United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

04-1581 

NOVO NORDISK PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., 

and NOVO NORDISK A/S, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

BIO-TECHNOLOGY GENERAL CORP. and 

TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC., 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Steven E. Lipman, Darby & Darby, P.C., of New York, New York, argued for 

plaintiffs-appellants. Of counsel were James Edward Hanft, Paul M. Zagar, Jay P. 

Lessler, Kevin L. Reiner, Robert Schaffer and Joseph R. Robinson. 

John W. Bateman, Kenyon & Kenyon, of Washington, DC, argued for 

defendants-appellees. On the brief was Richard L. DeLucia, of New York, New York. 

Of counsel were Steven J. Lee, and Thomas J. Meloro, of New York, New York, and 

Kenneth R. Corsello, of Washington, DC. 

Appealed from: United States District Court for the District of Delaware 

. 

Chief Judge Sue L. Robinson 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

04-1581 

NOVO NORDISK PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. 

and NOVO NORDISK A/S, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

BIO-TECHNOLOGY GENERAL CORP. and 

TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

__________________________

 DECIDED: October 5, 2005 

__________________________

Before SCHALL, Circuit Judge, ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge, and BRYSON, Circuit 

Judge. 

SCHALL, Circuit Judge. 

Novo Nordisk Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Novo Nordisk A/S (collectively, “Novo”) 

appeal from the final judgment of the United States District Court for the District of 

Delaware in their suit for patent infringement against Bio-Technology General Corp. and 

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. The district court held the two claims of Novo Nordisk 

A/S’s U.S. Patent No. 5,633,352 (“the '352 patent”) invalid by reason of anticipation 
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). The court also held the patent unenforceable due to

inequitable conduct. Novo Nordisk Pharms., Inc. v. Bio-Technology Gen. Corp., No. 

1:02-CV-00332-SLR (D. Del. Aug. 3, 2004) (“Opinion”). We affirm the judgment of 

invalidity with respect to claim 1 of the '352 patent, as well as the judgment that the 

patent is unenforceable. We vacate the judgment of invalidity with respect to claim 2 of 

the patent. 

BACKGROUND 

I. 

Novo Nordisk Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Novo Nordisk A/S are research-based 

pharmaceutical manufacturers. Novo Nordisk A/S is the assignee of the '352 patent, 

which is entitled “Biosynthetic Human Growth Hormone.” The '352 patent is directed to 

a process for producing “ripe” human growth hormone (“hGH”) protein in E.Coli bacteria 

through the use of recombinant DNA techniques. Novo Nordisk Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

is the U.S. healthcare affiliate of Novo Nordisk A/S. 

The hGH protein has a specific sequence of 191 amino acids and is secreted by

the anterior pituitary gland. The protein, which plays a central role in cell growth and 

metabolism, is therapeutically useful to treat, among other conditions, growth hormone 

deficiencies and infertility. It also is useful in wound care. Until the mid-1980’s, hGH for 

therapeutic purposes could be obtained only from the pituitary gland of a human 

cadaver (known as “pituitary-derived hGH”). However, the use of pituitary-derived hGH 

carried a high risk of contamination and infection for the patient. 

Prior to the '352 patent, numerous attempts were made to produce biosynthetic

hGH that would function in vivo in the same manner as pituitary-derived hGH. One 

04-1581 2
such attempt, set forth in U.S. Patent No. 4,342,832, resulted in hGH protein with 192 

amino acids, instead of the 191 amino acids found in pituitary-derived hGH. '352 patent

col. 1, ll. 20-25. The additional amino acid residue, methionine, resulted in a hGH

protein variant that does not function in the same way in vivo as pituitary-derived hGH.

Accordingly, there was a need for a method to produce “pure” hGH, or hGH containing 

the 191 amino acid sequence identical to that of pituitary-derived hGH. 

II. 

As noted, the '352 patent discloses the production of ripe hGH protein via 

recombinant DNA techniques. Recombinant DNA techniques make it possible to 

transfer DNA segments (genes) that code for a human protein to bacteria, such as E. 

coli, for the purpose of protein synthesis. 

Bacteria such as E. coli normally will not recognize a human gene sequence and, 

thus, will not synthesize the corresponding human protein. However, transferring the 

gene sequence for a “fusion protein”1

 into E. coli, in effect, “tricks” the bacteria into 

synthesizing the human protein. The gene sequence for the fusion protein contains, in 

a side-by-side relationship: (1) the gene sequence for a bacterial protein and (2) the 

gene sequence for a human protein, such as hGH. The E. coli recognizes the portion of

the gene sequence that encodes the bacterial protein and, as a result, synthesizes the 

entire fusion protein. The fusion protein is made up of: (1) the amino acid sequence for 

the bacterial protein and (2) the amino acid sequence for the human protein. In order to 

isolate the desired human protein, the bacterial amino acid sequence, or “prosequence,” must be removed from the fusion protein. This process can be 

04-1581 3
accomplished through the use of a proteolytic enzyme.2

 The proteolytic enzyme 

cleaves the bond between the pro-sequence and the amino acid sequence for the 

human protein. 

The '352 patent discloses a process whereby a proteolytic enzyme, preferably 

the enzyme dipeptidyl aminopeptidase I (DAP I), cleaves a pre-hGH fusion protein in 

order to produce “ripe” hGH protein. '352 patent col. 1, l. 56 – col. 2, l. 2. First, the 

gene sequence for the hGH protein is combined with the gene sequence for a bacterial 

protein. Id. col. 4, ll. 53-67. This DNA sequence is then introduced into E. coli. Id. col.

