U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

93–366 PDF 2015

SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 

WHILE KEEPING OUR SKIES SAFE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 

Serial No. 113–86 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

CURTIS CLAWSON, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

VACANCY

VACANCY

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN O’HARA, Acting Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Vice Chair 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

AMANDA PARIKH, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DENNIS TERRY, Subcommittee Clerk 

BRIAN TURBYFILL, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Richard Hudson, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

WITNESSES

Mr. Stephen Sadler, Assistant Administrator, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

Mr. Christopher M. Piehota, Director, Terrorist Screening Center, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

Ms. Jennifer A. Grover, Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 14 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15 

APPENDIX

Question From Honorable Michael D. Rogers for Stephen Sadler ...................... 35 

(1) 

SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY AND CIVIL 

LIBERTIES WHILE KEEPING OUR SKIES SAFE 

Thursday, September 18, 2014 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:18 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Richard Hudson [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Hudson, Rogers, Brooks, Sanford, Richmond, Jackson Lee, and Swalwell. 

Mr. HUDSON. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the process and procedures 

surrounding the U.S. Government’s No-Fly and Selectee lists. I recognize myself for an opening statement. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing here before the 

subcommittee. This hearing is an opportunity to discuss how the 

Federal Government is working to balance civil liberties protections 

for U.S. citizens with the security of our aviation system. 

Last week our Nation observed the 13th anniversary of 9/11. Together we remembered both the cowardly acts that took the lives 

of over 3,000 innocent American people and the bravery of our first 

responders on that tragic day. September 11 is the very reason our 

committee was created, and we must do everything we can to protect the homeland and prevent other attacks. 

The fact remains that our enemies still view the U.S. aviation 

sector as a highly-attractive target, as evidenced by several thwarted plots and attempted attacks. In addition to the threats posted 

by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the thousands of foreign fighters, including U.S. citizens affiliated with terrorist groups like ISIS, are 

a growing and serious threat to the security of U.S. aviation and 

the homeland. It is crucial that we accurately identify individuals 

who pose this threat and prevent them from boarding flights in the 

United States. 

TSA relies on a multi-layered approach to aviation security, with 

everything from Federal air marshals to canines to the latest explosive detection technology. One of the these layers is a behind-thescenes program known as Secure Flight. This program, which is 

the subject of today’s hearing, takes passenger data it receives from 

airlines and matches it against the U.S. Government’s consolidated 

terrorist watch lists, including the No-Fly and Selectee lists. This 
2 

program is crucial, not only for domestic flights, but also for protecting the international flights bound for the United States. 

Since 2009, TSA’s Secure Flight program has evolved from one 

that looks solely at the No-Fly List and Selectee List maintained 

by the Terrorist Screening Center to one that assigns passengers 

a risk category and uses additional criteria to identify high-risk 

passengers who might not be on the watch list. While these lists 

serve as an important counterterrorism tool, we must ensure that 

travelers who are incorrectly matched to a list are able to resolve 

those issues in a timely, effective manner. 

In two comprehensive reports issued today GAO found that TSA 

could improve Secure Flight by measuring and tracking errors that 

occur within the system and at the security screening checkpoint. 

The Government Accounting Office also found that TSA generally 

does a good job of protecting passenger data but could strengthen 

privacy awareness training among Secure Flight employees. 

I thank the GAO for its thorough approach to examining this 

program, and I look forward to hearing from TSA how the agency 

plans to implement these Government Accounting Office recommendations. 

In addition, we are pleased to have the director of the Terrorist 

Screening Center here today to discuss its role in managing this 

consolidated terrorist watch list, including the No-Fly List. 

Yesterday the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, 

testifying before the full committee, highlighted the value of the 

consolidated watch list and the TSC in making sure that front-line 

agencies like TSA are able to identify known or suspected terrorists 

and stop them from entering the country, boarding an airplane, or 

obtaining a visa. I look forward to discussing those efforts in greater detail here today. 

The bottom line is that our aviation security is only as strong as 

its weakest link. We must identify individuals who pose a threat, 

such as extremists with Western passports who have joined the 

fight in Iraq and Syria, and take the necessary steps to protect the 

homeland. 

[The statement of Chairman Hudson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN RICHARD HUDSON

SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 

I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today. 

This hearing is an opportunity to discuss how the Federal Government is working 

to balance civil liberties protections for U.S. citizens with the security of our aviation system. 

Last week, our Nation observed the 13th anniversary of 9/11. Together, we remembered both the cowardly acts that took the lives of over 3,000 innocent people 

and the bravery of our first responders on that tragic day. September 11 is the very 

reason our committee was created, and we must do everything we can to protect 

the homeland and prevent other attacks. 

The fact remains that our enemies still view the U.S. aviation sector as a highlyattractive target, as evidenced by several thwarted plots and attempted attacks. In 

addition to the threats posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the thousands of foreign 

fighters, including U.S. citizens, affiliated with terrorist groups like ISIS are a growing and serious threat to the security of U.S. aviation and the homeland. It is critical that we accurately identify individuals who pose this threat and prevent them 

from boarding flights to the United States. 

TSA relies on a multi-layered approach to aviation security with everything from 

Federal Air Marshals, to canines, to the latest explosives detection technology. One 
3 

of these layers is a behind-the-scenes program known as Secure Flight. This program, which is the subject of today’s hearing, takes passenger data it receives from 

airlines and matches it against the U.S. Government’s consolidated Terrorist Watch 

List, including the No-Fly and Selectee Lists. This program is crucial not only for 

domestic flights, but also for protecting international flights bound for the United 

States. 

Since 2009, TSA’s Secure Flight Program has evolved from one that looks solely 

at the No-Fly List and Selectee List maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center, 

to one that assigns passengers a risk category and uses additional criteria to identify high-risk passengers who might not be on the watch list. While these lists serve 

as an important counterterrorism tool, we must ensure that travelers who are incorrectly matched to a list are able to resolve those issues in a timely, effective manner. 

In two comprehensive reports issued today, GAO found that TSA could improve 

Secure Flight by measuring and tracking errors that occur within the system and 

at the security-screening checkpoint. GAO also found that TSA generally does a 

good job of protecting passenger data but could strengthen privacy awareness training among Secure Flight employees. I thank GAO for its thorough approach to examining this program and I look forward to hearing from TSA how the agency plans 

to implement GAO’s recommendations. 

In addition, we are pleased to have the director of the Terrorist Screening Center 

(TSC) here today to discuss its role in managing the consolidated Terrorist Watch 

List, including the No-Fly List. Yesterday the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, testifying before the full committee, highlighted the value of the consolidated Watch List and the TSC in making sure that front-line agencies like TSA 

are able to identify known or suspected terrorists and stop them from entering the 

country, boarding an airplane or obtaining a visa. I look forward to discussing those 

efforts in greater detail here today. 

The bottom line is that our aviation security is only as strong as its weakest link. 

We must identify individuals who pose a threat, such as extremists with Western 

passports who have joined the fight in Iraq or Syria, and take the necessary steps 

to protect the homeland. 

Mr. HUDSON. The Chairman would like to point out that other 

Members have the opportunity to submit opening statements for 

the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 

During times of heightened security concerns, like those we currently face in light 

of the potential threat ISIL poses, there is a tendency to cast aside privacy concerns 

in favor of security at any cost. To safeguard the American public against such an 

overreach, it is incumbent upon this committee to review the privacy protections 

that the Department of Homeland Security, and its components such as the Transportation Security Administration, has in place. 

Thanks to reports released today by the Government Accountability Office, we 

have a greater understanding of both the privacy protections and performance of 

TSA’s Secure Flight program. This critical program helps ensure passengers designated as high-risk by the intelligence community are screened appropriately or, 

for those on the No-Fly list, not permitted to board a plane at all. 

I look forward to hearing from our witness from the Government Accountability 

Office, Ms. Grover, regarding the findings and recommendations contained in the reports released today. I am also eager to hear from Mr. Sadler of TSA regarding how 

the agency intends to implement GAO’s recommendations. 

I will also be interested in hearing from TSA regarding the agency’s plans to upgrade the technology used by Transportation Security Officers to better enable them 

to identify and ensure the proper screening of individuals designated as selectees. 

The Secure Flight program is only as good as the end-user. It does no good for 

taxpayers to spend over $100 million a year on a program dedicated to ensuring the 

proper screening of individuals if Travel Document Checkers do not recognize the 

passengers’ designation. 

As it relates to current threats to aviation, I will be interested in hearing from 

the director of the Terrorist Screening Center about how information is obtained 

and used to designate individuals as selectees or to place them on the No-Fly list. 

With reports of Americans having joined ISIL and other groups fighting in Syria 

and Iraq, our Members want assurances that individuals engaging in terrorist ac-
4 

tivities are placed on the appropriate lists in as close to real-time as possible. While 

Secretary Johnson was clear with the committee yesterday that there is no credible 

information that ISIL is planning to attack the homeland at this time, we must remain vigilant. 

That means using all of the tools we have available to us to ensure that individuals who intend to commit acts of terrorism are properly identified. While doing so, 

we must also protect against violating the privacy and civil liberties of the American 

public. 

In part, that means having a Constitutional appeal process for individuals wrongly designated and placed on the No-Fly List. 

I look forward to hearing from both TSA and the TSC witnesses regarding how 

the appeal process is being revamped to address the recent decision from the 9th 

Circuit Court of Appeals that the previous appeals process is unconstitutional. 

Mr. HUDSON. I will now introduce our distinguished panel. 

Mr. Stephen Sadler currently serves as the assistant administrator for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at the Transportation Security Administration. In this capacity, Mr. Sadler aligns 

intelligence functions with vetting operations and manages the 

technical modernization and Secure Flight mission support resources critical to the TSA mission. Mr. Sadler joined TSA in 2003 

and has worked on implementing some of TSA’s largest vetting and 

credential programs. 

Mr. Chris Piehota—did I say that correctly—thank you—Mr. 

Piehota is the director of the Terrorist Screening Center within the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation. Before becoming director, Mr. 

Piehota served as the special agent in charge of the FBI’s Buffalo 

field office, overseeing FBI operations in western New York from 

2011 to 2013. In 2010 he joined the Terrorist Screening Center as 

its deputy director for operations, intelligence, and administration, 

and directly managed the FBI’s role in the U.S. Government’s 24- 

hour consolidated terrorist watchlisting, screening, and world-wide 

terrorist encounter operation enterprises. 

Finally, Ms. Jennifer Grover is the acting director of the GAO’s 

Homeland Security and Justice team, leading a portfolio of work on 

transportation security issues. Prior to this position, Ms. Grover 

was an assistant director on GAO’s health care team, where she led 

reviews on a diverse range of health care-related issues. Ms. Grover joined the GAO in 1991. 

So at this point I would like to recognize the Ranking Member, 

the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond, for any opening 

statement that he may have. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Chairman Hudson, for convening this meeting today. 

As the Members of this subcommittee are well aware, terrorists 

continue to target our commercial aviation sector for attack. Earlier 

this year, TSA took steps to mitigate these threats emerging from 

last-point-of-departure airports in Europe, Africa, and the Middle 

East. This past weekend, the Associated Press published an article 

outlining threats to commercial aviation emerging from terrorists 

currently residing in Syria. 

Yesterday the full committee heard from the director of the National Counterterrorism Center regarding AQAP’s continued pursuit of high-profile attacks against Western aviation. Today the 

subcommittee will examine TSA’s Secure Flight program, which 

serves as a critical tool for identifying high-risk passengers who 

may pose a threat to our aviation system. 
5 

Thanks to the two Government Accountability Office reports released today, we have a clear picture of how TSA can strengthen 

the Secure Flight program. According to GAO, there is room for improvement in the program as it relates to both operations and privacy training for employees. 

I was pleased to see that TSA referenced GAO’s audits in its prepared testimony and considered the Comptroller General’s feedback 

and recommendations invaluable. I look forward to hearing from 

both GAO and TSA regarding the improvements that can be made 

to the Secure Flight program and the time line for implementing 

recommended reforms. 

I am also interested in hearing from the director of the Terrorist 

Screening Center regarding the process for placing known or suspected terrorists on the Selectee and No-Fly lists. The Secure 

Flight program can only be effective if the Selectee and No-Flight 

lists are up-to-date, accurate, and complete. For that to be a reality 

requires continuous collaboration between TSA, the Terrorist 

Screening Center, and the intelligence and law enforcement entities that nominate individuals to the watch list. Given the number 

of individuals known to have recently traveled to Syria and Iraq to 

join with terrorist groups, it is imperative that the Selectee and 

No-Fly lists are current and comprehensive. 

In the wake of the attempted terrorist attack on Northwest 

Flight 253 on Christmas day in 2009, we learned valuable lessons 

about how TSA and CBP can better coordinate to identify potentially dangerous passengers in air transit. It is my hope that we 

no longer need close calls to prompt TSA to identify better ways to 

recognize those who pose a threat to commercial aviation. 

Before yielding back, I would like to thank each of the witnesses 

for appearing before the subcommittee today. We appreciate what 

you do on a day-to-day basis to keep our Nation secure. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Richmond follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER CEDRIC L. RICHMOND

SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 

As the Members of this subcommittee are well aware, terrorists continue to target 

our commercial aviation sector for attack. Earlier this year, TSA took steps to mitigate threats emerging from last point of departure airports in Europe, Africa, and 

the Middle East. 

