MARITIME 

SECURITY

Ongoing U.S. 

Counterpiracy Efforts 

Would Benefit From 

Agency Assessments

Report to Congressional Requesters

June 2014

GAO-14-422

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-422, a report to 

congressional requesters

June 2014

MARITIME SECURITY

Ongoing U.S. Counterpiracy Efforts Would Benefit 

From Agency Assessments

Why GAO Did This Study

Piracy and maritime crime continues to 

threaten ships off the Horn of Africa’s 

east coast and in the Gulf of Guinea off

Africa’s west coast, putting seafarers in 

harm’s way and costing governments 

and industry billions of dollars in ransom, 

insurance, and protective measures. The 

types and causes of piracy and maritime 

crime, as well as the African states’ 

ability to address the problem in the two 

regions, differ. To help U.S. agencies 

coordinate efforts, the NSCS developed

an interagency plan in 2008 to prevent, 

disrupt, and prosecute piracy off the Horn 

of Africa in collaboration with industry 

and international partners. GAO was 

asked to evaluate U.S. counterpiracy 

activities. 

This report: (1) assesses how piracy off 

the Horn of Africa has changed since our 

2010 review, and describes U.S. efforts 

to assess its counterpiracy actions, given 

any changing conditions; and (2) 

identifies trends in piracy and maritime 

crime in the Gulf of Guinea and U.S. 

efforts to address them, and evaluates 

the extent to which the United States has 

assessed its counterpiracy efforts in the 

Gulf of Guinea. GAO reviewed plans, 

activities, and data from 2007 through 

2013 and interviewed officials from U.S. 

agencies, international partners, and 

industry, selected as a nongeneralizable 

sample for their involvement in 

counterpiracy activities.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the NSCS, with 

the Secretaries of Defense and State, 

collaborate with the involved agencies to 

assess their efforts and to determine 

whether additional actions are needed to 

guide efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. The 

NSCS did not concur or non-concur with 

GAO’s recommendations but provided an 

update on its planning activities.

What GAO Found

Piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa’s east coast near Somalia have declined

sharply since 2010, but U.S. agencies have not assessed their counterpiracy 

efforts as GAO recommended in 2010. Since 2010, the International Maritime 

Bureau (IMB) reports piracy incidents declined from 219 to 15 in 2013. Similarly, 

from 2010 to 2013 hostages taken by pirates declined from 1,016 to 34. Also, a

World Bank report stated that total ransoms declined by 2012. Officials 

participating in counterpiracy activities from the Departments of Defense and 

State, among others, as well as shipping industry officials and international 

partners, attribute the decline to a combination of prevention, disruption, and 

prosecution activities. However, officials cautioned that this progress is tenuous, 

and discontinuing these efforts could allow piracy to resurge. Despite changing 

conditions, U.S. agencies have not systematically assessed the costs and 

benefits of their counterpiracy efforts. Agency officials stated that their decisions 

and actions are guided by discussions rather than formal assessments. GAO has 

previously noted that assessments of risk and effectiveness in an interagency 

environment can strengthen strategies and resource usage. As such, GAO’s 

prior recommendations remain valid and could help U.S. agencies identify the 

most cost effective mix of efforts and prioritize activities as they respond to 

changing conditions and fiscal pressures while avoiding a resurgence in piracy. 

Off the west coast of Africa, piracy and maritime crime has been a persistent 

problem in the Gulf of Guinea, as shown in the figure below. Although the United 

States has interagency and international efforts underway with African states to 

strengthen maritime security, it has not assessed its efforts or the need for a 

collective plan to address the evolving problem in the region. The U.S. role in 

addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has focused on prevention, disruption, 

and prosecution, through training and assistance to African coastal states. 

However, according to U.S. agencies working in the region, the National Security 

Council Staff (NSCS) has not directed them to collectively assess their efforts to 

address piracy and maritime crime. An assessment of agencies’ Gulf of Guinea 

efforts could strengthen their approach by informing the appropriate mix of 

activities to achieve the most effective use of limited resources, as well as help 

determine if additional actions are needed.

Reported Incidents of Piracy and Maritime Crime, 2008 through 2013

View GAO-14-422. For more information, 

contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 

or CaldwellS@gao.gov or Chris P. Currie at 

(404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov
Page i GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Letter 1

Background 5

Various Efforts Have Reduced Piracy off the Horn of Africa Since 

2010, but the United States Has Not Updated its Action Plan 13

U.S. Efforts Aim to Address Piracy and Maritime Security in the 

Gulf of Guinea, But an Assessment Would Help Inform Efforts 

and Determine the Need for Additional Actions 27

Conclusions 38

Recommendations for Executive Action 38

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 41

Appendix II Attempted and Successful Pirate Attacks off the Horn of 

Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea, 2010 through 2013 46

Appendix III Interagency Progress in Implementing the Lines of 

Action in the National Security Council’s 2008 Countering 

Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan 48

Appendix IV Department of Defense Counterpiracy Costs, 2010 through 2013 51

Appendix V GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 52

Related GAO Products 53

Tables

Table 1: Piracy and Maritime Crime Characteristics in the Horn of 

Africa and Gulf of Guinea 12

Table 2: Update on Recommendation Implementation since 

September 2010 25

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Table 3: Interagency Progress in Implementing the Lines of Action 

in the National Security Council’s (NSC) 2008 Action Plan 48

Table 4: Department of Defense Counterpiracy Costs Incurred 

from Calendar Years 2010-2013 (dollars in millions) 51

Figures

Figure 1: Attempted and Successful Piracy Incidents off the 

Horn of Africa, 2010 through 2013 10

Figure 2: Attempted and Successful Piracy and Maritime 

Crime Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, 2010 through 

2013 11

Figure 3: Piracy Incidents Reported off the Horn of Africa, 2008

through 2013 14

Figure 4: Hostages Taken In Horn of Africa Piracy Incidents, 2008 

through 2013 15

Figure 5: Estimated Total and Average Ransoms Paid in Piracy 

Incidents off the Horn of Africa, 2007 through 2012 16

Figure 6: U.S. Naval Vessel Steaming Days in Horn of Africa Task 

Forces, 2010 through 2013 20

Figure 7: Incidents of Piracy and Maritime Crime in the Gulf of 

Guinea, 2007 through 2013 28

Figure 8: Types of Piracy and Maritime Crime Incidents in the Gulf 

of Guinea, 2010 through 2013 30

Figure 9: Attempted and Successful Pirate Attacks off the Horn of 

Africa, 2010 through 2013 46

Figure 10: Attempted and Successful Pirate Attacks in the Gulf of 

Guinea, 2010 through 2013 47
Page iii GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Abbreviations

AMLEP African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership

BMP Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia 

Based Piracy

CPCC Counter-Piracy Coordination Center

CTF Combined Task Force

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

DOJ Department of Justice

DOT Department of Transportation

ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EU European Union

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

G8 Group of Eight

IMB International Maritime Bureau

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

IRTC Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor

MOTR Maritime Operational Threat Response

MSCHOA Maritime Security Centre–Horn of Africa

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSC National Security Council

NSCS National Security Council Staff

ONI U.S. Office of Naval intelligence

UN United Nations

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

June 19, 2014

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV

Chairman

Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation

United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan Hunter

Chairman

The Honorable John Garamendi

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rick Larsen

House of Representatives

The Honorable Frank A. LoBiondo

House of Representatives

Piracy and maritime crime, including armed robbery, kidnapping, and 

hijackings, continues to threaten ships in the waters off the Horn of Africa 

and in the Gulf of Guinea, putting seafarers in harm’s way and costing 

businesses and governments billions of dollars in ransoms, insurance, 

and protective measures. U.S. efforts to combat piracy and maritime 

crime involve multiple agencies from the Departments of Defense (DOD), 

Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), State (State), Transportation 

(DOT), and the Treasury (Treasury) and are coordinated with 

international and industry partners. While maritime piracy is not a new 

threat, pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa started reaching 

unprecedented levels in 2008. At the same time, the persistence of

attacks in West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea—including the kidnapping of two 

Americans from a vessel in October 2013—have evolved with pirates 

venturing farther from shore and using more violent tactics.1

 1

According to State officials, on October 23, 2013, the Captain and Chief Engineer on the 

C-Retriever, an American owned oil-supply vessel, were kidnapped in the Gulf of Guinea 

and released sometime in the 3 weeks following the event.

According to 

DOD and State officials, piracy off the Horn of Africa stems from an 
Page 2 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

ungoverned Somalia and has generally focused on hijacking ships 

transiting through open waters, while piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has 

generally focused on armed robbery of ships in territorial waters of 

sovereign states and has displayed less regard for the health and safety 

of its victims.

In September 2010, we issued a report examining U.S. efforts to address 

piracy off the Horn of Africa and found that the U.S. government had 

taken steps to implement the National Security Council’s (NSC) 

Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan 

(Action Plan) by, for example, working with partners to conduct naval 

patrols, update ship security plans, and provide judicial capacity building 

to African states.2 However, we found that many agencies could benefit 

from greater specificity in assigning roles and responsibilities, and from 

identifying the costs, benefits, and measures of effectiveness of their 

counterpiracy efforts, among other things.3 We recommended that the 

NSC collaborate with the agencies to reassess and update its Action 

Plan; identify metrics; assess the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of 

U.S. counterpiracy activities; and clarify agency roles and responsibilities. 

In March 2011, we testified that piracy off the Horn of Africa continued to 

be a problem as pirates shifted tactics, and we reiterated our 

recommendations on actions the government could undertake to improve 

U.S. efforts.4

As piracy and maritime crime continues to evolve off both African coasts 

and the U.S. government faces fiscal pressures, you asked that we 

examine whether opportunities exist to leverage the cooperative efforts 

and strategies used to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa in addressing 

the problem of piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea. 

Specifically, this report:

As of June 2014, these recommendations have not been 

implemented and are discussed later in this report.

 2

National Security Council, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and 

Action Plan: (Washington D.C. 2008).

3

GAO, Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance 

Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa, 

GAO-10-856 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2010). 

4

GAO, Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan Gains Urgency as 

Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa GAO-11-449T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2011). 
Page 3 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

• assesses how piracy off the Horn of Africa in the East has changed 

since our 2010 report and describes U.S. efforts to assess 

counterpiracy actions, given any changing conditions; and

• identifies trends in piracy and maritime crime in West Africa’s Gulf of 

Guinea and U.S. efforts to address them, and evaluates the extent to 

which the United States has assessed its counterpiracy efforts in the 

Gulf of Guinea.

To assess how piracy off the Horn of Africa has changed since 2010, we 

analyzed data from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the U.S. 

Office of Naval intelligence (ONI) on reported piracy incidents, hostages 

taken, and ransom paid off the Horn of Africa from 2008 through 2013.5

We discussed data collection methods, processes for data entry, and the 

steps taken to ensure reasonable accuracy of the data with both IMB and 

ONI. We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

this report. In addition, we met with DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, DOT, and 

Treasury officials; international partners; and representatives from 

insurance, shipping, and private security industry associations to discuss 

their involvement in counterpiracy activities such as developing best 

practices for protecting ships from pirate attack, working with the 

international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, and 

participating in naval patrols off the Horn of Africa.6

 5

IMB is a division of the International Chamber of Commerce established as a non-profit 

organization in 1981 to fight against all types of maritime crime and malpractice. IMB uses 

industry knowledge, experience, and access to contacts around the world to identify and 

investigate fraud, spot new criminal methods and trends, and highlight other threats to 

trade. ONI is the division of the U.S. Navy that provides U.S. military, intelligence, and 

policy stakeholders with maritime intelligence including the analysis, production and 

dissemination of scientific, technical, geopolitical and military intelligence information.

