Opium continues to pose one of the 

most serious threats to stability and good 

governance in Afghanistan. Proceeds 

and protection fees from trafficking are 

funneled to terrorist and insurgent groups, 

including the Taliban and al Qaeda. Insurgents have successfully leveraged poppy 

eradication efforts to increase popular 

resistance to both the government in Kabul 

and the presence of coalition forces. 

Despite major increases in counternarcotics programs and resources over the past 

year, production has shot up 59 percent.

Opium production and trafficking in 

Afghanistan are multifaceted problems 

with no simple solutions. To achieve real 

progress in the fight against illegal drug 

production, targeted efforts will be necessary on several fronts. The first of these is 

strengthening the rule of law, with emphasis on building the judiciary. Traffickers 

and other criminals at all levels of government must be prosecuted, sentenced, and 

incarcerated. Equally important is combating corruption. Afghanistan’s leaders 

must set an example by dismissing corrupt 

high-level officials.

The international community must 

continue to provide training to the Afghan 

National Police and Afghan National Army 

to professionalize and modernize these 

forces. The efficacy of existing programs 

should be reviewed and adjusted to reflect 

local requirements.

Countertrafficking and interdiction 

efforts should be increased throughout the 

region, particularly in countries neighboring Afghanistan. Eradication efforts must 

continue but in a more transparent manner 

to offset potential downsides.

Another essential element in the 

counternarcotics effort focuses on 

alternative livelihoods. A long-term approach to ensure a lasting shift away from 

narcotics production is essential. Farmers 

should be offered the carrot of training, 

materials, and marketing assistance for 

alternative crops, to accompany the stick 

of eradication, which on its own cannot 

be effective.

A Narco-economy 

Opium poses an enormous threat 

to stability and good governance in 

Afghanistan.1 President Hamid Karzai put 

it well: “If we don’t destroy poppy, it will 

destroy us.”2 However, the counternarcotics 

challenge is not one that the government 

of Afghanistan has been prepared to meet 

thus far.

The opium trade in Afghanistan 

is highly profitable. Of the total sales on 

the international market, only about 10 

percent remains within Afghanistan, with 

1 percent going to the farmers who grow 

poppy and the remainder to foreign dealers 

and trafficking networks. Afghanistan 

produces 87 percent of the world’s opium, 

comprising over half of its gross domestic 

product. It supplies three-quarters of the 

illicit opium used in Europe and almost 

all of that used in Russia.3 Rates of usage 

and addiction are increasing in neighboring countries, notably Iran, as well as in 

Afghanistan itself.

Approximately 10 percent of the Afghan 

population grows poppies as a subsistence 

crop. It is by far the most lucrative option 

for farmers, even when factoring in necessary bribes to officials and usury by traffickers. Farmers who claim that they would 

prefer a licit income protest that they have 

no option but to grow poppy to support 

their families.

Although drug usage is forbidden 

under Islam, opium and heroin use is 

surprisingly common and increasing 

significantly within Afghanistan itself. This 

habit exacerbates the severe poverty that 

many experience, with some addicts selling 

all their possessions to feed their addiction. 

Many farmers cite personal use as a 

contributing factor to their continued poppy 

production. Medical facilities are grossly 

inadequate, and the majority of addicts 

receive no treatment for their problem.

In the absence of a functional 

banking system, opium and heroin create 

Strategic Forum

No. 224

November 2006

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

No. 224, November 2006 Strategic Forum 

Combating Opium 

in Afghanistan

by Ali A. Jalali, Robert B. Oakley, and Zoe Hunter
No. 224, November 2006 Strategic Forum 

a narco-economy for farmers. Blocks of 

heroin serve as currency and may be used 

to purchase goods or serve as bribes; they 

also act as savings and investment accounts, 

as blocks are set aside until needed or until 

the price of heroin rises. Through shortterm loans (called Salaam), traffickers 

provide farmers a means to finance poppy 

planting. Such loans are generally at 

usurious rates, creating a debt cycle that 

can be difficult for farmers to break.

Widespread corruption is both a cause 

and result of the narcotics trade. The 

presence of drug traffickers at all levels of 

the Afghan government—from the local 

cop on the beat, to judges, to senior 

government ministers—severely hampers 

counternarcotic measures.

