1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 07 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### WATSON v . UNITE D STAT ES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 06–5 71. Ar g u ed Oc tober9, 2007—Dec i ded Dec e m b er10, 200 7 Aftertr ading a c o ntr o lled s u bstanc e forapisto l , peti tio n erWatson wa s

indict ed for, i n ter alia , v i ol atin g18 U. S. C. §924(c )(1)(A), wh ic hsets ama nda t ory minimum s e ntence, depending on the fa cts , for adefen

dant who, “during and in re lation toany . . . dru gtraffic k ing c r ime[,]

. . . uses . . . a fir e ar m.” Th e st atute doe s not define “u ses,” but thi s Cour t has spo k en to ittwic e . In holding t h at “ acrimina l who trades h i s fir e ar m fo rdr u g s ‘ u ses’ it .

. . within the meaning of §924(c)(1),” Smithv. Un it edSt at es , 508 U. S. 223, 24 1, th e Cou r t r e sted pr imar ily on the “or d inar yornatur a l mean ing” of the verb in context, id., at 228, u n d er st a n din gits c o m m onr a n g e as g o in gbey o n demploy men t as aweapon to tr adin ga weaponfordru g s, id., at 2 30. La ter , in holding that merely posses s ing a fire arm kept near thescene of drug tr affic k in gis n o t “u se” un der§924(c )(1), th e Cou r t , in Baileyv. United Stat es , 516 U. S. 13 7, ag ainlooke dto “or d in ar yorn a tu r a l” meaning , id., at 14 5, dec i din gth at “§924(c ) (1) r e qu ir es eviden c e su ffi

cient to show an active employmentof the fir e ar m bythe defendant, a use that m a k e s the f i r e ar m an o p er ati v e factor in relation to the predicate offense,” id., at 143. Watsonpleaded g u iltybu t r e ser v ed the r i gh t to c h alleng e the fac t ual b a sis fo r a §924(c)(1)(A) conviction a n d s e nt ence. The Fift h Circuita ffi rmed on its precedent foreclosing an yar gu men t th at Wat s onh a d n o t “u sed” a fir e ar m. Held: A per s ondoes n o t “u se” a fir e ar m u n d er18 U. S. C. §924(c )(1)(A)

wh en h e r e c e iv es it intr ade fordr ug s. Pp. 4–9.

(a) The Go vernment’s position la cks authority in eithe rprecedent or regular English. Neither Smith, whi c h addressed onl ythe trader who s w a p s his gun for dru g s , not the tra d ing pa rtner who ends up with the gun, nor Bailey, w h ich ruled tha tagun mus tb e ma de us e of ac tiv e lyto sa t i sfy§9 24(c )(1) ( A), dec i des th is c a se. W i th n o sta t u t or y2 WATSON v. UNITED STAT ES Sy llabu s definition, the meaningof “uses” ha s to t u r non “ev e r y daymeaning” revealed in phraseology that stri kes the ear as “both reasonable and norma l .” Smi t h, sup r a , 228, 23 0. Wh e nWatsonh a n d ed ov erth e drugs for t h e pis t ol, t h e officer “ u s e d” the pistol to g e t t h e dr ug s, but regula r s p eec h would not s a y tha tWa tso nhimself used the pistol in th e tr ade. Pp. 4–5.

(b) The Government’s first effort to trump ordina ry En glis h is re jec t ed. Notin gth at §924(d)(1) au th or izes seizu r e an d for f eitu r e of fir e ar ms “inte n ded to be use din” c e r t ain c r imes, the Go v e r n ment in

fers that sinc e some of tho s e offenses in volve receipt of a firearm,
“ u s e ” neces s a r ily includes re ceiptof aguneven in ab a r t e r t r a n s a c tion. The Government’s re liance on Smi t hfor the proposition that the ter m mustbe g i v e n the same meaning in both subse c tions overrea d s Smith

. The c o mmon v e rb “use” is not at odds in the two sub

s e c t i o n s b u t s p e a k s t o d i f f e r e n ti s s u e s i nd i f f e r e n tv o i c e s a n da td i f

fer e n tlev e ls of spec ific ity

. Sec t ion924(d) (1) in dic a tes t h at a g u n c a n be “used” in a r e c e ipt c r i me, but d oes not say whether both partie s to a transfer use the gun, or only one, or which o n e; ho weve r, §924(c )(1)(A) r e qu ir es ju st su c ha spec ific iden tific a tion

. Pp. 5–7.

