U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

93–294 PDF 2015

FROM ARAB SPRING TO COPTIC WINTER: 

SECTARIAN VIOLENCE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN EGYPT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 15, 2011 

Printed for the use of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

[CSCE 112–1–12] 

( 

Available via http://www.csce.gov 
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

HOUSE SENATE 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Chairman 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

New York 

MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, 

Co-Chairman 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

MICHAEL H. POSNER, Department of State 

MICHAEL C. CAMUN ̃ EZ, Department of Commerce 

ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, Department of Defense 

(II) 
FROM ARAB SPRING TO COPTIC WINTER: 

SECTARIAN VIOLENCE AND THE STRUGGLE 

FOR DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN EGYPT 

NOVEMBER 15, 2011 

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .............................................. 1 

Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, Commissioner, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 4 

Michael Posner, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human 

Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State ........................ 5 

Hon. Robert Aderholt, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .............................................. 23 

MEMBER 

Hon. Gus Bilirakis (R–12), a Member of Congress from the 

State of Florida ........................................................................ 17 

WITNESSES 

Dina Guirguis, Egyptian American Rule of Law Association .. 18 

Samuel Tadros, Research Fellow, Center for Religious Freedom, Hudson Institute ............................................................ 24 

Dr. Michele Dunne, Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the 

Middle East, Atlantic Council ................................................ 27 

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith ................. 36 

Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin .................... 39 

Prepared statement of Michael Posner ..................................... 40 

Prepared statement of Dina Guirguis ....................................... 44 

Prepared statement of Samuel Tadros ...................................... 47 

Prepared statement of Dr. Michele Dunne ............................... 50 

(III) 

(1) 

FROM ARAB SPRING TO COPTIC WINTER: 

SECTARIAN VIOLENCE AND THE STRUGGLE 

FOR DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN EGYPT 

November 15, 2011 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC 

The hearing was held at 2 p.m. in room 210, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Joseph 

R. Pitts, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe; and Hon. Robert Aderholt, Commissioner, Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Member present: Hon. Gus Bilirakis (R–12), a Member of Congress from the State of Florida. 

Witnesses present: Michael Posner, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State; 

Dina Guirguis, Egyptian American Rule of Law Association; Samuel Tadros, Research Fellow, Center for Religious Freedom, Hudson Institute; and Dr. Michele Dunne, Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council. 

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. SMITH. The Commission will come to order. And I apologize 

for the lateness in convening the hearing. And I would ask our witnesses and our audience to have some forbearance. 

There are a series of votes on the floor of the House that will 

have members coming in and out. But I want to assure our distinguished Assistant Secretary Michael Posner that all of us and 

those who are not here will read your testimony very carefully and 

are very grateful that you’re here to give testimony to us today. 

I want to welcome all of you to our second Helsinki Commission 

hearing on the volatile and dangerous situation facing Coptic 

Christians in Egypt following the Arab Spring. And our hearing is 

entitled ‘‘From Arab Spring to Coptic Winter: Sectarian Violence 

and the Struggle for Democratic Transition in Europe.’’ The world 

watched with hope and anticipation, and for some of us, with trepidation as events unfolded in Tahrir Square earlier this year. 
2 

This spring we saw Christians standing guard over Muslims during Friday prayers in the middle of the square. We saw Muslims 

standing guard over Christians as they celebrated Mass in Tahrir. 

Sadly, much has changed since then. While many of those who 

came together to forge the revolution want to continue that solidarity as they support Egypt’s political transition, there are many 

others—far too many others who do not. 

The transition period has been increasing in violence against 

Coptic Christians. The current Egyptian government controlled by 

the Supreme Alliance Council of the armed forces has not adequately responded to this violence, has not protected vulnerable 

Coptic Christians and as we have seen on video, to our horror, has 

even committed acts of violence against Coptic protestors. 

On Sunday, October 9th, 27 people were killed and more than 

300 injured in Maspero when Egyptian military attacked a peaceful 

group of Coptic Christians protesting the burning of a church in 

Aswan and demanding the removal of the governor of Aswan who 

had justified the mob’s destruction of the church. 

In this massacre in Maspero, witnesses saw the army firing on 

Coptic demonstrators with live ammunition and plow through the 

crowd with armored vehicles. Soldiers raided and stopped the live 

broadcast of two independent news channels that had been covering the clashes. 

At the same time, state-run television and radio reported that 

the Coptic demonstrators had attacked the military and called for 

honorable citizens to defend the army against attack, inciting violence against the Coptic minority. 

Amid widespread domestic and international outrage over the 

events, the White House issued a statement on October 10th saying 

that, quote, ‘‘The president is deeply concerned about the violence 

in Egypt and that has led to a tragic loss of life. Now is the time 

for restraint on all sides so that Egyptians can move forward together to forge a strong and united Egypt.’’ 

With all due respect, the president seems to have completely 

missed the point. This is not a situation of equal power and equal 

responsibility for violence. This was not a lawless gang clash on the 

street or a mob marauding the streets in the absence of a government. The Coptic community was protesting the fact that the Egyptian government in Aswan failed to protect Coptic property and allowed a mob to burn down the Coptic place of worship. 

When Copts called on the military government to treat the Copts 

as equal citizens and protect their rights, the government itself 

turned on them with a massacre. The time has come to ask if this 

government going to be better than the Mubarak thug regime. This 

same government is investigating itself for the incident and its assault on human rights continues. 

In fact, the military has arrested at least 28 people, mostly 

Copts, in connection with the clashes, including prominent blogger 

Alaa Abd El Fattah. These individuals are being hauled before 

military prosecutors. 

To date, despite multiple videos and eyewitnesses’ accounts 

showing the military’s use of lethal violence against peaceful 

protestors, the Egyptian military has yet to take responsibility for 

its actions or otherwise demonstrate that it will protect all Egyp-
3 

tians, including the Coptic minority who make up more than 10 

percent of its population. 

According to the press reports of last week, a member of a government-backed fact-finding committee said that the Egyptian 

army did not use live ammunition to disperse protestors during the 

October 9th incident. 

Yet, Hafez Abu Sayed Seada, a senior figure in the governmentsponsored National Council for Human Rights, which set up the 

committee, also said that an independent investigation was needed 

to establish the full facts and that some state institutions, including the army, did not cooperate fully with the committee. Rights 

activists including the Arab Network for Human Rights Information and Human Rights Watch have criticized the report for a lack 

of detail. Tragically, the massacre at Maspero is not an isolated incident but rather a continuation of the endemic discrimination 

against and the marginalization of Coptic Christians in Egypt. 

According to the 2010 State Department international religious 

freedom report for Egypt, and I quote, ‘‘The status of respect for religious freedom by the government remained poor, unchanged from 

the previous year.’’ Christians and members of the Baha’i faith, 

which the government does not recognize, face personal and collective discrimination, especially in government employment and their 

ability to build, renovate or repair places of worship. 

The government failed to prosecute perpetrators of violence 

against the Coptic Christians, according to the State Department 

report, and failed again to redress laws, particularly laws relating 

to church construction and renovation and government practices, 

especially government hiring that discriminates against Christians, 

especially allowing their discriminatory effects and their modeling 

effect on society to become further entrenched. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has noted that, and I 

quote, ‘‘In response to sectarian violence, Egyptian authorities typically conduct reconciliation sessions between Muslims and Christians as a means of resolving disputes. In some cases, authorities 

compel victims to abandon their claims to legal remedy. The failure 

to prosecute perpetrators fosters a climate of impunity,’’ close 

quote. 

A report by the Egyptian Initiative for Human Rights covering 

the period from January ’08 to January 2010 documented 53 incidents of sectarian violence, about two incidents per month that 

took place in 17 of Egypt’s 29 governorates. Most of the attacks 

were by Muslims on Christians and Christian churches or property. 

Egypt will not reach, I would submit, its democratic goals through 

the oppression of its minority peoples. 

Democracy does not come with an iron fist. Rather, democracy 

springs from the belief that all people are created equal and have 

the right to participate in their own governance. A legitimate government is of the people, by the people and for the people, including minorities. A legitimate government submits to the rule of law. 

The Egyptians demonstrated their belief in Tahrir Square but 

seem to be losing their way, spinning backwards into tyrannical 

abuses of power. If there is any hope for a democratic and peaceful 

Egypt, the Copts must be allowed to contribute actively to Egyptian 
4 

society and to the transformation of their country without fearing 

for their lives. 

I’d like to now introduce our very distinguished first witness, a 

man I’ve known for many years when he used to work for the committee for legal scholars—the lawyers rights committee—as well as 

for other human rights organizations in the past—Human Rights 

First. And I’ll introduce him and I understand there is another 

vote. It’s on. 

And I will have to report to the floor. So we’ll be in brief recess 

and then Mr. Posner—Secretary Posner, we’ll ask you to present 

your testimony. And I know some of the members will be back 

then. But so maybe on that point I’ll just—we’ll be in recess for just 

a few minutes. Sorry about that. The commission will resume its 

hearing. I’d like to yield to Commissioner Joe Pitts from Pennsylvania. 

HON. JOSEPH R. PITTS, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for holding 

this important hearing. It is important that we continue to stand 

by the people of Egypt as they seek a stable and transparent democracy where all Egyptian citizens are treated equally. Recent 

trends in Egypt in terms of attacks against minorities are deeply 

disturbing. 

Reports indicate that on October 16, teenager Ayman Labib was 

in his Arabic class when the teacher told him to get rid of the cross 

tattooed on his wrist. When Ayman said it was a tattoo, the teacher asked the other students, quote, ‘‘What are we going to do about 

this,’’ end quote. And he incited the students in the class to attack 

Ayman. 

Ayman tried to flee but ultimately the students, with the support 

of their teachers, murdered this young man. Egyptian news media 

controlled by the military government, has tried to deny the sectarian reasons for this brutal murder. After the new antidiscrimination law put into place after October 9 when Egyptian security 

forces ran over Copts with bulldozers, will those teachers and 

adults and students be brought to justice for this brutal murder? 

The October 9 attacks by the military against peaceful protestors 

do not bode well for the protection of fundamental rights for all 

Egyptians. The Egyptian military must bring the perpetrators of 

these violent acts to justice through a transparent investigation 

which punishes those truly responsible for those heinous acts. 

I still have hope for a peaceful Egypt but that will only happen 

if those who care about the protection of all people are in power. 

I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to hearing from our guests. I look 

forward to hearing from administration officials about specific actions they have taken to uphold and protect the rights of minorities 

in Egypt. With that, I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Commissioner Pitts. I’d like 

to now introduce Michael Posner, who has served as assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 

Labor since September of 2009. 

Prior to joining the State Department, Mr. Posner was the executive director and the president of Human Rights First, where he es-
5 

tablished himself as a leader in the defense of many critical human 

rights issues. He holds a J.D. from the University of California at 

Berkeley and his full re ́sume ́ will be made a part of the record 

without objection. But I welcome Secretary Posner to our commission. Please proceed. 

MICHAEL POSNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, 

HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Sec. POSNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, 

for inviting me to testify. We’ve worked together for many years 

and I’m always appreciative and admiring of your passion, your 

commitment, your determination, your unflagging energy to the 

cause of human rights. So I appreciate your doing this today and 

I welcome, Congressman Pitts, your participation as well. 

As you know, this is a time of substantial transition in Egypt as 

Egyptians strive to move their country towards democracy. It’s not 

an easy process and it’s not going to happen overnight. Egypt is 

only starting on the path from parliamentary elections that will 

begin in a couple of weeks to the process of drafting a new constitution and to presidential elections. 

As part of this process, it’s vital that there be a place in the new 

Egypt for all citizens, all religious minorities, of which the Coptic 

Christian community is the largest. While the focus of this hearing 

and my testimony is on the situation of the Copts, I want to point 

out there are other religious minorities that also suffer official discrimination, groups like the Baha’i, groups in the Muslim community—Shia, Ahmadiya, Quranist—as well as Jehovah’s Witnesses 

and Mormons. 

The Government continues to refuse to recognize conversions of 

Muslims to Christianity or other religions which constitutes a prohibition in practice. I want to set this testimony in a broader context. Last week, Secretary Clinton gave an important policy address in which, Congressman Pitts, she echoed something that you 

just said. She said: We support the aspirations of citizens to live 

in societies that guarantee freedom, including freedom of expression, assembly and religion. We strongly believe in systems that 

allow citizens a say in how they’re governed and that they will— 

that they will be provided with economic opportunities. 

These are the demands we heard in Tahrir Square where Copts 

and Muslims joined hands to protest and to pray. We’ve heard 

similar demands echoing throughout the Middle East and elsewhere. Secretary Clinton also spoke out consistently about the importance of religious freedom and religious tolerance both of which 

are fundamental human rights. Religious freedom is guaranteed by 

international human rights law. 

I have a longer written statement which I ask be made part of 

the record. But I just want to make three broad points about the 

Copts in Egypt. The first is that they have faced discrimination for 

many years. They face personal and collective discrimination especially in government employment, the ability to build, renovate and 

repair places of worship. 

Although they represent about 10 percent of the population, they 

play an important role in Egypt’s economy. They’ve suffered widespread discrimination and remain underrepresented in prominent 
6 

positions in Egyptian politics and society. The headlines tell a disturbing story. I was actually in Egypt in January 2010 when there 

was the horrendous attack on the Nag Hammadi Church in Upper 

Egypt. 

Gunmen shot and killed seven people and worshippers who were 

leaving midnight mass. Yesterday actually the government official 

news agency announced that two of the suspects in that murder 

who had previously been acquitted are about to be retried on December 19th, which is a positive sign. But the attacks and the violence has gone on. 

About a year after the Nag Hammadi attack, on January 1st of 

this year, a bomb exploded at the Coptic Orthodox Church of the 

Two Saints of Alexandria, killing 23 people and wounding a hundred. There are, today, no suspects in custody. The second point is 

that the violent attacks that are historically there have actually in 

some ways increased numerically since February 11th, since the 

change of government. 

We’ve received reports of at least 67 people killed in religious 

clashes, most of them Coptic Christians. This brings the total number of reported deaths this year to more than 90. There have been 

at least six reported major attacks of violence against the Copts. 

I list them all in my testimony but I just want to mention two. 

On September 30th, in the Merinab village in Aswan, an estimated crowd of 3,000 Muslims looted and burned the St. George 

Coptic Orthodox Church in addition to some Copt-owned homes 

and businesses. The status of the investigation in that case is unclear. 

And on October 9th, as you both have mentioned, in Cairo violence erupted in front of the Egyptian television building known as 

the Maspero as a demonstration by Copts protesting the government’s failure to investigate the burning of the church in Merinab. 

At least 25 people were killed, more than 300 injured. 

In these and other cases, we have made clear our deep concern 

about the violence against the Coptic community and the need for 

accountability. On October 11th, Secretary Clinton called for an immediate, credible, transparent investigation of all those who were 

responsible for the Maspero violence with full due process of law. 

The White House issued a similar statement urging Egyptians to 

move forward to forge a strong and united Egypt, reaffirming our 

belief in religious minorities. In raising our concerns, we are aware 

that the government of Egypt is doing some things and I want to 

point them out. They have in fact initiated two investigations in response to the Maspero violence. 

The first is an Egyptian armed forces review of the conduct of 

the military police. As you’ve indicated, the military police according to eyewitnesses and video evidence ran over and shot at demonstrators. Separately, military prosecutors are investigating about 

30 demonstrators, including one prominent blogger, who were detained during the violence. They’re accused of inciting violence and 

attacking security forces. 

During the height of the clashes—and this is something I want 

to emphasize as well—one of the state TV anchors called on honorable Egyptians to defend the army against attacks by violent demonstrators. Twenty-one prominent Egyptian human rights organi-
7 

zations have criticized the official media for what they call their inflammatory role in actually provoking greater violence. 

The Coptic community is as concerned as we are about the severity and frequency of these attacks. While they recognize, as we do, 

that these attacks are not necessarily not the product of government provocation, they’re greatly concerned, as we are, about the 

need to hold perpetrators accountable. 

I want to make clear that most of the clashes have involved both 

Copts and Muslims and members of both communities have been 

perpetrators as well as victims. It’s also important to note that 

many Muslims have stood up to defend members of the Coptic community against extremist violence. 

I want to finish with two other things that the government’s now 

doing which is important for us to emphasize and reinforce. One, 

the government has pledged to adopt a unified places of worship 

law which would guarantee all faiths the ability to construct and 

maintain places of worship. This is a debate that’s gone on for 

years. The government—the Cabinet sent a draft law to the military council in October. 

We urge strongly, and we have been in discussion with the government, the prompt adoption of this provision. That would send 

a very strong signal of the government’s commitment to protect religious freedom. And finally, we welcome steps the government has 

taken to reduce discrimination in their penal code. 

On October 15th, the SCAF issued a decree amending the penal 

code to prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion, gender, language, faith or race. This provision reinforces and will give life to 

Article 7 of the March 31st constitutional declaration on the same 

subject. We urge the government to enforce these provisions and to 

make nondiscrimination the order of the day. 

Like Egyptian Muslims, Egyptian Copts are concerned about 

their country’s future. In addition to security from sectarian violence and equal treatment under the law, they want equal representation in parliament, a proportional voice on the committee 

that will draft the new constitution. The vast majority of Egyptians 

support religious freedom and we support their efforts. 

