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JIHADIST SAFE HAVENS: EFFORTS TO DETECT 

AND DETER TERRORIST TRAVEL 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

AND INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 24, 2014 

Serial No. 113–80 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

CURTIS CLAWSON, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONDALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

VACANCY

VACANCY

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN O’HARA, Acting Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania, Vice Chair 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

CURTIS CLAWSON, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

MANDY BOWERS, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DENNIS TERRY, Subcommittee Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism 

and Intelligence: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESSES

Mr. Frederick W. Kagan, Director, Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

Mr. Robin Simcox, Research Fellow, The Henry Jackson Society: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Mr. Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs, Davis Institute 

for National Security and Foreign Policy, The Heritage Foundation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19 

Mr. Seth G. Jones, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, The Rand Corporation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 22 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 24 

(1) 

JIHADIST SAFE HAVENS: EFFORTS TO 

DETECT AND DETER TERRORIST TRAVEL 

Thursday, July 24, 2014 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King [Chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives King, Broun, Clawson, Higgins, and 

Thompson. 

Mr. KING. Good morning. First of all, thank you for being here. 

It is really—it is very much appreciated. I know I speak for the 

Ranking Member, as well. 

The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 

Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony examining jihadist 

safe havens and efforts to detect and deter terrorist travel. I now 

recognize myself for an opening statement. 

Today we know at least 100 Americans have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria for the purpose of joining an Islamist extremist group, either al-Nusra Front, the Islamic State of Iraq and 

al-Sham (ISIS), or another. We also know that several thousand individuals from European nations have flocked to Syria, and likely 

now Iraq, for the same purpose. 

Fifteen months ago, this subcommittee held a hearing on the 

growing threat posed to the homeland from al-Qaeda, which focused on foreign fighters from around the world converging on the 

war zone in Syria. Since that time, from all accounts, the situation 

has dramatically worsened. The number of al-Qaeda-affiliated and 

jihadist groups has multiplied. 

In May 2014, FBI Director Comey noted that the current Syrian 

conflict, ‘‘is an order of magnitude’’ worse than Afghanistan in the 

1980s and 1990s. With stunning velocity, the group formerly 

known as al-Qaeda in Iraq has evolved into the Islamic State of 

Iraq and al-Sham, and established what it calls a caliphate that 

spans across portions of Iraq and Syria. 

While core al-Qaeda leadership may have diminished capacity, in 

recent months, it has sought to rebuild as U.S. forces withdraw 

from Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda affiliates around the world are as 

strong as ever. ISIS has ruthlessly captured cities, killed indiscriminately, and mobilized thousands of foreign fighters to its 
2 

cause. It moves its men and arms at will into safe havens on both 

sides of the Iraqi-Syrian border. 

At least one American has died as a suicide bomber after spending 2 months in a training camp operated by al-Nusra Front in 

Aleppo. Twenty-two-year-old Moner Mohammed Abusalha, who 

was born and raised in Florida and reportedly traveled to Syria in 

late 2013, blew himself up in an attack in Syria on May 25, 2014. 

The threat is not limited to U.S. persons fighting and being 

radicalized overseas or constrained to battlefields in Syria and 

Iraq. On May 24, French jihadist and Syrian war veteran Mehdi 

Nemmouche attacked a Jewish museum in Brussels. 

Compounding the threat is the potential for terror groups to coordinate and share expertise, as well as fighters. Last month, we 

all followed press reports that members of al-Nusra had possibly 

linked up with bomb-making experts from AQAP, al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula. The potent combination of AQAP’s bomb-making expertise and al-Nusra’s large pool of radical converts, including U.S. and European passport-holders, poses a severe threat to 

the homeland. 

These concerns recently caused the United States to require additional security measures to enhance screening of travelers and 

luggage on U.S.-bound flights. Attorney General Holder’s comments 

that, ‘‘the Syrian conflict has turned that region into a cradle of 

violent extremism,’’ are important. As he said, the world cannot let 

it become a training ground from which our nationals can return 

and launch attacks. 

Unfortunately, as we have seen too often, words from key administration officials have not translated into plans and action. Political instability and American disengagement in the region has created the conditions allowing radical jihadism to regenerate and metastasize. It is essential that the White House articulates American 

interests in the region and elicits greater cooperation from European and foreign partners to identify and track individuals seeking 

to join extremist groups. 

As the diaspora of fighters and ideology spreads, there will be 

long-term consequences and a direct threat to the United States 

and to the West. It is time for the administration and the Congress 

to implement a plan to safeguard the homeland before Westerners 

who have become further radicalized in these conflicts are sent 

home to carry out attacks. 

I especially want to thank Dr. Simcox and Dr. Jones, who have 

previously testified before our committee. We also want to welcome 

Fred Kagan, who I had the opportunity of meeting, I guess, 7 or 

8 years ago now when you were in the process of formulating the 

surge policy in Iraq, you and General Keane. I remember that 

meeting very well. And Peter Brookes, who has been a long-time 

warrior in this fight against terrorism. 

So you are here to put ISIS’s growth in perspective, a group 

which was not even discussed a year ago, but now controls large 

portions of territory in Syria and Iraq and poses a significant 

threat to the United States. I look forward to the panel’s update 

and would like to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses in advance. 

[The statement of Chairman King follows:] 
3 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETER T. KING

Today we know that at least 100 Americans have traveled or attempted to travel 

to Syria for the purpose of joining an Islamist extremist group, either al-Nusrah 

Front, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), or another. We also know that 

several thousand individuals from European nations have flocked to Syria, and likely now Iraq, for the same purpose. 

Fifteen months ago, this subcommittee held a hearing on the growing threat 

posed to the homeland from al-Qaeda, which focused on foreign fighters from around 

the world converging on the war zone Syria. Since that time, from all accounts the 

situation has dramatically worsened. The number of al-Qaeda-affiliated and jihadist 

groups have multiplied. In May 2014, FBI Director Comey noted that the current 

Syrian conflict ‘‘is an order of magnitude’’ worse than Afghanistan in the 1980s and 

1990s. And with stunning velocity, the group formerly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq 

has evolved into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, and established what it calls 

a caliphate that spans across portions of Iraq and Syria. 

While core al-Qaeda leadership may have diminished capacity, in recent months 

they have sought to rebuild as U.S. forces withdraw from Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda 

affiliates around the world are as strong as ever. ISIS has ruthlessly captured cities, 

killed indiscriminately, and mobilized thousands of foreign fighters to its cause. It 

moves its men and arms at will into safe havens on both sides of the Iraqi-Syrian 

border. 

At least one American has died as a suicide bomber after spending 2 months in 

a training camp operated by al-Nusrah Front in Aleppo. Twenty-two-year-old Moner 

Mohammed Abusalha, who was born and raised in Florida and reportedly traveled 

to Syria in late 2013, and blew himself up in an attack in Syria on May 25, 2014. 

The threat is not limited to U.S. persons fighting and being radicalized overseas, 

or constrained to battlefields in Syria and Iraq. On May 24, French jihadist and Syrian war veteran Mehdi Nemmouche attacked a Jewish museum in Brussels. 

Compounding the threat is the potential for terror groups to coordinate and share 

expertise, as well as fighters. Last month, we all followed press reports that members of al-Nusrah had possibly linked up with bomb-making experts from al-Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The potent combination of AQAP’s bomb-making 

expertise and al-Nusrah’s large pool of radical converts including U.S. and European 

passport holders, poses a significant threat to the homeland. These concerns recently caused the United States to require additional security measures at certain 

foreign airports to enhance screening of travelers and luggage on U.S.-bound flights. 

Attorney General Eric Holder’s comments that ‘‘the Syrian conflict has turned 

that region into a cradle of violent extremism,’’ are important. As he said, ‘‘the world 

cannot let it become a training ground from which our nationals can return and 

launch attacks.’’ Unfortunately, as we have seen far too often, words from key administration officials, including the President, have not translated into plans and action. Political instability and American disengagement in the region has created the 

conditions allowing radical jihadism to re-generate and metastasize. 

It is essential that the White House articulates American interests in the region, 

and elicits greater cooperation from European and foreign partners to identify and 

track individuals seeking to join extremist groups. As the diaspora of fighters and 

ideology spreads, there will be long-term consequences and a direct threat to the 

United States and the West. It is time for the administration to implement a plan 

to safeguard the homeland before Westerners who have become further radicalized 

in these conflicts are sent home to carry out attacks. 

I would like to welcome back Mr. Simcox and Dr. Jones, who testified at our hearing last year. It appears that over the last year the situation on the ground have 

gotten substantially worse for American interests in the region. To put ISIS’s 

growth in perspective—a group not discussed a year ago now controls large portions 

of territory in Syria and Iraq and poses a significant threat to the United States. 

I look forward to the panel’s update, with the additional input from Dr. Kagan 

and Dr. Brookes, on the spreading conflict and would like to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses in advance. 

Mr. KING. With that, I yield to the Ranking Member from New 

York, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Chairman King, for holding this hearing. This hearing is a timely and necessary follow-up to our hearing last May regarding al-Qaeda operations in both Iran and Syria. 

I would also—I think that is supposed to be Iraq. 
4 

I would also like to thank the witnesses for appearing to testify 

as we expand our understanding about travel patterns of foreign 

fighters in Syria and Iraq and how they continue to impact the 

United States homeland. U.S. intelligence officials report that at 

least 7,000 fighters from more than 50 countries across the Middle 

East, North Africa, Europe, Asia, including dozens of volunteers 

from the United States, have traveled to Syria to support armed 

opposition groups there. 

Other estimates by non-governmental sources suggested over 

100,000 pro-opposition foreign fighters have traveled to Syria. 

Overall, the United States Government estimates place the 

strength of armed opposition forces, including foreign fighters, between 75,000 and 110,000 persons. Some of these opposition groups 

are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations, and a subset of dedicated extremist fighters may pose an outsized threat. Thousands of 

other non-Syrian fighters reportedly are fighting in Syria to support the government of Bashar al-Assad, including members of Lebanese Hezbollah, the Iranian military, and Iraq-Shia militias. 

Foreign fighters contribute to the persistence of the armed conflict in Syria, and they also pose external security risks now or in 

the near future. To date, the FBI has arrested a handful of U.S. 

citizens and residents on charges of providing material support to 

terrorist groups and using certain weapons in connection with the 

conflict in Syria. 

Officials in European and Asian governments have also made 

several arrests of would-be foreign fighters, returned foreign fighters or their recruiters and facilitators. It is imperative that the 

United States focus not only on the United States persons traveling 

to and from Syria, but also persons traveling to and from our 

neighboring countries, as well. 

On April 22, 2013, the Canadian police announced the arrest of 

two people in connection with plotting a terrorist attack on a passenger train that travels from Toronto through Niagara Falls, New 

York, and into New York City. According to Canadian officials, the 

alleged terrorists were receiving assistance from al-Qaeda elements 

in Iran. Last year’s plot in Canada raises questions both about 

whether al-Qaeda operatives in Iran and Syria have access to a 

broader terror network and whether Canada is a target for terrorist activity or recruitment. 

Today, in addition to their testimony on the larger issues of foreign fighters, I would ask our witnesses to provide information on 

foreign fighters in Canada and the potential for these individuals 

to enter the United States via Canada after returning from Syria 

or Iraq. 

Again, I look forward to today’s testimony. With that, I will yield 

back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BRIAN HIGGINS

JULY 24, 2014 

This hearing is a timely and necessary follow-up to our hearing last May regarding al-Qaeda operations in both Iran and Syria. I would also like to thank the witnesses for appearing to testify as we expand our understanding about travel pat-
5 

terns of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq and how they continue to impact on the 

U.S. homeland. 

U.S. intelligence officials report that at least 7,000 fighters from more than 50 

countries across the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, Asia, including dozens of 

volunteers from the United States, have traveled to Syria to support armed opposition groups there. Other estimates by non-Government sources suggest that over 

10,000 pro-opposition foreign fighters have travelled to Syria. Overall, U.S. Government estimates place the strength of armed opposition forces—including foreign 

fighters—between 75,000 and 110,000 persons. 

Some of these opposition groups are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations, and 

a subset of dedicated extremist fighters may pose an outsized threat. Thousands of 

other non-Syrian fighters reportedly are fighting in Syria to support the government 

of Bashar al Assad, including members of Lebanese Hezbollah, the Iranian military, 

and Iraqi Shia militias. 

Foreign fighters contribute to the persistence of the armed conflict in Syria and 

may also pose external security risks now or in the near future. To date, the FBI 

has arrested a handful of U.S. citizens and residents on charges of providing material support to terrorist groups and using certain weapons in connection with the 

conflict in Syria. 

Officials in European and Asian governments have also made several arrests of 

would-be foreign fighters, returned foreign fighters, or their recruiters and 

facilitators. It is imperative that United States focus not only on U.S. persons traveling to and from Syria, but also persons traveling to and from our neighboring 

countries as well. 

On April 22, 2013, the Canadian Police announced the arrest of two people in connection with plotting a terrorist attack on a passenger train that travels from Toronto, through Niagara Falls, New York, into New York City. According to Canadian 

officials, the alleged terrorists were receiving assistance from al-Qaeda elements in 

Iran. 

Last year’s plot in Canada raises questions both about whether al-Qaeda 

operatives in Iran and Syria have access to a broader terror network, and whether 

Canada is a target for terrorist activity or recruitment. 

Today, in addition to their testimony on the larger issues of foreign fighters, I 

would like our witnesses to provide information on foreign fighter transit in Canada, 

and the potential for these individuals, to enter the United States via Canada after 

returning from Syria or Iraq. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman yields back. 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JULY 24, 2014 

As the committee continues examine the homeland security implications of foreign 

fighting, it is important to revisit the facts that have lead us to this point. As fighting continues across Syria, government forces and their allies are being pitted 

against a range of anti-government insurgents. The disorder is so rampant that at 

times, many of these insurgent groups are even fighting amongst themselves. 

While the total population of Syria is more than 22 million, the Civil War has 

driven more than 2.8 million Syrians into neighboring countries as refugees, since 

March 2011. Millions more Syrians are internally displaced and in need of humanitarian assistance, of which the United States remains the largest bilateral provider, 

with more than $2 billion in funding. 

The United States also has allocated a total of $287 million to provide non-lethal 

assistance to select groups. While it is difficult to know exactly what is happening 

on the ground in Syria, as it changes day-to-day, it seems neither pro-Assad forces 

nor their opponents are capable of achieving outright victory in the short term. 

In the interim, conflict between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 

and other anti-Assad forces has also caused an increase in war fighting. Outside of 

Syria, the Syrian Civil War has caused an increase of religious-sect and political 

group conflicts in Iraq and Lebanon. It is clear that the Syrian conflict has national 

security implications that can be felt across the globe. 

However, the current humanitarian and security crises within Syria are beyond 

the power of any single actor to resolve, including the United States. Top U.S. officials have made public statements warning that Syria-based extremists may pose 
6 

a direct terrorist threat to the United States, including some foreign fighters who 

hold U.S., Canadian, or European passports. 

Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has stated that an al-Qaeda-affiliated group within Syria ‘‘does have aspirations for attacks on the homeland.’’ 

Central Intelligence Agency Director, John Brennan, has publically identified alQaeda-tied groups and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) within Syria 

as a concern for the recruitment of individuals and the development of capabilities 

to be able to carry out attacks inside of Syria and also to use Syria as a launching 

pad. 

In February of this year, as his first public address as Secretary, Department of 

Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson acknowledged that Syria has become a 

matter of homeland security. 

He did so because U.S. law-enforcement and intelligence officials know individuals 

from North America and Europe are heading to Syria and will be exposed to radical 

and extremist influences before possibly returning to their home countries with intent to do harm. 

Amid all the human suffering, in-fighting, and homeland security implications, it 

may seem lost that the Syrian conflict was once a mass civic movement advocating 

for greater political freedom. 

It is imperative for us to focus diplomatic efforts on coordinating with foreign 

fighter source, transit, and returnee destination countries to strengthen shared responses and preventive measures. I hope our conversation today provides insight 

into the full scope of the foreign fighter issues and how both U.S. and international 

officials can work to coordinate both intelligence and response efforts. 

Mr. KING. We are—as I said before—pleased to have a very distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important 

topic. 

Our first witness will be Dr. Fred Kagan, who is the Christopher 

DeMuth chair and director of the American Enterprise Institute’s 

Critical Threats Project. This project is dedicated to tracking and 

analyzing key and emerging National security threats to our Nation in order to inform on-going policy discussions. Prior to joining 

AEI, Dr. Kagan was a professor of military history at West Point. 

As I mentioned before, my first dealing with Dr. Kagan was back 

in 2007 when he I thought presented the most cogent analysis— 

you and General Keane—of the situation in Iraq and really laid out 

a battle plan and message which did succeed. Unfortunately, that 

has not been followed-up on, but I want to thank you for your service and I look forward to your testimony. 

Dr. Kagan, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK W. KAGAN, DIRECTOR, CRITICAL 

THREATS PROJECT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. KAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member, 

and thanks to the committee for holding this hearing. One of the 

things that has struck me is that in the midst of a public policy 

debate that is sometimes not well-moored in reality, the discussions that I have had about these topics on the Hill have been very 

serious and very thoughtful and very bipartisan. I think that that 

is a testimony to the seriousness with which you all take the security of the United States, and I am grateful to you for it. 

The establishment and expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq 

and Syria represents a step change in the threat to American 

homeland security and National security generally. This is the first 

time that an al-Qaeda-affiliated group has made the leap from 

stateless terrorist organization to a quasi-state with a combat-effective army and the resources of a modern urban region at its disposal. 
7 

The Islamic State has declared its intention of attacking Americans and is actively recruiting U.S. and European passport-holders. 

It has acquired radioactive material from Mosul University and 

many millions of dollars from banks in Mosul and Anbar. We have 

never seen an al-Qaeda threat of this magnitude before, and we 

must face it squarely now or face the consequences later. 

