EXPLOSIVES DETECTION

CANINES

TSA Has Taken Steps to 

Analyze Canine Team Data 

and Assess the 

Effectiveness of Passenger 

Screening Canines

Statement of Jennifer Grover, Acting Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on 

Transportation Security, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. ET

Tuesday, June 24, 2014

GAO-14-695T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-695T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security, Committee on Homeland Security, 

House of Representatives

June 24, 2014

EXPLOSIVES DETECTION CANINES

TSA Has Taken Steps to Analyze Canine Team Data 

and Assess the Effectiveness of Passenger 

Screening Canines

Why GAO Did This Study

TSA has implemented a multilayered 

system composed of people, 

processes, and technology to protect 

the nation’s transportation system. One 

of TSA’s security layers is NEDCTP, 

composed of over 800 deployed 

explosives detection canine teams, 

including PSC teams trained to detect 

explosives on passengers.

This testimony addresses the extent to 

which TSA has (1) regularly analyzed 

data to identify program trends and 

areas working well or in need of 

corrective action, and (2) 

comprehensively assessed the 

effectiveness of PSCs, and 

coordinated with stakeholders to 

deploy PSC teams to the highest-risk 

airports and utilize them as intended. 

This statement is based on a report 

GAO issued in January 2013 and 

selected updates obtained from 

October 2013 through June 2014. For 

the selected updates, GAO reviewed 

TSA documentation, including the 

results of PSC effectiveness 

assessments, and interviewed agency 

officials on the status of implementing 

GAO’s recommendations.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making no new 

recommendations in this statement.

What GAO Found

In January 2013, GAO reported that the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) collected and used key canine program data in support of its National 

Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP), but could better analyze 

these data to identify program trends. For example, GAO found that in reviewing 

short notice assessments (covert tests), TSA did not analyze the results beyond 

the pass and fail rates. Therefore, TSA was missing an opportunity to determine 

if there were any search areas or types of explosives in which canine teams were 

more effective compared with others, and what, if any, training may be needed to 

mitigate deficiencies. GAO recommended that TSA regularly analyze available 

data to identify program trends and areas that are working well and those in need 

of corrective action to guide program resources and activities. TSA concurred 

and has taken actions that address the intent of our recommendation. For 

example, in the event a team fails a short notice assessment, TSA now requires 

that canine team supervisors complete an analysis of the team’s training records 

to identify an explanation for the failure.

In January 2013, GAO found that TSA began deploying passenger screening 

canine (PSC) teams—teams of canines trained to detect explosives being carried 

or worn on a person—in April 2011 prior to determining the teams’ operational 

effectiveness and where within an airport PSC teams would be most effectively 

utilized. GAO recommended that TSA expand and complete testing to assess the 

effectiveness of PSCs and conventional canines (trained to detect explosives in 

stationary objects) in all airport areas deemed appropriate prior to making 

additional PSC deployments. This would help (1) determine whether PSCs are 

effective at screening passengers, and resource expenditures for PSC training 

are warranted, and (2) inform decisions regarding the type of canine team to 

deploy and where to optimally deploy such teams. TSA concurred and has taken 

steps to address the recommendation, but additional action is needed.

Specifically, TSA launched a PSC training and assessment initiative and 

determined PSCs to be most effective when working at the airport checkpoint, 

but TSA does not plan to conduct a comparison of PSC teams with conventional 

canine teams as GAO recommended. In January 2013, GAO also found that 

TSA’s 2012 Strategic Framework calls for the deployment of PSC teams based 

on risk; however, airport stakeholder concerns related to the composition and 

capabilities of PSC teams resulted in the teams not being deployed to the 

highest-risk airports. GAO recommended that if PSCs are determined to provide 

an enhanced security benefit compared with conventional canine teams, TSA 

should coordinate with airport stakeholders to deploy future PSC teams to the 

highest-risk airports. TSA concurred and has taken steps to address the 

recommendation. Specifically, the PSC teams for which TSA had funding and not 

already deployed to a specific airport at the time GAO’s report was issued have 

been deployed to, or allocated to, the highest-risk airports. 

