Edited by 

C S W. C, USAF, R

with Maj Gen Andrea D. Tullos, USAF, and Col Erik K. Rundquist, USAF, retired

Foreword by Gen James M. Holmes, USAF

Afterword by Maj Gen John T. Wilcox II, USAF

Integrated Base Defense Principles

for Commanders

VOLUME III

Defending

Air Bases

in an Age of

Insurgency

2020 USAF Year

of Integrated Base Defense
Defending Air Bases 

in an Age of Insurgency

Volume III:

Integrated Base Defense

Principles for Commanders

Shannon W. Caudill, Editor

Colonel, USAF, Retired

Andrea D. Tullos

Major General, USAF

Erik K. Rundquist

Colonel, USAF, Retired

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
Air University Press

Director

Maj Richard Harrison

Managing Editor

Dr. Christopher Rein

Design and Production Managing Edito

Luetwinder T. Eaves

Project Editor

Donna Budjenska

Editorial Assistant

Kimberly Leifer

Cover Art, Book Design, and Illustratio

Daniel Armstrong

Timothy Thomas

Composition and Prepress Production

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Air University Press

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Caudill, Shannon W.

Defending air bases in an age of insurgency /

Shannon W. Caudill, Colonel, USAF.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978–1–58566–241–8

1. Air bases—Security measures—United States.

2. United States. Air Force—Security measures.

3. Irregular warfare—United States. I. Title

UG634.99.C48 2014

358.4’14—dc23

2014012026

Published by Air University Press in March 2021

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed 

or implied within are solely those of the authors and do 

not necessarily represent the official policy or position 

of the organizations with which they are associated or 

the views of the Air University Press, Air University, 

United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or 

any other US government agency. This publication is 

cleared for public release and unlimited distribution.

This book and other Air University Press publications 

are available electronically at the AU Press website: 

https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress.
This book is dedicated to those who defend air bases—

our Airmen, members of the joint force, and our joint 

and coalition partners.

*****

We also present this book in memory of a gifted base 

defender, commander, and warrior:

Lt Col Brian L. Copper Jr., USAF

v

Contents

Illustrations vii

Foreword ix

James M. Holmes

About the Authors xiii

Acknowledgments xv

Introduction xvii

Ten Base Defense Principles for Commanders xxiii

 1 You Own It! 1

 2 Get Left of the Boom: Deter, Disrupt, Deceive 5

 3 Influence the Base Security Zone . . .

or Someone Else Will 11

 4 Unity of Effort: Synchronize the Fight 17

 5 Everyone Must Have a Role in Base Defense . . .

and Play It! 23

 6 Intelligence Drives Maneuver: A Joint-Interagency

Approach Is Critical 27

 7 Air-mindedness Includes Using Air Assets for

Base Defense 31

 8 Law Enforcement Skills Are Critical to Base Defense

and Irregular Warfare 35

 9 Manage the Risk: Commit Intellectual Capital

to the Fight 41

 10 Nowhere to Hide: Anticipate Future Threats

and Develop Countermeasures 47

Conclusion 55

Afterword 59

John T. Wilcox II
vi

CONTENTS

Appendix A: Base Defense Terminology 61

Appendix B: Recommended Reading List for

Air Base Defense and Counterinsurgency 67

Appendix C: Notable Airfield Attacks 69

Appendix D: Relevant Quotations about

Air Base Defense 73

Abbreviations 77

Bibliography 79

Index 87
vii

Illustrations

Figures

1 Integrated defense effects xviii

2 Overhead shot of Camp Bastion 1

3 Notional defense-in-depth schematic 2

4 The “Dover Effect” 6

5 Fort Dix Six 8

6 Base boundary considerations 12

7 Intelligence process 30

8 Risk-Management Process 44

Tables

1 Notable soft target attacks 38

2 Statistical comparison of fixed-wing aircraft

destroyed and damaged by air base attack 48

ix

Foreword

Likely readers of this book do not need to be told the United States 

has been in a continual state of conflict since 1990. It is sobering to 

think an entire generation of Airmen and their families entered the 

Air Force, served over two decades, and retired in this time frame 

after completing a steady stream of deployments in the skies over, or 

on the ground in, Iraq, Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Syria. 

In addition to these deployments, the same Airmen also protected 

the homeland in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and responded to humanitarian crises in Africa, Asia, South America, and within our 

own borders. The promise of the post–Cold War peace dividend 

never materialized for the US military—and in particular our nation’s Air Force.

During this generation, our air warfare capabilities dramatically 

changed. The employment of stealth technology, precision-guided 

munitions, remotely piloted aircraft, and globally networked information systems ensured our smaller Air Force remained a highly 

flexible and lethal instrument of national power. Airmen not only 

delivered air superiority—they also delivered air supremacy to a level 

never seen in the history of warfare. However, air superiority is not a 

birthright, nor is it a forgone conclusion for the next generation of 

Airmen. To think otherwise is folly.

Our adversaries continue to operate across a wide spectrum of capabilities and have chosen to avoid our strengths and take advantage 

of our vulnerabilities at home or abroad. They are lone-wolf attackers 

inspired by online hate messages. They are insider threats or computer “hacktivists” who target critical information systems. Highly 

capable insurgents and organized criminal networks have proven 

they possess both the means and will to affect sortie generation. 

While we fought violent extremist organizations, state-sponsored 

terrorist groups and resurgent near-peer militaries have also deployed new surface, air, cyber, and space capabilities that have forced 

the US and its allies to reexamine basing options and create new approaches to deployment.

The next generation of Airmen will contend with adversaries who 

fight outside the confines of traditional armed conflict. These adversaries are adept at hybrid warfare and have already demonstrated 

plausible deniability by employing “little green men” in Crimea and 
FOREWORD

x

ambiguous maritime threats in the South China Sea.1 Moreover, advancements in stand-off technology such as smart mortar rounds and 

simple-to-operate man-portable air defense systems offer unique 

challenges to our expeditionary airfields. The use of unsophisticated 

tactics such as vehicle ramming and basic incendiary devices are proliferating. Likewise, commercially available small unmanned aerial 

systems, geocaching smartphone computer applications, and social 

media flash mobs offer organizational, kinetic, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance opportunities to the next generation of 

tech-savvy threat actors.

How will the next generation of Airmen meet this challenge? The 

first two volumes of the Air University–sponsored work Defending 

Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency generated significant conversation 

about threats to air and space installations and operations. Military 

and civilian authors from around the world presented case studies, 

delivered international perspectives, recommended doctrinal and 

procedural changes, and provided insight about how to organize and 

protect our Air Force for future conflicts. This third volume goes beyond the technical aspects of defending bases and focuses on the responsibilities of the person responsible for ensuring mission success: 

the commander.

This work presents basic principles for air base commanders to 

consider when it comes to ensuring mission success in the air at 

ground level. The principles focus on risk management, mission 

planning, integrating air and ground force capabilities, capitalizing 

on law enforcement skills, and effectively using intelligence/information to your advantage. Many of these areas mirror what a groundbased task force commander would be responsible for in a contingency environment. As in that case, success will require us to prioritize 

many of these tasks, albeit from an air-minded perspective. We ask 

our wing and installation commanders to focus on the “deep fight” 

when it comes to employing air- and space power. There is, however, 

a very real “near fight” at each air base that is equally demanding, 

complex, and dangerous. New Agile Combat Employment concepts 

being developed for future conflict decentralize air asset basing and 

will require understanding of these tools and threats at the squadron 

level and below. Comprehensive training of the skills and tasks described in this volume will be required to ensure all Airmen understand their role in defending the base from evolving threats.
FOREWORD

xi

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the 

bibliography.)

1. Pifer, “Crimea: Six Years After Illegal Annexation”; and Chorn and Sato, “Maritime Gray Zone Tactics.”

I commend the authors and Air University for developing this 

guide. I urge commanders at all levels to research, study, and employ 

these truths when it comes to your installations and deployed bases. 

People First, Mission Always!

JAMES M. HOLMES

General, USAF

xiii

About the Authors

Col Shannon W. Caudill, USAF, retired (BS, Norwich University; 

MSA, Central Michigan University; MMS, Marine Corps Command 

and Staff College; MSS, Air War College; George Walker Executive 

Leadership Fellow, University of Charleston, West Virginia), is a doctoral student at the University of Charleston, an adjunct professor of 

leadership at Air Command and Staff College and the University of 

Charleston, founder of Home Plate Consulting and Writing Services, 

LLC, and owner of online book-sale business Baseball in Georgia. As 

a career Air Force security forces officer, he has worked at the unit, 

major command, and Joint Staff levels; commanded three security 

forces squadrons; and accumulated 18 months of combat experience 

in Iraq. He has written numerous white papers and articles on terrorism, leadership, base defense, and law enforcement that have been 

published in Air and Space Power Journal, Joint Force Quarterly, 

American Diplomacy, and the Guardian—the Joint Staff ’s antiterrorism publication. He is the editor and coauthor of the Air University 

Press three-volume monograph series, Defending Air Bases in an Age 

of Insurgency. In addition, he is coauthor of the history book Baseball 

in Kennesaw. As an educator, he has served on the resident and adjunct faculties of Air War College, Air Command and Staff College, 

Lake Region State College, North Dakota, and the University of 

Charleston, West Virginia.

Col Erik K. Rundquist, USAF, retired (BS, USAFA; MMAS, Army 

Command and General Staff College; MSSC, Syracuse University, 

New York; National Defense Fellow, Boston University), is a PhD 

candidate with King’s College London, an external fellow to Boston 

University’s International History Institute, and the Senior Aerospace 

Science Instructor for the Air Force Junior Reserve Officer Training 

Corps at North Henderson High School in Hendersonville, North 

Carolina. He is the former commander, Detachment 8 Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center. He was responsible for supporting Air Combat Command’s security/antiterrorism risk management, engineering support operations, emergency services, and 

mission beddown activities for 1,200 aircraft, 24 wings, 14 bases, and 

over 200 operating locations worldwide. He has served in various 

duty positions including group commander, Air Combat Command 

chief of security forces, squadron commander, and joint staff officer 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

xiv

where he managed the DOD antiterrorism program for Secretary of 

Defense Robert Gates. As the former commander, 455th Expeditionary Mission Support Group, and commander, Task Force 1/455 at 

Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, he led over 1,500 personnel—operating and defending the DOD’s strategic air hub into Afghanistan—and 

was the battlespace owner for Parwan Province. His other contingency experiences include the United Nations Protection Force in the 

Balkans; Operations Allied Force and Shining Hope in Albania and 

Kosovo; Determined Response (USS Cole) in Yemen; Enduring Freedom in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan; and Iraqi Freedom, where he 

led his squadron in an operational combat jump into Bashur, Iraq, 

while attached to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. He deployed again to 

Tallil, Iraq, as the defense force commander for the 407th Air Expeditionary Group and 22nd Corps Support Group and as the J-7 director to the Combined Joint Special Operations Air Component Command at Balad, Iraq, and Bagram, Afghanistan.

Maj Gen Andrea D. Tullos, USAF (BA, University of Virginia; 

MAS, University of New Mexico; National Defense Fellow; MANSS, 

National Defense University), is the commander of Second Air Force, 

Keesler Air Force Base, Biloxi, Mississippi. She is responsible for the 

development, oversight, and direction of all operational aspects of 

basic military training as well as initial skills, advanced, and supplemental nonaviation training for 93 percent of the Air Force’s enlisted 

force and officer corps. Second Air Force delivers more than 3,400 

courses spanning 265 Air Force specialties and graduates 150,000 

Airmen, Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and international students annually. The command includes five training wings at Keesler AFB; Sheppard and Goodfellow AFB, Texas; Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, 

Texas; and a network of 80 training detachments and operating locations around the world. Before this assignment, Major General Tullos 

was the Director of Security Forces, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, Headquarters US Air Force, 

the Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia.
xv

Notes

1. Tirpak, “Goldfein: USAF Needs ‘to Return to Our Expeditionary 

Roots.’”

2. Delgado, “CSAF Charts Air Force Defender Way Forward.”

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Air University (AU) Press for their continued support in publishing this third and final volume of Defending 

Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency. Special thanks to our AU Press 

Project Editor, Donna Budjenska, for the great care she gave this 

manuscript. Thanks also to AU Press’s Kim Leifer, Nedra Looney, and 

Timothy Thomas for their contributions to the book’s final product. 

The authors of all three volumes in this series want to express our 

deep appreciation to Daniel Armstrong for designing such a beautiful 

and unique cover for these books.

We are also grateful to Gen David Goldfein, the former Air Force 

Chief of Staff, for his support for base defense issues. First, he declared 2019 the “Year of the Defender” and provided resources to upgrade security forces and base defense assets.1

 Second, General 

Goldfein announced that 2020 was the “Year of Integrated Base Defense” with a focus on continued defensive modernization and innovation. General Goldfein’s initiatives illustrate and underpin the critical importance of integrated base defense to the effectiveness and 

sustainability of airpower. This volume provides future wing, group, 

and squadron commanders as well as maturing Air Force and Space 

Force leaders some guiding principles through which they can better 

lead, protect, and secure their people and air- and space power assets. 

We are grateful to the contributions of the following people for their 

insights and suggestions as we finalized volume three: Col Bryan Gillespie, USAF (retired); Col Brian Greenroad, USAF (retired); Lt Col 

Ben Jacobson, USAF; Lt Col Chris Lacek, USAF; Lt Col Clay Nichols, 

USAF; Lt Col Joe Sorenson, USAF; and Col Troy Roberts, USAF. We 

also thank Nicholas Caudill for his suggestions on the choice of background for the cover of this book. Finally, we thank all the authors 

and contributors in volumes one and two who inspired and informed 

so many of the lessons we distilled from their study of integrated base 

defense found in this final book.

xvii

Introduction

Commanders are responsible for force protection . . . it should 

be a commander’s skill and judgment that remains of primary 

importance when making decisions about force protection. The 

staff can provide recommendations, but it has no responsibility 

for resulting actions; the commander alone is responsible; 

therefore, the commander alone is accountable.

—Lt Gen William B. Garrett III, USA

Maj Gen Thomas M. Murray, USMC

US Central Command Bastion Attack

Investigation Executive Summary

Wearing US Army uniforms, the attackers penetrated the air base’s 

defenses under the cover of night. Armed with rifles, rocket-propelled 

grenade launchers, and suicide vests, the 14-man team began its 

deadly and well-planned mission against an air base in Helmand 

Province, Afghanistan, jointly manned by the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization’s (NATO) International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF). Hours of combat ensued, and the morning light revealed the 

destruction of six McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II ground-attack 

aircraft and six refueling stations and damage to two other aircraft 

and six aircraft hangers.1 In the aftermath, 14 insurgents and two US 

Marines, including the flying squadron commander, lay dead while 

eight coalition military members and one contractor were wounded. 

In September 2012, this insurgent operation constituted the most 

successful ground attack against ISAF’s air assets to date in the Afghanistan conflict and the costliest ground-based attack against a US 

military airfield since the Vietnam War. While Camp Bastion was not 

defended by the US Air Force, it serves as a cautionary tale for commanders about their inherent responsibility to ensure an integrated 

defense (ID) is in place to meet the threat. In the end, two American 

general officers were forcibly retired after the Camp Bastion attack, 

because, as the Commandant of the Marine Corps put it, they “did 

not exercise the level of judgment expected of commanders of their 

grade and experience in their decisions related to oversight of a layered, integrated, defense-in-depth force protection plan.”2

Aircraft are extremely fragile. If you look at the cost of a B-2 

bomber or a ramp of F-22 aircraft, several well-placed mortar rounds 
INTRODUCTION

xviii

can wipe out or cripple billions of dollars in modern aircraft. The 

destruction of a barracks occupied by the technical experts needed 

for air operations, such as the pilots or aircraft mechanics, will render 

air platforms unusable. Indeed, in Vietnam, the Vietcong specifically 

targeted lodging occupied by pilots, seeking to cripple air operations 

on the ground.3 In Vietnam, Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces 

attacked American air bases 475 times between 1964 and 1973, primarily with indirect fire (IDF), destroying 99 US and South Vietnamese 

aircraft and damaging 1,170 aircraft.4 In today’s environment, similar 

Key

AFOSI: Air Force Office of Special Investigations

EOC: emergency operations center

IDP: integrated defense plan

IDRMP: integrated defense risk management process

MWD: military working dog

RAM: random antiterrorism measures

Figure 1. Integrated defense effects (Source: Incident Continuum, Air 

Force Incident Management Course, Maxwell Air Force Base, 2016.)
INTRODUCTION

xix

losses would be unsustainable because of the cost and lengthy manufacturing timeline needed for sophisticated stealth aircraft.

Commanders must make hard choices on base defense, considering mission requirements, resource constraints, and the dangers of a 

determined enemy enabled by technology like remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) and GPS-guided munitions. The threat is growing, and 

defenses are less certain. A major leadership challenge for Air Force 

commanders is the arena of air base defense. The Air Force simply 

does not stress these skills as essential to building future leaders in 

the officer corps, yet the defense of air bases is a central component of 

airpower. Therefore, commanders are left to spin up quickly, sometimes at a base under fire. It is up to you, the commander, to build the 

proficiency needed to command the base defense, put your own imprint on it, and exercise your leadership responsibility and judgment 

in the protection of your people and war-fighting assets.

