Safety Evaluation Report

Related to the Operation of 

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2

Docket Number 50-391

Tennessee Valley Authority

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

NUREG-0847

Supplement 27
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Safety Evaluation Report

Related to the Operation of 

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2

Docket Number 50-391

Tennessee Valley Authority

Manuscript Completed: December 2014

Date Published: January 2015

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

NUREG-0847

Supplement 27

iii

ABSTRACT

This report supplements the safety evaluation report (SER), NUREG-0847 (June 1982), with 

respect to the application filed by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), as applicant and 

owner, for a license to operate Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 (Docket No 50-391). 

In its SER and Supplemental SER (SSER) Nos. 1 through 20 issued by the Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation (NRR) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the NRC staff

documented its safety evaluation and determination that WBN Unit 1 met all applicable 

regulations and regulatory guidance. Based on satisfactory findings from all applicable 

inspections, on February 7, 1996, the NRC issued a full-power operating license (OL) to WBN 

Unit 1, authorizing operation up to 100-percent power.

In SSER 21, the NRC staff addressed TVA’s application for a license to operate WBN Unit 2,

and provided information regarding the status of the items remaining to be resolved, which were 

outstanding at the time that TVA deferred construction of WBN Unit 2, and were not evaluated 

and resolved as part of the licensing of WBN Unit 1. SSERs 22 to 26 documented the NRC 

staff’s ongoing evaluation and closure of open items in support of TVA’s application for a license 

to operate WBN Unit 2. 

In this and future SSERs, the NRC staff continues its documentation of its review of open items 

in support of TVA’s application for an operating license for WBN Unit 2. 

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS v

ABBREVIATIONS vii

1 INTRODUCTION AND DISCUSSION 1-1

1.1 Introduction 1-1

1.7 Summary of Outstanding Issues 1-2

1.8 Confirmatory Issues 1-26

1.9 License Conditions 1-26

1.9.1 Flooding License Condition 1-26

1.9.2 Cyber Security License Condition 1-27

1.9.3 Core Operating Limits License Condition 1-27

1.9.4 Electrical Design License Condition 1-27

1.13 Implementation of Corrective Action Programs and Special Programs 1-28

1.13.1 Corrective Action Programs 1-28

1.13.2 Special Programs 1-29

1.14 Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements 1-30

2 SITE CHARACTERISTICS 2-1

2.4 Hydrologic Engineering 2-1

2.4.10 Flooding Protection Requirements 2-1

3 DESIGN CRITERIA 3-1

3.9 Mechanical Systems and Components 3-1

3.9.6 Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves 3-1

3.11 Environmental Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment 3-1

3.11.2 Evaluation 3-1

4 REACTOR 4-1

4.2 Fuel System Design 4-1

4.2.2 Thermal Performance 4-1

6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 6-1

6.1 Engineered Safety Features Material 6-1

6.1.1 Metallic Materials 6-1

7 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS 7-1

7.2 Reactor Trip System 7-1

7.2.1 Description 7-1

7.5 Safety-Related Display Instrumentation 7-3

7.5.2 Post-Accident Monitoring System 7-3

7.5.3 IE Bulletin 79-27 7-4

7.7 Control Systems 7-5

7.7.1 Description 7-5
vi

Page

8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 8-1

8.1 Introduction 8-1

8.2 Offsite (Preferred) Electric Power System 8-2

8.2.2 Analysis 8-2

8.3 Onsite (Standby) Power system 8-3

8.3.1 AC Power System 8-3

9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9-1

9.2 Water Systems 9-1

9.2.1 Essential Raw Cooling Water System 9-1

9.2.2 Component Cooling System 9-1

9.2.5 Ultimate Heat Sink 9-1

10 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM 10-1

10.4 Other Features 10-1

10.4.6 Condensate Cleanup System 10-1

11 RADIOACTIVE WASTE SYSTEM 11-1

11.3 Gaseous Waste Management 11-1

12 RADIATION PROTECTION 12-1

12.5 Dose Assessment 12-1

12.7 NUREG-0737 Items 12-1

12.7.1 Plant Shielding (TMI Action Item II.B.2) 12-1

13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 13-1

13.1 Organizational Structure of Applicant 13-1

13.1.3 Plant Staff Organization 13-1

25 QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION, OPERATIONAL READINESS, AND QUALITY 

ASSURANCE EFFECTIVENESS 25-1

25.9 Program for Maintenance and Preservation of the Licensing Basis for 

Units 1 and 2 25-1

APPENDIX A CHRONOLOGY OF RADIOLOGICAL REVIEW OF WATTS BAR 

NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2, OPERATING LICENSE REVIEW A-1

APPENDIX E PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS TO SSER 27 E-1

APPENDIX Z SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR 

REGULATION REGARDING THE PRESERVICE INSPECTION 

PROGRAM Z-1

APPENDIX HH WATTS BAR UNIT 2 ACTION ITEMS TABLE HH-1
vi

ABBREVIATIONS

ABB ASEA Brown Boveri

ABGTS auxiliary building gas treatment system

AC or ac alternating current

ACR auxiliary control room

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

AFW auxiliary feedwater

ALARA as low as reasonably achievable

ANSI American National Standards Institute

ANS American Nuclear Society

AOO abnormal operational occurrence

AOP abnormal operating procedure

APCSB Auxiliary Power Conversion Systems Branch (of NRR)

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

AST alternative source term

ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials

AV analysis volume

BEACON Westinghouse Best Estimate Analyzer for Core Operations—Nuclear

BHP brake horsepower

BL bulletin

BTP Branch Technical Position

BWR boiling-water reactor

CAP corrective action program

CCP centrifugal charging pump

CCS component cooling system

CET core exit thermocouple

cfm cubic feet per minute

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CI confirmatory issue

Ci curie

CLB current licensing basis

CMEB Chemical Engineering Branch (of NRR)

CO2 carbon dioxide

COMS cold overpressure mitigation system

COT channel operability test

CPU central processor unit

CR control room

CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check

CRDR control room design review

CSST common station service transformer

CST condensate storage tank

CT current transformer

Cv Charpy V-notch

CVCS chemical and volume control system

DBA design basis accident

DC or dc direct current

DCF dose conversion factor
viii

DCN design change notice

DCS distributed control system

DEI dose equivalent iodine-131

DF decontamination factor

DG diesel generator

D/Q deposition factor

DNB departure from nucleate boiling

DNBR departure from nucleate boiling ratio

EAB exclusion area boundary

EAL emergency action level

ECCS emergency core cooling system

EDCR Engineering Document Construction Release

EDG emergency diesel generator

EGTS emergency gas treatment system

EMC electromagnetic compatibility

EMI/RFI electromagnetic interference/radiofrequency interference

EOF emergency operations facility

EOI emergency operating instruction

EOP emergency operating procedure

EPA Environmental Protection Agency or electrical penetration assemblies

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute

EQ environmental qualification

ERCW essential raw cooling water

ERD Electronic Resources Division (Westinghouse)

ERDS emergency response data system

ERFBS electrical raceway fire barrier system

ESF engineered safety feature

FHA fuel handling accident

FHA fire hazard analysis

FM Factory Mutual

FPR fire protection report

FSAR final safety analysis report

FSSD fire safe shutdown

FW feedwater

GA General Atomics

GDC general design criterion/criteria

GL generic letter

gpm gallons per minute

GSI generic safety issue

HDLC high-level data link control

HEPA high efficiency particulate air

HPFP high pressure fire protection

HRCAR high range containment air radiation

HTH high-temperature heat treatment

HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning

Hz hertz

ICC inadequate core cooling

ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection

ICS integrated computer system
ix

IE Office of Inspection and Enforcement

IEB Office of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

IIS in-core instrumentation system

IITA in-core instrumentation thimble assembly

IN Information Notice

IP internet protocol

IPE individual plant examination

IPEEE individual plant examination of external events

IPS intake pumping station

IST inservice testing

JFD joint frequency distribution

kHz kilohertz

kV kilovolt

kVA kilovolt ampere

kW kilowatt

LAR license amendment request

LCP loop calculation processor

LOCA loss-of-coolant accident

LOOP loss-of-offsite power

LPMS loose part monitoring system

LPZ low-population zone

LTOP low-temperature overpressure protection

LWR light-water reactor

MCC motor control center

MCR main control room

MHIF multiple high impedence faults

MI Mineral Insulated

MIC microbiologically induced corrosion

MIL-STD military standard

MOV motor operated valve

MSIV main steam isolation valve

MSLB main steam line break

MSO multiple spurious operation

MTEB Materials Engineering Branch (of NRR)

MTP maintenance and test panel

MVA megavolt-ampere

MWt megawatts thermal

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NGDC New Generation Development and Construction

NPP Nuclear Performance Plan

NP-REP Nuclear Power Radiological Emergency Plan

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

NSSS nuclear steam supply system

NUREG report prepared by NRC staff

OBE operating-basis earthquake
x

ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

OL operating license

OM operation and maintenance

OMA operator manual action

OPC open phase condition

OSG original steam generator

PAD performance analysis and design

PAMS postaccident monitoring system

PARS publicly available records system

PC personal computer

PDR public document room

PER problem evaluation report

PMF probable maximum flood

PORV power-operated relief valve

ppm parts per million

PRT pressurizer relief tank

PSI preservice inspection

PTLR Pressure and Temperature Limits Report

PWR pressurized-water reactor

QA quality assurance

RAI request for additional information

RBPVS reactor building purge ventilation system

RCCA rod cluster control assembly

RCB reactor coolant pressure boundary

RCP reactor cooling pump

RCS reactor coolant system

RCW raw cooling water

RES radiant energy shield

RG Regulatory Guide

RHR residual heat removal

RPM radiation protection manager

RPV reactor pressure vessel

RTD resistance temperature detector

RV reactor vessel

RVI reactor vessel internals

RWST refueling water storage tank

scfm standard cfm

SDD software design description

SDOE Secure Development and Operational Environment

SE safety evaluation

SEC serial-to-ethernet converter

SER safety evaluation report, NUREG-0847, dated June 1982

SFP spent fuel pool

SG steam generator

SIS safety injection system

SP special program

SPM software program manual

SPND self-powered neutron detector

SRS software requirements specification
xi

SPS signal processing system

SRO senior reactor operator

SRP Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800

SSC systems, structures, and components

SSE safe shutdown earthquake

SSER Supplemental SER

Std. Standard

SV safety valve

SysRS System Requirements Specification

TCD thermal conductivity degradation

THR total heat release rate

TI Technical Instruction

TID total integrated dose

TMI Three Mile Island

TPBAR tritium production burnable absorber rod

TS technical specification

TSP test sequence processor

TSTF Technical Specification Task Force

TVA Tennessee Valley Authority

UFSAR Updated FSAR

UHS ultimate heat sink

UL Underwriters Laboratories

V volt

VAC volt alternating current

VDC volt direct current

V&V verification and validation

VCT volume control tank

VPA ventilation and purge air

WBA Web-based ADAMS

WBN Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

WCAP Westinghouse Commercial Atomic Power (report)

WEC Westinghouse Electric Corporation

WINCISE Westinghouse INCore Information, Surveillance, and Engineering system

WO work order

χ/Q atmospheric dispersion estimate

1-1

1 INTRODUCTION AND DISCUSSION

1.1 Introduction

The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN or Watts Bar) is owned by the Tennessee Valley Authority 

(TVA) and is located in southeastern Tennessee approximately 50 miles (80 kilometers) 

northeast of Chattanooga. The facility consists of two Westinghouse-designed four-loop 

pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) within ice condenser containments.

In June 1982, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff (NRC staff) issued safety 

evaluation report (SER), NUREG-0847, “Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of 

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2,” regarding TVA’s application for licenses to operate 

WBN Units 1 and 2. In SER Supplements (SSERs) 1 through 20, the NRC staff concluded that 

WBN Unit 1 met all applicable regulations and regulatory guidance and on February 7, 1996, 

the NRC issued an operating license (OL) to Unit 1. TVA did not complete WBN Unit 2, and the 

NRC did not make conclusions regarding it. 

On March 4, 2009, TVA submitted an updated application in support of its request for an OL for 

WBN Unit 2, pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, 

“Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.”

In SSER 21, the NRC staff provided information regarding the status of the WBN Unit 2 items 

that remain to be resolved, which were outstanding at the time that TVA deferred construction of 

Unit 2, and which were not evaluated and resolved as part of the licensing of WBN Unit 1. In 

SSERs 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26, the NRC staff documented its evaluation and closure of open 

items in support of TVA’s application for a license to operate WBN Unit 2.

In this and future SSERs, the NRC staff will continue the documentation of its evaluation and 

closure of open items in support of TVA’s application.

The format of this document is consistent with the format and scope outlined in the “Standard 

Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR 

[Light-Water Reactor] Edition (NUREG-0800),” dated July 1981 (SRP, NUREG-0800). The 

NRC staff added additional chapters to address the overall assessment of the facility, Nuclear 

Performance Plan issues, and other generic regulatory topics.

Each of the sections and appendices of this supplement is numbered the same as the SER 

section that is being updated, and the discussions are supplementary to, and not in lieu of, the 

discussion in the SER, unless otherwise noted. For example, Appendix E continues to list the 

principal contributors to the SSER. However, the chronology of the safety review 

correspondence previously provided in Appendix A has been discontinued, and a reference is 

provided instead to the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 

(ADAMS) or the Public Document Room (PDR). Public correspondence exchanged between 

the NRC and TVA is available through ADAMS or the PDR. References listed as “not publicly 

available” in the SSER contain proprietary information and have been withheld from public 

disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, “Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for 

Withholding.”

Appendix HH includes an Action Items Table. This table provides a status of all the open items, 

confirmatory issues, and proposed license conditions that must be resolved prior to completion 

of an NRC finding of reasonable assurance on the OL application for WBN Unit 2. The NRC 
1-2

staff will maintain the Action Items Table and revise Appendix HH in future SSERs, and add 

new appendices, as necessary. 

The NRC’s ADAMS is the agency’s official recordkeeping system. ADAMS has the full text of 

regulatory and technical documents and reports written by the NRC, NRC contractors, or NRC 

licensees. Documents include NRC regulatory guides, NUREG-series reports, correspondence, 

inspection reports, and others. These documents are assigned accession numbers and are 

searchable and accessible in ADAMS. Documents are released periodically during the day in 

the ADAMS PUBLIC/Legacy Interface Combined (ADAMS PUBLIC) and Web-based ADAMS 

(WBA) interfaces; they are released once a day in Web-based Publicly Available Records 

System (PARS). These documents in full text can be searched using ADAMS accession 

numbers or specific fields and parameters such as docket number and document dates. 

More information regarding ADAMS and help for accessing documents may be obtained on the 

NRC Public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/faq.html#1.

All WBN documents may be accessed using WBN docket numbers 05000390 and 05000391 for 

Units 1 and 2, respectively.

The WBN Unit 2 Project Manager is Justin C. Poole, who may be contacted by calling 

(301) 415-2048, by e-mail to Justin.Poole@nrc.gov, or by writing to the following address:

Mr. Justin Poole

Mail Stop O-8G9A

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

1.7 Summary of Outstanding Issues

The NRC staff documented its previous review and conclusions regarding the OL application for 

WBN Unit 1 in the SER (NUREG-0847, dated June 1982) and its Supplements 1 through 20. 

Based on these reviews, the NRC staff issued an OL for WBN Unit 1 in 1996. In the SER and 

SSERs 1 through 20, the NRC staff also reviewed and approved certain topics for WBN Unit 2,

though no final conclusions were made regarding an OL for WBN Unit 2. To establish the 

remaining scope and the regulatory framework for the NRC staff’s review of an OL for WBN 

Unit 2, the NRC staff reviewed the SER and SSERs 1 thorough 20. Based on this review, the 

NRC staff identified “resolved” topics (i.e., out of scope for review) and “open” topics (i.e., in 

scope for NRC staff review) for WBN Unit 2. Where it was not clear whether the SER topic 

applied to Unit 2 or not, the NRC staff conservatively identified it as “open” pending further 

evaluation. It should be noted that these were not technical evaluations of each topic; rather, it 

was a status review to determine whether the topic was “open” or “resolved.” The NRC staff 

documented this evaluation in SSER 21 as the baseline for resumption of the review of the OL 

application for Unit 2. Thus, SSER 21 reflects the status of the NRC staff’s review of WBN 

Unit 2 up to 1995. The NRC staff notes that a subsequent, more detailed assessment may find 

some topics conservatively identified in the initial assessment as “open” that should be 

redefined as “closed.” Conversely, the NRC staff notes that there may be circumstances that 

could result in the need to reopen some previously closed topic areas that may have been 

adequately documented and that are considered closed in SSER 21. Such cases will be 

identified by a footnote in future SSERs to document that previous “open” topics have been 

recategorized as “closed” without requiring further review, or vice versa. 
1-3

The SER and SSERs 1 through 20 evaluated the changes to the final safety analysis report 

(FSAR) until Amendment 91. FSAR Amendment 91 was the initial licensing basis for WBN 

Unit 1. At this time, the FSAR was applicable to both Units 1 and 2. As part of its updated OL 

application for WBN Unit 2, TVA split the FSAR Amendment 91 into two separate FSARs for 

WBN Units 1 and 2. TVA has submitted WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 92 through 112 to 

address the “open” topics in support of its OL application for WBN Unit 2. These FSAR 

amendments reflect changes that have occurred since 1995. These FSAR amendments are 

currently under NRC staff review. The NRC staff’s review of these FSAR changes is

documented in SSERs 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27.

Additional general topics (e.g., financial qualifications that were not included in SSER 21, but 

that should be resolved prior to issuance of an OL) are also identified in SSER 22 and 

subsequent supplements.

SSER 21 initially provided the table below documenting the status of each SER topic. The 

relevant document in which the topic was last addressed is shown in parenthesis. This table will 

be maintained in this and future supplements to reflect the updated status of review for each 

topic.

