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UNIT ED STA TES C OURT OF

APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

____________
No. 03-1626

____________ CAMPHILL SOLTANE,
Appellant

v.

US DEPARTMENT O F JUSTI CE; IMMI GRATI ON & NATURALIZATI ON SERVICE

___________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTE RN DI STRI CT OF

PEN NS YL VA NIA

District Cou rt Judge: H onorab le Herbe rt

J. Hutt on (CivilAction No. 02-0727)

________________ Argued: December 5, 2003

Be for e: S LO VI TE R a nd A LIT O, Circu it Judges , and OB ER DO RF ER , Distri ct

Judge * (Opinion Fi led: August 26, 2004)

LAW RENC E H. RUD NICK (Argued) 1608 Walnut Stre et, Suite 1500 Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for

Appellant

PATRI CK L. MEEHAN LA UR IE M AG ID VIR GINI A A. GIB SON SUSA N R. BEC KER (A rgued) 615 Chestnut St

reet, Suite 1250 Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for

Appellee

____________________
OPINI ON OF THE COURT

____________________

AL ITO , Circuit

Judge :
Cam phill Soltane ( “Camphill”) appeal s a finalorder of t he United States Distri ct Cou rt for

the East ern District

of Pe nnsylva nia affirm ing the denia l o f Cam phill’s visa pe titio n on behalf of an employe e sought t o be class ifi ed as a “specia l i mm igra nt re ligio us w ork er.” Because that denial w as pre dic ated on legal error and im proper f ind ings of evidentiary defici ency, we vacate the judgmentof the Dist

rict Court and remand this case forre co ns id er ati on by t he ag en cy.

I.
Cam phill Soltan e is a no n-pro fit organization, dedicated to provi ding

serv ice s to y oung adults with mental disabili ties. R oo ted in “A nt hr op os op hy” and the tea ching s of R udo lp h S teiner, * The H onorab le Louis F . Oberdo rfer, SeniorDi stri ct Judge for the Dist

rict of Columbia, s itting by designation.2

Camphi l l seeks t o creat e a spiritual

co mm unity through c ooperati ve lif e, soci al inte ra ction, and spiritualacti vity . “The Cam phill Mov eme nt is focused on Christianiz ing the ordi nary aspects of lif e for the mentall y handi capped as well as for the fully able m emb ers of the co mm unity

. . . .” Appell ant Br. at 6.
Since 199 6, the C hester Co unty facility o f Cam p hillhas employ ed Annagr et Goetze, a ci tize n and nati ve of G er m an y. Goetze wa s origin ally admitt ed into the Un ited States in the R -1 class ific ationas a nonimmigrant reli gious

w or ker. In 2000, Camphil l fil ed an I-360 immigrant vis a peti tion on beha lf of Goet ze with the Im migrati on an d Naturali zati on Service (IN S). 1 This petit ion sought t o ha ve G oetze cl assif ied

as a specia l immigr ant rel igious worker so that she could s erve in t he proposed position of houseparen t, music instructor, and reli gious i nstruc t o r at the C amp hill fac ility.
The Vermont Servici ng Center of the IN S mad e a request for furt

her eviden ce s how in g tha t Go et ze ha d t wo years of experi ence in a reli gious occupati on a nd that s he had recei ved spec ific reli gious t

raini n g. App. I at

32. Camph il l responded with explanations of the training process a nd the rel igious nature of th e po sition , see App. II at 59-61,

as we ll as a set o f li tera tu re (s ome author ed by St einer) that di scussed Anthropo sophy and the “C amp hil l M ovem ent” an d was presumabl y submitt ed as r epres entativ e tr ainin g mate rial. See App. II at 62-146. 2 No twiths ta nd ing the su pplem enta l submissions, th e I NS de ni ed Ca mp h ill’s pe t iti on in February 2001, finding t hat Ca mp hill had fail ed to est ablis h that Goetze was to be e mploy ed in a re ligi ous occupati on, as re quired und er th e regulat ions. App. I at 31.
Cam phill file d a time ly appea l with the Ad min istrative Appe als Unit. In December 2001, a f