This past weekend, the Associated Press published an article outlining threats to 

commercial aviation emerging from terrorists currently residing in Syria. 

Yesterday, the full committee heard from the director of the National Counterterrorism Center regarding AQAP’s continued pursuit of high-profile attacks against 

Western aviation. 

Today, the subcommittee will examine TSA’s Secure Flight program, which serves 

as a critical tool for identifying high-risk passengers who may pose a threat to our 

aviation system. 

Thanks to the two Government Accountability Office reports released today, we 

have a clear picture of how TSA can strengthen the Secure Flight program. According to GAO, there is room for improvement in the program as it relates to both operations and privacy training for employees. 

I was pleased to see that TSA referenced GAO’s audits in its prepared testimony 

and considered the comptroller general’s feedback and recommendations invaluable. 

I look forward to hearing from both GAO and TSA regarding the improvements that 

can be made to the Secure Flight program and the time line for implementing recommended reforms. 
6 

I am also interested in hearing from the director of the Terrorist Screening Center 

regarding the process for placing known or suspected terrorist on the Selectee and 

No-Fly lists. 

The Secure Flight program can only be effective if the Selectee and No-Fly lists 

are up-to-date, accurate, and complete. 

For that to be a reality, it requires continuous collaboration between TSA, the 

Terrorist Screening Center, and the intelligence and law enforcement entities that 

nominate individuals to the watch list. 

Given the number of individuals known to have recently traveled to Syria and 

Iraq to join with terrorist groups, it is imperative that the Selectee and No-Fly lists 

are current and comprehensive. 

In the wake of the attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Flight 253 on Christmas day in 2009, we learned valuable lessons about how TSA and CBP can better 

coordinate to identify potentially dangerous passengers in air transit. 

It is my hope that we no longer need close calls to prompt TSA to identify better 

ways to recognize those who pose a threat to commercial aviation. 

Before yielding back, I would like to thank each of the witnesses for appearing 

before the subcommittee today. We appreciate what you do on a day-to-day basis 

to keep our Nation secure. 

Mr. HUDSON. I thank the gentleman. 

The full written statements from all witnesses will appear in the 

record. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Sadler for your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN SADLER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. SADLER. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, Chairman Hudson, 

Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the subcommittee. I 

am pleased to be here today to talk about TSA’s Secure Flight program. 

The Secure Flight system was developed and implemented as a 

result of key recommendations in the 9/11 Commission report. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the Federal Government assume responsibility for all watch list matching from 

commercial air carriers. Congress agreed, and DHS was directed to 

do so under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 

of 2004. 

In 2005, Congress identified 10 conditions for this new system. 

Among those conditions was the establishment of a redress process 

for passengers who are delayed or prohibited from boarding flights. 

The Secretary of Homeland Security certified that all 10 conditions 

had been met in September 2008, and in January 2009 Secure 

Flight went operational. 

The Secure Flight program vets more than 2.2 million passengers 

daily and more than 800 million travelers annually, both international and domestic, to ensure that individuals on the No-Fly 

List are denied boarding and that selectees are identified for appropriate screening. Secure Flight is capable of randomly selecting a 

percentage of passengers for additional screening to build unpredictability into the matching process. 

The Secure Flight system is also critical for vetting individuals 

as part of TSA’s risk-based security initiatives, such as the TSA 

PreCheck program. Intelligence-driven, risk-based security increases TSA’s effectiveness by expediting the passenger screening 

process for known travelers while allowing us to focus our re-
7 

sources to those areas where we may have greater risk. We are 

able to more effectively mitigate risk to aviation based on the information passengers share with us ahead of time. 

Additionally, the Secure Flight program has enhanced aviation 

security significantly by delivering earlier indication of potential 

matches, allowing for expedited notification of law enforcement, 

providing a fair and equitable and consistent matching process 

across all airlines, implementing critical data security protections 

within the Secure Flight system, and creating consistent application of an integrative redress process for misidentified individuals 

through the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress 

Inquiry Program, also known as DHS TRIP. 

To balance passenger privacy and security TSA has built key privacy safeguards into the Secure Flight system through administrative, operational, and technical controls to mitigate unauthorized 

use, disclosure, and access to information. 

Two recent GAO reports on Secure Flight offer six recommendations, and TSA concurs with them all. GAO’s recommendations 

offer us an opportunity to further ensure TSA is meeting our critical security goals. TSA strives every day to provide the most effective security in the most efficient way. 

So thank you again for the opportunity to talk about this critical 

program. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sadler follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN SADLER

SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 

Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) Secure Flight program. 

TSA is a high-performing counterterrorism agency charged with facilitating and 

securing the travel of the nearly 1.8 million air passengers each day. Our Secure 

Flight program is an integral layer of security, crucial to our ability to deter and 

prevent terrorist attacks in aviation. As you know, this system performs secure, efficient, and consistent watch list matching of passenger names for all covered domestic and international flights into, out of, and within the United States. TSA also performs these services for domestic air carrier flights between international destinations. TSA vets approximately 2.2 million passengers per day on 250 domestic and 

foreign carriers. 

SECURE FLIGHT HISTORY

As you know, the Secure Flight program had its genesis in the 9/11 Commission 

Report, which recommended that TSA take over watch list matching from aircraft 

operators. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRPTA) of 2004 

codified this recommendation into law, requiring DHS to conduct pre-flight comparisons of passenger information to the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) watch 

list. Prior to the implementation of Secure Flight, airlines were responsible for 

matching passenger information against the TSDB. 

Since November 2010, Secure Flight has conducted watch list matching of passenger information against the TSDB for all covered U.S. and foreign flights into, 

out of, and within the United States, including point-to-point international flights 

operated by U.S. airlines. Secure Flight also performs watch list matching for flights 

that overfly, but do not land in, the continental United States. 

By transferring these matching responsibilities from the airlines to TSA, Secure 

Flight allows for expedited notification of law enforcement, airlines, and our partners in the intelligence community to prevent individuals on the No-Fly List from 

boarding an aircraft, as well as ensuring that individuals on the TSDB with the ‘‘selectee’’ designation receive appropriate enhanced screening prior to flying. Secure 

Flight allows TSA and our partners in the intelligence community to adapt quickly 

to new threats by accommodating last-minute changes to the risk categories as-
8 

signed to individual passengers. Passengers making an airline reservation are required to provide their full name, date of birth, and gender, as well as a Known 

Traveler Number and Redress Number, if applicable. TSA matches this information 

against the TSDB, then transmits the results back to airlines so they may issue or 

deny passenger boarding passes. 

The Secure Flight program continues to evolve as TSA’s approach to transportation security has shifted from a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ approach to a risk-based security 

approach. Improvements in technology and intelligence collection and sharing have 

allowed TSA to strengthen the TSA PreCheckTM program and focus our resources 

on individuals who may pose a higher risk to transportation security. Secure Flight 

is an essential component of efforts to provide population who have volunteered information about themselves such as pilots, flight attendants, members of the military, clearance holders, and individuals enrolled in Trusted Traveler programs with 

expedited screening. Travelers within these populations use their Known Traveler 

Number when making flight reservations, which allows TSA to vet them against the 

TSDB, confirm their eligibility for expedited screening, and provide the appropriate 

designation on the traveler’s boarding pass. 

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The Secure Flight program is vital to the success of TSA’s mission. Since its inception, Secure Flight has demonstrated reliability and superior effectiveness and 

performance compared to the aircraft operators’ watch list matching abilities. Secure 

Flight vets more than 800 million travelers annually to ensure that individuals on 

the No-Fly List are denied boarding and that selectees are identified for appropriate 

screening. 

In October 2011, TSA introduced TSA PreCheckTM, a program which expedites 

the screening of certain known populations at the airport passenger security checkpoint, thereby enabling TSA to focus its efforts and resources on those unknown 

passengers. Secure Flight is critical to the operation of TSA PreCheckTM. Watch list 

vetting and confirmation of eligibility for expedited screening are conducted by Secure Flight, which enables TSA airport staff to appropriately route and screen passengers. In December 2013, TSA expanded this program, allowing U.S. citizens and 

lawful permanent residents to participate via the TSA PreCheckTM Application program. Applicants undergo fingerprinting and a background investigation prior to 

being granted expedited screening benefits. As of August 2014, more than 500,000 

individuals have applied and been successfully enrolled in the program, further allowing TSA to focus its watch list matching efforts on high-risk individuals. 

Secure Flight is capable of identifying passengers flying internationally for enhanced screening measures based on risk-based, intelligence-driven information, as 

well as randomly selecting a percentage of passengers for additional screening to 

build unpredictability into the matching process. In 2013, TSA initiated TSA 

PreCheckTM Risk Assessments, which allows Secure Flight to enhance prescreening 

by utilizing intelligence-driven rule sets to identify high- and low-risk passengers, 

for either enhanced, standard, or expedited screening. 

PRIVACY AND REDRESS

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) integrated a robust privacy and redress system as part of the Secure Flight program. TSA has dedicated privacy staff 

to ensure Secure Flight systems and analyses are in compliance with applicable 

laws, procedures, and best practices. The system also has built-in safeguards to 

manage privacy risks. 

TSA serves as the executive agent for the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

(DHS TRIP), an interagency program made up of components of the Departments 

of Homeland Security, Justice, and State. It is a single point of contact for individuals who have inquiries or are looking to resolve security screening issues they have 

experienced during international or domestic travel, including enhanced screening, 

delays, or denials of boarding. These individuals can use the DHS TRIP to request 

redress and request that DHS, the Terrorist Screening Center which houses the 

TSDB, and any other involved agency review their personal information and correct 

their record to resolve their travel-related issues or to prevent misidentification as 

appropriate. 

DHS TRIP has received and processed more than 185,000 redress requests and 

inquiries since its establishment in 2007. Once the TRIP review process is complete, 

and all traveler records have been updated as appropriate, DHS issues a letter to 

the traveler signaling the completion of the review and closure of the case. Historically, approximately 98% of the applicants to DHS TRIP are determined to be false 
9 

positives. To avoid such instances, DHS TRIP assigns applicants a unique Redress 

Control Number, which they can use when booking travel. 

Since TSA has taken over watch list matching from airlines through Secure Flight 

and since the implementation of DHS TRIP, DHS has seen a significant decrease 

in the number of redress requests. 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE RECOMMENDATIONS

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recently conducted two audits 

of the Secure Flight program and provided TSA with invaluable feedback through 

their recommendations to strengthen our systems and procedures. In their audit on 

Secure Flight operations, GAO recommended TSA take the following steps: Develop 

a process for regularly evaluating causes of screening errors, implement corrective 

measures based on this analysis, tie performance more effectively to program goals, 

and document cases to improve program performance. 

TSA has already made great strides in addressing GAO’s recommendations by developing data collection mechanisms to evaluate the root causes of screening errors. 

TSA’s Office of Security Operations has taken the lead through the Security Incident Reporting Tool to collect feedback at airports including cause, corrective solution, and lessons learned from each incident. TSA expects to have this reporting system completed and implemented at all airports by the end of the month. These lessons learned will also be incorporated back into relevant program offices at TSA 

headquarters to ensure consistency and accountability throughout the agency. 

TSA has also implemented a number of critical data security protections within 

the Secure Flight system, including restricting access to authorized users and requiring audit logs as well as increasing privacy training, and strengthening the approval process to allow access to data. TSA also instituted a Management Directive 

to manage all requests for Secure Flight data and will implement additional systems to track all data access requests. 

Finally, GAO recommended that TSA develop a system to document Secure Flight 

system matching errors so TSA can better analyze data errors and address any 

matching issues in the future. Our Office of Intelligence and Analysis is developing 

a detailed tracking capacity for instances of system matching errors, which we expect to have completed by the end of the calendar year. 

With regard to GAO’s review of Secure Flight’s privacy protections, TSA has already begun to incorporate their recommendations to provide privacy refresher 

training and to track decisions pertaining to Personally Identifiable Information 

(PII). Secure Flight employees will receive job-specific privacy refresher training by 

the end of the calendar year. As stated earlier, we have dedicated privacy personnel 

on our staff to help with these efforts. As far as tracking decisions pertaining to PII, 

efforts are already underway to establish a tracking process and we expect a completion date early next year. 

TSA greatly appreciates the work GAO put into these audits and looks forward 

to enhancing the program through addressing their recommendations. 

CONCLUSION

TSA’s Secure Flight program is a robust system that allows TSA to make RiskBased Security decisions that are crucial to the security of our transportation systems. Today, Secure Flight not only identifies high-risk passengers by matching 

them against the TSDB, but it also uses the information to assign all passengers 

a risk category: High-risk, low-risk, or unknown-risk. At the same time, TSA has 

also enhanced Secure Flight’s privacy oversight mechanisms to protect personally 

identifiable information. 

Secure Flight continues to be the Nation’s front-line defense against terrorism targeting the Nation’s civil aviation system. It is an incredibly effective tool in identifying individuals of concern for denial of boarding, enhanced screening, or expedited 

screening. TSA will continue to expand on these successes even further as we work 

toward our goals of enhancing the passenger experience while at the same time 

keeping bad actors from doing us harm. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank you, Mr. Sadler. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Piehota to testify. 
10 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER M. PIEHOTA, DIRECTOR, TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. PIEHOTA. Good afternoon, Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to discuss the Terrorist Screening Center and its 

National security mission. 