ISSUE STATUS TABLE

Issue Status Section Note

(1) Site Envelope 2

(2) Geography and Demography Resolved (SSER 22) 2.1

(3) Site Location and Description Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

2.1.1 3

(4) Exclusion Area Authority and 

Control

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

2.1.2 3

(5) Population Distribution Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

2.1.3

(6) Conclusions Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

2.1.4

(7) Nearby Industrial, Transportation, 

and Military Facilities

Resolved (SSER 22) 2.2

(8) Transportation Routes Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

2.2.1

(9) Nearby Facilities Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

2.2.2

(10) Conclusions Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

2.2.3

(11) Meteorology Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

2.3

(12) Regional Climatology Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

2.3.1

(13) Local Meteorology Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

2.3.2

(14) Onsite Meteorological 

Measurements Program

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

(SSER 25)

2.3.3
1-4

Issue Status Section Note

(15) Short-Term (Accident) Atmospheric 

Diffusion Estimates

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 22)

2.3.4

(16) Long-Term (Routine) Diffusion 

Estimates

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 22)

2.3.5

(17) Hydrologic Engineering Open (SSER 27) 2.4

(18) Introduction Resolved (SER) 2.4.1

(19) Hydrologic Description Resolved (SER) 2.4.2

(20) Flood Potential Resolved (SER) 2.4.3

(21) Local Intense Precipitation in Plant 

Area

Resolved (SER) 2.4.4 1

(22) Roof Drainage Resolved (SER) 2.4.5 1

(23) Ultimate Heat Sink Resolved (SER) 2.4.6

(24) Groundwater Resolved (SER) 2.4.7 1

(25) Design Basis for Subsurface 

Hydrostatic Loading

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

2.4.8

(26) Transport of Liquid Releases Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

2.4.9 2

(27) Flooding Protection Requirements Open (NRR) (SER)

(SSER 24)

(SSER 27)

2.4.10

(28) Geological, Seismological, and 

Geotechnical Engineering

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 24)

2.5

(29) Geology Resolved (SER) 2.5.1

(30) Seismology Resolved (SER) 2.5.2

(31) Surface Faulting Resolved (SER) 2.5.3

(32) Stability of Subsurface Materials 

and Foundations

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 11)

2.5.4

(33) Stability of Slopes Resolved (SER) 2.5.5

(34) Embankments and Dams Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

2.5.6

(35) References (SER)

(SSER 22)

2.6

(36) Design Criteria - Structures, 

Components, Equipment, and 

Systems

3

(37) Introduction 3.1

(38) Conformance With General Design 

Criteria 

Resolved (SER) 3.1.1

(39) Conformance With Industry Codes 

and Standards

Resolved (SER) 3.1.2

(40) Classification of Structures, 

Systems and Components

Resolved (SSER 14)

(SSER 22)

3.2
1-5

Issue Status Section Note

(41) Seismic Classifications Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 6)

(SSER 8)

3.2.1

(42) System Quality Group Classification Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 6)

(SSER 7)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 22)

3.2.2

(43) Wind and Tornado Loadings 3.3

(44) Wind Loading Resolved (SER) 3.3.1

(45) Tornado Loading Resolved (SER) 3.3.2

(46) Flood Level (Flood) Design 3.4

(47) Flood Protection Resolved (SER) 3.4.1

(48) Missile Protection 3.5

(49) Missile Selection and Description Resolved (SER)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 22)

3.5.1

(50) Structures, Systems, and 

Components to be Protected from 

Externally Generated Missiles

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 22)

3.5.2

(51) Barrier Design Procedures Resolved (SER) 3.5.3

(52) Protection Against the Dynamic 

Effects Associated with the 

Postulated Rupture of Piping

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 6)

(SSER 11)

3.6

(53) Plant Design for Protection Against 

Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid 

System Outside Containment

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 22)

3.6.1

(54) Determination of Break Locations 

and Dynamic Effects Associated 

with the Postulated Rupture of 

Piping

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 22)

3.6.2 3

(55) Leak-Before-Break Evaluation 

Procedures

Resolved (SSER 5)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 22)

(SSER 24)

3.6.3

(56) Seismic Design Resolved (SER)

(SSER 6)

3.7 2

(57) Seismic Input Resolved (SER)

(SSER 6)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 16)

3.7.1 2
1-6

Issue Status Section Note

(58) Seismic Analysis Resolved (SER)

(SSER 6)

(SSER 8)

(SSER 11)

(SSER 16)

3.7.2 2

(59) Seismic Subsystem Analysis Resolved (SER)

(SSER 6)

(SSER 7)

(SSER 8)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 22)

3.7.3

(60) Seismic Instrumentation Resolved (SER) 3.7.4 1

(61) Design of Seismic Category I 

Structures

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 9)

3.8 2

(62) Steel Containment Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

3.8.1

(63) Concrete and Structural Steel 

Internal Structures

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 7)

3.8.2

(64) Other Seismic Category I Structures Open (NRR) (SER)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 16)

3.8.3

(65) Foundations Resolved (SER) 3.8.4

(66) Mechanical Systems and 

Components

Resolved (SER) 3.9

(67) Special Topics for Mechanical 

Components

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 6)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 22)

3.9.1

(68) Dynamic Testing and Analysis of 

Systems, Components, and 

Equipment

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 22)

3.9.2

(69) ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 

Components, Component 

Structures, and Core Support 

Structures

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 6)

(SSER 7)

(SSER 8)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 22)

3.9.3

(70) Control Rod Drive Systems Resolved (SER) 3.9.4

(71) Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

(SSER 26)

3.9.5
1-7

Issue Status Section Note

(72) Inservice Testing of Pumps and 

Valves

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 18)

(SSER 20)

(SSER 22)

(SSER 27)

3.9.6

(73) Seismic and Dynamic Qualification 

of Seismic Category I Mechanical 

and Electrical Equipment

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 1)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 6)

(SSER 8)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 23)

3.10

(74) Environmental Qualification of 

Mechanical and Electrical 

Equipment

Resolved (SSER 15)

(SSER 22)

(SSER 27)

3.11

(75) Threaded Fasteners — ASME Code 

Class 1, 2, and 3

Resolved (SSER 22) 3.13

(76) Reactor 4

(77) Introduction (SER)

(SSER 23)

4.1

(78) Fuel System Design Resolved (SSER 23)

(SSER 27)

4.2

(79) Description Resolved (SER)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 23)

4.2.1

(80) Thermal Performance Resolved (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 23)

(SSER 27)

4.2.2

(81) Mechanical Performance Resolved (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 23)

4.2.3

(82) Surveillance Resolved (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 23)

4.2.4

(83) Fuel Design Considerations Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

4.2.5

(84) Nuclear Design Resolved (SSER 23) 4.3

(85) Design Basis Resolved (SER)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 23)

4.3.1
1-8

Issue Status Section Note

(86) Design Description Resolved (SER)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 23)

4.3.2

(87) Analytical Methods Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

4.3.3

(88) Summary of Evaluation Findings Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

4.3.4

(89) Thermal-Hydraulic Design Resolved (SSER 23) 4.4

(90) Performance in Safety Criteria Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

4.4.1

(91) Design Bases Resolved (SER)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 23)

4.4.2

(92) Thermal-Hydraulic Design

Methodology

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 6)

(SSER 8)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 16)

SE dated 

6/13/89

(SSER 23)

4.4.3

(93) Operating Abnormalities Resolved (SER)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 23)

4.4.4

(94) Loose Parts Monitoring System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 23)

4.4.5

(95) Thermal-Hydraulic Comparison Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

4.4.6

(96) N-1 Loop Operation Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

4.4.7

(97) Instrumentation for Inadequate Core 

Cooling Detection (TMI Action Item 

II.F.2)

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 23)

(SSER 27)

4.4.8

(98) Summary and Conclusion Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

(SSER 25)

4.4.9

(99) Reactor Materials 4.5

(100) Control Rod Drive Structural 

Materials

Resolved (SER) 4.5.1 1

(101) Reactor Internals and Core Support 

Materials

Resolved (SER) 4.5.2

(102) Functional Design of Reactivity 

Control Systems

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

4.6
1-9

Issue Status Section Note

(103) Reactor Coolant System and 

Connected Systems

5

(104) Summary Description Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 6)

5.1 2

(105) Integrity of Reactor Coolant 

Pressure Boundary

5.2

(106) Compliance with Codes and Code 

Cases

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

5.2.1

(107) Overpressurization Protection Resolved (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 24)

5.2.2

(108) Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 

Materials

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

5.2.3

(109) Reactor Coolant System Pressure 

Boundary Inservice Inspection and 

Testing

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 23)

5.2.4

(110) Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 

Leakage Detection

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 11)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 22)

5.2.5

(111) Reactor Vessel 5.3

(112) Reactor Vessel Materials Resolved (SER)

(SSER 11)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 22)

(SSER 25)

5.3.1

(113) Pressure-Temperature Limits Resolved (SER)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 22)

(SSER 25)

5.3.2

(114) Reactor Vessel Integrity Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

5.3.3

(115) Component and Subsystem Design 5.4

(116) Reactor Coolant Pumps Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

5.4.1 2

(117) Steam Generators Resolved (SER)

(SSER 1)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 22)

5.4.2
1-10

Issue Status Section Note

(118) Residual Heat Removal System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 11)

(SSER 23)

5.4.3

(119) Pressurizer Relief Tank Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

5.4.4

(120) Reactor Coolant System Vents 

(TMI Action Item II.B.1)

Open 

(Inspection)

(SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 23)

5.4.5

(121) Engineered Safety Features 6

(122) Engineered Safety Feature 

Materials

6.1

(123) Metallic Materials Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

(SSER 27)

6.1.1

(124) Organic Materials Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

6.1.2

(125) Postaccident Emergency Cooling 

Water Chemistry

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

6.1.3

(126) Containment Systems 6.2

(127) Containment Functional Design Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 7)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 22)

6.2.1

(128) Containment Heat Removal 

Systems

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 7)

(SSER 22)

6.2.2

(129) Secondary Containment Functional 

Design

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 18)

(SSER 22)

6.2.3

(130) Containment Isolation Systems Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 7)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 22)

6.2.4

(131) Combustible Gas Control Systems Resolved (SER)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 8)

(SSER 22)

6.2.5
1-11

Issue Status Section Note

(132) Containment Leakage Testing Resolved (SER)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 19)

(SSER 22)

(SSER 26)

6.2.6

(133) Fracture Prevention of Containment 

Pressure Boundary

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 23)

6.2.7 1

(134) Emergency Core Cooling System Resolved (SER) 6.3 1

(135) System Design Open (NRR) (SER)

(SSER 6)

(SSER 7)

(SSER 11)

6.3.1

(136) Evaluation Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

6.3.2 1

(137) Testing Open (NRR) (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 9)

6.3.3

(138) Performance Evaluation Resolved (SER) 6.3.4

(139) Conclusions Open (NRR) (SER) 6.3.5

(140) Control Room Habitability Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 11)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 18

(SSER 22)

6.4

(141) Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) 

Filter Systems

6.5

(142) ESF Atmosphere Cleanup System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 22)

6.5.1

(143) Fission Product Cleanup System Resolved (SER) 6.5.2 1

(144) Fission Product Control System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

(SSER 26)

6.5.3

(145) Ice Condenser as a Fission Product 

Cleanup System

Resolved (SER) 6.5.4 1

(146) Inservice Inspection of Class 2 and 

3 Components

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 23)

6.6

(147) Instrumentation and Controls 7

(148) Introduction 7.1

(149) General Resolved (SER)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 23)

7.1.1
1-12

Issue Status Section Note

(150) Comparison with Other Plants Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.1.2 1

(151) Design Criteria Resolved (SER)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 23)

7.1.3

(152) Reactor Trip System Resolved (SER) 7.2

(153) System Description Resolved (SER)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 23)

(SSER 27)

7.2.1

(154) Manual Trip Switches Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.2.2 1

(155) Testing of Reactor Trip Breaker 

Shunt Coils

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.2.3 1

(156) Anticipatory Trips Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.2.4

(157) Steam Generator Water Level Trip Resolved (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 23)

7.2.5

(158) Conclusions Resolved (SER)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 23)

7.2.6

(159) Engineered Safety Features System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 13)

7.3

(160) System Description Resolved (SER)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 23)

7.3.1

(161) Containment Sump Level 

Measurement

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 23)

7.3.2

(162) Auxiliary Feedwater Initiation and 

Control

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.3.3 1

(163) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.3.4

(164) IE Bulletin 80-06 Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 23)

7.3.5

(165) Conclusions Resolved (SER)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 23)

7.3.6

(166) Systems Required for Safe 

Shutdown

7.4

(167) System Description Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.4.1
1-13

Issue Status Section Note

(168) Safe Shutdown from Auxiliary 

Control Room

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 7)

(SSER 23)

7.4.2

(169) Conclusions Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.4.3

(170) Safety-Related Display 

Instrumentation

7.5

(171) Display Systems Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.5.1

(172) Postaccident Monitoring System Open 

(Inspection)

(SER)

(SSER 7)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 23)

(SSER 25)

(SSER 27)

7.5.2

(173) IE Bulletin 79-27 Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

(SSER 27)

7.5.3

(174) Conclusions Open 

(Inspection)

(SER) 7.5.4

(175) All Other Systems Required for 

Safety

7.6

(176) Loose Part Monitoring System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

(SSER 24)

7.6.1

(177) Residual Heat Removal System 

Bypass Valves

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.6.2

(178) Upper Head Injection Manual 

Control

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.6.3

(179) Protection Against Spurious 

Actuation of Motor-Operated Valves

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.6.4

(180) Overpressure Protection during Low 

Temperature Operation

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 23)

7.6.5

(181) Valve Power Lockout Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.6.6

(182) Cold Leg Accumulator Valve 

Interlocks and Position Indication

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.6.7

(183) Automatic Switchover From 

Injection to Recirculation Mode

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.6.8

(184) Conclusions Resolved (SER)

(SSER 4)

7.6.9

(185) Control Systems Not Required for 

Safety

7.7
1-14

Issue Status Section Note

(186) System Description Open (NRR) (SER)

(SSER 23)

(SSER 24)

(SSER 25)

(SSER 27)

7.7.1

(187) Safety System Status Monitoring 

System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 7)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 23)

7.7.2

(188) Volume Control Tank Level Control 

System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.7.3

(189) Pressurizer and Steam Generator 

Overfill

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.7.4

(190) IE Information Notice 79-22 Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.7.5

(191) Multiple Control System Failures Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.7.6

(192) Conclusions Resolved (SER) 7.7.7

(193) Anticipated Transient Without 

Scram Mitigation System Actuation 

Circuitry (AMSAC)

Resolved (SSER 9)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 23)

7.7.8

(194) NUREG-0737 Items Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.8

(195) Relief and Safety Valve Position 

Indication (TMI Action Item II.D.3)

Open 

(Inspection)

(SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 23)

7.8.1

(196) Auxiliary Feedwater System 

Initiation and Flow Indication (TMI 

Action Item II.E.1.2)

Open 

(Inspection)

(SER)

(SSER 23)

7.8.2

(197) Proportional Integral Derivative 

Control Modification (TMI Action 

Item II.K.3.9)

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.8.3

(198) Proposed Anticipatory Trip 

Modification (TMI Action Item 

II.K.3.10)

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 23)

7.8.4

(199) Confirm Existence of Anticipatory 

Reactor Trip Upon Turbine Trip (TMI 

Action Item II.K.3.12)

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

7.8.5

(200) Data Communication Systems (SSER 23) 7.9

(201) Electric Power Systems 8

(202) General Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

(SSER 24)

(SSER 27)

8.1

(203) Offsite Power System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

8.2
1-15

Issue Status Section Note

(204) Compliance with GDC 5 Resolved (SER)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 22)

8.2.1

(205) Compliance with GDC 17 Resolved (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 15

(SSER 22)

(SSER 27)

8.2.2

(206) Compliance with GDC 18 Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

8.2.3

(207) Evaluation Findings Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

8.2.4

(208) Onsite Power Systems Resolved (SER)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 19)

(SSER 22)

8.3

(209) Onsite AC Power System 

Compliance with GDC 17

Open (NRR) (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 7)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 18)

(SSER 20)

(SSER 22)

(SSER 27)

8.3.1

(210) Onsite DC System Compliance with 

GDC 17

Open (NRR) (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 22)

8.3.2

(211) Common Electrical Features and 

Requirements

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 7)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 22)

8.3.3
1-16

Issue Status Section Note

(212) Evaluation Findings Open (NRR) (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 7)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 22)

8.3.4

(213) Station Blackout Open (NRR) (SSER 22) 8.4

(214) Auxiliary Systems Resolved (SER)

(SSER 10)

9

(215) Fuel Storage Facility 9.1

(216) New-Fuel Storage Resolved (SER) 9.1.1 1

(217) Spent-Fuel Storage Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 22)

9.1.2

(218) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and 

Cleanup System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 11)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 23)

(SSER 26)

9.1.3

(219) Fuel-Handling System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 22)

(SSER 24)

9.1.4

(220) Water Systems 9.2

(221) Essential Raw Cooling Water and 

Raw Cooling Water System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 18)

(SSER 23)

(SSER 27)

9.2.1

(222) Component Cooling System 

(Reactor Auxiliaries Cooling Water 

System)

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 23)

(SSER 27)

9.2.2

(223) Demineralized Water Makeup 

System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

9.2.3

(224) Potable and Sanitary Water 

Systems

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 22)

9.2.4

(225) Ultimate Heat Sink Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

(SSER 27)

9.2.5
1-17

Issue Status Section Note

(226) Condensate Storage Facilities Resolved (SER)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 22)

9.2.6

(227) Process Auxiliaries 9.3

(228) Compressed Air System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

9.3.1 1

(229) Process Sampling System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 24)

9.3.2

(230) Equipment and Floor Drainage 

System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

9.3.3 3

(231) Chemical and Volume Control 

System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

9.3.4 3

(232) Heat Tracing (SSER 22) 9.3.8

(233) Heating, Ventilation, and Air 

Conditioning Systems

9.4

(234) Control Room Area Ventilation 

System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 22)

9.4.1

(235) Fuel-Handling Area Ventilation 

System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

9.4.2

(236) Auxiliary Building and Radwaste 

Area Ventilation System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

9.4.3

(237) Turbine Building Area Ventilation 

System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

9.4.4

(238) Engineered Safety Features 

Ventilation System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 11)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 19)

(SSER 22)

9.4.5

(239) Reactor Building Purge Ventilation 

System

(SSER 22) 9.4.6

(240) Containment Air Cooling System (SSER 22) 9.4.7

(241) Condensate Demineralizer Waste 

Evaporator Building Environmental 

Control System

(SSER 22) 9.4.8

(242) Other Auxiliary Systems 9.5

(243) Fire Protection Resolved (SER)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 18)

(SSER 19)

(SSER 26)

9.5.1 3
1-18

Issue Status Section Note

(244) Communications System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

9.5.2 1

(245) Lighting System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

9.5.3

(246) Emergency Diesel Engine Fuel Oil 

Storage and Transfer System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 11)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 22)

9.5.4 2

(247) Emergency Diesel Engine Cooling 

Water System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 11)

9.5.5 1

(248) Emergency Diesel Engine Starting 

Systems

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 22)

9.5.6 2

(249) Emergency Diesel Engine 

Lubricating Oil System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 22)

9.5.7 2

(250) Emergency Diesel Engine 

Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust 

System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 22)

9.5.8 2

(251) Steam and Power Conversion 

System

10

(252) Summary Description Resolved (SER) 10.1

(253) Turbine Generator Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

10.2

(254) Turbine Generator Design Resolved (SER)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 22)

10.2.1

(255) Turbine Disc Integrity Resolved (SER)

(SSER 23)

10.2.2

(256) Main Steam Supply System Resolved (SER) 10.3

(257) Main Steam Supply System (Up to 

and Including the Main Steam 

Isolation Valves)

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 19)

(SSER 22)

10.3.1

(258) Main Steam Supply System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

10.3.2 2

(259) Steam and Feedwater System 

Materials

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

10.3.3

(260) Secondary Water Chemistry Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 22)

10.3.4

(261) Other Features 10.4
1-19

Issue Status Section Note

(262) Main Condenser Resolved (SER)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 22)

10.4.1

(263) Main Condenser Evacuation System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

10.4.2

(264) Turbine Gland Sealing System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

10.4.3

(265) Turbine Bypass System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 22)

10.4.4

(266) Condenser Circulating Water 

System

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

10.4.5

(267) Condensate Cleanup System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

(SSER 27)

10.4.6

(268) Condensate and Feedwater 

Systems

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 22)

10.4.7

(269) Steam Generator Blowdown System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

(SSER 24)

10.4.8

(270) Auxiliary Feedwater System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 23)

(SSER 24)

10.4.9

(271) Heater Drains and Vents Resolved (SSER 22) 10.4.10

(272) Steam Generator Wet Layup 

System

Resolved (SSER 22) 10.4.11

(273) Radioactive Waste Management 11

(274) Summary Description Resolved (SER)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 24)

