This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 29,594 9 EMANUEL B., 10 Child-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 12 William C. Birdsall, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellee 16 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 17 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender 18 Santa Fe, NM 19 for Appellant 20 MEMORANDUM OPINION 21 VIGIL, Judge. 222 Child appeals the revocation of his probation. [RP 71] He relies on State v. 1 Erickson K., 2002-NMCA-058, ¶¶ 21-25, 132 N.M. 258, 46 P.3d 1258, arguing 2 that the revocation was not supported by firsthand knowledge. [DS 3] Our notice 3 proposed to affirm. Child filed a memorandum in opposition. We have considered 4 the arguments in Child’s memorandum, but are not persuaded the evidence is 5 insufficient to support the revocation of his probation. Accordingly, we affirm. 6 DISCUSSION 7 A juvenile probation violation mustbe proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 Id. ¶ 21. On appeal, we view the evidence inthe light most favorable to the State 9 and indulge all reasonable inferences infavor of the trial court’s order. Id. 10 Child is correct that Erickson K. requires firsthand knowledge. In that case, 11 we found the evidence insufficient where the only evidence was the Juvenile 12 Probation Officer’s hearsay testimony that the child had absconded from a 13 treatment program. Id. ¶ ¶ 22, 24. We held that to support revocation of probation 14 the State must produce firsthand knowledge of the situation. 15 This case is distinguishable because there was much more than the scant 16 hearsay evidence produced in Erickson K. The evidence is that Child was home 17 from residential treatment on a pass, and went to a park. [RP 61] Child’s Mother 18 testified that when she next saw him he appeared to be intoxicated and smelled of 193 alcohol. [DS 2; RP 61] An officer from th e Juvenile Probation Office also testified 1 that Child appeared to be intoxicated. [DS 2; RP 62] Most significantly, Child’s 2 mental health therapist from the treatme nt program testified that Child was 3 discharged from the program based on Child’s conduct during Child’s home pass. 4 [DS 3; RP 62-63] This testimony, along with the other evidence, makes this case 5 distinguishable from Erickson K. In Erickson K., the State did not present a staff 6 member from the residential treatment cen ter, which we considered necessary. Id. 7 ¶ 22. Here, the State did present a st aff member to verify that Child was 8 discharged [DS 3], and why. The State also presented the testimony of two 9 witnesses whose testimony further explaine d the situation that resulted in Child 10 being discharged from the residential treatment program. 11 Child argues that without a finding thathe was intoxicated, the State’s case 12 is insufficient. He relies on the fact that when the juvenile probation officer 13 attempted to testify about the read out fro m the portable breath testing machine, the 14 court would not allow it. [RP 62] A review of the tape log indicates that the court, 15 in making it ruling revoking probation, obs erved that it “would” have found him 16 guilty of consuming alcohol, but because it had prohibited the juvenile probation 17 officer from testifying to the test result, it would not find him guilty of testing 18 positive for alcohol. [RP 63] The court did, however, revoke his probation because 194 he violated probation by being terminated from his residential treatment program. 1 [RP 63] 2 Child relies on the court’s failure to find a positive alcohol test result to 3 argue that the evidence is insufficient to support revocation: “[T]he children’s 4 court found that there was no evidence that [Child] was intoxicated, but in the same 5 breath determined that Child’s discharg e from the [residential treatment program] 6 for the non-existent intoxication was suffi cient to revoke his probation.” [MIO 5] 7 It is clear to us that the court did not find that Child tested positive, but it is 8 not clear that the court declined to cons ider any evidence of intoxication. As we 9 have noted, Child’s Mother and the juve nile probation officer both testified that 10 Child appeared to be intoxicated. In addition, there was also evidence, from 11 Child’s treatment therapist at th e program—someone with firsthand 12 knowledge—that the program terminated Child based on his misconduct while he 13 had been released to his Mother. Conseque ntly, we conclude that there was ample 14 evidence of Child’s misconduct, combinedwith firsthand knowledge that Child 15 was terminated from the treatment program based on his misconduct. We do not 16 read Erickson K. as requiring that every witness who testifies have firsthand 17 knowledge of every fact in the case. Wehold that the evidence was sufficient to 18 prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Child violated his probation, and affirm. 1956 IT IS SO ORDERED. 1

2 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 3 WE CONCUR: 4

5 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 6

7 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge 8