ICE Air Transportation of 

Detainees Could Be More 

Effective 

April 9, 2015 

OIG-15-57 
 

 

 

 

 

 

HIGHLIGHTS
 

ICE Air Transportation of Detainees 

Could Be More Effective 

April 9, 2015 

Why We 

Did This 

U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement Air Operations (ICE 

Air) is responsible for moving 

and removing detainees in ICE 

custody by providing air 

transportation services to 

Enforcement and Removal 

Operations’ (ERO) 24 field 

offices. We reviewed this 

program to determine whether 

ICE Air was ensuring the most 

effective use of its resources. 

What We 

Recommend 

ICE ERO should develop formal 

policies and procedures for its 

air transportation program. It 

should also ensure adequate 

staffing, complete and reliable 

program data, and perform an 

analysis of operations to identify 

factors affecting efficiency. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

(202) 254-4100, or email us at 

DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov 

What We Found 

Although ICE Air met its mission by transporting 930,435 

detainees over a 3-1/2-year period, it could have used its 

resources more effectively. In fact, ICE Air may have 

missed opportunities to improve the program’s overall 

effectiveness even though it has identified some ways to 

reduce costs associated with detainee transportation. 

Furthermore, ICE Air does not capture complete and 

accurate data essential to support operational decisions. 

This occurred because ERO did not provide the planning, 

management, and reporting tools needed to operate 

effectively, and it does not have a mechanism in place to 

obtain feedback on how well its processes are performing. 

ERO management has not developed a data management 

plan, assessed staffing and training needs, or 

implemented formal policies and procedures. It also has 

not conducted a comprehensive analysis of current 

operations for making informed business decisions that 

will safeguard the program’s resources. 

As a result, ICE Air operated charter flights with empty 

seats and could have realized cost savings of up to 

$41.1 million upon determining optimum flight capacity. 

This estimate is based on the average of charter costs 

incurred during the scope period for the missions 

analyzed. Although the estimated potential cost savings 

will not be claimed as funds put to better use, it is an 

indicator of ICE Air’s potential for future cost savings. 

ICE Response 

ICE concurred with all four recommendations and has 

begun taking actions for implementation. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
 

Department of Homeland Security
 

Table of Contents 

Background ........................................................................................... 1 

Results of Audit ..................................................................................... 2 

Operations Could Be Improved............................................................... 3 

Data May Not Be Adequate for Analysis and Decision Making ....... 3 

Program Staffing, Training, and Guidance Needed ....................... 5 

Missed Opportunities to Improve Efficiency................................... 8 

Conclusion ................................................................................. 11 

Recommendations................................................................................ 11 

ICE Comments to Draft Report and OIG Analysis ................................. 12 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Transmittal to Action Official ............................... .15 

Appendix B: Scope and Methodology ....................................... .16 

Appendix C: ICE Comments to the Draft Report ....................... 18 

Appendix D: ICE Air Operational Costs .................................... 22 

Appendix E: Analysis of Charter Missions ................................ 23 

Appendix F: Potential Cost Savings .......................................... 25 

Appendix G: Major Contributors to This Report ........................ 27 

Appendix H: Report Distribution .............................................. 28 

Abbreviations 

ARTS Alien Repatriation Tracking System 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

ERO Enforcement and Removal Operations 

FY fiscal year 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

U.S. United States 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
 

Department of Homeland Security
 

Background 

The United States (U.S.) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the 

principal investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Its 

mission is to promote homeland security and public safety through the 

criminal and civil enforcement of Federal laws governing border control, 

customs, trade, and immigration. 

The Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) is one of two principal 

operating components within ICE. ERO enforces the Nation’s civil immigration 

laws to promote public safety, border security, and the integrity of the 

immigration system. ERO does this by making the removal of criminal 

detainees and those who pose a threat to our communities its highest priority. 

Within ERO, the Repatriation Division 

is responsible for planning and 

coordinating the transportation of 

detainees, and developing and 

implementing strategies to support the 

return of all removable detainees to 

their country of origin. The Repatriation 

Division consists of ICE Air Operations 

and the Repatriation Management 

Division. For this review, we focused on 

ICE Air Operations, hereafter referred to 

as ICE Air, as it relates to charter 

flights. 

ICE Air’s operational headquarters is 

located in Mesa, AZ, with some program support staff located in the 

Washington, DC, area. ICE Air’s mission is to move and remove detainees in 

ICE custody by providing air transportation services to ERO's 24 field offices. 

ICE Air transports detainees within the United States or returns them to their 

countries of origin. 

