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32–235PDF 2007

IRAN

BRIEFING AND HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 11 AND JANUARY 31, 2007

Serial No. 110–3

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

TOM LANTOS, California, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

VACANT 

VACANT 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico 

ROBERT R. KING, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

ALAN MAKOVSKY, Senior Professional Staff Member 

GENELL BROWN, Staff Associate 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

DATES 

Briefing: January 11, 2007 ..................................................................................... 1

Hearing: January 31, 2007 ..................................................................................... 57

BRIEFERS 

The Honorable Thomas R. Pickering, former Under Secretary of State for 

Political Affairs ..................................................................................................... 18

The Honorable R. James Woolsey, Jr., former Director, Central Intelligence 

Agency ................................................................................................................... 31

WITNESSES 

Abbas Milani, Ph.D., Co-Director of Iran Democracy Project, Hoover Institution, Stanford University ..................................................................................... 66

Ray Takeyh, Ph.D., Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies, Council on Foreign 

Relations ............................................................................................................... 75

Mr. Enders Wimbush, Director of Center for Future Security Strategies, 

Senior Fellow for the Hudson Institute .............................................................. 83

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

The Honorable Thomas R. Pickering: Prepared statement .................................. 25

The Honorable R. James Woolsey, Jr.: Prepared statement ................................ 36

Abbas Milani, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................. 70

Ray Takeyh, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................... 78

Mr. Enders Wimbush: Prepared statement ........................................................... 86

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida: Prepared statement, January 11, 2007 ............................................ 97

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Texas: Prepared statement, January 31, 2007 .................................... 97
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UNDERSTANDING THE IRAN CRISIS 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Lantos 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman LANTOS. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come 

to order. This is our second hearing on Iran in a series of hearings 

during the course of which we will combine practical, political decision makers in the field as we had last week with former Under 

Secretary of State Pickering and former director of the CIA, James 

Woolsey. 

Today, we are fortunate to have two outstanding academicians 

who have made the study of Iran the central focus of their scholarly pursuit. And we are delighted to welcome them. 

Having just returned from a trip to the Middle East with Speaker Pelosi and the Democratic National Security leadership, it is 

clear to me that Iran and its nuclear ambitions are central to our 

interests and concerns in this vital region. 

The intentions and possible future actions of Iran are very much 

on the minds of top leaders in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, 

with whom we met. 

They shared their great concern regarding Iran’s growing influence in the area and what everyone believes to be its quest for nuclear weapons. 

A world with a nuclear armed Iran would be a very different 

world. It would be a world in which Tehran, without firing a shot, 

would be able to intimidate and bully its neighbors, including many 

today who are allies of the United States. 

It is clear that Iran’s neighbors know this, and for the most part, 

they are terrified by the prospect. 

We must know all we can about Iran’s capabilities and intentions 

because we must prevent a development of a nuclear armed Iran. 

At the same time, we must act very carefully in this sensitive 

and important region which is already in deep upheaval because of 

our Iraq policy. 

Iran is growing increasingly arrogant about its ability to act with 

impunity. 

Last June, the permanent five members of the United Nations 

Security Council and Germany offered the very generous package 

of incentives to Tehran to suspend its nuclear program. Iran merely shrugged it off. 

Click here for transcript of January 11, 2007 briefing
58

In July, the Security Council issued an ultimatum to Tehran, 

suspend uranium enrichment activities within 1 month, or face 

sanctions. Iran blithely ignored that threat as well and continued 

with enrichment. 

Nothing that happened subsequently shook Tehran’s faith in its 

ability to continue its cynical kabuki dance. 

Russia and China raised one road block after another. The Security Council failed to impose sanctions within 1 month or even 2. 

Instead, it wrangled for 5 long months before producing a pathetic 

set of sanctions that will do little or nothing to deter Iran’s reckless 

pursuit of nuclear arms. 

Meanwhile, the Chinese and Iranians announced a preliminary agreement worth some $16 billion for Chinese investment in an 

Iranian natural gas field. On Monday of this week, Royal Dutch 

Shell announced the signing of a preliminary multibillion-dollar 

deal with Iran to develop adjacent gas properties. The recently announced $16 billion oil and gas deal between Iran 

and Malaysia is equally abhorrent. That is why today I am sending 

a letter to our Trade Representative, Susan Schwab, requesting 

that all negotiations between the United States and Malaysia on 

a free trade agreement be suspended until Malaysia renounces this 

proposed deal. 

At a time when we and the United Nations should be imposing 

sanctions on Iran for its nuclear activities, Asian and European 

companies are signing lucrative contracts to provide massive additional revenues to fuel Iran’s search for nuclear weapons. If we permit this kind of heedless and mindless avarice, it will be at the 

world’s peril. 

This past week, Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency, revealed that, within a few 

weeks, Iran intends to begin construction of a new underground 

plant for uranium enrichment. 

Once again, Iran has thumbed its nose at the international community. 

Given the urgency of our concerns with Iran, we must use every 

tool in our diplomatic arsenal. The most basic is dialogue. I am 

passionately committed to dialogue with those countries with which 

we disagree. 

Dialogue does not mean appeasement or defeat. Dialogue represents our best opportunity to persuade as well as our best opportunity to determine if we have failed to persuade. 

For over a decade I have sought opportunities to meet with the 

Iranian leadership in Tehran. My friend, Kofi Annan, the former 

U.N. Secretary General, and Jan Eliasson, the last president of the 

U.N. General Assembly and foreign minister of Sweden, have both 

attempted to persuade the authorities that an open dialogue with 

Members of Congress is in our mutual interest. 

All of our approaches have so far been rebuffed. 

The Iranian people deserve leaders who are worthy of Iran’s 

noble traditions and their country’s importance. 

I am cautiously encouraged that Ahmadinejad has recently suffered a triple whammy, a resounding defeat of his party in local 

elections, a harsh letter of rebuke from the majority of the Iranian 

parliament and the denunciation of his diplomacy by the news-
59

paper considered as the mouthpiece of Iran’s Supreme Leader 

Khamenei. 

In short, it is a critically important time for us to make progress 

in dealing with the nuclear ambitions of Iran. And it may be that 

conditions in Iran are ripe to make steps forward. 

Now I urge all of my colleagues to read very carefully the submitted testimony of our three distinguished witnesses in total. 

These three papers represent a kaleidoscope of views concerning 

this unbelievably complex country. We are cautioned in their statements about falling victim to the Chalabi syndrome, the experience 

we had with respect to Iraq. They are cautioning against a grand 

bargain with the mullahs whereby we would overlook the human 

rights abuses, the nuclear plants, for the appearance of a surface 

relationship. They correctly point out that Iran is a despotic theocracy, and here I quote: ‘‘A theocracy despised, incompetent, morally 

bankrupt and bereft of legitimacy.’’

They are cautioning about the presence of a messianic clergy. 

And some of their leadership believes in the imminent return of the 

Mahdi, the 12th imam of Shi’a, who got into occultation 1,000 years 

ago. 

Yet at the same time, they correctly point out that the vast majority of the Iranian people despise the theocratic rulers and show 

their distrust through both capital flight and an enormous brain 

drain. And one of our witnesses calls for dramatic changes in our 

public diplomacy policy, vis-a-vis that country. 

I am deeply grateful for their three powerful papers and I am 

now delighted to turn to the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, who may have to 

leave because of votes in the banking committee, Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the distinguished ranking member for her collegiality. 

Even as American troops are now engaging in seizures of Iranian 

agents in Iraq, and an additional carrier battle group is being dispatched to the Persian Gulf, the Bush administration remains 

stuck behind the idea that diplomacy is equivalent to appeasement 

and that negotiation is akin to surrender. Consequently, with regard to Iran, we seem determined to achieve the worst of all policy 

outcomes. 

While the White House intones that ‘‘all options are on the 

table,’’ the military facts of life argue otherwise. Our armed forces, 

especially our Army and Marine Corps, are operating on the edge 

of their capacity, while the Air Force and Navy remain capable of 

conducting a robust conventional bombing campaign. I remain 

skeptical that the key would be able to strike all the key components of Iran’s nuclear program. 

Many facilities are extremely well protected. Some are buried. 

Others are hardened. Some have all of these features. More troubling, based on recent history, I think prudence demands that we 

assume that there are both facilities we have not yet identified and 

facilities we have misidentified. 

More over, we have scarcely considered the full nature and extent of Iran’s presence in Iraq and what capabilities it has to make 

mischief in other parts of the Middle East or the rest of the globe. 
60

Although our military options are dismal, the Bush administration seems intent on charging full speed ahead toward confrontation. If we had a credible diplomatic alternative that we were pushing the Iranians toward, such gambling might make sense. Without 

a diplomatic backstop, however, it is merely reckless. Without 

question, face-to-face dialogue, as the chairman has suggested, with 

the Iranians would be difficult, unpleasant and I believe also likely 

to fail. 

However, if there are no talks, a negotiated resolution of either 

the Iranian nuclear problem or the instability and violence in Iraq 

is essentially impossible. 

I would add here that this administration’s incessant practice of 

subcontracting to other countries the most vital question of our national security represents one of the most egregious and shameful 

failures in the history of American foreign policy. Achieving success 

in negotiations with Iran may not be possible, but without making 

the attempt, without demonstrating that America is doing its utmost to resolve these regional crises—apart from applying more 

and more force—our ability to attract and hold allies will be greatly 

diminished. 

Other nations expect us to lead, not to lecture. Painful as it may 

be for some to acknowledge, the United States has a credibility 

problem. 

There once was a Republican President who warned us to speak 

softly but carry a big stick. Instead of blustering about Iran while 

hollowing out our military in Iraq, we need to get serious about 

achieving some of the very simple but difficult goals: First, bringing 

our catastrophic adventure in Iraq to a conclusion that will not 

turn Iraq’s civil war into a regional war; second, restoring the 

strength and credibility to our already overextended armed forces; 

and third, engaging our European allies in a strategic plan to convince Iran that its best interests require a satisfactory resolution 

to the nuclear issue. Anyone who believes we can achieve any of 

this agenda without engaging the Iranians ourselves on the fundamental question of regional security is fooling themselves. 

I hope today’s panel will illustrate for us how Iran sees the 

world, where its vulnerabilities lie and how we can best achieve security in the Persian Gulf region for ourselves and our allies in and 

around the world. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. It is now my 

great pleasure to turn to my good friend, the distinguished ranking 

member of the committee, Congressman Ros-Lehtinen. She is the 

author of the Iran Freedom Support Act which Congress adopted 

last September. I was very pleased to work with her in developing 

that important legislation. She has been one of the foremost leaders in the Congress in our effort to deal with Iran, Mrs. RosLehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Lantos, and I congratulate you on the trip that you took, just came back yesterday, 

with Speaker Pelosi, and the chairman, Chairman Skelton, and Mr. 

Murtha and others, and we in our committee look forward to getting briefed by you on that trip to Iraq, to Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
61

And I would like to also thank our distinguished panelists for appearing before us today. 

Creating an effective long-term strategy regarding Iran is one of 

the highest priorities in the United States. The regime has called, 

as all of us know, for Israel to be wiped off the map. It continues 

to refer to the United States as the great Satan, and it hosted a 

conference that was so appalling aimed at denying the Holocaust. 

Iran’s aggressive words, however, are not mere rhetoric. Iran is the 

number one state sponsor of terrorism, enabling the murder of 

countless innocent civilians, endangering international security by 

supplying weapons, funding, training and providing sanctuary to 

terrorist groups such Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran continues to supply the Shiite Islamist groups in Iraq with money, training and 

weapons, such as the improvised explosive devices, IEDs, that are 

used to target United States coalition troops in Iraq. Iran’s support 

for these extremist groups is a major factor in the sectarian strife 

and attacks taking place in Iraq. 

If we fail in Iraq, Iran will be liberated to dominate the oil-producing Persian Gulf and increase its support for Islamist militant 

extremists, thereby spreading instability throughout the region. 

Iran’s self proclaimed goal is the promotion of an Islamist revolution worldwide. 

Ahmadinejad made the following statement just a few weeks ago: 

We must believe in the fact that Islam is not confined to geographical borders, ethnic groups and nations. It is a universal ideology. We do not shy away from declaring that Islam is ready to 

rule the world; we must prepare ourselves to rule the world. 

As the entire world knows, Iran has embarked on a major program to develop nuclear weapons which threatens to radically 

transform the balance of power in the Middle East. 

Iran’s nuclear capabilities would change perceptions of the military balance in the region and could pose serious challenges to the 

United States in terms of deterrence and defense. 

But the threat posed by Iran goes beyond its sponsorship of terror or its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Iran’s leadership has already 

expressed its willingness to assist other problem countries in obtaining nuclear capabilities. With respect to cooperation between 

Iran and other terrorist nations, former CIA director Tenet noted 

in a February 2004 threat assessment when he briefed Congress: 

Iran appears to be willing to supply missile related technology to 

countries of concern and publicly advertises its artillery rockets 

and related technologies including guidance instruments and missile propellants. On chemical weapons, government, private and intelligence sources report that Iran is pursuing a program to develop 

and stockpile these weapons. Reports state that Iran already may 

have stockpiled blister, blood choking and nerve agents and the 

bombs and artillery shells to deliver them, which they had previously manufactured. 

With respect to the biological weapons, it has been reported that 

Iran probably has an offensive biological weapons program, that it 

continues to seek dual-use material, equipment and expertise 

which can be used in that program, and that it has the capability 

to produce at least small weapons of BW agents and a limited ability to up-weaponize them. 
62

Some have argued that the solution to the Iranian threat is to 

engage in direct talks with the Iranian regime. I strongly disagree, 

Mr. Chairman. We must not abandon the longstanding U.S. policy 

of not negotiating with terrorists. I believe that engaging Iran 

without preconditions would embolden our enemies, would legitimize the extremist regime and would allow the Iranian radicals to 

buy even more time to develop weapons of mass destruction. 

Instead, we can persuade our allies to reduce or even halt the 

range of commercial ties with the Iranian regime. We could deprive 

Tehran of the revenues it needs to continue its destructive policies. 

I call upon our European allies and all of the responsible nations 

to take immediate steps to end investments in Iran’s energy sector 

and to adopt other sanctions to deprive the tyrannical regime of the 

revenue necessary to pursue their nuclear weapons program. 

As part of this effort, my distinguished colleague, Chairman Lantos, and I authored, as the chairman pointed out, the Iran Freedom 

Support Act signed into law in November, and it is already being 

used to great effect. 

I also plan to introduce another bill that targets the Iranian 

elite, which is a critical component of the Iranian economy, its energy sector. Among other provisions, the bill calls for public and 

private pension and thrift savings plans to divest from U.S. and 

foreign companies that have invested $200 million or more in that 

energy sector. 

I have been working with Chairman Lantos on this measure and 

hope that we will have an agreement soon so that we may introduce the bill. 

I look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the 

aisle to secure passage of this and other measures to weaken the 

regime in Tehran, compel it to permanently cease those activities 

that pose a threat to U.S. national security, our interests and our 

allies. I would like to thank once again our witnesses and thank 

you so much, Mr. Chairman, for the time. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you, very much. 

I am pleased to recognize Mr. Payne for 1 minute. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and as we all 

know, this is a very extremely important hearing today. We realize 

the importance of our policy toward Iran and for us to try to come 

up with some solutions to that problem, so I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. I, too, though feel that negotiations and 

discussions are necessary. I think the people of Iran have a positive 

feeling toward United States by and large. And if there was some 

way that we could reach the people, I think many of them really 

reject the hard line, and so before all is lost on aggressive military 

movement, I would hope that we would have some dual strategies. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you. 

Thank you very much. I am pleased to recognize the distinguished ranking member of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, my friend from Indiana, Mr. Pence. 

Mr. PENCE. I thank the chairman for yielding, and I want to 

commend the chairman for making this issue and this distinguished panel and hearing a priority for this committee in the 

110th Congress. 
63

Like many on this panel, I believe that Iran is the greatest diplomatic challenge facing the United States. And I am anxious to hear 

and have appreciated reading the testimony that has been submitted. 

President Bush’s national security strategy for March 2006 I believe correctly stated, and I quote, ‘‘that we may face no greater 

challenge from a single country than from Iran.’’ I believe this is 

a destabilizing rogue state that richly deserves the moniker ‘‘Axis 

of Evil’’ that it was awarded during the State of the Union Address 

years ago. 

