IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 11–0157

Filed April 29, 2011

IOWA SUPREME COURT 

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

KENNETH F. DOLEZAL,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Grievance commission recommends a thirty-day suspension of 

attorney’s license to practice law. LICENSE SUSPENDED.

Charles L. Harrington and David J. Grace, Des Moines, for 

complainant.

Kenneth F. Dolezal, Cedar Rapids, pro se.
2

MANSFIELD, Justice.

This attorney disciplinary proceeding comes before us on the 

report of a division of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of 

Iowa. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.10(1). The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 

Disciplinary Board alleged the respondent, Kenneth F. Dolezal, violated 

ethical rules by neglecting three clients’ matters, failing to deposit fees 

into a client trust account, failing to provide an accounting, failing to 

communicate with a client, making misrepresentations to a client, and 

improperly terminating representation of a client.

The commission found Dolezal violated several of the Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct and recommended Dolezal be suspended from the 

practice of law for thirty days. The commission further recommended 

Dolezal be required to submit a report from a qualified physician or 

mental health professional stating he is presently fit and capable to 

practice prior to reinstatement and attend a continuing legal education 

class on trust accounting. Upon our consideration of the commission’s 

findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation, we find Dolezal 

committed several violations of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 

and suspend his license for thirty days.

I. Scope of Review.

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Fields, 790 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Iowa 

2010). We give respectful consideration to the commission’s findings and 

recommendations, but we are not bound by them. Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Iowa 2010). “The 

board has the burden of proving attorney misconduct by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
3

II. Ethical Violations.

Dolezal was admitted to the bar in 1983 and maintains a law office

in Linn County. This proceeding is based on Dolezal’s handling of three 

separate legal matters between 2008 and 2010. We will set forth our 

findings and conclusions with respect to each matter.

A. Conservatorships of Wesley and Lenora Buresh. The first 

matter involves Dolezal’s failure, despite repeated warnings, either to 

pursue or dismiss two appeals before this court.

In approximately 2007, Dolezal was retained by the daughter of 

Wesley and Lenora Buresh to represent her in connection with the

Bureshes’ conservatorships. On March 26, 2008, Dolezal filed a notice of 

appeal challenging a district court ruling. He subsequently filed a 

combined certificate and paid the docketing fee but did nothing 

thereafter. On August 6, 2008, Dolezal was found in default and 

personally assessed a $50 penalty for failing to timely file a proof brief 

and designation of appendix in this court. 

On August 22, 2008, Dolezal paid the penalty and also applied for 

an extension of time to file the brief and designation. The extension of 

time was granted, but on October 16, 2008, Dolezal was again found in 

default for not filing the proof brief and designation and assessed another 

$50 fine. Dolezal paid the fine as before but, again, asked for another 

extension. On March 17, 2009, an order was entered directing the proof 

brief and designation of appendix to be filed within thirty days or the 

case would be dismissed. No brief or designation was filed, so on May 5, 

2009, a notice of default was issued, and Dolezal was personally 

assessed another $50 fine. That default was not cured, and the appeal 

was dismissed by our clerk of court on June 5, 2009, over a year after it 

had been initiated.
4

On May 26, 2009, Dolezal filed a second notice of appeal. This 

appeal related only to the conservatorship of Lenora Buresh, Wesley 

Buresh having died. Dolezal, however, did not pay the filing fee for this

appeal. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.102(3). On September 11, 2009, Dolezal 

received written notice that the $150 fee needed to be paid within seven 

days to avoid penalty. The fee was still not paid. On October 2, 2009, a 

notice of default was issued based on failure to pay the filing fee, and 

Dolezal was personally assessed a $150 fine. This notice of default, like 

the default notice from the previous appeal, specifically stated in bold:

You are advised that if the appeal is dismissed as a 

result of counsel’s failure to comply with this default 

notice, a copy of the dismissal order will be forwarded to 

the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board 

. . . . The dismissal may serve as grounds for an 

investigation of neglect of a client’s legal matter.

