February 2007 Defense Horizons  

Defense

including quick insertion (Panama), maneuver warfare (major combat 

operations in Iraq), an all-air campaign (Kosovo), and a Special Forces–

led effort (Afghanistan).

At the same time that major combat operations have proceeded 

so successfully, the United States and its allies have undertaken a 

variety of stability operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East 

Timor, several African countries, Afghanistan, and Iraq.2 These stability operations generally have included both economic and governance 

reconstruction and have spanned the full security gamut from nonviolent peacekeeping to full-blown counterinsurgency. Not one of these 

operations has approached the success achieved in combat operations 

undertaken in the same period.

This paper analyzes whether a strategic use of information and 

information technology (I/IT) in stability operations could lead to more 

successful operations. Certainly, the information revolution has been a 

dynamic and positive factor in business, government, and social arenas 

in the Western world. The combination of technology, information content, and people schooled in the use of each has reshaped enterprises 

and activities of all types. This paper concludes that utilizing the elements of the information revolution in a strategic approach to stability 

operations would have positive results and sets forth the strategic and 

operational parameters of such an effort.

Problems of Stability Operations 

Utilizing the fruits of the information revolution for effective stability operations requires a prior understanding of what makes a stability operation effective. As noted above, stability operations have security, economic, and governance reconstruction elements. Yet while it is 

widely recognized that stability operations go far beyond purely military 

actions—encompassing security, humanitarian, economic, and governance/rule of law issues—no one has set forth an actual strategic or 

operational doctrine that promises success in stability operations. As a 

World Bank staff report put it, “The Bank, like other international partners, is still learning what works in fragile states contexts.”3

Overview

Information and information technology (I/IT) can significantly increase the likelihood of success in stability operations—

if they are engaged as part of an overall strategy that coordinates 

the actions of outside intervenors and focuses on generating effective results for the host nation. Properly utilized, I/IT can help 

create a knowledgeable intervention, organize complex activities, 

and integrate stability operations with the host nation, making 

stability operations more effective.

Key to these results is a strategy that requires that 1) the 

U.S. Government gives high priority to such an approach and 

ensures that the effort is a joint civilian-military activity; 2) the 

military makes I/IT part of the planning and execution of the 

stability operation; 3) preplanning and the establishment of I/IT 

partnerships are undertaken with key regular participants in stability operations, such as the United Nations and the World Bank; 

4) the focus of the intervention, including the use of I/IT, is on the 

host nation, supporting host-nation governmental, societal, and 

economic development; and 5) key information technology capabilities are harnessed to support the strategy. Implementing the 

strategy will include 1) development of an information business 

plan for the host nation so that I/IT is effectively used to support 

stabilization and reconstruction; 2) agreements among intervenors on data-sharing and collaboration, including data-sharing on 

a differentiated basis; and 3) use of commercial IT tools and data 

provided on an unclassified basis.

Over the past 30 years, the information revolution has had an 

important impact on the conduct of military operations. In the United 

States, it has produced what is often called “netcentric warfare” or “netcentric operations”1

—the combination of shared communications, key 

data, analytic capabilities, and people schooled in using those capacities—that has enabled enhanced joint activities, integrated distributed 

capabilities, much greater speed, and more effective maneuver. The 

result has been that the United States and its allies have been able to 

conduct very effective combat operations under a range of conditions, 

I-Power: The Information Revolution 

and Stability Operations

Franklin D. Kramer, Larry Wentz, and Stuart Starr

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 7

Number 55

Horizons
 Defense Horizons February 2007

It is in this context that the question arises whether the application of the tools and content of the information revolution can have a 

positive effect on the outcome of a stability operation.

Opportunities for I/IT Strategy 

As difficult as the circumstances of a stability operation are, the 

very complexity provides significant opportunities for the use of an 

effective information strategy built around the use of information technology. It is worth underscoring at the outset what may be an obvious 

proposition: that information and information technology have to be 

used together to be effective. One will not suffice without the other.

At the most basic level, information technology can be used to distribute information to important players in an ongoing stability operation. 

Making information available can have four important consequences.

First, it can help create a “knowledgeable” intervention. Even 

before the intervention, and certainly as the intervention progresses, the 

intervenors will need information of many kinds about both planned and 

ongoing respondent activities and about the host nation. For the latter, 

population characteristics, cultural dynamics, economic structures, and 

historical governance issues all can be described and analyzed.

The intervenors will first plan and then undertake many activities, with multiple players in each field of endeavor. While it will not be 

possible for all intervening actors to have the unity of command that 

is sought by militaries, the use of I/IT may allow for organizing a more 

common approach—or at least to reduce inconsistent approaches.

An information strategy supported by information technology provides an opportunity to share information among the stability operation respondents themselves. This sharing of information will facilitate 

the generation of a common approach and can help in the effective 

use of scarce resources. As an example, the allocation of health care 

resources might be usefully rationalized once there is at least a working sense of what types of resources are available from the respondents. 

Also, intervenors working on the rule of law in different sections of the 

country will be more effective if they adopt closely aligned approaches 

than if they use significantly different approaches, even if each is valid 

in and of itself.

