 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ assets/fy2010_factsheets/fy

10_defense8.pdf.

10. See Harry W. Kopp and Charles A. Gillespie, Life and Work in the U.S. Foreign 

Service (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008).

11. Priest, Mission, 45.

12. The 9/11 Commission Report, 22 July 2004, 94, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu

/911/report/911Report.pdf.

13. Hillen, “Changing Nature of the Political-Military Interface.” 

14. Ibid.

15. Senate, Embassies as Command Posts, 12.

16. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, quoted in Gabriel Marcella, “Understanding the Interagency Process: The Challenge of Adaptation,” in Affairs of State, 39.

17. Secretary Gates, quoted in “A Foreign Affairs Budget for the 21st Century,” 

Foreign Service Journal 85, no. 12 (December 2008): 54.

18. Secretary Gates, quoted in William I. Bacchus, “Regaining Relevance: Five 

Steps to Strengthen State,” Foreign Service Journal 86, nos. 7–8 (July/August 2009): 14.

19. Clark A. Murdock and Michèle A. Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. 

Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2005), 17.

20. Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), Forging a New Shield (Arlington, VA: Center for the Study of the Presidency, November 2008), vi–vii, downloadable in free e-Book or PDF format from http://www.scribd.com/doc/38667628/Forging

-a-New-Shield-SSI-2008-National-Security-Strategy; and Bruce R. Pirnie, Civilians 

and Soldiers: Achieving Better Coordination (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), 14.

21. “The more ambitious post–Cold War peace operations, currently [as of this 

1998 writing] styled ‘complex contingency operations,’ blur the traditional distinction between peace and war.” Pirnie, Civilians and Soldiers, 10.
Chapter 2

Current Practices—Military

The first step toward analyzing regional-level US foreign policy 

and national security planning and implementation is to understand 

the organizations and mechanisms the United States currently employs in these processes. Numerous actors, including ambassadors, 

country-level representatives of various federal agencies, and regional 

military geographic combatant commands and their subordinate 

forces around the globe—as well as headquarters of both military and 

civilian agencies in Washington—must work together to plan and execute US foreign policy and ensure national security.

This book focuses on two primary actors, the Department of Defense (primarily the military) and the Department of State, including 

the US Agency for International Development (USAID). It also considers the role of the National Security Council. The US military has 

made several attempts to take the lead in improving interagency unity 

of effort at the regional level.

Military-Led Interagency Coordination Mechanisms

Since World War II, the military has developed three primary tools 

to drive interagency unity of effort from the military side—the political advisor, the joint interagency task force, and the joint interagency 

coordination group.

Political Advisors 

Since 1952 the State Department has provided the military with 

political advisors, or POLADs (officially renamed foreign policy advisors in 2004, but the former term is still more commonly used), to 

directly advise senior military leaders on foreign policy issues.1

 As of 

January 2008, 26 POLAD positions were allocated to the four service 

chiefs in the Pentagon, six geographic combatant commands, four 

functional combatant commands, NATO headquarters and its key 

subordinate commands, as well as several subordinate US commands 

in combat zones. Congress funded 10 additional POLAD positions in 

2009 in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.2
10 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

The POLAD at the GCCs is a State Department FSO with ambassadorial rank assigned to provide foreign policy advice directly to the 

combatant commander. POLADs aid in assessing the diplomatic implications of military planning and strategy, serve as the principal 

source of counsel on international issues to the respective commander, provide the combatant commander with a State Department 

perspective, and serve as an information conduit between the combatant commander and the State Department (both the Bureau of 

Political-Military Affairs and the appropriate regional bureau). However, POLADs have no formal role as a coordinator between the 

State Department and the military and no authority to commit the 

State Department to any course of action. Indeed, the essence of the 

POLADs’ effectiveness is their ability to function as personal and 

confidential advisors to the military commander. Any requirement 

for formal reporting back to the State Department could compromise 

the necessary relationship of personal trust and confidence between 

the POLAD and the commander.3

While POLADs have no formal role in civil-military coordination, they form relationships up and down the military chain of command, as well as with other military headquarters, embassies, international organizations, NGOs, and civilian entities, all of which can 

facilitate interagency unity of effort. According to Dr. John Finney 

and Amb. Alphonse La Porta, both of whom served as POLADs to 

senior military commanders, the POLAD “can help translate the local environment into operational ground truth and can facilitate the 

conduct of operations on the ground through negotiation, facilitating allied and indigenous contacts, and providing access to local actors and institutions.”4

Joint Interagency Coordination Group

As the United States prepared for the global war on terrorism in 

response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, planners and 

policy makers in the Defense Department recognized the complex 

nature of the counterterrorism mission, and many came to believe a 

“whole of government” response using all elements of national power 

would be required. To facilitate this, the Joint Staff requested, and in 

February 2002 the Deputies Committee of the NSC approved, a joint 

interagency coordination group concept and directed the combatant 

commands to each establish a JIACG “to provide interagency advice 
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 11

and expertise to combatant commanders and their staffs, coordinate 

interagency counterterrorism plans and objectives, and integrate 

military, interagency, and host-nation efforts.”5

 By the time the NSC 

and Joint Staff issued their guidance, all of the combatant commands 

had already established some form of counterterrorism office and for 

the most part renamed whatever structure they had already created 

as a JIACG for counterterrorism (JIACG/CT).6

Originally, the JIACG was limited to the counterterrorism mission 

and prohibited “from making policy, tasking non-DoD personnel, or 

altering lines of authority and coordination channels already in place.”7

However, in the ensuing years the JIACG concept has evolved beyond 

counterterrorism—both under the guidance of the now-defunct US 

Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)8

 and as a result of unique conditions and initiatives at the combatant commands—so that JIACGs 

now also support “military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities, as well as operations ranging from crisis response 

and limited contingency operations to, if necessary, major operations 

and campaigns.”9

USJFCOM—the combatant command charged with military-wide 

joint doctrine, transformation, and organizational standardization 

until it was disestablished in August 2011—attempted to guide and 

standardize the development of the JIACG across the COCOMs.10

Broadening beyond the initial counterterrorism mission, or any other 

specific mission, USJFCOM envisioned a “full spectrum” JIACG at 

each COCOM as a full-time interagency planning and advisory body 

for the commander. The JIACG would support peacetime theater 

engagement as well as the full spectrum of military operations, and 

JIACG members would act as informational liaisons with their respective departments and agencies in Washington. The JIACG may 

also provide interface with host nations, IGOs, and NGOs.11 If combatant commanders employed joint military forces in an operation, 

JFCOM envisioned that they could either retain the JIACG at the 

COCOM headquarters or integrate selected members into the joint 

task force (JTF) established to conduct the operation.12

JFCOM codified its vision of the JIACG into doctrine in the two 

volumes of Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination 

during Joint Operations.

13 Additionally, in March 2007, JFCOM issued 

the Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination 

Group to provide nondoctrinal “best practices,” a “common, practical 
12 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

baseline for continuing the evolution of the JIACG,” and “a bridge 

between the evolving JIACG and its migration into doctrine.”14 Per 

these documents, JFCOM envisioned a standard COCOM JIACG as 

a “separate staff directorate or element of approximately 12 personnel” led by a full-time civilian director and “consisting primarily of 

USG [US government] civilian personnel with extensive interagency 

experience.”15 The notional staffing includes three military personnel, 

three DOD civilians (including the director), two FSOs, and one representative each from the USAID and the Departments of Justice, 

Homeland Security, and Transportation. JFCOM’s “standard model” 

for interagency coordination at the regional level is shown in figure 1.

The JFCOM “Standard Model”

Combatant

Commander

POLAD

Ambassador (State Dept.) Deputy

Commander

Staff (not all staff directorates are shown)

J-2 Intelligence

6 DoD Personnel:

-3 military personnel

-3 DoD civilians (incl. JIACG director)

6 Interagency Representatives:

-State (2)

-USAID

-Justice

-Homeland Security

-Transportation

Interagency

Intelligence

Community

Representatives

JIACG

Fielded Forces

JTF Joint Task Force

May include

selected JIACG

members

Figure 1. JFCOM standard model for interagency coordination 

Essentially, in the absence of other mechanisms to facilitate interagency unity of effort at the regional level, the DOD attempted to 

establish its own organic capability by creating the JIACGs and empowering the combatant commanders to conduct interagency coordination. However, because the JIACG is located in one agency (the 

DOD) and has no presidential directive or legislative sanction, other 

agencies are under no obligation to participate. Indeed, the initial 
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 13

JIACG concept was not well received by the other agencies and departments asked to participate, as many perceived a military-led 

JIACG as an erosion of their autonomy or authority.16

Because other executive branch agencies are so much smaller than 

the DOD, providing even one or two qualified individuals to each of 

the GCCs is a significant drain on their available personnel. Thus, 

many agencies proposed providing representatives to the JIACGs on 

an as-needed basis to develop a specific plan or to participate in an 

exercise or crisis rather than providing permanent representatives. 

William Olson, who served as both a deputy assistant secretary of 

state and a deputy assistant secretary of defense, says even if there is 

enough work to justify a full-time JIACG during a crisis, it is not clear 

that justification exists for the full-time use of limited personnel resources otherwise.17 However, part-time JIACG staffing creates a lack 

of continuity and inhibits team building. 

In December 2003, the DOD attempted to make it easier for other 

agencies to send personnel to the JIACGs by using DOD funds to pay 

for individuals from the State Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Treasury to staff JIACGs at nine COCOMs. However, as Col Michael Bogdanos, USMCR, who served in US Central 

Command’s (CENTCOM) JIACG, notes, “This decision overlooked 

the possible effect on the nonreimbursed agencies, [which] became 

less inclined to continue providing representatives for JIACGs after 

they learned they did not make the final cut.”18 Similarly, Bogdanos 

criticizes JFCOM’s standard 12-person model for excluding other 

agencies such as Treasury, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the CIA, and other organizations which played key 

roles during the time he served with CENTCOM’s JIACG. He says 

each COCOM should be permitted to fund representatives from the 

agencies and departments best suited to its regional issues rather 

than following a one-size-fits-all model.19

The COCOM staff now has potentially two (or more) State Department representatives—the commander’s POLAD and State’s representative to the JIACG. The relationship between the JIACG and the 

POLAD is neither agreed upon nor well documented. As the JIACG 

concept was developed, POLADs reportedly believed they should 

not be a part of the JIACG because it would undermine their current 

role with the commander.20 However, former POLADs Finney and 

La Porta disagree, saying POLADs should both serve their individual 

commanders and exercise some level of oversight over the JIACG “to 
14 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

provide a broad regional picture and to help in bridging U.S. agency, 

region, and multilateral interests,” perhaps even dual-hatting the 

POLAD as the JIACG director.21 Currently, the nature of the POLADJIACG relationship is left up to each individual COCOM.

In interviews conducted in 2003 with personnel from State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury, participants pointed out several pros and 

cons of the JIACG concept. On the positive side, JIACGs can provide 

civilian agencies with access to DOD resources, facilitate information 

sharing, remove institutional barriers, and provide the DOD with 

outside perspectives. One participant said the regional focus is good 

since “terrorists don’t care about borders.”22 On the negative side, respondents perceive a lack of JIACG mission clarity. Some like a narrow focus on counterterrorism, while others believe the JIACG 

should have a larger scope. Many cited a lack of understanding of the 

JIACG’s role on both the military and civilian sides. Participants also 

said the lack of continuity on JIACG staffs was a problem. Finally, 

they felt the JIACG was too DOD-centric, saying, “The military is 

driving the JIACG process too much. . . . JIACGs should not be beholden to DOD or regional [combatant commanders].”23

The issue remains open as to whether the JIACG is an effective 

solution for achieving interagency unity of effort at the regional level. 

The construct is military-centric and still has little input or commitment from other agencies.24 Additionally, the JIACG construct expects to produce unity of effort but still does not provide any leader 

with unity of command. Olson concludes that “it is not clear that the 

JIACG concept or its reality can deliver” on the level of interagency 

unity of effort expected of it.25

Joint Interagency Task Force 

In addition to the POLAD and the JIACG, a combatant commander 

may create a subordinate joint task force with enough interagency representation to be designated a joint interagency task force. Currently, 

two long-standing units are so designated—JIATF-West (JIATF-W) 

under US Pacific Command (PACOM) and JIATF-South (JIATF-S) 

under US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Both date back to 

1989 and are focused on the counternarcotics mission. A third unit, 

JIATF-Iraq (JIATF-I) was established in 2008 to facilitate interagency 

unity of effort against threats to Iraq’s stability but has since been disestablished.26 NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 15

and US Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) established three combined 

joint interagency task forces (CJIATF) to focus on the complex “nexus 

of insurgency, narcotics, corruption, and criminality” in Afghanistan—CJIATF-Nexus, CJIATF-435, and CJIATF-Shafafiyat.

In current US joint military doctrine, JIATFs are mentioned only 

in JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations; JP 3-05.1, Joint Special 

Operations Task Force Operations; and JP 3-40, Combating Weapons 

of Mass Destruction.

27 A 2007 JFCOM white paper, while acknowledging that the JIATF concept is “not fully developed in joint doctrine,” defined the entity as “an interagency organization under a 

single military director that coordinates counterdrug operations at 

the operational and tactical level,” seemingly limiting the JIATF construct to the counternarcotics mission, though the concept is at least 

mentioned in doctrine dealing with the counter-WMD (weapons of 

mass destruction) and special operations missions.28 The white paper 

further notes that, unlike a JIACG, a JIATF “exercises tactical control 

over attached elements when executing a mission.”29

Like the JIACG, the JIATF is codified in neither executive order 

nor legislation; a JIATF derives its authority through a memorandum of agreement signed by the head of each participating agency 

or department.30 The JFCOM white paper notes that while agencies 

subordinate some of their assets under another agency’s leadership, 

the JIATFs do not have true unity of command because “the different agencies still retain many of their authorities, responsibilities, 

and prerogatives.” However, because many of the participants’ fieldlevel headquarters are collocated in the JIATF in something of an integrated command structure, the organization has the ability to cut 

across traditional agency stovepipes and facilitate rapid integrated 

action. The JFCOM white paper concludes that existing JIATFs took 

a long time to develop the level of trust needed to work collaboratively, so planners should not expect to form new ones rapidly for a 

crisis operation.31

Interagency Structures at 

the Geographic Combatant Commands

The US military has five geographic combatant commands with 

significant foreign policy responsibilities: US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), US Pacific Command (PACOM), US European Command (EUCOM), US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and US 
16 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

Africa Command (AFRICOM).32 This list begins with the most traditional war-fighting GCC and ends with one whose primary function 

is theater engagement. Each GCC has evolved a unique structure and 

set of tools to promote interagency unity of effort in the planning and 

execution of national security within its respective region.

US Central Command 

CENTCOM’s interagency entities at the unified command headquarters level include the commander’s POLAD, a JIACG (now called 

the interagency action group or IAG), a target synchronization board 

(TSB), and three JIATFs in Afghanistan.33 CENTCOM’s structures to 

facilitate interagency unity of effort are shown in figure 2. 

CENTCOM

Combatant

Commander

POLAD

Ambassador (State Dept.) Deputy

Commander

J-2 IntelligenceJ-5 Plans, Policy & StrategyJ-3

Operations

IAG Interagency Action Group

(formerly the JIACG)

8 Interagency Representatives:

-State

-USAID

-Treasury

-DEA

-ICE

-CPB

-FBI (2)

Interagency

Intelligence

Community

Representatives

-USAID

Fielded Forces

ISAF / 

USFOR-A Afghanistan

Force Protection

Office

1 Interagency Representative:

-DSS (State)

-Deputy FPA is also an

FSO from State

-Iran-focused FSO (State)

CJIATF-Nexus 

CJIATF-435

CJIATF-Shafafiyat

Staff (not all staff directorates are shown)

Figure 2. CENTCOM structures for interagency unity of effort

The ambassador serving as the POLAD, assisted by two deputies 

from the State Department and a military foreign area officer focused 

on Middle East peace, executes the traditional role as the primary 

foreign policy advisor to the commander.34 Both the POLAD and the 
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 17

State Department’s liaison to the IAG are conduits for coordination 

and information sharing from CENTCOM to the State Department 

headquarters and to the US embassies in each country in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR). Other elements of the staff, such 

as the military officers serving as security cooperation desk officers 

for each country in the AOR, also frequently conduct business directly with both the State Department headquarters and the US embassy in their assigned country.35 At CENTCOM, there is no formal 

relationship between the POLAD’s office and the IAG.

CENTCOM formed a JIACG in October 2001 specifically for operations in Afghanistan, initially as more of a counterterrorism task 

force and intelligence fusion center than a staff coordination element. 

(Given its mission, this organization should probably have been called 

a JIATF rather than a JIACG.) The unit deployed to Afghanistan in 

November 2001 with representation from the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), the Customs Service, and New York’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, among others—a total of 36 US military personnel 

and 57 non-DOD personnel, as well as several British and Australian 

special forces personnel—leaving a small detachment at CENTCOM 

headquarters in Tampa to facilitate communication from Afghanistan back to the various agencies in Washington.36 In Afghanistan the 

unit functioned primarily as an intelligence-gathering fusion center 

and assisted in operating the main interrogation facility in Bagram. 

Bogdanos concludes that although the unit achieved several tactical 

successes in Afghanistan, it lacked the resources to assist in shaping 

theater- or national-level interagency strategy. 37

Upon returning to the United States in April 2002, CENTCOM’s 

JIACG transformed from a counterterrorism-specific task force to 

more of a “full-spectrum” coordinating group akin to the JFCOM 

model. By September 2002, the JIACG came under the supervision of 

CENTCOM’s director of operations (J-3),38 dual-hatted as the JIACG 

director, and CENTCOM established a JIACG force structure of 26 

military positions.39 Prior to establishment of a full-spectrum JIACG, 

CENTCOM’s plans were usually in final form before being seen by 

other agencies. Bogdanos says that through the efforts of the fullspectrum JIACG, “all relevant agencies participated in the plan’s actual development.” While the JIACG representatives of the various 

agencies could not speak for or coordinate on behalf of their agencies, 

they were able to conduct “informal coordination with their parent 
18 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

agencies in advance of the plan’s release, enabling them to advise 

CENTCOM of what that particular agency’s official position would 

ultimately be.” In addition, the JIACG “provided both interagencytrained liaison officers and task-organized teams” to CENTCOM’s 

subordinate commands around the world. “This export of liaison officers and mini-JIACGs brought the same force-multiplying benefits 

to subordinate commands that [the] JIACG brought to CENTCOM.”40

In March 2003, the JIACG again assumed a tactical focus. The majority of its personnel deployed to Iraq “to search for evidence [of] 

terrorist-financing networks and terrorist activity in the United 

States, to investigate United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution violations, and to initiate criminal investigations of U.S. and foreign individuals who aided Iraq with its weapons of mass destruction 

programs.”41 Lt Col Terry Sopher, the first CENTCOM JIACG J-3 and 

later its deputy director, says that the JIACG was not as successful in 

Iraq as it had been in Afghanistan due to “leader turbulence and the 

resultant shifting of mission and focus, rotation of personnel,” and 

lack of JIACG involvement in planning the invasion of Iraq, with the 

DOD citing operational security in its refusal to authorize the interagency representatives access to the developing plan.42

In July 2004, the JIACG again returned to CENTCOM headquarters and resumed its full-spectrum focus, providing interagency advice and facilitating coordination of CENTCOM operations and 

plans.43 It reported to the CENTCOM deputy commander rather 

than to the J-3, to whom it had reported prior to departing for Iraq.44

Today, CENTCOM’s interagency action group (formerly the JIACG) 

once again reports to the J-3 and currently has several military billets 

and eight interagency billets: one each from the State Department, 

USAID, Treasury, DEA, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and two from the 

FBI.45 Each agency retains operational control of its personnel, but 

the senior IAG leader at headquarters or in the field has tactical control. Since its establishment in 2001, the director and deputy director 

of the IAG have been military personnel.46 Prior to the end of US 

military operations in Iraq in December 2011, the IAG had military 

liaison officers at the headquarters of the Multinational Force–Iraq 

(MNF-I), the FBI’s Baghdad operations center, and the Iraq Threat 

Finance Cell (co-led by CENTCOM and the Treasury Department to 

disrupt the flow of money to both insurgents and terrorists in Iraq) in 
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 19

addition to the headquarters presence in Tampa. The IAG still maintains a liaison presence in Afghanistan at the US Embassy in Kabul.47

Besides the interagency personnel in the POLAD’s office and the 

IAG, CENTCOM has a representative from the USAID working for 

the director of plans, policy, and strategy (J-5) and a State Department diplomatic security service officer in the J-3 force protection 

office. Filling the interagency billets continues to be a challenge, 

though most at CENTCOM are currently filled.48

In August 2004, its deputy commander decided CENTCOM 

needed a higher-level entity than the action-officer-level JIACG to 

facilitate interagency coordination, so he established an interagency 

executive steering committee, since renamed the Target Synchronization Board.49 Today, the TSB operates out of the IAG, and the interagency personnel from the IAG sit on the board, together with 

representatives from other headquarters directorates and from 

CENTCOM’s deployed task force in Afghanistan. The TSB meets 

approximately weekly and is chaired either by the IAG director or 

the J-3.50

CENTCOM has also established JIATFs in the field. In August 

2008, it established a joint interagency task force in Baghdad, Iraq 

(JIATF-I). According to Robert Birkenes, an FSO who served as the 

USAID representative to JIATF-I, Amb. Ryan Crocker and Gen David Petraeus jointly created JIATF-I as an interagency planning team 

focused on threats to Iraq’s stability from Iran and al-Qaeda. JIATF-I 

included representatives from the USAID, the State Department, the 

Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).51

JIATF-I participated in the development of a joint campaign plan 

(JCP) for Iraq, “the first interagency attempt to define all priorities, 

objectives and approaches to be taken by all U.S. agencies in Iraq.” The 

JCP was jointly approved by Ambassador Crocker and Gen Ray Odierno in December 2008. Upon implementation of the JCP, JIATF-I 

identified nonmilitary means to assist in countering threats to Iraq 

from foreign terrorists and Iran and worked with both the embassy 

and MNF-I to track progress toward achieving the goals spelled out 

in the plan. Birkenes credits JIATF-I with creating and managing the 

whole-of-government strategy for Iraq as expressed in the JCP and 

with assisting in weakening violent extremists in Iraq, leading to a 40 

percent decrease in weekly attacks against coalition forces after a year 
20 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

of operation.52 The mission of the JIATF has since been subsumed by 

the US Embassy in Baghdad.53

In 2010 the ISAF and USFOR-A established three combined joint 

interagency task forces to focus on the complex “nexus of insurgency, 

narcotics, corruption, and criminality” in Afghanistan.54 These include CJIATF-Nexus, CJIATF-435, and CJIATF-Shafafiyat. The addition of combined to the unit designation indicates these organizations 

are multinational as well as joint and interagency.

CJIATF-Nexus focuses on counternarcotics intelligence collection, campaign planning, and targeting. It analyzes key trafficking 

networks and assists with related anticorruption efforts by identifying corrupt Afghan powerbrokers. Established in early 2010, the unit 

reached full operational capability later that year. It provides intelligence analysis support to other US and NATO units, such as CJIATFShafafiyat, as well as to Afghan counternarcotics forces.55

CJIATF-435 focuses on detention operations and the criminal justice system. It evolved from JTF-435, established in September 2009, 

reaching initial operational capability as a CJIATF in January 2010 

and full operational capability in July 2010. CJIATF-435 was responsible for US detention operations in Afghanistan until that function 

transferred to the Afghan government in March 2012. It currently 

works with that government to assist in strengthening its judicial system—including investigative and prosecutorial capabilities—with the 

goal of developing an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned judicial process.56

CJIATF-Shafafiyat (which means “transparency” in Dari) focuses 

on corruption. The unit was established in August 2010 and reached 

full operational capability in October 2010. It was formed to “foster 

a common understanding of the corruption problem in Afghanistan, plan and implement ISAF anti-corruption efforts, and integrate 

USFOR-A anti-corruption activities with those of key partners.”57

Little information is available about these three CJIATFs beyond 

their missions and recent activities, such as interagency composition, 

organizational structure, and the nature of the memoranda of understanding that govern interagency contributions to these organizations. Also not clear is the command relationship between the ISAF/

USFOR-A commander and the embassy coordinating director of rule 

of law and law enforcement.58 Because of the lack of doctrinal guidance on JIATFs and the ongoing field-driven evolutions to US and 

coalition organizations in Afghanistan, some CENTCOM planners 

question whether all three of these are actually CJIATFs under a sub-
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 21

ordinate commander or actually elements of the USFOR-A, ISAF, or 

embassy staffs.59

US Pacific Command

The US Pacific Command has a POLAD and has had a JIACG 

since 2001 and a JIATF since 1989. Additionally, PACOM briefly experimented with establishing a second JIACG under crisis conditions. Today, the JIACG is part of the new J-9 Pacific Outreach Directorate, with the POLAD dual-hatted as the J-9 director.60 PACOM’s 

current structures to facilitate interagency unity of effort are shown 

in figure 3.

Combatant

Commander

Deputy

Commander

J-2 IntelligenceJ-9 Pacific OutreachJ-4

Logistics

J-91: JIACG Joint Interagency

Coordination Group

2 Interagency Representatives:

-State

1 International Liaison:

-UK Royal Navy

Interagency

Intelligence

Community

Representatives

1 Interagency Representative:

-USAID (Humanitarian

Assistance Officer)

Fielded Forces

JIATF-W Honolulu

PACOM

Led by Coast Guard (DHS)

Interagency Representatives:

-Coast Guard

-National intelligence agencies

-Law enforcement agencies:

DEA, FBI, ICE

Led by Ambassador (State)

Dual-hatted as POLAD

-USAID

Staff (not all staff directorates are shown)

Figure 3. PACOM structures for interagency unity of effort

Prior to 9/11, PACOM’s then-commander ADM Dennis Blair 

proposed the creation of a JIATF for counterterrorism (CT) in the 

Asia-Pacific region (JIATF-CTAP). By December 2001, this organization evolved into PACOM’s JIACG for counterterrorism (JIACG/

CT). Admiral Blair declared that the JIACG/CT would be the command’s office of primary responsibility for the global war on terrorism and directed the organization to conduct planning for a whole-
22 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

of-government CT campaign in the region.61 According to retired 

ambassador Edward Marks, a contractor on PACOM’s JIACG/CT, 

the organization began by focusing on tactical issues like actionable 

intelligence and measures to eliminate key terrorist actors but, by late 

2002, expanded its focus to developing working relations with US 

embassies as well as bilateral and multilateral engagements with governments in the region. Marks characterized the JIACG/CT as a “tiger team” that pulled together disparate elements of the PACOM staff 

across J-code lanes and produced a CT program for PACOM that was 

“well coordinated if not integrated with the programs of the other 

members of the interagency community.”62

For a time, the JIACG/CT placed liaison teams in key US embassies to facilitate communication between the JIACG at PACOM 

headquarters and the tactical operations of the ambassador and the 

interagency country team. After a year, the liaison teams were deemed 

unnecessary, as the defense attaché or military group commander already at the embassy could provide that function.63

The JIACG/CT was led by a military O-6 officer and initially staffed 

with more than 40 military personnel (both active and reserve), but 

PACOM had difficulty getting interagency participants. By the end of 

2002, it had just three interagency personnel: a full-time analyst from 

the NSA, a retired FSO from State, and an officer from Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on 60-day temporary duty assignment.64 An FBI officer served between 2004 and 2005, and one 

USAID senior staff member served in 2005. From its inception until 

mid 2005, PACOM’s JIACG/CT was the “most robust JIACG as measured by personnel and budget allocation among all of the combatant 

commands.”65 Over time, manning authorizations declined, and by 

midyear, the organization had just 12 authorized military billets, one 

DOD civilian billet, five DOD contractors, and three interagency 

representatives, though the agencies had difficulty filling the nonDOD billets.66

From its creation until mid 2005, the JIACG/CT was an advisory 

group reporting to the PACOM commander through the chief of 

staff, though the JIACG/CT personnel worked in the J-3 for administrative purposes.67 However, in mid 2005 PACOM commander ADM 

William Fallon assessed that the JIACG/CT was not well integrated 

with the rest of the staff and transferred responsibility for CT operations to the J-3 along with most of the personnel, including most interagency representatives. The remaining, much smaller organization 
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 23

was named simply the JIACG and aligned under the J-5, where it remained for several years, working on maritime security, the counterterrorism fellowship program, and some funding management responsibilities.68

The JIACG received a substantial increase in importance and visibility when PACOM commander ADM Robert Willard elected in 

October 2009 to create a new J-9 Pacific Outreach Directorate, which 

became operational on 15 January 2010.69 The J-9 is led by PACOM’s 

POLAD (who also retains the traditional role as a direct foreign policy advisor to the commander) and includes the JIACG, as well as a 

public-private partnership division, a legislative affairs division, and 

PACOM’s Washington liaison office. The mission of the new J-9 is to 

“orchestrate and enable enduring, collaborative partnerships between 

PACOM leadership/staff [and] key U.S. government, nongovernmental and international partners by facilitating introductions, information sharing, and collaboration in support of U.S. objectives” in 

the AOR.70 The JIACG within this new J-9 has a representative from 

the State Department and one from the USAID, as well as a liaison 

from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), a Royal Navy 

officer acting as the UK advisor, five US military officers, and a DOD 

civilian. The military officers on the JIACG further broaden PACOM’s interagency relationships by forming and maintaining relationships with Washington-based representatives from Commerce, 

Homeland Security, Treasury, and the Department of the Interior 

who are not assigned to PACOM. Beyond the JIACG and the POLAD’s office, PACOM also has interagency intelligence representatives in the intelligence directorate (J-2) and a USAID humanitarian 

assistance advisor in the logistics directorate (J-4) who can advise its 

logisticians in response to humanitarian emergencies.71

After the December 2004 Asian tsunami, the PACOM commander 

established a second JIACG, called a full-spectrum JIACG, to focus 

on interagency coordination in response to the disaster, staffing it 

with 30 individuals from across the PACOM staff. The USAID detailed two experts from its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 

(OFDA), but after spending some time in the JIACG, they moved to 

the J-3’s joint operations center, where they were better able to coordinate with Washington-based relief agencies and with the field, as 

well as provide their expert advice directly to the J-3. Because the 

disaster struck without warning and relief operations began immediately, there was no time for interagency operational planning. Further-
24 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

more, the initial PACOM response operation was never officially 

transferred to another agency, thus alleviating the need for a formal 

post-emergency transfer plan. While the relief operation is generally 

considered to have been a success, Ambassador Marks found little 

evidence that this JIACG contributed much, saying that despite its 

“full-spectrum” name, it was in effect an “ad hoc, short-term, single 

subject JIACG” with no interagency representation and largely redundant to other interagency coordination channels.72

The other significant interagency organization in PACOM is the 

Joint Interagency Task Force–West (JIATF-W), PACOM’s executive 

agent for DOD support to counternarcotics initiatives in the region. 

JIATF-W provides interagency intelligence fusion, supports US law 

enforcement, and develops partner-nation counternarcotics capabilities with the goal of detecting, disrupting, and dismantling narcoticsrelated transnational threats in the region. JIATF-W was initially established in California in 1989 as Joint Task Force-5 (JTF-5). It was 

granted additional interagency authorities and renamed JIATF-W in 

1994 and was collocated with PACOM headquarters in Hawaii in 

2004. JIATF-W is led by a US Coast Guard rear admiral and consists 

of “approximately 82 uniformed and civilian members of all five military services as well as representatives from the national intelligence 

community and U.S. federal law enforcement agencies” including the 

DEA, FBI, and ICE.73

JIATF-W has used its interagency mix of capabilities to achieve US 

counternarcotics goals in the region by deploying intelligence analysts 

to US embassies to support law enforcement agencies, constructing 

interagency intelligence fusion centers for partner nations, developing 

infrastructure such as border patrol stations and customs checkpoints 

in four partner nations, and conducting counternarcotics training for 

six partner-nation militaries and law enforcement agencies.74

In pursuing its counternarcotics mission, JIATF-W is closely 

aligned with PACOM’s counterterrorism, theater security cooperation, and maritime security missions. The synergy between counternarcotics and counterterrorism has been particularly helpful, because many of the capabilities needed to fight narcotics trafficking 

are also useful in fighting terrorism. In addition, many governments 

in the region have been much more open to initial cooperation with 

the United States in counternarcotics while reluctant to openly join 

in its global war on terrorism. The initial counternarcotics cooperation often opens the door to follow-on engagement to develop host 
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 25

nation capabilities for combatting local terrorist, insurgent, and criminal threats.75

US European Command

EUCOM entities for facilitating interagency unity of effort include 

the traditional POLAD and a JIACG, now called the J-9 Directorate 

of Interagency Partnering. In January 2010, EUCOM commander 

ADM James Stavridis dual-hatted the POLAD as the EUCOM civilian deputy (ECCD), creating a command structure with a military 

commander, a military deputy, and a civilian deputy—similar to 

structures previously established at SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM. 

The EUCOM commander is dual-hatted as NATO Supreme Allied 

Commander, Europe, and spends much time at NATO headquarters 

in Mons, Belgium, leaving day-to-day EUCOM operations in the 

hands of the Stuttgart, Germany–based military and civilian deputy 

commanders.76 EUCOM’s current structures to facilitate interagency 

unity of effort are shown in figure 4.

Combatant

Commander

Deputy

Commander

J-2 IntelligenceJ-9 Interagency Partnering

7 Interagency Representatives:

-State (2)

-USAID

-DoE

-CBP

Interagency

Intelligence

Community

Representatives

Fielded Forces

(Formerly the JIACG)

-ICE

-Treasury

EUCOM

ECCD EUCOM Civilian Deputy

Ambassador (State Dept.)

Dual-hatted as POLAD

-DEA

Staff (not all staff directorates are shown)

Figure 4. EUCOM structures for interagency unity of effort

EUCOM established a JIACG in October 2001 in response to NSC 

and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) guidance. From 2001 to 2002, its focus 

was on interagency and international coordination of actions to 
26 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

facilitate US goals in the global war on terrorism in the region, such as 

overflight rights, maritime interdiction, and intelligence sharing.77

EUCOM’s JIACG started as a stand-alone staff element in the headquarters with a DOD civilian senior executive service (SES) director 

and an Army general officer deputy director who reported to the EUCOM commander through the chief of staff and deputy commander. 

As with other COCOMs, EUCOM staffed its JIACG with military 

billets from across the headquarters, but non-DOD interagency participation was more difficult to obtain. However, by July 2002, the 

JIACG had either representatives from or access to individuals from 

State, Commerce, Justice, Treasury, several intelligence agencies, and 

other specialized experts.78

In 2003 EUCOM broadened the JIACG’s portfolio beyond counterterrorism to include participation in the full spectrum of plans and 

operations in the region, including security cooperation.79 Along with 

this broadening of mission, the JIACG transitioned from a standalone staff reporting to the chief of staff to an element of the operations directorate (J-3). Under the new construct, the SES-level civilian 

director was eliminated, and the director became a brigadier general 

who also served as the deputy J-3. At this time, the JIACG consisted of 

29 military personnel plus interagency representatives from the FBI, 

DEA, ICE, and Treasury’s OFAC, while representatives from State, the 

DOE, DTRA, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Coast Guard, and several intelligence agencies were present elsewhere in the EUCOM headquarters with linkages to the JIACG.80 In addition to its presence in the J-3, 

the JIACG maintained full-time representation in EUCOM’s standing 

joint force headquarters to both maintain situational awareness and 

provide interagency input to EUCOM’s current operations.81

In 2007 the JIACG became the commander’s interagency engagement group (CIEG) and moved from the J-3 to the commander’s special staff, headed by an SES-level DOD civilian. The CIEG focused on 

developing relationships by hosting a series of conferences with interagency, international, and academic participants to provide EUCOM leadership and staff with a broad range of inputs on issues such 

as global supply chain management, money laundering, drug trafficking, Islamic identity in Europe, and challenges the command 

would likely face in 2020.82

In November 2009, under EUCOM’s new commander, Admiral 

Stavridis, the CIEG became the J-9 partnering directorate. The direc-
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 27

torate still has an SES-level DOD civilian director who reports to the 

State Department ambassador serving as the dual-hatted POLAD 

and EUCOM civilian deputy—the only staff directorate reporting directly to the ECCD.83 While PACOM kept a JIACG division within its 

J-9 partnering directorate, EUCOM eliminated a separately named 

organization and spread the interagency coordination mission across 

its new J-9. The EUCOM J-9’s mission is to “integrate the efforts of all 

[USG] agencies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels,” lead 

“the EUCOM effort to integrate interagency, academia, NGOs [international organizations], and private sector partners to better execute 

the EUCOM mission through a ‘Whole of Society Approach,’ ” and 

advise the EUCOM commander “on objectives, support requirements, authorities, and limitations of other [USG] agencies.”84 The 

J-9, by mid 2010, had interagency representatives from State (2), ICE, 

USAID, and Treasury, and expected to acquire representatives from 

the DOE, the CBP, and the DEA.85

US Southern Command

It is particularly important to ensure that US foreign policy in 

SOUTHCOM’s region of Latin America and the Caribbean does not 

have a military face and voice. Between 1898 and 1994, the US government successfully intervened at least 41 times to change governments 

there, and Latin Americans remember this.86 According to a 2006 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, “In Latin America . . . military and intelligence efforts are viewed with suspicion, making it difficult to pursue meaningful cooperation on a counterterrorism 

agenda,” and “Latin American suspicions of American pressure and 

what is seen as an unspoken threat of military intervention run deep.”87

Given this sensitivity and that US goals in Latin America and the 

Caribbean are less about preparing for military operations and more 

about building international partnerships—working with other US 

agencies as well as NGOs and IGOs—SOUTHCOM has developed 

structures to facilitate interagency unity of effort in the region.88

These include a State Department ambassador dual-hatted as the 

POLAD and the civilian deputy to the SOUTHCOM commander; a 

JIACG, now called the J-9 partnering directorate; and a JIATF for 

counternarcotics operations hailed as the model both for JIATFs and 

for interagency cooperation in general. It also formed a headquarters 

command structure that until recently was built around partnership 
28 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

rather than a traditional J-code structure. SOUTHCOM structures to 

facilitate interagency unity of effort are shown in figure 5.

Combatant

Commander

Deputy

Commander

Staff (J-Coded) (not all staff directorates are shown)

J-2 IntelligenceJ-9

Partnering

3 Interagency Representatives:

-State (2)

Interagency

Intelligence

Community

Representatives

Fielded Forces

(Formerly the JIACG)

-USAID

Civilian

Deputy Commander

Ambassador (State Dept.)

Dual-hatted as POLAD

SOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command

12 Interagency Representatives:

-FBI (2)

-ICE (2)

-ATF

-CPB

Acquiring by summer 2010:

-State (4)

-DoE (2)

-USAID/OFDA

-DSS (State)

-Coast Guard (2)

Other Staff Directorates

JIATF-S Key West

Led by Coast Guard (DHS)

Interagency Representatives:

-Coast Guard

-National intelligence agencies

-Law enforcement agencies:

DEA, FBI, CBP

International Military Forces:

-UK, France, the Netherlands

International Liaisons:

-Brazilian Intelligence Agency

-Colombian, Ecuadorian, 

Peruvian, & El Salvadoran Air

Forces

-Mexican Navy

Figure 5. SOUTHCOM structures for interagency unity of effort

Looking first at the overall headquarters structure, former 

SOUTHCOM commander (and EUCOM commander as of June 

2009), Admiral Stavridis said in 2008, “We are working to create an 

organization that can best adapt itself to working with the interagency, with our international partners and even with the privatepublic sector.”89 On 1 October 2008, SOUTHCOM transitioned to a 

structure with two deputies reporting to the four-star military commander—a three-star military deputy focused on military operations 

and an ambassadorial-rank FSO as the civilian deputy focused on 

civil-military activities. SOUTHCOM chose to do away with the traditional stand-alone POLAD, instead using this FSO as the civilian 

deputy and foreign policy advisor to the COCOM.

