NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0620n.06 F iled: August 24, 2007 No. 06-5701 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA , P laintif f-App ellee,

v. JODY WAYNE COM P TON, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DI STR IC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEF OR E: KEITH , M OORE, a nd C OLE, Ci r c uitJudg e s. DAMON J. K

EITH , Circuit Judge

. Def endant- Appellant Jody

Way ne Compton (“Compton”) w as ch ar ged in a one-count indictment in conne ction with a ca rjac king, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119 and 2. After a jury trial, Compton was convicted a nd sentenc ed to 180 months of imprisonment. Compton now appeals his conviction, claiming there was i nsufficie nt evidence to sustain his conviction. I n particula r, C ompton argues t hat he lac ked the spe cific intent re quired to be convicted under the carjac king statute. For the re asons that follow, we AF F IRM Compton’s conviction. I. BACKG ROUNDNo. 06-5701

United States v. Compton Pag e 2

The re cord indicates that Clarenc e Ove rbay was in his seventies. Ha y nes had be friende d 1 him, and he would help he r out by providing her f

ood and a pla ce to stay

when she had nowhe re else to g o. Gr ee r t es t i fi edt h at Ov er

b ay ’s d au gh t er

s p ec i fi ca l l y

i n s t ru ct edh er

“t h at n o o n e w as t o go 2 in [h e r f a the r’ s] a pa rt me nt g e tti ngdr

un k o r p a rt

y ingor ste a lin g of

f o f h im a nd to t e ll the m to leave [.] ” (J.A. at 34). Def endant- Appellant Compton and h i s co-de fenda nt Ang ela Ha

y nes (“ Hay

nes”) wer e char ged with car

jacking . Hay

nes subseque ntly

pled g uilty

to car jacking pursuant to a plea

a g re e me nt. Com

pto n w a s tr ie d a

nd c on vic te d b y

a jur y . A c c or din g to t

he te sti mony

a t tr ia l, i n addition to a surveillance video that ca ptured the entire incident, the following fac ts were reve aled. On Marc h 14, 2005, Compton and Hay nes we re r iding in Compton’s Uncle’ s car in searc h of a pla ce to ha v e sex . Their se arc h ended pr emature ly when the br akes on the car overhe ated. Compton and Hay

n es t h en p ro cee ded, by

g etting a ride, to the re sidence of Clare nce O verba y (“ Ov e rb ay ” ), a pla c e Ha

y ne s wou ld of

te n g o to dri nk liq

uo r a nd e a t f oo d. Ov e rb a y

liv e d th re e to 1 four miles fr om where the ca r malfunc tioned. Upon arriving at Over bay ’s re sidence , Compton and Hay nes beg an drinkin g an d s i t t ing a round the a

partment. While at the re sidence , Ba rbar a Gr eer (“G ree r”) , Over

bay ’s ca retaker ( who was a lso responsible for c leaning his home), orde red Compton and Ha y nes to leave or she would call the police. After leaving Over

bay ’s re sidence , Compton and 2 Ha y ne s te le ph on e d s ome fr ie nd s to ge t a ride ba c k to the ma lf un c tio ne d c a r. Ho we ve r, a ll o f t he ir calls we re unsuc cessf

ul. Seeing that the walk ba ck to their ca r wa s too long in the c old weathe r, they proce eded to wa lk to a Conoco (a g as station and s t o re ) l ocate d rig ht in front of Ove rbay ’s apar tment. A sho rt tim e a ft e r ar

ri vin g a t the sto re , an d whi le Com pto n an d Hay

ne s we re tr

y ing to g e t aNo. 06-5701

United States v. Compton Pag e 3

Acc ording to Gree r’s testimony , as she wa lked by , Hay nes aske d if Gre er “ wanted a 3 piece of her .” (J.A. at 35). Ha y ne s te sti fi e d th a t G re e r w a s h e r e ne my a nd that th e y ha d s e ve ra l c on fr on ta tio ns in 4 the past. ride to their c ar, G ree r drove into the store’s parking lot a nd parke d her c ar. She e x ited her c ar a nd p r o c e e d e d

i n s i d e t h e s t o r e , w i t h h e r c a r k e ys o n a n e l a s t i c b a n d a r o u n d h e r a r m w i t h o t h e r

j e w e l r y. As Gre er w alke d p as t Ha y n es and Compt on to enter the store, Ha y nes aske d Gre er, “ do y ou have something smar

t to say now.” (J.A. at 60). Gre er did not respond and ente red the store. Compton