A second key element of the strategy will be using I/IT to help 

organize complex activities. Normally, a stability operation will be 

undertaken on a countrywide basis. For even the smallest countries, 

this means a significant geographic arena, with all the difficulties 

of maintaining connectivity. The intervention also will undoubtedly 

extend over a significant timeframe, and I/IT will be necessary to maintain an updated approach as conditions on the ground change.

Complexity also will be manifested in the requirement to deal 

simultaneously with security, humanitarian, economic, and governance 

issues. Many intervenors will be involved in only one or some of these 

actions, but actions in one field often have consequences for another. 

Moreover, knowledge of what is happening in each is important for the 

development of an overall strategy capable of achieving an effective 

host nation. Even in a single sector, information supported by effective 

information technology would allow for more effective in-country coordination; and distributed players would be better able to take focused 

effective actions. Furthermore, knowledge is an important element in 

building trust and commitment among different stability operations 

players, which can be a key element in enhancing effectiveness.

Franklin D. Kramer (kramerf@ndu.edu) is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) at the National Defense 

University. Larry Wentz (wentzl@ndu.edu) and Stuart Starr (starrs@ndu.edu) are 

Senior Research Fellows in CTNSP.

The problems of stability operations are evident. To begin with, no 

two circumstances are the same. To say that Haiti is different than Somalia is different than Bosnia is different than Afghanistan is only to hint 

at the depth and breadth of the complexities. These include the causes 

of the crisis that occasioned the intervention, the host-nation culture or 

cultures, the language or languages, the nature of the economies ante 

bellum, the influence of neighbors, and a multitude of other factors. 

By definition, the state structure has collapsed or is severely impaired. 

Often there has been significant violence. Internal groups have been factionalized and frequently have each others’ blood on their hands. Economies are in disarray. Social mechanisms have broken down. Information 

is lacking, and communications mechanisms are limited.

Prior to almost all interventions, the international community 

already will have been significantly present in the form of international 

organizations, nongovernmental organizations, businesses, bilateral 

governmental activities, and many more venues. Once there is a major 

international intervention, complexity increases greatly. Regardless of 

the initial number of international actors, the number and diversity 

of participants increase. More importantly, their relative importance 

increases for such functionality as exists or is created in the host 

country. Additionally, whereas before the intervention, development 

often had priority, now there are simultaneous challenges in the security, humanitarian, economic, and governance arenas—and, if social 

needs may be separated from the foregoing, in the social arena as well. 

Because of the expanded requirements, there are numerous players. 

Personnel and equipment stream in from civilian and military components of the governments of the United States and other nations, 

international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and its 

many agencies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the African 

Union, the World Bank, and others. Nongovernmental organizations 

also are involved, many of them in the humanitarian arena, as well as 

numerous others that participate in myriad aspects of reconstruction 

and development. Many businesses also get involved, either as contractors to national and international organizations or as participants in 

private ventures.

A very important aspect of the complexity is that dealing with 

the host nation has become more difficult. Governmental functions are 

broken, and the government is seen by many as illegitimate and not 

representative of all the people; its reach is generally limited, and it is 

ineffective in mobilizing domestic human and other resources.

A further complicating factor is that circumstances on the ground 

change over time in significant part in response to the intervention. 

(The transformation from liberator to occupier is a well-known problem for intervening forces.) Interventions generally last for years, and a 

decade is not unusual. Stability operations encompass not only security 

but also reconstruction, and reconstruction takes time. In addition to 

actual changes, managing expectations of both the intervenors and the 

host nation becomes extremely important. For example, there is a socalled “golden hour” of 6–12 months during which actions must support 

expectations and the local population must experience improvements 

in quality of life.
February 2007 Defense Horizons  

The third key use of distributed information will be to integrate 

the stability operation respondents with the host nation. It bears stating more than once that the objective of a stability operation is not a 

“good intervention” but rather an “effective host nation” as a result of the 

intervention. To accomplish this difficult task, given that the host nation 

is likely fragmented, disrupted, and not very effective, the intervenors 

need to stay connected to the host nation so that the results are adopted 

and adoptable by the populace on whose behalf the effort is being undertaken. An I/IT strategy needs to involve the host nation (likely in numerous manifestations) in the ongoing activities of the intervention.

The fourth use of I/IT is to integrate the host nation and make it 

more effective. Effectiveness can be enhanced by using I/IT to identify 

key requirements and target scarce resources. Information for a budget process is an important example. I/IT will also be able to facilitate 

informed senior decisionmaking well beyond budget and budget-type 

decisions. For example, how best to bring previous warring factions to 

work together will involve important social and economic issues whose 

resolution can be enhanced by good information.

Host-nation capacity can also be created by the use of I/IT. Government operations can be reestablished with the proper use of information technology. Both the information systems and the training to 

use them will be required, but information capacity can be generated 

far more quickly than other infrastructures—and can enable other 

effective actions.