Gains for Terrorists 

Terrorist and insurgent groups gain 

significant income by imposing repetitive 

transit and protection fees, generally in 

the range of 15 to 18 percent, on both drugs 

and precursor chemicals. Beneficiaries of 

materials passing into Pakistan include the 

Taliban, al Qaeda, and Hizb-e-Islami; fees on 

materials passing into Central Asia assisted 

the Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan, 

the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and 

the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.

Resurgent Taliban elements, based 

primarily in the southern Afghan provinces 

of Helmand and Kandahar, and in the 

Pakistani border provinces of the Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas and Balochistan, 

are using eradication as a flashpoint to 

incite local populations to violence against 

coalition forces. The Taliban maintains a 

territorial interest in Afghanistan and is 

attempting to use the professed protection 

of the farmers’ livelihoods as leverage for 

fighting the “foreign occupation.” This 

partnership might seem unconvincing, 

given the Taliban’s previous draconian 

crackdown on poppy production; however, 

desperation breeds strange bedfellows.

Rampant drug production spawns a 

culture of impunity that consistently 

undermines the exercise of legitimate 

government control. It also creates significant instability, particularly in Helmand 

and Kandahar provinces, which were 

the scene of heavy fighting throughout 

the summer of 2006. The Taliban and 

traffickers have portrayed the new North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation as antifarmer rather than antiterrorist. 

To combat eradication efforts, traffickers 

in the south are actively encouraging the 

planting of poppy crops in designated 

areas, both for protection and to exercise 

greater control over the farmers themselves. 

Trafficking groups have begun to consolidate to fight eradication efforts, with a 

correlating rise in firefights with Afghan 

and coalition forces.

Policy Options 

If there were easy solutions to 

Afghanistan’s narcotics problem, it would 

have been solved along ago. How should 

policy options be prioritized to deal with 

this rampant epidemic?

Strengthening Weak Institutions.

The Afghanistan Compact gives priority to 

“the coordinated establishment in each 

province of functional institutions including civil administration, police, prisons, and 

judiciary.” Reforming the justice system is 

of prime importance. The Compact aims 

at ensuring “equal, fair and transparent 

access to justice based upon written codes 

with fair trials and enforceable verdicts.” 

Achievement of this hinges on a comprehensive “legislative reform of the public 

and private sector, building the capacity of 

judicial institutions and cadres, promoting 

human rights and legal awareness and 

rehabilitating the judicial infrastructure.”4

The presence of drug traffickers at all 

levels of the Afghan government severely 

hampers counternarcotic efforts.5 Systematic 

police corruption facilitates the transport 

of opium across Afghanistan to heroin processing labs in the south, and from there 

across the Iranian border. While aware of 

the problem, the Afghan government has 

a tendency to move problems rather than 

remove them, simply relocating corrupt 

officials as their activities become public. 

Strong, decisive action against corruption is 

necessary. The government of Afghanistan 

must assume the leadership role and make 

examples of corrupt officials.

The justice sector suffers from limited 

human capacity and infrastructure. The 

court structure is outdated, many judicial 

personnel are unqualified, and corruption 

is deep-rooted. Years of fighting have 

destroyed the institutional integrity of the 

justice system and left a patchwork of contradictory and overlapping laws. Although 

some progress has been made, particularly 

in legislative reform, no strategy has been 

agreed upon for rebuilding the system.

The United States is working 

closely with the government of Afghanistan 

and with coalition partners to build 

enforcement and judicial capacities. The 

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 

Ali A. Jalali is a Distinguished Visiting Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the 

National Defense University, as well as a Distinguished Professor at the Near East–South Asia Center for 

Strategic Studies. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley is a Distinguished Research Fellow in INSS. Zoe Hunter 

is a former Research Assistant in INSS.

the government of 

Afghanistan must 

assume the leadership 

role and make examples 

of corrupt officials
No. 224, November 2006 Strategic Forum 

(DEA) is integrally involved in this cooperation. In 2005, DEA deployed five foreign 

advisory support teams to Afghanistan to 

mentor Afghan counternarcotics officials. 

DEA is also assisting with the establishment 

of mobile detection teams, which have 

the potential to disrupt trafficking routes 

and vastly improve interdiction capacities 

through the use of K–9 officers and 

the ability to establish checkpoints and 

conduct vehicle searches. In total, DEA has 

trained over 138 counternarcotics police 

in tactics and operations.6 The United States 

is also providing broader based training 

to the Afghan National Police, including 

basic skills and information management 

as well as more sophisticated techniques 

such as stings.

Enhancement of enforcement capacities has led to several high-profile arrests. 

