US Marine Corps

PCN 142 000014 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Marine Corps

Operations

MCDP 1-0
Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine

gender is used, both men and women are included.

To Our Readers

Changes: Readers of this publication are encouraged to

submit suggestions and changes through the Universal

Need Statement (UNS) process. The UNS submission processs is delineated in Marine Corps Order 3900.15A, Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development System,

which can be obtained from the Marine Corps Publications

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http://www.usmc/directiv.nsf/web+orders). The UNS recommendation should include the following information: 

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Additional copies: A printed copy of this publication

may be obtained from Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in

MCBul 5600, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status.

An electronic copy may be obtained from the MCCDC

Doctrine world wide web home page which is found at the

following universal reference locator:

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORP

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380-1775

9 

 FOREWORD

First published in September 2001, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0, Marine Corps Operations, provided a bridge betw

maneuver warfare philosophy articulated in our first nine MCDPs an

techniques, and procedures contained in our warfighting and referenc

publications. It focused on describing the role of the Marine Corps co

providing, sustaining, and deploying Marine Corps Forces at the oper

of war and on how the largest of our Marine air-ground task forces (M

the Marine expeditionary force, conducted operations at the tactical l

Developed just prior to, and published shortly after, the momentous e

11 September 2001, the original edition reflected the language and op

constructs prevalent within joint doctrine at that time. Key among the

notions of “war” versus “military operations other than war,” as well 

unstated, but imbedded, belief that the ability to defeat a conventiona

granted the ability to succeed against “lesser” foes. 

Since then, Marines have successfully conducted a wide variety of ex

missions. These missions have included the projection of a landing fo

amphibious ships in the Indian Ocean more than 400 miles inland int

Afghanistan; a mechanized attack from Kuwait to Baghdad, followed 

prolonged counterinsurgency operations to pacify major portions of I

numerous foreign humanitarian assistance and crisis response operat

worldwide. Critical to the success of these missions was the role play

forward-postured, sea-based forces and resources that were employed 

or with others and surged from dispersed global locations. Crisis resp

long been the stock-in-trade of—indeed the rationale for—forward-d

sea-based Marines; however, Marines have also become a force of ch

various engagement activities employed by the geographic combatan

commanders to build partnerships and proactively shape what is now 

operational environment.

The diversity of operations, the expanded application of Marine Corp

capabilities, and the changing lexicon all illustrate how our collective 

understanding of the security era, our national strategy, our organizat

our employment of military power have evolved during nearly ten ye
gy, , pp, 

that evolution. This publication records changes to Marine Corps org

and force posture. It discusses the use of smaller MAGTFs and other, 

nonstandard formations that are increasingly employed with our join

multinational partners—especially those in the Navy and special ope

forces—and how we plan, execute, and assess our expanded activitie

range of military operations. It provides concise descriptions of the v

operations Marines may conduct and elaborates on the various tactic

that Marine Corps commanders may integrate, in varying degrees, to 

accomplish assigned missions. 

Marine Corps commanders and staffs at all levels should read, study, 

be thoroughly conversant with the content of MCDP 1-0. The notion 

matter,” is embedded throughout this publication, which defines key 

to ensure Marines speak a common operational language. Inasmuch 

MCDP 1-0 illustrates how the flexibility and rapid deployability of o

organized, combined arms forces apply across the range of military o

joint and multinational force commanders and their staffs can also us

publication to better understand Marine Corps capabilities and consid

their employment.

This publication supersedes MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations, d

27 September 2001.

JAMES F. AMOS

General, United States Marine Corps

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Publication Control Number: 142 000014 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; 

distribution is unlimited.
MCDP 1

0, Marine Corps Operations

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1—The Marine Corps in National Defense

Expeditionary Force in Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Maneuver Warfare Philosophy and Mission Command . . . . . . . . . . . 

Enduring Marine Corps Principles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Instruments of National Power and the Range of Military Operations 

 Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence 

 Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations. . . . . . 

 Major Operations and Campaigns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Levels of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The National Security Structure and Strategic Direction. . . . . . . . . . . 

 The President and the Secretary of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 The Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 The Combatant Commanders and United States Ambassadors. . . . 

Unified Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Joint Phasing Model for Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Multinational Operations, Alliances, and Coalitions . . . . . . . 

Roles and Functions of the Marine Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 United States Code, Title 10, Armed Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Functions 

of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components. 

 Marine Corps Manual. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Key Marine Corps Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Commandant of the Marine Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
gp

 Headquarters, Marine Corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Marine Corps Operating Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Supporting Establishment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 2—Marine Corps Forces and Expeditionary Operati

Marine Corps Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Role and Responsibilities to the Commandant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Role and Responsibilities to the Joint Force Commander . . . . . 

Joint Operations Conducted Through Service Component Commander

Joint Operations Conducted Through Functional Component Comman

Marine Corps Component Commander 

as a Functional Component Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Marine Air-Ground Task Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Elements of a MAGTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Types of MAGTFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Other Task-Organized Marine Corps Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

United States Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command. . . . 

United States Marine Corps Forces, Cyber Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Marine Corps Core Competencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Power Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Amphibious Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Types of Amphibious Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Operational Environments of Amphibious Operations . . . . . . . 

 Amphibious Operation Command Relationships. . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Phases of Amphibious Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Sustained Operations Ashore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Enabling Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Decisive Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
p

 Sustaining Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Command and Control of Marine Corps 

Tactical Air During Sustained Operations Ashore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 3—Conducting Expeditionary Operations

Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Planning Tenets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Marine Corps Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Problem Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Course of Action Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Course of Action War Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Course of Action Comparison and Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Orders Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Transition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Planning Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Operational Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Battlespace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Battlespace Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Battlespace Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Maneuver Control and Fire Support Coordination Measures . 

 Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Commander’s Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Commander’s Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Lines of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Commander’s Critical Information Requirements . . . . . . . . . 

 Information Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Cyberspace Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Command and Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Information Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 Planning for Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Assessment Cell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness . . . . . 

 Assessment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Tactical Tenets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Achieving a Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Gaining Advantage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Tempo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Adapting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Exploiting Success and Finishing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 4—Military Engagement, 

Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

Nation Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Humanitarian and Civic Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Support to Foreign Internal Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Security Assistance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Maritime Security Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Combating Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Antiterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Counterterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Show of Force Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Arms Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Sanctions Enforcement/Maritime Interception Operations. . . . . . . . . . . 

Protection of Shipping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Defense Support to Public Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Exclusion Zones Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Department of Defense Support to Counterdrug Operations . . . . . . . . . 

Support to Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
ppgy p

Consequence Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Strikes and Raids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Embassy Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Recovery Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Defense Support of Civil Authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Peace Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Peacekeeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Peace Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Peacemaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Peace Building. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Conflict Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 6—Major Operations and Campaigns

Counterinsurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Other Tactical Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Reconnaissance and Security Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Stability Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Sustainment Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 7—Counterinsurgency Operations

Contemporary Imperatives of Counterinsurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Manage Information and Expectations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Use the Appropriate Level of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Learn and Adapt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Attack the Network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Empower at the Lowest Levels Through Mission Command 
pp

 Establish Genuine Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Successful and Unsuccessful Counterinsurgency Practices . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 8—Defensive Operations

Organization of the Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Deep Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Close Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Rear Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Types of Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Mobile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Area Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Retrograde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Defensive Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Battle Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Strong Point. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Perimeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Linear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Reverse Slope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 9—Offensive Operations

Organization of the Offense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Deep Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Close Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Rear Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Type of Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Movement to Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Pursuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 Frontal Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Flanking Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Envelopment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Turning Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Infiltration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Penetration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 10—Other Tactical Operations

Passage of Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Linkup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Relief in Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Obstacle Crossing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Breach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 River Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Breakout From Encirclement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 11—Reconnaissance and Security Operations

Reconnaissance Assets of the MAGTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Command Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Ground Combat Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Aviation Combat Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Logistics Combat Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

National and Theater Assets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Reconnaissance Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Types of Reconnaissance Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Route Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Area Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Zone Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Force-Oriented Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Reconnaissance Pull and Reconnaissance Push. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Counterreconnaissance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
y p

 Screening Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Guarding Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Covering Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 12—Stability Operations

Initial Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Fostering Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Rule of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Governance and Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 13—Sustainment Operations

Levels of Logistic Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Strategic Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Operational Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Tactical Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Logistic Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Logistics in Joint and Multinational Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Strategic Logistic Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Strategic Mobility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 United States Transportation Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Department of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Defense Logistics Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Operational Logistic Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Marine Corps Component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Organization of MAGTF Logistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Reconstitution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Logistic Support to MAGTF Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Maritime Prepositioning Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Aviation Logistics Support Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Norway Geoprepositioning Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 War Reserve Materiel Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Other Support to MAGTF Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Marine Corps Combat Development Command . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Marine Corps Systems Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Marine Corps Logistics Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Marine Corps Installations Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Department of the Navy Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Naval Logistics Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendices

A Principles of Joint Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

B Warfighting Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

C Tactical Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Glossary

References
The Marine Corps in National Defense

“The Marine Corps is America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness—a balanced air-gr

team. We are forward-deployed and forward-engaged: shaping, training, deterring, an

all manner of crises and contingencies. We create options and decision space for our 

Alert and ready, we respond to today’s crisis, with today’s force . . . TODAY. Responsi

we team with other services, allies and interagency partners. We enable and participa

combined operations of any magnitude. A middleweight force, we are light enough to 

but heavy enough to carry the day upon arrival, and capable of operating independen

infrastructure. We operate throughout the spectrum of threats—irregular, hybrid, conv

shady areas where they overlap. Marines are ready to respond whenever the Nation c

the President may direct.”

—General Jame

Commandant’s Planning 

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN READINESS

The Marine Corps has long provided the Nation with a force adept at 

effectively solving complex, multifaceted, and seemingly intractable 

challenges—so much so that “Send in the Marines” connotes both a 

for action and a presumption of success. While the general public ma

conversant with all the Marine Corps is or does, they display an intui

understanding that whenever and wherever crises arise, the Marines 

to get there fast and do whatever needs to be done. 

Like all members of the joint team, the Marine Corps conducts exped

military operations by an armed force to accomplish a specific object

foreign country. Each Service contributes complementary capabilitie

expedition. The Navy, Air Force, and Army are optimized to domina

air, and land, respectively. Generally, the greater the capability and ca

required to dominate those portions of the sea, air, or land necessary 

accomplishing the overall objective of the expedition, the longer it w

deploy the associated forces. Simply put, there is a tradeoff between 

speed whenever an expedition is put in motion.

While the Marine Corps may operate on and from the sea, in and from 

and on the land, it is not optimized to dominate any of them. Rather, 

Corps is optimized to be expeditionary—a strategically mobile midd

force that can fill the gaps created by the size/speed tradeoff. Usually 

organized and employed as Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs
pggg

amphibious shipping, maritime prepositioning, and intertheater airlift t

get to the scene of action, yet heavy enough to either accomplish the m

or provide a stopgap pending the arrival of additional forces, whose arr

employment Marine Corps forces may facilitate.

A key aspect of being expeditionary is providing, in partnership with th

the ability to bridge the difficult seam between operations on land and 

Although Marines are often thought of exclusively as an amphibious a

force, World War II was the only time in US history that the Marine Co

organized, trained, and equipped primarily for that one mission. Both b

after that period, the Marine Corps has focused on being able to respon

and effectively to crises. Within that context, the amphibious capabiliti

provided by the Navy-Marine Corps team—especially those that are fo

postured—have long played a critical role across a range of military op

They assure littoral access and enable the introduction of capabilities p

the other Services, other government agencies, nongovernmental organ

US allies, or other international partners.

Since the end of the Cold War, our amphibious forces have employed w

increased frequency to conduct diverse operations, such as foreign hum

assistance, noncombatant evacuations, and the suppression of piracy. 

Additionally, sea-based forces are increasingly prized by the geographi

combatant commanders to conduct engagement activities that address m

security concerns while respecting partner-nation sovereignty.

Many of the crisis response operations that Marine Corps forces condu

what have historically been known as “small wars,” from minor interve

protect US citizens, friends, or interests to punitive expeditions or longe

counterinsurgency operations. Marines have a long track record of succ

recent actions in al Anbar Province back to the suppression of the slave 

piracy in the Barbary Wars in the early 19th century—in solving comp

problems for which purely military solutions would not suffice. The fu

causes of such conflicts are often a complicated combination of securit

economic, political, and social issues. In other cases, Marine Corps for

responded to contingencies or major operations involving combat again

conventional forces, such as Operation Desert Storm. Still others have 

various blends of conventional and irregular conflict, such as Operation 

Freedom. Regardless of the nature of the conflict—conventional, irregu

hybrid of the two—expeditions that require larger forces/longer duratio

require capabilities or capacities not resident in a middleweight force. T

to rapidly aggregate additional Marine Corps capabilities—often provi
py 

capabilities provided by the US Army or multinational partners are e

enablers for the conduct of sustained operations ashore.

MANEUVER WARFARE PHILOSOPHY AND MISSION C

Marines operate in the spirit of, and are guided by, the philosophy of 

warfare articulated in the nine Marine Corps doctrinal publications (M

which predate this publication—MCDP 1, Warfighting; MCDP 1-1, S

MCDP 1-2, Campaigning; MCDP 1-3, Tactics; MCDP 2, Intelligenc

MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operations; MCDP 4, Logistics; MCDP 5, P

and MCDP 6, Command and Control. These publications constitute o

and enduring doctrine that should not be confused with more numero

frequently revised, subordinate Marine Corps warfighting publication

and Marine Corps reference publications (MCRPs), which address ev

tactics, techniques, and procedures. The MCDPs provide an overarch

philosophy of warfighting with the expectation that readers will consi

and creatively apply the ideas contained therein. They do not prescrib

techniques or procedures; instead, they provide ideas and values that 

high degree of professional competence and judgment in their applic

these ideas and values are expressed within the context of warfightin

pertinent and applicable not only across the range of military operatio

in how the Corps organizes, trains, and equips Marines for conductin

This philosophy recognizes that war is ultimately a violent clash of h

with an enduring nature characterized by friction, uncertainty, disord

complexity. Success in fluid environments demands leaders and orga

that can understand the nature of a given situation and adapt to it fast

opponents. There are several ways we can increase speed. First, we c

emphasize simplicity in all we do. Second, we can employ mission ta

commander’s intent to decentralize execution of operations. Mission 

assignment of a task to a subordinate without specifying how it must 

accomplished, while the accompanying commander’s intent provides 

purpose behind the task. Joint doctrine describes this as mission com

conveying the higher purpose, seniors give their subordinates the aut

responsibility—to adapt their methods for achieving the task as the si

unfolds. This approach permits a faster decision cycle than the enemy

Marines to exploit the advantages of speed, focus, tempo, shock, and 

A third way to become faster is through experience, gained through t

planning, or actual operations, which promotes implicit and lateral 

communication within the organization. Finally, a commander can ge

by positioning himself at the point of friction.
; , 

intelligence, and the warrior spirit are prime attributes. The warrior spir

not only tactical and technical proficiency, but also adherence to the hi

standards of personal and professional integrity. In doing so, Marines, 

individually and collectively, “keep our honor clean.”

Marines conduct all military operations in accordance with all applicab

regulations, and polices. In particular, Marines comply with the law of 

whether operating alone or with joint or multinational forces. Marines 

their best to prevent violations of the law of war and report all violation

superiors. The Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy of maneuver war

rooted in the long-standing principles of war. These original nine princ

part of the twelve principles of joint operations, which are discussed in 

appendix A.

ENDURING MARINE CORPS PRINCIPLES

The Marine Corps’ core values are honor, courage, and commitment. F

values come the principles that help to further define the cultural identi

beliefs of Marines in the most basic terms—

z Every Marine is a rifleman. Every Marine, regardless of military 

occupational specialty, is first and foremost a rifleman.

z The Marine Corps is an expeditionary naval force. Marines are “

the sea,” an integral part of the Naval Service—lean, versatile, fle

ready. Marines are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct na

campaigns on and from naval platforms or to fight in protracted c

ashore.

z The Marine Corps is a combined arms organization. In 1952, Co

directed the integration of Marine air and ground forces. The Mar

codified this directive in December 1963 with Marine Corps Orde

The Organization of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, which form

MAGTF construct. The MAGTFs have unique and incomparable 

warfighting capabilities. They contain organic air, ground, and lo

elements under a single command element, making them integrate

sustaining.

z Marines will be ready and forward deployed. The intent of Congre

Marine Corps serve as the Nation’s “force in readiness” reflected 

recognized national need for a force capable of rapid response to 

crises. To meet this need, Marines routinely forward deploy aroun

with operational forces ready to deploy on short notice.
gpp

its expeditionary mindset, flexible structure, and ability to opera

from the sea or in sustained operations ashore. Marines can ada

across an extraordinary range of military operations with the or

design and training to transition seamlessly between these opera

providing the necessary capability to operate effectively.

z Marines take care of their own. The Marine Corps is the stewar

Nation’s most important resource—its sons and daughters. The C

Marines, imbues them with its core values, and offers them the 

to serve a cause greater than themselves. Marines live up their m

Semper Fidelis, or “always faithful.” Marines are faithful to tho

and care for wounded Marines and their families.

INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

AND THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

There are four instruments of national power—diplomatic, informatio

military, and ecomonic (commonly referred to as DIME). These instr

employed in various combinations to achieve national strategic objec

various situations from peace to war. National leaders can use the mi

instrument of national power at home and abroad in a wide variety of 

activities, tasks, missions, and military operations that vary in purpos

risk, and combat intensity. Commonly characterized as operations, th

grouped in three areas that compose the range of military operations.

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrenc

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence are ongoin

that establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations

encompass the actions that military capabilities may employ in coope

or in support of other government agencies, intergovernmental organ

nongovernmental organizations, and other countries to mitigate the so

conflict, address common security interests, and deter conflict. These 

generally occur continuously in all geographic regions regardless of o

ongoing crises, contingencies, major operations, or campaigns.

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

Crisis response and limited contingency operations are episodic oper

conducted to alleviate or mitigate the impact of an incident or situati

involving a threat to a nation, its territories, citizens, military forces, 
p, p py 

conditions of such diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, political, or m

importance that they warrant the commitment of military forces and re

to achieve national objectives. The level of complexity, duration, reso

degree of cooperation with or support for other organizations and coun

depends on the circumstances. Many of the missions associated with c

response and limited contingency operations, such as foreign humanit

assistance, may not require combat. Others, as evidenced by Operation 

Hope in Somalia (1992–1993), can be undertaken primarily as a peace

mission, but require combat operations to protect US forces, aid work

the local citizenry.

Major Operations and Campaigns

Major operations and campaigns are extended-duration, large-scale ope

that usually involve combat. They typically involve multiple phases, su

Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Iraqi Freedom, wherein th

instrument of national power predominates in some or all phases. Som

crisis-response or limited contingency operations may not involve larg

combat, but could be considered major operations or campaigns depen

their scale and duration, such as the relief efforts after the tsumani in In

the earthquake relief in Haiti in 2010. Some major operations and camp

contribute to a larger endeavor. Operation Enduring Freedom, for exam

linked to the global counterterrorism campaign.

LEVELS OF WAR

The three levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical—help clari

links between national strategic objectives and tactical actions. The stra

is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of n

determines national or multinational strategic objectives and guidance 

develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Strate

involves establishing goals, assigning forces, providing assets, and imp

conditions on the use of force. Strategy derives from political and polic

objectives and is the sole authoritative basis for military operations.

The strategic level of war involves the art of winning wars and maintai

the peace. The operational level links the tactical employment of force

national and military strategic objectives through the planning and con

operations. It encompasses the art of campaigning, which includes dec

when, where, and under what conditions to engage the enemy in battle

operational level of war is the art and science of winning campaigns.
pg g gg

activities to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or ta

Tactics are the concepts and methods used to accomplish a particular 

war, tactics focus on applying combat power to defeat an enemy forc

tactical level of war involves the art and science of winning engagem

battles to achieve the objectives of the campaign. 

The distinctions between the levels of war are rarely clear and norma

in planning and execution, while the levels of command are more cle

Commanders may operate at multiple levels of war simultaneously. S

leaders may conduct tactical actions that align with the commander’s 

have operational and strategic consequences.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY

STRUCTURE AND STRATEGIC DIRECTION

The national security structure provides the strategic direction that gui

employment of the military instrument of national power as part of a g

strategy. Continuing assessments of the current and future strategic

environment inform the national strategy, goals, and objectives. Nation

strategic direction provides strategic context for the employment of th

instruments of national power.

The national security structure is established in public law. Title 50, N

Security Act of 1947, United States Code unified the defense establish

assigned roles and functions among major Department of Defense ag

including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Services, and combatant 

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act o

(United States Code, Title 10, sec. 151–155) further refined the organ

and division of responsibilities within the Department of Defense and 

the following:

z The operational chain of command is clearly established from t

through the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders

z Service Chiefs (Chief of Staff of the Army, Commandant of the 

Corps [hereafter referred to as the Commandant], Chief of Naval 

and Chief of Staff of the Air Force) are responsible for organizi

and equipping Service forces. While the Service Chiefs are mem

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders are responsibl

planning and execution of joint operations.

z Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (hereafter referred to as th

is the principal military advisor to the President, National Secur
y 

Armed Forces, he does not exercise military command over the c

commanders, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or any of the Armed Forces.

z The Joint Staff is under the exclusive direction of the Chairman. I

organized along conventional staff lines to support the Chairman 

other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in performing their dut

Joint Staff does not function as an overall Armed Forces general 

has no executive authority.

The President and the Secretary of Defense

The President and the Secretary of Defense, or their duly deputized alte

successors, exercise authority over the Armed Forces through combata

commanders and through the Secretaries of the Military Departments a

Service Chiefs for those forces not assigned to the combatant command

President and the Secretary of Defense translate policy into national str

military objectives. 

In general, the President frames strategic context by defining national i

and goals in documents, such as the National Security Strategy of the U

States of America presidential policy directives, executive orders, and o

strategic documents, with additional guidance and refinement from the 

Security Council/Homeland Security Council. The National Strategy fo

Homeland Security, also signed by the President, provides national dire

secure the homeland through a comprehensive framework for organizin

efforts of federal, state, local, and private organizations whose primary 

are often unrelated to national security.

The President also signs the Unified Command Plan and the Guidance 

Employment of the Force, which are both developed by the Office of th

Secretary of Defense. The Unified Command Plan establishes combata

command missions, responsibilities, and force structure, while the Gui

Employment of the Force provides the written policy guidance and prio

the Chairman and combatant commanders for reviewing and preparing 

plans and theater campaign plans.

The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America is publi

the Secretary of Defense and outlines how Department of Defense will 

objectives, providing a framework for other Department of Defense po

planning guidance, such as contingency planning, force development,

and intelligence.
In accordance with United States Code, Title 10, Armed Forces (1956

and 153, the Chairman assists the President and the Secretary of Defe

providing strategic direction of the Armed Forces. His responsibilitie

z Presiding over the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

z Acting as the spokesman for the combatant commanders. 

z Preparing military strategy, assessments, and strategic plans. 

z Providing for the preparation and review of operation plans. 

z Providing military guidance to the Services for the preparation 

detailed plans.

The Chairman periodically publishes The National Military Strategy 

United States of America, which is prepared in consultation with the 

 the Secretary of Defense, the Service Chiefs, and the combatant com

The National Military Strategy describes the strategic environment an

lates the National military objectives. Additionally, the Chairman pub

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which provides guidance to comba

commanders, directors, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 

plish tasks and missions based on near-term military capabilities. The 

Strategic Capabilities Plan implements campaign, campaign support

tingency, and posture planning guidance reflected in the Guidance fo

ment of the Force.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, and th

Service Chiefs. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the 

the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and t

of Defense. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are milita

to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of D

member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (other than the Chairman) may su

Chairman an opinion in disagreement with or in addition to the advic

by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, the 

Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. In their capacity as mi

advisers, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or col

provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, the H

Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter w

entities request such advice.
The combatant commanders exercise combatant command (command 

over assigned forces and are responsible to the President and the Secre

Defense for the preparedness of their command for, and the performan

assigned missions. There are geographic combatant commanders who 

responsibility for an area of responsibility and functional combatant co

whose responsibilities are assigned in the Unified Command Plan.

The six geographic combatant commanders are—

z Commander, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM).

z Commander, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM).

z Commander, United States European Command (USEUCOM).

z Commander, United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM).

z Commander, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM

z Commander, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM

The three functional combatant commanders are—

z Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSO

z Commander, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM

z Commander, United States Transportation Command (USTRANS

In a foreign country, the US ambassador is responsible to the President 

directing, coordinating, and supervising all US Government elements i

nation, except those under the command of a combatant commander. G

combatant commanders are responsible for coordinating with US amba

their geographic area of responsibility across the range of military oper

for negotiating memoranda of agreement with the chiefs of mission in 

countries to support military operations.

UNIFIED ACTION

Unified action in military usage is a broad term referring to the synchr

coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and 

nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of 

(Joint Publication [JP] 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Mil

Associated Terms) The geographic combatant commanders are the vita

between those who determine national security policy and strategy and 
py pgg

combatant commanders’ areas of responsibility. Directives flow from 

President and Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman, to the ge

combatant commanders. The geographic combatant commanders pla

conduct the operations that achieve national, alliance, or coalition st

objectives. They provide guidance and direction through strategic es

command strategies, theater campaign plans, contingency plans, ope

and operation orders for the employment of military force, which ma

in cooperation with other government agencies, intergovernmental 

organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, 

elements of the private sector.

Joint Phasing Model for Operations 

The geographic combatant commanders commonly employ security 

in their theater campaign plans, contingency plans, and operation pla

the means to translate strategic objectives into tactical actions. To ass

in formulating such plans, joint doctrine (see JP 5-0, Joint Operation 

provides the following “phasing model,” which describes a continuum

of operations:

z Phase 0: Shape. This phase involves those ongoing and routine 

interagency, and multinational activities conducted to assure or 

friendly relationships and alliances and/or deter potential advers

z Phase 1: Deter. This phase focuses on deterring specific oppone

demonstrating the capability and resolve to apply force in pursu

interests. These actions will likely build upon phase 0 activities 

include a show of force or initiatives that would facilitate deplo

employment, and sustainment of additional forces within the re

z Phase 2: Seize initiative. Hostilities commence during this phas

force applies combat power to delay, impede, halt, or dislodge th

as well as to gain access to theater infrastructure and enhance fr

freedom of action. Concurrently, the joint force provides assista

relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis in order to promote 

z Phase 3: Dominate. The focus during this phase is on the explo

pursuit, and destruction of the enemy in order to break the oppo

for organized resistance. Stability operations occur as needed to 

transition to the next phase. 

z Phase 4: Stabilize. The priority during this phase is on stabilizin

operations, reconstitution of infrastructure, and restoration of se
jy pg

coordinate activities of multinational and interagency organizatio

nongovernmental organizations. This phase concludes with the tr

regional authority to a legitimate civil entity. 

z Phase 5: Enable civil authority. The joint force will enable the le

civil authority and its provision of essential services to the popula

action includes coordinating joint force activities with those of 

multinational, nongovernmental, and interagency organizations a

promoting a favorable attitude among the population toward US a

nation objectives.

While these numbered phases reflect a likely sequence, activities from 

will normally overlap with other phases and may occur simultaneously

Commanders may omit some phases or expand others based on missio

The significance of this phasing construct is that it describes the applic

military capabilities broader than simply defeating an adversary’s milit

It gives greater visibility to sustaining continuous forward operations, w

with numerous and diverse partner organizations, responding quickly t

of emergencies, conducting wide ranging and often simultaneous activ

effectively dealing with changing operational situations, and quickly tra

from one mission to the next.

Multinational Operations, Alliances, and Coalitions

Although the United States may act unilaterally when the situation requ

pursues its national interests through alliances and coalitions when pos

Alliances and coalitions can provide larger and more capable forces, sh

costs of the operation, and enhance the legitimacy of the operation in w

US public opinion. Multinational operations are usually conducted wit

structure of an alliance or coalition. Alliances normally have establishe

agreements for long term objectives and have developed contingency p

some standardized equipment and procedures to ease interoperability. T

Atlantic Treaty Organization is an example of a standing military allian

Coalitions are normally established for shorter periods or for specific 

multinational operations and normally do not have established procedu

standardized equipment. The multinational force formed for Operation

Shield and Desert Storm and disbanded after the war is an example of 

However organized, multinational operations normally involve comple

cultural issues, interoperability challenges, conflicting national comma

and control procedures, intelligence sharing, and other support problem
gg

unity of command can be difficult to achieve in multinational operati

commanders concentrate on obtaining unity of effort among the parti

national forces. Consensus-building and cross-cultural competence ar

elements to unity of effort within multinational operations. 

Multinational operations’ command and control processes normally i

either parallel or lead nation command and control structures. Paralle

requires coordinated political and senior military leadership to make 

and transmit their decisions through existing chains of command to th

deployed forces. Though this method is the simplest to establish, it li

Lead nation command and control requires one nation (usually the on

the preponderance of forces or capabilities) to provide the multinatio

commander and uses that nation’s command and control system. Oth

forces are then assigned as subordinate forces. Normally, this structur

some integration of national staffs.

Multinational commanders must be prepared to accommodate differe

operational and tactical capabilities by nations within the combined f

commander must clearly articulate his intentions, guidance, and plan

confusion that might occur due to differences in language, culture, do

terminology. Detailed planning, wargaming, exchange of standing op

procedures and liaison officers, and rehearsals help overcome proced

difficulties among nations. Finally, the commander should ensure the 

assigned to nations within the multinational force reflect the specific 

and limitations of each national contingent. Mission success should n

jeopardized because of unrealistic expectations of the capabilities or p

of member forces. Similarly, one of the biggest dangers to multinatio

operations is mission creep—member nations could be placed in an u

situation due to either their limited capabilities or their political cave

ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MARINE CORPS

Roles are the broad and enduring purposes Congress established by la

Services and for USSOCOM. Functions are specific responsibilities 

the Services by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable the 

fulfill their legally established roles. Various laws, directives, and ma

establish the roles and functions of the Marine Corps and describe its 

composition and responsibilities. The key sources are United States C

10; Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Depar

Defense and Its Major Components (1987, updated in 2002 and 2010

Marine Corps Manual (1980 with changes in 1982, 1984, and 1986).
, , 

United States Code, Title 10, chap. 507, sect. 5063 and chap. 1006, sec

detail the composition and functions of the Marine Corps. It directs tha

Marine Corps—

z Shall be organized to include not less than three combat divisions

aircraft wings, and other organic land combat forces, aviation, an

z Shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine 

combined arms, together with supporting aviation forces, for serv

the fleet in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases and f

conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosec

naval campaign. 

z Shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed 

the Navy, provide security detachments for the protection of nava

at naval stations and bases, and perform such other duties as the P

may direct. These additional duties may not detract from or interf

the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized

z Shall develop, in coordination with the Army and Air Force, those 

amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, techniques, and 

used by landing forces. 

z Shall maintain the Marine Corps Reserve for the purpose of prov

trained units and qualified individuals to be available for active d

Marine Corps in time of war or national emergency and at such o

as the national security may require. 

z Is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization pla

expansion of the peacetime components of the Marine Corps to m

needs of war.

Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Functions

of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components

Pursuant to United States Code, Title 10, sect. 5063, the Marine Corps, 

Department of the Navy, shall develop concepts, doctrine, tactics, techn

procedures; organize, train, equip, and provide forces, normally emplo

combined arms air-ground task forces, to serve as expeditionary forces 

readiness; and perform the following specific functions:

z Seize and defend advanced naval bases or lodgments to facilitate s

joint operations. 

z Provide close air support for ground forces. 
pp

campaign or as directed. 

z Conduct complex expeditionary operations in the urban littorals 

challenging environments. 

z Conduct amphibious operations, including engagement, crisis re

power projection operations, to assure access. The Marine Corp

primary responsibility for the development of amphibious doctr

techniques, and equipment. 

z Conduct security and stability operations and assist with the ini

establishment of a military government, pending transfer of this 

responsibility to other authority. 

z Provide security detachments and units for service on armed ve

Navy, provide protection of naval property at naval stations and 

provide security at designated US embassies and consulates, an

other such duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense m

These additional duties may not detract from or interfere with th

for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.

Marine Corps Manual

The Marine Corps Manual adds two more functions. The Marine Co

z Provide Marine Corps officer and enlisted personnel in support 

Department of State security program overseas. (See also Unite

Code, Title 10, sec. 5983.) 

z Organize Marine Corps aviation, as a collateral function, to part

integral component of naval aviation in the execution of such ot

functions as the fleet commanders may direct.

KEY MARINE CORPS TASKS

In 2010, the Marine Corps conducted a formal review of the security 

environment, strategic direction, public law, and departmental policy 

guidance to refine the organization, posture, and capabilities necessar

the Marine Corps can fulfill its role as the Nation’s expeditionary for

readiness. The national strategy documents describe a geostrategic co

has dramatically changed in the last two decades, increasing the impo

the global commons and shifting strategic focus to the littoral regions

adversaries are likely to employ both conventional and irregular capa

hybrid form of conflict. Increased challenges to access and reduction
g gpppy, py

sustainment of US forces overseas. Furthermore, these documents note 

21st-century security challenges cannot be solved by any single nation 

military action alone. They call for the expansion of engagement activi

leverage all elements of national power, to promote the international pa

necessary to collectively address common security concerns.

This context demands a ready force that fills the void between special 

forces and heavy ground formations—a force that can leverage its expe

character to respond not only to crises, but also to proactively influence 

conditions. As a result, this formal review identified the following five 

interrelated tasks that Marine Corps forces must be able to perform:

z Conduct military engagement. The ability of the Marine Corps to 

military engagement is essential to building partner capability and 

forging relationships across cultural barriers, and promoting diplo

access. Sea-based military engagement also facilitates interaction 

treading lightly on the sovereignty of the partner-nations. Forward 

critical to providing effective engagement and ensuring rapid resp

crises. 

z Respond rapidly to crisis. Whether natural or manmade, crisis res

operations alleviate or mitigate the impact of an incident or situat

addition to those forward-postured forces, a high state of expediti

readiness is essential to rapidly projecting additional Marine Corp

capabilities in response to a crisis.

z Project power. The Marine Corps forces leverage and contribute t

“whole-of-government” system of projecting “smart” power acro

range of military operations. Smart power is the ability to selectiv

soft and hard power in combinations appropriate to a given situat

achieve national objectives. Soft power is the use of persuasive m

such as cultural affinity, diplomacy, economic interaction, and for

assistance, to establish legitimacy and influence or attract others t

their policies, interests, or objectives with one’s own. Hard power 

of military/economic coercion to influence the behavior of others

projection includes joint assured access operations from the sea, a

by littoral maneuver. 

z Conduct littoral maneuver. Naval forces are uniquely capable of 

transitioning ready-to-fight combat forces from the sea to the sho

to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy. Littoral maneu

be used to deny adversaries sanctuary, destroy critical enemy cap
pqpgp

destruction or associated materials, seize lodgments for the intro

additional joint or multinational forces, or cause an adversary to 

his forces.

z Counter irregular threats. These operations involve military for

in combination with the other elements of power, in the affairs o

state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfacto

measures may not, by themselves, restore peace and order beca

fundamental causes of unrest may be economic, political, or soc

these operations occur in response to crises under austere condi

are the modern manifestation of our “small wars” legacy.

Note

These tasks are nested under the missions identified in 

naval strategy and concept documents. The maritime 

strategy notes that naval forces perform many missions, bu

that six comprise our core cababilities. Naval Operations 

Concept 2010 elaborates on these missions in a sequence 

designed to describe how globally-dispersed naval forces 

conducting an array of steady state actitivities designed to 

prevent war will, when required, come together to prevail 

in crisis response or combat operations. Forward presence 

enables building partner capacity while facilitating our 

ability to perform all other missions. Maritime security 

involves partnering with others to promote safety, 

economic security, and homeland defense in depth. 

Humanitarian assistance and disaster response applies nav

power to mitigate suffering. Sea control and power 

projection are the application of naval power in fulfillmen

of our warfighting responsibilities. The ability of naval 

forces to perform all of these missions contributes to an 

expanded form of deterrence.

THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

The Commandant has two vital functions—as a member of the Joint 

Staff and as Marine Corps Service Chief (see United States Code, Tit

5043). His duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take preced

all other duties.
, y 

or opinion to the Chairman when it is in disagreement with, or provide

additional insight to, the Chairman’s point of view. When the Chairman 

his advice or opinion to the President, the National Security Council, th

Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, he is obliga

submit any additional input from the Commandant or other members o

Joint Chiefs of Staff. When the Commandant is acting in his capacity a

military adviser, he may provide advice to the President, the National S

Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense 

opinion is requested.

The Commandant may make recommendations to Congress relating to 

Department of Defense providing he has informed the Secretary of Def

to the meeting with Congress. The Commandant will attend the regular

scheduled meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As long as his indepen

member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not impaired, the Commandant w

the Secretary of the Navy informed of military advice given by the oth

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters that impact the Departm

the Navy.

As the Service Chief, the Commandant is subject to the authority, direc

control of the Secretary of the Navy. He is directly responsible for the 

administration, discipline, internal organization, training, requirements

efficiency, and readiness of the Marine Corps. He is also responsible fo

Marine Corps materiel support system and accountable for the total per

of the Marine Corps.

ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE MARINE CO

The organization of the Marine Corps consists of Headquarters, Marine 

the Marine Corps operating forces, and the supporting establishment. 

Collectively, they form the Marine Corps total force.

Headquarters, Marine Corps

The Commandant presides over the daily activities of Headquarters, M

Corps, which provides staff assistance to the Commandant by—

z Preparing the Marine Corps for employment through recruiting, o

supplying, equipping (including research and development), train

servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaini

Marine Corps. 
gg pg y p

preparation to support military operations by combatant comma

z Preparing detailed instructions for the execution of approved pl

supervising the execution of those plans and instructions.

z Coordinating the actions of organizations of the Marine Corps. 

z Performing other duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as may 

prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy or the Commandant.

Marine Corps Operating Forces

The Marine Corps operating forces consist of Marine Corps forces as

combatant commanders or retained under the control of the Comman

Marine Corps Reserve under the control of the Commandant, security 

under the control of designated fleet commanders, and special activit

under the control of the Secretary of State.

Marine Corps Forces

Marine Corps forces consist of combat, combat support, and combat 

support units that are normally task-organized as MAGTFs. The cont

publication focuses primarily on expeditionary operations by Marine 

forces and those elements of the Marine Corps Reserve activated to 

reinforce them.

Within the Secretary of Defense memorandum, Global Force Manag

Implement Guidance, the Forces for Unified Commands section assig

designated Marine Corps operating forces to three combatant comma

Commander, United States Pacific Command; Commander, USSOCO

Commander, United States Strategic Command, who exercise comba

command (command authority) through Commander, United States M

Corps Forces, Pacific (MARFORPAC); Commander, United States M

Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC); and Commander, 

States Marine Corps Forces, Strategic Command, respectively.

The remaining Marine Corps forces are under Service control, which 

Commandant exercises through the Commander, United States Marin

Forces Command (MARFORCOM). In that capacity Commander, 

MARFORCOM provides forces to the combatant commanders when 

through the Global Force Management process.

Whether assigned to a combatant commander or retained under Servi

control, Marine Corps forces are apportioned to the geographic comb

commanders to plan for contingencies and are provided to these unifi

combatant commands when directed by the Secretary of Defense thro
gg, , 

through, or training in a geographic combatant commander’s area of 

responsibility, a Marine Corps component commander commands thos

He is responsible for—

z Training and preparing Marine Corps forces for operational comm

commensurate with the strategic situation and the combatant com

requirements. 

z Advising the combatant commander on the proper employment o

Corps forces, participating in associated planning, and accomplis

operational missions as may be assigned. 

z Providing Service administration, discipline, intelligence, and ope

support for assigned forces. 

z Identifying requirements for support from the Marine Corps supp

establishment. 

z Performing such other duties as may be directed.

Marine Corps Reserve

The Marine Corps Reserve consists of the Ready Reserve, the Retired 

and the Standby Reserve.

The Ready Reserve’s personnel are liable for active duty in time of wa

national emergency as proclaimed by the President, declared by Congr

when otherwise authorized by law. Included in the Ready Reserve are t

Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve: 

z The Selected Reserve consists of Marine Corps Forces Reserve u

personnel assigned to individual mobilization augmention billets 

required to participate in inactive duty training periods and annua

Also classified as Selected Reserves are those Active Reservists w

on full time active duty to support the training and administration 

reserves. These units at the regiment/group level and below are d

formations that generally mirror their Active Component counter

structure, capability, and operational readiness. (Headquarters abo

regiment/group level perform administrative duties.) With the exc

few unique capabilities that are typically employed during major 

and campaigns, Reserve Component units are indistinguishable fr

of the Active Component with regard to the range of missions the

capable of performing. They can augment or reinforce MAGTFs 

composed of Active Component units or task-organize into MAG

composed entirely of Reserve Component units.
y gy 

recently served in the active forces or Selected Marine Corps R

have a period of obligated service remaining on their contract. M

the Delayed Entry Program also belong to the Individual Ready 

The Retired Reserve includes reservists who are retired under v

and regulations. Retired Reserves may be mobilized under cond

similar to those for Standby Reserve mobilization. 

The Standby Reserve is composed of Marines not in the Ready or Re

Reserve who are subject to recall to active duty in time of war or a na

emergency as declared by Congress.

Security Forces 

The Marine Corps Security Force Regiment provides armed antiterro

physical security trained forces to designated naval installations, vess

Fleet antiterrorism security team companies provide fleet commande

forward-deployed fleet antiterrorism security team platoons for respo

term security augmentation of installations, ships, or vital naval and n

assets when force protection conditions exceed the capabilities of the 

security forces. Marine Corps Security Force companies operate und

operational control of the designated Navy commanding officer and u

administrative control of the Commandant through Commander, MAR

Special Activity Forces 

Special activity forces provide security and services or perform other 

duties for agencies other than the Department of the Navy. Assignme

missions of these forces and the personnel to them are specified by th

agency and approved by the Commandant. For example, detachment

Marine Corps Embassy Security Group guard foreign service posts th

the world. Marines belonging to these security guard detachments pro

internal security services to selected Department of State embassies, 

and legations. They prevent the compromise of classified material an

and protect United States citizens and government property. Marine s

guard detachments operate under the operational control of the Secre

and under the administrative control of the Commandant. 

Supporting Establishment

The supporting establishment assists in the training, sustainment, equ

embarkation of deploying forces. The supporting establishment inclu

z Marine Corps bases. 

z Marine Corps air stations. 
g 

z Special supporting activities. 

The supporting establishment is vital to the success of the Marine Corp

and stations of the supporting establishment manage the training areas, 

and the modeling and simulation facilities necessary to prepare Marine

units for operations. These posts serve as training, staging, and marsha

for deploying units and are the foundation for a responsive replacemen

and equipment pipeline into the area of operations. 

The Marines, Sailors, and civilians of the supporting establishment are 

partners with the Marine Corps operating forces in accomplishing the m

Bases and stations of the supporting establishment also provide faciliti

support to the families of deployed Marines, allowing Marines to conc

fully on their demanding missions without undue concern for the welfa

their families.
Marine Corps Forces and Expeditionary Ope

“We are by our nature ‘expeditionary.’ This means several things. It means a high sta

we can go at a moment’s notice. It means our organization, our equipment, our struct

to allow us to deploy very efficiently . . . It’s a mind-set, too, about being ready to go, a

ready to be deployed, and about flexibility. We can easily and quickly move from fight

tarian operations.”

General 

Ba

MARINE CORPS COMPONENTS

Marine Corps forces normally conduct operations as part of a joint fo

consists of significant elements, assigned or attached, from two or m

Departments operating under a single commander. As noted in JP 1, 

the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 

are established at three levels—unified combatant commands, subord

unified commands, or joint task forces. While the terms combatant co

and geographic combatant commander are used in reference to the co

of unified combatant commands, the broader term of joint force com

applicable at all three levels. 

A joint force commander may organize his forces and conduct operat

Service components, functional components, or a combination of the 

each joint force commander defines the authority and responsibilities 

Service and functional component commanders, he must also consid

specific administrative and logistic responsibilities. In accordance wi

doctrine, a joint force commander should allow Service tactical and o

assets to function generally as they were designed, trained, and equip

Regardless of the level of the joint force or how a joint force comma

organizes his force, if Marine Corps forces are assigned, there is alwa

Corps Service component. There are two levels of Marine Corps com

Marine Corps component under a unified command and a Marine Co

component under a subordinate unified command or a joint task forc

Marine Corps component commander deals directly with the joint fo

commander in matters affecting Marine Corps forces (see fig. 2-1 on 
Role and Responsibilities to the Commandant 

Each Marine Corps component commander is responsible for and acco

the Commandant for the internal discipline, training, and administratio

forces. Component commander responsibilities specifically include—

z Internal discipline and administration.

z Training in Marine Corps doctrine, tactics, techniques, and proce

z Sustainment functions normal to the command, except as otherwi

by higher authority.

z Service intelligence matters and oversight of intelligence activitie

according to current laws, policies, and directives. 

