BORDER SECURITY

Opportunities Exist to 

Strengthen 

Collaborative 

Mechanisms along 

the Southwest Border

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

June 2014

GAO-14-494

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-494, a report to 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, 

House of Representatives

June 2014

BORDER SECURITY

Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Collaborative 

Mechanisms along the Southwest Border

Why GAO Did This Study

According to DHS’s CBP, Arizona and 

South Texas represent some of the 

highest-threat areas along the 

southwest border for illegal entrants 

and smuggling. DHS and CBP 

coordinate border security with 

interagency partners, including other 

federal, state, local, and tribal entities. 

DHS established collaborative 

mechanisms in Arizona and South 

Texas to integrate CBP operations and 

improve interagency coordination.

GAO was asked to review DHS efforts 

to coordinate resources along the 

southwest border. This report (1) 

describes how DHS uses collaborative 

mechanisms in Arizona and South 

Texas to coordinate border security 

efforts, and (2) examines the extent to 

which DHS has established 

performance measures and reporting 

processes and how, if at all, DHS has 

assessed and monitored the 

effectiveness of the collaborative 

mechanisms in Arizona and South 

Texas. GAO analyzed documentation, 

such as campaign plans for the 

mechanisms; conducted visits to 

Arizona and South Texas; and 

interviewed CBP components and 

interagency partners selected on the 

basis of agency type and level of 

participation in the mechanism. 

Information from these interviews 

cannot be generalized to all 

components and partners, but provided 

insights into the mechanisms.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that CBP assess 

the JFC and STC, and that DHS, 

among other things, establish written 

agreements with ACTT and the STC 

Unified Command partners. DHS 

concurred with the recommendations.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has coordinated border security 

efforts using collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas, specifically 

(1) the Joint Field Command (JFC), which has operational control over all U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) resources in Arizona; (2) the Alliance to 

Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT), which is a multiagency law enforcement 

partnership in Arizona; and (3) the South Texas Campaign (STC), which 

integrates CBP resources and facilitates coordination with other homeland 

security partner agencies. Through these collaborative mechanisms, DHS and 

CBP have coordinated border security efforts in (1) information sharing, (2) 

resource targeting and prioritization, and (3) leveraging of assets. For example, 

to coordinate information sharing, the JFC maintains an operations coordination 

center and clearinghouse for intelligence information. Through the ACTT, 

interagency partners work jointly to target individuals and criminal organizations 

involved in illegal cross-border activity. The STC leverages assets of CBP 

components and interagency partners by shifting resources to high-threat regions 

and conducting joint operations. 

DHS and CBP have established performance measures and reporting processes 

for the JFC and ACTT in Arizona and the STC in South Texas; however, 

opportunities exist to strengthen these collaborative mechanisms by assessing 

results across the efforts and establishing written agreements. Each collaborative 

mechanism reports on its results to DHS or CBP leadership through a variety of 

means, such as accomplishment reports and after-action reports. However, CBP 

has not assessed the JFC and STC mechanisms to evaluate results across the 

mechanisms. JFC and STC components GAO interviewed identified challenges 

with managing resources and sharing best practices across the mechanisms. For 

example, officials from all five JFC components GAO interviewed highlighted 

resource management challenges, such as inefficiencies in staff conducting dual 

reporting on operations to CBP leadership. Best practices for interagency 

collaboration call for federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts to create 

the means to monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas 

for improvement. An assessment of the JFC and STC could provide CBP with 

information to better address challenges the mechanisms have faced. In addition, 

DHS has not established written agreements with partners in the ACTT and STC 

Unified Command—the entity within STC used for coordinating activities among 

federal and state agencies—consistent with best practices for sustaining effective 

collaboration. Officials from 11 of 12 partner agencies GAO interviewed reported 

coordination challenges related to the ACTT and STC Unified Command, such 

as limited resource commitments by participating agencies and lack of common 

objectives. For example, a partner with the ACTT noted that that there have been 

operations in which partners did not follow through with the resources they had 

committed during the planning stages. Establishing written agreements could 

help DHS address coordination challenges, such as limited resource 

commitments and lack of common objectives.

View GAO-14-494. For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 

or gamblerr@gao.gov
Page i GAO-14-494 Border Security

Letter 1 

Background 5

DHS Uses Collaborative Mechanisms to Share Information, 

Target Resources, and Leverage Assets 9

DHS Has Established Performance Measures and Reporting 

Processes for the JFC, ACTT, and STC, but Could Strengthen 

These Collaborative Mechanisms 12

Conclusions 30

Recommendations for Executive Action 31

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 31

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 34

Appendix II List of Partners in the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats 

and South Texas Campaign Unified Command 37

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 42

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 44

Tables

Table 1: Summary of Collaborative Mechanisms in Arizona and 

South Texas 8

Table 2: Summary of Objectives and Performance Measures 

Reported by the Collaborative Mechanisms 13

Figure

Figure 1: Geographic Areas of Responsibility of the Joint Field 

Command (JFC), Alliance to Combat Transnational 

Threats (ACTT), and South Texas Campaign (STC) 

along the Southwest Border 6

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-494 Border Security

Abbreviations

ACTT Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

 Explosives

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOI Department of the Interior

ERO U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

 Enforcement and Removal Operations

HSI U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Homeland Security Investigations

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

JFC Joint Field Command

JOD Joint Operations Directorate

MOU memorandum of understanding

OA Office of Administration

OAM Office of Air and Marine

OFO Office of Field Operations

POE port of entry

STC South Texas Campaign

TSA Transportation Security Administration

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-14-494 Border Security

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

June 27, 2014

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul

Chairman

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The United States shares over 1,900 miles of border with Mexico, with 

Arizona and South Texas sharing 387 and 697 miles of that border 

respectively.1

Securing U.S. borders is the responsibility of the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), in collaboration with other federal, state, local, 

and tribal entities. CBP, a component within DHS that is the lead agency 

for border security, is responsible, among other things, for preventing 

terrorists and their weapons of terrorism from entering the United States 

and for interdicting persons and contraband crossing the border illegally. 

Within CBP, the Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for 

securing the border at ports of entry (POE).

The border with Mexico and these two states includes 

different types of terrain that represent a significant challenge to border 

security efforts. For example, in Arizona, the border is characterized by 

desert and rugged mountains, while in South Texas, the border is divided 

by the Rio Grande. Threats along the southwest border include illegal 

entrants and the smuggling of drugs, firearms, and currency by criminal 

networks. According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 

corridors in Arizona and South Texas represent some of the highestthreat areas along the southwest border for illegal entrants and 

smuggling.

2

 

1

South Texas is defined as the region encompassing U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s Laredo and Houston Office of Field Operations Field Offices; Del Rio, Laredo, 

and Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol sectors; and the Del Rio Air Branch, Laredo Air 

Branch, McAllen Air and Marine Branch, and Houston Air and Marine Branch. 

The U.S. Border Patrol 

(Border Patrol) is the CBP component charged with ensuring security 

along border areas between the POEs. Additionally, CBP’s Office of Air 

and Marine (OAM) provides air and maritime support to secure the 

2

Ports of entry are officially designated places that provide for the arrival at, or departure 

from, the United States.
 

Page 2 GAO-14-494 Border Security

national border between the POEs, within maritime operating areas, and 

within the nation’s interior. DHS and CBP and its components coordinate 

their border security efforts with various federal, state, local, and tribal 

entities.

DHS has established collaborative mechanisms throughout the southwest 

region that are designed to help integrate CBP operations and improve 

interagency coordination.3 In September 2013, we reported that DHS has 

established collaborative mechanisms with both similarities and 

differences in how they are structured, which missions or threats they 

focus on, and which agencies participate in them, among other things.4

You asked us to review how DHS is coordinating resources along the 

southwest border to achieve an integrated law enforcement response to 

border security threats. This report addresses the following two questions:

In 

Arizona, CBP realigned its resources in February 2011 through the Joint 

Field Command (JFC), wherein the operations of all CBP components in 

Arizona—OFO, Border Patrol, and OAM—report to a single commander. 

CBP also coordinates with interagency partners in Arizona through the 

Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT), which is a multiagency 

forum initiated in September 2009 to integrate intelligence and operations 

among homeland security partners, including DHS’s U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Arizona Department of Public 

Safety, among others. In South Texas, CBP instituted the South Texas 

Campaign (STC) in February 2012 to help integrate the activities of CBP 

components to accomplish specified objectives, such as targeting criminal 

networks, and to facilitate coordination with homeland security partners, 

such as ICE and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

• How does DHS use collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South 

Texas to coordinate border security efforts?

 

3

For the purposes of this review, collaboration is defined as a joint activity by two or more 

organizations (either within CBP or among CBP and interagency partners) that is intended 

to produce more public value than could be produced when the organizations act alone. In 

September 2012, we reported on collaborative mechanisms and the subject matter 

specialists we interviewed defined an interagency mechanism for collaboration as any 

arrangement or application that can facilitate collaboration between agencies. See GAO, 

Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency Collaborative 

Mechanisms, GAO-12-1022 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012).

4

GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Visibility over 

Collaborative Field Mechanisms, GAO-13-734 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2013).
 

Page 3 GAO-14-494 Border Security

• To what extent has DHS established performance measures and 

reporting processes and how, if at all, does DHS assess and monitor 

the effectiveness of the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and 

South Texas?

To address these objectives, we visited the JFC and the ACTT in Arizona 

and the STC in South Texas and conducted interviews with officials in 

CBP headquarters. In Arizona, we visited JFC and ACTT headquarters in 

Tucson and observed the JFC’s Joint Intelligence and Operations Center 

and an ACTT leadership meeting. We also conducted interviews with JFC 

and ACTT headquarters officials. In South Texas, we visited STC 

headquarters in Laredo, where we observed operations at Border Patrol 

checkpoints and POEs as well as the South Texas Border Intelligence 

Center, and conducted interviews with STC headquarters officials. During 

our site visits to Arizona and South Texas, we also met with officials from 

OFO, Border Patrol, and OAM. Additionally, we conducted semistructured 

interviews via telephone with officials from 5 CBP component offices from 

the 21 CBP component locations in Arizona and 5 CBP component 

offices from the 43 CBP component locations in the South Texas region.5

We also conducted semistructured interviews via telephone with officials 

from 6 ACTT partner agencies from the 66 ACTT partner agencies in 

Arizona and 6 STC Unified Command partner agencies from the 33 STC 

Unified Command partner agencies in South Texas.6

 

5

We interviewed JFC component officials from the Yuma and Casa Grande Border Patrol 

Stations, the Nogales and San Luis POEs, and the Tucson Air Branch. We interviewed 

STC component officials from the McAllen and Laredo South Border Patrol Stations, the 

Brownsville and Eagle Pass POEs, and the McAllen Air Branch.