As Secretary Clinton said last week, and I’m quoting here, ‘‘If 

over time the most powerful political force in Egypt remains a room 

full of unelected officials, they will have planted the seeds for future unrest and Egypt will have missed an historic opportunity.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, the door for real democratic change is only beginning to open in Egypt. We hope Egyptians will walk through it together towards a more peaceful and prosperous future. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Secretary Posner, thank you very much for your testimony. And I’d like to begin with a few questions. The first would 

be whether or not you believe and whether or not the department 

believes that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces deliberately 

provoked a confrontation with the Coptic Christian demonstrators 

on October 9th. 

Will they be able to credibly investigate themselves regarding 

that incident as they have claimed that they will? And then what 

steps do you believe that the government will take—proactive steps 

to ensure that those kinds of events don’t happen again? 
8 

Sec. POSNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have—we see no 

evidence of deliberate provocation. What is of concern and what I 

highlighted in the testimony is, one, that there be a real investigation and accountability for the actions of both the military police 

and the security forces. That’s the first and best protection against 

future acts of violence. There needs to be a clear demonstration 

that those responsible will be held accountable and that the government is fully committed to investigating these acts. The second—the piece that I talked about last I think also helps set a climate of tolerance and of official recognition of the importance of diversity. 

The unified law allowing churches and mosques on the same status and all religions to build religious facilities, to repair them and 

the like, that’s an important demonstration by the government that 

it is operating on the theory that all religions need to be treated 

the same, as well as the provisions in the penal code dealing with 

discrimination. 

So I think those two things together—strong investigation, prosecution, accountability and affirmative steps by the government by 

word and deed that suggests in fact the new Egypt is one where 

there is no official discrimination and the government respects the 

ability of every religion to practice freely. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could, with regards to the investigation, has the 

government sought the help of ourselves or any other international 

law enforcement asset, whether it be the FBI, Scotland Yard, any 

other Arab armed forces network to ensure that it’s aggressive, 

credible and comprehensive? 

You and I both remember that one of those—what helped in 

Northern Ireland tremendously was when international investigators were invited to be—to work in a cooperative way with the 

RUC to ensure that acts of violence by the paramilitaries were investigated properly. 

It takes the—I would suggest—the tinge out of whether or not 

it’s a real investigation or not or whether or not there’s an effort 

to suppress evidence. Has anything like that happened? Have they 

reached out to us or any other country? 

Sec. POSNER. I’m not aware of any request for our help. I will say 

one of the things we are very mindful of and sensitive to is that 

both in the political process and in the reform process these are 

steps that need to be led and directed by the Egyptian people 

themselves. We stand ready, and the government knows that, to 

provide assistance as it’s useful and necessary. 

I know there have been some discussions in a broader sense. I’ve 

been part of some of those discussions with the Ministry of Interior 

about ways in which there can be, you know, enhanced police reform and training. We stand ready to be helpful. But we are also 

mindful of the importance that these reforms need to be initiated 

by and directed by the government of Egypt. 

Mr. SMITH. Do you think we should reach out to them purely on 

a technical assistance basis? I mean, some of the very advanced 

protocols that our law enforcement people employ certainly would 

ensure a more comprehensive investigation. Is it something you 

might take back and look and see whether or not that might be 

useful? 
9 

Sec. POSNER. I’m glad to take that back. I had a good conversation with Ambassador Patterson on Thursday. She is adept, as 

good as our diplomatic corps ever produced. She knows the scene 

there very well now and is in constant conversation both with the 

government and with the SCAF. 

And I have every confidence that if there’s a way in which we 

can be helpful, we will make the government aware of that. And 

we certainly—it’s not lost on the government of Egypt how important their next actions are with regard to this attack. It’s gotten 

a huge amount of attention both here and in Egypt. And they know 

well. This hearing is another example of the extent to which the 

accountability issue needs to be addressed. 

Mr. SMITH. Secretary Posner, as you know, immediately prior to 

the revolution there was a huge cut in economic assistance for 

human rights and democracy building. And laying blame nowhere, 

whether it be on Congress or the administration, it was rather significant. Could you tell us how much U.S. economic assistance 

today is directed towards promoting human rights? 

Sec. POSNER. Well, as you know, Mr. Chairman, for FY ’10 we 

undertook to shift some of the economic support funds to democracy and governance. 

And some combination of our offices, the Middle East partnership—MEPI—and USAID, are now funding a range of activities— 

support both for strengthening democratic processes, training of political parties, voter education, et cetera, but also working with 

independent labor unions and journalists on some of the issues 

we’re discussing today. 

The number, I think, is in the vicinity of $50 million for FY ’10. 

And I think we’re—again, this is part of what the discussion has 

been internally in our government and with members of Congress. 

I think it’s important that we now recognize, and we do, that there 

are a range of places we can and should be helping in sustaining 

and encouraging the democratic process to go forward. 

Mr. SMITH. Just two final questions. How does a Coptic Christian 

raise a concern with the government and work to protect their own 

civil liberties? Who do they go to? 

Sec. POSNER. Well, I think, you know, one of the—hopefully one 

of the signposts for the future will be the election over the next several months of a new—of a new parliament which will include 

members of a new political order who are going to be more open 

and responsive to the needs of all Egyptians, including the Coptic 

community. 

We are certainly encouraging Egyptians of all faiths to participate actively in these elections which start on November 28th. And 

I would think that would be the best starting place for people in 

the Coptic community and all Egyptians to begin to use their 

democratic muscles and raise concerns of their own communities. 

Mr. SMITH. But what happens—I was one of those who was skeptical and I wasn’t alone in that, you know, as people were getting 

teary-eyed over whether or not this meant real reform or a further 

consolidation by groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. 

And I would appreciate your thoughts on the Muslim Brotherhood, if you would, whether or not perhaps we may as a govern-
10 

ment have underestimated their knowledge and appearing to be 

more moderate but now are consolidating more power. 

And frankly, in terms of election muscle, I mean, minorities by 

definition are profoundly disadvantaged which is why, at least our 

country and many countries, have very strong rules protecting minorities. 

And I know, you know, there are places that—so many of us are 

known as Democrats or Republicans, we run for election, if we’re 

gerrymandered into a certain area, you know, you could provide 

the greatest service imaginable and still not get elected and still 

not potentially have your voice heard. 

And I think when you’re about 10 percent of the population and 

there is this governmental or very profound bias against Coptic 

Christians, and as you mentioned there are other ethnic or religious minorities as well, unless you have strong protections, you 

know, their disadvantage becomes perhaps even persecution, which 

I think is what’s happening now. 

Dina Guirguis will testify later. And when you answer that, if 

you could just respond to this comment because she said, or will 

say, one only needs to give a cursory look at SCAF’s history since 

its assumption of power. Over 12,000 civilians have been tried in 

military tribunals that do not meet minimum standards of due 

process. 

Female protestors have been subjected to degrading virginity 

tests. The notorious emergency law has been extended and numerous laws restricting freedom of assembly and even criminalizing 

criticism of the military have been opaquely passed and enforced 

in draconian fashion. 

And then she goes on, local rights groups have already decried 

these abuses even more, including SCAF’s pre-election conduct 

which observers accurately note portends to substantial fraud in 

the upcoming elections where Islamists are expected to win a substantial parliamentary presence. That paints an extremely ominous 

present and certainly a more ominous future. What’s your take on 

that? 

Sec. POSNER. You know, I would say having worked in the 

human rights field for 30-some years that I’m an eternal optimist. 

So take this comment with that in mind. I believe we are at the 

beginning of a transition in Egypt. Some might call it a transition 

to a transition. I don’t think we can expect to see instantaneously 

the kind of a democratic foundation laid that we would all hope 

and expect to see over time. 

Secretary Clinton in her speech last week spoke about this and 

I think some of the elements you’ve raised are exactly the things 

we need to be pressing on. We do believe that there ought to be 

and needs to be a lifting of the state of emergency. 

We do believe that there needs to be an opening up of the process 

for, you know, there to be a real lively debate where multiple parties are allowed to function freely, where there’s a free press, where 

state television takes on a more balanced approach, where religious 

freedom flourishes. Those things are going to happen over time if 

there’s a sustained push by Egyptian people supported by governments like ours. 
11 

We don’t believe—we don’t—what we want to see is that parties 

that are committed to rejecting violence, that abide by the rule of 

law, that respect freedoms of speech, religion, association, that respect the rights of women are allowed to participate. 

Our view is if that happens over time we’re going to get a result 

that we like that’s going to lead to a real democratic transition. 

We’ve got to hold our nerve. We’ve got to stay involved and engaged. But I think we all understand that there is a range of challenges that we face in the coming weeks and months that we need 

to be attentive to and we need to, at the same time, be patient and 

resolute. 

Mr. SMITH. Is there concern that we might be underestimating 

the Muslim Brotherhood? 

Sec. POSNER. I think we are. Certainly as we watch what is happening it’s clear that the Muslim Brothers are well organized as a 

political party and that they will compete actively and aggressively 

in the election. Again, the decision about who to vote for is for the 

people of Egypt. 

Our role and our goal needs to be to promote a long-term democratic transition that’s based on the notion of strengthening of a political process that’s going to lead to a democratic, freely elected 

government, a constitution that supports that and the democratic 

infrastructure that yields the kind of result that we’re going to be— 

that Egyptian people are going to feel proud of and that’s going to 

make them a good and stable ally. 

Mr. SMITH. I do have one final question. And that would be a few 

months ago Michele Clark, who used to be number two at ODIHR 

and you and I did have a conversation about this, as you’ll recall, 

she testified and said, it’s no longer a matter of allegation that 

young Coptic teenage girls are abducted. She said the number was 

in the thousands. 

And when they turn 18, after the kidnapping, they are given to 

an Islamic man, a Muslim man who then makes her his wife. 

Women are often subjected to a great deal of exploitation, 

compounding the original kidnapping itself. 

And she even talked about the very awful term that this is an 

Islamization of the womb, Islamicizing the womb, that whatever 

children she bears will be Muslim, which is an absolutely outrageous human rights abuse from every way that it’s looked at— 

the kidnapping, the trafficking, the forced conversion and then the 

subsequent forced conversions of any children born to her in that 

so-called marriage. 

Have you been able to look into that as a bureau? I know the 

ambassador—Congressman Wolf took the information from that 

hearing and had a meeting in his office and asked her to, you 

know, aggressively look into it. Michele said—Clark said that, you 

know, we should no longer use the word allegation, that it’s beyond 

that. She did the investigations herself. 

And matter of fact, she said, these reports—this is her quote 

from July 22nd here in this room at a Commission hearing: ‘‘These 

reports are not allegations nor should they be disputed. Coptic 

women disappear. 

‘‘Coptic women are forcibly converted or converted under false 

pretenses. And Coptic women are forcibly married to Muslim men.’’ 
12 

What is your—what has your investigation or looks into this discovered? 

Sec. POSNER. We are—I know that you’ve raised this and we had 

a previous conversation about it. And I have made inquiries about 

the particular cases. We have—let me say broadly we obviously are 

greatly concerned about the Egyptian government’s failure to allow 

conversion of Muslims to Christianity and the various measures, 

coercive measures or discriminatory measures against those who 

seek to express their religious faith. 

The particular cases that she raised, we have not been able to 

substantiate the facts, although I’d be willing or people in our office 

would be willing to meet with her. 

But we are concerned about the broader phenomenon of the kind 

of coercive or discriminatory measures against people who are either trying to convert from Islam to Christianity, which the government doesn’t recognize, or the kinds of coercive things that she 

raises. Again, the particular cases I can’t speak to. 

Mr. SMITH. If you could— 

Sec. POSNER. But if— 

Mr. SMITH. Oh, I’m sorry, Mr. Secretary. If you could, how 

robustly have we tried to substantiate—have foreign service officers or human rights officers gone into the field? Have they done 

extensive interviews to determine whether or not this is a barbaric 

phenomenon that’s ongoing? 

Sec. POSNER. We have made inquiries through the embassy. And 

what I can do and I will do and I promise to do is go back. I’d actually like to get a hold of her testimony and maybe have people in 

our office talk to her and then we can look at the specific cases that 

she raises. And we’d be glad to look at it in more detail. 

Mr. SMITH. So just to be clear, have any of our human rights investigators gone out and done any first-person reporting on this? 

Sec. POSNER. Well, I think you and others have said this is a 

phenomenon and the cases that have come to our attention we 

have gone to look to see if can we we can verify the facts. We 

haven’t been able to do that. But that doesn’t mean it’s not happening. 

So what I would suggest is let me take a look at the testimony 

that she gave to you. If there are particular cases and facts, we 

welcome getting them. And then we will—I will endeavor to make 

sure that either people in my office or people in the embassy follow 

up and they get to the bottom of what’s happening in those cases. 

Mr. SMITH. If you could, because her testimony was very, very incisive and outrageous, what she uncovered. I mean, she even went 

through how it’s often done, the befriending of Coptic girls by Muslim girls, that it’s a process and that it’s just—as well as straightup, flat-out abductions and all leading to the same consequence. 

Sec. POSNER. Right. The thing that would be most helpful to us 

is if there are particular cases with facts, et cetera, that we can 

then pursue rather than the general pattern. 

Mr. SMITH. Sure. But if we could also be looking to see on our 

own, you know, not just following up on one of her leads because 

it would seem to me that, you know, it’s like any other kind of 

abuse. Unless we’re really aggressively looking for it, it is so easy 

to conceal this. 
13 

And so I’d like to—before I yield to Commissioner Pitts, you 

know, Fred Grandy, a former distinguished member of the House 

of Representatives, is here. He’s executive vice president of the 

Center for Security Policy. I want to welcome our former colleague 

for joining us today. Thank you—thank him for his work on Egypt. 

I’d like to yield to Mr. Pitts. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Posner, thank 

you for your testimony. Do you have or could you provide a list of 

the actions such as meetings with advocacy groups, public statements, conversations with Egyptian officials or activities at the UN 

that this administration including the State Department has taken 

since January to support the rights of minorities in Egypt? And if 

this list is not available today, could you provide us as list in writing? 

Sec. POSNER. Sure. You know, there are—you just mentioned five 

or six categories of things and we’ve done—we’ve taken actions in 

all of those areas. I can certainly—I’m not sure I can present a 

comprehensive list but I can certainly send you a representative 

list of the kinds of discussions we’ve had with the government, the 

kinds of support and discussions we’ve had with civil society. 

I routinely meet with civil society groups when I’m in Egypt. It’s 

most of what I do, meet with the government as well as meet with 

groups here. So I’d be glad to provide some representative or illustrative examples of what we’re doing. We take these issues extremely seriously. 

This is an extremely important area to Secretary Clinton, and to 

me personally. And we’re very aware of the precarious state of the 

Coptic community. These attacks are very serious and we want to 

do whatever we can to put—you know, to make sure that this kind 

of violence and discrimination doesn’t continue. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. What actions has the State Department 

taken since the October 9 incident when the military directly attacked and killed Egyptian citizens? To press the Egyptian government for a transparent investigation and to press the Egyptian 

government to prosecute those who were actually responsible for 

the murders of citizens? 

Sec. POSNER. As I mentioned briefly in my oral comments, and 

I think there’s a bit more detail in the statement I submitted, both 

the president and Secretary Clinton have issued public statements 

about the attack. Ambassador Patterson has been engaged almost 

on a daily basis since October 9th in urging and reiterating the importance of there being a strong investigation and prosecution of 

those who are involved. We are very mindful of the potential for 

there to be an escalation of violence. 

This was a tragic incident where people were killed, many more 

injured. And so we have been very, very mindful of it. I’ve talked 

several times to Ambassador Patterson about it and she is completely aware of all the details. There have been discussions with 

the military, discussions with security forces, ministry of interior 

and the like. We will continue to press. 

As I said in the testimony, there are two investigations underway. Investigation doesn’t equal results. And so our focus now is 

making sure that the people who were involved in these violent 

acts are brought to justice, that there are prosecutions and convic-
14 

tions and that the government is clear in its public statement and 

its action that this kind of violence cannot be countenanced. 

Mr. PITTS. We all know that if there are no prosecutions in relation to these violent acts against minority groups—the Coptic 

Christians—then violence is going to continue. Do you know of any 

successful prosecutions against violent acts against Coptic Christians? 

Sec. POSNER. Yeah. And, you know, again I would come back first 

of all to the tragic attacks in Nag Hammadi in January of 2010. 

I was in Egypt literally two weeks after those people were gunned 

down. I met with the ministry—the head of state security. I met 

with people in the government to make just the point you’re making. 

There has to be a serious investigation that leads to prosecutions. One of the principal perpetrators was prosecuted and convicted. Two were acquitted, and as I mentioned in my testimony, 

yesterday the government—the court reopened the case against 

those two and they will be put on trial before a military court on 

December 19th. So that’s one example. 

There are several others. But we’re not satisfied that enough has 

been done. And certainly in the case of the October 9th violence, 

it’s critical that there be a full investigation and prosecution. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. What role should the United States play 

in promoting human rights and religious freedom specifically? The 

chairman asked about how much economic assistance was directed 

towards promoting human rights. What kind of things should we 

be doing specifically to promote these principles? 

Sec. POSNER. Well, I think in a broad sense all of the building 

blocks of democracy are information and we ought to do what we 

can to reinforce that development. There is a lively civil society in 

Egypt. But many of the organizations are not yet able to register. 

