NUCLEAR 

COMMERCE

Additional Actions 

Needed to Improve 

DOE’s Export Control 

Process

Report to Congressional Requesters

October 2014

GAO-15-124

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-15-124, a report to 

congressional requesters

October 2014

NUCLEAR COMMERCE

Additional Actions Needed to Improve DOE’s Export 

Control Process

Why GAO Did This Study

Encouraging U.S. exports of civilian 

nuclear products, services, and 

technology while ensuring they are not 

used for foreign nuclear weapons 

programs is a fundamental goal of U.S. 

policy. Exports of U.S. civilian nuclear 

technology, assistance, and services

are regulated by DOE through 10 

C.F.R. Part 810. Depending on the 

importing country and technology, 

exports can be generally authorized, 

with no application required, or 

specifically authorized, in which case 

the exporter must submit an 

application to DOE. The Departments 

of Commerce, Defense, and State, as 

well as the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, also review the 

applications, which must finally be 

approved by the Secretary of Energy.

GAO was asked to examine the Part 

810 process. This report examines (1)

Part 810 processing times over the last 

6 years compared with DOE’s targets; 

(2) the extent to which Part 810’s 

scope is clear and DOE can 

reasonably assure consistent 

interpretation; and (3) the extent to 

which DOE enforces Part 810. GAO 

analyzed all 89 specific authorizations 

granted from 2008-2013 and 

interviewed key agency officials and 

U.S. nuclear industry representatives.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary 

of Energy take several actions to 

improve the Part 810 process, such as 

determine whether DOE has legal 

authority to impose civil penalties, and 

establish realistic and achievable 

targets for each stage of the Part 810 

process, as well as the overall process.

DOE agreed with the 

recommendations.

What GAO Found

The Department of Energy (DOE) has consistently missed its 30-day targets for 

the initial and interagency stages of the Part 810 review process (see table). 

From 2008 through 2013, DOE missed the target for the initial review stage for

80 of 89 applications processed, and interagency review times missed DOE’s 30-

day target for 85 applications. DOE has not established a target for the entire 

final review stage, which had the longest median review times, or for the overall 

process. DOE has acknowledged exporter concerns that processing times for 

specific authorizations can impose business risks, and DOE officials have 

proposed initiatives to reduce processing times.

Initial review stage Interagency review 

stage

Final review 

stage

Target review time 30 days 30 days None

Median Review time 71 days 105 days 125 days

Longest review

time

1,035 days 810 days 921 days

Shortest review time 0 daysa 12 days 14 days

Reviews exceeding 

30 days

80 of 89 85 of 89 86 of 89

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Energy information. | GAO-15-124 a

The 0-day initial review was for an amended application whose initial review was completed the same date the amended application 

was submitted.

The scope of Part 810 is unclear, and DOE’s inquiry process does not 

reasonably assure that the regulation is consistently interpreted. For example, it 

is unclear what marketing activities are covered by Part 810. DOE has not 

provided written guidance to clarify the regulation’s scope, instead directing

exporters to inquire with DOE officials. DOE officials said that they do not 

document all such inquiries or their responses. Without such documentation, 

DOE can neither reasonably assure that its responses are consistent, nor can it 

analyze the inquiries to identify parts of the regulation that may need clarification. 

DOE is taking some steps to clarify Part 810 by defining or refining some key 

terms. However, DOE’s revisions do not address all terms that exporters have 

identified as unclear, and the time frame of DOE’s revisions is unknown. 

DOE has taken limited actions to enforce Part 810. DOE’s primary method for 

monitoring compliance with Part 810 is reading reports from exporters, but 

according to DOE officials, they conduct in-depth analysis on less than 10 

percent of reports and do not have a risk-based procedure for selecting reports to 

analyze. Also, because DOE does not provide guidance for companies to selfidentify and self-report possible violations, DOE is missing an opportunity to 

leverage exporters’ role in monitoring their own compliance. DOE has not yet 

determined whether it has the legal authority to impose civil penalties for 

violations of Part 810. According to DOE officials, DOE has never taken a formal 

action for a violation of Part 810, such as revoking an authorization or referring a 

potential violation to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Furthermore, DOJ officials 

reported that they are not aware of any prosecutions related to Part 810 

violations from 2008-2013, the time frame GAO reviewed. 

View GAO-15-124. For more information, 

contact David C.Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or 

trimbled@gao.gov or Thomas Melito at (202) 

512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

Letter 1 

Background 5

DOE Consistently Missed Target Time Frames for Processing Part 

810 Applications, with the Interagency and Final Review Stages 

Taking Longest 9

Part 810 Is Unclear in Its Scope, and DOE’s Inquiry Process Does 

Not Reasonably Assure Consistent Interpretation 19

DOE Has Taken Limited Actions to Enforce Its Nuclear Export 

Controls 26

Conclusions 35

Recommendations for Executive Action 36

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 41

Appendix II Enforcement Tables 46

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Energy 49

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 56

Tables

Table 1: U.S. Nuclear Export Control Regime 6

Table 2: Comparison of Processing Times for Part 810 Process 16

Table 3: Common Conditions for Specific Part 810 Authorizations 

for Deemed Exports, 2008-2013 28

Table 4: Common Conditions for Specific Part 810 Authorizations 

Other Than for Deemed Exports, 2008-2013 29

Table 5: Conditions Imposed through Specific Authorizations for 

18 Deemed Exports, 2008 - 2013 46

Table 6: Conditions Imposed through Specific Authorizations for 

72 Technology Exports (Other Than Deemed Exports), 

2008-2013 47

Contents
Page ii GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

Figures

Figure 1: The Three-Stage Process for Reviewing Commercial 

Nuclear Technology Export Applications under 10 C.F.R. 

Part 810 7

Figure 2: Median Processing Time per Stage Compared with 

Applicable Targets 10

Figure 3: Median Processing Time per Stage for Deemed and 

Other Exports 13

Figure 4: Specific Authorizations by Year, 2008-2013 31
Page iii GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

Abbreviations

AEA Atomic Energy Act

ANS American Nuclear Society

AUECO Association of University Export Control Officers

BIS Bureau of Industry and Security

Commerce Department of Commerce

DDTC Directorate of Defense Trade Controls

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DOJ Department of Justice

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ISO International Standards Organization

ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations

MOX mixed oxide

NE Office of Nuclear Energy

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NIC Nuclear Infrastructure Council

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group

OEE Office of Export Enforcement

OIP Office of International Programs

State Department of State

UAE United Arab Emirates

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

October 14, 2014

The Honorable Fred Upton

Chairman

Committee on Energy and Commerce

House of Representatives

The Honorable Tim Murphy

Chairman

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Committee on Energy and Commerce

House of Representatives

Renewed interest in nuclear power worldwide has led to increased 

concerns about limiting the spread of nuclear weapons-relevant 

technology. Seeking a balance between encouraging U.S. exports of 

civilian nuclear products, services, and technology while ensuring they 

are not used for foreign nuclear weapons programs has long been a 

fundamental goal of U.S. policy. The U.S. nuclear industry faces 

formidable competition abroad from foreign companies, some of which 

receive strong financial and political support through direct government 

ownership or subsidies. As we reported in 2010, the U.S. share of global 

nuclear exports decreased during the period from 1994 through 2008.1

U.S. nuclear companies have raised concerns that, compared with the 

nuclear export control regimes of their major competitors—in Russia, 

Japan, South Korea, and France—the U.S. regime is, in many respects, 

more complex, restrictive, and time-consuming.

In 2010, we found that U.S. industry representatives believed that certain 

U.S. government policies and practices—particularly the Department of 

Energy’s (DOE) authorization process under 10 C.F.R. Part 810—

 

1

GAO, Nuclear Commerce: Governmentwide Strategy Could Help Increase Commercial 

Benefits from U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with Other Countries, GAO-11-36

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2010). 
 

Page 2 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

impeded the U.S. nuclear industry’s ability to compete globally.2 Part 810 

empowers the Secretary of Energy to authorize persons subject to the 

jurisdiction of the United States to directly or indirectly engage in the 

development or production of special nuclear material, which includes

plutonium,3 outside of the United States, upon a determination that the 

activity will not be inimical to the national interest. Part 810 applies 

broadly to commercial nuclear technology, assistance, and services 

abroad because nuclear reactors fueled with uranium also produce 

plutonium. Nuclear technology and assistance may include training and 

services in support of commercial power reactors, as well as tangible 

items such as manuals, blueprints, and software. Exports subject to Part 

810 also include the transfer of technology to non-U.S. persons in civilian 

U.S. nuclear facilities and universities.4

Exports with little or no proliferation or national security significance may 

be generally authorized under Part 810, with no application required. For 

example, the export of commercial nuclear power reactor technology may 

be generally authorized unless intended for restricted countries or 

nationals of those countries, to which any export of civilian nuclear

technology must be specifically authorized through an application to 

DOE.5 Transactions with a more direct relationship to the production of 

special nuclear material must always be specifically authorized through 

 

2

See GAO-11-36. Exports of U.S. civilian nuclear technology are regulated under 10 

C.F.R. Part 810, which implements Section 57(b) of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). The 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)—a separately organized agency within 

DOE—implements Part 810 through its Office of Nonproliferation and International 

Security. Part 810 applies to persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who 

engage directly or indirectly in the production of special nuclear material outside the 

United States, or by licensees, contractors or subsidiaries under their direction, 

supervision, responsibility, or control.

3

Special nuclear material includes plutonium and uranium enriched in the isotopes 

uranium-233 or uranium-235. 

4

The activities of non-U.S. persons in U.S. nuclear facilities are referred to as “deemed 

exports” because foreign nationals gain access to U.S. nuclear technology through such 

activities.

5

Commercial (or civilian) nuclear power activities represent “indirect” engagement or 

participation in the development or production of special nuclear material, and may or may 

not require specific authorization under Part 810. According to DOE documents, the 

agency interprets Part 810 broadly to include the provision of technology in the form of 

assistance or services to any nuclear power program outside the United States.10 C.F.R. 

Part 810 includes a list of 77 restricted countries, including China, Russia, and India.
 

Page 3 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

an application to DOE, regardless of the countries involved.6 DOE’s 

procedures for approving specifically authorized exports include target 

time frames, and the authorizations include conditions to hold the 

exporter, importer, and importing government accountable for protecting 

the technology and reducing the risk of proliferation. DOE data show that 

the value of generally authorized transactions is currently in the range of 

$2 billion to $3 billion per year, and the total value of specifically 

authorized transactions since 2009 is at least $13.6 billion. According to 

DOE officials and nuclear industry representatives, Part 810 applications 

are typically the initial foray into a broader nuclear relationship with a 

foreign partner company or foreign country.7

In 2010,8 we recommended that DOE review the Part 810 process and 

develop guidelines to help clarify the types of technology, information, 

and technical assistance that require a Part 810 authorization, among 

other things. Clarity and consistency are among the key principles of 

efficient regulation, according to two executive orders.9 DOE reviewed the 

Part 810 process and, in August 2013, DOE issued a Supplemental 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,10 with the purpose of “striking a balance 

to promote trade without increasing proliferation risk,” by clarifying the 

scope of the regulation, among other things. In this proposed rule, DOE 

 

6

The export of sensitive nuclear technology to any country must always be specifically 

authorized under Part 810. For example, enrichment is a sensitive nuclear technology. 

Enrichment is generally defined as the process of increasing the concentration of uranium235 from its natural concentration of less than 1 percent so that the uranium can be used 

for fuel in most commercial power reactors (or in a nuclear weapon). 

7

Part 810-authorized activities, such as bids for contracts, may be followed by activities 

that require export licenses from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which 

regulates exports of certain nuclear materials and equipment, under 10 C.F.R. Part 110. 

These nuclear materials and equipment include enriched uranium and reactor 

components, which can only be exported via NRC license if there is an agreement for civil 

nuclear cooperation (123 agreement) or a Project and Supply Agreement in place with the 

importing country. 

8

GAO-11-36. 