ICE Air uses commercial or charter flights to move detainees. Factors such as 

detainees’ country of citizenship, criminal status, and family status will 

influence whether they travel commercially or by charter aircraft. The 

Commercial Operations Section coordinates and supports removal of detainees 

by field offices using commercial airlines. ICE Air transports the majority of 

detainees by charter aircraft within the United States and to Central America, 

South America, and the Caribbean. ICE Air has four contracts for routine 

charter flights; and these contracts provide eight aircraft, each capable of 

carrying a maximum of 135 detainees. It also contracts aircraft for less 

Figure 1: Detainees boarding charter flight. 

Source: ICE Enforcement and Removal 

Operations. 

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frequent long-range charter flights to locations such as Europe, Africa, and 

Asia. ICE Air also arranges special charters to accommodate detainees with 

serious medical conditions, highprofile removals, or detainees who 

fail to comply with the removal 

process. 

ICE Air pays, on average, $8,419 

per flight hour for charter flights 

regardless of the number of 

passengers on the plane. The 

charter vendors provide the 

aircraft, the pilot, flight crew, 

security personnel, flight nurse, 

and maintenance services. The 

flight hour rate also includes 

operating expenses such as 

insurance, fuel, landing fees, 

passenger taxes, and all other 

miscellaneous fees and taxes 

associated with each flight. 

The ICE Air Division’s budget is contained in the Transportation and Removal 

Program Project Activity. This program project activity also encompasses the 

Removal Management Division and ground transportation. The Transportation 

and Removal Program operated with an average annual budget of $272 million 

during the period of our review, October 1, 2010, through March 31, 2014. 

According to ICE Air, it spent approximately $598 million for ICE Air 

Operations during that timeframe. Of that, approximately $464 million was for 

charter flights (see details in appendix D). 

Results of Audit 

ICE Air Operations is responsible for moving or removing detainees in ICE 

custody by providing air transportation services to ERO field offices. Although 

ICE Air met its mission by transporting 930,435 detainees over a 3-1/2-year 

period, it may have been able to use its resources more effectively. ICE Air does 

not capture complete and accurate data essential to support operational 

decisions and ensure program effectiveness. For example, mission routes lack 

details for individual stops, ICE Air does not capture and analyze the reasons 

detainees miss flights, and optimum seat capacity has not been determined. 

ERO management does not have a mechanism in place to obtain feedback on 

how well its processes are performing. As a result, ERO management may have 

missed opportunities to improve the program’s overall effectiveness. 

Figure 2: Aircraft staged for scheduled flights 

to transport detainees. 

Source: DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). 

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This occurred because ERO did not provide the planning, management, and 

reporting tools the ICE Air program needs to operate effectively. ERO 

management has not developed a data management plan, assessed staffing 

and training needs, or implemented formal policies and procedures. It also has 

not conducted a comprehensive analysis of current operations for making 

informed business decisions that will safeguard the program’s resources. 

As a result, ICE Air operated charter flights with empty seats and could have 

realized cost savings of up to $41.1 million upon determining optimum flight 

capacity. This estimate is based on the average of charter costs incurred during 

the scope period for the missions analyzed. We are not claiming this amount as 

funds put to better use. 

Operations Could Be Improved 

Data May Not Be Adequate for Analysis and Decision Making 

The ICE Air charter flight data captured is incomplete and inaccurate, and may 

not be sufficient for analysis and decision making. According to ICE Air 

records, it transported 930,435 detainees over a 3-1/2-year period. Of this 

amount, the program removed 711,945 detainees to their country of origin. It 

transferred the remaining 218,490 detainees among ICE field offices for various 

reasons, including lack of bed space, immigration proceedings, medical needs, 

security concerns, and other administrative reasons. 

ICE Air records data pertaining to charter flights and detainees in the Alien 

Repatriation Tracking System (ARTS). A contractor who managed the program’s 

daily activities created the ARTS database to provide a historical record of 

charter flights, monthly statistical reports, and data responses to ICE required 

under the contract. ARTS captures information such as the dates, routes, 

detainees, delays or cancelations, and costs associated with each chartered 

flight mission. A mission begins when the aircraft departs from its initial 

location and ends when the aircraft reaches its final destination.1 Depending 

on the need, a mission can contain one or more stops to destinations within 

the United States, internationally, or a combination. 

An analysis of 7,445 missions and associated detainees identified errors and 

missing information in various fields. For example: 

1 The definition for the term “mission” is derived from the definition used in the former Office of 

Detention and Removal Operations’ Policy and Procedure Manual (June 2008). 

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x	 There were 23,597 detainees listed as being “picked up” or “dropped off” 

at locations not on the charter flight route. Specifically, there were 54 

detainees recorded as removed to Nicaragua for one mission that 

included stops only in Louisiana, Texas, and Guatemala. 

x	 Information such as gender, criminal status, or known gang affiliation 

was incomplete or in error; 

3⁄4 The data field “Sex,” used to record gender, is not restricted to 

male or female, and contains numerous entries, such as the 

numbers 0, 30, and the word “none.” 

