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S. HRG. 113–513 

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 15, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Brzezinski, Dr. Zbigniew K., former U.S. National Security Advisor, counselor 

and trustee, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 24

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement ................. 2 

Melia, Thomas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ........ 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

Response to question submitted for the record by Senator Edward J. 

Markey ........................................................................................................... 40 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening statement .... 1 

Nuland, Hon. Victoria, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ......................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by the following 

Senators: 

Robert Menendez ....................................................................................... 37 

Bob Corker ................................................................................................. 39 

Edward J. Markey ..................................................................................... 40 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Prepared Statement of Ukrainian Congress Committee of America ................... 35 

Letter from the United Oppositions to the Senate of the United States ............ 36 

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1) 

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 15, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Shaheen, Durbin, Murphy, Corker, 

Risch, Johnson, and McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order. 

I want to thank our distinguished panelists for being here. Dr. 

Brzezinski, who will be here shortly, needs no introduction. His 

reputation as one of the Nation’s leading voices on foreign policy 

goes without saying. Assistant Secretary Nuland and Deputy 

Assistant Secretary Melia are equally able to give us a broader perspective on the implications of current events in the Ukraine, so, 

on behalf of the committee, we thank you for being here. 

Let me also join Senator McCain in recognizing the former 

Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Boris Tarasyuk, and the current 

Ambassador of the Ukraine, Olexander Motsyk, who are both here 

today. We welcome you to the committee. 

We are also joined by members of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, including President Tamara Olexy, chairman of 

the board, Stefan Kaczaraj, executive vice president, Andrew 

Futey, and board members, Roksolana Lozynskyj and Michael 

Sawkiw. So, we welcome all of you, and we appreciate that many 

of you are actually from the great State of New Jersey, and are 

contributing dramatically to our State. 

I am going to entertain Senator McCain’s request at this time, 

and, without objection, the statement will be entered into the 

record. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—Senator McCain’s prepared statement can be 

found in the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the Record’’ section 

of this hearing.] 

The CHAIRMAN. For 20 years, Ukrainians have labored to reestablish their nation and create a prosperous economy. In 2013, it 

seemed that the conclusion of association agreements with the 

European Union would have a profoundly positive effect on their 

national development; but, somewhat unexpectedly, on Thursday, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2 

November 21, Ukraine’s President, Viktor Yanukovych, announced 

that Ukraine would not sign those agreements, and people took to 

the streets. That decision was preceded by coercive actions by the 

Russian Government: Ukrainian exports to Russia were halted by 

Russian authorities, its energy lifeline from Russia was publicly 

threatened by Russian Ministers, and even EU member states were 

subjected to intimidation by Moscow for being sponsors of 

Ukraine’s affiliation with the European Union. 

Since then, the world has watched as Presidents Yanukovych 

and Putin negotiated a deal that will bring Ukraine once again 

within Russia’s political and economic orbit, suggesting Russia’s 

determination to exert control over Ukraine. 

We are here today to get a better understanding of the events 

leading up to President Yanukovych’s decision to break with the 

EU, the decision’s implication for the future of Ukraine, for the 

region, and, in my perspective, for the world. 

Let me say that, earlier this month, I met with members of New 

Jersey’s Ukrainian diaspora, and they asked me to bring attention 

to the thousands of protestors in the Maidan who want a voice in 

the future of their country and respect for their human rights and 

dignity, and I would like to assure them today that this committee 

is not deaf to those brave people whose capacity for hope and appetite for freedom has compelled them to take to the streets. The 

world is, indeed, watching. And how those who have been in the 

Maidan, and who leave it, are treated will also be watched by this 

committee and the world. 

With that, let me turn to Senator Corker for his remarks. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I typically do not read formal remarks, but I am going to do that 

today. 

I would like to welcome the witnesses from this administration, 

as well as Dr. Brzezinski. I am glad that the chairman has called 

this hearing. I think that the importance of Ukraine is not entirely 

appreciated. 

With the exception of Russia and France, Ukraine is the largest 

country in Europe, with a population of 46 million people and vast 

unrealized potential. And, while Ukraine is critically important in 

its own right, what is often missed is that positive change in 

Ukraine would help stimulate positive change in Russia. In my 

view, what has transpired in Ukraine is one of the most recent 

examples where United States leadership, at the right moment, 

could have been decisive. 

I recognize that the history of this is complex and there are mitigating factors and forces involved that, even in the best of times, 

we have little influence over. We should acknowledge that the 

Europeans did not want us deeply involved, fearing United States 

involvement would risk provoking Russia and framing the decision 

as part of a geopolitical struggle. 

The Ukrainian Government, for its part, seemed to be playing 

each side against each other, asking for unrealistic terms from the 

IMF that ignored the country’s need for reform. Ukraine’s leaderFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3 

ship failed to meet the EU’s condition for an association agreement 

and, instead, opted for a $15 billion loan and a natural gas discount from Russia. This decision to place the interest of Ukraine’s 

political elites above the country’s well-being has been rejected by 

the majority of Ukrainians, which is substantiated by the massive 

protests held since November. 

But, none of this accounts for why United States policy toward 

Ukraine was weak when it needed to be decisive and forceful. Critics have accused the administration of bumbling or incompetence 

as the reason for the absence of assertiveness and leadership on 

our part. But, I do not think that that is the case. A lack of U.S. 

leadership appears to be intentional, an example of troubling 

recent tendencies of the administration’s policies in places where 

our interests are being challenged. 

Apparently overly concerned with offending Russia, the administration seems to have somehow made the calculation initially that 

a passive response might yield more than assertive U.S. leadership. 

I think that it is important to ask now, with Russia gaining at our 

expense in Syria, in Iran, on missile defense, Edward Snowden, 

and now Ukraine, whether that was the right approach. When 

President Yanukovych saw that we did not come out clearly and 

forcefully when Russia all but boycotted Ukrainian goods and 

threatened them, he probably reached the same conclusion that 

many of our friends in tough neighborhoods have made: we are not 

the partner that they can count on in tough times. 

Perhaps even more troubling is the fact that our risk-averse policy precluded the very real opportunity to seek change in Russia 

through Ukraine by not making Ukraine a concession to the Kremlin, but by making Ukraine an example. The repercussions in Russia of a free and prosperous Ukraine integrated with Europe could 

be enormous. This might not be in Putin’s personal interest, but is 

certainly in the interest of the Russian people. 

Fortunately, I think that the administration has now begun to 

assert our interests and those of the Ukrainian people, but, like in 

other places, they got there only in reaction to events well after 

they begin to play out unfavorably. 

Ukraine is not a zero-sum game between Russia and the West. 

The popular sentiment in Ukraine is in favor of moving toward 

Europe, and I hope that that effort will ultimately prevail, but we 

have to determine how to best aid and hasten that move. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your testimony on the topic. I 

appreciate all of our witnesses being here. 

And, Ms. Nuland, I think that you have asserted effort there 

recently, which I much appreciate. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Our first panel today is the Assistant Secretary of European and 

Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 

Labor, Mr. Thomas Melia. We appreciate your appearance. Your 

full statements will be included in the record. We would ask you 

to summarize it in about 5 minutes or so, so that we can enter into 

a dialogue with you. 

And, with that, Madam Secretary, you will be up first. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4 

STATEMENT OF HON. VICTORIA NULAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador NULAND. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking 

Member Corker, distinguished members of the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee. It is my honor to appear before you today to 

discuss the situation in Ukraine and our response to it. 

These are, indeed, challenging times for the people of Ukraine 

and for people everywhere who care about democracy, economic 

prosperity, rule of law, and a European future for that country. 

First, let me express our gratitude to this committee and to the 

U.S. Senate for your leadership on Ukraine and for the superb 

working relationship between the executive and legislative 

branches of government on this issue. Senate Resolution 319, introduced in December and adopted on January 7, sent a strong bipartisan message of concern and support to the Ukrainian people at 

a key moment. 

I also want to thank and commend Senators McCain and Murphy for bringing that bipartisan support directly to the people of 

Ukraine on a key weekend in December and engaging with President Yanukovych, his government, the opposition, the business 

community, and civil society in support of a peaceful, democratic 

way out of the crisis. The people of Ukraine saw America stand 

with them at a critical moment, when they could have felt very 

alone. 

The world has watched as the peaceful protest of hundreds of 

thousands of Ukrainians on the Maidan, in Kiev, and tens of thousands in cities across Ukraine. I am often asked why they come 

out, week after week, young and old, and from every economic sector of Ukraine, despite the frigid weather. I can only tell you what 

Ukrainians tell us. They say that what began as a protest against 

the government’s decision to pause on the route to the association 

agreement and a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement 

with the European Union quickly deepened and broadened into 

something very much more in the ensuing weeks as events snowballed. These events included the violent action by security forces 

against Maidan protesters on November 30, the lack of government 

accountability that followed that, the second attempt to use security forces to shut down the Maidan in the wee hours of December 

11, an evening that EU High Representative Cathy Ashton and I 

were both in Ukraine, and, finally, the Ukrainian Government’s 

decision to accept $15 billion in Russian bailout money. The 

Ukrainians tell us that, over those weeks, the movement that 

started as a demand for a European future grew into a protest for 

basic human dignity and justice, for clean and accountable government, and economic and political independence of Ukraine. 

So, why does the United States have an interest in how this 

turns out? Our chairman and ranking member have spoken to that. 

It is because countries that live freely and independently and 

respect the rule of law are more stable and they make better partners for the United States. The same principles and values that 

Ukrainians are fighting for are the cornerstone of all free democracies, and America supports these values in every country on the 

planet. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5 

The EuroMaidan protestors—students, workers, pensioners, 

priests, entrepreneurs, business moguls, and pop stars—are all 

calling for the same basic rights that we hold dear here in the 

United States. They want to live in a country where their government truly represents the wishes of the people and where they can 

safely exercise their rights without fear of oppression. 

Just this past weekend, tens of thousands of protestors returned 

to the Maidan, and they also returned to the streets and squares 

across Kiev to make their demands and to protest the latest 

assaults on human dignity, including the beatings of opposition 

leader and former Interior Minister, Yuriy Lutsenko, and journalist, Tetyana Chornoval, as well as dozens of other acts of intimidation and criminality and efforts to stifle the media and political 

activity across the country. 

Like the vast majority of Ukrainians, the United States and our 

partners in the European Union want to see the current standoff 

resolved politically, democratically, and, above all, peacefully. This 

last point applies to the government and to protestors, alike. We 

condemn the actions of rioters outside the Kiev court building on 

January 10. However, the use of violence and acts of repression 

carried out by government security forces and their surrogates 

have compelled us to make clear, publicly and privately, to the 

Government of Ukraine that we will consider a broad range of tools 

at our disposal if those in positions of authority in Ukraine employ 

or encourage violence against their own citizens. 

We have also pressed all key stakeholders—President Yanukovych, his government, the opposition, business representatives, 

religious leaders, and civil society—to engage in a good-faith dialogue to get Ukraine back on the path to economic health, justice, 

and a European future. 

When I last met with President Yanukovych, which was on 

December 11, he asserted that he still wanted those things for his 

people, and Foreign Minister Kaczaraj reassured me of the same 

thing in a phone call on Monday. If those assertions are true, we 

call on the Ukrainian Government to make them credible through 

concrete actions to restore government accountability, rule of law, 

and engagement with Europe and the IMF. 

In this connection, we commend the European Union for leaving 

the door open for Ukraine and the International Monetary Fund for 

its willingness to work with Ukraine when the government decides 

that it is actually willing to roll up its sleeves and address the serious structural and macroeconomic problems that have plagued that 

country for years. 

The IMF is offering a proven, if arduous, long-term-diet plan 

back to good health for Ukraine. Like any tough health regime, it 

will require work and sacrifice, but the rewards are great. When 

Ukraine’s leaders are ready to invest in that kind of a program, the 

United States and our EU partners will help them sustain that 

commitment. We urge them to restart IMF consultations now. 

Looking forward, the United States will also work hard to support free and fair Presidential elections in 2015, and a fair electoral 

process leading up to the elections. The rerun of parliamentary 

elections in December was not up to international standards. We 

call on the Government of Ukraine to fully investigate all regularFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6 

ities there, and we call on all Ukrainians to help guard their democracy against encroachments on media freedom, political intimidation, efforts to rig, corrupt, or undercut the electoral structures 

and processes. 

U.S. preelectoral assistance in Ukraine will likely include programs to support citizen oversight of the electoral environment and 

the conduct of the elections, independent media coverage, and 

informed citizen awareness and participation. We will also focus on 

supporting the integrity of the process and not support any specific 

candidates or parties. Like the rest of our policy toward Ukraine, 

this will be carefully coordinated with the EU. 

In addition to election-related programming, the State Department and USAID are reviewing how best to support Ukrainian civil 

society and the media, and to further strengthen rule of law. Given 

the threats currently facing many nongovernmental organizations 

who participated in the EuroMaidan, we are looking at ways we 

can support those who feel that they may be in personal danger, 

as well. And we will work with the EU to support their efforts to 

disseminate reliable information on what European integration 

really means to the Ukrainian public, especially in the East, and 

to counter false narratives and fear-mongering. 

As we have said repeatedly over the last few months—and, Senator Corker, I was pleased to hear you say this—Ukraine’s European integration is not a zero-sum calculation. We encourage 

Ukraine to continue to develop normal and strong sovereign relations with all of its neighbors. There is also, unfortunately, a good 

deal of disinformation in Russia about the potential effect that the 

EU’s Eastern Partnership could have on its economy and arrangements with neighbors, so we encourage the EU also to redouble its 

efforts to counter those false narratives within Russia and actively 

make its case that a more prosperous, more European Ukraine will 

lift the whole neighborhood, both economically and in terms of 

democratic stability. 

Ukrainians have struggled for 20 years, as you said, Mr. Chairman, to protect and strengthen their sovereignty, their democracy, 

and their economy. The events of the last 6 months demonstrate 

that Ukrainians want and deserve better. I am proud to work with 

this committee to support those aspirations. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Nuland follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. VICTORIA NULAND

Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and distinguished 

members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It is my honor to appear 

before you today to discuss the situation in Ukraine and our response to it. These 

are challenging times for the people of Ukraine and for people everywhere who care 

about democracy, economic prosperity, rule of law and a European future for that 

country. 

