An Extended Deterrence

Regime to Counter Iranian

Nuclear Weapons

Issues and Options

Richard L. Kugler 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University

September 2009 
ii

The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not reflect the official policy or 

position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified 

materials. 

Dr. Richard L. Kugler is a senior consultant and former Distinguished Research 

Professor at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), National 

Defense University. His specialty is U.S. defense strategy, global security affairs, and 

NATO. He advises senior echelons of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint 

Staff, and the interagency community. He is the author of multiple books, journal articles, 

and official studies on U.S. defense strategy and programs as well as NATO and global 

security affairs. Dr. Kugler has his doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology. A former Pentagon senior executive and RAND research leader, he is one of 

the original architects of NATO enlargement and multiple other initiatives in U.S. 

national security policy. He is a recipient of the Distinguished Civilian Service Medal and 

other awards and decorations. 

Defense & Technology Papers are published by the National Defense University Center for Technology 

and National Security Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. CTNSP publications are available 

at <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html>. 
iii

Contents 

Executive Summary............................................................................................................ v

Introduction......................................................................................................................... 1

A New and Unpolished Idea: The Need for Careful Analysis ........................................ 1

Purposes of Paper ............................................................................................................ 2

Overarching Themes........................................................................................................ 4

Lessons from the Cold War ................................................................................................ 8

Strategic Threats and Dangers Posed by a Nuclear-Armed Iran ...................................... 11

Designing an Extended Deterrence Regime—Ends, Ways, and Means........................... 15

Choosing Ways: Crafting the Methods and Mechanisms of Deterrence.......................... 21

Deterring Iran ................................................................................................................ 22

Reassuring Friends and Allies, and Forging Common Security Commitments............ 27

Selecting Means—Blending the Instruments of Deterrence............................................. 30

Assessing Options—Balancing Political Feasibility and Strategic Performance............. 38

Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................................. 50
iv

Table 1. Elements of a Possible Extended Deterrence Regime 

Countries/Actors to be Protected 

Threat to be 

Deterred CONUS/ 

Deployed U.S. 

Forces 

NATO/Europe Israel Friendly Arab/ 

Muslim Countries 

Nuclear Missile 

Attack 

High priority High 

priority/NATO 

Treaty 

commitment 

High priority/ 

existential threat 

High-to-medium 

priority 

Nuclear Terrorism 

and Proliferation 

High priority High 

priority/NATO 

Treaty 

commitment 

High priority/ 

Existential threat 

High-to-medium 

priority 

Conventional Military 

Attack 

Low risk/ 

low emphasis 

Low risk/ 

low emphasis 

Low risk/ 

low emphasis 

Medium-to-high 

priority 

Political Coercion Low risk/ 

low emphasis 

Low risk/ 

low emphasis 

Medium risk/ 

medium 

emphasis 

Medium-to-high 

priority 

Conventional 

Terrorism 

Low risk/ 

low emphasis 

Medium risk/ 

medium emphasis 

High risk/ 

high priority 

 Medium-to-high 

priority 

Table 2. Mechanisms and Instruments of Extended Deterrence 

Threat to be 

Deterred

Strategic Mechanisms for 

Pursuing Deterrence

Key Instruments for Carrying out 

Mechanisms of Deterrence

Nuclear Missile 

Attack 

y Make clear gravity of event 

y Prevent successful missile attack 

y Credibly threaten nuclear 

retaliation 

y Strong U.S. declaratory policy 

y Missile defenses of protected countries 

y Nuclear retaliatory capabilities and options 

Nuclear 

Terrorism and 

Proliferation 

y Make clear gravity of event 

y Prevent nuclear terrorist attack 

y Credibly threaten nuclear 

retaliation 

y Strong U.S. declaratory policy 

y Homeland security and attribution assets 

y Nuclear retaliatory capabilities and options 

Conventional 

Military Attack 

y Make clear U.S. and regime will 

respond appropriately 

y Conventional defense against 

specific threats 

y Capacity to conduct counterattacks 

y Diplomatic collaboration among regime members 

y Allied capabilities to defend borders, airspace, and 

sea lanes 

y Conventional forces for spectrum of counterattacks

y U.S. conventional commitments, when appropriate 

Political 

Coercion 

y Deny Iran opportunities and 

benefits of political coercion 

y Protect vulnerable regime 

members from coercion 

y Impose political, diplomatic, and 

economic costs on Iran 

y U.S. and regime-wide political support of 

vulnerable countries 

y Reduce vulnerabilities of exposed countries 

through diplomatic collaboration 

y Wide array of instruments to exert counterpressures on Iran 

Conventional 

Terrorism 

y Deny Iran opportunities and 

benefits of conventional terrorism. 

y Protect vulnerable regime 

members. 

y Impose political, diplomatic, and 

economic costs on Iran. 

y Homeland security efforts, individual and 

multilateral. 

y Diplomatic collaboration among regime members 

to discourage terrorism. 
v

Executive Summary

This paper examines the idea of creating an American-led extended deterrence regime in 

the Middle East to address potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and missiles. 

It does not focus on how to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed power. Instead 

it addresses how the U.S. Government can act to deter Iran in a future setting where it 

already possesses these weapons and is trying to employ them to geopolitical advantage. 

Developing a coherent strategy can lessen the risk that the United States will be 

surprised, compelled to improvise, and unable to lead effectively in the Middle East and 

elsewhere. 

Even as the Administration employs diplomacy, sanctions, and multilateral cooperation 

to derail Iran from the nuclear path, it should also develop a clear sense of how it will 

react if, as is possible, Iran emerges as a nuclear power, led by a radical government with 

a menacing foreign policy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently stated that Iran 

should consider the consequences of a U.S. “defense umbrella over the region.” This 

paper explores many of the issues related to such an umbrella. 

Key questions arise regarding an extended deterrence regime. What Iranian threats would 

this regime try to deter? Who would it protect, and how would it protect them? How 

much deterrence is possible, and how much is enough? What shape would a deterrence 

regime take, how would it operate, and would it be effective? What options are available? 

This paper addresses these and related questions. Its intent is to illuminate issues and 

options, not to advocate any single approach. 

The recent tumultuous election in Iran has restored President Ahmadinejad to power in a 

setting of strong dissent and growing government repression. Should Iran verifiably 

forsake its nuclear weapons program, an extended deterrence regime would be 

unnecessary. But if Iran continues to pursue development of nuclear weapons and 

delivery systems, the United States may have little other choice than to seek to create a 

deterrence regime, because a nuclear-armed Iran would pose serious threats to Europe, 

Israel, and friendly Arab/Muslim countries in the Middle East. Creating such a regime 

could serve key U.S. strategic goals and is preferable to the alternatives of going to war 

with Iran or acquiescing to its menacing strategic designs. This complex and demanding 

endeavor will require careful analysis and planning that should begin soon. 

A plausible estimate is that Iran could start producing nuclear weapons in the near future 

and eventually field 20–30 nuclear missiles capable of covering the Middle East and 

Europe. The core idea behind an extended deterrence regime is that the United States 

would make security assurances and commitments that could deter Iran and establish an 

umbrella of protection over countries that are endangered by those missiles. If both goals 

are accomplished, the result could be to lessen regional political temperatures, including 

the risks of a nuclear arms race and escalating crises. Table 1 (facing page) displays the 

countries/actors that might need protecting, the different types of Iranian threats that 

could need deterring, and the priority likely to be given to each combination (represented 

by a cell of the matrix) based on its importance and associated risks. Top priority would 

need to be deterring Iran from exploiting its nuclear capability—using its nuclear missiles 

against protected countries, engaging in nuclear terrorism against them, or proliferating 
vi

nuclear weapons to such terrorist groups as al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Iran also 

must be deterred from employing conventional aggression, terrorism, and political 

coercion against its Arab/Muslim neighbors. 

Deterring a nuclear-armed Iran led by a radical government with high ambitions and risktaking propensities will be difficult. U.S. strategy would need to make tailored use of 

such classical deterrence methods as denying Iran the benefits of aggression, imposing 

unacceptable costs on aggression, and giving Iran incentives to exercise restraint so that 

peace would always be preferable to war with the United States and its allies. Table 2 

displays, for each of the five threats, the types of mechanisms and instruments that could 

be needed for deterrence. If the U.S. Government opts for a purely political regime, it 

could pursue deterrence through its own leadership and declaratory policy, plus such 

other instruments as multilateral cooperation and economic sanctions. If the U.S. 

Government also opts for a military regime, nuclear deterrence could be pursued through 

credible threats of nuclear retaliation, layered missile defenses, and enhanced homeland 

security to guard against nuclear terrorism. Could nuclear deterrence by itself prevent 

Iranian conventional aggression, political coercion, and terrorism against its nearby 

neighbors? Perhaps so, but more likely, it would need to be accompanied by such other 

measures as alliance political collaboration, stronger allied conventional defenses, and 

U.S. conventional forces. 

How could the United States best pursue creation of an extended deterrence regime? 

Multiple options embodying different permutations and combinations are available: all of 

them should be examined so that their attractions, liabilities, and tradeoffs can be known. 

This paper offers six illustrative options that range across a wide spectrum stretching 

from high political feasibility but relatively low strategic performance (option 1) to low 

feasibility but high strategic performance (option 6). The six options offer varying 

mixtures of steadily increasing U.S. commitments and efforts that begin with alternative 

approaches to pursuing deterrence of nuclear threats and then migrate to include 

deterrence of conventional aggression, political coercion, and conventional terrorism. 

Each option has its own strategic rationale as well as pros and cons. The six options are: 

1. Political Deterrence would strive to pursue nuclear deterrence and other goals 

purely through such means as U.S. political leadership and declaratory policy coupled 

with diplomatic and economic collaboration with partner countries. It would make no 

concrete U.S. military commitments to the regime. 

2. Variable-Geometry Deterrence would include the measures of option 1, but would 

also provide concrete military commitments in the form of nuclear deterrence 

coverage (i.e., missile defenses, retaliatory plans, and homeland security) to Europe 

and Israel. It would strive to protect friendly Arab/Muslim countries through political 

assurances: e.g., the type of consultative arrangements that, in Europe, are offered to 

partner countries not invited to join NATO. 

3. Regime-Wide Nuclear Deterrence would make concrete nuclear commitments to 

Europe, Israel, and friendly Arab/Muslim countries, and would strive to protect 

vulnerable Arab/Muslim countries from conventional aggression and coercion by 

using security assistance and training to strengthen their own self-defense forces. It 

envisions a small U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf: less than 25,000 

personnel largely composed of air and naval assets. 
vii

4. Full-Spectrum Deterrence strengthens option 3 by providing a larger U.S. force 

presence that likely would top 25,000 personnel and would be designed for new-era 

deterrence and reassurance missions. 

5. Collective Security Deterrence builds on option 4’s military features by striving to 

create a region-wide collective security architecture that would bond regime members 

into tighter political-military collaboration and a common strategic mindset. 

6. Integrated Multi-Theater Deterrence is the most visionary option: it strives to join 

Europe/NATO with a Middle Eastern collective security system so that deterrence 

policies in both regions can be pursued in lockstep. 

Table 3 summarizes the ability of these six options to meet key effectiveness criteria and, 

by implication, the tradeoffs they impose.

Table 3. Strategic Effectiveness of Options 

Key 

Effectiveness 

Criteria:

Option 1: 

Political 

Deterrence

Option 2: 

VariableGeometry 

Deterrence

Option 3: 

RegimeWide 

Nuclear 

Deterrence

Option 4: 

FullSpectrum 

Deterrence

Option 5: 

Collective 

Security 

Deterrence

Option 6: 

Integrated 

MultiTheater 

Deterrence

Deterrence 

Goals and 

Mechanisms 

LowMedium Medium High High High + High + 

Reassurance 

Goals 

LowMedium Medium High – High High + High + 

Other Goals Low Low Medium Medium + High High + 

Meet U.S. 

Military 

Requirements 

Low LowMedium High – High High + High+ 

Political 

Feasibility 

High High Medium + Medium Low Low 

Cost and 

Difficulties 

Low Low Medium – Medium High High + 

Options 1 and 2 are the easiest to carry out, but their strategic performance may be too 

low for the goals being pursued. Options 5 and 6 offer the best strategic performance, but 

their feasibility is too low. Options 3 and 4 are the “sweet spot” on the spectrum; both 

offer plausible political feasibility and solid strategic effectiveness in terms of strong 

nuclear deterrence and improved allied self-defense capabilities. The decision between 

them turns on the size and missions of the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, and 

on the importance attached to conventional deterrence and related goals. 

The time to start thinking, planning, and analyzing extended deterrence options is now, 

not after Iran has produced large quantities of fissile material, or tested a nuclear weapon, 

or fielded a delivery system. Months or years may pass before Iran has achieved these 

milestones, if internal developments, diplomacy, or other measures fail to end the Iranian 

nuclear weapons program. We must use whatever time we have to prepare to deter a 

nuclear Iran, or risk finding ourselves at a grave strategic disadvantage. 
viii
1

Introduction

This paper analyzes the idea of creating a U.S.-led “extended deterrence regime” to 

respond to potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and missiles. It does not focus 

on how to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed power. Instead it addresses how 

the U.S. Government can act to deter Iran in a future setting where Iran already possesses 

these weapons and is trying to employ them to geopolitical advantage. 

This paper supports the Administration’s effort to employ diplomacy, economic 

sanctions, and multilateral cooperation to derail Iran from the nuclear path. The future 

will be far safer and easier to handle if this goal can be accomplished. However, the U.S. 

Government should also develop a clear sense of how it will react if Iran emerges as a 

nuclear power, led by a radical government in pursuit of a menacing foreign policy. 

Developing a coherent strategy now can lessen the risk that the United States will be 

caught by surprise, compelled to improvise, and unable to lead effectively in the Middle 

East and elsewhere. 

The key questions that arise regarding an extended deterrence regime are: What Iranian 

threats would this regime try to deter? Who would it protect, and how would it protect 

them? How much deterrence is possible, and how much is enough? What shape would 

this regime take, how would it be established, how would it operate, would it be 

effective? What options are available to the United States? This paper addresses these 

and related questions. Its intent is to illuminate issues and options, not to advocate any 

single approach. 

A New and Unpolished Idea: The Need for Careful Analysis

One of the gravest dangers facing the United States is that during the coming years, Iran 

may acquire nuclear weapons and long-range missiles capable of delivering them not 

only across the Middle East but to Europe as well. Much will depend on how Iranian 

politics evolve. The tumultuous election of June 2009 has returned President 

Ahmadinejad to power amidst strong dissent and mounting governmental repression. 

Barring overthrow of Iran’s theocratic regime, which benefits from support by security 

and police institutions, internal politics seem unlikely to lead Iran to refrain from 

acquiring nuclear weapons. 

Currently the United States is working within the six-country negotiating group (other 

members of which are Britain, Germany, France, Russia, and China) in an effort to use 

diplomacy and economic sanctions to derail Iran from nuclear armament. Although this 

effort will remain a top priority, the likelihood that it will succeed seems to be fading. 

What is to be done if it fails entirely and Iran is irreversibly headed toward becoming a 

nuclear power? One idea advanced by some advocates is to launch military strikes 

against Iran, or even go to war with Iran to destroy its nuclear arsenal before it is 

deployed. But this step has obvious drawbacks, including risks that military strikes might 

fail, widespread violence would result, and any attempt to occupy Iran to impose regime 

change would be costly and perilous. At best, preventive war against Iran is a course of 

last resort, and an unappealing one even then. 
2

Is there a strategic alternative between going to war with Iran and passively 

accommodating a nuclear-armed Iran, with all its inevitable consequences? An 

alternative that has surfaced recently is to create an extended deterrence regime that could 

protect the Middle East and Europe by deterring Iran from using its nuclear weapons to 

attack or threaten its neighbors. During her presidential campaign of 2008, then-Senator 

Hillary Clinton raised the prospect of creating a deterrence umbrella in response to 

Iranian nuclear weapons. Speaking as Secretary of State in July 2009, she stated that the 

United States might extend a defense umbrella over the Middle East if Iran acquires 

nuclear weapons, but she added no details on how this umbrella would be constructed.1

Secretary of Defense Gates also has spoken about the role that ballistic missile defenses 

in Europe can play in deterring Iran. 

President Obama has publicly warned that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, this could 

trigger a nuclear arms race across the Middle East. Moreover, the Administration has said 

that by late 2009 it will take stock of its current negotiations with Iran, and that it may be 

willing to pursue stronger measures if Iran does not agree to forsake nuclear weapons by 

then. During the coming months, the Administration will continue forging its national 

security and defense strategies, which provides a good opportunity to assess the premises, 

postulates, and requirements of an extended deterrence regime tailored to Iran. The time 

has arrived to examine this unpolished idea, which needs careful thought before it can be 

adopted.2

Purposes of Paper

To set the stage for analysis, this paper postulates that Iran will strive to arm itself with 

nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles with the intent of using them to achieve hegemony 

in the Middle East and pursue strategic interests elsewhere. There are, of course, other 

possibilities. Iran might agree not to acquire nuclear weapons—and to verification that it 

has not acquired them—or it might acquire them but be led by a moderate government 

with a benign foreign policy in mind. Either outcome could be argued to negate the need 

for an extended deterrence regime. But if Iran acquires nuclear-tipped missiles and is led 

by a radical government that threatens its neighbors and other countries, a U.S.-led 

extended deterrence regime would be prudent. 

If an extended deterrence regime is to be established, it must be fitted carefully into the 

Administration’s comprehensive strategy for the Middle East and its efforts to engage 

Iran peacefully. In addition to protecting the United States and its deployed military 

forces, it would need to protect as many as three separate constituencies—NATO allies in 

Europe, Israel (with whom the United States has a special relationship), and friendly 

Arab/Muslim countries in the Persian Gulf and Middle East—each of which would have 

to be approached differently. Such a deterrence regime would not be a cure for all of the 

 

1

 Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, “Clinton Speaks of Shielding Mideast From Iran,” The New York 

Times, July 23, 2009. 2

 In 2007, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy issued a study on the deterrence issue. See Patrick 

Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt, Deterring the Ayatollahs: Complications in Applying Cold War Strategy 

to Iran (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Studies; July 2007). This study broadly 

assessed key issues at stake and discussed the importance and difficulty of pursuing deterrence, but did not 

put forth and evaluate different U.S. options for pursuing extended deterrence. Thus far, little other 

academic literature has been published on this subject. 
3

many problems confronting the Middle East, but if it solved the troubles uniquely posed 

by a nuclear-armed Iran, while safeguarding U.S. friends and allies, it would make a 

major contribution. 

The core idea of extended deterrence is that the United States would provide deterrence 

coverage over vulnerable overseas countries by either directly defending them or 

threatening to retaliate powerfully against a nuclear-armed adversary that might be 

tempted to commit aggression against them. The desired effect is to persuade potential 

adversaries that aggression cannot succeed and extend a reassuring umbrella of U.S. 

protection over exposed friends and allies. Success in this regard, in turn, presumably 

reduces the risk of a runaway nuclear arms race, lessens the danger that political crises 

might escalate into nuclear war, and otherwise helps promote regional stability. 

The idea of extended deterrence is nothing new. Throughout the Cold War, it was applied 

successfully in Europe and Asia, where it remains in effect today. But it has not been 

applied to the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. The United States has friends and allies 

in this region, but no nuclear-armed adversaries threaten them. Creating an extended 

deterrence regime to counter an Iranian nuclear threat would be an entirely new 

experience not only for the region, but also for U.S. foreign policy and defense planning. 

