BUREAU OF 

ALCOHOL, 

TOBACCO, 

FIREARMS AND 

EXPLOSIVES

Enhancing Data 

Collection Could 

Improve Management

of Investigations

Report to Congressional Requesters

June 2014

GAO-14-553

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-553, a report to 

congressional requesters

June 2014

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS 

AND EXPLOSIVES

Enhancing Data Collection Could Improve 

Management of Investigations

Why GAO Did This Study

ATF, which was transferred from the 

Department of the Treasury to DOJ in 

2003, is responsible for investigating 

federal laws related to firearms, 

explosives, arson, alcohol, and 

tobacco. In 2012, there were almost 

9,000 reported murders involving 

firearms. ATF oversight was a DOJ’s

2013 top management challenge for 

ensuring effective and efficient law 

enforcement. Congress continues to 

raise questions about ATF’s criminal 

law enforcement activities and 

operations. GAO was asked to review 

ATF’s activities.

This report addresses (1) how ATF’s 

priorities for its criminal law 

enforcement investigations have 

changed since fiscal year 2003, (2) 

ATF’s staffing challenges, and (3) the

extent to which ATF has data to 

monitor the timeliness and outcomes of 

delayed denial investigations. GAO 

reviewed ATF policies, analyzed 

investigative data from fiscal years 

2003 through 2013, and interviewed 

ATF officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that ATF establish 

a mechanism to provide headquarters

managers readily available data to 

better monitor the timeliness and 

outcomes of delayed denial 

investigations. ATF concurred with the 

recommendation and ATF officials 

outlined steps they plan to take to 

address it.

What GAO Found

Since fiscal year 2003, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF), within the Department of Justice, has been focusing more on decreasing 

violent crime. Beginning in 2010, ATF made criminal organization investigations 

one of its highest priorities, similar to firearms investigations, and deemphasized 

alcohol and tobacco investigations that do not involve violent crime. ATF data 

show that alcohol and tobacco investigations decreased by 85 percent (from 168 

to 25 investigations opened) from fiscal years 2003 through 2013. In 2012, to 

more effectively identify and address the most violent criminal threats, ATF 

established the Frontline initiative to, among other things, prioritize investigations 

and evaluate ATF’s efforts in reducing violent crime. ATF began evaluating its 

efforts in March 2014, and does not yet have a time frame for completing the 

evaluations. As such, it is too early to tell how well Frontline helps ATF to assess 

how effective its investigations are in addressing violent crime. 

ATF reported facing funding and hiring challenges. ATF’s number of special 

agents generally increased from fiscal years 2004 through 2010, but decreased 

by about 6 percent (from 2,562 to 2,399) through fiscal year 2013, which 

represents the lowest number of special agents in 8 years. According to ATF 

management officials, ATF was unable to hire agents because its funding did not 

keep pace with the cost of employee salaries and benefits. According to ATF 

data, the average salary and benefits costs for ATF employees increased by 55 

percent from $100,000 in fiscal year 2003 to $155,000 in fiscal year 2013.

Further, about a quarter of ATF’s on-board special agents were eligible to retire 

as of the end of fiscal year 2013, with an additional 20 percent becoming eligible 

to retire through fiscal year 2018. As of April 2014, ATF was hiring human 

resources personnel to assess how to better address staffing challenges, but it is 

too soon to tell the extent to which these efforts will address such challenges.

ATF does not have readily available data to track and monitor the timeliness and 

outcomes of delayed denial investigations. Delayed denial investigations are 

investigations of individuals who improperly purchased firearms when 

background checks did not initially determine that the individuals were ineligible 

to purchase a firearm. N-Force, ATF’s investigations database, does not have 

information readily available to systematically track the timeliness and 

outcomes—such as if a firearm is retrieved—of delayed denial investigations. 

ATF considers these investigations a top priority and is committed to responding 

to them quickly to protect public safety and prevent violent crime. A mechanism 

to (1) readily obtain data on the timeliness of such investigations and (2) allow

managers to easily query and analyze trends on the outcomes of such 

investigations could help ensure that ATF is retrieving firearms from prohibited 

persons to maximize public safety.

View GAO-14-553. For more information, 

contact Eileen R. Larence at (202) 512-8777

or larencee@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-553 ATF

Letter 1

Background 6

ATF is Focusing More on the Most Violent Criminal Threats and 

on Using Criminal Intelligence Data to Better Target Violent 

Crime Than it Did in Fiscal Year 2003 8

ATF Faces Projected Reductions in Staff and Reports Funding 

and Hiring Challenges 13

ATF Does Not Have Readily Available Data to Monitor the 

Timeliness and Outcomes of Delayed Denial Investigations 17

Conclusions 21

Recommendation for Executive Action 21

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 21

Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 23

Figures

Figure 1: The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives (ATF) Field Divisions 7

Figure 2: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF) Criminal Investigations Opened in Fiscal Years 

2003 through 2013, by Mission Activity 10

Figure 3: Percentage of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 

and Explosives (ATF) Special Agents Eligible to Retire as 

Compared with the Percentage of Special Agents 

Government-wide Eligible to Retire 14

Figure 4: The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives (ATF) Resources Available for Obligation, 

Fiscal Years 2003-2014 15

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-553 ATF

Abbreviations

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

DOJ Department of Justice

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FFL federal firearms licensee

Frontline Frontline Business Model

OIG Office of the Inspector General

OPM Office of Personnel Management

SAC special agent in charge

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-14-553 ATF

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

June 30, 2014

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Ranking Member

Committee on the Judiciary

United States Senate

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.