First let me express our gratitude to this committee and to the U.S. Senate for 

your leadership on Ukraine, and for the superb working relationship between the 

executive and legislative branches of government on this issue. Senate Resolution 

319, introduced in December and adopted on January 7, sent a strong, bipartisan 

message of concern and support to the Ukrainian people at a key moment. I also 

want to thank and commend Senators McCain and Murphy for bringing that bipartisan support directly to the people of Ukraine on a key weekend in December, and 

engaging with President Yanukovych, his government, the opposition, the business 

community and civil society in support of a peaceful, democratic way out of the criFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

7 

sis. The people of Ukraine saw America stand up with them at a critical moment 

when they could have felt very alone. 

The whole world has watched the peaceful protest of hundreds of thousands of 

Ukrainians on the Maidan in Kiev and tens of thousands in other cities across 

Ukraine. I am often asked why they come out week after week, young and old, and 

from every economic sector of Ukraine, despite the frigid weather. I can only tell 

you what Ukrainians tell us. They say that what began as a protest against the government’s decision to ‘‘pause’’ on the route to an Association Agreement and Deep 

and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the European Union deepened and 

broadened into something much more in the ensuing weeks as events snowballed. 

These included: the violent attempt by security forces to clear the Maidan of 

protestors on November 30 and the lack of government accountability that followed; 

the second attempt to use security forces to shut down the Maidan in the wee hours 

of December 11; and finally the Ukrainian Government’s decision to accept $15 billion in Russian bailout money. Ukrainians tell us that over those weeks the movement that started as a demand for a European future grew into a protest for basic 

human dignity and justice, clean and accountable government, and economic and 

political independence of Ukraine. 

Why does the United States have an interest in how this turns out? Because these 

same principles and values are the cornerstone of all free democracies, and America 

supports them in every country on the planet. Countries that live freely and independently and respect the rule of law are more stable and make better partners for 

the United States. The EuroMaidan protestors—students, workers, pensioners, 

priests, entrepreneurs, business moguls and popstars—are all calling for the same 

basic rights we hold dear here in the United States. They want to live in a country 

where their government truly represents the wishes of the people and where they 

can safely exercise their rights without the fear of oppression. 

Just this past weekend tens of thousands returned to the Maidan in Kiev, hundreds joined them in other cities like Kharkiv, and some 500 cars participated in 

a ‘‘protest drive’’ called AutoMaidan. They returned to the squares and streets of 

Ukraine to make their demands, and to protest the latest assaults on human dignity, including the beatings of opposition leader and former Interior Minister, Yuriy 

Lutsenko, and journalist, Tetyana Chornovol, as well as dozens of other acts of 

intimidation and criminality, and efforts to stifle the media and political activity 

across the country. 

Like the vast majority of Ukrainians, the United States and our partners in the 

European Union want to see the current standoff resolved politically, democratically 

and above all, peacefully. This last point applies to the government and protestors 

alike, and we condemn the actions of rioters outside a Kiev court building on January 10. However, the use of violence and acts of repression carried out by government security forces and their surrogates have compelled us to make clear publicly 

and privately to the Government of Ukraine that we will consider a broad range 

of tools at our disposal if those in positions of authority in Ukraine employ or 

encourage violence against their own citizens. We have also pressed all key stakeholders—President Yanukovych, his government, the opposition, business representatives, religious leaders, and civil society—to engage in a good-faith dialogue to get 

Ukraine back on the path to economic health, justice, and a European future. When 

I last met with President Yanukovych on December 11, he asserted that he still 

wanted all those things for his people. If that assertion is still true, we call on him 

to make it credible through concrete actions to restore government accountability, 

rule of law and engagement with Europe and the IMF. 

In this connection, we commend the European Union for leaving the door open 

for Ukraine, and the International Monetary Fund for its willingness to work with 

Ukraine when the government is willing to roll up its sleeves and address the serious structural and macroeconomic problems that have plagued the country for 

years. The IMF is offering a proven, if arduous, long-term diet plan back to good 

economic health. Like any tough health regime, it requires work and sacrifice but 

the rewards are great. When Ukraine’s leaders are ready to invest in that kind of 

program, the United States and our EU partners will help them sustain the commitment. We urge them to restart consultations now. 

Looking forward, the United States will work hard to support a free and fair Presidential election in 2015. The rerun of parliamentary elections held on December 15 

was not conducted according to international standards, especially with respect to 

alleged misconduct during the election campaign. We call on the Government of 

Ukraine to thoroughly investigate all reported violations, and to prosecute those 

responsible for them. We also call on all Ukrainians to help guard their democracy 

against encroachments on media freedom, political intimidation or efforts to rig, corrupt, or undercut electoral structures and processes. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8 

U.S. preelection assistance to Ukraine likely will include programs to support citizen oversight of the campaign environment and the conduct of the elections, independent media coverage and informed civic awareness and participation. The United 

States will focus on supporting the integrity of the process, and not support any specific candidates or parties. Like the rest of our policy toward Ukraine, our assistance 

will be carefully coordinated with the EU. 

In addition to election-related programming, the State Department and USAID 

are reviewing how best to support Ukrainian civil society and media and to further 

strengthen the rule of law. Given the threats currently facing many nongovernmental organizations who participated in the EuroMaidan, we are looking at ways 

we can support those who feel they may be in danger. We will also work with the 

EU to support their efforts to disseminate reliable information on what European 

integration really means to the Ukrainian public, especially in the East, and to 

counter false narratives and fear-mongering. 

As I have said repeatedly over the past few months, Ukraine’s European integration is not a zero-sum calculation. We encourage Ukraine to continue to develop normal and strong, sovereign relations with all neighbors. There is also, unfortunately 

a good deal of disinformation in Russia about the potential effect that the EU’s 

Eastern Partnership could have on its economy and arrangements with neighbors. 

We have encouraged the EU to redouble its efforts to counter false narratives in 

Russia and actively make its case that a more prosperous, European Ukraine will 

lift the whole neighborhood, both economically and in terms of democratic stability. 

Ukrainians have struggled for 20 years to protect and strengthen their sovereignty, their democracy and their economy. The events of the last 6 months demonstrate that Ukrainians want and deserve better. I am proud to work with this 

committee to support their aspirations. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Secretary Melia. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS MELIA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, 

AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. MELIA. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Senator Corker, 

and other Senators, for inviting me to testify on the situation in 

Ukraine. 

Over the last few weeks and months, your forthright statements, 

Mr. Chairman, forthright and principled statements, and those of 

so many others on this committee and in the Congress, have sent 

important messages about the interests and the focus of the United 

States and the American people to assist Ukraine at this critical 

moment. 

It is also an honor to appear beside Ambassador Nuland, who, 

you may know, is revered across the State Department, and especially in my Bureau for Democracy and Human Rights, for her 

leadership on issues of democracy and human rights. 

Working with her Bureau, our Embassy in Kiev, the Department 

of Justice, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, our 

Bureau has, over the last 3 years, maintained direct and frequent 

engagement with the Government of Ukraine, and intensely with 

Ukrainian civil society, on democracy and rule-of-law issues. These 

dialogues, often under the umbrella of the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic 

Partnership Commission, have provided a regular high-level forum 

for serious, honest exchanges about the government’s reform 

efforts, which have waxed and waned during the tenure of Viktor 

Yanukovych as President, and for frank conversations about problem areas, such as corruption, democratic backsliding, and other 

setbacks. 

We have utilized this forum to push back in the year 2010, on 

harassment of journalists in civil society in the first months of the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9 

Yanukovych administration, raising these issues directly with Cabinet members, including the head of the Internal Security Service 

in Ukraine. And the harassment waned for a while. 

Within this working group, we have held frank discussions about 

the increase in the harassment of journalists in civil society which 

surfaced again this year. As it did in 2010, the efforts by the government to repress civil society and independent journalism have 

galvanized civic activism across Ukraine. They have formed coalitions, called the Stop Censorship Movement and the New Citizen 

Campaign, which mobilized and informed citizens about their basic 

rights under Ukraine’s laws and constitution. Nonpartisan civil 

society remains a significant, powerful force for democratic reform 

in Ukraine. 

Unfortunately, the negative trend in the treatment of journalists, 

in particular, has seen a resurgence in the past few months. 

According to the Institute of Mass Information, respected Ukrainian media watchdog, there are more than 100 attacks and cases of 

intimidation against journalists in 2013, most half of them occurring in December, alone. In addition, IMI recorded 120 cases of obstruction of journalist professional activities, 51 cases of censorship, 

44 cases of economic and political pressure, and five arrests and 

detentions. 

While the protests on the Maidan and across the country may 

have lost some of their numbers, they have lost none of their intensity. The embers that sparked the protests in late November are 

still burning and will not be easily extinguished. The tens of thousands of people who turned out again this past weekend in Kiev 

and other cities across Ukraine, now in the third month of these 

protests, testify to this. And, thanks to the support of this committee and the Congress, we have invested over $5 billion to assist 

Ukraine in these and other goals to ensure a secure, prosperous, 

and democratic Ukraine. 

Since 2009 alone, when President Obama took office, the U.S. 

Government has provided more than $184 million in assistance to 

Ukraine in programs under the rubric of governing justly and 

democratically, those programs which focus on professional development programs for judges, Members of Parliament, legal advocates, civil society, and democratic political parties, elections, and 

independent media. Most of this is managed—and I would say 

managed well—by our colleagues at the U.S. Agency for International Development, led by Paige Alexander and her colleagues 

at the mission in Ukraine, but it also includes programs from the 

State Department, our Bureau, Department of Justice, and elsewhere across the U.S. Government. This level of assistance underscores both our commitment to Ukraine and our intention to continue engaging both with the government and the people of 

Ukraine. Our approach to Ukraine complements that of our EU 

partners and what they sought in their association agreement: a 

Ukraine that is more responsive to its citizens, that offers its people opportunities that a growing free-market economy would provide based on the rule of law. 

Looking forward, we will continue to work with our colleagues 

elsewhere in the State Department, AID, and across the governFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10 

ment, to support dialogue with the government, support for civil 

society, and especially independent media. 

We know there are senior officials in the Ukrainian Government 

today, as well as in the business community, just like in the opposition and in the civil society community, who believe in a democratic 

and European future for their country. They continue to work hard 

to move their country and their President in the right direction. 

We will continue to try to provide targeted, effective support to 

Ukraine’s democrats in and out of the government. This committee’s continuing support and attention remains absolutely essential. 

Again, we appreciate your support for last week’s resolution, the 

Murphy resolution. I think that sent a very powerful message. And 

this hearing today underscores that, as well. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Melia follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS O. MELIA

Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and distinguished 

members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for inviting me to testify on 

the situation in Ukraine. We very much appreciate the attention you are according 

to a country at the center of Europe and a valued partner for the United States. 

Last week the Senate unanimously passed Senator Murphy’s Senate Resolution 

319, which came out of this committee: Expressing support for the Ukrainian people 

in light of President Yanukovych’s decision not to sign an Association Agreement 

with the European Union. 

I am pleased to provide additional context from my Bureau, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor which, in partnership with the Bureau of European 

and Eurasian Affairs, our Embassy in Kiev, the Department of Justice and with the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), has been in direct and frequent engagement during the past 3 years with the Government of Ukraine and 

Ukrainian civil society in bilateral dialogues on democracy and rule of law issues. 

As my colleague Assistant Secretary Nuland noted these are indeed challenging 

times for the people of Ukraine and for people everywhere who care about the future 

of Ukraine. Many of us continue to monitor the ongoing developments in the center 

of Kiev on the ‘‘EuroMaidan’’ and in other cities across Ukraine that have come to 

symbolize a fundamental struggle for economic opportunity, political freedom, and 

personal expression. 

While the protests may have lost some of their intensity I believe the embers that 

sparked the protests in late November are still burning and will not be easily extinguished. The tens of thousands of people who turned out again this past weekend 

in Kiev and other cities across Ukraine are testimony to this. 

Senators McCain and Murphy have shared their experiences in the days after 

they returned from their December 15 visit to Kiev, which they described as ‘‘unforgettable and moving,’’ standing on the stage overlooking the Maidan and addressing 

a crowd estimated at 500,000—some of whom shouted cheers of ‘‘Thank you, USA!’’ 

The United States stands with the Ukrainian people in solidarity in their struggle 

for fundamental human rights and a more accountable government. To that end, we 

call on the government to intensify its investigations and to bring to justice those 

responsible for inciting incidents of violence, particularly on November 30 and 

December 11. Violence and intimidation have no place in a democratic state. We 

urge the Government of Ukraine to ensure that those who have led or participated 

in peaceful protests are not subjected to prosecution or other forms of political 

repression. 

At the same time, we will continue to engage with the Government of Ukraine. 

Ukraine remains an important partner for the United States. Our overall approach 

to Ukraine complements what our EU partners are also seeking in their Association 

Agreement—a Ukraine that is more responsive to its people and that offers its people the opportunities that a growing, free market economy based on the rule of law 

provides. 

The U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership signed in 2008 demonstrates 

the broad range of our relations, from economic and defense reform, to energy, to 

strengthening democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The fact that the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Charter has endured—even after changes in administrations in both our governments since 2008—is testimony to the enduring nature of our partnership. 

Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the United States has supported Ukrainians as they developed democratic skills and institutions, strengthened the rule of 

law, and promoted civic participation and good governance, all of which are preconditions for Ukraine to achieve its European aspirations. We have invested over 

$5 billion to assist Ukraine in these and other goals that will ensure a secure, prosperous, and democratic Ukraine. Of that amount well over $815 million was for 

democracy and exchange programs. Much of this is being implemented through a 

range of technical assistance programs and working with nongovernmental actors 

in Ukraine. 

Since 2009 when President Obama took office, the U.S. Government has provided over $184 million in Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) assistance to 

Ukraine. This includes democracy programs managed by USAID and the State 

Department, and exchange programs managed by the State Department and the 

Open World Leadership Center. 

A key element of the Strategic Partnership’s Charter to strengthen Ukraine’s 

democracy is the Political Dialogue/Rule of Law Working Group, which brings 

together American and Ukrainian officials to exchange ideas about best practices, 

the Ukrainian Government’s reform efforts, and about problems areas, such as corruption, which has stunted Ukraine’s economic and social development. Inclusive in 

its approach, the Working Group—which I cochair together with a senior Ukrainian 

counterpart—welcomes input from civil society and nongovernmental representatives from both countries. To date we have met formally six times in Kiev and 

Washington since 2009. Our last meeting was in October in Kiev, and the next 

meeting is planned for this March in Washington. 

Within the working group, we held frank discussions about the increase in harassment of journalists and civil society that has taken place in recent years. This harassment galvanized civil society. Together they formed new coalitions to stand up 

and push back, such as the ‘‘Stop Censorship!’’ movement and the ‘‘New Citizen’’ 

campaign, which sought to mobilize and inform citizens about the problems and 

their basic rights under the Ukraine’s laws and constitution. 