We selected 

component offices to interview based on type of component, the level of 

threat as defined by the number of CBP apprehensions of illegal entrants, 

and geographic location. We selected interagency partners to interview 

based on type of governmental unit and level of participation in the 

mechanisms. While we cannot generalize information obtained from 

these interviews to all CBP component offices and interagency partners in 

6

The Unified Command is an entity that the STC uses to coordinate with approximately 30 

officials from federal, state, and military agencies in South Texas. We interviewed the 

following ACTT participants: ICE, National Park Service, Arizona National Guard, Arizona 

Department of Public Safety, Sierra Vista Police Department, and the Tohono O’odham 

Police Department. We interviewed the following STC Unified Command participants: 

CBP Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol station; CBP Laredo Field Office; Drug Enforcement 

Administration (Houston); ICE (San Antonio); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives (San Antonio); and the U.S. Attorney’s Office (Laredo).
 

Page 4 GAO-14-494 Border Security

Arizona and South Texas, information from these interviews provided us 

with insights into how CBP has coordinated border security efforts.

To describe how DHS uses collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and 

South Texas to coordinate border security efforts, we reviewed 

documents from 2009 through 2014 obtained from JFC, ACTT, and STC 

officials, such as charter documents, establishment memos, and 

organizational charts, to identify the structure and roles and 

responsibilities for each mechanism.7 We also reviewed campaign and 

operational plans, as well as performance reports, to determine 

coordination efforts of the mechanisms. To examine the extent to which 

DHS has established performance measures and reporting processes 

and how, if at all, DHS has assessed and monitored the effectiveness of 

the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas, we analyzed 

campaign plans, after-action reports, and accomplishment reports from 

2011 through 2014 obtained from the collaborative mechanisms to 

determine what measures are in place to track outcomes and assess 

progress.8

 

7

While DHS has established other collaborative mechanisms along the southwest border, 

our review focused specifically on those mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas—the 

JFC, ACTT, and STC—as these areas are among the highest-threat areas for illegal 

entrants and smuggling activity along the southwest border. 

We also conducted interviews with officials from Border Patrol, 

OFO, and OAM headquarters to determine the extent to which CBP and 

its components are assessing the benefits and challenges of the JFC, 

ACTT, and STC. We compared the mechanisms’ structures and 

operations with best practices to enhance and sustain interagency 

collaboration and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

8

We did not evaluate the performance measures; rather we assessed the extent to which 

the collaborative mechanisms have performance measures in place.
 

Page 5 GAO-14-494 Border Security

Government.

9

We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix I presents more details about our objectives, 

scope, and methodology.

CBP’s three components—OFO, Border Patrol, and OAM—maintain a 

field structure across the United States and its territories consisting of 20 

OFO field offices, 20 Border Patrol sectors, and 3 OAM regions. Within 

this field structure, each component also manages individual locations; 

OFO field offices provide oversight of POEs, Border Patrol sectors 

oversee stations, and OAM regions oversee branches. For example, 

OAM’s Southwest Border Region provides oversight of individual air and 

marine branches across the southwest border, including locations in both 

Arizona and South Texas.

As stated in CBP’s Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan, providing 

security along the northern, southern, and coastal borders requires 

effective coordination and integration of all of CBP’s operational 

components, along with the guidance and assistance of essential CBP 

mission support personnel. One of CBP’s objectives is to establish and 

maintain effective control of air, land, and maritime borders through the 

use of the appropriate mix of infrastructure, technology, and personnel. 

To that end, CBP’s strategic plan states that gaining and maintaining 

effective control of the nation’s border requires useful intelligence and 

 

9

GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005);

GAO-12-1022; and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999). We developed effective practices 

to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration in GAO-06-15 and GAO-12-1022 by 

interviewing experts in the area of collaboration and gathering information on select areas 

where federal agencies have developed substantial ongoing collaborations. These 

practices are applicable to collaborative mechanisms DHS has established along the 

southwest border in Arizona and South Texas, as these mechanisms involve interagency 

collaboration and are intended to help strengthen coordination of border security efforts 

among participating agencies. 

Background
 

Page 6 GAO-14-494 Border Security

strong partnerships with federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign 

governments. The JFC, ACTT, and STC are intended to help CBP 

achieve these objectives, according to CBP documents. For example, the 

2011 memo establishing the JFC states that the JFC’s responsibility will 

be to ensure full strategic integration of all CBP assets where feasible and 

possible in order to maximize operational effectiveness and efficiencies. 

The ACTT’s charter states that the ACTT is to be an effort to maximize 

the cooperation and coordination of interagency law enforcement efforts 

in Arizona. Moreover, the STC’s establishment memo notes the STC 

Commander is to serve as the CBP integrator in South Texas, increasing 

CBP’s operational effects through partnerships with stakeholders and 

communities of interest in South Texas. Figure 1 shows the geographic 

area that the JFC, ACTT, and STC cover within the southwestern United 

States.

Figure 1: Geographic Areas of Responsibility of the Joint Field Command (JFC), Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats 

(ACTT), and South Texas Campaign (STC) along the Southwest Border

a

The STC added the New Orleans Border Patrol sector to the STC in 2013. The New Orleans sector 

oversees stations in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi.
 

Page 7 GAO-14-494 Border Security

The three mechanisms have varying structures that aim to integrate CBP 

operations and improve interagency coordination, as described below.

• JFC: The JFC is an entity, under the direction of a commander, with 

operational control over CBP’s resources in Arizona, including OFO, 

Border Patrol, and OAM resources. Intended to maximize operational 

effectiveness and efficiencies, the JFC exercises the authority to 

reallocate staffing and resources among CBP components in Arizona. 

While the JFC Commander maintains operational control of resources 

in Arizona, each component’s headquarters has authority over 

administrative decisions for the component, such as providing 

funding, equipment, and training. The JFC has a dedicated budget of 

approximately $5 million in fiscal year 2014 that primarily covers 

personnel costs.

• ACTT: The ACTT is a multiagency law enforcement partnership in 

Arizona designed to address smuggling of aliens, drugs, and bulk 

cash; exportation of weapons; and hostage taking, among other illegal 

activities. While it is a DHS initiative, the ACTT concept was 

implemented by CBP and other federal, state, and local agencies. 

According to the ACTT Chief of Staff, the ACTT is not under the 

authority of the JFC; however, the JFC approves CBP-level 

participation in ACTT operations. The JFC utilizes the ACTT to 

prioritize tactical targets and coordinate operations with homeland 

security partners. The ACTT is composed of more than 60 partners 

representing federal, state, local, military, and tribal organizations.10

• STC: The STC is an entity that realigned CBP resources, as well as a 

mechanism for fostering interagency partnerships. As a hybrid of the 

mechanisms that DHS has in place in Arizona, the STC is intended to 

enhance coordination both within CBP, as well as with external 

partners in South Texas. Like the JFC, the STC is managed by a 

commander; however, the STC Commander exercises less control 

Arizona’s ACTT is headed by a 13-member Unified Command, 

including three JFC component heads, which provides strategic 

direction to the ACTT as well as guidance for partner interaction. The 

ACTT does not have a dedicated budget, although CBP components 

and interagency partners provide funds for administrative, personnel, 

and operational costs. See appendix II for a full list of ACTT 

participants.

 

10DHS also maintains a separate ACTT in West Texas/New Mexico, which is not included 

in the scope of our review.
 

Page 8 GAO-14-494 Border Security

over the day-to-day operations of CBP components, instead assuming 

operational control as it specifically relates to the STC mission and 

objectives, such as conducting targeted operations to disrupt and 

degrade transnational criminal organizations. As with the JFC, each 

component’s headquarters has authority over administrative 

decisions, such as providing funding, equipment, and training. The 

STC Commander coordinates with a Unified Command composed of 

approximately 30 partners representing federal, state, and military 

organizations (see app. II for a full list of STC Unified Command 

participants). While the STC does not have a dedicated budget, the 

STC has received discretionary funds from the CBP Commissioner’s 

Office, as well as funds from the components, such as resources from 

Border Patrol targeted for border security efforts in the Rio Grande 

Valley area.

Table 1 provides additional information on each mechanism, including the 

staffing, participants, and purpose.

Table 1: Summary of Collaborative Mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas 

Mechanism Staffing Participants Purpose

Joint Field 

Command– Arizona

27 permanent 

staff members 

and 35 personnel 

on temporary 

detail

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) components, 

including the Office of Field Operations (OFO) Tucson Field 

Office, Office of Border Patrol Tucson and Yuma Sectors, 

the Office of Air and Marine (OAM) Tucson and Yuma Air 

Branches and National Air Security Operations Center - 

Sierra Vista, and the Office of Intelligence and Investigative 

Liaison

Integrate organizational 

responsiveness, resource 

allocation, and decisionmaking capabilities across 

Arizona 

Alliance to Combat 

Transnational 

Threats (ACTT)– 

Arizona 

3 permanent staff 

members and 19 

personnel on 

temporary detail

CBP; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); 

U.S. Attorney’s Office; Bureau of Land Management; U.S. 

