United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Information 

Policy, Census, and National Archives, 

House Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform

ELECTIONS For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Wednesday, April 18, 2007

All Levels of Government 

Are Needed to Address 

Electronic Voting System 

Challenges 

Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director 

Information Technology Architecture and Systems 

GAO-07-741T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 18, 2007

ELECTIONS

All Levels of Government Are Needed to 

Address Electronic Voting System 

Challenges 

Highlights of GAO-07-741T, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Information Policy, 

Census, and National Archives, 

Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform, House of Representatives

Since the 2000 national elections, 

concerns have been raised by 

various groups regarding the 

election process, including voting

technologies. Beginning in 2001, 

GAO published a series of reports 

examining virtually every aspect of

the elections process. GAO’s 

complement of reports was used by

Congress in framing the Help

America Vote Act of 2002, which, 

among other things, provided for

replacement of older voting

equipment with more modern 

electronic voting systems and 

established the Election Assistance

Commission (EAC) to lead the 

nation’s election reform efforts.

GAO’s later reports have raised

concerns about the security and

reliability of these electronic voting 

systems, examined the EAC’s 

efforts to address these concerns, 

and surveyed state and local 

officials about practices used 

during the 2004 election, as well as 

plans for their systems for the 2006 

election. 

 

Using its published work on

electronic voting systems, GAO

was asked to testify on (1) the

contextual role and characteristics 

of electronic voting systems, (2) 

the range of security and reliability

concerns that have been reported

about these systems, (3) the 

experiences and management 

practices of states and local 

jurisdictions regarding these

systems, and (4) the longstanding

and emerging challenges facing all

levels of government in using these

systems. 

Voting systems are one facet of a multifaceted, year-round elections process 

that involves the interplay of people, processes, and technology, and 

includes all levels of government. How well these systems play their role in 

an election depends in large part on how well they are managed throughout 

their life cycles, which begins with defining system standards; includes 

system design, development, and testing; and concludes with system 

operations. Important attributes of the systems’ performance are security, 

reliability, ease of use, and cost effectiveness. 

A range of groups knowledgeable about elections or voting systems have 

expressed concerns about the security and reliability of electronic voting 

systems; these concerns can be associated with stages in the system life 

cycle. Examples of concerns include vague or incomplete voting system

standards, system design flaws, poorly developed security controls, 

incorrect system configurations, inadequate testing, and poor overall 

security management. 

For the 2004 national elections, states’ and local governments’ responses to 

our surveys showed that they did not always ensure that important life cycle 

and security management practices were employed for their respective 

electronic voting systems. In particular, responses indicated that the most 

current standards were not always adopted and applied, security

management practices and controls were employed to varying degrees, and 

certain types of system testing were not commonly performed. Moreover, 

jurisdictions’ responses showed that they did not consistently monitor the 

performance of their systems. 

In GAO’s view, the challenges faced in acquiring and operating electronic

voting systems are not unlike those faced by any technology user—adoption 

and application of well-defined system standards; effective integration of the 

technology with the people who operate it and the processes that govern the 

operation; rigorous and disciplined performance of system security and 

testing activities; reliable measurement of system performance; and the 

analytical basis for making informed, economically justified decisions about 

voting system investment options. These challenges are complicated by

other conditions such as the distribution of responsibilities among various 

organizations and funding opportunities and constraints. Given the diffused 

and decentralized allocation of voting system roles and responsibilities 

across all levels of government, addressing these challenges will require the 

combined efforts of all levels of government, under the leadership of the 

EAC. To assist the EAC in executing its leadership role, GAO has previously

made recommendations to the commission aimed at better planning its 

ongoing and future activities relative to, for example, system standards and 

information sharing. While the EAC agreed with the recommendations, it 

stated that its ability to effectively execute its role is constrained by a lack of 

adequate resources. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-741T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Randolph C. 

Hite at (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov. 
April 18, 2007 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on our 

nation’s election system. As requested, my testimony will focus on 

our recent work on the security and reliability of electronic voting 

systems,1

 including the national certification and accreditation 

programs related to these systems and other efforts of the Election 

Assistance Commission (EAC). 

During the 2000 national elections, concerns were raised about 

“hanging chads” and “butterfly ballots.” In the 2004 and 2006 

elections, concerns shifted to “software bugs” and “voter verifiable 

paper trails.” In light of these and other election concerns, we 

produced a series of reports between 2001 and 2006 in which we 

examined virtually every aspect of the election process, including 

types of voting technology. We reported that the particular 

technology used to cast and count votes is a critical part of how 

elections are conducted, but it is only one facet of a multifaceted 

election process that involves the interplay of people, processes, 

and technology. Accordingly, we have long held the position that no

voting technology, however well designed, can be a magic bullet 

that will solve all election problems. 

My testimony today addresses four perspectives on the voting 

system environment: (1) the contextual role and characteristics of 

electronic voting systems, (2) the range of security and reliability 

concerns that have been reported about these systems, (3) the 

experiences and management practices of states and local 

jurisdictions regarding these systems, and (4) longstanding and 

emerging intergovernmental challenges in using these systems. 

 

1

In this testimony, the term electronic voting system is used generically to refer to 

both optical scan systems and direct recording electronic systems, both of which 

depend on electronic technology. Each type of system is described more fully in

the background section of this testimony. 

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GAO-07-741T 
In preparing this testimony, we drew extensively from our published 

work on the election process.2

 In addition, we reviewed recent 

studies of electronic voting systems, EAC publications, and other 

relevant documents. All the work on which this testimony is based 

was performed in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

In summary, the integrity of voting systems—which is but one 

variable in a successful election process equation—depends on 

effective system life cycle management, which includes systems 

definition, development, acquisition, operations, testing, and 

management. It also depends on measuring actual voting system 

performance in terms of security, reliability, ease of use, and cost 

effectiveness, so that any needed corrective actions can be taken. 

Unless voting systems are properly managed throughout their life 

cycle, this one facet of the election process can significantly 

undermine the integrity of the whole. 

Election officials, computer security experts, citizen advocacy 

groups, and others have raised significant concerns about the 

security and reliability of electronic voting systems, citing vague or 

incomplete standards, weak security controls, system design flaws, 

incorrect system configuration, poor security management, and 

inadequate security testing, among other issues. Many of these 

security and reliability concerns are legitimate and thus merit the 

combined and focused attention of federal, state, and local 

authorities responsible for election administration. 

For the 2004 general election, states and local jurisdictions’ 

responses to our surveys showed that they did not always use the 

most current voting system standards. Responses also showed that 

voting system practices were implemented to varying degrees and 

that certain types of system testing were not widely performed. 

 

2

 For example, GAO, Elections: The Nation’s Evolving Election System as 

Reflected in the November 2004 General Election, GAO-06-450 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 6, 2006); Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of 

Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be 

Completed, GAO-05-956 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2005); Elections: Electronic 

Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents Challenges, GAO-04-975T

(Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004); and Elections: Perspectives on Activities and 

Challenges across the Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 

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Moreover, responses indicated that jurisdictions did not consistently 

monitor the performance of their systems. Such monitoring is 

important for determining where performance needs, requirements, 

and expectations are not being met so that corrective actions are 

taken. 

The challenges confronting all levels of government in acquiring and 

operating voting systems for future elections are not unlike those 

faced by any technology user: adoption and consistent application 

of standards for system capabilities and performance; successful 

management and integration of the people, process, and technology 

components; rigorous and disciplined performance of testing and 

security activities; reliable measurement to determine whether the 

systems are performing as intended; and an analytical and 

economically justified basis for making informed decisions about 

voting system investment options. These challenges are heightened 

by other conditions common to both the national elections 

community and other information technology environments: the 

distribution of responsibilities among various organizations, 

technology changes, funding opportunities and constraints, 

emerging requirements and guidance, and public attention. 

Given the diffused and decentralized allocation of voting system 

roles and responsibilities across all levels of government, addressing

these challenges will require the combined efforts of all levels of 

government, under the leadership of the EAC. To assist the EAC in 

executing its leadership role, we previously made recommendations 

to the commission aimed at better planning its ongoing and future 

activities relative to, for example, system standards and information 

sharing. While the EAC agreed with the recommendations, it told us 

that its ability to effectively execute its role is constrained by a lack 

of resources. In our view, the adequacy of resources at its disposal 

and the degree of cooperation it receives from entities spanning all 

levels of government are critical elements in the commission’s 

ability to perform its leadership role. 

Background 

Following the 2000 national elections, we produced a 

comprehensive series of reports covering our nation’s election 

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process that culminated with a capping report and framework for 

Congress to use to enact reforms for election administration.3

 Our 

reports were among the resources that Congress drew on in 

enacting the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002,4

 which 

provided a framework for fundamental election administration 

reform and created the EAC mission to oversee the election 

administration reform process. HAVA also provided for funding to 

replace older voting equipment, specifically punch card and 

mechanical lever voting equipment and encouraged adoption of 

other technology.5

 Subsequently, jurisdictions have increased their 

use of electronic voting methods, of which there are two commonlyused types: optical scan and direct recording electronic (DRE). 

HAVA Was Enacted to Strengthen the Overall Election Process 

Enacted by Congress in October 2002, HAVA affects nearly every 

aspect of the voting process, from voting technology to provisional 

ballots and from voter registration to poll worker training. In 

particular, the act authorized $3.86 billion in funding over several 

fiscal years for programs to replace punch card and mechanical 

lever voting equipment, improve election administration and 

accessibility, train poll workers, and perform research and pilot 

studies. HAVA also established the EAC to assist in the 

administration of federal elections and provide assistance with the 

administration of certain federal election laws and programs. HAVA 

also established minimum election administration standards for the 

states and units of local government that are responsible for the 

administration of federal elections. The act specifically tasked the 

EAC to serve as a national clearinghouse and resource for compiling 

election information and reviewing election procedures; for 

example, it is to conduct periodic studies of election administration 

issues, including electronic voting system performance, to promote 

 

3

See, for example, GAO, Elections: A Framework for Evaluating Reform 

Proposals, GAO-02-90 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 4

Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252 (Oct. 29, 2002). 5

The General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for administering

grants to the states to replace punch card systems and lever machines in 

qualifying states, including providing payments for general election administration

improvements to states that apply for funds to replace voting equipment. 

