SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program

Increased Visibility, Monitoring, and Planning

Needed for Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program in Afghanistan 

September 9, 2009
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page i

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

September 9, 2009

General David Petraeus, USA

Commander, U.S. Central Command

General Stanley A. McChrystal

Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan 

 and International Security Assistance Force

This report presents the results of our review of controls and accountability for the 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan (CERP). CERP is an important tool 

for Commanders, generally intended to fund small-scale projects that can be sustained by the 

local population or government, and respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction 

needs. In May 2009, USFOR-A assumed responsibility for CERP. This report includes three

recommendations for USFOR-A to improve the management of CERP and ensure sufficient 

oversight of funds.

A summary of our report is on page ii. The audit was conducted by the Office of the Special 

Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) under the authority of Public Law 110-

181 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. When preparing the final report, we 

considered written comments from USFOR-A and incorporated information in their comments,

as appropriate. Copies of their comments are included in appendices III of this report. 

John Brummet

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
 Special inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

i

.

`

 

What SIGAR Reviewed 

Since 2004, the Department of Defense (DOD) has funded over $1.6 billion for the Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program in Afghanistan (CERP), generally intended to fund small-scale projects that can be sustained by the local 

population or government and respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs. This report discusses the 

extent to which internal controls for CERP ensure accountability for program funds. We conducted this performance audit 

in Kabul and Bagram Air Field in Afghanistan and in Washington, D.C., from April to July 2009 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

 

 SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

What SIGAR Found 

Although DOD has established procedures to ensure control and accountability for CERP funds, we identified weaknesses in 

monitoring and execution procedures. DOD and U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) have taken steps to ensure funds are 

obligated for authorized uses during the CERP approval process; however, additional measures are needed to ensure 

adequate controls over the execution of CERP projects. We found that management has limited visibility over CERP 

projects, due, in part, to a lack of centrally retained physical project files and incomplete or absent electronic project 

records. For example, program officials at USFOR-A were unable to identify, during the course of our audit, the number of 

ongoing CERP projects funded prior to fiscal year 2009.

CERP was designed to fund primarily small-scale projects. Although the majority of CERP projects remain small in scale, 

funds increasingly have been obligated for large-scale projects of $500,000 or more. While large-scale projects account for 

a small proportion (3 percent) of the total number of projects, they consume a majority (67 percent) of CERP funds. For 

example, through the third quarter fiscal year 2009, 6 percent of CERP projects were large-scale projects that constituted

$290 million or 78 percent of total obligations. Large-scale projects pose increased risks for CERP, because typically they

require several years for completion or consume significant amounts of time and resources by program managers who have 

been trained to primarily implement smaller-scale projects. Additionally, frequent rotations have challenged the ability of 

program officials to manage large, long-term projects.

SIGAR Audit-09-5 September 2009

INCREASED VISIBILITY, MONITORING, AND 

PLANNING NEEDED FOR 

COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE 

PROGRAM IN AFGHANISTAN

What SIGAR Recommends

To improve the management of CERP and ensure sufficient oversight of funds, SIGAR recommends that the Commander of 

USFOR-A develop and implement a process to systematically collect and track information on CERP projects; implement a 

solution for centralizing CERP records; and develop and implement a plan to address the management of large-scale 

projects of $500,000 or higher. USFOR-A concurred or partially concurred with the information presented in the report and 

described actions they are taking which are generally consistent with our recommendations. Specifically, USFOR-A did not 

agree that large-scale projects pose particular risk, indicating that almost all large-scale CERP projects are roads. However,

SIGAR’s review of project data provided by USFOR-A indicates that CERP projects from fiscal year 2005 through the third 

quarter of fiscal year 2009 included 109 non-transportation projects valued over $500,000 (35 percent of total large scale 

projects). USFOR-A did not state whether they did or did not concur with SIGAR’s recommendations. In its general 

comments on the report, USFOR-A discussed several actions that they plan to take to address identified deficiencies, 

including the addition of project managers for CERP administration, strengthening electronic record requirements, adding 

civilian information managers to facilitate electronic record keeping, and including limitations on the numbers of projects 

by region and reducing monetary approval authorities. These actions, if fully implemented, will lesson program risk. 
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background 1

