alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2013260EN.01004101.xml

| 7.9.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 260/41 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.9.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 260/41

---

Order of the General Court of 4 July 2013 — Just Music Fernsehbetriebs GmbH v OHIM — France Télécom (Jukebox)

(Case T-589/10) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Revocation of the earlier Community mark - No need to adjudicate)

2013/C 260/72

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Just Music Fernsehbetriebs GmbH (Landshut, Germany) (represented by: T. Kaus, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: P. Geroulakos, acting as Agent)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervening before the General Court: France Télécom (Paris, France) (represented by: C. Bertheux Scotte, lawyer)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervening before the General Court:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 14 October 2010 (Case R 1408/2009-1), concerning opposition proceedings between France Télécom and Just Music Fernsehbetriebs GmbH.

Operative part

Operative part

| 1. | There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

| 2. | Just Music Fernsehbetriebs GmbH and France Télécom shall bear their own costs and shall each pay half of the costs incurred by the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Just Music Fernsehbetriebs GmbH and France Télécom shall bear their own costs and shall each pay half of the costs incurred by the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM).

---

(1)  OJ C 72, 5.3.2011.

1

---
#### § 367.12 Payroll distribution.

Underlying accounting data must be maintained so that the distribution of the cost of labor charged direct to the various accounts will be readily available. The underlying data must permit a reasonably accurate distribution to be made of the cost of labor charged initially to clearing accounts so that the total labor cost may be classified among construction, cost of removal, or operating functions.
#### § 1315.410 Enforcement.

The head of each agency shall take such actions as are necessary to ensure that the provisions herein are vigorously implemented and enforced in that agency.
### §3611. Additional remedies

#### (a) Suits at law or equity

Unless otherwise limited as in section 3607 or 3608 of this title, any person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter may sue at law or in equity.

#### (b) Recovery of actual damages

In any action authorized by this section for a violation of section 3607 or 3609 of this title where actual damages have been suffered, such damages may be awarded or such other relief granted as deemed fair, just, and equitable.

#### (c) Contribution

Every person who becomes liable to make any payment under this section may recover contributions from any person who if sued separately, would have been liable to make the same payment.

#### (d) Amounts recoverable; defendant's attorneys' fees

The amounts recoverable under this section may include interest paid, reasonable attorneys' fees, independent engineer and appraisers' fees, and court costs. A defendant may recover reasonable attorneys' fees if the court determines that the cause of action filed by the plaintiff is frivolous, malicious, or lacking in substantial merit.

(Pub. L. 96–399, title VI, §612, Oct. 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 1679.)
Connecticut Staff Call Questions

September 25, 2014

1. Can EPA define Renewable Energy?

a. How will EPA treat Fuel Cells?

b. How will EPA treat municipal waste recovery facilities?

2. How did EPA determine the amount of RE credited to each state based on the EIA form data; 

seems there was a distinction drawn between biogenic and non-biogenic generation for 

biomass.?

a. How were Connecticut’s municipal waste recovery facilities counted?  appears only 

50% of their generation counted  error appears to come from how data is reported to 

EIA (i.e. biogenic vs. non-biogenic)

3. What data source did EPA use for Connecticut’s “existing biomass” in the alternative RE 

approach?

a. It appears EPA included only landfill gas, though numbers were slightly lower than 

generation data in EIA  what was EPA’s source for data?

4. What data did EPA use for Connecticut’s “other generation” and “other emissions” in the goal 

calculation  Connecticut can’t reproduce EPA’s numbers –

5. How did EPA calculate the RE goal when including existing hydro?

a. Appears EPA did not recalculate growth rate and therefore numbers are not correct

6. Can EPA explain the hydro calculations in the alternative RE goal calculation?  The data in the 

referenced study has different numbers than what EPA used in the TSD Data File. Issue appears 

to be a translation of the data.

7. Can EPA explain Connecticut’s total 2012 generation data used in the EE goal 

calculation?  There appears to be some double counting, counting of non-generation data, 

and counting of Indian Territory generation (Mohegan Tribal Utility Authority).
#### § 91.14 Other movements and conditions.

The Administrator may, upon request in specific cases, permit the exportation of livestock not otherwise provided for in this part under such conditions as he or she may prescribe in each specific case to prevent the spread of livestock diseases and to ensure the humane treatment of the animals during transport to the importing country.
#### § 96.4 Uncertified animal casings; disposition.

