### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-12-00220- CV

Juan E nriqu ez, A ppellan t

v. Am alia Rodriguez-Me ndoza, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 126 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-1 0-0 0155 8, H ONO RAB LE LO RA LIVINGSTO N, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

J u an Enriquez, an inmate confine d in the I nstitut ional Division of the Texa s Depa rtment of Criminal J ustice who is appea ring pro se and in forma pauper is, appea ls the dismiss al of his suit. Enriquez sued Amalia Rodrigue z-Mendoza, the Travis County District Clerk, alleg ing a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violations of the open c ourts provision of the Texas Constit ution. See Tex. Const. art. I , § 1 3

. Enriquez soug ht actua l and exemplary damag es as well as unspecifie d “dec lara tory and prospec tive equitab l e relief .” The trial court g rante d Rodrigue z-Mendoza’s motion to dismiss the claims as frivolous pursuant to chapte r 14 of the civil prac tice and reme dies code. See Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 14.001-.014 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012). Enriquez then brought t h i s ap peal contending that the t rial court err ed in dismiss ing his suit. W e will aff

irm.BACK GR OUND Enriquez is an inmate confine d to the I nstitut ional Division of the Texas Depa rtment of Criminal J ustice. Over the y ear s, Enriquez has filed in Travis County d i s t ri ct court numerous lawsuits ag ainst prison officia ls complaining of various conditions of his confine ment. I n th e p r esent

case , howeve r, E n ri q u ez has sued the Travis County District Clerk, complaining g ener ally of the

manner in which his filings in other case s have b ee n h andled by the district cler k’s office

. Specifica lly , Enriquez alleg es that:

• cer

tain documents submitted to the clerk’ s office wer e not prope rly filed;

• the cler

k’s office failed to issue citations as reque sted by Enrique z in his filings;

• the c l er k’s office failed to issue subpoenas Enriquez has requested in order to compel witnesses to testify at hea ring s;

• the cler

k’s offi ce fa i l ed t o provide him with a copy of an order deny ing a reque st for injunctive relief in one of his case s and a copy of a final judgme nt in another;

• the cler

k’s office did not provide him timely notice of specia l judge s assig ned to prisoner law suits; and

• in eac h of at least four of his appea ls, the district cler k’s office failed to timely file the clerk’s r ecor d with this C ourt and fa iled to provide Enrique z with a copy

of the re cord.

I n his p et i t i o n , Enriquez asser ted that these actions constituted violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 beca use they (1) deprive d him of equal protec tion by trea ting him differ ently from other Travis County litigants without a rational basis, and (2) deprive d him of due proce ss and the rig ht to acc ess the courts, prese nt evidenc e, and prosec ute his lawsuits and appea ls. Enriquez also alleg ed that the
2distr i ct cler k’s actions violated the open courts provision of the Texas Constit ution. Finally , E nriquez asser

ted that the district cler

k had violated state and fede ral law, which entitled him t o unspecifie d “equit ab l e relief .” I n his pray er for relief , Enriquez reque sted actua l damag es of $100,000, exemplary

damag es of $1,000,000, “ nominal” damag es of $5,000 and “dec lara tory and prospec tive equitable r elief to whic h he may show himself entitled.” Rodrigue z-Mendoza filed a motion to dismiss the suit pursuant to c hapter 14 of the civil prac tice and reme dies code, arg uin g t h at t h e suit was frivolous. I n the alterna tive, Rodriquez-Mendoza reque sted dismiss al for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court held

a hear ing on the motion, at which Enriquez was prese nt and p ro v i d ed testimony and arg ument. Following the hear i n g, the trial court signe d an order rec iting that the claims asser ted ag ainst Rodrigue z-Mendoza wer e frivolous and dismiss ing them. At the hear ing, the trial court explained that beca use of her immunit y , Enriquez’s claims ag ainst Rodrigue z-Mendoza had no re al istic likelihoo d o f s u cc es s and that the court could not g rant the decla ratory and injunctive relief he reque sted. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 1 4

. 0 0 3 (b ) (in deter mining whether claim is frivolous, court may consider whether there is rea listi c chanc e of ultimate succe ss and whether claim has ar g uable ba sis in law). Enriquez perf ecte d this appeal.

DISCUSSIO N Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applies to all suits, such

as this one , filed by inmates who decla re themselves unable to pa y costs. Id. § 14.002(a)

. Section 14.003 authorizes a trial court to dismiss an inmate’s claim, filed in forma pauper is, if it finds “the claim is frivolous or malicious.” Id. § 14.00 3 (a )( 2 ). I n assessing whether a suit is frivolous or 3malicious, a trial court may consid er v ar i o us fac tors, including whether the claim’s rea listi c

chanc e of ultimate succe ss is slight and whether the claim has no arg uable basis in law or fac t. Id. We revie w the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Leachman v. Dretke , 261 S.W .3d 297, 303 (Tex. A pp.—For t Worth 2008, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discr etion if it acts unrea sonably or without ref ere nce to any g uiding rules or principles. Id. We revie w de novo whether the plaintiff’s claims have no basis in law such that dismiss al on that g round is authorized. See Retzlaff v. Texas Dep’ t of Crim. Justice , 94 S.W .3d 650, 653 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2002, pet. denied)

.

