PUBLISH UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ TOOELE COUNTY; STATE OF UTAH, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant – Appellee, and
SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE; THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY; SIERRA CLUB, Intervenor-Defendants.

________________________ MICHAEL ABDO; SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE, Appellants. No. 15-4062

__________________ _______________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Utah (D.C. No. 2:12-CV-00477-CW)

__________________ _______________ Jess M. Krannich, Manning Curtis Bradshaw & Bednar LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah, (Stephen H.M. Bloch and Joseph J. Bushyhead , Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Salt Lake City, Utah; Brent V. Manning and Alan C. Bradshaw, Mannin g Curtis Bradshaw & Bednar LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah with her on the briefs) for Appellants. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 3, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Anthony L. Rampton, Assistan t Attorney General, Utah A ttorney General, Salt Lake City, Utah, (Kathy A. F. Davis, Assistant At torney General and Sean D. Reyes, Utah Attorney General, Salt Lake City, Utah, with him on the brief) for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

__________________ _______________ Before HARTZ , BACHARACH , and PHILLIPS , Circuit Judges.

__________________ _______________ BACHARACH , Circuit Judge.

__________________ _______________ This appeal concerns two suits in state and federal court and statutory limitations on th e power of the federal c ourt to enjoin the statecourt case. The first action to be filed was th e one in federal court, where the Utah Attorney General and the Boar d of Tooele Coun ty Commissioners sued the federal gov ernment under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a. In this suit, the Utah offi cials are attempting to qu iet title in favor of Utah for hundreds of rights of way in Tooele County, Utah. Five environmental groups opposed this su it, and the federal district court permitted the groups to intervene. The second suit was th e one in state court, wh ere the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance and Mr . Michael Abdo, a Tooe le County resident, claim that the Utah officials lack au thority under state la w to prosecute the quiet-title action in federal court. The Utah officials as ked the federal court to enjoin the Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo from prosecuting the state-co urt action. The federal3 district court granted the request and entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo for an indefinite period of time. The Wilderness Allian ce and Mr. Abdo appeal th is ruling, presenting us with two primary issues. First, do we have appellate jurisdiction? We conclude that we do. This issue arises because the federa l district court called its order a “temporary restraining order,” which is not ordinarily appealable. But temporary restraining orders cannot ex ceed fourteen days. After fourteen days, the order either lapses or be comes a preliminary injunction. The district court’s order had already last ed more than fourteen days by the time the Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo appealed. Thus, the order is treated as a preliminary injunction for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Second, did the federal district cour t have the authority to enjoin the state-court suit? We think not. The A ll Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, grants a district court expansive authority to issue “all writs ne cessary.” But the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U. S.C. § 2283 genera lly prohibits fe deral courts from enjoining state-court suits. An exception exists when an injunction is “in aid of” the federal cour t’s exercise of its juri sdiction. This exception applies when

 the federal and state court exer cise in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over the same res and

 the federal court is the first to take possessi on of the res.4 These circumstances are ab sent because the state-co urt action is neither in rem nor quasi in rem. Th us, the district court’s order violates the AntiInjunction Act.
I. Jurisdiction existed in district court and exists now in our court. The parties do not dispute our jurisdiction to hear this appeal, but we must independently examine our jurisdiction and the district court’s. See Lovell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 466 F.3d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 2006). We conclude that jurisdiction ex isted in district court and exists now in our court. A. The federal district co urt had jurisdiction. The federal court had jurisdiction ov er the quiet-title suit under the Quiet Title Act’s grant of ex clusive federal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(f). Exercising this jurisdiction, the federal district court used its authority under the All Writs Act to i ssue the temporary restraining order. The Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo challenge the district court’s jurisdiction, arguing that the district court tried “to attach subject matter jurisdiction” over the state- court suit by entering the temporary restraining order. Appellants’ Opening Br. at 17. We disagree. When a district court enjoins another court from proceeding with a parallel suit, the district court does not “assert ju risdiction” over the other suit; rather, the district court exercises its own jurisdiction. See Commercial Sec. Bank v. Walker Bank & Tr. Co. , 456 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that “no5 new grant of judicial power is co ntemplated” by a statute empowering federal courts to enjoin state-cour t proceedings). Thus, we reject the challenge to the district cour t’s jurisdiction.
B. We have appellate jurisdiction. Because the district court’s order took the form of a temporary restraining order, we must addre ss our own jurisdiction. Temporary restraining orders are not ordinarily appealable, but preliminary injunctions are appealable. Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co. , 388 F.2d 501, 511 (10th Cir. 1968) (tempo rary restraining order); Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham , 640 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2011) (preliminary injunction). Thus, we must consider whether the order, when appealed, was truly a temporary restraining order. If it was, it would not be appealable. But in our view, the order should be treated as a preliminary injunction for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions differ in how long they ca n last. Temporary restraining orders can last no more than fourteen days 1 ; preliminary injuncti ons can last longer. When a temporary restraining order lasts longer than four teen days, it becomes appealable as a preliminary injunction. Sampson v. Murray , 415 U.S. 61, 86 n.58, 87-88 (1974). This is true even if the district court labels its order a temporary

