UKRAINE’S MILITARY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich

May 2007

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ISBN 1-58487-295-0
iii

FOREWORD

America’s new allies in Central and Eastern Europe 

have been struggling with defense reform since the 

end of the Cold War. Only recently, since the Orange 

Revolution, has Ukraine’s national political and military leadership seriously engaged the process of radical 

and comprehensive defense reform. Dr. Marybeth 

Ulrich applies the various roadmaps for reform 

developed in the post-communist states of Central 

European states to the emerging Ukrainian case. She 

draws upon this mixed picture to suggest a framework 

focused on key areas in need of reform, as well as key 

conditions that will facilitate the achievement of reform 

objectives. The result is a richly developed case study 

revealing Ukraine’s main strengths as well as obstacles 

limiting the improvement of its military capabilities.

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased to 

publish this monograph, originally commissioned as 

a paper for the 2006 conference “The U.S. and Russia: 

Regional Security Issues and Interests,” conducted 

with the University of Washington’s Ellison Center for 

Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies; the 

Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security; and the 

Institute for Global and Regional Security Studies.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MARYBETH PETERSON ULRICH is Professor of 

Government in the Department of National Security 

and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. She has 

also taught at the U.S. Air Force Academy, the Naval 

Postgraduate School, the Baltic Defense College, and 

the Japanese National Defense Academy. She served 

15 years in the active U.S. Air Force as a navigator on 

KC-135Q refueling planes and as a political science 

instructor. She is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Air Force 

Reserve and is an international political military affairs 

officer. Dr. Ulrich has written extensively in the field 

of strategic studies with special emphasis on European 

security, civil-military relations, and national security 

democratization issues. Among her numerous 

publications is the book, Democratizing Communist 

Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed 

Forces (1999). Dr. Ulrich received a B.S. from the U.S. 

Air Force Academy and a Ph.D. in Political Science 

from the University of Illinois. 
v

SUMMARY

Ukraine’s geopolitical location positioning it firmly 

between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

allies to the west and Russia to the east has demanded 

that its foreign and security policy take into account 

its interests in the east and the west. The pro-reform 

forces in power since the Orange Revolution would 

like to move Ukraine squarely into the Euro-Atlantic 

community with only limited deference to Russia 

in matters where Ukrainian dependency remains 

unavoidable. Political forces favoring a more neutral 

stance between east and west or openly in favor of 

leaning eastward remain formidable. Russia’s astute 

deployment of its national instruments of power 

in support of these forces will loom large into the 

indefinite future. 

The Need for Radical Reform—Key Areas.

Key areas in need of radical reform include the 

quality and degree of intragovernmental coordination 

and improving the expertise of civilian defense 

bureaucrats, along with adapting Soviet era military 

experts to the new security environment and 

democratic political system. Other areas requiring 

priority attention and resources are the creation of a 

rational defense planning system and the revamping 

of personnel policies in accordance with the needs of a 

professional and expeditionary force. 

Reform may take place unevenly across the 

various governmental institutions depending on the 

level of democratization, especially with regard to 

transparency, accountability, and, in the case of the 
vi

security sector, the introduction of effective civilian 

democratic control. The Ukrainian political and military leadership has remained divided over the question 

of whether Ukraine should pursue a collective security 

approach or retain its neutral status.1

A key pillar of defense reform is the creation of 

a rational defense planning system. The essential 

ingredients of such a system include a coherent 

articulation of national interests within national 

security documents, defense programming processes 

that adequately match resources with requirements, 

and the systemic ability to choose among competing 

priorities using long-term planning timelines. 

Ukraine embarked on independence with 0.9 million Soviet troops stationed on its territory. Significant 

downsizing occurred, but by 2004 the remaining 

force of 355,000 “matched neither the requirements 

of the military-political situation in the world nor the 

country’s economic capabilities.”2 The 2004 Strategic 

Defense Review (SDR) recommended adopting a 

rational defense planning system linking objectives to 

an economic basis of reform. 

Fundamental transformation of personnel systems 

has eluded most post-communist militaries and been 

a major cause of these armies’ lack of capabilities. 

Ukraine’s distribution of officers is cylindrical rather 

than pyramidal, reflecting the fact that there are still 

far too many senior officers in proportion to junior 

officers. The White Paper lays out the objective of 

moving toward a normal-curve distribution, while 

interjecting a Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Corps 

and contract professional soldiers into the mix alongside 

the conscript pool. Conditions attracting appropriately 

educated civilians to serve in the Ministry of Defense 

(MOD) are also lacking.3
vii

Military education is another area in need of radical 

reform. The communist era system must adapt not 

only to the vast ideological changes that occurred 

within the state, but also overhaul curriculums to 

educate officers to perform within the post-Cold 

War threat environment in multinational coalition or 

alliance operations. Overall, the military education 

system is characterized by the side-by-side existence of 

two standards—NATO and Soviet—causing systemic 

tension and a continued waste of resources. 

Achieving Radical Military Reform—

Key Conditions.

Some conditions have emerged as key factors for 

beginning the cycle of substantive reform, which may 

lead to improved capabilities through systemic and 

integrated change. 

• Political will to undertake difficult reform 

and governmental commitment to dedicate a 

predictable level of scarce economic resources 

over a long period of time are the most essential 

factors required to facilitate the success of 

defense reform. The backing of key political 

leaders willing to appoint change agents in 

critical positions at the MOD and General Staff 

has proven to be a prerequisite to launching 

reform processes in the region. The Ukrainian 

armed forces have been on a starvation diet, 

recently receiving only 1.3 percent of gross 

domestic product (GDP). Ukraine ranks third 

among NATO’s 26 countries in terms of size, 

but 127th out of 150 countries worldwide in 

expenditure per serviceman. 
viii

• A country’s national security documents play a 

crucial role in setting forth the state’s strategic 

vision. Equally important is the quality of the 

strategic concepts being employed to effect 

change, that is, the reform plans themselves. 

Only reform plans that take an integrated and 

systemic approach have been effective in the 

region. Ukraine’s Defense White Paper takes some 

important steps in that it lays out the essential 

parameters of an integrated and systemic 

approach to reform. 

• In addition to political will at the top, strong 

leadership in positions of authority throughout 

the national security bureaucracy is necessary 

to move reform plans forward. Ukraine’s 

current senior military leadership is thought 

to support the reform agenda and favor closer 

ties to NATO. Most senior commanders have 

pro-reform credentials, but there are still large 

numbers of senior leaders within the Main 

Defense Forces who have no or only limited 

exposure to Western training and operations.

• Cases that leverage external expertise have 

advanced more quickly in the reform process. 

The additional input of external leverage from 

NATO in the form of Alliance assessments, 

both before accession and after, has also been 

critical. In the case of Ukraine, long-term 

collaboration between Ukraine and NATO 

provided the political and military leadership 

with expertise essential to the development of 

reform concepts. 
ix

The Way Ahead. 

