DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY

Interagency Review 

Needed to Update 

U.S. Position on 

Enriched Uranium 

That Can Be Used for 

Tritium Production

Report to Congressional Requesters

October 2014

GAO-15-123

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-15-123, a report to 

congressional requesters 

October 2014 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Interagency Review Needed to Update U.S. Position 

on Enriched Uranium That Can Be Used for Tritium 

Production

Why GAO Did This Study

The United States needs an assured 

source of tritium to maintain the U.S. 

nuclear weapons stockpile. To produce 

tritium, DOE has stated that it can only 

use LEU with no obligation to other 

countries under international 

agreements to use it for only peaceful 

purposes. USEC, a government 

corporation privatized in 1998, was the

only company enriching uranium that 

DOE said could meet its LEU needs, 

but USEC ceased enrichment 

operations in May 2013 and filed for 

Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 

March 2014. DOE is currently 

considering options for obtaining 

unobligated LEU. Only one enrichment 

facility, which is owned by URENCO, 

operates in the United States, and four

other commercial facilities are planned. 

Four of the five facilities use or will use 

technology that carries peaceful use 

obligations to other countries. 

GAO was asked to review international 

agreements addressing enrichment

technology in the United States with 

respect to how peaceful use provisions 

apply to tritium production. This report 

examines (1) the extent to which DOE 

has adhered to its practice of using 

only unobligated LEU to produce

tritium and (2) the basis for this 

practice. To address these issues, 

GAO analyzed agency documents and 

international agreements and 

interviewed DOE and Department of 

State officials, among other steps. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO recommends that the Secretary 

of Energy work through an interagency 

working group to review DOE’s current 

practice of using only unobligated LEU 

for the production of tritium. DOE 

neither agreed nor disagreed with 

GAO’s recommendation.

What GAO Found

The Department of Energy (DOE) has adhered to its practice of using only

unobligated low-enriched uranium (LEU) to meet national security needs for 

tritium—a radioactive isotope of hydrogen used to enhance the power of U.S. 

nuclear weapons. LEU is considered unobligated when neither the uranium nor 

the technology used to enrich it carries an “obligation” from a foreign country 

requiring that the material only be used for peaceful purposes. These obligations 

are contained in international agreements to which the United States is a party. 

DOE has adhered to this practice by, for example, requiring in its interagency 

agreement for tritium production with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) that

TVA use only unobligated LEU as fuel in any nuclear reactor that is being used to 

produce tritium for national security purposes, and DOE is responsible for 

ensuring that TVA can obtain unobligated LEU for this purpose.

The basis for DOE’s practice of using only unobligated LEU to produce tritium 

considers both law and policy. 

• Legal considerations: GAO reviewed the three key international 

agreements that address the importation of foreign-owned enrichment 

technology that is operating or planned for operation in the United States. 

GAO found that only one agreement explicitly addresses tritium and this 

agreement likely prohibits the production of tritium for weapons purposes. 

This is also consistent with an executive branch interpretation of the 

agreement. The other two agreements do not explicitly address tritium 

production for weapons purposes, but Department of State officials told GAO

that a reading of the agreements to prohibit the use of technology subject to 

the peaceful use restrictions for tritium production is consistent with U.S. 

nonproliferation policy interests.

• Policy considerations: Officials told GAO that using only unobligated LEU 

for national security purposes supports U.S. nonproliferation policy goals by, 

for example, avoiding setting a precedent for other countries that may seek 

to use purchased LEU for military purposes. A 1998 interagency report 

evaluated nonproliferation implications of U.S. tritium production and 

concluded that, in utilizing TVA’s reactors for tritium production, DOE should 

fuel the reactors with LEU that does not have peaceful use obligations to 

best preserve a military-civilian dichotomy. DOE and State officials have also 

cited policy goals in response to questions about whether TVA can use LEU 

produced by a URENCO enrichment facility for tritium production.

However, a key assumption underlying the decision to use only unobligated LEU 

for national security purposes has changed. The United States no longer has a 

ready capability to enrich unobligated LEU for tritium production because USEC 

ceased enrichment operations in 2013, and the future of the company’s planned

next-generation enrichment facility—the only planned enrichment facility that 

could produce unobligated LEU—is uncertain. According to DOE officials, the 

department is currently engaged with an interagency working group to assess

options for obtaining unobligated LEU in the future. Given that the United States

no longer has an assured source of unobligated LEU, the results of an updated 

interagency review that either reaffirms or supports a change in the current 

practice could help address questions about whether using certain other LEU for 

tritium production is an option for DOE at this time. 

View GAO-15-123. For more information, 

contact David C. Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or 

trimbled@gao.gov or Susan D. Sawtelle at 

(202) 512-6417 or sawtelles@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

Letter 1 

Background 6

DOE Has Only Used Unobligated LEU to Meet National Security 

Needs for Tritium Production 17

DOE’s Practice of Using Unobligated LEU for Tritium Production 

Is Based on a Mix of Legal and Policy Considerations, but a 

Key Assumption Underlying This Practice Has Changed 20

Conclusions 32

Recommendation for Executive Action 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 35

Appendix II Peaceful Use Language in Key International Agreements 

Addressing Uranium Enrichment Facilities Operating or Planned for 

Operation in the United States 37

Appendix III Peaceful Use Language in Additional Select Treaties and International 

Agreements Related to Nonproliferation and Nuclear Trade 38

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Energy 44

Appendix V Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 45

Appendix VI GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 46

Figures

Figure 1: Uranium Enrichment Facilities Closed, Currently

Operating, or Planned for Operation in the United States 10

Figure 2: The Nuclear Fuel Cycle 11

Contents
Page ii GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

Figure 3: Planned, Potential, and Backup Supplies of Unobligated 

Low-Enriched Uranium for Tritium Production, 2014 to 

2040 16

Abbreviations

ACP American Centrifuge Plant

AEA Atomic Energy Act

DOE Department of Energy

GDP Gaseous Diffusion Plant

GLE Global Laser Enrichment

HEU highly enriched uranium

LEU low-enriched uranium

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

SILEX Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation

TPBAR tritium-producing burnable absorber rod

TVA Tennessee Valley Authority

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

October 14, 2014

The Honorable Edward J. Markey

Chairman

Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance,

 Economic Affairs, International Environmental Protection, and Peace

 Corps

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Michael C. Burgess

House of Representatives

Uranium has been enriched for over 60 years in the United States both 

for national security purposes, such as for nuclear weapons, as well as 

for commercial purposes to fuel nuclear power plants.1 The enrichment 

process can result in low-enriched uranium (LEU), which DOE needs in 

order to produce tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, used to 

enhance the power of U.S. nuclear weapons. Beginning in the 1940s, the 

Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessor agencies enriched 

uranium for both national security and civilian purposes. In 1992, the U.S. 

government established the United States Enrichment Corporation 

(USEC) as a government corporation to take over operations of DOE’s 

enrichment facilities and to provide uranium enrichment services for the 

U.S. government and utilities that operate nuclear power plants.2 In 1998, 

USEC was privatized under the USEC Privatization Act.3

 

1

To transform uranium ore into a form that can be used in nuclear weapons and to fuel 

nuclear reactors, uranium goes through a number of steps including mining, conversion, 

and enrichment. Enrichment is the process of separating uranium-235—the form, or 

isotope, that undergoes fission to release enormous amounts of energy in nuclear 

reactors and weapons—from much of the uranium-238 to increase the concentration of 

uranium-235.

Since that time, 

USEC has been the only company that uses U.S.-developed technology 

to enrich uranium.

2

The corporation was initially established as the United States Enrichment Corporation. 

The privatization was accomplished by an initial public offering with the United States 

Enrichment Corporation becoming a subsidiary of the newly created USEC Inc., a 

Delaware corporation.

3

USEC Privatization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2297h-2297h-13 (2012).
 

Page 2 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

In May 2013, USEC ceased enrichment at its last commercially active 

enrichment plant—the Gaseous Diffusion Plant (GDP) in Paducah, 

Kentucky, that it had leased from DOE since the time of USEC’s 

establishment. In recent years, USEC’s financial condition has 

deteriorated, due in part to decreased commercial demand for LEU and 

high production costs associated with the energy intensive GDP 

enrichment technology, which is more than 60 years old.4 USEC filed for 

Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in March 2014 in order to strengthen its 

balance sheet and replace notes maturing in October 2014 with equity 

and new notes maturing in 5 years and extendable to 10 years.5 The 

bankruptcy placed in question the future of next-generation enrichment 

technology called the American Centrifuge, which USEC has spent $2.5 

billion developing at a site in Ohio and recently demonstrated under a 

cooperative agreement with DOE.6 If successfully deployed, the American 

Centrifuge Plant (ACP)—the facility where the American Centrifuge 

technology is currently operating in a demonstration environment—would 

again provide the United States with U.S.-developed technology to enrich 

uranium.7

 

4

See GAO, Department of Energy: Enhanced Transparency Could Clarify Costs, Market 

Impact, Risk, and Legal Authority to Conduct Future Uranium Transactions, 

In the wake of USEC’s bankruptcy filing in April 2014, the 

Secretary of Energy tasked its Oak Ridge National Laboratory with 

maintaining the operability of the centrifuges and associated technology, 

while DOE assesses options for meeting DOE’s national security needs 

for enriched uranium and preserves the option of commercial deployment. 

While DOE has taken steps to maintain the operability of the ACP in the 

interim, it is uncertain what the department’s future plans are for the ACP 

GAO-14-291 

(Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2014) for a complete description of these events.

5

On September 5, 2014, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware approved 

USEC’s plans for reorganization. At that time, USEC announced that it planned to emerge 

from Chapter 11 reorganization under the name Centrus Energy Corp. On September 30, 

2014, Centrus Energy Corp. announced that it had satisfied all conditions set forth in its 

Plan for Reorganization and that it was emerging in a stronger position to support the 

energy and national security needs of the United States.

6

USEC has also developed a manufacturing and testing facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 

and established an extensive domestic supply chain for acquiring and constructing 

components of the centrifuge units.

7

Gas centrifuge technology employs rapidly spinning rotors inside cylinders containing 

uranium hexafluoride to separate the fissile uranium-235 from the nonfissile uranium-238. 

The centrifuge requires significantly less power to operate than the gaseous diffusion 

process. 
 

Page 3 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

and the extent to which the plant may also be used for commercial 

purposes.

DOE has two primary national security needs for enriched uranium: (1) 

obtaining LEU, which is primarily needed for the production of tritium and 

(2) obtaining highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is needed to fuel the 

reactors that power the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carriers and submarines. With 

respect to LEU used for the production of tritium, tritium is a key 

component of nuclear weapons, and an assured source of tritium is 

necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.8 However, 

tritium has a relatively short half-life of 12 years and decays at a rate of 

about 5.5 percent per year. As long as the United States relies on nuclear 

weapons, DOE requires a continuous supply of LEU in order to produce 

tritium. Tritium is produced as a by-product in nuclear reactors, and 

DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) supports a 

program that produces tritium as a primary product to collect enough 

tritium to meet stockpile demands.9 With respect to HEU, the United 

States does not currently have a domestic capability to enrich HEU. 

Instead, national security needs are met using an inventory of HEU that 

was enriched prior to 1992.10

According to DOE, USEC has been the only potential commercial 

supplier of enrichment services for LEU that could be used for the 

production of tritium.11

 

8

DOE analysis of stockpile demand for tritium is classified.

DOE has asserted that international agreements to 

which the United States is a party prohibit the use of LEU for military 

purposes, such as tritium production, if the LEU was enriched by a facility 

9

NNSA was created as a semiautonomous agency within DOE by the National Nuclear 

Security Administration Act. Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 3211, 113 Stat. 512 957 (1999). NNSA 

is responsible for the management and security of the nation’s nuclear weapons, 

nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.