Forest Service; National Park Service; Transportation 

Security Administration; Arizona Department of Public 

Safety; Cochise County; Tucson Police Department; Tohono 

O’odham Nation; U.S. Army; and other federal, state, local, 

and tribal partners

Leverage the capabilities and 

resources of partners against 

individuals and criminal 

organizations involved in 

illegal cross-border activity

South Texas 

Campaign (STC)– 

South Texas

13 personnel on 

either permanent 

or temporary 

status

CBP components, including OFO Laredo and Houston Field 

Offices; Border Patrol Del Rio, Laredo, Rio Grande Valley, 

and New Orleans Sectors; and OAM Del Rio Air Branch, 

Laredo Air Branch, McAllen Air and Marine Branch, and 

Houston Air and Marine Branch

STC

CBP, ICE, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, and other federal and state partners

STC Unified Command

Integrate intelligence, 

leverage communities of 

interest, pursue enhanced 

coordination with the 

government of Mexico, and 

conduct targeted operations 

to disrupt and degrade 

transnational criminal 

organizations

Source: GAO analysis of CBP information. | GAO-14-494
 

Page 9 GAO-14-494 Border Security

CBP oversees the JFC and the STC through the Joint Operations 

Directorate (JOD). The JOD was created by the Secretary of Homeland 

Security in February 2011 and is part of the Office of the CBP 

Commissioner. The JOD’s purpose is to help ensure that CBP-wide 

missions are being carried out and that CBP maintains a nation-wide 

focus. Headed by an Executive Director, the JOD is intended to address 

CBP joint operations coordination, incident management, strategic 

planning, deliberate planning, and operational doctrine and policy. The 

JOD is also responsible for defining metrics to determine effectiveness 

and link CBP strategies to the budget cycle. The JOD is staffed by 

personnel from CBP components and funding is provided through the 

Office of the Commissioner. The JOD serves as a liaison for the JFC to 

Border Patrol, OFO, and OAM headquarters, and the CBP Commissioner 

for staffing, operations, and other requirements and, according to the JOD 

Executive Director, plans to serve as a liaison for the STC in the future as 

well.11 

DHS has taken a number of actions to coordinate border security efforts 

both within CBP and externally with interagency partners using 

collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas in three primary 

areas: (1) information sharing, (2) resource targeting and prioritization, 

and (3) leveraging of assets. Coordination efforts have involved sharing of 

information across geographic areas and organizations, strategic 

placement of resources to address threats, and the implementation of 

joint operations, among others.

Information sharing. DHS and CBP have coordinated information 

sharing among CBP components and participating agencies in the JFC, 

ACTT, and STC through the development and implementation of various 

programs or initiatives within these collaborative mechanisms. For 

example, in Arizona the JFC maintains the Joint Intelligence and 

Operations Center, which is an operations coordination center and 

clearinghouse for intelligence information. The Joint Intelligence and 

Operations Center is staffed by an integrated team of Border Patrol, OFO, 

and OAM officers and agents that use data, video, and communications 

systems to coordinate statewide operations. For example, the center 

monitors real-time air traffic in Arizona and moves air assets where 

 

11Since the ACTT is a multiagency effort, it is not overseen by CBP.

DHS Uses 

Collaborative 

Mechanisms to Share 

Information, Target 

Resources, and 

Leverage Assets
 

Page 10 GAO-14-494 Border Security

needed in support of ground operations. In addition, the Joint Intelligence 

and Operations Center disseminates strategic intelligence to all Arizona 

field components for immediate action, such as information on targets in 

Arizona. Among other things, the ACTT initiated focus area meetings in 

each of five geographic areas of Arizona to allow interagency partners to 

collaborate and share information related to their specific regions, such as 

tactics used by drug and alien smugglers, including types of vehicles and 

common routes.12

Resource targeting and prioritization. DHS and CBP, through the JFC, 

ACTT, and STC, have established strategies or mechanisms to target 

and prioritize resources among participating components and interagency 

partners. For example, in Arizona the JFC created an air integration 

strategy and a coordinated process of prioritizing and managing air 

assets through the establishment of an oversight mechanism known as 

the Air Council. The Air Council sets strategic goals and objectives for the 

management of all aviation assets in Arizona and meets weekly to set the 

aviation support air schedule, coordinating with military and other air 

partners to ensure that geographic areas are prioritized and covered 

appropriately without the overlap of air assets. In addition, the JFC 

monitors and analyzes real-time operational data to help target 

enforcement efforts against transnational criminal organizations. The 

ACTT is to act as a “force multiplier,” as interagency partners can 

leverage one another’s resources and capabilities to target individuals 

and criminal organizations involved in illegal cross-border activity. 

In addition, the ACTT provides intelligence briefings 

and support to the partners in all of the focus areas. Information sharing 

in South Texas is facilitated by the South Texas Border Intelligence 

Center, which the STC created to share intelligence at a centralized 

location. The South Texas Border Intelligence Center was established to 

facilitate the sharing and fusion of law enforcement information and 

intelligence among Border Patrol, OFO, OAM, and interagency partners, 

such as the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Texas Department 

of Public Safety. Among other things, the STC has facilitated information 

sharing between OFO and Border Patrol through OFO sharing knowledge 

regarding technology used at ports that Border Patrol is leveraging to 

conduct electronic scans of a larger number of vehicles moving through 

checkpoints.

 

12CBP defines focus areas as geographic divisions within Arizona that share similar 

threats, vulnerabilities, and transnational criminal activity levels.
 

Page 11 GAO-14-494 Border Security

Specifically, partners identify targets based on geographic vulnerabilities 

and emerging threat information, among other things. The ACTT targets 

are identified through established focus area meetings and 

communications between ACTT partner agencies, among other things. In 

South Texas, the STC jointly selects and prioritizes targets based on 

intelligence by collaborating with interagency partners through the Unified 

Command. The STC also established Joint Targeting Teams, which are 

focused on Unified Command approved targets, which present the 

highest threats to the area. In addition, the STC formalized an OFO 

operation that is designed to target transnational criminal organization 

leaders, members, associates, and family members to cancel their 

nonimmigrant visas, or place those that have legal permanent resident 

status in removal proceedings.

Leveraging of assets. DHS and CBP, through the JFC, ACTT, and STC, 

have leveraged assets of CBP components and interagency partners 

through resource sharing or joint operations. In Arizona, the JFC 

established the Canine Council, which integrates OFO and Border Patrol 

canine resources. In particular, OFO and Border Patrol representatives 

are to meet on a regular basis to discuss how canines might be used to 

address threats specific to their geographic areas. For example, Border 

Patrol canine assets are used at Arizona POEs to cover over 200 shifts 

per month. The ACTT has leveraged interagency partners’ assets by 

conducting a number of joint operations with interagency partners, 

including an operation that involved the deployment of increased 

resources from Border Patrol, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and 

local law enforcement agencies at a Border Patrol checkpoint and 

surrounding highways in the western part of Arizona. The operation was 

designed to disrupt transnational criminal organization activity along the 

Interstate 10 highway in Arizona. The ACTT also has provided partner 

agencies with access to resources, such as OAM air support and 

planning assistance for operations. The STC leverages component and 

interagency partners’ assets in South Texas. For example, the STC 

shifted Border Patrol assets from Laredo to the Rio Grande Valley in 

order to augment existing Border Patrol resources and address the 

current threat environment in the Rio Grande Valley area. Further, the 

STC conducted joint operations such as an operation that involved assets 

from multiple Border Patrol stations, OAM, the Department of Defense, 

the government of Mexico, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The purpose of 

the operation was to strategically place resources at and between POEs 

in South Texas in order to increase border security.
 

Page 12 GAO-14-494 Border Security

DHS and CBP have established processes, including objectives and 

performance measures, to report on the results of the JFC, ACTT, and 

STC, and these reporting processes vary across the mechanisms. For 

example, the STC develops and reports on specific quantitative 

performance measures for operations, while the JFC and the ACTT use 

and report on a mix of quantitative and qualitative measures to assess 

their activities. Some of the quantitative performance measures 

developed by the JFC, ACTT, and STC are existing metrics used by CBP 

and its components to assess and report on progress of their specific 

border security activities. For example, the ACTT reports on seizures of 

narcotics and currency as performance measures to assess efforts to 

disrupt, degrade, and dismantle criminal organizations operating in 

Arizona. CBP established these measures to assess and report on border 

security efforts. Further, the STC reports on apprehensions of illegal 

entrants as a performance measure to assess the success of various 

operations. This measure was established by Border Patrol to assess and 

report on its enforcement efforts between POEs. The objectives and 

performance measures reported by each collaborative mechanism are 

summarized in table 2.

DHS Has Established 

Performance 

Measures and 

Reporting Processes 

for the JFC, ACTT, 

and STC, but Could 

Strengthen These 

Collaborative 

Mechanisms

DHS and CBP Have 

Performance Measures 

and Reporting Processes 

in Place for Collaborative 

Mechanisms in Arizona 

and South Texas
 

Page 13 GAO-14-494 Border Security

Table 2: Summary of Objectives and Performance Measures Reported by the Collaborative Mechanisms

Mechanism Objectives Performance measures

Joint Field 

Command (JFC)– 

Arizona 

The JFC is focused on all U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) objectives in Arizona, specifically:

• manage the border

• expedite lawful trade and travel

• manage risk

• integrate missions

The JFC has performance measures in place across 

areas such as conducting targeted actions to 

mitigate risk posed by transnational criminal 

organizations and implementing innovative solutions 

to promote border security. The performance 

measures are a mix of quantitative and qualitative 

measures and include reducing illicit cross-border 

activity, developing and implementing new 

strategies to combat border security threats, and 

improving air and ground coordination. 

Alliance to Combat 

Transnational 

Threats (ACTT)– 

Arizona 

• Identify, prioritize and execute actions against 

common threats and targets in each focus area 

• Conduct sustained and unified actions against 

prioritized threats in each focus area

• Enhance the level of collaboration, principally in the 

areas of interagency participation, transparency, and 

information sharing

• Leverage intelligence, investigations, and interdiction 

to disrupt threats in Arizona

• Enhance situational awareness in order to more 

effectively detect, identify, classify, and track threats

• Enhance the ability to respond to and resolve 

identified threats

The ACTT maintains performance measures across 

the mechanism’s four objectives. Performance 

measures are both quantitative and qualitative, 

including initial increases in narcotics, currency, and 

weapons seizures; increased arrests and 

prosecutions of criminal organizations’ personnel; 

increased citizen calls reporting activity; and 

changes in concealment methods at ports of entry.

