PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

TOOELE COUNTY; STATE OF 

UTAH, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Defendant – Appellee, 

and 

SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS 

ALLIANCE; THE WILDERNESS 

SOCIETY; SIERRA CLUB, 

 Intervenor-Defendants. 

________________________ 

MICHAEL ABDO; SOUTHERN 

UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE, 

 Appellants. 

No. 15-4062 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 2:12-CV-00477-CW)

_________________________________ 

Jess M. Krannich, Manning Curtis Bradshaw & Bednar LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah, 

(Stephen H.M. Bloch and Joseph J. Bushyhead, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Salt 

Lake City, Utah; Brent V. Manning and Alan C. Bradshaw, Manning Curtis Bradshaw & 

Bednar LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah with her on the briefs) for Appellants. 

FILED 

United States Court of 

Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 3, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Anthony L. Rampton, Assistant Attorney General, Utah Attorney General, Salt Lake 

City, Utah, (Kathy A. F. Davis, Assistant Attorney General and Sean D. Reyes, Utah 

Attorney General, Salt Lake City, Utah, with him on the brief) for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, BACHARACH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

BACHARACH, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

 This appeal concerns two suits in state and federal court and 

statutory limitations on the power of the federal court to enjoin the statecourt case. 

 The first action to be filed was the one in federal court, where the 

Utah Attorney General and the Board of Tooele County Commissioners 

sued the federal government under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a. 

In this suit, the Utah officials are attempting to quiet title in favor of Utah 

for hundreds of rights of way in Tooele County, Utah. Five environmental 

groups opposed this suit, and the federal district court permitted the groups 

to intervene. 

 The second suit was the one in state court, where the Southern Utah 

Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Michael Abdo, a Tooele County resident, 

claim that the Utah officials lack authority under state law to prosecute the 

quiet-title action in federal court. 

 The Utah officials asked the federal court to enjoin the Wilderness 

Alliance and Mr. Abdo from prosecuting the state-court action. The federal 
3 

district court granted the request and entered a temporary restraining order 

enjoining the Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo for an indefinite period of 

time. The Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo appeal this ruling, presenting 

us with two primary issues. 

First, do we have appellate jurisdiction? We conclude that we do. 

This issue arises because the federal district court called its order a 

“temporary restraining order,” which is not ordinarily appealable. But 

temporary restraining orders cannot exceed fourteen days. After fourteen 

days, the order either lapses or becomes a preliminary injunction. The 

district court’s order had already lasted more than fourteen days by the 

time the Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo appealed. Thus, the order is 

treated as a preliminary injunction for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. 

Second, did the federal district court have the authority to enjoin the 

state-court suit? We think not. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, grants 

a district court expansive authority to issue “all writs necessary.” But the 

Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 generally prohibits federal courts 

from enjoining state-court suits. An exception exists when an injunction is 

“in aid of” the federal court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. This exception 

applies when 

 the federal and state court exercise in rem or quasi in rem 

jurisdiction over the same res and 

 the federal court is the first to take possession of the res. 
4 

These circumstances are absent because the state-court action is neither in 

rem nor quasi in rem. Thus, the district court’s order violates the AntiInjunction Act. 

I. Jurisdiction existed in district court and exists now in our court. 

The parties do not dispute our jurisdiction to hear this appeal, but we 

must independently examine our jurisdiction and the district court’s. See 

Lovell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 F.3d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 

2006). We conclude that jurisdiction existed in district court and exists 

now in our court. 

A. The federal district court had jurisdiction. 

The federal court had jurisdiction over the quiet-title suit under the 

Quiet Title Act’s grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1346(f). Exercising this jurisdiction, the federal district court used its 

authority under the All Writs Act to issue the temporary restraining order. 

The Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo challenge the district court’s 

jurisdiction, arguing that the district court tried “to attach subject matter 

jurisdiction” over the state-court suit by entering the temporary restraining 

order. Appellants’ Opening Br. at 17. We disagree. When a district court 

enjoins another court from proceeding with a parallel suit, the district 

court does not “assert jurisdiction” over the other suit; rather, the district 

court exercises its own jurisdiction. See Commercial Sec. Bank v. Walker 

Bank & Tr. Co., 456 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that “no 
5 

new grant of judicial power is contemplated” by a statute empowering 

federal courts to enjoin state-court proceedings). Thus, we reject the 

challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction. 

B. We have appellate jurisdiction. 

Because the district court’s order took the form of a temporary 

restraining order, we must address our own jurisdiction. Temporary 

restraining orders are not ordinarily appealable, but preliminary 

injunctions are appealable. Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 388 F.2d 

501, 511 (10th Cir. 1968) (temporary restraining order); Crowe & Dunlevy, 

P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2011) (preliminary 

injunction). Thus, we must consider whether the order, when appealed, was 

truly a temporary restraining order. If it was, it would not be appealable. 

But in our view, the order should be treated as a preliminary injunction for 

purposes of appellate jurisdiction. 

Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions differ in 

how long they can last. Temporary restraining orders can last no more than 

fourteen days1

; preliminary injunctions can last longer. When a temporary 

restraining order lasts longer than fourteen days, it becomes appealable as 

a preliminary injunction. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86 n.58, 87-88 

(1974). This is true even if the district court labels its order a temporary 

 

1

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2). 
6 

restraining order. See Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir. 

2007) (explaining that appellate “jurisdiction is not controlled by . . . the 

name that a district court attaches to an order”). 

Appellate jurisdiction turns on what kind of order was appealed. The 

Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo appealed an order labeled as a 

temporary restraining order. But the federal district court said that the 

order would remain in effect until the court decided whether to grant an 

injunction. That period of time was indefinite. For fourteen days, the order 

functioned as a temporary restraining order. But on the fifteenth day, that 

order could be treated as a preliminary injunction, for purposes of 

appealability, because a temporary restraining order cannot last longer than 

fourteen days. 

The Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo appealed on the eighteenth 

day. Thus, they appealed an order that “we view” as a preliminary 

injunction. Sampson, 415 U.S. at 87-88. And as a preliminary injunction, 

the order was appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 

II. The federal district court violated the Anti-Injunction Act by 

enjoining the state-court suit. 

In the temporary restraining order, the district court enjoined the 

Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo from prosecuting the state-court action 

until the district court decided whether to issue an injunction. This order 

implicated the Anti-Injunction Act, which ordinarily prohibits injunctions 
7 

against state-court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2283; see Phelps v. Hamilton, 

122 F.3d 1309, 1324-25 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he statute imposes an 

absolute ban on federal injunctions against pending state court proceeding, 

in the absence of one of the recognized exceptions in the law.”). 

The district court thought that one of the statutory exceptions 

applied, reasoning that an injunction against the state-court proceeding was 

necessary for the federal court to aid its jurisdiction over the federal quiettitle action. We respectfully disagree. 

A. We review de novo the district court’s application of the 

Anti-Injunction Act. 

We would ordinarily review the district court’s order for an abuse of 

discretion. Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., 269 

F.3d 1149, 1153 (10th Cir. 2001). But the applicability of the AntiInjunction Act calls for a legal conclusion. Ambort v. United States, 392 

F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 2004). Thus, we conduct de novo review of the 

district court’s application of the Anti-Injunction Act. Id.

B. The Anti-Injunction Act prohibited the federal district 

court from enjoining the state-court suit. 

The Anti-Injunction Act ordinarily precludes injunctions against 

state-court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2283. But three exceptions exist: 

1. Congress “expressly authorized” an injunction. 

2. The injunction is “necessary in aid of [the federal district 

court’s] jurisdiction.” 
8 

3. The injunction is necessary to “protect or effectuate” a 

previous judgment in federal district court. 