In October 2005, DEA successfully extradited Haji Baz Mohammed to New York 

for prosecution, a move that sent a chill 

throughout the Afghan trafficking community. A DEA-led investigation resulted in 

the arrest of Bashir Noorzai, who provided 

weapons and manpower to the Taliban 

in exchange for the protection of his 

drug crops in Afghanistan. These kinds of 

enforcement successes are precisely what 

Afghanistan needs and must be replicated 

many times over.

In tandem with enforcement comes 

the requirement for development of the 

judicial sector, leading to successful 

investigation, prosecution, and incarceration of offenders. The State Department’s 

Bureau for International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has been 

instrumental in establishing the Vertical 

Prosecution Task Force, which trains 

prosecutors and investigators in how to 

build cases, and the Central Narcotics 

Tribunal, which provides support (including needed protection) for judges. Although 

still in their initial stages, the successful 

functioning of both the task force and the 

tribunal will be important to the full establishment of the rule of law in Afghanistan. 

Such initiatives, along with DEA enforcement training, require full U.S. support if 

they are to effect timely and lasting change.

International Cooperation. 

The Afghanistan Compact was accepted 

as a blueprint for cooperation between 

the government of Afghanistan and the 

international community at the January 

2006 London Conference on Afghanistan.7

In part, the Compact aims at achieving a 

sustained and significant reduction (and 

eventually, complete elimination) of the 

production and trafficking of narcotics. 

Essential elements of the counternarcotic 

strategy include:

improved interdiction, law enforcement, 

and judicial capacity building; enhanced 

cooperation among Afghanistan, neighboring 

countries, and the international community 

on disrupting the drug trade; wider provision 

of economic alternatives for farmers and 

laborers in the context of comprehensive 

rural development; and building national 

and provincial counternarcotic institutions.

8

Until recently, the United Kingdom 

served as the Group of Eight lead nation 

for counternarcotics. The enormity of the 

opium challenge exposes the futility of the 

lead nation construct, which allows other 

contributing nations to shirk responsibility 

for participating in the counternarcotics 

effort. Given that Afghanistan is the source 

of most of Europe’s opium, European capitals must alter the mandates of personnel 

assigned to the International Security and 

Assistance Force (ISAF) to remove caveats 

preventing their forces from engaging in 

counternarcotics operations. The United 

Kingdom is an exemplar in this regard, 

training Afghan forces and developing an 

Afghan counternarcotic Criminal Justice 

Task Force, paralleling the U.S. DEA and INL 

initiatives. Moreover, the United Kingdom 

has committed over US$502 million to 

support the pillars of Afghanistan’s drug 

strategy.9

The updated National Drug Control 

Strategy of Afghanistan envisions that in 

the next 3 years, the government will focus 

on four vital areas: targeting the traffickers 

and the top end of the trade; strengthening 

and diversifying legal rural livelihoods; 

reducing the demand for illicit drugs and 

improving the treatment of drug users; and 

developing state institutions at the central 

and provincial governments.10

However, there is considerable 

disagreement among Afghan and international partners about strategic approaches 

and target priorities in counternarcotic 

operations. The main issue is whom to 

target first: producers and farmers, or processors and traffickers. The lessons learned 

over the past 4 years suggest that targeting 

traffickers and traders has fewer negative 

consequences and does not require the 

provision of alternative livelihoods.11 The 

Afghan government’s interdiction capacity, 

however, is limited, and the criminal justice sector responsible for processing drugrelated crime is not up to the challenge.

International assistance to the judicial 

system, led by Italy, has been so slow as to 

be largely ineffectual. Starting with provincial police and rising through more senior 

ranks, there have been very few arrests 

of well-known traffickers. While interim 

arrangements to expedite the judicial 

process have been taken, the involvement of international forces is needed to 

enhance the interdiction capacity.

there is considerable 

disagreement among 

Afghan and international 

partners about strategic 

approaches and target 

priorities in counternarcotic operations
Unfortunately, the jury is still out on 

whether this will happen. On July 31, 2006, 

NATO–ISAF took command of operations 

in restive southern Afghanistan. British, 

Canadian, and Dutch forces have demonstrated fortitude and commitment to the 

Afghan mission in heavy fighting against a 

resurging Taliban. However, ISAF has shown 

reluctance to get involved in the drug war. 