10According to DOE, the department’s current HEU inventory allocations are sufficient to 

meet national security demands through 2064, based on several assumptions, including 

no reallocation of non-excess HEU to downblending operations in support of tritium 

production. 

11There are no U.S.-owned enrichment facilities or foreign-owned enrichment facilities that 

use U.S. technology operating outside of the United States.
 

Page 4 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

that relies on technology subject to these same prohibitions.12 Under the 

“peaceful use” provisions of these agreements, LEU produced at these 

facilities can only be used for peaceful, nonexplosive purposes. In other 

words, the LEU carries an obligation to the foreign countries that exported 

the technology that it will only be used for peaceful purposes. For 

example, obligated LEU cannot be used in a bomb or be further enriched 

to HEU for other military purposes. DOE has further asserted that 

obligated LEU cannot be used to make tritium for military purposes.

13

Since USEC ceased enrichment at the Paducah GDP in May 2013, and 

the United States lost what DOE considered to be its sole supplier of 

enrichment services for national security purposes, Congress has raised 

questions about a future source of unobligated LEU for tritium production. 

Only one commercial facility currently enriches uranium in the United 

States, and it is operated by URENCO—a consortium of companies 

owned or controlled by the British and Dutch governments and by two 

German utilities. The LEU produced by URENCO is enriched using 

foreign technology and is subject to a peaceful use provision in an 

international agreement between the United States and Germany, the 

Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In addition to the ACP, three other

enrichment facilities are planned for construction in the United States, but 

these too will use foreign technology and will be subject to peaceful use 

provisions contained in other international agreements.14 Under the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014,15

 

12According to DOE officials, all steps in the nuclear fuel cycle must be free from peaceful 

use restrictions to result in wholly unobligated LEU that can be used for tritium production. 

GAO did not evaluate steps in the nuclear fuel cycle other than enrichment for this review.

DOE was directed to submit a 

tritium and enriched uranium management plan to Congress by June 30, 

2014, that includes, among other things, an assessment of the national 

security demand for tritium and LEU through 2060, as well as an analysis 

of alternative technologies that are planned or available to meet the 

supply needs for tritium and enriched uranium for national security 

13LEU that does not carry “peaceful use” restrictions is referred to as “unobligated LEU.” 

14The ACP would use U.S.-developed technology, thus producing unobligated LEU. The 

focus of this report is on enrichment facilities that use or will use foreign technology and 

are subject to peaceful use provisions contained in international agreements. 

15Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 311, 128 Stat. 5, 175.
 

Page 5 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

purposes.16 As DOE assesses future options for obtaining unobligated 

LEU to produce tritium, one option may be to pay the costs to operate the 

ACP—potentially hundreds of millions of dollars a year. In this context, 

you asked us to review the peaceful use provisions in international 

agreements pertaining to enrichment facilities using foreign technology in 

the United States, particularly as they pertain to the production of 

tritium.17

To determine the extent to which DOE has adhered to its practice of 

using only unobligated LEU to meet national security needs for tritium, we 

reviewed DOE and NNSA documents. In addition, we interviewed officials 

from DOE, NNSA, the Department of State, and the Tennessee Valley 

Authority (TVA)—which produces tritium through an interagency 

agreement with DOE. We also reviewed documents and interviewed 

officials from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). To determine 

the basis for DOE’s practice for using unobligated LEU to meet national 

security needs for tritium, we reviewed DOE and NNSA documents and 

assessed relevant international agreements pertaining to the transfer of 

enrichment technology into the United States and the extent to which 

these agreements compel DOE to use exclusively unobligated LEU for 

meeting national security needs. We interviewed officials from NNSA, 

TVA, and the Department of State, as well as representatives from USEC 

and URENCO.

This report examines (1) the extent to which DOE has adhered 

to its practice of using only unobligated LEU to meet national security 

needs for tritium and (2) the basis for DOE’s practice of using only 

unobligated LEU to meet national security needs for tritium.

18

 

16As of October 2, 2014, DOE had not yet submitted this tritium and enriched uranium 

management plan to Congress.

We also reviewed two analyses completed by the 

Congressional Research Service, including one on peaceful use 

restrictions applicable to uranium enriched at the URENCO facility, and 

we interviewed staff regarding their conclusions. To inform both 

objectives, we conducted site visits to the ACP in Piketon, Ohio; the 

Paducah GDP in Paducah, Kentucky; and DOE’s Oak Ridge Office and 

17This request was originally made by the Ranking Member of the House Committee on 

Natural Resources, Representative Edward J. Markey, who is now a member of the 

Senate, and Representative Michael C. Burgess.

18DOE, NNSA, and Department of State officials discussed various aspects of the 

international agreements and nonproliferation policy with us. We only identified a public 

interpretation of one of the agreements, however, and, thus for the other two agreements, 

this report identifies a range of possible readings.
 

Page 6 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

NNSA’s Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 

Additional details on our objectives, scope, and methodology can be 

found in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2013 to October 2014 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

This section describes international agreements and peaceful use 

restrictions; existing and proposed enrichment facilities in the United 

States that use or will use foreign technology; the U.S. involvement in the

markets that comprise the nuclear fuel cycle; and tritium production.

The United States is a party to various treaties and international 

agreements that promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As detailed 

below, these include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons (NPT), peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements, and other 

international agreements that restrict the use of certain foreign nuclear 

technology and material to peaceful purposes.

• The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, distinguishes between 

nuclear-weapon and nonnuclear-weapon states.19

• Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), 

establishes the conditions for civilian nuclear cooperation between the 

United States and foreign partners. The United States has 21 nuclear 

cooperation agreements (“123 agreements”) in force with 18 

It is considered the 

cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and aims to 

prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear-weapon 

states, facilitate the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and 

promote nuclear disarmament. Membership in the NPT includes 190 

countries, including the United States, which makes it the largest arms 

control treaty in the world.

 

19Nuclear-weapon states under the NPT are those that manufactured and exploded a 

nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967; nonnuclearweapon states are those that had not.

Background

International Agreements 

and Peaceful Use 

Restrictions
 

Page 7 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

countries, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the European 

Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and Taiwan.20

• Three other international agreements specifically address the 

importation of uranium enrichment technology into the United 

States.

Peaceful 

nuclear cooperation agreements must include, among other things, 

peaceful use provisions that guarantee that material and equipment 

transferred from the United States to its foreign partners, as well as 

certain material produced through the use of such material and 

equipment, not be used for any nuclear explosive device, for research 

on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any other 

military purpose.

21 They include peaceful use provisions that require that 

transferred technology and certain material produced through the use 

of such technology be used only for peaceful purposes. While each 

agreement contains peaceful use provisions, the specific language 

differs among the agreements.

There are four enrichment facilities that are currently operational or 

planned for operation in the United States that use or will use foreign 

technology. All four facilities operate or will operate under one of the three 

international agreements described above, which include peaceful use 

provisions, or obligations, on the technology and on certain material 

produced through the use of that technology. Each facility is briefly 

described below. See appendix II for the peaceful use language 

contained in each agreement.

• URENCO operates the only enrichment facility that is currently 

operating in the United States at a plant near Eunice, New Mexico. 

The URENCO USA plant is owned and operated by Louisiana Energy 

Services (LES), a subsidiary of URENCO. The URENCO centrifuge 

technology was initially developed in the 1960s as part of a joint 

venture between the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. 

Use of this centrifuge technology in the United States is addressed by 

the Agreement between the Three Governments of the United 

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federal Republic 

 

20The parties to the agreement are the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei 

Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States.

21In this report, we use the term “technology” to refer to any technology, equipment, 

components, or facilities addressed by these agreements. The full language of the 

peaceful use provisions in these agreements is laid out in appendix II.

Existing and Proposed 

Enrichment Facilities in 

the United States That 

Use or Will Use Foreign 

Technology
 

Page 8 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

of Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government 

of the United States of America regarding the Establishment,

Construction and Operation of a Uranium Enrichment Installation in 

the United States, hereafter referred to as the “Washington 

Agreement.”22 The Treaty of Almelo23 laid out the framework for the 

three countries to collaborate on the development and use of gas 

centrifuge uranium enrichment technology under one entity—which 

came to be known as URENCO.24

• AREVA has proposed building an enrichment facility, known as Eagle 

Rock, near Idaho Falls, Idaho, and in October 2011 received a license 

from the NRC to construct and operate the facility.

The foreign governments and 

companies that own URENCO have expressed interest in selling the 

company on separate occasions since fall 2011.

25 AREVA is 90 

percent owned by the French government and operates 

internationally. At Eagle Rock, AREVA plans to build an enrichment 

facility that uses the same gas centrifuge technology developed by 

URENCO.26

 

22Agreement between the Three Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 

Northern Ireland, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands 

and the Government of the United States of America regarding the Establishment, 

Construction and Operation of a Uranium Enrichment Installation in the United States, July 

24, 1992.

The facility will be operated under the Agreement 

between the Governments of the United States of America and the 

Four Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of 

Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 

and the Federal Republic of Germany regarding the Establishment, 

Construction and Operation of Uranium Enrichment Installations using 

23Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland the 

Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on Collaboration in the 

Development and Exploitation of the Gas Centrifuge Process for producing Enriched 

Uranium, Mar. 4, 1970.

24URENCO is currently owned in equal parts by the government of the Netherlands, the 

government of the United Kingdom, and two German utility companies.

25The NRC is the federal agency that regulates, among other things, the civilian uses of 

nuclear materials and production facilities (such as a uranium enrichment facility) in the 

United States.

26Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 

Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, and 

the French Republic regarding Collaboration in Centrifuge Technology, July 12, 2005 

(hereafter referred to as the “Cardiff Agreement”), laid out the framework for this 

collaboration between the URENCO governments and France.
 

Page 9 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

Gas Centrifuge Technology in the United States of America, hereafter 

referred to as the “Paris Agreement.”27

• Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) has proposed building an enrichment 

facility in Wilmington, North Carolina, and in September 2012 received 

a license from NRC to construct and operate the facility. GLE is a joint 

venture by General Electric, Hitachi, and Cameco.28 GLE plans to 

utilize an Australian uranium enrichment technology known as 

Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation (SILEX), which is still in 

development for commercial demonstration. The facility, if 

constructed, will be operated under the Agreement for Cooperation 

Between Australia and the United States of America Concerning 

Technology for the Separation of Isotopes of Uranium by Laser 

Excitation, hereafter known as the “SILEX 123 Agreement”—a 

peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement.29

• In 2013, GLE also proposed building an enrichment facility at the site 

of the former Paducah GDP near Paducah, Kentucky. This facility 

would also use SILEX laser enrichment technology and operate under 

the SILEX 123 Agreement, but this facility has not yet been licensed

by the NRC.30

Figure 1 shows the existing or planned locations of these four foreignowned enrichment facilities, as well as the location of the planned ACP 

and the now-closed USEC and DOE facilities.

 

27Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Four 

Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 

Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany regarding 

the Establishment, Construction and Operation of Uranium Enrichment Installations using 

Gas Centrifuge Technology in the United States of America, Feb. 24, 2011.

28General Electric is an American company. Hitachi is a Japanese company. Cameco is a 

Canadian uranium mining and conversion company. Its subsidiary, Cameco USA, is the 

largest uranium mining producer in the United States.

29Agreement for Cooperation Between Australia and the United States of America 

Concerning Technology for the Separation of Isotopes of Uranium by Laser Excitation, 

Oct. 28, 1999.