The Islamic State’s relationship with al-Qaeda and its leader, 

Ayman al-Zawahiri, is complex and fraught. The Islamic State 

evolved from the organization known as al-Qaeda in Iraq, which 

was a formal and recognized al-Qaeda affiliate. The group changed 

its name to the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006, and al-Qaeda leadership accepted that change, although grudgingly. When it began 

calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, ISIS, in 2013, 

however, asserting its control over the operations of al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, Zawahiri balked. Jabhat al-Nusra 

protested vigorously and appealed to Zawahiri, who ruled on its behalf and ordered ISIS to confine itself to Iraq. 

The ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, now styling himself as 

Caliph Ibrahim, rejected Zawahiri’s order, leading to an escalating 

rhetorical fight that ended with Zawahiri expelling ISIS from alQaeda, at least the portion of ISIS that was in Syria in early 2014. 

It was never clear, however, that Zawahiri was denying the continued validity of the al-Qaeda franchise in Iraq. It is my assessment 

that ISIS, the Islamic State, that is, remains a part of the larger 

al-Qaeda family, whatever its formal affiliation with the group 

might be. 

Other groups within the larger al-Qaeda-associated family have 

established statelets and armies before. The Afghan Taliban had 

both in the 1990s. Al-Shabaab had much more constrained versions 

in Somalia after 2009. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula briefly 

ruled parts of Abyan and Shabwah provinces in Yemen, although 

its rule and its conventional military capabilities proved too tenuous to hold. 

None of these situations were remotely as dangerous to the 

United States as the Islamic State is today, largely because they 

occurred in areas of the world that were impoverished, lacked basic 

resources, let alone the advanced technological, human capital, and 

financial resources of the areas they now control in Iraq and Syria. 

Recognizing the danger is not the same as seeing a solution, 

however. The Islamic State was able to advance rapidly because 

hollowed-out and demoralized Iraqi security forces in the north collapsed. Its advance ceased for the moment in large part because of 

the mobilization of Iranian-backed Shia militias and an armed populace. Even so, Iran has had to deploy probably hundreds of members of its own IRGC, the commander of its Quds Force, Qassem 

Soleimani, and elements of the IRGC air force, as well, to stave off 

the Islamic State’s attacks. 

The situation remains tenuous, and the security of Baghdad is by 

no means as certain as many appear to believe. The Islamic State 

is not 10 feet tall, but neither is it negligible, and nor is its collapse 

inevitable. 

The Iranian presence and obvious fear of the Islamic State has 

led some Americans to muse on the feasibility of either letting the 

Iranians fight this fight for us or even actively cooperating with 
8 

Tehran against a common enemy. This superficially plausible strategy will not survive contact with the reality that the Iranian leadership sees the Islamic State as an American-created and -supported tool for retaining U.S. influence in the region having abandoned Iraq and Afghanistan and lost in Syria. 

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his closest associates have categorically rejected cooperation with the United States 

in Iraq, even in the midst of the nuclear negotiations. Even if we 

could somehow persuade Khamenei to work with us, the results 

would not be satisfactory. It is, after all, Iranian policy and strategy that helped get us to this point. Iran consistently pursues a 

sectarian approach to the conflict that fuels the flames of the insurgency and creates fertile ground for recruitment for al-Qaeda. 

The prospect of sending American ground forces back into Iraq 

is distasteful, to say the least. Some have argued for a sort of expanded drone campaign—expanded from nothing, by the way, because until the fall of Mosul, we were taking reportedly absolutely 

no actions against growing al-Qaeda franchises in Iraq and Syria, 

creating one of the largest safe havens for those two groups anywhere in the world. 

But even an expanded drone campaign will fail. Even air strikes 

will fail. As Brett McGurk recently testified, we are now looking at 

a full-blown army with a state, not a terrorist organization. The 

track record of these kinds of attacks even against terrorist organizations is extremely limited. 

We need to do a few things to address this problem right now, 

and then we need to think hard about what the long-term solutions 

are going to be. It starts, of course, with recognizing the magnitude 

of the threat. Of course, ISIS, or the Islamic State, is only part of 

that threat. 

It starts with recognizing that we have to stop the process of disarming ourselves. We have to reverse the defense cuts that were 

made in the name of an austerity that seemed to have affected only 

the defense budget and that are out of touch with the reality of our 

time, when the tide of war is not receding, but rather flowing. 

We also have to make the very unpalatable choice to recognize 

that we cannot continue to attack our intelligence community to 

strip it of its capabilities to watch growing threats and to provide 

warning in an era when the threats are growing and our capabilities for dealing with them have diminished. 

I firmly believe in the principles of privacy and civil liberties and 

I believe that we must do everything in our power to defend those 

core principles of the American way of life, but we also need to recognize that nothing is more dangerous to that way of life and to 

our civil liberties over the long run than the prospect of renewed 

terrorist attacks that will drive fear and stampede us into eliminating all of those protections. 

If we want to protect our way of life, we have to protect ourselves 

against attack now, and that means that we have to invest in and 

support our armed forces and our intelligence community, while simultaneously developing a very complicated and very difficult, 

probably expensive strategy for dealing with an extremely serious 

threat. 

I thank the committee for its time. 
9 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kagan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FREDERICK W. KAGAN

JULY 24, 2014 

The establishment and expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (IS) represents a step-change in the threat to American homeland security and National security generally. This is the first time that an al-Qaeda-affiliated group has made 

the leap from stateless terrorist organization to a quasi-state with a combat-effective 

army and the resources of a modern urban region at its disposal. The Islamic State 

has declared its intention of attacking Americans and is actively recruiting U.S. and 

European passport holders. It has acquired radioactive material from Mosul University and many millions of dollars from banks in Mosul and Anbar. We have never 

seen an al-Qaeda threat of this magnitude before and we must face it squarely 

now—or face the consequences later. 

The Islamic State’s relationship with al-Qaeda and its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

is complex and fraught. The IS evolved from the organization known as al-Qaeda 

in Iraq, which was a formal and recognized al-Qaeda affiliate. The group changed 

its name to the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006, and al-Qaeda leadership accepted that 

change, although grudgingly. When it began calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq 

and al-Sham (ISIS) in 2013, however, asserting its control over the operations of alQaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, Zawahiri balked. Jabhat al-Nusra protested vigorously and appealed to Zawahiri, who ruled on its behalf and ordered 

ISIS to confine itself to Iraq. The ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdad (now styling 

himself as Caliph Ibrahim), rejected Zawahiri’s order, leading to an escalating rhetorical fight that ended with Zawihiri expelling ISIS from al-Qaeda—at least, the 

portion of ISIS that was in Syria in early 2014. It was never clear that Zawahiri 

was denying the continued validity of the al-Qaeda franchise in Iraq. 

This dispute led to commentary suggesting that ISIS was no longer part of alQaeda, which has led to a certain confusion in policy discussions. But the intra-al 

Qaeda tensions are actually of interest only to students of al-Qaeda and those who 

parse the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) with a microscope. In 

reality, IS remains a part of the global al-Qaeda movement. It is pursuing the same 

ideology—the argument, in fact, was over the fact that Zawahiri thinks that Caliph 

Ibrahim is moving too fast along the path toward the global caliphate. It continues 

to draw on the same pool of financial supporters, recruiters, and would-be suicide 

bombers or transnational fighters. It remains, in other words, a serious threat to 

the United States and the West. 

Other groups within the larger al-Qaeda-associated family have established 

statelets and armies before. The Afghan Taliban had both in the 1990s. Al-Shabaab 

had much more constrained versions in Somalia after 2009. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula briefly ruled parts of Abyan and Shabwah Provinces in Yemen, although 

its rule and its conventional military capabilities proved too tenuous to hold. None 

of these situations were remotely as dangerous to the United States as the Islamic 

State is today. 

The Afghan Taliban ruled Afghanistan, to be sure, a fact that has made fighting 

its insurgency more difficult. But it was not an al-Qaeda franchise and did not 

espouse or pursue goals beyond Afghanistan. The country it ruled, moreover, was 

a war-shattered, poverty-stricken land that offered little in the way of advanced resources, or even basic resources, for that matter. Al-Shabaab was an al-Qaeda affiliate (although a secret one until 2012), but it also ruled one of the poorest regions 

of the world and, at that, its rule was heavily contested. Iraq is an advanced, urban 

society with a highly literate and technically-educated population, vast natural resources, and excellent infrastructure, even after many years of war. And the Islamic 

State has already demonstrated that its aims transcend Iraq and even Syria. It has 

set its immediate sights on Jordan and Lebanon and threatened Iran and us. The 

danger is unprecedented. 

Recognizing the danger is not the same as seeing a solution, however. The IS was 

able to advance rapidly because hollowed-out and demoralized Iraqi Security Forces 

(ISF) in the north collapsed. Its advance was halted in large part because of the 

mobilization of Iranian-backed Shi’a militias and an armed populace. Even so, Iran 

has had to deploy probably hundreds of members of its own Islamic Revolutionary 

Guards Corps (IRGC), the commander of its Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, and 

elements of the IRGC Air Force as well to stave off the Islamic State’s attacks. The 

situation remains tenuous and the security of Baghdad is by no means as certain 

as many appear to believe. The Islamic State is not 10 feet tall, but neither is it 

negligible. 
10 

The Iranian presence and obvious fear of the IS has led some Americans to muse 

on the feasibility of either letting the Iranians fight this fight for us or even actively 

cooperating with Tehran against a common enemy. This superficially plausible 

strategy will not survive contact with the reality that the Iranian leadership sees 

the IS as an American-created and—supported tool for retaining U.S. influence in 

the region having abandoned Iraq and Afghanistan and lost in Syria. Supreme 

Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his closest associates have categorically rejected 

cooperation with the United States in Iraq—even in the midst of the nuclear negotiations when friendly overtures might have been expected—and ceaselessly repeat 

the mantra that the United States is backing the Islamic State. 

Even if we could somehow persuade Khamenei to work with us in Iraq, the results would not be satisfactory. Iranian rhetoric is pan-Islamic, but its tools and 

techniques are narrowly sectarian. Khamenei is now backing Iraqi Prime Minister 

Nuri al Maliki for a third term, despite the insistence of the United States and all 

but the most sectarian Iraqi actors that he step aside. The Shi’a militias that are 

Iran’s primary action arm in Iran also conduct sectarian killings that fan the flames 

of Sunni resentment and are important elements of the Islamic State’s recruitment 

efforts. Iranian involvement in Iraq will make the situation worse, not better, and 

rapidly. 

The prospect of sending American ground forces back into Iraq is distasteful, to 

say the least. Some have argued for a sort-of expanded drone campaign (expanded 

from nothing, by the way, since the United States had not been targeting al-Qaeda 

in Iraq or Syria at all before the fall of Mosul) or direct air support to Iraqi forces 

instead. This approach will fail. To begin with, air campaigns alone have never done 

more than disrupt terrorist organizations. Even the extremely aggressive drone program that decimated al-Qaeda in Pakistan was unable to destroy the group. But the 

IS is not a terrorist organization anymore. It is a small state and it has a small 

army. Targeted strikes will have even less effect on it, and they are likely to backfire. 

The Iraqi Security Forces (to say nothing of Bashar al Assad’s Syrian troops) have 

become sectarian. Iraqi social media refers to them as ‘‘Jaish al Maliki,’’ Maliki’s 

army, simultaneously dismissing the notion that they are Iraqi forces and equating 

them with the Jaish al Mahdi, the sectarian and Iranian-backed Shi’a militia 

formed by Moqtada al Sadr. If the United States simply provides air support to the 

ISF we will be seen as taking Maliki’s (and Iran’s) side against the Sunni. It is far 

from clear, moreover, that the ISF could retake the territories it has lost even with 

U.S. air support and without U.S. support on the ground. The United States had 

an extremely hard time, we should remember, driving al-Qaeda in Iraq from Baghdad and Mosul with 150,000 troops on the ground. The Iraqis will find it harder, 

not easier, because the ISF is regarded with such suspicion by many Sunni. 

We may well face a simple and extremely unpalatable choice: Send at least some 

U.S. ground forces back to Iraq or watch the consolidation of the first-ever effective 

al-Qaeda state and army. There is no guarantee at all that sending U.S. forces back 

would eliminate the threat. Neither is there any reason for confidence that an alQaeda state in Iraq and Syria will not launch a campaign against the U.S. homeland and interests abroad. 

Some will no doubt argue that the wisest course is to tend our own garden and 

focus on our own defenses rather than trying to intervene in an insanely complicated struggle. The trouble is that we are rushing to dismantle our defenses and 

make ourselves more vulnerable to the threat even as it grows exponentially. We 

are in the process of gutting our military in the name of an austerity that has not 

affected the parts of the Government that actually account for the massive increases 

in U.S. spending projected over the coming years. And we are dismantling our intelligence apparatus in the name of protecting privacy and civil liberty. 

The defense of American civil liberties, including privacy, is of paramount importance. It can never be ignored or simply pushed aside in the interests of expediency. 

It must be balanced, however, against the need to defend American lives and homes, 

which is the first responsibility of Government. We are not currently striking that 

balance properly. We have allowed highly colored and selective leaks to instill fear 

in our hearts about what our intelligence community is doing, while ignoring the 

very real external threats that community is actually focused on watching. 

There is no easy solution to the dilemmas posed here and I will not offer any. 

But the mandate of this committee requires it to evaluate all of the threats objectively and unemotionally and come to considered conclusions about how to strike the 

right balance. That evaluation must proceed, however, from an accurate and cleareyed assessment of the actual threat. That threat is large and growing while our 

ability to defend ourselves is shrinking. We must reverse both trends, lest we face 

attacks in the future that may well change our society fundamentally. We can start 
11 

by restoring defense cuts and re-considering the rush to outlaw specific intelligence 

programs whose merits cannot be debated publicly. This committee should, in fact, 

take the lead in developing and proposing expansions in U.S. intelligence capabilities that are coherent with the protection of civil liberties and privacy that is so 

vital to our democracy. 

The challenges we face are great, but we must avoid taking counsel of our fears— 

fears of the enemy, fears of an unchecked government, fears of overseas involvement, or simply fears of the complexity of the problem. There is no certainty in acting, but there is no safety in passivity. I thank the committee for the opportunity 

to consider these challenges at this important moment in history. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Dr. Kagan. 

Robin Simcox is a research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society 

in London, a bipartisan British-based think tank. His work focuses 

on terrorism and national security, specifically al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda 

affiliates, and terrorism trends. Prior to joining the society, Mr. 

Simcox was a research fellow at the Center for Social Cohesion, a 

think tank studying extremism and terrorism in the United Kingdom. Mr. Simcox testified previously before the subcommittee on 

the same issue. I guess that was about 15 months ago. 

I want to thank for returning and thank you for your testimony. 

You are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF ROBIN SIMCOX, RESEARCH FELLOW, THE 

HENRY JACKSON SOCIETY 

Mr. SIMCOX. Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today. 

In recent years, the United States and its allies have faced 

threats emanating from terrorist safe havens in countries such as 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. The most recent areas of concern to have developed are in Iraq and Syria. 

In the short term, the greatest danger to emerge from these safe 

havens is the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, ISIS, and also 

Westerners returning to their homeland having fought in Iraq and 

Syria. 

ISIS controls a stretch of territory the size of Jordan. It has acquired recruits, weapons, and finances to the extent there is now 

more of a terrorist army than a terrorist group. Over the last decade, ISIS and its precursor groups have targeted not just Iraq, but 

Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. It has also threatened Turkey. ISIS 

has succeeded in establishing a base in the Levant from which to 

expand its influence throughout the region. 

Iraq fatigue in Washington and in London is significant. There 

will be a temptation to dismiss this as sectarian bloodletting or a 

largely irrelevant civil war. This temptation absolutely has to be 

avoided. 

The danger posed by ISIS is real, enduring, and not limited to 

the Middle East. It has gone largely unnoticed that it has also been 

connected to a series of attacks in Europe over the last decade. 

This includes a June 2007 attack against targets in the United 

Kingdom, a suicide bombing in Sweden in 2010, and most recently 

the May 2014 shootings at the Jewish Museum in Brussels. This 

is not a group obsessed with only local sectarian concerns. 

ISIS is now likely to attract fresh recruits, including those from 

the West, to its safe havens in Iraq, where they can receive training. Earlier this year, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the supposed new ca-
12 

liph in ISIS, warned the United States that ‘‘soon we will be in direct confrontation.’’ I would suggest we take him at his word. 

However, the threat the West faces from terrorism today is obviously multi-pronged. An area of great concern to intelligence agencies is not just the dangers posed by terrorist groups operating in 

Iraq and Syria, but those returning to the West having fought 

there. I will focus specifically on the British angle. 

It is thought that between 400 to 500 Brits have traveled to fight 

in the Syrian conflict, a higher number than in Afghanistan or in 

Iraq. Those fighters who return to the United Kingdom will likely 

do so battle-hardened, well-trained, and exposed to extremist ideology. 

Not every returning fighter is going to try and aspire to carry out 

attacks domestically. Yet according to Henry Jackson Society Research, almost half of those who had committed al-Qaeda-related 

offenses in the United States had received terrorist training 

abroad. In the United Kingdom, it was over a quarter. 

The United Kingdom has taken a tough stance on Syria-related 

offenses. Already in the last 18 months, there have been 65 Syriarelated terrorism arrests. The first successful conviction occurred in 

May 2014, and others have already followed. This is a welcome 

change. Previously, not a single individual who fought in any other 

jihadist conflict abroad had been convicted for doing so in a British 

court. 

The U.K. government has also stepped up stripping dual-national 

fighters of their British citizenship. This power was used 20 times 

last year, a significant increase on previous years. However, the 

United Kingdom’s approach is not only based on tough measures 

against those who have already traveled. 