Chairman

Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and 

Investigations

Committee on the Judiciary

House of Representatives

Ensuring effective and efficient law enforcement is one of the Department 

of Justice’s (DOJ) six most pressing concerns, according to DOJ’s 2013 

report on top management and performance challenges.1 DOJ reports 

that a fundamental and persistent challenge in this area is ensuring that 

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF—also 

referred to as ‘the bureau’ in this report), among other DOJ components, 

conducts adequate oversight of its field offices. In 2010, for example, the 

oversight failures of ATF’s Fast and Furious investigation—in which ATF 

knowingly allowed criminal suspects to purchase firearms2

 1

DOJ, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Justice, 

2013, Dec. 23, 2013. The remaining five most pressing concerns are: addressing the 

growing crisis in the federal prison system; safeguarding national security consistent with 

civil rights and liberties; protecting taxpayer funds from mismanagement and misuse; 

enhancing cybersecurity; and restoring confidence in the integrity, fairness, and 

accountability of the department.

—resulted in 

DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) recommending that ATF take 

several corrective actions to improve agency oversight, and ATF is taking 

2

Operation Fast and Furious was a criminal investigation that ATF conducted in the 

Phoenix Field Division from 2009 through 2010 designed to combat firearms trafficking on 

the southwest border. This operation resulted in numerous firearms being purchased by 

straw purchasers (individuals who purchase firearms on behalf of others, such as 

prohibited persons who are not allowed to buy or possess firearms themselves) involved 

in a large-scale gun-trafficking organization responsible for buying guns for transport to 

violent Mexican drug-trafficking organizations. Law enforcement officials later recovered 

these guns at crime scenes in Mexico and the United States, including one recovery in 

connection with the shooting death of a U.S. Customs and Border Protection agent.
Page 2 GAO-14-553 ATF

action in response.3 However, with almost 9,000 reported murders 

involving firearms in 2012, according to the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), Congress has raised questions about whether ATF 

management challenges related to firearms trafficking investigations and 

undercover operations, among other things, continue.4

In 2003, ATF was transferred from the Department of the Treasury to 

DOJ where ATF supports DOJ’s strategic goals to prevent crime and 

enforce federal laws, among other things. According to ATF’s strategic 

plan, its mission is to protect communities from violent criminals, criminal 

organizations, the illegal use and trafficking of firearms, the illegal use 

and storage of explosives, acts of arson and bombings, acts of terrorism, 

and the illegal diversion of alcohol and tobacco products. To fulfill its 

mission, ATF uses investigative techniques, which are investigative tools 

ATF agents use to assist in the investigation of criminal activity. These 

techniques can include such things as storefronts (for conducting 

undercover operations to attract potential criminals), or wiretaps (for 

monitoring and recording telephone communications). According to ATF’s 

congressional budget submission for fiscal year 2015, illegal firearms are 

the “tools of the trade” used by drug traffickers, gang members, and other 

violent criminals against one another, law enforcement officials, and 

innocent civilians. An important part of ATF’s efforts to address firearms 

trafficking is conducting delayed denial investigations—investigations to 

retrieve firearms from purchasers who are subsequently determined 

through background checks to be prohibited from possessing firearms. 

Congress has enacted about $12 billion for ATF operations since 2003.

Given the importance of ATF’s mission for ensuring public safety, the 

amount of federal resources being devoted to ATF, and the questions 

raised about the management of ATF’s programs, you asked that we 

review the mission and activities of ATF. This report examines the 

following questions:

 3

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of Operation Fast 

and Furious and Related Matters (Washington, D.C.: September 2012). 

4

The number of reported murders involving firearms is from the FBI Uniform Crime 

Report, Crime in the United States 2012, and represents the most recent Uniform Crime 

Report data available. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

(October 2013). Crime in the United States, 2012. Retrieved (May 2014), from 

(http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012).
Page 3 GAO-14-553 ATF

1. How, if at all, have ATF’s priorities for its criminal law enforcement 

investigations changed since fiscal year 2003?

2. What, if any, staffing challenges has ATF faced since fiscal year 

2003?

3. To what extent does ATF have data to monitor the timeliness and 

outcomes of its delayed denial investigations?

To address the first question, we reviewed ATF’s statutory authorities; 

mission, and priorities, as outlined in past and current ATF strategic plans 

covering fiscal years 2003 through 2013, and; ATF’s Frontline Business 

Model, which outlines ATF’s efforts intended to assess criminal threats, 

use criminal intelligence information, prioritize and conduct criminal law 

enforcement investigations (also referred to as ‘criminal investigations’ in 

this report), allocate and redirect resources, and measure ATF’s efforts to 

ensure that it meets its goals and objectives. To examine any changes in 

ATF priorities for criminal investigations from fiscal years 2003 through 

2013, we analyzed data from ATF’s case management system—NForce—for those years that provide details on ATF criminal investigations 

opened by mission activities such as firearms, arson and explosives, 

alcohol and tobacco, and criminal organizations. We assessed the 

reliability of these data by interviewing staff responsible for managing the 

data and reviewing relevant documentation, and concluded that these 

data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We also 

interviewed ATF headquarters officials responsible for overseeing NForce data and developing policies related to priorities for criminal 

investigations. We interviewed senior officials at 5 of ATF’s 25 field 

divisions to obtain field perspectives and provide context on ATF’s 

priorities for criminal investigations.5

 5

We interviewed senior officials at ATF field divisions in Dallas, Chicago, Seattle, San 

Francisco, and Los Angeles. 

We selected the 5 field divisions 

based on factors including geographic dispersion and to cover the range 

of ATF mission activities, such as firearms trafficking on the southwest 

border, firearms crimes by criminal organizations in urban areas, and the 

use of tobacco funds to conduct illegal activity. We also interviewed 

representatives from selected federal partners and state and local law 

enforcement agencies in proximity to these 5 ATF field division offices to 

obtain the representatives’ perspectives on ATF’s changing priorities for 
Page 4 GAO-14-553 ATF

its criminal investigations.6

To address the second question, we analyzed Office of Personnel 

Management (OPM) on-board data for ATF personnel, including special 

agents eligible to retire and the projected rate of retirement as compared 

to special agents government-wide from fiscal years 2013 through 2018.

