Islamic Radicalization 

in the United States 

New Trends and a Proposed 

Methodology for Disruption 

Samuel Musa and Samuel Bendett 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University 

September 2010 
ii

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official 

policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the 

U.S. Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from 

unclassified materials. 

Samuel Musa is a Senior Research Fellow and the Homeland Security Science and 

Technology Chair at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), 

National Defense University. Dr. Musa served on Defense Intelligence Advisory Board, 

Army Science Board, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Air Force Foreign 

Technology Division Advisory Board, Air Force Logistics Command Scientific Advisory 

Board, and was Executive Secretary of Defense Science Board Summer Studies and Task 

Forces, as well as a member of Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee of the 

Director of Central Intelligence. Dr. Musa received his B.A. and B.S. in Electrical 

Engineering degrees from Rutgers University, and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Applied 

Physics from Harvard University 

Samuel Bendett is a Research Associate with the CTNSP Homeland Security Team, 

National Defense University. His previous work encompassed security and foreign policy 

issues at the U.S. Congress and a range of private and non-profit consulting companies. 

Mr. Bendett received his MA in International Security and Conflict Resolution studies 

from the Fletcher School and a BA degree in English and Politics from Brandeis 

University. 

Defense & Technology Papers are published by the National Defense University Center for Technology 

and National Security Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. CTNSP publications are available 

at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html. 
iii

Contents 

Executive Summary............................................................................................................ 4

Introduction......................................................................................................................... 5

Radicalization Model—Evolving Causes........................................................................... 7

Case Studies of Islamic Radicalization—Basic Trends and Principles............................ 10

A. 9/11 Timeline and Implications for Future Understanding................................... 10

B. 2010 Attempted Times Square Bombing.............................................................. 11

C. Lackawanna Six—the Case of Yemeni-Americans from Upstate New York. .... 12

D. Self-indoctrination—the Case of “Jihad Jane,” or Coleen Rene LaRose ............ 15

The Power of Technology in Radicalization .................................................................... 17

Conclusions....................................................................................................................... 25

Recommendations............................................................................................................. 28
4

Executive Summary

Over the past several years, the United States government and law enforcement agencies 

have become increasingly concerned with the spread and influence of Islamic 

radicalization amongst U.S. citizens and naturalized American individuals. Many such 

individuals are taking action intended to harm Americans and American interests 

domestically or abroad. Evidence points to a sophisticated and evolving indoctrination 

campaign that targets not just Americans of Muslim faith, but the larger population. It is 

becoming essential to view the spread of this radicalization as a technologically advanced 

phenomenon that should be addressed within the context of the evolving nature of the 

threat. This paper presents a study on practical and realistic assessments of Islamic 

radicalization in the United States and offers suggestions for its mitigation. In particular, 

the paper will address the emergence of the Internet as the battleground of ideas with the 

radical version of Islam, and will offer suggestions for addressing this problem for the 

government and law enforcement efforts. 
5

Introduction

To help policymakers understand and discuss the approaches to countering Islamic 

radicalization in the United States, the Center for Technology and National Security 

Policy (CTNSP) Homeland Security team is conducting a study on practical and realistic 

assessments of this threat and proposals to mitigate it. This paper addresses the growing 

and evolving threat of domestic terrorism that is advocated and perpetrated by radical 

Islamic ideologues. Specifically, we will review terrorist attempts on American soil and 

against the American population in order to offer recommendations. For the purpose of 

this study, only Islam-inspired terrorist activity will be reviewed; other activity related to 

fundamentalist Christian or activist anti-U.S. government actions will not be discussed. 

This paper does not attempt a discourse on the Islamic religion in general. Rather, 

specific ideological underpinnings that have inspired a few people to acts of terrorism for 

the sake of Islam will be scrutinized and reviewed. 

This study is necessary for several reasons. The first and most fundamental is the fact that 

the nature of terrorism in the United States is changing; over the past several years, major 

terrorist attempts were conducted by American-born or naturalized citizens.1 

Second, there is no longer a definite profile for an individual ready to commit terrorist 

acts in the name of radical Islam: "The profile is broken, [and] it's women as well as men, 

it's lifelong Muslims as well as converts, it's college students as well as jailbirds," 

according to a terrorist expert at the Georgetown University.2 

Third, the proliferation of personal technology is making it easy—and increasingly 

likely—for aspiring terrorists to gather intelligence, conduct surveillance, and design and 

carry out a terrorist act. The most notable factor linking the latest terrorist attempts is the 

Internet, which also offers a plethora of information on the religious ideology and 

indoctrination of the latest terrorist actors and suspects. Countering this latest 

technological trend is a formidable task for the intelligence and law enforcement 

community that requires development of different approaches to tracking and monitoring 

potential threats. 

Fourth, dealing with Islamic radicalization requires improved understanding of and 

familiarity with the larger Muslim community in the United States, which is diverse 

along ethnic, social, confessional, and geopolitical lines and does not represent a single 

Islamic point of view. 

Lastly, a review of radicalization timelines is necessary to better understand—and 

continuously update—the process of personal radicalization in the name of religion in 

order to develop better observation and prevention techniques. “It is difficult to say 

whether the uptick in [terrorist] cases is because law enforcement has gotten better at 

 

1

 http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/noticeable-increase-number-americans-arrested-al-qaedarelated-terrorism 

2

 Ibid. 
6

catching suspects or if there are simply more to catch,” according to the homeland 

security publication on the increase in the number of Americans arrested for al-Qaedarelated terrorism.3

This paper reviewed the timeline of how a suspected homegrown terrorist moves quickly 

from adopting extremist rhetoric to becoming a suicide bomber, which creates a 

challenge to law enforcement. “Individuals can be radicalized in a number of ways—by 

direct contact with terrorists abroad or in the United States, over the Internet or on their 

own through a process of self-radicalization,” said Assistant Attorney General David 

Kris, the top counterterrorism official at the Justice Department. These cases, Kris said, 

“underscore the constantly evolving nature of the threat we face.”4 Moreover, no single 

reason exists that attracts people to terrorism. According to Michael Chertoff, former 

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “it’s a combination of 

psychology, sociology, and people who, just for cultural reasons, gravitate” to Islamic 

extremism. We can’t assume we’ve got months and years”[to apprehend them].5

 

 

3

 Ibid. 

4

 Ibid. 

5

 Ibid. 
7

Radicalization Model—Evolving Causes 

Islamic radicalization in the United States is an evolving model that requires close 

attention and careful review. Prior radicalization models concentrated on personal 

interactions between those who preach and propagate forceful action in the name of 

religion and those who are receptive to such a message. This personal interaction between 

the “enabler” and “potential recruit” still remains, with a caveat—modern communication 

technology has extended the reach of the enabler. According to numerous official 

statistics, there are disaffected, alienated people throughout the United States who, for 

decades, have joined gangs and cults in search of an identity. According to experts, 

radical Islamist groups are yet another destination for those who seek purpose in their 

lives.6

 In many cases, such individuals have no criminal record and can blend into 

society. These are the people who could be affected by a call to action by an “enabler,” as 

they try to seek purpose in their lives.7

 

What some recent perpetrators of terrorist acts have in common is presence of 

community where the frustrated individual’ views may have been discussed, enforced, 

strengthened, sharpened and ultimately, radicalized. Such is not the case of everyone. 