We’ve raised concerns about that. We need to be supportive of an 

independent media. 

We need to support bloggers and activists who continue to raise 

concerns that are among the issues we’re discussing today. So there 

are a range of things that I think we’ve begun to do and we need 

to stay on that course. We need to make sure that there is a move 

away from a government that relies on an emergency law, move 

more towards a civilian rule of law and we need to support a political process that allows multiple views by nonviolent people—parties—that respect religious freedom, freedom of speech, association 

and the rights of women. 

Mr. PITTS. Now, you mentioned earlier the importance of diversity. How could the authorities involve Islamic and Christian religious establishments in a strategy to strengthen this idea of diversity, of values, of religious tolerance and coexistence? 

Sec. POSNER. You know this is a process. I think we start from 

a premise—I start from a premise that for several decades institutions of government and nongovernmental institutions were ossified. They weren’t allowed to flourish and operate openly. 

And so when I say we’re in the beginning of a transition, we’re 

at a place where we can encourage but Egyptian people to have to 

lead in creating a more open discussion both about advancing pluralistic democratic political process but as part of that encouraging 
15 

diversity of views, diversity of religions, and a diversity of perspectives as part of that mix. 

We take these things for granted in a society where we’ve had 

a lot of experience dealing with it. We’re in, in Egypt, in a very 

early stage of a transitional process where all of these elements are 

still being set up, as it were. 

Mr. PITTS. What about training, for instance, for judges, for prosecutors, for police, teachers, whomever, those who are responsible 

for administering and applying the law about respecting these 

rights? 

Sec. POSNER. I think those are critical elements. And those are 

very much— 

Mr. PITTS. Are we engaged in encouraging that? 

Sec. POSNER. Absolutely. I mean, there are discussions going on 

now between our governments about how can we best support a 

transformation, transition in the police. We have—there’s a long 

history of the police playing a—state security playing roles that we 

would consider antithetical to the way in which we practice democracy. 

And so it’s important that there be a move towards professionalizing the police, professionalizing the courts, creating, as I say, 

strong civilian institutions that are the kind of foundation, the 

basis for a democracy. All of that’s on the table. We’re doing training already of some of the political parties, voter education and all 

of that. 

But democracy isn’t just elections. It’s also building those strong 

institutions—police, prosecutors, courts, the media. All of those institutions are part of what makes sustainable democracy real. And 

we’re very much engaged in the discussion of all those things. 

Again, I want to say again, though, we need to take our lead from 

people of Egypt. 

This is their moment of transition and it’s critical that Egyptians 

lead. We are more than willing—we’re eager to be a strong partner 

in those efforts. But we’ve got to come in in a way that reinforces 

what Egyptians themselves are demanding and pursuing. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. Now, I was a little surprised with your 

answer to the chairman about this barbaric practice of forced, you 

know, kidnapping and forced conversion, if you will, forced marriages and conversion of Coptic Christians. For, you know, 15 years 

I’ve talked to people in Egypt who said this is a common practice. 

Doesn’t the State Department—aren’t they aware of this? Aren’t 

they pursuing this issue? 

Sec. POSNER. As I said, Congressman, we are very aware of the 

discriminatory practices that make it very difficult, for example, for 

people to convert from Islam to Christianity. We are aware of the 

discrimination and some of the harassment of the Christian community. That’s what this hearing is about. On the subject of abductions— 

Mr. PITTS. And marriage—forced marriage. 

Sec. POSNER. And forced marriage—the broad allegations are out 

there. What we’re—what we need and what we’re looking for are 

specific cases that we can pursue. If we get those cases, we will 

pursue them ourselves and raise them with the government. 
16 

We know those allegations are out there but as of this moment 

they’re not specific cases where we’ve been able to substantiate 

what’s been alleged in a broad sense. I’m not saying it doesn’t happen. What I’m saying is the more information we get, I am very 

open—in fact eager—to get information about specific cases that we 

can then examine ourselves and take to the government of Egypt. 

Mr. SMITH. Would my friend yield? 

Mr. PITTS. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. My concern is that we’re not even looking and not 

looking—I mean, this isn’t something that’s going to walk up and 

say, here’s a forced marriage. 

Because of retaliation, because of the killing of the young woman 

or the fact that in many cases she feels that she cannot go back 

to her Coptic family and all the other reasons, this is something 

that very aggressively, if not and covertly probably, has to be 

looked at which is why human rights investigators—I mean, I 

would hope there would be no takeaway for the Egyptian government and somehow our government in saying it has not been substantiated. 

I believe that the evidence is compelling. It awaits further investigation. But we need to be, I think, as aggressive as all get out. 

I mean, you know, anyone who—any daughter, any young woman 

to be abducted and forced into what I really believe is sexual slavery and to lose her faith and her life and to be forcibly married 

through some level and degree of coercion is among the worst 

human rights abuses I can possibly think of. 

So I would hope the takeaway would be to deploy our Foreign 

Service or human rights officers and to do a major study on this, 

to initiate something that is—that leaves no stone unturned. And 

we need to bring this up in every possible forum with the SCAF 

and every other official in Egypt. 

Sec. POSNER. Congressman, we will—I share the concern. We 

will—I will make sure—I will redouble our efforts with our embassy to make sure they are pursuing this subject in the way that 

you suggest. It would also help us if there are particular cases that 

come to your attention. That makes it easier for us to pursue this 

in a more concrete way. 

Mr. PITTS. Yeah, I thank you for that. I know that is a desire. 

But you have to also keep in mind you don’t want to jeopardize the 

lives, the safety of the families, the women, you know, who are involved in this horrific practice. But thank you very much. We appreciate your willingness to look into that. 

Mr. SMITH. Commissioner Pitts, thank you very much. And I’d 

just like to ask one final question, Mr. Secretary. 

Sec. POSNER. Sure. 

Mr. SMITH. And in a way, we’ve talked about it but just to get 

your reaction to this statement by Dr. Michele Dunne from the 

Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East of the Atlantic Council. In 

her testimony, she’ll say, the SCAF approach has been almost identical to that of the Mubarak era. 

That is, after each sectarian incident the authorities promise to 

investigate and prosecute crimes vigorously and to address the underlying causes of the incident such as discriminatory laws regarding the building and the alteration of places of worship. But as 
17 

soon as public attention moves on, such efforts are either abandoned or long delayed, leaving the victims with a sense of injustice 

and the perpetrators with a sense of impunity, and sowing the 

seeds of further violence. 

In cases where military government or government officials are 

accused of complicity in violence or at least irresponsibility in dealing with it, the SCAF has staunchly resisted accountability. Is that 

a true statement or a false statement? 

Sec. POSNER. Well, I think I would answer that by saying we are 

now at a critical moment following the October 9th violence. And 

what I’ve said here and what I think this hearing has helped us 

amplify is the need, one, for accountability. There are two investigations going on. It’s important that you and we stay the course 

in monitoring the progress of those investigations. 

And the other piece is the government’s stronger commitment to 

adopt a unified law of construction of new religious sites, repairs, 

et cetera and to amend the penal code in a way that fights discrimination in a more particular way. I want to leave this hearing 

with a the sense that these are priorities for the United States. 

I think it’s great that you’ve had this hearing. It helps draw attention to these issues. And there should be no doubt in anybody’s 

mind that we are highly attentive to the need for accountability 

and for affirmative expressions by the government of their desire 

to end practices of discrimination. 

Mr. SMITH. We’re joined by Gus Bilirakis from Florida. Mr. Bilirakis, do you have any statements or comments you’d like to make? 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I do have a statement, if that’s all right? 

Mr. SMITH. Absolutely. 

HON. GUS BILIRAKIS (R–12), A MEMBER OF CONGRESS FROM 

THE STATE OF FLORIDA 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. But anyway, I’m sorry that I’m late. 

I commend, of course, Chairman Smith and Chairman McGovern 

for holding this very important hearing. I’ve been heartsick over recent tragic events that have taken place in Egypt against the Coptic Christians. It is devastating what is happening to them under 

the current military regime in Egypt. 

The United States should contemplate defunding the Egyptian 

military until they can guarantee the religious freedom of all minority faiths, specifically the Coptic Christians. Christians are 

dying or being displaced as we speak. Perpetuating religious freedom for all minority religions, and especially Christians, in the 

Middle East will continue to be a top priority of mine. 

I look forward to meeting with your brothers and sisters here in 

faith later this week and I have some constituents coming up, Mr. 

Speaker, as well. But we need to do everything we can on behalf 

of religious freedom throughout the world, particularly in the Middle East. Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate you being here. Thank 

you for your testimony. We’re having a little trouble with the 

microphone. I apologize. And then I’d like to introduce the next 

panel. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 
18 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. OK, I’d like to introduce the second panel. Welcome. First, we have Dina Guirguis—I hope I pronounced that correctly. She’s an Egyptian-American democracy activist and attorney and member of the Egyptian-American Rule of Law Association. 

Formerly, she was the Keston Family research fellow in The 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s Project Fikra. She 

founded and was editor of a near real-time Arabic English blog 

called Fikra Forum, connecting Arab activists with U.S. policymakers on issues of regional political reform. 

Prior to joining the institute, Ms. Guirguis was the executive director of Voices for Democratic Egypt. She holds a J.D. from Vanderbilt University Law School. Welcome. 

Next, we have Samuel Tadros. Samuel is a research fellow with 

the Center for Religious Freedom aT the Hudson Institute. Before 

joining Hudson in 2011, Mr. Tadros was a senior partner at the 

Egyptian Union of Liberal Youth, an organization that aims to 

spread the ideas of classical liberalism in Egypt. 

He previously interned at the American Enterprise Institute and 

worked as a consultant for both the Hudson Institute on moderate 

Islamic thinkers and the Heritage Foundation on religious freedom 

in Egypt. He holds a master’s degree from Georgetown University. 

Next, we have Michele Dunne. She is the director of the Atlantic 

Council Rafik—I don’t know if I’m pronouncing this right—but 

Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. Dr. Dunne has served in 

the White House on the National Security Council staff, on the 

State Department’s policy planning staff and its bureau of intelligence and research and was a diplomat in Cairo and Jerusalem. 

Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, she was a senior associate 

at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace where she 

edited the Arab Reform Bulletin and carried out research on Arab 

politics and U.S. policies. She holds a doctorate in Arabic language 

and linguistics from Georgetown University. Welcome. 

And now we’ll begin the testimony. Ms. Guirguis, you’re recognized for five minutes. Thank you. 

DINA GUIRGUIS, EGYPTIAN AMERICAN RULE OF LAW 

ASSOCIATION 

Ms. GUIRGUIS. Thank you. Good afternoon. Can you hear me? 

Can you hear me now? Great. Good afternoon and thank you to 

Chairman Smith for organizing this timely hearing. Thank you, 

Congressman Bilirakis. I’m especially pleased to have the opportunity to give testimony on Egypt’s not only continuing, but growing, sectarian problem. I would even characterize it as a crisis at 

this point. 

To begin with: If I die, take me to Tahrir. These were the last 

words uttered by Mina Daniel, a young man in Maspero who eventually succumbed to a sniper bullet that entered his chest and 

exited through his lower back on October 9th, which has come to 

be known as ‘‘Bloody Sunday.’’ Mina’s story is only the most recent 

example of the plight of Egypt’s Christians, a tragic manifestation 

of Egypt’s sectarian crisis, a matter in which I testified earlier this 

year in January. 
19 

At that time, I began my testimony by quoting 22-year-old Miriam Fekry, who had posted a New Year’s prayer for 2011 on her 

Facebook page, just hours before she was killed in a heinous attack 

on the Two Saints Church in Alexandria on New Year’s eve which 

left at least 21 people dead. 

Then, I stated that Miriam’s hopes, and ultimate fate, and now 

joining her, Mina Daniel’s, even after Egypt’s promising revolution, 

so tragically and poignantly illustrated the plight of the Coptic people, Egypt’s native Christians, who represent 10 to 15 percent of 

Egypt’s 83 million people. I stated that while the Copts are the 

Middle East’s largest Christian minority, they have faced an alarming escalation of violence as state protection has dwindled. 

I explained that for at least three decades, we, the Copts, have 

been offered an authoritarian compact of sorts. The Copts, as all 

Egyptians, were to live under a draconian emergency law suspending basic constitutional protections, in exchange for the delivery of stability and protection from terrorism. 

In those three decades, however, Egypt failed to make adequate 

progress on key developmental indicators, and Egypt’s human 

rights record fared no better. Egypt’s record on religious freedom 

went from bad to worse, placing it on the U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom’s watch list since 2002. 

After Egypt’s revolution, the Commission recommended, for the 

first time, the further downgrade of Egypt’s status, designating 

Egypt as a, quote, ‘‘country of particular concern,’’ or, for the CPC, 

quote, ‘‘engaging in and tolerating egregious violations of freedom 

of religion or belief.’’ 

While religious freedom conditions in Egypt had been deteriorating during the last years of the Mubarak regime, the Commission stated, ‘‘since Mubarak’s ouster on February 11th, conditions 

have further deteriorated,’’ end quote. In the Commission’s view, 

this deterioration has warranted Egypt’s ranking alongside China, 

Iran and Afghanistan. 

I last testified on Egypt’s sectarian problem on January 20th, 

only five days before the Egyptian revolution broke out. Back then, 

I described the authoritarian pact offered by the Mubarak regime 

as an illusory Faustian bargain. I argued the real answer to 

Egypt’s sectarian crisis is progress toward a democratic state that 

respects human rights, applies the rule of law and extends equal 

constitutional protections to all citizens. 

I also noted that the Egyptian regime will avoid doing so at all 

costs. But we soon learned that Egyptians’ frustration with decades 

of tyranny could not be indefinitely contained, and on January 

25th, Egyptians of all stripes took to the streets to demonstrate 

precisely that. 

Somewhat cautiously, Christians regarded the revolution as a potential turning point and joined their fellow Muslim citizens in demanding fundamental change which they hoped would entail a new 

Egypt based on principles of equal citizenship, rule of law and individual freedoms. Instead, Egypt’s current trajectory highlights not 

just substantial challenges to democratic transition, but the absence of political will from the current military regime to affect 

that transformation. 
20 

In the process, Egypt’s vulnerable groups, including the Copts, 

women and others, are more susceptible than ever to unprecedented violence and insecurity. In 2011 alone, Copts have been the 

target of 33 sectarian attacks, 12 of which involved an attack on 

a church. The combined casualties, even before the latest Maspero 

massacre, include 72 dead, as well as a substantial number of 

Christian homes, property and churches destroyed. 

With the Maspero massacre, the death toll rises to 97, and the 

number of those injured exceeds 400. Compared to 2010, these statistics represent more than a six-fold increase in Christian casualties in 2011. 

While some may blame the revolution for this serious escalation 

and praise the relative stability of the Mubarak days, I submit that 

the same societal ills, and more significantly the insidious state 

role in inciting sectarian violence, plague Egypt more than ever 

today. 

And that responsibility lies in no small measure squarely at the 

foot of the military dictatorship, represented by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, or SCAF, which has adopted the old authoritarian tactics while proclaiming itself, quote, ‘‘the revolutionary government.’’ 

For decades, the regime encouraged and capitalized on the 

growth of a culture of discrimination against religious minorities, 

and eventually sectarian crimes became crimes of impunity. We’ve 

already heard about that from Assistant Secretary Posner. Substituting the extension of the rule of law and equal protection, the 

state always insisted on, quote, ‘‘reconciliation sessions,’’ where victims and perpetrators were coerced into extrajudicial settlements 

by the state security apparatus. 

In March of 2011, after Mubarak’s ouster, when a Christian man 

had his ear severed by hardline Islamists known as Salafis in 

Upper Egypt, SCAF very powerfully conveyed the message of impunity by forcing the victim, that man, not to bring legal charges and 

failing to investigate or bring the perpetrators to justice. 

Perceiving the continuation of the status quo, this and similar incidents strengthened extremists’ convictions that not only would 

the state tolerate blatant persecution of Christians and minorities, 

but it would do so with a nod and wink for its own interests, much 

like the days of the Mubarak era. 

Capitalizing on an environment of police absence from Egyptian 

streets following the Egyptian revolution—a massive security failure on the interim government’s part which itself requires investigation and accountability—the Salafis—hardline Islamists—once 

again lashed out at Christians in May, when they accused the Coptic church of holding alleged Christian converts to Islam against 

their will. 

Incitement by the Salafis in a poor, crowded neighborhood of 

Cairo resulted in an all-out war between Muslims and Christians 

which lasted for hours, with absolutely no police or military intervention, leaving 12 dead and two churches burnt to the ground at 

the end of the day. 

The response of SCAF to the incident was to send in a Salafi 

preacher known as Mohamed Hassan to the neighborhood to pacify 

the situation. This preacher has long been known for his incite-
21 

ment against Christians and calls for their second-class citizenship. 

He is also the same man that was granted a podium and allowed 

by the military regime to preach from Tahrir Square in the weeks 

following Mubarak’s ouster, where he was given free rein to express hate speech. 

I refer you specifically to this example because I think Chairman 

Smith had asked Assistant Secretary Posner whether the government was in any way involved in provoking sectarian incidents. 

And these are some very minor examples and examples abound. 