We selected these partners because they 

share jurisdiction or collaborate with ATF on criminal investigations. While 

the information obtained from the 5 divisions and the federal, state, and 

local partners cannot be generalized to all divisions and agencies, it 

provided us with insight and context on ATF’s priorities related to criminal 

investigations.

7

To address the third question, we reviewed ATF directives and 

memorandums governing ATF’s use of its case management system, NForce, as well as investigative policies and procedures, and ATF’s 

We assessed the reliability of OPM data through electronic testing and 

reviewing relevant documentation. We concluded that the OPM data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To provide additional 

context on the OPM data, we examined ATF data on staff levels, attrition 

and hiring, the costs of salaries and benefits, ATF’s resources available 

for obligation, and ATF requests for personnel as stated in ATF 

congressional budget justifications and appropriations. We assessed the 

reliability of ATF data by interviewing ATF human resources officials 

responsible for overseeing the data. We concluded that the ATF data 

were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We also 

interviewed ATF headquarters officials to get their perspectives on ATF’s 

staffing challenges and the reasons for these challenges, and to evaluate 

how ATF allocated personnel to meet its priorities during fiscal years 

2003 through 2014.

 6

Federal partners were the United States Attorneys’ Offices, the FBI, and the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA). State and local partners included state bureaus of 

investigation and city police departments. Specifically, we interviewed representatives 

from all three federal partners and two state and local partners associated with each of the 

5 field divisions, with the exception of 1 field division where officials at one state partner 

were unavailable to be interviewed due to having to respond to a law enforcement 

incident, and for which we interviewed representatives from all three federal partners and 

one local partner.

7

We calculated ATF personnel eligible for regular, voluntary retirement with an unreduced 

annuity (i.e., met retirement requirements for age and years of service). Projections are 

based on September 30, 2013, onboard staff, projecting forward from a constant 

population, not accounting for attrition or hires. 
Page 5 GAO-14-553 ATF

program on firearms enforcement. We also reviewed N-Force computer 

screenshots and user guides for completing data fields in N-Force, and 

we received a demonstration of the N-Force system’s capabilities to 

collect information on criminal investigations. We also reviewed prior 

inspector general reports on delayed denial investigations and 

coordinated with DOJ’s OIG on ATF’s progress in implementing 

recommendations.8 We compared ATF’s actions for collecting and using 

investigation information to monitor delayed denial investigations with 

ATF policy and criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal

Government related to control activities for implementing management 

directives.9

We conducted this performance audit from January 2013 to June 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Finally, we interviewed ATF officials in headquarters, and in 

the 5 selected field divisions, responsible for overseeing data and 

developing policies related to criminal investigations to understand 

oversight of these investigations.

 8

U.S. Department of Justice, Review of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives’ Enforcement of Brady Act Violations Identified Through the National Instant 

Criminal Background Check System, I-2004-006 (Washington, D.C.: July 2004). U.S. 

Department of the Treasury, Protecting the Public: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 

Firearms Could Improve Its National Instant Criminal Background Check System Program, 

OIG-02-004 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 2001).

9

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C: Nov. 1, 1999).
Page 6 GAO-14-553 ATF

ATF is one of several DOJ law enforcement components, such as the FBI 

and the DEA, responsible for fighting violent crime.10 As such, ATF is 

responsible for investigating criminals and criminal organizations that use 

firearms, arson, or explosives in violent criminal activity, among other 

things.11 ATF is also responsible for investigating criminal and regulatory 

violations of the federal firearms, explosives, arson, and alcohol and 

tobacco-smuggling laws subject to the direction of the Attorney General, 

as well as any other function related to the investigation of violent crime 

or domestic terrorism that is delegated to ATF by the Attorney General.12

To do this, ATF operates several programs and initiatives to fulfill its 

mission at its headquarters office and 25 field divisions throughout the 

country. At headquarters, ATF has eight directorates responsible for, 

among other things, developing staffing plans, succession plans, and 

training and recruitment. ATF’s largest directorate, the Office of Field 

Operations, is to provide strategic direction to ATF’s field divisions, as 

well as oversight of all field divisions’ criminal investigative activities. Field 

divisions make up about 70 percent (3,287) of ATF’s total on-board 

workforce (4,728) as of September 2013.13

 10We reported in April 2011 that DOJ law enforcement components—ATF, DEA, FBI, and 

the U.S. Marshals Service—have overlapping jurisdiction over violent crime investigations, 

specifically when the investigations involve illegal drugs, gang violence, firearms, 

explosives, arson and fugitive apprehension. We recommended that DOJ assess options 

to better identify and diagnose disagreements in the field and take action to limit the 

negative impacts from disagreements over jurisdictional overlap for some criminal 

investigations. In July 2011, DOJ identified steps to address our recommendation, but has 

not fully addressed it. See GAO, Law Enforcement Coordination: DOJ Could Improve Its 

Process for Identifying Disagreements Among Agents, 

See figure 1 for ATF field 

division locations.

GAO-11-314 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 7, 2011).

11For the purpose of this report, criminal organizations refer to criminal groups and gangs 

such as white supremacists, MS-13, and 18th Street.

1228 U.S.C. § 599A. See also 28 C.F.R. § 0.130.

13We used OPM data to identify ATF’s total onboard workforce, which includes permanent 

and temporary employees.