Unfortunately, the negative trend in the treatment of journalists has continued, 

and the Government of Ukraine has failed to consistently respect the rights of freedom of speech and press provided by the constitution and by law. Ukraine’s ratings 

for media freedom by international groups, such as Freedom House and Reporters 

without Borders, have declined for 3 years in a row. 

Interference with and pressure on media outlets by the government has increased, 

including the government’s tolerance of increased levels of violence toward journalists. Both media owners and journalists at times yield to government pressure and 

intimidation by practicing self-censorship. There is also an emerging pattern of targeted intimidation and violence against journalists and activists brave enough to 

speak out. 

According to the Institute of Mass Information (IMI), a respected Ukrainian 

media watchdog, there were more than 100 attacks and cases of intimidation 

against journalists in 2013—nearly half of these occurred in December. In addition, 

IMI recorded 120 cases of obstruction of journalists’ professional activities, 51 cases 

of censorship, 44 cases of economic and political pressure, and 5 arrests and detentions. The U.S Government will continue to speak out frankly and forcefully against 

violence, intimidation, and repression whenever and wherever it occurs, as we 

have in recent weeks with regard to the appalling and brutal beating of Tatiana 

Chornovol on Christmas Day. 

In our working group, we also continued to raise our concerns about politically 

motivated prosecutions, including that of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. 

We urged the government to allow Mrs. Tymoshenko to obtain the medical treatment she requires outside the country, to end all politically motivated prosecutions, 

and to undertake comprehensive justice sector reform to ensure such selective justice does not recur. 

Other issues of concern discussed were election standards and recent local and 

national elections. In October 2010, local elections did not meet the standards for 

openness and fairness due to numerous procedural and organizational irregularities, 

including incidents where authorities pressured election observers and candidates. 

The 2012 parliamentary elections did not meet international standards for fairness 

or transparency, and were assessed as a step backward compared with other recent 

national elections in the country. Repeat elections in December in five disputed 

single-mandate districts from the 2012 elections were no better. 

Looking forward, we will continue to work in concert with the Bureau of European 

and Eurasian Affairs, our Embassy in Kiev, and with USAID to support free and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12 

fair Presidential elections in 2015—not only on Election Day but in the many 

months ahead. 

We believe the frank and open conversations of the Working Group have strengthened our efforts, cooperation, and engagement with the Government of Ukraine on 

several important bilateral issues. For example, our engagement helped to press the 

Government of Ukraine in key areas, such as adoption of the new Criminal Procedure Code, which came into force in November 2012. The Embassy did much to 

facilitate deliberations to enable its adoption. Among other reforms, the code introduced adversarial criminal proceedings, alternatives to pre-trial detention and 

improved due process guarantees. 

Two other recent reforms were new laws on Public Associations and Access to 

Public Information. Both of these laws benefit civil society in that they simplify registration procedures for NGOs, expand their ability to engage in a broader range 

of activities, including limited fundraising, and create a mandate for more transparent and accountable government by requiring authorities to provide government 

information upon request. 

In addition, during 2103 Ukraine’s Parliament passed 18 separate pieces of 

reform legislation as part of its preparations to sign the Association Agreement and 

Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agreement with the European Union. 

These developments have, to a notable degree, been shaped and influenced by 

Ukrainian civil society, including think tanks, university centers, NGOs, and advocacy groups, which provided expertise on important policymaking initiatives outside 

of government. 

Civil society has played a very visible and vital role in our bilateral working group 

dialogues. In connection with the formal meetings, civil society representatives convened independent parallel democracy and rule of law sessions, in which we, 

together with Government of Ukraine officials, took part. Some of the outcomes and 

analysis from these events helped inform our discussion during the formal dialogues. 

As a result, we have facilitated and fostered direct contact between civil society 

and Ukrainian Government officials—in Kiev and Washington—to the level that 

civil society representatives now participate in the dialogues as observers, which, in 

the context of similar bilateral dialogues that we have with other governments, is 

an unusual demonstration of transparency and inclusiveness. We hope and expect 

that this practice will continue. 

Dialogue and passage of good laws are only the first steps; the challenge comes 

in the implementation. And this is where we will continue to work with the government and civil society. Through our dialogues we have had honest, substantive, and 

thoughtful discussions about the challenges, problems and opportunities confronting 

Ukraine and affecting our bilateral partnership. 

It is clear that we have not shied away from clearly and frankly expressing our 

concerns about the current setbacks to the rule of law and democratic development, 

increasing corruption, and other democratic backsliding. 

Still, we know today that there are senior officials in the Ukrainian Government, 

in the business community, as well as in the opposition, civil society and religious 

community who believe in a democratic and European future for their country. They 

continue to work hard to move their country and their President in the right 

direction. 

We urge the government and the President to listen to these voices, to the 

Ukrainian people, to the EuroMaidan, and work toward building a more democratic, 

and prosperous Ukraine. 

We who care deeply about Ukraine remain engaged and stand with the people of 

Ukraine because they deserve much better government performance and accountability. We will continue to support the aspirations of all Ukrainian citizens for a 

more democratic future, in which the rule of law and respect for human rights prevail. During these past 2 months we have witnessed a renewed energy and optimism. People of all ages, of all classes, of all walks of life, and from all parts of 

the country are taking ownership of their future and coming out to demand a European future with great courage. 

On New Year’s Eve, an estimated 200,000 Ukrainians gathered on the EuroMaidan to sing their national anthem—‘‘Ukraine Has Not Yet Perished’’—and welcome 2014, a new year of hope and transition to a more democratic country. One 

cannot help but to be moved and inspired after viewing the video images and photos 

of that night posted on the Internet. 

In that spirit, we continue to hold out the prospect of a closer and mutually beneficial partnership. We can be better friends and partners with a more democratic 

Ukraine than we can with a less democratic Ukraine. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

13 

And beyond our bilateral engagement, we will also continue to work with the 

European Union and within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe to press for respect for human rights and democratic principles in Ukraine. 

The vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace remains as compelling today as 

it did when it was first articulated some two decades ago. The United States seeks 

to work with the Ukrainian people and government to ensure a free, prosperous, 

and stable Ukraine anchored in the European future that its citizens desire. 

This committee’s support and attention remains absolutely essential in Ukraine’s 

continued democratic development. Again, we appreciate the committee’s efforts on 

last week’s resolution, this hearing, and your continued focus on Ukraine. 

Thank you. I look forward to answering your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both. 

Let me start off with an observation from our next witness after 

this panel. Dr. Brzezinski has said that Russia cannot be a democracy if it is an empire, and that it cannot be an empire if it lacks 

control of the Ukraine. Is that a view that you share? 

Ambassador NULAND. One would hope that the Russian Federation is not seeking to be an empire, that, according to its own constitution, it is seeking to be a democracy. The point that we have 

made repeatedly to Russia, and that I certainly made on my trip 

to Russia between two trips to Ukraine in December, was that a 

Ukraine that is economically stable and prosperous should be no 

threat to Russia; that this is not a zero-sum game that we are playing here; and that, in fact, the same benefits that the EU was offering to Ukraine, benefits of association and economic integration, 

are also available to a Russia that wants to take the same marketopening and democratic reform steps that Ukraine has already 

taken, 18 pieces of legislation having already been completed. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate that, but clearly the Russians’ 

view, in the greater scheme of things, even in the disparaging way 

in which they talk about the Ukraine as ‘‘Little Russia,’’ shows 

that, in fact, their aspirations are very concrete, as is witnessed, 

not by their words, but by their actions. And I am wondering why 

the United States and the West failed to enforce certain restrictions, particularly against economic coercion, that were part of the 

Trilateral Agreement of 1984. I do not get the sense that we have 

a very aggressive response to what the Russians have been doing, 

and continue to do, in this regard. And as I hear your language— 

I do not disagree with anything you are saying—but, as I hear your 

language, it almost seems to be a language that does not recognize 

the incredible coercive measures that are being taken against the 

Ukraine by the Russian Federation. 

So, why did we and the rest of the West not get more engaged 

when those measures were taking place and say, ‘‘These are violations of that Trilateral Agreement and other agreements that have 

been had’’? 

Ambassador NULAND. We have made clear, consistently, both 

publicly and privately, that the coercive actions of of Russia, not 

only against Ukraine, but also against Moldova and Georgia, are 

violations of many undertakings that they have made, including 

Helsinki Principles and, in some cases, WTO obligations. And we 

will continue to be absolutely clear about that. 

More importantly, what we have been doing is trying to work 

with Ukraine to get it on a path of increasing economic independence and self-sustainment. Ukraine is vulnerable to pressure from 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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the outside, because it has not done what it needs to do in terms 

of taking reform steps in its economy—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I do not mean to interrupt you, Madam Secretary. I am all for creating a more prosperous, stable, and economically viable Ukraine, but in the interim, while we are seeking 

that goal, Ukraine is very susceptible to being pounded on by the 

Russian Federation in the manner in which it has been. And, while 

we may register protests, it seems to me, for example, that if there 

are WTO violations, we should not be registering protests, but 

actually following WTO violations and pursuing those to be ultimately achieved, in that setting as well as others. 

You mentioned in your opening statement that the Department 

remains open to a wide range of possible reactions, depending upon 

how the Yanukovych government continues to act, particularly 

with regards to the protestors. Now, I believe that supporting sanctions and visa restrictions are among the options that should be 

seriously considered if, in fact, we continue to see violence used 

against individuals who peacefully demonstrate in their country to 

express their opposition to the government’s views and who want 

their human dignity. Are those elements of options that the State 

Department is willing to consider? 

Ambassador NULAND. Mr. Chairman, all tools of government are 

on the table, including those. 

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to hear from you, Mr. Secretary— 

I appreciate what you said, but what more can be done to assist 

and support journalists and civil society actors? As the Yanukovych 

family takes over TV channels and newspapers, and intimidation 

of independent journalists increases, what support are we directly 

providing, or can we provide, to the free media in the Ukraine? Are 

the Ukrainian services of Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, 

Radio Liberty, providing the appropriate information and direction 

in a country that increasingly seems to have its government clamping down on what is a free media? 

Mr. MELIA. It is an important and appropriate question, Mr. 

Chairman. 

We have—the U.S. Government, writ large—provided, over a 

number of years, financial assistance that enables the professionalization of journalism in Ukraine. Media in Ukraine faces many 

of the same economic survival challenges that media outlets do 

across the world today. In addition, there is political pressure on 

advertisers to stay away from media outlets that are critical of the 

government, and that creates a new dimension of difficulty for 

them. 

So, our programs have supported online media outlets, the kinds 

of media watchdog organizations that I quoted earlier. The Institute for Mass Information is a beneficiary of some U.S. Government assistance. And, as I do when I travel to Ukraine, and others 

do, we make a point of visiting those outlets, doing our interviews 

with them, as well as with others, showing that we know who they 

are and we respect their independence. So, there is a variety of 

things that we can do, politically—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you speak to VOA, Radio Free Europe—— 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Mr. MELIA. Yes, these are very valuable. They continue to provide important voices of honest reporting that is accessed by the 

Ukrainian people. It is very important to continue those services. 

The CHAIRMAN. Are we intending to send any election monitors, 

or to give resources to entities that have long been established as 

election monitors in countries? 

Mr. MELIA. OPORA, which is the network of domestic election 

monitors in Ukraine that has been supported, trained by the 

National Democratic Institute since the mid-1990s, has been very 

active on the ground around the recent elections. They provide 

important honest reporting. It complements the work of the 

OSCE’s Office of Democratic Initiatives and Human Rights, which 

has also monitored these processes, and gives us a huge wealth of 

information that enables us to comment in an informed way about 

the election processes. 

As you recall around the parliamentary elections a year and a 

half ago, we said that the elections represented a step backward 

from the quality of the election that brought Viktor Yanukovych to 

office in 2010. And that was based on the findings of the ODIHR 

mission that was there and of the domestic monitors led by 

OPORA. They continue to be very brave, very active, very honest 

watchdogs, and we continue to support them financially and politically. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me just say, before I turn to Senator 

Corker, that if the Yanukovych government continues to act 

against its citizens as we have seen thus far, then I am not sure 

that we will wait for the State Department to look at sanctions and 

visa revocations against those committing such acts. The committee, and certainly the Chair, is going to entertain legislation 

that will do exactly that. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And again, thank you both as witnesses. 

I think that many of us, after watching the administration throw 

itself in Russia’s arms during the Syrian conflict, have watched, 

with big question marks, relative to what we are actually willing 

to do to end up with a foreign policy that may be a counter to 

where Russia is. 

Last summer, when Russia placed these economic extortions— 

put those in place in Ukraine on exports—do you think that, had 

the United States stood more fully beside Ukraine, they might 

have, maybe, had greater strength and been more willing to go 

ahead and side with the association agreement, versus taking the 

steps that they took? 

Ambassador NULAND. Senator, I think there were many reasons 

why President Yanukovych decided to take a pause after spending 

6 months advertising and encouraging his people to want to go to 

Europe. One of the main concerns that we had throughout the fall, 

as we watched the preparations, or lack thereof, by the government 

for the Vilnius summit, was the vulnerability of the Ukrainian 

economy, not only, and not even primarily, because of the pressure 

some of the big companies came under from their northern neighbor, but because of years of financial mismanagement of the economy and lack of willingness to really, as I said, roll up sleeves with 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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the IMF and fix some of the fundamental problems. So, the degree 

to which Russia had the ability to bring Ukraine under economic 

pressure was very much a symptom of the fact that Ukraine was 

so economically fragile. We worked very intensively with the 

Ukrainian Government throughout the summer and fall to try to 

get them back into a dialogue with the IMF. I was involved with 

that. Secretary Kerry was involved with that. They did make some 

initial efforts, but they were nowhere near the kinds of intensive 

consultations that the IMF would have needed, to be supportive. 

And we began ringing the alarm bell increasingly loudly, throughout October and November, that, without more economic stability, 

in the event that Ukraine signed, the pressure could, in fact, be 

very, very dangerous for Ukraine, which was, at that point, within 

weeks of financial default. 

So, our position all the way through was that IMF reform and 

the EU Association Agreement needed to go hand in hand. 

Senator CORKER. Yes. 

Ambassador NULAND. But, unfortunately, that did not prevail in 

Ukrainian thinking. 

Senator CORKER. So, look, I appreciate the effort that you, personally, have put forth, and I know you have placed a lot of emphasis on this, especially in the last several months. But, why did we 

not criticize Russia openly and strongly when they put forth this 

economic coercion they put forth? Why did we not do that? It just 

does not seem like the place the United States would typically be 

when a country basically extorts another country, a country that 

we are trying to work with, a country that is so important to shaping that part of the world. Why did not we speak out strongly when 

that occurred? 