Air Force strategy for defending air bases is now known as integrated defense (formerly known as air base defense, air base ground 

defense, or integrated base defense).5 ID provides the requisite secure 

foundation from which the USAF launches combat operations and 

protects its personnel and resources—it represents an operational 

task. Without strong ID capabilities, USAF and joint force personnel 

and resources are more vulnerable to attacks that potentially decrease 

combat effectiveness, reduce sortie rates, and degrade the ability to 

project power. More importantly, if the USAF ID mantra “every Airman is a sensor” is to have long-term meaning, then a true integration of all units and personnel must be included in the base defense 

plan and vigorously practiced and exercised.

Airpower theorist Giulio Douhet wrote in 1921 that “it is easier 

and more effective to destroy the enemy’s aerial power by destroying 

his nests and eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the 

air.”6 This idea is captured in Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air 

Force Basic Doctrine: “Air and space power is most vulnerable on the 

ground. Thus, force protection is an integral part of air- and space 

power employment.”7 In 2015, RAND Corporation released a study 

on air base attacks, which concluded that air base threats, including 

new missile technology and ground attacks, will greatly affect air 

operations in the future. RAND prophesized the “end of the era of air 

base sanctuary”—launching air operations from relatively safe air 

bases will become a thing of the past. Additionally, RAND provided 

a critique of how the Air Force approaches base defense and recovery 
INTRODUCTION

xx

issues: “Too often, base defense and recovery are treated as support 

functions to be delegated to security forces and civil engineers. Although base and wing commanders take base defense seriously, it has 

not been a priority for the institutional air force, primarily because it 

has not been conceptualized as a core warfighting problem.”8

Commanders can create truly synchronized base defense efforts 

by fostering organizational constructs and leaders that rapidly adapt 

to the operational environment and threat. Establishing a successful 

and effective base defense posture relies on a proactive base security 

system focused on the full spectrum of threats to operations. Commanders can only do so if they utilize all available assets, especially 

joint, coalition, and host-nation partners. Joint and combined integration of base defense forces is therefore critical to this effort. It can 

only be accomplished if responsibilities for the defense are well understood and supported by all commanders and backed by a robust 

and regularly tested command-and-control system. It is also a function of the organizational culture and expectations for each Airman, 

as well as joint and coalition force partners on the installation. The 

goal is to create a sort of muscle memory for the installation in implementing the defense through exercise repetition, tabletop exercises, 

and continuous improvement. The same concepts that are foundational to airmanship and air-mindedness are foundational to ID. The 

Australian Air Power Development Centre said it best when it observed, “By virtue of the multi-dimensionality of air forces, airmen 

think differently and, therefore, are more likely to find alternative 

solutions to problems.”9 Air-mindedness lends itself to innovation 

and that same spirit and focus should enable the defense of an air 

base. Commanders and leaders do not need to learn all the skill sets 

found in security forces (SF) or military police; instead, they need to 

understand the basics of ID, shape their unit’s role in it, and tap into 

the military decision-making and risk-management skills the Air 

Force or Space Force has already given them.

As leaders reflect on the successes and failures of USAF operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan and a renewed focus takes hold on the threat 

of emerging peer competitors, there must be a holistic debate and 

discussion on air base defense. Additionally, we must be cognizant of 

growing threats in the homeland, which include insider threats as 

well as self-radicalized terrorists. Therefore, this volume in the Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency series puts forth 10 guiding 

principles for commanders and leaders to consider in leading base 
INTRODUCTION

xxi

defense. Additionally, while the title of this book series addresses insurgency, it also includes many direct lessons and historical accounts 

regarding peer competitors that will inform your base defense regardless of the adversary. The authors and contributors who shaped 

these propositions hope this material will provide a starting point for 

improving the intellectual understanding of the complexity of defending air bases in the modern era and challenges brought forth by 

threats empowered by the proliferation of technology.

Notes

1. Starr, Lawrence, and Sterling, “ISAF: Insurgents in Deadly Attack.”

2. Amos, Memorandum for record, Accountability Determination of US Commanders for the 14–15 September 2012 Attack.

3. Elliott and Elliott, Documents of an Elite Viet Cong Delta Unit, 38.

4. Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, 68.

5. In October 2019, Gen David Goldfein, the US Air Force Chief of Staff, designated 2020 the year of “Integrated Base Defense,” which may well indicate a return to 

this term vice integrated defense (ID) as the preferred nomenclature. Delgado, 

“CSAF Charts Air Force Defender Way Forward.”

6. Douhet, The Command of the Air, 53–54.

7. US Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 1, 34.

8. Vick, Air Base Attacks and Defensive Counters, 64.

9. Royal Australian Air Force Air Power Development Centre, “What Is Airmindedness?”

xxiii

Ten Base Defense Principles for Commanders

1. You Own It!

2. Get Left of the Boom: Deter, Disrupt, Deceive

3. Influence the Base Security Zone . . . or Someone Else Will

4. Unity of Effort: Synchronize the Fight

5. Everyone Must Have a Role in the Base Defense .  .  . and

Play It!

6. Intelligence Drives Maneuver: A Joint-Interagency Approach 

Is Critical

7. Air-mindedness Includes Using Air Assets for Base Defense

8. Law Enforcement Skills Are Critical to Base Defense and

Irregular Warfare

9. Manage the Risk: Commit Intellectual Capital to the Fight

10. Nowhere to Hide: Anticipate Future Threats and Develop 

Countermeasures

Chapter 1

You Own It!

The Camp Bastion attacks illustrate how difficult base defense can 

be in a complex, coalition environment. The attack on US Marine 

Corps aircraft and personnel fell in the British base defense sector. 

Despite an integrated and robust command, control, and communications capability with American and British representation, the base 

lacked integrated defense in depth, adequate force protection engineering (physical barriers), manned security towers, static security 

posts and machinegun positions, and ground defense sensors to provide warning of a sector penetration.1

Figure 2. Overhead shot of Camp Bastion where attackers split into 

three teams (A, B, C). Other than two metal fences, there was nothing to impede the attack (i.e., no defense in depth). (Source: Air Combat 

Command base attack video series, 2015.)
2  │ YOU OWN IT!

Regardless of British responsibilities, two US Marine Corps general officers were relieved because they did not ensure the safety of 

their aircraft. The US Marine flying squadron commander died with 

his aircraft. In the British Parliament’s House of Commons report on 

the attack, members observed that “no one was actually doing any 

guarding” from the perimeter to the aircraft—a wide open door the 

enemy exploited.2 After an inquiry, one British politician put it 

bluntly: “That is the sticking point. . . . We (UK) manned the perimeter, but the Americans lost their jobs.”3

 In short, regardless of the 

division of labor for security, if your aircraft, assets, or people suffer 

from an attack, you still own the results. Complacency and blind collegiality kill.

Figure 3. Notional defense-in-depth schematic (Source: Air War College, Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency, Spring Elective, 2016)

Key

RPA: remotely piloted aircraft
YOU OWN IT! │  3

From wing commanders to noncommissioned officers on combat 

patrol, all Airmen need to be connected and understand their part in 

the base defense mission and the plan for a defense in depth that protects the most critical mission assets (see fig. 3). Ultimately, the commander must be personally involved and engaged in developing and 

implementing an effective base defense effort. Commanders need to 

create an organizational climate that builds and values learning organizations that thrive by challenging assumptions, taking the initiative 

in building partnerships, and proactively engaging the local population and friendly forces in the operational environment surrounding 

its air bases. Investing in our intellectual capital is the way forward to 

creating a “thinking” force that will be quicker to adapt to new enemy 

tactics. It is not enough to know the science (i.e., interlocking fields of 

fire, blast mitigation, risk management, physical barriers, etc.) and 

the art (commander’s estimate, information operations, tactical deception, etc.) of base defense. One must also learn the nonkinetic actions 

that can often deter, dissuade, disrupt, or disable enemy operations in 

the base security zone.

Invest time: Have key leaders provide an overview of the ID and 

gauge whether your subordinate commands and tenant units comprehend, accept, and buy in to their role in it. Conduct tabletop exercises, 

execute an unscheduled recall exercise, and gauge your emergency 

operations center (EOC) response to a mass casualty exercise. These 

scenarios will build quick foundational understanding of the capabilities and plans of your Defense Force and EOC. Learn basic law 

enforcement processes by having SF pull you over, conduct a field 

interview, apprehend you, and then transport you for processing in a 

detention cell. In the wake of the George Floyd and Freddy Gray cases 

(where African-Americans were wrongfully killed while in police 

custody)4 and other recent law enforcement controversies, it is imperative commanders understand the apprehension process used by 

SF and Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) agents on 

their behalf. As the “mayor” of your base or unit, you will quickly 

learn the protocols used for officer safety and the physical environment of a detainee. Ultimately, you need to know these details, because 

each security and law enforcement process is designed to preserve 

good order and discipline, base security, and, ultimately, your mission.

Finally, with the exception of the Camp Bastion attack, the US 

military has been largely successful in protecting its aircraft and people during the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the 2020 
4  │ YOU OWN IT!

attacks on a Kenyan airfield underscore the importance of consistency in applying sound base defense practices. Poor US and Kenyan 

air base defense led to a successful attack by al-Shabab forces on 5 

January 2020, which resulted in the deaths of three Americans and 

the destruction of six aircraft. Gen Stephen J. Townsend, USA, commander, United States Africa Command, said, “We weren’t as prepared, and we’re digging in to find out why that is the case.”5

Notes

1. Garrett and Murray, Enclosure 3, Executive Summary of the Army Regulation 

(AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14–15 September 2012 Attack on Camp Bastion, 

Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (hereafter Executive Summary), 7–8.

2. British Parliament, Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack, vol 2, EV-13.

3. British Parliament, EV-24.

4. Deliso, “Timeline: The Impact of George Floyd’s Death”; and Woods and 

Pankhania, “Baltimore Timeline.”

5. Everstine, “AFRICOM: U.S. Forces Were Not Prepared.”
Chapter 2

Get Left of the Boom:

Deter, Disrupt, Deceive

In May 2006, six homegrown, but foreign-born, self-radicalized 

extremists were arrested for plotting an attack on Soldiers at Fort Dix, 

New Jersey, an Army training site. The would-be attackers filmed 

themselves conducting firearms training and took the footage to a 

video store to switch the format to DVD. The recording showed the 

men calling for jihad, or holy war, against the United States and 

shouting “God is great” in Arabic. Luckily, the video store attendant 

informed the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) about the contents of the videotape; the FBI then infiltrated the group and arrested 

them before they could conduct the attack.

However, largely underreported is the fact that the perpetrators 

discussed a total of nine potential US military targets in the US homeland. According to the indictment, the group surveilled five installations: in addition to Fort Dix, they profiled Dover Air Force Base, 

Delaware; Fort Monmouth and Lakehurst Naval Air Station, both in 

New Jersey; and the US Coast Guard building in Philadelphia.1 The 

conspirators also noted potential attacks against Naval Station Philadelphia and the “nearby air force base,” which likely referred to McGuire Air Force Base, located adjacent to Fort Dix (now known as the 

consolidated Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst).2 As they narrowed 

their focus on Fort Dix, they discussed attacking critical infrastructure including the base electrical grid to “cause a power outage and 

allow for an easier attack of the military personnel there.”3

The group also developed future plans for high-profile targets, including attacking the Army-Navy game participants in naval billeting 

or potentially at the game itself held at Lincoln Field in Philadelphia. 

They discussed the possibility of sinking US naval vessels while 

docked at the Port of Philadelphia. As they narrowed their search to 

the five potential targets for surveillance, they repeatedly videotaped 

the perimeters of the bases. For example, the conspirators surveilled 

Dover Air Force Base security operations and physical security and 

determined it “was too difficult of a target because of its high security.”4

Your defensive posture can create the “Dover Effect” by establishing 

observable and continuously changing security routines. The goal is 
6  │ GET LEFT OF THE BOOM

to affect the decision cycle of a determined enemy by forcing him to 

choose a more appealing and certain target.

Figure 4. The “Dover Effect”: learning the deterrent effect of security 

from the Fort Dix Case Study.

The group eventually selected Fort Dix as its primary target because one member had access to the base through his father’s pizza 

delivery business, which gave them more certainty on targeting and 

base security routines. Serdar Tatar’s father owned Super Mario’s restaurant, which made deliveries to both Fort Dix and McGuire Air 

Force Base. Significantly, Tatar was able to acquire a map of Fort Dix, 
GET LEFT OF THE BOOM │  7

labeled “Cantonment Area Fort Dix, NJ,” which helped the conspirators target personnel and facilities. The group also believed that the 

massing of Soldiers during training events would provide easy targets 

because they gained intelligence that the Soldiers often trained without ammunition.

The attackers estimated that a group of six or seven people could 

kill 100 unarmed Soldiers. One conspirator commented, “My intent 

is to hit a heavy concentration of soldiers”—a prospect that seemed 

possible at Fort Dix given their surveillance and knowledge of the 

installation.5 Their goals were “to kill as many American soldiers as 

possible” by procuring mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and machine guns.6

Attacking unarmed personnel in a training environment is not a 

new idea. On 9 October 2002, one US Marine was killed and another 

was wounded after two gunmen infiltrated a military training exercise 

on Failaka Island in the Persian Gulf near Kuwait City.7 Two Kuwaiti 

radicals, deemed terrorists by the Kuwaiti government, used AK-47 

automatic rifles to attack Marines who were training with blank 

rounds. On a smaller scale, the Failaka Island attack parallels the plan 

of the Fort Dix conspirators. For commanders with training missions, these two scenarios provide compelling reasons to examine the 

force protection arrangements for training sites with massed forces.

Information is power. The goal is to “get left of the attack” or proverbial boom (influencing or defeating an attack before it can begin 

by gaining the advantage through intelligence; see fig. 1). Law enforcement and intelligence partnerships are critical and can only be 

realized by fostering relationships that build trust and therefore lend 

themselves to information sharing. Stateside, commanders need to 

ensure liaison with state and local law enforcement, major urban area 

fusion centers (threat and warning intelligence), and the FBI’s Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). The JTTF provides valuable conduits 

for sharing vital homeland security information and countering domestic terrorism. Overseas, leaders must foster strong relationships 

with the host nation’s military leadership, intelligence, and SF, as well 

as local officials and coalition forces, to ensure threat intelligence is 

shared in a timely manner, trends are analyzed, and action is taken in 

the battlespace to deter enemy action or aggressive protestor activity.

In parallel with random antiterrorism measures (RAM), installations must develop military deception plans to moderate the risk to 

personnel and potential for materiel losses during an air base’s transition 
8  │ GET LEFT OF THE BOOM

Figure 5. Fort Dix Six: Targeting Military Trainees, Air Force Incident 

Management Course, Maxwell Air Force Base, 2015. (Reference: US 

Army Training and Doctrine Command, Handbook No. 1: A Military 

Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century [Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

TRADOC, 15 August 2007], https://apps.dtic.mil.)
GET LEFT OF THE BOOM │  9

to or execution of contingency operations. The goal of deception operations is “to deter hostile actions, increase the success of friendly 

defensive actions, or to improve the success of any potential friendly 

offensive action.”8 Examine the security posture your base projects 

along your perimeter and provide a constantly changing and observable 

security presence. Stagnation in creativity and an unchanging security routine provide the enemy confidence that your installation is a 

soft and predictable target. Influence the enemy’s decision cycle so 

they shop for another target—control what you can control. Ensure 

your commanders at all levels are overseeing a robust operational security program in support of your RAMs and military deception 

plans. In short, lead your version of the “Dover Effect” through active, intellectual engagement and by challenging the status quo.

Notes

1. United States of America vs. Dritan Duka.

2. United States of America vs. Dritan Duka.

3. United States of America vs. Dritan Duka.

4. United States of America vs. Dritan Duka.

5. United States of America vs. Dritan Duka.

6. United States of America vs. Dritan Duka.

7. Schmitt, “Threats and Responses: Skirmish.”

8. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13.4, Military Deception.

Chapter 3

Influence the Base Security Zone

. . . or Someone Else Will

Airmen should properly frame the operational environment of the 

area adjoining the base boundary to gain an understanding of the 

power brokers, key influencers, and potential threats in the battlespace. Some operating locations will have a clearly delineated 

ground battlespace owner (BSO), as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. At other locations, it may be less clear, or an authoritative or 

capable battlespace owner may not exist. It is up to you, the commander, to fully engage in your force protection and base defense 

responsibilities so that you understand the players and threats in the 

base security zone (BSZ) (see fig. 6 below). You have considerable 

expertise available to help you create by using the expert advice you 

receive and relying on your intuition and judgment.