Id. Applying the second exception, the district court concluded that an 

injunction would aid the court in exercising its own jurisdiction. The Utah 

officials defend this conclusion, arguing in the alternative that the first 

exception applies because the Quiet Title Act constitutes an “expressly 

authorized” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. 

 The federal district court erred. An injunction would not fall within 

the second exception, which encompasses injunctions in aid of the federal 

courts’ jurisdiction. And we decline to address the first exception—

whether the Quiet Title Act is an “expressly authorized” exception to the 

Anti-Injunction Act—because this issue was not presented to the federal 

district court. 

1. The exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act are narrow. 

The Anti-Injunction Act’s exceptions are narrow and are not to be 

loosely construed. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 131 S. Ct. 2368, 

2375 (2011). As a result, courts should resolve doubts about the 

applicability of an exception in favor of allowing the state-court 

proceeding to continue. Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2382. 

2. The second statutory exception does not apply. 

The second statutory exception is limited. The Supreme Court has 

applied it only when 
9 

 both the federal and state suits constitute in rem or quasi in rem 

proceedings and 

 the federal court was the first to take possession of the res (the 

property under dispute in the federal and state actions). 

See Mandeville v. Canterbury, 318 U.S. 47, 48-49 (1943) (per curiam).2

 To apply the second exception, the court must decide whether the two 

suits are either in rem or quasi in rem. “An action in rem is one founded 

upon the rights in or to property.” Housley v. Anaconda Co., 427 P.2d 390, 

392 (Utah 1967). Thus, in rem proceedings affect the interests of all 

persons in the property. Archer v. United States, 268 F.2d 687, 690 (10th 

Cir. 1959). An action is quasi in rem when it affects the interests of only 

some persons in the property. Id.; see Restatement (Second) of Judgments 

§ 6 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1982). 

 The federal quiet-title suit fits the definition of an in rem or quasi in 

rem proceeding. See Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 302 P.3d 

1103, 1106-07 (Nev. 2013) (stating that an action to quiet title is an in rem 

or quasi in rem proceeding); see also Enhancing the Marketability of Land: 

The Suit to Quiet Title, 68 Yale L.J. 1245, 1265 (1959) (stating that for a 

quiet-title suit, “the court obtains jurisdiction to adjudicate all interests in 

the land at issue through its control of that land”). 

 

2

 The Utah parties acknowledge that the second exception is generally 

limited to state and federal proceedings that control the same res. 

Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 11-12. 
10 

But the state-court suit was neither in rem nor quasi in rem because 

there, the Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo were not seeking adjudication 

of anyone’s interest in property. Thus, jurisdiction in state court was based 

on the court’s authority over the Utah officials, not over anyone’s 

property. By definition, that suit involved in personam jurisdiction rather 

than in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 

186, 199 (1977) (“If a court’s jurisdiction is based on its authority over the 

defendant’s person, the action and judgment are denominated ‘in 

personam.’”). Thus, the state-court suit would not ordinarily trigger the 

Anti-Injunction Act’s exception for injunctions involving two in rem or 

quasi in rem proceedings. 

 The Utah officials downplay the fact that the state-court suit was 

neither in rem nor quasi in rem, arguing that the “gravamen” of the statecourt suit involves the same res involved in the federal suit. We reject this 

argument because the second statutory exception requires more than a 

relationship between the suits and the property; both suits must also be in 

rem or quasi in rem proceedings. See Denver-Greeley Valley Water Users 

Ass’n v. McNeil, 131 F.2d 67, 71 (10th Cir. 1942) (“The mere fact that . . . 

two suits relate to the same physical property does not justify a restraint of 

the second suit by the court first acquiring jurisdiction.”). The state-court 

suit does not concern title to the contested rights of way at issue in the 

federal-court suit, and we cannot uphold the injunction based solely on a 
11 

“close relationship” between the subject matter of the federal and state 

suits. Id.; see Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 523 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (“[T]he mere fact that the actions of a state court might have 

some effect on the federal proceedings does not justify interference.”). 