In October 2008, SOUTHCOM also replaced the traditional 

J-coded staff structure with a new six-directorate structure—three 

mission directorates to promote regional security, stability, and part-
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 29

nering, respectively, and three functional directorates to support the 

mission directorates.90 However, in January 2010, new SOUTHCOM 

commander Gen Douglas Fraser transitioned back to the standard 

J-code structure. This change was largely a result of the January 2010 

earthquake in Haiti. To assist SOUTHCOM in the response effort, 

hundreds of military officers from US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and other staffs came to augment the SOUTHCOM staff and 

establish a joint task force. During this influx, SOUTHCOM found reverting to the standard structure greatly simplified staff coordination.91

SOUTHCOM formed a JIACG in 2003, initially staffed by a single 

lieutenant colonel in the J-9 transformation directorate, to “facilitate 

coordination, enhance information sharing, and integrate the planning efforts between [SOUTHCOM] and the interagency community.” In 2004 JIACG duties passed to two contractors who periodically convened meetings of interagency personnel assigned to 

SOUTHCOM’s JIATF-S or to their respective agencies’ Miami field 

offices to collaborate on specific requirements dealing with counternarcotics, foreign internal defense for SOUTHCOM partner nations, 

and contingency planning for stabilization operations. By 2005 the 

JIACG expanded to include four military personnel and two or three 

DOD civilians, as well as the contractors. This larger DOD team 

worked with five part-time representatives (one each) from State, 

Treasury, the FBI, Customs and Border Protection’s Office of Border 

Patrol, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. 

Moreover, the J-3 operations directorate sent liaison officers to the 

JIACG in the J-9 “to maintain staff interoperability.” In 2006 SOUTHCOM commander ADM James Stavridis established a more robust, 

full-time JIACG, still within the J-9.92 In the 2008 reorganization, the 

J-9 directorate became the new partnering directorate, and the JIACG 

changed its name to become the interagency coordination group under the integration division within the partnering directorate.93

In January 2010, when SOUTHCOM reverted to the J-code structure, the partnering directorate became the J-9. What started as the 

JIACG is now simply called the J-9 partnering directorate.94 The J-9 

has three interagency billets—two from the State Department and 

one from USAID. Twelve other interagency billets are spread across 

the staff, including two from the FBI, two from ICE, one from the 

ATF, one from CBP, two from the DOE, one from USAID’s OFDA, 

one from the State Department’s DSS, and two from the Coast Guard. 

Four additional FSOs from the State Department were projected to 
30 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

join SOUTHCOM in the summer of 2010.95 The number of agencies 

represented in SOUTHCOM is larger than in any other GCC, in large 

part because many of the agencies have regional offices near the 

SOUTHCOM headquarters. In addition to maintaining contacts 

with Washington and with US embassy country teams, the interagency staff across the SOUTHCOM headquarters coordinates frequently with these regional offices, meeting monthly to discuss regional issues. Through the State Department representative, the J-9 

has also established a dialogue with several NGOs.96

SOUTHCOM’s Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF-S) in 

Key West, Florida, was created in 1999 from the consolidation of two 

other counternarcotics task forces that the DOD established in 1989.97

The JIATF’s mission is to detect, monitor, and consign suspected narcotics trafficking targets to appropriate law enforcement agencies; 

promote regional security cooperation; and coordinate US country 

team and partner-nation counternarcotics initiatives.98 Because the 

Posse Comitatus Act limits the use of the US military in federal law 

enforcement, military personnel and assets can detect and monitor 

counternarcotics targets; however, law enforcement agencies must 

execute any necessary actions. Because these agencies are represented 

in the JIATF, the transition from military monitoring to law enforcement action “happens with little or no disruption.”99

JIATF-S has an integrated interagency structure, including a US 

Coast Guard admiral as its director, an officer from CBP as vice director, and participants from all US military branches, the DEA, FBI, 

Customs, Homeland Security, and elements of the US intelligence 

community. Interagency integration continues through the lower levels of the organization as well; while the directors for intelligence and 

operations are both military officers, the deputy for intelligence is from 

the DEA, and the deputy for operations is from CBP.100 This integrated 

structure also includes a key element—all personnel assigned to the 

task force, regardless of their parent agency, are rated by their bosses 

on the task force rather than by someone from their parent agency, 

providing the all-important ability to reward personnel for their job at 

the task force rather than for loyalty to their agency or department.101

JIATF-S is also a multinational organization, with participants 

from countries both inside and outside SOUTHCOM’s AOR working 

together both at the JIATF-S headquarters and in combined force 

packages across the region. The United Kingdom, France, and the 

Netherlands (all of which govern territories in the region) provide 
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 31

ships, aircraft, and liaison officers to the task force, and the commander of the Netherlands Forces Caribbean also commands a subordinate task group under JIATF-S. From within the AOR, JIATF-S 

has liaison personnel from the Argentinean air force, Brazilian intelligence agency, Colombian air force and navy, and Ecuadorian, El 

Salvadorian, and Peruvian air forces. While Mexico is not part of the 

SOUTHCOM AOR (it falls under NORTHCOM), the Mexican navy 

also has a liaison at JIATF-S. This robust liaison program not only 

facilitates operational cooperation but also improves information 

sharing across the region.102

Many have concluded that JIATF-S is the benchmark interagency 

organization to emulate. Dr. John Fishel, who has written extensively 

on civil-military relations, concludes that the JIATF-S model is an 

appropriate organizational construct “to coordinate the activity of 

many interagency players.”103 LCDR Tom Stuhlreyer, USCG, concludes that the organization makes best use of limited US resources 

across the interagency. He notes that JIATF-S narcotics seizure records were being broken at a time when fewer US military assets were 

available due to high operational requirements in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and elsewhere in the global war on terrorism, demonstrating “the 

efficacy and force-multiplying aspect of the joint, interagency, and 

multi-national approach to operations at JIATF South.”104 The Government Accountabilty Office (GAO) credits SOUTHCOM with 

more success in interagency collaboration than other COCOMs, in 

part due to having JIATF-S in the command.105 Indeed, SOUTHCOM 

approached its 2008 headquarters reorganization with the proven 

JIATF-S interagency model in mind.106

According to Fishel, “The real reason JIATF-S works is that it is 

structurally an organization that has unity of command. The Director 

is a commander with the authority to hire and fire, as well as to task, 

organize and direct actions.”107 However, because JIATFs are not codified in executive order or legislation, the authority remains largely 

voluntary. Stuhlreyer characterizes the JIATF as an interagency “coalition of the willing” and notes that while assigned military personnel are subject to normal military order and discipline, the interagency partners “are only obligated to remain invested in JIATF-South 

as long as the command assists them in achieving individual interagency goals.”108 However, because the counternarcotics mission of 

JIATF-S is a core mission of many of the interagency participants, 

these agencies are likely to continue to participate.
32 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

US Africa Command

On 30 September 2008, AFRICOM became the newest combatant 

command.109 AFRICOM is unique among the military’s combatant 

commands since it was created to focus on security cooperation and 

humanitarian issues more than war fighting and was envisioned 

from birth as an interagency entity. AFRICOM’s first commander, 

GEN William E. “Kip” Ward, said the United States needed an integrated, interagency approach to Africa because of previous “lost opportunities to establish programs or partnerships [with African 

partner nations] because of misunderstandings or conflicts within 

the U.S. Government.”110

Like SOUTHCOM and EUCOM, AFRICOM has a four-star military commander with a three-star deputy for military operations 

(DCMO) and an ambassadorial-rank FSO from State serving as the 

deputy for civil-military activities (DCMA). The DCMA supervises 

the coordination between the military and non-DOD agencies working on African issues; directs AFRICOM’s civil-military plans and 

programs, outreach, and strategic communication effort; and leads 

the command’s theater security cooperation policy development, resourcing, and assessment.111 However, it has no authority over US 

ambassadors in Africa. Unlike SOUTHCOM and EUCOM, AFRICOM has a second senior FSO (below the rank of ambassador) serving as the commander’s POLAD. AFRICOM chose to maintain two 

separate positions because that provides one FSO (the POLAD) to 

travel with the commander while the other (the DCMA) can either 

travel separately or remain at the headquarters to provide diplomatic 

expertise.112 This additional FSO is certainly an asset to the combatant commander but may not be replicated across all of the GCCs because of the limited supply of senior FSOs. Additionally, AFRICOM 

has an individual from the USAID who serves as the commander’s 

development advisor.

As did SOUTHCOM from 2008 to 2009, AFRICOM’s focus on 

missions other than war fighting led the command to choose an organizational structure other than the traditional J-code staff. It organized around a set of “cross-functional directorates”; however, AFRICOM commander, Army general Carter F. Ham, returned to a 

traditional J-code structure. Similar to PACOM, EUCOM, and 

SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM’s J-staff includes a J-9 outreach directorate focused on strategic communication and USG partnership and 
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 33

engagement with nations in Africa.113 This directorate also manages 

AFRICOM’s contacts with interagency, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and multinational agencies relevant to the command’s 

mission in Africa.114 Unlike the other GCCs, AFRICOM has never 

had a JIACG; instead, it integrates interagency personnel across the 

staff. In 2008 AFRICOM was supposed to have approximately 42 interagency personnel.115 As of December 2010, the command had four 

senior FSOs in key positions as well as more than 30 personnel from 

13 USG departments and agencies serving in leadership, management, and staff positions. Some of the agencies represented include 

the Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce; the USAID; and 

the US Coast Guard.116 This is an increase from only 13 interagency 

personnel in October 2008.117 Filling the billets has been challenging 

because even though AFRICOM reimburses the parent agencies for 

the salaries of the interagency personnel serving in the headquarters, 

many agencies simply do not have qualified personnel to spare.118

AFRICOM’s current structures to facilitate interagency unity of effort 

are shown in figure 6.

Combatant

Commander

DCMO Deputy to the Commander

for Military Operations

Staff (J-Coded) (not all staff directorates are shown)

J-2 Intelligence

12 Interagency

Intelligence

Community

Representatives

Fielded Forces

(AFRICOM never established a JIACG)

DCMA Deputy to the Commander

for Civil-Military Activities

Ambassador (State Dept.)

AFRICOM U.S. Africa Command

POLAD FSO (State Dept.)

Does not hold ambassadorial rank

30 Interagency Representatives:

-State

-USAID

-Treasury

-Commerce

-Coast Guard

Other Staff Directorates

CJTF-HOA Djibouti

Led by U.S. Military Officer

Interagency Representatives:

-FPA to the Commander (State)

-National Intelligence Agencies

International Liaisons:

-(list not available)

J-9 Outreach (Director is from State Dept.)

Development 

Advisor (USAID)

Figure 6. AFRICOM structures for interagency unity of effort

In addition to action officer–level positions, non-DOD agency personnel also hold leadership positions across the AFRICOM head-
34 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

quarters staff. The director of the J-9 outreach directorate is from 

State, the chief of the programs division under the directorate of strategy, plans, and programs is from the USAID, and the deputy director 

of resources is from Commerce. These interagency personnel rate 

their subordinates, both civilian and military, and have all the authorities of a military member in their position, with the exception that 

the interagency civilians cannot command US forces during military 

operations.119 Many of the current interagency personnel, whether supervisors or not, are very senior in rank—equivalent to a general officer or member of the SES (because AFRICOM requested this seniorlevel representation). Some interagency representatives have thus 

become frustrated that they are buried too deeply in the staff and do 

not have authority commensurate with their rank. Over time, more of 

these billets may be converted to action officer–equivalent ranks (military majors and lieutenant colonels) to address this issue.120

 In 2008 AFRICOM’s DCMO, VADM Robert Moeller, and DCMA, 

Amb. Mary Yates, said AFRICOM would not create a JIACG, preferring to integrate interagency personnel throughout the command 

“where their impact can be the greatest.”121 Because the interagency 

personnel are dispersed across the headquarters, AFRICOM created 

the command collaborative forum (CCF) to bring together all of the 

interagency representatives at least once a month, together with the 

AFRICOM chief of staff and individuals from the operations and 

plans directorates. The CCF provides an opportunity for interagency 

personnel to coordinate with each other, provide and receive feedback, and ensure their voices are heard.122

AFRICOM does not have a joint interagency task force, but it has 

a combined joint task force in the Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), 

which “spends an enormous amount of time assisting in nonmilitary 

actions” while at the same time assisting local security forces in counterterrorism.123 Established in October 2002 to counter violent extremism in East Africa, the task force is led by a two-star US military 

officer and includes personnel from all branches of the US military 

plus interagency civilians (a foreign policy advisor from the State Department and a few representatives from US intelligence agencies) 

and international liaisons from countries in the region. While the 

task force was established primarily as a direct-action counterterrorism organization, it has evolved today to focus on military-to-military 

counterterrorism training, as well as on international development 

operations such as building schools and clinics and conducting 
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 35

medical, dental, and veterinary civic action programs, all in coordination with the USAID and local US embassies.124 CJTF-HOA has 

also assisted in several humanitarian operations, such as floods in 

Ethiopia and Kenya and a capsized passenger ferry in Djibouti. The 

organization aspires to be “a model for the integration of Defense, 

Diplomacy, and Development.”125 Given the successful track records 

of JIATF-W, JIATF-S, and JIATF-I in integrating interagency personnel into a subregional task force to conduct predominantly nonmilitary missions and that CJTF-HOA performs precisely such missions, 

it is a good candidate for reorganization as a JIATF. Nevertheless, AFRICOM says it gets all the interagency assistance it needs through 

direct liaison with the various embassy country teams and thus does 

not require an integrated civil-military command structure in the 

task force itself.126

Observers both in Africa and in the United States have criticized 

putting the military in charge of interagency engagement with Africa 

by establishing AFRICOM. For example, Edward Marks says AFRICOM, though well-intentioned, “will only exacerbate the problem of 

over-militarization of U.S. policy and programs.”127 Marks questions 

how military-to-military programs in Africa will be subordinated to 

larger US policy goals when the military is in charge. He says the 

United States “should be looking for a whole-of-government approach, not the tweaking of a military model designed primarily for 

warfighting.”128

Summary of Current Structures at the GCCs

Since the JIACG concept was first introduced in 2001, interagency 

coordination structures have evolved differently in each of the geographic combatant commands. While JFCOM recommended a construct with an ambassadorial-rank POLAD reporting directly to the 

combatant commander and a JIACG consisting of six DOD and six 

non-DOD personnel, also reporting directly to the commander, none 

of the GCCs currently follow this model. 

In CENTCOM the ambassadorial-rank POLAD reports directly to 

the commander, but the IAG is located in the J-3. Not counting the 

interagency intelligence community representatives in the J-2, CENTCOM has 13 non-DOD personnel assigned: three in the POLAD’s 
36 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

office, eight in the IAG, one in the J-3’s force protection office, and one 

in the J-5.

In PACOM the ambassadorial-rank POLAD has been dual-hatted 

as the director of the J-9 outreach directorate. The JIACG (which retains the JIACG name in PACOM) is now J-91, subordinate to the J-9, 

thus reporting to the POLAD/J-9 director rather than directly to the 

combatant commander. Excluding the interagency intelligence community representatives in the J-2, PACOM has four non-DOD personnel assigned to the staff: the POLAD/J-9 director, two representatives in the J-91 JIACG, and one representative in the J-4. In the field, 

PACOM has a sizeable contingent of non-DOD personnel, predominantly from law enforcement and intelligence, assigned to JIATF-W.

In EUCOM the ambassadorial-rank POLAD has been dual-hatted 

as the EUCOM civilian deputy commander. The JIACG is now called 

the J-9 interagency partnering directorate and is the only staff directorate that reports to the ECCD. Excluding the intelligence community representatives in the J-2, EUCOM has six interagency personnel assigned to the staff: the ECCD and five representatives in the J-9, 

with plans to increase the interagency representation to nine. 

In SOUTHCOM, as in EUCOM, the ambassadorial-rank POLAD 

has been dual-hatted as the civilian deputy commander, and the 

JIACG is now called the J-9 partnering directorate. Excluding the intelligence community representatives in the J-2, SOUTHCOM has 16 

non-DOD personnel assigned: the civilian deputy commander, three 

representatives in the J-9, and 12 representatives in other directorates 

on the SOUTHCOM staff. The command planned to have four additional representatives from the State Department by the summer of 

2010, bringing the total number of non-DOD representatives on the 

staff to 20. In the field, SOUTHCOM has a sizeable contingent of 

non-DOD personnel—predominantly from law enforcement and intelligence—assigned to JIATF-S.

Finally, in AFRICOM, the POLAD reports directly to the commander but is a Foreign Service officer without ambassadorial rank. 

The ambassadorial-ranked FSO assigned to AFRICOM holds the position of deputy commander for civil-military activities. Unlike the 

other GCCs, AFRICOM has never had a JIACG, preferring to integrate non-DOD personnel across the staff. Not counting the intelligence community representatives, AFRICOM has about 32 nonDOD personnel assigned: the POLAD, the DCMA, and about 30 

representatives assigned across the staff. In the field, AFRICOM has 
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 37

one representative from the State Department serving as the POLAD 

to the CJTF-HOA commander in Djibouti, and the CJTF also has 

representatives from the national intelligence agencies.

While the GCCs have made great strides in integrating non-DOD 

expertise and viewpoints into their staffs, planning processes, and operations, these constructs still fall far short of the ideal regional interagency construct. First, excepting the national intelligence community representatives with their very specialized functions, each GCC 

staff has only four to 32 representatives from non-DOD agencies serving on a staff of military officers, DOD civilians, and DOD contractors—numbering well over a thousand. Given these figures, the GCC 

staffs will always be principally military in outlook and processes. Second, while the organizational constructs have evolved, the non-DOD 

representatives still do not have any authority to coordinate on military plans or operations on behalf of their parent agencies, nor can 

they commit their agency’s resources. Finally, while three of the five 

GCCs have elevated the ambassadorial-ranked FSO to the level of civilian deputy commander, they are still led by a four-star military officer. Thus, even when the organization intends to execute whole-ofgovernment foreign policy, the top-level face of that policy—as seen 

by countries in the region—continues to be a military officer.

Notes

1. Howard J. T. Steers, “Bridging the Gaps: Political-Military Coordination at the 

Operational Level,” research report (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 17 May 2001), 13.

2. John D. Finney and Alphonse F. La Porta, “Maximizing the Value of the Political Adviser Function,” Foreign Service Journal 85, no. 10 (October 2008): 16. Dr. 

Finney has had an extensive career in political-military affairs at the Departments of 

State and Defense in Washington and abroad. Retired as a career diplomat, he serves 

as the POLAD to the chief of the National Guard Bureau. He served as the POLAD 

coordinator at State and as the POLAD to the chief of naval operations (CNO), 

USPACOM, and various other US and multinational commands. La Porta served 38 

years in the Foreign Service, including as ambassador to Mongolia and POLAD to 

the commander of NATO’s Allied Joint Force Command Naples.

3. Ibid., 18.

4. John D. Finney and Alphonse F. La Porta, “Integrating National Security Strategy at the Operational Level: The Role of the State Department Political Advisors,” in 

Affairs of State, ed. Gabriel Marcella, 287–88.

5. COL Charles N. Cardinal, USA, CDR Timber P. Pagonas, USN, and Amb. 

Edward Marks, “The Global War on Terrorism: A Regional Approach to Coordination,” Joint Force Quarterly 32 (Autumn 2002): 50. At the time of this article, Colonel 
38 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

Cardinal was chief of staff of the 25th Infantry Division (the Army component to 

PACOM), Commander Pagonas was assigned as strategy, plans, and policy officer to 

the PACOM JIACG/CT, and Ambassador Marks was the State Department representative to the PACOM JIACG/CT. See also USJFCOM, Commander’s Handbook for 

the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (Norfolk, VA: USJFCOM Joint Warfighting 

Center, 1 March 2007), III-1.

6. Edward Marks, “PACOM, JIACG, and the War on Terror,” Camber Corporation on contract to the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group on Counterterrorism, 

PACOM, 18 August 2005, 7.

7. Col Matthew F. Bogdanos, USMC, “Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First 

Step,” Joint Force Quarterly 37 (2nd Quarter 2005): 12.

8. The USJFCOM was a joint military functional combatant command that provided trained and ready forces to other combatant commanders and supported the 

development and integration of new joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities for the joint force.

9. USJFCOM, Commander’s Handbook, III-2.

10. William J. Olson, “Interagency Coordination: The Normal Accident or the 

Essence of Indecision,” in Affairs of State, ed. Gabriel Marcella, 222. Dr. Olson is a 

professor at the Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. He has served 

as both a deputy assistant secretary of state and a deputy assistant secretary of defense.

11. Neyla Arnas, Charles Barry, and Robert B. Oakley, Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, August 2005), 14; and Alan G. 

Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune, “The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System,” in Affairs of 

State, ed. Gabriel Marcella, 152.

12. USJFCOM, Commander’s Handbook, III-6.

13. Ibid., I-6. See also JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and 

Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations, vol. 1, 17 

March 2006.

14. USJFCOM, Commander’s Handbook, i.

15. Ibid., vii, III-8.

16. LTC Terry R. Sopher, USANG, “Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs): A Temporary Solution to a Long Term Requirement,” Master of Strategic 

Studies Degree report (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 3 May 2004), 4. 

17. Olson, “Interagency Coordination,” 244–45.

18. Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency Cooperation,” 14.

19. Col Matthew F. Bogdanos, USMC, Transforming Joint Interagency Coordination: The Missing Link between National Strategy and Operational Success, Case Studies in National Security Transformation, no. 9 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, August 2007), 13. See 

also Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency Cooperation,” 14.

20. Arnas, Barry, and Oakley, Harnessing the Interagency, 14.

21. Finney and La Porta, “Integrating National Security Strategy at the Operational Level,” 294.

22. Marcy Stahl, Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) Training and 

Education Survey Results (Vienna, VA: Thought Link Inc., 15 January 2004), 15. In 
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 39

2003, on behalf of JFCOM and the National Defense University, Thought Link Inc. 

conducted interviews with 26 USG officials—from State (12), Justice (5), Defense 

(6), and Treasury (3)—associated directly or indirectly with the JIACG concept to 

learn agency perceptions of the concept and to identify the training and education 

needs of JIACG participants. Nearly all of the interviewees were familiar with the 

concept. Two were active members of a JIACG, about half had some direct experience or interaction with JIACGs, and most of the rest had some experience with 

other interagency groups.

23. Ibid., 16.

24. Olson, “Interagency Coordination,” 243–44.

25. Ibid., 247.

26. John T. Fishel, “The Interagency Arena at the Operational Level: The Cases 

Now Known as Stability Operations,” in Affairs of State, ed. Gabriel Marcella, 427–28; 

and Robert M. Birkenes, “Interagency Cooperation: The JIATF in Iraq,” Foreign Service Journal 86, no. 9 (September 2009): 29.

27. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, 13 June 2007; JP 3-05.1, Joint Special 

Operations Task Force Operations, 26 April 2007; and JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction, 10 June 2009. JP 3-07.4 briefly describes JIATF-S and JIATF-W but 

gives no broader doctrinal applications of JIATFs. JP 3-05.1 describes the JTF as the 

operational focal point for interagency coordination and mentions it may be assigned a subordinate JIATF to assist with interagency coordination. JP 3-40 provides 

the brief statement above but then notes “JIATFs currently do not have authority to 

conduct WMD interdiction.”

28. USJFCOM, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” Joint Warfighting Center 

predoctrinal research white paper no. 07-01, 21 November 2007, 14.

29. JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, B-32–33.

30. Ibid.

31. USJFCOM, Insights and Best Practices, 14–15.

32. While US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is also a GCC (its AOR includes Canada and Mexico), it is not examined in this study because of its overwhelming focus on domestic operations.

33. Brig Gen Robert H. Holmes, USAF, Statement of Brigadier General Robert H. 

Holmes, Deputy Director of Operations, United States Central Command, before the 

House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional 

Threats and Capabilities on Irregular Warfare, prepared statement, Washington, DC, 

110th Cong., 2d sess., 26 February 2008, 2, http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs

/testHolmes080226.pdf.

34. LTC Fadi Petro, USA (CENTCOM special advisor to the commanding general for Middle East peace), interview by the author, 9 March 2010.

35. Holmes, Statement, 5.

36. Bogdanos, Transforming Joint Interagency Coordination, 4.

37. Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency Cooperation,” 11.

38. The typical J-coded joint US military staff includes the following eight directorates: J-1, manpower and personnel; J-2, intelligence; J-3, operations; J-4, logistics; 

J-5, plans, policy, and strategy; J-6, communications; J-7, training, exercises, and engagement; and J-8, resources and assessments. Recently, some staffs have added a J-9 

partnering directorate.
40 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

39. Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency Cooperation,” 12; and Bogdanos, Transforming 

Joint Interagency Coordination, 7.

40. Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency Cooperation,” 12–13.

41. Ibid., 14.

42. Sopher, “Joint Interagency Coordination Groups,” 11.

43. Holmes, Statement, 4.

44. Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency Cooperation,” 18.

45. James Bond (State Department representative to CENTCOM IAG), interview by the author, 11 March 2010.

46. Arnas, Barry, and Oakley, Harnessing the Interagency, 10–11.

47. Holmes, Statement, 4–5.

48. Bond, interview.

49. Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency Cooperation,” 18; and Holmes, Statement, 4.

50. Bond, interview.

51. Birkenes, “Interagency Cooperation,” 28.

52. Ibid., 29–32.

53. Bond, interview.

54. Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan,” Dept. of State website, 24 March 2010, http://www

.state.gov/p/sca/ci/af/2010/141491.htm.

55. Ibid.; DOD, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, 62, 84; and Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule 

of Law and Justice Sector Assistance (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service [CRS], 9 November 2010), 37.

56. DOD, “Report on Progress,” 61; and Wyler and Katzman, Afghanistan, 33.

57. DOD, “Report on Progress,” 10, 62.

58. Wyler and Katzman, Afghanistan, 22. The creation of a coordinating director 

of rule of law and law enforcement (CDROLLE) “represents the first time in which 

[rule of law] issues are the core element of a portfolio handled by a permanent, Ambassador-rank official at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. Under the CDROLLE directorate are representatives from the State Department’s International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL), DOD, DOJ [Dept. of Justice], FBI, DEA, Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the U.S. 

Marshals Service.”

59. USCENTCOM operational planners, interview by the author, January 2011.

60. LTC Phil DuPont, USA (PACOM deputy foreign policy advisor), and LCDR 

Rob Hawthorne, USN (PACOM/J-9), interviews by the author, 11 March 2010.

61. MAJ David S. Doyle, USA, “Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare 

at the Combatant Command,” monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 14 April 

2009), 37–38.

62. Marks, “PACOM, JIACG, and the War on Terror,” 2–3, 9.

63. Ibid., 9.

64. Ibid., 8.

65. Doyle, “Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare,” 37–38.
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 41

66. Marks, “PACOM, JIACG, and the War on Terror,” 8.

67. Doyle, “Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare,” 38.

68. Ibid., 12; and Hawthorne, interview.

69. John Crowley (State Department liaison to PACOM’s JIACG), interview by 

the author, 15 March 2010.

70. “Pacific Outreach Directorate: PACOM J9,” briefing to IAWG, 9 March 2010, 

provided to the author by MAJ Lance Okamura of PACOM’s JIACG.

71. Hawthorne, interview; and Crowley, interview.

72. Marks, “PACOM, JIACG, and the War on Terror,” 16.

73. USPACOM, “Joint Interagency Task Force–West,” accessed 25 February 2010, 

http://www.pacom.mil/staff/JIATFWest/index.shtml. See also JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, I-2; and Marks, “PACOM, JIACG, and the War on Terror,” 17.

74. USPACOM, “Joint Interagency Task Force-West.”

75. Marks, “PACOM, JIACG, and the War on Terror,” 3.

76. Lt Col Carlene Perry, USAF (EUCOM/J-9), interview by the author, 15 

March 2010.

77. COL Harry A. Tomlin, USA, The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG): The United States European Command Experience and the Way Ahead (Syracuse, NY: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1 

October 2003), 10, 17.

78. Ibid., 15–17.

79. Ibid., 11, 22.

80. Ibid., 18–20.

81. A standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ) is a staff organization that provides a combatant commander with a full-time, trained command and control element that enhances the command’s peacetime planning efforts, improves operationallevel situational awareness, and stands ready to serve as the nucleus of or augment for 

a JTF headquarters during crisis operations (ibid., 21).

82. USEUCOM, “Biography of Mr. Michael G. Ritchie, Director of Interagency 

Partnering,” http://www.eucom.mil/english/bio2.asp?bioid=DAF6183B-F421-4BDF

-839B-94D68C3A38A0.

83. Perry, interview; and “United States European Command (EUCOM) Interagency Partnering Directorate, ECJ9,” briefing, 12 March 2010, provided to the author 

by Mike Anderson, deputy director, EUCOM/J-9.

84. USEUCOM, “Biography”; and “United States European Command (EUCOM) Interagency Partnering Directorate, ECJ9.”

85. Perry, interview.

86. Paul D. Taylor, “The Outlook for U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin American and the 

Caribbean: The Challenges of Transforming Goodwill into Effective Policy,” in American Foreign Policy: Regional Perspectives, Proceedings of a Ruger Chair Workshop, 

13–15 May 2009, ed. Richmond M. Lloyd (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2009), 86.

87. Senate, Embassies as Command Posts, 12–13. When the discussion at a May 

2009 workshop of foreign policy scholars and retired ambassadors turned to 

SOUTHCOM and US actions in Latin America, “the general consensus of the group 

was that the U.S. government would be best served by a military with a more reserved, secondary role in regional policy implementation—not the agency leading 

policy formulation and implementation.” One panelist said that “because of the rela-
42 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY

tive lack of interstate conflict the U.S. military should not be ‘out front’ in the region,” 

though other participants said it was important for the US military to work with 

Latin American militaries as they continue to reshape themselves. Laurence L. McCabe, “Panel II: Western Hemisphere—Summary of Discussion,” in American Foreign Policy, ed. Richmond M. Lloyd, 96–97.

88. SOUTHCOM has pioneered a number of exercises, conferences, modeling 

and simulation systems, and planning systems to coordinate its efforts with those of 

US ambassadors and their country teams in the region to promote interagency and 

international partnerships. For example, see William W. Mendel and Lt Col David G. 

Bradford, USAF, Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, 

McNair Paper 37 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 1995), 41–42, 49, 64.

89. Donna Miles, “SOUTHCOM Transformation Promotes New Approach to 

Regional Challenges,” American Forces Press Service, 28 August 2008, http://www

.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=1323.

90. Gabriel Marcella, “Understanding the Interagency Process: The Challenge of 

Adaptation,” in Affairs of State, ed. Gabriel Marcella, 35–36; and Miles, “SOUTHCOM 

Transformation.” 

91. CAPT Kevin Hutcheson, USN (SOUTHCOM/J-9 deputy director for interagency integration), and Kirk Dahlgren (USAID senior development officer, 

SOUTHCOM/J-9), interviews by the author, 9–10 March 2010.

92. Doyle, “Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare,” 41–43.

93. Ibid., 12, 42.

94. Dahlgren, interview.

95. Ted Halstead (SOUTHCOM/J-9), interview by the author, 9 March 2009.

96. Doyle, “Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare,” 45.

97. Fishel, “Interagency Arena at the Operational Level,” 427–28.

98. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, I-2.

99. Richard M. Yeatman, “JIATF-South: Blueprint for Success,” Joint Force Quarterly 42 (3rd Quarter 2006): 27.

100. Fishel, “Interagency Arena at the Operational Level,” 427–29; and Yeatman, 

“JIATF-South,” 26.

101. Stahl, Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) Training and Education 

Survey Results, 43.

102. Fishel, “Interagency Arena at the Operational Level,” 429; USJFCOM, Insights and Best Practices: Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Coordination, 15; and LCDR Tom Stuhlreyer, USCG, “The JIATF Organization Model: 

Bringing the Interagency to Bear in Maritime Homeland Defense and Security,” 

Campaigning, Spring 2007, 42–43.

103. Fishel, “Interagency Arena at the Operational Level,” 439. See also Yeatman, 

“JIATF-South,” 26.

104. Stuhlreyer, “JIATF Organization Model,” 43.

105. GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of 

National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing, 

GAO-09-904SP (Washington, DC: GAO, September 2009), 26.

106. Miles, “SOUTHCOM Transformation.” 

107. Fishel, “Interagency Arena at the Operational Level,” 429.
CURRENT PRACTICES—MILITARY │ 43

108. Stuhlreyer, “JIATF Organization Model,” 42.

109. Robert T. Moeller and Mary C. Yates, “The Road to a New Unified Command,” Joint Force Quarterly 51 (4th Quarter 2008): 68. At the time of this article, 

Vice Admiral Moeller was AFRICOM deputy for military operations and Ambassador Yates was AFRICOM deputy for civil-military activities.

110. GEN William E. Ward and Thomas P. Galvin, “U.S. Africa Command and 

the Principle of Active Security,” Joint Force Quarterly 51 (4th Quarter 2008): 65. 

General Ward was the AFRICOM commander until March 2011.

111. Moeller and Yates, “Road to a New Unified Command,” 71.

112. Col James Jacobson, USAF (AFRICOM deputy foreign policy advisor), interview by the author, 10 March 2010.

113. USAFRICOM, “Organizational Chart, Headquarters U.S. Africa Command,” 8 December 2011, http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/AFRICOM%20Org%20

Chart.pdf.

114. Moeller and Yates, “Road to a New Unified Command,” 70.

115. Maj Clifton D. Reed, USAF, “The Battle Within: DOD and Interagency Coordination for Regional Conflicts—AFRICOM and the Interagency Management 

System as Models,” research report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 2008), 3–5; and Moeller and Yates, “Road to a New Unified Command,” 72.

116. Jacobson, interview; and USAFRICOM, “About United States Africa Command,” accessed August 2011, http://www.africom.mil/AfricomFAQs.asp.

117. GAO, Interagency Collaboration, 32–33.

118. Reed, “Battle Within,” 3–5; and Moeller and Yates, “Road to a New Unified 

Command,” 72.

119. Moeller and Yates, “Road to a New Unified Command,” 71.

120. Senior AFRICOM staffer, unattributed interview by the author, March 2010.

121. Moeller and Yates, “Road to a New Unified Command,” 71.

122. Senior AFRICOM staffer, unattributed interview.

123. Isaac Kfir, “The Challenge That Is USAFRICOM,” Joint Force Quarterly 49 

(2nd Quarter 2008): 111.

124. Senior AFRICOM staffer, unattributed interview.

125. AFRICOM, “CJTF-HOA Factsheet,” http://www.hoa.africom.mil/AboutCJTF

-HOA.asp.

126. Senior AFRICOM staffer, unattributed interview.

127. Edward Marks, “Why USAFRICOM?,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 

2009): 148.

128. Ibid., 149. See also Robert Munson, “Do We Want to ‘Kill People and Break 

Things’ in Africa?,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 2, no.1 (Spring 2008): 97–110.

Chapter 3

Current Practices—US Civilian Agencies

US government organizations outside the military have also been 

designed to facilitate interagency unity of effort, primarily in the Department of State (DOS) and the National Security Council. Although not directly involved in regional foreign policy planning and 

execution, several other USG interagency organizations contribute to 

the process. 

State Department Structures 

for Civil-Military Coordination

The State Department is the lead foreign affairs agency for the 

United States. As such, it has the primary role for interagency coordination of the development and execution of US foreign policy.1

 Thus, 

we might expect the DOS to have robust capabilities to lead interagency foreign policy processes and to synchronize the efforts of the 

military and other agencies with overall US foreign policy goals.

The State Department is much smaller in terms of both personnel 

and budget than the Defense Department. While the military is organized in a three-level hierarchy—the strategic level in Washington, 

the operational level at the geographic combatant commands, and 

the tactical level of individual military units—the DOS is predominantly a two-tiered organization, with its strategic level in Washington and the tactical structure of the US embassies. The DOD has a 

workforce of approximately three million and an annual budget of 

about $660 billion, while State has fewer than 60,000 people, of whom 

only 6,400 are FSOs, and an annual budget of about $50 billion. At 

any given time, about two-thirds of FSOs are serving abroad.2

The DOS headquarters entities most relevant in examining civilmilitary unity of effort in regional US foreign policy are the undersecretary of state for political affairs (P) with its six regional bureaus, 

the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM Bureau), the Bureau of 

Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), and the USAID. These 

are highlighted in the organizational chart at figure 7. 
Deputy Secretary of State

D(B)

Secretary of State

(S)

Executive Secretariat

(S/ES)

Executive Secretary

United States 

Department of State

Under Secretary for 

Economic Growth, 

Energy and Environment

(E)

Under Secretary for

Political Affairs

(P)

Under Secretary for 

Arms Control and 

International Security Affairs

(T)

Under Secretary for 

Management

(M)

Under Secretary for 

Public Diplomacy 

and Public Affairs

(R)

Under Secretary for Civilian 

Security, Democracy and 

Human Rights

(J)

African Affairs

(AF)

Assistant Secretary

South and Central

Asian Affairs

(SCA)

Assistant Secretary

Western Hemisphere

Affairs

(WHA)

Assistant Secretary

Near Eastern Affairs

(NEA)

Assistant Secretary

European and 

Eurasian Affairs

(EUR)

Assistant Secretary

International Security

and Nonproliferation

(ISN)

Assistant Secretary

Arms Control,

Verification, and

Compliance

(AVC)

Assistant Secretary

Political-Military Affairs

(PM)

Assistant Secretary

Administration

(A)

Assistant Secretary

Comptroller, Global

Financial Services

(CGFS)

Director

Information Resource

Management

(IRM)

Chief Information Officer

Diplomatic Security

and Foreign Missions

(DS)

Assistant Secretary

Budget and Planning

(BP)

Director

Consular Affairs

(CA)

Assistant Secretary

Conflict & Stabilization

Operations

(CSO)

Assistant Secretary

International 

Organizations

(IO)

Assistant Secretary

Counterterrorism

(CT)

Coordinator and

Ambassador-at-Large

Democracy, Human

Rights, and Labor

(DRL)

Assistant Secretary

Public Affairs

(PA)

Assistant Secretary

Education and Cultural 

Affairs

(ECA)

Assistant Secretary

International

Information Programs

(IIP)

Coordinator

Economic & Business

Affairs

(EB)

Assistant Secretary

Deputy Secretary of State

D(N)

Counselor and

Chief of Staff

(S/COS) 

United States Agency for

International Development 

United States Mission

to the United Nations

East Asian

and Pacific Affairs

(EAP)

Assistant Secretary

Foreign Service

Institute

(FSI)

Director

Human Resources

(HR)

Director General of the

Foreign Service and Director

of Human Resources

International Narcotics

and Law Enforcement

(INL)

Assistant Secretary

Legislative Affairs

(H)

Assistant Secretary

Office of the

Legal Adviser

(L)

Legal Adviser

Office of Inspector

General

(OIG)

Inspector General

Office of Policy

Planning (S/P)

Director

Office of the

Chief of Protocol

(S/CPR)

Ambassador

Office of

Civil Rights

(S/OCR)

Director

Office of Global

Women’s Issues

(S/GWI)

Ambassador-at-Large

Office of the

Global AIDS

Coordinator

(S/GAC)

Ambassador-at-Large

Special Envoys

and Special 

Representatives

Overseas Buildings

Operations

(OBO)

Director

Energy Resources

(ENR)

Assistant Secretary

Oceans and Int'l

Environmental and

Scientific Affairs

(OES)

Assistant Secretary

Office to Monitor and

Combat Trafficking

in Persons

(TIP) Ambassador-at-Large

Office of Global 

Criminal Justice

(GCJ)

Ambassador-at-Large

Office of the Chief

Economist

(OCE)

Intelligence and

Research

(INR)

Assistant Secretary

Office of

Medical Services

(MED)

Director

Population, Refugees

and Migration

(PRM)

Assistant Secretary

Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance

(F)

Director

Office of Management

Policy, Rightsizing and

Innovation

(M/PRI)

Director

Approved May 2012

Figure 7. Department of State organizational chart (Reprinted from “Department Organization Chart,” May 2012, US Department of State website, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls//dos/99494.htm).
CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES │ 47

Undersecretary for Political Affairs—Regional Bureaus

The State Department has six regional bureaus—African Affairs 

(AF), East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP), European and Eurasian 

Affairs (EUR), Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), South and Central Asian 

Affairs (SCA), and Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA)—each 

headed by an assistant secretary and all reporting to the undersecretary of state for political affairs.3

 A director is assigned to each country to “set policy guidelines, coordinate outside the bureau, and administer and implement the programs for his assigned country” as 

well as to communicate the direction of the regional assistant secretaries to US embassies around the world.4

The undersecretary for political affairs is the State Department’s 

fourth-ranking official and a senior career diplomat. The undersecretary manages overall regional and bilateral policy issues and oversees 

the six regional bureaus as well as the Bureaus of International Organization Affairs (IO) and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. IO conducts multilateral diplomacy with global intergovernmental and international organizations such as the UN.5

The regional bureaus are the DOS focal point for the development 

and implementation of US foreign policy strategies requiring interagency coordination.6

 The assistant secretaries who lead the six regional bureaus advise the undersecretary for political affairs and the 

secretary of state on regional issues and assist in supervising and coordinating all US government activities across the interagency community within their assigned regions. 

