1

Cultivated Clam Pilot Evaluation

Final report

Contract No. D10PX18496

A report prepared for

Risk Management Agency

June 10, 2011

Promar International

333 N. Fairfax St., Suite 202

Alexandria, VA 22314 USA

Tel: (703) 739-9090

Fax: (703) 739-9098

E-mail: promar@promarinternational.com
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Cultivated clam pilot evaluation

Final report

A report prepared for

Risk Management Agency

CONTENTS

SECTION 1: Executive summary ....................................................................................................................................1

1.1 Objective of the project.....................................................................................................................................1

1.2 Methodology..........................................................................................................................................................1

1.3 Background ............................................................................................................................................................1

1.4 Summary of analysis.............................................................................................................................................2

1.5 Recommendations................................................................................................................................................3

1.5.1 Recommendations that affect statutes.......................................................................................................3

1.5.2 Recommendations that affect regulations.................................................................................................3

1.5.3 Recommendations that affect actuarial documents................................................................................5

1.5.4 Recommendations that affect program materials...................................................................................6

1.5.5 Impact analysis..................................................................................................................................................6

SECTION 2: Program evaluation tool findings............................................................................................................7

2.1 The production process.....................................................................................................................................7

2.2 Listening session summary.................................................................................................................................7

2.2.1 Importance of the plan to the local aquaculture sector........................................................................7

2.2.2 Awareness of the plan and its parameters ...............................................................................................8

2.2.3 The insured crop.............................................................................................................................................8

2.2.4 Use of the plan.................................................................................................................................................8

2.2.5 Farmer and agent concerns about the plan..............................................................................................8

2.2.6 Appraisal problems.........................................................................................................................................9

2.2.7 Plan vulnerabilities...........................................................................................................................................9

2.3 Program Evaluation Tool summary .................................................................................................................9

2.3.1 Yield, quality and price risk........................................................................................................................ 10

2.3.2 Other revenue risks and coping mechanisms....................................................................................... 10

2.3.3 Risk classification .......................................................................................................................................... 10

2.3.4 Moral hazard.................................................................................................................................................. 11

2.3.5 Participation................................................................................................................................................... 11

SECTION 3: Evaluation components findings........................................................................................................... 13

3.1 Background to the pilot program ................................................................................................................. 13

3.2 Industry research............................................................................................................................................... 13

3.2.1 The clam industry......................................................................................................................................... 16
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3.2.2 Aquaculture clams........................................................................................................................................ 17

3.3 Insurance experience........................................................................................................................................ 21

3.3.1 Overall Cultivated Clam Pilot insurance experience.......................................................................... 21

3.3.2 Cultivated Clam Pilot insurance experience by state and county ................................................... 21

3.3.3 Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance Buy-Up versus Cat .......................................................................... 27

3.3.4 Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance Participation ...................................................................................... 28

3.3.5 Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance By Reporting Organization............................................................ 30

3.3.6 Cultivated Clam Pilot Indemnity by Cause of Loss ............................................................................. 33

3.3.7 Cultivated Clam Pilot Indemnity Experience By State and County By Day.................................. 37

3.4 Policy content and structure .......................................................................................................................... 40

3.4.1 Principles of aquaculture insurance ......................................................................................................... 40

3.4.2 The insured crop.......................................................................................................................................... 41

3.4.3 Stages............................................................................................................................................................... 41

3.4.4 Inspections..................................................................................................................................................... 42

3.5 Loss adjustment standards.............................................................................................................................. 42

3.6 Underwriting standards................................................................................................................................... 43

3.7 Rating sufficiency and analysis ........................................................................................................................ 45

3.7.1 Discussion - Actuarially Sound.................................................................................................................. 45

3.7.2 Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance Experience......................................................................................... 45

3.7.3 Cultivated Clam Pilot Rates By State and County............................................................................... 46

3.7.4 Cultivated Clam Pilot Survival Factors ................................................................................................... 47

3.7.5 Cultivated Clam Pilot Rates By Stages.................................................................................................... 48

3.7.6 Cultivated Clam Pilot Rates By Coverage Level .................................................................................. 48

3.7.7 Cultivated Clam Pilot Rate Methodology .............................................................................................. 50

3.7.8 Cultivated Clam Pilot Rating Summary................................................................................................... 51

3.8 Pricing analysis.................................................................................................................................................... 51

3.9 Plans of insurance.............................................................................................................................................. 52

3.9.1 AGR and AGR-Lite ...................................................................................................................................... 52

3.9.2 NAP program................................................................................................................................................ 53

3.10 Data acceptance requirements...................................................................................................................... 53

3.11 Program acceptance ......................................................................................................................................... 53

3.12 Program delivery ............................................................................................................................................... 54

3.12.1 Overview................................................................................................................................................... 54

3.12.2 Review of policy files.............................................................................................................................. 55

SECTION 4: Unpublished data report findings........................................................................................................ 59

SECTION 5: Recommendations .................................................................................................................................. 60

5.1 Recommendations that affect statutes......................................................................................................... 60

5.2 Recommendations that affect regulations................................................................................................... 60

5.2.1 Conversion to a permanent program..................................................................................................... 60

5.2.2 Modification and continuation as a pilot................................................................................................. 60

5.2.3 Termination ................................................................................................................................................... 61

5.3 Recommendations that affect actuarial documents.................................................................................. 62

5.3.1 Special Provisions of Insurance................................................................................................................. 62

5.3.2 FCI-35 Coverage and Rates....................................................................................................................... 62

5.4 Recommendations that affect program materials..................................................................................... 62

5.5 Impact analysis.................................................................................................................................................... 62

5.5.1 Impact on government costs..................................................................................................................... 62
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5.5.2 Impact on insurers....................................................................................................................................... 62

5.5.3 Impact on clam producers......................................................................................................................... 62

Appendix A: Listening session comments...................................................................................................................... 63

a) Florida listening sessions................................................................................................................................. 63

b) Virginia listening session.................................................................................................................................. 67

c) Massachusetts listening session ..................................................................................................................... 71

d) South Carolina industry input........................................................................................................................ 73

Appendix B: Diagnostic instruments................................................................................................................................. 74

Appendix C: Statistical summary........................................................................................142

Appendix D: Analysis of loss experience by day.....................................................................217

Appendix E: Data for figures in the report...........................................................................250
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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: US Clam Supply...................................................................................................................................................... 16

Table 2: Clam landings by species ..................................................................................................................................... 17

Table 3: Price per pound by species................................................................................................................................. 17

Table 4: Price per meat pound for aquaculture clams................................................................................................. 18

Table 5: US Aquaculture Hard Clam Sales in 2005 ...................................................................................................... 19

Table 6: Hard Clam Price Structure in 2004.................................................................................................................. 20

Table 7: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience - All Pilot Counties................................................................................ 21

Table 8: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience - Brevard County, Florida.................................................................... 22

Table 9: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Dixie County, Florida........................................................................ 22

Table 10: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Indian River County, Florida ......................................................... 23

Table 11: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Levy County, Florida ....................................................................... 24

Table 12: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Barnstable County, Massachusetts.............................................. 24

Table 13: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Plymouth County, Massachusetts................................................ 25

Table 14: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Beaufort County, South Carolina ................................................ 25

Table 15: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Charleston County, South Carolina............................................ 26

Table 16: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Accomack County, Virginia ........................................................... 26

Table 17: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Northampton County, Virginia .................................................... 27

Table 18: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Liability by Coverage Level $(000s) ............................................ 28

Table 19: Cultivated Clam Pilot - Total Clam Value in $Millions.............................................................................. 29

Table 20: Cultivated Clam Pilot Participation ................................................................................................................ 29

Table 21: Cultivated Clam Pilot – Experience by Reporting Organization ............................................................ 30

Table 22: Cultivated Clam Pilot – Experience by Reporting Organization ............................................................ 31

Table 23: Cultivated Clam Pilot – Experience by Reporting Organization ........................................................... 31

Table 24: Cultivated Clam Pilot – Experience by Reporting Organization ............................................................ 32

Table 25: Cultivated Clam Pilot – Experience by Reporting Organization ............................................................ 32

Table 26: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience in $Millions ............................................................................................ 45

Table 27: Cultivated Clam Pilot Policy Base Rates for 2011...................................................................................... 46

Table 28: Cultivated Clam Pilot Policy Base Rates for Stage 3.................................................................................. 46

Table 29: Cultivated Clam Pilot Results Crop Years 2004-2010 - Recast at 2011 Base Rates......................... 47

Table 30: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience - 2004 to 2010 - Survival Factors.................................................... 48

Table 31: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience ................................................................................................................... 48

Table 32: Cultivate Clam Pilot Experience ..................................................................................................................... 49

Table 33: Cultivated Clam Pilot Example ........................................................................................................................ 49

Table 34: Cultivated Clam Pilot Rating Example ........................................................................................................... 49

Table 35: Cultivated Clam Pilot Comparison of Producer Paid Rates to AGR-Lite............................................ 53
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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Pilot States & Counties for the Cultivated Clam Insurance Program..................................................... 14

Figure 2 Virginia clam production data ........................................................................................................................... 20

Figure 3 Indemnity by Cause of Loss – Florida 2000 - 2003..................................................................................... 33

Figure 4: Indemnity by Cause of Loss – Florida 2004 - 2010.................................................................................... 33

Figure 5 Indemnity by Cause of Loss – Massachusetts 2000 - 2003....................................................................... 34

Figure 6 Indemnity by Cause of Loss – Massachusetts 2004 - 2010....................................................................... 34

Figure 7 Indemnity by Cause of Loss – Virginia 2000 - 2003.................................................................................... 35

Figure 8 Indemnity by Cause of Loss – Virginia 2004 - 2010.................................................................................... 35

Figure 9 Indemnity by Cause of Loss – South Carolina 2000 - 2003...................................................................... 36

Figure 10 Indemnity by Cause of Loss – South Carolina 2004 2010 ...................................................................... 36

Figure 11 Clam Indemnity Counts – Levy County, Florida ....................................................................................... 37

Figure 12 Clam Indemnity Counts – Barnstable County, Massachusetts .............................................................. 38

Figure 13 Clam Indemnity Counts – Accomack County, Virginia ........................................................................... 39

Figure 14 Cultivated Clams Pilot Coverage Level Relativity Comparison............................................................. 50

Figure 15 Virginia Clam Prices.......................................................................................................................................... 52

Figure 16: Letter regarding Massachusetts claim........................................................................................................... 58
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Executive summary

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SECTION 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Objective of the project

The objectives outlined in the contract for this project specified that we were to provide the Risk 

Management Agency (RMA) with the information necessary to determine whether the Cultivated Clam 

Pilot Crop Insurance Program should be modified and extended, terminated, or converted to a permanent 

program. 

1.2 Methodology

The evaluation was conducted by staff of Promar International and Milliman Inc. We were assisted by the 

staff of the Virginia Institute of Marine Science and by the University of Florida’s Multi-County Extension 

Agent for aquaculture. The methodology for this evaluation had five components:

 Desk research on the industry

 Review and analysis of the insurance experience records

 Review of the policy documents

 Listening sessions in pilot areas, supplemented by phone interviews

 Completion of Program Evaluation Diagnostic Instruments for each region.

1.3 Background

The Cultivated Clam Pilot Crop Insurance Program was announced in 1999 for the 2000-2003 crop years 

as RMA’s first insurance policy for aquaculture producers. Insuring aquaculture producers is challenging. 

The only other RMA products serving their risk management needs to some degree are the AGR and 

AGR-Lite plans, and a new group risk plan for Louisiana oysters introduced in 2010. (In response to a 

Congressional mandate, RMA has commissioned additional studies of the feasibility of insuring aquacultural 

production of freshwater and saltwater fish and bivalves, including clams.)

The Cultivated Clam Pilot was subsequently extended through 2005 and then through 2007 pending the 

results of an outside evaluation. In 2007 the FCIC’s Board of Directors approved a continuation of the 

pilot program through crop year 2011 after some additional modifications to program provisions. In 2010, 

6 of the 13 eligible counties in the four East Coast pilot states (Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina and 

Virginia) had producers participating in the plan. 

The pilot program covers hard clams of the species Mercenaria mercenaria (often referred to as quahogs) 

that are produced using aquaculture techniques. These clams account for about 6% of total US clam 

production by volume, but 21% by value. As indicated when the program was first announced, the two 

main reasons that clams were selected for the first aquatic crop insurance program were their resistance 

to disease and because they can be secured within specific boundaries.

The program had a troubled few years at the beginning with very high loss ratios. RMA implemented 

various changes on its own in 2004 and after a 2007 outside evaluation of the program. Those changes 

brought loss ratios down to more acceptable levels but they also significantly reduced producer interest in 

the program. Buy-up policies earning premium dropped from the 300-500 range in the early years to 
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Executive summary

2

fewer than 100 in the most recent three years. CAT policies earning premium averaged about 25 per year 

over most of the period. For 2010, the Summary of Business shows the number of policies earning 

premium dropping to 74 as of June 6, 2011 – 71 buyup and 3 CAT. Participation in Florida dropped 

sharply in 2010 due to the requirement that all policies undergo a pre-acceptance inspection, including 

sampling three percent of the insured bags.

1.4 Summary of analysis

There is less risk involved in producing clams than for many other crops. This is reflected in the base 

premium rate of about 3% in all states but Florida. The perils are mostly weather related, e.g. storm surge, 

freeze, ice flow, hurricane, or a change in salinity due to influx of fresh water from heavy onshore rains. 

Disease only accounted for three percent of indemnities over the life of the pilot.

The Program Evaluation Diagnostic instruments show that yield is the major risk. When clams are planted 

they are smaller than half an inch. As they grow to maturity there is normal mortality of 30-40%. The 

insurance plan provides coverage for losses above that normal mortality. There is little quality risk, as 

clams are generally marketable if alive. The pilot does not cover price risk, but clam prices seem to vary 

less than prices of many other products, probably because growers have some flexibility in deciding 

whether or not to harvest from the existing inventory.

We reviewed the experience data provided by RMA, which is summarized in the following table. After 

changes were made in 2004, the loss ratio for the subsequent years fell to 108% from 179% during the first 

four years of the pilot. The more favorable results have been due to the fact that the pilot insurance is 

mostly purchased at lower coverage levels, with 50% the most popular.

Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience - All Pilot Counties

Crop Year

Liability in 

$000s

Total 

Premium in 

$000s

Policies 

Earning 

Premium

Indemnity in 

$000s Loss Ratio

2000 36,121 1,126 335 2,070 184%

2001 41,215 1,401 377 2,881 206%

2002 59,953 2,181 472 4,019 184%

2003 51,177 1,860 417 2,775 149%

2004 27,701 969 293 2,182 225%

2005 18,160 626 202 624 100%

2006 26,119 932 164 677 73%

2007 26,780 973 144 502 52%

2008 30,843 1,051 111 407 39%

2009 27,880 674 107 1,557 231%

2010 23,499 520 74 241 46%

2000-2003 188,466 6,567.5 1,601 11,744 179%

2004-2010 180,982 5,745 1,095 6,191 108%

Grand Total 369,448 12,312 2,696 17,935 146%
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Executive summary

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The participation rate for the quahog industry is difficult to calculate due to lack of comparable data and 

the fact that clams are grown for longer than one year. For 2005 we estimate that 60% of the sales value 

and 73% of the clam farms in the pilot states were participating in the pilot. Assuming that the number of 

farms has not changed much, participation in 2010 was about 25% of eligible growers.

We held listening sessions in Florida, Virginia and Massachusetts, and received input from South Carolina 

growers by phone and email. Other information by phone or email from growers, agents, appraisers and 

insurance company representatives supplemented the listening sessions. In the Florida listening sessions 

the main concern was the pre-acceptance inspections. Outside of the sessions there were repeated 

allegations of fraud in the Gulf coast counties. Growers in counties other than the pilot counties wanted 

to either have the insurance available statewide or have the pilot terminated because it has left them at a 

competitive disadvantage.

In Virginia, the listening session attendees mostly want to see the program continued, viewing it as 

important for the growth of the industry in the state. However, we note that growers have been rapidly 

diversifying into oysters. We also received an allegation of fraud in that state, but our Virginia consultants 

thought it lacked credibility.

In Massachusetts, growers seemed indifferent to the program and it received no positive endorsements. 

Oysters are the primary crop for shellfish growers in the state, with 4 times the volume and 7 times the 

value of clams produced in 2010. South Carolina growers have not been participating but their association 

representatives urge continuation to potentially serve shrimpers idled by low cost imports who are 

beginning to shift to clam production.

We were unable to confirm allegations of fraud in Florida from the RMA experience data, but believe they 

are credible based on the input we received.

Insurance companies appear to put most if not all of the liability in the assigned risk pool but we did not 

have data to verify this. The insurance is not marketed aggressively because the policies are costly to 

administer and claims are difficult and expensive to appraise. Our examination of two policy files revealed 

other shortcomings in program delivery.

We reviewed the policy documents and found few problems. If the pilot is continued, this evaluation 

includes recommended revisions to the underwriting guide.

1.5 Recommendations

1.5.1 Recommendations that affect statutes

We have no recommendations requiring statutory changes.

1.5.2 Recommendations that affect regulations

With regard to regulatory changes, our primary recommendation is that the pilot program be terminated.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Executive summary

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We will first review the arguments for those courses we have not recommended and then explain why we 

have recommended termination of the pilot.

Conversion to a permanent program

This pilot will be in its twelfth year of operation in 2011, the final year currently authorized. During the 

first four years the average loss ratio was quite high at 179%. Changes implemented with the 2004 crop 

year addressed a number of problems with the initial design, and the loss ratio has averaged 108% for 

2004-2010. That is a positive development but there are two factors that prevent us from recommending 

that the pilot be converted to a permanent program. 

First, participation has declined every year since 2002. By 2005 there were 202 policies earning premium. 

The Census of Aquaculture for that year showed 276 farms producing market-size hard clams in the four 

pilot states, so 73% of those farms were covered. The percentage was necessarily higher in the pilot 

counties. By 2009 the policies earning premium had dropped to 107, and in 2010 to fewer than 75.

Second, there continue to be allegations of fraud, particularly in Florida. The nature of aquaculture is that 

the stock of animals is difficult to count, so determining stock mortality – the basis of this dollar insurance 

plan – is inherently challenging. In the case of hard clams, there continue to be vulnerabilities to abuse of 

the insurance coverage according to input from the listening sessions. 

Clams of this type are also produced in other parts of Florida as well as in Connecticut, New Jersey and 

North Carolina. There would clearly be some interest among growers in those areas in having access to 

insurance coverage. However, we cannot recommend conversion to a permanent program given the 

pilot’s trajectory and its vulnerability to abuse.

Modification and continuation as a pilot

For the same and related reasons, we cannot recommend continuation of the current pilot with 

modifications. We do not think that modifying plan provisions would increase participation rates. In 

Massachusetts there is no participation in four of the five pilot counties. In South Carolina there were no 

participants at all in 2008 or 2009, and only one last year. This is despite very low out-of-pocket premiums 

in all states except Florida. With continuation, we would recommend dropping Florida from the pilot due 

to concerns about fraud. That would leave only Virginia, where the program is well supported, plus a few 

policies in Massachusetts where growers have been lukewarm about it.

Participation in Florida dropped sharply in 2010 after RMA appropriately required pre-acceptance 

inspections for every policy. Eliminating the requirement for such inspections would probably cause 

participation to recover in that state, but we believe it would result in higher loss ratios. The insurance 

companies that have been successful at controlling losses mostly require that plantings be certified by an 

adjuster more often than dictated by the underwriting standards for the pilot.

One reason the pilot has not been successful is that it is both challenging and expensive for the AIPs to 

administer. Most, if not all, of the liability is reportedly placed in the assigned risk pool. The A&O expense 

allowance also may not be adequate to cover the companies’ actual costs. Thus the incentive to market 

the plan has been weak. This will not change with plan modifications.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Executive summary

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We did give consideration to two other factors. First, RMA has commissioned a research study on the 

feasibility of insuring bivalves, including oysters, mussels and clams. That might argue for continuing the 

pilot for another year or two pending the results of that study. But while it is conceivable that some 

recommendation might emerge with respect to clams that would involve a modification we have not 

considered, we think it is unlikely. 

Second, the two AIPs that have written the most coverage have cumulative 11-year loss ratios that are 

below 100%, suggesting that it is possible to run a successful program. However, this is entirely due to 

results in Virginia and does not imply that a geographically broader program can succeed. The Virginia 

results are attributable to the larger scale of growers in that state, the propensity to buy just 50 or 60 

percent coverage, and the requirement by at least one insurer that every planting be inspected by an 

adjuster.

While we are not recommending modifying and continuing the pilot, if the FCIC Board were to decide to 

continue the pilot, we would recommend the following main modifications:

 Drop the state of Florida from the pilot program.

 Clarify in the underwriting standards that pre-acceptance inspections must include sampling of the 

plantings following procedures in the loss adjustment standards handbook.

Termination

We recommend terminating the Cultivated Clam Pilot Crop Insurance Program after the 2011 crop year. 

There are four reasons:

 Participation has steadily declined and has now fallen to a level that cannot sustain a viable 

program.

 There continue to be allegations of fraud, particularly in Florida but in other states as well.

 This first program for an aquaculture crop is challenging and expensive for AIPs to operate.

 We do not find any potential program modifications that could be anticipated to both improve the 

performance of the program and increase grower participation.

If the pilot is terminated, clam growers will have access to the Farm Service Agency’s NAP program which 

can provide a degree of catastrophic protection. The AGR-Lite program is also available in all the pilot 

counties and can provide good insurance cover for those growers with five years of tax records, although 

at a higher cost in premiums.

1.5.3 Recommendations that affect actuarial documents

Special Provisions of Insurance

We have no recommended changes.

FCI-35 Coverage and Rates

We have no recommended changes.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Executive summary

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1.5.4 Recommendations that affect program materials

If the pilot were to be modified and continued, we recommend a number of revisions to the underwriting 

guide to correct or simplify wording and to clarify that pre-acceptance inspections must include taking 

actual samples from the production site, following procedures in the loss adjustment handbook. The 

purpose is to certify that the clams to be insured actually exist and were planted at a rate per square foot 

no greater than that listed in the special provisions for each pilot area. Some insurers already do this 

annually, but at a minimum it must be done for an initial application or whenever the policy is transferred 

to a different insurance company.

1.5.5 Impact analysis

Impact on government costs

Termination of the pilot would be the lowest cost option for the government. On the cost side, we 

estimate that a total of one person month would be required to implement the termination. On the 

savings side, current staff resources devoted to managing the pilot would be freed up but we do not have 

an estimate of the person months involved. 

If the Board were to decide to modify and continue the pilot, we estimate that a total of three person 

months would be required. In both cases this takes into account the personnel doing the actual work, 

those with supervisory responsibilities for reviewing and approving that work, and those tasked with 

communicating the changes to insurance providers.

Impact on insurers

Insurance providers would lose a source of potential revenue if the pilot is terminated. If 2010

participation remains representative, with its total premium of about $520,000, the companies collectively 

would lose potential A&O revenue of $114,000 but have a small offset for lower liabilities if the loss ratio 

remains above 100% (assuming they continue to put most of these policies in the assigned risk pool).

Impact on clam producers

Those growers who produce cultivated clams would lose a valuable risk management tool. Without the 

pilot program, their next best option would be either FSA’s NAP program or AGR-Lite. The NAP 

program has much lower levels of coverage and a maximum indemnity of $100,000, but it also costs next 

to nothing. The AGR-Lite policy has a much higher liability limit of $1,000,000 but it is more expensive.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Program evaluation tool findings

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SECTION 2: PROGRAM EVALUATION TOOL FINDINGS

2.1 The production process

The production process for the hard clams covered by the pilot program, the Mercenaria mercenaria

species, involves three stages: hatchery, nursery and growout. In the hatchery, brood stock are induced to 

spawn and the larval clams are grown to the one millimeter size. At that point they are put in a nursery, 

where they feed on algae enriched water and increase in size to 7-15 mm. The nursery stage may occur 

entirely on land, entirely in the ocean, or partly in both. In the growout stage the seed clams are planted 

on the bottom, either covered by netting or in mesh bags. The clams use their foot to burrow into the 

substrate. Two siphons extend to the surface, one to bring in seawater containing the phytoplankton that 

clams feed on, and one to expel waste. The insurance program covers only clams 10 mm or greater in size 

when planted for growout. Nursery clams were covered during the first four years of the pilot but are no 

longer eligible for insurance. The program evaluation tool and listening sessions therefore focused on the 

growout phase.

The evaluation of the pilot program that was undertaken by RTI during 2006-2007 included very thorough 

Program Evaluation Diagnostic Instruments for each of the four states. We have revised those instruments 

based on the listening sessions and our other research. They are provided in Appendix B. We will first 

summarize the listening session results provided in Appendix A because they had an important influence on 

our revision of the diagnostic instruments. We then summarize the program evaluation tool findings.

2.2 Listening session summary

We conducted two listening sessions in Florida in December 2010 – one on the Atlantic coast in Sebastian 

and one on the Gulf coast in Cedar Key. In February we held sessions in Melfa Virginia and Plymouth 

Massachusetts. We were unable to arrange a listening session in South Carolina but received written input 

from two associations and spoke with individual growers by phone.

2.2.1 Importance of the plan to the local aquaculture sector

The only state where a listening session conveyed a clear message that the insurance plan is important for 

the future of the state’s aquaculture industry was Virginia. It is the state with the greatest production and 

has larger companies producing clams than in other states due in part to the large size of available leases. 

Florida is the second largest producer, but there the message was mixed. Most producers who 

participated in the listening sessions want to keep the program, but producers we heard from in other 

parts of the state thought the program put them at a disadvantage and urged termination if the program is 

not extended to other producing counties. 

Massachusetts growers seemed disinterested and we received no positive endorsements of the program. 

In South Carolina the almost total lack of participation speaks for itself. However, the South Carolina 

Shellfish Growers Association and the South Carolina Seafood Alliance both asked that the pilot be 

continued for their state. A key reason that both gave is that shrimpers who are getting trade adjustment 

assistance due to competition from low priced imports are turning to clam aquaculture, and they see 

potential for growth in the aquaculture industry and in use of the insurance plan.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Program evaluation tool findings

8

2.2.2 Awareness of the plan and its parameters

Awareness of the plan seemed greatest in Virginia and Florida, more limited in Massachusetts where there 

is no participation in four of the five pilot counties, and very poor in South Carolina, where one grower 

told us that in his twenty years of raising clams he had never heard of it. In Florida, for example, there was 

poor understanding that pulling bags for inspection on the lease site does not constitute “removal” and the 

consequent uninsurability of those clams. Bringing the clams to shore does constitute removal, as was 

clarified during the listening session by RMA personnel. For a pilot that has been in operation for 11 

years, one would expect a greater degree of familiarity with the provisions. However, insurance agents 

have not had a strong incentive to market the plan due to its inherent underwriting and appraisal 

challenges. No agents or loss adjusters attended the listening sessions in Florida.

2.2.3 The insured crop

Some would certainly like to see nursery clams covered in addition to growout clams, but most recognize 

that the poor experience with that in the early years of the pilot makes it very unlikely to happen. The 

only other comment we received regarding the definition of insured crop was in Florida where there is 

considerable experimentation with hybridization of the Mercenaria mercenaria species with native clams, 

particularly Mercenaria campechiensis. Breeders believe that this cross has good prospects and will have 

greater survivability. Another local hard clam is the sunray venus which is also not currently eligible for 

insurance coverage. There was discussion of whether the ongoing hybridization work means one should 

not limit the program to Mercenaria mercenaria.

As discussed in Section 3.2.2, there are other types of clams that are being produced with aquaculture 

techniques. A feasibility research study commissioned by RMA is now underway to assess the potential for 

insuring a range of bivalves, including oysters, mussels, and these other clam types.

2.2.4 Use of the plan

Clam growers seem increasingly happy to do without the insurance. The 2005 Census of Aquaculture 

reported 277 hard calm farms in the four states. As discussed below in Section 3, there were 202 policies 

earning premium that year. The number has declined every year since, to 107 in 2009 and fewer than 75

in 2010. However some growers do see it as a critical part of their business plan. For example, one large 

Florida grower on the Atlantic coast said he would get out of the business if there were no insurance.

2.2.5 Farmer and agent concerns about the plan

Three main concerns about the plan were expressed by growers. First, we frequently heard allegations of 

fraud in Florida from people in both that state and Virginia. The nature of clam production does make it 

somewhat more amenable to fraud than many other crops. There was also an allegation of fraud in 

Virginia.

Second, Florida growers complained about the requirement to pull three percent of their bags for preacceptance inspections. They asserted, and the extension specialist agreed, that pulling bags for inspection 

causes increased mortality and introduces disease risks when the clams are replanted. However, growers 

in other parts of Florida and in other states thought pulling bags did not create significant risks.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

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9

Third, we heard complaints in Florida and Massachusetts about claims being unjustly denied, and/or delays 

in settlement of claims. These seem to get widely repeated, whether merited or not, and undoubtedly 

contribute to lower participation rates.

Agents and insurers have concerns about the inspection and appraisal process that technically may require 

them to actually get in the water or at least travel over water to lease sites. Most AIP staff are 

accustomed to dealing only with land-based crop and livestock production. Inspecting and appraising clams 

takes most of them well out of their comfort zone. Some, for example, cannot swim. Second, the amount 

of time and effort involved in selling and servicing these policies is higher in relation to premium than for 

other insurance plans.

2.2.6 Appraisal problems

We heard surprisingly few complaints about appraisal problems. Appraisals are challenging, in that they 

can involve working in water, but the methods for bags and bottom plant are accepted. All recognize that 

to prove a claim you have to count the clams. As mentioned above, no agents or adjusters attended the 

Florida listening sessions even though there were inspections occurring on the date of the listening session 

in Cedar Key and it would have been convenient.

2.2.7 Plan vulnerabilities 

One can drive by a corn field and see for oneself whether there is corn there. Clams are not only under 

water, they bury themselves down in the substrate. On a large lease, or multiple leases, who really knows 

where clams were planted, and at what density? Plan vulnerabilities arise mostly from the fact that the 

grower knows what is going on down there but it is more difficult for the agent or appraiser to accurately 

assess that. In bag culture in deeper water, as in Florida, it is also reportedly possible for the grower to 

practice deception and pull bags with dead clams. 

Other vulnerabilities arise from the arbitrary cutoff points for stages with different prices, and from the 

diversity of the hard clam market. There are markets for clams over a wide range of sizes, from three 

quarters of an inch to over three inches. At the lower end, getting 100% of the insurance price can be 

more attractive than the market price.

2.3 Program Evaluation Tool summary

Diagnostic tools were completed for all four states and are provided in Appendix B. In general, the 

assessments for the four states are quite similar. The main differences are associated with the larger scale 

in Virginia, and the greater potential for moral hazard with bag culture in Florida. 

For many of the questions a scale of one to five is used, and we refer to those scores in parts of the 

following discussion. Depending on the context, they signify e.g. “much less”, “less”, “average”, “more” or 

“much more”. For ten of the seventeen questions using that scale, the scores are the same for all four 

states.
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2.3.1 Yield, quality and price risk

The pilot counties for the clam pilot are not in major crop producing areas, and clam growers are not 

generally involved in production of terrestrial crop or animal products. Therefore, in one respect it is 

somewhat artificial to compare the risks of clam production to the risks of producing other crops covered 

by FCIC insurance plans. In the statistical sense though, risk is risk and can be compared based on the 

premium that has to be charged to achieve actuarial soundness. 

Clam yield risk tends to be lower than yield risk for other crops in the pilot counties. We scored it much 

less risky in Virginia, less risky in Massachusetts and South Carolina, and of average risk relative to other 

local crops in Florida. Looking at yield risk overall, however, we scored all but Virginia as average risk. 

Due to greater ability to diversify geographically, we rated Virginia producers as facing less yield risk.

Clams are subject to little quality risk. In general, if alive they are marketable. Disease can be an issue but 

may not be evident to the consumer. And the incidence of disease is rather small, representing only three 

percent of total liabilities paid. There can be quality issues that arise after harvesting, such as broken shells 

due to handling, or poor survivability due to cold chain violations. But these are not insurable and at 

harvest on the lease site, variability of quality is not an issue.

We assessed price risk as average, both relative to other local crops and within the production cycle. 

Massachusetts and Virginia growers also produce oysters. For both crops there is not a lot of short term 

price variability, in part because a grower can often harvest more from his inventory when prices go up, or 

just leave them to grow a little more when prices are low. 

2.3.2 Other revenue risks and coping mechanisms

Clam growers face a number of other risks but for all four states we rated them as less important than the 

combination of yield, quality and price risks. These include inadequate availability of seed from hatcheries 

or nurseries, area closures by government agencies due to disease or other concerns, poor growing 

conditions due to low phytoplankton populations, and harvesting delays due to weather events.

The ability of clam growers to self-insure is limited. They get most of their farm income from clams – an 

estimated 60% in Massachusetts, 85% in Virginia, 95% in South Carolina, and 100% in Florida. And only a 

minority are part-time clam farmers – an estimated 40% in Massachusetts and 15-20% in the other states. 

Growers in Massachusetts and Virginia have been diversifying into oyster production, but some of the 

same perils that affect clams would also affect oysters. 

Only the larger Virginia growers have some ability to diversify geographically. This is due to the larger 

lease sizes in that state and the ability to produce on both the sea side and Chesapeake Bay side of 

Virginia’s Eastern Shore. This led us to score availability of non-insurance coping mechanisms as “average” 

in Virginia, compared to below average in Massachusetts, and much below in the two other states.

2.3.3 Risk classification

Risk in shellfish farming is sometimes thought to be on a “waterbody scale” in that the weather or 

environmental changes that cause problems have the same effect on everyone in the area. But much 
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

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depends on the specific location of each lease and its individual exposure to freezing during low tide, 

salinity changes due to rainfall runoff, storm surges, etc. We concluded for all states that some clam 

growers are riskier to insure than others. Thus while the pilot’s provisions do an adequate job of 

establishing the guarantee, they are completely ineffective at classifying growers according to their loss 

exposure. There is no system to capture individual growers’ yield history and base the premium on that 

history. Everyone in a county pays the same rate.

2.3.4 Moral hazard

The insured’s behavior is difficult and expensive to monitor for several reasons. The clams are underwater 

much of the time and many lease sites must be visited by boat, which is relatively difficult and expensive 

compared with other commodities. There are significant time constraints for inspections due to the tides, 

which may necessitate multiple days for inspections of growers with multiple sites or inspections of 

multiple growers, even if they are located very close to one another. In bottom plant areas, growers 

typically only work their beds at low tides, when the clam beds are not underwater. Even when the beds 

are exposed, the clams are still not visible unless they are dead because live clams keep themselves buried 

under the substrate in which they are growing. Thus, inspectors can more easily inspect the condition of 

the lease site and the cover nets than the clams themselves. The clams can be sampled and dug up to 

assess their condition, but this is a time-consuming process. 

Where bag culture is used, bags can be randomly pulled up and assessed, but assessors are generally 

dependent on growers taking them out to their lease sites and there have been concerns that growers 

could potentially choose to visit and select only bags that they know are in good condition. Growers do 

not like to pull up many bags because bags are typically attached to one another and must be cut apart, and 

they also think that it increases mortality to pull up bags and then put them back.

This product is very unique for the insurance companies to monitor and there have been a number of 

concerns that they are less familiar with this product than others and do not sufficiently understand 

appropriate management strategies and therefore cannot fully evaluate behaviors observed. The 

management practice that can be best monitored and has an effect on yield/survival is probably stocking 

density. 

For these reasons we concluded that the potential for gaming yields through acts of management is high, 

and in Florida very high. In fact we think that Florida should be dropped from the pilot if it is extended. In 

contrast, the potential to game quality is very low, because there is no coverage for quality under the 

insurance pilot. Overall, we rated the extent of moral hazard problems as significant for South Carolina, 

Virginia and Massachusetts, and very large for Florida.

2.3.5 Participation

For agents as well as the companies, clam insurance is a unique product. It requires more time for agents 

to learn about, and the small markets in all four states seem to have limited agent interest. There were 

concerns expressed by stakeholders about the perceived lack of agent and adjuster knowledge of the clam 

industry and details of the clam insurance program, as well as lack of interest in selling clam policies among 

agents.
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Clam insurance is a unique product for which it is difficult and expensive to monitor insured behavior and 

adjust losses. Therefore, it is difficult for companies to justify investments in marketing and servicing clam 

policies. Companies seem to have limited interest in marketing this product, and a couple are doing it only 

due to company policy to serve all agricultural producers nationwide.

Participation has been declining. For Florida we concluded that participation could rebound if one 

eliminated the requirement for pre-acceptance inspections. However, this would likely result in payment 

of unacceptably high indemnities. For the other three states we concluded that there is little prospect that 

changes in the plan provisions could increase participation. 
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SECTION 3: EVALUATION COMPONENTS FINDINGS

3.1 Background to the pilot program

The cultivated clam insurance program was approved in July 1999 for the 2000-2003 crop years in the 

following pilot counties, which are also shown on the map on the next page:

 Massachusetts – Barnstable, Bristol, Dukes, Nantucket and Plymouth counties;

 Virginia – Accomack and Northampton counties

 South Carolina – Beaufort and Charleston counties; and

 Florida – Brevard, Dixie, Indian River, and Levy counties.

The insured crop is the Mercenaria mercenaria species of clam, grown in an acceptable location using a 

practice that fixes the clams to the ocean bottom. This clam is also referred to as a quahog or hard clam, 

to distinguish it from soft shell, geoduck, and other clam types.

During the first four years of the pilot there were numerous problems resulting in high loss ratios. An 

internal review in 2003 resulted in a wide range of changes in the pilot design for the following crop year 

and the Board extended it through 2005. Coverage was eliminated for nursery clams (those less than 10 

mm). RMA added growth stages and authorized optional units by stage, with early stages receiving less 

than the full price per clam. Language was added requiring at least three years of experience growing 

clams and managing a clam farming operation. Ice flow was added as a cause of loss and there were a 

number of other changes as well. Since then the policy has covered the following perils: oxygen depletion, 

disease, freeze, hurricane, decrease in salinity, tidal wave, storm surge, or ice flow.

In June 2005 the Board extended the pilot program through 2007 to provide time for an outside 

evaluation. That was completed in the spring of 2007 and the Board extended the program through 2011. 

Beginning with 2008, clam leases had to be identified by their Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates.

The current evaluation was commissioned in November 2010 to provide recommendations to RMA and 

the Board regarding whether to convert the pilot to a permanent program, extend it with modifications, or 

terminate it.

3.2 Industry research

Data on the cultivated clam industry and how it fits in the larger US seafood market is rather limited. The 

principle source of annual data is the “Fisheries of the United States” report from the National Marine 

Fisheries Service (NMFS). The most recent issue covers 2009. The information in the NMFS report 

comes from many sources, including NMFS field offices that work with state and federal agencies to 

compile this data. A major shortcoming for our purposes is that the publication shows clam meat weights 

and prices per pound, whereas cultivated clams are sold and priced by piece. NMFS uses a factor of 0.4 to 

convert gross weight of clams to meat weight, a factor that seems much too high for the Mercenaria 

mercenaria hard clams covered by the insurance policy. Nevertheless, the publication does allow us to put 

the cultivated clam business into a broader context, and to distinguish the species covered by the pilot 

program from other species produced through aquaculture.
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Figure 1: Pilot States & Counties for the Cultivated Clam Insurance Program
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The states and counties highlighted in Figure 1 are:

• Massachusetts

 Barnstable County

 Bristol County

 Dukes County

 Nantucket County

 Plymouth County

• Virginia

 Accomack

 Northampton

• South Carolina Counties

 Beaufort

 Charleston

• Florida

 Brevard

 Dixie

 Indian River

 Levy

The other main source of data on US aquaculture is the 2005 Census of Aquaculture, developed by 

USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). Another census was planned for 2010 but it has 

been delayed by budget issues and could be cancelled. The Census of Aquaculture does not disclose 

information that is about a specific company. Therefore in states with very few producers the data is not 

disclosed. However, when the totals across the US are looked at, the volumes and values from the states 

with consolidated data are included. In contrast to the NMFS report, the survey reports the number of 

clams produced and the price per clam. Clams vary in size but there do not appear to be any official 

conversion factors from clam count to meat weight, even for the broad categories like littlenecks.

In commerce, the Mercenaria mercenaria clams are commonly referred to as quahogs, the original Indian 

name, or by their general size classification:

 Chowder- 2.5-3.0 inch hinge

 Cherrystone- 2 inch hinge

 Topneck-1.5 inch hinge

 Middleneck- 1.25 hinge

 Littleneck-1 inch hinge

 Button- .88 inch hinge

 Pasta- .75 inch hinge.
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3.2.1 The clam industry

According to the 2009 “Fisheries of the United States” report, clams were the seventh most valuable 

seafood species in the US in 2009. They were valued at $191 million. This figure includes all US domestic 

species of clams that were landed or harvested in 2009. Of that amount, hard clams accounted for $41 

million, or 21% of the total. The Mercenaria mercenaria species that is covered by the crop insurance pilot 

is the principal hard clam.

There were 101 million pounds of US commercial clam landings in 2009. Of those, 5.7 million pounds 

were hard clams, or nearly 6% of the total. Hard clams are more valuable than some of the other species 

of clams. They are usually sold fresh, often served on the half shell, which makes them more expensive, 

and explains why 6% of the clams by weight make up more than 20% of the value. 

To determine estimated domestic consumption of hard clams, the trade data is needed in addition to the 

landings data. The “Fisheries of the United States” report includes trade information but it is not specific 

to hard clams. It gives the pounds imported and exported in clam meat equivalent for each year between 

2000 and 2009. Since the official trade data is in actual commercial weight, NMFS converts it to meat 

weight using the following factors: 0.40 for in shell or shucked; 0.30 for canned chowder and juice; and 

0.93 for all other. Without trade data by species, it is impossible to tell exactly how many hard clams were 

consumed domestically. 

Domestic aquaculture competes with both wild harvest and imports of clams. US commercial landings, 

including aquaculture, are broken into 7 categories: hard quahog, Pacific geoduck, Pacific manila, ocean 

quahog, softshell, Atlantic surf and other. Table 2 below shows the quantity (in pounds of meat) and value 

(in thousand dollars) for each species. The hard quahogs are also referred to as hard clams by NMFS and 

they are the clams covered by this insurance program. As one can see, there was a decrease in hard 

quahogs from 2008 to 2009, a decline of 1.6 million pounds. 

Table 1: US Clam Supply

Year

US commercial landings Imports Total Exports Domestic 

Total Aquaculture supply

thousand pounds, meat weight

2000 118,482 9,929 17,767 136,249 3,627 132,622

2001 122,764 9,975 19,962 142,726 4,080 138,646

2002 130,076 9,861 18,256 148,332 4,348 143,984

2003 127,806 10,790 21,697 149,503 6,429 143,074

2004 119,411 20,967 20,640 140,051 8,136 131,915

2005 105,640 12,564 21,252 126,892 6,725 120,167

2006 110,912 11,307 21,594 132,506 7,653 124,853

2007 115,848 10,743 19,423 135,271 7,833 127,438

2008 107,772 11,420 21,008 128,780 8,065 120,715

2009 101,137 n/a 21,875 123,012 7,243 115,769

Source: “Fisheries of the United States: 2009”, National Marine Fisheries Service
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Table 2: Clam landings by species

2008 2009

1,000 lbs $1,000 1,000 lbs $1,000 

Hard quahog 7,326 49,767 5,710 40,931

Pacific geoduck 3,534 38,620 4,399 52,064

Pacific manila 1,085 18,434 1,183 20,030

Ocean quahog 34,352 20,352 34,909 21,919

Softshell 3,818 21,649 3,853 20,334

Atlantic surf 57,330 36,664 50,641 34,050

Other 327 1,232 442 1,746

Total 107,772 186,718 101,137 191,074

Table 3: Price per pound by 

species

2008 2009

Hard quahog $6.79 $7.17

Pacific geoduck $10.93 $11.84

Pacific manila $16.99 $16.93

Ocean quahog $0.59 $0.63

Softshell $5.67 $5.28

Atlantic surf $0.64 $0.67

Other $3.77 $3.95

Total $1.73 $1.89

There is significant variation among the values of the different species of clams. Table 3 shows the 

calculated price per pound of clam meat, for each of the landed species. The Pacific manilas were valued at 

$17 per pound of meat, while the Atlantic surf were valued at under $1.00 per pound of meat. The hard 

quahogs were valued at $7.17 per pound in 2009. 

3.2.2 Aquaculture clams

The aquaculture data in “Fisheries of the United States” is similar to the trade data. It is not broken out by 

species of clam. The numbers could include hard clams, geoducks, Pacific manila clams, softshell clams, 

Atlantic surf and/or other clams. From the data in Table 4 one can see the overall clam aquaculture trend 

in the United States has been basically flat according to NMFS. Aquaculture clams are currently about 

10% of total clam production, and hard clams are roughly half of total aquaculture clam production. 

The NMFS data show the price per meat pound increasing rather steadily over the past decade, except for 

2004 (Table 4). However, the price for quahogs has reportedly declined since 2000, a fact that some 
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attribute to the advent of the clam insurance pilot and a resulting expansion in production. The price 

decline over the past decade was always commented upon in our listening sessions.

Table 4: Price per meat pound for aquaculture 

clams

1,000 lbs $1,000 $/lbs

2000 9,929 32,595 3.28

2001 9,975 35,404 3.55

2002 9,861 41,809 4.24

2003 10,790 53,966 5.00

2004 20,967 73,339 3.50

2005 12,564 72,783 5.79

2006 11,307 75,357 6.66

2007 10,743 65,754 6.12

2008 11,420 88,088 7.71

Source: “Fisheries of the United States: 2009”, National Marine 

Fisheries Service

In contrast to the NMFS data for all US clam aquaculture, the following table shows the data on hard clams 

from the 2005 Census of Aquaculture. This data is exclusively for hard clam aquaculture in the US. The 

census collected data on the number of clams sold and the value of those clams, which permits calculation 

of a price per clam. Table 5 shows the data on market size clams. Data were also collected on the value 

of seed clam sales.

Virginia, Florida, Massachusetts and South Carolina, the four states that have counties that are currently 

eligible for the cultivated clam pilot program, appear at the top of the table. The sub-total for these four 

states was 287 million clams valued at $40 million. 
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Table 5: US Aquaculture Hard Clam Sales in 2005

State

Number of 

clams sold 

(millions)

Total sales

(in $ million)

Price per clam

(cents)

Virginia 170 26.3 15.4

Florida 92 9.8 10.6

Massachusetts 14 2.4 17.0

South Carolina 12 1.4 11.8

Pilot states 287 39.9 13.9

Connecticut 90 11 12.8

New Jersey 11 N/A N/A

North Carolina 7 N/A N/A

Other 17 N/A N/A

US total 413 56.1 13.6

Pilot state share 70% 71%

Source: USDA, NASS “Census of Aquaculture 2005”

There were three other states that had significant clam production, Connecticut, New Jersey and North 

Carolina. The reason that New Jersey and North Carolina do not have values for total sales is because the 

industry is too concentrated in those states and disclosing that information could be detrimental to specific 

producers. 

By comparing the total number of clams produced in pilot states to the total number of clams produced in 

the US, one sees that the pilot states produce 70% of the clams and those clams are valued at over 70% of 

the value of all hard calms produced in the US through aquaculture. These percentages do not necessarily 

represent the number of actual clams produced that could be insured by the cultivated clam crop insurance 

from RMA. This is because the insurance does not cover all of the counties in these four states and some 

of the clams produced in these states were produced in regions that are ineligible for this insurance. 

The last year that the Fulton Fish Market released monthly data on the price of clams by type and state was 

2004. Table 6 below shows the average 2004 price per clam based on where they were harvested and the 

type of clam. The locations are arranged from north to south, because clams from northern locations are 

generally more expensive than their southern counterparts. Southern clams grow faster because they live 

in warmer water, and are perceived as having poorer storage qualities. 

In addition to decreasing in price as the harvest location moves further south, the clams also get cheaper 

the bigger they get. The “necks”, i.e. little necks and middle necks, are the smallest and typically the most 

expensive, followed by top necks, then cherrystone and finally chowders are the least expensive. The 

price structure today is similar but lower by 3-4 cents per pound.
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Table 6: Hard Clam Price Structure in 2004

Necks Top necks Cherrystone Chowder

cents per clam

Prince Edward Island 0.21 0.21 0.17

Massachusetts 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.15

Connecticut 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.15

Long Island, NY 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.16

New Jersey 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.15

Maryland 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.11

Virginia 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.15

North Carolina 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.14

South Carolina 0.16 0.16 0.16

Florida 0.15 0.18

Virginia hard clam production data

In 2005, Virginia was the leading producer with over 40% of the cultivated hard clams in the US. The state 

continues to be the largest producer and does a better job of tracking industry statistics. Figure 2 shows 

data collected from Virginia clam growers from 1991 to 2009 on the number of clams they produced and 

the value of those clams. 

Figure 2

The data for Figure 2 is included in Appendix E.

In 1991 Virginian growers produced 30 million clams, valued at $4 million. Between 1998 and 2000 when 

the pilot insurance plan was introduced, the number of clams produced grew from 71 million to 135 

million, almost doubling. The value of these clams nearly doubled as well, increasing from $11 million to 

$20 million over the two year period. The number of clams continued to grow until 2007 when 212 
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million were produced. Since that peak the number of clams has declined to 145 million in 2009. 

Production volume is thought to have been about the same in 2010 as the recession kept demand for fresh 

clams in the restaurant trade somewhat weak. 

3.3 Insurance experience

3.3.1 Overall Cultivated Clam Pilot insurance experience

RMA provided detailed policy level data for the entire history of the Cultivated Clam Pilot Program on 

January 3, 2011. The data tables as required in the Statement of Work are provided as Appendix C and 

are based on that data set. Using this information, we highlight the important issues we discovered during 

the analysis of this data. For Table 7 below, which also appears in the Executive Summary, we have used 

Summary of Business data for 2010 as of June 6, 2011. However, all of the analysis in this section is based 

on the January data set.

In the following tables, a dash “-“ signifies no data or zero. A “0” signifies a positive number that is less 

than 0.5 of the unit in question. Table 7 provides an overall summary of the liability, premium and loss 

experience for each year of the pilot program.

Table 7: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience - All Pilot Counties

Crop Year

Liability in 

$000s

Total 

Premium in 

$000s

Policies 

Earning 

Premium

Indemnity in 

$000s Loss Ratio

2000 36,121 1,126 335 2,070 184%

2001 41,215 1,401 377 2,881 206%

2002 59,953 2,181 472 4,019 184%

2003 51,177 1,860 417 2,775 149%

2004 27,701 969 293 2,182 225%

2005 18,160 626 202 624 100%

2006 26,119 932 164 677 73%

2007 26,780 973 144 502 52%

2008 30,843 1,051 111 407 39%

2009 27,880 674 107 1,557 231%

2010 23,499 520 74 241 46%

2000-2003 188,466 6,567.5 1,601 11,744 179%

2004-2010 180,982 5,745 1,095 6,191 108%

Grand Total 369,448 12,312 2,696 17,935 146%

3.3.2 Cultivated Clam Pilot insurance experience by state and county

The following tables display the insurance experience for each county in the pilot program for each year. 

Note though that the policy records for Florida for crop year 2010 in the January data set were 

incomplete.
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Brevard County is located on the eastern side of Florida. As Table 8 shows, the participation in the clam 

pilot program has dropped to one policy in the last few years. The 2004-2010 loss ratio of 327% is well 

above the RMA targeted loss ratio. Dixie County is located on the western side of Florida. As Table 9 

shows, there has been no participation in the clam pilot program since 2006.

Table 8: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience - Brevard County, Florida

Crop Year

Liability in 

$000s

Total 

Premium in 

$000s

Policies 

Earning 

Premium

Indemnity in 

$000s Loss Ratio

2000 580 23 14 132 577%

2001 1,426 79 31 520 659%

2002 1,286 75 26 274 367%

2003 595 34 17 213 630%

2004 125 13 8 60 481%

2005 75 6 3 0 0%

2006 17 2 2 0 0%

2007 31 2 3 0 0%

2008 76 7 1 34 507%

2009 4 0 1 0 0%

2010 5 0 1 5 1209%

2000-2003 3,888 210 88 1,139 541%

2004-2010 332 30 19 99 327%

Grand Total 4,220 241 107 1,238 514%

Table 9: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Dixie County, Florida

Crop Year

Liability in 

$000s

Total 

Premium in 

$000s

Policies 

Earning 

Premium

Indemnity in 

$000s Loss Ratio

2000 2,383 93 50 698 753%

2001 2,255 109 54 116 106%

2002 3,176 150 75 159 106%

2003 2,770 153 70 276 180%

2004 703 70 42 126 181%

2005 294 24 20 57 234%

2006 161 14 8 0 0%

2007 0 0 0 0 0%

2008 0 0 0 0 0%

2009 0 0 0 0 0%

2010 0 0 0 0 0%

2000-2003 10,584 505 249 1,249 247%

2004-2010 1,157 108 70 183 169%

Grand Total 11,741 614 319 1,432 233%
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Table 10: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Indian River County, Florida

Crop Year

Liability in 

$000s

Total 

Premium in 

$000s

Policies 

Earning 

Premium

Indemnity in 

$000s Loss Ratio

2000 1,976 86 16 261 301%

2001 1,670 96 32 360 376%

2002 2,059 132 39 134 101%

2003 1,462 98 30 87 88%

2004 448 51 18 178 347%

2005 175 15 14 0 0%

2006 193 18 9 0 0%

2007 149 14 7 0 0%

2008 150 15 4 7 48%

2009 56 5 3 0 0%

2010 0 0 0 0 0%

2000-2003 7,166 413 117 842 204%

2004-2010 1,171 118 55 185 157%

Grand Total 8,337 531 172 1,026 193%

Indian River County is located south of Brevard County on the eastern side of Florida. As Table 10 

indicates, there has been declining participation in the clam pilot program since 2003. The 2004-2010 

combined loss ratio of 157% is mostly caused by the 2004 year which experienced several hurricanes.