1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2).6 restraining order. See Workman v. Bredesen , 486 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that appe llate “jurisdiction is no t controlled by . . . the name that a district court attaches to an order”). Appellate jurisdiction tu rns on what ki nd of order wa s appealed. The Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo ap pealed an order labeled as a temporary restraining order. But the federal district court said that the order would remain in effect until th e court decided whether to grant an injunction. That period of time was indefinite. For fourteen days, the order functioned as a temporary restraining order. But on the fifteenth day, that order could be treated as a prelim inary injunction, for purposes of appealability, because a te mporary restrainin g order cannot last longer than fourteen days. The Wilderness Alliance and Mr. A bdo appealed on the eighteenth day. Thus, they appealed an orde r that “we view” as a preliminary injunction. Sampson , 415 U.S. at 87-88. And as a preliminary injunction, the order was appealable . 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
II. The federal district court violated the An ti-Injunction Act by enjoining the state-court suit. In the temporary restraining order, the district court enjoined the Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo from prosecuting the state-court action until the district court decided whethe r to issue an injunction. This order implicated the Anti-Injunction Act, wh ich ordinarily prohibits injunctions7 against state-court procee dings. 28 U.S.C. § 2283; see Phelps v. Hamilton , 122 F.3d 1309, 1324-25 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he stat ute imposes an absolute ban on federal injunctions against pending state court proceeding, in the absence of one of the recognized exceptions in the law.”). The district court thought that one of the statutory exceptions applied, reasoning that an injunction against the state-court proceeding was necessary for the federal court to aid its jurisdiction over the federal quiettitle action. We resp ectfully disagree. A. We review de novo the district court’s application of the Anti-Injunction Act. We would ordinarily review the dist rict court’s order for an abuse of discretion. Dominion Video Sate llite, Inc. v. EchoS tar Satellite Corp. , 269 F.3d 1149, 1153 (10th Cir. 2001). But the appl icability of the AntiInjunction Act calls for a legal conclusion. Ambort v. United States , 392 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 2004). Thus, we conduct de novo review of the district court’s application of the Anti-Injunction Act. Id.
B. The Anti-Injunction Act prohib ited the federal district court from enjoining the state-court suit. The Anti-Injunction Act ordinari ly precludes injunctions against state-court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2283. But th ree exceptions exist: 1. Congress “expressly aut horized” an injunction. 2. The injunction is “necessary in aid of [the federal district court’s] jurisdiction.”8 3. The injunction is necessary to “prot ect or effectuate” a previous judgment in federal district court. Id. Applying the second exception, the district court concluded that an injunction would aid the court in exer cising its own jurisd iction. The Utah officials defend this conclusion, argui ng in the alternative that the first exception applies because the Quiet T itle Act constitutes an “expressly authorized” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. The federal district court erred. An injunction would not fall within the second exception, wh ich encompasses injunctions in aid of the federal courts’ jurisdiction. And we declin e to address the first exception— whether the Quiet Title Ac t is an “expressly authorized” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act—becaus e this issue was not pr esented to the federal district court. 1. The exceptions to the Anti-Injunctio n Act are narrow. The Anti-Injunction Act’ s exceptions are narrow and are not to be loosely construed. Smith v. Bayer Corp. , 564 U.S. 299, 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2375 (2011). As a resu lt, courts should re solve doubts about the applicability of an ex ception in favor of allowing the state-court proceeding to continue. Id ., 131 S. Ct. at 2382. 2. The second statutory exception does not apply. The second statutory exception is limited. The Supreme Court has applied it only when9  both the federal and state suits constitute in rem or quasi in rem proceedings and