Channel, the home office’s de-radicalization program, is one alternative. Over 500 terror suspects have already been placed 

through this scheme, and this number will only grow as the fallout 

from Syria and Iraq continues. The police have also launched a national campaign of those who are concerned about their relatives 

traveling abroad, encouraging them to seek help from the authorities if so, with a particular focus being placed on women in these 

families. 

Another approach to consider is one that has been launched in 

Belgium, where authorities discovered that some of those who had 

joined the rebels in Syria were still receiving social security benefits. It subsequently stopped these payments. This could act as an 

effective deterrent. If an aspiring fighter knows that his departure 

would lead to his family being evicted, for example, that may cause 

him to reconsider his options. 

The United Kingdom and the United States face a differing level 

of threats from returnee fighters. The United States has yet to see 

the numbers travel that the United Kingdom has, although this 

probably has just as much to do with geographical proximity as it 

does ideological intent, yet I believe the solutions to be broadly 

similar. 

Prosecution of terrorism-related activity when possible, monitoring those deemed to be most dangerous by domestic security 

agencies, coordinating our de-radicalization efforts, potentially removing citizenship and social security benefits. Ultimately we need 
13 

1 ‘‘ISIS’ Western Ambitions’’, Foreign Affairs, 30 June 2014, available at http:// 

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141611/robin-simcox/isis-western-ambitions. 2 Ibid. 

3 Ibid. 

to show an unflinching determination to face down the multitude 

of threats to the Western homeland. 

Thank you for listening, and I am happy to try and answer any 

questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Simcox follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBIN SIMCOX

JULY 24, 2014 

In recent years, the United States and its allies have faced threats emanating 

from terrorist safe havens in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. 

The most recent areas of concern to have developed are in Iraq and Syria. In the 

short term, the greatest danger to emerge from these safe havens is the Islamic 

State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, and formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq, 

or ISI, and al-Qaeda in Iraq) and Westerners returning to their homeland having 

fought in Iraq and Syria. Formulating effective policies to counter this threat is now 

a priority for the United States and its allies. 

ISIS

The danger ISIS poses to the West is becoming increasingly clear, highlighted by 

General David Petraeus, European Union counterterrorism coordinator Gilles de 

Kerchove, and British Prime Minister David Cameron in recent weeks.1 These concerns are understandable. ISIS now controls a stretch of territory the size of Jordan 

and has declared an Islamic caliphate, acquiring recruits, weapons, and money to 

the extent that it is now more of a terrorist army than a terrorist group. 

ISIS has succeeded in establishing a base in the Levant from which to expand 

its influence throughout the region. In a recently-released ISIS video, a British 

jihadist proclaimed that ISIS ‘‘understand no borders’’ and will fight ‘‘wherever our 

sheikh wants to send us.’’ He specifically cites Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria as 

targets.2 All of these countries have been targeted on multiple occasions for terrorist 

attack by ISIS and its precursor organisations in the last decade. 

Yet the danger posed by ISIS is not limited to the Middle East. ISIS and its precursor groups have also been connected to a series of attacks in Europe over the 

last decade. • The perpetrators of a June 2007 attack against targets in London and Glasgow, 

Scotland—operations which consisted of a car bombing attack on Glasgow Airport and car bombs in London’s West End—had the telephone numbers of ISI 

members on their cell phones. At the time, counterterrorism officials called the 

Glasgow and London attacks ‘‘the closest collaboration’’ between ISI and terrorists outside the Middle East to date. • In 2010, a captured senior ISI operative admitted to Iraqi forces that ISI was 

preparing to carry out an attack in the West at the end of the year. Later that 

year, Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, an Iraqi-born militant who was thought 

to have trained with ISI in Mosul, carried out a suicide attack in Stockholm, 

Sweden. ISI praised this attack and in an audio message released after his 

death, al-Abdaly cited the Swedish artist Lars Vilks’ insulting cartoons of Islam’s Prophet Mohammed as a motivation for his act. ISI had previously offered 

$150,000 to anyone who ‘‘slaughtered’’ Vilks. • In June 2013, the Iraqi defense ministry said it had arrested members of a cell 

in Baghdad that had been attempting to manufacture chemical weapons to 

smuggle into Canada, the United States, and Europe. • In May 2014, Mehdi Nemmouche, a French citizen thought to have joined ISIS 

in Syria, shot and killed three people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels. His 

gun was wrapped in an ISIS flag.3

While it is not known whether ISIS and its precursor groups directed or merely 

inspired these plots, it certainly appears connected to them. Therefore, ISIS is not 

just a local threat. Over the last decade, it has carried out attacks in four Middle 

Eastern countries and been connected to three others in Europe; offered financial 

reward for the assassination of Europeans; and allegedly planned to smuggle chemical weapons into the West. This is not the behaviour of a group obsessed with local, 

sectarian concerns. 
14 

4 Ibid. 

5 ‘‘Up to 11,000 foreign fighters in Syria; steep rise among Western Europeans’’, International 

Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 17 December 2013, available at http://icsr.info/2013/ 

12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-syria-steep-rise-among-western-europeans/. 6 ‘‘Iraq and Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict’’, House of Commons, 16 June 2014, available 

at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm140616/debtext/140- 

6160001.htm#14061619000710; ‘‘Counter-terror cop: 500 Brits fighting in Syria and Iraq’’, ITV, 

21 June 2014, available at http://www.itv.com/news/update/2014-06-21/counter-terror-cop500-brits-fighting-in-syria-and-iraq/. 7 ‘‘Europeans are flocking to the war in Syria. What happens when they come home?’’, Washington Post, 29 January 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ 

europeans-are-flocking-to-the-war-in-syria-what-happens-when-they-come-home/2014/01/29/ 

772f56d0-88f6-11e3-833c-33098f9e5267lstory.html?hpid=z3. 8 ‘‘Syria extremism is unlike any threat UK has seen since 9/11, security chief warns’’, Evening 

Standard, 25 February 2014, available at http://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/exclusive-syriaextremism-is-unlike-any-threat-uk-has-seen-since-911-security-chief-warns-9151894.html. 9 ‘‘Anti-terrorism chief warns of British girls inspired by Jihad’’, Evening Standard, 23 January 2014, available at http://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/exclusive-antiterrorism-chiefwarns-of-british-girls-inspired-by-jihad-9080110.html. 10 Robin Simcox & Emily Dyer, Al-Qaeda in the United States: A Complete Analysis of Terrorism Offenses (Henry Jackson Society, February 2013). 11 Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, Houriya Ahmed & Douglas Murray, Islamist Terrorism: The 

British Connections (Henry Jackson Society, July 2011). 12 ‘‘Latest Syria Threat ‘More Frightening Than Anything’ Else, Holder Says’’, ABC News, 13 

July 2014, available at http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/latest-syria-threat-frightening-holder/ 

story?id=24538221. 

‘‘Iraq fatigue’’ in Washington and London is significant. There is a temptation towards isolationism: To dismiss this as sectarian bloodletting or a complex civil war 

which has no relevance to international security. This temptation must be avoided. 

Following its recent successes, ISIS is now likely to attract fresh recruits—including 

those from the West—to its safe haven in Iraq, where they can receive training and 

attempt to carry out terrorist attacks against the Western homeland. 

Earlier this year, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the supposed new caliph, warned the 

United States that, ‘‘soon we’ll be in direct confrontation’’ and to ‘‘watch out for us, 

for we are with you, watching’’.4 This warning should not be dismissed lightly. 

RETURNING FIGHTERS

However, the threat the West faces from terrorism today is multi-pronged. An 

area of great concern to intelligence agencies is that of the dangers posed by those 

returning from fighting jihad in Syria. 

The geographical proximity of Turkey to Syria has made accessing this conflict 

zone from Europe easier than past jihadist fronts. One analysis has concluded that 

as many as 2,000 Europeans have travelled to fight in Syria.5

Focusing specifically on the British angle, it is thought that between 400–500 

Brits have done so.6 This is a higher number than with the jihads in Afghanistan 

or Iraq near the beginning of the century.7 Charles Farr, Britain’s top counterterrorism official, stated this year that Syria was ‘‘different from any other counterterrorism challenge that [the United Kingdom] have faced since 9/11—because of 

the number of terrorist groups now engaged in the fighting, their size and scale, 

the number of people from this country who are joining them, ease of travel, availability of weapons and the intensity of the conflict’’.8

Those fighters who return to the United Kingdom will likely do so battle-hardened, well-trained, and exposed to extremist ideology. Richard Walton, speaking at 

the time as the head of the London Metropolitan Police’s counter-terrorism unit, has 

described an attack in the United Kingdom by a fighter returning from Syria as ‘‘almost inevitable’’.9

It is unlikely that every returning fighter is going to be a national security threat 

and aspire to carry out attacks domestically. Yet according to Henry Jackson Society 

research, almost half of those who had committed al-Qaeda-related offenses in the 

United States had received terrorist training. Almost 1 in 5 had combat experience 

abroad.10 In the United Kingdom, over a quarter of those who committed Islamismrelated offenses had received training abroad.11

To add to these security concerns, there have been recent reports that bomb-makers in Yemen are co-ordinating their efforts with terrorists in Syria in order to construct undetectable explosives targeting Western aviation. This led to a new round 

of security measures across airports targeting cell phones and other electronic devices. Attorney General Eric Holder recently stated these new threats were something he found ‘‘more frightening’’ than anything else he’d seen in his time in office 

yet.12 This is quite an admission when considering some of al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
15 

13 ‘‘Terror Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device on Jet’’, New York Times, 25 December 

2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/us/26plane.html?lr=0; ‘‘Cargo plane 

bomb plot: ink cartridge bomb ‘timed to blow up over US’ ’’, The Telegraph, 10 November 2010, 

available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8124226/Cargoplane-bomb-plot-ink-cartridge-bomb-timed-to-blow-up-over-US.html; ‘‘Al-Qaeda Yemen plane 

bomb plot foiled by ‘insider’ ’’, BBC News, 8 May 2012, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 

world-us-canada-17994493; ‘‘Al Qaeda’s Body Bombs: Al-Asiri’s Next Threat’’, Newsweek, 14 

May 2012, available at http://www.newsweek.com/al-qaedas-body-bombs-al-asiris-next-threat65057; Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency (HMH), p. 216. 14Simcox & Dyer, Al-Qaeda in the United States (Henry Jackson Society, 2013). 15 ‘‘Attorney General Holder Urges International Effort to Confront Threat of Syrian Foreign 

Fighters’’, United States Department of Justice, 8 July 2014, available at http:// 

www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/July/14-ag-704.html. 16 ‘‘UK will feel fallout of war in Syria ‘for years to come’, warns top Met officer’’, Guardian, 22 June 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/uk-syria-islamicextremism-isis-muthana-cressida-dick. 17 ‘‘Ex-Guantanamo Bay detainee Moazzam Begg charged with terror offences’’, The Telegraph, 1 March 2014, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/ 

10669848/Ex-Guantanamo-Bay-detainee-Moazzam-Begg-charged-with-terror-offences.html. 18 ‘‘Syria conflict: First Briton convicted of terrorist offences’’, BBC News, 20 May 2014, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27488006; ‘‘Two British men admit to linking up with 

extremist group in Syria’’, Guardian, 8 July 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/ 

world/2014/jul/08/two-british-men-admit-linking-extremist-group-syria. 19 ‘‘No way back for Britons who join the Syrian fight, says Theresa May’’, Independent, 23 

December 2013, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-no-wayback-for-britons-who-join-the-syrian-fight-says-theresa-may-9021190.html. 

Peninsula’s aspirational and actual attempts to target the United States in recent 

years (including bombs concealed in operatives’ underwear, in printer toner cartridges or even surgically implanted; ricin and cyanide plots; and poisoning Western 

water and food supplies).13

MEASURES TAKEN BY THE UNITED KINGDOM

Attorney General Holder also recently spoke about the need for European nations 

to take a more pre-emptive approach in preventing its citizens travelling to Iraq or 

Syria in the first place, including undercover investigations and prosecuting those 

for preparatory acts of terrorism. In the United States, the material support law— 

which covered almost a quarter of all charges used in al-Qaeda related offenses in 

the United States14—is a useful piece of legislation for this type of crime. However, 

similar legislation does not exist in all countries that suffer from a severe terrorist 

threat. For example, it took France until 2012 to bring in a new statute that made 

‘‘criminal association with the intent to commit terrorist acts’’ prosecutable.15

The United Kingdom has taken a tough stance on Syria-related offences. In the 

last 18 months there have been 65 Syrian-related arrests in the United Kingdom.16

Some of these cases—such as that of former Guantanamo Bay detainee Moazzam 

Begg, who has been charged with providing terrorist training in Syria and raised 

funds to aid terrorist causes there17—are now beginning to work their way through 

the British court system. The first conviction of a British citizen relating to Syriarelated terrorism offences occurred in May 2014 and others have already followed.18

This is a welcome change. Beforehand, not a single individual who fought in Afghanistan, Iraq, or any other jihadist conflict had been charged for doing so in a 

British court. This was largely a problem of political will, as well as some shortcomings in legislation. Yet this government has shown more determination to start 

prosecuting such offenses. 

The government has also stepped up stripping dual national fighters in Syria of 

their British citizenship. Under the British Nationality Act, the home secretary can 

deprive someone of their citizenship if it ‘‘is conducive to the public good’’ and it does 

not leave them stateless. This power was used 20 times last year, which is a significant increase on previous years. While this does not only apply to jihadists in 

Syria—for example, it has also been used against those fighting in Somalia—one 

former Foreign & Commonwealth official has said that it is an ‘‘open secret’’ that 

it is being applied to the conflict there.19

Another available option—although not one that has been used so far—is the use 

of Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs), which enable the government to place a series of restrictions on the movements of terror suspects they 

are unable to deport or prosecute. TPIM subjects are, for example, given a curfew, 

an electronic tag, restricted from meeting certain individuals and attending certain 

mosques. While these are not measures available to the United States, the need to 

detain those who are deemed a national security threat but who the state may not 
16 

20 ‘‘500 terror suspects ‘deradicalised’ by Home Office’’, BBC News, 26 March 2013, available 

at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21940899. 21 ‘‘Police make Syria plea to UK Muslim women’’, BBC News, 24 April 2014, available at 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27131707. 22 ‘‘Belgian jihadists in Syria stripped of welfare benefits’’, France 24, 19 August 2013, available at http://www.france24.com/en/20130819-belgian-jihadists-syria-stripped-welfare-payments-assad-antwerp/. 23 ‘‘After fighting in Syria 250 British jihadis are ‘back in the UK’ say intelligence officers’’, 

Daily Mirror, 21 June 2014, available at http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/after-fighting-syria-250-british-3739504. 24 ‘‘ ‘Not possible’ to monitor all UK Syria fighters’’, BBC News, 23 June 2014, available at 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27968963. 25 ‘‘ ‘Thousands’ pose UK terror threat’’, BBC News, 5 November 2007, available at http:// 

news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7078712.stm. 26Simcox, Stuart, Ahmed & Murray, Islamist Terrorism (Henry Jackson Society, 2011). 27 ‘‘Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005’’, Intelligence & Security Committee, HM Government, May 2009, available 

at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentldata/file/224542/7- 

7lattackslintelligence.pdf. 

be able to prosecute is certainly a dilemma that it is familiar with (those detained 

at Guantanamo Bay being the perfect example). 

However, the United Kingdom’s approach is not only based on tough measures 

against those who have already travelled. If prosecution is not possible, then Channel—the Home Office’s de-radicalisation programme—is a viable alternative. Over 

500 terror suspects have already been placed through this scheme, and this number 

will only grow as the fallout from Syria continues.20 The police have also launched 

a national campaign aimed at supporting the families—with a focus on women—of 

those who are concerned about their relatives travelling abroad, encouraging them 

to seek help from authorities if so.21

Another approach to consider is one that has been launched in Belgium and which 

could be considered by the West more broadly. Belgian authorities discovered that 

some of those who had joined the rebels in Syria were still receiving social security 

benefits and subsequently stopped these payments.22 This could act as an effective 

deterrent. If an aspiring fighter knows that his departure would lead to his family 

being evicted, for example, that may cause him to reconsider his options. 

THE ON-GOING THREAT

The exact amount of fighters that have already returned to the United Kingdom 

is unknown. One security official claimed the number could be as high as 250.23

However, since there is ambiguity over the amount who have already travelled, 

there will inevitably be ambiguity over how many have returned. The former head 

of counterterrorism at MI–6 has said it is ‘‘out of the question’’ to be able to monitor 

all those who have returned from fighting in Syria.24 The United Kingdom simply 

does not have the capacity. 

For example, in 2007, MI–5 acknowledged they were currently tracking 2,000 terror suspects in the United Kingdom.25 Assuming that the threat has remained reasonably consistent—a safe assumption, considering that Britain has either suffered 

from, or managed to foil, at least one major terrorist plot approximately every year 

since 9/11 26—and assuming that 500 Brits have travelled to Syria, that would mean 

that Syrian returnees could take up a quarter of MI–5’s casework. 

In reality, the number will not be that high yet—some fighters have already been 

killed in Syria; others have no intention of ever returning; some will be legally 

barred from returning by the government; while others may not assessed to be a 

threat to the United Kingdom. Yet this gives some indication of the scale of work 

that Syrian returnees could cause British security agencies. 

Furthermore, by its own admission MI–5 can only ‘‘hit the crocodiles nearest the 

boat’’ and has to ‘‘prioritise ruthlessly’’.27 This means that someone who is on the 

periphery of the Security Services’ radar eventually drops off. Inevitably, the wrong 

decisions are occasionally made. Last year, Michael Adebolajo, an extremist of interest to MI–5 who had previously attempted to travel to Somalia but not regarded 

as posing an imminent danger, stabbed a British soldier to death in broad daylight 

on the streets of London. 

SHARED CHALLENGE

The United Kingdom and the United States face a differing level of threat from 

returnee fighters. The United States is yet to see the numbers travel to Syria that 

the United Kingdom has, although this probably has just as much to do with the 
17 

geographical proximity as it does ideological intent. Despite this, the solutions are 

broadly similar. 