3⁄4 The data field “Criminality” was not restricted to specific entry 

choices and contains non-logical entries such as “#Ref!”. The field 

is blank for 20,798 detainees. 

3⁄4 The data field “Gang Member” contains non-logical numerical 

entries, such as “2” or “3770701,” for at least 3,000 detainees. The 

field is blank for 155,966 detainees. 

x	 The “Status” field is not restricted to specific entry choices. It contains 

894 different entries and is blank for 31,209 detainees. This field 

provides information regarding the purpose for a detainee’s transport, 

such as bond hearing, consular interview, and medical transfer. 

x	 The data fields in ARTS for the alien number and the fingerprint 

identification number are also not restricted to defined entries and 

contain errors; 

3⁄4 The alien file number is a unique seven-, eight- or nine-digit 

number. However, the field entries range from 1 to 32 characters 

in length. Alien file numbers were not recorded for 2,575 

transported detainees. 

 

3⁄4 ICE takes fingerprints for all detainees, yet ARTS did not contain 

an identification number for fingerprints belonging to 190,243 

transported detainees. 

ERO management did not develop a data management plan that could help 

ensure that employees accurately record all mission data in a standardized 

format. The lack of reliable data limits the ability of management to make 

informed decisions regarding how many planes it needs to transport the 

current level of detainees, whether it should revise the frequency of its flights, 

and how to improve operations overall. Government and private sector best 

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practices describe a data management plan as a key element in ensuring 

accurate and reliable information. According to Department of Defense 

Guidelines on Data Quality Management, a data management plan should 

contain the processes for: 

x defining data quality requirements and establishing data quality 

metrics; 

x measuring data quality conformance; 

x verifying, validating, and assessing the causes for poor quality data; 

and 

x identifying and implementing data quality improvements. 

Program Staffing, Training, and Guidance Needed 

ICE Air’s charter operations do not have sufficient trained personnel, and 

current employees lack the proper guidance to ensure successful daily 

operations. In May 2014, ICE Air transitioned program management from 

contract to government personnel without adequate planning. These processes 

included scheduling flights, obtaining country clearances, manifesting 

detainees,2 tracking charter contract costs, and reviewing invoices. ICE Air 

replaced the contractors with full-time employees. ICE Air staff said the 

program office did not adequately assess staffing and training needs to ensure 

continuity and effective daily operations. During the transition, ERO 

designated one person to identify the positions held by contractors and to 

determine how many Federal employees it needed to perform the same tasks. 

This individual determined that ICE Air needed 19 employees to replace the 37 

contractors who had previously provided mission support functions; however, 

only 13 Federal employees were present when the contractor departed. 

ERO has not established comprehensive policies and procedures as guidance 

for the ICE Air program. Staff responsible for arranging the charter flights 

explained the informal processes used to schedule, manifest, and oversee the 

charter flight operations. The schedulers do not have formal policies and 

procedures on how to prioritize charter flights or detainees. Management is 

responsible for establishing and maintaining policies and procedures sufficient 

to ensure that they efficiently operate Federal programs and use Federal 

resources to achieve desired objectives. 

The flights operate out of four main U.S. cities: Mesa, AZ; San Antonio, TX; 

Alexandria, LA; and Miami, FL. Charter flights can go to international locations 

2 Manifesting detainees is listing all the detainees who will board a flight. The Federal Aviation 

Agency requires all flights to maintain a complete manifest prior to each flight. 

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and any of the 24 field offices. Figure 3 illustrates examples of different 

domestic missions used by ICE Air. 

Figure 3: ICE Air Weekly Domestic Routes 

Source: ICE Air Operations. 

AIRPORT LEGEND 

AEX Alexandria, LA MCI Kansas City, MO 

ATL Atlanta, GA MDT Harrisburg, PA 

BFI Seattle, WA MIA Miami, FL 

BFL Bakersfield, CA MSP Minneapolis, MN 

BOI Boise, ID NYL Yuma, AZ 

CSG Columbus, GA OAK Oakland, CA 

DEN Denver, CO OMA Omaha, NE 

ELP El Paso, TX ORD Chicago, IL 

EWR Newark, NJ RNO Reno, NV 

HOU Houston, TX SAN San Diego, CA 

HRL Harlingen, TX SAT San Antonio, TX 

IWA Mesa, AZ SLC Salt Lake City, UT 

LAS Las Vegas, NV TOL Toledo, OH 

LRD Laredo, TX 

The schedulers worked from a few existing regular routes and added or 

removed stops to arrange more than 600 different routes to transport detainees 

to their final destination. To arrange the routes, the schedulers make 

subjective decisions and modifications based on conversations with field office 

personnel. The schedulers also coordinate with field offices regarding the 

number of detainees ready for removal and the number of seats available on a 

particular flight. ICE Air staff said they could benefit from more guidance, such 

as a formula or criteria based on analysis of historical data when prioritizing 

routes and detainees. Figure 4 illustrates examples of different international 

missions used by ICE Air to remove detainees. 