Weaknesses in Monitoring and Execution Put CERP Funds at Risk 2

Conclusions 5

Recommendations 6

Comments 6

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 8

Appendix II: USFOR-A Commander’s Emergency Response Program 9

(CERP) Project Data, 2005-2009

Appendix III: Comments from U.S. Forces Afghanistan 15

Abbreviations

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program

CJTF-101 Combined Joint Task Force-101

DOD Department of Defense

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

USFOR-A U.S. Forces Afghanistan
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 1

INCREASED VISIBILITY, MONITORING, AND PLANNING NEEDED FOR

COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM IN AFGHANISTAN

This report discusses the extent to which internal controls for the Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program in Afghanistan (CERP) ensure accountability for program funds.

We reviewed CERP guidance issued by the Department of Defense, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), 

and the Combined Joint Task Force-101 (CJTF-101) as well as program documents including, checklists 

and guidance prepared by CERP program managers. We also reviewed CERP data collected in the 

project tracking system and conducted a file review of 72 CERP project files. In addition, we interviewed 

officials responsible for the management, approval, and monitoring of the program at USFOR-A, CJTF101, as well as Task Force Phoenix and Task Force Warrior.

1 We also attended CERP board review 

meetings, chaired by USFOR-A. We conducted this performance audit in Kabul and Bagram Air Field in 

Afghanistan and in Washington, D.C. from April to July 2009 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Our scope and methodology is described in Appendix I. 

BACKGROUND

In fiscal year 2004, the Department of Defense (DOD) created CERP to enable local commanders in Iraq 

and Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements. Since then, 

DOD has funded over $1.6 billion for CERP in Afghanistan. According to DOD’s Financial Management 

Regulations for CERP, the program is generally intended to fund small-scale projects that can be 

sustained by the local population or government, and respond to urgent humanitarian relief and

reconstruction needs. According to the regulations, a small-scale project is generally defined as any 

project less than $500,000. The regulations identify 20 categories of authorized uses of CERP funds for 

projects ranging from the development of Afghanistan’s infrastructure to temporary contract guards for 

critical infrastructure.2

 The regulations also identify 11 unauthorized uses of CERP funds.3

USFOR-A and its subcommand, Combined Joint Task Force-82, as well as task forces and provincial 

reconstruction teams are responsible for the management and execution of CERP. 4

 1

In June 2009, CJTF-101 turned over command to CJTF-82.

 CERP managers

maintain the primary day-to-day responsibility for the program. The task force commanders are 

2

Authorized uses of CERP funds include: water and sanitation; food production and distribution; agriculture and 

irrigation; electricity; healthcare; education; telecommunications; economic, financial and management 

improvements, transportation; rule of law and governance; civic cleanup activities; civic support vehicles; repair of 

civic and cultural facilities; battle damage and/or repair; condolence payments; hero payments; former detainee 

payments; protective measures; other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction projects; temporary contract guards 

for critical infrastructure.

3

Unauthorized uses of CERP funds include: benefit to U.S., coalition, or supporting military personnel; providing 

goods, services, or funds to national armies or security forces; weapon buy-back programs or purchase of firearms 

or ammunition; entertainment; reward programs; removal of unexploded ordnance; duplication of services 

available through municipal governments; salaries for Afghan military or civilian government personnel, training, 

equipping, or operating costs of Afghan security forces; conducting operations; and support to individuals or 

private businesses.

4

In May 2009, USFOR-A assumed responsibility for management of CERP. Prior to that date, CJTF in regional 

command East was responsible for CERP in Afghanistan.
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 2

charged with appointing CERP personnel, including Project Purchasing Officers (PPO) and Paying Agents

(PA), and ensuring they are properly trained and follow program guidance. The PPO’s responsibilities 

include project contracting and oversight, and maintaining project files and required documents. The 

PA is responsible for receiving and disbursing CERP funds, including vendor payments. Staff officers at 

the task force level also play a role in the CERP process. For example, attorneys are responsible for 

reviewing project nominations to ensure that the projects are legally sufficient and in compliance with 

CERP guidelines. Engineers are responsible for providing engineering expertise when required, including 

adequacy of design and sustainment plan. 