Fazal Shazad, the Times Square bomber, was not part of a notable Muslim community in 

Connecticut where he spent the last year before attempting to detonate an automobile 

laden with explosives. Therefore, a continuous update of radicalization metrics is 

necessary in discussing how one gets involved with the radical Islamic ideology. 

CTNSP’s May 2008 study on the homegrown terrorism8

 identified a cluster of conditions 

that must be present for an individual to become radicalized. The effect is cumulative and 

iterative: removing one or more of these conditions may lower the radicalization level 

below the threshold required for violence. For example, an individual who is seeking an 

ideology, but who has no contact with a group and no particular grievance (i.e., has not 

been exposed to precipitants), will be unlikely to embrace terrorism (see figure 1.) 

The CTNSP study on homegrown terrorism identified specific initiatives to counter and 

disrupt indoctrination tactics and methodologies, which were listed in the West Point 

Combating Terrorism Center.9 In particular, the study encouraged law enforcement and 

intelligence community to exploit mistakes by radical Islamic jihadists. It also 

encouraged publicizing ideological retractors (leveraging the recanting of violence by 

former terrorists), as well as engaging mainstream Muslim clerics to issue fatwas 

(religious rulings) that incriminate the Jihadist Movement and their actions. 

 

6

 http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/noticeable-increase-number-americans-arrested-al-qaedarelated-terrorism?page=0,1 

7

 Ibid. The cases of the “Lackawanna Six” and Coleen LaRose, discussed below, exemplify this trend 8

 Kimberley L. Thachuk, Marion E. “Spike” Bowman, and Courtney Richardson, Homegrown Terrorism: 

the Threat Within, Defense & Technology Paper 48 (Washington, D: Center For Technology and National 

Security Policy, May 2008). 

9

 Jarret Brachman, Director of Research, West Point Combating Terrorism Center: “Abu Yahya’s Six Easy 

Steps for Defeating Al-Qaeda.” 
8

Figure 1. Disrupting radicalization patterns. 

What is changing in comparison with earlier cases and attempts is the time it takes 

individuals to become affiliated with more radical directions of Islamic ideology and to 

begin undertaking steps, which they believe is an inevitable goal of their new direction in 

life. Law enforcement and government agencies tasked with understanding, monitoring, 

and interdicting potential terrorist action must understand that the overall radicalization 

process is changing completely. 

Individual Enabler-leader Maturation

and training

Act

MUSLIM COMMUNITY

Pre-2009 general radicalization model involved individuals dedicated to their cause who 

lived, trained and received indoctrination, advice and support from within the Muslim 

community’s radicalized elements.

Present and future radicalization model takes the Muslim community and access to religious 

message into consideration, but does not require it – knowledge and radical Islamic message 

can be obtained from the Internet by an individual who was assimilated into larger American 

society.

Individual Knowledge Training/Access Act

INTERNET

MUSLIM COMMUNITY

Figure 2. The changing nature of Islamic radicalization in the United States. 

Analysis, resources, and technologies, were directed at recognizing, monitoring, and 

possibly identifying radicalized elements within the larger domestic Muslim community. 

It was believed that within large demographic concentrations of American Muslims, few 

disaffected, angered, or radicalized individuals could nurture their internal religious 

Support for 

violence

Precipitants

Ideological 

seeking

Contact 

with a 

group

Charismatic 

leader

Indoctrination

Internalize 

values
9

struggle until it could be manifested in specific acts. At the same time, the largely 

peaceful and largely integrated American Muslim community provided an effective 

“screen” to these individuals by virtue of the perception that an entire ethnic/religious 

community in the United States does not intend to attack the American way of life by 

forceful and/or illegal means. In this context, gathering information on individuals within 

a larger community is not without problems and controversies, as concerns about security 

and intelligence gathering meet with the constitutional issues of human rights and 

discrimination. 

Recent events have brought to light the evolving nature of an individual’s relationship 

and interaction with radical versions of Islam. The larger community—the house of 

worship, family and friends, constant presence of cultural and social backgrounds—are 

no longer necessary. While in some cases, the community acts as a backdrop to an 

individual’s perception of his or her role as a devout Muslim, in others it is the quest of 

the individual, far away from such community and connecting via Internet, that could 

lead to acts of terrorism. In such cases, individuals gain access to knowledge 

databases―radical teachings, sermons, preaching, essays, audio and video 

clips―available on various websites and content-sharing sites like YouTube. A leader 

who personally directs an individual toward more radicalized Islamic teachings may not 

be necessary at this crucial stage, making it harder for law enforcement to determine the 

origin and scope of motives that could lead to terrorist acts. Already in 2007, the 

intelligence community warned in an assessment that the spread of radical Internet 

websites and a growing number of self-generating cells in Western countries "indicate 

that the radical and violent segment of the West's Muslim population is expanding, 

including in the United States."10 By mid-2010, recruitment efforts are not fully known, 

nor can they be accurately determined. According to Richard Nelson, a retired naval 

officer who served with the National Counterterrorism Center, points to the difficulty of 

tracking a trend that involves multiple groups with varying objectives.11 What is now 

becoming clear is that past benchmarks for engaging, identifying, surveying, and 

interdicting potential domestic terrorists must be constantly updated to correspond with 

the evolving threat. 

 

10 http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5izUS-A5r110g6r4KACiIhLZE4myg 11 Ibid. 
10

Case Studies of Islamic Radicalization—Basic Trends 

and Principles 

A. 9/11 Timeline and Implications for Future Understanding 

It took the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks from 4 to 7 years, depending on the individual, 

to travel the path from studying Islam to becoming radicalized by extremist ideology to 

indoctrination, planning, and execution of the terrorist act.12 One of the key actors, 

Mohammed Atta, was introduced to observant Islam in 1994, when, while living in 

Germany, he went on a student trip to Turkey and Syria to research what would become 

his academic thesis on the conflict between Islam and modernity.13 That same year, 

he made a pilgrimage to Mecca.14 In 1995, he grew an Islamic-style beard, stopped 

listening to pop music and listened only to recitation of the Koran on tape. The following 

year, he began attending Al-Quds mosque in Hamburg.15 The evidence shows that Atta 

and others were guided to their action by long-term, personal interaction and connection 

to Islamist individuals at mosques, safe houses, or training centers. 

For all the men who planned attacks on American soil, years passed before they acted, 

during which time extensive religious debate, education, indoctrination, and planning 

took place. The culprits were interacting, congregating, and meeting at various American 

and international locales in order to plan their attack. They sought to avoid drawing much 

attention to their cause; their flight training ultimately did not arouse enough suspicion, as 

they sought to blend into the larger American society. The suspects often took part in 

joint activities, such as exercising at Florida gyms in the summer of 2001.16 Most 

importantly, they did not vocalize or discuss their disappointment and anger with the 

Western world, and the United States in particular, with anyone outside their immediate 

contact circle. To carry out most of their activities, the men would often pay in cash, such 

as for vehicle or residence rental, to reduce the ability of authorities to track them.17 

What is notable about their activities beginning approximately 1998―when some 

perpetrators and their associates started living and congregating together in Germany 

prior to moving to the United States—is their personal and direct connection to their 

cause, and the relatively basic use of modern communication technology like the Internet. 

They did not advertise or spread news of their planning via the worldwide web, nor did 

they post recruitment videos/websites to attract more followers to their cause. While it 

must be assumed that they knew their act would attract intense global attention, they 

nonetheless remained a close-knit group, preferring to maintain only low-level and 

minimal daily contact with everyone not associated with their cause. Once it became 

clear, through the process of indoctrination and personal interaction with their Islamist 

 

12 http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/683026/posts 13 Ibid. 

