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34-854 2007

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

INTELLIGENCE AND BORDER SECURITY:

DELIVERING OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

INFORMATION SHARING, AND 

TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 28, 2006

Serial No. 109-89

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND 

TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut, Chairman 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

PETER T. KING, NEW YORK (Ex Officio) 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENT

The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress For the State 

of Connecticut, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 

Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment .......................................................... 1

The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress For the State 

of California and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, 

Informaton Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment ...................................... 2

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress For the 

State of Mississippi, (ex officio) ........................................................................... 4

The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress For the State 

of Indiana .............................................................................................................. 12

The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress For the State 

of Nevada .............................................................................................................. 16

The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress For the State 

of California .......................................................................................................... 20

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress For the State 

of New York .......................................................................................................... 38

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Mr. Charles E. Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

PANEL II 

Mr. L. Thomas Bortmes, Director, Office of Intelligence, Customs and Border 

Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 31

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 33

Ms. Cynthia O’Connell, Acting Director, Office of Intelligence, Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 27

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 29

Mr. James Sloan, Assistant Commandant for Intelligence, U.S. Coast Guard, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 22

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 23

PANEL III 

Mr. Michael W. Cutler, Fellow Center for Immigration Studies: 

Oral Staement ...................................................................................................... 44

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 46

Mr. Michael O’Hanlon, Senior in Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 48

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 49
Page

IV

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Questions from Representative Rob Simmons for Assistant Secretary Charles 

Allen ...................................................................................................................... 60
(1)

DHS INTELLIGENCE AND BORDER SECURITY: 

DELIVERING OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Wednesday, June 28, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION . 

SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Rob Simmons [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Simmons, Souder, Gibbons, Dent, 

Lofgren, Harman, Lowey and Thompson (ex officio). 

Mr. SIMMONS. A quorum being present, the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing 

and Terrorism Risk Assessment will come to order. 

Today the subcommittee meets to hear testimony on the Department of Homeland Security’s border security intelligence operations. One of the Department’s primary jobs is to secure the homeland against the illegal entry of people, goods and illicit materials. 

The 9/11 Commission wrote in their comprehensive study, and I 

quote, targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their money. The United States should combine 

terrorist travel intelligence, operations and law enforcement in a 

strategy to intercept terrorists, fine terrorist travel facilitators and 

constrain terrorist mobility. 

DHS works to do this through the hard work of people, through 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement and the United States Coast Guard, among others in 

the intelligence and law enforcement communities. But as we all 

know, thousands of people illegally stream across our international 

borders. 

The 9/11 Commission estimated that annually approximately 

500,000 people enter this country illegally, without inspection, and 

overstay their legal welcome. Many come for opportunities that 

America provides, and we understand that, but others have a more 

sinister intent. In order to better protect our borders, we need to 

know who is attempting to cross, and what are they bringing into 

this country, and why. 

Our border immigration and Coast Guard officials protect more 

than 5,000 miles of the border with Canada, 1,900 miles of border 

with Mexico, and approximately 12,400 miles of shoreline east and 

west. To protect this vast international border, intelligence-driven 
2

operations will be the key to targeting and interdicting these 

threats before their arrival. 

On a typical day Federal officials will apprehend over 3,000 people trying to cross between ports of entry, and on a typical day will 

intercept one person for terrorism or national security-related reasons. These apprehensions net fraudulent documents and seemingly innocuous pocket litter, both of which can have tremendous 

intelligence value. Therefore, DES frontline operators must have 

the tools, the training, capability and processes in place to weave 

the information from these everyday encounters into a comprehensive intelligence picture. 

In addition to those who try to cross our borders illegally, on a 

typical day approximately 1,200,000 people and passengers arrive 

at our ports of entry, and approximately 80,000 shipments of goods 

arrive for approved entry. Nothing wrong with this, we want to encourage this. And we must make sure that this lawful travel and 

lawful commercial activity proceeds efficiently, without undue 

delay, while focusing again on those who deserve additional scrutiny. It is a daunting but necessary task. 

Today we will hear from Charlie Allen, the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department of Homeland Security, who will give an 

overall perspective of the Department’s strategic intelligence efforts 

and his support to DHS operational components. Again, welcome, 

Mr. Allen. This task is a huge task and a new task for United 

States as Americans. 

Next we will hear from the Coast Guard, the Customs and Border Patrol and the ICE on how they incorporate intelligence into 

their operations, and on how the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

is supporting their efforts. 

And then finally, our third panel will consistent of Mr. Michael 

W. Cutler from the Center for Immigration Studies, and Mr. Michael O’Hanlon from the Brookings Institute, who will provide the 

subcommittee with their perspective on how intelligence can best 

be used to secure and control America’s borders. 

Mr. SIMMONS. The Chair is now happy to recognize the Ranking 

Member of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from California, Ms. 

Lofgren for her opening statement. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

While I am pleased that we are finally turning our attention 

today to the question of intelligence and border security, I must 

say, Mr. Chairman, this hearing and other hearings the Republican 

leadership has scheduled in the next few months are a day late and 

dollar short—correction, we are 6 years late and millions of dollars 

short. 

President Bush took office in 2001, and this Congress has been 

controlled by Republicans since 1995. The Senate, with one exception, has had a majority of Republicans since 1995. The Federal 

Government, charged with making and enforcing the laws of this 

Nation, have been under the sole control of Republicans for the last 

6 years. 

With complete control of legislation and enforcement of the law 

for 6 years, you would think that a party that now calls so vigorously for border security and enforcement of immigration law could 

have solved the problem of illegal immigration by now, but, Mr. 
3

Chairman, the Republican Party seems to be all talk on this subject. 

Here is just a partial list of the failures presided over by the Republican majority on illegal immigration. 

Since 1996, when the Senate and the House were taken over by 

the Republican Party, 5.3 million undocumented immigrants came 

to the United States. Since 2003, when President Bush came to 

power, over 2 million undocumented immigrants have entered the 

United States. 

In 2004, Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform Act, or the 9/

11 Act, which mandated an additional 2,000 Border Patrol agents 

being hired over each of the next 5 years. But the President’s subsequent budgets and Congress have failed to include adequate resources to implement the act. Indeed, the President’s fiscal year 

2006 budget called for only 210 additional Border Patrol agents. In 

fiscal year 2006, the Congress, with both House and Senate controlled by Republicans, eventually funded only 1,000 additional 

agents. 

The 9/11 Act also mandated an additional 800 immigration enforcement agents over each of the next 5 years, and yet for fiscal 

year 2006, the Congress funded only 350 additional agents. The act 

also mandated an additional 8,000 detention beds, but for fiscal 

year 2006, the Congress funded only 1,800 additional detention 

beds. 

President Bush and the House Republicans continue to 

underfund the Border Patrol. The President’s fiscal year 2007 

budget does not fully fund the authorized levels for the Border Patrol. 

During the Bush administration, Catch and Release has been 

rampant, a program under which 12,000 undocumented immigrants each month are apprehended from countries other than 

Mexico and are released and allowed to live in the United States 

while awaiting a deportation hearing, yet the Federal Government, 

which is completely controlled by Republicans, 70 percent of the 

OTMs are released into the interior with notices to appear at a 

later date and are never heard from again. 

According to the Washington Post, between 1999 and 2003, worksite enforcement operations were scaled back 95 percent by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The number of employers 

prosecuted for unlawfully employing immigrants dropped from 182 

in 1999 to only 4 in 2003. And fines collected declined from $3.6 

million to 212,000. In 1999, the United States initiated fines 

against 417 companies; in 2004, it issued fine notices to only three. 

Next to nothing has been done to secure our northern border at 

a time when 17 suspected terrorists were arrested in Toronto, and 

there are reportedly 50 terrorist groups in Canada. The millennium 

bomber was arrested as he attempted to cross the northern border 

with explosives, and the Congressional Research Service says that 

Canada is, quote, ‘‘a favored destination for terrorist groups as a 

safe haven, transit point and place to raise funds.’’

While the Republican leadership in Congress focuses on the 

southern border, with 10,000 Border Patrol agents stationed along 

a 2,000-mile border with Mexico, only one-tenth of that amount is 

on the Canadian border, a border that is 2.5 times as long as the 
4

Mexican border. Recent news stories state that people drive, walk, 

sail, ski and sled across the northern border all the time. 

On December 16, 2005, all 219 House Republicans voting that 

day opposed a proposal, the Democratic motion to approve border 

security and immigration enforcement by fulfilling the 9/11 Commission’s border security recommendations. The proposal would 

have hired more border guards; ended the Catch and Release practice by authorizing 100,000 additional detention beds; and incorporated state-of-the art technology, including cameras, sensors, 

radar satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles in order to ensure 

100 percent border coverage. 

In 2005, all but one Republican voted against a comprehensive 

Homeland Security proposal that would commit 41 billion to securing the Nation from terrorists, 6.9 million more than the President’s budget. In 2005, all but two Republicans voted against an 

effort to add $284 million to an emergency spending bill for securing the Nation’s borders. 

Mr. Chairman, there has been a lot of talk about immigration 

these days, tough talk, but the pattern is talk and not action. And 

I say this because I have been made aware that there is a schedule—and this hearing, I think, is on that schedule, and I was on 

a hearing last week that was part of this schedule—to raise the 

issue of immigration, and I think the Republican leadership has 

made it a political issue. There was the hearing in the House Administration Committee last week; this hearing today; on July 5th, 

the hearing from the House International Relations subcommittee 

in San Diego, the Senate Majority is on it; Julyh, another hearing in Laredo, Texas; mid-July a hearing, House 

Education and Workforce; August 14th, Government Reform and 

the like. 

So I am quite skeptical that this hearing on border intelligence 

is more than talk. It seems to me this is just another long list of 

the hearings held and planned by the Republican-led Congress that 

does not lead to solutions to a problem that the American public 

cares about, and I thank the gentleman for recognizing me. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes. And I think some of the items that you have 

listed in your opening statement are just the reason why we are 

having this hearing today, so that we can hear from our Chief Intelligence Officer how he is working to incorporate the various components of the Department of Homeland Security intelligence to 

better address this important issue. And I think we understand it 

is an important issue, and we look forward to their testimony, and 

hopefully their statement of progress in these difficult issues. 

And now the Chair would like to recognize the distinguished 

Ranking Member of the full committee Mr. Thompson of Mississippi for any statement he would like to make. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this 

hearing. 

Always nice to see my friend Charlie Allen. First day of work he 

came by, and it has been a good relationship so far. I appreciate 

you, Mr. Allen. 

But for the sake of this hearing today, Mr. Chairman, we really 

should have been talking about border intelligence 5 years ago 
5

after 9/11. If we had conducted oversight and border intelligence 

during that time, we could focus legislation more adequately on 

what our problems are now. More importantly, it would have given 

us some meaningful starting point when taking up border security 

legislation. 

Essentially we have a bill pending now that is not informed by 

what is known at the border. This Republican Congress passes bill 

after bill—and I have five different bills that we have passed on 

border security, Mr. Chairman—and nothing has happened with 

them. If we are going to do top-notch border intelligence, it is essential that we develop a risk-based approach to border security. 

The United States has 216 airports, 143 seaports, and 115 land 

border crossings that are official ports of entry. Screening all the 

people and goods coming through these busy ports is already an 

enormous resource challenge for the men and women of the Department of Homeland Security. I have serious concerns that they 

lack the resources necessary to obtain true situational awareness 

at these locations, not to mention among the many hundreds of 

miles of unguarded rural and remote border locations. 

As we know, the threat to our northern border was thrown into 

sharp relief with the arrest of an apparent terrorist sailor in Toronto. This administration has failed to adequately secure our 

northern border by the fact that the northern border is more than 

twice the length of the southern border, with only one-tenth of the 

agents. 

State, local and tribal law enforcement is uniquely situated to 

help out with border intelligence where resources are stretched 

thin. What I am hearing from police and sheriffs’ offices, however, 

worries me. When it comes to border security, the Department 

should have an all-hands-on-deck attitude. Instead, I hear CBP 

holds back information from local law enforcement because they 

view locals as competitors. Some local officers tell me that if they 

arrest someone coming over the border illegally, CBP headquarters 

sees it as a black eye for them. 

Making matters worse, officers in northern border communities 

have told me that they often receive more specific and actionable 

information from their Canadian colleagues than they do from the 

Department. Add to this the fact that border security is a Federal 

responsibility, Mr. Chairman, and yet this administration has 

passed the buck to State and local authorities in some areas, relying on them to do its job, without providing adequate support. 

Whether it is a turf issue, a resource issue or something else, 

this is unacceptable. CBP, ICE and the Coast Guard need to adopt 

common and consistent practices to share information with all 

their border security partners. While I had high hopes for the 

Homeland Security information network as a key way to communicate with State and locals, moreover, I am troubled about a Department report yesterday that found that most officers either don’t 

trust it or don’t think it contains much useful information. 

This hearing, therefore, is both important and timely, Mr. Chairman. This administration has dropped the ball on border security 

by underfunding critical programs for recruiting Border Patrol 

agents, leaving large planks of our border vulnerable in not procuring sufficient detention beds. Constructive and thoughtful 
6

Democratic amendments that seek to fill these critical gaps have 

been rejected time and again, and now we face a possible intelligence breakdown on our borders. How we proceed from here will 

have a big impact both on how we go about securing our border, 

and ensuring that our immigration laws are fully enforced. 

I welcome all the witnesses and look forward to your thoughts 

on these critical issues. I yield back. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the Ranking Member for his comments, 

and I agree with him completely. I think this hearing is important, 

and I think it is timely. Other Members who are present know that 

they can submit opening statements for the record. 

Mr. SIMMONS. We will move now to the first panel. The Chairman calls the first panel, which is assembled; recognizes Mr.Allen 

as our Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department—of the Office 

of Intelligence and Analysis, who reports directly to Secretary 

Chertoff. In this role, he is responsible for coordinating with the Intelligence Community and providing guidance on Homeland Security intelligence issues. 

Mr. Allen has a long and distinguished career in the U.S. Intelligence Community, beginning in 1958, when he joined the Central 

Intelligence Agency. He has subsequently held assignments of increasing responsibility within that organization, within the Office 

of Secretary of Defense, and he has served his country in a variety 

of other capacities. 

Mr. Allen, welcome. It is good to see you again. We look forward 

to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. ALLEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, CHIEF INTELLIGENCE 

OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lofgren 

and members of the committee. I am very grateful for the invitation to speak to you today. I am also gratified to appear alongside 

my colleagues from the United States Coast Guard; Customs and 

Border Protection; and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. As 

members of the Homeland Security Intelligence Council, which I 

chair, they have been invaluable partners in realizing the Secretary’s vision of an integrated Department of Homeland Security 

intelligence enterprise. 

I have a very brief statement, and I would request that my full 

statement be submitted for the record. 

Providing intelligence support to border security is a subject that 

I have devoted considerable time and energy during my relatively 

short time as Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department. One of 

my first actions was to launch an intelligence campaign 

plan for border security. We began this process last October by 

holding a border security intelligence conference that enabled us to 

gain inputs from a wide range of Department of Homeland Security 

and Intelligence Community partners. 

Since then we have worked on two tracks. On one track, we have 

taken concrete measures to deliver discrete, actionable intelligence 

to the men and women securing our borders. And although the 

need to protect sensitive sources and methods precludes my discussing these measures in detail today, I can tell you that members 
7

of my office have drawn on the extensive experience in the Intelligence Community to help the Department get full benefit from 

national collection assets, and that is a process that was not evident before I came. We have changed that substantially. 

On the other track, we have been developing a phased framework for sustainable intelligence support to border security. Our 

overall approach is to bring national intelligence to bear on the border, while at the same time fusing intelligence from border and immigration activities into an integrated threat picture, at first within individual sectors, but eventually across the length of the borders. The approach is consistent with ongoing operational efforts to 

push the border outward and to build a layered defense extending 

into the U.S. Interior. 

As befits an office with department-wide responsibilities, my office has focused its own staff resources on strategic efforts, including the development of a department-wide intelligence, surveillance 

and reconnaissance architecture; establishing a border security 

analysis branch; and working with interagency partners to coordinate and streamline Federal intelligence efforts on the border. 

Some of our efforts have had an indirect but strong effect on the 

delivery of operational intelligence in support of border security. 

Our plan for supporting State and local fusion centers envisions deploying DHS personnel, including intelligence officers, in a way 

that is most responsive to each center’s particular need, including 

augmenting border security intelligence capabilities, if required. 

Our work on enhancing the Homeland Security Information Network, which will invigorate an important channel for sending intelligence to and receiving information from the State and local authorities. 

Finally, my office’s development of an information architecture 

for the Department’s intelligence enterprise will promote faster information sharing and greater interoperability, improving the delivery of operational intelligence in support of border security. 

In summary, my office has been an active and effective advocate 

of intelligence support to border security, deploying our department-wide perspective and authorities and the particular skills of 

our officers on behalf of the entire DHS intelligence enterprise. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you for that testimony. 

[The statement of Mr. Allen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. ALLEN

Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, Members of the Subcommittee, 

Thank you for inviting me to speak with you about my role in providing intelligence support to border security. The subject of today’s hearing is one to which 

I have devoted considerable time and energy during my tenure as Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department. I am gratified to appear alongside my esteemed colleagues from the Coast 

Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. As members of the Homeland Security Intelligence Council, which I chair, 

they have been invaluable partners in realizing the Secretary’s vision of an integrated DHS intelligence enterprise. 

When I arrived last September, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis already 

was leading a working group on intelligence initiatives in support of the Secretary’s 

Secure Borders Initiative, or SBI. One of my first acts was to launch an Intelligence 

Campaign Plan for Border Security, or ICP, which Deputy Secretary Jackson introduced to General Michael Hayden, then the Deputy Director for National Intel-
8

ligence, on Sept. 27, 2005. We kicked off our planning efforts by holding a DHS Border Security Intelligence Conference on 24-25 October, 2005. This conference, held 

in a secure facility, enabled us to gather inputs from a wide range of DHS and Intelligence Community partners. It proved highly valuable to our subsequent planning. 

Among the needed improvements we identified as a result of the conference were 

greater focus on strategic analysis; coordination and integration of analytic efforts 

at both the tactical and strategic levels; inclusion of DHS agent and inspector insight in collection and exploitation activities; better-defined areas of responsibility 

for information sharing; and dissemination of-and identified repositories for-relevant 

information. 

Since then, we have worked on two tracks. On one track, we have taken concrete 

measures to deliver discrete, actionable intelligence to the men and women securing 

our borders. I would be pleased to describe some of these measures in a closed hearing, but the need to protect sensitive sources and methods precludes my discussing 

them in detail in this setting. What I can tell you is that my officers have drawn 

on their extensive experience in the Intelligence Community to help ensure that 

DHS gets full benefit from national collection assets. 

On the other track, we have been developing a phased framework for sustainable 

intelligence support to border security. Our overall approach is to bring national intelligence resources to bear on the border while at the same time fusing intelligence 

from DHS border and immigration activities into an integrated threat picture-at 

first within individual sectors, but eventually across the length of the border. This 

approach is consistent with ongoing operational efforts to push the border outward 

and build a layered defense extending into the US interior. In addition we are maintaining focus on all of our borders to include the Northern Border and maritime domain. 

In the first phase of the ICP, covering fiscal years 2006 and 2007, we will develop 

and implement a comprehensive strategy for collection and analysis of border security intelligence. During this phase, we will apply our intelligence resources and 

analytic focus in areas of immediate need. Our research will be comprehensive covering a broad range of topics associated with cross border violence with subcategories of human, drug, weapons, contraband smuggling and trafficking, 

transnational gangs, documentation fraud, and the violence these topics spawn on 

the border. The research and assessments we produce will include all agencies with 

responsibilities in these areas of interest. We will start with the southwest border, 

progressing to all borders based on threat assessments. We will review lessons 

learned from the first phase and make any programmatic investments and structural changes that flow from these findings. Finally, we will be on a sustainable 

footing, allowing us to push the borders outward while supporting interior enforcement. 

I should point out that even though our planning efforts pre-date the President’s 

decision to deploy the National Guard to the border, we are taking this deployment 

into account. We plan to collaborate with the National Guard to ensure its intelligence capabilities are integrated with the overall intelligence enterprise at the border, filling in shortfalls and laying the foundation for the post-deployment period. 