We met with officials 

from shipping industry associations that represent owners and operators 

from over 80 percent of the world’s merchant fleet and describe 

themselves as providing a unified industry voice in the creation of industry 

policy and strategy; insurance industry associations whose members 

cover approximately 90 percent of the world’s ocean-going tonnage; and 

a private security industry association that has over 180 members across 

6

Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008), which encouraged states and 

regional organizations fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to 

establish an international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact, the 

Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia was established on January 14, 2009, 

to facilitate the discussion and coordination of actions among states and organizations to 

suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. 
Page 4 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

35 countries. While the statements of these industry officials cannot be 

generalized to the entire industries they represent, their perspectives 

provide valuable insight since each is actively involved in international 

collaborative efforts to combat piracy. To determine the extent to which 

the United States has assessed its counterpiracy actions as outlined in 

the 2008 Action Plan for countering piracy off the Horn of Africa, we 

reviewed the 2008 Action Plan, the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime 

Security, the 2007 Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal 

Acts of Violence at Sea, relevant U.S. policies and laws, and United 

Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions. We also reviewed program 

documents such as briefings and meeting summaries and interviewed 

officials from DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, DOT, and the Treasury, as well as 

components including U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, the U.S. 

Coast Guard, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to discuss 

implementation of the Action Plan and the status of implementing 

recommendations from our September 2010 report to improve the plan.7

To identify trends in piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, we 

analyzed IMB and ONI data on piracy incidents—hijackings, boardings, 

attempts, ships fired upon, and kidnappings—reported from 2007 through 

2013. As with the Horn of Africa data, we discussed the accuracy and 

reliability of the data with IMB and ONI officials and determined the data 

to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

We selected these departments and agencies because the Action Plan 

states they shall contribute to, coordinate, and undertake initiatives in 

accordance with the plan and they are members of the Counter-Piracy 

Steering Group established to oversee the implementation of the plan.

8

 7

To evaluate U.S. 

efforts to address piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, we 

reviewed program briefings and meeting summaries and interviewed 

officials from the previously described U.S. agencies, international military 

partners, and partners from the insurance, shipping, and private security 

GAO-10-856.

8

IMB data is based on self-reporting directly to IMB by vessels and companies operating 

in the area. According to ONI data—which is aggregated from multiple data sources, (e.g., 

open source data such as media reports, IMB information, and all-source intelligence) and 

corroborated with other U.S. agencies and information—the actual number of incidents in 

the Gulf of Guinea is greater than what is reported to IMB. According to ONI and IMB 

officials, reasons for the variation between the two sets of data, include differences in 

categorization of incidents, validation of sources, under reporting, and differences in 

geographic scope.
Page 5 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

industries. The agencies, international partners, and industry associations 

we interviewed were those that we identified as contributors to ongoing 

counterpiracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea or those representing or 

insuring vessel owners and operators in the region. While the statements 

of the industry officials cannot be generalized to the entire industries they 

represent, their perspectives provide valuable insight since each is 

actively involved in international collaborative efforts to combat piracy. We 

compared agency efforts and their coordination against recommended 

practices in the National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan and the 

Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime which are used to 

guide the efforts and, in general, call for risk-based assessments. A full 

description of our objectives, scope, and methodology can be found in 

appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the United 

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy consists of 

any of several acts, including any illegal act of violence or detention, or 

any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 

passengers of a private ship and directed against another ship, aircraft, 

persons, or property onboard another ship on the high seas, or against a 

ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any 

Background

Piracy Is a Recognized 

Global Issue
Page 6 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

state.9 According to both conventions, all states have the duty to 

cooperate to the fullest extent possible in the repression of piracy on the 

high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state and 

are authorized to seize pirate ships or a ship under the control of pirates 

and arrest the persons and seize the property onboard on the high seas 

or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state.10

Piracy and maritime crime off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea 

affect countries around the globe. In 2013, over 42,000 vessels transited 

the waters off the Horn of Africa, which include some of the world’s 

busiest shipping lanes. Within these waters, pirates target merchant 

When crimes 

that would constitute piracy are committed in the territorial waters of a 

coastal state, they are generally referred to as maritime crime. For the 

purposes of this report, we describe the criminal conduct in the Gulf of 

Guinea as piracy and maritime crime in order to include piracy on the high 

seas (i.e., outside the jurisdiction of any one sovereign state), as well as 

hijacking, armed robbery, kidnapping, and attempts at these crimes within 

the territorial waters of a state.

 9

In general, the degree to which a coastal state may exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction 

over its adjacent waters differs depending on its distance from the coast. Within a state’s 

territorial sea (also referred to as its territorial waters), which extends not more than 12 

nautical miles from its coast, is the area for which a state exercises sovereignty and 

jurisdiction. Within a state’s contiguous zone—the area outside the territorial sea 

extending not further than 24 miles from a state’s coast—the state may exercise control 

necessary to prevent infringement of laws and regulations within its territory or territorial 

sea. Further, within a state’s exclusive economic zone—the area beyond and adjacent to 

the territorial sea, not extending beyond 200 nautical miles from the coastal baseline—the 

state has sovereign rights for the purpose of (and authority to exercise jurisdiction related 

to) exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing any natural resources, but through 

which all states generally enjoy the freedoms of navigation and overflight, among others. 

The “high seas” include all parts of the sea beyond national jurisdiction (i.e., beyond any 

states’ exclusive economic zones). In this report, the term piracy refers to relevant acts 

committed in international waters—that is, anything beyond states’ territorial seas—and 

maritime crime refers to such acts committed in a state’s territorial sea. 

10The conventions further provide that the courts of the state that carry out such seizures 

may decide upon the penalties to be imposed and may determine the action to be taken 

with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in 

good faith.
Page 7 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

vessels, fishing ships, and dhows.11 Since 2008, the UN has adopted a 

number of United Nations Security Council resolutions related to 

countering piracy off the Horn of Africa.12 Similarly, in 2011 and 2012, 

recognizing the Gulf of Guinea’s critical shipping and global energy 

resources, the UN adopted resolutions that expressed deep concern 

about the threat that piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of 

Guinea pose to international navigation, security, and the economic 

development of states in the region.13

The types of crime, vessel traffic, and coastal states’ jurisdictional 

responses to address the piracy problem off the Horn of Africa and in the 

Gulf of Guinea generally differ, as does the U.S. response. DOD and 

State officials described the following as key differences:

• Types of crime: Piracy off the Horn of Africa is generally characterized 

by ransom-seeking, in which pirates attack ships for their crew, cargo, 

or the ship itself, which are often held hostage for months or years to 

obtain millions of dollars in ransom. In the Gulf of Guinea, piracy is 

generally characterized either as armed robbery—such as petroleum 

tanker hijackings to steal a ship’s oil—or targeted kidnappings for 

ransom near or within the Niger Delta, according to DOD officials. 

 11North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) documents describe the term “dhow” as 

referring to a number of traditionally-constructed vessels used as the primary maritime 

commercial mode of transportation throughout the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian 

Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. The structure and shape of dhows differentiate them from 

other types of merchant vessels and crew sizes vary between 5 and 30 individuals who, 

according to NATO’s description, often do not have formalized seamanship or fishery 

training.

12For example, Resolution 1816, adopted in June 2008, authorized states to enter the 

territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed 

robbery at sea. Resolution 2125, adopted in November 2013, renews the authorities and 

concerns raised in Resolution 1816 and other resolutions concerning piracy and armed 

robbery at sea with the backing of the Federal Government of Somalia that was formed in 

August 2012 following the end of the interim mandate of the Transitional Federal 

Government. Pursuant to Resolution 2125, international militaries and organizations may 

continue to operate in Somali territorial waters because the new government does not 

have the capability to protect its coastline.

13In October 2011 and in February 2012 the UN adopted Resolutions 2018 and 2039, 

respectively, urging Gulf of Guinea states to coordinate regionally and nationally, with help 

from international partners, to, among other things, develop and implement national 

maritime security strategies, including a legal framework for the prevention, and 

repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as for the prosecution of persons 

engaging in those crimes.

Piracy off the Horn of 

Africa Generally Differs 

from That in the Gulf of 

Guinea
Page 8 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Additionally, unlike the hostage-taking and high-dollar ransoms off the 

Horn of Africa that can result in months or years that a vessel and its 

crew are held, the kidnappings off the Niger Delta are for days or 

weeks, for thousands of dollars in ransom, and do not necessarily 

involve the hijacking of a vessel. In general, pirates hijack tankers and 

their crew only for the time it takes to offload the oil.14

• Vessel traffic: The nature of how vessels travel through the regions 

also differs. Sea traffic off the Horn of Africa is characterized by large, 

high-speed cargo vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden and 

Indian Ocean. Piracy in this region generally involves pirates pursuing 

and boarding moving vessels. In contrast, in the Gulf of Guinea, 

commercial vessels generally are smaller and operate closer to shore, 

slowing down to make port calls and stopping at off-shore facilities in 

territorial waters or in the exclusive economic zones of coastal states. 

The slow speeds and stationary positions make these vessels 

vulnerable to piracy and maritime crime.

• Jurisdiction and response: U.S. efforts to combat piracy off the Horn 

of Africa and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea evolved in response 

to the particular characteristics of piracy and maritime crime in each 

region and the extent to which the United States has jurisdiction and 

coastal states have the capability to respond. For example, the UN 

authorized international militaries and organizations to enter Somali 

territorial waters and economic zones to conduct counterpiracy 

operations and patrols as though they were international waters. The 

transitional and new Somali governments have relied on the 

assistance of international militaries since they are building maritime 

security capacities. Conversely, in the Gulf of Guinea, maritime 

 14According to DOD officials, as of September 2013, there is no linkage between the Gulf 

of Guinea piracy and violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram and oil and tanker 

theft is generally carried out by criminal organizations for financial gain.
Page 9 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

security in territorial waters is under the authority of the respective 

recognized national governments in the region.15

Figures 1 and 2 show the number of attempted and successful pirate 

attacks off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea respectively from 

2010 through 2013.

 15In June 2013, the governments of Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, 

Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote 

d’Ivoire, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, 

Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo signed the 

Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, 

and Illicit Maritime Activities In West and Central Africa which calls for a regional 

framework to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea, including information-sharing and 

operational coordination mechanisms, among other things.
Page 10 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy

Interactive graphic Figure 1: Attempted and Successful Piracy Incidents off the Horn of Africa, 2010 through 2013

Click on the to show that year’s attacks, click on the to hide that year. For a noninteractive version see appendix II.
Page 11 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy

Interactive graphic Figure 2: Attempted and Successful Piracy and Maritime Crime Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, 

2010 through 2013

Click on the to show that year’s attacks, click on the to hide that year. For a noninteractive version see appendix II.
Page 12 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

In addition to the types of crimes, vessel traffic, and jurisdiction, other 

characteristics such as the reporting of incidents by vessel owners and 

operators and the ability of pirates to use land based safe havens for 

operations, among others, create differences between piracy off the Horn 

of Africa and piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea. These 

differences are summarized in table 1.

Table 1: Piracy and Maritime Crime Characteristics in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Guinea 

Piracy characteristic Horn of Africa Gulf of Guinea

Location of incidents International waters Territorial and international waters

States with jurisdiction All states have jurisdiction within Somali 

coastal waters and in international waters

Gulf of Guinea coastal states have jurisdiction within 

0-12 nautical miles and all states have jurisdiction in 

international waters

Quality of incident reporting Good reporting of incidents a Underreporting of incidents 

Nature of ship traffic Transit the area at higher speeds and can 

avoid Somali coast

Make port calls to coastal states and are often slow 

moving or stationary

Pirate actors Homogeneous actors (predominantly from 

five Somali clans)

Diverse set of actors (former militants, criminals, 

transnational criminal organizations)

Type of piracy business model Hijacking vessels and crews Mixed—hijacking, robbery, cargo theft, kidnapping 

for ransom

Violence to crews/hostages Infrequent isolated incidents Frequent incidents of violence throughout the event

Vessels targeted Targets of opportunity, in particular ships 

that are “low and slow”

Intelligence-driven targets (i.e., pirates targeting 

vessels known to be carrying specific cargo such as 

oil) and some targets of opportunity

Pirate response to armed security 

teams

Pirates avoid engaging armed security 

teams

Pirates willing to engage armed security teams

Presence of safe havens Safe havens off Somali coast serve as 

bases for operations

Limited safe havens to serve as bases for operations

Type of naval security forces in the 

region 

International security forces provide naval 

patrols

Gulf of Guinea coastal states provide limited naval 

patrols

Source: GAO analysis of DOD, State, and UN information. | GAO-14-422

a

According to DOD officials, the quality of incident reporting is their assessment based on the number 

of incidents they are aware of compared to the number that is reported.