Ukraine has made tremendous strides toward its 

integration into the Euro-Atlantic community of states. 

The overall move toward the West is unlikely to be 

reversed, but Ukraine is still a divided society that is 

not yet at the stage of political, social, and economic 

development where a broad and deep consensus on 

Euro-Atlantic integration is possible. Ukraine’s main 

strengths lie in its capacity to develop sound reform 

concepts and to back them up with the strongest 

level of political will evident since independence. 

Ukraine’s greatest obstacles to reform are the prospect 

of indefinite underfunding of reform concepts and the 

lack of consensus beneath the top leadership within 

society as a whole and the military overall with regard 

to the reform agenda, both at the level of defense policy 

and in the overall orientation toward the West.

ENDNOTES

1. “Armed Forces, Ukraine,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: 

Russia and the CIS, March 24, 2005, p. 18, www.janes.com/Search/

printFriendlyview.do?docID=/content1/janesdata/sent/cissu/, p. 5, 

accessed March 3, 2006.

2. Ukraine’s Strategic Defence Bulletin until 2015 (Defence White 

Paper) Kyiv: Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, p. 7.

3. Ibid., p. 24.

1

UKRAINE’S MILITARY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

INTRODUCTION

Ukraine’s geopolitical position lies firmly between 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to 

the west and Russia to the east, thus demanding that its 

foreign and security policy take into account its interests 

in both directions. Maintaining its independence has 

been a consensus foreign policy objective since 1991, 

but the policy courses pursued to achieve this end and 

to determine the proper balance between Russia and 

the west have been more contentious. The pro-reform 

forces in power since the Orange Revolution of late 

2004 would like to move Ukraine squarely into the 

Euro-Atlantic community, with only limited deference 

to Russia in matters where Ukrainian dependency 

remains unavoidable. Political forces favoring a more 

neutral stance between East and West or openly in 

favor of leaning eastward remain formidable. Russia’s 

astute deployment of its national instruments of power 

in support of these political forces will loom large into 

the indefinite future. Meanwhile, the legacy of the 

Soviet past still has a great hold on Ukraine’s political 

institutions, society, and bureaucratic culture. 

This monograph examines the course of Ukrainian 

defense reform against the geopolitical backdrop 

outlined above. The experiences of Ukraine’s former 

Warsaw Pact allies to the west in defense reform 

may offer lessons that could be applied in support of 

Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The picture remains mixed in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland as the four states follow different roadmaps for defense reform. By observing the successes 

and failures in these cases, we can develop a credible 

framework for reform in the emerging Ukrainian case. 
2

Ukraine’s prospects for achievement of radical defense 

reform can be measured based on its performance 

across the key areas identified as essential in the Central 

European cases and based on the presence or absence of 

the key conditions proven to facilitate defense reform 

in post-communist Europe.1

THE NEED FOR RADICAL REFORM—

KEY AREAS

The legacy of Ukraine’s authoritarian past as a 

Soviet republic continues to hinder development of 

its national security system. The current deficiencies 

can be traced to incomplete adaptation of Soviet era 

structures, decisionmaking processes, and methods of 

resource allocation. Key areas in need of radical reform 

include the quality and degree of intragovernmental 

coordination and increased receptivity to newly influential civilian defense experts, along with adaptation 

of Soviet era military experts to the new security 

environment and democratic political system. Other 

areas requiring priority attention and resources are 

the creation of a rational defense planning system and 

the revamping of personnel policies in accordance 

with the needs of a professional and expeditionary 

force. Developing a culture of accountability that 

puts national interests before personal and corporate 

ones and mobilizes national resources toward the 

achievement of a shared strategic vision are key steps 

that must be taken before Ukraine achieves its security 

goals and its sought-for place in the Euro-Atlantic 

security system.
3

Immature Intragovernmental Decisionmaking 

Processes and Poor Political Guidance.

 Research across post-communist Europe indicates 

that comprehensive reform has not yet occurred 

without first reordering the domestic processes for the 

conduct of national security.2

 Furthermore, progress 

in the security sector is necessarily tied to the overall 

level of democratic development and transparency 

achieved in the transitioning state. Reform may take 

place unevenly across the various governmental 

institutions depending on the level of democratization, 

especially with regard to transparency, accountability, 

and, in the case of the security sector, the introduction 

of effective civilian democratic control. In the case of 

Ukraine, the nonmilitary structures of the security 

sector lag behind the military structures in their levels 

of democratization, remaining essentially unreformed 

since the early 1990s.3 The armed forces, however, have 

benefited from substantial external influences, political 

attention, and better than average Ministry of Defence 

(MOD) leadership from the late 1990s to the present. 

The strategic vision necessary for the achievement 

of radical defense reform is unlikely to result absent a 

consensus among the key national security actors and 

the population at large. The challenge is to develop 

capacities to formulate national security policy, 

coordinate joint responsibility within the government 

for national security affairs, realistically fund national 

security ambitions, and ensure that the oversight of 

national security actors and processes occurs. The 

stovepipe method of managing national security (and 

indeed all aspects of governmental affairs) inherited 

from the Soviet-era bureaucratic system has slowed 

the process of organizational change, impeded 
4

organizational effectiveness, undercut the development 

of transparent and effective interagency processes, 

and acted as a formidable barrier to the realization of 

defense reform.

Ukraine’s first attempts at military reform (1991-96) 

achieved little because they were undertaken within 

unreformed governmental institutions, lacked the 

proper legislative basis, were based on vague political 

objectives, and were formulated and implemented by 

bureaucrats with insufficient expertise to carry out 

the task. Because Soviet-style thinking still prevailed, 

these first efforts did little more than rebuild Sovietstyle forces and structures aimed at meeting Soviet 

era threats on a smaller scale.4

 According to a study of 

Ukraine’s armed forces by Oleksiy Melnyk and Leonid 

Polyakov, “It took years for the political and military 

leadership to realize that the Soviet military heritage 

of some 800,000 military personnel and thousands of 

tanks, personnel carriers, artillery pieces, and aircraft 

was more of a liability than an asset.”5

Although Ukraine engaged NATO immediately 

after independence through the North Atlantic 

Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1992 and was the first 

former Soviet republic to sign a Partnership for Peace 

(PfP) framework document in 1994, the Ukrainian 

government remained ambivalent concerning EuroAtlantic integration until the Orange Revolution in late 

2004.6

 Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk, appointed 

in June 2003, was regarded widely as a committed 

reformer and proponent of NATO integration, but 

Ukraine’s aspirations for NATO and European 

Union (EU) membership remained simply declaratory 

under President Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) who 

was unwilling to back them up with a commitment 

to democratization.7

 This led to a degree of “Ukraine 
5

fatigue” in the West due to the inconsistency between 

Ukraine’s actions and rhetoric.8

Various reform efforts in this period—the “State Program of Reformation and Development of the Armed 

Forces of Ukraine through 2005” (2000), “Concept for 

the Structure of the Armed Forces—2010” (2001), and 

the “State Program of Transition of the Armed Forces 

of Ukraine to Manning with Contracted Servicemen” 

(2002)—did not firmly orient Ukraine toward the West, 

did not focus on systemic reform, and were seriously 

underfunded. Even with the advent of increased 

political will, the capacity of the national security 

system to issue clear political guidance in the form of 

consensus-based strategic documents was still weak. 