The regional assistant secretaries are technically chartered to issue 

direction to US embassies in their region. However, the ambassadors 

leading these embassies are appointed by the president and generally 

deal directly with the secretary of state, bypassing the regional assistant secretary.7

 Thus, in a military analogy, the position of regional 

assistant secretary is much less like a GCC, who exercises command 

authority over the military elements in a specific AOR, and more like 

a director on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, who advises the chairman of the JCS and develops policy and guidance for military forces 

but does not exercise any command authority over fielded forces.

Two of the many DOS functional bureaus are of particular relevance to military-diplomatic unity of effort for foreign policy: the 

long-standing Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and the newer 
48 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES

Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), 

established after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

The PM Bureau—headed by an assistant secretary and staffed by 

nearly 300 FSOs, civil service officers, contractors, and uniformed 

military personnel—is State’s lead for all operational military matters 

and its primary link with the DOD.8

 It manages diplomatic personnel 

support to military organizations, such as DOS personnel serving as 

POLADs to the COCOMs and other senior military leaders, as well 

as those serving on the Joint Staff and in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) as part of the State-DOD officer exchange program.9

Another of the bureau’s functions is providing US foreign policy 

direction in several military-related areas, including defense strategy 

and policy, military operations, the overseas sale of military equipment by US companies, and security assistance to overseas partners. 

It also assists the military diplomatically in negotiating status-offorces agreements, securing basing and overflight rights for US forces 

deploying overseas, coordinating foreign participation in US-led 

military coalitions, and facilitating the training and education of foreign military personnel and international peacekeepers.10

Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations 

Congress established the Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization in August 2004 to “lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for 

post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies 

in transition from conflict.”11 In January 2012, the office became the 

Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO).12 Coordinating US civilian agencies, the US military, and multilateral organizations in developing and executing plans for a coordinated reconstruction and stabilization response is one of its taskings. Training and 

deploying US government civilians to reconstruction and stabilization 

operations either in partnership with the US military or as part of international peacekeeping missions is another.13 At the time of transition, the bureau had a headquarters staff of about 170, plus a Civilian 

Response Corps (CRC) of approximately 900 active and standby volunteers from across the interagency trained and ready to deploy to the 

field.14 In its first year of operation, CSO broadened the CRC by creating a network of experts from outside the federal government, in-
CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES │ 49

cluding state and local officials as well as representatives from think 

tanks and nonprofit and international organizations.15

Key elements within the CSO staff include the Offices of Policy 

and Programs, Overseas Operations, Civilian Response Corps and 

Deployment Support, Partnerships, and Learning and Training. Policy and Programs provides early warning of unstable states that may 

require intervention. Overseas Operations develops contingency 

plans for such efforts and deploys and manages in-country response 

teams. Civilian Response Operations and Deployment Support develops, trains, equips, deploys, and coordinates the CRC for such operations. Partnerships coordinate preventative strategies with foreign 

partners, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector.16

Since its establishment in 2012, CSO has supported efforts in 15 

countries, focusing on mitigating the effects of the Syrian crisis, the 

violent elections in Kenya, the high level of criminal violence in Honduras, and the large number of land mines in Burma (Myanmar).17

Initially, Congress was slow to provide adequate resources for S/

CRS to fulfill its mandated mission.18 Its first head, Amb. Carlos Pascual, resigned after only 14 months, expressing frustration over the 

lack of support.19 Three years later, the situation began to improve. 

The Congressional Research Service reports that by August 2007, S/

CRS had a staff of about 70—including 19 permanent DOS personnel, with others detailed from the USAID, the OSD, JFCOM, the Joint 

Staff, the Army Corps of Engineers, the CIA, and Treasury.20 According to Amb. John Herbst, the S/CRS coordinator then, “It took until 

early 2007 for the federal government to reach an agreement on an 

operational plan for S/CRS, and then it took 18 months to receive the 

initial funding to put these plans into effect.” S/CRS received a direct 

appropriation for the first time in 2009—a total of $140 million for 

reconstruction and stabilization personnel and support costs, providing the resources to establish its current headquarters staff and CRC.21

Staffing the CRC was a slow process because Congress did not make 

direct funding available to establish, train, and equip it until fiscal year 

2009. By August 2007, CRC-A had 11 trained volunteers while CRC-S 

had about 300. By 2008 the CRC-A increased to 33 personnel.22 By the 

end of 2009, it had reached 78 members while the CRC-S expanded to 

554 members, with congressional funding available to increase the active corps to 250 members and the standby corps to 2,000.23 During 

2009, 177 CRC personnel deployed to 17 reconstruction and stabilization activities in Africa, Latin America, and Central and East Asia.24
50 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES

On 16 April 2010, the State Department announced that the active 

corps had reached 100 and the standby corps 800 members.25

US Agency for International Development 

The USAID is the lead agency in providing humanitarian assistance 

and supporting development and democracy around the world. While 

nominally an independent agency following the 1999 reorganization of 

US foreign affairs agencies, it receives general direction and overall foreign policy guidance from the secretary of state, and the USAID administrator holds a rank equivalent to a deputy secretary of state.26

Development is a key piece of US overseas capabilities in peacetime as well as in disaster or postconflict reconstruction and stabilization operations. The DOS often speaks of better coordinating the 

“three Ds”—diplomacy, development, and defense. Secretary of State 

Hillary Clinton said in January 2010, “Development must become an 

equal pillar of our foreign policy, alongside defense and diplomacy, 

led by a robust and reinvigorated [USAID].”27

However, the USAID’s resources and capacity to provide personnel to interagency coordination cells or to assist other agencies in 

planning and operations is limited. The agency’s staff in Washington 

plus its more than 100 offices around the world consists of only about 

1,100 FSOs, another 1,100 civil service employees, and an additional 

5,000 foreign nationals serving with USAID overseas offices. Because 

it is so small, the USAID often relies on contractors, NGOs, and international organizations to carry out even its core responsibilities.28

Retired ambassador David Litt said, “USAID’s cadre of Foreign Service Officers is so miniscule that the agency no longer has the organic 

expertise in health, education, and agriculture that it once enjoyed. It 

now relies on the private sector to fill that need without adequate 

policy and programmatic supervision.”29 Recognizing this, Secretary 

Clinton noted in January 2010, “For too long, we’ve relied on contractors . . . and we have diminished our own . . . institutional capacities. 

This must change. . . . USAID and the State Department must have 

the staff, the expertise, and the resources to design, implement, and 

evaluate our programs.”30 The secretary also remarked that the USAID must be able to coordinate development activities across Washington and in the field, a capability it currently lacks, saying,

You have all the other agencies who are providing assistance of some sort or 

another. It’s not coordinated at the country level and it is certainly not coordinated at the national level or the international level. . . . 
CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES │ 51

We . . . have to have better coordination on the whole-of-government front. 

I have been in countries where I’ve asked to see everybody doing any development, and the ambassador nicely invites people that are on a list given to him 

or her. He or she has never met the people, has no idea who they are or what 

they do, and even more, the people themselves have never met each other.31

The USAID has three offices under its Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance particularly relevant to civilmilitary coordination: Foreign Disaster Assistance, Transition Initiatives (OTI), and Military Affairs (OMA). Its organizational structure 

is shown in figure 8.

Since 1964 the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has been 

charged with both providing and coordinating the USG interagency 

provision of humanitarian assistance to natural disasters and emergencies abroad, with a focus on immediate needs such as saving lives, 

reducing suffering, and mitigating the economic and social impacts 

of disasters. The OFDA has approximately 250 permanent staff and 

consultants, quite large for a USAID organization. When an interagency response involves the military, such as the 2004 Asian tsunami or the 2010 Haitian earthquake, the OFDA may send a liaison 

officer to either the relevant GCC headquarters or to the military field 

command to coordinate disaster response activities.32

The USAID created the Office of Transition Initiatives in 1994 “to 

support U.S. foreign policy objectives by helping local partners advance peace and democracy in priority countries in crisis.”33 The OTI 

typically works in 10–12 countries each year and focuses on shortterm (two to three years) assistance in areas such as postconflict reconciliation, restarting local economies, and developing independent 

local media. The OTI is small, with a staff of fewer than 50 personnel 

and an annual budget of about $50 million (less than 0.5 percent of 

the USAID budget), though it also receives funds from other sources 

such as supplemental appropriations for contingency operations and 

DOD Section 1207 funds. The OTI’s largest total funding to date was 

$226 million in fiscal year 2004. With the limited number of full-time 

staff, the OTI hires numerous contractors to round out its necessary 

personnel pool.34 James Stephenson, head of the USAID’s Iraq mission in 2006, said synergy between OTI personnel and the military in 

postconflict operations is critical but has been difficult to achieve because providing the right USAID experts in the conflict zone is complicated by the small pool available.35
OTI OFDA OMA

Figure 8. USAID organizational chart. (Reprinted from Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2008

[Washington, DC: USAID, 2009], 17, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACM965.pdf.)
CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES │ 53

In 2005 the USAID established the Office of Military Affairs to 

improve coordination with the military for developing doctrine as 

well as for planning and executing joint endeavors. These include 

conducting humanitarian relief after natural disasters, strengthening 

fragile states such as Afghanistan, supporting key underdeveloped 

states such as Pakistan, and addressing strategic issues such as the 

global war on terrorism. Speaking shortly after the OMA’s establishment, USAID assistant administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, 

Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, Michael Hess, said, “Since 

post-conflict reconstruction is a pillar of the U.S. national security 

strategy, it is imperative for USAID to have an operational link with 

the military on how to better coordinate strategic development 

goals.”36 The OMA has a staff of just 16 personnel, including advisors 

posted with the geographic combatant commands.37

US Embassies

In most countries where the United States has diplomatic relations, it maintains an embassy headed by an ambassador and staffed 

with DOS personnel, as well as those from many other US agencies, 

together comprising the embassy “country team.” Dr. Gabriel Marcella characterizes the country team as “a miniature replica of the 

Washington interagency.”38 Today, personnel from approximately 45 

USG agencies serve at one or more embassies abroad, and they often 

outnumber the DOS personnel there. According to Amb. Louis Nigro, “State employees make up just over one-third of the staff at U.S. 

Government posts worldwide.”39

In this environment, interagency coordination and unity of effort 

can be difficult for the ambassador to achieve. The Center for the 

Study of the Presidency’s Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) 

research team observes that “representatives from different agencies 

often pursue their organizational interests at the expense of a broader, 

integrated approach,”40 and former secretary of state Condoleezza 

Rice testified to Congress that it has “become an almost impossible 

task of coordinating massive numbers of agencies on the ground.”41

In an attempt to achieve interagency unity of effort, all US ambassadors since the Kennedy administration receive a letter of appointment from the president making them the president’s personal emissary and charging them “to exercise full responsibility for the direction, 

coordination, and supervision of all executive branch officers in (name 
54 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES

of country), except for personnel under the command of a U.S. area 

military commander.”42 However, many observers contend that the 

authority given to ambassadors there is ambiguous. The PNSR study 

team further identifies that other agencies often view them as DOS 

rather than as presidential representatives and that the letter of appointment does not clearly establish their authority over the interagency country team. Consequently, other agencies sometimes perceive ambassadors as attempting to assert authority they do not have.43

In civil-military coordination, the letter gives ambassadors authority over US military personnel in country except those under 

COCOM control. Dr. John Fishel, who has written extensively on 

civil-military relations, says this exception applies only when “major 

U.S. military operations are being conducted in the country” and 

does not apply to security assistance or military exercises.44 Nevertheless, GCCs have not always interpreted the authority this way and 

have sometimes claimed authority over peacetime military activities 

in the host nation. Marcella suggests that this ambiguity requires the 

ambassador and COCOM (or their bosses—the secretaries of state 

and defense) to work together to agree on specific issues of control 

over US military personnel in country.45

US Regional Missions

While US embassies and their ambassadors serve bilateral relations 

between the United States and a single foreign state, the United States 

has a few regional missions that conduct multilateral diplomatic relations with certain regional entities. Currently, there are diplomatic 

missions to the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American 

States, the African Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The United States has maintained diplomatic relations with the 

EU and its forerunners since 1953, with a permanent US mission in 

Brussels, Belgium, since 1961. An ambassador leads this US mission 

to the EU, which also includes representatives from the Departments 

of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, Treasury, Justice, and Defense, as well as USAID and the Office of the US Trade 

Representative.46 The United States also has missions to NATO in 

Brussels and to the OSCE in Vienna, both led by ambassadors. The 

mission to NATO includes personnel from the Departments of Defense and State, and the mission to the OSCE has a team of more than 
CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES │ 55

30 staffers from State, the JCS, and the joint congressional/executive 

branch Commission on Security Cooperation in Europe.47

Because the OAS is headquartered in Washington, DC, the US 

mission to the OAS is also located there. It is headed by an ambassador and supported by representatives drawn largely from the State 

Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs.48 The US mission to the African Union is in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It is headed by 

an ambassador and includes representatives from State, USAID, and 

the DOD, including military officers serving as liaisons from AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA.49 The United States recently established a permanent mission to the ASEAN in Jakarta, Indonesia. On 25 January 

2010, the United States announced the arrival of the first officer to the 

mission, acting as the resident representative of the US ambassador 

for ASEAN affairs, and the first ambassador to the ASEAN, David L. 

Carden, was appointed in April 2011.50

The National Security Council 

Established by the National Security Act of 1947, the NSC provides the president with a national, strategic-level forum for interagency coordination of foreign policy and national security issues. 

Although the NSC is a national-level strategic body, its policy committees sometimes fill a staffing gap between policies at the strategic 

level and execution in the field because most executive branch agencies lack regional-level staff organizations.

The four statutory members of the NSC are the president, vice 

president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense; the two statutory advisors are the chairman of the JCS and the director of national 

intelligence. President Obama added the secretary of energy as a statutory member of his NSC and the secretary of the treasury, attorney 

general, secretary of homeland security, US representative to the UN, 

White House chief of staff, and the national security advisor as additional members. Still others attend if the agenda includes issues related to the economy, homeland security, counterterrorism, or science 

and technology.51 The cabinet secretaries meeting without the president are referred to as the Principals Committee (PC) and a gathering 

of their deputy secretaries as the Deputies Committee (DC). 

Below the PC and DC in President Obama’s NSC are the interagency policy committees (IPC), each chaired by an undersecretary 
56 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES

or assistant secretary from an executive-branch agency, which manage “the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government.” The IPCs 

are “the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy” that could be aligned by mission or function or 

by geographic area and provide policy analysis for the DC and PC. 

The IPCs replaced Pres. George W. Bush’s policy coordination committees (PCC).52 However, the IPC approach can fail to produce optimal, coordinated policies because each IPC representative comes 

from a home agency or department and is generally inclined to protect that agency’s turf or equities at the expense of broader interagency 

unity of effort.53 Alternatively, the requirement to achieve interagency 

consensus at the IPC can lead to a sluggish policy formulation process 

and to satisficing decision-making processes. 

The president appoints a national security advisor, who is not subject to congressional confirmation, to support the work of the NSC 

and coordinate the activities of the national security staff (NSS). The 

national security advisor and the NSS work directly for the president; 

the cabinet principals on the NSC have no authority over the national 

security advisor or NSS.54 The NSS does both the daily and long-term 

integration and coordination of national security and foreign policy 

across the US government. The NSS is frequently pulled in two different directions. On the one hand, it is asked to be an interagency coordinating body, while on the other hand, it has sometimes been called 

on by the president to take policy control over an issue or to direct 

and/or monitor policy execution in a given area.55 The Tower Commission’s report on the 1986 Iran-Contra scandal strongly cautioned 

that the NSS and national security advisor should not be engaged in 

operations or the implementation of policy.56

While it would seem that the NSC and NSS should be an ideal 

structure to ensure interagency coordination at the strategic level, 

many say the NSC often fails to coordinate in practice. For example, 

former CENTCOM commander Gen Anthony Zinni, USMC, wrote, 

“In Washington, there is no one place, agency, or force that directs 

interagency cooperation. The only such cooperation is on an ad hoc, 

person-to-person or group-to-group basis. So if you have a problem 

like putting Iraq back together after Saddam . . . there’s nowhere to 

start.”57 After interviewing former JCS chairman Gen Peter Pace, 

USMC, American Forces Press Service journalist Jim Garamone 

stated, “It’s after the president makes a decision that the process slows 
CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES │ 57

up. Each department or agency takes its share of the mission and goes 

back into its ‘stovepipe’ to do the work.” Pace stated that “there is no 

one below the president ensuring the agencies work together.”58

Other Interagency Structures

While the National Security Council is in theory the only necessary body for interagency foreign policy and national security coordination in Washington, highly visible failures have led to the creation 

of other interagency entities—from new federal agencies, to missionoriented interagency centers, to mission-focused special envoys. 

However, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley cautions that 

these “new organizations and activities are being created piecemeal, 

so far without discussion of the broader interagency framework in 

which they operate.”59 While these organizations largely function at 

the national, strategic level in Washington, a brief description of why 

and how they were created and how they are structured is in order.

Department of Homeland Security 

The Department of Homeland Security was established after 9/11 

in response to the perceived failings among many executive-branch 

agencies with roles in homeland security. The creation of the DHS 

brought together the domestic security activities of more than 40 

separate agencies under one head. Initially established by executive 

order on 8 October 2001 as the Office of Homeland Security, it was 

formally established into law as a new federal department on 25 November 2002.60

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Similarly, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

(ODNI) was formed as a result of the 9/11 Commission’s identification of failures of separate US intelligence agencies to coordinate terrorist threat information. Per the commission’s findings and recommendations, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004 stating that “interagency coordination of intelligence should be and is a significant and complex function unto 

itself and should be separated from management of the CIA or any 

other particular agency.”61
58 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES

National Centers

National centers have been established for counterintelligence, 

critical infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism. These interagency entities are located and funded in a specified lead agency and 

staffed by personnel detailed from other agencies. They have been 

created by executive order, though two were subsequently codified in 

legislation.62

The National Counterintelligence Center was established in 1994 

by executive order in response to the CIA and FBI’s failure to discover 

long-time spy Aldrich Ames. It was staffed by senior counterintelligence and other specialists from across the national security and intelligence communities to improve interagency counterintelligence 

activities. In 2002 Congress codified the organization into law, aligning it under the new ODNI and renaming it the Office of the National 

Counterintelligence Executive.63

In response to a 1997 report from the President’s Council on Infrastructure Protection, executive order established the National Infrastructure Protection Center at the FBI in 1998. Interagency staffing 

comes from the FBI, the intelligence community, Defense, Transportation, and Energy, as well as a public-private partnership with private corporations that own much of the US critical national infrastructure.64

Initially formed by the president in January 2003 as the Terrorist 

Threat Integration Center, it was reestablished as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) by executive order in August 2004 and 

codified into law in December 2004. Aligned under the ODNI, the 

NCTC combines counterterrorist elements from the intelligence, 

homeland security, law enforcement, and defense communities. The 

NCTC fuses and analyzes all-source intelligence on terrorism, maintains a shared database and systems for interagency counterterrorist 

information sharing, and functions as the operational planner and 

coordinator for interagency counterterrorism operations across the 

USG, assigning operational responsibilities to lead agencies.65

The Project on National Security Reform study team assessed in 

September 2009 that the NCTC “represents one of the most mature 

interagency planning models in the U.S. government today.” However, because the NCTC lacks formal authority over participating departments and agencies, bureaucratic resistance creates barriers to the 

development of true whole-of-government strategic and operational 
CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES │ 59

counterterrorism plans, so “unity of effort remains an elusive goal.” 

The participating agencies have their own “deeply institutionalized” 

counterterrorism policies and processes and thus often avoid following an integrated strategy that runs counter to their established 

norms. This dichotomy leads individuals to try “to achieve their individual objectives using their existing authorities, rather than attempting to develop partnerships and cooperative arrangements with other 

departments in a harmonized and integrated approach.”66

Presidential Special Representatives

President Obama, like many presidents before him, has delegated 

responsibility for interagency coordination and implementation of 

several foreign policy matters to special envoys or special representatives who report either to the president, the national security advisor, 

or the secretary of state. They focus on issues such as nuclear nonproliferation or global partnerships as well as specific unstable regions of 

the world. The 2009 PNSR study on interagency reform characterizes 

these special representatives as “an established, if often unsatisfactory 

approach” because their “abilities to coordinate policy and strategy 

vary widely” and because they are ad hoc additions to the system.67

Recently, some envoys have constructed interagency support staffs 

drawn from the departments and agencies relevant to their missions. 

Such staffing action may help produce better interagency coordination because an agency whose representatives help develop envoys’ 

policies may be more willing to support them. This would not only 

produce a more coordinated policy but also lessen the president’s involvement in direct dispute resolution.68 While the special envoy to 

Sudan is a good example of what this approach can accomplish, it also 

illustrates some of the drawbacks of the envoy system in general. Former special envoy Scott Gration built an interagency support staff that 

arguably contributed to recent US successes in brokering settlements 

to the crises in Sudan after many years. However, limitations remain 

that are similar to those of the Interagency Policy Committee model 

at the NSC. First, although Special Envoy Gration officially reported 

to the secretary of state, he also could report directly to the president 

and thus overburden him with crisis management at the expense of 

strategic leadership. Second, the special envoy had no formal authority to compel interagency collaboration. Third, special envoys have 

only limited control over funds or resources outside the lead agency.69
60 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES

Summary of Nonmilitary Interagency Structures

The civilian side of the US government has several organizations 

and structures playing key roles in interagency unity of effort for 

planning and implementing foreign policy at the regional level. However, none of the current structures provides all of the organizational 

attributes needed to produce the desired unity of effort.

Regional bureaus at the State Department provide some strategiclevel interagency policy coordination in Washington, but they are 

much less effective at the operational level. The assistant secretaries 

who head these regional bureaus are staff officers who provide support to the undersecretary of state for political affairs and the secretary of state. The bureaus are not structured like the military’s GCCs 

in that these secretaries do not have the authority to compel interagency unity of effort at the regional level.

The State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations has established a good model for interagency unity of effort 

for planning and execution, but this model is limited to reconstruction and stabilization operations. Also, because CSO only recently 

received sufficient funding from Congress and has not yet been fully 

used in a real-world operation, there is little track record to judge 

whether the construct and concepts will produce the desired level of 

interagency unity of effort, even in its assigned mission area.

State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and the US Agency for 

International Development both provide critical capabilities to the 

US civil-military national security and foreign policy team, but neither plays a leading role in coordinating interagency planning and 

execution. While the USG needs these offices on the team, it should 

not look to them to take a leading role in an improved interagency 

structure.

At US embassies around the world, each ambassador has de jure

authority over all US interagency actors in the country, including the 

military (except during “major military operations”), which should 

produce a high degree of interagency unity of effort at the country 

level. However, the ambassador does not always have de facto control, 

as the military GCC or civilian agencies in Washington sometimes 

work directly with their agency’s counterparts in the country rather 

than through the ambassador. Even when an ambassador achieves a 

high degree of control over US activities in his or her assigned country, 
CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES │ 61

no mechanism exists to ensure unity of effort with other US ambassadors in the region.

US regional missions conduct multilateral diplomacy, unifying 

civil-military engagement with a handful of regional IGOs such as 

NATO, the EU, the AU, and the ASEAN. However these regional US 

missions are in no way regional headquarters like the military’s 

GCCs. The staff at each regional US mission is much smaller than a 

GCC staff, and the ambassador at each mission is focused only on 

engagement with the specified IGO and has no regional synchronization role or authority over other US ambassadors in the region.

In Washington, the National Security Council and its supporting 

national security staff provide a strategic-level, interagency, policycoordinating body that has occasionally been tasked to synchronize 

and monitor policy execution—sometimes with negative results. 

Even when the results are positive, placing too much execution responsibility in the NSS risks overburdening the White House and 

distracting from the NSC’s primary role in strategic policy formulation and coordination.

Congress created both the Department of Homeland Security and 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence to unify homeland security and intelligence organizations in response to perceived coordination failures associated with the 9/11 attacks. In many ways, the formation of these two organizations mirrors the DOD reorganization that 

the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated, which created today’s successful US joint military team. Some interagency reform advocates believe similar legislation may be required to achieve interagency unity 

of effort for regional-level foreign policy planning and execution.70

The national centers for counterintelligence, infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism represent recent attempts to improve interagency unity of effort in a specific mission area. Two of them (counterintelligence and counterterrorism) are codified in law, making 

them effectively permanent and providing a better chance of sufficient, continuous funding. These centers have generated successes in 

their mission areas that probably would not have occurred if each participating agency had been working separately, but these constructs 

still do not provide their directors with a level of authority commensurate with assigned responsibilities. Thus, while the centers provide 

some lessons for interagency reform, they still fall short of providing 

the authority required to execute interagency responsibilities.
62 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES

Finally, the president has assigned mission-specific interagency 

coordination and implementation for some issues to special envoys. 

In some cases, these envoys have assembled interagency staffs to assist in their missions and to provide a point of entry to the various 

agencies required. While these envoys can achieve successes with sufficient backing from the president and/or key cabinet secretaries, 

they have no formal legal authority to compel interagency unity of 

effort. Absent such formal authority, these ad hoc constructs risk 

overburdening the White House or the cabinet secretary assigned to 

support their activities.

None of the currently available civilian structures appears able to 

produce the desired level of interagency unity of effort for the planning and execution of US foreign policy at the regional level. 

Notes

1. Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune, “The National 

Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System,” in 

Affairs of State, ed. Gabriel Marcella, 137.

2. Louis J. Nigro Jr., “The Department of State and Strategic Integration: How Reinforcing State as an Institution Will Improve America’s Engagement with the World in 

the 21st Century,” in Affairs of State, ed. Gabriel Marcella, 258–59; USJFCOM, Insights and Best Practices: Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Coordination (A Joint Force Operational Perspective), Focus Paper no. 3 (Norfolk, VA: 

USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, July 2007), 2, http://jko.cmil.org/file/109/view; 

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “President’s Proposed Budget Request 

for Fiscal Year 2011 for the Department of State and Foreign Operations,” Testimony 

before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and 

Related Programs, Washington, DC, 24 February 2010; and White House Office of 

Management and Budget, “The U.S. Department of Defense 2010 Budget,” fact sheet, 

1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/fy2010_factsheets/fy10_defense.pdf.

3. DOS, “Department Organization Chart,” DOS website, May 2012, http://

www.state.gov.

4. MAJ Mark L. Curry, USA, “The Interagency Process in Regional Foreign Policy,” monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US 

Army Command and General Staff College, 5 May 1994), 6–7.

5. DOS, “Under Secretary for Political Affairs,” DOS website, http://www.state

.gov/p/; and DOS, “Bureau of International Organization Affairs,” DOS website, 

http://www.state.gov/p/io/other/133723.htm.

6. USJFCOM, Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination 

Group (Norfolk, VA: USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Innovation and Experimentation Directorate, 1 March 2007), IV-5.

7. Ibid., 9, 17.
CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES │ 63

8. Andrew J. Shapiro, assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, 

“Political-Military Affairs: Smart Power Starts Here” (keynote address, ComDef 

2009, Washington, DC, 9 September 2009).

9. Nigro, “Department of State and Strategic Integration,” 279–80; and John D. 

Finney and Alphonse F. La Porta, “Integrating National Security Strategy at the Operational Level: The Role of the State Department Political Advisors,” in Affairs of 

State, ed. Gabriel Marcella, 281–82.

10. Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration,The 

United States Government Manual 2009/2010 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 2009), 297–98, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/gmanual/index.html.

11. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, “National Security Policy Process,” 141.

12. DOS, Office of the Spokesperson, “U.S. Department of State Launches Bureau 

of Conflict and Stabilization Operations,” fact sheet, 22 November 2011; and DOS, 

Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, “CSO: One-Year Progress Report,” 8 

March 2013, DOS website, http://www.state.gov/j/cso/releases/other/2013/206410

.htm. 

13. Kennon H. Nakamura and Susan B. Epstein, Diplomacy for the 21st Century: 

Transformational Diplomacy, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: CRS, 23 

August 2007), 9; and Nigro, “Department of State and Strategic Integration,” 266.

14. DOS, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, “Staff 

List—Current as of April 5, 2010,” http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public

.display&shortcut=4X3I; and DOS, Office of the Spokesman, “Civilian Response Corps 

Reaches 100 Active Members,” 16 April 2010.

15. DOS, “CSO.”

16. Ibid. 

17. DOS, “What We Do,” DOS website, http://www.state.gov/j/cso/what/indes

.htm.

18. Gabriel Marcella, “Understanding the Interagency Process: The Challenge of 

Adaptation,” in Affairs of State, ed. Gabriel Marcella, 27.

19. Nora Bensahel and Anne M. Moisan, “Repairing the Interagency Process,” 

Joint Force Quarterly 44 (1st Quarter 2007): 107.

20. Nakamura and Epstein, Diplomacy for the 21st Century, 8–9.

21. S/CRS, 2009 Year in Review: Smart Power in Action (Washington, DC: DOS, 

1 March 2010), 5–7.

22. Nakamura and Epstein, Diplomacy for the 21st Century, 9.

23. DOS, 2009 Year in Review, 6, 8.

24. Ibid., 6, 14–15.

25. DOS, “Civilian Response Corps Reaches 100 Active Members.” 

26. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Foreign Affairs Reorganization,” fact sheet, 30 December 1998, http://www.fas.org/news/usa/1998/12/98123003

_tlt.html.

27. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Development in the 

21st Century,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, 6 

January 2010.

28. Nigro, “Department of State and Strategic Integration,” 276.
64 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES

29. David C. Litt, “New Directions for U.S. Foreign Policy in the Greater Middle 

East,” in American Foreign Policy, ed. Richmond M. Lloyd, 175.

30. Clinton, “Remarks on Development in the 21st Century.”

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. USAID, Office of Transition Initiatives, 15 Years: 1994–2009 (Washington, 

DC: USAID, 2009), 1, http://www.globalcorps.com/sitedocs/oti15yearreport.pdf.

34. Ibid., 2, 6–7, 14; and USAID, “Transition Initiatives,” http://www.usaid.gov

/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/. In §1207 of the FY 2006 

National Defense Authorization Act, Congress authorized the DOD to transfer up to 

$100 million per year to the secretary of state for “reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country.” This assistance can be in the form of either 

services or funds. Congress then reauthorized this authority in §1210 of the FY 2008 

Defense Authorization Act. These funds have hence been informally referred to as 

“Section 1207 funds.”

35. James Stephenson, “Military-Civilian Cooperation: A Field Perspective,” Foreign Service Journal, March 2006, 60–62.

36. Todd Bullock, “USAID Announces New Office of Military Affairs,” DOS International Information Programs, 24 October 2005. See also Thomas E. Johnson Jr., 

“Working It Out with the Military: The View from Kabul,” Foreign Service Journal 84, 

no. 6 (June 2007): 18.

37. Bullock, “USAID Announces New Office of Military Affairs”; and USAID, 

“USAID-DoD Relations,” 19 October 2005, 2, 5–6, http://www1.usaid.gov/about

_usaid/acvfa/usaid_dod_relations.pdf.

38. Marcella, “Understanding the Interagency Process,” 32–33.

39. Nigro, “Department of State and Strategic Integration,” 260–61.

40. PNSR, Forging a New Shield, 40.

41. Condoleezza Rice, quoted in ibid.

42. Marcella, “Understanding the Interagency Process,” 33.

43. PNSR, Forging a New Shield, 242; and PNSR, Turning Ideas into Action (Arlington: Center for the Study of the Presidency, September 2009), 29.

44. John T. Fishel, “The Interagency Arena at the Operational Level: The Cases 

Now Known as Stability Operations,” in Affairs of State, ed. Gabriel Marcella, 422.

45. Marcella, “Understanding the Interagency Process,” 33.

46. DOS, US Mission to the EU, “About the Mission,” USEU website, http://useu

.usmission.gov/root/about-the-mission.html.

47. DOS, US Mission to the OSCE, “The U.S. Mission to the OSCE,” OSCE website, http://osce.usmission.gov/infoosce.html.

48. DOS, US Mission to the OAS, “Introduction” and “United States Delegation,” 

http://www.usoas.usmission.gov.

49. DOS, US Mission to the AU, “About Us,” http://www.usau.usmission.gov

/about-us.html; and “Key Officers,” http://www.usau.usmission.gov/key-officers.html.

50. ASEAN Secretariat, “US to Open Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta,” press release, Phuket, Thailand, 22 July 2009; Embassy of the United States of America, 

Bangkok, “United States Moves on New Mission to ASEAN,” press release, Bangkok, 
CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES │ 65

Thailand, 25 January 2010, Bangkok; and DOS, “U.S.-ASEAN Cooperation,” http://

www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168943.htm.

51. The White House, Presidential Policy Directive 1 (PDD-1), Organization of 

the National Security Council System, 13 February 2009, 2.

52. Ibid., 4–5.

53. PNSR, Turning Ideas into Action, 116.

54. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, “National Security Policy Process,” 117.

55. Marcella, “Understanding the Interagency Process,” 15. See also Christopher 

L. Naler, “Are We Ready for an Interagency Combatant Command?,” Joint Force Quarterly 41 (2nd Quarter 2006): 27.

56. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, “National Security Policy Process,” 113.

57. Chris Strohm, “Former Commander Calls for New Military-Civilian Planning 

Organization,” Government Executive.com, 7 December 2004, http://www.govexec

.com/defense/2004/12/former-commander-calls-for-new-military-civilian-planning

-organization/18156/; and Naler, “Are We Ready for an Interagency Combatant Command?,” 27.

58. Jim Garamone, “Discussion Needed to Change Interagency Process, Pace 

Says,” American Forces Press Service, 17 September 2004.

59. Michael Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, Occasional Paper no. 05-

01 (McLean, VA: Hicks & Associates, March 2005), 5. Donley was the secretary of the 

Air Force until June 2013. His 30 years of government service include positions on the 

professional staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, five years on the National 

Security Council staff, and positions in both the Department of the Air Force and the 

OSD. While on the NSC staff, Donley coordinated White House policy on the 1986 

Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act and both conceived and organized the 

President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. While serving as a 

senior fellow at the Institute for Defense Analyses, he consulted to the Commission 

on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces and participated in two studies on the 

organization of the Joint Staff and the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. USAF, “Biography, Michael B. Donley,” http://www.af.mil/information/bios

/bio_print.asp?bioID=11336&page=1.

60. DHS History Office, Brief Documentary History of the Department of Homeland Security: 2001–2008 (Washington, DC: DHS, 2009), 3, 7.

61. Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, pt. 1, 9.

62. Ibid., 3.

63. Ibid.; and Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, “About the 

NCIX,” http://www.ncix.gov/about/index.html.

64. Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, pt. 1, 3–4; and Free Encyclopedia of 

Ecommerce, “National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC),” http://ecommerce

.hostip.info/pages/770/National-Infrastructure-Protection-Center-NIPC.html.

65. Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, pt. 1, 4.

66. PNSR, Turning Ideas into Action, 110. In April 2009, NCTC director Michael 

Leiter asked the PNSR to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the NCTC’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning and offer recommendations “for removing 

barriers to enhanced mission effectiveness.”
66 │ CURRENT PRACTICES—US CIVILIAN AGENCIES

67. Ibid., 54.

68. Ibid., 53–54.

69. Ibid., 115–16.

70. For example, see Murdock and Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols; and Lt 

Col Edward W. Loxterkamp, USAF, Lt Col Michael F. Welch, USAF, and CDR Richard M. Gomez, USN, The Interagency Process: The Need for New Legislation (Norfolk, 

VA: Joint Forces Staff College, 27 September 2003).
Chapter 4

The Need for Improvement

The United States conducts a broad range of activities overseas requiring coordinated actions of multiple agencies. These include 

peacetime security cooperation, counterterrorism cooperation, humanitarian relief operations in the wake of a disaster, complex reconstruction and stabilization operations, and combat and COIN operations. Reviewing each type of mission will help illustrate both the 

successes and challenges the United States has experienced in executing these complex interagency operations.

Security Cooperation

Security cooperation is a term used to describe programs conducted between the United States and partner nations—either bilaterally or on a regional basis—to shape the future security environment in ways favorable to US interests. Security cooperation activities 

promote partner nation military interoperability with US forces, 

build and strengthen defense partnerships, foster more capable and 

professional militaries in friendly countries, enhance US influence 

with the partner nation, and provide access for US forces in or 

through the partner nation when required. The OSD identifies security cooperation objectives; the OSD staff, Joint Staff, service staffs, 

and GCCs develop regional and country-specific security cooperation plans; and the GCCs, their service components, and the security 

cooperation offices (SCO) at each embassy take the lead in executing 

the program, with support from the State Department’s PoliticalMilitary Bureau and the interagency US embassy country teams.1

In addition to security cooperation objectives that the secretary of 

defense has identified, the GCCs may execute additional peacetime 

theater engagement activities under the heading of “Phase Zero” or 

“shaping” activities. The term refers to the first of six phases of a military operation, which include Phase 0: Shape; Phase I: Deter; Phase 

II: Seize the Initiative; Phase III: Dominance; Phase IV: Stabilization; 

and Phase V: Enabling Civil Authority.2

 The word shaping has come 

to mean almost any activity that might prepare the United States for 
68 │ THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

a future contingency operation, leading to concerns that the military 

is conducting activities that overlap with DOS diplomatic and USAID developmental goals and programs.3

 Programs under the heading of Phase Zero activities should in theory be limited to those specifically spelled out in approved operational plans and should be 

coordinated with the State Department at both the Washington and 

embassy levels, but for reasons of operational security, this is not always done.4

In the early years of the security cooperation program, coordination between State and Defense was limited. The DOD’s security cooperation plans were not shared until the chairman of the JCS and 

the secretary of defense had reviewed and approved them, offering 

no opportunity for unity of effort in development of these plans.5

 The 

GCCs have improved the security cooperation planning process in 

recent years by developing mechanisms such as POLADs and JIACGs 

to get earlier interagency input.