(c ) Noris the Gov e rnment’ s sec o nd effor tto tr ump or d i nar yEng

lish persuasiv e . It claims that failing to treat receipt in trade as “use” would c r eate unac c e ptable a s y mmet r y with Smith; i.e., it wo uld be strange to penalize one side of a g u n - for

- dr ug s ex chan g e bu t n o t the other. The problem is not with Sm i t h, howev e r , but with the li m ited m a lle abil i ty of the la nguage it co nstrued, and policy-driven sy mmetr yc a nnot tur n“r eceipt-in-tr ad e” into “use.” Whatever the tension between the p r ior result and the outcome here , law depends onr e spec t forlan g u a g e an d wou l d be ser v ed betterbysta t u t or y amen dmen t t h anby r a c k ingstatu t or ylan g u a g eto c o vera polic y it fails to r e ac h

. Pp. 8–9. 191 Fed. Appx . 326, r e v e r s ed an d r e man d ed.

S OUTER , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in whi c h R OBERTS , C. J., an d S TE VENS , S CALI A , K ENNEDY , T HOMAS , B REYER , an d ALITO , JJ., joined. G IN SB U R G , J., filed a nopinion concurring in the j u dgment._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt
NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p r in t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on s m a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp r in t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 06–5 71 

### MICHAEL A. WATSON, PETITI ONER v. UNITE D STATE S ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [Dec ember10, 2007] 

### J USTICE 

### S OUTER

### delivered the opinion of the C o urt. The question is whether a person who trades his drugs for a gun “u ses” a firear m “during and in relation to .

. . [a] drug trafficking crime” within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A). 1 

### We hold that he does not. I A Section 924(c)(1)(A) s e ts a mandatory min i mum sen tence, depending on th e facts, for a defendant who, “duri n g and in relation to any crime of violence or drug traffic k in g crime[,] .

. . uses or carries a firear m.” 2 

### The statute leaves the term “uses” undef ined, though we have spok en to i t twice before. Smithv. U n ited S t ates , 508 U. S. 223 (1993) raised the converse of today’s question, and h e ld that “a criminal who

——————

1 For m er ly18 U. S. C. §924(c )(1) (199 4 ed.). 2 An y v i olationof §924(c )(1)(A), forex ample, deman d s aman d ator y min i mu m sen t en c e of 5 y e ar s. See 18 U. S. C. §924(c )(1)(A)(i). If th e fir e ar m is b r andished, the minimum g oes up to 7 y e ar s, see §924(c )(1)(A)(i i); if th e fir e arm is di sc h a r g ed, th e min i mu m ju mps to 1 0 y e ars, see §924(c)(1)(A)(iii).2 WATSON v. UNITED STAT ES Opinion of theCourt 

### trades his fi rearm for drugs ‘uses’it during and in relation to a drug traffickin g offense within the meaning of §924(c)(1).” Id. , at 241. We rested primarily on the “ordi

nary or na tural meaning” of the verb in context, id., at 228, and understood its common range as going beyond employmen tas a weapon: “it is both reasonable and nor

mal to say that petitio n er ‘used’ h i s MAC–10 in his dru g traffic k ing offense by trading it forcocaine,” id., at 230. Two years later, the issue in Bailey v. UnitedS t ates , 516 U. S. 137 (1995) was whether possessing a firearm kept near the sc ene of drug trafficking is “use” und er §924(c)(1). We looked again to “ord inary or natural” meaning, id., at 145, and decided that mere possession does not amount to “use”: “§924(c)(1) requ ires evidence sufficient to show a n activ eempl oymentof t h e firearm by the defendant, a us e that makes the firear m an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense , ” id., at 143. 3 

### B This third case on the reach of § 924(c)(1)(A) began to take shape when peti tioner, Michael A. Watson, told a Government informant that he wanted to acquire a gun. On the matter of price, the infor m ant quoted no dollar figure but suggested that Wats on could pay in narcotics. Next, Wats on met with the informant and a nundercover law enforce ment agent posing as a firearm s dealer, to whom he gave 24 doses of oxycodone hydrocholoride (commonly, OxyContin) for a .50 caliber semiautomatic pistol. Wh en law enf o rcement o fficers arrested Watso n , they found the pistol in his car, a n d a later search of his house turned up a cache of prescription medicines, guns,