5, ll. 1-10. This results in a pre-hGH fusion protein being produced by the E. coli

bacteria. The resulting pre-hGH fusion protein is made up of: (1) the 191-amino-acid

sequence for the hGH protein; and (2) a variable amino acid sequence with an even 

number of amino acids that is formulated to take advantage of the cleavage specificity

of DAP I. When DAP I is then added, it works to cleave, or cut, the fusion protein at the 

junction of the two amino acid sequences described above. Id. col. 5, ll. 24-25. This

results in “ripe” hGH protein, or hGH protein containing the correct 191 amino acid 

sequence. 

III. 

The '352 patent traces priority back through a series of continuation applications

to Application Ser. No. 640,081, filed on December 9, 1983, as PCT Application

PCT/DK83/001118 (“the 1983 PCT application”). The 1983 PCT application, in turn, 

(Cont’d. . . .) 

1 A “fusion protein” is coded for by genes that have been combined together 

in vitro from two or more sources. 

04-1581 4
traces priority back to a 1982 Danish patent application filed on December 10, 1982. 

The 1983 PCT application was directed to “A Process for Preparing Ripe Proteins from 

Fusion Proteins, Synthesized in Pro- or Eukaryotic Cells.” Unlike the '352 patent, which 

discloses the use of the proteolytic enzyme DAP I, the 1983 PCT application discloses

leucine aminopeptidase (LAP) as the preferred cleavage enzyme to produce ripe hGH 

protein from a pre-hGH fusion protein.

On November 12, 1992, Novo filed U.S. Application No. 07/959,856 (“the '856 

application”), directed to “A Process for Preparing a Desired Protein.” The '856 

application discloses a process for producing hGH protein from a fusion protein using

the DAP I enzyme. The '856 application was the first in a series of applications that 

claimed a priority date of December 10, 1982, based on the 1983 PCT application. The 

final application in the chain was U.S. Application Ser. No. 402,286 (“the ''286 

application”), filed on March 10, 1995. The '352 patent issued from the '286 application 

on May 27, 1997. 

The '352 patent has two claims: 

1. Biosynthetic ripe human growth hormone free of contaminants 

from pituitary derived human growth hormone. 

2. Biosynthetic ripe human growth hormone produced by

expressing an amino terminal extended human growth hormone 

fusion protein in a microorganism capable of such expression,

enzymatically cleaving the amino terminal extension and recovering 

the biosynthetically produced ripe human growth hormone. 

(Cont’d. . . .) 

2 Proteolytic enzymes are unique proteins that catalyze the cleavage of 

peptide bonds (the bonds linking the chains of amino acids that make up proteins). 

Many proteolytic enzymes exhibit specificity with respect to the bonds that they cleave. 

04-1581 5
IV. 

On July 7, 2000, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) of the 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) declared an interference involving 

Novo’s '352 patent and Bio-Technology General Corp.’s3

 U.S. Application Ser. No.

09/023,248 (“the '248 application”). Blumberg v. Dalbøge, Interference No. 104,422 

(Bd. Pat. App. Int. Mar. 12, 2002) (“Board Decision”). The '248 application is directed to 

a biosynthetic hGH protein produced via recombinant DNA techniques. In declaring the

interference, the Board accorded the '352 patent the benefit of priority of the August 8, 

1984 filing date of U.S. Patent Application Ser. No. 06/640,081 (“the '081 application”).4

 

In due course, Novo filed a preliminary motion in the interference seeking the 

benefit, for purposes of priority, of the filing date of the 1983 PCT application. Board

Opinion, slip op. at 9. Bio-Technology General Corp., in turn, moved to deny Novo the 

benefit of the filing date of the 1983 PCT application, as well as the benefit of the filing

date of the '081 application. It argued that DAP I was not disclosed in the 1983 PCT

application, and that the LAP enzyme that was disclosed in the application was not 

effective to produce ripe hGH protein. Board Decision, slip op. at 11. 

On March 12, 2002, the Board issued its final decision, awarding priority to Novo. 

The Board noted that during prosecution of its applications resulting in the '352 patent, 

Novo had made contradictory statements regarding whether the 1983 PCT application 

enabled the production of ripe hGH protein. However, the Board concluded: “[W]e do 

not find the evidence relied upon by [Bio-Technology General Corp.] . . . to establish

 3 Bio-Technology General Corp. develops, manufactures, and markets 

biopharmaceutical products. 

04-1581 6
that pure LAP would not work to produce ripe hGH in the methods described in the '081 

and [1983] PCT applications to be convincing.” Board Decision, slip op. at 33. 

On April 1, 2002, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 146, Bio-Technology General Corp.

appealed the final decision of the Board to the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware. The district court eventually reversed the Board’s decision 

awarding Novo priority with respect to the invention claimed in the '352 patent. BioTechnology Gen. Corp. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, No. 02-235-SLR, slip op. at 59 (D. Del. 

Aug. 3, 2004) (“Priority Decision”). In doing so, the court ruled that the 1983 PCT

application was not enabled because one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been 

able to produce ripe hGH protein at the time the application was filed using the

information disclosed in the application. Id. at 49. The court based this determination,

in part, on a finding that Novo itself had been unable to synthesize ripe hGH protein 

using the disclosure of the 1983 PCT application. Id. at 56. The court remanded the 

case to the Board for consideration of two preliminary motions by Novo that the Board 

had dismissed as moot.5 

V. 