As James Sherr noted, Ukrainian governance is poor 

because Ukrainian bureaucracy suffers from a serious 

lack of coordination. In Ukraine, transparency also is 

lacking because information is treated like a strategic 

commodity instead of a public good. Furthermore, 

resources must be devoted to creating the human 

resources needed for good governance in the defense 

sector and all other governmental sectors.9

The 2004 Defence White Paper was a “breakthrough 

document” for providing clear political guidance for 

defense reform.10 This was the first strategic document 

since Ukraine’s independence that substantively assumed a future based on NATO integration. The White 

Paper concluded that Ukraine’s security depended 

on its strategy of integration into Euro-Atlantic and 

European security and cooperation structures, as 

well as future membership in both NATO and the 

EU.11 The strategic defense review faced head-on the 

Soviet legacy pattern of spending the vast majority of 

the defense budget just to sustain personnel. In short, 

the comprehensive review represented a systemic, 
6

resource-driven approach based on a reorientation of 

Ukraine force projection activities within the context of 

multinational formations and Western-led coalitions.12

However, the Kuchma cabinet neglected to fund 

the program adequately in its 2005 defense budget, 

indicating a lack of political commitment. Kuchma’s 

team worked under the assumption that Ukraine might 

be able to slip into NATO without fundamentally 

transforming its political system and implementing 

difficult economic and security reforms.13 Prior to the 

Orange Revolution, Kiev continued to receive poor 

marks from NATO for its failure to deliver on most 

governance-related reforms.14 Indeed, the reformminded Defense Minister Marchuk was sacked several 

months prior to the December 2004 presidential 

elections due to suspicions that his loyalty lay with 

presidential aspirant Viktor Yushchenko and his opposition allies. 

At the point of the Orange Revolution, then, 

Ukraine had rhetorically committed to the West while 

still courting Russia to the East. This balancing act 

made it impossible to issue clear political guidance 

committing Ukraine and its government firmly to the 

cause of NATO integration. The Ukrainian political and 

military leadership remained divided over the question 

of whether Ukraine should pursue a collective security 

approach or retain its neutral status.15 Furthermore, 

Kiev’s democratic shortcomings prevented the country 

from advancing its eligibility for NATO membership 

despite the depth of security cooperation with NATO 

and key NATO allies such as the United States and the 

United Kingdom.

Yushchenko’s ascension to power led to a more 

consistent pro-west and pro-reform message from 

the security and foreign policy team. Looking back 
7

on the Kuchma years, NATO Secretary General Jaap 

de Hoop Scheffer remarked, “For several years, we 

found ourselves in the unusual situation of dealing 

with a Ukrainian leadership that sent very mixed 

messages with regard to NATO.”16 Commenting on 

the impact the Orange Revolution was having on the 

NATO-Ukraine relationship, he said, “Ukraine has 

clearly indicated that it wants to go along the long 

and winding road to membership. Given the fact that 

there has been a peaceful revolution, the membership 

standards can be much more easily fulfilled by the 

Yushchenko government than by the [former] Kuchma 

government.”17 Ukrainian political guidance has 

become less ambivalent and more clearly aimed at 

directing resources toward the goal of Euro-Atlantic 

integration. NATO lauded Ukraine’s initiative to 

publish an annual White Book beginning in 2006 with 

the aim of communicating to the Ukrainian public 

and interested parties abroad the current state of the 

armed forces.18 These documents have addressed the 

achievements and challenges related to implementing 

“The State Program of Development of the Armed 

Forces of Ukraine for 2006-2011” (2006). To date these 

documents indicate trends toward further downsizing, 

continued rethinking of roles and missions, and 

increasing the proportion of professional contract 

forces.19

Rational Defense Planning.

A key pillar of defense reform is the creation of 

a rational defense planning system. The essential 

ingredients of such a system include a coherent 

articulation of national interests expressed within 

national security documents, defense programming 
8

processes that adequately match resources with 

requirements, and the systemic ability to choose wisely 

among competing priorities using long-term planning 

timelines. Making resource allocation decisions without effective defense planning processes necessarily 

leads to inefficient expenditures and makes it virtually 

impossible to achieve integrated defense goals over 

time. 

Ukraine embarked on independence with 900 

thousand Soviet troops stationed on its territory. 

Significant downsizing of this force occurred, but by 

2004 the reduced number of 355 thousand still “matched neither the requirements of the military-political 

situation in the world nor the country’s economic 

capabilities.”20 This bloated Soviet force commanded 85 

percent of the defense budget simply to pay personnel 

costs. Only 3 percent was spent on procurement, less 

than 2 percent on research and development, and less 

than 1 percent on training.21

Lacking both the expertise to prepare and defend a 

budget and a defense planning system with the processes and transparency needed to ensure rational defense budget development and implementation, 

Ukraine experienced severe yearly mismatches between its minimal defense needs and actual budget 

allocations for defense purposes.22 This situation led to 

a steady deterioration of military capabilities. Ukraine’s 

2004 Defence White Paper summed it up:

Severe underfunding of military demands, slow reform 

process, rapid physical and moral degradation of 

armament and equipment, [and] insufficient level of 

personnel training prove the existence of [a] gap between 

the requirements and capabilities of the Armed Forces to 

provide Ukraine with reliable defence.23
9

A key precursor document, the Strategic Defense 

Review (SDR), was initiated in 2003 and completed 

the following year. The substance of the SDR will be 

discussed in greater depth later in this monograph. 

One of the 2004 Defence White Paper’s most salient 

recommendations was to adopt a rational defense 

planning system linking objectives to an economic 

basis of reform. The Defence White Paper’s authors 

explained that, absent an effective defense planning 

system, it would be impossible to efficiently optimize 

resources to meet defense needs. Indeed, they warned 

that perpetuating planning errors would lead to the 

breakdown of reform plans, thus discrediting the very 

concept of defense planning itself.24 Getting such a 

system on-line remains crucial to Ukrainian reform. 

Planners are having to assume that savings garnered 

through the introduction of rational planning processes 

will underwrite reform since a significant increase in 

the defense budget is not politically or economically 

feasible.

Personnel Management Reform.

Fundamental transformation of personnel systems 

has eluded most post-communist militaries and has 

been a major cause of the lack of capabilities on the part 

of their armies. Top-heavy rank structures consume 

defense budgets and prohibit the development of more 

rational structures that match needed skill sets and 

experience levels to the appropriate positions across the 

force. Colonels and lieutenant colonels still outnumber 

captains and lieutenants across the region by a hefty 

margin. All reform efforts aim to “right-size” the force 

by reducing the proportion of senior grade officers 

and increasing that of junior officers and NCOs. The 
10

establishment of centralized personnel management 

systems that are capable of accessing, promoting, and 

releasing personnel on the basis of merit also is needed. 