View videos of GAO’s June 2012 observation 

of PSC teams. Part 1, Part 2. 

View GAO-14-695T. For more information, 

contact Jennifer Grover at (202) 512-7141 or 

GroverJ@gao.gov.
 

Page 1 GAO-14-695T 

Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our work on the Transportation 

Security Administration’s (TSA) National Explosives Detection Canine 

Team Program (NEDCTP). Within the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), TSA is the primary federal agency responsible for security of the 

nation’s transportation system. Since the terrorist attacks of September 

11, 2001, TSA has implemented a multilayered system of security 

composed of people, processes, and technology to protect the 

transportation system. One of TSA’s security layers is NEDCTP, 

composed of over 800 explosives detection canine teams—a canine 

paired with a handler—aimed at deterring and detecting the use of 

explosive devices in the U.S. transportation system.1

Through NEDCTP, TSA trains, deploys, and certifies explosives detection 

canine teams. The program began under the Federal Aviation 

Administration in 1972 as a partnership with state and local law 

enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over airports by pairing law 

enforcement officer (LEO) handlers with conventional canines trained to 

detect explosives in objects (e.g., baggage and vehicles). In accordance 

with the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which established TSA, 

the transfer of the canine program from the Federal Aviation 

Administration to TSA was accomplished in March 2003.2

 

1

NEDCTP is located within TSA’s Office of Security Operations.

TSA 

subsequently expanded the program beyond airports to other 

transportation modes, including mass transit, and in January 2008, further 

expanded the program to include civilian transportation security inspector 

(TSI) canine teams responsible for screening air cargo. In 2011, TSA 

again expanded the program by deploying TSI handlers to airports with 

passenger screening canines (PSC)—conventional canines also trained 

to detect explosives being carried by or worn on a person.

2

Enacted in November 2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act established, 

within the Department of Transportation, TSA as the agency responsible for securing the 

nation’s transportation systems. See Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(a), 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 subsequently transferred TSA to the newly 

established Department of Homeland Security. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 403, 116 Stat. 

2135, 2178 (2002). 
 

Page 2 GAO-14-695T 

My testimony today addresses the extent to which TSA has (1) regularly 

analyzed data to identify program trends and areas working well or in 

need of corrective action, and (2) comprehensively assessed the 

effectiveness of PSCs, and coordinated with stakeholders to deploy PSC 

teams to the highest-risk airports and utilize them as intended. This 

statement is based on our January 2013 report and includes selected 

updates on the status of TSA’s efforts to implement the recommendations 

in that report.3 The report cited in this statement provides detailed 

information on our scope and methodology. To update our work, we 

obtained related documentation from TSA from October 2013 through 

June 2014, including reports used by NEDCTP to monitor canine team 

training minute requirements, results of PSC effectiveness assessments, 

and PSC deployment schedules. We also interviewed agency officials in 

June 2014 on the progress made by TSA to implement the 

recommendations in our January 2013 report. The work upon which this 

statement is based was conducted in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

NEDCTP’s mission is to deter and detect the introduction of explosive 

devices into the transportation system. As of June 2014, NEDCTP has 

deployed 802 of 985 canine teams for which it is able to fund across the 

transportation system.4 Table 1 shows the number of canine teams by 

type for which funding is available, as well as describes their roles, 

responsibilities, and costs to TSA. There are four types of LEO teams: 

aviation, mass transit, maritime, and multimodal, and three types of TSI 

teams: air cargo, multimodal, and PSC.

 

3

GAO, TSA Explosives Detection Canine Program: Actions Needed to Analyze Data and 

Ensure Canine Teams Are Effectively Utilized, GAO-13-239 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 

2013). This is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued in December 2012. 

Information TSA deemed Sensitive Security Information was redacted.

4

NEDCTP has not deployed the remaining 183 canine teams. 