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Department of Homeland Security
 

Figure 4: ICE Air Routine International Routes 

Source: ICE Air Operations. 

AIRPORT LEGEND 

IWA Mesa, AZ 

SAT San Antonio, TX 

AEX Alexandria, LA 

MIA Miami, FL 

Based on conversations with management, we determined ICE Air provided 

newly hired staff with some initial training. However, several employees said 

they did not receive adequate training to perform assigned tasks effectively. For 

example: 

3⁄4 Schedulers received a week of on-the-job training. However, an ICE Air 

management official said the training was insufficient and did not 

address the complexities of scheduling. 

3⁄4 An employee hired for mission support functions generated reports and 

provided statistical data for public inquiries. The employee had no prior 

experience as a data analyst or information technology specialist who 

could generate reports, alter entry fields, or create new databases as 

needed. Although ICE Air provided some initial training, the employee 

said it was inadequate to enable the employee to perform the duties 

effectively. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
 

Department of Homeland Security
 

3⁄4 Four additional employees in various positions also said they had not 

received adequate training to perform their duties effectively. 

Missed Opportunities to Improve Efficiency 

ICE Air spent approximately $116 million for flights from October 2010 

through March 2014 that did not fill every allowable seat and flew at less than 

80 percent of the aircraft’s capacity. Although ERO conducted some studies to 

reduce costs, ERO management does not have a mechanism in place to obtain 

feedback on how well its processes are performing. As a result, ERO 

management may have missed opportunities to identify information that can 

improve the program’s overall effectiveness. This includes flight capacity levels 

and detention costs; reasons detainees are removed from the manifest; reasons 

for redundant transfers; and time and cost for each mission stop. 

Many factors affect ICE Air’s ability to provide efficient air transportation 

services. For example: 

x ICE Air must respond to special requests by the DHS Secretary and other 

mission needs such as the recent surge of unaccompanied children. 

x ICE Air must comply with various restrictions imposed by different 

countries when transporting detainees for removal. Restrictions include 

the number, timing, and frequency of flights a country will accept. 

x ICE Air does not control the number of detainees each country will 

accept. For instance, Guatemala and Honduras permit 135 detainees on 

each removal flight; yet, El Salvador will only accept 120 detainees on 

each flight. 

x Some countries accept juveniles on charter flights; in contrast, other 

countries do not. 

ICE Air also depends on ERO field offices to properly manifest, verify 

medical screening, and prepare detainees for transport. 

ERO conducted several studies between February 2012 and December 2013 to 

identify areas for potential cost savings and efficiencies. As a result, ICE Air 

reduced the frequency of one of its domestic transfer routes. ICE Air has also 

begun to address its reporting needs to respond better to questions about the 

air transportation related to the surge of illegal immigrants in the Rio Grande 

Valley in 2014. However, in spite of these efforts, ICE Air missed opportunities 

to improve efficiencies with its air transportation and to address the quality of 

its mission data. 

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An analysis of the number of detainees transported for 5,699 of the 7,445 

missions we reviewed revealed that ICE Air was not operating at full capacity 

for both its domestic and international missions. ICE Air does not know its 

optimum capacity levels for each type of mission, such as its domestic 

transfers, direct routes to international countries, and non-direct routes to 

both domestic and international destinations. Therefore, the program may have 

been able to transport the same number of detainees with fewer missions at a 

lower charter air cost. Of the 5,699 missions analyzed, approximately 2,121 

missions (or 37 percent) operated under 80 percent capacity, but we do not 

know whether this performance level is good or bad. ICE Air needs to ensure 

the data is complete and accurate for analysis to determine its optimum 

capacity levels and make sound business decisions. 

Table 1 provides a summary of the results of our review. Although tests of the 

reliability of the data revealed errors in some fields, we reconciled the number 

of missions, the costs reported with the financial records, and ICE’s reported 

statistics (see appendix E for detailed results). 

Percent of 

Allowable 

Seats Used 

Missions Detainees 

Transported 

Mission

 Cost 

40% – 60% 754 52,226 $ 41,085,000 

80% or more 3,578 505,175 $ 211,841,666 

Table 1. Analysis of Seat Capacity
 

$ 11,983,026 less than 40% 299 9,759

ICE Air spent 

approximately 

$116 million on 

flights less than 

61% – 79% 1,068 100,982 $ 62,496,952 80% capacity 

Total 5,699 668,142 $ 327,406,644 

Source: OIG analysis of ICE Air mission data recorded in ARTS. 