14 Ibid. 

15 Ibid. 

16 Ibid. 

17 Ibid. 
11

leaders and supporters, what role a particular individual would have in the impending 

attack the men carefully limited their interaction with most of the world around them. 

This process underscores careful planning, premeditation, and extensive training over 

several years. Most of the conspirators were devout individuals who believed deeply in 

their cause. They were also separated from their families and all non-Muslim friends. The 

attackers occasionally “floated” onto law enforcement radars, but none of the men was 

ultimately flagged for accurate surveillance and apprehension. Had more robust 

interagency cooperation existed, perhaps various government agencies could have begun 

to piece together the picture of a terrorist conspiracy. 

B. 2010 Attempted Times Square Bombing 

The case of Fazal Shahzad, who attempted to detonate an explosive-laden SUV in the 

middle of New York City’s Times Square, demonstrates the emergence of a different 

pattern, that of a fully integrated individual who, on the surface, and in the eyes of the 

larger community that surrounded him, drew no attention to himself. Unlike the 9/11 

hijackers, many of whom assumed the trappings of the more conservative version of 

Islam, Shahzad did nothing of the sort. His operation outside the larger Muslim 

community presents tremendous difficulties for law enforcement to monitor and 

apprehend similar individuals; no fellow community member could have observed and 

possibly alerted the authorities in time. There was practically no suspicion for simple lack 

of evidence. This is the emerging scenario illustrated by figure 2. 

Another disturbing fact is that Shahzad was at some point allegedly able to train with 

terrorists in Pakistan, return to the United States to assemble a car bomb in Connecticut, 

and park it in Times Square without anyone in the nation's counterterrorism apparatus 

knowing anything about it.18 Since he did not belong to any known radical Islamic group, 

did not associate with or contact radical Islamic clerics, and did not spend time on known 

and monitored radical Islamic websites and chat rooms, he presents an example of an 

individual accessing the knowledge that leads him to ultimately commit the final act 

without requiring an enabler or mentor. 

Following Shahzad’s attempted attack, U.S. lawmakers suggested that there is a problem 

in the intelligence system that is difficult to fix. "Increasingly, the dilemma is the welleducated man who moves through the education system of our country somewhat 

promisingly," said Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.). "I've always felt that this was the 

future in America for what we have to watch for in terrorism," said Sen. John D. 

Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. "And it's 

very hard to protect against, because you don't know who they are."19 Additionally, the 

officials agreed that it was unlikely that questions would have been raised over Shahzad's 

apparently taking several trips to Pakistan, where his parents and other family members 

lived. 

Shahzad is a graduate of U.S. universities and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in April 

2009. He lived with his family in a quiet Connecticut suburb, and until last year was an 

 

18 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/04/AR2010050405357.html 19 Ibid. 
12

employed homeowner. He broke no laws and did nothing to call attention to himself. So 

good was he at simply blending in with the rest of the American society that it was not 

until the day after the car bomb was found that Federal officials discovered a foreign 

connection, linking a telephone number used by the purchaser of the vehicle to Pakistan 

and, by early Monday morning, to Shahzad.20 They gleaned details about him from an 

unrelated airport screening conducted when he returned from Pakistan in February, a 

requirement for all passengers from certain countries instituted after December 2009. The 

requirement was eliminated this spring after the targeted countries, including Pakistan, 

complained.21 

Shahzad’s radicalization timeline was much shorter than for the 9/11 suspects, which 

could have been no more than a year. According to the experts who inspected his car 

found in Times Square, Shahzad’s training was “pitiful:” "There is less belief that he had 

any formal training or was a hardened militant," the Pakistani official interviewed by 

New York daily News said. "He might have gotten some briefings, but not much."22

"Hardcore" militants typically get about 5 to 6 months of training at modest camps near 

Afghanistan, officials said. Shahzad's shorter time in North Waziristan's most notorious 

towns wasn't enough for advanced terror instruction, the officials added.23 "It doesn't 

seem like he was there long enough," a second U.S. counterterrorism official 

confirmed.24

Whether Shahzad did not apply all he may have learnt in Pakistan, or whether he was not 

taught enough to properly construct a car bomb, the fact remains that in a relatively short 

time, this young man was able to place a deadly device that could have had as great an 

effect on New York City as the 9/11 attack, which was elaborately planned for many 

years. There may be repeats of such an act, as disaffected and radicalized Muslims in the 

United States opt to finish Shahzad’s mission. In such a scenario, the interdiction mission 

for domestic law enforcement would be exponentially complicated.

C. Lackawanna Six—the Case of Yemeni-Americans from Upstate New 

York. 

In the case of the six young Muslim-American men who traveled to Afghanistan from 

Lackawanna, New York, to receive terrorist training, the presence of a charismatic 

leader-enabler was crucial in pushing these young men in the direction of radicalized 

Islam. They were U.S. citizens bound together by their Yemeni heritage, went to 

Lackawanna High School and played soccer for the varsity team, and largely kept to 

themselves.25 They traveled to Yemen once a year, to the village of their heritage.26 Up 

 

20 Ibid. 

21 Ibid. 

22 http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/05/30/2010-05-

30_why_faisal_bombed_trained_in_taliban_cities_but_didnt_get_full_course_sez_pro.html 23 Ibid. 

24 Ibid. 

25 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/07/AR2007090702049_pf.html 26 Ibid. 
13

until that point, the young boys were able to assimilate and integrate into American 

society. Following high school graduation, their lives took a turn toward petty crime, 

low-level jobs, and drift. This lack of direction made them perfect targets for radical 

Islamist recruiting.27 

Their main recruiter was an al-Qaeda operative named Kamal Derwish. An American 

who had moved from Lackawanna to Saudi Arabia as a child, Derwish called the small 

steel town's Muslim community "virgin territory."28 He told the men that if they ever 

expected to be good Muslims, they would have to sign onto jihad.29 Significant signs of 

the boys’ radicalization included private meetings hosted by Derwish, who acted as the 

spiritual sanctioner and sought to create a bond between the boys in a place where they 

could freely discuss and study his version of religion. This was achieved by such 

activities as pizza and wrestling matches and was augmented by withdrawal from their 

mosque.30 Once the young men were relatively isolated from their familiar environment, 

they embarked on the road that would lead them to Afghanistan. 

After their indoctrination, seven U.S. citizens―Yaseinn Taher, Yahya Goba, Shafel 

Mosed, Mukhtar al-Bakri, Sahim Alwan, Faysal Galab, and Jaber Elbaneh―left for jihad 

training in Afghanistan in April-August 2001.31 They told friends they were going to 

Pakistan for religious instruction. Escorted by Derwish, the men traveled separately and 

attended a 6-week weapons course at the Al Farooq camp.32

Just two days after some of them have arrived, two of the seven, Sahim Alwan and Jaber 

Elbaneh, and Derwish met briefly with Osama bin Laden in a small group setting. One of 

the men asked bin Laden about a rumor that something big is about to happen. Bin Laden 

responded: “They’re threatening us. And we’re threatening them. But there are brothers 

willing to carry their souls in their hands.”33 A couple of weeks later, the seven 

Lackawanna men and Derwish began their training camp near Kandahar.34 One day, bin 

Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri came to their camp and bin Laden gave a speech in Arabic 

to the hundreds of trainees. In his 20-minute speech, he discussed the merger between alQaeda and Islamic Jihad.35 At the end, he called on the gathering to pray for the 40 

operatives who were en route for a very important mission.36

In early June 2001, the Buffalo, New York, FBI field office received an anonymous, 

handwritten letter from someone in the Yemeni community of Lackawanna, near Buffalo. 