30GLE’s stated use for this facility is to re-enrich depleted uranium to the level of natural 

uranium for further enrichment in another enrichment facility.
 

Page 10 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

Figure 1: Uranium Enrichment Facilities Closed, Currently Operating, or Planned for Operation in the United States

Note: DOE ceased enrichment at its Oak Ridge GDP in 1985 as a result of decreased demand for 

enrichment services. In 1993, the government leased the Portsmouth and Paducah GDPs to the 

United States Enrichment Corporation, which became a subsidiary of USEC Inc., created in 1998 at 

the time of privatization. USEC ceased enrichment activities at the Portsmouth GDP in 2001 also 

because of decreased demand for enrichment services and the high costs of operating the GDP, and 

it ceased enrichment activities at the Paducah GDP in 2013. The ACP is currently being maintained 

in operating status. 

According to DOE documents, all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle—the 

series of steps necessary to produce LEU fuel for nuclear reactors (see 

fig. 2)—must use unobligated natural uranium and unobligated 

processing technology if the resulting LEU will be used for national 

security purposes. Several facilities from the fuel cycle stages operate in 

the United States; however, the U.S. commercial nuclear industry is 

U.S. Involvement in the 

Nuclear Fuel Cycle 

Markets
 

Page 11 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

highly dependent on imports of mined uranium concentrates and uranium 

conversion and enrichment services.

Figure 2: The Nuclear Fuel Cycle

a

The enrichment process results in two principal products: (1) enriched uranium hexafluoride and (2) 

leftover “tails” of uranium hexafluoride, also called depleted uranium because the material is depleted 

in uranium-235 compared with natural uranium. 

b

Tails can only be re-enriched once, if at all, after which their uranium content is too depleted to make 

further re-enrichment economically feasible using current centrifuge and gaseous diffusion 

technology. 
 

Page 12 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

• Mining: The nuclear fuel cycle begins with the mining of uranium. 

Uranium is relatively abundant in the earth’s crust and can be found 

by detecting the presence of radioactivity from the air, from the earth’s 

surface, or by excavation. The United States had a large uranium 

mining industry in the 1950s, but the number of domestic mines 

declined over time, falling from a peak of over 250 in 1980 to 11 in 

2012, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. In 

2012, the United States produced about 2.7 percent of the world’s 

mined uranium, compared with Kazakhstan (36.5 percent); Canada 

(15 percent); and Australia (12 percent), according to the World 

Nuclear Association.

• Milling and conversion: After mining, the ore goes to a milling 

facility, where it is crushed and concentrated. There is currently only 

one uranium mill in operation in the United States. It is located in Utah 

and is operated by a Colorado-based subsidiary of a Canadian 

company.31

• Enrichment: The next step is the enrichment process, which entails 

concentrating the uranium-235—the isotope of uranium that 

undergoes fission to release enormous amounts of energy—in the 

uranium hexafluoride. Through enrichment, uranium-235 atoms are 

increased to 3-5 percent, the level required for fuel used in most U.S. 

commercial power plants.

The uranium milled at this facility is purchased by utility 

companies and then shipped to a conversion facility. At the 

conversion facility, the uranium is combined with fluorine gas to 

produce uranium hexafluoride, a powder at room temperature and a 

gas when heated. At present, there is one uranium hexafluoride 

conversion facility in the United States that uses U.S.-developed 

technology, which is located in Illinois.

32

 

31According to NRC officials, because the milling technology is originally derived from U.S. 

refinement methods, the uranium processed in the United States by this company is not 

considered to be obligated.

In 1993, the United States produced more 

than 90 percent of the enriched uranium used in U.S. nuclear reactors 

but, by 2008, only 15 percent was domestically produced. Currently, 

URENCO operates the only commercial enrichment facility operating 

in the United States, and it uses European-developed technology. As 

previously noted, there is currently no commercial facility operating 

that uses U.S.-developed technology to enrich uranium in the United 

States.

32Natural uranium has a concentration of uranium-235 of 0.7 percent, while depleted 

uranium has a concentration of uranium-235 less than 0.7 percent.
 

Page 13 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

• Fuel fabrication: The enriched uranium is then shipped to a fuel 

fabrication facility. At the fuel fabrication facility, the enriched uranium 

is converted to uranium dioxide powder and formed into ceramic 

pellets about the size of a pencil eraser. The pellets are loaded into 

metal tubes that are bundled together to form fuel assemblies, which 

are typically about 5 to 10 inches square and are 12 to 14 feet long. 

The fuel assemblies are then shipped to nuclear power plants. 

According to the NRC, several nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are 

licensed to operate in the United States.33

In 1998, DOE sought to develop tritium production technology because 

the last of its reactors used for tritium production was shut down in 1988 

due to safety concerns. Between 1988 and 1998, DOE was able to meet 

its tritium requirements by harvesting and recycling it from dismantled 

nuclear warheads, as the United States decreased the size of its nuclear 

arsenal. However, because of tritium’s short half-life, DOE could not meet 

its long-term tritium needs in this manner indefinitely and established the 

Commercial Light Water Reactor Program in 1996 to resume new tritium 

production; the program was renamed the Tritium Readiness Subprogram

in 2003.

34 DOE ultimately decided to produce tritium through an 

interagency agreement with TVA at the Watts Bar and Sequoyah 

commercial nuclear reactors, which are owned and operated by TVA, a 

government corporation, and produce electricity as their principal 

purpose.35

 

33According to NNSA officials, because the facilities are old, DOE has reasonable 

assurance that the existing technology and components of the fuel fabrication facility that 

it uses are of U.S. origin. 

34The Department of Defense is responsible for implementing the U.S. nuclear deterrent 

strategy, which includes establishing the military requirements associated with planning 

for the nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA and the Department of Defense work together to 

produce the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. This memorandum outlines a 

proposed plan for the President to sign to guide U.S. nuclear stockpile activities. This plan 

specifies the size and composition of the stockpile and other information concerning 

adjustments to the stockpile for a projected multi-year period. While the exact 

requirements are classified, NNSA uses the detailed information included in the 

memorandum on the number of weapons to be included in the stockpile to determine the 

amount of tritium needed to maintain these weapons. 

35In 1999, DOE entered into an interagency agreement with TVA to produce tritium in its 

Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactors, for which DOE would pay TVA approximately $1.5 

billion for its costs over the agreement’s 35-year term. To date, only TVA’s Watts Bar 1

reactor has been used to produce tritium under this agreement. 

Tritium Production
 

Page 14 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

Small quantities of tritium are normal by-products of the process nuclear 

power plants use to generate electricity. Nuclear power plants routinely 

and safely release diluted concentrations of water containing tritium. For 

DOE’s (now NNSA’s) tritium production program, TVA takes several 

steps to produce tritium for NNSA’s use. Specifically, to produce tritium, 

stainless steel rods containing lithium aluminate clad in zirconium—called 

tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBAR)—are irradiated in the 

Watts Bar 1 reactor. Instead of the ceramic rods containing boron that are 

inserted in most U.S. commercial nuclear reactors—as a subset of the 

fuel assembly rods, most of which contain nuclear fuel—TPBARs are 

inserted into the Watts Bar 1 reactor core during refueling and are 

irradiated for approximately 18 months. They are then removed and 

transported to DOE’s Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River 

Site in South Carolina, where they are processed in a specialized facility 

to extract and then prepare the tritium for nuclear warheads.

Under the interagency agreement between DOE and TVA, TVA must use 

unobligated LEU in its reactors that are used to produce tritium for NNSA. 

It is the responsibility of DOE/NNSA to ensure that TVA can obtain 

unobligated fuel to support tritium production, and DOE/NNSA is 

responsible for reimbursing TVA for any additional costs associated with 

this exclusivity.

36

According to DOE’s November 2013 draft Tritium and Enriched Uranium 

Management Plan through 2060, DOE’s tritium production needs can be 

met using unobligated LEU inventories that will last through the mid2030s. These inventories include the final deliveries of unobligated LEU 

from three sources (see fig. 3):

According to DOE, unobligated LEU has a premium—

that is, it costs more than other LEU that may carry obligations from other 

countries—because the gaseous diffusion technology USEC had been 

using to enrich uranium was older, less energy efficient, and more 

expensive than the centrifuge technology used by USEC’s main foreign 

competitors.

 

36The interagency agreement is intended to be at cost such that TVA neither loses money 

nor profits from it. NNSA agreed to pay TVA the cost difference—known as the 

enrichment price differential—for TVA’s commercial nuclear power reactors that are part 

of the tritium program. To determine the differential, the cost of fuel in TVA’s tritium 

program reactors is compared with the market price for LEU at a reference location 

(regardless of obligations). The reference location was selected as the best proxy for 

market prices TVA would have paid if it did not participate in the tritium program.
 

Page 15 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

• TVA’s contract with USEC: TVA signed a contract with USEC in 

December 1999 to purchase unobligated LEU from USEC through the 

middle of fiscal year 2015.

• The 2012 Depleted Uranium Enrichment Project: In May 2012, 

DOE initiated a series of uranium transfers between multiple parties to 

ensure availability of a supply of unobligated LEU for TVA to purchase 

from an energy company starting in mid-2015 through 2022. DOE 

expects that this will result in up to 15 years of unobligated LEU for 

tritium production, assuming the use of a single TVA reactor.

37

• Mixed Oxide Fuel Backup LEU Inventory Project: DOE maintains a 

reserve of unobligated LEU from an NNSA HEU disposition program 

referred to as the Mixed Oxide Backup LEU Inventory Project. DOE 

plans to use this unobligated LEU directly or for obligation 

exchanges—the process of swapping obligated uranium for similar 

types and amounts of unobligated uranium—to obtain additional LEU 

suitable for tritium production. DOE expects that this will provide about 

6 years of unobligated LEU for tritium production, assuming the use of 

a single TVA reactor. 

 

37See GAO-14-291 for additional details on this series of uranium transfers described as 

the “May 2012 Tails Transfer.” 
 

Page 16 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

Figure 3: Planned, Potential, and Backup Supplies of Unobligated Low-Enriched Uranium for Tritium Production, 2014 to 2040

Notes: The low-enriched uranium supply projections are based on TVA using one nuclear reactor to 

produce tritium. 

According to DOE, the LEU secured by DOE in the 2012 Depleted Uranium Enrichment Project will 

result in up to 15 years of unobligated LEU for tritium production. DOE’s fiscal year 2015 Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan only details the use of 12.5 years of LEU from the Depleted 

Uranium Enrichment Project for tritium production. 

However, this plan also notes that, if it becomes necessary to use more 

than one TVA nuclear reactor to meet DOE’s tritium production goals, the 

current LEU inventory intended for tritium production could be exhausted

by the mid-2020s. Despite redesigns of several components of the 

TPBARs, tritium has been leaking—or “permeating”—out of the TPBARs 

at higher-than-expected rates into the Watts Bar reactor’s coolant water. 

As a result, TVA has had to limit the number of TPBARs irradiated per 

cycle to keep the total amount of tritium released into the reactor coolant 

below regulatory limits, thereby resulting in significantly lower tritium 
 

Page 17 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

production than originally planned. NNSA and TVA have consequently 

been developing plans to seek a license amendment to irradiate 

increased numbers of TPBARs, which could result in a need to expand 

tritium production to TVA’s Sequoyah reactor. Such an expansion would 

essentially double unobligated LEU consumption, using the unobligated 

LEU supply at an accelerated rate.

