IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs June 4, 2024

CURTIS KELLER v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 10-02756 Carlyn L. Addison, Judge

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No. W2023-01188-CCA-R3-ECN

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Pro se petitioner, Curtis Keller, appeals the summary dismissal of his second petition 

seeking error coram nobis relief.1 Upon our review, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L.

EASTER and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

Terrell Tooten (on appeal), Memphis, Tennessee, and Curtis Keller (appellate brief), 

Tiptonville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Steve Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Leslie Byrd, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The Petitioner was charged and convicted of several offenses stemming from two 

home invasion robberies in Collierville, Tennessee, in May of 2010, see State v. Keller,

No. W2012-00825-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 3329032, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 27, 

2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 10, 2013), and in Germantown, Tennessee, in June 

of 2008, see State v. Keller, No. W2012-01457-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6021332, at *1 

(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 2013), remanded (Tenn. Feb. 11, 2014), for which the Petitioner 

received a total effective sentence of 510 years in confinement. As we understand the pro 

se petition, this Petitioner seeks coram nobis relief from his convictions stemming from his 

 

1 At some point after the filing of the pro se coram nobis petition and completion of briefing in this 

matter, the Petitioner retained counsel. His representation has no bearing on the merits of this appeal.

06/28/2024
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Germantown convictions based on alleged newly discovered evidence in the form of an 

“[i]nvestigative report dated January 30, 2023 . . . revealing that [Tennessee Bureau of 

Investigation (“TBI”)] Forensic Scientist Qadriyyah Debnam, whom was responsible for 

testing, analyzing, and testifying at trial in regards to the DNA evidence procured from the 

ski mask used to convict the petitioner, ‘was terminated on February 12, 2010 . . . for the 

good of services.’” 

The proof at the Petitioner’s trial established that the Petitioner organized the 

robbery, which was perpetrated with the assistance of seven accomplices. Keller, 2013 

WL 6021332, at *4-9. According to the testimony of two of his accomplices, the Petitioner 

masterminded the crime and, serving as the “lookout,” drove to the home in a blue truck. 

Id. The other seven accomplices arrived in a stolen white van, broke into the home, and 

terrorized and robbed the seven occupants. Id. at *5, 7-8. After one victim managed to 

call the police, the accomplices fled in the van, throwing various pieces of evidence from 

the vehicle as they led law enforcement on a lengthy, high-speed chase. Id. at *4, 9. When 

the van crashed, five of the men were apprehended, and one co-defendant was taken into 

custody trying to retrieve his vehicle from a rendezvous point the following day. Id. at *6, 

8. One of the co-defendants sustained an injury from broken glass and left DNA at the 

scene, tying him to the crime. Id. at *5.

Two of the co-defendants implicated the Petitioner and testified about his 

involvement at trial. Id. at *4-9. Furthermore, a blue truck tied to the Petitioner was visible 

on footage from police vehicles involved in the high-speed chase. The Petitioner’s 

involvement was also established by DNA analysis. A ski mask recovered from the 

getaway van was analyzed for DNA, and a partial profile was obtained. Id. at *10. A DNA 

sample taken from the Petitioner in May 2011 was subsequently matched to the profile on 

the ski mask, and this evidence was introduced at trial. Id. As relevant here, Dr. Debnam 

testified as a special agent forensic scientist who worked at the TBI’s Memphis crime 

laboratory. She obtained a sample of DNA off of a ski mask that was sent to her from the 

Nashville crime laboratory. She testified that this sample was a “mixed” profile, meaning 

that it likely contained the DNA of more than one individual, but she was able to isolate a 

single individual’s DNA from that mixture. She testified that the DNA profile of this 

unknown subject was kept in the TBI’s records. Lawrence James, another special agent 

forensic scientist for the TBI, analyzed a sample of DNA represented to him as having been 

taken from the Petitioner on May 27, 2011, and determined that it was a match with a DNA 

profile already on file that had been discovered by Dr. Debnam on a ski mask. Id. at *10.

This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal, and after our 

supreme court remanded, this court again affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. State v.

Keller, No. W2012-01457-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4922627, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 

29, 2014) (affirming convictions in light of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), 
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and State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. 2013)). On March 3, 2015, the Petitioner filed 

a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief and his first petition for writ of error 

coram nobis. Keller v. State, No. W2020-00590-CCA-R3-PC, 2021 WL 2886338, at *2 

(Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2021). With the assistance of counsel, the Petitioner amended 

the coram nobis petition and alleged that the State erroneously “proceeded as though they 

did not have [the Petitioner’s] DNA sample” despite a newly discovered 2009 report that 

showed that the State indeed had a DNA sample from the Petitioner and had matched that 

sample to the DNA found on a ski mask. Keller v. State, No. W2019-01652-CCA-R3-

ECN, 2021 WL 1699277, at *3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2021), perm. app. denied

(Tenn. May 14, 2021). The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition, 

“conclud[ing] that the 2009 report contained the same information as the 2010 report . . . 