——————

3 In1998, Con gr e ss r e spon ded to Baileyby amen din g§924(c )(1). Th e amendment broadened the provisio n to c o v e ra defendant who “in furtherance of any [crime o f violen ce or drug t r a fficking] crim e , pos sesse s a f i r e ar m.” 18 U. S. C. §924(c )(1)(A). Th e ame n dmen t did n o t tou c hth e “u se” pr on gof §924(c )(1).3 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt 

### and ammunition. Watson said he got the pistol “to protect his other firearms and drugs.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 11a. A federal grand jur yindicted him for dist ributing a Schedule II controlled substance and for “using” the pistol during andin relation to that crime, in violation of §924(c)(1)(A). 4

### Watson pleaded guilty across the board , reserving t h e right to challenge the factual basis for a §924(c)(1)(A) conviction and the added consecutive sen

tence of 60 months for using the gun. The Court of Ap

peals affirmed, 191 Fed. Appx. 326 (CA5 2 006) (per cu

riam) , on C i rcuit p r ecedent foreclosing any ar gument tha t Watson had not “used” a firearm, see id., a t327 (citing UnitedS t a t es v. Ullo a , 94 F. 3 d949 (CA5 1996) an d United Sta t es v. Zuniga , 18 F. 3d 1254 (CA5 1994)).

We granted certiorarito resolve a conflict among the Circuits on whether a person “uses” a firear m within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A) when he trades na r cotics to obtain a gun. 5

### 549 U. S. ___ (2007)

. We now

——————

4 Th e g r an d jur yalso in dic t ed Watsonas a feloninposses s ionof a firearm, in vi olation of §922(g)(1). This c o unt r e ferred to the five firea r ms found in Wa ts on’s hous e, but not the pistol he g o t for the na rcot i cs .

5 Compare Uni t ed States v. Cotto , 456 F. 3d 2 5 ( CA1 2 006) (tr a din g dr u g s fora firear m c o n s titu t e s “u se” of th e fir e ar m u n d er §924(c )(1)(A)); Un it e dSt at es v. Sumler , 294 F. 3d5 7 9 (CA 3 2 0 0 2 ) (same); United States v. Ram i rez -Range l , 1 03 F. 3d 150 1 (CA9 199 7) (same); United States v. Ulloa , 94 F. 3d 949 ( CA5 19 96) (s ame); United Sta t es v. Cannon , 88 F. 3d 149 5 ( CA8 1 9 9 6 ) (s ame), with United S t ates v. Montano , 398 F. 3d 1276 (C A11 2 0 0 5 ) (per c u riam ) (def endant did not “u se” a fir e ar m with inth e mean in gof §924(c )(1)(A) wh en h e tr aded drugs for a fi rearm); Un it edSt at es v. Ste w a r t , 246 F. 3d 72 8 (CAD C 200 1) (same); Un it edSt ates v. Warwick , 167 F. 3d 965 (CA6 1 9 9 9 ) (same); United States v. Westm o re land , 122 F. 3d 431 (CA 7 199 7) (s a m e). The Fourth Circuit ha s heldth a t a defen d an t “ u sed” afir e ar m where he ga vecoca ine b a s e t o acom p a t riotin excha n ge for a s s i s t a n ce in obt a ining agun. See Un ited States v. Harris , 3 9 F. 3 d12 62 (19 94). S u b s eq uent u n pub lis hed opinions in that Circuit have relied on Harris for the propos ition that the receipt of a fir e ar m inex chan g e fordr u g s c o nstitutes us e of the fir e arm. See, e. g . , Un it e d St at es v. Belcher , No.4 WATSON v. UNITED STAT ES Opinion of theCourt