Levy County is located south of Dixie County on the western side of Florida. The majority of clam 

producing area in Florida is around the city of Cedar Key. According to Table 12, there has been declining 

participation in the clam pilot program since 2003. The sharp drop in 2010 occurred because of 

enforcement of the requirement that a pre-acceptance inspection be conducted for every policy. This 

involved pulling three percent of the bags, and either the growers did not want to do that, or the insurers 

were unable to complete the inspections within the allotted time. 

The 2004-2010 combined loss ratio of 144% is caused by the 2004 hurricane year and low salinity in 2009 

due to large rainfalls inland and the runoff of fresh water into the clam leases. June 2011 Summary of 

Business data show 5 policies earning premium in 2010 and a loss ratio of 158%.

Barnstable County is one of the two counties in Massachusetts that has insurance experience from the 

clam pilot. The pilot is also available in Bristol, Dukes and Nantucket counties but there have been no 

policies earning premium. The participation has declined somewhat from 2004 and the loss ratios are high.
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Table 11: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Levy County, Florida

Crop Year

Liability in 

$000s

Total 

Premium in 

$000s

Policies 

Earning 

Premium

Indemnity in 

$000s Loss Ratio

2000 12,643 534 151 872 163%

2001 12,945 638 147 1,530 240%

2002 19,867 1,054 222 3,358 319%

2003 15,530 894 192 1,381 154%

2004 4,064 391 124 686 175%

2005 4,024 311 85 180 58%

2006 5,657 470 70 442 94%

2007 6,117 502 60 371 74%

2008 4,494 420 41 304 72%

2009 4,292 222 44 1,328 599%

2010 220 17 2 50 290%

2000-2003 60,985 3,119 712 7,141 229%

2004-2010 28,869 2,333 426 3,362 144%

Grand Total 89,854 5,453 1,138 10,503 193%

Table 12: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Barnstable County, Massachusetts

Crop Year

Liability in 

$000s

Total 

Premium in 

$000s

Policies 

Earning 

Premium

Indemnity in 

$000s Loss Ratio

2000 3,214 84 45 108 128%

2001 2,522 61 38 150 248%

2002 2,710 69 31 0 0%

2003 2,811 67 30 190 284%

2004 2,121 49 26 78 160%

2005 1,825 42 20 388 934%

2006 1,673 42 22 123 296%

2007 1,562 37 19 87 234%

2008 1,584 49 16 61 125%

2009 1,462 37 9 0 0%

2010 1,386 40 12 19 47%

2000-2003 11,256 281 144 447 159%

2004-2010 11,614 295 124 755 256%

Grand Total 22,870 576 268 1,203 209%
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Table 13: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Plymouth County, Massachusetts

Crop Year

Liability in

$000s

Total 

Premium in 

$000s

Policies 

Earning 

Premium

Indemnity in 

$000s Loss Ratio

2000 0 0 0 0 0%

2001 0 0 0 0 0%

2002 0 0 0 0 0%

2003 0 0 0 0 0%

2004 0 0 0 0 0%

2005 223 4 1 0 0%

2006 292 5 1 0 0%

2007 257 5 1 0 0%

2008 0 0 0 0 0%

2009 0 0 0 0 0%

2010 0 0 0 0 0%

2000-2003 0 0 0 0 0%

2004-2010 771 14 3 0 0%

Grand Total 771 14 3 0 0%

Plymouth County is the one other county in Massachusetts that has insurance experience from the clam 

pilot. One grower participated from 2005 through 2007 and had no indemnity.

Table 14: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Beaufort County, South Carolina

Crop Year

Liability in 

$000s

Total 

Premium in 

$000s

Policies 

Earning 

Premium

Indemnity in 

$000s Loss Ratio

2000 1,188 36 1 0 0%

2001 0 0 0 0 0%

2002 152 3 1 0 0%

2003 349 15 4 0 0%

2004 228 6 4 0 0%

2005 116 2 1 0 0%

2006 116 2 1 0 0%

2007 0 0 0 0 0%

2008 0 0 0 0 0%

2009 0 0 0 0 0%

2010 0 0 0 0 0%

2000-2003 1,688 54 6 0 0%

2004-2010 459 9 6 0 0%

Grand Total 2,147 64 12 0 0%

Beaufort County in South Carolina has relatively little participation in the program and no policies have 

earned premium since 2006 (Table 14).
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Table 15: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Charleston County, South Carolina

Crop Year

Liability in 

$000s

Total 

Premium in 

$000s

Policies 

Earning 

Premium

Indemnity in 

$000s Loss Ratio

2000 209 5 4 0 0%

2001 404 9 5 0 0%

2002 1,091 28 7 0 0%

2003 1,279 33 11 78 236%

2004 609 14 4 32 236%

2005 482 9 2 0 0%

2006 385 8 2 0 0%

2007 283 6 2 0 0%

2008 0 0 0 0 0%

2009 0 0 0 0 0%

2010 0 0 1 0 0%

2000-2003 2,985 75 27 78 104%

2004-2010 1,778 36 11 32 89%

Grand Total 4,762 110 38 110 99%

Charleston County in South Carolina has relatively little participation in the program as well and no 

policies earned premium during 2008-2009. In 2010, one policy was active.

Table 16: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Accomack County, Virginia

Crop Year

Liability in 

$000s

Total 

Premium in 

$000s

Policies 

Earning 

Premium

Indemnity in 

$000s Loss Ratio

2000 1,358 26 14 0 0%

2001 3,657 87 18 0 0%

2002 8,970 201 16 0 0%

2003 8,511 188 16 275 147%

2004 4,309 85 19 687 809%

2005 622 19 20 0 0%

2006 976 31 14 0 0%

2007 1,386 45 14 44 100%

2008 2,200 67 14 0 0%

2009 2,529 66 15 228 347%

2010 2,271 52 13 53 102%

2000-2003 22,496 501 64 275 55%

2004-2010 14,294 364 109 1,013 278%

Grand Total 36,790 865 173 1,288 149%

Accomack County in Virginia lies on the state’s Eastern Shore and has cultivated clams on both the ocean 

side and the Chesapeake Bay side. The policy count has been fairly stable over the last several years. The 

large loss in 2009 was due to a nor’easter and the 2004 indemnities were due to freeze. 
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Table 17: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Northampton County, Virginia

Crop Year

Liability in 

$000s

Total 

Premium in 

$000s

Policies 

Earning 

Premium

Indemnity in 

$000s Loss Ratio

2000 12,569 238 40 0 0%

2001 16,337 323 52 204 63%

2002 20,641 470 55 94 20%

2003 17,871 379 47 275 73%

2004 15,095 292 48 335 115%

2005 10,324 195 36 0 0%

2006 16,649 340 35 112 33%

2007 16,996 363 38 0 0%

2008 22,339 493 35 0 0%

2009 19,537 344 35 0 0%

2010 18,229 316 32 0 0%

2000-2003 67,418 1,409 194 547 41%

2004-2010 119,170 2,343 447 447 19%

Grand Total 186,588 3,752 1,021 1,021 27%

Northampton County in Virginia also lies on the southernmost part of the peninsula and has cultivated 

clams on both the ocean side and the Chesapeake Bay side. The policy count has been fairly stable over 

the last several years. The large loss in 2004 was also due to freeze. 

3.3.3 Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance Buy-Up versus Cat 

The following table displays the insured liability by coverage level. The pilot insurance is mostly purchased 

at lower coverage levels, with 50% the most popular. Florida is somewhat of an exception. In the rating 

section we will show that the coverage level relativities for Florida are much flatter than for the other 

states, making the incremental costs for higher coverage levels relatively lower in Florida. This may be the 

reason that higher coverage levels are purchased in Florida.
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Table 18: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience – Liability by Coverage Level $(000s)

State

Crop

Year

Coverage Level (Buy-Up)

CAT 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75%

Florida

2004 417 1,256  386 1,362 1,087 831

2005 728 421 97 310 1,514 708 790

2006 1,040 214  374 2,894 632 876

2007 986 310  1,269 1,924 1,078 730

2008 838 142 90 1,189 919 429 1,111

2009 1,328 1,734  151 4 352 783

2010 79    5  142

Massachusetts

2004 616 445 117 365 362 217 

2005 548 298  408 722 72 

2006 651 343  586 385  

2007 340 556  543 379  

2008 225 256  594 391  119

2009  243  674 389  156

2010  99  594 471  223

South Carolina

2004 61  378 358  39 

2005 273   325   

2006 263  237    

2007 125  157    

2008       

2009       

2010   19    

Virginia

2004 2,389 12,681 169 3,928 169  69

2005 5,548 1,415  3,465 395 124 

2006 72 11,775  5,064 527 187 

2007 164 11,284  5,749 916 269 

2008 72 14,467  8,098 1,515 387 

2009 125 13,215  6,378 2,098 251 

2010 1,780 11,617  4,904 2,017 182 

3.3.4 Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance Participation

The participation in the Cultivated Clam Pilot Program was more difficult to calculate than standard row 

crops due to the limited availability of NASS data and the fact that clams are grown for longer than one 

year. 

The only NASS data is from the 2005 Census of Aquaculture. It includes the number and value of clams 

sold that year as well as the number of clam farmers. Therefore we needed to make adjustments to the 

insurance data to make it more comparable to NASS. Table 19 shows the total harvest value of insured 

clams after adjusting for both coverage level and price election. For example, if the coverage level was 50% 

we would double the liability shown in the insurance records. In order to account for different price 
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elections (CAT or Stages) we also divided the liability by the price election percentage. By doing this we 

can estimate the total harvest value of all the insured clams at the full price per clam and adjusted for 

coverage level.

Table 19: Cultivated Clam Pilot - Total Clam Value in $Millions

Crop 

Year Florida Massachusetts South Carolina Virginia

2000 29 6 2 28

2001 28 6 1 39

2002 40 6 2 57

2003 30 7 3 52

2004 11 5 2 48

2005 8 4 1 25

2006 10 4 1 42

2007 11 4 1 44

2008 9 3  56

2009 9 3  49

2010 0 3 0 43

This table shows the decline in insurance for each pilot state except Virginia. The difficulty in calculating 

participation rates is that clams are grown for several years and harvested throughout the year. Using the 

last available stage for insurance (Stage 3 for Massachusetts and Virginia and Stage 4 for Florida and South 

Carolina) we made the following table. The latest NASS data is the 2005 Census data that includes all the

states’ clam data. The insurance data shown is therefore from crop year 2005 as well.

Table 20: Cultivated Clam Pilot Participation

State

NASS Total 

sales 

($Millions)

Last Insured 

Stage 

($Millions)

Liability 

Participation

NASS 

Number 

of Farms

Policies 

Earning 

Premium

Number of 

Farms 

Participation

Virginia 26.3 16.1 61% 38 56 147%

Florida 9.8 5.5 56% 142 122 86%

Massachusetts 2.4 1.5 62% 75 21 28%

South Carolina 1.4 0.8 57% 21 3 14%

Pilot states 39.9 25.3 60% 276 202 73%

NASS Source: USDA, NASS “Census of Aquaculture 2005”

This table shows that the Cultivated Clam Pilot Program appears to have had decent participation in 2005, 

whether measured by liabilities or number of farms producing market clams. Since then the participation 

has declined significantly for Florida and South Carolina while maintaining similar rates in Massachusetts and 

Virginia. Since Massachusetts can insure until four years after planting, the last insured stage liabilities were 

divided by two in order to calculate the participation rate. 

These are imperfect measures of participation at best. There are no data on square feet of clam beds that 

would compare to the planted or harvested area data used for measuring row crop participation in crop 
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insurance programs. And the accuracy of the 2005 Census data is unclear. However the participation 

rates calculated in Table 20 are probably indicative. What is clear is that participation by growers has 

declined sharply since then. If the total number of growers in the four states is still about 276, the fact that 

fewer than 75 policies were earning premium in 2010 implies that only about 25% of farmers are using the 

pilot insurance program. And while the calculated value of clams insured in Virginia has held up, one has to 

keep in mind that most of the coverage is at the 50% level.

3.3.5 Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance By Reporting Organization

We reviewed the insurance experience by reporting organization by state for each year of the pilot 

program. These tables show that there are two major AIPs writing the majority of the clam pilot coverage 

outside of Florida. These AIPs do not write the clam business in Florida anymore. Since 2006, different 

AIPs have written clam business in Florida for a year or two and then also exited the business. The 

reporting organizations are masked in the data provided to us from RMA, but evidence from the listening 

sessions allows us to deduce that MJ is probably Rain & Hail and OW is probably RCIS.

Table 21: Cultivated Clam Pilot – Experience by Reporting Organization

Florida - All Pilot Counties - Total Premium ($000s)

Crop Year

Reporting Organization

HB HL MB MJ MN OW PW SU YH

2000  37  12 466 63   158

2001  54  6 485 85   293

2002  30  5  28 829  517

2003  9  629  12   529

2004    516  9   

2005    348  8   

2006    504  1   

2007   313 204  1   

2008  196 212 27  7   

2009 219       8 

2010        17 

2000-2003  130  653 951 188 829  1,497

2004-2010 219 196 526 1,598  26  25 

TOTAL 219 326 526 2,250 951 214 829 25 1,497
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Table 22: Cultivated Clam Pilot – Experience by Reporting Organization

Florida - All Pilot Counties - Loss Ratio

Crop Year

Reporting Organization

HB HL MB MJ MN OW PW SU YH

2000 566% 737% 214% 182% 349%

2001 356% 321% 291% 207% 249%

2002 158% 0% 475% 276% 282%

2003 0% 146% 483% 185%

2004 200% 198%

2005 68% 0%

2006 88% 0%

2007 111% 11% 0%

2008 0% 143% 28% 507%

2009 607% 0% 0%

2010 1209% 290%

2000-2003 346% 157% 254% 257% 276% 248%

2004-2010 607% 0% 124% 109% 217% 200%

TOTAL 607% 138% 124% 123% 254% 252% 276% 200% 248%

Table 23: Cultivated Clam Pilot – Experience by Reporting Organization

Massachusetts - All Pilot Counties

Crop Year

Total Premium ($000s) Indemnity ($000s) Loss Ratio

Reporting Organization Reporting Organization Reporting Organization

MJ OW MJ OW MJ OW

2000 64 20 108 - 168% 0%

2001 51 9 150 - 293% 0%

2002 64 5 - - 0% 0%

2003 59 8 190 - 323% 0%

2004 42 7 78 - 185% 0%

2005 42 4 388 - 934% 0%

2006 35 12 30 93 88% 769%

2007 33 8 48 38 144% 462%

2008 45 4 39 22 86% 612%

2009 31 6 - - 0% 0%

2010 39 1 19 - 48% 0%

2000-2003 238 42 447 - 188% 0%

2004-2010 267 42 602 153 226% 367%

TOTAL 505 84 1,050 153 208% 183%
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Table 24: Cultivated Clam Pilot – Experience by Reporting Organization

South Carolina - All Pilot Counties

Crop Year

Total Premium ($000s) Indemnity ($000s) Loss Ratio

Reporting Organization Reporting Organization Reporting Organization

MB MJ OW MB MJ OW MB MJ OW

2000  42     0%

2001  8 1    0% 0%

2002  15 15    0% 0%

2003  43 5  78  181% 0%

2004  15 4   32 0% 728%

2005  4 6    0% 0%

2006  5 5    0% 0%

2007 2  3    0% 0%

2008      

2009      

2010   0    0%

2000-2003  107 21  78  72% 0%

2004-2010 2 24 19   32 0% 0% 164%

TOTAL 2 131 41  78 32 0% 59% 78%

Table 25: Cultivated Clam Pilot – Experience by Reporting Organization

Virginia - All Pilot Counties

Crop Year

Total Premium ($000s) Indemnity ($000s) Loss Ratio

Reporting Organization Reporting Organization Reporting Organization

MJ OW YH MJ OW YH MJ OW YH

2000 264      0% 

2001 270  140 151  53 56%  38%

2002 349 318 4 43 52  12% 16% 

2003 472 94  457 93  97% 99% 

2004 271 105  349 673  129% 640% 

2005 122 92     0% 0% 

2006 220 151  112   51% 0% 

2007 208 200   44  0% 22% 

2008 289 271     0%  

2009 211 199   228  0% 114% 

2010 181 187   53  0% 28% 

2000-2003 1,355 412 144 651 145 53 48% 35% 37%

2004-2010 1,501 1,206  462 998  31% 83% N/A

TOTAL 2,856 1,618 144 1,113 1,143 53 39% 71% 37%
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3.3.6 Cultivated Clam Pilot Indemnity by Cause of Loss

The following charts display the cause of loss by state. We split the data into 2000-2003 and 2004-2010 

due to the significant changes in the pilot. The major cause of loss in Florida was salinity for both time 

periods. The 2004 crop year experienced several major hurricanes and accounts for a significant portion 

of the losses for this time period. Oxygen depletion is also a major cause of loss for both time periods.

The data for Figures 3 through 10 is included in Appendix E.

Figure 3

Figure 4
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Figure 5

Figure 6

The major causes of loss in Massachusetts were ice floe and freeze. Disease was also a major cause of loss. 

There were freeze or ice floe losses in each year except for 2009 and 2010.
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Figure 7

Figure 8

The major causes of loss in Virginia were freeze and storm surge. The older period also had significant 

losses due to disease, but after the changes in the policy in 2004 there was no indemnity due to disease. 
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Figure 9

Figure 10

The only cause of loss in South Carolina was from storm surge in 2003 and 2004.
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3.3.7 Cultivated Clam Pilot Indemnity Experience By State and County By Day

We reviewed the insurance indemnity experience to attempt to address the allegations of fraud within the 

Cultivated Clam Pilot Program. The clams are grown on leased acres that are near each other so that a 

weather event would likely impact most clam growers at the same time and there should be losses on a 

certain date rather than being spread out over the year. We graphed both the indemnity and units 

indemnified by day for each pilot county. The graphs are shown in Appendix D.

The units indemnified by day for selected pilot counties are shown below. The first chart for Levy County, 

Florida shows the large number of claims for the 2000-2003 crop years. There was an obvious problem 

with the program and this appears to have been changed although there were still a handful of claims being 

reported in the later years. The large spike in 2004 was due to the hurricanes. The large spike in 2009 

was due to low salinity caused by fresh water from excessive rainfall. It should be noted these counts have 

not been normalized to the number of policies sold (since there are so few in most counties).

The data for figures 11 through 13 is included in Appendix E.

Figure 11

Figure 12 shows units indemnified by day for Barnstable County, Massachusetts. There are only 

approximately 20 policies per year. This chart shows a few claims have occurred each year. These claims 

were due to freeze or disease as discussed previously.
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The cultivated clam pilot county with the most liabilities is Northampton, Virginia. However few claims 

have been paid in the pilot years after changes were made to the pilot program. We show the chart from 

Accomack County as possible fraud was discussed with us. Figure 13 shows that since 2004, there have 

been only 5 days with claims filed. Due to the differences in leases in Virginia the clams are spread further 

out so it would be possible for perils to impact certain leases and not others.

Figure 12
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Figure 13

In conclusion, we do not see clear evidence of fraud strictly on using the data provided by RMA. Each 

county has a mix of single-claim days and multiple-claim days. However, the RMA database only records 

data when an indemnity is paid rather than reported so it is possible that many more claims are reported

and then denied. But we did not hear many complaints during the listening sessions regarding unpaid 

claims.
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3.4 Policy content and structure

The clam policy essentially provides stock mortality coverage. It is a dollar policy that relies on 

information on the number and density of seed clams planted, an assumed survival rate, the stage of 

growth of each past planting of seed clams, and a reference price. All of these can differ by region. After 

reviewing some basic principles of aquaculture insurance, we examine a number of ways in which industry 

practices are not fully aligned with the insurance plan.

3.4.1 Principles of aquaculture insurance

Aquaculture insurance serves to transfer risk from one party to another in exchange for a premium via 

contract. Critical challenges when reviewing crop insurance design are identifying the following:

• What perils are of concern and are to be addressed by the contract?

• How frequently are producers subject to the peril and what is the likely impact on losses? 

• How does the probability of loss vary among regions, species, production systems, or 

different types of managers? 

• To what extent are losses from the peril of one producer independent of the losses of others 

(idiosyncratic) or are losses likely to affect producers simultaneously (systemic)? To what 

extent is the impact of the peril affected by management practices? 

• Are there other methods of dealing with the risk and what are their costs? 

There are several important considerations when reviewing the viability of an RMA crop insurance plan for 

aquaculture. 

• It must be possible to determine very clearly that a loss has occurred and that it resulted 

from an insured peril. Also, the size of loss must be measurable using accurate procedures 

that are acceptable to all parties and repeatable. 

• Insurance can only cover losses incurred due to accidental and unintentional events. Moral 

hazard (behavior representing either fraud or a rational response to the availability of 

insurance coverage) can reduce the performance of an insurance plan. Deductibles can 

reduce behavior that might intentionally cause higher losses. However, it is normal to 

exclude a peril where management can influence the losses incurred. 

• Where insufficient data is available to classify potential policymakers, it is difficult to identify 

appropriate premium rates. This may result in adverse selection and allow more risky 

operators to pay premiums that are too low and to receive high indemnities. 

• Critically, the statistical probability distribution of loss is required for each type of peril. 

These are normally identified from analysis of data that describe the relationship between 

losses and perils over an appropriate time period. Such data are generally not available for 

any aquaculture systems or species. 
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• Pooling of different risks reduces the variability in losses and results in lower premiums as the 

incidence of one peril event can be offset against others that are not exposed to the peril. 

• The willingness to pay premiums varies according to the structure of the business. An 

aquacultural operator who is highly geared to aquaculture revenue will be much more likely 

to pay for aquaculture crop insurance than one that has other crops or enterprises. 

• The availability of alternative risk management tools should be considered. Individually or in 

combination, government disaster assistance programs (some of which are specifically 

designed for aquaculture), private insurance, contractual arrangements and hedging strategies 

may offer adequate risk coverage to some sector participants. 

Operating an insurance program for clams has a number of challenges. As noted in Section 2.3.4, it is 

difficult to monitor the insured’s behavior and the insured crop is not only underwater most of the time 

but buried in the sediment as well. 

In the following we examine selected policy elements with respect to whether there are discrepancies 

between policy provisions and industry practices that create vulnerabilities or fail to serve the needs of 

producers. Three areas warrant discussion – the definition of the insured crop, the classification by stage 

of growth, and the requirement for pre-insurance inspections.

3.4.2 The insured crop

The insured crop is the Mercenaria mercenaria species, after planting minimum size seed, and allowing for 

normal mortality. In Florida there is reportedly a small amount of production of hybrids with native clam 

species. This may be something to consider in any future insurance program for hard clams, but for now is 

not an issue. If the pilot is continued we think there should be no change in the insured crop.

With regard to mortality, the default survival rates in the Special Provisions are 60% in Massachusetts and 

Virginia where clams grow more slowly, and 70% in South Carolina and Florida (except only 50% of 

planted at densities greater than 75 per square foot). Maximum planting densities in the two more 

northern states are 90 per square foot. Growers are allowed to prove a higher survival rate using three 

successive years of their own records, but few do. This might be because most have lower survival, or 

because they do not want to share the information, or it could just be the paperwork burden. Comments 

in the listening sessions were that the default survival rates are about right as averages within the wide 

range of normal experience, i.e. plus or minus 20% around those numbers. We found no case for 

changing the default rates or planting density requirements.

3.4.3 Stages

The system of growth stages with lower prices at the earlier stages has some potential for abuse. The 

cutoff dates and stage lengths are somewhat arbitrary. But that is inevitable unless one adopts a 

continuous rather than stepwise function for rates and prices. Clams grow at a more or less constant rate, 

but slower in the winter and faster in moderate weather when food is more available. The fact that a 

grower can choose to market the clams as necks at any size between 7/8ths inch and 2 inches gives him 

some degree of flexibility to game the insurance. 
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For example, smaller independent Virginia growers who do not market clams themselves sell to bigger 

growers or distributors for 10 cents for 7/8 inch clams and 14 cents for one inch clams. If they plant 

before July 16, the clams are stage 3 the next spring and get the full price of 15 cents. If one typically 

grows 7/8 inch clams, an insurance claim gives the grower a 50% premium over the normal selling price, 

not including the labor savings from not having to harvest the clams. However, there were only 8 claims in 

Virginia since 2004, so if there has been any abuse of this type, the incidence is quite low.

We asked about stage definitions in the listening session and the typical response was that while arbitrary, 

they seemed to work. No alternatives were recommended, and we would leave them as is if the pilot is 

extended.

3.4.4 Inspections

The issue of pre-acceptance inspections (PAI) is important to address. The underwriting guide requires a 

PAI at the first application by a grower and then any time that a policy is transferred to a different insurer. 

Thus, if a grower sticks with the same AIP, his clam beds could go for years without an inspection. For 

other crops it is not uncommon for AIPs to let a farmer self-certify, but then dig in and check everything 

through an appraisal when there is a claim. This could in theory work for clams if all other procedures 

were being closely followed. After all, one can only get insurance if one has already been involved in the 

business for 3-5 years. However, the following of all procedures is not generally the case.

The underwriting guide is not very clear about what the PAI must include. But the bigger problem has 

been that virtually no PAIs were being done in Florida, despite almost annual changes in the AIPs providing 

coverage in that state. The RMA Regional Compliance Office finally cracked down and told AIPs that there 

would be no reinsurance of any Florida policy in 2010 that had not undergone a PAI. This resulted in a 

precipitous drop in participation. 

In Virginia and Massachusetts, some AIPs are requiring frequent inspections. One has an appraiser certify 

every planting that its clients make in Virginia. Another, for which we were provided two policy files, 

appears to require frequent inspections in Massachusetts but not in Virginia. These two AIPS account for 

77% of the liabilities over the life of the pilot and both have aggregate loss ratios of less than 100%.

Therefore, we conclude that the requirement in the underwriting guide is the minimum that should be 

applicable, and that the wording should be revised to make clear that the PAI requires sampling of the beds 

to the same standard that is required by the loss adjustment standards handbook.

3.5 Loss adjustment standards 

The listening sessions and our other investigations turned up no significant shortcomings in the loss 

adjustment standards or their application. They are appropriate for the alternative practices currently in 

use for production of cultivated clams, and are described in sufficient detail. 

The claim settlement process is understandable, but some growers in Florida complained about the length 

of time it took. In one instance the delay made it too late to plant due to the onset of winter weather, so 

the indemnity had to be reported as taxable income rather than being reinvested in replacement plantings.
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Loss data are reported at a level sufficient to support subsequent analyses.

If the pilot is modified and extended, we have no corrections or additions to the handbook.

3.6 Underwriting standards

We reviewed the “Cultivated Clam Pilot Crop Insurance Underwriting Guide” for 2010 and succeeding 

years (FCIC-24100(08-2010)). We found it to be clear and well written, and consistent with governing law 

and policies. The one main thing that needs to be clarified is that pre-acceptance inspections should 

include taking actual samples from the production site in order to certify that the clams to be insured 

actually exist and were planted at a rate per square foot no greater than that listed in the special provisions 

for each pilot area.

If the FCIC Board decides to modify and continue the pilot, we recommend making the changes to the 

underwriting guide listed below. These changes correct or simplify selected parts of the document, and 

clarify that pre-acceptance inspections must include sampling of the beds, following procedures in the loss 

adjustment handbook.

Section 4B: Remove the parentheses around “(B)”

Section 4B(3): In the discussion of growout, the statement that “all clams between 19 and 176 mm are

considered field plant size” is incorrect. It is possible that the correct range is 1.9 to 17.6 mm, or roughly 

one sixteenth to three quarters of an inch. However we could not verify it from the literature.

Section 10A(2): Delete the initial “.”

Section 16B: Insert the following after the second sentence: “The inspection must include sampling of 

the planted clams, following the procedures in Sections 5B and 6 of the Cultivated Clam Pilot Loss 

Adjustment Standards Handbook.”

Section 21A: Delete “The crop year deductible may increase due to increases in inventory value on a 

revised PIVR. The increased deductible under the endorsement is applicable only during the effective 

period of the peak endorsement.”

Section 22: Replace the existing sentence with the following: “Premium is calculated by multiplying the 

Inventory Value by the coverage level, premium base rate, coverage level factor, share, basic unit discount 

(if applicable) and proration percent.”

Section 23: Delete existing section on replant payments since the special provisions for every pilot 

county say they are not applicable.

Section 24: Renumber as Section 23. Renumber subsections B and C as C and D, and insert the 

following new subsection: “B. REPLANT PAYMENTS: Provisions of section 13 of the Basic Provisions do 

not apply.”
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Exhibit 2: Change requirement number 17 on pages 29 and 31 to read as follows: “Determine the 

average planting density and the number of existing clams in each stage on each unit, following the 

procedures in Sections 5B and 6 of the Cultivated Clam Pilot Loss Adjustment Standards Handbook.”

Exhibit 3: The space allowed for GPS coordinates on the sample Clam Inventory Value Report (and one 

we saw from an AIP) is clearly inadequate for the four sets of GPS coordinates needed to define the 

corners of a lease. They should be provided on an attachment, or in a notes section, linked to a site or 

lease ID.
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3.7 Rating sufficiency and analysis

3.7.1 Discussion - Actuarially Sound

The objective of our review was to evaluate the actuarial soundness of the Cultivated Clam Pilot Program 

rating structure. In the statement of work describing this project, RMA provided the following definition:

“Actuarially sound – For the purpose of the Federal Crop Insurance Program, a classification and 

premium rate determination system, where risk premium collected is sufficient to cover future 

losses and to build a reasonable amount of reserve.”

The Casualty Actuarial Society provides the following principles with respect to insurance rates:1

 A rate is an estimate of the expected value of future costs;

 A rate provides for all costs associated with the transfer of risk;

 A rate provides for the costs associated with an individual risk transfer; and

 A rate is reasonable and not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory if it is an actuarially 

sound estimate of the expected value of all future costs associated with an individual risk transfer.

In the following discussion, we refer to rate adequacy as the process for evaluating the overall adequacy of 

the rates and rating structure. The rates we reviewed are the amounts published in the actuarial 

documents and do not include provisions for acquisition and other expenses. The expenses are provided 

under the A&O subsidy which is out of the scope of this project. The RMA definition of actuarially sound 

as discussed above implies that the long-term loss ratio should be close to but less than 100%.

3.7.2 Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance Experience

The following table summarizes the liability, premium and loss experience for the pilot program in the 

initial years and the remaining years after significant changes were made.

Table 26: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience in $Millions

Crop Year Liability

Total 

Premium

Policies 

Earning 

Premium Indemnity Loss Ratio

2000-2003 188.5 6.6 1,601 11.7 179%

2004-2010 179.6 5.7 1,082 6.1 108%

Grand Total 368.1 12.2 2,683 17.8 146%

It is clear from the above table that the program did not perform well in the initial years. Significant 

changes were made for the 2004 year that brought the loss ratios closer to the RMA target. While this 

could be an indication that the rates are currently adequate in aggregate, several issues remain in the 

overall structure of the program that impact the overall rate adequacy. We also note that many pilot 

counties have zero or only a few policies sold from 2004-2010. We also believe that there is not enough 

insurance experience for the data to be fully credible in and of itself. 

 

1 Casualty Actuarial Society, Statement of Principles Regarding Property and Casualty Insurance Ratemaking

(1988).
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That being said, we reviewed the following information to determine if the current rates and methodology 

are reasonable.

 Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance experience by state and county,

 Changes in rates over the history of the pilot program,

 The initial and current methodology to establish and maintain the rates and rating structure.

Typically we would also review the insurance experience and rates of crops in the same counties to 

compare with the clam insurance experience and rates. We do not believe that this comparison is helpful 

in this situation because clams are grown underneath water and are exposed to different perils than the 

other crops. While a hurricane or freeze may damage both clams and other crops at the same time, the 

damage caused by a specified peril is likely to be significantly different between crops. The other crops are 

not exposed to salinity changes, oxygen depletion or QPX disease that clams are exposed to. On the 

other hand, clams would have no or less exposure to droughts and diseases that would impact the other 

crops in the county.

3.7.3 Cultivated Clam Pilot Rates By State and County

Table 27 displays the base rates (65% Coverage Level) for the pilot counties for crop year 2011.

Table 27: Cultivated Clam Pilot Policy Base Rates for 2011

State Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4

Florida 0.127 0.103 0.082

Massachusetts - Barnstable 0.036 0.033 NA

Massachusetts - All Other Counties 0.032 0.029 NA

South Carolina 0.033 0.030 0.028

Virginia 0.033 0.030 NA

Table 28 shows how the base rates have changed over the pilot policy years for the counties with the 

majority of the insured liabilities. 

Table 28: Cultivated Clam Pilot Policy Base Rates for Stage 3

Crop Year

Levy

Florida

Barnstable 

Massachusetts Virginia

2003 0.048 0.033 0.034

2004 0.105 0.030 0.031

2005 0.105 0.030 0.031

2006 0.115 0.033 0.034

2007 0.116 0.033 0.034

2008 0.116 0.036 0.034

2009 0.093 0.029 0.027

2010 0.093 0.029 0.027

2011 0.103 0.033 0.030

Since the major change in rates for Florida after 2003 there was an increase of about 10% in 2006. In 

2009, there was a base rate decrease of approximately 20%. In 2011, the base rate increased 

approximately 11% for each state. From this table it appears that the clam rates are being reviewed in 

total and similar changes are being made for each pilot county.
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Using the 2011 base rates we recalculated the loss ratios for the 2004-2010 crop years as shown below.

Table 29: Cultivated Clam Pilot Results Crop Years 2004-

2010 - Recast at 2011 Base Rates

State Actual Loss Ratio

Recast Loss 

Ratios 

Florida 148% 157%

Massachusetts 245% 233%

South Carolina 71% 74%

Virginia 54% 56%

Grand Total 108% 112%

Table 29 shows that there has not been a large impact from the rate changes, but for Florida the rate 

changes moved the recast loss ratios further away from 100%. The loss ratios for Massachusetts moved 

closer to 100%, but are still over 200%.

3.7.4 Cultivated Clam Pilot Survival Factors

The Cultivated Clam Pilot Program utilizes survival factors to adjust the number of clams reported in the 

inventory. The intent of the survival factor is to recognize the normal expected survival of seed clams as 

they grow to a marketable size. The factor is applied only once in setting the guarantee and does not 

enter into any loss adjustment calculations. The adjusted inventory carries through each stage until 

harvest. The insured has the option of using the default survival factor or using their own experience. The 

default factors are 70% in Florida and South Carolina and 60% in Massachusetts and Virginia. The insured 

must show three consecutive years of production history in order to use their own history.

We reviewed the insurance experience data to determine how many growers used their own production 

records. A field in the database provided by RMA indicated whether the default survival ratio was used, 

“A”, or the grower’s history, “I”. The following table shows that most growers use the default survival 

factors. We also noted many “I” codes for both the 70% and 60% factors. These corresponded to the 

default factors used in each state, so we believe there were several coding errors in these records and 

adjusted for this.

The data shows that growers using their individual survival factors have much better experience. This is 

not unexpected since growers who maintain detailed records may be better growers overall. However, 

the relatively low volume of experience lacks full credibility. We would not recommend making a rating 

adjustment for using a grower’s own experience. The grower will be provided with a larger guarantee. 

Since many growers are using the default survival factors it is possible that the default factors are too high. 

We do not have credible data to test these factors. In our listening sessions, many growers thought it was 

about right. If the plan continues we would recommend that all insureds maintain survival factors in 

addition to the inventory reports. We would recommend that growers keep track of all clam sales from 

the inventory records in addition to the plantings. 
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Table 30: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience - 2004 to 2010 - Survival Factors

Survival 

Flag

Liability in 

$000s

Total Premium 

in $000s

Indemnity in 

$000s Loss Ratio

A 152,805 4,813 5,766 120%

I 26,808 838 310 37%

Total 179,613 5,651 6,076 108%

60% I 2,604 58 57 97%

70% I 5,383 426 251 59%

Adjusted I 18,820 353 2 1%

Percentage 

Adjusted I

 10% 6% 0% N/A

3.7.5 Cultivated Clam Pilot Rates By Stages

The base rates for Stage 2 compared to Stage 3 are approximately 10% greater for Massachusetts and 

Virginia and 20% greater for Florida. In Florida the Stage 4 base rates are 20% less than the Stage 3 rates. 

Table 30 displays the insurance experience by Stage for each pilot state for 2004-2010. The results are 

somewhat inconclusive as to whether the factors are appropriate by stage. Massachusetts’ Stage 3 loss 

ratio is greater than Stage 2 while Virginia’s Stage 3 loss ratio is much lower than Stage 2. This may be due 

to the small number of losses in total which lead to a lack of credibility for these rating factors.

Table 31: Cultivated Clam Pilot Experience 

By State By Type Code (Stage) – Crop Years 2004 - 2010

State

Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4

Liability 

($000s) Loss Ratio

Liability 

($000s)

Loss 

Ratio

Liability 

($000s)

Loss 

Ratio

Florida 4,297 214% 8,022 121% 19,210 140%

Massachusetts 2,385 194% 10,000 259% N/A N/A

South Carolina 319 413% 714 0% 1,204 0%

Virginia 31,125 115% 102,338 35% N/A N/A

Total 38,126 133% 121,074 59% 20,414 132%

3.7.6 Cultivated Clam Pilot Rates By Coverage Level

The following table displays the insurance experience results by coverage level. The lower loss ratio at the 

50% coverage level is indicative of the lower loss ratio for Virginia overall since the majority of clams are 

insured at the 50% coverage level in Virginia. Likewise, the high loss ratio for the 75% coverage level is 

mostly attributable to Florida experience.
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Table 32: Cultivate Clam Pilot Experience

By Coverage Level for Crop Years 2004 - 2010

Coverage 

Level

Liability 

($000s)

Total Premium 

($000s)

Policies Earning 

Premium

Indemnity 

($000s) Loss Ratio

50% 101,438 2,157 486 1,458 68%

55% 1,265 37 13 197 537%

60% 45,712 1,310 119 648 49%

65% 19,356 1,089 194 1,276 117%

70% 6,013 505 156 785 155%

75% 5,830 553 114 1,711 309%

It is our understanding the coverage level factors are based on studies from crops with much more 

substantial data. It should be noted that since the majority of clam insurance in Virginia is sold at a 50% 

coverage level (see Section 3.3.3) this may be why there have been so few losses. A comparison of 

coverage and premium charged to a farmer in Virginia helps explain why most coverage is bought at the 

50% level:

Table 33: Cultivated Clam Pilot Example

Clams Planted 1,000,000

Survival Factor 0.6

Remaining Clams 600,000

Base Rate 0.030

Price Per Clam $0.15

Table 34: Cultivated Clam Pilot Rating Example

50% Clams Insured 300,000 75% Clams Insured 450,000

50% Coverage Level Factor 0.60 75% Coverage Level Factor 1.72

50% Subsidy 0.67 75% Subsidy 0.55

50% Premium Paid by Farmer $267.30 75% Premium Paid by Farmer $1,567.35

Premium per 100 clams $0.09 Premium per 100 clams $0.35

A farmer with a 50% coverage level would pay 9 cents per hundred clams for insurance, as shown in Table 

33. If the farmer instead selected a 75% coverage level they would pay 35 cents per hundred clams. The 

additional premium for the 75% coverage level would be $1,300.05 ($1,567.35 - $267.30). The marginal 

costs for insuring the additional 150,000 (450,000 – 300,000) clams would be 87 cents per hundred clams 

($1,300.05 / 150,000). While the additional insured clams would be first to receive an indemnity in case of 

a loss, the additional amount of premium for this coverage may be perceived to be too high for most 

growers. 

We compared the coverage level relativities for Florida to those in the other states. Figure 14 shows that 

there is a large difference in the relativities at the 70% and 75% coverage levels between the states. It is 

typical for other crops with larger base rates to have flatter relativity curves, but these seem much higher 

at the 70% and 75% coverage levels than for other crops.
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The data for Figure 14 is included in Appendix E.

Figure 14

It is not clear how the coverage levels were established. The relativities appear to be the same since the 

program began except in Florida where they were reduced after base rates were increased in 2004. Since 

most policies purchased have a 50% coverage level, but are not CAT, it would be difficult to conclude that 

changes to the higher coverage level relativities would have a significant impact on program experience.

3.7.7 Cultivated Clam Pilot Rate Methodology

It is unclear how the initial rates were established as the previous evaluation did not specifically review the 

initial rating methodology. However, the previous evaluation was performed after the significant changes 

were made to the pilot program so the initial rating methodology is somewhat irrelevant to this evaluation. 

RMA sent the following email regarding the rating methodology for the cultivated clam pilot program:

The clam program is still relatively new given the significant policy changes that occurred 

for the 2004 crop year rendering previous experience useless with respect to the formal 

methodology for determining target rates. For the 2004 crop year, an effort was made to 

take the data up until that point and restate it based on the new facets of the policy in 

order to estimate suitable rates. Since that time, rates have undergone cursory reviews to 

evaluate whether or not there was enough new information to warrant updates. The 

annual data is typically feast or famine, either a huge LR or LR of zero. Thus far, the big 

swings in program performance have typically led us to leaving the rates alone to avoid a 
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roller coaster effect of rate increases and decreases based on the extremes. Aside from a 

few minor rate changes, most rates have remained constant for clams.

The Regional Offices prepare an annual pilot program checklist for the Cultivated Clam Pilot program in 

conjunction with the Program Manager from RMA. We were provided these for 2006 through 2009. 

These checklists summarize the insurance experience for the pilot program and also compare the loss 

ratio to other crops in the pilot counties. We note that nothing was mentioned about the base rate 

changes in these checklists.

3.7.8 Cultivated Clam Pilot Rating Summary

Overall, the program appears to be performing at a reasonable level since the 2004 changes. However, the 

low participation since 2004, coupled with the generally concentrated geographic profile of the insureds, 

leaves the program susceptible to significant variation in loss ratios from year to year. The catastrophic 

nature of the program has a few years with very high loss ratios and many years with low loss ratios. This 

extreme variability results in an insurance experience database that has little credibility. When insurance 

data lacks credibility, actuaries will generally rely on other approaches to develop rates. These other 

approaches may include:

 Utilizing premium and loss experience from similar products, and/or

 Modeling the claims based on underlying risk characteristics of the exposure.

In our judgment, neither of these approaches will produce reliable rates for clams. As discussed earlier, 

clams appear to be uniquely different from other crops for which RMA has insurance products. The loss 

experience suggests that the crop is susceptible to catastrophic weather events, but the probability of 

these events differs geographically. Further, there is little credible information to assess the severity of loss 

associated with an event if it occurred. The amount of loss is also influenced by the farming practices of 

each individual grower, as well as by the location of the beds. Because of the many variables and the 

absence (to our knowledge) of data that measures the mortality risk of various hazards, we conclude that 

modeling will not produce reliable rates.

This leads to the use of underwriting judgment in developing rates, and that appears to be the approach 

RMA has used. While judgment is clearly important in the absence of credible data, we would recommend 

that RMA develop a framework for rate changes based on long and short-term performance (loss ratios) of 

the program. We believe there should be documentation, perhaps included in the annual pilot program 

checklist, when rates are changed.

3.8 Pricing analysis

Published price data on hard clams is scarce and may get scarcer. The only quotations readily available are 

from the New Fulton Fish Market in New York, but that institution is reportedly on the verge of 

liquidation. For now, the Urner Barry Seafood Price Current continues to publish quotations each 

Tuesday and Thursday for littleneck, topneck, cherrystone and chowder clams. The quotations are per 

bushel and usually reflect a range of a couple of dollars. Thus for a bushel of littlenecks, about 400 clams, a 

recent price of $88 per bushel works out to 22 cents per clam. Topnecks are 200 to the bushel so a $40 

price is 20 cents per clam. 
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Our understanding is that RMA has used a moving average of this data, adjusted for historic differentials 

among locations, and confirmed with trade sources, to set reference prices for the pilot program. We 

could not find any alternative. The historic data from that source do not show a great deal of variation 

year to year. That is also the case with the data collected by the Virginia Institute of Marine Science. 

Figure 15 shows the average price in the state typically at about 15 cents, plus or minus two cents. The 

current RMA method of setting reference prices is probably the only alternative.

The data for Figure 15 is included in Appendix E.

Figure 15

3.9 Plans of insurance

3.9.1 AGR and AGR-Lite

In our research we found no competing private insurance for cultivated clams. The other FCIC programs 

that are available to clam growers are AGR and AGR-Lite. AGR is only available in the Massachusetts and 

Virginia pilot counties as well as Levy County, Florida. AGR-Lite is available in every pilot county. AGR 

has three major restrictions that would impact participation by clam growers:

 Have had same tax entity for seven years (filed five consecutive years of Schedule F tax forms plus 

previous year and insurance year) unless a change in tax entity is reviewed and approved by the

insurance provider, 

 Earn no more than 35 percent of expected allowable income from animals or animal products, 

and

 Purchase traditional Federal insurance if more than 50% of your expected income is from 

insurable commodities.

AGR-Lite has fewer eligibility restrictions than AGR. The major differences for clam growers are:

 Eliminating the restriction of 35 percent of expected allowable income from animal or animal 

products, and 
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 Removing the requirement to purchase Federal insurance if more than 50% of your income is 

from insurable commodities.

AGR-Lite has a more restrictive liability limit of $1,000,000 compared to AGR which is $6,500,000. There 

were 40 clam policies with liabilities greater than $1,000,000, which was 1.5% of all policies. However, 

these policies accounted for about 25% of the total clam pilot premium. The liabilities may not be directly 

comparable since clams grow for more than one year. 

We received detailed policy records for AGR and AGR-Lite in connection with another project and only 

one clam farmer used AGR-Lite in one year. We compared the rates between the two programs and it is 

obvious why a clam grower would not buy AGR-Lite rather than clam insurance. The producer premium 

rates for AGR-Lite are between 250% and 350% greater than the clam pilot producer premium rates for 

Virginia and Massachusetts. 

Table 35: Cultivated Clam Pilot Comparison of Producer Paid Rates to AGR-Lite

Virginia – Northampton MA – Barnstable Florida – Levy

75% CL 65% CL 75% CL 65% CL 75% CL 65% CL

Clam Pilot 0.020 0.011 0.022 0.012 0.042 0.030

AGR-Lite 0.079 0.047 0.079 0.047 0.098 0.075

% Greater 295% 340% 259% 300% 133% 146%

It should be noted that the commodity rates for AGR-Lite are referred to as “Fish/Aquaculture” in Virginia 

and Massachusetts. There is a separate “Clam” commodity in Florida for AGR-Lite.

3.9.2 NAP program

In the absence of an FCIC clam policy, growers are eligible for the Farm Service Agency’s Non-insured 

Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP). The cost is $250 per crop, payable at the time of application. 

As with CAT coverage, the grower must have a loss greater than 50% to get an indemnity. Then for losses 

over that threshold he can receive 55% of the average market price. There is a payment limit of $100,000 

and producers with gross revenue greater than $2 million are ineligible.

3.10 Data acceptance requirements

In the course of our analysis of the program experience data, we encountered no incompatibilities 

between the formulas, calculations and equations used for the various program reports and the Appendix 

III data reporting requirements. While some records had what would be considered outliers, we were 

able to reconcile all our calculations to RMA’s Summary of Business.

3.11 Program acceptance

The listening sessions and other interviews undertaken as part of the industry research provide the best 

assessment of program acceptance. A report of the outcome of the listening sessions is included as

Appendix A: Listening session comments.
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Acceptance is mixed. Those who attended the listening sessions in Florida and Virginia were 

knowledgeable about the program and most wanted to see the pilot extended and saw no big market 

issues if it were to be expanded to other states and counties. However, Florida growers were very 

unhappy about inspections and if those are continued many will not use the program. 

We could not get a good reading on Massachusetts growers, who were not very forthcoming at the 

listening session. In South Carolina, both awareness and understanding of the pilot were poor to 

nonexistent. The head of the Shellfish Growers Association has been raising clams for 20 years but never 

heard of it. 

We frequently heard that the pilot insurance plan had had an impact on market prices because of the 

encouragement of clam production in Cedar Key. When the pilot was launched, the Florida state 

government was also encouraging development of a clam industry to absorb the fishermen who had lost 

their livelihood due to a fishing ban. The combination of incentives and insurance resulted in additional 

clams being produced and marketed. 

A secondary impact is related to the allegations of fraud in Cedar Key. Those who were said to be taking 

advantage of the program by filing unwarranted indemnity claims were also said to be still harvesting the 

clams and selling them under the table at discounted prices, and undermining the normal market price.

Florida clam producers outside the pilot counties wanted either to also be eligible for the insurance plan or 

to see it terminated because it was putting them at a competitive disadvantage.

The insurance provisions place limits on planting density that seemed to go unenforced in Florida. Planting 

1,400-1,500 clams per bag was reported at the Cedar Key listening session to be common practice. The 

limit for insurability is 1,200.

These problems notwithstanding, we do think the pilot plan’s model is an appropriate plan of insurance for 

cultivated clams. It is just challenging to implement and manage.

3.12 Program delivery

3.12.1 Overview

This has been a challenging program for the insurance companies to deliver. Some of the large companies 

have stuck with it due to their commitment to be national providers of these FCIC products. But for 

agents and adjusters accustomed to dealing with field crops, fruits and vegetables, and a little bit of 

livestock coverage, cultivated clams were an entirely different proposition, as discussed in more detail 

elsewhere in this report. 

After the initial flurry of activity and interest, insurance companies seem to have stopped any aggressive 

marketing of the product, and often as not, have been happy to have as little to do with the pilot as 

possible. Most of the liability continues to be placed in the assigned risk pool.
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3.12.2 Review of policy files

RMA provided us with two of the requested five policy files. The other three were apparently not 

forthcoming from the AIPs from which they had been requested. Both files were from RCIS, one from 

Virginia and one from Massachusetts. We reviewed both files and our comments on them are as follows:

Insurer: Rural Community Insurance Services

Insured: Ballard Fish & Oyster Co., Inc. DBA Cherrystone Aqua Farms

Cherrystone Aqua Farms is the largest cultivated clam producer in Virginia. Under a cooperative 

agreement, the company provides seed to contract growers who plant, grow, and harvest the clams, which 

are then delivered to Cherrystone, which markets them. Cherrystone also grows its own clams. For 2011 

the group is insuring plantings of approximately 240 million clams. The number of clams sold in Virginia in 

recent years has averaged below 200 million.

Gross revenue is split by a 60:40 formula between Cherrystone and the growers. They get 50% buyup 

coverage and the premium is shared in accordance with the same formula.

The 267 pages of material provided by RCIS included the following:

 Initial application for 2000 from 10/29/99.

 Legal correspondence from 11/22/99 regarding the respective insurable interests of Cherrystone 

and its contract growers.

 A file note from 12/2/99 on agreement with RMA that optional units would be allowed for each 

individual share with optional units within each share by noncontiguous lease. Cherrystone to 

handle insurance transactions for its contracted growers.

 Documentation of seed planting, harvests, prices and survival rates for 2000-2004 for various 

growers.

 Documentation of 2011 coverage for a total of 61 units among 16 growers.

 Documentation of 2010 coverage for 40 units among 18 growers.

 Documentation of 2009 coverage for 45 parcels in 2 units among 18 growers.

 Documentation of a 2009 claim for disease (QPX), with pathology report, appraisal, and 

withdrawal of claim after clam population per foot exceeded the 80 clam threshold.

 Documentation of 2008 coverage for 39 parcels in 2 units.

 Documentation of single 2007 GPS readings for various plats/leases.

For 2011, there was a signed clam inventory value report for each of the 16 growers with coverage plus 

one grower with no clams. Each is signed by a Cherrystone employee rather than the insured. 

Cherrystone has 3 units of Stage 2 clams. Each of 13 contract growers reported all Stage 2 clams as a 

single unit. All but one grower had multiple Stage 3 units, and that grower had no Stage 2 clams. 

The general picture was the same for 2010, but for the prior two years there were apparently only two 

units, one for Cherrystone and one for the contract growers. This is odd because optional units have 

been permitted for separately named creeks on the bay side and leases at least a mile apart on the sea side 

throughout this period.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Evaluation components findings

56

There are seven areas of concern.

1. The Special Provisions require that GPS readings be taken for each corner of a lease or parcel. 

The RCIS file has only a single reading per lease. 

2. Maps of leases with location of plantings would be useful, although they may not technically be 

required. There was only one map of a lease location in the file.

3. We have some concern that the contract grower does not sign the inventory value report.

4. Planting dates are frequently shown as a date range or as either July 15 or July 16 for stage 

differentiation purposes. This does not permit enforcement of the 3-year end of insurance. 

Growers may well have the necessary information, but it is not in the file.

5. There are no pre-acceptance inspections for what appear to be new contract growers, although it 

is possible that entities changed names. Whether there were ever inspections for any grower is 

not evident because we do not have the earlier years.

6. One error for 2011 is that Charles Robbins is designated as Stage 3 but has a 7/16/10 planting 

date.

7. There are never any reports of additions to inventory, which seems implausible for an operation 

this size.

Overall, RCIS appears to be relying on being able to access the growers’ records of planting and harvesting 

at particular locations after the fact in the event of a claim. This is a potential area of vulnerability. 

However, it may not be any different than the situation with corn and other field crops, where the AIP is 

relying to a great degree on self-certification by the farmer that he planted certain fields on certain dates, 

or applied crop protection chemicals at particular rates on particular dates. The company and associated 

growers are clearly aiming at a modest degree of protection if there is a catastrophic event like a 

hurricane. We conclude that the insurance agent is following the underwriting guidelines in spirit, but not 

in fact.

Insurer: Rural Community Insurance Services

Insured: Robert Ashworth

Ashworth farms on a two acre lease that his spouse has in Barnstable Harbor. The 118 pages provided 

from his policy file go back to a claim for ice floe damage filed in 2007 but do not contain the original 2007 

policy information. A state fisheries specialist certified that ice was abundant from mid-January to late 

February in 2007. The appraiser who investigated the claim in October 2007 also completed a preacceptance inspection for 2008. This included sampling the grower’s 2004, 2005 and 2007 plantings and 

determining that there were 502,731 clams in the 2007 planting. The PAI form’s question 25 – “Are the 

areas susceptible to excessive silting?” was answered in the negative.