Those who have attempted or successfully joined up with, fundraised for, and/or 

received training from terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria should be prosecuted. If 

prosecution is not possible, trained fighters assessed to be the most dangerous 

should be monitored by domestic security agencies. The United Kingdom can call 

upon Channel, its de-radicalization programme; in the United States, the Countering Violent Extremism initiative is a work in progress and our governments 

should continue to co-ordinate their efforts on this work. The removal of citizenship 

and social security benefits are other potentially useful National security tools. 

Ultimately, we need to show an unflinching determination to face down the 

threats being posed to the West by the dangers emerging from this region. 

Mr. KING. Thank you very much, Mr. Simcox. 

Dr. Peter Brookes is a senior fellow at the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation. He 

is serving his fourth term as a Congressionally-appointed member 

of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission and 

previously served in the President George W. Bush administration 

as deputy assistant secretary for defense for Asian and Pacific affairs and has been commenting on these issues as far as I can recall ever since al-Qaeda really emerged on the world scene. 

So, Dr. Brookes, it is really a privilege to have you here today. 

STATEMENT OF PETER BROOKES, SENIOR FELLOW, NATIONAL 

SECURITY AFFAIRS, DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. BROOKES. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to share my views today. I want to commend you, the committee and your staff, for highlighting this issue in this public setting. It comes none too soon, in my opinion. Of course, today the 

views I express today are my own. 

I want to make three fundamental points. It is my view that 

Islamist militancy is on the march. I believe that we are facing increasing threats to the homeland as a result. I have concerns about 

current U.S. policy for dealing with it. 

I never would have thought that 13 years after the 9/11 tragedy 

that we would still being dealing with the threat of Islamist terrorism, especially that associated with al-Qaeda, at such an elevated level. The al-Qaeda threat has proliferated significantly in 

recent years in my judgment. 

Syria is a good example, as others have already mentioned, and 

should be of significant concern, considering the estimated number 

of violent jihadists that have gathered there to oppose the Bashar 

Assad regime. Iraq is also deeply afflicted with terrorism, especially the resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq off-shoots. 

Of course, perhaps the most troubling development is the rise of 

the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, ISIS, which has been capturing 

and perhaps holding a swath of significant territory that spans 

both Iraq and Syria. Elsewhere in the Middle East, al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula may be the most dangerous al-Qaeda affiliate 

today. In South Asia, the Taliban and Haqqani Network violence 

is up in Afghanistan as the number of U.S. and foreign forces, the 

coalition forces, draws down. 

In Africa, terrorists and violent extremists are thriving, as well. 

In Libya, the situation remains chaotic 3 years after the U.S.- 
18 

NATO-led operation. Of course, Libya was the location of the deadly September 11, 2012, attack on our diplomatic facilities in 

Benghazi. Algeria is afflicted by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 

AQIM is also active in nearby Mali, where violence is on the upswing after a French intervention slowed the terror group’s advance. 

Fighting with Boko Haram, Islamist militants in Nigeria, has resulted in a reported death of some 2,000 people just this year, the 

tragic kidnapping of hundreds of schoolgirls aside. In Somalia and 

Kenya, al-Shabaab—noted for its brazen Westgate Mall attack in 

2013—is also gaining ground. In general, lawless, ungoverned, 

and/or chaotic places remain a significant counterterrorism problem. 

What does this militant Islamist movement mean? In my opinion, it signifies that we are facing an increasing threat not only to 

U.S. interests overseas, but to the homeland. While not all of these 

al-Qaeda groups are directly targeting the U.S. homeland security 

currently, we should not embrace the notion that this view will not 

change in the future. Their objectives will not necessarily remain 

local or regional. 

We should not assume that any seemingly overseas al-Qaeda 

threat will stay that way and will not evolve into a direct threat 

to the U.S. homeland. Indeed, intent can change quickly and may 

not be discovered by intelligence before it is too late. 

While each terror group is unique, hostility towards the United 

States in my view is a common characteristic. While I understand 

and appreciate the hard work being done by intelligence, law enforcement, the military, and others in battling violent extremists 

and protecting the American homeland, I have concerns about current U.S. policy. 

First, the rhetoric used by the Obama administration I believe 

has been misleading. Over time, the White House, including the 

President, has characterized al-Qaeda as on the run, on its heels, 

and decimated, and so forth. 

Second, I am also troubled by other National security decisions. 

For instance, I believe the decision to withdraw from Iraq without 

provision of follow-on forces directly contributed to, along with 

other factors, the dire situation that exists there today. I believe 

that the security vacuum that will be left by the drawdown of U.S. 

forces in Afghanistan in the coming years, which could result in a 

total withdrawal, could be filled by al-Qaeda-affiliated groups over 

time as happened in Iraq. 

Third, from a practical standpoint, I believe that the reluctance 

to influence or follow through on events in the Middle East/North 

Africa, such as Libya and the Arab Spring, especially the events in 

Syria, have not served our National interests well. Indeed, while a 

direct cause and effect is difficult to prove, I would suggest that a 

case could be made which claims that the failure of U.S. policies 

in Iraq and Syria had a hand in the success of ISIS today, which 

now stands as a significant National security threat. 

Fourth, I am concerned that much of the world sees the United 

States in absolute—or at least relative—decline. I also believe that 

perception of American inattention, disinterest, or weakness in 
19 

world affairs will drive policies and actions directed towards us, including provocations from militant Islamist extremists. 

Fifth, I am also worried that U.S. counterterrorism policy is 

meant more to contain than eliminate al-Qaeda threats. Relying 

too heavily on the political will of foreign governments and the capabilities of other nations’ counterterror forces or militaries to battle terror groups may be a losing, indeed, dangerous, proposition or 

strategy. 

In conclusion, I would assert that parts of the world are aflame 

with Islamist militancy and that we are in the crosshairs. We have 

already weathered some 60 terrorist plots and/or attacks since 

9/11, according to Heritage Foundation data. This is clearly no time 

for contentment with the status quo. 

The concern is that some believe we are in a post-Osama bin 

Laden era. That is factually correct. But we are not in a post-terrorism or post-al-Qaeda period in my judgment. Osama bin Laden’s 

and al-Qaeda’s inspirational Islamist ideology of political violence 

lives on. Letting down our guard at this time in the face of this 

growing Islamist extremist reality would be a huge mistake and a 

major threat to our security and interests both at home and 

abroad. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brookes follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER BROOKES

JULY 24, 2014 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee: Thank you for this opportunity to 

share my views on the subject of today’s hearing. I want to commend you, the committee, and your staff for highlighting this issue in this public setting. In my view, 

it comes none too soon. 

Before I begin my testimony, let me say that the views I express today are my 

own and should not be construed as representing the official position of any of the 

organizations with which I am associated. 

On the topic of today’s hearing, I would like to make three fundamental points. 

Quite simply, it is my view that Islamist militancy is on the march. Second, I believe we are facing increasing threats to the homeland as a result. And third, I have 

concerns about current U.S. policy for dealing with it. 

Let me briefly expand on these points. 

ISLAMIST MILITANCY IS ON THE MOVE

I never would have thought that nearly 13 years after the 9/11 tragedy that we 

would still being dealing with the threat of Islamist terrorism, especially that associated with al-Qaeda, at such an elevated level. 

The al-Qaeda threat, whether by groups that have a direct association with alQaeda’s core, exist as an off-shoot, or merely embrace its ideology, has proliferated 

significantly in recent years in my judgment. 

The increasing diversity and the intensity of the Islamist terrorist threat, in my 

mind, means we have to defend against a growing number of different threat vectors, making it more difficult for our intelligence, law enforcement, and military efforts to succeed, whether at home or overseas. 

We are all painfully aware of the rise of violent extremists across the globe. Indeed, the State Department reports that terrorist attacks were up more than 40 percent last year. 

Syria is a good example, and should be of significant concern, considering the estimated number of violent jihadists that have gathered there to oppose the Bashar 

Assad regime. 

As the committee knows, an estimated 7,000–12,000 foreign fighters from some 

70–80 countries have reportedly gathered in Syria, perhaps constituting what experts believe is the largest contingent of violent extremists in any one place at any 

one time, including in pre-9/11 Afghanistan. 
20 

Iraq is also deeply afflicted with terrorism, especially the resurgence of al-Qaeda 

in Iraq off-shoots, which seemed to have been almost extinguished by the end of the 

U.S. surge in Iraq. Last year, Iraq suffered some 5,000–9,000 casualties as a result 

of terrorist and sectarian violence, according to various sources. 

Of course, perhaps, the most troubling development is the rise of the Islamic State 

in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) which has set about capturing—and perhaps holding—a 

swath of significant territory that spans both Iraq and Syria. 

Within this territory, ISIS has declared a caliphate, which not only threatens the 

regimes in Baghdad and Damascus, but which may prove over time to be a safe 

haven for terrorist planning, training, and operations beyond Iraq and Syria. 

This newest caliphate is likely to resonate with Islamists on a number of levels 

around the globe. The allure of a new Islamist state may lead to more recruits, 

funding, and alliances. Moreover, ISIS’ early success may encourage others to undertake the same thing elsewhere. 

Indeed, even prior to the establishment of the ‘‘Islamic State,’’ there were reports 

of the development of camps for not only training fighters for opposing the Syrian 

and Iraqi regimes, but for training foreign fighters to return to their native lands, 

especially Europe and the United States, to undertake terror attacks there. 

Of course, the problem is not limited to Iraq and Syria. 

Elsewhere in the Middle East, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which 

is resident in Yemen, may be the most dangerous al-Qaeda affiliate today. It has 

held territory in Southern Yemen and its bomb-making prowess is well-known based 

on a number of spectacular plots by its innovative explosives expert, Ibrahim al 

Asiri. 

In South Asia, Taliban and Haqqani Network violence is up in Afghanistan as the 

number of U.S. and foreign forces draws down, according to news outlets. These terror groups have historically found safe haven in neighboring Pakistan, which has 

severely impacted U.S. and Coalition counterinsurgency and terror operations in Afghanistan. 

In Africa, terrorists and violent extremists are thriving as well. In Libya, the situation remains chaotic 3 years after the U.S.-NATO operation led to the demise of 

Libyan strongman Moammar Qaddafi. Libyan militias, including al-Qaeda-associated groups like Ansar al Sharia, continue to threaten any semblance of stability. 

Of course, Libya was the location of the deadly September 11, 2012 attack on our 

diplomatic facilities in Benghazi. 

Algeria is afflicted by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); it has been linked 

to recent plots in France on the Eiffel Tower, Louvre, and a nuclear power plant, 

according to news accounts. 

AQIM is also active in nearby Mali, where violence is on the up-swing after a 

French intervention slowed the terror group’s advance. Moreover, press reports indicate that al-Qaeda-linked militants in Mali may be working with Nigeria’s Boko 

Haram, a terror group causing increasing alarm. 

News accounts indicate that fighting with Boko Haram Islamist militants in Nigeria has resulted in the death of some 2,000 people this year, the tragic kidnapping 

of hundreds of school girls aside. It also reportedly operates in Cameroon and Niger. 

Across the continent in Somalia and Kenya, al-Shabab—noted for its brazen 

Westgate Mall attack in 2013—is gaining ground. The terror group also seems to 

be a significant draw for prospective militants from the United States, according to 

some research. 

Indeed, some analysts believed that al-Shabab may have drawn or recruited more 

Americans than any other terror group, but it has now likely been outpaced by a 

surge to Syria and Iraq. Moreover, some assert al-Shabab is cooperating and coordinating with Boko Haram, further expanding the terror network on the continent. 

In general, lawless, ungoverned, and or chaotic places remain a significant 

counterterrorism problem. 

INCREASING THREATS TO THE HOMELAND

What does this militant Islamist movement mean? In my opinion, it signifies that 

we are facing an increasing threat not only to U.S. interests overseas, but to the 

homeland. 

I do not have to tell the committee about the reports of nearly a hundred Americans and as many as 3,000 Europeans that have traveled to Syria—and perhaps 

now Iraq—to fight in the Syrian (and perhaps now Iraqi) civil war(s). 

We must assume that based on open-source reporting that some of these Americans and Europeans will be recruited and trained in the terrorist dark arts while 

in Iraq and Syria with the intention of returning to their native countries to commit 

terror, if reports are accurate. 
21 

Recent violence and plots in places like Britain, Belgium, and Spain that are related to Syria means that the threat is not a prospective one, but one that is here 

and now. 

Specifically, the recent reports of a possible terror plot involving explosive cell 

phones and or electronic devices that might be targeting U.S.-bound airliners out 

of Europe is of great concern—and may arguably represent the most imminent terror threat to the U.S. homeland today. 

Even more troubling are the reports that this plot involved a synergistic effort between al-Qaeda operatives in Syria/Iraq and AQAP bomb-makers. This sort of 

transnational terrorist teamwork is very disconcerting. 

But we should not be surprised. 

Al-Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden, has long valued zealous religious converts, 

recruiting operatives in place, including via the internet, and travelers with passports that may be in or enter a target country with limited scrutiny to perform terrorist acts. 

While not all of these al-Qaeda groups are directly targeting the U.S. homeland 

currently, we should not embrace the notion that this view will not change in the 

future; their objectives will not necessarily remain local or regional. 

In my view, these terror groups, whose goals may seem local or regional at this 

time, may have fundamental needs that might need to be satisfied first (e.g., holding territory for planning, training, and operating; securing funding; and finding recruits) before looking at expanding their operations afield such as toward the United 

States. 

Furthermore, from a strategic perspective, these terror groups may not want to 

encourage or give reason for opposition from the United States at this time. 

The point here being is that we should not assume that any seemingly overseas 

al-Qaeda threat will stay that way and not evolve into a direct threat to the U.S. 

homeland. Indeed, intent can change quickly and may not be discovered by intelligence before it is too late. 

While each terror group is unique, hostility toward the United States is a common 

characteristic, in my opinion. 

U.S. POLICY CONCERNS

While I understand and appreciate the hard work being done by intelligence, law 

enforcement, the military, and others in battling violent extremists and protecting 

the American homeland, I have concerns about current U.S. policy. 

First, the rhetoric used by the Obama administration has been misleading, in my 

view. Over time, the White House, including the President, has characterized alQaeda as ‘‘on the run,’’ ‘‘on its heels,’’ and ‘‘decimated,’’ and so forth. 

Suggesting such, especially as concerns al-Qaeda writ large, is unfortunately disingenuous. While the White House occasionally specified that it was referring to ‘‘alQaeda core’’ (essentially the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan) when it spoke of the terror group’s supposedly diminished status, that 

was not always the case. 

Indeed, I would suggest that the White House was attempting to create a narrative on its handling of National security, specifically al-Qaeda, that was arguably 

overly optimistic. Worse, it may have given the American public—and others—the 

impression that al-Qaeda was in its last throes. 

The take down of Osama bin Laden supported that narrative. 

The problem is that, yes, Osama bin Laden was dead, but al-Qaeda was still very 

much alive. I do not believe that this reality was conveyed accurately or adequately 

to the American people by the administration when it should have been part of our 

National security dialogue and debate. 

I believe that the early, public Benghazi attack assessments, such as references 

to a provocative video, were also driven by the White House’s chosen, perhaps politically-driven, National security narrative. 

Second, I am also troubled by other National security decisions. For instance, I 

believe the decision to withdraw from Iraq without the provision of follow-on forces 

directly contributed to, along with other factors, the dire situation that exists there 

today. 

In addition, I believe that the security vacuum that will be left by the drawdown 

of U.S. forces in Afghanistan in the coming years, which could result in a total withdrawal, could be filled by al-Qaeda-affiliated groups over time as happened in Iraq. 

Third, from a practical standpoint, I believe that a reluctance to influence or follow through on events in the Middle East/North Africa such as Libya and the Arab 

Spring, especially the events in Syria, has not served our National interests well. 
22 

Indeed, while a direct cause and effect is difficult to prove, I would suggest that 

a case could be made which claims that the failure of U.S. policies in Iraq and Syria 

had a hand in the success of ISIS today which now stands as a significant National 

security threat. 

Fourth, I am concerned that much of the world sees the United States in absolute—or at least relative—decline. I also believe that perceptions of American inattention, disinterest, or weakness in world affairs will drive policies and actions directed toward us, including provocations from militant Islamist extremists. 

Fifth, I am also worried that U.S. counterterrorism policy is meant more to contain than eliminate al-Qaeda threats. In other words, we are containing threats in 

places like Syria/Iraq or Yemen, but not acting vigorously enough, or at all, to eliminate them. 

Relying too heavily on the political will of foreign governments and the capabilities of other nations’ counterterror forces or militaries to battle terror groups may 

be a losing, indeed dangerous, strategy whether it is Iraq, Afghanistan, or Yemen. 

Specifically, I believe that we are facing increasing threats to our interests overseas and to the homeland as a result of our failure to develop effective counterterror 

policies, which have provided space for terrorists to plan, train, and operate. 

CONCLUSION

I would assert that parts of the world are aflame with Islamist militancy—and 

that we are in the crosshairs. Wishing away the terrorist threat we face at home 

or abroad will not make it disappear. Indeed, worse, we are at risk of creating complacency at home and abroad about this growing threat. 

Complacency about such a challenge can be a killer. We have already weathered 

some 60 terrorist plots and or attacks since 9/11, according to Heritage Foundation 

data. This is clearly no time for contentment with the status quo. 

The concern is that some believe we are in a post-Osama bin Laden era. That is 

factually correct, but we are not in a post-terrorism or post-al-Qaeda period in my 

judgment. Osama bin Laden’s and al-Qaeda’s inspirational Islamist ideology of political violence lives on in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria, Libya, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. 

Letting our guard down to this growing Islamist extremist reality would be a huge 

mistake—and a major threat to our security and interests both at home and abroad. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Dr. Brookes. 