The letter said that a group has traveled to “meet bin Laden and stay in his camp for 

 

27 Ibid. 

28 Ibid. 

29 Ibid. 

30 http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cpt.htm 

31http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?complete_911_timeline_al_qaeda_by_region=complete_91

1_timeline__lackawanna_six_&timeline=complete_911_timeline 

32 Ibid. 

33 Ibid. 

34 Ibid. 

35 Ibid. 

36 Bid. 
14

training.”37 The person who wrote it added, “I can not give you my name because I fear 

for my life.” It said that “two terrorists” have been recruiting in Lackawanna, and that 

eight men have gone to train in Afghanistan, and four more were planning to go later.38

The letter gave the names of the men, who at that time were already in an al-Qaeda 

training camp in Afghanistan. The letter was assigned to FBI agent Edward Needham, the 

only Buffalo agent at this time working on counterterrorism. He ran the names through 

criminal databases and found that many of them had criminal records for drug dealing 

and cigarette smuggling.39 He was skeptical that drug dealers would fight for al-Qaeda, 

but he sent the letter up the chain of command and opened an investigation on June 15, 

2001.40 Three of the suspects—Faysal Galab, Shafel Mosed, and Yaseinn Taher—were 

stopped on June 27, 2001 when they arrived in New York on a flight back from Pakistan, 

because Needham put their names on an FBI watch list.41 They were questioned for 2 

hours and released. 

Around July 2001, Needham interviewed Sahim Alwan, who had recently come back 

from Afghanistan. But Alwan said he had only traveled to Pakistan for religious 

training.42 The others who returned also failed to tell any authorities that they had been in 

Afghanistan or what they learned there.43 On September 11, 2001, hours after the 9/11 

attacks, Needham called Alwan and asked him if anyone new had come into town. Alwan 

answered in the negative.44 But in fact, Juma al-Dosari, an al-Qaeda operative who 

recruited the Lackawanna Six, had recently returned to Lackawanna, and Alwan knew 

where he was staying.45 Al-Dosari was trying to recruit a second group of young men to 

train in Afghanistan. The training camps were closed down, and al-Dosari left town 

before the FBI found out he was there.46

In November 2001, al-Dosari was captured in Afghanistan and later transferred to the 

Guantanamo prison. During interrogation, in the spring of 2002, he revealed several 

aliases and that he was trying to recruit a group of U.S. citizens in New York State 

known as the “Lackawanna Six.”47 In September 2002, the Lackawanna group was 

arrested by U.S. authorities. 

The Lackawanna Six spent several months in indoctrination and several months in actual 

training—again, their timeline is significantly shorter than for the 9/11 attackers, though 

certain parallels exist. They did not seek out radical Islamic doctrine on their own. 

Rather, they were recruited by an al-Qaeda affiliated individual who correctly assumed 

that their status as petty criminal and drifters without a cause made them ripe for “re-

 

37 Ibid. 

38 Ibid. 

39 Ibid. 

40 Ibid. 

41 Ibid. 

42 Ibid. 

43 Ibid. 

44 Ibid. 

45 Ibid. 

46 Ibid. 

47 Ibid. 
15

packaging.” Without such an enabler, these young men might have continued their lives 

as petty criminals. Their recruiter ensured that his students were surrounded by a 

radicalized “community,” his own apartment away from the rest of the people or at 

terrorist training camps in remote Afghanistan. Even after an anonymous tip from the 

Lackawanna community, the FBI remained skeptical of a terrorist connection, given that 

the men in question possessed no radical background. Had a better relationship existed 

between local and state law enforcement representatives and the Lackawanna Muslim 

community, perhaps the al-Qaeda recruiters would not have been able to operate in what 

was considered an open playing field for potential radicalization. 

D. Self-indoctrination—the Case of “Jihad Jane,” or Coleen Rene 

LaRose48

Coleen Larose was arrested October 16, 2009, after landing at the Philadelphia 

International Airport on a flight from the Netherlands. Federal authorities stated that 

LaRose, who had previously converted to Islam and become a militant Jihadist, flew to 

Europe on August 23, 2009, with the intent to live and train with Muslim jihadists in a 

plot to find and kill Swedish artist Lars Vilks, whose 2007 portrait of the prophet 

Muhammad as a dog angered many Muslims.49 

In 1980 at the age of 16, Colleen LaRose married a man in Fort Worth, Texas, who was 

twice her age. Reportedly, her husband was physically and mentally abusive, and the 

marriage did not last long. Police records indicate that Colleen LaRose had a history of 

misdemeanor violations, beginning with a charge of criminal trespass in 1985. She was 

charged with drunken driving in 1997; that same year she was arrested for passing four 

bad checks that totaled to $390.71.50 Her petty crime and unstable financial and personal 

situation, as with the Lackawanna Six, made her an attractive recruit into the radicalized 

part of Islam. 

In 1988, she married Rodolfo Cavazos, a gambler. That marriage ended in divorce after 

10 years. Caught in a life of mounting bills, little money, an unstable second marriage, 

and an addiction to alcohol, she became a person living on the “edge of personal 

destruction.”51 On May 21, 2005, depressed over her father’s recent death, LaRose began 

drinking heavily. In a failed suicide attempt, she swallowed 8–10 pills of a prescription 

muscle relaxant.52 After months of counseling for depression and alcoholism, LaRose 

apparently found spiritual rebirth in Islam.53

 

48 LaRose is not to be confused with another “Jihad Jane,” Nada Nadim Prouty, a naturalized American 

citizen who was arrested by U.S. authorities for ties to Hezbollah and for compromising FBI and CIA 

intelligence operations. 

49 http://www.examiner.com/x-21743-St-John-the-Baptist-Parish-Progressive-Examiner~y2010m3d13-

When-looks-can-kill-The-Story-of-Jihad-Jane-AKA-Colleen-Renee-LaRose 50 Ibid. 

51 Ibid. 

52 Ibid. 

53 Ibid. 
16

Unlike previous terrorist suspects and perpetrators, and possibly like many future 

attackers, Colleen LaRose freely visited Internet-based radical Islamic websites, using the 

alias “Jihad Jane.”54 On the Internet, she openly and angrily called for Muslims 

worldwide to rise in “Holy War” against the United States and the West; her web-based 

activities caught the attention of U.S. law enforcement as a person of interest to watch.55

LaRose allegedly wrote in an email message that it would be "an honor and great 

pleasure to die or kill for" Islamic holy war.56 Federal authorities claim LaRose raised 

funds for militant groups, arranged for false travel documents, and used Internet postings 

to recruit people to carry out violent attacks.57 U.S. Attorney Michael L. Levy, at a news 

conference about LaRose, said the woman was "another very real danger lurking on the 

Internet" and that the blonde, blue-eyed woman's alleged acts "shatter any lingering 

thought that we can spot a terrorist based on appearance."58

To friends and neighbors, LaRose’s transformation came as a shock, much like for those 

who knew Fazal Shahzad for most of his American life. According to those that know 

her, she was a polite yet eccentric woman who was known to talk loudly to her cats and 

on occasion indulged in hard drinking.59 It is also important to point out that like 

Shahzad, she did not otherwise draw attention to herself by exhibiting any type of 

conservative Islamic dress or code of conduct. 