While the Marine Corps component commander responds to the joint f

commander in the operational chain of command, his component is equ

staffed, and supported by the Commandant through the Service chain o

command. The Commandant’s relationship with the Marine Corps com

commander is through the Service chain—not the operational chain. U

Service

Branch

Operational

Branch

President

Secretary

of Defense

Secretary

of the Navy

Commandant

of the

Marine Corps

Combatant

Commander

Chairman of

the Joint

Chiefs of Staff

Command

Administrative Control

Channel of Communication

Marine Corps

Component

Commander

Figure 2-1. Chains of Command and Command Relationships.
y p

commander communicates through the combatant command on those 

over which the combatant commander exercises combatant command 

authority) or directive authority. On Service-specific matters, such as 

administration, and unit training, the Marine Corps component comm

normally communicates directly with the Commandant. For example

component commander may provide input to the Commandant regard

organization, training, and equipping of Marine Corps forces in order 

the combatant commander’s operational requirements. When commu

with the Commandant, the component commander informs the comb

commander as that officer directs.

Role and Responsibilities to the Joint Force Commander

A joint force commander conducts a campaign through a series of rel

operations. He conducts his campaign by assigning component comm

missions that accomplish strategic and operational objectives. The or

the Marine Corps component commander is normally at the operation

war, advising the joint force commander regarding the employment o

Corps forces. Commanders of MAGTFs or other task-organized force

normally focused at the tactical level as shown in figure 2-2. Naturall

some overlap. The Marine Corps component commander is normally 

to set the conditions for Marine Corps tactical operations. These oper

include military actions executed by the MAGTF, which may include 

assigned or attached Marine Corps forces and assigned or attached fo

other Services and nations. 

President/

Secretary of

Defense

MAGTF

Command

Joint Force

Commander/

Marine Corps

Component

Commander

Strategic Operational Tactical

Figure 2-2. Commander’s Level of War Orientation.
JOINT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED THROUGH

SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS

A joint force commander may conduct operations through the Service c

commanders, which has advantages, including clear and uncomplicated 

command lines. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continu

economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate 

the organizational integrity of Service forces. These conditions apply w

of the required functions in a particular domain are unique to a single-S

force or when Service force capabilities or responsibilities do not signi

overlap. In addition, Service component commands provide administra

logistic support for their forces in a joint operation. 

When the joint force commander conducts joint operations through Ser

component commanders, the Marine Corps component commander and 

Service component commanders have command—operational control 

administrative control—of their assigned Service forces. The joint forc

commander may also establish a support relationship (supporting/supp

between Service components to facilitate operations. Support—which 

general, mutual, direct, or close—is a command authority. A superior c

establishes a support relationship between subordinate commanders an

determines when one should aid, protect, complement, or sustain the o

JOINT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED THROUGH

FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMANDERS

A joint force commander may conduct operations through functional co

or employ them primarily to coordinate selected functions. Functional 

components may be established across the range of military operations 

perform operational missions of short or extended duration. They can b

appropriate when forces from two or more Military Departments must 

the same domain or when there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspec

assigned mission. The most common functional components the joint f

commander may establish include the joint force maritime component 

commander, joint force land component commander, joint force air com

commander, and the joint force special operations component comman

Functional components are components of a joint force and do not hav

authorities and responsibilities of a joint force. Regardless of how the j

commander organizes his assigned or attached forces, the Marine Corp
ppgppg

attached Marine Corps forces as in figure 2-3.

When the joint force commander centralizes direction and control of 

functions or types of joint operations under functional component co

he must establish the command relationships. The joint force comma

designate the military capability made available for tasking by the fu

component commander and the appropriate command relationships th

component commander will exercise. The functional component com

normally exercise operational control over forces from his own Servi

tactical control over forces from other Services made available for ta

example, an Army officer designated as a joint force land component 

would normally execute operational control over assigned Army forc

tactical control of Marine Corps forces made available. 

The Marine Corps component commander advises functional compon

commanders on the most effective use of Marine Corps forces or cap

made available. The Marine Corps forces or capabilities made availa

joint force commander respond to the functional component comman

operational matters based on the existing command relationship. Join

provides specific guidance regarding how this is accomplished with r

Marine Corps tactical aviation. All Marine Corps forces receive adm

and logistic support from the Marine Corps component commander. 

JTF

Commander

Joint Force

Special

Operations

Component

Joint Force

Land

Component

Joint Force

Air

Component

Joint Fo

Maritim

Compon

Forces/

Capabilities

Made Available

Forces/

Capabilities

Made Available

Forces/

Capabilities

Made Available

Forces

Capabili

Made Ava

Army

Component

Marine Co

Compon

Navy

Component

Air Force

Component

 Figure 2-3. Joint Task Force Organized by Function.
MARINE CORPS COMPONENT COMMANDER

AS A FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMANDER

Forward-deployed naval forces, including Marine Corps forces, are usu

first conventional forces to arrive in an austere theater or area of operat

during expeditionary operations. The Marine Corps component comma

inherent capability to command and control Marine Corps forces and a

or assigned forces of other Services or nations allows him to serve as a 

functional component commander. Such assignments may be for limite

contingencies or for some phases of a major operation or campaign, de

upon the size, scope, nature of the mission, and the functional area assi

MCWP 3-40.8, Componency, for additional information.

MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCES

Marine Corps component commanders normally task-organize for oper

forming MAGTFs—balanced, air-ground, combined arms formations u

single commander. Due to the operational flexibility inherent in its con

MAGTF is the principal organization for all Marine Corps missions acr

range of military operations. Expeditionary by nature, MAGTFs vary in 

capability according to their assigned or likely missions and are specifi

equipped for rapid deployment by air or sea. 

Elements of a MAGTF

All MAGTFs consist of four core elements—a command element, a gr

combat element (GCE), an aviation combat element (ACE), and a logi

combat element (LCE), as illustrated in figure 2-4. Although MAGTFs 

size and capabilities, standard procedures exist for organizing any MA

for planning and executing its operations.

As a modular organization, the MAGTF is tailorable to its mission thro

organization. This building block approach also makes reorganization 

routine. In addition to its Marine Corps units, a MAGTF may have atta

forces from other Services and nations, such as naval construction batt

infantry/armor brigades. 

A key feature of the MAGTF is its expandability. Crisis response may 

larger force than what can initially be brought to bear. Being able to ex

original force—rather than replacing it with a larger one—promotes co

operations. The MAGTF’s modular structure facilitates rapid expansion 
gy py g 

units of each existing element. 

Command Element

The command element is the MAGTF headquarters. As with all other 

elements, the command element task-organizes to provide the comm

control capabilities necessary for effective planning, execution, and a

of operations.

Additionally, the command element can exercise command and contr

joint force from the sea or ashore and act as a joint task force headqu

element. A command element may include additional command and 

intelligence capabilities from national and theater assets, force reconn

assets, signals intelligence capabilities from the radio battalion, and a 

coordination center. A command element can employ additional majo

subordinate commands, such as the force artillery headquarters, nava

construction regiments, or Army maneuver or engineering units. 

Ground Combat Element

The GCE task-organizes to conduct ground operations in support of t

MAGTF’s mission. It usually forms around an infantry organization r

with artillery, reconnaissance, light armored reconnaissance, assault a

tank, and engineer forces. The GCE can vary in size and composition

rifle platoon to one or more divisions. It is the only MAGTF element 

seize and occupy terrain. 

ACE

Task

Organization

CE

GCE

LCE

MAGT

CE command element

Legend

 Figure 2-4. MAGTF Organization.
The ACE task-organizes to conduct air operations, project combat pow

contribute to battlespace dominance in support of the MAGTF’s missio

performing some or all of the following six functions of Marine aviatio

z Antiair warfare.

z Assault support.

z Electronic warfare.

z Offensive air support.

z Air reconnaissance.

z Control of aircraft and missiles. 

The ACE consists of an aviation headquarters with air control agencies

squadrons or groups, and logistic units. It can vary in size and composi

a small aviation detachment of specifically required aircraft to one or m

Marine aircraft wings. The ACE may operate from ships or from auste

expeditionary locations ashore and can readily transition between them 

loss of capability. It exercises command and control throughout the bat

Logistics Combat Element

The LCE task-organizes to provide all functions of tactical logistics ne

support the continued readiness and sustainability of the MAGTF. The 

performs some or all six functions of tactical logistics: 

z Supply.

z Maintenance.

z Transportation.

z Health services.

z General engineering.

z Other services, which include legal, exchange, food, disbursing, p

billeting, religious, mortuary, and morale and recreation services. 

See MCWP 4-1, Logistics Operations, for a detailed discussion. 

The LCE may vary in size and composition from a support detachment 

or more logistic groups. The LCE operates from sea bases or from exp

bases established ashore. It may be the main effort of the MAGTF duri

foreign humanitarian assistance missions or selected phases of maritim

prepositioning operations. 
yp

There are five types of MAGTFs—Marine expeditionary forces (ME

expeditionary forces (Forward) (MEFs[Fwd]), Marine expeditionary 

(MEBs), Marine expeditionary units (MEUs), and special purpose M

ground task forces (SPMAGTFs), as illustrated in figure 2-5 on page 

Marine Expeditionary Force 

The MEFs are the principal warfighting organizations of the Marine 

capable of conducting and sustaining expeditionary operations in any 

environment. In addition to their warfighting role, MEFs routinely ta

subordinate units into smaller MAGTFs or other formations to suppo

geographic combatant commander’s ongoing engagement and episod

response requirements. The three standing MEFs vary somewhat in s

largest being approximately 40,000 Marines and Sailors. Normally co

by a lieutenant general, each includes—

z A command element of one MEF headquarters group.

z A GCE of one Marine division (MARDIV).

z An ACE of one Marine aircraft wing (MAW).

z An LCE of one Marine logistics group (MLG).

There are three standing MEFs: 

z I MEF, based in southern California and Arizona, under Comm

MARFORPAC. The major subordinate commands within I ME

1st MARDIV, 3d MAW, and 1st MLG.

z II MEF, based in North and South Carolina, under Commander, 

MARFORCOM. The major subordinate commands within II M

2d MARDIV, 2d MAW, and 2d MLG.

z III MEF, based in Okinawa, mainland Japan, Hawaii, and Guam

Commander, MARFORPAC. The major subordinate commands 

III MEF are the 3d MARDIV, 1st MAW, and 3d MLG. 

A deployed MEF, in addition to its normally assigned units, may com

from other MEFs, the Marine Corps Forces Reserve, other Services a

and USSOCOM. When augmented with forces from other MEFs, a d

MEF can have multiple GCEs, such as I MEF during Operation Dese

which had both 1st and 2d MARDIVs as well as a US Army armored 

Augmenting aviation units from other Marine sources normally opera

single ACE. Additional Marine Corps, Navy, and Army logistic unit
augment an LCE, as happened during Operation Desert Storm. Allied o

units may attach to a MEF, as the United Kingdom’s 3 Commando Bri

during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Given the foregoing, MEFs have grow

than 90,000 Marines, Sailors, and Soldiers.

A MEF typically deploys by echelon with 60 days of sustainment, whi

extended through external support from other Services or a host nation

commander and his staff can form the nucleus for a joint task force, co

task force, or functional component headquarters. 

Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) 

A MEF (Fwd) is normally the lead echelon of a MEF or, for some cont

it can be a stand alone MAGTF capable of sustained expeditionary ope

MEF (Fwd) is normally smaller than a MEF and larger than a MEB. Fo

Military Engagement,

Security Cooperation,

and Deterrence

Crisis Response and

Limited Contingency

Operations

Major Operations

and Campaigns

Capable Across the Range of Military Operations

Integrated Within the Combatant Commanders’ Theater Campaign Plans

Special Purpose MAGTFs

Advisors/Training Teams

(Mission Dependent)

Marine Expeditionary Unit

(~2.2K)

Infantry Battalion Reinforced

Composite Squadron Reinforced

(Task-Organized Logistics

Combat Element)

Marine Expeditionary Brigade

(~14 to ~17K)

Infantry Regiment Reinforced

Marine Aircraft Group

Combat Logistics Regiment

Marine E

(~

Mar

Mari

Marine 

Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)

(~16.5K to ~40K)

Marine Division (-)

Marine Aircraft Wing (-)

Marine Logistics Group (-)

 Figure 2-5. Types of MAGTF Organizations.
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rotational basis to execute combat operations in Operations Iraqi Free

Enduring Freedom. The GCE of the MEF (Fwd) normally consists of 

division (-) or multiple regiments. 

Marine Expeditionary Brigade 

Mid-sized MAGTFs, MEBs conduct major security cooperation oper

respond to larger crises or contingencies, or participate in major oper

campaigns—such as MEB-Afghanistan. They provide the “building 

forcible entry and other power projection operations, providing the la

for amphibious assault and the fly-in echelons that “marry-up” with e

and supplies delivered by maritime prepositioning ships. During Ope

Desert Shield, for example, two MEBs deployed via amphibious ship

Marines and Sailors from two other MEBs traveled to Saudi Arabia b

intertheater airlift to fall in on equipment and 30 days of supplies del

maritime prepositioning ships. Normally commanded by brigadier ge

MEBs number approximately 16,000 Marines and Sailors once their 

units are assigned. A MEB normally consists of—

z A command element that may include additional assets, such as 

and control, reconnaissance, signals intelligence capabilities fro

battalion, and engineering capabilities from the naval constructi

regiments.

z A GCE composed of an infantry regiment reinforced with artill

reconnaissance, engineer, light armored reconnaissance units, a

amphibian units, and other attachments as required.

z An ACE composed of a combat assault transport helicopter/tilt-

aircraft, utility and attack helicopters, vertical/short takeoff and 

fixed-wing attack aircraft, fighter/attack aircraft, electronic war

unmanned aircraft systems, air refuelers/transport aircraft, and r

aviation logistic and command and control capabilities.

z An LCE task-organized around a combat logistics regiment. Th

normally has engineering; supply; services; transportation; med

maintenance capabilities; and landing support for beach, port, a

delivery operations. 

There are five standing MEB command elements established to main

coordination and conduct operational planning with key joint and Ser
qy ppy g 

across the range of military operations:

z 1st MEB Command Element, under Commander, MARFORPAC

established to provide a habitual relationship with the Navy’s Exp

Strike Group Three for the conduct of amphibious operations.

z 2d MEB Command Element, under Commander, MARFORCOM

established to provide a habitual relationship with Expeditionary 

Group Two for the conduct of amphibious operations.

z 3d MEB Command Element, under Commander, MARFORPAC, 

established to provide a habitual relationship with Expeditionary 

Group Seven for the conduct of amphibious operations.

z 4th MEB Command Element, which is embedded in the staff of t

Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces, Africa, may be 

for exercises and operations as necessary to meet Commander, Un

Africa Command requirements.

z 5th MEB Command Element, under the Commander, United Sta

Corps Forces, Central Command, established in theater to provid

Commander, United States Central Command, a readily employab

headquarters for exercises and operations, especially those condu

Navy units and special operations forces.

Like the larger MEFs, MEBs may assimilate units from other Services 

and grow beyond their notional size. The MEBs are the smallest MAG

capable of performing all six functions of Marine aviation. A MEB can 

the full range of expeditionary operations and may serve as the lead ec

the MEF. The MEB command element can also serve as the nucleus of 

multinational task force headquarters. 

Marine Expeditionary Unit

The MEUs, embarked aboard Navy amphibious ready groups (ARGs), 

ARG/MEUs. The ARG/MEUs provide continuous, forward naval pres

key regions to conduct steady-state security cooperation, military enga

and deterrence, as well as immediate response to episodic crises and 

contingencies. The ARG/MEUs may also be called upon to support ma

operations and campaigns in a variety of ways, such as enabling the int

of other forces, acting as the lead echelon for expansion to a larger form

providing the geographic combatant commander an inherently mobile 

flexible sea-based reserve. A MEU is commanded by a colonel. When 
y y ppp

normally established between them. A MEU normally consists of—

z A command element that may include additional command and 

signals intelligence assets.

z A GCE formed around an infantry battalion landing team reinfo

artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, tanks, light armored reconna

units, assault amphibian units, and other attachments, as require

z An ACE composed of a combat assault transport helicopter/tilt-

squadron, utility and attack helicopters, vertical/short takeoff an

fixed-wing attack aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, unmanned 

systems, shore-based air refuelers/transport aircraft, and other d

as required.

z An LCE task-organized around a MEU combat logistics battalio

of engineering, supply, services, transportation, landing support

and maintenance capabilities.

There are seven standing MEU command elements. Six of them are i

cycle that provides continuous forward presence with two ARG/MEU

regions. The seventh is permanently forward-deployed in United Stat

Command. The seven MEU command elements are—

z 11th, 13th, and 15th MEU Command Elements, under Comman

MARFORPAC, which rotationally deploy with subordinate elem

provided from I MEF.

z 22d, 24th, and 26th MEU Command Elements, under Comman

MARFORCOM, which rotationally deploy with subordinate ele

provided from II MEF.

z 31st MEU Command Elements, under Commander, MARFORP

of the forward-deployed naval force in the Pacific. It periodical

with subordinate elements provided from III MEF. These eleme

units that are permanently assigned and others temporarily prov

MEF from the other MEFs through the unit deployment program

The major subordinate elements are normally assigned to rotational M

command elements several months prior to deployment to undergo, i

with the ARG, an extensive training and certification process. They u

deploy for six to seven months, carrying enough supplies for the MEU 

operations ashore for fifteen days, beyond which they are normally s
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ARG/MEU has a somewhat shorter work-up and deployment cycle. W

forward, ARG/MEUs frequently conduct multiple, simultaneous missi

distributed over a wide geographic area. In 2010, a single ARG/MEU 

concurrently conducted foreign humanitarian assistance operations in P

strike operations in Afghanistan, and counterpiracy operations in the G

Aden. In other cases, ARG/MEUs may aggregate to conduct larger ope

they did in 2001 to open a lodgment for the introduction of additional f

during Operation Enduring Freedom. Upon return from deployment, A

remain in a stand-by status for 30 to 60 days, prepared for immediate 

redeployment in response to crisis, as happened following the 2010 

earthquake in Haiti.

Special Purpose MAGTF

When situations arise for which a MEU or other unit is either inapprop

unavailable, a SPMAGTF is formed. A SPMAGTF may be of any size—

normally no larger than a MEU—with tailored capabilities required to 

accomplish a particular mission. It may be task-organized from nondep

Marine Corps forces or formed on a contingency basis from a portion o

deployed MAGTF. Regimental-level headquarters often assume the rol

SPMAGTF command element and may conduct training in anticipated 

skills prior to establishment. A SPMAGTF may deploy using commerc

shipping or aircraft, intertheater airlift, amphibious shipping, or organic 

aviation. 

Frequently, SPMAGTFs have conducted sea-based security cooperatio

activities, such as Unitas, Southern Partnership Station and Africa Part

Station. Others have been formed to provide sea-based foreign humani

assistance or military support to civil authorities or participate in freed

navigation operations. 

An important type of SPMAGTF is an alert contingency MAGTF. Each 

MEFs usually maintain an alert contingency MAGTF as an on-call, rap

response force. A MEF commander may prescribe that an alert conting

MAGTF be ready to initiate deployment to any location worldwide wit

certain number of days or hours, depending on the indications and war

associated with an emerging crisis. Because it may need to deploy so r

readiness is paramount. Equipment and supplies intended for use as pa

alert contingency MAGTF are identified and, where appropriate, staged 

immediate embarkation. The alert contingency MAGTF usually airlifts 

secure airfield and carries its initial sustainment. Deployment by air ne

that the size and weight of an alert contingency MAGTF be kept to an 
gy y py py 

conjunction with amphibious, maritime prepositioning, or other expe

forces. The rapid deployment of the II MEF alert contingency MAGT

the 23 October 1983 terrorist bombing of the Marine Corps barracks 

is an example of expeditionary agility by a SPMAGTF. 

OTHER TASK-ORGANIZED MARINE CORPS FORCES

On occasion, Marine Corps forces may task-organize to conduct oper

outside of the MAGTF construct. These occasions usually occur whe

Marine Corps capabilities are required, singly or in concert with thos

by the other Services and USSOCOM, to conduct operations that are 

purpose, scope, or duration or to provide a joint force commander, an

component, or civil authorities complementary capabilities or additio

Marine Corps fighter/attack squadrons, for example, are regularly ass

carrier air groups in order to provide the additional capacity necessar

rotational deployment of the Navy’s aircraft carriers. Similarly, Marin

fighter/attack squadrons and detachments of electronic warfare aircra

from bases in the Mediterranean in support of allied air operations in 

during the 1990s. 

Other examples include the use of Marine rifle companies in 2003 to 

effort by US Army special forces to counter the Abu Sayyaf insurgen

remote villages of the Philippines by providing security for Navy me

assistance teams. Given the geographic combatant commanders’ grow

requirements for similar engagement and protection activities, Marin

capabilities may employ from a variety of Navy and Military Sealift 

ships to conduct diverse security cooperation, foreign humanitarian a

and maritime security missions or to provide increased protection wh

ships are transiting high-threat areas. 

The Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) provides 

response capability for MAGTF operations and may provide direct su

geographic combatant commanders. For example, CBIRF responded 

anthrax incident in the US Capitol. Whether capabilities are drawn fr

assets or separate commands, task-organizing Marine Corps forces in 

nonstandard ways for employment in concert with a variety of partne

the close involvement of the Marine Corps component commanders. 

key role in identifying geographic combatant commander and other c

commander requirements—especially those of their Navy and specia

counterparts—and developing innovative ways to meet them. The ab
, pp, , pp

task-organized with other components, including the ability to employ 

from a wider variety of Navy ships, may be essential to meeting geogra

combatant commander requirements.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS FORCES,

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Established February 2006, MARSOC is the Marine Corps component 

USSOCOM and is headquartered at Camp Lejeune, NC. The MARSO

organizes, trains, equips, educates, sustains, and, when directed by the 

Commander, USSOCOM, deploys task-organized, scalable expeditiona

Corps special operations forces in support of combatant commanders a

other agencies. 

The Commander, MARSOC is responsible for identifying Marine spec

operations-unique requirements; developing Marine special operations 

doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; and executing assigned m

accordance with designated conditions and standards. A Marine Corps 

general commands MARSOC with a supporting staff compatible in all 

areas with USSOCOM and Headquarters, Marine Corps. The subordina

MARSOC are—

z The Marine Special Operations Regiment, consisting of three Mar

operations battalions.

z The Marine Special Operations Support Group, including the Ma

Special Operations Intelligence Battalion.

z The Marine Special Operations School.

The Marine Special Operations Regiment trains and deploys task-organ

scalable expeditionary forces to execute special operations activities as 

by Commander, MARSOC. These activities include training, advising, 

assisting partner nation and other identified foreign forces, including n

maritime military and paramilitary forces, enabling them to support th

governments’ security and stability, enhance their tactical capabilities, 

subversion, and reduce the risk of violence from internal and external 

adversaries. The three Marine special operations battalions within the M

Special Operations Regiment train, deploy, and employ task-organized 

expeditionary Marine special operations forces for worldwide missions 

directed by Commander, MARSOC. The 1st Marine Special Operation

is located at Camp Pendleton, CA. The 2d and 3d Marine Special Oper
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Marine special operations companies and is task-organized with pers

uniquely skilled in special equipment support, intelligence, and fire s

Marine special operations company is capable of deploying as a task-

expeditionary special operations force capable of conducting foreign 

defense missions, counterinsurgency operations, special reconnaissan

action, and other assigned missions. The Marine special operations b

is capable of deploying as the nucleus of a special operations task for

headquarters to provide command and control to operational special 

force elements. 

The Marine Special Operations Support Group provides specified sup

capabilities for worldwide special operations missions as directed by 

Commander, MARSOC. The Marine Special Operations Support Gro

tailored combat support and combat service support detachments cap

combined arms planning and coordination, multipurpose canine supp

operations communications support, logistic support, and all-source i

fusion for deployments and operations as directed by Commander, M

The Marine Special Operations Intelligence Battalion within the Mar

Operations Support Group consists of a headquarters company and th

operational companies, one of which is located at Camp Pendleton. T

provides mission-specific, integrated intelligence capabilities in supp

special operations forces through the deployment of task-organized su

providing organic all-source, fused intelligence collection; analysis; p

and dissemination. 

The Marine Special Operations School, located at Camp Lejeune, scr

assesses, selects, educates, and trains personnel for assignment as Ma

operations forces. The Special Operations Training Branch coordinat

conducts courses of instruction that produce trained and qualified Ma

operations forces. Other Marine Special Operations School branches 

survival, evasion, resistance, and escape instruction and intensive for

language instruction in MARSOC core languages. 

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

FORCES, CYBER COMMAND

Established October 2009, United States Marine Corps Forces, Cybe

(MARFORCYBER) is the Marine Corps component of United States 

Command (USCYBERCOM). Based at Fort George G. Meade, MD, 

MARFORCYBER, in support of USCYBERCOM, plans, coordinate
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it executes offensive cyberspace operations to enable freedom of action

across the physical domains and the information environment and deny 

to adversaries.

Secretary of Defense memorandum, Establishment of a Subordinate U

Cyber Command Under US Strategic Command for Military Cyberspa

Operations, dated 23 June 2009, directed MARFORCYBER, at initial 

capability, to plan, coordinate, and establish an operational Service com

The MARFORCYBER directs the operations and defense of the Marin

Enterprise Network; provides available offensive cyberspace capabiliti

USCYBERCOM; and, when directed, plans and forms a joint cyberspa

force and directs joint cyberspace attack teams. At full operating capab

MARFORCYBER will have a fully functioning operational staff that c

integrate, synchronize, and execute cyberspace operations within the M

Corps and across the combatant commands in support of US Governm

national security interests. A Marine Corps lieutenant general comman

MARFORCYBER, with a supporting staff compatible in all functional 

both USCYBERCOM and Headquarters, Marine Corps. 

The Marine Corps Network Operations and Security Center and Comp

Marine Cryptologic Security Battalion are assigned under the operation

of the Commander, MARFORCYBER. The Marine Corps Network Op

and Security Center provides global network operations and computer 

network defense of Marine Corps Enterprise Network to facilitate info

exchange in support of Marine Corps and joint forces operating worldw

The Marine Corps Network Operations and Security Center concurrent

provides technical leadership for Service-wide initiatives that use the e

capabilities delivered by the Marine Corps Enterprise Network. Compa

Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion, directed by MARFORCYBER, 

conducts computer network operations in support of national cyberspac

operations. The Marine Corps Information Operations Center is part of 

Headquarters, Marine Corps, Plans, Policies, and Operations and provi

support to MARFORCYBER. 

MARINE CORPS CORE COMPETENCIES

The Marine Corps is a naval, expeditionary force in readiness. An expe

military operation conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specif

objective in a foreign country. (JP 1-02) Expeditionary operations enco

the entire range of military operations, from foreign humanitarian assis

forcible entry in support of major operations and campaigns. The defin
py ppj

foreign setting. 

Marines, individually and collectively, possess and demonstrate an ex

mindset—an expeditionary culture—devoted to readiness and the me

and adaptability to accommodate changing conditions and accomplis

changing missions with the forces and capabilities at hand. 

This mindset and culture is embodied in the Marine Corps core comp

which answers the question, “What does the Marine Corps do?” The 

Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 describes the six core competencies 

Marine Corps—

z Conducts persistent forward naval engagement and is always p

respond as the Nation’s force in readiness. The Marine Corps is 

an expeditionary way of life. Marines understand that true readi

much more than being deployable. It requires a force that is dep

its Navy shipmates and engaged in the littorals, shaping the ope

environment and contributing to the prevention of conflict. This 

can react rapidly across the range of military operations and mu

even thrive, in the uncertainty and chaos of emerging crises. 

z Employs integrated combined arms across the range of military 

and can operate as part of a joint or multinational force. The M

blend the art and science of executing combined arms operation

land, and sea. Marine Corps employment and integration of air- 

ground-based capabilities reflect an innovative approach to war

History has shown this approach is effective in missions that ran

security cooperation to major operations. The MAGTFs task-or

each mission and can employ independently or as part of a joint 

multinational force. 

z Provides forces and specialized detachments for service aboard 

on stations, and for operations ashore. The Marine Corps and t

share a common heritage. Marines have served aboard Navy sh

marksmen, as embarked MAGTFs, as naval aviators, and as spe

detachments afloat. This heritage is reflected in Marine Corps d

in the design of equipment and weapon systems. Modernization 

for the future are being designed to allow Marine Corps forces t

seamlessly deploy, project power, and fight from naval vessels, 

expeditionary bases, or both. Its close association with the Navy 

today, along with a growing interaction with the Coast Guard. T

maritime strategy articulates a renewed emphasis on integrated 

capabilities and capacities. 
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amphibious landing force capabilities and doctrine. When access 

regions or allies is denied or in jeopardy, forward-deployed, rapid

employable Marine Corps forces are trained and ready to execute 

amphibious operations to overcome enemy defenses. Together, the 

Marine Corps provide the Nation with its primary capability to sw

project and sustain combat power ashore in the face of armed opp

The Marine Corps leverages available joint and naval capabilities

sustainable combat power ashore, and secures entry for follow-on 

Sea-based MAGTFs provide the Nation with expeditionary forces 

initial operations independent of local infrastructure or in undeve

austere areas. This capability enables the accomplishment of amp

joint forcible entry operations as well as various missions across th

military operations. These strategic capabilities require focused a

resources and doctrine. 

z Conducts complex expeditionary operations in the urban littorals 

challenging environments. The ability of the Marine Corps to con

expeditionary operations, such as irregular warfare, against emerg

in complex environments is well documented. These operations i

counterinsurgency; counterterrorism; train, advise, and assist acti

 and stability tasks. The complexity of these missions has increas

the presence of large numbers of noncombatants, urbanization in 

littorals, and the dynamics of the information environment. Marin

specifically trained and broadly educated to understand and achie

operational objectives among diverse cultures and populations, to 

chaotic environments, and to recognize and respond creatively to 

demanding situations. 

z Leads joint and multinational operations and enables interagency 

The complex nature of existing security challenges demands capab

harness the strengths of all the instruments of national power. Ma

well qualified to enable the introduction of follow-on forces and f

the integration of military and interagency efforts. This interopera

mandates the establishment of enduring relationships and the orch

of diverse capabilities, organizations, and cultural awareness acro

aspects of an operation. 

POWER PROJECTION

During the Cold War, the United States maintained significant military 

positioned overseas in close proximity to likely employment areas. Sin

of the Cold War, most US military forces are now based in the United S
py y pypq

The Nation’s global network of bases now includes a much smaller n

main operating bases complemented by a system of more temporary 

operating sites and cooperative security locations. Overall, however, 

operations overseas are increasingly challenged by diplomatic, geogr

military changes to access, necessitating a renewed emphasis on pow

projection capabilities. 

Power projection is the ability of a nation to apply all or some of its e

national power—political, economic, informational, or military—to r

effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed l

respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regiona

The United States has two broad military means—normally employe

combination—for projecting power overseas: air power and sea powe

provides a means to deliver fires, personnel (to include airborne and 

forces), and limited materiel very quickly. It is less effective, howeve

delivering equipment and supplies in the volume necessary to sustain 

operations. Sea power provides a means to deliver fires, personnel (to 

amphibious forces), and resources with somewhat less immediacy tha

but in much greater weight and volume. The preponderance of joint f

materiel—vehicles, equipment, ammunition, and supplies—is deliver

While air power can project a light force quickly, it is soon outpaced 

cannot compete with sea power in the projection and sustainment of f

Given the weight and volume advantages of seaborne transportation, 

the most useful means of projecting military power overseas for the r

military operations. It does so through two basic means—naval mane

naval movement. 

Naval maneuver may be conducted from strategic distances. It involv

on and from the sea and projecting and sustaining ready-to-fight com

can also involve strikes on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. Litto

maneuver is a critical subset of naval maneuver. Littoral maneuver is 

to transition ready-to-fight combat forces from the sea to the shore in 

achieve a position of advantage over the enemy. It may be employed 

against an objective, including inland objectives, to accomplish the m

singly; to seize infrastructure or lodgments that enable the arrival of f

forces; or to pose a continuous coastal threat that causes an adversary 

his forces. Amphibious capabilities provide the means to conduct litt

maneuver. While designed primarily for combat, such capabilities ha

applicability across the range of military operations. Since 1990, US 

have conducted more than 100 amphibious operations with 79 of them 
g, , 

similar crisis response events conducted in austere and uncertain enviro

Collectively, naval maneuver capabilities provide the ability to conduc

operational maneuver from the sea. Modern littoral maneuver capabiliti

the ability to conduct ship-to-objective maneuver, eliminating an opera

pause at the shoreline. See figure 2-6.

Naval movement involves military sealift and merchant vessels transpo

vehicles, equipment, and supplies in volume over strategic distances fo

at a port or via expeditionary means, such as using roll-on/roll-off disc

facilities, causeway ferries, and/or causeway piers as part of joint logis

the shore. Naval movement is normally employed in concert with the m

of personnel by intertheater airlift. Maritime prepositioning forces (MP

exemplify the combination of naval movement and intertheater airlift. 

approach merges the weight and volume advantages of sealift with the 

airlift. However, unlike naval maneuver, which projects units in a ready

condition, naval movement and intertheater airlift depend on a secure 

Ship-to-Shore Movement Ship-to-Objective Mane

Objective A Object

Objective A Objective B

Force

Beachhead

Line

Log

Base

 Figure 2-6. Ship-to-Shore Movement and Subsequent 

Maneuver Ashore Versus Ship-to-Objective Maneuver.
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a process of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration be

can employ. Therefore, naval movement and intertheater airlift may r

amphibious or airborne forces to seize existing infrastructure intact o

lodgment for the establishment of expeditionary facilities.

Both naval maneuver and naval movement may be enabled by naval 

presence, which includes sea-based Marines. The day-to-day operatio

deployed naval forces indirectly assures joint access by gaining famil

forward operating areas while fostering the international relationship

may alleviate diplomatic impediments to access. More directly, they 

provide the means to overcome geographic and, when necessary, mil

challenges to access. 

The Marine Corps conducts power projection primarily through amp

operations, MPF operations, or a combination of the two.

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Amphibious operations require a high degree of training and speciali

equipment to succeed. Marine Corps forces organize, train, and equip 

from amphibious ships, which are designed to project combat power. 

United States Code, Title 10 the Marine Corps has primary responsib

developing landing force doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedure

equipment that are of common interest to the Army and the Marine C

Furthermore, the doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are 

dynamic and evolutionary, adaptable to new technology, threats, and 

requirements. The primary reference for amphibious operations is JP 

Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. 

Types of Amphibious Operations

There are five types of amphibious operations, following in the order 

of likelihood:

z Amphibious support to other operations. This type of support c

conflict prevention or crisis mitigation. It may include activities

security cooperation, foreign humanitarian assistance, civil supp

noncombatant evacuations operations, peace operations, recove

operations, and disaster relief. 

z Amphibious raid. Amphibious raids involve a swift incursion in

temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned wi
pp

landing force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. 

z Amphibious withdrawal. Amphibious withdrawal involves the ex

forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile 

z Amphibious demonstration. Amphibious demonstrations involve 

force conducted to deceive the enemy with the expectation of del

enemy into a course of action (COA) unfavorable to him. 

The types of amphibious operations apply to a variety of missions acro

range of military operations. For example, a withdrawal could involve 

evacuation of nonstate actors within the context of peace operations, as 

the removal of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon (19

Alternatively, a withdrawal could involve the evacuation of friendly fo

within the context of a major war, as at Hungnam, Korea (1950). A 

demonstration could involve a show of force in support of United Nati

sanctions, as during Operation Restore Democracy (1998), or could be 

integral to the scheme of maneuver for a large-scale offensive action, a

Operation Desert Storm (1991). 

Amphibious operations occur for the purposes of—

z Supporting operations that deter war, resolve conflict, promote pe

stability, and support civil authorities in response to crises, such a

peace operations in Macedonia or the 2006 disaster relief in the P

z Achieving operational or campaign objectives in one swift stroke

the rescue of American civilians in Grenada or the 1991 evacuati

US embassy in Somalia. 

z Initiating a campaign or major operation, such as the 1942 landin

Guadalcanal, which began the campaign to neutralize the enemy 

Rabaul in the Southwest Pacific, or the 1944 Normandy landings

established a lodgment for the Allied campaign across Western E

z Supporting an ongoing campaign, such as the 1950 turning move

through Inchon or the 2001 seizure of a lodgment for the introduc

additional joint forces during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Operational Environments of Amphibious Operations 

In general, amphibious operations will likely be planned and executed 

one of three operational environments—permissive, uncertain, or hosti
In a permissive environment, host country military and law enforcem

have the control, intent, and capability to assist operations that a unit 

conduct. Forward-postured naval forces routinely conduct a variety o

amphibious operations in permissive environments, such as sea-based 

cooperation and disaster response. When conducting operations in a p

environment, personnel and equipment going ashore may be consider

force, but are not normally referred to as such due to the cooperative 

their missions. They are likely to organize by function or location of 

into one or more forward liaisons and some number of teams, as appr

the purpose of the operation. 

Uncertain Environment 

In an uncertain environment, host government forces, whether oppos

receptive to operations a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally e

control of the territory and population in the intended operational are

deployed naval forces are frequently called upon to conduct crisis res

operations, such as noncombatant evacuation or embassy reinforcem

uncertain environment. They may also be called upon to combine wit

forces to conduct larger missions, such as the 1995 amphibious withd

United Nations forces from Somalia. Furthermore, an increased num

ungoverned or undergoverned areas throughout the world are being e

safe havens by terrorists, weapons traffickers, pirates, and other crim

elements. Amphibious forces may conduct counterterrorism, counterp

and counterpiracy missions, such as amphibious raids conducted for 

of destroying terrorists and their sanctuaries; capturing pirates or othe

and seizing contraband; rescuing hostages; or securing, safeguarding

removing materiel, to include weapons of mass destruction. 

When conducting operations in an uncertain environment, landing fo

normally organize into a number of elements, which may include the 

z A forward command element to provide on-scene command an

include direct liaison with Department of State personnel when 

z A security element to isolate the objective area from external int

attack.

z An assault element tasked to destroy, capture, rescue, or recover 

target.

z A support element may serve a number of purposes. In a raid, it 

provide direct fire for the assault force or, during a noncombatan

operation, it might provide landing zone control or assist Depar

State personnel in processing evacuees.
In a hostile environment, hostile forces have control, intent, and capabi

effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. T

common mission for amphibious forces in a hostile environment involv

amphibious assaults, although withdrawals, demonstrations, and raids c

expected. Large-scale amphibious assault provides the Nation’s singula

sustainable capability for forcible entry, which is the seizing and holdin

military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. Regardless of the si

nature of the mission, the organization, capabilities, and techniques req

conduct large-scale amphibious assaults—with MEBs as the building b

the landing force—provide the basis for adaptation to conduct the othe

amphibious operations in a hostile environment.

Once a landing force has executed its initial mission ashore, it may rem

to support ongoing operations or re-embark in amphibious shipping to 

available for a new mission. Marine Corps forces can provide great fle

a joint force commander when they are re-embarked aboard amphibiou

and maneuver at sea to strike the enemy again. 

Amphibious Operation Command Relationships 

The joint force commander has the authority to organize forces to best 

accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations. T

organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases 

contemplated operation and any development that may necessitate a ch

the plan. The joint force commander establishes subordinate command

responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate command relation

establishes coordinating instructions for the component commanders. S

organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning, an

decentralized execution. 

A landing force is a Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to 

amphibious operations; an amphibious task force is a Navy task organi

formed to conduct amphibious operations. An amphibious force consis

amphibious task force and a landing force, together with other forces th

organize, equip, and train for amphibious operations (see JP 3-02). Imp

JP 3-02 explains that the terms commander, amphibious task force (CA

commander, landing force (CLF) do not confer titles or command relat

In practice, commanders assigned amphibious responsibilities are refer

either their command titles, such as Commanding General, 2d MEB, o

task force designators. 
pg 

designated commanders of the amphibious force are important decisi

type of relationship chosen by the common superior commander, or e

authority, should be based on the mission, nature, and duration of the 

force capabilities, command and control capabilities, operational env

and recommendations from subordinate commanders. While the full 

command relationship options, as outlined in JP 1, are available in am

operations, Service component commanders normally retain operatio

over their parent Services’ forces and tactical control over other Serv

attached or made available for tasking. 

Typically, a support relationship is established between the command

based on the complementary rather than similar nature and capabiliti

amphibious task force and landing force. However, it is not the intent 

common superior’s authority to establish either an operational contro

control command relationship, as appropriate. 

The command relationships are normally articulated in an initiating d

from the common superior commander. The initiating directive may 

form of a warning order, an alert order, a planning order, or an operat

Regardless of the command relationships, when the initiating directiv

received, unique relationships are observed during the planning phas

amphibious force commanders, designated in the initiating directive, 

in planning matters. Planning decisions must be reached on a basis of 

understanding of the mission; objectives; and tactics, techniques, and 

and on a free exchange of information. Some of these decisions are c

primary decisions and are central to the planning of an amphibious op

They may be either the responsibility of CATF or CLF or are mutual 

both the CATF and CLF, as shown in table 2-1 on page 2-28. Any dif

between commanders that cannot be resolved are referred to the estab

authority. If a change in the mission occurs after commencement of o

if an amphibious operation is initiated from an afloat posture, coequa

relationships (either as described previously or as specified in the init

directive) will apply to any subsequent planning. However, as the op

situation dictates, the commander delegated with operational control 

amphibious force may specify planning relationships to coordinate pl

efforts, especially during crisis action planning under the provisions o

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.01, Joint Operati

and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I (Planning Policies and Pro

An establishing directive is essential to ensure unity of effort within t

amphibious force. Normally, the commanders within the amphibious 
develop a draft establishing directive during the planning phase to prov

specifics of the support relationship. The commanders within the amph

force submit the draft establishing directive to the establishing authorit

approval. The establishing directive normally specifies the purpose of t

relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. 

also include the following: 

z Forces and other resources allocated to the supporting effort. 

z Time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort.

z Relative priority of the supporting effort. 

z Authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the sup

effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency. 

z Degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the 

effort. 

z Establishment of air, sea, and ground maneuver control measures

z Development of joint tactical airstrike requests and air support re

z Development of target nominations, establishment of fire support 

coordination measures, electronic order of battle, integration of a

and the role of the supporting arms coordination center. 

y pp

Primary Decision May be in the

Initiating Directive

Decis

Autho

Determine amphibious force mission(s) X Mutu

Select amphibious force objective(s) X Mutu

Determine COA for development X Mutu

Select COA Mutu

Select landing area Mutu

Select landing beaches Mutu

Determine sea echelon plan CAT

Select landing force objectives CL

Select landing zones and drop zones CL

Select date and hour of landing X Mutu
ppgp

z Nonorganic logistic support. 

z Force protection responsibilities afloat and ashore. 

Unless otherwise stated in the initiating directive for the amphibious 

or the establishing directive, the CATF and CLF will identify the eve

conditions for any shifts of the support relationship throughout the 

operation during the planning phase and forward them to the establis

authority for approval. The establishing authority will resolve any dif

among the commanders. 

Phases of Amphibious Operations 

Amphibious operations generally follow distinct phases, though the s

may vary when amphibious forces are forward-deployed or subseque

assigned. Generally, forward-deployed amphibious forces use the fol

sequence: planning, embarkation, rehearsal (to include potential reco

of embarked forces), movement to the operational area, and action. H

significant planning occurs prior to embarkation to anticipate the mo

missions and to load assigned shipping properly according to those m

Planning 

The planning phase normally denotes the period starting from the iss

initiating directive for the operation and ending with the embarkation 

forces. Planning, however, is continuous throughout the operation. A

planning does not cease with the termination of this phase, it is usefu

distinguish between the planning phase and subsequent phases becau

change that may occur in the relationship between amphibious force c

when the planning phase ends. 

Embarkation 

The embarkation phase begins when the landing forces, with their eq

supplies, embark in assigned shipping. Organization for embarkation 

flexible enough to support changes to the original plan. The landing p

scheme of maneuver ashore are based on conditions and enemy capa

existing in the operational area before embarkation of the landing for

change in conditions of friendly or enemy forces during the movemen

cause changes in either plan with no opportunity to reconfigure the la

The extent to which changes in the landing plan can be accomplished 

depend on the ability to reconfigure embarked forces. 
The rehearsal phase is the period during which forces rehearse the pros

operation to—

z Test the adequacy of plans, timing of detailed operations, and com

readiness of participating forces. 

z Ensure all echelons are familiar with plans. 

z Provide an opportunity to reconfigure embarked forces and equip

z Verify communications for commonality, redundancy, security, an

reliability. 

Rehearsal may consist of an actual landing or may be conducted as a c

post exercise.

Movement

The movement phase is the period during which various elements of th

amphibious force move from points of embarkation or from a forward-

position to the operational area. This move may commence from rehea

staging, or rendezvous areas. The movement phase completes when the 

elements of the amphibious force arrive at their assigned positions in th

operational area. 

Action 

The decisive action phase starts when the amphibious force arrives in t

operational area. It ends with the accomplishment of the mission and te

of the amphibious operation. 

MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE OPERATIONS

The MPF is an integral part of the expeditionary capability of the Mari

Rapid response to regional contingencies is its primary role. An MPF c

the maritime prepositioning ships squadron (MPSRON), Navy support 

and MAGTF fly-in echelon. Together, they provide the joint force com

with a proven, flexible force that can quickly respond across the full ra

military operations—from combat to humanitarian relief. Fundamental 

MPF is its interoperability with joint forces and its rapid introduction o

forces into austere environments. 

Three squadrons of specially-designed ships comprise the MPF. Each M

carries equipment and supplies for 30 days of combat operations by a M
pygpqp

support a MEF. At least two of these MPSRONs are forward-deploye

Pacific and Indian Oceans to ensure rapid closure to likely crisis area

to 14-day sailing period.

The MAGTF fly-in echelon and Navy support element personnel airl

previously seized lodgment, a benign or host nation port or airfield, o

intermediate location where they link up with equipment and supplie

from the MPSRON. If a port is not available, the MPSRON may con

stream offload. A unique characteristic of the MPF is that the embark

equipment is maintained aboard ship and is combat-ready immediate

offload. 

Movement and arrival of an MPSRON, the Navy support element, an

fly-in echelon must be integral parts of the MAGTF commander’s ove

of operations in order to achieve the desired tempo of force buildup a

sustainment ashore. Support packages can be tailored by MPFs to acc

variety of missions of varying scope and complexity across the range 

operations. Additionally, ongoing enhancements to maritime preposit

expanding the current in-stream offload capability for a more robust 

conduct sea-based operations independent of local ports and airfields

SUSTAINED OPERATIONS ASHORE

The Marine Corps also has the capability to operate independent of th

support sustained operations ashore with the Army or multinational p

Marine Corps provides the joint force commander with four options w

conducting sustained operations ashore—enabling, decisive, exploita

sustaining forces. 

Enabling Force

The enabling force sets the stage for follow-on operations by other jo

components. The amphibious landing and subsequent operations asho

Guadalcanal (1942) set the stage for the arrival of other joint forces t

the seizure of the island and the advance through the Solomon Island

Rabaul in 1943. Enabling actions are not limited to the opening phase

campaign, such as establishing a lodgment, but may be conducted to 

attention from the main effort. An example of enabling actions is the 

MEF in Operation Desert Storm (1991) in fixing the Iraqi forces in K

allowing United States Central Command’s main effort, US Army VI

maneuver to envelop the enemy. 
The decisive force accomplishes the essential task required to achieve 

success. Decisive actions may include defeat of enemy military units, i

of critical lines of communications, or the evacuation of American and 

country nationals from untenable urban areas. An example of such a de

action is when the 1st MARDIV severed the North Korean lines of 

communications at Seoul, forcing their withdrawal from South Korea i

Exploitation Force

The exploitation force takes advantage of opportunities created by the 

other joint force components. The joint force commader may exploit th

opportunities through rapid and focused sea-based operations by the M

capitalize on the results of ongoing engagements to achieve decisive re

24th MEU served in this role during operations to seize Grenada and s

American citizens in 1983. While Army forces fixed the Cuban and Gr

forces at one end of the island, the Marines landed and maneuvered fre

the island, accomplishing the joint force commander’s objectives. 

Sustaining Force 

The sustaining force maintains a presence ashore over an extended per

time to support continued operations by the joint force commander wit

joint area of operations. This force provides logistical sustainment to jo

and/or coalition forces until theater-level sustainment is established. I M

fulfilled this role in the early days of Operation Desert Shield (1990) in 

Arabia and Operation Restore Hope (1992–93) in Somalia by providin

tainment to joint and Army forces until arrangements for theater suppo

were complete.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MARINE CORPS

TACTICAL AIR DURING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS ASH

Joint doctrine states a joint force commander has full authority to assig

missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate 

commanders. It also notes joint force commanders should allow Servic

and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were 

and organized, explaining that the intent is to meet the needs of the join

commander while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of t

organizations. Given the unique nature of the MAGTF construct, JP 1 p
ppy p

sustained operations ashore. That policy states:

The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander will 

retain operational control (OPCON) of organic air assets. The 

primary mission of the MAGTF aviation combat element is th

support of the MAGTF ground combat element. During joint 

operations, the MAGTF air assets normally will be in support 

the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander will make sor

available to the joint force commander (JFC), for tasking throu

the joint force air component commander (JFACC), for air 

defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissanc

Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will 

provided to the JFC for tasking through the JFACC for the sup

of other components of the joint force or the joint force as a 

whole. 

The policy notes that sorties provided for air defense, long-range inte

long-range reconnaissance are not excess sorties, inasmuch as they p

distinct contribution to the overall joint force effort over which the jo

commander must exercise integrated control. Excess sorties are in ad

these sorties. Additionally, the policy provides the following caveat: 

Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the geographic 

combatant commander (GCC) or subordinate joint force 

commander (JFC) in the exercise of operational control (OPCO

to assign missions, redirect efforts (e.g., the reapportionment 

and/or reallocation of any Marine air-ground task force (MAGT

tactical air (TACAIR) sorties when it has been determined by t

JFC that they are required for higher priority missions), and dir

coordination among the subordinate commanders to ensure unit

effort in accomplishment of the overall mission, or to maintain 

integrity of the force.

See JP 1 and MCWP 3-43.3, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Fires.
Conducting Expeditionary Operations

“There wasn’t any fuss about their mobilizing. There never is. Just an order issued a

regiment after another are on their way to Cuba, or Mexico, or the world’s end. Where 

isn’t the Marine’s concern. Their business is to be always ready to go.” 

 —An editorial from Harper’s We

Soldiers 

This chapter describes how Marine Corps commanders plan, execute

expeditionary operations. It provides the tactical tenets that command

when conducting those activities appropriate to each unique situation

chapter links the maneuver warfare philosophy found in Marine Corp

publications with the techniques and procedures of planning, executi

and assessment.

PLANNING

For a planning process to be effective and enable the command’s abil

to and understand changing situations, the commander must ensure f

loops that connect ongoing planning with execution results and other 

information. Since perfect understanding is not possible and time is c

commanders must assume risk. They must act when they believe the

achieved sufficient understanding of the problem. Whether planning 

strategic, operational, or tactical level, its key functions are to— 

z Direct and coordinate actions. 

z Develop a shared situational understanding. 

z Generate expectations about how actions will evolve and how t

affect the desired outcome. 

z Support the exercise of initiative. 

z Shape the thinking of planners.

PLANNING TENETS

The planning tenets derive from the Marine Corps maneuver warfare 

These tenets—top-down planning, single-battle concept, and integrat
pgg

and execute military operations. 

z Top-down planning. Top-down planning is the active participation 

commanders that drives the process at their respective levels to g

knowledge and promote understanding as a basis for decisionmak

z Single-battle concept. Single-battle is a unifying perspective of op

which holds that actions anywhere in the operational environment 

actions elsewhere. For example, early fires success in the deep fig

facilitates rapid maneuver in the close battle, which exacerbates c

service support push over limited lines of communications. 

z Integrated planning. Integrated planning is the application of a sy

systematic approach to planning through the employment of a plan

that is composed of subject matter experts in appropriate disciplin

consider all relevant factors, reduce omissions, and share informa

THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS

The Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) provides commanders an

all levels a means to organize their planning activities, to transmit plan

subordinate units, and to share a common understanding of the mission 

intent. The MCPP applies across the range of military operations. It ap

equally to deliberate planning and continuous planning for ongoing op

There are six steps in the MCPP. While these steps appear in a particul

sequence, planning seldom occurs in the same straightforward manner. 

Environmental factors, enemy action, updated intelligence, revised gui

feedback as a result of operations all contribute to making most plannin

endeavors highly complex and nonlinear in practice. The problem will 

the process of being solved. Above all else, planning is a dynamic learn

process—one that improves the understanding of a situation even as th

constantly evolves. For a detailed discussion of the MCPP, refer to MC

Marine Corps Planning Process. The six-step MCPP involves problem 

COA development, COA war game, COA comparison and decision, or

development, and transition. 

Problem Framing 

Since no amount of subsequent planning can solve a problem insufficie

understood, framing the problem is critical. The purpose of problem fra

gain an understanding of the environment as well as an understanding 
ppg

allows a commander to visualize the operation and describe his conce

approach, providing context for the examination of what the comman

accomplish; when and where it must be done; and, most importantly, 

purpose of the operation. To achieve this understanding, problem fram

requires both the judgment of synthesis and the systematic study of a

Accordingly, problem framing consists of a commander-driven desig

by staff actions. 

Design 

As a form of conceptual planning, design is the conception and articu

framework for solving a problem. A design-inspired framework repre

broad operational approach conceived as a result of understanding ga

through critical thinking and dialog—the basic mechanism of design—

articulated through the commander’s intent and guidance. Design’s a

address complex problems lies in the power of organizational learnin

dialog, when conducted within the proper command climate, can fost

collective level of understanding not attainable by any individual wit

group regardless of experience or seniority. Short of direct interaction 

systems, such as the adversary or population, group interaction invol

and candid interaction is the best way to replicate the nonlinear natur

conflicts and the actors involved. 

To conceive of and articulate a framework for solving a problem, com

must understand the environment and the nature of the problem. How 

is understood points directly to possible solutions. For example, the c

insurgent murder and intimidation tactics is distinctly different—and 

entirely different COAs—from the passive or active acceptance of th

by the local villagers. 

Understanding the environment is a critical aspect of design; it provid

context for understanding the problem. Critical thinking and open an

dialog, while examining any number of factors, help expose a broad 

ideas to be considered in the identification of the problem. In the pro

only can design participants determine the relevant actors, but also th

relationships between and among them. Such interactions include pot

trends, tensions, strengths, and weaknesses. All of these dynamics he

identify the problem and suggest ways to interact not only with adver

also with the population and other elements within the battlespace. In 

manner, it is understandable how problem identification, or problem f

problem solving occur iteratively.
ppqy 

commander. Armed with an understanding of the environment and the 

the commander gains an appreciation for the situation as it exists. Coup

any assigned or anticipated tasks as well as guidance and intent from h

echelons, those conducting problem framing can determine a desired fu

The difference between the current and desired states is a catalyst in te

envisioning a tentative configuration of actions suggested by the variou

which the commander can interact within the battlespace.

Staff Actions 

Staff actions provide the information the commander needs to help gai

understanding and form his subsequent visualizations of the problem a

sees the operation unfolding. Staff actions involve a number of activitie

including intelligence preparation of the battlespace and task analysis. 

Commands normally receive tasks from which they use the more essen

them, along with the purpose and their understanding of the environme

problem, to form the mission statement, which is an action-based expre

the problem.

Course of Action Development 

The development of a COA outlines one or more broad options for how 

mission and commander’s intent might be accomplished. Simply put, C

development and all subsequent steps are about providing options for t

commander while continuing to refine the understanding of the problem

distinguishable, each COA must address the essential tasks determined 

problem framing and incorporate the commander’s guidance and inten

Course of Action War Game 

The COA war game critically examines and refines the broad options i

enemy capabilities and potential actions or reactions as well as the char

peculiar to the operational environment. Planners wargame friendly CO

against selected adversary COAs through an iterative action-reactioncounteraction process. On larger staffs, a free-thinking red cell builds a

“fights” the adversary COAs, while a green cell might be used to accou

actions/reactions by other actors, such as host nation security forces, go

agencies, host nation government, or the local population, to the friend

enemy actions. This form of interaction introduces the nonlinear, unpre

nature of war into the learning process, seeking to strengthen the friend

The results of COA war games include greater understanding of the pr
pqg

modifications to each COA. 

Course of Action Comparison and Decision 

With estimates of supportability from his staff and subordinate comm

commander reviews the pros and cons of the broad options and decid

will accomplish the mission. The commander either approves a COA 

formulated or assimilates what has been learned into a new COA, wh

should develop, wargame, and compare against previous COAs prior 

to an approved concept of operations and orders development. 

Orders Development 

Orders development translates the commander’s decision into oral, w

or graphic communication sufficient to guide implementation and ini

subordinates. Orders development often involves additional detailed 

When completed, the operation plan or operation order becomes the p

means by which the commander expresses his decision, intent, and g

Transition 

Transition may involve a wide range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals ne

ensure a successful shift from planning to execution, subject to the va

echelon of command, mission complexity, and, most importantly, tim

minimum, the transition step includes a concept of operations brief al

handover and explanation of any execution tools developed during th

planning steps, such as a decision support matrix and execution check

and resources allow, the transition step may include rehearsal of conc

and confirmation briefs by subordinate units. More than likely, highe

headquarters will require subordinate commanders to brief their plan

to execution. 

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Design does not end in problem framing. Every planning step further

effort by deepening the understanding of the environment and the pro

Because the situation is constantly evolving, design must be dynamic

continuous assessment of the situation in light of the mission and the 

conditions within the battlespace. The commander, based on his visu

directs the conduct of operations by issuing orders, assigning tasks an

assessing results, and adjusting as necessary. 
g , 

should proceed directly to staff actions. Whenever the paradigm or the 

understanding of the paradigm changes, commanders will need to refra

the problem. 

A commander must be constantly aware of and optimize the time each 

allows for planning. Whether planning is deliberate or rapid, the comm

must display an acute awareness of the time available and ensure he ac

the time needed for dissemination and understanding of his plan as wel

time needed by subordinate commanders to plan their operations. 

Operational Environment 

The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumst

influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the de

the commander. The term operational environment was introduced by J

encourage a more thorough examination of the battlespace based on le

learned from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Under

friendly and enemy forces is not enough; other factors, such as culture, 

tribal affiliations, and human environment, can be equally important. T

operational environment is consistent with the need to study and learn a

possible about a situation. Essentially, commanders analyze the operati

environment in order to determine the physical dimensions of their bat

the form of areas of interest, influence, and operations. 

Battlespace 

Battlespace includes areas of interest, influence, and operations. Opera

areas for MAGTFs are usually areas of operations. Commanders must d

appreciation of how conditions within the battlespace will impact and b

impacted by friendly, enemy, and civilian actions. Commanders must c

how best to arrange friendly forces and execute actions within the battl

accomplish the mission. 

Area of Interest 

The area of interest contains friendly and enemy forces, capabilities, 

infrastructure, and terrain that concern the commander. This area inclu

area of influence and those areas that contain current or planned object

enemy forces that are capable of endangering mission accomplishment

of the area of interest normally exceeds the commander’s operational r

While the area of interest includes any assigned area of operations and 

influence, the area of interest may stretch far beyond the other parts of 
p

area of interest and may include noncontiguous areas. A forward-dep

MEF, for example, may have an area of interest that extends back to 

continental United States during the execution of the time-phased for

deployment. The commander may also have areas of interest around 

in neighboring regions. 

Area of Influence 

The area of influence is that area which a commander can affect thro

maneuver, fires, and other actions of his force. Its geographical size i

based on the physical limits of organic systems, such as fire support, 

mobility, or reconnaissance capabilities, and operational requirement

within each of the warfighting functions (see app. B). However, actio

these areas may influence perceptions and events on a global scale. T

influence normally reflects the extent of the force’s operational reach

MAGTFs employing Marine fixed-wing aviation can extend their op

reach, their area of influence could be very large; however, determini

area of influence should not be based solely on the combat radius of t

MAGTF’s fixed-wing aircraft. The commander should consider his m

forces, warfighting functions, and the area of operation to determine 

of influence. Understanding the area of influence allows the comman

subordinate areas of operations and focus intelligence collection and 

mation operations. 

Area of Operations 

The joint force commander normally assigns areas of operations to la

maritime force commanders. Areas of operations are prescribed by p

boundaries and are normally large enough to allow commanders to ac

their missions and to protect their force by employing their organic, a

supporting systems to the limits of their capabilities. An area of oper

two-dimensional. Commanders of the MAGTF will need to request a

above their assigned area of operations in order to properly employ th

The joint force commander or component commander normally assig

MAGTF an area of operations. The MAGTF, in turn, will assign area

operations to subordinate commanders whenever those commanders 

ground-based tactical tasks (see the list of tactical tasks in app. C). Su

assignments are not limited to the GCE. Area of operations assignme

include the ACE, when tasked with screening or guarding the MAGT

example. They may also include the LCE when serving as the main e

noncombatant evacuation operation or foreign humanitarian assistanc
gpp 

plans for accomplishing assigned tasks, which may involve further sub

the area of operations and tasks to their subordinate commanders. Thes

may include sizing the operation and determining their contiguous and 

noncontiguous boundaries. 

The size of an area of operations will normally change over the course 

operation. Many factors can influence that change to include— 

z Incorporating geopolitical constraints. 

z Accomplishing objectives. 

z Assuming a new task or mission. 

z Shifting to a new phase of the operation. 

z Anticipating exploitation and pursuit. 

z Assuming the main effort. 

Regardless of the MAGTF’s size, its commander must be able to comm

control his forces throughout the assigned area of operations. Comman

should neither seek nor assign areas of operations that are greater than 

area of influence.

A subordinate commander who is unable to directly influence his entir

operations may have to request additional forces or assets that will exte

operational reach. Failing that, he may have to— 

z Request a change in mission or tasks. 

z Request a reduction in the size of his area of operations. 

z Revise his concept of operations by phasing operations in such a w

only needs to directly influence portions of his area of operations

z Accept some degree of risk. 

A contiguous area of operations is one in which all subordinate comma

of operations share one or more common boundaries. A noncontiguous 

operations involves one or more subordinate areas of operations do not 

common boundary. Commands with contiguous areas of operations are 

within supporting distance of one another. The commander establishes 

contiguous areas of operations when— 

z The area of operations is of limited size to accommodate the forc

z Political boundaries or enemy dispositions require concentration 
g y y 

situation is not clear. 

z Concentration of combat power along a single axis of advance o

corridor is required. 

A noncontiguous area of operations, shown in figure 3-1, is normally 

characterized by a 360-degree boundary. Because units with noncont

of operations must provide all-around security, such situations allow 

concentration of combat power along a single axis. There is additiona

units operating in noncontiguous areas of operations because they are 

out of supporting range of each other. The commander establishes no

areas of operations when— 

z Limited friendly forces must occupy or control widely separated 

z Subordinate units do not need to provide mutual support. 

z Dispersed enemy or population centers throughout the area of o

require a corresponding dispersal of friendly units. 

Operations in areas not included in assigned noncontiguous areas of o

are the responsibility of the common higher commander.

MAGTF

Area of

Operations

Area of

Operations

Subordinate

Unit

Subordinate

Unit

Subordinate Unit Area of

Operations Area of

Operations

Figure 3-1. Noncontiguous Areas of Operations.
p

The battlespace framework depicts how the commander may organize 

battlespace so he can relate his forces to one another in time, space, ev

purpose. The battlespace framework consists of envisioned deep, close

operations (shown in fig. 3-2) as well as the organization of the force in

main effort, reserve, and security. The nature of the mission may also m

organizing into contiguous or noncontiguous deep, close, and rear area

battlespace framework provides the commander and his staff with a me

ensure they consider all essential elements of military operations while 

planning and execution phases.

Deep Operations 

Deep operations afford commanders an opportunity to shape or preven

close battles. Deep operations can strip away enemy capabilities, force 

culmination, or otherwise attack the enemy system so friendly forces c

what remains when the enemy forces become a part of the close battle. 

conducting deep operations, the commander can seize the initiative, cre

windows of opportunity for decisive action, restrict the enemy’s freedo

action, and disrupt the cohesion and tempo of enemy operations. Becau

operational reach, deep operations are primarily conducted by the ACE

the GCE and LCE may play significant roles as well. The MAGTF inte

assets, such as reconnaissance and signals intelligence, contribute to th

of deep operations. Also contributing to deep operations are ACE and 

surveillance and reconnaissance assets, such as unmanned aircraft syst

ground surveillance radars. 

Deep operations normally focus on the enemy’s follow-on and support

command and control nodes, and key lines of communications or facili

operations may require coordination and integration with national-leve

and joint forces. They may include— 

z Interdiction through fire and maneuver. 

z Surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition. 

JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, changes joint 

rear area to joint security area. The Marine Corps continues to 

use the security area in the traditional sense (see chapters 8 an

9 of this publication), using the term rear area to mean the are

to the rear of the main battle area where logistic and 

administrative functions are normally the dominant activity.
pgg py 

support operations. 

z Offensive antiair warfare. 

z Electronic warfare. 

Close Operations 

Close operations project power against enemy forces in immediate co

operations require speed and mobility to rapidly concentrate overwhe

combat power at the critical time and place. Fire and maneuver condu

combined arms forces from the GCE and the ACE supported by the L

dominate close operations. Combined arms forces maneuver to enhan

effects of their fires and conduct fire support operations to enhance th

maneuver. Commanders weight the main effort and focus combat pow

effects that lead to a decision. 

MEF Deep

MEF Rear

Division

Deep

Division

Deep

MEF Close Division

Close

Division

Close

Division

Rear

Division

Rear

Figure 3-2. Battlespace Organization.
p

All MAGTF elements conduct rear operations. Sustainment and securit

normally the dominant rear area activities to ensure the freedom of acti

force and continuity of operations, logistics, and command and control

MAGTF commander may need to provide commanders in the rear area 

capabilities, such as a tactical combat force, fire support assets, and ass

command and control. To minimize the logistical footprint, rear operat

exploit seabasing, host nation support, and existing infrastructure. 

As the operation progresses, the geographic location, command and co

structure, and the organization of the rear area will likely change. The b

functions of rear area operations include— 

z Communications. 

z Intelligence. 

z Sustainment. 

z Security. 

z Movement. 

z Area management. 

z Infrastructure development. 

z Host nation support. 

To provide command and control of rear area operations, the command

assign a rear area coordinator or commander with specific, designated 

That individual usually establishes a rear area operations center to assi

conduct and coordination of assigned functions. 

Battlespace Considerations 

Battlespace framework allows a commander to relate his forces to one 

time, space, and purpose; however, past operations in such places as So

Afghanistan, and Iraq challenge traditional notions of deep, close, and 

Irregular warfare can involve areas of operations where deep, close, an

share the same space, which compresses the time between tactical actio

strategic effects. In counterinsurgency or other types of irregular warfa

operations may be more a function of time or activity than space. In thi

construct, various stability-related activities—such as economic develo

support to governance—may not yield immediate results. Instead, the d

result may be a product of numerous small successes over an extended 

of time. 
yy g

through such activities as shaping, sustaining, and decisive actions. Id

planning, the decisive action is envisioned first, allowing planners to 

the shaping actions, such as fires and intelligence, needed to set cond

success. Similarly, Marines conduct sustaining actions, such as plann

logistics, rehearsals, or force protection, in support of friendly forces

Maneuver Control and Fire Support Coordination Measure

Commanders use control measures to assign responsibilities, coordin

maneuver, and control combat operations. These measures delineate 

operations or other areas in which commands will conduct their oper

coordinate maneuver or fires between adjacent units. Each of these m

specific purposes. Therefore, it is critical Marines use these measures 

were designed and clearly articulate to all affected higher, adjacent, a

subordinate units any modifications to the doctrinally-based measure

Boundaries are the basic maneuver control measures used by comma

designate the geographical area for which a particular unit is tacticall

responsible. They affect fire support in two ways— 

z They are restrictive in that no fire support means may deliver fi

boundary unless those fires are coordinated with the force havin

responsibility for the area within that boundary. 

z They are permissive in that the maneuver commander has comp

of fire and maneuver within his boundaries, unless otherwise re

higher headquarters. Many times, boundaries negate the need for 

coordination measures.

As shown in figure 3-3, on page 3-14, fire support coordination mea

facilitate the rapid engagement of targets while providing safeguards 

forces. They ensure fire support will not jeopardize the safety of pers

interface with other fire support means, and/or will not disrupt adjace

unit operations. 

Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities 

An important aspect of the commander’s visualization includes his an

centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. These analyses assist th

commander in visualizing the relative strengths and weaknesses of th

friendly forces. 
A center of gravity is a source of power that provides moral or physic

freedom of action, or will to act. Depending on the situation, centers 

may be intangible characteristics, such as resolve or morale; they may 

units, such as armored forces or aviation; or they may be the cooperat

two arms, the relations in an alliance, or forces occupying key terrain 

an entire defensive system. In counterinsurgency operations, the cent

may be the support of the local population. 

As they explore options for attacking an adversary’s source of power

commanders ask themselves, “Where is the enemy vulnerable?” Of a

vulnerabilities a commander may seek to exploit, some are more criti

others. The commander should focus his efforts against a critical vuln

that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy. 

Center of gravity and critical vulnerability are complementary concep

former looks at the problem of how to attack the enemy system from 

MIN

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Legend

Figure 3-3. Unit Boundaries and Fire Support Coordination Meas
ppg gpp

seeking weakness. A critical vulnerability is a pathway to attacking th

of gravity. 

The center of gravity and critical vulnerability analyses are ongoing p

The commander’s thinking on these items may be radically altered du

planning process, once the plan is executed, or as the situation chang

conflict transitions to a new phase of the operation. 

Commander’s Intent 

Commander’s intent is the commander’s personal expression of the p

the operation. It must be clear, concise, and easily understood two lev

may also include end state or conditions that, when satisfied, accomp

purpose. Commander’s intent helps subordinates understand the large

of their actions and guides them in the absence of orders. It allows su

to exercise judgment and initiative—in a way that is consistent with t

commander’s aims—when the unforeseen occurs. This freedom of ac

within the framework of commander’s intent, creates tempo during p

and execution. 

Commander’s Guidance 

Commander’s guidance provides specific information that focuses th

effort. As planning progresses, the nature of the commander’s guidan

based on the stage of planning and his understanding of the situation

planning, the commander’s guidance is conceptual. He shares his und

of the environment and problem and a broad operational framework f

the problem. The latter stages of the planning process focus on the sp

implementation. Accordingly, the commander’s guidance will be mo

Of all the guidance the commander provides, COA development guid

provides the method—how the commander envisions solving the pro

commander should articulate his commander’s concept, a clear and c

expression of what he intends to accomplish and how it will be done 

available resources. As planning continues, this concept enables the p

develop and refine COAs. This visualization reflects the commander

understanding of the situation and a hypothesis for achieving the ove

Based on a variety of considerations, such as available time or under

the problem and its complexity, the commander’s guidance may be n

directive or it may be broad and inquisitive. The former may include 

development of a single COA, while the latter may direct exploration 

COAs. Specific guidance can be in terms of warfighting functions, ty
p, pg

should include the commander’s vision of decisive and shaping actions

assists the staff in determining the main effort, parts of the operation, lo

of critical events, and other aspects the commander deems pertinent to 

COA development. 

Decisive Action 

The purpose of all military operations is mission success. For any give

there is normally a decisive event or activity that is critical to success. 

counterinsurgency, it may be isolating the insurgents from the populace

small unit engagement, it may be destroying a particular enemy weapo

position. In a major operation, it may be defeating a particular unit. In 

humanitarian assistance, it may be reopening a host nation port or airfi

Ideally, Marines seek to achieve a decision with the least loss of time, e

and, most importantly, life.

A tactical engagement should lead to achieving operational and strateg

The goal is not just for the commander to achieve a decision, but to ens

greater meaning by contributing to the success of his senior commande

operation or campaign. For an action to be truly decisive, it must lead t

larger than the action itself. 

Decisive action may occur anywhere and at any time in the single battl

the MAGTF’s major subordinate commands/elements may conduct dec

actions. The commander considers the following in planning decisive a

z What are the enemy’s capabilities? 

z Given his capabilities, what is the enemy’s most dangerous COA

z Given his capabilities, what is the enemy’s most likely COA? 

z What are the centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities? 

z What are the shaping requirements necessary to achieve a decisio

z Have I resourced the main effort for decisive action? 

z Is the MAGTF prepared to shift priorities and resources to conver

power? 

z Can the MAGTF accomplish the mission without reaching a culm

point? 

z Are we prepared to recognize and act on unforeseen opportunities 

enemy or friendly actions? 
pg 

The commander employs shaping actions to set the conditions for ach

decision. Shaping actions are lethal and nonlethal activities conducted 

the battlespace to attack an enemy capability or force or to influence 

commander’s decisionmaking. Shaping actions can also protect frien

vulnerabilities or enhance friendly capabilities. In many cases, the M

achieve much of its own shaping. The objective of shaping actions ca

z Limiting enemy freedom of action. 

z Denying the enemy the capability to concentrate forces. 

z Deceiving the enemy about friendly intentions. 

z Destroying enemy capabilities. 

z Altering the tempo of operations. 

z Gaining and maintaining momentum. 

z Influencing perceptions of the enemy, allies, and the local civili

population.

Shaping can have a favorable impact on friendly forces; the sense of 

offensive and taking the fight to the enemy helps to maintain morale a

offensive spirit. For example, General Ulysses S. Grant, despite being 

from resupply and facing an imposing defense during the 1863 siege 

Vicksburg, kept his forces on the offensive throughout the winter, pri

keep their spirits up and morale high. 

Shaping incorporates a wide array of functions and capabilities to cre

effects and is more than just fires and targeting. It may include direct 

military information support operations, electronic warfare, civil affa

affairs, and engineer operations. Information management; preventiv

services; and logistic operations, such as the marshalling of critical am

fuel, and supplies to facilitate future operations, are also shaping actio

these shaping actions are directed at friendly forces, they are referred 

sustaining actions. 

Shaping makes the enemy vulnerable to attack, impedes or diverts hi

maneuver, aids the MAGTF’s maneuver, and otherwise dictates the ti

place for decisive action. It forces the enemy to abandon his COA an

COA favorable to the MAGTF. Shaping actions must be relevant to t

envisioned decisive action. The commander attempts to shape events 

that allows him several options, so that, by the time the moment for d

action arrives, he is not restricted to only one means of achieving it. I
, 

point have so shaped the conditions that the result is a matter of course

Lines of Operations 

A line of operations helps define the orientation of the force. In conven

operations, lines of operations connect actions related in time and spac

objective. During counterinsurgency or other irregular warfare operatio

of operations focus on major stability-related objectives, such as securi

restoration of essential services, and training host nation military and p

forces. In either case, lines of operations reinforce the idea of the single 

since success or failure in any line of operations will have an impact on 

the other lines of operations. There is more information on this topic in 

MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency.

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 

The commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) are those 

information requirements identified by the commander as being signifi

timely decisionmaking. The CCIRs identify information on friendly ac

enemy activities, and the environment. Commanders use CCIRs to help 

their vision of the battlespace, assess desired effects, and determine how 

achieve a decision to accomplish their mission or to identify significan

deviations from that vision. 

Not all information requirements directly support the commander’s 

decisionmaking, so CCIRs must link to the critical decisions the comm

anticipates making, thereby driving the command’s collection efforts. T

number of CCIRs must be limited to only those that support the comm

critical decisions. Too many CCIRs can diffuse the staff’s focus and ov

the collection effort. In many cases, such as during Operation Iraqi Fre

many of the CCIRs were significant notification events. Significant no

events identify a requirement for more information or the need to provi

information of a strategic communication nature to higher headquarters

CCIRs identify the need for the commander to make a decision. 

These requirements help the commander tailor his command and contr

organization and are central to effective information management. Whi

can recommend CCIRs, only the commander can approve them. The co

must continually review and update his CCIRs to reflect the changing 

Planning generates many information requirements. Those that are ans

inform planning, while those that remain unanswered require assumpti
pg pg

requirements can evolve into CCIRs, while some may also emerge fr

COA war game and link to decision points the commander will have 

during execution. 

There are two categories of CCIRs—priority intelligence requiremen

friendly force information requirements. A priority intelligence requi

adversary- or environment-based intelligence requirement associated 

decision that will affect the success of the command’s mission. A frie

information requirement is information the commander needs about f

forces to make effective decisions. Depending on the circumstances, 

on unit location, composition, readiness, personnel status, and logisti

could become a friendly force information requirement. 

Information Operations 

Information operations are the integrated employment, during militar

operations, of information-related capabilities with other lines of ope

influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decisionmaking of adversarie

potential adversaries while protecting our own. Marines conduct info

operations across the range of military operations and at every level o

are well-suited to support the MAGTF’s expeditionary operations, sin

information operations can project the influence of the United States 

tailored to create measured effects in a specific mission or situation. T

scalable, allowing the commander to increase or decrease the level of 

to reflect a changing situation. Information operations must be closel

coordinated with joint force commander information operations and a

commanders to ensure unity of effort and to avoid undermining the e

desired by higher headquarters. Information operations require a thor

understanding of the culture of the target audience in order to produc

effect by communicating messages in the right cultural context and u

appropriate means. 

The primary focus of MAGTF information operations is at the operat

tactical levels of war. Information operations in offensive operations 

on command and control targets, disrupting or denying an enemy’s u

information and information systems to achieve the commander’s obj

MAGTF relies primarily on electronic warfare and physical destructi

command and control, intelligence, and other critical information-bas

the enemy needs to conduct operations. The MAGTF can also emplo

operations to deceive the enemy commander’s intelligence collection

and dissemination systems. Information operations in defensive oper
py

to plan and execute operations. Information operations include percept

management or those actions taken to influence selected groups and de

makers. Perception management combines informational activities, tru

projection, operations security, military deception, and military inform

support operations. It encompasses all actions taken to convey or deny 

information to an audience and can be a key contributor to shaping effo

In some environments, information operations capitalize on the growin

sophistication, connectivity, and reliance on information technology. It 

the vulnerabilities and opportunities presented by the increasing depen

the United States and its adversaries on information and information sy

In other situations, information operations may mean employing low-te

to facilitate civil-military operations, influence selected target audience

support military deception. Whatever the nature of the conflict, inform

operations target information or information systems to affect the adve

decisionmaking process. Information operations may, in fact, have thei

impact as a deterrent in peace and during the initial stages of crisis, dis

adversaries from initiating actions detrimental to the United States. 

Forward-deployed MAGTFs, coordinated and integrated with public af

defense support to public diplomacy, exploit the full range of their info

operations capabilities in support of a communication strategy. When 

appropriate, MAGTFs will develop and nest with communication strate

programs, plans, objectives, themes, messaging, and images at the oper

and tactical levels, leaving them to exploit success attained and expone

shape the battlespace for future operations. The intent of these operatio

develop a relative advantage over the adversary and selected groups in 

information environment and create an operational advantage (informa

superiority) at a specific time and location. An operational advantage m

the form of adversarial decisionmaking or targeted audience behaviors

advantage enables the MAGTF to maneuver and execute actions relativ

unchallenged because the adversary does not have populace support or 

communicate timely, accurate guidance or direction to its own forces. O

other hand, an operational advantage may be one that permits the MAG

commander to make more timely and accurate decisions than the adver

resulting in an advantage in initiative, tempo of operations, and momen

Ultimately, the aim of information operations is to impact the content a

information to an adversary or neutral and friendly audiences (non-US 
ypp

Cyberspace may be described as a global domain that leverages infor

telecommunication technologies to create an environment of interdep

computer and telecommunication networks, including command and 

systems, which can be used to produce outcomes in virtual and physi

The ability to operate in cyberspace is critical to strategic, operationa

tactical successes. Without secure computerized technologies, many 

and command and control systems will not function properly; intellig

surveillance, and reconnaissance systems will be ineffective; and sen

information will be at risk of compromise. The Marine Corps and oth

depend on cyberspace operations for speed, precision, and lethality. A

recognize that much of the United States’ economic and military dom

relies upon the technology, communications, and automated systems 

cyberspace enables. Ease of access and rate of technological change 

to make dominance in this domain tenuous and invite asymmetric ch

Challenges range from recreational hackers to self-styled cyber-vigila

groups with nationalistic or ideological agendas, terrorist organizatio

transnational actors, international corporations with ties to other gove

and nation states. 

Cyberspace operations involve the employment of cyber capabilities 

primary purpose is to create military objectives or effects in or throug

cyberspace. Cyberspace operations comprise five broad categories—

of Defense network operations, defensive cyber operations, offensive 

operations, computer network exploitation, and information assuranc

z Network operations are Department of Defense-wide operation

organizational, and technical capabilities employed to operate a

the Department of Defense information network. This network 

globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilit

collecting, processing, storing, managing, and disseminating inf

demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. M

network operations include day-to-day operations required to m

Marine Corps Enterprise Network and protect it from both exte

internal threats.

z Defensive cyber operations involves actions taken to protect, m

analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within Dep

Defense information network. Defensive cyber operations empl

information technology, information assurance, intelligence, 
g, , y p

defend Department of Defense information network. 

z Offensive cyber operations includes the use of computer networks 

deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and c

networks, within the computers and networks themselves, or to en

offensive operations. Computer network attack is a subset of offe

cyberspace operations where the anticipated effect of the operatio

equivalent to a military attack. 

z Computer network exploitation is intelligence collection activitie

conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data fr

or adversary automated information systems or networks.

z Information assurance includes measures that protect and defend 

information and information systems by ensuring their availability

authenticity, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. These measures 

providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating 

detection, and reaction capabilities.

Given the scope and complexity of cyberspace operations, they must b

integrated into the overall joint and Marine Corps operational planning 

effectively coordinated to achieve designated operational and tactical o

EXECUTION

Execution of operations is the concerted action of the commander and 

to conduct operations based on the operation plan or operation order, m

the current tactical situation dictates, to achieve the commander’s inten

accomplish the mission. Similarly, execution is the commitment of cap

interactions with selected elements within the battlespace. In viewing t

as part of a system, Marines invest energy into the system during execu

order to influence how that system evolves. The commander and his fo

gain and retain the initiative, create overwhelming tempo, establish and 

momentum, create desired effects, exploit success, and successfully fin

the operation. 

The commander, assisted by his deputy commander and staff, oversees 

activities of the MAGTF. These activities include the movement and m

the force, coordination and control of fires, collection of intelligence, su

and protection of the force, and assessment of these activities to determ

progress of the command in achieving the desired end state.
No activities in war are more important than command and control. T

command and control, the commander recognizes what needs to be d

to it that appropriate actions are taken. Command and control provide

and direction to the varied activities of a military unit. If done well, c

and control add to the strength of the force. 

Decentralizing decisionmaking authority allows commanders on the 

closest to the events the latitude to deal with the situation on their ow

authority—but in accordance with the higher commander’s intent. In 

tralized approach, control of an operation rests, in large part, with sub

units working together laterally and from the bottom up to accomplis

fulfill the commander’s intent while providing feedback. Acting in th

places the friendly system under control. 

Commanders must determine where to locate in order to observe and 

timely and relevant decisions. For component and MAGTF command

hierarchically and geographically removed from the scene of the acti

mostly observe the operation vicariously, most notably through their 

units who are closer to the action. Component and MAGTF command

three basic methods for observation—the commander’s battle rhythm

plan, and feedback, such as combat reporting. 

The commander’s battle rhythm is an important aspect of command a

The battle rhythm will contain the venues that augment his battlefield 

and provide him critical information. It will likely include meetings w

and adjacent commanders, visits to subordinate commands where he 

personally observe the operation, and interactions with his staff. The 

effort is a source of information, whether conducting “front-end” coll

as answering CCIRs), locating and validating targets, or collecting po

information (such as bomb damage assessments). Finally, feedback is 

resource that identifies the difference between the situation as it exist

desired end state. 

Information Management 

The rate and amount of change occurring during execution and the st

to record and report on that change generates an overwhelming amou

information that must be managed. Accordingly, information manage

includes the processes and techniques the command uses to obtain, h
, , gp 

management processes to ensure access to timely and useful informatio

enabling them to make decisions. Sound information management prac

facilitate the rapid, distributed, and unconstrained flow of information 

directions—to higher headquarters, adjacent units, and subordinate com

Information management policies and procedures enable the staff to de

the importance, quality, and timeliness of information to provide the co

with refined and focused data and prevent information overload. Funda

a sound and productive information management program is basic staf

techniques, and procedure excellence. This excellence includes the mas

various information systems that helps staffs manage information. Bas

commander’s observation of the operation, he must orient to the chang

situation to assess its meaning to him and his command so he can conti

adapt in a relevant manner faster than the enemy, adversaries, or comp

ASSESSMENT

Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current 

and progress of an operation. It is the basis for adaptation, keyed to the 

purpose, oriented on the future, and focused on emerging opportunities

Successful assessment requires the commander’s situational understand

his recognition of the difference between planned goals and the situatio

exists. This difference between what was planned and what actually ha

becomes the catalyst for decisionmaking, either to correct deficiencies 

opportunities. An effective assessment process requires four elements: 

z A basis for comparisons in the form of planning goals, which inc

purpose, conditions, and effects. 

z Feedback that allows approximation of the situation as it exists. 

z Analysis and synthesis to determine the causes and difference betw

and execution. 

z Recommendations for change. 

Planning for Assessment 

The hierarchical layering of tasks and purposes in military plans and or

provides a natural framework for assessment. As planners determine sp

planning goals, the plan or order may contain sufficient information fo

assessment, particularly during conventional operations where so much 

operation is observable and measurable. However, in some cases, a mo

assessment process may be needed due to operational complexity, the 
p

detailed reporting requirements of higher headquarters. 

Assessment Cell 

On larger, more senior staffs, the commander may form an assessmen

assessment cell normally shadows the planning effort, looking for are

plan that may require assistance in measuring progress toward planne

the purpose of the operation. Since some conditions are necessarily c

commanders and their staffs, to include an assessment cell, may use m

performance and effectiveness to determine the degree to which a co

been satisfied. 

Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness 

Measures of performance help assess friendly actions tied to measuri

accomplishment. They help answer the question, “Are we doing thin

Measures of effectiveness help assess changes in system behavior, ca

operational environment that are tied to measuring the attainment of 

achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. They help answ

question, “Are we doing the right things?” The measures of performa

measuress of effectiveness provide the commander with tangible indi

how close he is to achieving his planned goals. To be meaningful, me

performance and measures of effectiveness need to be observable, m

and relevant.

Assessment Considerations 

Assessment, like the planning process, should be driven top-down by 

commander. His assessment guidance could begin as early as his com

orientation. Similarly, he needs to provide his information requireme

the assessment effort. 

While measures of performance and measures of effectiveness may i

assessment effort, they also impose collection requirements. Like CC

many measures of performance and measures of effectiveness can ov

collection effort and diffuse the staff’s focus. Staffs must avoid the te

unnecessarily complicate the assessment process. 

When developing orders and planning for assessment, measures of pe

and measures of effectiveness must be carefully crafted. Tactical task

precise definitions that describe what is to be accomplished. Planners 

select the most appropriate tactical task and stick with it to avoid con

possible mission creep. 
jp

terms of time, resources, and risk to friendly forces is the tactical task d

For example, before committing resources to “destroy 50 percent of all 

in zone,” planners should seek alternative solutions or a different tactic

can still contribute to the commander’s intent without obligating an ino

amount of the command’s resources and capabilities.

Joint Publications 3-0 and 3-60, Joint Targeting, portray tactical level a

as being primarily in the spatial/physical realm focused mostly on letha

While lethal fires can be a large and important part of tactical operation

greatest effect of fires is generally not the amount of physical destructi

cause, but the effect of that destruction on the enemy’s moral strength. 

is difficult to quantify mental and moral forces, it is tempting to exclud

from the assessment effort. However, any assessment process that negl

factors ignores the greater part of the nature of war—the human eleme

Military operations do not subscribe to the additive properties of math. 

Accordingly, any assessment-related, color-coded charts that reflect a n

sum or average of discrete values is fundamentally flawed. If the color 

represents better or worse, less or more, or other analogic indicators, th

may have merit with respect to the determination of progress or the lac

and the reasons why. The most insightful assessment reporting lies in t

narrative. What are commanders, staffs, or assessment officers saying i

reports, whether written or verbal? Their comments should reflect the w

the information in the charts. They are more likely to reflect knowledg

understanding, which is a requirement for relevant change. In the end, a

is a qualitative event, requiring commanders to balance the science of 

quantifiable information with the art of intuition and judgment to arrive 

understanding of the situation that fosters timely and relevant decisions

TACTICAL TENETS

Actions at the tactical level of war are the building blocks used to achie

operational success and fulfill the joint force commander’s operational 

Every action the MAGTF commander and the major subordinate comm

take is aimed at achieving the senior commander’s goals and accompli

mission. The tactical level of war is the province of combat. It includes 

maneuver of forces to gain a positional advantage, the use and coordin

fires, the sustainment of forces throughout the area of operations, the im

exploitation of success, and the combination of different arms and wea

to cause the enemy’s defeat. The MAGTF conducts these tactical opera

through the major subordinate commands that execute them. 
pqg

of a number of tactical tenets to succeed in the battlespace. Among th

achieving a decision, gaining advantage, tempo, adapting, and exploi

and finishing are key. They do not stand alone; rather, they merge to 

effect greater than each one applied separately. Part of the art of tacti

knowing where and when to apply these tenets and how to combine t

create the desired effect.

Achieving a Decision 

The objective of tactics is to achieve military success through a decis

In combat, the success the commander seeks is victory—not a partial 

outcome, but a victory that settles the issue in his favor and contribut

success of the overall operation or campaign.

Achieving a decision is not easy. The enemy’s skill and determination 

prevent even a victorious commander from achieving the decision he 

Commanders must not engage in battle without envisioning a larger r

their actions.