11.1 2

(275) Liquid Waste Management Resolved (SER)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 24)

11.2

(276) Gaseous Waste Management Resolved (SER)

(SSER 8)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 24)

(SSER 25)

(SSER 27)

11.3

(277) Solid Waste Management System Resolved (SER)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 24)

11.4

(278) Process and Effluent Radiological 

Monitoring and Sampling Systems

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 20)

(SSER 24)

11.5
1-20

Issue Status Section Note

(279) Evaluation Findings Resolved (SER)

(SSER 8)

(SSER 16)

11.6

(280) NUREG-0737 Items Open (NRR) (SER) 11.7

(281) Wide-Range Noble Gas, Iodine, and 

Particulate Effluent Monitors (TMI 

Action Items II.F.1(1) and II.F.1(2))

Open 

(Inspection)

(SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 6)

11.7.1

(282) Primary Coolant Outside 

Containment (TMI Action item 

III.D.1.1)

Open (NRR) (SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 6)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 16)

11.7.2

(283) Radiation Protection 12

(284) General Resolved (SER)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 24)

12.1

(285) Ensuring that Occupational 

Radiation Doses Are As Low As 

Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 24)

12.2 2

(286) Radiation Sources Resolved (SER)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 24)

12.3

(287) Radiation Protection Design 

Features

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 18)

(SSER 24)

(SSER 26)

12.4

(288) Dose Assessment Resolved (SER)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 24)

(SSER 27)

12.5

(289) Health Physics Program Resolved (SER)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 24)

(SSER 26)

12.6

(290) NUREG-0737 Items 12.7

(291) Plant Shielding

(TMI Action Item II.B.2)

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 24)

(SSER 27)

12.7.1

(292) High Range In-Containment Monitor 

(TMI Action Item II.F.1.(3))

Open (NRR) (SER)

(SSER 5)

12.7.2

(293) In-Plant Radioiodine Monitor (TMI 

Action Item II.D.3.3)

Open (NRR) (SER)

(SSER 16)

12.7.3

(294) Conduct of Operations 13
1-21

Issue Status Section Note

(295) Organization Structure of the 

Applicant

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 22)

13.1

(296) Management and Technical 

Organization

Resolved (SER) 13.1.1

(297) Corporate Organization and 

Technical Support

Resolved (SER) 13.1.2

(298) Plant Staff Organization Resolved (SER)

(SSER 8)

(SSER 22)

(SSER 25)

(SSER 27)

13.1.3

(299) Training 13.2

(300) Licensed Operator Training 

Program

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 22)

13.2.1

(301) Training for Non-licensed Personnel Resolved (SER) 13.2.2

(302) Emergency Preparedness 

Evaluation

13.3

(303) Introduction Open (NRR) (SER)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 20)

13.3.1

(304) Evaluation of the Emergency Plan Open (NRR) (SER)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 20)

(SSER 22)

13.3.2

(305) Conclusions Open (NRR) (SER)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 20)

(SSER 22)

13.3.3

(306) Review and Audit Resolved (SER)

(SSER 8)

(SSER 22)

13.4

(307) Plant Procedures Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

13.5

(308) Administrative Procedures Resolved (SER)

(SSER 22)

13.5.1

(309) Operating and Maintenance 

Procedures

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 22)

13.5.2

(310) NUREG-0737 Items Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 22)

13.5.3
1-22

Issue Status Section Note

(311) Physical Security Plan Resolved (SER)

(SSER 1)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 20)

(SSER 22)

13.6

(312) Introduction Resolved (SSER 22) 13.6.1

(313) Summary of Application Resolved (SSER 22) 13.6.2

(314) Regulatory Basis Resolved (SSER 22) 13.6.3

(315) Technical Evaluation Resolved (SSER 22) 13.6.4

(316) Conclusions Resolved (SSER 22) 13.6.5

(317) Cyber Security Plan Resolved (SSER 24) 13.6.6

(318) Initial Test Program Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 7)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 18)

(SSER 19)

(SSER 23)

14

(319) Accident Analyses 15

(320) General Discussion Resolved (SER) 15.1

(321) Normal Operation and Anticipated 

Transients

Open (NRR) (SER) 15.2

(322) Loss-of-Cooling Transients Resolved (SER)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 24)

15.2.1

(323) Increased Cooling Inventory 

Transients

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 24)

15.2.2

(324) Change in Inventory Transients Resolved (SER)

(SSER 18)

(SSER 24)

15.2.3

(325) Reactivity and Power Distribution 

Anomalies

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 7)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 24)

(SSER 26)

15.2.4

(326) Conclusions Resolved (SER)

(SSER 4)

15.2.5

(327) Limiting Accidents Resolved (SER) 15.3
1-23

Issue Status Section Note

(328) Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) Resolved (SER)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 24)

15.3.1

(329) Steamline Break Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 24)

15.3.2

(330) Feedwater System Pipe Break Resolved (SER)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 24)

15.3.3

(331) Reactor Coolant Pump Rotor 

Seizure

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 24)

15.3.4

(332) Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Break Resolved (SER)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 24)

15.3.5

(333) Anticipated Transients Without 

Scram

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 3)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 6)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 11)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 24)

15.3.6

(334) Conclusions Resolved (SER) 15.3.7

(335) Radiological Consequences of 

Accidents

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 25)

15.4

(336) Loss-of-Coolant Accident Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 9)

(SSER 18)

(SSER 25)

15.4.1

(337) Main Steamline Break Outside of 

Containment

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 25)

15.4.2

(338) Steam Generator Tube Rupture Resolved (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 12)

(SSER 14)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 25)

15.4.3

(339) Control Rod Ejection Accident Resolved (SER)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 25)

15.4.4
1-24

Issue Status Section Note

(340) Fuel-Handling Accident Resolved (SER)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 25)

15.4.5

(341) Failure of Small Line Carrying 

Coolant Outside Containment

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 25)

15.4.6

(342) Postulated Radioactive Releases as 

a Result of Liquid Tank Failures

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 25)

15.4.7

(342a) Postulated Waste Gas Decay Tank 

Rupture

Resolved (SSER 25) 15.4.8

(343) NUREG-0737 Items 15.5

(344) Thermal Mechanical Report (TMI 

Action Item II.K.2.13)

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 24)

15.5.1

(345) Voiding in the Reactor Coolant 

System during Transients (TMI 

Action Item II.K.2.17)

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 24)

15.5.2

(346) Installation and Testing of Automatic 

Power-Operated Relief Valve 

Isolation System (TMI Action Item 

II.K.3.1) Report on Overall Safety 

Effect of Power-Operated Relief 

Valve Isolation System (TMI Action 

Item II.K.3.2)

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

15.5.3

(347) Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant 

Pumps (TMI Action Item II.K.3.5)

Resolved (SER)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 24)

15.5.4

(348) Small-Break LOCA Methods 

(II.K.3.30) and Plant-Specific 

Calculations (II.K.3.31)

Open 

(Inspection)

(SER)

(SSER 4)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 16)

15.5.5

(349) Relative Risk of Low-Power 

Operation

Resolved (SER) 15.6

(350) Technical Specification Open (NRR) 16

(351) Quality Assurance 17

(352) General Resolved (SER) 17.1

(353) Organization Resolved (SER) 17.2

(354) Quality Assurance Program Resolved (SER)

(SSER 2)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 10)

(SSER 13)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 22)

17.3

(355) Conclusions Resolved (SER) 17.4

(356) Maintenance Rule 17.6

(357) Control Room Design Review 18
1-25

Issue Status Section Note

(358) General Resolved (SER)

(SSER 5)

(SSER 6)

(SSER 15)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 22)

18.1

(359) Conclusions Resolved (SER)

(SSER 16)

(SSER 22)

18.2

(360) Report of the Advisory Committee 

on Reactor Safeguards

Open (NRR) (SER) 19

(361) Common Defense and Security Resolved (SER) 20

(362) Financial Qualifications Resolved (SER) 21

(363) TVA Financial Qualifications for 

WBN Unit 2

Resolved (SSER 22)

(SSER 23)

21.1

(364) Foreign Ownership, Control, or 

Domination

Resolved (SSER 22) 21.2

(365) Financial Protection and Indemnity 

Requirements

22

(366) General Resolved (SER) 22.1

(367) Preoperational Storage of Nuclear 

Fuel

Resolved (SER) 22.2

(368) Operating Licenses Open (NRR) (SSER 22) 22.3

(369) Quality of Construction, Operational 

Readiness, and Quality Assurance 

Effectiveness

25

(370) Program for Maintenance and 

Preservation of the Licensing Basis 

for Units 1 and 2

Resolved (SSER 22)

(SSER 27)

25.9

Notes:

1. In the process of further validating the information in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR, TVA 

identified minor administrative/typographical changes to sections previously 

considered Resolved. TVA addressed these changes to the applicable sections 

in their submittals and clearly indicated them to the NRC staff. The NRC staff 

has reviewed and confirmed that the changes made are 

administrative/typographical and do not impact the NRC staff’s conclusions as 

stated in previous SSERs. Based on this review, no additional review is 

necessary and this section remains Resolved.

2. During the assessment of the regulatory framework for completion of the project, 

the NRC staff characterized certain topics as “Open” pending TVA’s validation of 

the information contained in the section. TVA has determined that the 

information presented in the FSAR remained valid and only identified minor 

administrative or typographical changes to the section. TVA addressed the 

changes in their submittals and clearly indicated the changes. The NRC staff 

reviewed and confirmed that the changes made to the section are 

administrative/typographical and do not impact its conclusions as stated in 
1-26

previous SSERs. Therefore, no additional review is necessary and the NRC staff 

considers this section Resolved.

3. In SSER 21, this issue was identified as “Resolved.” However, TVA made 

changes to the Unit 2 FSAR affecting the previous NRC staff conclusions. The 

NRC staff evaluated the changes and the results are documented in this SSER.

1.8 Confirmatory Issues

At this point in the review, there are some items that have essentially been resolved to the NRC 

staff’s satisfaction, but for which certain confirmatory information has not yet been provided by 

the applicant. In these instances, the applicant has committed to provide the confirmatory 

information in the near future. If NRC staff review of this information does not confirm 

preliminary conclusions on an item, that item will be treated as open, and the NRC staff will

report on its resolution in a supplement to this report.

The confirmatory items, with appropriate references to subsections of this report, are noted in 

Appendix HH.

1.9 License Conditions

1.9.1 Flooding License Condition

The NRC staff had proposed two license conditions in Section 2.4 of SSER 24. TVA has 

supplemented Section 2.4 since publication of SSER 24, the contents of which are still under 

NRC staff review. Upon completion of its review the NRC staff will determine whether the 

previously proposed license conditions are still valid, need to modified, or are no longer 

necessary.

Flooding Protection Proposed License Condition No. 1:

TVA will submit to the NRC staff by August 31, 2012, for review and approval, a 

summary of the results of the finite element analysis, which demonstrates that the 

Cherokee and Douglas Dams are fully stable under design basis probable maximum 

flood loading conditions for the long-term stability analysis, including how the preestablished acceptance criteria were met. 

Flooding Protection Proposed License Condition No. 2:

TVA will submit to the NRC staff, before completion of the first operating cycle, its 

long-term modification plan to raise the height of the embankments associated with the 

Cherokee, Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and Watts Bar Dams. The submittal shall include 

analyses to demonstrate that, when the modifications are complete, the embankments 

will meet the applicable structural loading conditions, stability requirements, and 

functionality considerations to ensure that the design basis probable maximum flood 

limits are not exceeded at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. All modifications to raise the 

height of the embankments shall be completed within 3 years from the date of issuance 

of the operating license.
1-27

1.9.2 Cyber Security License Condition

The NRC staff had proposed two license conditions discussed in Section 13.6.6.3.22 of

SSER 24. The NRC staff is awaiting an updated implementation schedule from TVA. Upon 

receipt of this information, the NRC staff will determine whether the NRC’s evaluation and the 

proposed license conditions published in SSER 24 are still valid, need to be modified, or are no 

longer necessary. 

Cyber Security Proposed License Condition 1:

The licensee shall implement the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54(a)(1)(ii) as they relate to 

the security computer. Completion of these actions will occur consistent with the full 

implementation date of September 30, 2014, as established in the licensee’s letter dated 

April 7, 2011, “Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Watts Bar 

Nuclear Plant Cyber Security Plan License Amendment Request, Cyber Security Plan 

Implementation Schedule - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1.”

Cyber Security Proposed License Condition 2:

The licensee shall implement the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54(a)(1)(iii) as they relate 

to the corporate based systems that support emergency preparedness. Completion of 

these actions will occur consistent with the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 

implementation schedule established in the licensee’s letter dated April 7, 2011, 

“Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 

Cyber Security Plan License Amendment Request, Cyber Security Plan Implementation 

Schedule - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1.”

1.9.3 Core Operating Limits License Condition

The NRC staff proposed a license condition discussed in Section 4.2.2 of SSER 27.

PAD TCD Proposed License Condition:

PAD4TCD may be used to establish core operating limits prior to the initial cycle, and 

prior to any remaining portion of the initial cycle. PAD4TCD may not be used to 

establish core operating limits prior to any reload cycle, and prior to any remaining 

portion of any reload cycle.

1.9.4 Electrical Design License Condition

The NRC staff proposed a license condition discussed in Section 8.2.2 of SSER 27.

Bulletin 2012-01, “Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System,” Proposed License 

Condition:

By December 31, 2017, TVA will report to the NRC that the actions to resolve the issues 

identified in Bulletin 2012-01, “Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System” have 

been implemented.
1-28

1.13 Implementation of Corrective Action Programs and Special Programs

In 1985, TVA developed a corporate Nuclear Performance Plan (NPP) that identified and 

proposed corrections to problems concerning the overall management of its nuclear program 

and a site-specific plan for WBN entitled, “Watts Bar Nuclear Performance Plan.” TVA 

established 18 corrective action programs (CAPs) and 11 special programs (SPs) to address 

these concerns. 

SSER 21, Table 1.13.1 documented the status of NRC staff review of the CAPs and SPs. In 

this SSER and future supplements to the SER, the NRC staff will document its evaluation and 

closure of open NPP items.

1.13.1 Corrective Action Programs

No. Title Program Review Status

(1) Cable Issues

a. Silicon Rubber Insulated Cable 

b. Cable Jamming

c. Cable Support in Vertical Conduit 

d. Cable Support in Vertical Trays

e. Cable Proximity to Hot Pipes

f. Cable Pull-Bys 

g. Cable Bend Radius 

h. Cable Splices 

i. Cable Sidewall Bearing Pressure 

j. Pulling Cables Through 90° Condulet and Flexible 

Conduit 

k. Computer Cable Routing System Software and 

Database Verification and Validation

Resolved

(See Appendix HH)

(2) Cable Tray and Tray Supports Resolved

(3) Design Baseline and Verification Program Resolved

(4) Electrical Conduit and Conduit Support Resolved

(5) Electrical Issues

a. Flexible Conduit Installations 

b. Physical Cable Separation and Electrical Isolation

c. Contact and Coil Rating of Electrical Devices

d. Torque Switch and Overload Relay Bypass Capability 

for Active Safety-Related Valves

e. Adhesive-Backed Cable Support Mount 

Resolved

(See Appendix HH)

(6) Equipment Seismic Qualification Resolved

(7) Fire protection Resolved

(8) Hanger and Analysis Update Program Resolved
1-29

No. Title Program Review Status

(9) Heat Code Traceability Resolved

(10) Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning Duct and 

Duct Supports

Resolved

(11) Instrument Lines Resolved

(12) Prestart Test Program Plan Resolved

(13) Quality Assurance (QA) Records Resolved

(14) Quality-List (Q-List) Resolved

(15) Replacement Items Program (Piece Parts) Resolved

(16) Seismic Analysis Resolved

(17) Vendor Information Program Resolved

(18) Welding Resolved

1.13.2 Special Programs

No. Title Program Review Status

(1) Concrete Quality Program Resolved

(2) Containment Cooling Resolved

(3) Detailed Control Room Design Review Resolved

(4) Environmental Qualifications Program Resolved

(5) Master Fuse List Resolved

(6) Mechanical Equipment Qualification Resolved

(7) Microbiologically Induced Corrosion Resolved

(8) Moderate Energy Line Break Flooding Resolved

(9) Radiation Monitoring System Resolved

(11) Use-As-Is Condition Adverse to Quality Resolved
1-30

1.14 Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements

From time to time, the NRC staff issues generic requirements or recommendations in the form 

of orders, bulletins (BLs), generic letters (GLs), regulatory issue summaries, and other 

documents to address certain safety and regulatory issues. These are generally termed 

“generic communications.”

The table below outlines the status of the resolution of the generic communications. It should 

be noted that, although many of the generic communications have been documented or 

otherwise resolved, the NRC staff has determined that there may be circumstances that could 

result in the need to reopen a previously closed topic.

Correspondence No. Title

(1) GL 1980-14

TVA Action:

NRC Action:

Light-Water Reactor Primary Coolant System Pressure 

Isolation Valves.

Submit Technical Specifications (TSs) for NRC Review.

To be reviewed during validation of TS 3.4.14 submitted 

February 2, 2010.

(2) GL 1980-77

TVA Action:

NRC Action:

Refueling Water Level - Technical Specifications Changes.

Submit Technical Specifications for NRC Review.

To be reviewed during validation of TS 3.9.5 –TS 3.9.7 

submitted February 2, 2010.

(3) GL 1982-28

TVA Action:

NRC Action:

Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation System.

Closed.

Closed. Subsumed as part of NRC staff review of 

Instrumentation and Controls submitted April 8, 2010.

(4) GL 1983-28 Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem 

Anticipated Transient without Scram Events (Screened into 

the Items 4 through 7).

(4.a) GL 1983-28 (item 

3.1)

TVA Action:

NRC Action:

Post-Maintenance Testing (reactor trip system components).

Submit Technical Specifications for NRC Review.

To be reviewed during validation of TS Bases 3.0.1 submitted 

March 4, 2009.
1-31

Correspondence No. Title

(4.b) GL 1983-28 (3.2)

TVA Action

NRC Action

Post-Maintenance Testing (All Surveillance Requirement 

Components).

Submit Technical Specifications and NRC Review.

To be reviewed during validation of TS Bases 3.0.1 submitted 

March 4, 2009.

(4.c) GL 1983-28 (4.2)

TVA Action

NRC Action

Reactor Trip System Reliability (Preventive Maintenance and 

Surveillance Program for Reactor Trip Breakers).

Submit Technical Specifications and NRC Review.

To be reviewed during NRC staff evaluation of Item 17 of TS 

Table 3.3.1-1 submitted February 2, 2010.

(4.d) GL 1983-28 (4.5)

TVA Action

NRC Action

Reactor Trip System Reliability (Automatic Actuation of Shunt 

Trip Attachment).

Submit Technical Specifications and NRC Review.

To be reviewed during NRC staff evaluation of Item 18 of TS 

Table 3.3.1-1 submitted February 2, 2010.

(8) GL 1986-09

TVA Action

NRC Action

Technical Resolution of Generic Issue B-59, (N-1) Loop 

Operation in BWRs and PWRs.

Submit Technical Specifications for NRC Review.

To be reviewed during validation of TS 3.4.4 - TS 3.4.8 

submitted February 2, 2010.

(9) GL 1988-20

TVA Action

NRC Action

Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerability.

Closed.

Closed. NRC letter dated August 12, 2011 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML111960228).

