Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 

Lemons, JJ., and Compton,∗ S.J. 

OLUDARE OGUNDE OPINION BY 

SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 

 v. Record No. 050212 April 21, 2006 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENSVILLE COUNTY 

W. Allan Sharrett, Judge 

 The dispositive question in this appeal is whether the 

trial court erred in ruling that an action filed by a prisoner 

under the Virginia Tort Claims Act (the Act), Code §§ 8.01-

195.1 to -195.9, is governed by the statute of limitations 

applicable to persons confined in state correctional 

facilities, as set forth in Code § 8.01-243.2, and not by the 

statute of limitations prescribed by Code § 8.01-195.7 for 

actions brought under the Act. 

 Plaintiff Oludare Ogunde is an inmate incarcerated at the 

Greensville Correctional Center in Jarratt. In August 2004, 

he filed this action under the Act against the Commonwealth 

alleging that the Commonwealth's employees negligently 

assigned him to an upper bunk bed and, in December 2002, 

ordered him to climb down from the bed for roll call when they 

knew, or should have known, that he had an injured knee and 

could fall. He further alleges that as the result of the 

 ∗

 Senior Justice Compton participated in the hearing and 

decision of this case before his death on April 9, 2006. 
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employees' negligence, he fell and injured his back, for which 

he seeks recovery in damages. 

 The plaintiff timely filed the notice of claim required 

by Code § 8.01-195.6 of the Act, and likewise timely filed 

this action under the Act's statute of limitations, Code 

§ 8.01-195.7. 

 The Commonwealth filed a plea of the statute of 

limitations, contending that the action was untimely and was 

barred under Code § 8.01-243.2 (the inmate statute), which 

limits the time that persons confined in correctional 

facilities may bring actions pertaining to conditions of their 

confinement. The trial court sustained the plea and dismissed 

the action. The plaintiff appeals. 

 The inmate statute, § 8.01-243.2, provides: 

"No person confined in a state or local correctional 

facility shall bring or have brought on his behalf 

any personal action relating to the conditions of 

his confinement until all available administrative 

remedies are exhausted. Such action shall be 

brought by or on behalf of such person within one 

year after [the] cause of action accrues or within 

six months after all administrative remedies are 

exhausted, whichever occurs later." 

 The Act's statute of limitations, § 8.01-195.7, provides, 

as pertinent: "Every claim cognizable against the 

Commonwealth" under the Act "shall be forever barred, unless 

within one year after the cause of action accrues to the 

claimant the notice of claim required by § 8.01-195.6 is 
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properly filed." The statute of limitations then refers to 

certain time limits for available administrative remedies and 

provides: "All claims against the Commonwealth" under the Act 

"shall be forever barred unless such action is commenced 

within eighteen months of the filing of the notice of claim." 

 The Act refers to claims filed by inmates and provides 

that an inmate must first exhaust administrative remedies. 

Code § 8.01-195.3, in subparagraph (7), requires "[a]ny claim 

by an inmate of a state correctional facility" to be excluded 

from the Act unless the claimant verifies under oath "that he 

has exhausted his remedies under the adult institutional 

inmate grievance procedures promulgated by the Department of 

Corrections." 

 Subparagraph (7) further provides: "The time for filing 

the notice of tort claim shall be tolled during the pendency 

of the grievance procedure." 

 The question in this case then becomes: When there are 

two potentially applicable statutes of limitations, which 

statute applies to an inmate's claim under the Act? There is 

no dispute that if the Act's statute of limitations applies, 

this action was timely filed; if the limitation of the inmate 

statute applies the trial court's ruling was correct. 

 On behalf of the Commonwealth, the Attorney General 

contends that the inmate statute applies. He relies on the 
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rule of statutory construction "that when one statute speaks 

to a subject in a general way and another deals with a part of 

the same subject in a more specific manner, the two should be 

harmonized, if possible, and where they conflict, the latter 

prevails." Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336, 340, 

257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979). He argues that the inmate statute 

is more specific as it applies only to prisoners while the Act 

applies generally to all plaintiffs. 