The funding for security cooperation activities traditionally comes 

from two sources: US Code Title 10, which funds military activities, 

and US Code Title 22, which funds programs controlled by the State 

Department but administered by the DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Title 22 encompasses a broad range of activities, including foreign military sales (FMS), foreign military financing (FMF), international military education and training (IMET), 

and the global peace operations initiative (GPOI).6

 The GAO says the 

proportion of foreign assistance that the State Department funded 

and DOD executed increased from 7 percent of official development 

assistance in 2001 to an estimated 20 percent in 2006.7

Some, such as Albert Zaccor at the Atlantic Council of the United 

States, caution that security cooperation objectives and programs 

should be strictly limited to “specific enumerated defense and security 

objectives and assistance to foreign establishments playing a role in 

national security or defense” to avoid the temptation to define security 

cooperation so broadly that it becomes “a surrogate for foreign policy.”8

 Similarly, Thomas E. Johnson Jr., an FSO who served as a USAID 

program officer in Kabul, says that “the military’s ‘mission creep’ into 

the Foreign Service lanes seems to be happening without sufficient 

thought, planning or coordination.”9

 For example, the Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program (CERP), “intended to enable commanders to ‘respond to humanitarian relief and reconstruction within 

their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will imme-
THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 69

diately assist the . . . population’ ” is instead often used for long-term 

projects, which Johnson says impedes the USAID’s ability to maximize unity of effort in developmental assistance.10

Beginning in fiscal year 2006, Congress provided an additional 

source of security cooperation funding directly to the DOD called 

“Section 1206 funding” (named after §1206 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act), giving Defense both the funding and authority to train and equip foreign police forces and militaries at the 

direction of the president and requiring only that it coordinate with 

State in the implementation of these programs.11 In 2009 the GAO 

reported that the DOD and DOS “had developed a coordinated process for jointly reviewing and selecting project proposals,” noting that 

while coordination between the GCCs and US embassies “did not occur consistently” in 2007, “officials reported better coordination in the 

formulation of fiscal year 2007 proposals.”12 In 2006 Section 1206 

funding was $200 million and grew to $400 million by 2012.13 The 

result is that the DOD provides a greater proportion of US foreign assistance than does the DOS, increasingly putting a military “face” on 

the aid that countries receive.14 Additionally, Congress created three 

country-specific Title 10 security cooperation funds—the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the Iraq Security Forces Fund 

(ISFF), and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF)—to build 

the capabilities of security forces in these three countries. At $11.6 billion in fiscal year 2011, the ASFF was one of the largest appropriations 

in the DOD.

A 2006 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report finds that the 

added funding for military involvement in theater engagement has 

led to increased US military presence in embassies and elsewhere in 

partner countries. Thus, not only must an already overburdened embassy handle the associated personnel support requirements, but also 

lines of authority between State and Defense may become blurred 

and hamper interagency unity of effort at the country level. At the 

same time, DOS funding and personnel were cut for several years, 

creating capability gaps that a well-funded DOD stepped in to fill.15

Further, some host countries have expressed concern over the expanded role of the US military in addressing nonmilitary problems 

such as building schools and drilling water wells. Ethiopia, for example, ordered a US military civil affairs team that had been conducting 

just such development projects out of the country to prevent any perception that the US military was taking sides in regional disputes, 
70 │ THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

possibly leading to cross-border hostilities.16 Testimony on the creation of AFRICOM during congressional hearings in the summer of 

2007 echoed many of the same concerns.17

While there are concerns the military is taking the lead role in 

security-related engagements, current organizational structures focus the State Department on bilateral relationships, while the military’s GCCs lead the DOD to take a more theater-level perspective. 

The DOD argues this regional-level perspective is often key to ensuring interagency unity of effort and coordination with other US partners working toward compatible goals in the host countries throughout the region. For example, RADM Hamlin Tallent, then serving as 

EUCOM’s director of operations, testified to Congress in 2005 that 

“EUCOM’s [security cooperation] strategy is derived from regional

priority and policy themes stated in the Secretary of Defense’s Security 

Cooperation Guidance. EUCOM has taken a regional approach that 

links individual country objectives to broader theater goals” (emphasis 

added).18

Examples of regional initiatives conducted by EUCOM include the 

Africa Clearinghouse,19 which “brought thirteen African countries 

together with NATO, the United Nations, and the European Union,” 

and the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse, which “is open to all NATO, 

European Union, and partner countries (Russia and Ukraine specifically) that have engagement programs in Southeastern Europe” (the 

former Yugoslavia). Another is the South Caucasus Clearinghouse, 

which “focuses on defense reform, energy security, maritime security, 

disaster response, peacekeeping, and training and education” and 

provides “a forum for EUCOM, our European partners, and international organizations like NATO and the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe to coordinate security cooperation programs with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.”20 EUCOM runs all of 

these clearinghouse activities from its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. Citing the Africa Clearinghouse, Rear Admiral Tallent testified 

that EUCOM created it because “we were finding . . . when we were 

down in Africa [that the United States and its European allies] were 

fumbling around over each other. We would go in and train a group 

in Ghana, let us say, only to find out the French had trained them the 

year before, the same group, so we were duplicating efforts. It was just 

insane.” As part of the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative 

in late 2004 or early 2005, EUCOM brought together the chiefs of 
THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 71

defense from the African countries in the region, which, according to 

Tallent, “was the first time they had ever met each other.”21

Counterterrorism Engagement

Another key security engagement between the United States and 

partner nations is in counterterrorism, particularly after 9/11. US 

counterterrorist engagements involve many interagency players—

State, Defense, USAID, law enforcement and intelligence, Commerce, 

Treasury, and others. In 2005 Rep. Edward Royce (R-CA), chair of the 

House International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, stated,

While [military] train and equip programming is important, combating terrorism requires many tools, including development assistance and diplomacy. 

The potential implications of security assistance include its impact on the rule 

of law and on human rights, and these need to be constantly considered. . . . A 

good public relations campaign must be waged, too. When we are sending 

troops into countries, even just to train, it is critical that we couple it with a 

very good explanation, an explanation that will resonate with the locals, of 

what we are doing and why we are doing it.22

One example of a US interagency regional program is the TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership. The State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs is the USG program lead, and other key players include the USAID, the DOD, and other elements of the DOS. 

However, interagency unity of effort remains a challenge. In a 2008 

study, the GAO concluded that these agencies “had not developed a 

comprehensive, integrated strategy for the program’s implementation.” It noted that “the State Department, USAID, and DOD had developed separate plans related to their respective program activities 

that reflect some interagency collaboration. . . . [but that] these plans 

did not incorporate all of the desirable characteristics” for interagency unity of effort.23

The GAO also found that “roles and responsibilities—particularly 

between the DOS and the DOD—were unclear with regard to authority over DOD personnel temporarily assigned to conduct certain 

program activities in African countries.” For example, in 2007 the 

DOD suspended most of its counterterrorist activities in Niger after 

the US ambassador limited the number of personnel who could enter 

the country. Although the DOD was highly critical of the ruling, the 
72 │ THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

ambassador was considering the larger diplomatic issue of the country’s fragile political environment, as well as the small US embassy’s 

inability to support the large DOD contingent.24

The GAO also found interagency coordination between State and 

the US law enforcement community was lacking, remarking that “the 

State Department office responsible for coordinating law enforcement agencies’ role in combating terrorism had not developed or 

implemented an overarching plan to use the combined capabilities of 

U.S. law enforcement agencies to assist foreign nations to identify, 

disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.” It further noted that “the national 

strategies related to this effort lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities.”25 The GAO reported that in one unnamed country 

“lack of clear roles and responsibilities led two law enforcement agencies, which were unknowingly working with different foreign law enforcement agencies, to move in on the same subject. According to 

foreign and US law enforcement officials, such actions may have 

compromised other investigations.” The agency also noted, “Because 

the national strategies related to this effort did not clarify specific 

roles, among other issues, law enforcement agencies were not being 

fully used abroad to protect US citizens and interests from future terrorist attacks.”26

The DOS office in Washington responsible for ensuring interagency coordination in developing, coordinating, and implementing 

US counterterrorism policy is the coordinator for counterterrorism. 

William Pope, then acting coordinator for counterterrorism, told 

Congress in March 2005, “In Washington, the Secretary of State, with 

assistance from my office, must continue to coordinate overseas 

counterterrorism assistance. In our missions overseas, the more nuanced work of ensuring collaboration among various members of the 

country team is and must remain the responsibility of the Chief of 

Mission.”27

However, the necessary coordination is often not occurring. EUCOM’s Tallent told Congress at the same March 2005 hearing that 

whole-of-government cooperation on counterterrorism is “one of the 

greatest challenges we have. . . . A sanctuary that we offer [terrorists] 

is our inability to work in an interagency approach in the time required to get the job done.” He pointed out challenges to effective 

civil-military unity of effort in counterterrorism engagement, saying 

the “State Department does not have the same mechanisms and doctrine for planning that we have. . . . There are some culture problems. 
THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 73

There are some tool/equipment problems. There are procedural 

problems. All of this together is stifling our ability, I think, to do very 

quick interagency agreed-upon plans in this fight on terrorism.”28

Response to Disaster or Humanitarian Crisis

With deterrence of the Soviet Union no longer the US military’s 

primary raison d’être after the Cold War, evolving to other missions 

caused an increased use of military assets in response to foreign 

disasters or humanitarian crises. Over time, the US military has developed institutional expertise in humanitarian relief, and many of its 

exercises—such as PACOM’s bilateral Cobra Gold with the Thai military—have humanitarian relief components. In 1995 the military 

began leading interagency exercises and discussions to create a standing US concept for response to such events, but no consistent model 

has yet been developed.29

Media reports on recent US responses to disasters or humanitarian crises tend to focus on the military component, despite the fact 

that the USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is the lead 

agency for such events. Because the military is frequently the first US 

responder on the scene, with vastly more personnel and equipment 

than any other agency, it is often the most visible part of the response.

The 26 December 2004 Asian tsunami provides a good example of 

current interagency semicoordinated response to humanitarian crises. This tsunami stretched across South Asia and the coast of Africa 

and required “the largest humanitarian relief and recovery operation 

the world has ever seen in the wake of a natural disaster.” The US response began within hours; however, the US government lacked a 

coherent, formalized, interagency approach, so the USAID, the State 

Department, the military, and other federal agencies each began responding individually using its own procedures.30

The military response was led by PACOM, which quickly put its 

joint operations center (JOC) on 24/7 operations and established a 

joint task force it called Combined Support Force (CSF) 536 to conduct military humanitarian response operations. While combined in 

a unit designation generally refers to a coalition military operation, 

CSF 536 never exercised operational control over non-US military 

forces responding in the region, though much of the international 

military effort relied on the robust command, control, and communi-
74 │ THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

cations capabilities it provided. CSF 536 in turn established subordinate combined support groups (CSG) for each country where 

significant military forces responded to support the ambassador and 

US country team in that country. At the peak of the operation, over 

17,000 US military personnel, 17 ships, and more than 170 aircraft 

were involved.31

Because many disasters substantially disrupt local transportation 

and communication infrastructure, one of the most urgent tasks of 

the relief effort is to restore these services. The CSGs executed search 

and rescue operations, transported and distributed relief supplies, 

provided emergency transportation, and contributed to the overall 

assessment of the disaster. Military involvement ends relatively 

early—once logistics and transportation infrastructures begin to recover, and local governments, NGOs, and other nonmilitary agencies 

reach increasing capability—but other agencies may be engaged for 

many months or even years.32

The USAID also responded quickly to the disaster. Its OFDA sent 

disaster assistance response teams (DART) to the affected countries, 

together with “culturally proficient experts” to act as liaisons with the 

host government and local population. Their first mission was to assess the impact so that relief assistance could be tailored for each country’s needs and the ability of the local infrastructure to accept aid. Because of the vastness of the affected area, the OFDA trained US special 

operations forces and Marine units to augment the DARTs. It also sent 

a two-person team to PACOM to act as a liaison between PACOM, 

OFDA headquarters in Washington, and the DARTs in the field.33

In each affected country, the US ambassador acted as overall coordinator of US efforts. Many of the embassies had a disaster contingency plan in place for their country, which gave the State Department a starting place. Once the disaster occurred, the embassies 

developed disaster relief coordination mechanisms with the host 

government, other diplomatic missions in the country, local NGO 

and international organization representatives, and the US military. 

They also established status of forces agreements with the local governments, enabled smooth communication between the United 

States and the host nation, and facilitated the flow of US relief supplies through customs. Each embassy played a leading role in tailoring the US response to local requirements and the method by which 

the local government would accept foreign assistance.34
THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 75

The State Department, the USAID, and PACOM formed an ad hoc 

cooperative arrangement to coordinate interagency policy in Washington, but it was assessed to be less effective than the regional-level 

coordination. At the regional level, PACOM provided interagency 

coordination by establishing a JIACG specifically for the disaster response. The two-person liaison team sent by the OFDA initially 

worked in this JIACG but soon moved to the PACOM JOC, where 

they were in a much better position to provide situational awareness 

to the military and fulfill their liaison role with Washington and the 

OFDA teams in the field. The disaster response JIACG experiment 

was not successful, as the emergency relief phase was largely over before it could get organized. However, the OFDA liaison team was very 

successful in fostering a high degree of mutual confidence among US 

interagency participants, thus leading to extensive cooperation in response operations.35

Despite the complications, the US response to the 2004 tsunami 

disaster is generally considered a success. The interagency coordination process worked well at the country level in the various embassies, the regional military response was effective, and the USAID’s 

OFDA played its key role, though coordination of these efforts across 

the region was ad hoc. For single-country disasters, this may be good 

enough, but disasters that affect several countries benefit from a regionally coordinated response. While there is no formal interagency 

doctrine, process, or organization above the embassy level for US disaster response operations, PACOM’s long experience in humanitarian relief planning, exercises, and operations—many times in concert 

with local partner countries and other US agencies—in this case provided a starting point for the ad hoc regional interagency response to 

the disaster.36

Complex Contingency Operations

While it might seem that combat operations belong uniquely to 

the Defense Department, all US actions since the Korean War have 

involved combat that is either relatively brief followed by a much longer period of interagency stabilization and reconstruction or that is 

episodic and conducted in parallel with a variety of interagency 

COIN operations. Such activities are often termed complex contingency operations. Five case studies—the 1964–73 Vietnam War, the 
76 │ THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

1989–90 regime change operation in Panama, the 1994–95 regime 

change operation in Haiti, the 2003–11 operations in Iraq, and the 

ongoing operations in Afghanistan—illustrate the complexity of 

achieving interagency unity of effort in such actions. All but the first 

occurred after the Goldwater-Nichols Act brought the military services together in a joint team, and thus provide the best examples of 

how the current civil-military system works during conflict operations. The Vietnam case is included because of lessons offered by the 

unique civil-military structure devised to facilitate unity of effort in 

that COIN operation.

Vietnam (1964–73)

Initially, US involvement in Vietnam occurred entirely within individual agency (as well as individual military service) “stovepipes.” 

The military focused at first on providing advisors and training to the 

South Vietnamese military and later on direct military operations. 

Meanwhile, US civilian agencies—including the State Department, 

CIA, USAID, Department of Agriculture, and US Information Service—each separately pursued its own agendas, which grew to include many programs we would today call “reconstruction and stabilization,” as well as COIN activities such as “pacification.” Each agency 

operated separately in Washington, at the military headquarters and 

embassy in Saigon, and at the provincial level across South Vietnam. 

Though the US ambassador in Saigon was nominally in charge of civilian agencies operating in South Vietnam, he did not have the span 

of control to effectively supervise and coordinate all the activities 

with their separate agency budgets, lines of authority, and divergent 

institutional cultures. While the commander of the US Military Assistance Command–Vietnam (MACV) met regularly with the ambassador, coordination between military and civilian efforts was frequently lacking, and neither the MACV commander nor the 

ambassador had full authority over US efforts in the country.37

As US involvement continued to expand, programs grew in size 

and complexity, and the initially poor interagency coordination 

worsened. In 1967 the president, secretary of defense, and JCS created the office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary (later “Rural”) 

Development Support (CORDS) to establish unity of command.38

Civil development efforts previously supervised by the US Embassy 

in Saigon were integrated under MACV, placing both military opera-
THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 77

tions and civilian development activities under the MACV commander, subject to the overall authority of the US ambassador 

(though in practice the MACV commander reported to PACOM, 

and disputes with the embassy were often elevated to Washington, 

diminishing the ambassador’s de facto authority over MACV).39 The 

civilian director of CORDS held ambassadorial rank equivalent to a 

four-star general and exercised control over all interagency assets involved in the counterinsurgency effort. In a significant organization 

innovation, the CORDS director was dual-hatted as a deputy to the 

MACV commander, ranking this civilian third in the US military 

chain of command in Vietnam, behind the MACV commander and 

military deputy.40 The MACV-CORDS construct is shown in figure 9.

MACV

Commander

Military Deputy

Commander

MACV Deputy to the

Commander for

CORDS

AMBASSADOR

Fielded

Military Forces

Fielded

CORDS Units

CORDS

Staff

5th Special Forces

Group

III Marine

Amphibious Force

7th Air Force Naval Forces

Vietnam

MACV

Staff

U.S. Army

Vietnam

U.S. Ambassador

to Vietnam

AMBASSADOR

Figure 9. MACV-CORDS organizational structure. (Robert S. Pope, “Interagency Task Forces: The Right Tools for the Job,” Strategic Studies 

Quarterly 5, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 116.)

This construct represents the first time a US ambassador operated in 

the chain of command under a general officer. It not only brought 
78 │ THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

together the civilian COIN operations under a single leader but also 

integrated civilian and military COIN efforts. Additionally, the CORDS 

director’s position in the military chain of command gave the civilian 

COIN leader regular access to the military commander and provided 

the civilian COIN effort access to military personnel, logistics, 

equipment, and funding. From the headquarters down through the 

provinces and hamlets, the CORDS structure was an integrated civilmilitary organization.41 Richard Stewart, chief historian of the US 

Army Center for Military History, writes: 

Military personnel were . . . put in charge of civilians [and] civilians were . . . 

put in charge of military personnel to create a truly mixed, interagency team 

based on skills and abilities, not agency loyalty. . . . When a senior civilian was 

assigned to a key . . . position, almost invariably he had a military assistant 

reporting to him and the reverse was true when a military officer was in the 

principal slot. This blending of military and civilian authority included the use 

of the power of personnel evaluation or rating authority.42

 While the creation of the integrated civil-military COIN organization vastly improved interagency unity of effort, developing and 

maintaining the organization faced significant bureaucratic hurdles. 

While the military was generally supportive of the CORDS construct, 

civilian agencies were less so.43 Stewart notes that 

presidential leadership proved vital in overcoming the single greatest obstacle 

to mission success—the reluctance of Washington officials and senior leaders 

in the field to relinquish control over field operations. The State Department . . . 

resisted the idea that any of its development or pacification assets should fall 

under a military chain of command, even one headed by a civilian. Even after 

several broad hints from the [Johnson] administration, a presidential intervention was needed to change their minds.44

Once CORDS was established, its director had to continually fight 

Washington-based bureaucratic attempts to reduce its funding, 

shrink its structure, limit its scope, and keep additional programs 

from coming under its control.45 This bureaucratic resistance to formal interagency command structures is probably the reason we have 

not seen more structures like CORDS in the decades after Vietnam. 

While it produced unity of effort through unity of command and 

solved the problem of resource asymmetries between military and 

civilian agencies by providing the latter access to military resources, 

the civilian agencies were never comfortable with the arrangement.46
THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 79

Panama: Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty (1989–90)

The 1989–90 US regime-change operation against Panamanian 

leader Manuel Noriega illustrates a lack of unity of effort, particularly 

in planning for postconflict operations. Beginning in 1987, SOUTHCOM developed two contingency plans for Panama: a combat plan 

(Operation Just Cause) and a postconflict reconstruction and stabilization plan (Operation Promote Liberty). These plans underwent extensive revision and military analysis in 1988 and 1989, but they were 

not coordinated with other US agencies.47 According to a study by the 

Defense Science Board, the SOUTHCOM commander focused on 

the combat plan, while the postconflict plan received little attention 

from senior military officers in either SOUTHCOM or Washington.48

Postconflict operations primarily involve activities such as law enforcement, reestablishment of civil government, and other important 

reconstruction and stabilization tasks largely outside the military’s 

core competencies. Yet for reasons of operational security, SOUTHCOM prohibited military planners from discussing the Promote Liberty postconflict plan with the US Embassy in Panama, even though 

they envisioned that the embassy would take the lead role in postconflict operations. Planners assumed that the US military would run 

operations in Panama for 30 days after removing Noriega and then 

turn that function over to the embassy.49 However, as tensions between the United States and Panama increased prior to the invasion, 

the State Department reduced the embassy staff “to a single chargé 

d’affaires and a couple of clerks,” but due to the lack of planner-level 

coordination, the military did not know this.50 Strangely, when the 

secretary of state was informed of the postconflict timeline three days 

prior to the invasion, he did not object.51

Immediately after the 20 December 1989 invasion, civil authority 

in Panama collapsed, and looting and civil disorder were rampant. 

On the day of the invasion, the SOUTHCOM commander placed a 

civil-military operations task force under the control of the chargé 

d’affaires to try to get the country team operational again but with 

little immediate effect.52

In January 1990, two meetings involving 18 USG agencies were 

held to build the civilian interagency contribution to postconflict operations in Panama, but they failed to produce an effective plan or 

significant contributions from these agencies because they “resented 

being called in after the fact to solve what they saw as a self-induced 
80 │ THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

‘military’ mess.”53 The new US ambassador to Panama arrived in 

country two weeks after the initial assault with few resources and no 

effective interagency plan for stabilizing the country. On 17 January 

1990, SOUTHCOM established a military support group (MSG) to 

act as part of the country team. The MSG’s charter was to conduct 

stabilization and reconstruction activities including restoring public 

services, establishing internationally recognized standards of justice, 

and ensuring democracy.54

In February 1990, two months after the invasion, SOUTHCOM 

tasked the MSG to produce a coordinated interagency postconflict 

plan. The plan underwent two rounds of coordination with all appropriate agencies and was executed under embassy control as the first 

coordinated interagency plan for Panama since planning began in 

1987. While there was now an approved interagency plan, only the 

military had the resources in place in Panama to execute it. Executing 

the plan did not truly become an interagency effort until six months 

after the invasion, and it took a full year after the invasion before the 

USAID began to fulfill its role. The delay was partially caused by 

Congress, which approved only half of the funds requested, and 

partly by the timing of other international events, such as the fall of 

the Berlin Wall, which distracted US foreign policy actors. As a result, 

many of the planned infrastructure, financial, and agricultural reforms never occurred, leading to the new Panamanian government’s 

loss of faith in US commitments.55

There are several lessons learned from this operation. The military 

must not allow operational security concerns to exclude other key 

elements of the interagency from the planning process, particularly 

postconflict planning. By the same token, the rest of the interagency—

which in this case was aware an operation was coming, if not its details—must not disengage and let the military do all of the planning. 

Finally, coordinated planning must start far enough before the operation to allow all interagency players time to get tactical plans, teams, 

and resources together, or the military will be alone in the country.

Haiti: Operation Uphold Democracy (1994–95)

The lessons learned from the Panama conflict seemingly went unheeded as the interagency embarked on the 1994–95 regime-change 

operation in Haiti to restore the elected president and government to 

power after a military coup. The GCC responsible for Haiti (US 
THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 81

Atlantic Command at the time) began planning in October 1993 for 

a military intervention in Haiti. Similar to Panama, the plan included 

a forced entry phase followed by postconflict operations. Also like the 

1989–90 Panama operation, the military planners at the GCC excluded 

other agencies, claiming security concerns. Limited strategic-level 

interagency coordination took place in Washington, but operationallevel planners were unaware of these agreements. The first comprehensive interagency coordination at the operational level occurred in 

September 1994, just a week prior to execution of Operation Uphold 

Democracy.56

A last-minute diplomatic effort eliminated the need to conduct the 

forcible entry operation, but once the United States reinstalled Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide, civil order collapsed and the 

Haitian military began conducting violent actions against civilians. 

Despite the lessons learned from Panama just five years earlier, neither the US military nor civilian agencies had considered the dissolution of the Haitian security forces and the collapse of civil order. The 

US military was again surprised that civilian agencies were not immediately ready with state-building programs to strengthen the Haitian government and restore civilian law enforcement, so emergency 

restoration of essential services again fell to the military, the only US 

actors on the scene. Development planners on the civilian side were 

upset that the military did not wish to accept responsibility for the 

state-building efforts—responsibility assigned during strategic interagency discussions in Washington but not communicated to the operational military planners at the combatant command.57 Despite increased planning by key civilian agencies such as the USAID and 

Department of Justice, civilian agencies were slow to build the resources necessary to conduct their agreed-upon development operations and often expected more support from the military than it had 

planned to provide.58

While more strategic-level coordination was done for Haiti than 

for the previous operation in Panama, interagency planning did not 

occur at the operational level, and the United States once again embarked on a complicated postconflict operation without an integrated 

plan. Once the process began, the military wanted very little to do 

with postconflict operations, but civilian agencies were again slow to 

arrive with the necessary capabilities. Little had changed in the interagency culture in the years since Panama.
82 │ THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–Present)

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the US-led invasion of Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks, provides an example of what happens, at least initially, to interagency unity of effort when the United 

States has almost no time to plan operations—combat or postcombat. 

It also reveals additional challenges of bringing together the US interagency with a larger alliance structure, in this case the NATO International Security Assistance Force. Finally, more than 10 years of US 

operations in Afghanistan have provided an opportunity for a slow 

evolution of thinking about the need for more effective, formal coordination of the civil-military COIN campaign.

As OEF commenced in October 2001, initial coordination occurred 

only between the military and the intelligence community (primarily 

the CIA) for the rapid planning and execution of operations with minimum use of US forces against al-Qaeda and the Taliban-led government of Afghanistan. Once the Taliban regime was toppled and US 

forces were on the ground in Afghanistan, initial coordination between the military and the development and diplomatic communities 

was largely nonexistent as well.

On the diplomatic front, establishment of an international coalition for operations in Afghanistan was hampered by the different, 

uncoordinated approaches of Defense and State. State’s diplomats set 

out to build the broadest coalition possible and develop the greatest 

possible international support and legitimacy for the operation, while 

DOD planners were interested only in militarily effective partners 

rather than in symbolic contributions. Failure to coordinate meant 

potential international partners received different messages based on 

whether they were talking to Defense or State, leading to frustration 

and reluctance of some nations to participate in stabilization efforts.59

On the development front, military planners at CENTCOM were 

concerned about an immediate crisis, the possibility of famine. They 

established a coalition joint civil-military operations task force 

(CJCMOTF)—collocated with the US military headquarters in Afghanistan and with a liaison cell at CENTCOM headquarters in 

Tampa—to coordinate between the military and humanitarian aid 

organizations. The CJCMOTF established a humanitarian affairs 

working group that included coalition military partners, the OFDA, 

an NGO umbrella organization called InterAction, and the UN. The 

CJCMOTF also established several humanitarian liaison cells in 
THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 83

Afghan cities to conduct tactical-level liaison with USAID and NGO 

representatives. While this effort provided some field-level coordination between the military and development communities, there was 

no effective strategic- or operational-level coordination between 

CENTCOM headquarters in Florida and USAID headquarters in 

Washington.60

The reestablishment in 2002 of a US embassy in Kabul with the 

first postinvasion ambassador to Afghanistan created an opportunity 

for increased civil-military coordination and unity of effort. However, this opportunity was largely wasted as the embassy pursued developmental efforts and the reestablishment of the Afghan government while the US military, under Army lieutenant generals Dan 

McNeill and John Vines, focused on the counterterrorist mission. 

General Vines was emphatic that the military mission was counterterrorism and not COIN or nation-building, going so far as to prohibit those under his command from using the word counterinsurgency to describe their efforts.61

US civil-military coordination in Afghanistan greatly improved in 

2003–05 under the next US team in the country, Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad and LTG David Barno, US Army. General Barno believed in the 

importance of civil-military coordination to achieving US goals, so 

he moved his living quarters to the embassy compound in Kabul, established an office next to Khalilzad’s, and attended daily country 

team meetings. He also provided the ambassador with five military 

planners to work with embassy personnel to form an interagency 

planning group and produce a coordinated US strategy for Afghanistan. The resulting strategy shifted the focus from counterterrorism 

to COIN and nation-building, creating two regional headquarters to 

direct all coalition actions in each region and successfully conduct 

elections, reduce violence, and begin reconstruction.62

However, the Khalilzad/Barno civil-military coordination was 

personality driven and was in no way formalized or directed by either 

legislation or presidential executive order. When they were replaced 

in 2005 by Amb. Ronald Neumann and LTG Karl Eikenberry, US 

Army, the civil-military cooperation effectively ended. General 

Eikenberry returned the military’s focus to counterterrorist kill-orcapture operations, increasing civilian casualties and consequently 

creating a steep decline in Afghan popular support for the United 

States.63 Political scientist and Afghanistan expert Seth Jones concludes 

that this “effectively shatter[ed] the military-civilian coordination 
84 │ THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

Khalilzad and Barno had painstakingly fashioned during their tenure 

together,”64 and Senator John McCain said that “between late 2003 

and early 2004, we were moving on the right path in Afghanistan, 

[but] rather than building on these gains . . . we squandered them. 

Beginning in 2004, our integrated civil-military command structure 

was disassembled and replaced by a balkanized and dysfunctional arrangement.”65

In 2007 the Neumann/Eikenberry team was replaced by Amb. William Wood (2007–09) and GEN Dan McNeill, USA (2007–08), followed by GEN David McKiernan, USA (2008–09). During this period, 

civil-military relations continued largely as they had under Neumann 

and Eikenberry, with the military primarily focused on kinetic counterterrorism operations and training the Afghan National Army, while 

civilian agencies worked independently on diplomatic and developmental goals. In early 2009, late in General McKiernan’s tour, the 

United States began moving once again toward more civil-military 

coordination with the creation of the Executive Working Group 

(EWG), which each month brings together the in-country principals 

from State, the USAID, and the DOD to discuss civilian and military 

plans and operations and attempt to synchronize interagency efforts. 

The high-level EWG is supported by a working-level interagency staff 

called the Integrated Civilian Military Action Group (ICMAG), staffed 

by DOS personnel from S/CRS, USAID personnel, and US military 

personnel from the Regional Command East and ISAF.66

Many have been critical of the ad hoc nature of US civil-military 

coordination in Afghanistan. An April 2008 report from the House 

Armed Services Committee said, “Rather than depending exclusively 

on personalities for success, the right interagency structures and processes need to be in place and working.”67 A former senior military 

commander in Afghanistan said in early 2009 that the most serious 

challenge the United States faces there is “not the Taliban. It’s not 

governance. It’s not security. . . . It’s the utter failure in the unity of 

effort department.”68 In April 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

expressed his lack of satisfaction with General McKiernan’s civilmilitary coordination efforts, saying the NATO ISAF commander 

needed to focus on “cooperation between civil and military efforts.”69

The US leadership in Afghanistan changed again, with now-retired 

lieutenant general Karl Eikenberry becoming ambassador on 29 

April 2009 and US Army general Stanley McChrystal becoming the 

NATO ISAF and USFOR-A commander on 15 June 2009. Under 
THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 85

direction from Washington, the new team quickly set out to develop 

an integrated civil-military plan. They assembled a planning team led 

by the S/CRS and including other US civilian agencies as well as both 

USFOR-A and ISAF. On 10 August 2009, they released the United 

States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for 

Support to Afghanistan under both of their signatures.70

Under the new plan, the United States created an integrated civilmilitary decision-making structure at all levels in Afghanistan. Several interagency groups work at the national level in Kabul. The Principals Group, consisting of the ambassador and the commanding 

general of ISAF and USFOR-A, is responsible for final coordination 

and decision making. The EWG, with interagency members from the 

embassy, USFOR-A, and US forces from ISAF, is a deputies-level 

body to make policy and decisions. A national-level working group 

for each “transformative effect” in the campaign plan monitors and 

assesses progress toward each desired effect. The Pol-Mil section of 

the embassy provides planning and assessment support for the EWG 

and national-level working groups. Also, embassy civilians have reorganized along functional rather than agency lines.71

In the field, the USG created civilian lead positions at the regional 

commands, at each subregional brigade task force, and for each province. These civilian leads coordinate the activities of all US civilians in 

Afghanistan at their level and subordinate levels who operate under 

the ambassador’s authority. They also serve as the civilian counterpart to the military commander at that organizational level. This dual 

role as the leader of US interagency civilians and counterpart to the 

US military commander is intended to produce civil-military unity 

of effort at each level. Each region has also established a Regional 

Integrated Team consisting of the regional commander, the US special operations forces commander for that region, the civilian lead, 

and representatives from US agencies operating in the region. Each 

regional command also has a civil-military fusion cell responsible for 

maintaining a common operating picture of the region. Similar civilmilitary entities operate at the subregional, provincial, and district 

levels.72 These structures have remained relatively consistent under 

subsequent USFOR-A/ISAF commanders GEN David Petraeus, USA 

(4 July 2010–18 July 2011), and Gen John R. Allen, USMC (18 July 

2011–10 February 2013), and Amb. Ryan Crocker (25 July 2011–

present). In addition, General Petraeus established the three previously described CJIATFs focused on interagency counternarcotics 
86 │ THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

and rule-of-law issues. The past and current US organizational structures in Afghanistan are shown in figure 10.

Ambassador

Fielded

Interagency Entities

USFOR-A

Commander

Embassy

Country Team

USFOR-A

Staff

Fielded

Military Forces

to State Dept. to CENTCOM

ad hoc

ad hoc

ad hoc

Ambassador

Fielded

Interagency Entities

USFOR-A

Commander

Embassy

Country Team

USFOR-A

Staff

Fielded

Military Forces

to State Dept. to CENTCOM

Civilian Lead

Principals’ Group

Executive 

Working Group

Regional

Integrated Team

2002 to

August 2009

August 2009

to Present

Figure 10. Past and current US organizational structure in Afghanistan 

(Pope, “Interagency Task Forces,” 127.)

While this parallel civilian-military organizational structure is 

the closest civil-military coordination the United States has produced in more than 10 years of operations in Afghanistan, it still 

falls short of the truly integrated CORDS structure employed in 

Vietnam. Dr. Christopher Lamb, acting director of the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, and Dr. 

Martin Cinnamond, who worked in a number of UN positions in 

Afghanistan in 2007 and 2008, call the new structure “insufficient,” 

saying, “It calls for parallel chains of command with coordination at 

every level. Historically, however, the way to ensure civil-military 

cooperation is to formally integrate the military and civilian chains 

of command.”73

Iraq: Operations Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn (2003–11)

Unlike OEF, the United States controlled the timing of the Iraq 

invasion and should have had plenty of time to develop a coordinated 

postconflict plan. However, politics between the DOD and other US 
THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 87

agencies (and lack of presidential orders to do so) prevented this. 

Planning for postconflict operations should have begun as early as 

1998 when Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act declaring that “it 

should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove 

the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power.”74 CENTCOM 

began planning for military operations long before this, while the 

State Department began postconflict planning in October 2001 and 

the USAID in September 2002. 

The postconflict plan actually implemented, however, came from 

the Pentagon. The DOD laid some groundwork shortly after the 9/11 

terrorist attacks but did not start planning for postconflict operations 

until just two months before the start of OIF, when Pres. George W. 

Bush assigned it the lead for postwar planning and execution in 

Iraq.75 On 20 January 2003, the DOD created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and named retired 

Army lieutenant general Jay Garner as its head. Garner and his staff—

initially three or four people, increasing to nearly 200 by midMarch—developed the postwar plan. Several sources indicate that 

senior DOD leaders deliberately rejected interagency planning and 

coordination and prohibited the ORHA from incorporating the State 

Department’s postwar plan or even hiring personnel who had been 

part of the DOS planning process.76

Garner and the interagency ORHA team arrived in Baghdad on 20 

April 2003 and began implementing their postconflict reconstruction 

and stabilization plan. Organizationally, the ORHA was subordinate to 

CENTCOM’s combined forces land component commander (CFLCC), 

so the military forces in Iraq and the interagency postconflict team 

were in the same chain of command. However, almost immediately 

after the ORHA arrived in Baghdad, Washington determined that its 

postwar plan was inadequate for the situation on the ground. The organization and its leader were quickly replaced with a more robust interagency organization led by a diplomat rather than a retired general.

On 12 May 2003, President Bush appointed Amb. L. Paul Bremer 

III as a presidential envoy to lead the new interagency effort in Iraq, 

the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which both led the reconstruction and stabilization operation and acted as the occupation 

government until the United States returned sovereignty to Iraq in 

2004. While many observers at the time saw the replacement of a retired general with an ambassador as an indication that influence over 

the occupation was shifting from the DOD to State, the CPA continued 
88 │ THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

to fall under the DOD.77 However, instead of reporting to CENTCOM forces in Iraq, the CPA bypassed both the military commander 

on the ground and CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, reporting 

directly to the secretary of defense. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) director Mitch Daniels told Congress this change meant 

that CENTCOM now supported the CPA’s reconstruction efforts 

rather than the ORHA working in support of CENTCOM’s efforts.78

In practice, the CPA and the military operated in a largely uncoordinated dual reporting chain, eliminating the unity of command that 

had briefly existed when the ORHA had been subordinate to CENTCOM’s CFLCC. Further complicating matters, because Bremer was a 

presidential envoy, he had lines of communication to the president, 

vice president, secretary of state, and national security advisor.79 Since 

the CPA and the military reported separately to the secretary of defense, they often proceeded with different goals and assumptions. Lt 

Gen Ricardo Sanchez, USA, focused on COIN operations and the hunt 

for Saddam Hussein rather than on stabilization and reconstruction, 

and the CPA focused on stabilization and reconstruction, often lacking 

access to military resources required to get the job done.80 During the 

year the CPA was in Iraq, Ambassador Bremer and General Sanchez 

“met often but never established procedures for anything more than ad 

hoc policy coordination.”81 The lack of coordination caused delays in 

security and logistics, which meant the CPA lacked a significant presence outside Baghdad for many months during the critical early phase 

of the occupation. Military commanders across Iraq were left to fill the 

void by developing their own policies on governance and other civilian 

matters in their areas of operation, making the CPA’s job even more 

difficult because it had to reconcile these various systems established 

and promises made into a single coherent policy.

Interagency coordination was also problematic below the level of 

senior military and DOS leadership in Baghdad. Foreign Service officer James Stephenson, who headed the USAID’s Iraq mission, reflects,

During the first year of post-conflict operations, military-civilian coordination in civil affairs at the policy level was virtually nonexistent. U.S. forces had 

[adequate funds]. Accordingly, commanders had less incentive to approach 

executing agencies for assistance. Although [USAID] reached out to the civil 

affairs commander at [Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), later Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I)], and he to us, meaningful cooperation was ad hoc 

and generally occurred only at the operational level.82
THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 89

Even when the military in the field did attempt better coordination with civilian agencies, the CPA sometimes did not respond. For 

example, MG Peter Chiarelli, commanding general of the Army’s 1st 

Cavalry Division, with responsibility for Baghdad, wanted a close 

working relationship with the USAID. Stephenson and Chiarelli met 

with Ambassador Bremer to gain the necessary funding, but while 

Bremer “enthusiastically supported” their plans, the CPA took no 

action to provide the necessary funding for a coordinated militaryUSAID program in Baghdad.83

On 28 June 2004, the United States transferred sovereignty back to 

the Iraqi government. At that time, the CPA was disbanded and replaced with a US embassy and interagency country team led by Amb. 

John Negroponte, who took over leadership for civilian-run stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq. At this point, the embassy 

led the interagency effort and reported to the State Department, while 

military operations, now under GEN George Casey, USA, continued 

to report to the DOD through CENTCOM. Ambassador Negroponte’s and General Casey’s offices were collocated, and they attempted to 

coordinate their actions and those of their staffs, but they continued 

to report to separate cabinet secretaries with neither subordinate to 

the other.84 Therefore, Washington politics sometimes intruded, as in 

March 2005 when Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld became furious because General Casey shared his strategy to accelerate the training of Iraqi army and police with Ambassador Negroponte and the 

embassy staff in Baghdad, who shared it with State Department officials in Washington before Rumsfeld received it for his approval 

through DOD channels.85

In the summer of 2005, General Casey tasked a colonel on his staff 

to produce a study grading the Iraq war effort to date. The report said 

the military commander in Iraq needed control of all aspects of the 

COIN campaign, including economic and political development, and 

recommended a model similar to the CORDS structure used in Vietnam in which the civilian in charge of development was dual-hatted 

as a deputy to the military commander. General Casey shared the 

suggestion with CENTCOM commander GEN John Abizaid, USA, 

and Secretary Rumsfeld but decided not to pursue it, saying, “I made 

the judgment that it was going to take an awful lot of energy to get it 

done and the likelihood of success was low.”86 At that time, the State 

Department was proposing to deploy a few hundred FSOs to provincial reconstruction teams to conduct development work in each of 
90 │ THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

Iraq’s 18 provinces. Casey decided this was a reasonable first step, and 

his goal was to get the DOS to do more rather than take control of the 

economic and development aspects of the counterinsurgency.87 From 

2005 through the end of Operation New Dawn (OND) in 2011, the 

United States maintained essentially the same parallel structure in 

Iraq, with the military commander reporting to the DOD through 

CENTCOM and the ambassador leading the interagency country 

team and reporting to the secretary of state, while the commander 

and ambassador coordinated in an ad hoc manner.