The newness of applying extended deterrence to a region known for its political conflicts 

and violence necessitates that the idea be subjected to careful scrutiny, analysis, and 

planning. In theory, an extended deterrence regime can be effective in the region, but 

failure is a possibility that cannot be discounted. Much depends on how such a regime 

would be constructed and executed. 

Could an extended deterrence regime truly deter Iran, whose definition of rational 

conduct and prudent risk-taking might differ from American adversaries of the past? 

Would it adequately reassure American friends and allies, including Israel, whose own 

strategic mindset might be different from the mindsets of allies protected during the Cold 

War? What would an extended deterrence regime entail in political and military terms? 

What steps would need to be taken to create it, and are they feasible in light of the 

constraints and barriers operating against them? If this regime could be created, what 

mechanisms would it employ and how would it function? What instruments would it 

employ and what consequences would it produce? Could it be confidently relied on to 

achieve its strategic goals, which would be multiple in nature and hard to attain? What 

labors, costs, and risks would this regime generate? What might be its secondary effects 

and unanticipated consequences, favorable or otherwise? What would be required from 

the United States to create and sustain such a regime over a period of perhaps many 

years? What would be required from its friends and allies that would be protected by such 

a regime? How would the politics, security affairs, and military dynamics of the Persian 

Gulf and the Middle East need to change? How would the triangular relationship among 

the United States, Europe, and the Middle East be affected? All of these questions are 

important, and they will require answers if this idea is to be pursued. 

Such questions are addressed by this paper, which strives to create an informative 

analytical framework. It represents an initial and exploratory treatment of a new, 

unpolished strategic idea rather than a final analysis intended to drive policy choices or to 

advocate in any other way. In particular, it does not put forth any fixed blueprint for how 

an extended deterrence regime against Iran might take shape. Instead, it examines several 
4

of the key strategic, political, and military issues that arise in considering this idea. 

Likewise, it endeavors to identify and evaluate a spectrum of illustrative options that the 

United States and its friends and allies might want to consider if they choose to pursue 

this course. If there are several potentially viable options for creating an extended 

deterrence regime, all of them need to be examined and compared before one is selected. 

This paper’s examination of them is intended to shed light on their assets, liabilities, and 

tradeoffs rather than to endorse any of them, or to preclude consideration of other 

options. 

This paper begins by discussing overarching themes that help provide a framework for 

examining the idea of creating an extended deterrence regime. Then it briefly assesses 

deterrence lessons from the Cold War that may be applicable to meeting today’s 

challenges. Next, it examines the dangers and threats posed by a nuclear-armed Iran, 

including the destabilizing impacts across the Middle East. Then it analyzes the ends, 

ways, and means of an extended deterrence regime targeted at Iran, i.e., the multiple 

goals that it would pursue, the methods and mechanisms that it would employ to achieve 

these goals, and the instruments and activities that it would use to make these methods 

and mechanisms work effectively. Finally, it puts forth six options of varying political 

feasibility and strategic performance for creating an extended deterrence regime and 

evaluates them comparatively. At the end, it offers summary conclusions and 

recommendations. 

Readers who know the complex logic of extended deterrence and its historical 

experiences will find this paper’s main arguments to be familiar terrain. Specialists in 

Middle East politics may be skeptical at the idea of establishing a deterrence regime on 

the infertile soil of their region. Both reactions are natural and understandable. If this idea 

is to be pursued by the United States, a central challenge will be to harmonize the logic of 

extended deterrence with the realities of Middle East security affairs. This paper aspires 

to provide intellectual capital for this endeavor. 

Overarching Themes  

The United States has been pursuing a containment strategy against Iran since the mid1990s, and for the entire period its relations with that country have been marked by 

hostility interrupted by ephemeral hopes for a thaw. Applying deterrence logic to Iran 

would usher in a new era. This step would be anchored in the premises that a nucleararmed Iran would need deterring, that it plausibly could be deterred, and that it would not 

pose such an existential threat that a disarming strike necessarily must be employed to 

eradicate its nuclear power. This step would mean that U.S. strategy toward Iran would 

be guided by both containment and deterrence, and that the latter would have a distinctly 

harder edge than the former. Whereas containment can be carried out by diplomatic and 

economic measures, deterrence is a concept that, in the past, has normally focused on an 

adversary’s military power, and it has been heavily pursued by strongly coercive 

measures, including threatened use of U.S. and allied military forces. It suggests that a 

willingness to go to war may be the best method, perhaps the only method, to convince 

the targeted country to keep the peace. Such could be the case again, if the United States 

decides that it must contemplate how best to deter a nuclear-armed Iran. 
5

The idea of creating an extended deterrence regime has traction only if ongoing efforts to 

divert Iran from the nuclear path are judged likely to fail. If this judgment is made, 

creating such a regime to counter Iranian nuclear power seems attractive enough to be 

considered as a strategy for the United States to pursue. Indeed, steps toward such a 

regime might themselves help dissuade Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and 

missiles, or at least exert a restraining influence on the type of Iranian nuclear force 

ultimately deployed. The idea of creating such a regime is unlikely to find unanimous 

support among observers. Critics from the “too little” school will assert that this idea is 

too prone to trying to live peacefully with a nuclear-armed Iran and too unwilling to 

pursue preventive war or regime change against it. Critics from the “too much” school 

will argue that creating an extended deterrence regime in the Middle East is an 

impossible endeavor, that it will further polarize relations with Iran, and that pursuing it 

will ultimately result in an embarrassing setback for the United States and possibly 

further destabilize the region. Both positions deserve to be taken seriously. Yet they have 

nothing better to offer. By steering a middle course between preemptive attack and 

accommodation, extended deterrence offers a potential strategy for coping with a 

dangerous future in ways that could both frustrate Iran’s menacing geopolitical ambitions 

and keep U.S. friends and allies secure. Indeed, strategic affairs in the Persian Gulf may 

leave the United States with little alternative to pursuing this idea, even though it comes 

equipped with thorns and bristles. 

Creating such a regime and making it work would be anything but easy. Difficult 

challenges and tough dilemmas would arise in trying to safeguard Europe, Israel, and 

friendly Arab/Muslim countries at the same time. More is involved than merely 

deploying ballistic missile defenses to cover the Middle East and Europe, and/or 

threatening U.S. nuclear retaliation if Iran commits aggression. In this regime, U.S. 

military power and commitments would need to be carefully designed to achieve 

peacetime political goals, and to influence multiple national capitals, not just Tehran. The 

regime also would require a capacity to inhibit nuclear proliferation and to prevent 

rivalries and crises—inter-state and otherwise—from escalating into nuclear 

confrontations. Handling the politics and diplomacy of such a regime thus might be fully 

as important, or more important, than crafting its military dimensions. 

The successful experiences with extended deterrence regimes in Europe and Asia during 

the Cold War cannot readily be grafted onto the Persian Gulf and Middle East. In Europe 

and Asia, the presence of collective security alliances with multiple allies coupled with 

well-oiled practices of multilateral and bilateral defense planning significantly aided the 

task of creating and sustaining extended deterrence. None of these assets exist in the 

Persian Gulf and Middle East. This unique region would need to be treated on its own 

terms, with all of its problems in mind, and with the aim of making it susceptible to the 

stabilizing effects of deterrence mechanisms. The United States would not be starting 

from scratch, but it would need to establish a solid foundation of appropriate political 

relations with key countries even as it erects a superstructure of instruments and actions 

to produce effective deterrence. Such an effort would need to be guided by new-era 

security affairs policies aimed not only at decisively influencing Iran’s strategic calculus, 

but also at shaping America’s political and military relations with its friends and allies in 

the region to support this regime. 
6

Decisively influencing Iran’s strategic calculus so that it keeps its nuclear weapons 

holstered would require carefully tailored deterrence methods and mechanisms that deny 

Iran any benefits from nuclear aggression, impose severe costs on such conduct, and 

provide Tehran reasons to exercise restraint. If Iran is led by a radical government with 

assertive ambitions, deterring it will be difficult. But, as will be argued later, the desire to 

protect its own safety and interests could provide powerful incentives for Iran to act 

rationally and prudently. Likewise, assurances to friends and allies would need to be 

sufficiently tailored and powerful so that these countries have convincing reasons not to 

attack Iran (in Israel’s case) or to acquire their own nuclear weapons (in the case of Arab 

and Muslim countries). Protecting countries close to Iran’s borders could also require 

efforts to improve their conventional military forces so that they are not vulnerable to 

local Iranian aggression, bullying, and coercion. Depending on the deterrence strategy 

chosen, peacetime deployment of modest U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf might 

also be needed. 

Creating an extended deterrence regime also would require close cooperation with NATO 

allies in Europe. Europe could be endangered by long-range Iranian missiles in ways 

requiring NATO to deploy sizable missile defenses and develop plans for retaliation 

against Iran. The United States would require diplomatic assistance from its European 

allies in its efforts to deter and contain Iran in the Middle East. Cooperation from Russia 

would also be highly desirable; restrictions on Russian military sales to Iran coupled with 

Moscow’s diplomatic support of U.S. policies toward Tehran could help appreciably. 

While Russia would have incentives to gain protection from a nuclear-armed Iran, its 

recent trend toward a geopolitical-minded foreign policy might place limits on its 

willingness to collaborate with the United States in dealing with Iran and the Middle 

East. In addition, Russia might seek to extract diplomatic concessions from the United 

States in exchange for its cooperation on Iran. For example, it might seek to block 

entrance by Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. If so, this would add even greater 

diplomatic complexity to establishing an extended deterrence regime aimed at Iran. 

Similar complexities could arise in trying to elicit help from China, India, and other 

major powers. 

For good or ill, pursuing this regime would draw the United States more deeply into 

Middle Eastern security affairs than (Iraq aside) is the case today. If such a regime is to 

succeed, it must help foster peace in the region, rather than backfire while entangling the 

United States in dangerous quagmires, traps, and escalatory hair triggers. This is a tall 

order, and dealing with it would require not only careful thinking, but also effective use 

of resources. The United States will need to forge well-conceived strategic concepts and 

adeptly blend hard and soft power. Its array of instruments would need to include military 

power, diplomacy, economic tools, homeland security, information assets, cyber 

networks, security assistance, partnership-building, and other tools. Its approach to 

deploying military power would need to be selective, for Middle Eastern politics likely 

will not permit the kind of weighty forward presences that have marked U.S. deterrence 

regimes in Europe and Asia. Reliance on offshore forces and swift power projection from 

CONUS may need to be important instruments of deterrence. Overall, the United States 

and its partners would need to commit adequate resources to the task, but owing to 

multiple constraints, the resources available may be scarce. If so, this would further 

elevate the importance of using resources efficiently. 
7

Because of the many complex challenges that could arise, the United States would need 

to make strategic decisions about the exact type of extended deterrence regime that it is 

striving to create. Before it does so, it would need to weigh carefully the full spectrum of 

options at its disposal. A wide spectrum of options is needed to provide varying answers 

to a key question: How much deterrence is possible and how much is enough? The 

United States would need to make tough decisions that answer this question in concrete 

ways, and a spectrum of options can help illuminate the different choices and tradeoffs. 

As a general rule, several options are especially needed when multiple threats are being 

deterred, multiple allies are being protected, multiple goals are being pursued, resources 

are limited, and the strategic terrain is not readily malleable. In the case of Iran and the 

Middle East, the multiple goals being pursued—e.g., deterrence, reassurance of allies, 

cohesive alliance policies, crisis control, escalation control, arms control, and political 

feasibility—are all demanding and not readily achievable at the same time. Consideration 

of multiple options is also needed when, as is the case here, critical strategic decisions 

must be made about how to allocate roles and missions among such diverse instruments 

as political declaratory policy, missile defenses, nuclear retaliatory forces, and U.S. and 

allied conventional forces. In such a setting, multiple options may help enable senior 

decisionmakers set priorities and practice the art of the possible. As will be argued below, 

a wide spectrum of options can be identified that offer varying degrees of political and 

military emphasis, and varying types of multilateralism and collective security. 

Unfortunately there is no fully effective, risk-free option. While all options offer 

prospects for success in varying degrees, all also pose liabilities and tradeoffs. Indeed, the 

options that offer the strongest potential benefits may be the hardest to create, and those 

that are most susceptible to creation may offer the weakest performance. In confronting 

the necessity of choice in this arena, the United States will need to strike a workable 

balance between competing imperatives. 

All of these problems and challenges are potentially resolvable, but only if the United 

States chooses, plans, and executes wisely—perhaps more wisely than sometimes has 

characterized past policies in the Middle East. Even if this is the case, success likely 

would not be achievable overnight, but neither will Iran become a full-fledged nuclear 

power overnight. A sense of navigating the future, marked by a combination of energetic 

purpose and patience, seems necessary. While a prolonged agenda may sound daunting, 

the successes in Europe and Asia were achieved only over a long period. Most likely, an 

extended deterrence regime for the Persian Gulf and Middle East would need to be 

structured differently, and operate differently, than the regimes in Europe and Asia, but 

what matters is whether it works effectively, not whether it resembles those of other 

theaters. A willingness to innovate is thus also needed. In gauging the challenges ahead, 

it should be remembered that if Iran becomes an unchecked nuclear power, the security 

politics of the already-unstable Persian Gulf and Middle East will be transformed in 

multiple undesirable ways that could endanger Europe and have global impact. The 

promise of an extended deterrence regime is that it could prevent this impending danger 

from becoming real. 
8

Lessons from the Cold War  

Thinking about how to create an extended deterrence regime for countering a nucleararmed Iran can best begin by recalling lessons learned during the Cold War about the art 

and science of deterrence. The specific experiences gained in Europe over 40 years of 

Cold War cannot readily be grafted onto the Middle East today, but a number of basic 

lessons can help provide guideposts for judging how to act. Because these lessons are 

rich in meaning, they rebut any notion that extended deterrence in the Middle East can be 

pursued in simple-minded terms. Together, they reinforce the judgment that extended 

deterrence there ideally should be pursued with the goal in mind of creating a true 

regime—a complex, well-tailored, and multifaceted edifice with firm political 

foundations and, depending on the option chosen, a strong superstructure composed of 

U.S. political leadership, military forces, and other instruments. 

A common misinterpretation of Cold War history is that extended deterrence in Europe 

was pursued simply by pointing U.S. nuclear missiles at the Soviet Union and warning 

Moscow that they would be used if it committed aggression. To be sure, the threat of U.S. 

nuclear retaliation was important, but it was far from being the only major feature of 

NATO’s deterrence regime. This regime was anchored in close political cooperation 

between the United States (the main nuclear protector) and European allies (the countries 

protected) that began in fledgling ways but grew steadily stronger as the Cold War 

unfolded. Creating this cooperation was not easily achieved, because both the United 

States and its European allies needed to pass through enough common experiences to 

learn to trust each other with their lives. Initially, the Europeans were wary of entrusting 

nuclear deterrence to the United States, a country that before World War II had pursued a 

policy of isolationism. Likewise, the United States was wary about irreversibly 

committing itself to full-scale involvement in European security affairs, on a continent 

long known for its explosive instabilities and violence. Complex negotiations and 

bargaining were required to create the mutual obligations that made extended deterrence 

an acceptable proposition on both sides of the Atlantic: each side had to make the types 

of commitments that satisfied the other of its reliability. Over a period of years, these 

negotiations and reciprocal commitments produced the Washington Treaty, the NATO 

political structure, the integrated military command, and NATO’s defense posture. The 

growth of NATO as a multinational institution, in turn, enabled its members to 

consistently produce coherent security policies that both commanded internal consensus 

and steadily strengthened deterrence as the Cold War unfolded. 

Against this backdrop of growing political collaboration, NATO gradually improved its 

military posture to make it increasingly capable of meeting the demanding requirements 

of deterrence. Early on, the United States and Europe lacked coherent strategic concepts 

for guiding this enterprise, a deficiency that could have resulted in major mistakes and 

dangers, had it not been corrected by the development of deterrence and its sister concept, 

containment. Initially, NATO’s strategy of deterrence was a purely political concept that 

was anchored mainly in declaratory policy and lacked the military power for carrying it 

out. When NATO became aware that it needed to match the USSR’s military power with 

military power of its own, it initially turned to U.S. strategic nuclear forces and a strategy 

of massive retaliation. Adopted in the 1950’s, this strategy left NATO without major 
9

conventional forces for defending its borders. In Central Europe, NATO fielded only 

about one-half of the ground forces that were needed to defend against the large Soviet 

army. 

Soviet Union acquisition of nuclear-tipped ICBMs of its own undercut the strategy of 

massive retaliation as an all-purpose deterrent and exposed NATO’s weak conventional 

forces to aggression. Accordingly, NATO reacted by adopting a new strategy of flexible 

response in the late 1960s that called for undiminished nuclear strength and conventional 

forces strong enough not only to deter aggression, but also to protect NATO’s borders, 

control escalation, and rebuff invasion in a war. NATO spent the 1970s and 1980s 

steadily strengthening its nuclear and conventional defenses, while pursuing arms control 

negotiations and détente with the USSR. The outcome was that the Cold War ended when 

the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, which had bankrupted themselves in a fruitless 

quest for military supremacy, collapsed of their own weight, leaving NATO the victor in 

the contest. 

A central lesson of this history is that the United States and its European allies employed 

collaborative, intra-alliance diplomacy and assertive actions to make extended deterrence 

work through four troubled decades in the face of a determined, well-armed opponent. 

During this long period, deterrence was not a static construct, but instead evolved and 

matured as conditions changed and new requirements emerged. Had the United States 

and its NATO allies pursued their security solely through political declarations, they 

likely would not have succeeded in achieving the core goals of extended deterrence. 

Indeed, they probably would not have succeeded had they limited their defense strategy 

to nuclear forces and retaliatory mechanisms. Either NATO could have collapsed owing 

to internal political frictions, or the USSR could have parlayed its nuclear and 

conventional strengths into political or military victory in Europe. Success at achieving 

extended deterrence and other key security goals was achieved because NATO: 1) built 

itself into an elaborate institutional structure; 2) fielded strong nuclear and conventional 

forces capable of fully counterbalancing Soviet military power; and 3) had the diplomatic 

agility to act when the opportunity of a favorable political settlement with the USSR 

offered itself. 

Another lesson is that extended deterrence worked successfully because the United States 

and its NATO partners took the steps that were needed to make deterrence credible not 

only in Moscow but in allied capitals as well. Pursuing credible deterrence required the 

United States to station large American military forces in Europe, including over 300,000 

personnel and 7,000 tactical nuclear warheads, to avoid appearances of decoupling and, 

along with large allied forces, provide a full spectrum of military options for deterrence, 

forward defense, and control of escalation. The presence of large, forward-stationed 

forces, backed by commitment of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, had the effects of 

preventing the Soviet Union from judging that aggression could succeed and of 

reassuring NATO’s European members of their security. It also so entangled the United 

States in NATO defense affairs that American cities were exposed to Soviet nuclear 

attack in a crisis that might begin in Europe but escalate to full-scale nuclear war. This 

risk to the United States, however, helped reassure allied countries that the United States 

would do everything possible to prevent war in Europe from erupting. 
10

Yet another lesson is that the United States and its NATO allies consistently 

supplemented their defense preparations with a diplomacy of engagement and outreach to 

the Soviet Union. Their dual-path agenda—defense and détente—began emerging in the 

late 1960s, grew to maturity in the 1970s, and reached fruition in the 1980s. The 

byproducts of diplomatic engagement included treaties on Berlin and East Germany’s 

status, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, MBFR negotiations, the 

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the ABM Treaty, the SALT Treaty capping U.S. and Soviet 

strategic nuclear force levels, and the LRINF Treaty. These agreements kept lines of 

communication open to Moscow and lessened several of the Cold War’s major frictions. 