in al admini strative de cisi o n wa s rend ered b y th e Administr ativeAppeals Office ( AAO ) of the INS. Reviewing t he record de novo, the AAO affirmed on four independe n t grounds, any one of w hich a lo ne co uld have justified the de nial: (1) C amp hill did not qualify as a religious o rg anization as required by 8 U.S. C. § 1101(a)( 27)(C); (2) the propose d position of housep are nt was neithe r a rel igious occu pation nor a rel igious voca tion; ( 3) th er e wa s in suffici ent evidence to determi ne whe the r Goetze had worked in a re ligi ous position for two years p recedi ng the petiti on; and (4) Cam phill p rovid ed insuffi cien t evidence to prove that there was a
1 The INS has ceas ed to ex ist as of March 1, 200 3, and has b een re pla ce d by the Bureau of Citi zenship a n d Immigration Services. We ne verth eless use the term INS throughout

this opinion ( as do the br ief s) f or th e s ak e o f c on sis ten cy. 2 For e xam ple, A pp. II at 8 6 is a sh eet l abeled “Study Material ” lis ting s everal

so urces, some of which appear to b e inclu ded in th e ad min istrati ve r eco rd.3

qualif yi ng tender of

a job to Goet ze.
C amp hill appealed for re view of th e AAO decisi on in the Eas tern Distri ct of Pe n nsyl vania, under the Admini strative Proced ure Act (APA). In Februar y 2003, the Distri ct Court e ntered j udgment agains t Cam phill, affirmi ng the AAO decision on all f our grounds. This appealfollowed.

II.
As a prel im inary matter, we are required to consi der the issue of subject matter juri sdiction, e ven though nei ther par ty con tend s tha t it is lac kin g he re. See Bender v. W illiamsp ort A rea S ch. D is t

. , 475 U.S

. 53 4, 541 (1986) (“[E]very federal appe llate cour t has a s pecia l obliga tion to sati sfy it se lf

not onl y of

it s o wn juri sdiction, but also that of the lower

cour ts in a caus e u nder revi ew, even though the part

ies are prepare d to concede it. ”) (internal quo t es omitted). The juri sdictional ques tion in th is case centers

on 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)( 2)(B)(i i), which prov ides in p ertinen t part:
Not w iths tanding any ot her provisi on of law , no court shall have jurisdictio n to review

. . . any ot her decisi on or action of the Atto rney Ge neral th e auth ority for which i s specifi ed under thi s ti tle [ 8 U.S .C. §§ 115 1 et seq.] t o be in th e discretion of the AttorneyGeneral, ot her tha n the gran ti ng of reli ef under [8 U .S.C. § 115 8(a) ] [gove rning asylum]. Id. I n this case, t he stat utorybasis f

or Ca mp hill’s vi sare que st was 8 U.S .C. § 115 3(b)(4 ), wh ic h governs the issuance of preferenc e visas to “certain s pecial imm igra nts,” including those enga ged in a “reli gious occupati on or voc ation ,” see id. § 1101(a)( 27)(C)(i i). If the AAO ’s deni al of Camph ill’ s visa r equest cons tit uted a “d ecisi on or acti on of the Att orney Gene ra l the authority for w hich is specifi ed under this tit l e to be i n the dis creti on of the Attorney General, ” then u nde r § 1251(a)( 2)(B)(i i) t

he District Cou r t lacked juri sdiction to rev iew the agency acti on. The key to § 1251 (a)(2)(B)(ii) lie s in its requirement that

the dis creti on giving rise to the juri sd i ctional bar must be “specif ied ” by stat

ute. In other words, “the language of t

he st atutein question must prov ide the discre tionary au thority ” before th e b ar ca n h av e a ny e ffe ct. Spencer Enterpri ses, Inc. v. United States , 345 F.3d 683, 689 ( 9th Cir. 2003). For example, in Spencer Enter prise s , the N inth Circu it found no discretion sp ecif ied in a statute that l isted “cle ar[]