3 then said to Hay

nes, “w hy did y ou even le t he r g et in there , y ou should have hit her the n.” Id . at 63. As Gre er e x ited the store, Ha y nes immediately

att ac k ed h er, hitting her on the side of her jaw. 4 Gre er w ent down, and H ay nes continued to beat her. A s the beating c ontinued, a strug g le ensue d

ov e r G re e r’ s k e y s, a s H a y ne s tr ie d to take the m fr om he r pos se ssi on . Gr e e r te sti fi e d tha t “I tr ie d to keep the m, but I couldn’t. My arm was damag ed from the fight over the key s, and she g ot them.” Id . at 36. As Hay

nes continued to be at Gre er, Sabr ina Holder (“H older” ), a store patron who

w it n e s s e d th e a tt a c k , jump e d o u t o f h e r c a r a n d s c r e a me d “ I ’ m c a ll ing 911.” Id . at 26. A fe w seconds a fter she scre amed, Holde r testified that Compton j umped in the fig ht, moved Hay nes aside, and starte d to hit Greer

as we ll. Com pton continued to hit Gree r, ul t i m at el y ramming her he ad ag ainst a pole, c ausing her to lose c onsciousness. After Gre er lost consciousness, Compton and Ha y nes, without any

communication betwe en them, and wi t h Greer’ s car key s in Hay

nes’s possession, hea ded straig ht to Gree r’s c ar. A s they approa ched G ree r’s c ar, Compton told H ay n es t o “unlock [the passeng er side] door,” a nd Hay nes responde d, “I

g ot to unlock mine first.” (J.A. at 62). Compton and Hay nes then g ot into Greer ’s ca rNo. 06-5701

United States v. Compton Pag e 4

On cr oss-examination, Com pton’s attorney initially introduced H ay

nes’s sig ned 5 statement stating (without expl anation) that when Compton intervened, he first told the two ladies to “quit fig hting.” Howeve r, on re -direc t by the Gover

nment, Hay

nes’ f urther e x plained that Compton onl y

said “quit fig hting” to make people think he was try ing to br eak up the fig ht. and dr ov e of f t he sc e ne . Wh ile dr ivi ngfr om t he sc e ne , Co mpt on

and Ha y ne s d isc us se d w hat ju st

occur red. A ccor ding to Ha

y nes, they discussed t he mom ent C ompton jumped in the fig ht betwee n her a nd Gre er, a

nd how Compton said “quit fig hting” as he pushed her aside. Id . at 74-75, 79-80. Ha y ne s te sti fi e d th a t du

ri ngthe ir dis c us sio n, Com

pto n disc los e d tha t he sa id “q uit fi g hti ng ” “ on ly to make people t hink he wa s coming to break [] up” the f ight. Id

. at 79. She further testified that 5 Compton t hen said, laug hingly , “did y ou see w hat I did to the bitch? ” Id . at 80. Compton and Hay

nes then drove Gre er’ s car from Te nnessee to Maryland. On Mar ch 19, 20 05 , f ive da y s a ft e r t he y too k th e c a r f

ro m G re e r’ s poss e ssi on , Co mpt on a nd Ha y ne s st a rt e d th e ir

re tur n tr ip t o T e nn e sse e . D ur ingthe ir re tur n tri p, ho we ve r, the y ra

n out of g a s. Th e y

le ft the c a r t o retrie ve some g as, and upon their return, the police had surrounde d the ca r. This prompted Compton and Ha y nes to flee the area. Compton eventua lly called Rebecc a Hill (“H ill”), his former g irlfriend, to pick them up. Hill drove fr om Tennesse e to Virg inia to pick up Compton and Hay nes. Hill took them back to he r house, and shortly afte r ar riving , the police a

rrived a nd arr ested Compton for a probation violation. On Aug ust 9, 2005, a one-c ount indictment was filed in the Easter n District of Tenne ssee,

c ha rg ingCom

pto n a nd Ha y ne s w ithtakin g a

mot or ve hic le wi th the int e nt to c a us e se ri ou s b od ily ha rm and de a th, in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § § 2 11 9 a nd 2. On F e br ua ry 13 , 20 06 , H a y

ne s p le d g uil ty to the one-c ount indictment p u rs u an t to a plea a g ree ment with the Gover nment. On Fe bruar

y 28,No. 06-5701

United States v. Compton Pag e 5 2006, Compton was tr ied by a jury , and on the same day , the jury returne d a verdic t f inding Compton g uil ty of c arj a c kin g . On

May 15 , 2 00 5, Com

pto n w a s se nte nc e d to 18 0 mo nth s o f i mpr iso nme nt. On May 24, 2006, the judg ment was e ntere d. Compton t imely filed the instant appe al. II. AN AL YSI S A. Standard of

