IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2015 WY 117

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2015

September 2, 2015

MOUNTAIN VISTA RETIREMENT 

RESIDENCE,

Appellant

(Petitioner),

v.

FREMONT COUNTY ASSESSOR,

Appellee

(Respondent).

S-14-0282

Appeal from the District Court of Fremont County

The Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Thomas N. Long and Aaron Lyttle of Long Reimer Winegar Beppler LLP, 

Cheyenne, WY. Argument by Mr. Lyttle.

Representing Appellee:

Jodi A. Darrough, Deputy Fremont County Attorney, Lander, WY.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, *KITE, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

* Justice Kite retired from judicial office effective August 3, 2015, and pursuant to Article 5, § 5 of the 

Wyoming Constitution and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-1-106(f) (LexisNexis 2015) she was reassigned to act on 

this matter on August 4, 2015.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, 

Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be 

made before final publication in the permanent volume.
1

HILL, Justice.

[¶1] Mountain Vista Retirement Residence (Mountain Vista) challenged the Fremont 

County Assessor’s 2012 property tax assessment to the Fremont County Board of 

Equalization (County Board), claiming an exemption. The County Board affirmed the 

county assessor’s determination that Mountain Vista is nonexempt from paying property 

taxes. The Wyoming State Board of Equalization (State Board of Equalization) affirmed 

the County Board, as did the district court. On appeal, Mountain Vista argues that it 

should be exempt based upon its status as a charitable or benevolent association. We will 

affirm the County Board.

ISSUES

[¶2] Mountain Vista presents three issues on appeal:

1. Whether the Fremont County Board of Equalization (the 

County Board) erred in determining that Mountain Vista 

Retirement Residence (Mountain Vista) is not entitled to 

exemption from ad valorem tax as a charitable or 

benevolent association because it serves a limited number 

of people, notwithstanding the substantial benefit to the 

entire public of providing senior independent living 

services at or below cost.

2. Whether Chapter 14, § 13(a)(ii) of the Department of 

Revenue’s rules, forbidding a tax-exempt senior housing 

facility from charging costs or allowing residents to 

provide their own furnishings, as interpreted by the 

County Board and applied to Mountain Vista, exceeds the 

Department of Revenue’s statutory authority.

3. Whether the County Board erred in determining that 

Mountain Vista uses its property for primarily commercial 

purposes, despite the fact that Mountain Vista’s provision 

of independent living services not available in commercial 

housing is central, rather than collateral, to its charitable 

purpose.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶3] The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act governs this Court’s review of a

decision by a county board. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2015) provides 

in pertinent part:
2

(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and 

when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant 

questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 

provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the 

terms of an agency action. In making the following 

determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 

those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 

taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 

shall:

. . . .

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency 

action, findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 

law;

. . . .

(B) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, 

authority or limitations or lacking statutory 

right;

. . . .

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in 

a case reviewed on the record of an agency 

hearing provided by statute.

[¶4] In Britt v. Fremont County Assessor, 2006 WY 10, 126 P.3d 117 (Wyo. 2006), we 

explained how we apply this statute in our review:

We review both the agency’s findings of fact and law:

“Considerable deference is accorded to the findings of 

fact of the agency, and this Court does not disturb them 

unless they are contrary to the overwhelming weight of 

the evidence. Amoco Production Co. v. Wyoming State 

Bd. of Equalization, 12 P. 3d 668, 671 (Wyo. 2000). An 

agency’s conclusions of law can be affirmed only if they

are in accord with the law. Id. at 672. Our function is to 

correct any error that an agency makes in its 

interpretation or application of the law.”

EOG Resources, Inc. v. Wyoming Dep’t of Revenue, 2004 

WY 35, ¶ 12, 86 P. 3d 1280, [1284] (Wyo. 2004).
3

. . . .

“The district court and this Court are charged with 

reviewing an agency’s decision for substantial evidence. 

That duty requires a review of the entire record to 

determine if there is relevant evidence that a reasonable 

mind might accept in support of the agency's decision. 

...”