When the Cold War ended, the diplomacy of engagement proved instrumental in 

reaching the agreements that resulted in Germany’s unification and continued 

membership in NATO as Soviet troops withdrew and the Warsaw Pact was dismantled. 

What conclusions from this history seem applicable to designing an extended deterrence 

regime to counter a nuclear-armed Iran today? 

1. Deterrence does not come easily: it must be carefully planned and executed. 

2. An extended deterrence regime for the Middle East must be credible—in the eyes 

of Iran, the United States, and the countries to be protected by the regime. 

3. Close diplomatic cooperation is required among the United States and its friends 

and allies that belong to the regime. 

4. An extended deterrence regime must be provided the political-military power and 

other instruments needed to achieve its core security goals. 

5. Deterrence should be accompanied by a diplomacy of engagement aimed at 

lessening tensions and dangers in relations with Iran. 

Finally, a few words about lessons from contemporary security affairs in Northeast Asia 

are appropriate. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and its Northeast Asian 

allies faced nuclear threats from the Soviet Union and China. Today, Russia and China 

still possess nuclear weapons, and America’s principal allies (Japan and South Korea) are 

not nuclear-armed. The latest newcomer to the regional nuclear club is North Korea, 

which is trying to build long-range missiles to deliver its nuclear weapons and has a wellestablished reputation for assertive conduct. In this sense, North Korea may be a 

forerunner of what Iran might become in the future. For the United States, handling the 

North Korean danger is rendered easier because it already has sizable military forces and 

naval interceptor missiles deployed to the region, and well-established security treaties 

with South Korea and Japan, both of which possess modern conventional forces for 

defending themselves. Also, the United States benefits from open diplomatic contacts 

with North Korea and leadership of a multilateral body, including Russia and China, that 

is trying to stem North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Because of these assets, key 

ingredients of a U.S.-led extended deterrence regime already exist in Northeast Asia, and 

they make the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea less dangerous. Comparable 

strategic assets do not exist in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Creating them, in ways 

appropriate to the region, would be a core purpose of establishing an extended deterrence 

regime there. 
11

Strategic Threats and Dangers Posed by a Nuclear‐Armed Iran

The emerging need for an extended deterrence regime is a direct consequence of Iran’s 

apparent nuclear aspirations and their worrisome strategic implications for the entire 

Middle East and beyond. Public debate thus far has focused mainly on whether Iran is 

trying to acquire nuclear weapons, and on whether and when it might succeed in doing 

so. While many controversies still surround these subjects, unfolding events in Iran 

suggest that attention should now also start focusing on the issue of what will happen if 

Iran, in fact, succeeds in this endeavor. Today Iran is a member of the Non-Proliferation 

Treaty (NPT). For years, it has publicly insisted that its research programs are entirely 

focused on creating nuclear energy for peaceful domestic uses and that it does not aspire 

to produce nuclear weapons for military purposes. In the eyes of skeptics, however, a 

different conclusion derives from the often inflammatory and menacing public rhetoric of 

its leaders, many of whom evidently judge that their country has ample reasons to 

become a nuclear power. Iran’s ongoing efforts to ward off IAEA inspections, Western 

diplomatic pressures, and economic sanctions further suggest that its nuclear aspirations 

are serious. Critics of Iran point out that, as an oil-exporting nation, it does not need 

nuclear energy to power its economy. Perhaps most important, Iran is pursuing scientific 

and military programs that, to many observers, are solid evidence of nuclear intentions. If 

these programs gain momentum, they could open the door to Iran’s deploying nuclear 

weapons and missile delivery systems in the coming years. If this development transpires, 

the future will have arrived in ways that could have dramatic geostrategic consequences 

for the Middle East and the global security system. 

According to press reports, in late 2007 a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) judged 

that Iran is not pursuing an active nuclear weapons-development program that has 

imminent prospects for success. But this NIE apparently also judged that Iran’s allegedly 

peaceful nuclear infrastructure and activities could enable Iran to keep open the option of 

building nuclear weapons someday. The scope of these activities, by any measure, is 

substantial. Today, Iran has a large network of uranium mines, enrichment plants, 

centrifuges, conversion sites, and research facilities at more than 20 locations scattered 

across the country. Recently it tested its first nuclear reactor, and it is building a 

plutonium reactor. Eventually, and perhaps soon, this infrastructure will enable Iran to 

produce nuclear weapons-grade materials, either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or 

plutonium or both. Recently, the IAEA announced that Iran already possesses nearly 

enough low-enriched uranium (LEU) to make the HEU needed for one nuclear device. If 

these materials are produced in growing quantities, and parallel progress is made in other 

areas of weapons design, Iran could start manufacturing nuclear weapons, much as 

already has been done by North Korea. 

Current press reports suggest that, although Iran might be able to produce a single nuclear 

device in the coming months, a more likely time frame for series production is 

somewhere during 2010–2015. As time is measured in strategic affairs, this is soon. If 

Iran succeeds in producing a single nuclear warhead, it should be able to produce more of 

them as the years unfold. Exactly how many is a matter of debate, but a reasonable 

estimate is that it should be able to produce enough by 2015–2020 to earn status as a 

serious nuclear-armed power—especially if it also succeeds in weaponizing its nuclear 

devices such that they can be delivered by missiles and aircraft. Success is not a sure 
12

thing, but India and Pakistan have both already succeeded in such endeavors, and Iran 

possesses the combination of political intentions, money, scientific expertise, and 

industrial infrastructure to follow their lead. 

Another important factor in the strategic calculus is that Iran is actively pursuing an effort 

to create ballistic missiles that could be armed with nuclear weapons and fired to long 

ranges. Indeed, it publicly pointed to this program when, some months ago, it test-fired 

several such missiles, displayed the firings on television, and proclaimed their success. In 

all likelihood, Iran would not be investing the time, money, and effort required by this 

long-range missile program unless it planned to produce nuclear weapons that can be 

carried by these missiles, which would lack strategic utility if they only carried 

conventional warheads. Because Iran's missile program has been shrouded in secrecy, it 

has given rise to uncertainty and debate among technical experts. The basic elements of 

this program, however, are publicly known. For some time, Iran has possessed a modest 

inventory of short-range missiles, including the Shahab 1 and 2, which are derived from 

the old Soviet SCUD missile and have ranges of up to 500 kilometers (310 miles). An 

important trend lately is that Iran has been developing the Shahab 3 medium-range 

ballistic missile (MRBM), which has a range of 1,300 kilometers (800 miles), enough to 

reach Israel. Beyond this, Iran has been developing the Shahab 3A, with a range of 1,800 

kilometers (1,100 miles), and the Shahab 3B, with a range of 2,500 kilometers (1,550 

miles). The Shahab 3B, a two-stage missile, has sufficient range to cover not only the 

entire Middle East, but key parts of southern and eastern Europe as well. In addition, Iran 

reportedly is working on a Shahab 4 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), a 

Shahab 5, and a Shahab 6, which may be an ICBM with intercontinental range. Recently, 

Iran demonstrated its growing missile prowess by firing its first satellite into space. While 

satellites have many peaceful uses, they can also be used for military purposes, notably, 

to provide precise targeting data so that long-range missiles can be fired with 

considerable accuracy. In May 2009, Iran reported that it had successfully test-fired a 

solid-fuel MRBM. Solid-fuel missiles are especially useful for military purposes because 

they can be kept in a high state of readiness and be deployed on mobile launchers.3

 

A near-term risk, of course, is that Iran might give a nuclear weapon to terrorists, who 

could smuggle it into Israel (or elsewhere) and detonate it. While this risk is important, an 

additional strategic threat is that Iran might eventually emerge with an inventory of 

nuclear-tipped missiles that could endanger not only deployed U.S. military forces, but 

also a large number of America’s friends and allies in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, 

and Europe. Iran seems unlikely to be able to deploy a large force of nuclear-tipped 

missiles, but even a small force of 20–30 such missiles would be capable of inflicting 

immense damage. To be sure, fielding such a nuclear missile force is not easy. 

Demanding engineering and maintenance standards must be met if the nuclear weapons 

and missiles are to be ready, reliable, and effective. A sophisticated command, control, 

and communications structure must be built. In addition, Iran would be compelled to 

ensure the survivability of these missiles, probably by making them ground-mobile, so 

 

3

 For more details, see Steven A. Hildreth, Iran's Ballistic Missile Programs: An Overview, (Washington 

DC: Congressional Research Service, February 4, 2009), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/ 

rpts/RS22758_20090204.pdf. 
13

that they could not be easily destroyed by an Israeli or U.S. air attack. But over a period 

of time, all these goals could be accomplished by a determined Iran. 

What will be Iran’s strategic intentions for its national security strategy and foreign 

policy after acquiring nuclear missiles? Some observers judge that Iran’s intentions might 

be limited to defending itself and deterring attack on its soil. Such an outcome is 

plausible if Iran acquires a more moderate government than now—e.g., if Ayatollah 

Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad are replaced by more-temperate leaders—and it 

could lead Iran to behave in a manner similar to that of India and Pakistan, which view 

their nuclear missiles as defensive weapons. A less sanguine outcome, however, is 

equally plausible if Iran does not change its current political stripes. In this event, 

acquisition of nuclear missiles could inflame Iran’s ambition to become the dominant 

geopolitical power in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. One risk is that Iran might make 

good on its longstanding threat to incinerate Israel. Even short of this step, Iran might 

intensify its support of terrorism against Israel and encourage Arab/Muslim countries to 

oppose it. Elsewhere, Iran might perceive that it now enjoys the latitude to step up its 

support for terrorism on behalf of causes it favors. If so, al Qaeda and other terrorist 

groups indirectly could benefit from the radicalized political climate in the Middle East. 

If Iran were to launch a nuclear attack on Israel, it would risk nuclear retaliation. The 

same cannot be said about attacking other Middle Eastern countries, none of which 

possess nuclear weapons. In absence of such weapons or credible U.S. security 

guarantees, all of them would be perpetually vulnerable to Iranian nuclear attack. While 

Iran might refrain from this step, the mere threat of such an attack—indeed, the very 

existence of Iranian nuclear missiles—could enable Iran to coerce, bully, and intimidate 

multiple countries into doing its bidding and acquiescing to its ambitions of how regional 

political, economic, and security affairs should evolve. For example, Iran might use its 

nuclear missiles as well as its conventional forces and terrorist allies to browbeat Iraq and 

interfere in that country’s internal affairs in order to snuff out democracy and shift Iraq’s 

foreign policy away from partnership with the United States. Because Iran possesses an 

army of only ten divisions, plus Islamic Revolutionary Guard units, it will not become 

capable of major invasions against its neighbors in the Persian Gulf. But it could employ 

these ground forces for offensive purposes against Iraq. 

Iran might use its nuclear muscle to bully the Persian Gulf countries, including Saudi 

Arabia, to dominate the Strait of Hormuz and related Gulf sea lanes, to try to push the 

United States out of the Gulf, and to control Gulf oil production. Such local political and 

diplomatic efforts especially might be pursued if Iran, in addition to acquiring nuclear 

missiles, succeeds in modernizing its air and naval forces so that they can be used for 

offensive purposes. Today, Iraq possesses an air force of about 300 combatant aircraft 

and a navy of patrol combatants and surface-to-surface missiles. In recent years, Iran has 

been increasing its purchases of sophisticated military technologies from Russia and 

China. This effort could reach fruition about the same time that Iran deploys a nuclear 

missile arsenal. Iran could then use modernized air and naval forces to close the Strait of 

Hormuz, and threaten nuclear retaliation against any military effort to reopen the strait. 

Beyond this, Iran would be in a better position to encourage radical regimes in Syria and 

elsewhere, to intimidate Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt, and to squelch democratic tendencies in 

neighboring countries. Indeed, Iran’s political influence over Turkey, Afghanistan, 
14

Pakistan, and India likely would increase, and Iran could be expected to seek greater 

influence at longer distances, including in Europe, Russia, China, and Central Asia. For 

all of these reasons, Iranian acquisition of nuclear missiles could cast a political shadow 

over the entire region and even the global security system, in ways that would seriously 

endanger U.S. and Western interests. 

While such a future seems dark enough, it could darken further if Iran’s neighbors react 

to its nuclear power and assertive political agendas in alarmed ways. One potential 

response is that some of its neighbors might seek political and military alliances with Iran 

in ways that would further increase its leverage across the Persian Gulf and Middle East. 

By contrast, implacable foes of Iran might react by striving to become nuclear powers 

themselves to counterbalance Iran’s nuclear power. Obvious candidates include Saudi 

Arabia and Egypt. Even though Turkey is a member of NATO, it might react similarly, as 

might Jordan. Whether Israel would launch preventive air strikes, aimed at disarming Iran 

before it becomes a nuclear power, is an imponderable as well as a serious risk. Even if 

Israel chooses to live with a nuclear-armed Iran, it almost certainly would seek enhanced 

nuclear capabilities, including additional long-range Jericho missiles and Arrow missile 

interceptors, for deterring Iran and retaliating against it. 

Such trends could produce accelerating nuclear proliferation across the Middle East, in a 

highly polarized setting whose instabilities would be even greater than today’s. In turn, a 

more dangerous Middle East, housing a large portion of the world’s oil reserves as well 

as several nuclear-armed countries, could make the entire global security system less 

stable. 

This worrisome forecast is, of course, a worst-case scenario. But worst-case scenarios 

have unfolded in the past—World Wars I and II, for example. Even if not all of the bad 

trends of this scenario unfold, enough of them might transpire to make the Middle East’s 

future far more troubled than now. The key point is not that Iran necessarily would use its 

nuclear missiles to attack its neighbors, but that it might employ them to provide added 

muscle to support an assertive geopolitical agenda across the region. A nuclear-armed 

Iran, led by a radical government, is unlikely to be a status-quo power. Rather, it might 

seek to overturn the status quo, perhaps in sweeping ways. Regardless of whether it fully 

succeeds in this agenda, its attempt to remake the Persian Gulf and Middle East could 

trigger a large set of actions, reactions, and interactions by other countries that, over time, 

could have a serious destabilizing impact, thereby increasing the chances for conflict and 

violence. The main risk of nuclear war may not stem from Iran’s intention to start one, 

but instead from unwanted and unforeseen escalation of political crises that spin out of 

control. Even if nuclear war might not be in the offing, the threats and dangers emanating 

from a nuclear-armed Iran asserting itself in a setting of multipolar regional rivalries and 

accelerating nuclear proliferation could be severe. Dampening these risks and dangers 

would be a key imperative for creating a U.S.-backed extended deterrence regime. 

In summary, if Iran is truly aspiring to become a nuclear-armed country, this trend means 

that a new and dangerous strategic clock has started ticking in the Middle East, one that 

arguably is creating a requirement for a U.S.-led extended deterrence regime to 

counteract this threat and its manifold negative consequences. If Iran can be influenced to 

halt its efforts to build nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, or if these efforts fail in 

some wholesale way, the need for such a regime will go away or be pushed off into the 
15

far-distant future. But such a hopeful outcome seems problematic. If so, the real issue 

will be the pace and timing of Iran’s progress toward becoming nuclear-armed. Economic 

conditions partly influence the pace. If the world economy remains in deep recession and 

oil prices stay low, Iran will have fewer funds for spending on military programs, and its 

progress will slow. But if the world economy recovers and oil prices rise again, Iran will 

possess more funds, and thus be able to make faster progress. In any event, Iran seems 

determined not to let its military aspirations be held hostage to economic trends. For this 

reason, Iran’s progress in the scientific and technological arena seems likely to be the 

most important variable in determining how fast the future unfolds. 

Because Iran likely will not become a full-fledged nuclear power in the next year or two, 

an extended deterrence regime will not be needed immediately. Even so, the United 

States cannot afford to act in a leisurely manner if it decides to pursue this fateful course. 

Within several years, Iran could succeed in deploying initial elements of its nuclear 

posture, including nuclear warheads and long-range missiles, and in the following years, 

it may succeed in bringing the entire enterprise to fruition. As Iran makes progress in this 

enterprise, countries in the Middle East and elsewhere will begin reacting to it in ways 

that could start triggering destabilizing consequences. Progress on creating an extended 

deterrence regime will need to be fast enough to counteract these developments. Because 

designing such a regime, and then erecting its foundations and superstructure, will take 

time, potentially years, work on it needs to start soon. At a minimum, initial analysis and 

planning needs to begin soon. 

Designing an Extended Deterrence Regime—Ends, Ways, and

Means

For the United States, creating an extended deterrence regime aimed at countering Iranian 

nuclear power, protecting vulnerable friends and allies, and otherwise promoting peaceful 

regional stability doubtless would be a difficult, labor-intensive undertaking. In addition 

to creating such a regime, the United States could be required to sustain it for years in the 

face of security politics and military dynamics that threaten to erode it. This, too, could 

require considerable effort, as well as patience and persistence. One reason for difficulty 

is the constraints, resistance, and friction that would arise from the Middle East itself, a 

region that has long been averse to supporting the strategic designs of outsiders. Another 

reason is that the United States would need to pursue this regime even as it 

simultaneously carries out its many other global security responsibilities in Europe, Asia, 

and elsewhere. Indeed, such big powers as Russia and China might not support such a 

regime, and could even seek to undermine it. These considerations do not negate the 

feasibility of creating and sustaining such a regime, but they clearly complicate matters, 

and they underscore the importance of designing the regime wisely so that it stands a 

reasonable prospect for enduring success. 

Designing an extended deterrence regime would require a three-step process: 

• Determining ends: the core security goals of the regime. 

• Choosing ways: the methods and mechanism for achieving goals. 

• Selecting means: the instruments and activities for implementing ways. 
16

Identifying goals is critical, because they will have a defining impact on determining how 

the regime should take shape. The necessity of being clear about strategic goals may 

seem obvious because, logically, goals are required to provide the strategic guidance that 

enables policies, plans, and programs to be coherently forged. Even so, clarity about 

goals should not be taken for granted. Sometimes the natural tendency of government 

bureaucracies is to leap prematurely from vague goals to vigorous actions in ways that 

can result in flawed policies and even fatal setbacks. Once goals have been selected, ways 

and means can then be determined in a manner that flows logically from the goals. The 

ultimate product should be a well-integrated construct of ends, ways, and means that are 

mutually consistent and internally supportive, so that the United States is not only clear 

about the goals being pursued, but also confident that the actions being pursued are 

wisely selected and will have a high probability of attaining the goals. What should be 

avoided is goals that are not equipped with proper ways and means, or ways and means 

that are in search of goals. When ends, ways, and means are properly aligned, a coherent 

strategy for guiding creation of a deterrence regime can emerge, 

Clarifying goals is especially important when multiple goals are being pursued, as is the 

case here. In this event, pursuit of multiple goals can necessitate the forging of quite 

complex and demanding policies and strategies. Indeed, each goal might require its own 

separate policy and set of instruments and resources. Moreover, steps to pursue multiple 

goals must be coordinated so that ideally they are mutually reinforcing or, at a minimum, 

do not interfere with each other in ways that inflict damage on some or all of them. When 

goals are in competition with each other, or consume more resources than are realistically 

available, priorities must be set among them, and setting priorities can impose painful 

tradeoffs in ways that have a tangible impact on how the strategic enterprise is being 

pursued. 