[and] was merely cumulative[] and that it would not have resulted in a different judgment.” 

Id. at *3.

The Petitioner appealed the summary dismissal of his first coram nobis petition, and 

this court affirmed. Id. at *1-5. We noted that “the limitations period expired in 2013 and 

that the petition was not filed until December 2018.” Id. at *5. We further concluded that 

“[t]he evidence which the Petitioner has discovered is the very definition of cumulative 

evidence[.]” Id. In rejecting the Petitioner’s argument that the ski mask was necessary to 

corroborate the accomplice’s testimony, we observed that “the ski mask was not the sole 

corroborating evidence; the State also introduced evidence that a blue pickup, connected 

by other evidence to the Petitioner, had momentarily blocked Detective Jason Heath’s 

pursuit of the white getaway van at the scene of the crime.” Id.

Trial counsel testified at the Petitioner’s January 2020 post-conviction evidentiary 

hearing and acknowledged that he did not interview Doctor Debnam or Special Agent 

James before trial or subpoena the TBI’s file on the DNA testing, explaining that he “didn’t 

view the DNA attachment to the mask as a significant issue.” Keller, 2021 WL 2886338, 

at *3. He had worked with Agent James in prior cases and “found him to be a pretty straight 

shooter” and “had no reason to doubt that [he] . . . was being straightforward about his 

testing” in this case. Id. Trial counsel did not retain a DNA expert to assist in the 

Petitioner’s defense or retest the ski mask because he “had no reason to question [the] 

results” of the State’s testing and did not deem the ski mask a significant piece of evidence.

Id. He explained that the ski mask was found in the get-away van, that the State did not 

allege that the Petitioner was ever in the van or at the crime scene and that the absence of 

the Petitioner’s DNA on the ski mask would not have contradicted the State’s theory of 

prosecution. Trial counsel said that he believed the outcome of the case hinged on the 

credibility of the co-defendant witnesses. Id.

In rejecting the Petitioner’s claim that the post-conviction court erred in denying the 

Petitioner’s motions for continuance to allow him time to have an independent DNA test 
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of the ski mask and to allow him to re-subpoena Doctor Debnam to testify at the evidentiary 

hearing, this court determined that the ski mask was not critical to the State’s case. We 

further concluded that the State prosecuted the Petitioner under a theory of criminal 

responsibility and, at no point, alleged that the Petitioner wore a ski mask or was in the getaway van during the robbery. Id. at *7. Consequently, even if additional testing 

contradicted the State’s finding of the Petitioner’s DNA on the ski mask, the Petitioner 

would not be entitled to post-conviction relief, and the Petitioner cannot show that a 

continuance of the hearing would have reasonably resulted in a different outcome of the 

post-conviction proceeding. Id.

We additionally concluded that the post-conviction court did not err in finding that 

the Petitioner had “ample time to seek independent DNA testing of the ski mask prior to 

his January 2020 evidentiary hearing.” Id. at *8. As relevant to the issues raised herein, 

we stated: 

The [P]etitioner initiated this post-conviction proceeding in March 2015, and 

current counsel had represented the [P]etitioner in this case since November 

2017. Current counsel also represented the [P]etitioner throughout his coram 

nobis proceedings, which case also involved a claim related to the DNA 

evidence on the ski mask. The [P]etitioner’s failure to seek additional DNA 

testing of the ski mask during the nearly five years that his post-conviction 

case was pending does not constitute “unforeseeable circumstances 

render[ing] a continuance a manifest necessity.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 

8(B).

Similarly, the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

the [P]etitioner’s motion for continuance to allow him to re-subpoena Doctor 

Debnam. The post-conviction court found that Doctor Debnam’s potential 

testimony was irrelevant to the issues raised in the post-conviction petition, 

and the record supports that finding. The [P]etitioner asserts that Doctor 

Debnam may have testified that it was possible for the ski mask to have been 

contaminated before her testing it for the presence of DNA. Even if Doctor 

Debnam’s potential testimony is as the [P]etitioner suggests, that testimony 

would not result in a different outcome of the post-conviction proceeding. 

As stated above, the ski mask was not critical to the State’s theory of 

prosecution. At most, Doctor Debnam’s potential testimony would cast 

doubt on the veracity of the State’s DNA testing of the ski mask. Because 

this court has already determined that other evidence sufficiently 

corroborated the testimony of the accomplices at trial, see Keller[], [2021 

WL 1699277, at*]7-8, the [P]etitioner cannot establish that he was 
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prejudiced by the post-conviction court’s denial of his motion for 

continuance to subpoena Doctor Debnam.

Id. at *8.