The issues that interest me the most about this panel have to do 

with the nature of the threat and the nature and the wisdom of 

what leverage we might bring to confronting that threat. And I 

hold to the view that when President Ahmadinejad called for Israel 

to be ‘‘wiped off the map’’ and described the Holocaust as a ‘‘myth’’ 

and has openly advocated resettling the population of Israel in Europe, that I hold that history teaches that, when a tyrant speaks 

violence against his neighbor, the world is wise to take him at his 

word. And I am very interested in this expert panel’s view of the 

intentions of President Ahmadinejad as well as the government. 

Secondly, I am very interested in recent revelations and news reports that suggest that Iran has been involved in providing technology and improvised explosive devices to personnel in Iraq. 

And lastly, with regard to the leverage that we might have, an 

important editorial this morning by Thomas Friedman uses the 

term leverage; the Secretary of State said that, before we should 

sit down—as the ranking member from Florida just stated, the Secretary of State said we should not sit down until we have leverage, 

believing that stability in Iraq would represent the strongest leverage in addition to our military presence in the region that could 

move us toward a diplomatic solution. 

I am very interested, having read Mr. Friedman’s comments 

today, having read the testimony of this panel’s view on that. 

And lastly, what we might be able to do consistent with Mr. 

Payne’s comments about, from the important legislation, the Iran 

Freedom Support Act, other legislation that is considered, I think 

it is imperative that this Congress consider ways that we can further catalyze forces of liberalization and democracy and human 

rights within Iran itself. 

And so I commend this panel whose credentials cannot be challenged. I look very much forward to the hearing, and I am grateful 

to the chairman for arranging this so early in the context of this 

Congress. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Pence. I am 

pleased to recognize Mr. Sherman for 1 minute. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. Preventing a nuclear Iran should be 

our top foreign policy objective. An Iranian Government that 

thought it was about to be overthrown could very well smuggle a 

nuclear weapon into an American city. The outcome in Iraq will 

have a modest impact on America’s long-term national security and 

cannot be allowed to distract us from the Iranian threat. Talking 

about talks to Iran may also be a bit of a distraction. 
64

We cannot solve the problem with Iran so painlessly as to simply 

say, oh, well, we will open discussions, and then we will achieve 

a nonnuclear Iran. 

Instead, we must be willing to sacrifice other diplomatic and economic priorities if we are to achieve what is most important to us, 

which is an end to the nuclear program in Iran. 

We must put ILSA and other economic pressure from Europe on 

Iran as our number one policy concern with Europe. 

And most importantly, in dealing with Russia, from JacksonVanik to Chechnya, the Iran issue must be placed first. Those who 

think that we can achieve a nonnuclear Iran without mobilizing all 

of our diplomatic strength and without sacrificing less important 

diplomatic objectives I think are deluding themselves. Thank you. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, very much and I want to commend Mr.—I guess Mr. Royce isn’t here. I was going to suggest 

that, and also Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, but also my friends on the other 

side of the aisle who are taking this issue very seriously. Mr. Sherman has again demonstrated that he has the focus on this particular challenge to our security, and I paid close attention to what 

he just had to say. Let me just note, and I won’t be repetitive, just 

we shouldn’t be negotiating from weakness. We must start doing 

those things that will give us leverage on Iran. Then we can have 

negotiations. Negotiating from weakness never got us anywhere. 

I would suggest, however, that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be 

talking to the Iranians, and I would like the panel’s impression of 

an idea; perhaps this President, instead of having bilateral negotiations with Iran and Syria, should we have—should this President 

call for a regional summit with the leaders from all of these countries in that region, the region, and sit down and see what would 

come out of a meeting like that? I am looking forward to hearing 

from you. Thank you very much for listening while we express our 

opinions. 

And thank you to Mr. Lantos for calling this hearing. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you, very much. 

Ambassador Watson. 

Ms. WATSON. I want to thank the chairman also for bringing 

these distinguished gentlemen here. 

I think dialogue is very much called for at this point. 

From what I am gathering, a military success will do nothing—

nothing to settle the cultural issues that are creating much of the 

conflict in Iraq. 

And it has been said that much of the violence is being instigated 

now by Iran. So I sense a creeping effect that we are creeping in 

closer to conflict with Iran. 

We have ships over in the water. We have submarines over off 

the coast. Anyone who does not know that has been from that place 

called Pluto. 

This creeping approach is very, very dangerous, because I see 

what happened in Korea happening in Iran. So what we need, Mr. 

Chairman, is a multilateral discussion with all of the countries surrounding and attached to the border to Iraq, because what happens 

in Iraq affects all of that region. 
65

And these talks must—must—include Syria and Iran. It is shortsighted not to sit down and talk with them. Oh, we can think and 

try to project what they are thinking. And we don’t do it from 

weakness. 

Chairman LANTOS. Gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, very much. Mr. Wimbush has been a 

withering critic of Radio Farda, our efforts to communicate with 

the Iranian people, and he makes a very strong case that these efforts frankly are becoming counter-productive as he says, filling up 

the airwaves with Britney Spears says that America has no ideas 

of value and that we don’t trust the Iranian listeners to distinguish 

intelligent debate from pop culture. And I know that you Mr. 

Chairman and Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen have shown leadership on Iran. 

And I think we all agree that we need to be making our best efforts on public diplomacy when it comes to Iran. And I would hope 

that this committee would give a very hard look at this broadcasting, getting a better read if this is how we should be doing 

business. 

I also agree with many of the other comments about keeping the 

financial pressure up on Ahmadinejad’s government. It is having a 

positive effect. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you. 

Mr. Inglis. 

Mr. INGLIS. Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to hearing the 

witnesses and happy to yield back. 

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

All of the options before us are mainly dealing with talk, talk 

and more talk and more talk on different fronts. Although talking 

is important mean while the Iranian Government progresses into 

being a nuclear power. 

I would like to know when the talks are going to end and we get 

a solution. I know all the options are difficult for us. But we need 

some kind of timetable on when are we going to reach some kind 

of consensus on how are we going to deal with the nuclear threat. 

Meanwhile, I hope the Iranian people see the error of the ways of 

their President and try to put him into some kind of control that 

only the people of any nation can do. And I look forward to all of 

your testimony. Thank you, very much. 

Chairman LANTOS. Any other members? 

If not, we have an exceptionally talented, respected and widely 

published group of Iran experts with us today to explain contemporary Iran’s domestic politics and foreign policy dynamics. 

Dr. Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow for the Middle East Studies 

Council on Foreign Relations here in Washington. He earned a doctorate in modern history from Oxford and is the author most recently of the book entitled, Hidden Iran: Politics and Power in the 

Islamic Republic. Dr. Abbas Milani is the director of Iranian Studies and professor 

of political science at Stanford. Along with Larry Diamond and Michael McFaul, he is also co-director of the Hoover Institution’s Iran 
66

Democracy Project which produced the policy paper a little over a 

year ago entitled, ‘‘Beyond Incrementalism: A New Strategy for 

Dealing With Iraq.’’

Mr. Enders Wimbush is senior fellow and director of the Center 

for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute. Before joining Hudson, he spent 10 years in the private sector as an officer 

with Booz Allen Hamilton, prior to which, he served as director of 

Radio Liberty in Munich from 1987 until 1993. 

We want to thank all our witnesses for taking the time to join 

us. And we will begin with Dr. Milani. 

STATEMENT OF ABBAS MILANI, PH.D., CO-DIRECTOR OF IRAN 

DEMOCRACY PROJECT, HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD 

UNIVERSITY 

Mr. MILANI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am very honored to be here. I think there is no doubt in anyone’s mind that the United States does need to have a strategy for 

dealing with Iran. 

Iran is a key player in the Middle East. But I also think there 

is little doubt that the United States, unfortunately, has not had 

a strategy for dealing with Iran in the last 25 years. The United 

States has been in a reactive mode and has been going from one 

tactical response to another, and as a consequence, it is now forced 

to play a catch-up game. 

And discussing Iran now I think comes at a very important juncture because we have two Presidents both under pressure at home. 

Both Presidents have gone from heights of popularity to serious political problems at home. Both President Bush and Mr. 

Ahmadinejad now face problems within their own constituency, 

within their own country, and we have two countries that are certainly divided in terms of what to do with the other one. The political leadership in Iran is certainly not one view. 

I think it would be gravely mistaken to assume that there is a 

monolithic Iranian ruling elite that has one opinion about what to 

do. It is even a graver mistake I think to assume that Mr. 

Ahmadinejad is the one that calls all the shots. Mr. Ahmadinejad’s 

popularity in the West is far more than his power at home. By constitution, by practice, in Iran, he holds little power. But the popularity, the rock star treatment that he was afforded when he came 

here, in fact, enhanced his power in Iran. But that enhancement 

was fortunately temporary. 

There are those in Washington that think that the nuclear issue 

in Iran has a military solution. There are also some who think—

and most of them are in the same camp—that the regime in Iran 

has a military solution as well, that this is a regime on the brink 

of collapse, and all the United States has to do is push it a little 

bit and this regime will fall. 

The Chalabi syndrome unfortunately has helped some of the advocates of this policy to get a hearing for their wrong-headed and 

dangerous suggestion. 

There are also those who have long argued that this regime is 

here to stay; there is no way to move it; the United States has to 

just forget about the human rights issue, make a deal with this re-
67

gime, give it what it wants and go on with the business of America. 

I think that, too, is wrong. 

This regime is strategically extremely vulnerable, but tactically 

extremely nimble. It is tactically entrenched but it is strategically 

on its way out because it does not have answers for fundamental 

problems of the Iranian people. This is a deeply incompetent, corrupt regime. 

The idea that dialogue with this regime will enhance its power 

I think is partly true. It depends what kind of dialogue the United 

States decides to have. The United States was very capable of having dialogues with the Soviet Union and not allowing those dialogues to become forced in the hands of the Soviet Union. The reason that that dialogue did not allow the Soviet Union to spin it in 

its own favor is because the issues of human rights were always 

on the table, never off the discussion. 

The grand bargainist who wants to make peace with this regime 

wants precisely that option off the table. They say, if you bring this 

issue to the discussion, they, Iranians, will not show up. Well, my 

suggestion is that, even if they don’t show up, still the attempt to 

offer to have a dialogue will have very, very positive impacts. 

It will have positive impacts because I think the Iranian regime 

is deeply fractured at this moment. Mr. Ahmadinejad has helped 

bring these fractures to a new level of intensity. Ahmadinejad has 

come to power—I think it is important to understand—with the 

help of the very powerful cabal of Revolutionary Guards, and some 

of the leaders of the Basij, these are street gangs cum militia that 

are the muscles of the regime that the regime uses when it wants 

to oppress, suppress demonstrations. 

And over the last year, Mr. Ahmadinejad has tried to further entrench himself by giving these people much more in terms of economic windfall, multibillion dollar, no-bid contracts have been 

given to these people. Nevertheless, because of his odious comments on the Holocaust, for example, because of his odious comments on Israel, because of the success of the United States and 

its allies to pass the U.N. resolution, Ahmadinejad now finds himself in a deeply isolated position. As Mr. Chairman referred to the 

letter, 150 people have signed this letter. There is talk of trying to 

curtail his presidency. 

If the United States continues on a path of confrontation, if Iran 

and United States come to blows within the next few weeks or 

months, that would be the greatest bonanza for Mr. Ahmadinejad. 

A policy that will enhance the hands of the intransigent radical 

elements identified with and allied with Mr. Ahmadinejad would be 

a very, very, I think, detrimental policy. 

My assumption is that there will not be peace and democracy in 

the Middle East unless there is peace and democracy in Iran; in 

other words, unless this region is gone. So long as this regime is 

in power, I think there cannot be peace in the Middle East, and 

there cannot be democracy because this regime is the source of so 

much of what is wrong and what is going on in the Middle East. 

But that democracy will have to come from inside Iran. And I think 

it is extremely dangerous and folly, to be honest, to assume that 

the Iranian democratic movement is dead and that it is no longer 

capable of challenging this regime. 
68

The policy that the United States, the strategy that the United 

States adopts will be successful if and to the extent that it allows 

these forces, now in retreat, to more openly directly challenge the 

United States. 

There is a large number of Iranians—and we have empirical evidence for this, we have polls, we have anecdotal evidence for this, 

who are very favorably disposed to the United States. An attack to 

Iran I think will fundamentally change that and will change the 

sentiments of the people and will allow the regime to further consolidate its despotic hold on power. 

The United States does have leverage now, and it has had leverage in the last few years. When the war with Iraq began, the 

United States had an enormous amount of leverage over this regime. The regime in Iran in the first weeks after the fall of Saddam 

Hussein was the weakest it had been in 27 years. It was very willing at that time to try to find a negotiated solution to its problem. 

It was willing to make a great number of concessions. But the 

United States decided not to take that opportunity, not to use their 

leverage it had then. 

Every time, every delay in this attempt to negotiate I think will 

further complicate the role of the United States, further limit the 

leverage that the United States has because, as Mr. Chairman 

pointed out, the regime was very successful in using the Europeans, using China, using Russia, in buying itself time. Mr. 

Rowhani, who was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, gave a very revealing speech that did not get the attention that I think it deserved. He said, ‘‘Our plan was to do a North Korea on the world. 

We wanted to quietly develop a program, and once we had a fully 

developed nuclear program, allow the world to face a fait accompli. 

Libya and the discovery of the A.Q. Kahn,’’ he said, ‘‘destructed 

this program.’’

But they were helped in those years precisely by, unfortunately, 

Europe’s insistence on putting economic interests over diplomatic 

long-term strategic interests over human rights interests, over the 

economic—the democratic future of Iran. 

Even today we see already signs that Europe is beginning to 

crack, that Europe is beginning to talk about changing its tactic. 

But the United States’ ability to create this coalition, this international coalition, that has brought some pressurel; and the pressure is beginning to have some impact in Iran—the Iranian regime 

is worried about these resolutions. You can read the Iranian leaders; Rahsanjani just last week said very pointedly that these resolutions are having more damage, and they might do more damage 

than in fact an invasion will do on Iran. 

So very serious concentrated pressure on the regime, at the same 

time with the offer, with the offer to talk about these issues, about 

all the outstanding issues, including and always including the 

human rights issue of the Iranian people I think will further weaken Ahmadinejad and his camp and further strengthen the majority, 

the silent majority in Iran who wants normalized relations with 

the world, who want to be part of the international community, 

who are embarrassed by Mr. Ahmadinejad and his anti-Semitism. 

I think, if you look in the history of the 20th century, Iran has 

probably one of the best records as a nation in dealing with Israel, 
69

in dealing with its Jewish population. Iran as a nation made a very 

successful attempt to save all of its Jews from the Holocaust. Iran 

was the first country to establish relations with Israel. And that reflects the sentiments of the Iranian people. 

And obviously, they are embarrassed by a leadership who talks 

in this irresponsible manner. Ahmadinejad and his camp will be 

the only winners of a confrontational policy with the United States. 

If there is an invasion of Iran, if there are surgical attacks on the 

nuclear sites—and as one honorable member said, there is serious 

doubt that such an attack will be successful in taking out these 

sites because there are so many of them and because they are fortified—but if any of these attacks come, I think the power of 

Ahmadinejad and his cabal will be extremely consolidated. 

And Ahmadinejad does have a policy on where he wants to take 

Iran long-term. Not only does he want to confront the United 

States and Middle East at every turn, but he also wants to fundamentally realign Iran away from the Western look, so to speak, 

toward Asia. There is talk of building a pipeline that will connect 

Iran to China, the multibillion-dollar deal that Mr. Chairman 

pointed to. There is something called—about the Asia onlook that 

is bandied about in Iran. And if that happens—and this is very 

much the talk of Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad went to China, tried 

very actively to join the Shanghai discussions, if that alternative 

comes to pass, there we are talking about a major strategic change 

in terms of the balance of forces. 

And what will help bring that about I think is an ascendant 

Ahmadinejad, an ascendant radical group that is now isolated and 

is pining for a confrontation with the United States. And the fact 

that the forces are now so closely face-to-face, the fact that the 

United States now has a policy of going after them publicly makes 

the likelihood of an unfortunate incident that will bring about, I 

think, a much larger confrontation. 

I completely understand Mr. Bush’s point that the Iranian network in Iran has to be stopped. Obviously, the Iranian regime has 

to be stopped from its shenanigans in Iraq, but I think a much 

more fruitful policy would be to make this the responsibility of the 

Maliki government. The United States should expect of the Maliki 

government to disrupt the flow of foreign forces inside Iraq. This 

will have not only the advantage of showing the rest of the Sunnis 

in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East that Maliki is not a mere 

puppet of Iran, but it will also lessen the possibility of military, inadvertent or desired military confrontation with the United States. 