Dr. Seth Jones, who is the director of International Security and 

Defense Policy Center at the Rand Corporation, as well as an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced 

International Studies. Previously, Dr. Jones served as the representative for the U.S. commander, U.S. Special Ops Command, to 

the assistant secretary of defense of special operations. Prior to 

that position, he served as a plans officer and adviser to the commanding general, U.S. special operations forces in Afghanistan, 

and specializes in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, including a focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and al-Qaeda. 

In a time of heightened partisanship in Washington, interesting 

to note that you have appeared as a Republican witness and today 

as a Democratic witness before this committee, which says a lot 

about you and your perspective, and also hopefully something 

about this committee and the fact that we do try to deal in a bipartisan way. I think the fact that you have been called by both parties as ‘‘their witness,’’ says—you know, speaks volumes about your 

knowledge and your ability. 

So, Dr. Jones. 

STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL 

SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, THE RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. JONES. Thank you very much, Chairman King, Ranking 

Member Higgins, other Members of the subcommittee, thanks for 
23 

inviting us to testify on I think what is a very important subject 

at a very important time. I have divided my comments into four 

sections, as you will see build on each other. 

The first is to emphasize what Chairman King and Ranking 

Member Higgins noted in their opening statements, which is that 

the United States does face a—what I consider a growing threat 

from violent extremists traveling to and returning from Syria and 

other locations. According to my own estimates, the number of 

Americans is now above 100, somewhere around 125, 130 Americans that have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria to assist 

rebel organizations. 

I do think it is important to look at the data here that there appear to be a wide range of motivations. Some appear to be interested in conducting violent jihad with al-Qaeda organizations or 

jihadist organizations like ISIS. Some appear to be interested in 

primarily fighting Shia. Some appear to be interested in supporting 

Syrian—what you might call Syrian nationalist groups against the 

Assad regime, others providing humanitarian assistance. So identifying the purpose of the individual traveling is obviously important. 

The numbers in Europe, as we heard from Mr. Simcox, are order 

of magnitude larger. I will come back to that issue in a moment. 

But as many as 2,500 potentially Sunni extremists from Europe 

have arrived in Syria between January 2012 and July 2014. I 

would note also that we have seen fairly large numbers, in the 

hundreds, also return from Syria into Europe. 

Just to put this into perspective, according to data I have, Syria 

today has the largest numbers of Westerners in any jihadist battlefield in the modern era, larger in terms of Westerners than what 

we saw in Afghanistan during the 1980s against the Soviet Union, 

larger after the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban regime, larger than 

in Iraq, including after the 2000 U.S. invasion, Somalia, Yemen, 

Libya. So I think it is important in that sense to put this into perspective and why we should focus on the subject. 

Second, the broader trends I think are important. According to 

a Rand report I recently authored and was published a few weeks 

ago, the trends here are a bit concerning. There has been a—according to our estimates—55 percent increase in the number of 

jihadist groups between 2010 and 2013. The largest number of 

that—percentage of that increase is in North Africa and in the 

Syria area. 

In addition, the number of jihadists themselves, not groups but 

fighters, has roughly doubled during that same time period, with 

the largest numbers of fighters operating in the Syria and broader 

Levant area. So this does appear to be a growing problem, and we 

can talk about the reasons for that in the discussion afterwards. 

As Dr. Brookes noted earlier, not all of these groups present a 

direct threat to the U.S. homeland. Nusra and ISIS and some of 

the groups operating in Syria and Iraq appear to be primarily focusing on targets inside of Syria and inside of Iraq, but I would say 

that the trends are concerning. The pipeline between Iraq and Europe, as well as other places, the United States, Australia, is growing, financing, recruitment, and potentially operatives, and there is 

always this—a concern about inspired individuals, not directly con-
24 

1The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should 

not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This 

product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony 

presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local legislative committees; Governmentappointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a non-profit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions 

that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 2This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/ 

CT414.html. 

nected with these groups, but that have trained. So this trend is 

concerning. 

Let me conclude, then, the fourth area which is detecting and deterring travelers. I just want to say, I appreciate the efforts of U.S. 

intelligence, law enforcement, military, diplomatic efforts to focus 

on this problem. 

But let me highlight three issues worth considering. I have got 

a much longer list, but just want to highlight three for note here. 

One is—and this really is a European issue—again, the largest 

numbers of extremists that we have seen where there is a visa 

waiver potential are in Europe. 

Criminalizing attendance, not just training, but attendance at 

terrorist training camps overseas I would assess would likely deter 

or could deter some terrorists from traveling. The United Kingdom 

appears to be the only or one of the only European Union countries 

with such a law. The United States prohibits attendance at terrorist camps overseas and will prosecute. I think encouraging the 

European countries to criminalize attendance, not just training, 

would be quite helpful. 

Second issue is preemptive action. Norway, Netherlands, France 

are among the few European countries of the United Kingdom that 

have preemptively arrested extremists preparing to travel to Syria. 

That is before they go, but many do not—do not have laws on the 

books along those lines, so I think working with our European allies on ways to prevent them from leaving, if there is enough evidence, would be helpful. Again, some European countries have now 

passed laws. 

The last thing I will just mention is we have got to find ways, 

I think, to fix loopholes in our system. The fact that apparently 

Abu-Salah was able to travel to Syria, return to the United States 

without our awareness, and then go back and blow himself up in 

Syria does raise questions about whether we missed this. 

So let me conclude by saying, I think this issue is very important. Thank you for calling this hearing. I look forward to the questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES 1 2

JULY 24, 2014 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing, ‘‘Jihadist Safe Havens: Efforts 

to Detect and Deter Terrorist Travel.’’ 

My argument today is straightforward: The United States faces a threat from violent extremists, including Americans and other Westerners, in safe havens in Syria 

and other locations. Syria today likely has the largest number of Westerners in any 

jihadist battlefield in the modern era, with greater numbers of Western participants 

than in past battlefields in Afghanistan (including during the 1980s anti-Soviet 
25 

3 Author estimates based on an overview of Salafi-jihadist groups and fighters since 1988. See, 

for example, Seth G. Jones, A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al-Qaeda and Other Salafi 

Jihadists (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014). 4 Author interviews with senior counterterrorism and diplomatic officials from a dozen European countries, July 2014. 5On the term Salafi-jihadists see, for example, Assaf Moghadam, ‘‘Motives for Martyrdom: AlQaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks,’’ International Security, Vol. 33, No. 3, 

Winter 2008/09, pp. 46–78; Moghadam, ‘‘The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology,’’ CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No. 3, February 2008, pp. 14–16. 

war), Pakistan, Iraq (including after the 2003 U.S. invasion), Somalia, Yemen, and 

Libya.3 But it is important not to exaggerate the threat. Westerners appear to be 

involved in a range of activities, from providing humanitarian aid to fighting with 

al-Qaeda-affiliated groups like Jabhat al-Nusrah. It is unclear how many of these 

individuals will attempt to return to the United States and become involved in terrorist activity. Some may die in Syria, some may move to other countries (including 

other jihadist battlefields), some may focus on humanitarian activity, and still others may become disillusioned with extremist activities. In addition, other groups, 

such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and core al-Qaeda, likely present a more 

immediate threat to the U.S. homeland—at least today. Still, the large number of 

Western violent extremists in sanctuaries like Syria makes it particularly important 

to adopt policies and practices in the U.S. homeland and overseas to ensure that 

violent extremists are detected if they return to the West and, more broadly, to reduce the flow of foreign fighters from the West. 

I have divided my comments into four sections. The first provides an overview of 

the threat from sanctuaries in Syria and potentially Iraq. The second section provides broader context and analyzes trends in the number of Salafi-jihadist groups, 

fighters, and attacks. The third examines the impact of this threat on the U.S. 

homeland. And the fourth section explores measures to detect and interdict the 

movement of Western violent extremists—including Americans—and prevent them 

from conducting attacks in the West. 

THE THREAT FROM SANCTUARIES IN SYRIA AND IRAQ

The United States faces a threat from violent extremists traveling to—and returning from—Syria and other locations. Since 2011, between 100 and 200 Americans 

have traveled—or attempted to travel—to Syria to assist rebel organizations. There 

appear to be a wide range of motivations, such as conducting violent jihad, fighting 

Shi’a, supporting Syrian nationalist groups against the Assad regime, and providing 

humanitarian assistance. However, the problem is broader than just Americans. Between 1,500 and 2,500 Sunni extremists from Europe arrived in Syria between January 2012 and July 2014. Many have joined jihadist groups such as Jabhat alNusrah and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). In turn, between 300 and 

400 extremists appear to have left Syria for countries in Europe.4 There are also 

a growing number of other Westerners, including Australians, participating in such 

jihadist battlefields as Syria. With the increase in ISIS control of territory in Iraq, 

there may be a growing number of Western violent extremists in Iraq as well. 

These developments should cause concern in the United States. European travelers do not need a visa to enter the United States. This is generally not a problem 

for known violent extremists that make it onto European—and then American—terrorism watch lists. But it is a problem if terrorist fighters and supporters train in 

Syria without being detected and, consequently, without making it onto any watch 

list. U.S. and European intelligence collection capabilities are not as robust in Syria 

today as they were in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the number of Western violent extremists appears to be significantly greater. 

BROADER TRENDS

The problem of violent extremism is broader than just Syria and Iraq. Current 

trends suggest that terrorist groups are metastasizing, particularly in North Africa 

and the Middle East. As noted in the next section, however, many of these groups 

are not a high threat to the United States today and are focused on local enemies. 

Figure 1 shows the number of active Salafi-jihadist groups, including al-Qaeda, 

by year since 1988. Salafi-jihadist groups can be distinguished by at least two main 

characteristics. First, these groups emphasize the importance of returning to a 

‘‘pure’’ Islam, that of the Salaf, the pious ancestors. Second, Salafi-jihadist groups 

believe that violent jihad is fard ‘ayn (a personal religious duty). Al-Qaeda leader 

Ayman al-Zawahiri, among others, encourages both Salafism and armed jihad.5

Each data point on the y-axis in Figure 1 represents the number of active Salafijihadist groups that year. As highlighted in the figure, there was a steady increase 
26 

6 As used here, Levant refers to the area that includes Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, and southern Turkey. 7 Jones, A Persistent Threat, p. 27. 

in the number of groups during the 1990s and 2000s, but a notable jump in the 

slope of the line after 2010. Most of these new groups were in North Africa and the 

Levant.6

FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF SALAFI-JIHADIST GROUPS BY YEAR, 1988–2013 7

Figure 2 provides a rough estimate of the number of Salafi-jihadist fighters between 1988 and 2013. Calculating the number of Salafi-jihadists is difficult, in part 

since groups do not provide public estimates of their numbers and they can vary 

considerably over the course of a group’s life. Consequently, Figure 2 includes high 

and low estimates for the number of Salafi-jihadists by year. The trend is similar 

to Figure 1. There was a notable increase in the number of fighters after 2010. The 

biggest jump was in Syria, which witnessed a dramatic rise in the number of fighters. 
27 

8 Jones, A Persistent Threat, p. 27. 9The data on attacks by other Salafi-jihadist groups were much less reliable, so I have not 

included the number of attacks by Salafi-jihadists outside of al-Qaeda. 

FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF SALAFI-JIHADISTS BY YEAR, 1988–2013 8

Figure 3 highlights the number of attacks by core al-Qaeda and affiliates since 

2009.9 The data indicate a substantial rise in the number of attacks over time. 

Trends for casualties and fatalities were similar. There was a 167 percent increase 

in attacks by al-Qaeda-affiliated groups between 2010 and 2013, with most of the 

violence in 2013 perpetrated by ISIS (44 percent), Jabhat al-Nusrah (24 percent), 

al-Shabaab (22 percent), and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (9 percent). This 

marked a change from 2012, when al-Shabaab conducted the most attacks (46 percent). 
28 

10Data are based on author estimates and the Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Intelligence 

Centre Events Database. 

FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF ATTACKS BY AL-QAEDA AND AFFILIATES, 2009–2013 10

To summarize the data, there was a 55 percent increase in the number of Salafijihadist groups from 2010 to 2013, primarily in North Africa and the Levant. Libya 

represents the most active sanctuary for Salafi-jihadist groups in North Africa, and 

Syria the most significant safe haven for groups in the Levant. In addition, the 

number of Salafi-jihadists roughly doubled from 2010 to 2013, according to both low 

and high estimates. The war in Syria was the single most important attraction for 

Salafi-jihadist fighters. 

These trends suggest that the United States needs to remain focused on countering the proliferation of violent extremist groups, including Salafi-jihadists, despite the temptation to shift attention and resources to other regions and to significantly decrease counterterrorism budgets in an era of fiscal constraint. 

IMPACT ON THE U.S. HOMELAND

Not all terrorist groups overseas present a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. As 

Table 1 highlights, terrorist groups can be divided into three categories: Those that 

pose a high threat because they are involved in active plotting against the U.S. 

homeland; groups that pose a medium threat because they are involved in plotting 

attacks against U.S. structures like embassies and U.S. citizens overseas (though 

not against the U.S. homeland); and those that pose a low threat because they are 

focused on targeting local regimes or other countries. 
29 

11 Committee on Homeland Security, Al-Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization Within the 

Muslim American Community and the Threat to the Homeland, Majority Investigative Report 

(Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, July 27, 2011), p. 2. 12Thomas Hegghammer, ‘‘The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization 

of Jihad,’’ International Security, Vol. 35, No. 3, Winter 2010/11, pp. 53–94. 

TABLE 1.—EXAMPLE OF TERRORISTS THAT THREATEN THE UNITED 

STATES 

High Threat Medium Threat Low Threat 

Characteristics ... Active plotting 

against the U.S. 

homeland and 

U.S. targets overseas (e.g. U.S. 

embassies and 

citizens).

Active plotting 

against U.S. targets overseas 

(e.g. U.S. embassies and citizens).

Limited or no active plotting 

against U.S. targets overseas. 

Examples ............ • al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula.

• Core al-Qaeda .....

• Some inspired individuals and 

networks.

• Al Shabaab .........

• Jabhat al-Nusrah 

• ISIS .....................

• Ansar al-Sharia 

Libya.

• Hezbollah ............

• East Turkestan 

Islamic Movement. 

• Suqor al-Sham. 

First, some groups pose a high threat. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and 

possibly core al-Qaeda likely present the most immediate threat, along with inspired 

networks and individuals. The growth in social media and the terrorist use of chat 

rooms, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other sites has facilitated radicalization inside the United States. 

Second, there are a number of groups that pose a medium threat. Al-Shabaab’s 

objectives are largely parochial, and it has conducted attacks in Somalia and the 

region. But al-Shabaab possesses a competent external operations capability to 

strike targets outside of Somalia. The Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya was 

well-planned and well-executed, and involved sophisticated intelligence collection, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance of the target.11

ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah are primarily interested in establishing Islamic emirates in Iraq, Syria, and the broader region, though their growing networks in Europe and the United States are concerning. Their access to foreign fighters, external 

network in Europe, and bomb-making expertise suggest that they may already have 

the capability to plan and support attacks against the West. It is currently unclear 

whether most of these individuals will remain in Syria or Iraq over the long run, 

move to other war zones, or return to the West. And even if some return, it is uncertain whether they will become involved in terrorist plots, focus on recruiting and 

fundraising, or become disillusioned with terrorism. Still, foreign fighters have historically been agents of instability. They can affect the conflicts they join, as they 

did in post-2003 Iraq by promoting sectarian violence and indiscriminate tactics. 

Perhaps more important, foreign fighter mobilizations empower transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, because volunteering for war is the principal stepping-stone for individual involvement in more extreme forms of militancy. When 

Muslims in the West radicalize, they usually do not plot attacks in their home country right away, but travel to a war zone first. A majority of al-Qaeda operatives 

began their militant careers as war volunteers, and most transnational jihadi 

groups today are by-products of foreign fighter mobilizations.12

Third, some groups present a low-level threat to the United States. They do not 

possess the capability or intent to target the United States at home or overseas. 

They include such groups as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which has a 

support base among China’s Uighur community and is primarily interested in Chinese targets. Despite this categorization, there is some fluidity between levels because the capabilities and intentions of groups—and their leadership—evolve over 

time. 

DETECTING AND DETERRING TRAVELERS

U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, military, and diplomatic officials have spent 

considerable time and resources on understanding the threat and developing measures to counter the spread of violent extremists from sanctuaries like Syria. But the 
30 

13The Schengen area includes 26 European countries that have abolished passport and any 

other types of border control at their internal borders, permitting the free movement of individuals. 

situation is complex. Violent extremists usually don’t advertise that they plan to 

fight in battlefields like Syria, and many attempt to take circuitous routes to Syria 

rather flying directly from the United States to neighboring countries like Turkey. 

Moving forward, the United States should consider several additional measures to 

detect and deter violent extremists from coming to—or departing from—the United 

States. 

Working with Europe.—The first is to continue assisting European allies, including Turkey, in efforts to identify violent extremists traveling to—and from—jihadist 

battlefields like Syria. U.S. and European intelligence collection capabilities are not 

as robust in Syria today as they were in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the number of 

Western violent extremists is greater. 

European states have taken some steps against jihadists traveling to—and from— 

Syria and Iraq. The United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 

Spain, Norway, and several other countries have arrested some outgoing and returning fighters, facilitators, and recruiters. In addition, several European countries 

have stripped their welfare benefits, frozen their financial assets, and seized their 

passports to prevent further travel. The United Kingdom, in particular, has established robust measures. In June 2014, the United Kingdom passed legislation banning ISIS and four other Syria-linked extremist groups, giving it the ability to prosecute individuals associated with or supporting these groups. The United Kingdom 

is one of only seven European countries that can seize passports of Syria-bound 

travelers not charged with a separate offense. 

