59–006 

110TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 110–154 

VOTER CONFIDENCE AND INCREASED ACCESSIBILITY 

ACT OF 2007 

MAY 16, 2007.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of 

the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on House 

Administration, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

MINORITY VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 811] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on House Administration, to whom was referred 

the bill (H.R. 811) to amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to 

require a voter-verified permanent paper ballot under title III of 

such Act, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that 

the bill as amended do pass. 

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act 

of 2007’’. 

SEC. 2. PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT. 

(a) BALLOT VERIFICATION AND AUDIT CAPACITY.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 301(a)(2) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 

U.S.C. 15481(a)(2)) is amended to read as follows: 

‘‘(2) BALLOT VERIFICATION AND AUDIT CAPACITY.— 

‘‘(A) VOTER-VERIFIED PAPER BALLOTS.— 

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‘‘(i) VERIFICATION.—(I) The voting system shall require the use of or 

produce an individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot of the voter’s vote that shall be created by or made available for inspection and 

verification by the voter before the voter’s vote is cast and counted. For 

purposes of this subclause, examples of such a ballot include a paper 

ballot marked by the voter for the purpose of being counted by hand 

or read by an optical scanner or other similar device, a paper ballot 

prepared by the voter to be mailed to an election official (whether from 

a domestic or overseas location), a paper ballot created through the use 

of a ballot marking device or system, or a paper ballot produced by a 

touch screen or other electronic voting machine, so long as in each case 

the voter is permitted to verify the ballot in a paper form in accordance 

with this subparagraph. ‘‘(II) The voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity 

to correct any error made by the system in the voter-verified paper ballot before the permanent voter-verified paper ballot is preserved in accordance with clause (ii). ‘‘(III) The voting system shall not preserve the voter-verified paper 

ballots in any manner that makes it possible, at any time after the ballot has been cast, to associate a voter with the record of the voter’s vote. 

‘‘(ii) PRESERVATION.—The individual, durable voter-verified paper ballot produced in accordance with clause (i) shall be used as the official 

ballot for purposes of any recount or audit conducted with respect to 

any election for Federal office in which the voting system is used, and 

shall be preserved—

‘‘(I) in the case of votes cast at the polling place on the date of 

the election, within the polling place in the manner or method in 

which all other paper ballots are preserved within such polling 

place on such date; or 

‘‘(II) in any other case, in a manner which is consistent with the 

manner employed by the jurisdiction for preserving such ballots in 

general. 

‘‘(iii) MANUAL AUDIT CAPACITY.—(I) Each paper ballot produced pursuant to clause (i) shall be suitable for a manual audit equivalent to 

that of a paper ballot voting system, and shall be counted by hand in 

any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for Federal 

office. 

‘‘(II) In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any 

electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by 

hand the individual, durable voter-verified paper ballots produced pursuant to clause (i), and subject to subparagraph (B), the individual, durable voter-verified paper ballots shall be the true and correct record 

of the votes cast. 

‘‘(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR TREATMENT OF DISPUTES WHEN PAPER BALLOTS

HAVE BEEN SHOWN TO BE COMPROMISED.—

‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—In the event that—

‘‘(I) there is any inconsistency between any electronic vote tallies 

and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual, 

durable voter-verified paper ballots produced pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i) with respect to any election for Federal office; and 

‘‘(II) it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence (as determined in accordance with the applicable standards in the jurisdiction involved) in any recount, audit, or contest of the result of 

the election that the paper ballots have been compromised (by 

damage or mischief or otherwise) and that a sufficient number of 

the ballots have been so compromised that the result of the election 

could be changed, 

the determination of the appropriate remedy with respect to the election shall be made in accordance with applicable State law, except that 

the electronic tally shall not be used as the exclusive basis for determining the official certified vote tally. 

‘‘(ii) RULE FOR CONSIDERATION OF BALLOTS ASSOCIATED WITH EACH

VOTING MACHINE.—For purposes of clause (i), the paper ballots associated with each voting system shall be considered on a voting-machineby-voting-machine basis, and only the paper ballots deemed compromised, if any, shall be considered in the calculation of whether or 

not the result of the election could be changed due to the compromised 

paper ballots.’’. 

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(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT CLARIFYING APPLICABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE LAN- GUAGE ACCESSIBILITY.—Section 301(a)(4) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(4)) is 

amended by inserting ‘‘(including the paper ballots required to be produced 

under paragraph (2) and the notices required under paragraphs (7) and 

(13)(C))’’ after ‘‘voting system’’. (3) OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 301(a)(1) of such Act (42 

U.S.C. 15481(a)(1)) is amended— (A) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking ‘‘counted’’ and inserting ‘‘counted, 

in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)’’; 

(B) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ‘‘counted’’ and inserting ‘‘counted, 

in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)’’; 

(C) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by striking ‘‘counted’’ each place it appears 

and inserting ‘‘counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)’’; and 

(D) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ‘‘counted’’ and inserting ‘‘counted, 

in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)’’. (b) ACCESSIBILITY AND BALLOT VERIFICATION FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABIL- ITIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 301(a)(3)(B) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(3)(B)) 

is amended to read as follows: ‘‘(B)(i) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) through the use of at 

least one voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each 

polling place; and ‘‘(ii) meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) and paragraph (2)(A) by 

using a system that— ‘‘(I) allows the voter to privately and independently verify the individual, durable paper ballot through the conversion of the human-readable printed or marked vote selections into accessible form, ‘‘(II) ensures that the entire process of ballot verification and vote 

casting is equipped for individuals with disabilities, and ‘‘(III) does not preclude the supplementary use of Braille or tactile 

ballots; and’’. (2) SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT OF STUDY, TESTING, AND DEVELOPMENT OF ACCES- SIBLE BALLOT VERIFICATION MECHANISMS.— (A) STUDY AND REPORTING.—Subtitle C of title II of such Act (42 U.S.C. 

15381 et seq.) is amended— (i) by redesignating section 247 as section 248; and 

(ii) by inserting after section 246 the following new section: 

‘‘SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE BALLOT VERIFICATION MECHANISMS. 

‘‘(a) STUDY AND REPORT.—The Director of the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology shall study, test, and develop best practices to enhance the accessibility 

of ballot verification mechanisms for individuals with disabilities, for voters whose 

primary language is not English, and for voters with difficulties in literacy, including best practices for the mechanisms themselves and the processes through which 

the mechanisms are used. In carrying out this section, the Director shall specifically 

investigate existing and potential methods or devices, including non-electronic devices, that will assist such individuals and voters in creating voter-verified paper 

ballots and presenting or transmitting the information printed or marked on such 

ballots back to such individuals and voters. ‘‘(b) COORDINATION WITH GRANTS FOR TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENTS.—The Director 

shall coordinate the activities carried out under subsection (a) with the research 

conducted under the grant program carried out by the Commission under section 

271, to the extent that the Director and Commission determine necessary to provide 

for the advancement of accessible voting technology. 

‘‘(c) DEADLINE.—The Director shall complete the requirements of subsection (a) 

not later than December 31, 2008. 

‘‘(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $3,000,000, to remain available until expended.’’. 

(B) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents of such Act is amended—

(i) by redesignating the item relating to section 247 as relating to section 248; and 

(ii) by inserting after the item relating to section 246 the following 

new item: 

‘‘Sec. 247. Study and report on accessible ballot verification mechanisms.’’. 

(3) CLARIFICATION OF ACCESSIBILITY STANDARDS UNDER VOLUNTARY VOTING

SYSTEM GUIDANCE.—In adopting any voluntary guidance under subtitle B of 

title III of the Help America Vote Act with respect to the accessibility of the 

paper ballot verification requirements for individuals with disabilities, the Elecmstockstill on PROD1PC66 with HEARING

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tion Assistance Commission shall include and apply the same accessibility 

standards applicable under the voluntary guidance adopted for accessible voting 

systems under such subtitle. 

(c) ADDITIONAL VOTING SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) REQUIREMENTS DESCRIBED.—Section 301(a) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 

15481(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: 

‘‘(7) INSTRUCTION REMINDING VOTERS OF IMPORTANCE OF VERIFYING PAPER

BALLOT.—

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The appropriate election official at each polling place 

shall cause to be placed in a prominent location in the polling place which 

is clearly visible from the voting booths a notice, in large font print accessible to the visually impaired, advising voters that the paper ballots representing their votes shall serve as the vote of record in all audits and recounts in elections for Federal office, and that they should not leave the 

voting booth until confirming that such paper ballots accurately record their 

vote. 

‘‘(B) SYSTEMS FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES.—All voting systems 

equipped for individuals with disabilities shall present or transmit in accessible form the statement referred to in subparagraph (A), as well as an explanation of the verification process described in paragraph (3)(B)(ii). 

‘‘(8) PROHIBITING USE OF UNCERTIFIED ELECTION-DEDICATED VOTING SYSTEM

TECHNOLOGIES; DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.—

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—A voting system used in an election for Federal office 

in a State may not at any time during the election contain or use any election-dedicated voting system technology which has not been certified by the 

State for use in the election and which has not been deposited with an accredited laboratory described in section 231 to be held in escrow and disclosed in accordance with this section. 

‘‘(B) REQUIREMENT FOR AND RESTRICTIONS ON DISCLOSURE.—An accredited 

laboratory under section 231 with whom an election-dedicated voting system technology has been deposited shall—

‘‘(i) hold the technology in escrow; and 

‘‘(ii) disclose technology and information regarding the technology to 

another person if—

‘‘(I) the person is a qualified person described in subparagraph 

(C) who has entered into a nondisclosure agreement with respect 

to the technology which meets the requirements of subparagraph 

(D); or 

‘‘(II) the laboratory is required to disclose the technology to the 

person under State law, in accordance with the terms and conditions applicable under such law. 

‘‘(C) QUALIFIED PERSONS DESCRIBED.—With respect to the disclosure of 

election-dedicated voting system technology by a laboratory under subparagraph (B)(ii)(I), a ‘qualified person’ is any of the following: 

‘‘(i) A governmental entity with responsibility for the administration 

of voting and election-related matters for purposes of reviewing, analyzing, or reporting on the technology. 

‘‘(ii) A party to pre- or post-election litigation challenging the result 

of an election or the administration or use of the technology used in an 

election, including but not limited to election contests or challenges to 

the certification of the technology, or an expert for a party to such litigation, for purposes of reviewing or analyzing the technology to support 

or oppose the litigation, and all parties to the litigation shall have access to the technology for such purposes. 

‘‘(iii) A person not described in clause (i) or (ii) who reviews, analyzes, 

or reports on the technology solely for an academic, scientific, technological, or other investigation or inquiry concerning the accuracy or integrity of the technology. 

‘‘(D) REQUIREMENTS FOR NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS.—A nondisclosure 

agreement entered into with respect to an election-dedicated voting system 

technology meets the requirements of this subparagraph if the agreement—

‘‘(i) is limited in scope to coverage of the technology disclosed under 

subparagraph (B) and any trade secrets and intellectual property rights 

related thereto; 

‘‘(ii) does not prohibit a signatory from entering into other nondisclosure agreements to review other technologies under this paragraph; 

‘‘(iii) exempts from coverage any information the signatory lawfully 

obtained from another source or any information in the public domain; 

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‘‘(iv) remains in effect for not longer than the life of any trade secret 

or other intellectual property right related thereto; 

‘‘(v) prohibits the use of injunctions barring a signatory from carrying 

out any activity authorized under subparagraph (C), including injunctions limited to the period prior to a trial involving the technology; 

‘‘(vi) is silent as to damages awarded for breach of the agreement, 

other than a reference to damages available under applicable law; 

‘‘(vii) allows disclosure of evidence of crime, including in response to 

a subpoena or warrant; 

‘‘(viii) allows the signatory to perform analyses on the technology (including by executing the technology), disclose reports and analyses that 

describe operational issues pertaining to the technology (including 

vulnerabilities to tampering, errors, risks associated with use, failures 

as a result of use, and other problems), and describe or explain why 

or how a voting system failed or otherwise did not perform as intended; 

and 

‘‘(ix) provides that the agreement shall be governed by the trade secret laws of the applicable State. 

‘‘(E) ELECTION-DEDICATED VOTING SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY DEFINED.—For 

purposes of this paragraph, ‘election-dedicated voting system technology’

means ‘voting system software’ as defined under the 2005 voluntary voting 

system guidelines adopted by the Commission under section 222, but excludes ‘commercial-off-the-shelf’ software and hardware defined under those 

guidelines. 

‘‘(9) PROHIBITION OF USE OF WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS DEVICES IN VOTING

SYSTEMS.—No voting system shall contain, use, or be accessible by any wireless, 

power-line, or concealed communication device, except that enclosed infrared 

communications devices which are certified for use in the voting system by the 

State and which cannot be used for any remote or wide area communications 

or used without the knowledge of poll workers shall be permitted. 

‘‘(10) PROHIBITING CONNECTION OF SYSTEM OR TRANSMISSION OF SYSTEM INFORMATION OVER THE INTERNET.—No component of any voting device upon 

which ballots are programmed or votes are cast or tabulated shall be connected 

to the Internet at any time. 

‘‘(11) SECURITY STANDARDS FOR VOTING SYSTEMS USED IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS.—

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—No voting system may be used in an election for Federal office unless the manufacturer of such system and the election officials 

using such system meet the applicable requirements described in subparagraph (B). 

‘‘(B) REQUIREMENTS DESCRIBED.—The requirements described in this subparagraph are as follows: 

‘‘(i) The manufacturer and the election officials shall document the 

secure chain of custody for the handling of all software, hardware, vote 

storage media, ballots, and voter-verified ballots used in connection 

with voting systems, and shall make the information available upon request to the Commission. 

‘‘(ii) The manufacturer shall disclose to an accredited laboratory 

under section 231 and to the appropriate election official any information required to be disclosed under paragraph (8). 

‘‘(iii) After the appropriate election official has certified the electiondedicated and other voting system software for use in an election, the 

manufacturer may not—

‘‘(I) alter such software; or 

‘‘(II) insert or use in the voting system any software not certified 

by the State for use in the election. 

‘‘(iv) At the request of the Commission—

‘‘(I) the appropriate election official shall submit information to 

the Commission regarding the State’s compliance with this subparagraph; and 

‘‘(II) the manufacturer shall submit information to the Commission regarding the manufacturer’s compliance with this subparagraph. 

‘‘(C) DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLICATION OF BEST PRACTICES ON DOCUMENTATION OF SECURE CHAIN OF CUSTODY.—Not later than August 1, 2008, the 

Commission shall develop and make publicly available best practices regarding the requirement of subparagraph (B)(i). 

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‘‘(D) DISCLOSURE OF SECURE CHAIN OF CUSTODY.—The Commission shall 

make information provided to the Commission under subparagraph (B)(i) 

available to any person upon request. 

‘‘(12) DURABILITY AND READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR BALLOTS.—

‘‘(A) DURABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR PAPER BALLOTS.—

‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—All voter-verified paper ballots required to be used 

under this Act (including the paper ballots provided to voters under 

paragraph (13)) shall be marked, printed, or recorded on durable paper. 

‘‘(ii) DEFINITION.— For purposes of this Act, paper is ‘durable’ if it is 

capable of withstanding multiple counts and recounts by hand without 

compromising the fundamental integrity of the ballots, and capable of 

retaining the information marked, printed, or recorded on them for the 

full duration of a retention and preservation period of 22 months. 

‘‘(B) READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR MACHINE-MARKED OR PRINTED PAPER

BALLOTS.—All voter-verified paper ballots completed by the voter through 

the use of a marking or printing device shall be clearly readable by the 

voter without assistance (other than eyeglasses or other personal vision enhancing devices) and by a scanner or other device equipped for individuals 

with disabilities. 

‘‘(13) MANDATORY AVAILABILITY OF PAPER BALLOTS AT POLLING PLACE.—

‘‘(A) REQUIRING BALLOTS TO BE OFFERED AND PROVIDED.—The appropriate 

election official at each polling place in an election for Federal office shall 

offer each individual who is eligible to cast a vote in the election at the polling place the opportunity to cast the vote using a pre-printed paper ballot 

which the individual may mark by hand and which is not produced by a 

direct recording electronic voting machine. If the individual accepts the 

offer to cast the vote using such a ballot, the official shall provide the individual with the ballot and the supplies necessary to mark the ballot, and 

shall ensure (to the greatest extent practicable) that the waiting period for 

the individual to cast a vote is not greater than the waiting period for an 

individual who does not agree to cast the vote using such a paper ballot 

under this paragraph. 

‘‘(B) TREATMENT OF BALLOT.—Any paper ballot which is cast by an individual under this paragraph shall be counted and otherwise treated as a 

regular ballot for all purposes (including, to the greatest extent practicable, 

the deadline for counting the ballot) and not as a provisional ballot, unless 

the individual casting the ballot would have otherwise been required to cast 

a provisional ballot if the individual had not accepted the offer to cast the 

vote using a paper ballot under this paragraph. 

‘‘(C) POSTING OF NOTICE.—The appropriate election official shall ensure 

that at each polling place a notice is displayed prominently which describes 

the obligation of the official to offer individuals the opportunity to cast votes 

using a pre-printed paper ballot under this paragraph. 

‘‘(D) TRAINING OF ELECTION OFFICIALS.—The chief State election official 

shall ensure that election officials at polling places in the State are aware 

of the requirements of this paragraph, including the requirement to display 

a notice under subparagraph (C), and are aware that it is a violation of the 

requirements of this title for an election official to fail to offer an individual 

the opportunity to cast a vote using a pre-printed paper ballot under this 

paragraph. 

‘‘(E) EXCEPTIONS.—This paragraph does not apply with respect to—

‘‘(i) a polling place at which each voting system used in the administration of an election for Federal office uses only pre-printed paper ballots which are marked by hand and which are not produced by a direct 

recording electronic voting machine (other than a system used to meet 

the disability access requirements of paragraph (3)); or 

‘‘(ii) a polling place in operation prior to the date of the election, but 

only with respect to days prior to the date of the election. 

‘‘(F) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This paragraph shall apply with respect to the 

regularly scheduled general election for Federal office in November 2010 

and each succeeding election for Federal office.’’. 

(2) REQUIRING LABORATORIES TO MEET STANDARDS PROHIBITING CONFLICTS OF

INTEREST AS CONDITION OF ACCREDITATION FOR TESTING OF VOTING SYSTEM

HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Section 231(b) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15371(b)) is 

amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: 

‘‘(3) PROHIBITING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST; ENSURING AVAILABILITY OF RESULTS.—

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‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—A laboratory may not be accredited by the Commission 

for purposes of this section unless— ‘‘(i) the laboratory certifies that the only compensation it receives for 

the testing carried out in connection with the certification, decertification, and recertification of the manufacturer’s voting system hardware 

and software is the payment made from the Testing Escrow Account 

under paragraph (4); ‘‘(ii) the laboratory meets such standards as the Commission shall establish (after notice and opportunity for public comment) to prevent the 

existence or appearance of any conflict of interest in the testing carried 

out by the laboratory under this section, including standards to ensure 

that the laboratory does not have a financial interest in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of voting system hardware and software, 

and is sufficiently independent from other persons with such an interest; ‘‘(iii) the laboratory certifies that it will permit an expert designated 

by the Commission to observe any testing the laboratory carries out 

under this section; and ‘‘(iv) the laboratory, upon completion of any testing carried out under 

this section, discloses the test protocols, results, and all communication 

between the laboratory and the manufacturer to the Commission. 

‘‘(B) AVAILABILITY OF RESULTS.—Upon receipt of information under subparagraph (A), the Commission shall make the information available 

promptly to election officials and the public. 

‘‘(4) PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING TESTING; PAYMENT OF USER FEES FOR COMPENSATION OF ACCREDITED LABORATORIES.—

‘‘(A) ESTABLISHMENT OF ESCROW ACCOUNT.—The Commission shall establish an escrow account (to be known as the ‘Testing Escrow Account’) for 

making payments to accredited laboratories for the costs of the testing carried out in connection with the certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software. 

‘‘(B) SCHEDULE OF FEES.—In consultation with the accredited laboratories, the Commission shall establish and regularly update a schedule of 

fees for the testing carried out in connection with the certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software, based 

on the reasonable costs expected to be incurred by the accredited laboratories in carrying out the testing for various types of hardware and software. 

‘‘(C) REQUESTS AND PAYMENTS BY MANUFACTURERS.—A manufacturer of 

voting system hardware and software may not have the hardware or software tested by an accredited laboratory under this section unless—

‘‘(i) the manufacturer submits a detailed request for the testing to the 

Commission; and 

‘‘(ii) the manufacturer pays to the Commission, for deposit into the 

Testing Escrow Account established under subparagraph (A), the applicable fee under the schedule established and in effect under subparagraph (B). 

‘‘(D) SELECTION OF LABORATORY.—Upon receiving a request for testing 

and the payment from a manufacturer required under subparagraph (C), 

the Commission shall select at random (to the greatest extent practicable), 

from all laboratories which are accredited under this section to carry out 

the specific testing requested by the manufacturer, an accredited laboratory 

to carry out the testing. 

‘‘(E) PAYMENTS TO LABORATORIES.—Upon receiving a certification from a 

laboratory selected to carry out testing pursuant to subparagraph (D) that 

the testing is completed, along with a copy of the results of the test as required under paragraph (3)(A)(iv), the Commission shall make a payment 

to the laboratory from the Testing Escrow Account established under subparagraph (A) in an amount equal to the applicable fee paid by the manufacturer under subparagraph (C)(ii). 

‘‘(5) DISSEMINATION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ACCREDITED LABORATORIES.—

‘‘(A) INFORMATION ON TESTING.—Upon completion of the testing of a voting system under this section, the Commission shall promptly disseminate 

to the public the identification of the laboratory which carried out the testing. 

‘‘(B) INFORMATION ON STATUS OF LABORATORIES.—The Commission shall 

promptly notify Congress, the chief State election official of each State, and 

the public whenever—

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‘‘(i) the Commission revokes, terminates, or suspends the accreditation of a laboratory under this section; 

‘‘(ii) the Commission restores the accreditation of a laboratory under 

this section which has been revoked, terminated, or suspended; or 

‘‘(iii) the Commission has credible evidence of significant security failure at an accredited laboratory.’’. 

(B) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 231 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 

15371) is further amended—

(i) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ‘‘testing, certification,’’ and all that 

follows and inserting the following: ‘‘testing of voting system hardware 

and software by accredited laboratories in connection with the certification, decertification, and recertification of the hardware and software 

for purposes of this Act.’’; 

(ii) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ‘‘testing, certification,’’ and all 

that follows and inserting the following: ‘‘testing of its voting system 

hardware and software by the laboratories accredited by the Commission under this section in connection with certifying, decertifying, and 

recertifying the hardware and software.’’; 

(iii) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ‘‘testing, certification, decertification, and recertification’’ and inserting ‘‘testing’’; and 

(iv) in subsection (d), by striking ‘‘testing, certification, decertification, and recertification’’ each place it appears and inserting ‘‘testing’’. 

(C) DEADLINE FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF STANDARDS, ESCROW ACCOUNT, AND

SCHEDULE OF FEES.—The Election Assistance Commission shall establish 

the standards described in section 231(b)(3) of the Help America Vote Act 

of 2002 and the Testing Escrow Account and schedule of fees described in 

section 231(b)(4) of such Act (as added by subparagraph (A)) not later than 

January 1, 2008. 

(D) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the Election Assistance Commission such sums as may be 

necessary to carry out the Commission’s duties under paragraphs (3) and 

(4) of section 231 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (as added by subparagraph (A)). 

(3) SPECIAL CERTIFICATION OF BALLOT DURABILITY AND READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR STATES NOT CURRENTLY USING DURABLE PAPER BALLOTS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—If any of the voting systems used in a State for the regularly scheduled 2006 general elections for Federal office did not require 

the use of or produce durable paper ballots, the State shall certify to the 

Election Assistance Commission not later than 90 days after the date of the 

enactment of this Act that the State will be in compliance with the requirements of sections 301(a)(2), 301(a)(12), and 301(b) of the Help America Vote 

of 2002, as added or amended by this subsection, in accordance with the 

deadline established under this Act, and shall include in the certification 

the methods by which the State will meet the requirements. 

(B) CERTIFICATIONS BY STATES THAT REQUIRE CHANGES TO STATE LAW.—

In the case of a State that requires State legislation to carry out an activity 

covered by any certification submitted under this paragraph, the State shall 

be permitted to make the certification notwithstanding that the legislation 

has not been enacted at the time the certification is submitted and such 

State shall submit an additional certification once such legislation is enacted. 

(4) GRANTS FOR RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTION-DEDICATED VOTING

SYSTEM SOFTWARE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle D of title II of the Help America Vote Act of 

2002 (42 U.S.C. 15401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new part: 

‘‘PART 7—GRANTS FOR RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENT 

OF ELECTION-DEDICATED VOTING SYSTEM SOFTWARE 

‘‘SEC. 297. GRANTS FOR RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTION-DEDICATED VOTING 

SYSTEM SOFTWARE. 

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the National Science Foundation (hereafter in 

this part referred to as the ‘Director’) shall make grants to not fewer than 3 eligible 

entities to conduct research on the development of election-dedicated voting system 

software. 

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‘‘(b) ELIGIBILITY.—An entity is eligible to receive a grant under this part if it submits to the Director (at such time and in such form as the Director may require) 

an application containing—

‘‘(1) certifications regarding the benefits of operating voting systems on election-dedicated software which is easily understandable and which is written exclusively for the purpose of conducting elections; 

‘‘(2) certifications that the entity will use the funds provided under the grant 

to carry out research on how to develop voting systems that run on electiondedicated software and that will meet the applicable requirements for voting 

systems under title III; and 

‘‘(3) such other information and certifications as the Director may require. 