### reverse. II A The Gover n ment’s position that Watson “used” the pistol under §924(c)(1)(A) by re ceiving it for na rcotics lacks authority i neither pre c edent or re gular En glish. To begi n with, neith e r Smith norBaileyimplicitly deci des this cas e . While Smithheld that firearms may be “used” in a barter transaction, even with no violent employment, see 508 U. S. , at 2 41, the case addressed only the trader wh o swaps his gun for drugs, not the trading partn e r who ends up with the gun. Bailey , too, is unhelpful, with its rule that a gu n must be made use of actively to satisfy §924(c)(1)(A), as “anoperative fa ctor in relation to th e predicate offense.” 516U. S., at 143. The question here is whether it mak e s sens e to say th at Watson employed the gun at all; Baileydoes not answer it. With no s t atutory definitionordefinitive clue, the meaning of the verb “u ses” has to turn on the language as we normally speak it, see, e.g., Lopez v. Gonzales , 549 U. S. ___, ___ (2006) ( s lip op., at5); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer , 513 U. S. 1 79, 187 (1995); FDIC v. Meyer , 5 10 U. S. 471, 476 (1994); t h ere is no other source of a reas on able inference about what Congress understood when writing or what its words will bri n g to the mind of a care

ful reader. So, in Smi t hwe looke dfor “ever y day mean

ing,” 508 U. S. , at 2 28, revealed in phras eology that strikes the ear as “both reasonable and normal,” id. , at 230. See a l so Bailey, supra, at 1 45. This a p peal to the ordinary leaves the Government without much of a case. The Govern ment may s a y that a person “uses” a firearm simply by receiving it in a barter transaction, but no one else would. A boy who trades an a p ple to get a granola ba r

—————— 98– 48 45, 19 99 WL 1080 103 ( CA4, Nov

. 29, 199 9) (per c u ri am )

.5 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt 

### is sens iblysaid to us e the apple, but on e would nev e r guess which way this commerce actually flowed from hearing that the boy used the granola. Cf. Unit e dSt at es v. Stewa r t , 246 F. 3d 728, 731 ( CADC 2001) (“[W]hen a person pay s a cashiera dollar fo r a cup of coffee in the courthouse cafeteria, the customer has not used the coffee. H e has on ly used the dollar bi ll”). So, when Watson handed over the drugs for the pistol, the infor m ant or th e agent 6

### “used” the pistol to get t h e drugs, just as Smith held, but regular speech would not say that Watson him

self used th e pistol inthe tra de. “A seller does not ‘use’ a buyer’s consideration,” United S t a t es v. We stmoreland , 122 F. 3d 431, 4 36 (CA7 19 97), and th e Government’s contrary position recalls anothercase; Lopez, supra, at _ __ (slip op., at 7), rejected the Government’s interpre tation of 18 U. S. C. §9 24(c)(2) because “we do not normally speak or write the Government’s way.” 7 

### B The Government would trump ordinary En glish with two ar guments. Firs t, i trelies on Smit h for the pertinence of a neighb oring provi s ion, 18 U. S. C. §924(d)(1), which authorizes seizure and forfeiture of firearms “intended to be used in” certain cri minal offen s es listed in §924(d)(3). Some of th ose offenses involve rec e ipt of afir e arm, 8

### from

——————

6 The recorddoes nots a y whi c h. 7 Dict iona ries confirm t h e conclus i on. “Use” is concededly “elas t ic,” Smithv. United States , 508 U. S. 2 23, 2 4 1 (1 99 3) (S CALI A , J., dis s e n t

ing), b u t none of its s t a n dard definitions s t retch fa r enoughto rea c h Watson’s conduct, see, e.g . , Webster’s Ne w International Dictionary of th e En g lishLan g u a g e 2806 (2d ed. 19 39) (“to emp l oy”); Th e Ran d o m Hou s e Dic t ion a r yof th e En glishLan g u a g e 209 7 (2ded. 1 987) ( t o “ a pply to one’s own purposes”; “pu tinto service; make use of ”); Black’s Law Dictionary1541 (6th ed. 19 90) (“[t]o av ailoneself of;

. . . to utilize”); see also Smith, supra, at 228– 22 9 (list i n gv a r i ou s dic t ion a r y defin i tion s).