As befits an office with Department-wide responsibilities, my office has focused its 

own staff resources on strategic efforts. In the area of collection and requirements, 

we are leading the development of a Department-wide intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) architecture that will serve as the central nervous system of 

DHS intelligence. In the area of analysis and production, we have created a border 

security branch that is focusing research and analysis on a number of topics relevant to the border, including alien smuggling, counter-narcotics, money laundering, 

transnational criminal gangs, and identity theft and benefit fraud using travel documents. Finally, we are deeply deeply engaged in efforts to coordinate and streamline 

interagency intelligence efforts on the border, notably in El Paso, where three valuable intelligence centers, run by elements of three different Cabinet agencies, are 

exploring new ways to work together on their common mission of securing the border. 

I wish to highlight several efforts of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis that 

will have an indirect, but powerful, effect on the delivery of operational intelligence 

in support of border security. First, my office has led the Department’s development 

of a plan to support state and local fusion centers across the country. Our plan envisions deploying DHS personnel, including intelligence officers, in a way that is most 

responsive to each center’s particular need. If the fusion centers in states along the 

border tell us they want particular support in partnering with the federal government on border security, we stand ready to deliver. Second, we have taken on the 

responsibility for enhancing the Homeland Security Information Network, an important channel for sending intelligence to, and receiving information from, state and 
9

local authorities. Third, we are developing an information architecture for the DHS 

intelligence enterprise in order to promote faster information sharing and greater 

interoperability-characteristics that undoubtedly will improve the delivery of operational intelligence in support of border security. 

In conclusion, I believe we have been an active and effective advocate of intelligence support to border security, deploying our Department-wide perspective and 

authorities and the particular skills of our officers on behalf of the entire DHS intelligence enterprise. I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. SIMMONS. And in my opening statement I made reference to 

the fact that we have a 5,000-mile border with Canada, an 

undefended or demilitarized border with Canada; 1,900 miles of 

border with Mexico, again, a demilitarized or undefended, in some 

respects, border with Mexico; 12,400 miles of shoreline. This geography presents a vast challenge. 

I think back to my experience, my service in Asia, working on 

the Great Wall of China, thinking about the logistics and expense 

of creating such a great wall and then reflecting on the fact for all 

that effort, it actually did not work; it did not keep, if you will, the 

barbarian hordes from penetrating that country. 

So my point of view has always been very simply stated. We need 

to be intelligent about how we control our border. We need to focus 

and target our intelligence assets so we are at the right place at 

the right time, doing the right things against the right people. 

Some of my colleagues, as you have heard from their opening 

statements, give the impression that nothing has been done. Of 

course, in the Intelligence Community it is often best not to be on 

the front pages of the New York Times; I think we understand 

that. But from your perspective, how have we been focusing our intelligence assets to this problem, and what successes do you feel 

that we have had over the last several years—or at least since you 

have been in office, which is a relatively short time? 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. That is an excellent question because this is a very difficult, multifaceted, multidimensional threat, 

and trying to secure all those lengthy borders is a very large challenge. But I think we have to do it in a couple of ways. And my 

colleagues, who will speak later, will speak on specific operational 

successes and programs on which they are engaged. 

What I see has been lacking is a good intelligence analytic baseline to understand the threat thoroughly, to look at the border holistically. We cannot break it into simply the legal movement of 

goods and people, narcotics, human smuggling, trafficking, contraband, potential of WMD being smuggled across the border, terrorism, and illegal immigration. We have to look at a secure border 

process. 

Under the Homeland Security Act, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security is charged with developing secure borders, and I think we 

have to look at it in a way that we have not looked before. One 

of the things that I have done since we have arrived is establish 

a border security branch that is going to be quite substantial in 

order to understand the threat, the drug smuggling, the alien 

smuggling, and the financial transactions, including money laundering. So we are going to have to take a very strategic look at this 

problem that we have not done previously. 

The other issues that we have to bring to bear is all of the capabilities of the national Intelligence Community on to this problem. 

And there is a lot that can be done through the various intelligence 
10

collection capabilities. I don’t have the power to collect intelligence, 

as the Chief Intelligence Officer, although the DHS operating components can collect information as part of their operational and law 

enforcement duties. But I do have the right to develop the collection requirements and priorities, which we are doing, and for the 

first time we have a set of priorities which we would be happy to 

talk about in a closed session. 

We also are developing new capabilities within the GEOINT. 

General Clapper, who just left NGA; there are things we have done 

that are totally unprecedented within the area of other intelligence 

collection capabilities. As I said in my opening comments, we are 

developing an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance plan to 

deal with border security, and working very closely with General 

Maples over in the Department of Defense, and General Cartwright 

at the Strategic Air Command. All of these things we have done 

in the last 3 or 4 months. And as I said, when I came in, we did 

not have an intelligence campaign plan against the border. The 

Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security directed me 

to do so. And I think we are in the opening stages of developing 

that overall strategic picture and landscape. My colleagues will talk 

to you in specific terms of successful operations. 

I agree with you that we should have done more earlier, but we 

are not at this vigorously. I have a weekly stand-up, and believe 

me, those are rough stand-ups. Of all of my people—

Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. Allen, before my time runs out, in all of these 

activities are you preserving and protecting civil liberties and 

rights of people across our borders? 

Mr. ALLEN. Absolutely. This is something of which we are very 

concerned. Civil liberties and civil rights, privacies are all taken 

carefully into account. Everything we are doing were done under 

the careful scrutiny of my legal staff as well as—and my colleagues 

can talk about their lawful activities. But everything we do is absolutely lawful. And we certainly are looking at special interest aliens 

from certain countries that could have not only just alien smuggling, but perhaps terrorism connections. 

Mr. SIMMONS. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And it is good to see you, Mr. Allen. Certainly your reputation 

in the Intelligence Community is a sterling one, and I am glad that 

you are in the job that you have. However, as you have only been 

there a short period of time, as we all know, so would it be accurate to say that you have—obviously no plan is ever completely 

done. Even when the plan is done, it must be continuously updated, but would it be accurate to say that you have completed the 

comprehensive DHS border intelligence plan, including CBP, ICE 

and the Coast Guard, or is that in progress still? 

Mr. ALLEN. Congresswoman, that is still in progress. We are 

still—in my view, we are only in midstream in getting that overall 

plan together. I have seen a lot of vigor on the part of the individual operating components, but we have to work this as an integrated process. As you know, there are a number of initiatives. 

There is a Southwest Counternarcotics Border Strategy in which 

we are participating. It is a very layered approach. 
11

One of the things we are looking at is the information flows and 

trying to ensure that as we acquire information, we provide the information to the border—to the Customs and Border Protection. 

And we obviously have to improve those connectivities and the flow 

of information. We have a good deal to do, but I have some good 

ideas on how to get this done. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I am sure that you do. Can you tell us, if you 

know, why this wasn’t done before you got here? 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, I think the real issue is bringing the Department together, bringing all these various agencies and operating 

components together, many of which have somewhat overlapping 

roles, but never ensuring there is a close collaboration, integration. 

I meet every week with the gentlemen and ladies who will be 

speaking later from the operating components, and we have 2 

hours of just talking about how we can integrate our efforts toward 

the borders and towards training together, developing our analytic 

expertise together. And these are very tough sessions, but we are 

getting things done. 

Ms. LOFGREN. As you know, 17 suspected terrorists were recently 

arrested in Toronto, and there are reported—I don’t know if it is 

accurate—at least 50 terrorist groups in Canada. And we know 

that the only reported terrorist caught at the border was the millennium bomber arrested at the northern border as he was—with 

explosives, and a Congressional Research Service says that Canada 

is the favored destination for terrorist groups as a safe haven, transit point and place to raise funds. 

Now, we have gone over that there are 10,000 Border Patrol 

agents stationed along the 2,000-mile border with Mexico, and we 

still have problems with illegal immigration with that level of patrol, but only one-tenth of that amount is on the Canadian border. 

That border is 2.5 times as long as the Mexican border. And I know 

it would be incorrect to assume that those 1,000 agents are really 

on the job because it is a post position. If you look at 24 hours a 

day, at any given time you have got between 200 and 300 people 

on that whole border. And we have had reports that people drive, 

walk, sail, ski, sled, crawl—and probably a few other things—

across the border with impunity. 

Does the comprehensive border plan that you are putting together address that gaping hole in border and national security? 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes. Our intelligence campaign plan would also include our northern border. We are very much concerned about our 

northern border. I believe that Ambassador Negroponte spoke indirectly to it in his hearing in front of the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence when he did his worldwide threat. I just met with 

Ambassador Negroponte and Stockwell Day, the Minister of Public 

Safety up in Canada. We certainly have some common interests. 

We are very impressed with what the Canadians have done in 

dealing with extremism. But this is an issue, and any nexus with 

the United States is of great concern to us. We obviously need to 

ensure that we work at this much harder. 

I just met with the head of the Border Patrol of Canada. We 

and—the head of the Border Patrol is a woman. We have agreed 

that we will work harder to look at issues where we should do common cause to better secure our border. 
12

The northern border is very different from the southern border, 

and we need new tools, techniques and methods to help make the 

border more secure. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Just before my time is up, do you think 200 Border Patrol agents on a 5,000-mile-long border is sufficient? 

Mr. ALLEN. I think we need substantial resources on all our land 

borders. And I am very impressed with what our U.S. Coast 

Guards have done with our maritime borders. We obviously have 

to spend a great deal of time and attention with our northern border as well as our southern border. 

I have spent time with our southern borders. I have just made 

a very good trip to Mexico City where we had some very strong discussions on how to work harder on particularly special-interest 

aliens, people who might be involved in terrorism, and we are getting good cooperation in the south. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up. 

Mr. SIMMONS. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana 

Mr. Souder. 

Mr. SOUDER. First I would like to make a couple of brief comments on the northern border. Clearly, coming from the Midwest, 

I am concerned about the northern border, but it is a little bit different than the southern border. One thing is we work with the Canadians on harmonization of immigrationwise. I have met teams 

along the border. They are taking down groups in Canada, the millennium bomber himself, and working with the RCMP. 

We have had open testimony in this committee from Mr. Garcia 

about the 10- to 12,000 that it usually takes to smuggle a Hispanic 

across the southern border, and that there are areas along the 

southern border where it is 30—to 35,000 to smuggle a Middle 

Easterner. But since we have no real knowledge of what is coming 

into Mexico, east, west or from the south, and they don’t have functional control of their country, and we don’t have functional control 

of our south border, that is partly why we focus so much on the 

south border. We do need attention in the north border, in fact, because so many Middle Eastern natives in Canada and citizens of 

the U.S. live in Detroit and Buffalo, Toronto and Montreal. That 

is clearly a pressure zone, but it is not exactly the same as the 

south border. 

I had a couple of questions. One is kind of simplistic, but it has 

been an increasing frustration of mine. It seems like often our 

agencies are spending more time meeting with each other to try to 

coordinate their intelligence than trying to figure out who the bad 

guys are. 

I have a very simple question: Given that we will probably never 

eliminate all stovepiping, and given the fact that so many of the 

different intelligence subgroups have somewhat different goals, in 

addition to terrorism they have a multiplicity of goals and focusing 

on different things, what I am wondering is if you are a border 

agent at any of the official border crossings, and you have an ID 

and the name comes up, is there a pop-up, just a signal? If the Department of Defense doesn’t want to share certain intelligence, if 

the CIA doesn’t want to share certain intelligence, if different parts 

of DHS have different intelligence in all this that pops up and says 

this is a person of interest, do we have enough harmonization of 
13

our intelligence agencies that even if they don’t want to share the 

information, that if a name hits the border system, a pop-up occurs? 

Mr. ALLEN. I think—and I will let Customs and Border Protection, Captain Bortmes, speak to that later, but I, having visited the 

Border Patrol and spent time with it in two sectors and traveled 

with Congressman Reyes to El Paso, I am convinced that databases, as names are checked, those are done very quickly and very 

efficiently. And believe me, having come from the Central Intelligence Agency, there is no information if it involves the security 

of the United States that can be withheld by CIA or anyone else 

in getting that information. If it needs to be sanitized and declassified, that can be done if it deals with personalities of interest to 

the Border Patrol. 

Mr. SOUDER. So you are saying that you are confident that—because I ran into a case in my area that we have. It was a new category of people we are watching as opposed to our watch list; in 

other words, they haven’t done anything wrong, they are not even 

a suspect, but they are doing certain behaviors. You are confident 

that each branch of the government, that if they have someone that 

they have some interest in, they may not have an arrest warrant 

out, they may just be trying to trap them, that all those names are 

in a system, in a computer system, that if that person crosses a 

border entry, that some warning will come up to say hold this person, here is the agency you contact. 

Mr. ALLEN. I am not confident that every database that has a potential person of interest would be immediately available to the 

Border Patrol. But the Border Patrol does have an ability to check 

to see if there is a potential record that would indicate that individual has engaged in something nefarious or has connections with 

terrorism. 

I think they do a good job. There are people turned away every 

day at our borders. I am sure Mr. Bortmes can speak more directly 

about this, but I do believe that this is improving. Database management is a very hard problem for the U.S. Government, and particularly for the U.S. Intelligence Community. 

Mr. SOUDER. Because this isn’t a question of whether the Border 

Patrol is doing their job, or CBP, this is a question about is the information getting to them with which to do this job, which I know 

we are pushing towards, but it is really hard to get all these agencies to share complete information, and if they won’t share it, if 

they would at least share the name so that people can get back to 

them. 

I have one other question. How do you see AMO fitting in Riverside? The maritime center. 

Mr. ALLEN. Out in California? 

Mr. SOUDER. Yes. 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, we are working closely with AMOC, that is a 

center there. We are providing them with strategic information. 

Through our initiatives and building requirements, we have provided them with data that they have never received in the last 2 

months. In fact, they say they are inundated with some of the information that using national NTM systems that they never had 
14

access before. So we are starting to make progress. We are not 

where we should be, sir, but I am pushing it every week. 

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. Because it is clear that the area you are 

working in is the underpinnings of everything else we do, because 

good intelligence and actionable intelligence is how we are going to 

prevent things. Thank you for your work. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I believe I just got a call for a vote, but we have 

time for an additional—a couple of sets of questions, I believe. 

The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Allen, are you aware of CBP being accused of holding back 

information to local law enforcement agencies? 

Mr. ALLEN. No, sir, I am not. And I would—I will let Mr. 

Bortmes answer that question when he appears on the second 

panel. Unless it is for some reason sensitive law enforcement 

case—investigative case information, one would think that information would not necessarily be held back in ways that would not be 

effective. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you would agree that the sharing of information between agencies is a must, from an intelligence standpoint. 

Mr. ALLEN. It absolutely is. That is where I am—as you know, 

Congressman Thompson, that is where I am spending a lot of my 

time. We are putting people—Secretary Chertoff has just approved 

my implementation plan for putting my officers out with State fusion centers—and, in fact, I want to put them out in every fusion 

center—in order to help both the sharing of information from the 

national Intelligence Community down at the lowest possible level 

to the local level. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Can you give me our analysis of where CBP, ICE 

and the Coast Guard is with regard to the common sharing of intelligence with other State and local partners? 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, I would defer to them, but we have become—

for State and local fusion centers, we have become—my own office 

has become sort of the centerpiece, the executive agent for the Department for the flow of information down to State and local level. 

I am sure there is information shared at the local level by all the 

operating components, and I should let them speak directly to that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So your job will be to manage the fusion center? 

Mr. ALLEN. To ensure that there is a flow of information down 

to the State fusion centers and to the major city fusion centers. We 

are in the process of doing that and in the process of deploying officers to those centers. We have deployed them to Los Angeles, New 

York, Louisiana, Maryland, and we are sending an officer to Georgia and to Virginia in the near future. 

Mr. THOMPSON. And the goal of those centers is to have some 

common thread of intelligence available to all parties? 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir. Those are under State or city control. And 

our job is to coordinate the flow of Federal information down to 

those centers and to ensure that they have all the information that 

they need in case there is some risk or danger to that particular 

State or that particular city. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, with respect to border intelligence, will we 

have CBP and ICE agents in those fusion centers also? 
15

Mr. ALLEN. That is a decision I think that the head of the operating component must make. We certainly will have officers from 

DHS there. They obviously, and JTTS, the Joint Terrorism Task 

Force, that is managed by the FBI, and they are there in many 

places, and they do a tremendous job in working and sharing of information. 

Mr. THOMPSON. If it was left up to you, would you have one 

there? 

Mr. ALLEN. I am not sure. I think that if we have the right small 

number of officers there—and certainly officers from ICE or CBP 

could come down to a fusion center working for the Chief Intelligence Officers as part of his outreach to State and local governments. I would like that very much. The Secretary has designated 

me and my office as executive agent for the Department in the flow 

of information to State and local governments. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, since we are talking about border intelligence—I will have some other questions, Mr. Chairman, I will 

submit for the record. 

Mr. THOMPSON. But, Mr. Allen, the only other question I have for 

you is, are you aware of the IG report that came out yesterday with 

respect to the Homeland Security Information Network? 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir, I am aware of it. I have not read it. I have 

asked my information management officer to send it to me. The 

Homeland Security security network is run by the operations director at the Department. 

Mr. THOMPSON. But you also—there was some—well, you have 

not seen it, but there are some weaknesses. 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes. And one of the things that we have been doing—

and let me just say on the classified side we are doing three things. 

One, on the Homeland Security Information Network I have put in 

an intelligence portal for sensitive but unclassified information to 

go to State and local governments. We have run some experiments, 

and we have gotten good reception on that. 

Two, I took over a very broken Homeland Security Information 

Network system. We have fixed that to almost every State and fusion center. 

And three, we are forming a Homeland Security data network, 

which will be a more robust—a more robust classified network. We 

are in the early stages of doing a pilot test on that. We have every 

intention of doing that. 

Very candidly, Mr. Thompson, we have been behind in our information management, and I am not happy with it, and I know that 

the Secretary isn’t either. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentleman. 

For the record, we have a motion to adjourn on the floor. I will 

keep the hearing going. Ms. Harman is going to go vote and return. 

I think there is adequate time for the gentlelady from New York 

to ask her questions of Mr. Allen, and we will try to keep this moving along. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank you, sir, for your presentation. And I particularly 

appreciate your focus on fusion centers. 
16

I met with the head of the New York State Department of Homeland Security just last week, and one of the points he unfortunately 

shared with me is that the communication between the Federal 

Government and the local officials in New York is mediocre at best. 

So, number one, I would appreciate if you would comment on that 

and what is being done to improve upon it. 

And secondly, there are three fusion centers, as you know, in 

New York. There is one in Albany, there is New York City Police 

Department, and there is one in Rockland County. I know Westchester is in the process of putting one together, but there isn’t one 

now. 

I am very pleased that you talked about placing your people in 

these fusion centers. Perhaps you can continue to expand on that. 

How fast is this moving? Are you getting support for doing that? 

Perhaps you can focus specifically on New York. I happen to have 

an interest in it; it happens to be my district. What is happening 

there? And if the New York State Department of Homeland Security said there is inadequate communication, what are you doing; 

what can you do; what will you do to improve upon it? 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, I thank you for the question because New York 

City—New York State, and New York City in particular, has been 

a focus right from the moment I arrived. I will soon have three officers in New York City working with the Intelligence Division and 

with the Counterterrorism Division. I have a general liaison officer 

there now full time. We are going to send up two very experienced 

all-sourc intelligence officers to help in mentoring and teaching in 

New York City. Mr. David Cohen and Larry Sanchez are very 

strong on this. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Didn’t David originally come from New York? 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, his wife is from Brooklyn. He came from Boston. He still has a Bostonian accent. But he is a New Yorker, he 

truly is. And up in Albany we have a UNYRIC where we work very 

closely. And I have a team in UNYRIC this week. I intend to put 

a full-time officer in UNYRIC, there is no question about that. My 

principal deputy, I have an outsider, Jack DiMaggio, who spends 

his full time working to get our officers out to the various fusion 

centers. 

Albany—at this stage we do not have plans to put anyone in 

Rockland County, but we do have—we will put people in Albany. 

And I respect that Homeland Security advisor. We are going to improve our communications flows. When we have a threat into New 

York, we always call the Homeland Security advisor. We call him 

on the unclassified line if it is an open issue, but if it is classified, 

we have secure communications. And Homeland Security has made 

certain that the UNYRIC as well as New York City has classified 

capabilities. 

I have substantially augmented cryptographic capabilities for 

New York City so that they can communicate with the Federal 

Government. And on top of that, I am going to put in a secure 

video for Commissioner Kelly up in New York City so that he can 

dial in if he has a problem or a worry about something, we can just 

sit and secure a video conference and discuss the threat. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, I personally, before I go and vote, want to 

thank you for that, because Chairman King and I—I am not sure, 
17

Chairman Simmons, whether you were with us at the time, it was 

shortly after 9/11, and we went down there and met with Commissioner Kelly, and it was clearly, good luck from the Federal Government, he was on his own. And as you know, he has established 

a counterterrorism network around the world. And I have been 

with David Cohen and others visiting their system and their various offices, and it really is impressive. They really follow up on 

every single lead. 