Indeed, one of the challenges of piecemeal reform has 

been undertaking personnel reductions without the 

benefit of such a system. 

Ukraine’s distribution of officers is cylindrical 

rather than the customary pyramidal, indicating that 

there are still far too many senior officers in proportion 

to junior officers. In 2004, the ratio between officers and 

the overall strength of the armed forces was 1:2.6, close 

to one officer for every three enlisted members, which is 

approximately twice the rate of militaries of advanced 

democracies.25 The White Paper laid out the objective of 

moving toward a pyramid-shaped distribution while 

interjecting an NCO Corps and contract professional 

soldiers into the mix alongside the conscript pool. The 

2006 White Book reports that specific steps are being 

taken to correct this imbalance such as reducing the 

intake of officer candidates by 28 percent.26

Professionalization, however, is much more 

complex than replacing conscripts with paid soldiers. 

It also requires a reconceptualization of officer and 

NCO roles as currently practiced in the Ukrainian 

armed forces, along with conversion of present grade 

structures to accommodate junior, mid-level, and 

senior NCO positions. 

Personnel management reform also includes 

issues related to the pay structure and assignment of 

soldiers. Some of the key hurdles of military reform 

in the region are the norms that governed these 

practices through the communist era. Soldiers were 

paid by position instead of rank, and officers did not 

regularly rotate to new geographic locations. Service 

on the General Staff was considered prestigious duty 

and paid more. It was not the norm to cycle General 
11

Staff members from the capital to units in the field 

in a continuing rotation that assured an officer corps 

of broad experience and geographical exposure. 

Coordinating policies related to the compensation and 

benefits of soldiers with policies for reassignment and 

promotion entails a comprehensive overhaul of the 

outdated legislation now in place and present legacy 

management concepts. 

The MOD readily admits that the Ukrainian 

personnel management system has yet to establish the 

legal basis for laying out a career path for professional 

soldiers. The assignment and promotion system does 

not select personnel based on specific requirements 

or the attainment of particular professional skills. 

Conditions attracting appropriately educated civilians 

to serve in the MOD also are lacking.27 The MOD 

leadership has stated that implementing such a 

personnel management system is integral to reform 

efforts, and the 2006 White Book reports some gains 

in this area including a summary of draft legislation.28 

But actual achievement of such a system depends on 

overcoming formidable cultural resistance to the initiatives within the institution.29 For the time being, the 

Ukrainian personnel management system will remain 

a mix between the Soviet legacy and first tentative 

steps to move toward western standards.

Professionalization. Recognizing that low pay and 

poor garrison facilities and accommodations will deter 

high-quality recruits from enlisting, the MOD has placed 

a high priority on modernizing selected facilities and 

raising the pay of contract soldiers so that it outpaces 

comparable civilian opportunities.30 The MOD plan 

also features a two-tiered, mission-oriented structure 

for the armed forces that distinguishes between Joint 

Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF) and Main Defense 
12

Forces (MDF). This approach focuses on building 

three professional brigades (one army, one navy, and 

one air force), with training and personnel initiatives 

and increases in funding being directed to the first-tier 

forces. Contract soldiers, sailors, and airmen will man 

the professional brigades and constitute the forces that 

deploy in multinational formations for peacekeeping 

and other alliance or coalition contingencies.

The MDF will continue to make up the bulk of 

the forces and have a mix of contract and conscript 

personnel. Their mission will remain territorial 

defense. However, unless steps are taken to change 

current conscription policy under which 91 percent of 

the relevant manpower pool is exempt from military 

service, this majority element of the armed forces will 

continue to be of poor quality. Only 32.7 percent of 

the conscripts have finished secondary school, which 

makes them poor prospects for the advanced technical 

training necessary to serve in first-tier units.31

Leader Development and Military Education.

Military education is another area in need of radical 

reform. In the communist era, military education was 

technically oriented and focused on the development 

of military specialists. The legacy communist era 

system must not only adapt to the vast ideological 

changes that have occurred within the state, but also 

overhaul curriculums to educate officers to perform in 

the post-Cold War threat environment in multinational 

coalition or alliance operations. Interoperability in 

officer development is an important ingredient for the 

success of these common endeavors. 

Leonid Polyakov, now the Deputy Defense Minister, noted in a paper published months before the 
13

Orange Revolution that “while some initial steps have 

been made . . . for the most part there has been no 

systemic review of curricula and training at military 

education institutions.”32 Since then, analysts have 

noted that some progress has been made in the areas 

of joint service training programs and in initiating 

programs to train NCOs.33 Additionally, the National 

Defense Academy has established Multinational Staff 

Officers’ courses as well as Euro-Atlantic orientations.34

English language courses for junior and mid-ranking 

officers have also been instituted.35 Overall, however, 

the military education system is characterized by the 

concurrent presence of two standards—NATO and 

Soviet—causing systemic tension and a continued 

waste of resources. Rationalization of this system, a 

crucial catalyst for defense reform, has not yet 

matured.

One significant bright spot, however, was the 

decree of the new defense minister to recognize the 

diplomas Ukrainian servicemen earned abroad in such 

places as Britain, Canada, and the United States.36 As 

is the custom in some post-communist militaries, these 

courses were not previously recognized. As a result, 

graduates had to repeat the courses at the appropriate 

level Ukrainian military school. The present MOD 

leadership is personally interviewing returning 

students from abroad in order to recommend their 

appropriate placement in the forces so as to leverage 

their education and experience.37

ACHIEVING RADICAL MILITARY REFORM—

KEY CONDITIONS

Defense reform in Europe’s post-communist 

states has been characterized by pockets of progress 

occurring side by side with legacy backwaters protected 
14

by reactionary bureaucrats resistant to change and 

other niches actually regressing due to continued 

underfunding and lack of strategic vision. Poor policy 

decisions, especially in the form of costly acquisitions, 

have also set back reform programs. In the first decade 

after the collapse of communism, very few reform 

initiatives in the key areas treated here actually resulted 

in improved military capabilities. But since 2001, with 

the advent of initiatives to conceive integrated reform 

measures and to enact them, greater differentiation 

among the cases is increasingly becoming evident. 

Field work in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 

Hungary, and Poland since 2001 has identified a set 

of key conditions that enable military institutions to 

break the cycle of ineffective reform. These conditions 

have emerged as key factors for beginning the cycle 

of substantive reform, which may lead to improved 

capabilities through systemic and integrated change. 

The more advanced Central European militaries are 

ahead of Ukraine in their reform accomplishments. 

Variations among the cases can be explained by the 

extent to which the key catalyst areas discussed in this 

monograph have been addressed. Variations are further 

explained by the extent to which the key conditions 

discussed in the next section of the monograph are 

present. Comparing these conditions with those present 

in the Ukrainian case will provide further insight on 

Ukraine’s progress vis-à-vis its former Warsaw Pact 

allies to the West, all now potential NATO allies.