While the churches were rebuilt, no one was held to account for 

the day’s heinous violence, and when interviewed about this in the 

independent media, SCAF General Hassan El-Reweiny stated that 

it was, quote, ‘‘preposterous’’ to demand further action on the matter, including an investigation and arrests, since the churches 

were, after all, rebuilt. 

Once again, taking their cue from the SCAF’s Mubaracist treatment of Egypt’s vicious sectarianism, extremist Muslim youths in 

an Upper Egyptian town called Edfu took it upon themselves in 

September to destroy a church because it allegedly lacked the necessary permits, even though the church was an ancient one and 

had been operating for years. Rather than hold the youth to account, the region’s governor praised them. 

SCAF subsequently refused an independent commission’s recommendation that the governor be removed. With these successive 

tragedies in mind and years of societal intolerance, institutionalized discrimination and state complicity and incitement continuing 

with the SCAF’s blessing, Christians took peacefully to the streets 

on October 9th, as they had alongside other Egyptians during the 

18-day uprising, to protest the military regime’s denial of basic civil 

liberties. 

Muslim activists and sympathizers joined them in their call. 

They were, as we all know now, met with disproportional violence, 

culminating in live shootings and the crushing of unarmed civilians 

by armored personnel carriers, or APCs. 

Meanwhile, the corpses of civilians, most of whom were Christian, were being taken to hospitals, while Egyptian state television 

misrepresented the facts, stating that, quote, ‘‘Coptic gangs,’’ had 

killed three soldiers and were attacking the military in a manner, 

quote, ‘‘not even the Israelis would dare,’’ end quote, even going so 

far as to exhort, quote, ‘‘honorable Egyptians’’ to come to the defense of their military against these elements. 

This incitement directly led to vigilante acts—this incitement directly led to vigilante acts of sectarian violence in Cairo’s streets, 

where some Muslims sought out Christians—sought out and targeted Christians for retribution and beatings or worse. 

Unsurprisingly but no less tragically, the SCAF’s ensuing press 

conference addressing the tragedy blamed the victims and exhorted 

Egyptians to, quote, ‘‘put themselves in the place of the soldier 

driving the armored—the armored carrier, who was understandably confused and panicked.’’ 

Adding insult to injury, the SCAF praised the role of Egyptian 

state TV and when asked about the names of the alleged military 

casualties, refused to release them for, quote, ‘‘security reasons.’’ 

Again, when we’re talking about provocation of the state, this is a 
22 

very, very blatant example. Egypt state TV does not act independently of the government. 

Thus, in the aftermath of the revolution, the state itself has continued institutionalized discrimination and encouraged the growth 

of a culture of sectarianism and impunity to act on that sectarianism. During the last days of the Mubarak era, a Cairo-based 

human rights organization had described Egypt as a, quote, ‘‘police 

state infused increasingly with theocratic elements.’’ 

I would submit that if you substitute the words ‘‘police state’’ 

with ‘‘military state,’’ this would be an accurate description of the 

state of things today. The military regime continues to count on divide and conquer tactics to consolidate its power. 

It continues to scapegoat the Copts to defect from its own governance failures. It continues to sow instability and simultaneously 

present itself as the sole solution to that instability, justifying 

along the way the continuation or institution of new repressive 

practices and laws. 

One need only give a cursory look at SCAF’s history since its assumption of power. As the chairman quoted, over 12,000 civilians 

have been tried in military tribunals that do not meet minimum 

standards of due process. 

Female protesters have been subjected to degrading virginity 

tests. The notorious emergency law which Egyptians were ruled by 

for three decades and were looking forward its removal, as soon as 

Mubarak left, was extended and numerous laws restricting freedom 

of assembly and even criminalizing criticism of the military have 

been opaquely passed and enforced in draconian fashion. 

Local rights groups are already decrying these abuses and more, 

including the SCAF’s pre-election conduct which observers accurately note portends substantial fraud in upcoming elections where 

Islamists are expected to win a substantial parliamentary presence. 

This parliament, according to the SCAF’s transition plan, will be 

responsible for the drafting of Egypt’s new constitution, raising 

doubts about whether such a document will embody the aspirations 

of Egyptians, as expressed through their revolution, which rejected 

notions of both autocracy and theocracy but rather expressed a desire for a civil, meaning nonmilitary and nonreligious, state. 

Attempts by the SCAF to issue, quote, ‘‘guiding principles’’ for 

the constitution are little comfort. While the U.S. government may 

be banking on SCAF to turn Egypt into a pre-Erdogan Turkish 

model, what is actually unfolding is more analogous to models such 

as the Pakistani one, entailing greater collusion between military 

authorities and Islamists at the expense of all other political forces. 

This is clearly a dangerous situation. 

Avoiding this outcome requires that the U.S. not fall into the 

trap it previously did with Mubarak, placing as it did all its bets 

on the authoritarian partner and a police state, which is what we 

have today. 

This means that the U.S. must insist that its support during and 

for Egypt’s transition be contingent on a prompt and genuine 

democratic transition to a civilian authority which represents the 

aspirations of all Egyptians and guarantees the equal rights of all, 

starting with the immediate cessation of sectarian incitement and 

elimination of all forms of discrimination. 
23 

And including, but not limited to, immediate security sector reform entailing the prompt return of police to the streets, the conduct of free and fair and monitored elections, an inclusive and 

transparent constitutional drafting process, the elimination of laws 

that repress basic rights and the expansion of the political space 

to allow a greater role for civil society, nonreligious political parties 

and ultimately a free civilian presidential race which represents a 

true handoff of power from the military. 

Egypt’s civilian president must then go about undoing decades of 

the disease of pernicious sectarianism which has infiltrated society 

through undertaking substantial legal, institutional, educational 

and media reform, all vast tasks which only a person entrusted and 

vested with the faith of Egyptians and the interests of Egypt, and 

not the interests of a few privileged generals, could assume. 

We owe it to those who sacrificed to herald a new era of freedom 

in the Middle East. We owe it to a young Mina Daniel, who while 

anticipating being killed by Mubarak’s police forces while camped 

out in Tahrir Square during Egypt’s courageous 18-day uprising, 

survived then, only to be massacred a few months later at the 

hands of Mubarak’s successors, who represent more of the same. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Guirguis, thank you very much for your very 

powerful testimony and for previous testimonies you’ve provided to 

this Commission. I’d like to yield to Mr. Aderholt, distinguished 

member of this Commission, for any comments he might have. 

HON. ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION 

ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. I came in late so I apologize for my 

tardiness. But the—you know, the SCAF is certainly disconcerting 

about a lot of the reports that we’ve heard. But I guess my question would be just, in your opinion do you think that they have deliberately provoked confrontation with Coptic Christians, basically 

going back to that date of October 9th? 

Ms. GUIRGUIS. This question is directed at me, I assume? OK, 

just didn’t—the specific events in terms of who started shooting 

when and where are still being parsed out. And I suspect that will 

remain unclear for some time given that the military has undertaken to investigate itself whereas it is the accused party in all of 

this, which truly undermines the independence of any such investigation. 

What is clear, however, is one thing, which is the incitement of 

the state or official TV on that day. I, as most Egyptians living 

abroad, was glued to Egyptian TV on that day and following the 

independent media as well. And the vast differences in reporting 

were quite stunning. As I stated before, official Egyptian TV can 

never act independently, would certainly never release numbers of 

military causalities and actually name an aggressor party without 

direct orders from the SCAF. 

In fact, after the incident when there was a lot of criticism regarding the conduct of the official media in covering the massacre, 

a group of anchors that were working for official TV resigned in 

protest. And they explicitly in their statement stated that they had 
24 

received explicit orders from the SCAF in terms of what to report 

and how to report that incident. 

And as I mentioned, the reporting led to direct violence. And as 

a lawyer, I can tell you that this rises to the level of criminal incitement, which is—should be punishable by law. So clearly in that 

instance, the instance of the incitement of the official media, the 

SCAF can be the only responsible party. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. OK, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And 

I may have some more questions after the rest of the testimony. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Aderholt, thank you so very much. I’d like to now 

recognize for purposes of receiving his testimony, Samuel Tadros, 

research fellow, Hudson Institute Center for Religious Freedom. 

Please proceed as you would like. 

SAMUEL TADROS, RESEARCH FELLOW, CENTER FOR 

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, HUDSON INSTITUTE 

Mr. TADROS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

this timely and important hearing and for inviting me to testify 

today on the plight of Egypt’s Christians and what it signifies for 

the prospects of a democratic transition in Egypt. 

The title of today’s hearing suggests a correlation and a linkage 

between religious freedom, or more precisely the lack thereof, and 

democracy and the prospects of a democratic Egypt. Unfortunately, 

for many policymakers, this linkage has been absent. The modern 

debasement of the concept of a free society to essentially mean the 

holding of elections has led to people ignoring the religious freedom 

as a foundation for a truly free society. 

The recent massacre of Copts while significant in terms of the 

number of people that were killed has to be viewed as part of an 

ongoing pattern that has taken its effect for many years. That pattern is a continuation of events and attacks that had been conducted during the Mubarak regime and before that and continued 

after the revolution. The three main parties that influence and 

take part in this pattern of discrimination are the Islamists, the 

Egyptian government and the general population. 

Instead of naming the specific incidents that my colleague has 

mentioned, I think it’s important to look at how those three elements work together to create this culture of intolerance and attacks on Christians. The first party in that regard, the Islamists, 

have conducted numerous attacks on Christians. We’ve seen a 

number of those attacks, most recently before the revolution, the 

Alexandria church bombing on New Year’s Eve. 

The state, for its part, has a number of very discriminatory laws 

against Christians, limiting the number of Christians in government service and putting restrictions on the building of churches. 

On the other hand, the government also participates in encouraging this culture through its impunity that it provides to the people conducting the attacks. The undersecretary mentioned the latest incident where someone was, for the first time, punished for 

one of those incidents in the Nag Hammadi attack. 

Unfortunately, this is the first time that such action is taken. 

We’ve seen a long number—a long list of attacks where no one has 
25 

ever been punished for them, creating the impression that attacking Christians was unpunishable and encouraged. 

The third element, and the most problematic for the future of 

Christians in Egypt, is the general intolerance amongst their Muslim countrymen. This increase in number of attacks by ordinary 

Muslims encouraged at certain moments by Islamists, whether the 

Salafis or others, or driven by their own feelings of—or their opinions about Copts, this number of attacks has been very problematic. 

If we can think that the government can be stopped or restrained 

by certain actions, that the U.S. can take or pressure applied, if we 

can think that the Islamists can be contained somehow, it is the 

fact of being attacked by one’s neighbors that is very problematic 

for the future of Christians in the Middle East. 

As Egyptians took to the streets in January and February, there 

were huge hopes that this was about to change. Powerful images 

of Christians and Muslims praying together and protesting together in Tahrir Square led to this belief that democracy would 

bring with it religious freedom. Unfortunately, reality has started 

to hit very soon. 

We’ve seen a continuation and an increase in—substantial increase in the number of attacks and the continuation of those patterns that we had witnessed before the revolution. The Islamists, 

now emboldened by the complete lack of control with the absence 

of the state security, have now started to take more drastic attacks 

against the Copts, whether in terms of attacks on specific Coptic 

churches or attacks generally in their TV channels on Copts and 

inciting people to act against them. 

The government, for its part, has not taken any action to stop 

this and has not punished anyone for those attacks. Again, as was 

mentioned, while the government—the Supreme Council of the 

Armed Forces—has built that one church that was burned in 

Otabia [ph] to the south of Cairo, they have not punished anyone 

for that specific attack. 

They have also not, until this moment, although the trial has 

been ongoing, offered any speedy trial for the people that have conducted the Imbaba attacks. As was mentioned also, they have continued to hold this pattern of reconciliation meetings whereby 

Christians and Muslims are expected to kiss each other and that 

would be the end of the affair. 

Those reconciliation councils have encouraged again this feeling 

that the local Muslim population can then put its demands on its 

Christian neighbors. The last element is that ongoing sectarian increase or the intolerance increase among the general Muslim population. We’ve seen a number of incidents where Christian girls are 

required to wear the hijab by government-appointed headmasters 

in schools. 

It was mentioned by the distinguished member before, during the 

opening remarks, the very disturbing incident of Ayman Nabil 

Labib, a 17-year-old kid—student in the school in Egypt, being 

killed by his very own colleagues and students in his classroom. 

The increased level of attacks by the ordinary Muslim population 

is the most alarming factor for the future. 
26 

Again, governments can be restrained and pressured. Islamists 

can be contained. This level of intolerance is the most drastic element in the whole process. Those—we also see a continuation in 

terms of the government arresting a number of Christians and 

holding them as a bargaining chip with the church leadership 

where the pope and the various bishops are pressured to agree to 

the government’s lack of action in exchange for getting their members out of the Egyptian jails. 

This pattern of arresting a number of Christians—we’ve seen it 

again with the Maspero incident, with around 25 Christians arrested and that remain in jail as we speak today. This level has— 

this increased level has raised the question for Christians, not 

whether Egypt that might be democratic in its future or might not, 

but whether Egypt will be a place for its Christian minority. 

Like their Jewish counterparts years ago, 60, 70 years ago, they 

are beginning to realize that their countries might be a place that 

is not welcoming for them anymore. Unfortunately, unlike the Jews 

who had a place to go to, these people do not. The facts of demography and geography pose limitations on any attempt to provide 

safe havens or any other such notions. 

The remaining prospect of immigration is problematic in and of 

itself. While we’ve seen waves of immigration before of Iraqi Christians and perhaps in the future Syrian ones, the numbers that are 

involved in Egypt are much larger. Simply put, neither the West 

nor anywhere in the region is a good place for 8 to 10 million refugees. 

This, again, creates the problem that while the richest elements 

of the Coptic community might be willing and capable of leaving 

the country, the poorest ones, the ones that face daily discrimination in their lives, will not find a place to go and will be living 

under this, what is becoming a very, very cold and long winter. 

For those that are concerned with Egypt’s future, it is also becoming very clear that elections will not provide a solution to religious freedom. I do not have a crystal ball but I am willing to predict that the Muslim Brotherhood will win a majority in the next 

Egyptian elections. This will change a culture of impunity into a 

culture of encouragement, whether by the Muslim Brotherhood or 

the more extremist Salafi groups. 

The prospects for the Christians in Egypt are becoming darker. 

Egypt remains a key ally and friend of the United States and cooperation between the two countries takes place on various issues, 

most importantly the military. 

However, the prospect of a democratic Egypt and one that is 

based on religious freedom is important to the U.S. national security and will have its effects on that cooperation with Egypt in the 

long-term. I have a number of policy recommendations or comments in that regard. I perhaps believe that might be better left 

to questions, or should I continue? 

Mr. SMITH. Sure. 

Mr. TADROS. The first element that we should understand is punishment for those that have conducted those attacks. There has 

been a good development in that regard last week with the military 

judges announcing for the first time that there are military per-
27 

sonnel that have been arrested and will be tried for the Maspero 

attack. 

This is the first time that the military actually acknowledges, 

even unofficially, that they did something wrong during that attack. An encouragement for that process to continue and for punishment to be provided for those responsible is something that the 

U.S. should work on. 

Secondly, we understand now that the Muslim Brotherhood will 

take a majority in the next parliament and the Christians will continue to be underrepresented. We must make sure that underrepresentation in terms of electoral votes does not result in underrepresentation in terms of the writing of the constitution. 

Making sure that the next Egyptian constitution will be one that 

protects religious freedom and provides equal citizenship for all of 

Egypt’s people is something that we need to definitely work on. 

Thirdly, while the wrong electoral timetable that the SCAF has 

suggested, provides us with an understanding that they will remain involved in running, ruling and governing the country. With 

the collapse of the police force, it is likely that the army will continue to provide basic law and order services in Egypt for some 

time in the future. 

The U.S. military has built a tremendous cooperation with the 

military and the U.S. military provides trainings for the Egyptian 

army on a variety of issues including trainings on basic law and 

order which the U.S. has perfected in conflict zones—in various 

conflict zones. This should be something that the U.S. can help the 

army deal with better. 

Fourthly, while the U.S. Department of State and USAID and 

MEPI have provided a variety of funding to strengthen democracy 

in Egypt, there have been very disturbing reports of a lot of this 

money, or at least some, going to Islamist parties whose commitment to religious freedom is, to say the least, questionable. 

Making sure that religious freedom is one of the key elements 

whereby those seeking help, those groups and parties seeking help 

are recognized and judged upon is an important step. 

Lastly, this money is being provided in order to strengthen various groups looking for having a sounder or voice in their country’s 

future. As a minority, the Copts are facing numerous challenging— 

challenges in organizing themselves. 

Whether any of that money provided by State goes specifically to 

minority groups to help them, like other Egyptians, to organize 

themselves and bring their voices to building their country’s future 

is something that needs to be looked into. Again, thank you very 

much for organizing this session and inviting me to testify. Thank 

you. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Tadros, thank you very much for your testimony, 

for your incisive analysis of the current, near-term and long-term 

situation and your policy recommendations, which will be most 

helpful going forward. Dr. Dunne, if you would proceed? 

DR. MICHELE DUNNE, DIRECTOR, RAFIK HARIRI CENTER FOR 

THE MIDDLE EAST, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Dr. DUNNE. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, thank you 

for the honor of testifying before the Commission. As you noted in 
28 

your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, it is quite disappointing 

that the unity between Muslims and Christians that we saw in 

Tahrir Square just earlier this year has deteriorated and sectarian 

tensions have escalated dangerously in the intervening months. 