Understanding the BSZ is critical in both expeditionary and garrison operational environments. Airfields rarely operate as selfsustaining islands of security removed from threats and disruptions 

common to any other industrial area. Power, fuel, water, food, communications infrastructure, and an ample supply of workers are essential to running and maintaining an airfield. An airfield is a small 

part of a larger biosphere. The base (and its Airmen) represents an 

obvious and lucrative target for criminal elements, spies, terrorists, 

and insurgents. From an active base defense perspective, history has 

shown the overwhelming majority of attacks against airfields have 

been launched from “outside the wire” (i.e., improvised rockets, mortars, snipers, lasing incidents, etc.). This tendency is compounded by 

the vulnerability of aircraft to small arms and surface-to-air fire while 

operating in the approach and departure profiles of an active airfield. 

The widespread use and commercial availability of small unmanned 

aerial vehicles expand the threat envelope even further and allow any 

group to incorporate an air component into their operational plans. 

Understanding and, more importantly, shaping this environment are 

critical to installation commanders and for sortie generation.

Operating and coordinating throughout the BSZ (and beyond) 

provide the commander depth and knowledge and two critical luxuries: time and space. In an expeditionary environment, this may 
12  │ INFLUENCE THE BASE SECURITY ZONE

Figure 6. Base boundary considerations. (Reproduced from JP 3-10, 

Joint Security Operations in Theater, 13 November 2014, IV-3, http://

dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_10.pdf.)
INFLUENCE THE BASE SECURITY ZONE │  13

mean dedicating SF patrols to operate several miles outside of the 

installation to deny key terrain from an insurgent who is focused on 

rocketing an air base or attempting to shoot down a troop-laden C-17 

aircraft. In a main operating base in Europe or the homeland, it could 

mean ensuring your SF and AFOSI detachments are fully engaged 

with local law enforcement to protect off-base mass gatherings or 

sharing information on criminals and terrorists operating within the 

area (including helping you establish “no-go” areas for your Airmen). 

Regardless, your defense force requires continuous engagement with 

the local population surrounding the base; as a commander, you set 

this tone for engagement. In a more complex combat environment, a 

ground commander/BSO is clearly identified (a more detailed explanation and exploration of the BSO concept will be offered later). This 

commander usually has primary responsibility for interaction with 

the local populace and officials. If this is the case, Airmen should not 

write off their own involvement and should maintain some influence 

in the battlespace through a proactive and engaged approach. In 

many cases, aircraft operations (noise, lighting, etc.) could adversely 

affect the lives of those living within the BSZ, which, if not managed 

or addressed, could lead to grievances that undercut local support for 

air operations. Leaders must be made aware of how air operations 

affect the local community and take thoughtful steps to engage in 

constructive conversations that lead to the mitigation of concerns 

and grievances.

One case study highlights the need for continuous and adaptive 

engagement with forces in the battlespace. At the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, many observers in the press and politics 

lauded the initial British counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in 

southern Iraq as the template for victory the rest of the country. After 

the invasion of Iraq in 2003, British troops quickly adapted a peacekeeping model and began foot patrols of Basra, wearing regimental 

berets instead of helmets and driving unarmored vehicles. However, 

what was praised widely as the way forward disintegrated into a disastrous rout over time. As Shiite criminal and Mahdi Militia groups 

organized, British casualties began to mount. During a period in 

2006–2007, as much as 80 percent of recorded attacks in Iraq targeted 

British forces, which directly affected the political support for British 

action.1 This in turn caused the British government to press its military forces to quickly transfer security control to the Iraqi forces.
14  │ INFLUENCE THE BASE SECURITY ZONE

Over the course of a year, the British forces in Basra went from 

patrolling the streets from six main bases to withdrawing all forces to 

their contingency operating base at Basra Air Station. The net effect 

was to vacate the battlespace to the enemy, isolate and barricade the 

remaining British forces at one air base, and become a magnet for 

rockets and mortars. The lesson for US forces defending air bases is 

to stay engaged in the battlespace to maintain accurate intelligence, 

gain support of the populace, and leverage local authorities for the 

security of the installation. Basra is a cautionary example of how we 

should maintain the initiative in the battlespace and constantly adapt 

to the changing tactics of the enemy. In short, if the population is not 

safe, neither are you. The base must not be walled off from the local 

populace with no interest in or responsibility for their security situation or well being.

David Kilcullen’s seminal paper, “Twenty-eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” offers the following 

wisdom for success in COIN operations, all of which is applicable in 

the defense of air bases.

Whatever else you do, keep the initiative. In counterinsurgency, the initiative 

is everything. If the enemy is reacting to you, you control the environment. 

Provided you mobilize the population, you will win. If you are reacting to the 

enemy—even if you are killing or capturing him in large numbers—then he is 

controlling the environment and you will eventually lose. In counterinsurgency, the enemy initiates most attacks, targets you unexpectedly, and withdraws too fast for you to react. Do not be drawn into purely reactive operations: focus on the population, build your own solution, further your game 

plan, and fight the enemy only when he gets in the way. This gains and keeps 

the initiative.2

During the insurgency in Iraq, an Air Command and Staff College 

professor relayed a story about an Air Force major who was involved 

in a student seminar on COIN. When the professor asked the major 

why he lacked an enthusiasm for the topic of COIN, the major responded, “Why should I? My responsibility stops at the fence line.”3

This thinking is outdated and cedes operational control to the enemy 

and operational influence to a friendly force that may not have protection of the air base as a primary concern. In fact, a commander 

should generally look at a fence as nothing more than a legal demarcation of a boundary with generally no tactical or operational value 

beyond that of signage. Unless a fence is monitored (with sensors or 

cameras), observed, and integrated into an obstacle plan as part of 
INFLUENCE THE BASE SECURITY ZONE │  15

defense in depth, it offers little more than an element of deterrence—

but perhaps also a false sense of security. Moreover, there are COIN 

opportunities that can exist inside the confines of an airfield, for example hiring local workers, training host-nation forces, key leader 

engagements, countersurveillance operations, law enforcement raids 

in third-country national and contractor housing areas, and so on. 

Maj Gen Thomas H. Deale, USAF, retired, a three-time wing commander—twice in Afghanistan—emphasized the importance of 

thinking outside the fence line by stating, “You must understand the 

strategic and operational value of everything that is going on within 

your battlespace, even if you do not own it.”4

Notes

1. Ucko, “Lessons from Basra.”

2. Kilcullen, “Twenty-eight Articles.”

3. Air Command and Staff College Faculty discussion with Col Shannon W. 

Caudill, 2013.

4. Maj Gen Thomas H. Deale, interview, n.d.

Chapter 4

Unity of Effort:

Synchronize the Fight

Synchronization of base defense resources is central to mounting 

any successful defense strategy. It is especially important when defense forces comprise joint and coalition forces sharing a complex 

battlespace. Regardless of who owns the battlespace outside the air 

base perimeter, Airmen should establish themselves as reliable partners who bring forth their expertise and assets to play a positive role 

in supporting the ground BSO’s COIN or stability operations, because ultimately it helps flying operations by having a more secure 

and stable operating environment in the BSZ. The lessons learned in 

Iraq and Afghanistan provide templates for engagement and synchronization in the battlespace. It is important to accept that hostnation and coalition forces have different rules of engagement (some 

known and others hidden from partners) and American forces have 

different statutes and authorities that potentially limit their roles in 

combat operations. For instance, there will be a wide range of interpretations and guidance among coalition partners about warning 

shots, use (or nonuse) of less lethal technology, employment of military working dogs, an aerial “show of force,” and so forth. A successful synchronization effort takes into account all of these differences to 

distill the key areas in which unity of effort can be achieved. Seek 

understanding of partner capabilities and limitations, then act to incorporate them into the base defense to the level they are capable, 

willing, and authorized to participate.

At Joint Base Balad (JBB), for example, Airmen learned to leverage 

nonkinetic assets and operations to achieve lasting effects in support 

of the ground BSO’s COIN and stability campaign plans. The wing 

hosted biweekly COIN and civil-engagement synchronization meetings to ensure full support to the BSO from the Army, Air Force, and 

Department of State partners at JBB. Equally, the BSO embraced Air 

Force and other partner units as a means of realizing his overall campaign objectives along three decisive lines of operation: security, 

economic development, and governance. Five times per week, at a 

minimum, wing staff representatives, SF, operations group representatives, and joint intelligence support element (JISE) analysts met 
18  │ UNITY OF EFFORT

with the BSO and partner units to optimize coordination and information sharing. These meetings included synchronization of operations, targeting, reviewing intelligence fusion, evaluation of the BSO’s 

weekly effects summary, and the sharing of operational notes from 

numerous synchronization meetings at the field grade and company 

grade officer levels. For operators, this meant providing support such 

as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data on the locations of high-value individuals, sweeps over IDF hot spots, aerial 

monitoring of security for Iraqi election polls, and aerial show-offorce flights by F-16s over terrain from which IDF attacks frequently 

originated.

The BSO was responsible for synchronizing all friendly forces in 

the area of operations, which included conducting kinetic and nonkinetic actions, maintaining situational awareness of all forces, and 

controlling fire-support coordination measures. The BSO leveraged 

the capabilities of all coalition, host-nation, and other partner units, 

including nonmilitary entities such as the Department of State’s provincial reconstruction teams and nongovernmental organizations. 

Their accomplishments proved that, if properly synchronized, such 

mutually supporting operations create a symbiotic relationship and 

unity of effort, ultimately yielding a more efficient and effective use of 

resources. US Joint Forces Command noted that the BSOs are learning to take advantage of all available operational enablers: “Many joint 

players . . . operate in the battlespace owners’ areas of operation . . . . 

Battlespace owners are becoming increasingly more comfortable 

with these ‘non-assigned’ players in their battlespace.”1 For Airmen, 

the goal is to create a common operating picture and achieve a unity 

of effort that better protects the installation, establishes security and 

influence in the BSZ, and, ultimately, better protects flying operations 

to support the larger strategic mission. For instance, Task Force 1/455 

at Bagram, Afghanistan (commanded by an Airman), coordinated 

ground patrols and synchronized BSZ operations at key times to deter attacks when larger transport aircraft were being launched and 

recovered at the expeditionary airfield.

It is important to recognize that all operating bases in the BSO’s 

area of operations can have profound positive or negative secondand third-order effects across the operational environment. These 

include decisions that may appear confined to the base itself, whether 

they are air provost services (law and order operations), contracting, 

construction, or simply hosting a local children’s event. If such opera-
UNITY OF EFFORT │  19

tions and activities are poorly coordinated and if local national ties 

and perceptions are not clearly understood, they can undermine the 

BSO’s relationship with key local officials and adversely affect efforts 

along multiple lines of operation and effort. Major General Deale 

summarized by stating, “To be effective at base defense, you have to 

have an accurate/detailed perspective of the threat and mission environment as well as the organizational dynamics of friendly forces and 

the resources that will interact to effectively provide for the defense. 

You must integrate and synchronize your efforts with the greater battlespace commander. . . . You’re not just on your own.”2

Airmen should remember that the relationship with ground BSOs 

should be given a great deal of attention and care. Additionally, the 

BSO may change periodically, whether it is a new unit and commander rotating in from the same service or, as in the case of Tallil 

Air Base, Iraq, a completely new BSO appointed from a different coalition partner (both Romania and Italy were battlespace owners at 

this air base).3 Ultimately, the synchronization efforts demonstrated 

at JBB and elsewhere provide examples of how air bases can truly 

optimize battlespace effects among coalition and joint partners to improve the aerodrome operating environment.

Centralized control and decentralized execution are tenets of airpower.4

 Similarly, throughout history, the centralized control of air 

base defense forces has proven essential to effectively countering attacks on air bases. During the Tet Offensive on 30 January 1968, simultaneous multi-battalion-level attacks occurred at Bien Hoa and 

Tan Son Nhut Air Bases, Republic of South Vietnam.5 During these 

attacks, defenders relied heavily upon the installation’s centralized 

control of base defense to properly position responding forces to repel enemy attackers and mount counterattacks on enemy forces already inside the perimeter.

Proper command and control provided by a joint base defense operations center (JDOC) is essential to enable senior decision makers 

with overall situational awareness to properly direct and position 

friendly forces to counterattacks. Centralized control also prevents 

individual units (with good intentions) from responding to an event 

autonomously, leading to confusion and possibly fratricide and inadvertently subverting the efforts of another responding force. This lack 

of a coordinated response could also lead to gaps in the overall 

scheme of the defense. Centralized control of responding forces under 
20  │ UNITY OF EFFORT

the defense plan ensures a controlled response that preserves the integrity of the defensive scheme of maneuver.

JBB provides another example of centralizing base defense under 

one leader. From 2008 to 2011, the 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing 

organized its base defense assets under the JBB defense force commander (DFC), an Air Force SF colonel, who was responsible for ensuring BSZ security and integrated, joint base defense.6

 This group 

commander and his team worked tirelessly to leverage the joint assets 

operating in the vicinity of JBB to implement a collaborative approach with partner joint units and host-nation forces that would 

produce operational gains and “mitigate potential risks and defeat 

adversary threats to Air Force operations.”7

Furthermore, the DFC synchronized his ID operations through 

the JDOC, collocated with a BSO’s tactical operations center. The 

JDOC directed and integrated all subordinate security systems and 

communications elements, serving as a tactical integrator of both 

ground intelligence affecting the air base and guidance for BSO effects that drove the base defense effort. Maj Gen Brian Bishop, then 

the wing commander, emphasized this point by observing, “My defense force commander, Col John Decknick, understood the mission, 

laid foundational relationships with the Battlespace Owner and partners, and integrated our efforts to eliminate seams in the defense. As 

a result, the BSO was confident in our Airmen as they performed the 

outside-the-wire mission.”8

A truly joint team, JBB’s defense structure included tactical control 

of the counter-rocket, artillery, mortar (C-RAM) joint intercept battery. C-RAM Soldiers and Sailors were responsible for employing the 

system’s intercept, sense, respond, and warn capabilities, as a unique 

defense against enemy IDF attacks and as a localized warning to populated areas of the base.9

 Countless lives were saved simply by the 

alarm warning them to take cover several seconds before impact. 

Placing C-RAM under tactical command of the USAF DFC ensured 

the best possible integration of C-RAM capabilities into the overall 

physical security and force protection architecture of JBB and the 

counter-IDF plan. As the threat of terrorist and insurgent forces using precision munitions and RPVs grows, the US military will likely 

need a C-RAM-like system as a key enabler under one DFC.

Major General Bishop summarized the JBB base defense experience by stating, “My biggest take-away for base defense is the JDOC. 

You integrate everything through the JDOC: outside-the-wire opera-
UNITY OF EFFORT │  21

tions, air support through the JTACs [joint terminal attack controller], 

C-RAM, sensors, intelligence, etc. From the command perspective, I 

had a very high level of confidence in what the JDOC team was doing 

to protect the base.”10

Notes

1. Luck and Findlay, “Insights and Best Practices,” 5.

2. Deale, interview.

3. Maj Jeffery Becker, email correspondence with Col Shannon W. Caudill, 4 

May 2013.

4. USAF, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command, 37.

5. USAF, AFDD 1-1, Leadership and Force Development, 66–77.

6. USAF, Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 31-1, Integrated Defense, 8.

7. USAF, AFPD 31-1, 2.

8. Brian Bishop, interview, n.d.

9. US Army, “Army Programs: Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM).”

10. Bishop, interview.

Chapter 5

Everyone Must Have a Role in Base Defense

. . . and Play It!

Defending air bases, their requisite airpower assets, and joint personnel should be a mission in which all Airmen (and joint personnel) 

are invested and play an active role. Today, USAF doctrine emphasizes that everyone shares in the responsibility of the new ID concept. 

Air Force Doctrine Document 3-10, Force Protection, states, “Every 

Airman is a sensor, and protecting the force is everyone’s duty. All 

Airmen are responsible for force protection, whether reporting suspicious activity while engaged in their primary duties, augmenting 

base defense, or assisting in response to a natural disaster.”1

Despite the rhetoric, the USAF has not lived up to this bumper 

sticker slogan. For instance, unlike sister services at some operating 

bases in Iraq, Airmen stood out because they were not required to 

carry a personal weapon for their own protection, and the majority 

played no role in base defense. Moreover, on deployments, an Airman’s first stop upon arriving at an expeditionary airfield was often 

spent turning in their assigned weapon to an armory instead of maintaining it for personal protection or having it available for an ID role. 

Also fueling this disconnect was a propensity to contract security 

taskings to private firms. The prevailing thought was, if you have a 

security concern, simply write a check for more contractors—a concept that ultimately led to increased congressional scrutiny and legal 

challenges from use-of-force incidents that damaged relations with 

host-nation populations.2 But more importantly, the inclination to 

rely on contractors has denigrated or hindered the concept of Airmen becoming sensors and playing a role in base defense.