On April 30, 2002, Novo filed a complaint in the District of Delaware against BioTechnology General Corp. and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (collectively, “BioTechnology”) for infringement of the '352 patent and for injunctive relief to prevent the 

(Cont’d. . . .) 

4 The '081 application is the U.S. counterpart of the 1983 PCT application. 

As far as this appeal is concerned, it is identical in substance to that application. 

5 As of the time of this appeal, remand proceedings before the Board still 

are pending. 

04-1581 7
sale of Tev-Tropin®, a recombinant hGH protein product.6

 On June 7, 2002, the district

court issued a preliminary injunction, which was vacated by this court on November 26,

2002. Novo Nordisk A/S v. Bio-Technology Gen. Corp., No. 02-1447, 52 Fed. Appx.

142 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 26, 2002). On June 12, 2002, Bio-Technology filed its answer to the 

complaint and asserted a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that the '352 patent is

invalid and unenforceable. 

Prior to trial, Bio-Technology admitted infringement of claim 1 of the '352 patent. 

Opinion, slip op. at 5. Thereafter, from August 4, 2003, to August 8, 2003, the district 

court construed the claims of the '352 patent and held a bench trial on the issues of: (1)

invalidity of claim 1 of the '352 patent by reason of anticipation; and (2) unenforceability 

of the '352 patent due to inequitable conduct. 

Following the trial, the district court found that claim 1 of the '352 patent was 

anticipated by a December 1981 article by George N. Pavlakis, published in the journal 

Biochemistry and entitled “Expression of two human growth hormone genes in monkey

cells infected by simian virus 40 recombinants” (“the 1981 Pavlakis article”). Opinion, 

slip op. at 80. Based upon that finding, the court ruled claims 1 and 2 invalid under 35

U.S.C. § 102(a). Id. In addition, the court held that the '352 patent was unenforceable 

based on inequitable conduct during prosecution of the '856 application and during the 

interference proceeding before the Board. Id. 

 6 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. develops, manufactures and markets 

generic pharmaceutical products. It has entered into an agreement with BioTechnology General Corp. to market and sell Bio-Technology General Corp.’s 

biosynthetic hGH protein in the United States under the name Tev-Tropin®. 

04-1581 8
Novo now appeals the district court’s decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

35 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

DISCUSSION 

I. 

We review a district court’s decision following a bench trial for errors of law and 

clearly erroneous findings of fact. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 

1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 

1336, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when, ‘although 

there is evidence to support [the finding], the reviewing court on the entire evidence is

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Tegal 

Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting 

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). However, 

“[w]here the record viewed in its entirety renders the district court’s account of the 

evidence plausible or discloses two permissible readings of the evidence, the fact-finder

has committed no clear error.” King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 943 

(Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 

On appeal, Novo challenges the district court’s rulings with respect to both 

validity and inequitable conduct. We address its contentions in turn, starting with the 

validity issue. 

II. 

A. 

As noted above, the district court ruled that the '352 patent was invalid by reason 

of anticipation based upon the 1981 Pavlakis article. In the article, Pavlakis describes a 

04-1581 9
method of producing hGH protein with monkey kidney cells using what is known as the 

secretion approach.7

 The article discusses using the secretion approach with two 

different hGH genes, identified as hGH1 and hGH2. The hGH1 gene encodes for the 

191 amino acid sequence of pituitary-derived hGH. The hGH2 gene is a variant of the 

hGH1 gene, containing fourteen amino acid substitutions. The article describes a 

variety of tests performed on the two resulting proteins, using (1) gel electrophoresis; (2)

isoelectric focusing and nonequilibrium pH gradient electrophoretic gels; and (3) cell 

surface receptor binding studies involving IM-9 culture human lymphocytes and 

pregnant rabbit liver membranes.8

 Based on these tests, Pavlakis comes to the 

conclusion that the “hGH1 protein, as predicted from the DNA sequence, appears

identical in all respects to the major form of pituitary hGH. In contrast, the hGH2 protein 

differs from authentic hGH both in its behavior on isoelectric focusing gels and in its low 

immunoreactivity, yet it binds to hGH receptors quite efficiently.” 

In its anticipation analysis, the district court construed the term “ripe” hGH in 

claim 1 of the '352 patent to mean “a protein produced by recombinant DNA techniques

composed of a 191 amino acid sequence identical to that of hGH produced by the 

human pituitary gland with the full biological activity of hGH produced by the human 

pituitary gland, and free of the contaminants present in hGH produced by the human 

 7 The secretion approach, based on recombinant DNA techniques, involves

the steps of transforming a host organism (such as a monkey kidney cell) to express a 

pre-protein consisting of the desired protein and a “leader” or “signal” sequence. The 

leader sequence causes the pre-protein to be transported across the cell membrane. In 

the process of transport across the cell membrane, a specialized enzyme clips off the 

leader sequence. As a result, the desired protein is secreted from the cell of the host 

organism. 

8 An understanding of the details of these tests is not necessary for 

purposes of this appeal. 