(10) GL 1988-20s1

TVA Action

NRC Action

Initiation of the Individual Plant Examination for Severe 

Accident Vulnerabilities — 10 CFR 50.54.

Closed.

Closed. NRC letter dated August 12, 2011 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML111960228).
1-32

Correspondence No. Title

(11) GL 1988-20s2

TVA Action

NRC Action

Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerability. 

Accident Management Strategies for Consideration in the 

Individual Plant Examination Process.

Closed.

Closed. NRC letter dated August 12, 2011 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML111960228).

(12) GL 1988-20s3

TVA Action

NRC Action

Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerability. 

Completion of Containment Performance Improvement 

Program and Forwarding of Insights for Use in the IPE for 

Severe Accident Vulnerabilities.

Closed.

Closed. NRC letter dated August 12, 2011 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML111960228).

(13) GL 1988-20s4

TVA Action

NRC Action

Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for 

Severe Accident Vulnerabilities.

Closed.

Closed. NRC letter dated September 20, 2011 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML111960300).

(14) GL 1988-20s5

TVA Action

NRC Action

Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for 

Severe Accident Vulnerabilities - 10 CFR 50.54(f).

Closed.

Closed. NRC letter dated September 20, 2011 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML111960300).

(15) GL 1989-04

TVA Action

NRC Action

Guidelines on Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing 

Programs.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC letter dated October 21, 2014 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14289A222).
1-33

Correspondence No. Title

(16) GL 1989-21

TVA Action

NRC Action

Request for Information Concerning Status of Implementation 

of Unresolved Safety Issue Requirements.

TVA provided an updated status of unresolved safety issues 

on September 26, 2008, as supplemented on December 2, 

2010, and January 25, 2011.

Closed. See Appendix C of SSER 23.

(17) GL 1990-06

TVA Action

NRC Action

Resolution of Generic Issues 70, “PORV [power-operated 

relief valve] and Block Valve Reliability,” and 94, “Additional 

LTOP [low-temperature overpressure] Protection for PWRs.”

Submit Technical Specifications for NRC Review.

To be reviewed during validation of TS 3.4.11 - TS 3.4.12 

submitted February 2, 2010.

(18) GL 1992-08

TVA Action

NRC Action

Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach will be proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Open. Pending NRC staff inspection verification.

(19) GL 1995-03

TVA Action

NRC Action

Circumferential cracking of Steam Generator (SG) Tubes.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML093631061).

(20) GL 1995-05 

TVA Action

NRC Action

Voltage –Based Repair Criteria for Westinghouse Steam 

Generator Tubes affected by Outside Diameter Stress 

Corrosion Cracking.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML093631061).
1-34

Correspondence No. Title

(21) GL 1996-06

TVA Action

NRC Action

Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity 

During Design-Basis Accident Conditions.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach will be proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML100130227).

(22) GL 1995-07

TVA Action

NRC Action

Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related 

Power-Operated Gate Valves (Not identified in SSER 21 as 

“Open”).

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach will be proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC letter dated August 12, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML100190443).

(23) GL 1997-01

TVA Action

NRC Action

Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle and 

Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach will be proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter dated June 30, 2010 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML100539515).

(24) GL 1997-04

TVA Action

NRC Action

Assurance of Sufficient Net Positive Suction Head for 

Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Heat Removal 

Pumps Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1;

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter dated February 18, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML100200375).
1-35

Correspondence No. Title

(25) GL 1997-05

TVA Action

NRC Action

SG Tube Inspection Techniques.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML093631061).

(26) GL 1997-06

TVA Action

NRC Action

Degradation of SG Internals.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML093631061).

(27) GL 1998-02

TVA Action

NRC Action

Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory and Associated Potential 

for Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions While in a 

Shutdown Condition.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach will be proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter dated May 11, 2010 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML101200155).

(28) GL 1998-04

TVA Action

NRC Action

Potential for Degradation of the ECCS [Emergency Core 

Cooling System] and the Containment Spray System after a 

LOCA because of Construction and Protective Coating 

Deficiencies and Foreign Material in Containment.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter dated February 1, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML100260594).
1-36

Correspondence No. Title

(29) GL 2003-01

TVA Action

NRC Action

Control Room Habitability.

No action or documentation is provided to show the NRC staff 

has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2, and the resolution is 

through submittal of a technical specification.

Closed. NRC Letter dated February 1, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML100270076).

(30) GL 2004-01

TVA Action

NRC Action

Requirements for SG Tube Inspection.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML093631061).

(31) GL 2004-02

TVA Action

NRC Action

Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency 

Recirculation during Design-Basis Accidents at PWRs.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter dated September 18, 2014 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14163A658).

(32) GL 2006-01

TVA Action

NRC Action

SG Tube Integrity and Associated Technical Specifications.

No action or documentation is provided to show the NRC staff 

has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2, and the resolution is 

through submittal of a technical specification.

Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML093631061) (See Appendix HH).
1-37

Correspondence No. Title

(33) GL 2006-02

TVA Action

NRC Action

Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the 

Operability of Offsite Power.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML093631061) (See Appendix HH Open 

Item 6). Staff has reviewed Revision I to the proposed 

technical specifications and found that TSTF 449 has been 

incorporated.

(34) GL 2006-03

TVA Action

NRC Action

Potentially Nonconforming Hemyc and MT Fire Barrier 

Configurations.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter February 25, 2010 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML100470398).

(35) GL 2007-01

TVA Action

NRC Action

Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that 

Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant 

Transients.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter dated January 26, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML100120052).

(36) GL 2008-01

TVA Action

NRC Action

Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, 

Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems.

TVA submitted the information requested by the GL.

Closed. NRC letter dated August 23, 2011 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML112232205).
1-38

Correspondence No. Title

(37) BL 1992-01 and 

Supplement 1

TVA Action

NRC Action

Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System to Perform its 

Specified Fire Endurance Function.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach will be proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Open. Pending NRC staff inspection verification.

(38) BL 1996-01

TVA Action

NRC Action

Control Rod Insertion Problems (PWR)

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC letter dated May 3, 2010 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML101200035) required Confirmatory Action (See 

Appendix HH Open Items 5 and 8). By letter dated July 30, 

2012, TVA provided the information in the Confirmatory Action 

and the staff verified the information and has closed Appendix 

HH Open Items 5 and 8. 

(39) BL 1996-02 Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel In the 

Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter dated March 4, 2010 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML100480062).

(40) BL 2001-01

TVA Action

NRC Action

Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) 

Head Penetration Nozzles.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. See NRC Letter dated June 30, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML100539515).
1-39

Correspondence No. Title

(41) BL 2002-01

TVA Action

NRC Action

RPV Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure 

Boundary Integrity.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. See NRC Letter dated June 30, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML100539515).

(42) BL 2002-02

TVA Action

NRC Action

RPV Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection 

Program.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. See NRC Letter dated June 30, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML100539515).

(43) BL 2003-02 

TVA Action

NRC Action

Leakage from RPV Lower Head Penetrations and Reactor 

Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML093631061).

(44) BL 2004-01

TVA Action

NRC Action

Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the 

Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space 

Piping Connections at PWRs.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach was submitted for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC letter dated August 4, 2010 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML102080017).
1-40

Correspondence No. Title

(45) BL 2007-01

TVA Action

NRC Action

Security Officer Attentiveness.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach will be proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed. NRC letter dated March 25, 2010 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML100770549).

(46) BL 20011-01

TVA Action

NRC Action

Mitigating Strategies

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

an updated approach will be proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Open.

(47) BL 2012-01

TVA Action

NRC Action

Design Vulnerability In Electric Power System

TVA submitted a letter on September 3, 2014 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14247A231) providing wording for the FSAR 

and proposed a license condition.

Resolved.

NUREG-0737, TMI Action Items (TVA letter dated September 14, 1981, applies

to all of the following NUREG-0737 issues):

(48) NUREG-0737 

Item I.B.1.2

TVA Action

NRC Action

Independent Safety Engineering Group.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach will be proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Open.

(49) NUREG-0737 

Item I.D.1

TVA Action

NRC Action

Control Room Design Review (CRDR).

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach will be proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed in SSER 22, Section 18.2.
1-41

Correspondence No. Title

(50) NUREG-0737 

Item II.B.3

TVA Action

NRC Action

Post-accident Sampling.

No action or documentation is provided to show the NRC staff 

has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2, and the resolution is 

through submittal of a technical specification.

Closed in SSER 24, Section 9.3.2.

(51) NUREG-0737 

Item II.E.4.2

TVA Action

NRC Action

Containment Isolation Dependability.

No action or documentation is provided to show the NRC staff 

has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2, and the resolution is 

through submittal of a technical specification.

Open.

(52) NUREG-0737 

Item II.F.2

TVA Action

NRC Action

Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core-Cooling.

Closed.

Closed. See SSER 25 and SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.2. Open 

Items 72, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, and 

109 were closed in SSER 25, Section 7.5.2.2. Open items 94, 

98, 101, 105, 108, 110, and 111 were closed in SSER 26, 

Section 7.5.2.2.

(53) NUREG-0737 

Item II.K.3.3

TVA Action

NRC Action

Reporting SV/RV Failures/Challenges. 

No action or documentation is provided to show the NRC staff 

has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2, and the resolution is 

through submittal of a technical specification.

Closed in SSER 22, Section 13.5.3.

(54) NUREG-0737 

Item II.K.3.10

TVA Action

NRC Action

Anticipatory Trip at High Power.

No action or documentation is provided to show the NRC staff 

has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2, and the resolution is 

through submittal of a technical specification.

Closed (SSER 23, Section 7.8.4).
1-42

Correspondence No. Title

(55) NUREG-0737 

Item III.D.1.1

TVA Action

NRC Action

Primary Coolant Outside Containment.

No action or documentation is provided to show the NRC staff 

has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2, and the resolution is 

through submittal of a technical specification.

Open.

(56) NUREG-0737 

Item III.D.3.4

TVA Action

NRC Action

Control-Room Habitability.

The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; 

the same approach will be proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 

without change.

Closed in SSER 22, Section 6.4.

(57) IEB 75-08

TVA Action

NRC Action

PWR Pressure Instrumentation.

The item has been approved either for both units at WBN or 

explicitly for WBN Unit 2; however, a change to the original 

approval requires submittal of the technical specifications and

NRC staff review.

Open.

(58) IEB 77-04

TVA Action

NRC Action

Calculation Error Affecting Performance of a System for 

Controlling pH of Containment Sump Water Following a 

LOCA.

The item has been approved either for both units at WBN or 

explicitly for WBN Unit 2; however, a change to the original 

approval requires submittal of the technical specifications and

NRC staff review.

Open.

Fukushima-Related Orders (NRC letters dated March 12, 2012):

(59) EA-12-049

TVA Action

NRC Action

Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events

(ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A735)

Provide final compliance letter by December 17, 2014.

Open.
1-43

Correspondence No. Title

(60) EA-12-051

TVA Action

NRC Action

Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation

(ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A679)

Compliance letter sent October 29, 2014.

Open

2-1

2 SITE CHARACTERISTICS

2.4 Hydrologic Engineering

2.4.10 Flooding Protection Requirements

Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 133

Open Item 133 states, “In order to confirm the stability analysis of the sand baskets used by 

TVA in the WBN Unit 2 licensing basis, TVA will perform either a hydrology analysis without 

crediting the use of the sand baskets at the Fort Loudoun Dam for the seismic dam failure and

flood combination, or TVA will perform a seismic test of the sand baskets, as stated in TVA’s 

letter dated April 20, 2011. TVA will report the results of this analysis or test to the NRC by 

October 31, 2011.”

By letter dated October 31, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11306A193), TVA informed 

NRC that TVA performed the hydrology analysis without use of the sand baskets under TVA 

Calculation CSQ000020080080, “Flood Levels at WBN and SQN [Sequoyah Nuclear Plant]

from Seismic Dam Failures.” The hydrology analysis confirms the sand baskets are not

required to be in place during and following the seismic events defined in Section 2.4.4 of the

WBN Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

By letter dated July 19, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13205A173), TVA notified the NRC 

staff that a permanent modification to replace the sand baskets located at the four dams had 

been chosen. The permanent modification consists of a combination of concrete floodwalls and 

raised earthen embankments or earthen berms. Heights of these modifications would range 

from 2.3 feet to 6.6 feet depending on the location. By letter dated April 25, 2014 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14122A219), TVA committed to removing the sand baskets (HESCO barriers) 

and completing the installation of the permanent modifications by October 31, 2015, except for 

1900 feet at the Fort Loudoun Dam that will be completed by February 1, 2017. 

Based on TVA’s description of the permanent modifications, and the commitment to remove the 

sand baskets (HESCO barriers) and complete the permanent modifications in a reasonable 

timeframe, the NRC staff considers Open Item 133 to be closed.

3-1

3 DESIGN CRITERIA

3.9 Mechanical Systems and Components

3.9.6 Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves

Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 13

Open Item 13 states, “TVA is expected to submit an IST [inservice testing] program and specific 

relief requests for WBN Unit 2 nine months before the projected date of OL issuance.”

TVA submitted the IST program on May 12, 2014 for WBN Unit 2. By letter dated 

October 21, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14289A222), NRC approved the program. 

Therefore, the staff considers Open Item 13 to be closed.

3.11 Evironmental Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment

3.11.2 Evaluation

3.11.2.2.1 Electrical Equipment in a Harsh Environment

In SSER 22, published in January 2011, the NRC staff documented its review of Section 3.11 of 

the FSAR. During its review, the NRC staff communicated to TVA a concern regarding the 

qualification of cables purchased under Contract 81K5-830078 for construction of WBN Unit 2. 

NRC staff sent TVA a Request for Additional Information on July 30, 2010, asking for additional 

information related to the cables in question. TVA responded to the NRC in a letter dated 

September 1, 2010, that these particular cables were properly qualified. 

By letter dated August 3, 2011, as supplemented by letters dated June 13, 2012, and March 18, 

2013, TVA identified additional cables similar to those discussed in the September 1, 2010, 

letter. Since 10 CFR 50.49(l) states “Replacement equipment must be qualified in accordance 

with the provisions of this section unless there are sound reasons to the contrary,” the NRC staff 

questioned the origin of these additional cables. 

TVA’s letter dated March 18, 2013, clearly identifies the origin of the cables installed at WBN 

Unit 2, and states that they meet the qualification criteria of NUREG-0588, Category II, using the 

guidelines established in Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std. 323-1971, 

“IEEE Trial Use Standard; General Guide for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power 

Generating Stations.” TVA stated that these cables were purchased prior to May 23, 1980, and 

were in the utility’s stock prior to February 22, 1983. TVA also states that some of the cables 

were installed in WBN Unit 2, between 1980 and 1983, and another portion was installed 

between 1983 and 1985 (when construction was halted).

10 CFR 50.49(k) states “Applicants for and holders of operating licenses are not required to 

requalify electric equipment important to safety in accordance with the provisions of this section 

if the Commission has previously required qualification of that equipment in accordance with 

“Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment in 

Operating Reactors,” November 1979 (DOR Guidelines), or NUREG-0588 (For Comment 
3-2

version), “Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical 

Equipment.”

Since these cables were purchased and in the utility’s stock prior to February 22, 1983; installed 

as new equipment rather than replacement equipment; and that the cables meet the 

qualification criteria of NUREG-0588, Category II, the NRC staff finds that these additional 

cables meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49(k). Because the cables are not replacement 

equipment, 50.49(l) is inapplicable.

Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 23

Open Item 23 states, “Resolve whether or not TVA’s reasoning for not upgrading the MSIV 

[main steam isolation valve] solenoid valves to Category I is a sound reason to the contrary, as 

specified in 10 CFR 50.49(i).”

TVA stated that the original WBN Unit 2 MSIVs are qualified to NUREG-0588, Category II. TVA 

is refurbishing the MSIVs by replacing the missing subcomponents, including the solenoid 

valves, terminal blocks, and manufacturing wiring, with components of the same make, model, 

and type as supplied on the original purchase order. With the exception of the solenoid valves, 

the subcomponents will be qualified to NUREG-0588, Category I requirements. According to 

TVA, the solenoid valves cannot be upgraded because equivalent subcomponents qualified to 

NUREG-0588, Category I, requirements are not available. The NRC staff does not consider 

TVA’s justification for not upgrading the MSIV solenoid valves to Category I, as specified in 

10 CFR 50.49(i), to be a sound reason. 

By letter dated April 6, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110980637), TVA stated that the MSIV 

solenoid valves would be upgraded to Category I. In inspection report 05000391/2014608 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14322A182), the NRC staff documented where it reviewed TVA’s 

Environmental Qualification Documentation Package binder as well as the qualification test 

reports and found that TVA had successfully qualified the MSIV solenoid valves to the 

Category I criteria as committed.

Based on this response, the staff considers Open Item 23 to be closed.
4-1

4 REACTOR

Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

4.2 Fuel System Design

4.2.2 Thermal Performance

Open Item 61

Open Item 61 states “TVA should provide information to the NRC staff to demonstrate that 

PAD 4.0 can conservatively calculate the fuel temperature and other impacted variables, such 

as stored energy, given the lack of a fuel thermal conductivity degradation model.”

By letter dated August 6, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13225A024), TVA submitted new 

PAD fuel performance data generated for WBN Unit 2 with an updated PAD model (PAD4TCD) 

that includes explicit modeling of thermal conductivity degradation. 

By letter dated May 22, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14143A250), TVA submitted computer 

code input data requested by the NRC staff in order to perform a confirmatory analysis. 

Based upon (1) comparison of the PAD4TCD model predictions against Halden high burnup fuel 

temperature measurements and (2) good agreement of the temperature dependent and 

exposure dependent coefficients between PAD4TCD and FRAPCON-3.4 thermal conductivity

models, the NRC staff has previously found the PAD4TCD thermal conductivity model 

acceptable during the review of the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Extended Power Uprate (EPU) 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML11293A365). Using the information supplied in the May 22, 2014, 

letter, the NRC staff performed a confirmatory analysis similar to that performed in the Turkey 

Point Units 3 and 4 EPU, which demonstrated that there is good agreement between PAD4TCD 

and FRAPCON-3.5 for the fuel design planned for WBN Unit 2. Based upon the previous 

review of PAD4TCD done for the Turkey Point 3 and 4 EPU and the confirmatory analysis 

performed by the NRC staff on the Watts Bar fuel, the NRC staff finds that this open item has 

been satisfied and considers Open Item 61 to be closed. 

Similar to other interim uses of PAD4TCD, the NRC staff is proposing a license condition on 

PAD4TCD. The proposed license condition is as follows:

PAD TCD Proposed License Condition:

PAD4TCD may be used to establish core operating limits prior to the initial cycle, and 

prior to any remaining portion of the initial cycle. PAD4TCD may not be used to 

establish core operating limits prior to any reload cycle, and prior to any remaining 

portion of any reload cycle. 

6-1

6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES

Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

6.1 Engineered Safety Features Material

6.1.1 Metallic Materials

6.1.1.1 Materials Selection and Fabrication

Open Item 59

Open Item 59 states, “The staff’s evaluation of the compatibility of the ESF [engineered safety 

features] system materials with containment sprays and core cooling water in the event of a 

LOCA is incomplete pending resolution of GSI-191 for WBN Unit 2.”