Political Will and Sustained Economic Resources.

Political will to undertake difficult reform and 

governmental commitment to obligate a predictable 

level of scarce economic resources over a long period 
15

of time are the most essential factors for the success 

of defense reform. The backing of key political leaders 

willing to appoint change agents in critical positions 

at the MOD and on the General Staff has proven to 

be a prerequisite to launching reform processes in the 

region. 

Reform is also more likely to succeed if political 

commitments to defense funding hold firm. The best 

efforts feature at least mid-range defense planning, 

which assume steady percentages of gross domestic 

product (GDP) earmarked for defense. The failure 

to adhere to the planning assumptions may deal a 

significant blow to the implementation of integrated 

reform concepts. Sustaining political will across 

administrations and across budgets is another key 

ingredient for success. 

The Ukrainian National Security and Defense 

Council (NSDC) decided on May 23, 2002, to seek 

future NATO membership. President Leonid Kuchma 

followed up the NSDC move with a presidential 

decree. Observers describe the marked policy shift as 

an effort to assert Ukraine’s independence by building 

ties to the West in the face of Russia’s aggressive polices 

toward Ukraine.38 These proclaimed goals, however, 

were viewed by the West as declaratory rather than 

substantive, because the expressed commitment to 

Euro-Atlantic integration was not backed up by real 

movement forward on the democratization front or in 

the realm of defense reform.39

The Orange Revolution erased such ambivalence, 

as President Yushchenko clearly affirmed Ukraine’s 

intent to join the alliance at the February 2005 NATO 

summit.40 Yushchenko’s defense and foreign ministers 

have been steadfast in arguing that Ukraine’s NATO 

goal is “irreversible.”41 Although Yushchenko’s Our 
16

Ukraine party suffered a disappointing setback in the 

March 26, 2006, parliamentary elections, the majority 

of Ukrainians still supported politicians and parties 

with overtly Western and pro-reform policies. As long 

as a generally pro-Western coalition is in office, the 

Euro-Atlantic orientation is unlikely to change. 

The depth of pro-NATO support required to 

sustain backing for the completion of costly and painful 

reforms, however, is still lacking. In the run-up to the 

March elections, parliament rebelled by voting down 

a bill that would have granted permission for foreign 

troops to enter the country for training exercises. The 

measure failed 226 to 215, reflecting the split in society 

over this issue.42

Only 30 percent of Ukrainians are in favor of 

NATO membership, a number that NATO will 

certainly want to approach the 50 percent mark before 

it would approve an actual Membership Action Plan 

(MAP) for membership for Ukraine.43 Ukrainian 

Defense Minister Anatoliy Gritsenko attributes the 

low polling numbers to a “lack of knowledge”44 about 

what alliance membership means. Russia, meanwhile, 

has capitalized on the poor polling data to support its 

efforts to keep Ukrainians from orienting westward. 

Chief of Russia’s General Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky 

crowed to ITAR-TASS, “[Seventy] percent of Ukraine’s 

population is against the idea of the country’s 

membership of NATO.”45 He went on to add that 

NATO would be departing from its own membership 

criteria if it considered admitting such a candidate. 

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian MOD and foreign ministry 

continue to support the NATO education campaign 

through regular visits to regional towns and cities and 

the launching of a new publication focusing on EuroAtlantic issues called The Atlantic Panorama to inform 
17

the army and public on developments in Euro-Atlantic 

integration.46

As late as 2002, receiving only 1.3 percent of 

GDP, the armed forces were subsisting figuratively 

on a starvation diet. One strategic research group 

characterized the armed forces then as a “semiprivatized, corporatized entity, forced to raise almost 

100 million dollars a year from ‘private economic 

activity’—supplying business with labour,” resulting 

in “scandals over the sale of equipment and fuel, 

and the de facto secondment of military personnel as 

private security forces.”47 In 2004, the year the Defence 

White Paper was published outlining Ukraine’s plan to 

reform its armed forces according to NATO standards, 

Ukraine ranked third among NATO’s 26 countries in 

terms of size, but 127th out of 150 countries worldwide 

in terms of expenditures per serviceman. Ukraine 

allotted the equivalent of 16 Euros per inhabitant for 

defense, while the United States spent 1,190; France, 

453; and Italy, 235.48

The 2005 budget contained a significant increase 

for defense spending. The military budget rose by 22 

percent (up to 2.41 percent of GDP) and included, for 

the first time, spending for military reform initiatives 

and new armaments. Yushchenko’s claim at the end 

of 2005 that the Ukrainian armed forces will actually 

receive the entire amount which they were supposed 

to be allocated is also significant. From 2000 to 2004, 

underfunding occurred at levels ranging from 35 up to 

60 percent. Figure 1, taken from the 2004 Defence White 

Paper, depicts these funding levels.49 The recent White 

Books report that the chronic problem of financing 

persists. In 2005 and 2006 the JRRF received only 54-56 

percent of their planned funding.50

Although the right areas are being targeted to 

receive increased funding, e.g., safety, housing 
18

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

UAH (hryvnia) million

Minimal needs

Envisaged by the budget

Actually allocated

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

2456,8

3302,3 3291,5

4447,0

4294,0

2348,0

3033,4

3070,3

4167,3

4821,4

4937,1

4785,6

5899,0

6400,0

Figure 1. Ministry of Defence Funding Levels.

construction, pay, and some new armaments, the 

overall budget is still insufficient to make significant 

gains in modernization, training, and other reformrelated programs.

The Quality of Reform Concepts.

A country’s national security documents play a 

crucial role in setting forth the state’s strategic vision. 

Equally important is the quality of the strategic 

concepts being employed to effect change, that is, 

the reform plans themselves. My research on the 

various practices of states in Central Europe points 

to the conclusion that only reform plans that take an 

integrated and systemic approach will be effective. 

Ukraine’s 2004 Defence White Paper, as seen in the 

following excerpt, takes some important steps in 
19

that it lays out at least the essential parameters of 

an integrated and systemic approach to reform:

The principal objective of the modernization of the 

Armed Forces of Ukraine is the creation, on the basis of 

the 21st century challenges, of the armed forces which 

will successfully fulfill their incumbent tasks, effectively 

function in a democratic society, correspond to the 

economic potential of the state to support them, adapt for 

changes of forms and ways of warfare and be completely 

interoperable within NATO Forces.51

Earlier in 2004, Leonid Polyakov, while still working 

for the Razumkov Centre, had summed up Ukraine’s 

effort to date as focusing on quantitative reductions 

instead of systemic transformation:

Current plans are still unrealistic. Technological advance 

means that the cost of military equipment for a given 

sized force doubles in price every 7-10 years, while 

the early stages of personnel reductions and all stages 

of professionalisation require considerable additional 

financial resources. Such factors have been ignored for 

many years in allocating funds to the national defence 

budget. As a result, even under the most optimistic 

scenario of economic development, Ukraine will not 

be able to afford 240,000 servicemen (as stipulated in 

the “Concept for the Armed Forces—2010”) or even 

180,000-200,000 (according to the latest declarations of 

the Defence Ministry) if it also wishes to meet its goals 

for maintaining a high level of combat readiness and 

developing professional Armed Forces.52

Ukraine’s military reform concepts have now 

evolved, however, to the point where the key areas 

of reform have been identified. Top national goals 

include:

• Defense planning review;

• Defense planning procedures;
20

• Defense budget;

• Resource management;

• Defense reform and forces review 

management;

• Personnel management; and,

• Training and education.53

These broad goal categories track closely with the 

key areas of reform identified earlier in this monograph 

that emerged from my own cross-national research. 