 

54 Ibid. 

55 Ibid. 

56 http://www.upi.com/Daily-Briefing/2010/03/10/Jihad-Jane/UPI-41871268228371/ 57 Ibid. 

58 Ibid. 

59 http://www.examiner.com/x-21743-St-John-the-Baptist-Parish-Progressive-Examiner~y2010m3d13-

When-looks-can-kill-The-Story-of-Jihad-Jane-AKA-Colleen-Renee-LaRose. 
17

The Power of Technology in Radicalization 

There appears to be emerging a dispersed model of radicalization and recruitment. Rather 

than follow a more defined and interpersonal path from interest in religion to committing 

acts of violence in its name, there is now a "self-regulating" model. While some acts of 

terror are committed following personal, face-to-face indoctrination by religious leaders 

and figureheads that are conducted in specific physical locations around the world, it is 

now becoming possible to absorb religious material and "call to arms" through readily 

accessible, electronic media, such as video sharing and social networking sites—

YouTube alone has numerous videos designed to educate, indoctrinate, and persuade 

those wishing to explore their options or test their faith. Such new ways of disseminating 

propaganda are causing great concern to law enforcement agencies, both domestic and 

international, as it targets not just a small, devout religious following, but potentially 

millions of users. 

The threat potential for Internet-dissemination of a radical Islamic agenda has been 

recognized by U.S. government organizations tasked with homeland security. The U.S. 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs issued a report in 2008 

on violent Islamist extremism and the Internet.60 In the report, the committee recognized 

that the Internet plays an important role during the radicalization process—as individuals 

progress through the various stages of radicalization, their use of the Internet evolves as 

well. This initiative made use of the New York City Police Department’s own report, 

“Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” which identified four 

radicalization stages. In the second, or self-identification, phase, the Internet serves 

chiefly as the person’s source of information about Islam and a venue to meet other 

seekers online.61 With the current aggressive proliferation of the jihadi-Salafi ideology 

online, it is nearly impossible for someone to avoid this extreme interpretation of Islam 

when inquiring about Islam as a religion. 

During the indoctrination phase, those undergoing self-administered brainwashing devote 

their time in the cyber world to extremist sites and chat rooms—tapping into virtual 

networks of like-minded individuals around the world who reinforce the individual’s 

beliefs and commitment and further legitimize them.62 Coleen LaRose participated in this 

process for years. At this stage, individuals or the groups they are in are likely to begin 

proliferating jihadi-Salafist ideology online along with consuming it. The Internet 

becomes a virtual “echo chamber”—acting as a radicalization accelerant while creating 

the path for the ultimate stage of jihadization.63 In the jihadization phase, people 

challenge and encourage each others’ move to action, with the Internet now a tactical 

 

60 May 8, 2008 Report by the Majority and Minority staff of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs Committee on the threat of homegrown terrorism inspired by violent Islamist 

extremism. http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/IslamistReport.pdf

61 Ibid. 

62 Ibid. 

63 Ibid. 
18

resource for obtaining instructions on constructing weapons, gathering information on 

potential targets, and providing spiritual justification for an attack.64

A good example of this Internet-based phenomenon, where domestic reach can quickly 

grow into an international message, is the case of the Russian citizen Alexander 

Tikhomirov (who went by the Islamic name Sayid Buryatski), who inspired two female 

suicide bombers to target the Moscow subway in March 2010. There are more than a 

dozen YouTube videos of him offering educational and ecumenical information in the 

Russian language.65 Anyone who wants to hear this man’s message and his take on Islam 

and non-believers can do so at the click of a button. There are numerous videos of 

Tikhomirov’s speeches, with comments of support or disdain offered by what looks like 

an international audience. Additionally, any YouTube search on Islam as a religion not 

only yields a massive database of knowledge, but turns up advocacy of Islam’s 

superiority to other religions by showing examples of conversions by Christians, Jews, 

and people from other religions. Utilizing the way that YouTube matches similar or 

linked videos together on the screen for ease of use by the inquirer, clicking successively 

on these videos can ultimately lead to information that offers a more stern and inflexible 

interpretation of Islam. Many YouTube channels also feature numerous clips that offer a 

wide religious spectrum, from entertainment to education to serious dialogue to claims of 

Islam’s superiority over other religions. 

This raises an uncomfortable point—how can potentially extremist propaganda be 

checked and properly monitored in a completely free information environment when 

even videos that incite religious discord are openly and repeatedly posted online? Should 

not the fight against technologically advanced extremism be concentrated at its 

informational source, such as the Internet, and YouTube in particular? What rules and 

regulations exist with YouTube, for example, as the dominant network of this kind that 

would allow for control and interdiction of extremist propaganda? As long as anyone can 

freely locate videos that feature calls to religious martyrdom, jihad, and war against nonMuslims, the majority of state and international efforts are doomed to lag behind those of 

radicalized individuals who wish to take the fight into their own hands. 

Other kinds of modern technology aid and abet the spread of web-based extremist 

propaganda, from smart phones to personal computing devices. The ease with which 

web-based content can be accessed at virtually any time and anywhere in the world 

impedes both domestic and international law enforcement efforts to undercut the spread 

of such unwelcome information. Therefore, it becomes essential to cut off access to such 

information at its source—but the freedom of information law and principles that apply to 

the Internet/YouTube content restrict such action. On occasion, we hear of more extreme 

videos taken down due to complaints, but for every video of the kind taken down, others 

remain, like the two below of Adam Ghadahn, “American Taliban.” 

 

64 Ibid. 

65 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dLMWueOuExQ (Tikhomirov seems to be sitting in front of a barrel 

that has been refashioned into a bomb, stating that “this is a “present” to the Nazran (Russian) security 

forces.”) 
19

Adam Gadahn (Azzam Al-Amriki) on the Pakistani Government 2/4 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q8S_0RFq4Nw&feature=related 

Al-Qaida Calls on U.S. Muslims to Attack America 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BBmhKutfJ48 

The apprehension of "Jihad Jane"—a white, middle-aged convert to Islam—illustrates the 

point that access to and dissemination of radical Islamist propaganda can incite unlikely 

people to acts of terror against non-Muslims. International law enforcement efforts can 

limit the spread or presence of perpetrators of terrorism by physically taking custody of 

individuals who advocate violence and conflict—but as long as their messages can be 

freely seen and read on the Internet, more and more people will be drawn to combat in 

the name of Islam. 

A recent example illustrates the power and reach of Internet-based radical Islamist 

propaganda. An online blogger who targeted the creators of the American South Park

animated series for satirizing issues surrounding the depiction of the Prophet Muhammad 

has distributed jihadist materials and promoted violence against non-Muslims through a 

variety of online platforms for at least a year.66 Abu Talhah Al-Amrikee, the username of 

the blogger who identified himself as Zachary A. Chesser in January 2010, publicized 

terrorist propaganda, endorsed suicide attacks, and espoused hatred against Jews, Israel, 

and Shi'a Muslims through a variety of websites, blogs, and social networking sites. "The 

jihad movement has moved from the mountains and caves to the bedrooms of every 

major city around the world," Chesser wrote in a March 2010 post to the website of 

Revolution Muslim (RM), a fringe, anti-Semitic Muslim organization that justifies 

terrorist attacks and other forms of violence against non-Muslims.67 

On April 15, 2010, the morning after the offensive episode of South Park aired, Chesser 

made his first comment about the program on his Twitter feed. "May Allah kill Matt 

Stone and Trey Parker (show creators and chief animators) and burn them in Hell for all 

eternity. They insult our prophets Muhammad, Jesus, and Moses ...."68 Chesser posted a 

similar entry to his Mujahid Blog on the same day. The post included a picture of the 

assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh by a Muslim extremist in 2004 with 

the caption: "Theo Van Gogh—Have Matt Stone And Trey Parker Forgotten This?"69 In 

the post, Chesser provided the address to Stone and Parker's offices, telling readers to 

"contact them" or "pay Comedy Central ... a visit."70 Chesser also noted: "We have to 

warn Matt and Trey that what they are doing is stupid and they will probably wind up 

like Theo Van Gogh if they do air this show. This is not a threat, but a warning of the 

reality of what will likely happen to them."71 As of the time of writing, June 2010, the 

 

66 http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/abu_talhah.htm 67 Ibid. 