So, I think a wise strategy that includes a very credible possibility of using pressure, military pressure if need be, but at the 

same time, combined with it, a willingness to negotiate, a willingness to talk with the Iranians is the path that can be most conducive and is a path that reflects the realities in Iran. 

And let me add by saying, I know of not a single Iranian democrat inside Iran who is fighting this regime on a daily basis, whose 

lives are on the line, who does not favor a dialogue with the United 

States. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Milani follows:]
70

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ABBAS MILANI, PH.D., CO-DIRECTOR OF IRAN DEMOCRACY

PROJECT, HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Mr. Chairman: When in an interview with Mr. David Ignatief, of Washington 

Post, President Bush declared that ‘‘one of the dilemmas facing American policymakers is to understand the nature, the complex nature of the Iranian regime,’’ he 

was grievously right. 

There can, I submit, be little disagreement with the proposition that the question 

of what do with Iran looms as the most serious challenge facing this administration, 

and arguably the next. Policy formed on ignorance is a sure recipe for disaster. A 

number of additional factors here in American and back in Iran add to the possibility for just such a disaster. The continuing crisis in Iraq has created in the Bush 

administration the need to find something to redeem its hitherto unsuccessful Middle East policy. A halt to Iran’s nuclear program through the use of military force 

might be seen by some as just such a redemption. 

There are those in the foreign policy establishment in Washington who still harbor the illusion that problems in the Middle East and Iran can and should be solved 

solely through the use of American military power. The surprising shrinkage of centers for the serious and academic study of Iran in American universities in that last 

quarter of century helped create a dangerous knowledge and expertise vacuum that 

has been filled with policy wonks with little experience in Iran, or with members 

of the Iranian-American Diaspora, who besotted with the new ‘‘Chalabi syndrome,’’ 

and understandably desperate in their attempt to get rid of the despotic mullahs 

in Iran, are trying to goad the United States into a war with the Iranian regime. 

Another group trying to fill this epistemic gap are those experts who sometimes 

seem to behave as de facto agents of the Islamic Republic and suggest that the regime in Tehran is here to stay, the opposition and the democratic movement is dead, 

and it is in America’s best interest to simply make a ‘‘grand bargain’’ with the 

mullahs, and forget and forego the idea of helping the people of Iran actualize their 

democratic aspirations. Neither those who see the regime as teetering on the edge 

of the abyss, nor those who say it is irremovably entrenched take into account the 

complicated and dynamic realities inside Iran. The regime in Tehran is tactically 

strong and nimble, but strategically daft and vulnerable. 

In Tehran, too, there are factions within the Islamic Republic of Iran who seek 

the dogs of a war with the US. For them, even the howls of such a war helps consolidate their power and further strangle the Iranian people and their hundred-year 

old dream of a secular democratic polity. To some of them, America is an empire 

in decline, bereft of the desire or resolve to fight. Still others in this camp simply 

welcome a war as a sure way to grab and consolidate more power. 

The challenge facing America today is formulating a policy that avoids the discredited (even delusional) optimism of the militarist camp as well as the appeasing 

pessimism of proponents of compromise with the mullahs who rule Iran. Moreover, 

doing nothing is about Iran is also not an option; with every passing day, inaction 

no less than a flawed policy, will allow the mullahs to become all but impervious 

to domestic or international pressures. And to some in the regime, only a nuclear 

bomb will afford them the security of such imperviousness. In the looming confrontation with the US, some of them believe, they can get, ‘‘a North Korean treatment’’ rather than the one afforded Saddam Hussein, only if they are part of the 

nuclear club. 

Iran is singularly important for the US by accidents of Nature, actions of Iranians, and dictates of History. Nature made the country sit on huge deposits of gas 

and oil, and allowed it to have a commanding position over the Strait of Hormoz, 

one of the most crucial waterways in the world. History rendered Iran important 

when it became (like Egypt) one of the only two countries whose existence and 

boundaries were not figments of colonial machination. These facts of History and 

Nature combined to make Iran, with Egypt, the two bellwether states for the entire 

Middle East (Egypt for the Sunnis and Iran for Shiites.) Finally, Iranians made the 

Revolution of 1979, hoping for democracy, but Ayatollah Khomeini and his cohorts 

turned the country instead into a despotic theocracy and a model and magnet for 

radical Islamists around the world. The regime’s increasingly overt and aggressive 

support for the Hezbollah in Lebanon and for Hamas in the Palestinian Authority, 

and Ahmadinejad’s inexcusable threats against the state of Israel are only some of 

the examples of these actions. And if all of these factors were not enough, the 

mullah’s nuclear adventurism has afforded Iran singular significance not just for the 

region and the United States, but for Israel and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 

Nevertheless for over a quarter of century, the US has not had a coherent strategic policy on Iran. It has, as a result, been forced in a tactical, reactive mode. For 
71

years, US and the EU were unable to agree on a common policy on Iran (with EU 

often pursuing its immediate economic interests in the guise of insisting on ‘‘constructive dialogue’’ with the regime in Tehran.) The absence of a common Western 

policy allowed the mullahs to pit the US against Europeans, and use the crucial interregnum to further develop their nuclear plans. As Mr. Rouhani, Iran’s leading 

negotiator on the nuclear issue for several years declared in a key speech, the regime wanted to ‘‘do a North Korea’’ on the world and force it to face a fait accompli 

on the country’s nuclear program. Libya’s decision to come clean on its nuclear plans 

and the discovery of A Q Khan’s supermarket of terror thwarted this effort. 

When the US and EU finally did agree on a common Iran policy-pressuring Iran 

through the UN-Iran had by then developed closer ties with China (an almost one 

hundred billion dollar oil and gas deal) and with Russia (multi-billion dollars in 

trade, military sales and future options for construction of new nuclear reactors.) 

Moreover, by this time, both China and Russia, for different reasons were bent on 

a more assertive, if not more muscular policy towards the United States. These new 

allies bought the mullahs still more time by delaying the passage of the UN resolution. When China and Russia finally agreed to a watered-down UN resolution, the 

reality was that the international community was playing ‘‘catch up’’ with the 

mullahs—and in poker as in diplomacy playing catch up is a recipe for disaster. 

Now that the Congress, as a co-equal branch of the government, is willing to play 

its role in formulating the contours of US foreign policy, it will hopefully take into 

consideration a number of crucial facts about Iran. 

As nearly every scholar, expert, and observer of Iran concurs, and as the majority 

of Iran’s population have repeatedly shown the theocracy in Iran is politically despised by its own people, economically incompetent, morally bankrupt and bereft of 

legitimacy. Ahmadinejad, for example, came to power in an election where he, and 

every other presidential candidate, ran against the status quo. Even pillars of that 

status quo—men like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani—tried to reinvent themselves 

as critics of the very regime they had built and maintained—often with bloodshed 

and brutality. 

But there is yet another key fact about the Iranian regime: It is not a monolith 

but instead riven by sometimes serious rifts between different factions. Everything 

from turf wars over a bigger share of the oil money to matters of ideology, tactics 

and personal rancor account for these rifts. The new more muscular approach by 

the Bush administration—sending new ships to and a much publicized presidential 

order to kill or arrests the regime’s agents and operatives in Iraq—come at a crucial 

moment in Iranian politics when the balance of forces between different factions is 

rapidly changing. Ironically, the commendable success of the Bush administration 

in hitherto marshalling an international coalition against the regime’s nuclear ambitions has exacerbated these tensions. The threat of war, and even more an act of 

war, is certain to reverse this process, lessen the factional feuds, solidify the regime 

and help the warmongers in Tehran increase their power. 

Ahmadinejad came to power because of a populist message: ending corruption and 

improving the economic lot of the people. Moreover, there was considerable evidence 

that his victory, particularly in the crucial first round, was made possible because 

of ‘‘support’’ from the Spiritual Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. 

Though by the existing constitution, a disproportionate part of actual power rests 

with the office of the Spiritual Leader, nevertheless Ahmadinejad’s ascent was seen 

as the last step in Khamenei’s attempt to complete his power grab. The judiciary 

was already in his control. In Parliamentary elections of that year, Khamenei had 

ensured that a majority of his most trusted allies, particularly from the ranks of 

the Revolutionary Guards and intelligent agencies win seats in the Majlis. By putting the presidency in the hands of Ahmadinejad, a young man, with no experience 

in national or international politics, Khamenei hoped to finally dominate the third 

and last remaining branch of the government. But things certainly did not work out 

as planned. 

Once elected, it became clear that Ahmadinejad was in fact part of a powerful 

cabal: Revolutionary Guard commanders, leading members of the Basij (the militiacum-street gang that isthe regime’s ‘‘enforcer’’), and stridently messianic clergy expecting the imminent return of the Mahdi—Shiism’s twelfth Imam believed to have 

gone into occultation a thousand years ago. One of the newly elected president’s 

closest aides announced that there was nothing ‘‘accidental’’ about the election, but 

that it had in fact come as a result of two years of a dynamic, complicated, and 

multi-faceted planning. Events in the first few months of the new administration 

certainly confirmed this surprising claim. 

Moreover, Ahmadinejad’s religious guru—the ayatollah he ‘‘emulates’’ in the Shiite tradition wherein humans are either emulated, as in the case of a few Ayatollahs, or ‘‘emulators’’ as in the case of everyone else—was Mesbah Yazdi, a defi-
72

antly despotic advocate of absolute power for clergy and of the inherent incompatibility between Islam and any notion of democracy. Like Ahmadinejad, Mesbah 

Yazdi, too turned out to be a fervent advocate of the idea that the pious must help 

the return of the Twelfth Imam, or the Mahdi. On more than one occasion, 

Ahmadinejad has suggested that the main function of his administration is to facilitate the return of the hidden messiah. 

The messiah’s return, according to some Shiites, is preceded by cataclysms of 

apocalyptic proportions. The suffering and mayhem that accompanies the return—

and religious sources describing the results of this return make images of a Bosch 

painting seem tame and peaceful—will be followed by an eternity of salvation. More 

importantly, the Shiite narratives on this (what they call hadith) are tales eerily 

similar to the stories favored by Christian fundamentalist reading of the Bible, and 

their jubilation over what they believe is the coming of Armageddon. There is, in 

fact, a worrisome similarity between this Christian vision, and Ahmadinejad’s radical brand of Shiism. If either vision becomes policy, then Iran and the US, will be 

in for a long night of millenarian machinations. Fortunately in Iran many in the 

regime’s hierarchy of power, don’t share the hopes for this dangerous ‘‘rapture,’’ 

while in the US, the Madisonian mechanisms for checks and balances and for 

taming the seething passions of factions and mobs offer a safety net against such 

extremism. 

In the first few weeks of his presidency, Ahmadinejad and his supporters took the 

Iranian political scene by storm. Ahmadinejad’s opponents, and even many of his 

allies, including the Spiritual Leader, Mr. Khamenei, were surprised by his ideological intransigence, his dangerous international brinkmanship, particularly in the 

nuclear negotiations, and his many verbal faux pas that crippled the economy domestically and embarrassed or isolated the regime internationally (most famously 

his odius anti-Semitic denial of the Holocaust). Most important of all, they were surprised by the number of allies and cronies Ahmadinejad appointed to important 

posts in the government. Nearly the entire diplomatic corps was changed, and even 

the last important survival of that foreign policy purge, Iran’s ambassador to the 

UN is soon scheduled to leave his post. 

But as the Iranian people, and even many of the clergy who rule over them, and 

as the world soon came to realize, Ahamdinejad’s rhetoric was no slip of the tongue 

but in fact part of a new strategy, or paradigm of domestic and international policy 

for the Islamic Republic. The more people and even many of the ruling mullahs 

learned about this paradigm, the more frightening the prospects of a regime dominated by Ahmadinejad came to look. 

Domestically, the new paradigm is a reversion to the bankrupt, pseudo-socialist, 

state-dominated, market-deprived, and subsidy-driven economy and polity of the 

first feverish years of the revolution. More than hundred papers and magazines, including Sharg, easily the most powerful voice of moderation in the country, have 

been closed down. The universities are being purged of all ‘‘secular’’ and ‘‘Western’’ 

influences. Pressures on the already anemic private sector have brought to a virtual 

stand-still most new investments. 

Internationally, the new paradigm has three key components. First is the idea of 

reviving the ‘‘revolutionary’’ spirit of the early days of the revolution, when Ayatollah Khomeini often defended the idea of exporting the Islamic revolution and creating a ‘‘Shiite revolutionary arc’’ in the Moslem world. An over-looked fact of the 

Islamic Revolution has been what it shares with the experience of the Bolshevik 

Revolution in Soviet Union. As in the Soviet Union—and the argument of those like 

Trotsky that the revolution in Russia can only survive and win if it is exported to 

the rest of the world to what he considered the ‘‘moribund world of capitalism,’’—

in Ahamdinejad’s vision, the Islamic revolution in Iran too can survive only if it 

helps lead the other Muslims in the fight against the weak, vacilating and declining 

West. Iran, Ahmadinejad argues, must be the ideological leader, military supplier 

and financial supporter of this international brotherhood (a ‘‘Shiite or Shiite-Sunni 

Commintern!’’) 

Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric, hand in hand with the increasing assertiveness of the 

Shiites in some of the countries in the Middle East, and the belief of many of these 

Sunni-dominated Arab states that Iran is developing a nuclear bomb has made 

them seriously concerned about a new emerging Iranian hegemony in the region. 

A second corollary of Ahmadinejad and his cabal’s paradigm is the proposition 

that on the nuclear issue, only by forcefully continuing enrichment activities, and 

by ignoring Western threats can the Islamic regime of Iran maintain its ‘‘dignity’’ 

(ezat) and achieve its goals. If Iran continues to pursue its nuclear program, 

Ahmadinejad and his supporters often declared, the West would ‘‘do nothing.’’ A few 

days after Iran announced that it had enriched uranium successfully, Ahmadinejad 

and his allies declared, in jingoist jubilation, that ‘‘ as we said, the West can do 
73

nothing,’’ adding that Iran must aggressively push forward with all aspects of its 

nuclear program. Nothing short of a full fuel cycle is the right of Iran under the 

current NPT, the declared. Ironically, as Ayatollah Montezari, Iran’s leading living 

cleric, and a critic of the regime, recently reminded his audience, the mullahs trample upon every right of the Iranian people, yet they staunchly safeguard its nuclear 

rights! 

The third component of the new paradigm of foreign policy is intimately interlinked with the second. It is called, in the jargon of Iranian policy establishment 

the ‘‘Asia Look.’’ According to this notion, Iran’s future no longer rests with the declining West, but with the ascendant East—particularly China, and India. Multi billion dollar oil and gas agreements with both China and India, and negotiations for 

the construction of a new pipe line connecting Iran to India through Pakistan, and 

eventually China will allow Iran to have a rapidly growing market for the country’s 

oil and gas. Moreover, both countries have nuclear technologies they could share 

with Iran, and both countries are unlikely to raise issues like human rights and the 

democratic rights of the Iranian people. North Korea is another element of this new 

‘‘Asia Look.’’ There are increasing reports about cooperation between North Korea 

and Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly in the field of military, missiles and nuclear technologies. Aside from regional rivalries between India, China and Pakistan, 

and aside from the problem of the vast sums needed to build the pipeline, a more 

recent obstacle to the Asia dream has appeared in the form of a powerful, seperatist 

movement of Baluchis in Iran and Pakistan’s Baluchestan provinces. 

Ahmadinejad and his allies were convinced that the world’s fear of another sharp 

increases in the price of oil, and the expected help of China and Russia, will render 

the US unable to push through a sanctions resolution in the UN. When Europe and 

the United States did in fact unite to forge ahead on a UN resolution, and when 

much to Ahmadinejad’s chagrin, Russia and China joined the vote, Ahmadinejad’s 

star began to fall. Signs of his fall from grace have been many. 

The first sign of his decline was an increasingly vocal chorus of critics who declare 

he has not delivered on his campaign pledges to fight corruption and improve the 

lot of the poor. In recent elections for local councils as well as for the powerful 

eighty-man Council of Experts (entrusted with the task of choosing the next spiritual leader) Ahmadinejad and his allies suffered a humiliating defeat. 