NRC Letter dated September 18, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14163A658), concluded that 

TVA’s response to Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, “Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on 

Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors”

(ADAMS Accession No. ML042360586) dated September 13, 2004, requesting that licensees 

address the issues raised by Generic Safety Issue 191, “Assessment of Debris Accumulation on 

Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance,” for WBN Unit 2 was acceptable. Therefore, 

Open Item 59 is closed.

7-1

7 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS

7.2 Reactor Trip System

7.2.1 Description

7.2.1.1 System Description

Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 63 states, “TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that testing prior to Unit 2 fuel load 

has demonstrated that two-way communications is impossible with the Eagle 21 

communications interface.”

Open Item 93 (Section 7.9.3.2 “Separation of Protection and Control Systems”) states, “TVA 

should confirm to the staff that testing of the Eagle 21 system has sufficiently demonstrated that 

two-way communication to the ICS is precluded with the described configurations.”

By letter dated October 22, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14295A520), TVA provided 

Enclosures 1, 2, and 3 to its letter describing its response to these action items. In this 

response, TVA provided a description of the test it performed on one of the Eagle 21 chassis to 

demonstrate that two-way communication was precluded by the specific configuration employed 

at WBN Unit 2. Their description included a copy of its test plan, a summary of the test steps 

performed, including sketches of the test setup employed, and a high level summary of the test 

and its results. The purpose of this test was to verify that the External Communications 

lnterface for WBN Unit 2 Eagle 21 Reactor Protection System only allows data flow in one 

direction (i.e., data out to the plant computer and no data into the Eagle 21 system). 

Under normal operating conditions, the Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) (which performs 

safety related functions) of each of the Eagle 21 chassis generates status information at a rate 

of ten times per second. This information travels on the internal Eagle 21 high-level data link 

control (HDLC) serial bus where it is received in parallel by the Eagle 21 Test Sequence 

Processor (TSP) and by a Serial-to-Ethernet converter (SEC). The SEC then passes this status 

information on to the plant lntegrated Computer System (ICS) through a fiber optic device to the 

Ethernet network connection. (As described above, each of the 14 Eagle 21 chassis sends such 

status information via a fiber optic Ethernet connection to a personal computer (PC) located in 

the process computer room. This PC then aggregates the data from the 14 Eagle 21 chassis 

and sends the aggregated data to the ICS over a separate network connection.) To ensure that 

no data traffic on the internal HDLC serial link of each Eagle 21 chassis can adversely impact 

the LCPs of each chassis, internal unidirectional communication between these sections is 

enforced to be from the LCP to the TSP and SEC by removing the “receive communications” 

integrated circuit chips from the sockets in the LCP data link handler board section and 

removing the “transmit communications” integrated circuit chips from their respective sockets in 

the TSP data link handler board and the SEC board. In addition, the installation of jumpers as 

described in Section 7.9.3.2 of the staff’s SER (SSER 23) prevents the SEC from transmitting 

data onto the HDLC serial port. Therefore, the LCP has no ability to receive data from any 

source nor does the TSP or SEC have the ability to transmit data to the LCP.

To demonstrate the unidirectional communications, the Ethernet port external to one of the

Eagle 21 chassis (which has a Serial-to-Ethernet communications configuration typical of each 
7-2

of the 14 Eagle 21 chassis) coming from the ICS PC was temporarily disconnected and an 

Ethernet hub was connected in its place. A laptop with an Ethernet communications port was 

connected to one side of the Ethernet port. The laptop computer was configured to generate a 

data storm pattern to the Eagle 21 by targeting the Eagle 21 chassis’ Internet Protocol (IP) 

address. A second laptop was connected to the Ethernet hub to analyze and record the 

network data traffic to verify that the Eagle 21 rack did not respond to any of the data storm 

traffic and that it continued to send out the appropriate LCP status information. Oscilloscope 

probes were also connected to the LCP Data Link Handler serial “receive” lines and the SEC 

serial “transmit” lines to verify that no serial data traffic was present, which was as expected 

since the SEC has no transmit capability.

The test demonstrated that when the data storm pattern information was generated by the first 

laptop, no change in response of the LCP was evident on the second laptop. Further, the 

oscilloscope traces showed no serial information present at the LCP “receive” portion of the 

HDLC. This testing was witnessed by NRC staff inspection team members. The inspectors 

reviewed the test procedure, Eagle 21 vendor manual, and associated drawings to verify that 

the described test configuration and acceptance criteria was valid for the Open Items in 

question. The inspection team member noted that the test procedure involved injecting data 

packets through the cable normally attached to the fiber optic converter and reading any return 

data packets. Additionally, the inspection team witnessed the performance of the test and 

observed the oscilloscope traces monitoring the SEC controller’s (i.e., the communications 

interface) transmit and receive lines, as well as the loop controller processer’s (the safetyrelated processor board) receive lines. The inspectors also reviewed the drawings to verify that 

they were in the same configuration described in Open Item 93. The inspectors observed the 

testing and reviewed the test results to verify the test setup and to determine whether the 

acceptance criteria were met.

Based on the staff evaluation that there appears to have been an appropriate test setup and 

successful performance of the licensee’s Eagle 21 digital communications test, and on the 

staff’s evaluation of the licensee’s responses in the enclosures to their October 22, 2014, letter, 

and the observations noted in the inspection report prepared by the NRC Region II staff, the 

NRC staff finds that Open Items 63 and 93 have been adequately addressed and are

closed. 

Open Item 64

Open Item 64 states, “TVA stated that, ‘Post modification testing will be performed to verify that 

the design change corrects the Eagle 21, Rack 2 RTD accuracy issue prior to WBN Unit 2 fuel 

load.’ This issue is open pending NRC staff review of the testing results.”

The inspectors reviewed the test in work order (WO) 11347100 and the change package to 

verify that a 0.2 degree Fahrenheit (°F) bias, which had been discovered during factory 

acceptance testing, was corrected. The inspectors also reviewed the WO to verify that the test 

equipment was properly calibrated. Based on a review of the final closure package as 

documented in the Inspection Report 2014-602 dated March 27, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14086A063), Open Item 64 is closed.
7-3

7.5 Safety-Related Display Instrumentation

7.5.2 Post-Accident Monitoring System

7.5.2.3 High-Range Containment Area Radiation Monitors

7.5.2.3.4 Technical Evaluation

Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 80

Open Item 80 states, “TVA should provide clarification to the staff on how TVA Standard 

Specification SS-E18-14.1 meets the guidance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.180, and should 

address any deviations from the guidance of the RG.”

By letter dated May 6, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11129A205), TVA responded to SSER, 

Appendix HH Open Item 80. In Attachment 1 to this letter, TVA provided a white paper entitled, 

“Comparison of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.180, “Guidelines For Evaluating Electromagnetic and 

Radio-Frequency Interference In Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems,” 

Revision 1, and TVA Standard Specification SS-E18-14.1, “Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) 

Testing Requirements for Electronic Devices,” Revision 3.” Attachment 1 to the TVA letter 

provided the history and program description of the subject standard, along with any differences 

between the subject standard and the guidance contained in RG 1.180. It further provided 

specific comparison for each test along with the conclusion statement. TVA also stated, in “30 

years of evaluating equipment TVA has not seen a failure from susceptibility testing.”

The NRC staff reviewed the TVA white paper and evaluated the differences and the specific 

comparisons. One of the cited differences is that TVA applies the Standard Specification to all 

electronic equipment, not just digital safety systems. The NRC staff has no concern with 

regards to this requirement because it covers a broader scope of equipment or testing than 

required by RG 1.180. The other difference is in the area of magnetic field testing. TVA has 

stated this requirement is typically not tested because their electronic equipment is not located 

in areas with strong magnetic fields. This exemption is permitted by RG 1.180.

The NRC staff further reviewed TVA’s response for each test item and found the tests met or 

exceeded the test requirements. TVA used alternate tests and followed the guidance in Electric 

Power Research Institute TR-102323, the use of which was approved by NRC on April 17, 

1996. TVA also provided justifications or an explanation for any differences. The NRC staff 

noted a difference in the area of low frequency susceptibility testing. In a letter dated 

September 21, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112590046), NRC requested TVA to justify 

why the low frequency conducted susceptibility test covered the frequency range from 30 Hz to 

50 kHz when RG 1.180 required testing from 30 Hz to 150 kHz. TVA responded in a letter 

dated September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11287A254), that the Nemko test report 

included test frequencies from 30 Hz to 50 kHz, however, 30 Hz to 150 kHz tests were 

performed as part of TUV test report S7439-03. By letter dated November 18, 2011 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML113130218), the NRC staff stated that it had reviewed the TUV test report 

and indicated that it was conducted on the older model RM-1000 radiation monitors. By letter 

dated November 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11341A156), TVA provided the similarity 

analysis between the old and the new model and justified any changes. Some of the changes 
7-4

included electromagnetic shielding to improve the electro-magnetic compatibility performance; a 

few new and improved components replaced the old obsolete components resulting in an 

improved accuracy.

By letter dated August 30, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12249A195), TVA further clarified 

that the low frequency conducted susceptibility testing was conducted in accordance with 

Military Standard MIL-STD-461E, which requires testing from 30 Hz to 150 kHz for DC powered 

equipment and from 120 Hz to 150 kHz for 60 Hz AC powered equipment (i.e. from the second 

harmonic of supply frequency). The test was carried out using MIL-STD-461D whereas 

RG 1.180 requires testing to MIL-STD-461E but TVA reviewed and confirmed the testing met 

the guidance of MIL-STD-461E and RG 1.180, Revision 1.

The NRC staff reviewed the information TVA provided as well as the test data. The NRC staff 

confirmed the testing was done for the required range and the differences between the old and 

new model of I/F converter were documented and justified. TVA letter dated December 10, 

2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12349A379) provided the formal test data as Enclosures 1 

and 2.

The last open issue regarding low frequency conducted susceptibility testing was resolved 

based on the NRC staff’s evaluation of TVA’s comparison and analysis of the applicability of old 

test data to the new I/F converters, provided in TVA’s letters dated May 6, 2011, August 30, 

2012, and December 10, 2012.

TVA has provided sufficient information in its responses to confirm that TVA Standard 

Specification SS-E18-14.1 meets the guidance of RG 1.180. The staff’s requests for 

clarification of various items including the frequency range for the low frequency conducted 

susceptibility were satisfactorily resolved by the referenced TVA letters and documents as 

detailed above. Therefore based on the above, Open Item 80 is closed.

7.5.3 IE Bulletin 79-27

Open Item 73

Open Item 73 (Appendix HH) states, “The NRC staff will inspect to confirm that TVA has 

completed the WBN Unit 2 EOPs [emergency operating procedures] prior to fuel load.”

Per NRC Inspection Report 05000391/2014604, dated June 25, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14177A214), the list of WBN Unit 2 emergency procedures is complete. Those procedures

reviewed were written in accordance with TI-12.06, “Writer’s Guide for Abnormal and Emergency

Operating Instructions,” and are complete and ready for approval and use. The NRC inspectors 

determined that the Watts Bar emergency, abnormal and annunciator response procedures are 

prepared to adequately control and correct safety-related functions in the event of a system or 

component malfunction indication. Therefore, Open Item 73 is closed.
7-5

7.7 Control Systems

7.7.1 Description

7.7.1.9 Incore Instrumentation System

Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 131

Open Item 131 states, “TVA should review the EOP action level setpoint to account for the 

difference between core exit temperature readings for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and confirm the EOP 

action level setpoint to the NRC staff.”

By letter dated October 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11291A095), TVA explained that 

change in the EOP action level setpoint due to the difference between core exit temperature 

readings caused by the location change of the core exit thermocouples (CETs) was evaluated in 

TVA calculation WBNOSG4188, “EOP Setpoints Verification Document, Appendix 1: Standard 

Setpoints Table,” Revision 21. TVA states that this calculation shows that the Unit 1 EOP CET 

setpoint is higher than the Unit 2 EOP CET setpoint. TVA submitted copies of the relevant 

pages from this calculation in Attachment 12 to TVA’s October 14, 2011, letter. This attachment 

shows that there is a difference in EOP action level setpoints between Unit 1 and Unit 2.

The NRC staff has reviewed the calculations in Attachment 12 which contains the environmental

allowances that are added to the core exit thermocouple readings. They’re different between 

WBN Units 1 and 2. For indication of an uncovered core that is more conservative, the staff has 

considered a lower G03 (core uncovered) value than a higher value.

Setpoint G03:

Core Exit Temperature (CET) = 670°F + normal channel inaccuracy and post-accident 

transmitter errors

Unit 1: CET = 670°F+ 57°F = 727°F

Unit 2: CET = 670°F + 30.7°F ≈ 700°F

The nominal G03 setpoint (core uncovered) value of 670°F is the same for both WBN Units 1 

and 2. The difference between the G03 setpoints, in Units 1 and 2, is due to different values for 

the normal channel inaccuracy and post-accident transmitter errors. Based upon this 

information, the staff infers the following basis:

1. If there is no LOCA, and the CET is reading 670 °F, then it would be expected that the 

pressurizer safety valves would be open (the saturation pressure, at 670 °F, is about 

2531 pounds per square inch absolute, which is a little higher than the safety valve 

opening setpressure).

2. If the core is not already uncovered, then it will eventually become uncovered if the RCS 

inventory loss through the safety valves is not replaced by charging flow.

3. Since the open safety valves will prevent RCS pressure from rising, CET readings of 670 

°F or higher would be indicative of superheated steam; attributed to an uncovered core.
7-6

4. If there is a LOCA, and RCS pressure is lower, then a CET reading of 670 °F or greater 

would indicate that the CET is measuring superheated steam, coming from an 

uncovered core.

5. Adding uncertainties to the 670 °F value rules out other situations that could produce 

lower CET readings, in which the core is not uncovered.

It is not uncommon to have different EOP parameter values for different units at a site, 

particularly those whose construction completion wasn’t concurrent. Some parameters can be 

standardized, while others cannot. 

By letter dated February 18, 2014, TVA submitted Revision 103XX of Appendix C to its 

Radiological Emergency Plan. Revision 103XX has been updated to include the different EOP 

CET setpoints for WBN Units 1 and 2. Based on the NRC staff’s review of the differences 

between the EOP CET setpoints for the two units, and TVA’s inclusion of the different setpoints 

in Appendix C to the Radiological Emergency Plan, the NRC staff considers Open Item 131 

closed.
8-1

8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

8.1 Introduction

Open Item 26

Open Item 26 states, “For the scenario with an accident in one unit and concurrent shutdown of 

the second unit without offsite power, TVA stated that Unit 2 pre-operational testing will validate 

the diesel response to sequencing of loads on the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators (EDGs). 

The NRC staff will evaluate the status of this issue and will update the status of the EDG load 

response in a future SSER.” 

By letter dated November 18, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113120438), the NRC staff 

requested additional details on Open Item 26. TVA updated its response by letter dated June 7, 

2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12160A351). The questions were related to EDG rating and 

loading criteria. Specifically the staff requested TVA to:

a) Explain the variations in the worst case loading provided in different responses and 

provide a summary of current calculations depicting DG loading, including procedurally 

required loads that may be manually connected, and 

b) Provide verification or test documents from the manufacturer or Appendix B qualified 

supplier of the DG engine and DG generator certifying the “hot”, “cold” and “step load”

capabilities.

In response to staff questions, TVA stated that the ongoing plant modifications and validation of 

calculation accuracies through the inspection process had resulted in adjustments to the EDG 

loading calculations. TVA attached excerpts from Calculation EDQ 00099920080014, “Diesel 

Generator Loading Analysis,” Revision 16, summarizing the results from the last update.

The licensee has evaluated the load carrying capability (steady-state running load) and margin 

available for the worst case EDG loading for two separate events. As stated in the FSAR, load 

carrying capability is based on a 2-hour rating of 4840 kilowatt (kW) from 0 to 2 hours and on a 

continuous rating of 4400 kW from 2 hours to the end of the event. Attachment 1 to Calculation 

EDQ 00099920080014, Revision 16, depicts worst case EDG loading with available margin 

when serving loads during a loss-of-offsite power (LOOP) concurrent with a loss-of-coolant 

accident (LOCA). This table indicates that EDG 2B-B has the highest loading of 

4237.20 kilowatt (kW), which is less than the 2 hour rating of 4840 kW. The maximum steady 

state running load (2 hours to the end of event) is calculated to be 4093.66 kW for EDG 1A-A 

compared to nominal rating of 4400 kW. The other EDGs have lower loading for this event.

Attachment 2 to Calculation EDQ 00099920080014, Revision 16, provides details on each EDG 

loading with one unit in LOOP plus LOCA and the second unit in LOOP only. For the case of 

Unit 1 in a LOOP/LOCA event and Unit 2 in a LOOP only condition, TVA has concluded that 

EDG 1A-A has the maximum loading of 4220.51 kW for the first 2 hours and 4093.66 kW for the 

remaining duration. These loadings are below the corresponding nominal and 2 hour ratings of 

the EDGs, as stated above. The other EDGs have lower loading for this event. 
8-2

For the case of Unit 2 in a LOOP/LOCA event and Unit 1 in a LOOP only condition, the licensee 

has concluded that EDG 2B-B has the maximum loading of 4237.2 kW for the first 2 hours and 

EDG 2A-A has 3975.57 kW for steady state operation beyond 2 hours. These loadings are 

below the corresponding nominal and 2 hour ratings of the EDGs, as stated above. The other 

EDGs have lower loading for this event.

The licensee has also performed a sensitivity analyses for transient loading of the EDGs during 

motor starts. Based on the details provided in the referenced calculation, the staff finds that the 

EDGs at WBN Units 1 and 2 are adequately rated to support safe shutdown of both units 

following an accident in one unit coupled with a LOOP at both units.

The licensee has indicated that the “hot,” “cold,” and “step load” capabilities of the EDGs were 

reviewed and concurred by MKW Power Systems, Inc., the Appendix B qualified supplier of the 

EDG engine and generator for WBN. The licensee has used the higher rating(s) for motor 

starting analyses. The staff did not consider the additional spare margin available with these 

ratings as the nameplate ratings envelope the postulated steady state loadings.

Based on the responses provided by the applicant, the NRC staff finds the responses 

acceptable and therefore considers Open Item 26 to be closed. 

8.2 Offsite (Preferred) Electric Power System

8.2.2 Analysis

NRC Bulletin 2012-01

The NRC issued Bulletin 2012-01, “Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System,” dated 

July 27, 2012, to notify licensees that the NRC staff is requesting information about the facilities’

electric power system designs to determine if further regulatory action is warranted. Bulletin 

2012-01 requires addressees to comprehensively verify compliance with the regulatory 

requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, “Electric Power Systems,” and the design 

criteria for protection systems under 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2). 

TVA provided its response for WBN Unit 2 in Enclosure 3 of letter dated October 25, 2012 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML12312A167). Based on review of the response, NRC staff 

determined that the design vulnerability exists at WBN Unit 2 electric power system and no 

design features have been provided to enable functioning of electric power system with an open 

phase condition (OPC) with offsite power circuits. In response to NRC staff’s RAI (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML13351A314) concerning status and schedule for completion of plant design 

changes and modifications to resolve the open phase design vulnerability, TVA provided its 

response in letter dated February 3, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14038A075). TVA stated 

that it is fully engaged in the development of accurate detection and protection equipment 

without compromising nuclear safety or increasing plant risk, this new OPC technology is being 

thoroughly evaluated, will be tested, and will be fully analyzed before installation. In addition, 

based on the operating experience to-date, the OPC of concern is a loss of one or two of the 

three phases of a nuclear power plant’s offsite electrical power circuit due to any component 

failure on the high voltage side of a transformer connecting a qualified offsite electrical power 

circuit to the transmission system with and without a high impedance ground under all operating 

electrical system configurations and loading conditions. In supplemental letter dated 

September 3, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14247A231), TVA submitted additional text to be 
8-3

added to the FSAR and proposed a license condition associated with actions for resolving NRC 

Bulletin 2012-01. 