. . . eli gibility requirements” with ins tructions that a visa “sha ll” issue when those requireme nts are met. By contr ast, in Urena -Tavare z v. Ashcroft , 367 F. 3d 1 54 ( 3d C ir . 2 004 ), we found that the statute a t issue “ expli ci tly assign[ed ]” discr etion to the Attorney Ge neral, focu sing o n the u se of spec ific language to that

end (“dis cr etio n” and “sole discre tion”), to geth er w it h inst ructi ons that c ertai n acti ons “may” ( as op pos ed to “shal l”) be t aken when any of the e num erate d co ndi tion s is sa tisfie d.4

The statute at

issue in thi s case provides:
Visas s hall be mad e avail able, in a nu mb er no t to exceed 7.1 pe rcent o f such

wor l d w i d e leve l, t o qualif ied spec ial immigran ts descri bed in [8 U. S. C. § 1101(a )(27)] (other

than those desc rib ed i n subparagr aph (A) or(B) thereof), of w hich not m ore than 5,000 m ay be made

av ailable in an y fis ca l ye a r to s pec ia l i mm igrant s descri bed in subclause (II)

or (III ) of

[8 U.S .C. § 1101(a)( 27) (C)(ii )(II) o r (III)], and not more than 100 may be m ade a vaila b le in any fiscalyear to speci al immigra nts, excl udin g spouses and chil dren, who

are descri bed in [8 U.S .C. § 1101(a )(27)(M )].
8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4) (emphasi s add ed)

. A “sp ecia l imm igra nt,” as that class ific ationpertai ns to mini ster s and other reli gious workers, is defined as:

( C) an im migra nt, and t he immigrant's spouse and ch i ldren i f

acco m panyi ng or foll owing to join the immigrant , who– (i) for at l east 2 years imm ediate ly prece ding the time of appl ication fo r ad miss ion, has been a member o f a rel igious denominati on having a bona fide nonpro fit, re ligi ous organization in the United States; ( ii) seeks to enter t he United States– (I) soll y for the purpose of carry ing on the voc ation of a mi nis ter of tha t reli gious denominat

ion, (I I) before October 1, 2008, in or de r to wo rk for the organization at

the request o f the organi zati on in a profess ional capa city in

a reli gious vocation or occupati on, or (II I) before October 1, 2008, in order

to wo rk for the organization (o r for a b ona fide o rgan izati o n which is affi liated with the reli gious d enominati on and is exe mp t f

rom taxation as

an orga nizatio n des cribed in

s ecti on 501(c)( 3) of th e Intern al Revenue Code of 19 86) at therequest

of the organization in a rel igious vocati on or occupation; and (iii) has bee n carrying on such vocati on, prof es sionalwork, or other work c on tinuous ly for at leastthe 2-y ear peri od5

described in c lause (i);
8 U .S.C . § 11 01( a)(2 7)(C ).
The la ng uag e of

8 U. S. C. § 1153(b)(4) makes clear that the Attorney General is re quired to grant prefe rence visas to thos e who fall with in certa in numericallimi ts and qual ifyas “speci a l immigrants” under § 1101( a )(27). These relevant numericallimi ts ar e setby st atute , see 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (4), and the defin itio n of “speci al immigr ant” (a s
r elevant to religio us w orke rs) is fair l y de tail ed and s pecif ic, with no ex plicit referenc e to “di sc reti on” as in UrenaTavarez