‘‘(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated 

for grants under this part $1,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2007 and 2008, to remain available until expended.’’. 

(B) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents of such Act is amended 

by adding at the end of the items relating to subtitle D of title II the following: 

‘‘PART 7—GRANTS FOR RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTION-DEDICATED VOTING SYSTEM SOFTWARE

‘‘Sec. 297. Grants for research on development of election-dedicated voting system software.’’. 

(d) AVAILABILITY OF ADDITIONAL FUNDING TO ENABLE STATES TO MEET COSTS OF

REVISED REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) EXTENSION OF REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS FOR MEETING REVISED REQUIREMENTS.—Section 257(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 

15407(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: 

‘‘(4) For fiscal year 2007, $1,000,000,000, except that any funds provided 

under the authorization made by this paragraph shall be used by a State only 

to meet the requirements of title III which are first imposed on the State pursuant to the amendments made by section 2 of the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007, or to otherwise modify or replace its voting 

systems in response to such amendments.’’. 

(2) USE OF REVISED FORMULA FOR ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.—Section 252(b) of 

such Act (42 U.S.C. 15402(b)) is amended to read as follows: 

‘‘(b) STATE ALLOCATION PERCENTAGE DEFINED.—

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the ‘State allocation 

percentage’ for a State is the amount (expressed as a percentage) equal to the 

quotient of—

‘‘(A) the voting age population of the State (as reported in the most recent 

decennial census); and 

‘‘(B) the total voting age population of all States (as reported in the most 

recent decennial census). 

‘‘(2) SPECIAL RULE FOR PAYMENTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007.—

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of the requirements payment made to a 

State for fiscal year 2007, the ‘State allocation percentage’ for a State is the 

amount (expressed as a percentage) equal to the quotient of—

‘‘(i) the sum of the number of noncompliant precincts in the State and 

50% of the number of partially noncompliant precincts in the State; 

and 

‘‘(ii) the sum of the number of noncompliant precincts in all States 

and 50% of the number of partially noncompliant precincts in all 

States. 

‘‘(B) NONCOMPLIANT PRECINCT DEFINED.—In this paragraph, a ‘noncompliant precinct’ means any precinct (or equivalent location) within a State for 

which the voting system used to administer the regularly scheduled general 

election for Federal office held in November 2006 did not meet either of the 

requirements described in subparagraph (D). 

‘‘(C) PARTIALLY NONCOMPLIANT PRECINCT DEFINED.—In this paragraph, a 

‘partially noncompliant precinct’ means any precinct (or equivalent location) 

within a State for which the voting system used to administer the regularly 

scheduled general election for Federal office held in November 2006 met 

only one of the requirements described in subparagraph (D). 

‘‘(D) REQUIREMENTS DESCRIBED.—The requirements described in this subparagraph with respect to a voting system are as follows: 

‘‘(i) The primary voting system required the use of or produced durable paper ballots (as described in section 301(a)(12)(A)) for every vote 

cast. 

‘‘(ii) The voting system provided that the entire process of paper ballot verification was equipped for individuals with disabilities.’’. 

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(3) INCREASE IN STATE MINIMUM SHARE OF PAYMENT.—Section 252(c) of such 

Act (42 U.S.C. 15402(c)) is amended— (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting after ‘‘one-half of 1 percent’’ the following: ‘‘(or, in the case of the payment made for fiscal year 2007, 1 percent)’’; and 

(B) in paragraph (2), by inserting after ‘‘one-tenth of 1 percent’’ the following: ‘‘(or, in the case of the payment made for fiscal year 2007, one-half 

of 1 percent)’’. (4) REVISED CONDITIONS FOR RECEIPT OF FUNDS.—Section 253 of such Act (42 

U.S.C. 15403) is amended— (A) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘A State is eligible’’ and inserting ‘‘Except as provided in subsection (f), a State is eligible’’; and 

(B) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ‘‘(f) SPECIAL RULE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007.— ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, a State 

is eligible to receive a requirements payment for fiscal year 2007 if, not later 

than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007, the chief executive officer of the State, or designee, in consultation and coordination with the chief State election official— ‘‘(A) certifies to the Commission the number of noncompliant and partially noncompliant precincts in the State (as defined in section 252(b)(2)); 

and 

‘‘(B) files a statement with the Commission describing the State’s need for 

the payment and how the State will use the payment to meet the requirements of title III (in accordance with the limitations applicable to the use 

of the payment under section 257(a)(4)). 

‘‘(2) CERTIFICATIONS BY STATES THAT REQUIRE CHANGES TO STATE LAW.—In the 

case of a State that requires State legislation to carry out any activity covered 

by any certification submitted under this subsection, the State shall be permitted to make the certification notwithstanding that the legislation has not 

been enacted at the time the certification is submitted and such State shall submit an additional certification once such legislation is enacted.’’. 

(5) PERMITTING USE OF FUNDS FOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR COSTS PREVIOUSLY INCURRED.—Section 251(c)(1) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15401(c)(1)) is amended by 

striking the period at the end and inserting the following: ‘‘, or as a reimbursement for any costs incurred in meeting the requirements of title III which are 

imposed pursuant to the amendments made by section 2 of the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 or in otherwise modifying or replacing voting systems in response to such amendments.’’. 

(6) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION REGARDING STATES RECEIVING OTHER FUNDS FOR

REPLACING PUNCH CARD, LEVER, OR OTHER VOTING MACHINES.—Nothing in the 

amendments made by this subsection or in any other provision of the Help 

America Vote Act of 2002 may be construed to prohibit a State which received 

or was authorized to receive a payment under title I or II of such Act for replacing punch card, lever, or other voting machines from receiving or using any 

funds which are made available under the amendments made by this subsection. 

(7) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this subsection shall apply 

with respect to fiscal years beginning with fiscal year 2007. 

(e) EFFECTIVE DATE FOR NEW REQUIREMENTS.—Section 301(d) of such Act (42 

U.S.C. 15481(d)) is amended to read as follows: 

‘‘(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this section on and 

after January 1, 2006. 

‘‘(2) SPECIAL RULE FOR CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS.—

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the requirements of this section which are first imposed on a State and jurisdiction 

pursuant to the amendments made by section 2 of the Voter Confidence and 

Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 shall apply with respect to the regularly 

scheduled general election for Federal office held in November 2008 and 

each succeeding election for Federal office. 

‘‘(B) DELAY FOR JURISDICTIONS USING CERTAIN PAPER BALLOT PRINTERS OR

CERTAIN PAPER BALLOT-EQUIPPED ACCESSIBLE MACHINES IN 2006.—

‘‘(i) DELAY.—In the case of a jurisdiction described in clause (ii), subparagraph (A) shall apply to the jurisdiction as if the reference in such 

subparagraph to ‘the regularly scheduled general election for Federal 

office held in November 2008 and each succeeding election for Federal 

office’ were a reference to ‘elections for Federal office occurring during 

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2010 and each succeeding year’, but only with respect to the following 

requirements of this section: 

‘‘(I) Paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I) and (II) of subsection (a) (relating to 

access to verification from the durable paper ballot). 

‘‘(II) Paragraph (12) of subsection (a) (relating to durability and 

readability requirements for ballots). 

‘‘(ii) JURISDICTIONS DESCRIBED.—A jurisdiction described in this 

clause is—

‘‘(I) a jurisdiction which used thermal reel-to-reel voter verified 

paper ballot printers attached to direct recording electronic voting 

machines for the administration of the regularly scheduled general 

election for Federal office held in November 2006 and which will 

continue to use such printers attached to such voting machines for 

the administration of elections for Federal office held in 2008; or 

‘‘(II) a jurisdiction which used voting machines which met the accessibility requirements of paragraph (3) of subsection (a) (as in effect with respect to such election) for the administration of the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held in November 2006 and which used or produced a paper ballot, and which 

will continue to use such voting machines for the administration of 

elections for Federal office held in 2008.’’. 

SEC. 3. ENHANCEMENT OF ENFORCEMENT OF HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002. 

Section 401 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15511) is amended—

(1) by striking ‘‘The Attorney General’’ and inserting ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The 

Attorney General’’; and 

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsections: 

‘‘(b) FILING OF COMPLAINTS BY AGGRIEVED PERSONS.—

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—A person who is aggrieved by a violation of section 301, 

302, or 303 which has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur may file a 

written, signed, notarized complaint with the Attorney General describing the 

violation and requesting the Attorney General to take appropriate action under 

this section. 

‘‘(2) RESPONSE BY ATTORNEY GENERAL.—The Attorney General shall respond 

to each complaint filed under paragraph (1), in accordance with procedures established by the Attorney General that require responses and determinations to 

be made within the same (or shorter) deadlines which apply to a State under 

the State-based administrative complaint procedures described in section 

402(a)(2). 

‘‘(c) CLARIFICATION OF AVAILABILITY OF PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION.—Nothing in 

this section may be construed to prohibit any person from bringing an action under 

section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983) (including 

any individual who seeks to enforce the individual’s right to a voter-verified paper 

ballot, the right to have the voter-verified paper ballot counted in accordance with 

this Act, or any other right under subtitle A of title III) to enforce the uniform and 

nondiscriminatory election technology and administration requirements under sections 301, 302, and 303. 

‘‘(d) NO EFFECT ON STATE PROCEDURES.—Nothing in this section may be construed to affect the availability of the State-based administrative complaint procedures required under section 402 to any person filing a complaint under this subsection.’’. 

SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT FOR MANDATORY MANUAL AUDITS BY HAND COUNT. 

(a) MANDATORY MANUAL AUDITS.—Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 

(42 U.S.C. 15481 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new subtitle: 

‘‘Subtitle C—Mandatory Manual Audits 

‘‘SEC. 321. REQUIRING AUDITS OF RESULTS OF ELECTIONS. 

‘‘(a) REQUIRING AUDITS.—

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In accordance with this subtitle, each State shall administer, without advance notice to the precincts selected, audits of the results of 

elections for Federal office held in the State (and, at the option of the State or 

jurisdiction involved, of elections for State and local office held at the same time 

as such election) consisting of random hand counts of the voter-verified paper 

ballots required to be produced and preserved pursuant to section 301(a)(2). 

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‘‘(2) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN ELECTIONS.—A State shall not be required to administer an audit of the results of an election for Federal office under this subtitle if the winning candidate in the election— ‘‘(A) had no opposition on the ballot; or 

‘‘(B) received 80% or more of the total number of votes cast in the election, as determined on the basis of the final unofficial vote count. ‘‘(b) DETERMINATION OF ENTITY CONDUCTING AUDITS; APPLICATION OF GAO INDE- PENDENCE STANDARDS.—The State shall administer audits under this subtitle 

through an entity selected for such purpose by the State in accordance with such 

criteria as the State considers appropriate consistent with the requirements of this 

subtitle, except that the entity must meet the general standards established by the 

Comptroller General to ensure the independence (including the organizational independence) of entities performing financial audits, attestation engagements, and performance audits under generally accepted government accounting standards. ‘‘(c) REFERENCES TO ELECTION AUDITOR.—In this subtitle, the term ‘Election Auditor’ means, with respect to a State, the entity selected by the State under subsection 

(b). 

‘‘SEC. 322. NUMBER OF BALLOTS COUNTED UNDER AUDIT. 

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b), the number of voterverified paper ballots which will be subject to a hand count administered by the 

Election Auditor of a State under this subtitle with respect to an election shall be 

determined as follows: ‘‘(1) In the event that the unofficial count as described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election is less than 1 percent of the total votes cast 

in that election, the hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots shall occur 

in at least 10 percent of all precincts or equivalent locations (or alternative 

audit units used in accordance with the method provided for under subsection 

(b)) in the Congressional district involved (in the case of an election for the 

House of Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other election for Federal office). ‘‘(2) In the event that the unofficial count as described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election is greater than or equal to 1 percent but 

less than 2 percent of the total votes cast in that election, the hand counts of 

the voter-verified paper ballots shall occur in at least 5 percent of all precincts 

or equivalent locations (or alternative audit units used in accordance with the 

method provided for under subsection (b)) in the Congressional district involved 

(in the case of an election for the House of Representatives) or the State (in the 

case of any other election for Federal office). ‘‘(3) In the event that the unofficial count as described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election is equal to or greater than 2 percent of the 

total votes cast in that election, the hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots shall occur in at least 3 percent of all precincts or equivalent locations (or 

alternative audit units used in accordance with the method provided for under 

subsection (b)) in the Congressional district involved (in the case of an election 

for the House of Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other election 

for Federal office). 

‘‘(b) USE OF ALTERNATIVE MECHANISM.—Notwithstanding subsection (a), a State 

may adopt and apply an alternative mechanism to determine the number of voterverified paper ballots which will be subject to the hand counts required under this 

subtitle with respect to an election, so long as the alternative mechanism uses the 

voter-verified paper ballots to conduct the audit and the National Institute of Standards and Technology determines that the alternative mechanism will be at least as 

statistically effective in ensuring the accuracy of the election results as the procedure under this subtitle. 

‘‘SEC. 323. PROCESS FOR ADMINISTERING AUDITS. 

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Election Auditor of a State shall administer an audit 

under this section of the results of an election in accordance with the following procedures: 

‘‘(1) Within 24 hours after the State announces the final unofficial vote count 

(as defined by the State) in each precinct in the State, the Election Auditor 

shall determine and then announce the precincts in the State in which it will 

administer the audits. 

‘‘(2) With respect to votes cast at the precinct or equivalent location on or before the date of the election (other than provisional ballots described in paragraph (3)), the Election Auditor shall administer the hand count of the votes 

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on the voter-verified paper ballots required to be produced and preserved under 

section 301(a)(2)(A) and the comparison of the count of the votes on those ballots with the final unofficial count of such votes as announced by the State. ‘‘(3) With respect to votes cast other than at the precinct on the date of the 

election (other than votes cast before the date of the election described in paragraph (2)) or votes cast by provisional ballot on the date of the election which 

are certified and counted by the State on or after the date of the election, including votes cast by absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters 

under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, the Election 

Auditor shall administer the hand count of the votes on the applicable voterverified paper ballots required to be produced and preserved under section 

301(a)(2)(A) and the comparison of the count of the votes on those ballots with 

the final unofficial count of such votes as announced by the State. ‘‘(b) USE OF ELECTION PERSONNEL.—In administering the audits, the Election 

Auditor may utilize the services of election administration personnel of the State or 

jurisdiction, including poll workers, without regard to whether or not the personnel 

have professional auditing experience. ‘‘(c) LOCATION.—The Election Auditor shall administer an audit of an election at 

the location where the ballots cast in the election are stored and counted after the 

date of the election, and in the presence of those personnel who under State law 

are responsible for the custody of the ballots. ‘‘(d) SPECIAL RULE IN CASE OF DELAY IN REPORTING ABSENTEE VOTE COUNT.—In 

the case of a State in which the final count of absentee and provisional votes is not 

announced until after the expiration of the 7-day period which begins on the date 

of the election, the Election Auditor shall initiate the process described in subsection 

(a) for administering the audit not later than 24 hours after the State announces 

the final unofficial vote count for the votes cast at the precinct or equivalent location 

on or before the date of the election, and shall initiate the administration of the 

audit of the absentee and provisional votes pursuant to subsection (a)(3) not later 

than 24 hours after the State announces the final unofficial count of such votes. ‘‘(e) ADDITIONAL AUDITS IF CAUSE SHOWN.— ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—If the Election Auditor finds that any of the hand counts 

administered under this section do not match the final unofficial tally of the results of an election, the Election Auditor shall administer hand counts under 

this section of such additional precincts (or equivalent jurisdictions) as the Election Auditor considers appropriate to resolve any concerns resulting from the 

audit and ensure the accuracy of the results. ‘‘(2) ESTABLISHMENT AND PUBLICATION OF PROCEDURES GOVERNING ADDI- TIONAL AUDITS.—Not later than August 1, 2008, each State shall establish and 

publish procedures for carrying out the additional audits under this subsection, 

including the means by which the State shall resolve any concerns resulting 

from the audit with finality and ensure the accuracy of the results. 

‘‘(f) PUBLIC OBSERVATION OF AUDITS.—Each audit conducted under this section 

shall be conducted in a manner that allows public observation of the entire process. 

‘‘SEC. 324. SELECTION OF PRECINCTS. 

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (c), the selection of the precincts in the State in which the Election Auditor of the State shall administer the 

hand counts under this subtitle shall be made by the Election Auditor on an entirely 

random basis using a uniform distribution in which all precincts in a Congressional 

district have an equal chance of being selected, in accordance with procedures adopted by the Commission, except that at least one precinct shall be selected at random 

in each county. 

‘‘(b) PUBLIC SELECTION.—The random selection of precincts under subsection (a) 

shall be conducted in public, at a time and place announced in advance. 

‘‘(c) MANDATORY SELECTION OF PRECINCTS ESTABLISHED SPECIFICALLY FOR ABSENTEE BALLOTS.—If a State establishes a separate precinct for purposes of counting 

the absentee ballots cast in an election and treats all absentee ballots as having 

been cast in that precinct, and if the state does not make absentee ballots sortable 

by precinct and include those ballots in the hand count administered with respect 

to that precinct, the State shall include that precinct among the precincts in the 

State in which the Election Auditor shall administer the hand counts under this 

subtitle. 

‘‘(d) DEADLINE FOR ADOPTION OF PROCEDURES BY COMMISSION.—The Commission 

shall adopt the procedures described in subsection (a) not later than March 31, 

2008, and shall publish them in the Federal Register upon adoption. 

‘‘SEC. 325. PUBLICATION OF RESULTS. 

‘‘(a) SUBMISSION TO COMMISSION.—As soon as practicable after the completion of 

an audit under this subtitle, the Election Auditor of a State shall submit to the 

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Commission the results of the audit, and shall include in the submission a comparison of the results of the election in the precinct as determined by the Election Auditor under the audit and the final unofficial vote count in the precinct as announced 

by the State and all undervotes, overvotes, blank ballots, and spoiled, voided or cancelled ballots, as well as a list of any discrepancies discovered between the initial, 

subsequent, and final hand counts administered by the Election Auditor and such 

final unofficial vote count and any explanation for such discrepancies, broken down 

by the categories of votes described in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 323(a). 

‘‘(b) PUBLICATION BY COMMISSION.—Immediately after receiving the submission of 

the results of an audit from the Election Auditor of a State under subsection (a), 

the Commission shall publicly announce and publish the information contained in 

the submission. 

‘‘(c) DELAY IN CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS BY STATE.—

‘‘(1) PROHIBITING CERTIFICATION UNTIL COMPLETION OF AUDITS.—No State may 

certify the results of any election which is subject to an audit under this subtitle 

prior to—

‘‘(A) to the completion of the audit (and, if required, any additional audit 

conducted under section 323(d)(1)) and the announcement and submission 

of the results of each such audit to the Commission for publication of the 

information required under this section; and 

‘‘(B) the completion of any procedure established by the State pursuant 

to section 323(d)(2) to resolve discrepancies and ensure the accuracy of results. 

‘‘(2) DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION OF AUDITS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.—In 

the case of an election for electors for President and Vice President which is 

subject to an audit under this subtitle, the State shall complete the audits and 

announce and submit the results to the Commission for publication of the information required under this section in time for the State to certify the results 

of the election and provide for the final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of such electors prior to the deadline described 

in section 6 of title 3, United States Code. 

‘‘SEC. 326. PAYMENTS TO STATES. 

‘‘(a) PAYMENTS FOR COSTS OF CONDUCTING AUDITS.—In accordance with the requirements and procedures of this section, the Commission shall make a payment 

to a State to cover the costs incurred by the State in carrying out this subtitle with 

respect to the elections that are the subject of the audits conducted under this subtitle. 

‘‘(b) CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE AND ANTICIPATED COSTS.—

‘‘(1) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED.—In order to receive a payment under this section, a State shall submit to the Commission, in such form as the Commission 

may require, a statement containing—

‘‘(A) a certification that the State will conduct the audits required under 

this subtitle in accordance with all of the requirements of this subtitle; 

‘‘(B) a notice of the reasonable costs incurred or the reasonable costs anticipated to be incurred by the State in carrying out this subtitle with respect to the elections involved; and 

‘‘(C) such other information and assurances as the Commission may require. 

‘‘(2) AMOUNT OF PAYMENT.—The amount of a payment made to a State under 

this section shall be equal to the reasonable costs incurred or the reasonable 

costs anticipated to be incurred by the State in carrying out this subtitle with 

respect to the elections involved, as set forth in the statement submitted under 

paragraph (1). 

‘‘(3) TIMING OF NOTICE.—The State may not submit a notice under paragraph 

(1) until candidates have been selected to appear on the ballot for all of the elections for Federal office which will be the subject of the audits involved. 

‘‘(c) TIMING OF PAYMENTS.—The Commission shall make the payment required 

under this section to a State not later than 30 days after receiving the notice submitted by the State under subsection (b). 

‘‘(d) RECOUPMENT OF OVERPAYMENTS.—No payment may be made to a State under 

this section unless the State agrees to repay to the Commission the excess (if any) 

of—

‘‘(1) the amount of the payment received by the State under this section with 

respect to the elections involved; over 

‘‘(2) the actual costs incurred by the State in carrying out this subtitle with 

respect to the elections involved. 

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‘‘(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated 

to the Commission for fiscal year 2008 and each succeeding fiscal year $100,000,000 

for payments under this section. 

‘‘SEC. 327. EXCEPTION FOR ELECTIONS SUBJECT TO RECOUNT UNDER STATE LAW PRIOR TO 

CERTIFICATION. 

‘‘(a) EXCEPTION.—This subtitle does not apply to any election for which a recount 

under State law will commence prior to the certification of the results of the election, including but not limited to a recount required automatically because of the 

margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes 

in the election, but only if each of the following applies to the recount: 

‘‘(1) The recount commences prior to the determination and announcement by 

the Election Auditor under section 323(a)(1) of the precincts in the State in 

which it will administer the audits under this subtitle. 

‘‘(2) If the recount would apply to fewer than 100% of the ballots cast in the 

election—

‘‘(A) the number of ballots counted will be at least as many as would be 

counted if an audit were conducted with respect to the election in accordance with this subtitle; and 

‘‘(B) the selection of the precincts in which the recount will be conducted 

will be made in accordance with the random selection procedures applicable 

under section 324. 

‘‘(3) The recount for the election meets the requirements of section 323(e) (relating to public observation). 

‘‘(4) The State meets the requirements of section 325 (relating to the publication of results and the delay in the certification of results) with respect to the 

recount. 

‘‘(b) CLARIFICATION OF EFFECT ON OTHER REQUIREMENTS.— Nothing in this section may be construed to waive the application of any other provision of this Act 

to any election (including the requirement set forth in section 301(a)(2) that the 

voter verified paper ballots serve as the vote of record and shall be counted by hand 

in all audits and recounts, including audits and recounts described in this subtitle). 

‘‘SEC. 328. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

‘‘This subtitle shall apply with respect to elections for Federal office beginning 

with the regularly scheduled general elections held in November 2008.’’. 

(b) AVAILABILITY OF ENFORCEMENT UNDER HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002.—

Section 401 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15511), as amended by section 3, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking the period at the end and inserting the following: ‘‘, or the requirements of subtitle C of title III.’’; 

(2) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ‘‘303’’ and inserting ‘‘303, or subtitle C of 

title III,’’; and 

(3) in subsection (c)—

(A) by striking ‘‘subtitle A’’ and inserting ‘‘subtitles A or C’’, and 

(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting the following: ‘‘, or the 

requirements of subtitle C of title III.’’. 

(c) GUIDANCE ON BEST PRACTICES FOR ALTERNATIVE AUDIT MECHANISMS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than May 1, 2008, the Director of the National 

Institute for Standards and Technology shall establish guidance for States that 

wish to establish alternative audit mechanisms under section 322(b) of the Help 

America Vote Act of 2002 (as added by subsection (a)). Such guidance shall be 

based upon scientifically and statistically reasonable assumptions for the purpose of creating an alternative audit mechanism that will be at least as effective 

in ensuring the accuracy of election results and as transparent as the procedure 

under subtitle C of title III of such Act (as so added). 

(2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out paragraph (1) $100,000, to remain available until expended. 

(d) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents of such Act is amended by adding at the end of the items relating to title III the following: 

‘‘Subtitle C—Mandatory Manual Audits 

‘‘Sec. 321. Requiring audits of results of elections. 

‘‘Sec. 322. Number of ballots counted under audit. 

‘‘Sec. 323. Process for administering audits. 

‘‘Sec. 324. Selection of precincts. 

‘‘Sec. 325. Publication of results. 

‘‘Sec. 326. Payments to States. 

‘‘Sec. 327. Exception for elections subject to recount under State law prior to certification. 

‘‘Sec. 328. Effective date.’’. 

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1 Examples of news articles include: Tinsley, Anna M. and Anthony Spangler. ‘‘Vote Spike 

Blamed on Program Snafu.’’ Fort Worth Star-Telegram, March 9, 2006; Tinsley, Anna M. ‘‘Judicial Candidate Files Challenge.’’ Fort Worth Star-Telegram, April 6, 2006; ‘‘Pottawattamie County Recorder’s Race Leads to Recount.’’ The Associated Press, June 8, 2006; Rabin, Charles and 

Darran Simon. ‘‘Glitches Cited in Early Voting; Early Voters are Urged to Cast Their Ballots 

with Care Following Scattered Reports of Problems with Heavily Used Machines.’’ The Miami 

Herald, October 28, 2006; McCormick, John. ‘‘Voting Equipment Glitches Lingering.’’ Chicago 

Tribune, November 2, 2006; Smith, Tammy M. ‘‘New Voting Machines Pose Election Day ProbSEC. 5. REPEAL OF EXEMPTION OF ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION FROM CERTAIN 

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 205 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 

15325) is amended by striking subsection (e). 