 Continuing, the Attorney General says that both statutes 

are clear and unambiguous and that they can be read 

harmoniously in the following manner. He notes that the 

purpose of the Act is to carve out an exception to the 

doctrine of sovereign immunity to allow citizens injured by 

state employees' negligence to sue the Commonwealth. He says 

that the Act provides relief generally to those coming within 

its purview so long as they otherwise comply with the 

procedures prescribed in the Act, including those in 

subparagraph (7) above. On the other hand, according to the 

Attorney General, the inmate statute specifically applies when 

"the plaintiff is a prisoner and the subject matter relates to 

the conditions of his confinement." 

 Finally, the Attorney General contends that a later 

enacted statute prevails over an earlier one with which it 

conflicts. The Act was adopted in 1981. 1981 Acts ch. 449. 
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The inmate statute was enacted in 1998. 1998 Acts ch. 596. 

According to the Attorney General, the legislature was "well 

aware" of the Act's provisions when it enacted the inmate 

statute in 1998. Thus, he maintains, "the intent of the 

General Assembly was to carve out of the Act a more 

restrictive statute of limitations where the plaintiff was a 

prisoner suing over the conditions of his confinement." 

 We do not agree with the Attorney General's several 

arguments. At the outset, it should be noted that in the view 

we take of the case we do not reach for decision the question 

whether this inmate's action involving allegedly negligent 

conduct of state employees relates to "the conditions of his 

confinement," as that phrase is used in the inmate statute. 

For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume, without 

deciding, that this action does relate to conditions of 

confinement. 

 The trial court's ruling regarding which statute of 

limitations applies was based upon the pleadings and presents 

a pure question of law to be reviewed de novo by this Court. 

Wilby v. Gostel, 265 Va. 437, 440, 578 S.E.2d 796, 798 (2003). 

It is elementary that when construing a statute, courts must 

ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intention. 

Chase v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 266 Va. 544, 547, 587 S.E.2d 

521, 522 (2003). In determining that intent, the plain 
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language of an unambiguous statute will be applied. Brown v. 

Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). And, 

rules of statutory construction will be used by the courts to 

harmonize enactments when the plain language of two statutes 

apparently conflict. See Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 

227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 926 (2006). 

 Employing these settled principles, we hold that the 

Act's statute of limitations applies to this inmate's tort 

action seeking recovery in damages for the ordinary negligence 

of state employees. 

 The Act is self-contained, incorporating its own statute 

of limitations, which likewise is self-contained. The Act's 

limited waiver of sovereign immunity is set forth in § 8.01-

195.3. There, the limited circumstances in which a litigant 

can sue the Commonwealth are described. Subparagraph (7) of 

that section refers specifically to "[a]ny claim" filed by 

inmates, and requires the inmate to first exhaust 

administrative remedies. 

 Significantly, the second sentence of subparagraph (7) 

tolls, during the pendency of the grievance (administrative) 

procedure, the time for filing the notice of the tort claim. 

If the inmate statute were to apply here, its final sentence, 

fixing the time limit for filing suit, would impliedly repeal 

the second sentence of subparagraph (7) by potentially 
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eliminating the tolling provision, as the Attorney General 

properly concedes. 

 We will not attribute to the General Assembly an 

intention to impliedly repeal the tolling provided in 

subparagraph (7). "The implied repeal of an earlier statute 

by a later enactment is not favored. There is a presumption 

against a legislative intent to repeal where the later statute 

does not amend the former or refer expressly to it." Sexton 

v. Cornett, 271 Va. 251, 257, 623 S.E.2d 898, 901 (2006). 

Obviously, the inmate statute does not amend the Act nor does 

it refer expressly to it. 

 These intersecting statutes can be harmonized. As the 

plaintiff observes, the inmate statute is not limited to tort 

actions. It may cover, for example, declaratory judgment 

actions, suits for injunctive or other equitable relief, and 

mandamus petitions, so long as they relate to the conditions 

of the prisoner's confinement. The inmate statute deals with 

all classes of litigation. On the other hand, the narrower 

Act applies to one type of litigation, tort actions against 

the Commonwealth. Even if the tort action relates to 

conditions of confinement, the Act nonetheless applies. 

 Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred in 

sustaining the plea of the statute of limitations and in 
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dismissing the action. The judgment appealed from will be 

reversed and the case will be remanded for further 

proceedings. 

Reversed and remanded.