 the federal court was the first to take possession of the res (the property under dispute in th e federal and state actions). See Mandeville v. Canterbury , 318 U.S. 47, 48-49 (1943) (per curiam). 2 To apply the second exception, th e court must decide whether the two suits are either in rem or quasi in rem. “An actio n in rem is one founded upon the rights in or to property.” Housley v. Anaconda Co. , 427 P.2d 390, 392 (Utah 1967). Thus, in rem proceeding s affect the interests of all persons in the property. Archer v. United States , 268 F.2d 687 , 690 (10th Cir. 1959). An action is quasi in rem when it affects th e interests of only some persons in the property. Id. ; see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 6 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1982). The federal quiet-title suit fits the definition of an in rem or quasi in rem proceeding. See Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. , 302 P.3d 1103, 1106-07 (Nev. 2013) (stati ng that an action to qui et title is an in rem or quasi in rem proceeding); see also Enhanci ng the Marketab ility of Land: The Suit to Quiet Title , 68 Yale L.J. 1245, 1265 ( 1959) (stating that for a quiet-title suit, “the court obtains jurisdicti on to adjudicate all interests in the land at issue through its control of that land”).

2 The Utah parties acknow ledge that the second exception is generally limited to state and fede ral proceedings that control the same res. Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 11-12.10 But the state-court suit was neither in rem nor quasi in rem because there, the Wilderness A lliance and Mr. Abdo were not seeking adjudication of anyone’s interest in pr operty. Thus, juri sdiction in stat e court was based on the court’s authorit y over the Utah offici als, not over anyone’s property. By definition, th at suit involved in personam jurisdiction rather than in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction. See Shaffer v. Heitner , 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977) (“If a court’s jurisdiction is based on its authority over the defendant’s person, th e action and judgment are denominated ‘in personam.’”). Thus, the state-court su it would not ordina rily trigger the Anti-Injunction Act’s exception for injunctions involving two in rem or quasi in rem proceedings. The Utah officials dow nplay the fact that the state-court suit was neither in rem nor quasi in rem, arguing that the “gravamen” of the statecourt suit involves the same res involved in the federal suit. We reject this argument because the second statutory exceptio n requires more than a relationship between the su its and the proper ty; both suits must also be in rem or quasi in rem proceedings. See Denver-Greeley Valley Water Users Ass’n v. McNeil , 131 F.2d 67, 71 (10th Cir. 1942 ) (“The mere fact that . . . two suits relate to the sa me physical proper ty does not justif y a restraint of the second suit by the court first acquiring jurisd iction.”). The state-court suit does not concern title to the contested rights of way at issue in the federal-court suit, and we cannot uphol d the injunction ba sed solely on a11 “close relationship” between the subject matter of the federal and state suits. Id. ; see Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. , 523 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he mere f act that the actions of a state court might have some effect on the federal proceedings does not justify interference.”). The federal district court relied on an expanded versio n of the second exception. Unlike ou r court, some other circui ts have applied the second exception more expansively in certai n cases addressing multi-district litigation, 3 school desegregation, 4 water rights, 5 congressional redistricting, 6 and class actions. 7 In expansively ap plying the second exception, these courts treat th e underlying federal litigation as functionally equiva lent to a res. See Bryan J. Schillinger, Preventing Duplicative Mass Liti gation Through the Lim ited Resources Doctrine , 14 Rev. Litig. 465, 467-68 ( 1995) (explaining th at the expansive approach is based on broadening of “the definition of in rem”).

3 In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig. , 261 F.3d 355, 364-65 (3d Cir. 2001).

4 Swann v. Charlotte-Mec klenburg Bd. of Ed. , 501 F.2d 383, 384 (4th Cir. 1974).

5 United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. , 174 F.3d 1007, 1014- 15 (9th Cir. 1999).

6 Wesch v. Folsom , 6 F.3d 1465, 1470 (1 1th Cir. 1993).

7 In re Diet Drugs , 282 F.3d 220, 235 (3d Cir. 2002).12 In the state-court action, we have nothing that can be treated as the functional equivalent of a res. Thus, ev en if we were to adopt the expanded exception, it would not apply here. The Utah official s point out that

 this case is one of 22 quiet-title suits involving rights of way in various Utah counties , which are pending in the same federal district court, and