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with 

respect to contracts entered into by the Election Assistance Commission on or after 

the date of the enactment of this Act. 

SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

Except as otherwise provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act 

shall apply with respect to the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office 

in November 2008 and each succeeding election for Federal office. 

PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION

In 2002, in response to the public’s mounting concern about election administration problems, Congress passed the Help America 

Vote Act (HAVA) P.L. 107–252 (42 U.S.C. 15301) to improve the 

voting process in a number of ways. One of the hallmark changes 

allowed citizens to cast provisional ballots if their eligibility was 

questioned at the polls. The eligibility of these provisional ballot 

voters would be verified before the ballots were ultimately counted, 

as Congress guaranteed that no eligible voter should ever leave the 

polling station without casting a ballot. 

Another improvement to the election process involved the replacement of punch card and lever voting machines with paperless 

direct recording electronic voting machines. Although these machines are generally easy to use and, if properly equipped, accessible to voters with disability and language assistance needs, the 

2006 election revealed that these machines suffer from an essential 

flaw: the digital results reported from these machines cannot be 

audited independently. The only output available is a digital readout that relies on the accuracy of the electronic software during the 

voting process and cannot be recounted. As a result, many of these 

paperless DRE voting machines are not properly equipped to independently demonstrate voter intent during a recount or audit. 

If a voter casts a vote on an paperless electronic voting machine, 

the only thing the voter verifies—the information displayed on the 

touch screen surface for a few moments while the voter votes—disappears forever the moment the voter hits the cast vote button and 

leaves the voting booth. No election official, no computer scientist, 

and no voting system vendor can reconstruct what that voter intended because the voter votes in secret. 

Because of the secret ballot, only the voter can verify that his or 

her intention is recorded correctly, and it is impossible for the voter 

to verify an electronic record. 

When questions arise, candidates, voters and election officials 

alike are left to trust voting system vendors who insist their tradesecret-protected software counts votes accurately. This difficulty became glaringly apparent in the 2006 election, when reports revealed voting problems in numerous jurisdictions, producing a lack 

of voter confidence and uncertainty regarding election results.1

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lems.’’ Sun Herald (Mississippi), November 7, 2006; ‘‘Voting Problems Reported in NJ.’’ New Jersey—WABC, November 7, 2006; Glendenning, Lauren. ‘‘Voting Glitch in Fairfax, Some Machine 

Malfunctions Could Fuel Arguments for Recount.’’ The Connection Newspaper (Virginia), November 8, 2006; ‘‘Some Electronic Voting Machines Not ’up to date’.’’ Pittsburg Tribune-Review, November 8, 2006; Burk, Jennifer. ‘‘Bibb Voting Glitches Nothing Out of the Ordinary, Carr Says.’’ The Telegraph (Georgia), November 9, 2006; ‘‘Disabled Voters Disappointed with Touch-Screen 

Problems.’’ WISH—TV, November 10, 2006; King, Lauren. ‘‘Count on Recount in E. City Mayor’s Race.’’ The Virginian-Pilot, November 11, 2005; ‘‘Arkansas Mayoral Candidate Disputes Tally 

of Zero Votes, Says He Voted for Himself.’’ The Associated Press, November 11, 2006; ‘‘Hendersonville Voters Back Building Height Restriction.’’ Tryon Daily Bulletin, November 13, 2006; ‘‘Another Voting Glitch in Baldwin County.’’ The Associated Press, November 14, 2006; Spoto, 

Maryann. ‘‘Voting Mishap Blamed on Software Problems, Some Ballots Counted Twice, Sparking 

a Call for a Check of Totals at Shore.’’ Star-Ledger (New Jersey), November 14, 2006; Peters, 

Paul. ‘‘Communication Breakdown.’’ Missoula Independent, November 16, 2006; ‘‘E-voting Glitch 

Turns up in Texas.’’ CNet.News, November 16, 2006; Toland, Bill. ‘‘If You Think the Computer ’Flipped’ Your Vote, You’re Not Alone; Though Solid Evidence is Hard to Pin Down, Complaints 

Abound About Voting Machines.’’ Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, December 10, 2006. 

In order to restore public confidence and ensure transparency in 

future elections, the law must be revised to require an independent 

paper copy of each vote—verified by the voter him or herself—to 

serve as a check on any electronic tallies reported by the voting 

machines. If a jurisdiction chooses an electronic system to tally 

votes, the vote of record—the ballot—must be tangible, not electronic. 

H.R. 811 allows jurisdictions to continue to rely on the expediency, convenience and accessibility of computer-assisted voting, 

while preserving the critical ability to independently confirm that 

the will of the voters is reflected in the final results. Votes represent the most basic right of citizens in a free society, and voters 

must be given the confidence that they are accurately tallied and 

easily recounted. 

In amending H.R. 811, the Committee has taken into account 

concerns raised by state and local officials and other stakeholders 

concerning the timing of implementation. As reported, the bill allows jurisdictions that used any paper-ballot-based voting system 

in 2006 a waiver until the first election in 2010 to meet new requirements. If H.R. 811 is enacted promptly, these states will have 

adequate time to implement the new requirements. Only the jurisdictions that used voting systems without any sort of voter-verified 

paper ballot in 2006 must replace or upgrade those systems by November 2008. This means that only six states would be required to 

replace all of their voting machines by 2008 (Delaware, Georgia, 

Louisiana, Maryland, South Carolina, and Tennessee). 

Four states, New Mexico, Nevada, North Carolina, and West Virginia, recently converted to voter verifiable paper ballot systems in 

less than one year: 

• New Mexico enacted a law on March 2, 2006 requiring 

conversion from a mixed system with paperless electronic voting machines to a uniform statewide system using paper optical scan ballots with accessible ballot marking devices. All 33 

counties fully deployed the new system eight months later, in 

time for the 2006 mid-term election. 

• Nevada’s then-Secretary of State, now Representative 

Dean Heller, mandated in December 2003 that the state would 

obtain new voting systems with voter-verified paper records. 

By the following August (again, eight months later), 16 of 17 

counties deployed voter-verified paper record systems countywide in time for the primary, and all counties had them for the 

November 2004 presidential election. 

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• North Carolina enacted a law requiring voter verified 

paper records on August 26, 2005. Eight months later, in time 

for the May 2006 primary, the entire state had completed the 

conversion process to new systems, including RFP, testing, certification and training. • West Virginia enacted a law requiring voter-verified paper 

records in May 2005; every county had new voter-verified 

paper record equipment in place for the primary the following 

year. 

To delay implementation beyond 2008 in jurisdictions that have 

no paper ballots at all would reduce trust in the process of democracy. 

Concern has been raised over relying on paper ballots as the primary vehicle for recounts and audits where thermal reel-to-reel 

systems remain in place. In the primary in Cuyahoga County, Ohio 

in 2006, where thermal paper printer retrofits were used, approximately 10% of the ballots were lost, missing or destroyed; however, 

thermal paper ballot printers used in (for example) Mississippi and 

Nevada did not experience similar failure rates. As amended, H.R. 

811 addresses this concern by providing that if it is demonstrated 

by clear and convincing evidence that the paper ballots have been 

compromised, and that a sufficient number of the ballots have been 

so compromised that the results of the election could be changed, 

the appropriate remedy will be determined in accordance with applicable State law, except that the electronic tally shall not be used 

as the exclusive basis for determining the official certified vote 

tally. 

During the 109th Congress, the House narrowly approved H.R. 

4844, ‘‘The Federal Election Integrity Act of 2006’’ introduced by 

former Representative Henry Hyde, which required all states to demand voters provide government-issued photo identification in 

order to vote in the 2008 election. By the time H.R. 4844 was considered on the floor, more than 100 civil rights organizations and 

citizen groups wrote to the House in opposition to any measures 

aimed at creating voter identification and proof of citizenship requirements to vote. The Committee considered and rejected two 

similar provisions proposed as amendments to H.R. 811 during 

Committee consideration of the bill. 

The Committee’s opposition to these photo ID proposals rests on 

several factors. In addition to the lack of evidence demonstrating 

voter fraud as a rampant problem that needs to be addressed, requiring Americans to show identification at the polls is contrary to 

the foundation of our democracy. Photo ID laws disproportionately 

impact the elderly, people with disabilities, rural voters, students, 

racial and ethnic minorities, the homeless, low-income people, frequent movers, and members of large households—all of whom are 

less likely to have current and valid photo ID. Requiring government-issued photo identification to vote also amounts to a modernday poll tax because acquiring the supporting documents required 

to obtain government photo ID takes both time and money. A birth 

certificate typically costs $10 to $15, a passport over $100, and naturalization papers, if they are lost or damaged and need to be replaced, cost $220. Lastly, voters with photo ID can be turned away 

for more benign reasons as well. If an ID card does not contain the 

voter’s current address or name, which is true of countless Amerimstockstill on PROD1PC66 with HEARING

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cans who move or marry, he or she will likely be turned away from 

the polls. Instead of increasing voter confidence and participation, 

onerous voter identification requirements will only serve to skew 

election results by removing countless eligible voters from the process. 

The Committee also assured reliable voting for all eligible voters 

by working extensively with prominent organizations and advocates in the disability community to ensure the standard of providing every voter access to a private and independent ballot, established by HAVA, is not violated. Diane Cordry Golden, Ph.D., 

Director, Missouri Assistive Technology conveyed in testimony presented before the House Administrations’ Subcommittee on Elections, March 15, 2007, hearing that Congress should not restrict 

the rights of the disabled to vote privately and independently with 

new laws. H.R. 811 does not change section 301(a)(3)(A) of HAVA, 

which requires each polling place be equipped with a voting machines that is accessible for individuals with disabilities, including 

nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, in a 

manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as other voters. 

As Ms. Golden testified, ‘‘Accessible verification technology will 

only develop if the law clearly requires it, and the technology will 

only be adequate if reasonable time and appropriate resources are 

allocated to support that development.’’ H.R. 811 provides clear indication that voting systems must be accessible for all voters. In 

fact, H.R. 811 extends further protections for persons with disabilities by requiring that any such voting system mush adhere to the 

following: 

(1) allow the voter to ‘‘privately and independently verify the permanent paper ballot through the conversion of the human-readable 

printed or marked vote selections into accessible form;’’ (2) ensure that ‘‘the entire process of ballot verification and vote 

casting is equipped for individuals with disabilities;’’ and 

(3) not preclude the supplemental use of Braille and tactile ballots. 

H.R. 811 does not alter satisfaction of the HAVA mandate requiring voting systems be equipped for individuals with disabilities in 

each polling place. 

Lastly, it is the intention of the Committee that the term ‘‘election dedicated voting system technology,’’ as used in Section 2(c)(1) 

of the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act, and in 

what will be Section 301(a)(8) of the Help America Vote Act, as 

amended by the same, be construed broadly to include all elements 

of election dedicated software, code, and programming files, all of 

which are to be disclosed in electronic form. In addition to the elements of ‘‘voting system software’’ included in the definition of ‘‘voting system software’’ contained in the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, it is the intention of the Committee that all of the 

elements and components mentioned in Sections 5.4 through 5.9 of 

the Election Assistance Commission’s Voting System Testing and 

Certification Manual Version 1.0, as well as subsequent versions 

and similar software or equivalent going forward, also be disclosed. 

The exclusion of ‘‘commercial off the shelf’’ software and hardware 

is intended to apply to the definition of ‘‘voting system software’’

included in the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, and the 

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elements and components mentioned in Sections 5.4 through 5.9 of 

the Election Assistance Commission’s Voting System Testing and 

Certification Manual Version 1.0 Attached to this Report as Exhibits C and D are the definition of ‘‘voting system software’’ and the 

definition of ‘‘commercial off the shelf’’ software and hardware, as 

defined by the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, and Sections 5.4 through 5.9 of the Election Assistance Commission’s Voting System Testing and Certification Manual Version 1.0. The 

Committee worked tirelessly with stakeholders to form a consensus 

that will allow for the protection of intellectual property while ensuring that manufacturers will provide adequate evidence to demonstrate that their products functioned as intended. 

SECTION BY SECTION SUMMARY OF THE LEGISLATION

The bill is to amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) 

to require a voter-verified permanent paper ballot under Title III 

of that Act, and for other purposes. 

Section 1.—Short title—provides a short title. 

Section 2.—Promoting accuracy, integrity, and security through 

voter-verified permanent paper ballot.—amends Section 301 of 

HAVA to require all voting systems to require the use of or produce 

a voter verified paper ballot, increase accessibility, and implement 

security requirements as more specifically set forth below. 

Section (2)(a)(1): ‘‘Ballot Verification and Audit Capacity.’’ 

Verification—each voting system must ‘‘require the use of or 

produce’’ an ‘‘individual durable voter-verified paper ballot’’ that 

‘‘shall be created by or made available for inspection and 

verification by the voter before the voter’s vote is cast and counted.’’ Examples are listed, including optical scan ballots, mail in ballots and print-outs from direct recording electronic (DRE) voting 

machines. Optical scan and other paper-ballot-based systems already meet the requirement; this bill is not exclusively about requiring DREs to print paper records, but it does require that. 

Voters must be allowed to correct ‘‘errors made by the system’’

on the paper ballot. (HAVA Section 301(a)(1), which is not changed 

by H.R. 811, already allows voters to correct errors made by themselves, and/or to change their mind and change their vote.) While 

machine errors in ballot production should not be an issue with optical scan ballots, which are created by the voter, machine errors 

could be an issue with DREs, which print ballots themselves after 

receiving data input. If the DRE prints an erroneous ballot, the 

voter must be given an opportunity to correct it. 

Preservation—the voting system ‘‘shall not preserve the voterverifiable paper ballots in any manner that makes it possible, at 

any time after the ballot is cast, to associate’’ the voter with his 

or her vote. This provision protects the secrecy of the ballot. 

The voter-verified ballots shall be used as the official ballots for 

purposes of any recount or audit and must be preserved by election 

officials. They do not leave the polling station with voters, thus 

minimizing vote-selling risks. 

Manual Audit Capacity—The paper ballots ‘‘shall be suitable for 

a manual audit equivalent to that of a paper ballot voting system 

and shall be counted by hand in any recount or audit.’’ This provision in effect rules out cryptographic audit schemes likely to be inmstockstill on PROD1PC66 with HEARING

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comprehensible to the average voter. Audits required under the bill 

must be done by hand count. 

In the event of discrepancies between an electronic tally and a 

hand count, the paper ballots ‘‘shall be the true and correct records 

of the votes cast.’’ The paper records are deemed the vote of record 

because they are the only ones verified by the voter, rather than 

the voting machine. Strictly electronic ‘‘recounts’’ (the computer rereporting its first reported total) would not be acceptable under 

H.R. 811. 

Compromised paper ballots—If it is demonstrated by clear and 

convincing evidence that the paper ballots have been compromised, 

and that a sufficient number of the ballots have been so compromised that the results of the election would be changed, ‘‘the determination of the appropriate remedy . . . shall be made in accordance with applicable State law, except that the electronic tally 

shall not be used as the exclusive basis for determining the official 

certified vote tally.’’ Section (2)(a)(2)—Language Access—clarifies that the language 

access requirements of the Voting Rights Act apply to the voter 

verified paper ballots and the instructional notices called for under 

the bill. 

Section 2(b)(1)—amends in part HAVA Section 301(a)(3), ‘‘Accessibility for Individuals with Disabilities’’. HAVA’s existing subparagraph 301(a)(3)(A) is unchanged; it requires voting systems to be ‘‘accessible for individuals with disabilities . . . in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for 

other voters.’’ HAVA’s existing subparagraph 301(a)(3)(C) is also unchanged; it 

requires that voting systems shall, ‘‘if purchased with funds made 

available under title II on or after January 1, 2007, meet the voting 

system standards for disability access (as outlined in this paragraph).’’ This deadline has passed and the provision applies to 

HAVA’s requirements; the new requirements of H.R. 811 have later 

deadlines (as set forth below). 

HAVA’s remaining subparagraph (B) in Section 301(a)(3) is preserved and amended as follows: it requires voting systems to satisfy the accessibility requirement in subparagraph 301(a)(3)(A) 

‘‘through the use of at least one voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling place.’’ H.R. 811 extends this 

by requiring any such system to: 

(4) allow the voter to ‘‘privately and independently verify the permanent paper ballot through the conversion of the human-readable 

printed or marked vote selections into accessible form;’’

(5) ensure that ‘‘the entire process of ballot verification and vote 

casting is equipped for individuals with disabilities;’’ and 

(6) not preclude the supplemental use of Braille and tactile ballots. 

Section 2(b)(2)—NIST Accessibility Study—adds to HAVA a requirement that the National Institute of Standards and Technology 

(NIST) study, test and develop accessible ballot marking and paper 

ballot verification mechanisms and best practices pertaining thereto; this requirement also applies to enhancing language access 

mechanisms. $3 million is authorized for the study, and the results 

are due by December 2008. Accessible systems that used or promstockstill on PROD1PC66 with HEARING

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duced paper ballots and were used in 2006 may be used until 2010, 

while improved systems are developed. 

Section 2(b)(3)—VVSG Accessibility Standards—requires that the 

voluntary voting system guidelines established by the Election Assistance Commission apply the same accessibility standards for access to ballot verification as are applied to access to voting. 

Section 2(c)(1)—Additional Voting System Requirements— HAVA’s current ‘‘Voting System Requirements’’ include (a) the opportunity for 2nd chance voting (changing your mind); (b) a requirement for ‘‘a permanent paper record’’ (but not a voter-verified 

paper record); (c) disability access; (d) language access; (e) compliance with federal error rate standards; and (f) a uniform definition 

of what constitutes a ‘‘vote’’. H.R. 811 adds to those the requirements that: 

(1) Vote of record instruction—a notice must be posted in each 

polling place instructing voters that the paper ballot shall serve as 

the vote of record in all recounts and audits, and not to leave the 

voting booth without verifying it. 

(2) Ban on uncertified, undisclosed software—no voting system 

shall ‘‘contain or use’’ any ‘‘undisclosed software,’’ or any software 

not certified by the State,’’ ‘‘at any time’’ (vendors’’ and others’ proprietary rights to the software remain, enabling them to license 

and sell it (etc.); downloading and use of undisclosed, uncertified 

‘‘patches’’ at the last minute, however, are prohibited). Test labs 

are to hold the software in escrow and release it to qualified reviewers who sign non-disclosure agreements protecting intellectual 

property and trade secrets. 

(3) Ban on wireless devices—voting systems must not ‘‘contain, 

use or be accessible by any wireless, power-line, remote, wide area 

or concealed communications device,’’ except enclosed infrared communications devices that cannot be used for remote or wide area 

communications. 

(4) Ban on Internet connections—‘‘no component of any voting device upon which ballots are programmed or votes are cast or tabulated shall be connected to the Internet at any time.’’

(5) Security standards for voting systems—no voting system shall 

be used unless 

(i) its manufacturer and the election officials using it document 

the secure chain of custody for handling the software, hardware, 

vote storage media and ballots; the Election Assistance Commission 

(EAC) is to develop best practices for same by August 2008; 

(ii) the manufacturer discloses its code to the test labs as required under item (2); 

(iii) the manufacturer does not, after election officials have certified the software, alter the software or insert or use in the system 

any software not certified by the State; and 

(iv) election officials submit information regarding the State’s 

compliance with the foregoing to the EAC upon request; the EAC 

is to disclose information confirming secure chain of custody to the 

public upon request. 

(6) Durability and readability of paper ballots— All voter-verified 

paper ballots shall be: 

(i) marked, printed or recorded on ‘‘durable’’ paper, defined as 

‘‘capable of withstanding multiple counts and recounts by hand 

without compromising the fundamental integrity of the ballots,’’

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and capable of retaining the information marked, printed or recorded on them for 22 months. 

(ii) ‘‘clearly readable by the voter without assistance’’ (other than 

eyeglasses, etc) and ‘‘by a scanner or other device equipped for individuals with disabilities.’’

(7) Mandatory availability of paper ballots at the Polls—Election 

officials at the polls shall make available to any individual who is 

eligible to vote the option of casting such vote by pre-printed paper 

ballot which is not produced by a direct recording electronic voting 

machine. The election officials shall, to the greatest extent practicable ensure that the waiting time to cast a vote on paper is not 

greater than the waiting period to cast a vote on a machine. All 

such ballots shall be counted as regular ballots (unless the voter 

was otherwise required to vote provisionally). Election officials are 

to be trained in this right and notice of this right is to be posted. 

Section 2(c)(2)—Testing Escrow Account—adds to HAVA’s existing ‘‘Certification and Testing’’ requirements, which currently mandates that the EAC will provide for the certification of voting system hardware and software by accredited labs, and makes it optional for States to provide for certification through those labs. H.R. 

811 adds the following requirements to HAVA’s provisions describing the lab approval process: 

(1) A lab cannot be accredited unless (i) it certifies that the only 

payment it receives for testing is from the Testing Escrow Account 

(see item (2)); (ii) it prohibits, in accordance with EAC protocols, 

‘‘the existence or appearance’’ of conflicts of interest with respect to 

its dealings with the manufacturers who hire the labs to test their 

equipment; (iii) the lab permits an expert designated by the EAC 

to observe testing; (iv) the lab discloses ‘‘the test protocols, results, 

and all communication between’’ the lab and the manufacturer. 

The EAC must disclose the results. 

(2) The EAC must, by January 1, 2008, establish a ‘‘Testing Escrow Account’’ and a schedule of testing fees; the manufacturer requests a test and pays the appropriate fee, upon which the EAC 

randomly (to the greatest extent practicable) selects a lab to conduct the test, and pays the lab upon completion of the test and submission of the results. 

(3) The EAC must disclose the identity of the lab that conducted 

the testing, and notify Congress, the chief state election official in 

each State and the public if it suspends, revokes or restores the accreditation of, or has credible evidence of a significant security failure at, any laboratory. 

Section 2(c)(3)—Certification as to compliance with new requirements—Requires each State not currently using durable paper ballots to certify to the EAC, within 90 days of enactment of the bill, 

that it will be in compliance with the durability, accessibility and 

readability requirements for paper ballots and the methods by 

which the State will meet the requirements. States are authorized 

to make the certification even if their legislatures have not met. 

Section 2(c)(4)—NSF Software Study—The National Science 

Foundation is to award grants to at least 3 entities for the purpose 

of researching and developing election dedicated voting systems 

software. $3 million is authorized (half in FY 2007 and half in FY 

2008). 

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Section 2(d)—Funding for new voting system requirements—provides funding to meet the requirements of Section 2. In particular, 

it amends HAVA Section 257, which authorized for $3 billion over 

fiscal years 2003, 2004 and 2005 to be paid to the states to help 

them meet their Title III (Voting System Standards) requirements, 

by: 

(1) adding $1 billion to be paid to states to help them meet the 

new paper record and other requirements of Title III imposed by 

H.R. 811; 

(2) establishing a formula for disbursement of funds, allocating 

the bulk of the funds to ‘‘noncompliant’’ (those with neither durable 

paper ballots nor accessible paper ballot verification) and ‘‘partially 

noncompliant’’ (those with either durable paper ballots or accessible paper ballot verification) precincts; 

(3) increasing the minimum requirements payment to each State 

to 1% (.5% for the territories); 

(4) requiring States to identify their noncompliant and partially 

compliant precincts and to describe their need for the payments 

and how they will spend the funds within 90 days of enactment 

(States are authorized to make this certification even if their legislatures have not met); 

(5) allowing the funds to be used to reimburse states for costs incurred to meet such requirements prior to enactment of H.R. 811; 

and 

(6) allowing States to receive funds even if they already received 

HAVA funds to replace voting equipment. 

HAVA provides, and H.R. 811 preserves the requirement, that all 

funds appropriated under this section remain available without fiscal year limitation until expended. 

Section 2(e)—Delayed Implementation for jurisdictions that used 

paper-ballot-based systems in 2006—The durable paper ballot and 

accessible ballot verification (scanning or conversion of vote selections from the paper ballot itself) requirements of Section 2 of the 

bill are to be implemented in time for the November 2008 election, 

except that 

(i) Jurisdictions that used thermal reel-to-reel paper ballot printers in 2006 and 

(ii) Jurisdictions that used accessible system in 2006 that used 

or produced a paper ballot, 

and will continue to use them in 2008, are authorized to keep using 

them until the first federal election in 2010. 

Section 3.—Enhancement of Enforcement of Help America Vote 

Act—amends the enforcement provisions of HAVA to clarify the 

rights of individuals and the Attorney General, respectively, to pursue legal resolution of complaints pertaining to violations of HAVA 

(as amended by H.R. 811) and discrepancies revealed by audits (as 

further described in Section 5). 

Section 401 of HAVA allows the Attorney General to bring a civil 

action to enforce Sections 301 (pertaining to Voting System Standards), 302 (pertaining to provisional ballots) and Section 303 of 

HAVA (pertaining to computerized statewide voter registration 

databases). Section 402 of HAVA requires States to set up administrative complaint procedures through which voters can file complaints with respect to violations of Title III. 

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H.R. 811 (Sections 3 and Section 5(b)) would amend HAVA Section 401 to: 

(1) allow individuals to file complaints with the Attorney General 

pertaining to violations of 301, 302, 303 and the new subtitle C of 

Title III (pertaining to routine random audits); and 

(2) require the Attorney General to respond on the same (or 

shorter) time frame as applies to State-based administrative complaint procedures; 

(3) clarify that nothing in the section may be construed to prohibit any person from bringing a civil action on his or her own behalf under section 1979 of 42 U.S.C. 1983 to enforce sections 301, 

302, 303 and Subtitle C of Title III; and 

(4) clarify that nothing in the section may be construed to affect 

the availability of Section 402’s State-based administrative complaint procedures. 