Flight Capacity 

ICE Air needs to determine its optimum seat capacity level for each 

mission type and the reasons why flights operate at less than full 

capacity. Even when ICE was limited to 120 seats because of country 

restrictions, ICE Air only used 90 seats at times; leaving the remaining 

seats empty, which may not be efficient. 

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Each time a scheduled detainee does not board a flight, the flight 

operates less efficiently. ICE Air management provided several reasons 

for empty seats. For example, ICE Air may remove detainees scheduled to 

travel from the manifest because of fear of returning to their country, 

missing travel documents, and medical reasons. However, 69 percent of 

all detainees scheduled to be on the flights who did not show up for 

travel were recorded as “no show” or the field was left blank. Without 

documenting the reason the detainee missed the flight, ICE Air does not 

have the information to correct potential problems in the process. 

Redundancy when Transporting Detainees 

A limited analysis of detainees transferred multiple times identified six 

detainees with redundant transfers that may not have been necessary. 

ICE Air moved all six detainees multiple times between the same cities. It 

was not possible to determine whether the transfers were necessary 

based on the ARTS information available. ERO does not collect and 

analyze data related to redundant transfers to determine the frequency, 

causes, or possible solutions. ICE Air officials said that detainees 

transfer back to the field office if travel documents are missing or for 

detainee medical reasons. Chart 1 illustrates the questionable transfers: 

Chart 1: Questionable Detainee Transfers 

Detainee 1 El Paso, TX 

11/7/12 

Phoenix, AZ 

11/8/12 

El Paso, TX 

11/28/12 

Phoenix, AZ 

11/29/12 Honduras 

Detainee 2 San Diego, CA 

11/13/12 

Phoenix, AZ 

11/14/12 

San Diego, CA 

11/20/12 

Phoenix, AZ 

11/21/12 El Salvador 

Detainee 

3 

Seattle, WA 

2/13/13 

El Paso, TX 

2/19/13 

Phoenix, AZ 

2/20/13 

Seattle, WA 

7/15/13 

Phoenix, AZ 

7/18/13 Guatemala 

Detainee 4 Newark, NJ 

4/30/13 

Alexandria, 

LA 5/6/13 

Harrisburg, 

PA 7/29/13 

Alexandria, LA 

8/5/13 

Harrisburg, 

PA 8/12/13 

Alexandria, LA 

8/16/13 El Salvador 

Detainee 

5 

Denver, CO 

7/17/13 

El Paso, TX 

7/22/13 

Phoenix, AZ 

7/24/13 

Denver, CO 

8/14/13 

El Paso, TX 

8/22/13 Mexico 

Detainee 

6 

Bakersfield, 

CA 9/23/13 

Phoenix, AZ 

9/25/13 

Bakersfield, CA 

9/30/13 Phoenix, AZ 

Source: OIG Analysis of ICE data. 

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Tracking Time and Cost for Each Mission Stop 

ICE Air needs to identify and track the time and cost for each mission 

stop. Each charter mission may involve as many as nine stops, and each 

route varies in distance and travel time. ICE Air only captures 

information regarding the cost and flight hours for the overall mission 

rather than for each stop. Therefore, if ERO wants to improve a mission’s 

efficiency by changing a stop location or removing a stop from a route, it 

does not have sufficient data to assess the impact associated with an 

individual stop. 

ICE Air may have missed opportunities to improve its operations. Based on our 

analysis of flight capacity in appendix F, ICE Air may have been able to save up 

to $41.1 million to transport detainees had it operated each flight at full 

capacity. Although we realize that operating at full capacity is not always 

possible and may result in additional cost, the potential cost savings illustrates 

the need for better planning, management, and reporting. 

Conclusion 

Although ICE Air met its mission by transporting 930,435 detainees over a 

3-1/2-year period, it may have been able to use its resources more effectively. 

ICE Air does not capture complete and accurate data essential to support 

operational decisions and does not have a mechanism in place to obtain 

feedback on how well its processes are performing. 

These shortfalls occurred because ERO did not develop a data management 

plan, assess its staffing and training needs, and implement formal guidance to 

support successful daily operations. As a result, ERO management may have 

missed opportunities to improve the program’s overall effectiveness. In 

addition, ICE Air operated charter flights with empty allowable seats and could 

realize cost savings of up to $41.1 million once it determines optimum flight 

capacity. 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: We recommend that the Executive Associate Director for 

Enforcement and Removal Operations provide formal policies and procedures 

for the ICE Air Operations program to ensure that it operates efficiently and 

that resources are used effectively to achieve the desired objectives. These 

procedures should address, at a minimum: 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
 

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a. clearly defined roles and responsibilities, 

b. performance measures, and 

c. reporting standards. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the Executive Associate Director for 

Enforcement and Removal Operations assess and provide the staffing and 

training needed to ensure effective air transportation of detainees. 

