* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion s h ould not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 95-21076

(Summary Calendar)

_______________

EARNEST BRISHUN LOVE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KAREN HUNT; GARY JOHNSON; STEPHEN

KELLEY, Capt.; SHARON KEILIN; JOHNA

SEPULVEDA,

Defendants-Appellees.

_______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(CA-H-94-3021)

_______________________________________________

August 29, 1996

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiff Earne st Brishun Love, an inmate of the Texas

Department of Crimi nal Justice, appeals the district court's

dismissal of his civil rights action. We vacate and remand.

Love filed this lawsuit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that Defendants Karen Hunt, Gary Johnson, Stephen Kelley,1 The Clerk of Court dismissed Love's appeal for want of prosecution,

pursuant to Local Rule 42.3, because of Love's failure to file his appel late

brief within the allotted time. Love filed a motion to reconsider, alleging that

his appellate brief and two appellate motions h a d been timely enclosed in the

parcel in which he returned the appellate record to the Clerk's Office. When

said brief and motions were in fact found in the appellate record, the Clerk of

Court reinstated the appeal.

-2- Sharon Keilin, and Johna Sepulveda harassed him because of his

religious beliefs and retaliated against him for filing complaints

against them. On November 21, 1994, the district court filed an

order requiring Love to submit a more definite statement of his

claim within thirty days. The order listed several questions that

Love should answer in his statement, and warned Love that failure

to comply with the order could result in dismissal of his action.

On that same day, the district court also filed an order staying

all proceedings pending a determination by the court, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), of whether the action should be dismissed as

frivolous. This order warned Love not to file any motions or

conduct any discovery until authorized by the court to do so. Love

never filed a more definite statement of his claim, and the

district court never made its § 1915(d) determination. No further

action was taken in the case until November 1, 19 95, when the

district court dismissed Love's suit for want of prosecution,

pursuant to F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 41(b), because he failed to comply with

the order to submit a more definite statement of his claim. Love

filed a timely notice of appeal. 1

Love argues that the district court erred by dismissing his-3-

complaint. A district court may dismiss a plaintiff's action sua

sponte for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with a

court order. F E D

. R. C I V

. P. 41(b); Sturgeon v. Airborne Freight

Corp.

, 778 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1985). Unless otherwise

specified in the order of dismissal, a dismissal under Rule 41(b)

operates as an adjudication on the merits, and thus as a dismissal

with prejudice. We review a district court's Rule 41(b) dismissal

for abuse of discretion. M cCullough v. Lynaugh

, 835 F.2d 1126,

1127 (5th Cir. 1988).

A Rule 41(b) dismissal of a plaintiff's action with prejudice

is a severe sanction, to be used only when the plaintiff's conduct

"has threatened the integrity of the judicial process." R ogers v.

Kroger Co. , 669 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, we

have previously stated that such a dismissal is improper unless the

recor d evidences (1) a clear record of delay or contumacious

conduct by the plaintiff, and (2) that a lesser sanction would not

better serve the interests of justice. M cNeal v. Papasan

, 842 F.2d

787, 790 (5th Cir. 1988). In his appellate brief, Love claims that

he failed to comply with the district court's order to file a more

definite statement of his claim because he did not have access to

the pleadings and other documents in the record that would enable

him to answer the questions in the district court's order. It is

also evident from Love's brief that he was confused by the district

court's order staying further proceedings, which warned him not to-4-

file any motions or conduct any discovery until authorized by the

court, becaus e he did not know how to obtain the documents he

needed to file a more definite statemen t without filing an

unauthorized motion.

We find that the record in this case demonstrates neither a

clear record of d elay nor contumacious conduct by Love. We also

find that lesser sanctions, such as an additional notice clarifying

the court's earlier orders, would have better served the interests

of justice. Accordingly, we hold that the district court abused

its discretion by dismissing Love's complaint under Rule 41(b). We

VACATE the district court's order d ismissing Love's civil rights

action for want of prosecution, and we REMAND to the district court

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.