But the violence is not, unfortunately, particularly surprising because it’s expected in a post-revolutionary climate that the tensions 

and conflicts that were beneath the surface are going to emerge 

more openly. And these sectarian tensions—sectarian tensions have 

been present for decades. 

But it was noticeable for the last couple of years that they 

were—that they were rising and especially in the months leading 

up to the January revolution, the attack on the church in Alexandria at the beginning of January has been mentioned a number of 

times. And even leading up to that, there were a number of antiChristian riots, particularly by Salafi Muslim groups that have become much more active in Egypt in the last couple of years. 

And I would suggest that the increasing activity of these Salafi 

groups is one of the reasons why we have seen these kind of tensions and anti-Christian violence on the rise. 

Now, these clear and disturbing trends that were apparent even 

before the revolution make it all the more difficult to understand 

why the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the SCAF, that was 

entrusted by Egyptians with the authority upon the forced resignation for former president Mubarak has failed to address sectarian 

violence in any effective manner. 

The SCAF’s approach has been almost identical to that of the 

Mubarak era; that is, after each sectarian incident, the authorities 

promise to investigate and prosecute crimes vigorously and to address the underlying causes of the incident such as discriminatory 

laws. 

But as soon as public attention moves on, such efforts are either 

abandoned or long delayed, leaving the victims with a sense of injustice and the perpetrators with a sense of impunity and sowing 

the seeds of further violence. 

As has already been noted during this hearing, the investigations 

of several serious incidents of large-scale anti-Christian violence 

leading to the deaths of almost a hundred people and the injuries 

of hundreds more are ongoing. And they might well be inconclusive 

if we look at what has happened in previous instances going back 

even to the al-Kush massacre a decade ago. 

What typically happens in these events is that the investigations 

are botched, either deliberately or through negligence, and there is 

very little, if any, effective prosecution after the fact. And in the 

case where military or government officials are—I’m sorry—accused of complicity or at least irresponsibility, and also today we’ve 

discussed this October 9th incident in Maspero extensively. 

The SCAF has staunchly resisted accountability. I would note 

that the SCAF’s seeming inability to carry out these investigations 

and prosecutions in an expeditious fashion contrast very much with 

their speed in prosecuting bloggers and others who are critical of 

the military. 

Also, I will skip through this but the transitional authority supervised by the SCAF also has been very slow to make the promised legal changes, especially these laws regarding the building and 
29 

renovation of places of worship which over and over again for years 

and decades now have been at the root at some of the sectarian 

tensions. 

Now, anti-Christian violence is one of several serious Egyptian 

issues that the SCAF has shown itself to be unwilling or unable to 

deal with. Others include rising crime, lack of needed police reforms and a deteriorating economy. As a military organization, the 

SCAF is not equipped to address such issues. And it shouldn’t be 

called upon to do so, particularly for a prolonged period. 

That’s why it’s essential that the SCAF agree to a clear, realistic 

timetable to turn over not only legislative but also executive authority to elected civilians. The problem right now is that the SCAF 

is trying to postpone the transfer of executive authority until it secures guarantees of its status post-elections. 

And the status the military is seeking is not simply a continuation of the extensive political influence and economic perquisites 

it enjoyed during the Mubarak era but actually more than that. 

The SCAF has sponsored a document of super-constitutional principles that would give it the implicit right to intervene in politics 

and the explicit right to overrule legislation as well as freedom 

from civilian supervision or budgetary oversight. 

What this would produce, as Ms. Guirguis noted, is a political 

system similar to that of Pakistan where elected civilian institutions are relatively powerless while unelected and unaccountable 

military and intelligence services actually run the country. 

And as we know from Pakistan as well as from Egypt’s own history and current situation, in that kind of a system, military and 

intelligence organizations often manipulate sectarian tensions and 

extremist tendencies within the country in order to serve narrow 

agendas. 

That would be a very unhappy outcome of the January 25th revolution for all Egyptians, including Egyptian Christians, and, I 

would also note, for the United States because the United States 

cannot escape partial responsibility for the actions of the SCAF due 

to the tens of billions of dollars in U.S. military assistance that it 

has provided over the decade and continues to provide now. 

The United States should stand unambiguously on the side of the 

development of a real democratic system in which the rights of all 

citizens, including the right to religious freedom, will be protected 

in a climate of free political competition and the rule of law. Only 

in the democratic system will difficult issues such as anti-Christian 

violence and discrimination be able to be addressed openly. This 

will not happen overnight. 

Building a strong Egyptian democracy will be a many-year 

project. But it would be a serious mistake to now create large new 

obstacles to real democratization by acquiescing to the expansion 

and formalization of military control out of fear that Islamists 

might gain a plurality or even a majority in the parliament which 

will be elected over the next few months. 

There are many uncertainties involved when freely elected civilian institutions have real power. But one thing we know for certain 

is that military rules—rulers will fail to protect all citizens and enforce laws without discrimination. Thank you very much. 
30 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Dunne, thank you as well for your excellent testimony. Let me just begin the questioning. You know, Mr. Tadros, 

you mentioned in your testimony that the growing number of 

threats is no surprise. The Copts are questioning whether or not 

there’s a future. 

And you said, isolated and ignored by the West, the Copts can 

only wonder today whether after 2,000 years the time has come for 

them to pack their belongings. If you could—and the other panelists—speak to the issue of being isolated and ignored by the West. 

Does that include the United States? 

Have we been—has there been a dereliction on our part, our duty 

to promote democracy and freedom there? Does that include the administration, the Obama administration, the U.S. House and Senate and the EU and others who at least in theory support democracy? I do believe that our intentions are right. But very often our 

intentions are not matched with deeds and with a seriousness 

about what the threat actually is. 

And your point that a ruler can be bought or constrained by 

international pressure but with the mob there are no constraints— 

we saw mob rule in history time and time again played out, and 

recently in the former Yugoslavia, where neighbor against neighbor 

committed unspeakable atrocities because—not just impunity but 

because a sense of hatred that was otherworldly took over. 

So I wonder if you might speak to that issue of being isolated 

and ignored by the West. How well are we doing? Are we being serious? 

Mr. TADROS. By isolated and ignored, I was referring to more of 

a historical story. The first is that Copts were historically isolated 

from Western Christendom by theological differences and were very 

skeptical about missionaries and what the West would offer them. 

The second is their experience under the British occupation was 

not a very pleasant one. 

Unlike the French and the Levant that favored religious minorities, the British in Egypt tried to undermine the Copts and exclude 

them from government service. Lord Cromer, the famous ruler of 

Egypt, was no friend to Copts and had very harsh opinions about 

them. 

This pattern of lack of a friend in the West as compared to the 

Maronite community in Lebanon, for example, has made the Copts 

very skeptical about any real offers of help or the willingness of 

any Western power to help them. 

As to the specific actions of the United States, as the statement 

from the president that he made after the Maspero attack, it’s a 

very disturbing statement to say the least. The attitude of equating 

both the victim and the victimizer and asking both sides to show 

restraint is, again, very troubling. One wonders how Copts should 

show restraint. Restraint from dying perhaps? One fails to understand the logic behind such actions. 

The president in his Cairo speech mentioned the Copts and the 

importance of their plight. But we have not seen any action in that 

regard. Again, the very distributing of reports from Islamist groups 

and parties getting money from the U.S. State Department, 

through its policy of not looking at parties’ ideologies but whether 
31 

they are committed to nonviolence is very disturbing and undermines the positions of the Copts in the country. 

So if I am to judge this administration in terms of its interest 

and actions, I would view it completely as a failure. Thank you. 

Ms. GUIRGUIS. Sir, I’d like to add to that. Just adding my voice, 

the statement indeed after the massacre from the White House was 

extremely disappointing. The very notion of equating victim with 

aggressor is an insult to unspeakable tragedy already. 

And I think that there has been a little too many U.S. concessions to the U.S.—to the Egyptian security solution for the Coptic 

problem which ruled the day during the Mubarak era and which 

continues. It is sort of this blackmailing relationship where as long 

as you stay out of our sensitive files, including our treatment of religious minorities, you will continue to gain our cooperation on 

strategic interests. 

And I think that that argument has held way too much sway for 

way too long. Egypt has its own interests in cooperating with the 

United States and they are compelling reasons. And there is no 

reason to think that Egypt will run to China tomorrow and turn 

away from the United States. 

One other comment that I have to make, major disappointment— 

SCAF delegations have been coming on a routine basis since February to visit Washington. They make their rounds in the Pentagon, on the Hill, at the White House. Only days after the latest 

Maspero massacre, there was a new SCAF delegation that came in 

town, mostly actually to protest the attempts at conditioning foreign assistance that the House and the Senate were attempting to 

undertake. 

Well, who was assisting them in their lobbying efforts? Well, it’s 

very disappointing for us to discover that CENTCOM was a part 

of that lobbying team. I myself have spoken to Pentagon officials 

in the aftermath of the Maspero massacre and the statements that 

I heard were incredibly disappointing. 

I heard and was told directly that the military acted with restraint, that they were actually pleased that the outcome, you 

know, was as it was, that it could have been much worse and so 

certainly the military-to-military relationship I think is really 

skewing what the larger perspective on all of this should be and 

what this entails for U.S. longer term strategic interests, not just 

in cooperating with Egypt but in the region as a whole. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Dunne? 

Dr. DUNNE. I agree that there has been a tendency on the side 

of the U.S. administration to accept the SCAF’s—the SCAF’s narrative which is that, you know, we’re just simple military men, 

we’re doing our best, it’s a difficult situation. And remember, it’s 

us or the Islamists. That’s your choice. 

And that of course is the—you know, is right out of the old Mubarak playbook. I think though that the actions of the SCAF recently in, this October 9th Maspero incident and their absolute failure to accept accountability for that, the super-constitutional document that I mentioned, the harassment and persecution of nongovernmental organizations, especially those receiving assistance 

from the United States, have really begun to make people here 
32 

wake up a little bit as to what the SCAF’s real intentions might 

be. 

So I hope we will not continue to fall victim to this, you know, 

binary choice. It’s either authoritarianism with all the ugliness that 

comes with that or Islamism. 

Mr. SMITH. In questioning Michael Posner, the assistant secretary for democracy, human rights and labor, I asked him a series 

of questions about Michele Clark’s testimony at our previous hearing. 

And he did indicate that he would take it back and hopefully 

robustly and very aggressively get the department to investigate 

forced marriages of Coptic Christian women and obviously the abductions that precede the forced marriage. Were you satisfied with 

his answers? Any of you—any of you want to comment on that? 

Mr. TADROS. On the specific issue, it’s disturbing that those allegations have been there for a number of years. They’ve been reported without comments in the various State Department-issued 

religious freedom reports. So it’s a bit surprising that if those have 

been there why didn’t anyone investigate them before. 

The more disturbing elements perhaps in the narrative that is 

accepted from SCAF is this issue that the military and the Egyptian government will pass a new law governing the houses of worship. I’m not sure if people at State have read that law or not. But 

I have, and it in no way supports religious freedom. The law requires that an area of a minimum of 500 meters be available between any other religious building or mosque. 

I don’t know if anyone has visited Cairo, but I doubt there is any 

500 meters between any two mosques in Cairo. So the idea that 

this law will somehow help Christians, make it easier for them to 

build churches, is debatable to say in the least. 

Mr. SMITH. Any other witnesses like to respond? 

Ms. GUIRGUIS. No, I just—I do agree with that. I don’t think it’s 

a solution at all. I think the bottom line is that there continues to 

exist no political will to address the root causes of this problem. 

I think if the sectarian problem of Egypt—I think the solutions 

are there. everybody knows them. We’ve been talking about them 

and offering them for years now. They’ve been on the books collecting dust in the Egyptian parliament for years now. 

But I think if you deprive any authoritarian government of that 

card, of the card to manipulate society in that way, to be able to 

use the divide-and-conquer card, to be able to sow instability and 

create these explosive events and justify their own existence, I 

think they would be gone. 

And that’s the most powerful—in my view, one of the most powerful sorts of evidentiary proofs there is of the intentions of the 

SCAF and what the SCAF actually represents. 

Mr. SMITH. Other—yes, Dr. Dunne? 

Dr. DUNNE. I have not seen Ms. Clark’s testimony and I don’t 

know anything about the specific cases that she raised there. I 

would say that having looked into some of these cases in the past— 

and I would say this is sometime in the past. This is, you know, 

10 years ago or so when I was at the U.S. embassy in Cairo. 

What I found in some of these cases where I was able to find out 

what happened was that a member of one religious community had 
33 

eloped with a member of another religious community. And this 

gets to the problem that religious conversion and intermarriage are 

completely unacceptable. And I believe they’re unacceptable to both 

communities, to both the Muslim and the Christian communities in 

Egypt. It is true that certainly Egyptian law discriminates in favor 

of the Muslim in this case, that conversion to Islam is permitted 

and from Islam not so much. 

But I would say on the level of society, there is a deep issue here 

and Dina was just alluding to it, that somehow cannot be addressed openly in a situation in which you have authoritarian governments that are manipulating these tensions for political advantage. 

Mr. SMITH. Is there anything else any of you would like to add 

before we conclude this hearing? 

Mr. TADROS. If I can add, going back to the assistant secretary’s 

statement where he writes on page six: I want to make clear that 

most of these clashes have involved both Copts and Muslims and 

members of both communities have been the perpetrators and victims of the violence. 

I’m not sure if State Department has seen any evidence of Copts 

attacking Muslims. At least I am not aware of any such incident. 

So it’s a very interesting statement to put, to say the least. 

Mr. SMITH. Anything further? Thank you so much for your testimony. This will be part of an ongoing series of hearings I’ve 

planned in my subcommittee. It’s called ‘‘Africa, Global Health, 

Global Human Rights,’’ sometime in probably January or February 

to hold another hearing. And it’s my understanding that the Lantos 

Commission for human rights might be planning one as well. While 

I don’t chair it, Frank Wolf does. I am a member of that and certainly will be at it. 

And I think now more than ever we need to bring maximum 

scrutiny and I hope for some very wise interventions on the part 

of the U.S. government and our European Union friends and everyone else who is concerned about religious persecution as well as democracy and good governance because there is a window of opportunity, it seems to me, and a window that is closing so fast and 

things, as you pointed out, Mr. Tadros, that could get—you know, 

it won’t just be impunity. 

It will be—it’ll encourage mob action. And in some cases, they 

may already be there. So I—and for the record, when a delegation 

from Egypt came through and visited members of the House foreign affairs committee, I did join in meeting with them and had 

with me a catalog of human rights abuses directed against Coptic 

Christians for which I got—you know, that’s been fixed and that’s 

OK, we’re working on that, always some kind of that’s always in 

the past. 

And I certainly was not convinced. And so I hope the wool is not 

being pulled over the eyes of the Congress or the administration. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. [Applause.] 

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(35) 

A P P E N D I X 
36 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Good afternoon and welcome to this, our second Helsinki Commission hearing on 

the volatile and dangerous situation facing the Coptic Christians in Egypt following 

the Arab Spring. 

The world watched with great hope and anticipation as events unfolded in Tahrir 

Square earlier this year. We saw Christians standing guard over Muslims during 

Friday prayers in the middle of the square. We saw Muslims standing guard over 

Christians as they celebrated mass in Tahrir. 

While I believe that many of those who came together to forge the revolution want 

to continue that solidarity as they support Egypt’s political transition, sadly, there 

are those who do not. Indeed, the transition period has seen increasing violence 

against Coptic Christians. The current Egyptian government, controlled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), has not adequately responded to this 

violence, and as we have seen on video, has perpetrated violence against Coptic 

protestors. 

On Sunday, October 9, 2011, twenty-seven people were killed and more than 300 

injured in Maspero when the Egyptian military attacked a peaceful group of Coptic 

Christians protesting the burning of a church in Aswan. The protesters were also 

demanding the removal of the governor of Aswan, who had justified the mob’s destruction of the church by saying that it had been built without a permit. 

In what has been deemed the ‘‘Massacre at Maspero,’’ witnesses say the army 

fired on the demonstrators with live ammunition and plowed into the crowd with 

armored vehicles. Military officers raided and stopped the live broadcast of two independent news channels that had been covering the clashes. At the same time, Staterun television and radio reported that the Coptic demonstrators had attacked the 

military and called for ‘‘honorable citizens’’ to ‘‘defend the army against attack’’-inciting violence against the Coptic minority. 

Amid widespread domestic and international outrage over the events, the White 

House issued a statement on October 10 saying that: ‘‘The president is deeply concerned about the violence in Egypt that has led to a tragic loss of life . . . . Now 

is the time for restraint on all sides so that Egyptians can move forward together 

to forge a strong and united Egypt.’’ 

With all due respect, the President seems to have completely missed the point. 

This is not a situation of equal power and equal responsibility for violence. This was 

not a lawless gang clash on the street, or a mob marauding the streets in the absence of a government. The Coptic community was protesting the fact that the 

Egyptian government in Aswan failed to protect Coptic property and allowed a mob 

to burn down the Coptic place of worship. 

When Copts called on the military government to treat the Copts as equal citizens 

and protect their rights, the government itself turned on them with a massacre. 

How is this government any different from the Mubarak thug regime? Had this 

occurred under Mubarak, we would have called for his removal. 