Key Questions for the I/IT Strategy 

An important question in analyzing an I/IT strategy for stability 

operations is how such a strategy relates to what else is happening in 

the intervention. As noted by the World Bank staff, no one has developed a truly knowledgeable approach to stability operations, which, in 

World Bank parlance, is one type of activity in fragile states. There are, 

however, some principles that have been adopted by the international 

community and the United States that are worth noting here.

First, the international community, through the Organisation for 

Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and otherwise, has 

emphasized the importance of the principles of harmonization and 

alignment. Harmonization refers to having the outside intervenors 

work in a generally coordinated fashion. As the OECD Development 

Co-operation Directorate has stated, “Harmonisation is taken to refer 

to common arrangements amongst the donor community, rationalized 

procedures and information sharing between donors . . . related to the 

goal of greater coherence between and among donors.”4 Alignment

refers to having the outside intervenors align their activities with the 

interests of the host nation. Again, as the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate stated, “Alignment has been defined . . . as a set of 

practices according to which donor organizations use recipient country strategies, policies, and practices . . . as a guide for their assistance 

programs.”5 Both these principles are embodied in the so-called Rome 

Declaration on Harmonization of 2003 and subsequent actions and 

statements of the major multilateral and bilateral donor entities and 

countries, including the United States.

I/IT can have an important, positive impact on both harmonization 

and alignment. Coordination among intervenors is one of the key achievable results of an effective information strategy implemented by information technology. Likewise, an I/IT strategy is an important element 

to ensure that the host nation is effectively integrated into the decisionmaking and implementing actions of the outside intervenors.

A second question is the relationship between an I/IT strategy and 

strategies for security, humanitarian needs, economic development, 

and governance/rule of law. The U.S. Government, and particularly the 

Department of Defense (DOD), has often talked about using all elements of national power for success in stability operations, often citing 

diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) power as key 

aspects of the types of power brought to bear by outside intervenors.

This so-called DIME paradigm is a useful model, although it is not 

meant to be exhaustive. For example, host-nation civil society may be 

affected by outside, nongovernmental, civil organizations that nonetheless are important elements of an intervenor’s national power. Social 

issues also must be considered, and, unless “diplomatic” is read to mean 

all contacts other than military or economic, there will be important 

nondiplomatic interactions on matters such as rule of law. What the 

DIME paradigm shows most importantly, however, is that information 

needs to be considered in an overall context, just as the principles of 

harmonization and alignment indicate.

There is a sterile debate as to whether information only supports 

other activities or is an activity in and of itself. Certainly, information 

supports other activities. Military, economic, and governance activities all operate on the basis of information. Conversely, certain aspects 

of information, such as the establishment of technical structures, can 

be undertaken apart from other activities. As an example, think of the 

building of towers to create the infrastructure for a cellular network. 

Overall, however, information, as every other action in a stability operation, is designed for one purpose: to serve the objective of making the 

host nation effective. That is the overall context in which to consider I/

IT and to determine whether and how to undertake a particular effort.

The broad challenge for an I/IT strategy for stability operations is to help create effective results from the multitude of players and actions that will be found in a particular situation. No one 

should think that information is a panacea. If a faction within a 

country resists working with another faction even after all information is exchanged, then that is a political problem and probably will 

not be solved by further information. But given that information is 

not a universal solution to all problems, the question is whether the 

information revolution can help harmonize, align, and make more 

effective the outside military and civilian governmental intervenors, 

international and nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and, 

especially, host nation in all its manifestations.

Elements of an I/IT Strategy 

Five key elements are required to generate an effective I/IT 

strategy for the United States to use in stability operations.

Element 1. The first requirement is for the U.S. Government to 

make the fundamental decision that such a strategy is a key mandatory element of all stability operations. That is no small statement, 

because the reality is that the United States has never—in any of its 

many stability operations—made such a decision. But the rationale 

for such a conclusion is clear: information and information technology are crucial elements to the success of stability operations, supporting effectiveness, harmonization, and alignment goals.

A coherent U.S. Government I/IT strategy is essential to produce the needed results. This means that the effort has to be truly 
 Defense Horizons February 2007

execute the strategy. There is no reason why the J–6 cannot help develop 

the I/IT strategy, but it cannot be developed apart from the policy, plans, 

and execution of the larger effort. This is not a technical problem; it is 

a strategic effectiveness problem to accomplish host-nation harmonization, alignment, and effectiveness.

The U.S. military has already taken some important steps in terms 

of using I/IT as part of a stability operation. Warfighting information 

technology is available if and when military operations are a required 

part of the stability operation. This paper does not deal with those 

issues and instead focuses on the issue of joint stability operations 

activity writ large—that is, joint within the U.S. Government and combined with other non-U.S. partners. On the latter, DOD has undertaken 

some very worthwhile efforts under the Combined Enterprise Regional 

Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) program.6

CENTRIXS is a Web-based network, developed with both commercial off-the-shelf and government off-the-shelf tools. It is designed 

to provide information among coalition partners in activities in which 

the U.S. military is involved. For example, U.S. Central Command uses 

CENTRIXS to support coalition military coordination and informationsharing for the Multinational Force in Iraq and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. CENTRIXS operates on military 

classified networks, so it is not broadly available to all participants in a 

stability operation. It is, however, quite useful for information exchange 

among coalition militaries and is a good step in the direction of using 

information in stability operations.