DOE is currently analyzing options for meeting national security needs for 

LEU after the supply sources noted above have been exhausted. Such 

options could include utilizing the American Centrifuge technology, 

developing a new domestic enrichment capability, or downblending 

HEU—which is the process of mixing HEU with either depleted or natural 

uranium, or LEU, to produce a new product that has a lower 

concentration of uranium-235. In the absence of a domestic enrichment 

capability, DOE documents state that it would consider downblending 

HEU only as a backup plan because most of the HEU it possesses is 

currently dedicated to other national security missions, such as for naval 

reactors.38

DOE uses only unobligated LEU to meet national security needs for 

tritium production and has taken several steps to adhere to this practice. 

In several key DOE documents—dating back to 1998 and as recent as 

2014—that we reviewed, DOE has stated that tritium will only be 

produced using unobligated LEU. For example, in its fiscal year 2011 

draft report, National Strategic Plan for Nuclear Materials, DOE stated 

that tritium production requires a supply of domestic-origin LEU fuel not 

subject to the peaceful use restrictions applied to foreign-origin uranium. 

In addition, in its fiscal year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management 

Plan, DOE discussed the various sources of unobligated LEU available to 

support tritium production. Numerous senior DOE and NNSA officials also 

consistently told us in interviews that tritium can only be produced using 

 

38Quantities of HEU were declared excess to national security needs in 1994 and 2005, 

which made some of this excess HEU available for downblending. According to DOE 

documents, the 1994 declaration by the President pledged that 174 tons of HEU would 

never again be used for any military purpose, including naval propulsion and tritium 

production. In 2005, the Secretary of Energy declared 200 tons of HEU excess to the 

weapons program. According to DOE documents, the 2005 declaration specifically 

allowed for use of this material for naval propulsion and tritium production. Most of this 

declared HEU has already been dedicated to specific purposes, such as for naval reactors 

and downblending to fuel research reactors. 

DOE Has Only Used 

Unobligated LEU to 

Meet National 

Security Needs for 

Tritium Production
 

Page 18 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

unobligated LEU. Finally, in letters to congressional representatives, 

former Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and other senior DOE officials 

have indicated that unobligated LEU is needed to support tritium 

production. In certain cases, only one supplier in the nuclear fuel cycle is 

available to provide unobligated services. For example, there is only one 

conversion facility that uses U.S. technology and only one milling 

company that uses U.S. technology.39

In addition, for over six decades, DOE has taken a number of steps to 

ensure that only unobligated LEU is used for tritium production for 

national security purposes, as described in the following examples:

• To secure and develop a domestic supply of uranium for the nation’s 

defense needs, beginning in 1948, the U.S. Bureau of Land 

Management withdrew certain uranium-rich land from the public 

domain and reserved it for the use of DOE’s predecessor agency, the 

Atomic Energy Commission. Through this land, DOE has ensured that 

natural uranium, domestic in origin, and therefore unobligated, is 

available to be mined for national security purposes.

• DOE’s 1999 interagency agreement with TVA for the production of 

tritium states that any reactor core that is irradiating TPBARs must 

contain unobligated fuel.40

• DOE has worked with USEC to help ensure that the American 

Centrifuge technology and its components are domestic in origin. The 

ACP is intended to produce LEU both for tritium production and 

potentially for commercial nuclear power plants. According to USEC 

officials, 100 percent of the centrifuge components are domestic or 

According to this agreement, DOE is 

responsible for ensuring that TVA can obtain unobligated LEU to 

support tritium production. As previously discussed, DOE is 

responsible for reimbursing TVA for any additional costs associated 

with using unobligated LEU, as obligated LEU is generally less 

expensive.

 

39GAO did not evaluate steps in the nuclear fuel cycle other than enrichment for this 

review. 

40Currently, TVA produces tritium in one reactor, Watts Bar 1. However, a second reactor, 

Sequoyah, is considered to be in backup status and may also be used for tritium 

production. As such, TVA is required by its agreement with DOE to use only unobligated 

LEU in Watts Bar 1 and may use obligated LEU in the Sequoyah reactor until formally 

notified by DOE to do otherwise. 
 

Page 19 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

unencumbered,

41 and a few peripheral support systems contain 

foreign components, but steps have been taken to bypass the foreign 

components that carry obligations if the plant is used to enrich LEU for 

use in tritium production. For example, USEC procured foreignproduced feed and withdrawal system components for the American 

Centrifuge technology. USEC officials demonstrated to us a specific 

work-around that will enable it to bypass the foreign equipment should 

the ACP be used to produce LEU for national security purposes.42

• In May 2012, in anticipation of USEC ceasing enrichment operations 

at the Paducah GDP, DOE initiated a complex series of transactions 

to ensure availability of a supply of unobligated LEU from USEC for 

future tritium production. The transactions involved DOE transferring 

U.S. origin depleted uranium tails to an energy company, which then 

contracted with USEC to enrich those tails to LEU. The energy 

company entered into an agreement with TVA to sell the majority of 

the resulting unobligated LEU to TVA starting in 2015, which TVA 

then plans to use to produce tritium for NNSA. DOE estimates that 

this series of transactions, known as the 2012 Depleted Uranium 

Enrichment Project, will provide up to 15 years of unobligated LEU for 

tritium production. According to DOE, this, along with other potential 

available sources, such as the Mixed Oxide Backup LEU Inventory 

Project, will help ensure a supply of unobligated LEU that will last 

through the mid-2030s, depending upon whether one or two reactors 

are needed to use this unobligated LEU to produce NNSA’s annual 

tritium requirements.

• DOE has used a practice called an “obligation exchange”—or flag 

swapping—in which DOE may swap obligated uranium with itself, or 

with other parties such as NRC regulated entities, for similar types 

and amounts of unobligated uranium (e.g., 1 ton of obligated natural 

uranium for 1 ton of unobligated natural uranium). Because uranium is 

considered by the industry to be fungible—that is, being of a nature 

that is easily exchangeable—the obligation exchange is made on the 

uranium inventory records, and no physical material is actually 

moved. DOE has used obligation exchanges in the past to ensure that 

LEU—and all of the processes that uranium undergoes before it is in 

a form useful for tritium production—is preserved as unobligated. For 

 

41Unencumbered LEU refers to LEU that is not encumbered by peaceful use restrictions 

and is thus considered to be unobligated.

42According to a senior NNSA official, the foreign government that placed the peaceful 

use obligations on the component agreed to this resolution.
 

Page 20 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

example, if DOE were to use LEU from the Mixed Oxide Backup LEU 

Inventory Project as discussed above, then it could pursue flag 

swapping as a way to ensure that this additional LEU would not carry 

obligations and would therefore be suitable for tritium production.

According to DOE and the Department of State, DOE’s practice of using 

exclusively unobligated LEU to meet national security needs for tritium 

production is based on both legal and policy considerations, including the 

U.S. commitment under international agreements that contain peaceful 

use provisions and U.S. nonproliferation policy goals. We found that there 

are three key international agreements that address foreign uranium 

enrichment facilities currently operating or planned for future operation in 

the United States. DOE believes that such agreements must be 

interpreted in light of U.S. nonproliferation policy and goals—including 

preventing other countries from producing tritium from U.S.-obligated 

uranium—and State officials told us that to construe the Washington and 

Paris Agreements regarding the permissibility of tritium production without 

regard to U.S. nonproliferation policy and goals could be detrimental. We 

found that only one of the agreements explicitly addresses by-product 

material such as tritium and that this agreement likely prohibits the 

production of tritium for any nuclear explosive device or for any military 

purpose. The other two agreements do not explicitly address whether 

only unobligated LEU may be used for tritium production; they are silent 

on this point. However, a key assumption underlying the decision to rely 

exclusively on unobligated LEU—that the United States has an ample 

supply of unobligated LEU—has changed with USEC ceasing enrichment 

operations and the uncertain future of the ACP. This change has led 

some parties to question whether a change in DOE’s practice could result 

in the United States obtaining LEU for national security purposes from 

other enrichment facilities, such as URENCO, and avoid the potentially 

significant expense of paying the costs to operate the ACP.

DOE documents state and officials from DOE and the Department of 

State told us that DOE’s practice of using only unobligated LEU for the 

production of tritium is based on both legal and policy considerations. For 

example, DOE’s November 2013 draft Tritium and Enriched Uranium 

Management Plan through 2060 links its practice to both law and policy 

when it states that, “U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy and U.S. 

international agreements for peaceful uses of nuclear materials require 

that any nuclear weapons materials be produced using materials, 

DOE’s Practice of 

Using Unobligated 

LEU for Tritium 

Production Is Based 

on a Mix of Legal and 

Policy 

Considerations, but a 

Key Assumption 

Underlying This 

Practice Has 

Changed

DOE’s Practice of Using 

Unobligated LEU Is Based 

on a Mix of Legal and 

Policy Considerations
 

Page 21 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

technologies, production equipment, and infrastructure that is free of 

foreign peaceful use restrictions.” 

Various DOE documents state that international agreements require that 

it use exclusively unobligated LEU for tritium production. DOE and 

Department of State officials explained that the United States has 

nonproliferation obligations under agreements to which the United States 

is a party that pertain to uranium enrichment facilities and associated 

technology imported into the United States. As discussed above, these 

agreements contain peaceful use provisions that require that transferred 

equipment and certain material produced through the use of such 

equipment be used only for peaceful, nonexplosive, purposes. The 

Executive Branch has made public its interpretation that the SILEX 123 

agreement does not allow the use of SILEX technology for tritium 

production.43

As noted above, Section 123 of the AEA requires a guarantee that U.S. 

exports and special nuclear material used in or produced through those 

exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive device, or for research 

on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any military 

purpose. Department of State officials told us that it would be inconsistent 

to read the peaceful use provisions implementing that requirement in U.S. 

peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements to prohibit the use of nuclear 

material covered by such agreements to produce tritium for weapons, 

while at the same time construing the substantively similar peaceful use 

provision of the Washington Agreement to permit use of the LEU covered 

by that agreement to produce tritium for weapons, even if the specific 

language of that agreement does not explicitly reference use of special 

nuclear material for production or use of by-product material.

However, we did not identify any public interpretation of the 

peaceful use restrictions of the Washington Agreement or the Paris 

Agreement with respect to tritium production for national security 

purposes. State officials noted that primary responsibility within the 

executive branch for the interpretation of U.S. obligations under an 

international agreement falls to the Secretary of State. State officials 

indicated that “concerns about this issue [specifically interpreting the 

peaceful use restrictions in the Washington Agreement] have been raised 

within the executive branch.” 

 

43President’s Message to Congress Transmitting the Australia-United States Agreement 

on Technology for the Separation of Isotopes of Uranium by Laser Excitation with 

Documentation, 35 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2243 (Nov. 3, 1999). 

DOE References Legal 

Considerations for Its Practice; 

Only One of the Three 

International Agreements We 

Reviewed Explicitly Addresses 

By-product Material Such as 

Tritium
 

Page 22 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

We analyzed the three key agreements that specifically address the 

importation of uranium enrichment technology into the United States—the 

Washington Agreement, the Paris Agreement, and the SILEX 123 

Agreement, which address the URENCO facility, the planned Eagle Rock 

facility, and the planned GLE facility, respectively—and we found that 

only one of the three international agreements we reviewed explicitly 

addresses by-product material, which includes tritium. However, DOE 

interprets and applies these agreements through the lens of U.S. 

nonproliferation goals, and thus it has consistently used only unobligated 

LEU for tritium production.44

The peaceful use provisions of the Washington and Paris Agreements are 

substantially the same. They provide as follows:

Any [technology], equipment and components transferred into the 

United States subject to this Agreement, [the facility itself and any 

nuclear material in the facility], any special nuclear material produced 

through the use of such technology, any special nuclear material 

produced through the use of such special nuclear material, and any 

data generated at [the facility which] is designated Restricted Data 

while such data is under the jurisdiction of the United States 

Government or [applicable foreign governments] shall only be used 

for peaceful, non-explosive purposes.45

Two clauses from these provisions are specifically relevant to this 

analysis. The first provides that special nuclear material produced through 

the use of transferred enrichment technology must only be used for 

peaceful, nonexplosive purposes. We refer to this clause as “the first 

clause.” The second clause provides that special nuclear material 

produced through the use of such special nuclear material must only be 

used for peaceful, nonexplosive purposes. We refer to this clause as “the 

second clause.” “Special nuclear material” as defined in these two 

 

44We also analyzed the peaceful use language in a selection of other international treaties 

and agreements that relate more generally to nonproliferation and nuclear trade. As 

summarized in appendix III, we found that those agreements do not speak directly to 

whether only unobligated LEU may be used for tritium production.