Since the creation of the Terrorist Screening Center 11 years ago, 

the center has played a vital role in the fight against terrorism. 

The Terrorist Screening Center integrates terrorist identity information from the law enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence communities into a single identities database known as the 

Terrorist Screening Database, or TSDB. 

The TSDB populates the various terrorist screening systems used 

by the Government. Since its inception, the Terrorist Screening 

Center has remained committed to protecting the American public 

from terrorist threats, while simultaneously protecting privacy and 

safeguarding civil liberties. 

The TSDB, commonly referred to as the Terrorist Watch List, 

contains both known or suspected international and domestic terrorist identity information. The procedure for submitting information on individuals for inclusion on the Terrorist Watch List is referred to as the nomination process. 

Nominations originate from credible information developed by 

the law enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence communities. Federal departments and agencies submit nominations from 

known or suspected international terrorists to the National 

Counterterrorism Center, or the NCTC, for inclusion in their Terrorist Identity Datamart Environment, or TIDE database. NCTC 

reviews the TIDE entries and submits them to the TSC if these entries include sufficient biographic or biometric identifiers and are 

supported with derogatory information that generally meets the 

reasonable suspicion standard. In a similar fashion, the FBI collects, stores, and forwards information relating purely to domestic 

terrorists to the Terrorist Screening Center. 

The facts and circumstances pertaining to a nomination should 

indicate that an individual is known or suspected to be or has been 

engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism or terrorist activities. The reasonable suspicion 

standard is based upon the totality of circumstances to account for 

the sometimes fragmentary nature of terrorist information. Mere 

guesses or hunches are not sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion. 

In addition, nominations cannot be solely based on race, ethnicity, National origin, religious affiliation, or First Amendmentprotected activity. Moreover, if the information is to the No-Fly or 

Selectee lists, the nomination must meet additional screening criteria. 

The utility of the watchlisting process is highest when the information is efficiently disseminated to those law enforcement agencies that need it to perform their law enforcement, homeland security, or intelligence missions. As such, the Terrorist Screening Center places a premium on the timely dissemination of terrorist identity data to our screening partners, and the TSC supports the TSA 
11 

and other partners by providing the No-Fly and Selectee lists for 

aviation security screening through real-time transactional information transfer. 

Throughout the entire watchlisting and screening process, the 

TSC continues to play a significant role in ensuring that civil liberties are safeguarded and privacy is protected. The goal of the redress process is to provide a timely and fair review of redress inquiries referred to DHS and, when applicable, the Terrorist Screening Center. Individuals who believe they were inconvenienced as a 

result of screening can submit a redress inquiry through DHS, the 

Traveler Redress Inquiry Program. We support DHS TRIP by resolving inquiries that appear to be related to terrorist data included in the TSDB. 

Upon receipt of a DHS TRIP referral, the Terrorist Screening 

Center redress program reviews the available information, including information provided by the inquiring party, and determines 

whether the inquiring party is an exact match to an identity in the 

TSDB and, if so, whether the identity should continue to be 

watchlisted in the TSDB or whether the inquiring party’s status 

should be adjusted. As part of the review process, the TSC’s redress 

program coordinates with the agency who had nominated the individual to the Terrorist Watch List and, if warranted, updates the 

applicable data. 

In conclusion, the TSC has firmly established itself as a primary 

element in the U.S. Government’s counterterrorism detection, early 

warning, and prevention network. As a premier counterterrorism 

function, the TSC supports its interagency partners in preserving 

the safety, security, and prosperity of our communities. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss the TSC and its 

National security mission. I look forward to any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Piehota follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER M. PIEHOTA

SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 

Good afternoon Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond and Members of 

the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Terrorist Screening 

Center (TSC) and its role in the interagency watchlisting and screening process. 

Over the past 11 years, the TSC has played a vital role in the fight against terrorism by integrating terrorist identity information from the law enforcement, 

homeland security, and intelligence communities into a single identities database 

known as the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), which populates the various 

terrorist screening systems used by the U.S. Government. Throughout this process, 

the TSC has remained committed to protecting the American public from terrorist 

threats while simultaneously protecting privacy and safeguarding civil liberties. As 

our efforts continue to evolve in response to new threats and intelligence, your support provides us with the tools necessary to continue our mission. 

TERRORIST NOMINATION PROCESS

The TSDB, commonly referred to as the Terrorist Watch List, contains both international and domestic terrorist identity information. The procedure for submitting 

information on individuals for inclusion on the Terrorist Watch List is referred to 

as the nomination process. The nomination process is the most fundamental and 

singularly important step in the watchlisting process. It is through this process that 

individuals are added to the Terrorist Watch List. Nominations originate from credible information developed by our intelligence and law enforcement partners. These 

intelligence and law enforcement agencies are referred to as Originators in the 

watchlisting community because it is through their work that nominations are de-
12 

veloped. Federal departments and agencies submit nominations of known or suspected international terrorists to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for 

inclusion in NCTC’s Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) database. 

NCTC reviews TIDE entries and transmits entries to TSC that include sufficient 

identifiers and are supported with information that meet the reasonable suspicion 

watchlisting standard described below. Similarly, the FBI collects, stores, and forwards information to the TSC relating to domestic terrorists that may have connections to international terrorism. 

Before placing any information into the TSDB, the TSC utilizes a multi-level review process to ensure that the nomination meets the criteria for inclusion. Generally, nominations to the TSDB must satisfy two requirements. First, the facts and 

circumstances pertaining to the nomination must meet the reasonable suspicion 

standard of review. Second, the biographic information associated with a nomination 

must contain sufficient identifying data so that a person being screened can be 

matched to or disassociated from another watchlisted individual. 

Reasonable suspicion requires articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences, reasonably warrant the determination that an individual ‘‘is known 

or suspected to be or has been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, 

in aid of or related to terrorism and terrorist activities.’’ The reasonable suspicion 

standard is based on the totality of the circumstances in order to account for the 

sometimes fragmentary nature of terrorist information. Due weight must be given 

to the reasonable inferences that a person can draw from the available facts. Mere 

guesses or inarticulate ‘‘hunches’’ are not enough to constitute reasonable suspicion. 

In addition, nominations must not be solely based on race, ethnicity, national origin, 

religious affiliation, or First Amendment-protected activity, such as free speech, the 

exercise of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of peaceful assembly, and petitioning the Government for redress of grievances. There are limited exceptions to 

the reasonable suspicion requirement, which exist to support immigration and border screening by the Department of State and Department of Homeland Security. 

Upon receiving the nomination, TSC personnel review the supporting information 

to assess sufficiency, including accuracy and timeliness. In particular, TSC personnel must make two determinations. First, they evaluate whether the nomination 

meets the reasonable suspicion standard for inclusion in the TSDB. This includes 

determining whether the derogatory information provided with the nomination 

meets the additional requirements for placing an individual on the No-Fly or Selectee list. If a nomination involves a request that an individual be placed on the 

No-Fly or Selectee list, the nomination must meet additional substantive criteria, 

above and beyond the ‘‘reasonable suspicion’’ requirement for TSDB nominations. 

Second, they consider whether the biographic information associated with a nomination contains sufficient identifying data so that a person being screened can be 

matched to or distinguished from a watchlisted individual on the TSDB. 

Upon conclusion of the TSC’s review, TSC will either accept or reject the TSDB 

nomination. If a nomination is accepted, the TSC will create a TSDB record which 

includes only the ‘‘terrorist identifiers’’ (e.g., name, date of birth, etc.). 

Because it is a Sensitive but Unclassified system, the TSDB does not include substantive derogatory information or Classified National security information. This facilitates the sharing of TSDB identifying information with Government screening 

and law enforcement officers, such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officers 

at ports of entry and State and local law enforcement officers throughout the United 

States. In addition, TSC personnel are trained on what information is proper to disclose when responding to an inquiry by a Government screening or law enforcement 

officer, based on the circumstances of the inquiry. 

To uphold the directive in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 to maintain 

‘‘thorough, accurate, and current’’ information, and to protect civil rights and civil 

liberties, within the TSDB, several quality control measures are continuously applied by nominating agencies, the NCTC, and TSC. These measures include periodic 

reviews of nominations and TSDB records, including by attorneys, as well as audits 

of supporting systems to promote the integrity of the information relied upon for 

maintenance of TSDB records. Nominating agencies have an on-going responsibility 

to notify NCTC and TSC of any changes that could affect the validity or reliability 

of TSDB information. In those cases where modification or deletion of a record relating to international terrorism is required, the nominating agency must notify NCTC, 

which will process the request and transmit it to the TSC for action. For nominations relating to domestic terrorism, the FBI must follow applicable FBI procedures 

to request that a FBI-nominated TSDB record be modified or deleted. 
13 

EXPORT TO SUPPORTED SYSTEMS

Once a known or suspected terrorist is identified and included in the TSDB, TSC 

ensures the timely dissemination of the terrorist identity data to our screening partners using encrypted electronic exports. The utility of the watchlisting process is 

highest when the information is efficiently disseminated to those who need it. The 

TSC uses subject-matter experts, who are experienced analysts and designated 

agency representatives, to support the U.S. Government watchlisting and screening 

mission and the screening systems supported by the TSDB. The six major U.S. Government systems supported by the TSDB are: Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) for passport and visa screening; Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) TECS system for border and port of entry screening; 

DHS Secure Flight system for air passenger screening (such as against the No-Fly 

and Selectee lists) by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA); DHS 

Transportation Vetting System for credentialing transportation and critical infrastructure workers; the Department of Defense for base access and screening; and, 

the FBI’s National Crime and Information Center’s Known or Suspected Terrorist 

File (formerly known as the Violent Gang/Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF)) for 

domestic law enforcement screening. The TSDB data exported to each of these systems is specifically tailored to the mission, legal authorities, and information technology requirements of the department or agency that maintains the system. Accordingly, each system receives a different subset of data from TSDB. In addition, 

TSC inserts provisions into its information-sharing agreements requiring its information-sharing partners to properly protect TSDB-derived information, grant access 

to or release that information only pursuant to the agreement, and to provide appropriate training to individuals granted access to this information. 

REDRESS

Throughout the entire watchlisting and screening process the TSC plays a significant role in ensuring that civil liberties are safeguarded and privacy is protected. 

The TSC led the interagency initiative to develop an effective interagency redress 

process and maintains a separate unit dedicated to resolving redress matters regarding individuals who believe they have been incorrectly watchlisted. The goal of 

the redress process is to provide a timely and fair review of redress inquiries referred to the TSC. Working closely with our interagency partners, TSC developed 

an interagency Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Terrorist Watchlist Redress Procedures that was signed in September 2007. The MOU standardizes interagency watch list redress procedures and provides complainants with an opportunity 

to receive a timely, fair, and accurate review of their redress concerns. 

For example, travelers who are denied or delayed boarding or entry into the 

United States can submit a redress inquiry through the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, commonly referred to as DHS TRIP. DHS TRIP provides the public 

with a single point of contact for individuals who have inquiries or seek resolution 

regarding difficulties they experienced during travel screening at transportation 

hubs (such as airports and train stations) or during their inspection at a U.S. port 

of entry. The TSC supports DHS TRIP by helping to resolve complaints that appear 

to be related to data in the TSDB. 

When a traveler’s inquiry appears to concern data in the TSDB, DHS TRIP refers 

the case to the TSC Redress Unit for research into the matter. Upon receipt of a 

DHS TRIP inquiry, TSC Redress Unit reviews the available information, including 

the information and documentation provided by the traveler, and determines: (1) 

Whether the traveler is an exact match to an identity in the TSDB; and, if an exact 

match exists, (2) whether the identity should continue to be in the TSDB or whether 

the status should be changed (for example, downgrade a No-Fly record). 

If the redress inquiry is a match to an identity in the TSDB, the TSC Redress 

Unit researches the record and underlying derogatory information, coordinates with 

the agency that nominated the complainant to the Terrorist Watch List to ensure 

the information is current and reliable, and, if warranted, updates incorrect or outdated Terrorist Watch List data that may cause the individual difficulty during a 

screening process. Upon the conclusion of TSC’s review, the TSC Redress Unit advises DHS TRIP representatives of the outcome so they can directly respond to the 

complainant. In some cases, the TSC determines that the individual should remain 

watchlisted, but may also modify the individual’s watch list status accordingly. 

In addition, when the TSC is advised through press or Congressional inquiries 

about individuals who have encountered travel difficulties due to their perceived 

watch list status, the TSC Redress Unit reviews the pertinent watch list encounter 

records. If the person is found to be misidentified, the TSC examines our records 

to determine if there is any additional information that could be used to reduce fu-
14 

ture misidentifications. At the conclusion of the process, the inquiring entity is notified that all reasonable measures to reduce any future misidentifications have been 

taken. 

Finally, as you may know, there are currently a number of pending court cases 

involving challenges to administration of the No-Fly List by plaintiffs who allege 

they have been wrongly denied boarding on an aircraft. We are currently working 

with our interagency partners on potential changes to the [existing No-Fly List] redress process to ensure that our procedures continue to safeguard civil liberties and 

privacy. These changes will be made in coordination with other agencies involved 

in aviation security screening, informed by legal and policy concerns that affect the 

U.S. Government’s administration of the No-Fly List and the overarching redress 

process. In so doing, the U.S. Government will endeavor to increase transparency 

for certain individuals denied boarding who believe they are on the No-Fly List and 

have submitted DHS TRIP inquiries, consistent with the protection of National security and National security information, as well as transportation security. 