Designing a U.S.-led extended deterrence regime for a region as complex and turbulent 

as the Middle East especially requires awareness of multiple goals as well as clarity about 

their respective roles and priorities. Provided below is a list of 16 strategic goals that an 

extended deterrence regime might be intended to pursue. Not all of these goals might be 

pursued by any single deterrence regime. Indeed, as will be argued below, different 

options for creating a deterrence regime might pursue different combinations of goals and 

emphasize some goals while de-emphasizing others. The intent here is to gather all of 

these goals together in a single place so that their overall composition, weight, and thrust 

can be determined. 

While this list is not necessarily exhaustive, it helps illuminate the magnitude and 

demanding nature of the task that could confront the United States if it decides to pursue 

this course. This list divides its goals into two broad categories: primary goals and 

supplementary goals. Primary goals are those that would need to be accorded highest 

priority. Supplementary goals are those that might be assigned somewhat lower priority, 

but nonetheless are important enough to affect how the regime is constructed. As the list 

shows, creating an extended deterrence regime could require considerably more than a 

singular fixation on Iran. Indeed, it could require a region-wide and global perspective. 
17

Primary Goals 

1. Deter Iran from using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons against its neighbors, 

and from other predatory behavior, e.g., conventional aggression and political 

coercion. 

2. Reassure friends and allies of their safety and promote common security policies. 

3. Maintain sufficient U.S. influence to lead the extended deterrence regime. 

4. Mobilize consensual support from member countries. 

5. Prevent further nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. 

6. Promote crisis control and escalation control. 

7. Discourage other dangerous trends and promote stability and progress in the 

region. 

8. Mobilize help globally, including from Russia, China, and India. 

Supplementary Goals 

9. Avoid unduly provoking Iran, while pursuing engagement and arms control 

 with it. 

10. Promote military collaboration and interoperability with friends and allies. 

11. Foster regime flexibility and adaptability for reacting to unanticipated events. 

12. Lessen uncertainties and vulnerability to adverse second-order consequences. 

13. Avoid overloading the political circuits in the Middle East. 

14. Minimize dangers to deployed U.S. military forces and the U.S. homeland. 

15. Ensure programs are funded, but avoid undue expenses and pursue burdensharing. 

16. Ensure that U.S. leadership is consistent with other global requirements and 

priorities. 

Achieving primary goals 1 and 2 would lie at the core of an extended deterrence regime, 

for this regime likely would be judged a success if these goals are fully achieved even if 

attainment of other goals is lacking. Depending on how it is defined by U.S. strategy, 

goal 1 could be more demanding than deterring Iran from actually attacking neighboring 

countries with nuclear weapons. It also could include deterring Iran from even 

threatening to attack its neighbors, or otherwise employing its nuclear power to coerce 

and intimidate them, or provoking crises that might trigger nuclear confrontations. As 

such, this is a demanding goal that requires powerful mechanisms that are directly 

tailored to influencing Iran’s decision calculus in multiple ways (discussed in more detail 

later). 

Table 4 helps illuminate the diverse and potentially demanding nature of goal 1. On the 

vertical axis, it displays five different types of Iranian threats to be deterred, ranging from 

nuclear attack to conventional terrorism. On the horizontal axis, it displays the countries 

to be protected by the deterrence regime, including the United States, Europe, Israel, and 
18

friendly Arab/Muslim countries. In each cell of the matrix are displayed three different 

assessments: the severity of the threat, the importance of deterring it based on its inherent 

priority and urgency, and the difficulty of the enterprise. Overall, the 20 cells of the 

matrix highlight the strategic choices facing U.S. strategy, which might choose to cover 

some, but not all, of these cells. For example, the deterrence regime might be designed to 

cover only the first two threats on the vertical axis: nuclear missile attack and nuclear 

terrorism and proliferation. Alternately, the regime might be more ambitious: it might 

cover the first four threats, and thus include not only nuclear aggression by Iran, but also 

conventional aggression and political coercion, while not trying to deter conventional 

terrorism. Another alternative is a regime that provides coverage of all threats to the 

United States, Europe, and Israel, but provides less-ambitious coverage to friendly 

Arab/Muslim countries. Two key points arise. Strategies for creating an extended 

deterrence regime must make conscious choices regarding which cells of the matrix are 

to be covered, and which cells are not to be covered. For the cells that are covered by the 

deterrence regime, each of them must be equipped with appropriate ways and means so 

that the deterrence goal can be accomplished in each case. 

Table 4. Countries to be Protected by Extended Deterrence Coverage 

Countries/Actors to be Protected 

Threat to be 

Deterred CONUS/ 

Deployed U.S. 

Forces 

NATO/Europe Israel 

Friendly 

Arab/ 

Muslim 

Countries 

Nuclear 

Missile 

Attack 

Low severity 

Highly important 

Low-to-moderate 

difficulty 

Moderate severity 

Highly important, 

NATO Treaty 

commitment 

Moderate 

difficulty 

High priority/ 

existential 

threat 

High-tomedium 

priority 

Nuclear 

Terrorism 

and 

Proliferation 

High priority High 

priority/NATO 

Treaty 

commitment 

High priority/ 

existential 

threat 

High-tomedium 

priority 

Conventional 

Military 

Attack 

Low risk/ 

low emphasis 

Low risk/ 

low emphasis 

Low risk/ 

low emphasis 

Medium-tohigh priority 

Political 

Coercion 

Low risk/ 

low emphasis 

Low risk/ 

low emphasis 

Medium risk/ 

medium 

emphasis 

Medium-tohigh priority 

Conventional 

Terrorism 

Low risk/ 

low emphasis 

Medium risk/ 

medium emphasis 

High risk/ 

high priority 

 Medium-tohigh priority 

Whereas surface appearances might suggest that goal 2, reassuring friends and allies of 

their safety and security, would be automatically achieved if goal 1 is attained, this is not 

necessarily the case in the Middle East. As the Cold War experience in Europe shows, 

actions that seemingly deter an adversary may not be convincing enough to persuade 

vulnerable allies to take such steps as foreswearing nuclear weapons of their own. 
19

Sometimes, the requirements of reassuring allies and promoting common security 

policies can be different from, and even greater than, the requirements of deterring 

adversaries. During the Cold War, many of NATO’s military preparations had more to do 

with reassuring nervous allies, calming American apprehensions about entangling 

commitments, and forging common alliance strategic policies than with deterring the 

Soviet Union. The key point is that these two goals are not one and the same, and they 

can necessitate different mechanisms to achieve them—in ways that elevate the 

requirements of an extended deterrence regime. 

Primary goals 3 and 4 identify vital political preconditions for trying to create an 

extended deterrence regime. As goal 3 suggests, the United States would need to 

maintain the type of influential profile across the Middle East that enables it to create, 

lead, and sustain the regime. Preserving such influence may be difficult, because as U.S. 

military forces withdraw from Iraq, Iran gains power, and the global security system 

becomes increasingly multipolar, the United States may suffer erosion in its superpower 

status and the influence that comes with it. Strong U.S. political leadership and effective 

diplomacy coupled with credible actions would be needed to achieve this goal. Goal 4, 

mobilizing consensual support from the countries that are to be protected by the regime, 

is important, because the regime could not be created, or function effectively, in absence 

of their support. This goal applies not only to the Middle East, but also to Europe, which 

also would need to be provided deterrence coverage and might be called on to help 

contribute to deterrence of Iran. In the Middle East, the nuclear threat posed by Iran, 

coupled with the promise of a protective umbrella provided by the deterrence regime 

should provide many countries with powerful incentives to support it. Even so, the 

decision to support the regime could be a wrenching choice for many countries, because 

it would limit their political maneuverability, impose on them commitments and 

obligations that they would not normally make, draw them closer into America’s political 

orbit, and unmistakably throw down the political gauntlet with Iran. In many capitals, all 

of these implications might be seen as serious drawbacks, perhaps enough to make 

joining the regime a close call. Here again, persuasive U.S. diplomacy and a reputation 

for credibility, coupled with the bargaining and negotiating that typically marks new 

coalitions when they are being formed, would be required. 

Primary goals 5 through 7 focus on achieving important strategic byproducts of an 

extended deterrence regime. Their key point is that if such a regime is to be successful, it 

must not only deter Iran and reassure friends and allies, but also should have other 

positive features. The goal of preventing nuclear proliferation is important because such 

proliferation could further endanger and destabilize a region already menaced by a 

nuclear-armed Iran. The goal of promoting crisis control and escalation control is 

important because, absent success in this arena, the combination of a nuclear-armed Iran 

and a U.S.-led deterrence regime could create a bipolar security structure that would be 

prone to fostering regular crises that might unintentionally escalate into nuclear war. The 

goal of discouraging other dangerous trends, while promoting stability and progress in 

the region, addresses the need to influence the fundamentals of Middle Eastern security 

affairs so that an extended deterrence regime is not placed atop a system of quicksand 

and volcanoes. This goal could mandate pursuit of such agendas as resolving Israeli 

conflicts with Palestine and Syria, defusing other tensions and rivalries, and encouraging 

democratization of traditional Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. As 
20

experience shows, pursuing these goals is hard. In itself, an extended deterrence regime 

could not achieve them, but if it creates a stable regional security system, it could help 

foster the conditions that permit parallel U.S. policies to pursue success in this arena. 

Primary goal 8 focuses on the global political requirements of an extended deterrence 

regime in the Middle East. In theory, such a regime could be created without the active 

support of Russia, China, and India. But the odds of success would increase if these big 

powers are willing to lend their diplomatic support, and the odds would worsen if Russia 

and China tried to meddle in this regime in order to weaken and destroy it. All three of 

these big powers would have an incentive to support this regime because it could help 

dampen nuclear threats posed by Iran to them. Even so, their own geopolitical aims in 

other arenas could provide them reasons for opposing this regime. Of the three countries, 

India seems most likely to support this regime if it enhances stability in South Asia and 

lessens risks of war with Pakistan. Russia and China are bigger question marks because, 

in varying degrees, their geopolitical rivalries with the United States, including over 

influence in the Middle East, could lead them to try to prevent such a regime from being 

created, and to weaken it if it does come to life. Much would depend on the quality of 

overall U.S. relations with both countries, especially whether these relations are marked 

by cooperation and partnership, or instead, by friction and rivalry. 

Of the supplementary goals, the first four deal with aims that would influence how an 

extended deterrence regime is constructed and operated. To the extent possible, such a 

regime should aspire to avoid unduly provoking Iran into taking further confrontational 

actions, such as fostering an arms race in the Persian Gulf or giving nuclear weapons to 

terrorists. Ideally, the regime should provide scope for pursuing arms control negotiations 

and disarmament with Iran, and it should keep the door open to reconciliation with that 

country in event that its government and policies change in constructive directions. The 

regime should also be designed and implemented in a manner that encourages close 

defense cooperation among its members, including military interoperability, so that 

common endeavors can be pursued. Another important goal is that the regime should be 

flexible and adaptable so that it can respond effectively to unanticipated events, including 

crises and confrontations that are not foreseen by its designers. Likewise, the regime 

should be designed to lessen uncertainties and vulnerabilities to such second-order 

consequences as greater terrorism and enhanced Islamic fundamentalist extremism. 

The last four supplementary goals focus on dealing with constraints that must be handled 

as an extended deterrence regime is being constructed and operated. One goal that would 

need to be kept consistently in mind is that of avoiding overloading the political circuits 

in the Middle East: the United States would need to be mindful of what is feasible and 

desirable in the minds of key friends and allies there. Also important, the regime would 

need to minimize dangers to deployed U.S. military forces in the Middle East and, if Iran 

eventually acquires nuclear-tipped ICBMs, to the U.S. homeland as well. Although the 

regime would need to provide adequate resources to permit the full scope of required 

U.S. activities, it would need to avoid unaffordable expenses, to spend available 

resources efficiently, and to pursue fair burden-sharing. The same emphasis on limiting 

budget costs to affordable levels would also need to apply to regime members in the 

region, who doubtless would be obligated to help finance common security and defense 

endeavors. Finally, the regime would need to ensure that the United States is not so 
21

encumbered by obligations and involvements that it is prevented from carrying out its 

security and defense commitments in other regions, including Europe and Asia. 

Taken together, these multiple goals have the effect of imposing potentially weighty 

strategic requirements on an extended deterrence regime. In particular, they illustrate the 

extent to which such a regime would require more than the mechanical application of 

U.S. military power. Although pursuing deterrence likely would require commitment of 

military forces to make it credible, it is inherently a political and strategic undertaking 

that must be seen in these terms if it is to succeed. At its core, it aspires to influence the 

political calculations of multiple actors, not only adversaries, but friends and allies as 

well. If an extended deterrence regime is to operate effectively, its political and 

diplomatic requirements need to be addressed with the same skill that is applied to 

meeting its military requirements. 

To the extent that an extended deterrence regime is added atop a reasonably stable 

Middle East made more tranquil by wise diplomacy, and soon brings additional peace 

and stability in its wake, it will be a success. Conversely, a regime that is added atop a 

highly turbulent region and introduces additional strains likely will not only fail, but 

make matters worse. Achieving the former while avoiding the latter helps frame a key 

political and military challenge of creating an effective regime. At first blush, the 

demands of meeting this challenge and pursuing so many objectives in the face of potent 

constraints can make the entire enterprise seem too formidable to be undertaken. But the 

potential risks of not pursuing this course, and thereby allowing a nuclear-armed Iran to 

dictate the Middle East’s future, could be significantly greater. Moreover, this endeavor 

should be judged by practical standards, not by the impossible criterion of fully achieving 

all plausible goals. Provided Iran is deterred and friends and allies are adequately 

reassured, the need to accept limits, tradeoffs, and priority-setting does not mean that the 

enterprise is made hopeless. It merely means that the best option among multiple 

imperfect alternatives should be selected. Not even the long-established deterrence 

regimes of Europe and Asia operate perfectly. Both of them foster imperfections, 

inadequately achieved goals in some areas, and troubling tradeoffs. What matters is that 

they work well enough to get the job done to the satisfaction of the United States and its 

allies. The same pragmatic standard of workability should be applied to pursuit of an 

extended deterrence regime in the Middle East, and to options that might be considered 

for pursuing it. 

Choosing Ways: Crafting the Methods and Mechanisms of

Deterrence  

By itself, an extended deterrence regime cannot be expected to robustly pursue all sixteen 

goals from the moment of its inception or to attain other aims of U.S. foreign policy in 

the Persian Gulf and Middle East. For example, it could not solve the Israeli-Palestinian 

conflict, or quell Hezbollah in Lebanon, or ensure a stable pro-U.S. government in Iraq, 

or win the war in Afghanistan. Parallel U.S. polices that operate alongside this regime 

would be needed for these endeavors. But largely on its own, such a regime would need 

to embrace those security goals that are central to its purposes, including deterring Iran, 

reassuring friends and allies of their security, and promoting common policies and 
22

collaborative defense ties with them. If these goals are to be successfully pursued, an 

extended deterrence regime would need to be equipped with appropriate methods and 

mechanisms, i.e., action agendas that can be relied on to produce favorable strategic 

consequences that bring about goal-achievement. Making careful choices in this arena is 

vitally important, for they will define not only how this regime takes shape, but whether 

it succeeds. 

Deterring Iran

Analyzing methods for deterring Iran is best undertaken by first addressing the issue of 

whether Iran can be relied on to behave rationally, with appropriate restraint and caution, 

if faced with a potent U.S.-led deterrence regime. In other words, would this regime 

compel Iran to keep its nuclear missiles holstered? In the worried eyes of some observers, 

a nuclear-armed Iran would be too radical, arrogant, ambitious, risk-taking, and prone to 

violent confrontations to be expected to act rationally. Genuine cause for concern comes 

from the radical nature of Iran’s government and many of its leaders, coupled with their 

support of terrorism and suicide bombers against Israel. But supporting terrorists in 

distant areas is not the same as being willing to wage nuclear war in a setting where Iran 

itself might be struck by nuclear weapons. Much will depend on Iran’s future political 

leaders: if radicals remain in power, Iran likely will be more prone to risky behavior than 

if moderates take power. Even if radicals remain in power, they will be constrained, to 

some degree, by Iranian society, which tends to focus on its own wellbeing and does not 

necessarily support nuclear adventurism. After all, nuclear war with the United States is 

hardly a viable way to build a safe, secure, and prosperous Iran that benefits its citizenry, 

even if zealots may have apocalyptic visions in mind. 

As a general rule, historical experience shows that even nation-states with extremist 

ideologies tend to value their interests and survival enough to act prudently when faced 

with credible guarantees that they will be frustrated in pursuing their goals and/or 

punished severely if they commit aggression or otherwise behave in menacing ways. 

True, Nazi Germany under Hitler recognized no limits on its aggressive behavior, but 

when it started on the path of aggression, it was not confronted by a potent regime aimed 

at deterring it. During the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and China possessed nuclear 

weapons and were guided by anti-western ideologies, yet they acted rationally when 

faced with credible threats of U.S. military reprisals. Although the future is uncertain, 

Iran’s fundamentalist Islamic ideology is not prone to committing national suicide, and 

thus far its government has demonstrated a capacity to calculate carefully in ways 

suggesting that while its policies are self-interested, they are often guided by rational 

perceptions of costs and benefits. Making selective use of suicide bombers to target Israel 

entails limited risks and costs—only the suicide bombers lose their lives, not the people 

directing them. Exposing the entire country of Iran, including its leaders, to U.S. nuclear 

retaliation is a quite different, less attractive proposition. 

Depending on the strategy chosen, an extended deterrence regime ideally would need to 

be influential enough to persuade Iran not only to refrain from launching nuclear attacks 

on its neighbors, but also to refrain from making threats of attacks, or otherwise using its 

nuclear power as an instrument of political coercion, or using nuclear weapons to provide 

an umbrella for carrying out conventional aggression with impunity, or provoking crises 
23

that might escalate into nuclear war. If this multifaceted agenda is adopted, it would mean 

that full-fledged deterrence of Iran would need to operate in more ways than one, and that 

some ways would be more difficult than others. Deterring Iran from actually using 

nuclear weapons is one thing; deterring it from employing them as geopolitical 

instruments in peacetime, crises, and limited wars is something else again. Iran might be 

more prone to risky adventurous behavior in places near its borders—where its interests 

and capabilities are greatest—than at longer distances. If so, the Persian Gulf could be a 

region where a nuclear-armed Iran might prove to be a tough customer. 

Motivational tools are available to influence Iran to behave rationally and circumspectly. 

Politically, isolation from the regional institutions, the global community, key leadership 

countries, and multinational governing bodies could wield influence in Tehran. Likewise, 

denial of access to the world economy as well as export, import, and foreign investment 

opportunities could damage Iran’s economic prospects in ways that could affect its 

strategic decisionmaking. The prospect of U.S.-led military opposition and retaliation 

could play a major role in discouraging Iranian adventurism. Of course, the extreme 

threats of regime change, destruction of its economic infrastructure and military forces, 

and even invasion could be quite influential if they are seen as credible in Tehran. If such 

motivational tools are combined together and used wisely, they could wield significant 

restraining influence on Iran, even if it has the mentality of being a tough customer. 