South Texas 

Campaign (STC)– 

South Texas

• Integrate intelligence, analysis, and targeting 

throughout the South Texas region

• Engage communities of interest in order to degrade 

transnational criminal organizations’ ability to operate 

throughout the region’s communities

• Engage, sustain, and enhance bi-national efforts with 

the government of Mexico in order to degrade the 

critical capabilities of transnational criminal 

organizations within the region and the adjoining 

states of Mexico

• Incorporate a flexible, mobile, and unified South 

Texas region workforce to address emerging threats

• Disrupt and degrade transnational criminal 

organizations’ ability to use established air, land, and 

sea routes of egress and ingress

The STC develops specific goals, objectives, 

metrics, and performance indicators for each 

operation. The metrics and performance indicators 

are designed to allow operational planners to 

categorize, evaluate, predict, and improve STC 

operations. Metrics and performance indicators vary 

based on the operation and can include increases in 

apprehensions; decreases in the number of illegal 

entries; changes in the recidivism rate; and changes 

in tactics, techniques, and procedures of 

transnational criminal organization in the area. The 

STC is to reevaluate the metrics and performance 

indicators on a regular basis to ensure that they are 

aligned with operational strategies. 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP information. | GAO-14-494

The type and frequency of reporting varies by each collaborative 

mechanism. Each collaborative mechanism reports on its results to its 

leaders, or DHS or CBP leadership, through a variety of means, such as 

accomplishment reports and after-action reports, as discussed below.
 

Page 14 GAO-14-494 Border Security

• JFC. The JFC reports on its results through quarterly progress 

reports, an initial accomplishment report, and operational after-action 

reports. First, the JFC develops quarterly progress reports, which are 

to be reviewed by JFC leadership. The quarterly progress reports 

began in fiscal year 2014 and provide information on new threats, 

high-traffic areas, and available resources. JFC leadership reviews 

the reports to assess progress made toward the JFC’s objectives and 

to determine whether changes are needed to JFC priorities based on 

changes to threats or border security activities identified in the report, 

according to JFC officials. Second, the JFC developed a report 

providing information on its initial accomplishments from its 

establishment in 2011 through 2013. This report provided information 

on JFC accomplishments in the areas of integrated operations and 

planning, sharing of information and skills among components, joint 

intelligence gathering, military coordination, and integrated resources. 

Finally, the JFC is to prepare after-action reports for each operation. 

These after-action reports provide information on the operation’s 

mission, use of resources, and operational results. For example, in an 

operation from October 2012 through July 2013, the JFC reported the 

following statistics from sustained outbound inspections: 

approximately $5.3 million in seized currency and 881 arrests.13

• ACTT. The ACTT reports information on its results through annual 

accomplishment reports; periodic, ad hoc reports; and after-action 

reports. For example, the ACTT produces annual accomplishment 

reports to report its results. In these accomplishment reports, the 

ACTT reports information on operations, tactics employed, 

intelligence, trends, and partner activities. The ACTT also reports on 

its results to DHS, CBP, and ICE leadership on an ad hoc basis upon 

request. For example, CBP has periodically requested ACTT progress 

reports on such things as the number of joint operations completed 

and their results, in connection with its year-end accomplishment 

reporting. In addition, the ACTT is to prepare after-action reports for 

each of its operations. These after-action reports contain information 

intended to help ACTT leadership determine whether the ACTT 

The 

JFC uses these after-action reports to debrief operations and to 

provide comments and recommendations for future operations. JFC 

and component leadership also discuss results of operations during 

biweekly teleconferences, according to JFC documents.

 

13Outbound inspections involve the screening of vehicles and persons leaving the United 

States in order to stem the outbound flow of currency and fugitives from the country.
 

Page 15 GAO-14-494 Border Security

should engage in additional phases of an operation. For example, a 

joint operation of Border Patrol and ICE, under the auspices of the 

ACTT, during November 2013, reported 34 arrests, 381 pounds of 

marijuana seized, and 1 recovered stolen vehicle.

• STC. The STC reports on its results through annual, weekly, and 

after-action reports. Specifically, the STC reports on its results 

through an annual accountability report provided to CBP 

headquarters. These annual accountability reports provide information 

on the STC’s progress toward meeting operational and administrative 

milestones, accomplishments related to each of the STC’s five 

objectives, and best practices across the South Texas region. 

Reported accomplishments in the fiscal year 2013 accomplishment 

report include intelligence sharing among interagency partners to 

identify targets and the completion of several joint operations. The 

report also includes performance measures for several operations, 

such as the number of arrests and seizures of drugs and currency. 

Across the South Texas region, the STC reported the disruption and 

degradation of the capabilities of transnational criminal organizations 

through the arrest of 231 approved targets. Beginning in fiscal year 

2014, the STC also prepares weekly status reports for Unified 

Command members and CBP headquarters, which include 

information on coordination efforts with other agencies as well as 

updates on operations. Additionally, the STC prepares an after-action 

report for each operation. For example, in an operation from June 

through September 2013, under the auspices of the STC, the Rio 

Grande Valley sector reported making 2,756 apprehensions of illegal 

entrants and seizing approximately 4,585 kilograms of marijuana. 

During the same operation, the Laredo sector reported making 223 

apprehensions of illegal entrants and seizing 4,085 kilograms of 

marijuana. According to STC officials, they use after-action reports to 

confirm whether the operation achieved the anticipated results and to 

determine if new strategies are necessary for future operations. The 

STC uses information in after-action reports to brief the STC Unified 

Command at quarterly meetings and provide ad hoc updates to the 

CBP Commissioner.

According to a senior JOD official, the JOD is working with components to 

standardize reporting processes among the JFC, STC, and ACTT. 

According to the official, the JOD envisions obtaining regular (e.g., 

biweekly) reports from each mechanism regarding progress made toward 

achieving its annual objectives. The intent of these reports, once 

implemented, will be to help ensure that CBP’s collaboration with other 

agencies is carrying out CBP’s mission.
 

Page 16 GAO-14-494 Border Security

Opportunities exist to strengthen collaborative mechanisms by conducting 

an assessment of results across the mechanisms and establishing written 

agreements and a strategic-level mechanism to monitor coordination 

efforts. Specifically, DHS has not assessed the JFC and STC 

mechanisms to determine their relative benefits and challenges. 

Moreover, DHS has not established written agreements or a monitoring 

mechanism that could help facilitate and strengthen coordination with 

interagency partners in the ACTT and the STC Unified Command.

CBP has not assessed the JFC and STC to evaluate results across the 

mechanisms to identify any possible areas for improvement. Our analysis 

of CBP documentation on the JFC and STC as well as our interviews with 

headquarters and field officials identified two primary challenges 

experienced by the JFC and STC: (1) resource management challenges 

and (2) limited sharing of best practices across mechanisms. An 

assessment of the JFC and STC mechanisms could provide CBP with 

information to help better address these challenges.

Resource management challenges. JFC and STC component officials 

reported to us resource management challenges that, while different in 

nature, could be evaluated through an assessment of these mechanisms. 

The Fiscal Year 2013 JFC Campaign Plan states that the JFC mission is 

to integrate organizational responsiveness, resource allocation, and 

decision-making capabilities to improve efficiencies and effectiveness; 

however, our interviews with officials from all five JFC components 

highlighted resource management challenges with the JFC. For example, 

the JFC Chief of Staff stated that Border Patrol canine teams have been 

successfully used at POEs in Arizona for a number of years and that 

Border Patrol station and OFO port leadership jointly determine canine 

requirements and priorities and address any gaps in coverage and 

operational needs with their combined canine assets. In addition, the JFC 

Chief of Staff stated that Border Patrol and OFO canines are routinely 

used at POEs and can be interchanged between CBP components in 

many environments. The Chief of Staff noted that the deployment of 

Border Patrol canine teams to POEs serves as a force multiplier. 

However, some officials we interviewed provided different perspectives 

on the use of canines. For example, three JFC component officials in 

Arizona we interviewed cited challenges, from their perspective, in how 

the JFC has used Border Patrol and OFO canine resources. For example, 

these officials in Arizona told us that the JFC has attempted to integrate 

Assessment of 

Collaborative 

Mechanisms, Written 

Agreements, and a 

Monitoring Mechanism 

Could Strengthen 

Integration and 

Coordination Efforts along 

the Southwest Border

DHS Could Benefit from an 

Assessment of the JFC and 

STC Mechanisms
 

Page 17 GAO-14-494 Border Security

the canine resources of Border Patrol and OFO by reassigning canines 

from Border Patrol stations to POEs; however, they stated that, in their 

view, the reassignment of canines can contribute to inefficiencies 

because, among other things, Border Patrol canines are not used to 

working in the POE environment. CBP headquarters officials from both 

OFO and Border Patrol stated that canines are not easily interchanged 

between CBP components. Specifically, according to OFO officials, 

Border Patrol canines have less frequent contact with passengers, do not 

receive training on searching pedestrians, and can be more aggressive 

than OFO canines, which are used to working closely with passengers 

entering and leaving the United States. According to a Border Patrol 

headquarters official, in his view, the JFC has shifted canines from 

higher-threat areas along the border to a lower-threat POE, despite the 

fact that the port is not an area priority and receives a nominal amount of 

traffic.

Moreover, CBP component officials stated that dual reporting on JFC 

activities can contribute to inefficiencies in the use of resources and could 

result in duplication of effort. In its initial accomplishment report, the JFC 

notes as a success the consolidation of reporting through the Joint 

Intelligence and Operations Center to provide CBP field and 

headquarters’ leadership with a single source for all Arizona operational 

reporting. However, our interviews with officials from all five CBP 

components identified challenges in the reporting of information from the 

field to headquarters units. For example, according to JFC officials, all 

JFC components—OFO, Border Patrol, and OAM—are required to report 

operational matters, such as significant incidents involving the use of 

weapons, through the Joint Intelligence and Operations Center to the 

CBP Commissioner’s office. However, according to CBP component 

officials, the heads of OFO, Border Patrol, and OAM have identified a 

need to receive the same information on these operational matters. Thus, 

OFO, Border Patrol, and OAM officials in Arizona typically report 

information to both the JFC and their own chains of command in their own 

components, resulting in dual reporting. In addition, CBP component 

officials in Arizona stated that it can be challenging reporting port-related 

information to the JFC because JFC staff members may not have 

knowledge of port operations. For example, a senior OFO official stated 

that the JFC has directed a significant amount of follow-up questions to a 

POE on the data it reported because Border Patrol agents handle the 

JFC reporting process, and these Border Patrol agents do not have 

familiarity with port operations, which can create a burden for the 

components.
 