Background
 

Page 3 GAO-14-695T 

Table 1: Total Number and Federal Costs of Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Canine Teams by Type of Team

Type of canine 

team 

Number of 

teams for 

which funding 

is availablea Description of roles and responsibilities

TSA start-up 

costs

TSA annual 

costs b

Law enforcement 

officer (LEO): 

aviation

b

511 Patrol airport terminals, including ticket counters, curbside 

areas, and secured areas; respond to calls to search 

unattended items, such as vehicles and baggage; screen air 

cargo; and serve as general deterrents to would-be terrorists 

or criminals 

$94,000 $63,000

LEO: mass transit 131 Patrol mass transit terminals; search platforms, railcars, and 

buses; respond to calls to search unattended items, such as 

baggage; and serve as general deterrents to would-be 

terrorists or criminals 

$84,000 $53,000

LEO: maritime 6 Conduct similar activities as LEO mass transit teams at ferry 

terminals

$84,000 $53,000

LEO: multimodal 27 Patrol and search transportation modes in their geographic 

area (e.g., aviation, mass transit, and maritime), and screen 

air cargo

$94,000 $53,000

Transportation 

security inspector 

(TSI): air cargo

120 Primarily screen air cargo $218,000 $159,000

TSI: multimodal 46 Patrol and search transportation modes in their geographic 

area (e.g., aviation, mass transit, or maritime), and screen 

air cargo

$218,000 $159,000

TSI: passenger 

screening canines 

144 Search for explosives odor on passengers in airport 

terminals

$237,000 $164,000

Total 985 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. | GAO-14-695T

a

The number of teams for which funding is available is for fiscal year 2014. b

TSA’s start-up costs for LEO teams include the costs of training the 

canine and handler, and providing the handler’s agency a stipend.

The cost data are as of June 2014, and have been rounded to the nearest thousand. Start-up costs 

reflect the costs incurred by TSA during the first year the canine team is deployed. Annual costs 

include the operations and maintenance costs incurred by TSA to keep canine teams deployed after 

their first year in the program.

5

 

5

The annual stipend is the federal cost share TSA provides per LEO team pursuant to a 

cooperative agreement between TSA and the LEO team’s agency (state or local). Certain 

items and services are reimbursable by TSA through the stipend, including canine food 

and veterinary care. The LEO team’s agency is responsible for any costs incurred greater 

than the amount covered by the stipend.

The 
 

Page 4 GAO-14-695T 

annual costs to TSA for LEO teams reflect the amount of the stipend.6

TSA’s start-up and annual costs for TSI canine teams are greater than 

those for LEO teams, because TSI handlers are TSA employees, so the 

costs include the handlers’ pay and benefits, service vehicles, and cell 

phones, among other things. PSC teams come at an increased cost to 

TSA compared with other TSI teams because of the additional 2 weeks of 

training and costs associated with providing decoys (i.e., persons 

pretending to be passengers who walk around an airport with explosive 

training aids). Of amounts appropriated in fiscal year 2014, TSA received 

a total of approximately $126.3 million for its canine program.

7 This 

amount includes an additional $1.25 million above TSA’s fiscal year 2014 

budget request to support not fewer than 10 more canine teams for the air 

cargo and aviation regulation environments.8 In its fiscal year 2015 

budget request, TSA is requesting approximately $127.4 million, a $1 

million increase.9

Figure 1 shows LEO, TSI, and PSC teams performing searches in 

different environments.

 

6

The LEO aviation teams’ stipends are $10,000 more than those for other LEO teams 

because the teams are required to spend 25 percent of their time screening air cargo, per 

the cooperative agreement with TSA. 

7

For fiscal year 2014, TSA funds NEDCTP through three TSA activities: aviation 

regulation and other enforcement (aviation), surface transportation security inspectors and 

canines (surface), and air cargo. 

8

See, e.g., Explanatory Statement accompanying Pub. L. No. 113-76, Div. F, 128 Stat. 5, 

247 (2014), at 32.

9

In its fiscal year 2015 budget request, TSA proposes to consolidate all canine assets, 

including PSC teams and mass transit teams, within its Aviation Regulation and Other 

Enforcement account to allow TSA maximum flexibility to utilize the teams in any 

transportation environment as needed in response to changes in intelligence or capability 

requirements. 
 