Recommendation 3: We recommend that the Executive Associate Director for 

Enforcement and Removal Operations develop and implement a Data 

Management Plan to ensure ICE Air Operation’s data is accurate, complete, 

and reliable to support analysis and decision-making. 

Recommendation 4: We recommend that the Executive Associate Director for 

Enforcement and Removal Operations conduct a comprehensive assessment of 

the Transportation and Removal Program to identify factors that affect detainee 

air transportation’s efficiency, such as capacity levels; reasons detainees are 

removed from the manifest; reasons for redundant transfers; and time and cost 

for each mission stop. It should also develop a plan to prioritize and address 

the critical factors annually to demonstrate ICE Air Operations is using its 

resources effectively. 

ICE’s Comments to the Draft Report 

ICE provided comments on the draft of this report. A copy of the response, in 

its entirety, is included in appendix C. ICE disagreed with the use of empty 

seats as a measure of efficiency, citing that delaying the removal of individuals 

to fill empty seats may incur higher costs, and that there are factors that are 

more important than seat cost. As noted in our report, we agree that an 

analysis of the data needs to occur for ICE to know what is most efficient when 

transporting detainees. The analysis of empty seats is only one method ICE 

may consider to help identify factors that may improve efficiency. ICE also 

provided technical comments and suggested revisions to our report in a 

separate document. We reviewed ICE’s technical comments and made changes 

throughout our report where appropriate. 

OIG Analysis of ICE’s Comments 

Management Comments to Recommendation #1 

Concur. ICE ERO indicated it is working on formal policies and procedures to 

ensure that resources are effectively used to achieve the desired objectives. ICE 

expects to complete and issue the documents by December 31, 2015. 

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OIG Analysis 

We consider ICE’s ongoing actions responsive to the recommendation. This 

recommendation is considered open and resolved until ICE ERO provides 

documentation that the planned corrective actions are completed and 

implemented. 

Management Comments to Recommendation #2 

Concur. ICE ERO stated that since the audit was conducted, ICE Air hired 58 

employees out of 62 authorized positions. In addition, ICE Air is training 

Enforcement and Removal Assistants and Flight Schedulers on the new 

processes of scheduling flights, tracking flights, and performing quality checks 

on the scheduling process. All activities should be completed by July 31, 2016. 

OIG Analysis 

We consider ICE’s actions responsive to the recommendation. This 

recommendation is considered open and resolved until ICE ERO provides 

documentation that the planned corrective actions are completed. 

Management Comments to Recommendation #3 

Concur. ICE ERO stated it is developing a Data Management Plan that will 

ensure that ICE Air’s data is accurate, complete, and reliable to support 

analysis and decision making. In addition, ICE Air is working with the ERO 

Law Enforcement and Systems Analysis Division, as well as the field offices, to 

focus on data integrity, and better track the reasons scheduled passengers do 

not board flights. ICE Air is also working to collect, clean up, store, and 

reconcile flight mission data. ICE expects to complete all corrective actions by 

November 30, 2016. 

OIG Analysis 

We consider ICE’s ongoing actions responsive to the recommendation. This 

recommendation is considered open and resolved until ICE ERO provides 

documentation that the planned corrective actions are completed. 

Management Comments to Recommendation #4 

Concur. ICE ERO stated it plans to complete a comprehensive assessment of 

the Transportation and Removal Program to identify factors that affect detainee 

air transportation's efficiency. The assessment also depends upon the 

successful completion and implementation of the Data Management Plan 

discussed in recommendation 3. ICE provided a completion date of 

March 31, 2017. 

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OIG Analysis 

We consider ICE’s ongoing actions responsive to the recommendation. This 

recommendation is considered open and resolved until ICE ERO provides 

documentation that the planned corrective actions are completed. 

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Appendix A 

Transmittal to Action Official 

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Appendix B 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

The DHS OIG was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public 

Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one 

of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

within the Department. 

We conducted this audit to determine whether ERO’s processes for the air 

transfer and removal of detainees ensure the most effective use of resources. 

The scope consisted of a review of air transportation of detainees during fiscal 

year (FY) 2011 through second quarter FY 2014. We reviewed the internal 

controls for ICE Air as it relates to charter operations. 