The proposed text that would be added to the WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 8.2.2 “Analysis,” as 

part of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 113 states:

The NRC issued Bulletin 2012-01, “Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power Systems,” 

describing a condition resulting from the loss of a single phase between the transmission 

network and the onsite power distribution system at an operating nuclear plant in the 

United States. TVA has taken the short term actions described in the bulletin and the 

nuclear industry is developing a long term resolution. TVA has added the following 

license condition for the long term actions:

Actions to resolve the issues identified in the Bulletin will be implemented on

or before December 31, 2017.

The NRC staff is proposing the following License Condition:

By December 31, 2017, TVA will report to the NRC that the actions to resolve the issues 

identified in Bulletin 2012-01, “Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System” have 

been implemented.

Based on the above, the staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that OPC design 

vulnerability with the WBN Unit 2 electric power system will be addressed by TVA when license 

conditions and regulatory commitments are met. The staff will close Bulletin 2012-01 for WBN 

Unit 2 when TVA notifies the NRC with a close-out letter when full compliance is achieved. 

8.3 Onsite (Standby) Power System

8.3.1 AC Power System

8.3.1.1 Description

Open Item 32

Open Item 32 states, “TVA should provide to the NRC staff the details of the administrative 

limits of EDG voltage and speed range, and the basis for its conclusion that the impact is 

negligible, and describe how it accounts for the administrative limits in the Technical 

Specification [TS] surveillance requirements for EDG voltage and frequency.”

By letter dated February 13, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Number ML14038A079), TVA proposed 

modifying the WBN Unit 2 TS Surveillance Requirements (SRs) related to surveillance, 

operation and testing of the EDGs when not connected in parallel with the offsite sources. 

Specifically, TVA proposed to modify the frequency range from greater than or equal to (≥) 58.8 

Hz and less than or equal to (≤) 61.2 Hz to ≥ 59.8 Hz and ≤ 60.1 Hz for SRs 3.8.1.7, 3.8.1.11, 

3.8.1.12, 3.8.1.15, 3.8.1.19, and 3.8.1.21. With respect to the monthly surveillance performed 

on the EDG, TVA proposes to revise this surveillance (i.e., SR 3.8.1.2) to confirm that the 

nominal frequency value of 60 Hz is achieved. The letter states that the EDG voltage limits of 

6800 V to 7260 V, as described in the TS, are correct as validated by the analyses.
8-4

The WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 3.1 details conformance with the Commission’s regulatory 

requirements related to the content of TSs as set forth in 10 CFR Section 50.36. GDC 17, 

“Electric Power Systems,” of Appendix A, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” to 

10 CFR Part 50, requires, in part, that an onsite electric power system shall be provided to 

permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The onsite 

electric power supplies and the onsite electric distribution system shall have sufficient 

independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a single 

failure. In addition, this criterion requires provisions to minimize the probability of losing electric 

power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of the loss of power from the unit, the 

transmission network, or the onsite electric power supplies.

GDC 18, “Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems,” requires that electric power 

systems important to safety be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing to 

demonstrate operability and functional performance.

It states in 10 CFR Section 50.36 that each license authorizing operation of a production or 

utilization facility of a type described in 10 CFR 50.21 or 50.22 will include TSs. As described in 

10 CFR 50.36(c)(1) - (8), TSs will include items in the following categories: (1) safety limits, 

limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; 

(3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; (5) administrative controls; 

(6) decommissioning; (7) initial notification; (8) written reports.

NRC RG 1.9, Revision 3, dated July 1993, “Selection, Design, Qualification and Testing of 

Emergency Diesel Generators used as Class 1E Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear 

Power Plants,” describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the 

Commission’s regulations with regard to design and testing of onsite EDGs. 

The staff has reviewed TVA’s regulatory and technical analyses in support of its proposed 

changes, which is described in Enclosure 1 of the TVA’s letter dated February 13, 2014.

The offsite and onsite power systems at the WBN Unit 2 are designed to comply with the 

requirements of GDC 17 and 18 respectively. The WBN Unit 2 FSAR states that the offsite 

sources are two independent 161-kV transmission lines terminating at the 161-kV switchyard, 

providing power to the plant, on demand, via the common station service transformers to the 

onsite Class 1E distribution system 

The standby Alternating Current (AC) power system (onsite electrical power system) serves the 

two nuclear power units (WBN Unit 1 and WBN Unit 2) and certain common plant equipment. It 

consists of two independent EDG systems, each system containing two EDG units, two 

redundant Class 1E electric power distribution trains, and four redundant vital instrument and 

control power channels, each provided with an uninterruptible ac power supply and distribution 

panel. Each EDG consists of two 16-cylinder engines directly connected to a 6.9 kV generator. 

The continuous rating of each EDG is 4400 kilowatt (kW) at 0.8 power factor, 6.9 kV, 3-phase, 

and 60 Hz. Each EDG also has an additional rating of 4840 kW for 2 hours out of 24 hours. 

Ratings for the EDGs satisfy the requirements of RG 1.9 Rev. 3. The continuous service rating 

of each EDG is 4400 kW with 10 percent overload permissible for up to 2 hours in any 24 hour 

period.

Any variation in steady state voltage and/or frequency affects the operating characteristics of 

motor driven loads such as pumps, fans and valves. If variation in both voltage and frequency 

occurs simultaneously, the effect will be superimposed and compounded such that the available 
8-5

margin in EDG capacity may be eroded. TVA has proposed to narrow the existing allowable 

range of frequency for the acceptance criteria during EDG surveillance testing to assure that 

safe shutdown equipment will perform as required by accident analyses. 

TVA has stated that the changes in frequency from the nominal rating of 60 Hz to the proposed 

range were evaluated for the following equipment with consideration to a LOOP or a LOCA 

coupled with a LOOP:

1. Pump flow, Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) availability and horsepower 

requirements,

2. Fan flow and horsepower requirements,

3. Motor operated valves (MOV) opening/closing speed and horsepower requirements,

4. Air compressor flow and horsepower requirements, and

5. Chiller horsepower requirements

TVA stated that only major pumps in safety significant systems were evaluated in detail, 

because, the speed, load, flow, and NPSH are only slightly impacted (i.e., 0.3%). The results of 

the evaluations are tabulated in Tables 3 and 4 of Enclosure 1 of the TVA’s letter dated 

February 13, 2014. TVA has concluded that the brake horsepower of motors due to a speed 

variation of ± 0.3% will vary by 1.0%. Table 5 of Enclosure 1 provides a summary of the major 

pump brake horsepower (BHP) as a result of frequency variation. TVA has concluded that the 

change in BHP of large motors is acceptable due to the rating of the equipment, the margin in 

nameplate rating or specific analyses performed by the vendor indicating that any temperature 

increase will not adversely impact the motor windings.

For the long term mitigation of a LOCA/LOOP, TVA evaluated major fans and air handling units 

(Section1.2.7 of Enclosure 1) supplied by the EDGs. The evaluation concluded that all of the 

fans affected by diesel generator frequency variation will provide adequate flow to maintain safe 

shutdown equipment environment. 

TVA stated that MOV stroke time will be approximately 0.8% longer as a result of the change in 

the frequency and voltage. The evaluation concluded that the longer stroke time does not 

exceed the time for MOV operation assumed in the safety analyses for accident mitigation 

requirements. Hence the longer stroke time is acceptable. The shorter stroke time due to 

higher frequency does not impact assumptions in safety analyses. TVA has concluded that 

there are no concerns with MOV operation due to the variation in EDG frequency and voltage.

Enclosure 1 also provided a summary of evaluations performed for voltage and frequency 

variations on air compressor and chiller flows, power transformers, battery chargers, hydrogen 

igniters and pertinent small motors. TVA has concluded that the impact on these components is 

minor and acceptable.

TVA also evaluated the impact of the proposed change on EDG1-1A, the heaviest loaded EDG, 

under postulated accident conditions and concluded that:

1. The calculated total load of 4116 kW is below the nominal rating of 4400 kW and 

therefore acceptable for the EDGs. 

2. There is no impact on TS-required fuel oil volume. The current calculation 

assumes that the EDGs operate at the 2-hour overload rating of 4840 kW for the 

first 2 hours of the seven-day period and at 4400 kW for the remaining 166 hours 

of the seven-day period. 
8-6

TVA has evaluated the impact of frequency and voltage variation in the ranges of 59.8 to 

60.1 Hz and 6800 V to 7260 V, respectively for WBN Unit 2 equipment fed by the EDGs during 

a LOOP or LOCA/LOOP and proposed TSs. The NRC staff has reviewed TVA’s proposed TSs

and supporting documentation. Based on the evaluation discussed above, the staff determined 

that the proposed TSs related to the allowable steady state operating voltage and frequency 

band of the EDGs is consistent with the recommendations of the NRC guidance in RG 1.9 

Rev. 3. The NRC staff also concludes that the proposed TSs will meet the intent of GDC 17 

and 18 governing the design and operation of the onsite electrical power systems and provides 

adequate assurance of system operability. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed 

changes acceptable and consistent with the NRC regulations and the regulatory guidance, and 

considers Open Item 32 to be closed.
9-1

9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS

9.2 Water Systems

9.2.1 Essential Raw Cooling Water System

Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

Open Item 91

Open Item 91 states, “TVA should update the FSAR with information describing how WBN 

Unit 2 meets GDC 5, assuming the worst case single failure and a LOOP, as provided in TVA’s 

letter dated April 13, 2011.”

In FSAR Amendment 112 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14160A901), TVA updated the FSAR 

describing how WBN Unit 2 meets GDC 5. The NRC staff has reviewed these changes and 

found them to be acceptable. Therefore, Open Item 91 is closed.

9.2.2 Component Cooling System (Reactor Auxiliaries Cooling Water System)

Open Item 67

Open Item 67 states, “TVA should confirm, and the NRC staff should verify, that the component 

cooling booster pumps for Unit 2 are above PMF [probable maximum flood] level.”

By letter dated March 20, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14085A009), TVA stated that rather 

than relocating the component cooling system thermal barrier booster pumps above the PMF 

level, it is implementing a flood barrier modification to prevent water damage to both Unit 1 and 

Unit 2 pumps in the event of a PMF. The flooding barriers around the Unit 1 pumps have been 

installed and inspected by the NRC staff (Inspection Report 05000390/2014003), verifiying that 

the height of the barriers are greater than the proposed PMF level for WBN. The Unit 2 barriers 

are the same design as the Unit 1 barriers and have been verified to be partially installed. For 

Unit 2, a section of the barrier has been left open allowing access to the pump for 

pre-operational testing. The Unit 2 barrier will be fully installed prior to fuel load. The NRC staff 

considers Open Item 67 closed.

9.2.5 Ultimate Heat Sink

Open Item 66

Open Item 66 states, “TVA should clarify FSAR Section 9.2.5 to add the capability of the UHS 

[ultimate heat sink] to bring the nonaccident unit to cold shutdown within 72 hours.”

The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendment 105, to add 

clarification that the UHS is capable of bringing the nonaccident unit to cold shut down 

within 72 hours. Therefore, Open Item 66 is closed. 

10-1

10 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM

10.4 Other Features

Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

10.4.6 Condensate Cleanup System

Open Item 35

Open Item 35 states, “TVA should provide information to the NRC staff that the CCS 

[condensate cleanup system] will produce feedwater purity in accordance with BTP MTEB 5-3 

or, alternatively, provide justification for producing feedwater purity to another acceptable 

standard.”

TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendment 112, to include the statement “The plant 

chemistry program establishes the steam generator steam side and feedwater chemistry 

specifications for normal power operations. This program is based on EPRI [Electric 

Power Research Institute] PWR secondary water chemistry guidelines as detailed in the 

plant chemistry program.” The NRC staff finds this to be consistent with staff 

expectations for secondary water chemistry, as described in BTP MTEB 5-3. Therefore, 

Open Item 35 is closed. 

11-1

11 RADIOACTIVE WASTE SYSTEM

11.3 Gaseous Waste Management

Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

Open Item 139

Open Item 139 states, “The results of the cost-benefit analysis required by 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix I, subsection II.D, should be provided in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR. Upon receipt of the 

updated FSAR, the NRC staff will confirm that the update has been made by TVA.”

The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendment 109, to include the 

results of the cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, Open Item 139 is closed. 

12-1

12 RADIATION PROTECTION

Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

12.5 Dose Assessment

Open Item 115

Open Item 115 states, “TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the information regarding design 

changes to be implemented to lower radiation levels as provided in its letter [to] the NRC dated 

June 3, 2010.”

The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendments 105 and 109, to 

include the information previously provided in its letter dated June 3, 2010. Therefore, 

Open Item 115 is closed. 

12.7 NUREG-0737 Items

12.7.1 Plant Shielding (TMI Action Item II.B.2)

Open Item 117

Open Item 117 states, “TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the calculational basis for 

access to vital areas as provided in its letter dated February 25, 2011.”

The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendment 109, to include the 

information previously provided in its letter dated February 25, 2011. Therefore, Open 

Item 117 is closed. 

13-1

13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

13.1 Organizational Structure of Applicant

13.1.3 Plant Staff Organization

Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

Open Item 9

Open Item 9 states, “Confirm that education and experience of management and principal 

supervisory positions down through the shift supervisory level conform to Regulatory Guide 1.8.”

Per NRC Inspection Report 0500391/2014603, dated May 9, 2014 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML14129A381), the education and experience of management at Watts Bar were confirmed

to conform to the requirements of RG 1.8, regarding the management of Unit 2

post-construction. Therefore, Open Item 9 is closed.

Open Item 10

Open Item 10 states, “Confirm that TVA has an adequate number of licensed and non-licensed 

operators in the training pipeline to support the preoperational test program, fuel loading, and 

dual unit operation.”

Per NRC Inspection Report 0500391/2014603, dated May 9, 2014 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML14129A381), the applicant had enough qualified personnel to staff for dual unit operation. 

The applicant had enough reactor operators in the training pipeline to be able to staff the reactor

operator position with reactor operators (rather than with senior reactor operators) after the

June 2016 License Class. Therefore, Open Item 10 is closed.

25-1

25 QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION, OPERATIONAL READINESS, AND QUALITY

ASSURANCE EFFECTIVENESS

25.9 Program for Maintenance and Preservation of the Licensing Basis for Units 1 and 2

Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

Open Item 12

Open Item 12 (Appendix HH) states, “TVA’s implementation of NGDC PP-20 and EDCR 

[Engineering Document Construction Release] Appendix J is subject to future NRC audit and 

inspection.”

The NRC staff performed the audit at TVA from August 12 to August 14, 2014 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14323A562), to review the implementation of the licensing basis preservation 

program (NGDC PP-20) and EDCR Appendix J. Overall the NRC staff found that the licensing 

basis preservation program was being adequately implemented such that the program was 

providing its intended function. Therefore, Open Item 12 is closed.

A-1

APPENDIX A CHRONOLOGY OF RADIOLOGICAL REVIEW OF WATTS BAR

NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2, OPERATING LICENSE REVIEW

Public correspondence exchanged between the NRC and TVA during the review of the 

operating license application for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Units 1 and 2, is available 

through the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) or the 

Public Document Room (PDR). This correspondence includes that occurring subsequent to 

TVA’s letter notifying the NRC of its decision to reactivate construction of WBN Unit 2, which 

had been in a deferred status under the Commission’s Policy Statement on Deferred Plants. 

Web-based ADAMS (WBA) is the latest interface to ADAMS. This search engine enables 

searching the ADAMS repository of official agency records (Publicly Available Records System 

(PARS) and Public Legacy libraries) for publicly available regulatory guides, NUREG-series 

reports, inspection reports, Commission documents, correspondence, and other regulatory and 

technical documents written by NRC staff, contractors, and licensees. WBA permits full-text 

searching and enables users to view document images, download files, and print locally. New 

documents become accessible on the day they are published, and are released periodically 

throughout the day. ADAMS documents are provided in Adobe Portable Document Format 

(PDF). 

The NRC PDR reference staff is available to assist with ADAMS. Contact information for the 

PDR staff is on the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/contact-pdr.html.

E-1

APPENDIX E PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS TO SSER 27

D. Hoang, NRR/DE/EMCB

K. Hoffman, NRR/DE/EPNB

J. Kaizer, NRR/DSS/SNPB

S. Lingam, NRR/DORL/LPWB

G. S. Matharu, NRR/DE/EEEB

R. Mathew, NRR/DE/EEEB

S. Miranda, NRR/DSS/SRXB

M. Panicker, NRR/DSS/SNPB

J. Parillo, NRR/DRA/ARCB

R. Pedersen, NRR/DRA/ARCB

J. Poole, NRR/DORL/LPWB

G. Purciarello, NRR/DSS/SBPB

D. Rahn, NRR/DE/EICB

S. Ray, NRR/DE/EEEB

G. Singh, NRR/DE/EICB

M. Yoder, NRR/DE/ESGB

Z-1

APPENDIX Z SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR

REACTOR REGULATION REGARDING THE PRESERVICE 

INSPECTION PROGRAM

Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

3.0 EVALUATION OF PRESERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM PLAN

3.2 Review of ASME [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] Code and OM [Operation 

and Maintenance] Code Requirements.

3.2.3 Acceptability of the Examination Sample

Open Item 70

Open Item 70 states, “TVA should provide the revised WBN Unit 2 PSI [preservice inspection] 

program ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 Supports “Summary Tables,” to include numbers of 

components so that the NRC staff can verify that the numbers meet the reference ASME Code.”

By letter dated November 1, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 

(ADAMS) Accession No. ML12311A296), TVA submitted Revision 7 to the Preservice 

Inspection Program Plan. Revision 7 included new tables for Class 1, 2 and 3 non-exempt 

piping support distribution by system and type. In these new tables the licensee identified the 

number of supports in the population and the number of examinations required to complete the 

preservice examinations. The staff has reviewed these tables, and the supports identified for 

examination, and find that they meet the requirements of the 2001 Edition through the 2003 

Addenda of ASME Code, Section XI. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that Open Item 70 has 

satisfactorily been completed and is closed.

HH-1

APPENDIX HH WATTS BAR UNIT 2 ACTION ITEMS TABLE

This table provides a status of required action items associated of all open items, confirmatory 

issues, and proposed license conditions that the NRC staff has identified. Unless otherwise 

noted, the item references are to sections of this SSER. Items that are still open are listed first, 

and items that have been closed are listed second. Some numbers were not used in the 

sequential list. There are 22 items still open and 106 items that have been closed as of 

November 15, 2014.