The economy has afforded Ahmadinejad’s critics easy ammunition. In spite of 

record earnings from oil, in recent months there has been a massive flight of capital 

from Iran. The country also has the infamous honor of topping the list of countries 

suffering from a brain drain and losing their best and brightest to exile. A shrinking 

private sector, a crisis in the banking sector, an increase on oil dependency and an 

increase in subsidies paid by the regime are other problems facing the regime. Any 

serious reduction in oil prices will force the regime to face an almost immediate economic crisis. The current double-digit unemployment (some sources putting it as 

high as thirty percent) has not improved, and Ahmadinejad’s habit of recklessly 

throwing money to disgruntled cities and provinces—without legitimate budgetary 

authority and sometimes even without the funds—has created for the regime the 

enigma of stagflation—high inflation rates and rapidly rising prices and a depression-like ‘‘recession.’’ So worried are elements within the regime that there is now 

talk of impeaching the president, or limiting his years in office through a legal maneuver about the timing of presidential and parliamentary elections. A letter signed 

by more than one hundred fifty members of the parliament boldly questions the 

ability of the once-Teflon president to steer the ship of state, 

In foreign policy the counter-attack by Ahmadinejad’s foes and critics began with 

Hashemi Rafjanjani’s decision to publish a hitherto classified letter by Ayatollah 

Khomeini. In the letter, written in 1988, and addressed to the leadership of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini describes the reasons why, after eight years of 

continuing the war with Iraq, he was left with no choice but to reluctantly sign a 

ceasefire. The letter explained this exigency by the fact that the Revolutionary 

Guards had demanded amongst other things nuclear bombs to win the war. The implied message of the letter’s publication seems clear: Iran was gradually put in a 

corner and had no choice to sign a peace agreement with Iraq, and Ahmadinejad’s 

intransigence in the nuclear issue today is likely to lead Iran into a similarly costly 

and humiliating situation. The letter was also important in that it was the first official confirmation that as early as 1988, Revolutionary Guards wanted to have nuclear weapons. 

The last example of conflict and criticism of Ahmadinejad’s handling of foreign 

policy has been over his attitude towards the passage of the UN Security Council 

resolution against Iran. Ahmadinejad continues to downplay the significance of the 

resolution, insisting it has no significance, and must not be taken seriously. It is 

nothing but a piece of paper, he declared. But other members of the leadership—
74

from Khamenei to Rafsanjani—have all insisted that the resolution is in fact very 

serious and must be treated with utmost urgency. The resolution, Rafsanjani declared in a Friday Sermon last week, will be even more damaging than an invasion 

of Iran. The hostile crowds Ahmadinejad faced recently at college campuses and the 

mounting parliamentary criticism of his actions show that even Ahmadinejad’s populism can no longer protect him. 

In the course of last year, Ahmadinejad has tried to help insure himself against 

this rising opposition by consolidating his relations with the Revolutionary Guards. 

Multi-billion dollar no-bid contracts have been given to Revolutionary Guards and 

their leaders and their companies. But even that has not silenced some in the ranks 

of the Guards who are also worried about the future of the regime. The website 

Baztab, supported by one of longest serving top commander of the Revolutionary 

Guards, has become increasingly and openly critical of Ahmadinejad. 

There is only one thing that can now save Ahmadinejad and his cabal’ s declining 

political fortune, and that a military confrontation with the United States or attack 

on Iran’s nuclear facilities by either Israel or the United States. The fact that Mr. 

Khamenei is reportedly in ill-health (lymphoma, according to critics of the regime 

and a bad flu according to the regime) and a power struggle is likely to take place 

over deciding his replacement make US foreign policy in the next few months of 

particular import. Military confrontation with American forces will strengthen the 

regime hardliners and weaken their opponents and critics who are already limited 

in their ability to operate. 

If Ahmadinejad and his cabal do consolidate power, Iran will become more of a 

serious problem for the United States, Israel and the region. Iran’s nuclear problem 

does not have a military solution. It is certainly true that so long as the Islamic 

Republic of Iran is in power, there will not be peace or democracy in the Middle 

East. But it is no less certain that this solution can and will come only if there is 

democracy in Iran. An attack on Iran will not only help the Ahmadinejad cabal consolidate its waning power, but elevate his status as a hero and martyr for Muslims 

around the world. 

A sustained American bombing campaign might temporarily disrupt or delay 

Iran’s nuclear programs. The fact that the regime, in anticipation of such an attack 

has dispersed these sites throughout the country, placing many of them in heavily 

populated cities makes the success of the attempt at delaying or disrupting the program less likely. Moreover, the newly consolidated hard-line regime in Tehran that 

is the likely to be the consequence of such an attack would be even more 

emboldened to openly acquire nuclear weapons, and it could count on a new degree 

of popular support for the program both inside Iran and around the Muslims around 

the world. A preemptive attack, which would lack international legitimacy, would 

also prompt Iran to withdraw entirely from the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as 

some of Ahmadinejad’s allies have already threatened, while inducing Russia and 

China to abandon the crucial international coalition against the Islamic regime’s nuclear adventurism. 

There is an alternative. Rather than throw the reactionaries in Tehran a political 

lifeline in the form of war, the United States should pursue a more subtle approach: 

In Iraq, instead of giving US soldiers the potentially incendiary task of containing 

Iranian agents in the country, America must demand of the Iraqi government to 

perform its duties of protecting the country from foreign interference. If the Maleki 

government does indeed follow this request and performs its duties, it will also help 

convince Sunnis in Iraq and other Arab countries that his government is more than 

a tool of Iranian hegemonic design. A few weeks after the studied silence of the Islamic Republic about the arrest of its operatives in Iraq, the Iranian regime just 

announced that with the consent and agreement of the Iraqi government, it is increasing its economic, military and intelligence presence and role in that country. 

Moreover, the US should offer to negotiate with Iran on all the outstanding 

issues. Comprehensive negotiations are not a ‘‘grand bargain.’’ Instead such negotiations can offer mullahs powerful inducements, such as a lifting the economic embargo and even establishing diplomatic ties. But contrary to the ‘‘grand bargain’’ suggestion, central to such negotiations must be the issue of the human rights of the 

Iranian people. Contrary to the masses of nearly all other Muslim nations, and contrary to the declining popularity of the US in the world, Iranian people are favorably disposed towards the United States. An offer of serious, frank discussions with 

the regime on all of these issues will, regardless of whether the regime accepts or 

rejects the offer, be a win-win situation for the United States, for the Iranian democrats and for the existing UN coalition against the regime’s adventurism. If the regime accepts the offer, anti-Americanism, as one of the regime’s most important ideological foundations will have dissipated, weakening the regime’s position among 

the radical Islamists. Such a negotiation will also clearly undermine the power of 
75

Ahmadinejad and his cabal. Finally normalized relations with Iran will deprive the 

regime of its favorite excuse to cover its incompetence. If they reject such an offer, 

again the inner tensions within the regime on the one hand and between the regime 

and the people of Iran, who overwhelmingly want normalized relations with the US, 

will increase. The regime’s rejection of such talks will also lead to more unity in 

the UN coalition on more serious sanctions against the regime. China and Russia 

will also find it harder to sit on the fence. 

Such negotiations, if they take place, are ultimately temporary cures for the problem of Iran and its nuclear adventurism. The regime in Tehran might in fact negotiate but it is sure to break its promise—as it has done so often in the past—and 

proceed with its nuclear program even more covertly. Only with the advent of democracy in Iran can a strategic solution to Iran’s nuclear problem be found. Democracy in Iran is also likely to have a democratic domino effect in the region. In Iran, 

an often silent majority wants democracy, normalized relations with the world, and 

avoid nuclear adventurism. Any policy that curtails the contributes to the continuous silence of this majority, derails or delays their democratic aspirations is detrimental to the long term interests of both the US and Iran. 

Moreover, if it is true that the war in Iraq and the confrontation with Iran are 

both parts of the international war on terror, and if it is true, that Iran is a bellwether state for the entire Muslim Middle East, then it is also true that US policy 

on Iran will have serious ramifications for that war and for the entire region. The 

war on terror, like Iran’s nuclear problem, does not have a military solution. Both 

require military might and the credible resolution to use it, but both ultimately 

have a political solution. Only a large, active coalition of Muslim moderates, Shiite 

and Sunni—who in spite of recent bloodshed amongst them have for centuries 

shown they can live together in relative harmony and amity—can defeat radical 

Islam and its Jihadist terrorist arm. The battle for the soul of Islam is less between 

reviving Shiite and a frightened Sunnis, but between the hitherto silent majority 

of Muslims, keen on a spiritual reading of Islam and Jihadists who want to turn 

Islam into an ideology for terror. That silent majority, in Iran as well as the rest 

of the Muslim world, is the natural ally of America and of the West, and a foe of 

the kind of dogma, intransigence and nuclear adventurism Ahmadinejad and his allies promote. Prudent American policy must strengthen the position of these majorities. Dogs of war with Iran, or even the howls of such dogs helps the likes of 

Ahmadinejad, and in spite of what results such tactics might bear in the short run, 

they will in the long run reap nothing but calamity and a nuclear, entrenched and 

despotic Iran.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. Dr. Takeyh. 

STATEMENT OF RAY TAKEYH, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW FOR 

MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. TAKEYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Over the past couple of years, when I have come to various congressional committees, I have sort of been adept at keeping my remarks to the time allotted time, another occasion for me to demonstrate that virtuosity today. 

Chairman LANTOS. We will help you attain that virtuosity. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Thank you. I think, as was mentioned, from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorism to human 

rights to democratization, Iran runs across a wide range of American concerns—meddling in Iraq, nuclear ambitions and so forth. 

I will refrain my comments to two issues, namely Iran’s policy 

toward Iraq as I understand it, and its nuclear ambitions as I understand it, complementing some of the things that Mr. Milani said 

regarding the internal developments of the country. 

As Iraq settles into a sort of a disturbing pattern of violence and 

disorder, the Islamic republic has conflicting and at times contradictory ambitions next door. I think the over-arching goal and 

priority for Tehran is to prevent Iraq from once more emerging as 

a military or ideological threat. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war 

between 1980 and 1988, an uneasy consensus has evolved within 
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Iran that the cause of Iraq’s aggressiveness was the Sunni domination of its politics. Thus the empowerment of the more friendly 

Shi’a regime is an essential objective of Iran strategy. 

Given the fears of the spillover of the ongoing civil war and the 

fragmentation of the country, the Iranian leaders also seek to 

maintain Iraq’s territorial integrity. 

Finally, there is a menacing United States presence in Iraq, and 

contrary to many analyses, I don’t believe that Iranians want the 

Americans to stay and bleed in Iraq as a means of detracting them 

from attacking its own suspected nuclear facilities. I think at this 

point they want the Americans to leave, on a gradual timetable or 

what have you, because they seem to feel that the beast has bled 

enough and whatever empirical ambitions the Americans might 

have had has already been beaten out of them so American presence is relatively superfluous. 

Tehran appreciates that a stable Iraq therefore in many ways is 

the best ways of ending the American occupation. These competing 

objectives have yielded alternative tactics. Iran has been active in 

subsidizing the Shi’a allies, arming their militias and agitating 

against the American presence yet also dispatching economic assistance and calls for stabilization of the country. 

I am not quite certain that achievement of Iranian objectives are 

contingent on the insurgency or violence but, frankly, on the unfolding democratic process. 

In a strange paradox, the Iranian clerical hardliners, who, as Mr. 

Milani said, have done much to suppress the reform movement at 

home, have emerged as forceful advocates of democracy next door. 

Indeed, a democratic Iraq offers Iran political and strategic advantages. 

It certainly will empower the Shi’a community, particularly at 

the time when that Shi’a community is largely represented by 

those with close associations and intimate ties with Iran. 

It will also yield an Iraq that is weak with a weak central government and strong promises, and such an Iraq is unlikely to contest Iran’s emerging hegemony in the Gulf. 

In essence, a democratic Iraq will produce an arrangement that 

will empower the congenial Shi’a population, contain the unruly 

ambitions of the Kurds and marginalize Iran’s Sunni foes. 

To some extent, actually, Iran’s model of expressing its influence 

in Iraq is similar to the way the Iranians behaved in Lebanon in 

the early 1980s, another multi-confessional society with a Shi’a 

population that was largely left out of the spoils of power. 

Iran’s strategy in Lebanon, as we know, was to dispatch financial 

and military assistance to Shi’a allies as a means of winning hearts 

and minds and also preparing that Shi’a community for a potential 

conflict. And from that potential strategic design, of course, 

Hezbollah was born. 

Iran today is, as in the past, seeking to mobilize and organize the 

diverse Shi’a communities’ forces in Iraq while not necessarily getting entangled in an altercation with a more powerful United 

States. That is a very difficult balancing act, as we have seen in 

the past couple of weeks. 
77

But our concerns with Iran of course are not limited to Iraq. And 

I will briefly touch on the nuclear issue, which is sort of like quick 

sand. Every time you think you understand it, it changes. 

First of all, the notion of a debate, disagreement and dissent 

within the Islamic republic’s corridors of power is not necessarily 

new. I mean, some of the disagreements and editorials and so forth 

are being presented as fracturing the Iranian political system. 

The Islamic republic has been fractured since 1979. Factionalism, 

competing centers of power, is just the way this country behaves. 

However, today, I believe beyond the evidence of fracturing, there 

is a consensus that has evolved within the regime, namely that 

Iran should have an advanced nuclear capability with a rather sophisticated infrastructure that will offer an opportunity to cross the 

nuclear threshold should it make that decision when it reaches 

that point. Whether Iran will remain satisfied with presumed capability short of actual breakout, as India did prior to 1997, will depend on the range of domestic, international and regional developments. 

Certainly Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which predated the rise of 

President Ahmadinejad, go back to the times of the 1970s. Nevertheless, they have been hardened as we begin to see the rise of a 

war generation coming to power, and the defining experience for 

the many of the younger conservatives is not necessarily the revolution itself but the Iran-Iraq War, the international indifference to 

Saddam’s war crimes. Tehran’s lack of effective response to Iraq’s 

employment of chemical weapons has led the war generation to 

perceive that the security of their country has to be predicated on 

what they do as opposed to global opinion and international treaties. 

The legacy of the war reinforces a nationalist narrative that sees 

America’s demands for relinquishing of Iran’s fuel cycle, an implied 

right at least under the NPT, as historically unjust. This is a country that has been historically subject to foreign intervention and 

imposition of various capitulation treaties. Therefore, it is inordinately sensitive of its national prerogatives and perceived sovereign 

rights. 

Iran’s rulers today perceive that they are being challenged not 

because of their provocation or treaty violations but because of 

super power bullying. So in a rather peculiar manner, the nuclear 

program and Iran’s national identity have become fused in the 

imagination of the hardliners. Thus the notion of compromise and 

acquiescence has rather limited utility to Iran’s aggrieved nationalists. 

Despite their bitterness and cynicism, the Iran theocratic 

hardliners are also eternal optimists when it comes to the assumption of the international community and its power. 

Many conservatives often say that Iran will follow the model of 

India or Pakistan, namely initial imposition of sanctions of international outcry will soon be followed by acceptance of this new status. Thus Tehran would regain its commercial status, which may 

be lost, commercial treaties which may be suspended, while maintaining its nuclear program as well. 

That right and the notion that Iran’s mischievous past and its 

tense relationships with the United States will somewhat militate 
78

against international community’s acceptance of its nuclear status 

is lost upon them. However, should that anticipation prove misguided, they are willing to suffer the consequences—to some extent—of their conduct. 

So what is to be done is the question that is often posed, and it 

is never answered satisfactorily. It is not going to be answered satisfactorily now. It is a rather curious proposition to me for those 

who suggest that the American containment policy has succeeded 

and should continue while at the same time suggesting that Iran’s 

behavior on the nuclear issue, terrorism, human rights, and regional activities is becoming worse. Well, if the containment policy 

has succeeded, it obviously hasn’t succeeded on those issues. Will 

a policy of dialogue engagement work? I don’t think there is an alternative to it. 

It is not going to be easy to negotiate with the Iranian Government when it feels itself as empowered and the United States is 

at the position of strategic disadvantage that it is today. Twice Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates have suggested that, if we negotiate with Iran today, we do so from a position of a supplicant. It 

is a remarkable statement to be made by the Secretary of Defense 

and Secretary of State of a country that routinely calls itself a 

super power. Well, if you are a supplicant, we are not a super 

power. And before that, in another context, National Security Adviser Hadley said in the New York Times that we cannot impose 

red lines on North Korea because they keep violating them. If as 

thought, we have been debilitated, demoralized, demystified by 

Iraq, then we should go one step further and relinquish our status 

as super power and what Madeleine Albright at another time used 

to call the indispensable power because, obviously, we have become 

rather indispensable by the acknowledgments of the administration 

itself. 