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methods of voting and administration that are most convenient, 

accessible, and easy to use for all voters. Other examples of EAC 

responsibilities include 

• developing and adopting voluntary voting system guidelines and 

maintaining information on the experiences of states in 

implementing the guidelines and operating voting systems; 

• testing, certifying, decertifying, and recertifying voting system 

hardware and software through accredited laboratories; 

• making payments to states to help them improve elections in the 

areas of voting systems standards, provisional voting and voting 

information requirements, and computerized statewide voter 

registration lists; and 

• making grants for research on voting technology improvements. 

The act also established the Technical Guidelines Development 

Committee to support the EAC, making it responsible for 

recommending voluntary voting system guidelines to the EAC. The

act assigned the National Institute of Standards and Technology 

(NIST) responsibility for providing technical support to the 

development committee and made the NIST Director the committee 

chair. 

The EAC began operations in January 2004, initially focusing on the 

distribution of funds to help states meet HAVA’s Title III 

requirements for uniform and nondiscriminatory election 

technology and administration, including the act’s requirements 

pertaining to voting system standards, provisional voting, voting 

information, a computerized statewide voter registration list, and 

identification for first-time voters who register to vote by mail. 

Actions EAC has taken since 2004 to improve voting systems 

include 

• publishing the Best Practices Toolkit and specialized 

management guides to assist states and local jurisdictions with 

managing election-related activities and equipment; 

• issuing voting system standards in 2005, referred to as the 

Voluntary Voting System Guidelines; 

• establishing procedures for certifying voting systems; 

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• establishing a program for accreditation of independent testing 

laboratories, with support from NIST’s National Voluntary 

Laboratory Accreditation Program; 

• disbursing to states approximately $2.3 billion in appropriations 

for the replacement of older voting equipment and election 

administration improvements under Title III of HAVA; and 

• conducting national surveys of the 2004 general election, 

uniformed and overseas voters, and other studies. 

For fiscal year 2006, EAC’s appropriation totaled $14.1 million. EAC 

reported that this included $3.8 million (27 percent) for activities 

related to development and adoption of the voting system standards 

and the voting system certification program; $3.5 million (25 

percent) for research and study and to establish the EAC as a 

national clearinghouse of election administration information; and 

$2.8 million (20 percent) to manage HAVA funds distributed to the 

states. The remaining funds went to various administrative 

expenses, including funding various advisory board meetings. EAC’s 

budget for fiscal year 2007 is $16.91 million, of which $4.95 million 

(29 percent) is to be transferred to NIST for its work on voting 

system standards and research performed under HAVA. EAC’s 

requested budget for fiscal year 2008 is $15.5 million, of which $3.25 

million (21 percent) is to be transferred to NIST. 

Electronic Voting Systems Fall into Two Primary Categories 

In the United States today, most votes are cast and counted by one 

of two types of electronic voting systems: optical scan and direct 

recording electronic (DRE). For the November 2004 general 

election, optical scan was the predominant voting method for more 

than half of local jurisdictions nationwide. In contrast, DREs were 

used as the predominant voting method by an estimated 7 percent of 

jurisdictions, although they were the predominant voting method for 

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large jurisdictions.6

 Figure 1 shows the estimated percentage of 

small, medium, and large jurisdictions using each predominant 

voting method in the 2004 general election. 

Figure 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Using Predominant Voting Methods in 2004, by Jurisdiction Size 

Note: Percentages for predominant voting methods within each jurisdiction size 

may not add to 100 because of rounding.

 

6

To obtain national information from local election officials on changes to election 

systems since 2000, election administration, and their experiences in the 2004

general election, we conducted a mail survey of a stratified random probability 

sample of 788 local election jurisdictions nationwide. Unless otherwise noted, the 

maximum sampling error at the 95 percent level of statistical confidence for 

estimates from this survey of all jurisdictions is plus or minus 5 percentage points,

plus or minus 7 percentage points for large jurisdictions, plus or minus 7 

percentage points for medium population size jurisdiction, and plus or minus 5 

percentage points for small population size jurisdictions. For more details about 

this survey, see appendix V in GAO-06-450. 

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a

The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and large 

jurisdictions are statistically significant. b

The differences between both small and medium jurisdictions and large 

jurisdictions are statistically significant. c

The differences between both small and medium jurisdictions and large 

jurisdictions are statistically significant. d

The difference between small jurisdictions and large jurisdictions is statistically 

significant. e

The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and large 

jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

Optical Scan Systems 

Optical scan voting systems use electronic technology to tabulate 

paper ballots. For the 2004 general election, we estimated that about 

51 percent of all local jurisdictions used optical scan voting 

equipment predominantly. 

An optical scan voting system is made up of computer-readable 

ballots, appropriate marking devices, privacy booths, and a 

computerized tabulation device. The ballot, which can be of various 

sizes, lists the names of the candidates and the issues. Voters record

their choices using an appropriate writing instrument to fill in boxes 

or ovals or to complete an arrow next to the candidate’s name or the 

issue. The ballot includes a space for write-ins to be placed directly 

on the ballot. 

Optical scan ballots are tabulated by optical-mark-recognition 

equipment (see fig. 2), which counts the ballots by sensing, or 

reading, the marks on the ballot. Ballots can be counted at the 

polling place—this is referred to as precinct-count optical scan7

—or 

at a central location. If ballots are counted at the polling place, 

voters or election officials put the ballots into the tabulation 

equipment, which tallies the votes; these tallies can be captured in 

removable storage media that are transported to a central tally 

location, or they can be electronically transmitted from the polling 

place to the central tally location. If ballots are centrally counted, 

 

7

Precinct-count optical scan equipment sits on a ballot box with two compartments for

scanned ballots—one for accepted ballots (i.e., those that are properly filled out) and one 

for rejected ballots (i.e., blank ballots, ballots with write-ins, or those accepted because of

a forced override). In addition, an auxiliary compartment in the ballot box is used for 

storing ballots if an emergency arises (e.g., loss of power or machine failure) that prevents

the ballots from being scanned.

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voters drop ballots into sealed boxes and election officials transfer 

the sealed boxes to the central location after the polls close, where 

election officials run the ballots through the tabulation equipment. 

Figure 2: Precinct-Count Optical Scan Tabulator and Central-Count Optical Scan 

Tabulator 

Software instructs the tabulation equipment to assign each vote (i.e.,

to assign valid marks on the ballot to the proper candidate or issue). 

In addition to identifying the particular contests and candidates, the 

software can be configured to capture, for example, straight party 

voting and vote-for-no-more-than-N contests. Precinct-based optical 

scanners can also be programmed to detect overvotes (where the 

voter, for example, votes for two candidates for one office, 

invalidating the vote) and undervotes (where the voter does not vote 

for all contests or issues on the ballot) and to take some action in 

response (rejecting the ballot, for instance), so that voters can fix 

their mistakes before leaving the polling place. If ballots are 

tabulated centrally, voters do not have the opportunity to detect and 

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correct mistakes that may have been made. In addition, optical scan 

systems often use vote tally software to tally the vote totals from 

one or more vote tabulation devices. 

Optical scan systems were widely used as the predominant voting 

method for jurisdictions in the 2004 general election and we 

reported last year that jurisdictions planned to acquire more of 

these systems for the 2006 general election. We estimated that 30 

percent of jurisdictions nationwide used precinct count optical scan 

voting equipment as their predominant voting method for the 2004 

general election, while an estimated 21 percent used central count 

optical scan predominantly. While all sizes of jurisdictions had plans 

to acquire both precinct count and central count optical scan 

systems for the 2006 general election, small jurisdictions showed a 

strong preference for acquiring precinct count optical scan systems 

(estimated at 28 percent of small jurisdictions) compared with DREs 

(13 percent) and central count optical scan (4 percent). 

Direct Recording Electronic Systems 

DREs capture votes electronically without the use of paper ballots. 

For the 2004 general election, we estimated that about 7 percent of 

all local jurisdictions used DREs predominantly, although 30 percent 

of all large jurisdictions used them as the predominant voting 

method. 

DREs come in two basic types: pushbutton or touch screen, with 

pushbutton being the older technology. The two types vary 

considerably in appearance, as shown in figure 3. 

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Figure 3: DRE Pushbutton and DRE Touch Screen 

Pushbutton and touch screen units differ significantly in the way 

they present ballots to the voter. With the pushbutton type, all ballot 

information is presented on a single “full-face” ballot. For example, 

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a ballot may have 50 buttons on a 3 by 3 foot ballot, with a candidate 

or issue next to each button. In contrast, touch screen DREs display 

ballot information on an electronic display screen. For both 

pushbutton and touch screen types, the ballot information is 

programmed onto an electronic storage medium, which is then 

uploaded to the machine. For touch screens, ballot information can 

be displayed in color and can incorporate pictures of the candidates. 

Because the ballot space on a touch screen is much smaller than on

a pushbutton machine, voters who use touch screens must page 

through the ballot information. Both touch screen and pushbutton 

DREs can accommodate multilingual ballots. 

Despite the differences between pushbutton and touch screen 

DREs, the two types have some similarities, such as how the voter 

interacts with the voting equipment. To make a ballot selection, 

voters press a button or the screen next to the candidate or issue, 

and the button or screen then lights up to indicate the selection. 

When voters are finished making their selections, they cast their 

votes by pressing a final “vote” button or screen. Until they hit this 

final button or screen, voters can change their selections. DREs are 

designed to not allow overvotes. Both types allow voters to write in 

candidates. While most DREs allow voters to type write-ins on a 

keyboard, some pushbutton types require voters to write the name 

on paper tape that is part of the device. In addition, different types 

of DREs offer a variety of options that jurisdictions may choose to 

purchase, such as printed receipts or audio interfaces for voters 

with disabilities. 