I just wonder, how many leads do you get from the Federal—just 

on average, from the Federal Government coming down to them, or 

are they really picking them up themselves through their own networks? 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, I think we get quite a number of threats that 

relate to this country that flow in from overseas, and obviously 

from the extraordinary capabilities of the FBI. Many of these are 

not valid; we have to look at their credibility. And this is something 

that goes on every day. New York City also picks up suspicious activity, and they are very good at informing us. 

New York City is a model for doing counterterrorism, and we 

learn from working with New York City it is a two-way street. I 

have learned a great deal from working with Dave Cohen, a man 

with whom I worked with at the CIA, as well as Mr. Sanchez. So 

I think it is a mutual sharing of information. And Commissioner 

Kelly has made it clear that he wants to work very closely with the 

Department and with the operations that I direct. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I gather I have to vote, but let me just say thank 

you very much. You have been on the job for how long now? 

Mr. ALLEN. I have just arrived 9 months ago. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, I appreciate it. I remember on our other committee it took 2-1/2 years out of 9/11 for an inspector general to set 

up a computer system. So all these questions that we have, why 

hasn’t it been done, that is past, and I hope that you can move as 

expeditiously as possible. And I know that New York City will be 

grateful for your efforts. 

One thing really impressed me as I visited these centers. They 

follow up on every single lead, no matter how minor, because you 

never know how minor it really is. So I thank you very much for 

your important work, and I guess I had better vote. 

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Congresswoman. Believe me, New York 

City is on my thoughts all the time. They ask me what worries me 

always, and I am always worried about New York City. And I am 

always sure to tell David Cohen I worry about it before I go to 

sleep. 

Mrs. LOWEY. You keep worrying about it, because I have five of 

my seven grandchildren living in New York City, plus two of my 

three kids. So I worry about it morning, noon and night. And hopefully we will continue to put all the appropriate procedures in 

place. Continue to worry because that is the only way we can make 

sure we are covered. And I thank you very much. 

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, ma’am. 

Mr. SOUDER. [Presiding.] I assume this is done—and I am not 

trying to get into specifics that would be classified, but I assume 

that on a daily basis there is attempts to see where our 

vulnerabilities are, where we are testing our border crossings, 
18

where we are testing our ports, where we are testing our airports, 

and you are checking to see where our holes are. Is that a correct 

assumption? 

Mr. ALLEN. That is correct. Whether it is terrorism from abroad, 

al-Qa’ida, whether it is sort of global—inspired homegrown terrorists that are looking for weaknesses. We see alien smuggling networks and narcotraffickers always trying to find new ways of getting across our borders, yes. 

Mr. SOUDER. One of the concerns that I have is historically—I 

chair the narcotics oversight committee directly and have spent 

most of my career working with narcotics as well as the Speaker’s 

Drug Task Force, and came on here because, having worked narcotics issues, it was a logical thing to move to Homeland Security 

and border because they are so interconnected, and their functions 

are interconnected—is that often we are better at figuring out after 

some things happened in explaining patterns rather than being 

able to prevent. And it is much more difficult to try to put the little 

pieces of the alphabet in the connection until you have actually had 

the action. And yet the risk is so much higher even in Homeland 

Security on one big tragic thing than kind of the daily pounding we 

take on narcotics and other types of illegal activity. 

My question is, how much of the focus in the intelligence gathering—is it the National Targeting Center? Who is primarily trying 

to figure out when we do this, this is how they may change? In 

other words, let’s say we put a fence over parts of the border. 

Where are they going to move next? Are we going to squeeze them 

into the Caribbean, are we going to move into the—if we control 

the Florida area, are they going to move in where we don’t have 

as much air surveillance between, say, Galveston and the center of 

Florida? What if we do this will move them more to the Canadian 

border? What will move them to North Dakota as opposed to 

through the main border crossings? Is that type of discussion occurring? Is it interagency? How does it interrelate with the 

NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM and the JATFs? 

Mr. ALLEN. And it is a very good question because—and I will 

let my colleagues—again, Mr. Bortmes, Mr. Sloan and Ms. 

O’Connell—talk particularly about the daily looking at changing 

patterns. 

My job—and I have here my Chief Threat Assessment Officer—

is to look at how these patterns change, working with all sources 

of information from the traditional Intelligence Community as well 

as from the operational components of Homeland Security to try to 

focus very clearly on where things have shifted because—and I am 

sure Mr. Sloan can tell you about maritime patterns and how, as 

the Coast Guard increases pressure in one area, the roots move to 

another. 

I think we have to do this very, very systemically. I have talked 

to Mr. John Walters, who heads their Office of Drug Enforcement 

Policy, and he believes that we have to look at this very holistically, and we have to stand back and get strategic intelligence. If 

we simply follow the latest lead, the latest tip, and just do tactical 

intelligence, we won’t understand it. 

And your question is very much on target. We have to do both; 

we have to do tactical operations, and we have to do strategical 
19

analysis, otherwise we will never win this—and I don’t know if win 

is the right word—otherwise we will never be successful in this 

struggle to secure our borders. 

Mr. SOUDER. One of the challenges, when there was a lot of focus 

on the Arizona border, we took resources from California and Texas 

and moved them over. It is not clear that the groups who are moving any kind of illegal traffic, whether it be human, narcotics, terrorists or anything else, behave in zones like we behave. While 

they may have certain syndicates that control certain parts of those 

zones, they don’t match up to our sectors. And what clearly happened is we had an increase in activity in areas where we had 

pulled out, and so the net reduction wasn’t anything like consolidating in one zone. 

If we put the Guard on the border, if we fence certain sections, 

I presume that as we are making those decisions, much like—I 

mean, anybody knows who goes to San Ysidro, you can see all the 

watchers. You can see the watchers on their side and our side 

going back and forth, and the lane movements, and both sides are 

watching that. And I would like to think that we are increasingly 

doing that anticipation of what, if we do this, the next move is 

going to be. And a lot of that is intelligence-driven: Are we doing 

preventative intelligence as well as reactive intelligence? And that 

is kind of the biggest challenge that you have in the services. 

One other question on NORTHCOM. They have been talking 

about standing up more intelligence and coordination, whether it 

is down at El Paso or up in Colorado. Do you know what the status 

of that is? And do you have an opinion as far as how—whether the 

Defense Department needs to get into more aggressive intelligence 

on the border? 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, let’s just go back to proactive intelligence activities and ways to do prevention. I think Mr. Bortmes may talk 

about intelligence-driven activities or operations on how we have 

tried to anticipate, if there is a threat, to preempt people from entering and crossing our borders who could have very nefarious 

plans. 

The one thing that we are working on right now broadly within 

the Intelligence Community as well as the Department of Homeland Security is the issue of radicalization. We are also working 

with State and local governments because we are finding that the 

States are studying radicalization. What causes a person to move 

from, say, a fundamentalist view of the world to one of extreme, 

say, solipsism and where violence might be created? How can you 

prevent that deterrence? How can you engage in a policy of deterrence or a policy of preemption? So we are working at that. 

And my deputy for intelligence, who is not here, has formed a 

Radicalization Working Group, and we work across the community 

and across the Department. 

On the NORTHCOM issue, that is very important. I’m getting a 

NORTHCOM officer assigned directly to my office so we can coordinate more. I met with Admiral Keating. I have met with retired 

Captain Mike Knoll, who is a J–2 out there. It is clear that they 

do wish to expand their energies and efforts to work secure borders. They have had some issues getting all the activities in which 
20

they want to undertake, but we are working very closely with 

them, and they are expanding their energy on border security. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Just real quickly. All of the terrorists who attacked the World Trade Tower, the first attack and the second, actually came in with visas through airports, not across the land borders. Does your plan that you are working on address that element? 

Mr. ALLEN. The intelligence campaign plan is more focused on 

securing the land borders in particular, both north and south. We 

have come leaps and bounds since September 11th in being able to 

control particularly the movement through the air and our airports 

of entry. I believe the kind of programs that are in place now and 

which are being improved is much greater. 

I know that Mr. Sloan could talk about security at ports as well 

as maritime and border intrusions. But what we have since September 11 is a much harder country to enter illegally. However, I 

am very concerned about the potential for ′′clean skins′′ getting 

breeder documents, getting genuine documents, say, in Western 

Europe and being able—as Director Mueller might say—to be only 

an e-ticket away from entering the United States. So we do worry 

about that. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would yield back 

so that my colleague from California can begin her questions. 

Mr. SIMMONS. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, the distinguished Ranking Member of the Intelligence Committee. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you for holding this hearing. 

Welcome, Charlie. I just voted not to adjourn Congress. I actually 

think there are some important things to do, and one of them is 

to enact a comprehensive immigration reform strategy. I realize 

you are not here testifying on that, but I thought I would, until I 

collect myself, make a point, which is that we do need stronger border enforcement at all of our borders and not just our southern border. We surely need an intelligence strategy to fit with border enforcement, because most folks coming here are just looking for a 

better way of life, they are not potential terrorists or criminals. But 

we also need the rest of it, which is some fair and reasonable suggestion for how to deal with 11—or 12 million people who are already here. And I hope we will do both, and I think it would be 

a huge mistake if some folks in this Congress prevent us from 

doing both. So that is my rant. Now I have collected myself. 

And I know you have been asked that question about fusion centers and some of the other issues that I care about, too. I sort of 

want to approach this more philosophically, if I can, and that is to 

get your sense, and I know you can give us your sense because this 

is your background in what you do for a living, of how critical the 

intelligence piece is to border enforcement. If you get this right, 

and if the intelligence—if the fusion centers work, and if information sharing actually happens, what could we begin to see? And if 

you get it wrong and there isn’t information sharing, and the fusion 

centers implode, and the intelligence products are bad, what could 

we see? 

Mr. ALLEN. I think a strong intelligence integrated capability 

with law enforcement along with good policies and good cooperation 
21

with our neighboring countries will make a world of difference. I 

think intelligence can and should be a major driver because, to me, 

to be able to understand the threat, to focus in on those threats 

that are most worrisome to us—and, as you said, it is not just the 

illegal workers. What really worries us are the narcotraffickers, the 

alien smugglers and, above all, special interest aliens, some of 

whom may be coming here from Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, 

or Africa as part of an extremist group. 

If we get this right—and this is something that we are working 

with Ambassador Negroponte. As you know, Ambassador 

Negroponte served in Honduras, he served in Mexico City, he 

knows some of the border issues very well, and we discussed it. He 

looks to the intelligence-driven efforts that we are conducting as 

very much part and parcel of the overall national intelligence effort. Ambassador Negroponte, and I saw him last night, is very determined to work with us on this issue. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I agree with that. We call him Director 

Negroponte, by the way, in the Intelligence Committee because we 

think he has got to lead this endeavor and not just be an ambassador. But that is a comment for the winds. 

At any rate, I agree. And if we get it wrong, conversely, the highest fences in the world, 3 million Border Patrol folks I doubt will 

prevent us from being harmed by either the criminal element or 

terrorist element because there is no such thing—and I am asking 

a rhetorical question, but I assume you agree with me, Charlie. But 

there is no such thing as 100 percent security anyway; is that correct? 

Mr. ALLEN. That is absolutely correct. I talk about stabilizing our 

borders. The term ‘‘seal our borders’’ is not a phrase I use. I want 

stability on the borders so we can then be able to focus on those 

real threats. And they are real threats, and some that I see every 

day that give us great concern. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I thank you for that. And, Mr. Chairman, let 

me conclude by saying if we don’t get the intelligence piece right, 

we will never get border enforcement right, period. And border enforcement obviously is more than the Mexican and the Canadian 

borders. It is port security; it is airport security; it is those folks 

who come in on cruise ships to Catalina off the coast of California 

where there are no border controls, and then take the ferry boat 

into San Pedro or Long Beach, or pick another island in another 

location. None of this will work if Charlie Allen doesn’t succeed. So, 

no pressure, Charlie, but please succeed. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentlelady for her questions and her 

comments. And I share with her that I could not agree with her 

more, that what we do intelligencewise on the border, how we focus 

our intelligence assets is going to determine whether or not we succeed; that we simply cannot put a policeman or a soldier in every 

place for 12,000 miles. It simply won’t work. 

And in excusing our first panel, I would like to comment again 

where he says ongoing operational efforts to push the border outward and build a layered defense extending within the United 

States. We talk about the border as a line in the sand, but from 

an intelligence standpoint we are talking about someone who may 
22

appear on the radar in Afghanistan, transit Europe, show up on a 

ship or in Canada or in Mexico, and at some point in that process 

we try to get a line on them so when they hit the border, we can 

grab them, or when they cross the border, they set off a trigger 

mechanism and ring a bell so that subsequently we can get them 

within the United States. 

So it is not a question of intelligence just at that point; it is a 

question of intelligence in depth overseas and intelligence follow-up 

within the continental United States, again, within the framework 

of our civil liberties and our rights. 

Thank you, Mr. Allen, for your testimony. And I would ask the 

second panel to quickly gather. I know our Coast Guard friends 

have some time constraints, but we want to pick their brains. 

Thank you very much. 

The second panel will be made up of what you might call the 

operational components of intelligence at the border. We have Mr. 

James Sloan, Assistant Commandant For Intelligence of the U.S. 

Coast Guard, charged primarily with port security and offshore security activities; Ms. Cynthia O’Connell, Acting Director, Office of 

Intelligence, Immigration and Customs Enforcement. And I think 

we all have an understanding of what our Immigration and Customs folks are doing intelligencewise at the border. And then lastly 

Mr. L. Thomas Bortmes, Director, Office of Intelligence, Customs 

and Border Protection. 

I welcome the three witnesses. I know they all have prepared 

statements. We would appreciate it if they could summarize the 

high points of their statements for no more than 5 minutes, allowing the Members to ask questions. 

And why don’t we start with the Coast Guard. Mr. Sloan, the 

motto is Semper Paratus. Are you prepared? 

STATEMENTS OF JAMES SLOAN, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT 

FOR INTELLIGENCE, U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY. 

Mr. SLOAN. Yes, I am, Mr. Chairman. And thank you. And 

thanks also to Ranking Member Lofgren. 

I am Jim Sloan. I am the Coast Guard’s Assistant Commandant 

For Intelligence and Criminal Investigations. And I do have a prepared statement that I would ask be inserted into the record. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Without objection. 

Mr. SLOAN. Thank you, sir. 

I would like to thank each of the members of the committee for 

the opportunity to discuss the Coast Guard’s intelligence and criminal investigations program and its role in support to Coast Guard 

missions regarding border security. 

Bounded by the oceans, America always has been a maritime Nation. The oceans are a resource that we have to protect, a path for 

global commerce, and, unfortunately in today’s world, a route for 

potential terrorists and other threats to our national security. 

Mr. Chairman, you commented on the 12,500-mile border that is 

the maritime border, but in addition to that, the Coast Guard is 

responsible for 95,000 miles of coastline when you consider the 

laws that the Coast Guard has to enforce within 3.4 million square 

miles of Exclusive Economic Zones extending 200 miles from the 
23

United States and its territories and possessions. This places us in 

a position to push our borders out and react to the threats far at 

sea. 

It is through the Coast Guard’s Intelligence and Criminal Investigation Program, that includes not only those personnel serving in 

Coast Guard headquarters, but those serving as liaison officers at 

various agencies, the intelligence analysts, the COASTWATCH personnel at the Intelligence Coordination Center, as part of and 

partnered with the Office of Naval Intelligence at the National 

Maritime Intelligence Center, the intelligence specialists at the 

Area Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers, the field intelligence 

support teams at U.S. ports, and our criminal investigators are all 

involved in accomplishing the objectives to provide immediate actionable warning intelligence on terrorists and other threats to the 

Coast Guard’s operational commanders, the Commandant, the Department of Homeland Security, and our other consumers. 

Many Coast Guard missions are cued by intelligence such as 

counterdrug initiatives, alien smuggling, migration, fisheries enforcement, and other law enforcement functions. It is the personnel 

at the Department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis that Charlie Allen represents, the Area Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers, and the Intelligence Coordination Center that blends the information and places it into the appropriate channels. 

As part of the Department of Homeland Security’s intelligence 

architecture, I am committed to integrating the Coast Guard intelligence capabilities with other components in the Department to 

support a unified DHS intelligence enterprise. Significant challenges remain, and many of them have been discussed in the last 

hour, and more work needs to be done, but the Coast Guard and 

the organizations represented here today are dedicated to ensuring 

the safety and security of the American people. 

Thanks for this opportunity, and I am prepared to answer any 

questions. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Sloan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES SLOAN

Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members. It is my pleasure to be 

here today, alongside Ms. Cynthia O’Connell, Intelligence Director of ICE and Mr. 

Tom Bortmes, the Intelligence Director of CBP, appearing before you today to discuss the Coast Guard Intelligence Program’s role in border security. 

The security of the U.S. borders is a top priority for the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This hearing is a testament to the continued 

importance placed on border security and recognition of the Coast Guard’s vital role 

in port and border security. Border security conveys the thought of land masses converging together. The reality is our maritime borders are the longest front in this 

battle. The Coast Guard’s authority focuses not on land-to-land borders but landto-water borders that include the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans as well as the Gulf 

of Mexico and the Great Lakes. These shores involve key border security issues that 

must be included in any border security discussions and decisions.
24

As the Nation’s primary maritime law enforcement agency, an armed force, and 

lead Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agency for maritime security, the 

Coast Guard has significant authorities and capabilities with regard to maritime security. Still, success in achieving maritime border security requires the full and 

complete cooperation of our interagency, state, local, tribal and private sector partners. 

The maritime domain is an avenue for those wishing to smuggle people and illicit 

drugs into our communities - and an avenue that could be exploited as a means to 

smuggle weapons of mass destruction and/or terrorists into our country. In 2005 

alone, the Coast Guard 

pted 9,500 undocumented migrants attempting to enter the United States illegally 

by sea, a 100 percent increase over 2001; and 

Prevented more than 338,000 pounds of cocaine (an all-time maritime record) and 

more than 10,000 pounds of marijuana from reaching the United States. 

While the 9/11 Commission noted the continuing threat against our aviation system, it also stated that ′′opportunities to do harm are as a great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation.′′ There has been a great deal of focus on container 

security, which is appropriate; however, a container is only as secure as the ship 

and crew that carries it. In fact, the most often observed U.S. maritime threat remains smuggling. As on land, we know that there are numerous professional migrant smuggling rings that operate in the maritime realm. The proximity of U.S. 

population centers to the maritime domain and the diversity of maritime users 

present significant and wide ranging vulnerabilities. Effective intelligence support 

can address these vulnerabilities to detect and defeat threats along our maritime 

borders. 

Many of the Coast Guard’s mission successes are cued by intelligence. In addition 

to supporting our focus on preventing terrorist attacks, timely intelligence is critical 

in our efforts to stop international maritime drug trafficking, maritime alien smuggling, illegal high-seas driftnet fishing encroachment of U.S. natural resources in 

the Exclusive Economic Zone, and damage to the marine environment. Intelligence 

is a needed force multiplier given our limited assets and expanding mission requirements, it is the value added to enhancing maritime domain awareness. 

Leveraging our longstanding partnerships and unique maritime authorities, access and capabilities the Coast Guard has significantly enhanced nationwide maritime security. The role of intelligence is to provide timely, accurate and actionable 

information so that decisions can be made and actions taken that support the operational commanders. Significant challenges remain and much more work needs to 

be done, but we are focused on the right priorities. 

The Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Program has established and actively participates in several partnerships to enhance border security 

and other Homeland Security initiatives, such as: 
25

The Coast Guard works in close partnership with DHS Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis (I&A) and other elements of the Department to provide intelligence support to homeland security. We are providing strong support for the standup of the 

intelligence functions within OI&A by detailing intelligence analysts and assisting 

in building relationships with other Intelligence Community partners. 

The Coast Guard Intelligence Program and the Office of Naval Intelligence continue to build an effective joint intelligence partnership to enhance maritime domain 

awareness. The Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination Center is co-located with 

the Office of Naval Intelligence, which comprises the National Maritime Intelligence 

Center (NMIC); 

The NMIC has been designated as the core element for the Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) Plan. The GMII Plan is one of the eight support plans 

that make up the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS). The Coast 

Guard’s Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) and the Office of Naval Intelligence 

(ONI) have been the foci of the GMII effort thus far. Achieving Final Operating Capability (FOC) is dependent upon strong representation from the other core elements, including: DHS - CBP and ICE, DOJ - FBI and DEA, Treasury - OFAC and 

FINCEN, NSA, and NGA. The overarching GMII requirement is to identify, locate, 

and track potential threats to U.S. maritime interests and subsequently transfer accurate, relevant, and collaborated information to those operational entities. 