9

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 

76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011). In particular, Executive Order 13,563 directs that 

regulations be accessible, consistent, written in plain language, and easy to understand.

10Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 46,829 (Aug. 2, 2013) (to 

be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 810). In September 2011, DOE issued a Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking for Part 810 (Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, 76 Fed. Reg. 

55,278 (Sep. 7, 2011).
 

Page 4 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

further noted that the goals of Part 810 were efficient regulation—defined 

by an efficient, timely, transparent, and predictable regulatory process; 

effective nuclear trade support; and effective threat reduction by better 

addressing proliferation challenges.

In light of the international security and commercial implications of the 

export of U.S. civilian nuclear technology, you asked us to examine the 

Part 810 process. This report examines (1) Part 810 processing times, 

compared with DOE’s targets, for applications over the last 6 years; (2) 

the extent to which the scope of Part 810 is clear and DOE can 

reasonably assure consistent interpretation; and (3) the extent to which

DOE enforces Part 810.

To examine processing times over the last 6 years for Part 810 

applications, we reviewed DOE’s 10 C.F.R. Part 810 Assistance to 

Foreign Atomic Energy Activities Part 810 Program Elements to 

determine DOE’s target time frames, and analyzed data on the 

processing times for specific authorizations granted from 2008 through 

2013. We selected eight applications to examine in more depth and 

interviewed agency officials to better understand the factors affecting 

processing times. We also interviewed representatives of nuclear 

exporters (including representatives of nuclear companies and industry 

organizations, as well as university export control officers) regarding how 

Part 810 processing times affect exporters, and we reviewed public 

comments submitted in response to DOE’s proposed changes. To 

examine the extent to which the scope of Part 810 is clear and DOE can 

reasonably assure that the regulation is consistently interpreted, we 

consulted the Atomic Energy Act, the federal standards for internal 

control,11 and executive orders related to government regulation,12 and we 

interviewed DOE officials and representatives of nuclear exporters for 

their views on the clarity of the regulation, and reviewed public comments 

submitted in response to DOE’s proposed changes. To examine the 

extent to which DOE enforces Part 810, we reviewed the authorization 

letters signed by the Secretary that state a determination that the 

proposed export is not inimical to the interest of the United States, 

 

11GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(“Green Book”) (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

12Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 

76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
 

Page 5 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

provided that the conditions imposed in the authorization are met. We 

also interviewed DOE officials and Part 810 applicants about these 

conditions and the mechanisms DOE uses to enforce the regulation.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2013 to October 2014 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains more 

detailed information on the scope and methodology of our review.

Different federal agencies have jurisdiction to control various types of 

nuclear-related exports; DOE regulates the export of nuclear technology 

through Part 810, which implements Section 57(b) of the Atomic Energy 

Act; DOE and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have roles in enforcing 

Part 810.

Four federal agencies share jurisdiction over nuclear-related exports, with 

different agencies regulating different types of such exports. DOE 

regulates exports of commercial nuclear technology and assistance 

through its National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of 

Nonproliferation and International Security.13 The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) regulates exports of commercial nuclear materials 

and equipment through its Office of International Programs (OIP). Nuclear 

materials and equipment include certain enriched uranium and reactor 

components, respectively. The Department of Commerce (Commerce) 

regulates dual-use items—those that can be used for both commercial 

and military applications—and certain military items. Nuclear dual-use 

items include, among other things, turbines, generators, and machine 

tools. The Department of State (State) regulates munitions items and 

technologies—those designed, developed, configured, adapted, or 

modified solely for military applications. Table 1 provides additional detail 

on the U.S. nuclear export control regime.

 

13 NNSA is a separately organized agency within DOE. 

Background

Nuclear Export Controls
 

Page 6 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

Table 1: U.S. Nuclear Export Control Regime

Agency and authority Jurisdiction Examples

Department of Energy 

National Nuclear 

Security Administration 

(Part 810)

Nuclear technology and services related to 

the production of special nuclear material

• Providing information or assistance to address a 

radiological emergency; enhance the safety of a 

civilian nuclear facility in certain other countries

• Participating in open meetings sponsored by 

educational, scientific, or technical organizations; 

approved exchange and International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) programs

• Providing sensitive nuclear technology (for example, 

through blueprints, manuals, or services)

• Designing, building, or operating: production reactors, 

facilities for enrichment or reprocessing; or some 

research and test reactors

• Deemed exports and deemed re-exports (activities of 

non-U.S. persons accessing U.S. nuclear 

technologies)

Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission 

(Part 110)

Nuclear reactors, reactor components, and 

material

• Nuclear reactor or fuel cycle facilities

• Reactor components

• Special nuclear material and source material

• Byproduct material

• Deuterium (heavy hydrogen)

• Nuclear grade graphite for nuclear end use

Department of 

Commerce 

(Export Administration 

Regulations) 

Nuclear-related dual-use items • Pressure transducers, mass spectrometers, machine 

tools

• Health and safety equipment

• Turbines, generators, pipes, and valves

• Materials and manufacturing equipment

• General infrastructure , telecommunications, and 

maintenance equipment

Department of State 

(International Traffic in 

Arms Regulations)

Defense articles and services • Nuclear reactors and associated power conversion 

systems associated with spacecraft

• Nuclear thermal propulsion systems associated with 

spacecraft

Sources: GAO analysis of agency data. | GAO-15-124

DOE regulates exports of commercial nuclear technology and assistance 

under section 57(b) of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), which governs 

development or production of special nuclear material outside the United 

States. DOE implements section 57(b) through the regulations at 10 

C.F.R. Part 810. Part 810 applies to commercial activities because 

nuclear reactors fueled with uranium also produce plutonium. Section 

57(b) of the AEA requires establishment of orderly and expeditious 

procedures, to include, among other things, explicit direction on the 

The Atomic Energy Act 

and the Part 810 Process
 

Page 7 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

handling of requests to engage or participate in development or 

production of special nuclear material outside of the United States and 

express deadlines for soliciting and collecting the views of the other 

agencies (with identified officials responsible for meeting such deadlines). 

Activities generally authorized under Part 810 do not require prior 

application to or notification of the Secretary of Energy, although 

companies must report certain information about such activities to DOE 

within 30 days. Applications for specific authorization, which must be 

approved by the Secretary of Energy, undergo a three-stage review 

process, as depicted in figure 1.

Figure 1: The Three-Stage Process for Reviewing Commercial Nuclear Technology Export Applications under 10 C.F.R. Part 

810

a

There is no target time frame for the entire final review stage; however, the Secretary is to be 

provided with a recommendation regarding the determination no later than 30 days following receipt 

of the interagency concurrence or views (or 60 days in the event of interagency disagreements).

In the first or “initial” review stage, NNSA prepares an analysis of each 

application. In the second or “interagency” review stage, NNSA provides 

the application to State for concurrence and to the NRC, Commerce, and 
 

Page 8 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

the Department of Defense (DOD) for consultation.14 DOE’s target time 

frames for completion of the initial and interagency review stages are 30 

days each. DOE does not have a target time frame for completion of the 

third or “final” review stage, in which NNSA and DOE staff conduct a final 

review of the application and make a recommendation to the Secretary, 

who then makes a determination as to whether the proposed export 

would be inimical to the national interest. DOE does, however, have an 

interim target within the final review stage for providing a recommendation 

to the Secretary. Specifically, NNSA’s procedures for processing, 

reviewing, and approving specific authorizations state that the Secretary 

is to be provided with a recommendation no later than 30 days following 

receipt of the interagency concurrence or views, or 60 days in the event 

of interagency disagreements.15

Both DOE and DOJ have a role in the enforcement of Part 810. DOE may 

act to correct deficiencies in applications or processes, or obtain an 

injunction or restraining order to prevent violation of Part 810, and may 

refer suspected criminal violations to DOJ for investigation and possible 

prosecution under the AEA. Any person convicted of violating, conspiring, 

or attempting to violate Section 57 of the AEA; or of willfully falsifying, 

concealing, or covering up a material fact or making false, fictitious or 

fraudulent statements or representations may be fined or imprisoned or 

both. Further, under Part 810, if a violation of the AEA is committed with 

intent to injure the United States or to aid a foreign nation, the penalty 

could be up to life imprisonment and a $20,000 fine. DOE has not yet 

determined whether it has legal authority to apply civil penalties for 

violation of Part 810. DOE monitors compliance with Part 810 in part 

through reports that exporters are required to submit on authorized

activities.

 

14State’s concurrence is required under the AEA; DOE must consult the other agencies, 

but their concurrence is not required.

15However, the procedures state that any time period in this stage may be extended by 

the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs or his designee. Under DOE’s current 

organization, which has changed since the procedures were last updated, this official is 

the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, NNSA. Amendment to 

Procedures Established Pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, 49 Fed. 

Reg. 20,780 (May 16, 1984).

Enforcement
 

Page 9 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

The United States has pledged to adhere to a set of guidelines that 

include export licensing regulations, enforcement procedures, and 

penalties for violations. These guidelines, developed by nuclear supplier 

countries (the Nuclear Suppliers Group [NSG]), aim to ensure that trade 

in civilian nuclear technologies does not contribute to nuclear 

proliferation.16 The NSG was established in 1975, and since 1978, it has 

published guidelines which cover transfers of nuclear and nuclear-related 

dual use equipment, material, software, and related technology. These 

guidelines lay out principles for the members to apply, in accordance with 

their national requirements. All NSG members, including the United 

States, have pledged to put in place legal measures to ensure the 

effective implementation of the NSG guidelines.

From 2008 through 2013, DOE consistently missed its 30-day targets to 

complete the initial and interagency stages of the Part 810 review 

process. Specifically, during this period, DOE missed the target to 

complete the initial stage of review for 80 of the 89 applications 

processed. Similarly, interagency review times missed DOE’s target for 

85 of the applications. The third stage, for which DOE has not established 

a target time frame, had the longest median review times. (See fig. 2). 

U.S. nuclear exporters said that the lengthy and unpredictable Part 810 

time frames can impose business risks.

 

16NSG is a voluntary, nonbinding arrangement among nuclear supplier countries. 

Participating countries undertake a political commitment to abide by the goals and 

principles established by the group. 

DOE Consistently 

Missed Target Time 

Frames for 

Processing Part 810 

Applications, with the 

Interagency and Final 

Review Stages Taking 

Longest
 

Page 10 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

Figure 2: Median Processing Time per Stage Compared with Applicable Targets

a

There is no target time frame for the entire final review stage; however, the Secretary is to be 

provided with a recommendation regarding the determination no later than 30 days following receipt 

of the interagency concurrence or views (or 60 days in the event of interagency disagreements).

We found that DOE missed its target to complete initial review for 90 

percent (80 of 89) of the applications for specific authorization approved 

from 2008 through 2013 (no application was denied during this period). 

DOE took a median of 71 days to complete the initial review stage, with 

DOE’s longest initial review taking 1,035 days.17 In this stage, NNSA 

prepares an analysis of each application based on a set of technical and 

other reviews by experts in DOE’s National Laboratories, its Office of 

Nuclear Energy (NE) and Office of General Counsel, and NNSA’s Office 

 

17In the data that DOE provided to us, on which we based our analysis, DOE recorded the 

date on the application as the start date for the initial review stage. However, DOE officials 

told us that they sometimes have to contact applicants to request additional information or 

clarification and do not start reviewing the application until they receive all of the required 

information. In response to GAO inquiries about Part 810 processing times in November 

2013, DOE began using the docket date—the date the initial internal review actually 

begins—as the start date for the initial review stage. 

DOE Missed Its Target to 

Complete Initial Review for 

90 Percent of Applications
 

Page 11 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

of General Counsel. NNSA considers eight factors, including whether the 

United States has an agreement for nuclear cooperation with the nation 

or group of nations involved; whether the country is a party to the Treaty 

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); and whether the 

country involved has entered into an agreement with the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of safeguards on all its 

peaceful nuclear activities.

For the two applications that we reviewed based on their initial review 

times—one that met the 30-day initial review target, and one that did 

not—the nature of the proposed export affected the initial review times. 