On May 24, 2023, the Petitioner filed the instant petition seeking a writ of error 

coram nobis. The petition asserts, in relevant part, that the alleged newly discovered 

evidence “is crucial because it reveals what the jury was never informed: that Mrs. Debnam 

had been terminated by the TBI ‘for the good of the service,’ two years prior to trial.” It 

further states that “[t]his information which reveals her neglect and fraudulent behaviors, 

during the same time frame as the [P]etitioner [sic] case, which led to her termination would 

have been useful to the jury in its decision-making abilities during deliberations and might 

have raised reasonable doubt in their minds in regard to the issue of the [P]etitioner’s guilt.” 

The Petitioner attached several exhibits to the petition, including the judgments of 

conviction, a January 30, 2023 Blackwatch Investigation and Mitigation investigative 

report, excerpts of Dr. Debnam’s trial testimony, various computer printouts purporting to 

challenge Dr. Debnam’s testing methodology, a March 1, 2023 Affidavit of Private 

Investigator Samantha Spencer, and a TBI Match Detail Report. 

Regarding the timeliness of the petition, the Petitioner averred that he “has exerted 

due diligence in locating and procuring said evidence which shows that he was without 

fault in failing to present said evidence at the proper time prescribed by statute.” The 

Petitioner further alleged that he had “exerted due diligence” by hiring a private 

investigator service to investigate the circumstances involving the testing and analysis of 

the ski mask. He argued “[d]ue process concerns require the tolling of the statute of 

limitations in order for the petitioner to be allowed ‘an opportunity for the presentation of 

claims at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner.’” The Petitioner claimed the “newly 

or subsequently discovered evidence helps prove [his] probable innocence, [and] a tolling 

of the statute of limitations is warranted.”

On August 8, 2023, the coram nobis court issued an order denying relief without a 

hearing. Without addressing the timeliness of the petition, the order provides that the 

Petitioner’s petition for writ of error coram nobis is “without merit.” The court reasoned 

that “the alleged ‘crucial’ newly discovered evidence is not such that would necessitate an 

evidentiary hearing nor should counsel be appointed.” The court further noted that the 

“information [the Petitioner] now insists would have altered [the] verdict, will not.” The 

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on August 21, 2023, and this case is now properly before 

this court for review.

ANALYSIS
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The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court abused its discretion in failing to 

make any findings of fact or conclusions of law in its “informal order denying the 

[Petitioner’s] petition for writ of error coram nobis.” In response, the State contends 

summary dismissal was proper because the instant petition was filed more than a decade 

after the limitations period expired, and the Petitioner has failed to establish that equitable

tolling is warranted. Upon our review, we agree with the State and conclude that the 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

A writ of error coram nobis is available to convicted defendants. Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 40-26-105(a). However, a writ of error coram nobis is an “extraordinary procedural 

remedy” that “fills only a slight gap into which few cases fall.” State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 

661, 672 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Penn v. State, 670 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Ark. 1984)). “The 

purpose of this remedy ‘is to bring to the attention of the [trial] court some fact unknown 

to the court, which if known would have resulted in a different judgment.’” State v. Hart, 

911 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (quoting State ex rel. Carlson v. State, 407 

S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tenn. 1966)). Relief by petition for writ of error coram nobis is provided 

for in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105. The statute provides, in pertinent 

part:

(b) The relief obtainable by this proceeding shall be confined to errors dehors 

the record and to matters that were not or could not have been litigated on 

the trial of the case, on a motion for a new trial, on appeal in the nature of a 

writ of error, on writ of error, or in a habeas corpus proceeding. Upon a 

showing by the defendant that the defendant was without fault in failing to 

present certain evidence at the proper time, a writ of error coram nobis will 

lie for subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to matters which 

were litigated at the trial if the judge determines that such evidence may have 

resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at the trial.

(c) The issue shall be tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and 

if the decision be in favor of the petitioner, the judgment complained of shall 

be set aside and the defendant shall be granted a new trial in that cause. . . . 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105(b), (c).

The decision to deny a petition for writ of error coram nobis on the grounds of 

subsequently or newly discovered evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial 

court, which this court will not disturb absent an abuse of discretion. Id. § 40-26-105. In 

order to qualify as “newly discovered evidence” for the purposes of a writ of error coram 

nobis, the proffered evidence must be (1) evidence of facts existing, but not yet ascertained, 
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at the time of the original trial, (2) admissible, and (3) credible. Nunley v. State, 552 

S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. 2018). 

