97-493

 No. 97-493

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

RONALD U. LURIE,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

ROBERT J. BLACKWELL, individually and in his capacity

as Liquidating Trustee of the Popkin & Stern Liquidating Trust,

 Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Gallatin,

 The Honorable Mike A. Salvagni, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Ronald U. Lurie, Pro Se, Bozeman, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Michael F. McMahon; Harrison, Loendorf, Poston & Duncan;

 Helena, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: October 9, 1997

 Decided: November 13, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the Opinion of the Court.

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 Ronald Lurie filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eighteenth Judicial

District in Gallatin County in which he alleged abuse of process against Robert J.

Blackwell, individually and in his capacity as liquidating trustee of the Popkin & 

Stern

Liquidating Trust. Blackwell removed the case to the United States District Court 

for the

District of Montana, but that court dismissed the complaint and remanded it to the

Montana District Court in Gallatin County. Blackwell filed a motion to dismiss the

claim. After oral argument, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss. Lurie

appeals. We affirm the order of the District Court.

 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred when it granted the

motion to dismiss.

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 In October 1994, a judgment was entered against Ronald Lurie in the United 

States

Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The judgment was in favor of

Robert Blackwell, the liquidating trustee for the Popkin & Stern Liquidating Trust. 

 On November 9, 1994, Blackwell filed the foreign judgment in the District Court

for Gallatin County and, pursuant to the judgment, a writ of execution was issued 

against

Lurie. The notice of filing foreign judgment identified Blackwell as the plaintiff 

and

foreign judgment creditor. He was not identified in his representative capacity. 

Pursuant

to the writ of execution, the Gallatin County Sheriff seized property from the Lurie 

home.

 The parties to the bankruptcy proceeding eventually reached settlement 

agreements,

which were approved by the Bankruptcy Court in October 1995. In January 1996, the

Bankruptcy Court held as a matter of law that the Luries were unable to close the

agreements on the scheduled dates. In April 1996, that court held that the 

agreements

were unenforceable as releases. It also held that Lurie's attempts to implement the

agreements were tainted with bad faith. 

 Nonetheless, Lurie sought a release from the Bankruptcy Court judgment in the

District Court in October 1996. Among other claims, Lurie alleged that the 

agreements

operated to release the judgment, that the notice of filing foreign judgment was 

ineffective

pursuant to õ 25-9-504, MCA, because it incorrectly identified Blackwell in his 

individual

capacity, rather than in his representative capacity, and that the judgment was

unenforceable. Both the District Court and then this Court held that Blackwell did 

in fact

comply with õ 25-9-504, MCA, and that the judgment was effective. See Blackwell v.

Lurie (Mont. 1997), 943 P.2d 1318, 54 St. Rep. 916.

 This appeal involves a complaint for abuse of process that Lurie filed on

December 3, 1996, against Blackwell individually and in his representative 

capacity. The

first count alleged that Blackwell's failure to identify his representative capacity 

in the

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notice of filing foreign judgment constituted abuse of process and claimed over one

million dollars in actual damages and ten million dollars in punitive damages. The

second count sought to recover an additional eleven million dollars in damages for 

abuse

of process based upon Blackwell's alleged failure to file a sufficient bond pursuant 

to õ

27-18-602, MCA, when the Sheriff seized the Lurie property. Although not at issue

here, Lurie filed an additional abuse of process claim against Blackwell, based upon 

his

assertion that the agreements had supposedly released the judgment and Blackwell

continued to attempt to enforce it.

 Blackwell removed the case to the United States District Court for the District 

of

Montana and filed a motion to dismiss, based upon a lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. 

The U.S. District Court dismissed and remanded to state court. It held that it 

lacked

jurisdiction because Lurie failed to obtain leave of the Bankruptcy Court before he

brought suit. 

 Once back in State District Court, Blackwell again filed a motion to dismiss 

for,

among other reasons, a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. That motion was granted

based on the same reasoning applied in Federal District Court.

 DISCUSSION

 Did the District Court err when it granted the motion to dismiss?

 Whether to dismiss a claim based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a

question of law. We review a district court's conclusion of law to determine if it 

is

correct. See Poteat v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. (1996), 277 Mont. 117, 119, 918 

P.2d

677, 679. See also Matter of Beneficial Water Use Permit Nos. 66459-76L, Ciotti;

64988-G76L, Starner (1996), 278 Mont. 50, 54, 923 P.2d 1073, 1076. 

 The basis for the District Court's conclusion that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over Lurie's abuse of process claim is the Barton doctrine. The Barton

doctrine provides that "leave of the appointing forum must be obtained by any party

wishing to institute an action in a non-appointing forum against a trustee, for acts 

done

in the trustee's official capacity and within the trustee's authority as an officer 

of the

court." In re DeLorean Motor Co. (6th Cir. 1993), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (applying

Barton v. Barbour (1881), 104 U.S. 126, 26 L. Ed. 672). Without leave from the

appointing court, no other court has jurisdiction to entertain suits against a 

trustee for acts

done in an official capacity. See In re Kashani (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995), 190 B.R. 