This same government is investigating itself for the incident. And the assault on 

human rights continues. 

In fact, the military has arrested at least 28 people—mostly Copts—in connection 

with the clashes, including prominent blogger Alaa Abdel Fattah. These individuals 

are being hauled before military prosecutors. 

To date, despite multiple videos and eyewitness accounts showing the military’s 

use of lethal violence against peaceful protestors, the Egyptian military has yet to 

take responsibility for its actions, or otherwise demonstrate that it will protect all 

Egyptians, including the Coptic minority that make up more than 10% of its population. 

According to press reports last week, a member of a government-backed fact-finding committee said that the Egyptian army did not use live ammunition to disperse 

protestors during the October 9 incident. 

However, Hafez Abu Saeda, a senior figure in the government-sponsored National 

Council for Human Rights which set up the committee, also said that an independent investigation was needed to establish the full facts and that some state institutions, including the army, did not cooperate fully with the committee. Rights 
37 

activists, including the Arab Network for Human Rights Information and Human 

Rights Watch, have criticized the report for a lack of detail. 

Tragically, the Massacre at Maspero is not an isolated incident, but rather a continuation of the endemic discrimination against, and marginalization of, Coptic 

Christians in Egypt. 

According to the 2010 State Department International Religious Freedom Report 

for Egypt: 

‘‘The status of respect for religious freedom by the government remained poor, unchanged from the previous year. Christians and members of the Baha’i Faith, which 

the government does not recognize, face personal and collective discrimination, especially in government employment and their ability to build, renovate, and repair 

places of worship. The government failed to prosecute perpetrators of violence 

against Coptic Christians and again failed to redress laws—particularly laws relating to church construction and renovation—and governmental practices, especially 

government hiring that discriminates against Christians, effectively allowing their 

discriminatory effects and their modeling effect on society to become further entrenched.’’ 

The US Commission on International Religious Freedom notes that, ‘‘In response 

to sectarian violence, Egyptian authorities typically conduct ‘reconciliation’ sessions 

between Muslims and Christians as a means of resolving disputes. In some cases, 

authorities compel victims to abandon their claims to legal remedy. The failure to 

prosecute perpetrators fosters a climate of impunity.’’ 

A report by the Egyptian Initiative for Human Rights (EIPR) covering the period 

from January 2008 to January 2010 documented 53 incidents of sectarian violenceabout two incidents per month—that took place in 17 of Egypt’s 29 governorates. 

Most of the attacks were by Muslims on Christians and Christian churches or property. 

Egypt will not reach its democratic goals through the oppression of its minority 

peoples; democracy does not come with an iron fist. Rather, democracy springs from 

the belief that all people are created equal and have the right to participate in their 

governance. A legitimate government is of the people, by the people, and for the people-including minorities. A legitimate government submits to the rule of law. 

The Egyptians demonstrated this belief in Tahrir Square, but seem to be losing 

their way-spinning backward into tyrannical abuses of power. 

If there is any hope for a democratic and peaceful Egypt, the Copts must be allowed to contribute actively to Egyptian society and to the transformation of their 

country without fearing for their lives. 

In order to further discuss this critical juncture in Egypt’s history, we have with 

us today a distinguished panel of witnesses who will help us more fully understand 

the plight of the Coptic Christians and what their status portends for peaceful and 

democratic political transition in Egypt. 

Michael Posner has served as Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and labor since September 2009. Prior to joining the State 

Department, Mr. Posner was the Executive Director and the President of Human 

Rights First. He played a key role in proposing and campaigning for the first U.S. 

law providing for political asylum, which became part of the Refugee Act of 1980. 

Mr. Posner also has been a prominent voice in support of fair, decent, and humane 

working conditions in factories throughout the global supply chain. Before joining 

Human Rights First, Mr. Posner was a lawyer in private practice in Chicago and 

also lectured at Yale Law School and at Columbia University Law School. He holds 

a J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley Law School and a B.A. with distinction and honors in history from the University of Michigan. 

Dina Guirguis is an Egyptian American democracy activist and attorney and 

member of the Egyptian American Rule of Law Association (EARLA). Formerly, she 

was the Keston family research fellow in The Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy’s Project Fikra. She founded and was editor of a near real time ArabicEnglish blog called Fikra Forum connecting Arab activists with U.S. policymakers 

on issues of regional political reform. Prior to joining the Institute, Ms. Guirguis 

was the executive director of Voices for a Democratic Egypt. She has been active 

in the struggle for democracy and human rights in Egypt beginning with her work 

at the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in Cairo, where she remained 

until the center’s closure by the Egyptian government in 2000. In the United States, 

Ms. Guirguis has practiced criminal and corporate law. She holds a J.D. from Vanderbilt University Law School and a B.A. from Wellesley College. 

Samuel Tadros is a Research Fellow with the Center for Religious Freedom a the 

Hudson Institute. Before joining Hudson in 2011, Mr. Tadros was a Senior Partner 

at the Egyptian Union of Liberal Youth, and organization that aims to spread the 

ideas of classical liberalism in Egypt. He previously interned at the American enter-
38 

prise Institute and worked as a consultant for both the Hudson Institute on Moderate Islamic Thinkers and the Heritage Foundation on Religious Freedom in Egypt. 

In 2007 Mr. Tadros was chosen by the state Department in its first Leaders for Democracy Fellowship Program in collaboration with Syracuse University’s Maxwell 

School. He holds an M.A. from Georgetown University and a BA from the American 

University in Cairo. 

Dr. Michele Dunne is Director of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for 

the Middle East. Dr. Dunne has served in the White House on the National Security 

Council staff, on the State Department’s Policy Planning staff and in its Bureau of 

Intelligence and Research, and as a diplomat in Cairo and Jerusalem. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, she was a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, where she edited the Arab Reform Bulletin and carried out research on Arab politics and U.S. policies. She holds a doctorate in Arabic language 

and linguistics from Georgetown University, where she has served as a visiting professor of Arab Studies. She co-chairs the Working Group on Egypt, a bipartisan 

group of experts established in February 2010 to mobilize U.S. government attention to the forces of change in that country. 
39 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION

ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

I thank Chairman Smith for holding this important and timely hearing. As the 

exhilarating events of the Arab Spring move forward into the reality of day to day 

transitional governance, election planning and the challenges of creating 

participatory democracy, the principles that sparked the revolutions must not be forgotten. Respect for the rights of minorities and women, free speech and freedom of 

assembly are critical building blocks for open and accountable governance. 

We condemn the violence perpetrated on Coptic Christians during their peaceful 

march to Maspero last month. This was certainly not the first time Copts have experienced violence. The past year has seen increased attacks on Coptic churches, 

homes and businesses, and the people in them. The brutality of the October 9 attacks by the Egyptian army—the supposed ‘‘protectors of the revolution’’—is an outrage. Even more outrageous, and dangerous in my view, is the army’s denial that 

they were involved in the killing spree and the current government’s refusal to conduct an independent and transparent investigation of the events. 

I understand that most of the people who have been arrested thus far in connection with October 9 are Copts and that all will be brought before military courts. 

According to yesterday’s Washington Post, Egypt’s military has ordered that Alaa 

Abdel-Fattah, a well known blogger and leader from Tahrir Square, be held in custody for another fifteen days. Abdel-Fattah was arrested on October 30 after he refused to answer questions about his alleged role in the October 9 events. He has 

not been charged, denies the allegations against him, and refuses to speak with 

military prosecutors because he insists they should have no role in trying civilians. 

More than 12,000 Egyptians have been brought before military tribunals this year— 

evidence of the dangers of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’ (SCAF) continuation of the decades old emergency law. 

Another dark cloud on the horizon of Egypt’s political transition is the SCAF’s increasing attacks on Egyptian civil society. The government has promoted stories in 

the state-run media accusing Egyptian NGOs of working on behalf of ‘‘foreign agendas’’ and began investigating them. The government’s report on the investigation, 

published in September, declared 39 NGOs to be ‘‘illegal,’’ including many of Egypt’s 

oldest and most respected human rights organizations such as the Cairo Institute 

for Human Rights Studies, the El-Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of 

Torture, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, and the Hisham Mubarak Law 

Center. 

Substantial public doubt has emerged regarding the capacity of the SCAF to appropriately manage the political transition following the January 2011 revolution. 

The first elections of the post-Mubarak Egypt are scheduled for November 28. The 

military’s brutal attack on Coptic Christians last month, its broadening imposition 

and extension of the emergency law, and attacks on Egyptian civil society challenges 

the notion that the SCAF is incorporating the diverse expectations of the Egyptian 

people. Egypt is a Mediterranean partner for Cooperation in the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and is expected to aspire toward OSCE 

norms. 

In her recent keynote address at the National Democratic Institute’s 2011 Democracy Awards Dinner, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton remarked. ‘‘If-over 

time-the most powerful political force in Egypt remains a roomful of unelected officials, they will have planted the seeds for future unrest, and Egyptians will have 

missed a historic opportunity.’’ 

We stand in solidarity with the international community and the Egyptian people 

as we urge a return to the principles of tolerance and pluralism that inspired the 

movement in Tahrir square. The future of Egypt rests with a political transition 

that respects the fundamental freedoms and the rights of all Egyptians. 

I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses. 
40 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL POSNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, 

BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting this important hearing on the situation 

faced by Coptic Christian community in Egypt, and for inviting me to testify. 

As you know, this is a time of substantial transition in Egypt as Egyptians strive 

to move their country towards democracy. This is not an easy process and it will 

not happen overnight. Egypt is only starting on a path from the temporary stewardship of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), through parliamentary 

elections that will begin in two weeks, then the process of drafting of a new constitution and finally presidential elections. As they move toward these milestones, 

millions of Egyptians hope to see the emergence of a democratic civilian government 

that respects the universal rights of all of its citizens. 

As part of this vision, it is vital that there be a place in the new Egypt for all 

citizens, including all religious minorities, of which the Coptic Christian community 

is the largest. President Obama and Secretary Clinton have made clear their deep 

concern about violence against Coptic Christians, most recently during the October 

9 tragedy in front of the Egyptian radio and television building in the Maspiro area 

of Cairo. At least 25 people died and more than 300 were injured. We have urged 

the Egyptian government to investigate this violence, including allegations that the 

military and police used excessive force that was the cause of most of the demonstrator deaths. We also have urged that those responsible for these deaths and injuries be held accountable. 

While the focus of my testimony is on the situation of the Copts, I would like to 

point out that other religious minorities also suffer official discrimination. While 

non-Muslim religious minorities officially recognized by the government—namely 

Christians and the tiny Jewish community—generally worship without harassment, 

members of the Bahai Faith, which the government does not recognize, face personal and collective discrimination. The government also sometimes arrests, detains, 

and harasses Muslims such as Shia, Ahmadiya, and Quranist, converts from Islam 

to Christianity, and members of other religious groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses 

and Mormons. The Government continues to refuse to recognize conversions of Muslims to Christianity or other religions, which constitutes a prohibition in practice. 

I would like to set this testimony on the Copts in a broader context. Last week 

Secretary Clinton gave an important policy address in which she outlined our overall policy on democratization in the Middle East and beyond. She described the US 

government’s principled engagement in the Middle East. We support the aspirations 

of citizens to live in societies that guarantee freedom, including freedom of expression, assembly and religion. We also believe strongly in systems that allow citizens 

a say in how they are governed and that will provide economic opportunities for all. 

These are the demands that we heard in Tahrir Square, where Copts and Muslims 

joined hands to protest and to pray in the weeks leading up to the downfall of the 

Mubarak regime. We have heard similar demands echoing throughout the Middle 

East and even far beyond that region in the ensuing months. 

Secretary Clinton also has spoken out consistently about the importance of religious freedom and religious tolerance, both of which are fundamental to human dignity and peaceful transitions to democracy. Religious freedom is a human right, 

guaranteed by international human rights law. At the release of the State Department’s report on International Religious Freedom in September, Secretary Clinton 

emphasized the role that religious freedom and tolerance play in building stable and 

harmonious societies. She said: 

‘‘Hatred and intolerance are destabilizing. When governments crack down on religious expression, when politicians or public figures try to use religion as a 

wedge issue, or when societies fail to take steps to denounce religious bigotry 

and curb discrimination based on religious identity, they embolden extremists 

and fuel sectarian strife. And the reverse is also true: When governments respect religious freedom, when they work with civil society to promote mutual 

respect, or when they prosecute acts of violence against members of religious 

minorities, they can help turn down the temperature. They can foster a public 

aversion to hateful speech without compromising the right to free expression. 

And in doing so, they create a climate of tolerance that helps make a country 

more stable, more secure, and more prosperous.’’ 

This is the basis for our belief that in order to succeed and prosper, Egypt, and 

its neighbors, must protect the rights of all citizens and all minorities, including its 

Coptic population. The corollary is also true: successful democratic transitions are 

the best way to safeguard those rights. 
41 

Mr. Chairman, the Copts in Egypt have faced discrimination for many years. 

Christians face personal and collective discrimination, especially in government employment and the ability to build, renovate, and repair places of worship. 

Although they represent about 10% of the population and play an important role 

in Egypt’s economy, Copts have suffered from widespread discrimination and remain underrepresented in prominent positions in Egyptian politics and society. 

The headlines—and the trend lines—continue to tell a disturbing story. 

I was in Egypt just days after the January 2010 attack on the Nag Hammadi 

Church in Upper Egypt, when gunmen shot and killed seven people as worshippers 

were leaving a midnight Christmas mass. At that time, I called for an end to impunity for such crimes and full accountability for those who attacked this holy place. 

One suspect, Hamam al-Kamouny was tried under the emergency law in a state security court, convicted on January 16 and executed on October 10. The other two 

defendants, Qoraishi Abul Haggag and Hendawi El-Sayyed, were acquitted by the 

court, angering many Coptic activists. Yesterday, November 14, Egypt’s official news 

agency announced that Abol-Haggag and El-Sayyed are to be retried on December 

19 under the Higher Emergency State Security Court, for crimes including premeditated murder and terrorism with the use of force and violence. We applaud the pursuit of accountability in this case, although we would prefer that these types of 

crimes be dealt with in civilian courts with full due process of law. 

Almost exactly a year after the Nag Hammadi attack, on January 1, 2011, a bomb 

exploded at the Coptic Orthodox Church of the Two Saints in Alexandria, killing 23 

people and wounding around 100. There are no suspects in custody for that crime, 

although the Government of Egypt reports that its investigation is ongoing. 

These two incidents, and others like them, took place before the fall of President 

Mubarak on February 11. We have since received reports of an increase in sectarian 

violence and tensions, including at least 67 people killed in religious clashes—most 

of them Coptic Christians. This brings the total number of reported deaths this year 

to more than 90. There have been at least six recent major incidents of violence 

against Copts: 

• On February 23, the Army used live ammunition, including rocket propelled 

grenades, against unarmed Copts during a land dispute at a monastery. A 

monk, one of the six shot, later died. To our knowledge, no one has been held 

accountable for these attacks. 

• On March 4, in the village of Sol, a large group of Muslim villagers destroyed 

the Church of Saint Mina and St. George after the army failed to stop them. 

To our knowledge, there has been no investigation and no one has been charged 

despite videos of the perpetrators. 

• On March 8, 13 people were killed when Muslims and Copts clashed in the 

Mukkatum area of Cairo. Some of the Copts had been protesting the slow government response to the destruction of the church in Sol. One Coptic bishop 

claimed that though news reports listed seven Christians and six Muslims. To 

our knowledge, there has been no investigation and no one has been charged 

in the deaths. 

• On May 8 in Imbaba, a poor neighborhood of Cairo, two churches were attacked 

and one burned during sectarian riots. The clashes resulted in 23 deaths and 

232 injuries. That month, the official media reported that the government referred 48 suspects to trial. Approximately half of these suspects have been arrested, including a prominent Salafist leader, while half remain at large. The 

High State Security Court in Giza has adjourned the trial until December 4, 

when it expects to hear testimony from the remaining witnesses. 

• On September 30, in Merinab village in Edfu, Aswan governorate, an estimated 

crowd of 3,000 Muslims looted and burned the St. George Coptic Orthodox 

Church, in addition to some Copt-owned homes and businesses, following reported incitement by village imams. Local media reported that a Ministry of 

Justice fact-finding committee traveled to Aswan on October 12, in the aftermath of the Maspiro violence, to investigate the church burning. The status of 

this investigation is unclear. 

• And finally, on October 9 in Cairo, violence erupted in front of the Egyptian television building known as Maspiro, at a demonstration by Copts protesting the 

government’s failure to investigate the burning of the church in Merinab in 

Aswan governorate. At least twenty-five people were killed and more than 300 

injured. 

On October 11, Secretary Clinton addressed the October 9 violence at Maspiro 

and called for an immediate, credible, and transparent investigation of all who were 

responsible for the violence, with full due process of law. The White House issued 

a statement urging Egyptians to move forward together to forge a strong and united 
42 

Egypt and reaffirming our belief that the rights of minorities—including Copts— 

must be respected, and that all people have the universal rights of peaceful protest 

and religious freedom. 

The government of Egypt has stated publicly that they are conducting two investigations. The Egyptian Armed Forces are reviewing the conduct of Military Police, 

who eyewitnesses and video evidence suggest ran over and shot at demonstrators. 