. In fact , 8 U .S .C. § 1153(b)(4) bears some simil arity t o the n ei ghboring provisi on , 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (5), which

was analy zed in Sp en cer Enter prise s , in that it s ets forth speci fic e l igibility requirements, with ins tructions that the visa “shall” issue if those re quireme nts are met. Accordingly , we do n ot r ead § 1153(b)(4) as having “s pecifi ed” that the granti ng of the vi sas in que sti on “be in the disc retio n of the A ttorn ey G ene ral.”
We note that

the dis sent i n Spencer Enterp ri ses criticiz ed the majority in that

case for w hat it be lieved wa s an o verly “me chan ical” approac h, including re lianc e
on the semantic distincti on be tw ee n “ m ay” and “shall .” See Spencer Enter prise s , 345 F.3d at 6 96-9 8. (Beeze r, J., dissenting). We agree that thequesti on of whether discre t ionary authori ty has been speci fied by stat ute shoul d be considered by examining the statu te as a wh ole. But we do not thi nk (as the Spencer Enter prise s dissent goes on to suggest) that t he use of marg inally ambiguous stat utorylanguage, withoutmore, is adeq uate to “spec ific[y]” that a parti cular a ction i s withi n the AttorneyGen er al’s discr etion f or the purposes of § 12 52(a)(2)(B ) (i i) . O f
course, in a sens e, an agency general lyhas “discretion” under Chevron to interp re t ambiguou s langu age u sed in a statute it administers. But if that sort of ubiqui tous “di sc reti on” we re suf ficien t by itself to sati sfy § 1252(a)( 2)(B)(i i), the effec ts of that juri sdictional bar would be sweeping indeed. We do not bel ieve that Congress intend ed su ch a re sult. 3

For these reas ons, w e hold that a preferenc e visa determination under § 115 3(b)(4 ) is not a “decis ion or act ion of the AttorneyGener al t he authori tyfor which i s spec ified u nder this title to be in the discr etion of t he A ttorn ey G ene ral.” T h e ju risdictional bar o f § 1252(a )( 2)(B )(i i) i s ther efor e inap plica ble in this c ase

.

3 Furthermore, i f “d iscr et ion” under § 1251(a)( 2)(B)(i i) means no th ing mo re than the “appl icat ion o f facts t o prin ciple s,” see Spencer Enter prise s , 3 45 F.3d at 699 (B eezer, J., dissen ting), the n it is hard to i magine any acti on by th e AttorneyGe ner al und er the re levan t title that would not be de em ed di sc re tio na ry. For example, t

he substantialevidence standard un der which we review many immigration acti ons cont emp lates tha t in

som e cases there w ill be a range of

acce ptable outcomes among which an adjudic atormight rea so nab ly cho ose . 8 U.S.C . § 1252(b )(4)(B).6 III.
We now turn to t

he m eri ts of the app eal. Unde r the Adminis trative Proced ure Act, we willrevers e agency acti on if i t is “a rb itra ry, capric ious, [or] an abuse of discretion, ” or “unsupported by substant ial evidence. ” 5 U.S.C. § 706; Spencer Enterpri ses , 345 F.3 d at 6 93. We deferto both formal and inf or mal agency inter pretat ions of an ambiguous re gulati on unless those i nterpre tations a re “pla inly

erroneous or incon sistent w ith the regulat ion.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. , 325 U .S. 410 (194 5); T homas Jefferson Un iversity v. Sh alala , 512 U.S

. 504, 512 (199 4); Auer v. Rob bin s , 519 U.S. 45 2 (1997 ). 4 A.
We firs t consi der the que sti on whether Cam phill qualif ies as a “rel igious organization” under § 1101(a )(27)(C). The associated re gul at io n at 8 C. F. R. § 204.5(m ) (3) man dates that petitioners prove eligibili ty fo r t ax-exempt st atus und er “secti on 501(c)( 3) of the I nternal Revenue Co de of 198 6 as it rela tes to reli gious organizations .” Id. The AAO held that “ [o]nlyorganizations class ifie d,

or classifiable, as ‘church es’ .

. . are qu ali fyi ng reli gious organizations for the purpose of sp ecial im migra nt religio u s worker clas sifi cati on.” App. I at 25.
The government l ater i nformed the Cou rt that “ the agency [was] in the process of issuing a me mo rand um th at .