The federal district court relied on an expanded version of the second 

exception. Unlike our court, some other circuits have applied the second 

exception more expansively in certain cases addressing multi-district 

litigation,3

 school desegregation,4 water rights,5 congressional 

redistricting,6

 and class actions.7 In expansively applying the second 

exception, these courts treat the underlying federal litigation as 

functionally equivalent to a res. See Bryan J. Schillinger, Preventing 

Duplicative Mass Litigation Through the Limited Resources Doctrine, 14 

Rev. Litig. 465, 467-68 (1995) (explaining that the expansive approach is 

based on broadening of “the definition of in rem”). 

 

3 In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 

364-65 (3d Cir. 2001). 

4 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 501 F.2d 383, 384 (4th 

Cir. 1974). 

5 United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 174 F.3d 1007, 1014-

15 (9th Cir. 1999). 

6 Wesch v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465, 1470 (11th Cir. 1993). 

7 In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 235 (3d Cir. 2002). 
12 

In the state-court action, we have nothing that can be treated as the 

functional equivalent of a res. Thus, even if we were to adopt the expanded 

exception, it would not apply here. 

The Utah officials point out that 

 this case is one of 22 quiet-title suits involving rights of way in 

various Utah counties, which are pending in the same federal 

district court, and 

 all of these suits pit Utah against the federal government. 

Because of the number of suits, the Utah officials compare this case to 

cases in which courts have upheld injunctions of state-court suits to 

facilitate multi-district or class-action litigation. In our view, however, the 

circumstances differ. 

In cases involving multi-district litigation, some courts have broadly 

applied the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act because 

1. a multi-district litigation panel, created by federal statute, has 

reviewed many different pending cases in different district 

courts and decided to consolidate the cases’ pretrial 

proceedings, 

2. a judge overseeing the multi-district litigation has “put forth 

considerable effort coordinating discovery or settlement 

discussions,” and 

3. a state-court suit could affect the consolidated class of cases 

and impede settlement. 

In re Life Inv’rs Ins. Co. of Am., 589 F.3d 319, 331 n.11 (3d Cir. 2009). 

None of these concerns apply here. 
13 

 First, the district court’s case management is not governed by federal 

statute, and the 22 quiet-title suits are pending in a single district rather 

than spread across districts. The cases have not been consolidated; the 

district court simply issued a case-management order before trial to 

collectively address procedural issues. 

Second, when the federal district court issued the temporary 

restraining order, the court had entered only a single case-management 

order. See Appellants’ App’x at 9, 15 (district court docket sheet showing 

entry of a case-management order). The case-management order would not 

be disturbed even without an injunction against the state-court 

proceedings. See note 10, below. 

Third, the state-court suit might affect the ability of the parties to 

settle the federal-court suit, but only because the state courts could resolve 

a related question under Utah law. As the federal district court apparently 

recognized, however, the state-law issue would not affect title to the 

property underlying the federal-court suit. Thus, the concerns animating 

expansion of the second exception in multi-district cases are not present 

here. 

The Utah officials also rely on cases involving class actions. For 

these cases, some courts have expanded the second statutory exception by 

analogizing an impending settlement in a class action to a res. See, e.g.,

Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1339 (11th Cir. 2012); Lorillard 
14 

Tobacco Co. v. Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, 589 F.3d 835, 844 (6th Cir. 

2009); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 1985). 

No one has suggested that the federal suit is likely to settle soon. 

Thus, the federal-court suit has not progressed to the point that an 

injunction of the state-court suit would be necessary to protect the 

equivalent of a res. In these circumstances, the injunction would be invalid 

even in those courts that have broadened the second exception to apply 

beyond in rem and quasi in rem proceedings. See Negrete v. Allianz Life 

Ins. Co., 523 F.3d 1091, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to apply the 

expanded exception in class-action litigation because the case did not 

involve multi-district litigation, discovery was incomplete, and settlement 

was not imminent). 