This default also was not cured, so on November 10, 2009, the

second appeal was dismissed by our clerk of court for want of 

prosecution.

At the grievance hearing, Dolezal sought to explain his actions. He 

testified that he and his client jointly decided it was not necessary to 

pursue either appeal. He also explained that he, not his client, paid the 

penalties assessed by the clerk. Finally, Dolezal admitted he had 

received the default notices and never responded to them. He 

acknowledged he should have dismissed the appeals on his own, but 

claimed he was unaware that he had to do so instead of relying upon the 

clerk. 

When an attorney’s failure to comply with appellate deadlines 

results in an administrative dismissal, his actions are prejudicial to the 

administration of justice. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Wright, 758 N.W.2d 227, 230–31 (Iowa 2008) (finding an attorney’s 
5

reliance on a default notice to dismiss an appeal when his client could 

not raise funds for the filing of the transcript was conduct prejudicial to 

the administration of justice); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d 661, 668 (Iowa 2007) (finding an attorney 

committed neglect and acted in a manner prejudicial to the 

administration of justice when he failed to prosecute or move to dismiss 

an appeal he believed to be without merit); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Lesyshen, 712 N.W.2d 101, 105 (Iowa 2006) (“To 

simply wait for the court to dismiss the case for lack of prosecution is 

neglect, inappropriate, and unethical.”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l 

Ethics & Conduct v. Daggett, 653 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa 2002) (failing to 

comply with appellate deadlines “not only constitutes neglect, but also 

amounts to conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice”).

Dolezal conceded he failed to cure the defaults. Instead, he relied 

on the clerk to administratively dismiss both appeals. But a client’s 

decision not to pursue an appeal does not put an end to the attorney’s 

responsibility for that matter. See Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d at 668 (“The 

burden is on the attorney to comply with the appellate deadlines 

regardless of a client’s instruction or interest in the case.”); Lesyshen, 

712 N.W.2d at 105 (“[S]imply because a client does not want to pursue 

the case does not relieve the attorney from taking steps necessary to end 

the matter.”). Dolezal’s failure to follow through with or dismiss the 

appeals and his disregard of the default notices violated ethical rules 

32:3.2 (requiring reasonable efforts to expedite litigation) and 32:8.4(d) 

(requiring conduct not be prejudicial to the administration of justice). 

See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Knopf, 793 N.W.2d 525, 

530 (Iowa 2011) (holding that “[i]gnoring deadlines and orders, which 

results in default notices from the clerk of court, hampers the ‘ “efficient 
6

and proper operation of the courts” ’ and therefore is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice” (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 373 (Iowa 2005))); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Monroe, 784 N.W.2d 784, 788 (Iowa 2010) (stating that 

acts prejudicial to the administration of justice generally have 

“ ‘hampered the efficient and proper operation of the courts or of 

ancillary systems upon which courts rely’ ” (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Borth, 728 N.W.2d 205, 211 (Iowa 2007))); Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hoglan, 781 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Iowa 

2010) (holding an attorney’s failure to prosecute four appeals violated 

rules 32:1.3, 32:3.2, and 32:8.4(d)).

The commission found that Dolezal’s conduct also violated rule 

32:1.3 requiring “reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 

client.” In a case decided under the former Iowa Code of Professional 

Responsibility for Lawyers, we held that even if a client no longer wants a 

matter to be pursued, it is neglect for the attorney to allow the matter to 

languish, without terminating it. See Lesyshen, 712 N.W.2d at 105. As 

we put it in Lesyshen:

[S]imply because a client does not want to pursue the case 

does not relieve the attorney from taking steps necessary to 

end the matter. To simply wait for the court to dismiss the 

case for lack of prosecution is neglect, inappropriate, and 

unethical. See DR 6–101(A)(3).

Id. We see no reason to interpret rule 32:1.3 differently from former DR 

6–101(A)(3) in this respect. The new rule provides that a lawyer “shall 

act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client”; 

the old rule provided that a lawyer shall not “neglect a legal matter 

entrusted to him.” Thus, both rules are broadly worded to require 

diligence, or conversely to prohibit neglect, in the course of legal work on 
7

a client’s behalf. It is not a defense under either rule that the client may 

be indifferent to the attorney’s lack of diligence.