The initial indemnity calculated by the appraiser was $12,923. This was recalculated to $18,605 when the 

claims administrator “was informed that the CAT price adjustment is to be made on the front end (i.e. on 

the Appraisal Worksheet) and not in Box 33 on the Clam Production Worksheet.” Why the latter had 

Box 33 CAT Adjustment is therefore not clear. The form was not changed in subsequent years. Total 

indemnities for ice flow damage in the county that year were $48,167.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Evaluation components findings

57

The applications for 2008-2011 include Clam Inventory Reports and copies of the town aquaculture license 

for the two acres that are leased. The letter includes the GPS coordinates of the lease. 

A June 2008 invoice is included for 500,000 seed clams. A PAI for 2009 included sampling of the 2008 

plantings (with an estimated 453,024 clams) and a more extensive resampling of the 2007 plantings, 

showing a larger planted area and total clams at 565,226. The larger area was due to the inclusion of 

previously uninsurable beds after the grower spread out clams to additional nets to get down to the 

acceptable planting density. The November 24 PAI form for 2009 again indicates that the lease is not 

susceptible to excessive silting. A December 2 file note from the adjuster says: “Insured stated that he 

wished to cancel his policy for 2009; that same confirmed by agent. No 2009 PAI is needed.”

Subsequently, 2009 policy materials are included in the file with signature dates in November 2008 but 

other date markings in December, indicating that this may have been put into effect after the November 30 

sales closing date. The only copy of a signed application for 2009 has a fax header on it with the insured’s 

company name and a date of February 1, 2011. The files were provided to Promar by RMA on February 9, 

2011. No claim was filed for 2009 so it is not clear why the agent thought it necessary to show a policy in 

place for that year.

The signed 2010 application has the same 2011 fax header. The Clam Inventory Value Report is signed and 

dated November 30, 2009. 

On September 15, 2010, the insured reported a loss due to oxygen depletion. The appraiser inspected 

and sampled the beds on November 6 and calculated an indemnity of $18,658. The extension agent 

provided a letter on November 5 which is reproduced on the following page. There are basic problems 

with this situation:

 The applications for both 2009 and 2010 appear to have been added to the file in 2011.

 The PAIs had indicated that the lease is not subject to excessive siltation, and there were no other 

claims in the county for any cause in 2010.

 The extension agent discusses siltation during the winter when beds are less accessible, and that 

would be discovered in the spring. Filing a claim in September indicates that the grower was not 

following good farming practices by inspecting and maintaining the beds. The letter does not 

provide a candid assessment of the situation.

 Siltation is not a cause of loss under the policy.

 Oxygen depletion is a cause of loss but not applicable here based on the definition of causes of 

loss in Section 13A(1) of the underwriting guide: “Oxygen depletion due to vegetation, microbial 

activity, harmful algae bloom, or high water temperature unless otherwise limited by the Special 

Provisions.”

It appears to us that, if there was indeed a valid policy in place, the claim should have been denied.

On the plus side, the appraiser does a workmanlike job throughout the period, and RCIS is doing preacceptance inspections, even though they are not formally required each year.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Evaluation components findings

58

Figure 16: Letter regarding Massachusetts claim
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Unpublished Data Report Findings

59

SECTION 4: UNPUBLISHED DATA REPORT FINDINGS

Standard analysis of records is appended at Appendix C. All additional analysis and tables are included in 

others parts of this report.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Recommendations

60

SECTION 5: RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Recommendations that affect statutes

We have no recommendations requiring statutory changes.

5.2 Recommendations that affect regulations

With regard to regulatory changes, our primary recommendation is that the pilot program be terminated.

Our assignment in this evaluation was to recommend whether the pilot program should be modified and 

continued as a pilot, terminated, or converted to a permanent program. We will first review the 

arguments for those courses we have not recommended and then explain why we have recommended 

termination of the pilot.

5.2.1 Conversion to a permanent program

This pilot will be in its twelfth year of operation in 2011, the final year currently authorized. During the 

first four years the average loss ratio was quite high at 179%. Changes implemented with the 2004 crop 

year addressed a number of problems with the initial design, and the loss ratio has averaged 108% for 

2004-2010. That is a positive development but there are two factors that prevent us from recommending 

that the pilot be converted to a permanent program. 

First, participation has declined every year since 2002. By 2005 there were 202 policies earning premium. 

The Census of Aquaculture for that year showed 276 farms producing market-size hard clams in the four 

pilot states, so 73% of those farms were covered. The percentage was necessarily higher in the pilot 

counties. By 2009 the policies earning premium had dropped to 107, and in 2010 to fewer than 75.

Second, there continue to be allegations of fraud, particularly in Florida. The nature of aquaculture is that 

the stock of animals is difficult to count, so determining stock mortality – the basis of this dollar insurance 

plan – is inherently challenging. In the case of hard clams, there continue to be vulnerabilities to abuse of 

the insurance coverage according to input from the listening sessions. 

Clams of this type are also produced in other parts of Florida as well as in Connecticut, New Jersey and 

North Carolina. There would clearly be some interest among growers in those areas in having access to 

insurance coverage. However, we cannot recommend conversion to a permanent program given the 

pilot’s trajectory and its vulnerability to abuse.

5.2.2 Modification and continuation as a pilot

For the same and related reasons, we cannot recommend continuation of the current pilot with 

modifications. We do not think that modifying plan provisions would increase participation rates. In 

Massachusetts there is no participation in four of the five pilot counties. In South Carolina there were no 

participants at all in 2008 or 2009, and only one last year. This is despite very low out-of-pocket premiums 

in all states except Florida. With continuation, we would recommend dropping Florida from the pilot due 

to concerns about fraud. That would leave only Virginia, where the program is well supported, plus a few 

policies in Massachusetts where growers have been lukewarm about it. 
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Recommendations

61

Participation in Florida dropped sharply in 2010 after RMA appropriately required pre-acceptance 

inspections for every policy. Eliminating the requirement for such inspections would probably cause 

participation to recover in that state, but we believe it would result in higher loss ratios. The insurance 

companies that have been successful at controlling losses mostly require that plantings be certified by an 

adjuster more often than dictated by the underwriting standards for the pilot.

One reason the pilot has not been successful is that it is both challenging and expensive for the AIPs to 

administer. Most, if not all, of the liability is reportedly placed in the assigned risk pool. The A&O expense 

allowance also may not be adequate to cover the companies’ actual costs. Thus the incentive to market 

the plan has been weak. This will not change with plan modifications.

We did give consideration to two other factors. First, RMA has commissioned a research study on the 

feasibility of insuring bivalves, including oysters, mussels and clams. That might argue for continuing the 

pilot for another year or two pending the results of that study. But while it is conceivable that some 

recommendation might emerge with respect to clams that would involve a modification we have not 

considered, we think it is unlikely. 

Second, the two AIPs that have written the most coverage have cumulative 11-year loss ratios that are 

below 100%, suggesting that it is possible to run a successful program. However, this is entirely due to 

results in Virginia and does not imply that a geographically broader program can succeed. The Virginia 

results are attributable to the larger scale of growers in that state, the propensity to buy just 50 or 60 

percent coverage, and the requirement by at least one insurer that every planting be inspected by an 

adjuster.

While we are not recommending modifying and continuing the pilot, if the FCIC Board were to decide to 

continue the pilot, we would recommend the following main modifications:

 Drop the state of Florida from the pilot program.

 Clarify in the underwriting standards that pre-acceptance inspections must include sampling of the 

plantings following procedures in the loss adjustment standards handbook.

5.2.3 Termination

We recommend terminating the Cultivated Clam Pilot Crop Insurance Program after the 2011 crop year. 

There are four reasons:

 Participation has steadily declined and has now fallen to a level that cannot sustain a viable 

program.

 There continue to be allegations of fraud, particularly in Florida but in other states as well.

 This first program for an aquaculture crop is challenging and expensive for AIPs to operate.

 We do not find any potential program modifications that could be anticipated to either improve 

the performance of the program or increase grower participation.

If the pilot is terminated, clam growers will have access to the Farm Service Agency’s NAP program which 

can provide a degree of catastrophic protection. The AGR-Lite program is also available in all the pilot 

counties and can provide good insurance cover for those growers with five years of tax records, although 

at a higher cost in premiums.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Recommendations

62

5.3 Recommendations that affect actuarial documents

5.3.1 Special Provisions of Insurance

We have no recommended changes.

5.3.2 FCI-35 Coverage and Rates

We have no recommended changes.

5.4 Recommendations that affect program materials

If the pilot were to be modified and continued, we recommend a number of revisions to the underwriting 

guide to correct or simplify wording and to clarify that pre-acceptance inspections must include taking 

actual samples from the production site, following procedures in the loss adjustment handbook. The 

purpose is to certify that the clams to be insured actually exist and were planted at a rate per square foot 

no greater than that listed in the special provisions for each pilot area. Some insurers already do this 

annually, but at a minimum it must be done for an initial application or whenever the policy is transferred 

to a different insurance company.

5.5 Impact analysis

5.5.1 Impact on government costs

Termination of the pilot would be the least cost option for the government. On the cost side, we estimate 

that a total of one person month would be required to implement the termination. On the savings side, 

current staff resources devoted to managing the pilot would be freed up but we do not have an estimate of 

the person months involved. 

If the Board were to decide to modify and continue the pilot, we estimate that a total of three person 

months would be required. In both cases this takes into account the personnel doing the actual work, 

those with supervisory responsibilities for reviewing and approving that work, and those tasked with 

communicating the changes to insurance providers.

5.5.2 Impact on insurers

Insurance providers would lose a source of potential revenue if the pilot is terminated. If 2010 

participation remains representative, with its total premium of about $520,000, the companies collectively 

would lose potential A&O revenue of $114,000 but have a small offset for lower liabilities if the loss ratio 

remains above 100% (assuming they continue to put most of these policies in the assigned risk pool).

5.5.3 Impact on clam producers

Those growers who produce cultivated clams would lose a valuable risk management tool. Without the 

pilot program, their next best option would be either FSA’s NAP program or AGR-Lite. The NAP 

program has much lower levels of coverage and a maximum indemnity of $100,000, but it also costs next 

to nothing. The AGR-Lite policy has a much higher liability limit of $1,000,000 but it is more expensive.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix A: Listening sessions comments 

63

APPENDIX A: LISTENING SESSION COMMENTS 

Listening sessions were held in Florida, Virginia and Massachusetts. We were unable to schedule a session 

in South Carolina, the fourth pilot state, due to lack of interest. However, we did interview selected 

producers by phone. The listening sessions and other input from producers and agents by phone or email 

are summarized below. 

a) Florida listening sessions 

During December 2010, two listening sessions were scheduled in Florida with the advice and help of the 

Multi-County Shellfish Aquaculture Extension Agent at the state’s Cedar Key Marine Field Station. One 

was scheduled for January 5 in Sebastian on the Atlantic Coast, and a second the following day in Cedar 

Key on the Gulf Coast. This made it feasible for growers in all four pilot counties to attend a listening 

session without an undue amount of time spent travelling to the session. 

We contacted the Florida Department of Agriculture’s Division of Aquaculture and they were able to 

provide us with contact information for all of the 360 certified clam growers, including hatchery and 

nursery as well as lease holders. We mailed each of them a letter inviting them to the listening sessions, 

and provided the Extension Agent with an appropriate notice that was placed in the local newspaper for 

Cedar Key. In addition, we contacted five of the insurance companies that had been identified as 

participating in the program: John Deere, Great American, Rain & Hail, Hudson and RCIS. We provided 

them with notice of the listening sessions. We also contacted NCIS staff who forwarded the notice to the 

group of insurance representatives that had been dealing with recent clam pilot issues such as preacceptance inspections. Despite this, no insurance company representatives attended either session. 

Prior to the listening sessions we prepared a one-page summary of program experience showing overall 

results by year, summary results by state and pilot county, and yearly policies earning premium and loss 

ratios for the four Florida counties. We also prepared a one-page “customer satisfaction questionnaire” to 

solicit additional feedback at the sessions. 

Sebastian listening session (January 5, 2011) 

The session was held at the Best Western. We had low expectations about attendance due to the 

apparent decline of the industry on the Atlantic coast after a 2004 hurricane and the small number of 

participants in the pilot program. However we had five people show up and they were all quite 

forthcoming. Two were growers, two were nursery but had experience as growers, and one was primarily 

a seed producer and breeder. Two RMA staff were also present. 

One participant was a large grower with 34 acres of leases. He was insistent that he would get out of the 

business if there was no insurance available and strongly recommended continuation of the program. He 

was the only one of the five using the insurance, and rated it very favorably. “The insurance payments can 

allow you to restart after a big loss, but it then takes you 18 months to get back on your feet.”

The others mostly thought the program should continue but only “if you could get the fraud under 

control”. There was also sentiment that all Florida clam growers should be eligible because the program 

has given Cedar Key growers a competitive advantage. They said there are about 10 growers in Charlotte 

Harbor, 80 in Cedar Key, and single digits in two or three other areas. 
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix A: Listening sessions comments

64

They complained about the decline in prices from 14-16 cents ten years ago to 10 cents or less recently. 

That is apparently another reason behind the decline of the industry on the Atlantic coast. One grower 

said there are 40 leases in his area but he only sees three being worked. There has apparently been a big 

improvement in water quality in the “lagoon”, the inland waterway where clams are grown. This is due to 

state efforts to control storm water runoff into Indian River. The C-54 canal and storage ponds, coupled 

with Marine Resource Council efforts to restore mangroves, have helped with this.

The clam breeder is doing a lot of work with hybrids and thinks a cross of the local mercenaria 

campechiensis with mercenaria mercenaria has good prospects and will have greater survivability. Another 

local hard clam is the sunray venus. There was discussion of whether the ongoing hybridization work 

means one should not limit the program to Mercenaria mercenaria.

Another area where there is apparently conflict between the pilot provisions and actual practice is planting 

density. The pilot specifies that there be no more than 1,200 clams per 16 square foot bag, i.e. 75 per 

square foot. But participants said most people plant 1,400-1,500 per bag. They also asked why the bottom 

planting practice is not covered in Florida, saying that one local grower has been using it with good results.

There is an active Clam Industry Task Force that has been meeting with state officials to address various 

issues related to leases and industry regulation.

With regard to pre-acceptance inspections, they said in their experience there is no unusual mortality 

resulting from pulling bags. The large grower said he had just finished his inspection and everyone should 

just do it.

They said there are many ways to commit fraud. You can put a burlap bag on top of a clam bag and it will 

kill them. Or a grower can be saving shell and planting it. But this only works when the adjuster is not 

choosing the bags to be pulled.

Prices for seed clams have been weak: $3,000 per million for 1.2mm, $7-8,000 per million for 4mm, and 

less than $20,000 per million for 12mm. From 1mm to 4mm the survival rate is 50%, and you lose another 

50% getting from 4mm to 12mm, according to the breeder. Then there is 30-40% mortality from that 

point on. 

One can plant clams year round, but summer is best. There was no basic problem with program dates. 

One grower said December is the best time for inspections.

Responses on the questionnaire supported the program design.

Cedar Key Meetings (January 6, 2011)

On arrival we went by boat out to the nearest lease area where we were met by a long-time grower. This 

was arranged by the Extension Agent. The grower pulled a bag of mature clams so we could get a sense of 

what the process and result looks like. He does not buy insurance. Back on shore, the Extension Agent 

took us to a nursery to show us the process and we spoke with the owner, also a long-time grower. He 

also does not buy the insurance because he is averse to paperwork. In a subsequent discussion the 

Extension Agent confirmed that growers typically plant 1,400-1,500 clams, particularly if they are producing 
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix A: Listening sessions comments

65

for the “casino market” that wants smaller clams. The agent was insistent that pulling bags causes 

increased mortality. Another problem is that bags are often belted together, so you have to pull cover 

netting off a large portion of the belt to get to a bag in the middle.

We then had a private meeting with a grower who said there are crooked agents and growers who have 

scammed the program for years. Some seem to get a check every year. They plant bags with clam shells 

in them and then pull those up for appraisals. Other relatives sell the clams that are harvested later at a 

low price to wholesalers. This drops the price for other legitimate growers. He said they should have to 

pull the bags with claimed losses and put them in the dumpster. With regard to inspections, he said 30 

days is not enough time to get them done. It took an hour per bag to inspect his. He felt there should be 

a ceiling of $50,000 on any insurance payment. Pulling bags for inspection may kill clams during certain 

times. 

We then had a second meeting with a town official with direct program experience who played a large role 

in getting everything in place to allow cultivated clams in Cedar Key. The pilot is a problem – “No one’s 

been driving that boat”. Instead of clam farmers, they now have “claim farmers” that are “a cancer that 

needs to be addressed”. The pilot is not fair across the board, no matter what insurance group is involved. 

The fraud has caused market price issues. The official does not want the industry to be destroyed by a

problematic program. It is a small town with a population of 700 and the “false sense of entitlement is 

eroding the integrity of the group”. They have a potential goldmine – a clean industry that is providing a 

safe American food product. The official believes there should only be a CAT or AGR type program to 

stem fraud. Companies are not fair. There are real problems that need to be addressed. Insurance 

caused a supply/demand issue that dropped prices. Regulation is needed for both seed and sales to address 

fraud. Agents and adjusters are not well informed. 

Cedar Key listening session (January 6, 2011)

The session was held in the evening at the Senator Kirkpatrick Marine Lab. We had been promised a 

group of irate growers, but the participants were all polite. The sign-in sheet recorded 15 attendees but 

there were over 20 present. Pre-acceptance inspections were the main topic they raised, but there was 

also discussion of long delays in payment of indemnities, the paperwork burden, and the definition of 

replants. They would not comment on the issue of fraud despite prompting, although two who filled out 

the customer satisfaction survey said those with high loss ratios should be penalized. 

The general opinion on pre-acceptance inspections was that they are too burdensome, will result in high 

mortality for the bags that are pulled, and will spread disease when the bags are returned to the bottom. 

Some farmers proposed that they simply be paid for those clams in the 3 percent of bags.

“You are creating disease by pulling the bags, taking them out, and putting them back.”

“They (RMA) are creating a lot of loss across the board for all the clammers. They are creating 

a field of disease out there, which has been documented.”

“Everything was fine till this came about. I don’t even let people walk into my clams. You can 

literally step on the bags and kill the clams it’s so soft.”
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix A: Listening sessions comments

66

The insurance agents and adjusters will generally not go in the water so the farmer has to go in to pull the 

bags. This is done by tying a line to the bag, which is then winched aboard the boat. What comes up is 

about half clams and half mud, worms and other matter that has to be washed away before one can count. 

Doing so in the bottom of a rocking boat out in the weather has its own problems. Insurance company 

staff have been asking (or requiring) the farmers to bring the clams to shore for counting. If a farmer has a 

million clams, that is 833 bags at 1,200 per bag, and a 3 percent sample is 25 bags. That is a lot to put in a 

boat, and very time consuming to clean and count. One farmer said it is simply not practical to count 

clams on the boat. Another farmer proposed that there be a cap on the number of bags that have to be 

pulled. If all 56 farmers were getting insurance and needed to be inspected, there is no way it could be 

done in 30 days. Most thought it is too cold in January to be doing inspections, and it was indeed cold the 

day we were there.

There was concern that pulling the bags made those clams uninsurable, due to confusion about what 

constituted replanting. We and RMA staff clarified that as long as the clams are not removed from the 

lease area, they remain insured when replanted after counting. But if they are brought ashore and then 

returned to the site, they become uninsurable. 

There were several complaints about the length of time it took to get paid an indemnity, e.g. a November 

claim with adjustment in January and no payment received until May. Another example was a June claim 

not paid until December. At that point it was impossible to plant, so the farmer could not spend it on new 

seed and the insurance money became taxable income. 

“That’s the problem with the whole program – real slow pay.”

“With clam insurance they treat you like a thief. And you wait nine months to get your check 

and it puts you so far behind and by the time your check comes it’s too late to plant seeds and 

by the time you plant you are a year behind. You follow the rules and they change the rules, 

and you follow the rules and they change the rules again and they still treat you like a thief.” 

Several complained about various aspects of the necessary paperwork. There was confusion about when 

growers need to submit updated Clam Inventory Reports (after every planting? Just quarterly?). They 

thought it was unfair that you can only add to the guarantee, not subtract. 

“They don’t send you notices saying they need your updated reports; you just have to know to 

do it.” 

“Clam farmers are not very adept at doing paper work. If there was a software developer that 

could create a point and click kind of thing and it all got submitted through the internet, it would 

be better. Instead of anything be due in the winter, which is ridiculous.”

They complained about having to re-designate clams as having moved to the next stage, saying this should 

happen automatically. Stages should automatically adjust based on planting date since they are six month 

stages. Now they need to resubmit the Clam Inventory report or the original clams will not be covered 

for insurance. It can only cost more when submitting an updated clam inventory report because you can 

increase Inventory but cannot decrease it. Why pay for something they don’t have? Sometimes planting 
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix A: Listening sessions comments 

67

isn’t viable (no seed clams for sale, poor weather, etc.). Some would like an internet application that 

keeps track of clams and could be submitted to agents (and automatically adjust for stages). 

Ten attendees filled out the “Cultivated Clam Pilot Satisfaction” form. They generally thought the 

November 30 sales closing date, 70% survival rate, $0.10 clam price, coverage levels, and premiums were 

appropriate. 40% said the program was well advertised and promoted while 60% thought not. Scoring of 

four aspects of administration by the insurance companies covered the full range of 1 to 5 but mostly 

averaged about 3. Adjusters scored higher than agents. Six of the ten said they bought buyup coverage for 

ten years, from 2 to 6 companies (although the latter might have been interpreted as agents rather than 

insurance companies). Fairness of indemnity was scored at 3.3 while promptness of payment was only 2.6. 

Five out of eight said the program was providing the necessary risk management tools and seven out of 

nine said the pilot should be continued. (Whether that is because it is a good program or because they see 

it as easy to defraud cannot be determined.) 

Other Florida input by phone 

After mailing the letter to Florida growers we received two phone calls from seed producers, one on the 

Gulf coast and one on the Atlantic coast. Both noted that Cedar Key growers were reportedly abusing 

the program. Cedar Key also has problems from the varying nutrient load in the Suwanee River and 

periodic influxes of fresh water. One wanted to begin growing out the clams but is constrained by the 

small size of Florida leases and the lack of insurance in his area and is contemplating beginning to produce 

in Thailand. One noted that Virginia has a commercial industry because of its large leases. One estimated 

that Virginia produces 70% of the cultivated clams, Florida 25%, and other areas 5%. One said seed 

producers would definitely benefit from coverage in the 4mm-12mm stage. 

After the listening sessions another Cedar Key farmer called and said the program was riddled with fraud 

and it was ruining the market. This past year there have been problems obtaining seed. 

A Charlotte Harbor grower called asking whether coverage would be expanded to that area, which he said 

would be beneficial. The Cedar Key clams go mostly to the New York market. Florida clams have always 

sold at a lower price than Virginia or Northeast clams because of the perception of shorter shelf life 

stemming from being grown in warmer water. Charlotte Harbor clams are mostly sold to the local 

markets in South Florida. He said they pull up bags all the time and put them back and it does not hurt 

them. He said the program should be continued only if it is expanded to other Florida clam areas. 

“I would be remiss if I did not let you know how negatively many farmers feel about this 

program at this time. I do believe that a decision to continue the pilot program in select 

counties as it is in its present form will be met with strong resolute opposition. Many farmers 

feel that they have been injured by this program in the past and will not tolerate further injury.” 

b) Virginia listening session 

In early January 2011 we scheduled a listening session for February 10 with the help of our consultants 

from the Virginia Institute of Marine Science (VIMS), who advertised it repeatedly over subsequent weeks 

through their shellfish industry listserv. In order to notify insurers we contacted NCIS staff who sent the 

announcement to their clam pilot committee. 
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix A: Listening sessions comments

68

The venue was the Eastern Shore Community College in Melfa, Virginia, conveniently located for growers 

in both pilot counties – Northampton and Accomack. The formal session was held in the evening from 

6:30 to 8:30. We also advertised our availability for private meetings from 4:00 to 5:30 in the afternoon. 

While no one showed up during that period, it was a good opportunity for an in-depth conversation about 

the industry with our VIMS consultants.

Prior to the listening session we prepared a one-page summary of program experience showing overall 

results by year, summary results by state and pilot county, and yearly policies earning premium and loss 

ratios for the two Virginia counties. We also prepared a one-page “customer satisfaction questionnaire” 

to solicit additional feedback at the session.

The evening listening session was conducted by Contractor staff and was reasonably well-attended. Nine 

people signed the attendance sheet and there were about five others who did not. One Rain & Hail agent 

and two adjusters attended. The rest were growers, including two associated with the largest clam and 

oyster producer – Cherrystone Aqua Farms. In addition, our two VIMS consultants were present.

There are two companies insuring clams in Virginia – Rain & Hail and RCIS. Much of the initial discussion 

was about the process of certifying plantings. Rain & Hail apparently requires growers to notify them of 

any new plantings and then adjusters have 30 days to go out and certify that the clams are there. Insurance

does not attach until the necessary paperwork reaches the company’s Raleigh office. If adjusters cannot 

get it done within 30 days, the plantings are automatically certified. The adjusters complained that this is 

simply not enough time. Growers do not notify the company promptly and then all come in at once and 

there is not enough time for adjusters to go out and inspect everything. They recommended a 60-day time 

period. 

“Thirty days is just not enough time to get certification completed. Even trying to sample 

50% of them, I don’t have a damn clue how they are coming close to doing it, you can’t do it. 

What I used to do is sample a bed here and a bed there and if you walk over them you know 

what’s going on.” 

This is clearly a company policy, and undoubtedly a good one from the fraud protection perspective, but it 

is not something required by the pilot provisions. The one Virginia policy file we were provided for review 

is from RCIS. They do not have the same elaborate certification requirement as Rain & Hail.

We reviewed the one-page summary of experience and asked why there seemed to be losses in Accomack 

but not in Northampton. The general response was that production in Accomack is more on the sea side 

rather than the bay side and experiences rougher weather. The high loss ratio in 2009 was attributed to a 

“Veterans Day northeaster”. 

Standard practice is to plant 50,000 clams per bed, so 1 million clams requires 20 beds. Beds are typically 

10-12 feet wide and 50-60 feet long. Beds are sampled by peeling back the covering netting and taking 

square foot samples.

Virginia has large leases and there are reportedly more than 100,000 acres under lease. The leases are for 

ten years and are supposed to be renewable only if you can prove you used it for aquaculture. However, 

only one or two thousand acres are in clams, and much less than that for oysters. There is also so-called 
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“Baylor Ground” which historically was naturally producing oyster rocks set aside for the public based on 

an 1890s U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey. There is pending legislation to restudy and recertify those areas 

on the sea side, which could make some of the existing Baylor Ground available for lease. The shellfish 

industry is reportedly very interested in leasing more bottom.

Optional units were something of an issue. Some said they wanted optional units by lease. They 

complained about the one year that the whole bay side was one unit. On one of the questionnaires the 

respondent also indicated that the optional unit policy did not meet his risk management needs. However, 

another commented that more units just mean more paperwork, and the broader consensus seemed to be 

that optional units were “not a big deal”.

It was suggested in discussion that areas with repeated losses should be classified as high risk land. In a 

similar vein, one written response on a questionnaire was “Shouldn’t insure clams in areas with loss 

history, i.e. freeze.” The thinking was that if a piece of bottom froze once, it will probably freeze again. 

Freeze damage occurs when temperatures are sufficiently low and strong winds from the right direction 

result in the bottom being exposed to the cold for a prolonged period. If this coincides with a spring tide 

(on a full moon or new moon) the effect is exacerbated.

A couple of attendees claimed great familiarity with the situation in Florida and felt that fraud there has 

been and continues to be a major problem. There were comments about growers keeping bags of shell on 

the leases to pull up for appraisals. Not surprisingly there was no mention of any abuse problems in 

Virginia.

Referring to Florida: “Anytime you go to a place with no wild clam landings and they go in 

there and teach them how to raise clams and give them leases on the bottom that has no 

wild stock on it, that is 5-6 feet deep and in bags you’ve got trouble .... I know for a fact that 

there are 500 bags with clam shells in them, they get rotated around when it comes time for 

a claim and they put them on top and they go down there and they are right on top and they 

have no growth on them.”

Attendees were generally satisfied with the other policy provisions -- the 60% survival rate, the $0.15 clam 

price, the stages, etc. “It’s tough to be consistently over 60%.” There was some discussion of whether 

one should get an “unharvested” price if the bed was not worth harvesting, but they concluded that the 

current system seems to work. It takes 4.5 man hours to harvest 30,000 clams, which works out to only 

three tenths of a cent per clam if wages are $20/hour. With regard to stages there was a similar comment 

to the effect that while they are arbitrary they seem to work. The limit on density made sense to them 

because “increasing density increases risk – the denser they are the longer they take to grow, and the 

longer it takes to grow, the more time at risk.” The concern about density focused on disease risk, i.e. 

QPX.

There were no complaints or suggestions regarding the loss adjustment standards. But it was suggested 

that sometimes the best way to appraise is just to harvest the whole bed and run the clams through a 

counter. A grower mentioned that he had a loss adjustment done on some beds and the sampling 

technique was saying that there were a lot more clams there than were actually planted a year earlier. He 

was present for the appraisal and it looked like everything was being done by the book. He believed it was 

perhaps that when they dug out the sample, clams from nearby would also get picked up, or they were 
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picking up dead clam shells from many years ago. He mentioned it would be simpler just to harvest the 

entire bed and run it through the machine. Another grower thought that during the Veterans Day 

Northeaster, the waves caused the sand to move around in the bed and this would impact the sampling 

technique. Storm surge could also have the same issue in bottom culture clams.

There was no concern that making the pilot a permanent program that could be expanded to other states 

or counties would result in excess production. They see themselves as the dominant leaders of the 

industry and did not seem concerned about new competition. However they do see Florida producers as 

having to compete via lower prices due to the perception of poorer shelf life for clams grown in warmer 

water.

They were familiar with the NAP program but commented that it does not cover nursery clams in their 

area. One grower said nursery clams do not do well on the bay side unless they are in containers, which is 

very labor intensive.

The overall sentiment during the meeting was that the program is important and should be continued. 

Losing it would weaken the industry, partly because it is harder for a grower to get a loan from a bank if he 

does not have insurance. 

“If you want to borrow money and there is no insurance it’s hard to borrow money. A lot of 

growers borrow money every year and with agriculture insurance its tough. I can’t get 

insurance on my seed crop, it makes life interesting.”

Seven attendees filled out the Cultivated Clam Pilot Satisfaction form. They mostly answered yes to the 

questions on program design, but two of the seven did not think the $0.15 cent price was appropriate. 

They were satisfied with program marketing and administration. Four reported using buy-up coverage for 

6-10 years, but one of those is not getting it for 2011. On loss adjustment and indemnity, one gave a grade 

of “1” and two gave “4” or “5”. Two of the seven said the pilot should not be continued. 

There was only one comment on RMA as an organization: “The biggest problem RMA’s got is that they 

don’t know what the hell they are doing with these pilot programs. You can’t get help from them.”

Input by phone

One insurance agent called prior to the listening session and said that one problem is that growers have to 

resort to administrative tricks to prevent escalation in premiums due to new plantings. Most growers are 

harvesting and planting continuously. Sometimes they might want to plant in a new area but will instead 

plant on a lease where they are harvesting so they don’t have to report them as additional plantings that 

would result in a premium increase. He also said there needs to be an easier way to get information to 

the insurance company than the quarterly inventory report, but did not have a specific recommendation.

Private meeting

We subsequently had a separate meeting with one knowledgeable grower who strongly believed that there 

is a significant amount of fraud in Accomack County and was very bothered by it. This resonated because

the experience data is showing losses in Accomack but not in Northampton. One method is to buy seed 
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but plant less than half of it in the reported beds, say a third, while planting the remainder elsewhere on 

that or some other lease. It costs $3,000 in labor to plant a million clams plus $20,000 for the seed (or 

$8,000 if you produce it yourself). Insurance at 75% is about $1,000 so the maximum investment is 

$24,000 plus labor and equipment. Moreover, if you plant before July 16 the clams will be Stage 3 the next 

year and eligible for the full $0.15 cent payment. 

You report a loss in the spring and the appraiser finds fewer than half the expected number of clams so an 

indemnity is paid. The guarantee is 450,000 clams. If the appraiser finds only 200,000 clams the indemnity 

is $37,500 so you have cleared $13,500 immediately ($37,500 - $24,000). And between the two sites you 

still have 600,000 clams to sell. The grower gets an interim return on his investment in less than a year 

instead of having to wait another year or more for the clams to mature. Various other tricks and 

strategies were explained, such as planting them where you know they will probably freeze, alternating 

losses between husband and wife, etc. His suggestions were to either end the program, do not cover 

certain areas, charge higher rates in Accomack, or just reimburse sunk costs rather than giving the grower 

the estimated market price.

Our VIMS consultants did not think this rang true because the insurance requires that there must be an 

event that causes the loss, which would also affect other growers. The scenarios painted seemed to them 

to involve a lot of effort with low probability of payoff. They felt that the biggest incentive to fraud is the 

15 cent payout for less than one year old clams.

Use of GPS in Virginia

Our VIMS consultants recommend that GPS positions required for insurance should be precisely qualified 

so that growers can provide useful coordinates. The coordinates for the outline of a lease could require 

10 to 20 points while the center of the lease would require only one, but neither is really much help on the 

ground. A lease can be 200 acres with the clams planted on only two of the acres. Neither the outline of 

the lease nor the center of the lease would facilitate the finding of a particular group of clams under this 

situation. The best way to designate an area may be to give the four coordinates of a named block on the 

grower’s lease map where a particular group of plantings are located. Most growers will usually block out 

their planting areas in this way and usually apply marking stakes to the block. If the adjusters had 

coordinates for the four corners of any given block, they could accurately find any group of clams in 

question.

c) Massachusetts listening session

We had considerable difficulty scheduling a listening session. Finally the head of the Massachusetts 

Aquaculture Association agreed to make it part of their annual meeting, which was scheduled for Saturday 

February 26 from 8:00 to 1:00 in Plymouth Massachusetts. 

As for the other listening sessions, we prepared a one-page summary of program experience showing 

overall results by year, summary results by state and pilot county, and yearly policies earning premium and 

loss ratios for the two Massachusetts counties. The pilot is available in five counties but except for one 

policy in Plymouth County during 2005-2007, all of the participation has been from Barnstable County. 

According to data compiled by the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries, Barnstable County 

accounted for almost all of the state’s clam production in 2010, and most of that was in the town of 
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Wellfleet. We also used the same one-page “customer satisfaction questionnaire” to solicit additional 

feedback at the session.

The clam insurance discussion ended up as the last thing on the morning’s agenda. There were more than 

50 people in attendance, predominantly oyster growers. We asked for a show of hands by clam growers 

and counted seven. After reviewing the handout on insurance experience, we solicited comments on 

various aspects of the insurance program, but with a couple of exceptions the attendees were pretty nonresponsive. The two exceptions mainly had stories about how growers who had major losses got nothing 

from the insurance.

“I know a couple of guys who have paid a pretty good premium in the past, six to nine 

thousand dollars, and we had one instance where this individual had two different beds from 

the same year class and there was a 90% loss on one bed. He had high end insurance but it 

was less than 50% of his total crop. He said you go by area and they said you go by year so 

that was out the window. Word got around. Then there was a QPX infection of an area. 

So in the winter we all volunteered to pull the clams and throw them in the dumpster. If we 

had left them it could have wiped out the whole harbor. They said ‘They weren’t dead, 

we’re not covering it.’ ”

“We had an instance of neoplasia, a 90% fatal disease. Peter had coverage but it was apparently 

not a covered disease and they denied the claim. I feel sorry for the girl who called a couple of 

weeks later asking if he was going to renew the policy.”

Use of the program has declined steadily, from more than 30 growers in the early years to just a dozen 

recently, with 60 percent buy-up coverage chosen most frequently.

There was time for informal conversation before the meeting and during breaks. Most of the interest 

among growers is in oysters, not clams. Demand is growing and prices per unit are much higher, e.g. 70 

cents for an oyster versus 17 cents for a clam. But oysters are viewed as more risky and require more of 

an investment in cages and other equipment. 

State data for 2010 show the value of oyster production at $7 million compared to only $1 million for 

clams. Not surprisingly, there seemed to be quite a bit of interest in having an oyster insurance program. 

Currently there is a lot of use of the NAP program for oysters, which is run by the Farm Service Agency 

county committee. The committee decides whether an indemnity is warranted and usually seeks advice 

from the Extension Agent. Mussels are being grown only experimentally in Massachusetts. There is a new 

offshore operation near Martha’s Vineyard, and one other was mentioned, along with one in Rhode Island. 

There were a couple of contrasting comments on insuring oysters:

“If I was in the insurance business I don’t think I would get near oysters. Diseases are the big 

issue.”

“The risk in oyster coverage may now be less than in previous years because of new technology 

that has been developed in the broodstock of these animals. Diseases may not occur as often 

or to such extremes as they have in the past. There are now disease resistant strains.”
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Overall this was not a very productive listening session, except to the degree that it illustrated an almost 

total lack of interest in the clam pilot. Only one person completed a questionnaire, and he indicated that 

the pilot should not be continued. We did not get the impression that anyone would miss it if it were 

gone. There was no appreciation of the fact that indemnities paid have been more than four times what 

growers paid out of pocket in premiums.

d) South Carolina industry input

Since we were unable to arrange a listening session in South Carolina, we made phone calls to selected 

clam growers in the state, including, by chance, the only one currently using the insurance. As a result of 

these conversations, we received input regarding the pilot plan from two organizations in the state – the 

South Carolina Seafood Alliance and the South Carolina Shellfish Growers Association. 

The Executive Director of the Seafood Alliance said they had not been aware of the low participation, or 

even of the existence of the insurance program, but think it is important for the future of the state’s fishery 

sector. He said that some of the fishermen who are abandoning the wild caught sector due competition 

from low-priced imports are turning to clam aquaculture as an alternative, and that maintaining the 

insurance plan would be important to them. Finally, he said the SCSA would initiate an 

information/education program for clam growers about the insurance and aid them in applying if it were 

continued.

The Shellfish Growers Association noted that 130 South Carolina shrimpers had been accepted to the 

USDA Trade Adjustment Assistance Program and are interested in diversifying into clam farming. This will 

give the insurance program an opportunity to grow in the state. The association Board observed that the 

state has had the fewest claims under the insurance (but that would tend to be the case if no one buys 

coverage). 

The Board requested that the pilot be continued and gave three reasons for the decline in participation in 

the state:

 “Conversion to a value crop over a market crop” reduced grower interest because the 

introduction of stages reduced the payout on smaller clams.

 The demand for larger product sizes has increased the time to harvest, so the insurance is being 

paid on the same clams for three years.

 The conversion to an inventory program caused record keeping problems for smaller growers 

who are also involved in commercial fishing and shrimping.

With regard to the second point, we would argue that in an ongoing business where the grower is planting 

and harvesting a constant number of clams each year, the single annual premium is the cost for what is 

harvested each year.
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APPENDIX B: DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENTS
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT: PROGRAM EVALUATION

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Program Evaluation Diagnostic Questions

Region Florida – Pilot Counties (Brevard, Dixie, Indian River, and Levy)

Crop Hard clam (Marcenaria mercenaria)

Market Fresh Live Market

Background Information

Production Processes

Annuals Multi-year Crop

1. Is the crop planted multiple times during a crop production year? If yes, explain:

Because of higher water temperatures and availability of seed clams, growers in warm 

climates such as Florida can plant year-round. Producers generally plant continuously 

throughout the year so that they have clams reaching market size throughout the year.

Yes No

2. For a single planting, is the crop harvested multiple times during a crop production year? If yes, explain:

Harvest for market occurs throughout much of the year, with a slow period in the winter. 

Portions of a single planting are potentially harvested on multiple occasions to provide a 

steady supply of market clams. In addition, clams are marketed and priced by size. Some 

farmers sort and sell everything they harvest from the field, whereas others will replant 

smaller clams and harvest them at a later date to get a higher price.

Yes No

3. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for this crop (e.g., practices such as double crop, fallow, 

irrigation, regional differences in climate or soils, etc.). Discuss, particularly, features that are critical in assessing potential 

demand including potential issues with practices and types. 

Clam production in Florida is typically a two-stage process. Unlike other states, almost all growers 

incorporate a field nursery into their growing practices. This involves planting 5-6mm seed clams in 

polyester mesh bags and growing them in the field until reaching a size of 12-15mm, when they are 

replanted at lower density in bags with larger mesh size for final growout. This initial stage usually 

takes 3-6 months, depending on the time of year the nursery clams are planted (faster growth at 
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warmer water temperatures), stocking densities, and site productivity. For final growout, clams are 

bottom planted in polyester mesh bags. Some reportedly plant 1,400 – 1,500 per bag, particularly if 

they are planning to produce smaller clams (less than one inch) for the “casino market”. (This 

exceeds the 75/sq. ft. ceiling for insurance eligibility.) Intensive methods are used (i.e., clams 

stocked in 3’x4’ or 4’x4’ bags at 75/sq ft and around 1,000 bags planted per acre). Many growers 

have enough lease area that they rotate planting on different parts of the lease(s). The average crop 

cycle for final growout of seed clams to market size ranges from 10-18 months (1-2 years total with 

nursery stage), again depending on water temperatures, stocking densities, and lease site

productivity.

Biennials

4. Is the crop harvested multiple times during a crop production year? Yes No

5. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for this crop (e.g., practices such as irrigation, regional 

differences in climate or soils, etc.). Discuss, particularly, features that are critical in assessing potential demand including 

potential issues with practices and types.

Perennials

6. Is the crop harvested multiple times during a crop production year? If yes, explain: Yes No

7. Is the crop alternate bearing? Yes No

8. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for this crop (e.g., practices such as irrigation, regional 

differences in climate or soils, etc.). Discuss, particularly, features that are critical in assessing potential demand including 

potential issues with practices and types. 

9. What is the economic life of the capital stock (trees, vines, etc.)? Years
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10. Over its economic life, what is the likelihood that 10 percent or more of the capital stock would be lost due to natural 

causes? Describe: % 

(probability of 

loss)

11. If capital stock is lost, how long will it take to reestablish the capital stock to a point where it starts producing salable

output? Years

12. If capital stock is lost, how long will it take to reestablish the capital stock to a point where it is at peak production? Years

Nursery

13. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for nursery crops in this region. Discuss, particularly, 

features that are critical in assessing potential demand including potential issues with practices and types. 

Marketing

14. Describe typical marketing channels and/or contracting structures for this crop.

The market for cultivated hard clams is primarily grocery chains and the main mode of 

consumption is probably steamed. Half-shell raw bars and other restaurants are also important.

Molluscan shellfish harvesting and marketing is regulated by FDA. Growers can only sell to 

certified shellfish wholesalers or become wholesalers themselves by following State and Federal 

guidelines for operating a shellfish food production facility. In Florida, there are about 350 people 

registered with the state as certified clam growers, but there appear to be fewer than 100 active 

growers. There tend to be informal working relationships between growers and their wholesalers, 

with no formal contracting structures or cooperatives in place.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT: PROGRAM EVALUATION

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15. In this region are there critical time periods (i.e., marketing windows) when producers hope to market this crop? If so, describe.

Clams are harvested and marketed year round, but the peak marketing periods for cultivated clams 

are the summer months (particularly around Memorial Day, July 4th, and Labor Day) followed by 

a second, smaller peak during the Thanksgiving to New Year’s Day holiday season.

16. Within the marketing channels and/or contracting structures mentioned above describe how quality variations are handled (e.g., 

off-grade apples in a fresh market system may be processed for juice).

The quality of cultivated hard clams centers on size, shelf-life, and breakage during handling and

shucking. If one of these quality issues should diminish, the wholesale/retail purchaser generally

provides feedback directly to the grower. Depending on the issue, growing and handling strategies

can be implemented to rectify quality issues. Clams are sorted by size and growers are paid based

on prevailing prices for each size, which go into different markets. Clams less than littleneck size (1

inch hinge) will be used in pastas and other products rather than sold on the half-shell and will

receive lower prices per clam. Clams that are too large for the half-shell market (e.g., cherrystones

and chowders) are chopped up for processed products such as clam chowder and also receive 

lower prices per clam.

17. In this region, do federal supply control marketing orders exist for production of this crop?

Describe:

Yes No

18. In this region, do state quality marketing orders exist for production of this crop?

Describe:

Yes No
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RMA–Facilitated Insurance Products

19. In this region, what RMA-facilitated insurance products are currently available for this crop? List all:

1) Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance Program (stock mortality insurance)

2) AGR-Lite (whole farm revenue insurance)

Yield Risk

20. In this region what are examples of crops with very low relative yield risk? Relative risk is used to adjust absolute magnitudes 

that vary across crops to a relative level to facilitate comparability (roughly, a measure of variation divided by the mean level).

Crops in the region that are relatively low risk include citrus, nursery and peanuts.

21. In this region what are examples of crops with very high relative yield risk?

Some of the crops with high relative yield risks include tobacco, peppers and other vegetables.

22. Is this crop exposed to catastrophic risks that would reduce yields by 50 percent or more?

This and responses below refer to the risk of mortality of 50 percent or

more, after adjusting for normal mortality. Yes No

23. If the answer to the previous question is yes, describe these risks. If no, proceed to the next question. Over 25 years (or crop 

cycles) approximately how often would you expect such catastrophic losses to occur?

Description Years (or crop cycles) out of 25

Hurricanes and other storm-related wind and wave action 4 years out of 25

Salinity changes Highly location-dependent; some 

locations seem to have large 

salinity changes almost annually 

whereas they are rare in other 

locations

Low dissolved oxygen 1 year out of 25

Freeze/ice < 1 year out of 25
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT: PROGRAM EVALUATION

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24. Characterize yield risk for this crop ignoring the catastrophic yield risk(s) described earlier. On a scale from one to five, if the 

low relative yield risk crops identified earlier were one, and the high relative yield risk crops identified earlier were five, what 

number would you assign to the non-catastrophic yield risk associated with this crop in this region?

1

very low relative 

yield risk

2 3

x

4 5

very high relative 

yield risk

25. In this region, do producers tend to experience multiple-year sequences of good yields or bad yields for this crop? If 

yes, describe what causes these multiple-year sequences.

Yes No

26. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low yield risk and five is very high yield risk, provide an overall assessment of 

yield risk faced by producers of this crop in this region.

1

very low yield risk

2 3

x

4 5

very high yield risk

Quality Risk

27. In this region what are examples of crops with very low quality risk?

As with yield risk, there are not many crops comparable to clams, but some products with 

relatively low quality risk include dairy and corn.

28. In this region what are examples of crops with very high quality risk?

Many nursery products, fruits, and vegetables produced in the region have relatively high 

quality risk

29. Is this crop exposed to catastrophic quality risks that would reduce the average price received by 20 percent or 

more?

In general, clams are marketable if alive and not subject to substantial quality risk from 

catastrophic events that would reduce average prices received substantially.

Yes No

30. If the answer to the previous question is yes, describe these risks. If no, proceed to the next question. Over 25 years (or crop 

cycles) approximately how often would you expect such catastrophic quality losses to occur?

Description Years (or crop cycles) out 

of 25
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31. We now want to characterize quality risk for this crop ignoring the catastrophic quality risk(s) described earlier. On a scale 

from one to five, if the crops with very low risk of quality problems identified earlier were one, and the crops with very high 

risk of quality problems identified earlier were five, what number would you assign to the quality risk associated with this 

crop in this region?

1

very low quality 

risk

x

2 3 4 5

very high quality 

risk

32. On a scale from one to five, if one is very low quality risk and five is very high quality risk, provide an overall assessment of 

quality risk faced by producers of this crop in this region.

1

very low quality 

risk

x

2 3 4 5

very high quality

risk

Price Risk

33. In this region what are examples of crops with very low relative price risk within the production cycle? That is, variation in 

price between pre-plant for annuals (or equivalent for perennials) and sale. (Similar concept to IP and RA for crops with 

futures markets).

Corn and livestock have low relative price risk in this region.

34. In this region what are examples of crops with very high relative price risk within the production cycle? That is, variation in 

price between pre-plant for annuals (or, equivalent for perennials) and sale. (Similar concept to IP and RA for crops with 

futures markets).

Many fruits and vegetables produced in this region have relatively high price risk.

35. On a scale from one to five, if the low price risk crops identified earlier were one and the high price risk crops identified 

earlier were five, what number would you assign to the relative price risk (within the production cycle) associated with this

crop in this region?

1

low price risk crop

2 3

x

4 5

high price risk crop
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36. In this region, do producers tend to experience multiple-year sequences of high prices or low prices for this crop?

If yes, describe.

Yes No

37. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low price risk and five is very high price risk, provide an overall assessment of 

price risk (within the production cycle) faced by producers of this crop in this region.

1

very low price risk

2 3

x

4 5

very high price risk

Other Sources of Revenue Risk

38. For this region, describe other factors that affect revenue risk for this crop (e.g., prevented planting).

1) Inadequate seed availability from commercial hatcheries.

2) High mortality at the nursery stage for growers with nursery clams, leaving them with fewer 

clams to plant for growout.

3) Area closures by government agencies.

39.

39. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low risk and five is very high risk, provide an overall assessment of risk sources 

other than yield, quality, and price risks faced by producers of this crop in this region.

40.

1

very low risk

2

x

3 4 5

very 

high risk

Sufficient Non-Insurance Coping Mechanisms

40. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low and five is very high, assess the extent to which producers of this 

commodity in this region use risk-reducing inputs as a substitute for crop insurance.

1

very low 

2

x

3 4 5

very 

high
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41. Are government crop programs (e.g., marketing loans and counter-cyclical payments) available for 

this crop?

Describe:

Yes No

42. In this region, is there a history of federal disaster payments for this crop?

Describe:

There have been claims made by hard clam growers under the Non- Insured 

Crop Disaster Assistance Program in the past prior to the introduction of the 

Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance Program.

Yes - limited No

43. Approximately what percentage of the total production of this crop is under production contract 

with a first handler or processor? 0 %

Describe contracts:

There are no known contracts in place in the region.

a. Under the terms of a typical production contract for this crop, is the grower exposed to 

production risk (i.e., the grower must deliver on the contract even if production shortfalls 

occur)?

Yes No

b. Under the terms of a typical production contract for this crop, is the grower exposed to 

quality risk (i.e., there are significant price penalties if the product does not meet the 

quality characteristics specified in the contract). 

Yes No

c. Under the terms of a typical production contract for this crop, is the grower exposed to 

price risk (i.e., prices for specific quality characteristics are not specified in the contract)? Yes No

44. In this region, approximately what percentage of the total production of this crop is priced prior to 

harvest (may or may not be tied to a production contract)?

Describe:

_0_%

45. When corn farmers in the Midwest experience low (high) yields, they can often expect higher (lower) market prices (i.e., prices and 

yields are very negatively correlated). This moderates the revenue impacts of low yields. In contrast, for corn farmers in the 

Southeast there is very little relationship between their yields and market prices (i.e., prices and yields are independent). In this 
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region the price and yield for this crop are (circle one):

Independent Somewhat Negatively Correlated Highly Negatively Correlated

Describe:

The regional price for hard clams is influenced by wild harvests as well as cultivated clam harvests from

other regions, which reduces the correlation between yield (mortality) and price. There are limited data to

quantitatively assess the correlation, but there seems to be some negative correlation between clam crop

success and prices. When there were high crop losses in the hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005, Florida

prices increased.

46. On a scale from one to five, where one is “strongly disagree” and five is “strongly agree,” provide your reaction to the following 

statement:

“In this region, producers of this crop are financially able to self-insure against production losses.”

1

strongly

disagree

2

x

3 4 5

strongly

agree

Describe: Most growers are highly dependent on revenue from clams and do not have sufficient 

assets to self-insure.

47. For a typical grower of this crop, approximately what percentage of the total farm revenue would be attributable to 

this crop?

According to growers and aquaculture specialists, clam growers in the state typically 

derive all farm income from clams.

100_%

48. What other commodities would typically be produced on a farm that produces this commodity? What is the correlation between 

revenue from these other commodities and the revenue from this commodity? For correlation use a scale of one to five, where 1

is “strongly negatively correlated,” 2 is “negatively correlated,“ 3 “independent,“ 4 is “positively correlated,“ and 5 is “strongly 

positively correlated.”

List:

Correlation

(assign a number between 

1-5)

N/A

49. In this region, approximately what percentage of the total production of this crop is produced by part-time farmers 

who have full-time employment off the farm? 20_%
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50. On a scale from one to five, where one is “strongly disagree“ and five is “strongly agree,“ provide your reaction to the following 

statement:

“In this region, producers of this crop attempt to manage production risk by spreading their production over several geographic 

locations.”

1

strongly

disagree

2

x

3 4 5

strongly

agree

Describe: Growers are dependent on access to shellfish leases from the State or can potentially

sublease from another grower that has a State lease. The available State creek leases have all 

been taken for years, but there is a market for subleasing. Many of the longer-term and larger 

growers have multiple lease sites and attempt to reduce production risk by having production 

on different creeks as well as on the seaside. They may plant near the head of a creek for more 

reliable protection from the weather, and near the mouth of the creek for protection from fresh 

water inflows. For newer growers forced to sublease from others, spatial diversification may 

be difficult to achieve. In addition, they are unlikely to be able to access the best sites in terms 

of risk/return tradeoff.

51. In this region, what private-sector insurance products (if any) are currently available for this crop?

List all:

None identified

52. Characterize how agricultural lenders in this region view the available RMA-facilitated insurance products for this crop. 

“Unfavorable” implies that lenders actually discourage borrowers from purchasing the product while “favorable” implies that 

lenders strongly encourage and often require borrowers to purchase the product. If multiple insurance products are offered, 

answer for each product.

Unfavorable Indifferent Favorable

Describe: Lenders view the insurance coverage positively and growers and aquaculture 

specialists indicated that it has been valuable for growers seeking loans (particularly with 

loan originators familiar with agriculture and crop insurance).
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53. On a scale from one to five, where one is very high and five is very low, assess the sufficiency of non-insurance coping 

mechanisms for producers of this crop in this region.