McTiernan v. Scott, 2001 WY 87, ¶ 16, 31 P. 3d 749, [756] 

(Wyo. 2001) (citations and footnote omitted).

. . . .

Findings of ultimate fact are reviewed de novo:

“When an agency’s determinations contain elements of 

law and fact, we do not treat them with the deference we 

reserve for findings of basic fact. When reviewing an 

‘ultimate fact,’ we separate the factual and legal aspects 

of the finding to determine whether the correct rule of 

law has been properly applied to the facts. We do not 

defer to the agency’s ultimate factual finding if there is 

an error in either stating or applying the law.”

Basin Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, State of 

Wyo., 970 P.2d 841, 850-51 (Wyo. 1998) (citations omitted).

Britt, ¶ 17, 126 P.3d at 122-123, (quoting BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 2005 

WY 60, ¶¶ 10-13, 112 P.3d 596, 602-603 (Wyo. 2005)). Neither the decision of the 

district court nor that of the State Board of Equalization is entitled to deference; rather, 

the court conducts “an independent inquiry into the matter, just as if it had proceeded 

directly to us from the agency.” Id.

FACTS

[¶5] Mountain Vista is a non-profit corporation that owns real property in Fremont 

County, Wyoming, which it uses to provide independent living services to elderly 

residents. To qualify to live at Mountain Vista, resident applicants may join through a 

membership fee or by agreeing to a month-to-month lease. Applicants must be age 55 or 

older and capable of living independently without the assistance of a third-party and 

without assistance from anyone employed by Mountain Vista. This means residents must 

be able to perform alone the tasks of day-to-day life, such as cooking, eating, cleaning 
4

and grooming. Support provided by Mountain Vista includes transportation, meal service, 

exercise classes, socialization with other residents, and safety services. These support 

services are paid for through usage fees from residents of Mountain Vista. Residents are 

expected and permitted to provide their own furnishings.

[¶6] To qualify for resident status at Mountain Vista, each resident application must 

complete an Independent Living Assessment and meet physical requirements, which 

demonstrate that the individual can live independently or with the aid of a spouse or 

roommate. Physical health is continually monitored and reassessed after an illness or a 

fall. This is done in order to determine that residents can continue to live at Mountain 

Vista independently. Applicants must also meet financial requirements to qualify to live 

at Mountain Vista. Members of Mountain Vista are assessed a one-time membership fee, 

which is calculated in increments of $10,000. The membership fee determines a monthly 

service fee, which includes property tax, cable, water, sewer, garbage and snow removal, 

lawn care, window washing, common area usage, security, and general maintenance. 

The higher the membership fee, the lower the monthly service fee. Residents choose 

their initial membership fee based on their personal finances and choice of housing unit, 

which does not give them a property interest. A unit may not be sold, but may be 

subleased, and if a resident moves or dies, the membership fee is reimbursed on a sliding 

scale based on length of residence.

[¶7] In 2012, the Fremont County Assessor issued its notice of property valuation to 

Mountain Vista, assessing its commercial land and improvements at $1,327,908 and its 

personal property at $8,246. Mountain Vista contested this valuation on the basis that it 

should be exempt from property tax because it is a charitable or benevolent association 

that uses its property for primarily non-commercial purposes. The County Board, the 

State Board of Equalization, and the district court upheld the valuation. This appeal 

followed. 

DISCUSSION

[¶8] The Wyoming Constitution specifies that certain property shall be exempt from 

taxation and authorizes the legislature to exempt other property by statute. It provides:

The property of the United States, the state, counties, 

cities, towns, school districts and municipal corporations, 

when used primarily for a governmental purpose, and public 

libraries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for 

religious worship, church parsonages, church schools and 

public cemeteries, shall be exempt from taxation, and such 

other property as the legislature may by general law provide.
5

Wyo. Const. art. 15, § 12.

[¶9] The statutory exemption at issue in this case exempts property from taxation if it 

is:

Property used by a secret, benevolent and charitable 

society or association including any fraternal organization 

officially recognized by the University of Wyoming or any 

community college, and senior citizens centers to the extent it 

is not used for private profit nor primarily for commercial 

purposes by the society, association or center, or lessee 

thereof[.]