Specifically, an application for a U.S. company to provide assistance to 

the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) nuclear regulatory body had a 29-day 

initial review stage (meeting the 30-day target), because, according to 

DOE officials, the details of the application matched those of another 

recently submitted application. As a result, DOE’s internal review of this 

application could leverage the work completed for the preceding 

application. The application that missed the target, taking 186 days for 

initial review, was for the export of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication 

technology to the United Kingdom.18 According to DOE officials, MOX is a 

sensitive technology, which requires greater scrutiny.

Interagency review times missed DOE’s 30-day target for 85 of the 89 

applications approved from 2008 through 2013. The interagency review 

stage was the second longest in the process, with a median review time 

of 105 days. Ten applications took more than a year for interagency 

review. As noted earlier, in this stage, DOE seeks concurrence from 

State, and consults Commerce, NRC, and DOD. These agencies have 30 

days to provide comments or concurrence, including any conditions they 

would place on the authorization.

State took the longest among the agencies to provide its comments or 

concurrence. State’s median review time—86 days—was nearly three 

times longer than DOE’s 30-day target. According to DOE and State 

officials, State’s concurrence times depend on, among other things, the 

responsiveness of the importing country in providing assurances of 

 

18MOX fuel is a mix of plutonium and uranium oxides. 

Interagency Review Times 

Missed DOE’s Target for 

More Than 95 Percent of 

Applications
 

Page 12 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

peaceful use and no re-export without U.S. government consent.19 For 

example, NNSA sent an application package for interagency review in 

April 2009 asking for responses within 30 days for the export of a 

computer program to a Chinese university for teaching and research 

purposes. State concurred in January 2011, about 2 weeks after receiving 

the foreign government assurance and almost 2 years after receiving the 

letter from NNSA. Agency officials attributed the 645-day interagency 

review period to delays in obtaining assurances from the Chinese 

government.

State officials, who obtain assurances through embassy staff, told us they 

have not established a time frame for the embassies to respond, but they 

noted that it is rare for embassy staff not to follow up on an assurance 

request expeditiously. Embassy staff, who receive instructions and 

background documents from State headquarters, often work to make sure 

that the facts listed in the request for assurances are correct and that the 

staff have current information for points of contact for the importer, which 

is a key step in the assurance process. State officials recognized the 

need to streamline the process for obtaining assurances in countries with 

growing nuclear markets, such as China and the UAE. Of the 89 

applications DOE approved from 2008 through 2013, 23 were for exports 

to the UAE—more than any other country—largely for U.S. persons to 

provide expertise to the UAE’s Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation and 

nuclear regulatory body. In 2010, State developed generic assurances for 

Part 810 authorizations to the UAE, based on an agreed-upon template, 

so that the language would not need separate negotiation for each 

application. These generic assurances confirm that the transferred 

technology will be used exclusively for civil nuclear power activities and 

not for any nuclear explosive or other military purpose and that the 

technology will not be retransferred outside the UAE without prior U.S. 

consent. State officials said they would seek to streamline the assurance 

process in other countries where needed, based on growth in their 

nuclear industries, which drives the number of requests for assurances.

 

19Foreign government assurances are not required by the regulation or by Section 57(b) 

of the AEA, but State will not provide its concurrence—which is required—without such 

assurances because it views them as meeting several important legal and policy 

objectives. Furthermore, DOE officials have stated that any Secretary of Energy would be 

unwilling to sign an authorization for which State cannot provide a foreign government’s 

assurance that the technology would not be retransferred or diverted.
 

Page 13 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

Foreign government assurance times are not a factor in interagency 

review times in the cases of deemed exports—foreign nationals who

access nuclear technology subject to Part 810 in the United States—

because, in these cases, DOE requires U.S. employers of the foreign 

nationals to obtain written nonproliferation assurances from the 

employees rather than from the foreign government. However, the 

median interagency review time for such cases—46 days—still exceeded 

DOE’s target of 30 days. Notably, the longest interagency review of 810 

days was for a deemed export.20 The 46-day median interagency review 

time for deemed export applications was shorter than that for other export 

applications—126 days. See figure 3 for interagency review times for 

deemed and all other exports.

Figure 3: Median Processing Time per Stage for Deemed and Other Exports

 

20This 810-day interagency review period was the longest, although the data that NNSA 

provided and that we used as the basis of our aggregated analysis included an 

interagency review period of 840 days (the application to export fuel specifications to 

Russia discussed below). Because the 840 days include the abeyance period that 

resulted from U.S. policy in response to Russia’s actions in Georgia, we are considering 

the 810-day interagency review period for this application the longest.
 

Page 14 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

In some cases, foreign policy considerations affect interagency review 

times. For example, a U.S. government hold on civil nuclear cooperation 

with Russia following its 2008 military actions in Georgia accounted for a 

large part of the 840-day interagency review for an application to export 

nuclear fuel specifications to Russia. The application, submitted in 

January 2008, had reached the final review stage in August 2008, when 

NNSA held it in abeyance because of Russia’s actions.21 Following the 

signing of the New START Treaty in April 2010 and resubmission of the 

U.S.-Russia nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress in May 2010,22

nuclear cooperation with Russia resumed, and NNSA requested that 

interagency reviewers resubmit their views on the application from 2008 

as soon as possible and emphasized the need for promptness. 

Interagency review times vary among countries and within the same 

country. For example, among the three countries with the most Part 810 

applications (excluding deemed exports)—UAE, China, and Russia—

interagency review times for exports to the UAE ranged from 27 to 344 

days; review times for exports to China ranged from 46 days to 749 days; 

and review times for exports to Russia ranged from 35 to 840 days.

Our analysis found that the final review stage, for which DOE has not 

established comprehensive targets, had the longest median processing 

times—125 days—with seven applications taking more than a year for 

final review and approval. In the final stage, NNSA’s and DOE’s Offices of 

General Counsel and DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy review the 

applications, and NNSA prepares a package of materials for the 

Secretary’s determination. According to DOE’s procedures, the Secretary 

is to be provided with a recommendation no later than 30 days following 

receipt of the interagency concurrence or views (or 60 days in the event 

 

21According to the dates NNSA provided, which we used as the basis of our aggregated 

data analysis, the interagency review accounted for 840 of the 972 days to process this 

application. However, those 840 days include the first final review in August 2008 (before 

the application was held in abeyance) and the entire abeyance period, rather than a 

discrete interagency review period. 

22The formal titles of these agreements are the Treaty Between the United States of 

America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and 

Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Agreement Between the Government of the 

United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation for Cooperation 

in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, respectively.

Final Review Was the 

Longest Stage
 

Page 15 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

of interagency disagreements).23 The Secretary of Energy reviews the 

package to determine whether the activities covered by the Part 810 

application will not be inimical to the interest of the United States. Under 

the AEA, the Secretary may not delegate the determination.24

We found variability in final-stage processing times across countries. For 

example, for the three countries with the most Part 810 applications 

(excluding deemed exports)—UAE, China, and Russia—median 

completion times for final review ranged from 100 days for the UAE to 

127 days for China. Final review times for applications for exports to the 

same country also varied. For example, the shortest final review time for 

an export to Russia was 35 days and the longest was 194 days; final 

review times for exports to the UAE ranged from 31 days to 197 days 

(excluding deemed exports). The longest final review took 921 days, for a 

deemed export.

A variety of factors contributed to the duration of final review. For an 

application to transfer controlled technology to Indian nationals working at 

a U.S. nuclear facility, DOE’s Office of General Counsel’s concerns about 

the application package contributed to DOE’s final review times of 241 

days. According to NNSA officials, this application was 1 of 10 delayed for 

this reason. Once DOE General Counsel completed its revisions, NNSA 

sent a memorandum to the Secretary recommending approval of the 

application, which the Secretary granted within 2 weeks.

In the final review stage, conditions that agencies imposed as part of their 

concurrence may also affect review times. In one case, DOD placed 

restrictions on foreign nationals’ access to information and facilities as a 

condition of its concurrence, in August 2010. Pending reconsideration of 

these conditions, NNSA held this application in abeyance for 10 months, 

starting in December 2010,25 contributing to a final review stage of 634 

days, out of a total processing time of 824 days for the application. The 

following October, DOD concurred with the application without conditions 

 

23Amendment to Procedures Established Pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 

1978, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,780 (May 16, 1984). 

2442 U.S.C. §§ 2077(b), 2201(n) (2012). 

25According to our analysis of NNSA data, NNSA attributed the number of days it held this 

application in abeyance to the final review stage. The final review stage was 634 days and 

the interagency stage was 30 days.
 

Page 16 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

after reviewing the background of the foreign nationals and the DOE staff 

analysis that determined that transfer of the technology would be 

appropriate and would not pose a risk to the facility where they would be 

employed.

NNSA has a 30-day target (60 days in the case of interagency 

disagreement) within the final review stage for providing a 

recommendation to the Secretary, but does not track the dates that it 

provides these recommendations. For the 10 applications for which we 

could determine the date that NNSA provided a recommendation to the

Secretary, DOE exceeded the 30-day target for 9 applications. Of these, 

2 were held in abeyance as described above.

Table 2 provides a comparison of processing times for each stage in the 

process and shows shortest and longest review at each stage.

Table 2: Comparison of Processing Times for Part 810 Process

Initial review 

stage

Interagency review 

stage

Final review 

stage

Target review time 30 days 30 days None

Median review time 71 days 105 days 125 days

Longest review 1,035 days 810 days 921 days

Shortest review 0 daysa 12 days 14 days

Reviews exceeding 

30 days 

80 of 89 85 of 89 86 of 89

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data | GAO-15-124

a

The 0-day initial review was for an amended application whose initial review was completed the 

same date the amended application was submitted.

DOE’s targets are not comprehensive, as DOE has not established 

targets for the entire third stage of the Part 810 process, or for overall 

processing time. By comparison, NRC has established targets—which 

are part of its performance metrics—for processing export licenses. We 

have identified measurable, numerical targets as key attributes of 
 

Page 17 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

successful performance measures.26 Furthermore, the rate at which DOE 

has missed its targets calls into question whether these targets are 

realistic and achievable. According to a 2007 executive order on 

improving government program performance,27 program goals should be 

sufficiently aggressive but realistic in light of authority and resources 

assigned. Without measurable and realistic targets, DOE cannot 

determine whether its Part 810 process is meeting its goal of efficient 

regulation, which includes timeliness.

Realistic targets could also further DOE’s goal of efficient regulation—

another aspect of which is predictability—by giving exporters a sense of 

how long the application process may take. According to some nuclear 

exporters, the lengthy and unpredictable specific authorization process 

affects the competitiveness and hiring practices of their companies and 

universities. One company, in its comments on DOE’s proposed changes 

to Part 810, noted that the Part 810 process is unpredictable, and that 

predictability is important for business planning. An industry organization 

representative we spoke to also emphasized the importance of 

predictability, stating that nuclear companies understand that nuclear 

matters may take a long time but that it is important to know how long 

things may take.

DOE, in its preamble to the proposed changes to Part 810, acknowledged 

nuclear exporters’ concerns that the time frame for processing specific 

authorizations can impose business risks for companies. In comments on 

DOE’s proposed changes to Part 810, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), 

an industry group that represents hundreds of nuclear companies,28 wrote 

in November 2013 that the specific authorization process was a cause of 

delay and uncertainty, and a distinct disadvantage, for U.S. exporters. 

Representatives of one U.S. nuclear exporter told us that Chinese clients 

 

26GAO, National Laboratories: DOE Needs to Improve Oversight of Work Performed for 

Non-DOE Entities, GAO-14-78 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 25, 2013); Environmental Justice: 

EPA Needs to Take Additional Actions to Help Ensure Effective Implementation, 

GAO-12-77 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 6, 2011); and Tax Administration: IRS Needs to 

Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002). 

27Exec. Order No. 13,450, 72 Fed. Reg. 64, 519 (Nov. 13, 2007). 

28NEI’s mission includes providing a unified industry voice on the global importance of 

nuclear energy and nuclear technology. NEI has over 350 members in 17 countries. 