Page 5 GAO-14-695T 

Figure 1: Various Types of Canine Teams

Canines undergo 10 weeks of explosives detection training before being 

paired with a handler at TSA’s Canine Training and Evaluation Section 

(CTES), located at Lackland Air Force Base. Conventional canine 

handlers attend a 10-week training course, and PSC handlers attend a 

12-week training course.10 Canines are paired with a LEO or TSI handler 

during their training course. After canine teams complete this training, and 

obtain initial certification, they acclimate to their home operating 

environment for a 30-day period. Upon completion of the acclimation 

period, CTES conducts a 3-day operational transitional assessment to 

ensure canine teams are not experiencing any performance challenges in 

their home operating environment. After initial certification, canine teams 

are evaluated on an annual basis to maintain certification. During the 

conventional explosives detection evaluation, canine teams must 

demonstrate their ability to detect all the explosive training aids the 

canines were trained to detect in five search areas.11

 

10The majority of canine teams are trained by TSA’s CTES. However, according to TSA 

officials, because of resource constraints, TSA contracted with Strijder Group K9, which 

subcontracted to Auburn University’s Canine Detection Training Center to train some of 

the PSC teams. 

The five search 

11An explosive training aid is any explosive used to test and train a canine in explosives 

detection. 
 

Page 6 GAO-14-695T 

areas are randomly selected among all the possible areas, but according 

to CTES, include the area that is most relevant to the type of canine team 

(e.g., teams assigned to airports will be evaluated in areas such as 

aircraft and cargo). Canine teams must find a certain percentage of the 

explosive training aids to pass their annual evaluation. In addition, a 

specified number of nonproductive responses (NPR)—when a canine 

responds to a location where no explosives odor is present—are allowed 

to pass an evaluation and maintain certification. After passing the 

conventional evaluation, PSC teams are required to undergo an 

additional annual evaluation that includes detecting explosives on a 

person, or being carried by a person. PSC teams are tested in different 

locations within the sterile areas and checkpoints of an airport.12 A certain 

number of persons must be detected, and a specified number of NPRs 

are allowed for PSC certification.

Since our January 2013 report, TSA has taken steps to analyze key data 

on the performance of its canine teams to better identify program trends, 

as we recommended. In January 2013, we reported that TSA collected 

and used key canine program data in its Canine Website System (CWS), 

a central management database, but it could better analyze these data to 

identify program trends. Table 2 highlights some of the key data elements 

included in the CWS.

 

12The sterile area of an airport is the portion in an airport, defined in the airport’s security 

program, that provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and to which the access 

generally is controlled by TSA through the screening of persons and property. See 49 

C.F.R. § 1540.5. 

TSA Has Taken Steps 

to Analyze Canine 

Team Data to Identify 

Program Trends
 

Page 7 GAO-14-695T 

Table 2: Examples of Data Elements Recorded in the Canine Website System (CWS)

Data element Description 

Training minutes • Canine handlers record time spent conducting training to ensure canine teams maintain proficiency in 

detecting explosives odor.

• The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) requires canine teams to conduct a minimum of 240 

proficiency training minutes every 4 weeks (month) and for handlers to record training minutes in the 

CWS within 48 hours.

Utilization minutes • Law enforcement officer teams record time spent patrolling transportation terminals, searching for 

explosives odor in railcars and buses, for example, and screening air cargo.

• Transportation security inspector teams record time spent screening cargo, which is their primary 

responsibility.

• TSA requires canine handlers to record utilization minutes in CWS within 48 hours.

Certification rates • Canine Training and Evaluation Section evaluators record the results (certifieda or decertifiedb

Short notice 

assessments 

) of annual 

canine team evaluations.

• Field canine coordinators (FCC) administer short notice assessments—covert tests to assess canine 

teams’ level of operational effectiveness—on two canine teams within each participating agency they 

oversee each year.

• FCCs are required to document results of short notice assessments, and handlers are required to record 

results, in CWS.

Final canine responses • Canine handlers record final canine responses—instances when a canine sits, indicating to its handler 

that it detects explosives odor.