CONCLUSION

The TSC has a standing commitment to protect the United States and its international partners from terrorist threats while protecting privacy and safeguarding 

civil liberties. Terrorist watchlisting has been a vital early warning and interdiction 

tool in the counterterrorism efforts of the United States Government and will continue to serve in this capacity in the future. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank you, Mr. Piehota. 

The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Grover to testify. 

STATEMENT OF JENNIFER A. GROVER, ACTING DIRECTOR, 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. GROVER. Good afternoon, Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and other Members and staff. I am pleased to be 

here today to discuss TSA’s implementation and oversight of the 

Secure Flight program. 

In my remarks, I would like to highlight four points from the reports GAO issued today on Secure Flight. First, what TSA knows 

about Secure Flight system-matching errors. Second, what TSA 

knows about screening errors at the checkpoint. Third, initiatives 

to reduce processing time of passenger requests for redress. Fourth, 

opportunities to strengthen Secure Flight privacy protections. 

First, Secure Flight system-matching errors, which are instances 

when the Secure Flight system fails to identify a passenger with 

a reservation on an upcoming flight as being included on a watch 

list and who therefore should receive additional screening or not be 

permitted to fly. We found that TSA is lacking key information 

about how well Secure Flight is achieving its goals, including the 

extent to which the system misses passengers on the watch lists. 

We therefore recommend that TSA develop additional performance 

measures to monitor this and other aspects of the Secure Flight 

program. 

Even without performance measures related to system-matching 

errors, sometimes TSA becomes aware of such errors through other 

means. In these cases, the TSA Match Review Board studies the 

incident to determine what actions are necessary to prevent similar 

errors. However, TSA has not maintained readily available, accurate information on the number or causes of system-matching errors which would provide a more robust basis for program oversight. Therefore, we also recommend that TSA develop a mechanism to systematically document the number and causes of Secure 

Flight system-matching errors. 
15 

Second, screening errors at the checkpoint, which are instances 

in which screening personnel have made errors in implementing 

Secure Flight determinations. We reviewed TSA data from May 

2012 through February 2014 and found that such errors have occurred. At some airports TSA officials conduct after-action reviews 

to identify and address the root causes of these errors. Conducting 

such reviews across all airports would allow TSA to identify trends 

and target Nation-wide efforts to address them. We recommend 

that TSA develop a process to evaluate the root causes of screening 

errors at all airport checkpoints and implement corrective measures as necessary. 

Third, passenger requests for redress, which gives passengers 

who believe they have been erroneously matched to a watch list an 

opportunity to address this and prevent it from happening in the 

future. DHS TRIP, the office that administers the redress process, 

and the Terrorist Screening Center, which maintains watch lists 

derived from the Terrorist Screening Database, are taking steps to 

reduce the processing time for redress applications. In fact, TRIP 

reduced the redress processing time from an average of 100 to 42 

days during fiscal year 2014. 

In contrast, the average processing time for redress appeals is 

significantly longer: 276 days, or about 9 months. This time period 

is inconsistent with the letter that appeals applicants receive stating that DHS will provide a final agency decision within 60 days. 

TRIP and TSC have taken steps to reduce the appeals review time, 

but it will be important for TRIP to monitor progress in this area 

and consider changes to the 60-day time frame referenced in the 

appeals letter if necessary. 

Fourth, Secure Flight privacy protections to safeguard passengers’ personally identifiable information. Let me acknowledge 

that TSA already has privacy mechanisms in place, including 

24/7 audit logs of the Secure Flight system and user events, privacy training for all new Secure Flight staff, and mechanisms to 

document some privacy-related issues, such as the destruction of 

passenger data. However, TSA’s protections could be further 

strengthened with the development of annual job-specific privacy 

training for all Secure Flight employees and through comprehensive documentation of key privacy issues and decisions. 

As Mr. Sadler noted, DHS has concurred with all of our recommendations regarding improvements to Secure Flight and is 

planning for implementation. 

Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, thank you for 

the opportunity to testify this afternoon. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Grover follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JENNIFER A. GROVER

SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 

Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the findings from our two September 2014 reports, being released today, in which we assessed the performance 

of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Transportation Security Adminis-
16 

1GAO, Secure Flight: TSA Should Take Additional Steps to Determine Program Effectiveness, 

GAO–14–531 (Washington, DC: Sept. 9, 2014), and Secure Flight: TSA Could Take Additional 

Steps to Strengthen Privacy Oversight Mechanisms, GAO–14–647 (Washington, DC: Sept. 9, 

2014). 2See Pub. L. No. 108–458, § 4012(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3714–18 (2004) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 

§ 44903(j)(2)(C)). The 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, July 2004. TSA efforts to develop a computer-assisted passenger prescreening system predated the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act and the report of the 9/11 Commission. 3TSA began implementing Secure Flight pursuant to the Secure Flight Program Final Rule, 

issued in October 2008. See 73 Fed. Reg. 64,018 (Oct. 28, 2008). 4Secure Flight screens certain nontraveling individuals, such as escorts for minor, elderly, 

and disabled passengers, who are authorized to access the airport’s sterile area—the portion of 

an airport defined in the airport security program that provides passengers access to boarding 

aircraft and to which access is generally controlled through the screening of persons and property. See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.5. For purposes of this report, the term ‘‘commercial flight’’ encompasses all U.S. and foreign air carrier operations covered by and subject to the Secure Flight 

Final Rule. See 49 C.F.R. § 1560.3 (defining ‘‘covered flight’’ for purposes of the Secure Flight 

Program). 5DHS established DHS TRIP in February 2007 as the central processing point within DHS 

for travel-related redress inquiries. See 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(G)(i) (requiring the establishment 

of a timely and fair process for individuals identified as a threat as a result of TSA’s passenger 

prescreening system to appeal the determination and correct any erroneous information). 6GAO–14–531 addressed the operations of the Secure Flight program, including TSA’s implementation of screening determinations at the checkpoint and performance measures for the Secure Flight program. GAO–14–647 addressed Secure Flight’s privacy oversight mechanisms and 

DHS’s redress process. 

tration’s (TSA) Secure Flight program and related privacy issues.1 Secure Flight 

screens approximately 2 million passengers each day, matching passenger information against Federal Government watch lists and other information to assign each 

passenger a risk category. By identifying those passengers who may pose security 

risks, Secure Flight helps protect against potential acts of terrorism that might target the Nation’s civil aviation system. 

In response to requirements of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 

Act of 2004, and a recommendation of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), TSA developed and implemented Secure Flight in order to assume from air carriers the function of matching passengers 

against watch lists maintained by the Federal Government.2 At the time, TSA 

matched passengers against two watch lists, which were intended to identify highrisk individuals: (1) The No-Fly List, composed of individuals who should be precluded from boarding an aircraft, and (2) the Selectee List, composed of individuals 

who should receive enhanced screening at the airport security checkpoint. The NoFly and Selectee Lists are subsets of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)—the 

U.S. Government’s consolidated watch list of known or suspected terrorists maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a multi-agency organization administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

After initiating development of Secure Flight in August 2004, TSA began implementing it in 2009, and completed transitioning foreign and domestic air carriers 

to the program in November 2010.3 Secure Flight now screens passengers and certain nontraveling individuals on all domestic and international commercial flights 

to, from, and within the United States; certain flights overflying the continental 

United States; and international point-to-point flights operated by U.S. aircraft operators.4

Secure Flight can have inadvertent and potentially inappropriate impacts on the 

traveling public, such as when passengers are identified as high-risk because they 

share a similar name and date of birth with an individual listed on a watch list, 

and thus experience delays and inconveniences during their travels. DHS’s Traveler 

Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) provides passengers who have been denied 

boarding, or identified for additional screening, with an opportunity to be cleared 

if they are determined not to be a match to TSDB-based watch list records (i.e., 

misidentified) or if they have been wrongly identified as the subject of a TSDB 

watch list record (i.e., mislisted).5

My testimony today highlights the key findings of our two reports on Secure 

Flight.6 My statement will address the extent to which: (1) TSA’s performance measures appropriately assess progress toward achieving the Secure Flight program 

goals, (2) TSA ensures that Secure Flight screening determinations for passengers 

are fully implemented at airport security checkpoints, (3) DHS’s redress process addresses the delays and inconveniences that result from Secure Flight screening, and 
17 

7Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993). 

GPRA was updated by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010. Pub. L. No. 111–352, 124 Stat. 

3866 (2011). 8GAO–14–531 and GAO–14–647. 

9See 49 C.F.R. § 1560.3. SFPD includes personally identifiable information, such as full name, 

gender, date of birth, passport information (if available), and certain nonpersonally identifiable 

information, such as itinerary information and the unique number associated with a travel 

record (record number locator). 10Standard screening typically includes passing through a walk-through metal detector or Advanced Imaging Technology screening, which identifies objects or anomalies on the outside of 

the body, and X-ray screening for the passenger’s accessible property. Enhanced screening includes, in addition to the procedures applied during a typical standard screening experience, a 

pat-down and an explosive trace detection search or physical search of the interior of the passenger’s accessible property, electronics, and footwear. Expedited screening typically includes 

walk-through metal detector screening and X-ray screening of the passenger’s accessible property, but unlike in standard screening, travelers do not have to, among other things, remove 

Continued 

(4) TSA has implemented privacy oversight mechanisms to address Secure Flight 

privacy requirements. 

For the September 2014 reports, we analyzed documentation of TSA’s program 

goals and performance measures for fiscal years 2011 through 2013 and assessed 

these measures against provisions of the Government Performance and Results Act 

(GPRA).7 We also analyzed a list that TSA compiled at our request of missed passengers on two high-risk lists (including the reasons for these matching errors) that 

occurred from November 2010 through July 2013. We analyzed certain TSA data on 

screener performance at airport security checkpoints from May 2012, when TSA 

began tracking these data, through February 2014, when we conducted the analysis. 

We also reviewed relevant DHS TRIP redress and appeals data for fiscal years 2011 

through 2013. In addition, to evaluate TSA’s documentation of Secure Flight privacy 

issues and decisions and TSA’s privacy training for Secure Flight staff, we reviewed 

relevant documents prepared by TSA privacy officials and contract staff, including 

privacy compliance validation reports for the period from April 2012 through April 

2013, monthly status reports prepared by TSA’s privacy contractor for the period 

from March 2013 through April 2014, and privacy training documents. We interviewed TSA and other DHS officials who are responsible for aspects of Secure Flight 

and DHS TRIP, as well as TSA officials at nine airports, which we selected based 

on a variety of factors, such as volume of passengers screened and geographic dispersion. Our September 2014 reports provide further details on our scope and methodology.8 The work upon which this statement is based was conducted in accordance 

with generally accepted Government auditing standards. 

BACKGROUND

Since its implementation in 2009, Secure Flight has changed from a program that 

identifies passengers as high-risk solely by matching them against the No-Fly and 

Selectee Lists to one that assigns passengers a risk category: High-risk, low-risk, 

or unknown-risk. In 2010, following the December 2009 attempted attack on a U.S.- 

bound flight, which exposed gaps in how agencies used watch lists to screen individuals, TSA began using risk-based criteria to identify additional high-risk passengers 

who may not be in the TSDB, but who should be subject to enhanced screening procedures. Further, in 2011, TSA began screening passengers against additional identities in the TSDB that are not already included on the No-Fly or Selectee Lists. 

In addition, as part of TSA PreCheckTM, a 2011 program through which TSA designates passengers as low-risk for expedited screening, TSA began screening against 

several new lists of preapproved low-risk travelers. TSA also began conducting TSA 

PreCheckTM risk assessments, an activity distinct from matching against lists that 

uses the Secure Flight system to assign passengers scores based upon their travelrelated data, for the purpose of identifying them as low-risk for a specific flight. See 

appendix I for a list of Secure Flight screening activities. 

To conduct Secure Flight screening, TSA uses passenger information, known collectively as Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD), which is collected by aircraft operators.9 Once this screening is conducted, Secure Flight then sends the air carrier 

a determination of how the passenger will be screened at the checkpoint if provided 

a boarding pass. These determinations include a ‘‘TSA PreCheckTM-eligible’’ message 

for passengers who may receive expedited screening; a ‘‘cleared’’ message for passengers found not to match any high- or low-risk list and who, therefore, will generally receive standard screening; and a ‘‘selectee’’ message for passengers who 

should undergo enhanced screening.10 For passengers matching the No-Fly List, the 

air carrier is precluded from issuing a boarding pass. 
18 

their belts, shoes, or light outerwear. The Secure Flight system may also return an error response to air carriers regarding passengers for whom Secure Flight has received incomplete 

data. 11TSC, in the course of its review, may also find the appellant was misidentified to a TSDBbased list. 

Passengers who believe they have been unfairly denied boarding or identified for 

additional screening may apply to DHS TRIP using an on-line application, by email, or by mail. If DHS TRIP determines that an individual is still a potential 

match to a TSDB watch list record, it refers the matter to TSC for further review. 