Commanders must be prepared to act decisively. Key to this effort is 

enemy critical vulnerabilities, shaping the operating area to gain an a

designating a main effort to focus the MAGTF’s combat power, and a

bold and relentless manner. 

Forcing a successful decision requires the commander to be bold and 

Boldness refers to daring and aggressiveness in behavior. It is one of 

requirements for achieving clear-cut outcomes. The commander mus

desire to “win big,” even if he realizes that in many situations the con

victory may not yet be present. Relentlessness refers to pursuing the 

goal single-mindedly and with dogged perseverance. Once he has an 

he should exploit it fully, increasing the pressure as he goes. Victory 

rarely the product of the initial plan; rather, it is because of a relentle

tion of any advantage, no matter how small, until the mission succeed

Gaining Advantage 

Some of those exploitable advantages include the use of maneuver an

whenever possible. The commander employs complementary forces 

arms; he exploits the terrain, weather, and times of darkness to his ad

traps the enemy by fire and maneuver; he fights asymmetrically to ga

advantage; and he strives to gain an advantage over the enemy by exp
y py, jy pg 

enemy’s strength with his own. 

Combined Arms 

Combined arms, a Marine Corps core competency, is an important mea

gaining advantage. Combined arms presents the enemy not merely with 

problem, but with a dilemma—a no-win situation. The commander com

supporting arms, organic fires, and maneuver in such a way that any ac

enemy takes to counteract one makes him more vulnerable to another. 

Modern combined arms tactics combine the effects of various arms—in

armor, artillery, aviation, and information operations—to create the gre

possible effect against the enemy. The strengths of the arms compleme

reinforce each other. At the same time, weaknesses and vulnerabilities 

arm are protected or offset by the capabilities of the other. 

The MAGTF is a perfect example of a combined arms team. For examp

entrenched enemy discovers that if he stays in fighting holes, Marine g

forces will maneuver into a position of advantage and, if necessary, wi

with and destroy him. If he comes out to attack, the enemy becomes su

to the lethal fires of Marine artillery and aviation. If he tries to retreat, 

motorized/mechanized and aviation forces will pursue him to his destru

Combined arms tactics is standard practice and second nature for all M

Exploiting the Environment 

The use of the environment offers tremendous opportunities to gain ad

over the enemy. Marines must train for and understand the characterist

environment where they may have to operate, such as jungle, desert, m

arctic, riverine, urban, and information. More importantly, Marines mu

understand how the terrain, weather, and periods of darkness or reduce

impact their own and the enemy’s ability to fight. 

In addition to the physical aspects of the environment, Marines must co

impact on the operation by the people and the culture, political and soc

organization, and any external agencies or organizations that exist with

of operations. These aspects will have differing effects in the informati

environment due to beliefs, ability to pass information, collect informa

understand the information available. Since most expeditionary operati

place in the world’s littoral regions, which are more urban and densely 

Marines must plan for and be prepared to conduct more urbanized and 

military operations. 
py 

Complementary forces—the idea of fix-and-flank—are an important 

gaining advantage. The commander seeks to crush the enemy—as be

hammer and an anvil—with two or more actions. With its two comba

MAGTF has organic complementary and asymmetric forces. Ground 

forces may attack an enemy in one direction and dimension, while av

combat forces attack from another. This capability places the enemy 

dilemma. The opponent is now vulnerable to one or the other of the t

combat forces. He has no protection against both; no matter how he m

he is exposed. 

One of the complementary forces may take a direct, obvious action to 

enemy. The other force takes the unexpected or extraordinary action. 

actions work together against the enemy. The two actions are insepar

be interchangeable in battle. The concept is basic, but it can be imple

variety of combinations limited only by imagination. 

Surprise 

Achieving surprise can greatly increase advantage. In fact, surprise c

prove decisive. The commander tries to achieve surprise through info

operations that result in deception, stealth, and ambiguity. 

The commander uses deception to mislead the enemy about his real i

and capabilities. By employing deception, he tries to cause the enemy 

ways that will eventually prove prejudicial for them. He may use dec

mislead the enemy about the time and location of a pending attack or 

impression his forces are larger than they really are. Forces used to su

deception operations must be appropriate and of sufficient size to ma

deception credible. Ideally, by the time the enemy discovers the dece

be too late for him to react effectively. 

Surprise can be generated through stealth, an advantage when maneu

against an enemy. It provides less chance of detection by the enemy, 

vulnerable to surprise action for which he may be unprepared. 

The commander can also achieve surprise through ambiguity. It is us

difficult to conceal all friendly movements from the enemy, but the c

can sometimes confuse him about the meaning of what he sees, espec

awareness of where the main effort is or where the commander has pl

for a decision. Clearly, the ambiguity created in the minds of the Iraq

command by the amphibious force contributed to fixing the Iraqi forc

coalition forces to succeed in Operation Desert Storm. 
yy 

Fighting asymmetrically means gaining advantage through imbalance, 

strength against an enemy weakness in an unexpected way. At the tacti

fighting asymmetrically means using dissimilar techniques and capabil

maximize the MAGTF’s strengths while exploiting enemy weaknesses

fighting asymmetrically, the MAGTF does not have to be numerically 

defeat the enemy. It only has to be able to exploit the enemy’s vulnerab

MAGTF operations, using tanks to fight enemy artillery or attack helic

against enemy tanks are examples of fighting asymmetrically. In these 

the greater speed and mobility of the tanks and aircraft provide an adva

the enemy. Fast-moving tanks operating in the enemy’s rear against sta

slow-moving artillery can disrupt the enemy’s cohesion. Ambushing ta

attack helicopters in terrain that hampers tank maneuver provides even 

effect and generates even more advantage. United States attack helicop

assisted in blunting a rapid and powerful North Vietnamese advance an

destroyed the enemy’s armor using just such tactics during the Easter O

sive (1972) in the Republic of Vietnam.

Commanders must anticipate asymmetric actions and take measures to 

reduce the adversary’s advantage. An adversary may counter MAGTF 

asymmetrically by conducting insurgency or terrorist operations, such 

terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon (1983). Th

sary may also try to use information operations to undermine alliances 

influence public opinion. 

Tempo 

One of the most powerful weapons available to the commander is spee

that can consistently move and act faster than its enemy has a powerful 

tage. The ability to plan, decide, execute, and assess faster than the ene

advantages commanders can exploit. 

In a military sense, there is more to speed than simply going fast and th

vital difference between acting rapidly and acting recklessly. Speed and 

closely related. In tactics, time is always of the utmost importance. Tim

cannot be spent in action must be spent preparing for action and shapin

ditions for decisive actions. If speed is a weapon, so is time. Speed and 

create tempo. Tempo is the rate of military action and has significance 

relation to that of the enemy. When friendly tempo exceeds that of the 

react, friendly forces seize and maintain the initiative and have a marke

tage. The advantage of tempo applies across the range of military oper

During counterinsurgency operations, for example, when the results of 
g pppp

tage is gained through a tempo or rhythm of adaptation that is beyond 

side’s ability to achieve or sustain. 

Tempo is not merely a matter of acting fastest or at the earliest oppor

also a matter of acting at the right time. The commander must be able 

and maintain a fast pace when the situation calls for it and to recover 

not hurt. Timing means knowing when to act and, equally important, 

act. To be consistent, superiority in tempo must continue over time. I

enough to move faster than the enemy only now and then. When the 

force is not moving faster, the advantage and initiative pass to the ene

forces can manage an intermittent burst of speed, but must then halt f

siderable period to recover; it is then when they are likely to lose thei

While a force cannot operate at full speed indefinitely, the challenge 

consistently faster than the enemy. 

To act consistently faster than the enemy, it is necessary to make rapi

from one action to another. While there are many types of transitions 

the important thing to remember is that transitions produce friction. R

friction minimizes the loss of tempo that is generated at the point of t

unit that can make transitions faster and more smoothly than another 

to have greater relative speed. 

Adapting 

War is characterized by friction, uncertainty, disorder, and rapid chan

situation is a unique combination of shifting factors that cannot be co

with precision or certainty. A tactically proficient leader must be able 

actions to each situation. For adaptation to be effective, commanders 

exploit the opportunities that arise during execution. While making th

possible preparations, commanders must welcome and take advantag

unforeseen opportunities. 

There are two basic ways to adapt—anticipation and improvisation. S

the commander has enough situational awareness to understand a situ

advance and take preparatory action—anticipation. At other times, he 

adapt to the situation on the spur of the moment without time for prep

improvisation. A successful commander must be able to do both. 

To anticipate, the commander must forecast future actions. Forecasts 

based on past experiences and learned through trial and error in traini

cises, and actual combat. Planning is a form of anticipatory adaptatio

actions in advance. Another form of adaptation is immediate-action d
g pg p

a coordinated way to a broad variety of tactical situations. They provid

for adaptation. 

Improvisation requires creative, intelligent, and experienced leaders wh

intuitive appreciation for what will work and what will not. Improvisat

critical to increasing speed. It requires commanders with a strong situa

awareness and a firm understanding of their senior commander’s intent 

can adjust their own actions in accordance with the higher commander

Exploiting Success and Finishing

The successful commander repeatedly exploits any advantage aggressi

relentlessly until the opportunity arises for the finishing stroke. He use

advantage to create new opportunities. The commander builds on succe

exploited advantages to create new ones, reflecting the changing situat

results from both friendly and enemy adaptation. Advantages don’t hav

large; small, favorable circumstances exploited repeatedly and aggress

quickly multiply into decisive advantages. In the same way, the comma

exploits opportunities to create others. Victories are usually the result o

aggressively exploiting some advantage or opportunity until the action 

becomes decisive. 

Such victories are realized through development and maintenance of m

and the successful attack of enemy critical vulnerabilities. Momentum 

increase of combat power, gained from seizing the initiative and attack

aggressively and rapidly. Once the commander decides to exploit an ad

he makes every effort to build momentum until the offensive becomes 

whelming and the objective is achieved. He should not sacrifice mome

preserve the alignment of advancing units and he should drive hard at g

enemy defense. The commander should not waste time or combat pow

enemy units that cannot jeopardize the overall mission, choosing instea

them with minimal forces and bypass them with his main force. The co

exploits enemy weaknesses, such as tactical errors, faulty dispositions, 

flanks, poor or no preparation, lack of support, numerical and equipme

inferiority, low morale, and predictable operational patterns. 

Subordinates must be accustomed through practice and training to seiz

tunities on their own initiative. For example, a major subordinate comm

should have a complete understanding of the MAGTF commander’s in

can recognize a decisive opportunity and have the confidence to rapidl

without further orders from the MAGTF commander. The commander 

opportunities by conducting consolidation, exploitation, or pursuit. 
pg gppyg g 

or achieve the objective will not be decisive. Once the commander ha

the opportunity to deliver the decisive blow, he must strike the enemy 

and relentlessly until the enemy is defeated. At the same time, the co

must exercise judgment to ensure the force committed to the decisive 

not unduly or unintentionally made vulnerable to enemy counteractio

and accurate assessment by the MAGTF commander and his major su

commanders is critical in determining the appropriate time and place 

decisive action. 

Tactical excellence is the hallmark of a Marine Corps leader. Marines 

win in combat through the mastery of both the art and science of tact

of tactics involves the creative and innovative use of maneuver warfa

while the science of tactics requires skill in basic warfighting techniq

procedures. Marine leaders must work continuously to develop tactic

proficiency within themselves and their Marines. 
Military Engagement, 

Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

“. . . all of these people here know that without the security provided by United States 

this would be happening. The NGO and civilian doctors would have been afraid to sh

Abu Sayyaf.”

—Lieutenant Colonel Denni

US Army Impe

“Lying offshore, ready to act, the presence of ships and Marines sometimes means mu

having air power or ship’s fire, when it comes to deterring a crisis. And the ships and M

have to do anything but lie offshore. It is hard to lie offshore with a C-141 or C-130 fu

troops.”

—General Co

US Army Congressional Testim

Forward-postured naval forces conduct a wide array of activities an

designed to build the partnerships that promote a collective approac

security concerns, as called for in the national strategy documents id

chapter 1. The imperative to build and sustain partnerships that con

collective security, deterrence, and combat effectiveness comes at a 

sensitivity to US bases overseas is rising and the overall number of 

stationed on foreign soil is much lower than during the Cold War. In 

context, sea-based forward presence provides the opportunity to con

cooperative activities with allies and an expanding set of internation

while minimizing the political, economic, cultural, and social impac

sometimes associated with forward-stationed US forces.

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities 

a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national pow

and deters conflict. These actions generally occur regularly in all ge

combatant commanders’ areas of responsibility regardless of other o

contingencies, major operations, or campaigns. They include partne

activities designed to collectively address mutual security concerns 

actions to alleviate or mitigate sources of conflict. They usually invo

combination of military forces and capabilities separate from and in

with the efforts of other government agencies and intergovernmenta
ggy jg

partners—in a complementary fashion. 

Because the Department of State plays a major role in many of these ac

joint force commanders maintain a working relationship with the chiefs 

diplomatic missions in their areas. Similarly, Marine Corps component 

commanders, subordinate commanders, and staffs tasked with conduct

activities should establish contact and maintain a dialogue with pertine

interorganizational partners to share information and facilitate operatio

Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between ind

elements of the US Armed Forces and either the armed forces of anoth

or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies. This contact is 

to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual acti

maintain influence. Military engagement occurs as part of security coo

but also extends to interaction with domestic civilian authorities.

Security cooperation involves all Department of Defense interactions w

foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that prom

specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capa

self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with 

and contingency access to a host nation. Security cooperation is a key e

global and theater shaping operations. The geographic combatant comm

shape their areas of operations through security cooperation activities b

continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce oth

instruments of national power. The geographic combatant commander’

campaign plans provide a framework within which Marine Corps comp

and subordinate echelons engage regional partners in cooperative milit

activities and development. Ideally, security cooperation activities less

causes of potential crises.

Deterrence is the prevention from action by fear of the consequences—

mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptab

counteraction. Naval forces have historically contributed to that form o

deterrence by providing the nuclear strike and conventional power proj

capabilities that discourage acts of aggression. Recognizing some rogu

nonstate actors may not be deterred by nuclear or conventional retaliati

may actually seek to elicit reprisals to support their own strategic objec

United States has developed an expanded form of deterrence. It now in

promoting a collective approach to mutual defense concerns among int

partners, denying rogue states or nonstate actors the likelihood of succe

expanded form of deterrence also includes addressing the local conditi
gy g ppp

this form of deterrence, military engagement and security cooperation 

provide an important, proactive complement to retaliatory deterrence 

The expeditionary character and forward posture of the Marine Corp

maintained through rotational and permanently forward-deployed for

proven to be critical enablers of rapid crisis response. Concurrently, t

qualities also enable military engagement, security cooperation, and d

Some of these activities involve larger formations—such as MEFs an

MEBs—conducting large-scale multilateral or bilateral exercises. Mo

they require a larger number of smaller, more dispersed formations c

of personnel with regional expertise and cultural savvy who establish 

relationships with their international partners. Recent force structure 

enhancements—such as intelligence; explosive ordnance disposal; ci

foreign military training units; and irregular warfare training and edu

initiatives in culture, languages, and foreign advisory duties—allow f

participation in the military engagement, security cooperation, and de

operations across the range of military operations.

Sea-based Marine Corps forces demonstrate commitment to partners 

imposing a lasting footprint ashore—persistent presence without perm

Often embarked aboard amphibious ships, Marines are ideally suited 

conduct an expanding array of activities that prevent, deter, or resolv

Examples include forward-deployed ARG/MEUs, SPMAGTFs afloat

detachments aboard a wider variety of Navy ships, and Marine Corps 

assistance groups.

Regardless of the size of the units involved or means of deployment 

employment, the Marine Corps component commanders play a key r

identifying and satisfying geographic combatant commander requirem

security cooperation, which includes educating joint force and other c

staffs regarding Marine Corps capabilities that may have utility in ac

given set of geographic combatant commander objectives. It also inc

gaining similar expertise with regard to the capabilities resident in ot

components, with a view toward task-organizing Service-unique capa

complementary, innovative ways to better satisfy operational requirem

ability to plan, execute, support, sustain, and command and control M

capabilities task-organized with those of other components, including 

to employ Marines from a wider variety of Navy ships, is essential to 

increasing geographic combatant commander requirements.
g gy p

major operations, or campaigns, numerous routine military engagemen

cooperation, and deterrence activities are occurring under the general h

engagement. In some cases, what begins as an engagement activity, suc

limited support to a counterinsurgency through a security assistance pro

expand to a limited contingency operation or even a major operation w

President commits US forces. Engagement activities generally are gov

various directives and agreements and do not require a joint operation 

operations order for execution.

The following paragraphs identify the types of military operations and 

activities Marine Corps commands may conduct to meet geographic co

commander military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence 

objectives. They are presented in the order of likelihood, as determined 

through a combination of historical experience and assessments of the 

21st-century security conditions.

NATION ASSISTANCE

Nation assistance includes civil/military assistance rendered to a nation 

foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or 

gencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between natio

assistance programs include humanitarian and civic assistance, support 

internal defense, security assistance, and other United States Code, Titl

grams and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal age

intergovernmental organizations.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance

Humanitarian and civic assistance to the local populace is predominant

vided by US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercis

assistance is specifically authorized by United States Code, Title 10, se

funded under separate authorities. Marine Corps forces often provide th

assistance in conjunction with MEF-level bilateral exercises, such as C

regularly scheduled ARG/MEU deployments; or smaller security coop

missions, such as those conducted by SPMAGTF Unitas.

Support to Foreign Internal Defense

Foreign internal defense involves participation by civilian and military 

of a government in any of the action programs taken by another govern

other designated organization to free and protect its society from subve

lawlessness, and insurgency. Forward-deployed MEUs, SPMAGTFs, a
gpy y 

internal defense tasks.

Security Assistance

Security assistance includes a group of programs authorized by Unite

Code, Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, as amended, by w

United States provides defense articles, military training, and other d

related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to further nationa

and objectives. Only those Marine Corps organizations and personnel 

authorized to do so can conduct security assistance.

MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS

Maritime security operations protect sovereignty and resources, ensu

open commerce, and counter maritime-related terrorism, transnationa

piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration. 

may participate in maritime security operations by conducting visit, b

search, and seizure operations, as in 2010 when elements of 15th ME

recaptured the MV Magellan Star and rescued its crew from Somali p

COMBATING TERRORISM

Combating terrorism actions are taken to oppose terrorism throughou

threat spectrum. They include antiterrorism and counterterrorism.

Antiterrorism

Antiterrorism consists of defensive measures used to reduce the vuln

individuals and property to terrorist acts. These defensive measures i

limited response and containment by local military and civilian force

fleet antiterrorism security teams.

Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism operations include the offensive measures taken to 

deter, pre-empt, and respond to terrorism. Marine Corps forces may c

variety of counterterrorism tasks or provide capabilities in support of 

engaged in counterterrorism. Operations by Task Force 58 (2001) du

initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrated the flexi

forward-deployed amphibious forces in counterterrorism operations. 
SHOW OF FORCE OPERATIONS

Show of force operations demonstrate US resolve. These operations in

increased visibility of deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specifi

that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or natio

objectives. These operations often involve the overt repositioning of fo

deployed forces, such as ARG/MEUs; the pairing of offloaded MPF as

fly-in echelon; multinational training exercises; rehearsals; forward dep

additional units; or the buildup of forces within a theater. In 1990, for e

Amphibious Group Two and 4th MEB conducted Operation Imminent 

in the Arabian Gulf. By design, the location of this amphibious exercis

accessibility for coverage by the world media were a signal to Saddam 

that the international coalition was serious about forcing his withdrawa

Kuwait. Two years later, 11th MEU conducted another show of force o

the same region to again signal US intentions to a re-assertive regime. 

ARMS CONTROL

Arms control includes those activities by military forces to verify conv

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear arms control agreements; 

destroy weapons; dismantle or dispose of weapons and hazardous mate

escort deliveries of weapons. It encompasses any plan, arrangement, or 

controlling the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of any 

system. These activities help reduce threats to regional security and ass

implementing arms agreements. Marine Corps forces may conduct arm

inspections or may provide command and control, logistic, or intelligen

to verification and inspection teams. They may also seize, secure, or re

weapons or support other organizations in those efforts.

SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT/MARITIME

INTERCEPTION OPERATIIONS 

Enforcement of sanctions includes coercive measures to interdict the m

of designated items in or out of a nation or specified area to compel a c

group to conform to the objectives of the nation or international body t

establishes the sanctions. Maritime interception operations include effo

monitor, query, and board merchant vessels in international waters to e

sanctions and/or prevent the transport of restricted goods. As part of a 

naval force, Marines can help establish a barrier, detect blockade runne

intercept and search such vessels to enforce the sanction. These operati

authorized cargo and persons to pass through while preventing materia
ppgg 

interception operations conducted in the 1990s in the Arabian Gulf ag

PROTECTION OF SHIPPING

Protection of shipping involves the use of proportionate force by US 

military aircraft, and other forces, when necessary, to protect US flag 

and aircraft and US citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign ves

their property against unlawful violence. This protection may extend 

with international law) to foreign flag vessels, aircraft, and persons. W

necessary, Marine Corps forces can protect US flag vessels, citizens, 

property embarked on US or foreign vessels from unlawful violence 

international waters. Protection can take the form of embarked Marin

providing security on board the vessel or from other ships or convoy 

Protection can also be combat air patrols by Marine aviation and the 

hijacked vessels by Marine Corps security forces. A MAGTF can als

US shipping by eliminating the threats of land-based antiship missile

guns, and hostile naval forces operating in the littorals. In 1988, for e

SPMAGTF operating from the USS Trenton conducted Operation Pra

to prevent the Iranians from using the Sassan oil platform to target sh

Arabian Gulf.

FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT

Freedom of navigation and overflight operations demonstrate US or i

rights to navigate sea or air routes in accordance with international la

Corps electronic warfare aircraft participated in Operation Attain Do

series of freedom of air and sea navigation operations against Libya in 

Sidra. Marines can conduct operations to seize and control critical cho

sea lines of communications to help ensure unimpeded use of the sea

aviation can assist the combatant commander by providing combat ai

strikes against antiair missiles and guns to ensure use of air routes in 

with international law.

DEFENSE SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Defense support to public diplomacy includes those activities and me

by Department of Defense components to support and facilitate the p

diplomacy efforts of the US Government. For example, in 1990 the M

provided a SPMAGTF afloat to support a Presidential visit to Colomb

recently, in 2010 the USS Peleliu ARG/15th MEU provided support t

US Secret Service during the Presidential visit to India.
EXCLUSION ZONES ENFORCEMENT

Exclusion zone enforcement operations employ coercive measures to p

selected activities in a specific geographic area. A sanctioning body est

an exclusion zone to persuade a nation or a group to modify its behavio

the desires of the sanctioning body or face either continuing sanctions 

or threat of force. As demonstrated in Operation Southern Watch (Iraq) 

Operation Deny Flight (Bosnia), Marine Corps forces, including Marin

enforced exclusion zones. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS 

The Department of Defense supports federal, state, local, and foreign l

enforcement agencies in their efforts to disrupt the transfer of illegal dr

the United States. Military forces assist in detecting and monitoring dru

trafficking, support interdiction efforts, provide intelligence and logisti

and integrate communications and intelligence assets dedicated to inter

movement of illegal drugs into the United States. Marines frequently su

Department of Defense counterdrug activities, such as the Joint Task Fo

operations along the US-Mexico border, by providing observation, rad

and cargo inspection. 

SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

An insurgency is an organized use of subversion and violence by a gro

movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing auth

Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 1-02) It uses a mixture 

political, economic, informational, and combat actions to achieve its po

aims. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken th

and legitimacy of an established government, an interim governing bod

peace process while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy—the c

issues in an insurgency. The United States may support an insurgency a

oppressive regime. Because support for an insurgency is often covert, m

the operations connected with it are conducted by special operations fo

Marine Corps forces may be called upon to conduct or support these op

providing logistic and training support as they did for the Mujahidin re

Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. In certain circu

the United States can provide direct combat support, as a small number 

Marines did with the French Resistance in World War II. 
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Op

“An amphibious force of modern type, operating from the sea and equipped with helico

dependence on airfields, beaches, ports, land-bases—with all their logistical and politic

The use of an airborne force, or of any land-based force, is a more irrevocable step, s

commitment is more definite and its withdrawal more difficult. A self-contained and se

amphibious force, of which the U.S. Marine Corps is the prototype, is the best kind of f

because of its flexibility, reliability, logistic simplicity, and relative economy . . . . Amphi

the greatest strategic asset that a sea-based power possesses.” 

—Sir B. H. Liddell 

Deterrence o

“Before their coming, sanitation, save in the crudest and most unsatisfactory forms, w

fevers and epidemics were as plentiful as revolutions, a press gang was in vogue and 

the victim of continuous uprisings engineered by political scoundrels, each of whom ra

customs money drawer as each in turn came into short-lived power. The entry of the 

Marines ended this sorry story.”

—Right Reverent Charles B. Colmore, Episcopal Bishop of 

Soldiers 

The vast majority of the Marine Corps’ expeditionary service has inv

response and limited contingency operations, usually conducted in pe

the Nation has ostensibly been at peace. Some of these were relativel

rescue or punitive expeditions. Others evolved from rapid crisis respo

operations into contingencies that were limited in force size, but not 

complexity, and level of integration with the other elements of nation

Such expeditions provided the source of our institutional “small wars

so much so that a previous generation of Marines was often referred 

Department troops.” 

Recognizing the need for/benefit of expeditionary responsiveness and 

versatility, the 1952 Congress (through the Douglas-Mansfield Act) c

the Marine Corps should provide the Nation an expeditionary force i

“the most ready when the nation is least ready,” to “prevent the grow

potentially large conflagrations by prompt and vigorous action during 

incipient stages” and to “suppress or contain international disturbanc

large scale war.”
pgy pp

military actions, often in support of other government agencies, to cont

mitigate the effects of natural disasters or calamitous human events. Th

episodically and may occur in any area of operations, requiring a milita

response regardless of ongoing operations elsewhere. They may occur 

a variety of nongovernmental organizations or the forces of other natio

operating—at least initially—without benefit of a commonly stated pur

formally established divisions of responsibility and authority. Addition

may occur in uncertain or hostile environments subject to the threat of 

opposition by state or nonstate actors whose objectives are contrary to 

the United States or the international community.

A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to a nation, its terr

citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rap

creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military 

importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contem

achieve national objectives. A contingency is a situation requiring mili

operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or as 

directed by appropriate authority to protect US interests. 

United States military forces need to be able to respond rapidly to crise

unilaterally or as a part of an interagency or multinational effort, when 

by the President or Secretary of Defense. The United States, by respon

rapidly with appropriate options to potential or actual crises, contribute

regional stability. Crisis response and limited contingency operations a

typically limited in scope and scale and conducted to achieve a very sp

strategic or operational objective. They vary greatly, however, regardin

of complexity, duration, resources, and degree of cooperation with or 

participation by other organizations and countries. These operations m

alone in response to a crisis, such as noncombatant evacuation operatio

an element of a larger, more complex joint or combined campaign 

or operation. 

The expeditionary character and forward posture of the Marine Corps a

critical enablers of rapid crisis response. Forward-postured forces—esp

ARG/MEUs—play a key role in responding to crises. Their inherent m

operational flexibility, and lethality provide the geographic combatant 

commanders a quick and effective means of intervening to deny an adv

time to accomplish his objectives. The ARG/MEUs can mitigate the ef

natural or manmade disaster and facilitate the introduction of additiona

capabilities provided by interorganizational partners and other forces, i

Marine Corps forces surged from other global locations. 
py gpy 

additional forces and capabilities can deploy swiftly to crisis areas w

This expeditionary readiness includes the ability to deploy by both se

and is further enhanced by the ability of troops to marry up with equi

forward-based in cooperative security locations overseas or forward-

aboard MPF squadrons. 

When the geographic combatant commanders conduct crisis action p

Marine Corps component commanders play a key role providing adv

regarding the additional forces and capabilities that can rapidly be br

action, such as alert contingency MAGTFs deployed by organic or in

airlift and the equipment sets and supplies embarked aboard prepositi

The geographic combatant commanders have often tasked MAGTF c

elements, given their expeditionary responsiveness and command and 

capabilities, to provide the nucleus of a joint or combined headquarte

III MEF Command Element performed such a role in Operation Unif

Assistance after a tsunami ravaged portions of Southeast Asia. The e

of 3d MEB Command Element under Commander, MARFORPAC; 2

Command Element under Commander, MARFORCOM; and 5th ME

Element under Commander, Marine Corps Forces, Central Command 

headquarters, as well as the embedding of 4th MEB Command Elem

the Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces, Africa staff, pro

respective geographic combatant commanders immediate access to a

tactical headquarters for similar purposes.

The following paragraphs identify the types of military operations an

that Marine Corps forces may conduct within the context of crisis res

limited contingencies. With the exception of consequence manageme

is not readily predictable, but certainly a national priority—they are p

the order of likelihood, as determined through a combination of histo

experience and assessments of the unfolding 21st-century security co

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

Consequence management consists of actions taken to maintain or re

essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from d

catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Whe

within the continental United States or on US installations overseas, c

management is closely aligned with military support to civil authoriti

of the United States assign primary authority to the states to respond 

consequences of terrorism; the federal government provides assistanc

required. When conducted outside the continental United States in su
, qgy gg

assistance. The Department of State generally serves as the lead federa

and will coordinate the actions of Department of Defense elements in s

foreign consequence management activities. 

Though each MAGTF maintains an organic capability to perform chem

biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management, the Ma

may provide additional chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

support through the employment of CBIRF or its elements. The Marine 

trains, organizes, and equips CBIRF to provide rapid response to chem

biological, or radiological incidents. The CBIRF is well-suited for oper

wide range of contingencies when designated by the President, the Sec

Defense, or the geographic combatant commander to which assigned or 

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Foreign humanitarian assistance operations relieve or reduce the results 

or manmade disasters that might present a serious threat to life or resul

extensive damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provi

forces is generally limited in scope and duration. The assistance is desi

supplement or complement the host nation civil authority’s efforts whe

is gravely urgent and when the humanitarian emergency overwhelms n

relief agencies. 

Foreign humanitarian assistance operations may be directed by the Pre

the Secretary of Defense when a serious international situation threaten

political or military stability of a region considered of interest to the Un

States. Assistance may also occur when the humanitarian situation itse

sufficient and appropriate to use US forces. The Department of State or 

ambassador in the affected country is responsible for declaring a foreig

or situation that requires humanitarian assistance. The Department of S

requests Department of Defense assistance from the Secretary of Defen

United States military forces participate in three basic types of foreign 

humanitarian assistance operations—United Nations-led, United States 

concert with other multinational forces, and United States unilateral ac

Through the provisioning of security, logistic, engineering, medical sup

command and control, and communications capabilities, the Marine Co

respond rapidly to emergencies or disasters and assist the restoration of 

austere locations. A foreign humanitarian assistance mission could also 

securing an environment to allow humanitarian relief efforts. In Operat

Provide Comfort (1991), the 24th MEU Special Operations Capable pr
yy 

Iraq. The 5th MEB, during Operation Sea Angel (1991), assisted Ban

the aftermath of a devastating tropical cyclone by distributing food an

supplies and repairing the country’s transportation infrastructure. In l

and early 2005, III MEF provided the core of Joint Task Force/Comb

Support Force 536 to oversee Operation Unified Assistance, which p

assistance to Indonesia and neighboring areas following an earthquak

subsequent tsunami. 

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

Noncombatant evacuation operations involve the use of Department 

forces under the direction of Department of State or other authorities 

evacuation of individuals, normally US citizens, who are located in a 

country and faced with the threat of hostile or potentially hostile actio

operations may also include the evacuation of US military personnel, 

the host country, and third country nationals friendly to the United St

determined by the Department of State. 

The Department of State is responsible for protecting and evacuating 

citizens abroad and for guarding their property. The Department of D

advises and assists the Department of State in preparing and impleme

for evacuating US citizens. The US ambassador or chief of the diplom

mission is responsible for preparing emergency action plans that addr

military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals fr

country. Military operations to assist implementation of emergency a

are the responsibility of the geographic combatant commander. 

Characterized by uncertainty, the requirement to conduct a noncomba

evacuation operation may arise without warning because of sudden c

country’s government, a reoriented political or military relationship w

United States, a sudden hostile threat to US citizens from elements w

external to a foreign country, or a natural disaster. Diplomatic consid

can significantly influence the tactics, methods, and timing of noncom

evacuation operations. Under ideal circumstances, there may be little 

no opposition; however, commanders should anticipate opposition an

plan accordingly. 

Similar to raids, noncombatant evacuation operations involve swift in

force (normally preceded by an advance party), temporary occupatio

objectives, and a planned withdrawal. They differ from raids by the s

purpose of the force. Forces penetrating foreign territory to conduct a 
pp

with mission accomplishment. Forward-deployed MAGTFs, sea-based 

organized, provide the geographic combatant commanders with multip

response options. Examples of Marine Corps noncombatant evacuation 

operations are Operations Assured Response (Liberia, 1996), Noble Ob

(Sierra Leone, 1997), and Silver Wake (Albania, 1997). A MAGTF mi

conduct the entire operation itself or provide support forces. 

STRIKES AND RAIDS

A strike is an attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability f

purposes. An example of a strike is Operation Praying Mantis (1988), d

which a SPMAGTF destroyed two oil platforms that Iran was using to 

dinate attacks on merchant shipping. In recent years, MEU aircraft flyi

ARG shipping attacked targets ashore in support of Operations Deliber

Force (Bosnia, 1995), Noble Anvil (Yugoslavia, 1999), Enduring Freed

Iraqi Freedom.

A raid is an operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure in

confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or destroy a cap

ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned missi

Operations of this type include amphibious raids, such as those conduc

13th MEU in 1991 to destroy enemy equipment on Umm Al Maradim 

to capture prisoners on Faylakah Island during Operation Desert Storm

EMBASSY DEFENSE

Detachments from the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group provide 

security services to selected Department of State embassies, consulates

legations. They prevent the compromise of classified material and equi

protect United States citizens and Government property. Each of these 

posts normally relies on host nation law enforcement or military forces 

external security. When periods of civil unrest, revolution, and lawless

exceed the host nation’s abilities to contain, Marine Corps forces have 

called upon to defend US diplomatic posts and personnel against extern

such as during Operations Sharp Edge (Liberia, 1990), Quick Respons

African Republic, 1996), and Resolve Resolute (Albania, 1998). Emba

defense operations are frequently conducted in conjunction with nonco

evacuation operations. 
RECOVERY OPERATIONS

Recovery operations search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return pe

human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national secu

forces may oppose recovery operations. One aspect of recovery opera

personnel recovery, which is an implicit requirement in all combat op

elements of the MAGTF possess the ability to support personnel reco

participate in the recovery of isolated personnel. The primary Marine 

method for personnel recovery is the tactical recovery of aircraft and 

Tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel includes rescue or extracti

surface or air, of downed aircraft/personnel and equipment; aircraft s

and advanced trauma life support in a benign or hostile environment. 

recovery of aircraft and personnel examples include the USS Kearsar

ARG/24th MEU’s rescue of a downed US Air Force pilot in Bosnia i

the rescue of another US Air Force pilot in Libya in 2011 by the USS 

ARG/26th MEU. 

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Defense support of civil authorities involves temporary military supp

permitted by law and normally occurs when an emergency overwhelm

capabilities of the civil authorities. Support of civil authorities may b

as temporary augmentation of government workers during strikes, re

law and order in the aftermath of riots, protecting life and property, o

humanitarian relief after a natural disaster. Limitations on military fo

providing support to civil authorities include the United States Code, 

Crimes and Criminal Procedure, sec. 1385, which prohibits the use o

military forces to enforce or otherwise execute laws unless expressly 

by the Constitution or by an act of Congress. 

During disaster relief operations, Marine Corps forces have provided 

support to civil authorities. For example, following Hurricane Andrew 

Florida in 1992, a SPMAGTF established and maintained a temporar

2,500 displaced civilians, distributed supplies, and helped restore pow

County. Marines also supported relief efforts after Hurricane Katrina 

Louisiana in 2003. Marine forces are called upon almost yearly to fig

in California.
PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace operations broadly refer to those military, multiagency, and mult

actions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environmen

support reconciliation and rebuilding, and facilitate the transition to leg

governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcemen

peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. Peace op

occur under the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The specific 

Nations resolution may dictate rules of engagement, use of combat pow

type of units deployed. See General Zinni’s 22 principles for peace ope

the end of this chapter. 

Peacekeeping 

Peacekeeping operations are military operations undertaken with the co

all major parties to a dispute. These operations monitor and facilitate 

implementation of an agreement, such as a cease fire or truce, and supp

diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Peacekeepi

operations involve high levels of mutual consent and strict impartiality 

intervening force and are authorized under Chapter VI of the United N

Charter. Forces conducting peacekeeping operations must be prepared 

transition rapidly to peace enforcement operations as conditions chang

more of the belligerents withdraw its consent. Preparation should inclu

planning, task organization, equipment, and appropriate force protectio

measures. An example of peacekeeping is the deployment of Marine Co

to Lebanon in 1982–83. This mission began as a peacekeeping operatio

evolved into a peace enforcement operation. 

Peace Enforcement 

Peace enforcement is the application of military force, or the threat of i

normally pursuant to international authorization to compel compliance 

resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and orde

peacekeeping, peace enforcement neither requires the consent of the st

involved nor of other parties to the conflict. Furthermore, the interveni

not necessarily considered impartial. Such operations qualify under the 

of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The purpose of peace en

is to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a 

settlement. Peace enforcement operations include intervention operatio

as operations to restore order, enforce sanctions, forcibly separate belli

and establish and supervise exclusion zones to create an environment f

or cease fire. A MAGTF must deploy sufficient combat power to prese

credible threat, protect the force, and conduct the full range of military 
y pg 

Examples of peace enforcement are Operation Power Pack (Dominic

1965) and the initial phase of US involvement in Haiti during Operat

Democracy (1995). 

Peacemaking

Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or 

of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves 

led to it. Military activities supporting peacemaking include security 

and military-to-military relations. 

Peace Building 

Peace building refers to stability actions, predominately diplomatic a

economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure an

institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. These activities i

restoring civil authority, rebuilding physical infrastructure, and re-est

civil institutions, such as schools and medical facilities. 

Conflict Prevention

Conflict prevention is a peace operation employing complementary d

civil, and, when necessary, military means, to monitor and identify th

of conflict and act in a timely manner to prevent the occurrence, esca

resumption of hostilities. Activities aimed at conflict prevention are o

conducted under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Conflict p

tion can include fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspe

and monitoring.
General Anthony Zinni’s 22 Principles for Peace Operation

One of the US military’s most experienced leaders in the field of irregular warfar

Anthony Zinni, USMC (Retired), developed the following considerations for humanita

tance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations:

Each operation is unique. We must be careful what lessons we learn from a single experie

Each operation has two key aspects: (1) the degree of complexity of the operation and (2) t

consent of the involved parties and the international community for the operation.

The earlier the involvement, the better the chance for success.

Start planning as early as possible, including everyone in the planning process.

Make as thorough an assessment as possible before deployment.

Conduct a thorough analysis, determining the centers of gravity, end state, comman

measures of effectiveness, exit strategy, and the estimated duration of the operation.

Stay focused on the mission. Line up military tasks with political objectives. Avoid missio

allow for mission shifts. A mission shift is a conscious decision, made by the political l

consultation with the military commander, responding to a changing situation.

Centralize planning and decentralize execution of the operation. This allows subordinate c

to make appropriate adjustments to meet their individual situations or rapidly changing cond

Coordinate everything with everbody. Establish coordination mechanisms that include polit

nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and other interested parties.

Know the culture and the issues. We must know who the decisionmakers are. We must kn

involved parties think. We cannot impose our cultural values on people with their own cultur

Start or restore key institutiions as early as possible.

Don’t lose the initiative and momentum.

Don’t make unneccessary enemies. If you do, don’t treat them gently. Avoid mindsets or 

that might come back to haunt you.

Seek unity of effort and unity of command. Create the fewest possible seams between o

and involved parties.

Open a dialogue with everyone. Establish a forum for each of the involved parties.

Encourage innovation and nontraditional responses.

Personalities often are more important than processes. You need the right people in the righ

Be careful whom you empower. Think carefully about those you invite to participate, use as 

go-between, or enter into contracts with since you are giving them influence in the process.

Decide on the image you want to portray and keep focused on it. Whatever the image, hum

as firm, but well-intentioned, agents of change, ensure your troops are aware of it so they 

themselves accordingly.

Centralize information management. Ensure that your public affairs and psychological op

coordinated, accurate, and consistent.

Seek compatibility in all operations; cultural and political compatibility and military interop

crucial to success. The interest, cultures, capabilities, and motivations of all the parties 

uniform, but they cannot be allowed to work against each other. 

Senior commanders and their staffs need the most education and training in nontraditiona

troops need awareness and understanding of their roles. The commander and the staff nee

and apply new skills, such as negotiating, supporting humanitarian organizations effectively 

priately, and building coordinating agencies with humanitarian goals.
Major Operations and Campaigns

“Military campaigns are not conducted in a vacuum. Military power is employed in conj

instruments of national power—diplomatic, economic, and informational—to achieve s

objectives. Depending upon the nature of the operation, the military campaign may be 

it may be used to support diplomatic or economic efforts. The military campaign must 

with the nonmilitary efforts to ensure that all actions work in harmony to achieve the e

—

When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect nati

interests, the United States may conduct a major operation or campai

are large-scale, long-duration operations that typically include multip

They usually involve warfare—armed conflict between or among var

combatants, whether nation-states or nonstate groups.

A major operation is a series of tactical actions, such as battles, enga

strikes, conducted by combat forces of one or several Services. It is c

in time and place to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an 

area. These actions can occur simultaneously or sequentially in accor

common plan.

A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achievin

and operational objectives within a given time and space. Campaigns 

nature—functional and Service components conduct supporting oper

support of campaigns. They are often the most extensive joint efforts 

time, the size of the forces involved, and the commitment of other re

The principal tool by which commanders translate national strategic 

tactical action is the campaign plan. Like planning at any level, fram

problem is critical to successful campaign planning. An essential asp

problem framing at this level is recognition of the military strategy a

warfare the combatants employ.

A military strategy of annihilation is used to achieve an unlimited po

objective, such as the overthrow of the enemy leadership or its uncon

surrender. A strategy of erosion may be used to achieve a limited pol

objective by wearing down an adversary’s will to continue the strugg

Alternatively, a strategy of annihilation can also be used to achieve a 
pjy 

he has any means to do so.

Joint doctrine delineates two basic forms of warfare—traditional and i

but acknowledges this naming convention is not ideal. It describes trad

warfare as a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or c

and alliances of nation-states. Irregular warfare is described as a violen

among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the r

population(s). It must be recognized, however, that “traditional” and “i

conflict in pure form are rare. World War II is generally considered a tr

conflict because it largely involved conventional combat among the for

nation-states, yet it also had irregular aspects that included partisans in 

Philippines, France, and Yugoslavia as well as nonstate entities, such a

Chinese Communists, fielding major forces to oppose both their nation

countrymen and the Japanese. Conversely, the war in Vietnam is gener

viewed as irregular, yet Marines were often heavily engaged in conven

combat against large formations of North Vietnamese Army regulars. A

examples illustrate, naming conventions may help inform understandin

conflict, but they cannot fully define it. As noted in MCDP 1, “War is b

timeless and ever changing. While the basic nature of war is constant, t

and methods we use evolve continuously.”

A combatant’s military strategy and forms of warfare are closely intert

 and must be understood to successfully frame the problem. During the 

Revolution, for example, a succession of British commanders employe

traditional form of warfare in pursuit of a strategy of annihilation. Faili

recognize that their opponent was employing both traditional and irreg

forms of warfare in a strategy of erosion, they won a succession of tact

victories, but failed at achieving their national strategic goal of retainin

American colonies.

Campaign plans rooted in national strategic goals establish the necessa

for tactical actions. Failure to understand the basic strategic approach 

(annihilation or erosion) and the form(s) of warfare (traditional, irregul

hybrid of the two) will prevent the development of a coherent campaig

may cause military and diplomatic leaders to work at cross-purposes. W

factors drive campaign planning, which drives tactical actions, the reve

true. Tactical results generate modifications to the campaign plan, whic

have strategic implications.

The art of campaigning requires understanding when military force is t

effort and when it is acting in support of some other instrument of natio

Lower-echelon commanders must understand the strategic context of th
y pg

effectiveness of their operations. Consequently, commanders must cl

communicate strategic goals to every level.

Given their size, scope, and duration, major operations and campaign

complex, interwoven, and evolving blend of many different types of 

Counterinsurgency operations, for example, will normally involve a m

stability operations and defensive measures to protect friendly forces

assets, and infrastructure. Offensive actions may occur only sporadic

result of actionable intelligence.