1

high

availability

2 3 4 5

low

availability

x

Risk Classification

54. On a scale from one to five, where one is strongly disagree and five is strongly agree, provide your reaction to the following 

statement:

“In this region, no producers of this crop are really any more or less risky than any others. They all face about the same risk 

of loss.”

54.

1

strongly

disagree

2

x

3 4 5

strongly

agree

Describe: Risk in shellfish farming is generally thought to be on a “waterbody scale” in that a

catastrophic situation probably will affect most growers within a specific embayment. 

Therefore, the risk in one embayment may be significantly different than the risk of a 

neighboring embayment, assuming that the two environments have distinct physical differences. 

Risk is also dependent on the husbandry practices of the individual grower.

55. In this region, for those who are currently not insured, would you say that premium rate on the existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for this crop are “much too low,” “about right,” or “much too high”? If more than one RMA insurance 

product is offered, answer for each product.

Much Too Low About Right Much Too High

If you answered that premium rates are “much too high,” explain why (or how) you think this happened.

56. In this region, for those who currently are insured, would you say that premium rate on the existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for this crop are “much too low,” “about right,” or “much too high”? If more than one RMA insurance 

product is offered, answer for each product.

Much Too Low About Right Much Too High

If you answered that premium rates are “much too high,” explain why (or how) you think this happened.

Rates have been higher in Florida than in other states since the inception of the program, but 

they were significantly increased beginning in the 2004 crop year following relatively high 

losses in the state in 2000-2003. Based on the frequency of past losses, the rates are probably 

not much too high and the insured growers that provided feedback did not emphasize rates as a 

major concern.
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57. For this region, to what extent does the system used to establish the guarantee (e.g., APH yield or expected revenue) for this 

crop match the true value of the production at risk? An answer of one indicates that the system used to establish the guarantee 

does a very poor job of matching the true value of the production at risk. An answer of five indicates that the system used to 

establish the guarantee does a very good job of matching the true value of the production at risk.

1

very poor job

2 3

x

4 5

very good job

58. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low and five is very high, assess the effectiveness of existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products in accurately classifying potential policyholders according to their loss exposure (i.e., higher risk growers 

pay higher premiums while lower risk growers pay lower premiums).

59. 60.

1

very low

x

2 3 4 5

very high All growers within a county pay the 

same premium for a given stage 

although there may be substantial 

differences in risk based on location 

and management practices, which 

was raised by the majority of 

stakeholders providing feedback on 

the program.

Moral Hazard and Monitoring

59. Yield variation can be caused by unavoidable “acts of nature” or avoidable “acts of management.” In practical parlance, what 

is the potential for “gaming” the insurance product? Evaluate the potential for gaming the RMA-facilitated crop insurance 

product for this crop on a scale from one to five, where one implies that variation in yield is almost exclusively due to “acts of 

nature” (potential for gaming is low) and five implies that yield variation is almost exclusively due to “acts of management” 

(potential for gaming is high). If multiple insurance products are offered, answer for each product.

60.

1

very low

2 3 4 5

very high

x

60. To the extent that management affects yield loss risk exposure, how difficult is it to monitor the insured’s behavior?

Extremely Difficult Difficult Not too Difficult

Explain: The insured’s behavior is difficult and expensive to monitor for several reasons. The 

clams are underwater at all times and must be visited by boat, which is relatively difficult and 

expensive compared with other commodities. In addition, because they are underwater, it is 

difficult and time-consuming to assess the condition of the clams. Bags can be randomly pulled 

up and assessed, but assessors are generally dependent on growers taking them out to their 

lease sites and there have been concerns that growers could potentially choose to visit and 

select only bags that they know are in good condition. Growers do not like to pull up many 

bags because bags are typically attached to one another and must be cut apart and they also 

feel that it increases mortality to pull up bags and then put them back. This product is also very 

unique for the insurance companies to monitor and there have been a number of concerns that 

61. 62.
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they are less familiar with this product than others and do not sufficiently understand 

appropriate management strategies and therefore cannot fully evaluate behaviors observed. 

The management practice that can be best monitored and would have an effect on

yield/survival is probably stocking density.

61. Quality variation can be caused by unavoidable “acts of nature” or avoidable “acts of management.” In practical parlance, 

what is the potential for “gaming” the insurance product? Evaluate the potential for gaming the RMA-facilitated insurance 

product for this crop on a scale from one to five, where one implies that variation in quality is almost exclusively due to “acts 

of nature” (potential for gaming is low) and five implies that quality variation is almost exclusively due to “acts of 

management” (potential for gaming is high). If multiple insurance products are offered, answer for each product.

62.

1

very low

x

2 3 4 5

very high

The current insurance product does 

not cover quality variations, so 

there is no potential for gaming it. 

In addition, quality variations do 

not tend to be as much of an issue 

for calms as yield/survival.

62. To the extent that management affects quality loss risk exposure, how difficult is it to monitor the insured’s behavior?

Extremely Difficult Difficult Not too Difficult

Explain: Quality variation results from subtle changes in management and acts of nature. It 

would be extremely difficult for someone not well-trained in clam farming practices to monitor 

a grower’s behavior with respect to quality variation.

63. On a scale from one to five, where one is very large and five is very small, assess the extent of moral hazard problems with 

existing RMA-facilitated insurance products for this crop.

63.

1

very large

x

2 3 4 5

very small

Moral hazard has been a major

problem in Florida based on

numerous reports from

stakeholders. There are concerns 

about moral hazard in Florida from 

stakeholders in all pilot states.

Problems Affecting Insurance Participation

64. Have significant problems occurred (either past or current) with policy provisions on existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for the crop? If multiple insurance products are offered, answer for each product. Yes No
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65. If the answer to the previous question is no, go to next question. If yes, for each significant problem:

a. Briefly describe the problem.

1) The 2007 evaluation of the program reviewed the problems that arose in the early years of the

pilot, their effects, and how they were dealt with. Those problems were associated with coverage of 

nursery clams (no longer covered), poorly defined causes of loss, planting density, and poor 

identification of planted clams and their locations. All of this was dealt with in the 2004 revisions to 

the pilot.

2) The one more recent recurring problem in Florida with policy provisions has been the continuing 

failure of insurers to carry out required pre-acceptance inspections. This issue was highlighted as

early as 2003. Section 16 of the underwriting guide requires that AIPs complete an inspection 

report the first year for all insureds and when a policy is transferred from one AIP to another, as 

well as under various other circumstances. Investigation by the RMA Eastern Regional Compliance 

Office revealed that the required inspections were still not being done in Florida.

b. What has been the impact of the problem (e.g., high loss ratios, reduced demand, etc.)?

1) Failure to complete pre-acceptance inspections was potentially contributing to abuse of the 

program because there was no verification that the number of clams being insured actually existed.

c. Have policy provisions since been changed to adequately address the problem?

1) This was less a problem with the policy provisions themselves than with AIP adherence to the 

provisions. There was also no specific definition of what constituted an appropriate inspection. 

Finally the Compliance Office notified AIPs that there would be no reinsurance for any policy 

without an acceptable pre-acceptance inspection in the file, and that for Florida it would be 

necessary to sample three percent of the bags.

d. If policy provisions have not been changed, what changes in policy provisions do you think would increase insurance demand for 

this crop?

1) Policy provisions (underwriting standards) have not been changed. Tightening them will likely 

reduce demand for the insurance.

66. In this region, do reinsured companies have sufficient incentives to aggressively market existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for the crop?

If yes, go to next question. If no, explain.

Clam insurance is a unique product for which it is difficult and expensive to monitor

insured behavior and adjust losses. Therefore, it is difficult for companies to justify

investments in marketing and servicing clam policies. No AIPs have consistently stuck 

Yes No
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with the Florida market for this pilot. Nine companies have written coverage at one point 

or another—six in the last three years. They seem to try it for a while and then give up.

67. In this region, do agents have sufficient incentives to aggressively market existing RMA-facilitated insurance 

products for the crop?

If yes, go to next question. If no, explain.

For agents as well as the companies, clam insurance is a unique product. It requires more 

time for agents to learn about, but the relatively larger market in Florida than in South 

Carolina or Massachusetts has led to more interest and more agents marketing the 

insurance than in those states. However, there have been numerous allegations of 

fraudulent practices both by growers and by agents in their marketing of clam policies in

the state. There have reportedly been cases of agents working with growers to structure 

their units and subleasing arrangements in attempts to increase the likelihood of losses 

sufficient for insurance claims as well as a variety of other questionable practices.

Yes No

68. List any perils that concern growers of this crop but are not covered by the existing RMA-facilitated insurance products (e.g., 

business interruption due to unavailability of irrigation water, disease quarantines, etc.). For each peril assess the extent of 

growers’ concerns about this peril on a scale from one to five where one is minor concern and five is major concern.

List all: 1

minor concern

2 3 4 5

major concern

Inability to market x

Inability to plant due to low seed 

availability x

Low market prices x

High salinity due to drought x

69. Briefly describe the potential for insuring these currently uninsured perils? In answering this, consider the following questions:

Can hidden action/moral hazard and classification/adverse selection problems be avoided?

Can clearly stated policy provisions be developed and accurate premium rates established?

Although growers and state aquaculture specialists identify several of these perils as major 
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issues, there is little potential for covering inability to market or inability to plant due to the high 

potential for hidden action/moral hazard and classification/adverse selection problems. High 

salinity could potentially be covered (it was previously covered under the program before being 

removed beginning in the 2004 crop year), including a clause that the loss must be verified by 

recognized marine authorities. Low market prices could also potentially be covered, although 

that would require development of revenue insurance for clams rather than the current stock 

mortality insurance.

70. On a scale from one to five, where one is very high and five is very low, assess the likelihood that problems affecting 

participation can be adequately addressed by product or policy modifications.

71. 72.

1

very low

2 3 4

x

5

very high

Changes to the program in 2004 have 

greatly reduced loss ratios. It may be 

difficult to increase participation back to 

peak levels (in part because of grower 

exit from the industry), but product and 

policy modifications dealing with some of 

the growers’ issues and improving risk 

classification are likely to increase

participation.
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Program Evaluation Diagnostic Questions

Region Massachusetts – Pilot Counties (Barnstable, Bristol, Nantucket, and Plymouth)

Crop Hard clam (Marcenaria mercenaria)

Market 

Fresh Live Market

Background Information

Production Processes

Annuals Multi-year Crop

1. Is the crop planted multiple times during a crop production year? If yes, explain:

Clams could potentially be planted multiple times during a year, although in 

Massachusetts, growers typically plant for final growout only once per year 

between September and November.

Yes, to 

some 

extent

No

2. For a single planting, is the crop harvested multiple times during a crop production year? If yes, explain:

Harvest for market occurs throughout much of the year, with a slow period in the

winter, with portions of a single planting potentially harvested on multiple 

occasions to provide a steady supply of market clams. In addition, clams are 

marketed and priced by size. Some farmers sort and sell everything they harvest 

from the field, whereas others will replant smaller clams and harvest them at a 

later date to get a higher price.

Yes No

3. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for this crop (e.g., practices such as double crop, 

fallow, irrigation, regional differences in climate or soils, etc.). Discuss, particularly, features that are critical in assessing 

potential demand including potential issues with practices and types. 

Leases used for clam production in Massachusetts are laid out in rectangular blocks and are 

relatively small compared with other states. In two of the primary production areas, Barnstable 

Harbor and Wellfleet, the standard lease areas are 2 acres and 7 acres, respectively, and many

leases are adjacent to one another in a grid pattern. Some growers have acquired multiple lease 

sites, but growers generally have less area here than in other locations and have limited ability to 

rotate their clams and leave parts of their leases fallow. As in Virginia, growers primarily rely on 

bottom culture with cover nets for growout and work on their clam beds (e.g., cleaning nets, 
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT: PROGRAM EVALUATION

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checking nets for predators, harvesting, etc.) at low tide when the clam beds are exposed. The 

average crop cycle for final growout of seed clams to market size ranges from about 2 to 3 years, 

depending on water temperatures when seeded, stocking densities, and lease site productivity.

Biennials

4. Is the crop harvested multiple times during a crop production year? Yes No

5. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for this crop (e.g., practices such as irrigation, regional 

differences in climate or soils, etc.). Discuss, particularly, features that are critical in assessing potential demand including 

potential issues with practices and types.

Perennials

6. Is the crop harvested multiple times during a crop production year? If yes, explain: Yes No

7. Is the crop alternate bearing? Yes No

8. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for this crop (e.g., practices such as irrigation, regional 

differences in climate or soils, etc.). Discuss, particularly, features that are critical in assessing potential demand including 

potential issues with practices and types. 

9. What is the economic life of the capital stock (trees, vines, etc.)? Years

10. Over its economic life, what is the likelihood that 10 percent or more of the capital stock would be lost due to natural 

causes? Describe: % 

(probability of 
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loss)

11. If capital stock is lost, how long will it take to reestablish the capital stock to a point where it starts producing salable 

output? Years

12. If capital stock is lost, how long will it take to reestablish the capital stock to a point where it is at peak production? Years

Nursery

13. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for nursery crops in this region. Discuss, particularly, 

features that are critical in assessing potential demand including potential issues with practices and types. 

Marketing

14. Describe typical marketing channels and/or contracting structures for this crop.

The market for cultivated hard clams is primarily grocery chains and the main mode of 

consumption is probably steamed. Half-shell raw bars and other restaurants are also important.

Molluscan shellfish harvesting and marketing is regulated by FDA. Growers can only sell to 

certified shellfish wholesalers or become wholesalers themselves by following State and Federal 

guidelines for operating a shellfish food production facility. There are several shellfish wholesalers 

in Massachusetts and they generally are also clam growers. In addition, there is a marketing 

cooperative in Wellfleet that has contracted with some growers in that region to supply clams.

15. In this region are there critical time periods (i.e., marketing windows) when producers hope to market this crop? If so, describe.

Peak marketing periods for cultivated clams are the summer months (particularly around Memorial

Day, July 4th, and Labor Day) followed by a second, smaller peak during the Thanksgiving to New
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Year’s Day holiday season. Winter is also slow for producers in colder climates, such as 

Massachusetts.

16. Within the marketing channels and/or contracting structures mentioned above describe how quality variations are handled (e.g., 

off-grade apples in a fresh market system may be processed for juice).

The quality of cultivated hard clams centers on size, shelf-life, and breakage during handling and

shucking. If one of these quality issues should diminish, the wholesale/retail purchaser generally

provides feedback directly to the grower. Depending on the issue, growing and handling strategies

can be implemented to rectify quality issues. Clams are sorted by size and growers are paid based

on prevailing prices for each size, which go into different markets. Clams less than littleneck size (1

inch hinge) will be used in pastas and other products rather than sold on the half-shell and will

receive lower prices per clam. Clams that are too large for the half-shell market (e.g., cherrystones

and chowders) are chopped up for processed products such as clam chowder and also receive 

lower prices per clam.

17. In this region, do federal supply control marketing orders exist for production of this crop?

Describe:

Yes No

18. In this region, do state quality marketing orders exist for production of this crop?

Describe:

Yes No
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RMA–Facilitated Insurance Products

19. In this region, what RMA-facilitated insurance products are currently available for this crop? List all:

1) Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance Program (stock mortality insurance)

2) AGR-Lite (whole farm revenue insurance)

Yield Risk

20. In this region what are examples of crops with very low relative yield risk? Relative risk is used to adjust absolute magnitudes 

that vary across crops to a relative level to facilitate comparability (roughly, a measure of variation divided by the mean level).

Eastern Massachusetts is not an agricultural area. Crops with low relative yield risk are nursery

and cranberries (the largest crop in the region by far).

21. In this region what are examples of crops with very high relative yield risk?

Corn and apples have high relative yield risk.

22. Is this crop exposed to catastrophic risks that would reduce yields by 50 percent or more? Yes No

23. If the answer to the previous question is yes, describe these risks. If no, proceed to the next question. Over 25 years (or crop 

cycles) approximately how often would you expect such catastrophic losses to occur?

Description Years (or crop cycles) out of 25

Ice damage and freezing 5 years out of 25

Disease (QPX) 5 years out of 25

Hurricanes and other storm-related wind and wave action 3 years out of 25

Salinity changes <1 year out of 25

Low dissolved oxygen <1 year out of 25

24. Characterize yield risk for this crop ignoring the catastrophic yield risk(s) described earlier. On a scale from one to five, if the 

low relative yield risk crops identified earlier were one, and the high relative yield risk crops identified earlier were five, what 

number would you assign to the non-catastrophic yield risk associated with this crop in this region?

1

very low relative 

yield risk

2

x

3 4 5

very high relative 

yield risk
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25. In this region, do producers tend to experience multiple-year sequences of good yields or bad yields for this crop? If 

yes, describe what causes these multiple-year sequences.

Yes No

26. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low yield risk and five is very high yield risk, provide an overall assessment of 

yield risk faced by producers of this crop in this region.

1

very low yield risk

2 3

x

4 5

very high yield risk

Quality Risk

27. In this region what are examples of crops with very low quality risk?

As with yield risk, there are not many low quality risk crops identified in the region, but there are 

limited data available to assess.

28. In this region what are examples of crops with very high quality risk?

Fruits, nuts, berries, vegetables produced in the region have relatively high quality risk.

29. Is this crop exposed to catastrophic quality risks that would reduce the average price received by 20 percent or 

more?

In general, clams are marketable if alive and not subject to substantial quality risk from 

catastrophic events that would reduce average prices received substantially.

Yes No

30. If the answer to the previous question is yes, describe these risks. If no, proceed to the next question. Over 25 years (or crop 

cycles) approximately how often would you expect such catastrophic quality losses to occur?

Description Years (or crop cycles) out 

of 25
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31. We now want to characterize quality risk for this crop ignoring the catastrophic quality risk(s) described earlier. On a scale 

from one to five, if the crops with very low risk of quality problems identified earlier were one, and the crops with very high 

risk of quality problems identified earlier were five, what number would you assign to the quality risk associated with this 

crop in this region?

1

very low quality 

risk

x

2 3 4 5

very high quality 

risk

32. On a scale from one to five, if one is very low quality risk and five is very high quality risk, provide an overall assessment of 

quality risk faced by producers of this crop in this region.

1

very low quality 

risk

x

2 3 4 5

very high quality

risk

Price Risk

33. In this region what are examples of crops with very low relative price risk within the production cycle? That is, variation in 

price between pre-plant for annuals (or equivalent for perennials) and sale. (Similar concept to IP and RA for crops with 

futures markets).

There is relatively little information available and most agricultural production in the region is 

expected to have relatively high price risk.

34. In this region what are examples of crops with very high relative price risk within the production cycle? That is, variation in 

price between pre-plant for annuals (or, equivalent for perennials) and sale. (Similar concept to IP and RA for crops with 

futures markets).

Nursery, fruits and vegetables have relatively high price risk. Cranberries, which are a major 

crop in this region, have had significant price variation in recent years.

35. On a scale from one to five, if the low price risk crops identified earlier were one and the high price risk crops identified 

earlier were five, what number would you assign to the relative price risk (within the production cycle) associated with this

crop in this region?

1

low price risk crop

2 3

x

4 5

high price risk crop
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36. In this region, do producers tend to experience multiple-year sequences of high prices or low prices for this crop?

If yes, describe.

Yes No

37. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low price risk and five is very high price risk, provide an overall assessment of 

price risk (within the production cycle) faced by producers of this crop in this region.

1

very low price risk

2 3

x

4 5

very high price risk

Other Sources of Revenue Risk

38. For this region, describe other factors that affect revenue risk for this crop (e.g., prevented planting).

1) Inadequate seed availability from commercial hatcheries.

2) High mortality at the nursery stage for growers with nursery clams, leaving them with fewer 

clams to plant for growout.

3) Poor growth conditions in the field, e.g., inadequate or improper food resources due to poor 

phytoplankton production.

4) Area closures by government agencies due to harmful algal blooms or other events.

39.

39. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low risk and five is very high risk, provide an overall assessment of risk 

sources other than yield, quality, and price risks faced by producers of this crop in this region.

40.

1

very low risk

2

x

3 4 5

very 

high risk

Sufficient Non-Insurance Coping Mechanisms

40. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low and five is very high, assess the extent to which producers of this 

commodity in this region use risk-reducing inputs as a substitute for crop insurance.

1

very low 

2

x

3 4 5

very 

high
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41. Are government crop programs (e.g., marketing loans and counter-cyclical payments) available 

for this crop?

Describe:

Yes No

42. In this region, is there a history of federal disaster payments for this crop?

Describe:

There have been claims made by hard clam growers under the Non- Insured 

Crop Disaster Assistance Program in the past prior to the introduction of 

the Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance Program.

Yes - limited No

43. Approximately what percentage of the total production of this crop is under production contract 

with a first handler or processor? 10 %

Describe contracts:

There is one marketing cooperative in Wellfleet that has negotiated

production contracts with local growers to supply clams.

a. Under the terms of a typical production contract for this crop, is the grower exposed to 

production risk (i.e., the grower must deliver on the contract even if production shortfalls 

occur)? Growers are not necessarily committed to provide a 

specific quantity of clams, but are subject to production risk 

because lower production will reduce their payments.

Yes No

b. Under the terms of a typical production contract for this crop, is the grower exposed to 

quality risk (i.e., there are significant price penalties if the product does not meet the 

quality characteristics specified in the contract). Growers are paid based on 

clams sorted by size so if they produce a mix of clams that are too 

small or too large (less likely), they will receive less per clam.

Yes No

c. Under the terms of a typical production contract for this crop, is the grower exposed to 

price risk (i.e., prices for specific quality characteristics are not specified in the contract)? 

Information not available.

Yes No
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44. In this region, approximately what percentage of the total production of this crop is priced prior to 

harvest (may or may not be tied to a production contract)?

Describe:

_N.A._%

45. When corn farmers in the Midwest experience low (high) yields, they can often expect higher (lower) market prices (i.e., prices 

and yields are very negatively correlated). This moderates the revenue impacts of low yields. In contrast, for corn farmers in the 

Southeast there is very little relationship between their yields and market prices (i.e., prices and yields are independent). In this 

region the price and yield for this crop are (circle one):

Independent Somewhat Negatively Correlated Highly Negatively Correlated

Describe:

The regional price for hard clams is influenced by wild harvests as well as cultivated clam harvests from

other regions, which reduces the correlation between yield (mortality) and price. There are limited data 

to quantitatively assess the correlation, but there seems to be some negative correlation between clam 

crop success and prices. Massachusetts produces a relatively small share of national clam production, 

but they are differentiated as a higher quality product in many markets and sell at a premium price. Thus, 

they are not perfect substitutes for clams from other locations and local yield will tend to have some effect 

on prices received.

46. On a scale from one to five, where one is “strongly disagree” and five is “strongly agree,” provide your reaction to the following 

statement:

“In this region, producers of this crop are financially able to self-insure against production losses.”

1

strongly

disagree

2

x

3 4 5

strongly

agree

Describe: Most growers are small and highly dependent on revenue from clams, although

somewhat more diversified than in other regions and a larger percentage estimated with work

off-farm. Their diversification is often with other aquaculture products such as oysters.

47. For a typical grower of this crop, approximately what percentage of the total farm revenue would be attributable to 

this crop?

According to growers and aquaculture specialists, clam growers in the state typically 

derive the majority of their farm income from clams, but oyster cultivating is growing in 

importance.

60_%
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48. What other commodities would typically be produced on a farm that produces this commodity? What is the correlation between 

revenue from these other commodities and the revenue from this commodity? For correlation use a scale of one to five, where 1 

is “strongly negatively correlated,” 2 is “negatively correlated,“ 3 “independent,“ 4 is “positively correlated,“ and 5 is “strongly 

positively correlated.”

List:

Correlation

(assign a number between 

1-5)

American oyster 4

Soft shell clam 4

49. In this region, approximately what percentage of the total production of this crop is produced by part-time farmers 

who have full-time employment off the farm? 40_%

50. On a scale from one to five, where one is “strongly disagree“ and five is “strongly agree,“ provide your reaction to the 

following statement:

“In this region, producers of this crop attempt to manage production risk by spreading their production over several geographic 

locations.”

1

strongly

disagree

2

x

3 4 5

strongly

agree

Describe: Growers are dependent on access to shellfish leases from the towns, which restrict 

access to lease sites and to area. All available leases are generally taken and growers 

attempting to diversify are likely to have difficulty finding areas in which to diversify. Some 

growers do have multiple sites, but they are not necessarily that distant from one another and 

individual leases are small compared to other states. This limits growers’ ability to diversify 

spatially.

51. In this region, what private-sector insurance products (if any) are currently available for this crop?

List all:

None identified
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52. Characterize how agricultural lenders in this region view the available RMA-facilitated insurance products for this crop. 

“Unfavorable” implies that lenders actually discourage borrowers from purchasing the product while “favorable” implies 

that lenders strongly encourage and often require borrowers to purchase the product. If multiple insurance products are 

offered, answer for each product.

Unfavorable Indifferent Favorable

Describe: The primary lender in this region is USDA Farm Services Agency. During the 2007 

evaluation, growers stated that they are required to have clam insurance coverage to get 

loans related to their clam production, which many growers indicated was the only reason 

they were still carrying the insurance.

53. On a scale from one to five, where one is very high and five is very low, assess the sufficiency of non-insurance coping 

mechanisms for producers of this crop in this region.

1

high

availability

2 3 4

x

5

low

availability

Risk Classification

54. On a scale from one to five, where one is strongly disagree and five is strongly agree, provide your reaction to the following 

statement:

“In this region, no producers of this crop are really any more or less risky than any others. They all face about the same risk 

of loss.”

55.

1

strongly

disagree

2

x

3 4 5

strongly

agree

Describe: Risk in shellfish farming is generally thought to be on a “waterbody scale” in that a

catastrophic situation probably will affect most growers within a specific embayment. 

Therefore, the risk in one embayment may be significantly different than the risk of a 

neighboring embayment, assuming that the two environments have distinct physical differences. 

Risk is also dependent on the husbandry practices of the individual grower.

55. In this region, for those who are currently not insured, would you say that premium rate on the existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for this crop are “much too low,” “about right,” or “much too high”? If more than one RMA insurance 

product is offered, answer for each product.

Much Too Low About Right Much Too High

If you answered that premium rates are “much too high,” explain why (or how) you think this happened.
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56. In this region, for those who currently are insured, would you say that premium rate on the existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for this crop are “much too low,” “about right,” or “much too high”? If more than one RMA insurance 

product is offered, answer for each product.

Much Too Low About Right Much Too High

If you answered that premium rates are “much too high,” explain why (or how) you think this happened.

57. For this region, to what extent does the system used to establish the guarantee (e.g., APH yield or expected revenue) for this 

crop match the true value of the production at risk? An answer of one indicates that the system used to establish the guarantee 

does a very poor job of matching the true value of the production at risk. An answer of five indicates that the system used to 

establish the guarantee does a very good job of matching the true value of the production at risk.

1

very poor job

2 3

x

4 5

very good job

58. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low and five is very high, assess the effectiveness of existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products in accurately classifying potential policyholders according to their loss exposure (i.e., higher risk growers 

pay higher premiums while lower risk growers pay lower premiums).

59. 60.

1

very low

x

2 3 4 5

very high All growers within a county pay the 

same premium for a given stage 

although there may be substantial 

differences in risk based on location 

and management practices, which 

was raised as an issue by the 

majority of stakeholders providing 

feedback on the program.

Moral Hazard and Monitoring

59. Yield variation can be caused by unavoidable “acts of nature” or avoidable “acts of management.” In practical parlance, what 

is the potential for “gaming” the insurance product? Evaluate the potential for gaming the RMA-facilitated crop insurance 

product for this crop on a scale from one to five, where one implies that variation in yield is almost exclusively due to “acts of 

nature” (potential for gaming is low) and five implies that yield variation is almost exclusively due to “acts of management”

(potential for gaming is high). If multiple insurance products are offered, answer for each product.

60.

1

very low

2 3 4

x

5

very high
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60. To the extent that management affects yield loss risk exposure, how difficult is it to monitor the insured’s behavior?

Extremely Difficult Difficult Not too Difficult

Explain: The insured’s behavior is difficult and expensive to monitor for several reasons. The 

clams are underwater much of the time and many lease sites must be visited by boat, which is 

relatively difficult and expensive compared with other commodities. There are significant time

constraints for inspections due to the tides, which may necessitate multiple days for inspections 

of growers with multiple sites or inspections of multiple growers, even if they are located very 

close to one another. Growers typically only work their beds at low tides, when the clam beds 

are not underwater. Even when the beds are exposed, the clams are still not visible unless they 

are dead because live clams keep themselves buried under the substrate in which they are 

growing. Thus, inspectors can more easily inspect the condition of the lease site and cover nets 

than the clams themselves. The clams can be sampled and dug up to assess their condition, but 

this is a time-consuming process. This product is very unique for the insurance companies to 

monitor and there have been a number of concerns that they are less familiar with this product 

than others and do not sufficiently understand appropriate management strategies and 

therefore cannot fully evaluate behaviors observed. The management practice that can be best 

monitored and has an effect on yield/survival is probably stocking density. Because leases in 

Massachusetts are smaller and often adjacent to one another on the same tidal flat areas, 

monitoring is somewhat easier than in other states, although still difficult.

61. 62.

61. Quality variation can be caused by unavoidable “acts of nature” or avoidable “acts of management.” In practical parlance, 

what is the potential for “gaming” the insurance product? Evaluate the potential for gaming the RMA-facilitated insurance 

product for this crop on a scale from one to five, where one implies that variation in quality is almost exclusively due to “acts 

of nature” (potential for gaming is low) and five implies that quality variation is almost exclusively due to “acts of

management” (potential for gaming is high). If multiple insurance products are offered, answer for each product.

62.

1

very low

x

2 3 4 5

very high

The current insurance product does 

not cover quality variations, so 

there is no potential for gaming it. 

In addition, quality variations do 

not tend to be as much of an issue 

for calms as yield/survival.

62. To the extent that management affects quality loss risk exposure, how difficult is it to monitor the insured’s behavior?

Extremely Difficult Difficult Not too Difficult

Explain: Quality variation results from subtle changes in management and acts of nature. It 

would be extremely difficult for someone not well-trained in clam farming practices to monitor 

a grower’s behavior with respect to quality variation.
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63. On a scale from one to five, where one is very large and five is very small, assess the extent of moral hazard problems with 

existing RMA-facilitated insurance products for this crop.

64.

1

very large

2

x

3 4 5

very small

Problems Affecting Insurance Participation

64. Have significant problems occurred (either past or current) with policy provisions on existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for the crop? If multiple insurance products are offered, answer for each product. Yes No

65. If the answer to the previous question is no, go to next question. If yes, for each significant problem:

a. Briefly describe the problem.

1) There have been instances where growers with valid claims (in their opinion) have not received

indemnities. Often, this is because they did not fully understand the policy provisions (e.g., survival

factors, reporting requirements, stages) or disagree with the adjusters’ interpretation of policy

provisions and/or their loss adjustment. Some growers feel adjustors are not sufficiently familiar 

with practices and procedures of clam farming and are not able to adequately perform field 

evaluations or adjust losses. In any event, word spreads that even if an insured farm suffers 

substantial losses, it is unlikely that an indemnity will be paid.

2) All the clam growers in the region seem to be familiar with the situation of a grower that 

discovered QPX in Wellfleet and destroyed their clams, with the help of neighboring clam growers, 

before they had died due to concern that the disease would spread to other growers. Because those 

clams had not died prior to removal, they did not meet the definition for a covered loss and the 

claim was denied, but growers in the region felt this was unfair and that if this particular grower 

was denied coverage, then they had little hope of receiving payments themselves if they had a loss. 

USDA eventually settled with this grower and did make some payment, but this case contributed to 

grower mistrust of the program and numerous questions about the status of QPX coverage.

b. What has been the impact of the problem (e.g., high loss ratios, reduced demand, etc.)?

1) Reduced demand and shift towards catastrophic coverage.

2) Reduced demand.

c. Have policy provisions since been changed to adequately address the problem?

1) This is not a problem with the provisions as much as a difficulty in providing the insured with

sufficient information about what the provisions are and ensuring that they are aware of and

understand the policy provisions and special provisions.

2) Again, this is in part a difficulty in providing the insured with sufficient information about what 

the provisions are and ensuring that they are aware of and understand the policy provisions and 

special provisions. In addition, more definitive information on QPX coverage would be helpful for 

growers in this region.

d. If policy provisions have not been changed, what changes in policy provisions do you think would increase insurance demand for 
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this crop?

1) With the pilot now in its 12th year, we think it unlikely that changes in the policy will increase 

participation. Minds are made up and there is not enough potential for insurance agents to be 

motivated to actively market it.

66. In this region, do reinsured companies have sufficient incentives to aggressively market existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for the crop?

If yes, go to next question. If no, explain.

Clam insurance is a unique product for which it is difficult and expensive to monitor

insured behavior and adjust losses. Therefore, it is difficult for companies to justify

investments in marketing and servicing clam policies. There are not many growers in

Massachusetts and they tend to be small. Companies seem to have limited interest in 

marketing this product.

Yes No

67. In this region, do agents have sufficient incentives to aggressively market existing RMA-facilitated insurance 

products for the crop?

If yes, go to next question. If no, explain.

For agents as well as the companies, clam insurance is a unique product. It requires

more time for agents to learn about and the small market in Massachusetts seems to

have limited agent interest. There were numerous concerns expressed by stakeholders 

about lack of contact with agents and the perceived lack of knowledge of the clam 

industry and details of the clam insurance program as well as lack of interest in selling 

clam policies among agents.

Yes No

68. List any perils that concern growers of this crop but are not covered by the existing RMA-facilitated insurance products (e.g., 

business interruption due to unavailability of irrigation water, disease quarantines, etc.). For each peril assess the extent of 

growers’ concerns about this peril on a scale from one to five where one is minor concern and five is major concern.

List all: 1

minor concern

2 3 4 5

major concern

Inability to market x

Inability to plant due to low seed 

availability x

Low market prices x
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69. Briefly describe the potential for insuring these currently uninsured perils? In answering this, consider the following questions:

Can hidden action/moral hazard and classification/adverse selection problems be avoided?

Can clearly stated policy provisions be developed and accurate premium rates established?

Although growers and state aquaculture specialists identify several of these perils as major 

issues, there is little potential for inability to market or inability to plant due to the high potential 

for hidden action/moral hazard and classification/adverse selection problems as well as the 

difficulty in defining premium rates for state or local government marketing restrictions being 

imposed. Low market prices could potentially be covered, although that would require 

development of a revenue insurance product rather than the current stock mortality insurance.

70. On a scale from one to five, where one is very high and five is very low, assess the likelihood that problems affecting 

participation can be adequately addressed by product or policy modifications.

71. 72.

1

very low

2

x

3

4 5

very high
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Program Evaluation Diagnostic Questions

Region South Carolina – Pilot Counties (Beaufort and Charleston)

Crop Hard clam (Marcenaria mercenaria)

Market 

Fresh Live Market

Background Information

Production Processes

Annuals Multi-year Crop

1. Is the crop planted multiple times during a crop production year? If yes, explain:

Because of higher water temperatures and availability of seed clams, growers in warmer 

climates such as South Carolina can plant year-round. Producers generally plant multiple 

times during the year so that they have clams reaching market size throughout the year. 

However, there is typically more planting in the cooler months of fall, winter, and early 

spring to reduce crab predation of the newly planted seed clams.

Yes No

2. For a single planting, is the crop harvested multiple times during a crop production year? If yes, explain:

Harvest for market occurs continuously throughout the year, with portions of a single 

planting potentially harvested on multiple occasions to provide a steady supply of market 

clams. In addition, clams are marketed and priced by size. Some farmers sort and sell 

everything they harvest from the field, whereas others will replant smaller clams and 

harvest them at a later date to get a higher price.

Yes No

3. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for this crop (e.g., practices such as double crop, 

fallow, irrigation, regional differences in climate or soils, etc.). Discuss, particularly, features that are critical in assessing 

potential demand including potential issues with practices and types. 

One large seed grower provides most of the seed used in the state, and also markets seed from 

Virginia down to Georgia. Most South Carolina growers buy 4-6 mm seed, grow it under mesh and 

then replant as 12-15 mm seed. From that point it takes about a year to produce a littleneck, and 

2-2.5 years to produce a cherrystone. The current trend is to produce bigger clams, with growers 

aiming for the topneck market. Growers have been switching from bag culture to bottom culture 

which reportedly has demonstrated better survival for the longer growth period. But it also 
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depends on the nature of the bottom. Some growers are doing both, keeping the easier to harvest 

bags for when they suddenly need to meet demand for volume.

Biennials

4. Is the crop harvested multiple times during a crop production year? Yes No

5. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for this crop (e.g., practices such as irrigation, regional 

differences in climate or soils, etc.). Discuss, particularly, features that are critical in assessing potential demand including 

potential issues with practices and types.

Perennials

6. Is the crop harvested multiple times during a crop production year? If yes, explain: Yes No

7. Is the crop alternate bearing? Yes No

8. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for this crop (e.g., practices such as irrigation, regional 

differences in climate or soils, etc.). Discuss, particularly, features that are critical in assessing potential demand including 

potential issues with practices and types. 

9. What is the economic life of the capital stock (trees, vines, etc.)? Years

10. Over its economic life, what is the likelihood that 10 percent or more of the capital stock would be lost due to natural 

causes? Describe: % 

(probability of 

loss)
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11. If capital stock is lost, how long will it take to reestablish the capital stock to a point where it starts producing salable 

output? Years

12. If capital stock is lost, how long will it take to reestablish the capital stock to a point where it is at peak production? Years

Nursery

13. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for nursery crops in this region. Discuss, particularly, 

features that are critical in assessing potential demand including potential issues with practices and types. 

Marketing

14. Describe typical marketing channels and/or contracting structures for this crop.

The market for cultivated hard clams is primarily grocery chains and the main mode of 

consumption is probably steamed. Half-shell raw bars and other restaurants are also important.

Molluscan shellfish harvesting and marketing is regulated by FDA. Growers can only sell to 

certified shellfish wholesalers or become wholesalers themselves by following State and Federal 

guidelines for operating a shellfish food production facility. In South Carolina, approximately 90 

percent of the clams are shipped out of state through traditional seafood channels, with some 

product going directly to large chain restaurants. There is limited local marketing. There tend to be

informal working relationships between growers and their wholesalers, with little or no formal 

contracting in place.

15. In this region are there critical time periods (i.e., marketing windows) when producers hope to market this crop? If so, describe.

Clams are harvested and marketed year round, but the peak marketing periods for cultivated clams 

are the summer months (particularly around Memorial Day, July 4th, and Labor Day) followed by 

a second, smaller peak during the Thanksgiving to New Year’s Day holiday season.
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16. Within the marketing channels and/or contracting structures mentioned above describe how quality variations are handled (e.g., 

off-grade apples in a fresh market system may be processed for juice).

The quality of cultivated hard clams centers on size, shelf-life, and breakage during handling and

shucking. If one of these quality issues should diminish, the wholesale/retail purchaser generally

provides feedback directly to the grower. Depending on the issue, growing and handling strategies

can be implemented to rectify quality issues. Clams are sorted by size and growers are paid based

on prevailing prices for each size, which go into different markets. Clams less than littleneck size (1

inch hinge) will be used in pastas and other products rather than sold on the half-shell and will

receive lower prices per clam. Clams that are too large for the half-shell market (e.g., 

cherrystones and chowders) are chopped up for processed products such as clam chowder and also 

receive lower prices per clam.

17. In this region, do federal supply control marketing orders exist for production of this crop?

Describe:

Yes No

18. In this region, do state quality marketing orders exist for production of this crop?

Describe:

Yes No

RMA–Facilitated Insurance Products

19. In this region, what RMA-facilitated insurance products are currently available for this crop? List all:

1) Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance Program (stock mortality insurance)

2) AGR-Lite (whole farm revenue insurance)
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Yield Risk

20. In this region what are examples of crops with very low relative yield risk? Relative risk is used to adjust absolute magnitudes 

that vary across crops to a relative level to facilitate comparability (roughly, a measure of variation divided by the mean level).

Crops in the region that are relatively low risk include nursery and fresh market tomatoes, but 

there is not much agriculture in these two counties. Clam growers do not produce field crops.

21. In this region what are examples of crops with very high relative yield risk?

Some of the crops with relatively high relative yield risks include corn, soybeans and wheat.

22. Is this crop exposed to catastrophic risks that would reduce yields by 50 percent or more?

This and responses below refer to the risk of mortality of 50 percent or more, after 

adjusting for normal mortality.

Yes No

23. If the answer to the previous question is yes, describe these risks. If no, proceed to the next question. Over 25 years (or crop 

cycles) approximately how often would you expect such catastrophic losses to occur?

Description Years (or crop cycles) out of 25

Hurricanes and other storm-related wind and wave action 2 years out of 25

Oxygen depletion 1 year out of 25

Freeze/ice 1 year out of 25

Toxic algae 1 year out of 25

24. Characterize yield risk for this crop ignoring the catastrophic yield risk(s) described earlier. On a scale from one to five, if the 

low relative yield risk crops identified earlier were one, and the high relative yield risk crops identified earlier were five, what 

number would you assign to the non-catastrophic yield risk associated with this crop in this region?

1

very low relative 

yield risk

2

x

3 4 5

very high relative 

yield risk

25. In this region, do producers tend to experience multiple-year sequences of good yields or bad yields for this crop? If 

yes, describe what causes these multiple-year sequences.

Yes No
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26. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low yield risk and five is very high yield risk, provide an overall assessment of 

yield risk faced by producers of this crop in this region.

1

very low yield risk

2 3

x

4 5

very high yield risk

Quality Risk

27. In this region what are examples of crops with very low quality risk?

Grains, soybeans and nursery plants have very low quality risk.

28. In this region what are examples of crops with very high quality risk?

Many fruits and vegetables produced in the region have relatively high quality risk.

29. Is this crop exposed to catastrophic quality risks that would reduce the average price received by 20 percent or 

more?

In general, clams are marketable if alive and are not subject to catastrophic quality risk.

Yes No

30. If the answer to the previous question is yes, describe these risks. If no, proceed to the next question. Over 25 years (or crop 

cycles) approximately how often would you expect such catastrophic quality losses to occur?

Description Years (or crop cycles) out 

of 25

31. We now want to characterize quality risk for this crop ignoring the catastrophic quality risk(s) described earlier. On a scale 

from one to five, if the crops with very low risk of quality problems identified earlier were one, and the crops with very high 

risk of quality problems identified earlier were five, what number would you assign to the quality risk associated with this 

crop in this region?

1

very low quality 

risk

x

2 3 4 5

very high quality 

risk
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32. On a scale from one to five, if one is very low quality risk and five is very high quality risk, provide an overall assessment of 

quality risk faced by producers of this crop in this region.

1

very low quality 

risk

x

2 3 4 5

very high quality

risk

Price Risk

33. In this region what are examples of crops with very low relative price risk within the production cycle? That is, variation in 

price between pre-plant for annuals (or equivalent for perennials) and sale. (Similar concept to IP and RA for crops with 

futures markets).

Corn and most livestock have low relative price risk in this region.

34. In this region what are examples of crops with very high relative price risk within the production cycle? That is, variation in 

price between pre-plant for annuals (or, equivalent for perennials) and sale. (Similar concept to IP and RA for crops with 

futures markets).

Many fruits and vegetables produced in this region have relatively high price risk.

35. On a scale from one to five, if the low price risk crops identified earlier were one and the high price risk crops identified 

earlier were five, what number would you assign to the relative price risk (within the production cycle) associated with this

crop in this region?

1

low price risk crop

2 3

x

4 5

high price risk crop

36. In this region, do producers tend to experience multiple-year sequences of high prices or low prices for this crop?

If yes, describe.

Yes No

37. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low price risk and five is very high price risk, provide an overall assessment of 

price risk (within the production cycle) faced by producers of this crop in this region.

38.

1

very low price risk

2 3

x

4 5

very high price risk
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Other Sources of Revenue Risk

38. For this region, describe other factors that affect revenue risk for this crop (e.g., prevented planting).

1) Inadequate seed availability from commercial hatcheries.

2) High mortality at the nursery stage for growers with nursery clams, leaving them with fewer 

clams to plant for growout.

3) Poor growth conditions in the field, e.g. inadequate or improper food resources due to poor 

phytoplankton production.

4) Area closures by government agencies.

5) Delayed harvest due to major rainfall events.

39.

39. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low risk and five is very high risk, provide an overall assessment of risk 

sources other than yield, quality, and price risks faced by producers of this crop in this region.

40.

1

very low risk

2

x

3 4 5

very 

high risk

Sufficient Non-Insurance Coping Mechanisms

40. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low and five is very high, assess the extent to which producers of this 

commodity in this region use risk-reducing inputs as a substitute for crop insurance.

1

very low 

2

x

3 4 5

very 

high

41. Are government crop programs (e.g., marketing loans and counter-cyclical payments) available 

for this crop?

Describe:

Yes No
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42. In this region, is there a history of federal disaster payments for this crop?

Describe:

There have been claims made by hard clam growers under the Non- Insured 

Crop Disaster Assistance Program in the past prior to the introduction of 

the Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance Program.

Yes - limited No

43. Approximately what percentage of the total production of this crop is under production contract 

with a first handler or processor? 0 %

Describe contracts:

We did not identify any.

a. Under the terms of a typical production contract for this crop, is the grower exposed to 

production risk (i.e., the grower must deliver on the contract even if production shortfalls 

occur)?

Yes No

b. Under the terms of a typical production contract for this crop, is the grower exposed to 

quality risk (i.e., there are significant price penalties if the product does not meet the 

quality characteristics specified in the contract). 

Yes No

c. Under the terms of a typical production contract for this crop, is the grower exposed to 

price risk (i.e., prices for specific quality characteristics are not specified in the contract)? Yes No

44. In this region, approximately what percentage of the total production of this crop is priced prior to 

harvest (may or may not be tied to a production contract)?

Describe:

_0_%

45. When corn farmers in the Midwest experience low (high) yields, they can often expect higher (lower) market prices (i.e., prices 

and yields are very negatively correlated). This moderates the revenue impacts of low yields. In contrast, for corn farmers in the 

Southeast there is very little relationship between their yields and market prices (i.e., prices and yields are independent). In this 

region the price and yield for this crop are (circle one):

Independent Somewhat Negatively Correlated Highly Negatively Correlated

Describe:

The regional price for hard clams is influenced by wild harvests as well as cultivated clam harvests from

other regions, which reduces the correlation between yield (mortality) and price. There are limited data 

to quantitatively assess the correlation, but there seems to be some negative correlation between clam 

crop success and prices. In the case of farmers who are selling to a local niche market, local yield can 

greatly influence their market price. For those farmers selling wholesale to larger regional markets, the 
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local yield has relatively little influence.

46. On a scale from one to five, where one is “strongly disagree” and five is “strongly agree,” provide your reaction to the following 

statement:

“In this region, producers of this crop are financially able to self-insure against production losses.”

1

strongly

disagree

2

x

3 4 5

strongly

agree

Describe: Most growers are highly dependent on revenue from clams and do not have sufficient 

assets to self-insure.

47. For a typical grower of this crop, approximately what percentage of the total farm revenue would be attributable to 

this crop?

According to growers and aquaculture specialists, clam growers in the state tend to derive 

almost all farm income from clams.

95_%

48. What other commodities would typically be produced on a farm that produces this commodity? What is the correlation between 

revenue from these other commodities and the revenue from this commodity? For correlation use a scale of one to five, where 1

is “strongly negatively correlated,” 2 is “negatively correlated,“ 3 “independent,“ 4 is “positively correlated,“ and 5 is “strongly 

positively correlated.”

List:

Correlation

(assign a number between 

1-5)

Oyster 4

Shrimp 3

49. In this region, approximately what percentage of the total production of this crop is produced by part-time farmers 

who have full-time employment off the farm? 20%
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50. On a scale from one to five, where one is “strongly disagree“ and five is “strongly agree,“ provide your reaction to the 

following statement:

“In this region, producers of this crop attempt to manage production risk by spreading their production over several geographic 

locations.”

1

strongly

disagree

2

x

3 4 5

strongly

agree

Describe: Growers are dependent on access to shellfish leases from the State or can potentially

sublease from another grower that has a State lease. There was an average of about 1.7

mariculture leases per mariculture permittee in South Carolina in 2004 with an overall 

average of 32 acres per lease (not all of which is necessarily usable area for planting clams). 

Therefore, at least some growers have multiple leases and leases are relatively large 

compared to states such as Florida or Massachusetts, but there is still generally limited 

ability to spatially diversify to reduce risk based on feedback received.

51. In this region, what private-sector insurance products (if any) are currently available for this crop?

List all:

None identified

52. Characterize how agricultural lenders in this region view the available RMA-facilitated insurance products for this crop. 

“Unfavorable” implies that lenders actually discourage borrowers from purchasing the product while “favorable” implies 

that lenders strongly encourage and often require borrowers to purchase the product. If multiple insurance products are 

offered, answer for each product.

Unfavorable Indifferent Favorable

Describe: Lenders view the insurance coverage positively and growers and aquaculture 

specialists indicated that it has been valuable for growers seeking loans.

53. On a scale from one to five, where one is very high and five is very low, assess the sufficiency of non-insurance coping 

mechanisms for producers of this crop in this region.

1

high

availability

2 3 4 5

low

availability

x
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Risk Classification

54. On a scale from one to five, where one is strongly disagree and five is strongly agree, provide your reaction to the following 

statement:

“In this region, no producers of this crop are really any more or less risky than any others. They all face about the same risk 

of loss.”

56.

1

strongly

disagree

2

x

3 4 5

strongly

agree

Describe: Risk in shellfish farming is generally thought to be on a “waterbody scale” in that a

catastrophic situation probably will affect most growers within a specific embayment. 

Therefore, the risk in one embayment may be significantly different than the risk of a 

neighboring embayment, assuming that the two environments have distinct physical differences. 

Risk is also dependent on the husbandry practices of the individual grower.

55. In this region, for those who are currently not insured, would you say that premium rate on the existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for this crop are “much too low,” “about right,” or “much too high”? If more than one RMA insurance 

product is offered, answer for each product.

Much Too Low About Right Much Too High

If you answered that premium rates are “much too high,” explain why (or how) you think this happened.

There are few growers in the state, but among growers and aquaculture specialists that 

provided feedback, there were concerns that the rates in South Carolina are too high relative to 

the risk protection provided. Rates in South Carolina have been exactly the same as in Virginia 

during the entire program (with the exception of stage 4 clams, which are not defined in 

Virginia, starting in 2004) and slightly higher than in Massachusetts. The perception is that the 

state is relatively low risk and large enough losses to trigger an indemnity are unlikely. 

However, participation has been limited and there is little data available to assess the 

probability and magnitude of expected indemnities.

56. In this region, for those who currently are insured, would you say that premium rate on the existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for this crop are “much too low,” “about right,” or “much too high”? If more than one RMA insurance 

product is offered, answer for each product.

Much Too Low About Right Much Too High

If you answered that premium rates are “much too high,” explain why (or how) you think this happened.

There is only one grower currently insured and he said he had no problem at all with the rate.
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57. For this region, to what extent does the system used to establish the guarantee (e.g., APH yield or expected revenue) for this 

crop match the true value of the production at risk? An answer of one indicates that the system used to establish the guarantee 

does a very poor job of matching the true value of the production at risk. An answer of five indicates that the system used to 

establish the guarantee does a very good job of matching the true value of the production at risk.

1

very poor job

2 3

x

4 5

very good job

58. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low and five is very high, assess the effectiveness of existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products in accurately classifying potential policyholders according to their loss exposure (i.e., higher risk growers 

pay higher premiums while lower risk growers pay lower premiums).

59. 60.

1

very low

x

2 3 4 5

very high All growers within a county pay the 

same premium for a given stage 

although there may be substantial 

differences in risk based on location 

and management practices.

Moral Hazard and Monitoring

59. Yield variation can be caused by unavoidable “acts of nature” or avoidable “acts of management.” In practical parlance, what 

is the potential for “gaming” the insurance product? Evaluate the potential for gaming the RMA-facilitated crop insurance 

product for this crop on a scale from one to five, where one implies that variation in yield is almost exclusively due to “acts of 

nature” (potential for gaming is low) and five implies that yield variation is almost exclusively due to “acts of management”

(potential for gaming is high). If multiple insurance products are offered, answer for each product.

60.

1

very low

2 3 4

x

5

very high

60. To the extent that management affects yield loss risk exposure, how difficult is it to monitor the insured’s behavior?

Extremely Difficult Difficult Not too Difficult

Explain: The insured’s behavior is difficult and expensive to monitor for several reasons. The 

clams are underwater at all times and must be visited by boat, which is relatively difficult and 

expensive compared with other commodities. In addition, because they are underwater, it is 

difficult and time-consuming to assess the condition of the clams. Bags can be randomly pulled 

up and assessed, or bottom plantings sampled, but assessors are generally dependent on 

growers taking them out to their lease sites and there have been concerns that growers could 

potentially choose to visit and select only sites that they know are in good condition. Growers 

do not like to pull up many bags because bags are typically attached to one another and must 

be cut apart and they also feel that it increases mortality to pull up bags and then put them 

back. This product is also very unique for the insurance companies to monitor and there have 

been a number of concerns that they are less familiar with this product than others and do not 

sufficiently understand appropriate management strategies and therefore cannot fully evaluate 

behaviors observed. The management practice that can be best monitored and would have an 

effect on yield/survival is probably stocking density.

61. 62.
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61. Quality variation can be caused by unavoidable “acts of nature” or avoidable “acts of management.” In practical parlance, 

what is the potential for “gaming” the insurance product? Evaluate the potential for gaming the RMA-facilitated insurance 

product for this crop on a scale from one to five, where one implies that variation in quality is almost exclusively due to “acts 

of nature” (potential for gaming is low) and five implies that quality variation is almost exclusively due to “acts of 

management” (potential for gaming is high). If multiple insurance products are offered, answer for each product.

62.