Since 2008, the international community has taken steps to respond to 

piracy off the Horn of Africa, including patrols by the United States, 

NATO, the European Union (EU), and others in waters near Somalia; the 

establishment of international naval task forces with specific mandates to 

conduct counterpiracy operations; and the formation of a voluntary 

multilateral Contact Group to coordinate international counterpiracy 

efforts such as the development of industry practices and coordination of 

international law enforcement efforts. Recognizing that vibrant maritime 

commerce underpins global economic security and is a vital national 

The Response to Piracy 

off the Horn of Africa 

Involves Combined Efforts 

from U.S. and 

International Partners
Page 13 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

security issue, the United States has also developed policies and plans to 

collaborate with its international partners and to mobilize a U.S. 

interagency response. In December 2008, the NSC published the Action 

Plan, which discusses countering piracy emanating from Somalia. The 

Action Plan directed the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to 

establish a high-level interagency task force—the Counter-Piracy 

Steering Group—to coordinate, implement, and monitor the actions 

contained in the plan. In addition, the NSC directed that DOD, DHS, DOJ, 

State, DOT, the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence undertake coordinated initiatives in accordance with the plan, 

subject to available resources.16

Piracy activity off of the Horn of Africa has declined as indicated by the 

number of incidents reported, the number of hostages taken, and the 

amount of money paid in ransoms in 2013 as compared with recent 

years. In September 2010, we reported that successful and attempted 

piracy attacks off the Horn of Africa had risen from 30 in 2007 to 218 in 

2009.17

 16A list of U.S. agencies, international partners, and industry partners involved in the 

response to piracy off the Horn of Africa as of September 2010 can be found in 

Our analysis of data provided by the IMB, which collects reported 

incidents from ship owners and operators, shows that the number of 

GAO-10-856 p.11 and 15.

17GAO-10-856.

Various Efforts Have 

Reduced Piracy off 

the Horn of Africa 

Since 2010, but the 

United States Has 

Not Updated its 

Action Plan

Piracy Incidents Off of the 

Horn of Africa Have 

Declined Since 2010
Page 14 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

piracy incidents continued to rise to 235 in 2011, but declined thereafter 

to 15 total incidents in 2013, as shown in figure 3.18

Figure 3: Piracy Incidents Reported off the Horn of Africa, 2008 through 2013

At the same time, the number of hostages taken during pirate attacks 

rose from 815 in 2008 to 1,016 in 2010, but declined to 34 in 2013, as 

shown in figure 4.

 18Reported incidents of piracy can vary based on the type of activity recorded and may 

include: (1) ships boarded, (2) ships hijacked, (3) attempted boardings of ships and (4) 

ships fired upon.
Page 15 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Figure 4: Hostages Taken In Horn of Africa Piracy Incidents, 2008 through 2013

Note: Hostages taken include victims abducted from dhows, fishing ships, and merchant vessels. 

However, no hostages were taken from merchant vessels in 2013.

As the number of hostages taken during piracy incidents rose, the amount 

of ransom money collected by pirates also increased. According to the 

UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Bank, low estimates of the 

total dollar amount of ransoms paid to free hostages rose from $2.4 

million in 2007 to $151.1 million in 2011 but declined to $36.4 million in 

2012.

19

 19 World Bank. 2013. Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities 

off the Horn of Africa. A World Bank Study. Washington, DC: World Bank.

doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-9963-7. 

While ransoms paid were an estimated average of $1.2 million in 
Page 16 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

2007, the estimated average amount rose to $4 million in 2012, as shown 

in figure 5. According to State Department officials, at of the end of 2013, 

there were at least 49 hostages from 11 countries held by Somali pirates.

Figure 5: Estimated Total and Average Ransoms Paid in Piracy Incidents off the 

Horn of Africa, 2007 through 2012

The Action Plan establishes the U.S. role in countering piracy as a 

collaborative one, seeking to involve all countries and shipping-industry 

partners with an interest in maritime security. DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, 

DOT, and the Treasury, in collaboration with their international and 

industry partners, have implemented steps in the Horn of Africa across 

the three lines of action established in the Action Plan, which are to: (1) 

prevent piracy attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime 

domain, (2) disrupt acts of piracy in ways consistent with international law 

and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states, and (3) 

Officials Attribute the 

Decline in Horn of Africa 

Piracy to a Combination of 

Efforts to Prevent, Disrupt, 

and Prosecute
Page 17 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for 

their actions by facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates.20

U.S. agencies, in collaboration with their international and industry 

partners have taken several steps to deter pirates and reduce the 

vulnerability of ships transiting off the Horn of Africa. DOD and State 

officials and representatives from each of eight shipping industry 

associations we met with emphasized that these prevention efforts work 

together and described the following as examples of key prevention 

efforts.

• Working with Industry: U.S. agencies have worked with industry 

partners to develop guidance and requirements for implementing 

counterpiracy efforts. For example, the Coast Guard issued Maritime 

Security (MARSEC) Directives that provide guidance to owners and 

operators of U.S. vessels on how to respond to emerging security 

threats.21 These directives include practices that help to prevent pirate 

attacks and require that vessels operating in high risk waters update 

their vessel security plans to include security protocols for terrorism, 

piracy, and armed robbery against ships in high risk waters. Among 

other things, these plans cover the need for enhanced deterrence, 

surveillance and detection equipment; crew responses if a potential 

attack is detected or is underway; and coordination with counterpiracy 

organizations that could be of assistance. The practices are mandated 

for U.S. flag vessels operating in high risk waters and are also 

recommended for foreign flag vessels in the Coast Guard’s Port 

Security Advisories and in the International Maritime Organization’s 

(IMO) Maritime Safety Committee circulars.22

 20The flag state is the country in which the vessel is registered. In general, flag states 

have the authority to enforce their own as well as international regulations, such as those 

relating to security standards, with respect to such vessels.

21Port Security Advisory (2-09) (Rev. 3) Maritime Security (MARSEC) Directive 104-6 

(series), Guidelines for U.S. Vessels Operating in High Risk Waters. January 07, 2011. 

22 As a specialized agency of the UN, IMO is the global standard-setting authority for the 

safety, security and environmental performance of international shipping. Its main role is 

to create a regulatory framework for the shipping industry that is fair and effective, 

universally adopted and universally implemented. The Maritime Safety Committee is a 

technical body with representatives from each of the IMO member states which, among 

other things, considers and submits recommendations and guidelines on safety for 

possible adoption by the IMO Assembly. 

U.S. Efforts to Prevent Acts of 

Piracy
Page 18 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Additionally, the Coast Guard and DOT’s Maritime Administration 

(MARAD) co-chaired Working Group 3 of the Contact Group on Piracy off 

the Coast of Somalia which focused on industry awareness. Through this 

working group, practices were developed and enhanced through the Best 

Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy 

(BMP), developed by the working group’s maritime industry 

representatives to deter, prevent, and deny incidents of piracy off the 

Horn of Africa. The BMP was introduced in 2008 as a joint industry 

strategy and has been updated based on lessons learned from 

investigated piracy incidents throughout the region. Version 4 of the BMP 

was issued in August 2011 and recommends 14 specific actions shipping 

companies can take to mitigate pirate activity while transiting high risk 

waters off the Horn of Africa. Examples of these ship protection measures 

include providing additional lookouts during watch periods, enhancing the 

ship’s physical barrier, and establishing a safe point or secure citadel on 

the ship to ensure the safety of the crew and vessel during a pirate 

boarding. Use of the BMP is not mandatory; rather, officials from each of 

the eight shipping industry associations we interviewed describe the BMP 

as a tool kit of practices the ship’s master can tailor to the situation and 

risks that the ship faces. Officials from an insurance industry association 

we met with stated that its members encourage and consider the 

implementation of the practices when pricing products based on steps 

that vessel owners have taken to mitigate risks.

Of the various implemented practices, officials from the six U.S. agencies 

engaged in counterpiracy activities and the eight shipping industry 

associations we interviewed describe the use of privately contracted 

armed security personnel on ships as a key factor in reducing the number 

of piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa. However, each of the eight 

shipping industry associations we interviewed stated that they do not 

want armed security teams to become a standard long term practice, 

primarily because of the hazards involved with the use of force and 

weapons aboard ships as well as the expense, with an average cost of 

about $5,000 per day for a four person security team. These officials 

added that, in comparison, requiring crew to continuously lookout for 

suspicious activity is a relatively low-cost measure when compared to 

deploying armed security personnel with a vessel – the burden of which 

could be too costly for smaller shipping companies. As security costs 

become a concern and the threat of piracy declines, DOD, EU, and NATO 

officials expressed concern that some in the shipping industry may seek 

to reduce the size and qualifications of the security teams as well as the 

hours they are deployed to protect the ship.
Page 19 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

• Strategic communication: According to officials from DOD’s 

AFRICOM, strategic communication from Somali radio stations is also 

an effective method of preventing piracy. These officials stated that 

the United States and its international partners have supported a 

partnership with Somali radio stations to bring awareness to the 

Somali public about the dangers of piracy and acts of abuse that 

hostages may endure.

U.S. efforts to disrupt acts of piracy involve working with international 

partners to position resources to interdict pirates at sea and prevent the 

financing of pirates on land. The following were described by DOD, State, 

Treasury, EU, and NATO as examples of U.S. efforts that are intended to 

prevent acts of piracy.

• Maritime coalition operations: DOD, State, industry, EU, and NATO 

officials cited the presence of international navies in the region as a 

key factor in interdicting and disrupting pirate activity. Three 

multinational maritime coalition operations— the Combined Task 

Force (CTF) 151, EU Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR) Operation 

Atalanta, and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield23—along with 

independent deployments from countries outside of NATO and the EU 

such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea have worked to protect 

the waters off the Horn of Africa and the Internationally 

Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC).24 U.S. involvement in these 

activities is primarily through participation in CTF 151 and NATO’s 

Operation Ocean Shield. DOD and State officials stated that these 

operations are effective in establishing a protective force in a region 

that is growing its own capabilities and has allowed the United States 

to build new partnerships with navies from around the world.

• U.S. presence: According to Navy officials, while as of 2013 the 

United States no longer regularly dedicates naval vessels to CTF 151, 

the U.S. presence plays an important role in fostering the participation 

of other countries in the task force. Additionally, the Navy may task 

 23CTF 151 is a multinational naval task force, set up in 2009 with a specific mandate to 

respond to piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia. The EU 

NAVFOR maintains a counterpiracy presence in the region with its Operation Atalanta 

CTF 465. NATO maintains its counterpiracy presence in the region with its Operation 

Ocean Shield CTF 508. 

24The IRTC is a defined geographic area in which ships are protected by transiting in 

groups at a common speed or in a planned convoy accompanied by a military vessel. 

U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Acts of 

Piracy
Page 20 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

ships from other missions, such as counternarcotics or 

counterterrorism, into the task force on a given day or for short 

periods to respond in an emergency if they are the closest or most 

appropriate—consistent with the overarching goal of preserving safety 

of life at sea. The Unites States has regularly provided, from 2010 

through 2014, at least one ship in support of NATO’s Operation 

Ocean Shield counterpiracy mission. As incidents of piracy have 

declined off the Horn of Africa, the number of steaming days has also 

declined, as shown in figure 6.

Figure 6: U.S. Naval Vessel Steaming Days in Horn of Africa Task Forces, 2010 

through 2013

Note: Steaming days are the days in which a naval vessel is actively patrolling the waters.