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-105(a)(xxvi) (LexisNexis 2013).

[¶10] Mountain Vista argues that the County Board erred when it decided that Mountain 

Vista is not entitled to exemption from ad valorem tax as a charitable or benevolent 

association. Mountain Vista does not claim to be a senior citizen center as that term is 

defined by statute and rule, but instead contends that it is exempt from taxation as a 

charitable and/or benevolent association. Mountain Vista also argues that it uses its 

property for primarily non-commercial purposes. We disagree and affirm the County 

Board’s decision, addressing each of Mountain Vista’s contentions hereinafter.

A. Charitable Association

[¶11] The Department of Revenue’s rules define charity as follows:

“Charity” is a gift for the benefit of an indefinite number of 

persons in Wyoming, by bringing their minds or hearts under 

the influence of education or religion, by relieving their 

bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them 

to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining 

public buildings or works. The fundamental basis for this 

exemption is the benefit conferred upon the public, and the 

consequent relief, to some extent, of the burden upon the state 

to care and advance the interests of its citizens.

Department of Revenue Rules, ch. 14, § 13 (a)(ii) (2014).

[¶12] The County Board affirmed the county assessor’s determination that Mountain 

Vista is not a charitable association, and we agree and find that substantial evidence 

exists in the record to support the finding that Mountain Vista is not a charitable 

association. A strong presumption favors the county assessor’s valuation. Britt, ¶ 20, 

126 P.3d 124. “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the officials 
6

charged with establishing value exercised honest judgment in accordance with the 

applicable rules, regulations, and other directives that have passed public scrutiny, either 

through legislative enactment or agency rule-making, or both.” Amoco Prod. Co. v. 

Dep’t of Revenue, 2004 WY 89, ¶ 7, 94 P.3d 430, 435 (Wyo. 2004). Here, Mountain 

Vista had the initial burden of presenting evidence sufficient to overcome the 

presumption. Id., ¶ 8, 94 P.3d 435. If successful, then the County Board was “required 

to equally weigh the evidence of all parties and measure it against the appropriate burden 

of proof.” Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 2001 WY 34, ¶ 10, 20 

P.3d 528, 531 (Wyo. 2001). The burden of going forward would then have shifted to the 

county assessor to defend her valuation. Id. Mountain Vista carried “the ultimate burden 

of persuasion to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the valuation was not 

derived in accordance with the required constitutional and statutory requirements for 

valuing ... property.” Id.

[¶13] The County Board considered the testimony and exhibits presented in the context 

of § 39-11-105 and the Department of Revenue rules and concluded:

a. Regarding the first factor, whether the purpose of the 

Taxpayer’s operation is charitable in nature, has not been 

proven by the taxpayer. Their membership is for a finite 

number of members who must have the financial, physical 

and mental capabilities to be accepted which is targeting a 

specific group of persons and is therefore not an indefinite 

number of persons as required by DOR rules Chapter 14 § 

12(a)(ii). This property simply does not meet the threshold 

intended by the Wyoming Legislature to qualify for taxexempt status as a charitable organization. The County Board 

notes that a potential applicant who “is not known by a Board 

Member, Staff Member or Resident, a personal interview may 

be required.” . . .

b. The purpose of the Taxpayer’s property is for housing 

which their members must pay for and is not subsidized in 

any fashion.

c. The Assessor’s argument that the taxpayer’s property 

is used for a commercial purpose is also compelling, but not 

necessary as the County Board finds this is not a charity. (see 

DOR Rules, Chapter 14, § 13(a)(ii)).

d. The dissenting County Board member notes that the 

taxpayer does relieve a burden on the citizens of Wyoming by 

fulfilling an intermediate stage of living between a personal 

home and a nursing home[.]