OIF and OND demonstrate that even with adequate time for interagency planning, the lack of a formal, mandated process allows bureaucratic politics to prevent unity of effort, or even rudimentary coordination, during the planning phase. During 10 years of postconflict 

operations, the United States has maintained separate civilian and 

military chains of command, hampering unity of effort. Air Force 

Secretary Michael Donley concluded, 

The status of interagency decision makers (such as Ambassador Bremer in 

Iraq) complicates the authority of senior departmental and agency officials in 

Washington and the reporting chain of departmental personnel operating in 

the field. For example, when the U.S. creates an organization such as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), originally established under DOD but 

ultimately composed of officials from across the U.S. government, are the key 

decision makers in the agency reporting to the President, to the head of a 

“lead department,” or to their own agency head? To what extent can the head 

of such an agency coordinate and direct the use of all U.S. resources? This 

problem is especially important for the State Department, in which the U.S. 

ambassador is supposed to be the President’s senior representative in a given 

country; and for DOD, which has a well-defined military chain of command 

which does not include ambassadors.88

In a 2009 study, the GAO assessed that “multiple U.S. agencies—including the State Department, USAID, and DOD—led separate efforts 

to improve the capacity of Iraq’s ministries to govern, without overarching direction from a lead entity to integrate their efforts.” It concluded that “the lack of an overarching strategy contributed to U.S. efforts not meeting their goal of key Iraqi ministries having the capacity 

to effectively govern and assume increasing responsibilities for operating, maintaining, and further investing in reconstruction projects.”89

As these peacetime theater engagement, humanitarian relief, and 

wartime cases demonstrate, the United States can generally claim 

success in its interagency foreign endeavors, but it is often costly in 
THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 91

resources, time, and foreign goodwill as the various elements of the 

interagency fail to work together in a synchronized manner. 

Notes

1. USJFCOM, Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination 

Group, IV-9; RADM Hamlin Tallent, EUCOM director of operations, quoted in US 

House of Representatives, Eliminating Terrorist Sanctuaries: The Role of Security Assistance—Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 10 March 

2005, serial no. 109-19, 19; and COL Thomas M. Rhatican, USAR, “Redefining Security Cooperation: New Limits on Phase Zero and ‘Shaping,’ ” strategy research project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 15 March 2008), 7.

2. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 17 September 2006 (incorporating chg. 1, 

13 February 2008), IV-26.

3. Rhatican, “Redefining Security Cooperation,” 5–6.

4. Ibid., 17–18.

5. Ibid., 6.

6. Ibid., 7.

7. GAO, Interagency Collaboration, 24–25.

8. Albert Zaccor, Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy, occasional paper (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United 

States, August 2005), 7. See also Rhatican, “Redefining Security Cooperation,” i.

9. Thomas E. Johnson Jr., “Working It Out with the Military: The View from 

Kabul,” Foreign Service Journal 84, no. 6 (June 2007): 15.

10. Ibid.

11. Senate, Embassies as Command Posts, 7. 

12. GAO, Interagency Collaboration, 28.

13. Nina M. Serafino, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

FY2006: A Fact Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign 

Military Forces, CRS Report RS22855 (Washington, DC: CRS, 28 September 2009).

14. LTC Thomas P. Galvin, USA, takes the other side of the security cooperation 

debate, arguing that the military needs more authority and more focus on this area. 

He notes, “Unity of effort suffers due to a number of factors . . . including budgetary 

restrictions, lack of interagency transparency, mismatched authorities and responsibilities, slow responsiveness, and outmoded legislation.” Additionally, he criticizes 

the military “cultural mindset that relegates [security cooperation] . . . to secondary 

status behind traditional military [activities].” He contends that while the DOD has 

given security cooperation and Phase Zero responsibilities to the COCOMs, they 

lack the necessary authority because the State Department “controls most of the resources under Title 22 through the Foreign Assistance Act.” Galvin says another 

problem is the lack of a “peer regional authority” to the COCOM at State “to discuss 

and solve regional disputes.” Yet another problem is congressional legislation that 

“interferes” with security cooperation planning and execution. He praises §1206 

funding and recommends that Congress continue to expand this funding line for 

security cooperation activities. LTC Thomas P. Galvin, USA, “Extending the Phase 

Zero Campaign Mindset: Ensuring Unity of Effort,” Joint Force Quarterly 45 (2nd 

Quarter 2007): 46–50.
92 │ THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

15. Rhatican, “Redefining Security Cooperation,” 12.

16. Ibid., 12–13; and Senate, Embassies as Command Posts.

17. Rhatican, “Redefining Security Cooperation,” 13–14.

18. House, Eliminating Terrorist Sanctuaries, 20.

19. EUCOM was assigned responsibility for most of the countries in Africa prior 

to the establishment of AFRICOM in 2008.

20. House, Eliminating Terrorist Sanctuaries, 21.

21. Ibid., 24, 30.

22. Ibid., 2.

23. GAO, Interagency Collaboration, 13–14.

24. Ibid., 14.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. House, Eliminating Terrorist Sanctuaries, 13.

28. Ibid., 32–33.

29. Gary W. Anderson, “ ‘Interagency Overseas’: Responding to the 2004 Indian 

Ocean Tsunami,” in Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis, ed. 

James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 

2008), 194, 203.

30. Ibid., 193–94, 202.

31. Ibid., 195–96, 202.

32. Ibid., 195, 197–98, 202.

33. Ibid., 195, 204.

34. Ibid., 196, 198, 203.

35. Ibid., 195, 203.

36. Ibid., 194–95, 200.

37. Richard W. Stewart, “Winning Hearts and Minds: The Vietnam Experience,” 

in Mismanaging Mayhem, ed. James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, 90. Stewart is 

the chief historian of the US Army Center of Military History.

38. Ibid.; and MAJ Ross M. Coffey, USA, “Improving Interagency Integration at 

the Operational Level: CORDS—A Model for the Advanced Civilian Team,” monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 25 May 2006), 24.

39. MG George S. Eckhardt, USA, Vietnam Studies: Command and Control, 1950–

1969 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1991), 27, 29, 48, 69.

40. Coffey, “Improving Interagency Integration at the Operational Level,” 19, 24.

41. Ibid., 24, 26; and Stewart, “Winning Hearts and Minds,” 90–91.

42. Stewart, “Winning Hearts and Minds,” 94.

43. Coffey, “Improving Interagency Integration at the Operational Level,” 28–29.

44. Stewart, “Winning Hearts and Minds,” 105–6.

45. Ibid., 106.

46. Coffey, “Improving Interagency Integration at the Operational Level,” 4. See 

also John T. Fishel, “The Interagency Arena at the Operational Level: The Cases Now 

Known as Stability Operations,” in Affairs of State, ed. Gabriel Marcella, 420–21.

47. Curry, “Interagency Process in Regional Foreign Policy,” 23.

48. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics (OSD/ATL), Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to 

and from Hostilities: Supporting Papers (Washington, DC: OSD, January 2005), 11.

49. Curry, “Interagency Process in Regional Foreign Policy,” 23.
THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 93

50. OSD/ATL, Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study: Supporting Papers, 12–13.

51. Curry, “Interagency Process in Regional Foreign Policy,” 24.

52. Ibid., 27–28.

53. Ibid., 28.

54. Ibid., 24–25, 28.

55. Ibid., 28–29, 31–32.

56. Maj Stephen A. Clark, USAF, “Interagency Coordination: Strengthening the 

Link between Operational Art and the Desired End State,” research report (Newport, 

RI: Naval War College, 8 February 1999), 10–11.

57. Ibid., 12–13.

58. Lt Col Ted T. Uchida, USAF, “Reforming the Interagency Process,” Air Force 

Fellows research report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Fellows, May 2005), 33. Colonel Uchida was a 2004–05 Air Force Fellow at the Ridgeway Center for International 

Security Studies and Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University 

of Pittsburgh.

59. Bensahel and Moisan, “Repairing the Interagency Process,” 106.

60. Patrick N. Kelleher, “Crossing Boundaries: Interagency Cooperation and the 

Military,” Joint Force Quarterly 32 (Autumn 2002): 108.

61. Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New 

York: W. W. Norton, 2009), 142.

62. Ibid., 139; and USJFCOM, Insights and Best Practices: Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Coordination: A Joint Force Operational Perspective, Focus Paper no. 3 (Norfolk, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, July 2007), 13, http://

jko.cmil.org/file/109/view.

63. Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond, “Unified Effort: Key to Special 

Operations and Irregular Warfare in Afghanistan,” Joint Force Quarterly 56 (1st 

Quarter 2010): 44.

64. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 150.

65. Lamb and Cinnamond, “Unified Effort,” 43–44.

66. Joshua W. Welle, “Civil-Military Integration in Afghanistan: Creating Unity 

of Command,” Joint Force Quarterly 56 (1st Quarter 2010): 56. LT Joshua Welle, 

USN, was a civil-military planner for ISAF Regional Command South from November 2008 to August 2009.

67. House Armed Services Committee, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, Committee print 8 (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 32.

68. Greg Bruno, “Afghanistan’s National Security Forces,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 16 April 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/19122/afghanistans

_national_security_forces.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fby_type%2Fback

grounder#2. 

69. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates at a 13 April 2009 NATO Summit, 

quoted in Lamb and Cinnamond, “Unified Effort,” 41.

70. Beth Cole and Emily Hsu, “Guiding Principles for Stability and Reconstruction: Introducing a New Roadmap for Peace,” Military Review 90, no. 1 (January/

February 2010): 15.

71. Karl W. Eikenberry and GEN Stanley McChrystal, USA, United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan (Kabul, 
94 │ THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

Afghanistan: Embassy of the United States of America and US Forces Afghanistan, 10 

August 2009), 29–30, ii.

72. Ibid., 28-30.

73. Lamb and Cinnamond, “Unified Effort,” 50.

74. James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” Atlantic Monthly 293, no. 1 (January/

February 2004): 54.

75. Maj Robert S. Pope, USAF, “Interagency Planning and Coordination for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” research report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 

Command and Staff College, April 2004), 8–9; and Johanna McGeary, “Looking beyond Saddam,” Time 161, no. 10 (10 March 2003): 26–33. See also George Packer, 

“War after the War: Letter from Baghdad,” New Yorker, 24 November 2003, 59–85, 

http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?031124fa_fact1.

76. Amb. Barbara K. Bodine, interview by the author, 9 February 2004. Ambassador Bodine served as the senior State Department member of the ORHA from 

January to May 2003. She stated, 

One reason for not much on planning for OHRA is there wasn’t any . . . there was no 

planning, to be blunt. The issue is more complicated and depressing than that, however. 

There was a significant amount of planning—18 months or 2 years, $5 million dollars. 

It was chaired by State—the Project for the Future of Iraq—and managed by a gentleman named Tom Warrick. It was interagency, private sector, think tanks, NGOs, etc. It 

exhaustively examined what needed to be done, how to do it, etc. It involved 250 

Iraqis—none with political ambitions. Problem is, OSD wanted nothing to do with it. 

So, it isn’t that we didn’t have a plan; it is we ignored the plan, and the planners.

See also Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” 72; and David Rieff, “Blueprint for a Mess,” 

New York Times Magazine, 2 November 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/02

/magazine/blueprint-for-a-mess.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.

77. For example, see Andrew F. Tully, “Iraq: New U.S. Plan Seeks to Expedite 

Reconstruction,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 8 October 2003.

78. Mitchell E. Daniels Jr., director, US Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB), “Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1506 of the Emergency Wartime 

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 108-11)” (Washington, DC: 

OMB, 2 June 2003), 2.

79. See Amb. L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future 

of Hope (New York: Threshold Editions, 2006).

80. Ibid., 150.

81. Bensahel and Moisan, “Repairing the Interagency Process,” 106.

82. Stephenson, “Military-Civilian Cooperation,” 56.

83. Ibid., 56, 58.

84. Arnas, Barry, and Oakley, Harnessing the Interagency, 19; and Fishel, “Interagency Arena at the Operational Level,” 431–33.

85. David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle 

for the Future of the United States Army (New York: Crown Publishers, 2009), 190–91.

86. Ibid., 201–4.

87. Ibid.

88. Michael Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, pt. 2, Occasional Paper 

no. 05-02 (McLean, VA: Hicks & Associates, May 2005), 3.

89. GAO, Interagency Collaboration, 1–2.
Chapter 5

Options for Improvement

Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization 

Act of 1986, more than 100 major studies, books, articles, and professional military education (PME) student papers have addressed the 

topic of improving interagency unity of effort.1

 Many of these studies, 

particularly in the earlier years, focused on interagency problems and 

solutions at the strategic level in Washington. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, much of the attention shifted to the 

counterterrorism mission. The US invasion of Iraq on 19 March 2003 

and subsequent collapse of order refocused research and the resulting 

literature on stabilization and reconstruction operations and COIN 

warfare. 

Among the most significant prior studies are the DOD-chartered 

2001 Hart/Rudman Commission Phase III report, the 2004 Defense 

Science Board summer study by another DOD-chartered panel of 

specialists, The 9/11 Commission Report in 2004 from a congressionally mandated bipartisan panel, the 2005 Beyond Goldwater-Nichols 

Phase 2 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank,2

 the 2007 State Department in 2025 Working 

Group study, and the 2008 Forging a New Shield and 2009 Turning 

Ideas into Action reports from the Project on National Security Reform produced as a requirement of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act that mandated a study of the interagency national 

security system by an independent, bipartisan organization. However, relatively few studies have looked at whole-of-government unity 

of effort at the operational level of foreign policy planning and execution across the spectrum of conflict.

At each of the organizational levels considered in this study—the 

regional level for steady-state operations and the subregional or 

country level during crisis operations—the reform proposals can be 

divided into four basic models: (1) an integrated interagency organization, (2) an organization led by the State Department, (3) an organization led by the military, or (4) a parallel structure with no single 

leader or organization in charge. We will examine these four potential reform models, first for regional steady-state operations and then 

for subregional crisis operations, with examples from the literature.
96 │ OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 

Reform Options at the Regional Level

Interagency coordination of foreign policy and national security 

planning and execution at the regional level is currently dominated 

by the military’s geographic combatant commands. Because the US 

government does not have a strong regional-level structure or process for interagency coordination and unity of effort, the military has 

stepped into the breach and developed a series of mechanisms, including JIACGs, POLADs, and even combatant commands with organizational structures designed more for noncombat interagency 

operations than for military combat. However, the military-driven 

structures are all “coalitions of the willing,” since the DOD has no 

authority to compel interagency participation in planning or to direct 

the actions of other agencies during mission execution. 

A Regional Integrated Interagency Organization

The first reform model envisions creating a new organization in 

each region with responsibility and authority to coordinate interagency planning and lead interagency execution. In some versions, 

the geographic combatant command would be subordinate to the 

new interagency organization, while in others, the GCC is absorbed 

into the new organization. The most prominent proponents of this 

reform option include the CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study 

team and the PNSR, as well as many books, journal articles, and PME 

student papers. A review of the literature finds no proposals of this 

type prior to 2005, indicating that the challenges of the increasingly 

complex mission in Iraq likely inspired many of these authors. 

Proponents have identified several advantages of this model. First, 

having members of a collocated staff working together on a daily basis 

is expected to lead to improved regional interagency coordination in 

both planning and execution. Second, shifting responsibility for regional interagency coordination to an organization outside of Washington would allow leaders there to focus on strategic and global issues. Third, the creation of regional interagency organizations would 

enhance the development of localized expertise across the participating agencies. Fourth, an organization with directive authority over all 

US embassies in the region would provide a mechanism to coordinate 

each embassy’s country-level plans and operations. Finally, a regional 
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 97

interagency organization would address the power imbalance which 

is currently overwhelmingly tilted toward the military. 

This model also has some disadvantages. First and foremost, if the 

leader of this organization does not come from the State Department, 

that agency’s role could be further diluted, reinforcing perceptions 

around the world that it is not really in charge of US foreign policy. 

Second, many issues cross regional boundaries, requiring regional 

organizations to coordinate horizontally with one another as well as 

vertically with respective national headquarters and US actors at the 

country level. Finally, Washington would have to guard against the 

tendency of these regional organizations to become powerful fiefdoms operating independently of national-level direction.

The first proposals of a true interagency organization at the regional level are found in a pair of 2005 Naval War College papers. LT 

Peter Halvorsen, USN, recommends creating unified interagency 

staffs at the regional level that include all relevant executive branch 

agencies, either augmenting or replacing the GCCs.3

 The commander 

of this organization could be a military officer or a skilled professional 

from any department or agency, subject to Senate confirmation. These 

commanders would have directive authority over all US activities in 

their region. The regional commands could be structured along traditional military J-staff lines (renaming them I-staffs for interagency), 

or they could organize functionally, with components for military, 

intelligence, diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and so forth.4

 Similarly, Maj J. D. York, USMC, proposed the creation of regional interagency directors (RID) with authority and responsibility for directing 

and coordinating all interagency activities at the regional level. These 

regional directors would have command authority over the agencies 

assigned to them and would also have authority over the US ambassadors or multilateral IGOs in the region. The RIDs would require 

Senate confirmation and would report directly to the president.5

In April 2005, the US Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats 

and Opportunities (CETO) proposed a less ambitious regional interagency model. Rather than creating full regional commands, it recommended smaller crisis management groups (CMG), which would be 

standing interagency bodies to integrate civil-military planning and execution of major contingency operations, making them more like a JIACG under independent control, rather than subordinate to the GCC.6

The CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study team, in its July 2005 

report, recommended emulating the success of the military’s GCCs 
98 │ OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 

across the interagency to better integrate day-to-day policy execution 

regionally. Rather than establish an interagency entity in each region, 

the team proposed tasking existing regional senior directors on the 

National Security Staff to lead interagency coordination for their region—both at the strategic level in Washington and at the regional 

levels—by convening regular summits of senior US officials who hold 

policy execution responsibility for that region. They also recommended in the longer term establishing interagency organizations, 

called “regional security councils,” to bring together senior representatives of all agencies executing US policy in the region to facilitate 

day-to-day unity of effort.7

In late 2005, Jeffrey Gardner further fleshed out the interagency 

organization proposal by recommending creation of a regional interest bureau (RIB) to fully integrate the planning and activities of all US 

agencies operating in the region. A presidential envoy (as described 

in chap. 3) would lead each RIB and have the “full authority of the 

President” to “direct the efforts of all executive agencies in the region.” 

In this construct, agency headquarters would make policy and serve 

as force providers while personnel from each agency, including the 

geographic combatant commander and staff, would work together at 

the RIBs to implement these policies, much as the military services 

currently provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders.8

 Gardner’s construct is shown in figure 11.

Also in late 2005, Mitchell Thompson, an instructor at the Defense 

Intelligence Agency’s Joint Military Attaché School and experienced 

Middle East foreign area officer and advisor to CPA administrator L. 

Paul Bremer, proposed transforming the military’s combatant commands into truly interagency regional organizations with the responsibility and authority to conduct the full spectrum of US foreign 

policy and national security operations in their regions. Each transformed organization would be led by a senior civilian with a long and 

distinguished career in executive branch agencies involved in foreign 

policy and national security. This leader would be nominated by the 

president and report to the national security advisor. Each would 

have a four-star military deputy, functionally aligned directors from 

across the interagency, and an interagency staff, as well as assigned 

military forces. While Thompson says the civilian director of this organization would carry the rank of ambassador, that individual would 

report directly to the president through the national security advisor 

rather than through the State Department, thus placing the NSC 
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 99

rather than State in charge of US activities abroad. Thompson envisions this as essentially the CORDS model elevated to the regional 

command level and reversed to put the senior civilian rather than the 

military commander in overall command.9

Authority

Region X

Presidential Special

Representative

Diplomatic

Assistant Secretary

of State and USAID:

Region X

Informational

Deputy Director of

National Intelligence:

Region X

Financial

Assistant Secretary

of the Treasury:

Region X

Military

Commander, U.S.

Region X

Command

Economic

Assistant Secretary

of Commerce:

Region X

Law Enforcement

Assistant Attorney

General:

Region X

Figure 11. Regional interagency model—the regional interests bureau. 

(Adapted from Jeffrey V. Gardner, “Fight the ‘Away Game’ as a Team: 

Organizing for Regional Interagency Policy Implementation,” American 

Intelligence Journal [Autumn/Winter 2005]: 57.)

Dr. James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation proposes in a 2008 

essay disbanding the GCCs in some regions and replacing them with 

standing regional interagency structures he calls “joint interagency 

groups.” Carafano describes these new regional structures as the expansion of the successful JIATF concept to the level of the regional 

operational headquarters. These organizations could be led by either 

a military officer or a civilian, based on the predominant US goals 

and missions in each region (which could send an alarming and 

probably unintended signal to countries in regions that find themselves hosting an interagency group with a US military leader in 
100 │ OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 

charge). Carafano does not describe the nonmilitary components 

that would presumably be present on the staff, but he does say the 

organization would have a military staff “tasked with planning military engagements, warfighting, and post-conflict operations” and 

that could be detached from the joint interagency group to form the 

nucleus of a JTF in the event of military operations in the region.10

Carafano does not specify how this new regional interagency organization would relate to US ambassadors in the region or to the NSC 

and the cabinet departments and agencies in Washington.11

That same year, NSA analyst Dennis R. J. Penn recommended establishing new interagency organizations in each region to eliminate 

“all vestiges of militarized foreign policy” and produce unity of effort 

across three equal pillars of US engagement—diplomacy, development, and defense. These new organizations would be separate from 

the GCCs and would be led by “a forward-deployed National Security 

Council–level representative,” meaning that this leader would probably hold the rank of undersecretary or perhaps assistant secretary 

and would report to Washington via the national security advisor and 

the NSS rather than to a cabinet agency.12

The PNSR’s 2008 and 2009 studies also considered how to improve 

interagency coordination at the regional level. The team studied several models and ultimately recommended establishing regional issue 

teams in each region. These issue teams would be composed of senior 

representatives at the undersecretary or assistant secretary level from 

across the interagency. They would replace the regional interagency 

policy committees at the NSC and would report to higher-level interagency teams there, while US ambassadors and country teams in the 

region would report to the regional issue team, defining a clear interagency chain of authority from the president through the regional 

level to the country level.13

The PNSR considered but rejected a much more robust regional 

interagency organization they called an “integrated regional center” 

(IRC), which deserves brief mention here. Each IRC would preferably be collocated with the corresponding geographic combatant command and would act as the interagency headquarters for planning 

and executing US national security policy in the region. Each would 

be staffed by personnel from across the interagency possessing regional expertise and would be organized according to US goals in the 

region. The PNSR believes each IRC would need a staff of 500–1,000 

people, and it would be led by a presidentially appointed and Senate-
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 101

confirmed director, who could come from any national security–related agency or even from outside of government (i.e., a political appointee rather than a government professional, as is the case with 

about one-third of US ambassadors and many cabinet secretaries, 

undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries).14 The director would have 

both the responsibility and the authority to execute US foreign policy, 

including directive authority over US ambassadors accredited to 

countries or multinational organizations in the region.15 The regional 

director would have some authority over the GCC during peacetime, 

providing direction on security cooperation activities, but would not 

have authority over US military forces conducting combat operations 

(though the IRC and GCC would maintain a coordinating relationship during combat operations). The regional director would provide 

direction for US forces conducting postconflict operations as part of 

a larger interagency effort.16

Rather than adding another layer of bureaucracy, the IRCs would 

replace the regional interagency policy committees at the NSC. Regional policy would be delegated to the IRCs in each region, freeing 

Washington to concentrate on global issues and long-range strategy.17

The NSC would establish broad guidance and goals, set strategic direction, provide national security strategy and policy, develop budget 

guidance, identify cross-regional issues, and deconflict IRC requests 

for departmental resources and support, while the IRCs would translate national security policy into interagency plans and oversee the 

execution of those plans.18 Under this proposed system, cabinet secretaries would retain the ability to influence and challenge policies 

via the NSC process, but once an issue was assigned to an IRC rather 

than to a lead cabinet agency, the IRC would have the authority to 

refine policy and direct execution using assigned personnel and resources from across the interagency.19

A recent version of this type of reform model comes from a 2009 

Joint Force Quarterly article by Army brigadier general Jeffrey Buchanan, Navy captain Maxie Davis, and Air Force colonel Lee Wight.20

They recommended disbanding the GCCs and creating standing interagency organizations in each region which would report to the 

president through the NSC and would have responsibility for all 

aspects of US foreign policy in their respective regions. Each regional organization, which they call a “joint interagency command” 

(JIACOM), would be led by a civilian, possibly with a four-star military deputy, and would be staffed with representatives of all agencies 
102 │ OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 

executing aspects of US foreign policy in the region, including the 

military. The JIACOM director would have true directive authority 

for all regional US activities, including the military and the ambassadors and their country teams. Like the GCCs, the JIACOMs would 

have joint military forces assigned based on US requirements in the 

region.21 Operational-level activities would be conducted by establishing subordinate JIATFs, making the operational activities both 

joint and interagency and providing command authority over all assigned interagency forces from the tactical level, through the JIATF 

commander, to the JIACOM director, to the president through the 

NSC.

State Leads at the Regional Level

The second regional-level interagency reform model puts the State 

Department in charge. Versions of this model vary from relatively 

modest proposals focused on strengthening the authority of the assistant secretaries of state in the regional bureaus to robust interagency organizations, as described in the previous section but headed 

by a State Department representative and reporting to the secretary 

of state rather than directly to the president or an element of the NSC. 

The major difference, then, between this and the previous interagency 

model, is that it clearly places the State Department in charge of regional foreign policy. The most prominent proponent of this reform 

option is the 2007 State Department–chartered “State Department in 

2025” working group, though its proposal is relatively modest.22 MAJ 

Brett Sylvia’s 2006 Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) 

paper, “The Interagency Process in Regional Foreign Policy,” provides 

the best description of the robust option, while MAJ Mark Curry’s 

1994 SAMS paper provides a third variant of this model.

In 1994 Curry proposed putting the State Department’s regional 

bureaus in charge of all noncombat interagency operations in their 

region. His proposal would strengthen their ability to direct interagency activities by moving the regional assistant secretary and a 

small staff from Washington, possibly collocated with the geographic 

combatant commanders, while the regional deputy assistant secretaries and the country directors remained in Washington to focus on 

policy formulation.23 It is not clear from Curry’s description whether 

the assistant secretary would have additional authority to direct the 

actions of other agencies in the region. Absent that authority, this 
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 103

model is more likely to place the assistant secretary of state in a de 

facto subordinate role to the combatant commander and much larger 

GCC staff, while a lower-ranked deputy assistant secretary remaining 

in Washington would have even less authority in leading interagency 

coordination there. 

Sylvia’s 2006 proposal would establish regional interagency consulates (more appropriately called regional interagency missions), led by 

a State Department civilian of ambassadorial rank with a military 

deputy dual-hatted as the geographic combatant commander and a 

robust interagency staff organized along functional lines with divisions headed by assistant secretaries from relevant agencies. 24 The regional ambassador would report to the secretary of state but like 

country-level ambassadors would also be the president’s personal representative in the region, reporting directly to the president as required. The military deputy would report to both the regional ambassador and through traditional military channels to the secretary of 

defense. While the State Department would be the lead agency for this 

organization, unresolved interagency disagreements could be elevated 

to the NSC for adjudication. Because the combatant commander 

would work for the regional ambassador, the ambassador would have 

access to military personnel, logistical, and communications resources 

to execute other US activities in the region.25 This structure effectively 

creates an embassy-style country team at the regional level with a diplomat from the State Department directing all efforts. It is similar to 

the regional interagency structures described in the previous section 

in most ways, but in this model the State Department is clearly in 

charge, reinforcing its statutory lead role in foreign policy and making 

the organization more attractive to partners who would prefer to deal 

with a diplomat. Sylvia’s proposed structure is shown in figure 12.

The “State Department in 2025” working group recommended a 

more modest proposal in 2007, with the State Department as the lead 

agency only for regional interagency planning. To increase State’s regional presence and capabilities, they recommended that each State 

Department regional bureau establish a new deputy assistant secretary to represent it in the region and lead all regional planning efforts, 

staffing that position with a senior career diplomat with prior ambassadorial experience. Outside the planning arena, however, this individual would be subordinate to the geographic combatant commander, becoming the commander’s POLAD and senior civilian 

deputy. Indeed, aside from the leading role in interagency planning, 
104 │ OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 

this is effectively a military-led model and is similar to current structures in AFRICOM, EUCOM, and SOUTHCOM, where the command’s civilian deputy to the commander comes from the State Department and oversees the JIACG’s role in interagency coordination.26

GCC

Figure 12. Regional state-led model—the regional interagency mission. 

(Adapted from Maj Brett G. Sylvia, USA, “Empowering Interagency 

Capabilities: A Regional Approach,” monograph [Fort Leavenworth, 

KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and 

General Staff College, 25 May 2006], 55.)

Military Leads at the Regional Level

The third model designates the Department of Defense as the lead 

agency for regional interagency unity of effort and puts the military’s 

GCCs in charge. Some versions of this model argue that the current 

JIACG construct either fills the bill or can do so with only minor 

tweaks, while more ambitious models would significantly increase the 

interagency representation at the GCC headquarters, all while maintaining a flag-rank military officer in charge and reporting through 
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 105

military channels to the secretary of defense. Significantly, all those 

who have proposed that the military should lead the interagency at the 

regional level have been either military officers or researchers at military schools. They argue that the combatant command is the only effective organization present in the region and has already taken great 

steps since 2001 to facilitate interagency coordination, so the United 

States should continue to build on this record of success. However, 

this model does nothing to alleviate concerns that the military plays 

too large a role in US foreign policy.

In a 1997 paper from the Center for Strategic Leadership at the 

Army War College, COL Michael Pasquarett and LTC James Kievit, 

USA, retired, proposed creating a set of interagency planning teams 

at each geographic combatant command. These operational planning 

groups (OPG) would focus on a specific mission and employ a core of 

planners from a wide variety of US government agencies, NGOs, and 

coalition partners, which would vary in size as the intensity or scope 

of the operation required. Depending on the mission, either a military flag officer or an ambassador could lead an OPG. In some cases, 

the planning group could become the core of an interagency task 

force during mission execution.27 Pasquarett and Kievit state that 

these changes would “establish interagency operations as a focal point 

throughout the training, planning, and execution cycles” of US activities and operations in the region.28

After the 2001 establishment of JIACGs at the combatant commands, several military officers—including LCDR Chris Herr, USN,

Col Matthew Bogdanos, USMC, and MAJ David Doyle, USA, as well 

as Neyla Arnas et al., at the National Defense University’s Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy—either argued that the 

JIACG is already sufficient or proposed further strengthening it to 

serve as the combatant commander’s primary tool to lead interagency 

coordination.29 However, it is clear that the JIACGs as currently 

structured are not able to achieve full interagency coordination at the 

regional level. Neither the combatant commanders nor their JIACGs 

currently have the authority to compel interagency participation in 

coordinated planning or execution, nor can the interagency members of the JIACG commit their agencies to any particular position or 

course of action.30 Furthermore, the existence of the JIACGs can leave 

the impression that the military is (or wants to be) responsible for all 

executive branch coordination for planning and executing interagency operations in the region.31
106 │ OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 

In 2006, Lt Col Christopher Naler, USMC, proposed an “interagency combatant command”32 which looks similar to the structures 

now used by AFRICOM, EUCOM, and SOUTHCOM. In Naler’s 

model, the combatant command would be a civil-military organization with interagency representatives integrated into key leadership 

and staff positions. It would have both a military and a civilian deputy 

commander, with the civilian deputy drawn from the State Department. The civilian deputy would be both the ranking State representative and the JIACG director. Interagency representatives on the staff 

would provide their perspective throughout planning, operations, 

and exercises and would also communicate relevant information between the combatant command and their parent agencies.33 Naler’s 

model is shown in figure 13.

Combatant

Commander

Civilian Deputy

Commander

Ambassador

(State Dept.)

Military Deputy

Commander

Staff

Personnel

and

Resources

Joint Interagency

Coordination Group (JIACG)

Standing Joint Force

Headquarters Element

Information

and

Intelligence

Strategy

and

Operations

Financial/Economic

Development and

Requirements/Acquisitions

Cultural

Communications

Legal and

Environmental

Health

Figure 13. Regional military-led model—the interagency COCOM.

(Adapted from Christopher L. Naler, “Are We Ready for an Interagency 

Combatant Command?” Joint Force Quarterly 41 [2nd Quarter 2006]: 28.)

LCDR William Whitsitt, USN, proposed a more unified, whole-ofgovernment reorganization of AFRICOM in 2007 which might be extended to the other GCCs. In his model, AFRICOM would continue 

to be led by a military officer. However, unlike the current structure 

which has a military flag officer serving as a second deputy, the command would have a single deputy commander, a State Department 

ambassador.34 Below the command section, the staff would be inher-
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 107

ently interagency and organized more like a JIACG, with the military 

J-staff working in a supporting role to the main interagency staff.35

Finally, in 2009, Maj Brian Schafer, USAF, proposed a more robust 

planning organization for the geographic combatant commander. 

This organization, called a “joint planning group” (JPG), would combine the command’s J-5 plans directorate, the JIACG, and a multinational planning augmentation team (MPAT), bringing together the 

GCC’s standard military planning organization (the J-5) with the interagency (through the JIACG) and foreign partners in the AOR 

(through the MPAT).36 In this construct, Schafer proposed that the 

J-5 director would lead all planning efforts across the interagency and 

with coalition partners. The JIACG would be led by a military officer 

“so the military can guide the interagency partners through the military planning cycle and expertly inject their civilian expertise into the 

planning process as needed,” while a deputy director from a nonDOD agency “would have the necessary authority over its members 

to make things happen with no legal issues arising.” Within the combined organization, the J-5 would take the lead for combat operations, the JIACG would take the lead for interagency-heavy noncombat contingency operations, and the MPAT would take the lead for 

multinational crises and humanitarian operations, in each case with 

the other two parts of the organization in support.37

A Parallel Regional Structure

Some reformers propose a fourth model consisting of both a GCC 

and a regional civilian interagency organization with neither having 

authority over the other and each reporting to different agencies in 

Washington. Like the military-centric model above, all proponents of 

this reform proposal found in the literature were members of the 

military. They tend to view the combatant command as a successful 

template and look to the civilian side of government to create something similar to balance power and capabilities between the military 

and civilian sides at the regional level without diminishing the effectiveness or independence of the GCC. However, it is not clear that 

any of these proposed models produce regional unity of effort, since 

the parallel civilian and military organizations report to separate 

bosses in Washington.

In 2005, LCDR Darin Liston, USN, proposed creating an operational level of government for all US civilian agencies equivalent to 
108 │ OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 

the military’s GCCs. The State Department’s regional assistant secretaries and staffs would relocate and become the equivalent of a civilian government “commander” for the region, with all nonmilitary US 

agencies in the region falling under their authority, including the ambassadors. The regional bureau chief (RBC) and staff would collocate 

with the geographic combatant commander to facilitate civil-military 

coordination and a close working relationship, but the RBC and GCC 

would be peers, with neither having authority over the other and each 

reporting to their separate agencies in Washington.38

That same year, Maj Sunil Desai, USMC, noted that while the military has effective regional structures, the State Department expects 

nearly 200 ambassadors to report directly to Washington. To enhance 

the power of the State Department at the regional level, where the 

combatant commander currently has the most prominent role, and 

create a more manageable span of control over ambassadors, Desai 

recommends creating US regional ambassadors who would be senior 

to country ambassadors, providing a strong parallel State Department 

chain of command to coordinate with the regional leaders of other US 

agencies.39 Like Liston’s model, the regional ambassador and geographic combatant commander would be peers, with neither having 

the authority or responsibility to achieve civil-military unity of effort.

Also in 2005, Lt Col Harold Van Opdorp, USMC, proposed creating a “Regional JIACG Headquarters” (JIACG HQ) to centralize all 

nonmilitary US agencies in the region.40 This organization’s director 

would be appointed by the NSC, likely be from the State Department, 

and report directly to the NSC rather than a lead agency. The regional 

JIACG HQ director would integrate planning at the regional level 

across the interagency, including the geographic combatant commander, though the relationship between the regional JIACG HQ 

and the COCOM would again be that of equals, with neither having 

directive authority over the other.41

Further developing this model in a 2008 article, Lt Col Shannon 

Caudill, USAF, MAJ Andrew Leonard, USA, and Sgt Maj Richard 

Thresher, USMC, recommend that the State Department create a regional chief of mission (RCM) in each area to lead nonmilitary elements of US power, be responsible for developing an interagency 

strategic plan for the region, integrate interagency activities, and act 

as the primary American voice in the region. This diplomatic post 

would be on par with the military’s GCC, and a joint interagency 

planning cell between the RCM and the GCC would facilitate civil-
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 109

military coordination for planning and execution. These authors argue that this construct would “lower the profile, but not the effectiveness, of the . . . regional combatant command.”42 The regional parallel 

structure model is shown in figure 14.

Regional Strategic

Communication

Division

Regional

Political-Military

Affairs Division

Economic Division

-USAID

-Trade

-Commerce

Regional

Law Enforcement

Task Force

-FBI -ATF -DEA

Diplomatic Division

-Stabilization and

Reconstruction

-NGO Coordination

Ambassador

Regional

Chief of Mission

(State Dept.)

Geographic

Combatant

Commander

(DoD)

GCC Staff Service 

Components

Operational

Joint Task Forces

Joint-Interagency

Planning Cell

Regional Interagency

Planning Cell

US Embassies

Figure 14. Regional parallel structure model—the regional chief of 

mission. (Adapted from Lt Col Shannon W. Caudill, USAF, MAJ Andrew 

M. Leonard, USA, and Sgt Maj Richard D. Thresher, USMC, “Interagency 

Leadership: The Case for Strengthening the Department of State,” American 

Diplomacy, April 2008, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2008

/0406/comm/caudilletal_strength.html.)

Reform Options at the Country Level 

during Crisis Operations

We next consider models to improve interagency unity of effort at 

the subregional or country level during crisis operations. In normal 

peacetime operations, the US ambassador leads the country team of 

all interagency personnel assigned to the embassy and other missions 

in the country. Few interagency reform proposals in the literature 

take issue with this construct.43 However, many authors note that ambassadors’ de facto authority is much weaker than their de jure authority, as expressed in Title 22 US Code and their letter of appoint-
110 │ OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 

ment from the president.44 To enhance the de facto authority of the 

ambassadors, the “State Department in 2025” working group recommends that the president issue an executive order codifying their authorities, which are currently carried in the presidential letter, and 

further recommends that the ambassador be the rater for all other 

agency heads in the country so the other agencies would truly work 

for the ambassador.45 Along similar lines, the PNSR study team recommends improving the language in the president’s letter “to reinforce the de jure authority provided in Title 22 USC Section 3927, and 

establish procedures for ensuring that country teams are, in fact, true 

interagency teams rather than a collection of individuals pursuing 

independent departmental/agency agendas.”46 Additionally, the 

PNSR team recommends providing each ambassador “control over 

the assignment, evaluation, and rewards for any official assigned to 

an embassy or mission staff,” including all military personnel not executing missions for the combatant commander under Title 10, who 

would report to the ambassador through the senior defense official in 

the embassy as defined in DOD Directive 5105.75, Department of Defense Operations at U.S. Embassies, issued 27 December 2007.47

More reform is needed for crisis operations, however, and several 

authors suggest various structures to enhance interagency unity of 

effort at the country level. Again, we consider four general categories 

of reform proposals: an integrated interagency organization, an organization led by the State Department, an organization led by the military, or a parallel structure with no single leader or organization in 

charge. Currently, the closest structures the United States has to interagency organizations at this level are the long-standing JIATFs at 

SOUTHCOM and PACOM that combine military, law enforcement, 

and intelligence community personnel in a unified structure. There 

are no recent examples of State Department–led interagency organizations for contingency operations, though of course the country 

team led by the ambassador at every US embassy provides a steadystate example of such an organization. On the other hand, recent examples of military-led interagency organizations include the MACV/

CORDS structure in Vietnam and the ORHA in Iraq. Finally, a parallel structure exists in Afghanistan (and in Iraq until the end of OND 

in 2011), with the embassy and the military JTF coordinating with 

one another but with neither formally subordinate to the other. There 

have been similar parallel structures during humanitarian response 
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 111

operations with the military and the USAID coordinating as equals, 

such as the response to the 2004 Asian tsunami.