As a security assistance force, it should play 

a role in counternarcotic operations that 

are part of a security-related effort. ISAF’s 

role in targeting drug laboratories, opium 

stockpiles, and trafficking routes would not 

only help Afghan counternarcotic efforts 

but also curtail the flow of Afghan drugs 

to Europe. It is in Europe’s own interest 

to fight the trafficking of opium; member 

nations should alter their mandates to 

encompass a broader range of counternarcotic activities.

Afghanistan’s neighbors have their 

own role to play in interdiction. The trafficking routes used by criminals are long 

established and well known. Drugs travel 

primarily via Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 

Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan to Russia; 

and via Pakistan and Iran to Europe. 

Corrupt border guards and high-ranking 

officials within the Central Asian countries 

continue to facilitate trafficking.

The same is true in Iran and Pakistan. 

Recently, Iran has increased its interdiction 

efforts, largely because of its increasing 

domestic addiction problem. Iran has lost 

several thousand troops in its efforts to 

guard the porous border with Afghanistan. 

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 

highlighted the importance of a regional 

approach—including efforts from 

Russia and Europe—in tackling the drug 

trade during his July 2006 trip to Tajikistan 

and Afghanistan. Tajikistan, Iran, and 

Afghanistan have established a trilateral 

agreement, in part to address the drug 

dilemma. While it remains to be seen what 

concrete actions these countries will take, 

the agreement illustrates the international 

complications the drug trade creates.

The Durand Line, which forms the 

mountainous border between Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, is a historically ungoverned 

territory. The Taliban finds refuge in the 

Pakistani province of Balochistan, across 

the border from the Afghan provinces of 

Kandahar and Helmand. The Pakistani 

government has demonstrated a reluctance 

to take action against Taliban militants 

operating out of Balochistan, electing to 

focus on a low-level insurgency among 

the disenfranchised Baloch population. 

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s 

recent peace deal with pro-Taliban militants 

in North Waziristan has been criticized by 

the Afghan government. Kabul believes that 

the accord reduces pressure on the Taliban 

who use Pakistani territory for attacks in 

Afghanistan. There has been a significant 

increase in militants’ cross-border attacks 

since the deal was signed.

Moreover, the border between Nangahar 

and the Pakistani Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas—where al Qaeda remnants 

have found sanctuary—also poses a 

problem. An increased military or enforcement presence in one of these areas simply 

prompts traffickers to reroute their efforts: 

between 2004 and 2005, there was a 20 

percent overall shift in trafficking from the 

southern border with Pakistan to the 

western border with Iran. This was largely 

in response to the presence of U.S. troops 

participating in Operation Enduring 

Freedom. Denying the traffickers their 

smuggling routes will demand a coordinated effort on behalf of all parties.

The illicit drug trade is a low-risk 

activity in a high-risk environment. To 

eliminate this trade, the situation must be 

reversed. This will require the firm establishment of the rule of law. The culture 

of impunity that fosters opium production 

must be challenged.

Eradication. In 2005, under its Poppy 

Elimination Program, the Afghan government eradicated 5,100 hectares of poppies, 

or 5 percent of the total planted.12 This 

resulted in only a small decrease in overall 

production, in part due to favorable growing 

conditions that produced a higher yield 

per hectare. Poppies must be replanted after 

every harvest, so the actual production 

impact of eradicating a given field is limited 

to the immediate harvest. Depending on their 

location within Afghanistan, farmers may 

be able to plant two crops a year; many 

follow a poppy harvest with a cannabis crop.

The projected cost of eradication in 

2006 is $175 million. However, efforts to 

date have been largely unsuccessful. 

Provincial governors overstate eradication 

efforts: for the 14,000 hectares claimed 

eradicated, the United Nations (UN) 

estimates that approximately 5,600 have 

actually been destroyed.13 This comes at a 

(hardly cost-effective) price of some $30,000 

per hectare. In the meantime, an estimated 

120,000 additional hectares of poppy have 

been planted; the net increased production 

has driven down the market price of opium 

to less than $100 a kilogram (50 percent 

lower than a year ago). Corruption plagues 

eradication efforts as government forces are 

bribed (typically $50, or a month’s salary) 

to leave fields standing. In many instances, 

the eradication process itself—which 

currently amounts to uprooting fields using 

bulldozers—has been haphazard and 

ineffective, leading to spontaneous poppy 

regrowth in fields supposedly eradicated. 

The increase in eradication has led to an 

upswing in violence as farmers resist the 

destruction of their livelihoods.