Ambassador NULAND. Senator, we certainly did. Secretary Kerry 

did. I did. I testified before the European Subcommittee, in November, and spoke out quite forcefully with regard to what Russia was 

up to. We also spoke to them privately throughout this period. 

Again, there were a lot of vulnerabilities on the Ukrainian side, 

as well, but nobody condoned what Russia was up to. And we do 

not, today. 

Senator CORKER. I will just have to say that the administration 

has a big megaphone, and it was not used in this case. 

Let me just say along those same lines, I think many of us are 

really disappointed that the administration did not come forth with 

a list—the Magnitsky List—that we all expected to be out by the 

end of this year. Can you tell us what is happening, between us 

and our relationship with Russia, where we continue to turn our 

head, and we do not do those things that are in law that Congress 

has put forth? What is keeping the administration from going 

ahead and naming people—we are hearing names on the list that 

are supposed to come out, and somehow they are tied to this and 

they are tied to other things. What is it that is keeping the administration from doing those things that, under law, it is supposed to 

do, relative to Russia? 

Ambassador NULAND. Well, Senator, as you know, we submitted 

our Magnitsky report in the middle of December, as we were 

required to do. We are continuing to look at names that could be 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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added to the list, and we will continue that process in the weeks 

ahead. 

Senator CORKER. Well, I think history is on our side, and I think 

that, eventually, Ukraine will associate itself with the West. But, 

I will just have to say, as an observer, as somebody who has been 

fairly deeply involved in foreign policy over the last 7 years, what 

has happened between us and Russia ever since August seems to 

have affected our ability to weigh in on issues that are clearly in 

our national interest and clearly in the West’s national interest. 

And I know that, again, you certainly have put forth tremendous 

effort, over especially the last several months, regarding this issue. 

But, Ukraine is an incredibly important country. It is a country 

that, if we can cause them to more fully associate with the West, 

could well be the thing that helps shape the way policies are inside 

Russia, itself. It is an incredibly important country. 

And, while I appreciate your efforts, and I certainly appreciate 

Senator McCain and Murphy being there at an incredibly important time, I do not think that our country has put forth policies, 

nor stood up in a way that it should in recent times, at a moment 

in time where there was a possibility of something happening right 

now that could have been incredibly beneficial to the people of 

Ukraine, beneficial to us, as a nation, and beneficial overall to 

Western values. 

But, I thank you for your efforts and I look forward to continuing 

this dialogue. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here this afternoon. 

I wonder if one of you could speak to the opposition that has 

been demonstrating, and if they have a coordinated strategy for 

what they want to accomplish, short of the association agreement, 

and are they seeking to win power in the elections? What is their 

real interest, here, and how successful do you think they can be? 

Ambassador NULAND. I would say that the events of November 

and December have certainly been unifying for the opposition, both 

in terms of its obligations, as it sees it, to the Ukrainian people and 

to try to meet their aspirations, but also in terms of their ability 

to work together. In the conversations that we have had with them, 

they are focused on presenting a united slate for the 2015 elections, 

they are focused on protecting the electoral environment and the 

free media environment between now and then, which, as I said, 

is an area of quite a bit of concern as we see a slow and steady 

effort to poison the democratic body politic across Ukraine. So, they 

are very much focused on that and trying to ensure that they 

expose efforts to intimidate NGOs or journalists or activists or any 

of those things, or otherwise dismantle the structures of a free electoral environment. 

They are also focused very much on the economy, because they 

know that if the current government does not take the hard steps 

to engage with the IMF and heal the systemic and structural problems in the Ukrainian economy, that anybody who wins the elections will inherit that problem. So, they are focused very much on 

trying to understand Ukraine’s problems, trying to understand 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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what this very nontransparent deal with Russia may do, over the 

medium and longer term, to Ukraine’s choices so that they can 

present an alternative to the Ukrainian people. 

Mr. MELIA. Can I add one point to that, Senator—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Sure. 

Mr. MELIA [continuing]. To broaden it beyond the political opposition, the parties who are seeking to win a majority and control 

of the government? 

Most of the people that came out in the Maidan after the 

announcement on the European integration was announced did not 

come out with partisan motives. In fact, most of them are not associated with one or another political party. They were people that 

were angry and frustrated that what they thought was a trajectory 

in fits and starts toward European integration being upended 

abruptly by their President. So, they came out to express their unhappiness with that. And the people who initially organized it— 

there was not a master plan, because they did not anticipate the 

announcement. But, over the weeks, it has become more and more 

organized, more and more kinds of groups have come out and participated, including political parties. But, most of the people that 

came out in those demonstrations were not party-oriented. And I 

think that speaks to a broader longing in the Ukrainian people for 

modernization, for fundamental freedoms, for European integration. And whether the alternative political parties on the scene will 

guarantee that or provide that, I think, remains for those parties 

to demonstrate. And they have not done—you know, they are working on that, but it is not a done deal yet. 

So, I think when we think about opposition to the government, 

we need to think about it more broadly than in partisan political 

terms. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I do not disagree with that. I am just thinking 

about where they go from here, in terms of those demonstrations, 

because just demonstrating, as you point out, is not going to solve 

the problem. We have got to figure out what happens next and 

what more can we do, in the United States, to help move to the 

next stage of how to address the situation there. 

Mr. MELIA. Well, let me speak up a bit for Ukrainian sovereignty, because that is ultimately what this is about. And it is 

partially in response to Senator Corker’s earlier comments that I 

would say we need to keep in mind that this is about respecting 

Ukrainian sovereignty, letting Ukrainians work this out, to the 

extent they can. We do not want this to be a tug-of-war with Russia over Ukraine. We are trying to demonstrate a different opportunity. It is not just East or West, us or them. This is about a completely different model. We are not going to bludgeon or pressure 

the Ukrainians into associating with us. The Russians may want 

to do that. It is not in our interests to do that. 

We have an open door to the West, we provide all kinds of longterm opportunities for them, and the Ukrainian Government can 

either choose to be bullied by one of its neighbors or they can 

choose to go through the open door to the West. That is the choice 

that has been presented to the Ukrainian people. There is a shortterm response to pressure that we have seen the President of 

Ukraine do. There is a longer term decision to be made by the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Ukrainian people, through their political process, which we hope 

will play out over the next year and beyond, in which these kinds 

of things can be debated and discussed publicly, and people will 

make their decision for who they want to govern them, based on 

the policy choices they present. 

We cannot insist that they do what we want. That is not the 

approach that we are offering them. We are offering them a chance 

to be a sovereign, independent country that makes its own decisions. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, and certainly I appreciate that. What I 

am really asking is, What more can we do to help ensure that they 

have that opportunity? Because that is the real challenge. 

Let me ask a different question, because I do not want this panel 

to end without asking about Yulia Tymoshenko and what her status is and whether we think there is any chance that she is going 

to be released before the elections in 2015—and again, what more 

we and the European community and the Ukrainian people might 

do to help ensure that that happens. 

Ambassador NULAND. Senator, we raise Mrs. Tymoshenko’s status in every meeting with every Ukrainian that we have. I have 

personally spoken to President Yanukovych about it in both of the 

long and intense meetings I have had with him. 

We are continuing to encourage the Ukrainian Government to 

release her to Germany for the medical treatment that she so desperately needs. We have also made the link that this would send 

a very strong signal to the world about their commitment to a 

European path and to meet those final requirements of the EU; 

and it would probably have a positive economic impact, as well, on 

the Ukrainian economy. But, to date, the President has not seen 

fit to take those steps. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Mr. MELIA. And I should mention that I have visited Mrs. 

Tymoshenko in her hospital prison in Kharkiv, in the eastern part 

of Ukraine, and both our recent Ambassadors, both Ambassador 

Tefft and Ambassador Pyatt, have also been out there to demonstrate our—at a very serious way—our concern for her situation. 

And, along with our European colleagues, who have the lead on the 

EU association agreement, obviously, this has been a central part 

of that discussion. This has been very central to our engagement 

and the Europeans’ engagement with the Government of Ukraine. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call on Senator McCain, let me just say, 

I do not think you meant this—or maybe you did. I agree that we 

all respect Ukrainian sovereignty. We are not seeking a tug of war 

with Russia. But, there is a difference between an open door, as 

you described it, full of opportunity for the Ukrainian people, that 

the United States and the West presents, and the economic coercion and intimidation that the Russians pursue. And pushing back 

on the economic coercion and intimidation, in my mind, is not a tug 

of war, it is creating the space for Ukrainians to decide their own 

future. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to associate myself with what you just said. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20 

Mr. Melia, this is not a high school student-body election, this is 

a country that wants to be European. They do not want to be Russian. That is what this is all about. 

That is what EU means to them. And the Russians have used 

energy, they have even cut off chocolate, they have bullied, they 

have supported the corruption, which is rampant in Ukraine. My 

colleagues may not know that the son of the President of Ukraine 

was a dentist, is now a billionaire, lives in a $100 million home. 

So, what this is all about, sir, is not about the Ukrainian people 

decide for themselves, this is about whether we will stand up for 

the Ukrainian people, who have been brutalized in demonstrations. 

The incarceration—I am glad you went to see Yulia Tymoshenko. 

But, the fact is, she should not be in prison. That is fact. And so, 

I am somewhat taken aback by your, ‘‘Well, it is sort of up to the 

Ukrainian people.’’ We want to be assisting, morally, the Ukrainian 

people for seeking what we want everybody on this earth to have. 

And so, it is not just up to the Ukrainian people. They cry out for 

our assistance and our moral support in a struggle which is totally 

unfair, which has been characterized by brutal crackdowns of demonstrators, and, recently, some leaders that I met with are now 

hospitalized. So, you are either incredibly naive or you are misleading the committee, one of the two. 

Secretary Nuland, I want to thank you for what you did. Senator 

Murphy and I had an incredible experience there. The people of 

Ukraine appreciated, very much, your moral support that you provided them. And I was very proud to have you as our Nation’s representative, providing the moral support to the people who were 

demonstrating in freezing cold weather, incredibly difficult conditions. 

So, I guess my first question is, to you, Secretary Nuland, Is not 

it true that the Russians have bullied, they have used energy, they 

have used embargoes on certain products, including chocolate, and 

they have—that Mr. Putin really, really believes that Russia without Ukraine is an Eastern power, and, with Ukraine, is a Western 

power? And there is a lot at stake here, and it is in United States 

national security interests. And maybe—as Senator Corker pointed 

out—maybe we ought to be standing up to the Russians and supporting these people, including a list, if it is necessary, of sanctions, 

in the case of further violence inflicted on the demonstrators. 

Would you agree with that? 

Ambassador NULAND. Certainly, we have been absolutely clear 

and we would agree with Senate Resolution 319 that the Ukrainian 

people and their right to peaceful assembly must be protected at 

all costs. And we have been very, very clear with the government, 

not only at my level, but at the Secretary of State’s level, Secretary 

of Defense’s level, and other people who have been in contact, that 

any further serious efforts by the government to repress their own 

people will be met with, with a firm response by the United States. 

Senator MCCAIN. And would sanctions be one of the considerations? 

Ambassador NULAND. As I said, Senator, that and other tools are 

on the table; yes. 

May I just make a point about the choice that Ukrainians have 

to make? I think we are all making the same point, which is, it is 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21 

in United States interest to help the people of Ukraine preserve the 

opportunity to have a choice for a European future. And that is 

what we have to do, particularly as we head toward these elections. 

That is about speaking out against further violence, that is about 

supporting a free, fair media environment, a free, fair electoral 

environment, so that they can actually judge this government and 

its behavior at the ballot box—— 

Senator MCCAIN. So, it is not a tug of war. It is standing up for 

the principles of the—we want every free people throughout the 

world to be able to determine their own future without having 

demonstrators beaten up, without embargoes, without the energy 

card being played to cut off energy in the middle of the winter, as 

happened in the past. And this is all about Mr. Putin’s desire to 

restore the old near abroad, the old Russian empire. And he has 

done the same thing in Moldova, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and 

all around the periphery of Russia. And it is part—as Senator 

Corker pointed out, it is part of the very aggressive behavior that 

Vladimir Putin displays, and we reward his Secretary, Mr. Lavrov, 

with funny little gag gifts. I do not get it. 

I would like to, again, recognize Boris Tarasyuk and also the 

Ukrainian Ambassador, Ambassador Motsyk, who is here also. 

Again, I would like to ask you, Secretary Nuland, Do you think 

that there is a path now for Yanukovych to allow a free and fair 

election? And what do you make of the decision of the upper court 

that says that Vitali Klitschko is ineligible for running for President in 2015? 

Ambassador NULAND. Again, Senator, I think when you ask how 

we can help, how the EU can help, it is to focus our attention on 

ensuring that the electoral environment is free and fair. That is 

going to be a very, very difficult task, given these moves that we 

are already seeing to intimidate journalists and to constrict the 

free media environment, to manipulate local electoral councils, 

these kinds of things. So, the assistance that we are putting into 

Ukraine—and we are increasing it in the areas of free media and 

electoral support—will all be in the direction of trying to prevent 

efforts to pervert the electoral environment before 2015. 

With regard to the current ongoing court situation for Mr. 

Klitschko, this is a very familiar playbook in this part of the world, 

to try to use the courts to manipulate the slate of opposition candidates, et cetera. We are watching this case extremely closely. We 

had observers in the court today from our Embassy in Kiev. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, again, I want to say that we thank you for what 

you did in Ukraine. The people were very grateful. And I was very 

proud to join Senator Murphy on what was, for me, a truly unforgettable experience. We thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Good to see both of you here. 

I thank Senator McCain for allowing me to join him on what was 

really an amazing visit to see hundreds of thousands of people on 

that square, also knowing that those numbers were in the tens of 

thousands before the crackdown, and it was in the face of that 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22 

brutal activity from the administration that people poured out into 

the streets in record numbers and, although the numbers have diminished, are still pretty substantial in the past few weeks. 

I want to just echo the comments of Senator McCain. I do not 

think Yanukovych can win a free and fair election, no matter what 

choices, what tacking to the left and to the right and to the East 

and to the West he may do, if it is truly an open election. And, 

obviously, our most important task here, if we want to truly support the Ukrainian people, is to do everything within our power to 

track these individuals, once they leave the Maidan, once they go 

back home, to make sure that they are not quietly spirited away, 

imprisoned, intimidated so that they do not participate in the 2015 

elections. 