The United States should continue working with its allies to improve European 

counterterrorism and counter-radicalization measures in several areas: 

• Regional intelligence-sharing.—Increased counterterrorism intelligence sharing 

across Europe would strengthen regional awareness of returnees and Syriabased plotters. But some European states appear to be reluctant to implement 

comprehensive intelligence-sharing mechanisms across Europe because of data 

privacy, data protection, and other concerns. Improved European Union approaches to the foreign fighter problem, including strengthening Schengen area 

border security and expanding the use of the EUROPOL and INTERPOL notice 

system, would enhance European states’ ability to mitigate the threat.13

• Attendance at terrorist camps.—Criminalizing attendance (not just training) at 

terrorist camps overseas would likely deter some terrorists from traveling to 

Syria and Iraq, as well as allow states to prosecute more returnees. It is likely 

an easier charge to prove than receiving terrorist training. The United Kingdom 

is the only European Union country with such a law. The United States prohibits attendance at terrorist camps overseas. 

• Pre-emptive action.—Once individuals arrive in Syria and Iraq, it is already late 

in the radicalization process for those committed to violent extremism. If there 

are adequate legal grounds to arrest individuals before they travel to Syria or 

Iraq, however, it would be helpful. Norway, Netherlands, and France are among 

the few European countries that have preemptively arrested extremists preparing to travel to Syria. 

Counterterrorism at Home.—The FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and 

State and local agencies have already increased efforts to counter the flow of violent 

extremists into—and out of—the United States. But the United States should consider a few additional counterterrorism steps. Following are two examples. 

The first is to increase intelligence collection on potential American violent extremists traveling to—and from—Syria and to ensure that U.S. agencies (such as 

CIA, NSA, FBI, and DHS) are adequately resourced by Congress to collect, analyze, 

and process signals and human intelligence on such travel. Extremists from the 

United States or other countries with visa waiver access need to be placed on proper 

watch lists in the United States, Europe, and other countries. It is troubling, however, that U.S. citizen Moner Mohammad Abu-Salha traveled to Syria to fight with 

al-Qaeda-affiliated rebels, returned to the United States around May 2013 without 

U.S. officials realizing that he had trained with an al-Qaeda-linked group, and traveled back to Syria in November 2013 before blowing himself up in a suicide attack 

in May 2014. In short, U.S. officials apparently did not realize that a U.S. citizen 

who had received terrorist training in Syria was on American soil for approximately 

6 months before returning to Syria to perpetrate a terrorist attack overseas. Was 

this a problem in U.S. intelligence collection or analysis overseas, information sharing with allies, customs and border protection inside the United States, law enforce-
31 

14 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Second Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 

2006), p. 169. 15Sheikh Ibrahim Ar-Rubaysh, ‘‘Allah Will Restrain the Evil Might of Those Who Disbelieve,’’ 

Inspire, Spring 1434, 2013, No. 11, pp. 36–37. 

ment gaps inside the United States (including with violent extremists on the internet and social media), or something else? 

Second, the United States should consider adopting—and Congress should consider studying and potentially funding—a modified version of the United Kingdom’s 

bottom-up law enforcement approach to counterterrorism. In the United Kingdom, 

there is a counterterrorism coordinating officer in each local police force, ranging in 

size from one officer to several hundred in the Metropolitan Police Special Branch. 

This is the point of contact for counterterrorism in local communities. 

The FBI and large U.S. police departments—such as Washington, New York, and 

Los Angeles—are better prepared for counterterrorism than most other departments. But terrorist plots are often hatched outside of these urban centers, and 

many of the Americans traveling to battlefields like Syria are apparently from rural 

or suburban areas. Moner Mohammad Abu-Salha lived for a time with his brother 

in Fort Pierce, Florida, 130 miles north of Miami. Najibullah Zazi constructed his 

bombs to attack the New York City subway in Aurora, Colorado. Faisal Shahzad 

rigged his dark blue Nissan Pathfinder with explosives in Connecticut, and then 

drove it to Times Square in New York City. Many smaller police forces are not involved in counterterrorism, understandably focusing on criminal activity and other 

local challenges. Their departments often aren’t resourced, trained, or prepared to 

deal with violent extremists in their communities. Yet local law enforcement agencies have a permanent presence in cities and towns, and frequently a better understanding of local communities. As Bruce Hoffman argued in his book Inside Terrorism, a critical step in countering terrorist groups is for law enforcement officials 

to ‘‘develop strong confidence-building ties with the communities from which terrorists are most likely to come or hide in... The most effective and useful intelligence comes from places where terrorists conceal themselves and seek to establish 

and hide their infrastructure.’’14

One variant of the U.K. approach in the United States might be to consider appointing a counterterrorism representative in most police departments to act as the 

intelligence point of contact across the department for counterterrorism. Counterterrorism would not necessarily be the full-time responsibility of this individual or 

group, who might be more focused on dealing with drugs, homicides, or other local 

challenges. But this individual would be responsible for coordinating concerns about 

violent extremists in their community and improving outreach programs to businesses, ethnic communities, schools, and other locations. In addition to serving as 

the subject-matter expert on counterterrorism (including training and contingency 

planning), this individual would closely cooperate with local Joint Terrorism Task 

Forces and Fusion Centers. Many police agencies do not have a single point of contact for counterterrorism. 

It is important to take proactive steps now to deal with the problem of terrorist 

sanctuaries. After all, the threat from violent extremists will persist. As a poem entitled ‘‘Mujahid’s Wish’’ in the Spring 2013 issue of al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine 

highlighted, the United States remains a bitter enemy: 

‘‘I wish I am in America. It seems odd, right? 

Hijra is not the end of a mujahid’s ambition. 

Walking with an AK is not the end of the road. I used 

To think the same as you, until I met brothers in the 

Training camps, brothers who look into the enemies’ 

Barrels and see Jannah. Surprisingly, many of them 

Wish to live in America. They have one gentle project 

To carry out; detonating even one bomb in any crowded 

area. They wish to be lone mujahideen like Tamerlan. 

Many of the brothers who made Hijrah from the West 

Wish they have a return ticket, returning home 

Heading for mom’s kitchen. Not to serve the kuffar 

With delicious and exotic meals, but to terrorize the 

American society until they case to fight and assault Muslims. 

Brother residing in the West, grab your chance and 

Walk steadfastly towards your goal. 

As for me here in Yemen, whenever I move around with 

Explosives around my waist, I wish I am in America.’’15
32 

Mr. KING. Let me thank all of the witnesses for their testimony. 

I am going to have two questions. I will ask them both and then 

just ask if each of the four panelists could give their thoughts on 

them. 

One is, we talk about ISIS and we talk about AQAP, et cetera, 

the various groups. If you could give evidence or testimony on how 

much cross-pollination there is, like how strictly are these lines of 

demarcation enforced? Or would you find an AQAP bomb-maker, 

for instance, lending his services to ISIS? Again, since the command structure of al-Qaeda seems to have broken down, how strictly is the demarcation enforced among the other groups? That would 

be the first question. 

Then, second, Dr. Jones mentioned the—how this appears to be— 

not appears—it would seem to be just by number-wise much more 

of a threat to Europe than it is to the United States. Now, we are 

probably the ultimate target, but as far as numbers, there are 

thousands and thousands of Europeans. If you could address the 

question of not just what laws have been passed, but how seriously, 

other than the Brits, are European governments and nations facing 

this issue of the returning foreign fighters? So we will start with 

Dr. Kagan and just work our way across. Thank you. 

Mr. KAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There is a tremendous amount of cross-pollination among the 

groups. I am not persuaded that the command of al-Qaeda has broken down. It depends on what you thought the command of alQaeda was to begin with. It has always been a rather loosely-affiliated organization. 

What we have seen is Zawahiri actually effecting more command 

and control publicly of it, especially with the mediation between 

ISIS and JN, than we usually had seen. But what is important to 

understand is that the leaders of these groups represent a human 

network that has—that for the most part goes back decades. A lot 

of these guys fought together against the Soviets. They have been 

fighting together against us for the 1990s. They know each other. 

We should remember that Naser al-Wuhayshi, the head of alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, is also the operational commander for Zawahiri at this point. We have seen cooperation between Shabaab and AQAP. We have these very credible reports of 

cooperation between AQAP and Jabhat Nusra. We have reports of 

cooperation between AQIM and Boko Haram. 

This is a movement. It is a global movement. Its organizations 

are complex, but we should not imagine that these organizations 

are in any way stovepiped from each other. 

Mr. KING [continuing]. European government concern and action? 

Mr. KAGAN. It is beyond my area of expertise to talk much about 

that, except to say that the European focus on privacy, to the exclusion of all other considerations, is making Europe a very effective cyber safe haven, among other things, for malign actors of all 

varieties, and we are seeing an increase of migration of malign 

cyber activity to European servers because they cannot by law inspect any of the packets or things that go in and out of those servers. 
33 

Mr. KING. With that comment regarding Europe, we will go to 

Mr. Simcox from Europe. 

Mr. SIMCOX. I will start with Europe. I think that there is certainly a recognition that it is a very, very dangerous situation, and 

the foreign fighters returning to Europe are going to pose a great 

problem. The shootings in the Jewish Museum in Brussels, we 

have already displayed that that is very clearly the case. 

Where the European countries are very much lacking, I think, is 

two aspects; one, the legislation. Dr. Jones referred to this already, 

and it is a problem in terms of preparatory offenses, that—it is 

easy to obviously take action after a terrorist attack has taken 

place, but some of these preparatory ones, European governments 

aren’t well-fitted-out legislatively to deal with them. 

In the United Kingdom, we had to pass a lot of laws to begin to 

effectively counter this. We still haven’t really got it exactly right, 

but we have been more serious than others on taking very stringent actions against those who are preparing for terrorist attacks, 

not just in the United Kingdom, but increasingly abroad. 

But I do think they have a problem with political will, as well, 

because, look, a lot of these countries, they hear about the problem 

more than they see it, in terms of it has only been the United Kingdom and Spain that have really suffered extremely badly in terms 

of loss of life in Europe from terrorist groups. 

There have been other small incidents in France and Belgium, 

but in terms of mass casualties, it is only the United Kingdom and 

Spain that have really suffered. I think that part of it is the very 

nature of the fact that there hasn’t been the huge loss of life as 

there has in the United States and the United Kingdom to this 

kind of terrorism. 

In terms of the cross-pollination, it certainly—it certainly happens, I would back up all Dr. Kagan said. The one thing maybe I 

would add to that is that one of the good things about the intensity 

of the U.S. drone campaign has been that perhaps some of these— 

let’s say somebody like Ibrahim al-Asiri, the AQAP bomb-maker, it 

is very hazardous for him to try and put his head above the parapet and work too closely with groups outside of Yemen and those 

he trusts very closely in Yemen, because the huge amounts of attention that are based on people like that, because of U.S. drones 

and military operations is very high, which is why I think we need 

to keep the pressure on in situations like that so that even greater 

interaction between the groups doesn’t take place. 

Mr. KING. Dr. Brookes. 

Mr. BROOKES. Yes, I think that Dr. Kagan has covered it quite 

well. I mean, we should be definitely concerned, this most recent 

plot regarding cell phones and electronic devices shows you the 

force multiplier effect that can take place. If you have a very 

skilled, innovative bomb-maker who might be working with willing 

travelers or willing terrorist operatives in al-Qaeda or Syria, I 

mean, this is very problematic to me. 

We have seen the cross-pollination between AQIM and Boko 

Haram and al-Shabaab and AQAP, and now we are seeing it between AQAP and the Syria-Iraq theater of operation. I think this 

was a real wake-up call to us, and I think it may be the most im-
34 

minent threat that we face today. It is going to be a very difficult 

summer. 

My concern about Europe is that—and I mentioned a little bit in 

my testimony is that publicly, are we taking this threat seriously? 

Some of the rhetoric that has come out of the administration to me 

has been troubling and may be breeding a sense of complacency. 

I think we are in a very much in a very difficult and dire situation here regarding this threat. I think that Europe and other parts 

or places around the world are watching the United States and 

looking for leadership on this issue. I think it is critically important 

that we have some sort of harmonization. International cooperation 

is critically important to fighting terrorism, whether you are talking about intelligence, legal, funding. I mean, terrorists still need 

funding to undertake operations and travel, so it is critically important. 

I think despite the challenges we are facing with Europe right 

now with Russia, the Ukraine, and things along that line, that terrorism has to be a top priority for senior leadership in the United 

States to make the—to increase our security here and to our interests overseas. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Dr. Brookes. 

Dr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Sure, I will be brief. I realize I am in the red now. 

First, on the cross-pollination—— 

Mr. KING. Don’t worry about that. Just go ahead. 

Mr. JONES. Okay. In terms of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

and its role in the Syria-Iraq context, my own view is that its relationship is closest with Nusra, because Nusra is an al-Qaeda affiliate, along with AQAP, and the relationship between Naser alWuhayshi, the emir in Yemen, and the Jalani in Syria is the closest. 

But I think what everybody said is right. The challenge here is 

that when you have so many foreign fighters coming from Europe, 

some in the United States, North Africa, Australia, they move between groups. So there are formal group members, but there is a 

lot of movement of individuals who aren’t formally affiliated. So in 

that sense, this makes this more challenging than I think we have 

seen in some other battlefields. 

On the European issue, I would just point to one challenge on 

the European context is that the Schengen agreement allows for 

the free movement of people within European Schengen countries. 

The fact that we have different laws, then, among these countries 

means that we have free movement, but we have different laws 

when people return or before they leave, so the challenge for us 

then is we don’t have agreement across European countries, but we 

do have the free movement of people. 

So I would say the United Kingdom has been and continues to 

be very concerned and has taken action and considers the threat 

seriously. The French and Spanish, in my view, have been very 

concerned, have conducted operations against Syrians and Spanish 

citizens in North Africa and Syria that they consider a threat, and 

there are several other countries, including the Norwegians now, 

have put laws in place that make it more difficult for people to 

travel to or to rest once they come back. 
35 

But I think outside of that, what we are seeing is huge variations. With visa waiver access into the United States, that should 

cause some concern here. 

Mr. KING. Thank you. Ranking Member, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Brookes, I just wanted to pick up on something that you had 

said relative to statements coming out of the White House and 

American policy in that part of the world. You know, the more you 

learn about that part of the world, the more you conclude that it 

is an absolute mess and that there are no good options for the 

United States. 

I take you back to September, when the administration was looking for Congress to authorize some kind of unspecified military action in Syria, which I opposed, primarily because at that point it 

seemed as though, you know, the administration was using the justification that 100,000 people had been killed because of the use of 

chemical weapons in Syria. 

Well, the most effective fighters on the other side were al-Qaeda 

affiliates and Islamic extremists who were beheading people that 

were supporting the government. When we looked to the rest of the 

world for support, including the 22-nation Arab League, they basically said, yeah, we will support the United States as long as we 

don’t have to do anything. Out of 194 countries, we had explicit 

support from Turkey and France. That was basically it. 

So my concern was—and I am very respectful of your position— 

I don’t mean this to be antagonistic at all, I just—I want to probe 

it, to be truthful. You know, the United States would have essentially went in to litigate a civil war in that part of the world for 

the third time, essentially alone again. That to me is very troubling. 

The United States gets played in that part of the world, whether 

it is the corrupt government in Afghanistan and its successor corrupt governments or whether it is the situation in Iraq. You know, 

someone had mentioned Qasem Soleimani, who is head of the Quds 

Forces, which as I understand it is essentially a cross between special forces and the CIA. You know, he cut the deal in Iran to give 

Nouri al-Maliki another term in office. So where do his loyalties 

lie? 

You know, at some point, at some point, these countries have to 

take responsibility for their own future. The United States has a 

limited role here. You know, General Jack Keane and Dr. Kagan 

and so many others, you know, the surge in Iraq was intended to 

do one thing, really—tamp down violence to allow a breathing 

space within which the warring factions could reach political reconciliation, including the sharing of oil revenues, to peacefully coexist in that country toward the goal of forging some kind of semblance of democracy. 

That has been an abject failure. Nouri al-Maliki was told at that 

time that unless and until he could reach into the Sunni community, the Kurd community, and instill a sense of confidence that he 

had the leadership ability to forge something better, we would end 

up with what we have. What we have is not our fault. The American military did everything possible and continues to in an advisory role to give them the opportunity to forge a better future. 
36 

But unless and until these two warring factions realize that, you 

know, the future is more important than these past grievances. So 

I went on a little bit, but, Dr. Brookes, go ahead. 

Mr. BROOKES. I am not sure where to start with that, but thank 

you very much for sharing your thoughts. I mean, there are a lot 

of opportunities to go back and talk about hypothetical 

counterfactuals, if we had done something different, but we are 

where we are today. I think that is the critical point here, is that 

I assume that the panelists would agree with me—and I will let 

them speak for themselves—is that we are facing a dire threat in 

that part of the world that not only is a threat to U.S. interests— 

in a difficult part of the world—to U.S. interests, but also, I think, 

increasingly to the homeland and what do we do about that? I 

mean, I did talk about some things. Like I said, I wish we had done 

some things differently, but we can’t go back and change that. 

So we are really saying, how do we go forward here? I think that 

is the purpose of the panel here, and I think there have been some 

good ideas put out by my colleagues here about what we need to 

do, working with international partners to try to deal with us. I 

hope we can all agree that we have a significant problem and that 

it needs to be publicized. I think it needs to be—we need to look 

at international cooperation for help with it. Like I said, going back 

now, I am not saying it is not important, but it is—I think we have 

to see where we go forward now at this point to deal with the challenges that we are facing. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yield back. 

Mr. KING. Gentleman yields back. 

Dr. Broun, from Georgia. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

When I was in the United States Marine Corps, I was taught to 

know your enemy. The President, as you know, of the United 

States has made statements that Dr. Brookes referred to. Osama 

is dead. Al-Qaeda is on the run. Just yesterday, the full committee 

had a follow up on the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. Some 

statements were made by my Democrat colleagues that basically 

supported this type of philosophy. 

Dr. Brookes was talking during his testimony that referred to 

this poor concept, in my opinion, by this administration of what we 

are facing, and I think there are Members of Congress that also 

have this poor concept of what we need to be doing to deal with 

this asymmetrical threat. 