Within the Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC), the Coast 

Guard and CBP have exchanged personnel to enhance data sharing between the 

ICC’s COASTWATCH program (which gathers and analyzes information based on 

the ship’s 96-Hour Notice of Arrival (NOA) report on vessels and people approaching 

U.S. ports) and CBP’s National Targeting Center (cargo tracking) process. 

COASTWATCH has improved processing of NOAs by more than 600 percent since 

FY05. This COASTWATCH mission has detected and provided advance warning 

about numerous arriving individuals identified in federal law enforcement and immigration databases as criminal or security concerns, including active warrants and 

′′deny entry′′ orders for previous border crossing violations. In addition, several individuals wanted for questioning by federal agencies about possible extremist associations have been identified in advance of arrival and referred to the relevant agency 

for investigation. 

The Coast Guard provides access, where authorized and appropriate, to its intelligence and criminal investigations databases, as well as advice to others developing 

intelligence sharing architectures. The Service has also provided intelligence analysts, exchange personnel, and liaison officers to other agencies active in the maritime arena; 

The Coast Guard’s Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Program provides a 

permanent presence on the FBI’s National Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and 

select regional JTTFs; 

′′Operation Drydock′′, which began in December 2002, is a joint Coast Guard and 

FBI criminal and counterterrorism investigation into national security threats and 

document fraud associated with U.S. merchant mariner credentials. Currently, the 

databases compiled are managed by the Coast Guard Investigative Services (CGIS) 

and are used by El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), Coast Guard ICC, and Coast 

Guard Sector Commands nationwide. The ′′Operation Drydock′′ databases are also 

used by Coast Guard Regional Examination Centers (REC) to vet applicants seeking 

merchant mariner documents and licenses; and 

′′Operation Panama Express′′ is a multi-agency Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) investigation that began in the mid 1990s to help stem 

the flow of illegal narcotics flowing from Central and South America via maritime 

means. The Coast Guard Investigative Service is a partner in Panama Express. The 

CGIS agents assigned to Panama Express speak fluent Spanish and have a wealth 

of practical hands-on experience in Coast Guard maritime law enforcement operations and CGIS narcotics investigations. 

The Coast Guard has also increased its efforts to share law enforcement and intelligence information collected by the Coast Guard with other DHS components and 

other federal government agencies. In addition, the Coast Guard’s Intelligence Program activities have been enhanced to assist in countering potential maritime 

threats there 

Establishment of Field Intelligence Support Teams (FIST) in various key U.S. 

ports. FISTs gather local law enforcement information, establishes contacts, interviews masters and crewmembers to better understand maritime threats; 

Enhanced intelligence capability at the theater-level with the standup of the Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFCs) Atlantic and Pacific. The MIFCs increase 

collection and analytical capabilities, enhance all-source intelligence and information 

fusion, improve the timeliness and quality of intelligence support to Coast Guard 
26

operational forces. The MIFCs also ensure the rapid reporting of information gathered by Coast Guard forces into the Department of Homeland Security and Intelligence Community at the national level; Conducting Port Threat Assessments as 

a complement to the MTSA-mandated Port Security Assessment, to provide analyses 

of threats for specific ports, inclusive of both terrorism and crime - foreign and domestic - using law enforcement and intelligence information; Fielding of Sector Intelligence Officers put intelligence support at the tactical level; and, the Coast 

Guard’s membership in the Intelligence Community; our wide-range of missions, 

and our expertise in the maritime domain allows us to interface in numerous and 

diverse forums at various levels within the DoD components, law enforcement agencies, intelligence community, state and local stakeholders, and private industry. 

Analysis of the maritime threat to U.S. ports is challenging. Characterization of 

incidents and trend analysis is complicated by the convergence of large volumes of 

cargo, alien smuggling networks, the narcotics trade, terrorism, regional conflict, 

maritime criminal enterprises, and some activities that fall into multiple categories 

but fall short of being a direct security threat to U.S. ports. It is the Coast Guard’s 

overarching strategy, through layered security architecture, to ′′push out our borders.′′ Our unambiguous goal is to meet threats far offshore in order to prevent hostile persons, vessels, or cargoes from entering our ports or coastal regions. Our ability to push the borders out is an essential element in protecting our homeland.The 

Coast Guard faces challenges in the maritime domain similar to those of our colleagues in securing the land border - with a limited set of resources, located amid 

vast geographic areas and huge amounts of legitimate activity - stop those seeking 

to do us harm. The foundation of the Coast Guard’s maritime strategy relies on 

three key priorities:

Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness; 

Establish and Lead a Maritime Security Regime; and 

Deploy effective and integrated Operational Capability.

These are not stand-alone goals, but rather part of an active system of layered 

maritime security. For example, the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) 

led to the establishment of domestic and international AIS carriage requirements 

for certain commercial vessels. But without investment in systems to collect, analyze 

and disseminate the AIS signals we lose the opportunity to assess threats early. 

Similarly, the detection, identification and interdiction of small vessels (that certainly do not advertise their position) used by smugglers throughout the Caribbean 

and Eastern Pacific requires persistent surveillance capabilities. In the end, Coast 

Guard assets must be capable of mounting a dependable response to identified 

threats lest we have information but not the capability to act. 

Coast Guard assets and systems are required to operate across a diverse operating area including within our ports, in the littoral region, and far offshore. Thanks 

to the strong support of the administration and Congress, a number of initiatives 

are underway to transform Coast Guard capabilities. I would like to highlight a few 

of these initiatives as each will have a broad and substantial influence on our intelligence capabilities to mitigate current and future maritime risks. 

Integrated Deepwater System. The centerpiece of the Coast Guard’s future capability is the Integrated Deepwater System, recently revised to reflect post-9/11 mission requirements such as enhanced intelligence gathering and handling capabilities. The Integrated Deepwater System was designed to secure the nation’s maritime borders. 

The vessels delivered by the Deepwater program will serve as the Coast Guard’s 

′′eyes and ears′′ and allow the nation to see, hear and communicate activity occurring within the maritime domain. The Coast Guard’s sustained presence along our 

maritime borders is unique. More capable Deepwater assets, linked to each other 

and multiple agencies through Deepwater’s net-centric command-and-control system 

will significantly improve information sharing, collaboration, and interoperability in 

the maritime domain. 

Vessel tracking. Securing our vast maritime borders requires improved awareness 

of the people, vessels and cargo approaching and moving throughout U.S. ports, 

coasts and inland waterways. The most pressing challenges we now face involve 

tracking the vast population of vessels operating in and around the approaches to 

the United States. In support of this requirement, the Coast Guard has: 

Established the Automatic Identification System (AIS) to provide continuous, realtime information on the identity, location, speed and course of vessels in ports that 

are equipped with AIS receivers. AIS is currently operational in several major U.S. 

ports, and the Coast Guard’s Nationwide Automatic Identification (NAIS) project 

will expand AIS capabilities to ports nationwide; and 
27

Under U.S. leadership the International Maritime Organization recently unanimously adopted a global long Range Identification and Tracking scheme that will 

provide information about all commercial ships of 300 gross tons and above operating within a 1,000 nautical miles of our coast whether the ship is bound for a U.S. 

port or is on innocent passage. Additionally, we will have tracking information out 

to 2,000 nautical miles when ships have declared its intent to arrive in a U.S. port. 

Maritime C4ISR Enhancement. Existing Command, Control, Communications, 

Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and 

operational concepts must be reoriented and integrated with current and emerging 

sensor capabilities and applicable procedures. Similar to the nation’s air space security regime, the maritime security regime must integrate existing C4ISR systems 

with new technologies and national command-and-control systems and processes. 

For example: 

The Common Operating Picture (COP) and corresponding Command Intelligence 

Picture (CIP) must continue to grow and expand to federal, state, and local agencies 

with maritime interests and responsibilities. The COP provides a shared display of 

friendly, enemy/suspect and neutral tracks on a map with applicable geographically 

referenced overlays and data enhancements. The COP is also a central element of 

the Deepwater solution tying Deepwater assets and operational commanders together with dynamic, real-time maritime domain information. This link is essential 

to ensure effective command and control of all available Coast Guard assets responding to a myriad of border security threats. 

An expansive and interoperable communications network is critical for maritime 

security operations and safety of life at sea. In the coastal environment, the Coast 

Guard’s Rescue 21 system will provide the United States with an advanced maritime distress and response communications system that bridges interoperability 

gaps, saves lives and improves maritime security.There is no single solution to maritime border security. It requires a layered system of capabilities, established competencies, clear authorities, and strong partnerships. The cost of allowing blind 

spots in our awareness, security regimes or operational capabilities is too high.This 

is the mandate for the Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Directorate to support those priorities, which ultimately supports the overall strategic 

and national level objectives of the Nation.Thank you for the opportunity to testify 

before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. SIMMONS. And we will now go to the second witness 

Ms.O’Connell. Welcome. 

CYNTHIA O’CONNELL, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. O’CONNELL. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Simmons. 

I will have just a few brief statements. I respectfully request that 

my full statement be submitted for the record. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Without objection. 

Ms. O’CONNELL. Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, 

members of the subcommittee, I am Cynthia O’Connell, Acting Director of the Office of Intelligence for Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement. I sincerely appreciate this opportunity to share with 

you how the men of women of ICE Intelligence employ our capabilities to help secure our Nation’s borders. 

I am also honored to testify alongside my colleagues from Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Coast Guard, as well as 

Mr. Charles Allen from the Department of Homeland Security. As 

the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, as you know, Mr. Allen has 

been instrumental in coordinating with the Intelligence Community 

and providing guidance on Homeland Security-specific issues. 

The ICE Office of Intelligence supports ICE and DHS intelligence 

requirements and priorities. We have made significant progress 

and continue in expanding our responsibilities to support the needs 

of ICE, DHS, and the Intelligence Community. 
28

With the unique Immigration and Customs authorities and intelligence tools, ICE Intelligence has also enhanced its detection, collection, and analysis capabilities. 

In addition to ICE Intelligence headquarters in Washington, 

D.C., we have six field intelligence units located in New York, Long 

Beach, Chicago, Houston, Tucson, and Miami; two technical collection facilities, the Tactical Intelligence Center, and a Special Operations Center; and intelligence assets at the El Paso Intelligence 

Center. 

ICE Intelligence headquarters supports ICE management and 

DHS intelligence and analysis efforts and coordinates ICE Intelligence programs and operations nationwide. The field intelligence 

units provide intelligence expertise to field investigative offices and 

detention facilities and to DHS intelligence as a whole. Our technical collection facilities act in concert for the Intelligence Community, the military, and other Federal agencies to safeguard the border that extends beyond our borders outward. These are powerful 

capabilities, and we have moved to organize them in a coherent 

and effective support system both to advance the ICE investigative 

mission and to support and integrate ICE into the DHS intelligence 

functions. 

Our specific intent is to integrate our intelligence capabilities 

with other components in the Department to support a unified 

DHS intelligence enterprise. ICE Intelligence takes advantage of 

currently operating effective projects and programs, and combines 

them with proposed new programs and capabilities, and unites the 

whole under a common strategic purpose, the protection of our 

country against threats that could arise from our borders. 

Our Special Operations Center detects and locates smugglers 

moving contraband and aliens across the borders by collecting intelligence through real-time technical means. Its methodologies not 

only interdict the incursion, but also helps identify smuggling organizations for investigation and dismantling. 

We coordinate Customs and Border Protection air and marine operations in the Office of Border Patrol and Office of Border Patrol 

assets to stop illegal activity. This year they have supported the 

interdiction of about 35 tons of marijuana with the seizure of associated vehicles and weapons and the arrest of countless smuggled 

aliens. 

ICE is integrating its Special Operations with geospatial intelligence capabilities sponsored by DHS and the analytical functions 

of our Southwest Field Intelligence Unit. We are working with 

DHS Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance to leverage 

available Department of Defense and DHS science and technology 

resources for upgrades to this dedicated border protection unit. 

What I have just described to you is true border-focused intelligence support. However, our protective effort is not devoted to 

just the land borders; we are also heavily involved in maritime and 

air transportation environments. 

Operation Last Call exploits the intelligence value of hundreds of 

thousands of individuals who enter the detention system annually. 

This highly effective operation collects, evaluates, analyzes, and 

disseminates information derived from detainees in ICE custody. 
29

Project Aegis supports the ICE visa security program which 

places ICE personnel in foreign countries to work with State Department consular officials in vetting these applicants. 

The Border Enforcement Security Task Force is a DHS-inspired 

initiative that responds to the increase in border violence. It is actively supported by analytical resources from our field intelligence 

units. 

ICE Intelligence is also working with DHS I&A on its intelligence campaign plan, a borderwide security effort aimed at more 

efficient consolidation of relevant field intelligence information. 

Operation Capistrano is a cooperative initiative with Department 

of State Consular Affairs where we train password examiners to 

recognize indicators that may point to potential narcotics and currency smugglers. This initiative has led to over 1,300 seizures and 

1,300 arrests with more than 1,700 pounds of heroin and 2,600 

pounds of cocaine seized. 

Operation Roswell uses similar techniques to identify alien 

smugglers, immigration fraud violators, and child sex tourism suspects. In the past 2 years, Operation Roswell resulted in 26 aliens 

removed, produced evidence of over 60 marriage fraud schemes, 

and in one significant case yielded analysis that led to eight arrests, ten removals, and the dismantling of an organization that 

smuggled 37 foreign nationals into the United States. 

In spite of all these successful initiatives, we are not content to 

rest on present production and current capabilities. Business plans 

and performance metrics based on objective customer evaluations 

must support all our work. From these markers, ICE Intelligence 

proposes the development and acquisition of advanced technologies, 

new techniques and new processes, and additional integration into 

multiagency and multinational operations. This is our future path 

to a safer and more secure border and homeland. 

I thank you for the opportunity to describe some of our initiatives 

that support border security. I would be happy to answer any questions at this time. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Ms. O’Connell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA O’CONNELL

Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, Members of the Subcommittee, 

I am Cynthia O’Connell, Acting Director of the Office of Intelligence for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). I sincerely appreciate this opportunity 

to share with you how the men and women of ICE Intelligence employ our capabilities to help secure our nation’s borders. 

The ICE Office of Intelligence supports ICE and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) intelligence requirements and priorities. We have made significant 

progress in continuing and expanding our responsibilities to support the needs of 

ICE, DHS, and the Intelligence Community (IC). With unique Immigration and Customs authorities and intelligence tools, ICE Intelligence has also enhanced its detection, collection and analysis capabilities. 

In addition to ICE Intelligence Headquarters in Washington DC, we have six 

Field Intelligence Units located in New York, Long Beach, Chicago, Houston, Tucson, and Miami; two technical collection facilities - the Tactical Intelligence Center 

(TIC) and a Special Operations Center; and intelligence assets at the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). 

ICE Intelligence Headquarters supports ICE management and DHS Intelligence 

and Analysis (I&A) efforts, and coordinates ICE intelligence programs and operations nationwide. The Field Intelligence Units provide intelligence expertise to investigative offices and detention facilities in the field and to the DHS Intelligence 
30

as a whole. Our technical collection facilities act in concert with the Intelligence 

Community, the military, and other Federal agencies to safeguard the southern border and to extend coverage of our borders outward even to the shores of South 

America. 

In intelligence terms, these are very powerful capabilities, and we have moved aggressively to organize them into a coherent and effective support system, both to advance the ICE investigative and operational missions, and to support and integrate 

ICE in the DHS intelligence functions. We have accomplished this through the ICE 

Intelligence Strategic Plan, which was constructed with the specific intent to integrate our intelligence capabilities with other components in the Department, to support a unified DHS Intelligence Enterprise. 

The ICE Intelligence plan takes advantage of currently operating, demonstrably 

effective projects, programs, and activities; combines them with proposed new programs and capabilities; and unites the whole under a common strategic purpose - 

the protection of our country against threats that could arise from our borders. It 

is more than just a plan. It reflects real, effective action on the front lines.

Special Operations Center 

The Special Operations Center detects and locates smugglers moving contraband 

and aliens across our borders by collecting intelligence through real-time technical 

means, primarily signals and imagery intelligence. It supports ICE investigations 

with methodologies that not only interdict the incursion, but also helps identify 

smuggling organizations for investigation and dismantling. This kind of intelligence 

has real long-term benefits. The unit’s emphasis to date has been on the U.S. and 

Mexico border. 

We coordinate with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Air and Marine Operations and Office of Border Patrol assets to stop illegal activity. The information we 

collect is disseminated to ICE and Border Patrol agents in affected areas along the 

border from California to Texas. 

ICE is currently integrating its intelligence program with the Special Operations 

Center geospatial intelligence capabilities, sponsored by DHS, and the analytical 

functions of our Southwest Field Intelligence Unit. We are working with DHS Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to leverage available Department of 

Defense and DHS Science and Technology resources for upgrades to this dedicated 

border protection unit. 

What I have just described to you is true, border-focused intelligence support; 

however, our protective effort is not devoted to just the land borders. We are also 

heavily involved in maritime and air transportation environments. We view border 

security as a continuum - it starts in various foreign countries, proceeds internationally to our borders, seaports, and airports, and extends into the interior of the 

United States, where support structures exist for criminal organizations as well as 

illegal immigrants. ICE provides intelligence at all points along this continuum.

ICE Intelligence Projects and Programs 

The Port Intelligence Center (PIC) was created in response to Secretary Michael 

Chertoff’s directive to develop a task force that addresses New York and New Jersey 

seaport vulnerabilities. The ICE Northeast Field Intelligence Unit (NEFIU), in coordination with the ICE Special Agent in Charge/New York (SAC/NY) and SAC/

Newark, CBP, USCG, the New York City Police Department (NYCPD), and other 

state and local law enforcement groups, have established the NY/NJ Metropolitan 

Area Port Intelligence Center. The PIC will develop a seaport intelligence collection 

strategy aimed primarily at cultivating human intelligence in the maritime environment. It utilizes the intelligence resources of its members to prioritize 

vulnerabilities and pursue entities and individuals for potential source cultivation. 

The National Security Integration Center (NSIC) is an Office of Investigations 

and Office of Intelligence joint center that assesses information, targets suspects, 

and supports national security investigations conducted by ICE. 

Operation Ardent Guardian targets the illicit use of legitimate immigration channels, seeking the indicators of asylum fraud, marriage fraud, false documents, and 

other fraudulent mean of entry. 

Extraterritorial Criminal Travel Strike Force (ECT) is a new cooperative initiative 

by the ICE Office of Investigations and the Criminal Division of the Justice Department. Supported by ICE Intelligence, the targeting capabilities of ECT are designed 

to leverage extraterritorial investigative and prosecutorial expertise to attack foreign-based criminal networks. 

Operation Last Call exploits the intelligence value of hundreds of thousands of individuals who enter our detention and removal system annually. This highly effective operation collects, evaluates, analyzes, and disseminates information derived 

from detainees in ICE custody. Customers for Operation Last Call intelligence are 
31

ICE operational units, DHS I&A, the Intelligence Community, the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI), and other Federal agencies. This program focuses on relevant 

collection in the areas of force protection, anti-terrorism, on-going criminal enterprises, human trafficking and smuggling, contraband smuggling (weapons of mass 

destruction, drugs, etc.), threats to critical infrastructure, and the movement of 

money that support illicit activities. 

Project Aegis (Domestic Visa Security) supports the ICE Visa Security program, 

which places ICE personnel in sensitive foreign countries to work with State Department consular officials in vetting visa applicants. The ICE Intelligence domestic 

program performs detailed research on the resident U.S. sponsors and contacts listed in visa applications and reports on the background and potentially suspect activities of those individuals. This program provided substantial intelligence on the Lodi, 

California, Pakistani community that has recently figured prominently in terrorist 

investigations and action. 

Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST), the DHS-inspired initiative that 

responds to the increase in border violence, is actively supported by the analytic resources of the Houston and Tucson Field Intelligence Units. In addition to the BEST 

program, ICE Intelligence is working with DHS I&A on its Intelligence Campaign 

Plan (ICP), a border-wide security effort aimed at more efficient consolidation of relevant field-generated information. 

Operation Crystal Ball, a joint operation involving ICE, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and CBP, tracks suspect vessels and crewmembers and maintains historical databases to respond to queries from investigators and officers working in the maritime environment. ICE Crystal Ball analysts 

use electronic collection techniques and perform both classified and unclassified research to derive movement and position information. They also populate Naval Intelligence databases with large volumes of current vessel tracking data. Crystal Ball 

support has repeatedly resulted in drug seizures from merchant vessels and crewmembers, and continually contributes to the strategic goal of awareness in the maritime and seaport environment. 