DOE and Representatives 

of U.S. Nuclear Exporters 

Stated That the Lengthy 

Part 810 Process Can 

Impose Business Risks
 

Page 18 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

had advised the company against submitting a bid if it would require a 

specific authorization. According to a representative from a second 

company, the delays in obtaining a Part 810 authorization inhibit the 

demonstration and deployment of reactor technology.

According to industry representatives and university officers, Part 810 

processing times may also delay or restrict the work or study of foreign 

nationals in the United States. The Ad-Hoc Utilities Group, another 

industry group, described the “two equally unsatisfactory alternatives” 

where (1) companies can either delay hiring foreign nationals or (2) hire 

them but limit the scope of their work functions until approval of the 

authorization. For example, a representative from a nuclear company told 

us that an engineer from India employed at a U.S. nuclear plant was 

unable to carry out the full scope of duties without a specific authorization, 

which took 14 months to process. The engineer left the job before the 

authorization was granted. According to the Ad-Hoc Utilities Group, it is 

impractical for nuclear power operators to offer a foreign national a job 

that depends on a specific authorization that can take a year to obtain. 

The group added that Part 810 hinders utilities from hiring qualified 

foreign employees for positions that require access to certain nuclearrelated materials. As a result, the group wrote, Part 810 can deter the 

hiring of workers who can safely operate nuclear power plants. In 

addition, a university officer whose institute offers a nuclear science and 

engineering program told us that Part 810 imposes a barrier for U.S. 

universities in recruiting faculty and students that the universities’ foreign 

competitors do not face.

DOE has begun efforts to reduce processing times of Part 810 

applications. For example, NNSA officials said they plan to build an elicensing system for the Part 810 process and are finalizing the details 

regarding the functionality of such a system. The e-licensing system 

would track applications as they proceed through the authorization 

process, allowing NNSA to monitor its performance in processing them. 

NNSA officials said that the e-licensing system would improve 

predictability by allowing applicants to track their applications throughout 

the process, including the interagency review. NNSA is also working to 

become compliant with the International Standards Organization (ISO)-

DOE Has Begun Efforts to 

Improve the Part 810 

Process, Including the 

Development of an ELicensing System
 

Page 19 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

9001, a quality management standard,29 and the Part 810 process is part 

of this initiative. NNSA officials told us that the agency has completed the 

initial interview phase of the ISO certification process, as well as the Lean 

Six Sigma process,30 but NNSA’s time frame for becoming compliant with 

the ISO-9001 standard is unclear.

Part 810 is unclear with regard to the activities it covers, among other 

things. DOE has not provided written guidance to help exporters interpret 

the scope of the regulation; instead, DOE encourages exporters to inquire 

with DOE officials for interpretation. DOE cannot reasonably assure that 

its responses to inquiries are consistent, however, because DOE officials 

do not routinely document these inquiries or DOE’s responses. DOE has 

taken steps to clarify the regulation and is planning to develop guidance.

Part 810 is unclear with regard to the scope of activities covered and 

application requirements. For example, key definitions do not make it

clear which activities are subject to the regulation. This affects, among 

other things, how companies conduct marketing activities related to 

nuclear reactors. Two executive orders identify clarity and consistency 

among the key principles of federal regulation.31 We identified the 

following three areas regarding the lack of clarity in the regulation:

• Key definitions in Part 810 are broad. The regulation’s definition of 

“nuclear reactor” does not distinguish among reactor components 

 

29The ISO 9000 series is a quality management standard developed from the collective 

experience and knowledge of international experts who participate in the ISO Technical 

Committee. These standards are based on eight quality management principles, which 

senior management can use as a framework to guide their organizations toward improved 

performance. The quality management principles include, among others, customer focus, 

leadership, continual improvement, and a factual approach to decision making. 

30Lean Six Sigma is a data-driven approach based on the idea of eliminating defects and 

errors that contribute to losses of time, money, opportunities, or business.

31Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 

76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011). As previously noted, Executive Order 13,563 directs 

that regulations be accessible, consistent, written in plain language, and easy to 

understand.

Part 810 Is Unclear in 

Its Scope, and DOE’s 

Inquiry Process Does 

Not Reasonably 

Assure Consistent 

Interpretation

Part 810 Is Unclear in Its 

Scope
 

Page 20 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

based on their relative sensitivities. Representatives of nuclear 

exporters have said that the regulation’s definition of “nuclear 

reactor”—as “an apparatus, other than a nuclear explosive device, 

designed or used to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain 

reaction”—is overly broad and could be interpreted to encompass a 

wide variety of technologies unrelated to the production of special 

nuclear material. For example, NEI noted in its comments on DOE’s 

proposed revisions to Part 810 that nuclear reactors, under DOE’s 

definition, contain thousands of components and systems, only some 

of which, such as the reactor pressure vessel,32 relate to the 

production of special nuclear material.33 The group raised concerns 

that absent a clearer definition of the technologies covered within the 

scope of “nuclear reactor,” companies would be forced to seek timeconsuming advisory opinions for each item in a nuclear power plant. 

By contrast, NRC’s export control regulations provide an illustrative 

list of covered nuclear reactor components,34 and representatives of 

exporters suggested in their public comments that DOE compile a 

similar list.

• Part 810 does not explicitly address sales or marketing. The 

regulation does not contain provisions that specifically address 

marketing and does not clearly delineate the types of marketing 

information that may require a general or specific authorization. A 

representative of an association for nuclear companies told us that 

this has created confusion and that exporters determine whether 

sales and marketing information is covered based on whether the 

information is public or proprietary. However, exporters noted in their 

public comments on DOE’s proposed revisions to Part 810 that 

marketing activities may entail the transfer of general design or price 

information that is proprietary but not sufficiently detailed to assist in 

production of special nuclear material. Nonetheless, such information 

may fall under the jurisdiction of Part 810 because it is not “public 

information,” which is generally authorized for transfer (and would be 

 

32Reactor pressure vessels contain the nuclear fuel in nuclear power plants.

33These comments were made on DOE’s 2011 proposed revisions to Part 810, but the 

definition in question is unchanged from its current version.

34NRC provides an “Illustrative List of Nuclear Reactor Equipment under NRC Export 

Licensing Authority” at 10 C.F.R. Part 110 Appendix A.
 

Page 21 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

exempt under the proposed rule).35 A company representative told us 

that absent greater clarity, companies are limited in marketing a 

design and advancing a contract because customers request detailed 

information—which may be proprietary—to understand how much 

they would be willing to pay for a product. Representatives of another 

company told us that it took 2 years to get the specific authorization to 

disclose the information needed for a marketing activity. While DOE 

has proposed to adjust its definitions related to public information,36 it 

has declined to specify what marketing activities may be exempt from 

authorization—stating that the regulation’s applicability depends on 

the data transferred rather than the activity—and has instead noted in 

its Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that companies can 

seek guidance from the department on a case-by-case basis.

• The regulation does not clearly specify the information and 

documents that applicants are required to submit. DOE’s review 

of Part 810 applications may be prolonged because applicants may 

not submit all of the information required, which may occur because it 

is sometimes unclear to applicants what information is required. For 

example, a university export control officer told us that she applied for 

a specific authorization for a course being developed on operating a 

nuclear power plant. More than 5 weeks after submitting the 

application, a DOE official requested additional information from the 

applicant—specifically, résumés for the foreign nationals involved. 

The university officer said that, unlike with other export control 

regimes, DOE does not provide guidance on the application materials 

necessary for Part 810, and that she would have included the 

résumés at the beginning of the process if she had known she needed 

 

35Under the regulation, “public information” includes information generally available in print 

or electronic media; libraries, archives, and university courses; information that has been 

presented in open meetings; and certain information that has been filed with the United 

States Patent and Trademark Office or which has been made available under the 

Freedom of Information Act. It does not include any technical embellishment, 

enhancement, explanation or interpretation which in itself is not public information.

36 Specifically, DOE has proposed to replace its definition of “public information” with 

definitions of “publicly available information” and “publicly available technology.” 
 

Page 22 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

to provide them.37 Section 57(b) of the AEA states that, to the extent 

practicable, an applicant should be advised of all the information 

required at the beginning of the process. NNSA officials told us that 

Part 810 contains the application requirements; however, the 

regulation does not list, for example, résumés among the 

requirements. The university officer said she submitted the additional 

information to DOE, and DOE officials informed her 4 weeks later that 

the activity would not require specific authorization.

DOE does not provide supplemental guidance to help exporters interpret 

the scope and requirements of Part 810. According to an OMB bulletin, 

agencies increasingly have relied on guidance documents to inform the 

public and to provide direction to their staffs as the scope and complexity 

of regulatory programs have grown.38 According to this bulletin, guidance 

documents, used properly, can channel the discretion of agency 

employees, increase efficiency, and enhance fairness by providing the 

public clear notice of the line between permissible and impermissible 

conduct, while ensuring equal treatment of similarly situated parties. We 

found that the other agencies that regulate civilian nuclear exports—NRC 

and Commerce—do provide written guidance, such as frequently-askedquestions documents, to clarify their interpretation of the regulations to 

 

37Part 810 specifies that each application shall contain (a) the name, address, and 

citizenship of the applicant, and complete disclosure of all real parties in interest; if the 

applicant is a corporation or other legal entity, where it is incorporated or organized, the 

location of its principal office, and the degree of any control or ownership by any foreign 

person or entity; (b) a complete description of the proposed activity, including its 

approximate monetary value, the name and location of any facility or project involved, the 

name and address of the person or legal entity for which the activity is to be performed, 

and a detailed description of any specific project to which the activity relates; (c) any 

information the applicant may wish to provide concerning the factors the Secretary must 

take into account in considering a grant of specific authorization; and (d) designation of 

any information considered proprietary for which public disclosure would cause substantial 

harm to the competitive position of the applicant. 

38Office of Management and Budget: Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices

(72 Fed. Reg. 3,432 (Jan. 2007) defines ‘‘guidance document’’ as an agency statement of 

general applicability and future effect, other than a regulatory action (as defined in 

Executive Order 12866, as further amended), that sets forth a policy on a statutory, 

regulatory, or technical issue or an interpretation of a statutory or regulatory issue.

DOE Does Not Provide 

Exporters with 

Supplemental Guidance 

and Its Inquiry Process 

Does Not Reasonably 

Assure Consistency
 

Page 23 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

exporters.39 Nuclear exporters said that such guidance would be helpful 

for Part 810. According to one company, a more comprehensive 

explanation of activities that require specific authorization would afford 

U.S. businesses the opportunity to adequately plan for international 

commitments.

DOE’s practice is to provide guidance on a case-by-case basis on its 

interpretations of various Part 810 provisions, but this guidance is 

provided only to the specific party and is not made public. One company 

wrote in its public comments on DOE’s proposed revisions to Part 810 

that, rather than requiring companies to obtain advisory opinions with 

respect to proposed activities, DOE and the nuclear industry would 

benefit from DOE’s establishment of clearer boundaries for the 

applicability of Part 810. University export officers also said that DOE 

declined their request to clarify which types of university activities would 

require authorization, but encouraged the officers to inquire or apply so 

that DOE could make a case-by-case determination. These officers 

raised concerns that the lack of clarity in Part 810, together with the 

uncertainty about DOE’s decisions regarding what activities require 

authorization, may restrict scientific communication by creating confusion 

about what universities may share openly.

Without established written guidance, exporters uncertain about the 

scope of Part 810 must inquire with DOE for interpretation. Under Part 

810, potential applicants may request advice on, among other things, 

whether a proposed activity falls within the scope of the regulations or 

requires specific authorization. According to DOE’s Part 810 procedures, 

DOE receives numerous inquiries from U.S. persons and firms regarding 

activities that may fall under the scope of Part 810 regulations. NNSA 

officials told us they receive approximately two inquiries in the form of 

letters and more than 10 inquiries by phone each week. According to 

DOE’s Part 810 procedures, most of these inquiries are requests for 

interpretation of the regulation or requests for review of proposed financial 

ventures with foreign entities. These inquiries require the input of a wide 

range of expertise from various sources inside DOE and elsewhere that 

 

39NRC provides an “Illustrative List of Nuclear Reactor Equipment under NRC Export 

Licensing Authority” at 10 C.F.R. Part 110 Appendix A. Commerce maintains the 

Commerce Control List, which describes the characteristics and capabilities of the dualuse items and certain military items that may require export licenses at 15 C.F.R. Part 774

Supplement 1, and the agency also provides an online list of frequently asked questions. 
 