An Integrated Interagency Structure

The first reform model envisions creating an integrated interagency task force for crisis operations, unifying civilian and military 

efforts and command structures. Many of these proposals are similar 

to the current JIATFs at PACOM and SOUTHCOM, though with increased command authorities. The most prominent proponents of 

this reform model include the Defense Science Board’s 2004 summer 

study and the PNRS’s 2008 Forging a New Shield and 2009 Turning 

Ideas into Action reports.

The Defense Science Board study recommends establishing JIATFs composed of the leaders operating in the area of interest—the 

ambassador, the USAID country director, the CIA chief of station, 

and other senior agency representatives—augmented with DOD personnel as needed to coordinate planning with higher organizational 

levels and ensure coordinated action by all US players.48

In a 2005 paper, LCDR Darin Liston, USN, recommends establishing joint government task forces (JGTF) for interagency contingency 

operations led by either the military or a civilian agency, based on 

which agency’s core competency most closely aligned with the primary mission. This means a civilian could have command of assigned 

military forces.49 Connecting this to Liston’s regional-level parallel 

structure recommendation described previously, the JGTF would report to either the GCC or the regional bureau depending on whether 

the commander was military or civilian. His proposed JGTFs would 

have stronger command arrangements than the current counternarcotics JIATFs at SOUTHCOM and PACOM. In JIATF-S and JIATF-W, 

the task force commander has only tactical control of participating 

units while operational control remains with the parent agencies. Liston recommends delegating operational control to JGTF commanders, similar to a military-only joint task force. He would also align the 

two current JIATFs, and any future standing JIATFs, under the stronger JGTF model.50

Maj Sunil Desai, USMC, in a 2005 article, recommends developing 

interagency task forces as needed for specific missions. A presidential 

special representative would lead these IATFs, report directly to the 

president, and have an integrated headquarters staff of representatives 
112 │ OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 

from all relevant agencies. Desai does not specifically address how 

the civilian and military components would relate, but presumably 

they would all fall under this integrated task force. The major concern 

with this model is his proposal to have the task force leader report 

directly to the president; a handful of integrated task forces responding to crises around the globe could quickly overload the president 

and the NSS.51

Another 2005 paper by Lt Col Ted Uchida, USAF, recommends 

creating and deploying ad hoc interagency task forces (IATF) for crisis operations. These IATFs would be task-organized to accomplish 

specific missions using the combined capabilities of the interagency 

and have operational control and command authority over all forces 

assigned for planning, exercises, and mission execution.52

In its 2008 and 2009 reports, the PNSR study team recommends 

creating integrated interagency crisis task forces (CTF) to conduct 

crisis operations. Unlike the parallel structure used in US operations 

in Afghanistan, the CTFs would have an integrated civil-military 

chain of command (see fig. 15). A CTF would have a single director, 

a clear mission, and resources and authority commensurate with assigned responsibilities. The CTF director could be either military or 

civilian, depending on the security situation, and would be supported 

by an interagency staff.53 As in other PNSR interagency reform recommendations—which do not envision a significant interagency 

presence at the regional level—the CTF director would report directly to the president through the national security advisor for “large 

and important” crises and to the director’s respective department 

(i.e., a lead agency) for less prominent crises. Once again, this reporting structure appears to have the potential to overload the president 

and the NSS. To ensure the CTF director has the necessary level of 

authority, the PNSR study team says CTFs should be authorized by 

Congress and chartered by the president.54

Most recently, Buchanan, Davis, and Wight suggest establishing 

JIATFs that would be subordinate to their proposed regional interagency organization. This type of structure would make operationallevel crisis operations both joint and interagency. Moreover, it would 

provide command authority over all assigned interagency forces 

from the tactical level, through the JIATF commander, to the regional 

JIACOM commander (per their regional-level proposal), to the president through the NSC, supported by the NSS.55
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 113

Interagency Staff

Leader

(Agency depends

on mission)

Civilian Deputy

(Agency depends

on mission)

Military

Deputy

Interagency

Fielded Forces

Organized functionally (not by agency)

Representatives from all relevant agencies:

may include military JTF staff and/or

embassy interagency country team

Figure 15. Integrated interagency crisis task force. (Adapted from PNSR, 

Forging a New Shield [Arlington, VA: Center for the Study of the Presidency, November 2008], 526.)

State Leads

The second model for interagency crisis operations reform would 

put the State Department in charge of the task force. Interestingly, an 

exhaustive literature search identified no proposals of this model in 

the past two decades, not even by State Department–affiliated authors. However, interagency country teams led by the ambassador are 

standard for steady-state operations at all US embassies, so the model 

is worth considering for contingencies as well.

In a State Department lead-agency model, the USG would create an 

interagency task force similar to those described previously, but the 

leader of the IATF would always be from the State Department. In 

countries with a functioning US embassy and ambassador, the ambassador would be the logical choice to lead the IATF, since he or she already has responsibility for all US interagency activities in the country 

except major military operations. Where no functioning US embassy is 

in place—as is often the case immediately after an invasion or in a 

failed state with no diplomatic relations with the United States—the 

president could designate a special representative who would then report through State Department channels rather than directly to the 

president or national security advisor. This model is shown in figure 16.
114 │ OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 

Interagency Staff

Leader

(State Department)

Civilian Deputy

(State Department)

Military

Deputy

Interagency

Fielded Forces

Organized functionally (not by agency)

Representatives from all relevant agencies:

may include military JTF staff and/or

embassy interagency country team

AMBASSADOR

Figure 16. State-led interagency task force

Using this model, the MACV/CORDS model would have been reversed, with the civilian CORDS director in charge of the overall US 

effort in Vietnam and the MACV commander subordinate and providing military support. Similarly, in the first year after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Ambassador Bremer, the CPA administrator and presidential special representative, would have been in charge of the 

overall US effort, with the military JTF in support rather than the 

uncoordinated parallel structure that existed. The rationale for this 

proposal is that in complex operations, such as counterinsurgencies 

or postconflict stabilization and reconstruction, the desired end state 

is political, not military. While security is a necessary part of the 

overall campaign, the years of frustration during US operations in 

Vietnam, Panama, Iraq, and Afghanistan demonstrate that substantial military effort achieves little in the way of overall strategic goals if 

it is not firmly directed toward larger strategic goals. This model 

would attempt to put the right senior civilian with the right understanding of broad US goals in charge of the response.

Military Leads

The third reform model for interagency crisis operations would 

put the military in charge of an interagency task force, much like the 

MACV/CORDS structure in Vietnam. Again, it is interesting that the 

literature mentions little about using this model despite praise from 

many historians and military analysts for the CORDS structure.
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 115

The only identified published proposal of this type comes from a 

2006 SAMS paper by MAJ Ross Coffey, USA, who states that a 

CORDS-like construct is still a good model. Coffey recommends that 

the State Department’s S/CRS create a CORDS-type civilian organization that would be a subordinate element of a military JTF like the 

MACV/CORDS construct in Vietnam. The military-led structure is 

shown in figure 17. Coffey contends that this would be better than the 

current JIACG and JIATF models, which try to achieve unity of effort 

without unity of command, and also better than the parallel structure 

frequently used today. He argues that the latter mirrors the unsuccessful structure the United States used in Vietnam prior to establishment of the CORDS.56

Interagency Staff

Commander

(Military)

Civilian Deputy

(State Department)

Military

Deputy

Fielded

Military Forces

Organized functionally (not by agency)

Representatives from all relevant agencies:

may include military JTF staff and/or

embassy interagency country team

AMBASSADOR

Fielded

Interagency Forces

Figure 17. Military-led interagency task force

A Parallel Structure

The fourth and final model for interagency crisis operations would 

use a parallel civil-military structure with neither in charge of the 

overall effort. Currently, when the United States has both an embassy 

and a large military presence in a country, the formal chain of command is usually split, with the ambassador supervising non-DOD 

personnel while the JTF commander commands DOD personnel. 

The most significant proponent of this structure is the CSIS Beyond 
116 │ OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 

Goldwater-Nichols study team; few others have proposed such a 

model. The PNSR study team contends that these “dual civilian and 

military chains of command in the field complicate unity of purpose 

and effort.”57

Lt Col Harold Van Opdorp, USMC, proposed a classic parallel 

structure in 2005—creating a “deployable JIACG” that would unify 

the civilian interagency presence in a country under a single organization operating in parallel with the military’s JTF.58 Depending on the 

situation, either the deployable JIACG or the JTF would be the supported command, with the other acting in support. During major 

combat operations, the JTF would be the supported command; however, during a humanitarian response, the deployable JIACG would 

most likely be the supported command. Van Opdorp notes that many 

operational plans incorporate phases, and the supported/supporting 

relationship could change as campaign phases change, for instance, 

passing the lead from the JTF to the deployable JIACG during the 

transition to postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations.59

The CSIS study team proposes a much more integrated task force 

structure but maintains two leaders reporting in two separate chains 

of command, albeit with an integrated staff and a great deal of coordination. It recommends establishing an interagency task force to integrate the day-to-day efforts of all US agencies participating in a crisis operation. The IATF would deploy to the field and be jointly led by 

a military JTF commander and a civilian special representative appointed by the president. 

The president’s special representative, who could be the US ambassador to the country or another senior civilian of comparable stature, 

would be responsible for achieving overall US objectives for the mission and would have directive authority over all US government civilians deployed to the field. The special representative would report to 

the president through the secretary of state. The JTF commander, a 

senior military officer, would be responsible for military operations—

with operational control over all US military forces—and report to the 

geographic combatant commander, leaving the traditional military 

chain of command unbroken. While the special representative would 

have no direct authority over the JTF commander, he or she would be 

able to raise disagreements to the NSC or the president for resolution. 

Both the special representative and the JTF commander would be 

supported by a single, integrated, interagency staff composed largely 

of military personnel under the JTF commander, plus civilian per-
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 117

sonnel detailed from various agencies to work for the special representative. Where a functioning US embassy exists, the integrated staff 

would augment the existing country team, which would then become 

the support staff for the operation.60 The parallel structure proposed 

by the CSIS team is shown in figure 18.

Interagency Staff

President’s Special

Representative

Military Joint Task

Force Commander

Fielded

Military Forces

Organized functionally (not by agency)

Representatives from all relevant agencies:

includes military JTF staff and

embassy interagency country team

Fielded

Civilian Forces

To President through

Secretary of State

To Geographic

Combatant Commander

Figure 18. Parallel structure—the interagency task force. (Adapted 

from Clark A. Murdock and Michèle A. Flournoy, Beyond GoldwaterNichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era,

Phase 2 Report [Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, July 2005], 49.) 

Notes

1. The bibliography to this study has more than 100 such references.

2. One of the two CSIS lead investigators for the 2005 Beyond Goldwater-Nichols

phase 2 study was Michèle Flournoy, who later served as the undersecretary of defense for policy from February 2009 to February 2012.

3. LT Peter Halvorsen, USN, “Reforming the Interagency at the Operational 

Level,” research report (Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2005), 2.

4. Ibid., 14–16.

5. Maj J. D. York, USMC, “Militarizing the Interagency,” research report (Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2005), 16.

6. Arnas, Barry, and Oakley, Harnessing the Interagency, 16.
118 │ OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 

7. Charles A. Murdock and Michèle A. Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. 

Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2005), 20, 37–38.

8. Jeffrey V. Gardner, “Fight the ‘Away Game’ as a Team: Organizing for Regional 

Interagency Policy Implementation,” American Intelligence Journal (Autumn/Winter 

2005): 57.

9. Mitchell J. Thompson, “Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power,” Parameters (Winter 2005/06): 63, 72–73.

10. James Jay Carafano, “Managing Mayhem: The Future of Interagency Reform,” Joint Force Quarterly 49 (2nd Quarter 2008): 136–37.

11. BG Jeffrey Buchanan, USA, CAPT Maxie Y. Davis, USN, and Col Lee T. 

Wight, USAF, “Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009): 94.

12. Dennis R. J. Penn, “USAFRICOM: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy?,” Joint Force Quarterly 51 (4th Quarter 2008): 77–78.

13. PNSR, Forging a New Shield, 517–18.

14. Ibid., 441, 492–93, 500.

15. Ibid., 498–99, 501.

16. Ibid., 493, 501–2.

17. Ibid., 442.

18. Ibid., 492, 496–97.

19. Ibid., 501.

20. Buchanan, Davis, and Wight, “Death of the Combatant Command?” At the 

time of their 2009 article, Brigadier General Buchanan was deputy commander for 

operations, Multi-National Division Center, Iraq; Captain Davis was deputy, Information Technology and Information Resource Management for the deputy chief of 

naval operations, communication networks; and Colonel Wight was commander, 

52nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem AB, Germany. An even more recent, though very 

brief, description of a reform proposal along these lines comes from Patrick Cronin 

and Kristin Lord, who advocate for “civilian-led equivalents of military combatant 

commands that can unify our diplomatic, development, public engagement and defense efforts,” which “may mean creating regional or subregional hubs, regional 

equivalents of embassy country teams.” Cronin is a senior advisor and senior director at the Washington, DC, think tank called the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and a former assistant administrator for policy and program coordination at the USAID. Lord is vice president and director of studies at the CNAS and a 

former special advisor to the US undersecretary of state for democracy and global 

affairs. Patrick Cronin and Kristin Lord, “Deploying Soft Power: Restructured, 

Larger Civilian Force Needed for Crises,” Defense News, 12 April 2010, 53.

21. Buchanan, Davis, and Wight, “Death of the Combatant Command?,” 94–95.

22. Barry M. Blechman, Thomas R. Pickering, and Newt Gingrich, Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy: Final Report of the State Department in 2025 

Working Group (2007), http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/99879

.pdf. The working group was headed by Dr. Barry Blechman, the Stimson Center’s 

cofounder; Amb. Thomas Pickering; and the Honorable Newt Gingrich, former 

speaker of the House of Representatives.

23. Curry, “Interagency Process in Regional Foreign Policy,” 35–36.
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT │ 119

24. Consulate is the wrong word to use for Sylvia’s regional construct. According 

to the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, consular functions generally 

consist of protecting the interests of (in this case US) persons and corporations in the 

host country and furthering commercial and economic relations between the two 

countries. The construct Sylvia describes would be better termed a regional interagency mission. See UN, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963, in 

Treaty Series, vol. 596, 261; and UN, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 

April 1961, in Treaty Series, vol. 500, 95.

25. Sylvia, “Empowering Interagency Capabilities,” 54–59.

26. Blechman, Pickering, and Gingrich, Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, 20–21.

27. Michael Pasquarett and James Kievit, A Blueprint for a Bold Restructuring of 

the Organization for National Security: The Military Combatant Commands and State 

Department Regional Bureaus (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, Army War College, 1997), 24–25.

28. Ibid., 35.

29. LCDR Christopher H. Herr, USN, “Joint Interagency at the Combatant Commands: Making it Real; Making It Work,” research report (Newport, RI: Naval War 

College, 13 February 2006), 11–13; Col Matthew F. Bogdanos, USMC, “Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step,” Joint Force Quarterly 37 (2nd Quarter 2005): 17; 

David S. Doyle, Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare at the Combatant 

Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 14 April 

2009), 56–57; and Arnas, Barry, and Oakley, Harnessing the Interagency, 16.

30. Thompson, “Breaking the Proconsulate,” 67; and Buchanan, Davis, and 

Wight, “Death of the Combatant Command?,” 94.

31. Maj Karen D. Stoff, USAF, “Strategic Planning and Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs),” research report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and 

Staff College, April 2006), 4–5.

32. Christopher L. Naler, “Are We Ready for an Interagency Combatant Command?,” Joint Force Quarterly 41 (2nd Quarter 2006): 26.

33. Ibid., 26–28.

34. This COCOM construct with a civilian deputy commander and no military 

deputy commander would require that the civilian deputy have the authority to 

command military forces in the combatant commander’s absence. The United States 

already practices civilian control of the military, with the president and secretary of 

defense in charge of the military during both peace and war, and the civilian secretaries of the military services in charge of each service’s organize, train, and equip 

(i.e., peacetime) mission. Therefore, placing a civilian in charge of the military at the 

regional level is not without precedent but would probably require congressional 

legislation. Absent such legislation, AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM, and EUCOM have a 

military deputy commander as well as the civilian deputy to preserve the military 

chain of command.

35. LCDR William C. Whitsitt, USN, “U.S. Africa Command: An Opportunity 

for Effective Interagency Coordination,” research report (Newport, RI: Naval War 

College, 10 May 2007), 6–7.
120 │ OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 

36. Maj Brian M. Schafer, USAF, “DIME Considerations: A New PACOM Planning Pyramid,” research report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 

April 2009), 12–15.

37. Ibid., 13–14.

38. LCDR Darin M. Liston, USN, “In the Interagency Process, Mere Coordination Is Not Enough: Toward Joint Government,” research report (Newport, RI: Naval 

War College, 14 February 2005), 7, 12.

39. Sunil B. Desai, “Solving the Interagency Puzzle,” Policy Review no. 129 (1 

February 2005), http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3431461.html#.

40. Harold Van Opdorp, “The Joint Interagency Coordination Group: The Operationalization of DIME,” Small Wars Journal, July 2005, 4.

41. Ibid., 4–5.

42. Lt Col Shannon W. Caudill, USAF, MAJ Andrew M. Leonard, USA, and Sgt 

Maj Richard D. Thresher, USMC, “Interagency Leadership: The Case for Strengthening the Department of State,” American Diplomacy, 15 April 2008, http://www.unc

.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2008/0406/comm/caudilletal_strength.html.

43. The only study I found in the literature focusing on problems and proposed 

solutions for the embassy country team for both normal and crisis operations is 

Amb. Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey Jr., “The Country Team: Restructuring 

America’s First Line of Engagement,” Joint Force Quarterly 47 (4th Quarter 2007): 

146–54. They argue that the country team needs to be improved by enhancing the de 

facto authority of the ambassador, giving ambassadors the latitude to restructure the 

embassy country team as they see fit, and creating a better interagency personnel 

system to develop better ambassadors and agency heads.

44. PNSR, Turning Ideas into Action, 28. See also Oakley and Casey, “Country 

Team,” 150, 152.

45. Blechman, Pickering, and Gingrich, Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, 22.

46. PNSR, Turning Ideas into Action, 29.

47. Ibid., 20, 29.

48. OSD/ATL, Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and 

from Hostilities (Washington, DC: OSD, December 2004), v, 32.

49. As stated in note 34, this would likely require legislation.

50. Liston, “In the Interagency Process, Mere Coordination Is Not Enough,” 13, 

15–16.

51. Desai, “Solving the Interagency Puzzle.”

52. Lt Col Ted T. Uchida, USAF, “Reforming the Interagency Process,” Air Force 

Fellows research report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Fellows Program, May 2005), 97.

53. PNSR, Turning Ideas into Action, 56; and PNSR, Forging a New Shield, 538–39.

54. PNSR, Turning Ideas into Action, 57.

55. Buchanan, Davis, and Wight, “Death of the Combatant Command?,” 95.

56. Coffey, “Improving Interagency Integration at the Operational Level,” 40–42.

57. PNSR, Forging a New Shield, 243.

58. Van Opdorp, “Joint Interagency Coordination Group,” 4–5.

59. Ibid., 6.

60. Murdock and Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, 48, 51–52.
Chapter 6

Analysis and Recommendation

From the many criticisms against current interagency structures 

and the problems identified in recent and ongoing operations, this 

study identified 13 objectives by which to evaluate proposed interagency reforms. It then applied these 13 criteria to national-level interagency reform models proposed in the literature and discussed 

herein. While this evaluation did not produce a clear recommendation for national-level reform, the details of proposed models and 

their analysis, albeit inconclusive, appear herein as an appendix.

Objectives

First and foremost, many observers argue that the military’s role in 

interagency foreign policy is too large and that a reform must be 

found that enables the State Department to lead US foreign policy 

across the interagency. Having the State Department play the primary role in foreign policy is particularly important externally, where 

several potential partners would like to engage with the United States 

at various levels but are wary of being associated with the US military.1

 It is also a key element of strategic communication—the United 

States cannot easily promote strong civilian-led democracy abroad if 

the message is delivered by a military officer.

Second, the reform must produce better-coordinated planning at 

the strategic and operational levels. The US interventions in Panama, 

Haiti, and Iraq are some illustrations of how lack of coordination between agencies during the planning phase led to significant problems 

during execution—particularly when the military perceived it was 

time to hand over responsibility for the operation to another agency.

Third, the reform must produce interagency unity of effort during 

execution. Uncoordinated actions waste time and resources and can 

make US goals more difficult to accomplish. For example, if the Army 

Corps of Engineers builds a school but USAID does not assist with 

funding for teacher training, the effort to build the school was wasted 

and may even be counterproductive if it leads the local population to 

doubt US abilities or commitment.
122 │ ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Fourth, any reorganization of interagency structures and processes 

must not only lead to a more effective and, ideally, more efficient system than various agencies working alone but also reduce bureaucratic 

and resource overhead often associated with interagency coordination.2

 Without increased effectiveness, reform is counterproductive. 

Improved efficiency, while not required, is desirable. The PNSR study 

team notes that the current system “militate[s] against efficiency and 

effectiveness by undermining cooperation and collaboration . . . [in 

which competition] and information hoarding between agencies and 

their personnel is often standard behavior.”3

Fifth, the reform should task leaders with clear responsibilities and 

give them the necessary authority to carry out those responsibilities. 

Prominent management theorist Lyndall Urwick defined the principle of authority as having a clear line of control from the top of a 

management structure to every individual and the principle of correspondence as giving leaders authority commensurate with assigned 

responsibility. He argued that these principles should be observed 

regardless of an organization’s complexity.4

 Too often, today’s system 

of interagency coordination assigns responsibility but does not clearly 

define a chain of command or provide a leader with the needed level 

of authority over personnel, resources, or processes of other agencies.

Sixth, participants outside the leader’s home agency must perceive 

decisions that leaders make as legitimate. Michael Donley notes, 

“Lack of complete authority and murky, unclear divisions of responsibility mean that legitimacy in decision making will be challenged.”5

This is often the case today, as one agency may not perceive a leader’s 

decisions from another executive-branch agency as binding.

Seventh, leaders of the interagency process must have access to the 

necessary financial, personnel, and material resources from other 

agencies to be successful in their assigned mission. For example, the 

State Department or USAID is often tasked to accomplish a diplomatic or developmental mission that it cannot achieve without military logistical or security resources. Avoiding this scenario will in 

some cases require congressional changes since Congress provides 

budgets to individual agencies and the executive branch has limited 

authority to realign resources among agencies.

Eighth, the leader and organization must have a clear chain of 

command to the president, the ultimate decision maker on foreign 

policy and national security issues. This is again Urwick’s principle of 

authority, which requires a clear line from the top of a management 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION │ 123

structure to every individual. Structures reporting generically to “the 

NSC” or having multiple leaders in the field report to different leaders in Washington contribute to either undefined or multiple competing chains of authority to the president, violating this principle.

Ninth, the structure must not overburden the president and the national security advisory team whose focus needs to be strategic goals 

and policies rather than crisis decision making. The PNSR study team 

notes, “White House centralization of interagency missions . . . risks 

creating an untenable span of control over policy implementation.” 

This “tends to burn out National Security Council staff, which impedes timely, disciplined, and integrated decision formulation and 

option assessment . . . [and] almost guarantees an inability to do deliberate, careful strategy formulation.”6

 Any reform of the interagency 

system “must free the president and his advisors for strategic direction by providing effective mechanisms for decentralizing national 

security issue management.”7

Tenth, the reform should fix the imbalance of bureaucratic power 

and prestige between the Departments of State and Defense. Additional power is required to ensure State’s voice is heard during interagency deliberations, and additional prestige is required for the DOS 

to obtain the necessary levels of funding and personnel from Congress. Even former defense secretary Robert Gates has argued that 

the State Department needs additional resources and capacity to participate in the interagency process, saying whole-of-government approaches “can only be done if the State Department is given resources 

befitting the scope of its mission.”8

Eleventh, for the coordinated interagency system to improve its 

capabilities over time, personnel from across the participating agencies need both training and experience working with other agencies. 

Reform options that routinely place working-level personnel from 

different agencies in contact with each other are more likely to achieve 

this objective than stovepiped agencies working in parallel or coordinating only through small interagency cells.

Twelfth, any changes to the interagency system should minimize 

the financial, personnel, and material costs required to establish a 

new system. The federal budget has limits, and advocating any reforms to Congress and the various interests in Washington will be 

much easier if costs are minimized.

Finally, changes to the interagency system should attempt to minimize culture shock in the participating agencies. Much has been writ-
124 │ ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 

ten about the different cultures in the various organizations, particularly between the military and the State Department.9

 Reforms will be 

easier to advocate and implement if working-level personnel in the 

participating agencies do not perceive the new procedures as threats 

to their careers or their sense of self. Cultures can be transformed, but 

it takes a great deal of time and effort. 

In summary, interagency reform should fulfill the following 13 

evaluation criteria:

1. Provide a nonmilitary voice and face for US foreign policy.

2. Produce fully coordinated planning.

3. Create unity of effort during execution.

4. Be more efficient and effective than agencies working alone.

5. Give leaders authority commensurate with their responsibility.10

6. Provide legitimacy to the leader’s decisions.

7. Enable the leader to access necessary resources.

8. Offer a clear chain of command to the president.

9. Avoid overburdening the president with operational or crisis 

matters.

10. Balance the power and prestige of the Departments of State 

and Defense.11

11. Develop interagency expertise among working-level personnel.

12. Minimize the financial, personnel, and material costs of reform.

13. Reduce agency culture shocks resulting from the reform.

Analysis

We will now apply these evaluation criteria to the proposed interagency structures at the regional and crisis levels. In the analysis, 

each of the four organizational structures is assigned a plus (+), a zero 

(0), or a minus (–) based on whether it is assessed as beneficial, neutral, or detrimental in meeting each criterion. Then the plusses are 

added and the minuses subtracted for each model to reach a final 

score. While this evaluation scheme is qualitative and subjective, it 

provides a helpful method to compare the models and determine 

which ones most closely satisfy the evaluation criteria. We first consider the crisis operations models and then the regional models. 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION │ 125

Crisis Operations Models

As noted previously, the four general types of structures to reform 

the interagency for crisis operations are (1) an interagency organization, (2) a State Department–led organization, (3) a military-led organization, or (4) a parallel structure. To evaluate these models, we consider the most robust versions of each structure—the interagency 

model described by the PNSR study team, Liston, and Buchanan et al.; 

the State-led model described by this author; the military-led model 

described by Coffey; and the parallel structure model described by the 

CSIS study team. Table 1 summarizes the assessment. Based on this 

analysis, the interagency task force is the best structural model for crisis 

operations. A brief description of the analysis of each criterion follows.

Table 1. Analysis of crisis-level reform models

Evaluation Criteria Interagency 

Organization

State 

Leads

Military 

Leads

Parallel 

Structure

Nonmilitary voice and face 

for US foreign policy

0 + – 0

Fully coordinated planning + + + 0

Unity of effort during execution + + + 0

More efficient and effective 

than agencies working alone

+ + + 0

Leader’s authority commensurate with responsibility+ 0 0 –

Legitimacy of leader’s 

decision making

+ 0 0 +

Leader can access necessary 

resources

+ 0 0 0

Clear chain of command 

to the president

+ + + –

Does not overburden 

the president

+ 0 0 –

Balance of power and prestige 

between DOD and DOS

0 + – –

Develops interagency expertise + + + 0

Minimizes cost in money, 

personnel, and material

0 0 0 +

Minimizes agency 

culture shocks

0 – 0 +

Totals +9 +6 +3 –1
126 │ ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 

The State Department–led interagency task force is best able to 

guarantee that a nonmilitary voice and face would lead the subregional task force. The interagency organization was judged as neutral 

since this structure permits either a military or a civilian task force 

leader. Similarly, the parallel structure has both a civilian- and a 

military-led structure so it is also neutral against this measure. Finally, the military-led task force is detrimental since it will never have 

a nonmilitary leader.

The interagency, State-led, and military-led organizations are each 

able to produce fully coordinated interagency plans at the subregional level. The parallel structure was judged as neutral. With separate military and civilian leaders and no mandate for collaboration, 

this model would produce coordination when enforced by the two 

leaders. However, it could drift into uncoordinated stovepipes if the 

leaders and their staffs choose to work in traditional, comfortable 

channels rather than coordinating. These arguments are similar for 

the four models’ ability to produce unity of effort during execution 

and to be more efficient and effective than the various agencies working separately.

The interagency organization is able to provide the leader with authority commensurate with responsibility, but this authority would 

need to be spelled out when establishing the task force. The leaders of 

the State- and military-led models would likely have slightly less authority delegated to them since they would report to a lead agency, 

potentially limiting some of their authority over resources from other 

agencies. The parallel structure does not provide authority commensurate with responsibility because, while each of the leaders would 

have authority over their piece of the organization, no one has overall 

charge of the mission with the ability to enforce decisions on the 

other side of the organization.

The interagency organization provides the leader with the greatest 

legitimacy since specifically the president would grant authority and 

should not be seen as partial to any particular agency. Subordinates 

will see the decisions of leaders as legitimate in the parallel structure 

since the military works for a military officer while civilians work in 

a traditional country-team structure. The State- and military-led task 

forces are judged as neutral on this measure because—despite enhanced authority vested in these individuals—some personnel from 

other agencies may still perceive decisions as biased toward the leader’s parent agency.
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION │ 127

The interagency organization is best able to access the necessary 

resources from other agencies, again due to the leader’s status as a 

presidential representative. The State-led, military-led, and parallel 

structures, with proper authority granted to their leaders, should all 

do reasonably well in accessing interagency resources. However, the 

agency-specific nature of the leaders would probably result in occasional problems in accessing resources from outside the leader’s parent agency.

The interagency model and both lead-agency models provide 

clear, unambiguous chains of command from everyone in the task 

force, through the task force leader, and up the chain to the president. 

The parallel structure model is unable to do this because there is no 

single leader for the crisis operation, resulting in multiple chains of 

command.

The interagency model is best to avoid nonstrategic decisions being routinely elevated to the presidential level, as the interagency task 

force leader would have the authority and legitimacy to make most 

decisions at the lower level. The lead-agency models are assessed as 

neutral against this measure since their leaders have most of the authority of the interagency leader but slightly less legitimacy, likely 

leading to more calls for the president to adjudicate interagency disputes. The parallel structure model fares poorly against this measure 

as the lack of a single decision authority in the region means many 

more decisions will be elevated to higher levels for adjudication.

The State-led model is best able to balance power and prestige between the Defense and State Departments. The interagency task force 

is judged as neutral because it may or may not increase State’s power 

and prestige, depending on whether the task force leader and many of 

the staffers come from State. The military-led and parallel structures 

are both unhelpful as both either maintain the current balance or 

shift power further toward the military.

All three single-leader task forces are assessed as likely to expose a 

sizable number of working-level personnel from different agencies to 

the interagency environment. The parallel structure is less likely to do 

so because coordination between the two organizations may be handled only by key leaders or a small coordination cell.

The parallel structure is the least costly to implement as it essentially uses existing elements. The other three are judged as neutral on 

this criterion because while they will all require some additional staff 

to implement, they will primarily be formed from personnel and re-
128 │ ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 

sources the individual agencies would have used in their response to 

the crisis.

Finally, the parallel structure has the least impact on agency cultures as this is largely the way things are done today. The military-led 

and interagency structures are judged as neutral against this criterion 

because they would involve only small shifts from the current way of 

doing business. However, the State-led model is judged as negative 

against this criterion since it would require a substantial cultural shift 

in the State Department to produce leaders for these interagency crisis task forces.

Regional Models

We now consider the four regional-level models: (1) a new regionallevel interagency organization, (2) a structure in which the State Department leads at the regional level, (3) a structure in which the military leads at the regional level, and (4) a parallel structure in which 

the military and the State Department operate as equals in the region, 

coordinating their activities to some degree but reporting separately 

to their parent agencies. To evaluate these regional structures, this 

study again considered the most robust versions of each structure—

Buchanan, Davis, and Wight’s and Gardner’s interagency structures 

and the PNSR study team’s integrated regional center; Sylvia’s Stateled model; Naler’s and Whitsitt’s military-led models, and Desai’s and 

Caudill, Leonard, and Thresher’s parallel structure models. Table 2 

shows the results of this assessment. Based on this analysis, the State 

Department-led structure is the best model for integrating interagency foreign policy and national security at the regional level, while 

an integrated interagency model comes in a close second. A brief description of the analysis follows.

Only the State-led model can guarantee a nonmilitary voice and 

face for US foreign policy at the regional level. The interagency 

structure is neutral on this measure because the leader could come 

from State or another agency. The parallel structure was also judged 

as neutral because, while the creation of a new regional-level State 

Department organization would certainly raise its profile in the region, the military’s geographic combatant command would be engaging in the region at the same time. Finally, the military-led solution was judged as detrimental since, by definition, it puts a military 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION │ 129

face on US regional engagement, one of the problems this study set 

out to address.

Table 2. Analysis of regional-level reform models

Evaluation Criteria Interagency 

Organization

State 

Leads

Military 

Leads

Parallel 

Structure

Nonmilitary voice and face 

for US foreign policy

0 + – 0

Fully coordinated planning + + 0 –

Unity of effort during 

execution

+ + 0 –

More efficient and effective 

than agencies working alone

+ + + 0

Leader’s authority 

commensurate with 

responsibility

+ + 0 –

Legitimacy of leader’s 

decision making

+ 0 0 0

Leader can access 

necessary resources

+ + 0 0

Clear chain of command to 

the president

+ + + –

Does not overburden the 

president

0 + 0 –

Balance of power and 

prestige between DOD and 

DOS

0 + – +

Develops interagency 

expertise

+ + 0 –

Minimizes cost in money, 

personnel, and material

– – + –

Minimizes agency culture 

shocks

– – 0 +

Totals +6 +8 +1 -5

The interagency organization would be expected to produce fully 

coordinated planning at the regional level as its leader would have the 

authority to accomplish this. Similarly, the State-led model would be 

expected to do well in producing coordinated regional plans because 
130 │ ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 

the organization is effectively identical to the proposed interagency 

regional organization, only with a leader from the State Department. 

The military-led model is neutral on this measure because the current COCOM-led, JIACG-enabled model has not always produced 

coordinated regional plans. Finally, the parallel structure is unhelpful 

because, while the COCOM would have a regional peer with whom 

to coordinate, no mechanism or single leader exists to enforce coordination between the two headquarters. The arguments are similar 

for producing regional unity of effort during execution.

All three single-leader models would be more efficient and effective 

than the agencies working individually, while the parallel structure is 

judged as neutral because the agencies are less closely tied together.

The interagency and State-led organizations are best able to provide authority commensurate with responsibility since this would be 

part of the charter for these organizations. This measure is judged 

neutral for the COCOM. While this study has demonstrated that the 

COCOM does not have the authority to compel interagency action, 

it is often able to produce some amount of interagency unity informally. The parallel structure is negative on this measure since neither leader would have the authority to compel action from the other 

organization.

The interagency organization best endows the leader’s decisions 

with legitimacy as the leader would be perceived as representing the 

president rather than a specific agency. The other three models are all 

judged as neutral against this criterion because, while they would all 

have strong authority, the perception that leaders primarily represent 

their parent agencies would decrease their legitimacy in the eyes of 

some personnel from other agencies.

The interagency organization would be able to access the necessary resources across the interagency due to the nature of the organization. The State-led regional organization is assessed similarly as it is 

effectively an identical interagency organization but headed by a 

leader from State. The military-led organization is assessed neutral as 

it is less able to access resources from outside the DOD because the 

military-heavy structure is seen as inherently less interagency. The 

parallel structure is also judged as neutral because, while each leader 

would have access to resources from the agencies in their organization, the ability to share resources between organizations may be less 

than complete.
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION │ 131

The interagency model and the two lead-agency models all have a 

clear chain of command to the president. The parallel structure fails 

on this measure because the two leaders would report through separate chains of command in Washington.

The State-led organization, established as a regional-level “country 

team” and reporting to the secretary of state rather than directly to the 

White House, would be best able to avoid overburdening the president with regional-level interagency policy disputes. The interagency 

organization is judged as neutral because it would report directly to 

the White House rather than to a parent agency, requiring more of the 

president’s attention. The military-led model is also judged neutral 

because history has shown many agencies appeal to the White House 

when they dispute the combatant commander’s decisions. The parallel structure is judged as worst because no decision maker is in place 

at the regional level. Thus, interagency decisions are forced back to 

Washington, with many likely ending up in the White House.

The State-led model and the parallel structure would each enhance 

the power and prestige of the State Department because each would 

create a State-led presence currently lacking in the region (or outside 

the region but focused exclusively on regional issues, as is the case 

with all the GCCs except EUCOM). The interagency organization is 

judged as neutral against this criterion because someone from State 

may or may not lead the organization. The military-led model is detrimental as it would perpetuate the DOD’s regional power and prestige.

The regional interagency organization and the State-led organization would each create a new interagency headquarters with both a 

substantial civilian and military presence, leading to the assessment 

that these structures would do the most to develop a cadre of personnel with interagency expertise. The military-led model is judged as 

neutral on this criterion because it creates only a small cadre of nonDOD civilians with experience on the COCOM staffs and a small 

number of military personnel who routinely work interagency issues 

with non-DOD personnel. The parallel structure would not be helpful since the civilian and military organizations would exist separately with only minimal contact opportunities, predominately by 

senior leaders and those in the coordination cell.

Only the military-led model is judged as a low-cost reform option 

since it has already been implemented across the COCOMs. The 

other three structures would all involve creating a new headquarters, 

requiring substantial funding and new personnel resources.
132 │ ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Finally, the parallel structure would least impact agency cultures 

as it looks very similar to current practice at the country level. The 

military-led model is judged as neutral because, while it has already 

been largely implemented, it continues to cause cultural dislocations 

among some interagency personnel assigned to work with the COCOMs. The other two models are judged as negative against this measure as both would require a significant change in State Department 

career paths and the development of personnel capable of leading 

large regional interagency organizations or directorates within them.

The Recommended Reform Model

Combining the crisis-level and regional analyses, this study recommends a new interagency structure built around regional headquarters led by the State Department. They would, in turn, conduct crisis 

operations by creating interagency task forces headed by a leader 

from the department or agency most appropriate to the mission. 

Each regional headquarters could be called a US regional mission 

(USRM)12 and led by a regional chief of mission (RCOM), who should 

be either a Foreign Service Officer with prior experience as an ambassador or a specially appointed ambassador.13 Because of the great deal 

of power and importance vested in this leader, the president should 

nominate, and the Senate confirm, this individual. The presidential 

nomination would endow this individual with the rank of presidential 

envoy or presidential special representative, as well as ambassadorat-large, to convey the importance of the position and its role as the 

region’s senior diplomat, overall senior executive-branch representative, and personal representative of the president. To ensure unambiguous State Department control over the organization, the deputy 

chief of this regional mission should also be a senior FSO so that the 

top leader would always be a State representative, even when the 

RCOM is away. The RCOM would be supported by a robust interagency staff similar to the interagency country team at an embassy. 

The geographic combatant commander would remain the senior military officer in the region and report to both the RCOM and through 

traditional DOD channels. To improve interagency capabilities, parts 

of the GCC’s staff would transfer to the USRM organization, including elements of the J-4 (logistics), J-5 (plans, policy, and strategy), 

and J-6 (communications) to provide those capabilities. In addition, 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION │ 133

the GCC’s security cooperation program would largely transfer to the 

USRM, as would the interagency coordination elements, such as the 

JIACG, since the USRM would now lead interagency coordination 

for the region.