 all of these suits pit Utah ag ainst the federal government. Because of the number of suits, the Ut ah officials comp are this case to cases in which courts have upheld in junctions of state-court suits to facilitate multi-district or class-actio n litigation. In our view, however, the circumstances differ. In cases involving multi- district litigation, some courts have broadly applied the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act because 1. a multi-district litigation pane l, created by fede ral statute, has reviewed many different pending cases in different district courts and decided to cons olidate the cases’ pretrial proceedings, 2. a judge overseeing the multi-dis trict litigation has “put forth considerable effort coordina ting discovery or settlement discussions,” and 3. a state-court suit could affect the consolidated class of cases and impede settlement. In re Life Inv’rs Ins. Co. of Am. , 589 F.3d 319, 331 n. 11 (3d Cir. 2009). None of these concerns apply here.13 First, the district court’s case ma nagement is not governed by federal statute, and the 22 quiet-title suits are pending in a single district rather than spread across distri cts. The cases have not been consolidated; the district court simply issued a case- management order before trial to collectively address procedural issues. Second, when the federal distri ct court issued the temporary restraining order, the court had entered only a single case-management order. See Appellants’ App’x at 9, 15 (district court docket sheet showing entry of a case-management order). The case-management order would not be disturbed even without an injunction against the state-court proceedings. See note 10, below. Third, the state-court suit might a ffect the ability of the parties to settle the federal-court suit, but only because the state courts could resolve a related question under Utah law. As the federal di strict court apparently recognized, however, the state-law issue would no t affect title to the property underlying the federal-court suit. Thus, the concerns animating expansion of the second ex ception in multi-district cases are not present here. The Utah officials also rely on cases involving class actions. For these cases, some courts have expanded the sec ond statutory exception by analogizing an impend ing settlement in a cl ass action to a res. See, e.g. , Juris v. Inamed Corp. , 685 F.3d 1294, 1339 (11th Cir. 2012); Lorillard14 Tobacco Co. v. Ches ter, Willcox & Saxbe , 589 F.3d 835, 844 (6th Cir. 2009); In re Baldwin-United Corp ., 770 F.2d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 1985). No one has suggested that the federal suit is likely to settle soon. Thus, the federal-court suit has not progressed to the point that an injunction of the state- court suit would be necessary to protect the equivalent of a res. In these circumstances , the injunction would be invalid even in those courts that have broa dened the second exception to apply beyond in rem and quasi in rem proceedings. See Negrete v. Allianz Life
Ins. Co. , 523 F.3d 1091, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) (decl ining to apply the expanded exception in class-action litigation because the case did not involve multi-district litiga tion, discovery was inco mplete, and settlement was not imminent). The Utah officials urge an even broader expansion, one that would authorize injunctions of state-court proceedings to prevent state courts “from undoing years of wo rk” in federal court to resolve complex cases. Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 25. 8 For this argument, the Utah officials rely on

8 In state court, the environmen tal groups asked for not only a declaratory judgment but also an in junction against the Utah officials’ “implementation and funding” of the suit in federal c ourt. Appellants’ App’x at 19, 30. Because the environm ental groups are seeking to enjoin the prosecution of a federal-court su it, one could argue that the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act allowed the federal court to enjoin the state court. See Donovan v. City of Dallas , 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964). But the Utah officials have not made that argument. Thus, we leave open the possibility that the second exceptio n to the Anti-Injunction Act might15 Winkler v. El i Lilly & Co. , 101 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1996). In Winkler , the Seventh Circui t declined to enjoin state-court procee dings. 101 F.3d at 1205-06. But the Seventh Circuit suggested that a federal court could enjoin state pr oceedings when

 the federal case involves mu lti-district litigation and

 the injunction is nece ssary to protect a previous discovery order. Id. at 1202. These circumstances are no t present here: the federal quiettitle suit does not involve multi-district litigation, an d the federal district court need not act to protect a previous discovery order. 9 See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court , 326 F.3d 816, 825- 26 (7th Cir. 2002) (declining to apply Winkler in a case that did not involve multi-dist rict litigation or the need to protect a pr eviously entered order). 10

allow a federal court to en join a state court from i ssuing an injunction that would prohibit prosecution of the federal-court suit.

9 The Utah officials also cite other opinions in which the courts relied partly on Winkler to enjoin state-court proceedings that threatened to undermine prior orders. Appell ees’ Resp. Br. at 25 (citing Newby v. Enron Corp. , 338 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2003); In re Ocwen v. Fed. Bank FSB Mortg. Servicing Litig. , 397 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Ill. 2005)). But here, the federal district court had no need to prevent interference with any prior orders.

10 The Utah officials ar gue that the state-court litigation could undo the federal court’s case-management order. We disagree. The case-management order would remain in pl ace; the state-court litiga tion would simply make further litigation in fede ral court unnecessary.16 * * * The second exception to the Anti -Injunction Act doe s not apply here. The federal suit was in rem or quasi in rem, but the state-court suit was neither. And the state-co urt suit did not involve the functi onal equivalent of a res. So even if we were to adopt the expand ed exception, it would not apply here. Thus, the sec ond exception to the Anti -Injunction Act does not allow an injunction against the state-court proceedings. 3. We decline to consider the Ut ah officials’ newly presented argument that the Qu iet Title Act is an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. For the first time on app eal, the Utah officials contend that the Quiet Title Act is an “expressly authorized” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. We decline to reac h this argument. We have discretion to affirm th e district court on any ground adequately support ed by the record. See Elkins v. Comfort , 392 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004). But in deciding whethe r to exercise th is discretion, we may consider whether an argument was fully briefed in our court and the district court. Id.