. . broadens its inter

pret ation of

when an organ ization may qual ifyas a ‘bona fi de reli gious orga nizati o n,’” an d that it therefore desir ed to withdr aw its ar gument that Camphill had not

qual ifie d for the specialimmi gra tion vi sa on the gr ound that it was not a “churc h.” Appell ee Lette r Br. at 1

. 5 We accept thi s concessi on, and 4 We need not de ci de whe th erth e AAO adjudic ation in this case is b es t charact erize d as “ for ma l” or “inf orm al,” since the ou tcom e in term s of d efere nce is the sam e. See Caruso v. Bloc kbuster -Sony M usic Entertainm ent Ctr. , 193 F.3d 730, 733 (3rd Cir. 19 99); Scott H. Angstr eich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Se min ole Rock Deference to Agency Regu latory Inter

pretat ions , 34 U.C . Dav is L. Rev. 49, 56 ( 2000) (“[A]n interpret ation of a regulation i n a format l acking the force of law warrants Chevron -style d eference, but such an i nterpretation of a statute does not .” ); Note , 11 4 Harv . L. Rev. 359, 377-78 ( 2000) (“The Auer Cou rt

. . . he ld that

agencies can i ssu e autho rit ati ve in te rp re tati ons of th ei r o wn ambiguous regu lations o utside [ th e proc edur al] strictures [of the A PA ]. ” ); cf. U.S. v. Mead Corp. , 533 U.S. 218, 227-29 (2001) (a gen cy ’s in forma l interpre tatio n of

a sta tutor

y amb iguity doe s not m erit Chevron def eren ce).

5 See Wil li am R. Ya tes, U .S. Citize nship and Immigratio n Services , Extens ion of the Spe cial Im migra nt Re li g ious Worker Program and Clari fication of Tax Exempt Status Requirements for R eli giou s Organi z ations (Dece mber 1 7, 2003), availa ble at http: //www.ilw.c om / lawyers /imm igdaily/d oj_news/200 4,01137

therefore pr oceed under the assumpti on that Camphill qual ifie s as a “r eligi ous org aniz ation .”
B.
We ne xtco ns id erwhe th erth e AAO decisi on can be affir med on the ground that the pro pose d po sit ion of houseparent is not a “reli gio us o ccu patio n.” 6 This term is defined by regulat

ion as follows: Religi ous occupati on means
an activit

y which re la tes to

a t raditio nal re ligio u s functi on. Exa mp le s o f individ uals in reli giou s occupati ons include, but are not limited to , litu r gical worke r s , reli giou s instructor s , reli giou s counselors, ca n t ors , catechists, workers i n rel igious hospit al s o r religio u s healt h car e fa ciliti es, missi onaries , relig ious trans lator s, o r reli gious b road casters . This group does not i nclude janitors, main tenanc e
w orkers, clerks, fun d raisers, or pe rsons solely involvedin the s olici tati on of donations.
8 C.F.R. § 2 04.5(m)(2 ) (emph asis added ). The AAO found that

the “duties of t

he position [of ho useparen t] involve the care of the mental ly handicap ped, ” and that “[s ]uch duties a re con sidere d a w holly secular fu nct ion, ev en if th e fac ility is operate d by a cha rita b le organi zati on founded on reli gious pri nciple s.” App. I at 26. The AAO further

explai ned that

“[t]he servi ce inter

prets the perti nent regul ations to requ ire that suc h positions are tradition ally full- time sal aried pos iti ons requi rin g specifi c reli gious or t heologic al train ing ,” andth atCamp hil l had f ailed to show that

t he position of houseparent

sa tisf ied this d efin ition

. Id. On appe al, Camphi l l argu es that th e IN S erre d in inter preti ng § 204.5(m)( 2) in a manner that excluded the posi tion i n which Goetze was to se rve

. We agree with Camph ill thatth e AAO improperl y appl ied the reg ulation in this cas e. The charact erization of G oetze’s position as no t “re lat[ ing] t o a tradi tional reli gious functi on” s u ggests t hat the conclusi on was predetermined. The AAO first des cr ib ed wh atGoet ze d idin te rms that excluded anymention of t he reli gious

c omponent of h er du ties— saying tha t h e r job wa s to ca re for the m entally -rel igious wker.pdf.