Review “I n d e te r mi n in g th e s u f

f ic ie n c y o f th e e v id e n c e to s u p p o rt a g u il ty v e r d ic t ‘ th e rele vant question is whether , afte r vi ewing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, any

ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble doubt.’” United St ates v. Pe arce , 9 1 2 F. 2 d 1 5 9 , 1 6 1 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 0 ) ( qu o t i n g J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “ ‘We do not weig h the evidenc e, conside r the c redibility of witnesses or substitute our judgme nt for that of the jury .’” United States v. Glov er , 265 F.3d 337, 341 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d S

tat es v . H ill iar d , 11 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir.1993). “[A] defendant c laiming insufficienc y

of the e vidence bear s a v e ry heavy burden,” United Stat es v. Abboud , 438 F.3d 554, 589 (6th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted) ( emphasis adde d), and w e “‘ will rever se a judg ment for insuff i ci ency of evide nce only

if this judgment is not supported by substantial and compete nt evidenc e u

p o n th e r e c o r d a s a w h o le , a n d

. . . th is r u le a p p li e s w h e th e r th e e v id e n c e is d ir e c t or

w h o ll y c ir c u ms tantial.’” United States v. Be ddow , 957 F.2d 1330, 1334 ( 6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Un ited States v. Stone , 748 F.2d 361, 363 ( 6th Cir.1984)). Also, “[i] t is not necessar y for the evidenc e to exclude eve ry rea sonable hy

pothesis except that of g uilt.” Id

. B. Discussion Com pto n a rgue s th a t th e re wa s insu ff ic ie nt ev ide nc e to p ro ve that he int e nd e d to pa rt ic ipateNo. 06-5701

United States v. Compton Pag e 6 in t he c arj a c kin g . Spe c if

ic a lly , Co mpt on

c on te nd s th a t he did

no t f or m th e int e nt t o p a rt ic ipate in the c arj a c kin g un til a ft e r the a ssa ult e nd e d, thu s “th e re is no ne xus bet we e n th e int e nt t o c a

us e de a th

or ser ious bodily

harm a nd the taking of [G re er ’s ] v eh i cl e.” ( Appellant’s B r. 5). In light of the evidenc e, this argument is wholly unpersua sive. Com pto n c ha lle ng e s h is c on vic tio n und e r t he c a rj a c kin g statut e , w hic h p ro vid e s: Who e ve r, wi th t

he int e nt t o c a

us e de a th or se ri ou s b od ily ha rm , ta ke s a mot or ve hic le that has bee n transporte d, shipped, or re ceive d in interstate or f oreig n commer c e f

rom the per son or pre sence of anothe r b y forc e and violenc e or by intimi dation, or attempts to do so, shall

. . . be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 y ear s, or both . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 2119. I n Holloway v. United States , 526 U.S. 1 (1999), the Supreme Court addr essed the ca rjac king stat u t e, an d the Gover nment’s burde n in satisfy ing the intent require ment. The Supreme Court held that “ [t ]he intent requireme nt of § 2119 i s s ati sfied whe n the Gover nment proves that at the moment the defe ndant demande d or took control over the driver ’s automobile the defe n d an t p o s s e s s e d th e in te n t to s e r io u s ly h a r m o r k il l th e dr iv e r if n e c e s s a r y to s te a l th e ca r (or , alternatively , if unnec essar y to steal the ca

r).” Id . at 12 . T here fore , th e qu e sti on be fo re us is wh e the r, in t

he lig ht mos t fa vo ra

ble to the Go ve rn me nt, the e vid e nc e of fe re d at tri a l w ou ld p e rm it anyrational trier

of fa ct to conclude , bey ond a rea sonable doubt, that Compton possessed the intent to seriously

harm or kill Gre er at the m oment he and Hay nes “demanded or took control” of Gre er’ s vehicle. We a

nswer in the a ffirmative. The evidenc e shows that Gre er had order ed Compton and Hay nes to e x it the home of Ov e rb ay ; th a t Co mpt on

a nd Ha y ne s found the mse lve s st

ra nd e d— thr e e to f our m ile s awa

y fr om t he ir

m al fu n ct i o n ed car—a

nd in need of

a ride ; that it was too cold to walk bac k to their ca r and a ll ofNo. 06-5701

United States v. Compton Pag e 7 their phone c alls asking others for a ride had bee n unsuccessful; that Compt on and Ha y nes then walked to the store in front of Ove rbay ’s apa rtment; that, while at the store , Gre er pulled up in he r