B. Social Security Disability Claim of Michael David. This 

attorney disciplinary proceeding also concerns Dolezal’s representation of 

a client in a social security disability appeal to federal district court. To 

summarize our findings, which we discuss in more detail below, Dolezal 

received a retainer from his client and filed the federal court complaint, 

but did not have the complaint served (resulting in dismissal of the case), 

did not communicate adequately with his client, and did not handle the 

retainer funds appropriately.

In March 2006, Dolezal was hired by Michael David to pursue a 

social security disability claim. After receiving unfavorable rulings in the 

Social Security Administration’s administrative process, Dolezal wrote 

David suggesting the matter be appealed to the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Iowa.1 Dolezal’s letter dated December 

27, 2007, stated:

I believe it should be appealed to the U.S. District Court but

there is now a financial cost. You would need to deposit 

$1,000.00 in my trust account for payment of filing fees, 

brief preparation costs and attorneys fees. This must be 

accomplished by February 8, 2008 if you want me to 

proceed.

On or about January 17, 2008, David made an initial payment of 

$500 to Dolezal by check and agreed to pay an additional $100 monthly 

through June 2008 to bring the total to $1000. This payment plan was 

memorialized in a writing that further provided, “These funds will be 

 1On June 29, 2007, while David’s original application for benefits was before the 

Social Security Appeals Council, the Social Security Administration granted David’s 

subsequent, pro se application for disability benefits. This ruling meant that David 

would be entitled to receive benefits beginning August 2007. However, David still had 

his original claim, prosecuted by Dolezal, for disability benefits for an earlier time 

period.
8

used to pay the court required filing fees, the service of process fees, my 

time at the rate of $175 per hour and copy or printing expenses.” 

Dolezal testified he put the $500 check in a file and left it there until he 

filed the federal court complaint. 

On March 13, 2008, Dolezal filed the complaint in federal district 

court.2 At that time, according to Dolezal’s testimony, he cashed the 

check and used $350 for the filing fee while keeping the remainder as 

attorney fees. David provided additional checks to Dolezal in February 

2008 ($100), May 2008 ($200), and October 2008 ($100). Dolezal did not 

place any of these payments into a trust account; presumably, they were 

also cashed and treated by Dolezal as income. In addition, David claims 

he paid $100 in cash to Dolezal, stating, “I thought I dropped it off.” 

However, David has no receipt for this alleged cash transaction.

Although Dolezal filed the complaint, he never had it served on the 

Commissioner. As a result, on February 25, 2009, the federal district 

court issued a notice stating the case would be dismissed unless some 

action was taken by March 16, 2009. No action was taken, and the case 

was dismissed.

According to Dolezal, shortly after the federal court complaint was 

filed in March 2008, David provided a transcript of a deposition he had 

given in December 2005 in a workers’ compensation case. Dolezal 

testified that after reading the deposition transcript, he concluded David 

had made several misrepresentations to him. Dolezal testified that “a 

very heated discussion” ensued during which he orally terminated his 

 2The board maintained that Dolezal’s filing of the complaint was untimely, but 

Dolezal testified he would have been able to get a retroactive extension of the filing 

deadline if he and his client had decided to pursue the matter. Dolezal claimed that he 

did not regularly handle social security appeals and that he and his secretary had some 

difficulty mastering the e-filing requirements.
9

representation of David and told David to find new counsel. Dolezal 

admitted he did not send a letter to David confirming the termination of 

their relationship, nor did he file a motion to withdraw as counsel with 

the federal district court. Dolezal further testified that he did not speak 

with David again until he came to his office in January 2010.