6 Camp hill origi nally

argued that Goe tze’s position als o consti tuted a “reli gi o us voca tion,” as that term is defined in 8 C. F. R. § 2 04.5(m)( 2). The AAO rejected that po sition, an d C amp hill does not appear to chal lenge that de term inati on on appe al . As id e fr om a passing ref

ere nce to the “rel igious vocati on” te rm i n i ts br ie f, Camp h ill’s argumentis centered entirel y on th e meaning of the t erm “rel igiou s
occ upa tion .” See Appellant Br. at 23-28; Appellant

Reply Br. at 8-15.8

handicapped—and then conc lu ded that she

was performing a secular function because its own characterization of what she w a s doing wa s sec ular . T he s ame approach could be used as a b asis for concl uding that m ost of the posi tions explic itl y l ist ed in the r egu latio n ar e se cula r. For example, § 204 .5(m)( 2) m entio ns “rel igiou s tran slato rs,” wh o m ight b e descri bed as performing the function of tr anslation, a “secular” activ ity. Si milarly, “reli gious counselors” per fo rm the function of counseli ng troubl ed indivi duals, which could also be cha racterized as secu lar. A cc or di ng ly, we believe t he AA O’s analytic approach is inconsist ent with the text of the regul ation.
We no t e that

the regul ation spec ifically ex clude s cert ain workers , such

a s “janitors” and “ maintena nce w orkers , ” who perform wh olly secular functi ons, but t his does not mean that a per son cann o t qualif y as having a “rel igious occupati on” if th e wor ker’s job includes both secular and religious aspect s. In thi s vein, we note that th e c om m en tar y ac co m pa nyi n g the promulgati on of § 20 4. 5(m)(2) provides that “[i]f [a] job has no r eli gious signi ficanc e , then thefac t that a p erson is

a member of a reli gious denominat ion working in a f ac ilit y run b y the den omi nati on would not by its elf make that pers o n a reli gious worker. ” 56 Fed. Reg. 66965 (D ec. 27 , 1991 ) (em phas is added ). We t ake thi s language a s suggesti ng that a

job may qua lify

under the regulat ion if it has som e reli gious signi ficance. To th e exte nt that the AAO

rea d § 204.5(m)( 2) as re quiri ng that a “reli gi ous occu pation ” in volve only reli gious fun ctions, w e belie ve tha t its interp reta tion is i nconsistent with t he text of the reg ulati on and other i ndications of the agency ’s intent and i s accordi ngly not entitled to d efe ren ce. Th omas Jeffers on , 512 U.S. at 512.
A lte rn ati ve ly, if

the AA O’s decisi on is re ad as finding t hat theposition of housepa re nt invol ved onlysecular functions, we do n ot find that c onclusi on supporte d by subs tanti al evi dence of record. Cam phill consistently testifie d that Go etze’s position invol ved a number of clearly religiou s respo nsibilities, in cludin g “imbuing re si de nt s wi th the rel igious values and practice s of C amp hill[;] conducti ng house-bas ed ac tivitie s , includi ng practi cal chor es, pr ayer , festival celebr ations and Bible re adings[; ] inst ructi ng other s taff

in the pr acti ces and Christian val ues of Ca mphi ll l ife[; ] [and] [t]ea ching religiou s sub jects and value s to

men tally retarded young adul ts. ” App. I at 35. Moreover, thereli gious t exts i ncluded in the admini strative record, i ncluding transc ripts from a seri es of lec t ures entitl ed “Curati ve Education, ” App. II at 62-85, appearto provi de some support for Cam phi ll’s contention that even the prescribed manner of care for its men tally handicappedresi dents i nvolved rel igious

as pe cts. The AAO did not ana ly ze or otherwise engage thi s evidence , but rat her stated pe rf

unc to ri ly th at Go et ze’s duties are “ wh olly sec ular .” There is l ittle or no sup port i n the reco rd for th atcl ai m.
Fi na lly, we cons id er the AA O’s position that a “reli gious occupation” must9