• Canine handlers are instructed to document final canine responses in CWS and submit swab samples to 

TSA’s Canine Explosives Unit to be analyzed for explosives odor.

Source: GAO analysis of TSA documentation. | GAO-14-695T

a

Certified teams are canine teams that passed their annual evaluation and are certified to search for 

explosives.

b

In January 2013, we found that NEDCTP was using CWS data to track 

and monitor canine teams’ performance. Specifically, field canine 

coordinators reviewed CWS data to determine how many training and 

utilization minutes canine teams conducted on a monthly basis. NEDCTP 

management used CWS data to determine, for example, how many 

canine teams were certified in detecting explosive odors, as well as the 

number of teams that passed short notice assessments. However, in our 

January 2013 report, we also found that TSA had not fully analyzed the 

performance data it collected in CWS to identify program trends and 

areas that were working well or in need of corrective action. For example:

Decertified teams are canine teams that failed their annual evaluation and are limited to training and 

providing mobile deterrence.

• Training minutes: TSA tracked the number of training minutes canine 

teams conducted on a monthly basis, as well as the types of 

explosives and search areas used when training, to ensure teams 

maintained their proficiency in detecting explosive training aids. 

However, we found that TSA did not analyze training minute data over 
 

Page 8 GAO-14-695T 

time (from month to month) and therefore was unable to determine 

trends related to canine teams’ compliance with the requirement. On 

the basis of our analysis of TSA’s data, we determined that some 

canine teams were repeatedly not in compliance with TSA’s 240-

minute training requirement, in some cases for 6 months or more in a 

1-year time period.

• Utilization minutes: We found that TSA collected and analyzed data 

monthly on the amount of cargo TSI air cargo canine teams screened 

in accordance with the agency’s requirement. However, it was unclear 

how the agency used this information to identify trends to guide 

longer-term future program efforts and activities, since our analysis of 

TSA’s cargo screening data from September 2011 through July 2012 

showed that TSI air cargo teams nationwide generally exceeded their 

monthly requirement. We concluded that TSA could increase the 

percentage of cargo it required TSI canine teams to screen.

• Certification rates: We found that TSA tracked the number of certified 

and decertified canine teams, but was unable to analyze these data to 

identify trends in certification rates because these data were not 

consistently tracked and recorded prior to 2011. Specifically, we could 

not determine what, if any, variances existed in the certification rates

among LEO and TSI teams over time because CTES reported it was 

unable to provide certification rates by type of canine team for 

calendar years 2008 through 2010. According to CTES, the agency 

recognized the deficiency and was in the process of implementing 

procedures to address data collection, tracking, and record-keeping 

issues. 

• Short notice assessments (covert tests): We found that when TSA 

was performing short notice assessments (prior to their suspension in 

May 2012), it was not analyzing the results beyond the pass and fail 

rates.13

 

13TSA suspended the short notice assessments because of FCC staffing shortages.

We concluded that without conducting the assessments and 

analyzing the results of these tests to determine if there were any 

search areas or type of explosives in which canine teams were more 

effective compared with others, and what, if any, training may have 

been needed to mitigate deficiencies, TSA was missing an opportunity 

to fully utilize the results.
 

Page 9 GAO-14-695T 

• Final canine responses: Our analysis of final canine responses and 

data on corresponding swab samples used to verify the presence of 

explosives odor revealed that canine teams were not submitting swab 

samples to NEDCTP’s Canine Explosives Unit (CEU). Specifically, we 

determined that the number of swab samples sent by canine handlers 

to CEU for scientific review was far lower than the number of final 

canine responses recorded in CWS. We concluded that without the 

swab samples, TSA was not able to more accurately determine the 

extent to which canine teams were effectively detecting explosive 

materials in real-world scenarios.

In January 2013, we recommended that TSA regularly analyze available 

data to identify program trends and areas that are working well and those 

in need of corrective action to guide program resources and activities. 

These analyses could include, but not be limited to, analyzing and 

documenting trends in proficiency training minutes, canine utilization, 

results of short notice assessments and final canine responses, 

performance differences between LEO and TSI canine teams, as well as 

an assessment of the optimum location and number of canine teams that 

should be deployed to secure the U.S. transportation system. TSA 

concurred with our recommendation and has taken actions to address it. 

