1 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the

Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue. All Rule

references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

T.C. Memo. 1996-518

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

MARK A. AND JUANITA D. MURDOCK, Petitioners v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 16255-92. Filed November 25, 1996.

Mark A. Murdock, pro se.

Timothy S. Murphy, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FAY, Judge: This case was assigned to Special Trial Judge

D. Irvin Couvillion pursuant to section 7443A(b)(4)1 and Rules

180, 181, and 183. The Court agrees with and adopts the opinion

of the Special Trial Judge, which is set forth below.
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2 Under the circumstances herein, the motion for leave to file

the motion to vacate is a prerequisite to filing the motion to

vacate. In deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for leave

to file a motion to vacate, the Court may consider the merits of

the underlying motion to vacate to determine whether further

proceedings are appropriate. Brannon's of Shawnee, Inc. v.

Commissioner, 69 T.C. 999 (1978). Accordingly, the Court here

considers the merits of petitioners' motion to vacate, even

though the motion before the Court is a motion for leave to file

the motion to vacate.

OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE

COUVILLION, Special Trial Judge: Petitioners have filed a

motion for leave to file a motion to vacate a decision that has

been entered in this case. The decision is a stipulated

decision, signed by counsel for the parties, and was entered by

the Court on January 11, 1994. Petitioners' motion for leave to

file the motion to vacate was filed February 20, 1996, over 2

years after the decision was entered. No other motions, such as

a motion to vacate, or a notice of appeal have ever been filed in

this case. Concurrent with petitioners' motion for leave to file

is a motion to vacate, which petitioners lodged with the Court. 

Petitioners' motion for leave to file was calendared for hearing

and was heard at this Court's Detroit, Michigan, trial session.2

In the notice of deficiency, on which this case is based,

respondent determined the following deficiencies in Federal

income taxes and additions to tax against petitioners:
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 Additions to Tax 

 Sec. Sec. Sec.

 Year Deficiency 6653(b) 6661 6663

 1988 $9,394 $7,046 $2,349 --

 1989 6,565 -0- -- $4,924

A timely petition was filed on behalf of petitioners by an

attorney who is admitted to practice before this Court. At the

time the petition was filed, and at the time the subject motion

was filed, petitioners were legal residents of the State of

Michigan. Subsequent to filing the petition, respondent filed an

answer and affirmatively alleged that petitioners were liable for

fraud pursuant to sections 6653(b) and 6663, respectively, for

the years 1988 and 1989. Counsel for petitioners thereafter

filed a reply to the affirmative allegations pursuant to Rule 37. 

In due course, a notice was issued by this Court calendaring this

case for trial at the Court's Detroit, Michigan, trial session

commencing on January 31, 1994.

On January 5, 1994, counsel for petitioners, John C.

Griffin, Jr. (Mr. Griffin), and Mark A. Murdock (petitioner) met

with counsel for respondent, Dennis G. Driscoll (Mr. Driscoll),

at respondent's offices. Petitioner Juanita D. Murdock was not

present at this meeting. At the meeting, the parties reached a

basis for settlement of the case. A stipulated decision document

was prepared and signed on that date by Mr. Griffin and Mr.

Driscoll, counsel for the parties. In that decision, the parties
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agreed to the following deficiencies in Federal income taxes and

additions to tax:

 Additions to Tax 

 Sec. Sec. Sec.

 Year Deficiency 6653(b) 6661 6663

 1988 $3,115 $2,336 -0- --

 1989 924 693 -- -0-

The decision document was forwarded to the Court, and the

decision was entered on January 11, 1994. At the ensuing trial

session at Detroit on January 31, 1994, the case was not called,

nor did petitioners or their attorney appear for trial. 

Petitioners were thereafter assessed by respondent for income tax

deficiencies and additions to tax in accordance with the

decision. It appears that no collection was made on the assessed

liabilities until petitioners filed their 1994 Federal income tax

return. That return reflected an overpayment of 1994 taxes in

the amount of $1,727. In lieu of refunding the overpayment to

petitioners, respondent applied the $1,727 to petitioners' unpaid

1988 liability. That action by respondent gave rise to the

motion presently before the Court.

In their motion for leave to file, in which petitioners are

pro se, petitioners contend there was fraud on the Court and on

the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the stipulated decision

that was signed by their attorney and counsel for respondent on

January 5, 1994. Petitioners correctly allege that they did not
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sign the decision document. They further allege that their

attorney, Mr. Griffin, did not have the authority to sign the

decision. Petitioners base their argument of lack of authority

of their attorney on the fact that a few days earlier, on

December 29, 1993, petitioners executed IRS Form 2848, Power of

Attorney and Declaration of Representative, in which they revoked

all previous powers of attorney and designated petitioner Juanita

D. Murdock as their agent and representative for petitioners'

1988 and 1989 tax years. Thus, petitioners contend Mr. Griffin

no longer had any authority to represent petitioners in this

case, and, since petitioner Juanita D. Murdock was not present at

the conference with counsel for respondent on January 5, 1994,

the stipulated decision signed on their behalf by Mr. Griffin is

invalid. Respondent objects to petitioners' motion.