Yanukovych is wrong to believe that there are no strings 

attached to this deal with Russia. He looks at the price that he was 

going to have to pay to do a deal with the EU and the IMF, and 

he just thought that it was too high, given the already difficult 

electoral prospects he faces in 2015. And he perceives that there is 

a lower price for him, in the short run, to do the deal with Russia. 

And, of course, that is not true, ultimately, though Russia may not 

impose strings at the outset, will all of a sudden start to meddle, 

on a weekly and daily basis, in the affairs of the Ukraine once they 

get their financial mitts into the country. 

But, it strikes me that, at some points during this process, both 

the EU and the IMF have acted as if there was not a choice for 

the Ukraine to make, that they were sort of used to doing deals— 

in the IMF, for instance; in the EU, to an extent—were used to 

doing bailout packages and financial packages with countries in the 

EU that did not have a choice. And, you know, Yanukovych greeted 

Senator McCain and I with about an hour-and-a-half lecture on all 

of the abuse that Ukraine has taken from the EU, and most of his 

litany was without merit. 

But, my question is this. Is there more that can be done, on 

behalf of the EU and the IMF, to try to work with the Ukraine in 

the coming months to answer some of the concerns which they may 

have that are legitimate, recognizing that this is not a zero-sum 

game, that they do have an alternative, and that alternative will 

continue to get sweeter and sweeter as the conditions get tougher 

and tougher from the IMF and the EU? And what can the United 

States do to work with the IMF and the EU to try to help answer 

some of the legitimate concerns that may come from Ukraine? 

Ambassador NULAND. Well, thank you, Senator. And again, 

thanks to both of you for your leadership on that vital weekend. 

I really do believe that having both of you present in a bipartisan 

way on the square that weekend may have prevented violence. 

First, to your point about the Russian bailout, if I may. You 

know, nobody knows what the terms really are, because they were 

not made transparent to the public, and certainly not to the 

Ukrainian public. And I would, as we do with the Ukrainians, draw 

your attention to the fact that one of the terms is that it will be 

renegotiated every 3 months, which, again, means that, at every 

3-month period, Ukraine could conceivably face default again, unless it goes down the tougher-medicine-but-better-reward track of 

the IMF. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23 

I think if, in fact, we have a Ukrainian Government that is willing to come back into a serious conversation with the EU and the 

IMF, what we need is a phased roadmap of restoring Ukraine to 

economic health, as the EU also works on how the IMF deal and 

the EU’s DCFTA might mesh together to ensure that Ukraine has 

other options than its extreme dependence on the Russian market. 

And that is what the EU is offering, but it requires some tough 

steps, and this government has not been willing to take them. 

Senator MURPHY. For all of the attention as to what did not happen at the Eastern Partnership summit, something did happen, 

which was that Georgia and Moldova, under very similar pressure, 

decided that they were going to move forward with their association with the EU. There is going to be a process, here, where the 

Ukraine looks to see what happens in Georgia and Moldova, 

Ukrainian citizens look to see what happens to the economies of 

Georgia and Moldova. And the look back will go the other way, as 

well; people in Georgia and Moldova are going to watch to see what 

happens in the Ukraine, having made a different decision. 

What can the United States do, what can the international community do, to stand with Georgia and Moldova to make sure that 

they are a shining example of what good can occur, both politically, 

from a human rights perspective, from an economic perspective, 

when you make the choice to join with the EU? 

Ambassador NULAND. Well, as you said, Senator, if all goes well 

for Moldova and Georgia, they will be able to sign both agreements, 

perhaps as early as next year, and, certainly in the case of Moldova 

and maybe even in the case of Georgia, be enjoying visa-free travel 

and DCFTA rights with the EU before the end of 2014. That will 

completely transform the economic opportunity for those countries, 

when people across the country can trade freely. And it will also, 

we believe, have an impact on thinking in the separatist area of 

Transnistria, in the occupied areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 

as they understand that their governments are offering a path, an 

opportunity to work with Europe; whereas that they had not had 

before. So, it is an extremely positive development. 

We are working with Moldova to try to diversify their economic 

base. Even as the EU opens markets, we are working to open U.S. 

markets, working on reverse trade, delegation support from the 

Commerce Department. We are also working on energy independence for Moldova. Secretary Kerry, as you know, made a stop in 

Moldova to give them a boost. Similarly, with Georgia we are very 

focused on efforts to destabilize minority areas and other parts of 

Georgia, which is part of the pressure playbook. I was in Georgia, 

about a month ago, to encourage the government and the opposition, now that they have had good elections, to come together 

around a strong economic program, and to take full advantage and 

speed up their integration with the EU, including doing what they 

need to do to get visa-free as soon as possible. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, just one last comment, which is that we are 

incredibly well-served by you, Secretary Nuland, but also by our 

Ambassador there. Ambassador Pyatt, under very difficult circumstances, has acquitted himself very well, and it is, frankly, an advertisement for the importance of this committee moving very 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

24 

quickly and expeditiously on nominations, because we were able to 

get him nominated, put in place before the summer break, which 

gave him enough time to develop relationships that have come in 

very handy in the middle of a crisis. And so, I would commend the 

chairman for the way in which he has moved nominations. In this 

case, it really made a difference. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

One last question, Madam Secretary. Analysts have asserted 

that Russia is trying to obtain control over critical infrastructure— 

Ukrainian infrastructure, that is. Do we have any information or 

idea of whether the Russians have acquired control over critical 

Ukrainian infrastructure as a result of the Putin-Yanukovych deal? 

Ambassador NULAND. Senator, as you know, this has been part 

of the 20-year struggle of Ukraine for sovereignty, efforts to resist 

outside purchase of key critical infrastructure. Frankly, we do not 

have the details on this Ukraine-Russia deal. The Ukrainian Government tells us that they have not made those kinds of concessions, but we are not in a position to independently verify that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you both for your testimony and 

your service. I can see that your time as the State Department’s 

spokesperson has honed the conciseness of some of your responses. 

And so, we will look forward to engaging with you in other parts 

of your portfolio. 

And, with that, you are both excused from the committee’s hearing and we will bring up our second panelist, who needs, really— 

[Pause.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say, as I said at the outset, Dr. Brzezinski needs no introduction, certainly not to this committee. Suffice 

it to say that he sees the world as a grand chessboard, as reflected 

in the title of one of his many books. He is, in my view, one of the 

world’s most insightful foreign policy analysts. He brings to the 

table a clear-eyed geopolitical view. And, as they say in chess, he 

sees the whole board. 

We appreciate your willingness to share your insights and your 

expertise with the committee. Your full statement will be included 

in the record, Dr. Brzezinski, and we invite you now to share your 

thoughts. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI, FORMER U.S. 

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, COUNSELOR AND TRUSTEE, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senators. 

I am most impressed by the work you have been doing on this 

issue. I have listened to the earlier part of this testimony here, and 

it seems to me that all of you appreciate the historic, as well as 

the strategic, importance of the issue that we are discussing. 

My own general message is simple. A democratic, sovereign, and 

European Ukraine is what the Ukrainian people want and deserve. 

Such a Ukraine will encourage Russia to become an important 

post-imperial partner of the West as a whole. And that is a very 

important strategic point. Hence, support for Ukrainian aspirations 

is not political warfare against Russia, but is, in fact, favoring 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

25 

Russia’s long-term interests. And we have to keep that in mind, 

that larger framework. 

A Eurasian Union, such as the one that Putin aspires to create, 

held together by pressure and motivated by nostalgia, is not a longterm solution for Russia’s own socioeconomic and geopolitical 

dilemmas. Hence, sooner or later, the current authoritarianism 

driven by imperial ambitions in Russia will fail, not only because 

Ukraine is hesitant and opposed; Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan are 

not eager to become, again, camouflaged colonies. 

With that in mind, let me make just a few general suggestions. 

And, conceivably, some of them may be redundant, because I do not 

have access to all that is going or is being discussed within the 

administration. 

First, my suggestion is that we should encourage all EU Parliaments to pass resolutions hailing the courage and determination 

of this new, younger Ukrainian generation which has shown itself 

to be so devoted to its new sovereignty, and we should express our 

strong support for it. And this should be done by other democratic 

assemblies as part of the historical record. It is important for the 

Ukrainian people to feel that they are not alone. 

We should also deplore all forms of blackmail, bribery, or pressure designed to limit Ukrainian sovereignty. Our admiration for 

the heroes of the Maidan should be clearly emphasized, and they 

should be conscious of our identification with them. And I know 

that some members of this committee have been in Kiev during the 

most dramatic moments. 

Ukrainian national patriotism is a recently reborn phenomenon, 

but it is fervent and it is authentic. Putin likes to say that Ukrainians are really Russians, but he overlooks one very simple fact: 

Today’s Ukraine harkens back directly to Kiev’s Russia. That is to 

say, to Kiev of 1,000 years ago in which the Kingdom of Rus, which 

is the Ruthenians, today called Ukrainians, was an authentic European entity. It is little known that the then-ruling King of France 

proposed that the princess, the daughter of the King of Ukraine, 

become his wife, and she traveled eventually to Paris and became 

the Queen of France. It is the Ukrainians who are the really 

authentic sources of Ruthenian, as well as Russian, identity. 

Ruthenians being the older word for Ukrainians. 

Secondly, we should encourage the emergence in Ukraine of a 

visible and standing committee for national unity and independence, with politically and effective, defined leadership that can engage, if the opportunity arises, in an ongoing dialogue with President Yanukovych regarding Ukraine’s long-term future. We know 

for a fact that some oligarchs who support Yanukovych would be 

interested in a dialogue with the opposition. Not all of the oligarchs 

are devoted to the idea of Ukraine being essentially a subprovince 

of a larger empire, and they have their own interests in promoting 

Ukrainian independence and closer ties with the West. 

In brief, we should not strive to polarize the situation in 

Ukraine, but we should promote the opportunity for a serious dialogue with a political entity that authoritatively speaks for the will 

of the politically awakened Ukrainian nation, and encourage them 

also to prepare, perhaps, for the free elections in 2015, though it 

is not at all certain, at this stage, that they, indeed, will be free. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

26 

Third, the United States should use its influence, as I hope it is 

using it, in IMF, in the World Bank, in the various G8 or G20 

assemblies, to explore what could be done to help Ukraine expand 

its relationship with the EU while remaining Russia’s good neighbor even under the currently contrived arrangements—not as a satellite; but, nonetheless, the EU should encourage whatever additional arrangements are feasible. And we should be exploring ways, 

if there are any, by which the WTO could help to expose economic 

intimidation, which is not in keeping with its rules, and communicate its sense of concern to the party responsible for generating 

it. Perhaps there could be some steps taken to facilitate preferential access for Ukrainians seeking to study and work in Europe. 

Fourth, we should keep in mind that the longer run issue is, 

What will Russia become as China increases its influence in the 

former Soviet Central Asia? We should keep reminding the Russian 

people and their leaders that we respect Russia’s European identity 

and culture, and that Russia’s true destiny is also to be a major 

European state in a larger democratic West. We should make it 

clear that we seek neither Russia’s isolation nor fragmentation, but 

Russia’s evolution to what is a genuine democracy. 

One way or another, that day will come. Putin stands in the way 

today with his nostalgic dream of a new empire called the Eurasian 

Union. But, the fact is that such a prospect is not realistic. None 

of the would-be members of the Eurasian Union truly desire to 

limit their sovereignty, to cede it to Russia, to participate in the 

creation of a new union which revokes memories of the recently 

disappeared union, not to mention the older-still Russian empire. 

In brief—and I conclude on this—we need a constructive, openended, long-term policy for Ukraine, as well as a long-term option 

for Russia that may follow. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Brzezinski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Mr. Chairman, Senators. My own general message is simple: a democratic, sovereign and European Ukraine is what the Ukrainian people want and deserve. Such 

a Ukraine will encourage Russia to become an important post-imperial partner of 

the West as a whole. And that’s a very important strategic point. Hence, support 

for Ukrainian aspirations is not political warfare against Russia but is, in fact, 

favoring Russia’s long-term interests. And we have to keep that in mind, that larger 

framework. 

A Eurasian union, such as the one that Putin aspires to create, held together by 

pressure and motivated by nostalgia, is not a long-term solution for Russia’s own 

socioeconomic and geopolitical dilemmas. Hence, sooner or later the current 

authoritarianism driven by imperial ambitions in Russia will fail, not only because 

Ukraine is hesitant and opposed; neither Kazakhstan nor Uzbekistan are eager to 

again become camouflaged colonies. 

With that in mind, let me make just a few general suggestions. And conceivably, 

some of them may be redundant because I do not have access to all that is going 

or is being discussed within the administration. 

First, my suggestion is that we should encourage all EU parliaments to pass resolutions hailing the courage and determination of this new, younger Ukrainian generation that has just shown itself to be so devoted to its new sovereignty, and we 

should express our strong support for it. And this should be done by other democratic assemblies as part of the historical record. It is important for the Ukrainian 

people to feel that they are not alone. 

We should also deplore all forms of blackmail, bribery or pressure designed to 

limit Ukrainian sovereignty. Our admiration for the heroes of the Maidan should 

be clearly emphasized and they should be conscious of our identification with them. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

27 

And I know that some members of this committee have been in Kiev during the 

most dramatic moments. 

Ukrainian national patriotism is a recently reborn phenomenon, but it is fervent 

and it is authentic. Putin likes to say that Ukrainians are really Russians, but he 

overlooks one very simple fact: today’s Ukraine harkens back directly to Kiev’s Russia, that is to say, to Kievan Rus of 1,000 years ago. 

Secondly, we should encourage the emergence in Ukraine of a visible standing 

committee for national unity and independence, with politically and effectively 

defined leadership that can engage, if the opportunity arises, in an ongoing dialogue 

with President Yanukovych regarding Ukraine’s long-term future. We know for a 

fact that some oligarchs who support Yanukovych would be interested in a dialogue 

with the opposition. Not all of the oligarchs are devoted to the idea of Ukraine being 

essentially a subprovince of a larger empire, and they have their own interests in 

promoting Ukrainian independence and closer ties with the West. 

In brief, we should not strive to polarize the situation in Ukraine, but we should 

promote the opportunity for a serious dialogue with the political entity that authoritatively speaks for the will of the politically awakened Ukrainian nation, and we 

should encourage them also to prepare perhaps for the free elections in 2015, though 

it is not at all certain at this stage that such elections indeed will be free. 

Third, the United States should use its influence, as I hope it is using it, in the 

IMF, in the World Bank, and in the various G8 or G20 assemblies to explore what 

could be done to help Ukraine expand its relationship with the EU while remaining 

Russia’s good neighbor, even under the currently contrived arrangements, though 

not as a satellite. 