Background
Page 7 GAO-14-553 ATF

Figure 1: The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Field 

Divisions

In order to track and monitor ATF’s criminal investigations throughout the 

country, ATF uses its N-Force case management system, which was 

developed in fiscal year 1999. According to ATF’s policy on N-Force, the 

system is to enable (1) agents in the field to store and query investigative 

information: (2) managers in the field divisions to oversee investigative 

activities and documents; and (3) senior managers in headquarters to 

more efficiently oversee programs and projects, monitor significant 

investigations and activities, collect and analyze statistical information, 

and support ATF’s financial statements. In general, field agents are to 

enter case information into N-Force, such as the agent and field office in 

charge of a particular investigation, the type of investigation being 

conducted, key dates, information on the suspect or defendant, interview 

records, whether certain property—such as vehicles or firearms—is in 

ATF custody, and information about investigative techniques, among 

other things. In response to oversight shortcomings related to ATF’s Fast 

and Furious investigation in July 2011, which included some of these 

investigative techniques, ATF developed the Monitored Case Program to 

provide greater headquarters oversight of sensitive investigations and to 

enhance communication between the field and ATF headquarters, which 
Page 8 GAO-14-553 ATF

is accomplished through a review of high-risk investigations and regular 

communication, such as monthly briefings, between field division 

managers and senior managers in headquarters.14

Since fiscal year 2003, ATF has been focusing more on decreasing 

violent crime by addressing its original mission activities of illegal firearms 

trafficking, explosives, and arson; however, the bureau’s strategic 

approach has evolved, and in 2010, ATF made criminal organization 

investigations one of its highest priorities to address the most violent 

criminal threats, while deemphasizing alcohol and tobacco investigations. 

According to senior ATF officials, the bureau is doing this so as to 

conduct a more focused and effective fight against violent crime. 

According to senior ATF officials, ATF has sharpened its focus in order to 

more effectively address violent crime by giving priority to investigations 

of those subjects that pose the most violent criminal threat. While ATF 

continues to prioritize three of its original mission activities—illegal 

firearms trafficking, explosives, and arson—in its 2010 strategic plan, 

which is ATF’s most recent strategic plan, ATF added criminal 

organizations to its list of mission activity priorities. That same year, ATF 

officials stated that they modified N-Force to separately track 

investigations of criminal organizations.15

 14In September 2012, the DOJ OIG issued a report on the Fast and Furious investigation, 

per the request of the Attorney General. See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the 

Inspector General, A Review of Operation Fast and Furious and Related Matters 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2012). The DOJ OIG initiated a follow-up review to 

evaluate the progress and effectiveness of measures DOJ and ATF took to implement 

recommendations related to the Fast and Furious investigation. Additionally, in February 

2014, the DOJ OIG initiated a review of ATF’s use of its storefront operations to evaluate, 

among other things, the effectiveness of the Monitored Case Program. 

ATF officials responsible for 

field operations reported that ATF expanded its efforts to identify, target, 

and dismantle those criminal organizations that use firearms, arson, and 

explosives in violent criminal activity so as to further reduce the risk to 

public safety.

15According to ATF officials, the bureau conducted investigations of criminal organizations 

prior to 2010, but did not identify these investigations as a mission priority to be tracked 

separately in N-Force before that year.

ATF is Focusing More 

on the Most Violent 

Criminal Threats and 

on Using Criminal 

Intelligence Data to 

Better Target Violent 

Crime Than it Did in 

Fiscal Year 2003
Page 9 GAO-14-553 ATF

ATF continues to prioritize firearms investigations over all other types of 

investigations.16 As illustrated in figure 2, out of approximately 302,859 

total investigations opened in fiscal years 2003 to 2013 related to ATF’s 

four mission activities, ATF data show the following breakdown of 

investigations: firearms (264,528, or 87 percent), arson and explosives 

(34,549, or 11 percent), criminal organizations—which ATF began 

tracking only in 2010—(2,414, or almost 1 percent), and alcohol and 

tobacco (1,368, or less than half of 1 percent).17

 16Firearms investigations involve criminal possession and use of firearms or firearms 

trafficking, among others things.

17For the purposes of demonstrating trends in these mission activities, we categorized 

investigation descriptions into ATF’s mission activities as follows: (1) firearms 

investigations include, criminal possession and use of firearms, firearms trafficking, 

firearms enforcement activity, deny criminals access to firearms, shooting incidents, and 

firearms referrals investigations; (2) arson and explosives investigations include arson and 

explosives enforcement activities, church fires, significant explosives investigation, 

safeguard the public from arson and explosives incidents; (3) criminal organizations 

investigations include investigations of criminal groups and gangs; and (4) alcohol and 

tobacco investigations include alcohol and tobacco diversion enforcement activities, 

alcohol and tobacco diversion investigations, and gray market tobacco investigations 

(investigations of tobacco that the U.S. trademark owner has not authorized for sale or 

import). We did not include certain investigations opened by ATF from fiscal years 2003 

through 2013—such as special events, partnerships, inspections, and firearms tracing—

because they did not relate to the four mission activities.
Page 10 GAO-14-553 ATF

Figure 2: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Criminal 

Investigations Opened in Fiscal Years 2003 through 2013, by Mission Activity

Notes: Percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.

a

ATF modified its coding system in N-Force—ATF’s case management system which it uses to 

manage its criminal investigations—to enhance its ability to track investigations involving criminal 

organizations in 2010. Therefore, the “<1% criminal organizations” refers to investigations opened 

from fiscal years 2010 through 2013.

Furthermore, according to ATF, from fiscal years 2009 through 2013, ATF 

reprogrammed funds to the firearms mission from other mission activities. 