04-1581 10
pituitary gland.” Opinion, slip op. at 45. The court determined that the 1981 Pavlakis 

article discloses each limitation of claim 1 of the '352 patent. Id. at 64. The court 

stated: 

First, the Pavlakis article describes a method to produce 

hGH . . . using . . . recombinant DNA techniques. Second, 

the Pavlakis 1981 article specifically discusses experimental 

tests used to characterize the hGH product. Gel 

electrophoresis, isoelectric focusing, and nonequilibrium pH 

gradient electrophoresis analyses all revealed that the hGH 

product was indistinguishable from pituitary-derived 

hGH. . . . This collective data establishes that the hGH 

product necessarily must be composed of the same 191 

amino acid residues as the pituitary-derived hGH. Third, the 

Pavlakis 1981 article discloses through receptor binding 

assay data that the hGH1 product exhibited the same 

receptor binding affinity as pituitary-derived hGH in both the 

human lymphocyte line IM-9 and the pregnant rabbit liver

membranes. From this, the court concludes that the hGH1 

product has the full biological activity of hGH produced by

the human pituitary gland. Finally, the aforementioned data 

inherently establishes that the hGH product is free of

contaminants present in hGH produced by the human 

pituitary gland. Accordingly, the court concludes that the 

1981 Pavlakis article clearly and convincingly discloses all of

the limitations of claim 1 of the '352 patent. 

Id. at 64-65. The court also determined that the Pavlakis article was enabled. Id. 

B. 

On appeal, Novo argues that the 1981 Pavlakis article cannot anticipate claim 1 

of the '352 patent because the article does not disclose the second and third limitations 

of the claim (a protein that is composed of a 191-amino acid sequence identical to that 

of pituitary-derived hGH and that has the full biological activity of pituitary-derived hGH). 

Novo argues that the test results disclosed in the article do not demonstrate 

conclusively that the hGH1 protein discussed is identical in these respects to pituitaryderived hGH. 

04-1581 11
Novo also argues that the district court committed reversible error when it stated 

that “[p]rior art references are presumed to be enabling,” Opinion, slip op. at 66, given 

that the 1981 Pavlakis article is a non-patent publication. Novo acknowledges our 

decision in Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir.

2003), in which we held that “a presumption arises that both the claimed and unclaimed 

disclosures in a prior art patent are enabled,” but in which we did not decide whether the 

presumption applies to non-patent publications. See id. at 1355 n.22 (“We note that by

logical extension, our reasoning here might also apply to prior art printed publications as

well, but as Sugimoto is a patent we need not and do not so decide today.”). Novo 

argues that, in the case of a non-patent prior art reference, however, the burden of

proving enablement of the prior art reference by clear and convincing evidence should 

remain on an alleged infringer. 

Bio-Technology responds that the district court correctly determined that the 

1981 Pavlakis article discloses each limitation of claim 1. Bio-Technology also argues 

that the district court correctly held that the 1981 Pavlakis article is presumed to be 

enabled. Lastly, Bio-Technology urges that even if the article is not presumptively

enabled, the district court held on separate grounds that it enabled the subject matter of 

claim 1. 

C. 

A patent claim is invalid by reason of anticipation if “the invention was known or

used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or

a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent . . . .” 35 

U.S.C. § 102(a). Anticipation based on a printed publication under section 102(a)

04-1581 12
requires the presence in the publication of each and every limitation of the claimed 

invention. Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. 

Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). However, “a prior art reference may anticipate without 

disclosing a feature of the claimed invention if that missing feature is necessarily 

present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.” SmithKline Beecham, 403 

F.3d at 1343 (quoting Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 

(Fed. Cir. 2003)). “What a prior art reference discloses in an anticipation analysis is a 

factual determination that we review under the clearly erroneous standard.” Tegal 

Corp., 257 F.3d at 1345-46 (citing In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 

In order to anticipate, a prior art disclosure must also be enabling, such that one 

of ordinary skill in the art could practice the invention without undue experimentation.

SmithKline Beecham, 403 F.3d at 1342. The standard for enablement of a prior art 

reference for purposes of anticipation under section 102 differs from the enablement

standard under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 

1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). While section 112 “provides that the 

specification must enable one skilled in the art to ‘use’ the invention,” id. (quoting In re 

Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (CCPA 1969)), “section 102 makes no such requirement 

as to an anticipatory disclosure,” id. Significantly, we have stated that “anticipation does 

not require actual performance of suggestions in a disclosure. Rather, anticipation only

requires that those suggestions be enabled to one of skill in the art.” Bristol-Myers 

Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing In re 

Donhue, 766 F.2d 531, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“It is not, however, necessary that an

invention disclosed in a publication shall have actually been made in order to satisfy the 

04-1581 13
enablement requirement.”)). “Whether a prior art reference is enabling is a question of

law based upon underlying factual findings.” SmithKline Beecham, 403 F.3d at 1342-43 

(citation omitted). 

D. 

We see no error in the district court’s finding that the 1981 Pavlakis article 

discloses the second and third limitations of claim 1 of the '352 patent. These 

limitations require that the hGH protein be composed of a 191-amino acid sequence 

identical to that of pituitary-derived hGH and that the protein have the full biological 

activity of pituitary-derived hGH. In that regard, the article states that “[t]he hGH1 

protein, as predicted from the DNA sequence, appears identical in all respects to the 

major form of pituitary hGH.” (emphasis added). Further, the article discusses 

experimental tests used to characterize the hGH product. These tests were designed in 

order to determine whether the hGH1 protein had the same amino acid sequence and 

biological activity as pituitary-derived hGH. The article’s discussion of the tests provides

strong support for the district court’s conclusion that the 1981 Pavlakis article discloses

the subject matter of claim 1. Gel electrophoresis tests reported in the article 

demonstrated that the hGH1 protein co-migrated with pituitary-derived hGH on the gel 

and that hGH1 thus was of the same overall size as pituitary-derived hGH. At the same 

time, the results from tests using isoelectric focusing and nonequilibrium pH gradient

electrophoresis gels showed that the hGH1 protein co-migrated with pituitary-derived 

hGH on a pH gradient and that it thus had the same charge as pituitary-derived hGH. 