Dr. Kagan in his testimony talked about that our intel community, as well as our military, is being decimated. Frankly, Dr. 

Kagan, I think we have had four administrations—two Republican 

and two Democrats—that have steadily degraded our defense capability. I find that reprehensible. I think all four have just steadily 

degraded our intel communities, as well. 

It is boots on the ground that is going to be absolutely critical, 

particularly in these safe havens, for us to know what kind of 

threats that we are actually facing. So I applaud your testimony, 

Dr. Kagan, about that, and I hope the administration is listening 

to you guys, all four of you, because I think it is absolutely critical, 

because we are not facing as a Nation the threat that we face, this 

asymmetric threat. 
37 

Now, as a person who believes in the Constitution that our 

founding fathers meant for it to be, the major function of the Federal Government should be National defense and National security. 

We don’t have enough ships in the Navy, we don’t have enough 

wings in the Air Force, we don’t have enough brigades in the Army, 

and I can tell you, as a U.S. Marine, God knows we don’t have 

enough Marines. 

We are paring the defense capability down, but beyond that, we 

have got a lot of state threats around the world, and we have all 

these asymmetric threats with these safe havens. What I would 

like for you all to do—and my question to you is, what would you 

tell the administration, what can we do? 

The other follow-up question for all four of you is this. When you 

have a snake, the way to kill the snake is cut off his head. The 

greatest amount of financing—I believe is coming from Iran. What 

would you do to help—each one of you—to help cut off the head of 

the supply chain, not only from Iran, but I know that from our 

committee work here that there is financing coming from the 

United States actually to help all these al-Qaeda-like organizations 

around the world. 

We have got a tremendous problem. We have got to stop worrying about containment, in my opinion, and start cutting off the 

head of the snake and end this once and for all, because we are 

going to be here spending trillions of dollars over the next decades, 

maybe century, if we don’t do something about it. 

So what is your solution? We will start with Dr. Kagan. 

Mr. KAGAN. I can’t give you a solution in a minute-and-a-half or 

even in quite a few minutes. 

Mr. BROUN. Well, you can answer about—— 

Mr. KAGAN. I will answer your question. 

Mr. BROUN. No, I am talking about written answers. I would appreciate all of you all—— 

Mr. KAGAN. I am going to have to ask for quite a bit of time on 

that. 

Mr. BROUN. Okay, please do. 

Mr. KAGAN. This is a very complicated problem, and there are no 

easy solutions. I think that the Ranking Member very articulately 

put the problem, but I think—and it is something that is paralyzing to a lot of people as they think about it. This is an insanely 

complicated problem; it really is. We don’t have good options. Almost all of the options that we are looking at are various degrees 

of bad or worse. 

But if it were the case that these problems were confined to the 

region, we might be able to say that, you know, this is too hard, 

this is too complicated, we don’t have support, they need to stand 

up. The problem is that the threats are to us. We must act against 

them, lest they act against us. 

So we have to address the complexity of this. It is out of respect 

for that complexity that I am not going to answer directly what a 

strategy would be—we are working on this. Everyone here at the 

table is working on it. We are working on it at AEI. We are trying 

to come up with something. 

But, frankly, there is not a lot of appetite in this administration 

for strategy, because we are still having arguments about whether 
38 

or not there is a problem. So the first thing that we need to do is 

what this committee is already doing, which is to recognize and 

publicize the extent of the threat and the extent of the problem and 

say we need to deal with it. 

What I will tell you is, we should immediately reverse the defense cuts. I agree with you that this has been a bipartisan attack 

on defense going back to the first Bush administration. We need to 

stop the runaway train toward curtailing our intelligence activities 

and impose appropriate oversight and appropriate controls to prevent abuses, while simultaneously enhancing our intelligence capabilities to understand this threat and help us develop strategies for 

it. 

These are two things that I think Congress can really take the 

lead on that would be extremely important and that will set the 

stage and create conditions that will make it possible to execute a 

coherent strategy as we can try to develop one and hopefully ultimately get an administration that would be willing to do so. 

Mr. BROOKES. Could I add to that? I mean, I agree with that. 

The other thing I would say is—and this may not surprise anybody 

based on my pedigree, but I am continually or increasingly concerned that we are unwilling to use military direct action in support of U.S. National interests. 

I am not saying there is a military solution to this. I believe in 

using all of the instruments of National policy to solve problems, 

but I sense that there is—everybody doesn’t really want to say that 

we shouldn’t—you know, the talk about using airpower in Iraq, for 

instance, for dealing with—as one of the ways or tools we can deal 

with this issue. I am concerned that people are becoming increasingly worried or unlikely to support the idea that we may need to 

use military operations to support our National security. I think 

that is something we have to throw back on the table, along with 

the other instruments of National policy, as an option when we feel 

we are facing an increasing threat. 

Mr. BROUN. Dr. Brookes, could I follow up real quickly, if I may, 

Mr. Chairman? I believe very firmly that SF, special forces and 

special ops, are probably the best option to utilize, as well as civilian intelligence community—I see Dr. Jones shaking his head 

agreeing with me—and I believe very firmly that we need to be expanding, not only our total defense capabilities, but I think we 

need to be expanding our special operations community. 

Pushing it down even further out of active forces down into the 

Reserves and even into the Guard units, because I believe that is 

going to be the ultimate solution for military action in these kind 

of things. 

I believe very firmly, we should never go to war unless Congress 

declares war. Congress has not done its duty in—through the Authorization for Use of Military Force and the War Powers Act of 

controlling Presidents of either party. 

But, Dr. Jones, you shook your head. Agree? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, two follow-on points. No. 1 is, I think we have 

got to be very careful when we talk about this threat that we then 

don’t take actions that undermine our seriousness. If we talk about 

this threat, if we talk—if our policymakers talk about the importance of counterterrorism missions, but then at the same time we 
39 

are leaving Afghanistan and, by part of that, Pakistan, where we 

have core al-Qaeda that continues to operate, we have got a milieu 

of militant groups, I would just ask, how serious are we, then, if 

we are leaving one of the areas where we see the sort-of headquarters and—I don’t want to overstate this—of the core, Ayman 

al-Zawahiri. So one thing I would say is, we cannot leave after 

2016 unless these kinds of groups have been defeated or severely 

weakened. 

The second issue that I would like to see more of, and I don’t see 

it much right now, is a specific strategy to deal with the kinds of 

issues we are talking about today. What are the areas of the world 

that we see the most significant threats from, including this one we 

are talking about here today in the Syria-Iraq, and what resources 

are we going to put there? 

Are we going to put in those areas then our sufficient signals intelligence collection capabilities, HUMINT, special operations 

forces, efforts to counter the ideology? What I don’t—what I see 

missing right now—and I would say this with the last administration to some degree, as well—is a specific strategy with resources 

attached to it to deal with it. 

I think until we see that, something we saw Reagan do effectively in 1981 and 1982 to deal with the Soviets, I don’t think— 

I think we are going to continue to find problems as these jihadists 

groups pop up in a range of different places. So I would like to see 

a strategy, resources put against it, and see that communicated to 

the American public. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman yields back. Now the newest Member 

of the committee and the newest Member of Congress, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Clawson, is recognized. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Everybody is going to be able to say that until November. Then I am going to have a little leg up. 

I apologize for being late. I have found in this job that you become totally over-scheduled from your first day. So I am—in my 

world previous—was not accustomed to showing up late when people are going to speak. I hope you all don’t take it the wrong way 

and just really appreciate you all being here. I have learned a lot. 

You know a lot. So I appreciate your service to the country. 

I don’t come at this in a partisan way. I will say that I believe 

that the Middle East is out of control. Whatever president or whatever is accosted, is of no service to me right now, because I think 

one of you said the cliche, ‘‘We are where we are.’’ Correct, gentlemen? 

I come at a little bit different. I believe that in this case, the supply chain is more important than the manufacturing site. The manufacturing site may well be Syria, Iraq, or Iran. But the supply 

chain for the next bomb into our country, I believe, runs through 

the heart of Europe, as you have spoken to. 

I have lived in Spain and I have seen the immigrant population 

explode from northern Africa. I have seen the sealed garbage cans 

in the subways of Paris when I lived there. I have managed plants 

as far east as Turkey in the Islamic world. 

These are troubled places. I also understand the point that you 

made earlier that these—although the European community is one 
40 

entity in terms of borders, in terms of security, every country is so 

different from the other one. So I don’t know how we manage that 

from afar, because it feels like if the wrong person gets on a plane 

to Barcelona, he can get to New York. He can get to New York. 

So, therefore, my concern drilling down is: What do we do as a 

country? These are proud countries in Europe, and they are our 

partners. But what can we do to influence that situation so that 

they are more effective? Second, as a Member of this committee 

and a Member of the Foreign Relations Committee, what can Congress do and what can we do to help you so that we are more safe, 

relative to what goes on in Europe? Because I think another event 

could be just around the corner. 

Gentlemen. 

Mr. SIMCOX. Yes, if I could begin, and also I would just like to 

quickly comment on Congressman Broun’s question, as well, if possible. I think the key thing—the United States has to take the lead 

in this. It really has to take the lead, and we—and a lot of Europe 

will take its direction from the United States. 

On something like—Attorney General Holder talked about the— 

was in Norway recently talking about the need for European nations to toughen up certain parts of their legislation, which they 

currently aren’t doing. The United States, you have this material 

support law which enables you to cover a huge variety of terrorism 

offenses that in Europe just doesn’t exist. 

So I think that there has to be a level of grave seriousness from 

the administration in terms of the way it talks about this threat. 

I think at the moment, still, the penny hasn’t really dropped with 

the threat that Syria poses to the United States and Europe. There 

was a very unhelpful contribution from the former head of MI6 recently where he talked about how this could potentially be overblown. I think there is a danger we get complacent about the 

threat to the homeland, because there has not been a 9/11-style attack, obviously, on that scale since then. 

Just to quickly go back to the defense question, I think this is 

another area where the United States has to take the lead, because 

other NATO countries are cutting defense spending even quicker 

than you are. There is this—this terrible notion of smart power 

that is upheld if everybody cut in different ways that we could 

somehow—the end result of that that we would all be safer is one 

that has taken root in Europe. 

The United Kingdom does all it can. We have been of limited 

help in Iraq and Libya and Afghanistan, but where is the help from 

the rest of Europe in these kind of military interventions? It is few 

and far between, really. 

So, again, I think if America starts cutting its military, that is 

a signal to Europe that it looks for excuses to do so, as well. So 

I really think strong American leadership is needed—— 

Mr. CLAWSON. Do we have unified conversations with European 

countries about the security risks so that there is a unified effort? 

Mr. SIMCOX. Do those conversations take place? I believe they do 

from government to government, but I have not seen any—I would 

prefer to see some kind of collective announcement. It all seems 

very piecemeal at the moment, because European countries take 

the level of threat from the returnees from Syria very differently. 
41 

So at the moment, I don’t think there is anything beyond just the 

cooperation that took place on counterterrorism efforts anyway, 

and Syria is a whole new load of casework. 

Mr. CLAWSON. But then you would agree that the European security and, therefore, our security is dependent on the weakest link 

in the chain in the European community? 

Mr. SIMCOX. Absolutely. 

Mr. CLAWSON. If that doesn’t create the biggest problem here 

that we have, I don’t know what does. 

Mr. SIMCOX. Certainly. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Because we are not going to shut it down in Syria 

or Iran all of a sudden. So the pipeline to us is through the weakest link in Europe. To your words, there are some countries that 

are not taking it as seriously. 

Mr. SIMCOX. I believe so. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Well, anything we can do? If you would like to 

communicate with me privately, I am very interested in this. I am 

not interested in partisanship. I am interested in preventing this 

problem or anything I can do as a Member of Congress in preventing this problem. Hope you all don’t—— 

Mr. JONES. Yes, I just wanted to add, just to make sure when 

we talk about Europe, that we are also adding probably the most 

vulnerable and potentially the weakest link, which is not an E.U. 

country, but is a NATO country, and that is Turkey. The concern 

I have with Turkey is the vast majority of foreign fighters that are 

going into and coming out of Syria, as well as Iraq, are coming 

through Turkey. They are getting there by land, by air, and by sea. 

So what I would like to see a little bit more fidelity on is, how 

much information is being passed by the Turks to the Europeans 

and to us about names of individuals with American passports and 

European passports going into and out of Turkey for—or into Syria 

in particular? So I would just—this is—in my view, this is not just 

a Europe or at least an E.U. issue. Turkey remains a very—because of its location next to Syria, a very, very important and potentially weak link. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Turkey’s economic future depends on manufacturing exports to Europe and tourism in the GNC. We have—the 

Europeans have leverage on the Turks. In spite of the administration that is in Turkey right now, the country is cut in half, that 

leverage exists back to the point if there is a European unified effort to lock down the pipeline, I believe Turkey would come along. 

Their future depends on it. Would you agree with that? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Mr. CLAWSON. So anything you all can pass on to me about how 

we can improve the effort among the European community to make 

the entrance of terrorists safer, I would appreciate it. I am sorry 

if I have taken so much time here. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman yields back. 

In view of what we have heard as far as the foreign fighters to 

Europe and, you know, the weak links, do any of you have any 

thoughts about rethinking visa waiver, modifying it, adjusting it to 

the current situation? 

Mr. SIMCOX. I mean, I couldn’t speak to it with any great level 

of gravitas. I think there is, obviously, a great concern about the 
42 

amount of traffic that goes between the United States and Europe, 

and we are right to be concerned about the potential threat. I suppose that the one thing I would caution against is going over the 

top on it. In terms of the actual numbers, I mean, 2,000 is—which 

is a potential amount that have gone from Europe—is an awful lot, 

and it is a potential threat. 

But in terms of the overall picture of the amount of travel between Europe and the United States that does take place, I 

wouldn’t want to see a significant strain on relations because of an 

issue like that. 

Mr. BROOKES. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would add, I would 

suggest you may want to talk to some of the people at Heritage 

who deal with visa waiver issues more deeply than I do, have a 

great level of expertise, but my concern is, is that we should extend 

our defense perimeter as far away from the United States as possible and beyond Europe. 

I think we—I am not convinced—and unfortunately, I didn’t have 

an opportunity to see the House Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday hearing on Iraq, but I would want to know as a committee 

Member what the strategy is for dealing with, you know, the inside 

strategy, the Classified strategy for dealing with what is going on 

in Syria and Iraq and the rise of ISIS and other al-Qaeda-related 

groups. 

I mean, I think we need—we would want to be dealing with it 

at that distance, not thinking about it at our shoreline or in Europe, as a portal. So—and I am—it is not clear to me—and, of 

course, I am outside the Government—that we have a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the rising threat that arises from 

groups like ISIS and al-Nusra and other militants in that part of 

that world. So I hope that the administration is speaking with you 

about those issues, but that is where I would want my first line 

of defense would be in theater, and I think that is where it needs 

to be, as opposed to in Europe, or at our shoreline. 

Mr. KING. I guess the concern I would have is, how certain are 

we as to how certain the European nations are about who the Syrian foreign fighters are and to what level are they recording that 

and making that known to us and making it available to airline security? 

Mr. KAGAN. Mr. Chairman, I think these are very good questions. 

I think I would go back to the issue of intelligence, because you are 

asking an intelligence question. The issue with visa is a visa—requiring someone to get a visa is only relevant if we have enough 

information to be able to say that we should or should not bring 

that person in. The more that we curtail our intelligence capabilities, the more it doesn’t matter whether we have a Visa Waiver 

Program or not, because we won’t have the intelligence that we 

need to put the pieces together to stop terrorists from getting our 

own visas. 

This is a problem that we are having in Europe. I think one of 

the other problems that we are having is that the enormous damage that the traitor Snowden did to our National security includes 

driving a very powerful wedge between us and our European partners on the subject of intelligence sharing, working together, and 

that is something that needs to be taken on very directly and very 
43 

energetically. It is not going to be taken on by apologizing to Angela Merkel about listening to her cell phone, which is not anyone’s 

issue and also not a surprise to Angela Merkel, I suspect. 

It is something that we need to take head-on. Again, it is why 

I say the specifics of what is being done to our intelligence capabilities are very important, but the overall messaging that is coming 

out of this country right now is that we are more interested in 

chasing after the possibility that a small number of people in the 

intelligence community might be doing things that they shouldn’t 

be doing that are already illegal than we are about building up and 

supporting our capabilities to identify exactly the people that you 

worried about. 

If that is our tone, we are going to have a very hard time getting 

the Europeans to take this intelligence problem very seriously. So 

my concern is less will they tell us, and more will they know? I 

think that is something that we really need to focus on. 

Mr. SIMCOX. I would just add to that. We absolutely do not know. 

We don’t know who all these—we don’t know—I mean, the fact 

that we are estimating in the United Kingdom about the amount 

of people who have gone means we almost certainly don’t know the 

amount of people who have come back. To give you an idea of the 

scale of this, I mean, in the United Kingdom, we have a relatively 

large intelligence budget, but nothing compared to the United 

States. There was a speech given a few years ago by the director 

general of MI5 who said that the United Kingdom monitors around 

2,000 terrorist suspects. The threat has remained reasonably constant since then. 

If you are talking about potentially 500 returnees from Syria— 

now, I know there won’t be 500. Some will have died over there. 

Some may not come back. Some may not pose an absolute direct 

threat. But that is potentially about a quarter of MI5’s case work 

just being added on in one conflict. There isn’t the capacity in any 

way, shape, or form to begin to deal with that, even if we knew 

who all the people were, and we don’t, which is why it is such a 

great problem for us. 

Mr. KING. Okay. Dr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. I think the political and economic relationship—and 

even the military one with the Europeans is important and will 

continue to be important. I think rethinking visa waiver in general 

probably would not be helpful over the long run. I mean, there may 

be ways to work on trying to close gaps in laws that allow individuals from moving to or coming back from Syria, but I agree with 

what a number of people here have said. The issue is getting 

names on watch lists. 