1

very low

x

2 3 4 5

very high

The current insurance product does 

not cover quality variations, so 

there is no potential for gaming it. 

In addition, quality variations do 

not tend to be as much of an issue 

for calms as yield/survival.

62. To the extent that management affects quality loss risk exposure, how difficult is it to monitor the insured’s behavior?

Extremely Difficult Difficult Not too Difficult

Explain: Quality variation results from subtle changes in management and acts of nature. It 

would be extremely difficult for someone not well-trained in clam farming practices to monitor 

a grower’s behavior with respect to quality variation.

63. On a scale from one to five, where one is very large and five is very small, assess the extent of moral hazard problems with 

existing RMA-facilitated insurance products for this crop.

65.

1

very large

2 3

x

4 5

very small

While there is some potential for 

gaming, there have been only 2 

indemnities in this state – one each 

in 2003 and 2004 – and no evidence 

that moral hazard has caused 

higher crop insurance indemnities.

Problems Affecting Insurance Participation

64. Have significant problems occurred (either past or current) with policy provisions on existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for the crop? If multiple insurance products are offered, answer for each product. Yes No
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65. If the answer to the previous question is no, go to next question. If yes, for each significant problem:

a. Briefly describe the problem.

1) The 2007 evaluation of the program reported instances where growers with valid claims (in 

their opinion) had not received indemnities. Often, this is because they did not fully understand 

the policy provisions (e.g., survival factors, reporting requirements, stages) or disagreed with 

the adjusters’ interpretation of policy provisions and/or their loss adjustment.

2) Many growers in the state plant clams significantly larger than 10mm and feel provisions do 

not adequately cover them because the payout by stage is based on the time since planting 

rather than size, i.e., their clams may already be the size of Stage 3 or even some Stage 4 clams 

when planted, but valued as Stage 2 for the first 6 months and Stage 3 for the next 6 months. 

They also think the survival factor for larger seed clams should be higher than for 10mm clams.

b. What has been the impact of the problem (e.g., high loss ratios, reduced demand, etc.)?

1) Reduced demand and shift towards catastrophic coverage.

2) Reduced demand.

c. Have policy provisions since been changed to adequately address the problem?

1) This is not a problem with the provisions as much as a difficulty in providing the insured with

sufficient information about what the provisions are and ensuring that they are aware of and

understand the policy provisions and special provisions.

2) No.

d. If policy provisions have not been changed, what changes in policy provisions do you think would increase insurance demand for 

this crop?

The pilot is now in its 12th year. It has never been embraced by South Carolina clam growers. 

Many seem to be totally unaware of it. We do not think there is any change to the provisions that 

would have a significant impact on participation.

66. In this region, do reinsured companies have sufficient incentives to aggressively market existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for the crop?

If yes, go to next question. If no, explain.

Clam insurance is a unique product for which it is difficult and expensive to monitor

insured behavior and adjust losses. There is also a small market for the insurance in

South Carolina as there are not many growers. Therefore, it is difficult for companies to 

justify investments in marketing and servicing clam policies.

Yes No
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67. In this region, do agents have sufficient incentives to aggressively market existing RMA-facilitated insurance 

products for the crop?

If yes, go to next question. If no, explain.

For agents as well as the companies, clam insurance is a unique product. It requires more 

time for agents to learn about and with the small market for the insurance in South 

Carolina, agents are not likely to have strong incentives to develop the detailed knowledge 

of the clam industry and to effectively market the insurance product.

Yes No

68. List any perils that concern growers of this crop but are not covered by the existing RMA-facilitated insurance products (e.g., 

business interruption due to unavailability of irrigation water, disease quarantines, etc.). For each peril assess the extent of 

growers’ concerns about this peril on a scale from one to five where one is minor concern and five is major concern.

List all: 1

minor concern

2 3 4 5

major concern

None known due to lack of industry 

feedback.

69. Briefly describe the potential for insuring these currently uninsured perils? In answering this, consider the following questions:

Can hidden action/moral hazard and classification/adverse selection problems be avoided?

Can clearly stated policy provisions be developed and accurate premium rates established?

70. On a scale from one to five, where one is very high and five is very low, assess the likelihood that problems affecting 

participation can be adequately addressed by product or policy modifications.

71. 72.

1

very low

2

x

3

4 5

very high
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Program Evaluation Diagnostic Questions

Region Virginia – Pilot Counties (Accomack and Northampton)

Crop Hard clam (Marcenaria mercenaria)

Market 

(fresh, processed, sold for animal feed, etc.) Fresh Live Market

Background Information

Production Processes

Annuals Multi-year Crop

1. Is the crop planted multiple times during a crop production year? If yes, explain:

Clams are typically planted multiple times during a year. The largest firms plant weekly 

from April through November. Small growers may plant 2 or 3 times.

Yes No

2. For a single planting, is the crop harvested multiple times during a crop production year? If yes, explain:

Harvest for market occurs throughout much of the year, with a slow period in the winter. 

Portions of a single planting are potentially harvested on multiple occasions to provide a 

steady supply of market clams. In addition, clams are marketed and priced by size. Some 

farmers sort and sell everything they harvest from the field, whereas others will replant 

smaller clams and harvest them at a later date to get a higher price.

Yes No

3. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for this crop (e.g., practices such as double crop, 

fallow, irrigation, regional differences in climate or soils, etc.). Discuss, particularly, features that are critical in assessing 

potential demand including potential issues with practices and types. 

Leases used for clam production tend to be much larger in Virginia than in other states – as large 

as 200 acres. Leases may be in creeks, the Chesapeake Bay, and/or seaside, which increases

interest in having multiple units for insurance purposes. Production in the bay is a result of all the 

creek leases being taken. Because the leases tend to be large, many growers rotate their clams 

between parts of the lease, leaving portions fallow. Most growers purchase seed clams from one of

the commercial hatcheries in the region or have a contracting or subleasing arrangement with one 

of the larger wholesalers. The average crop cycle for final growout of seed clams to market size 

ranges from about 1.5 to 3 years, depending on water temperatures when seeded, size of seed clams 

(some growers in the state typically use larger seed clams of 16- 18mm or even larger), stocking 
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densities, and lease site productivity.

Biennials

4. Is the crop harvested multiple times during a crop production year? Yes No

5. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for this crop (e.g., practices such as irrigation, regional 

differences in climate or soils, etc.). Discuss, particularly, features that are critical in assessing potential demand including 

potential issues with practices and types.

Perennials

6. Is the crop harvested multiple times during a crop production year? If yes, explain: Yes No

7. Is the crop alternate bearing? Yes No

8. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for this crop (e.g., practices such as irrigation, regional 

differences in climate or soils, etc.). Discuss, particularly, features that are critical in assessing potential demand including 

potential issues with practices and types. 

9. What is the economic life of the capital stock (trees, vines, etc.)? Years

10. Over its economic life, what is the likelihood that 10 percent or more of the capital stock would be lost due to natural 

causes? Describe: % 

(probability of 

loss)
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11. If capital stock is lost, how long will it take to reestablish the capital stock to a point where it starts producing salable 

output? Years

12. If capital stock is lost, how long will it take to reestablish the capital stock to a point where it is at peak production? Years

Nursery

13. Describe distinguishing characteristics of prevailing production system(s) for nursery crops in this region. Discuss, particularly, 

features that are critical in assessing potential demand including potential issues with practices and types. 

Marketing

14. Describe typical marketing channels and/or contracting structures for this crop.

The market for cultivated hard clams is primarily grocery chains and the main mode of 

consumption is probably steamed. Half-shell raw bars and other restaurants are also important.

Molluscan shellfish harvesting and marketing is regulated by FDA. Growers can only sell to 

certified shellfish wholesalers or become wholesalers themselves by following State and Federal 

guidelines for operating a shellfish food production facility. There are several very large shellfish 

wholesalers in Virginia and they generally are also clam growers. Some of the largest are 

vertically integrated through the production chain, with hatcheries, nurseries, growout sites, and 

wholesale distribution. Some large producers contract with growers to produce market clams and 

pay contract growers based on the number harvested. One producer in particular requires contract 

growers working with them to have clam insurance and pays 60% of the premium. Other large 

operations have a number of subleasing agreements and encourage the purchase of clam 

insurance. These arrangements increase the number of participants in the insurance program and 

total liability as long as the large growers maintain interest in the program and are requiring or 

encouraging growers working with them to hold insurance.

15. In this region are there critical time periods (i.e., marketing windows) when producers hope to market this crop? If so, describe.

Peak marketing periods for cultivated clams are the summer months (particularly around 

Memorial Day, July 4th, and Labor Day) followed by a second, smaller peak during the 

Thanksgiving to New Year’s Day holiday season.
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16. Within the marketing channels and/or contracting structures mentioned above describe how quality variations are handled (e.g., 

off-grade apples in a fresh market system may be processed for juice).

The quality of cultivated hard clams centers on size, shelf-life, and breakage during handling and

shucking. If one of these quality issues should diminish, the wholesale/retail purchaser generally

provides feedback directly to the grower. Depending on the issue, growing and handling strategies

can be implemented to rectify quality issues. Clams are sorted by size and growers are paid based

on prevailing prices for each size, which go into different markets. Clams less than littleneck size (1

inch hinge) will be used in pastas and other products rather than sold on the half-shell and will

receive lower prices per clam. Clams that are too large for the half-shell market (e.g., 

cherrystones and chowders) are chopped up for processed products such as clam chowder and also 

receive lower prices per clam.

17. In this region, do federal supply control marketing orders exist for production of this crop?

Describe:

Yes No

18. In this region, do state quality marketing orders exist for production of this crop?

Describe:

Yes No

RMA–Facilitated Insurance Products

19. In this region, what RMA-facilitated insurance products are currently available for this crop? List all:

1) Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance Program (stock mortality insurance)

2) AGR-Lite (whole farm revenue insurance)
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Yield Risk

20. In this region what are examples of crops with very low relative yield risk? Relative risk is used to adjust absolute magnitudes 

that vary across crops to a relative level to facilitate comparability (roughly, a measure of variation divided by the mean level).

Crops in the region that are relatively low risk include nursery and fresh market tomatoes, but 

clam growers do not generally also grow field crops.

21. In this region what are examples of crops with very high relative yield risk?

Crops with high relative yield risks include corn, cotton, soybeans and vegetables.

22. Is this crop exposed to catastrophic risks that would reduce yields by 50 percent or more? Yes No

23. If the answer to the previous question is yes, describe these risks. If no, proceed to the next question. Over 25 years (or crop 

cycles) approximately how often would you expect such catastrophic losses to occur?

Description Years (or crop cycles) out of 25

Hurricanes and other storm-related wind and wave action 1-2 years out of 25

Salinity changes Location-dependent; seaside <1 

year out of 25, bayside 1-3 years 

out of 25

Low dissolved oxygen 1 year out of 25

Freeze/ice 2 years out of 25

24. Characterize yield risk for this crop ignoring the catastrophic yield risk(s) described earlier. On a scale from one to five, if the 

low relative yield risk crops identified earlier were one, and the high relative yield risk crops identified earlier were five, what 

number would you assign to the non-catastrophic yield risk associated with this crop in this region?

1

very low relative 

yield risk

x

2 3 4 5

very high relative 

yield risk

25. In this region, do producers tend to experience multiple-year sequences of good yields or bad yields for this crop? If 

yes, describe what causes these multiple-year sequences.

Yes No
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26. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low yield risk and five is very high yield risk, provide an overall assessment of 

yield risk faced by producers of this crop in this region.

1

very low yield risk

2

x

3 4 5

very high yield risk

Quality Risk

27. In this region what are examples of crops with very low quality risk?

Grains, soybeans and nursery plants have very low quality risk.

28. In this region what are examples of crops with very high quality risk?

Tomatoes, green beans, and other vegetables have relatively high quality risk.

29. Is this crop exposed to catastrophic quality risks that would reduce the average price received by 20 percent or more?

In general, clams are marketable if alive and are not subject to catastrophic quality risk.

Yes No

30. If the answer to the previous question is yes, describe these risks. If no, proceed to the next question. Over 25 years (or crop 

cycles) approximately how often would you expect such catastrophic quality losses to occur?

Description Years (or crop cycles) out 

of 25

31. We now want to characterize quality risk for this crop ignoring the catastrophic quality risk(s) described earlier. On a scale 

from one to five, if the crops with very low risk of quality problems identified earlier were one, and the crops with very high 

risk of quality problems identified earlier were five, what number would you assign to the quality risk associated with this crop 

in this region?

1

very low quality 

risk

x

2 3 4 5

very high quality 

risk
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32. On a scale from one to five, if one is very low quality risk and five is very high quality risk, provide an overall assessment of 

quality risk faced by producers of this crop in this region.

1

very low quality 

risk

x

2 3 4 5

very high quality

risk

Price Risk

33. In this region what are examples of crops with very low relative price risk within the production cycle? That is, variation in 

price between pre-plant for annuals (or equivalent for perennials) and sale. (Similar concept to IP and RA for crops with 

futures markets).

Corn, soybeans, nursery and poultry have low relative price risk in this region.

34. In this region what are examples of crops with very high relative price risk within the production cycle? That is, variation in 

price between pre-plant for annuals (or, equivalent for perennials) and sale. (Similar concept to IP and RA for crops with 

futures markets).

Tomatoes and vegetables produced in this region have relatively high price risk.

35. On a scale from one to five, if the low price risk crops identified earlier were one and the high price risk crops identified earlier 

were five, what number would you assign to the relative price risk (within the production cycle) associated with this crop in

this region?

1

low price risk crop

2 3

x

4 5

high price risk crop

36. In this region, do producers tend to experience multiple-year sequences of high prices or low prices for this crop?

If yes, describe.

Yes No

37. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low price risk and five is very high price risk, provide an overall assessment of 

price risk (within the production cycle) faced by producers of this crop in this region.

1

very low price risk

2 3

x

4 5

very high price risk
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Other Sources of Revenue Risk

38. For this region, describe other factors that affect revenue risk for this crop (e.g., prevented planting).

1) Inadequate seed availability from commercial hatcheries.

2) High mortality at the nursery stage for growers with nursery clams, leaving them with fewer 

clams to plant for growout.

3) Area closures by government agencies.

4) Delayed harvest due to major rainfall events or other causes.

39.

39. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low risk and five is very high risk, provide an overall assessment of risk sources 

other than yield, quality, and price risks faced by producers of this crop in this region.

40.

1

very low risk

2

x

3 4 5

very 

high risk

Sufficient Non-Insurance Coping Mechanisms

40. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low and five is very high, assess the extent to which producers of this 

commodity in this region use risk-reducing inputs as a substitute for crop insurance.

1

very low 

2

x

3 4 5

very 

high

41. Are government crop programs (e.g., marketing loans and counter-cyclical payments) available 

for this crop?

Describe:

Yes No
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42. In this region, is there a history of federal disaster payments for this crop?

Describe:

There have been claims made by hard clam growers under the Non- Insured 

Crop Disaster Assistance Program in the past prior to the introduction of 

the Cultivated Clam Pilot Insurance Program.

Yes - limited No

43. Approximately what percentage of the total production of this crop is under production contract 

with a first handler or processor? 30 %

Describe contracts:

There are contracts in place where large vertically integrated companies

provide seed clams, technical expertise, and subsidize the purchase of

insurance in some cases. There is limited information available about

specific arrangements. In addition to the estimated share of clams 

produced under contract, there are a number of arrangements where 

smaller growers sublease from one of the extremely large growers (who 

tend to be vertically integrated) and other more informal structures where 

growers sell their clams to particular wholesalers.

a. Under the terms of a typical production contract for this crop, is the grower exposed to 

production risk (i.e., the grower must deliver on the contract even if production shortfalls 

occur)?

Yes No

b. Under the terms of a typical production contract for this crop, is the grower exposed to 

quality risk (i.e., there are significant price penalties if the product does not meet the 

quality characteristics specified in the contract). Growers are paid based on 

the market value of the clams so if they produce more clams that 

are smaller or larger than the primary market sizes, they would be 

receiving less per clam

Yes No

c. Under the terms of a typical production contract for this crop, is the grower exposed to 

price risk (i.e., prices for specific quality characteristics are not specified in the contract)? 

The price is determined when the clams are ready to market, so the 

grower is subject to price risk over the course of the production 

cycle.

Yes No

44. In this region, approximately what percentage of the total production of this crop is priced prior to 

harvest (may or may not be tied to a production contract)?

Describe:

_0_%
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT: PROGRAM EVALUATION

Appendix B: Diagnostic instruments

134

45. When corn farmers in the Midwest experience low (high) yields, they can often expect higher (lower) market prices (i.e., prices 

and yields are very negatively correlated). This moderates the revenue impacts of low yields. In contrast, for corn farmers in the 

Southeast there is very little relationship between their yields and market prices (i.e., prices and yields are independent). In this 

region the price and yield for this crop are (circle one):

Independent Somewhat Negatively Correlated Highly Negatively Correlated

Describe:

The regional price for hard clams is influenced by wild harvests as well as cultivated clam harvests from

other regions, which reduces the correlation between yield (mortality) and price. There are limited data 

to quantitatively assess the correlation, but Virginia produces a large share of national cultivated clam 

production, and the size of the Virginia crop probably influences prices.

46. On a scale from one to five, where one is “strongly disagree” and five is “strongly agree,” provide your reaction to the following 

statement:

“In this region, producers of this crop are financially able to self-insure against production losses.”

1

strongly

disagree

2

x

3 4 5

strongly

agree

Describe:

47. For a typical grower of this crop, approximately what percentage of the total farm revenue would be attributable to 

this crop?

Oyster production is growing rapidly in Virginia, enabling clam growers to diversify to 

some degree, but most revenue is still from clams.

85_%

48. What other commodities would typically be produced on a farm that produces this commodity? What is the correlation between 

revenue from these other commodities and the revenue from this commodity? For correlation use a scale of one to five, where 1 

is “strongly negatively correlated,” 2 is “negatively correlated,“ 3 “independent,“ 4 is “positively correlated,“ and 5 is “strongly 

positively correlated.”

List:

Correlation

(assign a number between 

1-5)

Oyster 4
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT: PROGRAM EVALUATION

Appendix B: Diagnostic instruments

135

49. In this region, approximately what percentage of the total production of this crop is produced by part-time farmers 

who have full-time employment off the farm? 15_%

50. On a scale from one to five, where one is “strongly disagree“ and five is “strongly agree,“ provide your reaction to the 

following statement:

“In this region, producers of this crop attempt to manage production risk by spreading their production over several geographic 

locations.”

1

strongly

disagree

2 3 4

x

5

strongly

agree

Describe: Growers are dependent on access to shellfish leases from the State or can potentially

sublease from another grower that has a State lease. The available State creek leases have 

all been taken for years, but there is a market for subleasing. Many of the longer-term and

larger growers have multiple lease sites and attempt to reduce production risk by having

production on different creeks as well as on the seaside. They may plant near the head of a 

creek for more reliable protection from the weather, and near the mouth of the creek for 

protection from fresh water inflows. For newer growers forced to sublease from others, 

spatial diversification may be difficult to achieve. In addition, they are unlikely to be able to 

access the best sites in terms of risk/return tradeoff.

51. In this region, what private-sector insurance products (if any) are currently available for this crop?

List all:

None identified

52. Characterize how agricultural lenders in this region view the available RMA-facilitated insurance products for this crop. 

“Unfavorable” implies that lenders actually discourage borrowers from purchasing the product while “favorable” implies 

that lenders strongly encourage and often require borrowers to purchase the product. If multiple insurance products are 

offered, answer for each product.

Unfavorable Indifferent Favorable

Describe: Lenders view the insurance coverage positively and growers and aquaculture 

specialists indicated that it has been valuable for growers seeking loans.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT: PROGRAM EVALUATION

Appendix B: Diagnostic instruments

136

53. On a scale from one to five, where one is very high and five is very low, assess the sufficiency of non-insurance coping 

mechanisms for producers of this crop in this region.

1

high

availability

2 3

x

4 5

low

availability

Risk Classification

54. On a scale from one to five, where one is strongly disagree and five is strongly agree, provide your reaction to the following 

statement:

“In this region, no producers of this crop are really any more or less risky than any others. They all face about the same risk 

of loss.”

57.

1

strongly

disagree

2

x

3 4 5

strongly

agree

Describe: Risk in shellfish farming is generally thought to be on a “waterbody scale” in that a

catastrophic situation probably will affect most growers within a specific area. In Virginia, risks 

differ depending on whether clams are in a creek, the bay, or seaside as well as depending on 

their specific location within those waterbodies. Risk is also dependent on the husbandry 

practices of the individual grower.

55. In this region, for those who are currently not insured, would you say that premium rate on the existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for this crop are “much too low,” “about right,” or “much too high”? If more than one RMA insurance 

product is offered, answer for each product.

Much Too Low About Right Much Too High

If you answered that premium rates are “much too high,” explain why (or how) you think this happened.

Rates are about right on average but should be reduced in Northampton County and increased 

in Accomack County, based on experience to date.

56. In this region, for those who currently are insured, would you say that premium rate on the existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for this crop are “much too low,” “about right,” or “much too high”? If more than one RMA insurance 

product is offered, answer for each product.

Much Too Low About Right Much Too High

If you answered that premium rates are “much too high,” explain why (or how) you think this happened.

Rates are about right on average but should be reduced in Northampton County and increased 

in Accomack County, based on experience to date.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT: PROGRAM EVALUATION

Appendix B: Diagnostic instruments

137

57. For this region, to what extent does the system used to establish the guarantee (e.g., APH yield or expected revenue) for this 

crop match the true value of the production at risk? An answer of one indicates that the system used to establish the guarantee 

does a very poor job of matching the true value of the production at risk. An answer of five indicates that the system used to 

establish the guarantee does a very good job of matching the true value of the production at risk.

1

very poor job

2 3

x

4 5

very good job

58. On a scale from one to five, where one is very low and five is very high, assess the effectiveness of existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products in accurately classifying potential policyholders according to their loss exposure (i.e., higher risk growers 

pay higher premiums while lower risk growers pay lower premiums).

59. 60.

1

very low

x

2 3 4 5

very high All growers within a county pay the 

same premium for a given stage 

although there may be substantial 

differences in risk based on location 

and management practices.

Moral Hazard and Monitoring

59. Yield variation can be caused by unavoidable “acts of nature” or avoidable “acts of management.” In practical parlance, what 

is the potential for “gaming” the insurance product? Evaluate the potential for gaming the RMA-facilitated crop insurance 

product for this crop on a scale from one to five, where one implies that variation in yield is almost exclusively due to “acts of 

nature” (potential for gaming is low) and five implies that yield variation is almost exclusively due to “acts of management”

(potential for gaming is high). If multiple insurance products are offered, answer for each product.

60.

1

very low

2 3 4

x

5

very high

60. To the extent that management affects yield loss risk exposure, how difficult is it to monitor the insured’s behavior?

Extremely Difficult Difficult Not too Difficult

Explain: The insured’s behavior is difficult and expensive to monitor for several reasons. The 

clams are underwater much of the time and must be visited by boat, which is relatively difficult 

and expensive compared with other commodities. There are significant time constraints for 

inspections due to the tides, which may necessitate multiple days for inspections of growers 

with large/multiple sites. Growers typically only work their beds at low tides, when the clam 

beds are not under water. Even when the beds are exposed, the clams are still not visible unless 

they are dead because live clams keep themselves buried under the substrate in which they are 

growing. Thus, inspectors can more easily inspect the condition of the lease site and cover nets 

than the clams directly. The clams can be sampled and dug up to assess their condition, but this 

is a time-consuming process. Lease sites are very spread out and many are located deep within 

creeks and assessors are generally dependent on growers taking them out to their lease sites. 

There have been concerns that growers could potentially choose to take the assessor (or loss 

adjuster) to the wrong site or only to portions of the lease(s) that they know are in good 

condition. This product is also very unique for the insurance companies to monitor and there 

61. 62.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT: PROGRAM EVALUATION

Appendix B: Diagnostic instruments

138

have been a number of concerns that they are less familiar with this product than others and do 

not sufficiently understand appropriate management strategies and therefore cannot fully 

evaluate behaviors observed. The management practice that can be best monitored and has an 

effect on yield/survival is probably stocking density.

61. Quality variation can be caused by unavoidable “acts of nature” or avoidable “acts of management.” In practical parlance, 

what is the potential for “gaming” the insurance product? Evaluate the potential for gaming the RMA-facilitated insurance 

product for this crop on a scale from one to five, where one implies that variation in quality is almost exclusively due to “acts 

of nature” (potential for gaming is low) and five implies that quality variation is almost exclusively due to “acts of 

management” (potential for gaming is high). If multiple insurance products are offered, answer for each product.

62.

1

very low

x

2 3 4 5

very high

The current insurance product does 

not cover quality variations, so 

there is no potential for gaming it. 

In addition, quality variations do 

not tend to be as much of an issue 

for calms as yield/survival.

62. To the extent that management affects quality loss risk exposure, how difficult is it to monitor the insured’s behavior?

Extremely Difficult Difficult Not too Difficult

Explain: Quality variation results from subtle changes in management and acts of nature. It 

would be extremely difficult for someone not well-trained in clam farming practices to monitor 

a grower’s behavior with respect to quality variation.

63. On a scale from one to five, where one is very large and five is very small, assess the extent of moral hazard problems with 

existing RMA-facilitated insurance products for this crop.

66.

1

very large

2

x

3 4 5

very small

Problems Affecting Insurance Participation

64. Have significant problems occurred (either past or current) with policy provisions on existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for the crop? If multiple insurance products are offered, answer for each product. Yes No
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT: PROGRAM EVALUATION

Appendix B: Diagnostic instruments

139

65. If the answer to the previous question is no, go to next question. If yes, for each significant problem:

a. Briefly describe the problem.

1) Growers are very sensitive to unit definitions in Virginia and most are interested in as many units 

as possible because they feel that different leases have been separated for a reason (e.g., channel 

between them, etc.) and may be impacted differently by a given weather event. Changes to the unit 

definition in the 2005 crop year that combined all of a producer’s units on the bayside into a single 

unit led to reductions in participation and switching from buy-up to catastrophic coverage. This was 

modified to allow separate units on bayside in the 2006 crop year for leases in each separately 

named creek and on seaside for leases that are separated by a minimum of one mile at their most 

proximal point.

b. What has been the impact of the problem (e.g., high loss ratios, reduced demand, etc.)?

1) Reduced demand.

c. Have policy provisions since been changed to adequately address the problem?

1) Improved. After reductions in participation due to the changes in 2005, units were redefined in 

2006 to allow multiple units for separately-named creeks on the bayside and for leases at least 1 

mile apart on seaside. Many growers are very interested in further disaggregation of units based on 

separate leases and/or by number of clams (e.g., unit for every 5 million clams) and this would 

likely increase participation, but this may lead to higher losses and induce planting on risky sites 

that could be defined as separate units.

d. If policy provisions have not been changed, what changes in policy provisions do you think would increase insurance demand for 

this crop?

1) Demand could likely be increased with further disaggregation of units, but as long as they are 

allowed to separate units by creek and on seaside for those far enough apart, it appears likely that 

most growers will choose to participate and defining in this way avoids increasing potential for 

planting on sites currently too risky to plant on if they could be treated as separate units. If there 

were better information for classifying sites by risk and adjusting premiums accordingly by unit,

then it may be worth exploring further disaggregation of units, but not with current information.
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT: PROGRAM EVALUATION

Appendix B: Diagnostic instruments

140

66. In this region, do reinsured companies have sufficient incentives to aggressively market existing RMA-facilitated 

insurance products for the crop?

If yes, go to next question. If no, explain.

Clam insurance is a unique product for which it is difficult and expensive to monitor

insured behavior and adjust losses. Therefore, it is difficult for companies to justify

investments in marketing and servicing clam policies. The market in Virginia is the largest 

in terms of liability and premium paid and companies have the opportunity to work with 

fewer, larger operations, which they tend to prefer. There are two companies servicing 

clam growers in Virginia.

Yes No

67. In this region, do agents have sufficient incentives to aggressively market existing RMA-facilitated insurance 

products for the crop?

If yes, go to next question. If no, explain.

Yes No

68. List any perils that concern growers of this crop but are not covered by the existing RMA-facilitated insurance products (e.g., 

business interruption due to unavailability of irrigation water, disease quarantines, etc.). For each peril assess the extent of 

growers’ concerns about this peril on a scale from one to five where one is minor concern and five is major concern.

List all: 1

minor concern

2 3 4 5

major concern

Inability to plant due to low seed 

availability x

Low market prices x
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT: PROGRAM EVALUATION

Appendix B: Diagnostic instruments

141

69. Briefly describe the potential for insuring these currently uninsured perils? In answering this, consider the following questions:

Can hidden action/moral hazard and classification/adverse selection problems be avoided?

Can clearly stated policy provisions be developed and accurate premium rates established?

There is little potential to cover inability to plant due to the high potential for hidden

action/moral hazard and classification/adverse selection problems. Low market prices could 

potentially be covered, although that would require development of a revenue insurance product

rather than the current stock mortality insurance.

70. On a scale from one to five, where one is very high and five is very low, assess the likelihood that problems affecting 

participation can be adequately addressed by product or policy modifications.

71. 72.

1

very low

2

x

3

4 5

very high
142 

Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance 

Appendix C 

Table of Contents 

Section 1: Tables of Insurance Experience for the Program

1.1 By Crop Year 143

1.2 By Crop Year, By County 144

1.3 By Coverage Flag 146

1.4 By Crop Year, By Coverage Flag 147

1.4a By Crop Year, By Type Code 148

1.4b By Crop Year, By Practice Code, By Coverage Flag 149

1.5 By Crop Year, By County, By Coverage Flag 151

1.6 By Coverage Level Percentage 156

1.7 By Crop Year, By Coverage Level Percentage 157

1.8 By Crop Year, By County, By Coverage Level Percentage 160

1.9 By Reporting Organization 167

1.10 By Crop Year, By Reporting Organization 168

1.11 By Crop Year, By County, By Reporting Organization 169

Section 2: Table of Indemnity and Indemnified Acres for the Program

2.1 By Cause of Loss 173

2.2 By Crop Year, By Cause of Loss 174

2.3 By Crop Year, By County, By Cause of Loss 175

2.4 By Option Code 177

2.5 By Crop Year, By Option Code 178

2.6 By Crop Year, By County, By Option Code 179

2.7 By Crop Year, By State, By County, By Cause of Loss, By Policy Count, By Liability, By

Risk Premium, By Producer Premium, By Subsidy, By Indemnity, By Loss Cost Ratio, By

Earned Premium, By Loss Ratio 181

Section 3: Participation Rates for the Program (Discussed in Report Text)

Section 4: (Not Applicable)

Section 5: Analysis of Cause of Loss Information

5.1 By Crop Year, County, Type, Practice, Primary Cause, Secondary Cause, Type Code 184

5.2 By Crop Year, County, Type, Practice, Primary Cause, Secondary Cause, Type Code, 

Coverage Level 188

5.3 By Crop Year, County, Coverage Level and Primary Cause 194

5.4 By Crop Year, Practice Code and Cause Loss 199

5.5 By Crop Year, County, Practice Code, Coverage Level and Cause of Loss 202

5.6 By Primary and Secondary Cause of Loss 208

5.7 By Primary and Secondary Cause of Loss by County and Coverage Level 211
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table 1.1

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability Total Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity 

Loss 

Ratio

Loss 

Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2000 335 91 415 101 36,120,805 1,125,781 497,917 0 2,069,575 1.84 0.057 0.031

2001 377 112 565 125 41,215,268 1,400,606 532,135 868,471 2,880,698 2.06 0.070 0.034

2002 472 134 793 155 59,952,613 2,180,703 849,518 1,331,185 4,019,248 1.84 0.067 0.036

2003 417 95 706 106 51,177,323 1,860,398 719,508 1,140,890 2,774,520 1.49 0.054 0.036

2004 293 111 555 138 27,701,342 969,181 334,833 634,348 2,182,402 2.25 0.079 0.035

2005 202 17 331 20 18,159,613 625,660 186,416 439,244 624,453 1.00 0.034 0.034

2006 164 16 185 17 26,119,310 931,521 326,234 605,287 677,213 0.73 0.026 0.036

2007 144 19 163 19 26,780,211 973,063 341,538 631,525 502,020 0.52 0.019 0.036

2008 111 11 136 11 30,842,822 1,050,795 368,019 682,776 407,045 0.39 0.013 0.034

2009 107 21 109 21 27,880,494 674,394 221,450 452,944 1,556,513 2.31 0.056 0.024

2010 61 5 65 8 22,129,619 426,246 142,806 283,440 126,090 0.30 0.006 0.019

Total 2,683 632 4,023 721 368,079,420 12,218,348 4,520,374 7,070,110 17,819,777 1.46 0.048 0.033

2000-2003 1,601 432 2,479 487 188,466,009 6,567,488 2,599,078 3,340,546 11,744,041 1.79 0.062 0.035

2004-2010 1,082 200 1,544 234 179,613,411 5,650,860 1,921,296 3,729,564 6,075,736 1.08 0.034 0.031

143
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year and County

Table 1.2

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2000 Florida Brevard 14 5 14 5 580,401 22,808 10,438 0 131,603 5.77 0.23 0.04

2000 Florida Dixie 50 30 67 37 2,382,796 92,623 42,206 0 697,557 7.53 0.29 0.04

2000 Florida Indian River 16 7 20 8 1,976,161 86,493 41,702 0 260,557 3.01 0.13 0.04

2000 Florida Levy 151 38 191 40 12,642,770 533,795 258,378 0 872,052 1.63 0.07 0.04

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 45 11 58 11 3,213,602 84,345 36,170 0 107,806 1.28 0.03 0.03

2000 South Carolina Beaufort 1 0 1 0 1,188,101 36,356 17,778 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 South Carolina Charleston 4 0 8 0 209,475 5,402 1,884 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 Virginia Accomack 14 0 14 0 1,358,400 25,673 8,660 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2000 Virginia Northampton 40 0 42 0 12,569,099 238,286 80,701 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 Florida Brevard 31 22 36 22 1,426,432 78,941 32,278 46,663 520,076 6.59 0.36 0.06

2001 Florida Dixie 54 20 71 20 2,254,998 109,372 45,127 64,245 116,184 1.06 0.05 0.05

2001 Florida Indian River 32 14 43 18 1,669,518 95,888 39,303 56,585 360,290 3.76 0.22 0.06

2001 Florida Levy 147 53 214 61 12,944,881 637,822 257,877 379,945 1,529,762 2.40 0.12 0.05

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable 38 1 38 1 2,521,563 60,571 15,669 44,902 150,000 2.48 0.06 0.02

2001 South Carolina Charleston 5 0 10 0 404,495 8,739 2,780 5,959 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 Virginia Accomack 18 0 53 0 3,656,503 86,770 31,292 55,478 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 Virginia Northampton 52 2 100 3 16,336,878 322,503 107,809 214,694 204,386 0.63 0.01 0.02

2002 Florida Brevard 26 8 27 8 1,286,458 74,752 31,557 43,195 274,015 3.67 0.21 0.06

2002 Florida Dixie 75 24 113 26 3,176,030 149,997 61,188 88,809 158,720 1.06 0.05 0.05

2002 Florida Indian River 39 4 53 5 2,058,561 132,004 56,359 75,645 133,750 1.01 0.06 0.06

2002 Florida Levy 222 95 360 113 19,867,220 1,053,549 436,495 617,054 3,358,347 3.19 0.17 0.05

2002 Massachusetts Barnstable 31 0 32 0 2,710,459 68,960 21,344 47,616 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2002 South Carolina Beaufort 1 0 1 0 151,778 2,869 947 1,922 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 South Carolina Charleston 7 0 18 0 1,091,084 27,509 9,886 17,623 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2002 Virginia Accomack 16 0 21 0 8,970,077 201,144 70,798 130,346 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 Virginia Northampton 55 3 168 3 20,640,946 469,919 160,944 308,975 94,416 0.20 0.00 0.02

2003 Florida Brevard 17 4 19 4 595,065 33,812 14,292 19,520 212,980 6.30 0.36 0.06

2003 Florida Dixie 70 20 98 22 2,769,756 153,273 63,249 90,024 276,156 1.80 0.10 0.06

2003 Florida Indian River 30 5 45 5 1,461,690 98,419 42,287 56,132 86,920 0.88 0.06 0.07

2003 Florida Levy 192 48 311 55 15,529,702 894,138 373,500 520,638 1,380,730 1.54 0.09 0.06

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 30 7 32 7 2,810,694 66,634 18,598 48,036 189,520 2.84 0.07 0.02

2003 South Carolina Beaufort 4 0 7 0 348,590 15,014 6,157 8,857 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2003 South Carolina Charleston 11 1 16 1 1,279,493 32,857 11,877 20,980 77,599 2.36 0.06 0.03

2003 Virginia Accomack 16 4 51 4 8,511,341 187,704 63,489 124,215 275,435 1.47 0.03 0.02

2003 Virginia Northampton 47 6 127 8 17,870,992 378,547 126,059 252,488 275,180 0.73 0.02 0.02

2004 Florida Brevard 8 7 8 7 124,537 12,510 5,312 7,198 60,208 4.81 0.48 0.10

2004 Florida Dixie 42 19 55 28 702,659 69,838 27,386 42,452 126,368 1.81 0.18 0.10

2004 Florida Indian River 18 11 29 15 447,830 51,214 21,853 29,361 177,515 3.47 0.40 0.11

2004 Florida Levy 124 49 162 58 4,063,989 391,262 145,346 245,916 686,482 1.75 0.17 0.10

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 26 3 42 4 2,120,979 48,820 14,698 34,122 77,958 1.60 0.04 0.02

2004 South Carolina Beaufort 4 0 6 0 227,527 5,583 2,090 3,493 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 South Carolina Charleston 4 1 4 1 609,049 13,512 4,479 9,033 31,938 2.36 0.05 0.02

2004 Virginia Accomack 19 11 57 11 4,309,291 84,924 15,349 69,575 687,082 8.09 0.16 0.02

2004 Virginia Northampton 48 10 192 14 15,095,481 291,518 98,320 193,198 334,851 1.15 0.02 0.02

2005 Florida Brevard 3 0 3 0 75,314 5,877 2,426 3,451 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

2005 Florida Dixie 20 4 27 5 293,619 24,221 9,354 14,867 56,560 2.34 0.19 0.08

2005 Florida Indian River 14 0 16 0 175,308 14,698 6,128 8,570 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

2005 Florida Levy 85 9 127 9 4,023,852 310,911 109,304 201,607 179,860 0.58 0.04 0.08

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 20 4 39 6 1,824,752 41,533 12,775 28,758 388,033 9.34 0.21 0.02

2005 Massachusetts Plymouth 1 0 1 0 222,858 3,732 1,232 2,500 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 South Carolina Beaufort 1 0 1 0 115,500 1,767 0 1,767 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

144
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year and County

Table 1.2

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2005 South Carolina Charleston 2 0 3 0 482,424 8,917 2,300 6,617 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 Virginia Accomack 20 0 21 0 622,324 18,695 7,389 11,306 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2005 Virginia Northampton 36 0 93 0 10,323,662 195,309 35,508 159,801 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 Florida Brevard 2 0 2 0 17,325 1,991 861 1,130 0 0.00 0.00 0.11

2006 Florida Dixie 8 0 8 0 160,876 14,410 5,141 9,269 0 0.00 0.00 0.09

2006 Florida Indian River 9 0 9 0 193,382 17,711 7,231 10,480 0 0.00 0.00 0.09

2006 Florida Levy 70 9 73 10 5,657,475 470,401 170,473 299,928 441,863 0.94 0.08 0.08

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 22 4 29 4 1,673,313 41,520 11,305 30,215 123,033 2.96 0.07 0.02

2006 Massachusetts Plymouth 1 0 1 0 291,600 5,249 1,732 3,517 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 South Carolina Beaufort 1 0 1 0 115,500 1,975 0 1,975 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 South Carolina Charleston 2 0 2 0 385,030 7,509 1,793 5,716 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 Virginia Accomack 14 0 14 0 976,202 31,056 12,365 18,691 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2006 Virginia Northampton 35 3 46 3 16,648,607 339,699 115,333 224,366 112,317 0.33 0.01 0.02

2007 Florida Brevard 3 0 3 0 30,695 2,413 1,034 1,379 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

2007 Florida Indian River 7 0 7 0 148,896 14,023 5,614 8,409 0 0.00 0.00 0.09

2007 Florida Levy 60 12 71 12 6,116,818 501,593 179,104 322,489 371,013 0.74 0.06 0.08

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 19 5 23 5 1,561,907 37,046 11,542 25,504 86,518 2.34 0.06 0.02

2007 Massachusetts Plymouth 1 0 1 0 256,500 4,641 1,531 3,110 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 South Carolina Charleston 2 0 2 0 282,675 5,554 1,190 4,364 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 Virginia Accomack 14 2 14 2 1,386,265 44,520 17,984 26,536 44,489 1.00 0.03 0.03

2007 Virginia Northampton 38 0 42 0 16,996,455 363,273 123,539 239,734 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2008 Florida Brevard 1 1 1 1 75,724 6,764 2,773 3,991 34,290 5.07 0.45 0.09

2008 Florida Indian River 4 1 4 1 149,520 15,491 6,882 8,609 7,461 0.48 0.05 0.10

2008 Florida Levy 41 7 59 7 4,494,398 420,259 146,070 274,189 304,269 0.72 0.07 0.09

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable 16 2 16 2 1,583,944 48,742 17,096 31,646 61,025 1.25 0.04 0.03

2008 Virginia Accomack 14 0 14 0 2,199,880 66,829 26,985 39,844 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2008 Virginia Northampton 35 0 42 0 22,339,356 492,710 168,213 324,497 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2009 Florida Brevard 1 0 1 0 3,538 366 150 216 0 0.00 0.00 0.10

2009 Florida Indian River 3 0 3 0 56,070 4,664 2,071 2,593 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

2009 Florida Levy 44 19 44 19 4,292,364 221,843 60,972 160,871 1,328,425 5.99 0.31 0.05

2009 Massachusetts Barnstable 9 0 9 0 1,462,379 37,397 14,554 22,843 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2009 Virginia Accomack 15 2 15 2 2,529,207 65,708 26,730 38,978 228,088 3.47 0.09 0.03

2009 Virginia Northampton 35 0 37 0 19,536,936 344,416 116,973 227,443 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 Florida Brevard 1 1 1 1 4,571 378 155 223 4,571 12.09 1.00 0.08

2010 Florida Levy 2 1 6 4 220,456 17,143 6,116 11,027 49,790 2.90 0.23 0.08

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable 12 1 12 1 1,386,254 40,033 15,993 24,040 18,658 0.47 0.01 0.03

2010 South Carolina Charleston 1 0 1 0 18,710 393 141 252 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 Virginia Accomack 13 2 13 2 2,270,508 52,196 21,248 30,948 53,071 1.02 0.02 0.02

2010 Virginia Northampton 32 0 32 0 18,229,120 316,103 99,153 216,950 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

Total 2683 632 4023 721 368,079,420 12,218,348 4,520,374 7,070,110 17,819,777 1.46 0.05 0.03

145
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Coverage Flag

Table 1.3

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

A 2264 597 3483 686 324,941,266 11,165,410 4,367,449 6,469,441 17,097,200 1.53 0.05 0.03

C 273 18 357 18 23,022,036 621,717 0 600,669 541,942 0.87 0.02 0.03

L 146 17 183 17 20,116,118 431,221 152,925 0 180,635 0.42 0.01 0.02

Total 2683 632 4023 721 368,079,420 12,218,348 4,520,374 7,070,110 17,819,777 1.46 0.05 0.03

146
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year and Coverage Flag

Table 1.4

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2000 A 164 72 207 82 14,980,909 673,512 344,992 0 1,879,113 2.79 0.13 0.04

2000 C 25 2 25 2 1,023,778 21,048 0 0 9,827 0.47 0.01 0.02

2000 L 146 17 183 17 20,116,118 431,221 152,925 0 180,635 0.42 0.01 0.02

2001 A 351 111 539 124 39,830,311 1,374,195 532,135 842,060 2,730,698 1.99 0.07 0.03

2001 C 26 1 26 1 1,384,957 26,411 0 26,411 150,000 5.68 0.11 0.02

2002 A 455 133 776 154 59,091,879 2,164,965 849,518 1,315,447 4,017,352 1.86 0.07 0.04

2002 C 17 1 17 1 860,734 15,738 0 15,738 1,896 0.12 0.00 0.02

2003 A 400 94 689 105 50,092,581 1,840,594 719,508 1,121,086 2,769,307 1.50 0.06 0.04

2003 C 17 1 17 1 1,084,742 19,804 0 19,804 5,213 0.26 0.00 0.02

2004 A 254 106 495 133 24,218,171 889,131 334,833 554,298 2,142,917 2.41 0.09 0.04

2004 C 39 5 60 5 3,483,171 80,050 0 80,050 39,485 0.49 0.01 0.02

2005 A 153 16 220 19 11,063,669 471,788 186,416 285,372 515,517 1.09 0.05 0.04

2005 C 49 1 111 1 7,095,944 153,872 0 153,872 108,936 0.71 0.02 0.02

2006 A 128 16 149 17 24,092,978 854,107 326,234 527,873 677,213 0.79 0.03 0.04

2006 C 36 0 36 0 2,026,332 77,414 0 77,414 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2007 A 119 17 138 17 25,164,966 904,898 341,538 563,360 449,004 0.50 0.02 0.04

2007 C 25 2 25 2 1,615,245 68,165 0 68,165 53,016 0.78 0.03 0.04

2008 A 95 10 120 10 29,707,503 989,192 368,019 621,173 384,956 0.39 0.01 0.03

2008 C 16 1 16 1 1,135,319 61,603 0 61,603 22,089 0.36 0.02 0.05

2009 A 87 17 89 17 26,427,271 606,014 221,450 384,564 1,405,033 2.32 0.05 0.02

2009 C 20 4 20 4 1,453,223 68,380 0 68,380 151,480 2.22 0.10 0.05

2010 A 58 5 61 8 20,271,028 397,014 142,806 254,208 126,090 0.32 0.01 0.02

2010 C 3 0 4 0 1,858,591 29,232 0 29,232 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

Total 2683 632 4023 721 368,079,420 12,218,348 4,520,374 7,070,110 17,819,777 1.46 0.05 0.03

147
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year and Type Code

Table 1.4a

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year 

 Type 

Code 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2000 80 77 9 92 12 8,980,513 202,552 75,240 0 415,729 2.05 0.05 0.02

2000 82 258 82 323 89 27,140,292 923,229 422,677 0 1,653,846 1.79 0.06 0.03

2001 80 114 25 177 31 13,446,673 328,285 116,801 211,484 421,238 1.28 0.03 0.02

2001 82 263 87 388 94 27,768,595 1,072,321 415,334 656,987 2,459,460 2.29 0.09 0.04

2002 80 157 36 247 42 18,168,245 489,564 179,931 309,633 705,429 1.44 0.04 0.03

2002 82 315 98 546 113 41,784,368 1,691,139 669,587 1,021,552 3,313,819 1.96 0.08 0.04

2003 80 104 14 186 15 15,283,109 368,578 126,092 242,486 301,848 0.82 0.02 0.02

2003 82 313 81 520 91 35,894,214 1,491,820 593,416 898,404 2,472,672 1.66 0.07 0.04

2004 84 129 51 197 65 7,692,842 302,094 108,479 193,615 1,067,299 3.53 0.14 0.04

2004 85 158 55 351 68 19,722,294 648,248 218,733 429,515 1,085,585 1.67 0.06 0.03

2004 86 6 5 7 5 286,206 18,839 7,621 11,218 29,518 1.57 0.10 0.07

2005 84 82 5 99 5 3,354,784 110,383 30,595 79,788 175,284 1.59 0.05 0.03

2005 85 45 5 119 8 10,923,154 257,557 58,149 199,408 323,007 1.25 0.03 0.02

2005 86 75 7 113 7 3,881,675 257,720 97,672 160,048 126,162 0.49 0.03 0.07

2006 84 72 3 82 3 5,656,064 164,398 58,699 105,699 42,848 0.26 0.01 0.03

2006 85 24 5 33 5 14,489,682 315,320 104,774 210,546 228,572 0.72 0.02 0.02

2006 86 68 8 70 9 5,973,564 451,803 162,761 289,042 405,793 0.90 0.07 0.08

2007 84 66 2 73 2 5,789,011 156,446 54,170 102,276 31,881 0.20 0.01 0.03

2007 85 26 9 30 9 15,548,787 392,806 137,299 255,507 146,397 0.37 0.01 0.03

2007 86 52 8 60 8 5,442,413 423,811 150,069 273,742 323,742 0.76 0.06 0.08

2008 84 17 2 24 2 6,726,786 234,502 85,524 148,978 59,276 0.25 0.01 0.03

2008 85 73 3 85 3 21,846,020 638,826 216,600 422,226 129,531 0.20 0.01 0.03

2008 86 21 6 27 6 2,270,016 177,467 65,895 111,572 218,238 1.23 0.10 0.08

2009 84 63 4 65 4 5,828,485 137,392 45,094 92,298 442,156 3.22 0.08 0.02

2009 85 18 5 18 5 19,703,036 412,383 139,321 273,062 230,935 0.56 0.01 0.02

2009 86 26 12 26 12 2,348,973 124,619 37,035 87,584 883,422 7.09 0.38 0.05

2010 84 44 1 44 1 3,077,565 62,576 22,275 40,301 38,659 0.62 0.01 0.02

2010 85 14 2 15 3 18,840,970 347,766 114,979 232,787 43,201 0.12 0.00 0.02

2010 86 3 2 6 4 211,084 15,904 5,552 10,352 44,230 2.78 0.21 0.08

Total 2683 632 4023 721 368,079,420 12,218,348 4,520,374 7,070,110 17,819,777 1.46 0.05 0.03

148
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, Practice Code, and Coverage Flag

Table 1.4b

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year 

 Practice 

Code 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2000 22 A 23 7 32 10 1,118,207 50,341 25,044 0 408,200 8.11 0.37 0.05

2000 22 C 6 0 6 0 44,516 1,163 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 22 L 7 2 13 2 303,323 8,474 3,009 0 7,529 0.89 0.02 0.03

2000 23 A 113 56 144 63 11,102,041 534,966 275,728 0 1,376,929 2.57 0.12 0.05

2000 23 C 6 2 6 2 271,427 7,084 0 0 9,827 1.39 0.04 0.03

2000 23 L 75 13 90 13 4,675,014 130,771 47,515 0 159,284 1.22 0.03 0.03

2000 24 A 28 9 31 9 2,760,661 88,205 44,220 0 93,984 1.07 0.03 0.03

2000 24 C 13 0 13 0 707,835 12,801 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2000 24 L 64 2 80 2 15,137,781 291,976 102,401 0 13,822 0.05 0.00 0.02

2001 22 A 50 24 80 29 1,194,395 67,846 28,579 39,267 296,052 4.36 0.25 0.06

2001 22 C 0 0 0 0 4,103 107 0 107 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2001 23 A 209 84 279 91 16,826,282 843,240 343,445 499,795 2,198,414 2.61 0.13 0.05

2001 23 C 4 0 4 0 175,499 4,581 0 4,581 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2001 24 A 92 3 180 4 21,809,634 463,109 160,111 302,998 236,232 0.51 0.01 0.02

2001 24 C 22 1 22 1 1,205,355 21,723 0 21,723 150,000 6.91 0.12 0.02

2002 22 A 87 34 146 40 1,934,398 110,125 46,737 63,388 667,833 6.06 0.35 0.06

2002 22 C 1 1 1 1 3,575 93 0 93 1,896 20.39 0.53 0.03

2002 23 A 279 96 422 111 25,610,995 1,328,301 549,351 778,950 3,255,103 2.45 0.13 0.05

2002 23 C 2 0 2 0 54,863 1,203 0 1,203 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 24 A 89 3 208 3 31,546,486 726,539 253,430 473,109 94,416 0.13 0.00 0.02

2002 24 C 14 0 14 0 802,296 14,442 0 14,442 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2003 22 A 48 7 92 8 780,154 44,654 18,749 25,905 100,968 2.26 0.13 0.06

2003 22 C 1 0 1 0 9,306 243 0 243 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2003 23 A 271 71 399 79 21,095,313 1,179,832 492,029 687,803 1,933,417 1.64 0.09 0.06

2003 23 C 3 0 3 0 53,323 1,162 0 1,162 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2003 24 A 81 16 198 18 28,217,114 616,108 208,730 407,378 734,922 1.19 0.03 0.02

2003 24 C 13 1 13 1 1,022,113 18,399 0 18,399 5,213 0.28 0.01 0.02

2004 23 A 177 81 241 103 5,688,919 516,080 206,292 309,788 1,035,181 2.01 0.18 0.09

2004 23 C 20 5 20 5 417,171 26,240 0 26,240 39,485 1.50 0.09 0.06

2004 24 A 77 25 254 30 18,529,252 373,051 128,541 244,510 1,107,736 2.97 0.06 0.02

2004 24 C 19 0 40 0 3,066,000 53,810 0 53,810 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 23 A 102 13 139 14 4,156,288 316,096 129,282 186,814 236,420 0.75 0.06 0.08

2005 23 C 22 0 36 0 1,000,279 49,657 0 49,657 0 0.00 0.00 0.05

2005 24 A 51 3 81 5 6,907,381 155,692 57,134 98,558 279,097 1.79 0.04 0.02

2005 24 C 27 1 75 1 6,095,665 104,215 0 104,215 108,936 1.05 0.02 0.02

2006 23 A 68 9 71 10 5,225,948 449,793 185,499 264,294 441,863 0.98 0.08 0.09

2006 23 C 24 0 24 0 1,303,640 64,204 0 64,204 0 0.00 0.00 0.05

2006 24 A 60 7 78 7 18,867,030 404,314 140,735 263,579 235,350 0.58 0.01 0.02

2006 24 C 12 0 12 0 722,692 13,210 0 13,210 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 23 A 56 12 67 12 5,468,041 464,631 186,942 277,689 371,013 0.80 0.07 0.08

2007 23 C 16 0 16 0 1,111,043 58,952 0 58,952 0 0.00 0.00 0.05

2007 24 A 63 5 71 5 19,696,925 440,267 154,596 285,671 77,991 0.18 0.00 0.02

149
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, Practice Code, and Coverage Flag