68 Ibid. 

69 Ibid. 

70 Ibid. 

71 Ibid. 
20

www.RevolutionMuslim.com website is still up and operational, delivering its opinion to 

anyone who logs on. 

The Internet was the chosen radicalization tool of Coleen LaRose, who used primarily 

YouTube and MySpace, the latter featuring pictures of her in both a hijab and burqa, 

items her neighbors in Pennsylvania never saw her wear.72 At the time of writing, police 

and intelligence services in 10 countries in North America, Europe, Asia and Africa were 

investigating a plot apparently conceived, planned, and brought down on the Internet.73

Sometime in June 2008, a “couple of months” after she had “reverted” to Islam, LaRose 

made her first, significant Internet move when she posted a video on YouTube using the 

pseudonym “Jihad Jane,” saying she was “desperate to do something somehow to help” 

ease the suffering of Muslims.74 People then began to email her via YouTube and, later, 

her MySpace page, where she listed “Sheikh OBL [Osama bin Laden] and the brothers in 

jihad” among her heroes.75

In December 2008, LaRose is alleged to have received an email from an unnamed male 

admirer in South Asia saying he wanted to become a “shaheed” or martyr. She replied the 

following day that she, too, wanted to die in holy war.76 Over the course of the following 

months, Ms LaRose is said to have been in Internet contact with at least five would-be 

terrorists in Asia, North America, and Europe, including at least one in Ireland.77 By 

March 2009, another correspondent in South Asia had proposed killing Lars Vilks, the 

Swedish cartoonist who enraged Muslims worldwide in 2007 with one of his drawings.78

He emailed Ms LaRose that Mr. Vilks should be killed “in a way that the whole kufar 

world would get frightened.” She replied: “I will make this my goal or die trying.”79

He also told Ms LaRose that, as a blonde, blue-eyed American, she “could get access to 

many places.” He suggested that she “marry me to get me inside Europe.”80 According to 

the U.S. indictment, she agreed and began making plans to go to Sweden. It is believed 

that much correspondence was conducted through a single email account—a so-called 

“blind drop,” where multiple users share one password, leaving messages in the drafts 

folder, so that key information never gets transmitted or caught up in web filters.81 In 

August 2009, Ms LaRose removed the hard drive from her computer, stole her 

boyfriend’s passport, and flew to Europe.82 She was arrested when she returned to the 

United States in mid-October 2009.83 Her online activities, however, had long been the 

 

72 http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100317/FOREIGN/703169948/1013/ART 73 Ibid. 

74 Ibid. 

75 Ibid. 

76 Ibid. 

77 Ibid. 

78 Ibid. 

79 Ibid. 

80 Ibid. 

81 Ibid. 

82 Ibid. 

83 Ibid. 
21

subject of interest to a band of amateur Internet investigators who dedicate their online 

time to tracking down potential terrorists, child abusers, and other criminals. 

Members of two such groups, the Jawa Report and the YouTube Smackdown Corps, 

claim to have been tracking Ms LaRose’s online postings as early as 2007.84 Originally, 

they regarded her online, anti-American, anti-Zionist rants as something of a joke, but in 

2009, when she is said to have appealed for funds to support terrorist activity through her 

postings on Twitter, one Jawa contributor reported her to the FBI.85 Agents interviewed 

her shortly before her abrupt departure for Europe, but she denied any knowledge of 

“Jihad Jane.” She avoided arrest on that occasion, but fortunately was on the U.S. 

security services’ radar. 

The American man who reported Ms LaRose to the authorities in July 2009 (he does not 

want to be identified), said he had been tracking her for about a year and a half.86 He first 

encountered her after watching a YouTube channel dedicated to Middle Eastern 

performing arts: “One thing led to another and the next thing I knew, I was dealing with 

fanatics such as Jihad Jane/Fatima LaRose, whose real identity was later revealed as 

Colleen LaRose.”87

He said Ms LaRose “recklessly” posted information about herself on websites. “Her 

previous internet activity was easy to track.88 In it she listed her real name, birth date, 

location, and even online pictures of herself,” he added. “Although YouTube Smackdown 

was responsible for removing most of her terrorist accounts, she remained determined to 

create more accounts on YouTube promoting terrorism against the United States.89 “She 

got more of a following of real terrorists as time went on, joining online terrorist websites 

and promoting them on her YouTube channels,” said the source. “When she finally made 

an account which actively solicited funds for the Pakistan Mujaheddin, which I knew she 

had acquired the contacts for, I knew she had become a real threat to our safety.”90

The above-mentioned examples represent a small portion of the way the Internet 

augments the dissemination and access to violent, radicalized, Islamist propaganda that 

calls for acts of physical harm to Americans and Westerners. These examples are also a 

tip of the iceberg, since they feature English-language content. It is known that numerous 

websites and Internet-based content exist in other languages all over the world. What is 

significant is that, previously, very few Americans could freely access and understand 

this content—especially if it was in another language. Today, more and more Englishlanguage data is targeting potential American audiences. Dealing with such an 

information stream requires both resiliency and resolve on the part of U.S. local, state, 

and Federal authorities. 

 

84 Ibid. 

85 Ibid. 

86 Ibid. 

87 Ibid. 

88 Ibid. 

89 Ibid. 

90 Ibid. 
22

Current efforts to police massive, content-sharing sites like YouTube fall short of 

removing videos and films that act as recruitment tools. When it comes to U.S. 

government efforts, there are only limited results. In May 2008, U.S. Senator Joseph 

Lieberman, chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee, asked Google CEO Eric Schmidt in an open letter to remove Islamic terrorist 

videos from YouTube, which is owned by Google.