According to CERP guidance and standard operating procedures, project files for all CERP projects are to 

be maintained at the task force level. Since 2007, CERP managers have been required to maintain 

electronic records of project files in the Combined Information Data Network Exchange, a DOD database 

that, among other things, tracks information on CERP projects such as project status; project start and 

completion date; and dollars committed, obligated, and disbursed. 

WEAKNESSES IN MONITORING AND EXECUTION PUT CERP FUNDS AT RISK

Although DOD has taken a number of measures to ensure accountability for the use of CERP funds, we 

identified weaknesses in monitoring and execution procedures. DOD Financial Management Regulation 

for CERP and the CERP Standard Operating Procedures established procedures to ensure proper controls 

and accountability for CERP funds.5 Those controls included measures to assess risk and limit access to 

vulnerable assets, which were generally followed by CERP program officials at USFOR-A and CJTF-101. 

For example, to strengthen oversight the threshold requirement for submission of project proposals to 

the CERP review board was reduced in 2008 from $500,000 to $200,000. In another example, CERP 

managers have increasingly limited access to vulnerable assets and facilitated the documentation of 

transactions, by encouraging the use of electronic funds transfers to pay contractors.

Although DOD and USFOR-A have taken steps to ensure funds are obligated for authorized uses during 

the CERP approval process, additional measures are needed to ensure adequate controls during the 

execution of CERP projects. Program officials we met with from USFOR-A and CJTF-101 stated that their 

focus is primarily on the obligation of funds for projects in the current fiscal year. We found that 

USFOR-A lacks sufficient oversight mechanisms for monitoring the execution of CERP projects and has 

focused on meeting the requirements for the obligation of funds. Although DOD regulations and 

standard operating procedures include controls for monitoring CERP project implementation, we found 

those procedures were not always being followed by CERP program officials. For example, we found 

that final inspections and project completion reports in project files lacked documentation or were 

incomplete. In addition, guidance since 2007 has required monthly input on CERP projects into the DOD 

electronic data management system. Although this requirement would assist in top-level review of 

project performance, we found that the requirement to enter CERP project data into the electronic 

 5 According to GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, internal controls help ensure that 

transactions and other significant events are authorized and executed only by persons acting within the scope of 

their authority. Access to resources and records should be limited to authorized individuals and accountability for 

their custody and use is assigned and maintained. Both the DOD Financial Management Regulation for CERP and 

the CERP Standard Operating Procedures establish a number of procedures to ensure proper controls and 

accountability for CERP funds to include the roles and responsibilities of all individuals, risk assessment and 

mitigation planning, monitoring procedures, and limited access to vulnerable resources such as cash. 
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 3

system was often not done. In commenting on a draft of this report, USFOR-A stated it is planning to 

improve access to project information by requiring project files to be maintained in the electronic 

database, including the requirement to scan all hard copy project documents.

In the course of our work, we found that USFOR-A and CJTF-101 CERP managers could not always 

determine the status of projects for which funds had been obligated in prior years. Limited 

management visibility meant that program officials were unable to produce complete and reliable 

results in response to our request for data on the status of all CERP projects. For example, CERP 

managers at USFOR-A were unable to identify, during the course of our audit, the number of ongoing 

CERP projects funded prior to fiscal year 2009. This limitation occurred, in part, due to a lack of centrally 

retained physical project files and incomplete or absent electronic project records. In May 2009, CERP 

program officials at USFOR-A told us that corrective actions were needed to permit full management 

visibility. As of September 2009, USFOR-A was able to report that approximately 1,500 CERP projects 

were either currently active or completed but not closed out.

In particular, we found that requirements for record updates and retention by CERP personnel were not 

implemented or fully understood. We reviewed 72 CERP project files funded from fiscal year 2007

through the second quarter of fiscal year 2009, and found that more than half of the files were 

incomplete and lacked required information on the status of individual projects. We conducted the 

project file review at a task force responsible for administering CERP projects across all five regional 

commands in Afghanistan. The file review focused on identifying the presence or absence of nine key 

documents required for all CERP project files by CERP Standard Operating Procedures.6 On average, the 

project files were only 54 percent complete. As shown in Figure 1, the results ranged from seven project 

files that were less than 25 percent complete to 12 project files that were 76 to 100 percent complete. 

One of the reviewed files was for a project worth over $1 million, which contained only 67 percent of 

the required documents. 