I t is appar ent fr o m the repor ter’s rec ord of the hear ing on Rodrigue z-Mendoza’s motion to dismiss that the trial court conclude d that Enriquez’s claims wer e frivolous beca use some
wer e barr ed by Rodrigue z-Mendoza’s officia l immunit y and by ju d ic ia l im mu n it y , and the rema ining claims soug ht relief that the trial court was not leg ally permitted to g rant. All of Enriquez’s complaints wer e associate d with the judicial p rocess and with the manner in which Rodrigue zMendoz a perf

ormed—or alleg edly failed to perf orm—her duties as Travis County District Clerk. Thus she was entitled to judicial immunit y or derive d judicial immuni t y

— a form of absolute immunit y . See Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (re cog nizi ng absolute immunit y from suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Martinez v. Hardy , 864 S.W .2d 767, 772 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1993, no writ) (district cler k protec ted by absolute immunit y ). Moreove r, state officia ls

are immune from suit ari s i n g from the g ood-fa ith perf ormanc e of their discretionar y duties

as long as they are acting within the s co p e o f their authority

. City of Lancaster v. Chambers , 883 S.W .2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994).

4There are , howeve r exceptions to g overnmen tal immunit y . Under the ultra vires

exception, a reque st for prospec tive equitable and injunctive relief from illega l or unauthorized acts may be p u rsued under the Texas Dec lara tory J udg ments Act. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich , 284 S.W .3d 366, 370 (Tex. 2009). To invo k e t h e u l tra vires exception, it must be shown that the office r acte d without leg al authority or failed to perf orm a p u re l y m i n i s t erial act. Id. at 372. Gover nmental immunit y “does not prec lude prospec tive in ju n c ti v e r e me d ie s in o f

f ic ia l- c a p a c it y suits ag ainst g overnme nt actor s who violate statutory or constitutio n a l p r o v is ions.” Heinrich , 284 S.W .3d
at 368-69; see Texas Dep’ t of Transp. v. Sefzik , 355 S.W .3d 618, 620, 623 (Tex. 2011). Under Heinrich , g overnme ntal immunit y does not bar such ultra v i re s cl aim s, but the only reme dies available to a succe ssful plaintiff are prospec tive decla ratory and injunctive relief

. Id. at 376, 380. I n his first two issues, Enriquez asser ts that b ec ause he asked for prospec tive injunctive and decla ratory relief from illega l or unauthorized acts, the trial court err ed in concluding that all his claims wer e fr ivolous. W e disag ree . Inju nctive Relief

Enriquez’s amende d petition, the live pleading at the time of the dismiss al, does not

re q u est any specific injunctive relief

. I n his brief, Enriquez simil arly fails to identify what, i f any , injunctive relief he is seeking

. To t h e extent that Enriquez is seeking a g ener al injunction requiring compliance with the law, such an injunction cannot b e g rante d. See Hailey v. Glaser , No. 06-12-00065- CV, 2012 WL 5872869, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Nov. 21, 2012, no pet. h.). An injunction must be definite, clea r, and prec ise; it must inform the defe ndant of the acts restra ined without calling on th e d ef en d an t to make infere nces. Tex. R. Civ. P. 683; W ebb v. Glenbrook
5Owners Ass’n , 298 S.W

. 3 d 3 7 4, 384 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). An injunction is not

available to “pre vent commission of wrong s not imminently threa tened.” W

ebb , 298 S.W .3d at 384. Enriquez has not specifie d any imminently threa tened wrong ; his alleg ations simply cata logue past events. Moreove r, injunctive relief was not available unless Enriquez established that he had no adequate reme dy at law. See Lazarides v. Farris , 367 S.W .3d 788, 803 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (party seeking injunctive relief preve nting alleg ed ult ra vires acts must plead and prove, among other things, exis tence of imminent harm, irrepa rable injury , and absenc e of adequate reme dy at law). As the trial court noted at the hear ing, if in the future the district cler k fails
to comply with her duties, Enriquez may , as he has in other instances, bring the matter to the attention of the judge presiding over the proce eding

. The trial court has the authority to ensure that the district cler

k complies with her obliga tions. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 21.001(a) (West 2004) (cour t has all power s nece ssary for the exercise of its jurisdiction and enfor ceme n t o f i t s o rders, including authority to issue writs and order s nece ssary or prope r i n aid of its jurisdiction). We
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Enriquez’s claim for prospec tive injunctive relief was fr ivolous.

Dec laratory Relief

Enriquez’s petition does not identify what decla ratory relief he claims to be seeking

. We rea d his brief to contend that he is seeking a decla ration that Rodrigue z-Mendoza’s past actions

wer e inconsistent with the g overning statutes an d rules. The ultra vires exception to immunit y , howeve r, only permits prospec tive, as opposed to retroa ctive, d ec l ar atory relief

. Heinrich , 284 S.W .3d at 374-77. The Dec lara tory J udg ments Act is “intended as a means of deter mining the
6parties’ rig hts when a controve rsy has arisen but befor e a wrong h as b een committed, and ‘is

preve nt at i v e in nature .’” Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann , 359 S.W .3d 620, 624 (Tex. 2011) (per curia m). Whil e E n ri q u ez pleads numerous instances of alleg ed past acts in contra vention of the g overning statutes and rule s, he does not re quest any prospec tive decla ratory relief

. His claim for
retroa ctive decla

ratory relief is there fore barr ed by g overnme ntal immunit y . Heinrich , 284 S.W .3d
at 374-77. Ag ain, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Enriquez’s claim for decla ratory relief was frivolous. We overr ul e E n ri q u ez’s first two appellate isues.

I n his third i s s u e, E n riquez arg ues that the trial court did not have discretion to dismiss his suit on the g round that it did not ha ve subject-matter jurisdiction ove r the case without g iving him an opportunity to amend his pleading

. The order dismiss ing the case expressly states that the case was dismissed as fr ivolous pursua nt to chapte r fourtee n of the civil pr actice and reme dies code. Be cause the t ri al court did not dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, we
overr ule Enriquez’s third issue.

CONCLUSION Having overr

uled Enriquez’s three appellate iss u es , we aff irm the trial court’s dismiss al orde r.

7_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Goodwin and F ield Affir med Filed: F ebrua

ry 1, 2013

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