Animal casings which are unaccompanied by the required certificate, those shipped in sheepskins or other skins as containers, and those found upon inspection to be unclean or unsound when offered for importation into the United States shall be kept in customs custody until exported or destroyed, or until disinfected and denaturated as prescribed by the Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) in §§ 96.5 through 96.16.

[28 FR 5986, June 13, 1963. Redesignated and amended at 57 FR 28082, 28083, June 24, 1992; 57 FR 29785, July 7, 1992. Redesignated and amended at 58 FR 47031, Sept. 7, 1993]
---

Exhibit 32.1
 Certification of Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of NutraCea (the “Company”) for the period ended March 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), each of the undersigned, in the capacities and on the date indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:
 1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Company.
  Dated:  March 31, 2011/s/ W. John ShortW. John ShortChief Executive Officer
  /s/ Dale BeltJerry Dale BeltChief Financial Officer
  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
  The foregoing certification is being furnished in accordance with Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-47551 and shall not be considered filed as part of the Form 10-Q.
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Kathryn B. McGuire, Also Known as Katherine B. McGuire McCann, Deceased. Chester McGuire, Respondent; Philip McGuire et al., Appellants.

[824 NYS2d 385]

In a contested probate proceeding, the objectants appeal from (1) an order of the Surrogate’s Court, Rockland County (Resnik, A.S.), dated May 27, 2005, which denied their motion for summary judgment, granted the petitioner’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the first and second objections to probate and, upon searching the record, dismissed the third objection to probate, and (2) a decree of the same court dated June 21, 2005, which, upon the order, dismissed the objections and admitted the will to probate.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the decree is affirmed; and it is further,

*590Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the petitioner.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of the decree in the proceeding *(see Matter of Aho,*39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the decree.

The decedent bequeathed approximately $3,000,000 of her money and possessions, in the will in question, to the petitioner and his family. The objectants filed three objections to the probate of the will, asserting that the will was not executed as required by the law, that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed, and that the will was the product of undue influence by the petitioner and his wife. The objectants moved for summary judgment revoking the preliminary letters testamentary issued to the petitioner and dismissing the petition to admit the will to probate on the ground, inter alia, that the will was the product of undue influence. The petitioner cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the objections relating to due execution and testamentary capacity. The Surrogate’s Court denied the object-ants’ motion, granted the petitioner’s cross motion, searched the record and dismissed the objection alleging undue influence, and admitted the will to probate.

In opposition to that branch of the objectants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the petition based on allegations of undue influence, the petitioner demonstrated, prima facie, that the will was not the product of undue influence *(see Matter of Walther,*6 NY2d 49, 55; *Matter of Herman,*289 AD2d 239, 240 [2001]). In opposition to this prima facie demonstration, the objectants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Thus, the Surrogate’s Court properly dismissed that objection to the admission of the will to probate.

The objectants’ remaining contentions are without merit. Miller, J.P., Ritter, Spolzino and Dillon, JJ, concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.2

                            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT 
                         CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


Nutrition for Life International, Inc.
Houston, Texas


We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statement Form S-8 of our report dated November 1, 1996, except Notes 7 and 8,
which are dated December 4, 1996, relating to the consolidated financial
statements and schedules of Nutrition for Life International, Inc. appearing in
the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended September 30,
1996.





                                                  BDO Seidman, LLP


Houston, Texas
January 28, 1997
# C_2012399EN.01001802.xml

| 22.12.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 399/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.12.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 399/18

---

Judgment of the General Court of 8 November 2012 — Hungary v Commission

(Case T-194/10) (1)

1

(Action for annulment - Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 - Regulation (EC) No 607/2009 - E-Bacchus database - Registration of the protected designation of origin ‘Vinohradnícka oblast’ Tokaj’, in respect of Slovakia - Measure not subject to review - Inadmissibility)

2012/C 399/31

Language of the case: Hungarian

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Hungary (represented initially by J. Fazekas, M. Fehér and K. Szíjjártó, then by M. Fehér and K. Szíjjártó, acting as Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: B. Schima, V. Bottka and M. Vollkommer, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Intervener in support of the defendant: Slovak Republic (represented by: B. Ricziová, acting as Agent)

Intervener in support of the defendant

Re:

Re:

Action for annulment of the registration of the protected designation of origin ‘Vinohradnícka oblasť Tokaj’, with Slovakia indicated as country of origin, in the electronic register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications for wine (the E-Bacchus database).