Specifically, TSA is monitoring canine teams’ training minutes over time 

by producing annual reports. TSA also reinstated short notice 

assessments in July 2013, and in the event a team fails, the FCC 

completes a report that includes an analysis of the team’s training records 

to identify an explanation for the failure. In April 2013, TSA reminded 

canine handlers of the requirement to submit swab samples of their 

canines’ final responses, and reported that the number of samples 

submitted that same month, increased by 450 percent, when compared 

with sample submissions in April 2012. CEU is producing reports on the 

results of its analysis of the swab samples for the presence of explosives 

odor. In June 2014, TSA officials told us that in March 2014, NEDCTP 

stood up a new office, known as the Performance Measurement Section, 

to perform analyses of canine team data. We believe that these actions 

address the intent of our recommendation and could better position TSA 

to identify program trends to better target resources and activities based 

on what is working well and what may be in need of corrective action.
 

Page 10 GAO-14-695T 

In our January 2013 report, we found that TSA began deploying PSC 

teams in April 2011 prior to determining the teams’ operational

effectiveness. However, in June 2012, the DHS Science and Technology 

Directorate (S&T) and TSA began conducting effectiveness assessments 

to help demonstrate the effectiveness of PSC teams.14

 

14S&T is the primary research and development arm of DHS and manages science and 

technology research for the department’s components, such as TSA.

On the basis of

these assessments, DHS S&T and TSA’s NEDCTP recommended that 

the assessment team conduct additional testing and that additional 

training and guidance be provided to canine teams. See the hyperlink in 

the note for figure 2 for videos of training exercises at one airport showing 

instances when PSC teams detected, and failed to detect, explosives 

odor. In January 2013, we concluded that TSA could have benefited from 

completing effectiveness assessments of PSCs before deploying them on 

a nationwide basis to determine whether they are an effective method of 

screening passengers in the U.S. airport environment.

TSA Has Conducted 

Additional PSC Team 

Effectiveness 

Assessments and 

Deployed Some 

Teams to HighestRisk Airports, but 

Additional Actions Are 

Needed

TSA Has Conducted 

Additional PSC Team 

Effectiveness 

Assessments, but Has Not 

Compared PSC Teams 

with Conventional Canine 

Teams
 

Page 11 GAO-14-695T 

Figure 2: Video Stills Showing Passenger Screening Canine (PSC) Teams Training in Airport Terminal, June 2012

Note: To view the full videos, please click on hyperlink to view Part 1 and Part 2.

We also reported in January 2013 that TSA had not completed an 

assessment to determine where within the airport PSC teams would be 

most effectively utilized, but rather TSA leadership focused on initially 

deploying PSC teams to a single location within the airport—the sterile 

area—because it thought it would be the best way to foster stakeholders’, 

specifically airport operators’ and law enforcement agencies’, acceptance 

of the teams. Stakeholders were resistant to the deployment of PSC 

teams because they have civilian handlers, and TSA’s response 

resolution protocols do not require the teams to be accompanied by a law 

enforcement officer.15

 

15Unlike LEOs, TSIs (PSC handlers) are unarmed civilians with no authority to take law 

enforcement action (e.g., arrest or detain). The response resolution protocols require the 

handler to be accompanied by two additional personnel that may, but not always, include 

a law enforcement officer. 

According to TSA’s Assistant Administrator for the 
 

Page 12 GAO-14-695T 

Office of Security Operations, to alleviate airport stakeholders’ concerns

regarding TSA’s response resolution protocols, the agency initially 

deployed PSC teams to the sterile areas, thereby enabling TSA to gather 

data on the value of PSC teams in the airport environment while reducing 

the likelihood of a final response from a PSC, since an individual has 

already passed through several layers of screening when entering the 

sterile area. However, aviation stakeholders we interviewed raised 

concerns about this deployment strategy, stating that PSC teams would 

be more effectively utilized in non-sterile areas of the airport, such as 

curbside or in the lobby areas. TSA subsequently deployed PSC teams to 

the passenger screening checkpoints. However, DHS S&T did not plan to 

assess the effectiveness of PSCs on the public side, beyond the 

checkpoint, since TSA was not planning to deploy PSCs to the public side 

of the airport when DHS S&T designed its test plan. In January 2013, we 

concluded that comprehensive effectiveness assessments that include a 

comparison of PSC teams in both the sterile and public areas of the 

airport could help TSA determine if it is beneficial to deploy PSCs to the 

public side of airports, in addition to or in lieu of the sterile area and 

checkpoint.