car , and wa lked in front of Compt on and Ha y nes as she enter ed the store ; that, upon exi ting the store , Hay nes attac ked Gr eer ; that during the fig ht, Hay nes tried to take Gre er’ s car key s (which we re visibly worn on he r ar

m); that Compton watched the attack and the strug g le that ensued ove r Gre er’ s key s; that he intervene d afte r a witness scre amed “I ’m calling 911”; that, as he inter vened, he uttered the words “ quit fighting ”; that he then beg an attackingGre er, ultimately knocking her unc onscious afte r hitting he r hea d on a pole; that af ter Gre er was unconscious, Compton and H ay nes, without

any communic ation , uniformly proce eded stra ight to Gr eer ’s ca r; that on the w a

y to G r e e r ’ s car , Compton tol d H ay ne s to un loc k h is doo r; a nd that, af te r fl e e ing fr om the sc e ne in G re e r’ s c a r, Com pto n s a id the only rea son he ut tere d the words “ quit fighting ” wa s to make people think he was try ing to br eak up the fig ht in case the surveillance came ra ha d sound. Con tr a ry to C omp ton ’s c on te nti on (t hat he did no t have a n int e nt to take Gr e e r’ s c a r pr ior to

or duri ngthe a ssa

ult ), a nd g ivi ngthe Go ve rn me nt t he be ne fi t of

a ll r e a so na

bly dr a wn inf e re nc e s,

se e Un ite d S

tat es v . S awy e rs , 409 F.3d 732, 735 (6th. Cir 2005) , a re view of this evidenc e shows that a rational trier of f

act c ould have f

ound that C o m p t o n p o s s essed the intent to cause ser ious bodily harm or death at the t ime he and Hay nes “demanded or took control” of Gre er’ s car . I ndeed, while strande d and in nee d of a r ide, Compton urge d Hay nes to attac k Gre er, w atche d as Ha y nes attempted to take he r ca

r key s, and int erve ned after someone threatened to aler t the police. A jury could re asonably

infer that Compton intervene d in the fight in order to help secur e Gr eer ’s key s (for the purposes of

taking her car) , espec ially afte r hearing Holder screa m “I ’m ca lling 911.” ( J .A. atNo. 06-5701

United States v. Compton Pag e 8 26). His interve ntion— attacking and beating Gree r, and ulti mately ramming her he ad into a pole, knocking her unc onscious—undoubtably cause d serious bodily harm to G ree r, and cer tainly helped

se c ur e Gr e e r’ s k e y s and

su bs e qu e ntl y

he r ca r. Any do ub t abo ut Comp ton ’s ro le or “ int e nt t o c a

us e serious bodily

harm or de ath” in the t aking of Gre er’ s key s is chilled by his statements (in a laug hing

manner ) af

ter the inc ident—“did y ou see w hat I did to the bitch? ” Id . at 80. Compton also claims that Gre er’ s car key s “mirac ulously ” appea red in Ha y nes’s ha nd afte r the fig ht, and t hat he only followed her t o Gre er’ s car . This arg ument is also unavailing . As stated above, a re asonable jury

could infer

that Compton i nterve ned in the fig ht in order to help Ha y nes

secur e Gr eer ’s key s. Also, G ree r testified that Hay nes intentionally tried to ge t her ke y s during the fig ht, and she “tried to keep them [away from Hay nes], but

. . . couldn’t.” Id

. at 36. Fur thermore , Holder, the witness, testified t hat after the assault, C ompton and Hay nes went straig ht to Gree r’s c ar. A re view of the rec ord as a whole shows substantial and c ompet en t fa cts from which a

re a so na ble tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have fo un d no t on ly the int e nt e le me nt, bu t a ll the e sse nti a l e le me nts

nece ssary to convict Compton under the ca rjac king statue. Additionally , Compton’s reliance on Un ite d S tat es v . H arris , 420 F.3d 467 ( 5th Cir. 2005) and Un ite d S

tat es v . A pp le wha ite , 195 F.3d 679 (3 d

. C i r. 1 9 99) is misguided. I n Ha rri s and Ap ple wha ite , the Fif

th and Third Circuits, respec tively , conclude d that the def endant’ s conviction under the car

jacking statute was prec luded since the evidenc e did not support the finding of the intent require ment under §2119. H ere , on the other ha nd, the re cord doe s provide s u ch a showing , and

acc ording ly , Compton’s conviction must s tand. III . C ON CL USI ONNo. 06-5701

United States v. Compton Pag e 9 For the re asons stated a bove, we AF F IRM Compton’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2119.