Although DREs do not receive paper ballots, they can retain 

permanent electronic images of all the ballots, which can be stored 

on various media, including internal hard disk drives, flash cards, or 

memory cartridges. According to vendors, these ballot images, 

which can be printed, can be used for auditing and recounts. 

Like optical scan devices, DREs require the use of software to 

program the various ballot styles and tally the votes, which is 

generally done through the use of memory cartridges or other 

media. Some of the newer DREs use smart card technology as a 

security feature. Smart cards are plastic devices—about the size of a 

credit card—that use integrated circuit chips to store and process 

data, much like a computer. Smart cards are generally used as a 

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means to open polls and to authorize voter access to ballots. For 

instance, smart cards on some DREs store program data on the 

election and are used to help set up the equipment; during setup, 

election workers verify that the card received is for the proper 

election. Other DREs are programmed to automatically activate 

when the voter inserts a smart card; the card brings up the correct 

ballot onto the screen. 

DREs offer various configurations for tallying the votes. Some 

contain removable storage media that can be taken from the voting

device and transported to a central location to be tallied. Others can 

be configured to electronically transmit the vote totals from the 

polling place to a central tally location. Vote tally software is often 

used to tally the vote totals from one or more units. 

DREs were chosen as the predominant voting method by a relatively 

small overall proportion of local jurisdictions for the 2004 general 

election (7 percent overall). However, as previously shown in figure 

1, large and medium jurisdictions identified DREs as their 

predominant voting method (estimated at 30 percent and 20 percent 

of jurisdictions, respectively) more often than small jurisdictions 

(estimated at 1 percent). DREs were the leading choice among 

voting methods for both large and medium jurisdictions that 

planned to acquire voting systems before the 2006 general election 

(an estimated 34 percent of jurisdictions in both size groups). 

Contextual Role and Performance Characteristics of Electronic 

Voting Systems Are Important to Understanding Their Use 

Voting systems are one facet of a multifaceted, continuous elections

process that involves the interplay of people, processes, and 

technology. All levels of government—federal, state, and local—

share responsibilities for aspects of elections and voting systems. 

Moreover, effective performance of these systems is a product of 

effective system life cycle management, which includes systems 

definition, development, acquisition, operations, testing, and 

management. Such performance can be viewed in terms of several 

characteristics, such as security, reliability, ease of use, and cost 

effectiveness. 

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Despite Their Vital Role, Voting Systems Are Only One Aspect of the Larger Election 

Process 

Voting systems represent one of many important components in the 

overall election process. This process involves all levels of 

government and is made up of several stages, with each stage 

consisting of the interplay of people, processes, and technology. 

At the federal level, Congress has authority under the Constitution 

to regulate the administration of presidential and congressional 

elections and to enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory 

practices in all elections—federal, state, and local.8

 It has passed 

legislation affecting the administration of state elections that 

addresses voter registration,9

 absentee voting,10 accessibility 

provisions for the elderly and handicapped,11 and prohibitions 

against discriminatory practices.12 Congress does not have general 

constitutional authority over the administration of state and local 

elections. 

At the state level, the states are responsible for the administration of 

both their own elections and federal elections. States regulate the 

election process, including, for example, adoption of voting system 

standards, testing of voting systems, ballot access, registration 

procedures, absentee voting requirements, establishment of voting 

locations, provision of Election Day workers, and counting and 

certification of the vote. As we have reported, the U.S. election 

process can be seen as an assemblage of 51 somewhat distinct 

election systems—those of the 50 states and of the District of 

Columbia. 

 

8

For more information on the role of the federal government in the administration

of elections, see GAO, Elections: The Scope of Congressional Authority in 

Election Administration, GAO- 01-470 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2001). 9

National Voter Registration Act of 1993, commonly known as the “Motor Voter” 

Act; 42 U.S.C. 1973gg to 1973gg-10. 10Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (1986); 42 U.S.C. 1973ff to

1973ff-6. 11Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (1984); 42 U.S.C. 

1973ee to 1973ee-6. 12Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973 to 1973bb-1. 

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Further, although election policy and procedures are legislated 

primarily at the state level, states typically have decentralized this 

process so that the details of administering elections are carried out 

at the city or county levels, and voting is done at the local level. This 

is important because local election jurisdictions number more than

10,000 and their size varies enormously—from a rural county with 

about 200 voters to a large urban county such as Los Angeles 

County, where the total number of registered voters for the 2000 

elections exceeded the registered voter totals in 41 states. 

The size and demographics of a voting jurisdiction significantly 

affects the complexity of planning and conducting the election, as 

does the method used to cast and count votes. For example, 

jurisdictions using DRE systems may need to manage the electronic 

transmission of votes or vote counts, while jurisdictions using 

optical scan technology need to manage the transfer of the paper 

ballots this technology reads and tabulates. Jurisdictions using 

optical scan technology may also need to manage electronic 

transmissions if votes are counted at various locations and totals are 

electronically transmitted to a central tally point. No matter what 

technology is used, jurisdictions may need to provide ballot 

translations; however, the logistics of printing paper materials in a 

range of languages, as would be required for optical scan 

technology, is different from the logistics of programming 

translations into DRE units. 

Some states do have statewide election systems so that every voting

jurisdiction uses similar processes and equipment, but others do 

not. For instance, we reported in 2001 that in Pennsylvania, local 

election officials told us that there were 67 counties and 

consequently 67 different ways of handling elections.13 In some 

states, such as Georgia, state law prescribes the use of common

voting technology throughout the state while in other states, local 

election officials generally choose the voting technology to be used 

in their precincts, often from a list of state-certified options. 

Regardless of levels of government, however, election 

administration is a year-round activity, involving varying sets of 

 

13GAO-02-3.

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people performing the activities of each stage of the election 

process. These stages generally consist of the following: 

• Voter registration. Among other things, local election officials 

register eligible voters and maintain voter registration lists, 

including updates to registrants’ information and deletions of the 

names of registrants who are no longer eligible to vote. 

• Absentee and early voting. This type of voting allows eligible 

persons to vote in person or by mail before Election Day. 

Election officials must design ballots and other systems to 

permit this type of voting and educate voters on how to vote by 

these methods. 

• Election Day vote casting. Election administration includes 

preparation before Election Day, such as local election officials 

arranging for polling places, recruiting and training poll workers, 

designing ballots, and preparing and testing voting equipment for 

use in casting and tabulating votes, as well as Election Day 

activities, such as opening and closing polling places and 

assisting voters in casting their votes. 

• Vote counting. At this stage, election officials tabulate the cast 

ballots, determine whether and how to count ballots that cannot 

be read by the vote counting equipment, certify the final vote 

counts, and perform recounts, if required. 

As shown in figure 4, each stage of an election involves people, 

processes, and technology. 

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Figure 4: Stages of Election Process 

Electronic voting systems are primarily involved in the last three 

stages, during which votes are recorded, cast, and counted. 

However, the type of system that a jurisdiction uses may affect 

earlier stages. For example, in a jurisdiction that uses optical scan 

systems, paper ballots like those used on Election Day may be 

mailed in the absentee voting stage. On the other hand, a jurisdiction 

that uses DRE technology would have to make a different provision 

for absentee voting. 

Management of Electronic Voting System Performance Is a Continuous Process 

The performance of any information technology system, including 

electronic voting systems, is heavily influenced by a number of 

factors, including how well the system is defined, developed, 

acquired, tested, and implemented. 

Like any information technology product, a voting system starts 

with the explicit definition of what the system is to do and how well 

it is to do it. These requirements are then translated into design 

specifications that are used to develop the system. Electronic voting

systems are typically developed by vendors and then purchased as 

commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and implemented by state 

and local election administrators. During the development, 

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acquisition, and implementation of the systems, a range of tests are 

performed and the process is managed to ensure performance 

expectations are met. Together, these activities form a voting 

system life cycle (see fig. 5). 

Figure 5: Simplified Voting System Life Cycle 

Unless voting systems are properly managed throughout their life 

cycle, this one facet of the election process can significantly 

undermine the integrity of the whole.

Standards. Voting system standards define the functional and 

performance requirements that must be met and thus provide the 

baseline against which systems can be developed and tested. They 

also specify how the systems should be implemented and operated. 

Voting system standards apply to system hardware, software, 

firmware, and documentation, and they span prevoting,voting, and 

postvoting activities. They address, for example, requirements 

relating to system security; system reliability (accuracy and 

availability); system auditability; system storage and maintenance; 

and data retention and transportation. In addition to national 

standards, some states and local jurisdictions have specified their 

own voting system requirements. 

Development. Product development is performed by the voting 

system vendor. Product development includes further establishing 

system requirements, designing the system architecture, developing 

software, integrating hardware and software components, and 

testing the system. 

Acquisition. Voting system acquisition activities are performed by 

state and local governments and include publishing a request for 

proposals, evaluating proposals, choosing a voting system method, 

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choosing a vendor, writing and administering contracts, and testing 

the acquired system. 

Operations. Operation of voting systems is typically the 

responsibility of local jurisdictions. These activities include setting 

up systems before voting, vote capture and counting during 

elections, recounts and system audits after elections, and storage of 

systems between elections. Among other things, this phase includes 

activities associated with the physical environments in which the 

system operates. These include ensuring the physical security of the 

polling place and voting equipment and controlling the chain of 

custody for voting system components and supplies. The operations 

phase also includes monitoring of the election process by use of 

system audit logs and backups, and the collection, analysis, 

reporting, and resolution of election problems. 

Testing. As noted, testing is conducted by multiple entities 

throughout the life cycle of a voting system. Voting system vendors 

conduct testing during system development. National testing of 

systems is conducted by accredited independent testing authorities. 