The Ministry of Justice has been tasked by the Egyptian Cabinet with a full investigation of the incident. Separately, military prosecutors are investigating about 30 

demonstrators, including one prominent blogger, who were detained during the violence. They are accused of inciting violence, stealing firearms, and attacking security forces. They will be tried in military courts. 

On November 2, a fact-finding committee established by the National Council for 

Human Rights issued an initial report on the Maspiro violence. (NCHR is a quasigovernmental watchdog body, but the committee was led by respected human rights 

advocates). The report found that the march by Copts and their Muslim allies began 

peacefully at Shubra and moved toward Maspiro in downtown Cairo. According to 

the report and several corroborating accounts, as the marchers approached Maspiro, 

they were attacked by civilians throwing rocks and chanting Muslim extremist slogans. According to the same sources, military police then confronted the marchers 

and attempted to keep them from reaching the building. The MPs used shields and 

batons, and fired blanks. Marchers began fighting back against the violent civilians 

and military police. The NCHR report acknowledged that 12 or more civilians were 

killed when they were run over by military vehicles. The committee said it could 

not determine who fired the bullets that killed at least seven demonstrators. 

During the height of the clashes, state TV anchor Rasha Magdy called on ‘‘honorable Egyptians’’ to defend the Army against ‘‘attacks by violent demonstrators.’’ 

Twenty-one prominent Egyptian human right organizations criticized the ‘‘inflammatory role played by the official state media,’’ charging that a ‘‘direct link can be 

traced between the outright incitement against demonstrators by state media and 

the events at Maspiro.’’ 

On October 13, the head of Egypt’s military justice system, Adel al-Morsi, said 

that the military would lead the official investigation into the events. According to 

Human Rights Watch and local media, the military has arrested approximately 30 

individuals. The government has said it will try suspects in military courts, since 

the crimes involved attacks on military personnel and equipment. 

The Coptic community is concerned, as we are, about the severity and frequency 

of sectarian attacks against their community, and while they recognize that the government has nothing to do with most of these attacks, they are greatly concerned 

about the need to hold perpetrators accountable. I want to make clear that most 

of these clashes have involved both Copts and Muslims, and members of both communities have been the perpetrators and victims of the violence. It also is important 

to emphasize that many Muslims have stood up to defend members of the Coptic 

community against extremist violence. 

The United States Government condemns this sectarian violence and continues to 

urge the Government of Egypt to take all necessary and available measures to reduce these tensions. 

In raising our concerns about the Coptic community, we are also aware and very 

supportive of the positive steps the Egyptian government has taken on behalf of the 

Copts. On March 8, by order of the Prime Minister, Coptic priest Mitaus Wahba was 

released from prison where he was serving a five year sentence for officiating at a 

wedding of a Christian convert from Islam. On April 14, the SCAF fulfilled its commitment to rebuild a church in Sol that had been destroyed on March 4 by mob violence. And as I noted earlier, the government also took steps in response to the May 

8 Imbaba violence; in addition to re-opening dozens of churches, the government is 

prosecuting 48 individuals charged with murder, attempted murder, and a variety 

of other crimes. The trial is scheduled to resume on December 4. 

The government also has pledged to adopt a Unified Places of Worship Law, 

which would guarantee all faiths the ability to construct and maintain places of 

worship. The Cabinet sent the draft law to the military council in October. We urge 

the SCAF to endorse this provision as soon as possible. The Government of Egypt 

has promised to consider this measure for several years, including twice in the last 

five months. Numerous cases of sectarian violence in recent years have stemmed 

from disputes over church construction. The prompt adoption of this provision now 

would send a very strong signal of the government’s commitment to protect religious 

freedom. It would recognize the right of all Egyptians to freely build places of worship they need to conduct religious activities. As the government reviews this proposal it should take into account the concerns expressed over earlier drafts that the 

suggested multi-stage process of applying for permits to construct and repair 
43 

churches is too convoluted, cedes too much authority to governors to grant permits, 

and imposes onerous restrictions on the number and location of houses of worship. 

Finally, in the aftermath of the Maspiro violence, we welcome steps that are being 

taken by the Government of Egypt to reduce discrimination in the penal codes. On 

October 15, the SCAF issued a decree amending Egypt’s penal code to prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion, gender, language, faith, or race. The decree also 

delineated prison sentences and specific fines for acts of discrimination, as well as 

failure to prevent discrimination. These included more severe penalties for government officials found to be complicit in discrimination. 

The new penal code provisions bolster the Egyptian constitution’s ban on discrimination. Article 7 of the March 31, 2011, constitutional declaration states that ‘‘all 

citizens are equal before the law. They have equal public rights and duties without 

discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnic origin, language, religion, or creed.’’ 

We urge the government to enforce these and other anti-discrimination laws and 

hold violators accountable so that all minorities, including Copts, can enjoy equal 

protection. 

Like Egyptian Muslims, Egyptian Copts are concerned about their country’s future and their own place in it. In addition to security from sectarian violence and 

equal treatment under the law, they want equal representation in parliament and 

a proportional voice on the committee that will draft Egypt’s new constitution. Like 

moderate Egyptian Muslims, the vast majority of whom support religious freedom, 

Copts and other religious minorities consider themselves full partners in a new 

Egypt. 

As Secretary Clinton said last week, ‘‘If—over time—the most powerful political 

force in Egypt remains a roomful of unelected officials, they will have planted the 

seeds for future unrest, and Egyptians will have missed a historic opportunity.’’ The 

door to real democratic change is only beginning to open. We hope Egyptians will 

walk through it together to a more peaceful and prosperous future. 

Thank you. 

llllllllllll 

MICHAEL H. POSNER

Michael H. Posner was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau 

of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor on September 23, 2009. 

Prior to joining State Department, Mr. Posner was the Executive Director and 

then President of Human Rights First. As its Executive Director he helped the organization earn a reputation for leadership in the areas of refugee protection, advancing a rights-based approach to national security, challenging crimes against humanity, and combating discrimination. He has been a frequent public commentator on 

these and other issues, and has testified dozens of times before the U.S. Congress. 

In January 2006, Mr. Posner stepped down as Executive Director to become the 

President of Human Rights First, a position he held until his appointment as Assistant Secretary. 

Mr. Posner played a key role in proposing and campaigning for the first U.S. law 

providing for political asylum, which became part of the Refugee Act of 1980. In 

1998, he led the Human Rights First delegation to the Rome conference at which 

the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted. 

Mr. Posner also has been a prominent voice in support of fair, decent, and humane working conditions in factories throughout the global supply chain. As a member of the White House Apparel Industry Partnership Task Force, he helped found 

the Fair Labor Association (FLA), an organization that brings together corporations, 

local leaders, universities, and NGOs to promote corporate accountability for working conditions in the apparel industry. He also was involved in the development of 

the Global Network Initiative, a multi-stakeholder initiative aimed at promoting 

free expression and privacy rights on the internet. 

Before joining Human Rights First, Mr. Posner was a lawyer with Sonnenschein, 

Nath & Rosenthal in Chicago. He lectured at Yale Law School from 1981 to 1984, 

and again in 2009. He was a visiting lecturer at Columbia University Law School 

since 1984. A member of the California Bar and the Illinois Bar, he received his 

J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley Law School (Boalt Hall) in 1975, 

and a B.A. with distinction and honors in History from the University of Michigan 

in 1972. 
44 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DINA GUIRGUIS, EGYPTIAN AMERICAN RULE OF LAW

ASSOCIATION

Good afternoon. Thank you Mr. Chairman for organizing this timely hearing. I’m 

especially pleased to have the opportunity to give testimony on Egypt’s not only continuing but growing sectarian problem. I would like to state that my testimony here 

today represents my individual views and not necessarily the views of any organization with which I’m affiliated, including the Egyptian American Rule of Law Association (EARLA). 

Last time I testified on Egypt’s sectarian problem, specifically the plight of the 

Copts, Egypt’s Christian population, back in January this year, I began my testimony by quoting 22 year old Mariam Fekry, who had posted a prayer for a wonderful new year in 2011 on her facebook page, just hours before she was killed in a 

heinous attack on the Saints Church in Alexandria, Egypt on New Year’s eve which 

left 21 dead. When I last testified, I stated that Mariam’s hopes, and ultimate fate, 

so tragically and poignantly illustrate the plight of the Coptic people, Egypt’s native 

Christians, who represent 10–15% of Egypt’s 83 million people. I stated that while 

the Copts are the Middle East’s largest Christian minority, they have faced an 

alarming escalation of violence as state protection has dwindled. 

I explained that for at least three decades, we, the Copts, have been offered an 

authoritarian compact of sorts. The Copts, as all Egyptians, were to live under a 

draconian emergency law, namely martial law suspending basic constitutional protections, in exchange for the delivery of stability and protection from terrorism. In 

those three decades, however, Egypt failed to make adequate progress on key developmental indicators, and Egypt’s human rights record fared no better: Freedom 

House consistently classified Egypt as ‘‘not free,’’ and Egypt’s record on religious 

freedom went from bad to worse, placing it on the US Commission on International 

Religious Freedom’s (USCIRF’s) ‘‘watch list’’ since 2002, for ‘‘serious problems of discrimination, intolerance, and other human rights violations against members of religious minorities.’’ After Egypt’s revolution, the commission recommended, for the 

first time, the downgrading of Egypt’s status, designating Egypt a ‘‘country of particular concern,’’ or CPC, for ‘‘engaging in and tolerating egregious violations of freedom of religion or belief. While religious freedom conditions in Egypt had been deteriorating during the last years of the Mubarak regime,’’ USCIRF stated, ‘‘since 

Mubarak’s ouster on February 11, conditions have further deteriorated.’’ In 

USCIRF’s view, this deterioration has warranted Egypt’s ranking alongside China, 

Iran, and Afghanistan. 

Last time I testified on Egypt’s sectarian problem was January 20, only 5 days 

before the revolution broke out. Back then, I had described the ‘‘authoritarian pact’’ 

offered by the Mubarak regime as an illusory Faustian bargain, and instead stated 

that the real answer to Egypt’s sectarian crisis is progress toward a democratic 

state that respects human rights, applies the rule of law and extends equal constitutional protections to all citizens. I also noted that the Egyptian regime will avoid 

doing so at all costs. But we soon learned that Egyptians’ frustration with decades 

of tyranny would and could not be indefinitely contained, and on January 25, Egyptians of all stripes took to the streets to determinedly but nonetheless peacefully 

demonstrate that. 

Somewhat cautiously, Christians regarded the revolution as a potential positive 

turning point and joined their fellow Muslim citizens in demanding fundamental 

change which they hoped would entail a new Egypt based on principles of equal citizenship, rule of law, and individual freedoms. Instead, Egypt’s current trajectory 

highlights not just substantial challenges to democratic transition, but the absence 

of political will from the current military de facto regime to affect that transformation. In the process, Egypt’s vulnerable groups are more susceptible than ever 

to unprecedented violence and insecurity. 

In 2011 alone, Copts have been the target of 33 sectarian attacks, 12 of which 

involved an attack on a church. The combined casualties, not counting the latest 

Maspero massacre, include 72 dead, as well as a substantial number of Christian 

homes, property, and churches destroyed. With the Maspero massacre, the death toll 

rises to 97, and the number of those injured exceeds 400. Compared to 2010, these 

statistics represent more than a 6 fold increase in Christian casualties in 2011. 

While it may be alluring to blame the revolution for this serious escalation and 

praise the relative stability of the Mubarak days, I submit that the same societal 

ills and perhaps more significantly the insidious state role in inciting sectarian violence plague Egypt more than ever today, and that responsibility lies in no small 

measure squarely at the foot of the military dictatorship, represented by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) which has taken hold and adopted the 
45 

old authoritarian tactics, while representing and proclaiming itself the ‘‘revolutionary government.’’ 

For decades, the regime encouraged and capitalized on the growth of a culture of 

discrimination against religious minorities, and eventually sectarian crimes became 

crimes of impunity. Substituting the extension of the rule of law and equal protection of the law, the state always insisted on ‘‘reconciliation sessions’’ where victims 

and perpetrators were brought together and coerced into extrajudicial settlements 

by the state security apparatus. In March of 2011, when a Christian man had his 

ear severed by hardline Islamists known as Salafis in Upper Egypt, SCAF very powerfully continued the message of impunity by forcing the victim not to bring legal 

charges and failing to investigate or bring the perpetrators to justice. Perceiving the 

continuation of the status quo, this and similar incidents strengthened extremists’ 

convictions that not only would the state tolerate blatant persecution of Christians 

and minorities, but it would do so with a nod and a wink for its own interests, much 

like the days of the Mubarak era. Capitalizing on an environment of literal police 

absence from Egyptian streets following the revolution—a massive security failure 

on the interim government’s part which itself requires investigation and accountability—the Salafis once again lashed out at Christians in May, when they accused 

the Coptic church of holding alleged Christian converts to Islam against their will. 

Incitement by the Salafis in a poor, crowded neighborhood of Cairo resulted in an 

all out war between Muslims and Christians which lasted for hours, without police 

or military intervention, leaving 12 dead and 2 churches burnt to the ground. 

The response of SCAF to the incident was to send in a Salafi preacher known as 

Mohamed Hassan to the neighborhood to ‘‘pacify the situation.’’ This ‘‘preacher’’ has 

long been known for his incitement against Christians and calls for their second 

class citizenship. He is also the same man that was granted a podium and allowed, 

by the military regime, to preach from Tahrir Square in the weeks following 

Mubarak’s ouster, where he was given free rein to express hate speech. 

While the churches were rebuilt, no one was held to account for the day’s heinous 

violence, and when interviewed about this in the independent media, SCAF General 

Hassan El-Reweiny stated that it was ‘‘preposterous’’ to demand further action on 

the matter, including an investigation and arrests, since the churches were rebuilt. 

Once again, taking their cue from the SCAF’s eerily Mubarakist treatment of 

Egypt’s vicious sectarianism, extremist Muslim youths in an Upper Egyptian town 

called Edfu took it upon themselves in September to destroy a church because it 

allegedly ‘‘lacked the necessary permits,’’ even though the church was an ancient 

one that had been operating for years. Rather than hold to account the youths who 

lacked any authority to act on any such claim, the region’s governor instead praised 

the youths who committed this act, and then SCAF refused to fire the governor. 

With all these successive tragedies in mind, and compounded by years of societal 

intolerance, institutionalized discrimination, and state complicity and incitement, 

which was clearly continuing with the SCAF’s blessing, Christians took peacefully 

to the streets on October 9, as they had alongside other Egyptians during the 18 

day uprising, to protest the current military regime and to demand basic civil liberties. Muslim activists and sympathizers joined them in their call. They were, as 

most of us now know and as is and was documented widely across international 

media, met with disproportional violence, culminating in live shootings and the 

crushing of unarmed civilians by armored personnel carriers (APC’s). Meanwhile, 

while the corpses of civilians, most of whom were Christian, were being taken to 

hospitals, Egyptian state television misrepresented the facts, stating that ‘‘Coptic 

gangs’’ had killed three soldiers and were attacking the military in a manner ‘‘not 

even the Israelis would dare,’’ even going so far as to exhort ‘‘honorable Egyptians’’ 

to come to the defense of their military. This incitement directly led to vigilante acts 

of sectarian violence in Cairo’s streets, where some Muslims sought out and targeted Christians for beatings or worse. 

Expectedly but no less tragically, the SCAF’s ensuing press conference addressing 

the tragedy blamed the victims and exhorted Egyptians to ‘‘put themselves in the 

place of the soldier driving the APC, who was understandably confused and panicked.’’ Adding insult to injury, the SCAF praised the role of Egyptian state tv, and 

when asked about the names of the alleged military casualties, refused to release 

them for ‘‘security reasons.’’ 

Thus, in the aftermath of the revolution, the state itself has continued institutionalized discrimination and encouraged the growth of a culture of sectarianism 

and impunity to act on that sectarianism. During the last days of the Mubarak era, 

a Cairo based human rights organization had described Egypt as a ‘‘police state infused increasingly with theocratic elements.’’ I would submit that if you substitute 

the word ‘‘police state’’ with ‘‘military state,’’ this would be an accurate description 

of the state of things today. The military regime continues to count on a divide and 
46 

conquer tactic to consolidate its power, to scapegoat the Copts to deflect from its 

own governance failures, and to sow instability and simultaneously present itself as 

the sole solution to that instability, justifying along the way the continuation or institution of new repressive practices and laws. One need only give a cursory look 

at SCAF’s history since its assumption of power: over 12,000 civilians have been 

tried in military tribunals that do not meet minimum standards of due process, female protesters have been subjected to degrading ‘‘virginity tests,’’ the notorious 

emergency law has been extended, and numerous laws restricting freedom of assembly and even criminalizing criticism of the military have been opaquely passed and 

enforced in draconian fashion. Local rights groups are already decrying these abuses 

and more, including the SCAF’s pre-election conduct which observers accurately 

note portents to substantial fraud in upcoming elections, where Islamists are expected to win a substantial parliamentary presence. This parliament, according to 

the SCAF’s transition plan, will be responsible for the drafting of Egypt’s new Constitution, raising doubts about whether such a document will embody the aspirations of Egyptians, as expressed through their revolution, which rejected notions of 

both autocracy and theocracy. 