Page 24 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

are consolidated into informal written or oral guidance or for formal 

correspondence. DOE’s responses to these inquiries are significant, 

because, as DOE acknowledges, the specific-authorization process can 

be protracted, and its approval time frames can impose business risks for 

U.S. companies.

Several representatives of nuclear exporters told us that DOE responded 

promptly to inquiries, but that the need to consult DOE to clarify the scope 

and applicability of the regulation contributed to a process that was too 

dependent on individual interpretation. For example, one company 

representative told us that there was no way of knowing whether other 

companies were getting the same response—with regard to what type of 

authorization would be needed—for the same set of circumstances. A 

university export officer said that a definition provided by DOE in the 

course of an inquiry appeared to be “made up on the spot.” Another 

company representative suggested that a potential applicant could get a 

different answer depending on which official at DOE takes the call, based 

on an individual interpretation with no basis in the regulation. This 

representative said that DOE’s inquiry system provides companies with 

an incentive to proceed with the activity in question without consulting 

DOE. Specifically, the representative noted that an inquiry could lead to a 

response that the transaction could not proceed without waiting for an 

authorization. If the company proceeds without inquiring, however, and 

DOE later determines that the transaction required authorization, this 

representative believes that the company would be able to defend itself 

against any enforcement action because DOE would not be able to point 

to the specific regulatory language on which it based its determination.

DOE officials do not consistently document inquiries or their responses, 

and cannot analyze them for consistency or to identify parts of the 

regulation that may need clarification. Part 810 does not require exporters 

to submit inquiries for interpretation of the scope of the regulation, or for 
 

Page 25 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

DOE to respond to them, in writing or electronically.40 However, DOE’s 

internal procedures state that DOE is to maintain a database that includes 

a listing of and files for all inquiries, and other export-control agencies 

such as State and Commerce do require written or electronic submissions 

and responses for inquiries regarding jurisdiction.41 DOE officials said that 

they do not document all inquiries or responses because some inquiries 

are vague, and DOE’s responses are predecisional. However, as noted 

earlier, DOE’s responses to these inquiries are significant because of the 

time frames of the specific authorization process; they determine whether 

or not an activity is subject to the regulation and whether an exporter has 

to engage in the time-consuming authorization process. Documenting all 

inquiries and responses would provide DOE with the information needed 

to reasonably assure that the agency’s responses are consistent under 

similar circumstances, and to identify aspects of the regulation that may 

need clarification. Under the federal standards for internal control, 

agencies are to accurately record and appropriately document 

transactions.42 Documentation of transactions is also important because 

gaps can develop in an organization’s institutional knowledge and 

leadership as experienced employees leave.43 Some nuclear exporters 

expressed concerns in this regard, stating that, while the staff that 

 

40Specifically, 10 C.F.R. § 810.5 provides that, “A person may request the advice of the 

Director, Nuclear Transfer and Supplier Policy Division (NN-43), on whether a proposed 

activity falls outside the scope of this part, is generally authorized under § 810.7, or 

requires specific authorization under § 810.8; however, unless authorized by the Secretary 

of Energy, in writing, no interpretation of the regulations in this part other than a written 

interpretation by the General Counsel is binding upon the Department. When advice is 

requested from the Director, Nuclear Transfer and Supplier Policy Division, or a binding, 

written determination is requested from the General Counsel, a response normally will be 

made within 30 days and, if this is not feasible, an interim response will explain the delay.” 

However, there is no requirement that inquiries be handled formally.

41If companies have determined that their items are Commerce-controlled but are 

uncertain of export licensing requirements, they may request a classification from 

Commerce through the commodity classification process. Commerce can refer 

classification requests to State and DOD to confirm that the items are Commercecontrolled. If companies are unsure of which department has jurisdiction over their items, 

they can request a determination through the commodity jurisdiction process from State, 

which consults with Commerce and Defense. For more information, please see GAO, 

Export Controls: Processes for Determining Proper Control of Defense-Related Items 

Need Improvement, GAO-02-996, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2002).

42GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

43GAO, Federal Workforce: Recent Trends in Federal Civilian Employment and 

Compensation, GAO-14-215 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2014).
 

Page 26 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

currently implements Part 810 is competent and helpful, the system 

should not rely on individuals, and that a change of staff could make the 

process more difficult.

DOE has taken steps to clarify Part 810, recognizing in its Supplemental 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that the scope of activities regulated 

under Part 810 could be clearer.44 For example, DOE is proposing to 

define some key terms, such as “technical assistance,” and to refine its 

definitions of other terms, for example by replacing its prior definition of 

“public information” with definitions of “publicly available information” and 

“publicly available technology,” so that potential applicants would have a 

clearer description of activities and technology subject to Part 810. 

However, DOE’s proposed rule neither clarifies the scope of the 

regulation by refining the definitions of other broad terms, such as 

“nuclear reactor,45” or by providing an illustrative list of reactor 

components, nor more clearly delineates sales and marketing activities 

subject to Part 810. DOE officials have said that they plan to develop 

guidance once the proposed changes to the regulation are finalized, but 

the proposed changes are an ongoing effort whose time frame and 

eventual impact are unclear.

DOE has taken limited actions to enforce its export controls for nuclear 

technology, assistance, and services, even though DOE must enforce 

Part 810 to achieve one of its goals for the regulation—effective threat 

reduction by mitigating the risk of proliferation. One way that DOE seeks 

to mitigate this risk is through conditions included in Part 810 specific 

authorizations; most authorizations are subject to common sets of 

conditions. DOE’s primary method for monitoring compliance with the 

conditions is for NNSA officials to read required reports from exporters 

and in some cases to conduct a more in-depth analysis of the reports. 

However, NNSA officials report that they typically conduct an in-depth 

analysis for compliance with the authorizations on less than 10 percent of 

 

44Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities. 78 Fed. Reg. 46,829 (Aug. 2, 2013). 

45The definition of “nuclear reactor” in DOE’s proposed rule is the same as that in the 

current rule. DOE’s proposed rule does not change the definition or clarify it with an 

illustrative list. The final rule, which has not yet been issued, may differ from the proposed 

rule, and DOE has not communicated its content to us.

DOE Has Taken Steps to 

Clarify the Regulation

DOE Has Taken 

Limited Actions to 

Enforce Its Nuclear 

Export Controls
 

Page 27 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

the reports, and they do not have risk-based procedures for prioritizing 

which reports to analyze. DOE does not provide guidance for companies 

to self-identify and self-report violations. DOE has not determined 

whether it has the authority to impose civil penalties for violations of Part 

810 and has not referred any potential violations to the Department of 

Justice (DOJ) for investigation or criminal prosecution within the last 6 

years, the period covered by our review.

On the basis of our analysis of all 89 specific authorizations approved 

between 2008 and 2013, we identified two common sets of conditions—

one for deemed exports, another for all other exports—that DOE imposes 

on specific authorizations. These conditions are enumerated in 

“Secretarial Determinations”—the authorization letters signed by the 

Secretary that state a determination that the proposed export is not 

inimical to the interest of the United States, as long as the conditions are 

met. The conditions on each authorization reflect the actions that DOE, 

State, Commerce, NRC, and DOD judge sufficient to mitigate the risk of 

proliferation in a given circumstance and which result in the export 

benefiting U.S. interests.

The common set of conditions on specific authorizations for deemed 

exports—in this case, foreign nationals who access nuclear technology in 

the United States—includes five conditions that appear in nearly all of the 

18 authorizations for such exports (see table 3). These conditions require 

the company or other applicant seeking the authorization to (1) ensure 

that the foreign national maintains a current passport and work visa, (2) 

notify DOE promptly upon termination or change in immigration status for 

the foreign national, (3) submit to DOE for prior approval changes in the 

foreign national’s work duties, (4) report annually to DOE on activities 

pursued by each foreign national covered by the authorization, and (5) 

obtain a signed nonproliferation or nondisclosure statement from the 

foreign national. In addition, there are other conditions that have been 

imposed less frequently; for example, DOE imposed conditions on some 

specific authorizations involving transfers of certain technologies related 

to reactor operations to certain foreign nationals in the United States. 

These conditions state that these individuals cannot have access to 

Most Part 810 

Authorizations Are Subject 

to Common Sets of 

Conditions
 

Page 28 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

sensitive nuclear technology46 or software programming language (see 

app. II).

Table 3: Common Conditions for Specific Part 810 Authorizations for Deemed Exports, 2008-2013

Condition Responsibility Frequency

Ensure that the foreign national maintains a current passport and visa U.S. company 16 of 18a

Notify DOE promptly upon termination or change in immigration status for the foreign 

national

U.S. company 17 of 18

Submit to DOE for prior approval changes in the foreign national’s work duties U.S. company 17 of 18

Report annually to DOE on activities pursued by each foreign national under the 

authorization

U.S. company 17 of 18

Obtain from the foreign national a signed nonproliferation or nondisclosure statement U.S. company, foreign national 17 of 18b

Source: GAO analysis of DOE information. | GAO-15-124

a

Two authorizations did not contain this condition. In one, the foreign nationals were being employed 

through a German affiliate. The other authorization was for the transfer of technology to a company in 

India, as well as Indian nationals in the company’s U.S. affiliate. The latter authorization also did not 

have the next two common conditions shown in the table and required quarterly, rather than annual, 

reports.

b

One authorization, for the transfer of mixed oxide fuel fabrication technology to a South African 

national, did not require a nonproliferation statement or a nondisclosure statement.

The common set of conditions for specific authorizations (other than 

deemed exports) includes four conditions that appear in nearly all of the 

72 authorizations for these types of exports (see table 4). The first two 

conditions—a requirement to use the technology for peaceful (nonmilitary 

and nonnuclear weapons) purposes and a requirement to obtain 

permission before re-exporting the technology to a country other than the

United States—are the responsibility of the importer and the importing 

country’s government to implement, and they are known collectively as 

“foreign government assurances.” The other two conditions are the 

responsibility of the exporter. These include requirements to (1) report to 

DOE on the activities conducted under the authorization on a quarterly, 

semiannual, or annual basis and (2) submit for prior DOE approval the 

names of any companies or individuals, beyond those listed in the original 

application, to which the exporter proposes transferring the technology. 

There are other conditions that have been imposed less frequently; for 

 

46Sensitive nuclear technology is any information that is not available to the public and is 

important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of a uranium 

enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of heavy 

water. 
 

Page 29 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

example, about 20 percent of the authorizations (13 of the 72) contain a 

condition that requires the importer and the importing country to take all 

measures necessary to maintain adequate protection of the technology 

and, in some cases, also to ensure adequate physical protection of any 

items derived from it (see app. II).

Table 4: Common Conditions for Specific Part 810 Authorizations Other Than for Deemed Exports, 2008-2013

Condition Responsibility Frequency

Peaceful (nonmilitary, nonexplosive) use Importing country, importing 

company or other entity

70 of 72a

Re-export permission requiredb Importing country, importing 

company or other entity

70 of 72c

Submit for prior DOE/NNSA approval names of additional companies or individuals 

to which the exporter proposes transferring the technology

Exporter (U.S. company or other 

entity)

70 of 72d

Report to DOE/NNSA on activities conducted under the authorization Exporter (U.S. company or other 

entity)

70 of 72e

Source: GAO analysis of DOE information. | GAO-15-124

a

Two authorizations for exports to China did not explicitly contain conditions on peaceful use. 