And we should be exploring ways, if there are any, by which the WTO could help 

to expose economic intimidation, which is not in keeping with its rules, and communicate its sense of concern to the party responsible for generating it. Perhaps there 

could also be some steps taken to facilitate preferential access for Ukrainians seeking to study and work in Europe. 

Fourth, we should keep in mind that the longer run issue is what will Russia 

become as China increases its influence in the former Soviet Central Asia. 

We should keep reminding the Russian people and their leaders that we respect 

Russia’s European identity and culture and that Russia’s true destiny is also to be 

a major European state in the larger democratic West. We should make it clear that 

we seek neither Russia’s isolation nor fragmentation, but Russia’s evolution towards 

a genuine democracy. 

One way or another, that day will come. Putin stands in the way today with his 

nostalgic dream of a new empire called the Eurasian Union. But the fact is that 

such a prospect is not realistic. None of the would-be members of the Eurasian 

Union truly desire to limit their sovereignty, to cede it to Russia, or to participate 

in the creation of a new union which evokes memories of the recently disappeared 

union, not to mention the older-still Russian Empire. 

In brief, and I’ll conclude on this: we need a constructive, open-ended, long-term 

policy for Ukraine as well as a long-term option for Russia that may follow. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Brzezinski, for 

those insights. 

Let me ask you, in your book you suggest that Russia cannot be 

a democracy if it is an empire, and it cannot be fully an empire if 

it lacks control of the Ukraine. Is that a view that you think is 

driving Moscow’s behavior toward Ukraine now? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, I think; certainly the present leadership 

feels convinced that, without Ukraine, the recreation of some form 

of supernational union—or, call it, simply, an empire—is not possible. This is why it is such a strategic stake for Putin. 

What he underestimates, however, in my view, are the consequences of 20 years of independence, these consequences we saw so 

dramatically and so admirable on the Maidan, where that younger 

generation of Ukrainians who have grown up in an independent 

state stood up and said, ‘‘No matter how cold or how difficult or 

how dangerous, we stand for independence, because we treasure 

our independence.’’ What is less visible but is also true, that that 

kind of sentiment pervades increasingly the elites in such signifiFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

28 

cant entities as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but also in the other 

smaller former Soviet states. 

To put it simply and in very human terms, who does not prefer 

to be a President of his own country, or a general in his own army, 

or a foreign minister in his own government, or an ambassador in 

Washington representing his sovereignty rather than to be officials 

of an entity in which they are subordinate? This is a normal 

human reaction. Nationalism is a deeply contagious social force, 

and, once awakened, it is almost impossible to sweep it back into 

the box. 

And what we are now seeing in Ukraine is a long-delayed awakening. But, it was coming. One could see it during the 20th century. One could see it during the days of the Gulag and the 

Holomodor, the starving to death of millions of Ukrainians by 

deliberate decisions in Moscow. But, now it is a pervasing reality, 

and particularly among the younger Ukrainians. They feel themselves to be Ukrainians. And this is why Putin betrays such an 

abysmal historical ignorance when he says, as he did just a few 

weeks ago, that Ukraine and Russia are just but one nation. And, 

of course, the Russians are the older brother in that nation, according to him. 

The CHAIRMAN. And the flip side of that—and I share your 

views—but, the flip side of that, so we understand the totality of 

the importance of this, is that—could we ever see or perceive a 

democratization of Russia if they were—be able to achieve their 

goals of having Ukraine join with them in this sphere? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I have no doubt that if Ukraine is suborned and subordinated, it marks a turning point and Russia 

becomes, in effect, an empire. My own personal view is that, first 

of all, I do not think that is going to happen, in total, even if there 

is retrogression today. And, secondly—and obviously this is speculative and is a question of judgment—my gut feeling is that Putin’s 

nostalgia for the past, which drives this aspiration for a supernational union, is simply divorced from political and socioeconomic 

realities. Russia today is no longer an imperially motivated entity 

mindlessly seeking imperial status the way, let us say, the Nazis 

did in order to compensate for their defeat in the first World War. 

It is no longer driven by an ideology which demands supernationality as the basis for superpower status. 

There is a nationalist element in Russia to which he is appealing 

that is retrogressive, but there is also a new manifestation in 

Russia which is gradually becoming, in my view, more significant: 

the emergence of an increasingly internationally connected, internationally educated, in many cases, middle class, particularly in 

the major cities of Russia—Moscow, Saint Petersburg, others— 

a middle class which increasingly identifies itself with more common Western values, including democracy, freedom of travel, freedom to read what one wishes, freedom to say what one desires, and 

freedom, eventually, to express one’s political preferences. That is 

a new reality, and it is becoming stronger. 

So, my gut feeling—and I have been a student of Soviet and Russian affairs now almost all of my life—is that this quest for a 

supernational union is directly linked to the longevity of the President of Russia. And if he fades from the scene, for one reason or 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

29 

another, politically or physically, I think there is going to be an 

accelerated turn toward a redefinition of Russia’s place in the 

world, for two reasons: one, which I have already mentioned— 

namely, the impulse of a middle class that sees itself part of the 

West and is increasingly educated in the West, in addition to traveling to it; and secondly, the extraordinary significant rise in the 

power and significance of China, and particularly now, increasingly 

so in Central Asia. The Russians are building, kilometer by kilometer, new roads spanning the former Russian Central Asia— 

roads, railroads, investments, increasingly matching and outstripping the Russians, investment in the real estate and in the natural 

resources of these newly independent states. 

Now, these states are ambivalent, because they are fearful of the 

Chinese, they are so huge and powerful. But, at the same time, 

they know that they create leverage which gives them room for 

self-assertion. 

I know the Presidents of the two most important Central Asian 

countries—Kazakhstan, extraordinarily rich in natural resources, 

and Uzbekistan, the center of Islamic self-awareness that is mixed 

with nationalism. Neither of these two leaders wants to be a satellite. In fact, for that reason, Nazarbayev, who is very careful in 

maneuvering between China and Russia, proposed to Putin—and 

Putin was smart enough to accept—that Putin’s original name of 

the Eurasian Union be changed to Eurasian Economic Union, 

which was an attempt, of course, by Nazarbayev, to limit what that 

union really means. In other words, do not limit our sovereignty. 

Now, of course, it does not work that neatly. If you have economic 

domination, the other one may be adversely affected. 

But, my point simply is this. There is some support for arrangements for customs union and so forth, because it can be beneficial 

two ways, but there is, above all else, in the newly independent 

states, including Belarus—it does not have a notably good democratic record—there is a commitment in all of them toward selfindependence. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Doctor, it is always impressive to listen to you and to get 

your insights on issues that are happening throughout the world; 

and certainly, in this part of the world, you are quite an expert. 

So, I thank you for your comments. 

And I know you listed a number of steps that should be taken 

to reinforce the Ukrainian people, and you have talked about the 

values that they share with the West, the values that middleincome people in Russia share with the West, and just the natural 

alliance that should be there. 

Many of us have watched the administration since August, and 

watch as we deal with Russia in ways that we do, and understand 

that the Russian people, in many ways, should be oriented toward 

us, and that there are issues of commonality that we should be 

pursuing. At the same time, as we watch what is happening, we 

also, it seems, see a deference to Russia, in so many cases, beginning with Syria stepping into their arms. 

And I know you were just talking about how we need to fertilize 

and we need to encourage the Ukrainian people to continue to 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

30 

move ahead. We hope there are going to be free elections. I know 

the standard there is for opponents to be arrested and not be available for election, which makes it more difficult. But, what would 

be your guidance to United States outward comments and policy 

relative to Ukraine right now, and pushback? And what effect does 

that actually have, if you will, on the Ukrainian people and in an 

outcome there? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think we should learn from the experience of 

Poland’s emancipation from Soviet control in the late 1980s, early 

1990s. What emerged in Poland was a national movement for independence, somewhat like the Maidan, although Maidan has not 

institutionalized itself. In Poland, it became institutionalized in a 

so-called Solidarity Movement with a dramatic leader, who may not 

have been the most senior leader originally, perhaps not always the 

most intelligent leader, but the most effective political leader. And 

it was under his leadership that eventually that movement forced 

the ruling Communist regime to negotiate, to negotiate an arrangement of accommodation which then was transformed into, eventually, a democracy, a Western-type democracy of Poland today in the 

EU and in NATO. 

Ukraine needs a clear-cut national alternative. I know that there 

are a number of outstanding Ukrainian leaders who have participated in what has been transpiring, and some with great personal 

courage and sacrifice. But, the biggest sacrifice that needs to be 

made is that all of them, but one, have to agree on ‘‘a one’’ that 

will be increasingly the symbol of an alternative. Because you are 

dealing with an entrenched regime which can use force and bribery 

to stay in power, and has Russian support. You need to have a figure that articulates your aspirations, symbolizes you, and becomes 

a focus of global attention. 

The second part of your question pertained to what you described 

as our deference to the Russians. I would take some exception to 

the word ‘‘deference.’’ I do not think we have really deferred to 

them. I know what I am about to say is controversial, but, frankly, 

I think that Russia’s interference in Syria, to some extent, made 

it easier for us to avoid sliding into direct participation in a war 

which would have been very damaging to our interests and probably would have spread more widely and more quickly than is 

already the case. So, that is a question of judgment, and we may 

disagree on that. But, I think, in any case, what it illustrates is 

something more basic than that. 

Our relationship with Russia during the cold war was one of 

hostility. It was a non-zero-sum game. We win, they lose. They win, 

we lose. Today, in many parts of the world, the relationship is 

much more mixed. We do not like what they are doing in Ukraine, 

but, in the long run, I would like them to become like Ukraine and 

pursue the same path. There are many things they are doing elsewhere that we do not like, but we may need them, and we do need 

them in the Middle East. In fact, I think the chances of stabilizing 

the Middle East, including in the forthcoming conference, are 

greater if, in the process, we have with us, not only the Europeans, 

some of whom are very disliked in the Middle East as former colonial powers, but we also have with us the Russians, who, in some 

cases, are not so disliked, and the Chinese, who are increasingly 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

31 

being an influence in the Middle East, and they have a growing 

stake in a stable Middle East. And that kind of a coalition, I think, 

gives us a greater opportunity to pursue arrangements that mitigate and minimize the danger of conflict spreading out, and certainly reduces the necessity of us being involved in these conflicts 

directly. Because the fact remains that, if we become involved 

directly, some people may applaud us, some people may rub their 

hands with glee that we are getting stuck, but none of them are 

going to help us. And I do not think the United States is in any 

position now to duplicate the wars in Iraq or in Afghanistan with 

a direct military engagement in the Middle East. 

So, we do need some accommodations even with the Russians on 

some issues, just as we disagree with them on other issues—today, 

for example, regarding what we were discussing. 

Senator CORKER. I appreciate your point of view. But, as it relates to Ukraine, it was just outward economic extortion. Obviously 

that is not something that we, in any way, condone, regardless of 

the complexities of any situation. And yet, we really did not speak 

to that. And I think, for some reasons, it is because of the other 

elements that you just alluded to. I mean, I understand that relationships are complex, and there are many other things that are 

occurring. And regardless of how you view those when it comes to 

an issue like Ukraine, where there is no question it was black-andwhite extortion, what should the United States do in those cases? 

Because it appears to me that we did ‘‘not much,’’ if you will—— 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I tend to—— 

Senator CORKER [continuing]. And I—— 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI [continuing]. Agree with you. 

Senator CORKER. What is that? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I tend to agree with you on that aspect. This is 

why I mentioned, for example, in my testimony, that we should 

take a hard look at WTO rules. There are some countries in the 

WTO that have behaved that fashion, and we do not need even to 

name them right now, but we know who we are talking about. We 

should look at the rules and see what is not acceptable, in terms 

of formal behavior of WTO members who—to benefit from the fact 

that such organizations contribute to more fluid trade flows and 

greater access. And we can have opportunities for limited boycotts, 

limited bans, and so forth. 

I agree with you, it is not either black or white. You can have 

different combinations. But, we have to have a sense of balance 

about it. I do not favor, at the same time, a reigniting of the cold 

war, for example, with Russia, of the kind that we had with the 

Soviet Union; in part because we do need Russia in some other 

parts of the world, and in part also because Russia itself is changing. 

You heard from me a very sharp criticism of Putin. And I know 

that he is an authoritarian, and I know that what he wishes to create is not good, and I believe it will not succeed. But, I also know 

that, today in Moscow, you can read criticisms of the government, 

you can read newspapers that blast official policies, you can watch 

skits on television that ridicule the rulers, and so forth. We are 

dealing with a more complicated Russia today than the Soviet 

Union of the past. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

32 

Senator CORKER. Well, thank you, and I appreciate your service 

to our country and your continued involvement in helping us think 

through these complex issues. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Dr. Brzezinski. 

You know, for all his faults, Yanukovych is a pretty savvy politician, and he seems to be under the impression that he can somehow manage a short-term transition of economic aid in Russia with 

an eventual long-term association with the EU, and further seems 

to be under the belief that he can manage that eventual transition 

to Europe without severe repercussions from Russia; if he keeps 

them happy for a period of time, maybe they will not notice if he 

eventually enters into a roadmap to join Europe. 

And when we were there, I tried to translate the phrase ‘‘rip the 

Band-Aid off,’’ which apparently does not translate very well into 

Ukrainian—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MURPHY [continuing]. And my point was, at some point, 

my impression is that you are going to have to deliver a very tough 

message to the Russians that you are going to join the EU, and you 

are going to have to potentially, as long as Putin is there, accept 

some of the very bad economic behavior, that Senator Corker talks 

about, coming along with it, unless we can stop it, as the United 

States and Europe, together. 

So, do you think that he is right, that there is a way for, without 

our intervention, the Ukraine to make the turn to Europe, in an 

overt way, without raising the ire of Russia in a way that will do 

great damage to their economy? Or, perhaps, do you think that 

Senator Corker is right, that, maybe with some intervention from 

the United States, we might be able to help manage that transition? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, we certainly should try, and we should certainly encourage the Ukrainians to try, themselves. Because, ultimately, this is not an issue which can be resolved by compulsion 

or pressure entirely from the outside. We can influence events, but 

we cannot really dictate them. 

My guess is—and I emphasis the word ‘‘guess’’—is that 

Yanukovych, in his gut, feels that if he moves toward the West— 

and part of it is also free elections that he will lose, and that is 

part of the difficulty. Now, it is not easy, or maybe not even productive, to speculate too publicly about how to manage that, but I 

will just draw you an analogy, again, to Poland, because it is 

relevant. 

I mentioned that Poland produced a movement that produced a 

popular leader, that they eventually sat down with a Communist 

regime which knew that it was losing because the Soviet Union 

was disintegrating, and they knew they had to somehow accommodate the new reality, and contrived free elections, which were free. 