Some states conduct testing before acquiring a system to determine 

how well it meets the specified performance parameters, or states 

may conduct certification testing to ensure that a system performs 

as specified by applicable laws and requirements. Once a voting 

system is delivered by the vendor, states and local jurisdictions may 

conduct acceptance testing to ensure that the system satisfies 

requirements. Finally, local jurisdictions typically conduct logic and 

accuracy tests prior to each election and sometimes subject 

portions of the system to parallel testing during each election. 

Management. Management processes ensure that each life cycle 

phase produces desirable outcomes and is conducted by the 

organization responsible for each life cycle phase. Voting system 

vendors manage the development phase, while states and/or local 

jurisdictions manage the acquisition and operations phases. Typical 

management activities that span the system life cycle include 

planning, configuration management, system performance review 

and evaluation, problem tracking and correction, human capital 

management, and user training. Management responsibilities related 

to security and reliability include program planning, disaster 

recovery and contingency planning, definition of security roles and 

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responsibilities, configuration management of voting system 

hardware and software, and poll worker security training. 

Electronic Voting System Performance Can Be Judged on Several Attributes 

Although the debate concerning electronic voting systems is 

primarily focused on security, other performance attributes are also 

relevant, such as reliability, ease of use, and cost. Each of these 

attributes is described here. 

Security. Election officials are responsible for establishing and 

managing security and privacy controls to protect against threats to 

the integrity of elections.14 Threats to election results and voter 

confidentiality include potential modification or loss of electronic 

voting data; loss, theft, or modification of physical ballots; and 

unauthorized access to software and electronic equipment. Different 

types of controls can be used to counter these threats. Physical 

access controls are important for securing voting equipment, vote 

tabulation equipment, and ballots. Software access controls (such as 

passwords and firewalls15) are important for limiting the number of 

people who can access and operate voting devices, election 

management software, and vote tabulation software. In addition, 

physical screens around voting stations and poll workers preventing

voters from being watched or coerced while voting are important to 

protect the privacy and confidentiality of the vote. 

Reliability. Ensuring the reliability of votes being recorded and 

tallied is an essential attribute of any voting equipment and depends 

to a large degree on the accuracy and availability of voting systems.

Without such assurance, both voter confidence in the election and 

the integrity and legitimacy of the outcome of the election are at 

 

14We have described an effective security program as including, at a minimum, (1) 

assigning responsibility for security, (2) assessing security risks and 

vulnerabilities and implementing both manual and technology-based security 

measures to prevent or counter these risks, and (3) periodically reviewing the 

controls to ensure their appropriateness. For more information, see GAO, 

Executive Guide: Information Security Management, GAO/AIMD-98-68

(Washington, D.C.: May 1998). 15A firewall is a hardware or software component that protects computers or

networks from attacks by outside network users by blocking and checking all 

incoming traffic. 

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risk. The importance of an accurate vote count increases with the 

closeness of the election. Both optical scan and DRE systems are 

claimed to be highly accurate. Although voting equipment may be 

designed and developed to count votes as recorded with 100 percent 

accuracy, how well the equipment counts votes as intended by 

voters is a function not only of equipment design, but also of how 

procedures are followed by election officials, technicians, and 

voters. It is also important to limit system down time so that polling

places can handle the volume of voter traffic.

Ease of Use. Ease of use (or user friendliness) depends largely on

how voters interact physically and intellectually with the voting 

system. This interaction, commonly referred to as the 

human/machine interface, is a function of the system design and 

how it has been implemented. Ease of use depends on how well 

jurisdictions design ballots and educate voters on the use of the 

equipment. A voting system’s ease of use affects accuracy (i.e., 

whether the voter’s intent is captured), and it can also affect the 

efficiency of the voting process (confused voters take longer to 

vote). Accessibility by diverse types of voters, including those with 

disabilities, is a further aspect of ease of use. 

Cost. For a given jurisdiction, the particular cost associated with an 

electronic voting system will depend on the requirements of the 

jurisdiction as well as the particular equipment chosen. Voting 

equipment costs vary among types of voting equipment and among 

different manufacturers and models of the same type of equipment. 

Some of these differences can be attributed to differences in what is 

included in the unit cost. In addition to the equipment unit cost, an 

additional cost for jurisdictions is the software that operates the 

equipment, prepares the ballots, and tallies the votes (and in some 

cases, prepares the election results reports). Other factors affecting

the acquisition cost of voting equipment are the number and types of 

peripherals required. Once jurisdictions acquire the voting 

equipment, they also incur the cost to operate and maintain it, which 

can vary considerably.

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Widespread Concerns about Electronic Voting Systems Have Been 

Reported 

Election officials, computer security experts, citizen advocacy 

groups, and others have raised significant security and reliability 

concerns with electronic voting systems, citing, for example, 

inadequacies in standards, system design and development, 

operation and management activities, and testing. In 2005, we 

examined the range of concerns raised by these groups and aligned 

them with their relevant life cycle phases. We also examined EAC’s 

efforts related to these concerns. Furthermore, we identified key 

practices that each level of government should implement 

throughout the voting system life cycle in order to improve security 

and reliability.16

The aspects of the voting system life cycle phases are 

interdependent—that is, a problem experienced in one area of the 

life cycle will likely affect other areas. For example, a weakness in 

system standards could result in a poorly designed and developed 

system, which may not perform properly in the operational phase. 

State and local jurisdictions have documented instances when their 

electronic voting systems exhibited operational problems during 

elections. Such failures led to polling place delays, disruptions, and 

incorrect vote tabulations. 

In reviewing the reported concerns, we have explained that many of 

the security and reliability concerns involved vulnerabilities or 

problems with specific voting system makes and models or unique 

circumstances in a specific jurisdiction’s election, and there is a lack 

of consensus among elections officials, computer security experts,

and others on the pervasiveness of the concerns. We concluded in 

2005 that these concerns have caused problems with recent 

elections, resulting in the loss and miscount of votes. In light of the 

demonstrated voting system problems; the differing views on how 

widespread these problems are; and the complexity of assuring the 

accuracy, integrity, confidentiality, and availability of voting systems 

throughout their life cycles, we stated that the security and 

 

16GAO-05-956.

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reliability concerns merit the focused attention of federal, state, and 

local authorities responsible for election administration. 

Inadequate National Standards 

Appropriately defined and implemented standards for system 

functions and testing processes are essential to ensuring the 

security and reliability of voting systems across all phases of the 

elections process. States and local jurisdictions face the challenge of 

adapting to and consistently applying appropriate standards and 

guidance to address vulnerabilities and risks in their specific 

election environments. The national standards are voluntary—

meaning that states are free to adopt them in whole or in part or 

reject them entirely. 

The Federal Election Commission (FEC) issued a set of voluntary 

voting system standards in 1990 and revised them in 2002. These 

standards identify requirements for electronic voting systems. 

Computer security experts and others criticized the 2002 voting 

system standards for not containing requirements sufficient to 

ensure secure and reliable voting systems. Common concerns with 

the standards involved their vague and incomplete security 

provisions, inadequate provisions for some commercial products 

and networks, and inadequate documentation requirements. 

In December 2005, EAC issued the Voluntary Voting System 

Guidelines, which includes additions and revisions for system 

functional requirements, performance characteristics, 

documentation requirements, and test evaluation criteria for the 

national certification of voting systems. These guidelines promote 

security measures that address gaps in prior standards and are 

applicable to more modern technologies, such as controls for 

software distribution and wireless operations. 

As we previously reported, the 2005 Voluntary Voting System 

Guidelines do not take effect until December 2007. Moreover, this 

version of the standards does not comprehensively address voting 

technology issues. For instance, they do not address COTS devices 

(such as card readers, printers, or personal computers) or software 

products (such as operating systems or database management 

systems) that are used in voting systems without modification. This 

is significant because computer security experts have raised 

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concerns about a provision in the prior voting system standards that 

exempted unaltered COTS software from testing and about voting 

system standards that are not sufficient to address the weaknesses 

inherent in telecommunications and networking services. 

Specifically, vendors often use COTS software in their electronic 

voting systems, including operating systems. Security experts note 

that COTS software could contain defects, vulnerabilities, and other 

weaknesses that could be carried over into electronic voting 

systems, thereby compromising their security. Regarding 

telecommunications and networking services, selected computer 

security experts believe that relying on any use of 

telecommunications or networking services, including wireless 

communications, exposes electronic voting systems to risks that 

make it difficult to adequately ensure their security and reliability—

even with safeguards such as encryption and digital signatures in 

place. 

As states and jurisdictions move to a more integrated suite of 

election systems, proactive efforts to establish standards in such 

areas will be essential to addressing emerging technical, security, 

and reliability interactions among systems and managing risks in 

this dynamic election environment. However, the 2005 guidelines do 

not address the emerging trends in election systems, such as the 

integration of registration systems with voting systems. 

In light of this and other weaknesses in the standards, we reported 

in 2005 that EAC did not yet have detailed plans in place for 

addressing these deficiencies. Accordingly, we recommended that 

EAC collaborate with NIST and the Technical Guidelines 

Development Committee to define specific tasks, measurable 

outcomes, milestones, and resource needs required to improve the 

standards. To its credit, EAC agreed with our recommendation, 

recognizing that more work was needed to further develop the 

technical guidelines. Accordingly, it stated that it planned to work 

with NIST to plan and prioritize its standards work within its scarce

resources. 