This implies that Ukrainian strategists have some familiarity with regional efforts and have adopted much 

of the reform framework that NATO experts have offered in the close consultations that have taken place in 

recent years. Indeed, the 2004 Defence White Paper built 

on the framework earlier developed in the two principal 

policy blueprints, both cited above: “The List of the 

National Goals of Military Reform in Ukraine” and 

“State Program of Armed Forces Transition towards 

Manning on a Contract Basis.” Each was developed in 

coordination with NATO planners.

Differentiating between the Joint Rapid Reaction 

Forces, which have an expeditionary role, and Main 

Defense Forces, which have a homeland defense role, 

is an attempt to funnel scarce resources to the units that 

will deploy abroad. The growing competence of these 

externally focused units has been widely recognized. 

The drawback of this approach is that the MDF units are 

kept at low operational levels, with poorly maintained 

or nonfunctional equipment and manned by few 

professionals. Additionally, within the MDF, most 

battalion and company-sized units follow the same 

training and organizational procedures as they did 

in the Soviet era. This mix of leading edge reforming 
21

units and lagging legacy units is an obstacle to reform 

because it allows major swaths of the armed forces to 

continue operating totally immune to the main reform 

principles.

Finally, it is important to note that although the 

reform documents identify the key areas for reform, 

these documents were created without the benefit of 

a national security strategy that would lay out the 

underlying strategic vision of the political leadership 

and the state’s plan for leveraging all its instruments 

of power to achieve its political objectives. President 

Yushchenko called for the preparation of such an 

overarching strategic document in early 2006. The 

National Security Strategy of Ukraine was finally 

published in February 2007. It is a sweeping view of 

Ukraine’s security interests calling for further reform 

of institutions essential to effective governance and 

economic development.54

Strong Leadership Atop the Bureaucracy.

In addition to political will at the top, strong 

leadership in positions of authority throughout the 

national security bureaucracy is necessary to move 

reform plans forward. Strong leadership is requisite 

in the post-communist strategic bureaucratic culture 

where proactive, forward-leaning managers are scarce. 

Bureaucrats may be more accustomed to reacting to 

direct and explicit orders from superiors. In such an 

environment, the opportunities to resist and impede 

change are limitless and can be overcome only by 

strong personalities demanding compliance. 

From 1991 to 1996, Ukraine had three Ministers of 

Defense and four Chiefs of General Staff, making it 

difficult to develop a consistent and forceful approach 

to reform.55 Kuchma’s main contribution to defense 
22

reform was the appointment of Yevhen Marchuk 

to be Ukraine’s sixth minister of defense on June 20, 

2003. A former intelligence chief and Secretary of the 

National Security and Defense Council, Marchuk was 

competent in national security affairs and respected in 

both the East and the West. A pragmatic centrist, his 

aim was to balance Russian influence with integration 

in NATO. During his tenure, Marchuk secured more 

funding for defense, began restructuring away from the 

Soviet model, and oversaw a comprehensive Strategic 

Defense Review which became the basis for the 2004 

White Paper.56

Unlike his predecessors, Marchuk had the broad 

interagency experience, political skills, and executive 

ability to implement radical change.57 He also was 

instrumental in securing governmental approval for 

the deployment of 1,600 Ukrainian peacekeepers to 

Iraq, which ranked as the fourth largest coalition contribution and ensured a strong strategic partnership 

with the United States. However, once President 

Kuchma understood that a NATO Membership Action 

Plan (MAP) would not be forthcoming in the short 

term without significant progress in the development 

of Ukraine’s democratic institutions, Marchuk was 

sacked in favor of a more loyal political ally who could 

be depended upon to maintain Kuchma’s oligarchic 

system.58 While Marchuk got the MOD on track with 

the introduction of key reform concepts, no similarly 

reform-minded leaders were in place atop other 

elements of the national security bureaucracy, and the 

President did not fully back the MOD reform team’s 

efforts.

Yushchenko’s victory resulted in the installation 

of a team of reform-minded leaders throughout the 

national security bureaucracy. Razumkov Centre 

founders Anatoliy Gritsenko and Leonid Polyakov 
23

assumed the key positions of Defense Minister and 

First Deputy Minister, respectively. This team was 

able to build on Marchuk’s plans to reduce the force 

and benefited from Marchuk’s efforts to bring more 

civilian experts to the MOD and his support for 

training Ukrainian officers at western staff colleges.59

Gritsenko is a graduate of the U.S. Air War College, 

while Polyakov graduated from the U.S. Army War 

College. Their American war college educations, and 

their subsequent experience staffing Ukraine’s leading 

think tank for national security issues, have provided 

Gritsenko and Polyakov with a genuine capacity for 

serious and relevant analytical planning.

Ukraine’s current senior military leadership is 

thought to support the reform agenda and to favor closer 

ties to NATO. Most senior commanders, especially 

those associated with the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, 

have pro-reform credentials. However, because of 

the present two-tier structure of the Ukrainian armed 

forces, large numbers of senior leaders within the MDF 

still have little or no exposure to western training and 

operations.

External Pressure and Advice.

Comparative research indicates that where external 

expertise is brought to bear, advances in the reform 

process occur far more quickly. The additional input 

of external leverage from NATO in the form of alliance 

assessments, both before accession and after, has 

also been critically important. In the case of Ukraine, 

long-term collaboration between Ukraine and NATO 

provided the political and military leadership with 

expertise essential to the development of reform 

concepts. 
24

In November 2002, the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan 

was adopted. The focus of the plan was fundamental 

reform of the entire security sector and strengthening 

the rule of law and democracy. Consequently, as we 

have seen, the Kuchma government did not make 

much headway in its implementation.60 The action 

plan is implemented through detailed annual Target 

Plans. Under Defense Minister Marchuk’s leadership, 

Ukraine scored some early high marks in the defense 

reform area, but received poor evaluations on the 

broader governance-related issues.61 NATO Secretary 

General de Hoop Scheffer remarked at a joint press 

conference with Kuchma at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, 

“We made it very clear the success of integration 

requires more than defense reform [, it also requires] a 

strong commitment to the highest values of NATO.”62 

NATO responded to the positive political development 

of the Orange Revolution with the offer to launch an 

“Intensified Dialogue” with Ukraine aimed at focusing 

on five areas essential to continued progress in defense 

reform and to the consolidation of democracy.63 The 

Intensified Dialogue falls short of a MAP, which 

implies that an offer of accession will be forthcoming 

upon completion. Until public and political support 

solidifies in favor of NATO accession and strides in 

good governance are more evident, the NATO-Ukraine 

relationship will likely plateau at this level for the time 

being.