• Disrupting pirate financing: To help disrupt pirate revenue, the U.S. 

Treasury is authorized to block financial transactions of known pirate 

actors through the application of Executive Order 13536 when there is 
Page 21 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

a nexus to U.S. interests.25

The Action Plan aims to ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are 

held accountable for their actions by facilitating the prosecution of 

suspected pirates, and in appropriate cases prosecuting pirates in the 

United States. Officials from DOD, State, and DOJ described several 

examples of how the United States plays a role in making sure pirates are 

brought to justice.

Under this authority, Treasury may impose 

sanctions on individuals providing funds to known pirate actors and 

can block the transaction if it involves a U.S. financial institution. 

Officials from an insurance industry association we met with stated 

that ship owners can carry insurance policies that reimburse 

companies for ransom paid as a result of pirate attacks. According to 

Treasury officials, members of the U.S. and international shipping 

industry initially expressed concerns that the ransom paid and 

reimbursed by their policies could be prohibited by the executive 

order. Treasury officials also stated that the order has specific 

application, is applied on a case-by-case basis, and, as of March 

2014, had not been formally applied in response to a potential ransom 

payment.

• Building law enforcement capabilities: The United States helps 

expand law enforcement capabilities within the region through two key 

efforts. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service conducts 

investigations and has developed a manual that provides 

recommendations to law enforcement agencies investigating acts of 

piracy at sea. Last, the United States has contributed to a piracy 

database administered by INTERPOL that allows law enforcement 

agencies to access evidence connected to piracy incidents, although 

U.S. investigations are primarily focused on piracy incidents with a 

nexus to U.S. interests.26

• Judicial capacity building: U.S. agencies have also provided piracyrelated judicial capacity-building assistance to countries in the region, 

 25See Exec. Order No. 13,536, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the 

Conflict in Somalia, 75 Fed. Reg. 19,869 (Apr. 15, 2010). 

26INTERPOL is an intergovernmental organization made up of 190 member countries that 

facilitates international police cooperation. Members work together to provide targeted 

training, expert investigative support, relevant data and secure communications channels, 

among other services.

U.S. Efforts to Facilitate 

Prosecutions of Suspected 

Pirates
Page 22 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

such as Kenya and the Seychelles, for law enforcement and 

prosecutions. These activities have included establishing regional 

courts and building prisons in Somalia. Additionally, DOD, DOJ, and 

State have worked with international partners to ensure that pirates 

are tried and held accountable for their crimes by facilitating 

prosecution agreements. As of November 2013, among 22 nations, 

1,130 Somali pirates had been detained for trial, were on trial, or had 

been convicted.

• U.S. prosecutions: The United States has jurisdiction to prosecute 

anyone who commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of 

nations on the high seas and is later brought to or found in the United 

States.27 U.S. government prosecutions have resulted in the 

conviction of at least 28 Somali pirates since 2010. In 2010, five men 

from Somalia were convicted of piracy and related offenses by a 

federal jury in what, according to DOJ officials, is believed to be the 

first piracy trial conviction in the United States since 1820 and is seen 

as the first in a series of government prosecutions aimed at slowing 

the spread of piracy off of Africa. In February 2013, a federal jury 

found five Somalis guilty of engaging in piracy and other offenses in 

connection with the attack on the Navy ship the USS Ashland. 

Additionally, in November 2013, a Somali pirate involved in the 

shooting of four Americans aboard a yacht off the coast of Somalia 

during a failed kidnapping attempt was sentenced to 21 life sentences 

for his role in their deaths.28

Appendix III provides a summary of the three lines of action and specific 

activities in the Action Plan. DOD, State, U.S. Coast Guard, DOJ, DOT, 

and the Treasury attribute the decline in piracy attacks to the collective 

implementation of these actions. Officials from these agencies noted that 

Also, DOD, State, and DOJ officials 

stated that these prosecutions send a message that piracy carries 

serious consequences and may serve as a deterrent to others 

involved in piracy. However, DOJ and State officials told us that, 

especially in cases where the hijacked vessel or crew has little or no 

connection to the United States, a more appropriate role for the 

United States would be to provide technical assistance to other 

countries in prosecuting pirates.

 27See 18 U.S.C. § 1651. 

28In total, this prosecution resulted in the conviction of three pirates and guilty pleas from 

11 others, all resulting in sentences of at least life imprisonment.
Page 23 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

the efforts of governments and the industry practices work together to 

reduce vulnerabilities and prevent attacks. DOD, State, EU, and NATO 

naval officials as well as officials from the eight shipping industry 

associations we interviewed cautioned that discontinuing counterpiracy 

efforts could provide opportunities for piracy to resurge off the Horn of 

Africa. They stated that piracy off the Horn of Africa is a crime of 

opportunity driven by economic conditions in Somalia that have not been 

addressed. They noted that the practices in place have reduced the 

likelihood of a successful pirate attack by increasing the risk but the 

capability and motivation of pirates have not changed.

The Action Plan was published in December 2008 when piracy off the 

Horn of Africa was on the rise but has not been updated, as we 

recommended in 2010, to reflect changing dynamics in piracy, such as 

industry’s use of armed security teams or the sharp decline in piracy 

incidents, or to implement recommendations we previously made to 

include elements of a strategic approach. The Action Plan was developed 

to identify and implement measures to suppress pirate activity off the 

Horn of Africa. Its intent was to respond to the growing threat and be 

mutually supportive of longer-term initiatives aimed at establishing 

governance, rule of law, security, and economic development in Somalia. 

In September 2010, we reviewed the Action Plan, which implements the 

National Strategy for Maritime Security29 and the Policy for the 

Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea30 as 

applied to piracy off the Horn of Africa. At that time, we found that the 

Action Plan had not been revised to reflect adapted piracy tactics and did 

not designate which agencies should lead or carry out most activities.31

 29The National Strategy for Maritime Security was created pursuant to National Security 

Presidential Directive NSPD-41 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13 

(Dec. 21, 2004) and identified piracy as a threat the strategy intended to address.

Additionally, we found that the National Security Council Staff (NSCS) did 

not fully include characteristics of a strategic approach in the Action Plan, 

such as measures to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. resources applied 

30The Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea

states that it is the policy of the United States to repress piracy through, among other 

actions, “continu[ing] to lead and support international efforts to repress piracy and urge 

other states to take decisive action both individually and through international efforts.”

31An assessment of progress made in implementing the Action Plan as of September 

2010 can be found in GAO-10-856, p 19.

The U.S. Action Plan Has 

Not Been Updated as We 

Recommended in 2010
Page 24 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

to counterpiracy, the identification of roles and responsibilities, or the cost 

of U.S. activities relative to the benefits they achieved.32

As a result, in September 2010 we recommended that the NSCS, in 

collaboration with the Secretaries of Defense, State, Homeland Security, 

Transportation, and the Treasury, as well as the Attorney General: (1) 

reassess and revise the Action Plan to better address evolving conditions 

off the Horn of Africa and their effect on priorities and plans; (2) identify 

measures of effectiveness to use in evaluating U.S. counterpiracy efforts; 

(3) direct the Counter-Piracy Steering Group to identify the costs of U.S. 

counterpiracy efforts including operational, support, and personnel costs; 

and assess the benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy 

activities; and (4) clarify agency roles and responsibilities and develop 

joint guidance, information-sharing mechanisms, and other means to 

operate across agency boundaries for implementing key efforts such as 

strategic communication, disrupting pirate revenue, and facilitating 

prosecution.33 Since we issued our report in 2010, conditions have 

continued to change off the Horn of Africa in many ways since the Action 

Plan was developed in 2008. However, as of June 2014 the NSCS had 

not fully implemented the four recommendations from our September 

2010 report as summarized in table 2.

 32We developed the characteristics of a strategic approach after our research examining 

legislative and executive mandates, including the Government Performance and Results 

Act of 1993; general literature on strategic planning and performance; and guidance from 

the Office of Management and Budget on the President’s Management Agenda, found 

that there were no legislative or executive mandates identifying a uniform set of required 

or desirable characteristics for national strategies. Some of these characteristics include 

1) a statement of purpose, scope, and methodology, 2) problem definition, 3) goals, 

priorities and performance measures, 4) costs and risk management, 5) roles, 

responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms, and 6) integration with other strategies. 

For a more detailed discussion, see Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected 

Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, 

D.C: Feb. 3, 2004). 

33Our recommendations were made to the National Security Staff which changed its name 

to the National Security Council Staff pursuant to Executive Order 13657, dated February 

10, 2014.
Page 25 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Table 2: Update on Recommendation Implementation since September 2010 

2010 Recommendation Update since 2010

Reassess and revise the Action Plan to better 

address evolving conditions off the Horn of 

Africa and their effect on priorities and plans

Action Plan not updated. In September 2010, we recommended that the NSCS 

update the Action Plan because piracy was increasing and pirate tactics were 

changing. Since that time, conditions have continued to evolve off the Horn of 

Africa. Industry has made frequent use of embarked armed security teams. An 

internationally-recognized Somali federal government was established in August 

2012 and responsibility for strategic communication was transferred to it. Piracy 

declined sharply in 2012 and 2013. EU NAVFOR and NATO counterpiracy 

operations off the Horn of Africa are set to expire by the end of 2016. State officials 

recognize that an updated Action Plan is needed and have provided input to the 

NSCS, but as of March 2014 they had not received guidance from the NSCS 

regarding any changes to counterpiracy plans or efforts. In commenting on a draft of 

this report, an NSCS official stated that a global action plan is being developed, with 

a separate annex focusing on the Horn of Africa and was expected to be issued in 

the summer of 2014.

Identify measures of effectiveness to use in 

evaluating U.S. counterpiracy efforts 

Measures not established to assess counter piracy efforts. In September 2010, we 

recommended that the NSCS include measures of effectiveness in the Action Plan 

to provide direction for counterpiracy activities and information that could be used in 

strategic and resource-based decisions. During the course of this review, State 

officials told us the key measures are the number of hostages and ships hijacked, 

but they have not established formal measures and their decisions are generally 

guided by discussions rather than formal assessments. However, this information 

does not provide insight into which efforts are having the greatest effect in 

suppressing piracy.

Direct the Counter-Piracy Steering Group to 

identify the costs of U.S. counterpiracy efforts 

including operational, support, and personnel 

costs; and assess the benefits, and 

effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities

U.S. counterpiracy costs and benefits not fully tracked. In September 2010, we 

reported that the United States is not collecting information to determine the most 

cost-effective mix of counterpiracy activities. During the course of this review, we 

obtained information from agencies identifying some costs related to their 

counterpiracy efforts. For example, the costs of counterpiracy efforts incurred by 

DOD peaked in 2011 at approximately $275 million but have declined to 

approximately $70 million in 2013.a

Clarify agency roles and responsibilities and 

develop joint guidance, information-sharing 

mechanisms, and other means to operate 

across agency boundaries for implementing key 

efforts such as strategic communication, 

disrupting pirate revenue, and facilitating 

prosecution

State tracks funds used to operate its 

counterpiracy and maritime security functions, as well as foreign assistance 

provided to African countries. However, most agencies do not systematically track 

the costs of counterpiracy efforts or activities because these efforts and activities 

typically fall under a broader maritime security category. Further, the Counter-Piracy 

Steering Group has not identified the benefits of the various counterpiracy activities 

relative to their costs and resources.

Agency roles and responsibilities defined for some tasks. In September 2010, we 

reported that agencies had made less progress in implementing action items in the 

Action Plan that involved multiple agencies than those that were the responsibility of 

one specific agency. Since that time, U.S. agencies have defined roles and 

responsibilities for applying the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) 

process to piracy incidents involving U.S. interests.b

Source: GAO analysis of DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, Treasury, and NSCS information. | GAO-14-422

DOJ officials stated that the 

NSCS has also identified roles and responsibilities for transporting pirate suspects 

for prosecution. However, the NSCS has not established roles and responsibilities 

across all activities outlined in the Action Plan.

a The costs include naval and air patrols, as well as contracted linguists.

b The MOTR is a separate presidentially approved Plan to achieve a coordinated U.S. Government 

response to threats against the United States and its interests in the maritime domain. The MOTR 
Page 26 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Plan contains operational coordination requirements to ensure quick and decisive action to counter 

maritime threats.