In a more traditional conflict, while one command might be conducti

there may be other units conducting security operations to protect the 

flanks and lines of communications. Meanwhile, adjacent units may 

defense, while others are retiring following a relief in place. Still othe

could be conducting stability operations within captured or liberated 

Activities and operations associated with major operations and camp

applicability throughout the range of military operations. For exampl

Corps forces often conduct multilateral and bilateral exercises focuse

developing interoperability and combined warfighting skills. These la

cooperative security events have significant deterrence value as well. 

crisis response and limited contingency operations conducted in unce

hostile environments may be heavily reliant on the combat capabilitie

techniques, and procedures developed primarily for major operations 

campaigns. 

Commanders must be capable of orchestrating—and Marine Corps fo

be capable executing—innumerable combinations of activities and op

discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Counterinsurgency refers to those military, paramilitary, political, eco

psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an i

Counterinsurgency and insurgency reside within a broad category of 

known as irregular warfare.

DEFENSEIVE OPERATIONS

Although offensive action is generally viewed as the decisive form o

it may be necessary, or appropriate, to conduct defensive operations. 
ypp, 

and retrogrades.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Offensive operations seek to gain, maintain, and exploit the initiative, c

enemy to react. Offensive operations focus on the enemy. There are fou

offensive operations—movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and p

These types may occur sequentially, simultaneously, or independently t

the depth of the battlespace.

OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS

Other tactical operations include passages of lines, linkups, reliefs in p

obstacle crossings, and breakouts from encirclement. Each of these ope

complex. They require detailed planning and close coordination. 

RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

Reconnaissance operations use visual observation or other detection m

obtain information about the activities and resources of an enemy or ad

Commanders use that information to help them understand the larger 

environment and the nature of the problem. Reconnaissance can help r

uncertainties about an area and an enemy who is actively concealing in

about his forces and intentions. Counterreconnaissance consists of all a

passive measures taken to prevent hostile observation of a force or area

Security operations are an essential component of all operations. They 

measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itse

all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. As the defi

implies, security operations can be defensive in nature, such as elemen

GCE preventing the enemy from collecting friendly information, prote

force from surprise, or deceiving the enemy about friendly capabilities 

intentions. Security operations can also involve significant offensive ac

such as the ACE conducting shaping actions in the MAGTF’s deep are

intercept, engage, delay, or disorganize the enemy. There are three type

security missions—screen, guard, and cover.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and ac

conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instrum
p

provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure rec

and humanitarian relief. They occur throughout all phases of conflict 

the range of military operations. The magnitude of stability operation

may range from small-scale, short-duration to large-scale, long durat

Corps forces may support stability operations led by other US Gover

departments or agencies, foreign governments and security forces, in

governmental organizations, or when otherwise directed. In some cir

Marine Corps forces may lead stability operations until they transitio

responsibility to one of the aforementioned organizations.

SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS

Sustainment is the ability to ensure combat forces are provided the su

required until the mission is completed. Marine Corps forces normall

as self-contained and self-sustaining organizations with sufficient log

capabilities to accomplish assigned missions.
Counterinsurgency Operations 

“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and 

to make is to establish. . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistakin

to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questi

comprehensive.” 

—Carl von Clauswit

“Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary p

afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population.” 

—David Gallula, Counterinsurgency War

Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence by a grou

movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing au

Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. Each insurgency is uniq

of purpose and scope, and a given insurgency might pursue political, 

or criminal objectives on a local, national, regional, or transnational l

Counterinsurgency involves comprehensive civilian and military effo

defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. Political po

central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims 

people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. Insurgents 

diplomacy, information—including appeals to religious, ethnic, or id

beliefs—military actions and economics to overthrow the existing au

Counterinsurgents use all instruments of national power to sustain the 

or emerging government. 

Counterinsurgency is an extremely complex form of warfare that ofte

actions counterintuitive to traditional warfare (see the end of the chap

paradoxes of counterinsurgency). At its core, counterinsurgency is a 

the population’s support. The protection, welfare, and support of the 

vital to success. Gaining and maintaining that support is a formidable 

Achieving these aims requires integrating the efforts of many nonmil

host nation agencies in a comprehensive approach.

Designing operations that achieve the desired end state require count

to understand the culture and the problems they face. Both insurgents 

counterinsurgents are fighting for the support of the populace; howev

insurgents are constrained by neither the law of war nor the bounds o

decency as Western nations understand them. In fact, some insurgent
yg p

this a legitimate option. They also will do anything to preserve their gr

advantage, the ability to hide among the people. These amoral and ofte

enemies survive by their wits, constantly adapting to the situation. Suc

countering them requires developing the ability to learn and adapt rapid

and continuously. 

Popular support allows counterinsurgents to develop the intelligence ne

identify and defeat insurgents. Designing and executing a comprehensi

campaign to secure the populace and then gain their support requires c

coordinating actions over time to produce success. One of these action

developing host nation security forces that can assume primary respons

combating the insurgency. 

Long-term success in counterinsurgency depends on the local populatio

charge of its own affairs and accepting the government’s rule. Achievin

condition requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the i

gency as feasible, including eliminating those violent extremists whose 

prevent them from ever reconciling with the government. Over time, c

insurgents aim to enable a country or regime to provide the security an

law that allow establishment of social services and growth of economic 

Therefore, counterinsurgency involves the application of national powe

political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fie

Political and military leaders and planners should never underestimate 

and complexity of counterinsurgency; moreover, they should recognize 

military forces cannot succeed in counterinsurgency without the active 

ment of other government agencies. Purely military solutions to counte

insurgency operations are unlikely to succeed. Peacekeeping and stabil

operations that support counterinsurgency often depend on other gover

agencies, such as Department of State, and host nation government stab

and legitimacy. Counterinsurgency campaigns are generally long, 

complex undertakings.

CONTEMPORARY IMPERATIVES OF COUNTERINSURGE

Recent counterinsurgency experiences have identified an important set 

additional imperatives to consider for success in counterinsurgency ope

Manage Information and Expectations 

Information and expectations are related; skillful counterinsurgents mu

both. To limit discontent and build support, the host nation governmen
gp

populace, friendly military forces, and the international community. I

operations, including military information support operations, and th

activities of public affairs and civil-military operations are key tools 

steady progress toward a set of reasonable expectations. These expec

increase the populace’s tolerance for the inevitable inconveniences en

ongoing counterinsurgency operations. Where a large US force is pre

establish a regime, such progress can extend the period before the pop

a force of liberation as a force of occupation. 

United States forces start with a built-in challenge because of their re

accomplishment, what some call the “man on the moon syndrome.” T

refers to the expressed belief that a nation able to put a man on the m

quickly restore basic services. Therefore, US agencies trying to fan e

for their efforts should avoid making unrealistic promises. In some cu

failure to deliver promised results is automatically interpreted as deli

deception, rather than good intentions gone awry. In other cultures, e

promises are normal and people do not expect them to be kept. Effec

counterinsurgents understand local norms; they use locally tailored ap

control expectations. Managing expectations also involves demonstra

economic and political progress to show the populace how life is imp

Increasing the number of people who feel they have a stake in the suc

village, province, or nation and its government is a key to successful 

counterinsurgency operations. In the end, victory comes, in large mea

convincing the populace that their lives will be better under the host n

government than under an insurgent regime. 

To better manage expectations, both counterinsurgents and the host n

government must ensure their deeds match their words. They also mu

understand action has an information reaction. Counterinsurgents and 

nation government must carefully consider that impact on the many a

involved in the conflict and on the sidelines. They work actively to sh

responses via a communication strategy to further their goals. In part

messages to different audiences must be consistent. In the global info

environment, people in the area of operations can access the Internet 

television to determine the messages counterinsurgents are sending to 

international community and the US public. Any perceived inconsiste

credibility and undermines counterinsurgency efforts. 

Use the Appropriate Level of Force 

Any use of force generates a series of reactions. There may be times 

overwhelming effort is necessary to destroy or intimidate an insurgen

and reassure the populace. Extremist insurgent combatants often have 
; , gyp

applied and who wields it for any operation. An operation that kills fiv

gents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the generation 

new insurgents. 

In a counterinsurgency environment, it is vital for military commander

appropriate and measured levels of force and apply that force precisely 

proportionally to accomplish the mission without causing unnecessary 

truction of infrastructure, suffering, or loss of life. Normally, counterin

use force continuum procedures to minimize potential loss of life. Thes

cedures are especially appropriate during convoy operations and at che

and roadblocks. Force continuum refers to using lesser means of force 

use is likely to create the desired effects without endangering their own 

others, or mission accomplishment. Escalation of force continuum proc

not limit the right of self-defense, including the use of deadly force, wh

force is necessary to defend against a hostile act or demonstrated hostil

Commanders must ensure their Marines are properly trained in such pr

and, more importantly, in methods of shaping situations so that small u

have to make fewer split-second, life-or-death decisions. 

Who wields force is also important. If the host nation police have a rea

reputation for competence and impartiality, it is better for them to exec

raids. Local circumstances affect this decision; if the police are seen as 

ethnic or sectarian group oppressing the general population, their use m

counterproductive. Effective counterinsurgents must understand the ch

the local police and popular perceptions of both police and military uni

understanding helps ensure the application of force is appropriate and r

the rule of law. 

Learn and Adapt 

An effective counterinsurgent force is a learning organization. Insurgen

constantly shift between military and political phases and tactics. In ad

networked insurgents constantly exchange information about the enem

vulnerabilities, even with insurgents in distant theaters. However, skillf

counterinsurgents can adapt at least as fast as insurgents. Every unit ne

observe, draw, and apply lessons, and then assess results. Commanders 

develop an effective system to circulate best practices throughout their 

Combatant commanders might also need to seek new laws or policies t

authorize or resource necessary changes. Insurgents shift their areas of 

looking for weak links, so competence and adaptability are critical thro

counterinsurgent force. 
Insurgencies are normally directed, supported, and sustained through 

of key individuals. These include leaders, recruiters, financiers, logis

facilitators, weapons providers, human smugglers, and, in some cases

who produce/smuggle illicit drugs. Understanding the insurgent netw

infiltration, intelligence sharing, and mapping of network nodes. The

resemble police work and are long, complex endeavors that can take 

years. Once critical actors and physical targets are identified, they are 

through arrests or lethal operations, preferably accomplished in simu

raids in order to dismantle the network at one time. 

Empower at the Lowest Levels Through Mission Comman

Mission command is the conduct of military operations through dece

execution based upon mission type orders. Successful mission comm

from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiat

the commander’s intent. It requires an environment of trust and mutu

standing and is the preferred method of the Marine Corps for comma

controlling forces during all types of operations. Under mission comm

commanders provide subordinates with a mission, their commander’s 

concept of operations, and resources adequate to accomplish the miss

commanders empower subordinates to make decisions within the fram

their intent. They leave details of execution to their subordinates and 

to use initiative and judgment to accomplish the mission. 

Mission command is ideally suited to the mosaic nature of counterins

operations. Local commanders have the best grasp or understanding o

situation. Under mission command, they have access to or control of 

resources needed to produce timely intelligence, conduct tactical ope

manage information and civil-military operations. Effective counterin

operations are decentralized, and higher commanders owe it to their s

to push as many capabilities and authorities as possible to their level. 

command encourages subordinate initiative and facilitates learning at 

It is a major characteristic of a counterinsurgency force to be able to 

react at least as quickly as the insurgents.

Support the Host Nation 

United States forces committed to a counterinsurgency effort assist a 

government. The long-term goal is to prepare a government to stand 

the end, the host nation has to win on its own. Achieving this victory 

viable local leaders and institutions. United States forces and agencie
pp

While it may be easier for US military units to conduct operations them

is better to strengthen local forces and institutions and subsequently as

The temptation will be to train host nation forces “in our own image,” 

Marines must resist this urge and train forces in a manner appropriate t

situation and purpose. Host nation governments ultimately have to solv

problems. Eventually all foreign forces are seen as interlopers or occup

sooner the main effort can transition to host nation institutions without 

unacceptable degradation, the better.

Establish Genuine Partnerships 

Partnering is an arrangement between US and host nation forces in wh

operate together to achieve missions success while building capability 

capacity. Partnering should be a real union of the organizations involve

cannot be done on occasion, when convenient, or as time permits. Nor 

be limited to periodic or occasional combat operations. Real partnering 

and hard—a continuous, collective, and collaborative effort on both lar

small tasks toward a common goal. It requires mutual respect despite d

in size, skill, training, capability, or culture. In every partnership, each 

has relative strengths. Effective partnering will exploit all these relative 

and overcome respective weaknesses. It also requires flexible and inno

leaders capable of forging strong personal relationships—which are a k

successful counterinsurgency efforts. Ultimately, however, successful 

counterinsurgency partnerships are designed to end as host nation force

capability and capacity to stand alone. 

SUCCESSFUL AND

UNSUCCESSFUL COUNTERINSURGENCY PRACTICES

Successful practices of counterinsurgency include—

z Emphasizing intelligence.

z Focusing on the population, its needs, and its security.

z Establishing and expanding secure areas.

z Isolating insurgents from the populace.

z Conducting effective, persuasive, and continuous military inform

support operations.

z Providing amnesty and rehabilitation for those willing to support 

government.
g py pp

security situation permits.

z Expanding and diversing the host nation police force.

z Training military forces to conduct counterinsurgency.

z Embedding quality advisors with the host nation forces.

z Denying sanctuary to insurgents.

z Encouraging strong political and military cooperation and infor

sharing.

z Securing host nation borders.

z Protecting key infrastructure.

Unsuccessful practices of counterinsurgency include—

z Overemphasizing killing and capturing the enemy rather than se

engaging the population.

z Conducting large-scale operations as the norm.

z Concentrating military forces in large bases for protection.

z Focusing special operations forces primarily on raiding.

z Placing low priority on assigning quality advisors to host nation 

z Building and training host nation security forces in the US milit

z Ignoring peacetime government processes, including legal proc

z Allowing open borders, airspace, and coastlines.
PARADOXES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

In many ways, the conduct of counterinsurgency is counterintuitive to the traditional US view of 

although counterinsurgency operations have actually formed a substantial part of the US militar

experience. The following paradoxes of counterinsurgency operations are examples of the diffe

mindset required. These paradoxes are offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit it. The applicab

thoughts behind the paradoxes depends on a sense of the local situation and, in particular, the s

insurgency. For example, the admonition, “Sometimes, the more force used, the less effective it 

not apply when the enemy is coming over the barricades; however, that thought is applicable wh

increased security is achieved in an area. In short, these paradoxes should not be reduced to a 

rather, they should be used with considerable thought.

The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably Is Normally Better Than Us Doing It Well

It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as it is to assess how well it is done

United States is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires establishing viable host n

leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant US support. The longer that process 

more US public support will wane and the more the local populace will question the legitimacy o

forces and government. General Creighton Abrams, the US commander in Vietnam in 1971, rec

this fact when he said, “There’s very clear evidence, . . . in some things, that we helped too muc

retarded the Vietnamese by doing it....We can’t run this thing. . . .They’ve got to run it. The near

that, the better off they are and the better off we are.” 

T.E. Lawrence made a similar observation while leading the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman E

1917: “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that 

perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.” A key word in Lawrence

“tolerably.” If the host nation cannot perform tolerably, counterinsurgents supporting the host na

have to act. Experience, knowledge of the area of operations, and cultural sensitivity are essent

deciding when such action is necessary.

The More Successful The Counterinsurgency Is, 

The Less Force Can Be Used And The More Risk Must Be Accepted

As the level of insurgent violence drops, the requirements of international law and the expectati

populace lead to a reduction in direct military actions by counterinsurgents. More reliance is pla

police work, rules of engagement may be tightened, and troops may have to exercise increased 

Marines may also have to accept more risk to maintain involvement with the people.

Sometimes Doing Nothing Is The Best Reaction

Often insurgents carry out a terrorist act or guerrilla raid with the primary purpose of enticing 

counterinsurgents to overreact or at least to react in a way that insurgents can exploit—for exam

opening fire on a crowd or executing a clearing operation that creates more enemies than it take

streets. If an assessment of the effects of a COA determines that more negative than positive ef

result, an alternative, such as not acting, should be considered.

Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing

As important as they are in achieving security, military actions by themselves cannot achieve su

counterinsurgency. Insurgents that never defeat counterinsurgents in combat still may achieve t

strategic objectives. Tactical actions must be linked not only to strategic and operational military 

but also to the host nation’s essential political goals. Without those connections, lives and resou

be wasted for no real gain.
PARADOXES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS—Continued

If A Tactic Works This Week, It Might Not Work Next Week;

If It Works In This Province, It Might Not Work In The Next

Competent insurgents are adaptive. They are often part of a widespread network that commu

constantly and instantly. Insurgents quickly adjust to successful counterinsurgency practices 

disseminate information throughout the insurgency. Indeed, the more effective a counterinsur

is, the faster it may become out of date because insurgents have a greater need to counter it

leaders at all levels avoid complacency and are at least as adaptive as their enemies. There 

bullet” set of counterinsurgency procedures. Constantly developing new practices is essentia

Sometimes, The More Force Used, The Less Effective It Is

Any use of force produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen. The more force ap

greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also increases 

opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal. In contrast, 

precisely and discriminately strengthens the rule of law that needs to be established. As note

the key for counterinsurgents is knowing when more force is needed—and when it might be 

counterproductive. This judgment involves constant assessment of the security situation and 

timing regarding insurgents’ actions.

Sometimes, The More You Protect Your Force, The Less Secure You May Be

Ultimate success in counterinsurgency is gained by protecting the populace, not the counteri

force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to 

scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive saturation, patrolling, ambushes, 

post operations must be conducted; risk shared with the populace; and contact maintained. T

effectiveness of establishing patrol bases and operational support bases should be weighed 

effectiveness of using larger unit bases. These practices ensure access to the intelligence ne

operations. Following them reinforces the connections with the populace that help establish r

Often, The Most Effective Weapons For Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot

Counterinsurgents often achieve the most meaningful success in garnering public support an

for the host nation government with activities that do not involve killing insurgents, though kill

clearly will often be necessary. Arguably, the decisive battle is for the people’s minds; hence, 

nizing military information support operations with other efforts is critical. Every action, includ

force, must be “wrapped in a bodyguard of information.” While security is essential to setting 

overall progress, lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation, and res

Particularly after security has been achieved, dollars and ballots will have more important effe

bombs and bullets. This is a time when “money is ammunition.” Depending on the state of the 

gency, therefore, Marines should prepare to execute many nonmilitary missions to support co

insurgency efforts. 

Many Important Decisions Are Not Made By Generals

Successful counterinsurgency operations require competence and judgment by Marines at a

Indeed, young leaders—the “strategic corporals”—often make decisions at the tactical level t

strategic consequences. Senior leaders set the proper direction and climate with thorough tra

clear guidance; then, they trust their subordinates to do the right thing. Leaders must be train

educated to adapt to their local situations, understand the legal and ethical implications of the

and exercise initiative and sound judgment in accordance with their senior commanders’ inte
Defensive Operations

 “A sudden powerful transition to the offensive—the flashing sword of vengeance—is 

moment for the defence [sic].” 

—Carl von C

Warri

“Counterattack is the soul of defense . . . We wait for the moment when the enemy sha

to a counter-stroke, the success of which will so far cripple him as to render us relative

to pass to the offensive ourselves.”

 — Sir Julian S

Warri

The Marine Corps forces conduct defensive operations, often in com

with offensive operations, to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, or ec

forces. During the early days of the Korean War (1950–53) the 1st M

Brigade (Provisional) participated in defensive operations along the P

Perimeter. These operations gave the 1st MARDIV extra time to emb

deploy to Korea where it conducted an amphibious assault at Inchon 

the United Nation’s long awaited offensive. 

While opposing forms, the offense and defense are not mutually excl

fact, they cannot exist separately. (MCDP 1) For example, during the 

38 days of Operation Desert Storm, I MEF/United State Marine Corp

Central Command’s aviation forces conducted offensive operations w

other elements of the MAGTF completed preparations for the ground 

from defensive positions. 

Defensive operations require agility and flexibility since the defende

constantly seeking to regain the initiative. An effective defense will n

involve the following: 

z Use of intelligence assets to locate enemy forces. 

z Combined use of fire and maneuver to blunt the enemy’s mome

z Speed that facilitates transition of friendly forces to the offense

While the defense can deny victory to the enemy, it rarely results in v

the defender. The defense, however, tends to be the more efficient fo
, pg gy p, 

familiar terrain, friendly civilian populations, known enemy operationa

subject to exploitation, and interior lines may prompt a commander to a

defense to reduce enemy capabilities that are essential to his success. T

attacking enemy usually chooses the time and place he will strike the d

The defender uses his advantages of prepared defensive positions, conc

firepower, obstacles, and barriers to slow the enemy’s advance and disr

flow of his assault. Marines exploited these advantages in the defense o

Sanh Combat Base, Republic of South Vietnam, during the Tet Offensi

1968. Using aggressive defensive tactics and well-placed obstacles sup

responsive and continuous fires, the 26th Marines (Reinforced) destroy

North Vietnamese army divisions. 

While in the defense, the commander conducts shaping actions, such a

enemy forces echeloned in depth and/or his sustainment capabilities. T

shaping actions help to set the conditions for decisive action, such as th

the enemy’s main effort by a counterattack that could allow the friendly 

transition to offensive operations. 

ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE

As in the offense, the MAGTF commander must also consider the orga

of the battlespace and the force for the defense. As with other types of 

tions, the MAGTF commander organizes his battlespace for the defens

 three areas—deep, close, and rear—in which the defending force perfo

specific functions. 

Deep Area 

The MAGTF conducts security operations in its deep area consistent w

security missions of screen, guard, and cover. Accordingly the MAGTF 

commander seeks to gather, gain, and maintain contact (visual or physi

protect the force by fighting to gain time; and/or to intercept, engage, d

disorganize the enemy to facilitate GCE success during close operation

they be required. Security operations in the MAGTF deep area (spatial 

are a form of shaping operations (purpose base). 

The MAGTF deep area includes all the battlespace not assigned to subo

units. Unless designated to subordinate units, the MAGTF command el

responsible for the conduct of all operations in the deep area. For the M

commander, the operational reach of the ACE allows him to create dep

defense by extending the deep area as far forward as is tactically feasib
y ppppq(q

Iraqi Freedom rotations) following the fall of Baghdad and the Husse

government, the Marine Corps-led Multinational Force-West establis

security area as part of its deep operations. It included vast areas of la

unpopulated terrain within Al Anbar Province. The MEF (Fwd) comm

element, as Multinational Force-West, tasked the ACE to conduct rec

to track activity in that area, and it occasionally conducted limited du

limited objective operations in the security area to disrupt enemy safe 

lines of communications. 

Close Area 

The close area is normally the province of the GCE(s). The MAGTF’

close area is to monitor, facilitate, and support the GCE operations pr

through resource allocation. The GCE will typically organize for the 

security, main battle, and rear areas (see fig. 8-1). The GCE comman

positions forces in the main battle area to defeat, destroy, or contain e

assaults. Reserves/counterattack force may employ in the main battle 

destroy enemy forces, reduce penetrations or regain lost terrain, exec

Security

Area

Main Battle

Area

Rear

Area

FEBA FEB

Figure 8-1. Organization of the Battlespace.
, p

attack. The MAGTF may establish a separate reserve or dual-designate 

reserve. If the latter, the MAGTF commander must articulate who can c

reserve. See MCWP 3-1, Ground Combat Operations, for more inform

regarding the GCE in defense. 

Rear Area 

The MAGTF rear area extends forward from the command’s rear boun

rear of the area assigned to the command’s subordinate units. Rear area 

operations include those functions of security and sustainment required 

maintain continuity of operations by the entire force. Rear area operatio

the sustainment effort as well as deny use of the rear area to the enemy

area may not always be contiguous with the main battle area. 

TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

There are three fundamental types of defense—the mobile defense, the 

defense, and retrogrades. In practice, Marine Corps commanders may 

in combination. Mobile defense orients on the destruction of the attack

by permitting the enemy to advance into a position that exposes him to 

counterattack by a mobile reserve. An area defense orients on retention 

by absorbing the enemy in an interlocking series of positions and destr

largely by fires. Retrogrades seek to reposition friendly forces to impro

operational or tactical situation and often involve trading space for tim

to prepare a decisive counterstroke. Combining these three types of def

be very effective as the commander capitalizes on the advantages of ea

strengths and capabilities of his subordinate units. 

Although these descriptions convey the general pattern of each type of 

all may involve static and dynamic elements. Mobile defenses may em

defensive positions to help control the depth and breadth of enemy pen

and ensure retention of ground from which to launch counterattacks. In 

defenses, commanders may employ patrols, intelligence units, and rese

to cover the gaps among defensive positions, reinforcing as necessary a

counterattacking from defensive positions as directed. 

In retrogrades, commanders may employ dynamic elements to draw an 

into a positional disadvantage as well as relatively static elements to w

adversary down. Defending commanders may combine all three pattern

static elements to delay, canalize, and halt the attacker, while using dyn

elements, such as spoiling attacks and counterattacks, to strike and dest

forces. The balance of these patterns depends on the enemy, mission, fo

composition, mobility, relative combat power, and the nature of the con
pgqg p

conditioned by experience; force capability; and mission, enemy, terr

and support available-time available (METT-T). The MAGTF comm

elect to defend well forward with strong covering forces by striking t

he approaches or he may opt to fight the decisive battle by facilitating 

operations within the main battle area. If the MAGTF commander do

to hold a specified location, he may draw the enemy deep into its def

then strike his flanks and rear. The MAGTF commander may even ch

preempt the enemy with spoiling attacks in the deep or security area 

favor such tactics. 

A key characteristic of defensive operations is the ability of the comm

take offensive action and wrest the initiative from the enemy. With th

the decision to conduct a hasty or deliberate defense is based on the t

available or the requirement to quickly resume the offense. 

A hasty defense normally occurs while in contact with the enemy or 

contact is imminent and time available for organization is limited. It 

requires defensive strength, such as emplacements and obstacles. The 

defense normally allows for only a brief leaders’ reconnaissance and 

the immediate engagement by security forces to buy time to establish 

A commander may establish a deliberate defense when not in contact 

enemy or when contact is not imminent and time for organization and 

is available. A deliberate defense normally includes fortifications, str

extensive use of barriers, and fully integrated fires. The commander n

free to make a detailed reconnaissance, select the terrain on which to 

identify key terrain, establish mutually supporting defensive position

determine the best distribution of forces. 

Mobile Defense 

A mobile defense uses maneuver and fires with terrain to seize the in

the enemy. The mobile defense destroys the attacking enemy through 

and offensive action. The commander allocates the bulk of his comba

mobile forces to strike the enemy where he is most vulnerable and w

expects attack. Minimum forces positioned forward canalize, delay, d

deceive the enemy about the actual location of the defensive position

his mobile forces until the critical time and place are identified, the c

can focus combat power in a single or series of violent and rapid cou

throughout the depth of the battlespace, as illustrated in figure 8-2 on 
qy g

generate the mobility advantage necessary in the mobile defense with o

mechanized and armor forces and Marine aviation. The commander mu

sufficient depth within the area of operations to trade space and draw th

into the defensive area, causing the enemy commander to overextend h

and expose his flanks and lines of communications to attack. The succe

mobile defense often presents the opportunity to resume the offense. 

In mobile defense, the MAGTF commander— 

z Commits minimum forces to fixed locations. 

z Positions maximum combat power to catch the enemy as he attem

overcome that part of the force in fixed locations. 

(Mobile Reserve)

AA Blue

FEBA F

Figure 8-2. Mobile Defense.
gp

firepower and maneuver to wrest the initiative from the attacker

z Employs a strong counterattack force to strike the enemy at his 

vulnerable time and place. 

z Uses reconnaissance and surveillance assets to track the enemy, 

critical enemy nodes, such as command and control, radars, log

and indirect fire support elements. 

Area Defense 

The area defense denies the enemy critical terrain or facilities for a sp

time. An area defense is suitable for the following conditions.

z The force must defend specific terrain that is militarily and poli

essential.

z The defender possesses less mobility than the enemy.

z Maneuver space and depth of the battlespace is limited or the ter

mutual support to the defending forces.

An area defense focuses on the retention of terrain by absorbing the e

series of interlocked positions from which, through friendly maneuve

he can be destroyed. As shown in figure 8-3, on page 8-8, the area de

on the ability of the defenders to maintain their positions and to contr

terrain among them. An area defense uses battle positions and strong 

combination with obstacles and barriers to slow, canalize, and defeat 

attack. The array of forces within these defensive positions allows fo

mutual support of the force. 

While a mobile defense requires considerable depth, an area defense 

depth according to the situation. For example, a significant obstacle t

such as a river, built-up area, swamp, or escarpment favors an area de

an obstacle adds to the relative combat power of the defender. Obstac

static elements of the defense and slow or canalize the enemy through 

The commander positions the bulk of his ground combat power in sta

defensive positions and employs a small mobile reserve. He depends 

static forces to defend their positions and uses his reserves to blunt an

penetrations, to counterattack, and to exploit opportunities presented 

the enemy. 
Retrograde 

A retrograde involves organized movement away from the enemy. The

movements may involve delaying an adversary’s advance, withdrawal 

in contact, or the retirement of forces not in direct contact and various 

combinations thereof. All retrograde operations seek to improve an ope

tactical situation. These operations— 

z Reduce the enemy’s offensive capabilities. 

z Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation. 

z Enable combat under conditions favorable to friendly forces. 

z Gain time. 

z Disengage from contact with the enemy. 

z Reposition forces for commitment elsewhere. 

z Shorten lines of communications. 

(Reserve)

AA Red Main

Battle

Force

Main

Battle

Force

Main

Battle

Force

Engagement

Area

FEBA FE

Figure 8-3. Area Defense.
gpy 

is normally the main effort, the ACE and the LCE play major roles in 

conditions for a successful retrograde. The ACE, operating from the 

bases beyond the reach of the enemy’s artillery, interdicts enemy forc

and delay his advance. The ACE also provides close air support to gr

in contact with the enemy and assault support to move troops, equipm

supplies away from the enemy. The LCE continues to provide comba

support to the MAGTF and transportation to move troops, equipment

supplies away from the enemy. It establishes new combat service sup

facilities in the rear to support future operations. 

Delay 

A delay involves a force under pressure trading space for time by slo

the enemy’s momentum. Its goal is to inflict maximum damage on th

without becoming decisively engaged. Forces execute delays when th

insufficient combat power to attack, to establish an adequate position 

defense, or when the plan calls for drawing the enemy into an area fo

counterattack, as illustrated in figure 8-4.

Figure 8-4. Delay.
y py g

to be accomplished by the delaying force to successfully accomplish th

Delays may be used in the deep area, main battle area, or close area or 

area. Delaying operations require sufficient depth of area. 

Commanders should plan for maximum use of terrain, barriers, and ob

Delaying forces must remain in constant contact with the enemy to ens

enemy experiences continuous pressure and cannot bypass delaying un

delaying force should make every effort to avoid becoming decisively 

Delays are conducted— 

z When the force’s strength is insufficient to defend or attack. 

z To reduce the enemy’s offensive capability by inflicting casualtie

z To gain time by forcing the enemy to deploy. 

z To determine the strength and location of the enemy’s main effort

z When the enemy’s intent is not clear and the commander desires 

intelligence. 

z To protect and provide early warning for the main battle area forc

z To allow time to re-establish the defense. 

Withdrawal 

Withdrawals are planned events in which a force in contact with the en

disengages and moves in a direction away from the enemy. Ideally, a w

occurs without the enemy’s knowledge or before he can prevent or disr

Conditions favorable to a withdrawal include— 

z Danger of being defeated. 

z Battle under unfavorable conditions. 

z Opportunity to draw the enemy into terrain or a position that facil

friendly offensive action. 

z Reposition or redeployment of the force for employment elsewhe

Some offensive operations, such as raids, also involve planned withdra

There are two types of withdrawal operations. They are distinguished b

enemy’s reaction to the withdrawal— 

z Withdrawal under enemy pressure, in which the enemy tries to pr

disengagement by attacking. 

z Withdrawal not under enemy pressure, in which the enemy does n

cannot try to prevent the withdrawal. 
gyppg 

prudent commander always plans to execute a withdrawal under enem

He should anticipate enemy interference by fires, direct pressure, and 

envelopment. If the enemy interferes, security forces fight a delaying 

they move to the rear. If the enemy does not interfere, security forces 

and withdraw on order. 

The more closely a unit is engaged with the enemy, the more difficul

withdraw. Withdrawal is easiest after success in combat. If a unit can

disengage from the enemy on its own, the commander may employ o

elsewhere to reduce enemy pressure on the withdrawing unit or he m

additional combat power at the point of withdrawal for disengagemen

In any withdrawal, the commander should attempt to deceive the enem

intention to withdraw. Withdrawing during periods of reduced visibil

facilitates disengagement from the enemy and conceals movement to 

but may make control more difficult. Due to the inherent difficulties 

conducting a withdrawal, the commander must have the flexibility to 

any other type of operation, such as delay, defend, or attack, as the si

demands. 

Retirement 

Retirements involve forces out of contact moving away from the ene

retirement may immediately follow a withdrawal and is normally pro

another unit between it and the enemy; however, the commander mus

establish adequate security during the movement. Speed, control, and 

the most important considerations. Commanders retire units to— 

z Position forces for other missions. 

z Adjust the defensive scheme. 

z Assist the delays and withdrawals of other units. 

z Deceive the enemy.

DEFENSIVE METHODS

The six defensive methods—battle position, strong point, perimeter, 

reverse slope, and sector—are the basic dispositions a commander ma

array forces relative to the terrain and enemy. The defensive methods 

normally employed in combination based on the mission; terrain; rela

and capabilities of the forces involved, especially in terms of mobility

type of defense selected by the MAGTF commander. 
A battle position is a defensive position oriented on the most likely ene

avenue of approach from which a unit may defend or attack. The purpo

battle position is to deny or delay the enemy the use of certain terrain o

avenue of approach. The size of a battle position can vary with the size 

assigned. For ground combat units, battle positions are usually hastily 

but should be continuously improved. 

Strong Point 

Usually heavily fortified and armed with automatic weapons, a strong 

key point in a defensive position around which other positions are grou

protect it. It is designed to deny the enemy certain terrain and the use o

avenue of approach. It differs from a battle position in that it is designe

occupied for an extended period of time. It is established on critical ter

must be held for the defense to succeed. A strong point requires all-aro

defense and should have sufficient supplies and ammunition to continu

even if surrounded or cut off from resupply. Strong points often require 

considerable time and engineer resources to develop.

Perimeter

A perimeter defense orients in all directions and applies to situations w

must hold critical terrain, such as a combat outpost, bridge, mountain p

airfield. Patrolling and security operations are usually prerequisites for 

successful perimeter defense. A commander may also employ a hasty d

perimeter when the unit has been bypassed and isolated by the enemy o

pausing to rearm or refuel during offensive operations.

Linear

A linear defense orients in a single direction to take advantage of a line

feature, such as a river line or ridge, or when a wide area must be defen

characterized by the commitment of the preponderance of ground com

forward, strong mutual support between forward units, limited depth w

main battle area, and a relatively small reserve. 

Reverse Slope

A reverse slope defense orients in a single direction and is organized o

portion of a terrain feature or slope with a topographical crest that mas

main defensive positions from enemy observation and direct fire. All o

the defending ground forces may employ this method, which is normal
pppy 

reverse slope defense offers the opportunity to gain surprise and wres

initiative from the attacker. Its success rests on denying the attacker c

topographical crest.

Sector

A commander may assign subordinate commanders defensive sectors 

them maximum latitude to accomplish assigned tasks. The extent of t

sector assigned is METT-T dependent, but as a general rule should be 

than can be influenced by the unit. 
Offensive Operations

“Since I first joined the Marines, I have advocated aggressiveness in the field and con

action. Hit quickly, hit hard and keep right on hitting. Give the enemy no rest, no oppo

consolidate his forces and hit back at you. This is the shortest road to victory.”

—General Holland 

Coral 

The offense is the decisive form of warfare. While defensive operatio

great damage to an enemy, offensive operations are the means to a de

victory. Offensive operations seize the initiative, gain freedom of act

create effects to achieve objectives. Offensive operations allow the co

impose his will on the enemy by shattering the enemy’s moral, menta

physical cohesion. The enemy loses his ability to fight as an effective

coordinated force as Marine Corps forces generate an overwhelming 

conducting a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected offensive acti

The offense gains, maintains, and exploits the initiative, causing the 

react. The focus of offensive operations is the enemy, not seizure of t

in the defense, a commander must take every opportunity to seize the 

offensive action. Offensive operations—

z Destroy enemy forces and equipment. 

z Deceive and divert the enemy. 

z Deprive the enemy of resources. 

z Gain information. 

z Fix the enemy in place. 

z Seize key terrain. 

z Force an enemy decision. 

z Disrupt enemy actions or preparations. 

Successful offensive operations—

z Avoid the enemy’s strength and attack his weakness by focusin

power against the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities. 

z Isolate the enemy from his sources of support, to include the po

counterinsurgency operations. 
y p, pg p

z Exploit every advantage. 

z Overwhelm the enemy commander’s ability to observe, orient, de

act.

The Marine Corps warfighting philosophy is offensive in nature. It focu

enemy and uses speed to seize the initiative and degrade the enemy’s a

resist. To be decisive in offensive operations, the attacker weights the m

The fundamentals of offensive action are general rules evolved from th

proven application of the principles of war. Many of the following fund

are related and reinforce one another:

z Orient on the enemy. 

z Gain and maintain contact. 

z Develop the situation. 

z Achieve surprise. 

z Exploit known enemy weaknesses. 

z Seize or control key terrain. 

z Gain and maintain the initiative. 

z Neutralize the enemy’s ability to react. 

z Advance by fire and maneuver. 

z Maintain momentum. 

z Act quickly. 

z Exploit success. 

z Be flexible. 

z Be aggressive. 

z Provide for the security of the force.

ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFENSE

Leveraging the unifying perspective of the single-battle approach to op

the commander organizes the battlespace and his forces in order to rela

forces to one another in time, events, space, or purpose. This chapter u

spatial reference—deep, close, and rear construct—to discuss offensive 

operations. In other types of operations, a purpose-based construct—de

shaping, sustaining—may prove more useful.
p p

Conceptually, deep operations begin the process of attacking the enem

moral, and physical forces not so much to destroy them, but to isolate 

components so they cannot be employed coherently. Deep operations 

opportunities by addressing the enemy’s potential. Specifically, deep 

help locate the enemy, restrict his freedom of action, disrupt the cohe

tempo of his operations, interdict his supplies, and isolate or destroy 

Successful deep operations may defeat the enemy outright or, at a mi

the conditions for successful close operations. In doing so, deep oper

enable friendly forces to choose the time, place, and method for close 

Whether in the offense or defense, operations in the MAGTF deep ar

similar. For example, as part of security operations in the MAGTF de

ACE will conduct deep air support just as it will for offensive operati

is consistent with MCDP 1; there is no clear division between the off

defense. They exist simultaneously as necessary components of each 

Another common trait to both the offense and defense in the MAGTF 

area is the responsibility of the MAGTF command element for the co

deep operations.

Close Operations

Due to the proximity of opposing forces, the intensity of operations d

fire and maneuver, and the potential for extreme rates of physical des

close operations will always be viewed as the decisive element in com

during close operations that mission tactics and commander’s intent s

most vital role by empowering subordinates to exercise judgment and 

quickly adapt their actions to the changing situation.

Ideally, the commander, through his single-battle approach to operati

have set the conditions for successful close operations. Shaping actio

strip away the enemy’s capabilities and attack the enemy’s mental, m

physical abilities to force him into predictable actions. Sustaining act

logistics, force protection, planning—promote freedom of action and 

effort and extend the MAGTF’s operational reach.

Responsibility for offensive operations in the close area reside with th

MAGTF command element influences close operations primarily thro

resource allocation—battlespace; priority of fires; lift; or intelligence

surveillance, and reconnaissance—and whatever success it is achievi

shaping and sustaining actions in the deep and rear areas.
p

Rear operations enhance a force’s freedom of action and extend the for

operational reach both in time and space. While deep operations imply 

actions, rear area operations are synonymous with sustaining actions th

uninterrupted support to the force. The primary focus of rear area opera

during the offensive is to maintain momentum and prevent culminating 

TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

There are four types of offensive operations—movement to contact, att

exploitation, and pursuit. These operations may occur in sequence, 

simultaneously, or independently across the depth of the battlespace. F

example, a movement to contact may be so successful that it immediate

exploitation or an attack may lead directly to pursuit as shown in figure 

All four types of offensive operations rarely occur in one campaign or 

sequence presented in this chapter; moreover, the dividing lines betwee

types of offensive operations are not always distinct. The successful co

uses the appropriate type of offensive operation for his mission and situ

hesitating to change as the situation dictates. The goal of offensive ope

to move to exploitation and pursuit as rapidly as possible. The comman

to take advantage of enemy weaknesses and maneuvers to a position of 

advantage, creating the conditions that lead to exploitation. For examp

Desert Storm, 1st and 2d MARDIV went directly into the attack from d

positions in Saudi Arabia. After clearing the obstacle belts, the two div

were mostly in pursuit of Iraqi ground forces while 3d MAW was cond

exploitation along what became known as the “Highway of Death.”

Movement

to Contact

Attack

Exploitation

Pursuit

Figure 9-1. Types of Offensive Operations.
Movement to contact is largely a GCE event supported by the other e

the MAGTF. While the LCE provides sustainment, the ACE assists w

support, reconnaissance, command and control, and offensive and ant

Because the ACE, in many cases, is already in contact with the enem

of security/shaping operations, it can help develop the situation throu

interdiction and armed reconnaissance, as well as reporting on observ

See figure 9-2.

Attack

An attack is an offensive operation of coordinated movement and ma

supported by fire to defeat, destroy, or capture the enemy or seize/sec

terrain. Focusing combat power against the enemy with a tempo and 

that the enemy cannot match, the commander attacks to shatter his op

will, disrupt his cohesion, and gain the initiative. If an attack is succe

enemy is no longer capable of—or willing to offer—meaningful resis

The commander has a variety of attack options available to him. Typ

include hasty, deliberate, spoiling, counterattack, feint, demonstration

reconnaissance in force, and raids.

Hasty and Deliberate Attacks 

Attacks can be hasty or deliberate based on the degree of preparation

and coordination involved prior to execution. A hasty attack is when 

commander trades preparation time for speed to exploit an opportuni

Advance

Force

Flank

Security

Flank

Security

Main

Body

Rear

Security

Figure 9-2. Movement to Contact.
gy, p, p

before the enemy can effectively respond. The commander launches a 

attack with the forces at hand and with little preparation before the ene

concentrate forces or prepare to counter the attack effectively.

By necessity, hasty attacks do not employ complicated schemes of man

require a minimum of coordination. Habitual support relationships, sta

operating procedures, and battle drills contribute to increased tempo an

likelihood of success of the hasty attack. Unnecessary changes to the ta

organization of the force risks the loss of momentum.

A deliberate attack involves preplanned employment of firepower and 

and usually includes the coordinated use of all available resources. Del

attacks apply when there is no apparent advantage that can be rapidly e

Spoiling Attack 

A spoiling attack pre-empts the enemy who is in the process of forming 

assembling for an attack.

Counterattack 

A counterattack is a limited-objective attack conducted by part or all o

defending force to prevent the enemy from attaining the objectives of h

It may be the precursor to resuming offensive operations.

Feint

A feint is a limited-objective, supporting attack away from the main ef

distract the enemy’s attention. A feint involves contact with the enemy 

be of sufficient strength to confuse the enemy about the location of the 

attack. Ideally, a feint causes the enemy to commit forces to the diversi

A unit conducting a feint usually attacks on a wider front than normal w

consequent reduction in mass and depth to include a minimal reserve to 

unexpected developments. 

Demonstration 

A demonstration is an attack or a show of force on a front where a deci

sought. Its aim is to deceive the enemy. A demonstration, like a feint, i

supporting attack, but, unlike a feint, does not make contact with the en

commander executes a demonstration by an actual or simulated massin

combat power, troop movements, or other activities designed to indicat

preparations for or beginning of an attack at a point other than the main 
y ppp

forces away from the actual landing beaches or to fix them in place. 

Demonstrations and feints increase the enemy’s confusion while con

combat power for the main and supporting efforts.

Reconnaissance in Force 

A reconnaissance in force is a deliberate attack to obtain information 

locate and test enemy dispositions, strengths, and reactions. While th

purpose of a reconnaissance in force is to gain information, the comm

be prepared to exploit opportunity. Reconnaissance in force usually d

information more rapidly and in more detail than other reconnaissanc

The commander may conduct reconnaissance in force as a means of k

pressure on the defender by seizing key terrain and uncovering enem

weaknesses. The reconnoitering force must be of a size and strength 

enemy to react strongly enough to disclose his locations, dispositions

planned fires, and planned use of the reserve.

Raid 

A raid is an attack, usually small scale, involving a penetration of hos

for a specific purpose other than seizing and holding terrain. It ends w

planned withdrawal. Raids are characterized by surprise and swift, pr

bold action. Raids typically—

z Destroy enemy installations and facilities.

z Disrupt enemy command and control or support activities.

z Divert enemy attention.

z Secure information.