Open Items

Item Type Action Required Lead Status

(1) CI Review evaluations and corrective actions 

associated with a power assisted cable pull. (NRC 

safety evaluation dated August 31, 2009, ADAMS 

Accession No. ML092151155)

NRR Open

(16) Based on the uniqueness of EQ, the NRC staff must 

perform a detailed inspection and evaluation prior to 

fuel load to determine how the WBN Unit 2 EQ 

program complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 

50.49. (SSER 22, Section 3.11.2) 

RII/NRR Open

(17) The NRC staff should verify the accuracy of the 

WBN Unit 2 EQ list prior to fuel load. (SSER 22, 

Section 3.11.2.1)

RII/NRR Open

(25) Prior to the issuance of an operating license, TVA is

required to provide satisfactory documentation that 

it has obtained the maximum secondary liability 

insurance coverage pursuant to 10 CFR 

140.11(a)(4), and not less than the amount required 

by 10 CFR 50.54(w) with respect to property 

insurance, and the NRC staff has reviewed and 

approved the documentation. (SSER 22, 

Section 22.3)

NRR Open

(30) TVA should confirm that all other safety-related 

equipment (in addition to the Class 1E motors) will 

have adequate starting and running voltage at the 

most limiting safety related components (such as 

motor operated valves, contactors, solenoid valves 

or relays) at the degraded voltage relay setpoint 

dropout setting. TVA should also confirm that the 

final Technical Specifications are properly derived 

from these analytical values for the degraded 

voltage settings. (SSER 22, Section 8.3.1.2) 

RII/NRR Open
HH-2

(33) CI TVA stated in Attachment 9 of its letter dated July 

31, 2010, that certain design change notices 

(DCNs) are required or anticipated for completion of

WBN Unit 2, and that these DCNs were unverified 

assumptions used in its analysis of the 125 VDC

vital battery system. Verification of completion of 

these DCNs to the NRC staff is necessary prior to 

issuance of the operating license. (SSER 22, 

Section 8.3.2.3; SSER 24, Section 8.1)

RII/NRR Open

(37) CI The NRC staff will review the combined WBN Unit 1 

and 2 Appendix C prior to issuance of the Unit 2 OL 

to confirm (1) that the proposed Unit 2 changes 

were incorporated into Appendix C, and (2) that 

changes made to Appendix C for Unit 1 since 

Revision 92 and the changes made to the NP-REP 

since Revision 92 do not affect the bases of the 

staff’s findings in this SER supplement. (SSER 22, 

Section 13.3.2) 

NSIR Open

(38) CI The NRC staff will confirm the availability and 

operability of the ERDS for Unit 2 prior to issuance 

of the Unit 2 OL. (SSER 22, Section 13.3.2.6) 

RII/NSIR Open

(40) CI The NRC staff will confirm the adequacy of the 

emergency facilities and equipment to support dual 

unit operations prior to issuance of the Unit 2 OL. 

(SSER 22, Section 13.3.2.8) 

RII/NSIR Open

(41) CI TVA committed to (1) update plant data displays as 

necessary to include Unit 2, and (2) to update dose 

assessment models to provide capabilities for 

assessing releases from both WBN units. The NRC 

staff will confirm the adequacy of these items prior 

to issuance of the Unit 2 OL. (SSER 22, Section 

13.3.2.9)

RII/NSIR Open

(43) CI Section V of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires 

TVA to submit its detailed implementing procedures 

for its emergency plan no less than 180 days before 

the scheduled issuance of an operating license. 

Completion of this requirement will be confirmed by 

the NRC staff prior to the issuance of an operating 

license. (SSER 22, Section 13.3.2.18) 

NSIR Open

(69) CI The WBN Unit 2 RCS vent system is acceptable, 

pending verification that the RCS vent system is 

installed. (SSER 23, Section 5.4.5) 

RII Open

(74) CI The NRC staff will verify installation of the acousticmonitoring system for the power-operated relief 

valve (PORV) position indication in WBN Unit 2 

before fuel load. (SSER 23, Section 7.8.1)

RII Open

(75) CI The NRC staff will verify that the test procedures 

and qualification testing for auxiliary feedwater 

initiation and control and flow indication are 

completed in WBN Unit 2 before fuel load. (SSER 

RII Open
HH-3

23, Section 7.8.2)

(79) TVA should perform a radiated susceptibility survey, 

after the installation of the hardware but prior to the 

RM-1000 being placed in service, to establish the 

need for exclusion distance for the HRCAR monitors 

while using handheld portable devices (e.g., walkietalkie) in the control room, as documented in 

Attachment 23 to TVA’s letter dated February 25, 

2011, and item number 355 of TVA’s letter dated 

April 15, 2011. (SSER 23, Section 7.5.2.3)

NRR Open

(83) CI TVA should confirm to the NRC staff the completion 

of the data storm test on the DCS. (SSER 23, 

Section 7.7.1.4)

NRR Open

(90) CI The NRC staff should verify that the ERCW dual 

unit flow balance confirms that the ERCW pumps

meet all specified performance requirements and 

have sufficient capability to supply all required 

ERCW normal and accident flows for dual unit 

operation and accident response, in order to verify 

that the ERCW pumps meet GDC 5 for two-unit 

operation. (SSER 23, Section 9.2.1)

RII/NRR Open

(134) TVA should provide to the NRC staff supporting 

technical justification for the statements in 

Amendment 104 of FSAR Section 2.4.4.1, “Dam 

Failure Permutations,” page 2.4-32 (in the section 

“Multiple Failures”) that, “Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and 

Watts Bar have previously been judged not to fail for 

the OBE (0.09 g). Postulation of Tellico failure in 

this combination has not been evaluated but is 

bounded by the SSE failure of Norris, Cherokee, 

Douglas and Tellico.” (SSER 24, Section 2.4.10)

NRR Open

(140) CI TVA to confirm to the staff the completion of the 

Unit 2 OMA feasibility walkdowns. (SSER 26, 

Appendix FF, Section 8.0)

NRR Open

(141) CI TVA to confirm to the staff the completion of the 

multiple spurious operation scenario resolution 

actions for scenarios which only affect Unit 2. 

(SSER 26, Appendix FF, Section 8.0)

NRR Open

(142) CI TVA to confirm to the staff the completion of the 

electrical coordination modifications. (SSER 26, 

Appendix FF, Section 8.0)

NRR Open

(143) CI TVA to confirm the as-built FPR aligns with asdesigned FPR. Gaps to be submitted to the NRC 

for approval. (SSER 26, Appendix FF, Section 8.0)

NRR Open
HH-4

Closed Items

(2) CI Conduct appropriate inspection activities to verify 

cable lengths used in calculations and analysis 

match as-installed configuration. (NRC safety 

evaluation dated August 31, 2009, ADAMS 

Accession No. ML092151155). Closed in 

Inspection Report 05000391/2013604, dated June 

27, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13179A079.

RII Closed

(3) CI Confirm TVA submitted update to FSAR section 

8.3.1.4.1. (NRC safety evaluation dated August 31, 

2009, ADAMS Accession No. ML092151155) 

Closed in SSER 24, Section 8.1.

NRR Closed

(4) CI Conduct appropriate inspection activities to verify 

that TVA’s maximum SWBP criteria for signal level 

and coaxial cables do not exceed the cable 

manufacturer’s maximum SWBP criteria. (NRC 

safety evaluation dated August 31, 2009, ADAMS 

Accession No. ML092151155) Closed in Inspection 

Report 0500391/2012602, dated March 27, 2012, 

ADAMS Accession No. ML12087A324.

RII Closed

(5) CI Verify timely submittal of pre-startup core map 

and perform technical review. (TVA letter dated 

September 7, 2007, ADAMS Accession No. 

ML072570676). By letter dated July 30, 2012, 

TVA provided the pre-startup core map. The 

staff has verified the information and has closed 

Appendix HH Open Items 5 and 8, which came 

from the review of BL 1996-01. 

NRR Closed

(6) CI Verify implementation of TSTF-449. (TVA letter 

dated September 7, 2007, ADAMS Accession No. 

ML072570676). Staff has reviewed Revision I to 

the proposed technical specifications and found that 

TSTF 449 has been incorporated.

NRR Closed

(7) CI Verify commitment completion and review electrical 

design calculations. (TVA letter dated October 9, 

1990, ADAMS Accession No. ML073551056). 

Closed in Inspection Report 05000391/2013610, 

dated February 14, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14049A158.

RII Closed

(8) CI TVA should provide a pre-startup map to the NRC 

staff indicating the rodded fuel assemblies and a 

projected end of cycle burnup of each rodded 

assembly for the initial fuel cycle 6-months prior to 

fuel load. (NRC safety evaluation dated May 3, 

2010, ADAMS Accession No. ML101200035). By 

letter dated July 30, 2012, TVA provided the 

pre-startup core map. The staff has verified the 

information and has closed Appendix HH Open 

NRR Closed
HH-5

Items 5 and 8, which came from the review of 

BL 1996-01.

(9) CI Confirm that education and experience of 

management and principal supervisory positions 

down through the shift supervisory level conform to 

Regulatory Guide 1.8. (SSER 22, Section 13.1.3). 

Closed in Inspection Report 0500391/2014603,

dated May 9, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14129A381.

RII Closed

(10) CI Confirm that TVA has an adequate number of 

licensed and non-licensed operators in the training 

pipeline to support the preoperational test program, 

fuel loading, and dual unit operation. (SSER 22, 

Section 13.1.3). Closed in Inspection Report 

0500391/2014603, dated May 9, 2014, ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14129A381.

RII Closed

(11) CI The plant administrative procedures should clearly 

state that, when the Assistant Shift Engineer 

assumes his duties as Fire Brigade Leader, his 

control room duties are temporarily assumed by the 

Shift Supervisor (Shift Engineer), or by another 

SRO, if one is available. The plant administrative 

procedures should clearly describe this transfer of 

control room duties. (SSER 22, Section 13.1.3) 

Closed in SSER 25, Section 13.1.3.

NRR Closed

(12) TVA’s implementation of NGDC PP-20 and EDCR 

Appendix J is subject to future NRC audit and 

inspection. (SSER 22, Section 25.9). Closed in 

SSER 27, Section 25.9

NRR Closed

(13) TVA is expected to submit an IST program and 

specific relief requests for WBN Unit 2 nine months 

before the projected date of OL issuance. 

(SSER 22, Section 3.9.6). Closed in SSER 27, 

Section 3.9.6.

NRR Closed

(14) TVA stated that the Unit 2 PTLR is included in the 

Unit 2 System Description for the Reactor Coolant 

System (WBN2-68-4001), which will be revised to 

reflect required revisions to the PTLR by

September 17, 2010. (SSER 22, Section 5.3.1) 

Closed in SSER 25, Section 5.3.1.

NRR Closed

(15) TVA should confirm to the NRC staff the completion 

of Primary Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) 

mitigation activities on the Alloy 600 dissimilar metal 

butt welds (DMBWs) in the primary loop piping. 

(SSER 22, Section 3.6.3) Closed in SSER 24, 

Section 3.6.3. 

NRR Closed

(18) Based on the extensive layup period of equipment 

within WBN Unit 2, the NRC staff must review, prior 

to fuel load, the assumptions used by TVA to 

re-establish a baseline for the qualified life of 

RII/NRR Closed
HH-6

equipment. The purpose of the staff’s review is to 

ensure that TVA has addressed the effects of 

environmental conditions on equipment during the 

layup period. (SSER 22, Section 3.11.2.2) Closed 

in Inspection Report 0500391/2011604, dated 

June 29, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. 

ML111810890.

(19) The NRC staff should complete its review of TVA’s 

EQ Program procedures for WBN Unit 2 prior to fuel 

load. (SSER 22, Section 3.11.2.2.1) Closed in 

Inspection Report 0500391/2011604, dated 

June 29, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. 

ML111810890.

RII/NRR Closed

(20) CI Resolve whether or not routine maintenance 

activities should result in increasing the EQ of the 

6.9 kV motors to Category I status in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.49. (SSER 22, Section 3.11.2.2.1; 

SSER 24, Section 8.1) Closed in Inspection Report 

0500391/2011605, dated August 5, 2011, ADAMS 

Accession No. ML112201418.

RII/NRR Closed

(21) The NRC staff should confirm that the Electrical 

Penetration Assemblies (EPAs) are installed in the 

tested configuration, and that the feedthrough 

module is manufactured by the same company and 

is consistent with the EQ test report for the EPA. 

(SSER 22, Section 3.11.2.2.1) Closed in Inspection 

Report 05000391/2011607, dated September 30, 

2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML112730197.

RII/NRR Closed

(22) TVA must clarify its use of the term “equivalent” 

(e.g., identical, similar) regarding the replacement 

terminal blocks to the NRC staff. If the blocks are 

similar, then a similarity analysis should be 

completed and presented to the NRC for review. 

(SSER 22, Section 3.11.2.2.1) Closed in SSER 24, 

Section 8.1.

NRR Closed

(23) Resolve whether or not TVA’s reasoning for not 

upgrading the MSIV solenoid valves to Category I is 

a sound reason to the contrary, as specified in 

10 CFR 50.49(l). (SSER 22, Section 3.11.2.2.1; 

SSER 24, Section 8.1). Closed in SSER 27, 

Section 3.11.2.2.1.

NRR Closed

(24) The NRC staff requires supporting documentation 

from TVA to justify its establishment of a mild 

environment threshold for total integrated dose of 

less than 1x103 rads for electronic components such 

as semiconductors or electronic components 

containing organic material. (SSER 22, Section 

3.11.2.2.1) Closed in SSER 24, Section 8.1.

NRR Closed
HH

-7

(26) For the scenario with an accident in one unit and 

concurrent shutdown of the second unit without 

offsite power, TVA stated that Unit 2 pre-operational 

testing will validate the diesel response to 

sequencing of loads on the Unit 2 emergency diesel 

generators (EDGs). The NRC staff will evaluate the 

status of this issue and will update the status of the 

EDG load response in a future SSER. (SSER 22, 

Section 8.1). Closed in SSER 27, Section 8.1.

NRR Closed

(27) TVA should provide a summary of margin studies 

based on scenarios described in Section 8.1 for 

CSSTs A, B, C, and D. (SSER 22, Section 8.2.2) 

Closed in SSER 24, Section 8.1. 

NRR Closed

(28) TVA should provide to the NRC staff a detailed 

discussion showing that the load tap changer is able 

to maintain the 6.9 kV bus voltage control band 

given the normal and post-contingency transmission 

operating voltage band, bounding voltage drop on 

the grid, and plant conditions. (SSER 22, 

Section 8.2.2) Closed in SSER 24, Section 8.1. 

NRR Closed

(29) TVA should provide information about the operating 

characteristics of the offsite power supply at the 

Watts Bar Hydro Plant (for dual-unit operation), 

including the operating voltage range, 

postcontingency voltage drops (including bounding 

values and post-unit trip values), and operating 

frequency range. (SSER 22, Section 8.2.2) 

(corrected version of Open Item 29 from SSER 22 

Appendix HH) Closed in SSER 24, Section 8.1.

NRR Closed

(31) TVA should clarify the loading sequence as 

explained in its letter dated December 6, 2010, to 

the staff. TVA should clarify whether the existing 

statements in FSAR regarding automatic 

sequencing logic are correct. If the FSAR 

description is correct, TVA should explain how the 

EDG and logic sequencing circuitry will respond to a 

LOCA followed by a LOOP scenario. (SSER 22, 

Section 8.3.1.11) (corrected version of Open Item 

31 from SSER 22 Appendix HH) Closed in 

SSER 24, Section 8.1 

NRR Closed

(32) TVA should provide to the NRC staff the details of 

the administrative limits of EDG voltage and speed 

range, and the basis for its conclusion that the 

impact is negligible, and describe how it accounts 

for the administrative limits in the Technical 

Specification surveillance requirements for EDG 

voltage and frequency. (SSER 22, Section 

8.3.1.14). Closed in SSER 27, Section 8.3.

NRR Closed
HH-8

(34) CI TVA stated that the method of compliance with 

Phase I guidelines would be substantially similar to 

the current Unit 1 program and that a new Section 

3.12 will be added to the Unit 2 FSAR that will be 

materially equivalent to Section 3.12 of the current 

Unit 1 FSAR. (SSER 22, Section 9.1.4) Closed in 

SSER 24, Section 9.1.4.

NRR Closed

(35) TVA should provide information to the NRC staff 

that the CCS will produce feedwater purity in 

accordance with BTP MTEB 5-3 or, alternatively, 

provide justification for producing feedwater purity to 

another acceptable standard. (SSER 22, Section 

10.4.6). Closed in SSER 27, Section 10.4.6.

NRR Closed

(36) TVA should provide information to the NRC staff to 

enable verification that the SGBS meets the 

requirements and guidance specified in the SER or 

provide justification that the SGBS meets other 

standards that demonstrate conformance to GDC 1 

and GDC 14. (SSER 22, Section 10.4.8) Closed in 

SSER 24, Section 10.4.8. 

NRR Closed

(39) CI The NRC staff will confirm the adequacy of the 

communications capability to support dual unit 

operations prior to issuance of the Unit 2 OL. 

(SSER 22, Section 13.3.2.6) Closed in Inspection 

Report 0500391/2011609, dated December 16, 

2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML11350A229. 

RII/NSIR Closed

(42) CI The NRC staff will confirm the adequacy of the 

accident assessment capabilities to support dual 

unit operations prior to issuance of the Unit 2 OL. 

(SSER 22, Section 13.3.2.9) Closed in Inspection 

Report 0500391/2011609, dated December 16, 

2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML11350A229.

RII/NSIR Closed

(44) TVA should provide additional information to clarify 

how the initial and irradiated RTNDT was 

determined. (SSER 22, Section 5.3.1) Closed in 

SSER 25, Section 5.3.1.

NRR Closed

(45) CI TVA stated in its response to RAI 5.3.2-2, dated 

July 31, 2010, that the PTLR would be revised to 

incorporate the COMS arming temperature. 

(SSER 22, Section 5.3.2) Closed in SSER 25, 

Section 5.3.2.

NRR Closed

(46) CI The LTOP lift settings were not included in the 

PTLR, but were provided in TVA’s response to RAI 

5.3.2-2 in its letter dated July 31, 2010. TVA stated 

in its RAI response that the PTLR would be revised 

to incorporate the LTOP lift settings into the PTLR. 

(SSER 22, Section 5.3.2) Closed in SSER 25, 

Section 5.3.2.

NRR Closed
HH-9

(47) CI The NRC staff noted that TVA’s changes to 

Section 6.2.6 in FSAR Amendment 97, regarding 

the implementation of Option B of Appendix J, were 

incomplete, because several statements remained 

regarding performing water-sealed valve leakage 

tests “as specified in 10 CFR [Part] 50, Appendix J.” 

With the adoption of Option B, the specified testing 

requirements are no longer applicable; Option A to 

Appendix J retains these requirements. The NRC 

discussed this discrepancy with TVA in a telephone 

conference on September 28, 2010. TVA stated 

that it would remove the inaccurate reference to 

Appendix J for specific water testing requirements in 

a future FSAR amendment. (SSER 22, Section 

6.2.6) Closed in SSER 26, Section 6.2.6.

NRR Closed

(48) CI The NRC staff should verify that its conclusions in 

the review of FSAR Section 15.4.1 do not affect the 

conclusions of the staff regarding the acceptability 

of Section 6.5.3. (SSER 22, Section 6.5.3) Closed 

in SSER 26, Section 6.5.3.

NRR Closed

(49) CI The NRC staff was unable to determine how TVA 

linked the training qualification requirements of 

ANSI N45.2-1971 to TVA Procedure TI-119. 

Therefore, the implementation of training and 

qualification for inspectors will be the subject of 

future NRC staff inspections. (NRC letter dated 

July 2, 2010, ADAMS Accession No. 

ML101720050). Closed in Inspection Report 

0500391/2014602, dated March 27, 2014, ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14086A063.