During crisis operations, the USRM would establish an interagency task force. Each IATF would have a single director, a clear 

mission, and resources and authority commensurate with assigned 

responsibilities. The IATF director could be either military or civilian, depending on the security situation and which agency’s core 

competency most closely aligned with the primary mission of the 

task force. The IATF director would be supported by an interagency 

staff using an integrated civil-military chain of command. The task 

force would be provided with the necessary personnel and material 

resources from across the interagency, including the military, and the 

IATF director would have operational control over all assigned forces. 

The recommended model is shown in figure 19. This model could 

also be used to strengthen the authorities of the existing counternarcotics JIATFs (JIATF-S and JIATF-W) by transforming them into 

IATFs and providing their directors with operational control over assigned personnel and resources. 

Applying the Model

Under this construct, the United States would build on the successes of the GCCs in both bilateral and regional security cooperation activities. However, leadership and oversight of these activities 

across the region would now fall under the RCOM, placing these engagement programs under the guidance of a senior diplomat, and 

they would be planned and executed by an interagency USRM staff 

with representatives from the geographic bureaus under State’s undersecretary for political affairs, USAID, and the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency, as well as the military. All theater engagements 

would meet overall US goals and not just military goals. Additionally, 

participating personnel would come from the correct mix of agencies, ensuring a civilian diplomatic face on a mission when necessary, 

leveraging USAID developmental expertise when it is important to 

the engagement, and so on. 
134 │ ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Deputy Regional

Chief of Mission

Foreign Service Officer

Regional Chief

Mission (RCOM)

Ambassador at Large

and Presidential Envoy

Geographic

Combatant

Commander

GCC Staff

(minus elements

transferred to USRM)

Regional

Military Service 

Components

Interagency

Task Forces (IATFs)

for 

Contingency Operations

U.S. Embassies

U.S. Regional Mission (USRM)

Interagency staff, functionally aligned,

including elements of GCC’s J-4, J-5,

J-6, JIACG, and TSC office, as well as

USAID, Commerce, Treasury, etc.

Secretary of Defense Secretary

of State NSC New InteragencyOrganization or or

Strategic /

National 

Level

Operational /

Regional Level

Operational /

Sub-Regional /

Country Level

Figure 19. Recommended regional- and crisis-level interagency structure

For regional counterterrorism, moving the oversight of military as 

well as necessary nonmilitary activities—such as State, the USAID, 

law enforcement, intelligence, Commerce, and Treasury—from the 

GCC to the USRM would facilitate interagency participation during 

operational planning and execution. Enduring regional counterterrorism engagements, such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 

Partnership, could be executed by an IATF established and supervised by the USRM. In either case, overall authority would fall under 

a senior diplomat who would be able to harmonize these activities 

with broader US policies and interests in the region. The centralized 

interagency planning would reduce the wasted efforts of uncoordinated agencies working in parallel, as sometimes happens today. Similarly, regional counternarcotics initiatives under SOUTHCOM and 

PACOM should be moved to the corresponding USRMs, recasting 

JIATF-S and JIATF-W as IATFs with operational control over assigned assets and working under the supervision of the RCOM and a 

truly interagency regional headquarters.

For humanitarian responses to disasters such as the Asian tsunami 

or the Haitian earthquake, the USRM would combine the military’s 

logistical and communication capabilities, as well as its large pool of 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION │ 135

personnel, with the disaster response expertise of the USAID’s Office 

of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the diplomatic skills of the State 

Department, both to plan and coordinate the operation and to execute the US response. The response could be conducted as an IATF led 

by a senior OFDA expert. The task force would initially have a large 

military component to provide search and rescue, logistics, and communication, but the military component would diminish over time, 

leaving the OFDA in charge of the remaining interagency response, 

which could last for months or even years, depending on the magnitude of the disaster and the capacity of the affected areas to recover.

Military actions in which US goals are fulfilled by the military 

alone—such as the Operation El Dorado Canyon attack on Libya, 

cruise missile attacks against terrorist targets, hostage rescue missions, 

and so forth—would be planned and executed by a military-only joint 

task force under the command of the GCC. The RCOM would be kept 

informed to ensure that the action was in accordance with US strategic goals, but the overall USRM staff would have little involvement. 

However, most military missions are more complex and involve US 

goals much larger than the military can accomplish on its own, such 

as creating stable, democratic governments in South Vietnam, Panama, Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The USRM interagency staff should 

plan and an IATF execute these more involved types of missions. 

In Vietnam, the MACV/CORDS organization could have been 

designated an IATF, with the civilian development element subordinate to the military effort. Or perhaps it could have been better structured with the development director in overall command, while the 

military commander executed military missions advancing larger US 

development goals in South Vietnam. Similarly, the USRM staff 

would have planned the interventions in Panama and Haiti, ensuring 

interagency involvement from the very beginning rather than after 

US military forces were on the ground. The missions would then have 

been executed by an IATF combining the military’s JTF headquarters 

and assigned forces with an ambassador designee for that country 

from the State Department and an interagency staff. Once a US embassy (re)opened, elements of the IATF would form the ambassador’s 

country team, resulting in an integrated IATF under the overall leadership of the future ambassador.

The model would also work for operations such as Afghanistan 

and Iraq and would likely have avoided many of the problems the 

United States has faced in years of often disjointed operations in both 
136 │ ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 

countries. In Afghanistan, given the limited time available for the response to the 9/11 attacks, the planning for the initial military operation may not have changed much. However, the USRM staff should 

have been involved in parallel with interagency planning to determine how to reach the overall desired end state in Afghanistan beyond the military’s initial plan to remove the Taliban from power and 

hunt al-Qaeda terrorists. Once the United States reopened the embassy in Kabul, US forces in Afghanistan would have become an IATF 

under overall supervision of the US ambassador, with the commander of US military forces in Afghanistan as the ambassador’s 

military deputy. This structure would have produced unity of effort 

through unity of command rather than personality-driven parallel 

structures that have existed through most of the US involvement 

there. Similarly, in Iraq all US elements would have operated under 

an IATF, with the military deputy initially leading the invasion. Then 

the civilian director of the task force, Ambassador Bremer, would 

have taken overall control, ensuring all US actions led toward a coherent end state.

Implementation Considerations

The steps necessary to implement these proposed reforms include 

overcoming bureaucratic resistance, obtaining diplomatic endorsement from the rest of the world to accept the new construct, choosing 

locations for the new US regional missions, aligning regional boundaries across the various US departments and agencies, minimizing 

the cost of the reform while finding a way to pay those costs, addressing issues of agency culture and personnel, and, finally, obtaining 

congressional support and action.

Bureaucratic Resistance

One issue in implementing any reforms in USG executive agencies 

is the entrenched power of bureaucracies and their desire to preserve 

the status quo. While the military has many proponents of various 

interagency reforms, relatively few of these proposals have come 

from the State Department. This may indicate that those who hold 

bureaucratic power at State are not in favor of reform along the lines 

advocated in this study. For example, while the DOD largely supported the CORDS interagency construct used during the Vietnam 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION │ 137

War, non-DOD agencies opposed it and continually tried to reduce 

the funding, personnel, and mission.14 Similarly, today there are those 

in the State Department—particularly in the Bureau of African Affairs and at US embassies across Africa—who did not support the 

establishment of the military’s US Africa Command.15

One State Department group that may be particularly resistant to 

creating a new State-led regional interagency organization is the assistant secretaries who currently direct the six regional bureaus. As 

the proposed RCOMs assume greater power over interagency planning and execution at the operational level, as well as some authority 

over the US embassies in their respective regions, the regional assistant secretaries in Washington will almost certainly lose power and 

resources. To make this reform more palatable, their role in strategiclevel foreign policy development and coordination should be maintained and codified. Additionally, if additional resources are directed 

to the State Department as part of the reform (which would almost 

certainly be the case), some could go to the regional bureaus to ensure the assistant secretaries have the necessary manpower and funding to fulfill their strategic-level mandate.

DOS leaders also may be concerned that the new IATF construct 

will divert too many scarce personnel and resources, making it impossible to properly staff and fund existing missions. This concern 

would be best addressed by increasing the department’s budget and 

staffing, as former defense secretary Gates; former JCS chief, ADM 

Mike Mullen; and many others have advocated for years.

Another group that may resist this reform is the American Foreign 

Service Association, the bargaining organization that protects the interests of US Foreign Service Officers. FSOs may have concerns about 

their career paths, such as whether serving as the US ambassador to 

a country is as prestigious under the new model, whether service in 

interagency organizations will derail their careers, or whether interagency service will be required to advance to senior ranks in the Foreign Service. These subjects could be addressed by clearly describing 

the new career tracks for FSOs and offering suitable promotion, 

monetary, or other incentives for accepting these career paths.

Other non-DOD agencies may also resist this new construct because their personnel will report to leaders from another agency 

when serving at the USRMs or IATFs, which many leaders would 

perceive as a diminution of their power. Addressing the concerns of 

these non-DOD and non-State leaders could include providing them 
138 │ ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 

with additional personnel and funding, clarifying and codifying their 

roles and authorities under the new system, and clearly delineating 

career paths leading to senior levels of leadership.

Diplomatic Endorsement

The greatest challenge may come in obtaining diplomatic acceptance and endorsement from the rest of the world for this new foreign affairs construct. Current diplomatic relations around the world 

are predominantly bilateral, and most countries may prefer to continue this arrangement with the United States via reciprocal embassies in each nation’s capital rather than by relating to a new regional 

construct. The USRMs will not change how other countries engage 

with the United States, however, because the US embassies will still 

be in place and US ambassadors will still have plenipotentiary powers 

to directly represent the United States in that nation. Indeed, the 

USRMs should actually improve bilateral relations because the 

country-level ambassadors would be supported by a regional-level 

pool of interagency resources to aid in their activities. The RCOM 

would only be expected to redirect the actions of a country-level US 

ambassador when broader regional or global interests require a different approach at the country level. Because of today’s rapid global 

communication, US ambassadors are no longer truly independent 

and isolated representatives of the United States—the secretary of 

state provides guidance as needed—so occasional inputs from the 

new RCOM should not fundamentally affect their latitude to execute 

bilateral diplomatic functions.

The United States would need to exercise caution to ensure countries do not bypass the US ambassador to their country in favor of the 

new RCOM. In the same way that some foreign leaders “follow the 

money” and choose to deal increasingly with the geographic combatant commander rather than their local US ambassador, the presence 

of a new RCOM could produce a similar temptation. One way to 

minimize this problem would be for the RCOM to have relatively 

little direct interaction with senior foreign leaders, instead working 

primarily with US actors in the region and in Washington.

The US regional missions are not envisioned to be accredited diplomatic representatives to any particular multilateral counterpart. 

Consequently, the regions would not be expected to create an equivalent organization to the USRM or to provide a reciprocal regional 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION │ 139

representation in Washington. The regional chief of mission would 

be an ambassador-at-large and presidential envoy, meaning the 

RCOM would represent the president and US interests in the region 

but would not be accredited to any particular foreign government or 

multilateral organization.

The new US regional missions would not replace current multilateral US missions to the EU, OSCE, OAS, AU, ASEAN, and NATO, 

which would continue to be led by US ambassadors accredited to 

these organizations. Instead, the USRMs would provide additional 

support, when required, to these multilateral missions in the same 

way they support bilateral US embassies.

When establishing these USRMs, the United States would need to 

ensure they are not perceived as imperial proconsulates or neocolonial entities by exercising energetic diplomacy, strategic communication, and judicious choice of location. These civilian-led regional 

organizations are intended to be more acceptable to local entities 

than the current military GCCs with their areas of responsibility 

spanning the globe. As the USRM coordinates US interagency activities in the region, the GCCs should become less visible, placing a diplomatic rather than a military face on US actions in the region.

At the crisis-action level, achieving diplomatic acceptance of the 

new IATF structure should be much less challenging. When the 

United States conducts noncombat actions, such as disaster relief, 

many host nations should prefer to work with an IATF headed by a 

senior USAID OFDA representative, for example, than one headed 

by a military officer. Similarly, in complex reconstruction and stabilization operations, host nations would probably perceive an IATF 

headed by a senior diplomat or reconstruction and stabilization specialist—rather than a military officer—as more of an offer of assistance and less of a threat to their sovereignty. In cases involving US 

military action in a nonpermissive environment, a military officer 

would likely lead the IATF, at least initially. Threatened governments 

in the region would welcome this arrangement, while the perceptions 

of the target nation would be largely irrelevant.

Locating the US Regional Missions

Choosing suitable locations for US regional missions would be an 

important factor in both their diplomatic acceptance and effectiveness. Locating USRMs in their respective regions, while desirable, is 
140 │ ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 

not required. Currently only one GCC is in its respective region—

EUCOM in Stuttgart, Germany—while the others are headquartered 

elsewhere (i.e., AFRICOM is also in Stuttgart; CENTCOM is in 

Tampa, FL; SOUTHCOM is in Miami, FL; and PACOM is in Honolulu, HI). The USRMs corresponding to CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, 

and PACOM could be collocated with the GCCs, avoiding the need 

to find a willing host nation and also making it easier for the RCOM 

to leverage the GCC’s logistical, planning, communication, and personnel resources.

It is possible that countries in one or more regions would be interested in hosting USRMs, perhaps for a stronger relationship with the 

United States or for regional prestige, or because it makes sense to 

collocate the USRMs near other multilateral diplomatic entities. For 

example, the USRM for Europe might find a suitable home in Brussels (along with NATO and the European Council) or Vienna (home 

of many IGOs under the auspices of the UN). The USRM for Africa 

might be invited to locate in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, near the headquarters of the African Union, or perhaps Vienna, the location of 

many Africa-focused UN agencies. Similarly, the USRM for the Pacific region might one day be invited to locate in Jakarta, Indonesia, 

near the ASEAN headquarters (though the history of US-Indonesian 

relations makes this unlikely anytime soon). By such reasoning, the 

USRM for the Americas and the Caribbean might best be located in 

Washington to be near the headquarters of the OAS. For the Middle 

East and Central Asia, a minimal US footprint probably best suits US 

diplomatic goals in the region, so the USRM would probably be best 

located near CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa or elsewhere in the 

United States. Ultimately, the locations of these regional missions are 

less important than their existence and their acceptability to nations 

in the region.

Regional Boundaries

The major agencies involved in foreign policy each draw different 

regional boundaries. While the military currently divides the world 

into six regions (including NORTHCOM), none of the other agencies and departments involved in foreign policy divides the world the 

same way, making direct coordination at times challenging.16 The 

State Department divides the world into six regions with different 

boundaries. The CIA uses seven regions. Even the OSD divides the 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION │ 141

world into four regions, choosing a scheme different from its combatant commands.17

If the State Department, the military, and other agencies are to 

work more closely together at the regional level, agreeing on a common map of regional boundaries would make sense. Indeed, without 

such consensus, it is difficult to imagine USRMs with subordinate 

GCCs and personnel from other agencies—all supported by various 

staff structures in Washington—working at all. For example, using 

current boundaries, the USRM for South and Central Asian Affairs 

(aligned with the State Department’s regional bureau of the same 

name) would have to supervise the work of two combatant commands—PACOM and CENTCOM. However, PACOM would report 

as well to the USRM for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and CENTCOM would also report to the USRM for Near Eastern Affairs. Similar problems exist elsewhere between State Department and GCC 

regional maps, and the problem gets worse once the regional maps of 

other agencies are considered. Diplomacy may account for a small 

number of exceptions (e.g., Canada for many years wanted the State 

Department to include it in its Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs rather than its Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs),18 but 

they should not be made for the convenience of various US agencies.

Several of the reform proposals—including the Project for National Security Reform and the CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols 

studies—have recognized this problem and recommended establishing a common regional map across the interagency. Several other authors have addressed this issue, including one student in the Army’s 

School of Advanced Military Studies who devoted an entire paper to 

the topic.19 President Obama’s former national security advisor, retired general James L. Jones, affirmed the need for unified regional 

boundaries across the interagency, saying, “We are going to reflect in 

the NSC all the regions of the world along some map line we can all 

agree on,”20 though no moves have yet been made in this direction.

Cost

Any reform of the interagency system becomes more difficult, or 

even impossible, as the projected cost increases. While conducting a 

detailed assessment of the costs of this reform is beyond the scope of 

this study, some ballpark estimates can be offered for the countrylevel IATFs and the regional-level USRMs.
142 │ ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 

The crisis-level reforms would cost relatively little since the envisioned IATFs would consist mostly of military-heavy organizations 

like today’s JTFs and JIATFs, with the addition of interagency personnel from embassy country teams or other ad hoc groups that currently often operate in parallel with the military structure. Thus, the 

IATF would use largely the same personnel and resources but in a 

more integrated structure. However, a modest number of additional 

personnel from other agencies would be required—as few as 10 or 20 

for a small operation to as many as a few hundred for a large, complex 

operation like the CPA in Iraq prior to returning sovereignty to the 

Iraqi government. At any given time, probably two to 10 IATFs would 

be active around the world, leading to a surge requirement of perhaps 

100–1,000 non-DOD personnel across the interagency—costing in 

the neighborhood of $10–100 million in annual salaries, plus training, pensions, and other expenses.21 However, if legislation shifted 

these billets from the DOD to the other agencies, additional personnel requirements could be cost-neutral except for additional training. 

Moving the billets would make sense since the increased presence of 

the interagency in these operations would be expected to reduce the 

workload on the military, and 1,000 DOD billets is less than 0.10 percent of its three million personnel.

The US regional missions, on the other hand, could potentially 

drive a much larger bill. Each USRM would require a headquarters 

building, office equipment, and an operating budget, as well as perhaps 200–500 staff personnel from across the interagency. This could 

cost perhaps $5–25 million for each facility,22 $10–30 million for the 

operating budget,23 and $20–50 million for personnel. Assuming five 

regions, this would require five headquarters buildings, five operating budgets, and 1,000–5,000 personnel; perhaps an upfront cost of 

$25–125 million and annual personnel and operating costs of $150–

400 million. Some of the USRM staff would be military personnel 

reassigned from the combatant command or elsewhere in the DOD. 

The other staffers would have to come from non-DOD agencies, but 

billets could again be transferred from the military to nonmilitary 

agencies, potentially reducing the costs. If the USRMs were collocated with the current GCCs, they might even be able to share office 

space (because the GCC staff should shrink as the USRM assumes 

some of its functions), driving down some or all of the facility costs.

The USRMs may achieve some modest savings in personnel cost by 

centralizing some of the low-density, high-demand interagency per-
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION │ 143

sonnel from some of the country teams, making these scarce experts 

available for use across the region. The regional chief of mission, the 

US bilateral ambassadors, and the various executive branch agencies 

would have to carefully examine each case and determine whether the 

individual would be best used in a regional or bilateral capacity.

Personnel and Culture

While funding for the new model may not be difficult to arrange, 

actually recruiting and training the necessary 1,100–6,000 new personnel for the non-DOD agencies could be much more challenging, 

since the skill sets in these agencies tend to require much more initial 

education than the average entry-level military or DOD civilian position. It might take several years to recruit the necessary personnel 

and run them through the Foreign Service Institute, National Defense University, or other interagency schools. In the interim, the 

new organizations could be temporarily staffed with military personnel and DOD civilians, who would be returned to the DOD as nonDOD personnel become available.

Even more important than recruiting and training new personnel 

is the development of a true interagency career path. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) concurs, saying that interagency operations would be strengthened by establishing a National Security 

Officer career path.24 The 2010 QDR also addresses this issue, recommending that the USG “allocate additional resources across the government and fully implement the National Security Professional 

(NSP) program to improve cross-agency training, education, and 

professional experience opportunities.”25

The Goldwater-Nichols Act created the joint military, in part by 

requiring that all flag-rank personnel have experience in a qualifying 

joint position. The combatant commands, joint staff, and many JTFs 

provide ample opportunities for military officers to gain experience 

working in the joint military environment at multiple points in their 

careers. While mandated interagency experience may not be required 

to qualify for senior non-DOD leadership positions, the new system 

would have to offer opportunities at several points in an individual’s 

career—at the working, line supervisory, and senior leadership levels. 

Doing so would allow the USG to create a cadre of seasoned interagency professionals. These individuals would also benefit from opportunities to attend professional interagency education, analogous 
144 │ ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 

to professional military education, at one or more points in their career. This would require funding for the cost of a school and instructors and for enough surplus personnel in the small agencies to ensure 

all critical billets remain filled.

A further step is making service in interagency organizations an 

acceptable and even valued part of each participating agency’s culture. Today, many professionals in non-DOD agencies are strongly 

partial to their agency’s culture and would prefer to work only within 

that agency. Over time, this cultural isolation would need to change. 

Although a defined interagency career path and opportunities to attend school with personnel from other agencies would help, cultural 

change requires above all simply time to evolve.

Congressional Support and Legislation

Large-scale reforms to the national security system above the level 

of a single agency or department would require the action of both the 

president and Congress. Some argue that a presidential executive order would be sufficient to enact the proposed reforms, but this is almost certainly not the case.26 While an executive order might serve to 

change the interagency system during that administration, history 

indicates it would not likely remain the same under the next president.27 For example, President Clinton’s process for interagency reconstruction and stabilization operations, described in Presidential 

Decision Directive-56 (PDD-56), neither outlasted his presidency 

nor was generally followed while he was in office.28 Additionally, an 

executive order does not presuppose support from Congress, which 

funds the executive-branch agencies. Because political power in Congress is often strongly tied to the large sums of money associated with 

the defense budget, Congress will certainly want to be involved in any 

reforms that change the national security structure. The CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study team notes that “the role of Congress 

in the process is the most crucial determinant of the prospects for a 

reform effort. The recommendations that flow from congressionallymandated groups, commissions, or blue ribbon panels are more 

likely to lead to lasting changes than efforts launched exclusively at 

the executive branch level.”29

Enduring change comes from legislation. Examples include the 

1947 National Security Act that established, among other things, the 

National Security Council and the Department of Defense; the 1986 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION │ 145

Goldwater-Nichols Act that created the joint military; the 2002 act 

that resulted in the Department of Homeland Security; and the 2004 

act that founded the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

and the National Counterterrorism Center. 

Proper resourcing also comes from legislation. Michael Donley argues that if a new interagency structure is established in statute, 

“Congress has a more visible obligation to provide supporting institutional resources.”30 The CSIS study team states that “legislation 

could also provide the basis for realigning agency authorities and resources to ensure that each agency has the capabilities it needs to execute its assigned tasks.”31 Budgeting for the new USRMs would be 

fairly stable and predictable from year to year. However, because the 

complex operations that IATFs execute involve unpredictable crises, 

their funding would require both Congress and executive-branch 

agencies to exercise some guesswork and flexibility. The State Department and USAID budgets could include additional funds in anticipation of a certain number of IATF operations each year, or funds could 

be provided to participating agencies through supplemental appropriations for particular crisis operations, as Congress has done for 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To facilitate unity of effort, the 

legislation authorizing these funds should include language that facilitates the transfer of funds between agencies and provides the IATF 

leader with some ability to prioritize efforts and direct interagency 

funding transfers when necessary and within specified limits. To ensure oversight, the legislation could require congressional notification of any transfers in excess of a specified amount. 

While allowing IATF leaders to direct the interagency transfer of 

funds would be new, the process of interagency funding transfer itself 

is not without precedent. For example, Section 1207 of the FY 06 National Defense Authorization Act permits the DOD to transfer to the 

State Department “up to $100 million in defense articles, services, 

training, or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries.” Also, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF)—established by the FY 09 Supplemental Appropriations Act—permits the State Department to transfer 

all monies appropriated to this fund to the DOD or other federal 

agencies for building and maintaining the capability of Pakistani 

COIN forces.32 In a significant step forward, Congress in FY 12 established the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), a pooled account from both Defense and State for executing contingency opera-
146 │ ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 

tions. Initially funded with $50 million transferred from the PCCF, it 

is envisioned to grow to as much as $2 billion per year. A director 

from State and a deputy director from Defense will manage the fund.33

Finally, legislation would be required to place interagency civilian 

leaders, such as the regional chief of mission or a USAID OFDA expert leading a disaster-response IATF, in command of participating 

military forces and assigned personnel from other US agencies. The 

United States already practices civilian control of the military, with 

the president and secretary of defense in charge during both peace 

and war and the civilian secretaries in charge of each service’s organize, train, and equip (i.e., peacetime) missions. Additionally, US ambassadors direct interagency country teams—generally comprising 

some military personnel—at their respective embassies. Thus, placing civilians in charge of military personnel or placing personnel 

from one agency in charge of personnel from another is not without 

precedent. As with interagency funding transfers, Congress could 

specify authorities and limitations in legislation and provide oversight 

through the congressional hearing process. Participating executivebranch agencies could also elevate concerns and disputes to the National Security Staff and National Security Council process for resolution, when necessary, though these disputes should decrease in both 

intensity and frequency as participating agencies become more comfortable with the new construct.

Obtaining legislation for the new reforms would not be easy. Previous ones have largely resulted from significant lessons learned from 

World War II, the failed hostage rescue mission in Iran, and the 9/11 

attacks. The noteworthy lessons learned over the more than two decades since Goldwater-Nichols could serve to motivate the necessary 

reforms, but they have not yet been enough to influence the president 

or Congress to devote political capital to a reform effort. Changes 

across multiple agencies are particularly difficult to get through Congress because authority is distributed across multiple committees in 

the House and Senate, requiring not only action by those different 

committees but also the understanding that committee power may 

shift based on the reform. For example, the proposed reforms would 

likely appreciably strengthen the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees while diminishing some of the 

power of the armed services committees.34

There is at least some interest in Congress in assessing and addressing the lack of interagency unity of effort. On 30 April 2009, 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION │ 147

Rep. Randy Forbes (R-VA) sponsored the Interagency Cooperation 

Commission Act (H. R. 2207) that would “establish a commission to 

examine the long-term global challenges facing the United States and 

develop legislative and administrative proposals to improve interagency cooperation.”35 However, the bill has no co-sponsors and has 

been stalled in the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee’s Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, 

and Procurement since June 2009, with no plans for further action on 

the bill.36

In June 2011, Senator Joe Lieberman introduced the Interagency 

Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 (S. Res. 1268; HR 2314) to develop 

national security professionals with interagency experience. The act 

would establish a committee on national security personnel within 

the Executive Office of the President. It would produce a strategy to 

develop personnel to accomplish objectives requiring integration of 

national security and homeland security personnel, as well as activities from multiple executive-branch agencies, to maximize mission 

success and minimize cost. The act would also create a system of interagency rotational service to develop expertise in working with personnel from other agencies and would make this service a requirement for promotion to senior executive service. Finally, the act would 

create an interagency training course. The bill was referred to the 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

in October 2011, which ordered it “to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.”37

More recently, in December 2011, Rep. Russ Carnahan (D-MO) 

introduced the Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency 

Enhancement Act of 2011 (HR 3660). It would institute a new stabilization and reconstruction fund and create a new interagency organization—the US Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO). 

Charged with planning and executing overseas contingency operations, it would report both to the DOD and State. Specifically, this 

office would

(1) monitor political and economic instability worldwide in order to anticipate 

the need for mobilizing US and international assistance for the stabilization and 

reconstruction of a foreign country or region that is at risk of, in, or in transition 

from, conflict or civil strife in the wake of violence or cataclysmic disaster; (2) 

develop contingency plans and procedures to mobilize and deploy civilian and 

military personnel to conduct appropriate foreign stabilization and reconstruction operations (operations); (3) execute, administer, and enforce laws, rules, 
148 │ ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 

and regulations relating to the preparation, coordination, and execution of operations; and (4) evaluate, and report to Congress on, the impact of operations.38

In December 2011, the bill was referred to the House Foreign Affairs 

Committee as well as to the House Armed Services Committee and 

the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.39

These bills demonstrate that some congressmen are thinking about 

the need to reform the interagency national security and foreign policy apparatus. Nonetheless—given the many other significant issues 

facing Congress at the time of this writing, coupled with various election cycles—there may simply not be enough congressional attention 

or interest to move any of these bills forward or to tackle an interagency reform of this magnitude in the near future.

What If There Is No Appetite for Interagency Reform?

Absent the will (or funds) to establish US regional missions, Congress could still mandate the much more modest step of requiring that 

contingency operations be conducted by an interagency task force 

headed by a leader from the organization whose portfolio most closely 

aligns with the mission. This may be the necessary first step before 

tackling change at the regional level. Assuming Congress is unwilling 

or unable to address interagency reform and that reform by executive 

order would have no lasting effect, can individual agencies do anything within their existing budgets and authorities that would help? 

The State Department is very small, both in budget and personnel, 

and is already struggling to meet its current taskings. Thus, there is 

little chance it can or will take the initiative to implement the parts of 

this model that would fall within its jurisdiction. 

The Defense Department, on the other hand, has a much larger 

budget and personnel pool. It also has more motivation to improve 

interagency coordination since the military is often asked to take on 

inherently interagency tasks when no one else in government can get 

the job done.40 However, the military has already done much of what 

it can do by itself to create interagency coordination and unity of effort. Additional, feasible steps in this direction could include continuing to evolve the geographic combatant commands along the 

lines of SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM, and EUCOM, with civilian deputies from the State Department and robust partnering structures in 

their headquarters, though this will do nothing to put a civilian face 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION │ 149

on these activities. Increased use of the JIATF construct in areas like 

the Horn of Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan would bring more interagency unity of effort and coordination to subregional missions. The 

DOD could also increase its current personnel exchange programs 

with the interagency, placing more officers in the State Department, 

USAID, and other agencies where civil-military contact will enhance 

working relationships and understanding on both sides. Finally, the 

DOD could fund additional billets at its PME schools—such as the 

command and staff colleges, the war colleges, and the National Defense University—to provide more opportunities for interagency personnel to get to know their military counterparts and experience a 

common national-security curriculum. However, all of these DODonly actions fall short of the goal of true interagency unity of effort.

Notes

1. Edward Marks, “Why USAFRICOM?,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 

2009): 148–49; Robert Munson, “Do We Want to ‘Kill People and Break Things’ in 

Africa?,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 2, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 97–110; and Sylvia, “Empowering Interagency Capabilities,” 25.

2. COL Albert Zaccor, USA, Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call 

for an Integrated Strategy, occasional paper (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of 

the United States, August 2005), 24–25.

3. PNSR, Forging a New Shield, 95.

4. Derek S. Pugh and David J. Hickson, Great Writers on Organizations, 3rd omnibus ed. (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 149. Lyndall F. Urwick (1891–

1983) had the experience of both industry and the British army, was director of the 

International Management Institute in Geneva, and subsequently devoted himself to 

lecturing and writing about management.

5. Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, pt. 2, 9.

6. PNSR, Forging a New Shield, viii.

7. Ibid., 445.

8. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, quoted in William I. Bacchus, “Regaining Relevance: Five Steps to Strengthen State,” Foreign Service Journal 86, no. 7–8 

(July/August 2009): 14.

9. See LTC Rickey L. Rife, USA, and Rosemary Hansen, FSO, “Defense Is from 

Mars, State Is from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security,” strategy research project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, June 

1998).

10. Leaders here refers to the leader of whatever organizations are constructed at 

the regional or subregional levels.

11. Increasing the prestige of the State Department relative to the Defense Department could also increase the relative prestige of other agencies, such as Commerce, Treasury, etc., but that is beyond the scope of this study.
150 │ ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 

12. The author proposes the term US regional mission to replace Sylvia’s misnamed “regional interagency consulate,” which requires a new name since the proposed organization does not perform a consular function as defined by the Vienna 

Convention on Consular Relations. UN, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 

24 April 1963, 261.

13. The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is the number two diplomat assigned to 

an embassy or mission and serves as the deputy to the ambassador. While the ambassador is often a political appointee with no background in the Foreign Service, the 

DCM is almost always a career FSO.

14. Stewart, “Winning Hearts and Minds,” in Mismanaging Mayhem, ed. James 

Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, 106.

15. US DOS and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General, Report of Inspection: The Bureau of African Affairs, report no. ISP-I-09-63, August 2009, 13.

16. Murdock and Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, 37.

17. Ibid.

18. Dr. Edwina Campbell (professor of national security studies, Air Command 

and Staff College, and former FSO), correspondence with the author, 16 April 2010.

19. MAJ David A. Meyer, USA, “Normalizing Executive Department Boundaries: A Timely First Step to Improving Interagency Coordination,” monograph (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and 

General Staff College, 21 March 2007). See also Sunil B. Desai, “Solving the Interagency Puzzle,” Policy Review, no. 129 (February/March 2005): 57–71, http://www

.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3431461.html#; Uchida, “Reforming the Interagency Process,” 75; Pasquarett and Kievit, Blueprint for a Bold Restructuring of the 

Organization for National Security, xiii, 24; and Sylvia, “Empowering Interagency 

Capabilities,” 62.

20. The national security advisor, retired general James L. Jones, quoted in PNSR, 

Turning Ideas into Action (Arlington, VA: Center for the Study of the Presidency, September 2009), 59, http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr_turning_ideas_into_action.pdf.

21. Based on a rough order of magnitude (ROM) cost of $100,000 in salary per 

person.

22. ROM cost based on an Internet survey of office buildings 20,000–75,000 

square feet for sale in Miami and Honolulu, two of the current regional combatant 

command locations.

23. ROM cost based on SOUTHCOM’s average annual operating budget prior to 

FY 98. “U.S. Military Facilities: U.S. Southern Command,” informal weblog for the US 

military’s airborne Spanish linguists, http://www.beanerbanner.org/ussouthcom.htm.

24. DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: DOD, 6 February 2006), 79.

25. Ibid., February 2010, 71. Pres. George W. Bush initiated the National Security 

Professional Development (NSPD) program by executive order (EO) in 2007. See 

Bush, EO 13434, NSPD, 22 May 2007. According to the CRS, the NSPD program has 

accomplished little, and EO 13434 excludes the military, the Foreign Service, and the 

intelligence community, citing concerns the program would detract from these 

agencies’ already-established education and training paths. The CRS recommends 

congressional legislation and oversight to improve the NSPD program. See Cathe-
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION │ 151

rine Dale, Building an Interagency Cadre of National Security Professionals: Proposals, 

Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress RL34565 

(Washington, DC: CRS, 8 July 2008).

26. PNSR, Turning Ideas into Action, 19.

27. Murdock and Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, 147. “Executive-driven 

reforms often lack staying power. . . . The executive branch in the 1990s often sought 

to use existing agencies for new purposes through the exercise of executive fiat rather 

than seeking broad, bipartisan reforms. The result was the ‘bending’ of legacy institutions to new missions, often using Presidential directives and executive findings. . . . 

These executive-driven innovations had their uses . . . but rarely carried over into 

successive administrations.” York, “Militarizing the Interagency,” 13.

28. MAJ Thomas M. Lafleur, USA, “Interagency Efficacy at the Operational 

Level,” monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US 

Army Command and General Staff College, 26 May 2005), 17–22; and Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, pt. 2, 5.

29. Murdock and Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, 146.

30. Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, pt. 2, 8.

31. Murdock and Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, 34.

32. Nina M. Serafino, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: A Fact Sheet, CRS Report RS22871 (Washington, DC: CRS, 7 May 

2008), 1; and Supplemental Appropriations Act, Public Law 111-32, 123 Stat. 1895, 

111th Cong., 1st sess., 24 June 2009.

33. Josh Rogin, “State Department and Pentagon Creating Joint Office for Funding 

Emergency Response,” The Cable, Foreign Policy, 27 December 2011, http://the

cable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/27/state_department_and_pentagon_creating

_joint_office_for_funding_emergency_response.

34. Ben Lieberman, “Crisis! What Crisis? America’s Response to the Energy Crisis,” in Mismanaging Mayhem, 125.

35. US House Armed Services Committee, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Interagency Cooperation Commission Act, 111th Cong., 1st sess., H. R. 

2207, 30 April 2009, 1.

36. Library of Congress (LOC), THOMAS, “Status of H. R. 2207,” 110th Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov.

37. LOC, THOMAS, “Status of S.1268,” 111th Cong.; and LOC, THOMAS, “Status of H. R. 2314,” 111th Cong..

38. LOC, THOMAS, “Status of H. R. 3660,” 111th Cong.

39. Ibid.

40. RAND and the Army also note the prudence of this approach. In their “Integrating the Interagency in Planning for Army Stability Operations” project, the 

RAND team writes, “The Army has a great interest in . . . a ‘whole-of-government’ 

approach to [stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction] operations, but 

the Army also has low leverage over the process. In addition, the DoD and the Army 

are in a position of trying to move the interagency collaboration process forward and 

simultaneously planning in case it fails.” Thomas S. Szayna et al., Integrating Civilian 

Agencies in Stability Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), xiv.

Appendix

Interagency Reform at the National Level

While this study focused on the regional and crisis action levels of 

US interagency foreign policy planning and operations, many authors 

have proposed interagency system reforms at the strategic or national 

level. This study applied the 13 reform analysis criteria to three major 

categories of national-level reform proposals but found them insufficient to select any one of the three structures. Thus, it makes no 

recommendations for interagency reform at the national level. 

Reform Options at the National Level

The literature proposes three general types of national-level interagency reform models. Authority and responsibility for leading interagency planning and coordinating execution of foreign policy and 

national security missions could be assigned to a new interagency organization (1) outside the National Security Council (NSC), (2) within 

the NSC under expanded authorities, or (3) with a lead cabinet-level 

agency (most likely either the State or Defense Department) operating within the current NSC structure.

A National Interagency Organization outside the NSC

This national-level interagency reform proposal envisions creating 

a new interagency organization in Washington with the responsibility and authority to coordinate interagency planning and execution, 

task cabinet-level agencies and other executive-branch departments, 

and resolve interagency disputes. Proponents of this reform option 

include both the 9/11 Commission and Gen Anthony Zinni, USMC, 

retired, a former combatant commander and presidential envoy to 

Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

This new organization could be created either inside or outside the 

executive office of the president (EOP). Creating it within the EOP 

would keep the interagency coordination function close to the president and provide additional capacity for interagency planning and 

direction, while leaving the NSS free to concentrate on its role of developing policy and advising the president. However, this approach 
154 │ APPENDIX

would create two similar national security staffs in the EOP, potentially complicating both coordination and oversight. If the new 

strategic-level interagency organization were created outside the 

EOP, it would have some independence from the White House, potentially distancing the organization from politics.1

Whether inside or outside the EOP, the new organization would 

have the authority and resources necessary to lead integrated interagency planning and coordination for both steady-state and crisis activities rather than relying on ad hoc or personality-driven arrangements. However, it would be expensive in personnel from across the 

relevant executive-branch agencies, requiring the manning of a second national security–related staff. It could also be financially very 

expensive; for example the new Department of Homeland Security 

costs $30 billion annually in administrative overhead above the cost of 

running the 22 previously separate entities centralized under the new 

department.2

 Additionally, this new organization would create a new 

layer of government between the president and national security–

related agencies and departments, which could create additional bureaucratic costs. Finally, unless establishing the new organization under a suitably strong statute, the very powerful secretaries of defense 

and state, as well as others, might simply choose to work around it.3

In one of the earliest proposals of this type, Lt Col James Bartran, 

USA, in a 2000 paper proposed creating a national interagency emergency operations center (NIEOC) in Washington with responsibility 

to execute coordinated US interagency responses to crises around the 

world. This organization would have a standing professional staff representing all relevant members of the interagency community and be 

run by a presidential appointee having direct tasking authority over 

all government agencies designated in support of a crisis response. 