Exploitation

Exploitation disorganizes the enemy in depth usually following a suc

attack. The exploitation extends the initial success of the attack by pr

enemy from disengaging, withdrawing, and re-establishing an effecti

The commander must prepare to exploit the success of every attack w

delay. In the hasty attack, the force in contact normally continues the 

transitioning to exploitation. In the deliberate attack, the commander

tool for the exploitation is normally the reserve. At the MAGTF level

forces may support the reserve or assume the exploitation role. The c

retains only those reserves necessary to ensure flexibility and continu

momentum. The reserve generally positions where it can exploit the 
ppg p, 

aggressive, and rapid operations and thus require commensurate mobil

The decision to commence the exploitation requires judgment, intuition

situational understanding by the commander or the boldness and daring 

subordinate commander who recognizes an opportunity and acts on it. C

favorable for exploitation often include—

z Increased number of enemy prisoners of war. 

z Absence of organized defenses. 

z Absence of accurate enemy-massed direct and indirect fires. 

z Loss of enemy cohesion upon contact. 

z Capture, desertion, or absence of enemy commanders and senior 

officers.

Typical objectives for the exploitation force include command posts, re

seizure of key terrain, and the destruction of combat support and comb

support units located deep in the enemy’s rear area. The destruction or 

these objectives further disrupts and disorganizes the enemy, preventin

reconstitution. The commander must be prepared to assess the effects o

exploitation and determine when the time is at hand to pursue the enem

Pursuit

A pursuit is an offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile 

attempting to escape. Pursuit aims to destroy the enemy. Pursuits often 

from successful attack or exploitation operations when the enemy defe

to disintegrate. A pursuit may also occur when the enemy has lost the a

fight effectively and attempts to withdraw.

Since the conditions that allow for pursuit are seldom predictable, a pu

is not normally established ahead of time. The commander must design

appropriate forces to conduct and support pursuit operations or the exp

force may continue as the pursuit force. A pursuit is normally made up 

pressure force and an encircling force as illustrated in figure 9-3.

Pursuits challenge the utmost limits of endurance of troops/aircrew, eq

and supplies to include ordnance and fuel. If the pursuit force pauses fo

reason, the enemy has an opportunity to reorganize. Pursuit, like explo

must be relentless. Highly mobile and versatile combat service support 

critical to sustaining a pursuit and preventing the MAGTF from reachin

culminating point before the enemy is completely defeated.
FORMS OF MANEUVER

The six forms of offensive maneuver—frontal attack, flanking attack

envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, and penetration—are th

techniques a force conducting offensive operations uses to gain advan

the enemy. Each form of maneuver has a specific purpose relative to 

The MAGTF commander chooses the form of maneuver that best acc

his mission.

The MAGTF commander organizes and employs the ACE, GCE, or L

support the chosen form of maneuver. The GCE and ACE execute tac

to support or accomplish the MAGTF commander’s mission. The MA

commander may task-organize aviation and ground combat units, alo

combat service support units, under a single commander to execute th

offensive maneuver selected.

Direct pressure force

conducts hasty attacks

and maintains 

foward pressure

Encircling force

moves as quickly as

possible to cut off

enemy retreat

EnemyEnemy

Figure 9-3. Pursuit.
A frontal attack is directed against the front of the enemy forces. It is u

rapidly overrun or destroy a weak enemy force or fix a significant port

larger enemy force to support a flanking attack or envelopment. Illustra

figure 9-4, frontal attack is generally the least preferred form of maneu

because it strikes the enemy where he is the strongest. It can expose the 

to the concentrated fires of the defender while limiting the effectivenes

attacker’s own fires. Commanders may opt for a frontal attack when th

overwhelming combat power and the enemy is at a clear disadvantage. 

attack may also work because it is the last thing the enemy expects; the 

shock and surprise could shatter the enemy’s cohesion. Supporting effo

frontal attacks to fix the enemy, enabling the main effort to maneuver t

position of advantage during an envelopment or a flanking attack.

Flanking Attack

A flanking attack pits our strength against the enemy’s weakness in ord

a position of advantage while avoiding the enemy’s combat power. It is 

of offensive maneuver directed at the flank of an enemy force as illustr

figure 9-5. A flank is a vulnerable aspect of an enemy formation. A fla

attack is similar to an envelopment, but generally not as deep. The purp

Objective A

Enemy En

Figure 9-4. Frontal Attack.
of a flanking attack is to avoid the enemy’s combat power in the proc

defeating him.

Envelopment

Envelopment is an offensive maneuver in which the main attacking f

around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure ob

the enemy’s rear. During the execution of a single envelopment, as sh

figure 9-6 on page 9-12, the enemy’s defensive positions may be byp

ground, waterborne, or vertical envelopment, compelling the defende

the ground of the attacker’s choosing. It requires surprise and superio

relative to the enemy. The operational reach and speed of aviation for

with their ability to rapidly mass fires on the enemy, make them an id

conduct or support an envelopment. Envelopment is designed to—

z Strike the enemy where he is weakest, at critical vulnerabilities

z Strike the enemy at an unexpected place. 

z Attack at the enemy’s rear area. 

z Avoid the enemy’s strengths. 

z Disrupt the enemy’s command and control. 

z Disrupt the enemy’s logistic effort. 

z Destroy or disrupt the enemy’s fire support assets.

z Sever the enemy’s lines of communications.

z Minimize friendly casualties.

Enemy Enemy

Figure 9-5. Flanking Attack.
Envelopments normally require a supporting effort to fix the enemy, pr

escape or withdrawal, and reduce his ability to react against the main e

succeed by forcing the enemy to fight in multiple directions simultaneo

deceiving him regarding the location, timing, or existence of the main 

Success of the envelopment often depends on the effects created by the 

supporting effort.

Envelopments require sufficient depth so the enemy cannot reorient his 

before the commander concentrates his force for the attack on the obje

Because of their ability to rapidly mass, aviation forces are particularly 

suited to function as the enveloping force or to enable the success of th

enveloping force.

The commander may choose to conduct a double envelopment as illust

figure 9-7. A double envelopment is an offensive maneuver designed t

enemy to fight in two or more directions simultaneously. It may lead to 

encirclement of the enemy force so the commander must be prepared t

and defeat any breakout attempts. The commander may select multiple 

to the rear of the enemy’s defense and the enveloping forces use differe

to attack, seize, or secure those objectives.

Objective A

Enemy Enemy

Figure 9-6. Single Envelopment.
Turning Movement

A turning movement is a variation of the envelopment in which the a

force passes around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions 

objectives deep in the rear area of the enemy. Normally, as shown in f

page 9-14, the main effort executes the turning movement as the supp

fixes the enemy in position. A turning movement differs from envelo

that the turning force usually operates at such distances from the fixin

mutual support is unlikely. The turning force must be able to operate 

independently. The turning movement, such as the Inchon landing, is 

of a loosely coupled plan where two independent forces linked throug

not specific time tables.

The goal of a turning movement is to force the enemy to abandon his 

reposition major forces to meet the adversary. Once “turned,” the ene

advantage of fighting from prepared positions on ground of his choos

Using the sea as maneuver space, the MAGTF is particularly well-su

conduct a turning movement for the joint force commander. Through 

decentralized operations, the mobility of the ACE, and the use of the 

Objective A

Objective B

Enemy Enemy

Figure 9-7. Double Envelopment.
maneuver space, the MAGTF is capable of employing independent and 

forces from a variety of directions and means to positions well to the re

enemy’s forces.

Infiltration

Infiltration is a form of maneuver in which friendly forces move throug

an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or orga

The movement occurs, either by small groups or by individuals, at exte

irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it implies 

is to be avoided. Forces move over, through, or around enemy position

detection to assume a position of advantage over the enemy, as illustrat

figure 9-9. Infiltration is normally conducted in concert with other form

of maneuver.

Objective A

Enemy Enemy

Figure 9-8. Turning Movement.
The commander orders an infiltration to move all or part of his force 

gaps in the enemy’s defense to—

z Achieve surprise. 

z Attack enemy positions from the flank or rear.

z Occupy a position from which to support the main attack by fire

z Secure key terrain. 

z Conduct ambushes and raids in the enemy’s rear area to harass 

his command and control and support activities. 

z Cut off enemy forward units.

Infiltrations normally take advantage of limited visibility, rough terra

unoccupied or unobserved areas. These conditions often allow undete

Objective A

Assembly

Area

Enemy 

Figure 9-9. Infiltration.
present greater risks. The commander may elect to conduct a demonstr

feint, or some other form of deception to divert the enemy’s attention f

area to be infiltrated.

To increase control, speed, and the ability to mass combat power, a for

infiltrates with the largest possible units compatible with the need for s

enemy detection capabilities, and speed. Infiltrating forces may depend 

on aviation forces for lift, aerial resupply, and close air support.

After infiltration, the infiltrating force may require a linkup or series of 

assemble for its subsequent mission. Infiltration requires extremely det

accurate information about terrain and enemy dispositions. The plan fo

infiltration must be simple, clear, carefully coordinated, and well under

the executing force. Due to the need for linkup, close air support, and d

planning, infiltrations are an example of a tightly-coupled plan. Infiltra

operations are the most easily damaged and most difficult to repair. Ac

risk is a key consideration for this form of maneuver.

Penetration

A penetration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks 

enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system. Pen

apply when enemy flanks are not assailable or time, terrain, or the enem

disposition does not permit the employment of another form of maneuv

Successful penetrations create assailable flanks and provide access to th

rear. A penetration generally occurs in three stages—

z Rupturing the position.

z Widening the gap.

z Seizing the objective.

A penetration concentrates overwhelmingly superior combat power on 

front and in depth. As the attacking force ruptures the enemy’s defense

secure the shoulders of the breach to widen the gap for follow-on units. 

the enemy position and widening the gap are not inherently decisive; th

must exploit the rupture by attacking either into the enemy’s rear area o

laterally to roll up the enemy’s positions as shown in figure 9-10. The s

action and mobility of motorized, mechanized, and aviation forces are u

rupturing the enemy’s position and exploiting that rupture.

A commander may conduct multiple penetrations. Exploitation forces 

converge on a single, deep objective or seize independent objectives. W
pg

the success. Due to their inherent flexibility and ability to rapidly ma

aviation forces are well-suited for the role of a penetration. Because t

conducting the penetration is vulnerable to flanking attack, it must m

Follow-on forces must be close behind to secure and widen the shoul

of the breach.

Objective A

Enemy 

Figure 9-10. Penetration.
Other Tactical Operations

“The operational tasks during the execution phase were extremely complex. We woul

night amphibious landings at the Mogadishu port and airfield; two reliefs in place of U

withdrawal and passage of lines by the Pakistani Brigade through our coalition lines (U

Marines); a day and night defense of the air- and seaports; a Non-combatant Evacuat

and civilian agencies personnel; and two night amphibious withdrawals. These difficul

evolutions were tough enough, but the mix of coalition forces, the nighttime execution

prospect of doing these under fire compounded the difficulty exponentially.” 

—General Anthony Zinni, US

Ba

Other tactical operations—passages of lines, linkups, reliefs in place

crossings, and breakouts from encirclement—enable the MAGTF to 

variety of missions. While other tactical operations primarily involve 

the ground, they are not the exclusive province of the GCE. Dependi

their size, scope, and duration, all elements of the MAGTF may be in

planning, coordinating, integrating, supporting, and conducting these 

In preparation for a relief in place, linkup, or passage of lines, the com

ordering the operation will specify responsibilities and procedures an

differences in methods of execution among subordinate commanders

commander must establish measures to ensure continuous and effecti

other support during the operation. 

PASSAGE OF LINES

During a passage of lines operation, a force moves forward or rearwa

another force’s combat positions with the intention of moving into or 

contact with the enemy. The operation may be a forward or rearward 

lines. It usually occurs within the context of another mission, such as 

exploitation, or security force mission. 

A passage of lines, forward or rearward, is a complex and often dang

operation, requiring thorough coordination. Inherent in the conduct o

operations, especially in the defense, is the requirement to execute a 

lines. Faced with a superior enemy force or in the conduct of security 

in the defense, security forces must fall back and execute a rearward 

lines, conducting battle handover with forces in the main battle area.
, y y y p

force to pass through in the attack. In either instance, the commander m

leverage additional capabilities, such as MAGTF fires, to support thest

operation. 

The conduct of a passage of lines involves a stationary force and a mov

In the offense, the moving force is normally the attacking force and org

assume its assigned mission after the passage. The stationary force faci

passage and provides maximum support to the moving force. Normally

and requirements of the moving force have priority. 

Normally, the responsibility for the zone of action transfers from the st

force to the moving force. The timing or circumstances of that transfer 

agreement by the two commanders or specified by higher authority. Th

commander assumes responsibility at or before the time of attack. Resp

may transfer before the time of attack to allow the attacking commande

control any preparatory fires. In this case, stationary force elements tha

are in contact at the time of the transfer operate under the control of the

attacking commander. Liaison between the forces involved should occu

as early as possible. 

In the defense, a rearward passage of lines normally occurs during the w

of a security force. The withdrawing force is the moving force and may 

through the stationary force en route to performing another mission or 

the stationary unit. The common commander must specify any special 

relationships and retain control of the passage. The executing comman

preferably collocated, mutually decide on the actual transfer of respons

the sector. The withdrawing commander is responsible for identifying t

element of his command as it passes through the stationary unit. A deta

for mutual recognition, disseminated throughout both forces, is critical 

passage of lines. The stationary commander reports to his senior comm

when he assumes responsibility for the sector. The withdrawing comm

reports to the senior commander when his unit has completed the passa

Due to the risks associated with a passage of lines (mainly enemy actio

disrupt the passage or capitalize on the vulnerable forces), commander

execute passages of lines at night or during periods of reduced visibilit

include fratricide, exposure to enemy counteractions, loss of control du

transfer of sector responsibility, and the potential for uncoordinated mo

forces. Whether conducting a forward or rearward passage of lines, sta

and moving force commanders normally collocate their command post

facilitate command and control of this demanding tactical operation.
LINKUP

A linkup is an operation wherein two friendly forces join together in 

area. The purpose of the linkup is to establish contact between two fo

linkup may occur between a helicopterborne force and a force on the 

between two converging forces, or in the relief of an encircled force. 

commander directing the linkup establishes the command relationshi

responsibilities of the two units involved during and after the linkup t

responsibility for fire support coordination. If the linkup occurs betw

Marine unit and a unit from another component of the joint or multin

force, the commander can employ MAGTF enablers, such as an air-n

liaison company, to provide a liaison capability and assist in the coor

fires. Like a passage of lines, a linkup normally involves a stationary 

moving force. If both units are moving, one is designated the stationa

and should occupy the linkup point at least temporarily to affect linku

commanders involved must coordinate their schemes of maneuver. T

on primary and alternate linkup points where physical contact betwee

advance elements of the two units will occur. Linkup points must be 

recognizable to both units and where the routes of the moving force i

elements of the stationary force. Commanders must coordinate fire su

the safety of both units. 

RELIEF IN PLACE

When directed by higher authority, a relief in place operation involve

replacement of all or part of a unit in a specific area by an incoming f

Mission responsibilities for the replaced elements and the assigned zo

transfer to the incoming force. This transfer of authority is usually pa

relief in place operation and is termed a relief in place-transfer of aut

TOA). The incoming unit continues the operation as ordered. The rel

occur in an expeditious and orderly manner. Ideally, the RIP-TOA wi

without weakening the tactical integrity and security of the assigned 

During a relief in place operation, the outgoing commander is respon

defense of his sector until transfer of authority. Both commanders sho

collocate throughout the operation to facilitate the transfer. The outgo

commander assumes command of any subordinate forces that have c

the relief in place. Following the transfer, the incoming commander a

control of all elements of the outgoing force that have not yet been re

The incoming commander reports to higher headquarters upon comp

the RIP-TOA. 
gpg

time. Simultaneous reliefs take less time, but can cause greater congest

threaten the readiness of the defense, and increase the likelihood of ene

detection due to the greater level of movement. By contrast, a staggere

takes longer, but a larger portion of the force is prepared to conduct op

OBSTACLE CROSSING

An obstacle is any obstruction that disrupts, fixes, turns, or blocks the m

of an opposing force. The objective is to impose the loss of personnel, 

equipment. Obstacles can be natural, manmade, or both. They are impe

movement that usually require specific techniques and equipment to ov

series of such obstacles is called a barrier. Crossing obstacles is a comm

requirement in the offense. Though any obstacle can be crossed given 

time and resources, extensive preparation can help minimize losses fro

action. Employment of obstacles covered by fires should be a normal e

the defense.

A critical requirement in any obstacle crossing is the reduction or elim

the effects of enemy fire covering the obstacle. The goal is to cross the 

with minimum delay to maintain momentum and limit casualties. 

Upon encountering an obstacle, the commander can bypass or breach. 

Intelligence can reveal the enemy’s capability to oppose the crossing, t

characteristics of the obstacle and crossing points, and the terrain on th

When possible, the attacker bypasses enemy obstacles, saving time, lab

risk to personnel and equipment. However, the commander must exerc

when bypassing, since obstacles can lead to predictability by canalizing 

For example, a bypass route that at first appears desirable may lead to a 

A deliberate obstacle crossing should include a branch plan for a hasty 

the event the situation allows. The commander’s options may be limite

maneuver restrictions, the ability to deliver supporting fires, and the tim

required to move forces across or around the obstacle. The commander 

conduct demonstrations and feints at locations away from the main cro

breaching point to draw the enemy’s attention and defenses or fires els

The attacker advances to the obstacle quickly and on a broad front to in

possibility of affecting a hasty crossing. The inherent capabilities of th

provide the MAGTF commander multiple options for moving on a bro

and rapidly crossing obstacles to establish security on the enemy side. 

can provide combat assault transport for MAGTF units attacking direct
y yyp

or conduct a turning movement. 

Once forces and equipment commit to crossing, withdrawal or deviat

the initial plan is extremely difficult. During a crossing, a force is mo

vulnerable while astride the obstacle. After establishing units on the f

the obstacle, the commander pushes his combat power across or throu

quickly as possible. 

Breach 

A breach is the employment of any available means to break through 

passage through an enemy defense, obstacle, minefield, or fortificatio

attacker attempts to breach an obstacle when it cannot be bypassed. A 

the most common means of crossing an obstacle. The plan for breach

on the concept of operation on the far side. There are two types of br

generally correspond to hasty and deliberate attacks, with many of th

considerations, advantages, and disadvantages. 

Hasty Breach 

A hasty breach is the rapid creation of a route through a minefield, ba

fortification by any expedient method. It is a continuation of the oper

underway with a minimum loss of momentum. A hasty breach involv

and surprise, force dispersion, and decentralized control. 

Deliberate Breach 

A deliberate breach is the creation of a lane through a minefield or a 

through a barrier or fortification. It requires a concentrated force to o

obstacle and enemy defenses on the far side. A deliberate breach requ

extensive planning, detailed preparation, sustained supporting arms, a

support. When forced to conduct a deliberate breach, the attacker ma

momentum and the initiative. 

River Crossing 

Unfordable water obstacles have considerable influence on military o

due to their restrictions on movement and maneuver. They are obstac

attack and form natural lines of resistance for defense. The strength o

water as an obstacle increases with the width, depth, and velocity of t

A river crossing is a type of gap-crossing operation necessary for the 

of ground combat power on the other side. It is a centrally planned of
pqg 

dedicated to the security of the beachhead. The primary concern is the 

buildup of combat power on the far side to continue offensive operatio

BREAKOUT FROM ENCIRCLEMENT

An encircled force normally attempts a breakout when it— 

z Does not have sufficient relative combat power to defend itself ag

enemy.

z Does not have adequate terrain to conduct its defense.

z Cannot sustain itself and needs relief by friendly forces.

The sooner the breakout occurs, the less time the enemy has to strength

position and the more organic resources and support the encircled force 

available. The encircled force may receive fire support and diversions 

elements of the MAGTF, such as the ACE. Most importantly, the encir

must maintain the momentum of the attack. If the breakout fails, the fo

more vulnerable to defeat or destruction than it was before the breakou

The encircled force normally conducts a breakout by task-organizing w

to conduct the rupture, a main body, and a rear guard. If the commande

enough forces, he may organize separate reserve, diversionary, and sup

elements. Any of these forces may consist of appropriate combat servic

and aviation or ground combat units with one or both as individual elem

task-organized, combined arms teams.
Reconnaissance and Security Operation

“The most certain method to uncover an enemy is to send scouts to visit suspected po

—Small Wars Ma

“Skepticism is the mother of security. Even though fools trust their enemies, prudent p

The general is the principal sentinel of his army. He should always be careful of its pres

that it is never exposed to misfortune.”

—Frederick the G

Dictionary of Military and Naval Q

The fog and friction of war will never allow the commander to have 

picture of the battlespace. However, reconnaissance operations can re

uncertainties about an unfamiliar area and an enemy who is actively 

conceal information about his forces and intentions. 

Reconnaissance of some type should always precede a commitment o

Failure to conduct a thorough reconnaissance may lead to the loss of 

an inability to exploit fleeting opportunities. Lack of reconnaissance 

the enemy achieving surprise, inflicting unacceptable losses on friend

and causing the failure of the mission. As part of the overall MAGTF 

effort, reconnaissance operations support the commander’s decisionm

process by collecting information to develop situational awareness an

critical information requirements. 

Security operations may occur in concert with a variety of MAGTF o

They can reduce risk by providing the MAGTF commander with earl

and increased reaction time. They protect the force from surprise and 

eliminate the unknowns in any tactical situation. Security operations 

enemy from collecting information on friendly forces, deceive him ab

capabilities and intentions, and prevent enemy forces from interferin

friendly operations.

Reconnaissance operations support security operations by providing 

on enemy forces, capabilities, and intentions and by denying the enem

information about friendly activities through counterreconnaissance. 

a MAGTF’s security operations should be an integral element of its 
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defensive, and other tactical operations.

RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS OF THE MAGTF

Reconnaissance attempts to answer the commander’s questions about t

and the battlespace in which the MAGTF will operate. Reconnaissance 

mission—aerial, ground, or amphibious—undertaken to obtain, by visu

detection methods, information about the activities and resources of the 

to secure data on the meteorological, hydrographic, electromagnetic, or 

geographic characteristics of a particular area. More simply, reconnaiss

obtains information about the characteristics of a particular area and an

or potential enemy within it.

The commander uses reconnaissance to collect information and to gain 

maintain contact with the enemy. Reconnaissance activities may range 

passive surveillance to aggressive measures designed to stimulate an en

response, such as reconnaissance by fire. Passive surveillance includes 

systematically watching an enemy force or named area of interest; liste

area and the activities in it to help develop intelligence needed to confir

adversary COAs; or identifying adversary critical vulnerabilities and li

All MAGTF elements have reconnaissance capabilities, but each has a 

capacity. Organic MAGTF chemical, biological, radiological, and nucl

reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities provide chemical, biologic

radiological, and nuclear hazard information to the MAGTF commande

intelligence collection. These capabilities support chemical, biological

radiological, and nuclear passive defense and critical command decisio

Command Element

The command element centralizes planning and direction of the entire 

reconnaissance effort for the MAGTF. The command element can task 

MAGTF element to conduct reconnaissance to satisfy the commander’

information requirements. It also directly controls MAGTF-level recon

assets, such as radio battalion, force reconnaissance company, and the 

intelligence battalion. 

Radio Battalion 

The radio battalion provides ground-based signals intelligence, electron

warfare, communications security monitoring, and special intelligence 

communications capability to support MAGTF operations. It plans and 

coordinates the employment of its subordinate elements, to include rad
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vehicles. The radio battalion is the focal point for MAGTF ground-ba

intelligence operations. 

Force Reconnaissance Company

The force reconnaissance company is organized within the division 

reconnaissance battalion and is the MAGTF commander’s ground rec

asset. The company trains in unique insertion/extraction modes for de

reconnaissance. It receives operational guidance and tasking from the

MAGTF commander.

Intelligence Battalion

The intelligence battalion provides remote sensor, imagery interpreta

topographic intelligence support to MAGTF operations. In addition to 

control and management platoon, the force imagery interpretation un

topographic platoon, the intelligence battalion establishes and staffs t

MAGTF’s surveillance and reconnaissance center. It plans, executes, 

monitors MAGTF reconnaissance operations.

The intelligence battalion also provides human intelligence, counterin

and interrogator-translator support to MAGTF operations. This suppo

include screening, interrogating, and debriefing prisoners of war and 

intelligence interest; conducting counterintelligence force protection 

operations; conducting counterintelligence surveys and investigation

counterintelligence estimates and plans; translating documents; and e

captured material to a limited extent.

In addition to the specialized counterintelligence and interrogator-tra

platoons, the battalion employs task-organized human intelligence ex

teams in direct support of MAGTF subordinate elements. These explo

teams combine counterintelligence specialists and interrogator-transl

one element, providing a unique and comprehensive range of counter

human intelligence services. 

Ground Combat Element 

The GCE has substantial organic reconnaissance assets. Those units i

with the enemy, especially patrols, are among the most reliable sourc

information. Combat engineers are also good sources of information. 

units often conduct engineer reconnaissance of an area and can provi

reporting on obstacles to lines of communications, such as roads, rive

lines, and bridges.
pg

surveillance to the GCE. Like force reconnaissance, ground reconnaiss

employs to observe and report enemy activity and other information of 

significance. Their capabilities are similar to those of force reconnaissa

The division reconnaissance battalion conducts close reconnaissance a

surveillance in support of GCE operations. It uses insertion, patrolling, 

and extraction techniques to carry out amphibious reconnaissance, grou

reconnaissance, and surveillance tasks in support of the GCE. The divi

has other reconnaissance assets—light armored reconnaissance, counte

radar, and scout snipers.

Light Armored Reconnaissance

Light armored reconnaissance units usually operate in forward areas or 

flanks and report early warning of contact with an enemy force. The M

each light armored vehicle train in information collection and reporting

units are capable of a wide variety of missions due to their inherent mo

organic firepower. The division light armored reconnaissance battalion 

the GCE with its light armored reconnaissance capability.

Counterbattery Radar 

The counterbattery radar platoon, located within the artillery regiment’

headquarters battery, uses mobile radars to detect and accurately locate 

mortars, artillery, and rockets, permitting rapid engagement with count

The GCE reports information on enemy order of battle and locations to 

MAGTF command element based on information derived from counter

radar detections.

Scout Snipers 

The scout sniper platoon is an organic collection asset of each infantry 

Although the platoon can employ in support of numerous tactical miss

in defensive and offensive operations, they primarily employ to provid

surveillance and tactical information and coordinate supporting arms a

air support. The scout sniper platoon provides the infantry battalion wi

extended area observation.

Aviation Combat Element

The capability of the ACE to observe the battlefield and report in near 

gives the MAGTF commander a multidimensional capability. Aviation 

units can span the entire area of operations, providing early indications
ACE aircraft, whether rotary-wing, fixed-wing, or tilt-rotor, can cond

observation of terrain and enemy forces. The ACE aircraft can engag

targets immediately or direct other supporting arms. The ACE manag

unmanned aircraft system, advanced tactical airborne reconnaissance 

electronic reconnaissance and warfare assets.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

Unmanned aircraft systems provide day-night, real-time imagery for 

reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. Their unique cap

also support real time target engagement and assist in the control of f

supporting arms and maneuver. These systems provide high quality v

imagery for artillery or naval gunfire adjustment, battle damage asses

reconnaissance over land or sea. They are capable of day and night o

using television or forward-looking infrared cameras. Unmanned aer

squadrons (VMU-1, VMU-2, and VMU-3) task-organize under the c

ACE and provide sorties in general support of MAGTF collection req

Because of the limited number of unmanned aircraft system assets an

reconnaissance capabilities they provide to the entire force, the MAG

command element collection management section coordinates unman

system mission tasking.

Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System 

The F/A-18D can employ the advanced tactical airborne reconnaissan

a real-time digital package providing day/night, all-weather imagery 

The imagery provides sufficient detail and accuracy to permit deliver

appropriate air and ground weapons; assist with battle damage assess

provide tactical commanders with detailed information about the ene

weapons, units, and disposition. Imagery resulting from collection ca

digitally disseminated to the force imagery interpretation unit’s tactic

exploitation group for exploitation, printing, and dissemination.

Electronic Reconnaissance and Warfare 

The EA-6B aircraft conducts aerial electronic reconnaissance and ele

warfare. Intelligence personnel can also process and disseminate info

from digital tape recordings obtained during electronic warfare missi

update and maintain enemy electronic order of battle information. Th

are passive systems that require active adversary emitters. 

Through its ground-based, long-range radar, the ACE’s tactial air ope

center generates an air picture depicting friendly and enemy air activ
, pp

the field of view to include other areas of operation, as well as share th

picture with the ACE’s tactical air command center for its use in the co

of aviation operations.

Logistics Combat Element

The LCE has limited reconnaissance capabilities and no organic reconn

assets; however, it can conduct road and route reconnaissance with its 

units, convoys, and military police.

NATIONAL AND THEATER ASSETS

The MAGTF can request reconnaissance support from national, theater

other Service, and allied reconnaissance assets. When made available, 

capabilities, such as Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System or 

signals intelligence aircraft, integrate fully into MAGTF reconnaissanc

operations. During forcible entry operations, the MAGTF integrates its 

amphibious reconnaissance capabilities with national, theater, and spec

operations forces. Some MAGTF reconnaissance assets, such as the rad

battalion and the counterintelligence/human intelligence company, usu

have direct connectivity with appropriate external agencies to coordina

or support.

RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING

Reconnaissance supports the MAGTF commander by contributing to th

commander’s situational understanding and development. Reconnaissa

support the specific CCIRs indicated by the commander’s intent and su

unit intelligence and operations planning. Simultaneously, reconnaissan

must remain alert to any developments that may cause the commander 

his intent.

Ideally, the MAGTF reconnaissance assets employ early to support the 

and friendly COA development and selection. When reconnaissance oc

in the planning cycle, planning and execution are driven by the flow of 

information and intelligence. If reconnaissance is delayed, situation de

will generally be more uncertain. Reconnaissance assets are best emplo

general support. The MAGTF reconnaissance units will most likely em

rapidly developing and fluid situations. The main effort may shift quick

one subordinate element to another. Such situations often require modi

or complete changes in the reconnaissance elements’ missions.
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capable of determining the best use of MAGTF reconnaissance assets 

given time to provide the necessary support and to integrate the resul

reconnaissance information with other intelligence sources. Although 

reconnaissance assets in direct support of some subordinate element 

even attaching them to specific units is occasionally appropriate, such

support relationships generally make for inefficient use of specialized 

reconnaissance forces.

Reconnaissance requires time for detailed planning and preparation. 

reconnaissance focuses on the enemy’s activities and intentions to sat

commander’s need to exploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities or to attack 

gravity. This requirement frequently necessitates operating in and aro

enemy’s most critical and best-defended areas, over long distances, a

advance of the commencement of the operations it will support. Thes

usually dictate specialized methods of transportation, communication

support, combat service support, equipment, and coordination.

TYPES OF RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

There are four basic types of reconnaissance—route, area, zone, and 

oriented. Each type provides specific details for mission planning and 

maintaining situational understanding.

Route Reconnaissance

Route reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed informatio

specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence 

along that route. Route reconnaissance focuses along a specific line o

communications, such as a road, railway, or waterway, to provide new 

information on route conditions and activities. It normally precedes t

movement of friendly forces and provides detailed information about 

route and the surrounding terrain that could be used to influence mov

that route.

Area Reconnaissance

Area reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information 

terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area, such as a town, rid

woods, or other feature critical to operations. The focus in an area rec

can be a single point, such as a bridge or installation, and could inclu

headquarters, key terrain, objective areas, or critical installations. Ho

situations encountered en route are developed only enough to allow t
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without being detected.

Zone Reconnaissance

Zone reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information 

routes, obstacles (to include chemical or radiological contamination), t

enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. A zone reconnaissa

normally applies when the enemy situation is vague or when informati

cross-country trafficability is desired.

Zone reconnaissance supports the total integrated intelligence picture o

defined by length and width. The size of the area depends on the poten

information on hostile forces, terrain, and weather in the zone; the requ

levied by the commander; and the reconnaissance forces available to ex

intelligence value in the zone.

Force-Oriented Reconnaissance

Force-oriented reconnaissance is a directed effort to find a specific ene

quickly and stay with it wherever it moves on the battlefield. Force-ori

reconnaissance focuses on a specific enemy organization, wherever it i

go. Force-oriented reconnaissance gathers intelligence information requ

a specific enemy or unit. Reconnaissance assets orient on that specific 

moving when necessary to observe it and reporting all required inform

information that has been requested as well as other pertinent observed 

collected information.

RECONNAISSANCE PULL AND RECONNAISSANCE PUS

A MAGTF can conduct reconnaissance using one of two basic method

reconnaissance pull and reconnaissance push.

In operations based on reconnaissance pull, information derived from 

reconnaissance forces guides friendly force activities. Reconnaissance 

identify the surfaces and gaps in overall enemy dispositions and permit 

commander to shape the battlespace. Making rapid decisions based on 

information, friendly combat forces are drawn to and through the weak 

the enemy defense and seek to quickly exploit the advantages gained.

Reconnaissance pull requires early commitment of reconnaissance elem

allowance for the time to fully develop the reconnaissance picture, and 

flow of information from reconnaissance elements directly to higher an

supported commanders and staffs in immediate need of reconnaissance 
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Aerial and amphibious reconnaissance determined the Japanese defen

largely ignored the northern beaches, while focusing most of their de

effort on the most likely landing beaches in the southwest. The landin

the northern beaches. Coupled with a deception operation off the sou

the result was a complete surprise. Current concepts for MAGTF ope

as operational maneuver from the sea, depend on the ability of the MA

reconnaissance pull to determine enemy dispositions and find or crea

exploitable gaps through which the MAGTF can pass while avoiding 

and strong points.

Reconnaissance pull requires a high tempo of intelligence operations 

and report timely information. To sustain such operations, a reserve m

maintained to ensure fresh reconnaissance elements are always availa

support developing situations. Maintenance of a reconnaissance reser

adequate consideration of the time required for reconnaissance unit p

insertion, mission execution, extraction, and recovery. Reconnaissanc

easiest to execute early in an operation, but it is difficult to support ov

period of high-tempo operations.

Operations based on reconnaissance push use reconnaissance elemen

conservatively. They are often used as a tactical resource and general

shorter timeline. Reconnaissance push uses reconnaissance forces as 

element of preplanned tactical operations, detecting enemy dispositio

the movement of the entire friendly force. The operations of I MEF i

Desert Storm (1991) were characterized by reconnaissance push. Rec

forces, assisted by aggressive patrolling by combat forces, located Ira

forward of advancing friendly forces in enough time to prevent them 

interfering with I MEF operations.

Reconnaissance pull is preferred when the MAGTF can maneuver fre

exploit the enemy’s weaknesses located by reconnaissance forces. It 

preferred method during offensive operations as it takes advantage of 

MAGTF’s inherent flexibility and reconnaissance capabilities. Recon

push is more often used when the MAGTF is following a predetermin

targeting and destruction of enemy forces is a priority, freedom of ma

limited, and usually when on the defense.

Reconnaissance, although naturally oriented toward the battlespace b

forward edge of the battle area, should not ignore exposure of the rea

command and control nodes, lines of communications, and logistic fa

Devoting sufficient MAGTF reconnaissance capabilities to the rear a

the enemy from interfering with friendly combat operations.
g 

within the MAGTF as well as within the joint force avoids duplication 

by scarce reconnaissance assets and facilitates turnover of reconnaissan

responsibilities as units maneuver throughout the battlespace. Reconna

assets may be given the additional mission of engaging enemy forces w

combined arms to disrupt and delay their advance. With advances in te

there is now an emerging capability to directly communicate between a 

MAGTF reconnaissance asset through an automated data link and a fir

unit, such as sensor to shooter. Automatically transmitting target data f

sensor directly to the aircraft or firing unit brings combat power to bea

the enemy before the situation can change.

In counterinsurgency, stability, and other irregular warfare operations, 

reconnaissance forces provide a broad range of capabilities from direct

combat missions to support for disaster relief and humanitarian operati

Irregular warfare calls for intelligence-collection accuracy and timely r

support the MAGTF’s delivery of services, fires, or other support, and 

usually calls for great restraint in the use of force.

Reconnaissance operations may emphasize objectives, such as the loca

identification of lines of communications, services, and infrastructure, 

threatened civilian populations. The counterintelligence/human intellig

capabilities of the MAGTF are exceptionally useful in the surveillance 

indigenous peoples and identification and targeting of the hostile segm

the population.

COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

At the same time a force conducts its reconnaissance operations, the op

will conduct similar operations to determine the disposition of those 

reconnaissance forces. For example, a force under indirect fire will inc

counterreconnaissance operations to locate and destroy the reconnaissa

elements controlling the fire. Counterreconnaissance prevents the oppo

from collecting sufficient information about friendly activities.

Counterreconnaissance consists of all measures taken to prevent hostile 

observation of a force or area. It focuses on denying the enemy access t

elements of friendly information, information about the MAGTF in the 

area, the flanks, and the rear that would further enemy objectives.

Counterreconnaissance consists of active and passive measures. Active 

detect, fix, and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements. Passive measu

conceal friendly units and capabilities and deceive and confuse the ene
p

reconnaissance forces and the targeting, destruction, or suppression o

reconnaissance forces so they cannot report friendly unit positions or 

Counterreconnaissance consists of—

z Developing named areas of interest and target areas of interest f

enemy reconnaissance forces. 

z Conducting continuous surveillance of designated named areas 

and target areas of interest. 

z Executing a targeting plan against enemy reconnaissance forces

z Recovering forward security elements.

Reconnaissance operations support counterreconnaissance by collect

information on enemy reconnaissance forces, assets, and activities. 

Counterreconnaissance supports security operations by protecting the 

from enemy collection.

SECURITY OPERATIONS

Security is the measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installati

protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its eff

Local security is an inherent responsibility of command at every eche

Additionally, Marine Corps forces may conduct specific security ope

designed to aggressively and continuously seek the enemy and recon

terrain. The forces assigned to conduct security operations are generi

referred to as a “security force.” Security forces conduct active recon

to detect enemy movement or preparations for action and to learn as 

possible about the terrain. The ultimate goal is to determine the enem

and assist the main body in countering it. Security forces may employ 

combination of ground patrols, observation posts, electronic warfare, 

aviation assets.

Note

“Security forces” in this context should not be confused 

with those Marine Corps units that perform security duties 

as a primary mission in support of fleet commanders and 

Department of State, as identified in chapter 1. Similarly, i

should not be confused with the broader Department of 

Defense definiton of security forces being composed of th

duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and 

constabulary forces of a state.
y ppyy p

from unexpected attack, long-range fires, and observation by the enem

MAGTF commander can employ a wide range of forces and capabilitie

conduct security operations, which can include—

z Aviation forces to screen the main force from enemy interference

z Ground forces to control, seize, or retain terrain to prevent enemy 

observation. 

z Detection devices, such as unmanned aircraft systems, radar, and 

sensors, to discover the enemy or his long-range fires.

There are three types of security missions—screen, guard, and cover. E

in the degree of security provided, the forces and capabilities required, 

degree of engagement with the enemy the commander desires. The for

conducting these security missions are called a screening, a guarding, o

covering force. These forces may be further identified by the establishi

headquarters and the location of the security force, such as a MEF cove

division advance guard, or regimental flank screen. Security forces ma

of existing units, reinforced units, or task-organized forces.

Screening Force

A screening force observes, identifies, and reports information. It only 

self-protection. A screening force—

z Provides early warning of enemy approach. 

z Gains and maintains enemy contact and reports enemy activity. 

z Conducts counterreconnaissance within capabilities. 

z Impedes and harasses the enemy within capabilities.

A screening force provides surveillance and early warning of enemy ac

physical protection. It can employ as an economy of force measure in a 

area because it provides security on a broad frontage with limited asset

screening force provides the least amount of protection of any security 

lacking the combat power to develop the situation. Aviation combat for

be used to screen large, open areas. Terrain, weather, and the duration o

screen are critical considerations when assigning screening missions to 

forces. The screening force may operate within range of friendly artille

positioned with the ground forces because of its immediate availability

can also provide this fire support capability, but the cost in resources v
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squadron for 24-hour coverage.

Guarding Force

A guarding force protects the main force from attack, direct fire, and 

observation by fighting to gain time, while also observing and report

information. A guarding force—

z Provides early warning of enemy approach.

z Provides maneuver space to the front, flanks, and rear of the for

z Screens, attacks, defends, or delays within its capabilities to pro

force.

A guarding force differs from a screening force in that a guarding for

sufficient combat power to defeat, repel, or fix the lead elements of a

ground force before they can engage the main body with direct fire.

Covering Force

A covering force operates apart from the main force to intercept, eng

disorganize, and deceive the enemy before he can attack the main bo

prevents surprise during the advance. A covering force—

z Gains and maintains contact with the enemy.

z Denies the enemy information about the size, strength, composi

intention of the main force.

z Conducts counterreconnaissance and destroys enemy security f

z Develops the situation to determine enemy dispositions, strengt

weaknesses.

A covering force is a self-contained maneuver force that screens, gua

defends, and delays. In order to operate independently, a covering for

task-organize to include aviation, artillery, tank reconnaissance, and c

service support. The covering mission may operate in terms of time 

and enemy disposition. One example of a covering mssion is engagin

forces until our main body deploys for attack.
Stability Operations

“In virtually every province, city, and village it was the same. Corrupt governing counci

former regime’s local means of control and repression, were replaced by the most hon

women that commanders could locate and convince to serve. . . .The citizens also loo

commanders, and the civil affairs soldiers attached from our Army to every battalion h

the lessons on how to govern democratically.” 

—Brigadier General Joh

Marine Corp

Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and 

conducted outside the United States. In coordination with other instru

national power, stability operations seek to maintain or re-establish a 

secure environment and provide essential governmental services, em

infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. 

To achieve conditions that ensure a stable and lasting peace, stability 

capitalize on coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchroniza

military and nonmilitary organizations. These complementary civil-m

efforts aim to strengthen legitimate governance, restore or maintain r

support economic and infrastructure development, and foster a sense 

unity that enable the host nation government to assume responsibility 

civil administration.

Civil-military operations are a primary military instrument to integra

and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in suppor

operations. These operations are the activities of a commander that e

collaborative relationships among military forces, governmental and 

nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civil

in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate 

operations that are nested in support of the overall US objectives. 

In 2005, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support 

Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, establis

operations as a core US military mission and directed the Armed For

prepare to conduct these types of operations with a level of proficien

equivalent to combat operations. In 2009, the directive was revised a
p, y p

Department of Defense must be prepared to—

z Conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of co

across the range of military operations. The magnitude of stability 

operations missions may range from small scale, short duration to 

scale, long duration. 

z Support stability operations activities conducted by other US Gov

departments or agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as “US 

Government agencies”), foreign governments and security forces

international governmental organizations, or when otherwise dire

z Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and c

control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as i

feasible to transition lead responsibility to other US Government 

agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or internationa

governmental organizations.

While stability operations are often considered largely in terms of actio

they have a maritime application as well. The maritime domain, which 

both landward and seaward portions of the littorals, connects the nation

world by carrying 90 percent of the world’s trade and two thirds of its p

The maritime domain is the lifeline of the modern global economy, wh

on free transit through increasingly urbanized littoral regions. Marine C

forces have an important and enduring role in the conduct of stability o

in the littorals. Often task-organized with Navy and Coast Guard force

Corps forces perform a variety of tasks associated with stability operat

both landward and seaward portions of the maritime domain. Example

but are not limited to, nation assistance, maritime security operations, c

terrorism, sanctions enforcement/maritime interception operations, pro

shipping, freedom of navigation and overflight, exclusion zone enforce

Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations, consequenc

management, foreign humanitarian assistance, and peace operations.

Stability operations have occurred with increasing frequency during th

twenty years in such places as Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Somalia, the Phili

Haiti, and Afghanistan, as well as on the high seas in places like the Gu

Aden, the Arabian Sea, Adriatic Sea, and Caribbean Sea. As these exam

illustrate, stability operations are not limited to post-conflict applicatio

may occur across the range of military operations. Conceptually, action
y pg

initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. 

INITIAL RESPONSE 

Initial response encompasses those tasks to stabilize the operational e

in a crisis. During this phase, which normally occurs during or direct

conflict or crisis, the MAGTF performs tasks aimed at providing a sa

environment and attending to the immediate essential service needs o

population. The duration of the first phase can vary. It may be relativ

following a natural disaster or conventional combat. When conducted 

context of counterinsurgency, the initial response may last for years. 

expeditionary nature of the MAGTF, it is very likely that naval forces 

first responders and responsible for setting conditions for the success

accomplishment of national stability campaign objectives and goals. 

TRANSFORMATION

Transformation represents a broad range of post-conflict reconstructi

stabilization, and capacity-building activities. The transformation pha

occur in either crisis or vulnerable states. The desire in this stage is to 

and build enduring capability and capacity in the host nation governm

security forces. As civil security improves, focus expands to include 

development of legitimate governance, provision of essential service

stimulation of economic development. Concurrently and as a result o

expanded focus, stability force relationships develop and strengthen w

nation counterparts and with the local populace.