Operation Capistrano, a cooperative initiative with the State Department’s Office 

of Consular Affairs, trains passport examiners to recognize indicators that may 

point to potential narcotics and currency smugglers. This initiative has led to 1,366 

seizures and 1,300 arrests. 

Operation Roswell, an outgrowth of Operation Capistrano, uses similar techniques 

to identify alien smugglers, immigration fraud violators and child sex tourism suspects. In the past two years, Operation Roswell has led to the removal of 26 aliens, 

provided evidence of over 60 incidences of marriage fraud schemes, and in one significant case, yielded analysis that led to 8 arrests, 10 removals, and the dismantling of an organization that had successfully smuggled 37 foreign nationals into the 

United States. 

Operation Watchtower, working in coordination with USCG and CBP, analyzes 

the international movements of vessels and cargoes to provide timely intelligence 

and risk assessment for investigative and threat detection support. 

These examples are all actual ongoing activities, presently producing valuable intelligence that protects our borders. Many of these activities also directly support 

the Department’s Secure Border Initiative. We also maintain a full-time senior liaison officer posted permanently to DHS I&A, which serves as an open conduit between ICE Intelligence and I&A. 

In spite of such successful initiatives, we are not content to rest on present production and current capabilities. Business plans and performance metrics based on 

objective customer evaluations must support all our work. From these markers, the 

ICE Intelligence strategic plan proposes the development and acquisition of advanced technologies, new techniques, new processes, and additional integration into 

multi-agency and multi-national operations. This is our future path to a safer and 

more secure border and Homeland. 

Thank you for the opportunity to describe some of our initiatives that support border security. I would be happy to answer any questions at this time.

Mr. SIMMONS. And our third witness is from U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection, Mr. Bortmes. Welcome. We have your testimony, 

so if you summarize in 5 minutes, that would be great. 

L. THOMAS BORTMES, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE, 

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BORTMES. Will do, sir. 
32

Thank you, Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the opportunity to join my Department of Homeland Security intelligence 

colleagues, Assistant Secretary Allen, Director O’Connell, and Assistant Commandant Sloan, to discuss with you the role intelligence plays within the United States Customs and Border Protection to help secure our Nation’s borders. I have submitted, as you 

stated, sir, a formal statement, and would request that it be accepted for the record. 

I want to begin this very brief oral statement by saying that I 

am privileged to serve as the Executive Director of Customs and 

Border Protection’s Office of Intelligence, which is charged with 

three primary responsibilities. The first is to directly support the 

Commissioner and Customs and Border Protection’s headquarters 

and field leadership with the acquisition, analysis, and timely dissemination of intelligence information critical to CBP’s primary 

mission of detecting, identifying, and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. 

The second is to efficiently manage a developing integrated Customs and Border Protection intelligence capability that ensures 

frontline CBP officers and decisionmakers have the value-added intelligence required to sustain border situational awareness, drive 

operations, and support policy. This larger CBP intelligence enterprise consists of the intelligence capabilities within the Office of Intelligence, the Office of Border Patrol, CBP Air and Marine, the Office of International Affairs, and the Office of Antiterrorism, and 

works very closely with the National Targeting Center and operational field analysis capabilities of the Office of Field Operations. 

And, finally, as a member of the Department’s Homeland Security Intelligence Council, it is the responsibility of the Office of Intelligence to represent CBP’s intelligence requirements and equities 

to the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer and assist him in directing 

an integrated DHS intelligence enterprise. 

Customs and Border Protection intelligence exists to support an 

agency that, in addition to facilitating international trade critical 

to the United States economy, is responsible for border security. As 

you stated earlier, Mr. Chairman, and I won’t repeat the numbers, 

it is responsible for protecting more than 5,000 miles of border with 

Canada, 1,900 miles of border with Mexico, and operating 325 official ports of entry. 

An average day in Customs and Border Protection, from the 

statements you have already made this morning, is a demanding 

day. We process well over 1.1 million passengers and pedestrians; 

69,000 containers; 333,000 incoming privately owned vehicles; $81 

million, almost $82 million, in fees, duties, and tariffs; execute 62 

arrests at ports of entry; over 3,200 apprehensions between the 

ports for illegal entry; seized over 5,500 pounds of narcotics; and 

not to forget over 1,100 prohibitive meat and plant materials, animal products at and between the ports of entry; refuse entry to 868 

noncitizens at the ports of entry; and intercept 146 smuggled 

aliens, and over 200 fraudulent documents, while rescuing 7 illegal 

immigrants in distress or dangerous conditions between the ports 

of entry. And I remind you, again, that is every day. 
33

As the figures demonstrate, CBP addresses a variety of threats 

to U.S. borders that include illegal immigration, illegal drugs, border violence, illegal incursions, pests and diseases, and a host of 

trade violations running from smuggling to international property 

rights. 

While all of these threats to our borders are demanding in their 

own right, everyone at Customs and Border Protection understands 

that their priority mission is to prevent terrorists and terrorist 

weaponry from entering the United States. 

While the Office of Intelligence and the broader CBP intelligence 

enterprise directly support operations aimed at addressing all border threat categories, they also remain focused on supporting 

CBP’s priority mission of preventing terrorists and their weaponry 

from entering the United States. Our first priority is to 

operationalize intelligence reporting on terrorist threats. 

In my formal written statement I discuss how CBP intelligence 

supports border security by supporting CBP’s layered defense strategy, a strategy that, in partnership with an array of countries, 

international organizations, private businesses, trade entities, as 

well as State and local governments, has developed a host of programs and initiatives aimed at pushing our zone of defense as far 

outward as responsible to identify people and cargo long before 

they have the opportunity to board or enter the United States. 

I look forward, sir, to answering yours and the committee’s questions and working with my colleagues here today, and appreciate 

the opportunity to speak on these matters. 

[The statement of Mr. Bortmes follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. L. THOMAS BORTMES

Introduction 

Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, distinguished Members of the 

Subcommittee. I thank you for this opportunity to join my Department of Homeland 

Security colleagues - Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Mr. Charles 

Allen, Ms. Cynthia O’Connell the Director of ICE’s Office of Intelligence and Mr. 

Jim Sloan, the Coast Guard’s Assistant Commandant for Intelligence and Criminal 

Investigations - to discuss with you the role intelligence plays within U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) to help secure our Nation’s borders. 

I am privileged to serve as the Executive Director of the CBP Office of Intelligence 

(OINT), a critical element of the Office of the Commissioner, charged with three primary responsibilities. The first is to directly support the Commissioner and CBP 

headquarters and field leadership with the acquisition, analysis and timely dissemination of intelligence information critical to CBP’s primary mission of detecting, 

identifying and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the 

United States. The second is to efficiently manage an integrated CBP intelligence 

capability that ensures front-line CBP officers and decision makers have the valueadded intelligence required to sustain border situational awareness, drive operations 

and support policy. And finally, as a member of the Department’s Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC), it is the responsibility of the OINT to represent 

CBP’s intelligence requirements and equities to the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer/

Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, and assist him in directing an integrated DHS intelligence enterprise that provides one DHS face to the National Intelligence Community. I will address each of these responsibilities from the perspective of intelligence support to border security.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Overview 

In addition to facilitating the international trade critical to the United States 

economy, CBP is responsible for protecting more than 5,000 miles of border with 

Canada, 1,900 miles of border with Mexico and operating 325 official Ports of Entry. 

On an average day in 2005, CBP personnel: processed 1,181,605 passengers and pedestrians, 69,370 containers, 333,226 incoming privately owned vehicles and 

$81,834,298 in fees, duties and tariffs; executed 62 arrests at ports of entry and over 
34

3,257 apprehensions between the ports for illegal entry; seized over 5,541 pounds 

of narcotics and 1,145 prohibited meat, plant materials or animal products at and 

between the ports of entry; refused entry to 868 non-citizens at the ports of entry; 

and intercepted 146 smuggled aliens and 206 fraudulent documents while rescuing 

7 illegal immigrants in distress or dangerous conditions between the ports of entry. 

As these figures demonstrate, CBP, the nation’s unified border agency, addresses a 

variety of threats to U.S. borders that includes illegal immigration, illegal drugs, 

border violence, illegal incursions, pests/diseases and a host of trade violations ranging from smuggling to intellectual property rights.

Countering Terrorists 

While these threats to our borders are addressed each day, all CBP personnel understand that their priority mission is to prevent terrorists and their weaponry from 

entering the United States. While OINT directly supports operations aimed at addressing all border threat categories, it also remains focused on supporting CBP’s 

priority mission of preventing terrorists and their weaponry from entering the 

United States. The first priority of CBP’s Office of Intelligence is to operationalize 

intelligence reporting on terrorist threats. Each day, OINT watch standers and analysts review over 1000 intelligence community products, engage with CBP liaison officers and analysts embedded in DHS and the national intelligence community, and 

leverage long-standing partnerships with federal, state, local and international law 

enforcement and intelligence organizations to ensure early awareness of all potential terrorist travel or movement of materials to the United States. Working closely 

with their operational counterparts, OINT analysts meld this intelligence with information, trends and patterns identified in CBP operational reporting to properly assess and place in context these threats, discern vulnerabilities, evaluate potential 

consequences and ultimately calculate the risk these threats may pose to the borders of the United States. The results of this daily all-source analysis and risk assessment process is disseminated via over a dozen intelligence product lines and 

services including intelligence reports and alerts to CBP’s operational and field elements on the border that provide situational awareness, address officer safety and/

or assist in developing targeting criteria against specific terrorist threats to the 

United States.

Operations and Intelligence Briefings/Intelligence Driven Operations 

Regular, all-source, intelligence briefings are provided to the Commissioner and 

CBP operational Assistant Commissioners from the Offices of Field Operations, Border Patrol, Anti-Terrorism, Air and Marine and International Affairs. During these 

briefings, CBP’s senior leadership review the most current threat developments, 

maintain continuity on existing terrorist threat streams and utilize the latest intelligence available to formulate appropriate operational actions required to counter 

those threats. CBP’s senior leadership has a number of operational courses of action 

available to operationalize threat intelligence, to include directing intelligence driven operations. Once CBP’s senior leadership concurs that there is viable intelligence 

indicating a threat to our borders, an operational response plan is quickly formulated to address the specific threat modus, timeframe and geographic locations. 

These threat-based operations are put together by CBP’s affected headquarters and 

field elements, formally vetted through the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, then promulgated to the appropriate CBP operational field components for implementation. 

Additionally, OINT will regularly report the results of these operations via Homeland Security Intelligence Reports, and the CBP Office of Field Operations or Office 

of Border Patrol will formally assess the operational results upon their conclusion.

Supporting Forward Operations 

To meet its priority mission, CBP has implemented a layered, defense in-depth 

strategy that thoroughly addresses people and cargo for linkages to terrorism prior 

to entering the United States. In partnership with an array of countries, international organizations, private businesses, and trade entities, CBP is involved with 

a host of programs and initiatives aimed at pushing our ′′zone of defense′′ outward. 

A key example of this is the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which places CBP 

personnel teams in key overseas ports to assist in identifying high-risk cargo. OINT 

has selected and trained intelligence research specialists to work as members of 

these CSI teams. Embedded with their host country, CSI intelligence personnel are 

supported daily by OINT which routinely provides them overviews of the latest intelligence threat reporting and vets their individual and company names of interest 

against U.S. intelligence terrorist data bases for derogatory information, etc.Another 

example of CBP pushing its ′′zone of defense′′ outward is the Customs and Trade 

Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) which has CBP partnering with over 9,000 

private businesses to ensure the security of the international supply chain to prevent terrorists from exploiting legitimate trade. Membership in C-TPAT requires the 
35

CBP to regularly certify partner company due diligence, and OINT plays a significant role in supporting CBP with intelligence research, entity searches, and the 

verification of information.

Supporting Operations at the Border 

In addition to OINT’s regular products and support to intelligence driven operations, OINT provides daily support to, the operational offices charged with maintaining CBP’s border presence and security. These operational offices have placed 

subject matter experts within secure OINT facilities in order to increase information 

sharing and agency cooperation. Furthermore, OINT maintains a permanent detachment at CBP’s National Targeting Center (NTC) with secure connectivity to national intelligence community reporting and data bases. This detachment supports 

the NTC’s mission to assess all cargo and passengers enroute to the U.S. for potential links to terrorism and to directly support CBP Officers and Agents when they 

encounter individuals or cargo linked to terrorism.Q02

Managing the Integrated CBP Intelligence Enterprise 

It is the responsibility of the Office of Intelligence to functionally manage the larger 

CBP intelligence enterprise. A number of CBP components have formally designated 

intelligence organizations, while others, such as the Office of Field Operations, have 

robust operational information analysis capabilities that work closely with these intelligence organizations. The Office of the Border Patrol has a significant intelligence organization that includes a national headquarters division, a Border Field 

Intelligence Center in El Paso, Texas and intelligence units at each of the 20 Border 

Patrol Sectors, all responsible for directly supporting front line Border Patrol 

Agents. CBP Air and Marine has a formal intelligence capability with designated 

intelligence personnel at their national headquarters, Air and Marine Operations 

Center in Riverside, California and with their Directors of Air Operations and 

Branches around the United States. These intelligence organizations are staffed 

with a combination of intelligence research specialists as well as Border Patrol 

Agents and CBP Air and Marine officers filling intelligence positions. 

As you can imagine, each of these organizations generate standing and ad hoc information needs, intelligence requirements, requests for information, collection requirements, as well as a host of personnel, training, connectivity, equipment and 

policy needs. OINT aggregates, validates and prioritizes these requirements and 

brokers them through the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis to the national 

intelligence community for satisfaction.

Leveraging the DHS Intelligence Enterprise 

CBP leverages the DHS Intelligence Enterprise largely by OINT’s membership in 

the larger DHS intelligence enterprise. Working with the Chief Intelligence Officer, 

Assistant Secretary Charles Allen, the Department of Homeland Security is putting 

into place a rapidly expanding capability to support its agencies’ intelligence components. As CBP’s Key Intelligence Official, I am a member of Assistant Secretary Allen’s Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC) - the primary DHS intelligence 

decision-making body. Personnel from my office represent CBP’s intelligence requirements on over a dozen HSIC-established panels, boards and working groups 

that address issues ranging from analytical production coordination to collection, 

training, and information systems. It is through this maturing DHS intelligence enterprise management architecture that OINT is addressing critical intelligence concerns such as supporting Operation Jumpstart’s deployment of National Guard Bureau intelligence personnel to the Southwest Border and supporting implementation 

of the Southwest Border Counter-Narcotics Strategy. Additionally, by leveraging the 

developing DHS report writers and intelligence training programs, CBP is gaining 

personnel and training necessary to ensure that it can translate its significant operational information flow into a steady supply of timely, intelligence reports. These 

reports are earning acclaim for their relevancy from national, state and local intelligence and law enforcement customers, and make CBP a leading producer of intelligence reporting among DHS components. OINT will continue to play a leading role 

in developing this DHS intelligence enterprise and leverage it to facilitate its own 

developing intelligence integration plans and meet its intelligence needs.

Closing 

I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to testify today with my Department of Homeland Security intelligence colleagues. I will be happy to answer 

any questions you may have.

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank all three witnesses for their testimony. We 

have learned there is another procedural motion and vote on the 

floor. We will do our best to keep this dialogue moving forward. My 
36

colleague has gone to vote. I will keep the mike open, and we will 

do our questions. 

Mr. Sloan, in your testimony on page 4 you make reference to information collected by the Coast Guard. 

Ms. O’Connell, in your testimony you also make reference to the 

collection capabilities of your organization. 

And, Mr. Bortmes, you just referred to what I called surveillance 

and depth. 

The Coast Guard is now a full members of the U.S. Intelligence 

Community. The other entities I don’t believe are. But the Coast 

Guard does not have a history and tradition of collection in an intelligence sense. But since 9/11 and in the new environment, the 

issue of collection of these assets to me is critically important. I 

don’t want to know that you are acquiring information; in other 

words, that somebody hands you something and you take it. I do 

want to know that you are engaged in collection, because that 

seems to me to be a very worthwhile addition to our capabilities 

in a post-9/11 environment. 

Could each of you talk a little bit about how you operate in the 

field and what opportunities you have to collect information that 

others don’t have? In other words, what is your value added from 

that standpoint to the overall intelligence efforts of our country? 

Mr. SLOAN. Sir, I will begin. First of all, as you probably know, 

in addition to being a member of the Intelligence Community, the 

Coast Guard is also one of the largest law enforcement agencies in 

the United States Government, particularly in DHS, and our law 

enforcement activity principally revolving around the maritime domain also includes information at ports, and we have over 360 

ports for which we are responsible in addition to those miles of 

coastline. 

In each of the ports and I will focus first, if I may, on the law 

enforcement intelligence collection activity. In most of the strategically and economically important ports of the United States, we 

have what are known as field intelligence support teams. These are 

law enforcement information collectors who work with not only the 

Federal counterparts, but the State and local counterparts in each 

of these ports. New York, for instance, they work with the New 

York City police and the police authorities. 

Mr. SIMMONS. If I could interrupt for just 1 minute. But when 

you collect for law enforcement, is that shared with your intelligence folks? 

Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. That is the point I was going to get at. All 

of this information that is collected, to include, I might add, the 

interview of the masters of ships who come from overseas who can 

give us essentially the lay of the land in the port that they just departed from, this information is then put into field intelligence reports, which not only go to-in a law enforcement capacity not only 

go to Coast Guard Intelligence Fusion Centers, but also to the 

Homeland Security Department. 

When they arrive at our fusion centers—and as you might recall, 

I indicated we have one on each coast as well as a production center out in Suitland with the Office of Naval Intelligence—the information, where appropriate and authorized, bumps up against validated requirements that the Intelligence Community has to an-
37

swer. And that is where the nexus occurs, and then, of course, published into the larger community if it would answer an intelligence—validated intelligence requirement. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I appreciate that. I know my time is going to run 

out. 

Ms. O’Connell, you collect, you provide new information to the 

community; is that correct? 

Ms. O’CONNELL. We do. We have got the six field intelligence 

units and the tactical intelligence centers out in the field where we 

collect information and then analyze it and put it back out into the 

operational components. For instance, in Operation Watchtower we 

work jointly with Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection in 

order to get information and identify individuals that may be a 

threat coming in. Also on Operations Capistrano and Roswell, we 

are looking at those individuals who are coming in to the airports, 

getting, collecting information, and analyzing that, and then identifying individuals that pose a vulnerability. 

The field intelligence units work with State and local Federal, 

State, and local and tribal authorities collecting intelligence, put it 

in Homeland Security intelligence reports, which we then bring 

into—some of them are brought into headquarters. Some of them 

are developed into intelligence information reports that go to the 

Intelligence Community. Other information is pumped out through 

the law enforcement components. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. Bortmes. 

Mr. BORTMES. Again, all the information that we are able to put 

in the Intelligence Community channels is derived from our law enforcement authorities and done in the normal process of our duties 

in carrying out those authorities. For instance, at our ports of entry 

each day, as individuals are encountered, and, in fact, we realize 

that they might have, for instance, a record, a tied record or something along those lines, they are taken to a secondary examination. 

We are able to sit down with our colleagues from ICE, from the 

FBI or the JTTFs, go into a more in-depth interview to determine 

their admissibility. That information and what might be obtained 

from those interviews will then be forwarded out to our National 

Targeting Center and to the Office of Intelligence. We ensure that 

gets captured in Homeland Security information reports, intelligence reports, and sent down to the community through the Department. So that occurs. And it gets posted, regularly sent to the 

National Counterterrorism Center, et cetera. 

The value added there, again, is that granularity, the ability to 

look at an individual up close. If they are denied admissibility into 

the United States and returned back, we have them for that time 

frame. So that is a unique piece of value added. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you very much. 

The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I will be quick so that my colleague will also have 

a chance to ask her questions. 

Last year there was an effort made to add an additional 550 Border Patrol agents and additional 200 immigration investigators, 

and again, in December, an effort to authorize 3,000 additional 

Border Patrol agents, for a total of 12,000 by 2010, along with a 

new training facility to expand capacity. 
38

As the Executive Director of Intelligence Office at CBP, would 

you find these resources helpful to you when you are doing your 

job? 

Mr. BORTMES. Border Patrol agents all represent to me a collector, a conduit of information. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you very much. 

We have, we know, on the northern border, our 5,000-mile-plus 

northern border, at any given time we have between 200 and 300 

Border Patrol agents. Do you believe this is an adequate force at 

the northern border? 

