alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofInformation Holdings Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter endedJune 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9,2004 (the “Report”), I, Mason P. Slaine, President and Chief Executive Officerof the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to myknowledge:

 

(1) The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| August 9, 2004 | /s/ Mason P. Slaine                   |   |
|----------------|---------------------------------------|--------|
|           | Mason P. Slaine                       |
|           | President and Chief Executive Officer |

 

 

A signed original statement of thiswritten statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed formwithin the electronic version of this written statement required by Section906, has been provided to Information Holdings Inc. and will be retained byInformation Holdings Inc. and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.

 

----
The Honorable Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., United States District Judge for the Southern *

District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 08a0547n.06

Filed: September 8, 2008

Case No. 07-5940

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

)

NOLAN WHITAKER, )

)

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED

) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

) WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 

) AT LOUISVILLE

v. )

) 

)

ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS )

CORPORATION, et al., ) 

)

Defendant-Appellees. ) 

BEFORE: COLE and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; SARGUS, District Judge.*

SARGUS, District Judge. The Appellant, Nolan Whitaker (“Whitaker”),

appeals the summary judgment rendered by the district court in favor of the Appellee, Electronic

Data Systems Corporation (“Electronic Data”). Whitaker contends that his former employer,

Electronic Data, retaliated against him for asserting his rights under the Family Medical Leave

Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et. seq., interfered with his rights under the FMLA, and

discriminated against him in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. 
-2-

§ 344.040.

After carefully reviewing the record, the applicable law, and the parties’ briefs,

we are convinced that the district court did not err. The opinion issued by the district court

correctly sets forth the law governing the issues raised in this case. Therefore, we AFFIRM the

district court’s summary judgment for the reasons set forth in the thorough opinion of the district

court.
```

[113th Congress Public Law 220]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[[Page 128 STAT. 2093]]

Public Law 113-220
113th Congress

                                 An Act

 
To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 
   90 Vermilyea Avenue, in New York, New York, as the ``Corporal Juan 
Mariel Alcantara Post Office Building''. <<NOTE: Dec. 16, 2014 -  [H.R. 
                                4443]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. CORPORAL JUAN MARIEL ALCANTARA POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 90 Vermilyea Avenue, in New York, New York, shall be known 
and designated as the ``Corporal Juan Mariel Alcantara Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Corporal 
Juan Mariel Alcantara Post Office Building''.

    Approved December 16, 2014.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 4443:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 160 (2014):
            Sept. 8, considered and passed House.
            Dec. 3, considered and passed Senate.

                                  <all>
```
### §4408. Definitions

For purposes of this chapter:

(1) The term "smokeless tobacco" has the meaning given such term by section 387(18) of title 21.

(2) The term "commerce" means (A) commerce between any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef, or Johnston Island and any place outside thereof; (B) commerce between points in any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef, or Johnston Island, but through any place outside thereof; or (C) commerce wholly within the District of Columbia, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef, or Johnston Island.

(3) The term "United States", when used in a geographical sense, includes the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef, Johnston Island, and installations of the Armed Forces.

(4) The term "package" means a pack, box, carton, pouch, or container of any kind in which smokeless tobacco products are offered for sale, sold, or otherwise distributed to consumers.

(5) The term "sale or distribution" includes sampling or any other distribution not for sale.

(6) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Health and Human Services.

(Pub. L. 99–252, §9, Feb. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 34; Pub. L. 111–31, div. A, title I, §101(c), June 22, 2009, 123 Stat. 1830.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2009—Par. (1). Pub. L. 111–31 amended par. (1) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (1) read as follows: "The term 'smokeless tobacco' means any finely cut, ground, powdered, or leaf tobacco that is intended to be placed in the oral cavity."
### §11. Forfeiture of property in transit

Any property owned under any contract or by any combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy, and being the subject thereof, mentioned in section 8 of this title, imported into and being within the United States or being in the course of transportation from one State to another, or to or from a Territory or the District of Columbia, shall be forfeited to the United States, and may be seized and condemned by like proceedings as those provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure, and condemnation of property imported into the United States contrary to law.

(Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, §76, 28 Stat. 570; Feb. 12, 1913, ch. 40, 37 Stat. 667.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1913—Act Feb. 12, 1913, substituted "imported into and being within the United States or" for "and".
# C_2012379EN.01000702.xml

| 8.12.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 379/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.12.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 379/7

---

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 18 October 2012 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Civil Division) — United Kingdom) — Football Dataco Ltd, Scottish Premier League Ltd, Scottish Football League, PA Sport UK Ltd v Sportradar GmbH, Sportradar AG

(Case C-173/11) (1)

1

(Directive 96/9/EC - Legal protection of databases - Article 7 - Sui generis right - Database relating to football league matches in progress - Concept of re-utilisation - Localisation of the act of re-utilisation)

2012/C 379/12

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Referring court

Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Civil Division)

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Football Dataco Ltd, Scottish Premier League Ltd, Scottish Football League, PA Sport UK Ltd

Applicants:

Defendant: Sportradar GmbH, Sportradar AG

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Civil Division) — Interpretation of Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases (OJ 1996 L 77, p. 20), in particular Article 7 — Right of the maker of a database to prevent extraction and/or re-utilisation of part of the contents of the database — Concepts of extraction and re-utilisation (Article 7(2) of the directive) — Database containing information on football matches in progress (‘Football Live’)

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 7 of Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases must be interpreted as meaning that the sending by one person, by means of a web server located in Member State A, of data previously uploaded by that person from a database protected by the sui generis right under that directive to the computer of another person located in Member State B, at that person’s request, for the purpose of storage in that computer’s memory and display on its screen, constitutes an act of ‘re-utilisation’ of the data by the person sending it. That act takes place, at least, in Member State B, where there is evidence from which it may be concluded that the act discloses an intention on the part of the person performing the act to target members of the public in Member State B, which is for the national court to assess.

---

(1)  OJ C 194, 2.7.2011.

1

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET OF SILVER CINEMAS, INTERNATIONAL,
INC. AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1999, AND THE RELATED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS
OF OPERATIONS FOR THE NINE-MONTH PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1999.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                              JAN-1-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                       1,147,840
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  522,538
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    543,656
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,214,034
<PP&E>                                      73,785,613
<DEPRECIATION>                             (8,162,545)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             124,950,621
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       11,499,600
<BONDS>                                    100,000,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                 35,847,006
<COMMON>                                         1,436
<OTHER-SE>                                (28,098,500)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               124,950,621
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            82,423,689
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               71,807,444
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           8,730,696
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (9,847,781)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (9,847,781)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (9,847,781)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
#### Watson and wife *vs.*Conkling and wife.

A denial that the defendants received the whole sum of money mentioned in the mortgage, and an averment that a *“*large amount of money mentioned in the mortgage, was unjustly and unlawlully detained by the complainant as a bonus and unlawful interest, in excess of seven per cent, per annum, and not paid over to the defendants at the time of the execution of the mortgage, and that it has not been paid to them, or to any other person in their behalf, since the execution of the mortgage,” is insufficient as a plea of usury.

On final hearing, on pleadings and proofs.

*Mr. M. L. Keefe,*for complainants.

*Mr. A. Comstock,*for defendants.

The Chancellor.

This is a suit to foreclose a mortgage made December 31st, 1870,. on land in Passaic. The defence is usury. The answer denies that the defendants received the whole sum of money mentioned in the mortgage, and avers that a *“*large amount of money, mentioned in the mortgage, was unjustly and unlawfully detained by the complainants as a bonus, and unlawful interest in excess of seven per cent, per annum, and not paid over to the defendants at the time of the execution of the mortgage, and that it has not been paid to them, or to any other person or persons in their behalf, since the .execution of the mortgage.”

*231The pleading is manifestly insufficient. It is unnecessary to point out its defects with particularity. It gives none of the particulars of the transaction. It alleges no usurious agreement. It does not even state the amount of the alleged bonus.

But, were the pleading sufficient, the proof does not sustain the defence. No usurious contract is proved. Nor is there any proof of the taking of any unlawful Interest, or that any bonus was paid or retained. The complainants are husband and wife. The wife was Ihe lender of the money. The husband was her agent in the matter. John Manson, a witness for the complainants, was the agent for the defendant, Joseph B. Colliding, the borrower and mortgagor in the transaction. Colliding applied to him for a loan. Manson could not accommodate him, but undertook to get it for him. Manson, who was a broker, applied to the complainants, or one of them, for it, and obtained it. Mr. Watson swears he paid, for his wife, to Manson, the whole amount, $3000, agreed to be loaned, and to secure which the mortgage was made. There is not only no proof, that tiie complainants received or retained a bonus, but they both deny that they did so, and there is no evidence that they did not pay to Manson, for Colliding, the whole 33000.