Element 3. The third element of an I/IT strategy for the U.S. Government for stability operations is to pre-establish I/IT partnerships 

with key stability operations participants. It is important to underscore 

the word key. It is not possible, and would not be effective, to try to 

establish pre-existing partnerships with all of the many players who will 

be involved in a stability operation. But there are some very key players 

from the government perspective.

A few countries can be expected to participate in many and even 

most operations that the United States does. The United Kingdom 

is one; Australia is another. Certain key international organizations 

likewise will be there. The UN certainly would be involved—though 

dealing with the UN requires dealing with a variety of UN groups and 

agencies, since it does not act as a single entity. Thus, planning will 

be important with the Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian 

Affairs, the UN Development Program, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and perhaps the UN Children’s Fund. NATO is 

often a player, as well as the European Union. Major nongovernmental 

organizations will also regularly be engaged in stability operations. In 

fact, these organizations will generally be there in advance of the U.S. 

military. The fact that preplanning only includes some players is meant 

to allow for creation of a useful framework. An effective I/IT strategy 

will include many others, and there may be conferences, meetings, and 

workshops of a broader nature. But real planning will be enhanced by 

a more limited approach.

Element 4. The fourth element of an effective information 

strategy is to focus on the host nation. The importance of establishing host-nation effectiveness has already been emphasized. Informing host-nation decisionmaking, enhancing governmental capacities, 

and supporting societal and economic development are all crucial 

elements of an information strategy. Working with I/IT as discussed 

below can help generate important progress in security, humanitarian, 

economic, and governance/rule of law arenas. The recognition by the 

interagency—and, most importantly, be accepted as a key element 

by both DOD and the State Department (including USAID, the U.S. 

Agency for International Development). While some individuals have 

acknowledged this point, no such government-wide I/IT strategy exists, 

although a potential framework for one has been created.

Released by the President in December 2005, NSPD-44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” articulates the basic framework for interagency cooperation. It 

assigns primary responsibility for stabilization and reconstruction operations to the Secretary of State (through the Office of the Coordinator 

for Stabilization and Reconstruction) and mandates close coordination 

with DOD to integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency 

planning with military planning, when relevant and appropriate. The 

Director of Foreign Assistance, who reports directly to the Secretary of 

State, also serves as the Administrator of USAID, where several offices 

have been created or restructured to deal with stabilization and reconstruction challenges. 

At DOD, the framework was supported in November 2005 by the 

release of Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, 

Transition and Reconstruction Operations,” which affirms that such 

activities represent a core DOD mission and are given a priority comparable to combat operations.

Within this framework, however, the focus on I/IT has been limited. USAID, recognizing the potential of I/IT in stability and reconstruction operations, has taken some steps to include I/IT as a sector 

and development tool. USAID strategy states that it seeks to leverage 

I/IT in conflict management and mitigation missions and in humanitarian assistance operations. USAID also seeks to promote global access to 

IT and to assist development through several ongoing projects such as 

the Leland Initiative for Africa, the Digital Freedom Initiative, and the 

Administrator’s Last Mile Initiative.

Some important embassies have also taken I/IT steps. The U.S. 

Embassy in Afghanistan created the position of Senior Telecom Advisor 

to facilitate coordination among both military and civilian U.S. Government elements in country. In Iraq, DOD established the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office within the Embassy structure, and it, too, 

has a telecommunication advisor to unify I/IT efforts. These efforts are 

the beginning of a coherent U.S. Government approach to I/IT. A complete strategy would, however, require the Department of State/USAID 

to make I/IT a key element of strategy in stability operations. These I/IT 

initiatives are a good start, but are not an integrated strategy. They do, 

however, provide a basis on which to build.

Element 2. Although the problems of stability operations go far 

beyond military, the second element of an effective I/IT strategy recognizes that, doctrinally, the military requires an I/IT strategy as part 

of the planning and execution of any stability operation. Accordingly, 

in both joint and Service documents—plans and the rules and guidance for the development and execution of plans—an I/IT strategy is 

a required element.

As noted above, this approach is fully consistent with the military 

analysis of the DIME paradigm. The key point here is that military planners and operators need to include an I/IT strategy in their approaches. A 

subsidiary—but crucial—point is that an I/IT strategy is not a traditional 

function of the J–6 (the technical information officer on a military staff, 

the chief information officer in business terms). Rather, I/IT has to be a 

function of both J–3 and J–5: that is, built into plans and implementation and policy. The J–6 will be in a supporting/implementing role to help 
February 2007 Defense Horizons  

do one’s “day job.” Accordingly, some common training, exercising, and/

or education away from a stability operation can create potentially significant opportunities to enhance harmonization. None of this will occur 

unless an element of the government, preferably a joint Department of 

State-DOD element, focuses on the requirement for preplanning.