[¶14] Mountain Vista never overcame the presumption favoring the county assessor’s 
7

valuation. The county assessor reviewed the exemption statutes and determined that 

Mountain Vista was not a charitable association. The county assessor concluded that the 

exclusivity of Mountain Vista’s membership, the membership fees, security deposit, and 

monthly fees and charges for additional services, in addition to the health requirements 

and the fact that the residents do not own the property and must provide their own 

furnishings, established the use of the property as commercial and disqualified it for 

exemption. We are in total agreement. While Mountain Vista does provide beneficial 

services to its occupants, those services cannot be classified as a gift such that Mountain 

Vista is then classified as a charity. Mountain Vista’s policies require residents to pay for 

the costs of operating the property, as well as extra amenities. It is difficult to view such 

an arrangement as charitable. See Friendship Manor Corp. v. Tax Comm’n, 26 Utah 2d 

227, 487 P.2d 1272 (1971) (requiring that a charity relieve the burden of government or 

benefit the general welfare); United Presbyterian Asso. v. Board of County Comm’rs, 167 

Colo. 485, 448 P.2d 967 (1968) (where material reciprocity between alleged recipients 

and their alleged donor exists -- then charity does not).

[¶15] Mountain Vista also argues that it should be classified as a charitable organization 

because the services it provides are “for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons.” 

We disagree. As testified to by the county assessor, Mountain Vista’s facility “is for a 

finite number of individuals who have adequate financial resources and the gift of good 

health.” Mountain Vista’s facility consists of 19 units and thus serves a very limited 

number of residents. However, Mountain Vista argues that “all charities benefit only a 

limited number of persons” and refers to Department of Revenue & Taxation v. Casper 

Legion Baseball Club, 767 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1989) where this Court determined that in 

deciding whether an organization is eligible for a charitable tax exemption, the focus 

must be “on whether the charity primarily engages in activities providing an indefinite 

number of persons in the general public with benefits designed to aid them in an 

educational, moral, physical, or social manner” and “whether the charity provides access 

to those benefits in an equal and nondiscriminatory way.” Id., 767 P.2d at 611. There, all 

youth who chose to participate positively benefit from the “physical,” “social,” and 

“moral” experience of trying out for a baseball team. Here, there is no public benefit to 

the members of the general public that apply for membership and are theoretically 

denied.

[¶16] Other courts have spoken on this very subject. In an Idaho Supreme Court case, 

the following discussion occurred:

The question of whether a non-profit corporation provides a 

general public benefit, so as to be entitled to property tax 

exemption, is somewhat complex. Tax exemptions are 

disfavored generally, perhaps because they seem to conflict 

with principles of fairness – equality and uniformity – in 

bearing the burdens of government. See, Hilltop Village, Inc. 
8

v. Kerrville Independent School District, 426 S.W.2d 943, 

947 (Tex.1968) overruled on other grounds in City of 

McAllen v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, 

530 S.W.2d 806 (Tex.1976). They are said to be justified, in 

cases of a charitable or benevolent organization for example, 

by an offsetting benefit to the community (monetary or 

otherwise). Hence has arisen the test that an institution may 

be entitled to an exemption where it performs a function 

which might otherwise be an obligation of government. A 

nonprofit corporation may benefit only a limited group of 

people and still be considered “charitable” if that group of 

people possess a need which government might be required to 

fill. For example, a facility for physically handicapped 

persons might be “charitable” even though those persons 

were all members of a particular church or club because the 

facility is providing a general benefit to the community by 

relieving a potential obligation of government. However, 

where there is no assistance to individuals which might 

normally require governmental funds, as is the case with 

Sunny Ridge, the institution must meet a stricter test: it must 

provide benefits to the community at large (or, as some 

courts have stated it, to an “indefinite number of 

persons”). See, e.g., Oasis, Midwest Center for Human 

Potential v. Rosewell, 55 Ill.App.3d 851, 13 Ill.Dec. 97, 370 

N.E.2d 1124, 1130 (1977); Benton County v. Allen, 170 Or. 

481, 133 P.2d 991, 992 (1943). Since the residents at Sunny 

Ridge must be able to pay completely for the benefits they 

receive, and since they must be physically able to care for 

themselves, they are not a group of persons for whom any 

government assistance would be needed. Therefore, Sunny 

Ridge must provide some general benefit to the community as 

a whole. However, the benefits available at the center are 

reserved for the restricted group of persons who have met the 

entrance qualifications, and while in theory any member of 

the community who can meet those qualifications may join, 

in actual effect only a limited number of openings can exist 

during a given period of time. We find no fault in this; we 

simply recognize that benefits provided by Sunny Ridge must 

necessarily be limited to a relative few. It may be that an 

indirect benefit flows to the community; however, as pointed 

out by the court in Massachusetts Medical Society v. 