David, who also testified at the grievance hearing, denied that this 

argument had occurred or that the attorney-client relationship had been 

terminated. Rather, while acknowledging that he was “not very good 

with the dates,” David testified his meeting with Dolezal in January 2010 

was his first news about the case since its filing. David characterized 

that meeting as follows:

I went to the office and I said, what’s going on? He said, let 

me get my laptop, and I’ll look it up. He got his laptop, and 

he came back to the desk, and he looked for a while, and he 

said, if I recollect – if I recollect right, he said you’ve been 

denied. And I said, okay. Why didn’t you get a hold of me so 

we could appeal it again, because you said there’s another 

appeal process? He really didn’t answer me. He just looked 

down, and that was about it. He just didn’t say nothing to 

me, why or what happened; it was just that that’s it. You 

can’t appeal it no more, or I was denied, one or the other, so 

I just left.

David also testified that he referred his brother to Dolezal for 

representation in October 2009. Finally, David testified he had retained 

an attorney for the potential purpose of filing a malpractice case against 

Dolezal.

Upon our de novo review, we are not persuaded by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence that Dolezal misrepresented the status of 

the case to David. The commission found, “Mr. David testified that he 

would try and call [Dolezal] during 2008 and 2009 regarding the case 

and was told it would take awhile, that he had not heard anything, and 

[Dolezal] would find out.” David’s actual testimony, however, was that
10

once, in 2008, Dolezal said the case was “going to take a while” and 

much later, in December 2009 or January 2010, Dolezal promised to find 

out about the case but never got back to David, prompting David to 

make the January 2010 trip to Dolezal’s office. Given David’s actual

testimony, and his admissions to being “forgetful” and “forget[ting] a lot 

of things,” we are not able to find that Dolezal misled his client. Yet,

Dolezal’s claim that he orally terminated the attorney-client relationship

shortly after March 13, 2008, does not square with events either. 

Dolezal did nothing at the time to withdraw from the district court case 

or to protect his client’s interests therein. Dolezal also did not send a 

letter to David confirming the termination of representation, despite 

having previously sent David letters confirming the terms of 

representation. In addition, after the alleged termination, David 

continued to make installment payments, Dolezal continued to accept 

them, and David also referred his brother to Dolezal for representation. 

It seems odd that all of these things would have occurred if Dolezal had 

actually “fired” David after learning of David’s alleged dishonesty.

Thus, we find Dolezal continued to represent David, but neglected 

his case, with the result that it was involuntarily dismissed for failure to 

effect timely service. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Thomas, 

794 N.W.2d 290, 293–94 (Iowa 2011) (holding that failure to effect 

service within the prescribed time period constitutes neglect). David lost 

his right of appeal to federal court, and the court was forced to expend 

resources unnecessarily before dismissing David’s stale appeal. The 

neglect was further compounded by Dolezal’s failure to keep David 

informed of the case’s status. By his own admission, Dolezal went 

almost two years without speaking to David, and all attempts at

communication after early 2008 were initiated by David. Accordingly, we 
11

find sufficient proof that Dolezal violated rules 32:1.3 (requiring 

reasonable diligence and promptness), 32:1.4 (requiring reasonable 

communication with client), 32:3.2 (requiring reasonable efforts to 

expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client), and 

32:8.4(d) (requiring conduct not be prejudicial to the administration of 

justice). See Thomas, 794 N.W.2d at 293–94 (finding violations of rules

32:1.3, 32:1.4, and 32:8.4(d)); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Johnson, 792 N.W.2d 674, 681 (Iowa 2010) (finding that an attorney’s 

failure to make necessary filings in bankruptcy case—resulting in a 

motion to dismiss and a court hearing—and his failure to keep clients 

informed violated rules 32:1.3, 32:1.4, 32:3.2, and 32:8.4(d)). As 

previously noted, we do not find a clear preponderance of evidence 

establishes a misrepresentation by Dolezal to his client in violation of 

rule 32:8.4(c). In addition, because we find that Dolezal did not 

terminate his representation of David in early 2008, and instead

continued to serve as his counsel in the federal appeal, we do not find a 

violation of rule 32:1.16(d) (requiring certain procedures when 

terminating client representation).3

This brings us to Dolezal’s trust account violations. In his initial 

December 2007 letter, Dolezal agreed to perform the specific service of 

appealing David’s claim to the federal district court for a predetermined 

amount of $1000. This was a “flat fee” arrangement. See Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Piazza, 756 N.W.2d 690, 697 (Iowa 2008) 