Specifically, according to ATF, since fiscal year 2009, ATF has 

reprogrammed a total of at least $140.6 million18 to the firearms mission 

activity—that is, $13.9 million of $103 million19

 18According to ATF’s congressional budget submissions, ATF reported reprogramming 

these funds to the firearms mission from the alcohol and tobacco mission activity in fiscal 

years 2009-2010 and 2012-2013. Additionally, ATF reported reprogramming funds from 

the arson and explosives mission activity in fiscal years 2009-2013.

from the alcohol and 

tobacco mission activity and $126.7 million of $1.269 billion from the 

19The totals are actual amounts that include enacted appropriations and any changes in 

funding.
Page 11 GAO-14-553 ATF

arson and explosives mission activity. According to ATF, funds were 

reprogrammed because of ATF’s increasing illegal firearms-trafficking 

enforcement efforts along the southwest border, as well as an overall 

increased focus on firearms enforcement activities and reducing gun 

violence across the country.20

ATF officials responsible for field operations in headquarters and in the 

field reported, and ATF data show, that the number of alcohol and 

tobacco investigations opened decreased by 85 percent, from 168 to 25 

from fiscal years 2003 through 2013. These investigations are opened 

only when there is a nexus to violent crime or when such investigations 

may result in addressing substantial fraud or state tax revenue losses. 

For instance, according to ATF headquarters officials who are responsible 

for field operations and officials we interviewed at all five field divisions, 

ATF’s alcohol and tobacco investigations are increasingly likely to involve 

organized criminal groups that use illicit proceeds to fund criminal or 

terrorist activities. In its 2010 strategic plan, ATF continued to identify 

alcohol and tobacco as one of its mission activities, but the bureau did not 

identify this mission activity as one of its strategic goals. Further, ATF 

officials stated that they are no longer giving a high priority to alcohol and 

tobacco investigations because of limited resources and an aim to 

maximize ATF’s impact on the most violent criminal threats. According to 

ATF, this approach allows the bureau to be more strategically focused 

and proactive when it comes to preventing and addressing violent crimes, 

rather than being opportunity driven and simply reacting to nonviolent 

crimes that have already occurred.

In 2012, ATF created the Frontline Business Model (Frontline), which, 

according to ATF, is intended to establish ATF’s approach for using 

criminal intelligence information to assess criminal threats, prioritize and 

conduct investigations, and evaluate the extent to which its efforts have 

reduced violent crime.21

 20According to ATF, the bureau reprogrammed these funds in accordance with section 

505 of the General Provisions of each year’s Department of Justice appropriation acts 

from fiscal years 2009 through 2013.

According to ATF, Frontline formalizes ATF’s 

approach for using criminal intelligence information to more effectively 

21In addition, Frontline is intended to allocate and redirect resources, as needed, to align 

ATF’s efforts with its priorities in order to maximize ATF’s impact on reducing violent 

crime.
Page 12 GAO-14-553 ATF

identify and address the most violent criminal threats.22 Under Frontline,

ATF is using a model of law enforcement known as intelligence-led 

policing to leverage (1) criminal intelligence information, such as crime 

statistics and trends, and (2) criminal intelligence–related investigative 

techniques—such as electronic surveillance, undercover operations, and 

liaisons with other agencies—to better target investigations on violent 

crime areas, individuals, and organizations.23 For example, according to 

Frontline guidance, ATF analyzes firearms trace data and multiple 

firearms sales data to develop investigative leads on the sources of 

firearms used in crimes and the persons who have possessed firearms 

used in crimes, such as firearms traffickers and potential straw 

purchasers (individuals who purchase firearms on behalf of other 

individuals, such as prohibited persons who are not allowed to buy or 

possess firearms themselves).24

Under Frontline, each field division is to establish priorities on an annual 

basis for having the greatest impact on violent crime in the division’s 

particular area of jurisdiction. As part of this process, Frontline lays out an 

evaluation mechanism for headquarters managers to assess how well 

each division is meeting these priorities. Specifically, field division 

managers are required to conduct semiannual Frontline Performance 

Reviews by comparing field division investigation activities against each 

field division’s assessments of violent crime to ensure that specific violent 

crime threats in their areas are addressed. This information is to be used 

to inform discussions between headquarters and field division managers 

to help determine whether each field division is aligning investigations 

with ATF’s priorities. ATF officials responsible for field operations 

explained that Frontline is in the implementation phase and began its first 

 22According to ATF documentation describing Frontline, “criminal intelligence” means 

information from a variety of sources, such as firearms tracing, confidential informants, 

and state and local agencies, which the bureau uses to investigate persons suspected of 

being involved in criminal activity.

23According to DOJ, intelligence-led policing is a collaborative law enforcement approach 

combining problem-solving policing, information sharing, and police accountability with 

enhanced intelligence operations.

24ATF, Order ATF O 3310.4C, Firearms Enforcement Program, March 19, 2013. 

According to ATF’s order governing its firearms enforcement program, a firearm trace 

systematically tracks a firearm through the chain of distribution to identify an unlicensed 

purchaser. According to the order, ATF is authorized to trace only firearms that are 

illegally possessed, involved in a crime, or suspected to have been involved in a crime, or 

for law enforcement purposes or national security interests.
Page 13 GAO-14-553 ATF

round of evaluations in March 2014. As of that date, they did not have 

results, nor did they have time frames for completing the evaluations. 

Accordingly, it is too early to tell the extent to which this evaluation is 

going to adequately assess efforts under Frontline.

ATF is facing a reduction in its number of special agents, who, according 

to management officials, are critical to carrying out its mission of reducing 

violent crime. While ATF’s onboard full-time staff remained relatively 

stable over time, with a slight—about 4 percent—increase from fiscal 

years 2008 through 2010, ATF’s staff decreased by about 8 percent from 

fiscal years 2010 through 2013. This represents the lowest number of 

onboard staff since fiscal year 2004. According to ATF management 

officials, ATF was unable to hire agents because the bureau’s funding did 

not keep pace with the cost of employee salaries and benefits. Similarly, 

while ATF’s number of special agents generally increased from fiscal 

years 2004 through 2010, the number of special agents decreased by 

about 6 percent from fiscal year 2010 (2,562) to fiscal year 2013 (2,399). 

This represents the lowest number of special agents since 2005. 

Furthermore, ATF data show that ATF’s hiring of special agents has not 

kept pace with its attrition since fiscal year 2011. For instance, ATF lost 

78 special agents in fiscal year 2011, but hired 23 special agents. 