To accomplish our objective we conducted site visits to ICE Headquarters in 

Washington DC; ICE Air Headquarters in Mesa, AZ; and ICE field offices in 

Phoenix and Florence, AZ; Miami, FL; and Houston, TX. We obtained and 

reviewed pertinent Federal, departmental, and ICE specific regulations, 

policies, procedures, and guidance relevant to the Air Operations program. At 

each location, we interviewed ICE officials and staff responsible for the 

management, oversight, and execution of the ICE Air Operations program for 

detainees. In Mesa, we observed the detention, staging, and aircraft boarding 

operations for ICE Air charter flights. 

In addition, we conducted data analysis of the ARTS, used to document ICE Air 

charter missions. To determine the accuracy and completeness of recorded 

data, we analyzed the data fields and entries used to record transported 

detainees for anomalies, errors, and omissions. We found numerous errors and 

omissions regarding the gender, criminality, status, gang affiliation, and 

recorded pick-up and drop-off locations of individual detainees; rendering 

much of the detainee data unreliable for further analysis, as discussed in the 

body of our report. 

Despite these limitations, we determined that the recorded mission date, flight 

hours, number of detainees, mission cost, and mission routes were sufficiently 

accurate and complete to allow for an analysis of the capacity of chartered 

missions pertinent to our audit objective. We selected a random sample of 32 

missions and verified data recorded in the ARTS database to the detainee 

manifests and vendor invoices for each of the sampled missions. We also 

compared the total cost recorded in the ARTS database to the amounts 

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reported in ICE’s financial reporting system. We compared the number of 

detainees reported as removed in the ARTS database to the number of 

detainees reported as removed in an ICE Air charters briefing document. 

We determined that the ARTS database contained 7,951 missions to 

transport 930,435 detainees at a total cost of about $456 million for the period 

October 1, 2010, to March 31, 2014. Of these missions, 7,445 used a 136-

passenger aircraft to transport 857,421 detainees at a total recorded cost of 

$448 million for the scope period. The remaining 506 missions were either 

canceled, for long-range international charters, or other missions flown using 

smaller aircraft. 

To determine the efficiency of the 7,445 charter missions: 

x We selected all 4,136 domestic missions and a judgmental sample of 

1,563 international missions for analysis. The selected missions 

transported 668,142 detainees at a total recorded cost of $327.4 million. 

x The 4,136 domestic missions analyzed transported 491,084 detainees at 

a total cost of $231.3 million. 

x	 The 1,563 international missions sampled transported 177,058 detainees 

at a recorded total cost of $96.1 million. 

x	 We analyzed the selected missions to determine the percentage of 

available seats used. 

See appendix E for the results of our analysis. 

We conducted this performance audit between May and November 2014 

pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require 

that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions. 

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Appendix C 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Comments to 

the Draft Report 

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Appendix D 

ICE Air Operational Costs 

 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 

(10/1/2013– 

3/31/2014) 

Charter $124,660,618 $125,610,645 $125,901,869 $87,925,214 $464,098,346* 

Commercial 33,677,042 33,074,231 30,980,147 11,803,201 109,534,621
 

Payroll &
 

Benefits 4,508,993 5,576,596 6,134,360 3,385,406 19,605,355
 

Other 

Expenses 314,905 99,296 2,633,111 1,946,909 4,994,221 

Total $163,161,558 $164,360,768 $165,649,487 $105,060,730 $598,232,543

Source: OIG tabulation of ICE’s financial data. We did not validate this data.
 

*Total charter costs may include travel expenses for employees as well as detainees.
 

 

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Appendix E 

Analysis of Charter Missions 

An analysis of 5,699 domestic and international missions selected for the scope 

period, October 1, 2010, through March 31, 2014, revealed that missions 

operated under capacity. 

Domestic missions account for 52 percent of all charter flights. The analysis 

included all the domestic missions. 

Domestic Missions
 

Percent of Detainees Allowable Missions Mission Cost Transported Seats Used 

< 40% 276 9,205 $11,051,460 

40% – 60% 638 44,280 $33,794,267 

61% – 79% 778 73,860 $43,940,621 

>80% 2,444 363,739 $142,525,371 

Total 4,136 491,084 $231,311,719 

For international missions, ICE Air flew most to Guatemala, Honduras, and 

El Salvador. The analysis reviewed 1,563 missions that represented about 47 

percent of all international missions, at a recorded cost of $96 million. The 

sample of international missions includes all direct mission routes to these 

three countries. Direct missions begin at a U.S. city, depart to one 

international country, and return to the United States. 