However, the authorizations stated that the transferred technology would be subject to the Agreement 

for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 

People’s Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy of July 23, 1985. This 

agreement provides that transferred technology may not be used for any nuclear explosive device, for 

research specifically on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any military purpose.

b

Some authorizations state that prior written permission is required for re-exports, while in other 

cases, they do not state that written permission be “prior.” In one authorization, the condition required 

“prior coordination,” without defining what coordination would entail.

c

Two authorizations for exports to China did not explicitly contain conditions on re-export. However, 

the authorizations stated that the transferred technology would be subject to the Agreement for 

Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 

People’s Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy of July 23, 1985. This 

agreement provides that transferred technology may not be retransferred outside the parties’ 

boundaries unless the parties agree.

d

Two authorizations for exports to the UAE did not contain this condition.

e

Two authorizations, one for the export of sensitive nuclear technology to Germany and the other for 

computer codes to China, did not contain any reporting requirements.

NNSA officials, who implement Part 810, draw on various information 

sources to monitor compliance with the conditions on authorizations. 

NNSA officials said their primary source of information is the reports 

submitted by exporters. These reports are required by the conditions on 

the specific authorizations, as described above, as well as by Part 810, 

which contains reporting requirements for all specifically authorized 

DOE Does Not Use a 

Risk-Based Procedure to 

Determine Which Reports 

to Analyze for Compliance
 

Page 30 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

exports and certain generally authorized exports.47 Exporters who are 

required to report on generally authorized activities must do so no more 

than 30 days after they begin.48 According to an NNSA official, some 

generally authorized activities would trigger frequent reports, so NNSA 

negotiates a filing frequency for the exporters to report all of their 

generally authorized activities on a consolidated basis instead of requiring 

reports for each activity. For specific authorizations, exporters must also 

report no more than 30 days after they initiate activities,49 and, depending 

on the conditions contained in their authorization, they are also required 

to submit ongoing reports that detail their activities conducted under the 

authorization on a quarterly, semiannual, or annual basis.

NNSA officials stated that they read and categorize each report as it is 

received. If they decide that a particular report merits further attention, 

they conduct follow-up analysis, which includes checking that the 

activities and individuals listed are consistent with the application and the 

authorization. However, NNSA officials stated that they currently do not 

conduct such an analysis for every report to determine compliance or to 

identify trends; the officials estimate that they currently conduct follow-up 

analysis on less than 10 percent of reports. They also stated that they do 

not have procedures for determining which reports merit in-depth analysis 

and that their current practice is to decide on a case-by-case basis 

according to the type of technology and parties involved. As a result, 

NNSA may be missing important information that could lead to 

identification of violations and provide a fuller understanding of the degree 

of compliance with Part 810.

We requested information on the number of reports NNSA received from 

2008-2013 for generally and specifically authorized exports. For generally 

authorized exports, NNSA officials stated that they had a gap in their data 

 

47For some categories of generally authorized exports, such as furnishing public 

information as defined in the regulation, there are no reporting requirements. 

48Part 810 requires reports submitted for general authorizations to include the following 

elements: (1) the name, address, and citizenship of the person submitting the report; (2) 

the name, address, and citizenship of the person or entity for which the activity is being 

performed; and (3) a description of the activity, the date it began, its location, status, and 

anticipated date of completion.

49Part 810 requires reports submitted for specific authorizations to include the same 

elements we described for generally authorized exports, with the addition of a copy of 

DOE’s letter authorizing the activity.
 

Page 31 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

that prevented them from providing complete information during these 6 

years, but according to their data, they received at least 50 reports per 

year from 2009-2013. For specifically authorized exports, NNSA officials 

stated that providing information on the number of reports received would 

be challenging.

NNSA officials said that their report analysis process is not as systematic 

as they would like, but noted that they do not have the staff to analyze the 

reports more thoroughly. According to NNSA officials, they employ two 

people who work full-time on Part 810 authorizations, as well as six 

people who work on the authorizations as part of their broader 

responsibilities. Officials at the national laboratories also assist with 

reviewing reports, based on the end user and the type of technology 

being transferred, according to NNSA officials. Staffing levels in the 

NNSA office that processes these authorizations and reviews the reports 

have remained level over the last 6 years, but the number of specific 

authorizations granted each year has increased (see fig. 4). An NNSA 

official noted that the office is looking into changes that could be made to 

the report analysis process to facilitate monitoring for compliance, such 

as linking the reports to the authorizations in the proposed e-licensing 

system. 

Figure 4: Specific Authorizations by Year, 2008-2013
 

Page 32 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

NNSA officials said they have other sources of information for monitoring 

compliance with Part 810 authorizations, including the national 

laboratories, trade publications, and newsletters from a variety of sources, 

as well as the companies themselves (NNSA periodically asks companies 

for briefings). They stated that they also receive support from the 

intelligence community, including DOE’s Office of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence. In addition, according to a State official, U.S. 

embassies play a role in monitoring the extent to which the importing 

country and company or other entity, as well as the exporter, are 

complying with the conditions associated with Part 810 authorizations.

DOE has not determined whether it has legal authority to impose civil 

penalties for violations of Part 810 and does not provide guidance for 

companies to self-identify and self-report possible violations. Part 810 

contains a statement about the actions that DOE can take to prevent 

violations under the authority of the AEA (temporary injunctions and 

restraining orders) and a description of penalties for criminal violations. 

However, Part 810 does not indicate that DOE can impose civil penalties 

for violations, and DOE officials told us that the issue of whether the 

department has the authority to impose civil penalties was “unsettled.”

50

We have previously found that civil penalties are an important element of 

regulatory enforcement, allowing agencies to punish violators 

appropriately and to serve as a deterrent to future violations.51 Without a 

clear position on whether DOE has authority to impose such penalties for 

violations of Part 810, DOE may not have access to a tool for enforcing its 

export controls.

Furthermore, DOE does not provide any external guidance to exporters 

on enforcement of Part 810, such as a voluntary disclosure policy, 

internal compliance guidelines, or an enforcement manual, in the 

 

50Officials from DOE’s Office of General Counsel initially told us that the AEA provision for 

civil penalties regarding violations of Section 57—which authorize the imposition of a civil 

penalty of no more than $100,000 for each violation—applied to violations of Section 57(b) 

and thus Part 810. However, DOE officials later told us that they were uncertain whether 

the Department had authority under the AEA to impose civil penalties, because the matter 

had not come up prior to their receipt of portions of our draft report. DOE officials also said 

that they were uncertain of when they may determine whether the Department has this 

authority. 

51GAO, Civil Penalties: Agencies Unable to Fully Adjust Penalties for Inflation Under 

Current Law, GAO-03-409 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.14, 2003). 

DOE Has Not Determined 

Its Authority to Impose 

Civil Penalties and Does 

Not Provide Guidance for 

Companies to Self-Identify 

and Self-Report Possible 

Violations
 

Page 33 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

regulation, or, according to DOE officials, elsewhere. In contrast to DOE, 

other government agencies that regulate nuclear or nuclear-related 

exports have established procedures, as well as policies and guidelines 

on enforcement of their export controls. As discussed below, NRC, State, 

and Commerce provide a variety of resources for companies to 

understand the enforcement policies for their respective export control 

regimes and to provide incentives for companies to recognize and 

address violations. These resources are publicly available on the 

agencies’ websites. In addition, information on civil and criminal 

enforcement is stated in the regulations governing their respective export 

control regimes.

• NRC has an enforcement policy and enforcement manual. NRC 

has a publicly available enforcement policy document that lays out the 

general principles governing its enforcement efforts and information 

on the process it uses to deal with violations. NRC also has an 

enforcement manual that contains specific processes and guidance 

for implementing the enforcement policy. The stated goals of NRC’s 

enforcement policy are to (1) deter noncompliance by emphasizing 

the importance of compliance with regulations and other NRC 

requirements, and (2) encourage prompt identification and prompt 

comprehensive correction of violations. The policy clearly describes 

the factors that NRC takes into consideration when assessing the 

significance of the violation and describes how prompt selfidentification of violations can decrease consequences for violators. In 

addition, NRC publishes on its website Notices of Violation, which can 

serve as examples of how violations are assessed and fines are 

determined. Its website also contains the Part 110 regulations, which 

describe, among other things, the civil penalties and the procedures 

through which they would be applied, in the case of violations.

• State’s website contains compliance resources, including 

guidelines for comprehensive compliance programs. State’s 

Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) maintains a website 

with a variety of compliance-related resources and documents for 

exporters, including a list of significant export control enforcement 

cases. The site contains the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 

(ITAR), of which Parts 127 (Violations and Penalties) and 128 

(Administrative Procedures) lay out State’s enforcement policies, 

including its voluntary disclosure policy, the aim of which is to strongly 
 

Page 34 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

encourage self-disclosure of violations by noting that such disclosures 

may be considered as mitigating factors in determining penalties.52

The site also provides guidelines that exporters can use to create 

comprehensive operational compliance programs. The guidelines do 

not promote a certain type of program; instead, they list the important 

elements of effective programs, including organizational structure; 

corporate commitment and policy; identification, receipt and tracking 

of controlled items and technical data; re-exports; and internal 

monitoring, and training, among other elements.

• Commerce’s website provides a variety of compliance and 

enforcement information. Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and 

Security (BIS) has an Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) that works 

with companies to prevent export control violations and is responsible 

for enforcement actions in response to such violations. OEE’s website 

contains, among other things, information on compliance, penalties, 

and voluntary self-disclosures, including voluntary self-disclosure 

cases. The BIS website contains the Export Administration 

Regulations, which govern the export of dual-use items and certain 

military items. Part 764, “Enforcement and Protective Measures,” 

provides readers with information on enforcement, including voluntary 

self-disclosure and civil penalties, and Part 766, “Administrative 

Enforcement Proceedings,” describes the administrative enforcement 

process and includes guidance on how BIS makes penalty 

determinations.

While DOE’s export controls and their regulatory basis may differ in some 

aspects from those administered by NRC, State, and Commerce, these 

other agencies provide information to companies and individuals to help 

them understand how to comply with their rules and the consequences of 

violating those rules. Several exporters told us that other agencies 

provide guidance that is more comprehensive. By not establishing 

policies or creating guidance that encourages companies to create strong 

 

52 The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) provide that the Department of 

State may impose civil penalties for violations of the ITAR. As discussed above, DOE has 

not determined whether it has the legal authority to impose civil penalties for violations of 

Part 810. In 2013, the ITAR was revised so as not to apply to certain nuclear-related items 

to the extent that they are under the export control of the Department of Energy or the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. To the extent that those items were previously controlled 

by the Department of State and are now controlled by the Department of Energy, they 

were moved from a system with clear administrative enforcement authority to one without 

such clear authority.
 

Page 35 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

compliance programs and self-identify and self-report violations, DOE is 

missing an opportunity to leverage exporters’ potential to play a greater 

role in monitoring their own compliance.

Neither DOE nor DOJ have taken formal actions—such as revoking an 

authorization or prosecuting an exporter—to enforce Part 810 within the 

last 6 years, even though there have been violations of Part 810 within 

this period. Between 2008 and 2013, NNSA received at least 11 notices 

of voluntary disclosures of violations of the Part 810 regulations, mostly 

related to deemed exports to India or China—but according to an NNSA 

official, any time NNSA knows of a violation of the Part 810 regulations, 

NNSA tries to deal with it internally, generally meeting with the company 

to discuss the issue. This official reported that NNSA has not identified 

any willful violations of Part 810,53 and consequently, NNSA has not 

referred any potential criminal violations to the DOJ for investigation or 

prosecution. According to DOE and NNSA officials, NNSA has never 

taken any formal action, such as revoking an authorization, against 

companies that have violated Part 810. DOE’s internal procedures for 

administering Part 810 contain no information on DOE enforcement of the 

regulation. DOJ, which is charged with investigating and prosecuting 

suspected criminal violations, reports that of the cases charged under the 

AEA in the last 6 years, it is not aware of any related to Part 810 

violations.