No. 224, November 2006 Strategic Forum 

corruption plagues 

eradication efforts as 

government forces are 

bribed to leave poppy 

fields standing
The credible threat of eradication 

appears to deter many farmers who fear 

losing their source of income. According to 

a recent UN study, of those who reduced 

poppy cultivation in 2005, 70 percent cited 

the fear of eradication as a main reason for 

not growing.14 The corollary of this is that 

the absence of a viable threat leads to 

a resumption of production. Where 

government forces are unable to eradicate 

or are easily bribed, eradication fails and 

poppy growth flourishes. Indeed, despite 

progress in 2005, the UN Office on Drugs 

and Crime (UNODC) reports that opium 

cultivation has increased 59 percent in 

2006. The UNODC reports further that 

in the province of Helmand, where NATO 

forces are engaging in heavy fighting 

against the Taliban, cultivation has soared 

162 percent.15 As UNODC Executive Director 

Antonio Maria Costa put it: 

Political, military, and economic investments by coalition countries are not having 

much visible impact on drug cultivation. As 

a result, Afghan opium is fuelling insurgency 

in western Asia, feeding international mafias, 

and causing a hundred thousand deaths 

from overdoses every year.16

There is strong political opposition 

to any airborne eradication method, 

both among NATO allies and within the 

Afghan government (particularly President 

Karzai). Conventional herbicides, 

being poisons, carry significant health 

hazards in any broad-based use and are 

not recommended.

Alternative Livelihood Development.

Opium is seamlessly integrated into, and 

in fact forms the cornerstone of, the Afghan 

economy. Drug production is corrupting 

Afghanistan and disabling Afghans. While 

this problem itself is widely recognized,

the question remains how to address it 

effectively. In the words of Afghan Minister 

of Counter Narcotics Habibullah Qaderi:

‘alternative livelihoods’ is not simply about 

crop substitution, but about facilitating access 

to credit, land, food, employment, and 

markets while maintaining a credible enforcement and eradication threat. . . . At the same 

time we recognize that unless we develop 

accountable, transparent, and effective institutions, our capacity to deliver on our counternarcotics strategy will be severely limited.17

Truffles, a fungi delicacy, are the only 

legal agricultural product whose value 

rivals that of opium poppy, and these are 

not suited to Afghanistan’s climate. Iran’s 

experimentation with saffron production 

in western Afghanistan has seen moderate 

success. Other possible crops, such as 

apricots, were destroyed during the Russian 

occupation to make way for poppy production; these trees take 7 years to bear fruit 

and are not viable sources of income over 

the short term.

Wheat, a favorite substitute of Western 

aid agencies, does not provide a viable 

alternative for farmers. Income from 

poppy production is approximately $5,400 

per hectare, while wheat brings in $500. 

Farmers claim that they cannot support 

their families on this income. Furthermore, 

neighboring Pakistan holds a comparative 

advantage in wheat production, making 

it cheaper for Afghans to import wheat 

than to produce it domestically.

In short, from a purely economic 

standpoint, there is no true alternative crop 

to poppy for the farmer. There is no silver 

bullet that will cause farmers to stop 

growing poppy. Indeed, where such aid as 

wheat seed and fertilizers are distributed, 

it is common for farmers to grow both 

poppy and the alternative crop. The solution 

here is to combine the carrot with a stick: 

provide licit alternatives to opium while 

increasing interdiction and enforcement 

efforts.

Legalization of Poppy? Some 

groups—most vocally the Senlis Council, 

an international policy think tank—have 

proposed that the solution to the narcotics 

problem in Afghanistan is to legalize the 

production of drugs. Proponents of this 

theory suggest a variety of possibilities, 

from providing cheap narcotics to Third 

World countries to buying and destroying 

the poppy crops; they suggest that production could be controlled by providing 

“color-coded poppies” whose flowers would 

be a different color than those grown 

illicitly.

The morality of pushing narcotics 

on Third World countries aside, this 

suggestion reflects a complete lack of 

understanding of the situation in 

Afghanistan. The Afghan government 

is incapable of controlling poppy production. It would be even more difficult 

to regulate a dual system, featuring both 

licit and illicit production. Rampant 

corruption would only exacerbate this, as 

officials would be left to determine who 

could and could not grow the product 

legally. The illegal trade would certainly 

continue, along with an increase in opium 

production.

The National Economy Commission 

of the Upper House of Parliament of 

Afghanistan recently rejected the proposed 

legalization of opium as counter to Islam. 

It further declared that the activities of the 

Senlis Council should be legally banned.