Outside advisers, often made available as a result 

of specific bilateral agreements, have also played a 

critical role in defense reform. Such consultants have 

been able to contribute expertise that native members 

of the defense communities simply did not have, 

such as the drafting of foundational documents and 

amelioratory analysis of processes. In late 2004, the 

United Kingdom seconded a British Defense Ministry 
25

civilian adviser, David Jones, to the Ukrainian MOD 

for a 2-year term to assist with the implementation of 

the 2004 Defence White Paper.

64 Ukrainian sources report 

that Slovakia, Hungary, and the Baltic states actively 

participated in Ukraine’s Strategic Defense Review.65

Lithuania has provided experts to help Ukraine draft 

the first annual plan for MAP implementation and 

lobbied NATO to implement a MAP with Ukraine.66 

Lithuania and numerous other western countries have 

sponsored the education of Ukrainian officers at their 

military educational institutions. Poland is another 

strong advocate of Ukrainian accession to NATO. 

The United States has a robust security cooperation 

program with Ukraine featuring joint exercises, 

training, and education. Substantial foreign aid aimed 

at consolidating democracy is provided as well.67

The United States is a strong proponent of eventual 

Ukrainian accession to NATO.

Participation with western armed forces in 

numerous operations and exercises is another valuable 

experience. Ukrainian units have deployed to the 

Balkans, contributed Antonov transport aircraft to 

NATO forces in Afghanistan, and contributed 1,650 

soldiers to the Polish-led multinational force in southern Iraq.68 More than 2,700 soldiers were participating 

in operations abroad prior to the pull-out of the Ukrainian contingent from Iraq at the end of 2005.

The role of Russia is an external factor absent in 

the other post-communist cases of Central Europe, but 

is highly important in Ukraine. Russia is adamantly 

opposed to Ukraine cementing its orientation to 

the West with NATO membership. Russia has not 

hesitated to use its power in a heavy-handed way, most 

recently by cutting off Ukraine’s natural gas supply 

and demanding substantial increases in payments 

for Russian energy. Bilateral military ties continue, 
26

although at reduced levels. Russia’s Black Sea fleet is 

based in the Crimea on Ukrainian territory.69 Soviet 

era procedures, equipment, and thinking are still 

prevalent throughout the armed forces. Russia will 

continue to use whatever leverage is available to 

counter Ukraine’s march toward the West. Each step 

toward further integration with the West will have 

serious consequences for Ukraine’s relationship with 

Russia.

THE WAY AHEAD 

Ukraine has made impressive strides toward its 

integration into the Euro-Atlantic community of states. 

Recent elections indicate that the overall move toward 

the West is unlikely to be reversed. The results also 

reveal, however, a divided society that is not yet at the 

stage of political, social, and economic development 

where a broad and deep consensus on Euro-Atlantic 

integration is possible. A pro-reform, pro-Western 

government can continue to make progress on overall 

governance issues, while the reform-minded leadership 

in the MOD and General Staff may be able to make 

headway on defense reform. However, democratic 

consolidation and its manifestation in transformed 

military institutions will not occur until the Ukrainian 

society is more unified toward this end.

Ukraine’s main strengths lie in its capacity to 

develop sound reform concepts and to back them up 

with the strongest level of political will evident since 

independence. Ukraine’s greatest obstacles to reform 

are the prospect of chronic underfunding of reform 

concepts and the lack of consensus beneath the top 

leadership and within society as a whole, and also 

within segments of the military itself, for the reform 

agenda—both at the level of defense policy and in the 
27

overall orientation toward the West. Real movement 

on reform depends on an awakening of public 

consciousness that the Euro-Atlantic community and 

the NATO alliance system offer the best solution 

for meeting Ukraine’s security needs. Admission to 

the Euro-Atlantic community also depends on the 

consolidation of democracy that will come only with 

the maturation of democratic institutions.

Until these elements come together, personal and 

corporate interests will continue to outweigh national 

interests, civilian control will remain incomplete, 

transparency will be limited, nepotism and corruption 

will hold sway, and a culture of accountability will elude 

the majority who seek it. Ukraine is likely to remain 

frozen “between East and West” for the indefinite 

future. However, many elements are in place to move 

Ukraine’s political system, society, and security sector 

more firmly into the Western camp. As one scholar 

of Soviet era armed forces remarked recently, “The 

greatest achievement of the Cold War was the export 

of NATO’s military model.”70 Military reform, when 

it occurs in Europe, is squarely along the lines of the 

NATO paradigm. This reality will necessarily influence 

Russia once its political and military leaders emerge 

from their post-Soviet era of reform intransigence. 

What remains to be seen is the final balance that will 

result as Ukraine’s democratic institutions mature, its 

military evolves on the path of NATO integration, and 

its society’s hybrid identity emerges with aspects of 

both the East and the West. The cumulative effect of 

the post-Soviet movement toward the NATO model 

in the management, training, and equipping of armed 

forces is an ongoing phenomenon worthy of continued 

observation, study, and, where feasible, gentle nudges 

from the West.
28

ENDNOTES

1. See Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, “Civil-Military Relations 

and Defense Reform in Post Communist Central Europe,” paper 

prepared for the Interuniversity Seminar on the Armed Forces 

and Society (IUS) Biennial International Conference, October 21, 

2005. 

2. Ibid.

3. Oleksiy Melnyk and Leonid Polyakov, “Ukraine: The Armed 

Forces and Beyond,” The Ukraine Center for Economic and 

Political Studies [named after Olexander Razumkov], January 1, 

2004, www.uceps.org/eng/print/652/, accessed March 28, 2006.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. “After the Revolution: NOSTRUM Workshop in Kyiv,” 

Security Matters: Newsletter from the Centre for European Security 

Studies, Issue 14, August 2005, p. 3, www.cess.org/publications/

securitymatters/pdf/securitymatters-14.pdf, accessed April 12, 2006.

7. James Sherr, Into Reverse? The Dismissal of Ukraine’s Minister 

of Defence, Surrey, England: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 

September 29, 2004.

8. “External Affairs, Ukraine,” Jane’s Sentinel Security 

Assessment: Russia and the CIS, December 28, 2005, p. 18, www8.

janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content/janesdata/sent/

cissu/uk, accessed March 28, 2006.

9. “After the Revolution: NOSTRUM Workshop in Kyiv.”

10. Interview with Ukrainian officer studying in the United 

States, by author, March 22, 2006 (hereafter Interview with 

Ukrainian officer); Ukraine’s Strategic Defence Bulletin until 2015 

(Defence White Paper), Kyiv: Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, 2004. 