Table 1.4b

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year 

 Practice 

Code 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2007 24 C 9 2 9 2 504,202 9,213 0 9,213 53,016 5.75 0.11 0.02

2008 23 A 34 8 52 8 3,806,126 380,028 152,983 227,045 311,730 0.82 0.08 0.10

2008 23 C 11 0 11 0 838,369 55,797 0 55,797 0 0.00 0.00 0.07

2008 24 A 61 2 68 2 25,901,377 609,164 215,036 394,128 73,226 0.12 0.00 0.02

2008 24 C 5 1 5 1 296,950 5,806 0 5,806 22,089 3.80 0.07 0.02

2009 23 A 28 15 28 15 3,020,215 159,975 63,043 96,932 1,176,945 7.36 0.39 0.05

2009 23 C 19 4 19 4 1,328,219 66,532 0 66,532 151,480 2.28 0.11 0.05

2009 24 A 59 2 61 2 23,407,056 446,039 158,407 287,632 228,088 0.51 0.01 0.02

2009 24 C 1 0 1 0 125,004 1,848 0 1,848 0 0.00 0.00 0.01

2010 23 A 1 1 4 4 141,531 13,591 6,116 7,475 49,790 3.66 0.35 0.10

2010 23 C 1 0 2 0 78,925 3,552 0 3,552 0 0.00 0.00 0.05

2010 24 A 57 4 57 4 20,129,497 383,423 136,690 246,733 76,300 0.20 0.00 0.02

2010 24 C 2 0 2 0 1,779,666 25,680 0 25,680 0 0.00 0.00 0.01

Total 2683 632 4023 721 368,079,420 12,218,348 4,520,374 7,070,110 17,819,777 1.46 0.05 0.03

150
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County and Coverage Flag

Table 1.5

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2000 Florida Brevard A 10 5 10 5 439,171 19,009 9,305 0 131,603 6.92 0.30 0.04

2000 Florida Brevard C 1 0 1 0 24,750 646 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 Florida Brevard L 3 0 3 0 116,480 3,153 1,133 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 Florida Dixie A 26 20 42 27 1,594,845 71,572 34,984 0 608,424 8.50 0.38 0.04

2000 Florida Dixie C 3 1 3 1 14,311 374 0 0 78 0.21 0.01 0.03

2000 Florida Dixie L 21 9 22 9 773,640 20,677 7,222 0 89,055 4.31 0.12 0.03

2000 Florida Indian River A 14 6 18 7 1,891,955 84,134 41,140 0 250,808 2.98 0.13 0.04

2000 Florida Indian River C 1 1 1 1 39,243 1,024 0 0 9,749 9.52 0.25 0.03

2000 Florida Indian River L 1 0 1 0 44,963 1,335 562 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 Florida Levy A 87 32 107 34 8,361,877 413,512 216,771 0 794,294 1.92 0.09 0.05

2000 Florida Levy C 7 0 7 0 237,639 6,203 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 Florida Levy L 57 6 77 6 4,043,254 114,080 41,607 0 77,758 0.68 0.02 0.03

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable A 24 9 25 9 1,347,010 43,771 22,493 0 93,984 2.15 0.07 0.03

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable C 11 0 11 0 640,460 11,528 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable L 10 2 22 2 1,226,132 29,046 13,677 0 13,822 0.48 0.01 0.02

2000 Massachusetts Plymouth A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2000 South Carolina Beaufort A 1 0 1 0 1,188,101 36,356 17,778 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 South Carolina Beaufort C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2000 South Carolina Charleston A 1 0 3 0 95,550 3,249 1,587 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 South Carolina Charleston C 2 0 2 0 67,375 1,273 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2000 South Carolina Charleston L 1 0 3 0 46,550 880 297 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2000 Virginia Accomack A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2000 Virginia Accomack C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2000 Virginia Accomack L 14 0 14 0 1,358,400 25,673 8,660 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2000 Virginia Northampton A 1 0 1 0 62,400 1,909 934 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 Virginia Northampton C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2000 Virginia Northampton L 39 0 41 0 12,506,699 236,377 79,767 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 Florida Brevard A 31 22 36 22 1,426,432 78,941 32,278 46,663 520,076 6.59 0.36 0.06

2001 Florida Brevard C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2001 Florida Dixie A 54 20 71 20 2,254,998 109,372 45,127 64,245 116,184 1.06 0.05 0.05

2001 Florida Dixie C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2001 Florida Indian River A 32 14 43 18 1,669,518 95,888 39,303 56,585 360,290 3.76 0.22 0.06

2001 Florida Indian River C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2001 Florida Levy A 143 53 210 61 12,765,279 633,134 257,877 375,257 1,529,762 2.42 0.12 0.05

2001 Florida Levy C 4 0 4 0 179,602 4,688 0 4,688 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable A 18 0 18 0 1,345,853 39,409 15,669 23,740 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable C 20 1 20 1 1,175,710 21,162 0 21,162 150,000 7.09 0.13 0.02

2001 Massachusetts Plymouth A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2001 South Carolina Beaufort A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2001 South Carolina Beaufort C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2001 South Carolina Charleston A 3 0 8 0 374,850 8,178 2,780 5,398 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 South Carolina Charleston C 2 0 2 0 29,645 561 0 561 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 Virginia Accomack A 18 0 53 0 3,656,503 86,770 31,292 55,478 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 Virginia Accomack C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2001 Virginia Northampton A 52 2 100 3 16,336,878 322,503 107,809 214,694 204,386 0.63 0.01 0.02

2001 Virginia Northampton C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2002 Florida Brevard A 26 8 27 8 1,286,458 74,752 31,557 43,195 274,015 3.67 0.21 0.06

151
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County and Coverage Flag

Table 1.5

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2002 Florida Brevard C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2002 Florida Dixie A 75 24 113 26 3,176,030 149,997 61,188 88,809 158,720 1.06 0.05 0.05

2002 Florida Dixie C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2002 Florida Indian River A 39 4 53 5 2,058,561 132,004 56,359 75,645 133,750 1.01 0.06 0.06

2002 Florida Indian River C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2002 Florida Levy A 221 94 359 112 19,840,545 1,052,853 436,495 616,358 3,356,451 3.19 0.17 0.05

2002 Florida Levy C 1 1 1 1 26,675 696 0 696 1,896 2.72 0.07 0.03

2002 Massachusetts Barnstable A 17 0 18 0 1,908,163 54,518 21,344 33,174 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2002 Massachusetts Barnstable C 14 0 14 0 802,296 14,442 0 14,442 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 Massachusetts Plymouth A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2002 South Carolina Beaufort A 1 0 1 0 151,778 2,869 947 1,922 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 South Carolina Beaufort C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2002 South Carolina Charleston A 5 0 16 0 1,059,321 26,909 9,886 17,023 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2002 South Carolina Charleston C 2 0 2 0 31,763 600 0 600 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 Virginia Accomack A 16 0 21 0 8,970,077 201,144 70,798 130,346 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 Virginia Accomack C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2002 Virginia Northampton A 55 3 168 3 20,640,946 469,919 160,944 308,975 94,416 0.20 0.00 0.02

2002 Virginia Northampton C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2003 Florida Brevard A 17 4 19 4 595,065 33,812 14,292 19,520 212,980 6.30 0.36 0.06

2003 Florida Brevard C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2003 Florida Dixie A 70 20 98 22 2,769,756 153,273 63,249 90,024 276,156 1.80 0.10 0.06

2003 Florida Dixie C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2003 Florida Indian River A 30 5 45 5 1,461,690 98,419 42,287 56,132 86,920 0.88 0.06 0.07

2003 Florida Indian River C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2003 Florida Levy A 190 48 309 55 15,498,836 893,333 373,500 519,833 1,380,730 1.55 0.09 0.06

2003 Florida Levy C 2 0 2 0 30,866 805 0 805 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable A 17 6 19 6 1,788,581 48,235 18,598 29,637 184,307 3.82 0.10 0.03

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable C 13 1 13 1 1,022,113 18,399 0 18,399 5,213 0.28 0.01 0.02

2003 Massachusetts Plymouth A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2003 South Carolina Beaufort A 4 0 7 0 348,590 15,014 6,157 8,857 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2003 South Carolina Beaufort C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2003 South Carolina Charleston A 9 1 14 1 1,247,730 32,257 11,877 20,380 77,599 2.41 0.06 0.03

2003 South Carolina Charleston C 2 0 2 0 31,763 600 0 600 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2003 Virginia Accomack A 16 4 51 4 8,511,341 187,704 63,489 124,215 275,435 1.47 0.03 0.02

2003 Virginia Accomack C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2003 Virginia Northampton A 47 6 127 8 17,870,992 378,547 126,059 252,488 275,180 0.73 0.02 0.02

2003 Virginia Northampton C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2004 Florida Brevard A 8 7 8 7 124,537 12,510 5,312 7,198 60,208 4.81 0.48 0.10

2004 Florida Brevard C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2004 Florida Dixie A 38 19 51 28 657,542 67,052 27,386 39,666 126,368 1.88 0.19 0.10

2004 Florida Dixie C 4 0 4 0 45,117 2,786 0 2,786 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2004 Florida Indian River A 18 11 29 15 447,830 51,214 21,853 29,361 177,515 3.47 0.40 0.11

2004 Florida Indian River C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2004 Florida Levy A 108 44 146 53 3,691,935 367,808 145,346 222,462 646,997 1.76 0.18 0.10

2004 Florida Levy C 16 5 16 5 372,054 23,454 0 23,454 39,485 1.68 0.11 0.06

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable A 14 3 30 4 1,505,281 38,659 14,698 23,961 77,958 2.02 0.05 0.03

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable C 12 0 12 0 615,698 10,161 0 10,161 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

152
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County and Coverage Flag

Table 1.5

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2004 Massachusetts Plymouth A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2004 South Carolina Beaufort A 4 0 6 0 227,527 5,583 2,090 3,493 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 South Carolina Beaufort C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2004 South Carolina Charleston A 2 1 2 1 547,945 12,442 4,479 7,963 31,938 2.57 0.06 0.02

2004 South Carolina Charleston C 2 0 2 0 61,104 1,070 0 1,070 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 Virginia Accomack A 16 11 33 11 1,983,156 43,444 15,349 28,095 687,082 15.82 0.35 0.02

2004 Virginia Accomack C 3 0 24 0 2,326,135 41,480 0 41,480 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 Virginia Northampton A 46 10 190 14 15,032,418 290,419 98,320 192,099 334,851 1.15 0.02 0.02

2004 Virginia Northampton C 2 0 2 0 63,063 1,099 0 1,099 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 Florida Brevard A 3 0 3 0 75,314 5,877 2,426 3,451 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

2005 Florida Brevard C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2005 Florida Dixie A 19 4 24 5 268,242 22,685 9,354 13,331 56,560 2.49 0.21 0.08

2005 Florida Dixie C 1 0 3 0 25,377 1,536 0 1,536 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2005 Florida Indian River A 14 0 16 0 175,308 14,698 6,128 8,570 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

2005 Florida Indian River C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2005 Florida Levy A 66 9 97 9 3,321,712 267,086 109,304 157,782 179,860 0.67 0.05 0.08

2005 Florida Levy C 19 0 30 0 702,140 43,825 0 43,825 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable A 10 3 23 5 1,276,859 32,475 12,775 19,700 279,097 8.59 0.22 0.03

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable C 10 1 16 1 547,893 9,058 0 9,058 108,936 12.03 0.20 0.02

2005 Massachusetts Plymouth A 1 0 1 0 222,858 3,732 1,232 2,500 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 South Carolina Beaufort A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2005 South Carolina Beaufort C 1 0 1 0 115,500 1,767 0 1,767 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 South Carolina Charleston A 1 0 1 0 325,162 6,388 2,300 4,088 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 South Carolina Charleston C 1 0 2 0 157,262 2,529 0 2,529 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 Virginia Accomack A 20 0 21 0 622,324 18,695 7,389 11,306 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2005 Virginia Accomack C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2005 Virginia Northampton A 19 0 34 0 4,775,890 100,152 35,508 64,644 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 Virginia Northampton C 17 0 59 0 5,547,772 95,157 0 95,157 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 Florida Brevard A 2 0 2 0 17,325 1,991 861 1,130 0 0.00 0.00 0.11

2006 Florida Brevard C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2006 Florida Dixie A 7 0 7 0 130,776 12,299 5,141 7,158 0 0.00 0.00 0.09

2006 Florida Dixie C 1 0 1 0 30,100 2,111 0 2,111 0 0.00 0.00 0.07

2006 Florida Indian River A 8 0 8 0 170,975 16,800 7,231 9,569 0 0.00 0.00 0.10

2006 Florida Indian River C 1 0 1 0 22,407 911 0 911 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2006 Florida Levy A 50 9 53 10 4,669,682 413,722 170,473 243,249 441,863 1.07 0.09 0.09

2006 Florida Levy C 20 0 20 0 987,793 56,679 0 56,679 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable A 11 4 18 4 1,022,807 29,673 11,305 18,368 123,033 4.15 0.12 0.03

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable C 11 0 11 0 650,506 11,847 0 11,847 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 Massachusetts Plymouth A 1 0 1 0 291,600 5,249 1,732 3,517 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 South Carolina Beaufort A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2006 South Carolina Beaufort C 1 0 1 0 115,500 1,975 0 1,975 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 South Carolina Charleston A 1 0 1 0 237,190 4,981 1,793 3,188 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 South Carolina Charleston C 1 0 1 0 147,840 2,528 0 2,528 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 Virginia Accomack A 14 0 14 0 976,202 31,056 12,365 18,691 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2006 Virginia Accomack C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2006 Virginia Northampton A 34 3 45 3 16,576,421 338,336 115,333 223,003 112,317 0.33 0.01 0.02

2006 Virginia Northampton C 1 0 1 0 72,186 1,363 0 1,363 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

153
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County and Coverage Flag

Table 1.5

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2007 Florida Brevard A 3 0 3 0 30,695 2,413 1,034 1,379 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

2007 Florida Brevard C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2007 Florida Dixie A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2007 Florida Dixie C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2007 Florida Indian River A 6 0 6 0 126,142 12,753 5,614 7,139 0 0.00 0.00 0.10

2007 Florida Indian River C 1 0 1 0 22,754 1,270 0 1,270 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2007 Florida Levy A 46 12 57 12 5,153,732 446,158 179,104 267,054 371,013 0.83 0.07 0.09

2007 Florida Levy C 14 0 14 0 963,086 55,435 0 55,435 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable A 12 3 16 3 1,222,087 30,854 11,542 19,312 33,502 1.09 0.03 0.03

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable C 7 2 7 2 339,820 6,192 0 6,192 53,016 8.56 0.16 0.02

2007 Massachusetts Plymouth A 1 0 1 0 256,500 4,641 1,531 3,110 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 South Carolina Beaufort A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2007 South Carolina Beaufort C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2007 South Carolina Charleston A 1 0 1 0 157,472 3,307 1,190 2,117 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 South Carolina Charleston C 1 0 1 0 125,203 2,247 0 2,247 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 Virginia Accomack A 14 2 14 2 1,386,265 44,520 17,984 26,536 44,489 1.00 0.03 0.03

2007 Virginia Accomack C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2007 Virginia Northampton A 36 0 40 0 16,832,073 360,252 123,539 236,713 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 Virginia Northampton C 2 0 2 0 164,382 3,021 0 3,021 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2008 Florida Brevard A 1 1 1 1 75,724 6,764 2,773 3,991 34,290 5.07 0.45 0.09

2008 Florida Brevard C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2008 Florida Dixie A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2008 Florida Dixie C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2008 Florida Indian River A 4 1 4 1 149,520 15,491 6,882 8,609 7,461 0.48 0.05 0.10

2008 Florida Indian River C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2008 Florida Levy A 30 7 48 7 3,656,029 364,462 146,070 218,392 304,269 0.83 0.08 0.10

2008 Florida Levy C 11 0 11 0 838,369 55,797 0 55,797 0 0.00 0.00 0.07

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable A 12 1 12 1 1,359,216 44,284 17,096 27,188 38,936 0.88 0.03 0.03

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable C 4 1 4 1 224,728 4,458 0 4,458 22,089 4.95 0.10 0.02

2008 Massachusetts Plymouth A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2008 South Carolina Beaufort A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2008 South Carolina Beaufort C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2008 South Carolina Charleston A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2008 South Carolina Charleston C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2008 Virginia Accomack A 14 0 14 0 2,199,880 66,829 26,985 39,844 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2008 Virginia Accomack C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2008 Virginia Northampton A 34 0 41 0 22,267,134 491,362 168,213 323,149 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2008 Virginia Northampton C 1 0 1 0 72,222 1,348 0 1,348 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2009 Florida Brevard A 1 0 1 0 3,538 366 150 216 0 0.00 0.00 0.10

2009 Florida Brevard C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2009 Florida Dixie A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2009 Florida Dixie C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2009 Florida Indian River A 3 0 3 0 56,070 4,664 2,071 2,593 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

2009 Florida Indian River C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2009 Florida Levy A 25 15 25 15 2,964,145 155,311 60,972 94,339 1,176,945 7.58 0.40 0.05

2009 Florida Levy C 19 4 19 4 1,328,219 66,532 0 66,532 151,480 2.28 0.11 0.05

2009 Massachusetts Barnstable A 9 0 9 0 1,462,379 37,397 14,554 22,843 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

154
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County and Coverage Flag

Table 1.5

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2009 Massachusetts Barnstable C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2009 Massachusetts Plymouth A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2009 South Carolina Beaufort A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2009 South Carolina Beaufort C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2009 South Carolina Charleston A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2009 South Carolina Charleston C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2009 Virginia Accomack A 15 2 15 2 2,529,207 65,708 26,730 38,978 228,088 3.47 0.09 0.03

2009 Virginia Accomack C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2009 Virginia Northampton A 34 0 36 0 19,411,932 342,568 116,973 225,595 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2009 Virginia Northampton C 1 0 1 0 125,004 1,848 0 1,848 0 0.00 0.00 0.01

2010 Florida Brevard A 1 1 1 1 4,571 378 155 223 4,571 12.09 1.00 0.08

2010 Florida Brevard C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2010 Florida Dixie A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2010 Florida Dixie C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2010 Florida Indian River A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2010 Florida Indian River C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2010 Florida Levy A 1 1 4 4 141,531 13,591 6,116 7,475 49,790 3.66 0.35 0.10

2010 Florida Levy C 1 0 2 0 78,925 3,552 0 3,552 0 0.00 0.00 0.05

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable A 12 1 12 1 1,386,254 40,033 15,993 24,040 18,658 0.47 0.01 0.03

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2010 Massachusetts Plymouth A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2010 South Carolina Beaufort A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2010 South Carolina Beaufort C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2010 South Carolina Charleston A 1 0 1 0 18,710 393 141 252 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 South Carolina Charleston C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2010 Virginia Accomack A 13 2 13 2 2,270,508 52,196 21,248 30,948 53,071 1.02 0.02 0.02

2010 Virginia Accomack C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2010 Virginia Northampton A 30 0 30 0 16,449,454 290,423 99,153 191,270 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 Virginia Northampton C 2 0 2 0 1,779,666 25,680 0 25,680 0 0.00 0.00 0.01

Total 2683 632 4023 721 368,079,420 12,218,348 4,520,374 7,070,110 17,819,777 1.46 0.05 0.03

155
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Coverage Level Percentage

Table 1.6

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Coverage 

Level 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

50% A 531 54 1072 62 152,213,772 3,046,963 1,005,483 2,041,480 2,004,466 0.66 0.01 0.02

50% C 273 18 357 18 23,022,036 621,717 0 600,669 541,942 0.87 0.02 0.03

50% L 124 13 144 13 18,169,316 375,989 126,872 0 117,231 0.31 0.01 0.02

55% A 28 4 37 4 3,007,057 79,267 28,533 50,734 196,983 2.49 0.07 0.03

55% L 10 1 13 1 610,551 17,095 7,208 0 7,742 0.45 0.01 0.03

60% A 171 20 251 25 56,881,025 1,634,363 588,382 1,045,981 805,617 0.49 0.01 0.03

60% L 12 3 26 3 1,336,251 38,137 18,845 0 55,662 1.46 0.04 0.03

65% A 773 247 1098 289 64,241,702 3,007,964 1,276,016 1,455,049 6,202,082 2.06 0.10 0.05

70% A 477 148 668 168 32,314,824 2,034,362 837,886 1,185,584 3,964,864 1.95 0.12 0.06

75% A 284 124 357 138 16,282,886 1,362,491 631,149 690,613 3,923,188 2.88 0.24 0.08

Total 2683 632 4023 721 368,079,420 12,218,348 4,520,374 7,070,110 17,819,777 1.46 0.05 0.03

156
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, Coverage Level Percentage

Table 1.7

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year 

 Coverage 

Level 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2000 50% A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2000 50% C 25 2 25 2 1,023,778 21,048 0 0 9,827 0.47 0.01 0.02

2000 50% L 124 13 144 13 18,169,316 375,989 126,872 0 117,231 0.31 0.01 0.02

2000 55% A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2000 55% L 10 1 13 1 610,551 17,095 7,208 0 7,742 0.45 0.01 0.03

2000 60% A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2000 60% L 12 3 26 3 1,336,251 38,137 18,845 0 55,662 1.46 0.04 0.03

2000 65% A 148 61 187 70 13,030,187 541,789 264,890 0 1,665,145 3.07 0.13 0.04

2000 70% A 5 3 7 3 538,824 24,899 14,007 0 35,863 1.44 0.07 0.05

2000 75% A 11 8 13 9 1,411,898 106,824 66,095 0 178,105 1.67 0.13 0.08

2001 50% A 88 10 157 12 20,179,930 403,302 133,102 270,200 233,591 0.58 0.01 0.02

2001 50% C 26 1 26 1 1,384,957 26,411 0 26,411 150,000 5.68 0.11 0.02

2001 55% A 5 0 5 0 396,044 9,912 3,570 6,342 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2001 60% A 19 2 28 2 1,457,615 45,230 16,287 28,943 71,297 1.58 0.05 0.03

2001 65% A 128 39 190 45 9,148,405 388,533 159,299 229,234 844,251 2.17 0.09 0.04

2001 70% A 84 44 119 49 7,453,494 434,175 178,009 256,166 1,384,188 3.19 0.19 0.06

2001 75% A 27 16 40 16 1,194,823 93,043 41,868 51,175 197,371 2.12 0.17 0.08

2002 50% A 74 3 209 3 24,470,646 507,113 167,340 339,773 67,928 0.13 0.00 0.02

2002 50% C 17 1 17 1 860,734 15,738 0 15,738 1,896 0.12 0.00 0.02

2002 55% A 4 0 9 0 613,328 16,328 5,878 10,450 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2002 60% A 18 2 31 2 6,039,740 174,886 62,961 111,925 65,094 0.37 0.01 0.03

2002 65% A 199 75 306 85 15,666,586 679,921 278,768 401,153 1,856,640 2.73 0.12 0.04

2002 70% A 93 26 138 32 8,382,366 486,400 199,428 286,972 1,125,802 2.31 0.13 0.06

2002 75% A 67 27 83 32 3,919,213 300,317 135,143 165,174 901,888 3.00 0.23 0.08

2003 50% A 71 11 194 13 24,793,471 518,320 171,035 347,285 619,759 1.20 0.02 0.02

2003 50% C 17 1 17 1 1,084,742 19,804 0 19,804 5,213 0.26 0.00 0.02

2003 55% A 6 0 7 0 733,097 16,322 5,876 10,446 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2003 60% A 15 2 24 2 3,671,701 104,167 37,503 66,664 21,077 0.20 0.01 0.03

2003 65% A 104 26 164 32 7,040,685 308,693 126,559 182,134 559,959 1.81 0.08 0.04

2003 70% A 139 28 212 30 9,926,710 583,834 239,367 344,467 633,898 1.09 0.06 0.06

2003 75% A 65 27 88 28 3,926,917 309,258 139,168 170,090 934,614 3.02 0.24 0.08

2004 50% A 87 20 259 24 14,381,638 329,942 108,877 221,065 652,484 1.98 0.05 0.02

2004 50% C 39 5 60 5 3,483,171 80,050 0 80,050 39,485 0.49 0.01 0.02

2004 55% A 8 4 10 4 663,910 14,311 5,148 9,163 196,983 13.76 0.30 0.02

157
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, Coverage Level Percentage

Table 1.7

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year 

 Coverage 

Level 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2004 60% A 21 7 43 12 5,036,425 141,868 51,072 90,796 352,556 2.49 0.07 0.03

2004 65% A 52 22 69 31 1,892,881 155,123 63,600 91,523 349,875 2.26 0.18 0.08

2004 70% A 51 26 72 31 1,343,025 135,391 55,513 79,878 198,078 1.46 0.15 0.10

2004 75% A 35 27 42 31 900,292 112,496 50,623 61,873 392,941 3.49 0.44 0.12

2005 50% A 27 1 45 1 2,133,409 52,246 17,244 35,002 19,570 0.37 0.01 0.02

2005 50% C 49 1 111 1 7,095,944 153,872 0 153,872 108,936 0.71 0.02 0.02

2005 55% A 1 0 1 0 96,985 5,674 2,043 3,631 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2005 60% A 18 0 27 0 4,508,282 113,772 40,958 72,814 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2005 65% A 43 6 63 7 2,631,133 144,619 59,296 85,323 291,196 2.01 0.11 0.05

2005 70% A 38 4 52 6 903,946 77,201 31,651 45,550 45,163 0.59 0.05 0.09

2005 75% A 26 5 32 5 789,914 78,276 35,224 43,052 159,588 2.04 0.20 0.10

2006 50% A 37 3 45 3 12,331,103 234,932 77,524 157,408 112,317 0.48 0.01 0.02

2006 50% C 36 0 36 0 2,026,332 77,414 0 77,414 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2006 55% A 1 0 1 0 237,190 4,981 1,793 3,188 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 60% A 19 2 26 2 6,024,761 171,748 61,830 109,918 109,025 0.63 0.02 0.03

2006 65% A 34 6 40 7 3,805,809 280,567 115,029 165,538 218,238 0.78 0.06 0.07

2006 70% A 18 2 18 2 818,362 69,716 28,583 41,133 89,869 1.29 0.11 0.09

2006 75% A 19 3 19 3 875,753 92,163 41,475 50,688 147,764 1.60 0.17 0.11

2007 50% A 41 1 47 1 12,150,984 235,491 77,710 157,781 22,412 0.10 0.00 0.02

2007 50% C 25 2 25 2 1,615,245 68,165 0 68,165 53,016 0.78 0.03 0.04

2007 55% A 1 0 1 0 157,472 3,307 1,190 2,117 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 60% A 20 3 24 3 7,561,134 265,886 95,721 170,165 14,430 0.05 0.00 0.04

2007 65% A 27 5 34 5 3,218,472 210,666 86,368 124,298 81,147 0.39 0.03 0.07

2007 70% A 18 6 19 6 1,347,030 118,801 48,712 70,089 161,547 1.36 0.12 0.09

2007 75% A 12 2 13 2 729,874 70,747 31,837 38,910 169,468 2.40 0.23 0.10

2008 50% A 36 0 44 0 14,864,670 305,662 100,867 204,795 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2008 50% C 16 1 16 1 1,135,319 61,603 0 61,603 22,089 0.36 0.02 0.05

2008 55% A 1 0 2 0 90,321 8,039 2,894 5,145 0 0.00 0.00 0.09

2008 60% A 18 0 25 0 9,881,099 337,940 121,657 216,283 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2008 65% A 16 3 23 3 2,825,106 172,778 70,841 101,937 84,314 0.49 0.03 0.06

2008 70% A 14 4 14 4 816,045 59,664 24,460 35,204 108,454 1.82 0.13 0.07

2008 75% A 10 3 12 3 1,230,262 105,109 47,300 57,809 192,188 1.83 0.16 0.09

2009 50% A 43 5 45 5 15,192,351 275,419 90,883 184,536 276,405 1.00 0.02 0.02

2009 50% C 20 4 20 4 1,453,223 68,380 0 68,380 151,480 2.22 0.10 0.05

158
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, Coverage Level Percentage

Table 1.7

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year 

 Coverage 

Level 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2009 55% A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2009 60% A 11 1 11 1 7,202,493 155,764 56,072 99,692 147,838 0.95 0.02 0.02

2009 65% A 11 2 11 2 2,490,334 66,282 27,177 39,105 228,088 3.44 0.09 0.03

2009 70% A 13 4 13 4 602,952 38,211 15,666 22,545 153,231 4.01 0.25 0.06

2009 75% A 9 5 9 5 939,141 70,338 31,652 38,686 599,471 8.52 0.64 0.07

2010 50% A 27 0 27 0 11,715,570 184,536 60,901 123,635 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 50% C 3 0 4 0 1,858,591 29,232 0 29,232 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 55% A 1 0 1 0 18,710 393 141 252 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 60% A 12 1 12 1 5,497,775 123,102 44,321 78,781 24,300 0.20 0.00 0.02

2010 65% A 11 2 11 2 2,492,104 58,993 24,189 34,804 23,229 0.39 0.01 0.02

2010 70% A 4 1 4 1 182,070 6,070 2,490 3,580 28,771 4.74 0.16 0.03

2010 75% A 3 1 6 4 364,799 23,920 10,764 13,156 49,790 2.08 0.14 0.07

Total 2683 632 4023 721 368,079,420 12,218,348 4,520,374 7,070,110 17,819,777 1.46 0.05 0.03

159
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County, Coverage Level Percentage

Table 1.8

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State County Name 

 Coverage 

Level 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2000 Florida Brevard 50% C 1 0 1 0 24,750 646 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 Florida Brevard 50% L 2 0 2 0 104,000 2,715 916 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 Florida Brevard 60% L 1 0 1 0 12,480 438 217 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2000 Florida Brevard 65% A 9 4 9 4 436,477 18,856 9,219 0 130,704 6.93 0.30 0.04

2000 Florida Brevard 70% A 1 1 1 1 2,694 153 86 0 899 5.88 0.33 0.06

2000 Florida Dixie 50% C 3 1 3 1 14,311 374 0 0 78 0.21 0.01 0.03

2000 Florida Dixie 50% L 19 8 20 8 676,950 17,806 6,011 0 81,313 4.57 0.12 0.03

2000 Florida Dixie 55% L 2 1 2 1 96,690 2,871 1,211 0 7,742 2.70 0.08 0.03

2000 Florida Dixie 65% A 26 20 42 27 1,594,845 71,572 34,984 0 608,424 8.50 0.38 0.04

2000 Florida Indian River 50% C 1 1 1 1 39,243 1,024 0 0 9,749 9.52 0.25 0.03

2000 Florida Indian River 55% L 1 0 1 0 44,963 1,335 562 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 Florida Indian River 65% A 14 6 18 7 1,891,955 84,134 41,140 0 250,808 2.98 0.13 0.04

2000 Florida Levy 50% C 7 0 7 0 237,639 6,203 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 Florida Levy 50% L 45 5 60 5 3,307,047 89,485 30,191 0 35,918 0.40 0.01 0.03

2000 Florida Levy 55% L 6 0 9 0 337,327 10,165 4,285 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 Florida Levy 60% L 6 1 8 1 398,880 14,430 7,131 0 41,840 2.90 0.10 0.04

2000 Florida Levy 65% A 75 23 91 24 6,785,639 296,443 144,937 0 589,217 1.99 0.09 0.04

2000 Florida Levy 70% A 3 2 5 2 173,250 10,703 6,022 0 34,964 3.27 0.20 0.06

2000 Florida Levy 75% A 9 7 11 8 1,402,988 106,366 65,812 0 170,113 1.60 0.12 0.08

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% C 11 0 11 0 640,460 11,528 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% L 4 0 4 0 169,670 3,053 1,030 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 55% L 1 0 1 0 131,571 2,724 1,150 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 60% L 5 2 17 2 924,891 23,269 11,497 0 13,822 0.59 0.01 0.03

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 65% A 21 8 22 8 975,220 29,270 14,311 0 85,992 2.94 0.09 0.03

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 70% A 1 0 1 0 362,880 14,043 7,899 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 75% A 2 1 2 1 8,910 458 283 0 7,992 17.45 0.90 0.05

2000 South Carolina Beaufort 65% A 1 0 1 0 1,188,101 36,356 17,778 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 South Carolina Charleston 50% C 2 0 2 0 67,375 1,273 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2000 South Carolina Charleston 50% L 1 0 3 0 46,550 880 297 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2000 South Carolina Charleston 65% A 1 0 3 0 95,550 3,249 1,587 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 Virginia Accomack 50% L 14 0 14 0 1,358,400 25,673 8,660 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2000 Virginia Northampton 50% L 39 0 41 0 12,506,699 236,377 79,767 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2000 Virginia Northampton 65% A 1 0 1 0 62,400 1,909 934 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2001 Florida Brevard 60% A 3 0 4 0 114,270 4,330 1,559 2,771 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2001 Florida Brevard 65% A 5 3 5 3 134,296 5,802 2,379 3,423 35,070 6.04 0.26 0.04

2001 Florida Brevard 70% A 21 17 25 17 1,133,991 65,532 26,866 38,666 464,777 7.09 0.41 0.06

2001 Florida Brevard 75% A 2 2 2 2 43,875 3,277 1,474 1,803 20,229 6.17 0.46 0.07

2001 Florida Dixie 50% A 11 6 11 6 174,661 4,558 1,506 3,052 33,187 7.28 0.19 0.03

2001 Florida Dixie 60% A 2 0 2 0 81,060 2,845 1,025 1,820 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2001 Florida Dixie 65% A 31 10 41 10 1,499,829 66,325 27,193 39,132 51,215 0.77 0.03 0.04

2001 Florida Dixie 70% A 5 1 9 1 258,923 15,905 6,521 9,384 19,904 1.25 0.08 0.06

2001 Florida Dixie 75% A 5 3 8 3 240,525 19,739 8,882 10,857 11,878 0.60 0.05 0.08

2001 Florida Indian River 50% A 1 0 2 0 22,750 660 218 442 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2001 Florida Indian River 65% A 6 1 8 1 137,061 6,348 2,603 3,745 10,726 1.69 0.08 0.05

2001 Florida Indian River 70% A 22 11 30 15 1,494,584 87,751 35,974 51,777 339,932 3.87 0.23 0.06

2001 Florida Indian River 75% A 3 2 3 2 15,123 1,129 508 621 9,632 8.53 0.64 0.07

2001 Florida Levy 50% A 19 3 23 4 1,299,415 35,318 11,658 23,660 49,204 1.39 0.04 0.03

2001 Florida Levy 50% C 4 0 4 0 179,602 4,688 0 4,688 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2001 Florida Levy 55% A 3 0 3 0 190,520 5,658 2,038 3,620 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

160
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County, Coverage Level Percentage

Table 1.8

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State County Name 

 Coverage 

Level 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2001 Florida Levy 60% A 6 1 8 1 601,980 21,522 7,750 13,772 18,111 0.84 0.03 0.04

2001 Florida Levy 65% A 67 25 100 31 5,710,068 258,062 105,805 152,257 747,240 2.90 0.13 0.05

2001 Florida Levy 70% A 34 15 53 16 4,204,796 250,942 102,890 148,052 559,575 2.23 0.13 0.06

2001 Florida Levy 75% A 14 9 23 9 758,500 61,632 27,736 33,896 155,632 2.53 0.21 0.08

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% A 1 0 1 0 12,258 221 73 148 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% C 20 1 20 1 1,175,710 21,162 0 21,162 150,000 7.09 0.13 0.02

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable 55% A 2 0 2 0 205,524 4,254 1,532 2,722 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable 60% A 2 0 2 0 213,905 5,198 1,872 3,326 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable 65% A 12 0 12 0 626,886 18,618 7,634 10,984 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable 70% A 1 0 1 0 287,280 11,118 4,558 6,560 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2001 South Carolina Charleston 50% A 2 0 7 0 343,000 7,203 2,380 4,823 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 South Carolina Charleston 50% C 2 0 2 0 29,645 561 0 561 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 South Carolina Charleston 65% A 1 0 1 0 31,850 975 400 575 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2001 Virginia Accomack 50% A 9 0 25 0 2,593,584 52,483 17,321 35,162 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 Virginia Accomack 60% A 3 0 6 0 126,144 3,265 1,176 2,089 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2001 Virginia Accomack 65% A 5 0 21 0 900,775 29,110 11,935 17,175 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2001 Virginia Accomack 75% A 1 0 1 0 36,000 1,912 860 1,052 0 0.00 0.00 0.05

2001 Virginia Northampton 50% A 45 1 88 2 15,734,262 302,859 99,946 202,913 151,200 0.50 0.01 0.02

2001 Virginia Northampton 60% A 3 1 6 1 320,256 8,070 2,905 5,165 53,186 6.59 0.17 0.03

2001 Virginia Northampton 65% A 1 0 2 0 107,640 3,293 1,350 1,943 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2001 Virginia Northampton 70% A 1 0 1 0 73,920 2,927 1,200 1,727 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2001 Virginia Northampton 75% A 2 0 3 0 100,800 5,354 2,408 2,946 0 0.00 0.00 0.05

2002 Florida Brevard 60% A 2 0 2 0 62,400 2,327 836 1,491 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2002 Florida Brevard 65% A 6 3 6 3 251,820 10,881 4,462 6,419 107,683 9.90 0.43 0.04

2002 Florida Brevard 70% A 10 3 10 3 632,450 35,861 14,702 21,159 136,699 3.81 0.22 0.06

2002 Florida Brevard 75% A 8 2 9 2 339,788 25,683 11,557 14,126 29,633 1.15 0.09 0.08

2002 Florida Dixie 50% A 6 0 8 0 201,240 5,764 1,901 3,863 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2002 Florida Dixie 60% A 2 1 3 1 80,280 3,034 1,093 1,941 13,487 4.45 0.17 0.04

2002 Florida Dixie 65% A 56 21 86 23 2,484,900 114,702 47,025 67,677 130,912 1.14 0.05 0.05

2002 Florida Dixie 70% A 6 0 11 0 308,210 18,923 7,761 11,162 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2002 Florida Dixie 75% A 5 2 5 2 101,400 7,574 3,408 4,166 14,321 1.89 0.14 0.07

2002 Florida Indian River 65% A 5 0 5 0 183,264 7,917 3,246 4,671 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2002 Florida Indian River 70% A 21 2 33 3 1,136,281 68,096 27,917 40,179 61,669 0.91 0.05 0.06

2002 Florida Indian River 75% A 13 2 15 2 739,016 55,991 25,196 30,795 72,081 1.29 0.10 0.08

2002 Florida Levy 50% A 9 1 16 1 647,853 18,093 5,971 12,122 25,119 1.39 0.04 0.03

2002 Florida Levy 50% C 1 1 1 1 26,675 696 0 696 1,896 2.72 0.07 0.03

2002 Florida Levy 55% A 2 0 7 0 321,145 10,280 3,700 6,580 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2002 Florida Levy 60% A 8 0 18 0 608,106 23,305 8,391 14,914 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2002 Florida Levy 65% A 114 51 189 59 10,150,065 466,511 191,271 275,240 1,618,045 3.47 0.16 0.05

2002 Florida Levy 70% A 51 21 79 26 5,610,347 336,067 137,792 198,275 927,434 2.76 0.17 0.06

2002 Florida Levy 75% A 37 21 50 26 2,503,029 198,597 89,370 109,227 785,853 3.96 0.31 0.08

2002 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% A 1 0 1 0 11,400 206 68 138 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% C 14 0 14 0 802,296 14,442 0 14,442 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 Massachusetts Barnstable 55% A 2 0 2 0 292,183 6,048 2,178 3,870 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 Massachusetts Barnstable 60% A 3 0 4 0 591,660 15,182 5,466 9,716 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2002 Massachusetts Barnstable 65% A 9 0 9 0 725,070 21,533 8,830 12,703 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2002 Massachusetts Barnstable 70% A 1 0 1 0 255,360 9,882 4,052 5,830 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2002 Massachusetts Barnstable 75% A 1 0 1 0 32,490 1,667 750 917 0 0.00 0.00 0.05

2002 South Carolina Beaufort 50% A 1 0 1 0 151,778 2,869 947 1,922 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

161
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County, Coverage Level Percentage

Table 1.8

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State County Name 

 Coverage 

Level 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2002 South Carolina Charleston 50% A 2 0 13 0 682,500 14,339 4,732 9,607 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 South Carolina Charleston 50% C 2 0 2 0 31,763 600 0 600 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 South Carolina Charleston 65% A 2 0 2 0 261,426 8,000 3,280 4,720 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2002 South Carolina Charleston 70% A 1 0 1 0 115,395 4,570 1,874 2,696 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2002 Virginia Accomack 50% A 8 0 12 0 6,661,535 131,046 43,242 87,804 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 Virginia Accomack 60% A 2 0 3 0 952,027 26,171 9,423 16,748 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2002 Virginia Accomack 65% A 5 0 5 0 1,298,375 40,840 16,744 24,096 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2002 Virginia Accomack 75% A 1 0 1 0 58,140 3,087 1,389 1,698 0 0.00 0.00 0.05

2002 Virginia Northampton 50% A 47 2 158 2 16,114,340 334,796 110,479 224,317 42,809 0.13 0.00 0.02

2002 Virginia Northampton 60% A 1 1 1 1 3,745,267 104,867 37,752 67,115 51,607 0.49 0.01 0.03

2002 Virginia Northampton 65% A 2 0 4 0 311,666 9,537 3,910 5,627 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2002 Virginia Northampton 70% A 3 0 3 0 324,323 13,001 5,330 7,671 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2002 Virginia Northampton 75% A 2 0 2 0 145,350 7,718 3,473 4,245 0 0.00 0.00 0.05

2003 Florida Brevard 60% A 2 0 2 0 92,400 3,424 1,233 2,191 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2003 Florida Brevard 65% A 6 3 6 3 159,379 6,884 2,823 4,061 86,165 12.52 0.54 0.04

2003 Florida Brevard 70% A 5 0 7 0 143,729 8,597 3,526 5,071 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2003 Florida Brevard 75% A 4 1 4 1 199,557 14,907 6,710 8,197 126,815 8.51 0.64 0.07

2003 Florida Dixie 50% A 2 0 2 0 16,563 432 142 290 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2003 Florida Dixie 65% A 33 8 48 10 1,128,357 52,061 21,342 30,719 80,631 1.55 0.07 0.05

2003 Florida Dixie 70% A 27 11 40 11 1,473,711 89,491 36,686 52,805 193,275 2.16 0.13 0.06

2003 Florida Dixie 75% A 8 1 8 1 151,125 11,289 5,079 6,210 2,250 0.20 0.01 0.07

2003 Florida Indian River 65% A 2 0 2 0 40,040 1,730 709 1,021 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2003 Florida Indian River 70% A 17 2 29 2 802,168 48,245 19,779 28,466 11,840 0.25 0.01 0.06

2003 Florida Indian River 75% A 11 3 14 3 619,482 48,444 21,799 26,645 75,080 1.55 0.12 0.08

2003 Florida Levy 50% A 10 0 15 0 523,370 14,281 4,714 9,567 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2003 Florida Levy 50% C 2 0 2 0 30,866 805 0 805 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2003 Florida Levy 55% A 1 0 1 0 79,235 2,353 847 1,506 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2003 Florida Levy 60% A 2 0 8 0 423,376 16,511 5,945 10,566 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2003 Florida Levy 65% A 53 12 98 16 4,776,480 219,837 90,131 129,706 238,339 1.08 0.05 0.05

2003 Florida Levy 70% A 83 15 126 17 6,772,112 407,400 167,033 240,367 428,783 1.05 0.06 0.06

2003 Florida Levy 75% A 41 21 61 22 2,924,263 232,951 104,830 128,121 713,608 3.06 0.24 0.08

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% A 3 1 3 1 295,830 5,325 1,757 3,568 8,334 1.57 0.03 0.02

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% C 13 1 13 1 1,022,113 18,399 0 18,399 5,213 0.28 0.01 0.02

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 55% A 2 0 3 0 317,262 7,002 2,521 4,481 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 60% A 3 1 4 1 378,526 9,383 3,379 6,004 4,288 0.46 0.01 0.02

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 65% A 7 3 7 3 525,073 15,593 6,393 9,200 154,824 9.93 0.29 0.03

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 70% A 1 0 1 0 239,400 9,265 3,798 5,467 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 75% A 1 1 1 1 32,490 1,667 750 917 16,861 10.11 0.52 0.05

2003 South Carolina Beaufort 70% A 4 0 7 0 348,590 15,014 6,157 8,857 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2003 South Carolina Charleston 50% A 2 1 7 1 451,999 9,207 3,039 6,168 77,599 8.43 0.17 0.02

2003 South Carolina Charleston 50% C 2 0 2 0 31,763 600 0 600 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2003 South Carolina Charleston 60% A 4 0 4 0 486,000 12,248 4,408 7,840 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2003 South Carolina Charleston 65% A 1 0 1 0 162,731 4,980 2,042 2,938 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2003 South Carolina Charleston 70% A 2 0 2 0 147,000 5,822 2,388 3,434 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2003 Virginia Accomack 50% A 12 4 46 4 6,570,251 135,969 44,863 91,106 275,435 2.03 0.04 0.02

2003 Virginia Accomack 55% A 1 0 1 0 168,300 3,484 1,254 2,230 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2003 Virginia Accomack 60% A 3 0 4 0 1,772,790 48,251 17,372 30,879 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2003 Virginia Northampton 50% A 42 5 121 7 16,935,458 353,106 116,520 236,586 258,391 0.73 0.02 0.02

2003 Virginia Northampton 55% A 2 0 2 0 168,300 3,483 1,254 2,229 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

162
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County, Coverage Level Percentage

Table 1.8

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State County Name 

 Coverage 

Level 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2003 Virginia Northampton 60% A 1 1 2 1 518,609 14,350 5,166 9,184 16,789 1.17 0.03 0.03

2003 Virginia Northampton 65% A 2 0 2 0 248,625 7,608 3,119 4,489 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2004 Florida Brevard 65% A 2 2 2 2 71,663 5,418 2,222 3,196 16,492 3.04 0.23 0.08

2004 Florida Brevard 70% A 3 3 3 3 19,664 2,555 1,048 1,507 17,597 6.89 0.89 0.13

2004 Florida Brevard 75% A 3 2 3 2 33,210 4,537 2,042 2,495 26,119 5.76 0.79 0.14

2004 Florida Dixie 50% A 4 1 4 1 43,014 2,619 865 1,754 13,437 5.13 0.31 0.06

2004 Florida Dixie 50% C 4 0 4 0 45,117 2,786 0 2,786 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2004 Florida Dixie 60% A 1 0 1 0 13,441 1,125 405 720 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

2004 Florida Dixie 65% A 17 6 24 11 336,546 32,652 13,388 19,264 24,669 0.76 0.07 0.10

2004 Florida Dixie 70% A 14 11 19 15 231,045 26,646 10,924 15,722 71,643 2.69 0.31 0.12

2004 Florida Dixie 75% A 2 1 3 1 33,496 4,010 1,804 2,206 16,619 4.14 0.50 0.12

2004 Florida Indian River 50% A 4 1 6 1 54,034 3,583 1,182 2,401 7,845 2.19 0.15 0.07

2004 Florida Indian River 60% A 1 0 2 0 20,097 1,869 673 1,196 0 0.00 0.00 0.09

2004 Florida Indian River 70% A 5 3 10 4 131,936 14,919 6,119 8,800 28,894 1.94 0.22 0.11

2004 Florida Indian River 75% A 8 7 11 10 241,763 30,843 13,879 16,964 140,776 4.56 0.58 0.13

2004 Florida Levy 50% A 26 4 41 5 1,158,954 82,092 27,093 54,999 72,902 0.89 0.06 0.07

2004 Florida Levy 50% C 16 5 16 5 372,054 23,454 0 23,454 39,485 1.68 0.11 0.06

2004 Florida Levy 60% A 10 3 19 7 352,271 33,626 12,105 21,521 45,073 1.34 0.13 0.10

2004 Florida Levy 65% A 25 11 29 14 953,667 101,504 41,616 59,888 239,651 2.36 0.25 0.11

2004 Florida Levy 70% A 26 9 33 9 704,520 80,786 33,122 47,664 79,944 0.99 0.11 0.11

2004 Florida Levy 75% A 21 17 24 18 522,523 69,800 31,410 38,390 209,427 3.00 0.40 0.13

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% A 3 0 4 0 444,959 7,316 2,413 4,903 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% C 12 0 12 0 615,698 10,161 0 10,161 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 55% A 1 1 2 1 117,018 2,446 881 1,565 55,788 22.81 0.48 0.02

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 60% A 2 0 8 0 364,889 8,906 3,207 5,699 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 65% A 6 2 11 3 361,745 11,172 4,580 6,592 22,170 1.98 0.06 0.03

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 70% A 2 0 5 0 216,670 8,819 3,617 5,202 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2004 South Carolina Beaufort 55% A 3 0 4 0 188,337 3,917 1,407 2,510 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 South Carolina Beaufort 70% A 1 0 2 0 39,190 1,666 683 983 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2004 South Carolina Charleston 50% C 2 0 2 0 61,104 1,070 0 1,070 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 South Carolina Charleston 55% A 1 1 1 1 189,925 4,386 1,579 2,807 31,938 7.28 0.17 0.02

2004 South Carolina Charleston 60% A 1 0 1 0 358,020 8,056 2,900 5,156 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 Virginia Accomack 50% A 9 5 22 5 710,808 12,993 4,287 8,706 254,995 19.63 0.36 0.02

2004 Virginia Accomack 50% C 3 0 24 0 2,326,135 41,480 0 41,480 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 Virginia Accomack 55% A 2 2 2 2 115,500 2,558 920 1,638 109,257 42.71 0.95 0.02

2004 Virginia Accomack 60% A 4 3 8 3 1,069,488 25,874 9,314 16,560 275,937 10.66 0.26 0.02

2004 Virginia Accomack 65% A 1 1 1 1 87,360 2,019 828 1,191 46,893 23.23 0.54 0.02

2004 Virginia Northampton 50% A 41 9 182 12 11,969,869 221,339 73,037 148,302 303,305 1.37 0.03 0.02

2004 Virginia Northampton 50% C 2 0 2 0 63,063 1,099 0 1,099 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 Virginia Northampton 55% A 1 0 1 0 53,130 1,004 361 643 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 Virginia Northampton 60% A 2 1 4 2 2,858,219 62,412 22,468 39,944 31,546 0.51 0.01 0.02

2004 Virginia Northampton 65% A 1 0 2 0 81,900 2,358 966 1,392 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2004 Virginia Northampton 75% A 1 0 1 0 69,300 3,306 1,488 1,818 0 0.00 0.00 0.05

2005 Florida Brevard 65% A 1 0 1 0 68,250 5,160 2,116 3,044 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

2005 Florida Brevard 70% A 1 0 1 0 3,126 338 139 199 0 0.00 0.00 0.11

2005 Florida Brevard 75% A 1 0 1 0 3,938 379 171 208 0 0.00 0.00 0.10

2005 Florida Dixie 50% A 1 0 2 0 12,869 750 248 502 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2005 Florida Dixie 50% C 1 0 3 0 25,377 1,536 0 1,536 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2005 Florida Dixie 65% A 8 0 10 0 98,347 7,824 3,209 4,615 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

163
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County, Coverage Level Percentage

Table 1.8

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State County Name 

 Coverage 

Level 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2005 Florida Dixie 70% A 9 3 11 4 117,650 11,305 4,634 6,671 37,404 3.31 0.32 0.10

2005 Florida Dixie 75% A 1 1 1 1 39,376 2,806 1,263 1,543 19,156 6.83 0.49 0.07

2005 Florida Indian River 50% A 1 0 1 0 14,438 728 240 488 0 0.00 0.00 0.05

2005 Florida Indian River 60% A 2 0 3 0 25,200 1,702 614 1,088 0 0.00 0.00 0.07

2005 Florida Indian River 70% A 4 0 5 0 66,532 6,155 2,523 3,632 0 0.00 0.00 0.09

2005 Florida Indian River 75% A 7 0 7 0 69,138 6,113 2,751 3,362 0 0.00 0.00 0.09

2005 Florida Levy 50% A 4 1 7 1 393,628 21,444 7,077 14,367 19,570 0.91 0.05 0.05

2005 Florida Levy 50% C 19 0 30 0 702,140 43,825 0 43,825 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2005 Florida Levy 55% A 1 0 1 0 96,985 5,674 2,043 3,631 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2005 Florida Levy 60% A 5 0 6 0 285,075 19,244 6,927 12,317 0 0.00 0.00 0.07

2005 Florida Levy 65% A 22 4 33 4 1,347,780 99,753 40,901 58,852 19,858 0.20 0.01 0.07

2005 Florida Levy 70% A 17 0 27 0 520,782 51,993 21,317 30,676 0 0.00 0.00 0.10

2005 Florida Levy 75% A 17 4 23 4 677,462 68,978 31,039 37,939 140,432 2.04 0.21 0.10

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% A 1 0 3 0 75,060 1,231 406 825 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% C 10 1 16 1 547,893 9,058 0 9,058 108,936 12.03 0.20 0.02

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 60% A 2 0 6 0 407,981 8,813 3,174 5,639 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 65% A 6 2 12 3 721,998 19,910 8,162 11,748 271,338 13.63 0.38 0.03

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 70% A 1 1 2 2 71,820 2,521 1,033 1,488 7,759 3.08 0.11 0.04

2005 Massachusetts Plymouth 50% A 1 0 1 0 222,858 3,732 1,232 2,500 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 South Carolina Beaufort 50% C 1 0 1 0 115,500 1,767 0 1,767 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 South Carolina Charleston 50% C 1 0 2 0 157,262 2,529 0 2,529 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 South Carolina Charleston 60% A 1 0 1 0 325,162 6,388 2,300 4,088 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 Virginia Accomack 50% A 3 0 4 0 54,222 949 314 635 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 Virginia Accomack 60% A 6 0 6 0 158,508 4,005 1,441 2,564 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2005 Virginia Accomack 65% A 5 0 5 0 285,558 8,852 3,629 5,223 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2005 Virginia Accomack 70% A 6 0 6 0 124,036 4,889 2,005 2,884 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2005 Virginia Northampton 50% A 16 0 27 0 1,360,334 23,412 7,727 15,685 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 Virginia Northampton 50% C 17 0 59 0 5,547,772 95,157 0 95,157 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 Virginia Northampton 60% A 2 0 5 0 3,306,356 73,620 26,502 47,118 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 Virginia Northampton 65% A 1 0 2 0 109,200 3,120 1,279 1,841 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2006 Florida Brevard 65% A 1 0 1 0 6,825 885 363 522 0 0.00 0.00 0.13