Second, improved collaboration depends on both better processes 

and use of available technical means. The process issue is perhaps the 

most crucial. As noted above, it is important to decide how, with whom, 

and how much data are shared. There is a general tendency, particularly at DOD, to come at the problem through a classified lens. That is, 

since DOD is used to treating data as classified, the question is often 

framed as how such data can be made available. Often, the answer 

is given in binary terms: information either can be made available or 

it cannot. This all too often becomes a least common denominator 

approach because the judgment is made that if the data are not available to some, it cannot be available to any.

A much better approach would be to recognize that, in stability 

operations, most relevant data are broadly available from other than 

classified sources—though often not broadly collected. Furthermore, 

and most importantly, data can be shared on a differentiated basis. For 

example, information provided to Japanese civilian officials can be differentiated from information provided to World Bank officials, which 

can be differentiated from information provided to Red Cross officials. 

Groups that have engaged in preplanning and have built up trust will 

find it easier to share information than groups that meet only in the 

circumstances of the stability operation. Differentiation is one key element to enhancing data-sharing—and working differentiation as an 

effective operational approach will depend on preplanning.

A second important step to better data-sharing will be better use of 

technical means. For example, the Internet has become a mechanism for 

unclassified collaboration and sharing of information among civilian and 

military elements responding to crisis operations. Furthermore, commercially available collaboration tools and other tools, such as video teleconferencing and Web-cams, are being used by them on the Internet. Technologies are improving quickly to enhance data-sharing. In the civilian 

arena, the growth of Web logs (blogs), file-sharing, Wikipedia, MySpace, 

and similar sites all attest to the possibilities of sharing, if the desire to 

use the mechanisms is there. Many organizations already run sites to 

make information available (for example, the UN-sponsored ReliefWeb). 

However, the collaborative aspects of these sites are limited.

U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has taken strides to 

enable the sharing of unclassified information with nontraditional partners. The command has conducted several exercises that explore this 

challenge, and Multinational Experiment 4 specifically addressed it. 

The command is also standing up a nonmilitary domain portal outside 

its firewall that takes an approach more akin to that of a relief organization—many of which are linked to it—than a military one. The portal 

(http://harmonieweb.org/) enables people and organizations who are 

participating in a relief effort to obtain and post information that may 

be valuable in providing the needed assistance.7

Additionally, the United States is encouraging the development 

of an open-source, collaborative arena, tentatively called “the hub,” 

that would use blogging, file-sharing, and Wikipedia-type approaches 

to create an open space for collaborative sharing. It is not clear as of 

this writing what the outcome of that effort will be. However, even 

assuming its success, it seems probable that a combination of both 

a fully open site (the hub or some variant) and a more directed 

international community of the harmonization and alignment goals 

is important. However, when information technology is considered, 

all too often harmonization with respect to the intervenors becomes 

emphasized as compared to alignment and effectiveness of the host 

nation. This is backwards. An effective I/IT strategy is one that makes 

the host nation effective. Nothing else will do. Thus, a critical element of the strategy is an I/IT business plan for the host nation and 

an intervenor support strategy that aims to enable the host-nation 

business plan.

Element 5. The last element of an I/IT strategy will be to work with 

others to use the key technical capabilities to support the effectiveness, 

harmonization, and alignment goals. The specifics are discussed below, 

but a crucial point is that generating the technical part is far less about 

invention—the information revolution has given us and continues to 

give us broad capabilities—than it is about developing ways to use 

those brilliant inventions in an overall effective, collaborative fashion. 

The planning aspects of the strategy are crucial to effective use of the 

tools. Common choice can create highly effective capabilities. Divergent choices can undercut well-meaning strategies.

Operationalizing the I/IT Strategy 

It is one thing to have a strategy; it is quite another to implement it effectively. The discussion below sets forth how to implement 

an operational I/IT strategy. A key point is to remember that both the 

end goal (creating an effective host nation) and the strategic context 

(the I/IT strategy itself) must be developed and implemented inside 

an overall approach of harmonization and alignment that supports 

enabling the host-nation security, humanitarian, economic, and governance activities.

To effectuate those tasks, the U.S. Government needs to adopt 

an information business model with multiple key elements. Those who 

have responsibility for the I/IT strategy, which ideally will be a joint 

effort led by the Department of State (including USAID) and DOD, will 

need to run the business model in a focused, long-term fashion; otherwise, achievement of the strategic aims will be jeopardized.

The business model breaks down into two broad elements: harmonization among outside intervenors, and effectiveness and alignment 

for, and with, the host nation.

Harmonization. On the harmonization side, a good place to start 

operational analysis is to recall the complexity of the problem and the 

number of intervenors. As discussed above, an important element of 

the strategy is to undertake preplanning with key partners. There are 

four important elements of preplanning to achieve harmonization.

First, joint civil-military information planning will be critical. In 

the first instance, this needs to be done between the Department of 

State and DOD, but most importantly it needs to be done between the 

U.S. Government and other major intervenors to harmonize their interventions. It is not an impossible task to keep others informed and aware, 

but it is difficult. Issues arise immediately as to what data can be provided and how information can be exchanged. With respect to the latter, 

development of agreed management and data standards can fundamentally enhance the provision of information. Pre-event planning and faceto-face meetings can enhance trust and provide important education 

about others’ methods. While the myriad actual stability operations have 

provided some reasonable knowledge about different key actors, on-thejob learning is necessarily more difficult because of the requirement to 
 Defense Horizons February 2007

approach (for example, NATO–UN–World Bank collaborative sharing) might be useful. Remember the point about differentiation: to 

try to use only one tool or one kind of approach to allow for all types 

of collaboration is not necessarily the most successful approach. 