Section 4.—Requirement for Mandatory Manual Audits by Hand 

Count—adds to HAVA a requirement for routine, random audits to 

be administered by a State audit board. 

Section 4(a)—Requiring audits (Section 321(a))—adds a new subtitle C to HAVA Title III, ‘‘Mandatory Manual Audits,’’ which requires each State to administer, ‘‘without advance notice to the precincts selected,’’ ‘‘random hand counts of the voter-verified paper 

ballots.’’ At the option of the States, elections for State and local 

office may be included in the audits. Exceptions—Audits do not 

have to be conducted in 

(i) Unopposed races and 

(ii) Races determined by 80% or more of the vote 

Section 321(b)—Requirement of ‘‘independence’’—The entity conducting the audits (the ‘‘Election Auditor’’) must satisfy the requirement of ‘‘independence,’’ including ‘‘organizational independence,’’ as defined in GAO Government Accounting Standards. 

Section 322(a)—Number of Ballots Counted Under Audit—sets 

forth the number of ballots that shall be subject to a hand count: 

(1) at least 3% of the precincts in the case of elections decided by 

more than a 2% margin; (2) at least 5% of the precincts in the case 

of races decided by a margin of between 1% and 2%; and (3) at 

least 10% of the precincts in the case of races decided by a margin 

of less than 1%. 

Section 322(b)—Alternative ballot sampling method—allows 

States to use an ‘‘alternative mechanism’’ to determine the number 

of ballots selected for a hand count, so long as NIST determines 

that it is ‘‘at least as statistically effective in ensuring the accuracy 

of the election results’’ and equally transparent as the procedure 

set forth in the bill. 

Section 323(a)—‘‘Process for Administering Audits—sets forth the 

process for administering the audits: 

(1) Within 24 hours after the State announces the final unofficial 

vote count, the Audit Board shall determine and then announce the 

precincts in which the audits are to be conducted. 

(2) Early votes are to be included in the audit. 

(3) Mail-in (including military and overseas) and provisional 

votes are to be included in the audit. 

Sections 323(b) and (c)—Personnel and ballot custody—provide 

that election administration personnel may be used to conduct audits, regardless of whether they have auditing experience, and that 

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the audits must be done where the ballots are kept and in the presence of the ballot custodian. 

Section 323(d)—Two-stage audit to include absentee and provisional ballots—sets forth a procedure for including absentee and 

provisional votes not counted on election day: if more than 7 days 

elapse between the date of the election and the date upon which 

mail-in and provisional votes are counted, the audit process shall 

be conducted in 2 stages. The 1st will commence within 24 hours 

of the announced totals of all early and election-day votes, and the 

2nd within 24 hours of the announced totals for all mail-in and 

provisional votes. 

Section 323(e)—Additional audits—sets forth a procedure by 

which additional audits can be conducted if cause is shown: 

(1) If the Audit Board finds that the ‘‘results don’t match,’’ the 

Election Auditor shall conduct hand counts of ‘‘such additional precincts . . . as the Election Auditor considers appropriate to resolve 

any concerns resulting from the audit and to ensure the accuracy 

of the results;’’ and 

(2) by August 1, 2008, each State must establish and publish a 

procedure by which it will ‘‘resolve any concerns resulting from the 

audit with finality and ensure the accuracy of the results.’’

Section 323(f)—Publicly observable—requires the audits be conducted in a manner ‘‘that allows public observation of the entire 

process.’’

Section 324(a)—Selection of Precincts—sets forth the manner in 

which precincts to be hand counted are to be selected: 

(1) the Election Auditor shall select the precincts ‘‘on an entirely 

random basis using a uniform distribution in which all precincts in 

a Congressional District have an equal chance of being selected’’; 

and 

(2) ‘‘at least one precinct shall be selected at random in each 

county.’’

Section 324(b)—Public selection process—requires the random selection to be conducted in public (in a sense similar to public lottery 

drawings). 

Section 324(c)—Absentee ballot precinct—provides that if a State 

establishes a separate precinct for absentee ballots, and if the absentee ballots are not sortable by precinct, then the absentee ballot 

precinct will be included in the precincts selected for audit. 

Section 324(d)—Publication of selection procedure—requires the 

EAC to adopt and publish the random selection procedures in the 

Federal Register by March 31, 2008. 

Section 325(a)—Publication of Results—requires the Audit 

Boards to announce and submit to the EAC for publication the 

audit results, in accordance with the following procedures: 

(1) ‘‘as soon as practicable after the completion’’ of the audit, the 

Board is to submit to the EAC the results of the audit 

(2) The announcement/publication shall include a comparison of 

the results as announced by the jurisdiction as well as a list of any 

discrepancies discovered . . . and an explanation for such discrepancies. 

(3) The announcement/publication shall, include undervotes and 

spoiled ballots and be broken down by the categories of early, dayof, mail-in and provisional ballots 

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Section 325(b)—Publication by Commission—requires the EAC to 

publish the results ‘‘immediately after receiving’’ them. 

Section 325(c)—Delay in Certification of Results by State—requires that the audits (and any additional audits) be conducted and 

completed, discrepancies be resolved in accordance with state procedures called for by Section 323(c), and the results sent to the 

EAC, prior to certification of results by a State and, in Presidential 

elections, prior to appointment of electors. 

Section 326—Payments to States—provides that the EAC shall 

make payments to the states to cover the costs of the audits. In 

order to receive payments, the States must certify that it will conduct the required audits and submit a ‘‘notice of reasonable costs’’

of the audits. The EAC will then issue payment equal to ‘‘the reasonable costs.’’ The notice cannot be submitted until the ballots are 

final and include all of the candidates. Payment is due to the state 

within 30 days of receipt of the notice. $100 million is authorized 

each fiscal year to make the payments. 

Section 327—Exception for Elections Subject to Automatic Recount Under State Law—pre-empts the possibility that a recount 

that will commence prior to certification (including but not limited 

to recounts triggered automatically under state law due to a narrow margin of victory) could take place at the same time as an 

audit—especially a large audit as called for due to narrow margin 

of victory under the bill. Several states commence such automatically-triggered and other recounts or allow other recounts to commence prior to certification. The recount, however: 

• Must commence prior to when the audit would have commenced; 

• Must be by hand count of the paper ballots; 

• Must include at least as many ballots as would have been 

called for by the audit and use the same random selection 

method called for by the audit section if the recount would be 

less than a 100% recount; 

• Must be conducted in the same transparent manner as required by the audit section; and 

• Must ensure that all discrepancies are reported and resolved prior to certification as called for by the audit section. 

Section 328—Effective Date—establishes a November 2008 implementation date for the audits. 

Section 4(b)—Conforming changes to HAVA enforcement provisions—further amends HAVA’s Section 401 (see Section 3 above) to 

clarify HAVA’s enforcement provisions. 

Section 4(c)—NIST Guidance re: Alternative Method—NIST must 

develop and publish guidance with respect to the alternative ballot 

sampling method described in 322(b) by May 1, 2008; $100,000 is 

authorized to NIST for such development. 

Section 5.—Repeal of exemption of Election Assistance Commission from certain government contracting requirements—Repeals 

HAVA’s exemption of the EAC from government contracting requirements, effective as of the date of enactment of H.R. 811. 

Section 6.—Effective date—Provides that the implementation 

deadline for HR 811 is November 2008, except as otherwise provided in the bill. 

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IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE 

Within 90 Days of Enactment ...................................... Paperless States to certify how they will meet requirements of the legislation 

States to identify the number of non-compliant and 

partially-compliant precincts they have and describe how the State will use the funding under 

the bill to meet the requirements of the bill 

January 2008 ................................................................ Establishment of testing escrow account and fee 

schedule 

March 2008 .................................................................. EAC to publish procedures for random selection of 

precincts 

May 2008 ...................................................................... NIST to publish guidance on best practices for alternative ballot sampling methods 

August 2008 ................................................................. EAC best practices for documenting secure chain of 

custody to be published 

States to publish produces by which they will resolve discrepancies in audits 

December 2008 ............................................................ NIST to complete accessible ballot verification study 

January 2010 (First federal election in 2010) ............ States using paper-ballot based systems (thermal 

reel-to-reel and/or accessible systems that used 

or produced a paper ballot) in 2006 to be in 

compliance with durable paper and accessible 

paper ballot verification requirements of H.R. 811 

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF THE LEGISLATION

INTRODUCTION AND REFERRAL

On February 5, 2007, Mr. Holt, along with 168 members of the 

House, introduced H.R. 811, which was referred to the Committee 

on House Administration. The Committee referred the legislation 

to the Subcommittee on Elections on March 23, 2007. 

HEARINGS

The Committee on House Administration Subcommittee on Elections held three hearings relating to issues encompassed in H.R. 

811. 

On March 15, 2007, the Subcommittee on Elections held its first 

hearing on matters relating to HR 811 titled ‘‘Election Reform 

Hearing: Machines & Software.’’

Members present: Subcommittee Chair Zoe Lofgren, Juanita 

Millender-McDonald, Susan Davis, and Kevin McCarthy. 

Witnesses: 

Panel 1: 

1. The Honorable Eric Clark—Secretary of State, State of Mississippi 

2. Diane Cordry Golden, Ph.D.—Director, Missouri Assistive 

Technology 

3. Ted Selker, Ph.D.—Director, Voting Technology Project, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

4. Mr. Kelly Pierce—Disability Specialist, Cook County (IL) 

State’s Attorney Office 

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Panel 2: 

1. Brit Williams, Ph.D.—Professor of Computer Science and Information Systems, Kennesaw State University 

2. David Wagner, Ph.D.—Associate Professor, University of California, Berkeley 

3. Mr. Brian Behlendorf—Founder and Chief Technology Officer, 

CollabNet 

4. Mr. Hugh J. Gallagher—Managing Director, Election System 

Acquisition and Management Services, Inc. 

5. Mr. Matt Zimmerman—Staff Attorney, Electronic Frontier 

Foundation 

On March 20, 2007, the Committee on House Administration 

Subcommittee on Elections held its second hearing relating to the 

subject matter of H.R. 811 titled ‘‘Election Reform Hearing: Auditing.’’

Members present: Subcommittee Chair Zoe Lofgren, Charlie Gonzalez, Susan Davis, Kevin McCarthy, and Vern Ehlers. 

Witnesses: 

Panel 1: 

1. Ion Sancho—Supervisor of Elections, Leon County (FL) 

2. Matt Damschroder—Director, Franklin County (OH) Board of 

Elections 

Panel 2: 

1. Candice Hoke—Director, Cleveland State University Center 

for Election Integrity 

2. R. Doug Lewis—Executive Director, National Association of 

Election Officials 

3. Lawrence Norden—Counsel, Brennan Center for Justice 

4. Tammy Patrick—Federal Compliance Officer, Maricopa County (AZ) Elections Department 

5. Pamela Smith—President, Verified Voter 

On March 23, 2007, Committee on House Administration Subcommittee on Elections held its third hearing on matters relating 

to H.R. 811. 

Members present: Subcommittee Chair Zoe Lofgren, Juanita 

Millender-McDonald, Charlie Gonzalez, Susan Davis, Kevin McCarthy, and Vern Ehlers. 

Witnesses: 

Panel 1: 

1. The Honorable Charlie Crist, Governor of Florida 

Panel 2: 

1. The Honorable Rush Holt 

2. The Honorable Tom Petri 

Panel 3: 

1. The Honorable Debra Bowen, Secretary of State of California 

2. The Honorable Chris Nelson, Secretary of State of South Dakota 

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Panel 4: 

1. Tanya Clay House, Director of Public Policy, People for the 

American Way 

2. George Gilbert, Director of Elections, Guilford County, North 

Carolina 

3. Edward Felten, Ph.D., Professor of Computer Science and Public Affairs, Princeton University 

4. Don Norris, Ph.D., Professor of Public Policy, University of 

Maryland, Baltimore County 

Panel 5: 

1. Noel Runyan, President, Personal Data Systems 

2. Dr. Harold Snider, Access for the Handicap, Inc. 

3. Warren Stewart, Policy Director, VoteTrustUSA 

4. Commissioner Gail W. Mahoney, Jackson County, Michigan; 

Chair, National Association of Counties 

Also, full Committee Chairwoman Juanita Millender-McDonald 

and Ranking Member Vernon Ehlers hosted a voting machine 

forum on March 15, 2007, which gave Members of Congress and 

their staff an opportunity to learn more about voting systems firsthand. The companies in attendance were: Avante, Automark, 

Diebold Election Systems, Hart InterCivic, Inc., IVS—Vote by 

Phone, Perfect Voting System, Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc., 

Unisyn Voting Solutions. 

Companies that were unable to attend but provided materials for 

distribution included: Election Systems and Software, Unilect Corporation, VoteHere, Inc. 

MARKUP

On Tuesday, May 8, 2007, the Committee met to mark up H.R. 

811. The Committee favorably reported H.R. 811, as amended, by 

a recorded vote (6–3), a quorum being present. 

MATTERS REQUIRED UNDER THE RULES OF THE HOUSE

COMMITTEE RECORD VOTES

Clause 3(b) of House rule XIII requires the results of each record 

vote on an amendment or motion to report, together with the 

names of those voting for and against, to be printed in the committee report. The first amendment introduced was an amendment 

in the nature of a substitute by Ms. Lofgren. All of the following 

votes, until the vote on the Lofgren substitute, were on amendments to the Lofgren substitute. 

Ehlers’ Amendment to the Lofgren Substitute. 

The first recorded vote of the mark-up was on an amendment in 

the nature of a substitute to the Lofgren substitute offered by Mr. 

Ehlers. The amendment directs the EAC with the help of NIST to 

establish guidelines and standards for new Federal election equipment. The substitute also requires States to submit both audit 

plans and security implementation plans to the EAC that would be 

implemented in the states by the 2010 elections. The vote was 3–

5 and the amendment was not agreed to. 

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Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Brady .................................................................................................................................. — X — 

Ms. Lofgren ............................................................................................................................... — — — 

Mr. Capuano ............................................................................................................................. — X — 

Mr. Gonzalez .............................................................................................................................. — X — 

Mrs. Davis (CA) ......................................................................................................................... — X — 

Mr. Davis (AL) ........................................................................................................................... — X — 

Mr. Ehlers .................................................................................................................................. X — — 

Mr. Lungren ............................................................................................................................... X — — 

Mr. McCarthy ............................................................................................................................. X — — 

Total ............................................................................................................................. 3 5 — 

Record votes on additional amendments to the Lofgren Substitute 

The Committee then voted on Mr. Ehlers’ Amendment #1, which 

would give election officials the choice of deciding what the official 

ballot of record should be in case of recount and audits. The vote 

was 3–6 and the amendment was not agreed to. 

Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Brady .................................................................................................................................. — X — 

Ms. Lofgren ............................................................................................................................... — X — 

Mr. Capuano ............................................................................................................................. — X — 

Mr. Gonzalez .............................................................................................................................. — X — 

Mrs. Davis (CA) ......................................................................................................................... — X — 

Mr. Davis (AL) ........................................................................................................................... — X — 

Mr. Ehlers .................................................................................................................................. X — — 

Mr. Lungren ............................................................................................................................... X — — 

Mr. McCarthy ............................................................................................................................. X — — 

Total ............................................................................................................................. 3 6 — 

The Committee then voted on Mr. Lungren’s Amendment #1, 

which would allow states to continue the to use of electronic voting 

machines that use thermal paper in perpetuity. The vote was 3– 5 and the amendment was not agreed to. 

Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Brady .................................................................................................................................. — X — 

Ms. Lofgren ............................................................................................................................... — X — 

Mr. Capuano ............................................................................................................................. — X — 

Mr. Gonzalez .............................................................................................................................. — X — 

Mrs. Davis (CA) ......................................................................................................................... — X — 

Mr. Davis (AL) ........................................................................................................................... — — — 

Mr. Ehlers .................................................................................................................................. X — — 

Mr. Lungren ............................................................................................................................... X — — 

Mr. McCarthy ............................................................................................................................. X — — 

Total ............................................................................................................................. 3 5 — 

The Committee then voted on Mr. McCarthy’s Amendment #1, 

which would allow states to continue use electronic voting machines not equipped with any voter verified paper ballots for early 

voting. The vote was 3–5 and the amendment was not agreed to. 

Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Brady .................................................................................................................................. — X — 

Ms. Lofgren ............................................................................................................................... — X — 

Mr. Capuano ............................................................................................................................. — X — 

Mr. Gonzalez .............................................................................................................................. — — — 

Mrs. Davis (CA) ......................................................................................................................... — X — 

Mr. Davis (AL) ........................................................................................................................... — X — 

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Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Ehlers .................................................................................................................................. X — —

Mr. Lungren ............................................................................................................................... X — —

Mr. McCarthy ............................................................................................................................. X — —

Total ............................................................................................................................. 3 5 —

The Committee then voted on Mr. Ehlers’ Amendment #2, which 

would require states to submit audit plans to the Election Assistance Commission by the 2010 election cycle. The vote was 3–5 and 

the amendment was not agreed to. 

Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Brady .................................................................................................................................. — X —

Ms. Lofgren ............................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Capuano ............................................................................................................................. — X —

Mr. Gonzalez .............................................................................................................................. — — —

Mrs. Davis (CA) ......................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Davis (AL) ........................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Ehlers .................................................................................................................................. X — —

Mr. Lungren ............................................................................................................................... X — —

Mr. McCarthy ............................................................................................................................. X — —

Total ............................................................................................................................. 3 5 —

The Committee then voted on Mr. Lungren’s Amendment #2, 

which would allow states to continue the use of paperless electronic 

voting machines to comply with the disability access provisions of 

HAVA. The vote was 3–5 and the amendment was not agreed to. 

Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Brady .................................................................................................................................. — X —

Ms. Lofgren ............................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Capuano ............................................................................................................................. — X —

Mr. Gonzalez .............................................................................................................................. — — —

Mrs. Davis (CA) ......................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Davis (AL) ........................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Ehlers .................................................................................................................................. X — —

Mr. Lungren ............................................................................................................................... X — —

Mr. McCarthy ............................................................................................................................. X — —

Total ............................................................................................................................. 3 5 —

The Committee then voted on Mr. Lungren’s Amendment #3, 

which would remove the software code disclosure language entirely 

from the legislation. The vote was 3–6 and the amendment was not 

agreed to. 

Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Brady .................................................................................................................................. — X —

Ms. Lofgren ............................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Capuano ............................................................................................................................. — X —

Mr. Gonzalez .............................................................................................................................. — X —

Mrs. Davis (CA) ......................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Davis (AL) ........................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Ehlers .................................................................................................................................. X — —

Mr. Lungren ............................................................................................................................... X — —

Mr. McCarthy ............................................................................................................................. X — —

Total ............................................................................................................................. 3 6 —

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The Committee then voted on Mr. McCarthy’s Amendment #2, 

which would force voters to show government-issued photo identification at the polls by 2010. The vote was 3–5 and the amendment 

was not agreed to. 

Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Brady .................................................................................................................................. — X —

Ms. Lofgren ............................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Capuano ............................................................................................................................. — X —

Mr. Gonzalez .............................................................................................................................. — — —

Mrs. Davis (CA) ......................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Davis (AL) ........................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Ehlers .................................................................................................................................. X — —

Mr. Lungren ............................................................................................................................... X — —

Mr. McCarthy ............................................................................................................................. X — —

Total ............................................................................................................................. 3 5 —

The Committee then voted on Mr. McCarthy’s Amendment #3, 

which would require voters to show government-issued photo identification at the polls by 2010. If voters could not produce such 

identification, they must sign affidavits swearing to their identity. 

The vote was 3–5 and the amendment was not agreed to. 

Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Brady .................................................................................................................................. — X —

Ms. Lofgren ............................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Capuano ............................................................................................................................. — X —

Mr. Gonzalez .............................................................................................................................. — — —

Mrs. Davis (CA) ......................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Davis (AL) ........................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Ehlers .................................................................................................................................. X — —

Mr. Lungren ............................................................................................................................... X — —

Mr. McCarthy ............................................................................................................................. X — —

Total ............................................................................................................................. 3 5 —

The Committee then voted on Mr. Lungren’s Amendment #4, 

which would remove the private right of action section of the legislation. The vote was 2–5 and the amendment was not agreed to. 

Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Brady .................................................................................................................................. — X —

Ms. Lofgren ............................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Capuano ............................................................................................................................. — X —

Mr. Gonzalez .............................................................................................................................. — X —

Mrs. Davis (CA) ......................................................................................................................... — — —

Mr. Davis (AL) ........................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Ehlers .................................................................................................................................. — — —

Mr. Lungren ............................................................................................................................... X — —

Mr. McCarthy ............................................................................................................................. X — —

Total ............................................................................................................................. 2 5 —

The Committee then voted on Mr. McCarthy’s Amendment #4, 

which would suspend the requirements of the bill until the authorization amount is fully appropriated. The vote was 3–5 and the 

amendment was not agreed to. 

Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Brady .................................................................................................................................. — X —

Ms. Lofgren ............................................................................................................................... — X —

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Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Capuano ............................................................................................................................. — X —

Mr. Gonzalez .............................................................................................................................. — X —

Mrs. Davis (CA) ......................................................................................................................... — — —

Mr. Davis (AL) ........................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Ehlers .................................................................................................................................. X — —

Mr. Lungren ............................................................................................................................... X — —

Mr. McCarthy ............................................................................................................................. X — —

Total ............................................................................................................................. 3 5 —

The Committee then voted on Mr. Lungren’s Amendment #5, 

which would delay the implementation date until 2012. The vote 

was 3–5 and the amendment was not agreed to. 

Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Brady .................................................................................................................................. — X —

Ms. Lofgren ............................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Capuano ............................................................................................................................. — X —

Mr. Gonzalez .............................................................................................................................. — X —

Mrs. Davis (CA) ......................................................................................................................... — — —

Mr. Davis (AL) ........................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. Ehlers .................................................................................................................................. X — —

Mr. Lungren ............................................................................................................................... X — —

Mr. McCarthy ............................................................................................................................. X — —

Total ............................................................................................................................. 3 5 —

Lofgren Amendment in the nature of a substitute 

Offered by Ms. Lofgren. The substitute addresses a number of 

concerns that were raised by the minority, interest groups and 

other stakeholders during the timeframe between introduction of 

the original bill and the mark-up. For example, the amendment addresses many of the concerns regarding implementation dates and 

funding of the legislation. All jurisdictions that used any paper-ballot-based voting system in 2006, including thermal reel-to-reel systems and accessible systems that used a paper ballot in any manner have until the first election in 2010 to meet new requirements. 

Additionally, funding for the voting system requirements has been 

increased from $300 million to $1 billion. Furthermore, entities 

chosen by the State to conduct the audits must satisfy the requirements of ‘‘independence’’ set forth in the GAO’s ‘‘Government Accounting Standards.’’

The Lofgren substitute changes the original bill in the following 

areas: 

Effective Date for New Requirements—January 2008 deadline has 

been replaced with bifurcated deadline: 

• All jurisdictions that used any paper-ballot-based voting 

system at all in 2006 (including thermal reel-to-reel systems 

and accessible systems that used a paper ballot in any manner) 

have until the first election in 2010 to meet new requirements; 

• All jurisdictions that had no voter verified paper ballots at 

all in 2006 have until November 2008 to meet all of the requirements (and they are not entitled to a waiver). 

Funding for Voting System Requirements—has been increased 

from $300 million to $1 billion. 

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Ban on Internet connections—has been expanded to include, in 

addition to devices upon which votes are cast, devices upon which 

votes are tabulated and ballots are programmed. 

Software disclosure—the requirement that software be disclosed 

to any person has been replaced by a requirement that electiondedicated software be released to qualified persons who sign nondisclosure agreements protecting intellectual property rights and 

trade secrets. 

Extension of Authorization of EAC—has been removed. 

Military and overseas voting—overseas ballots are included in 

audits, but the requirement that the DOD and EAC develop protocols for treatment of paper ballots has been removed. 

Vote of Record language—now provides that even if paper ballots 

have been demonstrated to have been compromised in numbers exceeding the margin of victory, ‘‘the electronic tally shall not be used 

as the exclusive basis for determining the official certified vote 

tally.’’ Audit Board—The Audit Board has been removed, but it has 

been replaced with a requirement that the entity chosen by the 

State to conduct the audits satisfy the requirements of ‘‘independence’’ set forth in the GAO’s ‘‘Government Accounting Standards.’’ How many federal elections will be audited—Unopposed elections 

and elections determined by more than an 80% margin of victory 

are not required to be audited. 

Audit procedures and ballot custody—Audits must be conducted 

in the place where the ballots are stored and counted after the election, and in the presence of the ballot custodians. 

Funding for audits—an explicit authorization of $100 million annually has been added. 

Recounts that occur prior to certification (and might overlap with 

an audit)—Section 327 requires that any pre-certification recount 

done instead of an audit be done by hand count of the paper ballots, and it has been expanded to provide that if the recount is not 

a 100% count, that at least as many ballots be counted, the selection of those ballots be just as random, the recount be just as publicly observable, and the results be published, all as is required of 

audits. 

Mandatory availability of paper ballots at the polls—adds that 

any eligible voter shall be given the option by the election officials 

of casting a vote by a pre-printed paper ballot not produced by a 

direct recording electronic voting machine. The election officials 

shall, to the greatest extent practicable ensure that the waiting 

time to cast a vote on paper is not greater than the waiting period 

to cast a vote on a machine. It further requires the posting of notice regarding this right of voters to access the paper ballot, and 

additional poll worker training regarding this requirement. It exempts early voting, since voters exercising this option have a separate opportunity to access a paper ballot. The amendment takes effect in November 2010. 