And Solidarity won. And then Solidarity agreed to the erstwhile 

dictator in Poland who imposed on Poland, with Soviet approval, 

the marshal law, to be the first President. You know what I am 

hinting at. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

33 

In other words, what the Ukrainians have to have is a viable 

source of political influence, but also political dialogue and some 

degree of elasticity in dealing with Yanukovych to see that as possible. But, may not be possible. It may not be possible. He may be 

too fearful. Look how stupidly rigid he is on the Yulia Tymoshenko 

case. He could have solved it just like that, without even too much 

fanfare, simply expelling her; not necessarily even just sending her 

to Germany for medical treatment, but simply saying, ‘‘I am getting 

rid of her.’’ All right, so she would be outside the country. Part of 

the problem would be solved. Perhaps the West would demand that 

she then be permitted to return and campaign, but that would be 

a bit of a stretch. But, he did not have the guts or the imagination 

to do that, because he is, I think, a little bit frozen in his anxiety 

that he might lose. 

But, I think it is worth a try, but a lot depends also on the maturity and flexibility, organizational skill, and charismatic appeal of 

the opposition, including its willingness to play the game, depending how it unfolds. 

Senator MURPHY. Well—— 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. One more sentence. 

Senator MURPHY. Yes, yes, sure. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. On one point, Putin’s money is going to run out. 

Senator MURPHY. Right. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. So, this is a lousy economy. It is an economy 

from which funds are fleeing to the West. The new middle class is 

enriching itself, but look where it is depositing its money. There 

could be a crisis, in terms even of what Putin can do for Yanukovych. And he has to be careful not to use force on the Ukrainians. If he uses force on the Ukrainians, he will discover very 

quickly that he has bitten more than he can chew. These are tough 

people. They are not going to give up their independence. 

Senator MURPHY. I wanted to ask you about the opposition. And 

I know you will not necessarily want to comment on individual 

political leaders in the Ukraine, but it struck me that there is— 

when you are on the Maidan, there is this huge, giant portrait of 

Tymoshenko; and yet, when you are actually talking to individuals 

there, there is not a lot of talk of individual political leaders. They 

are there for a variety of reasons, but most of which, as Tom Melia 

was mentioning earlier, are not connected to an individual political 

party. And there seems to be a disconnect between what those in 

the Maidan, who were there and who have left, want and what the 

political opposition is able to deliver. 

And the worry is, is that if we are really counting on political 

change in 2015 to ultimately deliver on the potential ultimate salvation of the Ukraine, folks out there may have expectations that 

the political opposition ultimately cannot make good on. 

So, how does—regardless of who ends up being the standard 

bearer, how does the political opposition try to capitalize on these 

fairly nonpolitical sentiments that are captured on the Maidan? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, first of all, by trying to create a broader 

national dialogue. Now, it may be that Yanukovych—in particular, 

his Prime Minister, who is very dogmatic—may not want to talk 

to them. But, there are a lot of other people in Kiev that are not 

committed to the regime, nor are entirely against it, who can be 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

34 

talked to. I could give you—but I would not do it now, publicly— 

the names of some oligarchs who I am sure would engage in discussion with the opposition; in part, because they are uneasy about 

the way things are shaping up. They resent the fact that this territory is not theirs exclusive, but a Mafia in Moscow has priority 

rights in what they claim to be their exclusive area. They know 

that greater opportunities shine in the West. They may be interested in alternative deals. They may also have access and sources 

of influence on Yanukovych. They may even be able to contrive— 

I am talking literally from the top of my head right now—some 

arrangement whereby the election is delayed for a while, but with 

an understanding of a process that, in the meantime, takes fruit 

and then leads to a transition, which is exactly what happened in 

Poland. The elected President that they elected from the previous 

regime lasted 1 year, and yet went peacefully, in the end. 

There are many ways you can skin that cat, but the political 

leadership in Ukraine has to be manifestly mature, but also symbolic. I am not going to mention names, but they cannot all be running for President against each other. 

Senator MURPHY. Yes. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. One of them has to be, and they have to make 

a calculation what is likely to be most effective. 

And do not forget, this movement is driven by the passions of the 

younger people, who relish the fact that they are independent. That 

is a whole new psychological reality. And the leader has to be, in 

a sense, somehow or other in tune with that mood, has to symbolize it most effectively. And if that manifests itself, that creates 

a new ball game. And, okay, they can perhaps arrest him, Yanukovych can be under pressure from Putin to arrest him, but it 

might not work. 

And do not forget, Russia is changing, too. I am not sure that 

everybody in Russia is crazy about trying to create some sort of a 

union in which there is going to be, internally, more opposition, 

and China, in the meantime, gains influence. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Brzezinski, thank you very much for your 

very insightful views and for giving us a sense of the entire field, 

as I like to call it. I grew up sitting in the cheap seats, but it gave 

you a view of the entire field, and it gave you a sense of what, in 

fact, is in front of you in terms of choices to be made. So, I think 

you have done this for the committee extraordinarily well. 

There is a reason that I called this hearing as the second hearing 

of this new session of the Congress, after South Sudan, because I 

believe in the importance of the Ukraine, in the urgency of protecting the civil society, that Senator Murphy saw for himself when 

he was there, and in the possibilities of what a sovereign Ukraine 

free from economic coercion can ultimately achieve. And I think it 

is in the national interests of the United States, as well as of the 

Ukrainian people, to be able to try to achieve those goals. 

So, we thank you for your testimony. We will continue to monitor 

the events in the Ukraine, with both the full committee and with 

our distinguished colleague. 

This record will remain open until the close of business tomorrow. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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And, with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thank 

you, on behalf of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, for giving us the 

opportunity to submit testimony today during this critical hearing entitled ‘‘Implications of the Crisis in Ukraine.’’ 

The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA), the umbrella organization, representing the interests of the over 1 million Americans of Ukrainian descent 

for close to 75 years, would like to express our community’s gratitude to the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee for your continued interest in the developments 

unfolding in Ukraine today, and for your steadfast support for stronger bilateral 

relations between the United States and Ukraine. 

BACKGROUND

The Government of Ukraine’s recent decision to reverse its course on the signing 

of an Association Agreement with the European Union has led to massive prodemocracy rallies throughout the country and widespread condemnation from the 

Ukrainian American community. Though the catalyst for the nationwide protests 

has perhaps been the government’s reversal of policy regarding Euro-Atlantic integration for Ukraine, the movement’s spirit has become one of standing in defense 

of human rights, the protection of dignity, the eradication of corruption within society and the defense of Ukraine’s independence from Russia’s imperial ambitions. 

For the demonstrators, integrating with Europe and into Western institutions 

means not only assuring their economic well-being and political security but also 

defining their own and their nation’s political identity. Throughout Ukraine, the 

demonstrators have remained peaceful in their approach and resolve. Numerous 

acts of government sanctioned violence against the protesters, and subsequent 

attacks upon civic activists and media outlets, have sparked widespread concern 

among Ukraine’s citizens for their personal safety and human rights. 

Acts of savagery, such as the beatings of innocent students on Ukraine’s 

EuroMaidan (central square) on December 1 and December 11 have no place in a 

civilized, democratic country. While condemnation of the violence has been heard 

worldwide, targeted violence and intimidation continues. The UCCA condemns any 

use of force and has repeatedly urged the Government of Ukraine to refrain from 

further violence against individual activists and the peaceful protesters gathered in 

Kiev and throughout Ukraine. As citizens of a democracy, Ukrainians have the 

expressed right to come together and collectively voice and defend their common 

interests. The UCCA has called upon the Government of Ukraine to respect the rule 

of law, conform to its international commitments and to uphold democratic principles, one of which is the freedom to assemble. 

The UCCA fully supports and grateful to the U.S. Senate for the passage of S. 

Res. 319. One clause therein emphatically states that: ‘‘in the event of further state 

violence against peaceful protestors, the President and Congress should consider 

whether to apply targeted sanctions, including visa bans and asset freezes, against 

individuals responsible for ordering or carrying out the violence.’’ In light of the continued government sponsored violence, the UCCA feels that it is imperative that 

such sanctions be placed immediately in order to prevent further acts of violence 

against the protesters and intimidation of media outlets, journalists, and civic 

leaders. 

GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

In the context of U.S. geostrategic interests, the current situation in Ukraine cannot be understood without recognizing its potentially far-reaching consequences for 

the world’s security dynamic. The Putinesque neocolonialist policy of expanding a 

‘‘Russkiy Mir’’ and the ever increasing, multivectored, political, economic, social, cultural and religious aggression and encroachment directed against Ukrainian sovereignty, can be directly referenced as the cause for Yanukovych’s seemingly abrupt 

about-face regarding the EU’s Eastern Partnership. The passionate yet peaceful 

response by the people of the Maidan to the attempts at recolonization has challenged contemporary notions of the state of European security. Russian behavior toward Ukraine is rightly viewed with alarm by our NATO allies, most particularly 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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by those in Central Europe. It is understood to be a threat to the stabilizing 

transnational, trans-Atlantic security framework that first emerged in the years 

after the Second World War and expanded with the fall of the Soviet Union. 

For the United States, Ukraine’s inclusion into these structures clearly serves our 

national interests. The security of the United States lies in the expansion of democracy, not in the appeasement of a failed empire intent on renewal. Furthermore, the 

United States has provided public and politically binding security guarantees 

including, but not limited to, the 1994 Trilateral Agreement which elicits, at the 

very least, Washington’s engagement when Ukraine’s security is threatened in 

exchange for Ukraine’s commitment to its renunciation of its nuclear weapons and 

its ascension to NPT as a nonnuclear state. These assurances were and remain critical for Ukraine and they include U.S. support for Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty 

and integrity, the nonuse of force and the freedom from economic coercion. Today, 

each of these security components is at issue. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America calls upon the United States to: 

• Enact the appropriate clauses of S. Res. 319 calling for targeted sanctions 

against Ukrainian Government officials for their corrupt practices; 

• Expand the ‘‘Magnitsky Act’’ legislation to include the Yanukovych ‘‘clan,’’ their 

supporting oligarchs and security forces as well as Russian officials who are 

actively threatening Ukraine; 

• Freeze Russia’s membership applications to OECD and other international 

organizations; 

• Publicly condemn Russian economic aggression and its consequent violations of 

the Tripartite Agreement, the CSCE Final Act, WTO agreement and other 

international treaties and accords as they affect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, 

stability and political independence; 

• Facilitate all possible unilateral and multilateral economic assistance to 

Ukraine under circumstances ensuring its benefit to the Ukrainian people, not 

to governmental functionaries; 

• Maintain U.S. Government spending on democracy programs and continued 

civil society in Ukraine at 2013 levels; 

• Provide immediate emergency supplemental funding to counter the regime’s 

efforts to block the public’s access to information. 

The crisis in Eastern Europe and Ukraine specifically, will not simply go away. 

In an increasingly interconnected and economically interdependent world, the 

United States must take the lead in promoting international norms and consolidating geopolitical stability. It must work to facilitate the transformation of Russia’s 

lingering imperial ambitions into ambitions of democratic statehood. Today, Russia’s 

intellectuals and democrats look toward Ukraine and the EuroMaidan as an inspiration. With American support, a democratic, independent Ukraine can be that keystone of freedom in the region. However, unless Ukraine is safeguarded allowing it 

to integrate into Europe and its structures as its people wish, trans-Atlantic security 

is simply an illusion. 

CONCLUSION

The UCCA stands in admiration of the hundreds of thousands demonstrating 

their commitment to the future of their nation. We are humbled by their fortitude 

and courage and we stand united with all Ukrainians gathered on the EuroMaidans 

throughout Ukraine who are freely expressing their desire for a democratic, European future! 

The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, urges the United States Senate 

to continue assisting the people of Ukraine and heed their calls for support of their 

democratic and EuroAtlantic aspirations during this most critical juncture! 

LETTER FROM THE UNITED OPPOSITIONS TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

KIEV, INDEPENDENCE SQUARE, 

January 12, 2014. 

DEAR MEMBERS OF THE SENATE: On behalf of the millions of Ukrainians, who are 

standing in an over 50 days protest against the authoritarian regime and for their 

European choice, democracy, fundamental human rights and freedoms, we, the participants of the Rally on January 12, 2014, express our sincere gratitude to our 

American friends, especially the U.S. Senate for your support. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

37 

We highly appreciate the position of principles of the U.S. Senate, reflected in the 

Resolution of January 7, supporting the Ukrainian people. The Senate fairly condemned the violence against the peaceful demonstrators that happened on November 30, December 1 and December 11, 2013, and clearly warned that in case of further use of force against the protestors, the U.S. should consider whether to apply 

targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for ordering or carrying out the 

violence. 

On the night of January 10–11 the anti-peoples regime has once again behaved 

aggressively and used violence against the peaceful demonstrators, injuring at least 

11 people in Kiev. Yuriy Lutsenko, former Minister of Interior, well-known activist 

and the former political prisoner of this regime is severely injured. This very day 

in Kharkiv bandits directed by local authorities stormed Saint-Dimitriy Cathedral 

of Ukrainian Autocefalous Orthodox Church where protestors of Kharkiv Maydan 

found their refuge. 

Ukrainian Government moved to direct threats to the Church. So, on January 3 

this year, Ministry of Culture warned in written Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, 

which was repressed by Stalin’s regime in Soviet times, about possible termination 

of its activity for making divine services at Maydan in December 2013–January 

2014. 

Ministry of Education and Science is increasing illegal pressure and intimidation 

of students in order to prevent their participation in protests. Courts are pronouncing unconstitutional verdicts prohibiting citizens to exercise their right on 

peaceful gatherings. 

It is a high time to step from warnings to the targeted sanctions application 

against Yanukovych, his family and closest surrounding—all those involved in 

establishment of authoritarian regime in Ukraine, political repressions and selective 

justice towards Yulia Tymoshenko, Euromaydan activists and other opposition and 

public leaders. 

First of all we urge to introduce sanctions against those who issued and carried 

out criminal orders to beat up people and intimidate activists, or who criminally 

remained inactive on their wielded positions instead of defending the civil rights, 

namely: Viktor Yanukovych, Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, Minister of Interior 

Vitaliy Zakharchenko, Minister of Culture Leonid Novokhat’ko, Minister of Education and Science Dmytro Tbachnik, Secretary of the National Security and 

Defense Council Andriy Klyuyev, General Prosecutor Viktor Pshonka, Head of 

Kharkiv Regional Administration Mykhailo Dobkin, Mayor of Kharkiv City 

Guennady Kernes, judges and other officials involved in mass violation of human 

rights in Ukraine. 