Transferring the CENTRIXS in some modified form for collaboration 

among key civil-military players while generating a broader opensource approach is likely to be a useful effort.

The third element required to achieve harmonization is the development of an implementation strategy. Whatever the precise mechanism for improved collaboration, it can be fairly confidently stated 

that improvements will not occur absent a strategy that designates 

elements within the government to make such improvements happen. At the moment, there are good but separate efforts. The Office 

of the Secretary of Defense is working on the hub effort. USJFCOM is 

seeking to support elements of the Department of State and, through 

experimentation, is developing new civil-military coalition processes 

for improved collaboration and information-sharing and assessing commercial information technology tools for enabling the processes. The 

recent DOD directive on stability operations requires development of a 

collaborative information-sharing mechanism.8 But there is no overall 

directed effort—and this key element is crucial. Otherwise, the efforts 

will be personality-driven and ad hoc. Such approaches are way better 

than nothing but not likely enough to be effective.

An improved approach to collaboration includes broad agreement 

on the information needed to be collected and exchanged; standards 

for collection and exchange; technical mechanisms for each that work 

together; processes; and some education and training together. The final 

important element of collaboration is the ability to improve data usability. As noted above, it is probably useful to think about data in two broad 

types of collaborative forums: a more limited network among key partners, and a broader, more open network. In each, capacities for search, 

aggregation, storage, and retrieval are useful and potentially important. 

In each, the issues of quality control and information assurance will 

arise, as will the issue of dissemination.

Technical improvements in recent years have significantly 

increased the ability to aggregate different types of data, such as the 

ability to put written information on photographs and to integrate geographic material with other data. That said, there needs to be some 

data-management group that will determine for the collaborating 

activity just what kind of capacities will be created—or allowed. For 

example, it is possible to add to a photograph the names of the people 

in the picture, but in certain circumstances, adding names might be 

very hazardous for the individuals identified. An ongoing data-management effort to create rules and manage the activity will be necessary. 

There is, of course, a technical aspect to this, but some of the key issues 

will turn out to be policy issues, so the group will need to engage both 

technicians and policymakers.

Information power derives from a combination of people, content, 

and technical capabilities. In the technical arena, there is a whirlwind 

of ongoing activity and innovation. A very useful capability would be to 

have an “information toolbox” that maintains lists of:

■ key information partners, including businesses with technical 

capabilities

■ information and data-management tools

■ other key tools, such as collaboration and translation.

For the effort that we are focusing on here, commercially developed tools are essential because government-generated tools will 

often not be available to important partners. There will be debates 

between open-source and proprietary tools, and those debates need to 

be resolved in actual context, based on what the effort is intended to 

establish. The case will probably be that the broader the activity, the 

more desirable the use of open-source—but even that statement needs 

to be evaluated in the particular circumstance.

The Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the 

National Defense University has generated a first order “tool kits and 

best practices” analysis in its recently published ICT Primer.

9

 That discussion includes, inter alia, review of telecommunications capabilities 

such as satellite communications, creation of a civil-military information environment, data and information management, and best practices. Maintaining and updating such an activity is an important element of an overall strategy.

Effectiveness and Alignment. The fundamental task of an I/IT 

strategy is to enhance host-nation capacity. That is the critical result 

for which the stability operation is undertaken. To accomplish that 

result in an effective fashion, the strategy will need to accomplish 

two tasks, each familiar to the international community: first, assess 

the host nation and, second, establish a goal toward which to build. 

To put it more in the vernacular, a cure without a diagnosis will be 

improbable; directions without destination will be random. In short, 

an effective approach will require an information business plan for 

the host nation.

The assessment phase of an information business plan should 

begin before the intervention. It must include analyses of both information requirements and available information technology. Unlike 

humanitarian interventions, such as the relief effort for the December 

26, 2004, tsunami, stability operations generally have long build-up 

periods, so there is time to prepare. An assessment would consider the 

pre-intervention state of information technology and information usage 

in the host nation. It is important to recognize that baselines will differ in different host nations. What can be accomplished in a country 

with an austere, pre-crisis baseline is likely considerably different from 

what can be accomplished in a more built-up, moderately established 

country. As an example, Bosnia is different from Afghanistan in terms of 

establishing an information business plan. Different baselines will generate different goals, and there will be no “one-size-fits-all” approach.

Some key elements of an information assessment will include 

evaluation of the host nation’s telecommunications laws and regulations and communication infrastructures—land line telephone system, 

cell phone capacity, and Internet availability. It should also address 

usage patterns, language and literacy issues, technical training of 

locals, and financial resources.