There will be an order of reference to a master, to compute the amount due the complainants on their mortgage.
# C_2010100EN.01004202.xml

| 17.4.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/42 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.4.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/42

---

Action brought on 25 January 2010 — Esprit International v OHIM — Marc O’Polo International (Representation of the letter ‘e’ on a trouser pocket)

(Case T-22/10)

2010/C 100/66

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Esprit International LP (New York, United States of America) (represented by: M. Treis, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM: Marc O’Polo International GmbH (Stephanskirchen, Germany)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | Annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 19 November 2009 in Case R 1666/2008-4; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 19 November 2009 in Case R 1666/2008-4;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for a Community trade mark: Esprit International

Applicant for a Community trade mark:

Community trade mark concerned: a figurative mark representing the letter ‘e’ on a trouser pocket for goods in Classes 18 and 25 (Application No 5 089 859)

Community trade mark concerned:

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: Marc O’Polo International GmbH

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings:

Mark or sign cited in opposition: in particular, a German figurative mark No 30 303 672 representing the letter ‘e’ for goods in Classes 18 and 25

Mark or sign cited in opposition:

Decision of the Opposition Division: Opposition upheld

Decision of the Opposition Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Appeal dismissed

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009, (1) since there is no likelihood of confusion between the opposing marks

Pleas in law:

1

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1).

1

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0000913497
<NAME>                        WNC HOUSING TAX CREDIT FUND IV, SERIES 2
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     US DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                           1,480,862
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                            0
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 1,480,862
<PP&E>                                                   0
<DEPRECIATION>                                           0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  11,499,186
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                    0
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                                 0
<OTHER-SE>                                      11,086,506
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    11,499,186
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                    74,570
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      106,539
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    31,969
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (769,084)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (769,084)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (769,084)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       (48.81)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            0
        


</TABLE>
# C_2014045EN.01000701.xml

| 15.2.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 45/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.2.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 45/7

---

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 5 December 2013 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo — Portugal) — TVI Televisão Independente SA v Fazenda Pública

(Joined Cases C-618/11, C-637/11 and C-659/11) (1)

1

(Taxation - VAT - Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC - Article 11(A)(1)(a), (2)(a) and (3)(c) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 73, point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 78 and point (c) of the first paragraph of Article 79 - Taxable amount for the VAT payable on commercial advertising screening services - Commercial advertising screening tax)

2014/C 45/12

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Referring court

Supremo Tribunal Administrativo

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: TVI Televisão Independente SA

Appellant:

Respondent: Fazenda Pública

Respondent:

Intervener: Ministério Público

Intervener:

Re:

Re:

Request for a preliminary ruling — Supremo Tribunal Administrativo — Interpretation of Article 11(A)(1)(a) and (3)(c) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1) and of Article 73 and point (c) of the first paragraph of Article 79 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1) — Concept of consideration which has been or is to be obtained by the supplier for certain supplies — Tax payable on the broadcasting of commercial advertising.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

On a proper construction of Article 11(A)(1)(a), (2)(a) and (3)(c) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment and Article 73, point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 78 and point (c) of the first paragraph of Article 79 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, a tax such as the ‘screening tax’ provided for under Portuguese legislation for the benefit of the cinematographic and audiovisual arts must be included in the taxable amount for the purposes of the VAT payable on services consisting in the screening of commercial advertising.

---

(1)  OJ C 49, 18.2.2012.

1

---
§ 385.2008 Extensions of time (Rule 2008). ( a ) Except as otherwise provided by law, the time by which any person is required or allowed to act under any statute, rule, or order may be extended by the decisional authority for good cause, upon a motion made before the expiration of the period prescribed or previously extended.
( b ) If any motion for extension of time is made after the expiration of a specified time period, the decisional authority may permit performance of the act required or allowed, if the movant shows extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify the failure to act in a timely manner.