Inadequate System Design and Development 

Multiple reports, including several state-commissioned technical 

reviews and security assessments, have raised concerns about the 

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design and development of secure and reliable electronic voting 

systems. Among other things, weak embedded security controls and 

audit trail design flaws were two major areas of concern: 

• Weak system security controls. Some electronic voting

systems reportedly have weak software and hardware security 

controls. Regarding software controls, many security 

examinations reported flaws in how controls were implemented 

in some DRE systems to prevent unauthorized access. For 

example, one model failed to password-protect the supervisor 

functions controlling key system capabilities; another relied on 

an easily guessed password to access these functions. If 

exploited, these weaknesses could damage the integrity of 

ballots, votes, and voting system software by allowing 

unauthorized modifications. Regarding physical hardware 

controls, several recent reports found that certain DRE models 

contained weaknesses in controls designed to protect the 

system. For instance, reviewers were concerned that a particular 

model of DRE was set up in such a way that if one machine was 

accidentally or intentionally unplugged from the others, voting 

functions on the other machines in the network would be 

disrupted. In addition, reviewers found that the switches used to 

turn a DRE system on or off, as well as those used to close the 

polls on a particular DRE terminal, were not protected. 

• Design flaws in developing voter-verified paper audit 

trails. Establishing a voter-verified paper audit trail involves 

adding a paper printout to a DRE system so that a voter can 

review and verify his or her ballot. Some citizen advocacy 

groups, security experts, and elections officials advocate these 

audit trails as a protection against potential DRE flaws. 

However, other election officials and researchers have raised 

concerns about potential reliability and security flaws in the 

design of systems using voter-verified paper audit trails. If voting 

system mechanisms for protecting the paper audit trail were 

inadequate, an insider could associate voters with their 

individual paper ballots and votes, particularly if the system 

stored voter-verified ballots sequentially on a continuous roll of 

paper. If not protected, such information could breach voter 

privacy and confidentiality. 

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Inadequate System Operation and Management Activities 

Several reports raised concerns about the operational practices of 

local jurisdictions and the actual performance of their respective 

electronic voting systems during elections. These include incorrect 

system configurations, inadequate security management programs, 

and poor implementation of security procedures. 

• Incorrect system configuration. Some state and local election 

reviews have documented cases in which local governments did 

not properly configure their voting systems. These improper 

configurations resulted in voters being unable to vote in certain 

races or their votes not being captured correctly by the voting 

system. 

• Poor version control of system software. Security experts 

and some election officials expressed concern that the voting 

system software installed at the local level may not be the same 

as what was qualified and certified at the national or state levels. 

These groups raised the possibilities that either intentionally or 

by accident, voting system software could be altered or 

substituted, or that vendors or local officials might install 

untested or uncertified versions of voting systems, knowingly or 

unknowingly. As a result, potentially unreliable or malicious 

software might be used in elections. 

• Inadequate security management programs. Several

technical reviews found that states did not have effective 

information security management plans in place to oversee their 

electronic voting systems. The reports noted that key managerial 

functions were not in place, including (1) providing appropriate 

security training, (2) ensuring that employees and contractors 

had proper certifications, (3) ensuring that security roles were 

well defined and staffed, and (4) ensuring that pertinent officials 

correctly set up their voting system audit logs and require them 

to be reviewed. 

• Poor implementation of security procedures. Several 

reports indicated that state and local officials did not always 

follow security procedures. For example, reports found that a 

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regional vote tabulation computer was connected to the Internet 

and that local officials had not updated it with several security 

patches, thus needlessly exposing the system to security threats. 

In addition, several reports indicated that some state and local 

jurisdictions did not always have procedures in place to detect 

problems with their electronic voting systems such as ensuring 

the number of votes cast matched the number of signatures on 

precinct sign-in sheets.

Inadequate Testing 

Security experts and some election officials have expressed 

concerns that the tests performed by independent testing authorities 

and state and local election officials do not adequately assess 

electronic voting systems’ security and reliability. These concerns 

are intensified by what some perceive as a lack of transparency in 

the testing process. 

• Inadequate security testing. Many computer security experts 

expressed concerns with weak or insufficient system testing, 

source code reviews, and penetration testing. To illustrate their 

concerns, they pointed to the fact that most of the systems that 

exhibited the weak security controls previously cited had been 

nationally certified after testing by an independent testing 

authority. Security experts and others point to this as an

indication that both the standards and the testing program are 

not rigorous enough with respect to security. 

• Lack of transparency in the testing process. Security 

experts and some elections officials have raised concerns about 

a lack of transparency in the testing process. They note that the 

test plans used by the independent testing authorities, along with 

the test results, are treated as protected trade secrets and thus 

cannot be released to the public. Critics say that this lack of 

transparency hinders oversight and auditing of the testing 

process. This in turn makes it harder to determine the actual 

capabilities, potential vulnerabilities, and performance problems 

of a given system. Despite assertions by election officials and 

vendors that disclosing too much information about an 

electronic voting system could pose a security risk, one security 

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expert noted that a system should be secure enough to resist 

even a knowledgeable attacker. 

Variability and Weaknesses in State and Local Approaches to Voting 

System Standards, Testing, Operations, and Performance 

Measurement 

In 2006, we reported on state and local government experiences in 

conducting the 2004 national election.17 Regarding voting systems, 

states’ and jurisdictions’ responses to our surveys showed that 

differing versions of the national voting system standards were used 

(not always the most current version); voting system life cycle 

management practices were not consistently implemented; and 

certain types of system testing were not widely performed. 

Moreover, jurisdictions reported that they did not consistently 

monitor the performance of their systems, which is important for 

determining whether election needs, requirements, and expectations 

are met and for taking corrective actions when they are not. 

States’ Use of Standards Varied 

States and jurisdictions reported that they applied a variety of voting

system standards, some of which were no longer current. 

Specifically, 44 states and the District of Columbia reported that 

they were requiring local jurisdictions’ voting systems to be used for 

the first time in the November 2006 general election to comply with 

the national voting system standards.18 However, these states were 

not all using the same version of the standards. This is troublesome 

because the later versions of the standards are more stringent than 

the earlier versions in various areas, including security. 

More specifically, 28 of the 44 states and the District of Columbia 

reported that voting systems to be used for the first time in the 2006 

 

17GAO-06-450. 18To obtain information from state election officials on any changes made in 

selected state statutory requirements since the 2000 election and other changes 

made including actions taken to implement HAVA, we conducted a Web-based 

survey of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. For more details about this

survey, see appendix V in GAO-06-450. 

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election comply with the 2002 voting system standards. Nine of 

these 28 states would also require their jurisdictions to apply the 

1990 federal standards to new voting systems and 4 of the 28 would 

also require jurisdictions to use the 2005 voting system standards, 

which were in draft version at the time of our survey. (One other 

state also expected to apply the 2005 voting system standards.) Ten 

other of the 44 states reporting said that they expected to use hybrid 

standards that were based on one or more versions of the national 

standards, without specifying the composition of their hybrid, and 4 

states planned to use the national standards in 2006, but did not 

specify a version. (Five states responded that they did not require 

their voting systems to comply with any version of the national 

standards or had not yet made a decision on compliance with the 

standards for 2006. One state did not respond.) 

Jurisdictions Varied Widely in Applying Security Practices

Local jurisdictions varied widely in the nature and extent of their 

voting system security efforts and activities during the 2004 election. 

Our research on recommended security practices shows that 

effective system security management involves having, among other 

things, (1) defined policies governing such system controls as 

authorized functions and access and documented procedures for 

secure normal operations and incident management; (2) 

documented plans for implementing policies and procedures; (3) 

clearly assigned roles and responsibilities for system security; and 

(4) verified use of technical and procedural controls designed to 

reduce the risk of disruption, destruction, or unauthorized 

modification of systems and their information. Jurisdictions’ efforts 

in each of these areas for the November 2004 general election are 

discussed here. 

Policies and procedures. Many jurisdictions reported having 

written policies and procedures for certain aspects of security 

related to their voting systems, but others did not. Written security 

policies were more prevalent among large jurisdictions (an 

estimated 65 percent) than small jurisdictions (an estimated 41 

percent). An estimated one-fifth of jurisdictions reported that they 

did not have written policies and procedures in place for 

transporting ballots or electronic memory, storing ballots, or 

electronic transmission of voted ballots to ensure ballot security. In 

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addition, some jurisdictions that we visited had published detailed 

voting system security policies and procedures that included such 

topics as network security policies for election tabulation, 

procedures for securing and protecting election equipment and 

software, testing voting equipment to ensure accurate recording of 

votes, and disaster recovery plans, while others omitted these 

topics.19 Some jurisdictions also took additional steps to ensure that 

election workers had access to, and were trained in, the contents of 

the policies and procedures for securing ballots and voting 

equipment. 

Implementation plans. Election officials in only 8 of the 28 

jurisdictions that we visited told us that they had written plans for 

implementing security aspects of their voting systems and 

processes. Moreover, the contents of plans we obtained from local 

jurisdictions varied widely. One of the jurisdiction’s security plans 

covered most aspects of the voting process, from ballot preparation 

through recount, while another plan was limited to the security of 

its vote-tallying system in a stand-alone environment. Of the 5 plans 

we reviewed, 2 covered almost all of the 8 security topics in our 

review that included risk assessment, physical controls, awareness 

training, and incident response, while the others covered just one or 

two topics. 

Roles and responsibilities. In addition, security management 

roles and responsibilities for the 2004 general election were not 

consistently assigned.20 According to survey responses, security 

responsibilities fell primarily to local election officials (estimated at 

67 percent) for the 2004 general election, although state officials 

(estimated at 14 percent) and other entities (e.g., independent 

consultants and vendors, estimated at 24 percent) were also 

 

19To obtain a more detailed understanding of the stages of the election process,

challenges associated with it in local jurisdictions, and how local election officials 

address those challenges, we visited and interviewed officials in a nonprobability

sample of 28 local election jurisdictions in 14 states nationwide. For more details 

about these visits, see appendix V in GAO-06-450. 20From our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 90 percent of all 

jurisdictions (excluding those that used only hand-counted paper ballots on 

Election Day) specifically assigned responsibility for voting system security. 

Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day were

excluded from this survey question. 