Mr. BORTMES. I believe that the number of Border Patrol agents 

on the border is closer to 1,000. But—

Ms. LOFGREN. But they are post positions. So we have only got 

at any given time 200 or 300 physically there. So do you think that 

is adequate? 

Mr. BORTMES. I don’t believe anyone thinks it is adequate right 

now. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you very much. 

The 9/11 Act mandated an additional 800 immigration enforcement agents over the next 5 years, but we have only actually funded 350. The 9/11 Act also mandated an additional 800 detention 

beds, but we have only funded, Congress has only funded, an additional 1,800. Do you think that this is adequate to deal with the 

flow that you have seen? 

Mr. BORTMES. The question is again directed at me? 

Ms. LOFGREN. Yes. 

Mr. BORTMES. These are questions again, ma’am, that I believe 

are best answered by our operational folks, and I would like to take 

it for the record and have them respond to you and the previous 

question about adequate numbers on the northern border. 

Ms. LOFGREN. That would be fine. 

Ms. LOFGREN. And I think I will stop my questioning at this 

point and yield back so that my colleague Mrs. Lowey may ask her 

questions, and we can all get our votes in. 

Mr. SIMMONS. The Chair recognizes the distinguished gentlelady 

from New York. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. And I will ask it quickly because the 

bells are still going off. 

I would like to direct it to Mr. Bortmes. You have heard us talk 

frequently about the fact that only about 2 percent of our cargo is 

being inspected while Hong Kong inspects 100 percent. I am sure 

you are going to say you are not satisfied with 2 percent, but can 

you tell me what is actually being done to remedy that? And why 

can’t we move more quickly? 

Mr. BORTMES. Ma’am, I believe you are really addressing the 

issue of physically inspecting all of the cargo. As you know, a great 

deal of the cargo from our perspective, CBP’s perspective, is inspected. The records are looked at long before it is loaded aboard—

the manifests. 

Ms. LOWEY. Do you think it is adequate? 

Mr. BORTMES. The efforts that I have seen so far and, again, it 

is our operational elements as opposed to our intel pieces. From 

what I have seen, the automated targeting system that is in place 
39

is working extremely well at identifying those suspect cargos that 

I have to worry about as the Executive Director for Intelligence. 

Mrs. LOWEY. If you had your way, would you move in more physical inspection, as you call it, or are you including a more advanced 

technology in that description as well? 

Mr. BORTMES. Again, this is a question that if—I think if we 

bring our operational folks back to talk with you about in more detail, they can address it far better. But from all the discussions I 

have been part of, it is a combination of the reviewing them, the 

manifest information, better material, information arriving quicker, 

the nonintrusive inspection capabilities that are being developed. 

And there are plans for far more robust abilities to do that, and 

then actually devanning or having to inspect cargo, physically inspect the cargo. If you are doing all those things up front adequately and robustly, then the necessity for that latter part would 

not be there. 

Mrs. LOWEY. But as I understand it, you just said you do have 

plans for more robustly inspecting the cargo. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I would like to certainly request from the gentleman more detailed information, if you can follow up with us on 

that, because it is very disturbing to the average American when 

we continually read that Hong Kong is doing it, and we are not 

doing it, and we are all living at the edge these days. So I would 

appreciate that information. 

Mrs. LOWEY. And I thank the panel again. I am sorry we have 

to run, but I thank you for your important work. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SOUDER. [Presiding.] Thank you. 

I have—let me first—you heard me ask the first panel that as 

I visited the many border crossings north and south, and fast pass 

lanes or whatever it is called in different places, when they put 

their scan card in, if there is a question, a little pop-up occurs, and 

the person then has run a check. And what my question is is in 

the different intelligence agencies, are you confident that, first, 

within DHS, all the information is getting there with an individual 

name? And then, secondly, is the entire system getting into that? 

Now, the danger of having every single piece of intelligence available to everybody, if there is one leak, you compromise the entire 

system. But the question is why can’t at least a pop-up occur if 

anywhere in any of our intelligence systems there is a question 

about this name, even if it is just wanting to know where they are 

moving? Are you confident that that information is getting into our 

systems at this point? Could each of you briefly comment on that? 

Because you each deal with slightly different types of things. 

Maybe start with CBP, and whether the Coast Guard is getting it 

if they have a boat, and then ICE if you are doing an investigation. 

Mr. BORTMES. Sir, I am very confident that the information that 

is within the Intelligence Community on particular names, identifying data, the plus one data, et cetera, on those that we know are 

linked particularly to terror and then to criminal activity as well, 

that it is there. It is popping up. We have done, I think, efforts and 

strides have been made to make sure that it actually pops up in 

front of the CBP officer or the Border Patrol agent when they do 
40

run that information check. So I am confident that every effort—

that great strides have been made. 

Clearly there leaves this hole of what you do as you are developing information, names that are being investigated, operations 

that are under way by the Intelligence Community. There are other 

names there that are not quite yet definitive or authoritative. We 

always worry about that. We take great strides within CBP that 

as we are associating or linking individuals with terrorist backgrounds to others to make sure that that information gets in the 

appropriate law enforcement and terrorist databases so that it is 

there, with the caveat that, hey, we are now looking at this individual linked to another in this particular way. 

So great strides, I believe, have been made, and I am comfortable 

that the information the community has is getting there. You clearly always want it faster; you always want it better, clearer. And 

I know there are a number of initiatives throughout the community 

to make that happen. 

Mr. SOUDER. Because you have seconds. Your agent at the line 

at San Ysidro is going to be backed up hours at almost any time 

of the day, so there is huge pressure in seconds. That is why it has 

to—even a 6-hour delay, if it is not instantaneous, we could miss 

somebody going through the border. 

Before I follow up, let me clarify here, because you had some 

other—you had a question I want to follow up briefly. Is it CBP or 

ICE at our embassies that would have a DHS person doing a check, 

a background check? Is it ICE? 

Ms. O’CONNELL. ICE has. We have attaches and assets overseas. 

Mr. SOUDER. I just want to make sure. I couldn’t remember 

which one it was. In Pakistan, when I was there recently, that is, 

at the front desk—this isn’t just about whether we have agents at 

the border, this is an interrelated system inside the United States 

and externally. And the ICE agent had identified somebody on one 

of the lists, but the list of this person’s name had like 12 variations, because it isn’t just like Mark Edward Souder. Often they 

will have six names, will have an A and E turned around, will have 

two or three of the names here. Are you confident that at our borders, at the CBP or at the Coast Guard, or as we are doing the investigations, that all the different variations of the name are getting into the system as well? 

Ms. O’CONNELL. If we have an ongoing investigation, and with 

the focus on antiterrorism national security issues, I am confident 

that the names are in the system. It may be the main name and 

then AKAs, also known as, attached to that. Many instances when 

individuals coming into the port of entry Mr. Bortmes can speak 

on this also—an inspector will look at that name, and it will possibly highlight it, and in instances would identify that person who 

would go into secondary, and then you would work out different 

names and other uses. 

Mr. SOUDER. Let us say it is not an ongoing investigation, but 

a person on a watch list. We have a potential latent cell. Part of 

the way they move from just kind of casual watch to an aggressive 

watch to whether it is an ongoing, or whatever information you put 

together, so, for example, if we think that they are located in someplace in Indiana and haven’t moved, but then we see this person 
41

who we really were—just casually had on the list because of his relationship to, say, several individuals, all of a sudden we see them 

move at a border place in Texas, then we see them move up by 

Buffalo, then we see him at an embassy, it suggests that there may 

be a pattern. But without kind of core information, you can’t even 

get to the point. 

And so I understand if there is an active investigation, I have 

seen them pull into secondary on that. I am just wondering how 

far we are moving on this, and are we getting enough information 

in the system to be proactive other than an ongoing investigation? 

Ms. O’CONNELL. If they are identified as a lookout, yes, I am confident that they are in the system. 

Now, when you mentioned about movement between States, keep 

in mind that the identification of an individual in the system would 

be when they are coming in through the border. So there is obviously no checks going from State to State. But I am confident that 

that individual, if they rise to the level of putting them in as a 

lookout, that they would be in there, yes. 

Mr. SOUDER. That is assuming that they are a citizen of the 

United States. We would have no way of seeing whether a person 

who has either overstayed their visa or is on a visa is moving inside the United States? 

Ms. O’CONNELL. It is not just individuals that are U.S. citizens 

that would be put in the record that inspectors would identify coming through the border. It is also other individuals, lawfully admitted permanent residents, visitors, students. 

Mr. SOUDER. In the Coast Guard is there adequate technology 

now on—in most of our vessels to be able to read it if they pick 

somebody up or detain somebody? 

Mr. SLOAN. Well, sir, if I could just back up 1 second. The Coast 

Guard obviously doesn’t have a border check, if you will, but we do 

have a responsibility to vet the names of all crew members of certain vessels over a certain tonnage that must be supplied to us 96 

hours prior to the arrival in the United States; otherwise, the ship 

can’t enter. And we vet those names not only against the law enforcement database, but intelligence database that you can imagine 

we have available to us, to include the Terrorist Screening Center. 

The names, if they provide a hit, clearly the ship will be boarded 

before it arrives in the United States and the individuals be dealt 

with appropriately to the degree that it is a law enforcement matter or somebody who shouldn’t be coming into the country. But 

also, we provide some degree of check and balance. We want to 

make certain that the names that are being supplied to us and the 

passport information and the last port of call information and the 

origin of the particular crew, we will actually inspect vessels to 

verify before the vessel arrives to make certain that the information that was provided is, in fact, accurate. 

Mr. SOUDER. Two of the biggest potential areas for terrorists to 

hide are in Detroit and also crossing in upstate New York. I am 

from Fort Wayne, Indiana. I have been to Michigan many times, 

been at the border crossing many times there as well as other reasons, certainly the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair. The islands there 

are such at you can swim in 5 minutes between them, and the 

Coast Guard does, in fact, have primary responsibility at that point 
42

if a boat is coming into our waterway. The same thing in the St. 

Lawrence Seaway, that—and what I am wondering is, if the—do 

you, if—do you have the capability if you find that, or do you then 

if you have a suspect take them into another agency, have to run 

them to shore? Are we moving towards having some sort of onboard 

vessels? I know for narcotics we do in the Caribbean, but I am trying to think as we look at some of the Great Lakes areas and the 

St. Lawrence River, too, as well as the area coming into Seattle 

where the Coast Guard has a huge waterway with lots of San Juan 

Islands and everything. 

Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. The San Juan Islands are a perfect example 

as are the Great Lakes. But I would point out that although the 

appearance of Coast Guard efforts in the Great Lakes and the San 

Juan Islands would not look like what is going on in the Florida 

straits and the eastern Pacific and the Caribbean, the same 

amount of attention is being paid to it. 

And I recall from some of the discussion that occurred in the 

prior panel, the relationship with Canada is particularly important. 

We do have representatives of the Coast Guard who operate out of 

Ottawa, we have law enforcement agreements with the Canadian 

authorities, and we actually have a Canadian representative in our 

National Maritime Intelligence Center. So the link and the exchange of information with the Canadians is as important to cue 

our activities relative to those issues as anything else. 

Mr. SOUDER. I have one additional question, if I may, Mr. Chairman, that one of the things as we have looked at the border challenge is that—is the networks that work in between the borders. 

Particularly we have looked at OTMs as a higher risk, theoretically 

at least, in terrorism, other than Mexicans, but it could be any 

number of smuggling organizations. And the question is are we 

proactive? 

We have tried to increase legislation on coyotes, for example. In 

San Diego, Congressman Issa said that the penalty was 6 months, 

and it took 9 months to get to trial, so nobody was investigating 

that. Yet, in fact, for major smuggling organizations it is much 

going to be like Panama Express. In other words, when somebody—

we don’t believe at this point that the Veterans Administration 

files were stolen for that purpose; it appears to be some college 

kids, and we are watching that very closely. 

But much of identity theft in the United States is related to trying to get the Social Security numbers and IDs; that when somebody does a package to come across the border, whether it be an 

other than Mexican or a Mexican coming across, and they purchase 

this, often somebody is providing a map, providing a van to pick 

them up, providing a false green card, that with the Social Security 

number, and obviously work sites. As they come into Indiana, in 

my district, which is the number one manufacturing—and the bottom line is we have a number of people there or we wouldn’t be 

making it in manufacturing. 

I am not taking immediate sides on that question. I am asking, 

do we have a systematic way? Because we clearly have an 

‘‘interterior’’ smuggling organization that has places they rent the 

vans, buy the vans, markets. We had three green card manufacturers taken down in 30 days in my district. Is this being investigated 
43

in holistic? Because this is a gaping hole in our system over the 

last couple of years. 

Ms. O’CONNELL. I can speak a little bit about that on the operational side of ICE. The investigations program has just identified 

identity and benefit fraud units that will actively work within the 

interior of the United States. I don’t want to state a number. I 

have got one in my head, but I don’t know it 100 percent. So anyway, identity and benefit fraud units. 

Then, on the intelligence front, I have got a unit at headquarters 

that specifically specializes in human smuggling, in trafficking, immigration fraud types of things that have identified a number of 

areas. As a matter of fact, we had a case related to the vans that 

are moving people from the southern border up into the northwest 

or the northeast coast. 

Also, the field intelligence units that are out there on the ground 

work daily with the SAC offices, the special agent in charge offices, 

and get information in and work on and analyze different organizations and try to pull those details together, add the classified information, and try to identify target packages for those smuggling organizations. 

Mr. SLOAN. Sir, may I comment on that? Clearly asymmetrical 

immigration is a concern to the Coast Guard. This is where SIAs 

or people who might have a terrorist link or associations would 

come in by absconding or deserting or being a stowaway on a vessel. 

But your point relative to identification, I think, is an important 

one for the Coast Guard. We issue merchant mariner licenses for 

hundreds of thousands of individuals, and I think it is important 

for me to testify to the fact that over the last 2 years, actually over 

2 years, the Coast Guard Investigative Service along with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the cooperation that we get from 

our partners in Homeland Security, Defense Department, and the 

Intelligence Community, has been vetting close to a quarter of a 

million merchant mariner documents to make certain that they are 

in the hands of the correct people. 

In fact, I couldn’t even tell you in an open session that we have 

associated nine individuals—it doesn’t seem like a lot out of a quarter million, but it is significant—who actually have associations 

with terrorism over the course of that period of time. It is an effort 

that continues, ongoing, and actually our regional centers that 

issue mariner documents are now trained to go through that program before mariner documents are actually allowed to be issued. 

Mr. SIMMONS. [Presiding.] I want to thank this panel for their 

testimony. It has been extremely interesting and thought-provoking. I realize that some of our panelists have stayed beyond 

their anticipated time of testimony, and particularly you, Mr. 

Sloan. So we thank you very much. It has been very informative. 

And at this point I will excuse the second panel and invite our 

third panel to come forward. 

The third panel is made up of two individuals, Mr. Michael W. 

Cutler from the Center for Immigration Studies, and Mr. Michael 

O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institute. I welcome both of you gentlemen to testify. I think you have already determined that we have 

your written statements in our notebooks, we have reviewed those 
44

written statements prior to today’s hearing, so feel free to cherrypick the most cogent points to present to us so that we can get into 

the questions and answers, which is often very informative for the 

subcommittee. And, again, I thank you for being here. 

And I would ask the staff to secure the door so that we can hear 

the testimony. 

Thank you, gentlemen. C comes before O. Why don’t we proceed 

on that basis. Mr. Cutler. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL W. CUTLER, FELLOW, CENTER FOR 

IMMIGRATION STUDIES 

Mr. CUTLER. Thank you, sir. Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, Members of Congress, ladies and gentlemen, I welcome this invitation to appear before you today at a hearing that 

I believe is of critical importance to the safety of our citizens and 

indeed to the very survival of our Nation. 

The gathering of effective intelligence is essential for effective 

law enforcement and for issues relating to national security. Nothing can be of greater significance than the issue of developing effective intelligence; that is to say, the culling of accurate information 

and understanding its place in the overall picture. 

Intelligence should be thought of as being comparable to the way 

that a digital photograph is made. A digital photograph is comprised of a huge number of elements or pixels which are placed in 

the proper location to paint the clear picture. As the number of 

pixels increases, the clarity of the photo increases proportionately. 

So, too, the clarity of the picture painted by effective intelligence 

is proportionate to the quantity and quality of the intelligence nuggets or bits of information that can be gathered and placed into 

their proper position in the mosaic that makes up the overall pictures. And the ability to understand the significance of each kernel 

of information also contributes to the clarity of the picture that the 

intelligence will create. 

But effective intelligence also requires that it be disseminated 

quickly to the ultimate users of the intelligence. It has a short shelf 

life, and, therefore, where critical intelligence is concerned, time is 

of essence. Pixels do not lose their value over time, but intelligence 

does. 

Additionally, it is important to understand that human nature 

often creates additional hurdles. Approximately 400 years ago, Sir 

Francis Bacon said, knowledge is power. That statement is as true 

today as it was when he first said it. Various Federal agencies realize that intelligence that they possess provides them with a certain 

amount of power, and therefore their members have been reluctant 

to share their knowledge with other agencies. However, to the 

point that intelligence is to protect our Nation, intelligence is critical today that will become worthless in a very short period of time 

if it is not freely and expeditiously shared with those who possess 

the need to know. 

Rather than to continue to read my prepared statement, what I 

do want to do is point to something that I did talk about in my prepared statement that I would like to paraphrase. 

You know, I have heard today members of the subcommittee talk 

about the idea of allowing people in to work because we are con-
45

cerned about terrorists and we are concerned about the border. But 

the point of fact, the border alone won’t solve our problems. I have 

often spoken about the need to think of immigration law enforcement as a tripod, with the inspectors who enforce the immigration 

laws at ports of entry, the Border Patrol between ports of entry, 

but you need to have enough special agents to enforce the immigration laws from within the interior of the United States so that we 

have a seamless coordinated effort. 

I share Ms. Lofgren’s concern about the numbers of people that 

have been proposed to be hired. In fact, in May of last year I testified at the Immigration Subcommittee about the fact that while 

Congress had authorized the hiring of 800 new special agents, the 

administration only hired 143, or wanted to hire 143. The number 

was eventually increased. 

But this has been going on for the longest time. There was no 

response to the first attack on the World Trade Center from an immigration perspective, and today we are in a situation where we 

are not even giving foreign language training to the special agents 

who are supposed to be investigating illegal aliens operating within 

our country. And, quite frankly, if you can’t communicate with people, then you are unable to investigate those people. And the dayto-day routine enforcement of the immigration laws is critical to 

our security because it is during the routine enforcement of the 

laws that you will encounter potential terrorists and develop information. 

Twenty years ago—and this is also my prepared testimony—I 

was doing a rather mundane and routine job. I was assigned to the 

squad that was responsible for investigating locations that were 

knowingly hiring illegal aliens, and we arrested a bunch of people 

working illegal in the United States in a diner at Staten Island. 

One of the individuals whom we arrested turned out to be a citizen 

of Egypt; and we went back to his apartment in order to get his 

passport, which was the standard procedure. What we found were 

bags filled to the brim with food coupons and dog food coupons and 

detergent coupons. And we could not understand why he had this, 

and he had no adequate explanation. 

Mr. CUTLER. We had no place to go with that information and 

no place to make inquiries. We ultimately deported that guy. And 

months later I was shocked to listen to a television news report 

about how the PLO had sent some of their folks into our country 

to commit coupon fraud to fund terrorism in the Middle East. 

It is important that if we are going to secure our country and 

protect our people, that we have enough agents and that we understand who we are really dealing with. And quite frankly, I am very 

much concerned when I hear stories about guest worker programs 

that would provide official documentation to illegal aliens whose 

true identities we don’t know. There is no way that we can develop 

a system that will deal with millions of people who have no way 

of proving who they are, where we would wind up giving people official identity documents without knowing whether or not these are 

bad guys, because I would like to remind you that the job of a terrorist, just like a spy, is to hide in plain sight, and if we give identity documents to people without knowing their true identities, we 

make it that much easier for them to hide in plain sight. 
46

And finally, I want to make one point, if I may. I have heard 

some of the folks today talk about interior enforcement, and they 

are right, but they have limited it to people who have been identified on the border who fail to show up, the so-called OTMs who 

failed to appear, and employer sanctions. 

A big issue is immigration benefit fraud. Janice Kephart was the 

counsel to the 9/11 Commission, and I provided testimony to her, 

and she did a little bit of a study and found that there were over 

90 terrorists that were identified in our country operating during 

the decade leading up to 9/11. Of those 90-odd aliens, some 59, or 

about two-thirds, had used immigration benefit fraud either to 

enter into the United States or to embed themselves in the United 

States once they got here. 