The only matter of reversing Iran’s misbehavior and tempering 

its design may be through a negotiated platform. It is not going to 

be easy. But the alternatives are hard to come by, and I think I 

will stop there, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Takeyh follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAY TAKEYH, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EAST

STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

From the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorism, from human 

rights to democratization, the Islamic Republic of Iran cuts across a wide range of 

American concerns. The American leaders routinely characterize Iran’s meddling in 

Iraq and its nuclear ambitions as a grave threat, while often musing about the eventual necessity of using military force against the recalcitrant theocracy. To properly 

contemplate the Iranian challenge, I shall focus on two areas of contention: Iran’s 

Iraq policy and its ambitious nuclear program. Through a better understanding of 

Iran’s motivations, one can best assess how to address its essential goals and objectives on these two critical issues. 

REVOLUTION VERSUS STABILITY: IRAN IN IRAQ

On July 7, 2005, a momentous event took place in Tehran. Saadun al-Dulaimi, 

Iraq’s then-defense minister, arrived in Iran and formally declared, ‘‘I have come to 

Iran to ask forgiveness for what Saddam Hussein has done.’’ The atmospherics of 

the trip reflected the changed relationship, as Iranian and Iraqi officials easily 

intermingled, signing various cooperative and trade agreements and pledging a new 

dawn in their relations. In yet another paradox of the Middle East, it took a 
79

hawkish American government with its well-honed antagonism toward the Islamic 

Republic to finally alleviate one of Iran’s most pressing strategic quandaries. 

Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the Bush administration 

has periodically complained about Iran’s mischievousness and intervention in Iraq’s 

politics. The question then becomes, what are Iran’s priorities and objectives in 

Iraq? Does Iran seek to export its revolution next door and create another Islamic 

Republic? Is it in Iran’s interest to intensify the prevailing insurgency and further 

entangle America in its bloody quagmire? Do Iran and the United States have common interests in the troubled state of Iraq? 

As Iraq settles into its disturbing pattern of violence and disorder, the Islamic Republic has contending and at times conflicting objectives next door. The overarching 

priority for Tehran is to prevent Iraq from once more emerging as a military and 

ideological threat. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war an uneasy consensus has 

evolved among Iran’s officials that the cause of Iraq’s aggressive behavior was the 

Sunni domination of its politics. Thus, the empowerment of a more friendly Shiite 

regime is an essential objective of Iran’s strategy. However, given the fears of a 

spillover from a potential civil war and the fragmentation of the country, Iran’s 

leaders also seek to maintain Iraq’s territorial integrity. Finally, there is the menacing U.S. military presence in Iraq. Contrary to the notion that Iran seeks to fuel 

the insurgency as a means of deterring the United States from attacking its suspected nuclear facilities, Tehran appreciates that a stable Iraq is the best means 

of ending the American occupation. These competing aims have yielded alternative 

tactics, as Iran has been active in subsidizing its Shiite allies, dispatching arms to 

friendly militias, and agitating against the American presence. 

Although Iraq’s Shiite political society is hardly homogeneous, the two parties 

that have emerged as the best organized and most competitive in the electoral process are the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the 

Dawa Party. Both parties have intimate relations with Tehran and allied themselves with the Islamic Republic during the Iran-Iraq war. SCIRI was essentially 

created by Iran, and its militia, the Badr Brigade, was trained and equipped by the 

Revolutionary Guards. For its part, Dawa is Iraq’s longest surviving Shiite political 

party, with a courageous record of resisting Saddam’s repression. Under tremendous 

pressure, Dawa did take refuge in Iran, but it also established a presence in Syria, 

Lebanon and eventually Britain. However, despite their long-lasting ties with the 

Islamic Republic, both parties appreciate that in order to remain influential actors 

in the post-Saddam Iraq they must place some distance between themselves and 

Tehran. The members of SCIRI and Dawa insist that they have no interest in emulating Iran’s theocratic model, and that Iraq’s divisions and fragmentations mandate 

a different governing structure. Their persistent electoral triumphs reflect not just 

superior organization, but a successful assertion of their own identity. Still, Dawa 

and SCIRI do retain close bonds with Iran, and have defended the Islamic Republic 

against American charges of interference and infiltration. In the end, although both 

parties have no inclination to act as Iran’s surrogates, they are likely to provide 

Tehran with a sympathetic audience, and even an alliance that, like all such arrangements, will not be free of tension and difficulty. 

Although less well-publicized by Tehran, it does appear that Iran has established 

tacit ties with Moqtada al-Sadr and has even supplied his Mahdi army. In a sense, 

unlike their relations with SCIRI and Dawa, Iran’s ties to Sadr are more opportunistic, as they find his sporadic Arab nationalist rhetoric and erratic behavior problematic. Nonetheless, given his emerging power-base, strident opposition to the 

American occupation and his well-organized militia group, Tehran has found it advantageous to at least maintain some links with Sadr. Among the characteristic of 

Iran’s foreign policy is to leave as many options open as possible. At a time when 

Sadr is being granted an audience by the Arab leaders and dignitaries across the 

region, it would be astonishing if Iran did not seek some kind of a relationship with 

the Shiite firebrand. 

Finally, there is Iran’s relation with Iraq’s most esteemed and influential Shiite 

cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Grand Ayatollah stands with traditional 

Shiite mullahs in rejecting Khomeini’s notion that proper Islamic governance mandates direct clerical assumption of power. As we have noted, Khomeini’s innovation 

contravened normative Shiite political traditions, making its export problematic, if 

not impossible. Thus far, both parties have been courteous and deferential to one 

another, with Sistani refusing to criticize Iran, while Tehran has been generous 

with crediting him for the Shiite populace’s increasing empowerment. Rafsanjani 

made a point of emphasizing Sistani’s role after the elections of the interim government, noting, ‘‘The fact that the people of Iraq have gone to the ballet box to decide 

their own fate is the result of efforts by the Iraqi clergy and sources of emulation, 

led by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.’’
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For his part, Sistani maintains close ties to Iran’s clerical community and routinely meets with visiting Iranian officials—a privilege not yet granted to U.S. representatives. Moreover, even though Sistani has not pressed for a theocracy, he still 

insists that religion must inform political and social arrangements. 

The professions of the region’s Sunni elite notwithstanding, as clerical regime 

plots its strategy toward Iraq, it does not seem inordinately interested in exporting 

its failed governing model to an unwilling Shiite population. As an influential Iranian politician, Muhammad Javad Larijani, plainly noted, ‘‘Iran’s experience is not 

possible to be duplicated in Iraq.’’ As such, Tehran’s promotion of its Shiite allies 

is a way of ensuring that a future Iraqi government features voices who are willing 

to engage with Iran. The clerical rulers have no delusions about the Iraqi Shiite 

community subordinating its communal interests to Iran’s prerogatives; they merely 

hope that promotion of Shiite parties will provide them with a suitable interlocutor. 

It is important to note that Iran’s policy toward Iraq, as elsewhere in the Gulf, is 

predicated on carefully calibrated calculations of national interest, as opposed to a 

messianic mission of advancing the revolution. 

Today, the essential estrangement of the Iraqi Shiites from the larger Arab world, 

and the Sunni dynasties unease with their empowerment makes the community 

more attractive to Iran. The ascendance of the Shiites maybe acceptable to the Bush 

administration with its democratic imperatives, but the Sunni monarchs of Saudi 

Arabia and Jordan and the presidential dictatorships of Egypt and Syria are extremely anxious about the emergence of a new ‘‘arch of Shiism.’’ At a time when 

the leading pan-Arab newspapers routinely decry the invasion of Iraq as an U.S.-

Iranian plot to undermine the cohesion of the Sunni bloc, the prospects of an elected 

Shiite government in Iraq being warmly embraced by the Arab world seems remote. 

Iraq’s new Shiite parties, conservative or moderate, are drawn to Iran, as they look 

for natural allies. It is unlikely that this will change, as the political alignments of 

the Middle East are increasingly being defined by sectarian identities. 

Although it is customary to speak of Iran’s ties to the Shiites, it should be noted 

that the Islamic Republic has also sought to cultivate relations with the Kurdish 

parties, particularly Jalal Talibani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Iran’s own history 

with the Kurdish population is contentious, as the Shah mercilessly exploited the 

Kurds, and then casted them aside when they proved inconvenient. Soon after assuming power, the Islamic Republic itself confronted Kurdish separatism and one 

of its first challenges was the suppression of a determined Kurdish rebellion. However, during their long years of common struggle against Saddam, the two sides 

often cooperated with each other, and eventually came to establish relatively reasonable relations. For the past two decades, Iran not only sustained those ties but often 

housed substantial Kurdish refugees whenever they had to flee Saddam’s war machine. Today, Iran’s relations with Talibani are cordial and correct, as Tehran hopes 

that a degree of Kurdish autonomy will persuade them to remain within a unitary 

Iraqi state. 

Contrary to Washington’s presumptions, the realization of Iran’s objectives is not 

predicated on violence and the insurgency, but on the unfolding democratic process. 

In a strange paradox, the Iranian clerical hardliners who have been so adamant 

about suppressing the reform movement, have emerged as forceful advocates of 

democratic pluralism in Iraq. Indeed, a democratic Iraq offers Iran political and 

strategic advantages. After much deliberation, Iran’s theocrats have arrived at the 

conclusion that the best means of advancing their interests is to support an electoral 

process that is increasingly constructing a state with strong provinces and a weak 

federal structure. Such an arrangement would empower the more congenial Shiite 

populace, contain the unruly ambitions of the Kurds, and marginalize Iran’s Sunni 

foes. 

Moreover, Iran’s stratagem is not devoid of realpolitik considerations. A pluralistic 

Iraq is bound to be a fractious, divided state too preoccupied with its internal squabbles to contest Iran’s aspirations in the Gulf. At a time when Iraq’s constitutional 

arrangements are ceding essential authority to the provinces, and privileging local 

militias over national armed forces, it is unlikely that Iraq will once more emerge 

as a powerful, centralized state seeking to dominate the Persian Gulf region, if not 

the entire Middle East. It would be much easier for Iran to exert influence over a 

decentralized state with many contending actors, then a strong, cohesive regime. 

Given Iran’s interest in the stability and success of a Shiite-dominated Iraq, how 

does one account for the credible reports indicating that Tehran has been infiltrating men and supplies into Iraq? To be sure, since the removal of Saddam, the 

Islamic Republic has been busy establishing an infrastructure of influence next door 

that includes funding political parties and dispatching arms to Shiite militias. 

Iran’s model of ensuring its influence in Iraq is also drawn from its experiences 

in Lebanon, another multi-confessional society with a Shiite population that was 
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traditionally left out of the spoils of power. Iran’s strategy in Lebanon was to dispatch economic and financial assistance to win Shiite hearts and minds, while making certain that its Shiite allies had sufficient military hardware for a potential 

clash with their rivals. As such, Iran’s presence was more subtle and indirect, and 

sought to avoid a confrontation with the United States. Not unlike its approach to 

Lebanon, Iran today is seeking to mobilize and organize the diverse Shiite forces 

in Iraq, while not necessarily getting entangled in an altercation with the more powerful United States. 

THE NUCLEAR CONUNDRUM

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a regime continuously divided against itself. Even 

in the era of conservative political hegemony, there are factions, as on issues of economic reforms, regional priorities and even relations with America, conservative frequently find themselves at odds with one another. However, today, a unique consensus has evolved within the regime on the nuclear issue. Iran’s cantankerous conservatives seem united on the notion that the Islamic Republic should have an advanced nuclear infrastructure that will offer it an opportunity to cross the nuclear 

threshold at some point. Whether Iran will take that step or will remain satisfied 

with a presumed capability just short of an actual breakout, as India did prior to 

1997, will depend on a range of domestic and international developments. 

From the outset it must be emphasized that for all the factions involved in this 

debate, the core issue is how to safeguard Iran’s national interests. The Islamic Republic is not an irrational rogue state seeking such weaponry as an instrument of 

an aggressive, revolutionary foreign policy. This is not an ‘‘Islamic bomb’’ to be 

handed over to terrorist organizations or exploded in the streets of New York or 

Washington. The fact is that Iran has long possessed chemical weapons, and has 

yet to transfer such arms to its terrorist allies. Iran’s cautious leaders are most interested in remaining in power and fully appreciate that transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists could lead to the type of retaliation from the United States or Israel 

that would eliminate their regime altogether. For Iran this is a weapon of deterrence and power projection. 

The primary supporters of the nuclear program are now officials in command of 

key institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards and the Guardian Council. A fundamental tenet of the hardliners’ ideology is the notion that the Islamic Republic 

is in constant danger from predatory external forces, necessitating military self-reliance. This perception was initially molded by a revolution that sought not just to 

defy international norms but also to refashion them. The passage of time and the 

failure of that mission have not necessarily diminished the hardliners’ suspicions of 

the international order and its primary guardian, the United States. Jumhuri-ye 

Islami, the conservative newspaper and the mouthpiece of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, sounded this theme by stressing,

The core problem is the fact that our officials’ outlook on the nuclear dossier 

of Iran is faulty and they are on the wrong track. It seems they have failed to 

appreciate that America is after our destruction and the nuclear issue is merely 

an excuse for them.

In a similar vein, Resalat, another influential conservative paper, sounded out the 

themes of deterrence and national interest by claiming, ‘‘In the present situation of 

international order whose main characteristics are injustice and the weakening of 

the rights of others, the Islamic Republic has no alternative but intelligent resistance while paying the least cost.’’ Given its paranoia and suspicions, the Iranian 

right does not necessarily object to international isolation and confrontation with 

the West. Indeed, for many within this camp, such a conflict would be an effective 

means of rekindling popular support for the revolution’s fading e ́lan. 

Iran’s nuclear calculations have been further hardened by the rise of war veterans, such as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to positions of power. Although 

the Iran-Iraq war ended nearly twenty years ago, for many within the Islamic Republic it was a defining experience that altered their strategic assumptions. Even 

a cursory examination of Ahmadinejad’s speeches reveals that for him the war is 

far from a faded memory. In his defiant speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2005, Iran’s president pointedly admonished the assembled dignitaries for 

their failings:

For eight years, Saddam’s regime imposed a massive war of aggression against 

my people. It employed the most heinous weapons of mass destruction including 

chemical weapons against Iranians and Iraqis alike. Who, in fact, armed Saddam with those weapons? What was the reaction of those who claim to fight 

against WMDs regarding the use of chemical weapons then?
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The international indifference to Saddam’s war crimes and Tehran’s lack of an effective response has led Iran’s war-veteran president to perceive that the security of 

his country cannot be predicated on global opinion and treaties. 

The impact of the Iran-Iraq war on Tehran’s nuclear calculations cannot be underestimated. Iraq’s employment of chemical weapons against Iranian civilians and 

combatants has permanently scarred Iran’s national psyche. Whatever their tactical 

military utility, in Saddam’s hands, chemical weapons were tools of terror, as he 

hoped that through their indiscriminate use he could frighten and demoralize the 

Iranian populace. To a large extend, this strategy did succeed, as Iraqi attacks did 

much to undermine the national support for the continuation of the war. 

Beyond the human toll, the war also changed Iran’s strategic doctrine. During the 

war, Iran persisted with the notion that technological superiority cannot overcome 

revolutionary zeal and a willingness to offer martyrs. To compensate for its lack of 

weaponry, Iran launched human wave assaults and used its young population as a 

tool of an offensive military strategy. The devastation of the war and the loss of an 

appetite for ‘‘martyrdom’’ among Iran’s youth has invalidated that theory. As 

Rafsanjani acknowledged, ‘‘With regards to chemical, bacteriological and radiological 

weapons, it was made clear during the war that these weapons are very decisive. 

We should fully equip ourselves in both offensive and defensive use of these weapons.’’ Moreover, the indifference of the international community to Saddam’s crimes 

also left its mark, leading Iran to reject the notion that international agreements 

can ensure its security. As Mohsen Rezai, the former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, said in 2004, ‘‘We cannot, generally speaking, argue that our country will derive any benefit from accepting international treaties.’’ Deterrence could 

no longer be predicated on revolutionary commitment and international opinion, as 

Iran required a more credible military response. 