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assigned these responsibilities. Local officials were typically 

responsible for implementing security controls, while state officials 

were usually involved with developing security policy and guidance 

and monitoring local jurisdictions’ implementation of security. Some 

jurisdictions reported that other entities performed tasks such as 

securing voting equipment during transport or storage and training

election personnel for security awareness. Similarly, 26 states 

reported that security monitoring and evaluation was performed by 

two or more entities. In 22 states and the District of Columbia, 

responsibility for security monitoring and evaluation was shared 

between the state and local election officials. States also reported 

cases where other entities (e.g., independent consultants or 

vendors) were involved in monitoring and evaluating controls. The 

entities that were assigned tasks and responsibilities at the local 

jurisdictions we visited are described in table 1. 

Table 1: Voting System Security Tasks and Responsibilities for the 2004 General Election Reported by Election Officials in 

Local Jurisdictions Visited by GAO 

Performing entity Examples of voting system security tasks identified by local 

officials Local officials State Other entities 

Secure ballot programming X 

Sealing of voted ballots X 

Secure storage of voting equipment X X 

(e.g., schools)

Video surveillance of stored equipment or ballots X 

Access control to stored election materials X 

Protection of voting equipment and materials during transport X X 

(e.g., law enforcement officials) 

Inventory management of voting equipment and ballots X 

Monitoring vote tallying systems for unauthorized connections X 

Impoundment of election materials after elections X 

Monitoring and testing of equipment accuracy before, during, and after 

elections 

X X X

Security awareness training for election personnel X X X 

Certification of voting equipment X X 

Development of security policies and guidance for jurisdictions X X 

Monitoring implementation of security policies by jurisdictions X X 

Source: GAO analysis of documents provided by local jurisdictions we visited.

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Use of security controls. For the November 2004 general election, 

jurisdictions’ operation of voting systems employed varying uses of 

certain security controls.21 Based on survey responses, we estimated 

that 59 percent of jurisdictions used power or battery backup, 67 

percent used system access controls, 91 percent used hardware 

locks and seals, and 52 percent used backup electronic storage for 

votes.22 We further estimated that 95 percent of jurisdictions used at 

least one of these controls, and we estimated hardware locks and 

seals were the controls most consistently used for electronic voting

systems.23 Furthermore, we estimated that a lower percentage of 

small jurisdictions used power or battery backup and electronic 

backup storage of votes for their voting systems than large or 

medium jurisdictions, and these differences are statistically 

significant in most cases. Figure 6 presents the use of various 

security controls by jurisdiction size. 

 

21Common security controls included (1) identification names and passwords to control

access to voting equipment and software, (2) redundant storage media for recovery in the

event of power or equipment failure, (3) encryption to ensure privacy of votes and 

confidentiality of election results, (4) audit trails to document the integrity of the voting 

process, and (5) hardware locks and seals to prevent unauthorized access to voting

equipment components. 22Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day were excluded 

from this survey question. 23We were unable to reliably estimate percentages for jurisdictions where predominant

voting methods were central count punch cards or precinct count punch cards voting 

methods for all but one of these security controls. We estimate that 95 percent of

jurisdictions where the predominant voting method was central count punch cards used

hardware locks and seals. 

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Figure 6: Estimated Use of Security Controls by Local Jurisdictions in the 2004 

General Election, by Jurisdiction Size 

Note: More than one group may have been identified with security

responsibilities. a

The difference between small jurisdictions and medium jurisdictions is 

statistically significant. The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions 

is plus or minus 8 percentage points. b

The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is plus or minus 8 

percentage points. c

The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and large 

jurisdictions are statistically significant. The 95 percent confidence interval for 

small jurisdictions is plus or minus 8 percentage points. 

Among the jurisdictions that we visited, election officials reported 

that various security measures were in use during the 2004 general 

election to safeguard voting equipment, ballots, and votes before, 

during, and after the election. However, the measures were not 

uniformly reported by officials in these jurisdictions, and officials in 

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most jurisdictions reported that they did not have a security plan to 

govern the scope, nature, and implementation of these measures or

other aspects of their security program. The security controls most 

frequently cited by officials for the jurisdictions that we visited were

locked storage of voting equipment and ballots and monitoring of 

voting equipment. Other security measures mentioned during our 

visits included testing voting equipment before, during, or after the 

election to ensure that the equipment was accurately tallying votes; 

planning and conducting training on security issues and procedures 

for elections personnel; and video surveillance of stored ballots and 

voting equipment. Table 2 summarizes the types and frequency of 

security measures reported by election officials in the jurisdictions 

we visited.

Table 2: Security Controls Reportedly Used in the 2004 General Election by Election

Officials in Jurisdictions Visited by GAO

Reported security control 

Number of 

jurisdictions 

Locked/sealed storage of voting equipment and ballots a 25

Monitoring of voting equipment

 a 14

Encrypted ballots or election results a 10

Security plans a 8

Testing of voting equipment

 a 7

Control of voting machine memory cards by precinct personnel 

during elections

 a

6 

Video surveillance for voting equipment or ballots 5 

Security training 4 

Source: GAO analysis of interviews from local jurisdictions we visited. 

a

One or more jurisdictions we visited indicated this security control was not applicable 

because of the voting method used. 

Voting systems that can be remotely accessed introduce additional 

security challenges. Based on survey responses, we estimated that a 

small percentage of local jurisdictions (10 percent) provided remote 

access to their voting systems for one or more categories of 

personnel—local election officials, state election officials, vendors, 

or other parties.24 Some of the jurisdictions that provided this access 

 

24Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day were

excluded from this survey question. 

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described a variety of protections to mitigate the risk of 

unauthorized remote access, including locally controlled passwords, 

passwords that change for each access, and local control of 

communications connections. However, the percentage of 

jurisdictions with remote access may actually be higher because 7 to 

8 percent of jurisdictions did not know if remote access was 

available for their systems. 

Some Types of Testing Were Not Commonly Performed 

To ensure that voting systems perform as intended, the systems 

must be effectively tested. Voting system test and evaluation can be 

grouped into various types, or stages: certification testing (national 

level), certification testing (state level), acceptance testing, 

readiness testing, parallel testing, and postelection voting system 

audits. Each of these tests has a specific purpose and is conducted 

at the national, state, or local level at a particular time in the 

election cycle. Table 3 summarizes these types of tests.

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Table 3: Types of Testing and Evaluation for Voting Systems, with Common Time Frames and Responsibilities

Test type Purpose When conducted Responsibility 

Certification (national)aTo verify compliance of voting equipment 

with federal standards 

Prior to (or as a 

condition of) system 

acceptance 

Federal authorities and independent 

laboratories

b

Certification (state) To validate compliance of voting 

equipment with state-specific 

requirements 

Before election State election authorities 

Acceptance To verify that voting equipment delivered 

by a vendor meets state or local 

requirements 

Before election State or local election authorities 

Readiness (logic and 

accuracy) 

To verify that voting equipment is 

functioning properly, usually by

confirming that predictable outputs are 

produced from pre-defined inputsc

Before election Local election authorities 

Parallel To verify accurate performance of voting 

equipment through random selection and 

systematic evaluation of operational 

equipment 

During election State or local election authorities 

Audit To review and reconcile election records 

to confirm correct conduct of an election 

or uncover evidence of problems with 

voting equipment or election processes 

After election State or local election authorities 

Source: GAO analysis based on GAO-02-3 and GAO-05-956. 

a

With the enactment of HAVA in 2002, responsibility for overseeing national testing of 

voting systems and certifying those that met federal standards was assigned to the EAC in 

HAVA § 231(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15371(a)(1)). The EAC assumed this 

responsibility in August 2005, when it was transferred from the National Association of 

State Election Directors, where national testing against federal standards was called 

“qualification testing”. b

Refers to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission and testing laboratories accredited by

them as provided for in HAVA § 231 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15371). c

Readiness testing that is conducted to confirm the proper functioning of election 

equipment on Election Day just before the polls open is sometimes called verification 

testing. 

For the November 2004 general election, voting system testing was 

conducted for almost all voting systems, but the types and content 

of the testing performed varied considerably. According to survey 

responses, most states and local jurisdictions employed national and 

state certification testing and readiness testing to some extent, but 

the criteria used in this testing were highly dependent on the state 

or jurisdiction. Also, many, but not all, states and jurisdictions 

conducted acceptance testing of both newly acquired systems and 

those undergoing changes or upgrades. In contrast, relatively few 

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states and jurisdictions conducted parallel testing during elections

or audits of voting systems following elections. State and local 

responses to our surveys are summarized here relative to each type 

of testing. 

National certification. Most states continued to require that 

voting systems be nationally tested and certified. For voting systems 

being used for the first time in the 2004 general election, national 

certification testing was almost always uniformly required. In 

particular, 26 of 27 states using DRE for the first time in this 

election, as well as the District of Columbia, required their systems 

to be nationally certified, while 9 of the 10 states using punch card 

equipment for the first time and 30 of 35 states and the District of 

Columbia using optical scan equipment for the first time, reported 

such requirements. However, for the 2004 general election, we 

estimated that 68 percent of jurisdictions did not know whether 

their respective systems were nationally certified. This uncertainty 

surrounding the certification status of a specific version of voting 

system at the local level underscores our concern that even though 

voting system software may have been qualified and certified at the 

national or state levels, software changes and upgrades performed 

at the local level may not be. 

State certification. For the November 2004 general election, 42 

states and the District of Columbia reported that they required state 

certification of voting systems. Seven of these states purchased 

voting systems at the state level for local jurisdictions. Officials for 

the remaining states and the District of Columbia reported that 

responsibility for purchasing a state-certified voting system rested 

with the local jurisdiction. While state certification requirements 

often included national testing as well as confirmation of 

functionality for particular ballot conditions, some states also 

required additional features such as construction quality, 

transportation safety, and documentation. Among the remaining 8 

states that did not require state certification, officials described 

other mechanisms to address the compliance of voting equipment 

with state-specific requirements, such as a state approval process or 

acceptance of voting equipment based on federal certification. 