Page 18 GAO-14-494 Border Security

In addition, officials we interviewed stated that the STC has experienced 

resource challenges related to limited funding and personnel. The STC 

has no permanent staff and depends on a rotation of personnel from CBP 

components (e.g., Border Patrol, OFO, OAM) through the STC, as 

additional positions were not created to support the STC. Four of five 

CBP component officials we interviewed stated that limited resources are 

an overall challenge of the STC, and three of these component officials 

noted that detailing personnel to the STC can create staffing challenges. 

An official from one Border Patrol station in South Texas stated that the 

STC is pulling top resources from the station and that this creates 

challenges with backfilling the positions at the station and training the new 

staff. OFO officials also told us that POEs in South Texas have limited 

personnel to conduct port operations, making it difficult for POEs to 

provide personnel resources to the STC. In January 2013, the STC 

completed a staffing forecast, projecting ongoing staffing and resource 

needs that discusses the STC’s dependence on components to provide 

staff and resources to support the STC. The staffing forecast noted that 

this practice is not sustainable. According to senior STC headquarters 

officials, CBP headquarters has not taken any action on the STC’s 

staffing forecast because of staff turnover. An assessment of the JFC and 

STC could help CBP better understand areas for possible improvement 

related to resource management, such as the resources needed to 

implement these mechanisms and how to use the mechanisms’ 

resources efficiently.

Limited sharing of best practices across mechanisms. Opportunities 

also exist for CBP components to share best practices across Arizona 

and South Texas. The CBP Commissioner’s fiscal year 2014 operational 

priorities state that CBP should take the best practices of existing 

innovative and successful initiatives and apply them agency-wide. 

Further, both the STC Campaign Plan and the JFC Commander’s intent 

state that the mechanisms should capture and replicate best practices to 

better fulfill their missions and improve strategies; however, CBP has not 

assessed the potential application of best practices across these 

mechanisms. The JFC has shared some of its practices with the STC, 

such as sending officials to the STC to help establish standard operating 

procedures and sharing various initiatives, such as a visa revocation 

program. The STC has compiled a list of 40 administrative and 

operational best practices throughout the South Texas region for the 

potential application of the practices region-wide. The STC has 

implemented two of the identified best practices, an OAM fuel-saving 

program that provides bulk fuel prices for marine vessels and a physical 

training regimen to improve the daily duty performance of employees, and 
 

Page 19 GAO-14-494 Border Security

as of April 2014, according to STC officials, was also in the process of 

implementing an auto parts concession program.14

JFC and STC officials identified opportunities for the sharing of best 

practices across the various mechanisms. For example, an official at one 

STC component we interviewed noted that the STC should encourage 

additional sharing of best practices and that components should seek 

them out for continued growth. However, a senior STC official was 

unaware of efforts to apply STC best practices outside of the South Texas 

region. CBP headquarters officials stated that the STC planners used 

some informal lessons learned from the JFC when planning the STC and 

noted that the STC benefitted from the JFC having been established first. 

Sharing of practices, however, has not been ongoing. JFC officials stated 

that some JFC practices, such as the coordinated process of prioritizing 

and managing air assets, should serve as best practices for potential 

replication in other parts of the country, but that CBP has not made a 

systematic effort to share these practices, although the JFC has shared 

some practices on an ad hoc basis. An assessment of the JFC and STC 

mechanisms could help provide CBP with insights on areas for possible 

improvement and best practices that could be shared among the 

mechanisms.

However, this list of 

best practices compiled by the STC has not been shared with other CBP 

collaborative mechanisms, as CBP has not assessed the extent to which 

best practices could be identified and shared among the mechanisms.

In addition to resource management challenges and limited sharing of 

best practices across the mechanisms, CBP officials we interviewed 

identified concerns regarding the structure and operations of the JFC. 

Specifically, senior Border Patrol officials in Arizona told us that, in their 

view, the JFC has added an unnecessary layer to CBP operations in the 

state and that it was unclear to them what added capabilities the 

mechanism was providing. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated 

that, in their view, CBP should evaluate the JFC to determine whether 

 

14The Auto Parts Concession program establishes on-site, independently operated auto 

parts concession stores to support CBP fleet operations. For example, prior to the 

establishment of concessions stores, sectors ordered parts in bulk. This required 

excessive storage space and isolated costs in a single fiscal year. Now, parts ordering 

and payment are conducted online and parts are delivered the same or next day to the 

repair location. The STC reports more efficient fleet operation, better accountability of 

vehicle maintenance, and cost savings and avoidance as successes of the concession 

stores. 
 

Page 20 GAO-14-494 Border Security

changes are needed to the way the mechanism is structured and 

operated. These officials suggested that changes could be made to the 

JFC, such as letting POEs maintain responsibility for their daily 

operations and focusing more on targeted enforcement instead of 

focusing primarily on the allocation and control of CBP resources.

JFC officials noted that the establishment of the JFC was a major 

realignment of CBP operations in Arizona as well as a cultural change for 

personnel in the field. The officials noted that field-level resistance to the 

JFC is not unexpected given the massive undertaking of the realignment, 

and that the components are now recognizing the benefits of the JFC. 

However, an assessment of the JFC and STC could help position CBP to 

evaluate the effects of these mechanisms, best practices that could be 

shared among the mechanisms, and any areas for possible improvement, 

such as management of resources. Senior JOD officials stated that the 

JOD could help to ensure that JFC and STC local operational objectives 

are in line with nationwide objectives and make sure that the objectives 

are being met for more consistent nationwide monitoring. These officials 

stated that since the JOD is a new organization that is developing and 

being shaped by CBP, it has not assessed CBP’s collaborative 

mechanisms, including reviewing the potential sharing of best practices. 

These officials stated that CBP at the agency level needs to decide which 

mechanisms are working and to fund them based on an informed 

analysis. However, no entity within CBP has been directed to complete an 

assessment. 

CBP and its components have taken some steps to assess the JFC and 

STC; however, these actions have not been completed and do not 

evaluate the effects of these mechanisms, best practices that could be 

shared among the mechanisms, and any areas for possible improvement, 

such as management of resources. First, CBP initiated a review of the 

costs and benefits of the JFC. CBP’s Office of Administration (OA) began 

work on the cost-benefit analysis of the JFC in April 2013 in response to 

direction in the explanatory statement accompanying the fiscal year 2013 

DHS Appropriations Act.15

 

15Explanatory Statement, Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, 

159 Cong. Rec. S1287, S1550 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 2013). 

According to CBP officials, a draft cost-benefit 

analysis was completed in September 2013 and provided to the CBP 

Commissioner’s office for review; however, as of April 2014, the analysis 
 

Page 21 GAO-14-494 Border Security

has not been approved by the Commissioner and CBP officials could not 

provide us with a time frame for when the analysis would be approved. 

CBP OA officials stated that the draft cost-benefit analysis has no findings 

or recommendations. According to these officials, the draft analysis 

describes the costs, which are primarily personnel related, and discusses 

the qualitative benefits of the JFC related to its stated objectives; 

however, the draft analysis does not address resources needed to 

maintain the JFC going forward, nor does it evaluate the results achieved 

through the JFC. Further, according to OA officials, there is no consensus 

among CBP officials regarding the purpose of the analysis or how it will 

be used.

In addition to this CBP-wide cost-benefit analysis of the JFC, OFO is 

conducting its own internal assessment of the benefits and challenges 

associated with OFO’s involvement in collaborative mechanisms, such as 

the JFC and STC. Senior OFO officials stated that they are conducting 

this assessment to better understand the various collaborative 

mechanism structures as well as to determine how OFO is integrated into 

each mechanism and what resources it is contributing to the 

mechanisms. The officials said that they anticipate presenting the final 

assessment to the OFO Assistant Commissioner by July 2014. According 

to the officials, this assessment by OFO will focus on that component’s 

inputs to the JFC and STC, but is not intended to address other CBP 

components’ input and benefits from participation in those mechanisms.

Although CBP and OFO have taken steps toward assessing the JFC and 

STC, these assessments are not intended to provide CBP with 

information to evaluate challenges across components participating in 

these mechanisms or determine ways to address those challenges. Best 

practices for interagency collaboration call for federal agencies engaged 

in collaborative efforts to create the means to monitor and evaluate their 

efforts to enable them to identify areas for improvement.16

 

16

Further, 

according to these best practices, reporting on these activities can help 

key decision makers within the agencies, as well as clients and 

stakeholders, to obtain feedback for improving both policy and operational 

effectiveness. Best practices also indicate that collaborating agencies 

GAO-06-15. 
 

Page 22 GAO-14-494 Border Security

should identify the human, information, technology, physical, and financial 

resources needed to initiate or sustain their collaborative effort.17

In September 2013, we reported that collecting and assessing information 

on existing collaborative mechanisms would enable DHS to better monitor 

these mechanisms.18 In December 2010, we also reported that DHS 

could benefit from an assessment of operations along the northern border 

to identify outstanding challenges and develop planned corrective 

actions.19

ACTT and STC Unified Command partners reported positive aspects of 

coordination; however, officials from 11 of 12 partner agencies we 

contacted reported coordination challenges.

Specifically, we found that officials in the field were left to 

resolve coordination challenges without adequate headquarters 

involvement. While CBP’s current efforts to assess the JFC and STC are 

limited, or focus on a single component, an assessment of the JFC and 

STC could help CBP better determine the effects of these mechanisms, 

best practices that could be shared among the mechanisms, and any 

areas for possible improvement, such as management of resources. 

CBP’s memo to the Secretary of Homeland Security establishing the JFC 

in February 2011 notes that Arizona will be the site of CBP’s first JFC 

structure, suggesting that CBP may seek to establish additional JFC 

structures in other geographic areas. Senior CBP officials explained that 

CBP may look to expand these mechanisms; however, CBP has not 

finalized the cost-benefit analysis and has not made efforts to evaluate 

the STC. An assessment could help inform CBP decision making 

regarding any future uses or changes to the collaborative mechanisms.

20

 

17

Officials we interviewed 

from CBP headquarters and the partner agencies reported benefits of 

coordination, including increased information sharing and improved 

GAO-12-1022. 

18GAO-13-734. 

19GAO, Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency 

Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border, GAO-11-97 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.17, 

2010).

20In this section of the report, we provide the results of interviews with ACTT and STC 

Unified Command partners, including the number of partners of each mechanism that 

identified a specific area as a coordination challenge, such as limited resource 

commitments by participating agencies. The other ACTT and STC Unified Command 

partners did not identify these areas as challenges during the interviews.