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action as inadmissible; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action as inadmissible;

| 2. | Orders Hungary to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Hungary to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

| 3. | Orders the Republic of Slovakia to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Republic of Slovakia to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 195, 17.7.2010.

1

---
# C_2013225EN.01001701.xml

| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 225/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 225/17

---

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 13 June 2013 — HGA Srl. and Others v European Commission

(Joined Cases C-630/11 P to C-633/11 P) (1)

1

(Appeals - Regional State aid - Aid to the hotel industry in Sardinia - New aid - Alteration to an existing aid scheme - Corrective decision - Possibility of adopting such a decision - Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 - Articles 4(5), 7(6), 10(1), 13(2), 16 and 20(1) - Incentive effect of the aid - Protection of legitimate expectations)

2013/C 225/27

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Parties

Appellants: HGA Srl., Gimar srl, Coghene Costruzioni srl, Camping Pini e Mare di Cogoni Franco & C. Sas, Immobiliare 92 srl, Gardena srl, Hotel Stella 2000 srl, Vadis srl, Macpep srl, San Marco srl, Due lune SpA, Hotel Mistral di Bruno Madeddu & C. Sas, L’Esagono di Mario Azara & C. Snc, Le Buganville srl, (formerly Le Buganville di Cogoni Giuseppe & C. Snc), Le Dune srl, (formerly Le Dune di Stefanelli Vincenzo & C. Snc) (represented by: G. Dore, F. Ciulli and A. Vinci, avvocati) (C-630/11 P), Regione autonoma della Sardegna (represented by: A. Fantozzi and G. Mameli, avvocati) (C-631/11 P), Timsas srl (represented by: D. Dodaro and S. Pinna, avvocati) (C-632/11 P), Grand Hotel Abi d’Oru SpA (represented by: D. Dodaro and R. Masuri, avvocati) (C-633/11 P)

Appellants:

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: D. Grespan, C. Urraca Caviedes and G. Conte, Agents)

Other party to the proceedings:

Re:

Re:

Appeal against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 20 September 2011 in Case T-394/08 Regione autonoma della Sardegna and Others v Commission by which that court dismissed the applications for annulment of Commission Decision 2008/854/EC of 2 July 2008 concerning aid schemes ‘Regional Law No 9 of 1998 — Misapplication of aid No 272/98’ (OJ 2008 L 302, p. 9) by which the Regione autonoma della Sardegna granted subsidies for initial investments in the hotel industry in Sardinia — Obligation to state reasons — Principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations

Regione autonoma della Sardegna and Others

Commission

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeals; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeals;

| 2. | Orders the appellants, jointly and severally, to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the appellants, jointly and severally, to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 118, 21.4.2012.

1

---
# C_2011204EN.01002203.xml

| 9.7.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 204/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.7.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 204/22

---

Judgment of the General Court of 24 May 2011 — Longevity Health Products v OHIM — Tecnifar (E-PLEX)

(Case T-161/10) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for Community word mark E-PLEX - Earlier national word mark EPILEX - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Similarity of the signs - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

2011/C 204/40

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Longevity Health Products, Inc. (Nassau, Bahamas) (represented by: J. Korab, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: R. Pethke, Agent)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM: Tecnifar — Industria Tecnica Farmaceutica, SA (Lisbon, Portugal)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM:

Re:

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 5 February 2010 (Case R 662/2009-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Tecnifar — Industria Tecnica Farmaceutica, SA and Longevity Health Products, Inc.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Longevity Health Products, Inc. to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Longevity Health Products, Inc. to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 148, 5.6.2010.

1

---
### §5714. Definitions

For purposes of this subchapter:

(1) The term "pay-per-call services" has the meaning provided in section 228(i) of title 47, except that the Commission by rule may, notwithstanding subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section 228(i)(1) of title 47, extend such definition to other similar services providing audio information or audio entertainment if the Commission determines that such services are susceptible to the unfair and deceptive practices that are prohibited by the rules prescribed pursuant to section 5711(a) of this title.

(2) The term "attorney general" means the chief legal officer of a State.

(3) The term "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and any territory or possession of the United States.

(4) The term "Commission" means the Federal Trade Commission.