45See appendix II for the complete text of these provisions.
 

Page 23 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

agreements includes LEU and plutonium, but not tritium.46

There are alternative ways to interpret the peaceful use provisions in the 

Washington and Paris Agreements with regard to the production of 

tritium. One alternative reflects a narrower reading of the agreements just 

to prohibit (1) the use of obligated uranium in weapons or (2) the use of 

obligated uranium to produce additional special nuclear material for 

weapons. Under this reading, the breadth of the first clause—which limits 

the use of uranium enriched by the technology to peaceful purposes—is 

limited by the second clause, which specifically prohibits the production of 

additional special nuclear material from the uranium enriched by the 

technology. Arguably the imposition of limits only on the use of special 

nuclear material derived from obligated uranium suggests that no limits 

on other types of material, such as by-product material like tritium, are to 

be inferred. Furthermore, the second clause of the provision arguably 

serves no purpose in the text if it does not limit the breadth of the first 

clause because the first clause on its own would already prohibit the 

production of special nuclear material from the obligated uranium, along 

with all other military purposes. Under this reading, obligated uranium 

may not be used directly in weapons and may not be used to produce 

additional special nuclear material, such as plutonium, for weapons. The 

agreements are silent as to tritium production.

Accordingly, 

these agreements explicitly prohibit (1) using the technology to enrich 

uranium for nuclear weapons and (2) using uranium enriched by the 

technology to produce additional special nuclear material, such as 

plutonium, for nuclear weapons. Since tritium is not a special nuclear 

material, it is unclear whether using obligated LEU to produce tritium for 

nuclear weapons is prohibited under the Washington and Paris 

Agreements.

 

46Specifically, the agreements define “special nuclear material” to include “plutonium, 

uranium-233, and uranium enriched in the isotopes U-233 or U-235.” By comparison, 

“special nuclear material” is defined by the AEA to include plutonium or uranium enriched 

in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235 and any other material that NRC determines to be 

special nuclear material, but it does not include source material. The NRC has not 

declared any other material—including tritium—as special nuclear material. In addition, 

the 1998 interagency review, Interagency Review of the Nonproliferation Implications of 

Alternative Tritium Production Technologies under Consideration by the Department of 

Energy, states that, “...tritium is not a fissionable material capable of sustaining a nuclear 

reaction. Thus, it is not classified as a special nuclear material...”. 
 

Page 24 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

Another interpretation reflects a broader reading of the agreements, to 

prohibit the use of obligated uranium for any military purpose. Under this 

reading, the scope of the first clause is not limited by the second clause; 

rather, the second clause simply emphasizes a particular prohibition on 

the use of uranium enriched by the technology. Under this reading, 

obligated uranium may not be used for any non peaceful purpose,

specifically including the production of additional special nuclear material 

and more generally including the production of any other weapons 

material, such as by-product material like tritium.47

The peaceful use provision of the third agreement—the SILEX 123 

Agreement—differs somewhat from those of the Washington and Paris 

Agreements. It provides as follows:

This reading is 

consistent with DOE’s long-standing practice of using only unobligated 

uranium for the production of tritium for nuclear weapons.

Sensitive nuclear facilities and major critical components subject to 

this Agreement and any material used in them or produced through 

their use, and Restricted Data and sensitive nuclear technology 

transferred pursuant to this Agreement, shall not be used for any 

nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any 

nuclear explosive device, or for any military purpose.

This provision prohibits the use of the transferred enrichment technology 

and any material produced through their use for any nuclear explosive 

device or for any military purpose. “Material” is defined by the agreement 

to include enriched uranium, plutonium, and by-product material, such as 

tritium.48

 

47This broader reading would also arguably prohibit the use of obligated uranium for the 

production of power to be used for any military activities. For example, under this reading, 

the uranium enriched by a facility using power produced from obligated uranium would 

itself be obligated. As noted above, the Paducah GDP was, until May 2013, DOE’s sole 

supplier of enrichment services for national security purposes. While the Paducah plant 

obtained its power from TVA, that power was provided by the Shawnee Power Plant, 

which is a coal-fired power plant.

Accordingly, it prohibits using the technology to enrich uranium 

48Specifically, the agreement defines “material” to mean “source material, special nuclear 

material, byproduct material, radioisotopes other than byproduct material, or any other 

such substance so designated by agreement of the Parties.” “Special nuclear material” is 

defined to mean “(1) plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched in the isotope 235 or 

(2) any other material so designated by agreement of the Parties.” “Byproduct material” is 

defined to mean “any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or 

made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or 

utilizing special nuclear material.” Tritium is produced in this way.
 

Page 25 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

directly for nuclear weapons and likely also prohibits using obligated LEU 

for the subsequent production of other weapon materials such as 

plutonium and tritium. The presidential message transmitting the SILEX 

123 agreement to Congress in 1999 supports this conclusion. 

Specifically, the letter stated that all material produced by and through the 

use of the SILEX technology would be precluded from use in U.S. nuclear 

weapons and naval nuclear propulsion programs and that, furthermore, 

“...all other military uses of this material, such as tritium production and 

material testing, would . . . not be possible because of the assurances 

given to the Government of Australia.”

We sought to identify a range of readings of these three agreements 

because, while DOE has stated what it believes the agreements require, 

and the Department of State discussed various aspects of the 

agreements with us, we only identified a public interpretation of one of the 

agreements. If DOE and State were to put forth a formal interpretation, 

we note that courts have found that such interpretations are entitled to 

“great weight.”49 In addition, it is the Administration’s prerogative to make 

international nonproliferation policy,50

 

49Factor v. Lauenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 

194 (1961); Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982); 

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 326 (1987). 

and State officials stated that their 

reading of the agreements is supported by the text of those agreements 

and consistent with U.S. nonproliferation policy interests, as described 

below, and is also reflected in nuclear cooperation agreements with other 

50Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for S. Dist. Of 

Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 552 (U.S. 1987); see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 

Relations Law of the U.S. § 1 (1987) (In strictly domestic matters, Congress enacts laws 

and the President takes care that the laws be faithfully executed. In domestic affairs, 

presidential action can be seen as a source of law primarily as he exercises authority 

delegated to him by Congress, and secondarily insofar as some law-making is inherent in 

the interpretation and execution of laws. In foreign affairs, however, the President is 

clearly a separate source of law since he makes treaties (with the advice and consent of 

the Senate), which are the law of the land. As the ‘sole organ of the nation in its external 

relations,’ in whom is lodged ‘the executive power,’ and as Commander in Chief, the 

President also has authority to make other agreements wholly on his own authority”) 

(internal citations removed).
 

Page 26 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

countries.51

According to DOE officials, U.S. policy considerations are furthered by 

having a domestic uranium enrichment capability for tritium production. 

Specifically, the United States has broad nonproliferation policy goals that 

build on its commitments under the NPT regarding the prevention of the 

proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Officials told us that they believe that U.S. practice is in 

keeping with that of other countries on this point and that the best way to 

ensure that U.S. policy is upheld with respect to our requirements on 

other countries is to interpret our obligations to other countries in a similar 

manner.

52

 

51For example, they cited the U.S. 123 Agreement with India, which explicitly prohibits the 

use of by-product material, such as tritium, produced through the use of transferred 

nuclear material or equipment for any nuclear explosive device or for any military purpose. 

We note that, unlike certain of the agreements discussed in the text above, there is only 

one interpretation of the 123 Agreement with India in this regard. This is because the 

equipment transferred under the agreement is reactor equipment—which can be used to 

produce tritium in one generation—not enrichment equipment, which can only be used to 

produce tritium in a subsequent generation and through the use of additional reactor 

equipment. 

A 1998 interagency report concluded 

that, in utilizing commercial light water reactors owned by TVA to produce 

tritium for defense purposes, to preserve the military-civilian dichotomy,

DOE should fuel such reactors only with U.S. LEU fuel that was 

“unencumbered by peaceful use pledges.” This report, entitled 

Interagency Review of the Nonproliferation Implications of Alternative 

Tritium Production Technologies under Consideration by the Department 

of Energy, was prepared following a review conducted by DOE, the 

Departments of State and Defense, and several other agencies to 

consider nonproliferation issues associated with using a commercial 

reactor—in this case, TVA’s Watts Bar 1 and potentially Sequoyah 

52Under the NPT, the United States is obligated not to transfer possession or control of 

nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not in any way to assist, 

encourage, or induce any nonnuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire 

or control such weapons or devices. According to Department of State officials, the United 

States must therefore ensure that its nuclear cooperation with nonnuclear weapon states 

is exclusively for peaceful purposes. It implements this obligation, among other ways, 

through the peaceful use provisions in U.S. 123 Agreements. 

U.S. Nonproliferation Policy 

Goals Call for DOE to Use 

Unobligated LEU for Tritium 

Production
 

Page 27 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

reactors—to establish a new domestic means for tritium production.53,

54

The interagency review determined that several factors could mitigate the 

potential impact of this path forward for tritium production on U.S. 

nonproliferation policy. First, the review concluded that using a 

commercial light water reactor was not prohibited by law or international 

treaty,55 and second that the use of a government-owned and -operated 

nuclear reactor (a TVA reactor) to produce an essential material for 

nuclear weapons contributed to minimizing a divergence from the 

separation between civil and military nuclear applications that evolved in 

the 1950s and 1960s.56

 

53Interagency Review of the Nonproliferation Implications of Alternative Tritium Production 

Technologies under Consideration by the Department of Energy, Report to the Congress, 

July 1998. Participants in the review included the Departments of Defense, Energy, and 

State; the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 

the National Security Council; the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy; 

and the Office of the Vice President.

According to this review, the United States 

54The report analyzed the nonproliferation implications of the United States pursuing three 

tritium production technologies: a commercial light water reactor, a proton accelerator, and 

the Fast Flux Test Facility. The accelerator technology would accelerate protons (particles 

within an atom that have a positive electrical charge) to nearly the speed of light. The 

protons would impact or collide with tungsten, releasing neutrons through a process called 

spallation, which can be used to change helium into tritium. The Fast Flux Test Facility is a 

sodium-cooled, fast-neutron flux reactor plant designed specifically for irradiation testing of 

nuclear reactor fuels and materials for liquid metal fast breeder reactors. Neither of the 

latter two options was ultimately pursued.

55Specifically, the review notes that (1) the sole prohibition in U.S. law against the use of a 

commercial reactor for defense purposes relates to a ban on the use for nuclear explosive 

purposes of special nuclear material, such as uranium or plutonium produced in a 

commercial reactor, not tritium; (2) the NPT would not ban the use of U.S. commercial 

reactors for defense purposes because, as a nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty, the 

United States is not prohibited from manufacturing weapons or materials needed for their 

production; (3) the U.S Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy 

Agency would not ban the production of tritium in a commercial reactor because 

safeguards are applied to source materials, such as LEU and purified natural uranium, 

and special fissionable materials, such as HEU and plutonium, but not to tritium; and (4) to 

the extent that nuclear cooperation agreements prohibit imported fuel and equipment from 

being used for explosive purposes, the United States would assure its foreign trading 

partners that no restricted fuel or equipment was used for tritium production.