FOSTERING STABILITY

The third phase encompasses long-term efforts that capitalize on cap

building and reconstruction activities to establish conditions enabling 

development. This phase emphasizes capacity building with the goal 

transitioning responsibility to host nation leadership and security forc

FUNCTIONS

The primary stability operations functions align with the five end stat

and secure environment, rule of law, stable governance, social well-b

sustainable economy—adopted in the Guiding Principles for Stabiliz
py pp

framework for stabilization efforts that stems from the policies, doctrin

training of civilian agencies across the US Government and internation

guiding principles present a series of end states in stabilization, conditi

describing those end states, and approaches to achieving those end stat

functions are—

z Security.

z Foreign humanitarian assistance.

z Economic stabilization and infrastructure.

z Rule of law.

z Governance and participation.

Together, they provide a framework for integration of the instruments o

national power. 

Security 

Security activities seek to protect and control civil populations and terr

friendly, hostile, or neutral. They may be performed as part of a militar

occupation during or after combat, to help defeat an insurgency, or in r

a humanitarian disaster. Security activities seek ultimately to reassure r

compel. They conclude successfully when civil violence is reduced to 

manageable by host nation law enforcement authorities. A safe and sec

environment is one in which the population has the freedom to pursue 

activities without fear of politically motivated, persistent, or large-scale 

Such an environment is characterized by an end to large-scale fighting

adequate level of public order; the subordination of security forces acco

legitimate state authority; the protection of key individuals, communiti

and infrastructure; and the freedom for people and goods to move abou

country and across borders without fear of undue harm. 

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Foreign humanitarian assistance includes programs conducted to meet 

human needs in order to ensure the social well-being of the population

well-being is characterized by equal access to and delivery of basic nee

as water, food, shelter, sanitation, and health services; the provision of 

and secondary education; the return or voluntary resettlement of those 

by violent conflict; and the restoration of a social fabric and communit

Some foreign humanitarian assistance activities are not conducted with

overall context of stability operations. Delivery of foreign humanitaria
y 

society and culture. 

Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure 

The function of economic stabilization and infrastructure includes pr

conducted to ensure an economy exists in which people can pursue o

for livelihoods within the local system of economic governance. A su

economy is characterized by market-based macroeconomic stability, 

the illicit economy and economic-based threats to the peace, develop

market economy, and employment generation. Meeting the needs of h

security—both in terms of the provision of physical security and fore

humanitarian assistance—lays the foundation for the stabilization of 

states. Economic stabilization and development help to consolidate g

human security and enable political solutions. Although security and 

reform remain priorities, early attention to economic growth improve

likelihood of success. Accordingly, while economic measures and rec

are not the panacea for stability, they should constitute a significant c

the solution. Priorities for international agencies and forces include m

designed to stabilize the economy, protect, and reconstruct critical ec

infrastructure, generate employment, and address any underlying eco

drivers of conflict.

Rule of Law 

The rule of law function refers to programs conducted to ensure all in

and institutions, public and private, and the state itself are held accou

law. The rule of law in a country is characterized by just legal framew

order, accountability to the law, access to justice, and a culture of law

Rule of law requires laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enfo

independently adjudicated and that are consistent with international h

principles. It also requires measures to ensure adherence to the princi

supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, 

applying the law, separation of powers, participation in decisionmakin

certainty. Such measures also help to avoid arbitrariness as well as pr

procedural and legal transparency. 

Governance and Participation 

Programs that support governance and participation help people to sh

or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to e

collective benefits and services of the state. Stable governance involv

government that provides essential services and serves as a responsib
p; g

political and legal processes; and a population that can participate in go

through civil society organizations, an independent media, and politica

Stable governance is the mechanism through which basic human needs 

population are largely met, respect for minority rights is assured, confl

managed peacefully through inclusive political processes, and competi

power occurs nonviolently. 
Sustainment Operations

 “Strategy and Tactics will indicate the extent of operations that are proposed, and Log

the means therefor [sic]. . . .” 

—Pure Logistics: The Science of War P

The terms sustainment, logistics, and combat service support are ofte

interchangeably, but there are differences among them. Sustainment 

to ensure combat forces are provided the support required until the m

completed. Logistics is the science of planning and executing the mo

support of forces and is a fundamental element of MAGTF expeditio

operations. Combat service support is the tactical activity that actuall

essential services and supplies to operating forces in theater.

United States Code, Title 10 assigns each Service responsibility for o

training, and equipping forces for employment in the national interes

Commandant is responsible for Marine Corps logistics, ensuring Ma

forces under the combatant command of a combatant commander or 

operational control of a unified, subunified, or joint task force comm

trained, equipped, and prepared logistically to undertake assigned mi

The principal logistic responsibilities of the Marine Corps include—

z Preparing forces and establishing reserves of equipment and sup

effective prosecution of war.

z Planning and executing the expansion and reduction of forces to 

needs of war.

z Preparing budgets for submission through the Department of the 

on input from Marine Corps operating forces.

z Conducting research and development and recommending proc

weapons, equipment, and supplies essential to the fulfillment of 

mission assigned to the Marine Corps.

z Developing, garrisoning, supplying, equipping, and maintaining 

other installations.
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and bases.

z Ensuring supported unified commanders are advised of significan

in Marine Corps logistic support, including base adjustments that 

impact plans and programs.

The Commandant, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ensures the 

Marine Corps—

z Prepares integrated logistic plans, which include assignment of lo

responsibilities.

z Prepares integrated plans for military mobilization.

z Reviews major personnel, materiel, and logistic requirements in r

strategic and logistic plans.

z Reviews the plans and programs of commanders of unified and sp

commands to determine their adequacy, feasibility, and suitability 

performance of assigned missions.

The Commandant tasks Marine Corps commanders with the responsibi

authority to ensure their commands are logistically ready for employm

logistic operations are efficient and effective. This authority is exercise

administrative command channels for routine matters of logistic readin

service planning. Marine Corps component commanders, MAGTF com

and their subordinate commanders exercise the appropriate logistic 

responsibilities and authorities. Operational assignments do not preclud

administrative command responsibilities and obligations.

LEVELS OF LOGISTIC PLANNING

Although the Marine Corps generally focuses on the tactical level of lo

is imperative Marines understand the interaction of all three logistic lev

levels interconnect like sections of a pipeline, tying together logistics a

strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Strategic Logistics

Strategic logistics supports organizing, training, and equipping the forc

applies the national economic base—people, resources, and industry—

fielding the desired operational capabilities. These capabilities include 

Department of Defense; the Military Services; functional component c
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agencies, as necessary or appropriate; and the private sector.

The Marine Corps supporting establishment and Headquarters, Marin

plan and conduct Marine Corps strategic logistics—with the exceptio

aviation-peculiar support, which is planned and conducted by the Ch

Operations, the Navy supporting establishment, and the Navy Reserv

strategic level, the Marine Corps—

z Procures weapons and equipment, except aircraft and aviation o

z Recruits, trains, and assembles forces.

z Establishes bases, stations, and facilities, to include ranges and 

stockpile resources and house, train, and maintain forces.

z Mobilizes forces.

z Oversees and coordinates employment of strategic-level transpo

assets. 

z Regenerates forces.

z Provides command and control to manage the flow of resources 

strategic, to the operational/theater, to the tactical levels, using n

controlled by organizations, such as the Defense Distribution C

the Defense Logistics Agency and the United States Transporta

Command.

Operational Logistics

Operational logistics involves the preparation, movement, and positio

forces and resources in the sequence, timeliness, and readiness-level 

accomplish established operational goals and objectives. It includes t

required to sustain campaigns and major operations. Marine Corps op

logistics orients on force closure, sustainment, reconstitution, and red

of Marine Corps forces in theater. Operational logisticians coordinate 

logisticians at the tactical level to identify and communicate theater s

the strategic source. The focus of operational logistics is to balance th

deployment, employment, and support requirements to maximize the 

effectiveness of the force. Marine Corps operating forces, assisted by 

Headquarters, Marine Corps and the supporting establishment, are res

operational logistics. The Marine Corps component commander cond

operational logistics. In large operations, the Marine Corps componen

commander may establish a logistic support organization to perform 

logistic functions to support tactical logistics in the area of operation
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distribution nodes.

Tactical Logistics

Tactical logistics includes organic unit capabilities and the combat serv

support activities conducted in support of military operations. The goal 

tactical-level logistics is to support maneuver forces in the battlespace.

The MAGTF task-organizes combat service support capabilities to acc

assigned missions. Although no single MAGTF element has all of the l

capabilities to operate independently for extended periods, each elemen

accomplish at least some basic self-support tasks.

The LCE provides general ground logistics to all MAGTF elements, w

ACE possesses logistic capabilities essential for aircraft operations. Th

is able to deploy with accompanying supplies that enable it to conduct 

for 15 to 60 days, but resupply channels and the flow of supplies to sup

MAGTF begin prior to the consumption of the MAGTF’s organic supp

depth discussion on the levels of logistics is found in MCDP 4, and MC

LOGISTIC FUNCTIONS

Seven core logistic capabilities are identified in JP 4-0, Joint Logistics—

maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, health service su

engineering, logistic services, and operational contract support. The M

Corps views contract support as an operational/strategic function. Acco

the Marine Corps categorizes the above core capabilities into six functi

areas—supply, maintenance, distribution/transportation, general engine

health services, and other services. Operational contract support falls u

other services.

LOGISTICS IN JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATION

In joint operations, the Services are normally responsible for providing 

logistics; however, the combatant commander, acting through the comm

the component forces, is responsible for overall logistic coordination. T

combatant commander has the directive authority for logistics for force

area of operations; JP 4-0 explains how the combatant commander is s

responsible for developing and sustaining military effectiveness by esta

logistic structure.
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Service components and to control distribution of support when shor

The most common type of support is single Service logistic support; 

plans may require or direct the use of other types of support, such as 

servicing, cross-servicing, or joint servicing, at the force, theater, Mil

Department, or Department of Defense level.

In multinational operations, logistics is a national responsibility; how

agreements may establish the framework for mutual support. The exc

logistical support between US forces and multinational participants c

significant economies of effort and cost savings. If no appropriate int

agreements exist, combatant commanders cannot provide for or accep

support from allies or coalition forces without direction from the Sec

of Defense.

STRATEGIC LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Organizations enabling the strategic logistic support effort include th

States Transportation Command, Department of Transportation, and 

Logistics Agency.

Strategic Mobility

Strategic mobility includes the ability of the US Armed Forces to dep

expeditionary forces to any region in the world and sustain them for a

across the range of military operations. The strategic mobility triad is 

combination of sealift, airlift, and prepositioning. Table 13-1 highligh

strengths of each component of the strategic lift triad. 

The sea dominates the surface of the globe; hence, for any global pow

power is essential. Lack of modern or developed infrastructure can p

significant problems for military action in the developing world. Man

cannot accommodate deep-draft ships and many airfields in the devel

cannot handle large military transport aircraft. The MEF, as the prem

Table 13-1. Strategic Mobility Strengths.

Closure Speed Flexibility Capability

Sealift X X

Prepositioning X X

Airlift X X
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prepositioning, and airlift.

United States Transportation Command

The United States Transportation Command is the single manager of th

Transportation System. It is also the Secretary of Defense-designated d

process owner charged with “coordination and synchronization” of peo

sustainment cargo throughout the Joint Deployment and Distribution E

providing air, land, and sea transportation and common-user port mana

airports and seaports of debarkation as well as airports and seaports of 

embarkation for Department of Defense across the range of military op

Deployment and distribution operation at the joint level is defined in JP 

Distribution Operations.

Department of Transportation

Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Respo

established the Secretary of Transportation as the federal government l

transportation community. During national defense emergencies, the Se

Transportation has a wide range of delegated responsibilities, including 

management of the Nation’s transportation resources. A more detailed 

Department of Transportation responsibilities appears in JP 4-01, Joint 

for the Defense Transportation System.

Defense Logistics Agency

The Defense Logistics Agency is a strategic- and operational-level log

agency of the Department of Defense. It provides worldwide logistic su

the Military Departments and the combatant commands across the rang

military operations as well as to other Department of Defense compone

federal agencies, foreign governments, or international organizations. I

materiel and supplies to the Military Services and supports their acquis

weapons and other equipment. Such Defense Logistics Agency-level s

begins with joint planning with the Services regarding parts for new w

systems, extends through production, and concludes with the disposal o

either obsolete or at the end of its service life. The Defense Logistics A

provides supply, support, technical, and logistic services to all branche

the military.
OPERATIONAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT

The Marine Corps component commander takes on several additiona

responsibilities when providing operational logistic support.

Marine Corps Component

Assigned or attached Marine Corps forces provide their support requi

priorities to the Marine Corps component commander, who then dete

resources will fulfill the requirements. The Marine Corps component 

develops agreements with other component commanders and particip

component command-level working groups. In some instances, Mari

forces may provide logistical support to other US forces, US Govern

agencies, multinational forces, or groups supported by the United Sta

employment, the Marine Corps component commander concentrates 

z Sustainment sourcing.

z Intratheater transportation asset allocation.

z Facility and base development.

z Host nation support.

z Health services management.

During redeployment, the Marine Corps component commander’s fo

is the reconstitution of Marine Corps forces. The identification of acc

mission costs and material losses is also important to the Marine Cor

component commander.

Organization of MAGTF Logistics

The Marine Corps component commander may employ a short durat

operational logistic organization when the commander believes an op

logistic capability is needed to ensure effective support for deploying 

and the following operational conditions occur:

z Expeditious force closure of a MEF-sized MAGTF and early lin

operational logistic capabilities are required.

z Sequential MPF offloads or backloads are planned or required.
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z The combatant commander or joint force commander has identifi

shortages in planned theater logistic support that will impact the M

mission and operations.

Two key planning factors the Marine Corps component commander sh

consider prior to any decision regarding the formation and deployment 

operational logistic organization are—

z Maximizing reliance on the MAGTF construct and levying requir

theater and common-user logistic support providers (United State

Title 10).

z Minimizing the size, scope, and number of Marine component op

logistic organizations.

Reconstitution

Reconstitution refers to those actions required to restore a unit to a des

of combat effectiveness to meet future mission requirements. Reconstit

Marine Corps forces is the responsibility of the Marine Corps compone

commander. Besides normal support actions, reconstitution may also in

removing the unit from combat, assessing the unit with external assets, 

establishing the chain of command, training the unit for future operatio

establishing unit cohesion.

There are two methods for conducting reconstitution—reorganization a

regeneration.

Reorganization is action taken to shift internal resources within a degra

to increase its level of combat effectiveness. Reorganization is normall

the unit level and does not require extensive external support.

Regeneration reconstitutes a unit through significant replacement of pe

equipment, and supplies in an attempt to restore a unit to full operation

capability as rapidly as possible. When established, the operational log

organization—augmented by the supporting establishment—is respons

executing regeneration operations. When an operational logistic organi

not established, the Marine Corps component commander will plan mo

replacement personnel and equipment from outside the theater.
COMMAND AND CONTROL

Logistic command and control is the means to ensure the effective em

of resources. Effective logistics must match resources to warfighting 

requirements. Since requirements may be unlimited and resources are 

limited, logistic commanders must allocate resources consistent with 

commander’s intent and overall concept of operations.

Command and control of logistics must provide visibility of both cap

and requirements, allowing the commander to make decisions regard

effective allocation of scarce, high-demand resources. Additionally, 

command and control facilitates the integration of logistic activities w

warfighting functions in order to optimize the commander’s time for 

planning, decisionmaking, execution, and assessment. An effective fl

information and directives enables the Marine Corps to manage mate

readiness, mobilization and deployment support, and materiel repleni

the strategic level, the principal agents for dissemination of logistic p

directives, and information are the Deputy Commandant for Installati

Logistics and the Deputy Commandant for Aviation. The Commande

Corps Logistics Command (MARCORLOGCOM) and Commander, 

Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) are principally resp

executing Marine Corps strategic-level ground logistics, while Comm

Naval Air Systems Command executes strategic-level aviation suppo

operational level, the logistic effort enables force closure; establishes 

maintains arrival and assembly areas; and coordinates intratheater air

sustainment needs, and force reconstitution and redeployment require

Marine Corps component G-4s coordinate ground logistic issues with 

subordinate MAGTF G-4/S-4. The Commander, Naval Air Force, Pa

Commander, Naval Air Force, Atlantic deal directly with the MAGTF 

logistic department to assist in resolving aviation logistic requiremen

operations, the principal logistic agent is the J-4.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO MAGTF OPERATIONS

Initially, logistics come from internal Marine Corps/Navy resources l

within the operating forces, Marine Corps Forces Reserve, and the su

establishment. Specific operational requirements dictate the extent to 

additional logistic support comes from other Services, Defense Logis
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mission of the Marine Corps is to ensure MAGTFs are deployable, self

self-sustaining, flexible, and capable of rapid reconstitution. In coordin

cooperation with the Navy, the Marine Corps has made logistical self-s

a central element of MAGTF expeditionary warfighting capabilities.

Maritime Prepositioning Forces

The MPFs provide an added dimension to strategic mobility, readiness

global responsiveness. By prepositioning the bulk of equipment and 30 

supplies for a notional 17,600-troop force aboard specially-designed sh

MPF program reduces MAGTF response time from weeks to days. Inc

in each MPSRON is organizational-level common aviation support equ

and limited intermediate-level support equipment. The ACE deploys w

fly-in support package that, when combined with prepositioned assets o

MPSRON, provides critical aviation support for 30 days of combat ope

While normally associated with MEB employment, supplies and equip

aboard MPSRONs can support other contingencies. Although normally 

offloaded pierside, the maritime prepositioning ships have a limited in-

offload capability.

Aviation Logistics Support Ship

The two aviation logistics support ships—one located on the west coas

on the east coast—are under the administrative control of the Military 

Command. They provide dedicated sealift for movement of the Marine 

logistics squadron’s supplies and equipment and an afloat intermediate 

maintenance activity capability. This task-organized intermediate main

activity repairs aircraft parts and equipment.

Norway Geoprepositioning Program

The Norway Geoprepositioning Program is a capability similar in scop

an MPSRON. The program, established with the Government of Norw

the prepositioning and maintenance of a MEB’s worth of equipment in 

underground storage facilities in Norway.

War Reserve Materiel Support

War reserve materiel includes mission-essential principal end items, sec

items, and munitions required to attain operational objectives in the scen

authorized for sustainability planning and other stockage objectives app

programming in the Defense Planning Guidance. The Department of De
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flexible and provide an expansion capability that can respond to a rang

contingencies while minimizing investment in resources. Authority to 

release of war reserve materiel stocks is limited to specified command

OTHER SUPPORT TO MAGTF OPERATIONS

The supporting establishment and separate field commands are inextr

linked to the operational forces, as they furnish logistics vital to the o

combat readiness and sustainment of the Marine Corps. Although no

Marine Corps, the Navy’s supporting establishment also provides ess

logistics to Marine Corps aviation.

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Logistics is a significant focus of the Marine Corps Combat Develop

Command and is the principal responsibility of the Logistics Integrat

within the Combat Development Directorate.

Marine Corps Systems Command 

Marine Corps Systems Command is responsible for the research, dev

acquisition, and lifecycle management of Marine Corps-funded mate

information systems. It directs Marine Corps-sponsored programs an

the Marine Corps in the development of other Service-sponsored pro

which the Marine Corps participates. Marine Corps Systems Comma

coordinates program interface internally within the Marine Corps and 

with the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, other Serv

Congress, and industry.

Marine Corps Systems Command, in the execution of strategic level 

logistics duties, is primarily focused on equipping the Force. In coord

Marine Corps Combat Development Command and MARCORLOGC

MARCORSYSCOM maintains a focus on product support managem

referred to as system sustainment. To that end, MARCORSYSCOM 

engaged in the following activities:

z Assess and refine requirements for both urgent and deliberate n

z Develop lifecycle management plans for ground equipment.

z Report enterprise-level readiness.

z Analyze ongoing lifecycle of Marine Corps ground equipment t

systems operational effectiveness and sustainment.
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shapes desired ground equipment capabilities through the national econ

to enable and sustain Marine Corps operations.

Marine Corps Logistics Command

Marine Corps Logistics Command’s principal responsibilities include S

level and assigned operational-level supply, maintenance, and distribut

support to maximize Service readiness and increase the combat effectiv

the operating forces. Marine Corps Logistics Command supports opera

level logistic operations through the following activities:

z Equipment sourcing, including principal end item inventory mana

maintenance planning and execution, and storage and distribution

z Prepositioning support, including MPF operations, planning and e

and other planned prepositioned stocks and inventories.

z Logistic services, including planned logistic capabilities develope

response to a specified operating forces operational requirement.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, and Acquisit

provides policy, governance, and oversight to Marine Corps acquisition 

ground equipment.

In order to ensure operational value to the Marine Corps forces, 

MARCORLOGCOM sources capabilities from a wide range of organiz

include military, government, and commercial elements.

At the request of the Marine Corps forces, MARCORLOGCOM is cap

providing a forward-deployed command detachment, which is an organ

option available to the Marine Corps forces. This option is scalable and 

complementary to other operational logistic support providers. During o

MARCORLOGCOM (Forward) attaches to the Marine Corps compon

direct liaison with supported MAGTFs; and leverages its parent organi

MARCORLOGCOM, for continental United States-coordinated suppo

Maintenance centers in Albany, GA, and Barstow, CA, are capable of c

depot-level repairs, rebuilds, and modifications to all Marine Corps gro

combat equipment, combat support equipment, and combat service sup

equipment. The flexibility of the centers also allows for task-organized 

provide rapid responses for equipment modification solutions and forw

positioned maintenance teams.
for inventory management, equipment maintenance, and replacement 

the MPF and the Norway Geoprepositioning Program. Upon request 

Marine Corps forces, Blount Island Command is also prepared to dep

technical assistance advisory team for MPF regeneration operations a

support of MPF offload and backload operations.

Marine Corps Installations Command

Marine Corps Installations Command, planned for initial operational 

2011 and final operational capability in 2012, will consist of a headqu

three subordinate components—Marine Corps Installations East, Mar

Installations West, and Marine Corps Installations Pacific. The missio

Corps Installations Command is to exercise command and control of 

Corps installations regional commanders, establish policies, exercise 

and prioritize resources in order to optimize installation support to th

forces and tenant commands.

Marine Corps bases, stations, and reserve support centers provide the 

infrastructure and facilities that support the operating forces and allow 

a MAGTF. They support force deployments on routine and contingen

operations and provide critical logistics to deploying units from pred

preparation through deployment and reconstitution.

In support of the total force, selected bases and stations are designated 

initial assignment for Marine Corps Reserve mobilization. These desig

stations are responsible for assisting the operating forces with the throu

Marine Corps Reserve personnel and materiel in support of MAGTF d

Department of the Navy Agencies

Selected Department of the Navy agencies support both the Navy and 

Corps. In logistics, the most visible functions are naval aviation mate

and health service support.

The Navy’s logistic effort is divided among the following commands

z Naval Supply Systems Command provides materiel support as w

logistic support without aviation logistic support.

z Naval Air Systems Command provides aviation logistic suppor

oversight of fleet readiness centers.
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shipyards.

z Naval Medical Logistics Command provides the Navy and Marin

with subject matter expertise for medical materiel and procures al

and dental equipment, services, and supplies for naval forces.

z Naval Facilities Engineering Command provides initial outfitting 

chemical, biological, and radiological defense material and equip

overseas shore installations, naval construction force, and naval b

group units.

z Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command provides software s

the fleet logistic programs to automate supply, inventory control, 

maintenance, and financial management.

Naval Logistics Integration

The Secretary of the Navy Instruction 4000.37, Naval Logistics Integra

tion (NLI), is the ongoing effort to improve logistic support to both the 

and the Marine Corps. The goal of naval logistic integration is to estab

integrated naval logistic capability to operate seamlessly, whether afloa

ashore, successfully supporting and sustaining naval operation units in 

environment. Naval logistic integration initiatives currently support afl

The MEU’s use of Navy supply and cargo routing procedures has beco

integral part of their deployed logistic support.
Principles of Joint Operations 

The Marine Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare is ro

long-standing principles of war. These original nine principles: mass

offensive, security, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, 

simplicity—known by the memory aid “MOOSEMUSS”—are part o

principles of joint operations, which includes three principles specifi

to irregular warfare (perseverence, legitimacy, and restraint).

The principles of joint operations are useful aids to a commander as h

how to accomplish his mission. They assist the commander in organi

thinking about his mission, the enemy, the battlespace, and his forces

should not be considered as prescriptive steps or actions that must be 

accomplished, but as tools to plan, execute, and assess operations. Su

application of the principles requires a commander’s judgment, skill, 

experience to adapt to constantly changing conditions and situations. 

principles are explained in the following subparagraphs. 

MASS

Mass refers to the concentration of friendly capabilities at the decisiv

time to achieve decisive results. Commanders mass capabilities to ov

enemy and gain control of the situation. Mass applies to fires, comba

combat service support, and numbers of forces. Proper use of the prin

mass, together with the other principles of war, may achieve decisive 

superiority by a numerically inferior force. The decision to concentra

strict economy and the acceptance of risk elsewhere, particularly in v

lethality of modern weapons that mandate the rapid assembly and spe

dispersal of forces. 

OBJECTIVE

This principle advises the direction of every military operation towar

defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The ultimate military obje

is to defeat the enemy’s forces or destroy his will to fight. The object

operation must contribute quickly and economically to the ultimate o

purpose of the operation. The selection of an objective is based on co

of the ultimate goal, forces available, the level of threat, and the area 
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higher command, his own mission, the tasks he must perform, and the r

them. He considers every contemplated action in light of its direct cont

the objective. He must clearly communicate the overall objective of the 

to his subordinates. 

OFFENSIVE

This principle refers to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. 

action is the decisive form of combat. It is necessary to seize, retain, an

the initiative and to maintain freedom of action. It allows the command

exploit enemy weaknesses, impose his will upon the enemy, and determ

course of the battle. A defensive posture should only be a temporary ex

until the means are available to resume the offensive. Even in the cond

defense, the commander seeks every opportunity to seize the initiative 

offensive action. 

SECURITY

The goal of security is never to permit the enemy to acquire an unexpe

advantage. Security is those measures taken by a military unit, activity

installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, i

effectiveness. Security measures are designed to prevent surprise, ensur

of action, and deny the enemy information about friendly forces, capab

plans. Security is essential to the preservation of combat power across 

of military operations, even in benign environments. However, since ri

inherent condition of war, security does not imply overcautiousness or 

avoidance of calculated risk. In fact, security can often be enhanced by 

maneuver and offensive action, which deny the enemy the chance to in

Adequate security requires an accurate appreciation of enemy capabilit

sufficient security measures, effective reconnaissance, and continuous 

for action. 

ECONOMY OF FORCE

The reciprocal of the principle of mass, economy of force allocates min

essential combat power to secondary efforts. The commander allocates 

minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts, requiring the ac

of prudent risks in selected areas to achieve superiority at the decisive 

location with the main effort. Devoting means to unnecessary efforts or 

means to necessary secondary efforts violates the principles of mass an
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defense, deceptions, or delaying actions. 

MANEUVER

Maneuver is Department of Defense-defined as the employment of fo

operational area through movement in combination with fires to achi

position of advantage with respect to the enemy in order to accompli

mission. Maneuver allows for the distribution or concentration of cap

in support of the commander’s concept of operations. The Marine Co

maneuver warfare philosophy expands the concept of maneuver to in

action in any dimension, whether temporal, psychological, or technol

gain an advantage.

UNITY OF COMMAND

Unity of command requires that, for every objective, there is unity of 

ensured under one responsible commander. Unity of command is bas

designation of a single commander with the authority to direct and co

efforts of all assigned forces in pursuit of a common objective. The g

of command is unity of effort. In joint, multinational, and interagency 

where the commander may not control all elements in his area of ope

seeks cooperation and builds consensus to achieve unity of effort. 

SURPRISE

Striking the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is u

the element of surprise. It is not essential that the enemy be taken una

only that he become aware too late to react effectively. Factors contri

surprise include speed, the use of unexpected forces, operating at nig

and timely intelligence, deception, security, variation in tactics and te

and the use of unfavorable terrain. Surprise can decisively affect the o

battle and may compensate for numerical inferiority. 

SIMPLICITY

Preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensu

understanding follow the principle of simplicity. Plans should be as s

direct as the situation and mission dictate. Direct, simple plans and cl

orders reduce the chance for misunderstanding and confusion and pro

effective execution. In combat, even the simplest plan is usually diffi

execute, though usually the simplest plan is preferred. Multinational 
pgppy, gg, , 

differences complicate military operations. Simple plans and orders mi

confusion inherent in joint, multinational, and interagency operations.

PERSERVERANCE

Ensuring the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end 

requires perseverance. Commanders prepare for measured, protracted m

operations in pursuit of the desired national strategic end state, which e

joint operations may require years to reach. The underlying causes of t

may be elusive, making resolving it and achieving conditions supportin

state difficult. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national g

objectives often is a requirement for success, frequently involving dipl

informational, and economic measures to supplement military efforts. I

the will of the American public, as expressed through their elected offi

advised by expert military judgment, determines the duration and size 

military commitment.

United States military forces’ endurance and commanders’ perseveranc

necessary to accomplish long-term missions. A decisive offensive oper

swiftly create conditions for short-term success; however, protracted st

operations, executed simultaneously with defensive and offensive tasks

needed to achieve the strategic end state.

LEGITIMACY

A legitimate operation develops and maintains the will necessary to att

national strategic end state. For US military forces, legitimacy comes f

important factors—

z First, the operation or campaign must be conducted under US law

z Second, the operation must be conducted according to internationa

treaties recognized by the United States, particularly the law of w

z Third, the campaign or operation should develop or reinforce the 

and acceptance for the host nation government by both the govern

international community. This factor is frequently the decisive ele

Legitimacy is also based on the will of the American people to support 

mission. The American people’s perception of legitimacy is strengthen

obvious national or humanitarian interests are at stake. Their perceptio

depends on their assurance that American lives are not being placed at 

needlessly or carelessly.
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near the operational area, and participating multinational forces. Com

forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host na

government, where applicable. Security actions must balance with th

maintain legitimacy. Commanders must consider all actions potential

competing for strategic and tactical requirements. All actions must ex

fairness in dealing with competing factions where appropriate. Legiti

depends on the level of consent to the force and to the host nation go

the people’s expectations, and the force’s credibility. 

RESTRAINT

In an effort to limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary us

restraint requires careful and disciplined balancing of security, the co

military operations, and the desired strategic end state. Excessive for

antagonizes those friendly and neutral parties involved; hence, it dam

legitimacy of the organization that uses it while potentially enhancing 

legitimacy of any opposing party. The rules of engagement must be c

matched to the strategic end state and the situation. Commanders at a

ensure their personnel are properly trained in rules of engagement an

informed of any changes. Rules of engagement may vary according t

policy concerns, but unit commanders always retain the inherent righ

obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or 

demonstrated hostile intent. 

Restraint is best achieved when rules of engagement issued at the beg

operation address a range of plausible situations. Commanders shoul

consistently review and revise rules of engagement as necessary. Add

commanders should carefully examine them to ensure that the lives a

Marines are not needlessly endangered. National concerns may lead t

rules of engagement for multinational participants; commanders must 

national restrictions imposed on force participants.
Warfighting Functions 

The warfighting functions encompass all military activities performe

battlespace. Warfighting functions are a grouping of like activities in

functional areas that aid in planning and execution of operations. The 

functional areas are command and control, maneuver, fires, intelligen

and force protection. The key advantage of using warfighting functio

allow the commander and his planners to look at all aspects of the bat

not leave anything to chance if it is within their capability to coordin

influence, and synchronize. By integrating the warfighting functions, 

commander can increase the force’s combat power, mass capabilities 

enemy, and aid in the assessment of the operation’s success. As discu

MCDP 1-2, the synchronization of all warfighting functions gives the

maximum impact on accomplishing the desired objective within the 

possible and with minimum casualties. 

Planners consider and integrate the warfighting functions when analy

accomplish the mission, because integrating the warfighting function

achieve focus and unity of effort. Planners think in terms of how each 

supports the accomplishment of the mission; moreover, they conside

coordination of activities not only within each warfighting function, 

among all the warfighting functions. By using warfighting functions 

integration elements, planners ensure all functions are focused towar

purpose. The warfighting functions apply equally to conventional and 

of operations, such as information operations, counterinsurgency, or 

of irregular warfare. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces to accompl

mission. Command and control involves arranging personnel, equipm

and facilities to allow a commander to extend his influence over the f

during the planning and conduct of military operations. Command an

control is the overarching warfighting function that enables all of the 

warfighting functions. 
y ppp

personality, and the will of strong commanders represent a significant p

unit’s combat power. The commander goes where he can best influence 

action; where his moral and physical presence can be felt; and where h

achieve a decision can best be expressed, understood, and acted upon. 

of command and control is on the commander—his intent, guidance, d

and how he receives feedback on the results of his actions. Commande

command while staffs coordinate and make necessary adjustments con

with the commander’s intent. 

Control allows the commander to adjust and modify command action a

based on feedback. Feedback is the basic mechanism of control. It is th

continuous flow of information about the unfolding situation returning 

commander. This information indicates the difference between the goa

situation as it exists. Feedback may come from any direction and in an

intelligence about how the enemy is reacting, information about the sta

subordinate or adjacent units, or revised guidance from above based on 

developments. Accordingly, feedback allows commanders to adapt to c

circumstances—to exploit fleeting opportunities, respond to developin

problems, modify schemes, or redirect efforts. In this way, feedback “c

subsequent command action. Control is not strictly something that seni

on subordinates; rather, the entire system comes “under control” based 

feedback about the changing situation. Command and control is an inte

process involving all the parts of the system and working in all directio

result is a mutually supporting system in which complementary comma

controlling forces interact to ensure the force as a whole can adapt con

to changing requirements. 

MANEUVER

Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area through 

in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect 

enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02) Maneuver allows 

distribution or concentration of capabilities in support of a commander

of operations. The Marine Corps maneuver warfare philosophy expand

concept of maneuver to include taking action in any dimension, whethe

temporal, psychological, or technological, to gain an advantage. 

FIRES

Fires use weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect 

target. Fires harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy in order to accomp
gg jpyp

include the collective and coordinated use of target acquisition system

and indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft of all types, and other lethal 

nonlethal means. Fires are normally used with maneuver and help sh

battlespace, setting conditions for decisive action.

INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence provides the commander with an understanding of the en

battlespace and identifies the enemy’s centers of gravity and critical 

vulnerabilities. It assists the commander in understanding the situatio

to new opportunities, and helps him assess the effects of actions upon 

Intelligence drives operations, is focused on the enemy, and supports 

formulation and subsequent modification of the commander’s estima

situation by providing as accurate an image of the battlespace and the 

possible. It is a dynamic process used to assess the current situation a

or deny the adoption of specific COAs by the enemy. It helps refine t

commander’s understanding of the battlespace and reduces uncertain

LOGISTICS

Logistics encompasses all activities required to move and sustain mil

forces. At the tactical level, logistics is combat service support and in

arming, fueling, maintenance, transportation, supply, general enginee

health services. 

FORCE PROTECTION

Force protection is the measures taken to preserve the force’s potenti

that it can be applied at the appropriate time and place. It includes tho

the force takes to remain viable by protecting itself from the effects o

adversary activities and natural occurrences. Force protection safegua

friendly centers of gravity and protects, conceals, reduces, or elimina

critical vulnerabilities.
Tactical Tasks

The MAGTF tactical tasks may be specified, implied, or essential. Th

actions the commander may take to accomplish his mission. In speci

circumstances, tasks may be modified to meet METT-T requirements

commander must clearly state that he is departing from the standard 

these tasks. One way this can be done is by prefacing the modified ta

statement, “What I mean by [modified task] is . . . .”

Tactical tasks are assigned based on capabilities. The GCE can execu

MAGTF’s tactical tasks. The combat service support element can exe

tactical tasks essential for it to provide sustainment to the MAGTF. T

execute many of the MAGTF’s tactical tasks, but it cannot secure, sei

occupy terrain without augmentation by the GCE. Weather and task d

significantly affect the ACE’s ability to execute assigned tactical task

For additional information on tactical tasks, see JP 1-02; MCRP 5-12

Operational Terms and Graphics; and MCRP 5-12C, Marine Corps 

to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

ENEMY-ORIENTED TACTICAL TASKS

AMBUSH

A surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or tem

halted enemy.

ATTACK BY FIRE

Fires (direct and indirect) destroy the enemy from a distance, normal

when the mission does not require or support occupation of the objec

Note

This task is usually given to the supporting effort during 

offensive operations and as a counterattack option for the 

reserve during defensive operations. The assigning 

commander must specify the intent—destroy, fix, 

neutralize, or suppress.
To deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent enemy advance 

direction or on an avenue of approach. It may be for a specified time. 

Note

Units assigned this task may have to retain terrain.

BREACH

To break through or secure a passage through a natural or enemy obsta

BYPASS

To maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain 

momentum of advance. Previously unreported obstacles and bypassed 

forces are reported to higher headquarters.

CANALIZE

To restrict operations to a narrow zone by the use of existing or reinfor

obstacles or by fires or bombing.

CONTAIN

To stop, hold, or surround enemy forces or to keep the enemy in a give

prevent his withdrawing any part of his forces for use elsewhere.

DEFEAT

To disrupt or nullify the enemy commander’s plan and overcome his w

thus making him unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of a

yield to the friendly commander’s will.

DESTROY

To physically render an enemy force combat ineffective unless it is rec

DISRUPT

To integrate fires and obstacles to break apart an enemy’s formation an

interrupt his timetable, or cause premature commitment or the pieceme

his forces.

EXPLOIT

To take full advantage of success in battle and follow up initial gains, o

actions that usually follow a successful attack and are designed to disor

enemy in-depth.
An offensive action involving contact with the enemy to deceive him 

location or time of the actual main offensive action.

FIX

To prevent the enemy from moving any part of his forces, either from 

location or for a specific period of time, by holding or surrounding th

prevent their withdrawal for use elsewhere.

INTERDICT

An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface mil

potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.

NEUTRALIZE

To render the enemy or his resources ineffective or unusable.

PENETRATE

To break through the enemy’s defense and disrupt his defensive syste

RECONNOITER

To obtain, by visual observation or other methods, information about 

activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy.

RUPTURE

To create a gap in enemy defensive positions quickly.

SUPPORT BY FIRE

A tactical mission in which a force engages the enemy by direct fire t

maneuvering force using overwatch or by establishing a base of fire. 

supporting force does not capture enemy forces or terrain.

FRIENDLY FORCE-ORIENTED TACTICAL TASKS

BREACH

To break through or secure a passage through a natural or friendly ob

COVER

Offensive or defensive actions to protect the force.
To break contact with the enemy and move to a point where the enemy 

observe or engage the unit by direct fire.

DISPLACE

To leave one position and take another. Forces may be displaced latera

concentrate combat power in threatened areas.

EXFILTRATE

The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control.

FOLLOW

The order of movement of combat, combat support, and combat servic

forces in a given combat operation.

GUARD

To protect the main force by fighting to gain time while also observing 

reporting information.

PROTECT

To prevent observation, engagement, or interference with a force or loc

SCREEN

To observe, identify, and report information and only fight in self-prote

TERRAIN-ORIENTED TACTICAL TASKS

CLEAR

To remove enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assig

area, or location by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of 

forces that could interfere with the unit’s ability to accomplish its miss

CONTROL

To maintain physical influence by occupation or range of weapon syste

the activities or access in a defined area.

OCCUPY

To move onto an objective, key terrain, or other manmade or natural te

without opposition and control the entire area.
To secure data about the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic 

characteristics of a particular area.

RETAIN

To occupy and hold a terrain feature to ensure it is free of enemy occ

or use.

SECURE

To gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without fo

prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action. The attacking force m

not have to physically occupy the area.

SEIZE

To clear a designated area and gain control of it.

ENVIRONMENTALLY-ORIENTED TACTICAL TASKS

ASSESS THE POPULATION

To evaluate the situation and attitudes of the civil population inhabiti

of operations; this will likely be an ongoing task that friendly forces u

determine how and to what extent its own or enemy actions or enviro

events are likely to affect the actions of the population.

BUILD/RESTORE INFRASTRUCTURE

To construct, rebuild, or repair local infrastructure (roads, bridges, po

plants, etc.) usually after a natural disaster or after major operations a

complete, in order to win local support/cooperation and/or to support 

force operations.

COORDINATE WITH CIVIL AUTHORITIES

To harmonize military activities with those of other (nonmilitary) gov

agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and national or local host 

nation government entities in order to achieve unity of effort and faci

meeting objectives.

ENABLE CIVIL AUTHORITIES

To support or assist local or national host nation government or other 

entities to effectively govern in their respective jurisdictions or to car

legitimate functions.
To interact with, coordinate with, and influence host nation civil author

members of the local population (with or without official titles) who ca

influence popular attitudes or actions.

INFLUENCE THE POPULATION

To persuade the civil population of the area of operations to support or 

with operations by friendly forces or at least to accept the friendly forc

in the area of operations.