Finally, the results of radioreceptor assays with both the human lymphocyte IM-9 line

and pregnant rabbit liver membranes showed that hGH1 was indistinguishable from 

04-1581 14
pituitary-derived hGH, indicating that hGH1 had an identical ability to bind to cell surface 

receptors. Thus, the test results disclosed in the Pavlakis article indicated that the 

hGH1 protein had the same structure and chemical properties as pituitary-derived hGH.

In other words, the test results indicated that the hGH1 protein contained the same 191 

amino acid sequence and biological activity as pituitary-derived hGH. Accordingly, we 

hold that the article discloses a ripe hGH protein. 

As far as enablement is concerned, in our view, a fair reading of the district 

court’s opinion is that the court did not rely solely on the Amgen presumption in finding

that the 1981 Pavlakis article was enabled. See Koito Mfg. v. Turn Key Tech., 381 F.3d 

1142, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“At trial, [the declaratory judgment plaintiff (potential

infringer)] . . . failed to provide any testimony or other evidence that would demonstrate 

. . . how that reference [JP '082, a Japanese unexamined application] met the limitations 

of the claim in the '268 patent or how the reference enabled one of ordinary skill in the

art to practice the claimed invention.”). In that regard, the court determined that BioTechnology affirmatively established enablement of the 1981 Pavlakis article. The court

stated: 

Moreover, the Pavlakis 1981 article offers particular 

materials and methodology to produce hGH. The court has 

no reason to doubt that this information will not lead to the 

successful production of hGH. Indeed, Dr. Pavlakis actually 

made the subject matter of claim 1 using the disclosed 

materials and methodology set forth in the Pavlakis 1981 

article. 

Opinion, slip op. at 67-68. 

The critical inquiry is whether the 1981 Pavlakis article discloses in an enabling 

manner the production of ripe hGH. See SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1344 (“Thus, whether

04-1581 15
it was actually possible to make pure PCH anhydrate before the critical date of the '723 

patent is irrelevant. The '196 patent suffices as an anticipatory prior art reference if it

discloses in an enabling manner the production of PHC hemihydrate.”); see also

Rasmusson, 413 F.3d at 1326; Bristol-Myers Squibb, 246 F.3d at 1379; In re Donhue, 

766 F.2d at 533. The 1981 Pavlakis article discloses the production of ripe hGH protein 

in an enabling manner because it discusses particular materials and a particular 

methodology (the secretion approach) to produce the hGH protein. In other words, the 

article relies on standard recombinant DNA techniques that would have been 

understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of its publication. We see no 

reason to disturb the district court’s conclusion that the 1981 Pavlakis article is 

sufficiently enabling to serve as an anticipating reference. We therefore affirm the 

district court’s ruling that claim 1 of the '352 patent is anticipated by the 1981 Pavlakis

article.9

The district court’s order, dated August 3, 2004, states that “[the '352 patent] is 

invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102.” However, as Novo points out, the validity of claim 2 was 

not litigated at trial. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the district court’s order 

relating to claim 2 of the '352 patent. 

 9 Because we affirm the district court’s ruling that claim 1 of the '352 patent

is invalid as anticipated by the 1981 Pavlakis article, we need not address BioTechnology’s alternative arguments that the district court erred in construing claim 1,

and that under Bio-Technology’s proposed construction, U.S. Patent No. 4,775,622 to 

Hitzeman would anticipate claim 1. 

04-1581 16
III. 

A. 

We turn next to Novo’s argument that the district court erred in holding the '352 

patent unenforceable due to inequitable conduct during prosecution of the '856

application and during the interference proceedings before the Board. The following 

additional facts relating to prosecution of the '856 application are relevant to the 

inequitable conduct issue: 

As noted above, the '352 patent claims priority based on the 1983 PCT

application. The 1983 PCT application, in turn, claims priority to the Danish Patent

application filed on December 10, 1982. 

The 1983 PCT application discloses the use of the LAP enzyme to produce ripe 

hGH from a pre-hGH fusion protein. Example 1 of the application describes the 

production, purification, and evaluation of a fusion protein. It also describes treatment 

of the fusion protein with the LAP enzyme in order to obtain ripe hGH. Finally, Example

1 states that standard tests indicated that the disclosed methodology produced ripe 

hGH protein that was 98% pure. Speaking in the past tense, the example states that

“[t]he fusion product was purified from this extract,” 1983 PCT application at 10 

(emphasis added), that “[t]he purified fusion protein was evaluated to be more than 98%

pure,” id. (emphasis added), and that “[t]his . . . product was then treated with leucine 

aminopeptidase,” id. (emphasis added). 

The district court found, however, and it is undisputed, that when the 1983 PCT

application was filed on December 10, 1983, the inventors had not successfully

prepared hGH with LAP using recombinant DNA technology. Priority Decision, slip op. 

04-1581 17
at 20. For five months after the 1983 PCT application was filed, Novo’s scientists 

attempted unsuccessfully to use LAP enzyme to synthesize hGH. Finally, on March 7, 

1984, Novo successfully synthesized hGH using commercial LAP purchased from a 

company called Sigma. Id. at 21. However, unbeknownst to Novo at the time, the 

particular batch of LAP contained the DAP I enzyme. Id. at 22. At a meeting on 

October 18, 1984, Novo scientists concluded that “the active component in Sigma LAP 

presumably is not LAP but a ‘contaminating’ substance.” Id. at 23. The discovery that 

this “contaminating” substance was DAP I led to the filing, on February 6, 1986, of 

PCT/DK86/00014 (“the 1986 PCT application”). The 1986 PCT application, entitled “A 

Process for Producing Human Growth Hormone,” disclosed a process for producing 

hGH from a fusion protein using the DAP I enzyme. Id. 