56In addition, the report asserted that, although use for tritium production of a nuclear 

reactor producing energy for civilian use could raise concerns about the practice of 

military-civilian dichotomy separation in U.S. nuclear energy programs, the particular 

reactors proposed to be used for this purpose would be wholly owned by the U.S. 

government, rather than by a private entity and, therefore, would be in effect extending the 

past practice of using government-owned facilities simultaneously for civil and military 

purposes rather than setting a precedent.
 

Page 28 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

developed its commercial nuclear power industry beginning in the 1950s 

and by the mid-1960s had insulated that industry from producing 

materials for nuclear weapons. To mitigate concerns associated with 

using a commercial light water reactor for tritium production, the review 

concluded that DOE should exclusively use LEU that is unobligated by 

peaceful use restrictions to maintain the separation between the military 

and civilian sectors. Notably, this conclusion was predicated on an 

assumption that the United States had a sufficient supply of unobligated 

LEU available for use in the TVA reactor. Specifically, the report states 

that “there are ample supplies of unencumbered U.S. low enriched 

uranium to satisfy the fueling needs of a CLWR [commercial light water 

reactor] used for the production of tritium.” On these bases, the 

administration determined that the nonproliferation policy issues 

associated with using a commercial light water reactor were manageable 

and that DOE should pursue this option for future tritium production, 

which it did. A subsequent 1999 Record of Decision for tritium supply and 

recycling incorporated the conclusion about using only unobligated 

uranium by indicating that production of tritium for nuclear weapons by 

commercial reactors “would be operated in compliance with international 

agreements imposing restrictions on use of transferred materials for 

peaceful purposes only, e.g., no reactor fuel or component transferred 

under these agreements would be used by any reactor making tritium.”57

Officials from DOE, NNSA, and the Department of State outlined a 

number of additional policy considerations that inform DOE’s 

interpretation of international agreements and its associated practice of 

using only unobligated LEU for the production of tritium, including the 

following.

• In keeping with broad nonproliferation goals, NNSA officials told us 

that, if the United States did not require the use of unobligated LEU 

for its own national security purposes, it could cause an unintended 

“domino effect” abroad. For example, some countries purchase LEU 

on the open market, and the United States would not want to set a 

precedent for “blurring the line” between using LEU for energy 

purposes and using LEU for tritium production or other military 

purposes when the LEU carries broad peaceful use obligations. 

 

5764 Fed. Reg. at 26,369 (May 14, 1999).
 

Page 29 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

According to NNSA officials, the consequences of setting such a 

precedent could be severe. 

• Furthermore, according to State officials, they believe that permitting 

the use of foreign-obligated nuclear fuel for tritium production for 

nuclear weapons could encourage other countries to argue that they 

could use U.S.-obligated material for production of tritium for foreign 

military purposes under their peaceful nuclear cooperation 

agreements with the United States.

• NNSA officials told us that, if DOE were to allow the use of LEU 

carrying broad peaceful use obligations for tritium production, then 

other countries that are a party to those agreements could also ask for 

concessions from the United States on other issues—such as for the 

United States to relax polices on the physical protection of nuclear 

materials, which could have severe negative consequences if the 

materials were not adequately protected from theft.

• A May 2012 DOE briefing document states that having a domestic 

enrichment capability enhances the nation’s nonproliferation credibility 

by assuring other nations that they do not need their own enrichment 

capability because the United States can provide them with LEU for 

the purpose of generating power. For example, officials told us that if 

the United States were to permanently lose its domestic enrichment 

capability, it could cause concern among other countries that the 

United States may not be able to ensure a guaranteed LEU supply, 

and other countries may then seek to acquire their own indigenous 

enrichment capability. This could, in turn, create new proliferation 

concerns, as the use of sensitive nuclear fuel enrichment technologies 

that are used to develop LEU for nuclear fuel could also be used for a 

clandestine nuclear weapons program.58

• State officials also indicated that, from a policy perspective, as a 

nuclear weapon state, it would not be ideal for the United States to 

rely on a foreign entity to meet national security needs.

• Finally, NNSA officials told us in written correspondence that having a 

domestic enrichment capability provides the United States with 

information about how uranium enrichment facilities operate, which 

 

58In 2013, we found that there is potential overlap among the U.S. nuclear fuel bank—

which seeks to guarantee the supply of fuel for civilian nuclear power programs and offer 

countries an alternative to developing their own indigenous fuel supplies—and other 

guaranteed fuel supply options, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency’s fuel 

bank, and questioned the need for the U.S. nuclear fuel bank. See GAO, Nuclear 

Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Made Progress in Implementing Critical Programs but 

Continues to Face Challenges, GAO-13-139 (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2013).
 

Page 30 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

could help the United States maintain both information and expertise 

to detect new proliferation programs in other countries.

DOE and Department of State officials have cited these U.S. 

nonproliferation goals in response to questions about whether TVA could 

use LEU produced by URENCO LES for tritium production. Specifically, 

URENCO’s corporate position has been that the Washington Agreement, 

under which its uranium enrichment facility in the United States operates, 

does not restrict the use of its LEU for the production of tritium. In 2006 

and 2010, URENCO LES entered into a contract with TVA to provide LEU 

for use in TVA’s commercial nuclear reactors. Because TVA produces 

tritium for NNSA in one of its nuclear reactors, URENCO LES evaluated 

the extent to which the Washington Agreement precludes the use of LEU 

produced with URENCO technology in TVA’s tritium-producing reactor. 

According to a URENCO legal memorandum, in a July 2005 meeting of 

the Joint Committee—the British-Dutch-German government body 

supervising company activities under the Treaty of Almelo—URENCO 

corporate management posited that providing LEU enriched by URENCO 

LES to TVA for use in any of its reactors was not in conflict with the 

Washington Agreement’s peaceful use provisions. As reported to 

company officials in the United States, the Joint Committee confirmed 

that the Washington Agreement’s provisions restrict special nuclear 

material produced by URENCO LES to peaceful purposes. According to 

URENCO’s legal memorandum, it was further discussed that URENCO 

LES’s LEU will be used by TVA principally to produce electricity and that, 

if used in TVA’s tritium producing reactor, the resulting tritium produced in 

that reactor is a by-product material and not a special nuclear material. 

According to senior URENCO officials, the Joint Committee further 

discussed the fact that TVA would primarily use URENCO LES’s LEU for 

the purpose of producing commercial power. According to company 

officials, the Joint Committee did not place restrictions on the URENCO 

LES’s contract with TVA and did not distinguish between TVA’s reactors 

that produce tritium and those that do not. Furthermore, according to TVA 

officials, URENCO has consistently informed TVA that it places no 

restrictions on TVA using URENCO LES’s LEU in its tritium-producing 

reactors.

URENCO’s reading of the Washington Agreement is consistent with the 

narrower reading of the agreement outlined above rather than the broader 

reading, which prohibits the use of obligated uranium for any military 

purpose. DOE states that TVA may not use LEU produced by URENCO 

LES for tritium production because the output of URENCO’s facility is 

obligated. NNSA’s interagency agreement with TVA for tritium production 
 

Page 31 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

requires TVA to use unobligated LEU in the reactors being used for 

tritium production. Department of State officials also noted that the view of 

a private entity does not have weight in the interpretation of an agreement 

binding under international law between governments.

Although DOE has only used unobligated LEU for tritium production, a 

key assumption underpinning the decision to use unobligated LEU to 

meet national security needs for tritium production has changed. As 

previously discussed, in 1998, when the interagency report was drafted 

that advised DOE to use only unobligated LEU in the TVA reactors that 

produce tritium, the government had a ready supplier of enrichment 

services to produce unobligated LEU. Because USEC ceased enrichment 

operations in May 2013, and because of the uncertain future of the ACP 

following USEC’s March 2014 bankruptcy filing, the United States no 

longer has a domestic enrichment capability that will provide an assured 

source of unobligated LEU for tritium production. As explained above, 

while DOE’s November 2013 draft Tritium and Enriched Uranium 

Management Plan through 2060 estimates that DOE’s tritium production 

needs can be met using unobligated LEU inventories that will last through 

the mid-2030s, the inventories could be exhausted by the mid-2020s if it 

becomes necessary to use a second TVA nuclear reactor to meet DOE’s 

tritium production goals.

In addition, over the last several years, DOE has, in some instances, 

provided vague reasoning to Congress for the United States’ need to 

maintain a domestic uranium enrichment capability to produce 

unobligated LEU. In letters to members of Congress, congressionally 

mandated reports, and a congressional briefing document, DOE has 

stated that international agreements require their practice of using only 

unobligated LEU to produce tritium and has cited various policy 

considerations—such as national security interests and proliferation 

detection—as reasons why the United States needs to use unobligated 

LEU, without providing much detail about the rationale for each 

consideration. Without more information about the rationales for DOE’s 

practice, decision makers may not have the information needed to 

consider the range of national security concerns raised by this issue.

The U.S. practice to use only unobligated LEU to produce tritium has not 

been examined collaboratively by the many interested entities of the 

government since 1998 when the conditions surrounding the availability 

of unobligated LEU for tritium production were quite different. Because 

the United States no longer has an assured source of enrichment 

The Key Assumption 

Underlying DOE’s 

Practice, Available 

Unobligated LEU, Has 

Changed
 

Page 32 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

services to produce unobligated LEU for tritium production, DOE is 

currently assessing options for obtaining unobligated LEU, as required by 

the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014. According to DOE officials, 

DOE is currently engaged with an interagency working group under the 

National Security Council that includes representatives from the 

Departments of State and Defense to conduct such an analysis. While 

officials indicated that the short-term lack of a domestic enrichment 

capability is unlikely to shift long-established national policy, DOE and 

State officials also told us that, prior to this interagency working group, the 

two agencies had not communicated with each other on this topic in 

several years because they had not seen a need to do so. In prior work, 

we identified practices that can enhance and sustain collaboration among 

federal agencies, thereby improving performance and results.59 One such 

practice is to define and articulate a common outcome. An updated 

interagency review to either reaffirm or support a change in the current 

practice of using unobligated LEU for tritium production could help 

address questions about whether using LEU produced, for example, 

under the Washington Agreement, is an option for DOE.

Conditions have changed since DOE, the Department of State, and other 

relevant U.S. government entities completed their 1998 interagency 

review of the nonproliferation implications of tritium production. Because 

USEC ceased enrichment operations in May 2013 and the future of the 

ACP is uncertain, the United States no longer has a domestic enrichment 

capability that will provide an assured source of unobligated LEU. DOE is 

currently collaborating with an interagency working group to assess 

options for obtaining unobligated LEU to produce tritium to meet national 

security needs, and it is possible that, among these options, DOE will 

revisit the advice it received in 1998. DOE and State officials told us that, 

prior to this interagency analysis, the two entities had not communicated 

about the interpretation of international agreements and nonproliferation 

concerns associated with using certain foreign-produced LEU for tritium 

production in several years. We believe the change in the assumption 

fundamental to the 1998 interagency review—that sufficient unobligated 

LEU would be available for tritium production—gives new importance to 

the need for the executive branch to review its position on how the United 

 

59GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).