Figure 1: Percent Completeness of Reviewed CERP-A Project Files

Source: SIGAR analysis.

 6

The nine documents included records of purchase request and commitment, endorsed cost estimate from 

government or unit engineer, statement of work, draft contract, legal review, purchase order and invoice voucher, 

statement of agent officer’s account or public voucher for purchase, purchase request and commitment clearing 

report, and a project closure report. 

7

24

29

12

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

<25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100%

Number of Files

Percentage of Files Completed
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 4

We also found a lack of routine management reviews of the status of CERP projects across fiscal years. 

Such gaps in performance monitoring place the CERP program at risk by diminishing visibility over 

program results. Visibility over the outcomes and success of CERP projects was particularly limited for 

high-level CERP managers for the fiscal year in which projects were approved. In another example, we 

found enforcement of internal control processes and procedures for documentation of execution and 

closeout of CERP-funded projects were largely left up to the leadership of task forces and provincial 

reconstruction teams. Program officials we met with at various levels of the CERP program stated that 

standards for internal control documentation processes and procedures were not systematically 

enforced by the task force or provincial reconstruction team leadership. The same officials indicated 

that there was a lack of continuity and systematic communication on the requirements. 

Lack of Experience and Continuity Increases Risk for Large-Scale CERP Projects

While CERP was designed to fund primarily small-scale projects, over time, DOD has increased its use of 

large-scale projects of $500,000 or more. Since fiscal year 2005, CERP’s large-scale project obligations 

have increased from 39 percent of $130 million in total obligations to 78 percent of $374 million in total

obligations for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2009. While large-scale projects account for a small 

proportion (3 percent) of the total number of projects, they consume a majority (67 percent) of CERP 

funds. For example, through the third quarter fiscal year 2009, 6 percent of CERP projects were largescale projects, constituting $290 million or 78 percent of total obligations. From fiscal years 2005 

through the third quarter of fiscal year 2009, $913 million has been obligated for 307 large-scale 

projects. Transportation projects account for 198 of these projects, or $766 million in obligations. The 

remaining $147 million went towards 109 projects in agriculture, electricity, healthcare, and 

telecommunications, among others. See Appendix II for details on obligations of CERP funds by fiscal 

year and category. 

Table 1: CERP Projects Valued at $500,000 or More, Fiscal Year 2005 Through Third Quarter Fiscal 

Year 2009

Source: SIGAR analysis of USFOR-A CERP data.

Large-scale projects pose particular risks for CERP, as they may require several years for completion or 

consume significant amounts of time and resources by program managers who have been trained to 

implement primarily smaller-scale projects. According to CERP managers and PPOs, they are not 

sufficiently trained or experienced to oversee or manage large-scale, complex projects. PPOs also told 

Fiscal Year Projects 

$500,000 and 

above

Percentage of 

Total Projects

Obligations for 

Projects $500,000 

and above 

(in millions)

Percent of Total 

Obligated

2005 21 0.8% $49.9 38.5%

2006 28 2.0 135.0 67.2

2007 48 2.5 116.3 60.6

2008 129 4.1 321.7 69.3

2009 (First 3 Quarters) 81 6.1 290.3 77.7

2005 – First 3 Quarters of 

2009

307 2.9% $913.2 67.1%
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 5

us they have additional responsibilities beyond CERP, further limiting their ability to provide proper 

contract oversight for large and complex projects. For projects valued over $500,000, a Warranted 

Contracting Officer is also responsible for overseeing the project, in addition to the PPO. In commenting 

on a draft of this report, USFOR-A stated that the risk to funds on larger projects is reduced by the 

contract oversight provided by a Warranted Contracting Officer. 

Continuity of oversight also presents a challenge to CERP, in part, due to the rotation of CERP managers 

at task forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams every nine months.7 Due to that turnover, largescale CERP projects may require the supervision of several different program managers before 

completion. For example, CERP program officials indicated that large-scale road projects of $500,000 or 

more in the mountainous northeast of Afghanistan typically take years to complete due to weatherinduced limitations on the construction period. In May 2009, GAO reported similar findings, concluding 

that program management and oversight of contracts and contractor efforts were hindered by 

insufficient and inadequately trained personnel.8

 

On September 2, 2009, USFOR-A provided a draft USFOR-A fragmentary order and briefing slides 

outlining planned changes to CERP that are intended to increase management oversight of CERP project 

execution in Afghanistan. USFOR-A discussed several actions that it plans to take to address 

deficiencies, including the addition of project managers for CERP administration, strengthening 

electronic record requirements, adding civilian information managers to facilitate electronic record 

keeping, limiting the numbers of projects by region, and reducing monetary approval authorities. 