(discussing the concept of a “flat fee”); see also Iowa Ct. R. 45.10(1) 

(defining a “flat fee” as “one that embraces all services that a lawyer is to 

 3Notably, even if Dolezal’s testimony were accepted in its entirety, he still failed 

to terminate his representation of David properly. As Dolezal put it, “My problem, as I 

see it, with the David case is I did not send him a letter, okay, confirming that I was no 

longer representing him.”
12

perform, whether the work be relatively simple or complex”). “A flat fee is 

‘nothing more than an advance fee payment which . . . must be deposited 

in a client trust account.’ ” Piazza, 756 N.W.2d at 697 (quoting Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Apland, 577 N.W.2d 50, 56 

(Iowa 1998)); accord Iowa Ct. R. 45.10(2). “[A] flat fee . . . is earned when 

the services are completed and therefore requires deposit in a client trust 

account coupled with a contemporaneous accounting to the client prior 

to withdrawal of such fees from the trust account.” Piazza, 756 N.W.2d 

at 698. This is because, “[u]ntil services are complete, it is possible that 

at least a portion of the fee ‘would need to be refunded to the client in the 

event the attorney-client relationship is terminated before the services 

were rendered.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. 

Kennedy, 684 N.W.2d 256, 260 (Iowa 2004) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Frerichs, 671 N.W.2d 470, 476 (Iowa 

2003)). Arguably, in his second letter of January 2008, Dolezal qualified 

his earlier description of the fee arrangement by stating that he would 

bill for his time at $175 per hour. Still, we believe the only reasonable 

interpretation of the two letters would leave the overall amount paid by 

David subject to a $1000 cap. (The second letter reiterates that $1000 is 

the amount “required to pursue the appeal of your case to the U.S. 

District Court.”) And if anything, the second letter confirms that Dolezal 

would only earn fees as he performed work on the case.

It is undisputed that Dolezal received a $500 check from David 

before performing any services. Dolezal testified he did not cash the 

check, but kept it in a file until he had prepared and filed the four-page 

federal appeal and incurred the $350 filing fee. At that time, he treated 

the remaining $150 as income he had earned through his work on the 

federal appeal. He took the same position with respect to the subsequent 
13

installment payments totaling $400, which he also took as income. 

Neither the board nor the commission questioned Dolezal’s contentions 

that he had earned these funds; however, they faulted Dolezal for not 

opening a trust account, for not initially depositing the payments into a 

trust account, and for not providing an accounting and notice to his 

client of how the client’s funds were being used.4

We agree that Dolezal should have deposited the funds in a trust 

account, as he said he would do in his December 2007 letter to David, 

and should have provided an accounting to David for the use of the 

funds. These actions were required by rule 32:1.15 and rule 45.7. See

Iowa Ct. R. 32:1.15(a), (c) (requiring complete records of trust account 

funds to be kept and requiring advance payments of fees and expenses to 

be deposited into a client trust account); Iowa Ct. R. 45.7(4) (requiring 

the lawyer to provide an accounting and notice to the client when 

withdrawing advance fee or expense payments); Iowa Ct. R. 32:1.15(f) 

(incorporating chapter 45 of the Iowa Court Rules); see also Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hauser, 782 N.W.2d 147, 152–53 

(Iowa 2010) (finding violations of rules 32:1.15 and 45.7 when a lawyer 

did not properly maintain trust records justifying withdrawals of 

payments to himself and did not provide an accurate accounting to his 

client); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d 

263, 269 (Iowa 2010) (finding violations of rules 32:1.15 and 45.7 when a 

lawyer received advance fee retainers, failed to deposit them in a client 

trust account, and failed to properly account for them).

 4Dolezal testified that, after his client complained to the board, he prepared a 

statement recreating his time and showing that he had earned his fees.
14

C. Estate of Steven M. Carter. The final subject of this 

proceeding is a probate proceeding in which Dolezal failed to file required 

reports or explain to the court why he was unable to do so.