If Airmen are separated from any obligation to their own defense 

or that of defending the base they operate, there will be a price to pay 

down the line, either from an insider threat or direct attack by an 

enemy force. Indeed, it may take a calamity on the scale of what the 

British suffered in World War II to sort out the future of Air Force 

base defense. Dismayed at how few of his Royal Air Force personnel 

participated in the defense of British air bases on Crete from German 

air assault and their subsequent loss, British Prime Minister Winston 

Churchill lamented:
24  │ EVERYONE MUST HAVE A ROLE IN BASE DEFENSE

Every man in Air Force uniform ought to be armed with something—a rifle, 

a tommy-gun, a pistol. . . . Every airman should have his place in the defence 

scheme. . . . It must be understood by all ranks that they are expected to fight 

and die in the defence of their airfields.  .  . . The enormous mass of noncombatant personnel who look after the very few heroic pilots, who alone in 

ordinary circumstances do all the fighting, is an inherent difficulty in the organization of the Air Force. . . . Every airfield should be a stronghold of fighting air-groundmen, and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of 

life protected by detachments of soldiers.3

Base defense should be comprehensive and involve the entire military population in one form or another. This requires leaders who 

will confront complacency and challenge those in their command 

who disavow any responsibility for their own security. A positive example of how Airmen can play a constructive role in the defense 

comes from Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. In 2011, all Airmen were 

required to be armed and play a role in base defense and personal 

protection.4 In addition, the base was broken into defensive sectors, 

and each sector had smaller defensive strongholds. All joint personnel, not just SF, defended these internal sectors. Not only did this 

ensure a comprehensive defense, but it also enabled the limited number of SF and military police to focus their efforts on the perimeter, 

exterior avenues of approach to the base and their response to actual 

penetration attempts.

Future military operations will undoubtedly limit the use of contractors in base defense. This will necessitate the further integration 

of Airmen and all base personnel into the defensive scheme. As has 

been noted about the USAF’s ID doctrine, there is the intent of policy 

and doctrine and then there is the reality of how it is applied or rejected by the dominant organizational culture. The Marines have the 

motto that states, “Every Marine is a rifleman,” regardless of military 

specialty. If ID is to be truly transformative, it must evolve to the concept that “Every Airman is a Defender,” denoting an inherent obligation by Airmen to defend their joint and coalition partners, their 

aircraft and assigned sector, and themselves from an attack or insider 

threat. Major General Deale noted that “base defense is not just the 

defender’s activities; it has to be a defense in depth with all Airmen 

engaged.”5 Know your mission, know your operational environment, 

and ensure everyone under your command knows their responsibility in 

the defensive scheme.
EVERYONE MUST HAVE A ROLE IN BASE DEFENSE│  25

Notes

1. USAF, AFDD 3-10, Force Protection, 3.

2. Schwartz, The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors.

3. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 3, The Grand Alliance, 692–93.

4. Capt Lucas Hall, email correspondence with Col Shannon W. Caudill, 18 April 

2013.

5. Deale, interview.

Chapter 6

Intelligence Drives Maneuver:

A Joint-Interagency Approach Is Critical

The failure to commit adequate intelligence assets to air base defense can lead to spectacular and devastating attacks. The terrorist 

organization the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also 

known as the Tamil Tigers, made an audacious attack on the Bandaranaike International Airport and its adjoining Sri Lankan air force 

base. Using suicide squad tactics, they infiltrated the military runway 

through storm drains on 24 July 2001.1 Their attack destroyed or 

damaged 26 civilian and military aircraft and “revealed the weakness 

of strategic and tactical intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination, and review and, second, force protection. . . . There was no prioritization of intelligence gathering, projection, and sharing to erode 

the LTTE network.”2

USAF intelligence assets have historically emphasized air operations to the detriment of intelligence about ground-based defense 

threats—a situation that proved highly problematic in Vietnam. As 

the Office of Air Force History observed, “Hobbling external security 

[in Vietnam] was the lack of reliable intelligence on enemy activities 

within striking distance of bases. This arose chiefly from the Air 

Force’s failure to generate tactical ground intelligence.”3

Illustrating this point, Lt Col Kenton Miller, the 3rd Security Police Squadron Commander at Bien Hoa, noted in his after-action report after the Tet Offensive in January 1968:

The enemy regiment dressed in North Vietnamese Army (NVA) uniforms 

walked nine hours to reach the base. They walked past a 50,000 man US Army 

Camp (Long Bien Post), Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Ranger 

permanent installation, III Corp ARVN HQ, 101st US Division base camp, 

staged in a village 200 yards off base, proceeded by two ARVN ambush sites, 

past two ARVN outposts on the base perimeter, over three base perimeter 

fences, through the minefield, and remained undetected until observed by a 

USAF Security Police K-9 team.4

In contrast to bases in Vietnam, JBB enjoyed a true commitment 

of intelligence assets for base defense. To remedy historical shortfalls 

in ground intelligence analysis, the 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing at 

JBB stood up a dedicated, ground-focused, force-protection intelligence 
28  │ INTELLIGENCE DRIVES MANEUVER

organization in November 2008 modeled after the joint intelligence 

cell template operated by the previous Army DFC.5 Led and manned 

by USAF ISR professionals, the JISE received augmentation from 

contracted intelligence analysts focused on ground threats and the 

BSZ. Robust ground intelligence operations fully enabled Army and 

Air Force ground forces to defend JBB through proactive deterrent 

patrols, surveillance, and data analysis for terrain which IDF tended 

to originate.

The BSO fully leveraged USAF intelligence analysis and capacity 

to create synergy with his own intelligence staff, thereby optimizing 

the JISE’s capabilities. This completely synchronized effort supported 

intelligence fusion designed to drive defense operations in the BSZ. 

The JISE’s goal of attaining predictive battlespace awareness required 

foreknowledge and the ability to shape operations based not only on 

reviewing the enemy’s past actions but also on predicting actions the 

enemy would likely take in the future. Classic approaches to intelligence based on analyses of historical trends tend to drive a defense 

posture that responds after attacks occur. In those paradigms, ground 

forces are no more than “shot responders” in a counter-IDF fight, essentially sweeping for the enemy in the location from which the IDF 

round came, as indicated by radar and spotter reports. This reactive 

approach became a frustrating exercise comparable to a game of 

“whack-a-mole,” chasing the enemy around the battlespace without 

generating any lasting effects with the commitment of a great deal of 

energy and resources with little to show for it.

The JISE’s analysis led to an intelligence-driven targeting process 

that enabled Air Force SF to move from a mostly reactive defensive 

posture to a proactive scheme of maneuver. Lasting effects of this 

strategy require dominance of the human terrain within and outside 

an installation as well as understanding the relationships among key 

groups, tribes, and individuals. This reality drove Airmen to study 

and gain insights into the violent extremist networks operating in the 

area and to participate actively in mapping and pressuring these networks through a constant presence. Both AFOSI and SF Airmen fed 

the intelligence cycle by gathering information from relationships 

they had established in the battlespace, thereby closing the intelligence gap between themselves and the enemy network.

Joint ID operations adopted an intelligence-driven model that followed four lines of operation based on JISE analysis: (1) denying the 

enemy unobserved freedom of movement, particularly in traditional 
INTELLIGENCE DRIVES MANEUVER │  29

attack locations; (2) mapping out insurgent networks and identifying 

key leaders, weapons facilitators, and support nodes; (3) establishing 

patterns of life (e.g., determine who met with whom, when and where 

they met, and how they moved, shot, and communicated); and (4) 

mapping out the human terrain to discover fault lines among locals 

who hate the coalition, those who grudgingly tolerate but do little to 

help coalition forces, and, finally, those who might be willing to support efforts to secure the installation and the area surrounding it.

This effort prompted the development of an intelligence-collection 

plan and operational framework that cycled over a two-week period, 

maximizing the existing ground combat power. Additionally, intelligence analysis of historical data produced a strategy that denied the 

enemy access to his favored locations for launching attacks during 

the most likely times for hostile activities. Each intelligence objective 

had a list of subobjectives for signals intelligence resources, a similar 

list for airborne ISR resources, and so forth, including one for SF Airmen during their combat patrols.

Importantly, the Air Force’s most recent irregular warfare doctrine 

recognized some of the positive lessons of JBB, Iraq. These included 

the intelligence synergy achieved by noting Airmen “coordinated 

closely with the battlespace owner (US Army) to ensure information 

sharing and the seams in the defense were covered.” The wing leveraged “existing human networks to gauge US COIN efforts at various 

mass gatherings in and around the base boundary . . . [and] combined COIN and HUMINT [human intelligence] efforts of the entire 

332nd Air Expeditionary Wing [which] resulted in an overall decrease of indirect fire attacks against the base by more than 50 

percent.”6 Finally, the lessons learned from Iraq have application to 

home station as well. A commander must develop informationsharing processes and strengthen ties with local officials on a wide 

range of activities such as enhancing an installation’s Eagle Eyes program, encouraging emergency response partnerships, and participating in regularly scheduled forums between installation, local, state, 

and federal law enforcement agencies. These meetings are likely already taking place; as a commander you need to be involved, or at 

least informed. Ultimately, commanders must understand the intelligence tools available to them, drive analysts toward useful products 

and analysis, and stay engaged in the intelligence process (see fig. 7 

below) so that timely changes can be made to the defensive posture of 

the installation to meet the changing nature of the threat.
30  │ INTELLIGENCE DRIVES MANEUVER

Figure 7. Intelligence process. (Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence, Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, 22 October 2013, I-6, https://www.jcs.mil.)

Notes

1. Gunaratna, “Intelligence Failures Exposed.”

2. Gunaratna.

3. Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, 171.

4. Miller, 3rd SPS Ground Defense Lessons Learned, 6.

5. Col Timothy Farrell, email correspondence with Col Shannon W. Caudill, 4 

May 2013.

6. USAF, AFDD 3-2, Irregular Warfare, 34.
Chapter 7

Air-mindedness Includes Using Air 

Assets for Base Defense

Leveraging air assets directly enables base defense. Vietnam 

showed the utility of gunship, ground attack, and helicopter employment in deterring and repelling enemy ground attacks from the air. 

In Iraq from 2008 to 2012, JBB’s base defense effort integrated and 

incorporated air assets into its defensive scheme. JBB utilized JTACs 

as needed to support the base defense by requesting air support. Additionally, the wing fostered a collaborative atmosphere among many 

joint players who provided aerial support to the defense mission on 

largely an ad hoc and volunteer basis.

Through the standard air tasking order and collection-management 

processes, the JISE obtained regular Global Hawk and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) geospatial products as 

well as nationally derived intelligence products delivered through the 

combined air operations center’s (CAOC) forward-deployed Air 

Force National Tactical Integration Cell. Despite the usefulness of 

these planned ISR assets, they were dwarfed by contributions of the 

expeditionary operations group and Army aviation units, both fixed 

and rotary wing, which delivered countless hours of “residual” ISR. 

To realize the most value from planned and residual airborne assets, 

the JISE had to produce, execute, and assess a comprehensive collection plan.

The JISE was effective at pulling together disparate units to reach a 

commonly desired end state: protecting their own people from IDF 

attacks. Because of the absence of an insurgent air threat and very few 

opportunities to strike targets kinetically, pilots and air planners welcomed the opportunity to fly residual ISR to protect the base, using 

their remaining fuel and loiter time after completing their primary 

missions. Members of the operations group collected intelligence, 

logging hundreds of hours as they followed insurgent leaders to 

meetings at all times of the day and night, and Army aviation units 

loitered at a distance, capturing imagery of insurgents’ patterns of life. 

The JISE orchestrated a collection plan adaptable to residual flight 

schedules to piece together persistent ISR 15- to 60-minute time 
32  │ AIR-MINDEDNESS INCLUDES USING AIR ASSETS FOR BASE DEFENSE

intervals—the length of time that a residual asset would make itself 

available for the local ISR effort.

The JISE collection coordinator produced a daily collection plan 

known as the “residual deck.” For each collection target, the plan included specific elements of information needed by JISE analysts to fill 

gaps in their knowledge of the target, the target’s activities, and insurgent networks associated with the target. JISE partner analysts supplied crucial information about the activity patterns of each target by 

maintaining this information on a simple spreadsheet compiled each 

week. Planning also factored in predictable attack patterns of the enemy that took advantage of sandstorms, rain, and the moon’s cycle. 

Given the nature of the Iraqi insurgency, successful ISR operations 

had to include ground-based collection by patrols in close contact 

with high-value individuals and the populace surrounding them.

Another example comes from Afghanistan. In 2010, at Bagram Air 

Base, synchronization and collaboration of available air assets included Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), F-16 and F-15 

fighter aircraft, AH-64 attack helicopters, OH-58 observation helicopters, and Scan Eagle UAVs, which enhanced battlespace awareness 

and helped senior decision makers deconflict priorities to maximize 

available resources and properly position responding forces from the 

JDOC. Drawing on his experience as a wing commander in Afghanistan, Major General Deale said, “There is an ‘air-minded’ approach to 

air base defense; it is not just a large forward operating base to defend. Airmen need to ensure that defense of an air base goes well 

beyond perimeter security, including defending the mission by addressing the SAM [surface-to-air missile] threat and approach corridors—

integrating military deception and other innovative methods to assure the continuity of air operations.”1

In the case of Bagram, despite the complexity of air operations 

(with sorties launching around the clock), the wing leadership 

understood the value of flying ISR assets in support of base defense. 

The 455th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron (ESFS) coordinated an “operations box” where they could fly organic Raven-B assets or 

launch Scan Eagle ISR platforms to support ground-based Air Force 

SF patrols or conduct independent area sweeps. In addition, despite 

the incredibly busy traffic pattern, the Mission Support and Operations Group commanders analyzed the air traffic pattern and historical 

base attack windows and locations and permanently employed an 
AIR-MINDEDNESS INCLUDES USING AIR ASSETS FOR BASE DEFENSE │  33

aerostat “persistent threat detection system” aloft to provide ground 

maneuver forces a tactical edge.2

As displayed by vignettes from Iraq and Afghanistan base defense 

techniques, air assets can play an important role in the defensive 

scheme. Ultimately, prior coordination and synchronization of combat aircraft into the base defense scheme enabled US aircraft providing close air support capability to kill insurgents outside the wire, 

including those who were too close to the perimeter wall to be observed and engaged by SF personnel at tower positions on the base 

perimeter. Airmen must bring all their skill sets to the table to defend 

the air base, not trap themselves in one-dimensional thinking about 

ground threats. In short, air-mindedness is a framework for base defense operations.

Notes

1. Deale, interview.

2. Observations, Col Erik Rundquist, 455 EMSG/CC and TF 1/455 Commander 

Bagram, Afghanistan, 2011–2012.

Chapter 8

Law Enforcement Skills Are Critical

to Base Defense and Irregular Warfare

Conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in an increased 

demand for law-and-order capability and revalidated the importance 

of basic law enforcement skills within the ID construct. After the 

merger of the law enforcement and security missions within the SF 

career field in the mid-1990s, SF underestimated the future requirements for law enforcement capability in base defense operations and 

irregular warfare. Subsequently, law enforcement skills deteriorated 

after the first Gulf War. High demand for this capability in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom validated law enforcement as an important contributor to COIN operations and base 

defense. Law enforcement supports the nine stated desired effects of 

ID by aiding deterrence, detection, assessing, warning, defeating, delaying, defending, and recovery operations (refer to fig. 1).1

Law enforcement operations ensure public safety and good order 

and discipline and, importantly, enable intelligence activities through 

the investigation, tracking, and analysis of criminal activities on and 

off the installation. Law enforcement personnel play an important 

role in deterring crime, instituting theft prevention, ensuring traffic 

safety, conducting detainee operations, supporting security, and establishing local police force liaison. Air bases in combat zones are not 

US-only installations. Force structure caps and host-nation limitations mean heavy reliance on coalition, contractor, host-nation, and 

foreign national support. Theft of coalition supplies and materials by 

local nationals, contractors, friendly forces, or foreign nationals 

working inside the perimeter can affect the outcome of insurgent attacks outside the wire. In addition, black markets materialize, which 

can undercut good order and discipline, encourage the pilfering of 

supplies, and even lead to the sale of weapons by contractors and others 

that may enable the enemy. In short, police investigations give base 

leadership a deeper understanding of the nexus between criminal 

elements and potential terrorists and insider threats, which feeds intelligence activities supporting base defense.

Two modern examples show how the interconnection between 

criminal activity and terrorist groups can enable anticoalition forces. 
36  │ LAW ENFORCEMENT SKILLS ARE CRITICAL

In one, illegal arms sales in the International Zone in Baghdad threatened internal security and provided enablers to insurgent groups and 

criminal elements in 2006.2 Another example is from JBB, Iraq, in 

2009, where investigators discovered a black market fuel theft operation that was fed by a supporting network of illegal fueling points off 

the installation, potentially funding groups who were attacking the 

base.3 The fuel was stolen on base by contractors, transferred off the 

installation, and sold for a profit. Both case studies illustrate that bases 

are ultimately porous because some trusted elements with access will 

use that access for nefarious purposes. Active and skilled law enforcement professionals provide the means necessary to identify the gaps 

and seams in the defense that would otherwise go undetected.

The need for law enforcement expertise is often overlooked, but 

history captures its necessity. In World War II, Gen William Tunner 

found himself struggling to resupply Chinese and American forces 

over the famed Hump: the Himalayan Mountains. The operational 

demands of this mission were extreme, but the pilferage of food and 

other supplies by indigenous workers became a true mission impediment. Tunner’s leaders quickly adapted to this internal mission threat 

and created a police force to combat the theft. General Tunner described the effort:

Our base at Barrackpore north of Calcutta was patrolled by one of the most 

unique police forces in the Army Air Force—a group of 259 Indians recruited 

from pension policemen, veteran soldiers, and retired Indian army officers. 