We urge for application of the U.S. entrance ban, bank accounts freeze, proceedings against laundering of funds acquired through criminal means, arrest of 

real estate and other property and assets in direct ownership, belonging to family 

members or dummy firms. 

The evil must be punished. The truth should win! 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY VICTORIA NULAND AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY THOMAS MELIA TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT

MENENDEZ

Question. There are recent reports of isolated, but disturbing, incidents of antiSemitism and xenophobia in Ukraine. What, if anything, has the Embassy done to 

respond to these incidents? What are the lessons learned from years of fighting antiSemitism in other parts of Europe and in the former Soviet Union that can be 

applied to Ukraine? 

Answer. The Department of State condemns anti-Semitism and xenophobia in 

Ukraine. We share your concern about recent incidents. 

Ambassador Pyatt has personally delivered the message to all of Ukraine’s political leaders—those parties in power and in opposition—that political parties must 

not just refrain, but refute any form of anti-Semitism or endorsement of violence 

against minorities. 

Our Ambassador and other officials at Embassy Kiev have played an active role 

in raising these incidents bilaterally with Ukrainian Government officials and other 

political players. They have also engaged with religious leaders and with civil society to promote religious freedom and human rights. 

The U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism visited Ukraine in 

November, meeting with government officials as well as Jewish community leaders. 

He saw signs of a reviving Jewish community, and open anti-Semitism is limited. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Wherever and whenever minority groups face discrimination and violence, all of 

us must speak up and speak out. Governments must enact laws and policies that 

guarantee and promote religious freedom. Government and civil society, including 

religious leaders across faiths, must work together to promote tolerance and combat 

anti-Semitism. 

We look forward to continuing to work closely with you and other concerned Members of Congress to combat anti-Semitism. 

Question. How have we targeted our assistance to Ukraine in recent years? To 

what extent have we sought to support democratic institutions and civil society, and 

how do we coordinate our efforts with the European Union? 

Answer. In recent years, U.S. assistance programs have focused on encouraging 

the development of a democratic, prosperous, and secure Ukraine, fully integrated 

into the Euro-Atlantic community. Major emphases include promoting democracy 

and human rights, including through support to civil society, independent media, 

and efforts to reform the justice sector; expanding access to HIV prevention, treatment, and care; securing the Chornobyl accident site; and facilitating energy efficiency and independence. In FY 2013, the United States provided more than $25 million in governance and 

democracy assistance. U.S.-funded training teaches nongovernmental organizations 

about management, financial sustainability, advocacy, and monitoring the public 

sector. Technical assistance to independent media organizations improves journalists’ professionalism and skills. U.S. training and technical advice improves judicial 

administration; promotes criminal justice reform in line with the improved Criminal 

Procedure Code; increases the availability of pro bono legal services; and improves 

the effectiveness of defense advocates, judges, and other actors in the criminal justice sector. We also work to build local governments’ capacity to manage and implement budgets; interact with citizens; deliver municipal services; and build and 

maintain infrastructure. 

The United States regularly coordinates our efforts with the EU through consultations in Brussels and Washington and via meetings of diplomats and assistance 

partners based in Ukraine. 

Question. Increasing numbers of international NGOs report problems with registration and tax issues in Ukraine. What action is and/or has the State Department 

taken to address these concerns? 

Answer. International and local NGOs that implement humanitarian assistance 

programs in Ukraine have been experiencing problems with customs clearance since 

December 2012 due to the absence of a procedure within the Government of Ukraine 

for recognizing shipments as humanitarian aid. Until December 2012, this procedure was routinely accomplished through the Humanitarian Assistance Commission 

(HAC) under the Cabinet of Ministers. However, a Cabinet of Ministers resolution 

dissolved the HAC in December 2012 and transferred its responsibilities to the Ministry of Social Policy (MSP). The MSP has yet to fully implement a permanent 

mechanism to coordinate clearance of humanitarian assistance. 

Specifically on these issues, the State Department has been in regular contact 

with representatives from the Joint Jewish Distribution Committee (JDC), which 

provides humanitarian assistance directly to Holocaust survivors and funds to Jewish community and cultural centers. In years past, the MSP extended tax-exempt 

status to JDC’s annual operating budget within 4–6 weeks of JDC’s application. In 

2013, JDC did not receive this tax exemption, despite having applied in late November 2012. They have applied again for 2014 and are still awaiting a response. 

Officials at our Embassy in Kiev as well as State Department officials in Washington have repeatedly reached out to the Ukrainian Government on behalf of the 

NGOs facing these issues in Ukraine. Some have only recently managed to receive 

the necessary approvals to continue providing assistance, such as the American Red 

Cross. 

Question. Ukraine has been pursuing a policy of creating greater energy independence and had invited Chevron and Shell in to drill, to what extent do you believe 

that will be pursued in the future? 

Answer. Chevron signed a production sharing agreement (PSA) with the Govern- ment of Ukraine on November 5, 2013. The agreement could lead to a $10 billion 

investment by Chevron in Ukraine, according to Chevron’s public announcement. 

Chevron is now working on concluding an operating agreement. It has not yet 

drilled any exploratory wells, but Chevron estimates that the field could produce up 

to 11 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas per year. ExxonMobil has not yet signed a 

PSA for an offshore field in the Black Sea, but that field could produce an estimated 

5 bcm per year. ExxonMobil still hopes to conclude the PSA by early this year. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

39 

These projects are a major opportunity for Ukraine to develop domestic resources 

that could significantly supplant imported supplies. In 2012 Ukraine consumed 55 

bcm of gas, of which 33 bcm was imported from Russia. Together, these projects 

could cut Ukraine’s dependence on Russia in half. Missing the opportunity to sign 

the PSA with ExxonMobil, on the other hand, would be an enormous step backward 

in Ukraine’s goal of energy diversification. It would also be a negative signal to 

other foreign companies thinking of investing in Ukraine. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY VICTORIA NULAND TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT CORKER

Question. How many protesters have been imprisoned since November? On 

December 20, 2013, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted an amnesty law to have 

these protesters released; however, Ukraine’s Justice Minister has said that this law 

cannot be implemented until it is harmonized with a number of other laws. 

♦ What is the status of the imprisoned protesters, how many are there, and does 

the Ukrainian Government intend to fully implement the amnesty law in both 

letter and spirit? 

Answer. Due to the fluidity of the situation in Ukraine, Embassy Kiev reports it 

is impossible to determine with certainty the number of individuals who have been 

detained or the number released with charges pending against them. However, the 

Ukrainian Interior Ministry released a report on January 24 which stated that, 

since the protests began on November 21, 103 people have been detained, at least 

temporarily, by the police. Of them, 53 have been informed that they are suspects 

in ongoing investigations. Twenty-four have been remanded into custody by the 

courts. The week of January 27, at least six protestors were killed during clashes 

with the government. 

The December amnesty law was amended on January 16, 2014. It was originally 

understood that the purpose of the law was to release from criminal liability and 

prosecution all peaceful protesters who were detained following government crackdowns on the Maidan, which occurred on November 30 and December 11. The law 

was poorly drafted and enforced only in very few cases. The revised law will apparently extend the amnesty to cover crimes committed during 21 November–26 

December 2013 by any person for offences such as inflicting bodily injuries, harassment of journalists, making false bomb threats, and exceeding of authority or service powers. 

On January 23, President Viktor Yanukovych met directly with the three main 

opposition leaders for the first time since the protests began. Following those negotiations, both the President and opposition have said the government will move to 

release all peaceful protestors. On January 24, at least three individuals who had 

been detained since December 10 were released. Negotiations were continuing as of 

January 27. The Parliament is scheduled in an extraordinary session on January 

28. We will continue to monitor closely over the coming days. 

Question. How can the United States and EU prevent further violence in Ukraine? 

Answer. We have stated publicly and privately to the Ukrainian Government that 

it must take immediate steps to de-escalate the situation. These steps should include removing the riot police from the center of Kiev, releasing all peaceful 

protestors, and holding accountable all officials responsible for ordering violence. 

Vice President Biden has personally delivered this message to President Viktor 

Yanukovych during three phone calls over the last week. Assistant Secretary Victoria Nuland also spoke to Foreign Minister Kozhara on January 28 to reiterate 

that all sides must refrain from violence. She urged the government to win back 

the trust and confidence of the Ukrainian people. She will be engaging Ukrainian 

officials again at the Munich Security Conference and plans to visit Kiev on February 6. 

The EU and several member states have echoed these statements and are becoming increasingly engaged. Stephan Fuele, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement 

and European Neighborhood Policy, was appointed to represent the EU and all 

member states in talks with Ukrainian officials and the opposition. He met with 

President Yanukovych on January 24. High Representative Catherine Ashton traveled to Kiev the week of January 27 and returned the week of February 3 for similar discussions. Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke to Yanukovych on January 23 to 

encourage a serious dialogue with opposition leaders. Foreign Minister Kozhara 

spoke to his counterparts in Poland, Sweden, and Germany on January 27. 

On January 23, the opposition called for a truce to allow time for negotiations 

with the government. To date, that truce has largely held and there has been a sigFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

40 

nificant de-escalation in violence. However, our officials at Embassy Kiev will continue to follow events closely. 

Question. Moscow has called for the EU to engage in trilateral talks with Russia 

and Ukraine on the topic of EU-Ukraine relations. Why should Russia be involved 

in this? Shouldn’t the EU and Ukraine define their relations on a bilateral basis? 

Answer. The EU has said that it will not engage in trilateral negotiations with 

Russia and Ukraine, as the question of Ukraine’s association with the EU is a bilateral issue. The EU has been clear that the agreement itself has already been negotiated directly with Ukraine over a number of years and any such discussions would 

not reopen those negotiations. 

Question. Ukraine has substantially reduced imports of Russian natural gas over 

the past 2 years. Will Moscow’s recent price cut reverse this trend and thus increase 

Ukraine’s energy dependence on Russia? 

Answer. The details of the gas price deal with Russia are not public, so we do 

not know if Ukraine committed to importing a certain volume of gas in exchange 

for the discounted price. In addition, the price will be re-negotiated every 3 months, 

so it remains unclear whether the discount will be permanent. Therefore, at this 

time it is not possible to predict how much gas Ukraine will import from Russia 

in the future. 

RESPONSE OF HON. VICTORIA NULAND TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY

Question. I cosponsored Senate Resolution 319, which was adopted by unanimous 

consent on January 7, to express support for the Ukrainian people after their President’s unfortunate decision not to sign an Association Agreement with the European 

Union. In part, the resolution noted that ‘‘in the event of further state violence 

against peaceful protestors, the President and Congress should consider whether to 

apply targeted sanctions, including visa bans and asset freezes, against individuals 

responsible for ordering or carrying out the violence.’’ 

♦ Under what circumstances do you believe such measures would be warranted? 

What other tools might the United States utilize in order to hold Ukraine’s 

leaders responsible for acts of violence? 

Answer. We were appalled by the violence in Ukraine which led to four deaths 

and many more injuries and by the government’s antidemocratic steps, including 

passage of problematic laws restricting basic freedoms. These antidemocratic steps 

fueled popular frustration and tensions, and to a significant degree are responsible 

for current tensions. The U.S. Government has remained active throughout this crisis, reaching out to the opposition and the government at senior levels, and civil 

society leaders, making clear our interest in a peaceful, negotiated solution to the 

current standoff, and we are beginning to see positive steps, including the repeal 

of antidemocratic legislation. We have made clear that we have a variety of options 

at our disposal, including but not limited to sanctions, if warranted. To underscore 

our concern, the U.S. Embassy in Kiev has announced that it revoked visas for several Ukrainians involved in the recent violence. We are looking at other available 

policy tools and assistance mechanisms and consulting with the EU and European 

governments most closely interested in Ukraine and its future. 

RESPONSE OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS MELIA TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY

Question. I continue to be concerned about deteriorating conditions in Ukraine for 

LGBT individuals. Unfortunately, it has become increasingly common for factions 

opposed to closer affiliation with the European Union to try to mark the LGBT community as an unwanted ‘‘Western’’ force in Ukrainian society. 

♦ Do you see signs that reactionary groups are using the LGBT community as a 

scapegoat for Ukraine’s problems? 

♦ How can the United States and our European allies promote equal rights for 

LGBT individuals without at the same time providing fodder for the anti-LGBT 

propaganda being promulgated in Ukraine? 

Answer. We share your concerns and want to assure you that we are well aware 

of the problems affecting the LGBT community in Ukraine. During the last 2 years 

we have put in place programs to support local civil society organizations working 

to advance the human rights of LGBT persons. We have also established strong 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

41 

partnerships with like-minded European governments to support Ukrainian LGBT 

human rights defenders and activists on the front lines. 

We have seen officials in a number of governments, including Russia and 

Ukraine, describe LGBT persons and their human rights as ‘‘western imports.’’ To 

them we reiterate the words of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: ‘‘gay people are born into and belong to every society in the world. They are all ages, all 

races, all faiths; they are doctors and teachers, farmers and bankers, soldiers and 

athletes. They are our family, our friends, and our neighbors. Being gay is not a 

Western invention; it is a human reality.’’ And we remind them that universal 

human rights—enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—belong to 

everyone, not just to certain people in certain countries. 

Through statements, actions and bilateral engagement with the Government of 

Ukraine—in coordination with our European allies—we have pushed back against 

the fear, ignorance, and hate that lead to violence against members of the LGBT 

community. There have been some successes. 

On numerous occasions we urged the Government of Ukraine, publicly and privately, to fulfill its commitments to OSCE principles and obligations as a party to 

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including protecting the 

fundamental freedoms of all of its citizens, including freedom of expression. We also 

advocate for respect for the human rights of members of minority communities. 

Last May, under arduous circumstances, LGBT activists hosted Kiev’s first Equality Pride March. Our colleagues at Embassy Kiev maintain contact with LGBT 

activists and provide moral and other support to those who come under threat. 

In addition to our individual and bilateral engagement, in 2011 the State Department launched the Global Equality Fund to support projects and programs to 

advance and protect LGBT persons globally. Since then, the Fund has allocated over 

$7.5 million to civil society organizations in over 50 countries, including in Europe, 

to bolster their efforts to increase human rights protections for LGBT persons. 

Still, we know that much more needs to be done to ensure the protection of LGBT 

persons in Ukraine, to separate discussion of their rights from the geopolitics of the 

region, and to reduce discrimination, social stigma, and violence. We will continue 

to speak out and to work with the European Union and within the Organization 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe to press for respect for human rights and 

democratic principles in Ukraine. 

Æ 

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