11. Ibid., p. 13.

12. Ibid., p. 32.

13. “Armed Forces, Ukraine,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: 

Russia and the CIS, March 24 2005, p. 18, www8.janes.com/Search/

printFriendlyView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/cissu/p.5, 

accessed March 3, 2006.

14. Ibid., p. 5.

15. Ibid., p. 8.
29

16. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General, NATO, speech, 

June 27, 2005, M2 Presswire, web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/printdoc, 

accessed February 13, 2006.

17. Daniel Dombey, “Head of NATO Warns Ukraine ‘Long 

Road’ to Membership,” London Financial Times, April 20, 2005, 

www.dia.smil.mil/admin/EARLYBIRD/050420/e20050420364377.

html, accessed April 5, 2006.

18. NATO Press Releases, “Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine 

Commission in Defence Ministers session held in Brussels on 

Thursday, 8 June 2006,” Press Release (2006)065.

19. White Book 2005: Defense Policy of Ukraine, Kyiv: Ukrainian 

Ministry of Defense, 2006; White Book 2006: Defence Policy of 

Ukraine, Kyviv: Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, 2007.

20. Defence White Paper, p. 7.

21. “Defence Reform Faces Formidable Challenges,” Oxford 

Analytica, April 7, 2005, p. 1, proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0, p. 

3, accessed March 28, 2006.

22. Defence White Paper, p. 79.

23. Ibid., p. 30.

24. Ibid., p. 82.

25. Ibid., p. 25.

26. White Book 2006: Defence Policy of Ukraine, Kyiv: Ukrainian 

Ministry of Defence, 2007, p. 46.

27. Ibid., p. 24.

28. White Book 2006, p.47.

29. Interview with Ukrainian officer.

30. “Defence Reform Faces Formidable Challenges.”

31. Defence White Paper, p. 25.

32. Melnyk and Polyakov, “Ukraine: The Armed Forces and 

Beyond,” p. 3.

33. “Armed Forces, Ukraine,” p. 4.

34. Melnyk and Polyakov, “Ukraine: The Armed Forces and 

Beyond,” p. 3.

35. “Defence Reform Faces Formidable Challenges,” p. 2.

36. Interview with Ukrainian officer.
30

37. Ibid.

38. “Ukraine: Kyiv moves toward NATO membership,” Oxford 

Analytica, June 21, 2002, p. 1; proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index, 

accessed March 28, 2006.

39. “External Affairs, Ukraine,” p. 18.

40. “After the Revolution: NOSTRUM Workshop in Kyiv.”

41. “Defense Minister: Ukraine Will Be Ready to Join NATO 

by 2008,” Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, October 24, 2005, 

https://www.fbis.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_3935_246_

203_0_43, accessed March 28, 2006.

42. David Holley, “Ukraine Leader Faces Opposition on NATO 

Drive,” Los Angeles Times, February 10, 2006.

43. “Ukrainian Defense Minister Expects NATO Entry by 

2010,” Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, April 4, 2006, www.

fbis.cia.sgov.gov/cgi-bin/cqcgi, accessed April 7, 2006.

44. Mark Mazzetti, “NATO A Tough Sell At Home, Ukraine 

Official Says,” Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2005.

45. “Russian Chief of Staff Says 70% of Ukrainians Against 

Joining NATO Alliance,” ITAR-TASS, April 3, 2006.

46. “Ukrainian Defence Ministry Publishes Magazine about 

NATO,” Kiev Unian, April 4, 2006; www.fbis.cia.sgov.gov, accessed 

April 7, 2006.

47. “Ukraine: Air disaster highlights military defects,” Oxford 

Analytica, August 8, 2002, p. 1, proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index, pp. 

2-3, accessed March 28, 2006.

48. “Ukraine Plans Sweeping Reform of Armed Forces,” Kiev 

Defense-Express, July 12, 2004, https://www.fbis.gov/portal/server.pt/

gateway; March 28, 2006. 

49. Defence White Paper, p. 29.

50. White Book 2006, p. 28.

51. Ibid., p. 54.

52. Melnyk and Polyakov, “Ukraine: The Armed Forces and 

Beyond,” p. 3.

53. A complete list of national goals can be found at the MOD 

web site, www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=cooperation&sub

=national_goals, accessed March 31, 2006.
31

54. National Security Strategy of Ukraine, Kyiv: Government 

of Ukraine, February 2007, www.mfa.gov.ua/usa/en/publication/

content/8387.htm, accessed May 3, 2007.

55. “The History of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” Ministry of 

Defence of Ukraine web-site; www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&

part=history&sub=history, p. 3, accessed March 28, 2006.

56. “Armed Forces, Ukraine,” p. 4.

57. James Sherr, Into Reverse? The Dismissal of Ukraine’s Minister 

of Defence, p. 2.

58. Ibid.

59. “Defence Reform Faces Formidable Challenges.”

60. “Armed Forces, Ukraine,” p. 5.

61. Ibid.; “NATO ‘Satisfied’ With Ukraine’s Fulfillment of the 

2004 Cooperation Target Plan,” Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh 

Novostey, November 11, 2004, www.fbis.gov, accessed March 28, 

2006.

62. “NATO Tells Ukraine to Strengthen Democracy,” Agence 

France Presse, June 29, 2004, web.lexis-nexis.com, accessed March 28, 

2006.

63. The five areas where Ukrainian-NATO cooperation will 

intensify are: (1) Democratic political control of the armed forces; 

(2) Overall defense and security sector reform (i.e., modernization 

of defense budget and command structure); (3) Political dialogue 

to cooperate on security issues of common interest; (4) Managing 

the social and economic consequences of reform; and, (5) Public 

information. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General, NATO, 

speech, June 27, 2005, pp. 2-3.

64. “Temporary British Adviser Appointed to Consult with 

Ukrainian Defense Ministry,” Kiev Interfax-Ukraine, November 12, 

2004, www.fbis.gov, accessed March 28, 2006.

65. Interview with Ukrainian officer.

66. “Ukraine Gets in Vilnius Baltic, Nordic, US Support for 

Defense Reforms,” Baltic News Service, March 1, 2006, web.lexisnexis.com, accessed March 28, 2006.

67. The Bush administration requested $60 million for Ukrainian democracy for 2006; Congress appropriated $37 million. 

Peter Baker, “Bush Promises More Help to Ukraine,” Washington 

Post, April 5, 2005, p. 2.
32

68. “NATO Tells Ukraine to Strengthen Democracy,” Agence 

France Presse, June 29, 2004. 

69. Peter Finn, “Russians Sense the Heat of Cold War,” 

Washington Post, April 3, 2006, p. 3.

70. Christopher D. Jones, Jackson School of International 

Studies, University of Washington; remarks made in open 

discussion, “The U.S. and Russia: Regional Security Issues and 

Interests,” April 26, 2006, Washington, DC.