Amendments to the Lofgren Substitute agreed to by voice vote 

The amendment offered by Mr. Capuano provides every voter 

voting in a polling place the opportunity to vote using a pre-printed 

paper ballot not produced by a direct recording electronic voting 

machine, regardless of the circumstance. It further requires the 

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posting of notice regarding the right of voters to access the paper 

ballot, and additional poll worker training regarding this requirement. It also exempts early voting, since voters exercising this option have a separate opportunity to access a paper ballot. The 

amendment takes effect in November 2010. 

The amendment offered by Mr. Gonzalez makes two technical 

corrections to the Lofgren substitute. The first change, which was 

contemplated in an earlier version of the substitute, replaces the 

term ‘‘Commission’’ in a section where it should state ‘‘laboratory 

accredited under Section 231.’’ Mr. Gonzalez’s amendment also inserts the amended clause (iv) of Section 2(c)(1) of the substitute to 

read as follows: ‘‘(iv) At the request of the Commission—‘‘(I) the appropriate election official shall submit information to the Commission regarding the State’s compliance with this subparagraph; and ‘‘(II) the manufacturer shall submit information to the Commission 

regarding the manufacturer’s compliance with this subparagraph.’’ Both are conforming changes that did nothing to affect the substance of the substitute 

The Committee then voted on the amendment in the nature of 

a substitute, as amended, offered by Ms. Lofgren. The vote was 6– 3 and the amendment was agreed to. 

Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Brady .................................................................................................................................. X — —

Ms. Lofgren ............................................................................................................................... X — —

Mr. Capuano ............................................................................................................................. X — —

Mr. Gonzalez .............................................................................................................................. X — —

Mrs. Davis (CA) ......................................................................................................................... X — —

Mr. Davis (AL) ........................................................................................................................... X — —

Mr. Ehlers .................................................................................................................................. — X —

Mr. Lungren ............................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. McCarthy ............................................................................................................................. — X —

Total ............................................................................................................................. 6 3 —

The Committee then voted to favorably report H.R. 811, as 

amended. The vote to report favorably was approved by a recorded 

vote (6–3). 

Member Ayes Noes Present 

Mr. Brady .................................................................................................................................. X — —

Ms. Lofgren ............................................................................................................................... X — —

Mr. Capuano ............................................................................................................................. X — —

Mr. Gonzalez .............................................................................................................................. X — —

Mrs. Davis (CA) ......................................................................................................................... X — —

Mr. Davis (AL) ........................................................................................................................... X — —

Mr. Ehlers .................................................................................................................................. — X —

Mr. Lungren ............................................................................................................................... — X —

Mr. McCarthy ............................................................................................................................. — X —

Total ............................................................................................................................. 6 3 —

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee states that the findings 

and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Repmstockstill on PROD1PC66 with HEARING

37 

resentatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. 

GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The Committee states, with respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, that the goal and objective of H.R. 811 is to increase voter confidence in the election 

process by requiring an independent audit mechanism for all voting 

systems in Federal elections. 

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

In compliance with clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee 

states that Article 1, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to make laws governing the time, place and 

manner of holding Federal elections. 

EARMARK IDENTIFICATION

Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XXI, H.R. 811, the Voter Confidence 

and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007, does not include any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits 

as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of rule XXI. 

PREEMPTION CLARIFICATION

Section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires the 

report of any committee on a bill or joint resolution to include a 

committee statement on the extent to which the bill or joint resolution is intended to preempt state or local law. H.R. 811 is intended 

to apply in all States and preempt laws to the contrary in their application to Federal elections. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with respect to 

the bill, the following estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the 

Congressional Budget Act of 1974: 

MAY 15, 2007. 

HON. ROBERT A. BRADY, 

Chairman, Committee on House Administration, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 811, the Voter Confidence 

and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew Pickford. 

Sincerely, 

PETER R. ORSZAG. 

Enclosure. 

H.R. 811—Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 

Summary: H.R. 811 would amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to authorize the appropriation of more than $1 billion for the 

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Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to provide grants to states 

to prepare permanent paper ballots for use in all federal elections 

beginning with the November 2008 federal election. H.R. 811 also 

would authorize the appropriation of $100 million annually for 

states to audit the paper ballots. Finally, the legislation would authorize appropriations for the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) to 

study voting technologies. 

Assuming appropriation of the authorized and estimated 

amounts, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 811 would cost 

$10 million in 2007 and $1.3 billion over the 2007–2012 period. Enacting the bill would affect direct spending or revenues, however, 

CBO estimates that there would be no significant net budgetary 

impact from those effects each year. All provisions of H.R. 811 

would be excluded from the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

(UMRA). 

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary impact of H.R. 811 is shown in the following table. The costs 

of this legislation fall within budget functions 250 (general science, 

space, and technology), 370 (commerce and housing credit), and 800 

(general government). 

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars—

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 

CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION 1

Ballot Verification and Other Requirements: 

Authorization Level .......................................................................... 1,000 0 0 0 0 0 

Estimated Outlays ........................................................................... 0 800 100 100 0 0 

Audit Payments to States: 

Authorization Level .......................................................................... 0 100 100 100 100 100 

Estimated Outlays ........................................................................... 0 60 40 60 40 60 

Testing and Certification of Voting Systems: 

Estimated Authorization Level ......................................................... 0 10 5 5 5 5 

Estimated Outlays ........................................................................... 0 8 7 5 5 5 

Other Reporting Provisions: 

Authorization Level .......................................................................... 2 5 0 0 0 0 

Estimated Outlays ........................................................................... 0 4 3 0 0 0 

Other Provisions: 

Estimated Authorization Level ......................................................... 0 10 8 8 9 9 

Estimated Outlays ........................................................................... 0 10 8 8 9 9 

Total Proposed Changes: 

Estimated Authorization Level ................................................ 1,002 125 113 113 114 114 

Estimated Outlays .................................................................. 0 882 158 173 54 74 

1 H.R. 811 also would affect revenues and direct spending by authorizing an escrow account to collect fees from voting systems manufac- turers and spend those fees to have testing laboratories verify the performance of the equipment. CBO estimates that the net budgetary impact of this activity would be insignificant each year. 

Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill 

will be enacted near the end of fiscal year 2007, that the necessary 

amounts will be appropriated each year, and that outlays will follow historical spending patterns for similar programs. CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 811 would cost $1.3 billion over the 

2008–2012 period, assuming appropriation of the specified and estimated amounts. (For this estimate, we assume that authorized 

2007 funding would be provided late in the year, with no outlays 

until fiscal year 2008.) 

Ballot verification and other requirements 

H.R. 811 would authorize the appropriation of $1 billion in fiscal 

year 2007 for grants to states to pay for the cost of providing a permstockstill on PROD1PC66 with HEARING

39 

manent paper record of each voter’s ballot. Assuming appropriation 

of the authorized amounts, CBO estimates that implementing those 

provisions would cost $1 billion over the 2008–2012 period (with no 

estimated outlays in 2007). 

Audit payments to States 

The bill would authorize the appropriation of $100 million annually over the 2008–2012 period for payments to states to provide 

various audits of the paper ballots. This would include specific 

audit requirements for elections that are closely contested. Based 

on information from EAC, CBO expects that the audits would take 

place over a two-year period. Assuming appropriation of the authorized amounts, CBO estimates that implementing this provision 

would cost $60 million in 2008 and $260 million over the 2008–

2012 period. 

Testing and certification of voting systems 

The bill would authorize the EAC to create a Testing Escrow Account that would be used by accredited laboratories to certify the 

performance of voting system hardware and software. The EAC 

would set a fee schedule for the voting equipment industry, receive 

fees from each manufacturer, and distribute the fees to laboratories 

to conduct testing. CBO expects that such fees would be recorded 

as federal revenues, and their expenditure would constitute direct 

spending. The net effect of those collections and their distribution 

would be insignificant in each year. 

Based on information from the EAC, CBO expects that six laboratories would be accredited to test the equipment of 10 manufacturers. Assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts, CBO estimates that implementing this section would cost $30 million over 

the 2008–2012 period for the EAC to administer the new program. 

Other reporting provisions 

H.R. 811 also would authorize the appropriation of $3 million in 

fiscal year 2008 for the NIST to study and report to the Congress 

on ballot verification methods for individuals with disabilities and 

best practices for ballot auditing. In addition, the legislation would 

authorize the appropriation of $1.5 million annually over the 2007–

2008 period for the NSF to provide grants to study election voting 

software. Assuming appropriation of the specified amounts, CBO 

estimates that implementing those provisions would cost $7 million 

over the 2008–2012 period. 

Other provisions 

Implementing H.R. 811 would increase the responsibilities of the 

EAC. The agency estimates that it would need more than 30 new 

staff primarily to oversee the certification of voting systems nationwide and to audit the new grant programs. CBO estimates that the 

additional staff and administrative requirements would cost $45 

million over the 2008–2012 period. 

Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: Section 4 of UMRA 

excludes from the application of that act any legislative provisions 

that enforce the Constitutional rights of individuals. CBO has determined that the provisions of H.R. 811 would fall within that exmstockstill on PROD1PC66 with HEARING

40 

clusion because they would protect individuals’ voting rights. 

Therefore, CBO has not reviewed this bill for mandates. 

Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Matthew Pickford. Impact 

on State, local, and tribal governments: Elizabeth Cove. Impact on 

the private sector: Paige Piper-Bach. 

Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, 

existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 

* * * * * * * 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

(a) * * * 

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of this Act is as 

follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE II—COMMISSION 

* * * * * * * 

Subtitle C—Studies and Other Activities To Promote Effective Administration of 

Federal Elections 

Sec. 241. Periodic studies of election administration issues. 

* * * * * * * 

Sec. 247. Study and report on accessible ballot verification mechanisms. 

Sec. ø247¿ 248. Consultation with Standards Board and Board of Advisors. 

Subtitle D—Election Assistance 

* * * * * * * 

PART 7—GRANTS FOR RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTION-DEDICATED VOTING

SYSTEM SOFTWARE

Sec. 297. Grants for research on development of election-dedicated voting system 

software. 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE III—UNIFORM AND NONDISCRIMINATORY ELECTION TECHNOLOGY 

AND ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS 

* * * * * * * 

Subtitle C—Mandatory Manual Audits 

Sec. 321. Requiring audits of results of elections. 

Sec. 322. Number of ballots counted under audit. 

Sec. 323. Process for administering audits. 

Sec. 324. Selection of precincts. 

Sec. 325. Publication of results. 

Sec. 326. Payments to States. 

Sec. 327. Exception for elections subject to recount under State law prior to certification. 

Sec. 328. Effective date. 

* * * * * * * 

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TITLE II—COMMISSION 

Subtitle A—Establishment and General 

Organization 

PART 1—ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 205. POWERS. 

(a) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

ø(e) CONTRACTS.—The Commission may contract with and compensate persons and Federal agencies for supplies and services 

without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes of the 

United States (41 U.S.C. 5).¿ 

* * * * * * * 

Subtitle B—Testing, Certification, Decertification, and Recertification of Voting 

System Hardware and Software 

SEC. 231. CERTIFICATION AND TESTING OF VOTING SYSTEMS. 

(a) CERTIFICATION AND TESTING.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall provide for the 

øtesting, certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software by accredited laboratories.¿ 

testing of voting system hardware and software by accredited 

laboratories in connection with the certification, decertification, 

and recertification of the hardware and software for purposes 

of this Act. 

(2) OPTIONAL USE BY STATES.—At the option of a State, the 

State may provide for the øtesting, certification, decertification, 

or recertification of its voting system hardware and software by 

the laboratories accredited by the Commission under this section.¿ testing of its voting system hardware and software by the 

laboratories accredited by the Commission under this section in 

connection with certifying, decertifying, and recertifying the 

hardware and software. 

(b) LABORATORY ACCREDITATION.—

(1) RECOMMENDATIONS BY NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY.—Not later than 6 months after the 

Commission first adopts voluntary voting system guidelines 

under part 3 of subtitle A, the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall conduct an evaluation 

of independent, non-Federal laboratories and shall submit to 

the Commission a list of those laboratories the Director proposes to be accredited to carry out the øtesting, certification, 

decertification, and recertification¿ testing provided for under 

this section. 

* * * * * * * 

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(3) PROHIBITING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST; ENSURING AVAILABILITY OF RESULTS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—A laboratory may not be accredited by 

the Commission for purposes of this section unless—

(i) the laboratory certifies that the only compensation 

it receives for the testing carried out in connection with 

the certification, decertification, and recertification of 

the manufacturer’s voting system hardware and software is the payment made from the Testing Escrow Account under paragraph (4); 

(ii) the laboratory meets such standards as the Commission shall establish (after notice and opportunity 

for public comment) to prevent the existence or appearance of any conflict of interest in the testing carried out 

by the laboratory under this section, including standards to ensure that the laboratory does not have a financial interest in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of voting system hardware and software, and is 

sufficiently independent from other persons with such 

an interest; 

(iii) the laboratory certifies that it will permit an expert designated by the Commission to observe any testing the laboratory carries out under this section; and 

(iv) the laboratory, upon completion of any testing 

carried out under this section, discloses the test protocols, results, and all communication between the laboratory and the manufacturer to the Commission. 

(B) AVAILABILITY OF RESULTS.—Upon receipt of information under subparagraph (A), the Commission shall make 

the information available promptly to election officials and 

the public. 

(4) PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING TESTING; PAYMENT OF

USER FEES FOR COMPENSATION OF ACCREDITED LABORATORIES.—

(A) ESTABLISHMENT OF ESCROW ACCOUNT.—The Commission shall establish an escrow account (to be known as the 

‘‘Testing Escrow Account’’) for making payments to accredited laboratories for the costs of the testing carried out in 

connection with the certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software. 

(B) SCHEDULE OF FEES.—In consultation with the accredited laboratories, the Commission shall establish and regularly update a schedule of fees for the testing carried out 

in connection with the certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software, based 

on the reasonable costs expected to be incurred by the accredited laboratories in carrying out the testing for various 

types of hardware and software. 

(C) REQUESTS AND PAYMENTS BY MANUFACTURERS.—A 

manufacturer of voting system hardware and software may 

not have the hardware or software tested by an accredited 

laboratory under this section unless—

(i) the manufacturer submits a detailed request for 

the testing to the Commission; and 

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43 

(ii) the manufacturer pays to the Commission, for deposit into the Testing Escrow Account established 

under subparagraph (A), the applicable fee under the 

schedule established and in effect under subparagraph 

(B). 

(D) SELECTION OF LABORATORY.—Upon receiving a request for testing and the payment from a manufacturer required under subparagraph (C), the Commission shall select at random (to the greatest extent practicable), from all 

laboratories which are accredited under this section to 

carry out the specific testing requested by the manufacturer, 

an accredited laboratory to carry out the testing. 

(E) PAYMENTS TO LABORATORIES.—Upon receiving a certification from a laboratory selected to carry out testing 

pursuant to subparagraph (D) that the testing is completed, 

along with a copy of the results of the test as required 

under paragraph (3)(A)(iv), the Commission shall make a 

payment to the laboratory from the Testing Escrow Account 

established under subparagraph (A) in an amount equal to 

the applicable fee paid by the manufacturer under subparagraph (C)(ii). 

(5) DISSEMINATION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ACCREDITED LABORATORIES.—

(A) INFORMATION ON TESTING.—Upon completion of the 

testing of a voting system under this section, the Commission shall promptly disseminate to the public the identification of the laboratory which carried out the testing. 

(B) INFORMATION ON STATUS OF LABORATORIES.—The 

Commission shall promptly notify Congress, the chief State 

election official of each State, and the public whenever—

(i) the Commission revokes, terminates, or suspends 

the accreditation of a laboratory under this section; 

(ii) the Commission restores the accreditation of a 

laboratory under this section which has been revoked, 

terminated, or suspended; or 

(iii) the Commission has credible evidence of significant security failure at an accredited laboratory. 

* * * * * * * 

(d) TRANSITION.—Until such time as the Commission provides for 

the øtesting, certification, decertification, and recertification¿ testing of voting system hardware and software by accredited laboratories under this section, the accreditation of laboratories and the 

procedure for the øtesting, certification, decertification, and recertification¿ testing of voting system hardware and software used as 

of the date of the enactment of this Act shall remain in effect. 

Subtitle C—Studies and Other Activities 

To Promote Effective Administration of 

Federal Elections 

* * * * * * * 

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SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE BALLOT VERIFICATION 

MECHANISMS. 

(a) STUDY AND REPORT.—The Director of the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology shall study, test, and develop best practices to enhance the accessibility of ballot verification mechanisms 

for individuals with disabilities, for voters whose primary language 

is not English, and for voters with difficulties in literacy, including 

best practices for the mechanisms themselves and the processes 

through which the mechanisms are used. In carrying out this section, the Director shall specifically investigate existing and potential 

methods or devices, including non-electronic devices, that will assist 

such individuals and voters in creating voter-verified paper ballots 

and presenting or transmitting the information printed or marked 

on such ballots back to such individuals and voters. 

(b) COORDINATION WITH GRANTS FOR TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENTS.—The Director shall coordinate the activities carried out 

under subsection (a) with the research conducted under the grant 

program carried out by the Commission under section 271, to the 

extent that the Director and Commission determine necessary to provide for the advancement of accessible voting technology. 

(c) DEADLINE.—The Director shall complete the requirements of 

subsection (a) not later than December 31, 2008. 

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to 

be appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $3,000,000, to remain 

available until expended. 

SEC. ø247¿ 248. CONSULTATION WITH STANDARDS BOARD AND BOARD 

OF ADVISORS. 

The Commission shall carry out its duties under this subtitle in 

consultation with the Standards Board and the Board of Advisors. 

Subtitle D—Election Assistance 

PART 1—REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS 

SEC. 251. REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS. 

(a) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(c) RETROACTIVE PAYMENTS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of 

this subtitle, including the maintenance of effort requirements 

of section 254(a)(7), a State may use a requirements payment 

as a reimbursement for costs incurred in obtaining voting 

equipment which meets the requirements of section 301 if the 

State obtains the equipment after the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held in November 2000ø.¿, or as 

a reimbursement for any costs incurred in meeting the requirements of title III which are imposed pursuant to the amendments made by section 2 of the Voter Confidence and Increased 

Accessibility Act of 2007 or in otherwise modifying or replacing 

voting systems in response to such amendments. 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 252. ALLOCATION OF FUNDS. 

(a) * * * 

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ø(b) STATE ALLOCATION PERCENTAGE DEFINED.—The ‘‘State allocation percentage’’ for a State is the amount (expressed as a percentage) equal to the quotient of—

ø(1) the voting age population of the State (as reported in 

the most recent decennial census); and 

ø(2) the total voting age population of all States (as reported 

in the most recent decennial census).¿ 

(b) STATE ALLOCATION PERCENTAGE DEFINED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 

‘‘State allocation percentage’’ for a State is the amount (expressed as a percentage) equal to the quotient of—

(A) the voting age population of the State (as reported in 

the most recent decennial census); and 

(B) the total voting age population of all States (as reported in the most recent decennial census). 

(2) SPECIAL RULE FOR PAYMENTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of the requirements payment made to a State for fiscal year 2007, the ‘‘State allocation percentage’’ for a State is the amount (expressed as a 

percentage) equal to the quotient of—

(i) the sum of the number of noncompliant precincts 

in the State and 50% of the number of partially noncompliant precincts in the State; and 

(ii) the sum of the number of noncompliant precincts 

in all States and 50% of the number of partially noncompliant precincts in all States. 

(B) NONCOMPLIANT PRECINCT DEFINED.—In this paragraph, a ‘‘noncompliant precinct’’ means any precinct (or 

equivalent location) within a State for which the voting system used to administer the regularly scheduled general 

election for Federal office held in November 2006 did not 

meet either of the requirements described in subparagraph 

(D). 

(C) PARTIALLY NONCOMPLIANT PRECINCT DEFINED.—In 

this paragraph, a ‘‘partially noncompliant precinct’’ means 

any precinct (or equivalent location) within a State for 

which the voting system used to administer the regularly 

scheduled general election for Federal office held in November 2006 met only one of the requirements described in subparagraph (D). 

(D) REQUIREMENTS DESCRIBED.—The requirements described in this subparagraph with respect to a voting system are as follows: 

(i) The primary voting system required the use of or 

produced durable paper ballots (as described in section 

301(a)(12)(A)) for every vote cast. 

(ii) The voting system provided that the entire process of paper ballot verification was equipped for individuals with disabilities. 

(c) MINIMUM AMOUNT OF PAYMENT.—The amount of a requirements payment made to a State for a year may not be less than—

(1) in the case of any of the several States or the District of 

Columbia, one-half of 1 percent (or, in the case of the payment 

made for fiscal year 2007, 1 percent) of the total amount appromstockstill on PROD1PC66 with HEARING

46 

priated for requirements payments for the year under section 

257; or 

(2) in the case of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, 

American Samoa, or the United States Virgin Islands, onetenth of 1 percent (or, in the case of the payment made for fiscal year 2007, one-half of 1 percent) of such total amount. 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 253. CONDITION FOR RECEIPT OF FUNDS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—øA State is eligible¿ Except as provided in subsection (f), a State is eligible to receive a requirements payment for 

a fiscal year if the chief executive officer of the State, or designee, 

in consultation and coordination with the chief State election official, has filed with the Commission a statement certifying that the 

State is in compliance with the requirements referred to in subsection (b). A State may meet the requirement of the previous sentence by filing with the Commission a statement which reads as 

follows: ‘‘llllll hereby certifies that it is in compliance with 

the requirements referred to in section 253(b) of the Help America 

Vote Act of 2002.’’ (with the blank to be filled in with the name of 

the State involved). 

* * * * * * * 

(f) SPECIAL RULE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this 

part, a State is eligible to receive a requirements payment for 

fiscal year 2007 if, not later than 90 days after the date of the 

enactment of the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility 

Act of 2007, the chief executive officer of the State, or designee, 

in consultation and coordination with the chief State election 

official—

(A) certifies to the Commission the number of noncompliant and partially noncompliant precincts in the State (as 

defined in section 252(b)(2)); and 

(B) files a statement with the Commission describing the 

State’s need for the payment and how the State will use the 

payment to meet the requirements of title III (in accordance 

with the limitations applicable to the use of the payment 

under section 257(a)(4)). 

(2) CERTIFICATIONS BY STATES THAT REQUIRE CHANGES TO

STATE LAW.—In the case of a State that requires State legislation to carry out any activity covered by any certification submitted under this subsection, the State shall be permitted to 

make the certification notwithstanding that the legislation has 

not been enacted at the time the certification is submitted and 

such State shall submit an additional certification once such 

legislation is enacted. 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 257. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—In addition to amounts transferred under section 104(c), there are authorized to be appropriated for requirements payments under this part the following amounts: 

(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

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47 

(4) For fiscal year 2007, $1,000,000,000, except that any 

funds provided under the authorization made by this paragraph shall be used by a State only to meet the requirements 

of title III which are first imposed on the State pursuant to the 

amendments made by section 2 of the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007, or to otherwise modify or replace its voting systems in response to such amendments. 

* * * * * * * 

PART 7—GRANTS FOR RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTION-DEDICATED VOTING 

SYSTEM SOFTWARE 

SEC. 297. GRANTS FOR RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTIONDEDICATED VOTING SYSTEM SOFTWARE. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the National Science Foundation (hereafter in this part referred to as the ‘‘Director’’) shall make 

grants to not fewer than 3 eligible entities to conduct research on 

the development of election-dedicated voting system software. 

(b) ELIGIBILITY.—An entity is eligible to receive a grant under this 

part if it submits to the Director (at such time and in such form as 

the Director may require) an application containing— (1) certifications regarding the benefits of operating voting 

systems on election-dedicated software which is easily understandable and which is written exclusively for the purpose of 

conducting elections; 

(2) certifications that the entity will use the funds provided 

under the grant to carry out research on how to develop voting 

systems that run on election-dedicated software and that will 

meet the applicable requirements for voting systems under title 

III; and 

(3) such other information and certifications as the Director 

may require. 

(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to 

be appropriated for grants under this part $1,500,000 for each of 

fiscal years 2007 and 2008, to remain available until expended. 

TITLE III—UNIFORM AND NONDISCRIMINATORY ELECTION TECHNOLOGY 

AND ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS 

Subtitle A—Requirements 

SEC. 301. VOTING SYSTEMS STANDARDS. 

(a) REQUIREMENTS.—Each voting system used in an election for 

Federal office shall meet the following requirements: 

(1) IN GENERAL.—

(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the voting 

system (including any lever voting system, optical scanning voting system, or direct recording electronic system) 

shall—

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48 

(i) permit the voter to verify (in a private and independent manner) the votes selected by the voter on 

the ballot before the ballot is cast and øcounted¿ 

counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3); 

(ii) provide the voter with the opportunity (in a private and independent manner) to change the ballot or 

correct any error before the ballot is cast and øcounted¿ counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and 

(3) (including the opportunity to correct the error 

through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the 

voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error); and 

(iii) if the voter selects votes for more than one candidate for a single office— (I) notify the voter that the voter has selected 

more than one candidate for a single office on the 

ballot; 

(II) notify the voter before the ballot is cast and 

øcounted¿ counted, in accordance with paragraphs 

(2) and (3) of the effect of casting multiple votes 

for the office; and 

(III) provide the voter with the opportunity to 

correct the ballot before the ballot is cast and 

øcounted¿ counted, in accordance with paragraphs 

(2) and (3). (B) A State or jurisdiction that uses a paper ballot voting 

system, a punch card voting system, or a central count voting system (including mail-in absentee ballots and mail-in 

ballots), may meet the requirements of subparagraph 

(A)(iii) by— (i) * * * 

(ii) providing the voter with instructions on how to 

correct the ballot before it is cast and øcounted¿ counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) (including instructions on how to correct the error through 

the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was 

otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any 

error). 