During the June 2012 assessment of PSC teams’ effectiveness, TSA 

conducted one of the search exercises with three conventional canine 

teams. Although this assessment was not intended to be included as part 

of DHS S&T’s and TSA’s formal assessment of PSC effectiveness, the 

results of the assessment suggested, and TSA officials and DHS S&T’s 

Canine Explosives Detection Project Manager agreed, that a systematic 

assessment of PSCs with conventional canines could provide TSA with 

information to determine whether PSCs provide an enhanced security 

benefit compared with conventional LEO aviation canine teams that have 

already been deployed to airport terminals. In January 2013, we 

concluded that an assessment would help clarify whether additional 

investments for PSC training are warranted. We also concluded that since 

PSC teams are trained in both conventional and passenger screening 

methods, TSA could decide to convert existing PSC teams to 

conventional canine teams, thereby limiting the additional resource 

investments associated with training and maintaining the new PSC 

teams.

We recommended that TSA expand and complete testing, in conjunction 

with DHS S&T, to assess the effectiveness of PSCs and conventional 

canines in all airport areas deemed appropriate prior to making additional 

PSC deployments to help (1) determine whether PSCs are effective at 

screening passengers, and resource expenditures for PSC training are 
 

Page 13 GAO-14-695T 

warranted, and (2) inform decisions regarding the type of canine team to 

deploy and where to optimally deploy such teams within airports. TSA 

concurred and has taken some actions to address our recommendation, 

but further action is needed to fully address it. Specifically, in June 2014, 

TSA reported that through its PSC Focused Training and Assessment 

Initiative, a two-cycle assessment to establish airport-specific optimal 

working areas, assess team performance, and train teams on best 

practices, it had assessed PSC teams deployed to 27 airports, cumulating 

in a total of 1,048 tests. On the basis of these tests, TSA determined that 

PSC teams are effective and should be deployed at the checkpoint 

queue. In February 2014, TSA launched a third PSC assessment cycle to 

determine how PSCs’ effectiveness changes over time in order to 

determine their optimal duration time when working the checkpoint queue 

(i.e., how many minutes they can work and continue to be effective).

Although TSA has taken steps to determine whether PSC teams are 

effective and where in the airport environment to optimally deploy such 

teams, as of June 2014, TSA has not compared the effectiveness of 

PSCs and conventional canines in order to determine if the greater cost 

of training canines in the passenger screening method is warranted. 

According to TSA, the agency does not plan to include conventional 

canine teams in PSC assessments because conventional canines have 

not been through the process used with PSC canines to assess their 

temperament and behavior when working in proximity to people. While we 

recognize TSA’s position that half of deployed conventional canines are 

of a breed not accepted for use in the PSC program, other conventional 

canines are suitable breeds, and have been paired with LEO aviation 

handlers working in proximity with people since they patrol airport 

terminals, including ticket counters and curbside areas. We continue to 

believe that TSA should conduct an assessment to determine whether 

conventional canines are as effective detecting explosives odor on 

passengers when compared with PSC teams working in the checkpoint 

queue. As we reported, since PSC teams are trained in both conventional 

and passenger screening methods, TSA could decide to convert existing 

PSC teams to conventional canine teams, thereby limiting the additional 

resource investments associated with training and maintaining PSC 

teams.