be a “tra d iti onally

full- time sal aried po si tion[] requiring speci fic re ligi ous or theologi ca l t raini ng.” This inter pretat ion is similarly questi onable. The requir ement that the po sition b e “sala ried” a ppea rs to be inconsi stentwith the l ist of reli gious occupa t ions given in t

he regulation i tsel f, which includes p ositions—perhaps most notab ly “missi on a ries ”—w ho do not alw ays receiv e salarie s. W e furth er no te that in promulgat

ing the f

inal r ules at issue, the agencyexplic itl y st ated that the y had been “revi sed to acc oun t more clearly for uncompensated voluntee rs , whose servi ces are engaged but who are not tec hni cally employe es.” 56 Fed. Reg. 66965 (Dec. 27, 1991) (emphasi s add ed)

. With respe ct to the “ful l-time” and “reli gious or theol ogica l tr ai ning ” requirements, assuming for the sake o f

ar gume nt that such requ irements are consistent with the regulation, we s ee no evidence that t

he position offere d by Cam phill would not qua lify. Cam phill ind icat ed to the a gency t hat Goetze ’ s responsi bi lities required at least 80 hours of labor per w eek , see App. I at 35, and that she w ould be w orkin g “fu ll-ti m e,” without“supplement al employ ment.” Id. at 3 6. Ca mp hill also su bm itted de tail e d descri ptions of its train ing pro ces s, see App. II at

59- 61, as well as extensive

exce rpts from its reli giou s texts in response t o the agency ’s reque st for trai ni ng cur ricu lum

. See Ap p. I at 3 2 ; App. II at 62-146. A gain, there is no sugg estion in the A AO ’s opin ion tha t this evidence w as ev er co ns id er ed

— on ly t he bald assert

ion that Camphill had “not show n that the positio n of hou sepa rent i s tradition ally a permanent s alari ed position

or t h at the duties of the position require sp ec ific reli gious t

raini ng.” App. I at 26. This is in suffici ent to c onsti tute s ubstantial evidence i n s upport of the AA O’s conclusi on.
We need not set

forth here a defini tive test

regardi ng when a job may or may not be char act eriz ed as a “re ligi ous
occ upa tion .” However, we think i t cle ar that the A AO has f ailed to show wh y th e position offered byCam phill to Go etze in this case do es no t q ua lif y. A cc or di ng ly,

we cannotsustai n the deci sion of th e AAO

on this ground without

further evidence or explanation.
C.
The othe r t wo reasons underl yi ng the AAO ’s denial of Camphill’s visa applic ationhad to do with pur ported evidentiary defici encies. Specifi call y, the AAO hel d that Camphil l had not proven that Goetze had two y ea rs of conti nuous experie nce in the relevant occupati on, see 8 C.F.R. § 204. 5(m)(1), nor had it proven that a “quali fyi ng job offer” had been tendere d to G oetz e, see id. § 204.5(m )(4).
It is t rue that Camphil l did no more than subm it a letter explaining (a m ong otherthings ) that

Goetze had been employe d by C am phi ll for fou r years , see App. II at

35, and that she would cont inue to recei ve room, boar d, medicalinsurance, etc., as comp ens ation for her wo rk, see App. II at

36. On the othe r h an d, th e AAO decisi on does not explai n in any

reasonabl e detai l why this evi dence was10

insuf ficien t. Th e A A O sim pl y s tate s that “support ing documentary evide nce ” shou ld have been submitted, and cit es Matterof