* * * * * * * 

ø(2) AUDIT CAPACITY.— ø(A) IN GENERAL.—The voting system shall produce a 

record with an audit capacity for such system. 

ø(B) MANUAL AUDIT CAPACITY.— ø(i) The voting system shall produce a permanent 

paper record with a manual audit capacity for such 

system. 

ø(ii) The voting system shall provide the voter with 

an opportunity to change the ballot or correct any 

error before the permanent paper record is produced. 

ø(iii) The paper record produced under subparagraph (A) shall be available as an official record for 

any recount conducted with respect to any election in 

which the system is used.¿ 

(2) BALLOT VERIFICATION AND AUDIT CAPACITY.—

(A) VOTER-VERIFIED PAPER BALLOTS.—

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(i) VERIFICATION.—(I) The voting system shall require the use of or produce an individual, durable, 

voter-verified paper ballot of the voter’s vote that shall 

be created by or made available for inspection and 

verification by the voter before the voter’s vote is cast 

and counted. For purposes of this subclause, examples 

of such a ballot include a paper ballot marked by the 

voter for the purpose of being counted by hand or read 

by an optical scanner or other similar device, a paper 

ballot prepared by the voter to be mailed to an election 

official (whether from a domestic or overseas location), 

a paper ballot created through the use of a ballot 

marking device or system, or a paper ballot produced 

by a touch screen or other electronic voting machine, so 

long as in each case the voter is permitted to verify the 

ballot in a paper form in accordance with this subparagraph. 

(II) The voting system shall provide the voter with an 

opportunity to correct any error made by the system in 

the voter-verified paper ballot before the permanent 

voter-verified paper ballot is preserved in accordance 

with clause (ii). 

(III) The voting system shall not preserve the voterverified paper ballots in any manner that makes it possible, at any time after the ballot has been cast, to associate a voter with the record of the voter’s vote. 

(ii) PRESERVATION.—The individual, durable voterverified paper ballot produced in accordance with 

clause (i) shall be used as the official ballot for purposes of any recount or audit conducted with respect to 

any election for Federal office in which the voting system is used, and shall be preserved— (I) in the case of votes cast at the polling place 

on the date of the election, within the polling place 

in the manner or method in which all other paper 

ballots are preserved within such polling place on 

such date; or 

(II) in any other case, in a manner which is consistent with the manner employed by the jurisdiction for preserving such ballots in general. 

(iii) MANUAL AUDIT CAPACITY.—(I) Each paper ballot 

produced pursuant to clause (i) shall be suitable for a 

manual audit equivalent to that of a paper ballot voting system, and shall be counted by hand in any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election 

for Federal office. 

(II) In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual, 

durable voter-verified paper ballots produced pursuant 

to clause (i), and subject to subparagraph (B), the individual, durable voter-verified paper ballots shall be the 

true and correct record of the votes cast. 

(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR TREATMENT OF DISPUTES WHEN

PAPER BALLOTS HAVE BEEN SHOWN TO BE COMPROMISED.—

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(i) IN GENERAL.—In the event that— (I) there is any inconsistency between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined 

by counting by hand the individual, durable voterverified paper ballots produced pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i) with respect to any election for 

Federal office; and 

(II) it is demonstrated by clear and convincing 

evidence (as determined in accordance with the applicable standards in the jurisdiction involved) in 

any recount, audit, or contest of the result of the 

election that the paper ballots have been compromised (by damage or mischief or otherwise) and 

that a sufficient number of the ballots have been so 

compromised that the result of the election could 

be changed, 

the determination of the appropriate remedy with respect to the election shall be made in accordance with 

applicable State law, except that the electronic tally 

shall not be used as the exclusive basis for determining 

the official certified vote tally. 

(ii) RULE FOR CONSIDERATION OF BALLOTS ASSOCI- ATED WITH EACH VOTING MACHINE.—For purposes of 

clause (i), the paper ballots associated with each voting 

system shall be considered on a voting-machine-by-voting-machine basis, and only the paper ballots deemed 

compromised, if any, shall be considered in the calculation of whether or not the result of the election could 

be changed due to the compromised paper ballots. 

(3) ACCESSIBILITY FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES.—The 

voting system shall— (A) * * * 

ø(B) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) 

through the use of at least one direct recording electronic 

voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling place; and¿ 

(B)(i) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) 

through the use of at least one voting system equipped for 

individuals with disabilities at each polling place; and 

(ii) meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) and paragraph (2)(A) by using a system that— (I) allows the voter to privately and independently 

verify the individual, durable paper ballot through the 

conversion of the human-readable printed or marked 

vote selections into accessible form, 

(II) ensures that the entire process of ballot 

verification and vote casting is equipped for individuals with disabilities, and 

(III) does not preclude the supplementary use of 

Braille or tactile ballots; and 

* * * * * * * 

(4) ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE ACCESSIBILITY.—The voting system (including the paper ballots required to be produced under 

paragraph (2) and the notices required under paragraphs (7) 

and (13)(C)) shall provide alternative language accessibility 

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pursuant to the requirements of section 203 of the Voting 

Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973aa–1a). 

* * * * * * * 

(7) INSTRUCTION REMINDING VOTERS OF IMPORTANCE OF

VERIFYING PAPER BALLOT.— (A) IN GENERAL.—The appropriate election official at 

each polling place shall cause to be placed in a prominent 

location in the polling place which is clearly visible from 

the voting booths a notice, in large font print accessible to 

the visually impaired, advising voters that the paper ballots representing their votes shall serve as the vote of record 

in all audits and recounts in elections for Federal office, 

and that they should not leave the voting booth until confirming that such paper ballots accurately record their vote. 

(B) SYSTEMS FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES.—All 

voting systems equipped for individuals with disabilities 

shall present or transmit in accessible form the statement 

referred to in subparagraph (A), as well as an explanation 

of the verification process described in paragraph (3)(B)(ii). 

(8) PROHIBITING USE OF UNCERTIFIED ELECTION-DEDICATED

VOTING SYSTEM TECHNOLOGIES; DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.— (A) IN GENERAL.—A voting system used in an election for 

Federal office in a State may not at any time during the 

election contain or use any election-dedicated voting system 

technology which has not been certified by the State for use 

in the election and which has not been deposited with an 

accredited laboratory described in section 231 to be held in 

escrow and disclosed in accordance with this section. 

(B) REQUIREMENT FOR AND RESTRICTIONS ON DISCLO- SURE.—An accredited laboratory under section 231 with 

whom an election-dedicated voting system technology has 

been deposited shall— (i) hold the technology in escrow; and 

(ii) disclose technology and information regarding 

the technology to another person if— (I) the person is a qualified person described in 

subparagraph (C) who has entered into a nondisclosure agreement with respect to the technology 

which meets the requirements of subparagraph 

(D); or 

(II) the laboratory is required to disclose the 

technology to the person under State law, in accordance with the terms and conditions applicable 

under such law. 

(C) QUALIFIED PERSONS DESCRIBED.—With respect to the 

disclosure of election-dedicated voting system technology by 

a laboratory under subparagraph (B)(ii)(I), a ‘‘qualified 

person’’ is any of the following: 

(i) A governmental entity with responsibility for the 

administration of voting and election-related matters 

for purposes of reviewing, analyzing, or reporting on 

the technology. 

(ii) A party to pre- or post-election litigation challenging the result of an election or the administration 

or use of the technology used in an election, including 

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but not limited to election contests or challenges to the 

certification of the technology, or an expert for a party 

to such litigation, for purposes of reviewing or analyzing the technology to support or oppose the litigation, and all parties to the litigation shall have access 

to the technology for such purposes. 

(iii) A person not described in clause (i) or (ii) who 

reviews, analyzes, or reports on the technology solely 

for an academic, scientific, technological, or other investigation or inquiry concerning the accuracy or integrity of the technology. 

(D) REQUIREMENTS FOR NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS.—

A nondisclosure agreement entered into with respect to an 

election-dedicated voting system technology meets the requirements of this subparagraph if the agreement—

(i) is limited in scope to coverage of the technology 

disclosed under subparagraph (B) and any trade secrets and intellectual property rights related thereto; 

(ii) does not prohibit a signatory from entering into 

other nondisclosure agreements to review other technologies under this paragraph; 

(iii) exempts from coverage any information the signatory lawfully obtained from another source or any 

information in the public domain; 

(iv) remains in effect for not longer than the life of 

any trade secret or other intellectual property right related thereto; 

(v) prohibits the use of injunctions barring a signatory from carrying out any activity authorized under 

subparagraph (C), including injunctions limited to the 

period prior to a trial involving the technology; 

(vi) is silent as to damages awarded for breach of the 

agreement, other than a reference to damages available 

under applicable law; 

(vii) allows disclosure of evidence of crime, including 

in response to a subpoena or warrant; 

(viii) allows the signatory to perform analyses on the 

technology (including by executing the technology), disclose reports and analyses that describe operational 

issues pertaining to the technology (including 

vulnerabilities to tampering, errors, risks associated 

with use, failures as a result of use, and other problems), and describe or explain why or how a voting system failed or otherwise did not perform as intended; 

and 

(ix) provides that the agreement shall be governed by 

the trade secret laws of the applicable State. 

(E) ELECTION-DEDICATED VOTING SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY

DEFINED.—For purposes of this paragraph, ‘‘election-dedicated voting system technology’’ means ‘‘voting system software’’ as defined under the 2005 voluntary voting system 

guidelines adopted by the Commission under section 222, 

but excludes ‘‘commercial-off-the-shelf’’ software and hardware defined under those guidelines. 

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(9) PROHIBITION OF USE OF WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS DE- VICES IN VOTING SYSTEMS.—No voting system shall contain, 

use, or be accessible by any wireless, power-line, or concealed 

communication device, except that enclosed infrared communications devices which are certified for use in the voting system 

by the State and which cannot be used for any remote or wide 

area communications or used without the knowledge of poll 

workers shall be permitted. 

(10) PROHIBITING CONNECTION OF SYSTEM OR TRANSMISSION

OF SYSTEM INFORMATION OVER THE INTERNET.—No component 

of any voting device upon which ballots are programmed or 

votes are cast or tabulated shall be connected to the Internet at 

any time. 

(11) SECURITY STANDARDS FOR VOTING SYSTEMS USED IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—No voting system may be used in an 

election for Federal office unless the manufacturer of such 

system and the election officials using such system meet the 

applicable requirements described in subparagraph (B). 

(B) REQUIREMENTS DESCRIBED.—The requirements described in this subparagraph are as follows: 

(i) The manufacturer and the election officials shall 

document the secure chain of custody for the handling 

of all software, hardware, vote storage media, ballots, 

and voter-verified ballots used in connection with voting systems, and shall make the information available 

upon request to the Commission. 

(ii) The manufacturer shall disclose to an accredited 

laboratory under section 231 and to the appropriate 

election official any information required to be disclosed under paragraph (8). 

(iii) After the appropriate election official has certified the election-dedicated and other voting system 

software for use in an election, the manufacturer may 

not— (I) alter such software; or 

(II) insert or use in the voting system any software not certified by the State for use in the election. 

(iv) At the request of the Commission— (I) the appropriate election official shall submit 

information to the Commission regarding the 

State’s compliance with this subparagraph; and 

(II) the manufacturer shall submit information 

to the Commission regarding the manufacturer’s 

compliance with this subparagraph. 

(C) DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLICATION OF BEST PRACTICES

ON DOCUMENTATION OF SECURE CHAIN OF CUSTODY.—Not 

later than August 1, 2008, the Commission shall develop 

and make publicly available best practices regarding the 

requirement of subparagraph (B)(i). 

(D) DISCLOSURE OF SECURE CHAIN OF CUSTODY.—The 

Commission shall make information provided to the Commission under subparagraph (B)(i) available to any person 

upon request. 

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(12) DURABILITY AND READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR BAL- LOTS.—

(A) DURABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR PAPER BALLOTS.— (i) IN GENERAL.—All voter-verified paper ballots required to be used under this Act (including the paper 

ballots provided to voters under paragraph (13)) shall 

be marked, printed, or recorded on durable paper. 

(ii) DEFINITION.— For purposes of this Act, paper is ‘‘durable’’ if it is capable of withstanding multiple 

counts and recounts by hand without compromising 

the fundamental integrity of the ballots, and capable of 

retaining the information marked, printed, or recorded 

on them for the full duration of a retention and preservation period of 22 months. 

(B) READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR MACHINE-MARKED

OR PRINTED PAPER BALLOTS.—All voter-verified paper ballots completed by the voter through the use of a marking or 

printing device shall be clearly readable by the voter without assistance (other than eyeglasses or other personal vision enhancing devices) and by a scanner or other device 

equipped for individuals with disabilities. 

(13) MANDATORY AVAILABILITY OF PAPER BALLOTS AT POLLING

PLACE.—

(A) REQUIRING BALLOTS TO BE OFFERED AND PROVIDED.— The appropriate election official at each polling place in an 

election for Federal office shall offer each individual who is 

eligible to cast a vote in the election at the polling place the 

opportunity to cast the vote using a pre-printed paper ballot 

which the individual may mark by hand and which is not 

produced by a direct recording electronic voting machine. If 

the individual accepts the offer to cast the vote using such 

a ballot, the official shall provide the individual with the 

ballot and the supplies necessary to mark the ballot, and 

shall ensure (to the greatest extent practicable) that the 

waiting period for the individual to cast a vote is not greater than the waiting period for an individual who does not 

agree to cast the vote using such a paper ballot under this 

paragraph. 

(B) TREATMENT OF BALLOT.—Any paper ballot which is 

cast by an individual under this paragraph shall be counted and otherwise treated as a regular ballot for all purposes (including, to the greatest extent practicable, the 

deadline for counting the ballot) and not as a provisional 

ballot, unless the individual casting the ballot would have 

otherwise been required to cast a provisional ballot if the 

individual had not accepted the offer to cast the vote using 

a paper ballot under this paragraph. 

(C) POSTING OF NOTICE.—The appropriate election official shall ensure that at each polling place a notice is displayed prominently which describes the obligation of the official to offer individuals the opportunity to cast votes using 

a pre-printed paper ballot under this paragraph. 

(D) TRAINING OF ELECTION OFFICIALS.—The chief State 

election official shall ensure that election officials at polling 

places in the State are aware of the requirements of this 

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paragraph, including the requirement to display a notice 

under subparagraph (C), and are aware that it is a violation of the requirements of this title for an election official 

to fail to offer an individual the opportunity to cast a vote 

using a pre-printed paper ballot under this paragraph. 

(E) EXCEPTIONS.—This paragraph does not apply with 

respect to—

(i) a polling place at which each voting system used 

in the administration of an election for Federal office 

uses only pre-printed paper ballots which are marked 

by hand and which are not produced by a direct recording electronic voting machine (other than a system 

used to meet the disability access requirements of paragraph (3)); or 

(ii) a polling place in operation prior to the date of 

the election, but only with respect to days prior to the 

date of the election. 

(F) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This paragraph shall apply with 

respect to the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office in November 2010 and each succeeding election 

for Federal office. 

* * * * * * * 

ø(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this section on and after 

January 1, 2006.¿ 

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), each 

State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this section on and after January 1, 2006. 

(2) SPECIAL RULE FOR CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph 

(B), the requirements of this section which are first imposed 

on a State and jurisdiction pursuant to the amendments 

made by section 2 of the Voter Confidence and Increased 

Accessibility Act of 2007 shall apply with respect to the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held in 

November 2008 and each succeeding election for Federal office. 

(B) DELAY FOR JURISDICTIONS USING CERTAIN PAPER BALLOT PRINTERS OR CERTAIN PAPER BALLOT-EQUIPPED ACCESSIBLE MACHINES IN 2006.—

(i) DELAY.—In the case of a jurisdiction described in 

clause (ii), subparagraph (A) shall apply to the jurisdiction as if the reference in such subparagraph to ‘‘the 

regularly scheduled general election for Federal office 

held in November 2008 and each succeeding election 

for Federal office’’ were a reference to ‘‘elections for Federal office occurring during 2010 and each succeeding 

year’’, but only with respect to the following requirements of this section: 

(I) Paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I) and (II) of subsection 

(a) (relating to access to verification from the durable paper ballot). 

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(II) Paragraph (12) of subsection (a) (relating to 

durability and readability requirements for ballots). 

(ii) JURISDICTIONS DESCRIBED.—A jurisdiction described in this clause is— (I) a jurisdiction which used thermal reel-to-reel 

voter verified paper ballot printers attached to direct recording electronic voting machines for the 

administration of the regularly scheduled general 

election for Federal office held in November 2006 

and which will continue to use such printers attached to such voting machines for the administration of elections for Federal office held in 2008; or 

(II) a jurisdiction which used voting machines 

which met the accessibility requirements of paragraph (3) of subsection (a) (as in effect with respect 

to such election) for the administration of the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office 

held in November 2006 and which used or produced a paper ballot, and which will continue to 

use such voting machines for the administration of 

elections for Federal office held in 2008. 

* * * * * * * 

Subtitle C—Mandatory Manual Audits 

SEC. 321. REQUIRING AUDITS OF RESULTS OF ELECTIONS. 

(a) REQUIRING AUDITS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—In accordance with this subtitle, each State 

shall administer, without advance notice to the precincts selected, audits of the results of elections for Federal office held 

in the State (and, at the option of the State or jurisdiction involved, of elections for State and local office held at the same 

time as such election) consisting of random hand counts of the 

voter-verified paper ballots required to be produced and preserved pursuant to section 301(a)(2). 

(2) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN ELECTIONS.—A State shall not be 

required to administer an audit of the results of an election for 

Federal office under this subtitle if the winning candidate in 

the election—

(A) had no opposition on the ballot; or 

(B) received 80% or more of the total number of votes cast 

in the election, as determined on the basis of the final unofficial vote count. 

(b) DETERMINATION OF ENTITY CONDUCTING AUDITS; APPLICATION

OF GAO INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS.—The State shall administer 

audits under this subtitle through an entity selected for such purpose by the State in accordance with such criteria as the State considers appropriate consistent with the requirements of this subtitle, 

except that the entity must meet the general standards established 

by the Comptroller General to ensure the independence (including 

the organizational independence) of entities performing financial 

audits, attestation engagements, and performance audits under generally accepted government accounting standards. 

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(c) REFERENCES TO ELECTION AUDITOR.—In this subtitle, the term 

‘‘Election Auditor’’ means, with respect to a State, the entity selected 

by the State under subsection (b). 

SEC. 322. NUMBER OF BALLOTS COUNTED UNDER AUDIT. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b), the number of voter-verified paper ballots which will be subject to a hand 

count administered by the Election Auditor of a State under this 

subtitle with respect to an election shall be determined as follows: 

(1) In the event that the unofficial count as described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between the two 

candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election 

is less than 1 percent of the total votes cast in that election, the 

hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots shall occur in at 

least 10 percent of all precincts or equivalent locations (or alternative audit units used in accordance with the method provided 

for under subsection (b)) in the Congressional district involved 

(in the case of an election for the House of Representatives) or 

the State (in the case of any other election for Federal office). 

(2) In the event that the unofficial count as described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between the two 

candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election 

is greater than or equal to 1 percent but less than 2 percent of 

the total votes cast in that election, the hand counts of the voterverified paper ballots shall occur in at least 5 percent of all precincts or equivalent locations (or alternative audit units used in 

accordance with the method provided for under subsection (b)) 

in the Congressional district involved (in the case of an election 

for the House of Representatives) or the State (in the case of any 

other election for Federal office). 

(3) In the event that the unofficial count as described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between the two 

candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election 

is equal to or greater than 2 percent of the total votes cast in 

that election, the hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots 

shall occur in at least 3 percent of all precincts or equivalent 

locations (or alternative audit units used in accordance with the 

method provided for under subsection (b)) in the Congressional 

district involved (in the case of an election for the House of Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other election for 

Federal office). 

(b) USE OF ALTERNATIVE MECHANISM.—Notwithstanding subsection (a), a State may adopt and apply an alternative mechanism 

to determine the number of voter-verified paper ballots which will 

be subject to the hand counts required under this subtitle with respect to an election, so long as the alternative mechanism uses the 

voter-verified paper ballots to conduct the audit and the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology determines that the alternative mechanism will be at least as statistically effective in ensuring the accuracy of the election results as the procedure under this 

subtitle. 

SEC. 323. PROCESS FOR ADMINISTERING AUDITS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Election Auditor of a State shall administer an audit under this section of the results of an election in accordance with the following procedures: 

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(1) Within 24 hours after the State announces the final unofficial vote count (as defined by the State) in each precinct in the 

State, the Election Auditor shall determine and then announce 

the precincts in the State in which it will administer the audits. 

(2) With respect to votes cast at the precinct or equivalent location on or before the date of the election (other than provisional ballots described in paragraph (3)), the Election Auditor 

shall administer the hand count of the votes on the voterverified paper ballots required to be produced and preserved 

under section 301(a)(2)(A) and the comparison of the count of 

the votes on those ballots with the final unofficial count of such 

votes as announced by the State. 

(3) With respect to votes cast other than at the precinct on the 

date of the election (other than votes cast before the date of the 

election described in paragraph (2)) or votes cast by provisional 

ballot on the date of the election which are certified and counted by the State on or after the date of the election, including 

votes cast by absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting 

Act, the Election Auditor shall administer the hand count of the 

votes on the applicable voter-verified paper ballots required to 

be produced and preserved under section 301(a)(2)(A) and the 

comparison of the count of the votes on those ballots with the 

final unofficial count of such votes as announced by the State. 

(b) USE OF ELECTION PERSONNEL.—In administering the audits, 

the Election Auditor may utilize the services of election administration personnel of the State or jurisdiction, including poll workers, 

without regard to whether or not the personnel have professional 

auditing experience. 

(c) LOCATION.—The Election Auditor shall administer an audit of 

an election at the location where the ballots cast in the election are 

stored and counted after the date of the election, and in the presence 

of those personnel who under State law are responsible for the custody of the ballots. 

(d) SPECIAL RULE IN CASE OF DELAY IN REPORTING ABSENTEE

VOTE COUNT.—In the case of a State in which the final count of absentee and provisional votes is not announced until after the expiration of the 7-day period which begins on the date of the election, the 

Election Auditor shall initiate the process described in subsection 

(a) for administering the audit not later than 24 hours after the 

State announces the final unofficial vote count for the votes cast at 

the precinct or equivalent location on or before the date of the election, and shall initiate the administration of the audit of the absentee and provisional votes pursuant to subsection (a)(3) not later than 

24 hours after the State announces the final unofficial count of such 

votes. 

(e) ADDITIONAL AUDITS IF CAUSE SHOWN.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—If the Election Auditor finds that any of the 

hand counts administered under this section do not match the 

final unofficial tally of the results of an election, the Election 

Auditor shall administer hand counts under this section of such 

additional precincts (or equivalent jurisdictions) as the Election 

Auditor considers appropriate to resolve any concerns resulting 

from the audit and ensure the accuracy of the results. 

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(2) ESTABLISHMENT AND PUBLICATION OF PROCEDURES GOVERNING ADDITIONAL AUDITS.—Not later than August 1, 2008, 

each State shall establish and publish procedures for carrying 

out the additional audits under this subsection, including the 

means by which the State shall resolve any concerns resulting 

from the audit with finality and ensure the accuracy of the results. 

(f) PUBLIC OBSERVATION OF AUDITS.—Each audit conducted 

under this section shall be conducted in a manner that allows public observation of the entire process. 

SEC. 324. SELECTION OF PRECINCTS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (c), the selection of the precincts in the State in which the Election Auditor of 

the State shall administer the hand counts under this subtitle shall 

be made by the Election Auditor on an entirely random basis using 

a uniform distribution in which all precincts in a Congressional 

district have an equal chance of being selected, in accordance with 

procedures adopted by the Commission, except that at least one precinct shall be selected at random in each county. 

(b) PUBLIC SELECTION.—The random selection of precincts under 

subsection (a) shall be conducted in public, at a time and place announced in advance. 

(c) MANDATORY SELECTION OF PRECINCTS ESTABLISHED SPECIFICALLY FOR ABSENTEE BALLOTS.—If a State establishes a separate 

precinct for purposes of counting the absentee ballots cast in an election and treats all absentee ballots as having been cast in that precinct, and if the state does not make absentee ballots sortable by 

precinct and include those ballots in the hand count administered 

with respect to that precinct, the State shall include that precinct 

among the precincts in the State in which the Election Auditor shall 

administer the hand counts under this subtitle. 

(d) DEADLINE FOR ADOPTION OF PROCEDURES BY COMMISSION.—

The Commission shall adopt the procedures described in subsection 

(a) not later than March 31, 2008, and shall publish them in the 

Federal Register upon adoption. 

SEC. 325. PUBLICATION OF RESULTS. 

(a) SUBMISSION TO COMMISSION.—As soon as practicable after the 

completion of an audit under this subtitle, the Election Auditor of 

a State shall submit to the Commission the results of the audit, and 

shall include in the submission a comparison of the results of the 

election in the precinct as determined by the Election Auditor under 

the audit and the final unofficial vote count in the precinct as announced by the State and all undervotes, overvotes, blank ballots, 

and spoiled, voided or cancelled ballots, as well as a list of any discrepancies discovered between the initial, subsequent, and final 

hand counts administered by the Election Auditor and such final 

unofficial vote count and any explanation for such discrepancies, 

broken down by the categories of votes described in paragraphs (2) 

and (3) of section 323(a). 