8 See, e. g. , 18 U. S. C. §922(j ) (pr o h ibitin g , inter alia, t h e receiptof a s t olen firea r m in int e rs t a t e com m e rce); §9 2 4 (b ) (prohib i ting, inter alia,6 WATSON v. UNITED STAT ES Opinion of theCourt 

### which the Government infers th at “use” u n der §924(d) necessarily includes receipt of a gun evenin a barter transaction. Smithis cited for the proposition that the term must be given the same meaning in both subsections, and the Government urges us to import “use” as “receipt in barter” into §924(c)(1)(A). We agree with the Government that §924(d) calls for attention; the reference to in tended use in a receipt cri me carries some suggestion that re ceipt can be “ u se” (more of a hint, say, than spea king of intended “use” in a crim e defined as exchange). But the s u ggestion is a tepid one and falls short of supp orting wha tis really an attempt t o draw a conclusion too s p ecificfrom a premise too general. The Smith majority rested principally on ordinary speech in r e asoning th at §924(c)(1) extends beyond use a s a weapon a n d includes use a s an item of bar ter, see 50 8 U. S., at 228–230, and the Smithopinion looks to §924( d) only for its light on t hat conclusion. It not e s that the “intended to be used” clause of §924(d)(1) refers to offenses where “the firearm is not used as aweapon bu t instead as an item of barter or co mmerce,” id., at 234, with the impli

cation thatCongress intended “u se” to reac h commercial transaction s, not just gun violence, in §924(d) generally, see id., at 2 34–235. It was this breadth of treatment that led the Smi t h majority to say that, “[u]nless we are to hold that using a firearm h a s a different meaning in §924(c)( 1 ) than it does in §924(d) —and clearly we should not—we must reject petitioner’s narrow inte rpretation.” Id., at 235 (citation omitted); see a l so Bailey, supra, at 14 6 (“[U]sing a firearm should not have a differen tmeaning in §924(c)(1) than it doe s in §924(d)” (internalquotation marks omit

ted)). The Government overreads Smith

. While the neighbor

-

—————— the r e c e ipt of a fir e ar m in inter s tate c o mmer c e with the intent to c o mmit a felony).7 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt 

### ing provision indicates that a fire arm is “used” nonoffen

sively, and supports the conclusion that a gun can be “used” in b a rter, beyond that point its illum i nation fai l s . This is so b e cause the utility of §9 24(d)(1) is l i mited by it s generality and its pas s ive voice; it tells us a gun can be “used” in a receipt crime, but notwhether both parties to a transfer use the gun, or only o n e, or whi c h one. The nearby subsection (c)(1)(A), ho wever, requires just such a specific ide n tification. It provides that a person who use s a gun in the circumstances described commits a crime, whose perpetrator must be clearly identifiable in advance. The agnosticism on the part of §924(d)(1) about who does the using is entirely consistent with com m on speech’s understanding that the first possessor is the one who “uses” the gun in the trade, and there is thus no cause to admonish u s to adhere to the paradigm of a statute “as a symmetrica l and coher e nt regulat o ry scheme, .

. . in whic h the operative words have a consistent mean ing through

out,” Gus t af sonv. Alloyd Co. , 513 U. S. 561, 5 69 (1995), or to invoke t h e “standar d principle of statutoryconstruc t ion

. . . that identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning, ” Powerex Corp. v. Reli a n t Ene r gy Servi ces, In c. , 551 U. S. ___, ___ (2 007) (slip op., at 7). Subsections (d)(1) and (c)(1)(A) as we read them are not at odds o v er the verb “use”; the p o int is merely that in the two sub s ections the common ve rb speak s to different i ssues indif f erent voices and at different level s of specifi c ity. The provisions do distinct jobs, but we donot mak e them guilty of employin g the common verb inconsistently. 9

——————

9 Forthat m a t t er , the Gov e r n ment’ s ar g u ment tha t“us e ” mus ta l

way s h a v e an iden tic a l mea n in gi n§§924(c )(1)(A) an d 9 24(d)(1) wou l d upend Baileyv. United States , 516 U. S. 137 (19 95). On e of th e r e le

vant predicate offenses referred to by §924(d)(1) is possession of “any stolen fir e ar m . . . [in] intersta te orfor e ig n c o mmerc e.” 18 U. S. C

. §922( j). If we wer e to h o l dth at al l c r i min a l c o n d u c t c o v e r e d by th e8 WATSON v. UNITED STAT ES Opinion of theCourt 

### C The second effort to tr ump regular English is the claim that failing to treat receipt intrade as “use” would create unacceptabl e asymmetry wi th Smit h