Trea sure C raft of Calif ornia , 14 I. & N. Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972), for the proposition that t

he petitioner i n visa proceedi ngs bears the ev identi ary burden of p roo f.
Of course, the re is no doubt that Cam phill bore the burde n of proo f in this
case; again, the cri tical question is why the lett er present ed b y Ca mph il l wa s insuffi cient

to sust ain that burden. In this respe ct, Tre asure Craftis easil y distinguis hed from this case. There, the petit ionerwent on record a s declaring that competenttraining in the pottery industry

was not ava ila ble in Mexico. The Regional Comm issioner decidi ng the case took adm inistr ative noticeof the fact that Mexico had a thri ving pottery trade, and

acco rding ly held that the a ssertions bythe petit ioner w ere ins uffici ent to s ustai n the burden of proof. Here , byco ntrast, there

was no simil ar admini strative not ice opposing Camphill’ s documentation to t he effectthat Goet ze did i ndeed un derg o
s ignifi cant religiou s train in g, wa s employe d by C am phi ll for two years, a nd had be en extend ed a job o ffer.
“An ag ency's rejec ti on o f

un co ntradi cted testimo ny can s upp ort a finding of

substant ial evidence. ” Tieniber

v. Heckler , 720 F.2d 1251, 1254 (11th C ir. 1983); see also NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co. , 369 U.S. 40 4, 408 (1 962 ). However, an agency is gen erally und er at leas t a minimal ob li gation to pro vide a dequ ate

reasons ex pl ain in g w hy i t has rej ected uncontradi cted evid enc e. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 2 Adm inistr ative Law Treatise § 11.2 at 791 (2002). For example, if the AAO ruli ng was based on a determi nation that Camp hi ll ’s as se rtio ns we r e not credibl e, then the re shoul d have bee n so me sort of fin di ng re ga rd in g c re di bi lity, eithe r expl i cit or im plici t. See Tieniber v. Heckler , 720 F.2d at 12 54 ( descri bing “strict” and “leni ent ” approaches by courts); see also Choratch v. Finch , 438 F.2d 342, 343 (3d C ir. 1971 ) (“W e think it is not t oo muc h to requi re that an administ rati ve decisio n that a claim ant is not eligible . . . besupporte d by exp licit findings of all facts that are esse ntialto the conclusi on of

in el ig ib il it

y .” ). The AAO makes no effort to explai n or suggest why it rej ect ed Camphill’ s detai led le tter explai ning the nature of G oetze’s position.
Furthe rmo re, Camphil l notes that INS regulat

ions pl ace an obli gation on t he part of the INS to request ad ditio nal evidence if that which was already submitted is dee me d i nsu ffic ient. See 8 C.F .R. § 103.2(b) (8) (“ where there is no evidence of inel igibi lit y, and initial eviden ce or eligib ility informa tion is missi ng or the Service fi nds that the evidence submitted e ither do es no t fully establisheligibili ty for the requested bene fit or raises unde rl yi ng questi ons regardi ng eligibili ty , the Service shall request th e mi s sing i niti al evi dence”) (empha s is added ). 7 The INS does not

7 For exam pl e, al th oug h the AAO mentions tha t C amphillmight have submitted Goetze’s t ax documents t o show11

provide an y ex planation, e ither in the AAO ruli ng or in i ts bri ef on appeal, as to why this reg ulation wo uld be ina pplica ble in thi s case.
Because the AAO’s rejection of the

e vidence regardi ng Goe tze’s wor k experie nce and job offer does not appear to be support ed by s ubstantial e vidence,

we conclude that theA AO d ecisi on may not be sustained on the se grounds wit hout further evidence or

explanation.
IV.
None of the argu men ts advanced by the AAO in s upport of t he visa deni al withst and sc ru ti nyon appe al . T he AAO clearly did not “c onsider [] allrelevant [e vi de nt iar y] factors” in th is ca se, Flori da Power & Light Co. v. Lorion , 470 U. S. 729, 744 (19 85), no r did it pro perly inter pretits regulat

ion defi ning “rel igious

occ upa tion .” The “p r oper cour se” is th erefore to “remand t o the agencyfor additi onal inv estig ation or e xpl ana tion .” Id.

that she had been employ ed f u ll- time by Cam phill without enga g ing i n
su ppl emental em plo ymen t, see App. I at 27, it is clear that t

he initialrequest f or additi onal ev id en ce iss ue d b y t he INS, wh ile it demanded s eve ra l items of information from Ca mphill , did not make any dem and f or tax d ocum ents

. App. I at 32.