In October 2006, Dolezal was retained by Gene Carter, the 

administrator of the estate of Steven Carter (Gene’s father). No question 

has been raised about Dolezal’s initial work on the case, including his

successful defense of an appeal. See In re Estate of Carter, No. 08–0344, 

2008 WL 5235574 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2008). However, following the

issuance of procedendo by the appellate court on January 16, 2009, 

Dolezal took no further action in the still pending case in the district 

court. Dolezal received notices of delinquency from that court on or 

about June 1, 2009, and December 1, 2009. Each notice specified the

failure to file the interlocutory report within sixty days could result in a 

report being made to the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary 

Board. See Iowa Ct. R. 7.6. Nonetheless, Dolezal took no action.

On or about March 11, 2010, Dolezal received a notice directing 

both him and Gene Carter to appear in person at a show-cause hearing 

on April 27, 2010. Dolezal came to the hearing, but his client did not. 

As a result of that hearing, the district court again ordered an 

interlocutory report to be filed within sixty days. However, to date, no 

interlocutory or final reports have been filed with the district court, and 

the estate has not been closed.

Dolezal testified that the estate is still open because Gene Carter 

absconded with funds from the estate and he has been unable to locate 

him. However, Dolezal admitted that he has never raised this issue with 

the district court in writing nor sought to withdraw from representation 

due to a lack of cooperation. In addition, although the notices of 

delinquency mailed to Carter were returned to sender, Carter filed an 
15

address change with the district court in September 2010. Despite this 

filing, Dolezal has still not made any attempts to contact Carter at the 

new address.

The failure to close an estate in a timely fashion, despite repeated 

delinquency notices, constitutes neglect. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 759 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 2009) (finding that 

an attorney committed professional neglect under the prior DR 6–

101(A)(3) when he did not sell a piece of real estate or close the estate 

allegedly because he could not locate the administrator). In addition, 

such inaction results in unnecessary oversight by the clerk of court and 

judicial officers that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Curtis, 749 N.W.2d 694, 701 (Iowa 

2008). Based on the foregoing, we find a convincing preponderance of 

the evidence shows violations of rules 32:1.3 (requiring reasonable

diligence and promptness), 32:3.2 (requiring reasonable efforts to 

expedite litigation), and 32:8.4(d) (requiring conduct not be prejudicial to 

the administration of justice). See Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d at 867 (dilatory 

handling of four estates violated rules 32:1.3, 32:3.2, and 32:8.4(d)); 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ackerman, 786 N.W.2d 491, 

495–96 (Iowa 2010) (dilatory handling of two estates violated rules 32:1.3 

and 32:8.4(d)).

III. Discipline.

“There is no standard sanction for a particular type of misconduct, 

and though prior cases can be instructive, we ultimately determine an 

appropriate sanction based on the particular circumstances of each 

case.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Earley, 729 N.W.2d 

437, 443 (Iowa 2007). In determining an appropriate sanction, we 

consider
16

the nature of the violations, the attorney’s fitness to continue 

in the practice of law, the protection of society from those 

unfit to practice law, the need to uphold public confidence in 

the justice system, deterrence, maintenance of the 

reputation of the bar as a whole, and any aggravating or 

mitigating circumstances.

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ireland, 748 N.W.2d 498, 502 

(Iowa 2008).

As discussed above, this case involves primarily neglect and 

related conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. “In general, 

the sanction imposed when neglect is the principal violation can range 

from a public reprimand to a six-month suspension.” Thomas, 794

N.W.2d at 294. The sanction imposed in a particular instance often 

depends upon whether there are multiple instances of neglect, a history 

of past disciplinary problems, and other companion violations. Fields, 

790 N.W.2d at 798. Another important consideration is the harm caused 

by the neglect. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Casey, 761 

N.W.2d 53, 61 (Iowa 2009). 