Assessors of Boston, 340 Mass. 327, 164 N.E.2d 325 (1960),
9

“Whether an institution is in its character literary, 

benevolent, charitable or scientific will depend upon 

the declared purposes and the actual work performed. 

(Citations omitted.) An institution will be classed as 

charitable if the dominant purpose of its work is for the 

public good and the work done for its members is but 

the means adopted for this purpose. But if the 

dominant purpose of its work is to benefit its members 

or a limited class of persons it will not be so classed, 

even though the public will derive an incidental benefit 

from such work.” Id. at 328. (Emphasis added.)

We find it laudable that Sunny Ridge provides the care it 

does; however, as this court stated in Sunset Memorial 

Gardens v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 80 Idaho 206, 219, 

327 P.2d 766, 774 (1958), “[t]he basis of tax exemptions is 

the accomplishment of public purpose and not the favoring of 

particular persons or corporations at the expense of taxpayers 

generally.” If Sunny Ridge attempted to provide its services 

based on need to a greater extent, there might be more of a 

direct public benefit, even though the center can 

accommodate only a limited number of persons. As the 

record shows, however, there is no means provided by which 

individuals having particular needs for the types of services 

Sunny Ridge can provide are singled out for admission, or for 

assistance. Although the record shows that Sunny Ridge 

provides its care at substantial savings over what would be 

charged at a nursing home, for example, there is nothing in 

the record to indicate that this benefit of reduced costs is 

directed toward those who particularly need it. The savings 

may well benefit primarily persons who could afford to pay 

higher costs. In any case, the type of individual who needs 

nursing home care could not pass the entrance qualifications 

at Sunny Ridge.

. . . .

Based on the factors already discussed, and after 

consideration of the authorities cited, we hold as a matter of 

law that Sunny Ridge -- under the particular circumstances of 

this case -- is not a “charitable corporation” under I.C. § 63-

105C. We emphasize that our determination is a narrow one: 

we are persuaded of a need to be flexible in such cases. We 
10

agree with the Colorado Supreme Court when it stated:

“We shall not attempt in this opinion to enunciate a 

fixed definition of the phrase ‘strictly charitable 

purposes,’ ‘lest by words of exclusion we might 

unintentionally seem to impose a legal restraint upon 

that cardinal grace which by its very nature thrives in

proportion to the freedom of its proper exercise.”

United Presbyterian Ass’n v. Board of County 

Comm’rs, 167 Colo. 485, 448 P.2d 967, 972 (1968).

We leave for determination at another time whether a similar 

nonprofit corporation -- or, for that matter, whether this 

corporation, under different circumstances -- is entitled to a 

property tax exemption under the terms of I.C. § 63-105C as

it now reads.

In re Appeal of Sunny Ridge Manor, 675 P.2d 813, 817-818 (Idaho 1984) (emphasis 

added).

[¶17] The decision of the Idaho court is on point. Here, we agree that the service 

Mountain Vista provides is an important one. However, it does not qualify as a 

charitable association. Mountain Vista’s services are not a gift pursuant to Department of 

Revenue rules, nor does Mountain Vista benefit an indefinite number of persons. 

Furthermore, Mountain Vista’s services do not provide educational or religious benefits, 

or relief from suffering. There is no public benefit provided, nor a public burden relieved 

and, accordingly, Mountain Vista does not qualify as a charitable association.

B. Benevolent Association

[¶18] We turn to our next consideration: whether or not Mountain Vista is a benevolent 

association. The Department of Revenue’s rules define benevolent as follows:

“Benevolent” includes purposes which may be deemed 

charitable, as well as acts dictated by kindness, good will, or a 

disposition to do good, the objects of which have no relation to 

the promotion of education, learning, or religion, the relief of 

the needy, the sick, or the afflicted, the support of public 

works, or the relief of public burdens. The term has wider 

significance than “charitable” as a legal tenet but shall be 

limited to purposes or activities of sufficient public importance 

and wide-spread social value.
11

Department of Revenue Rules, ch. 14, § 13(a)(iii) (2014).