LIAISON WITH CIVIL AUTHORITIES

To maintain communication (including personal contact) with key mem

US Government agencies, host nation government entities, and nongov

organizations to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose or a

TRANSFER TO CIVIL CONTROL

The handover of civil government responsibilities from friendly force m

authorities to civil authorities. Civil authorities may include representat

Government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and/or host na

government entities.
Glossary

SECTION I: ACRONYMS

ACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aviation com

ARG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .amphibious 

CBIRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . chemical and biological incident re

CCIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . commander’s critical information 

COA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . cou

G-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistic

GCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ground com

J-4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistics directorate o

JP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . join

LCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistics com

MAGTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine air-grou

MARCORLOGCOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Logisti

MARCORSYSCOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps System

MARDIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ma

MARFORCOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States Marine Corps Forc

MARFORCYBER . . . . . . . United States Marine Corps Forces, Cyb

MARFORPAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States Marine Corps Fo

MARSOC. . . . United States Marine Corps Forces, Special Operatio

MAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine 

MCDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps doctrina

MCPP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine Corps Plan

MCRP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps referenc

MCWP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine Corps warfightin

MEB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditio

MEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expedi

MEF (Fwd). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary for

METT-T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .mission, enemy, terrain 

troops and support available-t

MEU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine exped

MLG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine lo

MPSRON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . maritime prepositioning sh
g

SPMAGTF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .special purpose Marine air-ground 

US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Un

USCYBERCOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States Cyber 

USSOCOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States Special Operations 
SECTION II: DEFINITIONS

action phase—In amphibious operations, the period of time between 

of the landing forces of the amphibious force in the operational area a

accomplishment of their mission. (JP 1-02)

administrative control—Direction or exercise of authority over sub

other organizations in respect to administration and support, includin

organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, p

management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, m

demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the oper

missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCO

(JP 1-02) 

adversary—A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendl

against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 1-02)

alliance—The relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g.

between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that furt

common interests of the members. (JP 1-02) 

amphibious assault—The principal type of amphibious operation th

establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. (JP 1-02) 

amphibious demonstration—A type of amphibious operation condu

purpose of deceiving the enemy by a show of force with the expectat

deluding the enemy into a course of action unfavorable to him. (JP 1-

amphibious force—An amphibious task force and a landing force to

other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious 

Also called AF. (JP 1-02) 

amphibious operation—A military operation launched from the sea 

amphibious force, embarked in ships or craft with the primary purpos

introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish the assigned missio

amphibious raid—A type of amphibious operation involving swift i

into or temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned w

(JP 1-02) 

amphibious support to other operations—A type of amphibious op

contributes to conflict prevention or crisis mitigation. These may incl

operations such as security cooperation, foreign humanitarian assista
pp, , pp, y p

disaster relief. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-1

amphibious task force—A Navy task organization formed to conduct 

amphibious operations. The amphibious task force, together with the la

force and other forces, constitutes the amphibious force. Also called AT

(JP 1-02) 

amphibious withdrawal—A type of amphibious operation involving 

extraction of forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially 

shore. (JP 1-02) 

antiair warfare—That action required to destroy or reduce to an accep

the enemy air and missile threat. Antiair warfare integrates all offensiv

defensive actions against enemy aircraft, surface-to-air weapons, and th

missiles into a singular, indivisible set of operations. Antiair warfare is 

six functions of Marine aviation. (MCRP 5-12C) 

antiterrorism—Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability o

individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include rapid containment 

military and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)

area defense—A type of defense in which the bulk of the defending fo

disposed in selected tactical localities where the decisive battle is to be 

Principal reliance is placed on the ability of the forces in the defended 

to maintain their positions and to control the terrain between them. The 

used to add depth, to block, or restore the battle position by counteratta

(Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) 

area of influence—A geographical area wherein a commander is direc

capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems 

under the commander’s command or control. (JP 1-02) 

area of interest—That area of concern to the commander, including th

influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to 

objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes are

occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment o

mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02) 

area of operations—An operational area defined by the joint force com

for land and maritime forces. Areas of operations do not typically enco

entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be larg

for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect th

Also called AO. (JP 1-02) 
pyggp

command within which a geographic combatant commander has auth

and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)

area reconnaissance—A directed effort to obtain detailed informatio

concerning the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area such 

ridge line, woods, or other features critical to operations. Air reconna

one of the six functions of Marine aviation. (MCRP 5-12C) 

asymmetry—Unconventional, unexpected, innovative, or disproport

used to gain advantage over an adversary. (MCRP 5-12C) 

attack—An offensive action characterized by coordinated movemen

by fire, conducted to defeat, destroy, or capture the enemy or seize an

key terrain. (Proposed for the next edition of. (MCRP 5-12C) 

avenue of approach—An air or ground route of an attacking force o

size leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path. Also called A

aviation combat element—The core element of a Marine air-ground 

(MAGTF) that is task-organized to conduct aviation operations. The 

combat element (ACE) provides all or a portion of the six functions o

aviation necessary to accomplish the MAGTF’s mission. These funct

antiair warfare, offensive air support, assault support, electronic warf

reconnaissance, and control of aircraft and missiles. The ACE is usua

composed of an aviation unit headquarters and various other aviation 

their detachments. It can vary in size from a small aviation detachme

specifically required aircraft to one or more Marine aircraft wings. In 

multinational environment, the ACE may contain other Service or mu

forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. The ACE itself is not a fo

command. Also called ACE. (MCRP 5-12C)

axis of advance—A line of advance assigned for purposes of control

road or a group of roads, or a designated series of locations, extendin

direction of the enemy. (JP 1-02) 

barrier—A coordinated series of obstacles designed or employed to 

direct, restrict, delay, or stop the movement of an opposing force and 

additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on the opposing f

Barriers can exist naturally, be man-made, or a combination of both. 

battle drill—A critical collective action or task performed by a plato

smaller element without the application of a deliberate decisionmakin

initiated on cue, accomplished with minimal leader orders, and perfo
g(p

MCRP 5-12C.)

battle position—1. In ground operations, a defensive location oriented 

enemy avenue of approach from which a unit may defend. 2. In air ope

airspace coordination area containing firing points for attack helicopter

called BP. (MCRP 5-12C) 

battle rhythm—A deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit a

intended to synchronize current and future operations. (JP 1-02) 

battlespace—The environment, factors, and conditions that must be un

to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the 

This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and frien

forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and th

information environment within the operational areas, areas of interest

of influence. (MCRP 5-12C)

battlespace dominance—The degree of control over the dimensions o

battlespace that enhances friendly freedom of action and denies enemy 

of action. It permits force sustainment and application of power projec

accomplish the full range of potential operational and tactical missions

includes all actions conducted against enemy capabilities to influence f

operations. (MCRP 5-12C) 

boundary—A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of faci

coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, fo

or areas. (JP 1-02) 

breakout—An operation conducted by an encircled force to regain fre

movement or contact with friendly units. It differs from other attacks o

a simultaneous defense in other areas of the perimeter must be maintai

(Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C) 

campaign—A series of related major operations aimed at achieving str

operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02) 

center of gravity—The source of power that provides moral or physica

freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. (JP 1-02) 

close air support—Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft again

targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require de

integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those for

called CAS. (JP 1-02) 
py pjp

enemy forces that pose an immediate or near term threat to the succe

battles or engagements. These military actions are conducted by com

forces and their readily available tactical reserves, using maneuver an

arms. (MCRP 5-12C) 

close reconnaissance—Ground reconnaissance and surveillance cond

area extending forward of the forward edge of the battle area. It is dir

toward determining the location, composition, disposition, capabilitie

activities of enemy committed forces and is primarily conducted by e

combat units. (MCRP 5-12C) 

close support—That action of the supporting force against targets or 

which are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed 

or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or o

of the supported force. (JP 1-02) 

coalition—An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for 

action. (JP 1-02) 

combat air patrol—An aircraft patrol provided over an objective are

protected, the critical area of a combat zone, or in an air defense area

purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they rea

targets. Also called CAP. (JP 1-02) 

combatant command (command authority)—Nontransferable com

authority established by Title 10 (Armed Forces), United States Code

164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatan

unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defens

Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and i

authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of co

over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands 

assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direc

aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary t

accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant comm

(command authority) should be exercised through the commanders o

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised throu

subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional co

commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides fu

to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant comm

considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational co

inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called C

(JP 1-02)
p

combatant commands established by the President. Also called CCDR

combating terrorism—Actions, including antiterrorism and counterte

taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also c

(JP 1-02) 

combat power—The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force 

military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. 

combat service support—The essential capabilities, functions, activit

tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at 

of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but 

limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspec

supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services 

by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accompl

missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activit

levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the ba

Also called CSS. (JP 1-02) 

combined—Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more a

(When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations a

services shall be identified, e.g., combined navies.) (JP 1-02) 

combined arms—1. The full integration of combat arms in such a way 

counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. 2. 

tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by a force to integrate fir

and mobility to produce a desired effect upon the enemy. (MCRP 5-12

combined force—A military force composed of elements of two or mo

nations. (JP 1-02)

command and control—The exercise of authority and direction by a p

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accom

of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through 

arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and p

employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and co

forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also calle

1-02) The means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be d

sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. (MCRP 5-12C) 

command element—The core element of a Marine air-ground task for

(MAGTF) that is the headquarters. The command element is composed 

commander, general or executive and special staff sections, headquarte
qppg

necessary to accomplish the MAGTF’s mission. The command eleme

command and control, intelligence, and other support essential for ef

planning and execution of operations by the other elements of the MA

command element varies in size and composition; and, in a joint or m

environment, it may contain other Service or multinational forces ass

attached to the MAGTF. Also called CE. (MCRP 5-12C)

commander, amphibious task force—The Navy officer designated 

initiating directive as the commander of the amphibious task force. A

CATF. (JP 1-02) 

commander, landing force—The officer designated in the initiating 

the commander of the landing force for an amphibious operation. Als

CLF. (JP 1-02) 

commander’s critical information requirement—An information r

identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely de

making. The two key elements are friendly force information require

priority intelligence requirements. (JP 1-02) Information regarding th

friendly activities and the environment identified by the commander 

maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and fac

timely decisionmaking. The two subcategories are priority intelligenc

requirements and friendly force information requirements. Also calle

(MCRP 5-12C)

commander’s intent—A commander’s clear, concise articulation of 

purpose(s) behind one or more tasks assigned to a subordinate. It is o

parts of every mission statement which guides the exercise of initiativ

absence of instructions. (MCRP 5-12C) 

component—1. One of the subordinate organizations that constitute 

Normally a joint force is organized with a combination of Service an

components. (JP 1-02, part 1 of a 2 part definition)

concept of operations—A verbal or graphic statement that clearly an

expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and 

be done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an 

picture of the operation. Also called commander’s concept or CON

(JP 1-02)

contiguous area of operations—An area of operations where all of 

commander’s subordinate forces’ areas of operation share one or mor

boundaries. (MCRP 5-12A) 
pg p

nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special ope

forces. Also called CF. (JP 1-02) 

counterattack—Attack by part or all of a defending force against an e

attacking force, for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost or c

or destroying enemy advance units, and with the general objective of d

the enemy the attainment of the enemy’s purpose in attacking. In sustai

defensive operations, it is undertaken to restore the battle position and 

at limited objectives. (JP 1-02) 

counterfire—Fire intended to destroy or neutralize enemy weapons. In

counterbattery and countermortar fire. (JP 1-02) 

counterinsurgency—Comprehensive civilian and military efforts take

an insurgency and to address any core grievances. Also called COIN. (

counterintelligence—Information gathered and activities conducted to 

deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligenc

activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of fore

powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terror

activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02) 

counterreconnaissance—All measures taken to prevent hostile observ

force, area, or place. (JP 1-02) 

counterterrorism—Actions taken directly against terrorist networks a

indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inh

to terrorist networks. Also called CT. (JP 1-02) 

cover—1. A type of security operation that protects the force from surp

develops the situation, and gives commanders time and space in which 

to the enemy’s actions. 2. A form of security operation whose primary 

protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and 

information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fir

the main body. 3. Offensive or defensive actions to protect the force. 4. 

from the effects of direct and indirect fire. It can be provided by ditche

river banks, folds in the ground, shell craters, buildings, walls, and emb

(MCRP 5-12C) 

covering force—1. A force operating apart from the main force for the 

of intercepting, engaging, delaying, disorganizing, and deceiving the en

before the enemy can attack the force covered. 2. Any body or detachm
ppy gy 

attack, or defense, or by any combination of these methods. (JP 1-02)

crisis action planning—One of the two types of joint operation plan

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving th

sensitive development of joint operation plans and operation orders f

deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated 

resources in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning is 

actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also calle

(JP 1-02) 

critical vulnerability—An aspect of a center of gravity that, if explo

the most significant damage to an adversary’s ability to resist. A vuln

cannot be critical unless it undermines a key strength. Also called CV

(MCRP 5-12C)

cross-cultural competence—The ability to quickly and accurately c

then appropriately and effectively act, to create the desired effect in a 

complex environment. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of 

MCRP 5-12C.) 

culminating point—The point at which a force no longer has the cap

continue its form of operations, offense or defense. a. In the offense, 

which effectively continuing the attack is no longer possible and the 

consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational 

the defense, the point at which effective counteroffensive action is no 

possible. (JP 1-02) 

decentralized execution—Delegation of execution authority to subo

commanders. (JP 1-02) 

deception operation—A military operation conducted to mislead the 

unit conducting a deception operation may or may not make contact 

enemy. (MCRP 5-12C) 

deep operations—Military actions conducted against enemy capabil

pose a potential threat to friendly forces. These military actions are d

isolate, shape, and dominate the battlespace and influence future oper

(MCRP 5-12C) 

deep reconnaissance—Ground reconnaissance and surveillance cond

commander, landing force’s area of interest. It is directed toward dete

location, composition, disposition, and movement of enemy reinforce

(MCRP 5-12C) 
y y pp

and prevent it from achieving its objectives. (MCRP 5-12C) 

defense in depth—The siting of mutually supporting defense position

to absorb and progressively weaken attack, prevent initial observations 

whole position by the enemy, and to allow the commander to maneuve

reserve. (JP 1-02)

defensive operations—Operations conducted to defeat an enemy attac

time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable to offensive 

stability operations. The three types of defensive operations are area, m

retrograde. (MCRP 5-12C) 

defensive sector—A section assigned to a subordinate commander in w

he is provided the maximum latitude to accomplish assigned tasks in o

conduct defensive operations. (Proposed for inclusion in the next editio

MCRP 5-12C.) 

delay—A form of retrograde in which a force under pressure trades sp

time by slowing the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum dam

enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged. (MCRP 5-

deliberate attack—A fully coordinated operation that is conducted wh

preparation time is available for lengthy reconnaissance, precise planni

rehearsals. Deliberate attacks normally include large volumes of suppo

main and supporting attacks, and deception measures. (MCRP 5-12C) 

deliberate breach—1. The creation of a lane through a minefield or a 

through a barrier or fortification that is systematically planned and carr

(MCRP 5-12C, part 1 of a 2 part definition)

deliberate defense—A defense normally organized when out of conta

enemy or when contact with the enemy is not imminent and time for or

is available. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C

deny—To hinder or prevent the enemy from using terrain, space, perso

supplies, or facilities. (MCRP 5-12C) 

demonstration—1. An attack or show of force on a front where a deci

sought, made with the aim of deceiving the enemy. 2. In military decep

show of force in an area where a decision is not sought, made to deceiv

adversary. It is similar to a feint, but no actual contact with the adversa

intended. (JP 1-02)
pyp

areas. (Excerpt of JP 1-02, part 4 of a 4-part definition.) 

deterrence—The prevention from action by fear of the consequences

is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat o

unacceptable counteraction. (JP 1-02) 

direct support—A mission requiring a force to support another spec

and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request 

assistance. Also called DS. (JP 1-02) 

double envelopment—An offensive maneuver designed to force the 

fight in two or more directions simultaneously to meet the convergin

attack. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) 

economy of force—The allocation of minimum essential combat cap

supporting efforts, with attendant degree of risk, so that combat powe

concentrated on the main effort. Economy of force is used to describe 

of war and a condition of tactical operations; it is not used to describe 

(MCRP 5-12C) 

embarkation phase—In amphibious operations, the phase that enco

orderly assembly of personnel and materiel and their subsequent load

ships and/or aircraft in a sequence designed to meet the requirements 

landing force concept of operations ashore. (JP 1-02) 

encircling force—In pursuit operations, the force that maneuvers to 

flank of the enemy to block its escape so that it can be destroyed betw

direct pressure force and encircling force. This force advances or flie

routes parallel to paralleling the enemy’s line of retreat. If the encircl

cannot out distance the enemy to cut him off, the encircling force ma

enemy’s flank. (MCRP 5-12C) 

end state—The set of required conditions that defines achievement o

commander’s objectives. (JP 1-02) 

envelopment—An offensive maneuver in which the main attacking f

around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure ob

the enemy’s rear. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCR

exclusion zone—A zone established by a sanctioning body to prohib

activities in a specific geographic area. The purpose may be to persua

or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanction

face continued imposition of sanctions, or use or threat of force. (JP 
py py 

specific objective in a foreign country. (JP 1-02) 

expeditionary force—An armed force organized to accomplish a spec

objective in a foreign country. (JP 1-02) 

exploitation—An offensive operation following a successful attack tha

designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. It extends the initial succe

attack by preventing the enemy from disengaging, withdrawing, and 

reestablishing an effective defense. (Proposed for inclusion in the next 

MCRP 5-12C.) 

fires—The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonleth

on a target. (JP 1-02) 

fire support coordination measure—A measure employed by land or 

amphibious commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets a

simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Also called FSC

(JP 1-02) 

flanking attack—An offensive maneuver directed at the flank of an en

(Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) 

fly-in echelon—Airlifted forces and equipment of the Marine air-grou

force and Navy support element plus aircraft and personnel arriving in 

ferry of the aviation combat element. (MCRP 5-12C)

follow-on forces—All enemy ground forces not committed during thei

operations to the contact battle, their command and control installation

logistic and other support provided for sustained operations. (MCRP 5

force continuum—The wide range of possible actions ranging from v

commands to application of deadly force that may be used to gain and 

control of a potentially dangerous situation. (MCRP 5-12C)

force-oriented reconnaissance—A directed effort to find a specific en

quickly and stay with it wherever it moves on the battlefield. (MCRP 5

force protection—Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile action

Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resourc

facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include ac

defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (JP 

Actions or efforts used to safeguard own centers of gravity while prote
ggg y 

protection is one of the six warfighting functions. (MCRP 5-12C)

forcible entry—Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the fa

opposition. (JP 1-02)

foreign humanitarian assistance—Department of Defense activitie

in support of the United States Agency for International Developmen

Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territori

possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or 

Also called FHA. (JP 1-02)

forward edge of the battle area—The foremost limits of a series of 

which ground combat units are deployed, excluding the areas in whic

covering or screening forces are operating, designed to coordinate fir

the positioning of forces, or the maneuver of units. Also called FEBA

frontal attack—An offensive maneuver in which the main action is 

against the front of the enemy forces. (MCRP 5-12C.) 

function—The specific responsibilities assigned by the President and 

of Defense to enable Services to fulfill legally established roles. (MC

functional component command—A command normally, but not n

composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may 

established across the range of military operations to perform particu

operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend ove

time. (JP 1-02) 

general engineering—Those engineering capabilities and activities, 

combat engineering, that modify, maintain, or protect the physical en

Examples include: the construction, repair, maintenance, and operatio

infrastructure, facilities, lines of communications, and bases; terrain m

and repair; and selected explosive hazard activities. Also called GE. 

general support—1. That support which is given to the supported fo

whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. 2. A tactical artil

mission. Also called GS. (JP 1-02) 

governance—The process, systems, institutions, and actors that enab

function. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C

ground combat element—The core element of a Marine air-ground 

(MAGTF) that is task-organized to conduct ground operations. It is u
y gy 

ground unit of any type, to one or more Marine divisions that can be 

independently maneuvered under the direction of the MAGTF comman

includes appropriate ground combat and combat support forces, and in 

multinational environment, it may also contain other Service or multin

forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. The ground combat elemen

not a formal command. Also called GCE. (MCRP 5-12C)

guard—1. A form of security operation whose primary task is to protec

force by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting inform

and to prevent enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the 

by reconnoitering, attacking, defending, and delaying. A guard force n

operates within the range of the main body’s indirect fire weapons. (JP 

1 of a 3 part definition.)

hasty attack—Offensive action conducted when preparation time mus

for speed. Forces readily available are committed immediately to the a

(Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) 

hasty breach—The rapid creation of a route through a minefield, barri

fortification by any expedient method. (Proposed for inclusion in the n

of MCRP 5-12C.) 

hasty crossing—The crossing of an inland water obstacle using crossin

at hand or those readily available and made without pausing for elabor

preparations. Preferably, a hasty crossing is conducted by seizing an in

crossing site. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12

hasty defense—A defense normally organized while in contact with th

or when contact with the enemy is imminent and time for organization 

(Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) 

health service support—All services performed, provided, or arrange

promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-bein

personnel. These services include, but are not limited to, the managem

health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; pr

and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or s

selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blo

management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; com

control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, nutritio

and medical intelligence services. Also called HSS. (JP 1-02) 
p

control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or re

operations a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02) 

host nation—A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of a

and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to trans

its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02) 

infiltration—A form of maneuver in which friendly forces move thr

into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops o

organizations. The movement is made, either by small groups or by i

at extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the e

implies that contact is to be avoided. (Proposed for inclusion in the n

of MCRP 5-12C.) 

information operations—The integrated employment, during milita

operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other li

operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-makin

adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Also 

(JP 1-02) 

initiating directive—An order to a subordinate commander to condu

operations as directed. It is issued by the unified commander, subunif

commander, Service component commander, or joint force command

overall responsibility for the operation. (JP 1-02) 

instruments of national power—All of the means available to the g

in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic

informational and military. (JP 1-02) 

insurgency—The organized use of subversion and violence by a gro

movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing au

Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 1-02) 

intelligence preparation of the battlespace—The analytical method

employed by the Services or joint force component commands to red

uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, time, and terrain. I

preparation of the battlespace supports the individual operations of th

component commands. Also called IPB. (JP 1-02)

interdiction—1. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the en

military surface capability before it can be used effectively against fr
, jpp

activities conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain, or 

as appropriate, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, and cargo. (JP 1-02) 

irregular warfare—A violent struggle among state and non-state acto

legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular war

indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full ran

military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, in

and will. Also called IW. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander—The commander within a un

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsibl

establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper em

of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; plan

coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational mission

be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the aut

necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishin

commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander—A general term applied to a combatant comm

subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to ex

combatant command (command authority) or operational control over 

force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint force land component commander—The commander within a u

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsibl

establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper em

of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces;, p

and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational m

may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given 

authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the e

commander. Also called JFLCC. (JP 1-02) 

joint force maritime component commander—The commander with

unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force res

to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the pro

employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking m

forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations, or 

accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The join

maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to ac

missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also calle

JFMCC. (JP 1-02) 
jppp

within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint tas

responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendati

proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for 

special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating speci

operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be as

joint force special operations component commander is given the aut

necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establish

commander. Also called JFSOCC. (JP 1-02) 

joint task force—A joint force that is constituted and so designated b

Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified comman

existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02) 

kill zone—That part of an ambush site where fire is concentrated to i

and destroy the enemy. (MCRP 5-12C) 

landing force—A Marine Corps or Army task organization formed t

amphibious operations. The landing force, together with the amphibi

force and other forces, constitute the amphibious force. Also called L

landing zone—Any specified zone used for the landing of aircraft. A

LZ. (JP 1-02) 

law of war—That part of international law that regulates the conduct 

hostilities. Also called the law of armed conflict. (JP 1-02) 

line of communications—A route, either land, water, and/or air, that 

operating military force with a base of operations and along which su

military forces move. Also called LOC. (JP 1-02) 

line of operations—1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes 

decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s). 2. A 

line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in rela

enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points relate

and space to an objective(s). Also called LOO. (JP 1-02) 

linkup—An operation wherein two friendly ground forces join toget

hostile area. (MCRP 5-12C) 

littoral—A zone of military operations along a coastline, consisting 

seaward approaches from the open ocean to the shore, which must be 

to support operations ashore, as well as the landward approaches to th

can be supported and defended directly from the sea. (MCRP 5-12C) 
gpg g 

forces. 2. All activities required to move and sustain military forces. Lo

one of the six warfighting functions. (Proposed for inclusion in the nex

MCRP 5-12C.) 

logistics combat element—The core element of a Marine air-ground t

(MAGTF) that is task-organized to provide the combat service support 

to accomplish the MAGTF’s mission. The logistics combat element var

from a small detachment to one or more Marine logistics groups. It pro

supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health servic

variety of other services to the MAGTF. In a joint or multinational env

it may also contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or at

the MAGTF. The logistics combat element itself is not a formal comma

called LCE. (MCRP 5-12C) 

main battle area—That portion of the battlespace in which the comma

conducts close operations to defeat the enemy. Normally, the main batt

extends rearward from the forward edge of the battle area to the rear bo

the command’s subordinate units. (Proposed for inclusion in the next e

MCRP 5-12C.) 

main body—The principal part of a tactical command or formation. It 

include detached elements of the command such as advance guards, fla

and covering forces. (MCRP 5-12C) 

main effort—The designated subordinate unit whose mission at a give

time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted w

preponderance of combat power and is directed against a center of grav

through a critical vulnerability. (MCRP 5-12C) 

major operation—A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, s

conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinate

and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operation

These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordan

common plan and are controlled by a single commander. For noncomb

operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military opera

(JP 1-02) 

maneuver—4. Employment of forces in the operational area through m

in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect 

enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02, part 4 of a 4 part d

The movement of forces for the purpose of gaining an advantage over 

Maneuver is one of the six warfighting functions. (MCRP 5-12C)
gg ppy 

cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions 

turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy ca

(MCRP 5-12C) 

Marine air-ground task force—The Marine Corps’ principal organi

missions across a range of military operations, composed of forces ta

organized under a single commander capable of responding rapidly t

contingency anywhere in the world. The types of forces in the Marin

task force (MAGTF) are functionally grouped into four core elements

command element, an aviation combat element, a ground combat ele

logistics combat element. The four core elements are categories of fo

formal commands. The basic structure of the MAGTF never varies, th

number, size, and type of Marine Corps units comprising each of its f

elements will always be mission dependent. The flexibility of the org

structure allows for one or more subordinate MAGTFs to be assigned

or multinational environment, other Service or multinational forces m

assigned or attached. Also called MAGTF. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine Corps forces—All Marine Corps combat, combat support, a

service support units. These forces are normally task-organized as M

ground task forces or as a Service component under joint force comm

called MARFOR. Note: The Marine Corps forces are formally ident

Fleet Marine Forces in Title 10. (Proposed for inclusion in the next e

MCRP 5-12C.)

Marine Corps operating forces—The Marine Corps forces (formall

as Fleet Marine Forces in Title 10), the Marine Corps Reserve, Marin

security forces at Navy shore activities, Marine Corps special activity 

Marine Corps combat forces not otherwise assigned. (Proposed for in

the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.)

Marine expeditionary brigade—A Marine air-ground task force (M

is constructed around ana reinforced infantry regiment reinforced, a c

Marine aircraft group, and a combat logistics regiment. The Marine e

brigade (MEB), commanded by a general officer, is task-organized to 

requirements of a specific situation. It can function as part of a joint t

as the lead echelon of the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), or alon

in size and composition, and is larger than a Marine expeditionary un

smaller than a MEF. The MEB is capable of conducting missions acr

of military operations. In a joint or multinational environment, it may 

contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to 

Also called MEB. (MCRP 5-12C)
py gg

(MAGTF) and the Marine Corps’ principal warfighting organization, p

for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a perman

command element and normally contains one or more Marine division

aircraft wings, and Marine logistics groups. The Marine expeditionary 

capable of missions across a range of military operations, including am

assault and sustained operations ashore in any environment. It can oper

sea base, a land base, or both. In a joint or multinational environment, i

contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to th

Also called MEF. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine expeditionary force (Forward)—A designated lead echelon 

Marine expeditionary force (MEF), task-organized to meet the requirem

specific situation. A Marine expeditionary force (Forward) varies in siz

composition, and it may be commanded by the MEF commander perso

another designated commander. It may be tasked with preparing for the 

subsequent arrival of the rest of the MEF/joint/multinational forces, an

conduct of other specified tasks, at the discretion of the MEF command

Marine expeditionary force (Forward) may also be a stand-alone Marin

ground task force (MAGTF), task-organized for a mission in which a M

required. In a joint or multinational environment, it may also contain o

Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. Al

MEF (Fwd).

Marine expeditionary unit—A Marine air-ground task force (MAGT

constructed around an infantry battalion reinforced, a composite squad

reinforced, and a task-organized logistics combat element. It normally 

Marine Corps’ forward sea-based deployment requirements. The Marin

expeditionary unit provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis 

and is capable of limited combat operations. In a joint or multinational 

environment, it may contain other Service or multinational forces assig

attached to the MAGTF. Also called MEU. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine logistics group—The logistics combat element (LCE) of the M

expeditionary force (MEF). It is a permanently organized command tas

providing combat service support beyond the organic capabilities of su

units of the MEF. The Marine logistics group (MLG) is normally struc

direct and general support units, which are organized to support a MEF 

possessing one Marine division and one Marine aircraft wing. The ML

also provide smaller task-organized LCEs to support Marine air-ground 

forces smaller than a MEF. Also called MLG. (MCRP 5-12C) 
ppqy

merchant vessels in international waters to enforce sanctions against o

such as those in support of United Nations Security Council Resoluti

prevent the transport of restricted goods. Also called MIO. (JP 1-02) 

maritime prepositioning force—A task organization of units under 

commander formed for the purpose of introducing a Marine air-groun

(MAGTF) and its associated equipment and supplies into a secure are

maritime prepositioning force is composed of a command element, a 

prepositioning ships squadron, a MAGTF, and a Navy support elemen

called MPF. (MCRP 5-12C) 

maritime prepositioning ships squadron—A group of civilian-own

civilian-crewed ships chartered by Military Sealift Command loaded 

prepositioned equipment and 30 days of supplies to support up to a m

prepositioning force Marine air-ground task force. Also called MPSR

(MCRP 5-12C)

measure of effectiveness—A criterion used to assess changes in syst

behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measur

attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation o

Also called MOE. (JP 1-02) 

measure of performance—A criterion used to assess friendly action

to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (JP 1-02) 

military engagement—Routine contact and interaction between indi

elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of anoth

armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies 

trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, 

maintain influence. (JP 1-02) 

mission—1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicate

to be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially 

applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or un

The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular 

(JP 1-02) Tasks assigned by the President to the combatant command

Unified Command Plan. (MCRP 5-12C)

mission type order—1. An order issued to a lower unit that includes 

accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquart

order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be 

accomplished. (JP 1-02)
p

organization of fire and utilization of terrain to seize the initiative from 

enemy. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.)

movement phase—In amphibious operations, the period during which 

elements of the amphibious force move from points of embarkation to 

operational area. This move may be via rehearsal, staging, or rendezvo

The movement phase is completed when the various elements of the am

force arrive at their assigned positions in the operational area. (JP 1-02

movement to contact—A form of the offense designed to develop the 

and to establish or regain contact. (JP 1-02) 

multinational operations—A collective term to describe military acti

conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within 

structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

mutual support—That support which units render each other against a

because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and 

enemy, and their inherent capabilities. (JP 1-02) 

noncombatant—1. An individual in an area of combat operations who 

armed and is not participating in any activity in support of any of the fa

forces involved in combat. 2. An individual, such as chaplain or medic

personnel, whose duties do not involve combat. (MCRP 5-12C) 

noncombatant evacuation operations—Operations directed by the D

of State or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Departm

Defense, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries 

their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to saf

as designated by the Department of State. Also called NEOs. (JP 1-02) 

noncontiguous area of operations—An area of operations where one 

the commander’s subordinate forces’ area of operations do not share a 

boundary. (MCRP 5-12A) 

objective area—A defined geographical area within which is located a

objective to be captured or reached by the military forces. This area is 

competent authority for purposes of command and control. Also called 

 (JP 1-02)

obstacle—Any obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, 

the movement of an opposing force, and to impose additional losses in 
qpppg 

be man-made, or can be a combination of both. (JP 1-02) 

offensive air support—Those air operations conducted against enem

installations, facilities, and personnel to directly assist the attainment 

objectives by the destruction of enemy resources or the isolation of th

military forces. Offensive air support is one of the six functions of M

aviation. (MCRP 5-12C) 

offensive operations—Operations conducted to take the initiative fro

enemy, gain freedom of action, and generate effects to achieve object

four types of offensive operations are movement to contact, attack, ex

and pursuit. (MCRP 5-12C) 

operational area—An overarching term encompassing more descrip

for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Ope

areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of respo

theater of war, theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibiou

area, joint special operations area, and area of operations. Also called 

(JP 1-02) 

operational control—Command authority that may be exercised by c

at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operatio

is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be 

within the command. Operational control is the authority to perform 

functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing 

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating object

giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. O

control includes authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the m

Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects o

operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assign

command. Operational control should be exercised through the comm

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised throu

subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional co

commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to 

commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander 

operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missi

not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or ma

administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also 

OPCON. (JP 1-02) 
pp, 

influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the de

the commander. Also called OE. (JP 1-02) 

operational level of war—The level of war at which campaigns and m

operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic o

within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link ta

strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the st

objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, ini

actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events

operational logistics—The art of applying the military resources avail

operating forces to achieve national military objectives in a theater or a

operations or to facilitate the accomplishment of assigned missions in a 

region, theater, or campaign. At the operational level of war, logistics i

fundamental decisions concerning force deployment and sustainability 

in terms of identifying military requirements, establishing priorities, an

determining allocations necessary to implement the commander’s conc

(MCRP 5-12C) 

operational reach—The distance and duration across which a unit can 

successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 1-02) 

order of battle—The identification, strength, command structure, and 

disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force

called OB; OOB. (JP 1-02) 

passage of lines—An operation in which a force moves forward or rea

through another force’s combat positions with the intention of moving 

of contact with the enemy. A passage may be designated as a forward o

passage of lines. (JP 1-02) 

peace operations—A broad term that encompasses multiagency and 

multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involv

instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflic

the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebu

facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations inclu

peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and c

prevention efforts. Also called PO. (JP 1-02) 

penetration—A form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks t

enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system. (Pro

inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) 
pp

military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the int

capability to assist operations a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02) 

planning phase—In amphibious operations, the phase normally den

period extending from the issuance of the initiating directive up to th

embarkation phase. The planning phase may occur during movement 

other time upon receipt of a new mission or change in the operationa

(JP 1-02) 

power projection—The application of measured, precise offensive m

at a chosen time and place, using maneuver and combined arms again

forces. (MCRP 5-12C) 

principles of war—The most important nonphysical factors that affe

conduct of operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels

principles of war are mass, objective, offensive, security, economy of 

maneuver, unity of command, surprise, and simplicity (Proposed for 

the next edition of MCRP 5-12C) 

procedures—Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform 

tasks. (JP 1-02) 

pursuit—An offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostil

attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it. (Proposed for inc

next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) 

raid—An attack, usually small scale, involving a penetration of host

for a specific purpose other than seizing and holding terrain. It ends w

planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. (Propo

inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) 

rear area—That area extending forward from a command’s rear bou

rear of the area assigned to the command’s subordinate units. This ar

provided primarily for the performance of combat service support fun

(Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) 

rear guard—1. The rearmost elements of an advancing or a withdraw

It has the following functions: to protect the rear of a column from ho

during the withdrawal, to delay the enemy; during the advance, to ke

routes open. 2. Security detachment that a moving ground force detai

to keep it informed and covered. (Proposed for inclusion in the next e

MCRP 5-12C.) 
py ppp

sustainment and to provide security for such actions. (MCRP 5-12C) 

reconnaissance—A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observatio

detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an 

adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrograph

geographic characteristics of a particular area. Also called RECON. (J

reconnaissance in force—A deliberate attack made to obtain informat

locate and test enemy dispositions, strengths, and reactions. It is used w

knowledge of the enemy is vague and there is insufficient time or resou

develop the situation. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of 

MCRP 5-12C.) 

reconstitution—1. Those actions that commanders plan and implemen

units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mis

requirements and available resources. Reconstitution operations includ

regeneration and reorganization. 2. In maritime prepositioning force op

the methodical approach to restore the maritime prepositioned equipme

supplies aboard the maritime prepositioning ships squadron to full mis

capable status. (MCRP 5-12C) 

redeployment—The transfer of forces and materiel to support another 

commander’s operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipm

materiel to the home and/or demobilization stations for reintegration an

processing. (JP 1-02) 

regeneration—Significant replacement of personnel, equipment, and s

an attempt to restore a unit to full operational capability as rapidly as p

(Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) 

rehearsal phase—In amphibious operations, the period during which t

prospective operation is practiced for the purpose of: (1) testing adequa

plans, the timing of detailed operations, and the combat readiness of pa

forces; (2) ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans; and (3) te

communications-information systems. (JP 1-02) 

relief in place—An operation in which, by direction of higher authorit

part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit. The responsib

the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operatio

transferred to the incoming unit. The incoming unit continues the opera

ordered. (JP 1-02) 
g

to increase its level of combat effectiveness. (Proposed for inclusion 

edition of MCRP 5-12C.) 

reserve—1. Portion of a body of troops that is kept to the rear, or wit

action at the beginning of an engagement, in order to be available for 

movement. 2. Members of the Military Services who are not in active 

who are subject to call to active duty. (JP 1-02, parts 1 and 2 of a 3-p

definition)

retirement—An operation in which a force out of contact moves aw

enemy. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.)

retrograde—Any movement or maneuver of a command to the rear, 

from the enemy. (MCRP 5-12C) 

river crossing—A type of gap crossing operation required before gro

power can be projected and sustained across a water obstacle. It is a c

planned and controlled offensive operation that requires the allocatio

crossing means and a force dedicated to the security of the bridgehea

12C) 

role—The broad, enduring purposes for which the Services and the U

Special Operations Command were established forced by Congress in 

United States Code. (MCRP 5-12C)

route reconnaissance—A directed effort to obtain detailed informat

specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence 

along that route. (MCRP 5-12C)

rules of engagement—Directives issued by competent military auth

delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United State

initiate and /or continue combat engagement with other forces encou

called ROE. (JP 1-02)

scheme of maneuver—Description of how arrayed forces will accom

commander’s intent. It is the central expression of the commander’s c

operations and governs the design of supporting plans or annexes. (JP 

screen—1. A security element whose primary task is to observe, iden

report information, and only fight in self-protection. 2. A form of sec

operation that primarily provides early warning to the protected force

(Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.)
gpy, y, pj, 

reemployment of joint power from the sea without reliance on land bas

the operational area. (JP 1-02)

sector—An area designated by boundaries within which a unit operate

which it is responsible. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of 

MCRP 5-12C.) 

security area—The area that begins at the forward edge of the battle a

extends as far to the front and flanks as security forces are deployed, n

the forward boundary of the area of operations. Forces in the security a

conduct reconnaissance to furnish information on the enemy and to del

deceive, and disrupt the enemy. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edi

MCRP 5-12C.) 

security cooperation—All Department of Defense interactions with fo

defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote spec

security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for se

and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime an

contingency access to a host nation. Also called SC. (JP 1-02) 

security force—The detachment deployed between the main body and 

(to the front, flanks, or rear of the main body) tasked with the protectio

main body. The security force may be assigned a screening, guarding, o

mission. (MCRP 5-12C) 

Service component command—A command consisting of the Service 

component commander and all those Service forces, such as individual

detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, incl

support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command or fur

assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (JP 1-02

shaping—The use of lethal and nonlethal activities to influence events 

manner that changes the general condition of war to an advantage. 

(MCRP 5-12C) 

show of force—An operation designed to demonstrate US resolve that 

increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a spe

situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interest

national objectives. (JP 1-02) 

situational awareness—Knowledge and understanding of the current 

that promotes timely, relevant, and accurate assessment of friendly, ene

other operations within the battlespace in order to facilitate decisionma
ppy 

context and relevance of events that are unfolding. (MCRP 5-12C) 

situational understanding—The product of applying analysis and s

relevant information to determine the relationship among the mission

terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available var

facilitate decisionmaking. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition 

MCRP 5-12C.) 

special operations forces—Those Active and Reserve Component fo

Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specific

organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special oper

called SOF. (JP 1-02)

special purpose Marine air-ground task force—A Marine air-groun

(MAGTF) organized, trained, and equipped with narrowly focused ca

is designed to accomplish a specific mission, often of limited scope a

It may be any size, but normally it is a relatively small force—the siz

Marine expeditionary unit or smaller. In a joint or multinational envir

may contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attache

MAGTF. Also called SPMAGTF. (MCRP 5-12C)

spoiling attack—A tactical maneuver employed to seriously impair 

attack while the enemy is in the process of forming or assembling for 

Usually employed by armored units in defense by an attack on enemy 

positions in front of a main line of resistance or battle position. (JP 1

stability operations—An overarching term encompassing various m

missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in 

with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a 

secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emerge

infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02) 

standing operating procedure—A set of instructions covering those 

operations that lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedur

loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered othe

(Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) 

strategic level of war—The level of war at which a nation, often as a 

a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or c

strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses nat

resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish 

and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define lim
y p

develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; a

military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans

strategic mobility—The capability to deploy and sustain military forc

worldwide in support of national strategy. (JP 1-02)

strike—An attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. (J

strong point—A key point in a defensive position, usually strongly for

heavily armed with automatic weapons, around which other positions a

grouped for its protection. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition o

MCRP 5-12C.)

support—1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or 

another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A 

helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, p

supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02) 

supported commander—1. The commander having primary responsib

all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or 

operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning

refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation ord

response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2

context of a support command relationship, the commander who receiv

assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is 

responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands th

assistance required. (JP 1-02) 

supporting commander—1. A commander who provides augmentatio

or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporti

This includes the designated combatant commands and Department of 

agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relatio

commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another comm

force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by t

supported commander. (JP 1-02) 

supporting effort—Designated subordinate unit(s) whose mission is d

directly contribute to the success of the main effort. (MCRP 5-12C) 

supporting establishment—Those personnel, bases, and activities tha

the Marine Corps operating forces. (Proposed for inclusion in the next 

MCRP 5-12C.) 
y

named area of interest or an area and the activities in it to collect inte

required to confirm or deny adversary courses of action or identify ad

critical vulnerabilities and limitations. (Proposed for inclusion in the 

of MCRP 5-12C) 

sustained operations ashore—The employment of Marine Corps fo

for an extended duration. It can occur with or without sustainment fro

Also called SOA. (MCRP 5-12C)

sustainment—The provision of logistics and personnel services requ

maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplish

(JP 1-02) 

tactical combat force—A combat unit, with appropriate combat sup

combat service support assets, that is assigned the mission of defeatin

threats. Also called TCF. (JP 1-02) 

tactical control—Command authority over assigned or attached forc

commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking

limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuv

the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assign

control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be del

and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant comman

control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the 

of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned m

task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

tactical level of war—The level of war at which battles and engagem

planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactic

task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement 

maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the ene

achieve combat objectives. (JP 1-02) 

tactical logistics—The art of sustaining forces in combat. At the tact

war, logistics involves the performance of supply, maintenance, trans

health services, general engineering, and other services with resource

immediately or imminently available. Tactical logistics draws upon r

made available at the operational level and focuses on the provision o

within the force. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 

tactics—The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relat

other. (JP 1-02) 
qppyp

functions, or tasks. (JP 1-02) 

tempo—The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over tim

respect to the enemy. (MCRP 5-12C) 

turning movement—A variation of the envelopment in which the atta

force passes around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions t

objectives deep in the enemy’s rear to force the enemy to abandon his p

divert major forces to meet the threat. (JP 1-02) 

uncertain environment—Operational environment in which host gov

forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intend

conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and popula

intended operational area. (JP 1-02) 

unified action—The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration 

activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military 

to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1-02) 

unity of effort—Coordination and cooperation toward common object

if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or org

the product of successful unified action. (JP 1-02) 

unmanned aircraft system—That system whose components include 

necessary equipment, network, and personnel to control an unmanned 

Also called UAS. (JP 1-02) 

vertical envelopment—A tactical maneuver in which troops, either air

or air-landed, attack the rear and flanks of a force, in effect cutting off 

encircling the force. (JP 1-02) 

warfighting functions—The six mutually supporting military activitie

integrated in the conduct of all military operations (command and cont

force protection, intelligence, logistics, and maneuver. (MCRP 5-12C) 

withdrawal operation—A planned retrograde operation in which a fo

contact disengages from an enemy force and moves in a direction away 

enemy. (JP 1-02) 
gp

which is assigned to a tactical unit; generally applied to offensive act

 (JP 1-02) 

zone reconnaissance—A directed effort to obtain detailed informatio

cerning all routes, obstacles (to include chemical or radiological cont

terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. A zon

connaissance normally is assigned when the enemy situation is vague 

information concerning cross-country trafficability is desired. (MCRP 
References

Federal Statutory Laws

Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Res

Public Law 82-416, Douglas-Mansfield Act of 1952.

Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols,Department of Defense Reor

Act of 1986

United States Code, Title 10, Armed Forces

United States Code, Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure

United States Code, Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse

United States Code, Title 50, War and National Defense

Strategic Guidance and Policies

National Security Strategy 

National Strategy for Homeland Security

Unified Command Plan 

Secretary of Defense Publications

National Defense Strategy

Secretary of Defense Memoranda

Establishment of a Subordinate Unified U.S. Cyber Command Under 

Strategic Command for Military Cyberspace Operations

Global Force Management Implement Guidance (GFMIG)

Defense Planning and Programming Guidance (Publication is classif

SECRET/NOFORN)

Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) (Publication is classifi

SECRET/LIMDIS)
p()

3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reco

(SSIR) Operations

5100.1 Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Com

Department of Defense Instruction (DODI)

3000.05 Stability Operations

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM)

3122.01_ Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, (JOPES), 

(Planning Policies and Procedures)

Joint Publications (JPs)

1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associat

3-0 Joint Operations

3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

3-10 Joint Security Operations in Theater

3-60 Joint Targeting

4-0 Joint Logistics

4-01 Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System

4-09 Distribution Operations

5-0 Joint Operation Planning
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1 Warfighting

1-1 Strategy

1-2 Campaigning

1-3 Tactics

2 Intelligence

3 Expeditionary Operations

4 Logistics

5 Planning

6 Command and Control

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

3-1 Ground Combat Operations

3-33.5 Counterinsurgency

3-40.8 Componency

3-43.3 Marine Air-Ground Task Force Fires

4-1 Logistics Operations

5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process

Marine Corps Reference (MCRPs)

5-12A Operational Terms and Graphics

5-12C Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Di

Military and Associated Terms

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publications (FMFRP)

12-15 Small Wars Manual

Marine Corps Orders (MCOs)

3120.3 The Organization of Marine Air-Ground Tasks Forces
y fpy (pp

(MEU[SOC])

4470.1 Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Deployment and D

Policy (MDDP)

Other Marine Corps Publications

Marine Corps Manual

Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025

Commandant’s Planning Guidance

Navy Publications

Secretary of the Navy Instruction 4000.37, Naval Logistics Integration 

Naval Operations Concept 2010

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Charter of the United Nations

Clancy, Tom, Zinni, General Tony (Retired), and Koltz, Tony, Battle R

York, NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004)

Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Pre

Congressional Testimony of General Colin Powell, US Army, 14 Marc

Department of State. Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstr

Gallula, David, Counterinsurgency Warfare, (Westport, CT: Frederick A

Inc., 1964)

Hart, Sir Basil H. Liddel, Deterrent of Defense: A Fresh Look at the We

Military Position (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960)

Heinl, Robert Debs, Jr., Col., USMC, Retired, Dictionary of Military a

Quotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1966)

Heinl, Robert Debs, Jr., Col., USMC, Retired, Soldiers of the Sea (Balt

MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991)

Kaplan, Robert D., Imperial Grunts, (New York, NY: Random House, 
ygy

Corps Gazette, March 2004

Smith, Holland M., USMC, Retired, and Finch, Percy, Coral and Bra

(Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, 1989

Thorpe, George C., Pure Logistics: The Science of War Preparation (

RI: Naval War College Press, 1997)

Tsouras, Peter G., Warriors’ Words: A Quotation Book: from Sesostri

to Schwarzkopf, 1871 BC to AD 1991 (London, England: Arms and A

Press, 1992)