According to Bartran, the NIEOC director could either report directly to the president (which puts the model in this outside-the-NSC 

category), or it could potentially fall under the NSC.4

In 2004 the 9/11 Commission’s report identified the failure of interagency coordination as one of the causes of the terrorist attacks 

and recommended creating new interagency institutions inside the 

EOP but separate from the NSC, which would be empowered to coordinate interagency information sharing, jointly plan operations, 

and oversee the execution of interagency operations. The commission believed this structure would put a leader in charge to ensure 

unity of effort and improve efficiency while leaving the NSC to focus 
APPENDIX │ 155

on policy direction and advising the president. These recommendations led to the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center 

(NCTC) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

(ODNI), which perform the interagency information sharing and 

oversight functions for counterterrorism and intelligence, though the 

NCTC lacks formal authority over the participating agencies and the 

ODNI is located outside the EOP.5

Also in 2004, General Zinni—who served as both US Central 

Command commander and presidential envoy—proposed creating 

an independent interagency organization to coordinate civil-military 

planning for complex contingency operations, saying, “The new organization should not be at the Cabinet level or within an existing 

government body, but instead should have representatives from different departments and agencies and make recommendations to the 

National Security Council.”6

In a 2005 paper, Maj J. D. York, USMC, proposed the creation of 

a unified interagency authority analogous to the establishment of 

the joint military by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. In York’s 

model, this new agency would replace the NSC and be led by a Senateconfirmed director with a staff representing all government agencies 

active in foreign policy. This director would replace the national security advisor as the principal advisor to the president for interagency foreign policy, review interagency contingency plans, and 

provide oversight of interagency operations.7

 However, since the 

NSC no longer exists in this model—with its policy formulation and 

presidential advisory functions subsumed by the new organization—one could argue that this is actually a model that places interagency coordination under the NSC, albeit with increased authority 

and a new name. Capt Timothy Hsia, USA, made a similar recommendation in a 2008 article, calling for the establishment of a foreign 

policy director, unaligned with either the State or Defense Departments, to be analogous to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

for the interagency to “orchestrate all the instruments of national 

policy.”8

In perhaps the most thorough description of this model, the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) in 2008 recommended creating within the EOP a director for national security (DNS) with 

“super-cabinet” authority.9

 The national security advisor and NSS 

would remain, but the staff would be reduced to 40–50 people and 

would only provide advice to the president. The DNS would help the 
156 │ APPENDIX

president determine which issues should be assigned to lead agencies 

and which are inherently interagency. For interagency issues, the DNS 

staff would have the legal authority to supervise interagency teams 

working the issues and providing direction to all other executivebranch agencies and departments, including directing mission execution. Under the supervision of the DNS, the PNSR study team recommends creating “empowered interagency teams” as needed to 

work on specific issues and which would have the authority to direct 

the activities of executive-branch departments and agencies within 

the scope of their mandate.10 However, in 2009, the PNSR study team 

issued a new report backing away from creating an interagency organization separate from the NSC and instead recommending performing the function within an NSS with expanded authorities and capabilities; this new recommendation is described in the next section.11

The NSC Leads

In the second type of strategic-level interagency reform structure—

the NSC-centric model—the NSC itself coordinates interagency planning and unity of effort. Proposals to strengthen the NSC’s authority 

and capability to provide strategic-level interagency coordination are 

the most common reform recommendations. This model includes 

structures in the NSC and staff to directly conduct interagency coordination in a permanent office subordinate to the NSC or in ad hoc 

organizations created for short-term issues or crisis operations. Prominent proponents of this model include the Defense Science Board, 

the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study team, and the PNSR 2009 study.

Broadening the NSC’s responsibility to include coordination of 

operational-level planning and execution would make its existing interagency committees responsible for these roles in addition to policy 

development and strategic-level coordination. This approach has a 

couple of key advantages. First, if policy developers also oversee operations, then addressing operational requirements, resources, command arrangements, and other implementation issues will become a 

natural extension of policy development. Consequently, the NSC 

would not only produce a better executable policy but also be equipped 

to more fully advise the president on the implications of various 

courses of action. Additionally, this model provides an unambiguous 

chain of authority to the president. However, it could divert the NSC’s 

attention from its primary policy development and presidential advi-
APPENDIX │ 157

sory functions as urgent operational issues crowd out strategy development.12 The Hart/Rudman Commission agreed, recommending 

that the national security advisor and NSS focus on coordinating 

policy and avoid planning and oversight of execution functions or 

becoming operators.13 Echoing this finding, the 9/11 Commission determined that operational planning and direction at the NSC overwhelms the staff and causes it to focus too much on day-to-day issues 

at the expense of advising the president on larger policy issues—another failure the commission says contributed to the 9/11 attacks.14

In 1993 the commander of US Atlantic Command, ADM Paul David Miller, proposed the creation of ad hoc interagency action groups 

(IAG) under the NSC to coordinate interagency planning and execution for specific missions, such as counternarcotics or humanitarian 

assistance.15 IAGs would implement policy, facilitate and expedite 

interagency coordination, and adjudicate interagency issues during 

execution. They would be established by presidential decision and 

report to the NSC. Each IAG would operate under the sponsorship of 

a lead agency, and the director of an IAG would be the deputy director of the lead agency or an immediate subordinate. A committee of 

senior representatives from the member agencies would advise and 

assist the director, and relevant executive-branch agencies would 

contribute working-level personnel. The IAG director would determine the capabilities and functions required, including personnel 

and budget from participating agencies, to meet the policy objective 

and task the organizations possessing the needed capabilities. Each 

participating department or agency would then use its own established procedures to execute its assigned functions. The IAG would 

be disbanded upon mission completion.16 This model contains many 

of the elements of today’s joint interagency task forces (JIATF), 

though Miller’s IAGs operate at both the strategic and operational 

levels while JIATFs today exist only at the operational level.

In 1997 the US government came close to implementing an NSCled process at the strategic level when President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), codifying a process by 

which the NSC would lead interagency coordination, planning, and 

the monitoring of execution for “complex contingency operations.” 

As a result of interagency friction during the planning and execution 

of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992–93 and Operation 

Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994, Clinton saw the need for a more 

systematic approach to interagency planning and execution for these 
158 │ APPENDIX

types of multifaceted operations.17 Under PDD-56, once a crisis was 

declared, the NSC’s Deputies Committee would task the appropriate 

functional or regional policy coordination committee (PCC, renamed an integration planning cell [IPC] in the Obama administration) to lead the interagency coordination process for the contingency. The tasked PCC would then develop the political-military 

(“pol-mil”) plan—the strategic-level, interagency blueprint for the 

contingency—and the director of the PCC (an individual at the deputy assistant secretary level) would become responsible for policy development, planning, day-to-day oversight, and implementation of 

the pol-mil plan across all executive-branch agencies. However, President Clinton never used the PDD-56 process, instead preferring a 

less formal process,18 and in 2001 Pres. George W. Bush rescinded 

PDD-56, so the NSC-centric process it described was never used.19

In 1998 RAND analyst Bruce Pirnie described an NSC-led process 

specifically focused on interagency coordination of complex contingency operations that shares many features with PDD-56. In Pirnie’s 

model, the NSC’s standard system of committees would work together 

with a presidentially appointed special representative or presidential 

envoy to provide leadership for the mission. The NSC’s Principals 

Committee would set the policy and strategy for the mission and the 

Deputies Committee would task a mission-specific NSC executive 

committee and the special representative to develop and coordinate 

an integrated pol-mil plan to meet the policy goals. The national security advisor would authenticate the completed pol-mil plan, the special representative would then lead the US government’s execution of 

the plan, and the NSC’s tiered system of committees and interagency 

meetings would continue to revise policy and make day-to-day policy 

decisions.20 Pirnie’s addition of the presidentially appointed special 

representative to provide sustained, personal leadership for the mission below the level of the president is a significant new feature over 

the PDD-56 model. This new role could circumvent not only overloading the advisor but also creating the appearance that the advisor 

has a vested interest in the mission and is thus less of an honest broker 

during ongoing interagency policy development and any interagency 

disputes about the mission that the NSC would need to resolve.21

In 2004 the Defense Science Board (DSB) recommended another 

variation of the NSC-centric model, this time focused on stabilization and reconstruction operations. The DSB stated that “the management discipline used by the military services to plan and prepare 
APPENDIX │ 159

for combat operations must be extended to peacetime activities . . . 

across the government.”22 It recommended creating a set of contingency planning and integration task forces (CPITF) under the NSC 

to direct the interagency planning effort and ensure interagency unity 

of effort for stabilization and reconstruction operations. Instead of 

waiting for a crisis to occur requiring stabilization and reconstruction operations, CPITFs would be proactively established for all 

countries the NSC assessed as high risk for US intervention leading 

to stabilization and reconstruction operations. The DSB estimated 

that anywhere from two to 10 CPITFs would exist at a time, each 

staffed with personnel from all relevant executive-branch agencies 

and supported by a small permanent cadre on the NSC staff to provide continuity and expertise.23

Also in 2004, Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson at the National 

Defense University’s Center for Technology and National Security 

Policy proposed a model similar to that in the 2004 DSB summer 

study. They advocate the creation of national interagency contingency coordinating groups (NIACCG) under the NSC to plan and 

coordinate postconflict operations. Each NIACCG would have representatives from relevant executive-branch departments and would 

provide strategic guidance and coordinate planning for a postconflict 

operation. The NIACCGs would use the JIACGs at each geographic 

combatant command (GCC) to coordinate national-level interagency 

planning with regional-level military planning conducted by the 

combatant commands.24

In a 2005 paper, Lt Col Ted Uchida, USAF, recommended creating 

an interagency headquarters (IAHQ) in Washington.25 In this model, 

the NSC would organize and staff a single, national-level IAHQ with 

representatives from all executive-branch agencies having a role in 

overseas crisis operations. This IAHQ would consist of both geographic and functional subdirectorates representing, as the Defense 

Science Board said, areas “where US interests are very important and 

the risk of intervention is high.” The leader of the IAHQ would be 

nominated by the president, not require Senate confirmation, and report directly to the president and national security advisor. The IAHQ 

could create and deploy ad hoc interagency task forces (IATF) as 

needed, which would be task-organized to accomplish specific missions using the combined capabilities of the interagency.26

Also in 2005, the Center for Strategic and International Studies 

(CSIS) released phase 2 of its Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study, led 
160 │ APPENDIX

by Clark Murdock and Michèle Flournoy (who served as Obama’s 

undersecretary of defense for policy from 2009 to 2012 and in the 

Clinton administration as both the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction and the deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy), which offered one of the 

most comprehensive descriptions of the NSC-centric model, though 

again their model is specific to complex contingency operations. The 

CSIS team recommended broadening the NSC beyond its traditional 

role of preparing policy decisions for the president to include a more 

active coordination and oversight role, ensuring presidential intent is 

reflected in US government actions, particularly for complex contingency operations. However, the CSIS team cautioned that the NSC 

should not get involved in the actual conduct of operations and that 

no NSC staffer should have directive authority over any executivebranch agency or department.27

To implement the NSC’s expanded role, the study team recommended making more use of the NSS by establishing a new senior 

director for strategic planning and a senior director for complex contingency planning, each with support offices.28 In the CSIS model, 

like PDD-56, the strategic-level interagency process for a complex 

contingency operation would begin with a decision by the NSC Principals Committee or Deputies Committee, which would task the 

deputy national security advisor to guide the development of planning guidance and oversee interagency planning. An NSC executive 

committee—composed of undersecretaries or assistant secretaries 

from the relevant departments, chaired by the new NSC senior director for complex contingency planning, and supported by the Office of 

Complex Contingency Planning—would determine the desired strategic end state, the roles and responsibilities of the participating agencies, and the mechanisms to be used to achieve interagency unity of 

effort and oversee the operation on a day-to-day basis, while the NSC 

Deputies Committee would be the primary interagency decisionmaking body.29

To connect the strategic-level interagency planning and coordination in Washington with operational-level military planning at the 

GCC, the NSC executive committee for the operation would assign 

personnel from its respective agencies to serve on an interagency crisis 

planning team (ICPT), led by the NSC senior director for that region 

(positions currently exist on the NSC staff). The ICPT would deploy to 

the GCC headquarters as early as possible in the planning process to 
APPENDIX │ 161

integrate civilian planning at the NSC with military planning at the 

GCC, reaching back to the NSC and its respective agencies as needed. 

The ICPT would be the supported planning agency, with the GCC 

planners supporting its efforts. Any disagreements between the ICPT 

and military planners would be elevated directly to the national security advisor, who would act as an honest broker and could further elevate issues to the Deputies Committee as the “court of appeals.”30

In a 2007 article, Nora Bensahel at RAND and Col Anne Moisan, 

USAF, at the Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense 

University proposed another NSC-centric model for interagency coordination of stabilization and reconstruction operations. They recommended creating a prevention, reconstruction, and stabilization 

cell (PRSC) under the NSC to monitor potential conflicts around the 

world which might require a US stabilization and reconstruction 

mission, to develop coordinated interagency plans for those conflicts 

which emerge, and to build international coalitions with potential 

future partners for stabilization and reconstruction operations. The 

director would report to the national security advisor, and the PRSC 

would be staffed with 10–15 core personnel from State and Defense 

who would be permanent NSC staff employees rather than detailees 

whose loyalties might lie with their parent agencies. The NSC would 

designate a lead agency for mission execution, but policy oversight 

and strategic direction would remain in the PRSC.31

Finally, PNSR’s 2009 report rejected its 2008 recommendation to 

establish an interagency coordinating body outside the NSC and ultimately decided in favor of an interagency coordination system under 

NSC leadership. In the revised proposal, the national security advisor 

would remain as advisor to the president and would receive additional authority to manage the end-to-end national security interagency process but would not have the authority to direct the actions 

of executive-branch agencies and departments. The interagency 

teams from the 2008 proposal would report to the national security 

advisor, preserving several of the features of the earlier recommendation but significantly reducing the authority of the interagency leader 

below the president.32

A Lead Agency

The third type of interagency reform at the strategic level is the 

lead-agency model in which the National Security Council would 
162 │ APPENDIX

retain its traditional policy coordination and presidential advisory 

functions and would delegate strategic-level planning and interagency coordination of foreign policy and national security issues to 

an existing cabinet-level agency. Depending on the model, the NSC 

might assign all planning and coordination to the same agency, or the 

lead agency might change depending on the issue addressed. 

The lead-agency model has two key advantages. First, it “builds on 

the fact that departments and agencies have operational responsibilities, capabilities and resources that policy making bodies such as the 

NSC do not.” Second, it “frees the NSC staff to concentrate on high 

level policy issues.” However, there are also some disadvantages. First, 

while the Department of Defense (DOD) has robust capabilities to 

lead an interagency process, it is not clear other agencies, such as the 

State Department, have the resources or institutional culture to be an 

effective lead agency. Second, it is not certain other executive-branch 

agencies would follow the lead of a peer agency, which may be perceived to have different agency priorities and goals. The 9/11 Commission expressed concerns over the lead-agency model, saying that 

coordination during execution often suffers because the lead agency 

lacks the authority to direct the activities of other executive-branch 

agencies.33 Additionally, the CSIS study team considered both the 

NSC-centric and lead-agency approach to strategic-level interagency 

coordination and assessed the NSC-centric model to be superior. It 

found the lead-agency approach is often insufficient because bureaucratic agencies resist taking direction from one another and “only the 

NSC can play the role of the honest broker in coordinating the planning and oversight of interagency operations at the strategic level.”34

Fewer strategic-level lead-agency reform proposals are found in 

the literature than for the other two options. The most prominent of 

these are the Hart/Rudman Commission and the State Department 

in 2025 Working Group studies, both proposing designating the State 

Department as lead agency. While the DOD is often either the designated or de facto lead agency for several issues at the strategic level, 

the literature identifies no reform proposals assigning the DOD as 

lead agency for foreign policy. 

In a 1994 paper, Maj Mark Curry, USA, suggests giving the regional assistant secretaries of state directive authority for all interagency programs in their region, including peacetime engagements 

by the combatant commander but excluding combat operations. 

They would also have formal authority over the ambassadors in the 
APPENDIX │ 163

region, preventing them from reporting directly to the secretary of 

state or the president (though this is highly unrealistic).35 While the 

regional assistant secretaries are technically chartered to issue direction to US embassies in their region, the ambassadors leading these 

embassies are appointed by the president with plenipotentiary powers to represent the United States in their assigned country and generally prefer to deal directly with the secretary of state or the president, bypassing the regional assistant secretary.36

In 2001 the Hart/Rudman Commission recommended increasing 

the importance and authorities of the regional bureau leaders at the 

State Department by upgrading the positions from assistant secretaries to undersecretaries.37 These more senior strategic-level leaders 

of regional foreign policy would then chair interagency working 

groups within the NSC “to develop regional strategies and coordinated government-wide plans for their implementation.” This would 

“position the State Department to play a leadership role in the making and implementation of US foreign policy.”38 Additionally, the 

Hart/Rudman Commission recommended the State Department 

regional undersecretaries meet at least twice a year with the ambassadors and military combatant commanders in their regions to improve coordination between the strategic and operational levels.39

The 2007 report from the State Department in 2025 Working 

Group also recommended casting the State Department as the lead 

foreign affairs agency within the interagency structure. In this model, 

the State Department, working in support of the NSC, would lead the 

periodic interagency development of a global affairs strategic plan, 

translating the US National Security Strategy into a set of specific interagency goals and plans, with the designation of a lead agency to 

accomplish each goal and performance objectives to assess attainment of the goals. This State-led planning process would provide 

strategic coherence to US engagement and operations overseas, “create close collaboration on key strategic issues, highlight vulnerable 

gaps and seams, and foster a culture of unity across the government.”40

The working group believed the State Department was the correct 

lead agency for this task because State “is already accountable to the 

President for ensuring that all USG [US government] efforts overseas 

support American foreign policy objectives.”41
164 │ APPENDIX

Analysis

We now apply the 13 evaluation criteria to the three general structures for interagency reform at the national level. To evaluate these 

structures, we consider the most robust versions of each—the PNSR 

super-cabinet model for a new interagency organization, the CSIS 

description of the NSC-centric model, and the lead-agency description offered by Curry and the Hart/Rudman Commission. Table 3 

shows the results of the analysis. The lead-agency model with the 

State Department in charge comes out slightly ahead. However, the 

scores for the other two models are very close, so this study does not 

offer a national-level reform recommendation. A brief description of 

the analysis follows.

Table 3. Analysis of national-level reform models

Evaluation Criteria Non-NSC

Interagency 

Organization

NSC 

Leads

Lead 

Agency

Nonmilitary voice and face for US 

foreign policy 0 0 +

Fully coordinated planning + + +

Unity of effort during execution + 0 0

More efficient and effective than 

agencies working alone + + +

Leader’s authority commensurate with 

responsibility + + 0

Legitimacy of leader’s decision making + + 0

Leader can access necessary resources + + 0

Clear chain of command to the president + + +

Does not overburden the president 0 – +

Balance of power and prestige between 

DOD and DOS 0 0 +

Develops interagency expertise + 0 0

Reform minimizes cost in money, 

personnel, and material – 0 +

Reform minimizes agency culture shocks – 0 0

Totals +6 +5 +7
APPENDIX │ 165

The lead-agency model with State in charge would slightly improve State’s role as the nonmilitary voice and face for US foreign 

policy, though this has never been a major shortfall at the national 

level. The other two models do less to enhance State’s role as the foreign policy lead, but they would not really put the military more in 

charge either. All three reforms are equally likely to provide fully coordinated interagency planning at the national level because this is 

precisely what these models were designed to do.

The non-NSC interagency model is best able to produce interagency unity of effort during execution for two reasons. First, since 

the organization is independent of all cabinet agencies, it would be 

viewed as an honest broker by the participating agencies. Second, because the organization is outside the NSC and would presumably 

have a robust staff focused on interagency planning, execution, and 

assessment, it is more likely than the NSC process itself to focus the 

necessary time and personnel on achieving unity of effort. The other 

two models are assessed as weaker against this criterion but not negative. All three models are equally likely to be more efficient and effective than the cabinet agencies working without any coordination.

The lead-agency model is slightly weaker than the other two in its 

ability to provide the leader a level of authority commensurate with 

responsibility, provide legitimacy to the leader’s decisions, and facilitate the leader’s access to resources because of the perceived biases 

that come from a lead agency directing the efforts of other cabinet 

agencies. The interagency and NSC-centric models are equally likely 

to produce good results in these areas.

All three models produce an equally clear chain of command to the 

president. However, the cabinet-level lead-agency model is the least 

likely to overburden the president as most decisions would be made 

outside the White House. The interagency organization is judged as 

neutral against this criterion as its closeness to the White House may 

or may not drive increased presidential attention. The NSC-centric 

model is worst against this measure since it would raise many more 

decisions to the president and occupy much of the NSC staff ’s time 

that could otherwise be spent formulating policy and advising the 

president. The State-Department-as-lead-agency model would enhance the power and prestige of the State Department, while the other 

two models would have neither a positive nor a negative effect.

The interagency organization would offer the most opportunities 

to develop personnel with interagency experience as this new struc-
166 │ APPENDIX

ture would require a robust staff to do its job. The other two models 

are judged as neutral against this criterion because fewer new personnel would be exposed to the interagency environment.

The lead-agency model is the least costly to implement since it 

would require only a modest augmentation of the State Department’s 

staff. The NSC-centric model is assessed as neutral because it would 

take several more staffers to enable the NSC to fulfill the interagency 

coordination role for planning and execution. The new interagency 

organization is the most costly option because not only would a large 

staff have to be created from scratch but also a new facility would 

likely be required.

Finally, the lead-agency and NSC-centric models are judged as 

having a minimal impact on agency cultures. The new interagency 

organization, though, would have a relatively large impact as it was 

staffed from across the interagency and as career paths were altered 

to staff it.

Notes

1. Michael Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, pt. 2, Occasional Paper no. 

05-02 (McLean, VA: Hicks & Associates, May 2005), 8.

2. MAJ David A. Meyer, USA, “Normalizing Executive Department Boundaries: 

A Timely First Step to Improving Interagency Coordination,” monograph (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and 

General Staff College, 21 March 2007), 15.

3. Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, pt. 2, 9; Clark A. Murdock and 

Michèle A. Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, July 2005), 21.

4. LTC James R. Bartran, USA, “PDD-56-1: Synchronizing Effects; Beyond the 

Pol/Mil Plan,” strategy research project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 10 

April 2000), 12–14.

5. The 9/11 Commission Report, 22 July 2004, 399–400, http://www.9-11commis

sion.gov/report/911Report; and Michael Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, 

pt. 1, Occasional Paper no. 05-01 (McLean, VA: Hicks & Associates, March 2005), 7.

6. Chris Strohm, “Former Commander Calls for New Military-Civilian Planning 

Organization,” GovernmentExecutive.com, 7 December 2004, http://www.govexec

.com/defense/2004/12/former-commander-calls-for-new-military-civilian-planning

-organization/8156.

7. Maj J. D. York, USMC, “Militarizing the Interagency,” research report (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 14 February 2005), 14–15.

8. Timothy K. Hsia, “Building on the Goldwater-Nichols Act,” Foreign Service 

Journal, June 2008, 48.
APPENDIX │ 167

9. PNSR, Forging a New Shield (Arlington, VA: Center for the Study of the Presidency, November 2008), 384, http://pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20forging%20a%20

new%20shield.pdf. This report “represents the culmination of more than two years 

of work by more than three hundred dedicated U.S. national security executives, 

professionals, and scholars” (ibid.).

10. Ibid., xi, xii, 441, 482, 516, 599. 

11. PNSR, Turning Ideas into Action (Arlington, VA: Center for the Study of the 

Presidency, September 2009), 18, 23, http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr_turning

_ideas_into_action.pdf.

12. Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, pt. 2, 6–7.

13. US Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart/Rudman Commission), Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report, 

15 February 2001, xi.

14. The 9/11 Commission Report, 402.

15. Admiral Miller was the combatant commander of the US Atlantic Command, 

later renamed the US Joint Forces Command and disestablished in August 2011.

16. ADM Paul David Miller, The Interagency Process: Engaging America’s Full National Security Capabilities, National Security Paper 11 (Cambridge, MA: Institute 

for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993), 16–18, 45.

17. MAJ Thomas M. Lafleur, USA, “Interagency Efficacy at the Operational 

Level,” monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US 

Army Command and General Staff College, 26 May 2005), 17.

18. Ibid., 18–22.

19. Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, pt. 2, 5.

20. Bruce R. Pirnie, Civilians and Soldiers: Achieving Better Coordination (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND National Security Research Division, 1998), xv–xvi, 45.

21. Ibid., 43.

22. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OSD/ATL), Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and 

from Hostilities (Washington, DC: OSD/ATL, December, 2004), transmittal letter 

from board chairman William Schneider Jr.

23. Ibid., transmittal letter from summer study co-chairs, 29.

24. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, Transforming for Stabilization and 

Reconstruction Operations (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2004), 

110–11.

25. Lt Col Ted T. Uchida, USAF, “Reforming the Interagency Process,” Air Force 

Fellows research report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Fellows Program, May 2005), 

13. This recommendation builds on the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study.

26. Ibid., 96–97.

27. Murdock and Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2 Report, 7, 50.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 45–46.

30. Ibid., 20, 46–47.

31. Nora Bensahel and Anne M. Moisan, “Repairing the Interagency Process,” 

Joint Force Quarterly 44 (1st Quarter 2007): 107–8. Dr. Bensahel is a senior political 

scientist at RAND. US Air Force colonel Moisan at the time of this writing was a 
168 │ APPENDIX

senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National 

Defense University.

32. PNSR, Turning Ideas into Action, 16, 18, 23.

33. Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, pt. 2, 7–10.

34. Murdock and Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2 Report, 20.

35. MAJ Mark L. Curry, USA, “The Interagency Process in Regional Foreign 

Policy,” monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US 

Army Command and General Staff College, 5 May 1994), 34–35.

36. Ibid., 9, 17.

37. Hart/Rudman Commission, Road Map for National Security, xi.

38. Ibid., 59, 62.

39. Ibid., 63.

40. Barry M. Blechman, Thomas R. Pickering, and Newt Gingrich, Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy: Final Report of the State Department in 2025 

Working Group, 2007, ii, 19–22, http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization

/99879.pdf.

41. Ibid., 19.
Abbreviations

ACT advance civilian team

AF Bureau of African Affairs

AFF Air Force Fellows

AFRICOM US Africa Command

AOR area of responsibility

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASFF Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

AU African Union

C4I command, control, communications, computers,

and intelligence

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CCF command collaborative forum

CENTCOM US Central Command

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program

CETO Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities

CFLCC combined forces land component commander

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CIEG commander’s interagency engagement group

CJCMOTF coalition joint civil-military operations task force

CJTF–HOA Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa

CJIATF combined joint interagency task force

CMG crisis management group

COCOM combatant command

COIN counterinsurgency

CORDS Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary 

(or “Rural”) Development Support

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CPITF contingency planning and integration task force

CRC Civilian Response Corps

CRC-A Civilian Response Corps–Active

CRC-R Civilian Response Corps–Reserve

CRC-S Civilian Response Corps–Standby

CRSG country reconstruction and stabilization group

CSF combined support force

CSG combined support group

CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies
170 │ ABBREVIATIONS

CT counterterrorism

CTF crisis task force

DART disaster assistance response team

DC Deputies Committee

DCM deputy chief of mission

DCMA deputy to the commander for civil-military activities

DCMO deputy to the commander for military operations

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DOS Department of State

DSB Defense Science Board

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency

DSS Diplomatic Security Service

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EAP Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

ECCD US European Command civilian deputy

EOP executive office of the president

EU European Union

EUCOM US European Command

EUR Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

EWG executive working group

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FMF foreign military financing

FMS foreign military sales

FPA foreign policy advisor

FSO foreign service officer

GAO Government Accountability Office

GCC geographic combatant command

GPOI global peace operations initiative

GSCF global security contingency fund

HQ headquarters

IA interagency

IACG interagency coordination group

IAG interagency action group

IAHQ interagency headquarters
ABBREVIATIONS │ 171

IATF interagency task force

IAWG interagency working group

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement

ICMAG integrated civilian military action group

ICPT interagency crisis planning team

IGO intergovernmental organization

IMET international military education and training

IMS interagency management system

IPC integration planning cell

IPC interagency policy committee

IRC integrated regional center

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

J-1 joint staff directorate of manpower and personnel

J-2 joint staff directorate of intelligence

J-3 joint staff directorate of operations

J-4 joint staff directorate of logistics

J-5 joint staff directorate of plans, policy, and strategy

J-6 joint staff directorate of communications

J-7 joint staff directorate of training, exercises, 

and engagement

J-8 joint staff directorate of resources and assessments

J-9 joint staff directorate of partnering or outreach

JCP joint campaign plan

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFCOM US Joint Forces Command

JGTF joint government task force

JIACG joint interagency coordination group

JIACG/CT Joint Interagency Coordination Group 

for Counterterrorism

JIACOM joint interagency command

JIATF joint interagency task force

JIATF-CTAP Joint Interagency Task Force 

for Counterterrorism in the Asia-Pacific Region

JIATF-I Joint Interagency Task Force–Iraq

JIATF-S Joint Interagency Task Force–South

JIATF-W Joint Interagency Task Force–West

JOC joint operations center

JP joint publication

JPG joint planning group
172 │ ABBREVIATIONS

JTF joint task force

JTF-5 Joint Task Force–5

MACV Military Assistance Command–Vietnam

MNF-I Multinational Force–Iraq

MPAT multinational planning augmentation team

MSG military support group

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center

NEA Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs

NGO nongovernmental organization

NIACCG national interagency contingency 

coordinating group

NIEOC national interagency emergency operations center

NORTHCOM US Northern Command

NSA National Security Agency

NSC National Security Council

NSP national security professional

NSPD national security professional development

NSS national security staff

OAS Organization of American States

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OMA Office of Military Affairs

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OND Operation New Dawn

OPG operational planning group

OPLAN operational plan

ORHA Office of Reconstruction and 

Humanitarian Assistance

OSCE Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OTI Office of Transition Initiatives

PACOM US Pacific Command

PC Principals Committee
ABBREVIATIONS │ 173

PCC policy coordination committee

PCCF Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PM Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

PME professional military education

PNSR Project on National Security Reform

POLAD political advisor

PRSC prevention, reconstruction, and stabilization cell

PRT provincial reconstruction team

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

RBC regional bureau chief

RCM regional chief of mission

RCOM regional chief of mission

RIB regional interest bureau

RID regional interagency directors

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SAMS School of Advanced Military Studies

SCA Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs

S/CRS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization

SDE senior developmental education

SES senior executive service

SJFHQ standing joint force headquarters

SOUTHCOM US Southern Command

TSB target synchronization board

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

USA US Army

USAF US Air Force

USAID US Agency for International Development

USFOR-A US Forces–Afghanistan

USG US government

USN US Navy

USRM US regional mission

WHA Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs

WMD weapon of mass destruction

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Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN), 2, 54–55, 61, 139, 140

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 

and Explosives (ATF), 29

CENTCOM, see US Central Command

Center for Strategic and International 

Studies (CSIS), 95–97, 115–17, 125, 

141, 144, 145

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 3, 

13, 17, 49, 57, 58, 76, 82, 111, 140

Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), 76–78, 86, 

89, 99, 110, 114, 115, 135, 136

Civilian Response Corps (CRC), 48, 49

CJTF-HOA, see combined joint task 

force in the Horn of Africa

coalition joint civil-military operations 

task force, 82

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 

provisional administration in Iraq 

following Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

87–90, 98, 114, 142

COIN, see counterinsurgency

combatant command (COCOM), 1, 7, 

11–14, 28, 32, 54, 81, 96, 100, 105–

9, 128, 130, 131, 142

combined forces land component commander (CFLCC), 87, 88

combined joint interagency task forces 

(CJIATF), 15, 20

combined joint task force in the Horn of 

Africa (CJTF-HOA), 34, 35, 37, 55

Combined Support Force (CSF), 73, 74

combined support group (CSG), 74

Command Collaborative Forum 

(CCF), 34

Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (CERP), 68

commander’s interagency engagement 

group (CIEG), 26

coordinating director of rule of law and 

law enforcement (CDROLLE), 20

CORDS, see Civil Operations and Rural Development Support

Corps Center for Emerging Threats 

and Opportunities (CETO), 97

counterinsurgency (COIN), 1, 3, 67, 69, 

75, 76–78, 82, 83, 88, 89, 90, 95, 145

counterterrorism (CT), 10, 11, 14, 17, 

21–23, 24, 26, 27, 34, 55, 58, 59, 61, 

67, 71, 72, 83, 84, 95, 134, 145

crisis management groups, 97

crisis task force, 112–13

CSIS, see Center for Strategic and International Studies

CT, see counterterrorism

Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 

18, 27, 29, 30

Defense Information Systems Agency 

(DISA), 26

Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 

68, 133

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA), 23, 26

Department of Defense (DOD), 1, 4, 5, 

9, 12–14, 18, 22–24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 

35, 37, 45, 48, 51, 55, 61, 68–72, 82, 

84, 86–90, 95, 96, 104, 110, 111, 

115, 125, 129–32, 136, 142, 143–44, 

145, 147, 149

Department of Energy, 19

Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), 19, 57, 61, 145

Department of State (DOS), 9, 45–50, 

53, 54, 68, 69, 71, 72, 84, 87, 88, 90, 

109, 123, 125, 129, 137

Deputies Committee (DC), 10, 52, 55, 

56, 117

Index
194 │ INDEX

deputy to the commander for civilmilitary activities (DCMA), 32, 34, 36

deputy to the commander for military 

operations (DCMO), 32, 34

Diplomatic Security Service, 17, 19, 29

directorate of intelligence (J-2), 23, 35, 36

directorate of interagency partnering 

(J-9), 21, 23, 25–27, 29, 30, 32, 34, 36

directorate of logistics (J-4), 23, 36, 132

directorate of operations (J-3), 17–19, 

22, 23, 26, 29, 35, 36

directorate of plans, policy, and 

strategy (J-5), 19, 23, 36, 107, 132

disaster assistance response team 

(DART), 74

DOD, see Department of Defense

DOS, see Department of State

Drug Enforcement Administration 

(DEA), 13, 18, 24, 26, 27, 30

East Asian and Pacific Affairs, agency 

within Department of State, 47

EUCOM, see US European Command

EUCOM civilian deputy (ECCD), 25, 

27, 36

European Union (EU), 54, 61, 70, 139

Executive Working Group, 84, 85

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 

13, 17, 18, 22, 24, 26, 29, 30, 58

foreign military financing, 68

foreign military sales, 68

Foreign Service Officer (FSO), 4, 10, 

19, 22, 28, 32, 36, 37, 68, 88, 132

geographic combatant command 

(GCC), 1, 3, 9, 15–16, 30, 37, 45, 47, 

51, 53, 60, 61, 80, 81, 96, 97, 101, 

103, 104, 107, 108, 111, 132–35, 

140–42, 148

global peace operations initiative, 68

Government Accountability Office 

(GAO), 31, 68, 69, 71, 72, 90

Hart/Rudman Commission, 2, 95

IGO, see intergovernmental organizations

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 18, 24, 26, 27, 29

Integrated Civilian Military Action 

Group, 84

integrated regional center, 100, 101, 128

Integration Planning Cell (IPC), 55, 56

interagency action group (IAG), 16–19, 

35, 36

interagency policy committee (IPC), 

55, 56, 59

interagency task force (IATF), 9, 14, 19, 

24, 30, 34, 105, 111, 113–17, 125–

27, 133–37, 139, 142, 145, 146, 148

intergovernmental organizations 

(IGO), 2, 61

international military education and 

training, 68

International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF), 14, 20, 21, 82, 84, 85

Iraq Security Forces Fund, 69

ISAF, see International Security Assistance Force

JFCOM, see US Joint Forces Command

JIACG, see joint interagency coordination group

JIACG for counterterrorism, 11, 21, 22

JIATF, see joint interagency task forces

JTF, see joint task force

joint campaign plan, 19

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 25, 47, 55, 

56, 68, 76, 137

joint directorates (J-#), see directorate of

joint government task force, 111

joint interagency command (JIACOM), 

101, 102, 112

joint interagency coordination group 

(JIACG), 1, 9–19, 21–27, 29, 33–36, 

75, 97, 104–8, 115, 116, 133

joint interagency task forces (JIATF), 1, 

15, 17, 20, 21, 27, 30, 31, 35, 99, 

102, 112, 115, 149

Joint Interagency Task Force-South 

(JIATF-S), 14, 29–31, 35, 36, 111, 

133, 134

Joint Interagency Task Force-West 

(JIATF-W), 14, 24, 35, 36, 111, 133, 134

joint operations center (JOC), 23, 73, 75

joint planning group, 107
INDEX │ 195

joint task force (JTF), 9, 11, 14, 17, 19, 

24, 29, 30, 34, 73, 100, 110–11, 

114–16, 135

Military Assistance Command–Vietnam (MACV), 76, 77, 110, 114, 

115, 135

Military Support Group, 80

Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF-I), 18, 

19, 88

multinational planning augmentation 

team, 107

National Counterterrorism Center, 

58, 145

National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency, 26

National Security Agency (NSA), 17, 

22, 100–1

National Security Council (NSC), 5, 

9–10, 11, 25, 45, 55, 56–57, 59, 61, 

98, 100–3, 108, 112, 116, 123, 141, 

144, 146

National Security Staff, 56, 61, 98, 100, 

112, 123, 146

NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Near Eastern Affairs, agency within 

Department of State, 47

nongovernmental organizations 

(NGO), 2, 74, 82, 83

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), 2, 9, 14, 20, 25, 54, 61, 70, 

82, 84, 139, 140

NORTHCOM, see US Northern 

Command

NSC, see National Security Council

OAS, see Organization of American States

Office of Foreign Assets Control 

(OFAC), 22, 26

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 

(OFDA), 23, 29, 51, 73–74, 75, 82, 

135, 139, 146

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB), 4, 88

Office of Military Affairs, 51, 53

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), 87, 88, 110

Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), 

48, 49, 84, 85, 115

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), 57, 58, 61, 145

Office of Transition Initiatives, 51

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 

82, 86

Operation New Dawn (OND), 90, 110

operational planning group, 105

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 54, 70, 139

Organization of American States 

(OAS), 2, 54–55, 139, 140

PACOM, see US Pacific Command

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, 

69, 145

PME, see professional military education

PNSR, see Project on National Security 

Reform

policy coordination committees, 56

political advisor (POLAD), 1, 9, 10, 13, 

14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, 32, 

35–37, 103

Principals Committee, 55, 56

professional military education (PME), 

95, 96, 144, 149

Project on National Security Reform 

(PNSR), 53, 54, 58–59, 95–96, 100, 

110, 112, 113, 116, 122, 123, 125, 128

regional bureau chief, 108

regional chief of mission (RCOM), 

108, 109, 132–35, 138–40, 143, 146

regional interagency directors, 97

Regional Interest Bureau, 98

School for Advanced Military Studies 

(SAMS), 102, 115

security cooperation offices, 67

S/CRS, see Office of the Coordinator of 

Reconstruction and Stabilization

Senior Executive Service (SES), 26, 

34, 147

SOUTHCOM, see US Southern 

Command

standing joint force headquarters, 26

Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 25
196 │ INDEX

target synchronization board, 16, 19

United Nations (UN), 18, 47, 55, 70, 

82, 86, 140

US Africa Command (AFRICOM), 

15–16, 25, 32–36, 55, 70, 104, 106, 

137, 140, 148 

US Agency for International Development (USAID), 9, 12, 18, 19, 22, 23, 

27, 29, 32–35, 45, 49–55, 60, 68, 69, 

71, 73–76, 80, 81, 83, 84, 87–90, 

111, 121, 122, 133–35, 139, 145, 

146, 149

US Central Command (CENTCOM), 

13, 15–20, 35, 56, 82, 83, 87–90, 

140, 141

US European Command (EUCOM), 

15, 25–28, 32, 36, 70, 72, 104, 106, 

131, 140, 148

US Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), 

15, 20, 21, 84, 85, 136

US government (USG), 3, 12, 27, 32, 33, 

45, 47, 48, 51, 53, 56, 58, 60, 71, 73, 

79, 85, 96, 105, 113, 116, 136, 143

US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), 

11–13, 15, 17, 35, 49

US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), 29, 31, 140

US Pacific Command (PACOM), 14, 

15, 21–24, 27, 32, 36, 73–75, 77, 

110, 111, 134, 140, 141

US regional mission (USRM), 7, 132–

36, 138–42

US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), 14, 15, 25, 27–32, 36, 79, 80, 

104, 106, 110, 111, 134, 140, 148

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 

15, 18

Western Hemisphere Affairs, 47, 55, 141