Similarly, in fiscal year 2012, ATF lost 61 special agents, but hired 14 

special agents.

In addition to citing these reductions of special agents, ATF is expecting a 

potential attrition of special agents because of projected retirements over 

the next 4 years. According to ATF’s Fiscal Year 2014 Congressional 

Budget Submission, all of ATF’s special agents in charge (SAC) will be 

eligible to retire by November 2017.25

 25According to ATF, as of April 2014, 23 of 25 SACs are eligible to retire by the end of 

fiscal year 2017. Two SAC positions (Baltimore and Los Angeles) are vacant. ATF special 

agents under the Civil Service Retirement System may retire at age 50 with 20 years of 

service. Special agents under the Federal Employees Retirement System may retire at 

any age with 25 years of service. 

Moreover, according to our analysis 

of OPM data, about 26 percent of ATF’s onboard special agents, who 

work for SACs, were already eligible to retire as of the end of fiscal year 

2013, with an additional 20 percent becoming eligible for retirement 

through fiscal year 2018. As shown in figure 3, ATF’s projected retirement 

eligibility of special agents through fiscal year 2018 is higher than the 

ATF Faces Projected 

Reductions in 

Staff and Reports 

Funding and Hiring 

Challenges
Page 14 GAO-14-553 ATF

government-wide projected eligibility of special agents. Government-wide, 

16 percent of special agents onboard as of September 2013 were eligible 

to retire with an additional 19 percent becoming eligible for retirement 

through fiscal year 2018.

Figure 3: Percentage of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF) Special Agents Eligible to Retire as Compared with the Percentage of Special 

Agents Government-wide Eligible to Retire

Note: Figures are based on ATF agents onboard as of September 2013.

ATF officials attributed this current and impending reduction of personnel 

to funding and hiring challenges. According to ATF management officials, 

the bureau received marginal or non-existent funding increases over time, 

while the cost of full-time employees has increased, similar to other 

federal agencies, because of government-wide pay raises, annual step 
Page 15 GAO-14-553 ATF

increases, promotions, and health insurance costs.26

Figure 4: The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) 

Resources Available for Obligation, Fiscal Years 2003-2014

Specifically, 

according to ATF data, the average salary and benefits costs for ATF 

employees increased by 55 percent, from $100,000 in fiscal year 2003 to 

$155,000 in fiscal year 2013. In terms of its funding, as shown in figure 4, 

both nominal data (actual funding) and real dollars as of 2013 (data 

adjusted for inflation) show that ATF’s funding has fluctuated throughout 

the years. For example, real dollars decreased by about 10 percent (from 

fiscal years 2012 to 2013) and increased by about 9 percent (from fiscal 

years 2008 to 2009). ATF’s total overall real dollars funding increased by 

23 percent from fiscal years 2003 through 2014, based on estimated 

budget resources available for 2014.

 26According to OPM guidance, most federal civilian employees in executive branch 

agencies were covered by pay freezes on across-the-board pay adjustments from the 

beginning of 2011 through the end of 2013, but pay adjustments not covered by the freeze 

include periodic within-grade step increases and promotion increases, among other 

things. 
Page 16 GAO-14-553 ATF

Note: Fiscal year 2014 value is estimated budget resources available for obligation.

ATF strategic management officials cited additional hiring challenges. 

They stated that the bureau was under a hiring freeze from approximately 

January 2011 to February 2014. Additionally, ATF lost schedule B hiring 

authority after it became a part of DOJ.27 This is an OPM hiring authority 

that allows agencies to hire directly without rating applicants using a 

competitive hiring process to fill special jobs or jobs with unusual 

circumstances.28

To address the reductions in its staff, ATF senior officials explained that in 

fiscal year 2014, the bureau had thus far hired 96 agents, which is the 

first year since 2010 in which ATF has been able to hire more agents than 

the number of agents who left the agency. ATF also noted that in 2013, it 

reorganized its human resources office to create a unit tasked with 

improving the bureau’s capability to conduct data-driven workforce 

analysis, or assessments of workforce data to improve ATF’s 

understanding of trends and dynamics within the workforce. According to 

ATF, such assessments will help improve the bureau’s understanding of 

According to ATF human resources officials, not having 

schedule B hiring authority complicated hiring for the bureau since it could 

no longer target applicants based on certain qualifications, such as 

individuals with prior law enforcement experience or specific language 

skills, and had to review a high volume of applications that were timeconsuming to process. For instance, an ATF human resources official 

reported that the bureau received approximately 17,000 applications in 1 

day for one special agent job announcement. ATF human resource 

officials stated that to better target applicants, they requested schedule B 

hiring authority from OPM in 2012, and regained it in April 2013. 

According to ATF officials, regaining this authority has allowed the bureau 

to streamline its hiring process by focusing on candidates with the most 

relevant experience, such as those with law enforcement experience.

 27Prior to being transferred from the Department of the Treasury to the DOJ, the Office of 

Personnel Management (OPM) had granted the ATF schedule B excepted hiring authority 

in certain circumstances. 

285 C.F.R. § 213.3201. “Upon specific authorization by OPM, agencies may make 

appointments . . . to positions which are not of a confidential or policy-determining 

character, and which are not in the Senior Executive Service, for which it is impracticable 

to hold open competition or to apply usual competitive procedures. Appointments under 

this authority are subject to the basic qualification standards established by the Office of 

Personnel Management for the occupation and grade level. Positions filled under this 

authority are excepted from the competitive service and constitute Schedule B.”
Page 17 GAO-14-553 ATF

attrition challenges and hiring needs. As of April 2014, ATF was finalizing 

the hiring of personnel to conduct these efforts. Accordingly, it is too soon 

to tell the extent to which ATF’s workforce efforts will address staffing 

challenges.