Conclusions
 

Page 33 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

States will obtain LEU for tritium production. By taking steps to coordinate 

the interagency community to review DOE’s current practice of using 

unobligated LEU for tritium production, decision makers may have greater 

assurance that decisions on how to obtain future LEU for tritium 

production are based on a coordinated understanding of U.S. obligations 

consistent with international agreements and U.S. nonproliferation goals.

In light of the significantly reduced availability of unobligated LEU, the 

absence of a domestic enrichment capability, and the questions that this 

condition has raised about options for its supply, GAO recommends that 

the Secretary of Energy ensure that DOE’s interagency review of options 

for obtaining unobligated LEU assesses DOE’s current practice of using 

only unobligated LEU for the production of tritium for national security 

purposes. Further, we recommend that this review result in either an 

affirmation of DOE’s continuing practice or a commitment to study 

alternative sources of LEU consistent with international agreements and 

U.S. nonproliferation goals.

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the

Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, Executive Director for 

Operations of NRC, and the Vice President for Government Relations of 

TVA on August 15, 2014. We also provided a technical statement of facts 

to the following third parties: USEC and URENCO. We received technical 

comments from these parties and incorporated them, as appropriate, prior 

to providing the draft of this report to the agencies noted above. DOE 

provided written comments on September 22, 2014, which are 

reproduced in appendix IV. DOE acknowledged our recommendation but 

did not agree nor disagree with our recommendation, and stated that the 

department will continue working with interagency partners, including on a 

collaborative review of current policies and practices. DOE also provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The 

Department of State did not provide comments on GAO’s findings and 

recommendation, but did provide technical comments on September 15

and September 18, 2014, which we incorporated as appropriate. We 

received a written response from NRC on September 9, 2014, which is 

reproduced in appendix V. NRC also provided technical comments, which 

we incorporated as appropriate. TVA did not provide comments on GAO’s 

findings and recommendation, but did provide technical comments orally 

on September 8, 2014, which we incorporated as appropriate.

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 34 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate 

congressional committees, the Secretary of Energy, and other interested 

parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO 

website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have questions about this report, please 

contact David C. Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov or 

Susan D. Sawtelle at (202) 512-6417 or sawtelles@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may

be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 

listed in appendix VI. 

David C. Trimble

Director, Natural Resources and Environment

Susan D. Sawtelle

Managing Associate General Counsel
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 35 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

The objectives of our review were to assess (1) the extent to which the 

Department of Energy (DOE) has adhered to its practice of using only 

unobligated low-enriched uranium (LEU) to meet national security needs 

for tritium and (2) the basis for DOE’s practice of using only unobligated 

LEU to meet national security needs for tritium.

To determine the extent to which DOE has adhered to its practice of only 

using unobligated LEU to meet national security needs for tritium, we 

reviewed DOE and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 

documents. These included DOE strategic planning documents, 

contracts, internal memos and letters, internal analyses, and budget 

documents. In addition, we interviewed officials from DOE’s Office of 

Management, Office of Nuclear Energy, and NNSA’s Tritium Readiness 

Subprogram Office and the Office of Nonproliferation and International 

Security. We also interviewed officials from the Department of State’s 

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation and Office of the 

Legal Advisor. Furthermore, we reviewed documents and interviewed 

officials from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)—which produces 

tritium through an interagency agreement with DOE—and the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC). Moreover, we interviewed USEC officials 

involved with the American Centrifuge project in Piketon, Ohio, at the 

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (GDP) in Paducah, Kentucky, and at 

USEC’s headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland.

To determine the basis for DOE’s practice for using only unobligated LEU 

to meet national security needs for tritium, we reviewed DOE and NNSA 

documents and assessed relevant international agreements pertaining to 

the transfer of enrichment technology into the United States and the 

extent to which these agreements require DOE to use exclusively 

unobligated LEU for meeting national security needs. In particular, we 

analyzed the following nuclear cooperation agreements and international 

agreements: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the 

Paris Agreement; the Washington Agreement; the nuclear cooperation 

agreement between the United States and Australia; nuclear cooperation 

agreements between the United States and EURATOM; the Agreement 

Between the United States of America and the International Atomic 

Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of 

America; the Treaty of Almelo between Germany, the Netherlands, and 

the United Kingdom; and the Cardiff Agreement between France, 

Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. We also interviewed 

officials from the Department of State’s Bureau of International Security 

and Nonproliferation and Office of the Legal Advisor and NNSA’s Office of 

Nonproliferation and International Security, as well as officials from TVA 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 36 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

and representatives from USEC and URENCO.1,

2 We also reviewed two 

analyses completed by the Congressional Research Service on peaceful 

use restrictions applicable to uranium enriched at the URENCO facility 

and on potential sources of LEU for tritium production, and we 

interviewed staff regarding their conclusions.3

To inform both objectives, we conducted site visits to the Paducah GDP 

in Paducah, Kentucky, and the American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, 

Ohio, because these are the two locations where USEC had been 

enriching or planning to enrich uranium. We also visited DOE’s Oak 

Ridge Office, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and NNSA’s Y-12 National 

Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, because these offices play a 

role in uranium management or collaboration with USEC, such as on the 

development of the American Centrifuge technology. We also interviewed 

senior USEC officials, including its Chief Financial Officer, to learn more 

about the company’s financial condition and future plans.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2013 to October 2014 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 

1

DOE, NNSA, and Department of State officials discussed various aspects of the 

international agreements and nonproliferation policy with us. We only identified a public 

interpretation of one of the agreements, however, and, thus for the other two agreements, 

this report identifies a range of possible readings.

2

NNSA was created as a semiautonomous agency within DOE under the National Nuclear 

Security Administration Act. Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 3211, 113 Stat. 512, 957 (1999). NNSA 

is responsible for the management and security of the nation’s nuclear weapons, 

nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.

3

CRS, Peaceful Use Restrictions on Uranium Enriched at the Urenco Uranium Enrichment 

Facility (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2012). CRS, Potential Sources of Nuclear Fuel for 

Tritium Production (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2012).
Appendix II: Peaceful Use Language in Key 

International Agreements Addressing Uranium 

Enrichment Facilities Operating or Planned for 

Operation in the United States

Page 37 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

Sources: GAO analysis of international agreements. | GAO-15-123

Appendix II: Peaceful Use Language in Key 

International Agreements Addressing 

Uranium Enrichment Facilities Operating or 

Planned for Operation in the United States 

International agreement

Date of 

agreement

Government 

signatories Facility Peaceful use language

Agreement between the Three 

Governments of the United 

Kingdom of Great Britain and 

Northern Ireland, the Federal 

Republic of Germany and the 

Kingdom of the Netherlands 

and the Government of the 

United States of America 

regarding the Establishment, 

Construction and Operation of 

a Uranium Enrichment 

Installation in the United 

States (Washington 

Agreement)

July 24, 1992 • United States

• Germany

• Netherlands

• United Kingdom

URENCO, 

Louisiana Energy 

Services (New 

Mexico) 

“Any centrifuge technology, equipment and 

components transferred into the United 

States subject to this Agreement, the 

Installation, any nuclear material and the 

Installation, any special nuclear material 

produced through the use of such 

technology, any special nuclear material 

produced through the use of such special 

nuclear material, and any data generated at 

the Installation which is designated 

Restricted Data while such data is under 

the jurisdiction of the United States 

Government or of the Three Governments 

shall only be used for peaceful, nonexplosive purposes.” 

Agreement between the 

Government of the United 

States of America and the 

Four Governments of the 

French Republic, the United 

Kingdom of Great Britain and 

Northern Ireland, the Kingdom 

of the Netherlands, and the 

Federal Republic of Germany 

regarding the Establishment, 

Construction and Operation of 

Uranium Enrichment 

Installations using Gas 

Centrifuge Technology in the 

United States of America

(Paris Agreement)

February 24, 

2011

• United States

• France

• United Kingdom

• Netherlands

• Germany

AREVA, Eagle 

Rock (Idaho) 

“Any ETC [Enrichment Technology 

Company] Centrifuge Technology, 

Operations Technology, equipment and 

components transferred into the United 

States subject to this Agreement, each 

Installation, any Nuclear material in an 

Installation, any special nuclear material 

produced through the use of such 

technology, any special nuclear material 

produced through the use of such special 

nuclear material, and any data generated at 

an Installation that is designated Restricted 

Data while such data is under the 

jurisdiction of the United States 

Government or any of the Four 

Governments shall only be used for 

peaceful, non-explosive purposes.” 

Agreement for Cooperation 

Between Australia and the 

United States of America 

Concerning Technology for the 

Separation of Isotopes of 

Uranium by Laser Excitation

(SILEX 123 Agreement)

October 28, 

1999

• United States

• Australia 

Global Laser 

Enrichment (any 

planned facility)

“Sensitive nuclear facilities and major 

critical components subject to this 

Agreement and any material used in them 

or produced through their use, and 

Restricted Data and sensitive nuclear 

technology transferred pursuant to this 

Agreement, shall not be used for any 

nuclear explosive device, for research on or 

development of any nuclear explosive 

device, or for any military purpose.” 
Appendix III: Peaceful Use Language in 

Additional Select Treaties and International 

Agreements Related to Nonproliferation and 

Nuclear Trade

Page 38 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

The Department of Energy (DOE), DOE’s National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA), and Department of State officials discussed 

various aspects of three international agreements specifically related to 

the import of uranium enrichment technology, as well as nonproliferation 

policy, with us, but they did not explain specifically how these 

international agreements affect their decisions regarding the production of 

tritium. In the body of this report, we analyze a range of possible readings 

of the text of those three enrichment technology agreements.1 In this 

appendix, we summarize our analysis of peaceful use language in certain 

additional treaties and international agreements—agreements that are 

related more generally to nonproliferation and nuclear trade—to 

determine whether their provisions might affect DOE’s ability to produce 

tritium from uranium enriched using foreign technology. For example, we 

analyzed agreements between the United States and the European 

Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) because the European parties to 

the agreements pertaining to URENCO and AREVA are also members of 

EURATOM. As described in further detail below, we did not identify any 

provisions in these more general agreements that prohibit tritium 

production.

International agreement or treaty

Date of 

agreement or 

treaty Government parties Peaceful use language

Agreement Between the Government of the 

United States of America and the European 

Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)a

(EURATOM Agreement, May/June 1958)

May and June 

1958 (Expired)

• EURATOM

• United States

“The Parties will cooperate in programs 

for the advancement of the peaceful 

applications of atomic energy. Such 

cooperation will be undertaken from time 

to time pursuant to such terms and 

conditions as may be agreed and shall 

be subject to all provisions of law 

respectively applicable to the Parties.” 

 

1

Relevant provisions of these three agreements are quoted in appendix II.

Appendix III: Peaceful Use Language in 

Additional Select Treaties and International 

Agreements Related to Nonproliferation and 

Nuclear Trade
Appendix III: Peaceful Use Language in 

Additional Select Treaties and International 

Agreements Related to Nonproliferation and 

Nuclear Trade

Page 39 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

International agreement or treaty

Date of 

agreement or 

treaty Government parties Peaceful use language

Agreement for Cooperation Between the 

Government of the United States of America 

and the European Atomic Energy Community 

(EURATOM) Concerning Peaceful Uses of 

Atomic Energy (EURATOM 123 Agreement, 

1958)b

November 1958 

(Expired) 

• EURATOM

• United States

“The Community guarantees that: No 

material, including equipment and 

devices, transferred pursuant to this 

Agreement to the Community or to 

persons within the Community, will be 

used for atomic weapons, or for research 

on or development of atomic weapons, or 

for any other military purpose; .... No 

source or special nuclear material utilized 

in, recovered from, or produced as a 

result of the use of material, equipment, 

or devices transferred pursuant to this 

Agreement to the Community or to 

persons within the Community will be 

used for atomic weapons, or for research 

on or development of atomic weapons, or 

for any other military purpose.” 