TSC then conducts its own review of whether the individual has been misidentified 

to a watch list and whether, based on the most current available information and 

criteria for inclusion on the list, the individual is either correctly assigned to the 

list or is wrongly assigned and should be removed from the list. If DHS TRIP and 

TSC determine that no change in the passenger’s status is warranted, the passenger 

is notified of this decision, and depending on the determination, some passengers 

are permitted the opportunity to appeal the decision. When passengers appeal, DHS 

TRIP forwards all completed appeals paperwork to TSC. TSC analysts are to review 

all derogatory information maintained on the appellant to make a written recommendation to TSA on the appeal. TSA then reviews TSC’s recommendation 

through its own internal process, which can include going back to TSC for additional 

information, before the TSA administrator makes the final determination to uphold 

the appellant’s status, recommend that TSC downgrade the appellant to another 

TSDB-based list, or recommend that TSC remove the appellant from the list.11

TSA LACKS KEY INFORMATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM

IS ACHIEVING ITS GOALS

In September 2014, we reported that Secure Flight has established program goals 

that reflect new program functions since 2009 to identify additional types of highrisk and also low-risk passengers; however, current program performance measures 

do not allow Secure Flight to fully assess its progress toward achieving all of its 

goals. For example, to measure performance toward its goals that address the system’s ability to accurately identify passengers on various watch lists, Secure Flight 

collects various types of data, including the number of passengers TSA identifies as 

matches to high- and low-risk lists. However, we found that Secure Flight does not 

have measures to assess the extent of system-matching errors—for example, the extent to which Secure Flight is missing passengers who are actual matches to these 

lists. In addition, we found that Secure Flight’s measures do not provide information 

on progress toward the program’s goal to incorporate additional risk-based security 

capabilities to streamline processes and accommodate additional aviation populations, in part because the goal itself did not specify how performance toward the 

goal should be measured. 

We concluded that additional measures that address key performance aspects related to program goals, and that clearly identify the activities necessary to achieve 

goals, in accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act, would 

allow TSA to more fully assess progress toward its goals. For example, a measure 

that reflects misidentifications to all high-risk lists could help TSA appropriately 

gauge its performance with respect to its goal of limiting such misidentifications. 

Likewise, establishing measures that clearly represent the performance necessary to 

achieve the program’s goal that addresses risk-based security capabilities will allow 

Secure Flight to determine the extent to which it is meeting its goal of adapting 

the Secure Flight system for different risk-based screening activities. Without measures that provide a more complete understanding of Secure Flight’s performance, 

TSA cannot compare actual with desired results to understand how well the system 

is achieving these goals. Therefore, we recommended in September 2014 that TSA 

develop additional measures to address key performance aspects related to each program goal, and ensure these measures clearly identify the activities necessary to 

achieve progress toward the goal. DHS concurred with our recommendation and 

stated that TSA’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) will evaluate its current 

Secure Flight performance goals and measures and develop new performance measures as necessary. 

We also found in September 2014 that TSA lacks timely and reliable information 

on all known cases of Secure Flight system matching errors. TSA officials told us 

at the time of our review that when TSA receives information related to matching 

errors of the Secure Flight system, the Secure Flight Match Review Board reviews 

this information to determine if any actions could be taken to prevent similar errors 
19 

12Secure Flight’s Match Review Board—a multi-departmental entity—and associated Match 

Review Working Group review performance measurement results and recommend changes to 

improve system performance, among other things. 13GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/ 

AIMD–00–21.3.1. (Washington, DC: Nov. 1, 1999). 14The specific impacts experienced by a passenger who has been matched to a watch list vary 

depending upon the list to which the passenger is matched. For example, an individual with 

a name similar to that of someone who is on the No-Fly list likely will be unable to utilize the 

convenience of internet, curbside, and airport kiosk check-in options. 

from happening again.12 We identified instances in which the Match Review Board 

discussed system-matching errors, investigated possible actions to address these errors, and implemented changes to strengthen system performance. However, we also 

found that TSA does not have readily-available or complete information on the extent and causes of system-matching errors. We recommended that TSA develop a 

mechanism to systematically document the number and causes of the Secure Flight 

system’s matching errors, in accordance with Federal internal control standards. 

Such a mechanism would provide Secure Flight more timely and reliable information on the extent to which the system is performing as intended. DHS concurred 

with our recommendation and stated that TSA’s OIA will develop a more robust 

process to track all known cases in which the Secure Flight system has made a 

matching error, and that the Secure Flight Match Review Board will conduct reviews to identify potential system improvement measures on a quarterly basis. 

TSA HAS PROCESSES IN PLACE TO IMPLEMENT SECURE FLIGHT SCREENING DETERMINATIONS AT CHECKPOINTS, BUT COULD TAKE FURTHER ACTION TO ADDRESS SCREENING

ERRORS

In September 2014, we reported that TSA has processes in place to implement 

Secure Flight screening determinations at airport checkpoints, but could take steps 

to enhance these processes. Screening personnel at airport checkpoints are primarily 

responsible for ensuring that passengers receive a level of screening that corresponds to the level of risk determined by Secure Flight by verifying passengers’ 

identities and identifying passengers’ screening designations. TSA information from 

May 2012 through February 2014 that we assessed indicates that screening personnel have made errors in implementing Secure Flight determinations at the 

checkpoint. TSA officials we spoke with at five of the nine airports where we conducted interviews conduct after-action reviews of screening errors at the checkpoint 

and have used these reviews to take action to address the root causes of those errors. However, we found that TSA does not have a systematic process for evaluating 

the root causes of these screening errors at the checkpoint across airports, which 

could allow TSA to identify trends across airports and target Nation-wide efforts to 

address these issues. 

Officials with TSA’s Office of Security Operations (OSO) told us in the course of 

our September 2014 review that evaluating the root causes of screening errors 

would be helpful and stated they were in the early stages of forming a group to discuss these errors. However, TSA was not able to provide documentation of the 

group’s membership, purpose, goals, time frames, or methodology. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that managers should compare actual performance with expected results and analyze significant differences.13 Therefore, we recommended in September 2014 that TSA develop a process for evaluating 

the root causes of screening errors at the checkpoint and then implement corrective 

measures to address those causes. DHS concurred with our recommendation and 

stated that TSA’s OSO will collect and evaluate data on screening errors to identify 

root causes and work to implement corrective measures. Uncovering and addressing 

the root causes of screening errors could allow TSA to strengthen security screening 

at airports by reducing the number of these errors at the checkpoint. 

DHS TRIP ADDRESSES INCONVENIENCES AND DELAYS RELATED TO TSDB-BASED LISTS, 

AND IS TAKING ACTIONS TO REDUCE CASE-PROCESSING TIME

In September 2014, we reported that DHS TRIP affords passengers adversely affected by TSA screening processes an opportunity to address inconveniences and 

delays associated with being potentially misidentified to a TSDB-based list.14 Passengers who are determined to have been incorrectly matched to or listed on highrisk lists based on the TSDB are added to a list of passengers known as the TSA 

Cleared List, which allows them to be cleared (not identified as high-risk) nearly 
20 

15 Upon receipt of a complete application, DHS TRIP sends a notification of receipt with a redress control number to the passenger. DHS TRIP adds the name, date of birth, and redress 

control number of applicants determined not to match a TSDB-based list to the TSA Cleared 

List. Passengers included on the TSA Cleared List must then submit their redress control number when making a reservation to allow the Secure Flight system to recognize and clear them. 

Because of the application of other TSA security measures, such as random selection, an individual’s presence on the Cleared List may diminish, but will not preclude, the possibility of being 

selected for enhanced screening. 16During the pendency of this review, various courts have issued decisions relating to the NoFly List and DHS TRIP. For example, in January 2014, a judge of the U.S. District Court for 

the Northern District of California issued a findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for 

relief in the case of Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, No. C 06–00545 WHA (N.D. Cal. 

Jan 14, 2014) (redacted). Specifically, the court found that in this matter, which involved facts 

dating back to 2004, the plaintiff had been placed on the No-Fly List as a result of a Federal 

Bureau of Investigation agent’s human error and that, among other things, the redress response 

letter provided to the plaintiff by the redress program in place prior to the establishment of 

DHS TRIP was inadequate at the time because the response was vague and ‘‘fell short of providing any assurance to [the Plaintiff]... that the mistake had been traced down in all its 

forms and venues and corrected.’’ In June 2014, a judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon issued an opinion and order concluding, among other things, that because DHS 

TRIP procedures do not afford individuals the requirements of due process in so much as they 

do not provide them with notice regarding their status on the No-Fly List and the reasons for 

placement on the list, ‘‘the absence of any meaningful procedures to afford Plaintiffs the opportunity to contest their placement on the No–Fly List violates Plaintiffs’ rights to procedural due 

process.’’ See Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10–cv–00750–BR (D. Or. June 24, 2014). According to a Joint 

Supplemental Status Report filed with the district court on September 3, 2014, the Government 

is in the process of developing revised procedures and is committed to complete this and other 

steps and issue final orders prior to February 2, 2015. Our review focused on the procedures 

and data relating to implementation of the DHS TRIP redress and appeals processes and did 

not evaluate DHS TRIP on sufficiency of procedural due process grounds. 

100 percent of the time.15 The DHS TRIP process also allows passengers determined 

to have been improperly included on a TSDB-based list (mislisted) to be removed, 

minimizing the likelihood they will be identified as matches during future travels.16

Although DHS TRIP is not able to provide redress for passengers who may have 

been misidentified to high-risk, rules-based lists (TSA’s lists of high-risk passengers 

who, based on risk-based criteria, should be subject to enhanced screening procedures though they may not be in the TSDB), according to TSA officials, TSA procedures for using such lists mitigate impacts on these passengers. These procedures 

may result in TSA removing passengers from the lists, which ensures that passengers who are misidentified to those individuals will no longer be identified as a 

match, and thus delayed or inconvenienced as a result. 

We also found that DHS has reduced its average processing time for redress cases 

and is taking actions to further reduce processing times. Specifically, we found that 

DHS TRIP officials took several steps in fiscal year 2013 to reduce the overall processing time and a backlog of redress cases including, for example, automating its 

response to DHS TRIP applicants and hiring additional staff. According to DHS 

TRIP officials, at the beginning of fiscal year 2014, DHS TRIP’s average case-processing time for redress cases was approximately 100 days, and as of June 2014, the 

average case-processing time was about 42 days. In January 2014, DHS TRIP also 

reduced its target for one of its key performance indicators—average number of days 

for DHS TRIP redress cases to be closed—from 93 to 78 days. 

In addition, we reported in September 2014 that DHS TRIP is taking actions to 

reduce processing times for appeals cases. Appeals applicants receive a letter stating 

that DHS will provide a final agency decision on the appeal within 60 days of receipt of the appeal. However, we found that the average total processing time for 

the appeals process for fiscal years 2011 through 2013 was 276 days. In fiscal year 

2013, DHS TRIP began taking several actions to make the appeals process more 

structured and reduce the overall review time, including, among other things, developing and distributing documents that provide information on the status and outcome of each appeal case and implementing a more formalized process for reviewing 

appeals. In January 2014, DHS TRIP also established intermediate and long-term 

performance goals for the appeals process for the first time. Specifically, the intermediate performance goal calls for an average total processing time of 92 days, 

while the long-term performance goal calls for an average processing time of 60 

days, consistent with the time frame DHS TRIP commits to achieving in the letter 

informing applicants of their right to appeal. According to DHS TRIP officials, the 

agency plans to periodically assess its progress toward achieving its intermediate 

and long-term goals for reducing appeals-processing times. Officials stated that if 

DHS TRIP finds it is not making adequate progress by February 2015—about 1 

year after the program began taking specific actions to reduce the overall review 
21 

17See Office of Management and Budget, Safeguarding Against and Responding to the Breach 

of Personally Identifiable Information, OMB Memorandum M–07–16 (Washington, DC: 2007). 

time—it would first evaluate whether further changes and improvements could be 

made to shorten the appeals process before considering, in collaboration with TSC 

and the DHS Screening Coordination Office, a change to the 60-day time frame stated in the appeals letter. 

TSA HAS IMPLEMENTED OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS TO ADDRESS PASSENGER PRIVACY

REQUIREMENTS, BUT ADDITIONAL ACTIONS COULD BETTER ENSURE FULL COMPLIANCE

TSA has taken steps to implement privacy oversight mechanisms, but, as we reported in September 2014, additional actions could allow TSA to sustain and 

strengthen its efforts. Overall, TSA has implemented mechanisms to identify privacy implications associated with program operations and address them as necessary. For example, TSA has regularly-updated privacy documents to address 

changes in the Secure Flight program and maintains and reviews audit logs of Secure Flight system and user events, such as requests to access the system that generates reports on Secure Flight activities. TSA has also implemented privacy training for new Secure Flight staff, and all DHS employees receive annual privacy training. However, we found that existing Secure Flight staff do not receive job-specific 

privacy refresher training consistent with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

requirements.17 For example, TSA updated its privacy training for new Secure 

Flight staff in December 2013 to reflect new privacy risks unique to Secure Flight’s 

expanded screening activities. However, because the DHS privacy refresher training 

for existing staff is not job-specific, staff who joined Secure Flight prior to December 

2013 may not have received privacy training specific to these new screening activities. We recommended that TSA provide at least annual job-specific privacy refresher training in order to further strengthen Secure Flight’s protection of personally identifiable information. DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated 

that TSA’s OIA will develop and deliver job-specific privacy refresher training for 

all Secure Flight staff. 