The Utah officials urge an even broader expansion, one that would 

authorize injunctions of state-court proceedings to prevent state courts 

“from undoing years of work” in federal court to resolve complex cases. 

Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 25.8

 For this argument, the Utah officials rely on 

 

8

 In state court, the environmental groups asked for not only a 

declaratory judgment but also an injunction against the Utah officials’ 

“implementation and funding” of the suit in federal court. Appellants’ 

App’x at 19, 30. Because the environmental groups are seeking to enjoin 

the prosecution of a federal-court suit, one could argue that the second 

exception to the Anti-Injunction Act allowed the federal court to enjoin the 

state court. See Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964). But 

the Utah officials have not made that argument. Thus, we leave open the 

possibility that the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act might 
15 

Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1996). In Winkler, the 

Seventh Circuit declined to enjoin state-court proceedings. 101 F.3d at 

1205-06. But the Seventh Circuit suggested that a federal court could 

enjoin state proceedings when 

 the federal case involves multi-district litigation and 

 the injunction is necessary to protect a previous discovery 

order. 

Id. at 1202. These circumstances are not present here: the federal quiettitle suit does not involve multi-district litigation, and the federal district 

court need not act to protect a previous discovery order.9 See Zurich Am. 

Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 326 F.3d 816, 825-26 (7th Cir. 2002) (declining 

to apply Winkler in a case that did not involve multi-district litigation or 

the need to protect a previously entered order).10

 

allow a federal court to enjoin a state court from issuing an injunction that 

would prohibit prosecution of the federal-court suit.

9

 The Utah officials also cite other opinions in which the courts relied 

partly on Winkler to enjoin state-court proceedings that threatened to 

undermine prior orders. Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 25 (citing Newby v. Enron 

Corp., 338 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2003); In re Ocwen v. Fed. Bank FSB Mortg. 

Servicing Litig., 397 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Ill. 2005)). But here, the 

federal district court had no need to prevent interference with any prior 

orders. 

10 The Utah officials argue that the state-court litigation could undo the 

federal court’s case-management order. We disagree. The case-management 

order would remain in place; the state-court litigation would simply make 

further litigation in federal court unnecessary. 
16 

* * * 

 The second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply here. 

The federal suit was in rem or quasi in rem, but the state-court suit was 

neither. And the state-court suit did not involve the functional equivalent 

of a res. So even if we were to adopt the expanded exception, it would not 

apply here. Thus, the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act does not 

allow an injunction against the state-court proceedings. 

3. We decline to consider the Utah officials’ newly presented 

argument that the Quiet Title Act is an expressly authorized 

exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. 

For the first time on appeal, the Utah officials contend that the Quiet 

Title Act is an “expressly authorized” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. 

We decline to reach this argument. 

We have discretion to affirm the district court on any ground 

adequately supported by the record. See Elkins v. Comfort, 392 F.3d 1159, 

1162 (10th Cir. 2004). But in deciding whether to exercise this discretion, 

we may consider whether an argument was fully briefed in our court and 

the district court. Id.

 

 The concerns underlying the Seventh Circuit opinion in Winkler are 

absent here. Indeed, after deciding Winkler, the Seventh Circuit 

unambiguously stated that “the prospect of a state court reaching [a] 

decision first, making federal decision unnecessary . . . does not justify a 

federal injunction against the state litigation.” Adkins v. Nestle Purina Pet 

Care Co., 779 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2015). 
17 

In district court, no one addressed whether the Quiet Title Act is an 

“expressly authorized” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. The 

proposition appears at least debatable, for the Quiet Title Act states: “No 

preliminary injunction shall issue in any action brought under this 

section.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(c). 