CONCLUSIONS

CERP is an important tool for U.S. commanders. Procedures are in place, which if fully implemented 

would ensure that CERP funds are used properly and as intended. However, weaknesses in monitoring 

and execution of some of these procedures are potentially placing CERP funds at risk. Funds are further 

placed at risk by the evolution of the program to include larger, more complex projects that require 

sufficient and more highly trained personnel for effective management and oversight. Actions are 

needed to ensure proper controls and management of CERP funds. In May 2009, USFOR-A assumed 

responsibility for CERP and recently has begun to initiate changes in policy and procedures to address 

weaknesses in CERP management. However, these changes have not been fully implemented. 

 7

In commenting on a draft of this report, USFOR-A stated that until recently rotations for many taskforces used to 

occur every fifteen months. 

8

See GAO-09-615, “Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and Interagency Coordination for 

the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan”, May 2009.
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 6

RECOMMENDATIONS

To improve the management of CERP and ensure sufficient oversight of funds, SIGAR is making several 

recommendations to the Commander of USFOR-A. Specifically, we recommend that the Commander of 

USFOR-A: 

• Develop and implement a process to systematically collect and track project information on

CERP project execution, disbursements, and results over the entire life of the program.

• Implement a solution for centralizing CERP records in a complete and up-to-date manner, in 

accordance with regulations and requirements. This solution should consider strengthening 

electronic record keeping and reporting capabilities.

• Develop and implement a plan that addresses how to manage the heightened risks associated 

with devoting increasing funds to large-scale projects of $500,000 or higher. The plan should 

take into account the capabilities of the program’s implementing units and processes, given 

their current limitations in such areas as staffing levels, technical expertise, and rotation 

timelines. The plan should, among other things, identify funding and resource requirements 

needed to improve the program’s oversight capabilities for larger and more complex projects.

COMMENTS

USFOR-A provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are included in appendix III. In its 

response, USFOR-A concurred with the information presented in the report and indicated actions it is 

taking which are generally consistent with our recommendations. However, USFOR-A did not state 

whether it did or did not concur with the recommendations.

USFOR-A concurred with the information on the need to develop a process to systematically collect and 

track project information and to implement a solution for centralizing CERP records. In its general 

comments, USFOR-A described several actions that it plans to take to address deficiencies, including the 

addition of project managers for CERP administration, strengthening electronic record requirements, 

and adding civilian information managers to facilitate electronic record keeping. 

USFOR-A partially concurred with the information on the need to develop a plan for managing the

heightened risk associated with projects of $500,000 or higher. In its general comments on the report, 

USFOR-A described several actions it plans to take to address these risks, including limiting the numbers 

of ongoing projects by region and reducing monetary approval authorities. USFOR-A did not believe 

that projects over $500,000 entailed higher risks. USFOR-A stated that almost all large scale projects are 

roads. USFOR-A believes that CERP officials have particular expertise in managing road construction and 

that these projects, although expensive, are not complex. We acknowledge that all projects over 

$500,000 do not carry the same risk. Our review of project data provided by USFOR-A shows that CERP 

projects from fiscal year 2005 through the third quarter of fiscal year 2009 included 109 nontransportation projects valued over $500,000 (35 percent of total large scale projects). Those projects 

included activities in agriculture, electricity, healthcare, and telecommunications. Furthermore, 

according to USFOR-A documentation, CERP projects over $1 million are projected to increase by over 

35 percent in fiscal year 2010, in part, due to expansion in the south and west of Afghanistan. Thus, 
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 7

developing a plan to specifically address management controls of projects over $500,000 remains 

important to providing effective program management.