[¶19] The Department of Revenue’s rules preclude application of the benevolent 

association exemption if the entity uses its property primarily for commercial purposes. 

Specifically, the rules provide:

Housing made available to senior citizens which is not part of 

a senior citizens’ center (such as a retirement home) is 

exempt only if the entity owning the property meets the 

criteria of a “charitable and benevolent society or association” 

in Section 13 of this Chapter. A retirement home is taxable 

if the residents provide their own furnishings and are 

charged for the cost of operating the home, including extra 

amenities enjoyed by the residents. Such a retirement home 

constitutes a commercial enterprise, even if operated on a 

non-profit basis with reduced charges.

Department of Revenue Rules, Chapter 14, § 14(a)(ii) (2014) (emphasis added).

[¶20] The County Board made no specific findings based upon the definition of a 

benevolent association and instead upheld the county assessor’s determination based 

upon the assessor’s conclusion that Mountain Vista’s property was primarily used for 

commercial purposes. More specifically, the county assessor found:

“Mountain Vista residents must provide their own furnishings 

and are charged for the cost of operating the home. ...

[The rule] goes on further to state that, ‘A retirement home is 

taxable if the residents provide their own furnishings and are 

charged for the cost of operating the home...’

. . . . 

Section 12 defines commercial purpose as ‘The property at 

issue shall not be used primarily for a commercial purpose, 

that is, use of a property or any portion thereof to provide 

services, merchandise, areas or activities for a charge which 

are generally obtainable from any commercial enterprise and 

are collateral to the purpose of secret, benevolent and 

charitable. ...

‘The use of property for commercial purpose is controlling, 

not whether or not a profit is actually made nor how the 
12

revenue is ultimately used. If an activity is considered 

commercial, it does not become noncommercial merely 

because the revenue derived from the commercial use is 

devoted to charitable and authorized purposes.’

[¶21] We find this conclusion to be supported by substantial evidence. The county 

assessor testified that “[t]he residents provide their own furnishings and pay for their own 

utilities, phone, gas, electric and personal property.” The record also shows that the 

property is used as housing for senior citizens with means to live independently, and the 

property is in the competitive housing market. Furthermore, residents pay for the 

services used in the daily operation of the housing, as well as utilities.

[¶22] Mountain Vista attempts to avoid the application of this rule by arguing that the 

Department of Revenue exceeded its authority in promulgating the rule. In so arguing, 

Mountain Vista contends that the rule is clearly contrary to a legislative intent and policy 

to encourage these types of residential facilities. We disagree. The legislature has made 

numerous revisions to the statutory tax exemptions, the most recent changes taking effect 

on January 1, 2015. Those changes in fact specifically addressed the exemptions at issue 

and separated out the exemptions for senior citizens, charitable associations, and 

benevolent associations. The current exemptions for senior centers and benevolent 

associations still, however, condition their exemption on a showing that the property is 

used for primarily noncommercial purposes. The legislature did not add a “commercial 

purposes” definition, nor did it make changes to address the Department of Revenue’s 

interpretation of that term. We presume that when the legislature enacts laws, it does so 

with full knowledge of the existing law. In re Estate of Scherer, 2014 WY 129, ¶ 17, 

336 P.3d 129, 134 (Wyo. 2014). Because the legislature has revised these exemptions 

without addressing the Department of Revenue’s interpretation of the exemption, we 

conclude that the Department of Revenue’s interpretation is consistent with the 

legislature’s intent.

CONCLUSION

[¶23] We affirm the County Board’s decision to uphold the Fremont County Assessor’s 

original status determination and tax assessment and ultimately deny Mountain Vista a 

property tax exemption.

[¶24] We conclude that Mountain Vista is neither a charitable or benevolent association 

and that its property is primarily used for commercial purposes.

[¶25] Affirmed.