The legacy of the war only reinforces a nationalistic narrative that sees America’s 

demands for Iran to relinquish its fuel cycle rights under the Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty as inherently unjust. As a country that has historically been the subject 

of foreign intervention and the imposition of various capitulation treaties, Iran is 

inordinately sensitive of its national prerogatives and sovereign rights. The rulers 

of Iran perceive that they are being challenged not because of their provocations and 

previous treaty violations, but because of superpower bullying. In a peculiar manner, the nuclear program and Iran’s national identity have become fused in the 

imagination of the hardliners. To stand against America on this issue is to validate 

one’s revolutionary ardor and sense of nationalism. Ali Husseini Tash, the Deputy 

Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, stressed this point, saying, ‘‘A 

nation that does not engage in risks and difficult challenges, and a nation which 

does not stand up for itself can never be a proud nation.’’ Thus, the notion of compromise and acquiescence has limited utility to Iran’s aggrieved nationalists. 

Despite their bitterness and cynicism, the theocratic hardliners are eternal optimists when it comes to their assessment of how the international community will 

respond to Iran’s nuclear breakout. Many influential conservative voices insist that 

Iran would follow the model of India and Pakistan, with the initial international 

outcry soon followed by an acceptance of Iran’s new status. Thus, Tehran would regain its commercial contracts and keep its nuclear weapons. The former Iranian foreign minister Akbar Velayati noted this theme when stressing, ‘‘Whenever we stand 

firm and defend our righteous stands resolutely, they are forced to retreat and have 

no alternatives.’’ The right thus rejects the notion that Iran’s mischievous past and 

its tense relations with the United States would militate against the international 

community’s accepting Iran’s nuclear status. 

However, should their anticipations prove misguided, and Iran becomes the subject of sanctions, it is a price that the hardliners are willing to pay for an important 

national prerogative. Ahmadinejad has pointedly noted that even sanctions were to 

be imposed, ‘‘the Iranian nation would still have its rights.’’ In a similar vein, Ayatollah Jannati has noted, ‘‘We do not welcome sanctions, but if we are threatened 

by sanctions, we will not give in.’’ The notion of the need to sacrifice and struggle 

on behalf of the revolution and resist imperious international demands is an essential tent of the hardliners’ ideological perspective. 

For the foreseeable future, the United States confronts an Iranian state whose 

strategic vulnerabilities, regional ambitions and internal political alignments press 

it in the direction of nuclear capability. Moreover Iran’s nuclear empowerment 

comes at a time when it is bound to be the leading state in the strategically critical 

Persian Gulf region. These trends can neither be easily reversed through a policy 

of coercion or pressure, as in the end, a diplomatic engagement between the United 

States and Iran maybe the only manner of tempering the theocracy’s more troublesome designs.
83

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Wimbush. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ENDERS WIMBUSH, DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR FUTURE SECURITY STRATEGIES, SENIOR FELLOW 

FOR THE HUDSON INSTITUTE 

Mr. WIMBUSH. Mr. Chairman, Representative Ros-Lehtinen and 

members of the committee, I am honored to be able to testify before 

you today on this very important issue. 

From my perspective, as someone who has spent a great deal of 

his professional life trying to understand how nuclear weapons will 

figure in the future strategies of states that currently do not possess them, I have concluded, Mr. Chairman, that under no circumstances—under no circumstances—should Iran be allowed to 

acquire them. 

A nuclear Iran can neither be managed, as some of our European 

allies believed, nor deterred in the traditional sense, as advocates 

of stronger non-proliferation treaties hope will be the case. 

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, Iran is fast building its position as 

the Middle East political and military hegemony, a position which 

will be largely unchallengeable if it acquires nuclear weapons. 

A nuclear Iran will change all of the critical strategic dynamics 

of this volatile region in ways that threaten the interests of virtually everyone else. The outlines of some of these negative trends 

are already visible as other actors adjust their strategies to accommodate what increasingly appears to be the emerging reality of an 

unpredictable unstable nuclear power. 

The opportunities nuclear weapons will afford Iran go far beyond 

the prospect of using them in a military conflict. First, nuclear 

weapons will empower strategies of coercion, intimidation and denial that go far beyond purely military considerations. Second, acquiring the bomb as an icon of state power will enhance the legitimacy of Iran’s mullahs and make it harder for disgruntled Iranians to oust them. Third, with nuclear weapons, Iran will have 

gained the ability to deter any direct American threats as well as 

the leverage to keep the United States at a distance and discourage 

it from helping Iran’s regional opponents. If it succeeds in this, a 

relatively small nuclear outcast will therefore thus be able to deter 

a mature nuclear power. 

This means that, fourth, Iran will become a billboard advertising 

nuclear weapons as the logical asymmetric weapon of those choice 

for nations that wish to confront the United States. 

This leads logically to a fifth point: International proliferation to 

state and non state actors is virtually certain as newly capable 

states seek to empower friends and sympathizers. Iran, with its 

well-known support of Hezbollah, is a particularly good candidate 

to proliferate nuclear capability beyond the control of any state as 

a way to extend the coercive reach of its own nuclear politics. 

The diffusion of nuclear know-how is on the verge of becoming 

impossible to impede any way. Just yesterday I listened to former 

Senator Sam Nunn describe the chances of success of his nuclear 

threat initiative which seeks to put barriers on the pathway of nuclear proliferation. And he described the chances of success as a 3 

on a scale of 10 and getting worse. Finally and sixth, small arse-
84

nals of just a few weapons will mean that nuclear use will become 

more likely as deterrence disappears. If it appears easy to destroy 

an adversary’s nuclear weapons in a single blow, small arsenals 

will increase the incentive to strike first. But some nuclear actors 

will be less interested in deterrence than in using nuclear weapons 

to annihilate their enemies. Iran’s leadership has spoken of its willingness, in their words, to martyr the entire Iranian nation, and 

it has even expressed the desirability of doing so as a way to accelerate an inevitable apocalyptic collision between Islam and the 

West that will result in Islam’s final worldwide triumph. 

Iran’s President Ahmadinejad is the poster child of this idea. He 

is the product of the most reactionary parts of Iran’s clerical regime, the support structures and security intelligence and the paramilitary vigilante Basij forces and their hardline Islamic mentors. 

The zealots he represents and their views are more extreme in virtually all respects than those of the regime’s house clerics. According to them, the inevitable clash between Islam and the West, as 

you noted, will accelerate the appearance of the hidden imam, also 

known as the Imam Mahdi, the Messianic core of Shia Islam. 

Is Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons connected to Ahmadinejad 

and his followers’ plans for martyring the entire Iranian nation to 

speed the return of the hidden imam? I think we should be clear, 

Mr. Chairman, that we have no idea, no idea how to deter an ideological actor who might seek to annihilate others and then to be 

annihilated himself gloriously in return. 

If we wish to avoid having to confront Iran militarily at some 

point in the near future, we need to unleash other influences and 

instruments that can help shape Iran’s emerging landscape in ways 

that give Iranians a chance to step back, rethink the dangerous 

path they are now on, and understand the consequences of going 

there. Constrain the radicals among them, and recalibrate their 

strategies in a direction toward rejoining the world community. I 

strongly believe—and I echo Dr. Milani on this—I strongly believe 

that this is possible by going directly to Iran’s people, especially to 

its young educated men and women, its intellectuals, its labor 

unions and its business communities and its other key agents of 

change. Yet while these diverse groups may share visions of pushing the ruling mullahs into retirement, to date little critical mass 

has developed amongst them that might eventually coalesce to 

make this happen. 

During the Cold War, as you know, we faced similar challenges 

in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union where unconventional ideas and intense debate were considered offenses against 

the state. Into this void of ideas, we directed America’s powerful 

international broadcasting stations, especially Radio Free Europe 

and Radio Liberty, now acknowledged by virtually everyone has 

perhaps the most important influences in shaping and accelerating 

change in the East. Iran is easily as resonant a milieu for idea-induced change as say Poland or Russia and perhaps more so. But 

unfortunately both the war of ideas and the instruments that gave 

them life had been largely ignored by this administration, and 

there is no better illustration of this than America’s principal 

broadcast service to Iran, Radio Farda, which the broadcasting 

board of governors describes, and I quote, ‘‘a youth-oriented 24/7 
85

Persian language radio service that broadcasts political, social, economic news, information, public affairs and music to Iran.’’

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, the youth orientation of Radio 

Farda means that the broadcasts are mostly music. It has moved 

far from the successful Radio Free Europe radio model. The Radio 

Free Europe gave its listeners a little bit of music, but primarily 

it enlivened their critical thinking with analysis and context, history, culture, religion, economics, law, human rights, labor, and 

cross reporting from many perspectives, all mostly missing from today’s Radio Farda broadcasts. Radio Liberty’s broadcast to the 

former USSR never used music, and yet boasted a substantial 

youth audience. 

Radio Farda’s confusion, I believe, is elementary. The confusion 

is between public diplomacy, which features telling America’s story, 

advocating for America’s position, and promoting American culture, 

very useful in some respects. And strategic communications, which 

is very different and which was practiced by the radio frees. The 

Voice of America, the official voice of the U.S. Government, has always been part of the public diplomacy architecture, but the radio 

frees, better known as surrogate radio stations, have not. Their 

mission is fundamentally different. While public diplomacy is all 

about us, the surrogate radios are all about them. The surrogate 

radios were successful in the Cold War because they were less concerned with how or why people disliked us or with advocating for 

America than in spurring intelligent listeners to think about the 

cost to their nation of runaway ideologies and isolation from critical 

globalizing trends. They were intended to stir debate within societies like Iran in ways that weaken the ability of oppressive regimes to monopolize information and ideas, enhance power. 

What eventually became Radio Farda was created for exactly 

this purpose. In the unadopted Radio Free Iran Act of 1995, Congress called for additional broadcasts to further open the communications of accurate, in their words, about Iran to the people of 

Iran. The language of the bill is crystal clear in its intent to create 

a new surrogate broadcast entity. In 1998, Congress appropriated 

$4 million to fund Radio Free Iran to be run by Radio Free Liberty, 

the nation’s premiere surrogate broadcaster. At no point did Congress envision or approve creating another public diplomacy instrument that focused on America and pumped out popular music. 

In the beginning this worked well. Radio Free Iran, renamed 

Radio Azadi, was run as a real surrogate station until 2002. It was 

an effective operation. By 2002 after 4 years of operation, Azadi 

had become the most popular foreign broadcaster to Iran, outpacing 

the better Voice of America and the BBC in the size of its elite audience, and anecdotal evidence that we have from this period suggests incidentally that even current President Ahmadinejad was a 

regular listener, reminiscent of the success of RFE–RL in drawing 

most of the critical elites in their broadcast areas during the Cold 

War. 

Chairman LANTOS. We didn’t do very well with Ahmadinejad, did 

we? 

Mr. WIMBUSH. We did not do very well with him. 

But in 2002 unfortunately the station was abruptly morphed to 

Radio Farda and programming that changed it from the successful 
86

surrogate service, aimed at critical elites and the populations that 

support them as Congress had envisioned, to the airy music station 

aimed at kids took place. Today what passes for broadcast strategy 

at Radio Farda features an indiscriminate audience-maximizing 

formula that measures success by the number of listeners tune in, 

not by the quality of those listeners or by the critical positions and 

influence and authority they occupy. 

If that metric had been applied to Radio Liberty, it would have 

been abolished before it came into its own in the 1970s, becoming 

a powerful instrument of change. This dumbing down, dumbing 

down respects the needs and intelligence of neither the traditional 

agents of change nor the critical younger audiences, especially 

Iran’s powerful student movement. In Farda’s defense its managers 

insist that without music Iranians will tune Radio Farda out because it will cease to be, in their words, believable. As you know, 

Mr. Chairman, credibility is indeed the currency of strategic communications, which is why substituting music for powerful ideas is 

so confused. Any sentient Iranian can see that it is the music that 

lacks credibility. It is a trick, it is a gimmick. They also see that 

filling up the airwaves with Britney Spears and Shania Twain says 

that America has no ideas of value and that we don’t trust Iranian 

listeners to distinguish intelligent debate from pop culture pap. 

America is trying to make us like them; it is public diplomacy all 

over again. A far better and tested strategy would be to level with 

them and help them level with each other. The notion that we 

must not offend Farda’s Iranian listeners throws the station for existing into question. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, while stressing balance, these radios have never been neutral. To the contrary, they were created 

to help shape political landscapes in ways that favor our desired 

outcomes, and our listeners have always known it. 

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Wimbush, can you wrap up because I 

think we have sort of run out of time. 

Mr. WIMBUSH. My recommendation, Mr. Chairman, is that as a 

very strong priority that this committee take it on itself to reexamine our strategic communication instruments, starting with Radio 

Farda, scrubbing them of their music and replacing it with serious 

programming. This may draw smaller audiences in the beginning, 

but they will be audiences that count for something. It is with some 

urgency, Mr. Chairman, that I urge you to go in that direction because we are in late innings with Iran, and the time has come to 

do this. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wimbush follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. ENDERS WIMBUSH, DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR FUTURE

SECURITY STRATEGIES, SENIOR FELLOW FOR THE HUDSON INSTITUTE

Mr. Chairman, Representative Ros-Lehtinen, Members of the Committee, I am 

honored to be asked to testify before you today on this important issue. By way of 

identification, I am currently Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Future 

Security Strategies at Hudson Institute in Washington working principally on trying 

to understand the character of emerging security landscapes and the challenges and 

opportunities they might offer to U.S. security planning. For the last 30 years, I 

have consulted on long-range security issues for many agencies of our government, 

as well as for foreign governments and private sector clients. From 1987–93, I was 

Director of Radio Liberty in Munich, Germany, a period that encompassed the fall 

of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. I was trained as a Central 
87

Asianist, hence my abiding interest in Iran and its environment. In my short testimony today, I shall endeavor to draw on each of these perspectives. 

Nuclear Iran and International Security 

From my perspective as someone who has spent a great deal of my professional 

life trying to understand how nuclear weapons might figure in the future strategies 

of states that do not now possess them, I have concluded, Mr. Chairman, that under 

no circumstances should Iran be allowed to acquire them. A nuclear Iran can neither be ‘‘managed,’’ as many of our European allies believe, nor deterred in any traditional sense, as advocates of stronger non-proliferation treaties hope will be the 

case. Iran is fast building its position as the Middle East’s political and military 

hegemon, a position that will be largely unchallengeable once it acquires nuclear 

weapons. A nuclear Iran will change all of the critical strategic dynamics of this 

volatile region in ways that threaten the interests of virtually everyone else. The 

outlines of some of these negative trends are already visible, as other actors adjust 

their strategies to accommodate what increasingly appears to be the emerging reality of an unpredictable, unstable nuclear power. It is important to understand 

where we are today with respect to a nuclear Iran. Tehran needn’t test a device to 

shift these dangerous dynamics into high gear; that is already happening. By the 

time Iran tests, the landscape will have changed dramatically because everyone will 

have seen it coming. 

The opportunities nuclear weapons will afford Iran far exceed the prospect of 

using them to win a military conflict. Nuclear weapons will empower strategies of 

coercion, intimidation and denial that go far beyond purely military considerations. 

Acquiring the bomb as an icon of state power will enhance the legitimacy of Iran’s 

mullahs and make it harder for disgruntled Iranians to oust them. With nuclear 

weapons, Iran will have gained the ability to deter any direct American threats, as 

well as the leverage to keep the U.S. at a distance and to discourage it from helping 

Iran’s regional opponents. Would the U.S. be in Iraq if Saddam had had a few nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them on target to much of Europe and all 

of Israel? Would it even have gone to war in 1991 to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi aggression? Unlikely. Yet Iran is rapidly acquiring just such a capability. If it succeeds, a relatively small nuclear outcast will be able to deter a mature nuclear 

power. Iran will become a billboard advertising nuclear weapons as the logical 

asymmetric weapon of choice for nations that wish to confront the United States. 

Mr. Chairman, it should surprise no one that quiet discussions have already 

begun in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and elsewhere in the Middle East about the 

desirability of developing national nuclear capabilities to blunt Iran’s anticipated advantage and offset the perceived decline in America’s protective power. I believe that 

this is just the beginning. Proliferation across Eurasia will be broad and swift, creating nightmarish challenges. The diffusion of nuclear know-how is on the verge of 

becoming impossible to impede. Just yesterday, I heard former senator Sam Nunn 

describe the chances of success of his Nuclear Threat Initiative, which seeks to put 

barriers in the pathway of proliferation, as only a three on a scale of ten, and getting worse. Non-proliferation treaties, never effective in blocking the ambitions of 

rogues like Iran and North Korea, will be meaningless. Intentional proliferation to 

state and non-state actors is virtually certain, as newly capable states seek to empower their friends and sympathizers. Iran, with its well known support of 

Hezbollah, is a particularly good candidate to proliferate nuclear capabilities beyond 

the control of any state as a way to extend the coercive reach of its own nuclear 

politics. 