(b) PUBLICATION BY COMMISSION.—Immediately after receiving 

the submission of the results of an audit from the Election Auditor 

of a State under subsection (a), the Commission shall publicly announce and publish the information contained in the submission. 

(c) DELAY IN CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS BY STATE.—

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(1) PROHIBITING CERTIFICATION UNTIL COMPLETION OF AU- DITS.—No State may certify the results of any election which is 

subject to an audit under this subtitle prior to— (A) to the completion of the audit (and, if required, any 

additional audit conducted under section 323(d)(1)) and the 

announcement and submission of the results of each such 

audit to the Commission for publication of the information 

required under this section; and 

(B) the completion of any procedure established by the 

State pursuant to section 323(d)(2) to resolve discrepancies 

and ensure the accuracy of results. 

(2) DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION OF AUDITS OF PRESIDENTIAL

ELECTIONS.—In the case of an election for electors for President 

and Vice President which is subject to an audit under this subtitle, the State shall complete the audits and announce and submit the results to the Commission for publication of the information required under this section in time for the State to certify the results of the election and provide for the final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of such electors prior to the deadline described in section 

6 of title 3, United States Code. 

SEC. 326. PAYMENTS TO STATES. 

(a) PAYMENTS FOR COSTS OF CONDUCTING AUDITS.—In accordance with the requirements and procedures of this section, the Commission shall make a payment to a State to cover the costs incurred 

by the State in carrying out this subtitle with respect to the elections 

that are the subject of the audits conducted under this subtitle. 

(b) CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE AND ANTICIPATED COSTS.— (1) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED.—In order to receive a payment 

under this section, a State shall submit to the Commission, in 

such form as the Commission may require, a statement containing—

(A) a certification that the State will conduct the audits 

required under this subtitle in accordance with all of the 

requirements of this subtitle; 

(B) a notice of the reasonable costs incurred or the reasonable costs anticipated to be incurred by the State in carrying out this subtitle with respect to the elections involved; 

and 

(C) such other information and assurances as the Commission may require. 

(2) AMOUNT OF PAYMENT.—The amount of a payment made 

to a State under this section shall be equal to the reasonable 

costs incurred or the reasonable costs anticipated to be incurred 

by the State in carrying out this subtitle with respect to the elections involved, as set forth in the statement submitted under 

paragraph (1). 

(3) TIMING OF NOTICE.—The State may not submit a notice 

under paragraph (1) until candidates have been selected to appear on the ballot for all of the elections for Federal office which 

will be the subject of the audits involved. 

(c) TIMING OF PAYMENTS.—The Commission shall make the payment required under this section to a State not later than 30 days 

after receiving the notice submitted by the State under subsection 

(b). 

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(d) RECOUPMENT OF OVERPAYMENTS.—No payment may be made 

to a State under this section unless the State agrees to repay to the 

Commission the excess (if any) of— (1) the amount of the payment received by the State under 

this section with respect to the elections involved; over 

(2) the actual costs incurred by the State in carrying out this 

subtitle with respect to the elections involved. 

(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to 

be appropriated to the Commission for fiscal year 2008 and each 

succeeding fiscal year $100,000,000 for payments under this section. 

SEC. 327. EXCEPTION FOR ELECTIONS SUBJECT TO RECOUNT UNDER 

STATE LAW PRIOR TO CERTIFICATION. 

(a) EXCEPTION.—This subtitle does not apply to any election for 

which a recount under State law will commence prior to the certification of the results of the election, including but not limited to a 

recount required automatically because of the margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in 

the election, but only if each of the following applies to the recount: 

(1) The recount commences prior to the determination and 

announcement by the Election Auditor under section 323(a)(1) 

of the precincts in the State in which it will administer the audits under this subtitle. 

(2) If the recount would apply to fewer than 100% of the ballots cast in the election—

(A) the number of ballots counted will be at least as 

many as would be counted if an audit were conducted with 

respect to the election in accordance with this subtitle; and 

(B) the selection of the precincts in which the recount will 

be conducted will be made in accordance with the random 

selection procedures applicable under section 324. 

(3) The recount for the election meets the requirements of section 323(e) (relating to public observation). 

(4) The State meets the requirements of section 325 (relating 

to the publication of results and the delay in the certification 

of results) with respect to the recount. 

(b) CLARIFICATION OF EFFECT ON OTHER REQUIREMENTS.— Nothing in this section may be construed to waive the application of any 

other provision of this Act to any election (including the requirement 

set forth in section 301(a)(2) that the voter verified paper ballots 

serve as the vote of record and shall be counted by hand in all audits and recounts, including audits and recounts described in this 

subtitle). 

SEC. 328. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

This subtitle shall apply with respect to elections for Federal office 

beginning with the regularly scheduled general elections held in November 2008. 

TITLE IV—ENFORCEMENT 

SEC. 401. ACTIONS BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR DECLARATORY 

AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 

øThe Attorney General¿ (a) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General 

may bring a civil action against any State or jurisdiction in an appropriate United States District Court for such declaratory and inmstockstill on PROD1PC66 with HEARING

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junctive relief (including a temporary restraining order, a permanent or temporary injunction, or other order) as may be necessary 

to carry out the uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology 

and administration requirements under sections 301, 302, and 

303ø.¿, or the requirements of subtitle C of title III. 

(b) FILING OF COMPLAINTS BY AGGRIEVED PERSONS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—A person who is aggrieved by a violation of 

section 301, 302, or 303, or subtitle C of title III, which has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur may file a written, 

signed, notarized complaint with the Attorney General describing the violation and requesting the Attorney General to take 

appropriate action under this section. 

(2) RESPONSE BY ATTORNEY GENERAL.—The Attorney General 

shall respond to each complaint filed under paragraph (1), in 

accordance with procedures established by the Attorney General 

that require responses and determinations to be made within 

the same (or shorter) deadlines which apply to a State under 

the State-based administrative complaint procedures described 

in section 402(a)(2). 

(c) CLARIFICATION OF AVAILABILITY OF PRIVATE RIGHT OF AC- TION.—Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit any person from bringing an action under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983) (including any individual 

who seeks to enforce the individual’s right to a voter-verified paper 

ballot, the right to have the voter-verified paper ballot counted in 

accordance with this Act, or any other right under subtitles A or C 

of title III) to enforce the uniform and nondiscriminatory election 

technology and administration requirements under sections 301, 

302, and 303, or the requirements of subtitle C of title III. 

(d) NO EFFECT ON STATE PROCEDURES.—Nothing in this section 

may be construed to affect the availability of the State-based administrative complaint procedures required under section 402 to any 

person filing a complaint under this subsection. 

* * * * * * * 

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APPENDIX A 

LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 

Washington, DC, May 8, 2007. 

OPPOSE 21ST CENTURY POLL TAX: DEFEAT EHLERS VOTER ID 

AMENDMENT

DEAR HOUSE ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE MEMBER: On behalf of 

the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), the nation’s 

oldest, largest, and most diverse civil and human rights coalition, 

we write in strong opposition to any amendment to H.R. 811 that 

would impose new requirements on voters to show photo identification prior to exercising their constitutional right to vote. We understand that Committee Ranking Member Rep. Vernon Ehlers (R–

MI) intends to offer such an amendment. If so, we urge you in the 

strongest terms to defeat it. 

Voters ID requirements represent one of the most serious threats 

in decades to our efforts to ensure the right of every eligible American to vote. They would encourage racial and ethnic discrimination 

at polling places, would prevent many eligible voters across the 

country from participating in our democracy, and would do nothing 

to combat genuine instances of voter fraud. Indeed, citing such concerns, federal courts have already struck down several state-level 

voter ID laws on constitutional grounds. 

We oppose the Ehlers voter ID amendment for the following reasons: 

First, no citizen should have to pay to vote. Many U.S. citizens 

either do not have or cannot easily access documents that prove 

their identity, such as a passport or birth certificate. Proposals that 

would give free ID to voters who cannot afford it are not sufficient, 

as our most cherished civil right should never depend on the annual appropriations process. Furthermore, citizens would still be 

faced with the expense and time involved in getting the documentation required to obtain photo ID. While the Voting Rights Act 

eliminated poll taxes, the Ehlers amendment would bring them 

back. 

Second, photo ID requirements will disproportionately disenfranchise people of color, the elderly, individuals with disabilities, rural 

and Native voters, the homeless, low-income people, and married 

women, who are less likely to carry a photo ID. They also give poll 

workers an unacceptable level of discretion, opening the door to 

discrimination at the polls against racial, ethnic, and language-minority voters. 

Third, while supports of stronger photo ID requirements argue 

that they are needed to combat voter fraud, the evidence clearly establishes that current anti-fraud laws work. Moreover, while there 

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is no question that election misconduct exists, including improper 

purges of voters, distributing false information about when and 

where to vote, stuffing ballot boxes, and tampering with registration forms, there is no evidence that the type of fraud that the 

Ehlers amendment purports to address—voters who misrepresent 

their identity—is anything but an anomaly. 

The right to vote, and to have your vote counted, is the most important civil right of all. Photo identification requirements are one 

of the greatest threats to fair and equal voting rights today. Congress should be in the business of encouraging full participation of 

our citizenry, not developing ways to limit the right to vote. For 

these reasons, we urge you to oppose any photo identification 

amendment that may arise during the consideration of H.R. 811. 

Thank you for your consideration. If you have any questions, 

please contact Rob Randhava, LCCR Counsel, at (202) 466–6058 or 

at randhava@civilrights.org. 

Sincerely, 

WADE HENDERSON, President & CEO. 

NANCY ZIRKIN, 

Vice President/Director of 

Public Policy. 

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APPENDIX B 

PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, 

Washington, DC, May 8, 2007. 

House Administration Committee, 

House of Representatives, 

Washington, DC. 

DEAR COMMITTEE MEMBER: On behalf of the more than one million members and activists of People For the American Way 

(PFAW), we write in support of the Voter Confidence and Increased 

Accessibility Act of 2007 (H.R. 811) introduced by Representative 

Holt, and also to oppose any photo-identification amendments that 

may be offered to this worthwhile bill. This much needed legislation is likely to lead to major improvements over the status quo, 

diminishing voting machine problems and making elections safer 

and more secure. 

Unfortunately—with millions of voters disenfranchised each election cycle—our citizens have lost confidence that their votes are 

counted accurately—or even counted at all. The recent debacle in 

Sarasota County, where some 18,000 votes were inexplicably not 

recorded on the paperless voting machines, is only the tip of the 

iceberg. Poll after poll shows the impact of voting irregularities on 

people’s faith in our electoral system. H.R. 811 addresses this national crisis. 

Most importantly, H.R. 811 gives voters a chance to verify that 

their vote was recorded properly before they leave the booth. Under 

H.R. 811, all voting machines must produce a paper ballot that 

would count as the official ballot for purposes of all recounts. In addition, H.R. 811 contains two very important safeguards. It requires voting machine vendors to provide independent access to 

their machines source codes to permit inspections to verify the integrity of elections without compromising ballot secrecy. And it requires manual audits of all voting machines pursuant to established federal standards. 

H.R. 811 also goes a long way toward protecting voters with disabilities and language minority voters’ access to the ballot box. Voters whose primary language is not English will be able to make the 

best and most informed choice at the polls. It will also allow voters 

with disabilities to cast their ballots with the privacy and dignity 

we all expect. 

Additionally, in the spirit of moving H.R. 811 forward in a bipartisan fashion, we urge you to oppose any amendment that would 

add to this legislation language requiring that voters provide photo 

identification before casting a ballot. Such requirements are unnecessary and harmful. They impose a severe burden and are likely 

to disenfranchise poor, minority, elderly and young voters, who are 

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less likely to have photo identification and move more frequently. 

The data is clear: • Approximately 6 to 10% of the American electorate does 

not have any form of state identification. • African Americans are four to five times less likely than 

whites to have photo identification. • Young adults (age 20–29) move almost 6 times more frequently than adults over 55, and minorities move 50% more 

frequently than whites. • In Georgia, it is estimated that nearly 40% of seniors lack 

photo identification. 

The purported reason for enacting such restrictive voting measures to counteract voter fraud is unsubstantiated. Virtually every 

academic study of voter fraud concludes that it is not close to being 

a significant problem. In fact, in 2002 the Bush Justice Department 

launched the ‘‘Voting Access and Integrity Initiative,’’ which directed Justice Department attorneys, including those in U.S. Attorneys’ offices, to prioritize investigations of alleged voter fraud. Despite being a top priority, this initiative resulted in only 24 convictions for illegally voting nationwide from 2002 to 2005, compared 

to the hundreds of millions of votes cast during that period. Even 

bipartisan experts contracted by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) similarly found, in a report they submitted to the EAC 

in 2006, that there is no widespread existence of voter fraud. 

Furthermore, when questioned regarding the existence of voter 

fraud in states where it was used as the justification for requiring 

restrictive voter identification, supporters of voter identification 

have been consistently forced to testify that they cannot prove that 

any widespread voter fraud exists. Examples include: • The State of Indiana, and its Republican Secretary of 

State Todd Rokita, in defending the voter identification law in 

court documents, admitted that it could not find one single instance of voter impersonation fraud in the history of the state. 

Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

20321 (S.D. Ind. 2006). 

• The Republican Governor of Missouri, who had formerly 

been the Secretary of State (and run Missouri’s elections), admitted that elections in Missouri were ‘‘fraud-free,’’ before unsuccessfully defending the restrictive voter identification laws 

in court. Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006). 

Missouri’s Secretary of State agrees, noting in a recent report 

that ‘‘As in previous elections, the absence of reports of voting 

impersonation or voting fraud in the 2006 election in Missouri 

was notable.’’

• The State of Arizona and its counties, in defending their 

restrictive voter registration laws and voter identification laws, 

admitted that, of the over 2.7 million registered voters in Arizona, not one had been convicted of registering to vote illegally, 

and not one instance of voting by an ineligible non-citizen. 

Voter identification proposals unnecessarily erect barriers to the 

ballot and are likely to be enforced in discriminatory ways against 

poor and minority voters to intimidate, misinform, stigmatize, and 

ultimately suppress the vote. The right to vote is fundamental and 

Congress should be focused on ways to open the franchise to all elimstockstill on PROD1PC66 with HEARING

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gible citizens. Consistent with this view, PFAW urges that photo 

identification requirements be opposed in hopes of passing a bipartisan H.R. 811. 

Make no mistake: the need for election reform in this country is 

urgent. Americans deserve to know that the next time they cast a 

vote it will be counted—and, if necessary, recounted, by fair and 

independent observers. Nothing less than the integrity and fairness 

of the 2008 elections is at stake. Congress must act immediately to 

pass H.R. 811. We urge you to support H.R. 811 as it moves toward 

passage by voting in favor of it during the committee markup. 

Sincerely, 

RALPH G. NEAS, 

President. 

TANYA CLAY HOUSE, 

Director, Public Policy. 

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APPENDIX C 

NATIONAL NETWORK FOR ELECTION REFORM, 

May 8, 2007. 

DEAR MEMBER OF CONGRESS: Attached is a letter sent by the National Network for Election Reform in response to the most recent 

attempt to pass additional photo-identification requirements in the 

109th Congress. It is our understanding that a similarly focused 

amendment will be offered during the markup of H.R. 811, the 

Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007. On behalf 

of the National Network for Election Reform, we wish to reiterate 

our continued opposition to such attempts and encourage Committee members to oppose any such amendment should it be offered. Thank you. 

Signed, 

TANYA CLAY HOUSE, Director, Public Policy, People For the American Way. 

JONAH GOLDMAN, Director, National Campaign 

for Fair Elections, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 

Rights Under Law. 

NATIONAL NETWORK FOR ELECTION REFORM, 

September 19, 2006. 

DEAR MEMBER OF CONGRESS: We write on behalf of the National 

Network for Election Reform in strong opposition to H.R. 4844, the 

deceptively titled ‘‘Federal Election Integrity Act of 2006.’’ The National Network is a coalition of organizations committed to providing Americans with a responsive and fair election system. As 

written, the bill will sacrifice the integrity of our electoral process 

by imposing an unfunded mandate on the states and blocking 

countless eligible seniors, minority voters, poor voters, students 

and young voters, and voters with disabilities from the polls. Moreover, H.R. 4844 will do nothing to address the shortcomings with 

America’s electoral infrastructure. Instead, by passing H.R. 4844, 

Congress will create a 21st Century poll tax. 

In August, Congress demonstrated its commitment to a fair and 

open democratic process by reauthorizing the expiring provisions of 

the Voting Rights Act with unprecedented bi-partisan unity. Passing H.R. 4844 will undermine that noble pursuit by disfranchising 

the very Americans that the Voting Rights Act protects. 

H.R. 4844 will require nearly every eligible American voter to 

navigate a new and complex bureaucracy in order to cast a ballot. 

Additionally, this measure will force the vast majority of states to 

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implement an incredibly costly new process for issuing identification. The bill’s central provision requires all eligible voters to 

produce a government-issued photo identification before participating in the electoral process. According to the mandates of the 

bill, the only acceptable form of identification is one that requires 

proof of citizenship as a condition of its issuance and indicates citizenship status on the face of the identification. Currently, the only 

types of identification that satisfy this requirement are a few 

states’ driver’s licenses, and a United States Passport which, according to the Bureau of Consular Affairs, only 25–27% of Americans have. For the rest of the country, state governments will have 

to develop and issue new identification in order to facilitate voting 

in federal elections. 

Designing and implementing a program that will facilitate identification to comply with H.R. 4844 will be an unprecedented burden on state governments. A recent example portends the drastic 

complications that states will have to navigate in order to meet the 

demands of H.R. 4844. In 2002, Congress created the Transportation Workers Identity Credential, a program to provide identification similar to that required by H.R. 4844 for the nation’s 750,000 

critical sea, air and land transportation facility workers by the end 

of 2003. Nearly three years past the deadline, fewer than 5,000 of 

these workers have been issued this identification and the program 

costs have skyrocketed, nearly doubling from the original projections. This demonstrates that requiring the vast majority of states 

to engage in this type of endeavor for nearly 200 million Americans 

is not only unworkable, but irresponsible. 

The unfunded mandate that this bill will create, coupled with the 

financially precarious situation of many state budgets, means that 

citizens will be burdened with the increased cost of this program. 

In addition to the high price that many voters will be forced to pay 

to obtain this new form of identification, each voter will also be required to produce proof of citizenship. Official citizenship documents, such as birth certificates, passports or naturalization papers, are expensive and time-consuming to obtain. While this burden is heavy on all Americans, voters in poor and minority communities, seniors, students and young voters, voters with disabilities, 

and Americans in rural areas are the voters who are least likely 

to have documents that prove their citizenship and are the least 

likely to be able to afford the increased cost of obtaining both the 

underlying documentation and the new identification required by 

H.R. 4844. Requiring citizens to pay for these documents as a prerequisite to voting constitutes a poll tax in violation of the TwentyFourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

Proponents of H.R. 4844 claim that this measure is necessary to 

prevent misconduct in elections; that assertion, however, is contradicted by overwhelming evidence. There are no facts to suggest our 

elections are plagued by a wave of individuals voting multiple 

times or voting as someone else. Likewise, despite detailed investigations across the country, there is almost no evidence of non-citizens voting. This is not surprising since each act of this type of 

voter fraud carries with it possible penalties of five years in prison 

and a $10,000 fine. Individuals know that the risk is not worth the 

cost. In addition to these harsh penalties, non-citizens would sacmstockstill on PROD1PC66 with HEARING

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rifice their ability to become citizens or remain in this country legally. Undocumented immigrants would risk announcing their 

presence to a government official each time they attempted to register or vote. Effective safeguards are already in place to protect 

election results from being manipulated by ineligible voters. 

H.R. 4844 will do nothing to address the systemic problems that 

plague our democratic process nor will it effectively secure our election administration system. Because of the bill’s failure to address 

the needs of American voters, it will not restore public confidence 

in the electoral process. Since the presidential election in 2000, voters across the country have begun to notice the shortcomings in our 

electoral system. Congress has the opportunity to address the real 

obstacles that voters face each time they go to the polling place; 

unfortunately, H.R. 4844 chooses instead to create additional barriers. 

We oppose H.R. 4844, the ‘‘Federal Election Integrity Act of 

2006,’’ because it imposes an unfunded mandate on the states and 

blocks countless eligible voters from the electoral process. We urge 

you to oppose H.R. 4844. For more information, please contact 

Jonah Goldman, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 

(202) 662–8321 or Tanya Clay House, People For the American 

Way, (202) 467–2341. 

Signed, 

African American Ministers in Action. 

American Association of University Women. 

American Jewish Committee. 

Anti-Defamation League. 

Asian American Justice Center. 

Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund. 

Brennan Center for Justice. 

Common Cause. 

Demos. 

Electronic Frontier Foundation. 

FairVote. 

Jewish Council for Public Affairs. 

Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. 

League of United Latin American Citizens. 

League of Young Voters Education Fund. 

Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund. 

MassVote. 

NAACP. 

National Congress of American Indians. 

National Council of Jewish Women. 

National Disability Rights Network. 

National Education Association. 

National Voting Rights Institute. 

People For the American Way. 

Project Vote. 

Rock the Vote. 

Service Employees International Union. 

The Arc of the United States. 

Union for Reform Judaism. 

United Cerebral Palsy. 

United Church of Christ Justice & Witness Ministries. 

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U.S. PIRG. 

Vote By Mail Project. 

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APPENDIX D 

2005 VOLUNTARY VOTING SYSTEM GUIDELINES

GLOSSARY DEFINITIONS FOR SELECTED TERMS

‘‘voting system software:’’ All the executable code and associated 

configuration files needed for the proper operation of the voting 

system. This includes third party software such as operating systems, drivers, and database management tools. See also ‘‘dynamic 

voting system software,’’ ‘‘semi-static voting system software,’’ and 

‘‘static voting system software.’’

‘‘dynamic voting system software:’’ Software that changes over 

time once it is installed on the voting equipment. See also voting 

system software. 

‘‘semi-static voting system software:’’ Software that may change 

in response equipment on which it is installed or to election-specific 

programming. 

‘‘static voting system software:’’ Software that does not change 

based on the election being conducted or the voting equipment 

upon which it is installed, e.g., executable code. 

‘‘commercial off-the-shelf (COTS):’’ Commercial, readily available 

hardware devices (such as card readers, printers or personal computers) or software products (such as operating systems, programming language compilers, or database management systems). 

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APPENDIX E 

ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

VOTING SYSTEM TESTING AND CERTIFICATION PROGRAM MANUAL

VERSION 1.0, EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2007

5.4. Pre-Certification Requirements. Before an Initial Decision 

becomes final and a certification is issued, Manufacturers must ensure certain steps are taken. They must confirm that the final 

version of the software that was certified and which the Manufacturer will deliver with the certified system has been subject to a 

trusted build (see Section 5.6), has been delivered for deposit in an 

EAC-approved repository (see Section 5.7), and can be verified 

using Manufacturer-developed identification tools (see Section 5.8). 

The Manufacturer must provide the EAC documentation demonstrating compliance with these requirements. 

5.5. Trusted Build. A software build (also referred to as a compilation) is the process whereby source code is converted to machine-readable binary instructions (executable code) for the computer. A ‘‘trusted build’’ (or trusted compilation) is a build performed with adequate security measures implemented to give confidence that the executable code is a verifiable and faithful representation of the source code. A trusted build creates a chain of 

evidence from the Technical Data Package and source code submitted to the [Voting System Test Labs (VSTLs)] to the actual executable programs that are run on the system. Specifically, the build 

will do the following: 

5.5.1. Demonstrate that the software was built as described in 

the Technical Data Package. 

5.5.2. Show that the tested and approved source code was actually used to build the executable code used on the system. 

5.5.3. Demonstrate that no elements other than those included in 

the Technical Data Package were introduced in the software build. 

5.5.4. Document for future reference the configuration of the system certified. 

5.6. Trusted Build Procedure. A trusted build is a three-step 

process: (1) the build environment is constructed, (2) the source 

code is loaded onto the build environment, and (3) the executable 

code is compiled and the installation device is created. The process 

may be simplified for modification to previously certified systems. 

In each step, a minimum of two witnesses from different organizations is required to participate. These participants must include a 

VSTL representative and vendor representative. Before creating 

the trusted build, the VSTL must complete the source code review 

of the software delivered from the vendor for compliance with the 

VVSG and must produce and record file signatures of all source 

code modules. 

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5.6.1. Constructing the Build Environment. The VSTL shall construct the build environment in an isolated environment controlled 

by the VSTL, as follows: 

5.6.1.1. The device that will hold the build environment shall be 

completely erased by the VSTL to ensure a total and complete 

cleaning of it. The VSTL shall use commercial off-the-shelf software, purchased by the laboratory, for cleaning the device. 

5.6.1.2. The VSTL, with vendor consultation and observation, 

shall construct the build environment. 

5.6.1.3. After construction of the build environment, the VSTL 

shall produce and record a file signature of the build environment. 

Loading Source Code Onto the Build Environment. After successful source code review, the VSTL shall load source code onto the 

build environment as follows: 

5.6.2.1. The VSTL shall check the file signatures of the source 

code modules and build environment to ensure that they are unchanged from their original form. 

5.6.2.2. The VSTL shall load the source code onto the build environment and produce and record the file signature of the resulting 

combination. 

5.6.2.3. The VSTL shall capture a disk image of the combination 

build environment and source code modules immediately before 

performing the build. 