In this case, Dolezal has neglected three client matters—Buresh, 

David, and Carter. Moreover, Buresh could be considered two separate 

matters because it involved two different appeals approximately a year 

apart from each other. Although Dolezal’s conduct in the Buresh and 

Carter proceedings did not result in harm to his clients, the neglect in 

the David matter led to the dismissal of David’s appeal. Dolezal’s neglect 

in the David matter was coupled with trust account violations. The 

violations involved a relatively small amount of money ($900), and the 

record does not establish that Dolezal failed to earn the fees, just that he 

did not handle the funds properly.

Dolezal also has a history of past disciplinary problems. He was 

privately admonished in October 2009 for failing to respond to 
17

delinquency notices in another guardianship/conservatorship. In 

addition, Dolezal was privately admonished in the early 1990s for an 

advertising violation and for acquiring a security interest in the property 

of a client that was part of the subject matter of his representation. The 

latter two ethical violations occurred many years ago and do not appear 

to be similar to Dolezal’s more recent ethical lapses.

Dolezal’s right to practice also was suspended in 1991 for 

noncompliance with both continuing legal education requirements and 

client security requirements. This conduct, although it occurred some 

time ago, is more similar in nature to Dolezal’s recent pattern of 

inattention to court requirements.

Dolezal was temporarily suspended from the practice of law in 

March 2010 for failing to respond to inquiry notices from the board 

relating to a complaint. However, we conclude the temporary suspension 

was adequate discipline for failing to respond to the board’s inquiry, and 

will not consider his failure to respond to the board in fashioning any 

additional discipline. Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d at 870.

We also consider any mitigating circumstances. Since the late1980s, Dolezal has undergone periodic counseling for depression 

stemming from his combat service in the Vietnam War. Dolezal 

participates in the counseling voluntarily and is currently taking three 

medications for depression and anxiety. While depression and other 

illnesses do not excuse an attorney’s misconduct, they can be mitigating 

factors that influence our approach to discipline. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d 

at 271. To the extent Dolezal acknowledges his depression and has 

sought appropriate treatment, we should take this into account in 

fashioning an appropriate sanction. Fields, 790 N.W.2d at 799–800. 
18

Dolezal also testified that he underwent back surgery in September 2009 

and was catheterized for three weeks.

Yet Dolezal’s own testimony limits our ability to rely on these 

mitigating circumstances. In general, Dolezal did not attribute his 

specific ethical violations, as described above, to his medical conditions.5 

Rather, he essentially described his failure to take required court action 

in the Buresh, David, and Carter matters as decisions he made with full 

command of his faculties. Dolezal’s attempts to justify his own conduct 

reveal some misunderstanding of ethical duties:

A. . . . I believe my duty is to the client.

Q. Do you believe you have a duty to the court, the courts in 

which you are licensed to practice, as well? A. I have – I see 

that as a secondary duty, yes. I have a duty to the court, 

but I believe my duty to the client exceeds or precedes my 

duty to the court.

See Knopf, 793 N.W.2d at 532 (refusing to consider personal illness as a 

mitigating factor when it was not shown to have affected the attorney’s 

fitness to practice law).

In determining an appropriate sanction, we are guided not only by 

the factors listed above, but also by prior cases. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Conroy, 795 N.W.2d 502, 506, (Iowa 2011). We find 

several prior neglect cases instructive to the present situation.

 5For example, on the Buresh and David matters Dolezal testified:

Q. Now, do you claim that problems with depression that you’ve had had 

anything to do with not getting the work done in the Buresh appeals? A. 

No.

. . . .

Q. And do you claim that your problems with depression had anything 

to do with the David matter, with not following through on the federal 

court case? A. Well, maybe not the following through . . . .

On the Carter matter, Dolezal claimed that he did not go back to court because 

he was “depressed” and “frustrated” about being owed several thousand dollars 

and the estate not having been resolved.
19

In Conroy, we found an attorney neglected two matters, did not

comply with trust account requirements, failed to forward proceeds to a 

client, failed to furnish a timely and complete accounting regarding 

earned fees, failed to communicate with a client, and failed to respond to 

the board’s inquiries and request for documents. Id. at 504–05. As 

mitigating circumstances, we found the attorney voluntarily ceased the 

practice of law and had no prior discipline. Id. at 506. Under these 

circumstances, we determined a sixty-day suspension was appropriate. 