Once an assessment has been undertaken, goals will need to be 

set for operationalizing the information business plan. Generally, it will 

be useful to time-phase the goals into an initial deployment phase, a 

middle phase (getting-things-going phase), and a long-term (exit-byintervenors) phase. A critical point throughout is that the intervenors’ 

information business plan goals need to be in support of the overall 

goals for the host nation, and the host nation as promptly as possible 

will need to help generate those goals.

The initial deployment phase will require the intervenors to consider what deployable capabilities will be useful to help establish a 

host-nation element or elements. There are both structural information 
February 2007 Defense Horizons  

capabilities, such as deployable cell phone capacities and the use of satellites, and functional capabilities, such as “health care in a box,” that 

need to be considered.

The virtue of preplanning is that key intervenors can rationalize 

their capacities in the early, usually chaotic days of an intervention by 

considering which capabilities each might focus on. Equally important 

is to undertake such a discussion remembering that, first, numerous 

entities will already be in country with some capacities that can be 

utilized and that, second, host countries will likely have some capacity, 

and perhaps some significant capacity. Over the entirety of the intervention, the implementation of the information business plan likely will 

mean that the lead on different aspects of the plan will change. Broadly, 

one might expect a move from outside military intervenors to outside 

civilian intervenors to host nation, although the reality is likely to be 

more coordinated and complex. The transitions will occur over time, so 

there will be overlaps that need careful management. If it is understood 

from the beginning that there will be transitions in the way the plan is 

implemented, it will make for a more realistic and effective approach.

The middle phase of an information business plan for the host 

country will focus on five key elements. First is to align the host country so that it is connected to the collaborative mechanisms used by 

the intervenors in some fashion. While the key intervenors likely can 

use high-tech means, it may be that the host country will not be able 

to do so. An important task of an information business plan will be to 

allow for low-tech to high-tech connectivity. As an example, in Afghanistan, the literacy rate is so low that Internet use is necessarily limited 

and cell phone connectivity may be much more important. In fact, in 

Afghanistan, the cell phone is the lifeline communications capability. 

These points can be more broadly generalized: if the information business plan is to succeed, it must take account of the host nation’s information culture and the related information technology culture.

A second element is to help establish working government agencies. Depending on the overall strategy, these could be central ministries or local/provincial offices. Information technology can be used 

to improve ministry effectiveness, especially to allow for an analytic 

approach through budgeting and transparency of expenditures. Those 

are crucial functions for the establishment of legitimate governance, 

and information technology can help each.

A third element for many stability operations will be to increase 

connectivity between the central government and provincial/local 

governments. Information technology can enhance this connectivity 

through, for example, the two-way flow of data and finances. Often, 

the cause of the crisis will have been differences between the central 

government and a region of the country, and working to bring warring 

elements together will be important. An information business plan can 

be an effective part of an overall effort.

A fourth element will often be to provide certain important 

greater functionalities in government services to the populace. 

While an information business plan may not be able to improve all 

functionalities significantly, health and education are two arenas 

of consequence in which such a plan can make an important difference. In the health arena, information technology can be used 

to build up local centers of health care, such as hospitals; support 

training of health care workers; and provide valuable functionalities, 

such as health surveillance systems. In the education arena, information technology can support curriculum establishment and the 

provision of instruction, as well as the training of teachers.

The fifth element is to provide for the private-sector development of information capabilities. Two of the most important issues are 

informed regulatory mechanisms and useful seed financing. An overly 

constrained regulatory environment will make it difficult for private 

enterprise to operate at a profit. A properly structured set of incentives 

can help create an environment in which profit-making companies can 

contribute importantly to economic reconstruction. Seed money may be 

very important, especially in the early days of a stability operation, particularly to get local involvement in the development of the information 

business plan.

The middle phase of the plan often may be the equivalent of the 

medical “golden hour” for establishing a framework for effective use 

of I/IT for the host nation. While the information flow may be limited, 

meeting expectations of the host government and population during 

this middle phase will be very important to longer-term success for the 

intervention and the host nation.

The middle phase will naturally flow over into the long-term phase 

for the host nation and the exit strategy for the intervenors. That part 

of the information business plan strategy should have at least three key 

elements. First, as noted above, the private sector should become a 

key element. Creating an environment in which there are commercial 

opportunities for information technology and information firms will 

help seed economic revitalization. Second, the host nation will need to 

consider what role it will play in the development of a national information technology infrastructure. Models range from full privatization 

to early phase ownership to ongoing involvement. Third, as part of 

their effort in country, intervenors will have established IT capabilities. 

Such facilities and datasets should not be automatically dismantled as 

the intervenors leave. Rather, they should be built as leave-behinds for 

local partners, both governmental and nongovernmental, whether commercial or nonprofit.

An I/IT strategy includes people, content, and technology. In a 

stability operation, the information needs—the content of what must 

be provided in addition to the connectivity—of the host nation require 

consideration. Broadly speaking, those information content needs will 

fall into the categories of security, humanitarian, economic, governance/rule of law, and social.