On October 3, 1986, Novo filed U.S. Patent Application Ser. No. 06/910,230 (“the 

'230 application”), entitled “Process for Producing Human Growth Hormone.” Priority 

Decision, slip op. at 24. The '230 application did not claim priority to the 1983 PCT

application, but instead claimed priority to the 1986 PCT application. During 

prosecution of the '230 application, the originally filed claims were rejected under 35 

U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over U.S. Patent No. 4,532,207 to Brewer10 in view of U.S.

Patent No. 4,543,329 to Daum.11 On April 11, 1990, in a response to a final rejection, 

 10 The application that resulted in the Brewer '207 patent was filed on March 

3, 1983. Its European counterpart was published on September 28, 1983. The 

examiner read the Brewer patent as disclosing a method of producing a protein using a 

sequence of charged amino acids and a cleavage enzyme. 

11 The application that resulted in the Daum '329 patent was filed on July 6,

1982, claiming priority to an application filed on May 29, 1980. The Daum patent

discloses the use of LAP enzyme to cleave a fusion protein. '329 patent col. 9, ll. 60-62. 

04-1581 18
Novo argued that the Daum patent was distinguishable from the invention in the '230 

application. Novo stated: 

Daum mentions . . . that with LAP it is possible to

“split off N-terminal methionine from foreign proteins[.]” 

Although applicants have tested LAP with bacterially

produced HGH, LAP has been shown not to be effective. 

The effectiveness of LAP seems to disappear as soon as

peptides greater than about 50 amino acids are involved. 

(emphasis in original). 

In addition, on September 12, 1990, Novo filed a declaration on behalf of Jorli 

Ringsted, John Pendersen, and Thorkild Christensen, all of whom are named inventors

on the '352 patent (the “1990 declaration”). The 1990 declaration described the ability

of the LAP enzyme to remove a pro-sequence from a fusion protein to produce hGH.

After describing an experiment in which the scientists compared LAP preparations from

several different suppliers, the inventors stated: 

It is shown that essentially only LAP-preparations from 

Sigma contain enzymatic activity able to convert Ala-GluhGH to mature hGH. LAP-preparations from Merck, Serva, 

and Worthington did not contain such enzymatic activity at 

all. It is thus likely that an enzymatic activity different from

LAP-activity is contained in the Sigma preparations . . . , 

which can convert Ala-Glu-hGH to mature hGH. 

The Novo scientists went on to conclude: 

The experiments show clearly that a pure LAP-preparation 

will not convert amino extended hGH to mature hGH. Only

LAP-preparations with relevant impurities will have some 

effect depending upon the nature and amount of the impurity

and of course this can lead to misunderstanding about the 

effect of LAP. 

04-1581 19
Thus, during prosecution of the '230 application, Novo sought to overcome the prior art 

rejection based upon Daum by arguing that the LAP enzyme disclosed in Daum was not 

effective in the production of hGH protein. 

Unable to overcome the examiner’s rejections under section 103, Novo 

eventually abandoned the '230 application. Over the next several years, Novo filed a 

number of U.S. applications describing the use of the DAP I enzyme to produce ripe 

hGH and claiming priority to the 1986 PCT application. Then, on November 12, 1992,

Novo filed the '856 application, directed to “A Process for Preparing a Desired Protein.” 

As seen above, the '856 application disclosed a process for producing hGH from a 

fusion protein using the DAP I enzyme. In a preliminary amendment, filed on October

13, 1992, Novo amended the specification of the '856 application to indicate that the 

application was entitled to a priority date of December 10, 1982, based upon the 1983

PCT application claiming priority back to the 1982 Danish application. Novo specifically

pointed out that the December 10, 1982 priority date of the 1983 PCT application—

based upon that application’s claim of priority to the priority date of the 1982 Danish

patent application—preceded the 1983 priority date of the Brewer patent. 

The examiner did not immediately accept the new priority claim, and on 

September 22, 1993, rejected the two pending claims as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 

in view of several references, including the Brewer patent. On January 7, 1994, the 

examiner held a personal interview with Cheryl Agris, a Novo in-house patent attorney, 

Poul Eisten Petterson, a Novo in-house patent advisor, and Thorkild Christensen and 

Henrik Dalbøge, two of the named inventors on the '856 application. The examiner’s

interview-summary record indicates that the Brewer patent was one of the prior art 

04-1581 20
items that was discussed at the conference and states in relevant part: “The priority 

date should be 1982. [Cheryl Agris] will point out where in priority documents the 

enablement is present.” 

Novo followed up the interview with an amendment, on January 20, 1994, which 

addressed the issue of whether the 1983 PCT application was enabled. The issue of

whether the 1983 PCT application was enabled was critical to the prosecution because,

if the application was not enabled, Novo would not be able to rely upon the application’s

priority date to overcome the Brewer patent. Novo pointed to the 1983 PCT application 

as providing “the general concept of adding an amino-terminal extension with an

aminopeptidase, and isolation of mature hGH.” Novo also pointed to Example 1 of the 

1983 PCT application as being “specifically directed to hGH.” Novo was ultimately able 

to claim priority to the 1983 PCT application. Upon allowance, the examiner stated: 

[T]he amendment of abandoned files to recite additional 

parent history places the effective filing date of the instant

invention to December 9, 1983, and foreign priority to 

December 10, 1982. Therefore, the Brewer et al. reference, 

published September 28, 1983, does not appear to be prior 

art against the invention. 