Look, our presence in Syria—even the U.S. presence is not like 

what it was in Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban regime. It is not like what it was in Iraq. The jihadist problem is 

worse. We have much worse collection capabilities in these countries. 

The issue I would also point out is, we have gotten it wrong, too. 

This is not just about the Europeans. We didn’t get it right with 

the Tsarnaevs, the Boston bombers, who had traveled. We didn’t 

get it right with Abu-Salah, who had gone to fight, come back, and 

then returned to blow himself up. We didn’t catch Zazi going back 
44 

and forth. We didn’t catch Shizad going back and forth. So we continue to have similar issues with Americans going over and returning, as well. 

So, you know, I think we also cannot forget that we have got 

issues with putting the right people on our watch lists, as well as 

pointing fingers at the Europeans. 

Mr. BROOKES. I think, Mr. Chairman, we also—and I am sure 

this committee is obviously concerned about this and looking at it— 

is the lone wolf that is already here that may be inspired by what 

is going on there and never travels abroad. Obviously, that is always a concern to us, but this—what is going on, as I mentioned 

in my testimony, I think the establishment of this caliphate is 

going to be inspirational to many Islamists around the world on a 

number of different levels. I don’t know what effect it will have, 

whether it brings in more foot soldiers or brings in more funding, 

brings in alliances. Of course, there probably will be some that will 

oppose it, as well, but that is another thing we have to worry about 

is the inspiration of Osama bin Laden’s ideology and al-Qaeda’s 

ideology for people wherever they are. 

Mr. KING. All right, thank you. 

The Ranking Member. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, just—you know, to what extent does the 

panel—I say this generally—believe that this is really a battle for 

control of that part of the world between Shia and Sunni that goes 

back to the 7th Century? Now, I was kind of intrigued, you know, 

the quick emergence of this Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, you know, 

where would this guy come from? Why is he so extreme to even be 

essentially shunned in some reports by al-Qaeda, that—I don’t 

think anybody accepts that that is a benign organization. 

If you look at the origins, Abu Bakr was, you know, head of the 

first caliphate. He was the rightful successor as Sunnis believe to 

the Prophet Muhammad. His daughter was married to the Prophet 

Muhammad. He was a companion of him. 

You know, you see how—what he says about Shias, that they are 

apostates, that they are not true Muslims. Vali Nasr, in his book 

‘‘The Shia Revival,’’ said that Sunnis in Lebanon believe that Shias 

have tails. I just think what you have got going on here is a battle 

for control of the 1.6 million Muslim world, the vast majority of 

whom are Sunni, but Shia obviously control, you know, Iran and 

now Iraq. 

So, you know, what I am trying to figure out my own view of 

things is, can you allow that battle between these two groups to 

proceed and, at the same time, concurrently protect the homeland 

by use of military and intelligence? But I will leave it to the panel. 

Mr. KAGAN. It is a great question, and it goes obviously to the 

heart of the complexity of the problem. There is now a sectarian 

war between Sunni and Shia that runs from the Persian Gulf to 

the Mediterranean and is expanding. I do not believe that that is 

a spontaneous development, and nor that it is a continuation of 

what—of—because, in fact, this is a worse and more widespread 

sectarian war than the Muslim world has seen for many, many 

centuries. This is an extreme aberration in that world. There have 

always been sectarian tensions, but organized sectarian warfare of 

this variety is extraordinarily rare in the Muslim community. 
45 

It is not accidental. It was caused in large part by the deliberate 

policies of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s predecessor, Abu Musab alZarqawi, who believed—apparently rightly—that it served his interests to stoke sectarian war in Iraq to try to get the Shia majority in Iraq to attack the Sunni minority in Iraq in order to drive 

recruitment for his cause, and that has been successful and it has 

spread and sectarian groups on both sides are leaning into this. 

But the battle for the Muslim world that I am most concerned 

about is not the sectarian fight. It is the battle by al-Qaeda, which 

is an insurgent group fundamentally that does desire to gain control over the entire 1.6 million—or billion ummah to do so. I believe 

that its attempt will ultimately fail, because—and I am happy to 

have this conversation with you at greater length—this is part of 

the heresy that—what they espouse, in my view, part of a heresy 

that goes back to the very, very first days of Islam. It has emerged 

periodically. It is always rejected in the end by the Muslim community, and I believe that it will be rejected again here. 

The question is: How long will it take? How much damage will 

be done in the mean time to the Muslims themselves and to us? 

But that is why I think that you can’t separate the fight against 

al-Qaeda from the sectarian fight. We have to address both of those 

problems, and it is why we have to be careful—as one of my panelists said—not to look at short-sighted solutions to the problem. 

I was the one who mentioned Qassem Soleimani. I follow Haji 

Qassem very closely. If the more we support the Iranians, the more 

we fuel the sectarian war, the more we provide a recruiting basis 

for al-Qaeda. So we must not look at short-term solutions that say 

let’s back Assad because he might be fighting Sunni extremists, 

let’s back Maliki—and I agree with every word you said about 

Maliki and would add a lot more and not fit for printing—let’s just 

back this guy because he is fighting al-Qaeda. No. That is why we 

do have to engage in the complexity, painful as it is. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Higgins, Ranking Member Higgins, I just wanted 

to add two comments to what Dr. Kagan said. No. 1 is: I do think 

you are right. There is an important Shia-Sunni sectarian component of this. The group we see in Iraq and also in Syria, ISIS, since 

its origins under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in western Afghanistan, 

has been among the most anti-Shia of any of these jihadist organizations. That translated when he went into Iraq before the U.S. invasion and then when he associated himself with al-Qaeda. 

He has—this group has been—has committed the most atrocities 

against Shia. But I would say, more broadly, the largest amounts 

of violence we have seen in jihadist battlefields has been intraSunni. There is intense fighting among Sunni organizations, and 

this gets me to my second point briefly, which is I think Fred is 

right, that there is—this is about extremism versus non-extremists. 

As we have seen these—where these groups have been beaten back 

in Mali, with French and U.S. participation, in Saudi Arabia in 

2003 and other locations, during the Awakening, it has been 

Sunnis that have pushed them back in areas because their views 

are too extreme. 

I think they will go down and they will go down in part because 

Sunnis will not accept these extremists, because they do not 

espouse the views of most Muslims in these areas. Thank you. 
46 

Mr. SIMCOX. I think there certainly is battle of sectarian warfare 

going on and battle for control, but what we have to avoid is the 

temptation to then just take a step back and say, well, everyone 

is as bad as each other, we can’t do anything about this, and retreat towards isolationism. We have a role to play, and we have a 

great stake in the outcome. We have a great stake in as best as 

we can trying to foster democratic movements in that part of the 

world, because some of these groups that we are worried about and 

that we are talking about today, their ideology and their ambitions 

don’t stay at their own borders. They ultimately come to affect us 

in the homeland, so we have to be very active in our engagement 

in that area. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Just a final thought. There is a relatively recent 

book by Marwan Muasher called ‘‘The Second Arab Awakening.’’ In 

it, you know, he argues that that part of the world is very pluralistic. Unless and until there are, minority rights, these battles will 

always continue. 

So if there is—you know, it is a zero-sum game. So long as there 

is a zero-sum game, in order for somebody to win, somebody has 

to lose. Unfortunately, it is not ideal, but it is the reality that civil 

wars in world history are a part of nation-building. You know, we 

in our own country had a civil war. About 625,000 people died in 

the American civil war. At that time, our Nation’s population was 

probably about 38 million people. That is pretty significant. 

It just seems that I understand the importance of this. I understand the importance of protecting the homeland. I really do, and 

I would do anything in my power to support policies to achieve that 

objective. But the fact of the matter is, everybody has been wrong, 

Democrats and Republicans, Democratic administration, Republican administrations, because of the complexity of these kinds of 

issues. 

It just seems to me that more military intervention, if it is 

viewed as supporting the Maliki government in Iraq, despite the 

fact that he doesn’t deserve American support, because he only 

came to us when he was threatened. He cut a deal with the Iranians to keep him in power. This is just a vicious cycle that will 

continue, and there is really no game-changing moment unless and 

until the warring factions make a decision that in order to 

progress, they have to coexist peacefully. 

You know, a lot of people say that, you know, that is impossible, 

particularly in that part of the world, but, you know, when you 

look at the situation in Northern Ireland, the Protestants and the 

Catholics, they had to do one thing before they were accepted to 

the negotiating table. They had to renounce violence. They had to 

renounce violence and then they had to participate in an international process to destroy their arms, to confirm that they were 

disavowing the tradition, both traditions, both sides of violence, 

then and only then—and it wasn’t unilateralism, it was mutuality—they progressed. 

The United States and Great Britain played an extraordinary 

role in that great achievement, albeit still with problems, but that 

was a major, major achievement. The United States didn’t deploy 

any military troops. We had great leverage. 
47 

So I just think that, you know, we are going to be here 5 years 

from now, because talking about the same things, because this will 

require at least another generation. Any involvement, for every action, there is a reaction. It seems as though, when there is a reaction, typically it doesn’t accrue to the benefit of the United States. 

So I will yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. KING. Gentleman from Georgia. 

Mr. BROUN. I will just add a little more and just associate myself 

with what my friend from New York, Mr. Higgins, just said. I think 

very long-term the basic solution is going to be the non-extremist 

Muslim saying, ‘‘We are not going to put up with this anymore 

world-wide.’’ Somehow we as a Nation need to foster that type of 

philosophy within the Muslim community. 

Part of our heritage, part of our Constitution, part of what we 

are all about is accepting people of different religious beliefs. I 

don’t think as a Nation we have really understood how important 

it is to work with the non-extremist Muslim community world-wide 

to try to help stop this. Again, I think it is intelligence as well as 

our special ops people who can help foster this. 

Can you all expound upon that philosophy that I have that it is 

going to be the Muslim community itself that just rejects extremism and stops it world-wide, as opposed to us doing what we have 

been doing, again, has been all about containment? 

Mr. KAGAN. I do agree with you that this ends when—or ends 

for now when the Muslim community does reject this. But this is 

not a theoretical political ideological discussion that is being had in 

the Muslim right now. It is a war. This is something that we really 

can’t lose sight of, because you can be an Iraqi and most Iraqis reject the Islamic State ideology. But that doesn’t do you any good 

if the Islamic State are the guys who have got the guns and the 

gun trucks sitting on every corner going around, rounding up everybody who speaks against them, killing them. 

If you don’t have an ability to defend yourself against those people, then disagreeing with their ideology is just an extravagant way 

of committing suicide. We have done this before. With respect to 

the Ranking Member, not everything we have done has failed and 

not everything that we have tried has been a mistake. 

We did enable the Iraqi Sunni community to turn against alQaeda in Iraq in 2007. We did support them, and they did reject 

them, and they put 100,000 of their own sons into the front line 

against this organization. Now, Maliki screwed that up, absolutely, 

right with you on that, sir. But they did turn. What made them 

turn? One of the things that made them turn was the belief that 

they would win, that they would fight, they would bleed, they knew 

that, but when they came to believe that they could win, they were 

willing to do that. We had to help them believe that they could win. 

So what I would say is, no one is advocating a blanket, largescale military intervention around the world. That is not what we 

are talking about. Although this committee is not engaged in this, 

there is a lot of straw man discussion that is going on in town 

where people are saying, oh, you just want to send hundreds of 

thousands of troops. I don’t know anybody who is advocating doing 

that. 
48 

What I am going to say is that from the standpoint of answering 

the question: Who is capable of helping moderate Muslims defeat 

militarily the people who are attempting to impose this ideology 

upon them by force? That capability does not exist within the Muslim community right now. 

Our alternative is going to be, we are either going to help provide 

that capability to defeat this organization so that what you are describing can occur, which I believe it will, or we can have this protract for a much longer period of time, have many, many, many 

more people die, including our own, and have this movement 

spread. 

I believe we can affect this. Although I absolutely do understand 

that every action we take has a consequence and there are going 

to be unforeseen consequences, we also need to recognize that inaction has consequences and very frequently unforeseen, but in this 

case very foreseeable consequences. 

One of those is, is that if no one takes action to help moderate 

Muslims defeat the armies of extremists they are now facing, those 

armies will triumph for quite some time and the situation will get 

a lot worse. 

Mr. BROUN. I agree with you. Again, I think it is our intel community and our SF and special ops military forces that are going 

to pay a key role in doing just that. 

Mr. Chairman, if you will give me one more question, I would appreciate it, because I believe the policies of four administrations— 

two Republicans and two Democrats now of open borders—and 

they have—both Bush administrations, the Clinton administration, 

as well as now the Obama administration—have absolutely refused 

to secure our borders. To me, that is a National security issue. I 

think the United States is becoming a safe haven, also, because of 

administrations. 

Again, I think it is going to take intel, boots on the ground, not 

monitoring every American’s emails and phone calls, but having 

the intelligence community in this country, as well as worldwide, 

to have that human intelligence is absolutely critical for us to 

make sure that America is as safe as possible. 

So I assume all of you all would agree that we need to secure 

the borders and we need to do it as quickly as possible. Is my assumption correct? Yes, no, all four of you? 

Mr. KAGAN. Yes, I would agree with you. But I think the larger 

point you are making is also very important, that—— 

Mr. BROUN. Well, absolutely. 

Mr. KAGAN [continuing]. The defense of the borders does not 

start at the border. 

Mr. BROUN. No, in fact, a lot—40 percent of the people here in 

this country illegally—in fact, all of the ones that perpetrated the 

9/11 attack came here legally. They just overstayed their visa. That 

is also a part of the problem that we have as a Nation. We don’t 

know when people come and go, and we are not following them. 

Again, four administrations have been guilty of just saying, come 

if you want to, and we know—people coming across our Southern 

Border, I am sure across our Northern Border, as well, that are— 

the Department of Homeland Security and CBP calls them OTMs, 
49 

other than Mexicans. We are capturing folks from the Middle East, 

from Asia, that are coming across our borders. 

But who are we not capturing? With this flood of unaccompanied 

minors that are coming into this country, it is—that our administration has encouraged is exacerbating the problem that we have 

from entities coming into this country with other than generous 

reasons towards helping the United States or for economic reasons. 

I think they are coming here. 

So I would appreciate just a written idea from all of you all, too, 

about—and I am going to ask a question for you to answer about 

the funding, if you would, please answer that in writing about— 

again, we see Iran funding Hezbollah, as well as Hamas, both 

sides, from Sunni, as well as Shia. Iran is a huge part of this issue, 

and I don’t see this administration or the previous administration 

really dealing with Iran to the strength that we need to. 

If you all have any suggestions about doing so, Mr. Chairman, 

my time is up, unless they want to have a comment. 

Mr. KING. Actually, if you could do it in writing, I would appreciate it, because we are running short on time. 

So—the gentleman from Florida. 

Mr. CLAWSON. A little economic practicality here might be in 

order. I think that the idea that we are the only arbiter in the Arab 

world as this religious political civil war plays out bothers me a little bit. Our trade deficit with Arab nations and with oil-exporting 

nations, it is hundreds of billions of dollars. They should be part 

of this solution. It is their neighborhood, and it is our money that 

goes from our consumer to their pocketbooks. Where are the gulf 

nations? 

We have had this conversation today, where that hasn’t even 

come up. We should not be funding this. We are paying them. We 

are paying for our oil, first of all. I think I am in agreement with 

the Ranking Member that this is going to be such a complicated 

thing. It is so difficult, because it is the intersection of Government 

and religion which makes it a lot different than a lot of civil wars 

that we have seen. It has been going on for centuries. 

I think in the Muslim world, now means 100 years time frame, 

and America now means a week. Their now is a very long now, 

isn’t it not, gentlemen? So, therefore, I revert back to what I am 

worried about for us, our allies, and especially Israel, what—assuming we can’t solve this program anytime soon, I am worried 

about the supply chain, coming through Europe or, to your point, 

Mr. Jones, straight to the United States. It matters not to me all 

of our intelligence and all of our resources to cut off people that are 

going to do us and our enemies harm. 

I am not saying, Mr. Congressman Broun or Mr. Brookes, that 

we shouldn’t be engaged there—you know, with special forces or 

anybody else. I am saying I think that is a very difficult situation 

that won’t be solved anytime soon, even if we do pull the right 

knobs, and in the mean time, let’s cut off the supply chain. Any 

communication to me that we can do to help or that I can do to 

help, I am all ears. 

I yield back. 

Mr. KING. I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony. I 

would just say, in conclusion for myself, this could be a battle and 
50 

struggle that goes on for decades, centuries, whatever. My concern 

is the innocent Westerners that are killed in the mean time. As far 

as whether or not we have had success, the fact is, there has not 

been a major attack on our mainland since September 11, 2001. To 

me, that is a success. 

It didn’t happen just because you waited for it to resolve itself. 

It is because we did take aggressive action, not always done perfectly, but the fact is, we took action, and I think it is because of 

that that we are a safer Nation today or at least we have been protected more—since 9/11 than we have before. I think emerging 

threats could make it more dangerous, but that would even exacerbate itself if we lowered our defenses. 

As far as the question of intelligence, I think it is absolutely essential. The gentleman from Georgia and I can have a debate, because I don’t believe the NSA is listening to anyone’s phone calls 

or reading anyone’s emails, but that is another story for another 

hearing. 

But if we don’t fully use our intelligence capabilities and don’t 

maximize our potential, I believe that—while the Sunnis and the 

Shias and the fragmentation within the Sunnis is being resolved, 

I don’t want Americans killed in the mean time. Mr. Simcox doesn’t 

want Europeans killed, nor do I, and I think that is really what 

this is about, how we keep enough pressure on to protect us and 

protect the homeland. I don’t think any of us ever wants to go 

through another 9/11. 

So with that, the hearing stands adjourned. I thank the witnesses for their testimony. As the gentleman from Georgia said, 

any questions that you want to respond to in writing, he is more 

than willing to take them. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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