91 Islamic terrorist organizations, 

Lieberman said, use YouTube to distribute propaganda, attract followers, and provide 

weapons training.92 While YouTube has community guidelines for its users, Lieberman 

said "it does not appear that [Google] is enforcing these guidelines to the extent they 

would apply to [terrorist] content.93 According to the Senator’s findings, "searches on 

YouTube return dozens of videos branded with an icon or logo identifying the videos as 

the work of one of these Islamist terrorist organizations," Lieberman said. “A great 

majority of these videos document horrific attacks on American soldiers in Iraq or 

Afghanistan. Others provide weapons training, speeches by al-Qaeda leadership, and 

general material intended to radicalize potential recruits."94 

The results were split between YouTube’s need for transparency in its global operations 

and security concerns by a senior U.S. legislator, which ultimately fell short of attempting 

to remove questionable content from the website. At the time, the company replied that 

"Senator Lieberman stated his belief, in a letter, that all videos mentioning or featuring 

these groups should be removed from YouTube—even legal nonviolent or non-hate 

speech videos. While we respect and understand his views, YouTube encourages free 

speech and defends everyone's right to express unpopular points of view. We believe that 

YouTube is a richer and more relevant platform for users precisely because it hosts a 

diverse range of views, and rather than stifle debate we allow our users to view all 

acceptable content and make up their own minds."95 

Following Senator Lieberman’s efforts and wide-ranging debate on the issue, YouTube 

changed its Community Guidelines by adding language prohibiting the posting of videos 

“inciting others to commit violent acts.”96 These Community Guidelines assist 

YouTube’s internal monitoring team to review flagged videos for removal. The larger 

issue, however, is whether YouTube’s internal monitoring effort is effective enough, 

since the company only reviews videos flagged by YouTube viewers that may violate the 

Community Guidelines. "The core underlying issue," said Ben Venzke of Intel Center, a 

private sector contractor that monitors extremist web communications for clients, 

including the U.S. government, "is that whether you take these videos off YouTube or 

not, they will always be available at numerous other locations online. New outlets are 

popping up constantly, and when you take one down, 10 more simply appear to fill the 

gap. The problem is the very nature of the Internet itself. It makes controlling and 

 

91 http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/google/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=207801148 92 Ibid. 

93 Ibid. 

94 Ibid. 

95 Ibid. 

96 http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines 
23

denying access to information simply impossible."97 Many of the videos highlighted by 

Senator Lieberman’s office that were produced by al-Qaida's media arms in Iraq and 

Afghanistan "show attacks on U.S. forces in which American soldiers are injured and, in 

some cases, killed," wrote Lieberman.98 While many roadside bomb attacks against 

coalition vehicles were shown in the mid-distance, there were plenty of other videos that 

showed more graphic scenes. But John Morris, senior counsel at the Center for 

Democracy and Technology, noted that "top-selling movies also have scenes depicting 

extreme violence" and that it was appropriate that YouTube should enforce its own 

guidelines.99 In what is perhaps the best evidence of the evolving nature and tactics of the 

domestic terrorist threat over the past several years, intelligence specialists at the time 

told the press that “Lieberman is barking up the wrong tree. Removing material from 

YouTube would have little to no effect on key terrorist groups' primary dissemination 

efforts. There are no major jihadi groups ... using YouTube as their primary release 

point."100 While these specialists may have been right at the time, several arrests suggest 

that the domestic threat may not be coming from “major jihadi groups,” but from 

individuals with no direct connections to international terrorist networks. 

At the time of writing, another group of individuals was apprehended by the authorities 

for planning to wage Jihad against the American people and U.S. interests. On June 6, 

2010, two New Jersey men who envisioned a terrorist attack in the United States with a 

body count twice that of the Fort Hood massacre were arrested at New York's Kennedy 

Airport, as they were about to board flights on their way to Somalia to seek terror training 

from al-Qaida-affiliated jihadists.101 Mohamed Mahmood Alessa, 20, and Carlos Eduardo 

Almonte, 26, were arrested before they could board separate flights to Egypt and then 

continue on to Somalia, according to Federal officials in New Jersey and the New York 

Police Department.102 The two men tried to get recruited by Islamic radicals on their own, 

and had traveled to Jordan in 2007 to get into Iraq, but were turned back by their intended 

recruiters. Since then, during the lengthy investigation, an NYPD undercover officer 

recorded conversations with the men in which they spoke about jihad against 

Americans.103 "I leave this time. God willing, I never come back," authorities say Alessa 

told the officer last year. "Only way I would come back here is if I was in the land of 

jihad and the leader ordered me to come back here and do something here. Ah, I love 

that."104

According to the Associated Press, they had no known connections to terrorist groups, 

and their planned trip to Somalia apparently amounted to a leap of faith that they would 

be embraced by the jihadists. Investigators say they are among many U.S. terrorism 

suspects to have been inspired by two well-known U.S. citizens who have recruited 

 

97 http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2008/05/20/Analysis-Should-YouTube-censor-al-Qaida/UPI60601211292733/ 

98 Ibid. 

99 Ibid. 

100 Ibid. 101 http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/06/06/2243660/two-terrorism-suspects-arrested.html 102 Ibid. 103 http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100607/ap_on_re_us/us_terrorism_arrests 104 Ibid. 
24

terrorists through the Internet: Adam Gadahn, an al-Qaida spokesman in Pakistan, and 

Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical al-Qaida cleric hiding in Yemen, who is believed to have 

helped inspire recent attacks, including the Fort Hood shooting, the Times Square 

bombing attempt, and the failed Christmas Day 2009 airline bombing.105 The FBI 

received a tip regarding the men's activities in October 2006, according to the U.S. 

Attorney's office in New Jersey. The tip, from someone who knew the men, said, “Every 

time they access the Internet all they look for is all those terrorist videos. ... They keep 

saying that Americans are their enemies, that everybody other than Islamic followers are 

their enemies ... and they all must be killed.”106 While the two men did not make 

sophisticated preparations for their intended activities, what is crucial here is that young, 

impressionable American citizens were influenced by the radicalized information found 

freely on the Internet to such a degree that they were willing to undertake a complicated 

journey to Somalia to join the ranks of Al-Shahab, a violent, Islamist extremist group, to 

target the American people.

 

105 Ibid. 106 http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/06/06/new.york.terror.arrests/?hpt=T2 
25

Conclusions

At this point, U.S. government agencies are well aware of the magnitude of risk that is 

posed by the evolving domestic radicalization fueled by an extreme version of Islam. 

Specifically, the Department of Homeland Security has an Extremism and Radicalization 

Branch within the Homeland Environment Threat Analysis Division (Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis). In studying radicalization, DHS is working closely with 

Federal, state, and local partners and is focusing on a wide range of actors and 

organizations both Islamic—those who try to gain legitimacy by illegitimately wrapping 

themselves within Islam—and non-religious extremists.107 This initiative has yielded key 

finds, among which is the recognition that “Lone-wolf” radicalization is not unique to 

any particular ideology, and the ease of mass communications portends an increase in 

acts of terror by violent individuals. Formal affiliation with a group is not essential to 

radicalization, nor is it essential to being trained, obtaining resources, or otherwise 

supporting an operational capability.108 

When it comes to people willing to join the ranks of violent extremist organizations 

influenced by radical Islamist teachings, we are witnessing an evolution of sorts in 

methods, tactics, and most importantly, “idea proliferation” in the United States. In some 

examples presented here, an older model of radicalization was discussed. For the 9/11 

and Lackawanna Six perpetrators, the process of indoctrination, radicalization, training, 

and planning took place over years and was done with the direct participation of specific 

Islamic figures, who mentored, supported, encouraged, and led the men towards their 

final act. The perpetrators belonged to Muslim communities, and while their degree of 

religiosity differed substantially, they were nonetheless radicalized and encouraged in the 

atmosphere of extreme religious teaching, either in the United States or abroad. In the 

case of the Lackawanna Six, they were recruited by Al Qaeda representatives themselves, 

whose stated goal was to recruit American Muslims for acts of terrorism. On the other 

hand, Shahzad and LaRose present a different dilemma, with LaRose exemplifying a new 

trend, where the Internet can act as a powerful amplifier of radical Islamic teachings. If 

the overall radicalization trends discussed in the paper are mapped out, the following 

trend emerges, as illustrated by figure 3. 