We also reported in September 2014 that TSA documents some aspects of its Secure Flight privacy oversight mechanisms, such as scheduled destructions of passenger data and reviews of planned changes to the Secure Flight system. However, 

TSA does not have a mechanism to comprehensively document and track key privacy-related issues and decisions that arise through the development and use of Secure Flight—a mechanism TSA planned to develop when Secure Flight implementation began in 2009. In the course of our September 2014 review, TSA’s Secure Flight 

privacy officer told us that, in the absence of such a system, Secure Flight relies 

on its privacy contract staff to oversee and monitor privacy protections, in consultation with the designated Secure Flight program privacy officer and the TSA Privacy 

Officer. However, it is unknown whether this ad hoc communication would be sustained after a personnel change in Secure Flight’s privacy team or contractor personnel, and whether privacy-related decisions previously made would continue to be 

implemented without documentation to inform new staff. Therefore, to help TSA ensure that these decisions are carried into the future in the event of a change in personnel, we recommended that TSA comprehensively document and track key privacy-related issues and decisions, in accordance with Federal internal control standards. DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it will develop a 

mechanism to document such issues and decisions. 

Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the subcommittee, this concludes my prepared testimony. I look forward to answering any 

questions that you may have. 
22 

APPENDIX I.—SECURE FLIGHT SCREENING ACTIVITIES

Screening Activity Description 

No-Fly List (high-risk) ....... The No-Fly List is a subset of the Terrorist Screening 

Database (TSDB), the U.S. Government’s consolidated watch list of known or suspected terrorists 

maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center 

(TSC), a multi-agency organization administered by 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The No-Fly 

List contains records of individuals who are suspected of posing or known to pose a threat to aviation or National security and are prohibited from 

boarding an aircraft or entering the sterile area of 

an airport. Secure Flight has matched passengers 

against the No-Fly List since 2009. 

Selectee List (high-risk) ..... The Selectee List is a subset of the TSDB containing 

records of individuals who must undergo enhanced 

security screening before being permitted to enter 

the sterile area or board an aircraft. Secure Flight 

has matched against the Selectee List since 2009. 

Expanded Selectee List 

(high-risk).

The Expanded Selectee List includes terrorist records 

in the TSDB with a complete name and date of 

birth that meet the reasonable suspicion standard 

to be considered a known or suspected terrorist, but 

that do not meet the criteria to be placed on the NoFly or Selectee Lists 1 Secure Flight began matching 

against the Expanded Selectee List in April 2011. 

Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) 

rules-based lists (highrisk).

The high-risk rules-based lists include two lists of 

passengers who may not be known or suspected terrorists, but who, according to intelligence-driven, 

scenario-based rules developed by TSA in consultation with U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP), may pose an increased risk to transportation 

or National security. 

Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention (CDC) Do 

Not Board List (highrisk).

The CDC Do Not Board List is managed by CDC. It 

includes individuals who pose a significant health 

risk to other travelers and are not allowed to fly. 

TSA PreCheckTM lists (lowrisk).

TSA PreCheckTM lists include lists of pre-approved, 

low-risk travelers, such as certain members of 

CBP’s Trusted Traveler programs, members of the 

U.S. armed forces, Congressional Medal of Honor 

Society members, and Members of Congress— 

groups of individuals TSA has determined pose a 

low risk to transportation or National security—as 

well as a PreCheckTM list created by TSA and composed of individuals who apply and are pre-approved as low-risk travelers through the 

PreCheckTM Application Program.2 Secure Flight 

began matching against its first set of low-risk lists, 

CBP Trusted Traveler Lists, in October 2011 and 

instituted the PreCheckTM Application Program in 

December 2013. 

TSA PreCheckTM Disqualification List (ineligible 

for low-risk).

The PreCheckTM Disqualification List is a list of individuals who, based upon their involvement in violations of security regulations of sufficient severity or 

frequency (e.g., bringing a loaded firearm to the 

checkpoint), are disqualified from receiving expedited screening for some period of time or permanently. 
23 

Screening Activity Description 

TSA PreCheckTM risk assessments (low-risk).Secure Flight assesses certain travel-related information submitted by passengers and assigns them 

scores that correspond to a likelihood of being eligible for expedited screening for a specific flight. Secure Flight began performing these assessments for 

selected frequent flier members in October 2011 

and, in October 2013, began using them to evaluate 

all passengers not determined to be a match to a 

high-risk or low-risk list. 

Source.—GAO analysis of TSA and TSC information. GAO–14–796T 

1 All TSDB-based watch lists utilized by the Secure Flight program contain records determined to have met TSC’s reasonable suspicion standard. In general, to meet the reasonable 

suspicion standard, the agency nominating an individual for inclusion in the TSDB must consider the totality of information available that, taken together with rational inferences from 

that information, reasonably warrants a determination that an individual is known or suspected to be or have been knowingly engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid 

of, or related to terrorism or terrorist activities. To be included on the No-Fly and Selectee 

Lists, individuals must meet criteria specific to these lists. The TSDB, which is the U.S. Government’s consolidated watch list of known or suspected terrorists, also contains records on additional populations of individuals that do not meet the reasonable suspicion standard articulated above but that other Federal agencies utilize to support their border and immigration 

screening missions. In addition, according to TSA officials, Secure Flight does not utilize all 

terrorist records in the TSDB because records with partial data (i.e., without first name, surname, and date of birth) could result in a significant increase in the number of passengers 

misidentified. 2 Individuals on all low-risk lists receive a Known Traveler Number that they must submit 

when making travel reservations to be identified as low-risk. See 49 C.F.R. § 1560.3 (defining 

‘‘Known Traveler Number’’). TSA also refers to these lists as Known Traveler lists. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank you, Ms. Grover. 

We appreciate all of the witnesses for being here, and thank you 

for your service to our country. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask questions. 

We will start, Mr. Piehota, we know that an increasing number 

of Westerners, including Americans, have joined the fight in Iraq 

and Syria. How confident are you in our ability to track these foreign fighters and ensure that they are being added to the terrorist 

screening database, including the No-Fly List? 

Mr. PIEHOTA. The U.S. Government has a very capable 

watchlisting and screening enterprise, and I have a high amount 

of confidence in the abilities of my partners to identify and report 

known or suspected terrorist identities to the Terrorist Screening 

Center, and I have a high bit of confidence in the Terrorist Screening Center’s ability to export that information to be used by our 

partners in countering the terrorist threat. 

Mr. HUDSON. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Sadler, do you want to comment on that at all? 

Mr. SADLER. Well, I would say that we have a very close working 

relationship with the Terrorist Screening Center, as we do with all 

our Federal partners. It is important to understand that when that 

intelligence comes in, that when it goes into the organizations that 

will nominate to the Terrorist Screening Center and when the Terrorist Screening Center nominates those individuals to the watch 

list, we come in and do our job and we operationalize that data. 

So I just want to make the point, we have got a great working 

relationship with all of our partners, and I think we are doing a 

good job with this. 

Mr. HUDSON. Great. Well, it is important that we do. 
24 

Mr. Piehota, has the number of individuals on the No-Fly List 

grown significantly due to the situation in Syria and Iraq? 

Mr. PIEHOTA. We can’t correlate any significant increase in the 

TSDB populations due to the overseas activities right now. 

Mr. HUDSON. How has the Terrorist Screening Center streamlined the watch list process and improved information sharing 

within the intelligence community? I mean, you both said that 

there is a good working relationship there, but could you maybe 

give us some specifics of how you have made those improvements? 

Mr. PIEHOTA. Well, first the Terrorist Screening Center has improved its policy, its protocol, and its technical infrastructure over 

the past few years to remove manual processes, lower potential for 

human error, and as well as to send information to our 

watchlisting and screening partners in a real-time fashion. 

As information is processed at the Terrorist Screening Center, 

seconds later it shows up with our partners so they can do nearreal-time screening as well, a significant technical increase in information management. 

We have also participated with our partners in various committees, interagency functions, and collaborative projects that have 

brought our organizations close together, that we have common operating perspectives, and, as Mr. Sadler said, we work exceptionally well together, and I would daresay that our relationship with 

TSA has never been closer or more effective than it is right now. 

Mr. HUDSON. Great. 

Mr. Sadler, recently we learned that a former employee at the 

Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport was killed while fighting for ISIS in 

Syria. While employed at the airport, this individual held credentials that allowed him to work as a fuel technician and a cleaner 

with access to sterile areas of the airport as well as the tarmac and 

the aircraft itself. 

Can you explain how TSA works to mitigate the insider threat 

at airports across the country, especially in light of this latest situation? 

Mr. SADLER. Well, every individual that is issued an airport credential is sent into my office, and we vet those individuals on a 

daily basis against the Terrorist Screening Database. We also do 

some other checks on them as well. So we are very cognizant of the 

population that works at the airport. 

That is just my piece of it. You also have to understand that we 

have personnel at the airport. We have great relationships with the 

FBI, with State and local authorities at those individual airports 

as well. But my part of it is to take that information and vet it on 

a daily basis. So if a change comes through from the Terrorist 

Screening Center we will know very quickly what that change is 

and what it means to our vetted population. 

Mr. HUDSON. Great. I appreciate that. 

Ms. Grover, I have become a fan of your work over the years. Appreciate you being here with us again. You talked about some of 

the difficulties of the checkpoint, and you mentioned in your written statement about fraudulent IDs, people being able to avoid sort 

of the No-Fly List or the advanced screening. 

How is TSA addressing this vulnerability posed by fraudulent 

IDs and boarding passes? 
25 

Ms. GROVER. TSA is making better progress with boarding pass 

issues than the issue of potential fraudulent IDs, I would say. They 

have boarding pass scanners in place at many, but not all of the 

airport checkpoints, and the scanners are designed to provide support to the travel document checker who works there to confirm 

that the boarding pass is genuine, and then it alerts the travel document checker to the specific level of screening that that individual 

is supposed to receive. 

As far as confirming that the identification that individuals are 

using is genuine, that is still the responsibility of the travel document checker at this point. TSA has awarded a contract for the development of credential authentication technology, but it was just 

awarded in April, and I believe it is still in the proof-of-concept 

stage, so that technology support is still quite a ways out. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank you. 

My time has expired and so I will recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Richmond, for any questions he may have. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Piehota, according to publicly-available data from TSC, as of 

September 2011 there were approximately 16,000 individuals on 

the No-Fly List and approximately 16,000 individuals on the Selectee List. What are the current statistics for those numbers of 

people who are on the No-Fly and Selectee lists? 

Mr. PIEHOTA. The Terrorist Screening Center currently stands at 

about 800,000 identities. For those identities, for the No-Fly List, 

we are looking at about 8 percent of the overall population of the 

TSDB are watchlisted at the No-Fly level; about 3 percent of the 

overall population of the TSDB is watchlisted at the Selectee level. 

Mr. RICHMOND. As I play around with that, how many of those 

individuals on the No-Fly List are U.S. persons? 

Mr. PIEHOTA. Approximately 0.8 percent of the overall TSDB 

population. 

Mr. RICHMOND. A lot of times what we deal with, and we develop 

policies in theory, and in theory they make a lot of sense, and in 

reality we either didn’t go far enough or it just doesn’t make sense. 

As I look at all the people on the No-Fly List, it just does not make 

common sense to me that you can be on the No-Fly List, where we 

don’t want you flying on our planes, but you can go and enroll in 

flight school and learn how to fly a plane. 

Can you all just give me your assessment of why we would have 

a policy where you can’t fly, but you can go learn how to fly a 

plane? Am I missing a distinction? 

Mr. SADLER. I will take that one, sir. So any foreign applicant 

who wants to learn how to fly an aircraft gets vetted prior to them 

receiving training. So whether they are training here, if it is an 

FAA-certified school, whether they are training here, whether they 

are training overseas, we vet them. 

Any U.S. person gets vetted through the FAA process. So anyone 

who has an FAA certificate, a student pilot, whatever that happens 

to be, that comes into my office, we vet those individuals on a daily 

basis against the TSDB. So they are all vetted. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Right. But if we don’t want them even flying on 

a plane, why would we want them to learn how to fly a plane? 
26 

Mr. SADLER. If they are on the watch list, No-Fly, they do not 

learn how to fly a plane. So the foreign applicants get vetted 

against the No-Fly List and the full TSDB, and they are denied 

their training application if we determine that they are on that 

watch list. 

Mr. RICHMOND. So everyone on the No-Fly List and the Selectee 

List, they are barred from flight school? 

Mr. SADLER. There are other operational considerations whenever you vet an individual, and I would be happy to talk about that 

in a closed setting, but they are all vetted through the watch list. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Okay. I just want to make sure we are saying 

the same thing. If they are on the watch list, they can’t go to flight 

school? 

Mr. SADLER. It depends on the situation, sir, and that is why I 

said I would like to talk to you about this in a closed session. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Well, thank you. 

Did anybody else want to respond to that? 