They were divided into four companies, one composed of Ghurkas, one of 

Sikhs, one of Pathans, and one of Hindus, each under the command of an 

American enlisted man. The American noncoms conscientiously studied the 

religion, customs, and language of the men in their companies, and could give 

them a verbal pat on the back—or chew them out—in their own language. 

Petty thievery decreased noticeably after the Indians began patrolling the beat.4

Effective law enforcement operations deny enemies and their support networks the ability to pilfer supplies and materials. Moreover, 

such operations allow coalition forces to concentrate on the mission. 

Law enforcement closes important avenues of ingress and egress used 

by smugglers and thieves and denies the enemy the ability to exploit 

these porous avenues of base access.

The stresses of combat can create an environment rich in problems 

like physical and sexual assault, vehicle accidents, and dereliction of 

duty, all of which can poison unit cohesion, dampen mission focus, 

and sap military strength. Ultimately, a well-organized law enforce-
LAW ENFORCEMENT SKILLS ARE CRITICAL │  37

ment effort will preserve and protect your mission, enable your understanding of the physical and human terrain in your area of operation, 

and illuminate how criminal networks operate in your backyard.

Additionally, strong law enforcement patrolling and community 

relationships are central to effective deterrence and response, especially with the growing threat of lone-wolf and self-radicalized terrorist attacks in the United States. In May 2016, Islamic State–linked 

hackers released photographs and addresses of 70 US Air Force pilots 

and military members in the hope that sympathizers and selfradicalized terrorists would materialize to attack them.5

 In June 2016, 

intelligence agencies reported that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 

(ISIS) had collected information on 77 US and NATO air force bases 

and had called on supporters to attack these locations.6 A strong force 

protection plan goes beyond the physical boundaries of the installation and focuses on prudent security steps for individuals and families 

off the installation as well—where many can be targeted more easily.

Airmen often forget that the Air Force was the victim of a lone 

gunman attack in 1994 when a former Airman, discharged for mental health issues, returned to the base hospital to exact his revenge.7

Dean A. Mellberg killed five people and wounded 23 at Fairchild Air 

Force Base’s hospital. His initial attack focused on fatally shooting his 

psychiatrist and a psychologist, but he then turned his wrath on other 

hospital personnel and patients, killing an 8-year-old girl, wounding 

two toddlers, and killing the elderly spouse of a retiree.8 No one was 

safe. Thankfully, an SF bike patrolman stopped Mellberg by confronting him outside the hospital and fatally shooting him before he could 

move to another facility to continue the attack. Regardless of the motivation, there are real and growing threats to air bases that require 

vigilance, preparation, exercises, and joint planning with local law 

enforcement.

Finally, greater coordination between the military and law enforcement is needed with the increasing political radicalization of 

veterans, law enforcement members, and, yes, active duty. There have 

been many instances of this phenomenon in recent years, but two are 

worth highlighting: (1) an Air Force sergeant killed a law enforcement officer as part of the radical antigovernment Boogaloo movement 

in 2020,9 and (2) the 2021 Capitol Hill insurrection (1 in 5 of the defendants charged had military experience).10 Table 1 shows the increasing lethality of individuals or small groups in attacking soft targets.
38  │ LAW ENFORCEMENT SKILLS ARE CRITICAL

Table 1. Notable soft target attacks

Incident Year No. 

Attackers

Weapon

types

No. 

Killed

No. 

Injured

Las Vegas Music

Festival, NV 2017 1 Rifles 58 413

Orlando Night Club, FL 2016 1 Rifle, pistols 49 54

Inland Regional Center, 

San Bernardino, CA 2015 2 Rifles, pistols 14 22

Sandy Hook Elementary School, Newtown, 

CT

2015 1 Rifle, pistols 26 2

Movie Theater, Aurora, 

CO 2012 1

Rifle, shotgun, 

handgun, 

teargas

12 70

22/7 Oslo & Utoeya 

Island, Norway 2011 1

Rifle, improvised explosive device 

(IED)

77 33

Mumbai Attacks, India 2008 10

automatic 

weapons, 

grenades

173 308

Virginia Tech University, Blacksburg, VA 2007 1 handguns 33 23

Beslan School, Beslan, 

Russia 2004 32

automatic 

weapons, 

IEDs, rocketpropelled 

grenades

385 100+

Columbine High 

School, Littleton, CO 1999 2

handguns, 

shotguns, 99 

small IEDs

15 24

Fairchild AFB, Spokane, WA 1994 1 rifle 4 23

(Source: Air Force Incident Management Course, Maxwell Air Force Base, 2016. Note: This is not a comprehensive list of every incident but rather a sampling that shows a variety of soft targets and their outcomes.)

Notes

1. USAF, AFPD 31-1, Integrated Defense, 3.

2. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to Congress, 

183; and Dahl, “Summary Report of Det 3, 732 ESFS, Mission Accomplishments.”

3. Lt Col Keith McCormack, interview and email correspondence, 8 April 2013.

4. Tunner, Over the Hump, 96.

5. Pawlyk, “ISIS-linked Hackers Claim to Release Personal Information.”
LAW ENFORCEMENT SKILLS ARE CRITICAL │  39

6. Handcocks, “ISIS Threat to US Air Bases.”

7. “An Airman’s Revenge: 5 Minutes of Terror.”

8. “An Airman’s Revenge: 5 Minutes of Terror.”

9. MacFarquhar and Gibbons-Neff, “Air Force Sergeant with Ties to Extremist 

Group Charged.”

10. Dreisbach and Anderson, “Nearly 1 In 5 Defendants in Capitol Riot Cases 

Served in the Military.”

Chapter 9

Manage the Risk:

Commit Intellectual Capital to the Fight

Ground combat and base defense operations, dynamic activities 

with infinite variables (threats) and finite resources, provide opportunities for you to lead. For commanders, the Air Force has moved 

away from being overly proscriptive on how to defend its bases and 

given its installation commanders a high degree of authority. This 

lack of specificity may be liberating at times and frustrating at others. 

Regardless, the base is executing the installation commanders’ intent 

as they are generally the risk acceptance authority, although there are 

exceptions that will be discussed later. While there is no foolproof 

checklist on how to conduct base defense operations, you should be 

familiar with five fundamentals on how to conduct the fight.1

Aggressiveness. Regarding the geometry of an airfield, your defense forces should be aggressive in their action where they actively 

seek the initiative by meeting threats as far away from resources as 

much as possible. While an assault force typically enjoys advantages 

such as surprise, time, location, and attack methodology (swarming, 

stand-off, penetrating, surveillance, etc.). Defenders: enjoy the advantage of terrain and base familiarization; prepare the ground 

(alarms, rehearsals, sensors); seek intelligence and information sharing; and ultimately try to affect the attacker’s sense of certainty and 

security.

Defense in depth. The security force should provide defense in 

depth to deny an assailant the opportunity to reach a resource by 

penetrating a single line. Depth increases the chance of detection and 

provides an opportunity to maintain continuous contact with an attacking force while responding forces maneuver into position to generate mass and fix the opposing force. As noted earlier regarding the 

BSZ, depth provides the commander time to make an informed decision, alert base personnel to take appropriate actions, and commit a 

quick reaction force to block or counterattack. Depth is accomplished 

by close coordination with external forces (local law enforcement, 

Army maneuver units, and coalition forces), off-base SF patrols, sensor fields, ISR, and so forth.
42  │ MANAGE THE RISK

360° awareness. The security plan must take into account an allaround and three-dimensional perspective. Unlike larger army or 

naval formations, air bases are fixed locations and cannot give up 

ground, unless the base is to be evacuated. Insurgencies are characterized by the lack of a contiguous linear battlefield where air bases 

are not afforded the safety of a rear area behind friendly lines (as seen 

in WWII, the Cold War, and Desert Storm). Moreover, airfields offer 

unlimited approaches for special operations forces and insurgents 

(tunnels, sewer systems, cyber, stand-off, maritime approaches, etc.), 

not to mention the fact that local populations on expeditionary air 

bases present significant insider threat challenges.

Integration. Any base defense plan needs to be integrated where 

multiple parties mutually support each other for a common purpose. 

Tactically, this can mean interlocking fields of fire and observation 

between different organizations and covering gaps that come to light 

as the plan is developed. Often, installation command centers, such 

as JBB’s JDOC, enable full integration and mission deconfliction. 

Commanders must also examine and test the relationship between 

multiple C2 elements such as crisis action team, wing operations center, emergency operations center, maintenance operations center, 

unit control centers, higher headquarters on the base, and so forth, 

and aggressively seek to fill gaps and information voids.

Key terrain. Finally, air base defense activities should be organized 

around key terrain. Key terrain is any ground/facility that offers concealed approaches to the base or provides the holder a marked advantage. For instance, anywhere that enables an attacker to observe base 

activities, monitor/jam communications, or safely assemble forces is 

probably key terrain. From a kinetic perspective, key terrain also is 

ground where an insurgent can fire directly or indirectly against an 

installation or critical off-base infrastructure (navigation aids, supply 

lines, fuel systems, etc.). Key terrain needs to be physically occupied, 

randomly patrolled, or denied (through obstacles, sensors, weapons 

fire, or removing the terrain).

By quickly examining the key fundamentals of base defense, the 

critical takeaway is that there is no foolproof checklist for how to hold 

and secure ground. However, these fundamentals orient you to the 

characteristics of successfully employing a base defense force. The 

Air Force transitioned from compliance to “effects-based” security in 

2009, which both permitted and encouraged installation commanders to exercise tactical flexibility. However, when sequestration re-
MANAGE THE RISK │  43

duced the number of available military personnel and reallocated 

physical security funds for other projects while defense forces remained at a high deployment tempo, terrorist organizations demonstrated the strategic reach to inspire and motivate attacks within the 

United States (i.e., Little Rock, Fort Hood, Boston, Chattanooga, and 

San Bernardino). Commanders have been asked to increase their risk 

tolerance in a very dynamic and unforgiving environment.

Regarding risk management, installation commanders must be 

made aware of significant challenges.2 Air Force policy mandates that 

all installations, regardless of geographic location, require a comprehensive integrated defense plan (IDP) signed by the wing commander. The IDP indicates how the base is to be defended using all 

available resources and with proscriptive methods derived from risk 

analysis and management tools that examine factors such as threat, 

vulnerability, and criticality.

Once the IDP is developed, it must be tested repeatedly and under 

a range of conditions to determine its level of effectiveness. How do 

commanders know if their intent and approaches are working? The 

answers are regular base defense and force protection exercises, continuous leader engagement, war-gaming, constant analysis of the 

plan, and continual evaluation of real-world events and intelligence. 

Be mindful that the various functional communities on the installation have different perspectives on threats—international terrorism, 

homegrown violent extremists, foreign intelligence, information protection, domestic criminal and gang activity, medical force health 

protection, operational security, cybersecurity, and so forth. All these 

inputs are important to the protection of your installation—and very 

rarely in today’s environment will all these inputs default to the “no 

threat to low threat” setting. The effort to develop an IDP via the riskmanagement process requires the active participation of all mission 

owners and cannot be relegated to a handful of functional communities.

Buying down risk—going, going, gone. As the leadership develops 

an IDP and assesses facilities and missions, the team must make 

actionable recommendations to reduce the risk to missions and 

forces. Often, discussions involve getting more “gates, guards, and 

guns” to reduce risk. In some cases, this may be a solution, but as a 

commander you may have limited maneuver forces to dedicate to 

this task. Be open to suggestions such as reducing the signature (i.e., 

remove signs identifying a particular building), advocate for creating 

a redundant/backup capability, use technology to enhance entry 
44  │ MANAGE THE RISK

Figure 8. Risk-Management Process: creating a smart defense that 

better uses resources to meet the threat. (Source: AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense.)

Key

CCIR: commander’s critical information requirement

COA: course of action
MANAGE THE RISK │  45

control and circulation flow throughout a building, ensure alarms 

are in place, increase SF patrol coverage, examine force protection 

engineering solutions, determine if owners of the facilities should be 

armed (i.e., unit marshal program or selective arming), and so forth. 

More often than not, the working groups can generate solutions to 

reduce risk that are acceptable to all parties involved.

Notes

1. Erik K. Rundquist, “Air Base Defense Doctrine,” taught to HQ Air Mobility 

Warfare Center’s Phoenix Readiness and Contingency Support Operations Course, 

Fort Dix, NJ, 1996–1999.

2. The authors would like to thank the ACC/A4S, Integrated Defense Operations Branch (A4SO), Mr. Wayne Chapman, and Mr. Curtis Easley for providing an 

historical analysis and perspectives on defending air bases under the auspice of the 

Air Force integrated defense risk management program, interviewed 20 May 2016.

Chapter 10

Nowhere to Hide:

Anticipate Future Threats 

and Develop Countermeasures

Protecting air bases and aerospace assets in the future will grow 

exponentially more complex and expensive due to the proliferation 

of technology, abundance of open-source intelligence, and growth in 

adversary capabilities. Of course, as learned in 2020, pandemics and 

disease epidemics can further complicate security efforts by threatening the health of security staff and making the base entry screening 

process lengthier and more cumbersome because of masks and health 

protocols. Looking forward, traditional threats such as airborne assault, IDF through rockets and mortars, and direct attack by suicide 

squads will continue to be staple courses of potential enemy action. It 

is important to examine emerging threats enabling new modes of air 

base attack, including the development of precision munitions, the 

spread of RPVs (large, small, and micro), the proliferation of 

shoulder-fired missiles, insider threats, and other variants of new 

technology for terrorists and insurgents. Looking to the future, exploitation of cyber vulnerabilities and technological proliferation will 

further enable air base attack. Defending air assets will become even 

more problematic with increasing vulnerabilities across the spectrum 

of threats. The problem set goes beyond the traditional kinetic threat 

of indirect fire or ground attack. With relatively little modern technology, enemy forces were able to cause damage to flying assets (see 

table 2).

The threat of terrorism has driven most base defense operations to 

focus operations on the defeat of vehicle-borne improvised explosive 

devices (VBIED). Top-tier terrorist groups have long wanted 

headline-grabbing attacks that are big on visual imagery, shock, and 

body count. Images of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, or the 

Air Force’s Khobar Towers in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, became the adversary’s desired outcome of an attack. We see the same intent at play 

in the Taliban’s detonation of a truck bomb on the tenth anniversary 

of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001—a strike that wounded 

89 people, including 77 Soldiers. This section examines some of the 

more alarming threats—such as VBIEDs, which we expect the enemy 
48  │ NOWHERE TO HIDE 

to use in future attacks—and the emerging technology that could enable them to assail our air bases. The list below highlights some, but 

not all, of the emerging technological threats to air bases.

Table 2. Statistical comparison of fixed-wing aircraft destroyed and 

damaged by air base attack

Theater

Number of fixedwing aircraft 

destroyed

Number of fixedwing aircraft 

damaged

Estimated 

size of 

insurgency

Vietnam (1964–73) 99 1,170 300,000a

Iraq (2003–12) 0 15 20,000–

100,000b

Afghanistan (2002–14) 6 4 20,000c

Source: Data was produced during the 2013–14 Air Command and Staff College yearlong research elective 

Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency, instructed by Col Shannon W. Caudill. Student researchers 

were Maj Russell S. Badowski, Maj Jason F. Baggett, Maj Scott Black, Maj Loren M. Coulter, Maj Colby B. 

Edwards, Maj Raymond J. Fortner, Maj Steward J. Parker, and Maj Michael M. Wellock. Researchers reviewed all available Air Force history reports covering Sather AB (Baghdad International Airport), Joint 

Base Balad, Tallil AB, Kirkuk AB, and al-Asad AB. See notes 1–3 and below for specific sources.

a

 “Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960,” The Pentagon Papers, Gravel ed., vol. 1 (Boston: 

Beacon Press, 1971), chap. 5, sec. 3, 314–46, www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent14.htm.

b Daniel L. Byman, “Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism,” Brookings Institution, 1 July 2007, https://www

.brookings.edu/articles/iraq-and-the-global-war-on-terrorism/. c

 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “Commentary: More Troops Needed for Afghan War,” CNN, 4 

August 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/04/bergen.afghanistan/index.html.

Precision indirect fire. IDF has been the traditional choice among 

insurgents for attacking an air base. Fired at a distance and often 

rigged to fire after the attacker has departed, it offers a degree of survivability. In Afghanistan, the enemy employed IDF not only to harass 

coalition forces but also to mask and cover ground attacks. On 22 

August 2012, enemy forces even managed to damage the visiting aircraft of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.1

 Mortars and rockets 

aimed at a base by someone with limited targeting information rely 

on the technical expertise of the operator, factors that hinder their 

overall effectiveness. However, a new age in precision IDF weapon 

systems is now upon us. On 31 March 2011, Soldiers from the 4th 

Brigade Combat Team fired a 120 mm precision-guided mortar 

round from Forward Operating Base Kushamond, Afghanistan, hitting 

within four meters of the target.2 Normally a mortar fires a “dumb” 

round—one that has no onboard guidance system. Over time this 

technology will likely spread to insurgent and terrorist groups, improving their ability to pick and choose targets with extraordinary 

accuracy and making aircraft as well as key facilities much more 

vulnerable. No doubt peer competitors will employ this technology 
NOWHERE TO HIDE│  49

and provide it to their proxies when advantageous to their strategic 

interests.