In the world of nuclear Iran, arsenals will be small, which sounds reassuring, but 

in fact it heightens the dangers and risk. New players, including Iran, with just a 

few weapons will be especially dangerous. Cold War deterrence was based on the 

belief that an initial strike by an attacker could not destroy all of an opponent’s nuclear weapons, leaving the adversary with the capacity to strike back in a devastating retaliatory blow. Because it is likely to appear easier to destroy them in 

a single blow, small arsenals will increase the incentive to strike first in a crisis. 

Some of the new nuclear actors will be less interested in deterrence than in using 

nuclear weapons to annihilate their enemies. Iran’s leadership has spoken of its 

willingness—in their words—to ‘‘martyr’’ the entire Iranian nation, and it has even 

expressed the desirability of doing so as a way to accelerate an inevitable, apocalyptic collision between Islam and the West that will result in Islam’s final worldwide triumph. 

Ahmadinejad is the product of the most reactionary parts of Iran’s clerical regime: 

the support structures in security, intelligence and paramilitary vigilante baseej

forces and their hardline Islamic mentors. This group of zealots and their views are 
88

more extreme in virtually all aspects than those of the regime’s house clerics. They 

see themselves as the true guardians of Ayatollah Khomeini’s legacy, often criticizing the clerics for not being radical enough in pursuing Islamic revolution. Their 

ideological godfather is the ultra-conservative Ayatollah Mesba-e Yazdi—better 

known as ‘‘Professor Crocodile’’ to Iranians—whose teachings converge with the 

anti-Western conspiracy theories of Ahmad Fardid, a Persian follower of Nazi sympathizer Martin Heidegger. Together they espouse an ideological cocktail whose 

main ingredients are a pathological hatred of the West and its civilization and the 

inevitability of an apocalyptic collision between Islam and the West that will result 

in Islam’s triumph worldwide. 

This is not an original interpretation of what Islam requires of its followers, but 

Ahmadinejab and the zealots who support him have given it a novel and disturbing 

twist. According to them, the inevitable clash between Islam and the West will accelerate the reappearance of the Hidden Imam, also known as Imam Mahdi, the 

messianic core of Shiite Islam. According to Shia doctrine, the messiah will return 

to lead the forces of righteousness in a final cosmic battle against evil shortly before 

Judgement Day and the end of history. Ahmadinejad thus urges the Iranian people 

to bring the Hidden Imam’s reappearance closer through ‘‘the art of martyrdom.’’ 

And ‘‘A nation with martyrdom knows no captivity,’’ he recently exhorted his followers. Moreover, he insists, anyone who resists this principle, ‘‘undermines the 

foundation of our eternity.’’ How soon can the Hidden Imam appear? Ahmadinejad 

has said that it is possible in only two years. 

Is Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons connected to Ahmadinejad and his followers’ 

plans for martyring the Iranian nation to speed the return of the Hidden Imam? 

As if to provide an answer to this question, a disciple of Professor Crocodile recently 

issued a fatwa for the use of nuclear weapons by Muslims on the basis of shari’a, 

in what regime critics have characterized as a new effort by the hardliners to ‘‘prepare the religious grounds for use of these weapons.’’ We should be clear, Mr. Chairman, that we have no idea how to deter ideological actors who may seek to annihilate others and be annihilated, gloriously, in return. 

This is the world Iran is dragging us into. French president Jacques Chirac clearly had Iran in mind when, uncharacteristically, he recently threatened devastating 

retaliation by France’s nuclear forces for any nuclear strike on France. His message 

could not have been blunter: Iran will indeed be martyred if it takes this direction. 

This is a message the Iranian people need to hear, alerting them that Ahmadinejad 

and his confederates may be taking Iranians down a road most wish not to travel. 

But are they getting this message? 

If we wish to avoid having to confront Iran militarily at some point in the foreseeable future, we need to unleash other influences and instruments that can help 

shape Iran’s emerging landscape in ways that give Iranians a chance to step back, 

rethink their current trajectories, constrain the radicals among them, and recalibrate their strategies in the direction of rejoining the world community. I strongly 

believe that this is possible by going directly to Iran’s people, especially its young 

educated men and women, its intellectuals, its labor unions and business community, and other key agents of change. Yet while these diverse groups may share visions of pushing the ruling mullahs into retirement, to date little critical mass has 

developed amongst them that might eventually coalesce to make this happen. 

During the Cold War, we faced similar obstacles in Eastern Europe and the 

USSR, where unconventional ideas and intense debate were considered offenses 

against the state. Into this void of ideas, we directed America’s powerful international broadcasting stations, now acknowledged by nearly everyone as perhaps 

the most important influence in shaping and accelerating change in the East. Iran 

is easily as resonant a milieu for idea-induced change as, say, Poland or Russia, and 

perhaps more so, but unfortunately both the war of ideas and the instruments that 

gave them life have been largely ignored by this administration. There is no better 

illustration of this neglect than America’s principal broadcast service to Iran, Radio 

Farda, which the Broadcasting Board of Governors describes as ‘‘a youth-oriented 

24/7 Persian-language radio service that broadcasts political, social, and economic 

news, information, public affairs, and music to Iran.’’

Unfortunately, the youth orientation of Radio Farda means that broadcasts are 

mostly music. Media consultant Bert Kleinman, the architect of musical Radio 

Farda, insists in a recent AP story that Iran’s large under-30 demographic offers 

the best opportunity for fomenting change in Iran. Kleinman notes that if you want 

to reach young people anywhere in the world, ‘‘this is how you do it.’’ This will come 

as a surprise to the critically important youth of Poland under Communism in the 

1960s and 1970s, a youth bubble that was larger in fact than Iran’s today. Radio 

Free Europe gave them a little music, but it also enlivened their critical thinking 

with analysis and context—history, culture, religion, economics, law, human rights, 
89

labor, and cross-reporting from many perspectives—mostly missing from today’s 

Radio Farda broadcasts. Radio Liberty’s broadcasts to the former USSR never used 

music yet boasted a substantial youth audience. 

Radio Farda’s confusion is elementary. Unfortunately, the same confusion increasingly infects most of our broadcast efforts throughout the world. The confusion is 

between public diplomacy—which features telling America’s story and advocating 

for America’s positions—and strategic communications, which is very different. The 

VOA, the official voice of the U.S. Government, has always been part of the public 

diplomacy architecture, but the Radio Frees, better known as ‘‘surrogate’’ radio stations, have not. Their mission is fundamentally different. While public diplomacy is 

all about ‘‘us,’’ the surrogate Radios are all about ‘‘them.’’ The surrogate radios were 

successful during the Cold War because they were less concerned with how or why 

people dislike us or with advocating for America than in spurring intelligent listeners to think about the costs to their nation of runaway ideologies and isolation 

from critical globalizing trends. They were intended to stir debate within societies 

like Iran in ways that weaken the ability of oppressive regimes to monopolize information and ideas and, hence, power. 

What eventually became Radio Farda was created for exactly this purpose. In the 

un-adopted Radio Free Iran Act of 1995, Congress called for additional broadcasts 

to further ‘‘the open communication of accurate information and ideas about Iran 

to the people of Iran.’’ The language of the bill is crystal clear in its intent to create 

a new ‘‘surrogate’’ broadcast entity to compliment existing broadcasts to Iran from 

the VOA. In 1998 Congress appropriated $4 million for a Radio Free Iran, to be run 

by RFE/RL, the nation’s premier ‘‘surrogate’’ broadcaster. At no point did the Congress envision or approve creating another public diplomacy instrument that focused 

on America and pumped out popular music. 

In the beginning, this worked well. Radio Free Iran, renamed Radio Azadi, was 

run by RFE/RL as a real surrogate station until 2002. It was an effective operation. 

By 2002, after only four years of operation, Azadi had become the most popular foreign broadcaster to Iran, outpacing the better-known BBC and VOA in the size of 

its elite audience. (Anecdotal evidence suggests that even current Iranian president 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was a regular listener—reminiscent of the success of Radio 

Free Europe and Radio Liberty in drawing in most of the critical elites in their 

broadcast areas during the Cold War.) But in 2002, the station was abruptly 

morphed into Radio Farda, and the programming changes that transformed it from 

the successful surrogate service aimed at critical elites and the populations that 

support them, as Congress had envisioned, to an airy music station aimed at kids 

took place. 

Today, what passes for broadcast strategy at Radio Farda features an 

indiscriminant audience-maximizing formula that measures success by the number 

of listeners who tune in, not by the quality of those listeners or by the critical positions of influence and authority they occupy. If that metric had been applied to 

Radio Liberty, it would have been abolished before it came into its own in the 1970s, 

becoming a powerful instrument of change. This dumbing down respects the needs 

and intelligence of neither the traditional change agents nor critical younger audiences, especially Iran’s powerful student movement. Apparently distrustful that Iranians can handle anything but ‘‘news products,’’ many of which they already receive 

from other sources—and only if enticed to listen with feel-good music—Radio Farda 

offers little other substantive programming. 

In Radio Farda’s defense, its manager insists in the AP story I cited earlier that 

Iranians will tune Radio Farda out if it ceases to be ‘‘believable.’’ Credibility is indeed the currency of strategic communications, which is why substituting music for 

powerful ideas is so confused. Any sentient Iranian can see that it’s the music that 

lacks credibility, that it’s a trick, a gimmick. They also see that filling up the airwaves with Britney Spears and Shania Twain says that America has no ideas of 

value and that we don’t trust Iranian listeners to distinguish intelligent debate from 

pop culture pap. What else could they conclude but the obvious: America is just trying to make us like them, it’s public diplomacy all over again. A far better and tested strategy would be to level with them, and help them level with each other. 

The notion that we must not offend Radio Farda’s Iranian listeners throws that 

station’s reason for existing into question. As you know better than most, Mr. Chairman, while stressing balance, the Radios have never been neutral. To the contrary, 

they were created to shape political landscapes in ways that favor our desired outcomes, and our listeners have always known it. Calling for the overthrow of any regime has never been permitted by broadcast guidelines, and shouldn’t be. But as 

the Cold War experience demonstrated beyond question, the Radios can contribute 

momentum towards political change by stimulating and encouraging the right audience. 
90

During the Cold War, Russians, Poles, Czechs, Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks and many 

others tuned in to RFE/RL to receive ideas they hungered for and to hear support 

for unpopular, often dangerous, platforms for change. These audiences started 

small, grew large, and eventually encompassed most critical elites. Iran, with a 

strong cohort of educated young people, including the most educated women in the 

Middle East, is probably a more resonant milieu than Russia ever was. Yet, while 

the Russians received serious analysis, commentary, context—all from within their 

society—and the views of others elsewhere in the world grappling with similar challenges, Iranians get Madonna. 

Mr. Chairman, shielding Iranians with pop music from a reality they already understand is a losing strategy. Radio Farda should scrub much of the music and replace it with serious programming. It should not function simply as another news 

organization in an increasingly globalized information universe. Indeed, Iran, like 

most of the Middle East, is awash in news from hundreds of sources. What Iranians 

lack is internally generated discussion and debate on what the news means and how 

they should incorporate that knowledge into their view of themselves and the world. 

This approach may draw a smaller audience, at least in the beginning, but it will 

be an audience that counts for something. 

Mr. Chairman, public diplomacy—that is, telling America’s story and emphasizing 

American values—will not lure Iran back from the nuclear threshold. Strategic 

broadcasting by the Radios—that is, seeding Iran with ideas from within Iran and 

stimulating debate—on the airwaves, on the Internet, and on emerging technologies—is a far more powerful and proven weapon. Shielding Iranians with pop 

music from a reality they already understand is a losing strategy, but it is the strategy Radio Farda has adopted. My recommendation, Mr. Chairman, is simple. Radio 

Farda should scrub its broadcasting of music and replace it with serious programming. This approach may draw a smaller audience, at least in the beginning, but 

it will be an audience that counts for something. Moreover—and I can’t stress this 

strongly enough—we know how to organize and implement such a strategy. We 

have done it before, and we are good at it. But we are not doing it now. Although 

not the subject of this hearing, I recommend taking a similar hard look at the extremely expensive BBG Arabic-language investments Al Hurra TV and Radio Sawa. 

The knowledge and the art of strategic communications is being lost, nearly all 

its traditional instruments, including Radio Farda, are currently degraded, their 

successful strategies have been polluted and discarded, and their missions are badly 

garbled. Added to this, we are in late innings with Iran. It is with a sense of some 

urgency, therefore, that I urge you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, 

to make fixing America’s strategic communications a top priority.

Chairman LANTOS. I want to thank all three of our distinguished 

witnesses. We begin the questioning with Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You 

are always a gentleman about that. Because we have four votes I 

believe coming up rather rapidly, some of our more junior members 

may not have the opportunity to ask questions. I will be happy to 

yield my time to Mr. McCaul of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I want to thank the gentlelady from Florida for 

yielding her time to me. In my view, a nuclear Iran poses the 

greatest threat to the world. That may be a statement of the obvious, but I believe that Iran is on a collision course with the world, 

and we really have three options here. One is to try to negotiate. 

I know there are some people here who think we should talk to 

Iran. I am not averse to talking, but I don’t believe we have a lot 

of leverage, and I don’t believe that the doctrine of mutually assured destruction which worked so well with the Soviets is going 

to apply with the mindset that is willing to take its own life in the 

name of a greater power. 

There is a military option. I believe, as I think everyone here 

would agree, that should always be a last resort, last option put on 

the table. 

The third option in my view is a more intriguing one, and that 

is the fact that as was highlighted in some of the testimony that 
91

about 80 percent of the current population do not agree with the 

suppressive regime, they do not agree with the mullahs. But they 

are oppressed to the point where they have basically a shotgun put 

down, a barrel put down at their face, they have to go along. 

I wanted the panel as a whole to comment on those three options, and specifically even more so focus on the internal resistance 

idea. Finally, what role, if any, the MEK could play in this resistance movement? 

Chairman LANTOS. Dr. Milani. 

Mr. MILANI. Let me begin by the last part of your question. 

Every evidence I have seen from inside Iran is that the MEK, because of its association with Saddam Hussein, because it became 

associated with Saddam Hussein during the years where Saddam 

was fighting Iran, is extremely unpopular within Iran. And it is 

known as a group that has used terror in the past. It now says that 

it has given up that practice. The idea of using them as an alternative, the idea of them playing a role as an alternative in Iran I 

think goes against everything I understand about the Iranian community, both inside Iran and outside Iran. And I think it has, in 

some fundamental ways, also undermined the legitimacy of the 

claim of the United States that we don’t negotiate, for example, we 

don’t cooperate with terrorists. For the Iranian people, right or 

wrong, this was a group that was known as having begun its history in that process. 

I think the United States can play a very, very important role 

in helping that 80 percent, that side of the majority so far, and not 

always silent, to rise up and create a democratic option in Iran. As 

I said earlier, I truly believe that the only solution to the nuclear 

issue is if we have a democratic government in Iran. 

Israel was not opposed to the idea of Iran having a nuclear program when Iran was not in the hands of the regime like the Islamic republic. In fact, Israel was one of the advocates of Iran’s nuclear program in the 1970s and one of the forceful advocates of the 

nuclear program. We have to bring Iran back to the kind of a state 

where the world does not fear that if they get their hands on any 

kind of a nuclear weapons, for example, that they will not give it 

to terrorists. I don’t believe that this leadership as an entirety is 

the kind of leadership that wants to commit suicide, that it is going 

to be willing to die. Most of this leadership, in fact, has become 

deeply corrupt. They have become renters. Mr. Rafsanjani is one of 

the richest men in Iran right now. The rest of the clergy, because 

of the corrupt practices, have become owners of this society in 

ways—in terms of the corruption that I think far exceeds anything 

Iran has seen in the past. They want to continue collecting their 

share of this loot. This is a $50 billion loot that is coming in. To 

me, this regime is truly like a Mafia that has suddenly found itself 

in the control of a beat that is $50 billion. Now, there are some, 

in the great tradition of the godfather, who want to threaten and 

go out and get more and are not willing to—are not afraid to die, 

but the rest of the godfathers, they just want to continue reaping 

these benefits. But that doesn’t mean they are not dangerous, that 

doesn’t mean that the world should not try to help the Iranians 

change this government. That I think is the only strategic solution 

to this problem. Every aspect, every problem in the Middle East I 
92

think can be solved with this. And I think that movement, that 

democratic movement within Iran is far more potentially viable 

than we give it credit for. It is not dispirited. It is disheartened. 