DHS Could Strengthen 

Coordination by Establishing 

Written Agreements and a 

Monitoring Mechanism
 

Page 23 GAO-14-494 Border Security

planning for joint operations. For example, CBP headquarters officials 

and partners noted that intelligence sharing among agencies has 

improved because of the establishment of the ACTT and STC Unified 

Command. However, our discussions with officials from ACTT and the 

STC Unified Command partner agencies identified three barriers that they 

most frequently stated hindered effective coordination within their 

mechanisms: (1) limited resource commitments by participating agencies, 

(2) lack of common objectives, and (3) limited outreach to interagency 

partners.21

Limited resource commitments by participating agencies. Our 

interviews with officials from ACTT and STC Unified Command partner 

agencies identified challenges associated with limited partner resource 

commitments to the collaborative mechanisms. As stated in the ACTT 

charter, the ACTT is intended to engage individual agencies through a 

joint and cooperative effort to maximize resources toward a common 

strategy; however, officials from three of six ACTT partner agencies we 

interviewed cited resource challenges as a barrier to effective 

coordination. For example, a partner with the ACTT noted that resources 

are limited for all partners, and that there have been operations in which 

partners did not follow through with the resources they had committed 

during the planning stages. Specifically, this official explained how his 

agency was responsible for leading an overnight operation, which 

involved the commitment of other ACTT partners. However, the official 

said that other ACTT partners decided to cover a portion of the overnight 

operation, rather than the entire operation, without communicating the 

change in resources to the lead agency or the ACTT, a decision that 

shortened the length of the operation. Also, another ACTT partner stated 

that an operation was hampered by lack of resources from an interagency 

partner. In this case, the ACTT partner said that his agency was unable to 

apprehend a group of illegal entrants because it did not have the authority 

Written agreements and a strategic-level monitoring 

mechanism could better position DHS to address these challenges and 

strengthen coordination among partner agencies participating in the 

ACTT and STC Unified Command.

 

21Similar coordination challenges were raised in an internal DHS assessment of the ACTT 

by the Homeland Security Advisory Council in the fall of 2011. Per the request of the 

former secretary of homeland security, the ACTT was assessed by the Homeland Security 

Advisory Council Southwest Border Security Task Force. See Homeland Security 

Advisory Council, Southwest Border Task Force Report: Third Set of Recommendations

(Washington, D.C.: Fall 2011). 
 

Page 24 GAO-14-494 Border Security

to detain or arrest the entrants, and the agency did not have resources 

from an interagency partner with those authorities. The ACTT partner 

stated that it would be helpful to establish a partnership agreement 

regarding the level of resources that agencies can commit to joint 

operations.

Additionally, according to ACTT officials, the ACTT has experienced 

challenges finding interagency partners to contribute personnel to the 

ACTT staff. Border Patrol, ICE, the Arizona Department of Public Safety, 

and the Arizona National Guard are the four entities that provide staff to 

the ACTT. While the ACTT Charter states that the ACTT staff is to be 

recruited by individual agencies, there is no agreement among ACTT 

partners regarding how many staff will be provided or by which partners. 

Members of the ACTT staff said that, in their view, a number of different 

interagency partners should have the opportunity to lead the ACTT to 

better reflect a whole-of-government effort, in which partners participate 

jointly, as noted in the ACTT Charter; however, they stated that no 

agencies other than CBP and ICE have expressed an interest in 

assuming a leadership role in the ACTT.

Further, the STC Campaign Plan reflects the intention of the STC Unified 

Command to take a whole-of-government approach, with partner 

agencies contributing resources to enhance operations; however, officials 

from five of six STC Unified Command partners we interviewed cited 

resource challenges as a barrier to effective coordination. For example, 

an STC Unified Command partner stated that it can be difficult to address 

specific targets, such as a “stash house,” which is a property that a

criminal network may use to harbor illegal entrants, because of not having 

a sufficient resource commitment from investigative agencies. This 

partner stated that the success of the STC’s Unified Command is 

predicated on a whole-of-government approach in which all partner 

agencies provide ample resources. Another STC Unified Command 

partner stated that agencies may be reluctant to share personnel with the 

STC Unified Command because of pressure within these agencies to 

dedicate resources strictly for internal agency initiatives, rather than 

multiagency efforts.

Lack of common objectives. Our interviews with officials from ACTT 

and STC Unified Command partner agencies identified lack of common 

objectives as a barrier to coordination, which could result in limited 

sharing of information between interagency partners. Officials from three 

of six ACTT partner agencies and four of six STC Unified Command 

partner agencies cited lack of common objectives as a challenge. 
 

Page 25 GAO-14-494 Border Security

Specifically, according to officials from some of these partner agencies, 

as CBP is a lead agency of the ACTT and the STC, those mechanisms 

have been more focused on helping CBP achieve its interdiction 

objectives, rather than the missions of the various interagency partners. 

For example, one ACTT partner stated that the ACTT has not taken the 

priorities of investigative agencies into account when planning joint 

operations, which has marginalized these agencies. This partner noted 

that in some instances valuable operations have collapsed prior to 

implementation because ACTT partners could not reach consensus 

regarding whether and how to proceed because of the ACTT’s focus on 

interdictions. An STC Unified Command partner also noted that, in his 

view, the STC Unified Command has been more focused on interdictions, 

which has resulted in inadequate information sharing between CBP and 

investigative agencies, such as ICE and the Drug Enforcement 

Administration. In addition, DHS and CBP headquarters officials stated 

that the lack of common objectives between CBP and investigative 

agencies has been an ongoing challenge and has resulted in limited 

information sharing between the agencies.

Limited outreach to interagency partners. Our interviews with officials 

from ACTT and STC Unified Command partner agencies identified 

challenges associated with limited outreach from the mechanisms to 

interagency partners. Specifically, officials from two of six ACTT partner 

agencies cited limited outreach as a barrier to coordination. One partner 

stated that the ACTT has not provided partner agencies with a sufficient 

understanding of how the ACTT is different from other multiagency task 

forces and initiatives in Arizona, in his view contributing to less support for 

the mechanism among interagency partners. Another partner noted that 

the ACTT has not communicated its approach to prioritizing resources 

across the focus areas, which has created a lack of alignment between 

the focus areas. Moreover, officials from four of six STC Unified 

Command partner agencies we interviewed noted that STC leadership 

could improve its outreach to federal, state, and local entities in order to 

increase awareness of how the STC Unified Command can serve 

different partners’ needs. For example, one partner stated that the STC 

Unified Command has incorporated one of the partner agency’s locations 

in South Texas into the STC Unified Command; however, the STC 

Unified Command has not conducted outreach to the agency’s other 

locations in the area. Consequently, the official stated that these other 

locations either do not know about the STC Unified Command or are not 

yet aware of the value that the mechanism can provide. This partner 

noted that gaining the support of all area offices is important in helping 

the STC Unified Command to build cases against criminal networks as 
 

Page 26 GAO-14-494 Border Security

opposed to making individual apprehensions without knowledge of the 

broader threat environment. Senior STC headquarters officials noted that 

the STC Unified Command can do a better job of conducting outreach to 

interagency partners.

Establishing ACTT- and STC Unified Command-specific agreements with 

interagency partners could help better position DHS to address these 

challenges. While there are broader agreements in place between some 

federal agencies relating to agency authorities, protocols, and 

responsibilities along the southwest border, ACTT- and STC Unified 

Command-specific partnership agreements have not been developed or 

implemented. Best practices for interagency collaboration call for the 

development of written agreements to document collaboration.22

Accordingly, we have previously recommended that collaborations would 

benefit from a formal written agreement. For example, in April 2013, we 

recommended that DHS examine the potential benefits of written 

agreements between Border Patrol and tribes to address border security 

coordination issues.

These 

practices indicate that as agencies bring diverse cultures to the 

collaborative effort, it is important to address these differences to enable 

a cohesive working relationship and to create the mutual trust required to 

enhance and sustain the collaborative effort. Written agreements, in part, 

provide a legal framework to improve partnerships, facilitate information 

exchange, define tasks to be accomplished by each entity, and establish 

written assurances of each entity’s commitments.

23

 

22

We concluded that written agreements could help 

DHS and tribal governments come together as partners to establish 

complementary goals and strategies for achieving shared results in 

securing the border on tribal lands. Moreover, in March 2006, in response 

to a GAO recommendation, DHS, the U.S. Department of the Interior 

(DOI), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) signed a 

memorandum of understanding (MOU) related to border security efforts 

GAO-06-15 and GAO-12-1022. 

23GAO, Border Security: Partnership Agreements and Enhanced Oversight Could 

Strengthen Coordination of Efforts on Indian Reservations, GAO-13-352 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 5, 2013).
 

Page 27 GAO-14-494 Border Security

on federal lands.24 The agreement defines the resource commitments of 

each agency related to areas such as operations and training, outlines 

common goals, and specifies outreach activities designed to enhance 

communication among the parties. In November 2010 we found that 

DHS, DOI, and USDA could better implement some provisions of the 

agreement; however, we concluded that information sharing among the 

parties increased since establishment of the MOU.25

Officials from CBP noted that ACTT- and STC Unified Command-specific 

partnership agreements do not exist because there is a tendency to 

depend on informal relationships among partner agencies and there may 

be some concern about making a written commitment, which would hold 

agencies accountable for multiagency efforts in addition to their internal 

agency initiatives. However, written agreements could serve as a guiding 

document or overarching statement of principles for ACTT and STC 

Unified Command participants, including specifying the types and levels 

of participation and resources by agencies, delineating common 

objectives, and defining outreach activities to enhance awareness across 

agencies. For example, the ACTT Chief of Staff stated that the ACTT is 

facing coordination challenges, such as lack of common objectives, and 

noted that a partnership agreement could help document partner 

resource commitments and achieve higher-level buy-in to ACTT 

objectives and missions. According to this official, establishment of such a 

written agreement would need to be initiated at a higher level, such as by 

DHS, since many partners are components within larger organizations. 

Senior Border Patrol officials in South Texas stated that the STC Unified 

Command would also benefit from an overarching written agreement, or 

agreements, with partner agencies, which could serve as a road map 

among the agencies and could help delineate resource commitments.