An extended deterrence regime could offer no ironclad guarantees that it would compel 

Iran to behave prudently across the board. But an equal truth is that, if Iran is deemed 

irrational enough to commit aggression in the teeth of a U.S.-led deterrence regime, it 

would be much more likely to take risks and act provocatively absent such a regime. All 

things considered, the ability of a deterrence regime to shape Iran’s behavior would 

depend on how the regime is constructed and operated, and whether its actions are 

capable of bringing about their desired consequences. The regime would need to be 

carefully tailored to influence not only Iran’s strategic policies, but also its internal 

politics, decision processes, and cultural predispositions. It would need to be powerful 

and convincing enough to decisively sway Iran’s decision calculus rather than be 

perceived merely as an irritant that could be brushed aside at the moment of truth. 

Provided the deterrence regime is equipped with sufficient motivational tools to achieve 

this purpose, it could aspire to significantly reduce the odds that Iran would act like a 

nuclear-armed rogue. 

In the eyes of DOD planners, modern deterrence theory is guided by three methods that 

together can achieve decisive influence on an adversary.4

 In their choice of mechanisms, 

these three methods focus on shaping an adversary’s political intentions, strategic 

calculations, and risk-taking propensities in its decisionmaking, rather than on 

counterbalancing its nuclear missiles in some mechanical sense or on defeating them in 

wartime. The three methods are: 

• Deterrence by denying the adversary the benefits of aggression. 

• Deterrence by imposing painful, unacceptably high costs on the adversary. 

• Deterrence by convincing the adversary of the virtues of restraint. 

 

4

 See Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (Washington, DC: 

Department of Defense, December 2006). 
24

Deterrence by denial focuses on convincing the adversary that it cannot achieve the 

strategic objectives or reap the benefits of aggression and other provocative conduct. 

Deterrence by imposing costs focuses on convincing the adversary that the punishments 

and costs as a result of aggression or belligerent conduct will be severe, will be certain, 

and will decisively outweigh, in the adversary’s eyes, any anticipated benefits of 

aggression. Deterrence by encouraging adversary self-restraint focuses on convincing 

adversary decisionmakers that not committing aggression or belligerent conduct will 

result in an outcome acceptable to them (although not necessarily desired by them). 

These three methods are not mutually exclusive, and they typically work best when they 

are combined together to form a portfolio of interlocking, interdependent motives and 

mechanisms that operate in mutually reinforcing fashion. Together, they strive to 

convince the adversary that aggressive, belligerent conduct will result in outcomes that 

are decisively worse than could be achieved through alternative, peace-preserving 

courses of action. Deterrence by denial is especially important when an adversary 

perceives such high stakes in a confrontation that it is willing to pay a high price and 

accept significant risks. Deterrence by imposing costs is typically employed when the 

adversary’s strategic calculus is shaped by balancing benefits against costs. It strives to 

drive up costs to the point where they decisively outweigh any rational sense of expected 

benefits and gains. Deterrence by encouraging restraint is pursued by convincing the 

adversary that there are important benefits to refraining from aggression and other 

menacing conduct, and that the adversary will not lose more by exercising restraint than 

by committing aggression. 

How can these three methods best be pursued in designing an extended deterrence regime 

focused on Iran? In general, deterrence by denial requires defensive assets for protecting 

the targets of adversary aggression, deterrence by imposing costs requires offensive 

assets for retaliation, and deterrence by encouraging self-restraint requires diplomatic 

engagement and strategic dialogue with the adversary. These, however, are abstract 

propositions that would need to be given specificity before they could applied in 

practical, effective terms. This is especially true for determining how deterrence by denial 

and deterrence by imposing costs are to be equipped with the necessary strategic tools 

that can enable them to wield effective influence over Iran’s conduct. The following table 

helps meet this need by portraying the different strategic mechanisms and key 

instruments that could be applied to deter the five types of Iranian threats discussed above 

(instruments are discussed more fully in the following section). 
25

Table 5. Mechanisms and Instruments of Extended Deterrence 

Threat to be 

Deterred

Strategic Mechanisms for 

Pursuing Deterrence by Denial, 

Cost Imposition, and Restraint

Key Instruments for Carrying out 

Mechanisms of Deterrence

Nuclear 

Missile Attack 

y Make clear gravity of event 

y Prevent successful missile attack 

y Credibly threaten nuclear 

retaliation 

y Strong U.S. declaratory policy 

y Missile defense of protected countries 

y Nuclear retaliatory capabilities and 

options 

Nuclear 

Terrorism and 

Proliferation 

y Make clear gravity of event 

y Prevent nuclear terrorist attack 

y Credibly threaten nuclear 

retaliation 

y Strong U.S. declaratory policy 

y Homeland security and attribution 

assets 

y Nuclear retaliatory capabilities and 

options 

Conventional 

Military Attack 

y Make clear U.S. and regime will 

respond appropriately 

y Conventional defense against 

specific threats 

y Capacity to conduct counterattacks 

y Diplomatic collaboration among 

regime members 

y Allied capabilities to defend borders, 

airspace, and sea lanes 

y Conventional forces for spectrum of 

counter-attacks

y U.S. conventional commitments, when 

appropriate 

Political 

Coercion 

y Deny Iran opportunities and 

benefits of political coercion 

y Protect vulnerable regime 

members from coercion 

y Impose political, diplomatic, and 

economic costs on Iran 

y U.S. and regime-wide political support 

of vulnerable countries 

y Reduce vulnerabilities of exposed 

countries through diplomatic 

collaboration 

y Wide array of instruments to exert 

counter-pressures on Iran 

Conventional 

Terrorism 

y Protect vulnerable countries from 

terrorism 

y Defend against terrorist strikes 

sponsored by Iran. 

y Coerce Iran and provide it 

incentives to refrain from terrorism 

y Homeland security assets 

y Multilateral collaboration among 

regime members 

y Diplomatic and economic instruments 

for use against Iran. 

Deterring Iranian nuclear missile attack would be the highest priority goal of an extended 

deterrence regime. As the table suggests, this endeavor could be pursued through a 

combination of measures: strong U.S. declaratory policy that makes clear to Iran the 

gravity of nuclear use; missile defenses that can prevent successful missile attacks; and 

the threat of decisive U.S. nuclear retaliation if Iran employs its nuclear missiles to attack 

any member of the regime. Deterring nuclear terrorism—either directly by Iran or by 

giving nuclear weapons to such terrorist groups as Hezbollah and Hamas—would be an 

equally high priority. It could be pursued through such measures as enhanced homeland 

security of protected countries and the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation if Iran resorts to 

nuclear terrorism. If these political-military mechanisms and instruments are employed, 

the odds of deterring Iran from using its nuclear weapons against vulnerable countries 

seemingly would be high because Iran would stand to gain little and to loose a great deal 

by taking this fateful step. An accompanying U.S. declaration to refrain from nuclear 
26

attacks on Iran unless it crosses the nuclear threshold or is imminently threatening to do 

so would give Iran a powerful inventive to exercise restraint because, for it, peace would 

always be preferable to nuclear war. 

Would U.S. nuclear coverage of regime members suffice to deter Iran from committing 

conventional aggression or employing political coercion to pursue its strategic aims 

against countries near its borders such as Iraq and the Persian Gulf countries? Perhaps. At 

a minimum, a credible U.S. willingness to employ nuclear retaliation against nuclear 

threats likely would make Iran pause before instigating local crises that could escalate 

into direct confrontation with the United States. Nonetheless, Iran plausibly might judge 

that the United States would be unwilling to be the first to cross the nuclear threshold in a 

non-nuclear crisis, or that Iranian nuclear weapons might deter the United States from 

taking this step. If so, Iran might perceive a conventional power vacuum around its 

borders as inviting it either to commit conventional aggression with impunity or, during 

peacetime, to bully, intimidate, and coerce its neighbors. To the extent this threat is 

judged real, political-military mechanisms are available to directly counter it. As the table 

suggests, U.S. declaratory policy, alliance collaboration, capable allied conventional 

forces, and, as necessary, U.S. conventional force commitments would be available to 

deter this threat. Together, they could deny Iran significant benefits from non-nuclear 

aggression, impose prohibitive costs on it, and give Iran ample incentives to exercise 

restraint. Because Iran is unlikely to become an imposing conventional military power 

anytime soon, deterring it from aggression in this arena is an agenda that could be 

accomplished with multinational efforts, provided the United States and its regional allies 

work closely together. The same applies to the endeavor of deterring Iran from 

intensifying its support of conventional terrorism. 

In summary, an extended deterrence regime that effectively employs these methods, 

mechanisms, and instruments could aspire to reliably deter Iran from multiple different 

types of threatening behavior. But they must be designed and implemented in ways that 

are directly tailored to the situation at hand rather than interpreted as generically valid 

propositions whose details matter little. Because any single one of these mechanisms and 

instruments may not suffice in individual situations, favorable outcomes likely will be 

consistently achieved if the extended deterrence regime is regularly able to employ all of 

them in ways that remove any temptations for Iran to transgress, that ensure any 

transgressions will not only fail but be punished appropriately, and that Iran is provided 

positive incentives for respecting U.S. and allied interests. Even then, a nuclear-armed 

Iran might not be easy to deter, and it likely would take steps aimed at weakening or 

circumventing the regime The bottom line is that deterrence of Iran will be achievable 

only when the deterrence regime and its methods are perceived as highly credible not 

only in U.S. and allied eyes, but in Iran’s eyes in a manner that responds to the 

personalities, bureaucracies, decision processes, and cultural predispositions at work in 

Tehran. Achieving such credibility, in ways that would not be mistaken or discounted, 

would be a core requirement of an extended deterrence regime. 
27

Reassuring Friends and Allies, and Forging Common Security Commitments

Credibly deterring Iran would be a necessary condition for reassuring friends and allies of 

their safety and security in the face of its nuclear power, but not likely a sufficient 

condition. A core reason is that regime members would be perpetually uncertain about 

whether U.S.-led nuclear deterrence efforts are, in fact, influencing Iran’s decision 

calculus in the desired ways. Faced with this uncertainty, and worried about Iran’s 

proclivities, they likely would gauge their security by taking stock of whether the 

deterrence regime’s commitments and capabilities seem solid and satisfactory when 

judged on their own merits. To the extent this is judged to be the case, members likely 

would come away satisfied and content. To the extent not, they likely would be left 

nervous, perhaps to the point of questioning whether membership in the regime is capable 

of meeting their security requirements. Perhaps generic U.S. political assurances would 

be enough to satisfy these countries that their security is intact. If the history of 

deterrence in Europe and Asia is a valid indicator, however, these countries might seek 

more-ironclad security guarantees from the United States, and even if such guarantees are 

granted in political terms, to persistently seek tangible assurances that if the deterrence 

regime is put to a severe test by Iran, its instruments and mechanisms would work 

effectively in the ways advertised. Owing to such worries and pressures, achieving the 

goal of adequately reassuring them could be a difficult and complex undertaking that 

would require more features than merely addressing the requirements of deterring Iran. 

In pursuing an extended deterrence regime, the United States likely would have concerns 

and aspirations of its own that derive not only from Iran’s reaction, but also from the 

reactions of friends and allies that would be protected by this regime. For the United 

States, providing extended deterrence coverage over major parts of the Persian Gulf and 

Middle East would be a potentially risky endeavor. This step would deeply and 

permanently entangle the United States in the turbulent security affairs of this region, and 

it would mean that in a severe crisis or war with Iran, the United States could not stand 

aloof on the sidelines. In such a case, the United States would not be able to confine its 

actions to issuing rhetorical calls for peace and offering to play the diplomatic role of 

honest broker. Instead, it would be obligated to intervene powerfully on the side of its 

friends and allies, and to act in ways, perhaps by employing military force, that deter, 

coerce, and even defeat Iran. For such reasons, the United States likely would aspire to 

broader goals than just reassuring its friends and allies. To protect its own security and 

safeguard its interests, it also would want to ensure that its friends and allies consistently 

act in ways that make this regime a viable, effective, and safe proposition, e.g., by not 

acquiring nuclear weapons and by acting prudently in daily security affairs as well as 

crises. Such American requirements would further complicate the demanding nature of 

constructing an extended deterrence regime that meets the strategic needs of those 

countries that produce security and those that consume it. 

Success at creating a shared strategic mindset that bonds the United States with its friends 

and allies could spell the difference between a regime that is powerfully effective and one 

that is little more than a hollow shell. The traditional method for pursuing these purposes 

is coalition planning and collaborative partnership among members of the deterrence 

regime. That is, the United States works closely with its friends and allies to define 
28

agreed-upon common goals, commitments, and requirements, to craft plans and programs 

for carrying them out, to implement those plans and programs effectively, and to monitor 

their performance closely so that periodic adjustments can be made to them. When 

common approaches cannot readily be found through analysis of policies, intra-alliance 

negotiations are typically employed to bridge the gaps between the United States and its 

partners. Often, bargaining mechanisms and reciprocal exchanges are employed to forge 

agreements that require all sides to make some concessions to create mutual accords in 

ways that meet the top priorities of the participants. For example, the United States might 

agree to provide extended deterrence coverage for a particular country, and in exchange, 

that country might agree to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, to support U.S. 

regional diplomacy, and to make its military forces available for multilateral missions. As 

a result of such reciprocal agreements, the United States and its partners can come away 

satisfied that their core interests have been protected and their key priorities are 

advanced. When such methods and mechanisms are employed, the ideal result is a shared 

mindset that faces both inward and outward: inward in ways that produce widespread 

consensus, and outward in ways that achieve deterrence and other key security goals. 

In gauging how these methods might be used, it is important to note that an extended 

deterrence regime would need to protect not only the Middle East, but Europe as well. 

Employing these methods would be far easier to accomplish in Europe than in the Middle 

East. In Europe, NATO provides the well-oiled collective defense institutions and 

practices that enable the United States to work closely with its allies on common security 

policies. Even in Europe and NATO, however, political and military challenges are likely 

to be encountered. There, the United States has already managed to gain support for 

deploying a limited number of missile interceptors in Eastern Europe to provide 

protection against Iran, but this step remains controversial in many alliance capitals and is 

strongly opposed by Russia. If Iran deploys nuclear missiles capable of reaching Europe, 

presumably opposition to missile defenses will quickly fade away, and NATO might be 

entrusted with the mission of operating these defenses. Missile defenses, however, are not 

likely to be the only requirement facing NATO. A nuclear-armed Iran would mean that 

country posed a serious Article 5 threat to NATO and Europe. Although missile defenses 

would be part of the solution, they could not provide an impenetrable shield over Europe, 

and consequently they likely would not be the only solution. NATO would also be faced 

with the need to develop retaliatory policies and capabilities as part of its deterrence 

strategy, and this could produce a requirement for targeting nuclear missiles, possessed 

by not only by the United States but also Britain and France, against Iran. 

Faced with a nuclear-armed Iran, European countries likely would be willing to employ 

NATO to deter and defend against attacks on their own continent. Whether they would be 

willing to employ NATO to deter and defend against Iranian attacks on Israel or other 

Middle Eastern countries is less certain. The Middle East is not covered by Article 5 of 

the NATO Treaty, and no European country maintains the type of close relations in the 

Middle East that would readily produce a willingness to provide extended deterrence 

coverage over the region. The idea of Europe and NATO providing such coverage across 

the Middle East could be expected to generate intense political debate across Europe and 

potentially major opposition. If this opposition could be overcome, NATO would need to 

craft a new defense strategy that pivots the alliance to face southward not only in military 

terms, but in diplomatic terms as well. Creating such a strategy, and forging consensus 
29

behind it, would confront the alliance with the difficult task of politically reorienting 

itself to handle a new and different type of collective defense planning. If NATO and 

Europe recoil from deterring Iran in the Middle East, this mission presumably would 

have to be handled by the United States itself, without Europe’s help. Such an outcome 

could leave the United States presiding over two separate and distinct deterrence 

missions: protecting Europe and protecting the Middle East. 

In the Middle East, fostering the type of coalition planning and collaborative partnership 

that is needed for extended deterrence would be doubly difficult. Depending on the 

strategy adopted, deterrence might need to protect both Israel and friendly Arab/Muslim 

countries. There, no collective security mechanisms exist, much less a collective defense 

alliance similar to NATO. Nor does the United States currently possess the close relations 

with many countries that would be required to carry out this endeavor on a multilateral 

basis. Beyond this, the Arab-Israeli dispute creates a formidable barrier. Another barrier 

is created by the lack of close political cooperation among many Arab countries. The 

basis for creating the necessary U.S.-allied relations come closest to existing in the 

Persian Gulf, where the United States has fairly good political ties, plus a history of 

defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries. Whether 

cooperative planning can be achieved with Iraq will depend on the outcome as U.S. 

military withdrawal from Iraq occurs, and as the government of Iraq defines its foreign 

policy. Close U.S.-Iraqi cooperation could serve as a bulwark against Iranian 

adventurism. Elsewhere, the United States has good relations with Jordan and Egypt, but 

these relations have not yet been tested to withstand the new, unique pressures of forging 

agreement on an extended deterrence regime. Nor have U.S. relations with Israel yet been 

tested by such pressures. The threat of Iranian nuclear missiles likely would motivate 

several of these and other countries to welcome the umbrella of a U.S.-led deterrence 

regime. But whether they would be willing to pursue the necessary entangling ties with 

the United States and each other is another matter. To the extent progress is achievable in 

this arena, it likely would come slowly and gradually, rather than emerge instantly in a 

single big bang of political awakening. 

What strategic model should guide this enterprise? The NATO model of collective 

defense and integrated multilateral planning provides the optimal choice, but it is likely to 

be well beyond the art of the possible in the Middle East anytime soon. Another model is 

that of bilateral ties as practiced in Asia. There, the United States pursues deterrence 

through the vehicle of separate, bilateral security treaties and military partnerships with a 

number of countries, including Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Although the United 

States is trying to encourage multilateral planning there, it remains the exception, not the 

rule. In theory, the United States could pursue a similar model of bilateralism in the 

Middle East. In this event, it might seek to foster a deterrence regime by forging the 

necessary ties with several countries on a bilateral basis. This model offers potential 

feasibility, but it also suffers from a key drawback. Bilateralism works in Asia because 

key U.S. friends and allies are normally separated from each other by long distances, and 

in key ways they face dissimilar strategic challenges that can be addressed individually. 

Such is not the case in the Middle East. There, the key countries are bunched closely 

together, and they would confront a similar challenge in the nuclear threat posed by Iran. 

For this reason, some form of multilateral defense ties and collective security could be 

needed. 
30

The complex conditions in the Middle East suggest that an extended deterrence regime 

will need to be guided by a new, unique approach to achieving the necessary ingredients 

of coalition planning and collaborative partnership. While careful attention would need to 

be paid to real-life political constraints that set limits on the enterprise, ideally such steps 

as signing appropriate security and defense agreements, forging accords on regime 

requirements and capabilities, establishing military ties with the United States, and 

pursuing cooperative defense planning would form a strong foundation of this approach. 

Such steps might begin on a bilateral basis and then result in creation of a loose and 

pluralistic collective security system, one that reflects Middle East realities but 

nonetheless gets the job done. Such a system might be a modular creation; although it 

would be guided by uniform strategic principles, the exact nature of U.S.-allied 

relationships might vary from country to country. Such a flexible model could at least 

help guide initial thinking and planning, and form one of the options to be considered. To 

the extent possible, efforts to create common security policies could also be needed in 

such areas as regional stability, non-proliferation, crisis control, escalation control, arms 

control, and diplomatic outreach toward Iran and other trouble spots. Progress on forging 

multilateral agreement on such policies would further strengthen the regime’s cohesion, 

enhance prospects for success across the region, and deny Iran opportunity to employ 

divide-and-conquer tactics aimed at weakening the regime. 