Remotely piloted vehicles. Personnel contemplating defense of an 

air base must consider the threat posed by RPVs by formulating a 

plan to tackle a range of remote threats, both ground and airborne. 

Who is cleared to engage such vehicles, and with what weapons? For 

ground-based attacks, the answer is more clearly defined and in line 

with established contingencies; however, a defensive gap exists in defending against airborne threats. The fact that we have yet to fully 

explore protocols for these defenses leaves a seam that a technologically savvy enemy could exploit.

In fact, the Department of Homeland Security warned in 2015 that 

it had documented over 500 cases of unknown and “unauthorized” 

RPVs that had flown and, in some cases, loitered over “sensitive sites 

and critical installations,” including military bases.3 Beyond the surveillance value, off-the-shelf RPVs are capable of being converted 

into flying bombs or guns. The “weaponizing” of small drones is not 

terribly difficult. In 2016, ISIS militants began weaponizing drones, 

which started as simply booby-trapping the craft and evolved into 

ordnance delivery against a target.4 By 2020, US forces in Iraq reported being attacked by drones carrying bombs using ordnance 

made with 3-D printers.5

Of more pressing concern, Hezbollah has shown technological 

prowess through its use of explosive-laden RPVs and missile technology, 

even managing to cripple an Israeli warship.6 Although American 

policy makers have concerned themselves with al-Qaeda in recent 

years, Hezbollah has proven to have global reach and staying power. 

It is credited as the first terrorist group to pioneer the use of suicide 

bombers as a weapon of mass destruction, delivering large vehicle 

bombs to specific targets.7 The success of the organization comes 

from its financial and logistical backing by Syria and Iran, the latter 

supplying advanced weapons and reconnaissance equipment. Starting in November 2004, Hezbollah shocked Israelis by launching a 

remotely piloted surveillance plane, the Mirsad 1, that flew over Israeli 

towns and returned to Lebanon unharmed. At a Hezbollah rally, the 

organization’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, declared, “You can load the 

Mirsad plane with a quantity of explosive ranging from 40 to 50 kilos 

and send it to its target. . . . Do you want a power plant, water plant, 

military base? Anything!”8
50  │ NOWHERE TO HIDE 

To punctuate this point, examine the case of Rezwan Ferdaus, a 

26-year-old US citizen. He was arrested on 28 September 2011, 

charged with plotting to attack the Pentagon and US Capitol with 

“large remote controlled aircraft filled with C-4 plastic explosives” 

and providing “material support and resources to a foreign terrorist 

organization, specifically to al-Qaeda.”9 According to the FBI, Ferdaus planned to augment his “aerial assault” by three explosive-laden 

drones with a ground attack that included “six people, armed with 

automatic firearms and divided into two teams.” Ferdaus explained 

that “with this aerial assault, we can effectively eliminate key locations of the P-building [Pentagon] then we can add to it in order to 

take out everything else.”10

Social media: Flash mobs, terrorism, and networking base attacks. Instantaneous communication dramatically improves enemies’ 

information operations and base attacks, allowing them to draw upon 

elements of a sympathetic local populace to create situations that embarrass an air base’s leadership or overwhelm defenses. Thus, intelligence and law enforcement must stay one step ahead of an increasingly 

agile foe by becoming more adept in their collection efforts. Basic 

technology (such as cell phones) affects society in unusual ways by 

creating unprecedented means for communicating and coordinating 

actions. Take for example the phenomenon of the flash mob, a group 

of people summoned via cell phone, social media, and viral emails for 

the purpose of performing some sort of act at a specific location. The 

web and even commercials of telecommunications companies are replete with footage of benign flash mobs who appear in a public place 

to carry out some sort of unusual or artistic act, like freezing in one 

place or performing a coordinated dance routine. Although they do 

this in the name of entertainment, what happens when someone uses 

this same technology for nefarious purposes?

Terrorists and criminal groups are increasingly using social media 

for the “purpose of operational communication, intelligence gathering, technical information sharing, recruiting, training, etc.”11 As an 

example, a study from Brookings Institution’s Center for Middle East 

Policy found that between September and December in 2014 there 

were an estimated 46,000 to 70,000 Twitter accounts owned and operated by Islamic State supporters and activists with each having an 

average of 1,000 followers per account.12 In 2019, a bored 21-year old 

party organizer started a Facebook page called “Storm Area 51: They 

Can’t Stop All of Us” that quickly went viral, gaining over one million 
NOWHERE TO HIDE│  51

RSVPs, and causing Air Force and government officials to make public 

statements to counter this potential security risk.13 Finally, an example 

of mass criminal activity organized through social media occurred in 

England in 2011, in which riots occurred in London, Birmingham, 

Manchester, and elsewhere. British authorities identified and arrested 

nearly 3,000 people suspected of physically rioting or inciting violence across the country by using BlackBerry Messenger, Twitter, and 

Facebook.14 David Cameron, former British prime minister, observed 

that “everyone watching these horrific actions will be struck by how 

they were organized via social media. . . . So we are working with the 

police, the intelligence services and industry to look at whether it 

would be right to stop people communicating via these websites and 

services when we know they are plotting violence, disorder and 

criminality.”15 The above examples provide a glimpse of the power of 

social media and its potential as a means of organizing an attack on a 

military installation in the future.

The rapid pace of technological advancement has spread to every 

corner of the globe. Cell phones are now powerful computers, networking with other devices globally. Nowhere is this more apparent 

than in developing countries that had poor communications because 

of the cost of hard-wiring infrastructure for landlines. Cell phones 

now make that expense moot since cell towers and satellites allow 

such countries to plug into the global communications grid. The 

same technology that enables global information sharing and advancement also supports the networking of terrorist and criminal groups.

How will this technology and social networking affect base security in the future? Protestors, mobs, and terrorist groups can now be 

easily summoned with no prior notice to military intelligence or law 

enforcement, quickly assembling near a base’s entry control point or 

perimeter to protest, riot, or attack. In many instances, such areas 

would have only a handful of guards available to counter the assembled groups—a scenario that could easily overwhelm the few SF on 

scene and escalate beyond their capacity to quell such action.

It is easy: Obtaining maps and imagery of air bases. Enemy 

forces planning a ground assault of an air base used to rely on collaborators who had access to the target base to facilitate the mapping 

of terrain and key facilities, as well as attain pace counts that enable 

IDF attacks. Today the information superhighway offers access to 

satellite imagery and other open-source information that make the 

job of a would-be attacker much easier. One such website, that of the 
52  │ NOWHERE TO HIDE 

Federation of American Scientists (FAS), describes itself as “an independent, nonpartisan think tank and registered 501(c)(3) nonprofit 

membership organization . . . dedicated to providing rigorous, objective, evidence-based analysis and practical policy recommendations 

on national and international security issues connected to applied 

science and technology.”16 Global Security, an offshoot of FAS founded 

by John Pike, one of its former members, claims to be “the leading 

source of background information and developing news stories in the 

fields of defense, space, intelligence, WMD [weapons of mass destruction], and homeland security.”17 Its website features satellite images of military bases around the world, many of which the US government considers classified. Other sites, such as Google Maps, make 

imagery and street maps available. In sum, people now have many 

ways to acquire detailed maps of air bases that could facilitate attacks on 

those locations.

The expanding insider threat and lone wolves. For the foreseeable future, US and coalition forces will operate amid insider threats. 

Pentagon statistics reveal that in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2018, insider attacks by members of the Afghan National Security Forces on 

US and NATO personnel claimed the lives of 155 US military members, coalition troops, and contractors, and wounded over 200.18 One 

of the most egregious and horrific instances of an insider threat occurred on the morning of 27 April 2011, when an Afghan air force 

captain killed eight Airmen and one contractor at Kabul International 

Airport.19 Another incident demonstrated how a determined and 

crafty suicide bomber could infiltrate a Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) base in eastern Afghanistan and kill eight Americans.20 In 

2014, Afghan insurgents managed to kill a US Army major general,21

and in 2018, a US Army brigadier general was shot while the US 

commanding general in Afghanistan barely escaped injury.22

More troubling still is the growing threat from within the ranks of 

American military personnel and veterans. On 11 May 2009, five 

American military members were killed by a US Soldier at a military 

counseling center in Camp Liberty, Baghdad.23 Shootings by a US 

Army psychiatrist on 5 November 2009 in Fort Hood, Texas, resulted 

in the deaths of 13 people and wounding of 32 others.24 Since a 2009 

Department of Homeland Security report, law enforcement officials 

have become increasingly concerned about military veterans joining 

right-wing extremist groups.25 Indeed, a Security Forces Airman apparently was involved in an extremist group and was arrested as the 
NOWHERE TO HIDE│  53

primary suspect in the June 2020 killing of a California sheriff’s deputy 

and wounding of his partner with a rifle.26

As displayed in table 1, it is important to remember that one person can do a great deal of harm—witness the number of lone-wolf 

incidents that have occurred. As an example, on 22 July 2011, Anders 

Breivik, a Norwegian, set off a vehicle bomb near government buildings in Oslo, killing eight, and then massacred 69 people at a youth 

camp on the nearby island of Utoeya.27 On 20 July 2012, American 

James Holmes walked into a sold-out movie theater near Denver and 

began shooting, killing 12 and wounding 58.28 Whether stateside or 

overseas, commanders must ensure that they provide and exercise a 

comprehensive interior security plan—one that includes using all the 

psychological tools and law enforcement capabilities available to 

identify insider threats.

Well-defended air bases drive the enemy to explore alternative 

means to affect air operations. If your defenses persuade an attacker 

to pursue another target, you and your team have done their job. You 

can do your part to affect the enemy’s observe-orient-decide-act 

(OODA) loop, whether that is a terrorist or a lone-wolf attacker.29

Naturally, any rational actor desires the quickest, cheapest route to 

success in negatively affecting air operations or creating an international sensation through a high death count, as an ongoing costbenefit analysis drives target selection.

When examining the threat, one should constantly ask what the 

enemy will target, because it is not necessarily aircraft on the ground. 

Targets and objectives depend upon the attackers, ranging from terrorist groups to conventional forces to special operations, and upon 

the political objectives and actual capabilities that they can bring to 

bear against an air base. In Vietnam, enemy forces found ground attacks against airfields a drain on their resources. As a result, they 

adapted their tactics to focus on disrupting versus destroying air operations, because “whether the raids resulted in aircraft, facility, or 

runway damage, sortie rates were impaired.”30 Both Iraq and Afghanistan provide modern examples of IDF attacks that temporarily 

closed airfields, thus delaying sorties with a negative mission impact.

Understanding and countering these growing threats will play a 

major role in the ability of the United States and its allies to effectively 

project airpower effectively in the future. One solution is to base aircraft as far from hostilities as possible, which strains aircraft and aircrews 

with longer flight times, reduces potential loiter times, and potentially 
54  │ NOWHERE TO HIDE 

reduces the persistence of airpower. However, it does not address the 

likely requirement for mobility aircraft to land near or in the combat 

zone to provide support to ground operations. Nor does remote basing address the technological means of attack through cyberspace, 

reach and lethality of technologically enabled terrorists, or special 

forces engagement by a determined enemy. These concerns require 

Airmen to conduct a truly full-spectrum threat analysis and ensure 

these potential vulnerabilities are addressed in force protection planning.

Notes

1. Starr, “Shrapnel Hits Joint Chiefs Chairman’s Plane.”

2. Christopherson, “Soldiers Fire First Precision-Guided Mortar in Afghanistan.”

3. Esler, “What a Business Aviation Flight Department Needs to Know.”

4. Reuters, “ISIS Booby-trapped Drone Kills Troops.”

5. Woody, “Drones Are Dropping Bombs on US Troops.”

6. Associated Press, “Israel: Iranian Troops Helping Hezbollah Attack.”

7. Helmer, “Hezbollah’s Employment of Suicide Bombing during the 1980s.”

8. Myers, “Hezbollah Drone Threatens Israel.”

9. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Massachusetts Man Charged with 

Plotting.”

10. FBI.

11. Hossain, “Social Media and Terrorism.”

12. Berger and Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census.

13. Montero, “Storm Area 51 Creator.”

14. Lancefield, “3,000 Arrests in London Riots Investigation.”

15. Halliday, “David Cameron Considers Banning Suspected Rioters.”

16. Federation of American Scientists, “About FAS.”

17. Global Security, “Company History.”

18. Constable, “U.S. Military Scales Back Contacts.”

19. Pawlyk, “Questions Remain as Families Mourn Victims.”

20. Warrick, “Suicide Bomber Attacks CIA Base in Afghanistan.”

21. Sciutto, Shoichet, and Fantz, “U.S. General Killed in Afghanistan.”

22. Martinez, “US General Was Wounded in Kandahar Attack.”

23. Williams, “US Soldier Kills 5 of His Comrades in Iraq.”

24. Lieberman and Collins, A Ticking Time Bomb.

25. Associated Press, “Homeland Security Leaders Defend Memo on Veterans.”

26. Dazio, “Airman Charged with Murder of Federal Officer.”

27. BBC, “Anders Breivik Describes Norway Island Massacre.”

28. Johnson and Williams, “Cops: Weeks of Planning Went into Shootings at 

Colo. Batman Screening.”

29. Boyd, “Destruction and Creation.”

30. Buonaugurio, “Air Base Defense in the 21st Century,” 8.
Conclusion

Finding the precise balance between force projection and force 

protection lies with the subjective judgment ultimately reserved 

for those bestowed with the command. The fog of war, the uncertain risks of combat, and the actions of a determined foe do 

not relieve a commander of the responsibility for decisions that 

a reasonable, prudent commander of the same grade and experience would have made under similar circumstances.

—Gen James F. Amos, Commandant, US Marine Corps

Accountability Determination of US Commanders for the 14–15 

September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and 

Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan

Commanders have many demands and priorities. In a command 

portfolio, one area commanders are often least comfortable in is their 

responsibilities for a ground defense. Central to a true integrated defense is a command climate that stresses that all leaders and installation 

members, including coalition and joint forces, understand their role 

in the defense and the effects, positive and otherwise, of their own 

actions in the battlespace. Senior commanders set the tone, but all 

commanders must play a role and be the squeaky wheel when they 

believe there are security gaps. Looking the other way or simply writing 

it off as an SF and AFOSI issue is an abrogation of responsibility. From 

his own base defense experience, Major General Deale summarizes 

his view as: “The Senior Airman at any location has got to be equipped 

to lead the base defense. We also need Defense Force Commanders 

who know their business and can effectively shape the perspectives of the Senior Airman on scene to ensure an effective defense.”1

We often focus on terrorist groups and lone-wolf attacks, forgetting that there are also nation-state forces preparing for conflict and 

focusing on air bases as the critical hubs to target their efforts. Not 

too long ago, planners at NATO bases concentrated on the USSR’s 

plans to attack air bases. During the Cold War, the Soviets explored 

ways to assault and disable bases, primarily by employing the Spetsnaz 

(special forces). A review of Spetsnaz airfield-attack profiles in declassified Cold War–era CIA reports would prove useful because they 

provide insights into methods for direct strikes on these targets. 

These included the airdrop near an air base of 30 special operators, 
56  │ CONCLUSION

who then broke into “four teams, each team with specific responsibilities including capturing vehicles and personnel for the purpose of 

infiltrating the target [air base],” using SAMs and explosive devices to 

destroy aircraft.2 Additional methods were also practiced: a Spetsnaz 

company (approximately 10 teams of five to 12 men) operated against 

a heavily defended airfield. The company could not get closer than 2 

to 3 km to the target. During the first night Block Strelas [three-tubed 

SAM launchers mounted on a tripod] were positioned as close as 

possible to either end of the field, and then attacks were initiated 

against pipelines, powerlines, communication lines, security personnel, 

and crews heading toward the airfield.3

This type of attack would disrupt airfield operations, create the impression that a larger Soviet force was in the area, and draw more 

NATO forces in for defense and away from the front lines. Imagine 

well-trained enemy special forces enabled by many of the aforementioned technological advances. Base defense would become incredibly 

difficult, and the complexity of countering the threat would escalate 

significantly. This is one threat to contend with in future nation-state 

warfare, one which does not usually spring to the forefront given the 

recent focus on lone-wolf, terrorist, and insurgent attacks.

Defending air bases is a challenge that can only be met by agile, 

dynamic thinkers, backed by an Air Force and joint force that value 

air base defense as a central component to airpower itself. The complexity of the threat posed to air bases and other military installations 

will only grow. Airmen must debate and engage with one another 

about the future of air base security and the required defenses for a 

multitude of operational environments. In command, whether deployed or at home station, you are charged with a lofty responsibility 

of protecting mission assets, military members, and families.