“The Government of the United States of 

America and the Community reaffirm 

their common interest in fostering the 

peaceful applications of atomic energy 

through the International Atomic Energy 

Agency and intend that the results of the 

joint program will benefit the Agency and 

the nations participating in it.” 

Additional Agreement for Cooperation 

Between the United States of America and the 

European Atomic Energy Community 

(EURATOM) Concerning Peaceful Uses of 

Atomic Energy (EURATOM 123 Agreement, 

1960)

1960 (Expired) • EURATOM

• United States

“The Government of the United States of 

America and the Community reaffirm 

their common interest in fostering the 

peaceful applications of atomic energy 

through the International Atomic Energy 

Agency and intend that the results of the 

cooperation envisaged by this 

Agreement will benefit the Agency and 

the nations participating in it.” 

Discussion: The prior EURATOM Agreements, completed in 1958 and 1960, expired in 1996, so they were in force when the 

Washington Agreement was completed in 1992, but not when the SILEX 123 and Paris Agreements were completed in 1999 and 

2011, respectively. The May/June 1958 Agreement and the 1960 123 Agreement contained only general language that related to 

peaceful use, which does not change our reading of the Washington Agreement. The November 1958 123 Agreement contains 

peaceful use language that applied only to EURATOM and not to the United States. We note that the agreement pertained to bringing 

into operation within EURATOM large-scale power plants using nuclear reactors on which research and development had been 

carried to an advanced stage in the United States at the time, as well as a joint research and development program centered on these 

types of reactors; accordingly, transfers under the agreement were likely mostly from the United States to EURATOM rather than from 

EURATOM to the United States. In any case, the agreement did not include peaceful use restrictions on transfers of enrichment

technology from the member countries of EURATOM to the United States.
Appendix III: Peaceful Use Language in 

Additional Select Treaties and International 

Agreements Related to Nonproliferation and 

Nuclear Trade

Page 40 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

International agreement or treaty

Date of 

agreement or 

treaty Government parties Peaceful use language

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons (NPT)

1968 • Australia 

• France

• Germany

• Netherlands

• United Kingdom

• United States

• 184 others

“Each State Party to the Treaty 

undertakes not to provide: (a) source or 

special fissionable materialc or (b) 

equipment or material especially 

designed or prepared for the processing, 

use or production of special fissionable 

material, to any non-nuclear-weapon 

Stated for peaceful purposes, unless the 

source or special fissionable material 

shall be subject to ...safeguards [as set 

forth in an agreement with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency].” 

Discussion: The NPT does not prohibit the United States from producing nuclear weapons or devices or the materials needed to 

produce them, such as tritium, and does not impose any restrictions on transfers of nuclear material or equipment, including 

enrichment technology, to the United States.

Agreement between the United Kingdom of 

Great Britain and Northern Ireland the Federal 

Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of the 

Netherlands on Collaboration in the 

Development and Exploitation of the Gas 

Centrifuge Process for producing Enriched 

Uranium (Treaty of Almelo)

1970 • United Kingdom

• Germany

• Netherlands

“The Contracting Parties jointly and 

separately undertake to ensure that any 

information, equipment, source, or 

special fissionable material which may be 

at their disposal for the purpose of or as 

a result of the collaboration described in

[this agreement] will not be used by or to 

assist, encourage, or induce any nonnuclear-weapon State to manufacture or 

otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or 

other nuclear explosive devices or 

control over such nuclear weapons or 

explosive devices.... 

The Contracting Parties further 

undertake to ensure that the joint 

industrial enterprises [established by] this 

Agreement shall not produce weapons 

grade uranium for the manufacture of 

nuclear weapons or other nuclear 

explosive devices.” 

Discussion: Under the Treaty of Almelo, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands agreed to collaborate on the 

development of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment technology. The United States is not a party to this treaty and is thus not bound by 

its language, but we reviewed it to see if its provisions could provide useful context for the provisions of the Washington Agreement, 

which relate to the same technology addressed by this treaty. Two provisions of the treaty address peaceful use of this technology. 

The first echoes the NPT, prohibiting the parties from helping nonnuclear-weapon States to produce or obtain nuclear weapons or 

devices. Since the United States is a nuclear-weapon State, this provision has no applicability to any subsequent agreement with the 

United States. The second provision specifically obligates the parties to ensure that the enrichment technology on which they agreed 

to collaborate is not used to produce weapons grade uranium for nuclear weapons or devices. The production of weapons grade 

uranium is not at issue in our analysis.
Appendix III: Peaceful Use Language in 

Additional Select Treaties and International 

Agreements Related to Nonproliferation and 

Nuclear Trade

Page 41 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

International agreement or treaty

Date of 

agreement or 

treaty Government parties Peaceful use language

Agreement of 18 November 1977 Between the 

United States of America and the Agency 

[International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA]e

for the Application of Safeguards in the United 

States of America (United States Voluntary 

Offer Safeguards Agreement)

1977 • IAEA 

• United States

“The United States undertakes to permit 

the Agency to apply safeguards, in 

accordance with the terms of this 

Agreement, on all source or special 

fissionable material in all facilities within 

the United States, excluding only those 

facilities associated with activities with 

direct national security significance to the 

United States, with a view to enabling the 

Agency to verify that such material is not 

withdrawn, except as provided for in this 

Agreement, from activities in facilities 

while such material is being safeguarded 

under this Agreement.” 

Discussion: While, as a nuclear-weapon state, the United States is not required to accept safeguards to verify the fulfillment of its 

obligations under the NPT, the United States has voluntarily accepted certain safeguards on certain nuclear materials, which do not 

include tritium.

Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful 

Uses of Nuclear Energy Between the 

European Atomic Energy Community and the 

United States of America (EURATOM 123 

Agreement)

1995 • EURATOM

• United States

“Cooperation under this Agreement shall 

be carried out for peaceful purposes... 

Non-nuclear material, nuclear material 

and equipment transferred pursuant to 

this Agreement and special fissionable 

material used in or produced through the 

use of such items shall not be used for 

any nuclear explosive device, for 

research on or development of any 

nuclear explosive device or for any 

military purpose.” 

Discussion: The current EURATOM 123 Agreement was not in force when the Washington Agreement was completed in 1992, but 

was in force when the SILEX 123 and Paris Agreements were completed in 1999 and 2011, respectively. It addresses cooperation on 

nuclear trade, among other things. Specifically, the agreement addresses the transfer of nuclear material and equipment. “Equipment” 

is defined by the agreement to include “any reactor as a complete unit, other than one designed or used primarily for the formation of 

plutonium or uranium-233 or any other item so designated jointly by the appropriate authorities of the Parties.” According to the 

Department of State, no uranium enrichment technology has been designated as “equipment” under this agreement. Accordingly, the 

agreement does not address the transfer of uranium enrichment technology between EURATOM and the United States.
Appendix III: Peaceful Use Language in 

Additional Select Treaties and International 

Agreements Related to Nonproliferation and 

Nuclear Trade

Page 42 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

International agreement or treaty

Date of 

agreement or 

treaty Government parties Peaceful use language

Agreement between the Governments of the 

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 

Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the 

Federal Republic of Germany and the French 

Republic regarding Collaboration in Centrifuge 

Technology (Cardiff Agreement)

2005 • United Kingdom

• France

• Germany

• Netherlands

“The Four Governments jointly and 

separately undertake to ensure, in 

conformity with the NPT, that any 

Centrifuge Technology, which may be at 

their disposal for the purpose of, or as a 

result of, the collaboration described in 

[this agreement] shall not be used in any 

way to assist, encourage or induce any 

non-nuclear-weapon State to 

manufacture or otherwise acquire 

nuclear weapons or other nuclear 

explosive devices or control over such 

weapons or explosive devices.... 

The Government of the French Republic 

shall ensure that any organisation which 

builds plants for the enrichment of 

uranium on the territory of the French 

Republic using or otherwise exploiting 

Centrifuge Technology owned by, held 

by, or deriving or arising from the 

operations of, ETC,f

or operates such 

plants, shall not produce weapons grade 

uranium for the manufacture of nuclear 

weapons or other nuclear explosive 

devices.” 

Discussion: The Cardiff Agreement added France to the collaboration on gas centrifuge enrichment technology that was established 

by the Treaty of Almelo between the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. As with the Treaty of Almelo, the United States 

is not a party to this agreement and thus is not bound by its language, but we reviewed it to see if its provisions could provide useful 

context for the provisions of the Paris Agreement, which relate to the same technology addressed by this agreement. The two 

provisions of the agreement related to peaceful use are substantively the same as those included in the Treaty of Almelo. The first 

echoes the NPT, prohibiting the parties from helping nonnuclear-weapon States to produce or obtain nuclear weapons or devices. 

Since the United States is a nuclear-weapon State, this provision has no applicability to any subsequent agreement with the United 

States. The second provision specifically obligates France to ensure that the enrichment technology is not used to produce weapons 

grade uranium for nuclear weapons or devices. The production of weapons grade uranium is not at issue in our analysis.

Sources: GAO analysis of international agreements. | GAO-15-123

a

EURATOM is composed of the 27 countries of the European Union. 

b

Under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, nuclear cooperation 

agreements are a prerequisite to certain aspects of civilian U.S. nuclear cooperation with countries 

and other cooperating partners. Section 123 also requires that these agreements include, among 

other things, guarantees from the partners that they will maintain safeguards over nuclear materials 

and equipment transferred and adequate physical security for all nuclear material transferred. These 

nuclear cooperation agreements are referred to as “123 Agreements.” 

c

Neither source material nor special fissionable material is defined in the treaty. The IAEA defines 

“source material” as “uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium 

depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical 

compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such 

concentration as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; and other such material 

as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine. This definition is similar to the definition 

of “source material” provided in the Atomic Energy Act. The IAEA defines “special fissionable 

material” as “plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material 

containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of 
Appendix III: Peaceful Use Language in 

Additional Select Treaties and International 

Agreements Related to Nonproliferation and 

Nuclear Trade

Page 43 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

Governors shall from time to time determine; but the term ‘special fissionable material’ does not 

include source material.” This definition is similar to the definition of “special nuclear material” 

provided in the Atomic Energy Act. 

d

Nonnuclear-weapon states are those states that had not manufactured and exploded a nuclear 

weapon or other nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967. 

e

IAEA, an independent international organization based in Vienna, Austria, is affiliated with the United 

Nations and has the dual mission of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and verifying that 

nuclear materials intended for peaceful purposes are not diverted to military purposes. IAEA had 162 

member states as of February 2014. 

f

”ETC” refers to the joint venture established between URENCO and AREVA to carry out Centrifuge 

Technology research and development, manufacturing of gas centrifuges and related technology and 

activities, named Enrichment Technology Company Ltd, including its subsidiaries and their possible 

legal successors. 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 44 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Energy 
Appendix V: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission 

Page 45 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

Appendix V: Comments from the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission 
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 46 GAO-15-123 Department of Energy

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov

Susan D. Sawtelle, (202) 512-6417 or sawtelles@gao.gov

In addition to the individuals named above, Allison B. Bawden, Assistant 

Director; Eric Bachhuber; Antoinette Capaccio; Delwen A. Jones; 

Amanda K. Kolling; and Karen Villafana made key contributions to this 

report. Also contributing to this report were Elizabeth R. Beardsley; 

Doreen Eng; Karen K. Keegan; Risto Laboski; Dr. Timothy M. Persons; 

Dan C. Royer; and Rebecca Shea.

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(361461)
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