In this demanding arena, initial steps might be modest, but over time, perhaps greater 

progress could be made in ways that eventually result in a tightly integrated collective 

security and defense architecture for the Middle East, one that might also benefit from 

collaborative ties with NATO. If so, such an achievement could help transform the region 

in ways that go well beyond the immediate task of deterring Iran. By promoting regional 

peace and cooperation, it could help create conditions that enable economic prosperity 

and democratization to take hold in widespread ways. But this is a distant vision. For the 

period ahead, the priority would need to be one of laying a solid political-military 

foundation for the regime, and this is likely to be challenging enough to occupy the 

energies of the United States as well as its friends and allies. Many skeptics might judge 

than even limited progress of this sort would be impossible to achieve in light of the 

many political constraints barring the way. Perhaps so, but an equal truth is that if such 

progress can be made, an extended deterrence regime would be more likely to succeed 

than without it. Indeed, such progress could be a key to determining whether Iran—and 

other countries—take this regime as seriously as it should be taken. 

Selecting Means—Blending the Instruments of Deterrence

If a solid foundation for an extended deterrence regime is established, instruments and 

activities can provide the superstructure in ways that determine how the regime would 

operate on a daily basis, and how it would respond to crisis confrontations with a nucleararmed Iran. Today the United States and its partners mainly rely on diplomatic pressure 

and economic sanctions in their efforts to deflect Iran away from nuclear weapons. If Iran 

deploys nuclear missiles in the coming years, an extended deterrence regime would need 

to continue employing these two instruments, but it also likely would need to create 

other, more powerful instruments. A guiding principle should be that a family of 

mutually supporting instruments and activities should be chosen, and they should operate 
31

in ways focused on supporting the goals, methods, and mechanisms of the regime. They 

should also respond to limits on resources and to related constraints on what realistically 

can be attempted by the United States and its friends and allies. 

While detailed plans and programs would need to be designed to support the specific 

deterrence strategy being employed, the aim here is limited to broadly assessing the types 

of instruments, activities, requirements, and capabilities that might be contemplated. The 

analysis especially focuses on the military agenda facing the United States. Its main 

conclusion is that if the regime is to be militarily prepared, the United States likely would 

be required to commit a balanced combination of missile defenses, nuclear forces and 

other retaliatory capabilities, increased security assistance to allies, and some number of 

U.S. conventional forces. Peacetime use of such military assets would need to be 

carefully embedded in an overarching diplomatic strategy so that political and military 

pressures on Iran work in tandem with maximum effect. 

Assertive U.S. Political Leadership. For the United States, creating and leading an 

extended deterrence regime focused on Iran would entail worrisome risks. This especially 

would be the case if Iran acquires ICBMs that could reach U.S. soil and plausibly 

penetrate U.S. missile defense systems. In this event, the United States could face the 

dilemma of being compelled to place American cities at risk to safeguard the cities of 

European and Middle Eastern friends and allies. Even if Iran does not acquire ICBMs, its 

shorter range missiles could directly threaten U.S. military forces in the Middle East and 

Europe, and menace other vital American interests. Managing such risks would enhance 

the premium on wise and effective U.S. foreign policy and defense strategy in the Middle 

East. Achieving control of events there could spell the difference between a future of 

unacceptably high risks and a future of manageable risks and safeguarded U.S. interests. 

In order to create and sustain an extended deterrence regime in the Middle East, the 

United States would need to consistently pursue an agenda of strong political leadership 

and vigorous diplomatic action there. Its diplomacy would need to combine hard power 

and soft power in ways that, depending on the country, both coerce and persuade regional 

capitals to follow its leadership and to accept its designs. Above all, a clear declaratory 

policy that credibly sends its deterrence message would be needed, one aimed at 

convincing Iran that it truly is deterred, and that it cannot erode or sidestep the U.S.-led 

deterrence regime. Likewise, U.S. declaratory policy would need to be convincing in the 

capitals of friends and allies that are beneficiaries of the regime. In order to pursue this 

goal and to establish a legal basis for the regime, the United States might need to sign 

security treaties (or at least executive agreements) with many, if not all, regime members. 

This effort could begin on a bilateral basis and then transition to multilateral approaches 

and collective security. 

Throughout this enterprise, U.S. political leaders and senior diplomats would need to be 

regularly active in meeting, negotiating, and bargaining with regime members to 

convince them to pursue policies and activities that support the regime’s purposes. Their 

efforts would go a long way toward determining whether the regime would gain enough 

traction to take hold with friends and allies. For such reasons, the U.S. diplomatic profile 

in the Middle East would need to ascend to a high, permanent level aimed at managing a 

region of vulnerable partners as well as a dangerous Iranian adversary. In this respect, 

U.S. diplomatic energy in the Middle East would need to resemble that of its diplomacy 
32

in Europe and Asia—a full-time occupation. 

Vigorous U.S. political leadership on the world stage would also be required. In 

particular, successful efforts to mobilize political help from Europe, Russia, China, India, 

Japan, and other major powers could play a key role in determining whether an extended 

deterrence regime aimed at Iran can succeed. If a nuclear-armed Iran benefits from 

support by these actors, or even their passive acquiescence, it would be better-able to 

weaken the deterrence regime and circumvent its strictures. But if these actors lend their 

support to the regime, Iran’s latitude would be restricted, and it would be better deterred. 

In all likelihood, the stances of these actors will depend heavily on how the United States 

approaches them in political and diplomatic terms. In this arena, influence and 

persuasiveness by the U.S. Government would be a premium quality. The same judgment 

applies to the task of mobilizing political help from other countries in the Middle East, 

South Central Asia, and elsewhere. 

Creating an extended deterrence regime could publicly brand Iran as an enemy and a 

nuclear threat. Doing so could run the risk of so polarizing relations that Iran is provoked 

into the type of menacing and dangerous behavior that the deterrence regime is intended 

to prevent. To reduce this risk, a dual-track U.S. diplomacy likely would be needed, with 

one track coercing and deterring Iran, and the other trying to establish stabilizing accords. 

At stake would be whether a nuclear-armed Iran could be persuaded to temper its 

geopolitical ambitions and accept being a status-quo power, one that refrains not only 

from rattling nuclear sabers, but also from supporting terrorism and otherwise promoting 

destabilizing trends in the region. As long as Iran remains a nuclear power with menacing 

geopolitical aims, any fundamental reconciliation with it would be improbable. But arms 

control negotiations with it could be pursued in ways that profit from the leverage 

provided by the extended deterrence regime. Such negotiations likely would need to be 

guided by a comprehensive approach aimed at dismantling the deterrence regime only if 

Iran totally abandons possession of nuclear weapons and missiles. It is hard to see how 

the quest for a robust deterrence regime could be halted if, for example, Iran dismantles 

only half of its nuclear missile inventory. Perhaps the painful prospect of facing a U.S.-

led deterrence regime, as well as isolation from its neighbors and the world community, 

might motivate Iran to give up its nuclear missiles. Even short of this outcome, U.S. 

diplomatic outreach toward Iran potentially could help dampen hostilities with it and 

enhance prospects for peace, but only if deterrence is not compromised. 

Missile Defenses. In appraising military requirements ahead, some observers might call 

for U.S. strategy to focus on fostering a mutual deterrence system in which U.S. and 

Iranian nuclear missiles checkmate each other to the point of guaranteeing that neither 

would ever be used. In such a setting, U.S. strategy presumably could forsake the option 

of deploying missile defenses capable of shooting down Iranian missiles. Closer 

inspection, however, suggests a more complicated reality. A new mutual deterrence 

regime for the Middle East might not be as stable as that of the Cold War, and it could 

not guarantee that Iran would never fire its nuclear missiles. Nor would it necessarily 

reassure regime members of their security, and in a crisis, it would deny the United States 

options for responding flexibly in ways that could control escalation. 

For these reasons, deployment of missile defenses is attractive; they could help deter an 

Iranian attack and provide self-protection assets in the event Iranian offensive missiles 
33

were fired in anger. During the Cold War, the idea of deploying missile defenses was 

examined in the 1960s and the 1980s, but both times technological constraints prevented 

deployments, and the ABM Treaty of the 1970s ruled out any major missile defense 

systems for both sides. In today’s world, both impediments have faded away to the point 

where, in theory, missile defenses could be a key part of an extended deterrence regime 

in the Middle East and Europe. While this idea clearly is worth pursuing, there are 

technological and budgetary reasons for stopping short of the judgment that an affordable 

missile defense system could create such an impenetrable shield that it could be the sole 

military component of the regime. Missile defenses can be part of the military solution, 

but not the whole solution. 

If Iran acquires long-range missiles capable of striking Europe, an expanded missile 

defense system would be needed there. In 2006, the United States proposed to create a 

missile shield of ten interceptors based in Poland and a radar system based in 

Czechoslovakia. In September 2009, the Obama Administration decided to cancel this 

plan in favor of a different approach initially anchored in sea-based interceptors. As 

explained by Secretary of Defense Gates, the new plan responds to new intelligence 

estimates on the Iranian missile threat, i.e., compared to earlier estimates, Iran is making 

faster progress on deploying MRBMs and slower progress on deploying ICBMs. In 

addition, Secretary Gates said, the new plan responds to recent progress in U.S. research 

and development programs. Accordingly, Secretary Gates outlined a new, three-phased 

plan for missile defense deployments. In Phase 1, beginning in 2011, the United States 

will deploy a system intended to protect the Mediterranean and Southern Europe from 

Iranian MRBMs. Phase 1 is to include a distributed sensor system coupled with Standard 

Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptors based on Aegis cruisers. Phase 2, beginning in 2015, will 

deploy a land-based SM-3 interceptor intended to provide broader coverage of Europe. 

Phase 3, beginning in 2018, will include a larger, more capable interceptor missile 

capable of protecting all of Europe as well as the United States from Iranian IRBMs and 

ICBMs. Secretary Gates characterized this new plan as providing a faster, more capable, 

and cheaper response than the old plan. As this new U.S. plan is pursued, it will need to 

be integrated into ongoing NATO studies on missile defense. For years, NATO has been 

studying how to employ terminal missile interceptors to protect its deployed military 

forces. At its recent Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, NATO political leaders approved an 

intensified effort to determine how such systems and other interceptors could be used to 

provide territorial defense of Europe.5

 While the results will not be available for a year or 

two, they may envision eventual coverage of all of Europe. How many interceptors will 

be needed for this purpose? The answer depends on the number of Iranian missiles to be 

shot down and the lethality of U.S./NATO interceptors. In general, defense missiles that 

rely on kinetic-energy, hit-to-kill mechanisms require several interceptors to destroy a 

single enemy offensive missile. Thus, if Iran deploys 20–30 nuclear missiles, a fairly 

large number of missile interceptors could be needed to defend against this threat, and 

even then, some operational failures might occur. Complex politics enter the equation 

here. Russia complained bitterly about the previous plan to deploy interceptors to Poland. 

When the new U.S. plan was announced, Russian spokesmen hailed the step, but 

 

5

 See Declaration on Alliance Security, issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the 

Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on April 4, 2009, available at 

<http://www.nato.int/cps/eb/natolive/news-52838.htm>. 
34

cautioned that Russian interests could be menaced if the three phases of the U.S. plan 

result in a large missile interceptor force that endangers its own deterrent strategy. In this 

arena, much will depend on whether steps can be taken to integrate NATO missile 

defenses with Russian missile defenses in ways that protect both Europe and Russia from 

Iranian nuclear missiles. 

In addition to protecting all of Europe, what missile defense assets would be required to 

protect the Middle East from Iranian nuclear missiles? In principle, U.S. SM-3 missiles 

on Aegis ships could provide a foundation for a viable missile interceptor force, but 

eventually land-based interceptors might be needed as well. To determine ultimate 

requirements, technical details would have to be studied closely. The geography of the 

region seemingly could require deployment of two separate missile defense networks to 

defend both the Persian Gulf (south of Iran) and multiple countries to the northwest of 

Iran (e.g., Israel and Egypt). In theory, a missile defense network that protects countries 

to the east of Iran—Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India—might also be needed. The budget 

costs of a fully capable interceptor force could be substantial and might overwhelm the 

defense budgets of regional countries and strain the U.S. defense budget. If a large 

missile defense is unaffordable, and potentially too leaky, a viable proposition could be to 

field smaller defense networks, e.g., 10–20 missile interceptors each. Such networks 

could handle limited missile threats, inhibit graduated escalation by Iran, and potentially 

compel Iran to think twice about the prospect of draining its nuclear missile inventory in 

any single crisis. As a result, these networks could help strengthen deterrence against 

Iran, and they would be considerably less expensive than a full-blown missile defense 

system. 

Offensive Retaliatory Options. If missile defenses cannot provide airtight protection 

from Iran, U.S. military strategy could also need to include offensive retaliatory 

capabilities that could not only deter Iran and reassure friends and allies, but also provide 

strike options for use in a crisis. The simplest and least expensive approach would be to 

threaten Iran with U.S. nuclear retaliation in the event it launches a nuclear attack on any 

regime member. Most likely, many regime members would not feel safe and secure 

unless Iran is publicly threatened with nuclear retaliation, and this step might be needed 

to convince Iran to take the regime seriously enough to be deterred by it. Some observers 

might judge that the threat of nuclear retaliation might be enough to reliably deter Iran, 

even absent deploying expensive and controversial missile defenses. Perhaps so, but there 

always would be a risk that Iran might view this threat as a bluff, and in a crisis, sole 

reliance on nuclear retaliation would provide a one-way path to rapid escalation while 

denying the United States and its partners any other options for crisis management and 

escalation control. Missile defenses would help provide such options, and they would 

allow the United States to choose retaliation only if Iranian missiles actually reach their 

targets. For these reasons, a combination of missile defenses and retaliatory capabilities 

seems the best strategic plan. 

An argument can be made that retaliation with nuclear weapons might not be necessary, 

because the same strategic combat missions could be performed by U.S. bombers or 

missiles carrying precision-strike conventional munitions. In a technical sense, this 

argument has some validity, because many Iranian targets could be destroyed this way. 

But relying exclusively on conventional weapons might take away some credibility from 
35

the threat of retaliation. This might be true not only in Iran’s eyes, but also in the eyes of 

regime members, who likely would feel safer if they are protected by U.S. nuclear 

weapons. Such considerations suggest that the United States would be best served by 

keeping its retaliation options open. In this approach, it would have both nuclear and 

conventional options at its disposal for strike missions, it could anchor its declaratory 

messages on both options, and it could flexibly choose from these options at the moment 

of truth. Options are especially desirable because, whereas some crises may call for 

prompt nuclear retaliation, other crises might permit a graduated escalation that begins 

with conventional strikes and ends before nuclear strikes become necessary. 

The need for options also applies to shaping U.S. targeting policy and doctrine for 

determining the Iranian targets that might be struck in a crisis. The premises of an 

extended deterrence regime presumably rule out preventive warfare against Iran, but they 

do not rule out preemptive attacks against an imminent threat of Iranian attack, and they 

certainly call for second-strike retaliatory attacks. The wide potential range of crises that 

might erupt could necessitate a capability to strike different types of targets sets. In a 

limited crisis that does not automatically involve use of nuclear weapons, U.S. military 

forces could require a capacity to strike military, industrial, command and control, and 

infrastructure with conventional weapons. In an actual nuclear crisis, U.S. forces might 

be called on to launch a preemptive attack aimed at destroying Iran’s nuclear missiles 

before they could be used. Doing so could require nuclear weapons in a fast-paced crisis 

or conventional weapons in a slow-paced crisis. If retaliatory attacks on Iranian urban 

centers are required, either nuclear weapons or conventional weapons might be needed. 

The key conclusion is that U.S. strategy would need to have a spectrum of retaliatory 

options that facilitate flexible responses, calculated actions, and deliberate escalation 

rather than permit only massive retaliation or any other single-minded response. 

Assuming nuclear weapons would be required by the U.S. deterrence strategy, would 

they need to be physically present on the soil of regime members? In other words, would 

the United States be compelled to station tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems 

in the Middle East, as was done in Europe during the Cold War? An argument for 

forward stationing is that the presence of nuclear weapons could be needed largely for 

political reasons: to reassure allies and to warn Iran. Militarily, their presence might help 

provide faster response times in some crises, especially when tactical weapons are chosen 

rather than such strategic weapons as long-range bombers. At the same time, their 

presence on Middle East soil would be controversial and could make them tempting 

targets for Iranian nuclear strikes, thus might stimulate escalation in a crisis. If a 

requirement for forward stationing emerges in future deterrence strategy, perhaps it could 

be met by relying on an off-shore approach that would employ U.S. naval ships to carry 

nuclear weapons as well as missile defenses. 

U.S. and Allied Conventional Forces. In today’s setting, thoughts about the presence 

of U.S. conventional military forces in the Middle East are mostly focused on the pace of 

withdrawing troops from Iraq and sending some of them to Afghanistan. The prospect of 

having to create an extended nuclear deterrence regime aimed at countering Iranian 

nuclear missiles introduces a new and critical element into the long-range calculus. 

Although this regime might rely heavily on missile defenses and nuclear retaliatory 

options, adequate conventional defenses would also be needed if, as is possible, Iran 
36

emerges as a conventional military threat to regional security. The best way to provide 

local defense is to enhance the self-defense capabilities of Iraq, the Persian Gulf 

countries, and other endangered countries. Assuming this goal is pursued, there could be 

accompanying reasons for maintaining a moderate U.S. conventional presence in the 

region as well. One reason is to underscore the seriousness of the U.S. commitment to the 

regime in ways that erase any doubts in Iran or other countries. Another reason is to 

provide robust U.S. military options for handling non-nuclear crises with Iran that might 

emerge and directly entangle the United States. Such crises might, for example, involve 

Iranian efforts to close the Strait of Hormuz, or wage war against Iraq, or launch air 

strikes against Persian Gulf countries or other regime members. Crises of this sort could 

mandate the speedy commitment of U.S. conventional forces, which would be needed to 

perform necessary military missions while reducing the need for unwarranted escalation. 

Limited crises would require limited force commitments, but U.S. plans could not rule 

out the possibility that major combat operations might be necessary. Indeed, 

circumstances plausibly could require a full-scale invasion and occupation of Iran, and 

the capability to do so might play a significant role in strategy for deterring Iran. While 

major combat operations would require large reinforcements from CONUS, peacetimedeployed forces would be needed to help maintain the military infrastructure needed to 

make such operations possible. 

How many forces might need to be deployed for normal peacetime missions? Any 

attempt to forecast a future CENTCOM posture would need to take into account ongoing 

military operations in Afghanistan as well as residual U.S. missions in Iraq after 

withdrawal of today’s presence is complete. These requirements aside, three options help 

bound the range of future requirements ahead: 

Posture 1: A small and symbolic U.S. military presence limited to such missions as 

security assistance, training with allies, and maintaining a reinforcement 

infrastructure. 

Posture 2: A posture similar to that deployed before the invasions of Afghanistan and 

Iraq: i.e., about 25,000 personnel that included small Army ground forces, an air 

defense unit, one or two USAF fighter squadrons, a Marine battalion aboard 

amphibious ships, a Navy carrier strike group, headquarters units, and prepositioned 

equipment. 