(Pub. L. 102–556, title II, §204, Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 4191; Pub. L. 104–104, title VII, §701(b)(1), Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 147.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1996—Par. (1). Pub. L. 104–104 amended par. (1) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (1) read as follows: "The term 'pay-per-call services' has the meaning provided in section 228 of title 47."
Exhibit
23





Consent
of Auditors







CONSENT
OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





We
consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement (No.
33-87234) on Form S-8 of First Bancshares, Inc. of our report dated September
24, 2009 relating to our audit of the consolidated financial statements, which
appear in the Annual Report to Shareholders, which is incorporated in this
Annual Report on Form 10-K of First Bancshares, Inc. as of and for the year
ended June 30, 2009.







/s/McGladrey
& Pullen, LLP





Kansas
City, Missouri


September
28, 2009
§ 157.201 Applicability. ( a ) *Scope.* This subpart establishes a procedure whereby an interstate pipeline may obtain a blanket certificate authorizing certain construction and operation of facilities and certain certificate amendments and abandonment under section 7 of the Natural Gas Act.
( b ) *Who may apply.* This procedure is only applicable to interstate pipelines.
( c ) *Cross-reference.* The procedures applicable to transportation by interstate pipelines under blanket certificates are set forth in subpart G of part 284 of this chapter.
( d ) *Availability of case-specific certificates.* Nothing in this subpart shall preclude an interstate pipeline from proceeding under any other provision of the Commission's regulations to obtain Commission approval of abandonments or a temporary or permanent certificate of public convenience and necessity.
[Order 234, 47 FR 24266, June 4, 1982, as amended by Order 436, 50 FR 42490, Oct. 18, 1985; Order 603, 64 FR 26606, May 14, 1999]
### §657n. Immediate Disaster Assistance program

#### (a) Program required

The Administrator shall carry out a program, to be known as the Immediate Disaster Assistance program, under which the Administration participates on a deferred (guaranteed) basis in 85 percent of the balance of the financing outstanding at the time of disbursement of the loan if such balance is less than or equal to $25,000 for businesses affected by a disaster.

#### (b) Eligibility requirement

To receive a loan guaranteed under subsection (a), the applicant shall also apply for, and meet basic eligibility standards for, a loan under subsection (b) or (c) of section 636 of this title.

#### (c) Use of proceeds

A person who receives a loan under subsection (b) or (c) of section 636 of this title shall use the proceeds of that loan to repay all loans guaranteed under subsection (a), if any, before using the proceeds for any other purpose.

#### (d) Loan terms

#### (1) No prepayment penalty

There shall be no prepayment penalty on a loan guaranteed under subsection (a).

#### (2) Repayment

A person who receives a loan guaranteed under subsection (a) and who is disapproved for a loan under subsection (b) or (c) of section 636 of this title, as the case may be, shall repay the loan guaranteed under subsection (a) not later than the date established by the Administrator, which may not be earlier than 10 years after the date on which the loan guaranteed under subsection 1 is disbursed.

#### (e) Approval or disapproval

The Administrator shall ensure that each applicant for a loan under the program receives a decision approving or disapproving of the application within 36 hours after the Administration receives the application.

(Pub. L. 85–536, §2[42], as added Pub. L. 110–234, title XII, §12084, May 22, 2008, 122 Stat. 1420, and Pub. L. 110–246, §4(a), title XII, §12084, June 18, 2008, 122 Stat. 1664, 2182.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Pub. L. 110–234 and Pub. L. 110–246 enacted identical sections. Pub. L. 110–234 was repealed by section 4(a) of Pub. L. 110–246.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Enactment of this section and repeal of Pub. L. 110–234 by Pub. L. 110–246 effective May 22, 2008, the date of enactment of Pub. L. 110–234, see section 4 of Pub. L. 110–246, set out as a note under section 8701 of Title 7, Agriculture.

1 So in original. Probably should be "subsection (a)".
§ 1301.51 Purpose and scope. ( a ) *Purpose.* This part sets forth the procedures to be followed when TVA or a TVA employee is served with a demand to provide testimony and/or produce or disclose official information or records in a legal proceeding in which TVA or the United States is not a party, and where such appearance arises out of, or is related to, the individual's employment with TVA.
( b ) *Scope.* This part applies when, in a judicial, administrative, legislative, or other legal proceeding, a TVA employee is served with a demand to provide testimony concerning information acquired in the course of performing official duties or because of official status and/or to produce official information and/or records.