In a written note on the official comments, the Deputy Commanding General of USFOR-A said that he is 

disappointed in SIGAR’s report because it did not give USFOR-A credit for the changes that have been 

planned. A USFOR-A official stated that our findings should have been provided to USFOR-A prior to the 

distribution of our draft report in August 2009. This, in fact, is what SIGAR did. In May, SIGAR briefed

senior USFOR-A officials on the findings of this performance audit. In July, USFOR-A informed SIGAR 

that it had initiated actions in response to SIGAR’s work and preliminary findings but provided no details 

or documentation. Our report recognizes that USFOR-A has begun to take corrective actions in response 

to this audit’s findings and recommendations. In September 2009, in response to a draft of this report, 

USFOR-A indicated actions it plans to take to improve its management and oversight of CERP. In this 

report, we have incorporated these planned actions, where appropriate. We recognize that USFOR-A is 

taking steps to begin to implement our recommendations. However, based on documentation provided 

with their comments, these changes are planned and have not yet been fully implemented. Although 

these are good first steps to improve accountability, implementation of USFOR-A’s planned 

improvements is needed to ensure proper controls and management of CERP funds. 
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 8

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To identify program requirements and controls, we reviewed CERP guidance issued by the Department 

of Defense, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), and the Combined Joint Task Force-101 (CJTF-101) as 

well as program documents, including checklists and guidance prepared by CERP program managers. 

We also conducted a non-random sample file review of 72 project files for CERP projects funded in fiscal 

years 2008 and 2009. To observe the review and approval process for projects costing over $200,000,

we attended CERP-A board review meetings chaired by USFOR-A. We also reviewed CERP project data 

collected in the DOD project tracking system and by USFOR-A. We did not verify USFOR-A obligation 

figures against DOD financial records.

We conducted this performance audit from April to July 2009 in Kabul and Bagram Air Field in 

Afghanistan. We conducted our work at USFOR-A and its subcommand CJTF-101, as well as Task Force 

Phoenix and Task Force Warrior, where we reviewed documents and interviewed officials responsible 

for the management, approval, and monitoring of the program. We conducted this performance audit 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions. The audit was conducted by the Office of the 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law 110-181, 

Section 1229, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. 
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 9

Appendix II: USFOR-A Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) Project Data, 2005-2009

This appendix contains information on CERP projects in Afghanistan. The tables below provide 

information on the number of projects and total amounts obligated for each CERP authorized category 

since fiscal year 2005. These data are a summary of information USFOR-A collects.

Table 1: Number of FY 2005 Projects and Total Amount Obligated, by CERP Categories

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Categories Obligated Percentage 

of total 

obligation

Number of 

projects

Percentage 

of total 

projects

Water & Sanitation $5.4 4.2% 345 12.6%

Food Production & Distribution 0.5 0.4 18 0.7

Agriculture & Irrigation 3.7 2.8 191 7.0

Electricity 2.4 1.9 93 3.4

Healthcare 6.0 4.7 228 8.3

Education 21.1 16.3 513 18.7

Telecommunications 5.5 4.2 67 2.4

Economic, Financial & Management 

Improvements 3.6 2.8 44 1.6

Transportation 52.9 40.8 202 7.4

Rule of Law & Governance 13.9 10.7 463 16.9

Civic Cleanup Activities 0.4 0.3 16 0.6

Civic Support Vehicles 8.9 6.9 163 5.9

Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities 1.9 1.5 120 4.4

Battle Damage/Repair 0 0 0 0

Condolence Payments 0 0 0 0

Hero Payments 0 0 0 0

Former Detainee Payments 0 0 0 0

Protective Measures 0 0 0 0

Other Urgent Humanitarian or 

Reconstruction Projects 3.4 2.6 282 10.3

Temporary Contract Guards for 

Critical Infrastructure 0 0 0 0

Totals $129.6 2,545

 Source: SIGAR analysis of USFOR-A CERP data.

 Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding.
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 10

Table 2: Number of FY 2006 Projects and Total Amount Obligated, by CERP Categories

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Categories Obligated Percentage 

of total 

obligation

Number of 

projects

Percentage 

of total 

number of 

projects

Water & Sanitation $4.5 2.2% 163 11.6%

Food Production & Distribution 0.4 0.2 10 0.7

Agriculture & Irrigation 6.8 3.4 98 7.0

Electricity 4.6 2.3 72 5.1

Healthcare 6.9 3.4 144 10.3

Education 10.9 5.4 202 14.4

Telecommunications 5.4 2.7 52 3.7

Economic, Financial & Management 

Improvements 0.08 0.04 11 0.8

Transportation 145.8 72.6 191 13.6

Rule of Law & Governance 7.2 3.6 86 6.1

Civic Cleanup Activities 0.1 0.1 12 0.9

Civic Support Vehicles 3.1 1.5 21 1.5

Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities 1.2 0.6 56 4

Battle Damage/Repair 0 0 0 0

Condolence Payments 0.08 0.04 22 1.6

Hero Payments 0 0 0 0

Former Detainee Payments 0 0 0 0

Protective Measures 0.3 0.2 13 0.9

Other Urgent Humanitarian or 

Reconstruction Projects 1.3 0.7 74 5.3

Temporary Contract Guards for 

Critical Infrastructure 0 0 0 0

Non categorized obligated fundsa 2.3 1.1 176 12.5

Totalsb $200.9 1,403

Source: SIGAR analysis of USFOR-A CERP data.

a

Includes obligated funds not identified under a specific CERP category. b

Funding data have been rounded and therefore may not precisely match the total.
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 11

Table 3: Number of FY 2007 Projects and Total Amount Obligated, by CERP Categories

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Categories Obligated 

Dollars

Percentage 

of Total 

Obligated 

Dollars

Total Number 

of Projects

Percentage 

of Total 

Number of 

Projects

Water & Sanitation $6.2 3.2% 260 13.7%

Food Production & Distribution 0.3 0.1 11 0.6

Agriculture & Irrigation 9.5 4.9 146 7.7

Electricity 7.3 3.8 96 5.1

Healthcare 8.0 4.2 201 10.6

Education 25.8 13.4 265 13.9

Telecommunications 0.9 0.5 23 1.2

Economic, Financial & Management 

Improvements 0.7 0.4 13 0.7

Transportation 107.0 55.8 211 11.1

Rule of Law & Governance 11.0 5.7 114 6.0

Civic Cleanup Activities 0.2 0.1 11 0.6

Civic Support Vehicles 3.7 1.6 9 0.48

Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities 3.8 2 138 7.3

Battle Damage/Repair 0 0 0 0

Condolence Payments 0.1 0.1 17 0.9

Hero Payments 0 0 0 0

Former Detainee Payments 0 0 0 0

Protective Measures 0.4 0.2 17 0.9

Other Urgent Humanitarian or 

Reconstruction Projects 3.7 1.9 143 7.6

Temporary Contract Guards for 

Critical Infrastructure 0 0 0 0

Non categorized obligated fundsa 3.2 0.02 220 11.6

Totalsb $191.8 1,895

 Source: SIGAR analysis of USFOR-A CERP data.

 a

Includes obligated funds not identified under a specific CERP category.

 b

Funding data have been rounded and therefore may not precisely match the total.
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 12

Table 4: Number of FY 2008 Projects and Total Amount Obligated, by CERP Categories

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Categories Obligated 

Dollars

Percentage 

of Total 

Obligated 

Dollars

Total Number 

of Projects

Percentage 

of Total 

Number of 

Projects

Water & Sanitation $20.9 4.5% 344 10.9%

Food Production & Distribution 0.4 0.1 14 0.5

Agriculture & Irrigation 25.1 5.4 191 6.1

Electricity 15 3.2 133 4.2

Healthcare 23.6 5.1 259 8.2

Education 53.8 11.6 441 14.0

Telecommunications 1.9 0.4 52 1.7

Economic, Financial & Management 

Improvements 4.5 1 18 0.6

Transportation 270.5 58.3 269 8.6

Rule of Law & Governance 13.3 2.9 103 3.3

Civic Cleanup Activities 0.1 0.02 6 0.2

Civic Support Vehicles 0.7 0.2 14 0.5

Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities 10.6 2.3 183 5.8

Battle Damage/Repair 0.7 0.2 26 0.8

Condolence Payments 0.3 0.1 49 1.7

Hero Payments 0 0 0 0

Former Detainee Payments 0 0 1 0.03

Protective Measures 2.9 0.6 48 1.5

Other Urgent Humanitarian or 

Reconstruction Projects 3.0 0.6 133 4.2

Temporary Contract Guards for 

Critical Infrastructure 0 0 0 0

Non categorized obligated fundsa

16.8 3.6 860 27.4

Totalsb $464.3 3,144

 Source: SIGAR analysis of USFOR-A CERP data.