. At bottom, this atextual policy critique says itwould be strange to penal

ize one side of a gun-for-dru g s exchange but not the other: “[t]he dang er to societ y is created not only by the person who brings the firearm to the drug transaction, but also by the drug de aler who takes the weapon in exchange for his drugs du ring the trans action,” Bri e f for United States 23. The position assumes t hat Smith must be respected, and we join the Government at leas t on this starting point. A difference of opinion within the Court (as in Smith ) does not k eep the door open for anoth er try at s t atutory con struction, where stare decisi shas “special force [since] t h e legislative power is implicat ed, and Congress remains free to alter wh at we ha ve done.” Pa ttersonv. Mc Lean Credi t Union , 491 U. S. 164, 172–173 (19 89). What is more, in1 4 years Congress has taken no step to modify Smith ’s hold

ing, and this long congressi onal acquiescence “has en

hanced even the usual precedential force” we accord to ou r interpretati ons of statutes, Shepard v. UnitedSta t es , 544 U. S. 13, 23 (2005). The proble m, then, is not with the sturdines s of Smith but with the limited malleabi lity of the language Smi t h construed, and policy-driven symmetry cann ot turn “re

ceipt-in-tra de” into “us e .” Whatev er the tension between the prior r e sult and the outcome here, law depends on respect for language and would b e served better bystat u tory amendment (if Congress sees asymmetry) than b y

—————— “in t en ded to be u s ed” c l au se in§924(d)( 1 ) is “u se ” forpu r p oses of §924(c )(1)(A), it wou l d fol l o wth at mer e posses s ioni s u s e. Bu t th a t would s q ua rely co nflict withour cons idere da n d una nimous decis i on in Baileythat “ ‘ u se’ must c o nnote mor e tha nmer e posses s ion of a fir e ar m.” 516 U. S., at 143.9 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt 

### rackin g sta t utory lang uage to cover a policy it fails to reach. The argument is a pec u liar one, in fact, given the Gov

ernment’s take on the current state of §924(c)(1)(A). I t was amended after Baileyand now prohibits not only using a firearm during and in relation to a drug traffickin g crime, but also possessing one “in furtheran ce of” such a crime. 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1)(A); see n. 3, supra . Th e Government is confident that “a drug dealer who takes a firearm in exchange for his drugs generally will be subject to prosecution” under this new possession prong. Brief fo r United Sta t es 27; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 41 (Watson’s case “could have been charged as possession”); cf. United S t a t es v. Cox , 324 F. 3d 77, 83, n. 2 (CA2 2003) (“For defendants charged un der §924(c) after [the post- Bailey ] amendment, trading drugs for a gun will probably result in . . . p o ss es sion [in furtherance of a drugtra fficking cri me]”). This view may or may not prevail, and we do not speak to it today, but it does leav e the appeal to sym m etry underwhelming in a contestwith the English language, on th e Government’s very terms. * * * Given ordin a ry meanin gand the conventions of English, we hold th at a perso ndoes not “use” a fi rearm under §924(c)(1)(A) when he receives it in trade for drugs. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cas e is remanded for furth er proceedings consistent with th is opinion. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) G IN SB U R G , J ., conc urri ng inj u dgment 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 06–5 71 

### MICHAEL A. WATSON, PETITI ONER v. UNITE D STATE S ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [Dec ember10, 2007] 

### J USTICE 

### G IN S B UR G 

### , concurring in the judgme nt. It is better to receive than to give, the Court holds today, at least when the subj ect is guns. Distinguishing, as the Court does, between trading a gu n for dru g s and tra din g drugs for agun, for purposes of the 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1) enhancement, makes scant sense t o me. I jointhe Court’s judgment, however, b e cause I am persuaded that th e Court took a wrong tu rn in Smith v. UnitedStates , 508 U. S. 223 (1 993), when it held that trading agun for dru g s fits within §924(c)(1)’s compass as “us[e]” of a firear m “during andin relation to any .

. . drug traf f icking crime.” For reasons well stated by J USTI C E 

### S CALIA 

### in his dissent

ing opinionin Smith, 508 U. S., at 241, I would read the word “use” in §924(c)(1) to mean u s e as a wea p on, not us e in a barteri ng transaction. Accordingly, I wo uld overrul e Smith , and thereby re nder our precedent both coherent and consistent with normal usage. Cf. Hensleev. Uni o n Plante rs N a t. Bank & Trus t Co. , 335 U. S. 595, 600 (194 9) (Frankfu rte r, J., dissenting) (“Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.” ).