Ms. Grover, GAO noted in its Secure Flight effectiveness report 

that TSA has asserted that it is difficult to measure the extent to 

which the Secure Flight system may miss passengers on a highrisk list in real time, but used proxy methods to accomplish this 

when the system was under development. Should TSA reinstate 

the use of proxy methods to better assess the rates at which a 

watchlisted passenger may be missed by the Secure Flight program? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir, that is exactly the sort of strategy that 

would allow TSA to have some additional information about the extent to which the Secure Flight system is accurately identifying all 

of the individuals that it needs to identify. 

When they were first developing the Secure Flight program they 

used simulated passenger lists and watch lists to be able to approximate the accuracy of the system, and that would be something 

that they could use on a regular basis to get information about how 

well the system is working and the likelihood of misses occurring. 

They also have a similar system that they use right now when 

they are considering changes to the way the match process is working that allows them to use historical data, just from the past 7 

days, to say, if we make this change, does it improve the matching 

rate or does it introduce more errors. So any of those approaches 

would be better than the current situation, which is really no information about the number of misses that are occurring on a regular 

basis. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you. 

I see my time has expired, so I yield back. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank the gentleman. 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from Indiana, Mrs. 

Brooks, for any questions she may have. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling this hearing on this most important topic. 

Mr. Sadler, how does the TSA know that individuals who are on 

the watch list are not experiencing the expedited screening through 

TSA’s PreCheck, like managed inclusion, which I am seeing more 

and more? I fly in and out of the Indianapolis Airport, that is a 
27 

managed inclusion site. How do we know that they are not being 

chosen and put into managed inclusion? 

Mr. SADLER. Well, the first thing, I just want to go back, if you 

don’t mind, ma’am. We do have information on the efficiency and 

effectiveness of our system. We are looking at new test data, and 

that new test data is going to be developed based on our experience 

of vetting 3.7 billion records since we implemented Secure Flight. 

So we have a pretty good idea of what we are doing. We can improve. We appreciate GAO’s recommendations, and we concur with 

those and we are going to implement those. 

So everyone who goes through that airport is going to be 

prescreened by TSA. So they should have a marking on the boarding pass. That marking should be identified. That should preclude 

them from going into managed inclusion. 

The other thing I would say is, even with the recommendations, 

everyone who goes through that checkpoint is screened. So when 

you go through a managed inclusion checkpoint we are screening 

you with a number of layers of security at that checkpoint and 

within the airport itself. So I think that is a very important point. 

Everyone is being screened going through that checkpoint. 

Mrs. BROOKS. What happens if the travel documents checker 

that we have heard referred to misses the selectee marking? 

Mr. SADLER. If they miss the selectee marking, that individual 

is going to be screened. That is the point that I want to make. You 

don’t go through the checkpoint, to my knowledge, without being 

screened. Whether it is a behavior detection officer, whether it is 

a canine, whatever, whether it is an ETD, explosion trace detection, those individuals are being screened. 

Mrs. BROOKS. I would like to just ask Mr. Piehota, on average, 

your watch lists, they aren’t randomly created. Obviously you get 

referrals from law enforcement and from others, from FBI, Secret 

Service, others. How long does it take once an intelligence or a law 

enforcement agency nominates an individual to make it into the 

Terrorist Watch List before that person is added to the list? 

Mr. PIEHOTA. The time varies due to the complexity of certain 

issues and the priority assigned to certain watchlisting transactions. Some are routine modifications to records. They are, of 

course, lower priority rather than people who are added to the list, 

who receive higher priority. I would not give a specific time period, 

because it varies from record to record, because there are many different aspects to each record of nomination. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Well, and I am certain, having worked with Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces in the past, when they refer you names, 

what are some of the criteria that you use to determine how quickly, if the JTTF sends you a name, how quickly does it make it into 

that list, because, as we know, timing can be critically important 

in today’s environment. 

Mr. PIEHOTA. All add nominations are processed immediately. 

They are usually done, it could be minutes to hours. Modifications, 

again, the type of modification it is, it could take anywhere from 

hours to a day or so. If it is a delete action, they generally happen 

pretty quickly as well, within the next day or so. 
28 

Mrs. BROOKS. Mr. Sadler, does TSA have the ability to prevent 

an individual from boarding an airplane even before that individual 

is added to a No-Fly List? 

Mr. SADLER. Yes. The administrator has the authority to determine who can board an aircraft and who can’t. 

Mrs. BROOKS. How would that work if TSA believes—maybe it 

has not yet gone through the practice, they are not on the No-Fly 

List—how would that process work if TSA receives information 

that this person should not be boarding a plane? 

Mr. SADLER. So based on our earlier comments, the communication between our organizations is as good as I have seen it since 

I have been in this job. So we would receive that information. If 

we felt that there was a threat to the aircraft or the risk was too 

high, then we would notify our vetting operations, who would inhibit the record of that individual, if we had that record, or it 

would be inhibited when the individual made a reservation, and 

then we would stop that individual at that point. 

Mrs. BROOKS. How often does TSA review the names that are actually on the expedited list? 

Mr. SADLER. From the TSC, you mean? 

Mrs. BROOKS. Yes. Not from TSC. You have expedited lists. How 

often does TSA take a look at that list? 

Mr. SADLER. We normally do that on a monthly basis, and then 

I personally review it on a quarterly basis. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Okay. 

Mr. SADLER. We have a very strict oversight process for that with 

our chief counsel and with our privacy officer as well when we 

make those decisions. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Thank you. My time is up. I yield back. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank the gentlelady. 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from California, 

Mr. Swalwell, for any questions you may have. 

Mr. SWALWELL. Thank you, Chairman. 

Last week I had the opportunity, on September 10, to go over to 

the TSA, Administrator Sadler, you were there, and I met with Administrator Pistole and sat in on your morning threat assessment 

brief. I appreciate you extending that opportunity to me. It was a 

very, I think, timely visit, in that September 11 was the next day. 

I left that meeting impressed with the men and women and the effort behind keeping us safe in the skies every day. So I have great 

confidence that within our country and across the globe TSA is 

working hard to make sure we address the evolving threats across 

the country. 

I also believe that the threats that we face right now from ISIL 

and the way that TSA and DHS are responding is exactly what 

was envisioned out of the September 11 Commission report. We are 

certainly being tested today. 

Before I ask any further questions, oftentimes it is too easy, I 

think, for us to beat up on TSA, but I do want to congratulate you 

on the success so far on PreCheck. I hear about it from my constituents all the time. If anyone hasn’t signed up for PreCheck, I 

really encourage you to sign up for PreCheck. It has been a success. TSA and its partners in implementing it have done a terrific 

job. 
29 

A few questions. First, Director Piehota, your testimony details 

an extensive system of making sure only the correct individuals are 

put into the Terrorist Screening Database, but according to Administrator Sadler, 98 percent of the people who ask DHS to remove 

their names as being incorrectly listed are successful in doing so. 

I understand the importance of being over-inclusive. But what 

assurances can you give us that the TSA as well as DHS are being 

just as vigorous to put people on that list as they are to take those 

folks who don’t belong on the list off of it? Because it is important 

to me that that list is accurate. I understand why it has to be a 

little more broad. But if someone has evidence that they don’t belong on the list, I think we need to work overtime to take them off 

and not inconvenience them. So if you could just briefly explain 

how the GAO report will bring us to that moment. 

Mr. PIEHOTA. Well, in collaboration with our DHS partners, we 

have cooperatively managed the Redress Inquiry Program. When 

DHS provides us with an inquiry from their Redress Program, we 

take it, we make sure that the individual is actually an identical 

match to an identity in the TSDB. If they have been misidentified, 

we work with our partners at DHS to expeditiously remove them. 

Mr. SWALWELL. Great. Thank you. 

I also have a question for Administrator Sadler. In light of the 

emerging threat from ISIL, the Americans who we know are over 

there fighting shoulder to shoulder with ISIL, and the thousandplus Westerners who are in the visa waiver countries, what are we 

doing right now to ensure that those countries, those visa waiver 

countries, who do not have 100 percent check against the lost and 

stolen travel database, the lost and stolen document database, 

what are we doing with those countries to bring them up to 100 

percent compliance? 

Mr. SADLER. Yeah. Sir, I can’t speak to that. I am not prepared 

to speak to that today. What I can say, though, is that we work 

very closely with CBP, Customs and Border Protection, and along 

with CBP we vet passports against the Stolen and Lost Travel Document database from Interpol. So we are taking actions on our side 

to try and mitigate that risk and buy the risk down in that area. 

Mr. SWALWELL. Great. As we continue to address this threat, is 

there anything that you believe Congress can do to assist the TSA 

as we try and learn more about what Americans are over in the 

Middle East and North Africa? Is there anything that you believe 

you need additional authority from Congress for or funding to better protect us here at home? 

Mr. SADLER. Sir, I mean, we can always use more help, but I 

think the process that we went through with GAO and the oversight process makes us stronger, because we have somebody who 

comes in and says, these are the things that we see where you can 

improve. That is what we are about. We are about buying down 

risk, we are about getting better every single day so we can do our 

job the best that we can for the American public. 

Mr. SWALWELL. Great. Thank you, Mr. Sadler. 

Ms. Grover, thank you for you and your office’s helpful report in 

this matter. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank the gentleman. 
30 

The Chairman recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, 

Mr. Sanford, for any questions he may have. 

Mr. SANFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess a couple different questions. The first, and I don’t mean 

to be obstinate, but I want to go back to the question that my colleague from New Orleans was asking. It seemed to me like a fairly 

plain vanilla question, which is, help me understand, if somebody 

is on the No-Fly List then that means that they can’t go and learn 

how to fly a plane, right? 

Mr. SADLER. Yes. 

Mr. SANFORD. There were, like, three different bites at the apple, 

and ultimately still no answer. It was sort-of, if I take you into a 

dark tunnel, then I can answer the question. 

I think from a civil liberties standpoint, that is what drives a lot 

of people crazy about these different lists that are kept by the Government. If we are a Nation of laws and not men, there is a belief 

that it ought to be fairly transparent at times where we are coming 

from. Are you on, are you off? If it takes three cracks at the apple 

in a public hearing, and then no answer and then the promise of 

in some closed-door environment we can talk about it, it makes a 

civil libertarian crazy. So what about that? 

Mr. SADLER. Well, sir, I think there are some things that are 

operationally sensitive that should be discussed within a closed setting. So we try and be as transparent—— 

Mr. SANFORD. I know. But just going back to common sense, to 

his point, if you say, let me get this right, you can’t go sit in aisle 

37D of the airplane, but you can sit in the cockpit, and you can’t 

get an answer on that. 

Mr. SADLER. No, sir. I didn’t say that. 

Mr. SANFORD. No, but you—— 

Mr. SADLER. I didn’t say an individual on a No-Fly List could sit 

in the cockpit of an aircraft. I didn’t say that. What I said was—— 

Mr. SANFORD. Well, if you learn how to fly an airplane, that is 

where you are sitting. 

Mr. SADLER. What I said was that an individual on the No-Fly 

List, to my knowledge, has not received training since I have been 

in this position. All right? What I also said was that there were 

operationally-sensitive matters that I would like to discuss in a 

closed session, but I did not say that somebody on the No-Fly List 

was going to sit in the cockpit. So I want to be very—— 

Mr. SANFORD. But you also did—— 

Mr. SADLER. I want to be very clear about that, sir. 

Mr. SANFORD. You also equally clearly said that they definitively 

would—there was no definitive yes or no. 

Mr. SADLER. I am telling you, sir, that I do not know of any NoFlys that are sitting in the cockpit of an aircraft. That is as definitive as I can get. 

Mr. SANFORD. Okay. Well, that is much more definitive than we 

got. 

Mr. SADLER. When it gets to an operational issue, then I would 

like to talk to you in a closed session. 

Mr. SANFORD. Understood. Okay. All right. We got to a little bit 

of closure on that one. 
31 

Here is another question. I want to follow up on my colleague 

from California’s question with regard to delisting, which again I 

think is something that would drive somebody from a civil liberties 

standpoint a bit crazy, which is, you end up on the wrong list, it 

turns out you shouldn’t be on that list. As I understand it now, it 

is taking people about a year to be cleared from that list, in terms 

of rough averages, about a year, and that the goal now is to take 

it down to 3 months. Why does it still take that long? 

Mr. SADLER. Well, I want to clarify something. The 98 percent 

of the individuals that we work with are not on the No-Fly List. 

They have no nexus to the No-Fly List. 

Mr. SANFORD. Understood. 

Mr. SADLER. Those are individuals that have been matched potentially to a person who was on the No-Fly List, and then after 

going through the process you find that they have no nexus to that 

individual on the watch list. So I just wanted to clarify that. 

Ninety-eight percent of the individuals who come through the Redress Program were not on the watch list and taken off; they were 

individuals that may have been matched to a person on the watch 

list, and then through our redress process, we determined that they 

don’t have a nexus to the watch list. 

Mr. SANFORD. But it is still taking them a year to get off the list. 

Mr. SADLER. No. Those cases through the initial redress process, 

if it is internal to TSA, we can do it within about 2 weeks; if it is 

external to TSA, so if it is a CBP issue or a Department of State 

issue, the initial redress takes about 60 days. That is where the 

majority of those individuals fall, that 98 percent. 

Once you get past that point, the other 2 percent, who have some 

nexus to the watch list, a portion of those may appeal. That is 

when we start getting into the longer time frame. 

Mr. SANFORD. Okay. I guess one question would be, though, even 

if you are taken off the list, so as I understand it, you are still then 

on a cleared list. 