The renewed interest in nuclear power worldwide could provide increased 

opportunities for U.S. companies. The highly competitive global nuclear 

market underscores the importance of an efficient authorization process 

for U.S. nuclear technology exports. DOE has stated that its goals for the 

Part 810 process are efficient regulation (defined by an efficient, timely, 

transparent, and predictable process); effective nuclear trade support; 

and effective threat reduction by better addressing proliferation 

challenges. DOE and NNSA have taken steps toward a more efficient 

regulatory process, including developing an e-licensing system. However, 

DOE and NNSA’s current implementation of Part 810 raises questions as 

to whether the agencies are administering the process in accordance with 

 

53An example of a non-willful violation, according to DOE officials, is an employee 

inadvertently leaving export-controlled material in open places where non-U.S. persons 

may access them. 

DOE and DOJ Have Not 

Taken Any Formal Actions 

to Enforce Part 810

Conclusions
 

Page 36 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

DOE’s goals and with key principles of federal regulation, which include 

clarity and consistency.

DOE rarely meets its existing target time frames for processing Part 810 

applications, which calls into question whether these targets are realistic 

and achievable in light of its resources and authorities. Furthermore, DOE 

has not established target time frames for obtaining the Secretary’s 

determination in the third stage of the process, or for the overall Part 810 

authorization process. Without realistic and achievable targets for the 

entire Part 810 process, DOE cannot provide U.S. nuclear exporters with 

a timely and predictable regulatory process, which could impair their 

competitiveness.

DOE has taken steps to clarify the scope of Part 810, but DOE officials 

plan to continue to rely on a case-by-case inquiry process. DOE currently 

does not document all inquiries, contrary to agency procedures. Without a 

documented inquiry process, DOE does not have the information it needs 

to provide reasonable assurance that its responses are consistent, and 

DOE officials are not documenting information that could identify parts of 

the regulation that may need clarification.

DOE must enforce Part 810 to achieve one of its goals for the 

regulation—effective threat reduction by mitigating the risk of proliferation. 

However, DOE may be missing opportunities to enforce its nuclear export 

controls. Civil penalties are an important element of regulatory 

enforcement, but DOE has not determined whether it has the legal 

authority to impose civil penalties for violations of Part 810. In addition, 

NNSA does not conduct in-depth analysis on all reports from exporters on 

activities authorized under Part 810 and does not have a risk-based 

procedure for prioritizing which reports to analyze. As a result, NNSA may 

be missing important information that could lead to identification of 

violations and allow the agency to take enforcement actions when 

warranted. Moreover, unlike other agencies that administer nuclearrelated export controls, DOE does not have policies or guidance for

exporters about self-identifying, self-reporting, and correcting possible 

violations. Consequently, DOE is missing an opportunity to encourage 

exporters to recognize and address violations.

We are making six recommendations to improve the administration of 10 Recommendations for C.F.R. Part 810.

Executive Action
 

Page 37 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

• To better align the Part 810 process with its stated goal of efficient 

regulation, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working with 

the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, take 

the following two actions:

• Review existing targets for processing Part 810 applications and 

determine the extent to which they align with DOE’s resources 

and authorities. Based on the results of this review, establish 

realistic and achievable targets for each stage of the Part 810 

process, including the third stage, as well as the overall process.

• As DOE moves forward with the e-licensing system, integrate 

these targets into the system to monitor agency performance 

against them to ensure that the targets remain realistic and 

achievable and that they improve predictability for exporters.

• To promote clarity and consistency in administering Part 810, we 

recommend that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security 

Administration ensure that all inquiries about the scope of Part 810, 

together with NNSA’s responses to these inquiries, are documented, 

in accordance with existing DOE procedures.

• To facilitate enforcement of Part 810 and encourage compliance, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working with the 

Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, take the 

following three actions:

• Determine whether DOE has legal authority to impose civil 

penalties for violations of the regulation and develop procedures 

accordingly.

• Develop a risk-based procedure for selecting exporters’ reports on 

authorized activities for in-depth analysis.

• Assess the need to establish and articulate export compliance 

policies that encourage and reward exporters who self-identify, 

self-report, and correct violations, and provide guidance to 

exporters on such policies.

We provided a draft of this report to DOE, NRC, State, Commerce, DOD, 

and DOJ for review and comment. NNSA provided written comments for 

DOE, which are presented in appendix III. In addition, NNSA, NRC, State, 

Commerce, and DOJ provided technical comments that we incorporated, 

as appropriate. 

In its written comments, NNSA agreed with all six of our 

recommendations and noted several actions and initiatives it is planning 

or undertaking to implement our recommendations. For example, NNSA 

stated that as part of its ongoing process improvements, the agency is 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 38 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

working to identify gaps, overlaps, and inefficiencies in the Part 810 

authorization process and will establish new, achievable targets for each 

stage of the Part 810 process. Among other things, NNSA also stated that 

it plans to consult with other regulatory agencies, such as NRC, to 

determine what risk-based procedures the agency has for analyzing 

reports on authorized activities and whether they could be modified to 

work for Part 810 reports. NNSA also stated that it would consult with 

regulatory agencies such as NRC and Commerce to determine what 

export compliance policies they have for encouraging and rewarding selfdisclosure and whether they could be modified for Part 810 self-reporting.

NNSA also provided general comments on some of our findings. For 

example, NNSA stated that the draft report frequently draws comparisons 

between DOE’s Part 810 process and other agencies’ export control 

regimes. NNSA stated that, unlike the other regimes, DOE’s export 

authorization process involves other agencies and diplomatic 

engagements with foreign governments, whose responsiveness the U.S. 

government cannot control. We note that our analysis considered relevant 

differences in the export control regimes. As noted above, NNSA 

concurred with our recommendations and stated that it would consider 

whether the processes of these agencies could be adapted for Part 810. 

NNSA also stated that the ability to devise “creative solutions” for unique 

or new situations remains an important aspect of the Part 810 

authorization process, and that consistent guidance in light of such 

situations is inapplicable. However, as noted in the report, DOE must 

reasonably assure that its interpretation of Part 810 is consistent in 

responding to wide-ranging questions from exporters. 

In addition, NNSA stated that the Department clearly took seriously the 

recommendations from our report, Nuclear Commerce: Governmentwide 

Strategy Could Help Increase Commercial Benefits from U.S. Nuclear 

Cooperation Agreements with Other Countries (GAO-11-36), as 

evidenced by the current rulemaking, process improvements, and the 

creation of an e-810 system. We noted the actions DOE took in response 

to these recommendations in the current report. However, because the 

rulemaking and process improvements were ongoing at the time of our 

audit, we could not evaluate the extent to which these initiatives will 

address the findings and recommendations in this report. NNSA said that 

our draft report stated that DOE had not proposed revising its inquiry 

process, but noted that its initiatives will address the inquiry process, and 

that the inquiries we referred to are exploratory and informal. We clarified 

the language in the report to address NNSA’s comment. However, as we 
 

Page 39 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

say in the report, several exporters whom we interviewed expressed 

concern about the consistency of the responses DOE was providing to 

their inquiries. We could not evaluate whether DOE’s responses to 

inquiries were consistent because DOE does not document all inquiries. 

Without such documentation, DOE cannot reasonably assure that the 

interpretations offered in response to these inquiries are consistent. 

Finally, in its written comments, NNSA stated that it is true that it has not 

referred any suspected Part 810 violations to the Department of Justice 

for criminal investigation or revoked any authorizations for cause but that 

it has not received reports of illicit technology transfers or seen evidence 

of violations of Part 810 authorization restrictions. We recommend in this 

report, as a step in strengthening export controls through Part 810, that 

DOE take a risk-based approach to reviewing reports for in-depth 

analysis from exporters and assess the need for guidance and incentives 

to exporters for self-identifying, self-reporting, and correcting possible 

violations. NNSA agreed with these recommendations.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate 

congressional committees, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of 

the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Secretary of State, the 

Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Secretary of 

Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, and other interested parties. The 

report also will be available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 
 

Page 40 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact David C. Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov or 

Thomas Melito at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix IV. 

David C. Trimble

Director, Natural Resources and Environment

Thomas Melito

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 41 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

In this report, we examine (1) Part 810 processing times, compared with 

the Department of Energy’s (DOE) targets, for over the last 6 years; (2) 

the extent to which Part 810 is clear and DOE can reasonably assure 

consistent interpretation; and (3) the extent to which DOE enforces Part 

810.

To examine DOE’s processing times for Part 810 applications over the 

last 6 years compared with its own targets, we reviewed DOE’s 10 C.F.R. 

Part 810 Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities Part 810 

Program Elements and the National Nuclear Security Administration’s 

(NNSA) procedures for processing, reviewing, and approving specific 

authorizations1 to determine DOE’s internal targets. We analyzed DOE 

data on the processing times for the 89 specific authorizations granted 

from 2008 through 2013.2 For each authorization, the analysis included a 

calculation of the number of days between the date of each application for 

authorization and the date of the Secretary’s determination, which 

encompasses the entire Part 810 process. We also calculated the 

number of days between each of the three stages of the process—initial 

review, interagency review, and final review. We calculated the duration 

of the internal review stage based on the number of days between the 

date on the application and the date NNSA forwarded the application to 

the interagency. This date marked the beginning of the interagency stage, 

which ended when NNSA received the last interagency concurrence with 

the application package. The final review stage started from the date of 

the last interagency concurrence and ended on the date of the Secretary 

of Energy’s determination. To ensure the analysis was as accurate as 

possible, we reviewed the data, identified irregularities, and contacted 

NNSA officials to clarify and correct those irregularities. For example, 

when we noticed an application in which the Department of Commerce’s 

concurrence date preceded the date NNSA submitted the application to 

the interagency, we notified NNSA officials of this inconsistency, and they 

provided us with the correct date. Moreover, we interviewed the NNSA 

officials who collected and recorded the data, about the procedures they 

follow to ensure the data are accurate, complete, and reliable. On the 

 

1

“Amendment to Procedures Established Pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 

1978.” 49 Fed. Reg. 20,780 (May 16, 1984). 

2

Our analysis excluded one application that DOE approved in 2008, because that 

application preceded DOE’s electronic data collection system on which we based our 

aggregate data analysis. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 42 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

basis of our review, we concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable 

for purposes of analyzing trends in processing times.

To identify factors affecting the processing times for specific 

authorizations, we selected a nonprobability sample of eight applications 

that represented a range of processing times. Specifically, for each stage 

in the Part 810 process as well as for the entire process, we selected (1) 

one case from among applications with short processing times, defined 

as processing times in the 25th percentile (that is, processing times 

shorter than those for 75 percent of all applications), and (2) one case 

representing long processing times, defined as applications in the 75th 

percentile (that is, processing times longer than those for 75 percent of all 

applications). Among applications with long processing times, we 

considered those with over twice the median processing time. We used 

the median—rather than the mean—because outliers in the data unduly 

impact the size of the mean, making it a less valid representation of the 

typical processing time. From applications with long and short processing 

times, we selected cases that represented a range of countries and types 

of exports or assistance, such as computer codes, consulting services, 

and advanced reactor technologies.

The small number of cases selected precluded us from generalizing the 

results, but the case study analysis provided examples of factors that may 

explain the varying processing times. To identify these factors, we 

reviewed application packets NNSA provided to us, including technical 

assessments and intra- and inter-agency correspondence. When 

reviewing case study documents, we noticed that some of the 

correspondence dates differed from the dates recorded in the 

spreadsheet.3 Because these discrepancies are small, they do not 

significantly impact the results of our aggregate data analysis, which 

measures the duration (i.e., number of days) between each stage of the 

process and the overall process. The small discrepancies also do not 

impact the findings of our case study analysis, which focuses on the 

causes of long and short processing times. We also interviewed agency 

officials to better understand these factors. For seven of the eight 

applications in our case study, as well as for the three applications that 

 

3

In seven cases, the dates in the aggregate data NNSA provided to GAO for applications 

processed from 2008-2013, on which we based our aggregate data analysis, differed from 

the dates on formal and informal correspondence, on which we based our case study 

analyses.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 43 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

NNSA provided to us as samples, we were able to determine, based on 

the last internal concurrence among DOE and NNSA staff, the earliest 

date that the recommendation could have been provided to the Secretary 

upon receipt of interagency comments to determine whether the 

recommendation was provided to the Secretary within 30 days—the 

target time frame. In one case, the correspondence was not dated, and 

we could not determine the date of the recommendation to the Secretary.