In summary, commanders must lead the defense, understand their 

operational environment, manage the risks and defensive partnership opportunities, and take the steps needed to safeguard the people 

and assets needed to sustain our national defense mission. Your Airmen and joint force members are counting on you. You own it. You’ve 

got this. Lead from the front.
CONCLUSION │  57

Notes

1. Deale, interview.

2. Director of Central Intelligence, Warsaw Pact Nonnuclear Threat, 35.

3. Director of Central Intelligence, 36, 39.

Afterword

It is no coincidence that the Chief of Staff followed the 2019 “Year 

of the Defender” with 2020’s commitment to the “Year of Integrated 

Base Defense.” We have the best security forces in the world, but defending, or “fighting the base,” requires an active role by everyone on 

the base. Churchill correctly observed that “every airman should 

have his place in the defence scheme.” Our Air Force has emphasized 

this point with phrases like “every Airman a sensor” and “defending 

the base is commander business,” yet there is still resistance in some 

corners, because it is outside functional lines or because some do not 

believe the concept is realistic. We are the most powerful Air Force in 

the world, and this is exactly why commanders at all levels need to 

understand their role in fighting the base. Future threats will be multispectrum and simultaneous: they will come from the air, ground, 

electronic spectrum, space, sea, cyberspace . . . wherever our adversaries sense an advantage. It is vital to our success that all Airmen 

understand and embrace their role in fighting the base.

The national defense strategy focuses on those near-peer potential 

adversaries that we know will threaten our operations from a 360-degree 

multidimensional spectrum. Whether deployed or in the homeland, 

our operating locations are no longer a sanctuary, and we must be 

able to fight through different types of attack while continuing to generate air- and space power. Our installations are our power-projection 

platforms. It does not matter if we are fighting in air or space—we 

operate from these power-projection platforms, and these bases will 

be targeted. Long-standing installations where high-demand, lowdensity aircraft are operated are but one of several likely targets, both 

from the kinetic and nonkinetic sense. We must be able to fight 

through different scenarios.

If adversaries can slow down or disrupt our sortie generation, they 

are successful. We must all think through our processes and procedures to ensure we can continue the fight. Think about what happens 

today if someone fires a shot on base: we lock down the entire base 

until security forces clear the affected area. We cannot afford to shut 

down the base for this, an Amber Alert, or any other single threat; we 

must apply risk management principles and fight through the scenario by releasing nonaffected sectors and defending our mission 

sets. Are you practicing this? Are you practicing and planning for 
60  │ AFTERWORD

asset dispersal across the installation so we do not have all our spare 

engines, fuel trucks, or unique pieces of equipment locked in the 

same place? This is “fighting the base” and is each commander’s responsibility. You must make sure your mission can continue with the 

personnel and material on hand. Can you shift personnel across mission sets to reopen a bombed-out runway, or is this a Civil Engineering only squadron responsibility? Our logistics readiness squadron 

personnel are also trained on heavy equipment—have you familiarized them with runway repair ops and turned them into multicapable 

Airmen?

Commanders lead more than their squadron mission: they are responsible for the protection of their people and warfighting assets. It 

is a solemn duty that cannot be subcontracted. Unfortunately, too many 

leaders rely solely on security forces or the ground component to protect. 

We are all in this together—as warriors—as Airmen—as Defenders!

It is fitting that the final volume of the Defending Air Bases in an 

Age of Insurgency series is focused on providing lessons and principles for commanders, especially principles for the next era, beyond 

an insurgency and instead one of a near-peer state-sponsored competitor. Our collective defense can only be truly integrated if all installation organizations are led by those who understand and embrace 

their responsibility to protect their people and mission.

My charge to each commander is to read this book, study your 

base defense plans, analyze your unit’s role, and ask questions to ensure your plans have transitioned from that of insurgency to a nearpeer, more skilled adversary. Please take the initiative to address 

those shortfalls in the design and implementation of these plans and 

instill a warrior culture in your organization to enable our very best 

defensive effort. Remember, you set the tone and ensure we can 

“Fight the Base!”

JOHN T. WILCOX II

Major General, USAF
Appendix A

Base Defense Terminology

(All terms drawn from the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, except 

as noted.)

na na

area damage control 

(ADC)

Measures taken before, during, and/or 

after a hostile action or natural or manmade disasters to reduce the probability 

of damage and minimize its effects.

base boundary A line that delineates the surface area 

of a base for the purpose of facilitating 

coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, 

or areas.

base cluster A collection of bases, geographically 

grouped for mutual protection and ease 

of command and control.

base cluster operations 

center (BCOC)

A command-and-control facility that 

serves as the base cluster commander’s 

focal point for defense and security of the 

base cluster.

base defense The local military measures, both normal 

and emergency, required to nullify or 

reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks 

on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure the 

maximum capacity of its facilities is available to US forces.

base defense operations center (BDOC)A command-and-control facility established by the base commander to serve 

as the focal point for base security and 

defense.
62  │ APPENDIX A

na na

base security zone 

(BSZ)

To secure airpower assets and protect 

personnel and resources in this area, the 

Air Force uses a unique planning construct, referred to as the BSZ. The BSZ 

is that area from which the enemy can 

launch an attack against the personnel 

and resources located on or aircraft approaching/departing the base. The term, 

an Air Force–specific term used intraservice only, is similar to but not synonymous with the term base boundary as 

defined in JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater. The base commander is 

responsible for identifying the BSZ and 

coordinating with the host nation or area 

commander for the BSZ to be identified 

as the base boundary. If the base boundary does not include all of the terrain 

of the BSZ, the base commander is still 

responsible for either mitigating (though 

coordination with the area commander 

or host nation) or accepting the risks of 

enemy attack from the area outside the base 

boundary. (Source: Air Force Policy Directive [AFPD] 31-1, Integrated Defense, 

and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-101, 

Integrated Defense [ID])

defense force commander (DFC)The individual provided authority to 

conduct integrated base defense for the 

senior Air Force commander responsible for an air base. The defense force 

commander exercises command and 

control through an established chain of 

command and directs the planning and 

execution of base defense operations. 

(Source: AFPD 31-1 and AFI 31-101)
APPENDIX A │  63

na na

force protection (FP) Preventive measures taken to mitigate 

hostile actions against Department of 

Defense personnel (including family 

members), resources, facilities, and critical information.

force protection condition (FPCON)A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff–

approved standard for identification of 

and recommended responses to terrorist 

threats against US personnel and facilities.

force protection

detachment (FPD)

A counterintelligence element that 

provides counterintelligence support to 

transiting and assigned ships, personnel, 

and aircraft in regions of elevated threat.

force protection intelligenceAnalyzed or vetted all-source information that drives effective FP decisions and 

operations. (Source: AFPD 31-1 and AFI 

31-101)

force protection working group (FPWG)Cross-functional working group whose 

purpose is to conduct risk assessment 

and risk management and to recommend 

mitigating measures to the commander.

integrated defense 

(ID), integrated base 

defense

An Air Force term that indicates the integration of multidisciplinary active and 

passive, offensive and defensive capabilities, employed to mitigate potential risks 

and defeat adversary threats to Air Force 

operations. Installation commanders will 

determine the effect and intensity of ID 

operations required at garrison and deployed locations through a risk estimate 

of the installation’s operating environment.

(Source: AFPD 31-1)
64  │ APPENDIX A

na na

joint base In base defense operations, a locality 

from which operations of two or more of 

the Military Departments are projected 

or supported and which is manned by 

significant elements of two or more Military Departments or in which significant 

elements of two or more Military Departments are located.

joint security area 

(JSA)

A specific area to facilitate protection of 

joint bases and their connecting lines 

of communications that support joint 

operations.

joint security coordination center (JSCC)A joint operations center tailored to assist 

the joint security coordinator in meeting the security requirements in the joint 

operational area.

joint security coordinator (JSC)The officer responsible for coordinating 

the overall security of the operational 

area in accordance with joint force commander directives and priorities.

law enforcement 

agency (LEA)

Any of a number of agencies (outside the 

Department of Defense) chartered and 

empowered to enforce US laws in a state 

or territory (or political subdivision) of 

the United States, a federally recognized 

Native American tribe or Alaskan Native 

Village, or within the borders of a host 

nation.

mobile security force 

(MSF)

A highly mobile and dedicated security 

force with the capability to defeat Level I 

and II threats in a joint security area.

port security The safeguarding of vessels, harbors, 

ports, waterfront facilities, and cargo 

from internal threats such as destruction, 

loss, or injury from sabotage or other 

subversive acts, accidents, thefts, or other 

causes of similar nature.
APPENDIX A │  65

na na

provost operations The integrated application of active and 

passive offensive and defensive actions 

taken across the ground dimension of 

the battlespace to promote and maintain 

public order (law enforcement) and efficient military operations. Detects and 

investigates threats and criminal activity 

in coordination with other agencies. Safeguards detained persons. (Source: AFPD 

31-1 and AFI 31-101)

regional security officer (RSO)A security officer responsible to the chief 

of mission (ambassador) for security 

functions of all US embassies and consulates in a given country or group of 

adjacent countries.

security 1. Measures taken by a military unit, 

activity, or installation to protect itself 

against all acts designed to, or which may, 

impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition 

that results from the establishment and 

maintenance of protective measures that 

ensure a state of inviolability from hostile 

acts or influences. 3. With respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents 

unauthorized persons from having access 

to official information that is safeguarded 

in the interests of national security.

security operations The integrated application of active and 

passive offensive and defensive actions 

taken across the ground dimension of the 

battlespace, to dominate the base security zone and defeat security threats and 

performed as part of the integrated base 

defense. (Source: AFPD 31-1 and AFI 

31-101)
66  │ APPENDIX A

na na

tactical combat force 

(TCF)

A rapidly deployable, air-ground, mobile 

combat unit with appropriate combat 

support and combat service support 

assets assigned to, and capable of, defeating Level III threats, including combined 

arms.

vehicle-borne improvised explosive device 

(VBIED)

A device placed or fabricated in an 

improvised manner on a vehicle incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, 

pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and 

designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, 

or distract.
Appendix B

Recommended Reading List for Air Base 

Defense and Counterinsurgency

Ian Beckett. Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents Since 1750. London: Routledge, 2001.

Sean Stuart Carwardine. “Defending the Nest: The History and 

Analysis of Airfield Defence Policy in the Royal Australian Air Force.” 

Thesis, University of New England, Armidale, Australia. https://rune

.une.edu.au.

Shannon W. Caudill, ed. Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency, vol. I. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2014. https://

media.defense.gov.

Shannon W. Caudill, ed. Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency, vol. II. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2019. https://

www.airuniversity.af.edu.

Anthony M. Coston. “Is U.S. Army Rear Area and Base Security 

Doctrine Sound for Sustaining Operations on the Noncontiguous 

Nonlinear Battlefield?” Thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space 

Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, May 2003. https://www

.hsdl.org.

Roger P. Fox. Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, 1961–

1973. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, United States Air 

Force, 1979. https://media.defense.gov.

Adam Freedman. Air Force Protection: An Inconvenient Truth? Defense Research Paper, Joint Services Command and Staff College, 

Royal Air Force, July 2019. Copies available by request from author, 

adam.freedman866@mod.gov.uk.

David Galula. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. 

Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1964.

Benjamin E. Hettinga. The Defense of Tan Son Nhut, 31 January 

1968: A Study in the Nature of Air Base Security. Dayton, OH: Air 

Force Institute of Technology, 2002. https://apps.dtic.mil.

Bruce Hoffman. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 2004. https://www.rand.org.
68  │ APPENDIX B

David Kilcullen. The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in 

the Midst of a Big One. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

M. J. E. MacEachern. Synchronizing Security Effects on Our Air 

Bases: Moving from An Ad Hoc Approach to Force Protection. JSCP 45 

Service Paper, Canadian Forces College, 2018. https://www.cfc.forces

.gc.ca.

Mao Zedong. On Guerrilla Warfare. Translated by Samuel B. 

Griffith. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc., 2005.

Joseph A. Milner. Integrated Defense: Lessons Learned from Joint 

Base Balad, Air Force Research Institute Paper 2012-3. Maxwell AFB, 

AL: Air University Press, 2013. https://media.defense.gov.

Nicholas J. Petren. “Expeditionary Air Base Defense: Historical 

Cases and Modern Implications.” Thesis, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 2017. https://

apps.dtic.mil.

Project CHECO. Southeast Asia Report #51, Special Report: Attack on Cam Ranh—25 August 1971, 15 December 1971, Box 0016, 

Folder 0463, Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive Collection, Vietnam 

Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University. 

https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu. Accessed 16 June 2020.

Project CHECO. Southeast Asia Report #222, Special Report: Attack Against Tan Son Nhut, 13 April 1966, 08 July 1966, Box 0002, 

Folder 0001, Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive Collection, Vietnam 

Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, 

https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu. Accessed 16 June 2020.

Thomas Ricks. The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American 

Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008. New York: Penguin Press, 2009.

David A. Shlapak and Alan J. Vick. “Check Six Begins on the 

Ground”: Responding to the Evolving Ground Threat to US Air Force 

Bases. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995. http://www.rand.org.

Alan J. Vick. Air Base Attacks and Defensive Counters: Historical 

Lessons and Future Challenges. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015.

http://www.rand.org.

———. Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on 

Air Bases. Project Air Force. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995. https://

www.rand.org.
Appendix C

Notable Airfield Attacks

1. Camp Simba, Kenya, 5 January 2020. Destroyed: 6 (one US 

Havilland Dash 8, two US helicopters, and one Kenyan 

Cessna). Damaged: 6 (US contractor-operated civilian aircraft). Killed in action (KIA): 3 (one US Army soldier, 2 US 

contractor pilots). Wounded in action (WIA): 2. The insurgent group al-Shabaab began an early morning attack by firing 

mortars as a team infiltrated the base from the thick jungle 

bordering the base. Using rocket propelled grenades and small 

arms, insurgents destroyed the US Havilland Dash 8 as it taxied and pressed their attack deep into the camp before being 

repelled.1

2. Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, 14 September 2012. Destroyed: 

6 aircraft (all US). Damaged: 2 (both US). KIA: 2 (both US). 

WIA: 9 (Coalition). Fifteen Taliban insurgents launched a 

five-hour attack on “one of the largest and best-defended posts 

in Afghanistan.”2

3. Pakistan, 23 May 2011. Destroyed: 2 aircraft (Pakistani Navy 

P-3 Orions) and one helicopter. Damaged: None. KIA: 18. 

WIA: 16. Insurgents cut through fencing in an unmonitored area 

and then attacked the P-3 Orions with rocket-propelled grenades. The attackers then began firing at any observed personnel in the area and continued to move deeper into the installation.3

4. Sri Lanka, 24 July 2001. Destroyed: 11 (8 military, 3 civilian airliners). Damaged: 14 (11 military, 3 civilian airliners). The terrorist organization the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 

(LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, made an audacious 

attack on the Bandaranaike International Airport and its adjoining Sri Lankan air force base. Using suicide squad tactics, 

terrorists infiltrated the military runway through storm drains 

on 24 July 2001. Their attack destroyed or damaged 25 civilian 

and military aircraft and revealed the weakness of the base’s 

strategic and tactical intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination, and review as well as its force protection.4
70  │ APPENDIX C

5. El Salvador, 7 February 1982. Destroyed: 14 aircraft. Damaged: 5 aircraft. El Salvador’s insurgent forces attacked the El 

Salvador government’s main operating base with 100 guerillas. 

The operation was “well-planned and executed operation . . . 

demonstrated the tactical superiority” of the insurgents 

against the government’s base defense force. Strategic effect: 

The US deepened its commitment to the El Salvadoran government by completely replacing and modernizing the El Salvadoran Air Force.5

6. Muñiz Air National Guard Base, Puerto Rico, 12 January 

1981. Destroyed: 11 (10 A-7D and one F-104). On 12 January 

1981, shortly after midnight, eleven terrorists from the Popular 

Army of Puerto Rico (also known as “The Macheteros”) infiltrated the base by boat and entered the parking ramp by cutting a hole cut in the perimeter fence. In under eight minutes, 

the group placed approximately 25 parcels containing four 

sticks of Iremite with detonators and incendiary charges that 

were time delayed allowing for escape.6

7. Tan Son Nhut, Vietnam, 1 March 1968. Destroyed: 7 aircraft 

(4 US, 3 Republic of Vietnam [RVN]). Damaged: 75 (74 US, 1 

RVN). KIA: 9 (all US). WIA: 162 (151 US, 11 RVN). The enemy 

did all this with only 16 mortar rounds.7

8. Da Nang, Vietnam, 15 July 1967. Destroyed: 10 aircraft (all 

US). Damaged: 50 (49 US, 1 RVN), KIA: 8 (all US). WIA: 175 

(all US). Notes: The enemy fired a total of 83 mortar rounds.8

9. Tan Son Nhut, Vietnam, 13 April 1966. Destroyed: 2 aircraft 

(both RVN). Damaged: 62 (all US), KIA: 9 (7 US, 2 RVN). WIA: 

111 (all US). The enemy massed fires with a total of 243 mortar 

rounds.9

10. Bien Hoa AB, Vietnam, 1 November 1964. Destroyed: 5 aircraft (all US). Damaged: 22. KIA: 4 (all US). WIA: 72 (all 

US). Enemy forces launched a midnight mortar attack in 

which Viet Cong moved to within 440 yards of the base 

perimeter, staged six 81-millimeter mortars, and fired approximately 80 high-explosive rounds. They were able to 

depart before any South Vietnamese external response 

teams could locate them. This attack also had the strategic 
APPENDIX C │  71

Notes

1. Gibbons-Neff, Schmitt, Savage, and Cooper, “Chaos as Militants Overran Airfield.”

2. Amos, Memorandum for record: Accountability Determination of US Commanders for the 14–15 September 2012 Attack, 3.

3. Atlantic Council, “Karachi Airport Attack Shows Vulnerabilities.”

4. Gunaratna, “Intelligence Failures Exposed,” 14–17.

5. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 334–35.