The concerns underlying the Seventh Circuit opinion in Winkler are absent here. Indeed, after deciding Winkler , the Seventh Circuit unambiguously stated that “the prospect of a st ate court reaching [a] decision first, making federal decisi on unnecessary . . . does not justify a federal injunction against the state litigation.” Adkins v. Nestle Purina Pet Care Co. , 779 F.3d 481, 485 (7 th Cir. 2015).17 In district court, no on e addressed whether the Quiet Title Act is an “expressly authorized” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. The proposition appears at l east debatable, for the Qu iet Title Act states: “No preliminary injunction shall issue in any acti on brought und er this section.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(c). During oral argument, th e Utah officials assert ed that § 2409a(c) of the Quiet Title Act does not apply here . But no one has br iefed the effect of this provision, and no other fe deral appellate court has considered whether the Quiet Title Ac t constitutes an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. In these ci rcumstances, we decl ine to decide the issue newly raised in our court.
III. Conclusion The second exception to the Anti-I njunction Act does not apply, and the district court erred by concluding that it could enjoin the state-court proceedings. This erro r requires reversal an d remand for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded.15-4062 – Tooele County v. United States HARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring: The opening paragraph of the Complain t for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief filed in Utah state court by Michael Abdo and Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (Appellants) states that they are “seeking a judgment declaring Defendants’ federal court quiet title action involving alle ged R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in Tooele County illegal, unconstitutional, and an ultra vires action brou ght outside the authority of the Office of Attorney General, as well as an order enjoining the impl ementation and funding of this litigation.” Aplt. App. at 19. The injuncti on sought in this complaint would “restrain federal court proceedings”; “it does not ma tter that the prohib ition . . . [would be] addressed to the parties rather than to the federal court itself.” Donovan v. City of Dallas , 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964). I do not think that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C § 2283, fo rbids the issuance of an injunction to prohibit a state court fro m restraining federal-court proceedings. To restrain a federal-court proceedi ng is to impair – to eviscerat e – that court’s jurisdiction, preventing it from even considering the dispute befo re it. As the district court said in this case, the injunction sought by Appellants in st ate court “would . . . effectively defeat the jurisdiction of the federal court.” Interven ors’ App. at 60. An injunction prohibiting such a restraint could be “necessa ry in aid of [the court’s] ju risdiction.” 28 U.S.C § 2283. In this light, it is easy to understand w hy the federal district court issued its injunction in this case. Nevertheless, such an injunction was unnecessary. The law is well-settled that a state court cannot grant the injunctive relief sought by Appellants.-2- Other than to protect its own jurisdiction ove r property in an in rem or quasi in rem proceeding, a state court has no authority to restrain a federal-court proceeding. See Donovan, 377 U.S. at 412-13; General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977); see also Baker ex rel Thomas v. General Motors Corp. , 522 U.S. 222, 236 n.9 (1998) (“This court has held it impermissible for a state c ourt to enjoin a party from proceeding in a federal court.”) We should presume, a very safe presumption, that no Utah court would issue the injunction sought by Appellants. As for the declaratory relief sought by Appe llants in state cour t, I agree with the panel majority that the Anti-Injunction Act ba rs the issuance of an injunction to prevent that portion of the state litigation. Even th ough the claim for declaratory relief raises issues that would also be before the federa l court, there is nothing wrong with parallel claims being pursued in both state and federal court. To be sure, if the state proceeding were the first to arrive at a judgment, that judgment could have preclusive effect in federal court (although the federal court, ap plying state preclusion law, would be the tribunal to determine the preclusive effect); but such a result is not improper under our federal system. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005) (“In parallel litigation, a fe deral court may be bound to recognize the claim- and issue-preclusive effects of a state-court judgment . . . .”); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Loc. Eng. , 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970) (“the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdictio n in this case, and neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in bo th courts”). In fact, before the states adopted statutes and rules permitting federal courts to certify questions of state law to-3- state courts, the United States Supreme Cour t endorsed the practice of federal-court parties seeking determinations of state-law issues in the federal litigation by commencing actions in state courts. See, e.g., Government & Civic Em ployee Organizing Committee, CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 365 (1957). Insofar as Appellants’ state-court action seeks that court’s interpretation of Utah law, it is not at all troubling, although it would be surprising if the state court exercised its disc retion to issue a declaration on whether state law would be superseded by federa l law in the present circumstance.