• In commenting on a draft of this report, an NSCS official stated that 

the Action Plan is being updated through a global action plan, with a 

separate annex focusing on the Horn of Africa, but did not indicate 

whether the plan would include all of the elements in our 

recommendations. We continue to believe our recommendations have 

merit and should be implemented. While conditions affecting piracy 

have continued to evolve in the Horn of Africa since 2010, the 2008 

Action Plan continues to guide U.S. efforts. Officials from each of the 

six agencies engaged in counterpiracy activities noted that current 

efforts are suppressing piracy off the Horn of Africa, but the results 

are tenuous and piracy could resurge without addressing its root 

causes. The Action Plan was developed at a time when U.S. policy 

focused on addressing problems in the absence of a functioning 

government in Somalia and without involving a U.S. presence in the 

country. With U.S. agencies and industry both having limited 

resources available for counterpiracy activities, we continue to believe 

that implementing our recommendations would be of value in 

understanding the costs and benefits and measuring the effectiveness 

of U.S. counterpiracy efforts. DOD, Coast Guard, DOJ, and State 

officials, as well as shipping industry officials, noted that the 

suppression of piracy has been based on a combination of 

government and industry counterpiracy activities, particularly the use 

of armed security teams on private vessels and the presence of naval 

patrols. However, U.S. agencies do not assess how industry practices 

and government resources could potentially offset each other’s roles 

and associated costs.34 As we concluded in September 2010, in an 

environment where government resource decisions directly affect 

costs incurred by the shipping industry and international partners, 

balancing risk reduction and benefits with costs should be 

emphasized.

 34See appendix IV for a description of DOD counterpiracy costs, 2010 through 2013.
Page 27 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Piracy and maritime crime, primarily armed robbery at sea, oil theft, and 

kidnapping, is a persistent problem that continues to contribute to 

instability in the Gulf of Guinea. According to ONI data, incidents of piracy 

and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea rose from nearly 60 in 2010 to 

over 100 in 2011, and totaled more than 110 in 2013, as shown in figure 

7. According to this data, incidents in 2013 included 11 vessel hijackings 

and 32 kidnappings. According to officials from AFRICOM, ONI, State, 

and the IMO, this recent rise in piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of 

Guinea is part of a long-standing, persistent problem in the region. For 

example, according to DOD officials, the Gulf of Guinea was the most 

active region in the world for piracy in 2007, prior to the rise in pirate 

activity off the Horn of Africa. According to the IMB, the number of vesselreported incidents in the Gulf of Guinea from 2007 through 2009 is similar 

to that of 2011 through 2013.35

 35As shown in figure 7, IMB reports a dip in incidents in the Gulf of Guinea in 2010. The 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the U.S. Energy Information Administration 

reported that a contributing factor to this decline was the 2009 amnesty and subsequent 

ceasefire between the Nigerian government and Niger Delta militants who had previously 

been responsible for attacks on the oil industry, to include kidnappings, acts of piracy, and 

attacks on pipelines and other oil facilities. However, according to the Energy Information 

Administration as well as State officials, delayed progress in implementing some of the 

conditions of the amnesty has in turn contributed to increased oil theft and other attacks in 

recent years. 

IMO officials added that, while the 

reported incidents indicate an ongoing, persistent problem, the number 

and frequency of incidents do not yet rise to the epidemic proportions that 

were seen off the Horn of Africa.

U.S. Efforts Aim to 

Address Piracy and 

Maritime Security in 

the Gulf of Guinea, 

But an Assessment 

Would Help Inform 

Efforts and Determine 

the Need for 

Additional Actions

Piracy and Maritime crime 

in the Gulf of Guinea Is an 

Ongoing Problem, 

although Recent Incidents 

May Indicate Evolving 

Tactics and Capabilities
Page 28 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Figure 7: Incidents of Piracy and Maritime Crime in the Gulf of Guinea, 2007 through 

2013

Notes: ONI data is aggregated from multiple data sources, (e.g., open source data such as media 

reports, IMB information, and all-source intelligence) and corroborated with other U.S. agencies and 

information. However, according to ONI officials, similar ONI data prior to 2010 is not available. IMB 

data is based on self-reporting by vessels and companies operating in the area made directly to IMB. 

According to DOD, State, industry, and IMB officials, there are several reasons for the variation 

between the two sets of data, including differences in categorization of incidents, validation of 

sources, under reporting, and differences in geographic scope. A discussion of the data used in this 

report can be found in appendix I.

According to the U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime 

and information from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, as well 

as the UN Security Council, piracy and maritime crime pose a threat to 

regional commerce and stability in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, 

according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, while Nigeria 

has the second largest amount of proven crude oil reserves in Africa, as 

of December 2013, exploration activity there was at its lowest levels in a 

decade as a result of rising security problems related to oil theft, onshore 

pipeline sabotage, and piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, 

as well as other investment and government uncertainties.
Page 29 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Moreover, incident data since 2010 shows that piracy is moving farther off 

shore, prompting concerns that these trends may continue. According to 

officials from AFRICOM, ONI, and State, and according to IMB data as 

shown in figure 2 of this report, Gulf of Guinea piracy and maritime crime 

prior to 2011 have generally occurred in the coastal areas near Lagos or 

off the Niger Delta. However, recent attacks have taken place farther 

away from the waters off Nigeria, demonstrating a broader reach of 

pirates, as well as increasing the number of coastal states involved. For 

example, since 2011, several tanker hijackings were reported farther west 

than previously observed, off Togo and Cote d’Ivoire, according to ONI 

officials. Further, a July 2013 tanker hijacking off the coast of Gabon, and 

a similar incident off Angola in January 2014 represent, as of March 2014, 

the southernmost occurrences in which vessels were hijacked and sailed 

to Nigeria to offload the stolen oil cargo. According to AFRICOM officials, 

the ability to conduct such hijackings, which involve difficult maneuvering 

of large vessels across swaths of open water while conducting oil 

bunkering operations, illustrates that these maritime criminals may be 

increasingly capable of complex and long-range operations.36

The types of piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea fluctuate 

from theft of petroleum products and other cargo to include a greater 

proportion of kidnappings for ransom. According to ONI and AFRICOM 

officials, while the total number of incidents has remained relatively 

constant since 2011, they have observed a recent increase in the 

proportion of kidnappings. Specifically, incidents of kidnapping increased 

from 14 incidents (or 16 percent of attacks) in 2012, to 32 incidents (or 29 

percent of attacks in 2013), as shown in figure 8.37

 36Oil bunkering is the process of offloading oil from one vessel onto another vessel.

Further, combined with 

the higher levels of violence seen in the Gulf of Guinea as compared to 

37In the context of this report and data reported by ONI and IMB, kidnappings refer to 

those that have occurred, or were reported to have occurred. According to ONI and 

AFRICOM officials, such incidents would include scenarios in which oil industry personnel 

or others were kidnapped from offshore supply vessels or platforms and held for ransom, 

such as the case of the two U.S. oil industry personnel taken from the C-Retriever in 

October 2013 off the coast of Nigeria. However, according to AFRICOM and Naval 

Forces–Africa officials, kidnappings conducted against the oil industry, including those 

perpetrated by Nigerian militants over the last decade, also include onshore kidnappings, 

or kidnappings within the inland waters and river ways of the Niger Delta. Onshore or 

inland kidnappings are generally not included in this data, and ONI officials said they take 

steps to validate the data they report However, ONI officials told us that some selfreported or other data may unintentionally include such incidents.
Page 30 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

the Horn of Africa, MARAD, State, and all eight of the shipping industry 

association officials we interviewed expressed that the increasing 

prevalence of kidnappings is a cause for concern.

Figure 8: Types of Piracy and Maritime Crime Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, 2010 

through 2013
Page 31 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

According to AFRICOM officials, the objective of building partner capacity 

in the Gulf of Guinea, including strengthening maritime security, has long 

been part of U.S. military and diplomatic efforts in the region, even though 

the United States and international partners do not generally conduct 

naval patrols such as those conducted off the Horn of Africa.38

According to State and DOD officials, providing a permanent U.S. or 

international interdiction presence in the region is impractical because 

foreign nations do not have the authority to conduct military operations in 

another sovereign nation’s territory and the need for limited naval 

resources to address other strategic priorities. However, as in the Horn of 

Africa, a variety of U.S. efforts are underway to help prevent acts of piracy 

and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, including in the following areas:

For 

example, AFRICOM has conducted training and other efforts to 

strengthen regional security, including combating piracy and maritime 

crime, since its creation in 2008. According to AFRICOM, State, and U.S. 

Coast Guard Officials, while U.S. efforts in the Gulf of Guinea are 

informed by the region’s specific geopolitical context, they also include 

efforts aimed to improve the prevention, disruption, and prosecution of 

piracy and maritime crime.

• Coordination of international activities and assistance: According to 

DOD and State officials, facilitating collaboration and avoiding 

duplication is important to U.S. and international partners. To help 

achieve this, and in recognition of increasing concern in the region, an 

ad hoc Group of Eight (G8) group called the G8++ Friends of the Gulf 

of Guinea was established to conduct high-level coordination and 

discussion of international assistance efforts.39

 38Maritime security activities in the Gulf of Guinea are primarily conducted by DOD and

State, while others such as U.S. Coast Guard and MARAD also play a role.

Further, State and 

AFRICOM officials said that as part of their planning process, 

AFRICOM holds planning conferences to solicit input from 

international partners, coordinate activities, and leverage resources. 

All U.S. officials we spoke with agreed that while the establishment of 

the Contact Group for the Horn of Africa was helpful in the absence of 

39Since 1997, the G8 has been a forum for the governments of eight of the world’s largest 

national economies—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United 

Kingdom, and the United States. In March 2014 it was announced that Russia would no 

longer take part in the international group; however, it is unknown how this will effect G8-

related organizations.

The United States Has 

Ongoing Efforts to 

Strengthen Maritime 

Security in the Gulf of 

Guinea

U.S. Efforts to Prevent Acts of 

Piracy and Maritime Crime
Page 32 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

a functioning Somali government, in the case of the Gulf of Guinea, 

solutions must emerge from the region itself, and the role of the 

international community is to support and promote African-led 

initiatives. For example, the U.S., through DOD and State, has 

supported and facilitated the efforts of the two relevant African 

economic communities—the Economic Community of West African 

States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African 

States (ECCAS)—to develop and lead efforts to prevent and suppress 

piracy. For example, according to AFRICOM and State officials, 

AFRICOM and respective U.S. embassies supported the recent 

development of a code of conduct concerning the prevention of 

piracy, armed robbery, and other maritime crime, which was signed in 

June 2013 by leaders of the Gulf of Guinea coastal states.

• Security advisories for U.S. vessels and ship protection measures: 

MARAD provides security advisories to alert U.S. vessel operators 

transiting all over the world, and in August 2008, MARAD issued a 

maritime advisory warning of piracy and criminal activity against oil 

industry and other vessels by Niger Delta militants in Nigerian 

territorial waters. Additionally, in August 2010, MARAD warned that 

vessels operating near oil platforms in Nigerian waters were at high 

risk of armed attacks and hostage taking, and advised vessels to act 

in accordance with Coast Guard directives on security plans and risk 

assessments. Further, in March 2012, shipping industry organizations 

in coordination with NATO issued interim guidelines for protection 

against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea as a companion to their August 

2011 BMP version 4 for the Horn of Africa region. Most recently, in 

July 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard directed U.S. vessels to revise their 

ship security plans and protective measures in response to continued 

attacks and lessons learned from investigations of recent incidents, 

including hijacking tankers for oil theft, acts of robbery, and 

kidnapping for ransom of vessel masters and officers from offshore oil 

exploration support vessels.