Conclusions

The key to the long-term defeat of narcotics trafficking is to establish and enforce 

the rule of law throughout Afghanistan. 

Ultimately, the Afghans must achieve this

for themselves. The international community can best contribute to this effort 

No. 224, November 2006 Strategic Forum 

from a purely economic 

standpoint, there is no 

true alternative crop to 

poppy for the Afghan 

farmer
gename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&ci

d=1050510446431>.

10 The Afghan National Drug Control Strategy 

is available at <www.ands.gov.af/admin/ands/goa/

upload/UploadFolder/National%20Drug%20Control%20

Strategy%20-%20%20English.pdf>.

11 See, for example, Barnett Rubin and Omar 

Zakhilwal, “A War on Drugs, Or a War on Farmers,” The

Wall Street Journal, January 11, 2005, A20, available at 

<www.cic.nyu.edu/archive/pdf/WSJ%20War%20on%20D

rugs%20or%20War%20on%20Farmers.pdf>.

12 See United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and 

Crime, World Drug Report 2006, Volume 2, 211, available at <www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2006/wdr2006_volume2.pdf>.

13 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Weekly Report 

on Eradication Verification (Number 15),” May 5, 2006.

14 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Summary 

Findings of Opium Trends in Afghanistan, 2005,” September 12, 2005, 11, available at <www.unodc.org/pdf/

afg/2005SummaryFindingsOfOpiumTrendsAfghanistan.

pdf>.

15 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Afghan opium 

cultivation soars 59 percent in 2006, UNODC survey 

shows,” September 2, 2006, available at <www.unodc.

org/unodc/press_release_2006_09_01.html>.

16 Ibid.

17 “Message from Minister Engineer Habibullah 

Qaderi,” available at <www.mcn.gov.af/Eng/Minister_Message.htm>.

by building Afghan capacities in interdiction, enforcement, and prosecution. Such 

training, already undertaken by the United 

States and other allies, should be reviewed 

and augmented to bring such capacities 

online as soon as possible, as they are the 

prerequisite to stability both in Afghanistan 

and in the region. In the short term, coalition forces should increase their interdiction 

operations and ensure that these criminals 

are held to account for their crimes.

Concurrent with strengthening the 

rule of law, Afghanistan must develop a 

licit economy, rather than one dependent 

on drug revenues. Although the Afghans 

must achieve this for themselves, the 

international community is well positioned 

to provide support in rural development, 

including alternative livelihoods and establishment of a banking system. However, 

given rampant corruption, economic 

support must be tied to a maturing of the 

rule of law if any progress is to be made. 

The leadership of Afghanistan must 

demonstrate zero tolerance for corruption 

at all levels. Solving the issue will facilitate 

needed private investment in the country 

and assist with all of the country’s 

challenges.

All this is easier said than done, to 

be sure. Ridding Afghanistan of its opium 

dependency will take years of steady effort 

and realistic expectations. As one of us has 

said in another setting, a job of this magnitude “requires the life of Noah, the patience 

of Job, and the wisdom of Solomon.”

Notes

1 This essay draws in part from an earlier Institute for National Strategic Studies workshop entitled 

No. 224, November 2006 Strategic Forum 

“Afghanistan: Assessing the Counter-Narcotics Effort,” 

held December 16, 2005. The authors are most grateful 

to participants at that session for their insights and to 

Michael Casey for editorial assistance on this essay. A 

copy of the workshop proceedings can be obtained at 

<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/>.

2 Speech of Hamid Karzai at the Second Conference on Counternarcotics, Kabul, Afghanistan, August 

22, 2006, available at <www.president.gov.af/english/

news/220806_Secondconference2nc.mspx>.

3 See Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan: When 

Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism,” The 

Washington Quarterly 28, no. 4 (Autumn 2005), 

55–72, available at <www.twq.com/05autumn/docs/

05autumn_felbab.pdf>.

4 The Afghanistan Compact, available at <www.

unama-afg.org/news/_londonConf/_docs/06jan30-

AfghanistanCompact-Final.pdf>.

5 For example, see “Afghanistan Riddled with 

Drug Ties,” Christian Science Monitor, May 13, 2005, 

available at <www.csmonitor.com/2005/0513/p01s04-

wosc.html>.

6 Interview with U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration officials, March 2006.

7 For more information on the London Conference, consult <www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename

=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=113

3773247211>.

8 The Afghanistan Compact, 4.

9 The United Kingdom’s efforts on counternarcotics may be tracked at <www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pa

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