In nine other cases, we were able to determine whether the time elapsed

between the receipt of interagency comments and the last internal 

concurrence among DOE and NNSA staff—which must precede the 

recommendation to the Secretary— exceeded 30 days.

To examine the impacts of Part 810 processing times on U.S. nuclear 

exporters, we interviewed representatives of these exporters and 

reviewed public comments submitted in response to DOE’s proposed 

changes to Part 810,4 as well as DOE’s response to comments made in 

response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, as articulated in the 

preamble to the Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The 

representatives we interviewed included representatives of companies, as 

well as representatives of four associations (the Nuclear Energy Institute 

(NEI), American Nuclear Society (ANS), Nuclear Infrastructure Council 

(NIC), and Association of University Export Control Officers (AUECO),

5

and reviewed the public comments of a fifth (the Ad-Hoc Utilities Group)). 

The companies were either identified through interviews with association 

representatives—we requested that they identify nuclear exporters with 

experience with the Part 810 authorization process for us to interview— 

or by GAO (for example, at public meetings and other forums on nuclear 

export issues, or through their public comments). We then interviewed 

five exporters, including reactor designers and manufacturers, 

engineering service providers, and fuel companies, and obtained written 

comments from a nuclear energy technology company. We also selected 

for interviews, based on recommendations from industry associations and 

on our reviews of public comments and letters, representatives from a 

 

4

We reviewed all public comments submitted (on www.regulations.gov) in response to the 

proposed rule changes. We conducted a double-blind content analysis of the 75 

comments submitted to identify those pertinent to the scope of our work. We used the 

public comments to provide illustrative examples (and to identify additional exporters to 

interview). We did not analyze the contents of the comments to quantify exporter views on 

the regulation.

5

AUECO representatives are university export control officers. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 44 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

consulting group that exports nuclear services and from a utility company, 

which is the largest commercial nuclear generator in the United States, 

and from two law firms. The law firms were selected because of their 

expertise and experience in U.S. nuclear export controls. To learn more 

about the relevance of regulation of civilian nuclear technology to 

nonproliferation more generally, we interviewed five nonproliferation 

experts.

To examine the extent to which the scope of Part 810 is clear, we 

consulted and analyzed the Atomic Energy Act, as well as executive 

orders and Office of Management and Budget bulletins related to 

government regulation. We also reviewed the Part 810 regulation. We 

interviewed DOE officials and a variety of entities regulated or potentially 

regulated under Part 810, as well as various groups representing these 

entities—as described above—for their views on the clarity of the 

regulation. We also consulted public comments submitted in response to 

DOE’s proposed changes to Part 810, as well as DOE’s response to the 

comments received in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking as 

articulated in the preamble to the Supplemental Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking. To examine the extent to which DOE can reasonably assure 

that the regulation is consistently interpreted, we consulted DOE’s 10 

C.F.R. Part 810 Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities Part 810 

Program Elements and the federal standards for internal control,6 and 

interviewed DOE officials and a variety of entities regulated or potentially 

regulated under Part 810, as well as various groups representing these 

entities, as described above.

To examine the extent to which DOE enforces its nuclear export controls, 

we first determined the activities DOE undertakes to monitor conditions 

imposed through authorizations by interviewing DOE and NNSA officials. 

We then conducted an analysis of the conditions imposed through the 89 

Part 810 authorizations approved from 2008-2013. The conditions for 

each authorization are documented in determination letters signed by the 

Secretary of Energy, and we conducted a double-blind content analysis of 

the 89 letters to determine the range and frequency of conditions. 

Specifically, two analysts independently reviewed the 89 letters and 

recorded the range and frequency of conditions in separate documents. 

Then the analysts compared their assessments and resolved any 

 

6

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (“Green Book”) (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 45 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

differences through discussion. To describe DOE’s authorities to enforce 

these conditions, as well as the actions DOE has taken to enforce them, 

we reviewed the Atomic Energy Act and 10 C.F.R. Part 810. We also 

interviewed DOE, NNSA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 

Department of Justice officials and obtained information on enforcement 

actions. To describe the information DOE provides on its enforcement of 

Part 810, we reviewed DOE’s 10 C.F.R. Part 810 Assistance to Foreign 

Atomic Energy Activities Part 810 Program Elements and interviewed 

DOE and NNSA officials. We also interviewed representatives from 

entities regulated or potentially regulated under Part 810, as described 

above. To determine the information provided by other agencies that 

administer related export control regimes, we reviewed relevant 

regulations and publicly available information on NRC and the 

Departments of State and Commerce’s enforcement policies, including 

enforcement manuals and voluntary disclosure guidelines; and 

interviewed NRC officials. We also interviewed two export-control 

compliance experts, recommended to us based on their expertise, and 

representatives from two law firms with expertise and experience in U.S. 

nuclear export controls.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2013 to October

2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Enforcement Tables

Page 46 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

Tables 5 and 6 contain information on the common conditions imposed 

on specific authorizations for exports of nuclear technology under 10 

C.F.R. Part 810 granted from 2008 through 2013, as well as examples of 

less common conditions.

Table 5: Conditions Imposed through Specific Authorizations for 18 Deemed Exports, 2008 - 2013

Condition Responsibility Frequency Relevant notes

Common conditions

Ensure that the foreign national 

maintains a current passport and visa

U.S. company 16 of 18 Two authorizations did not contain this condition. 

In one, the foreign nationals were being 

employed through a German affiliate. The other 

authorization was for the transfer of technology 

to a company in India, as well as Indian nationals 

in the company’s U.S. affiliate.

Notify Department of Energy (DOE) 

promptly upon termination or change in 

immigration status for the foreign national

U.S. company 17 of 18 The one authorization without this condition was 

for the transfer of technology to a company in 

India, as well as Indian nationals in the 

company’s U.S. affiliate.

Submit to DOE for prior approval 

changes in the foreign national’s work 

duties

U.S. company 17 of 18 The one authorization without this condition was 

for the transfer of technology to a company in 

India, as well as Indian nationals in the 

company’s U.S. affiliate.

Report annually to DOE on activities 

pursued by each foreign national under 

this authorization

U.S. company 17 of 18 In one case, for the transfer of technology to a 

company in India, as well as Indian nationals in 

the company’s U.S. affiliate, the authorization 

required quarterly reports. 

Obtain from the foreign national a signed 

nonproliferation or nondisclosure 

statement.

U.S. company, 

foreign national

17 of 18 In one case, for the transfer of mixed oxide fuel 

fabrication technology to a South African 

national, neither a nonproliferation statement nor 

a non-disclosure statement was required. 

Examples of less common conditions

Ensure that the foreign national has 

access to technology governed by Part 

810 only through fulfillment of contracts 

and projects described in the 

authorization. 

U.S. company 12 of 18 It appears that DOE meant to include this 

condition in one authorization (not counted in the 

12), but omitted the word “only,” which potentially 

renders the provision meaningless. a 

Ensure that the foreign national will not 

access sensitive nuclear technology. 

U.S. company 3 of 18 These three authorizations involved exports of 

nuclear power plant technology and training tools 

to either Indian or Chinese nationals. 

Ensure that the foreign national will only 

have access to executable code (i.e., not 

source code).

U.S. company 3 of 18 The three authorizations pertained to transfers of 

nuclear power plant technology and training tools 

to either Indian or Chinese nationals. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE information. | GAO-15-124

Note: We analyzed all authorizations from 2008-2013; the 18 authorizations for deemed exports were 

signed in 2010 or later.

Appendix II: Enforcement Tables
Appendix II: Enforcement Tables

Page 47 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

a

The condition requires that the company ensure that each foreign national approved under the 

authorization be allowed access to the nuclear technology described in its application during 

fulfillment of the company’s contracts and projects.

Table 6: Conditions Imposed through Specific Authorizations for 72 Technology Exports (Other Than Deemed Exports), 2008-

2013

Condition Responsibility Frequency Relevant notes

Common conditions

Peaceful (non-military or nonexplosive) useImporting country, 

importing company or other 

entity

70 of 72 Two authorizations for exports to China did not explicitly 

contain conditions on peaceful use. However, the 

authorizations stated that the transferred technology would 

be subject to the Agreement for Cooperation between the 

Government of the United States of America and the 

Government of the People’s Republic of China Concerning 

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy of July 23, 1985. This 

agreement provides that transferred technology may not be 

used for any nuclear explosive device, for research 

specifically on or development of any nuclear explosive 

device, or for any military purpose. 

Re-export permission required: 

prior written permission

written permission

prior permission

prior coordination

Importing country, 

importing company

70 of 72

42 of 72

10 of 72

17 of 72

1 of 72

Two authorizations for exports to China did not explicitly 

contain conditions on re-export. However, the 

authorizations stated that the transferred technology would 

be subject to the Agreement for Cooperation between the 

Government of the United States of America and the 

Government of the People’s Republic of China Concerning 

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy of July 23, 1985. This 

agreement provides that transferred technology may not be 

retransferred outside the parties’ boundaries unless the 

parties agree. In one case, an export to Ukraine in 2013, 

retransfer required “prior coordination.” 

Submit for prior DOE approval 

names of additional companies 

or individuals to which the 

exporter proposes transferring 

the technology

Exporter 70 of 72 The two authorizations that did not include this condition 

were for exports to the United Arab Emirates in 2009 and 

2010.

Report to DOE on activities 

conducted under the 

authorization:

quarterly

semi-annually

annually

Exporter 70 of 72

5 of 72

19 of 72

46 of 72

Two authorizations did not contain any explicit reporting 

requirement. One authorization was for an export to 

Germany of specifications and requirements for procuring 

components, equipment and services for construction of a 

centrifuge plant. The other was for an export to China of 

computer codes.

Examples of less common 

conditions

Implement necessary physical 

protections

Importing country, 

importing company

13 of 72 The 13 authorizations with this condition involved exports 

to China (7), Russia (4), Germany (1), and Armenia (1).
Appendix II: Enforcement Tables

Page 48 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

Condition Responsibility Frequency Relevant notes

The identified recipients of the 

transferred technology are 

authorized to receive the 

technology.

Importing country, 

importing company

12 of 72 This condition was imposed for 12 of the 21 authorizations 

for exports to China.

Prior to any third party transfer, 

the United States and China 

mutually agree in writing on 

conditions associated with the 

transfer.

U.S. government, importing 

government, importing 

company

12 of 72 This condition was imposed for 12 of the 21 authorizations 

for exports to China.a

In case of possible re-export, 

the principles stipulated in 

IAEA document 

INFCIRC/254/Part1 will be 

applied.b

 

Importing country, 

importing company

6 of 72 This condition was imposed in six authorizations for 

exports to Russia.

Source: GAO analysis of DOE information. | GAO-15-124

a

The 12 authorizations that contained this condition are not the same 12 authorizations that contained 

the prior condition requiring that the identified recipients of the technology are authorized to receive it.

b

For example, see INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part1, “Communication Received from the Permanent Mission 

of Brazil regarding Certain Member States’ Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment 

and Technology,” 7 November 2007. This communication lays out the Nuclear Suppliers Group 

(NSG) guidelines.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 49 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Energy
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 50 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 51 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 52 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 53 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 54 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 55 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 56 GAO-15-124 Nuclear Export Controls

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841, or trimbled@gao.gov and 

Thomas Melito, (202) 512-9601, or melitot@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Glen Levis (Assistant Director), 

Jeff Phillips (Assistant Director), Alisa Beyninson, Antoinette Capaccio, 

Pamela Davidson, R. Scott Fletcher, Grant Mallie, Cynthia Norris, John 

Rastler, and Jennifer Young made key contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts:

Staff 

Acknowledgments:

(361525)
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