Posture 3: A larger posture that is better equipped for immediate crisis response, and 

might include one or two Army ground brigades, additional USAF fighters and 

reconnaissance assets, additional Marine and Navy forces, more prepositioned 

equipment, larger headquarters staffs, and more assets for security assistance and 

training. The total number of personnel would be determined by specific decisions, 

but it likely would be less than one-half the size of the current U.S. postures in 

Europe and Asia. 

The future peacetime U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and Middle East will be 

partly determined by operational requirements, but it will also be affected by political 

incentives and constraints. On the one hand, Arab/Muslim countries threatened by Iran 

might welcome a significant U.S. military presence. On the other hand, Muslim political 

sensitivities could place a firm lid on the number of U.S. personnel deployed, perhaps 
37

necessitating a smaller presence than might seem desirable for operational missions. If 

political realities prevent stationing of an adequate peacetime posture ashore, especially 

ground forces, the natural alternative would be to shift more heavily to an offshore 

maritime force. In this approach, deployed Army units would be kept quite small, modest 

USAF forces would be stationed ashore, and larger Marine amphibious forces and Navy 

carrier forces would be deployed to the Persian Gulf and nearby waters. 

Such an offshore maritime posture might be suboptimal in key respects. Naval forces 

might not wield enough visible political clout in Tehran and other regional capitals. Even 

so, this posture would be preferable to having virtually no U.S. forces deployed to the 

region in peacetime. A principal drawback is that this posture could drain Navy and 

Marine forces away from other important global missions, including in Asia and the 

Mediterranean Sea. To avoid this adverse outcome, the Marine Corps and Navy might 

need to be enlarged. Normally, three new ships must be procured to keep one additional 

ship deployed overseas. Thus, the offshore posture would require DOD to alter force 

posture and budget priorities. 

Regardless of the number of U.S. military personnel ultimately deployable ashore and at 

sea, the force likely would not be large enough to provide adequate capabilities for 

carrying out the full set of missions that might arise in a major crisis with Iran. To meet 

the requirements of a major crisis, DOD would need to remain capable of speedily 

sending sizable reinforcements from CONUS. Continued prepositioning of Army and Air 

Force equipment in the region would help speed reinforcement. Throughout the 1990s, 

DOD planned to make roughly one-half of its active duty combat forces available for 

wartime Persian Gulf missions. The invasion of Iraq did not necessitate such a large 

deployment, but the need for continuing counterterrorism, stabilization, and 

reconstruction missions elevated the sustained deployment well above what had 

commonly been expected. Similarly, the need to deter Iran, and to defeat it in a crisis or 

war, could necessitate demanding reinforcement plans carried out by sizable forces. How 

many combat forces and mobility assets would be required for potential reinforcement 

missions is an issue that will need careful analysis, but the major implication is that the 

U.S. military may need to consider sizable combat operations in the Persian Gulf and 

Middle East for a long time to come. 

Homeland Security and Other Instruments. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, a 

worrisome risk is that it might provide one or more to terrorist groups. Israel could be 

highly vulnerable to nuclear terrorism, but other countries and regions, including the 

United States and Europe, would also be vulnerable. Accordingly, enhanced homeland 

security almost everywhere would be a compelling requirement to deny Iran the capacity 

to employ nuclear terrorism. Enhanced homeland security would need to be accompanied 

by improved attribution assets so that, if nuclear terrorism takes place, the sponsor can be 

promptly identified and targeted for retaliation. To the extent that such terrorism can be 

foiled or attributed, the odds would decrease that Iran might resort to this practice. 

Likewise, strong efforts would be needed to create safeguards against Iran proliferating 

nuclear weapons to nation-states that share its strategic persuasions. 

Other instruments could importantly help empower an extended deterrence regime. In 

deterring Iran, stiff economic sanctions (tougher than now) would be needed. Use of 

cyber networks could also help by providing defenses against Iranian cyber attacks and 
38

providing options for taking down Iranian cyber networks, including those that sustain its 

military command structures and nuclear missiles in a crisis. To the extent that Iran’s 

overall strategic power can be diminished by such steps, Tehran would be less able to 

translate its nuclear missiles into usable political influence across the Middle East. 

Likewise, public information campaigns aimed at Iran possibly could weaken its radical 

government by provoking internal political opposition. If Iran could be influenced to 

lessen its embrace of Islamic fundamentalism, it would be an easier country to deal with 

diplomatically, and the importance of its nuclear weapons would decrease. 

Parallel instruments could help influence friends and allies in ways that increase the 

cohesion and effectiveness of an extended deterrence regime. Public information 

campaigns could be employed to enhance support of this regime among key Arab 

populations. Security assistance could help modernize the militaries of these countries 

and make them better able to carry out missions with U.S. forces. A program of defense 

cooperation activities, including exercises with U.S. military forces, could help encourage 

the type of multilateral military collaboration and local self-defense that the regime 

would require. Enhanced military cooperation would be especially possible in the Persian 

Gulf, where Arab countries already have large defense budgets, possess modern weapons, 

and have a history of working with the U.S. military. The same applies to U.S. military 

cooperation with Israel. A more difficult path would need to be followed in pursuing 

defense cooperation with such countries as Egypt and Jordan, which do not have large 

defense budgets or a long legacy of close cooperation with the U.S. military. Over time, 

however, gradual progress might be possible. 

Adequacy of These Instruments. An extended deterrence regime thus could require a 

multiplicity of instruments that include assertive U.S. leadership, credible U.S. military 

commitments and regional presence, coercive political and economic instruments aimed 

at Iran, and multilateral political and military collaboration with friends and allies that are 

members of the regime. In theory, all of these instruments lie within the grasp of the 

United States and its partners. The key question is whether political realities would 

permit them to be assembled with the necessary strength. Surface appearances suggest 

that at the outset the regime might be under-resourced and ineffective in many areas. But 

as time passes and the regime gradually gains maturity, the amount of resources made 

available to it might grow, and the effectiveness of the regime might increase. This path 

of gradual growth, after all, is the one that was followed by the deterrence regimes of 

Europe and Asia, both of which started slowly and then gained momentum. Along the 

way in the Middle East, steps would be needed to apply scarce resources as efficiently as 

possible. Provided this is the case, there are realistic prospects that this regime could gain 

strength and momentum at the pace needed to check Iran as it acquires nuclear missiles 

and the political leverage that accompanies them. If so, the regime could succeed in 

accomplishing its core strategic purposes, even if it does not operate perfectly or 

otherwise conform to ideal textbook standards. This, at least, would need to be a core 

proposition and goal for the United States if it decides to embark on the demanding and 

uncertain path of creating an extended deterrence regime for the Persian Gulf and Middle 

East. 

Assessing Options—Balancing Political Feasibility and Strategic
39

Performance  

Identifying and evaluating alternative options for creating an extended deterrence regime 

needs to begin by taking stock of the various deterrence missions that might have to be 

performed as well as the actions needed for performing them. Table 6, which synthesizes 

tables 2 and 3, presents the overall priority of the various deterrence missions (taking into 

account the severity of the threat, the urgency of the mission, and its difficulty) and the 

main associated mechanisms and instruments. 

Table 6 conveys three strategic points: 

• Deterring Iranian nuclear missile attack and nuclear terrorism against all four 

categories of protected countries should be the top priority of the regime. Deterrence 

of nuclear threats could be pursued by purely political and diplomatic means, but it 

likely is best accomplished by a combination of U.S. declaratory policy, missile 

defenses, the threat of nuclear retaliation, and homeland security. Whereas 

Europe/NATO has nuclear weapons, friendly Arab/Muslim countries lack them. As a 

result, U.S. nuclear assurances would be needed to provide an umbrella of protection 

over them. 

• Only friendly Arab/Muslim countries are vulnerable to Iranian conventional 

aggression and political coercion. Deterring such threats is less critical than deterring 

nuclear attack, but nonetheless is important. U.S. nuclear commitments can help 

strengthen deterrence, but a combination of U.S./allied diplomatic collaboration and 

conventional military preparedness is also needed to solidify deterrence, provide 

direct defense, and reduce undue reliance on nuclear escalation. 

• Deterrence of conventional terrorism is a high priority for certain regime members, 

and is important to the homeland security policies of the various countries. 

Table 6. Priority and Main Mechanisms/Instruments of Deterrence Missions 

Countries to be Protected by Extended Deterrence Coverage 

Threat to be 

Deterred

CONUS and 

Deployed U.S. 

Forces

NATO/Europe Israel

Friendly Arab/Muslim 

Countries in Persian 

Gulf/Middle East

Nuclear 

Missile 

Attack 

y Vital priority 

y Declaratory 

policy, missile 

defenses and 

nuclear 

retaliation 

y Vital priority 

y Declaratory policy, 

missile defenses 

and nuclear 

retaliation 

y High priority 

y Declaratory policy, 

missile defenses 

and nuclear 

retaliation 

y High-to-medium priority 

y Declaratory policy, 

missile defenses and 

nuclear retaliation 

Nuclear 

Terrorism/ 

Proliferation 

y High priority 

y Declaratory 

policy, 

homeland 

security and 

nuclear 

retaliation 

y High priority 

y Declaratory policy, 

homeland security 

and nuclear 

retaliation 

y High priority 

y Declaratory policy, 

homeland security 

and nuclear 

retaliation 

y High to-medium priority 

y Declaratory policy, 

homeland security and 

nuclear retaliation 

Conventional 

Military 

Attack 

y Low emphasis 

y U.S. 

conventional 

military 

preparedness 

y Low emphasis 

y Allied 

conventional 

military 

preparedness 

y Low emphasis 

y Israeli 

conventional 

military 

preparedness 

y Medium-to-high priority 

y U.S. force commitments 

y Arab/Muslim 

conventional 

preparedness 
40

Political 

Coercion 

y Low emphasis 

y U.S. diplomacy 

and military 

power 

y Low emphasis 

y U.S./European 

diplomacy and 

military power 

y Medium priority 

y Israeli/U.S. 

diplomacy and 

military power 

y Medium-to high priority 

y U.S./allied diplomatic 

collaboration and 

military power 

Conventional 

Terrorism 

y Low-emphasis 

y U.S. homeland 

security and 

protection of 

overseas forces 

y Medium emphasis 

y European 

homeland security 

y High priority 

y Israeli homeland 

security 

y Medium-to-high priority 

y Arab/Muslim homeland 

security 

How can these deterrence demands and priorities best be met? If the United States 

decides to try to create an extended deterrence regime for dealing with a nuclear-armed 

Iran, it will need to weigh carefully the multiple strategic options at its disposal. The idea 

of such a regime does not come with a single, clear blueprint for guiding its creation. 

Indeed, such a regime can be pursued in diverse ways, and the final product can take one 

of several different forms. As discussed above, much depends on U.S. decisions 

regarding the threats to be deterred, the countries/actors to be protected, and the 

mechanisms/instruments to be employed. Much also depends on U.S. decisions regarding 

how to mobilize and orchestrate the security activities of regime members, and how the 

U.S. Government decides to grapple with the art of the possible. Across the Middle East 

and Europe, a central dilemma will need to be confronted, that of striking a satisfactory 

balance between feasibility and performance. That is, the option chosen will need to 

embrace a plausibly achievable outcome taking into account the constraining realities of 

Middle East politics as well as Europe. At the same time, it will need to pursue an 

outcome that reliably can achieve the core strategic goals being sought, including 

deterrence of Iran and reassurance of friends and allies. Achieving both outcomes at the 

same time promises to be challenging. The task of weighing and balancing these 

competing imperatives lies at the heart of developing and assessing options for pursuing 

this idea. 

To contribute to this enterprise, the six options below are arrayed across a wide spectrum 

that stretches from the pole of political feasibility (option 1) to the pole of high strategic 

performance (option 6). As such, they provide varying answers to a key question: How 

much deterrence is possible, and how much is enough? The six options provide ascending 

levels of ambitions, requirements, U.S. commitments, political-military arrangements, 

and different ways of treating Europe and the Middle East. They begin with alternative 

approaches to pursuing deterrence of nuclear threats and then migrate to pursuing 

deterrence of conventional aggression, political coercion, and conventional terrorism. 

The first option, political deterrence, is minimalist: it seeks to provide nuclear deterrence 

coverage of the Middle East and Europe through U.S. declaratory policy and other 

political instruments. The second, variable-geometry deterrence, is more demanding 

militarily, but it accords higher priority to protecting Europe and Israel than friendly 

Arab/Muslim countries. The third and fourth options are still more ambitious, are 

military-minded, and treat regime members equally. Whereas option 3, regime-wide 

nuclear deterrence, focuses on U.S. nuclear deterrence and strives for allied conventional 

preparedness, option 4, full-spectrum deterrence, elevates the priority attached to the 

presence of U.S. conventional forces and related deterrence missions in the region. The 

fifth and sixth options have a broader political-military mindset. Whereas option 5, 
41

collective security deterrence, aspires to create a collective security system in the Middle 

East, option 6, integrated multitheater deterrence, strives to integrate deterrence coverage 

of the Middle East and Europe into a single strategic construct. These are not the only 

options that can be imagined, and indeed, something different may ultimately be chosen. 

But because these options offer distinct strategic choices, they help frame the judgments 

that must be made about goals and aspirations, tradeoffs, and priorities that must be set in 

the coming years if the multiple demands of a deterrence regime are to be pursued in 

coherent ways. 

Although each of these options will be described and analyzed in some detail below, the 

following table helps portray how they stack up in relation to each other in terms of their 

performance and other characteristics. The table provides summary evaluations of them 

according to six key criteria. Overall, the table shows that options 1 and 2 are the easiest 

and least costly to pursue, but offer relatively low strategic performance in the Middle 

East. Options 3 and 4 offer medium degrees of feasibility and difficulties, and relatively 

high performance in achieving deterrence and other key goals. Options 5 and 6 offer the 

highest potential performance, but would be highly difficult and costly to pursue, and 

might not succeed, even then. As will be argued below, all of these options have 

attractions, liabilities, and tradeoffs, including reasons for supporting them and reasons 

for not favoring them. But if this table has a “sweet spot,” it lies in the range of options 3 

and 4, because they perform well in terms of both feasibility and performance. 

Table 7. Strategic Effectiveness Of Deterrence Options 

Deterrence Options 

Effectiveness 

Criteria 

Option 1: 

Political 

Deterrence

Option 2: 

VariableGeometry 

Deterrence

Option 3: 

RegimeWide 

Nuclear 

Deterrence

Option 4: 

FullSpectrum 

Deterrence

Option 5: 

Collective 

Security 

Deterrence

Option 6: 

Integrated 

MultiTheater 

Deterrence

Deterrence 

Goals and 

Mechanisms

LowMediumMedium High High High + High +

Reassurance 

Goals

Low - 

Medium

Medium High - High High + High +

Other Goals Low Low Medium Medium + High High +

Meet US 

Military 

Requirements

Low Low – 

Medium

High - High High + High+

Political 

Feasibility

High High Medium + Medium Low Low

Cost and 

Difficulties

Low Low Medium- Medium High High +

Option 1, Political Deterrence, is the least ambitious and demanding of the six options. It 

calls for extended deterrence to be pursued through the vehicle of U.S. political 

commitments and actions. That is, the United States would employ declaratory policy and 

private diplomacy as well as economic sanctions to warn Iran against aggressive conduct, 

and to reassure friends and allies that if Iran tries to victimize them, the United States will 

come to their rescue. It also would employ a political engagement strategy in an effort to 
42

build constructive relations with Iran and close political collaboration with friends and 

allies that are protected by the regime. This option would seek support from the United 

Nations, other international bodies, and other countries, but U.S. declaratory policy 

would provide the regime’s main deterrent mechanism. Using diplomacy, the United 

States would endeavor to keep Iran adequately deterred while maintaining the kind of 

political relations with friends and allies in Europe and the Middle East that preserve 

harmonious consensus with them. But the United States would not sign any new security 

agreements with them that create concrete obligations, and would not specify exactly 

how its promised rescue mission would be performed in a crisis. In particular, this option 

makes no formal U.S. military commitments, and would not deploy missile defenses or 

offer to protect friends and allies with nuclear weapons. It would continue to deploy a 

small U.S. conventional military posture in the region, but that force would not be 

designed to deter Iran or defend against it. Nor would the United States offer increased 

security assistance to upgrade the military forces of friends and allies. 

The United States thus would refrain from pursuing any special arrangements to create a 

militarily prepared regime that provides pre-packaged response capabilities if Iran 

misbehaves in ways necessitating a military reaction. In essence, this option would be 

empowered by U.S. political and diplomatic instruments, but it would not seek new treaty 

arrangements, and it would not provide powerful military instruments. It would rely only 

on improvised and ad-hoc military responses if the moment of truth arrived. In essence, 

this option provides a minimalist approach to creating an extended deterrence regime, 

one that relies on U.S. political actions to achieve its purposes and lacks powerful 

military teeth and other instruments. It makes sense if the U.S. Government judges that 

deterrence, reassurance, and other key goals can be accomplished by this strategy, or if 

political constraints prohibit a stronger U.S. stance. But if these conditions do not apply, 

its attractions fade. Judged against the criteria outlined above, this option’s pros and cons 

are as follows: 

Pros: 

• Its declaratory policy can be pursued by the United States unilaterally, and can be 

done quickly and easily. It is a highly feasible option. 

• It makes clear U.S. opposition to Iranian nuclear missiles and its support of 

friends and allies, while not unduly provoking Iran. 

• It allows for mobilization of global political support for the deterrence regime, 

and for such steps as diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions against Iran. 

These steps would stand a good chance of being supported by Russia, China, and 

other major powers. 

• It is inexpensive in budgetary terms, imposes no new requirements on U.S. 

military forces, and would not interfere with U.S. global involvements elsewhere. 

Cons: 

• While it could irreversibly entangle the United States in the Middle East, it lacks 

potent U.S. military instruments, and it does not mobilize major military help 

from friends and allies. 
43

• It may be too weak to be credible in Iran’s eyes or those of friends and allies. 

• It might not accomplish the deterrence and reassurance missions or such other 

goals as preventing further nuclear proliferation. 

• It could leave the United States unable to control crises and escalation, reliant on 

ad-hoc military responses in a crisis, and lacking flexibility and adaptability for 

adjusting to surprising developments. 

Option 2, Variable-Geometry Deterrence, includes the measures of option 1, but it is 

more ambitious and demanding because it also provides nuclear deterrence coverage to 

two of the three key constituencies—Europe and Israel—while providing only political 

deterrence for friendly Arab/Muslim countries in the Middle East. To reassure Europe, it 

would make unequivocal U.S. military commitments to NATO allies and would deploy a 

sizable force of missile interceptors to cover the entire continent. It also would 

reconfigure NATO to treat Iran as a potential Article 5 threat, and it would seek to 

prepare NATO to conduct retaliatory strikes against Iran if it employs nuclear weapons 

against Europe. Option 2 recognizes the special U.S. relationship with Israel and the 

likelihood that Israel would be a main target of Iranian nuclear strategy. Accordingly, 

option 2 would strengthen security and defense ties with Israel, deploy U.S. missile 

interceptors to protect that country if necessary, and make clear that an Iranian nuclear 

strike against Israel would trigger devastating U.S. nuclear retaliation against Iran. While 

option 2 would use U.S. declaratory policy to help protect friendly Arab/Muslim 

countries in the Middle East, it would enter into no formal security treaties with them, or 

deploy missile defenses to protect them, or make unequivocal nuclear commitments to 

them, or otherwise tailor forward-deployed U.S. forces to enhance deterrence coverage of 

them. It might, however, employ the type of consultative arrangements that are used in 

Europe to help reassure Partnership for Peace (PFP) members and other partner countries 

that are not invited to join NATO, e.g., Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. 