2006 Florida Brevard 75% A 1 0 1 0 10,500 1,106 498 608 0 0.00 0.00 0.11

2006 Florida Dixie 50% C 1 0 1 0 30,100 2,111 0 2,111 0 0.00 0.00 0.07

2006 Florida Dixie 60% A 1 0 1 0 18,346 1,354 487 867 0 0.00 0.00 0.07

2006 Florida Dixie 65% A 2 0 2 0 9,100 754 310 444 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

2006 Florida Dixie 70% A 3 0 3 0 63,955 6,044 2,478 3,566 0 0.00 0.00 0.09

2006 Florida Dixie 75% A 1 0 1 0 39,375 4,147 1,866 2,281 0 0.00 0.00 0.11

2006 Florida Indian River 50% C 1 0 1 0 22,407 911 0 911 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2006 Florida Indian River 60% A 1 0 1 0 21,000 1,550 558 992 0 0.00 0.00 0.07

2006 Florida Indian River 70% A 2 0 2 0 50,225 4,747 1,946 2,801 0 0.00 0.00 0.09

2006 Florida Indian River 75% A 5 0 5 0 99,750 10,503 4,727 5,776 0 0.00 0.00 0.11

2006 Florida Levy 50% A 4 0 4 0 213,500 11,913 3,930 7,983 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2006 Florida Levy 50% C 20 0 20 0 987,793 56,679 0 56,679 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2006 Florida Levy 60% A 4 0 5 0 334,479 25,118 9,043 16,075 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

2006 Florida Levy 65% A 21 4 23 5 2,877,946 249,562 102,319 147,243 204,230 0.82 0.07 0.09

2006 Florida Levy 70% A 9 2 9 2 517,629 50,722 20,797 29,925 89,869 1.77 0.17 0.10

2006 Florida Levy 75% A 12 3 12 3 726,128 76,407 34,384 42,023 147,764 1.93 0.20 0.11

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% A 1 0 2 0 51,300 1,048 345 703 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% C 11 0 11 0 650,506 11,847 0 11,847 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

164
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County, Coverage Level Percentage

Table 1.8

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State County Name 

 Coverage 

Level 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 60% A 4 2 6 2 586,440 15,484 5,574 9,910 109,025 7.04 0.19 0.03

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 65% A 6 2 10 2 385,067 13,141 5,386 7,755 14,008 1.07 0.04 0.03

2006 Massachusetts Plymouth 50% A 1 0 1 0 291,600 5,249 1,732 3,517 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 South Carolina Beaufort 50% C 1 0 1 0 115,500 1,975 0 1,975 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 South Carolina Charleston 50% C 1 0 1 0 147,840 2,528 0 2,528 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 South Carolina Charleston 55% A 1 0 1 0 237,190 4,981 1,793 3,188 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 Virginia Accomack 50% A 2 0 2 0 61,868 1,141 376 765 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 Virginia Accomack 60% A 4 0 4 0 200,910 5,487 1,976 3,511 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2006 Virginia Accomack 65% A 4 0 4 0 526,871 16,225 6,651 9,574 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2006 Virginia Accomack 70% A 4 0 4 0 186,553 8,203 3,362 4,841 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2006 Virginia Northampton 50% A 29 3 36 3 11,712,835 215,581 71,141 144,440 112,317 0.52 0.01 0.02

2006 Virginia Northampton 50% C 1 0 1 0 72,186 1,363 0 1,363 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 Virginia Northampton 60% A 5 0 9 0 4,863,586 122,755 44,192 78,563 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2007 Florida Brevard 65% A 1 0 1 0 11,375 942 386 556 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

2007 Florida Brevard 70% A 1 0 1 0 8,820 365 150 215 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2007 Florida Brevard 75% A 1 0 1 0 10,500 1,106 498 608 0 0.00 0.00 0.11

2007 Florida Indian River 50% C 1 0 1 0 22,754 1,270 0 1,270 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2007 Florida Indian River 70% A 2 0 2 0 34,545 3,108 1,274 1,834 0 0.00 0.00 0.09

2007 Florida Indian River 75% A 4 0 4 0 91,597 9,645 4,340 5,305 0 0.00 0.00 0.11

2007 Florida Levy 50% A 4 1 6 1 310,058 18,991 6,266 12,725 22,412 1.18 0.07 0.06

2007 Florida Levy 50% C 14 0 14 0 963,086 55,435 0 55,435 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2007 Florida Levy 60% A 8 2 12 2 1,269,282 93,973 33,830 60,143 10,490 0.11 0.01 0.07

2007 Florida Levy 65% A 14 2 17 2 1,912,275 169,739 69,588 100,151 28,905 0.17 0.02 0.09

2007 Florida Levy 70% A 13 5 14 5 1,034,340 103,459 42,421 61,038 139,738 1.35 0.14 0.10

2007 Florida Levy 75% A 7 2 8 2 627,777 59,996 26,999 32,997 169,468 2.82 0.27 0.10

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% A 5 0 5 0 299,948 5,487 1,810 3,677 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% C 7 2 7 2 339,820 6,192 0 6,192 53,016 8.56 0.16 0.02

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 60% A 3 1 3 1 543,024 13,332 4,798 8,534 3,940 0.30 0.01 0.02

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 65% A 4 2 8 2 379,115 12,035 4,934 7,101 29,562 2.46 0.08 0.03

2007 Massachusetts Plymouth 50% A 1 0 1 0 256,500 4,641 1,531 3,110 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 South Carolina Charleston 50% C 1 0 1 0 125,203 2,247 0 2,247 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 South Carolina Charleston 55% A 1 0 1 0 157,472 3,307 1,190 2,117 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 Virginia Accomack 50% A 2 0 2 0 65,475 1,217 402 815 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 Virginia Accomack 60% A 2 0 2 0 135,758 3,484 1,255 2,229 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2007 Virginia Accomack 65% A 8 1 8 1 915,707 27,950 11,460 16,490 22,680 0.81 0.02 0.03

2007 Virginia Accomack 70% A 2 1 2 1 269,325 11,869 4,867 7,002 21,809 1.84 0.08 0.04

2007 Virginia Northampton 50% A 29 0 33 0 11,219,003 205,155 67,701 137,454 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 Virginia Northampton 50% C 2 0 2 0 164,382 3,021 0 3,021 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 Virginia Northampton 60% A 7 0 7 0 5,613,070 155,097 55,838 99,259 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2008 Florida Brevard 65% A 1 1 1 1 75,724 6,764 2,773 3,991 34,290 5.07 0.45 0.09

2008 Florida Indian River 70% A 1 1 1 1 23,520 2,223 911 1,312 7,461 3.36 0.32 0.09

2008 Florida Indian River 75% A 3 0 3 0 126,000 13,268 5,971 7,297 0 0.00 0.00 0.11

2008 Florida Levy 50% A 1 0 2 0 141,750 8,735 2,882 5,853 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2008 Florida Levy 50% C 11 0 11 0 838,369 55,797 0 55,797 0 0.00 0.00 0.07

2008 Florida Levy 55% A 1 0 2 0 90,321 8,039 2,894 5,145 0 0.00 0.00 0.09

2008 Florida Levy 60% A 7 0 14 0 1,189,304 113,278 40,778 72,500 0 0.00 0.00 0.10

2008 Florida Levy 65% A 6 1 13 1 843,738 108,369 44,432 63,937 11,088 0.10 0.01 0.13

2008 Florida Levy 70% A 9 3 9 3 405,614 40,837 16,742 24,095 100,993 2.47 0.25 0.10

2008 Florida Levy 75% A 6 3 8 3 985,302 85,204 38,342 46,862 192,188 2.26 0.20 0.09

165
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County, Coverage Level Percentage

Table 1.8

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State County Name 

 Coverage 

Level 

 Coverage 

Flag 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% A 5 0 5 0 255,690 5,694 1,878 3,816 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% C 4 1 4 1 224,728 4,458 0 4,458 22,089 4.95 0.10 0.02

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable 60% A 3 0 3 0 593,517 17,429 6,276 11,153 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable 65% A 3 1 3 1 391,049 14,524 5,955 8,569 38,936 2.68 0.10 0.04

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable 75% A 1 0 1 0 118,960 6,637 2,987 3,650 0 0.00 0.00 0.06

2008 Virginia Accomack 50% A 2 0 2 0 102,720 1,992 657 1,335 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2008 Virginia Accomack 60% A 2 0 2 0 195,654 5,112 1,840 3,272 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2008 Virginia Accomack 65% A 6 0 6 0 1,514,595 43,121 17,681 25,440 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2008 Virginia Accomack 70% A 4 0 4 0 386,911 16,604 6,807 9,797 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2008 Virginia Northampton 50% A 28 0 35 0 14,364,510 289,241 95,450 193,791 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2008 Virginia Northampton 50% C 1 0 1 0 72,222 1,348 0 1,348 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2008 Virginia Northampton 60% A 6 0 6 0 7,902,624 202,121 72,763 129,358 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2009 Florida Brevard 65% A 1 0 1 0 3,538 366 150 216 0 0.00 0.00 0.10

2009 Florida Indian River 70% A 1 0 1 0 8,820 667 273 394 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

2009 Florida Indian River 75% A 2 0 2 0 47,250 3,997 1,798 2,199 0 0.00 0.00 0.08

2009 Florida Levy 50% A 10 5 10 5 1,733,702 57,828 19,081 38,747 276,405 4.78 0.16 0.03

2009 Florida Levy 50% C 19 4 19 4 1,328,219 66,532 0 66,532 151,480 2.28 0.11 0.05

2009 Florida Levy 60% A 1 1 1 1 151,200 8,981 3,233 5,748 147,838 16.46 0.98 0.06

2009 Florida Levy 70% A 8 4 8 4 343,476 29,186 11,966 17,220 153,231 5.25 0.45 0.08

2009 Florida Levy 75% A 6 5 6 5 735,767 59,316 26,692 32,624 599,471 10.11 0.81 0.08

2009 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% A 3 0 3 0 243,454 4,222 1,394 2,828 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2009 Massachusetts Barnstable 60% A 2 0 2 0 673,596 14,439 5,197 9,242 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2009 Massachusetts Barnstable 65% A 3 0 3 0 389,205 11,711 4,801 6,910 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2009 Massachusetts Barnstable 75% A 1 0 1 0 156,124 7,025 3,162 3,863 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2009 Virginia Accomack 50% A 2 0 2 0 120,480 1,839 607 1,232 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2009 Virginia Accomack 60% A 2 0 2 0 60,480 1,306 470 836 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2009 Virginia Accomack 65% A 7 2 7 2 2,097,591 54,205 22,226 31,979 228,088 4.21 0.11 0.03

2009 Virginia Accomack 70% A 4 0 4 0 250,656 8,358 3,427 4,931 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2009 Virginia Northampton 50% A 28 0 30 0 13,094,715 211,530 69,801 141,729 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2009 Virginia Northampton 50% C 1 0 1 0 125,004 1,848 0 1,848 0 0.00 0.00 0.01

2009 Virginia Northampton 60% A 6 0 6 0 6,317,217 131,038 47,172 83,866 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 Florida Brevard 65% A 1 1 1 1 4,571 378 155 223 4,571 12.09 1.00 0.08

2010 Florida Levy 50% C 1 0 2 0 78,925 3,552 0 3,552 0 0.00 0.00 0.05

2010 Florida Levy 75% A 1 1 4 4 141,531 13,591 6,116 7,475 49,790 3.66 0.35 0.10

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable 50% A 2 0 2 0 98,940 1,584 523 1,061 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable 60% A 5 0 5 0 593,525 14,165 5,099 9,066 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable 65% A 3 1 3 1 470,521 13,955 5,723 8,232 18,658 1.34 0.04 0.03

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable 75% A 2 0 2 0 223,268 10,329 4,648 5,681 0 0.00 0.00 0.05

2010 South Carolina Charleston 55% A 1 0 1 0 18,710 393 141 252 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 Virginia Accomack 50% A 1 0 1 0 22,500 370 124 246 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 Virginia Accomack 60% A 2 1 2 1 106,110 2,546 917 1,629 24,300 9.54 0.23 0.02

2010 Virginia Accomack 65% A 6 0 6 0 1,959,828 43,210 17,717 25,493 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 Virginia Accomack 70% A 4 1 4 1 182,070 6,070 2,490 3,580 28,771 4.74 0.16 0.03

2010 Virginia Northampton 50% A 24 0 24 0 11,594,130 182,582 60,254 122,328 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 Virginia Northampton 50% C 2 0 2 0 1,779,666 25,680 0 25,680 0 0.00 0.00 0.01

2010 Virginia Northampton 60% A 5 0 5 0 4,798,140 106,391 38,305 68,086 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 Virginia Northampton 65% A 1 0 1 0 57,184 1,450 594 856 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

Total 2683 632 4023 721 368,079,420 12,218,348 4,520,374 7,070,110 17,819,777

166
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Reporting Organization

Table 1.9

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Reporting 

Organization 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

HB 43 19 43 19 4,256,152 218,779 59,593 159,186 1,328,425 6.07 0.31 0.05

HL 42 15 82 16 4,151,545 326,380 133,959 176,787 449,316 1.38 0.11 0.08

MB 66 16 81 16 5,886,669 528,105 178,156 349,949 653,635 1.24 0.11 0.09

MJ 1319 219 2140 256 205,865,298 5,742,708 1,988,911 3,515,034 5,006,783 0.87 0.02 0.03

MN 316 115 393 133 21,589,186 950,812 418,855 288,954 2,410,440 2.54 0.11 0.04

OW 296 49 338 50 77,437,333 1,956,478 700,583 1,208,697 1,867,153 0.95 0.02 0.03

PW 224 91 370 103 17,110,113 829,322 339,301 490,021 2,285,227 2.76 0.13 0.05

SU 6 1 10 4 312,738 24,871 9,566 15,305 49,790 2.00 0.16 0.08

YH 371 107 566 124 31,470,386 1,640,893 691,450 866,177 3,769,008 2.30 0.12 0.05

Total 2683 632 4023 721 368,079,420 12,218,348 4,520,374 7,070,110 17,819,777 1.46 0.05 0.03

167
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, Reporting Organization

Table 1.10

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year 

 Reporting 

Organization 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2000 HL 8 7 15 8 575,393 37,240 21,606 0 210,917 5.66 0.37 0.06

2000 MJ 103 14 122 14 18,115,597 381,860 143,097 0 195,055 0.51 0.01 0.02

2000 MN 148 46 176 53 11,250,090 465,660 222,657 0 997,674 2.14 0.09 0.04

2000 OW 27 5 40 5 2,396,462 83,055 35,857 0 114,459 1.38 0.05 0.03

2000 YH 49 19 62 21 3,783,263 157,966 74,700 0 551,470 3.49 0.15 0.04

2001 HL 9 7 18 7 737,463 53,569 23,492 30,077 190,743 3.56 0.26 0.07

2001 MJ 92 3 132 4 16,548,627 334,380 110,032 224,348 319,648 0.96 0.02 0.02

2001 MN 168 69 217 80 10,339,096 485,152 196,198 288,954 1,412,766 2.91 0.14 0.05

2001 OW 33 8 46 8 2,640,009 94,983 32,518 62,465 175,417 1.85 0.07 0.04

2001 YH 75 25 152 26 10,950,073 432,522 169,895 262,627 782,124 1.81 0.07 0.04

2002 HL 8 1 16 1 457,106 30,254 13,048 17,206 47,656 1.58 0.10 0.07

2002 MJ 86 2 213 2 19,885,704 433,515 144,357 289,158 42,809 0.10 0.00 0.02

2002 OW 37 6 40 6 14,273,477 366,623 131,807 234,816 186,604 0.51 0.01 0.03

2002 PW 224 91 370 103 17,110,113 829,322 339,301 490,021 2,285,227 2.76 0.13 0.05

2002 YH 117 34 154 43 8,226,213 520,989 221,005 299,984 1,456,952 2.80 0.18 0.06

2003 HL 2 0 4 0 108,046 8,968 4,036 4,932 0.00 0.00 0.08

2003 MJ 260 62 476 68 37,812,663 1,203,578 449,987 753,591 1,645,970 1.37 0.04 0.03

2003 OW 25 4 28 4 4,745,777 118,436 39,635 78,801 150,088 1.27 0.03 0.02

2003 YH 130 29 198 34 8,510,837 529,416 225,850 303,566 978,462 1.85 0.11 0.06

2004 MJ 271 97 529 123 22,087,603 843,686 293,063 550,623 1,459,357 1.73 0.07 0.04

2004 OW 22 14 26 15 5,613,739 125,495 41,770 83,725 723,045 5.76 0.13 0.02

2005 MJ 177 17 303 20 13,541,430 515,371 146,119 369,252 624,453 1.21 0.05 0.04

2005 OW 25 0 28 0 4,618,183 110,289 40,297 69,992 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 MJ 140 15 158 16 19,491,388 762,459 265,689 496,770 584,622 0.77 0.03 0.04

2006 OW 24 1 27 1 6,627,922 169,062 60,545 108,517 92,591 0.55 0.01 0.03

2007 MB 42 9 53 9 3,834,982 315,626 107,923 207,703 349,366 1.11 0.09 0.08

2007 MJ 74 6 82 6 15,321,971 445,047 156,560 288,487 69,814 0.16 0.00 0.03

2007 OW 28 4 28 4 7,623,258 212,390 77,055 135,335 82,840 0.39 0.01 0.03

2008 HL 15 0 29 0 2,273,537 196,349 71,777 124,572 0.00 0.00 0.09

2008 MB 24 7 28 7 2,051,687 212,479 70,233 142,246 304,269 1.43 0.15 0.10

2008 MJ 47 2 54 2 16,072,620 360,854 122,776 238,078 46,397 0.13 0.00 0.02

2008 OW 25 2 25 2 10,444,978 281,113 103,233 177,880 56,379 0.20 0.01 0.03

2009 HB 43 19 43 19 4,256,152 218,779 59,593 159,186 1,328,425 6.07 0.31 0.05

2009 MJ 36 0 38 0 14,163,326 241,856 81,837 160,019 0.00 0.00 0.02

2009 OW 24 2 24 2 9,368,734 206,031 76,570 129,461 228,088 1.11 0.02 0.02

2009 SU 4 0 4 0 92,282 7,728 3,450 4,278 0.00 0.00 0.08

2010 MJ 33 1 33 1 12,824,369 220,102 75,394 144,708 18,658 0.08 0.00 0.02

2010 OW 26 3 26 3 9,084,794 189,001 61,296 127,705 57,642 0.30 0.01 0.02

2010 SU 2 1 6 4 220,456 17,143 6,116 11,027 49,790 2.90 0.23 0.08

Total 2683 632 4023 721 368,079,420 12,218,348 4,520,374 7,070,110 17,819,777 1.46 0.05 0.03

168
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County, Reporting Organization

Table 1.11

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Reporting 

Organization 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2000 Florida Brevard MJ 2 2 2 2 197,694 8,577 4,205 0 83,589 9.75 0.42 0.04

2000 Florida Brevard MN 4 1 4 1 134,959 3,973 1,321 0 9,492 2.39 0.07 0.03

2000 Florida Brevard OW 1 0 1 0 4,388 190 93 0 0.00 0.00 0.04

2000 Florida Brevard YH 7 2 7 2 243,360 10,068 4,819 0 38,522 3.83 0.16 0.04

2000 Florida Dixie MN 42 24 55 31 1,940,161 75,031 33,997 0 573,106 7.64 0.30 0.04

2000 Florida Dixie OW 3 2 6 2 184,440 7,083 3,272 0 72,012 10.17 0.39 0.04

2000 Florida Dixie YH 5 4 6 4 258,195 10,509 4,937 0 52,439 4.99 0.20 0.04

2000 Florida Indian River OW 1 0 1 0 44,963 1,335 562 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 Florida Indian River YH 15 7 19 8 1,931,198 85,158 41,140 0 260,557 3.06 0.13 0.04

2000 Florida Levy HL 8 7 15 8 575,393 37,240 21,606 0 210,917 5.66 0.37 0.06

2000 Florida Levy MJ 2 1 2 1 75,637 3,268 1,598 0 3,660 1.12 0.05 0.04

2000 Florida Levy MN 102 21 117 21 9,174,970 386,656 187,339 0 415,076 1.07 0.05 0.04

2000 Florida Levy OW 17 3 27 3 1,466,260 54,400 24,031 0 42,447 0.78 0.03 0.04

2000 Florida Levy YH 22 6 30 7 1,350,510 52,231 23,804 0 199,952 3.83 0.15 0.04

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable MJ 40 11 53 11 2,517,191 64,298 28,271 0 107,806 1.68 0.04 0.03

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable OW 5 0 5 0 696,411 20,047 7,899 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 South Carolina Beaufort MJ 1 0 1 0 1,188,101 36,356 17,778 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 South Carolina Charleston MJ 4 0 8 0 209,475 5,402 1,884 0 0.00 0.00 0.03

2000 Virginia Accomack MJ 14 0 14 0 1,358,400 25,673 8,660 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2000 Virginia Northampton MJ 40 0 42 0 12,569,099 238,286 80,701 0 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 Florida Brevard MJ 2 1 2 1 32,729 1,428 585 843 18,448 12.92 0.56 0.04

2001 Florida Brevard MN 20 18 25 18 1,034,865 59,251 24,263 34,988 344,163 5.81 0.33 0.06

2001 Florida Brevard OW 6 2 6 2 160,068 7,083 2,847 4,236 16,622 2.35 0.10 0.04

2001 Florida Brevard YH 3 1 3 1 198,770 11,179 4,583 6,596 140,843 12.60 0.71 0.06

2001 Florida Dixie MN 44 15 54 15 1,917,445 88,149 36,086 52,063 57,757 0.66 0.03 0.05

2001 Florida Dixie OW 0 0 1 0 9,035 391 160 231 0.00 0.00 0.04

2001 Florida Dixie YH 10 5 16 5 328,518 20,832 8,881 11,951 58,427 2.80 0.18 0.06

2001 Florida Indian River MJ 1 0 1 0 592 26 11 15 0.00 0.00 0.04

2001 Florida Indian River MN 30 14 41 18 1,665,546 95,716 39,232 56,484 360,290 3.76 0.22 0.06

2001 Florida Indian River OW 1 0 1 0 3,380 146 60 86 0.00 0.00 0.04

2001 Florida Levy HL 9 7 18 7 737,463 53,569 23,492 30,077 190,743 3.56 0.26 0.07

2001 Florida Levy MJ 1 0 1 0 57,362 4,286 1,929 2,357 0.00 0.00 0.07

2001 Florida Levy MN 74 22 97 29 5,721,240 242,036 96,617 145,419 650,556 2.69 0.11 0.04

2001 Florida Levy OW 19 6 31 6 1,912,390 76,969 29,051 47,918 158,795 2.06 0.08 0.04

2001 Florida Levy YH 44 18 67 19 4,516,426 260,962 106,788 154,174 529,668 2.03 0.12 0.06

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable MJ 32 1 32 1 1,998,277 51,152 15,669 35,483 150,000 2.93 0.08 0.03

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable OW 6 0 6 0 523,286 9,419 0 9,419 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 South Carolina Charleston MJ 4 0 9 0 372,645 7,764 2,380 5,384 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 South Carolina Charleston OW 1 0 1 0 31,850 975 400 575 0.00 0.00 0.03

2001 Virginia Accomack MJ 6 0 8 0 238,560 4,508 1,488 3,020 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 Virginia Accomack YH 12 0 45 0 3,417,943 82,262 29,804 52,458 0.00 0.00 0.02

2001 Virginia Northampton MJ 46 1 79 2 13,848,462 265,216 87,970 177,246 151,200 0.57 0.01 0.02

2001 Virginia Northampton YH 6 1 21 1 2,488,416 57,287 19,839 37,448 53,186 0.93 0.02 0.02

2002 Florida Brevard OW 7 4 7 4 278,761 11,921 4,770 7,151 118,745 9.96 0.43 0.04

2002 Florida Brevard PW 3 1 3 1 94,609 4,641 1,903 2,738 12,978 2.80 0.14 0.05

2002 Florida Brevard YH 16 3 17 3 913,088 58,190 24,884 33,306 142,292 2.45 0.16 0.06

2002 Florida Dixie PW 65 22 99 24 2,823,580 129,058 52,430 76,628 144,399 1.12 0.05 0.05

169
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County, Reporting Organization

Table 1.11

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Reporting 

Organization 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2002 Florida Dixie YH 10 2 14 2 352,450 20,939 8,758 12,181 14,321 0.68 0.04 0.06

2002 Florida Indian River MJ 1 0 1 0 4,969 215 88 127 0.00 0.00 0.04

2002 Florida Indian River OW 2 0 2 0 147,030 6,351 2,604 3,747 0.00 0.00 0.04

2002 Florida Indian River PW 4 1 4 1 110,841 6,132 2,558 3,574 45,881 7.48 0.41 0.06

2002 Florida Indian River YH 32 3 46 4 1,795,721 119,306 51,109 68,197 87,869 0.74 0.05 0.07

2002 Florida Levy HL 8 1 16 1 457,106 30,254 13,048 17,206 47,656 1.58 0.10 0.07

2002 Florida Levy MJ 1 0 1 0 69,962 5,227 2,352 2,875 0.00 0.00 0.07

2002 Florida Levy OW 3 1 4 1 228,428 10,133 4,116 6,017 16,252 1.60 0.07 0.04

2002 Florida Levy PW 152 67 264 77 14,081,083 689,491 282,410 407,081 2,081,969 3.02 0.15 0.05

2002 Florida Levy YH 58 26 75 34 5,030,641 318,444 134,569 183,875 1,212,470 3.81 0.24 0.06

2002 Massachusetts Barnstable MJ 27 0 28 0 2,448,072 64,237 21,344 42,893 0.00 0.00 0.03

2002 Massachusetts Barnstable OW 4 0 4 0 262,387 4,723 0 4,723 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 South Carolina Beaufort OW 1 0 1 0 151,778 2,869 947 1,922 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 South Carolina Charleston MJ 4 0 15 0 714,263 14,939 4,732 10,207 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 South Carolina Charleston OW 3 0 3 0 376,821 12,570 5,154 7,416 0.00 0.00 0.03

2002 Virginia Accomack MJ 4 0 8 0 354,195 7,047 2,324 4,723 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 Virginia Accomack OW 12 0 13 0 8,615,882 194,097 68,474 125,623 0.00 0.00 0.02

2002 Virginia Northampton MJ 49 2 160 2 16,294,243 341,850 113,517 228,333 42,809 0.13 0.00 0.02

2002 Virginia Northampton OW 5 1 6 1 4,212,390 123,959 45,742 78,217 51,607 0.42 0.01 0.03

2002 Virginia Northampton YH 1 0 2 0 134,313 4,110 1,685 2,425 0.00 0.00 0.03

2003 Florida Brevard MJ 2 1 2 1 67,198 2,902 1,189 1,713 29,376 10.12 0.44 0.04

2003 Florida Brevard OW 6 2 6 2 184,581 7,406 2,867 4,539 56,789 7.67 0.31 0.04

2003 Florida Brevard YH 9 1 11 1 343,286 23,504 10,236 13,268 126,815 5.40 0.37 0.07

2003 Florida Dixie MJ 46 18 68 19 2,121,638 119,032 48,917 70,115 258,287 2.17 0.12 0.06

2003 Florida Dixie YH 24 2 30 3 648,118 34,241 14,332 19,909 17,869 0.52 0.03 0.05

2003 Florida Indian River MJ 3 0 3 0 50,974 3,141 1,363 1,778 0.00 0.00 0.06

2003 Florida Indian River YH 27 5 42 5 1,410,716 95,278 40,924 54,354 86,920 0.91 0.06 0.07

2003 Florida Levy HL 2 0 4 0 108,046 8,968 4,036 4,932 0.00 0.00 0.08

2003 Florida Levy MJ 118 27 189 30 9,208,332 504,418 207,419 296,999 633,872 1.26 0.07 0.05

2003 Florida Levy OW 2 0 3 0 104,607 4,359 1,687 2,672 0.00 0.00 0.04

2003 Florida Levy YH 70 21 115 25 6,108,717 376,393 160,358 216,035 746,858 1.98 0.12 0.06

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable MJ 26 7 28 7 2,371,793 58,734 18,598 40,136 189,520 3.23 0.08 0.02

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable OW 4 0 4 0 438,901 7,900 0 7,900 0.00 0.00 0.02

2003 South Carolina Beaufort MJ 4 0 7 0 348,590 15,014 6,157 8,857 0.00 0.00 0.04

2003 South Carolina Charleston MJ 10 1 15 1 1,116,762 27,877 9,835 18,042 77,599 2.78 0.07 0.02

2003 South Carolina Charleston OW 1 0 1 0 162,731 4,980 2,042 2,938 0.00 0.00 0.03

2003 Virginia Accomack MJ 9 3 43 3 5,415,101 113,879 37,736 76,143 198,925 1.75 0.04 0.02

2003 Virginia Accomack OW 7 1 8 1 3,096,240 73,825 25,753 48,072 76,510 1.04 0.02 0.02

2003 Virginia Northampton MJ 42 5 121 7 17,112,275 358,581 118,773 239,808 258,391 0.72 0.02 0.02

2003 Virginia Northampton OW 5 1 6 1 758,717 19,966 7,286 12,680 16,789 0.84 0.02 0.03

2004 Florida Brevard MJ 6 5 6 5 52,874 7,092 3,090 4,002 43,716 6.16 0.83 0.13

2004 Florida Brevard OW 2 2 2 2 71,663 5,418 2,222 3,196 16,492 3.04 0.23 0.08

2004 Florida Dixie MJ 41 18 54 27 651,471 65,968 25,799 40,169 124,491 1.89 0.19 0.10

2004 Florida Dixie OW 1 1 1 1 51,188 3,870 1,587 2,283 1,877 0.49 0.04 0.08

2004 Florida Indian River MJ 18 11 29 15 447,830 51,214 21,853 29,361 177,515 3.47 0.40 0.11

2004 Florida Levy MJ 124 49 162 58 4,063,989 391,262 145,346 245,916 686,482 1.75 0.17 0.10

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable MJ 24 3 40 4 1,702,614 42,040 12,533 29,507 77,958 1.85 0.05 0.02

170
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County, Reporting Organization

Table 1.11

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Reporting 

Organization 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable OW 2 0 2 0 418,365 6,780 2,165 4,615 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 South Carolina Beaufort MJ 4 0 6 0 227,527 5,583 2,090 3,493 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 South Carolina Charleston MJ 3 0 3 0 419,124 9,126 2,900 6,226 0.00 0.00 0.02

2004 South Carolina Charleston OW 1 1 1 1 189,925 4,386 1,579 2,807 31,938 7.28 0.17 0.02

2004 Virginia Accomack MJ 8 2 45 2 2,499,553 46,491 4,715 41,776 45,890 0.99 0.02 0.02

2004 Virginia Accomack OW 11 9 12 9 1,809,738 38,433 10,634 27,799 641,192 16.68 0.35 0.02

2004 Virginia Northampton MJ 43 9 184 12 12,022,621 224,910 74,737 150,173 303,305 1.35 0.03 0.02

2004 Virginia Northampton OW 5 1 8 2 3,072,860 66,608 23,583 43,025 31,546 0.47 0.01 0.02

2005 Florida Brevard MJ 2 0 2 0 7,064 717 310 407 0.00 0.00 0.10

2005 Florida Brevard OW 1 0 1 0 68,250 5,160 2,116 3,044 0.00 0.00 0.08

2005 Florida Dixie MJ 19 4 26 5 259,494 21,641 8,296 13,345 56,560 2.61 0.22 0.08

2005 Florida Dixie OW 1 0 1 0 34,125 2,580 1,058 1,522 0.00 0.00 0.08

2005 Florida Indian River MJ 14 0 16 0 175,308 14,698 6,128 8,570 0.00 0.00 0.08

2005 Florida Levy MJ 85 9 127 9 4,023,852 310,911 109,304 201,607 179,860 0.58 0.04 0.08

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable MJ 20 4 39 6 1,824,752 41,533 12,775 28,758 388,033 9.34 0.21 0.02

2005 Massachusetts Plymouth OW 1 0 1 0 222,858 3,732 1,232 2,500 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 South Carolina Beaufort MJ 1 0 1 0 115,500 1,767 0 1,767 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 South Carolina Charleston MJ 1 0 2 0 157,262 2,529 0 2,529 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 South Carolina Charleston OW 1 0 1 0 325,162 6,388 2,300 4,088 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 Virginia Accomack MJ 3 0 4 0 58,254 1,348 492 856 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 Virginia Accomack OW 17 0 17 0 564,070 17,347 6,897 10,450 0.00 0.00 0.03

2005 Virginia Northampton MJ 32 0 86 0 6,919,944 120,227 8,814 111,413 0.00 0.00 0.02

2005 Virginia Northampton OW 4 0 7 0 3,403,718 75,082 26,694 48,388 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 Florida Brevard MJ 1 0 1 0 10,500 1,106 498 608 0.00 0.00 0.11

2006 Florida Brevard OW 1 0 1 0 6,825 885 363 522 0.00 0.00 0.13

2006 Florida Dixie MJ 8 0 8 0 160,876 14,410 5,141 9,269 0.00 0.00 0.09

2006 Florida Indian River MJ 9 0 9 0 193,382 17,711 7,231 10,480 0.00 0.00 0.09

2006 Florida Levy MJ 70 9 73 10 5,657,475 470,401 170,473 299,928 441,863 0.94 0.08 0.08

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable MJ 17 3 24 3 1,362,975 34,728 9,652 25,076 30,442 0.88 0.02 0.03

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable OW 5 1 5 1 310,338 6,792 1,653 5,139 92,591 13.63 0.30 0.02

2006 Massachusetts Plymouth OW 1 0 1 0 291,600 5,249 1,732 3,517 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 South Carolina Beaufort MJ 1 0 1 0 115,500 1,975 0 1,975 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 South Carolina Charleston MJ 1 0 1 0 147,840 2,528 0 2,528 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 South Carolina Charleston OW 1 0 1 0 237,190 4,981 1,793 3,188 0.00 0.00 0.02

2006 Virginia Accomack MJ 2 0 2 0 116,505 3,650 1,420 2,230 0.00 0.00 0.03

2006 Virginia Accomack OW 12 0 12 0 859,697 27,406 10,945 16,461 0.00 0.00 0.03

2006 Virginia Northampton MJ 31 3 39 3 11,726,335 215,950 71,274 144,676 112,317 0.52 0.01 0.02

2006 Virginia Northampton OW 4 0 7 0 4,922,272 123,749 44,059 79,690 0.00 0.00 0.03

2007 Florida Brevard MJ 2 0 2 0 19,320 1,471 648 823 0.00 0.00 0.08

2007 Florida Brevard OW 1 0 1 0 11,375 942 386 556 0.00 0.00 0.08

2007 Florida Indian River MJ 7 0 7 0 148,896 14,023 5,614 8,409 0.00 0.00 0.09

2007 Florida Levy MB 41 9 52 9 3,709,779 313,379 107,923 205,456 349,366 1.11 0.09 0.08

2007 Florida Levy MJ 19 3 19 3 2,407,039 188,214 71,181 117,033 21,647 0.12 0.01 0.08

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable MJ 14 3 18 3 1,378,658 33,383 11,043 22,340 48,167 1.44 0.03 0.02

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable OW 5 2 5 2 183,249 3,663 499 3,164 38,351 10.47 0.21 0.02

2007 Massachusetts Plymouth OW 1 0 1 0 256,500 4,641 1,531 3,110 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 South Carolina Charleston MB 1 0 1 0 125,203 2,247 0 2,247 0.00 0.00 0.02

171
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Insurance Experience by Crop Year, County, Reporting Organization

Table 1.11

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Reporting 

Organization 

 Policies 

Earning 

Premium 

 Policies 

Indemnified 

 Units 

Earning 

Premium 

 Units 

Indemnified Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2007 South Carolina Charleston OW 1 0 1 0 157,472 3,307 1,190 2,117 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 Virginia Accomack MJ 1 0 1 0 48,375 909 300 609 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 Virginia Accomack OW 13 2 13 2 1,337,890 43,611 17,684 25,927 44,489 1.02 0.03 0.03

2007 Virginia Northampton MJ 31 0 35 0 11,319,683 207,047 67,774 139,273 0.00 0.00 0.02

2007 Virginia Northampton OW 7 0 7 0 5,676,772 156,226 55,765 100,461 0.00 0.00 0.03

2008 Florida Brevard OW 1 1 1 1 75,724 6,764 2,773 3,991 34,290 5.07 0.45 0.09

2008 Florida Indian River MJ 4 1 4 1 149,520 15,491 6,882 8,609 7,461 0.48 0.05 0.10

2008 Florida Levy HL 15 0 29 0 2,273,537 196,349 71,777 124,572 0.00 0.00 0.09

2008 Florida Levy MB 24 7 28 7 2,051,687 212,479 70,233 142,246 304,269 1.43 0.15 0.10

2008 Florida Levy MJ 2 0 2 0 169,174 11,431 4,060 7,371 0.00 0.00 0.07

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable MJ 13 1 13 1 1,421,096 45,130 16,530 28,600 38,936 0.86 0.03 0.03

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable OW 3 1 3 1 162,848 3,612 566 3,046 22,089 6.12 0.14 0.02

2008 Virginia Accomack MJ 1 0 1 0 43,200 902 297 605 0.00 0.00 0.02

2008 Virginia Accomack OW 13 0 13 0 2,156,680 65,927 26,688 39,239 0.00 0.00 0.03

2008 Virginia Northampton MJ 27 0 34 0 14,289,630 287,900 95,007 192,893 0.00 0.00 0.02

2008 Virginia Northampton OW 8 0 8 0 8,049,726 204,810 73,206 131,604 0.00 0.00 0.03

2009 Florida Brevard OW 1 0 1 0 3,538 366 150 216 0.00 0.00 0.10

2009 Florida Indian River SU 3 0 3 0 56,070 4,664 2,071 2,593 0.00 0.00 0.08

2009 Florida Levy HB 43 19 43 19 4,256,152 218,779 59,593 159,186 1,328,425 6.07 0.31 0.05

2009 Florida Levy SU 1 0 1 0 36,212 3,064 1,379 1,685 0.00 0.00 0.08

2009 Massachusetts Barnstable MJ 8 0 8 0 1,131,899 31,192 12,321 18,871 0.00 0.00 0.03

2009 Massachusetts Barnstable OW 1 0 1 0 330,480 6,205 2,233 3,972 0.00 0.00 0.02

2009 Virginia Accomack MJ 1 0 1 0 50,400 830 274 556 0.00 0.00 0.02

2009 Virginia Accomack OW 14 2 14 2 2,478,807 64,878 26,456 38,422 228,088 3.52 0.09 0.03

2009 Virginia Northampton MJ 27 0 29 0 12,981,027 209,834 69,242 140,592 0.00 0.00 0.02

2009 Virginia Northampton OW 8 0 8 0 6,555,909 134,582 47,731 86,851 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 Florida Brevard OW 1 1 1 1 4,571 378 155 223 4,571 12.09 1.00 0.08

2010 Florida Levy SU 2 1 6 4 220,456 17,143 6,116 11,027 49,790 2.90 0.23 0.08

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable MJ 10 1 10 1 1,324,289 38,954 15,614 23,340 18,658 0.48 0.01 0.03

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable OW 2 0 2 0 61,965 1,079 379 700 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 South Carolina Charleston OW 1 0 1 0 18,710 393 141 252 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 Virginia Accomack OW 13 2 13 2 2,270,508 52,196 21,248 30,948 53,071 1.02 0.02 0.02

2010 Virginia Northampton MJ 23 0 23 0 11,500,080 181,148 59,780 121,368 0.00 0.00 0.02

2010 Virginia Northampton OW 9 0 9 0 6,729,040 134,955 39,373 95,582 0.00 0.00 0.02

Total 2683 632 4023 721 368,079,420 12,218,348 4,520,374 7,070,110 17,819,777 1.46 0.05 0.03

172
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Indemnity by Cause of Loss

Table 2.1

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

Description Indemnity Percent Indemnity

Disease, Aquaculture 615,161 3%

Excess Wind 41,028 0%

Freeze 2,327,174 13%

Hurricane 2,403,206 13%

Ice Floe 340,306 2%

Other 135,280 1%

Oxygen Depletion 1,472,829 8%

Salinity 7,115,158 40%

Storm Surge 3,350,580 19%

Tidal Wave 19,055 0%

Total 17,819,777 100%

173
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Indemnity by Crop Year and Cause of Loss

Table 2.2

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year Description Indemnity Percent Indemnity

2000 Disease, Aquaculture 205,758 10%

2000 Excess Wind 25,740 1%

2000 Freeze 148,879 7%

2000 Hurricane 472,528 23%

2000 Other 14,160 1%

2000 Oxygen Depletion 344,641 17%

2000 Salinity 817,885 40%

2000 Storm Surge 39,984 2%

2001 Disease, Aquaculture 151,200 5%

2001 Freeze 214,828 7%

2001 Hurricane 694,670 24%

2001 Oxygen Depletion 18,448 1%

2001 Salinity 708,366 25%

2001 Storm Surge 1,093,186 38%

2002 Disease, Aquaculture 51,607 1%

2002 Freeze 210,979 5%

2002 Other 63,542 2%

2002 Oxygen Depletion 373,246 9%

2002 Salinity 2,053,673 51%

2002 Storm Surge 1,266,201 32%

2003 Excess Wind 15,288 1%

2003 Freeze 469,084 17%

2003 Hurricane 35,542 1%

2003 Oxygen Depletion 56,789 2%

2003 Salinity 1,835,464 66%

2003 Storm Surge 362,353 13%

2004 Disease, Aquaculture 55,788 3%

2004 Freeze 991,662 45%

2004 Hurricane 1,004,500 46%

2004 Salinity 44,196 2%

2004 Storm Surge 86,256 4%

2005 Disease, Aquaculture 108,936 17%

2005 Freeze 7,759 1%

2005 Hurricane 83,649 13%

2005 Ice Floe 265,074 42%

2005 Other 53,007 8%

2005 Salinity 36,562 6%

2005 Storm Surge 50,411 8%

2005 Tidal Wave 19,055 3%

2006 Freeze 95,968 14%

2006 Hurricane 112,317 17%

2006 Ice Floe 27,065 4%

2006 Oxygen Depletion 273,550 40%

2006 Storm Surge 168,313 25%

2007 Disease, Aquaculture 34,411 7%

2007 Freeze 48,429 10%

2007 Ice Floe 48,167 10%

2007 Oxygen Depletion 278,015 55%

2007 Salinity 92,998 19%

2008 Disease, Aquaculture 7,461 2%

2008 Freeze 61,025 15%

2008 Oxygen Depletion 109,482 27%

2008 Salinity 197,589 49%

2008 Storm Surge 31,488 8%

2009 Salinity 1,328,425 85%

2009 Storm Surge 228,088 15%

2010 Freeze 78,561 62%

2010 Other 4,571 4%

2010 Oxygen Depletion 18,658 15%

2010 Storm Surge 24,300 19%

174
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Indemnity by Crop Year, County, and Cause of Loss

Table 2.3

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year State County Name Description Indemnity

2000 Florida Brevard Disease, Aquaculture 12,782

2000 Florida Brevard Excess Wind 25,740

2000 Florida Brevard Freeze 899

2000 Florida Brevard Oxygen Depletion 9,492

2000 Florida Brevard Salinity 82,690

2000 Florida Dixie Freeze 18,332

2000 Florida Dixie Hurricane 28,365

2000 Florida Dixie Oxygen Depletion 111,653

2000 Florida Dixie Salinity 539,207

2000 Florida Indian River Disease, Aquaculture 192,976

2000 Florida Indian River Hurricane 33,183

2000 Florida Indian River Salinity 34,398

2000 Florida Levy Freeze 21,842

2000 Florida Levy Hurricane 410,980

2000 Florida Levy Other 14,160

2000 Florida Levy Oxygen Depletion 223,496

2000 Florida Levy Salinity 161,590

2000 Florida Levy Storm Surge 39,984

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 107,806

2001 Florida Brevard Hurricane 379,332

2001 Florida Brevard Oxygen Depletion 18,448

2001 Florida Brevard Salinity 122,296

2001 Florida Dixie Salinity 68,290

2001 Florida Dixie Storm Surge 47,894

2001 Florida Indian River Hurricane 182,187

2001 Florida Indian River Salinity 178,103

2001 Florida Levy Freeze 11,642

2001 Florida Levy Hurricane 133,151

2001 Florida Levy Salinity 339,677

2001 Florida Levy Storm Surge 1,045,292

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 150,000

2001 Virginia Northampton Disease, Aquaculture 151,200

2001 Virginia Northampton Freeze 53,186

2002 Florida Brevard Oxygen Depletion 101,254

2002 Florida Brevard Salinity 172,761

2002 Florida Dixie Freeze 1,597

2002 Florida Dixie Other 10,315

2002 Florida Dixie Oxygen Depletion 16,566

2002 Florida Dixie Salinity 117,518

2002 Florida Dixie Storm Surge 12,724

2002 Florida Indian River Oxygen Depletion 7,062

2002 Florida Indian River Salinity 126,688

2002 Florida Levy Freeze 209,382

2002 Florida Levy Other 53,227

2002 Florida Levy Oxygen Depletion 248,364

2002 Florida Levy Salinity 1,636,706

2002 Florida Levy Storm Surge 1,210,668

2002 Virginia Northampton Disease, Aquaculture 51,607

2002 Virginia Northampton Storm Surge 42,809

2003 Florida Brevard Oxygen Depletion 56,789

2003 Florida Brevard Salinity 156,191

2003 Florida Dixie Salinity 276,156

2003 Florida Indian River Salinity 86,920

2003 Florida Levy Excess Wind 15,288

2003 Florida Levy Salinity 1,316,197

2003 Florida Levy Storm Surge 49,245

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 189,520

2003 South Carolina Charleston Storm Surge 77,599

2003 Virginia Accomack Freeze 204,351

2003 Virginia Accomack Hurricane 35,542

175
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Indemnity by Crop Year, County, and Cause of Loss

Table 2.3

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year State County Name Description Indemnity

2003 Virginia Accomack Storm Surge 35,542

2003 Virginia Northampton Freeze 75,213

2003 Virginia Northampton Storm Surge 199,967

2004 Florida Brevard Hurricane 60,208

2004 Florida Dixie Hurricane 124,491

2004 Florida Dixie Storm Surge 1,877

2004 Florida Indian River Hurricane 177,515

2004 Florida Levy Hurricane 642,286

2004 Florida Levy Salinity 44,196

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable Disease, Aquaculture 55,788

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 22,170

2004 South Carolina Charleston Storm Surge 31,938

2004 Virginia Accomack Freeze 687,082

2004 Virginia Northampton Freeze 282,410

2004 Virginia Northampton Storm Surge 52,441

2005 Florida Dixie Hurricane 12,827

2005 Florida Dixie Salinity 19,156

2005 Florida Dixie Storm Surge 24,577

2005 Florida Levy Hurricane 70,822

2005 Florida Levy Other 53,007

2005 Florida Levy Salinity 17,406

2005 Florida Levy Storm Surge 19,570

2005 Florida Levy Tidal Wave 19,055

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable Disease, Aquaculture 108,936

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 7,759

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable Ice Floe 265,074

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable Storm Surge 6,264

2006 Florida Levy Oxygen Depletion 273,550

2006 Florida Levy Storm Surge 168,313

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 95,968

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable Ice Floe 27,065

2006 Virginia Northampton Hurricane 112,317

2007 Florida Levy Oxygen Depletion 278,015

2007 Florida Levy Salinity 92,998

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable Disease, Aquaculture 34,411

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 3,940

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable Ice Floe 48,167

2007 Virginia Accomack Freeze 44,489

2008 Florida Brevard Salinity 34,290

2008 Florida Indian River Disease, Aquaculture 7,461

2008 Florida Levy Oxygen Depletion 109,482

2008 Florida Levy Salinity 163,299

2008 Florida Levy Storm Surge 31,488

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 61,025

2009 Florida Levy Salinity 1,328,425

2009 Virginia Accomack Storm Surge 228,088

2010 Florida Brevard Other 4,571

2010 Florida Levy Freeze 49,790

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable Oxygen Depletion 18,658

2010 Virginia Accomack Freeze 28,771

2010 Virginia Accomack Storm Surge 24,300

176
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Indemnity by Unit Option Code

Table 2.4

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Unit Option Code Indemnity Percent Indemnity

None 6,768,929 38%

BU 11,050,848 62%

Total 17,819,777 100%

177
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Indemnity by Crop Year and Unit Option Code

Table 2.5

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year Unit Option Code Indemnity Percent Indemnity

2000 None 561,003 27%

2000 BU 1,508,572 73%

2001 None 832,583 29%

2001 BU 2,048,115 71%

2002 None 2,187,174 54%

2002 BU 1,832,074 46%

2003 None 1,338,949 48%

2003 BU 1,435,571 52%

2004 None 1,155,157 53%

2004 BU 1,027,245 47%

2005 None 58,000 9%

2005 BU 566,453 91%

2006 None 158,911 23%

2006 BU 518,302 77%

2007 None 77,521 15%

2007 BU 424,499 85%

2008 None 50,024 12%

2008 BU 357,021 88%

2009 None 228,088 15%

2009 BU 1,328,425 85%

2010 None 121,519 96%

2010 BU 4,571 4%

178
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Indemnity by Crop Year and Unit Option Code

Table 2.6

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year State County Name Unit Option Code Indemnity

2000 Florida Brevard BU 131,603

2000 Florida Dixie None 255,960

2000 Florida Dixie BU 441,597

2000 Florida Indian River None 74,918

2000 Florida Indian River BU 185,639

2000 Florida Levy None 216,303

2000 Florida Levy BU 655,749

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable None 13,822

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable BU 93,984

2001 Florida Brevard None 37,063

2001 Florida Brevard BU 483,013

2001 Florida Dixie None 31,007

2001 Florida Dixie BU 85,177

2001 Florida Indian River None 100,208

2001 Florida Indian River BU 260,082

2001 Florida Levy None 664,305

2001 Florida Levy BU 865,457

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable BU 150,000

2001 Virginia Northampton BU 204,386

2002 Florida Brevard None 27,965

2002 Florida Brevard BU 246,050

2002 Florida Dixie None 91,221

2002 Florida Dixie BU 67,499

2002 Florida Indian River None 15,788

2002 Florida Indian River BU 117,962

2002 Florida Levy None 1,957,784

2002 Florida Levy BU 1,400,563

2002 Virginia Northampton None 94,416

2003 Florida Brevard BU 212,980

2003 Florida Dixie None 152,426

2003 Florida Dixie BU 123,730

2003 Florida Indian River None 11,840

2003 Florida Indian River BU 75,080

2003 Florida Levy None 862,891

2003 Florida Levy BU 517,839

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable None 4,288

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable BU 185,232

2003 South Carolina Charleston BU 77,599

2003 Virginia Accomack None 71,084

2003 Virginia Accomack BU 204,351

2003 Virginia Northampton None 236,420

2003 Virginia Northampton BU 38,760

2004 Florida Brevard BU 60,208

2004 Florida Dixie None 48,596

2004 Florida Dixie BU 77,772

2004 Florida Indian River None 67,397

179
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Indemnity by Crop Year and Unit Option Code

Table 2.6

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year State County Name Unit Option Code Indemnity

2004 Florida Indian River BU 110,118

2004 Florida Levy None 291,760

2004 Florida Levy BU 394,722

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable None 77,958

2004 South Carolina Charleston None 31,938

2004 Virginia Accomack None 522,889

2004 Virginia Accomack BU 164,193

2004 Virginia Northampton None 114,619

2004 Virginia Northampton BU 220,232

2005 Florida Dixie BU 56,560

2005 Florida Levy None 58,000

2005 Florida Levy BU 121,860

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable BU 388,033

2006 Florida Levy None 125,068

2006 Florida Levy BU 316,795

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable None 30,442

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable BU 92,591

2006 Virginia Northampton None 3,401

2006 Virginia Northampton BU 108,916

2007 Florida Levy None 40,160

2007 Florida Levy BU 330,853

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable None 15,552

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable BU 70,966

2007 Virginia Accomack None 21,809

2007 Virginia Accomack BU 22,680

2008 Florida Brevard BU 34,290

2008 Florida Indian River BU 7,461

2008 Florida Levy None 11,088

2008 Florida Levy BU 293,181

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable None 38,936

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable BU 22,089

2009 Florida Levy BU 1,328,425

2009 Virginia Accomack None 228,088

2010 Florida Brevard BU 4,571

2010 Florida Levy None 49,790

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable None 18,658

2010 Virginia Accomack None 53,071

180
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Indemnity by Crop Year, State, County, and Cause of Loss

Table 2.6

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year State County Name Description Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

Partial 

Loss Ratio

Partial 

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2000 Florida Brevard Disease, Aquaculture 580,401 22,808 10,438 0 1 12,782 1.225 0.560 0.458