875,

884; In re Jacksen (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989), 105 B.R. 542, 545. 

 Lurie contends that the Barton doctrine does not apply here because he maintains

that Blackwell was not acting in an official capacity, and that even if he was 

acting in his

representative capacity, his actions were ultra vires and unprotected. It is true 

that a

trustee who exceeds his authority will not be protected by the Barton doctrine. See

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Leonard v. Vrooman (9th Cir. 1967), 383 F.2d 556, cert. denied (1968), 390 U.S. 925,

88 S. Ct. 856, 19 L. Ed. 2d 985. See also In re Markos Gurnee Partnership (Bankr.

N.D. Ill. 1995), 182 B.R. 211, 222 ("'ultra vires' actions involve only the personal

liability of trustees . . . . [and] generally implicate none of the bases for 

bankruptcy

jurisdiction, and are properly determined in a nonbankruptcy forum with no input from

the bankruptcy court"). However, we disagree with Lurie's characterization of

Blackwell's conduct and conclude as a matter of law that Blackwell's actions were 

within

the scope of his authority.

 In Markos Gurnee Partnership, the court noted that a trustee is "immune from 

suit

for actions arising out of the operation of the estate," and that only a breach of a

fiduciary duty or "willful violations of applicable nonbankruptcy law" are 

sufficient bases

for a court to find that a trustee has acted outside the operation of the estate and 

should

therefore be personally liable. Markos Gurnee Partnership, 182 B.R. at 216-19. For

example, it observed that "trustees have been most commonly found to have acted 

outside

of their authority . . . in seizing property which is found not to be property of 

the estate." 

Markos Gurnee Partnership, 182 B.R. at 217 (citing Vrooman and Barton).

 Lurie failed to submit any evidence that Blackwell acted in willful violation 

of the

law or that he breached a fiduciary duty. Nor did he make any allegation that 

Blackwell

improperly seized non-estate property. Rather, Lurie relies solely on the fact that

Blackwell did not allege his representative capacity when he filed his foreign 

judgment. 

It is undisputed that the only conduct complained of was the fact that Blackwell 

filed the

foreign judgment. In doing so, he clearly was performing his official duties as a 

trustee

in the administration of the estate. Accordingly, we conclude that Blackwell did 

not act

individually or outside his official capacity.

 Lurie also alleges that even if Blackwell acted in his representative capacity, 

his

actions were ultra vires and, therefore, beyond his authority as a trustee and not 

protected

by the Barton doctrine. However, the doctrine of ultra vires applies when a trustee 

is

without authority to perform an act in any circumstances or for any purpose. See 

Larry

C. Iverson, Inc. v. Bouma (1981), 195 Mont. 351, 366, 639 P.2d 47, 55 (contrasting

ultra vires acts with acts committed without proper agency authority); Sibert v.

Community College of Flathead County (1978), 179 Mont. 188, 191, 587 P.2d 26, 28

(labeling a statutorily unauthorized act as ultra vires). Here, Blackwell's actions 

were not

ultra vires because they were neither unlawful nor beyond his authority. 

 We held in Blackwell v. Lurie (Mont. 1997), 943 P.2d 1318, 1323, 54 St. Rep.

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916, 919, a previous attempt by Lurie to fault Blackwell for failing to identify 

himself

in his representative capacity, that "[t]here is no requirement that the judgment 

creditor

must acknowledge his representative capacity." Accordingly, Blackwell did not exceed

his authority as a trustee, substantively or procedurally, when he filed the notice 

of filing

foreign judgment in his name. Therefore, we hold that the District Court was correct

when it applied the Barton doctrine and dismissed Lurie's claim for lack of subject 

matter

jurisdiction.

 Blackwell has asked this Court to decide that Lurie's claim should be dismissed

not only for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but also on its merits based on 

collateral

estoppel, and based on our holding in Blackwell v. Lurie (Mont. 1997), 943 P.2d 1318,

54 St. Rep. 916. Once a court has determined that it lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction,

however, the only further action it can take is to dismiss the case. See In re 

Marriage

of Miller (1993), 259 Mont. 424, 427, 856 P.2d 1378, 1380; Rule 12(h)(3), M.R.Civ.P. 

Thus, despite the fact that we rejected Lurie's nearly identical allegations in that 

case, the

Barton doctrine precludes the consideration of substantive defenses no matter how

meritorious they might be.

 We understand Blackwell's frustration with Lurie's repeated efforts to avoid

satisfaction of the judgment against him; this is the fourth appeal to this Court by 

Lurie

and his family in cases involving Blackwell in just the last seven months. However,

despite our past holdings and the concomitant recognition of the dubious allegations 

put

forth by Lurie in the present action, we lack jurisdiction to review the merits or to

dismiss the claim as a matter of collateral estoppel. We affirm the District Court's

judgment.

 /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

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