Mr. SADLER. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. SANFORD. Why be on any list at all? 

Mr. SADLER. Because we want to give you a redress number that 

would allow you to enter that into your reservation, so when you 

come back with another reservation we can run that through our 

system and we can keep you from being inconvenienced again. It 

is our way of ensuring that you can go through the checkpoint 

without being inconvenienced. 

Mr. SANFORD. But, I mean, I thought you were cleared. So if you 

got one citizen who goes through the line, turns out he has never 

had any mishap, never been on any wrong list, he is not on a 

cleared list. Why should somebody that went through, turns out 

they were bungled with somebody else’s name, why should they be 

on again a cleared list, which raises some level of suspicion with 

regard to, I am on yet another Government list? 

Mr. SADLER. Because we are trying to ensure that they can go 

through the checkpoint without being inconvenienced. So if your 

name is that close and your date of birth is that close to that individual, the way we clear that name is by assigning this redress 

control number to the individual that they can put in their reservation and then they should be cleared. 
32 

Mr. SANFORD. One last question. Well, I am going over. I guess 

I can’t. Can I ask one more question? Five seconds? No. Okay. 

Come back to it. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HUDSON. I am happy to do a second round if the committee 

would like to do that. 

Mr. SANFORD. Thank you. Yes, sir. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield to him so he can ask his question. 

Mr. HUDSON. Well, if the gentlelady is willing to hold off for a 

second before her start—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will. 

Mr. HUDSON [continuing]. Then sure, we will allow the gentleman to ask one more question. 

Mr. SANFORD. Well, I thank the gentlewoman from Texas. Thank 

you very much. 

I guess my one question would be with all these lists, as I understand it, whether it is a Member of Congress or whether it is anybody in this room, even we are on different levels of risk in terms 

of gradation. Is that correct? 

Mr. SADLER. Well, I wouldn’t go gradation. Well, that is a correct 

answer, but our lists are based on what we know about you. 

Mr. SANFORD. Well, my only point being, again from a civil liberties standpoint, whether it is a Member of Congress who has Secret clearance and a whole host of other things, or a member of the 

military or somebody out here, again, why do they have to be on 

any gradation with regard to lists? Why couldn’t we just clear those 

folks off this? 

Mr. SADLER. Well, we have to know, sir, that when you are coming through the airport that it is you, and we can move you off. 

That is the whole intent of PreCheck. We want to move those people off that we know so we can focus our resources where they need 

to be focused. 

Mr. SANFORD. But as I am saying, you could be on TSA, have 

PreCheck, but still have a risk factor assigned to you, and I don’t 

understand that risk factor. 

But I have taken too much time from the gentlewoman from 

Texas and I need to yield back to her. I really appreciate it. Thank 

you, ma’am. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank the gentleman. 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. 

Jackson Lee, for any questions she may have. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, let me thank you and Mr. 

Richmond for this hearing, very timely hearing, and following up 

on the hearings that we have had this week, the briefings that we 

have had. I just had an opportunity to sit on the Foreign Affairs 

Committee for the testimony of Secretary Kerry; as he testified in 

the Senate yesterday, he was in the House today. We had a full 

committee hearing in the Homeland Security Committee with Mr. 

Thompson, Mr. McCaul this week. Previously the Border Security 

and Maritime Security addressed the question of the visa waivers 

and other ways and means that individuals who may be foreign 

fighters or who may attempt to come into the United States might 

use, and so that we must be vigilant to do so. 

Certainly the witnesses before us represent the component of vigilance that is important. Secretary Johnson was here, of course, 
33 

and represented well the position of the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

Let me make one or two points before. We are in a posture of 

making sure that we coordinate and are aware of the actions that 

are taken outside the borders of this Nation to protect the homeland and to collaborate with what is done on the soil of the Nation 

to protect the homeland and the American people. So it is important for the knowledge of the actions that are going to be taken, 

the train and equip, that Congress is briefed on that. It is wellknown by the American people that there have been air strikes, 

and there are deliberations on the utilization of air strikes in 

places where ISIL can be stopped. There is collaboration with other 

nations in a variety of ways. I think it all makes to the security 

of this Nation. 

So I make the point, and I hope that I will make this on the 

record and that we can get it clarified, on the McKeon amendment 

establishing the appropriate committees that should be briefed as 

the actions have taken place on the train and equip, the Homeland 

Security Committee in both the House and the Senate, I believe, 

should be added. It is outrageous that the drafters of the amendment left out the Homeland Security Committee. It would be good 

to keep it quiet and not let anyone know that they have been left 

out, but I believe that it is an egregious error by the drafters and 

whoever is responsible and that there is no way that you can ensure the safety of the homeland unless we are collaborating. So I 

hope someone hears it and I hope someone makes a correction on 

that point. 

The second point I want to do is to encourage my colleagues to 

join me on the legislation that I have introduced, the No-Fly Foreign Fighters legislation, which does not compromise a recent court 

case dealing with the watch lists and the No-Fly structure that I 

understand was just rendered. This is a simple cleaning-up. The 

language I think that is relevant in this legislation that has been 

introduced is that the terrorist watch lists utilized by the Transportation Security Administration, to determine basically if this is a 

complete list. So we are asking for the appropriate agencies to determine whether or not this list that is being utilized is an accurate 

list, is a complete list. It has no impact on one’s removal. That 

process is being reviewed. I agree with the American Civil Liberties 

Union that there should be a proper process for removal. But I 

hope my colleagues will join in this, simple, that says no fly for foreign fighters. I will read some of the language in a moment. 

I see my time is out. So let me just, if I could, ask this question, 

and maybe you will answer it, to—is it Mr. Piehota? Is that the 

correct pronunciation? 

Mr. PIEHOTA. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. As I indicated, we held a recent hearing on 

the Visa Waiver Program, and during that hearing concerns were 

expressed that someone with a passport from a Western country 

that has joined in the fighting in Syria or in any other place in the 

region where there are efforts at jihad, joined with a terrorist organization, could be only one flight away from our shores. 

On Tuesday I introduced the No-Fly for Foreign Fighters Act. 

Are individuals known to have joined terrorist organizations in 
34 

Syria and Iraq, is there seemingly a current list or current knowledge of those individuals, and are they being placed in a position 

not to possibly do harm in to the United States and to the American people? Are we continually updating and making sure that we 

have a complete list to address? 

Then my other subset of that, to explain to the subcommittee 

how Secure Flight is being used to identify passengers flying internationally for enhanced screening based on risk-based, intelligencedriven information. 

Mr. PIEHOTA. The Terrorist Screening Database is updated on a 

24-hour, 7-day-a-week basis through collaboration with the law enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence communities. We do 

this in partnership, we do this in a joint National security mission 

fashion. 

The Terrorist Screening Database at the current time has approximately 9,000 identities that have been associated with foreign 

terrorist fighter activities. Of those 9,000 identities, 95 percent of 

these people have already been watchlisted at the No-Fly level. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. On the Secure—— 

Mr. PIEHOTA. That information is then transmitted in a transactional real-time fashion to our TSA partners, who then use it in 

their Secure Flight program. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So let me just conclude, Mr. Chairman, by 

saying, and the idea of my legislation is for Congress to be advised 

on the completeness of the Terrorist Screening Database, which I 

think has not been done, particularly to our relevant committees, 

and to ensure that it is continuously updated, and particularly with 

those who have gone for the fight. 

So I hope my colleagues will consider the legislation, but I thank 

the gentleman. I reinforce the point that I am making with this 

legislation, but as well with the questions that I asked, in order to 

secure the homeland, the committees of jurisdiction that are relevant to the actions outside of the boundaries of this Nation must 

collaborate with those who have the ultimate responsibility for the 

securing of this Nation. As I understand it, that is the jurisdiction 

of the Homeland Security Committee and in this instance on the 

aviation and other matters with the Transportation Security Committee. I hope we can fix this as quickly as possible. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. HUDSON. Well, I thank the gentlelady. 

Thank the witnesses for your testimony and all of the Members 

for your questions today. 

The Members of the subcommittee may have additional questions 

for the witnesses we will ask that you respond to in writing. 

Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank 

you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(35) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTION FROM HONORABLE MICHAEL D. ROGERS FOR STEPHEN SADLER

Question. The Secure Flight Program’s success depends in large part upon supporting contracts and contractors. Please provide an overview and status update on 

each of the TSA’s supporting Secure Flight and Operational Computing Environment contracts and acquisitions, including the length and cost of each contract. 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight contract information requested is provided in the tables below: 

Active 

Contract 

No. 

Contract 

Type Contractor Description of Supply/Service 

Period of 

Performance 

(Start & End 

Date) 

Total 

Value $ 

Million 

1 ........ Cost Plus 

Fixed Fee 

(CPFF).

Flatter & 

Associates.

Independent 

validation & 

verification 

services.

Sep 18, 2009 

thru Mar 

17, 2015.

7.049 

2 ........ CPFF ......... Infozen ........... System 

operations & 

maintenance, 

production 

environment.

Feb 1, 2008 

thru Nov 

27, 2014.

64.779 

3 ........ Firm Fixed 

Price 

(FFP).

InfoGlide ........ Bladeworks 

software 

maintenance.

Jan 4, 2011 

thru Nov 

3, 2015.

9.391 

4 ........ Time and 

Material 

(T&M).

IBM ................ System 

application 

development 

and Tier 3 

Support.

Dec 14, 2013 

thru Oct 

20, 2014.

16.837 

5 ........ FFP ........... Comp Sci 

Corp.

WebEOC 

support.

Nov 1, 2013 

thru Aug 

3, 2015.

0.251 

6 ........ FFP ........... Dell ................ Hardware .......... Dec 17, 2013 

thru Dec 

16, 2014.

0.292 

7 ........ FFP ........... Infozen ........... Hardware/Software (H/W) 

maintenance 

renewal, H/S 

license, spare 

parts.

Apr 1, 2013 

thru Nov 

27, 2014.

6.974 

8 ........ FFP ........... Omniplex ....... Physical 

Security.

Nov 10, 2013 

thru Nov 

9, 2018.

1.813 

9 ........ FFP ........... TSA Office of 

Facilities.

Annapolis 

Junction 

facility lease 

and utilities.

Oct 22, 2013 

thru Jan 

31, 2018.

13.616 

10 ...... FFP ........... TSA Office of 

Facilities.

Colorado 

Springs 

facility lease 

and utilities.

Oct 22, 2013 

thru Dec 

21, 2018.

9.286 
36 

Active 

Contract 

No. 

Contract 

Type Contractor Description of Supply/Service 

Period of 

Performance 

(Start & End 

Date) 

Total 

Value $ 

Million 

11 ...... FFP ........... Customs and 

Border 

Protection.

Connectivity 

with Customs 

and Border 

Protection.

Aug 11, 2009 

thru Aug 

10, 2015.

15.254 

12 ...... Labor Hour 

(LH).

RCM 

Solutions.

Program 

management 

support.

Apr 9, 2010 

thru Jan 

12, 2015.

4.862 

13 ...... LH ............. SRA ................ Privacy program 

development 

and support.

Sep 21, 2009 

thru Mar 

20, 2015.

4.206 

14 ...... CPFF ......... Deloitte 

Consulting.

Implementation 

and business 

operations.

Aug 11, 2012 

thru Jan 

31, 2015.

18.722 

15 ...... FFP ........... GSA ................ Lines 

connectivity.

July 1, 2014 

thru June 

30, 2015.

0.589 

16 ...... FFP ........... Zibiz Corp. ..... Hardware .......... Mar 23, 2012 

thru Mar 

21, 2015.

1.900 

17 ...... FFP ........... Immixtechnology.Software license Apr 1, 2013 

thru Mar 

31, 2015.

0.011 

18 ...... FFP ........... ECS Gov, 

Inc.

Software ............ Dec 20, 2011 

thru Mar 

31, 2016.

2.959 

19 ...... FFP ........... Snap, Inc. ...... Virtual Storage, 

Smart Cloud.

Sep 22, 2014 

thru Sep 

21, 2015.

1.028 

20 ...... FFP ........... Govplace ........ Net App SAN 

(storage).

Sep 19, 2014 

thru Sep 

18, 2015.

0.229 

21 ...... FFP ........... ESC Gov 

(IBM).

Enterprise 

license 

agreement.

April 15, 

2013 thru 

Mar 31, 

2018.

61.100 

22 ...... FFP ........... Dell ................ Software license Apr 1, 2013 

thru Mar 

31, 2014.

0.089 

23 ...... CPFF ......... QinetiQ North 

America.

System 

operations 

and 

maintenance 

—under 

protest.

July 15, 2013 

thru Oct 

31, 2014.

9.481 

24 ...... FFP ........... Govplace ........ Software ............ April 1, 2014 

thru 

March 31, 

2015.

0.041 

25 ...... T&M .......... Sev1tech, 

Inc.

Implementation 

and business 

operations.

Nov 17, 2014 

thru June 

20, 2018.

14.912 

26 ...... T&M .......... IBM ................ System 

development 

and Tier 3 

System 

Support.

Aug 20, 2014 

thru Feb 

19, 2016.

34.458 

27 ...... FFP ........... Wildflower ..... DBI Data Base 

software.

Sep 10, 2014 

thru Sep 9, 

2015.

0.121 

Æ