 a

Includes obligated funds not identified under a specific CERP category. b

Funding data have been rounded and therefore may not precisely match the total.
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 13

Table 5: Number of FY 2009 Projects and Total Amount Obligated, by CERP Categories

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Categories Obligated 

Dollars

Percentage 

of Total 

Obligated 

Dollars

Total Number 

of Projects

Percentage 

of Total 

Number of 

Projects

Water & Sanitation $12.4 3.3% 179 13.7%

Food Production & Distribution 0.6 0.2 12 0.9

Agriculture & Irrigation 19.3 5.2 144 10.8

Electricity 2.4 0.6 38 2.8

Healthcare 6.8 1.8 137 10.3

Education 23.4 6.3 166 12.4

Telecommunications 0.7 0.2 6 0.5

Economic, Financial & Management 

Improvements 1.0 0.3 11 0.8

Transportation 269.1 72 178 13.3

Rule of Law & Governance 7.8 2.1 37 2.8

Civic Cleanup Activities 0.3 0.1 9 0.7

Civic Support Vehicles 0.6 0.2 4 0.3

Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities 5.2 1.4 88 6.6

Battle Damage/Repair 0.8 0.2 70 5.2

Condolence Payments 0.3 0.1 40 3.0

Hero Payments 0.1 0.03 5 0.4

Former Detainee Payments 0 0 0 0

Protective Measures 5.0 1.3 40 3.0

Other Urgent Humanitarian or 

Reconstruction Projects 17.7 4.7 172 12.9

Temporary Contract Guards for 

Critical Infrastructure 0.2 0.1 1 0.1

Totalsb $373.7 1,337

 Source: SIGAR analysis of USFOR-A CERP data.

a

Funding data have been rounded and therefore may not precisely match the total.
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 14

Table 6: Number Projects and Total Amount Obligated for Fiscal Year 2005 through Third Quarter 

2009, by CERP Categories

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Categories Obligated 

Dollars

Percentage 

of Total 

Obligated 

Dollars

Total Number 

of Projects

Percentage 

of Total 

Number of 

Projects

Water & Sanitation $49.4 3.6% 1291 12.3%

Food Production & Distribution 2.3 0.2 65 0.6

Agriculture & Irrigation 64.4 4.7 770 7.3

Electricity 31.7 2.3 432 4.1

Healthcare 51.4 3.8 969 9.2

Education 134.9 9.9 1587 15.1

Telecommunications 14.4 1.1 200 1.9

Economic, Financial & Management 

Improvements 10.0 0.7 97 0.9

Transportation 845.3 62.1 1051 10.0

Rule of Law & Governance 53.0 3.9 803 7.6

Civic Cleanup Activities 1.2 0.1 54 0.5

Civic Support Vehicles 17.1 1.3 211 2.0

Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities 22.7 1.7 585 5.7

Battle Damage/Repair 1.5 0.1 96 0.9

Condolence Payments 0.8 0.1 128 1.2

Hero Payments 0.1 0.01 5 0.1

Former Detainee Payments 0 0 1 0.01

Protective Measures 8.6 0.6 118 1.1

Other Urgent Humanitarian or 

Reconstruction Projects 29.1 2.1 804 7.6

Temporary Contract Guards for 

Critical Infrastructure 0.2 0.01 1 0.01

Non categorized obligated & 

disbursed fundsa 22.3 1.6 1256 11.9

Totalsb $1.4 10,524

 Source: SIGAR analysis of USFOR-A CERP data.

 a

Includes obligated funds not identified under a specific CERP category.

 b

Funding data have been rounded and therefore may not precisely match the total.
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 15

Appendix III: Comments from U.S. Forces Afghanistan 
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 16
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 17
SIGAR Audit-09-5 Commander’s Emergency Response Program Page 18

(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-005A).
_________________________________________________________________________________

SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

Reconstruction is to enhance oversight of programs for the 

reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and 

objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide 

accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and 

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and 

other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions to:

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy 

and its component programs;

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

Reports and Testimonies SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all released 

reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

Abuse in Afghanistan allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and

Reconstruction Programs reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202