A petition for a writ of error coram nobis must be filed within one year after the 

challenged judgment becomes final. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-7-103. The petition is subject 

to being summarily dismissed if it does not show on its face that it has complied with the 

one-year statute of limitations, and such compliance is an essential element of a coram 

nobis claim. Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828. To accommodate due process concerns, the oneyear statute of limitations may be tolled if a petition for a writ of error coram nobis seeks 

relief based upon new evidence of actual innocence discovered after the expiration of the 

limitations period. Id. 828-829. If the coram nobis petition does not show on its face that 

it has been filed within the one-year statute of limitations, the petition must set forth with 

particularity facts demonstrating that the prisoner is entitled to equitable tolling of the 

statute of limitations:

To be entitled to equitable tolling, a prisoner must demonstrate with 

particularity in the petition: (1) that the ground or grounds upon which the 

prisoner is seeking relief are “later arising” grounds, that is grounds that arose 

after the point in time when the applicable statute of limitations normally 

would have started to run; [and] (2) that, based on the facts of the case, the 

strict application of the statute of limitations would effectively deny the 

prisoner a reasonable opportunity to present his or her claims. . . . A prisoner 

is not entitled to equitable tolling to pursue a patently non-meritorious ground 

for relief.

Id. at 829.

“Whether due process considerations require tolling of a statute of limitations is a 

mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo with no presumption of 

correctness.” Id. at 830. Upon review of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis for 

timeliness, an appellate court must first determine whether the petitioner “asserted the 

claim in a timely manner and, if not, whether he has demonstrated that he is entitled to 

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations as provided in [Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 27-7-103]. The inquiry ends if his petition is not timely and if he has failed to 

demonstrate that he is entitled to relief from the statute of limitations.” Id.

In Keller, 2014 WL 4922627, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions 

following remand, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied his application for appeal on 

January 15, 2015. Accordingly, the Petitioner had until January 15, 2016, to file his error 

coram nobis petition. The Petitioner filed his petition for writ of error coram nobis on May 

24, 2023, seven years after the limitations period had expired. Accordingly, the petition is 
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time-barred unless the Petitioner demonstrates he is entitled to equitable tolling of the 

statute of limitations. 

To establish equitable tolling, the Petitioner relies on an investigative report

obtained on January 30, 2023, alleging that “Mrs. Debnam had been terminated by the TBI 

‘for the good of the service,’ two years prior to trial.” Although he claims this information 

reveals her neglect and fraudulent behaviors, would have been useful to the jury, and might 

have raised reasonable doubt in their minds as to his guilt, we disagree. First, the 

investigative report does not assert that the partial DNA profile obtained by Dr. Debnam 

in the Petitioner’s case was tainted, and the Petitioner does not so allege. We further 

observe that while the investigative report may be newly discovered, the evidence it 

contains in this case is not. As fully detailed above, the Petitioner has been aware of Dr. 

Debnam’s testimony since his trial. He has unsuccessfully mounted several challenges to 

the DNA evidence on direct appeal, his first error coram nobis petition, and his postconviction proceedings. Yet, the Petitioner has failed to explain why he waited until 

January 30, 2023, almost seven years after the statute of limitations expired, to contact a 

private investigator in order to request the records at issue pertaining to a known trial 

witness. The petition is simply devoid of any details concerning the timeline for the 

discovery of this alleged newly discovered evidence. Accordingly, we are unable to 

conclude that the grounds upon which the Petitioner is seeking relief are sufficiently “later 

arising” to satisfy due process tolling. 

In addition, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to establish a reasonable basis 

to conclude that, had the jury known of the investigative report at the time of the trial, the 

result of the proceedings may have been different. This court previously determined that 

the ski mask from which the DNA was obtained was not critical to the State’s case because 

the State prosecuted the Petitioner under a theory of criminal responsibility and, at no point, 

alleged that the Petitioner wore a ski mask or was in the get-away van during the robbery. 

Keller, 2021 WL 2886338, at *7. The Petitioner was convicted based on the testimony of 

two of his accomplices, and this court previously determined their testimony was 

corroborated by evidence in addition to the ski mask, including a blue pickup, connected 

by other evidence to the Petitioner, that had momentarily blocked Detective Heath’s pursuit 

of the white getaway van at the scene of the crime. Based on this evidence, we similarly 

conclude that had the jury been presented with the investigative report, it would have 

served no other purpose than to impeach the partial DNA profile obtained by Dr. Debnam. 

Wlodarz v. State, 361 S.W.3d 490, 499 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Hart, 911 S.W.2d at 375), 

abrogated on other grounds by Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016) (“[N]ewly 

discovered evidence which is merely cumulative or ‘serves no other purpose than to 

contradict or impeach’ does not warrant the issuance of a writ.”). As such, the alleged 

newly discovered evidence in the form of the investigative report cannot serve as grounds 

for coram nobis relief.
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On this record, the Petitioner has failed to show that a strict application of the 

limitations period would effectively deny him a reasonable opportunity to present the 

claim, and therefore, he is not entitled to due process tolling. We conclude that summary 

dismissal was proper.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above reasoning and analysis, we affirm the judgment of the coram 

nobis court.

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CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, PRESIDING JUDGE