If we don’t address immigration from all aspects, then I think we 

are going to have a very serious problem. And intelligence is only 

a part of the metrics; we also need to look at the visa waiver program as well. 

I know my time is up. I thank you for your indulgence, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you for that insightful statement. We appreciate the breadth of experience you bring to the issue. 

[The statement of Mr. Cutler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL W. CUTLER

Chairman Simmons, ranking member Lofgren, members of Congress, ladies and 

gentlemen, I welcome this invitation to appear before you today at a hearing that 

I believe is of critical importance to the safety of our citizens and indeed to the very 

survival of our nation. 

The gathering of effective intelligence is essential for effective law enforcement 

and for issues relating to national security. Nothing can be of greater significance 

than the issue of developing effective intelligence, that is to say, the culling of accurate information and understanding its place in the overall picture. Intelligence 

should be thought of as being comparable to the way that a digital photograph is 

made. A digital photograph is comprised of a huge number of elements or pixels, 

which are placed in the proper location to paint a clear picture. As the number of 

pixels increases, the clarity of the photo increases proportionately. So too, the clarity 

of the picture painted by effective intelligence is proportionate to the quantity and 

quality of the intelligence or nuggets of information that can be gathered and placed 

in the proper position in the mosaic that makes up the overall picture. The ability 

to understand the significance of each kernel of information, also contributes to the 

clarity of the picture that the intelligence will create. 

Effective intelligence also requires that it be disseminated quickly to the ultimate 

users of the intelligence. It has a short ′′shelf life′′ and therefore where critical intelligence is concerned, time is of the essence. Pixels do not lose their value over time, 

intelligence does. Additionally, it is important to understand human nature. Approximately 400 years ago Sir Francis Bacon said, ′′Knowledge is power.′′ That 

statement is as true today as it was when he first said it. Various federal agencies 

realize that intelligence that they possess provides them with a certain amount of 

power and therefore their members have been reluctant to share their knowledge 

with other agencies. However the point to intelligence is to protect our nation and 

intelligence that is critical today will become worthless in a very short period of 

time. That is why it must be freely and expeditiously shared with those who truly 

possess the ′′Need to know.′′

It is also worth noting that intelligence comes from many sources. It comes from 

electronic surveillance and other high-tech means and also comes from low-tech 

sources; informants who are willing to talk and field personnel who make observations in the field when they find documents and other materials that yield valuable 

information. That is why it is essential that field agents understand that they have 

a vital role to play in the development of intelligence. They are our government’s 

eyes and ears on the ground and their discoveries and insights are invaluable. Because of this, not only must they be provided with accurate intelligence to help them 

do their jobs, they must also be provided with an opportunity to share their observa-
47

tions with intelligence analysts who may be able to take seemingly unconnected observations and even ′′hunches′′ and weave them into a tapestry of effective intelligence. 

I would like to share with you an experience I had approximately 20 years ago 

which is as relevant today as it was when it occurred. Back then I was assigned 

to a unit of the former INS in New York that was charged with finding illegal aliens 

who were working illegally in the United States. My colleagues and I were in the 

process of arresting a number of illegal aliens who were working in a diner in Staten Island, New York when one of the illegal alien employees, a citizen of Egypt, fled 

the restaurant when he realized we were present. He made an exhaustive although 

ultimately futile effort to evade us and we succeeded in taking him into custody. 

We took him back to his apartment to attempt to retrieve his passport, a standard 

procedure, since his passport would be helpful in positively identifying him and determining his date place and manner of entry into the United States. His passport 

would also be useful in arranging for his deportation should the immigration judge 

order him deported. With his consent, we entered his apartment and were surprised 

to find that there were numerous department store shopping bags lining one of the 

walls in his sparsely furnished apartment. These bags were filled to the very top 

with hundreds upon hundreds of coupons for all sorts of merchandise ranging from 

dog food to detergent to cereal. He had no meaningful explanation for this but we 

had no way of making any inquiries to understand the possible significance of those 

coupons. We retrieved his passport and he was ultimately deported. Several months 

later I was shocked to learn from a televised news program that the PLO had sent 

a number of their people to the United States to engage in coupon fraud in order 

to fund terrorism in the Middle East. Purportedly this tactic netted the PLO millions of dollars in ill-gotten funds. This young man who was seemingly engaged in 

nothing more sinister than washing dishes in a diner was apparently an operative 

of a terrorist organization. We had him in custody and we deported him, losing a 

potential treasure trove of intelligence from a terrorist operative or at least terrorist 

sympathizer. To this day I wonder what intelligence we might have gained had we 

understood the significance of the shopping bags filled with coupons on the day we 

arrested him. I also wonder where he is now and what efforts he might be engaged 

in that pose a threat to our nation or our allies today. 

If the news media understood the significance of coupon fraud, why did not the 

former INS make certain that their field agents were aware of such activities? Keeping our law enforcement personnel in the dark not only keeps them from being as 

effective as possible at carrying out their day to day duties, it also keeps them from 

recognizing situations that may make their jobs more hazardous and also prevents 

them from pressing an investigation further, where the results might yield highly 

critical information. 

This is also the reason that I am greatly concerned when I hear members of the 

administration talk about the need to conduct field investigations where critical infrastructure facilities are concerned such as airports and nuclear power plants but 

where limited resources make routine immigration law enforcement a non-priority. 

Certainly it is vital that we make certain that we make vital infrastructure facilities 

as secure as possible and not only where hiring illegal aliens is concerned, but from 

other perspectives as well. However, as we have seen in a number of terrorism investigations over the past several years, many of the suspected terrorists who have 

been identified and arrested have not worked as such sensitive locations as airports 

and nuclear power plants, but had relatively ′′pedestrian′′ jobs driving taxi cabs and 

ice cream trucks as well as teaching in schools and working in used car lots. The 

goal of terrorists is to ′′hide in plain sight′′ or in the parlance of the 911 Commission, to ′′embed′′ themselves in our nation. 

The routine enforcement of immigration laws can provide our government with 

the opportunity to cultivate informants and provide essential insight if our agents 

are properly briefed and properly debriefed. They need to be encouraged to come forward whenever they make observations that arouse their suspicions or curiosity and 

need to have an easy way to report on their findings in the field. 

Finally, we also need to provide our field personnel at ICE with appropriate training, including foreign language training. When I attended the Border Patrol Academy in 1972 I was required to successfully complete a Spanish language training 

program as were all enforcement personnel who were hired by the INS. Today, incredibly, that foreign language training is not only not required, it is not even offered for newly hired special agents of ICE. As I have stated at previous Congressional hearings at which I have testified, you simply cannot investigate people you 

are unable to communicate with. It is absolutely essential that our ICE personnel 

be given Spanish language training and they also need to be trained in various strategic languages such as Arabic, Farsi and Urdu to name a few. They also need to 
48

be given on-going training to properly identify fraudulent and/or altered identity 

documents, since these documents are the linchpins that hold the immigration system together. From what I have been told, this training is far from adequate at 

present, and this is not in our nation’s best interest. I would remind you that the 

terrorists who attacked our nation on September 11, 2001 used multiple identities 

and false documents as well as documents that were improperly issued to them, in 

order to embed themselves in our country as they prepared for the horrific attacks 

that they launched against our nation and our people on that terrible day. 

I look forward to your questions.

Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. O’Hanlon. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL O’HANLON, SENIOR FELLOW IN 

FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. O’HANLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congresswoman. 

It is an honor to be here. I will try to be very quick. I just want 

to make one broad comment. Having listened to the great expertise 

this morning and learned a lot myself, I think it highlights, if you 

put it all together, one broad observation, which is that intelligence 

is very important clearly at land border crossings, but we are never 

going to have good enough intelligence to find individuals and be 

able to target Border Patrol assets accurately. Our only hope using 

intelligence really is at the places where people come through official points of entry. That is where we spotlight attention. 

So this leads me to a couple of broad conclusions. While I think 

we do need to keep working on intelligence capability for land 

crossings, we are never going to know enough about coyotes and 

about preferred points of entry and so forth to have that be a reliable way to stop people. It takes very good luck to find someone, 

it is going to always take very good luck, which leads me to think 

we need to continue to increase capacity first to seal those borders 

to the extent possible, even though we all know it is not theoretically truly possible. 

Secondly, to be able to do a very good job at official points of 

entry in certain areas where we are not doing very well right now, 

I think we need to be making inquiries of a lot more passengers 

inside of cars at official points of entry and not simply hoping that 

the driver’s identity gives us a sufficient tip as to whether that car 

is suspicious. 

And I also think that, in keeping with some of the comments 

that have just been made, we do need to think hard about better 

forms of identification for American citizens, standards for driver’s 

licenses, possibly even national ID cards. 

The 9/11 Commission, I think, was quite convincing on these 

points. Americans have a very strong civil liberties concept on our 

Nation’s history and in our thinking, and therefore, there is always 

pushback against this sort of idea. But I think tougher standards 

on driver’s licenses and other forms of identification are critical, because we have to always be looking inside the country, too, because 

we are going to have people keep crossing across the land borders. 

That is never going to be sealed enough, and we can’t assume that 

intelligence is going to ever get good enough to solve that problem. 

So, official points of entry, whether it is people coming through 

or cargo coming through, we need more capacity, more capacity for 

land borders to reduce the likelihood of people getting through because intelligence is not going to help us pinpoint to know exactly 

when and where to look for whom. We are going to have to try to 
49

increase general capability across that land border. And in general, 

on sort of a broad unfocused note, but more, more, more. We need 

more capacity in general because intelligence is never going to be 

smart enough to tell us when and where to look for whom. And I 

will stop with that simple point. 

[The statement of Mr. O’Hanlon follows:]

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL O’HANLON

Border protection is a critical pillar of homeland security. It keeps dangerous people and materials out of the country before terrorists can even get into a position 

to attack. In other words, it is preventive in nature-and thus represents an optimal 

approach to homeland security policy, as my coauthors and I argue in our new 

Brookings book, Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007. 

Border protection should not be principally viewed as a literal defense of the nation’s perimeter. It is not tantamount to the creation of a moat around American 

borders. Rather, it is a set of efforts that exploits the fact that people and goods 

are relatively easily monitored when they arrive at checkpoints. In other words, 

movement across borders allows spotlighting to occur. To be sure, some border protection functions represent something closer to the direct physical protection of borders-most notably, the efforts of the border patrol along the long perimeters of the 

United States, as well as some activities of the Coast Guard and the Department 

of Defense. But the spotlighting role is even more critical. Its failure is what allowed 

the 19 September 11 hijackers to enter the country. Similarly, the nation’s inability 

to know accurately what goods are coming across its borders have much more to 

do with holes in the official inspection process-that is, with the spotlighting function-than with the weaknesses of our national walls. 

Done right, border security activities can offer additional benefits beyond the 

homeland security sphere, meeting another one of our four recommended guidelines. 

Digitized and computerized borders can allow more dependable and rapid movement 

of people and goods in and out of the United States. They can also provide better 

knowledge of where ships and goods are when in transit. That in turn translates 

into, among other things, a greater ability to prevent or respond quickly to other 

dangers such as piracy and ship accidents that can afflict trade and travel. This 

should be the goal of tighter border protection; we must avoid the risk of borders 

turning into chokepoints. Homeland security efforts should reinforce, not compete 

with, economic competitiveness. 

America’s geography generally helps in the effort to monitor borders and to use 

them as a means of funneling goods and routing people through places where spotlighting is possible. But the country has two long land borders that remain very difficult to guard. And they are far from the only main challenge facing this domain 

of homeland security. This testimony considers a number of relevant problems, as 

well as the general matter of aviation security, which is in part a matter of border 

protection. Its conclusions, in short, are that there is no magic bullet for keeping 

illicit goods and people out of the country, and no easy analytical way to deduce 

what level of increased inspection or monitoring capacity would be sufficient for national security. Ongoing efforts since 9/11 have been headed in the right direction, 

however, and the gradual increase in capacity for monitoring borders as well as 

goods should continue. In addition, some additional policy steps such as much more 

uniform standards for drivers’ licenses are called for.

Monitoring of People 

There has been progress in regulating and monitoring the movement of people 

into the United States. It is much harder for individuals to gain access to this country while disguising their true identities, particularly for those on terror watch lists. 

Notably, someone trying to fly into an airport from abroad is unlikely to get through 

under their own name if on a terrorist watch list, and indeed is unlikely to be allowed entry even under a false name if his or her fingerprints are already on file. 

This is a major step forward since 9/11. 

Other useful measures have also been adopted. For example, the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) now appears to be functioning quite 

well in helping track those foreigners in the United States on student visas. Those 

who overstay visas can be more quickly identified and located. 

Biometric indicators are used increasingly to control foreign travel. The U.S.-

VISIT program requires foreign visitors from all countries except Canada to submit 

to fingerprinting (of right and left index fingers) and digital photography upon arrival in the United States. A complementary program, the State Department’s Bio-
50

metric Visa Program, requires that fingerprints be taken of visa applicants before 

travel to the United States and compared to those in a DHS database (known as 

IDENT) consisting of some five million individuals, some of whom are ineligible for 

American visas. Upon arrival in the United States, visitors’ fingerprints taken by 

DHS under the U.S.-VISIT program are also checked against those on the visas to 

confirm that the individual in question is indeed the one to whom the visa was 

granted. 

To reduce the chances that individuals planning terror attacks will find a legal 

way into the country and then overstay their visas, it would be useful to record exits 

in real time from the United States. Those remaining longer than they should could 

then be more easily identified and pursued (as the 9/11 Commission recommended). 

A remaining problem in air travel security arises from what is known as the Visa 

Waiver Program. Until digitized passports with biometric indicators are widely used 

by qualifying countries, the visa waiver program (VWP) will continue to constitute 

a substantial loophole in U.S. border security, given the prevalence of stolen and 

forged passports around the world. While individuals entering under VWP are still 

checked upon entry, there is less ability to interview them thoroughly when required if such activities must be carried out at the actual border. 

This circumstance argues for some other level of screening of individuals from 

VWP countries before they can board flights for the United States. For example, 

DHS security personnel could be deployed at foreign airline check-in counters in certain VWP countries (as Israel does with El Al flights). 

Terrorist watch lists also need to be improved. The United States is presently consolidating some dozen watchlists into a single terrorist screening database (TSDB) 

using more extensive data in the terrorist identities database (TID) that is also now 

being constructed. (The effort to construct the TID began with the previous gold 

standard of terrorist watch lists, the State Department’s TIPOFF list. The list was 

subsequently scrubbed and expanded by consolidating it with other databases.) 

Some new specialized watchlists with limited information (easier to share with people not possessing security clearances) are being created as well, such as the Secure 

Flight database to assist in monitoring aircraft passengers and improve the accuracy with which their names are matched against those of suspected terrorists. 

Thankfully none of the watchlist consolidations have turned into complete fiascos, 

as the FBI’s attempts to computerize its case files unfortunately has. But the consolidation and integration process remains slow. For example, Secure Flight had not 

yet been tested as of September 2005. 

Even digitized passports with biometric indicators cannot track new recruits with 

no known ties to terrorist organizations. It is therefore important to recall that 

there are inherent limitations to these sorts of terrorist tracking efforts. This is one 

clear example of the reason why a multi-tiered strategy for homeland security is imperative. 

The problem with screening people also works in the opposite direction--keeping 

good people out while they wait for security reviews to be completed. This is true 

for example for foreign students, who when screened through the so-called Visas 

Mantis program have had to wait months for their visas in many cases. Improvements have been underway in these programs, including allowing students to get 

a single visa for an entire period of study (rather than requiring annual renewal). 

But there are still long delays. This problem also applies to individuals trying to 

enter the country to conduct business, seek medical care, or pursue other important 

matters. 

The student problem has not truly become severe. While the 2003/2004 academic 

year did register a 2.4 percent decline in foreign students relative to the year before, 

the number of foreign students remained greater than in 2000 or any year before. 

Moreover, numbers of applications from the Middle East to U.S. graduate schools 

actually increased in both the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 academic years (while numbers from China, India, and Korea continued to fall). Indeed, the overall number of 

foreign students in the United States was 4.5 percent greater in 2004/2005 than just 

before the September 11, 2001 attacks, though there was a decline of 14 percent in 

Middle Eastern students. And the U.S. figures were not notably worse than those 

witnessed in the United Kingdom. That said, the problem could again intensify--and 

could affect some of the most talented individuals in the broader foreign student 

pool, convincing disproportionate numbers of them to go elsewhere. Further measures to address this problem, such as increases in government capacity for processing such paperwork, are therefore warranted. 

In situations involving certain non-western countries, American technical and financial help may be needed to ensure good border security and travel controls. The 

simple fact of the matter is that the United States has a greater interest in tracking 

the movement of many terrorists than do developing countries. Even when that is 
51

not the case, many countries will not have the resources to do all they should given 

the urgency of the threat. Seen in this light, President Bush’s June 2003 East Africa 

Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) is a good step in the right direction. It provides 

$100 million to improve border control, police, airline security, and related homeland security operations in a region that has been hit hard by terrorist violence. The 

latter includes the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the 

2002 attacks on a hotel and airline in Kenya (the latter thankfully not successful), 

not to mention ongoing civil strife in places such as Somalia. This is enough money 

to make a real difference in a region of relatively low incomes. But these funds were 

apparently taken in large part out of existing programs, meaning that their net beneficial effect is difficult to ascertain. And similar programs are probably needed in 

other regions such as Central Asia. 

Ensuring adequate capacity to screen individuals and issue visas, as well as proper means for verifying their identities, helps the United States beyond the homeland 

security arena. It can expedite the movement of people into the country who can 

contribute to the economy, and who can ideally become goodwill ambassadors as 

well as important contact points for the United States once they return home. 

Whenever a homeland security program can have additional benefits beyond that 

immediate objective, it is especially worthy of serious consideration and serious support.

The Special Problem of Land Borders 

The preceding discussion pertains generally to the movement of individuals to and 

from the United States. But monitoring the movements of people at land borders 

poses special problems. It also offers unique opportunities, underscoring our theme 

about the need for greater international cooperation in the ′′homeland′′ security effort. To the extent Canada and Mexico make it hard for terrorists to use their countries as staging bases or waystations, the United States benefits from an added line 

of defense of its own country. That does not make its own border enforcement job 

unimportant, but it does allow a somewhat greater (and more realistic) margin for 

error at that inherently difficult line of defense. If Canada and Mexico improve their 

own monitoring of persons traveling into and out of the country, only modest additional improvements may be needed in border security along the U.S.-Canada frontier, and other lines of protection in the broader homeland security arena may become more effective. 

The United States has 216 airports, 143 seaports, and 115 land facilities that are 

official ports of entry, at a total of 317 places. Those land facilities generally involve 

car and truck traffic that is especially difficult to regulate. In addition, of course, 

land borders are very hard to control in between official points of entry. At many 

official checkpoints, passengers in cars are not checked as long as they are in vehicles with legitimate license plates. This policy should be changed. Care must be 

taken to do it in a way that does not seriously slow movement at checkpoints, with 

resulting consequences for commerce as well as convenience of travel. That suggests 

that the change in policy will have to be gradual to allow time for more inspectors 

to be hired and new procedures to be developed (such as adding lanes at checkpoints). Given typical car passenger loads, it may be necessary to increase staffing 

by as much as 100 percent. 

Open land borders are also a serious problem. For example, U.S. land management agencies are responsible for the 30 percent of the borders owned by the federal 

government. Yet they have only 200 full-time law enforcement officers, a number 

increased by just 20 percent in the first two years after September 11. Such numbers cannot begin to credibly monitor or prevent off-road border crossings. 

Such limited vigilance of U.S. land borders is a mistake. It can deprive the country of the opportunity to ′′spotlight′′ people effectively at official points of entry, 

thereby blunting one of the very best homeland security tools that the United States 

and the international community in general possess. There are relatively few dependable ways to search for terrorists among the huge throngs of individuals on the 

planet; this needle-in-haystack effort requires some means of rendering people visible, and official border crossings can do that. So it is especially important to ensure 

that individuals pass through such locations when traveling. 

Take for instance the sparsely guarded Canadian border, which can be an important means of entry. The Patriot Act led to a tripling of the number of U.S. agents 

along that border, but the total remains just under 1,000 for an enormously long 

and porous border, and there is little reason to think the number adequate. The 

United States also needs an integrated plan involving increased, random patrols 

and better equipment for surveillance and mobility for the U.S.-Canada border, as 

well as better cooperation with Ottawa in this effort. There is movement in the right 

direction. DHS is developing a way to have response capability anywhere within an 

hour of notice of a problem, and to improve monitoring as well. This might not help 
52

with the ′′lone wolf′′ terrorist sneaking through the woods, but could pick up illicit 

vehicle movements or groups of individuals. Five DHS bases near the Canadian border are being created to help in the effort. Overall, this border is better protected 

than before, and will soon be monitored even more effectively. But the absolute 

numbers of U.S. capabilities are still extremely modest, suggesting an enduring 

problem. 