For the 2006 general election, 44 states reported that they would 

have requirements for certification of voting systems, 2 more states 

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GAO-07-741T 
than for the 2004 general election. Of the 44, all but 1 expected to 

conduct the certification themselves; the remaining state reported 

that it would rely on results from a national independent testing 

authority to make its certification decision. In addition, 18 of the 43 

states planned to involve a national testing laboratory in their 

certification process. 

Acceptance testing. With regard to acceptance testing of new 

voting systems, 26 states and the District of Columbia reported that 

responsibility for such testing was assigned to either the state or 

local level for the 2004 general election. Specifically, 8 states and the 

District of Columbia reported that they had responsibility for 

performing acceptance testing, 15 states required local jurisdictions 

to perform such testing, and 3 states reported that requirements for 

acceptance testing existed at both the state and local levels. Twentytwo states either did not require such testing or did not believe that 

such testing was applicable to them. (Two states did not know what 

their acceptance testing requirements were for the 2004 election.) 

In addition, more states required that acceptance testing be 

performed for changes and upgrades to existing systems than they 

did for new systems—30 states in all and the District of Columbia. 

Similarly, election officials at a majority of the local jurisdictions 

that we visited told us that they conducted some type of acceptance 

testing for newly acquired voting equipment, although they 

described a variety of approaches to performing acceptance testing.

For example, the data used for testing could be vendor-supplied, 

developed by election officials, or both, and could include system 

initialization, logic and accuracy, and tamper resistance. Other 

steps, such as diagnostic tests, physical inspection of hardware, and 

software configuration checks, were also mentioned as testing 

activities by local election officials. Further, election officials from 3 

jurisdictions that we visited said that vendors were heavily involved 

in designing and executing the acceptance tests, while officials from

another jurisdiction that we visited said that vendors contributed to 

a portion of their testing. In 2 jurisdictions, officials said that 

acceptance tests were conducted at a university center for elections

systems. 

Readiness testing. Almost all states (49) and the District of 

Columbia reported that they performed readiness testing of voting 

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GAO-07-741T 
systems at the state level, the local level, or both (one state did not 

require readiness testing). Most states (37) required local 

jurisdictions to perform readiness testing. However, 7 states 

reported that they performed their own readiness testing for the 

2004 general election in addition to local testing. Five states and the 

District of Columbia reported that they had no requirements for 

local jurisdictions to perform readiness testing but conducted this 

testing themselves. 

State laws or regulations in effect for the 2004 election typically had 

specific requirements for when readiness testing should be 

conducted and who was responsible for testing, sometimes 

including public demonstrations of voting system operations. We 

found that most jurisdictions conducted readiness testing, also 

known as logic and accuracy testing, for both the 2000 and 2004 

general elections. Election officials in all of the local jurisdictions 

we visited following the 2004 election reported that they conducted 

readiness testing on their voting equipment using one or more 

approaches, such as diagnostic tests, integration tests, mock 

elections, and sets of test votes, or a combination of approaches. 

Security testing. Security testing was reportedly performed by 17 

states and the District of Columbia for the voting systems used in 

the 2004 general election, and 7 other states reported that they 

required local jurisdictions to conduct such testing. The remaining 

22 states said that they did not conduct or require system security 

testing. (Three states reported that security testing was not 

applicable for their voting systems.) Moreover, we estimated that at 

least 19 percent of local jurisdictions nationwide (excluding 

jurisdictions that reported that they used paper ballots) did not 

conduct security testing for the systems they used in the November 

2004 election. Although jurisdiction size was not a factor in whether 

security testing was performed, the percentage of jurisdictions 

performing security testing was notably higher when the 

predominant voting method was DRE (63 percent25) and lower for 

 

25The 95 percent confidence interval for DRE is plus14 or minus15 percentage

points.

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GAO-07-741T 
jurisdictions where the predominant method was precinct count 

optical scan (45 percent).26

Parallel testing. Parallel testing was not widely performed by local 

jurisdictions in the 2004 general election, although 7 states reported 

that they performed parallel testing of voting systems on Election 

Day, and another 6 states reported that this testing was required by 

local jurisdictions.27 We estimated that 2 percent of jurisdictions 

using electronic systems for at least some of their voting conducted 

parallel testing for the 2004 general election.28 Large and medium 

jurisdictions primarily performed this type of testing (7 percent and 

4 percent of jurisdictions, respectively). The percentage of small 

jurisdictions performing this type of testing was negligible (0 

percent). Election officials in 2 of the 28 jurisdictions that we visited 

told us that they performed parallel testing either at the state level 

or at the local jurisdiction. In both cases, the tests were conducted 

on voting equipment for which security concerns had been raised in

another state’s voting equipment test report. Local officials who told 

us that parallel testing was not performed on their voting systems 

attributed this to the absence of parallel testing requirements, a lack 

of sufficient voting equipment to perform these tests, or the view 

that parallel testing was unnecessary because of the stand-alone 

operation of their systems. 

Post-election audits. Less than one-half of the states (22) and the 

District of Columbia reported that they performed postelection 

voting system audits for the 2004 general election. Specifically, 4 

states and the District of Columbia reported that they conducted 

postelection audits of voting systems, 16 states required that audits 

of voting systems be conducted by local jurisdictions, and 2 states 

reported that audits of voting systems were performed at both the 

state and local levels. Moreover, state laws or regulations in effect 

 

26The 95 percent confidence interval for precinct count optical scan is plus or

minus 9 percentage points. The difference between the percentages of 

jurisdictions performing security testing on DRE and central count optical scan 

was not statistically significant. 27Both EAC’s Best Practices Tool Kit and the 2005 Voluntary Voting System 

Guidelines recommend development of parallel testing procedures for all types of 

automated voting equipment. 28We estimated that 91 percent of jurisdictions considered parallel testing to be

not applicable.

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for the 2004 general election varied in when and how these audits 

were to be conducted. 

We estimated that 43 percent of jurisdictions that used voting 

systems for at least some of their voting conducted postelection 

voting system audits. This practice was much more prevalent at 

large and medium jurisdictions (62 percent and 55 percent, 

respectively) than small jurisdictions (34 percent).29 We further 

estimated that these voting system audits were conducted more 

frequently in jurisdictions with central count optical scan voting 

methods (54 percent) than they were in jurisdictions with precinct 

count optical scan voting methods (35 percent). 

Jurisdictions Did Not Consistently Monitor Voting System Performance 

It is important that performance be measured during system 

operation. As we reported in 2001 and 2006, measuring how well 

voting systems perform during a given election allows local officials 

to better position themselves for ensuring that elections are 

conducted properly. Such measurement also provides the basis for 

knowing where performance needs, requirements, and expectations 

are not being met so that timely corrective action can be taken to 

ensure the security and reliability of the voting system. Jurisdictions 

without supporting measures for security and reliability may lack 

sufficient insight into their system operations. 

Overall, responses to our local jurisdiction survey show that large 

jurisdictions were most likely to record voting system performance 

and small jurisdictions were least likely. We estimated that 42 

percent of jurisdictions overall monitored the accuracy of voting 

equipment in the 2004 general election. Other measures recorded 

were spoiled ballots (estimated at 50 percent of jurisdictions), 

undervotes (50 percent of jurisdictions),30 and overvotes (49 percent 

of jurisdictions). During our visits to local jurisdictions, election 

officials in several jurisdictions told us that measuring overvotes 

 

29The 95 percent confidence interval for large jurisdictions is plus or minus 8 

percentage points, and for small jurisdictions it is plus or minus 7 percentage 

points. 30An estimated 25 percent of respondents selected “not applicable” to the question 

on spoiled/ruined ballots in their survey response. 

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GAO-07-741T 
was not a relevant performance indicator for jurisdictions using 

DREs because they do not permit overvoting, and that undervotes 

were not a meaningful metric because most voters focused on a 

limited range of issues or candidates and thus frequently chose not 

to vote on all contests. Figure 7 shows the percentages of small, 

medium and large jurisdictions that collected information on 

various measures of accuracy. 

Figure 7: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions that Collected Information on

Voting Accuracy for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size 

a

The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and large 

jurisdictions are statistically significant. b

The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions in these categories is 

plus or minus 6 percentage points.

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GAO-07-741T 
c

The difference between small jurisdictions and large jurisdictions is statistically 

significant. The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is plus or 

minus 6 percentage points.

We estimated that 15 percent of jurisdictions measured voting 

system failure rates and 11 percent measured system downtime.31 A 

higher percentage of large and medium jurisdictions collected these 

performance data than small jurisdictions. Collection of these data 

was also related to the predominant voting method used by a 

jurisdiction, with jurisdictions that predominantly used DREs more

likely to collect system data than those that used precinct count or 

central count optical scan voting methods (an estimated 45 percent 

of jurisdictions versus 23 percent or 10 percent, respectively). 

Figure 8 shows the percentages of small, medium, and large 

jurisdictions that collected information on voting equipment failures 

and downtime. Figure 9 shows the percentages by predominant 

voting method of all jurisdictions that collected data on equipment 

failures. 

 

31An estimated 66 percent of respondents selected the response “not applicable”

for the survey questions on measurement of pieces of equipment that failed and 

equipment downtime. 

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GAO-07-741T 
Figure 8: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions that Collected Information on

Voting Equipment Reliability for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size 

a

The differences between all categories of jurisdiction size are statistically

significant. 

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GAO-07-741T 
Figure 9: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions that Collected Information on

Voting Equipment Failures for the 2004 General Election, by Predominant Voting

Method 

Note: The differences between DRE and both central count and precinct count 

optical scan voting methods are statistically significant. a

The 95 percent confidence interval for DRE is plus or minus 13 percentage points. b

The 95 percent confidence interval for central count optical scan percentages is

plus 7 or minus 5 percentage points. c

The 95 percent confidence interval for precinct count optical scan percentages is

plus 8 or minus 7 percentage points. 