Unlike off the coast of Somalia, where agreements authorize international 

forces, including the United States, to disrupt pirate attacks in territorial 

waters and dismantle pirate bases ashore, every Gulf of Guinea country 

possesses the sovereign rights to control its maritime and land borders. 

Accordingly, the U.S. role and the majority of its efforts pertain to training, 

security assistance, and coordination, including the following activities:

• Bilateral equipment and training assistance to navies and coast 

guards: According to IMO, DOD, and State officials, the development 

of regional countries’ naval capabilities is critical to successfully 

U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Acts of 

Piracy and Maritime Crime
Page 33 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

fighting piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea. Further, DOD 

officials told us that regional navies have either nascent or insufficient 

national maritime forces to independently combat the crime that 

occurs off their coasts, let alone that which may occur farther out to 

sea. To increase capabilities for regional maritime forces, State, in 

coordination with DOD, provides bilateral assistance and training to 

countries in the region. This includes approximately $8.5 million since 

2010 in equipment and related training (e.g., vessels, engines, and 

maintenance training and parts) provided to countries in the greater 

Gulf of Guinea region to help build their maritime forces, according to 

State officials.40 Additionally, according to State budget documents, 

since 2010, State has used its Africa Maritime Security Initiative to 

provide regional maritime security training and support through the 

DOD’s Africa Partnership Station and requested $2 million for this 

effort in fiscal years 2013 and 2014.41

• Training exercises to strengthen regional response capabilities: In 

addition to equipment and training to build countries’ maritime forces, 

AFRICOM and its naval component, U.S. Naval Forces – Africa 

provide multilateral training to improve regional maritime security 

operations capability, such as navy-to-navy exercises focused on 

maritime interdiction operations and response. For example, the 

annual Obangame Express exercise is a multi-country, multi-fleet 

exercise that implements various scenarios over several days. Begun 

as a proof of concept in 2010 with limited countries and vessels 

 40According to State officials, this amount includes completed assistance programs with 

appropriated funding from fiscal years 2010 through2013; it does not include funding 

requests for fiscal year 2014 or activities with 2010 through 2013 funding that have not 

been fully executed. Additionally, State and AFRICOM officials said that their relevant Gulf 

of Guinea regional maritime security efforts, such as those provided through Africa 

Partnership Station, include West Africa countries not technically within the Gulf of 

Guinea.

41Africa Partnership Station, directed by AFRICOM and administered through U.S. Naval 

Forces – Africa, is the platform through which U.S. maritime security assistance—

including that through State and Coast Guard—is provided to Africa. According to Naval 

Forces–Africa program documents, the fundamental purpose is to foster safety and 

security at sea to help promote prosperity and development ashore, and its broad areas of 

effort include combating trafficking in North and West Africa, securing energy 

infrastructure and maritime transportation in the Gulf of Guinea, and countering Somaliabased piracy. AFRICOM officials stated this effort has grown from an individual U.S. 

training effort to a coordinated, international set of activities. For example, according to 

Naval Forces–Africa, in 2013 all ship contributions for Africa Partnership Station activities 

were from partner nations. 
Page 34 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

involved, the objectives of Obangame Express conducted in February 

2013, according to AFRICOM, were focused on information sharing 

and interoperability among 10 Gulf of Guinea countries, the ECCAS 

Combined Maritime Center, ECOWAS, as well as the United States 

and 4 international partners. The exercises involve combating and 

responding to various scenarios including oil bunkering, trafficking 

illegal cargo, illegal fishing, and piracy, and AFRICOM officials stated 

that future exercises already have commitments of expanded 

international and regional participation.

According to the Action Plan, facilitating the prosecution and detention of 

pirates off the Horn of Africa is a central element of U.S. efforts to combat 

piracy in the region. However, as previously noted, the majority of Gulf of 

Guinea maritime crimes occur within the territorial waters of one or more 

country and as a result are under their legal jurisdiction. As such, the U.S. 

role in prosecuting suspected criminals, like its role in prevention and 

disruption of attacks, is one of support and capacity building, such as the 

following efforts:

• Maritime law enforcement training and prosecution: According to 

DOD, State, and U.S. Coast Guard officials, much of the training the 

United States provides to maritime law enforcement in the Gulf of 

Guinea is similar to that provided in the Horn of Africa, and is used to 

combat a variety of crimes, such as narcotics trafficking, arms 

smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing, as well as piracy. For 

instance, in West Africa, AFRICOM and the Coast Guard provide 

training including visit, board, search, and seizure skills and 

mentorship through the African Maritime Law Enforcement 

Partnership (AMLEP) program, which aims to strengthen countries’

abilities to enforce their maritime laws. AMLEP targets illicit trafficking 

in drugs, arms, and humans, as well as counterpiracy issues and 

illegal fishing, and the program has resulted in the successful seizure 

and prosecution of illegal fisherman by African law enforcement 

officers in African waters, according to AFRICOM officials.

• Judicial capacity building: State’s Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement (INL) has conducted a series of regional 

maritime criminal justice seminars. Specifically, INL and the Africa 

Center for Strategic Studies have hosted a series of Trans-Atlantic 

Maritime Criminal Justice Workshops, which provide an opportunity 

for regional law enforcement agencies to learn about maritime crime 

and related gaps in their judicial systems. This series of conferences

included a June 2013 session for ECOWAS countries in Ghana, with 

the other conferences held in February 2013 in Cape Verde and 

U.S. Efforts to Support 

Prosecution of Suspected

Pirates and Maritime Criminals
Page 35 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

February 2014 in Benin. Additionally, according to State officials, in 

2013 the agency began discussions with the G8++ Friends of Gulf of 

Guinea to develop possible future U.S. programs to strengthen 

regional countries’ capacity to investigate and prosecute cases of 

armed robbery at sea and piracy.42

According to DOD and State officials, U.S. efforts to combat piracy and 

maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea are guided by the same over-arching 

U.S. policies and security goals as the efforts to combat piracy off of the 

Horn of Africa. These policies include the 2007 Policy for the Repression 

of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, the 2011 Strategy to 

Combat Transnational Organized Crime, the 2012 Strategy toward SubSaharan Africa, the 2012 National Strategy for Maritime Security, and the 

2013 National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan. For example, the 

Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime outlines East and 

West African maritime security as regional priorities, specifically noting 

incidents of Somali piracy and oil theft and kidnapping of oil workers in 

the Gulf of Guinea. DOD and State officials emphasized that U.S. efforts 

are then developed in consideration of the particular contexts of each 

region. In the case of Somalia, the surge and intensity of the rising piracy 

problem, the specific nature of the crime, and the absence of a 

functioning government presented a crisis that warranted collective 

international action, as well as a U.S. plan to guide its contribution to this 

response. Alternatively, State, DOD, and Coast Guard officials we spoke 

with explained that because the context of maritime crime in the Gulf of 

Guinea, and thereby the U.S. efforts there, encompass a broader set of 

geopolitical issues and maritime crimes, creating a piracy-focused plan 

similar to the Action Plan in the Horn of Africa may not be appropriate.

While there is not a whole-of-government plan to guide maritime security 

efforts in the Gulf of Guinea, DOD, State, Coast Guard, and others 

continue to expand and coordinate their maritime security activities there, 

which range from individual boarding team trainings to broad judicial 

sector reform. DOD and State officials told us that as the United States 

and international partners look to expand efforts in the Gulf of Guinea, 

coordinating activities to achieve the most effective mix and efficient use 

 42The United States also engages in a variety of judicial sector reform and bilateral 

governance programs intended to strengthen national judicial systems in Nigeria and 

other countries in the region, which includes but is not specifically aimed toward maritime 

law enforcement and prosecution capabilities, according to State officials.

The United States Has Not 

Assessed Piracy and 

Maritime Crime in the Gulf 

of Guinea
Page 36 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

of resources is increasingly important. For example, officials from U.S. 

Naval Forces – Africa stated that occasional duplication of training 

activities can happen, particularly as international partners increase their 

attention to the region. However, according to officials from the U.S. 

government agencies working in the region, the NSCS has not directed 

them to conduct a collective assessment of efforts to combat piracy and 

maritime crime that weighs the U.S. security interests, goals, and 

resources in the region against the various types of agency and 

international activities underway. Moreover, while individual agencies 

have conducted analysis regarding the incidents of piracy and maritime 

crime such as armed robbery and kidnapping in the region, there has not 

been a coordinated interagency appraisal of how the variety of existing 

and planned activities address U.S. policy objectives in the context of 

such a broad set of maritime crimes, from illegal fishing and oil theft, to 

arms trafficking and kidnapping of U.S. citizens from offshore supply 

vessels.

The National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan cites the importance of 

understanding new and emerging maritime challenges in the maritime 

domain, the development of solutions to address those challenges, and 

continuous reassessment using risk management principles. Further, the 

Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime outlines a specific set 

of U.S. priority actions to combat transnational criminal threats such as 

piracy and maritime crime, one of which is to increase research, data 

collection, and analysis to assess the scope and impact of such crime 

and the most effective means to combat it.

Individual agencies may include some assessment information into their 

planning and evaluation processes but this information is specific to 

agencies and programs rather than the overall U.S. effort. For example, 

according to AFRICOM officials, it uses available information to assess 

the operating environment, such as demographic surveys, to develop 

indicators to help measure program effectiveness, or it may conduct an 

assessment of a partner country’s naval capabilities to inform program 

design. However, the chief of the AFRICOM assessments directorate said 

this assessment process is relatively new for the command, and there are 

no known interagency efforts to leverage this information into a broader 

assessment of U.S. maritime security or counterpiracy efforts. 

Additionally, according to State officials from the Political-Military Affairs 

Bureau, while individual programs such as State’s foreign military 

financing or other security assistance activities may conduct evaluations 

of their programs, it is not part of a broader assessment of State’s 

regional maritime security activities.
Page 37 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Program guidance for other multi-agency international collaborative 

efforts—such as providing counternarcotics assistance to countries to 

disrupt drug production and trafficking—has also shown that assessing 

agencies’ progress in meeting established goals can provide better 

information for decision making. Guidance for these efforts demonstrates 

how incorporating elements of a strategic approach such as evaluating 

performance measures and setting performance targets can provide 

oversight and guide management decisions about the allotment of 

program resources.43 If a multi-agency collaborative plan, such as the 

Action Plan, was developed for the efforts that address piracy and 

maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, including elements of a strategic 

approach could help determine the best use of resources to meet its 

objectives.44

An assessment that identifies the various U.S. and international efforts 

underway to strengthen maritime security, examines the relationship of 

these efforts with the nature and scope of the problem in the region, and 

considers the geopolitical environment and other regional factors could 

help strengthen ongoing efforts to combat maritime crime, as well as 

inform the appropriate mix of activities in order to use resources most 

effectively. Further, such an assessment could help determine whether 

additional actions, such as developing an action plan or other guidance, is 

needed to align U.S. interagency efforts to better achieve national 

security goals. In commenting on a draft of this report, an NSCS official 

stated that a global action plan is being developed, with a separate annex 

focusing on the Gulf of Guinea, but did not indicate the extent to which 

the plan was based on an assessment of ongoing activities or would 

include elements of a strategic approach.

 43GAO, Counternarcotics Assistance: U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in Andean 

Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of Results, GAO-12-824 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 10, 2012).

44GAO-10-856. Elements of a strategic approach that could benefit such a plan include 

those previously recommended for the Action Plan to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa 

including defined agency roles and responsibilities; measurable goals and objectives 

linked to agency activities; a mechanism to assess the collective effectiveness, costs, and 

benefits of U.S. interagency activities; and a process to revise the plan as necessary to 

address evolving conditions, assessments of U.S. efforts, and priorities.
Page 38 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Since our September 2010 report on piracy off the Horn of Africa, the 

U.S. Government—as part of an international partnership—has continued 

to take steps outlined in the Action Plan to counter piracy. In 2013, piracy 

steeply declined off the Horn of Africa, but the gains are tenuous and 

piracy could easily resurge if the international coalition becomes 

complacent. Whether piracy incidents are rising or declining, it is 

important for the Action Plan to be updated to account for current 

circumstances. In addition, our current work indicates that the U.S. 