Although few Canadians would pose major terrorism-related concerns, Canada’s 

efforts to monitor its own borders against terrorist infiltration are wanting in a 

number of areas. For example, its coast guard does little to monitor Canada’s long 

shorelines and cruise ships coming ashore do not have passenger manifests examined. This underscores the importance of Canada improving its own regulations on 

individuals visiting the country, but also means the United States must assume that 

foreign terrorists may try to reach this country via our northern neighbor. 

A greater worry is the Mexican border, where despite the presence of almost 

10,000 border agents, an estimated 4,000 illegal aliens cross per day. They are mostly Latinos, but also include individuals from countries such as Afghanistan, Egypt, 

Iran and Iraq with a greater corresponding risk of possible terrorist infiltration. Intelligence reports express concern that al Qaeda may indeed try to exploit the porosity of this border and infiltrate operatives through it. 

A rough benchmark for the above proposals to increase monitors at borders is that adding 1,000 employees costs the government $100 million. So the costs associated 

with the above proposals might be roughly $1 billion a year, if the doubling of inspectors recommended to monitor passengers in vehicles crossing the border were 

matched by comparable increases in other aspects of the border protection effort. Accurately estimating the appropriate number of additional inspectors is beyond the 

scope of this analysis, but the above number gives a reasonable ballpark. The number of inspectors has grown by 5,000 over the last decade, with some beneficial effect on estimated infiltration rates. Indeed, it possibly reduced them by one-third, 

though it is admittedly difficult to be sure of the exact numbers as well as the true 

causes of any decline. It makes sense therefore to continue on the same trajectory 

while also introducing new operational procedures and new technologies--such as 

UAV patrols, the sea wall near San Diego, and America’s Shield Initiative involving 

multispectral sensors and cameras as well as magnetic and seismic detectors. The 

Bush administration’s idea of using National Guard forces as a temporary means 

of supplementing DHS personnel at the borders seems in this light to be a good 

idea. 

The right policy is to start increasing border patrol personnel year by year in significant numbers and then attempt to modify procedures to improve border monitoring. As experience is gained, it can then be determined more accurately how 

many will be enough. Unfortunately, the Bush administration’s request for additional border agents in 2006 totaled just 210 individuals, a far cry from the scale 

of increase that would be appropriate, given the present porous nature of the country’s perimeter. But Congress wisely added $600 million to the president’s request 

in this area, enough for 1,000 additional agents. 

The database used by DHS’s Border Patrol, IDENT, is not fully integrated on a 

national scale with other databases. IDENT uses a photo and two fingerprints, 

whereas the FBI’s IAFIS (or Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System) uses all ten fingerprints. Reportedly, all U.S. Border Patrol stations now have 

interoperable systems capable of accessing IAFIS records and cross-checking the 

Border Patrol’s IDENT entries against those records. But Border Patrol agents cannot access the consolidated name-based terrorist watchlist maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center at their stations. 

Another problem is that the consular identification cards issued to their own citizens by some foreign governments, including Mexico, can be fraudulently obtained 

fairly easily. They are often used for identification in the United States. Lax standards for such cards cannot be tolerated. The United States may need to consider 

contributing seed money to encourage Mexico in particular to develop more rigorous 

and real-time databases of possible terrorists as well as better ID technology of its 

own. At present, the United States has a plan to require visitors crossing the Canadian or Mexican borders to present a passport or one of four other hard-to-counterfeit documents. But that plan is not due to be implemented before December 31, 

2007. 

Summing up, the land border security problem poses three special challenges. 

One, making sure that smaller border crossing posts receive up-to-date technology 

to become full participants in new efforts such as U.S.-VISIT, is mostly a matter 

of taking the problem seriously and providing adequate funds. A second, improving 

screening of individuals in cars--and working toward a standard by which all who 

pass through a land border are checked-is more demanding conceptually, though 
53

surely doable. It will take new procedures not yet developed. They could slow crossings dramatically, however, so considerable work is needed to add inspectors and 

increase the numbers of lanes at key crossings. Third is a problem for which solutions have not yet been successfully conceptualized, even in theory--closing down 

U.S. land borders to illegal infiltration, which is of course linked to broader U.S. 

immigration policy. More technical and human resources to monitor borders are 

generally well-advised to mitigate the problem, but are unlikely to solve it--again 

underscoring the need for a multi-tier approach to homeland security that begins 

by pushing America’s own borders ′′outward′′ and improving cooperation with other 

countries’ parallel homeland security efforts. 

There is clearly also a major benefit to improving border monitoring outside the 

homeland security domain. It is an important means of reducing illegal immigration, with all of its associated economic and political repercussions. Thus, focusing 

on land border controls within a homeland security strategy is consistent with the 

principle, as presented in the introduction, that the United States should be especially keen to pursue programs with multiple benefits. Indeed, the United States 

and Canada might push this logic one step further and consider another crossing 

point in the Detroit/Windsor area (where more than $100 billion of trade occurs annually between the two countries). If built outside of the immediate urban areas, 

it would not only provide backup in case a major bridge were destroyed, but reduce 

traffic congestion under normal conditions.

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank you both for your comments. 

My recollection—and I couldn’t find it right away in the book—

is somewhere in the 9/11 Commission report it made some interesting statements about who is to blame and what went wrong. 

And the Commission stated that our aim has not been to assign individual blame, which is a position that I also agree with. If anyone 

is to blame, we are all to blame. We are all to blame because after 

the Cold War ended, we felt that there were no threats, no real 

threats, that were presented against us, and certainly in those days 

not the threat of terrorism, which was a nonsovereign nation, nongovernmental-sponsored activity. 

But somewhere else it says that some of our failures were a failure of imagination; a failure of imagination. I have used the image 

of the Great Wall of China to try to illustrate what I consider to 

be the fundamental problem. We have such extensive borders. We 

are engaged economically, socially, politically with the rest of the 

world on an hourly basis, much less a daily basis. We have a set 

of standards and values with regard to rights and liberties that 

make us the most open and free country in the history of the world, 

and yet that very freedom allows those who hate us to attack us. 

I mean, this is a huge problem. 

And I guess you can take pieces of it, like language training, 

pieces of it like who is on a certain port of entry and how are they 

trained and how many are there, but I think we have to apply 

imagination as well. And I guess that, to me, is where intelligence 

does come in. We don’t have perfect security, we never will, but 

how—you work for the Congressional Budget Office, I believe—

Mr. O’HANLON. I do. 

Mr. SIMMONS. How do we apply those resources intelligently? If 

we have 200 on the border, is 1,000 going to solve the problem; or 

should we have 800 at the border and the money for 200 go to 

mandatory language training? How can we apply our imagination 

to this problem for which we don’t have unlimited resources, Mr. 

Cutler? 

Mr. CUTLER. Well, one of the things that we seem to have developed a fixation is high technology, and sometimes that can be very 

good. But there was a story not long ago about—I think it was 
54

220—or $230 million that was spent on cameras on the border. 

Cameras don’t make arrests. Half the cameras, as it turned out, 

didn’t work. 

You know, I am a New Yorker. The ashes of 9/11 actually landed 

on my house. And I have been working as a volunteer with 9/11 

Families for a Secure America who lost their family members. I 

can’t tell you how many yellow ribbons are tied to my neighbors’ 

trees. It is a constant reminder to me about our failings. 

And I have arrested terrorists in my career. And sometimes you 

get to play a hunch, and when I was a new agent, I had a guy come 

in at the airport, and he had an altered visa. And he kept calling 

Israel Palestine. He had an Israeli passport. We dug a little deeper. 

Long story short, he had a diagram in his possession, and the diagram was of their oil refinery. He was here to get the money to 

blow it up. We eventually prevented it from happening, and that 

was in my first year as a special agent. I had 30 years in with the 

INS. But what it taught me is playing hunches and freeing people 

up to sometimes follow that wild idea, but not with technology as 

much as with human resources. 

Mr. SIMMONS. If I could interrupt for just that point. When Commissioner Kelly and Mayor Bloomberg say we need the Federal 

Government to give us dollars for human beings, there is a lot of 

value in that. 

Mr. CUTLER. There is absolutely a lot of value. And I like that 

comparison because I want you to think about something. It is estimated that right now there is about 15—, 20 million illegal aliens 

in the United States, depending on whose statistics you want to 

read. New York has 8 million residents. We are the safest big city 

in the United States because we have 37,000 cops. We have less 

than 10 percent the number of Special Agents to enforce the immigration laws with double the number of people as there are residents in the city of New York, and they are scattered across a third 

of the North American continent. That is not a workable situation. 

When I hear about these so-called successes that ICE broke up 

a ring that brought in 50 or 60 or 80 people, and we are dealing 

with millions of illegal aliens, I am sorry, it leaves me not feeling 

very confident. We need to make the effort to do a far better job 

and dedicate the resources. We can’t do it on the cheap, but look 

at what 9/11 cost us, besides the precious human lives which no 

money can replace. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. O’Hanlon. 

Mr. O’HANLON. Congressman, just a very brief point. I am glad 

you pushed me on the issue of priorities. We do need to establish 

priorities, and there are proposals in Homeland Security that I 

think are excessive, but not usually on the prevention end of 

things. Most of what I think you are considering in this committee 

today and in general are border protection problems, intelligence. 

These are on the front end, the preventive end, and that is where 

we should be emphasizing in general. 

So I know I gave a bit of a broad-brush comment that most of 

the things we touched on today require more resources, and in one 

sense that can never be a good enough answer. But I would 

prioritize preventive areas of activity over consequence management. We need some capacity for consequence management, but 
55

some of the ideas I have heard in the homeland security debate in 

the last 5 years to equip most first responders in the country with 

state-of-the-art chem gear or interoperable radios, or have them 

drill several times per month in terms of response to incidents that 

have already occurred that we didn’t stop, some of these are excessive, and that is where you can spend too much. More of the money 

should be spent on preventative efforts, on intelligence and on border protection. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I really am glad to hear you say that. 

And for you, Mr. Cutler, my daughter’s apartment was so close 

to Ground Zero that she never reoccupied it after 9/11. She now 

lives in Brooklyn and works in Manhattan. So, like you, this is a 

daily—

Mr. CUTLER. I hope she is going okay today. 

Mr. SIMMONS. She is physically—

Mr. CUTLER. I don’t think any New Yorker has been the same 

after that. 

Mr. SIMMONS. No. Well, two of her four roommates went down 

with the building. 

Mr. CUTLER. I am so sorry. 

Mr. SIMMONS. The gentlelady from California. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

All of us, even those of us in California, were touched in some 

way by 9/11. The valedictorian of my high school class, Naomi Solomon, was on the Windows on the World that morning, and we lost 

her. So this is something that touched the whole country, and 

something that we are committed to preventing again. 

I don’t have a lot of questions because both witnesses have been 

very clear. I would note just for the record, a little parochialism 

here, that although San Jose may not seem like a big city to New 

York, it is the 10th largest city in the United States and has the 

lowest crime rate of any major city in the United States, just for 

the record. 

Mr. O’Hanlon, thank you for the book that you coauthored. The 

Chairman has suggested that I get your autograph on it, which 

maybe we will do after the hearing. But I did want to talk a little 

bit about your comments on page 103 about IDENT, the database 

used by the Border Patrol, and that it is not fully integrated on a 

national scale with other databases. And this is something that 

bothered me from the very beginning, and I asked about this both 

in the Homeland Security Committee, the Science Committee and 

the Judiciary Committee on why we were not going to have interoperability, and even asked NIST how long and how much would 

it take to integrate this. And for reasons I cannot understand, we 

never took care of that. 

And as you point out, the FBI now has an integrated automated 

fingerprint identification system using all 10 prints, and the Border 

Patrol now have interoperable systems capable of accessing IDENT 

and the IAFIS records, but they are not interoperable, and they 

don’t have access to the consolidated name base terrorism watch 

list. 

What do you think needs to be done here? I mean, it is heartbreaking actually that we didn’t plan at the beginning, and now we 
56

have this proliferation? What should we do? How much is it going 

to cost? 

Mr. O’HANLON. Thank you for the question. 

I am glad you are pursuing it, because, speaking honestly, from 

the point of view of an analyst, it is hard to keep track of this for 

two reasons: One, some of this is classified. Secondly, when you are 

doing a book, there is a lag time between when you write and when 

it is published. This has to be followed up in real time continually, 

and they are making progress, as I understand things, at integrating these two different systems. 

So I think the broad story of integrating the terrorism watch list 

in the last 5 years, thanks in large part to the scrutiny of committees like this, is that we have a progress. 

Ms. LOFGREN. The sad thing is they could have been the same 

system at virtually no additional cost to the country. 

Mr. O’HANLON. But the reassuring news, despite that, is that we 

are essentially sharing names in one way or another at this point, 

even though there are these inefficiencies, and it took us too long, 

and thank God we weren’t attacked in the meantime. 

Ms. LOFGREN. But the names yield false positives all the time. 

It is the biometrics that really give you—I mean, you can do one 

false identification, but only one; I mean, once you have got their 

biometrics. 

Mr. O’HANLON. Well, you summarized it as least as well as I 

could. 

I will just make one additional point, if I could, which is on the 

visa waiver program and visa issues, we typically give our European friends a hard time, as we should, for being too slow in some 

of their upgrades, but they have, I think, one thing right that we 

need to reconsider, which is they realize fingerprints are the way 

to go, or something better, with IRIS for example. We are still relying too much in visas on photographs; not a good way to do biometric-reliable identification. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, I would just note that the other concern that 

I have—and then I actually am supposed to chair a meeting over 

in the Capitol 20 minutes ago—but the US-VISIT is not interoperable in terms of the algorithms and the biometrics with the other 

systems. So we are building up data that ultimately I think we are 

going to have to go back in and redo. And did you have an opportunity to examine that, along with the IDENT, the other issue here 

that you mention in this chapter? 

Mr. O’HANLON. My broad sense is that, to the extent we can understand this problem, we have had a lot of inefficiencies and 

delays, but ultimately we are working towards systems that, however inefficient, however much different from one another where 

they don’t need to be, at least now you do have the ultimate information, which is the names of the individuals, being shared in 

much better real-time ways. It has taken too long, it has been too 

slow, and thank God we haven’t been attacked—

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, I appreciate it. My time is just about up. 

I would like to ask unanimous consent to put in the record an 

editorial from the San Jose Mercury News in yesterday’s paper 

about immigration hearings, if I could, Mr. Chairman—

Mr. SIMMONS. Without objection. 
57

Ms. LOFGREN.—as well as thank the witnesses and give my opinion that in the end it is going to cost us billions to go back and 

redo these biometrics. And we could have done it for a couple of 

million if we had done it at the beginning. 

And I yield back and thank the gentlemen. 

Mr. O’HANLON. I think you are right on cost, by the way. 

Mr. SIMMONS. And I would ask unanimous consent that the 

chapter you referred to in the book be copied and entered into the 

record, if that doesn’t violate your copyright rules. 

Mr. CUTLER. Could I make one fast point? 

Mr. SIMMONS. Please. 

Mr. Cutler. In 1997, I testified at my first congressional hearing, 

and the advice I gave them was the need to use biometrics. And 

after everything that I heard and saw afterwards, the fact that 

here we are almost 5 years after 9/11 and we are still banging our 

head against the wall. You know, World War II ended in less than 

4 years. And what frustrates me is we are not hitting the ground 

running, we haven’t been, and we need to be, and that is something that concerns me tremendously. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I appreciate the comment. And I think that those 

of us who have been involved with the terror issue for any period 

of time—and for me it goes back pretty much to my service to the 

Central Intelligence Agency back in the mid 1970s, certainly in 

1979 when colleagues were seized in the embassy in Iran, and 

when my roommate was killed in the Beirut Embassy in 1983—we 

have always felt—or I have always felt that we need a consolidated 

database on terrorists just as we needed it for counterespionage, 

and if we had moved aggressively in the early 1980s to create those 

databases, we wouldn’t have the problem that we have today. But 

unfortunately, there are several libertarian issues that arose at the 

time, and people felt that the focus on the Cold War was more important than a focus on this kind of unconventional war. 

Sadly, we have learned the hard way that you cannot ignore 

multiple threats, that the world is dangerous in multiple ways; 

that our democracy is threatened and our values are threatened, 

our people and resources are threatened in multiple ways. We can’t 

pay for it all, so we have to be smart. And in the past mistakes 

have been made. 

Mr. CUTLER. I just wanted to respond quickly. I know we are 

running long on time. 

The administration has been doing these operations to target airports and nuclear power plants, and I think we need to. I mean, 

that should be a given if it is a secure facility. But the idea of hiding in plain sight—you know, there was a terrorist suspect who 

was arrested in Lodi, California, who was driving an ice cream 

truck. That ice cream truck kept me awake for a couple of weeks. 

I spent half my career doing drug and terrorism investigations, 

and much of what I did also involved surveillance. When a bad guy 

gets into a car and drives for a half hour to a parking lot and meets 

somebody else, you know he has had a meeting. How many people 

approach an ice cream truck on a hot afternoon? How hard would 

it be to slip a memory card from a little PDA device into a $5 bill, 

pay for ice cream and get another one in return? And those things 

can hold over a gigabyte of data. There have been terrorist suspects 
58

driving taxi cabs. The guy that was involved with terrorism in Canada that drove a school bus, which gave him easy access to easily 

persuadable children, young men. 

So the problem is that if we focus on secure facilities, two things 

have happened, in my judgment: Number one, we are leaving out 

the broader potential that the bad guys are hiding in plain sight. 

Somebody once said that a spy is somebody that wouldn’t attract 

the attention of a waitress in a greasy spoon diner. The point of 

fact is it might well be that the waitress or the waiter is the spy 

or the terrorist. 

But the other thing is we have also given the other side a playbook. Don’t get a job in a nuclear power plant if you want to stay 

under the radar, get a job selling hot dogs right outside the gates 

of the nuclear power plant, and nobody will pay attention to you. 

The reality is that we need to have an immigration system that 

has integrity. For far too long this has been a fragmented effort. 

And one of the things I have testified at a few prior hearings was 

about the structure of ICE versus CBP. And literally it has been 

versus, where there have been barriers erected, noncooperation and 

so forth. We need a seamless operation. And this needs to be seen 

as a continuum, not simply if you get past the Border Patrol, you 

are home free. It is kind of like trying to play baseball and telling 

your outfielders not to bother showing up in the outfield, hit the 

ball over the second baseman’s head, and you have got an in-thepark home run. And that is the way immigration has been enforced 

and administered for far too long. 

And I would also ask, I don’t know if procedurally this can be 

done, but the GAO did a report that was issued on March 10th of 

this year that addressed the issue of immigration benefit fraud. 

And if we do everything possible on the border and made the border completely impermeable, if we don’t get to the issue about how 

we give out residency and citizenship and do those other things 

that constitute the benefits program, it would be the same thing as 

a homeowner securing his house and putting strong doors and 

locks on his windows and doors, and then handing out the keys to 

anybody who walks by. So all the efforts on the border will mean 

nothing if the immigration system itself lacks integrity, in my judgment. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I agree with you completely. Just again referring 

back historically to the Soviet Union, Colonel Abel, who was one 

of the KGB’s most successful spies, came through Canada, established himself as a photographer in Brooklyn, I believe, for 7 years, 

and only after 7 years was activated, and by that time he had established his bona fides. He was a member of the community, et 

cetera, et cetera. 

You know, sleepers commit espionage, sleepers commit terrorist 

acts, and we need to be imaginative in how we go about targeting 

these problems, because if we are not imaginative, we will simply 

build that Great Wall of China, take a look at it, say, well, you 

know, we have emptied the Treasury, so therefore we have done 

everything we can do because the Treasury is empty, we haven’t 

spared a dollar, the taxpayers have been decimated, and we have 

got this big wall, but it doesn’t work. Maginot Line bankrupted the 

French. Didn’t work. So the challenge is to apply economics and 
59

imagination, as you have described, to the problem. And I thank 

you both for your testimony. It has been very insightful. 

And I would say that members of the committee who have additional questions for the witnesses, we will ask them to respond to 

these in writing. The hearing record will be held open for 10 days. 

Mr. SIMMONS. There being no further business, and without objection, I thank the members of the third panel for their excellent 

testimony, and the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

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