In addition, establishing a monitoring mechanism could help better 

position DHS to address challenges and strengthen coordination among 

DHS components and components from other federal, state, and local 

 

24Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, and Department of 

Agriculture, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Cooperative National Security and 

Counterterrorism Efforts on Federal Lands along the United States’ Border (Washington, 

D.C.: March 2006). 

25GAO, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated 

Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands, GAO-11-177 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 18, 2010).
 

Page 28 GAO-14-494 Border Security

agencies that participate in the ACTT and STC Unified Command. There 

is no DHS headquarters-level monitoring mechanism for coordination 

among DHS components participating in the ACTT and the STC Unified 

Command, or the external coordination efforts of the ACTT or the STC 

Unified Command. However, such a mechanism could help DHS, at a 

strategic level, to monitor the implementation of any written agreements 

to address the coordination challenges we identified, particularly related 

to agencies’ resource commitments to the ACTT and STC Unified 

Command and establishment of common objectives. For example, as 

previously discussed, officials from ACTT and STC Unified Command 

partner agencies we interviewed identified challenges associated with 

limited partner resource commitments to the collaborative mechanisms. 

Written agreements could help document partner resource commitments 

to the ACTT and STC Unified Command, and a DHS-level monitoring 

mechanism could help the department monitor implementation of 

resource commitments identified in the written agreements. Moreover, as 

previously discussed, officials from some ACTT and STC Unified 

Command partner agencies we interviewed cited challenges related to 

lack of common objectives. As the ACTT and STC Unified Command are 

led by DHS component agencies, a DHS strategic-level monitoring 

mechanism could help support and review the establishment of common 

objectives among partner agencies and help better ensure that those 

common objectives are appropriately balanced among the missions of 

interagency partners.

Officials from both the ACTT and STC have also said that a DHS-level 

monitoring mechanism could strengthen these collaborative mechanisms. 

For example, ACTT staff members noted that DHS is not involved with 

the ACTT and stated that more DHS headquarters involvement is needed 

to monitor the whole-of-government effort and to create a unified strategy. 

The ACTT Chief of Staff suggested that increased DHS engagement at 

the strategic level could improve coordination among DHS component 

partners, help better integrate ACTT partners, and serve as an example 

for other partners to increase their participation. Moreover, senior STC 

headquarters officials stated that operations in the field are evolving more 

quickly than operations at the headquarters level, and the success of 

collaborative mechanisms is predicated on headquarters-level monitoring. 

Further, the Executive Director of the JOD stated that a DHS-level 

mechanism to monitor the ACTT and STC Unified Command would help 

in ensuring that these mechanisms are operating in a strategic manner.

In addition, an assessment of DHS’s collaborative mechanisms by the 

Homeland Security Advisory Council found that DHS’s collaborative 
 

Page 29 GAO-14-494 Border Security

mechanisms would benefit from strategic-level monitoring at the 

headquarters level.26

In September 2013, we reported that DHS’s limited visibility over the 

universe of collaborative field mechanisms operating under its purview 

reduced its ability to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of these 

mechanisms to enhance cross-departmental management and integrated 

operations.

Specifically, this assessment found that 

headquarters-level support could help to set and monitor specific 

objectives for the mechanisms and improve outreach to interagency 

partners, among other things. Further, in documentation establishing 

another border security collaborative mechanism, DHS identified the 

importance of a DHS headquarters leadership entity or monitoring 

mechanism. For example, the charter establishing DHS’s ACTT in New 

Mexico and West Texas stated that a leadership group at the DHS 

headquarters level would be beneficial in providing guidance to 

collaborative mechanisms, and should be composed of senior officials 

from each DHS component.

27 Specifically, DHS senior officials stated at the time that the 

components, not the department, are responsible for the mechanisms’ 

oversight because the department is more focused on strategic rather 

than operational-level management activities. In addition, a DHS senior 

policy official during our review indicated that a monitoring mechanism at 

the DHS headquarters level would be beneficial if it functions in a 

strategic manner, rather than managing the operations of collaborative 

mechanisms. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government 

indicates that controls should generally be designed to ensure that 

ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations and 

assesses the quality of performance over time.28 Such monitoring should 

be performed continually and ingrained in the agency’s operations. 

Further, best practices for interagency collaboration state that federal 

agencies can enhance and sustain collaborative efforts by, in part, 

developing mechanisms to monitor and evaluate their results to identify 

areas for improvement.29

 

26See Homeland Security Advisory Council, Southwest Border Task Force Report: Third 

Set of Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: Fall 2011). 

These practices indicate that monitoring can be 

achieved through various means, such as establishing a leadership 

27GAO-13-734. 

28GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

29GAO-06-15. 
 

Page 30 GAO-14-494 Border Security

council to oversee coordination efforts or conducting regular progress 

reviews.

DHS could benefit from strategic-level monitoring of the ACTT and the 

STC Unified Command, as the department is accountable for the 

resources that support these mechanisms and ensuring that components, 

such as CBP and ICE, are integrated. In addition, DHS is better 

positioned than the components to increase collaboration and resolve 

potential issues with other departments participating in collaborative 

mechanisms, such as the Department of Justice. Specifically, a DHSlevel monitoring mechanism could help address the coordination 

challenge that the ACTT and the STC Unified Command are facing 

related to lack of common objectives across agencies. A department-level 

monitoring mechanism could also help better position DHS to ensure that 

DHS agencies participating in the ACTT and the STC Unified Command 

are following provisions established in any written agreements, including 

resource commitments.

Security threats along the southwest border highlight the importance of 

integrated operations and interagency coordination with respect to DHS’s 

border security efforts. DHS has established collaborative mechanisms in 

Arizona and South Texas to help better integrate CBP components and 

facilitate coordination with federal, state, local, tribal, and military 

homeland security partners. These mechanisms have coordinated CBP 

and interagency partner efforts through areas such as information 

sharing, resource targeting and prioritization, and leveraging of assets.

DHS and CBP have established processes to report on the results of the 

JFC, ACTT, and STC. Although these reporting processes are in place, 

opportunities exist for CBP to more thoroughly address integration and 

coordination challenges. For example, CBP has not completed an 

assessment of the benefits and challenges of the JFC and STC. An 

assessment looking across the JFC and STC could help CBP evaluate 

the effects of these mechanisms, best practices that could be shared 

among the mechanisms, and any areas for possible improvement, such 

as management of resources. Moreover, while interagency partners 

report benefits of participation in these collaborative mechanisms, 

participants we interviewed identified barriers to effective coordination, 

including limited partner resource commitments and lack of common 

objectives. Written agreements specific to ACTT and STC Unified 

Command participation could provide a mechanism to help resolve 

coordination issues, such as resource commitments. Further, DHS does 

Conclusions
 

Page 31 GAO-14-494 Border Security

not have a headquarters-level monitoring mechanism to oversee the 

interagency coordination efforts of the ACTT or STC Unified Command. A 

monitoring mechanism could help address ACTT and STC Unified 

Command coordination challenges related to lack of common objectives, 

resolve potential issues among interagency partners, and help ensure 

that partner agencies are following parameters established in partnership 

agreements, including resource commitments. Establishing written 

agreements and a monitoring mechanism could be helpful in minimizing 

ongoing coordination issues related to the ACTT and the STC Unified 

Command and help DHS to develop more effective collaborative field 

mechanisms.

To strengthen coordination within the JFC and STC, we recommend that 

the Commissioner of CBP complete an assessment of the JFC and STC, 

including evaluating the effects of these mechanisms, best practices that 

could be shared among the mechanisms, and any areas for possible 

improvement, such as management of resources.

To strengthen coordination among partner agencies participating in the 

ACTT and the STC Unified Command, we recommend that the Secretary 

of Homeland Security take the following two actions:

1. establish written agreements with interagency partners participating in 

the ACTT and the STC Unified Command, and

2. establish a strategic-level mechanism to monitor the interagency 

coordination efforts of the ACTT and the STC Unified Command.

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense, 

Homeland Security, the Interior, and Justice for review and comment. The 

Departments of Defense, the Interior, and Justice did not provide 

comments on our draft report. DHS provided written comments, which are 

summarized below and reproduced in full in appendix III, and technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS concurred with 

the three recommendations in the report and described actions underway 

or planned to address them.

With regard to the first recommendation, that CBP complete an

assessment of the JFC and STC, DHS concurred and stated that CBP’s 

Joint Operations Directorate will develop a plan to conduct an 

assessment of the JFC and STC, including the criteria to be evaluated, a 

timeline for the assessment, and courses of action to conduct the 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 32 GAO-14-494 Border Security

assessment. DHS stated that, based on the plan, the CBP Commissioner 

will designate an entity to conduct the assessment. With regard to the 

second recommendation, that DHS establish written agreements with 

interagency partners participating in the ACTT and the STC Unified 

Command, DHS concurred and stated that the department will establish a 

process to develop MOUs for coordination mechanisms along the 

southern border, including the ACTT and STC Unified Command. DHS 

noted that it has already taken initial steps in addressing this 

recommendation, such as creating a strategic framework to guide 

development of a campaign plan for the southern border. DHS stated 

that, once completed, this plan will, among other things, include

approaches for improved information sharing and inform related efforts, 

including the development of MOUs with federal, state, local, and 

international governments. With regard to the third recommendation, that 

DHS establish a strategic-level mechanism to monitor the interagency 

coordination efforts of the ACTT and the STC Unified Command, DHS 

concurred and stated that the DHS Office of Operations Coordination and 

Planning, in coordination with other components, will establish a strategiclevel mechanism to monitor the interagency coordination efforts of the 

ACTT and STC Unified Command. DHS noted that it has initiated steps 

toward addressing this recommendation, such as creating the strategic 

framework to guide development of a campaign plan for the southern 

border. DHS stated that this plan, once completed, will promote further 

development of mechanisms for enhanced strategic-level monitoring and 

interagency coordination. If fully implemented, these and other actions 

noted in DHS’s written comments should help address the intent of the 

recommendations. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested 

parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO 

website at http://www.gao.gov. 
 

Page 33 GAO-14-494 Border Security

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix IV.

Rebecca Gambler

Director,

Homeland Security and Justice
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 34 GAO-14-494 Border Security

This report (1) describes how the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) uses collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to 

coordinate border security efforts, and (2) examines the extent to which 

DHS has established performance measures and reporting processes 

and how, if at all, DHS has assessed and monitored the effectiveness of 

the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas.