Attempts by the SCAF to issue ‘‘guiding principles’’ for the Constitution are no 

comfort. While the US government may be banking on SCAF to turn Egypt into a 

pre-Erdogan Turkish model, what is actually unfolding is more analogous to more 

insidious models such as the Pakistani one, entailing greater power for Islamists 

and the marginalization of all other political forces. Avoiding this outcome requires 

that the US not fall into the trap it previously did with Mubarak, placing as it did 

all its bets on an authoritarian partner and a police state, which SCAF represents. 

It means that the US must insist that its support during and for Egypt’s transition 

be contingent on a prompt and genuine democratic transition to a civilian authority 

which represents the aspirations of all Egyptians and guarantees the equal rights 

of all, starting with the immediate cessation of sectarian incitement and elimination 

of all forms of discrimination, and including but not limited to: immediate security 

sector reform entailing the prompt return of police to the streets; the conduct of free 

and fair elections; an inclusive and transparent constitutional drafting process; the 

elimination of laws that repress basic rights and the expansion of the political space 

to allow a greater role for civil society and nonreligious political parties; and a free 

civilian presidential race which represents a true handoff of power from the military. Egypt’s civilian president must then go about undoing decades of the disease 

of pernicious sectarianism which has infiltrated society through undertaking substantial legal, institutional, educational, and media reform, all vast tasks which only 

a person entrusted and vested with the faith of Egyptians and the interests of 

Egypt—and not the interests of a few privileged generals—could assume. We owe 

it to those who sacrificed to herald a new era of freedom in the Middle East. We 

owe it to Mina Daniel, who while anticipating being killed by Mubarak’s police 

forces while camped out in Tahrir Square during the 18 day uprising, survived, only 

to be killed a few months later at the hands of Mubarak’s successors, who represent 

more of the same. 
47 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SAMUEL TADROS, RESEARCH FELLOW, CENTER FOR

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, HUDSON INTITUTE

Thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this timely and important hearing and for 

inviting me to testify today on the plight of Egypt’s Christians and what it signifies 

for the prospects of a democratic transition in Egypt. 

The title of today’s hearing suggests a linkage between religious freedom, or more 

precisely the lack thereof and the prospects of democracy in Egypt. Unfortunately 

this linkage has been often ignored by policy makers. The modern debasement of 

the concept of a free society to mean, essentially, the holding of elections has blinded many to the importance of religious freedom to the health and survival of free 

societies. 

The recent massacre of Copts on the 9th of October, while certainly significant 

in terms of the number of victims and the manner of their deaths, should not blind 

us to the fact that it is only a continuation of a previous pattern. Attempting to deal 

with the massacre and propose solutions without recognizing that pattern, would 

limit our understanding and as a result our proposed remedies. 

Previously, before the revolution, Copts were facing three distinct threats, from 

Islamists, the government and the general population. Each entity has its own internal considerations and goals that help to diminish religious freedom, but it is the 

dynamic relationship between them that creates ongoing cycles of intolerance and 

discrimination. 

The Islamist threat took the form of direct violent attacks on Copts conduct by 

terrorist organizations. The recent Alexandria Church bombing on New Year’s Eve 

is a stark reminder of the threat that they pose. 

The government itself engaged in rampant discrimination. Ottoman-era laws restricting the building of churches remained in force. Christians were excluded from 

important government positions. Egypt’s Christian heritage was not mentioned in 

schoolbooks, and Copts were almost completely absent from the political landscape. 

Attacks against Copts almost always went unpunished. 

Most worrisome of all, in recent years, has been the spate of attacks by ordinary 

Muslims on their Christian neighbors. Starting with the massacre in El-Kosheh in 

January 2000, recent attacks usually have not been orchestrated by Islamist groups, 

but have been the result of ordinary Muslims’ anger at something they see as an 

affront to Islam’s domination and supremacy in the land of Islam: the resumption 

of work on an old church, the building of a new one, a rumor of a sexual relationship between a Christian man and a Muslim woman, or a report of a suspected lack 

of respect for Islam shown by a Christian. The incident usually involves a Muslim 

mob’s attacking Christian homes and shops, ransacking, burning, and, in some 

cases, killing. 

The Mubarak government’s reaction to such attacks only encouraged them further. The police never arrived in time to stop the violence, and when they did, they 

usually simply arrested a couple of dozen local residents, Christians and Muslims 

alike. The arrested Christians would serve as a bargaining chip that the government would use to force the church to keep quiet. Faced with possible harsh sentences for their people, the clergy felt that their hands were tied. They were made 

to participate in government-organized reconciliation sessions that gathered local 

Christian and Muslim clergymen and other notables, the result of which was to 

force the Christians to drop all charges. These gatherings would also, usually, pass 

some sentence on the Christian community for its apparent affront—e.g., the family 

of a Christian man rumored to be involved sexually with a Muslim woman might 

be forced to emigrate from the village and pay compensation, or the Copts might 

be forced to abandon building a church and instead conduct their worship in an unmarked house. 

As Egyptians took to the streets in January and February of this year, calling for 

an end to the regime’s authoritarian grip on power, some observers were hopeful 

that the fall of a regime would bring about a change in the sectarian problem in 

Egypt. Egypt seemed headed to a transition to democracy and images of Christians 

and Muslims protesting together as well as praying in Tahrir Square created a false 

optimism on the direction that Egypt was taking. 

Reality soon became hard to ignore. 

Instead of bringing about change, the past few months have shown a reinforcement of pattern of religious discrimination and a substantial increase in the number 

of attack on Christians. These new attacks involved the same three responsible parties. Islamists, freed from any restraining check of the police, are now free to enforce 

their vision on Egyptian society at large and Copts in particular. This enforcement 

takes the shape both of planned attacks led by Salafis and joined by the local mob, 

such as the May attacks on churches in the Imbaba neighborhood of Cairo, and of 
48 

daily persecutions that though mostly escaping the attention of the press, represent 

the most alarming aspect the threats facing Copts. Increasingly, Copts living in 

poorer neighborhoods find themselves forced to abide by certain Islamic practices or 

face possible punishment. In some cases, Christian girls in government schools have 

been forced to wear the hijab by the Islamist headmasters, who are now free from 

government control. In a very disturbing incident, on October 16th, Ayman Nabil 

Labib, a 17-year-old Christian student was asked by his teacher to remove the cross 

tattooed on his wrist and the one he was wearing around his neck. When he refused, 

the teacher was angered and started beating him; his Muslim classmates joined in 

the beating, which resulted in his death. 

The government, meanwhile, evinces a continued lack of interest in protecting 

Christians. The solution of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to the burning 

of a church in Atfih in March was to invite Salafi preacher Mohamed Hassan to 

try to cool down the local Muslims. Appearing on national TV later, however, he explained that the attack was not sectarian in nature, but was driven by the discovery 

of black magic conducted in the church. No attackers were ever punished. After an 

attack on a church in Aswan on September 30, the local governor actually encouraged the attackers: He declared on TV that the Christians were to blame for a building violation and that ‘‘our boys’’ had corrected the wrongdoing. As a result, a culture of impunity has been created. Realizing that they will never be punished for 

their actions, people are emboldened to attack Christians. 

When international and local pressure for action becomes high, the government 

resorts to the old tactic of arresting Christians and using them as a bargaining ship 

with the Church leadership. Following the recent attack at Maspero, the government arrested a number of young Christians. They remain jailed as we speak. 

Most worrisome for the future of Christians in Egypt is the participation of the 

general Muslim population in these attacks. It is important to note here that those 

attacks are not driven by a desire to kill Christians. The goal remains for Christians 

to live, permanently, as second-class citizens. Any attempt by the Copts to break 

the chains of Dhimmitude and act as equals is seen as an affront to the supremacy 

of Islam in its own land. What fueled the attack on the Aswan church, for example, 

was not that Christians wanted to pray; they can do so, as long as the building in 

which they do so is not a church. The local Muslims’ demands were that the building have no bells, no microphones, no crosses, and no domes. What instigated the 

attacks on the Christians during their march, before they were killed by the army, 

was their chants of ‘‘Raise your head up high, you are a Copt’’ and their raised 

crosses. In the new Egypt, you can exist as a Copt, but you are not allowed to be 

proud of that fact. You will be allowed to survive, but you must show your submission to the religion of the majority and recognize your inferior status. 

Faced with these growing threats, it is no surprise that the Copts are questioning 

whether there is a future for them in the new Egypt. Isolated and ignored by the 

West, the Copts can only wonder today whether, after 2,000 years, the time has 

come for them to pack their belongings and leave, as Egypt looks less hospitable 

to them than ever. Like the Jewish communities scattered in Europe during the 

Middle Ages, the Copts are realizing the eternal lesson of minorities’ survival: Better the persecuting ruler than the mob. A ruler can be bought off or constrained 

by international pressure; with a mob there are no constraints. 

Most importantly elections are not likely to provide any remedy to their predicament. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the more extremist Salafists poses 

an unprecedented threat to the Copts. With the Islamists all but guaranteed to control the next Egyptian Parliament, a culture of impunity is about to become a culture of encouragement. 

As recent events have shown, the Copts refuse to accept the inferior status. They 

refuse simply to disappear, as many ancient communities in the Middle East have 

done in the last century. They will continue to raise their heads up high with their 

crosses, but they will not succeed. Neither is Egypt’s geography or demographic distribution in their favor. 

Neither is immigration. While the intensified pressure and attacks are likely to 

result in a large wave of emigration, the sheer numbers involved make the complete 

immigration of the community unfeasible regardless of its undesirability. The most 

fortunate will take the first planes to the U.S., Canada, and Australia, but a community of 8–10 million people cannot possibly emigrate en masse in a short time. 

The poorer Copts, the ones who face daily persecution, will be left behind. For them, 

the winter has already arrived, and it will be cold and long. 

For those concerned about Egypt’s future and the prospect of a transition to democracy, defending religious freedom remains the only solution. The ballot box offers no magical solution. It is merely a tool. Building a truly free society is like Ed-
49 

mund Burke wrote no easy task, for a free society is one where religious freedom 

and free enterprise provide the foundation on which democracy can be built. 

Egypt remains a key ally and friend of the United States. The direction that 

Egypt will take will have ramifications on the surrounding countries and as such 

is of vital importance to the United States national security. There is no question 

that the United States has at its disposal numerous tools to positively affect the 

transition in Egypt. The real question is whether it is willing. 

The following steps are essential to take: 

• Last week’s announcement by the head of the military courts that both civilians 

and military personal are being tried for the Maspero massacre offers the first 

admission by the Military that something went wrong at that incident and that 

they lost control of their soldiers. Punishment for those responsible for the massacre should be a first step in dealing with the incident. 

• The parliamentary elections in Egypt will not result in any significant Christian 

representation. Nevertheless Christian participation in the Constitution writing 

process should be stressed. The new Egyptian Constitution must offer religious 

freedom for its citizens and equality for all Egyptians regardless of their religion. 

• As according to the existing electoral timetable, the Supreme Council of the 

Armed Forces will continue to rule and govern Egypt for at least 1 year, and 

with the collapse of the police, the army is likely to continue being used for 

basic policing and law and order for some time to come. Not having gone 

through any policing training, they have shown a lack of ability to deal with 

such tasks. The US military has developed excellent manuals and built tremendous experience in providing law and order in conflict zones. With its strong ties 

to the Egyptian military, the U.S. Army can help provide them with necessary 

trainings. 

• While the United States through the State Department and the USAID is providing numerous grants to strengthen democracy in Egypt, there have been disturbing reports recently that some of this money is being provided to Islamist 

parties and groups, whose commitment to religious freedom is doubtful. Oversight of this funding should ensure that this money is only given to groups committed to religious freedom. 

• Copts, like their fellow countrymen are discovering democracy for the first time. 

They are challenged to organize quickly to be able to have a voice in their country’s future. The U.S. must ensure that amongst the groups that it funds, adequate attention and funding is provided to Coptic groups that attempt to organize politically. 

Thank you once again for organizing and chairing this hearing and for inviting 

me to testify. 
50 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MICHELE DUNNE, DIRECTOR, RAFIK CENTER FOR THE

MIDDLE EAST ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Mr. Chairman, Senator Cardin, distinguished members: 

Thank you for the honor of testifying before the Commission. 

After the celebrations of Muslim-Christian unity that Tahrir Square witnessed 

during the 18 days of the Egyptian revolution early this year, it is disappointing 

to see that sectarian tensions have escalated dangerously in the intervening months, 

leading to dozens of deaths, hundreds of injuries, and a spreading sense of fear 

among Egyptian Christians. The violence is not, unfortunately, particularly surprising, because it is to be expected that in a post-revolutionary climate all of the 

tensions and conflicts that were beneath the surface will emerge more openly. Sectarian tensions have been present for decades and were already rising noticeably in 

the months before the January 25 revolution. One of the most disturbing sectarian 

attacks in years-the bombing of a church in Alexandria in which 23 people died-took 

place on January 1, following weeks of escalating anti-Christian demonstrations by 

Salafi Muslims. 

This clear and disturbing trend makes it all the more difficult to understand why 

the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), entrusted by Egyptians with authority upon the forced resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak, has failed 

to address sectarian violence in any effective manner. The SCAF’s approach has 

been almost identical to that of the Mubarak era; that is, after each sectarian incident the authorities promise to investigate and prosecute crimes vigorously and to 

address the underlying causes of the incident, such as discriminatory laws regarding 

the building and alteration of places of worship. But as soon as public attention 

moves on, such efforts are either abandoned or long delayed, leaving the victims 

with a sense of injustice and the perpetrators with a sense of impunity, and sowing 

the seeds of further violence. 

Investigations of several incidents of large-scale anti-Christian violence (the January 1 Alexandria bombing as well as clashes in March and April in Cairo, and the 

October 9 Maspero incident) are ongoing and might well be inconclusive. With more 

than 75 people dead in these and other incidents in 2011, there has not as yet been 

a single conviction on charges of murder or manslaughter. In cases where military 

or government officials are accused of complicity in violence or at least irresponsibility in dealing with it—such as the October 9 incident in which Egyptian state 

media incited citizens to confront peaceful demonstrators and soldiers ran over them 

in armored vehicles-the SCAF has staunchly resisted accountability. 

The transitional authority supervised by the SCAF also has been slow to make 

promised legal changes to address the causes of violence. After a May 2011 attack 

on a church in Cairo, the authorities promised to pass a new law on construction 

of places of worship. The draft has languished in various forms for months, while 

many new instances of violence (including the Maspero incident in October) have 

broken out due to inter-communal tensions surrounding the building or renovation 

of church facilities. An anti-discrimination law was finally issued in the aftermath 

of the October violence; it is yet to be seen whether it will be applied. 

Anti-Christian violence is one of several serious internal Egyptian problems (rising crime, for example, and a deteriorating economy) with which the SCAF has 

shown itself to be unwilling or unable to deal. As a military organization, the SCAF 

is not equipped to address such issues and should not be called upon to do so, particularly for a prolonged period. That is why it is essential that the SCAF agree to 

a clear, realistic timetable to turn not only legislative but also executive authority 

over to elected civilians. 

The problem now is that the SCAF is trying to postpone the transfer of executive 

authority until it secures guarantees of its status post-elections; and the status it 

is seeking is not simply a continuation of the extensive political influence and economic perquisites it enjoyed during the Mubarak era, but more than that. The 

SCAF has sponsored a document of supraconstitutional principles that would give 

it the implicit right to intervene in politics and the explicit right to overrule legislation, as well as freedom from civilian supervision or budgetary oversight. What this 

would produce is a political system similar to that of Pakistan, where elected civilian institutions are relatively powerless while unelected and unaccountable military 

and intelligence services actually run the country. And as we know from Pakistan 

as well as from Egypt’s own history and current situation that in such a system 

military and intelligence organizations often manipulate sectarian tensions and extremist tendencies within the country in order to serve narrow agendas. 

That would be a very unhappy outcome of the January 25 revolution for all Egyptians, including Egyptian Christians, and also for the United States, which cannot 

escape partial responsibility for the actions of the SCAF due to the tens of billions 
51 

in military assistance it has provided. The United States should stand unambiguously on the side of development of a real democratic system in which the rights 

of all citizens are protected in a climate of free political competition and the rule 

of law. 

Only in a democratic system will difficult issues such as anti-Christian violence 

and discrimination be able to be addressed openly. This will not happen overnight; 

building a strong Egyptian democracy will be the project of many years. But it 

would be a serious mistake to create large new obstacles now by acquiescing to the 

expansion and formalization of military privileges out of fear that Islamists might 

gain a plurality, or even a majority, in the parliament to be elected over the next 

few months. There are many uncertainties involved when freely elected civilian institutions have real power; one thing that is already known for certain is that military rulers will fail to protect all citizens and enforce laws without discrimination. 

Æ 
This is an official publication of the 

Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe. 

★ ★ ★ 

This publication is intended to document 

developments and trends in participating 

States of the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 

★ ★ ★ 

All Commission publications may be freely 

reproduced, in any form, with appropriate 

credit. The Commission encourages 

the widest possible dissemination 

of its publications. 

★ ★ ★ 

http://www.csce.gov @HelsinkiComm 

The Commission’s Web site provides 

access to the latest press releases 

and reports, as well as hearings and 

briefings. Using the Commission’s electronic 

subscription service, readers are able 

to receive press releases, articles, 

and other materials by topic or countries 

of particular interest. 

Please subscribe today.