RII Closed

(50) CI TVA stated that about 5 percent of the anchor bolts 

for safety-related pipe supports do not have quality 

control documentation, because the pull tests have 

not yet been performed. Since the documentation is 

still under development, the NRC staff will conduct 

inspections to follow-up on the adequate 

implementation of this construction refurbishment 

program requirement. (NRC letter dated July 2, 

2010, ADAMS Accession No. ML101720050) 

Closed in Inspection Report 0500391/2013612, 

dated March 28, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. 

ML13088A066.

RII Closed

(51) CI The implementation of TVA Procedure TI-119 will 

be the subject of NRC follow-up inspection to 

determine if the construction refurbishment program 

requirements are being adequately implemented. 

(NRC letter dated July 2, 2010, ADAMS Accession 

No. ML101720050). Closed in Inspection Report 

0500391/2014602, dated March 27, 2014, ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14086A063.

RII Closed
HH-10

(52) 

through 

(58)

Not used.

(59) The staff’s evaluation of the compatibility of the ESF 

system materials with containment sprays and core 

cooling water in the event of a LOCA is incomplete 

pending resolution of GSI-191 for WBN Unit 2. 

(SSER 23, Section 6.1.1.4). Closed in SSER 27, 

Section 6.1.

NRR Closed

(60) CI TVA should amend the FSAR description of the 

design and operation of the spent fuel pool cooling 

and cleanup system in FSAR Section 9.1.3 as 

proposed in its December 21, 2010, letter to the 

NRC. (SSER 23, Section 9.1.3) Closed in 

SSER 26, Section 9.1.3.

NRR Closed

(61) TVA should provide information to the NRC staff to 

demonstrate that PAD 4.0 can conservatively 

calculate the fuel temperature and other impacted 

variables, such as stored energy, given the lack of a 

fuel thermal conductivity degradation model. (SSER 

23, Section 4.2.2). Closed in SSER 27, Section 4.2.

NRR Closed

(62) CI Confirm TVA’s change to FSAR Section 10.4.9 to 

reflect its intention to operate with each CST 

isolated from the other. (SSER 23, Section 10.4.9) 

Closed in SSER 24, Section 10.4.9.

NRR Closed

(63) CI TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that testing 

prior to Unit 2 fuel load has demonstrated that twoway communications is impossible with the Eagle 

21 communications interface. (SSER 23, Section 

7.2.1.1). Closed in SSER 27, Section 7.2.

RII Closed

(64) CI TVA stated that, “Post modification testing will be 

performed to verify that the design change corrects 

the Eagle 21, Rack 2 RTD accuracy issue prior to 

WBN Unit 2 fuel load.” This issue is open pending 

NRC staff review of the testing results. (SSER 23, 

Section 7.2.1.1). Closed in Inspection Report 

05000391/2014602, dated March 27, 2014, ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14086A063.

RII Closed

(65) TVA should provide justification to the staff 

regarding why different revisions of WCAP-13869 

are referenced in WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. (SSER 

23, Section 7.2.1.1) Closed in SSER 26, 

Section 7.2.1.1.

NRR Closed

(66) CI TVA should clarify FSAR Section 9.2.5 to add the 

capability of the UHS to bring the nonaccident unit 

to cold shutdown within 72 hours. (SSER 23, 

Section 9.2.5). Closed in SSER 27, Section 9.2.5.

NRR Closed

(67) CI TVA should confirm, and the NRC staff should 

verify, that the component cooling booster pumps 

for Unit 2 are above PMF level. (SSER 23, Section 

NRR Closed
HH-11

9.2.2). Closed in SSER 27, Section 9.2.2.

(68) Not used.

(70) TVA should provide the revised WBN Unit 2 PSI 

program ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 Supports 

“Summary Tables,” to include numbers of 

components so that the NRC staff can verify that the 

numbers meet the reference ASME Code. (Section 

3.2.3 of Appendix Z of SSER 23). Closed in 

SSER 27, Section 3.2.3 of Appendix Z.

NRR Closed

(71) By letter dated April 21, 2011 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML111110513), TVA withdrew its commitment 

to replace the Unit 2 clevis insert bolts. TVA should 

provide further justification for the decision to not 

replace the bolts to the NRC staff. (SSER 23, 

Section 3.9.5) Closed in SSER 26, Section 3.9.5.

NRR Closed

(72) The NRC staff should complete its review and 

evaluation of the additional information provided by 

TVA regarding the ICC instrumentation. (SSER 23, 

Section 4.4.8) Closed in SSER 25, Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(73) CI The NRC staff will inspect to confirm that TVA has 

completed the WBN Unit 2 EOPs prior to fuel load. 

(SSER 23, Section 7.5.3). Closed in Inspection 

Report 05000391/2014604, dated June 25, 2014, 

ADAMS Accession No. ML14177A214.

RII Closed

(76) CI The NRC staff will verify that the derivative time 

constant is set to zero in WBN Unit 2 before fuel 

load. (SSER 23, Section 7.8.3) Closed in 

Inspection Report 05000391/2011607, dated 

September 30, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. 

ML112730197.

RII Closed

(77) It is unclear to the NRC staff which software V&V 

documents are applicable to the HRCAR monitors. 

TVA should clarify which software V&V documents 

are applicable, in order for the staff to complete its 

evaluation. (SSER 23, Section 7.5.2.3) Closed in 

SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.3.4

NRR Closed

(78) TVA intends to issue a revised calculation reflecting 

that the TID in the control room is less than 1×103

rads, which will be evaluated by the NRC staff. 

(SSER 23, Section 7.5.2.3) Closed in SSER 25, 

Section 7.5.2.3.

NRR Closed

(80) TVA should provide clarification to the staff on how 

TVA Standard Specification SS-E18-14.1 meets the 

guidance of RG 1.180, and should address any 

deviations from the guidance of the RG. (SSER 23, 

Section 7.5.2.3). Closed in SSER 27, Section 

7.5.2.3.

NRR Closed
HH-12

(81) The extent to which TVA’s supplier, General 

Atomics (GA), complies with EPRI TR-106439 and 

the methods that GA used for its commercial 

dedication process should be provided by TVA to 

the NRC staff for review. (SSER 23, Section 

7.5.2.3) Closed in SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.3.4.

NRR Closed

(82) The staff concluded that the information provided by 

TVA pertaining to the in-containment LPMS 

equipment qualification for vibration was incomplete. 

TVA should provide (item number 362 of ADAMS 

Accession No. ML111050009), documentation that 

demonstrates the LPMS in-containment equipment 

has been qualified to remain functional in its normal 

operating vibration environment, per RG 1.133, 

Revision 1. (SSER 23, Section 7.6.1) Closed in 

SSER 24, Section 7.6.1.4.5.

NRR Closed

(84) 

through 

(89)

Not used.

(91) TVA should update the FSAR with information 

describing how WBN Unit 2 meets GDC 5, 

assuming the worst case single failure and a LOOP, 

as provided in TVA’s letter dated April 13, 2011. 

(SSER 23, Section 9.2.1). Closed in SSER 27, 

Section 9.2.1.

NRR Closed

(92) Not used.

(93) TVA should confirm to the staff that testing of the 

Eagle 21 system has sufficiently demonstrated that 

two-way communication to the ICS is precluded with 

the described configurations. (SSER 23, 

Section 7.9.3.2). Closed in SSER 27, Section 7.9.

RII Closed

(94) TVA should provide to the staff either information 

that demonstrates that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q 

PAMS meets the applicable requirements in IEEE 

Std. 603-1991, or justification for why the Common 

Q PAMS should not meet those requirements. 

(SSER 23, Section 7.5.2.2.3) Closed in SSER 26, 

Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(95) TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1, “Watts Bar 

Nuclear Plant NRC Regulatory Guide 

Conformance,” to reference IEEE Std. 603-1991 for 

the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. (SSER 23, 

Section 7.5.2.2.3) Closed in SSER 25, Section 

7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(96) TVA should (1) update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to include 

RG 1.100, Revision 3, for the Common Q PAMS, or 

(2) demonstrate that the Common Q PAMS is in 

conformance with RG 1.100, Revision 1, or provide 

justification for not conforming. (SSER 23, Section 

7.5.2.2.3) Closed in SSER 25, Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed
HH-13

(97) TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 

Common Q PAMS is in conformance with 

RG 1.153, Revision 1, or provide justification for not 

conforming. (SSER 23, Section 7.5.2.2.3) Closed 

in SSER 25, Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(98) TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 

Common Q PAMS is in conformance with 

RG 1.152, Revision 2, or provide justification for not 

conforming. (SSER 23, Section 7.5.2.2.3) Closed 

in SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.2.3.

NRR Closed

(99) TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference 

IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 as being applicable to the WBN 

Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. (SSER 23, Section 

7.5.2.2.3; SSER 25, Section 7.5.2.2) Closed in 

SSER 25, Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(100) TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference 

RG 1.168, Revision 1; IEEE 1012-1998; and IEEE 

1028-1997 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 

Common Q PAMS. (SSER 23, Section 7.5.2.2.3) 

Closed in SSER 25, Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(101) TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 

Common Q PAMS application software is in 

conformance with RG 1.168, Revision 1, or provide 

justification for not conforming. (SSER 23, Section 

7.5.2.2.3) Closed in SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(102) TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference 

RG 1.209 and IEEE Std. 323-2003 as being 

applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. 

(SSER 23, Section 7.5.2.2.3) Closed in SSER 25, 

Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(103) TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 

Common Q PAMS conforms to RG 1.209 and IEEE 

Std. 323-2003, or provide justification for not 

conforming. (SSER 23, Section 7.5.2.2.3) Closed 

in SSER 25, Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(104) CI The NRC staff will review the WEC self assessment 

to verify that it the WBN Unit 2 PAMS is compliant to 

the V&V requirements in the SPM or that deviations 

from the requirements are adequately justified. 

(SSER 23, Section 7.5.2.2.3.4.2) Closed in 

SSER 25, Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(105) TVA should produce an acceptable description of 

how the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SysRS and 

SRS implement the design basis requirements of 

IEEE Std. 603-1991 Clause 4. (SSER 23, 

Section 7.5.2.2.3.4.3.1) Closed in SSER 26, 

Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(106) TVA should produce a final WBN Unit 2 Common Q 

PAMS SRS that is independently reviewed. 

(SSER 23, Section 7.5.2.2.3.4.3.1) Closed in 

NRR Closed
HH-14

SSER 25, Section 7.5.2.2.

(107) CI TVA should provide to the NRC staff documentation 

to confirm that the final WBN Unit 2 Common Q 

PAMS SDDs that are independently reviewed. 

(SSER 23, Section 7.5.2.2.3.4.3.2) Closed in 

SSER 25, Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(108) TVA should demonstrate to the NRC staff that there 

are no synergistic effects between temperature and 

humidity for the Common Q PAMS equipment. 

(SSER 23, Section 7.5.2.2.3.5.2) Closed in 

SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(109) TVA should demonstrate to the NRC staff 

acceptable data storm testing of the Common Q 

PAMS. (SSER 23, Section 7.5.2.2.3.7.1.8) Closed 

in SSER 25, Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(110) TVA should provide information to the NRC staff 

describing how the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS 

design supports periodic testing of the RVLIS 

function. (SSER 23, Section 7.5.2.2.3.9.2.6) Closed 

in SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(111) TVA should confirm to the staff that there are no 

changes required to the technical specifications as a 

result of the modification installing the Common Q 

PAMS. If any changes to the technical 

specifications are required, TVA should provide the 

changes to the NRC staff for review. (SSER 23, 

Section 7.5.2.2.3.11) Closed in SSER 26, 

Section 7.5.2.2.

NRR Closed

(112) CI TVA should provide an update to the FSAR 

reflecting the radiation protection design features 

descriptive information provided in its letter dated 

October 4, 2010. (SSER 24, Section 12.4) Closed 

in SSER 26, Section 12.4.

NRR Closed

(113) CI TVA should provide an update to the FSAR 

reflecting the justification for the periodicity of the 

COT frequency for WBN non-safety related area 

radiation monitors. (SSER 24, Section 12.4) 

Closed in SSER 26, Section 12.4.

NRR Closed

(114) CI TVA should update the FSAR to reflect that WBN 

meets the radiation monitoring requirements of 

10 CFR 50.68. (SSER 24, Section 12.4) Closed in 

SSER 26, Section 12.4.

NRR Closed

(115) CI TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the 

information regarding design changes to be 

implemented to lower radiation levels as provided in 

its letter the NRC dated June 3, 2010. (SSER 24, 

Section 12.5). Closed in SSER 27, Section 12.5

NRR Closed
HH-15

(116) CI TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the 

qualification standards of the RPM as provided in its 

letter to the NRC dated October 4, 2010. 

(SSER 24, Section 12.6) Closed in SSER 26, 

Section 12.6.

NRR Closed

(117) CI TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the 

calculational basis for access to vital areas as 

provided in its letter dated February 25, 2011. 

(SSER 24, Section 12.7.1). Closed in SSER 27, 

Section 12.7.1

NRR Closed

(118) TVA should provide to the NRC staff a description of 

how the other vanadium detectors within the IITA 

would be operable following the failure of an SPND. 

(SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.2) Closed in SSER 26, 

Section 7.7.1.9.

NRR Closed

(119) TVA should submit WNA-CN-00157-WBT, 

Revision 0, to the NRC by letter. The NRC staff 

should confirm by review of WNA-CN-00157-WBT, 

Revision 0, that no credible source of faulting can 

negatively impact the CETs or PAMS train. 

(SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5) Closed in SSER 25, 

Section 7.7.1.9.

NRR Closed

(120) TVA must confirm to the NRC staff that the 

maximum over-voltage or surge voltage that could 

affect the system is 264 VAC, assuming that the 

power supply cable to the SPS cabinet is not routed 

with other cables greater than 264 VAC. (SSER 24, 

Section 7.7.1.9.5; SSER 25, Section 7.7.1.9) 

Closed in SSER 26, Section 7.7.1.9.

NRR Closed

(121) TVA should submit the results to the NRC staff of a 

600 VDC dielectric strength test performed on the 

IITA assembly. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5) 

Closed in SSER 26, Section 7.7.1.9.

NRR Closed

(122) TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that different 

divisions of safety power are supplied to the IIS SPS 

cabinets, with the power cables routed in separate 

shielded conduits. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5) 

Closed in SSER 25, Section 7.7.1.9.

NRR Closed

(123) TVA should provide an explanation to the NRC staff 

of how the system will assign a data quality value to 

notify the power distribution calculation software to 

disregard data from a failed SPND. (SSER 24, 

Section 7.7.1.9.5) Closed in SSER 26, Section 

7.7.1.9.

NRR Closed

(124) While the BEACON datalink on the Application 

server can connect to either BEACON machine, 

only BEACON A is used for communication. TVA 

should clarify to the NRC staff whether automatic 

switchover to the other server is not permitted. 

(SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5) Closed in SSER 25, 

NRR Closed
HH-16

Section 7.7.1.9.

(125) TVA should provide clarification to the NRC staff of 

the type of connector used with the MI cable in 

Unit 2, and which EQ test is applicable. (SSER 24, 

Section 7.7.1.9.5) Closed in SSER 26,

Section 7.7.1.9.

NRR Closed

(126) To enable the NRC staff to evaluate and review the 

IITA environmental qualification, TVA should 

provide the summary report of the environmental 

qualification for the IITA. (SSER 24, 

Section 7.7.1.9.5) Closed in SSER 26, 

Section 7.7.1.9.

NRR Closed

(127) TVA should provide a summary to the NRC staff of 

the electro-magnetic interference/radio-frequency 

interference (EMI/RFI) testing for the MI cable 

electro-magnetic compatibility (EMC) qualification 

test results. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5) Closed 

in SSER 26, Section 7.7.1.9.

NRR Closed

(128) TVA should submit the seismic qualification test 

report procedures and results for the SPS cabinets 

to the NRC staff for review. (SSER 24, 

Section 7.7.1.9.5) Closed in SSER 25, 

Section 7.7.1.9.

NRR Closed

(129) TVA should verify to the NRC staff resolution of the 

open item in WNA-CN-00157-WBT for the Quint 

power supply (to be installed in the SPS cabinet) to 

undergo EMC testing of 4 kV to validate the 

assumptions made in the Westinghouse analysis. 

(SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5) Closed in SSER 26, 

Section 7.7.1.9.

NRR Closed

(130) TVA should provide a summary to the NRC staff of 

the EMC qualification test results of the SPS 

cabinets. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5) Closed in 

SSER 25, Section 7.7.1.9.

NRR Closed

(131) TVA should review the EOP action level setpoint to 

account for the difference between core exit 

temperature readings for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and 

confirm the EOP action level setpoint to the NRC 

staff. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5). Closed in 

SSER 27, Section 7.7.

NRR Closed

(132) TVA must provide the NRC staff with analyses of 

the boron dilution event that meet the criteria of 

SRP Section 15.4.6, including a description of the 

methods and procedures used by the operators to 

identify the dilution path(s) and terminate the 

dilution, in order for the staff to determine that the 

analyses comply with GDC 10. (SSER 24, 

Section 15.2.4.4) Closed in SSER 26, 

Section 15.2.4.4.

NRR Closed
HH-17

(133) In order to confirm the stability analysis of the sand 

baskets used by TVA in the WBN Unit 2 licensing 

basis, TVA will perform either a hydrology analysis 

without crediting the use of the sand baskets at the 

Fort Loudoun Dam for the seismic dam failure and

flood combination, or TVA will perform a seismic 

test of the sand baskets, as stated in TVA’s letter 

dated April 20, 2011. TVA will report the results of 

this analysis or test to the NRC by 

October 31, 2011. (SSER 24, Section 2.4.10). 

Closed in SSER 27, Section 2.4.10.

NRR Closed

(135) TVA has not provided the analysis required by 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, subsection II.D. TVA 

must demonstrate with a cost-benefit analysis that a 

sufficient reduction in the collective dose to the 

public within a 50-mile radius would not be achieved 

by reasonable changes to the design of the WBN 

gaseous effluent processing systems. (SSER 24, 

Section 11.3) Closed in SSER 25, Section 11.3.

NRR Closed

(136) CI The JFD summary for the data from 1991 through 

2010 provided by letter dated November 7, 2011, 

and a discussion of the long-term 

representativeness of these data should be 

provided in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR. Upon receipt of 

the updated FSAR, the NRC staff will confirm that 

these updates have been made by TVA. (SSER 25, 

Section 2.3.3) Closed in SSER 26, Section 2.3.3.

NRR Closed

(137) CI The NRC staff will confirm, upon receipt, that TVA 

integrated the updated CR χ/Q values from its letter 

dated September 15, 2011, into a future 

amendment of the FSAR. (SSER 25, Section 2.3.4) 

Closed in SSER 26, Section 2.3.4.

NRR Closed

(138) CI Upon receipt of the updated ODCM, the NRC staff 

will confirm that corresponding revisions related to 

the updated annual average χ/Q and D/Q values 

have been made to the ODCM. (SSER 25, 

Section 2.3.5) Closed in SSER 26, Section 2.3.5.

NRR Closed

(139) CI The results of the cost-benefit analysis required by 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, subsection II.D, should 

be provided in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR. Upon receipt 

of the updated FSAR, the NRC staff will confirm that 

the update has been made by TVA. (SSER 25, 

Section 11.3). Closed in SSER 27, Section 11.3

NRR Closed

CI – Confirmatory Issue






UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

------------------

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
NUREG

-0847

Supplement 27

Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of 

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2