To address these objectives we visited the Joint Field Command (JFC) 

and the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) in Arizona and 

the South Texas Campaign (STC) in South Texas and conducted 

interviews with officials in U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

headquarters. In Arizona, we visited JFC and ACTT headquarters in 

Tucson and observed the JFC’s Joint Intelligence and Operations Center 

and an ACTT leadership meeting. We also conducted interviews with JFC 

and ACTT headquarters officials. In South Texas, we visited STC 

headquarters in Laredo, where we observed operations at Border Patrol 

checkpoints and ports of entry (POE) as well as the South Texas Border 

Intelligence Center, and conducted interviews with STC headquarters 

officials. During our site visits to Arizona and South Texas, we also met 

with officials from the Office of Field Operations (OFO), Border Patrol, 

and the Office of Air and Marine (OAM). Additionally, we conducted 

semistructured interviews via telephone with CBP component officials in 

Arizona and South Texas. We selected nonprobability samples of 5 CBP 

component locations from the 21 CBP component locations in Arizona 

and 5 CBP component locations from the 43 CBP component locations in 

the South Texas region. Concerning the JFC, we conducted interviews 

with officials from the Yuma and Casa Grande Border Patrol stations, the 

Nogales and San Luis POEs, and the Tucson Air Branch. Regarding the 

STC, we conducted interviews with officials from the McAllen and Laredo 

South Border Patrol stations, the Brownsville and Eagle Pass POEs, and 

the McAllen Air Branch. We selected these JFC and STC component 

locations based on (1) the type of component (Border Patrol station, OFO 

POE, or OAM air branch), (2) the level of threat as defined by the number 

of CBP apprehensions of illegal entrants, and (3) geographic location.

Further, we conducted semistructured interviews via telephone with 

officials from interagency partners participating in the ACTT and the STC 

Unified Command. We selected nonprobability samples of 6 ACTT 

partners from the 66 ACTT partners in Arizona and 6 STC Unified 

Command partners from the 33 STC Unified Command partners in South 

Texas. With respect to the ACTT, we interviewed officials from the U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), National Park Service, 

Arizona National Guard, Arizona Department of Public Safety, Sierra 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 35 GAO-14-494 Border Security

Vista Police Department, and Tohono O’odham Police Department. 

Regarding the STC Unified Command, we interviewed officials from the 

CBP Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol station; CBP Laredo Field Office; 

Drug Enforcement Administration (Houston); ICE (San Antonio); Bureau 

of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (San Antonio); and the 

U.S. Assistant Attorney’s Office (Laredo). We selected these agencies

based on a range of factors, including (1) type of governmental unit 

(federal, state/county, local, tribal, or military), and (2) the level of 

participation in the mechanism as defined by leadership role. While we 

cannot generalize information obtained from these interviews to all CBP 

component offices and intergovernmental partners in Arizona and South 

Texas, we selected these locations and partners to provide examples of 

the way CBP has integrated and coordinated border security efforts. We 

used the results of semistructured interviews with CBP component offices 

in the field and interagency partners to identify the primary areas of 

integration and coordination of the collaborative mechanisms.

To describe how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) uses 

collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to coordinate 

border security efforts, we reviewed program documentation and

interviewed officials from CBP. Specifically, we reviewed documents 

obtained from JFC, ACTT, and STC officials covering the time frame 

2009 through 2014, such as charter documents, establishment memos, 

and organizational charts, to identify the structure and roles and 

responsibilities for each mechanism. We also reviewed campaign and 

operational plans, as well as performance reports, to determine 

coordination efforts of the mechanisms. Further, we interviewed CBP 

headquarters officials, including officials from the Office of Administration 

(OA) and the Joint Operations Directorate (JOD), regarding DHS’s 

coordination efforts in Arizona and South Texas.

To examine the extent to which DHS has established performance 

measures and reporting processes and how, if at all, DHS has assessed 

and monitored the effectiveness of the collaborative mechanisms in 

Arizona and South Texas, we analyzed campaign plans, after-action 

reports, and accomplishment reports from 2011 through 2014 obtained 

from the collaborative mechanisms to determine what measures are in 

place to track program results and outcomes. In addition, we conducted 

interviews with officials from Border Patrol, OFO, and OAM headquarters 

to determine the extent to which CBP and its components are assessing 

the benefits and challenges of the JFC, ACTT, and STC. We used our 

interviews with CBP’s JOD and OA to determine the extent to which CBP 

is evaluating the JFC and STC mechanisms to identify challenges and 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 36 GAO-14-494 Border Security

potential best practices for replication. Additionally, we reviewed 

partnership agreements in place among interagency partners in Arizona 

and South Texas, as well as a previous DHS assessment of collaborative 

mechanisms in the field.1 We evaluated CBP’s integration and 

coordination efforts against best practices for implementing interagency 

collaboration.2 We also compared CBP’s monitoring efforts against 

criteria in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.

3

We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 

1

Homeland Security Advisory Council, Southwest Border Task Force Report: Third Set of 

Recommendations, (Washington D.C.: Fall 2011). Per the request of the former secretary 

of homeland security, the ACTT was assessed by the Homeland Security Advisory 

Council (HSAC) Southwest Border Security Task Force as part of a larger study on the 

potential for expanding the corridor security concept throughout the southwest border 

environment.

2

GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005); 

GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency 

Collaborative Mechanisms, GAO-12-1022 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012); and 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999). We developed effective practices to enhance and 

sustain interagency collaboration in GAO-06-15 and GAO-12-1022 by interviewing experts 

in the area of collaboration and gathering information on select areas where federal 

agencies have developed substantial ongoing collaborations. These practices are 

applicable to collaborative mechanisms DHS has established along the southwest border 

in Arizona and South Texas, as these mechanisms involve interagency collaboration and 

are intended to help strengthen coordination of border security efforts among participating 

agencies.

3

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 
Appendix II: List of Partners in the Alliance to 

Combat Transnational Threats and South 

Texas Campaign Unified Command

Page 37 GAO-14-494 Border Security

U.S. Border Patrol Tucson and Yuma Sectors

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Field Operations

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security 

Investigations (HSI)

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Enforcement and Removal 

Operations (ERO)

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

U.S. Attorney’s Office

U.S. Department of the Interior

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Bureau of Land Management

U.S. Forest Service

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

U.S. Marshals Service

U.S. Secret Service

Transportation Security Administration (TSA)

U.S. Department of State

National Park Service

Arizona Department of Public Safety

Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas

Tucson Counter Narcotics Alliance

Appendix II: List of Partners in the Alliance to 

Combat Transnational Threats and South 

Texas Campaign Unified Command

Alliance to Combat 

Transnational Threats
Appendix II: List of Partners in the Alliance to 

Combat Transnational Threats and South 

Texas Campaign Unified Command

Page 38 GAO-14-494 Border Security

State of Arizona Attorney General

Pima County Attorney

Santa Cruz County Attorney

Maricopa County Attorney

Yuma County Attorney

Pinal County Attorney

Cochise County Attorney

Pima County Sheriff

Santa Cruz County Sheriff

Maricopa County Sheriff

Yuma County Sheriff

Pinal County Sheriff

Cochise County Sheriff

Graham County Sheriff

Gila River Police Department

Tohono O’odham Police Department

Ak-Chin Indian Community Police Department

Phoenix Police Department

Tucson Police Department

Nogales Police Department

Patagonia Police Department

Sahuartia Police Department
Appendix II: List of Partners in the Alliance to 

Combat Transnational Threats and South 

Texas Campaign Unified Command

Page 39 GAO-14-494 Border Security

South Tucson Police Department

Marana Police Department

Oro Valley Police Department

Casa Grande Police Department

Eloy Police Department

Maricopa Police Department

San Luis Police Department

Yuma Police Department

Wellton Police Department

Benson Police Department

Bisbee Police Department

Douglas Police Department

Huachuca City Police Department

Safford Police Department

Sierra Vista Police Department

Tombstone Marshal’s Office

Willcox Police Department

Thatcher Police Department

Arizona National Guard

Arizona Joint Counter Narco-Terrorism Task Force

Luke Air Force Base

U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Fort Huachuca
Appendix II: List of Partners in the Alliance to 

Combat Transnational Threats and South 

Texas Campaign Unified Command

Page 40 GAO-14-494 Border Security

Laredo Border Patrol Sector Chief Patrol Agent

Del Rio Border Patrol Sector Chief Patrol Agent

Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol Sector Chief Patrol Agent

New Orleans Border Patrol Sector Chief Patrol Agent

Laredo Field Office Director of Field Operations

Houston Field Office Director of Field Operations

Southwest Region Director

San Antonio Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent in Charge

Houston DEA Special Agent in Charge

San Antonio HSI Special Agent in Charge

Houston HSI Special Agent in Charge

Southern District of Texas U.S. Marshal

Laredo DEA Assistant Special Agent in Charge

San Antonio DEA Assistant Special Agent in Charge

McAllen DEA Assistant Special Agent in Charge

Dallas DEA Assistant Special Agent in Charge

San Antonio ATF Resident Agent in Charge

Houston ATF Special Agent in Charge

Corpus Christi U.S. Coast Guard Captain

Joint Task Force North Lieutenant Colonel

U.S. Army North Colonel

San Antonio USCIS District Director

South Texas Campaign 

Unified Command
Appendix II: List of Partners in the Alliance to 

Combat Transnational Threats and South 

Texas Campaign Unified Command

Page 41 GAO-14-494 Border Security

San Antonio USCIS Records Manager

San Antonio ERO Field Office Director

Houston ERO Field Office Director

Laredo Assistant U.S. Attorney

CBP Internal Affairs Special Agent in Charge

CBP Assistant Chief Counsel

CBP Attaché Mexico City

TSA Field Security Director

Texas Department of Public Safety Regional Director

South Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Director

Houston High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Director
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 42 GAO-14-494 Border Security

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 43 GAO-14-494 Border Security
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 44 GAO-14-494 Border Security

Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or GamblerR@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Jeanette Espínola (Assistant 

Director), David Alexander, Molly Callaghan, Frances Cook, Joseph Cruz, 

Anthony Fernandez, Eric Hauswirth, Lauren Membreno, and Jessica Orr 

made key contributions to the report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(441163)
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