 

107 2007 written testimony by Charles Allen, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the DHS, 

speaking to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs on the “Threat of 

Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland.” 

http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/270.pdf 

108 Ibid. 
26

Dedication to

the cause

Self-isolation

Careful planning 

of activities

Deep religious 

beliefs

Low profile in daily 

life

Active interaction

with leader/enabler

Overseas training

In terrorist camps

Visits to Jihadist

and radical Islamist 

websites

Viewing of Jihadist

and radical Islamist 

videos

Communication via 

Internet

in order to seek out 

like-minded 

individuals

An indoctrination 

figure

not necessary

Radicalization takes 

place

outside of the 

Muslim community

2001 2010

9-11 

perpetrators

Lackawanna Six

Fazal Shahzad

Coleen 

La Roze

Noticeable trend

Figure 3. Changing nature of Islamic radicalization trends in the United States 

Several key factors that were important for the 9/11 perpetrators are absent for the latest 

suspects. It can be expected—and indeed the law enforcement community is already 

concerned—that the next potential terrorists will come from the larger American society, 

and will not draw attention to themselves until it is too late to stop them. It must be noted 

that Shahzad’s bomb could have worked, and it was only by chance that he was 

apprehended at the airport as he prepared to flee the country. 

The common elements that can be mapped out for the four above-mentioned cases are 

that the suspects and perpetrators were: 

• Dissatisfied with their lives; 

• Indoctrinated, either overseas or in the United States; 

• Trained, either overseas or locally; 

• Separated from the larger Muslim community and their families, which had no 

part in their path towards radicalization. 

• Radicalized largely via the Internet, especially in the most recent cases. 

It is, therefore, essential to assess the emerging trends in domestic radicalization and treat 

this menace not just as a law enforcement issue, but as information warfare. The 

discussion, communication, and interaction over the Internet that targets the United States 

and its core values now take place in English, and very specific content is now aimed at 

American audiences with websites, videos, and messages. This is a major difference form 

the earlier communication and indoctrination tools, when the potential terrorists had to be 

present in Muslim countries and territories for training and preparation. Such activity 
27

would draw domestic and international attention from entities responsible for interdicting 

such actions. 

Today, that dynamic is changing—Coleen LaRose, Alessa, and Almonte exemplify the 

new trend, and Shahzad reinforces it by virtue of being considered a successful, 

assimilated naturalized U.S. citizen with perceived loyalties to the United States and its 

value system. If this new trend is reinforced by the Internet, then the American law 

enforcement and intelligence communities must target the source and dissemination 

tactics of radicalized Islamist propaganda—the websites, chat rooms, and Internet videos 

that spread such messages. Such information outlets must be shut down, taken out of 

commission, removed from servers, and otherwise disabled in order to minimize potential 

exposure to its hateful content by impressionable or desperate individuals. The 

proliferation of such Internet-based content can be greatly reinforced by a variety of new 

technologies like smart phones; as long as such information remains in the open, it can 

potential recruit numerous individuals to undertake radical actions. 
28

Recommendations

The growing threat posed by domestic radicalization, coupled with the difficulty of 

identifying/spotting/interdicting individuals who embark on the path of violence against 

U.S. territory and citizens, is revitalizing the debate on domestic intelligence gathering. In 

order for the public to be protected against violent acts of terrorism, key and specific 

information has to be targeted by the nation’s law enforcement bodies to properly analyze 

and interdict the emerging threat. In some cases, the threat may have matured to the point 

of individuals embarking on the final stages of preparation for an attack. Therefore, a 

wide ranging effort is necessary which takes into account people’s backgrounds, 

communities, contacts, interests, and interactions in order to get a better “visual” on the 

potential or real threat. 

There is a growing difficulty in gathering adequate intelligence on domestic acts of 

terrorism. As noted in the case of the recent attempt to bomb Times Square, there were 

few pieces of data that an intelligence analyst would have been able to assemble “to zero 

in on a suspect,” according to Los Angeles Police Department counterterrorism chief 

Michael Downing.109 Currently, DHS is proposing countering ideologically driven 

violence by training local police and community members to look for signs of violent 

behavior.110 According to official sources, the goal of such an effort is to incorporate tips, 

such as purchases of large quantities of propane, into "the day-to-day business of local 

police.”111 Motives, particularly religious ones, aren't always clear at the outset, so police 

and residents are encouraged to look out for behavior that might suggest someone is 

planning violent action; this approach has backing from local police, who say they are 

best positioned to see emerging extremism and build relationships with communities.112

The local effort needs to be coupled with continuing and evolving intelligence and 

information-gathering mechanisms. 

The following list of recommendations seeks to address the broader issue of indentifying, 

monitoring and stopping radical Islamic-inspired domestic terrorism: 

 Understand the regional, country, and ethnic divisions within the MuslimAmerican community; first- and second-generation immigrants from certain 

countries (Somalia, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) may be more amenable and 

susceptible to the message of Islamic radicalization. 

 Monitor the availability and download traffic of YouTube videos that are hosted 

by radical Islamic clerics/imams/speakers who advocate harmful acts against the 

American people/interests/places/targets. Encourage YouTube to remove such 

videos altogether through existing YouTube Community Guidelines by 

highlighting that the presence of these videos on the Internet serves as inspiration 

to individuals who seek to follow radical Islamic teachings and practices. 

 Enter into direct debate in the “marketplace of ideas”—promote/support/endorse/ 

disseminate across the Internet the teachings/sermons/arguments of moderate 

Islamic clerics and scholars who argue against war/Jihad/combat with the United 

 

109 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703322204575226612162292130.html 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. 
29

States and American citizens; special attention should be paid to content that 

refutes, discredits, and counterbalances the speeches by main Jihadist clerics on 

the U.S. list of international terrorists. 

 Promote relationships between authorities and amateur/unofficial groups that 

monitor Internet traffic for terrorist, criminal, and other unlawful behavior. This 

type of activity helped alert authorities to Coleen LaRose’s activities and led to 

her arrest. 

 Utilize search engine optimization that promotes one type of Internet-based 

content over another, particularly as it applies to search for content related to 

radical Islamic teachings/texts/sermons/explanations of Koran/debate on 

Jihad/role of Muslims in non-Muslim societies.113

 Monitor websites/discussion boards/chat rooms that espouse radical Islamic 

teachings and serve as communication portals for American and foreign 

individuals. U.S. law enforcement and the intelligence community must go a step 

further and target such websites for complete removal/incapacitation from the 

Internet so as not to give an opportunity for men and women in the United States 

to absorb radical Islamic message that calls for a violent confrontation between 

Muslims and the Western world, particularly America. 

 Recognize that passengers returning from/having evidence of being in specific 

countries—Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia—can run a higher risk of coming in 

contact with/having engaged with/having spent time with/having met with 

individuals/groups/organizations that espouse radical Islamist ideology that calls 

for a confrontation with/targeting of the Western world, especially the United 

States. Therefore, effective security technology, funded and managed through the 

DHS and FBI, should be utilized for the following purposes: 

o Share/train/familiarize local as well as Federal law enforcement bodies 

with biometric databases containing information on specific individuals. 

o Utilize electronic and surveillance-type facial recognition technology at 

points of entry to the United States—airports, sea ports, rail terminals, 

significant border crossings. 

 Continue to facilitate information exchanges and establish faster linkages between 

the DHS, domestic intelligence agencies, and the security/community 

representatives at the governors’ offices, the U.S. Marshals Service, chiefs of 

police, and attorneys general in all U.S. states and territories. 

 

113 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_engine_optimization