Sections 7481 and 7483 provide generally that a decision of

this Court becomes final, in the absence of a timely filed notice

of appeal, 90 days from the date the decision is entered. As a

general rule, this Court is without jurisdiction to vacate a

decision after the decision becomes final.

Petitioners contend that our final decision herein should be

vacated on the ground that it was entered as a result of fraud on

the Court. Petitioners, therefore, must establish that there was

fraud on the Court in the entry of the decision on January 11,

1994, based on the conference of January 5, 1994. The burden of
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3 Petitioners' motion to withdraw Mr. Griffin as their

attorney, filed on June 14, 1996, was granted by the Court by

order dated July 3, 1996.

proof is on the party filing the motion to vacate, and such

burden must be established by clear and convincing evidence. 

Kraasch v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 623, 626 (1978).

This Court, in Abatti v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1319, 1325

(1986), affd. 859 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1988), has described the

term "fraud on the Court" as follows:

Fraud on the court is "only that species of fraud which

does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud

perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial

machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial

task of adjud[g]ing cases that are presented for

adjudication. Fraud, inter partes, without more, should not

be a fraud upon the court." Toscano v. Commissioner, 441,

F.2d at 933, quoting 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice, par.

60.33 (2d ed. 1970). To prove such fraud, the petitioners

must show that an intentional plan of deception designed to

improperly influence the Court in its decision has had such

an effect on the Court. * * *

The evidence adduced at the hearing on petitioners' motion

falls far short of establishing fraud on the Court. Mr. Griffin

was counsel of record for petitioners, and no motion to remove or

cause the withdrawal of Mr. Griffin as counsel for petitioners

was filed until after petitioners filed the subject motion

seeking to vacate the decision.3 Thus, on January 5, 1994, when

Mr. Griffin and petitioner met with counsel for respondent, Mr.

Driscoll, Mr. Griffin was duly authorized to represent

petitioners in this case. Moreover, the evidence is clear that
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neither Mr. Griffin nor Mr. Driscoll had received any notice or

had knowledge that Mr. Griffin no longer represented petitioners

or no longer had the authority to act for them as their attorney. 

The IRS Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of

Representative, which petitioners executed on December 29, 1993,

was not received by counsel for respondent until February 14,

1994. The Form 2848 was accompanied by a letter signed by

petitioners, dated January 5, 1994, which stated in part:

This letter is to certify that my wife and I disagree

with the decision (Docket No. 16255-92) that you and Mr.

Griffin has agreed upon. Mr. Griffin is no longer

hired/representing me nor can he enter into any contracts. 

His Power of Attorney is no longer valid. His signature on

the United States Tax Court Decision is invalid/void as of

the date he signed it.

I have decided that there is no tax due and will be

going to Tax Court on my behalf. I have a number of

witnesses and affidavits to win in Tax Court.

Also I have not seen any figures, explanations, or

relevant reasons that the imposed tax is true and correct by

you or Mr. Griffin.

The Court is satisfied from the evidence adduced at the

hearing that, at the conference on January 5, 1994, petitioner

raised no objection to a settlement of the case. The purpose of

the conference was to determine whether the case would settle, or

whether the parties would proceed to trial. The Court is

satisfied that Mr. Griffin, at the time of that conference and of

the entry of decision, had no knowledge that petitioners desired

to remove him as their attorney, nor did such information come to
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his attention until long after January 1994. Although Mr.

Driscoll acknowledged at the hearing that petitioner was not

happy with the decision, both Mr. Driscoll and Mr. Griffin agreed

that petitioner raised no objection on January 5, 1994, to Mr.

Griffin's signing the decision on that date. It is apparent from

the language in petitioner's letter to counsel for respondent

that petitioner prepared the letter after the conference on

January 5, 1994. The Court is satisfied that the letter was not

mailed to counsel for respondent, or it was not received by

respondent, until February 14, 1994. It is significant that

petitioners failed to appear at the Court's session on January

31, 1994, to present their case, as they indicated they would do

in their letter of January 5, 1994. Petitioners offered no

evidence as to why they failed to appear on January 31, 1994, to

have their case heard if they disagreed with the basis of

settlement that the parties had agreed to on January 5, 1994. 

Petitioners, therefore, have not convinced the Court that a fraud

was perpetrated on the Court in the entry of the decision of this

case on January 11, 1994. Petitioners' motion for leave to file

a motion to vacate will be denied.

 An appropriate order

 will be issued.