Further, an estimated 55 percent of all jurisdictions kept a written 

record of issues and problems that occurred on Election Day, which 

could be a potential source of performance data. Large jurisdictions 

were more likely to keep a written record of issues or problems that 

occurred on Election Day. Specifically, we estimated that 79 percent 

of large jurisdictions kept such records, compared with 59 percent 

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GAO-07-741T 
of medium jurisdictions and 52 percent of small jurisdictions.32 The 

responsibilities for monitoring or reporting voting system 

performance most often rested with local jurisdictions. We 

estimated that 83 percent of local jurisdictions had local officials 

responsible for performance monitoring or reporting, while states or 

other organizations (such as independent consultants or vendors) 

held such responsibilities in 11 percent and 13 percent of 

jurisdictions, respectively. 

Addressing Voting System Challenges Requires the Combined 

Efforts of All Levels of Government 

The challenges in ensuring that voting systems perform securely and 

reliably are not unlike those faced by any technology user—

application of well-defined standards for system capabilities and 

performance; effective integration of the people, processes, and 

technology throughout the voting system life cycle; rigorous and 

disciplined performance of security and testing activities; objective 

measurement to determine whether the systems are performing as 

intended; and analytical and economically justified bases for making

informed decisions about voting system investment options. These 

challenges are complicated by other conditions common to both the 

national elections community and other information technology 

environments: the distribution of responsibilities among various 

organizations, technology changes, funding opportunities and 

constraints, changing requirements and standards, and public 

attention. Although responsibility for voting system performance 

falls largely on local governmental units, state and federal 

governments have important roles to play as well. Therefore, all 

levels of government need to work together to address these 

challenges, under the leadership of the EAC. 

To assist the EAC in executing its leadership role, we previously 

made recommendations to the commission aimed at better planning

its ongoing and future activities relative to, for example, system 

standards and information sharing. While the EAC agreed with the 

 

32The differences between large jurisdictions and both medium and small 

jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

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recommendations, it told us that its ability to effectively execute its 

role is resource constrained. 

Establishing and Applying Current and Comprehensive Standards 

The extent to which states and local jurisdictions adopt and 

consistently apply up-to-date voting system standards directly 

affects the security and reliability of voting systems during 

elections. For the 2006 general election, a substantial proportion of 

states and jurisdictions had yet to adopt the most current federal 

voting system standards or related performance measures, meaning 

that the systems they employ may not perform as securely and 

reliably as desired. Beyond this, decisions by states and local 

jurisdictions to apply these latest standards for the 2008 election 

present additional challenges such as (1) whether the systems can 

be tested and certified in time for the election and (2) adopting 

standards that are now undergoing revision rather than continued 

use of earlier standards or later adoption of even newer standards. 

EAC plays an important role in ensuring the timely testing and 

certification of voting systems against the latest standards and in 

informing state and local decisions on whether to adopt these 

standards for the 2008 election. Accordingly, we have recommended 

that EAC define tasks and time frames for achieving the full 

operational capability of the national voting system certification 

program. These management elements would need to take into 

account estimating testing capacity and expected volume for the 

testing laboratory accreditation program, establishing protocols and 

time frames for reviewing certification packages, and setting norms 

for timely consideration and decision making regarding system 

certifications. Sharing this information with state and local election 

officials would help them to plan for system upgrades, testing, and 

state certification to meet their upcoming election cycles. 

States and local jurisdictions must also consider the timely adoption 

of standards in light of the additional work that is currently under 

way and planned to address known weaknesses in the national 

standards. For example, in addition to establishing minimum 

functional and performance requirements for voting systems, 

standards can also be used to govern integration of election 

systems, such as the accuracy, reliability, privacy, and security of 

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components and interfaces. Accordingly, we have recommended 

that the EAC collaborate with NIST and the Technical Guidelines 

Development Committee to define the specific tasks, measurable 

outcomes, milestones, and resource needs required to improve the 

voting system standards. Identifying the incremental improvements 

to standards for several future election cycles and coordinating 

these with states and local jurisdictions would help those officials 

plan for these cycles and prepare the public for expected changes in 

voting technologies, security and reliability features, and 

compensating controls. 

Ensuring that Necessary Security, Testing, and Operational Activities Are Effectively 

Performed 

Maximizing the performance of the voting systems that jurisdictions 

currently have and those they plan to use in the next general 

election means taking proactive steps between now and November 

2008 to ensure that these systems perform as intended. These steps 

include activities aimed at securing, testing, and preparing these 

systems for operation. Although the vast majority of jurisdictions 

performed security, testing, and operational activities in one form or 

another for the 2004 general election, the extent and nature of these 

activities varied among jurisdictions and depended on the 

availability of resources (financial and human capital) committed to 

them. The challenge facing all voting jurisdictions will be to ensure 

that these activities are fully and properly performed, particularly in 

light of the security and reliability concerns that have been reported 

with electronic voting systems. 

Security, testing, and operational activities are to a large degree 

responsive to—and limited by—formal state and local directives. 

For 2004, election officials for some states identified various state 

and local directives for managing the security and reliability of their 

voting systems, including security plans, security testing, system 

acceptance testing, and voting equipment auditing. When 

appropriately defined and implemented, such directives can 

promote the effective execution of security and testing practices 

across all phases of the election process. As voting technologies and 

requirements evolve, states and local jurisdictions face the challenge 

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of adapting and implementing the directives to meet the needs of 

their specific election environments. 

Managing the People, Processes, and Technology as Components of the Overall Process 

As previously stated, jurisdictions need to manage the triad of 

people, processes, and technology as interrelated and 

interdependent parts of the total voting process. Given the amount 

of time that remains between now and the November 2008 elections,

jurisdictions’ voting system performance is more likely to be 

influenced by improvements in poll worker system operation 

training, voter education about system use, and vote casting and 

counting procedures than by changes to the physical systems. The 

challenge for voting jurisdictions is thus to ensure that these people 

and process issues are dealt with effectively. 

In this regard, the election management decisions and practices of 

states and local jurisdictions can benefit from the experiences and 

results of those with comparable election environments. In 2004 and 

again in 2006, EAC compiled such information into guidance 

documents for widespread use by election officials. However, as the 

election environment and voting systems continue to evolve, 

additional lessons and topics will undoubtedly surface. Accordingly, 

we have recommended that the EAC establish a process and 

schedule for periodically compiling and disseminating 

recommended practices for security and reliability across the 

system life cycle and that the practices be informed by information

it collects on the problems and vulnerabilities of these systems. 

Incorporating the feedback obtained through actual voting system 

development, acquisition, preparation, and operations into practical 

guidance will allow the election community to be more robust and 

efficient. 

Gathering and Using Reliable System Performance Measures and Data and Making 

Informed Investment Decisions 

Reliable measures and objective data are needed for jurisdictions to 

know whether the technology they use is meeting the needs of the 

user communities (both the voters and the officials who administer 

the elections). While the vast majority of jurisdictions reported that 

they were satisfied with the performance of their respective 

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technologies in the November 2004 elections, this satisfaction was 

based mostly on the subjective impressions of election officials 

rather than on objective data that measured voting system 

performance. Although these impressions should not be discounted, 

informed decision making on voting system operations and 

technology investment requires more objective data. The immediate 

challenge for jurisdictions is to define measures and begin collecting 

data so that they can definitely know how their systems are 

performing. 

States and local jurisdictions can benefit from sharing performance 

data on voting systems, including information on problems and 

vulnerabilities. However, the diffused and decentralized nature of 

our election system impedes timely and accurate collection and 

dissemination of this type of information for particular voting 

system models. Accordingly, we have recommended that the EAC 

develop a process and associated time frames for sharing 

information on voting system problems and vulnerabilities across 

the election community. The national voting system certification 

process established in January 2007 provides a mechanism for 

election officials to report problems and vulnerabilities with their 

systems to the EAC. Not yet defined are the mechanisms to collect 

and disseminate information on problems and vulnerabilities that

are identified by voting system vendors and independent groups 

outside of the national certification process. 

In addition, foreseeable changes in technology require jurisdictions 

to determine whether a particular technology will provide benefits 

that are commensurate with life cycle costs (acquisition as well as 

operation and maintenance) and to assess whether these collective 

costs are affordable and sustainable. Thus, the long-term challenge 

for jurisdictions is to view and treat voting systems as capital 

investments and to manage them as such, including basing decisions 

on technology investments on clearly defined requirements and 

reliable analyses of quantitative and qualitative return on 

investment. 

In closing, I would like to say again that electronic voting systems 

are an undeniably critical link in the overall election chain. While 

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this link alone cannot make an election, it can break one. The 

problems that some jurisdictions have experienced and the serious 

concerns that have surfaced highlight the potential for continuing 

difficulties in upcoming national elections if these challenges are not 

effectively addressed. The EAC plays a vital role related to ensuring 

that election officials and voters are educated and well informed 

about the proper implementation and use of electronic voting 

systems and ensuring that jurisdictions take the appropriate steps—

related to people, process, and technology—that are needed 

regarding security, testing, and operations. More strategically, the 

EAC needs to move swiftly to strengthen the voting system 

standards and the testing associated with enforcing them. However, 

the EAC alone cannot ensure that electronic voting system 

challenges are effectively addressed. State and local governments 

must also do their parts. Moreover, critical to the commission’s 

ability to do its part will be the adequacy of resources at its disposal

and the degree of cooperation it receives from entities at all levels of 

government. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to 

answer any questions that you or other Members of the 

Subcommittee may have at this time. 

Contact and Acknowledgments 

For further information, please contact Randolph C. Hite at (202) 

512-3439 or by e-mail at hiter@gao.gov. Other key contributors to 

this testimony were Nancy Glover, Paula Moore, Sushmita Srikanth

and Kim Zelonis. 

(310645) 

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Abbreviations 

COTS commercial off-the-shelf 

DRE direct recording electronic 

EAC Election Assistance Commission 

FEC Federal Election Commission 

GSA General Services Administration 

HAVA Help America Vote Act of 2002 

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

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