During oral argument, the Utah officials asserted that § 2409a(c) of 

the Quiet Title Act does not apply here. But no one has briefed the effect 

of this provision, and no other federal appellate court has considered 

whether the Quiet Title Act constitutes an expressly authorized exception 

to the Anti-Injunction Act. In these circumstances, we decline to decide the 

issue newly raised in our court. 

III. Conclusion 

The second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply, and 

the district court erred by concluding that it could enjoin the state-court 

proceedings. This error requires reversal and remand for further 

proceedings. 

Reversed and remanded. 
15-4062 – Tooele County v. United States 

HARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

The opening paragraph of the Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 

filed in Utah state court by Michael Abdo and Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 

(Appellants) states that they are “seeking a judgment declaring Defendants’ federal court 

quiet title action involving alleged R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in Tooele County illegal, 

unconstitutional, and an ultra vires action brought outside the authority of the Office of 

Attorney General, as well as an order enjoining the implementation and funding of this 

litigation.” Aplt. App. at 19. The injunction sought in this complaint would “restrain 

federal court proceedings”; “it does not matter that the prohibition . . . [would be] 

addressed to the parties rather than to the federal court itself.” Donovan v. City of Dallas, 

377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964). 

I do not think that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C § 2283, forbids the issuance 

of an injunction to prohibit a state court from restraining federal-court proceedings. To 

restrain a federal-court proceeding is to impair – to eviscerate – that court’s jurisdiction, 

preventing it from even considering the dispute before it. As the district court said in this 

case, the injunction sought by Appellants in state court “would . . . effectively defeat the 

jurisdiction of the federal court.” Intervenors’ App. at 60. An injunction prohibiting 

such a restraint could be “necessary in aid of [the court’s] jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C § 2283. 

In this light, it is easy to understand why the federal district court issued its 

injunction in this case. Nevertheless, such an injunction was unnecessary. The law is 

well-settled that a state court cannot grant the injunctive relief sought by Appellants. 
 

-2- 

Other than to protect its own jurisdiction over property in an in rem or quasi in rem 

proceeding, a state court has no authority to restrain a federal-court proceeding. See 

Donovan, 377 U.S. at 412-13; General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977); see 

also Baker ex rel Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 236 n.9 (1998) (“This 

court has held it impermissible for a state court to enjoin a party from proceeding in a 

federal court.”) We should presume, a very safe presumption, that no Utah court would 

issue the injunction sought by Appellants. 

As for the declaratory relief sought by Appellants in state court, I agree with the 

panel majority that the Anti-Injunction Act bars the issuance of an injunction to prevent 

that portion of the state litigation. Even though the claim for declaratory relief raises 

issues that would also be before the federal court, there is nothing wrong with parallel 

claims being pursued in both state and federal court. To be sure, if the state proceeding 

were the first to arrive at a judgment, that judgment could have preclusive effect in 

federal court (although the federal court, applying state preclusion law, would be the 

tribunal to determine the preclusive effect); but such a result is not improper under our 

federal system. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 

280, 293 (2005) (“In parallel litigation, a federal court may be bound to recognize the 

claim- and issue-preclusive effects of a state-court judgment . . . .”); Atlantic Coast Line 

R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Loc. Eng., 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970) (“the state and federal 

courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this case, and neither court was free to prevent either 

party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts”). In fact, before the states 

adopted statutes and rules permitting federal courts to certify questions of state law to 
 

-3- 

state courts, the United States Supreme Court endorsed the practice of federal-court 

parties seeking determinations of state-law issues in the federal litigation by commencing 

actions in state courts. See, e.g., Government & Civic Employee Organizing Committee, 

CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 365 (1957). Insofar as Appellants’ state-court action 

seeks that court’s interpretation of Utah law, it is not at all troubling, although it would be 

surprising if the state court exercised its discretion to issue a declaration on whether state 

law would be superseded by federal law in the present circumstance.