Government has not implemented additional steps we recommended to 

identify measures of effectiveness, identify costs and benefits, and clarify 

agency roles and responsibilities. We are not making any new 

recommendations regarding the Action Plan for the Horn of Africa, but we 

continue to believe that our 2010 recommendations remain relevant to the 

changing conditions, and acting on these recommendations would assist 

the NSCS—and DOD and State as the co-chairs of the Counter-Piracy 

Steering Group—in better assessing, planning, and implementing actions 

to counter piracy as it continues to evolve, and would help ensure that 

recent progress is sustained.

Meanwhile, piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea has escalated 

and in 2013 surpassed the Horn of Africa in terms of incidents. The 

variety of U.S. efforts by multiple government agencies to combat piracy 

in the region highlights the importance of having coordinated activities 

that combine the most effective mix of resources. Without a collective 

assessment of the scope and nature of the problem of piracy and 

maritime crime, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea where no such collective 

assessment has occurred, the U.S. may not be coordinating its efforts in 

the most effective or cost efficient manner. An assessment of the various 

U.S. and international efforts, as well as of the geopolitical environment 

and other regional factors could help determine what additional actions 

are needed to align all of the efforts underway. Furthermore, an 

assessment of whether and to what extent such actions, such as 

developing an action plan that would include elements of a strategic 

approach, is needed can guide decision making to address the evolving 

threat, coordinate resources and efforts, and prioritize maritime security 

activities in the Gulf of Guinea.

To help ensure that efforts to counter piracy and maritime crime are 

coordinated and prioritized to effectively address the evolving threat, we 

recommend that the Assistant to the President for National Security 

Affairs, in collaboration with the Secretaries of Defense and State, work 

through the Counter-Piracy Steering Group or otherwise collaborate with 

Conclusions

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 39 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Transportation, and the Treasury, 

and the Attorney General to

• conduct an assessment of U.S. efforts to address piracy and maritime 

crime in the Gulf of Guinea to inform these efforts and

• determine whether additional actions to address counterpiracy and 

maritime security, such as developing an action plan that includes 

elements of a strategic approach, are needed to guide and coordinate 

activities.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, DOT, 

Treasury, and the NSCS for review and comment. DHS, DOJ, DOT, and

Treasury, did not provide official comments on our draft report and DOD 

and State deferred to the NSCS for comments on the recommendations. 

In an email from the NSCS dated June 12, 2014, the NSCS did not 

concur or non-concur with our recommendations, but provided 

information related to its current counterpiracy efforts.

Specifically, the NSCS stated that it is coordinating with departments and

agencies through the interagency process to develop a global action plan 

for countering piracy, with separate annexes focusing on the Horn of 

Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. The updated plan will provide guidance to 

the federal government focusing on three core areas including: prevention 

of attacks, response to acts of maritime crime, and enhancing maritime 

security and governance. The plan will be forthcoming in the summer of 

2014 and the Executive Branch will continue to evaluate maritime crime 

around the world and develop or refine guidance to account for evolving 

conditions in specific regions.

We are encouraged by the steps being taken by the NSCS in providing 

the federal agencies responsible for counterpiracy activities with an 

updated plan, but it is not clear to what extent the plan will include 

previously recommended elements of a strategic approach. The 

description of the plan appears to provide a needed update to the Action 

Plan given the changes in conditions off of the Horn of Africa. The 

updated plan also appears to be responsive to part of our 

recommendation to consider additional actions such as developing a 

similar plan for the Gulf of Guinea. However, the description of the plan 

does not address the extent to which it will include elements such as an 

assessment of costs and benefits, measures of effectiveness to evaluate 

counterpiracy efforts, and defined roles and responsibilities for the 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 40 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

agencies involved in carrying out counterpiracy activities. Further, the 

description does not address the extent to which the updated plan is 

based on an assessment of ongoing counterpiracy activities in the Gulf of 

Guinea. We will monitor the situation and review the updated plan once it 

is released and will continue to monitor the NSCS’s progress in planning 

and providing guidance for counterpiracy activities as well as DOD and 

State’s progress in implementing the plan as co-chairs of the Counter 

Piracy Steering Group.

DOD, DHS, and DOJ provided technical comments on a draft of this 

report which have been incorporated as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its 

issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Assistant

to the President for National Security Affairs; the Attorney General; the 

Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, State, Transportation, and 

the Treasury; and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be 

made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

either Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov or 

Chris P. Currie at (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are found in 

Appendix V.

Stephen L. Caldwell

Director, Homeland Security and Justice

Chris P. Currie

Acting Director, Defense Capabilities

 and Management
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 41 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

This report assesses how piracy off the Horn of Africa has changed since 

2010 and describes U.S. efforts to assess its counterpiracy actions, given 

any changing conditions; and identifies trends in piracy and maritime 

crime in the Gulf of Guinea and U.S. efforts to address them and 

evaluates the extent to which the United States has assessed its 

counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea.

To assess how piracy off the Horn of Africa has changed since 2010, we 

analyzed data from the International Chamber of Commerce’s 

International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the U.S. Office of Naval 

intelligence (ONI) on reported piracy incidents, hostages taken, and 

ransoms paid off the Horn of Africa from 2008 through 2013.1 We 

discussed data-collection methods, processes for data entry, and the 

steps taken to ensure the reliability of the data with both IMB and ONI 

officials. We collected information from both IMB and ONI on their 

processes for quality control, data verification, and how potential errors 

are identified and corrected. We also discussed variation between IMB 

and ONI data with officials from ONI and other Department of Defense 

(DOD) organizations, the Department of State (State), and IMB, who 

attributed differences in categorization of incidents, validation of sources, 

and geographic scope to the variation.2 Officials stated that while values 

between ONI and IMB data may differ, IMB is a generally accepted data 

source for tracking global piracy incidents and suitably reflects general 

historical trends.

3

 1

The IMB collects its data on piracy incidents through its Piracy Reporting Centre. 

According to the IMB, the primary functions of the center are: to be a single point of 

contact for ship masters anywhere in the world who are under piratical or armed robbery 

attack; to immediately relay information received to local law enforcement 

agencies requesting assistance; and to immediately broadcast the information to all 

vessels in the region in order to increase overall domain awareness. 

We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of describing the context, trends, and scope of pirate attacks off 

the Horn of Africa in this report. In addition, we met with U.S. agency 

2

We reviewed unclassified ONI data that is aggregated from multiple information sources 

(e.g., all-source data such as company- or vessel-provided information, media reports, 

and IMB data, as well as other U.S. and international partner entities such as MARAD, 

NATO, and the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization) and corroborated with other 

U.S. Government entities. IMB data is based on self-reporting of actual and attempted 

incidents by vessels and companies directly to IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre. 

3

IMB officials told us there is the potential for underreporting with their data because they 

rely on ship officials to provide the information, and the extent to which individuals are 

willing to report incidents can vary.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 42 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

officials, international partners, and representatives from insurance, 

shipping, and private security industry associations to discuss their 

involvement in counterpiracy activities such as developing best practices 

for protecting ships from pirate attack, working with the international 

Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, and participating in 

naval patrols off the Horn of Africa.4 We met with officials from shipping 

industry associations that represent owners and operators from over 80 

percent of the world’s merchant fleet and provide a unified industry voice 

in the creation of industry policy and strategy; insurance industry 

associations whose members cover approximately 90 percent of the 

world’s ocean-going tonnage; and a private security industry association 

that has over 180 members across 35 countries. While the statements of 

these industry officials cannot be generalized to the entire industries they 

represent, their perspectives provide valuable insight since each is 

actively involved in international collaborative efforts to combat piracy. To 

determine the extent to which the U.S. has assessed its counterpiracy 

actions as outlined in the 2008 Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: 

Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan), we reviewed the Action Plan, 

the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, the 2007 Policy for the 

Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, relevant 

U.S. policies and laws, and United Nations Security Council resolutions. 

We also reviewed program documents including briefings and meeting 

summaries and interviewed officials from DOD, State, and the 

Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), Transportation 

(DOT), and the Treasury, including components such as U.S. Naval 

Forces – Central Command, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to discuss implementation of the Action 

Plan and the status of our 2010 recommendations to improve the plan.5

 4

Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008), which encouraged states and 

regional organizations fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to 

establish an international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact, the 

Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia was established on January 14, 2009, 

to facilitate the discussion and coordination of actions among states and organizations to 

suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. 

We selected these departments and agencies because the Action Plan 

states they shall contribute to, coordinate, and undertake initiatives in 

accordance with the plan.

5

GAO, Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance 

Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa, 

GAO-10-856 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2010).
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 43 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

To identify trends in piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea we 

analyzed IMB data on actual and attempted piracy incidents from 2007 

through 2013, and ONI data from 2010 through 2013. As with the IMB 

and ONI data pertaining to the Horn of Africa, we collected information on 

the quality control, verification, and safeguards from error and discussed 

the reliability of the data with officials from IMB, ONI, and State officials 

involved in maritime security initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea and 

determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report. Because ONI data on the Gulf of Guinea is unavailable prior to 

2010 we chose to present the IMB data from 2007 through 2013 

alongside the ONI data to show trends over a broader period. In addition 

to data, we reviewed publicly available reports and documents regarding 

maritime security and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea from the United Nations 

Office on Drugs and Crime, the EU, and other multilateral and 

nongovernmental organizations. To evaluate U.S. efforts to address 

piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the extent to 

which the U.S. has assessed the need for a strategic approach for the 

region, we reviewed relevant U.S. and international policies and laws, 

such as the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, 2007 Policy for 

the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, the 

2008 Action Plan, the 2012 Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, and 

United Nations Security Council resolutions pertaining to the Gulf of 

Guinea. We also compared agency efforts with U.S. policy priorities and 

requirements for conducting assessments outlined in the 2011 Strategy to 

Combat Transnational Organized Crime and the 2013 National Maritime 

Domain Awareness Plan, documents that guide U.S. maritime security 

efforts, including in the Gulf of Guinea.

For both of our objectives, we interviewed officials and, where 

appropriate, obtained documentation related to their activities off the Horn 

of Africa or in the Gulf of Guinea such as fact sheets, briefings, and 

meeting summaries from the following U.S. government agencies and 

offices, international entities, and U.S. and international industry and 

nongovernmental organizations:

• Office of the General Counsel; Office of the Undersecretary of 

Defense for Policy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Counter-Narcotics and Global Threats; and the Joint Staff 

J5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate

• Department of the Navy, as well as the Naval Criminal Investigative 

Service, and the Office of Naval Intelligence

Department of Defense
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 44 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

• U.S. Africa Command (Germany) and its components U.S. Naval 

Forces – Africa and Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa

• U.S. Central Command and its component U.S. Naval Forces –

Central Command (Bahrain)

• Office of the Legal Adviser for: Economic and Business Affairs; and 

Law Enforcement and Intelligence

• Bureau of African Affairs

• Bureau of Counterterrorism

• Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs

• Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

• Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

• Bureau of International Organization Affairs

• Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

• U.S. Coast Guard offices, including the National Defense Strategy 

Division, Maritime Security (Counterterrorism) Division, Office of 

International Affairs and Foreign Policy; Office of Commercial Vessel 

Compliance; Office of Budget and Programs; and the Intelligence 

Coordination Center

• U.S. Coast Guard representatives at other agencies, including U.S. 