As seen, the '352 patent issued on May 27, 1997 from the '286 application, the final 

application in the chain of applications that resulted in the patent. 

B. 

Inequitable conduct occurs when a patent applicant breaches his or her “duty of 

candor and good faith” to the PTO. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2004); Bruno Indep. Living

Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

Inequitable conduct includes “affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, failure to 

disclose material information, or submission of false material information, coupled with 

04-1581 21
an intent to deceive.” CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUp Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1340 (Fed. Cir.

2003) (quoting Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 

Materiality and intent must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Once 

materiality and intent have been established, the district court must weigh these factors 

in light of all of the circumstances to determine whether a finding that inequitable 

conduct occurred is warranted. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 

1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 

237 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). We have stated that “when balanced against

high materiality, the showing of intent can be proportionally less.” Bristol-Myers Squibb

Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation 

omitted). 

We review the district court’s factual findings with respect to materiality and intent

for clear error. Perspective Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315,

1319 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). We review the ultimate determination of 

inequitable conduct, however, under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. (citations

omitted). Thus, we may reverse a district court’s decision on inequitable conduct only if 

the decision is based upon “clearly erroneous findings of fact or on a misapplication or 

misinterpretation of applicable law, or evidences a clear error of judgment on the part of 

the . . . court.” Elk Corp. of Dallas v. GAF Bldg. Materials Corp., 168 F.3d 28, 30 (Fed.

Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 

The district court based its finding of inequitable conduct with respect to 

prosecution of the '856 application on Novo’s failure to disclose to the PTO that

Example 1 of the 1983 PCT application had never actually been performed. Id. at 76. 

04-1581 22
Referring to Example 1 being worded in the past tense, the court found that “Novo did 

not alert the examiner that the cleavage and purification steps had not been performed 

or that the purity result was merely a prediction.” Id. The district court found the 

requirement of materiality satisfied because the examiner relied upon Example 1 in 

deciding whether the 1983 PCT application enabled the invention of the '856 application 

and thus was entitled to a priority date earlier than that of the Brewer patent. Id. 

Next, the court found the inequitable conduct intent requirement satisfied 

because “Novo, nine years after it first submitted Example 1 to the PTO, knew or should 

have known that the examiner would have considered the fact that Example 1 contained 

prophetic data important in evaluating whether the [’081 application, the U.S.

counterpart of the 1983 PCT application,] enabled the invention of the '856 application, 

particularly in light of the fact that Novo never successfully produced ripe hGH using the 

methodology described in Example 1.” Priority Decision, slip op. at 76. 

The district court found inequitable conduct with respect to the interference 

proceedings before the Board based again upon Novo’s failure to inform the Board that 

it was ultimately unable to produce ripe hGH using the methodology described in 

Example 1 of the 1983 PCT application. Priority Decision, slip op. at 79. First, the 

district court found the materiality element satisfied because the Board “looked to 

Example 1 and reviewed expert testimony related to . . . whether the steps described 

therein enabled one of ordinary skill in the art to produce ripe hGH.” Id. With respect to 

the intent element, the court noted that, before the Board, Novo presented extensive 

expert testimony from Dr. Villa-Romaroff about Example 1, knowing that Example 1 had

never been successfully performed. The court found that “Novo knew or should have 

04-1581 23
known that the Board would consider both Example 1 and Dr. Villa Romaroff’s expert 

opinion material to the question of enablement, particularly since this question was the 

sole focus of the interference.” Id. at 80. Moreover, the court found that following the 

interference proceeding, Novo failed to offer any explanation for its silence, merely 

asserting that “it was not required to provide the PTO with a running update of its efforts 

to make hGH.” Id. 

C. 

On appeal, Novo argues that the district court’s finding that Novo was unable to 

make ripe hGH according to the methodology of Example 1 is clearly erroneous.

Pointing to the experiment performed on March 7, 1984, during which Novo used

commercial grade LAP enzyme purchased from the Sigma company in order to produce 

ripe hGH, Novo asserts that it was able to produce ripe hGH according to the 

methodology of Example 1. Thus, Novo argues, because the methodology did work, 

there can be no culpable failure to say that it did not work. 

The district court did not commit clear error in determining that Novo was unable 

to make ripe hGH according to the methodology of Example 1. It is undisputed that on 

March 7, 1984, Novo unintentionally used LAP from the Sigma company which 

happened to be “contaminated” with DAP I. Priority Decision, slip op. at 56-57. 

Moreover, at oral argument, counsel for Novo conceded that Novo was never able to

produce ripe hGH through the use of “pure” LAP enzyme. Example 1 is directed to the 

production of ripe hGH through the use of LAP enzyme. We are not prepared to accept 

the proposition that simply because fate interceded and Novo scientists unintentionally 

04-1581 24
used LAP “contaminated” with DAP I, Novo produced ripe hGH according to the 

methodology of Example 1. 

Novo also assigns error to the district court’s finding that Novo acted with 

deceptive intent in failing to disclose the prophetic nature of Example 1 to the PTO or

the Board. According to Novo, the district court never made a finding that anyone had 

actual knowledge that Example 1 of the PCT application was prophetic and that Novo 

never successfully produced ripe hGH using the methodology described in Example 1. 