6. Thomas, “Armed Puerto Rican Groups Focus Attacks on Military.”

7. Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam.

8. Fox.

9. Fox.

10. Fox.

effect of galvanizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff in recommending military escalation to President Johnson, which 

set the US on the path of the prolonged Vietnam conflict.10

Appendix D

Relevant Quotations about Air Base Defense

“It is easier and more effective to destroy the enemy’s aerial 

power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to 

hunt his flying birds in the air.”1

—Italian general Giulio Douhet, 1921

“Every man in Air Force uniform ought to be armed with 

something—a rifle, a tommy-gun, a pistol, a pike, or a mace; 

and every one, without exception, should do at least one hour’s 

drill and practice every day. Every airman should have his 

place in the defence scheme. . . . It must be understood by all 

ranks that they are expected to fight and die in the defence of 

their airfields. . . The enormous mass of non-combatant personnel who look after the very few heroic pilots, who alone in 

ordinary circumstances do all the fighting, is an inherent difficulty in the organization of the Air Force. . . . Every airfield 

should be a stronghold of fighting air-groundmen, and not the 

abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by 

detachments of soldiers.”2

—Sir Winston Churchill, British prime minister, 1941

“In developing this expeditionary force culture, force protection 

is a key issue. The traditional mindset that has developed over 

the years is an inside-the-fence mentality about force protection. This inside-the-fence mentality said it was the Air Force’s 

business to watch inside the fence—it was up to us to coordinate with or depend on others for whatever was to happen outside the fence. We had joint agreements that said the Army 

would watch us outside the wire, and that they would help 

train our people to have the capability inside the wire. But 

these agreements, as it turns out, were only valid during times 
74  │ APPENDIX D

of declared war. It has become apparent that we are going to 

have to take on some of this capability ourselves.”3

—Gen John P. Jumper, USAF, commander, United States Air 

Forces in Europe, and later USAF chief of staff, 1998

“After we stood up 50 expeditionary bases in [Southwest Asia] 

and after we’ve had attacks on the bases, after we have had 

rockets and mortar attacks on the bases, after we’ve had aircraft hit on arrival and departure with surface-to-air missiles 

and small-arms fire, and after we’ve looked at what does it take 

to secure an airfield in an expeditionary sense, this security 

force business takes on a whole different light.”4

—Gen T. Michael Moseley, chief of staff, USA, 2006

“The senior Airman at any location has got to be equipped to 

lead the base defense. We also need Defense Force Commanders 

who know their business and can effectively shape the perspectives 

of the senior Airman on scene to ensure an effective defense.”5

—Maj Gen Thomas H. Deale, USAF, Retired, former wing 

commander, Operation Enduring Freedom, 2014

“We could improve senior leader training in regards to base 

defense. There isn’t anything in the predeployment training 

that I received that specifically prepared me for my responsibilities in base defense. Having experience helps a lot, and I 

credit my time as a wing commander in Korea as essential. You 

have to have some basic knowledge of how things work. You get 

that through personal experiences accumulated over the course 

of a career. One thing we must do is continue the left seat and 

right seat exchanges of information and orientation prior to 

deployment and change of command. In combat, you do not 

have time for on-the-job training. You may be attacked at any 

moment and as such, you must be ready to assume commander 

responsibilities from day one; your Airmen rightly expect that 

from their leaders.”6

—Maj Gen Thomas H. Deale, USAF, Retired, former wing 

commander, Operation Enduring Freedom, 2014
APPENDIX D │  75

The commanding general “did not adequately assess the force 

protection situation at Bastion Airfield and failed to devote the 

resources to actively participate in a layered, integrated, 

defense-in-depth force protection plan. He and his staff unreasonably minimized the force protection threats which, in turn, 

exposed his command to unnecessary risk.”7

—Gen James Amos, USMC, commandant of the Marine Corps

“We must not ignore the ultimate truth about the Khobar Towers 

tragedy: a determined and resourceful adversary, armed with 

a massive amount of explosives and given a setting that made 

surveillance easy and defense challenging, exploited one of the 

few, but patent, vulnerabilities of a highly fortified compound. 

In the period leading up to the attack, the compound’s force 

protection posture was significantly enhanced. Nevertheless, 

vulnerabilities that had been identified in the months before 

the attack remained exposed at the time the terrorists acted. 

The commander, who had been made aware of these vulnerabilities, failed to take actions within his authority to address them.”8

—William Cohen, Secretary of Defense

“U.S. forces in Vietnam are disposed in large fixed installations 

which always provide our forces with lucrative targets. Our 

forces are always certain that as long as the weapons hit the 

installation, the U.S. forces will lose equipment and manpower. 

Likewise, these large posts do not have sufficient forces to control 

the surrounding countryside, which makes our attacks easier.”9

—North Vietnamese Army rocket company commander, 1968

“Whatever else you do, keep the initiative. In counterinsurgency, the initiative is everything. If the enemy is reacting to 

you, you control the environment. Provided you mobilize the 

population, you will win. If you are reacting to the enemy—

even if you are killing or capturing him in large numbers—then 

he is controlling the environment and you will eventually lose. 

In counterinsurgency, the enemy initiates most attacks, targets 

you unexpectedly and withdraws too fast for you to react. Do 
76  │ APPENDIX D

Notes

1. Douhet, The Command of the Air, 53–54.

2. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 3, The Grand Alliance, 692–93.

3. Jumper, “Expeditionary Air Force: A New Culture for a New Century.”

4. Grant, “The Security Forces Rewrite.”

5. Then–Brig Gen Thomas H. Deale, vice commander, Carl A. Spaatz Center for 

Officer Education, interview with Col Shannon W. Caudill, 17 January 2014. Deale 

retired as a major general.

6. Deale, interview.

7. Amos, Memorandum for record, Accountability Determination of US Commanders for the 14–15 September 2012 Attack.

8. Cohen, Personal Accountability for Force Protection at Khobar Towers, 18.

9. Hay, Vietnam Studies, Tactical and Materiel Innovations, 149.

10. Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles,” 11.

11. Dean, afterword to Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency, vol. 1, 367.

not be drawn into purely reactive operations: focus on the population, build your own solution, further your game plan and 

fight the enemy only when he gets in the way. This gains and 

keeps the initiative.”10

—Dr. David J. Kilcullen, counterinsurgency expert and author, 

reserve lieutenant colonel, Australian Army

“Defending air assets on the ground in the midst of an insurgency has been a challenge over the course of history. One need 

only look at the Americans in Vietnam and the Russians in 

Afghanistan to see how airpower can be tested when its aircraft 

and people are sufficiently threatened in the performance of 

their mission. Sound air base defense (ABD) begins with ensuring that airpower leaders understand counterinsurgency 

(COIN) theory and how it applies to securing the terrain affecting air operations.”11

—Dr. William T. Dean III, counterinsurgency expert and Air 

Command and Staff faculty
Abbreviations

AFOSI Air Force Office of Special Investigations

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam

BLS Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak

BSO battlespace owner

BSZ base security zone

CAOC combined air operations center

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COA course of action

COIN counterinsurgency

C-RAM counter-rocket, artillery, mortar

DFC defense force commander

EOC emergency operations center

ESFS Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron

FAS Federation of American Scientists

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigations

HUMINT human intelligence

ID integrated defense

IDF indirect fire

IDP integrated defense plan

IDRMP integrated defense risk management process

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JBB Joint Base Balad

JDOC joint base defense operations center

JISE joint intelligence support element

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

JTAC joint terminal attack controller

JTTF joint terrorism task force
78  │ ABBREVIATIONS

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MWD military working dog

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NVA North Vietnamese Army

OODA observe-orient-decide-act

RAM random antiterrorism measures

RPV remotely piloted vehicles

SAM surface-to-air missile

SF security forces

UAV unmanned aerial vehicles

VBIED vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
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Index

active base defense, 11

Afghanistan, 3, 11, 15, 17, 18, 24, 32, 33, 

35, 43, 44, 48, 49, 51, 63, 70

Air Force Incident Management 

Course, 8, 38

Air Force National Tactical Integration 

Cell, 31

Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), 3

air support, 21, 31, 33

Army Air Force, 17, 28, 36

Army aviation units, 31

Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

(ARVN), 27

attack methodology, 39

Australian Air Power Development

Centre, xx

Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, 18, 24, 

32

Bandaranaike International Airport,

Sri Lanka, 27, 63

Barrackpore, India, 36

base familiarization, 39

base security zone (BSZ), 3, 11, 13, 17, 

18, 20, 28, 39, 57, 59

Basra, Iraq, 13, 14

battlespace owner (BSO), 11, 13, 17–20, 

28, 29

Bien Hoa, Vietnam, 64

Bishop, Brian, 20

black market, 36

Boston, 41, 44

British forces, 13, 14

Camp Bastion, Afghanistan (now called 

Camp Shorabak), 1, 3, 51, 63

campaign objectives, 17

Capitol riot, 37

Chattanooga, Tennessee, 41

Churchill, Winston, 23, 55, 67

coalition, 1, 7, 17-19, 24, 29, 35, 36, 39, 

44, 48, 51, 63

coalition partners, 17, 24

Coast Guard, Philadelphia, 5

Cold War, 40, 51, 52

counterinsurgency (COIN), 13–15, 17, 

29, 35, 61, 69, 70

counter-rocket artillery mortar

(C-RAM), 20, 21

Crete, 23

crisis action team, 40

cybersecurity, 42

Deale, Thomas H., 15, 19, 24, 32, 51, 68 

Decknick, John, 20

Department of State, 17, 18

Dover AFB, Delaware, 5

“Dover Effect,” 5, 6, 9

Eagle Eyes program, 29

Emergency Operations Center (EOC), 

3, 40

Europe, 13, 68

Failaka Island, Kuwait, 7

Fairchild AFB, Washington, 38

Federal Bureau of Investigations

(FBI), 5

Floyd, George, 3

Fort Dix, New Jersey, 5

Fort Hood, Texas, 41, 48

Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, 5

Forward Operating Base Kushamond, 

Afghanistan, 44

455th Expeditionary Security Forces 

Squadron (ESFS), 32

Global Hawk, 31

Gray, Freddy, 3

Gulf War, 35

Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 51

host nation, 7, 57, 59

indirect fire (IDF), 18, 20, 28, 29, 31, 43, 

44, 47, 49

insurgents, 11, 31, 33, 40, 43, 44, 48, 63

integrated defense (ID), 1, 3, 20, 23, 24, 

28, 35, 41, 51, 55, 57–59, 62
88  │ INDEX

integrated defense plan (IDP), 41, 42

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 18

interlocking fields of fire, 3, 40

International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF), xvii

Iraq, 3, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 33, 

35–37, 43–45, 49, 61, 62

ISIS, 37, 45

Islamic state, 37, 46

Italy, 19

Joint Base Balad (JBB), 17, 19, 20, 27–

29, 31, 36, 40, 44, 62

joint defense operations center (JDOC), 

19

joint intelligence support element 

(JISE), 17

joint personnel, 23, 24

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

System (JSTARS), 31

joint terminal attack controller (JTAC), 

21, 31

Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), 7

key terrain, 13, 40

Kilcullen, David, 14, 62, 70

Lakehurst Naval Air Station, New

Jersey, 5

law enforcement, 3, 7, 13, 15, 29, 35-37, 

39, 46–49, 59

lessons, 17, 29, 56, 62

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 

(LTTE), 27, 63

Little Rock, Arkansas, 41

maintenance operations center, 40

McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II, 

xvii

McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, 

5–6

Mellberg, Dean A., 37

Miller, Kenton, 27

Mission Support and Operations 

Group, 32

mortar, 20, 44, 64, 68

Naval Station Philadelphia, 5

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), xvii, 37, 48, 51, 52

North Vietnamese Army (NVA), 27

Office of Air Force History, 27, 61

OH-58 observation helicopters, 32

101st Airborne, 27

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 

35, 68

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 13, 35

organizational climate, 3

outside the wire, 11, 21, 33, 35, 67

Persian Gulf, 7

persistent threat detection system, 32

Port of Philadelphia, 5

RAND Corporation, xix

random antiterrorism measures

(RAM), 7

Raven-B, 32

Republic of South Vietnam, 19

risk management process, xix, 42

rocket-propelled grenade launcher, xvii

Romania, 19

Royal Air Force, 23, 61

San Bernardino, California, 37

security forces (SF), xx

shoulder-fired missiles, 43

suicide squad tactics, 27, 63

surface-to-air missile (SAM), 11, 32, 68

synchronization, 17–19, 32, 33

Tallil Air Base, Iraq, 19

Tamil Tigers, 27, 63

Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of 

South Vietnam, 19

Task Force 1/455, 18

Tatar, Serdar, 6

terrorism, 7, 8, 42, 44, 46; domestic, 7, 

42; gang activity, 42; homegrown, 5, 

42; violent extremists, 42

Tet Offensive, 19, 27

3rd Security Police Squadron, 27

332nd Air Expeditionary Wing, 20, 27, 

29

Tunner, William, 36
INDEX │  89

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), 11, 32; 

Predator, 32; Scan Eagle, 32

US Joint Forces Command, 18

Vietcong, xviii

Vietnam, 19, 27, 31, 43, 44, 49, 61, 62, 

64, 69, 70

wing operations center, 40

World War II, 23, 36

Col Shannon W. Caudill, USAF, retired (BS, Norwich University; MSA, Central Michigan University; MMS,

Marine Corps Command and Staff College; MSS, Air War College; George Walker Executive Leadership Fellow,

University of Charleston, West Virginia) is a doctoral candidate at the University of Charleston, an adjunct professor of leadership at Air Command and Staff College and the University of Charleston, founder of Home Plate Consulting and Writing Services, LLC, and owner of the online book sale business Baseball in Georgia. As a career Air

Force security forces officer, he has worked at the unit, major command, and Joint Staff levels; commanded three

security forces squadrons; and accumulated 18 months of combat experience in Iraq. He has written numerous

white papers and articles on terrorism, leadership, base defense, and law enforcement that have been published in

Air and Space Power Journal, Joint Force Quarterly, American Diplomacy, and the Guardian—the Joint Staff’s antiterrorism publication. He is the editor and coauthor of the Air University Press’s three-volume monograph series,

Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency. In addition, he is coauthor of the history book Baseball in Kennesaw.

As an educator, he has served on the resident and adjunct faculty of Air War College, Air Command and

Staff College, Lake Region State College, North Dakota, and the University of Charleston, West Virginia.

How does an Airman define a fighting position? For a Soldier or Marine it’s most likely a firebase. For a

Sailor it’s a ship. And for an Airman it’s an air base. Our proficiency and commitment to defending our

fighting positions should be no less than the Soldier, Sailor, or Marine. The people of the United Statescelebrate their Air Force because it relentlessly delivers kinetic effects to the nation’s enemies, through a continuous evolution of stealth, standoff, and precision. The security of bases necessary to deliverthese effects

must be a core competency of our Air Force. Air-minded commanders who understand the extended

security perimeter of an air base, the logistics of weapons, fuel, and 24/7 sortie generation must be trained

with the heart and spirit of the Battlefield Airman. Read this book to understand what that means.

— Gen John P. Jumper, USAF, Retired, 17th Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency: Integrated Base Defense Principles for Commanders is

the final volume of the Air University Press trilogy on air base ground defense. The first two volumes

present a uniquely comprehensive assessment of integrated base defense combat lessons learned and

evolving requirements. Thus, volumes I and II were directed primarily at an audience comprised of professional air base defenders, analysts, and scholars. Volume III perfectly complements the first two

volumes, offering 10 principles for base commanders who typically will not have Security Forces backgrounds. The 10 principles are crisp and pithy but also well-grounded in history, offering practical advice

that all base commanders would be wise to heed. The three volumes in this set are an invaluable resource

and belong on the bookshelves of every air base defender, base commander, and airpower analyst.

— Dr. Alan Vick, senior political scientist, RAND Corporation, author of Snakes in the

Eagle’s Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases and Air Base Attacks and

Defensive Counters: Historical Lessons and Future Challenges

This is an essential guide for every commander on an air base who must protect Air Force assets in order

to project airpower anytime and anyplace. Effective execution of mission command, agility, and a

well-led, well-trained defense force will carry the day.

— Lt Gen Brad Webb, USAF, commander, Air Education & Training Command