ATF does not have readily available data to track and monitor how well 

field divisions initiate and resolve delayed denial investigations. These are 

investigations of persons who were able to improperly purchase firearms 

from federal firearms licensees because the firearm criminal background 

checks for the persons did not determine that the persons were ineligible 

to purchase a firearm within the particular timeframe for the firearms 

transaction to be completed.29 These persons that are prohibited from 

purchasing firearms include, but are not limited to, convicted felons, 

fugitives from justice, drug addicts, and persons with a history of domestic 

violence.30 Under federal law, a federal firearms licensee may transfer a

firearm to a person if, after contacting the National Instant Criminal 

Background Check System,31 3 business days have elapsed and the 

system has not notified the licensee that the recipient of a firearm by such 

person is unlawful.32

 29These investigations relate to the required background check for firearms purchases.

Delayed denial investigations are investigations of individuals prohibited from purchasing 

a firearm, but who were able to purchase a firearm from a federal firearms licensee (FFL). 

FFLs are persons or companies licensed by ATF, pursuant to federal firearms laws and 

regulations, to engage in a firearms business. According to senior ATF officials, standard 

denial investigations are investigations of persons who were properly denied a firearms 

purchase by a FFL, but who may have made false statements in responding to the 

background check questions. 

Any subsequent investigation that eventually 

determines the person to be ineligible to purchase or possess a firearm 

results in a delayed denial. The risk of firearms-related violent crime by 

these individuals increases if ATF does not investigate them in a timely 

manner and resolve unlawful possession of the firearm.

3018 U.S.C. § 922(g).

31The FBI and designated state and local criminal justice agencies use the National 

Instant Criminal Background Check System to conduct background checks on individuals 

seeking to purchase firearms from federal firearms licensees or obtain permits to possess, 

acquire, or carry firearms.

3218 U.S.C. § 922(t). A business day means “a day on which State offices are open.”

ATF Does Not Have 

Readily Available 

Data to Monitor the 

Timeliness and 

Outcomes of Delayed 

Denial Investigations
Page 18 GAO-14-553 ATF

ATF has the primary federal responsibility for investigating these persons 

and retrieving or disposing of any firearms as appropriate.33

Senior ATF officials stated that resolving delayed denials in a timely way 

is important to protect the public, but ATF headquarters managers do not 

have information readily available to systematically monitor the timeliness 

of delayed denial investigations. In 2005, to address a recommendation 

by DOJ’s OIG, the bureau developed a timeliness standard by which field 

agents are to initiate delayed denial investigations.

Bureau policy 

states that ATF is committed to act quickly in the interest of ensuring 

public safety and preventing violent crime. Bureau policy also states that 

these cases are a top priority. According to ATF data, delayed denial 

investigations opened for fiscal years 2003 through 2013 make up about 

10 percent of investigations opened in all four mission activities and about 

12 percent of investigations opened in the firearms mission activity. For 

this mission activity, delayed denial investigations make up about 16 

percent of investigations opened in fiscal year 2013. In addition, 

according to ATF data, from fiscal years 2003 through 2013, the number 

of delayed denial investigations opened went from 32 percent of all ATF 

investigations opened in response to firearms-related background checks 

in fiscal year 2003 to 53 percent in fiscal year 2013, a 21 percent 

increase.

34 The standard 

stipulates that field agents are to initiate delayed denial investigations 

within 7 days of receiving the delayed denial information in the respective 

field offices.35

 33Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213.

However, ATF’s N-Force database does not have the 

capacity to track whether ATF field agents initiate delayed denial 

investigations in accordance with this standard. For example, N-Force 

does not have the capability to track when an investigation is initiated 

because N-Force queries only yield the date an agent documented an 

34In its 2004 report, the OIG recommended that ATF establish a timeliness standard for 

firearm retrievals and develop a system for ATF field office management to monitor and 

report on compliance with these standards. ATF reported that the system developed was 

one in which field managers rely on immediate supervisors to monitor and report 

compliance with the timeliness standard on a case-by-case basis. U.S. Department of 

Justice, Review of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ Enforcement 

of Brady Act Violations Identified Through the National Instant Criminal Background Check 

System, I-2004-006, Washington, D.C.: July 2004.

35According to senior ATF officials, the FBI forwards delayed denials to ATF 

headquarters, which in turn refers them to ATF field offices.

Timeliness Compliance
Page 19 GAO-14-553 ATF

action, and not the date the action was actually taken. As a result, ATF 

managers do not readily have the information to systematically monitor 

the timeliness of delayed denial investigations because they would need 

to manually query each investigation to obtain the date.

According to senior ATF officials, they do not track when the field started 

a delayed denial investigation because the timeliness standard is a 

guideline, not a required deadline. Additionally, the officials stated that the 

field has competing investigative priorities, which could take precedence 

over a delayed denial investigation and which may take a long time to 

investigate, affecting the field division’s ability to pursue the delayed 

denial investigation. For example, if a violent crime incident were to occur 

at a major sporting event, ATF would deploy field agents to investigate 

that incident as its top priority versus sending a field agent to investigate a 

delayed denial. Although ATF does not systematically track timeliness, 

according to senior ATF officials, field managers are responsible for 

ensuring the timeliness of investigations and field supervisors are 

responsible for reviewing field agents’ responses to delayed denials. ATF 

officials stated that headquarters managers do not monitor delayed denial 

investigations nor is there any other mechanism outside of N-Force to 

monitor delayed denials as they consider this to be a field function, and, 

therefore, they rely on field managers and supervisors for this oversight. 