Variable-geometry deterrence is motivated by a combination of strategic reasoning and 

diplomatic practicality. Whereas strategic reasoning guides its treatment of Europe and 

Israel, practicality guides its treatment of friendly Arab/Muslim countries. Essentially, 

option 2 calculates that purely declaratory commitments to Arab/Muslim countries are as 

much as the political traffic in the Middle East will bear, that such commitments will be 

adequate to warn Iran to refrain from aggressive conduct toward them, and that special 

U.S. military commitments to them would unduly provoke Iran. It could make sense if 

U.S. political commitments are sufficient to reassure friendly Arab/Muslim countries, but 

if this is not the case, its attractions fade. Its pros and cons are as follows: 

Pros: 

• It is highly feasible and strongly enhances extended deterrence coverage of 

Europe and prepares NATO for potentially conducting military strikes against 

Iran. 

• By assertively reassuring Israel, it greatly reduces the risk that Israel will be 

tempted to conduct preventive strikes against Iran. 

• Aside from Israel, it avoids pursuit of disruptive changes to Middle East and 

Persian Gulf security affairs. 
44

• Compared to more-ambitious options, it lessens provocation of Iran and is more 

likely to elicit support from Russia, China, and other big powers. 

Cons: 

• It creates two separate tiers of U.S. partners. Critics will allege it treats friendly 

Arab/Muslim countries as not entitled to the same protection as Europe and Israel. 

• Israel aside, it might not be adequately deter Iran from aggressive conduct in the 

Persian Gulf and Middle East. 

• Friendly Arab/Muslim countries might judge that they are not adequately 

protected and either pursue acquisition of nuclear weapons or seek 

accommodation with Iran. 

• It could leave the United States lacking adequate military forces and preparations 

for defending friendly Arab/Muslim countries in a crisis with Iran. 

Option 3, Regime-Wide Nuclear Deterrence, is more ambitious and demanding than 

option 2. It includes the steps of the first two options, but goes beyond them by also 

providing unequivocal U.S. nuclear guarantees to friendly Arab/Muslim countries that 

seek protection from the deterrence regime. Under its auspices, the United States might 

pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, but it would declare clearly that if Iran 

fires nuclear missiles (or is imminently threatening to do so) or employs nuclear terrorism 

against any regime member, it would definitely retaliate with nuclear strikes against Iran 

in devastating ways. This option also would deploy missile interceptors to help protect 

not only Europe and Israel, but also friendly Arab/Muslim countries, from Iranian missile 

attack. The combination of missile interceptors and credible threats of nuclear retaliation 

would be intended to strongly achieve the two highest-priority goals of a deterrence 

regime: deterrence of Iranian nuclear attacks or threats to employ such attacks. 

Although focused primarily on nuclear deterrence, this option also includes provisions for 

deterring Iranian conventional attacks or political coercion of vulnerable countries around 

its borders. It pursues this goal through a strategy of devolution aimed at enhancing the 

conventional militaries and political resolve of such endangered countries as Iraq, Persian 

Gulf friends and allies, and others. It would increase U.S. security assistance to those 

countries, including sales of advanced conventional weapons that might be needed, as 

well as U.S. training and exercises with their forces. Its goal would be to create allied 

forces that are strong enough to defend their borders, but not strong enough to threaten 

Iran. This option would not specially deploy, design, and configure U.S. conventional 

forces for the deterrence regime. But depending on strategic requirements in general, it 

would deploy modest U.S. forces to the region. The U.S. posture could range from a 

small presence for security assistance, training, and exercises, to a larger posture of about 

25,000 personnel that would include air, marine, and naval forces to provide a credible 

military presence as well as initial crisis response options. 

This option makes sense if the main U.S. goal is to deter Iranian nuclear attacks and 

reassure friendly Arab/Muslim countries that they are protected by U.S. extended nuclear 

deterrence coverage. It also makes sense if the accompanying strategy of devolving 

conventional defense responsibilities and capabilities onto the shoulders of friendly 

Arab/Muslim countries can be relied on to succeed. This option’s main potential liability 
45

is that a strategy of conventional devolution might not succeed, and that deployed U.S. 

conventional forces, if kept too small, might not be powerful enough to make up the 

difference. Its pros and cons are as follows: 

Pros: 

• It provides strong mechanisms for achieving the highest priority goals of a 

deterrence regime: deterrence of Iranian nuclear use and reassurance of allies that 

they are protected from this threat. 

• It avoids the political onus of a two-tiered regime by assuring friendly 

Arab/Muslim countries that they are provided U.S. nuclear deterrence coverage 

equal to that offered to Europe and Israel. 

• Pursuing devolution, it provides a potential strategy for bolstering the capacity of 

friendly Arab/Muslim countries to resist Iran conventional threats and associated 

political coercion, while keeping the U.S. military profile in the region low. 

• Although implementing it could encounter difficulties, overall it is a feasible 

option, while scoring high on performance criteria. 

Cons: 

• Compared to option 2, it creates unequivocal and demanding U.S. commitments 

to countries in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. If Iran were to conduct a nuclear 

attack, the United States would have little choice but to retaliate with nuclear 

strikes of its own. 

• Compared to option 2, it would be more controversial globally, and it could be 

hard-pressed to elicit support from Russia, China, and other major powers. 

Indeed, some of them might actively oppose the regime and attempt to undermine 

it or curry favor with Iran. 

• Its strategy of conventional devolution could require significant increases of U.S. 

military sales to the Persian Gulf and Middle East, which could generate 

controversy. 

• If devolution fails, this option might provide too few deployed U.S. military 

forces to achieve some key goals and respond quickly to crises. This especially 

could be the case if no U.S. combat forces are deployed to the region. 

Option 4, Full-Spectrum Deterrence, contains all of the nuclear provisions of option 3. 

But in addition to seeking better allied conventional forces, it also provides for a larger 

U.S. conventional military presence in the Persian Gulf and Middle East, contemplating 

that a strategy of conventional devolution might not fully succeed or could be too 

controversial to implement. In any event, it judges that the United States might want a 

significant, combat-capable military presence for reasons of its own. Such reasons could 

include a desire to enhance U.S. influence and control in a region where it has nuclear 

commitments, and a desire to have already-deployed forces for reacting swiftly to crises 

that might erupt suddenly and have the potential to escalate quickly. 

The key feature of this option is that, in addition to its nuclear guarantees, it aspires to 

specifically design deployed U.S. conventional forces and reinforcement plans to serve 
46

the purposes and requirements of the extended deterrence regime. How large would these 

forces need to be and how would they be composed? This issue would need to be 

addressed by technical analyses. The force posture likely would need to include enough 

air, air defense, marine, and naval forces to meet peacetime requirements and 

contingency needs. It likely would not need significant ground combat forces unless such 

a requirement emerges in Iraq. That country aside, one or two Army brigades likely 

would be enough to meet normal peacetime training requirements with allied forces and 

provide early response options in a crisis. Total manpower requirements would be 

knowable only when the posture is decided, but they likely would be more than 25,000 

personnel. How much more would depend on not only operational requirements, but also 

constraining political realities. Arab/Muslim sensitivities likely would place a firm lid on 

the total forces that could be deployed on Persian Gulf/Middle East soil. 

Compared to option 3, this option performs equally in pursuing nuclear deterrence and 

reassurance missions, and potentially does a better job of safeguarding against 

conventional aggression and political coercion by Iran. Also, it is less vulnerable than 

option 3 to strategic failure if efforts to bolster allied conventional forces do not succeed, 

or if crises erupt in which sizable U.S. forces are required. However, it could be harder to 

implement, because it would encounter greater political controversies in the region and 

elsewhere, and would entail higher costs and burdens on the U.S. military. The outcome 

would be a U.S-led regime that is configured for a full spectrum of military 

multilateralism, even if its members are not politically bonded together in ways that 

create a true collective security architecture. Its pros and cons are as follows: 

Pros: 

• Similar to option 3, option 4 performs well at achieving nuclear deterrence and 

reassurance. 

• Compared to option 3, it potentially performs somewhat better at pursuing 

conventional deterrence and defense, as well as other regional security goals. 

• It is less vulnerable than option 3 to failure of local allies to bolster their 

conventional defenses to the degree required. 

• It provides better military assets for maximizing U.S. political influence and 

improved options for crisis control and escalation control. 

Cons: 

• Compared to option 3, it would more deeply and permanently entangle the United 

States in Middle East security affairs, and cause disruptive changes there. 

• It would be harder to implement than option 3. It could place unwelcome 

pressures on Arab/Muslim friends and allies, further inflame relations with Iran, 

and provoke opposition by Russia and China. 

• It would create a militarized deterrence regime that may lack adequate high-level 

political institutions to guide it. 

• It would impose significant U.S. budget costs and would constrain U.S. force 

commitments and diplomacy elsewhere. 
47

Option 5, Collective Security Deterrence, is more farsighted, ambitious, and demanding 

than the first three options. It includes the measures of options 1 through 4, but it would 

seek to elevate the extended deterrence regime onto a higher plateau of political 

preparedness and capability. It would do so by striving to create a collective security 

system in the Middle East that would work closely with the United States to operate the 

deterrence regime. It would treat Europe and the Middle East as separate entities, but it 

would seek to provide the Middle East with security assurances vis-a-vis Iran that are 

comparable to those provided to Europe. Compared to option 4, it would require similar 

U.S. military commitments, but would seek to create a stronger multilateral political 

framework for guiding the regime’s military and defense practices in the Middle East, 

including those of Israel and friendly Arab/Muslim countries. In addition, it would seek 

to forge multilateral consensus behind a wider set of security policies and instruments 

than only defense preparedness. For example, it would seek widespread consensual 

support in such policy arenas as nonproliferation, security assistance, crisis management, 

arms control negotiations with Iran, and diplomatic outreach to other regions. Initially, 

this collective security system would depend heavily on U.S. guarantees and 

commitments, but as it gained strength in the Middle East, this dependency would 

gradually lessen. 

This option would be pursued by forging enhanced security and defense ties with 

Arab/Muslim friends and allies on a multilateral basis, i.e., these agreements would 

provide uniform strategic principles for covering the entire regime. If desirable and 

possible, a single omnibus collective security treaty might be signed that covers the entire 

Middle East regime, as was done by NATO in 1949. Initially, collective security likely 

would be pursued through flexible, modular mechanisms that enable the various countries 

to participate in ways that are suited to their special circumstances. But over time, 

common institutions might be created to provide multilateral political and military 

leadership for the regime. For example, this option might result in committees of foreign 

ministers and defense ministers that meet regularly. Option 5 does not envision a NATOlike alliance for the Middle East, with big bureaucracies similar to those in Brussels and 

Mons, plus integrated military commands. It does envision enough collective security 

collaboration to accomplish deterrence and other common missions and provide a 

flexible capacity to gradually strengthen the regime in both political and military terms. 

Option 5 would enable pursuit of a broader set of goals, stronger institutional 

arrangements, more instruments, and a larger set of common security policies than 

options 3 and 4. It also would mandate more challenges, complexity, and difficulty for 

U.S. policy and strategy—not only in the Middle East but also globally, because Europe, 

Russia, China, and other powers likely would take a keen interest in the enterprise. 

Pros: 

• It provides the United States a powerful vehicle for asserting its influence and 

leadership across the Middle East through collective security activities. 

• It provides a potent political-military instrument for deterring Iran and otherwise 

limiting its influence in the region. 

• It can provide strong, regime-wide political leadership for pursuing defense 

planning and common security policies toward proliferation and other issues. 
48

• It can create a framework for pursuing unity, stability and progress across the 

entire Middle East and for acting responsibly on the global stage. 

Cons: 

• It would entangle the United States in regional security affairs in ways that go 

beyond options 3 and 4. 

• If pursued unwisely, it might so overload Middle Eastern political circuits that it 

would fail or even backfire in ways producing adverse, second-order 

consequences. 

• It could be viewed by Russia, China, and other powers as a U.S. effort to control 

the Middle East to their exclusion. 

• It would require greater U.S. diplomatic efforts, impose larger budget costs, and 

affect global policies elsewhere to a greater extent than options 3 and 4. 

Option 6, Integrated Multi-theater Deterrence, is the most visionary and demanding of 

the six options. Whereas the first five options view the Middle East in terms separate 

from Europe, option 6 seeks a fusion of extended deterrence activities in both theaters. 

Under its auspices, NATO would be brought into close contact with the emerging Middle 

East deterrence and collective security regime. The two bodies initially would remain 

different entities, but they would endeavor to develop collaborative ties with each other 

that, while starting slowly, could grow over time. For example, the NAC might meet 

regularly with the foreign and defense ministers of the Middle East regime, and their 

staffs would conduct ongoing dialogue and cooperation. One goal would be to confront 

Iran with stronger deterrence barriers to committing nuclear aggression against either the 

Middle East or Europe. Another goal would be to commit NATO and European countries 

to performing important security missions in the Middle East. A third goal would be to 

foster close military and security collaboration among the United States, Europe, and the 

Middle East. 

This option would enable the United States to view both regions through a similar 

strategic lens, and it could help empower NATO and the Middle East so that both are 

made more secure against a nuclear-armed Iran, as well as other dangers. Eventually, it 

could result in a strategic bonding of Europe and the Middle East in handling common 

security affairs. Initially option 6 would require a strong U.S. military presence and 

commitments in the Middle East, but as this option gains maturity, it could enable 

European and local military forces to perform a broader set of missions in ways that 

provide more partners for U.S. forces and lessen long-term U.S. military requirements in 

the Middle East. 

Pros: 

• It could enhance U.S. ability to exert leadership in both Europe and the Middle 

East. 

• It could provide a framework for creating integrated missile defenses of both 

regions, as well as other forms of common defense planning. 

• It could encourage Europe and NATO to perform a widening scope of strategic 
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missions in the Middle East in partnership with the United States. 

• It could foster a powerful triangular relationship among the United States, Europe, 

and the Middle East in ways that have positive global impacts. 

Cons: 

• It would create a highly demanding political agenda for the United States that 

may exceed the art of the possible.. 

• Some Middle Eastern countries might view it as a new form of Western 

imperialism aimed at controlling their region for economic purposes. 

• Should it fail, the effort could damage NATO cohesion and U.S. leadership in 

Europe and the Middle East. 

• Russia and China likely would oppose this option and try hard to frustrate it. 

How do these six options compare and contrast in terms of opportunities, challenges, and 

likely strategic performance in meeting demands for deterrence coverage? In a nutshell, 

they offer different combinations of political feasibility and strategic performance. At one 

extreme, option 1 opts for high feasibility at the expense of performance, because it lacks 

many of the military mechanisms that are commonly thought necessary to make extended 

deterrence succeed against a nuclear-armed adversary Option 2 also scores well on 

feasibility, and offers a better strategy for making Europe and Israel secure from Iranian 

nuclear threats, but leaves friendly Arab/Muslim countries lacking concrete U.S. nuclear 

guarantees. At the other extreme, options 5 and 6 are visionary in ways that opt for high 

performance at the expense of feasibility. Whereas they offer the best approaches for 

powerfully pursuing extended deterrence and other strategic goals in both Europe and the 

Middle East, they may be infeasible, indeed implausible, in both regions in the years 

immediately ahead. In the middle of these extreme alternatives are options 3 and 4. 

Option 3 provides for strong nuclear deterrence coverage of all regime members, 

including friendly Arab/Muslim countries, as well as a devolution strategy for improving 

allied conventional forces so that they can defend themselves without U.S. military help. 

Option 4 adds significant U.S. conventional combat forces to the strategic equation, 

thereby potentially adding greater confidence that deterrence of Iranian conventional 

aggression and political coercion will succeed. 

Together, options 1 and 2 offer approaches for pursuing extended deterrence while not 

making concrete U.S. nuclear commitments to friendly Arab/Muslim countries. If the 

United States decides that such nuclear commitments must be offered, then focus 

naturally turns to options 3 and 4. Both options offer similar nuclear guarantees. Their 

principal difference lies in how they treat conventional deterrence and preparedness. 

Whereas option 3 relies heavily on Persian Gulf allies to defend themselves, option 4 

places greater emphasis on the U.S. military presence. If the “sweet spot” lies in the range 

of options 3 and 4 because both strike a sensible balance of feasibility and performance, 

the choice between them turns on decisions for U.S. security assistance to allies and on 

the size and composition of U.S. conventional forces that are deployed to the region in 

peacetime, and on the relative priority attached to conventional deterrence and related 

goals. 
50

Other analyses, of course, might reach different conclusions, as might senior 

decisionmakers. Regardless of how these six options are appraised individually, a key 

point is that each of them has a distinct rationale, yet all of them are imperfect. All have 

significant attractions, but all also pose significant liabilities. Together, they illustrate that 

there is no fully satisfactory, risk-free, or cheap solution to deterring a nuclear-armed 

Iran. Tough choices will need to be made among options that pose difficult tradeoffs. The 

options that are easiest to implement likely would offer the lowest strategic performance, 

and those that offer the highest strategic performance likely would the hardest to 

implement. The good news, nevertheless, is that the threat of a nuclear armed Iran is not 

impossible to counter peacefully. All six of these options provide strategic approaches for 

deterring Iran short of war, and for reassuring friends and allies short of their acquiring 

nuclear weapons of their own. 

In the near term, the United States could face the necessity to choose among these six 

options. Over the long term, these six options may not be so different from each other 

that they are mutually exclusive. In theory, they could be pursued sequentially. That is, 

the United States could begin by pursuing option 1, and as success is achieved, shift gears 

to pursue option 2. As the military and defense measures of option 2 take hold, the United 

States could then start pursuing option 3 and, if necessary, option 4. Option 5 could then 

provide a way to start building a collective security system in the Middle East by first 

attending to the regime’s military requirements and then adding an institutional political 

architecture. This is the opposite of how NATO emerged—it started with the political 

architecture and then added the military power—but this approach might accord better 

with Middle Eastern political realities. As the collective security measures of option 5 

gain momentum, the United States could then begin pursuing option 6, which seeks to 

fuse Europe and the Middle East in strategic terms. If such a sequential path proves 

possible over the long haul, it would help transform an emerging crisis with Iran into a 

golden opportunity for its neighbors, the United States, and Europe. This, at least, could 

be the upside of danger. 

Conclusions and Recommendations  

In summary, the idea of creating an extended deterrence regime in the Middle East is a 

formidable undertaking, but if Iran acquires nuclear missiles, the United States may have 

little alternative but to pursue some version of a deterrence regime. If the United States 

decides to do so, it will need to think and act with its eyes wide open. Although such 

regimes have long track records of success in Europe and Asia, there is no guarantee of 

comparable success in the Middle East. Much depends on how such a regime is 

assembled and operated. Here, coherent concepts and mastery of details both matter 

hugely. This paper has provided an initial appraisal of the subject, but before the United 

States is able to contemplate action, a great deal more thought—careful thought—will be 

needed. 

If the United States decides to develop potential policies and plans for creating an 

extended deterrence regime, this effort will need to be placed at the core of the 

Administration’s national security strategy and defense strategy, rather than be confined 

to the periphery. This agenda is one that will need to be carried out by the entire 

interagency community, not by any single department or agency. To lay the intellectual 
51

groundwork, there is considerable analytical and planning work to be done by DOD, 

CENTCOM and EUCOM, the State Department, the NSC staff, the Intelligence 

Community, and other agencies. The time to start performing this work is now.