Direct International Missions to 

Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador 

Percent of Detainees Allowable Missions Mission Cost Removed Seats Used 

< 40% 21 474 $799,376 

40% – 60% 86 5,818 $5,423,042 

61% – 79% 179 16,711 $11,559,653 

> 80% 618 76,436 $36,660,908 

Total 904 99,439 $54,442,979 

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The sample of international missions also included 659 non-direct missions 

representing the top 4 routes to each of these countries. A non-direct mission 

contains stops at domestic cities and one or more international countries. 

Non-Direct International Missions to 

Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador 

Percent of Detainees Allowable Missions Mission Cost Removed Seats Used 

< 40% 2 80 $132,190 

40% – 60% 30 2,128 $1,867,690 

61% – 79% 111 10,411 $6,996,679 

> 80% 516 65,000 $32,655,387 

Total 659 77,619 $41,651,946 

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Appendix F 

Potential Cost Savings 

To calculate ICE Air’s potential for cost savings, we determined the maximum 

amount of potential cost savings ICE Air could have achieved if the flights had 

operated at full capacity and all other factors remained constant. This estimate 

is based on the average of charter costs incurred during the scope period for 

the missions analyzed. This calculation is an indicator of ICE Air’s potential for 

future cost savings, actual expenses would include additional costs such as, 

detention costs and medical care. Such expenses cannot be projected and may 

reduce the amount of ICE Air’s future cost savings. We understand ICE Air 

cannot always use all allowable seats on every flight, but we believe ICE Air can 

improve the efficiency of its operations. 

Table 2 illustrates the number of detainees transported for the missions 

reviewed by country, divided by the number of available seats for the respective 

countries. Each country determines the maximum number of detainees it is 

willing to receive per flight. ICE Air cannot control this number, and it can 

sometimes vary. 

Table 2. Estimated Number of Flights Needed 

FY 2011 – 2nd QTR FY 2014 

Country Detainees 

Transported 

Maximum Detainees 

per Flight 

Estimated Flights 

Needed 

(C ) (D) (C)/(D) = (F) 

Guatemala (Direct) 55,794 135 414 

Honduras (Direct) 27,719 135 206 

El Salvador (Direct) 15,926 120 133 

Guatemala (Non-Direct) 35,006 135 260 

Honduras (Non-Direct) 24,871 135 185 

El Salvador (Non-Direct) 17,742 120 148 

Domestic 491,084 135 3,638 

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Next the average cost per mission was determined. See table 3. 

Table 3. Average Cost per Mission 

Country Missions Mission Costs Average Cost per 

Mission 

(A) (B) (B)/(A) = (E ) 

Guatemala (Direct) 478 $29,063,131 $60,802 

Honduras (Direct) 261 $14,878,081 $57,004 

El Salvador (Direct) 165 $10,501,767 $63,647 

Guatemala (Non-Direct) 286 $17,442,787 $60,989 

Honduras (Non-Direct) 205 $12,084,712 $58,950 

El Salvador (Non-Direct) 168 $12,124,447 $72,169 

Domestic 4136 $231,311,719 $55,926 

Last, the average cost per mission is multiplied by the number of flights needed 

to determine the estimated cost for flights operated at full capacity. ICE Air’s 

mission costs less the estimated costs of flights at full capacity yield the 

estimated potential cost savings. This estimate is based on the average of costs 

ICE Air incurred during the scope period. Actual costs, including additional 

costs for detainee detention can not be projected and may reduce the amount 

of savings (see table 4). We are not claiming this figure as a funds put to better 

use. 

Table 4. Estimated Potential Cost Savings 

Country Mission Costs 

Estimated Cost of 

Flights 

 at Full Capacity 

Estimated Potential 

Cost Savings 

(B) (F)*( E) = (G) (B) - (G) 

Guatemala (Direct) $29,063,131 $25,172,028 $3,891,103 

Honduras (Direct) $14,878,081 $11,742,824 $3,135,257 

El Salvador (Direct) $10,501,767 $8,465,051 $2,036,716 

Guatemala (Non-Direct) $17,442,787 $15,857,140 $1,585,647 

Honduras (Non-Direct) $12,084,712 $10,905,750 $1,178,962 

El Salvador (Non-Direct) $12,124,447 $10,681,012 $1,443,435 

Domestic $231,311,719 $203,458,788 $27,852,931 

Total Potential Cost Savings $41,124,051 

Source: DHS OIG Analysis of ICE Alien Removal Transportation System Mission Data. 

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Appendix G 

Office of Audits Major Contributors to This Report 

Patrick O’Malley, Director 

Yesenia Starinsky, Audit Manager 

Philip Emswiler, Program Analyst 

Carolyn Floyd, Auditor 

Enrique Leal, Auditor 

Eliece Pizarro, Auditor 

Kevin Dolloson, Communications Analyst 

Gary Alvino, Independent Report Referencer 

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Appendix H 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

ICE Acting Director 

ICE Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

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