In our January 2013 report, we found that TSA’s 2012 Strategic 

Framework calls for the deployment of PSC teams based on risk; 

however, airport stakeholder concerns about the appropriateness of 

TSA’s response resolution protocols for these teams resulted in PSC 

TSA Deployed Some PSC 

Teams to Highest-Risk 

Airports
 

Page 14 GAO-14-695T 

teams not being deployed to the highest-risk airports. TSA officials stated 

that PSC teams were not deployed to the highest-risk airports for various 

reasons, including concerns from an airport law enforcement association 

about TSA’s decision to deploy PSC teams with civilian TSI handlers and 

the appropriateness of TSA’s response resolution protocols. These 

protocols require the canine handler to be accompanied by two additional 

personnel that may, but not always, include a law enforcement officer. 

According to representatives from an airport law enforcement association, 

these protocols are not appropriate for a suicide bombing attempt 

requiring an immediate law enforcement response. TSA’s decision to 

deploy PSC teams only to airports where they would be willingly accepted 

by stakeholders resulted in PSC teams not being deployed to the highestrisk airports on its high-risk list. Moreover, PSC teams that were deployed 

to high-risk airports, specifically two airports we visited, were not being 

used for passenger screening because TSA and the local law 

enforcement agencies had not reached agreement on the PSC response 

resolution protocols.

We recommended that if PSCs are determined to provide an enhanced 

security benefit, TSA should coordinate with airport stakeholders to 

deploy future PSC teams to the highest-risk airports, and ensure that 

deployed PSC teams are utilized as intended, consistent with its statutory 

authority to provide for the screening of passengers and their property. 

TSA concurred with our recommendation, and has taken action to 

address it. Specifically, as of June 2014, the PSC teams for which TSA 

had funding and not already deployed to a specific airport at the time our 

report was issued have been deployed to, or allocated to, the highest-risk 

airports. According to TSA, it was successful in deploying PSC teams to 

airports where they were previously declined by aviation stakeholders for 

various reasons. For example, TSA officials explained that stakeholders 

have realized that PSCs are an effective means for detecting explosives 

odor, and no checkpoints have closed because of a nonproductive 

response. PSCs also help reduce wait times at airport checkpoints 

because PSC teams are one method by which TSA can operate 

Managed Inclusion—a tool that allows passengers who have not, for 

example, enrolled in TSA PreTM to access to PreTM screening lanes.16

 

16Through the TSA PreTM program, passengers who experience expedited screening 

may not have to remove their shoes; may leave their liquids and gels and laptops in carryon baggage; and are not required to divest light outerwear, jackets, or belts when passing 

through screening checkpoints. We have an ongoing review of the TSA PreTM program, 

including Managed Inclusion, and anticipate issuing a report in September 2014. 
 

Page 15 GAO-14-695T 

According to TSA, PSC teams provide an added layer of security, making 

it possible for TSA to provide expedited screening to passengers who 

have not enrolled in TSA PreTM and therefore have not had a 

background check.17 In November 2013, TSA also reported it was making 

progress in working with stakeholders to allow PSC teams to work at 

checkpoints at airports where PSC teams were not previously performing 

passenger screening, but rather were training and screening air cargo. In 

June 2014, TSA officials reported that of all the airports where PSC 

teams had been deployed, all but one airport agreed to allow TSA to 

conduct screening of individuals at passenger screening checkpoint 

queues. We believe that these actions address the intent of our 

recommendation, contingent upon TSA comparing PSC teams with

conventional canine teams.

Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and members of the 

subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy 

to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

For questions about this statement, please contact Jennifer Grover at 

(202) 512-7141 or GroverJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement 

include Chris Ferencik (Assistant Director), Chuck Bausell, Lisa Canini, 

Josh Diosomito, Michele Fejfar, Eric Hauswirth, Richard Hung, Thomas 

Lombardi, Jessica Orr, and Michelle Woods. Key contributors to the 

previous work that this testimony is based on are listed in the report.

 

17For PreTM applicants, TSA conducts a background check that includes checks against 

law enforcement, immigration, and intelligence databases, including a fingerprint-based 

criminal history records check conducted through the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The 

results are used by TSA to decide if an individual poses a sufficiently low risk to 

transportation or national security to participate in PreTM. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

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