Nevertheless, given that ATF policy states that the bureau is committed to 

act quickly in the interest of protecting public safety and preventing violent 

crime, having data on the timeliness of delayed denial investigations 

would allow field and headquarters managers to determine how quickly 

the field is initiating these investigations and addressing any delays or 

barriers to timely resolution. ATF officials explained that they are aware of 

the limitation in N-Force to produce timeliness data, and noted that the 

system is no longer adequate for ATF’s needs and explained that ATF 

plans to replace the system. They also noted that N-Force was not 

designed to generate tracking information related to delayed denials. As a 

result, ATF officials solicited a request for information in April 2014, to 

develop a new case management system to replace N-Force, but they do 

not have a completion date yet. ATF provided us information outlining its 

efforts to develop the new system. However, the information ATF 

provided us did not demonstrate how, or if at all, the system would 

produce timeliness data. Establishing a mechanism to readily obtain data 

on the timeliness of initiating delayed denial investigations could help ATF 

ensure delayed denial investigations are being conducted in a timely 

manner in order to maximize public safety. To do this, the bureau could 

(1) ensure that the technical requirements outlined in the request for 

proposal for its new case management system will allow the new system 
Page 20 GAO-14-553 ATF

to provide managers with such data and (2) use a short term mechanism 

by, for example, revising the current case management system or using 

an interim tool—outside the current system—to easily query data, analyze 

trends, and monitor investigations—while the new system is under 

development.

Likewise, because of limitations with N-Force data, ATF headquarters 

managers do not have information readily available to systematically 

monitor the outcomes of delayed denial investigations. Outcomes can 

include retrieval of the firearm from a prohibited person or the transfer of 

the firearm to a nonprohibited person or to a federal firearms licensee.36

According to senior ATF officials, field managers and supervisors are 

responsible for monitoring the outcomes of all investigations to ensure 

field agents are responding to delayed denials in compliance with ATF 

policy and priorities. However, by not having the necessary data readily 

available to monitor these outcomes, it is difficult for ATF headquarters 

and field managers to ensure that agents are responding to delayed 

denials in compliance with ATF policy and priorities. Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government state that control activities 

should be designed to ensure management’s directives are carried out.

In other instances, ATF may determine that the person is not prohibited or 

ATF may be unable to locate the prohibited person. ATF field agents are 

required to record firearm retrievals in N-Force, but not any of the other 

outcomes. According to ATF officials responsible for firearms 

enforcement operations, if field agents record the outcomes of any of its 

delayed denial investigations—other than firearms retrievals—they do so 

in N-Force in a narrative format, and the information cannot be easily 

searched using an electronic query.

37

 36Prohibited persons include those who are convicted felons, fugitives from justice, drug 

addicts, and persons with a history of domestic violence.

An example of such a control activity would be a mechanism to monitor 

the outcomes of delayed denial investigations. Such mechanisms would 

help ATF provide the necessary oversight of delayed denial 

investigations, particularly given that ATF has identified these 

investigations as one of its top priorities and that these investigations help 

promote public safety.

37 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

Investigation Outcomes
Page 21 GAO-14-553 ATF

As an agency that has assigned a high priority to protecting communities 

from violent crime, ATF’s ability to adequately oversee investigations and 

monitor field operations is critical to public safety. ATF is beginning to 

evaluate whether field division investigations align with ATF’s priorities 

and assess how to better address staffing challenges. However, it is too 

early to assess these efforts. Additionally, ATF does not have complete 

information to track and monitor the timeliness and outcomes of delayed 

denial investigations. Given that there are potential safety issues 

regarding delayed denials, establishing a mechanism—by, for example, 

revising N-Force and building capabilities into ATF’s new case 

management system—to monitor the timeliness and outcomes of delayed 

denials could help provide data to better inform managers. Specifically, 

these adjustments could help ATF ensure the timely completion and 

monitoring of the status of delayed denial investigations so as to help 

maximize public safety.

In order for ATF to achieve its priority of having the greatest impact on the 

most violent criminal threats, we recommend that the Director of ATF take 

the following action:

• establish short-term mechanisms—by, for example, making revisions 

to the current case management system—and long-term 

mechanisms, such as by incorporating technical requirements into its 

requests for proposal on ATF’s new case management system, to 

allow headquarters managers to have readily available data to 

systematically monitor

• time frames for initiating delayed denial investigations in the field 

in order to have the information to better monitor the timeliness of 

these investigations and

• outcomes of all delayed denial investigations in order to better 

monitor how effectively ATF is responding to these investigations.

We provided a draft of this report to ATF and DOJ for review and 

comment. ATF did not provide written comments to include in our report. 

However, during a meeting held on June 23, 2014 with DOJ and ATF 

senior officials, the legal counsel to ATF’s director stated that the bureau 

appreciated the opportunity to review the draft report and that ATF 

concurred with our recommendation. On June 25, 2014, DOJ also 

explained by email that the agency and ATF concurred with the 

recommendation. During our meeting, ATF senior officials noted specific 

Conclusions

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 22 GAO-14-553 ATF

short-term and long-term actions the bureau plans to take in order to 

address the recommendation. These actions include, among other things, 

potential revisions to the current case management system and 

incorporating technical requirements into requests for proposal on the 

bureau’s new case management system. ATF senior officials explained 

that they plan to complete the short-term actions within 9 months and the 

long-term actions within 1 year. If implemented effectively, we believe that 

ATF’s actions would address the intent of our recommendation. Thus, we 

revised our recommendation to include ATF’s planned actions as 

examples of the types of actions the agency could take to satisfy the 

recommendation. ATF also provided us written technical comments that 

included technical comments from DOJ, which we incorporated as 

appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Director of ATF, and 

the Attorney General of the United States and appropriate congressional 

committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix I.

Eileen R. Larence

Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Dawn Locke (Assistant Director); 

Joel Aldape; David Alexander; Nanette J. Barton; Billy Commons, III; Eric 

Hauswirth; Susan Hsu; Mary Catherine Hult; Linda Miller; Robin Nye; Luis 

E. Rodriguez; and Su Jin Yon made key contributions to this report.

Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(441124)
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