5.6.2.4. The VSTL shall deposit the disk image into an authorized archive to ensure that the build can be reproduced, if necessary, at a later date. 

5.6.3. Creating the Executable Code. Upon completion of all the 

tasks outlined above, the VSTL shall produce the executable code. 

5.6.3.1. The VSTL shall produce and record a file signature of the 

executable code. 

5.6.3.2. The VSTL shall deposit the executable code into an EACapproved software repository and create installation disk(s) from 

the executable code. 

5.6.3.3. The VSTL shall produce and record file signatures of the 

installation disk(s) in order to provide a mechanism to validate the 

software before installation on the voting system in a purchasing 

jurisdiction. 

5.6.3.4. The VSTL shall install the executable code onto the system submitted for testing and certification before completion of system testing. 

5.6.4. Trusted Build for Modifications. The process of building 

new executable code when a previously certified system has been 

modified is somewhat simplified. 

5.6.4.1. The build environment used in the original certification 

is removed from storage and its file signature verified. 

5.6.4.2. After source code review, the modified files are placed 

onto the verified build environment and new executable files are 

produced. 

5.6.4.3. If the original build environment is unavailable or its file 

signatures cannot be verified against those recorded from the original certification, then the more labor-intensive process of creating 

the build environment must be performed. Further source code review may be required of unmodified files to validate that they are 

unmodified from their originally certified versions. 

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[5.7 Additional Elements.] After EAC certification has been 

granted, the VSTL project manager, or an appropriate delegate of 

the project manager, shall deliver for deposit the following elements in one or more trusted archive(s) (repositories) designated by 

the EAC: 

5.7.1. Source code used for the trusted build and its file signatures. 

5.7.2. Disk image of the pre-build, build environment, and any 

file signatures to validate that it is unmodified. 

5.7.3. Disk image of the post-build, build environment, and any 

file signatures to validate that it is unmodified. 

5.7.4. Executable code produced by the trusted build and its file 

signatures of all files produced. 

5.7.5. Installation device(s) and file signatures. 

5.8. System Identification Tools. The Manufacturer shall provide 

tools through which a fielded voting system may be identified and 

demonstrated to be unmodified from the system that was certified. 

The purpose of this requirement is to make such tools available to 

Federal, State, and local officials to identify and verify that the 

equipment used in elections is unmodified from its certified 

version. Manufacturers may develop and provide these tools as 

they see fit. The tools, however, must provide the means to identify 

and verify hardware and software. The EAC may review the system identification tools developed by the Manufacturer to ensure 

compliance. System identification tools include the following examples: 

5.8.1. Hardware is commonly identified by model number and revision number on the unit, its printed wiring boards (PWBs), and 

major subunits. Typically, hardware is verified as unmodified by 

providing detailed photographs of the PWBs and internal construction of the unit. These images may be used to compare with the 

unit being verified. 

5.8.2. Software operating on a host computer will typically be 

verified by providing a self-booting compact disk (CD) or similar device that verifies the file signatures of the voting system application files AND the signatures of all nonvolatile files that the application files access during their operation. Note that the creation of 

such a CD requires having a file map of all nonvolatile files that 

are used by the voting system. Such a tool must be provided for 

verification using the file signatures of the original executable files 

provided for testing. If during the certification process modifications are made and new executable files created, then the tool must 

be updated to reflect the file signatures of the final files to be distributed for use. For software operating on devices in which a selfbooting CD or similar device cannot be used, a procedure must be 

provided to allow identification and verification of the software that 

is being used on the device. 

5.9. Documentation. Manufacturers shall provide documentation 

to the Program Director verifying that the trusted build has been 

performed, software has been deposited in an approved repository, 

and system identification tools are available to election officials. 

The Manufacturer shall submit a letter, signed by both its management representative and a VSTL official, stating (under penalty of 

law) that it has (1) performed a trusted build consistent with the 

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requirements of Section 5.6 of this Manual, (2) deposited software 

consistent with Section 5.7 of this Manual, and (3) created and 

made available system identification tools consistent with Section 

5.8 of this Manual. This letter shall also include (as attachments) 

a copy and description of the system identification tool developed 

under Section 5.8 above. 

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1Pub. L. No. 107–252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002). 

MINORITY VIEWS OF THE HONORABLE VERNON J. EHLERS, THE HONORABLE DANIEL E. LUNGREN, AND THE HONORABLE KEVIN

MCCARTHY

H.R. 811, VOTER CONFIDENCE AND INCREASED ACCESSIBILITY ACT

OF 2007 

On Tuesday, May 8, 2007, the Committee on House Administration ordered favorably reported to the House H.R. 811, the ‘‘Voter 

Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007,’’ as amended, 

on a 6–3 party-line vote. In our view, H.R. 811 would not accomplish the objectives that the majority purports are needed to ensure 

integrity and increased voter confidence in U.S. elections. In fact, 

this bill would do everything to promote a false sense of security 

and diminish confidence in our elections. H.R. 811 would undermine the goals and the true reforms of the bipartisan Help America 

Vote Act of 2002 1 (HAVA) that improved elections and increased 

voter participation. Furthermore, H.R. 811 would roll back significant strides allowing disabled voters to cast ballots both independently and privately for the first time. If the goal is to provide a secure fraud-proof election process, which we support, H.R. 811 as 

currently written falls woefully short and in the words of one election official in one of the largest counties in the nation, is ‘‘ill-conceived and unworkable.’’

PREFACE

H.R. 811, under the guise of providing voters with a paper mechanism to independently verify their vote, would create serious unintended consequences that will hinder the administration of the 

upcoming 2008 Federal elections. Most of the bill’s provisions have 

absolutely nothing to do with independent verification of votes cast 

on machines at the polls on Election Day. Rather, these alterations 

are aimed at limiting the use and value of electronic voting systems, weakening intellectual property rights, infringing on state’s 

rights, federalizing and micro-managing the administration of elections, expanding enforcement by private parties and ultimately 

waste taxpayer dollars. 

H.R. 811 would deny state and local election administrators the 

ability to determine what voting system is preferable in their specific locale based on demographics. Instead H.R. 811 creates a onesize-fits-all voting scheme that is tailored to nowhere and no one 

and considers all thoughts and viewpoints from Washington, D.C. 

as being definitive, inerrant and prescient. What may work well in 

urban areas of California or New York may not be administratively 

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2Dr. Donald F. Norris, Ph.D., testified before the Committee on House Administration’s Elections Subcommittee on March 23, 2007 that, ‘‘In nearly every election where recounts are undertaken of paper ballots, the vote tallies completed manually by human beings produce inconsistent and sometimes conflicting results.’’

feasible in rural areas of South Dakota or North Carolina; the bill 

ignores that fact. 

It has been five years since the enactment of HAVA. Regrettably, 

there are states that have yet to fully comply with the requirements. Until the requirements of HAVA are fully implemented, we 

are unable to accurately measure its successes and shortcomings. 

It would be hasty and potentially detrimental to implement new 

Federal standards until we can closely examine the current system. 

With approximately 18 months until the 2008 General Elections, 

forcing states to adopt change is now foolish, particularly when so 

many states are reconsidering their Presidential election process 

and timelines. 

H.R. 811 does not enjoy the type of bipartisan or industry support that Federal election modification deserves. In 2002, HAVA affected meaningful change that met the shared goals of both the 

majority and minority parties to improve our nation’s voting systems. Unlike HAVA, which was reported out of the Committee on 

a truly bipartisan vote of 8–0, H.R. 811 is the majority’s hasty attempt at election restructuring that received insufficient deliberation from their members and zero support from Republican members of the Committee. Not only have election officials in over 35 

states opposed H.R. 811, industry experts, the disabled community 

and other interest groups have expressed concerns and highlighted 

the myriad of problems associated with the bill. The Republican 

members of the Committee realize the bill’s shortcomings and offered a substitute amendment as well as 12 additional amendments to address the concerns raised by these groups in an effort 

to reach a bipartisan consensus. Rather than address these concerns or seek compromise, the majority charged forward with blinders, ignoring the very people who are responsible for administering 

our nation’s elections: city clerks, county clerks, state election officials and secretaries of state. Below is a more detailed review of 

the major deficiencies and flaws contained in H.R. 811. 

PRINCIPAL FLAWS OF H.R. 811 

PAPER AS THE OFFICIAL BALLOT OF RECORD

H.R. 811’s reliance on paper as the official ballot of record for all 

Federal elections is misguided. We have all learned from the 2000 

Presidential recount in Florida that paper ballots (punch cards, in 

this case) are not the answer for instilling confidence in our voting 

system. The primary reason that the nation moved from paper ballots to more mechanical voting machines in the last century was 

because of fraud associated with paper ballots and frequent problems with discerning voter intent. Paper ballots are more susceptible to being lost, stolen or damaged. 

When paper ballots are the official ballot of record, history has 

shown, there is increased risk of disenfranchising voters and producing inconsistent election results.2 The Director of Elections for 

Franklin County, Ohio, in his testimony before the Committee on 

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3During the Committee on House Administration’s Elections Subcommittee hearing on March 

20, 2007, Matt Damschroder, Director of Elections for Franklin County, Ohio, further discussed, 

‘‘the question ‘what constitutes a vote’ having long been determined in Ohio for punch cards and 

optically scanned paper ballots, it seemed wrong to introduce a new voter intent question that 

could cause a voter’s properly cast and accurately recorded vote to go uncounted.’’ 4Testimony from Matt Damschroder, Director of Elections, Franklin County, Ohio, House Administration’s Elections Subcommittee hearing on March 20, 2007. 5Testimony from Dr. Michael Shamos, Committee on House Administration Hearing, September 28, 2006. 6Dr. Norris also notes problems with optical scan voting systems in an editorial that appeared 

in the Baltimore Sun on February 26, 2007. He states in relevant part, ‘‘Voters are more likely 

to select the wrong candidate or commit ‘‘undervotes’’ or ‘‘overvotes’’ when voting on paper than 

when using the state’s touch screen system. The evidence further shows that voters who try to 

change their votes or cast write-in votes also make more errors when using paper. This may 

be because, unlike touch screen systems, opscan [optical scan] systems have no review screen. 

And in the event of a controversy, recount discrepancies can occur with the interpretation of 

paper ballots, as we well know from Florida in 2000 and Washington State in 2004.’’ 7Testimony during the Committee on House Administration’s Elections Subcommittee hearing 

on March 20, 2007, from R. Doug Lewis, Executive Director of the National Association of Election Officials. Dr. Ted Selker during the Committee on House Administration’s Elections SubContinued 

House Administration’s Subcommittee on Elections, advised members of problems with relying on paper for the recounts and stated 

(Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails) VVPATs should be used only as 

an audit device to prove an electronic record.3 In discussing the 

procedures for the recount conducted in Ohio’s 15th Congressional 

District, he demonstrated how having VVPATs as the official ballots of record would make it possible for properly cast ballots accurately recorded by Direct-Recording Electronic Voting Machines 

(DREs) to be ignored during recounts. In a close election, paper 

jams or poll worker errors in loading the paper backwards could 

cause erroneous results.4 Congress should not support a voting system that has the potential of disenfranchising voters. 

MANDATED VOTING MACHINE REPLACEMENT

H.R. 811 mandates replacement of paperless DREs by 2008 and 

DREs equipped with current VVPATs by 2010. The only voting machines that meet the durable paper ballot requirement under H.R. 

811 are paper-based optical scan voting machines. The motivation 

for the change back to a paper ballot system is based largely on 

unfounded claims and unsubstantiated fears that electronic voting 

systems are not secure. Computer scientists have stated that the 

software contained in electronic voting systems is, in fact, harder 

to manipulate than a paper ballot would be during an election.5

While there may have been isolated instances of voting machine 

problems in 2006, there was no evidence of rampant electronic voting system malfunction, including DRE voting machines, in the 

2006 elections. Most of the incidents on Election Day were a direct 

result of human errors, including poll worker errors, voter mistakes 

or poor ballot design. While optical scan machines satisfy the 

auditable paper audit trail provisions of H.R. 811, these machines 

do not always provide 100% accurate results and can fail due to 

calibration problems or be difficult to count due to ballot marking 

by voters that make voter intent unclear.6

Since the 2000 presidential elections, contrary to the majority’s 

allegations, Americans have increased confidence in our voting system. Exit polls conducted for CNN in the 2006 election found that 

88 percent of voters said that they had ‘‘full confidence’’ that their 

votes were counted accurately.7 In November 2006, there were 

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committee hearing on March 15, 2007, also stated that exit polls show ‘‘that people are comfortable with the voting systems they use.’’ candidates elected on electronic voting machines not 

equipped with a verified paper audit trail, and all 435 Congressional results were certified by 

their respective states for being free and fair elections. The mere fact that electronic voting machines did not provide paper verification should not be the rationale for placing doubt on election 

results or the justification for requiring states to change their preferred voting system. 

many Federal candidates elected on electronic voting machines not 

equipped with a verified paper audit trail, and all 435 Congressional results were certified by their respective states for being free 

and fair elections. The mere fact that electronic voting machines 

did not provide paper verification should not be the rationale for 

placing doubt on election results or the justification for requiring 

states to change their preferred voting system. 

Many states enjoy the benefits of using DRE voting machines for 

their elections. DREs have made it administratively feasible for 

states and local jurisdictions to successfully implement early voting 

programs, provide multiple language ballots and meet the accessibility requirements for disabled voters under HAVA. Prohibiting 

the use of DREs will not only frustrate the administration of elections at the local levels, it may likely contribute to longer lines at 

polls. 

We are not opposed to the idea of a redundant method of capturing vote totals; in fact we welcome it. But we believe all avenues 

should be explored to accomplish duplicate capture of this information, not just paper ballots. The goal of HAVA was to provide the 

states with the flexibility to choose the voting system that best fits 

its needs. Congress should not be the judge, nor require one type 

of voting system for all elections, nor should we outlaw voting machines that have recently been purchased to meet 2006 HAVA 

mandates. 

UNFETTERED ACCESS TO PROTECTED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

H.R. 811 allows access to sensitive and security-related voting 

machine software to a broad spectrum of parties, some of whom 

may not have real interest in the software or the security of elections. While the majority believes this expanded access will make 

elections more transparent, it poses serious security threats to our 

election system. Allowing access to the source code for voting machines will give the blueprint for manipulation of elections and the 

ability to irrationally criticize the software to the point that it negatively affects voter confidence. 

The level of access provided in H.R. 811 also sets new precedents 

for intellectual property disclosure requirements. Software disclosure of this nature and magnitude does not apply to the Central 

Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, the Department of 

Defense, or even the airline industry. People’s lives and national 

security are at stake in each of those cases. It is unclear why the 

majority is authorizing different treatment for election-related intellectual property that provides fundamental protections to one of 

our most precious rights as United States citizens; the right to 

vote. Although H.R. 811 requires non-disclosure agreements to be 

signed by qualified individuals who wish to review election dedicated software, it does not provide for any enforcement actions or 

criminal penalties for disclosure breaches or trade secret violations. 

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8During the March 15, 2007 hearing before the Committee on House Administration’s Elections Subcommittee, Dr. Diane Golden, disability access and technology witness, testified, ‘‘there 

are two access problems that we have still got in existing products related to print. It is not 

going to work to have an accessible electronic vote record or ballot and an inaccessible paper 

one. You just see the problem with that. It is clearly lack of equal access. When you add paper 

into that process (speaking about the EAC system standards), we currently don’t have equipment on the market readily available that delivers all of those access features when a paper 

ballot is involved.’’

Furthermore, it provides no protections against nefarious attempts 

to ‘‘hack’’ the computer code. 

Expanded access to election dedicated software essentially takes 

away the proprietary rights of companies and gives them away. 

This is contrary to the whole premise of our free enterprise system. 

Moreover, H.R. 811’s disclosure requirements will limit the desire 

of election industry companies to continue to develop new technologies and improve their existing systems. 

DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF DISABLED VOTERS

H.R. 811 severely limits voter accessibility among disabled voters. HAVA required states to deploy at least one voting system in 

each polling location that allowed individuals with disabilities to 

vote independently and privately, a right that they had not had before. Many states purchased DRE voting machines to satisfy the 

accessibility requirement. The provisions contained in H.R. 811 

prohibit the use of the paperless DRE voting machines. While proponents of H.R. 811 state there are accessible paper-based voting 

systems currently on the market that accommodate individuals 

with disabilities, these systems fall short of providing these individuals with the ability to cast or verify a ballot independently or privately. Testimony presented before the Committee demonstrated 

that access problems with paper ballots and paper trails still exist.8

It is the Republican members’ view that if Congress is going to 

require accessible machines for the disabled to be equipped with a 

paper backup, it must first ensure that these machines meet accessibility standards for all disabled voters before requiring states to 

purchase such technology. Congress should not roll back the significant progress made for disabled voters and risk disenfranchising 

this group of American voters. 

UNREASONABLE FEDERAL ELECTION AUDITING PROTOCOLS

H.R. 811 requires states to administer hand-counted audits of 

virtually all Federal races before certifying official election results. 

Under this mandatory audit plan states must administer audits for 

at least 3% of all precincts after every Federal election unless a 

candidate wins by at least 80% or runs unopposed. This one-sizefits-all approach is severely flawed as it fails to consider the statutory requirements and deadlines states have in place to administer 

elections. 

State and local administrators testified to the difficulty in auditing Federal races under the scheme mandated by H.R. 811. Testimony presented to the Committee revealed that these requirements 

would not accomplish the goals the majority seeks. First, mandating a hand-counted audit for virtually every Federal race would 

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9During the March 20, 2007 hearing before the Committee on House Administration’s Elections Subcommittee, when asked if he would audit every race Florida Election Administrator 

Ion Sancho said ‘‘No, I would randomly select races.’’ Guilford County Election Administrator 

George Gilbert opined: ‘‘We have counted paper ballots by hand before, and we know how difficult—it is the most difficult aspect of conducting an election.’’ 10During the March 20, 2007 hearing before the Committee on House Administration’s Elections Subcommittee, Tammy Patrick, Federal Compliance Officer for Maricopa County Elections 

Department in her testimony discussed Arizona’s statutory hand audit requirement of 2% of the 

precinct-cast ballots and 1% of early ballots. 11For example, the Ohio Election Code provides ‘‘If the number of votes cast for the declared 

winning candidate in a district election does not exceed the number of votes cast for the declared 

losing candidate by a margin of one-half of one percent or more of the total vote, a recount shall 

be conducted. If the number of votes cast for the declared winning candidate in a statewide election does not exceed the number of votes cast for the declared losing candidate by a margin of 

one-fourth of one percent or more of the total vote, a recount shall be conducted. Any candidate 

who was not declared elected may submit an application for a recount of the votes. Any group 

of five or more qualified electors may also file an application for a recount of the votes at an 

election upon any question or issue, provided that they either voted ‘‘Yes’’ or in favor of an issue 

that was defeated of they voted ‘‘No’’ or against an issue that was adopted.’’ Ohio Revised Code 

§ 3515.01–3515.071 

tifying official election results.9 Second, the tiered audit scheme 

contained in H.R. 811 has never been piloted in any state’s Federal 

election and has not been proven to be statistically relevant to the 

objectives cited by the majority for conducting hand-counted audits. 

It is imprudent and costly to require every state to administer this 

method of manual election audits without empirical evidence of its 

effectiveness and feasibility. Several states have already instituted 

a mandatory audit of their respective elections,10 while a majority 

of states administer automatic recounts of races where the margin 

of victory between two candidates is within a certain percentage.11

Permitting this overly prescriptive hand-counted audit process will 

not only stifle the ability of election officials to administer elections 

and report results, but will also eliminate audit programs that 

have been successful in certain state and local jurisdictions. Furthermore, as cited earlier, hand counting ballots has been shown 

to be inaccurate. 

UNNECESSARY CREATION OF A FEDERAL PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION

H.R. 811 creates a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against any state to enforce provisions of Title III of HAVA. This 

provision authorizes a system that would not benefit voters, but 

rather would result in endless Federal litigation. Perhaps the only 

beneficiaries would be attorneys. Individuals who are 

disenfranchised by their state’s election process or claim their jurisdiction is not following the provisions under Title III of HAVA already have a means for filing claims. Currently under HAVA, 

states are required to establish administrative grievance procedures to provide sufficient Federal and state enforcement of HAVA 

requirements. We also have grave concerns whether the Department of Justice has adequate staffing to timely and successfully respond to the volume of potential claims; this might result in delays 

of election results. Moreover, creating a Federal private right of action will impose an additional administrative burden on local and 

state election officials, and it may force local governments to spend 

millions of dollars on politically or financially motivated lawsuits. 

INSUFFICIENT FUNDING

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12During the March 20, 2007 hearing before the Committee on House Administration’s Elections Subcommittee, Pamela Smith, President, VerifiedVoting.org testified that there are 16 

states that require post-election manual audits: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Colorado, Kentucky, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 

Pennsylvania, Washington and West Virginia. 

thorized $3.86 billion for states to replace punch card and lever 

machines, provide training for poll workers, provide voter education, and improve the administration of Federal elections. To 

date, states have not received the final $800 million needed to meet 

all the HAVA mandates, and have had to resort to using state 

funds to meet all of the 2006 compliance deadlines. 

Clearly, the amount of funding provided in H.R. 811, which a 

number of election experts have deemed inadequate, will leave taxpayers holding the bill. Congress has a duty to spend the public’s 

money wisely, and not to use it to attempt to implement legislation 

that the states have told is unnecessary and unworkable. Not considering the full implementation of our actions, is utterly irresponsible. 

UNATTAINABLE STATE COMPLIANCE DEADLINES

H.R. 811 places unrealistic deadlines on state and local election 

officials to effectively administer the 2008 elections. Testimony presented to the Committee suggests that the changes that are required under this bill would take approximately 18 months to 4 

years to accomplish. This Committee was well aware of the potential danger of implementing major changes in elections during a 

presidential election year. HAVA gave states more than four years 

to acquire new voting systems. H.R. 811 is forcing states to again 

replace their newly purchased voting equipment under a time 

frame of less than 18 months. 

Other than optical scan voting machines, there is no other voting 

system currently certified and in use in the United States that 

meets the very specific requirements proposed in H.R. 811. Not one 

witness over the course of three hearings before the Committee on 

House Administration’s Elections Subcommittee was able to identify a DRE equipped with a VVPAT or an accessible voting machine that ensures independent verification that: (1) is available in 

the marketplace, (2) has been used in an election in the United 

States and (3) can be appropriately tested and certified for use 

through the Election Assistance Commission Voting System Certification Program by 2008. It is clear that the intent of H.R. 811 is 

to move toward nationwide deployment of optical scan voting machines which directly contradicts the flexibility HAVA provided to 

the states in administering elections. 

Since the implementation of HAVA, states have endured major 

changes to their election process, including the replacement of voting machines, implementation of statewide voter registration systems and steps to increase the accessibility to polling locations. 

Many states have already enacted legislation that requires their 

voting systems to be equipped with a voter verifiable paper audit 

trail. In addition, a number of states have also enacted mandatory 

manual audits.12 It is unnecessary to mandate Federal changes 

when states are already adopting requirements that are similar to 

those in H.R. 811. Moreover, requiring them to comply with the 

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13During the March 15, 2007 hearing before the Committee on House Administration’s Elections Subcommittee, Secretary of State Eric Clark of Mississippi testified, ‘‘There is no way 

under the sun we [state election administrators] can make the kind of changes that are contemplated in [H.R. 811] by next year’s elections.’’ During the March 23, 2007 hearing before the 

Committee on House Administration’s Elections Subcommittee, George Gilbert, Director of Elections for Guilford County North Carolina stated, ‘‘We are concerned that implementation date 

of 2008 would actually collapse the election system.’’ Mr. Gilbert further stated, ‘‘We do not believe that it would be feasible nationwide to implement the kinds of changes, both procedural 

and technological that [H.R. 811] proposes by 2008.’’ 14For example, during the March 15, 2007 hearing before the Committee on House Administration’s Elections Subcommittee Dr. Selker describes a voter-verified audit trail which is accessible to individuals with disabilities and contains a tape drive which ‘‘is a much more reliable 

drive than any of the printers that we have been able to find.’’ In addition, VoteHere, a division 

of Dategrity Corp has developed a DRE Audit Trail that provides equal accessibility to voter 

verification. 

provisions contained in H.R. 811 is not only unattainable, but may 

result in utter chaos in the 2008 election cycle.13

CONCLUSION

H.R. 811 directly undermines the valuable gains from HAVA and 

takes us back to 19th Century election systems and procedures. 

Congress should craft legislation and utilize technology to strengthen, secure, and improve our nation’s voting systems, not revert 

back to requirements of problematic paper ballots. It has been 5 

years since the enactment of HAVA, and there are still states that 

have yet to fully comply with HAVA’s requirements. It is foolhardy 

to believe that states will have the ability to implement all the requirements of H.R. 811 for the 2008 election cycle. To resort back 

to a pure paper voting system, without additional research into alternative technologies that may be more reliable for voter 

verification, would be ill-advised. Instead of rushing to implement 

a paper voting system that has been historically mired with problems, we should allow the marketplace to develop new technologies 

and solutions to enhance our voting systems.14

Republicans have been most willing to work with the Democrats 

to draft election-related legislation that increases confidence and 

ensures security and integrity in our nation’s voting system. We 

are dismayed that our offer was rebuffed. We believe H.R. 811 is 

a step backwards, and is far from accomplishing its primary objective of increasing voter confidence. If H.R. 811 becomes law, Americans just could bear witness to the most dysfunctional administration of Federal elections in our nation’s history. 

VERNON J. EHLERS. 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN. 

KEVIN MCCARTHY. 

Æ 

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