Africa Command (Germany) and Patrol Forces Southwest Asia 

(Bahrain)

• National Security Division; the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and 

Dangerous Drug Section, International Criminal Investigative Training 

Assistance Program, and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 

Development Assistance Training

• Federal Bureau of Investigation

• Office of the General Counsel

• Maritime Administration: Office of the Associate Administrator for 

Environment and Compliance and its Office of Security; Office of the 

Chief Counsel; Office of International Activities

• Office of General Counsel; Office of Terrorism and Financial 

Intelligence and its offices of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes 

and Foreign Assets Control; Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

Department of State

Department of Homeland 

Security

Department of Justice

Department of 

Transportation

Department of the 

Treasury
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 45 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

• International Maritime Organization (United Kingdom)

• European Union Naval Forces (United Kingdom)

• Combined Maritime Forces (Bahrain)

• Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Meeting (observed in Bahrain)

• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the NATO Shipping 

Centre (United Kingdom)

• United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)

• Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO)

• Center for Strategic and International Studies

• Chamber of Shipping of America

• International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO)

• International Association of Independent Tanker Owners 

(INTERTANKO)

• International Chamber of Shipping

• International Group of P&I Clubs

• International Maritime Bureau

• International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF)

• Japanese Shipowners’ Association

• Lloyd’s Market Association

• Maersk Line, Limited

• Oceans Beyond Piracy

• Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)

• Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)

• Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI)

• Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators Limited 

(SIGTTO)

We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

International Government 

and Multilateral 

Organizations include:

Industry Partners and 

Nongovernmental 

Organizations include:
Appendix II: Attempted and Successful Pirate 

Attacks off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of 

Guinea, 2010 through 2013

Page 46 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Figure 9: Attempted and Successful Pirate Attacks off the Horn of Africa, 2010 through 2013

Appendix II: Attempted and Successful 

Pirate Attacks off the Horn of Africa and in 

the Gulf of Guinea, 2010 through 2013
Appendix II: Attempted and Successful Pirate 

Attacks off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of 

Guinea, 2010 through 2013

Page 47 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Figure 10: Attempted and Successful Pirate Attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, 2010 through 2013
Appendix III: Interagency Progress in 

Implementing the Lines of Action in the 

National Security Council’s 2008 Countering 

Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and 

Action Plan

Page 48 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

In September 2010, we assessed the counterpiracy efforts of the United 

States government against the lines of action identified in the Countering 

Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan).1

These lines of action continue to guide the United States’ efforts off the 

Horn of Africa. Table 3 summarizes our assessments from our September 

2010 report and also provides updated information for each action since 

that time.2

Table 3: Interagency Progress in Implementing the Lines of Action in the National Security Council’s (NSC) 2008 Action Plan

Tasks within each Line of Action Status as of March 2014 

Line of Action 1: Prevent pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain to piracy

Establish and maintain a Contact Group We assessed that the United States had made substantial progress on this 

action in 2010 by helping establish the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast 

of Somalia, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1851. Chaired by the 

United States in 2013, the voluntary group of over 80 countries, 

organizations, and industry groups facilitate the discussion and coordination 

of actions among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of 

Somalia. The 2014 chair is the European Union.

Strengthen and encourage the use of the Maritime 

Security Patrol Area

We assessed that the United States had made substantial progress in this 

area in 2010 by working with international and industry partners. Since that 

time, the U.S. has continued to strengthen patrols by providing surface and 

air support. The U.S. has also actively encouraged practices such as 

registering with the regional coordination center and traveling in convoys. 

However, the United States has limited influence with ships that are not U.S. 

flagged. 

Updating ships’ security plans We assessed that the Coast Guard had made substantial progress in this 

area in 2010 by approving piracy annexes to ship security plans for 100 

percent of U.S.-flagged vessels identified as transiting high-risk waters, 

including those in the Horn of Africa. The Coast Guard has also issued 

Maritime Security (MARSEC) Directives that provide direction to owners and 

operators of U.S. vessels on how to respond to emerging security threats. 

The industry updated the Best Management Practices by releasing BMP4 in 

August 2011 to include recommended risk assessments and planning 

practices. 

 1

GAO, Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance 

Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa, 

GAO-10-856 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2010). 

2

In our September 2010 report, we assessed the efforts of U.S. agencies using three 

levels of progress: (1) substantial progress, (2) some progress, and (3) little or no 

progress.

Appendix III: Interagency Progress in 

Implementing the Lines of Action in the 

National Security Council’s 2008 Countering 

Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and 

Action Plan
Appendix III: Interagency Progress in 

Implementing the Lines of Action in the 

National Security Council’s 2008 Countering 

Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and 

Action Plan

Page 49 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Tasks within each Line of Action Status as of March 2014 

Strategic communication The U.S. government made some progress on this in 2010 by issuing 

counterpiracy statements and supporting international efforts. Since 2010, the 

United States began periodic anti-piracy radio programming in Somalia in 

coordination with local organizations, NATO, and the United Nations (UN). In 

November 2013, the Somali Government took over the responsibility for 

strategic communication.

Line of Action 2: Disrupt acts of piracy consistent with international law and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and

flag states

Support a regionally based Counter-Piracy Coordination 

Center (CPCC)

We assessed that this action was not applicable in 2010 because there were 

already reporting and monitoring functions being performed by other 

organizations. While the United States has not directly established a 

regional counterpiracy coordination center, the United States provides 

assistance to other centers. For example, the United Kingdom has 

established the Regional Fusion and Law Enforcement Center for Safety 

and Security at Sea in partnership with the Seychelles. State and DOJ have 

worked with the center to improve information sharing and coordination with 

INTERPOL. EU NAVFOR has also established the Maritime Security Centre 

– Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) to provide 24-hour manned monitoring of 

vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden. While the United States 

supports the mission of these centers, State officials stated that it would be 

duplicative to establish one of its own and have no plans to do so.

Seize and destroy pirate vessels and related equipment 

and deliver suspected pirates to prosecuting states

We assessed that the U.S. government had made some progress in this 

area in 2010. Since that time, the United States and international forces 

have delivered over 1,000 piracy suspects for prosecution. The United 

States and international forces have also continued to seize vessels and 

equipment used for piracy.

Provide interdiction-capable presence The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard had made substantial progress on this in 

2010 and continue to contribute assets (such as ship and air patrols), 

leadership, and other support to coalition forces patrolling off the Horn of 

Africa. As piracy has decreased the United States has contributed fewer 

Naval patrols, but air patrols and other contributions have been more 

consistent. 

Support shipridera The U.S. government had made some progress on this in 2010 and 

continues to support other bilateral and regional arrangements to bolster 

regional capabilities to counter piracy. These include collecting and 

analyzing incident information, as well as facilitating assistance and a 

coordinated and effective information flow among partners.

programs and other agreements

DOJ officials stated that U.S. agencies have not established shiprider 

programs and have no plans to do so because the U.N. has designated 

Somalia’s territorial waters as international waters for the purpose of fighting 

piracy. Therefore they question the benefits of shiprider programs to 

facilitating prosecutions in this context. 

Disrupt and dismantle pirate bases ashore While the U.S. government had taken little or no action on this in 2010, the 

EU has since taken military action against pirate bases on the Somali coast. 

As a result, pirate bases have been largely dismantled or moved inland 

where DOD officials reported that they are a less effective threat.
Appendix III: Interagency Progress in 

Implementing the Lines of Action in the 

National Security Council’s 2008 Countering 

Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and 

Action Plan

Page 50 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Tasks within each Line of Action Status as of March 2014 

Disrupt pirate revenue The U.S. government had made some progress on this in 2010 as the 

President signed an executive order blocking assets of certain designated 

individuals, including two pirate financiers.b

Line of Action 3: Facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates by flag, victim, and coastal states, and, in appropriate cases, 

the United States to ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their actions 

However, U.S. efforts to track 

financial assets or transactions are hampered because there are not 

financial institutions in Somalia.

Conclude prosecution agreements In 2010, we noted that the U.S. government had made some progress in this 

area. Since that time a prosecution agreement with Kenya has become less 

effective because Kenya’s judicial system has become saturated with piracy 

suspects, according to State and Justice officials. The United States has a 

prosecution agreement with the Seychelles.

Support the exercise of jurisdiction under the 

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 

against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 

In 2010, we noted that the U.S. government had made some progress in this 

area. The United States continues to exercise jurisdiction under the 

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 

Maritime Navigation to prosecute pirates in the United States.

Support the use of other applicable international 

conventions and laws

Having made some progress in 2010, the United States has continued to 

exercise jurisdiction and prosecute, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1651, 11 

suspected pirates for attacks on the USS Nicholas and USS Ashland, as 

well as 15 suspected pirates tied to the hijacking of the S/V Quest which 

resulted in the murder of four Americans. 

Enhance regional states’ capacity to prosecute While having made some progress on this in 2010, U.S. agencies continue 

to provide assistance to countries in the region for law enforcement and 

judicial capacity building and reform, which can include assistance related to 

maritime law enforcement and piracy. For example, the State Department 

has provided some foreign assistance funding to countries such as Kenya 

and the Seychelles, to help improve their judicial infrastructures. The United 

States also supports investigations and prosecutions, such as conducting 

Naval Criminal Investigative Service investigations aboard pirated vessels, 

and having U.S. Navy personnel provide testimony in foreign trials. 

Source: GAO summary of the NSC Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan. | GAO-14-422

a Shiprider programs involve embarking law enforcement officials from one country onto a ship of 

another country. The law enforcement official (shiprider) would be able to authorize the ship to pursue 

and apprehend a criminal suspect in the territorial waters of that official’s country.

b Executive Order 13536, issued April 12, 2010, blocks all property and property interests within U.S. 

jurisdiction of persons listed in the Annex to the order and provides the authority for the Secretary of 

the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to designate additional persons that threaten 

the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, which includes those who support or engage in acts of 

piracy off the coast of Somalia. See 75 Fed. Reg. 19,869 (Apr. 15, 2014). Property and property 

interests within U.S. jurisdiction include property in the possession or control of any United States 

person in the United States or overseas. United States person is defined as “any United States 

citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any 

jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States.”
Appendix IV: Department of Defense 

Counterpiracy Costs, 2010 through 2013

Page 51 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

During the course of our review, the Department of Defense provided 

information on the costs of its counterpiracy efforts as shown in table 

4.

Table 4: Department of Defense Counterpiracy Costs Incurred from Calendar Years 

2010-2013 (dollars in millions)

Counterpiracy effort 2010 2011 2012 2013

CTF 151 Surface $161.1 $184.9 $53.5 $10.9

CTF 151 Air 17.9 23.9 33.5 16.0

CTF 508 Surface 61.7 63.2 52.7 40.0

Other 2.5 a 2.5 2.5 2.5

Total $243.2 $274.5 $142.2 $69.4

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data. | GAO-14-422

a

Appendix IV: Department of Defense 

Counterpiracy Costs, 2010 through 2013

The “other” category reflects the costs of contract linguists used in counterpiracy operations. Dollar 

values are fully-burdened costs incurred in a specific year.
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 52 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov. 

Chris P. Currie, (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov

In addition to the contacts above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director; Suzanne 

Wren, Assistant Director; Jason Bair; Charles Bausell; Jennifer Cheung; 

Toni Gillich; Eric Hauswirth; Kevin Heinz; Stan Kostyla; Landis Lindsey; 

Tom Lombardi; John Mingus; Jessica Orr; Matt Spiers; and Sally 

Williamson made key contributions to this report.

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 53 GAO-14-422 Combating Maritime Piracy 

Defense Headquarters: DOD Needs to Periodically Review and Improve 

Visibility of Combatant Commands’ Resources. GAO-13-293. 

Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2013.

Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage 

Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation.

GAO-13-335T. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2013.

Maritime Security: Progress Made, but Further Actions Needed to Secure 

the Maritime Energy Supply. GAO-11-883T. Washington, D.C.: August 

24, 2011.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, 

Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness.

GAO-11-621. Washington, D.C.: June, 20, 2011.

Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan Gains 

Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa. GAO-11-449T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2011.

Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and 

Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off 

the Horn of Africa. GAO-10-856. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2010.

Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency 

Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa. GAO-10-794. 

Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of 

Africa Task Force. GAO-10-504. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.

Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were 

Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. GAO-08-672. 

Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2008.

Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in 

Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity 

Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007.

Related GAO Products

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