Id. at 507.

Likewise, in Thomas, we found an attorney failed to serve original 

notice on a defendant in a personal injury action resulting in the case 

being dismissed. 794 N.W.2d at 292. The attorney compounded his

neglect by avoiding his clients and then misrepresenting to his clients

the cause of the dismissal. Id. Taking into account the attorney’s 

history of prior disciplinary problems and several mitigating 

circumstances, we determined the attorney should be suspended from 

the practice of law for sixty days. Id. at 295.

In Hoglan, an attorney failed to prosecute four appeals resulting in 

their dismissal. 781 N.W.2d at 282–83. We decided the proper sanction 

was a suspension of thirty days, noting that each dismissal had harmed 

the client (although three of the clients did not hold this against Hoglan), 

the multiple incidents of neglect covered a two-and-a-half-year span, and 

the attorney had already been publicly reprimanded for the dismissal of 

two other appeals due to neglect. Id. at 286–87.

We do not believe this case warrants a sanction as severe as that 

in Conroy and Thomas. In Conroy, the attorney’s neglect was coupled 

with two trust account violations that appear to be more serious than the 

trust account violation in this case. In Thomas, the attorney also made 
20

misrepresentations to his clients, a factor we have not found here. 

Furthermore, while Dolezal’s behavior has inconvenienced the court 

system, in two out of three instances it has not harmed his clients. We 

thus believe a sanction comparable to that in the Hoglan case is 

appropriate. As in Hoglan, we have a pattern of “dilatory handling” of 

litigated matters. See 781 N.W.2d at 287. Also, as in Hoglan, the 

attorney was recently involved with the board due to similar misconduct, 

although in this case Dolezal received a private admonishment, rather 

than a public reprimand. Although we have a trust account violation in 

this case, unlike in Hoglan, this consideration is counterbalanced to 

some extent by the fact that only one of Dolezal’s acts of neglect caused 

harm to the client.

In our view, a public reprimand here would not be adequate. Such 

a sanction might have been appropriate had this case involved only a 

single instance of misconduct. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Sobel, 779 N.W.2d 782, 789–90 (Iowa 2010) (attorney received 

public reprimand for failing to provide accounting for an advance fee 

payment); Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 231 (finding an attorney who failed to 

dismiss an appeal after his client was unable to raise enough funds 

warranted a public reprimand); Piazza, 756 N.W.2d at 700 (attorney 

received public reprimand for failing to place advance fee payment in 

trust account and to provide an accounting); Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d at 

670 (finding an attorney who failed to dismiss appeal after he determined 

it to be without merit warranted a public reprimand); Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dunahoo, 730 N.W.2d 202, 207–08 (Iowa 2007) 

(attorney was publicly reprimanded for failing to provide an accounting 

and neglect in timely closing an estate). The recurring pattern of conduct 

in this case warrants a stiffer sanction—namely, a suspension. See 
21

Marks, 759 N.W.2d at 333 (“Although it is unlikely we would suspend 

Marks’ license for these instances of neglect alone, Marks’ pattern of 

refusing to cooperate with the Board’s investigation tips the scale in favor 

of a short suspension.”). Taking into account all the circumstances of 

this case, for the reasons we have already discussed, we agree with the 

commission’s recommendation of a thirty-day suspension.

IV. Conclusion.

Accordingly, we suspend Dolezal’s license to practice law in the 

State of Iowa for thirty days. This suspension applies to all facets of the 

practice of law. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(3). Dolezal must comply with Iowa 

Court Rule 35.22 dealing with notification of clients and counsel. Costs 

of this action are taxed to Dolezal pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.26.

Absent an objection by the board and under the condition that Dolezal 

has paid all costs assessed under rule 35.26, we shall reinstate Dolezal’s 

license to practice law on the day after the thirty-day suspension period 

expires. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(2).

LICENSE SUSPENDED.