Specifically, Novo contends that there is no evidence that Dr. Christensen, the coinventor who wrote Example 1, subsequently learned that the drafting of a prophetic 

example in the past tense was not a good procedure at the PTO, or that he 

subsequently told any of Novo’s attorneys that Example 1 was prophetic.12 Thus, Novo

asserts, because it is impossible to disclose the unknown, the district court’s finding of 

inequitable conduct is reversible error under FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., Inc., 835 

F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that an “[a]pplicant must be chargeable with 

knowledge of the existence of the prior art or information, for it is impossible to disclose 

the unknown”). Novo also asserts that the district court’s finding of inequitable conduct

amounts to a finding of misconduct based on an imputation of gross negligence, 

contrary to our holding in Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 

F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“We adopt the view that a finding that particular conduct 

 12 The district court found that, at the time of filing the '081 application, Dr. 

Christensen did not intentionally breach his duty of candor and good faith. Rather, the 

court concluded “that Mr. Christensen’s use of past tense was merely an oversight on 

his part, likely due to the fact that Dr. Christensen is trained as a scientist, not as a 

patent attorney familiar with the teachings of the MPEP.” Priority Decision, slip op. at 

75. However, the district court did not extend this finding to actions taken by Dr. 

Christensen during prosecution of the '856 application and thereafter. 

04-1581 25
amounts to ‘gross negligence’ does not of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive;

the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of

good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive.”). 

Bio-Technology responds that Dr. Christensen was aware that Example 1 was

prophetic, and because “knowledge of the law is chargeable to the inventor,” and 

“inventors represented by counsel are presumed to know the law,” the district court’s 

inference of deceptive intent was not clearly erroneous. See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. 

Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 

We agree with Bio-Technology. It is undisputed that Dr. Christensen was aware 

that Example 1 was prophetic and that Novo never successfully produced ripe hGH 

through the use of “pure LAP” enzyme. It also is undisputed that, during prosecution of

the '856 application, Dr. Christensen was one of four Novo representatives present 

during the January 7, 1994 interview with the examiner, during which one of the issues

addressed was enablement of the 1983 PCT application, of which the ’081 application 

was the U.S. counterpart. As noted, other representatives included Novo’s in-house 

patent attorney and in-house patent advisor. Thus, Novo asks us to hold, on the one 

hand, that the failure of Dr. Christensen and his co-inventors to disclose the truth about

Example 1 to Novo’s attorneys absolves them of their duty to disclose this information to 

the PTO or the Board, because without their attorney’s consultation, they could not have

known that this information was material. At the same time, Novo asks us to hold that

its counsel’s failure to disclose the truth about Example 1 to the PTO or Board is 

excused because the inventors failed to fully inform them of the details surrounding 

Example 1. As we have done in similar situations in the past, we reject the “circular 

04-1581 26
logic” of this request. See Brasseler, 267 F.3d at 1380 (“We refuse to pursue the

circular logic of Brasseler’s request and decline to carve out an exception to the 

inequitable conduct law to shield those guilty of inequitable conduct from responsibility

for their actions.”); see also Molins, 48 F.3d at 1178 (stating that the knowledge and 

actions of an applicant’s representatives are chargeable to the applicant (citing FMC 

Corp., 835 F.2d at 1415 n.8)). Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that

Novo knew or should have known that the PTO and the Board would have considered 

the information relating to Example 1 important in evaluating whether the 1983 PCT 

application was enabled. 

Finally, Novo argues that the withheld information about Example 1 cannot be 

material as a matter of law because it was cumulative of what was already before the 

examiner, or because it is less relevant than information about the Example 1 

methodology that was disclosed. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 

F.3d 1559, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[E]ven where an applicant fails to disclose an 

otherwise material prior art reference, that failure will not support a finding of inequitable 

conduct if the reference is ‘simply cumulative to other references,’ i.e., if the reference 

teaches no more than what a reasonable examiner would consider to be taught by the 

prior art already before the PTO.”) (citing Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v.

Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“A reference that is simply

cumulative to other references does not meet the threshold of materiality that is 

predicate to a holding of inequitable conduct.”) (citation omitted)). 

In making this argument, Novo points to the 1990 declaration, which it describes

as showing that pure LAP enzyme did not work, while commercial LAP from Sigma did 

04-1581 27
work. However, the withheld information concerning Example 1 was not merely

cumulative of information already before the examiner; nor was the withheld information 

less relevant than information already before the examiner. First, the testing conditions

in Example 1 of the 1983 PCT application differ from the testing conditions used in the 

examples in the 1990 declaration. The 1990 declaration does not indicate that pure 

LAP enzyme is not effective to produce ripe hGH under the methodology and testing

conditions of Example 1 of the 1983 PCT application. In addition, an inventor’s failed 

attempts to practice an invention are relevant evidence of non-enablement. See AK 

Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244-45 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[G]iven the 

specification’s teaching away from the subject matter that was eventually claimed and 

AK Steel’s own failures to make and use the later claimed invention at the time of the 

application, the district court correctly concluded that there was no genuine issue of 

material fact relating to undue experimentation as it relates to enablement.”); Enzo

Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The court noted 

that the record is replete with the inventor’s own failed attempts to control the

expression of other genes in prokaryotes or eukaryotes using antisense technology.”). 

We see no error in the district court’s finding that the withheld information concerning

Example 1 was material. We therefore affirm the district court’s ruling that the '352 

patent is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. 

CONCLUSION 

In sum, we affirm the district court’s holding that claim 1 of the '352 patent is

invalid based on anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), as well as its holding that the 

'352 patent is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. However, we vacate the 

04-1581 28
court’s ruling that claim 2 of the '352 patent is invalid based on anticipation under 35 

U.S.C. § 102(a). 

COSTS 

Each party shall bear its own costs. 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART and VACATED-IN-PART

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