Mr. Khatami played a very, very negative role in making it lose 

faith, but I think—this is a movement that is 100 years old. The 

Iranian democratic—you know, we are now celebrating the centennial of the constitutional revolution. This is not something that has 

come overnight, and it is not something that is going to go away 

overnight because fundamentally, the only solution to Iran’s economic problem, social problem, drug problem with—all of these are 

serious problems. Ten percent of the population is addicted to heroin or opium in Iran, 10 percent of the entire population. These 

things can only be solved; the unemployment problem can only be 

solved if there is democracy in Iran, the infusion of capital that is 

required. Iran needs $600 billion to get its oil business back to 

1975. That money is not going to come unless there is democracy 

in Iran, and the way the United States can help this democratic 

potential become reality. 

Chairman LANTOS. Dr. Takeyh. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Let me deal with one of the first issues that you 

brought up, military option, and I think as Dr. Milani suggested, 

there is no realistic military option, because a military option relies 

not so much on logistical capability but on precise intelligence, and 

if I start the following sentence by saying that the United States 

possesses detailed and accurate information regarding Middle Eastern countries’ concealed nuclear weapon facilities, any paragraph, 

any chapter that begins with the phrase ‘‘according to U.S. intelligence’’ has to be treated with skepticism, if not outright derision. 

Second of all, you know for the past 4 years at least the United 

States has said, the President has said on a rather routine basis 

that at some point we may consider the military option. Well, if I 

am an Iranian strategic planner, I am taking the necessary steps 

in terms of dispersal, concealment and so forth to ensure the survival of my program should those persistently uttered advocated 

threats come to realization. So the mere invocation of military 

threat makes the actual military attack somewhat improbable in 

terms of the success. I mean, you know, they presumably know 

what we are talking about, as they do in fact. So that is the military option. 

Let me deal with the notion of whether or not the regime can be 

overthrown, which I gather is the core of the evidence, through a 

popular revolution. I think Iran has democratic sentiments, but I 

would disagree that it has an organized democratic movement willing and capable of confronting the regime, especially the way the 

regime is being depicted today, the messianic, suicidal, determined 

to blow us up and the universe, and the way you deal with those 

radio broadcasts. I think frankly, Mr. Chairman, you should have 

a hearing on what precipitated the demise of the Soviet Union because often people come to these hearings and others and suggest 

that it was the broadcast from the United States. The point Mr. 

Wimbush made. I think we should actually test this proposition. 

You should actually have experts on what precipitated the demise 

of the Soviet Union. Because frankly, it was awfully complicated, 

flexible American containment policy that involved negotiation and 
93

deterrence at the same time, and it had to do with the inability of 

the Soviet elite at the end to rescue their own state. There was a 

loss of will of the Soviet Union, but that is something that I think 

you should actually have so we can actually put this issue to rest. 

Do radio broadcasts help? Sure. This is a country of 85 percent illiteracy rate. It knows what is wrong with the society. There is 24-

hour radio broadcast in Iran today. It is called BBC Persian Service. I mean, I don’t know how that works. I am Hamed. I live in 

Iran. I have four jobs. I make $150 a month. I was living a blissful 

life. Then I heard Radio Farda said, hey, you know, Hamed, your 

life is actually not that great. So that is what is wrong. So I am 

going to get my two friends Ali and Mohammed, and we are going 

to have a revolution. Does it help to inform the society? Yes. Is it 

an ill-informed society? No. And I am not quite sure. If Iran is all 

the things that the conservatives say it is, messianic, determined 

to blow itself up and the universe, then they should have the courage and conviction, and actually I advocate an invasion. Because 

then it is an existential threat. So I am not quite sure if that particular—waiting for revolution as a counterproliferation strategy 

seems injudicious to me. If you believe that, you are wrong. If you 

believe that, you are ahistorical. 

This is a serious problem we face with Iran, crossing successive 

nuclear demarcations with apparent impunity. I mean, this is a 

country that is going to have—that is essentially an indigenous 

uranium enrichment capability in a very short time. You know, can 

negotiations help rest that? Maybe. I am not quite sure. Is there 

a military option? No. Is waiting for popular revolution stimulated 

through radio broadcasts a judicious strategy? I don’t think so. Are 

they the type of sanctions that the administration is trying to impose on Iran, financial sanctions, and so on, through indirect disinvestment from it, are those sanctions going to have a cost on the 

Iranian economy? Indisputably so. But the problem with sanctions 

has never been that they don’t have a cost. Is the cost sufficient 

to detract the regime from its contemplated policy objectives? And 

the record on that is indisputably clear, for 27 years is no. 

Chairman LANTOS. I am sorry. Mr. Wimbush. 

Mr. WIMBUSH. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is seldom that 

I get a chance to say I disagree with everything my predecessor has 

just said, but I do. Apart from his oversimplification of my discussion of how the radios were effective during the Cold War and suggesting that maybe we should study it again; it has been studied 

and studied. There have been many retrospectives on it, and I don’t 

think that the jury is out on that anymore. 

What I am suggesting, and this gets to Congressman McCaul’s 

question, is that one gets a sense in Iran today, and I think this 

is clear in Dr. Milani’s larger testimony as well, that there are new 

dynamics at work, that there is movement in directions that we 

may not have seen before, that we should be paying attention to. 

I am reminded of the period shortly after 1987, 1988 when we 

began to see the same thing in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe with the advent of glasnost. All kinds of things began to happen. I am not in a position to characterize all those things. I think 

Dr. Milani and others like him can do that very well, but to miss 

encouraging that dynamic, as he has suggested, to me is to miss 
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a great opportunity. I think that there is every opportunity to 

strengthen forces of change in Iran that ultimately will work out 

to our advantage. I am not saying that we should be calling for a 

regime change. But let’s be honest, if you strengthen those forces, 

if you support those forces, what you are hoping for is eventually 

that the regime will disappear and you will get something a little 

bit better. But I think that, you know, I would not want to see this 

characterized as a kind of troglodyte approach to a question that 

can’t be penetrated. We know how to do this. We have done it before. We are really quite good at it, and I think it needs a lot more 

scrutiny. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Without provoking an outburst by using the word ‘‘godfather,’’ 

what specifically can we do or should we be doing, in specific, to 

drive a wedge into the fissure in the family? 

Mr. MILANI. First of all, let me make one small point clear. I did 

not mean and I think Dr. Takeyh knows that that is not what I 

mean, that you have a radio broadcast and that somehow turns on 

the key and you have a democratic revolution in Iran. I was never 

implying that. There is a vast movement, even many within the regime itself, who have come to recognize that the continuation of the 

status quo is not tenable. Saeed Hajjarian was one of the most important elements of this regime’s intelligence agency and Saeed 

Hajjarian was the architect of Khatami’s reform movement because 

from within the intelligence agency he began to recognize that the 

status quo is untenable. I suggest we go back and look at the elections that Mr. Ahmadinejad won. Every candidate without fail, 

every candidate ran against the status quo, including 

Ahmadinejad. There wasn’t a single candidate, including Mr. 

Rafsanjani, who was the pillar of the status quo, he too ran against 

the status quo. So there is something fundamentally rotten in the 

state of Iran. And a correct policy, judicious policy, exactly as you 

suggest, sir, will throw—will help these fissures, and will help 

these fissures in two ways, the fissures that exist between the Iranian people in this regime and the fissures that exist within this 

regime. Militarism only consolidates the most radical intransigents, 

and helps the tribe get together. Rafsanjani, for example, when the 

election he claimed was stolen from him, he said, I have secrets 

that I want to share but we are in a state of war. I can’t do it at 

this time. In other words, if the United States offers, for example, 

the chance for a negotiation, I am not sure the Iranians will necessarily accept it, but the possibility of this reality coming to fruition will I think in itself create an enormous tension within the 

regime. It would bring to the surface many of these issues that are 

now in the background. It will potentially encourage some of the 

people who——

Mr. ACKERMAN. You are saying that offering to talk to them will 

divide them? 

Mr. MILANI. Absolutely it will. Because there will have to be a 

serious debate within the regime in Iran about doing this. And 

there is another point that I want to emphasize. The idea that this 

regime, the mullahs are going for the nuclear program because of 

their nationalism I think misses an important point about these 
95

mullahs. The fundamental ideology of this regime is that nationalism is a colonial concept, that nationalism came because the West 

wanted to weaken the world. The mullahs want a nuclear program 

because they want to stay in power. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Could we just ask Dr. Takeyh? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Yes. The idea of offering to negotiate will divide 

Iran. There is an American offer to negotiate with Iran. It was offered in May 2006 by Condoleezza Rice. There was a precondition 

to it; namely, suspension of the enrichment activity for an interim 

period of time. There was an Iranian counterproposal in August 

2006 when they accepted the offer of negotiations, but they wanted 

to do so on a broader basis and without the precondition. So Iranians have accepted negotiations with the United States. America 

has offered those negotiations. Now, whether you want to dispense 

with the precondition, if Secretary Rice comes here and announces 

that we are going to negotiate with our precondition, then those negotiations will take place. That may not be a judicious thing to do. 

Chairman LANTOS. Go ahead. 

Mr. TAKEYH. We should insist on the precondition because otherwise the negotiations could be a ruse for continuation of the nuclear program. But we are beyond whether or not to negotiate with 

Iran. That is a consensus position from the left wing of the Democratic Party to the Bush-Cheney administration. That is where we 

are now. 

Now how do you create a more liberalized, tolerant Iranian regime? Well, here I actually have the advantage of quoting Mr. 

Milani’s work back to him in the current issue in the Washington 

Quarterly and in other issues he has suggested along with his coauthors that the best way of tempering the Iranian regime and creating a change in this dynamic—I don’t want to misquote you since 

you are here—is to actually engage it in a global society and a global economy, dispensing with those economic sanctions and the idea 

of being as Iran becomes part of the global economy, organizations 

like the World Trade Organization and the investment community 

will impose discipline on Iran in terms of having the rule of law, 

decentralization of power, institutional accountability. Those are 

prerequisites of the modern private economy, but they are also prerequisites of an antecedent of a democratic society. 

Hoping I didn’t misinterpret what he said, because in essence 

Mr. Milani has made a far-reaching argument for lifting of American economic sanctions and engaging with Iran. That sort of 

makes sense to me, but it is a politically precarious proposition to 

advance because if it doesn’t work then actually we see the experience of China; namely, strengthens the regime and doesn’t necessarily facilitate democratic transition. 

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Wimbush. 

Mr. WIMBUSH. I think that Congressman Sherman and Congressman Rohrabacher had it about right. Discussions I think are certainly worthwhile. Negotiations are something else. It depends 

what you are negotiating for. And what I fear is that we will get 

into negotiations with the Iranians as a fig leaf for allowing them 

quietly to become a nuclear power. That to me is unacceptable. If 

you take the position that I have taken that that has to be stopped 

at all costs, then it seems to me you treat the whole subject of ne-
96

gotiations very carefully. As much as I would hate to do it, you 

keep a military option on the table, although one should be under 

no illusions about the outcome. Dr. Milani I think is absolutely 

right. A military strike of any kind will strengthen the regime, at 

least in the short run, but it will pull the nation together in ways 

that they currently are not pulled together, and so I think one 

wants to keep that very far in the background. 

Chairman LANTOS. I want to thank all three of our distinguished 

witnesses. This was a singularly illuminating hearing. The committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

JANUARY 11, 2007

Mr. Chairman, the Iranian nuclear clock is ticking, and it is not in our favor. The 

US and our allies face an unprecedented strategic threat from Iran, the world’s 

leading State sponsor of terror. This is a nation—despite repeated international offers to dissuade its leaders from enriching Uranium—that continues on a dangerous 

path of nuclear weapons development, continues to support terrorist organizations, 

and threatens to wipe out the State of Israel. 

In addition, Iran and it leaders continue to spread anti-Semitism throughout the 

region and globally, operating outside the mainstream of the international community with President Ahmadinezhad hosting a vile Holocaust denial conference in December. I am proud to have joined my colleagues in the 109th Congress condemning 

in the strongest terms this heinous conference and urge the Bush Administration 

and international community to reject and repudiate Mr. Ahmadinezhad and Iran’s 

anti-Semitic statements and revisionist rhetoric. 

Given that Iran’s nuclear program and its enrichment program has progressed, 

it is incumbent on the United States, Europe and the international community to 

make it crystal clear to Iran and its leaders Ayatalloh Ali Khamenei and Mahmoud 

Ahmadinezhad that its pursuit of nuclear weapons will come at an diplomatic, economic and political cost to their nation. To date, Iranian leaders even under the 

threat of new UN sanctions, which include preventing Iran from receiving materials 

and technology that could contribute to its nuclear and missile programs, continue 

to thwart the will of the international community. 

Mr. Chairman, it is essential as Congress along with the Bush Administration 

focus on Iran’s nuclear weapons program that we also address Tehran’s troubling 

partnership with Syria and their nefarious support of terrorist organizations such 

as Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad. To this end, I look forward to hearing from 

our witnesses Ambassador Pickering and Director Woolsey to discuss different policy 

options to end Tehran’s support of terrorist organizations and to determine what action needs to be taken by the United States, EU and our allies to prevent Iran from 

obtaining nuclear weapons. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

JANUARY 31, 2007

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by welcoming the expert witnesses, Dr. Abbas Milani, Dr. Ray Takeyh, and Mr. Enders Wimbush for being here 

today. I look forward to hearing your testimony on the very complex quandary posed 

by Iran. 

I am grateful for the opportunity to closely examine the situation in Iran and U.S. 

foreign policy in relation to it. Iran poses a great danger to what little stability exists in the Middle East, as its government continues to arrogantly push forward 

with a nuclear program, support Islamic extremist activity, and oppress its people. 

The policies of this Administration thus far have been ineffective at best and we 

must take serious action to prevent a much more disastrous situation from developing. 
98

However, at the same time, I am concerned by the Bush Administration’s position 

on Iran. As important as it is to address the issue, the President’s recent comments 

regarding Iran have been either antagonistic or dismissive, mirroring his failed foreign policy to date. While it is essential for the government of Iran to understand 

how serious we are about the situation, my fear is that his statements are more 

than just rhetoric. 

The Center for American Progress notes that recently the Bush Administration 

has:

• Announced the movement of Patriot missile units into Iraq, which are only 

useful against Scud-range missiles—weapons that Iraqi insurgents do not 

possess but Iran and Syria do.

• Ordered the deployment of a second carrier battle group into the Persian 

Gulf.

• Declared the war in Iraq part of ‘‘a broad struggle going on in the Middle 

East between the forces of freedom and democracy and the forces of terror 

and tyranny—and Iran is behind a lot of that,’’ as National Security Advisor 

Stephen Hadley said on Meet the Press.

• Arrested several Iranian diplomats in Iraq in December and in January, and 

arrested six other Iranians associated with Revolutionary Guards at an office 

opened in Kurdistan in 1992 that has been functioning as an Iranian consulate.

• Did not criticize press reports that Israel was practicing air strikes on Iranian 

facilities, including the possible use of Israeli nuclear weapons.

• Announced in the President’s January 10 speech to the nation: ‘‘We will interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies 

in Iraq.’’

These actions imply a direction in our nation’s foreign relations with which Congress has neither been consulted nor informed. I maintain that we must condemn 

Iran’s support of terrorist organizations in the Middle East, which hold the threat 

of much more violence and instability to come. We must condemn Iran’s nuclear program and join the international community in attempting to negotiate with the government to cease nuclear production. We must condemn the Iranian government’s 

tyrannical oppression of its people, the majority of which disagree with its policies. 

But we must not act rashly and risk involving ourselves in a conflict as potentially 

disastrous as the one in Iraq. 

In a hearing yesterday in the Committee on Armed Services, expert witnesses advised this House to avoid too much focus on Iran, or else risk more essential duties 

in Iraq, and the pressing needs of our troops in the forgotten war in Afghanistan. 

We must approach this situation cautiously, and I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for 

your emphasis on the need for dialogue. Serious efforts are needed to confront the 

threat that Iran poses, but we must be reasonable, and develop a clear strategy and 

remember that military force is always a last resort. We have seen how disastrous 

it can be to do otherwise, as we seek to remedy the chaos in Iraq. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the remainder of my time.

Æ