In analyzing how such information needs should be fulfilled, an 

I/IT strategy will recognize that the information element will support 

functional strategies for each of these arenas—all of which will have 

significant subparts. For example, the establishment of prosecutorial, 

court, and prison functions will have security and rule of law/governance aspects. Significant programs will be under way to help create 

each of these elements as part of a stability operation. Responding to 

the information needs of those programs has to be an affiliated strategic effort—or, to use the terms of the international community, needs 

to be aligned with the overall aims of the functional programs.

The specific needs may be provided with the use of information 

from one or more of the intervenors. In a variety of ways, information 

technology can be utilized to provide expert assistance. A simple example is maintaining an online list of experts. More sophisticated efforts 

can be established, such as a call-in center for the provision of various 

kinds of information. Research arrangements can be set up online, as 

can connectivity with key national and international organizations, 

both governmental and nongovernmental, that are willing and able to 

provide assistance.
 Defense Horizons February 2007

As is true for the technology itself, information needs change 

over time. In fact, the ability to provide information may become more 

important as the host nation develops its own capacities. The capacity to access such information may be developed in two parallel fashions. First, in a traditional approach there could be an office to help 

facilitate access to expert management. More recently, a distributed 

approach, such as Wikis and blogs, may be able to make a great deal 

of expert information available without a specific data manager, if the 

right information tools are provided. Issues of trust and reliability will 

arise, but the community approach to providing information via the 

Internet has been very powerful in other arenas, and its use in stability operations should be encouraged.

The discussion of the management of information needs raises 

the important question of how to manage the I/IT strategy in the course 

of the stability operation. Adoption of a strategic approach and even 

operational activities will be greatly facilitated by the establishment 

of a forward field organization. Ideally, this would be a joint Department of State-DOD function with the job of carrying out the information strategy in country. In a stability operation, the organization likely 

would be collocated with the military command activity.

The role of the organization would include carrying out the U.S. 

Government aspects of the I/IT strategy. In addition, the organization 

would collaborate with the organizations with which preplanning took 

place, including key countries, the UN, and major nongovernmental 

organizations. As promptly as possible, the organization will want to 

begin to work with the host nation, though precisely what that means 

will depend on the circumstances of the operation. As a forward community of interest is being set up, the organization will want to create 

mechanisms that add to the effort entities that have not been part of 

the preplanning. As discussed above, a hub type approach may be very 

valuable, as may more structured relationships. In addition, the organization will want to work with the public affairs office to facilitate 

interaction with the media and, most importantly, information for the 

public at large.

Conclusion 

I/IT can be important components for success in stability operations. Achieving successful results requires that a purposeful strategy 

be adopted to use these capabilities to the desired end of building up 

the host nation and to develop operational activities that effectively 

implement the strategy. A strategic approach causes coalition participants to undertake five key activities:

■ conduct pre-event activities with partners

■ implement improved collaboration

■ ensure improved data usability

■ develop an information toolbox

■ create a forward field information office.

Also, creating an overall focus to generate an effective host-nation 

information business plan consists of four actionable items:

■ assessing host-nation information capacity

■ building a host-nation information goal

■ creating immediate, medium, and long-term information capacities

■ analyzing information needs and developing methods to fulfill those 

needs.

These activities and items can generate an environment in which the 

information revolution can help create success in stability operations.

Notes

1 Net-centric warfare, as defined by the Department of Defense Functional 

Capabilities Board, refers to: warfighting that networks all elements of an appropriately 

trained joint force; integrates their collective awareness, knowledge, and experience in 

order to rapidly create new capabilities, make superior decisions, and achieve a high 

level of agility and effectiveness in dynamic and uncertain operational environments. 2 Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, 

Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, Section 4.2, provides: 

“Stability operations . . . immediate goal . . . is to provide the local populace with 

security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal 

is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market 

economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.” In this paper, 

the term stability operations is used per the DOD Directive to mean the full-spectrum 

of stabilization and reconstruction activities. 3

 World Bank, Operations Policy and Country Services, Fragile States—Good 

Practices in Country Assistance Strategies, December 19, 2005, vii, available at 

<www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/

IB/2005/12/22/000090341_20051222094709/Rendered/PDF/34790.pdf>. 4

 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Cooperation Directorate, Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile 

States, Harmonisation and Alignment in Fragile States, December 17, 2004, 14, available 

at <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/56/34084353.pdf>. 5

 Ibid.

6

 Jill L. Boardman and Donald W. Shuey, “Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS); Supporting Coalition Warfare World-Wide,” available at <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ccrp/centrixs.pdf>. 7

 Robert K. Ackerman, “Unclassified Information New Key to Network Centricity,” SIGNAL Magazine (September 2006), available at <www.afcea.org/signal/

articles/templates/SIGNAL_Article_Template.asp?articleid=1185&zoneid=52>. 8

 DOD 3000.05, Sections 5.1.9, 5.7.1.

9

 Larry Wentz, An ICT Primer: Information and Communication Technologies 

for Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Relief and Stabilization and Reconstruction, Defense and Technology Paper 31 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy, July 2006), available at <www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Def_Tech/

DTP31%20ICT%20Primer.pdf>.

Defense Horizons is published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. CTNSP 

publications are available online at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other 

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

 Hans Binnendijk

Director