2000 Florida Brevard Excess Wind 580,401 22,808 10,438 0 1 25,740 2.466 1.129 0.458

2000 Florida Brevard Freeze 580,401 22,808 10,438 0 1 899 0.086 0.039 0.458

2000 Florida Brevard Oxygen Depletion 580,401 22,808 10,438 0 1 9,492 0.909 0.416 0.458

2000 Florida Brevard Salinity 580,401 22,808 10,438 0 1 82,690 7.922 3.625 0.458

2000 Florida Dixie Freeze 2,382,796 92,623 42,206 0 1 18,332 0.434 0.198 0.456

2000 Florida Dixie Hurricane 2,382,796 92,623 42,206 0 1 28,365 0.672 0.306 0.456

2000 Florida Dixie Oxygen Depletion 2,382,796 92,623 42,206 0 7 111,653 2.645 1.205 0.456

2000 Florida Dixie Salinity 2,382,796 92,623 42,206 0 21 539,207 12.776 5.822 0.456

2000 Florida Indian River Disease, Aquaculture 1,976,161 86,493 41,702 0 5 192,976 4.627 2.231 0.482

2000 Florida Indian River Hurricane 1,976,161 86,493 41,702 0 1 33,183 0.796 0.384 0.482

2000 Florida Indian River Salinity 1,976,161 86,493 41,702 0 1 34,398 0.825 0.398 0.482

2000 Florida Levy Freeze 12,642,770 533,795 258,378 0 2 21,842 0.085 0.041 0.484

2000 Florida Levy Hurricane 12,642,770 533,795 258,378 0 18 410,980 1.591 0.770 0.484

2000 Florida Levy Other 12,642,770 533,795 258,378 0 1 14,160 0.055 0.027 0.484

2000 Florida Levy Oxygen Depletion 12,642,770 533,795 258,378 0 6 223,496 0.865 0.419 0.484

2000 Florida Levy Salinity 12,642,770 533,795 258,378 0 10 161,590 0.625 0.303 0.484

2000 Florida Levy Storm Surge 12,642,770 533,795 258,378 0 1 39,984 0.155 0.075 0.484

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 3,213,602 84,345 36,170 0 11 107,806 2.981 1.278 0.429

2001 Florida Brevard Hurricane 1,426,432 78,941 32,278 46,663 12 379,332 11.752 4.805 0.409

2001 Florida Brevard Oxygen Depletion 1,426,432 78,941 32,278 46,663 1 18,448 0.572 0.234 0.409

2001 Florida Brevard Salinity 1,426,432 78,941 32,278 46,663 9 122,296 3.789 1.549 0.409

2001 Florida Dixie Salinity 2,254,998 109,372 45,127 64,245 15 68,290 1.513 0.624 0.413

2001 Florida Dixie Storm Surge 2,254,998 109,372 45,127 64,245 5 47,894 1.061 0.438 0.413

2001 Florida Indian River Hurricane 1,669,518 95,888 39,303 56,585 9 182,187 4.635 1.900 0.410

2001 Florida Indian River Salinity 1,669,518 95,888 39,303 56,585 5 178,103 4.532 1.857 0.410

2001 Florida Levy Freeze 12,944,881 637,822 257,877 379,945 2 11,642 0.045 0.018 0.404

2001 Florida Levy Hurricane 12,944,881 637,822 257,877 379,945 3 133,151 0.516 0.209 0.404

2001 Florida Levy Salinity 12,944,881 637,822 257,877 379,945 21 339,677 1.317 0.533 0.404

2001 Florida Levy Storm Surge 12,944,881 637,822 257,877 379,945 27 1,045,292 4.053 1.639 0.404

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 2,521,563 60,571 15,669 44,902 1 150,000 9.573 2.476 0.259

2001 Virginia Northampton Disease, Aquaculture 16,336,878 322,503 107,809 214,694 1 151,200 1.402 0.469 0.334

2001 Virginia Northampton Freeze 16,336,878 322,503 107,809 214,694 1 53,186 0.493 0.165 0.334

2002 Florida Brevard Oxygen Depletion 1,286,458 74,752 31,557 43,195 5 101,254 3.209 1.355 0.422

2002 Florida Brevard Salinity 1,286,458 74,752 31,557 43,195 3 172,761 5.475 2.311 0.422

2002 Florida Dixie Freeze 3,176,030 149,997 61,188 88,809 1 1,597 0.026 0.011 0.408

2002 Florida Dixie Other 3,176,030 149,997 61,188 88,809 1 10,315 0.169 0.069 0.408

2002 Florida Dixie Oxygen Depletion 3,176,030 149,997 61,188 88,809 2 16,566 0.271 0.110 0.408

2002 Florida Dixie Salinity 3,176,030 149,997 61,188 88,809 19 117,518 1.921 0.783 0.408

2002 Florida Dixie Storm Surge 3,176,030 149,997 61,188 88,809 1 12,724 0.208 0.085 0.408

2002 Florida Indian River Oxygen Depletion 2,058,561 132,004 56,359 75,645 1 7,062 0.125 0.053 0.427

2002 Florida Indian River Salinity 2,058,561 132,004 56,359 75,645 3 126,688 2.248 0.960 0.427

181
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Indemnity by Crop Year, State, County, and Cause of Loss

Table 2.6

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year State County Name Description Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

Partial 

Loss Ratio

Partial 

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2002 Florida Levy Freeze 19,867,220 1,053,549 436,495 617,054 7 209,382 0.480 0.199 0.414

2002 Florida Levy Other 19,867,220 1,053,549 436,495 617,054 1 53,227 0.122 0.051 0.414

2002 Florida Levy Oxygen Depletion 19,867,220 1,053,549 436,495 617,054 8 248,364 0.569 0.236 0.414

2002 Florida Levy Salinity 19,867,220 1,053,549 436,495 617,054 49 1,636,706 3.750 1.554 0.414

2002 Florida Levy Storm Surge 19,867,220 1,053,549 436,495 617,054 30 1,210,668 2.774 1.149 0.414

2002 Virginia Northampton Disease, Aquaculture 20,640,946 469,919 160,944 308,975 1 51,607 0.321 0.110 0.342

2002 Virginia Northampton Storm Surge 20,640,946 469,919 160,944 308,975 2 42,809 0.266 0.091 0.342

2003 Florida Brevard Oxygen Depletion 595,065 33,812 14,292 19,520 2 56,789 3.973 1.680 0.423

2003 Florida Brevard Salinity 595,065 33,812 14,292 19,520 2 156,191 10.929 4.619 0.423

2003 Florida Dixie Salinity 2,769,756 153,273 63,249 90,024 20 276,156 4.366 1.802 0.413

2003 Florida Indian River Salinity 1,461,690 98,419 42,287 56,132 5 86,920 2.055 0.883 0.430

2003 Florida Levy Excess Wind 15,529,702 894,138 373,500 520,638 1 15,288 0.041 0.017 0.418

2003 Florida Levy Salinity 15,529,702 894,138 373,500 520,638 46 1,316,197 3.524 1.472 0.418

2003 Florida Levy Storm Surge 15,529,702 894,138 373,500 520,638 1 49,245 0.132 0.055 0.418

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 2,810,694 66,634 18,598 48,036 7 189,520 10.190 2.844 0.279

2003 South Carolina Charleston Storm Surge 1,279,493 32,857 11,877 20,980 1 77,599 6.534 2.362 0.361

2003 Virginia Accomack Freeze 8,511,341 187,704 63,489 124,215 2 204,351 3.219 1.089 0.338

2003 Virginia Accomack Hurricane 8,511,341 187,704 63,489 124,215 1 35,542 0.560 0.189 0.338

2003 Virginia Accomack Storm Surge 8,511,341 187,704 63,489 124,215 1 35,542 0.560 0.189 0.338

2003 Virginia Northampton Freeze 17,870,992 378,547 126,059 252,488 3 75,213 0.597 0.199 0.333

2003 Virginia Northampton Storm Surge 17,870,992 378,547 126,059 252,488 3 199,967 1.586 0.528 0.333

2004 Florida Brevard Hurricane 124,537 12,510 5,312 7,198 7 60,208 11.334 4.813 0.425

2004 Florida Dixie Hurricane 702,659 69,838 27,386 42,452 18 124,491 4.546 1.783 0.392

2004 Florida Dixie Storm Surge 702,659 69,838 27,386 42,452 1 1,877 0.069 0.027 0.392

2004 Florida Indian River Hurricane 447,830 51,214 21,853 29,361 11 177,515 8.123 3.466 0.427

2004 Florida Levy Hurricane 4,063,989 391,262 145,346 245,916 47 642,286 4.419 1.642 0.371

2004 Florida Levy Salinity 4,063,989 391,262 145,346 245,916 2 44,196 0.304 0.113 0.371

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable Disease, Aquaculture 2,120,979 48,820 14,698 34,122 1 55,788 3.796 1.143 0.301

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 2,120,979 48,820 14,698 34,122 2 22,170 1.508 0.454 0.301

2004 South Carolina Charleston Storm Surge 609,049 13,512 4,479 9,033 1 31,938 7.131 2.364 0.331

2004 Virginia Accomack Freeze 4,309,291 84,924 15,349 69,575 11 687,082 44.764 8.091 0.181

2004 Virginia Northampton Freeze 15,095,481 291,518 98,320 193,198 7 282,410 2.872 0.969 0.337

2004 Virginia Northampton Storm Surge 15,095,481 291,518 98,320 193,198 3 52,441 0.533 0.180 0.337

2005 Florida Dixie Hurricane 293,619 24,221 9,354 14,867 2 12,827 1.371 0.530 0.386

2005 Florida Dixie Salinity 293,619 24,221 9,354 14,867 1 19,156 2.048 0.791 0.386

2005 Florida Dixie Storm Surge 293,619 24,221 9,354 14,867 1 24,577 2.627 1.015 0.386

2005 Florida Levy Hurricane 4,023,852 310,911 109,304 201,607 4 70,822 0.648 0.228 0.352

2005 Florida Levy Other 4,023,852 310,911 109,304 201,607 1 53,007 0.485 0.170 0.352

2005 Florida Levy Salinity 4,023,852 310,911 109,304 201,607 2 17,406 0.159 0.056 0.352

2005 Florida Levy Storm Surge 4,023,852 310,911 109,304 201,607 1 19,570 0.179 0.063 0.352

2005 Florida Levy Tidal Wave 4,023,852 310,911 109,304 201,607 1 19,055 0.174 0.061 0.352

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable Disease, Aquaculture 1824752 41,533 12,775 28,758 1 108,936 8.527 2.623 0.308

182
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Table of Indemnity by Crop Year, State, County, and Cause of Loss

Table 2.6

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year State County Name Description Liability 

 Total 

Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

Partial 

Loss Ratio

Partial 

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 1824752 41,533 12,775 28,758 1 7,759 0.607 0.187 0.308

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable Ice Floe 1824752 41,533 12,775 28,758 1 265,074 20.749 6.382 0.308

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable Storm Surge 1824752 41,533 12,775 28,758 1 6,264 0.490 0.151 0.308

2006 Florida Levy Oxygen Depletion 5657475 470,401 170,473 299,928 5 273,550 1.605 0.582 0.362

2006 Florida Levy Storm Surge 5657475 470,401 170,473 299,928 4 168,313 0.987 0.358 0.362

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 1673313 41,520 11,305 30,215 2 95,968 8.489 2.311 0.272

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable Ice Floe 1673313 41,520 11,305 30,215 2 27,065 2.394 0.652 0.272

2006 Virginia Northampton Hurricane 16648607 339,699 115,333 224,366 3 112,317 0.974 0.331 0.340

2007 Florida Levy Oxygen Depletion 6116818 501,593 179,104 322,489 11 278,015 1.552 0.554 0.357

2007 Florida Levy Salinity 6116818 501,593 179,104 322,489 1 92,998 0.519 0.185 0.357

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable Disease, Aquaculture 1561907 37,046 11,542 25,504 1 34,411 2.981 0.929 0.312

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 1561907 37,046 11,542 25,504 1 3,940 0.341 0.106 0.312

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable Ice Floe 1561907 37,046 11,542 25,504 3 48,167 4.173 1.300 0.312

2007 Virginia Accomack Freeze 1386265 44,520 17,984 26,536 2 44,489 2.474 0.999 0.404

2008 Florida Brevard Salinity 75724 6,764 2,773 3,991 1 34,290 12.366 5.069 0.410

2008 Florida Indian River Disease, Aquaculture 149520 15,491 6,882 8,609 1 7,461 1.084 0.482 0.444

2008 Florida Levy Oxygen Depletion 4494398 420,259 146,070 274,189 3 109,482 0.750 0.261 0.348

2008 Florida Levy Salinity 4494398 420,259 146,070 274,189 3 163,299 1.118 0.389 0.348

2008 Florida Levy Storm Surge 4494398 420,259 146,070 274,189 1 31,488 0.216 0.075 0.348

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable Freeze 1583944 48,742 17,096 31,646 2 61,025 3.570 1.252 0.351

2009 Florida Levy Salinity 4292364 221,843 60,972 160,871 19 1,328,425 21.787 5.988 0.275

2009 Virginia Accomack Storm Surge 2529207 65,708 26,730 38,978 2 228,088 8.533 3.471 0.407

2010 Florida Brevard Other 4571 378 155 223 1 4,571 29.490 12.093 0.410

2010 Florida Levy Freeze 220456 17,143 6,116 11,027 1 49,790 8.141 2.904 0.357

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable Oxygen Depletion 1386254 40,033 15,993 24,040 1 18,658 1.167 0.466 0.399

2010 Virginia Accomack Freeze 2270508 52,196 21,248 30,948 1 28,771 1.354 0.551 0.407

2010 Virginia Accomack Storm Surge 2270508 52,196 21,248 30,948 1 24,300 1.144 0.466 0.407

183
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Type, Practice, Primary Cause and Secondary Cause

Table 5.1

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State County Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Practice 

Code Primary Cause Secondary Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2000 Florida Brevard 80 22 Salinity 1 82,690

2000 Florida Brevard 82 23 Disease, Aquaculture 1 12,782

2000 Florida Brevard 82 23 Excess Wind 1 25,740

2000 Florida Brevard 82 23 Freeze 1 899

2000 Florida Brevard 82 23 Oxygen Depletion 1 9,492

2000 Florida Dixie 80 22 Salinity 3 170,925

2000 Florida Dixie 82 23 Freeze 1 18,332

2000 Florida Dixie 82 23 Hurricane 1 28,365

2000 Florida Dixie 82 23 Oxygen Depletion 7 111,653

2000 Florida Dixie 82 23 Salinity 18 368,282

2000 Florida Indian River 80 22 Disease, Aquaculture 0 5,027

2000 Florida Indian River 82 23 Disease, Aquaculture 5 187,949

2000 Florida Indian River 82 23 Hurricane 1 33,183

2000 Florida Indian River 82 23 Salinity 1 34,398

2000 Florida Levy 80 22 Freeze 1 6,900

2000 Florida Levy 80 22 Hurricane 1 102,429

2000 Florida Levy 80 22 Hurricane Salinity 1 37,855

2000 Florida Levy 80 22 Salinity 2 9,903

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 Freeze 1 14,942

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 Hurricane 16 270,696

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 Other 1 14,160

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 Oxygen Depletion 6 223,496

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 Salinity 8 151,687

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 Storm Surge 1 39,984

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 82 24 Freeze 11 107,806

2001 Florida Brevard 80 22 Hurricane 1 3,902

2001 Florida Brevard 80 22 Oxygen Depletion 1 18,448

2001 Florida Brevard 80 22 Salinity 4 28,096

2001 Florida Brevard 82 23 Hurricane 11 375,430

2001 Florida Brevard 82 23 Salinity 5 94,200

2001 Florida Dixie 80 22 Salinity 0 0

2001 Florida Dixie 80 22 Storm Surge 2 5,108

2001 Florida Dixie 82 23 Salinity 15 68,290

2001 Florida Dixie 82 23 Storm Surge 3 42,786

2001 Florida Indian River 80 22 Hurricane 2 7,870

2001 Florida Indian River 80 22 Salinity 1 5,752

2001 Florida Indian River 82 23 Hurricane 7 174,317

2001 Florida Indian River 82 23 Salinity 3 140,505

2001 Florida Indian River 82 24 Salinity 1 31,846

2001 Florida Levy 80 22 Freeze 2 11,642

2001 Florida Levy 80 22 Salinity 3 37,158

2001 Florida Levy 80 22 Salinity Storm Surge 0 0

2001 Florida Levy 80 22 Storm Surge 8 178,076

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 Hurricane 3 133,151

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 Salinity 14 252,589

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 Salinity Storm Surge 4 49,930

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 Storm Surge 19 867,216

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable 82 24 Freeze 1 150,000

2001 Virginia Northampton 80 24 Disease, Aquaculture 0 72,000

184
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Type, Practice, Primary Cause and Secondary Cause

Table 5.1

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State County Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Practice 

Code Primary Cause Secondary Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2001 Virginia Northampton 80 24 Freeze 1 53,186

2001 Virginia Northampton 82 24 Disease, Aquaculture 1 79,200

2002 Florida Brevard 80 22 Oxygen Depletion 2 14,646

2002 Florida Brevard 80 22 Oxygen Depletion Salinity 1 21,868

2002 Florida Brevard 82 23 Oxygen Depletion 1 17,620

2002 Florida Brevard 82 23 Oxygen Depletion Salinity 1 47,120

2002 Florida Brevard 82 23 Salinity 3 172,761

2002 Florida Dixie 80 22 Freeze 1 1,597

2002 Florida Dixie 80 22 Oxygen Depletion 0 5,991

2002 Florida Dixie 80 22 Salinity 6 25,555

2002 Florida Dixie 80 22 Storm Surge 1 12,724

2002 Florida Dixie 82 23 Other 1 10,315

2002 Florida Dixie 82 23 Oxygen Depletion 2 10,575

2002 Florida Dixie 82 23 Salinity 13 91,963

2002 Florida Indian River 80 22 Salinity 2 96,904

2002 Florida Indian River 82 23 Oxygen Depletion 1 7,062

2002 Florida Indian River 82 23 Salinity 1 29,784

2002 Florida Levy 80 22 Freeze 5 96,234

2002 Florida Levy 80 22 Oxygen Depletion Salinity 1 1,896

2002 Florida Levy 80 22 Salinity 10 293,349

2002 Florida Levy 80 22 Salinity Storm Surge 1 34,266

2002 Florida Levy 80 22 Storm Surge 5 64,699

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 Freeze 2 113,148

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 Other 1 53,227

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 Oxygen Depletion 6 230,216

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 Oxygen Depletion Salinity 1 16,252

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 Salinity 38 1,309,091

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 Storm Surge 25 1,145,969

2002 Virginia Northampton 80 24 Storm Surge 1 35,700

2002 Virginia Northampton 82 24 Disease, Aquaculture 1 51,607

2002 Virginia Northampton 82 24 Storm Surge 1 7,109

2003 Florida Brevard 80 22 Oxygen Depletion 0 22,062

2003 Florida Brevard 82 23 Oxygen Depletion 2 34,727

2003 Florida Brevard 82 23 Salinity 2 156,191

2003 Florida Dixie 80 22 Salinity 2 8,896

2003 Florida Dixie 82 23 Salinity 18 267,260

2003 Florida Indian River 80 22 Salinity 1 1,224

2003 Florida Indian River 82 23 Salinity 4 85,696

2003 Florida Levy 80 22 Salinity 3 19,541

2003 Florida Levy 80 22 Storm Surge 1 49,245

2003 Florida Levy 82 23 Excess Wind 1 15,288

2003 Florida Levy 82 23 Salinity 42 1,253,266

2003 Florida Levy 82 23 Salinity Excess Wind 1 43,390

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 80 24 Freeze 2 13,547

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 82 24 Freeze 5 175,973

2003 South Carolina Charleston 82 23 Storm Surge 1 77,599

2003 Virginia Accomack 80 24 Freeze 1 76,510

2003 Virginia Accomack 80 24 Hurricane 1 35,542

2003 Virginia Accomack 80 24 Storm Surge 1 35,542

185
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Type, Practice, Primary Cause and Secondary Cause

Table 5.1

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State County Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Practice 

Code Primary Cause Secondary Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2003 Virginia Accomack 82 24 Freeze 1 127,841

2003 Virginia Northampton 80 24 Freeze Hurricane 1 22,950

2003 Virginia Northampton 80 24 Storm Surge 1 16,789

2003 Virginia Northampton 82 24 Freeze 1 5,853

2003 Virginia Northampton 82 24 Freeze Hurricane 1 46,410

2003 Virginia Northampton 82 24 Storm Surge 2 183,178

2004 Florida Brevard 84 23 Hurricane 3 27,379

2004 Florida Brevard 85 23 Hurricane 2 16,337

2004 Florida Brevard 86 23 Hurricane 2 16,492

2004 Florida Dixie 84 23 Hurricane 3 14,532

2004 Florida Dixie 85 23 Hurricane 15 109,959

2004 Florida Dixie 86 23 Storm Surge 1 1,877

2004 Florida Indian River 84 23 Hurricane 2 21,419

2004 Florida Indian River 85 23 Hurricane 7 138,192

2004 Florida Indian River 85 23 Hurricane Oxygen Depletion 1 10,059

2004 Florida Indian River 85 24 Hurricane 1 7,845

2004 Florida Levy 84 23 Hurricane 29 434,415

2004 Florida Levy 84 23 Salinity 1 40,209

2004 Florida Levy 85 23 Hurricane 17 200,709

2004 Florida Levy 86 23 Hurricane 1 7,162

2004 Florida Levy 86 23 Salinity 1 3,987

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 84 24 Freeze 2 15,528

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 Disease, Aquaculture 1 55,788

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 Freeze 0 6,642

2004 South Carolina Charleston 84 23 Storm Surge 1 31,938

2004 Virginia Accomack 84 24 Freeze 5 332,068

2004 Virginia Accomack 85 24 Freeze 6 355,014

2004 Virginia Northampton 84 24 Freeze 2 97,370

2004 Virginia Northampton 84 24 Storm Surge 3 52,441

2004 Virginia Northampton 85 24 Freeze 5 185,040

2005 Florida Dixie 84 23 Hurricane 1 5,168

2005 Florida Dixie 85 23 Storm Surge 1 24,577

2005 Florida Dixie 86 23 Hurricane 1 7,659

2005 Florida Dixie 86 23 Salinity 1 19,156

2005 Florida Levy 84 23 Other 1 53,007

2005 Florida Levy 84 23 Salinity 1 3,518

2005 Florida Levy 85 23 Hurricane 1 4,418

2005 Florida Levy 85 23 Storm Surge 1 19,570

2005 Florida Levy 86 23 Hurricane 3 66,404

2005 Florida Levy 86 23 Salinity 1 13,888

2005 Florida Levy 86 23 Tidal Wave 1 19,055

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 84 24 Disease, Aquaculture 1 108,936

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 84 24 Storm Surge 1 4,655

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 Freeze 1 7,759

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 Ice Floe 1 265,074

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 Storm Surge 0 1,609

2006 Florida Levy 84 23 Oxygen Depletion 1 36,070

2006 Florida Levy 86 23 Oxygen Depletion 4 237,480

2006 Florida Levy 86 23 Storm Surge 4 168,313

186
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Type, Practice, Primary Cause and Secondary Cause

Table 5.1

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State County Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Practice 

Code Primary Cause Secondary Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 84 24 Freeze 1 3,377

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 Freeze 1 92,591

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 Ice Floe 2 27,065

2006 Virginia Northampton 84 24 Hurricane 1 3,401

2006 Virginia Northampton 85 24 Hurricane 2 108,916

2007 Florida Levy 84 23 Oxygen Depletion 1 9,201

2007 Florida Levy 85 23 Oxygen Depletion 3 38,070

2007 Florida Levy 86 23 Oxygen Depletion 7 230,744

2007 Florida Levy 86 23 Salinity 1 92,998

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 Disease, Aquaculture 1 34,411

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 Freeze 1 3,940

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 Ice Floe 3 48,167

2007 Virginia Accomack 84 24 Freeze 1 22,680

2007 Virginia Accomack 85 24 Freeze 1 21,809

2008 Florida Brevard 85 24 Salinity 0 9,802

2008 Florida Brevard 86 24 Salinity 1 24,488

2008 Florida Indian River 86 23 Disease, Aquaculture 1 7,461

2008 Florida Levy 84 23 Oxygen Depletion 2 59,276

2008 Florida Levy 85 23 Oxygen Depletion 0 27,216

2008 Florida Levy 85 23 Storm Surge 1 31,488

2008 Florida Levy 86 23 Oxygen Depletion 1 22,990

2008 Florida Levy 86 23 Salinity 3 163,299

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 Freeze 2 61,025

2009 Florida Levy 84 23 Salinity 3 242,788

2009 Florida Levy 85 23 Salinity 4 202,215

2009 Florida Levy 86 23 Salinity 12 883,422

2009 Virginia Accomack 84 24 Storm Surge 1 199,368

2009 Virginia Accomack 85 24 Storm Surge 1 28,720

2010 Florida Brevard 84 24 Other 0 1,997

2010 Florida Brevard 86 24 Other 1 2,574

2010 Florida Levy 85 23 Freeze 0 8,134

2010 Florida Levy 86 23 Freeze 1 41,656

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 Oxygen Depletion 1 18,658

2010 Virginia Accomack 84 24 Freeze Freeze 0 12,362

2010 Virginia Accomack 84 24 Storm Surge 1 24,300

2010 Virginia Accomack 85 24 Freeze 1 16,409

Total 632 17,819,777

187
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Type, Practice, Primary Cause and Secondary Cause

Table 5.2

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Practice 

Code Coverage Primary Cause Secondary Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2000 Florida Brevard 80 22 0.65 Salinity 1 82,690

2000 Florida Brevard 82 23 0.65 Disease, Aquaculture 1 12,782

2000 Florida Brevard 82 23 0.65 Excess Wind 1 25,740

2000 Florida Brevard 82 23 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 1 9,492

2000 Florida Brevard 82 23 0.7 Freeze 1 899

2000 Florida Dixie 80 22 0.5 Salinity 1 2,250

2000 Florida Dixie 80 22 0.65 Salinity 2 168,675

2000 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.5 Hurricane 1 28,365

2000 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.5 Oxygen Depletion 4 46,855

2000 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.5 Salinity 3 3,921

2000 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.55 Salinity 1 7,742

2000 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.65 Freeze 1 18,332

2000 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 3 64,798

2000 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.65 Salinity 14 356,619

2000 Florida Indian River 80 22 0.65 Disease, Aquaculture 0 5,027

2000 Florida Indian River 82 23 0.5 Disease, Aquaculture 1 9,749

2000 Florida Indian River 82 23 0.65 Disease, Aquaculture 4 178,200

2000 Florida Indian River 82 23 0.65 Hurricane 1 33,183

2000 Florida Indian River 82 23 0.65 Salinity 1 34,398

2000 Florida Levy 80 22 0.5 Salinity 1 5,279

2000 Florida Levy 80 22 0.65 Freeze 1 6,900

2000 Florida Levy 80 22 0.65 Hurricane 1 102,429

2000 Florida Levy 80 22 0.65 Hurricane Salinity 1 37,855

2000 Florida Levy 80 22 0.65 Salinity 1 4,570

2000 Florida Levy 80 22 0.75 Salinity 0 54

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 0.5 Hurricane 4 30,639

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 0.6 Oxygen Depletion 1 41,840

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 0.65 Hurricane 11 222,687

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 0.65 Other 1 14,160

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 2 81,407

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 0.65 Salinity 4 79,225

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 0.65 Storm Surge 1 39,984

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 0.7 Salinity 2 34,964

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 0.75 Freeze 1 14,942

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 0.75 Hurricane 1 17,370

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 3 100,249

2000 Florida Levy 82 23 0.75 Salinity 2 37,498

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 82 24 0.6 Freeze 2 13,822

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 82 24 0.65 Freeze 8 85,992

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 82 24 0.75 Freeze 1 7,992

2001 Florida Brevard 80 22 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 1 18,448

2001 Florida Brevard 80 22 0.7 Hurricane 1 3,902

2001 Florida Brevard 80 22 0.7 Salinity 2 7,867

2001 Florida Brevard 80 22 0.75 Salinity 2 20,229

2001 Florida Brevard 82 23 0.65 Salinity 2 16,622

2001 Florida Brevard 82 23 0.7 Hurricane 11 375,430

2001 Florida Brevard 82 23 0.7 Salinity 3 77,578

2001 Florida Dixie 80 22 0.65 Salinity 0 0

2001 Florida Dixie 80 22 0.75 Storm Surge 2 5,108

2001 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.5 Salinity 5 17,075

188
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Type, Practice, Primary Cause and Secondary Cause

Table 5.2

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Practice 

Code Coverage Primary Cause Secondary Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2001 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.5 Storm Surge 1 16,112

2001 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.65 Salinity 10 51,215

2001 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.7 Storm Surge 1 19,904

2001 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.75 Storm Surge 1 6,770

2001 Florida Indian River 80 22 0.7 Hurricane 1 3,990

2001 Florida Indian River 80 22 0.75 Hurricane 1 3,880

2001 Florida Indian River 80 22 0.75 Salinity 1 5,752

2001 Florida Indian River 82 23 0.65 Salinity 1 10,726

2001 Florida Indian River 82 23 0.7 Hurricane 7 174,317

2001 Florida Indian River 82 23 0.7 Salinity 2 129,779

2001 Florida Indian River 82 24 0.7 Salinity 1 31,846

2001 Florida Levy 80 22 0.65 Salinity 2 23,905

2001 Florida Levy 80 22 0.65 Salinity Storm Surge 0 0

2001 Florida Levy 80 22 0.65 Storm Surge 0 0

2001 Florida Levy 80 22 0.7 Freeze 1 1,535

2001 Florida Levy 80 22 0.7 Salinity 0 8,736

2001 Florida Levy 80 22 0.7 Storm Surge 4 157,327

2001 Florida Levy 80 22 0.75 Freeze 1 10,107

2001 Florida Levy 80 22 0.75 Salinity 1 4,517

2001 Florida Levy 80 22 0.75 Storm Surge 4 20,749

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 0.5 Salinity 1 3,551

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 0.5 Salinity Storm Surge 1 2,712

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 0.5 Storm Surge 1 42,941

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 0.6 Salinity 1 18,111

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 0.65 Hurricane 3 133,151

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 0.65 Salinity 7 110,278

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 0.65 Salinity Storm Surge 3 47,218

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 0.65 Storm Surge 10 432,688

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 0.7 Salinity 3 58,690

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 0.7 Storm Surge 7 333,287

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 0.75 Salinity 2 61,959

2001 Florida Levy 82 23 0.75 Storm Surge 1 58,300

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable 82 24 0.5 Freeze 1 150,000

2001 Virginia Northampton 80 24 0.5 Disease, Aquaculture 0 72,000

2001 Virginia Northampton 80 24 0.6 Freeze 1 53,186

2001 Virginia Northampton 82 24 0.5 Disease, Aquaculture 1 79,200

2002 Florida Brevard 80 22 0.65 Oxygen Depletion Salinity 0 10,806

2002 Florida Brevard 80 22 0.7 Oxygen Depletion 1 12,978

2002 Florida Brevard 80 22 0.7 Oxygen Depletion Salinity 1 11,062

2002 Florida Brevard 80 22 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 1 1,668

2002 Florida Brevard 82 23 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 1 17,620

2002 Florida Brevard 82 23 0.65 Oxygen Depletion Salinity 1 47,120

2002 Florida Brevard 82 23 0.65 Salinity 1 32,137

2002 Florida Brevard 82 23 0.7 Salinity 1 112,659

2002 Florida Brevard 82 23 0.75 Salinity 1 27,965

2002 Florida Dixie 80 22 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 0 5,991

2002 Florida Dixie 80 22 0.65 Salinity 6 25,555

2002 Florida Dixie 80 22 0.75 Freeze 1 1,597

2002 Florida Dixie 80 22 0.75 Storm Surge 1 12,724

2002 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.6 Salinity 1 13,487

189
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Type, Practice, Primary Cause and Secondary Cause

Table 5.2

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Practice 

Code Coverage Primary Cause Secondary Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2002 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.65 Other 1 10,315

2002 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 2 10,575

2002 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.65 Salinity 12 78,476

2002 Florida Indian River 80 22 0.7 Salinity 1 31,885

2002 Florida Indian River 80 22 0.75 Salinity 1 65,019

2002 Florida Indian River 82 23 0.7 Salinity 1 29,784

2002 Florida Indian River 82 23 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 1 7,062

2002 Florida Levy 80 22 0.5 Oxygen Depletion Salinity 1 1,896

2002 Florida Levy 80 22 0.65 Freeze 1 2,456

2002 Florida Levy 80 22 0.65 Salinity 7 265,643

2002 Florida Levy 80 22 0.65 Salinity Storm Surge 1 34,266

2002 Florida Levy 80 22 0.65 Storm Surge 4 35,936

2002 Florida Levy 80 22 0.7 Freeze 1 79,969

2002 Florida Levy 80 22 0.7 Salinity 1 3,236

2002 Florida Levy 80 22 0.7 Storm Surge 1 28,763

2002 Florida Levy 80 22 0.75 Freeze 3 13,809

2002 Florida Levy 80 22 0.75 Salinity 2 24,470

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 0.5 Storm Surge 1 25,119

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 3 107,828

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 0.65 Salinity 26 849,238

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 0.65 Storm Surge 9 322,678

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 0.7 Freeze 1 52,766

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 0.7 Other 1 53,227

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 0.7 Oxygen Depletion 3 122,388

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 0.7 Salinity 6 203,735

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 0.7 Storm Surge 7 383,350

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 0.75 Freeze 1 60,382

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 0.75 Oxygen Depletion Salinity 1 16,252

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 0.75 Salinity 6 256,118

2002 Florida Levy 82 23 0.75 Storm Surge 8 414,822

2002 Virginia Northampton 80 24 0.5 Storm Surge 1 35,700

2002 Virginia Northampton 82 24 0.5 Storm Surge 1 7,109

2002 Virginia Northampton 82 24 0.6 Disease, Aquaculture 1 51,607

2003 Florida Brevard 80 22 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 0 22,062

2003 Florida Brevard 82 23 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 2 34,727

2003 Florida Brevard 82 23 0.65 Salinity 1 29,376

2003 Florida Brevard 82 23 0.75 Salinity 1 126,815

2003 Florida Dixie 80 22 0.65 Salinity 1 7,508

2003 Florida Dixie 80 22 0.7 Salinity 1 1,388

2003 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.65 Salinity 7 73,123

2003 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.7 Salinity 10 191,887

2003 Florida Dixie 82 23 0.75 Salinity 1 2,250

2003 Florida Indian River 80 22 0.7 Salinity 1 1,224

2003 Florida Indian River 82 23 0.7 Salinity 1 10,616

2003 Florida Indian River 82 23 0.75 Salinity 3 75,080

2003 Florida Levy 80 22 0.65 Salinity 1 5,360

2003 Florida Levy 80 22 0.75 Salinity 2 14,181

2003 Florida Levy 80 22 0.75 Storm Surge 1 49,245

2003 Florida Levy 82 23 0.65 Salinity 11 232,979

2003 Florida Levy 82 23 0.7 Excess Wind 1 15,288

190
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Type, Practice, Primary Cause and Secondary Cause

Table 5.2

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Practice 

Code Coverage Primary Cause Secondary Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2003 Florida Levy 82 23 0.7 Salinity 13 370,105

2003 Florida Levy 82 23 0.7 Salinity Excess Wind 1 43,390

2003 Florida Levy 82 23 0.75 Salinity 18 650,182

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 80 24 0.5 Freeze 2 13,547

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 82 24 0.6 Freeze 1 4,288

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 82 24 0.65 Freeze 3 154,824

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 82 24 0.75 Freeze 1 16,861

2003 South Carolina Charleston 82 23 0.5 Storm Surge 1 77,599

2003 Virginia Accomack 80 24 0.5 Freeze 1 76,510

2003 Virginia Accomack 80 24 0.5 Hurricane 1 35,542

2003 Virginia Accomack 80 24 0.5 Storm Surge 1 35,542

2003 Virginia Accomack 82 24 0.5 Freeze 1 127,841

2003 Virginia Northampton 80 24 0.5 Freeze Hurricane 1 22,950

2003 Virginia Northampton 80 24 0.6 Storm Surge 1 16,789

2003 Virginia Northampton 82 24 0.5 Freeze 1 5,853

2003 Virginia Northampton 82 24 0.5 Freeze Hurricane 1 46,410

2003 Virginia Northampton 82 24 0.5 Storm Surge 2 183,178

2004 Florida Brevard 84 23 0.7 Hurricane 2 15,566

2004 Florida Brevard 84 23 0.75 Hurricane 1 11,813

2004 Florida Brevard 85 23 0.7 Hurricane 1 2,031

2004 Florida Brevard 85 23 0.75 Hurricane 1 14,306

2004 Florida Brevard 86 23 0.65 Hurricane 2 16,492

2004 Florida Dixie 84 23 0.65 Hurricane 1 10,103

2004 Florida Dixie 84 23 0.7 Hurricane 2 4,429

2004 Florida Dixie 85 23 0.5 Hurricane 1 13,437

2004 Florida Dixie 85 23 0.65 Hurricane 4 12,689

2004 Florida Dixie 85 23 0.7 Hurricane 9 67,214

2004 Florida Dixie 85 23 0.75 Hurricane 1 16,619

2004 Florida Dixie 86 23 0.65 Storm Surge 1 1,877

2004 Florida Indian River 84 23 0.75 Hurricane 2 21,419

2004 Florida Indian River 85 23 0.7 Hurricane 3 28,894

2004 Florida Indian River 85 23 0.75 Hurricane 4 109,298

2004 Florida Indian River 85 23 0.75 Hurricane Oxygen Depletion 1 10,059

2004 Florida Indian River 85 24 0.5 Hurricane 1 7,845

2004 Florida Levy 84 23 0.5 Hurricane 4 35,529

2004 Florida Levy 84 23 0.6 Hurricane 1 12,499

2004 Florida Levy 84 23 0.65 Hurricane 10 231,859

2004 Florida Levy 84 23 0.7 Hurricane 3 32,324

2004 Florida Levy 84 23 0.75 Hurricane 11 122,204

2004 Florida Levy 84 23 0.75 Salinity 1 40,209

2004 Florida Levy 85 23 0.5 Hurricane 5 76,858

2004 Florida Levy 85 23 0.6 Hurricane 2 32,574

2004 Florida Levy 85 23 0.65 Hurricane 1 7,792

2004 Florida Levy 85 23 0.7 Hurricane 6 47,620

2004 Florida Levy 85 23 0.75 Hurricane 3 35,865

2004 Florida Levy 86 23 0.75 Hurricane 1 7,162

2004 Florida Levy 86 23 0.75 Salinity 1 3,987

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 84 24 0.65 Freeze 2 15,528

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 0.55 Disease, Aquaculture 1 55,788

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 0.65 Freeze 0 6,642

191
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Type, Practice, Primary Cause and Secondary Cause

Table 5.2

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Practice 

Code Coverage Primary Cause Secondary Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2004 South Carolina Charleston 84 23 0.55 Storm Surge 1 31,938

2004 Virginia Accomack 84 24 0.5 Freeze 2 200,176

2004 Virginia Accomack 84 24 0.55 Freeze 2 65,554

2004 Virginia Accomack 84 24 0.6 Freeze 0 19,445

2004 Virginia Accomack 84 24 0.65 Freeze 1 46,893

2004 Virginia Accomack 85 24 0.5 Freeze 3 54,819

2004 Virginia Accomack 85 24 0.55 Freeze 0 43,703

2004 Virginia Accomack 85 24 0.6 Freeze 3 256,492

2004 Virginia Northampton 84 24 0.5 Freeze 2 97,370

2004 Virginia Northampton 84 24 0.5 Storm Surge 3 52,441

2004 Virginia Northampton 85 24 0.5 Freeze 4 153,494

2004 Virginia Northampton 85 24 0.6 Freeze 1 31,546

2005 Florida Dixie 84 23 0.7 Hurricane 1 5,168

2005 Florida Dixie 85 23 0.7 Storm Surge 1 24,577

2005 Florida Dixie 86 23 0.7 Hurricane 1 7,659

2005 Florida Dixie 86 23 0.75 Salinity 1 19,156

2005 Florida Levy 84 23 0.65 Salinity 1 3,518

2005 Florida Levy 84 23 0.75 Other 1 53,007

2005 Florida Levy 85 23 0.5 Storm Surge 1 19,570

2005 Florida Levy 85 23 0.65 Hurricane 1 4,418

2005 Florida Levy 86 23 0.65 Hurricane 2 11,922

2005 Florida Levy 86 23 0.75 Hurricane 1 54,482

2005 Florida Levy 86 23 0.75 Salinity 1 13,888

2005 Florida Levy 86 23 0.75 Tidal Wave 1 19,055

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 84 24 0.5 Disease, Aquaculture 1 108,936

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 84 24 0.65 Storm Surge 1 4,655

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 0.65 Ice Floe 1 265,074

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 0.65 Storm Surge 0 1,609

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 0.7 Freeze 1 7,759

2006 Florida Levy 84 23 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 1 36,070

2006 Florida Levy 86 23 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 3 168,160

2006 Florida Levy 86 23 0.7 Storm Surge 2 89,869

2006 Florida Levy 86 23 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 1 69,320

2006 Florida Levy 86 23 0.75 Storm Surge 2 78,444

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 84 24 0.65 Freeze 1 3,377

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 0.6 Freeze 1 92,591

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 0.6 Ice Floe 1 16,434

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 0.65 Ice Floe 1 10,631

2006 Virginia Northampton 84 24 0.5 Hurricane 1 3,401

2006 Virginia Northampton 85 24 0.5 Hurricane 2 108,916

2007 Florida Levy 84 23 0.7 Oxygen Depletion 1 9,201

2007 Florida Levy 85 23 0.5 Oxygen Depletion 1 22,412

2007 Florida Levy 85 23 0.6 Oxygen Depletion 1 3,396

2007 Florida Levy 85 23 0.7 Oxygen Depletion 1 12,262

2007 Florida Levy 86 23 0.6 Oxygen Depletion 1 7,094

2007 Florida Levy 86 23 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 2 28,905

2007 Florida Levy 86 23 0.7 Oxygen Depletion 3 118,275

2007 Florida Levy 86 23 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 1 76,470

2007 Florida Levy 86 23 0.75 Salinity 1 92,998

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 0.5 Disease, Aquaculture 1 34,411

192
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Type, Practice, Primary Cause and Secondary Cause

Table 5.2

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State 

 County 

Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Practice 

Code Coverage Primary Cause Secondary Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 0.5 Ice Floe 1 18,605

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 0.6 Freeze 1 3,940

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 0.65 Ice Floe 2 29,562

2007 Virginia Accomack 84 24 0.65 Freeze 1 22,680

2007 Virginia Accomack 85 24 0.7 Freeze 1 21,809

2008 Florida Brevard 85 24 0.65 Salinity 0 9,802

2008 Florida Brevard 86 24 0.65 Salinity 1 24,488

2008 Florida Indian River 86 23 0.7 Disease, Aquaculture 1 7,461

2008 Florida Levy 84 23 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 2 59,276

2008 Florida Levy 85 23 0.7 Storm Surge 1 31,488

2008 Florida Levy 85 23 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 0 27,216

2008 Florida Levy 86 23 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 1 11,088

2008 Florida Levy 86 23 0.7 Salinity 2 69,505

2008 Florida Levy 86 23 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 0 11,902

2008 Florida Levy 86 23 0.75 Salinity 1 93,794

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 0.5 Freeze 1 22,089

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 0.65 Freeze 1 38,936

2009 Florida Levy 84 23 0.5 Salinity 3 119,439

2009 Florida Levy 84 23 0.7 Salinity 0 13,699

2009 Florida Levy 84 23 0.75 Salinity 0 109,650

2009 Florida Levy 85 23 0.5 Salinity 3 139,031

2009 Florida Levy 85 23 0.7 Salinity 1 22,952

2009 Florida Levy 85 23 0.75 Salinity 0 40,232

2009 Florida Levy 86 23 0.5 Salinity 3 169,415

2009 Florida Levy 86 23 0.6 Salinity 1 147,838

2009 Florida Levy 86 23 0.7 Salinity 3 116,580

2009 Florida Levy 86 23 0.75 Salinity 5 449,589

2009 Virginia Accomack 84 24 0.65 Storm Surge 1 199,368

2009 Virginia Accomack 85 24 0.65 Storm Surge 1 28,720

2010 Florida Brevard 84 24 0.65 Other 0 1,997

2010 Florida Brevard 86 24 0.65 Other 1 2,574

2010 Florida Levy 85 23 0.75 Freeze 0 8,134

2010 Florida Levy 86 23 0.75 Freeze 1 41,656

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable 85 24 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 1 18,658

2010 Virginia Accomack 84 24 0.6 Storm Surge 1 24,300

2010 Virginia Accomack 84 24 0.7 Freeze Freeze 0 12,362

2010 Virginia Accomack 85 24 0.7 Freeze 1 16,409

Total 632 17,819,777

193
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Coverage Level and Primary Cause

Table 5.3

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year State County Name 

Coverage 

Level Description Liability Total Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Partial Loss Ratio

Partial Loss 

Cost Ratio

Earned 

Premium Ratio

2000 Florida Brevard 0.65 Disease, Aquaculture 436,477 18,856 9,219 - 12,782 0.678 0.029 0.043

2000 Florida Brevard 0.65 Excess Wind 436,477 18,856 9,219 - 25,740 1.365 0.059 0.043

2000 Florida Brevard 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 436,477 18,856 9,219 - 9,492 0.503 0.022 0.043

2000 Florida Brevard 0.65 Salinity 436,477 18,856 9,219 - 82,690 4.385 0.189 0.043

2000 Florida Brevard 0.70 Freeze 2,694 153 86 - 899 5.876 0.334 0.057

2000 Florida Dixie 0.50 Hurricane 691,261 18,180 6,011 - 28,365 1.560 0.041 0.026

2000 Florida Dixie 0.50 Oxygen Depletion 691,261 18,180 6,011 - 46,855 2.577 0.068 0.026

2000 Florida Dixie 0.50 Salinity 691,261 18,180 6,011 - 6,171 0.339 0.009 0.026

2000 Florida Dixie 0.55 Salinity 96,690 2,871 1,211 - 7,742 2.697 0.080 0.030

2000 Florida Dixie 0.65 Freeze 1,594,845 71,572 34,984 - 18,332 0.256 0.011 0.045

2000 Florida Dixie 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 1,594,845 71,572 34,984 - 64,798 0.905 0.041 0.045

2000 Florida Dixie 0.65 Salinity 1,594,845 71,572 34,984 - 525,294 7.339 0.329 0.045

2000 Florida Indian River 0.50 Disease, Aquaculture 39,243 1,024 - - 9,749 9.521 0.248 0.026

2000 Florida Indian River 0.65 Disease, Aquaculture 1,891,955 84,134 41,140 - 183,227 2.178 0.097 0.044

2000 Florida Indian River 0.65 Hurricane 1,891,955 84,134 41,140 - 33,183 0.394 0.018 0.044

2000 Florida Indian River 0.65 Salinity 1,891,955 84,134 41,140 - 34,398 0.409 0.018 0.044

2000 Florida Levy 0.50 Hurricane 3,544,686 95,688 30,191 - 30,639 0.320 0.009 0.027

2000 Florida Levy 0.50 Salinity 3,544,686 95,688 30,191 - 5,279 0.055 0.001 0.027

2000 Florida Levy 0.60 Oxygen Depletion 398,880 14,430 7,131 - 41,840 2.900 0.105 0.036

2000 Florida Levy 0.65 Freeze 6,785,639 296,443 144,937 - 6,900 0.023 0.001 0.044

2000 Florida Levy 0.65 Hurricane 6,785,639 296,443 144,937 - 362,971 1.224 0.053 0.044

2000 Florida Levy 0.65 Other 6,785,639 296,443 144,937 - 14,160 0.048 0.002 0.044

2000 Florida Levy 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 6,785,639 296,443 144,937 - 81,407 0.275 0.012 0.044

2000 Florida Levy 0.65 Salinity 6,785,639 296,443 144,937 - 83,795 0.283 0.012 0.044

2000 Florida Levy 0.65 Storm Surge 6,785,639 296,443 144,937 - 39,984 0.135 0.006 0.044

2000 Florida Levy 0.70 Salinity 173,250 10,703 6,022 - 34,964 3.267 0.202 0.062

2000 Florida Levy 0.75 Freeze 1,402,988 106,366 65,812 - 14,942 0.140 0.011 0.076

2000 Florida Levy 0.75 Hurricane 1,402,988 106,366 65,812 - 17,370 0.163 0.012 0.076

2000 Florida Levy 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 1,402,988 106,366 65,812 - 100,249 0.942 0.071 0.076

2000 Florida Levy 0.75 Salinity 1,402,988 106,366 65,812 - 37,552 0.353 0.027 0.076

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.60 Freeze 924,891 23,269 11,497 - 13,822 0.594 0.015 0.025

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.65 Freeze 975,220 29,270 14,311 - 85,992 2.938 0.088 0.030

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.75 Freeze 8,910 458 283 - 7,992 17.450 0.897 0.051

2001 Florida Brevard 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 134,296 5,802 2,379 3,423 18,448 3.180 0.137 0.043

2001 Florida Brevard 0.65 Salinity 134,296 5,802 2,379 3,423 16,622 2.865 0.124 0.043

2001 Florida Brevard 0.70 Hurricane 1,133,991 65,532 26,866 38,666 379,332 5.789 0.335 0.058

2001 Florida Brevard 0.70 Salinity 1,133,991 65,532 26,866 38,666 85,445 1.304 0.075 0.058

2001 Florida Brevard 0.75 Salinity 43,875 3,277 1,474 1,803 20,229 6.173 0.461 0.075

2001 Florida Dixie 0.50 Salinity 174,661 4,558 1,506 3,052 17,075 3.746 0.098 0.026

2001 Florida Dixie 0.50 Storm Surge 174,661 4,558 1,506 3,052 16,112 3.535 0.092 0.026

2001 Florida Dixie 0.65 Salinity 1,499,829 66,325 27,193 39,132 51,215 0.772 0.034 0.044

2001 Florida Dixie 0.70 Storm Surge 258,923 15,905 6,521 9,384 19,904 1.251 0.077 0.061

2001 Florida Dixie 0.75 Storm Surge 240,525 19,739 8,882 10,857 11,878 0.602 0.049 0.082

2001 Florida Indian River 0.65 Salinity 137,061 6,348 2,603 3,745 10,726 1.690 0.078 0.046

194
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Coverage Level and Primary Cause

Table 5.3

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year State County Name 

Coverage 

Level Description Liability Total Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Partial Loss Ratio

Partial Loss 

Cost Ratio

Earned 

Premium Ratio

2001 Florida Indian River 0.70 Hurricane 1,494,584 87,751 35,974 51,777 178,307 2.032 0.119 0.059

2001 Florida Indian River 0.70 Salinity 1,494,584 87,751 35,974 51,777 161,625 1.842 0.108 0.059

2001 Florida Indian River 0.75 Hurricane 15,123 1,129 508 621 3,880 3.437 0.257 0.075

2001 Florida Indian River 0.75 Salinity 15,123 1,129 508 621 5,752 5.095 0.380 0.075

2001 Florida Levy 0.50 Salinity 1,479,017 40,006 11,658 28,348 6,263 0.157 0.004 0.027

2001 Florida Levy 0.50 Storm Surge 1,479,017 40,006 11,658 28,348 42,941 1.073 0.029 0.027

2001 Florida Levy 0.60 Salinity 601,980 21,522 7,750 13,772 18,111 0.842 0.030 0.036

2001 Florida Levy 0.65 Hurricane 5,710,068 258,062 105,805 152,257 133,151 0.516 0.023 0.045

2001 Florida Levy 0.65 Salinity 5,710,068 258,062 105,805 152,257 181,401 0.703 0.032 0.045

2001 Florida Levy 0.65 Storm Surge 5,710,068 258,062 105,805 152,257 432,688 1.677 0.076 0.045

2001 Florida Levy 0.70 Freeze 4,204,796 250,942 102,890 148,052 1,535 0.006 0.000 0.060

2001 Florida Levy 0.70 Salinity 4,204,796 250,942 102,890 148,052 67,426 0.269 0.016 0.060

2001 Florida Levy 0.70 Storm Surge 4,204,796 250,942 102,890 148,052 490,614 1.955 0.117 0.060

2001 Florida Levy 0.75 Freeze 758,500 61,632 27,736 33,896 10,107 0.164 0.013 0.081

2001 Florida Levy 0.75 Salinity 758,500 61,632 27,736 33,896 66,476 1.079 0.088 0.081

2001 Florida Levy 0.75 Storm Surge 758,500 61,632 27,736 33,896 79,049 1.283 0.104 0.081

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.50 Freeze 1,187,968 21,383 73 21,310 150,000 7.015 0.126 0.018

2001 Virginia Northampton 0.50 Disease, Aquaculture 15,734,262 302,859 99,946 202,913 151,200 0.499 0.010 0.019

2001 Virginia Northampton 0.60 Freeze 320,256 8,070 2,905 5,165 53,186 6.591 0.166 0.025

2002 Florida Brevard 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 251,820 10,881 4,462 6,419 75,546 6.943 0.300 0.043

2002 Florida Brevard 0.65 Salinity 251,820 10,881 4,462 6,419 32,137 2.953 0.128 0.043

2002 Florida Brevard 0.70 Oxygen Depletion 632,450 35,861 14,702 21,159 24,040 0.670 0.038 0.057

2002 Florida Brevard 0.70 Salinity 632,450 35,861 14,702 21,159 112,659 3.142 0.178 0.057

2002 Florida Brevard 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 339,788 25,683 11,557 14,126 1,668 0.065 0.005 0.076

2002 Florida Brevard 0.75 Salinity 339,788 25,683 11,557 14,126 27,965 1.089 0.082 0.076

2002 Florida Dixie 0.60 Salinity 80,280 3,034 1,093 1,941 13,487 4.445 0.168 0.038

2002 Florida Dixie 0.65 Other 2,484,900 114,702 47,025 67,677 10,315 0.090 0.004 0.046

2002 Florida Dixie 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 2,484,900 114,702 47,025 67,677 16,566 0.144 0.007 0.046

2002 Florida Dixie 0.65 Salinity 2,484,900 114,702 47,025 67,677 104,031 0.907 0.042 0.046

2002 Florida Dixie 0.75 Freeze 101,400 7,574 3,408 4,166 1,597 0.211 0.016 0.075

2002 Florida Dixie 0.75 Storm Surge 101,400 7,574 3,408 4,166 12,724 1.680 0.125 0.075

2002 Florida Indian River 0.70 Salinity 1,136,281 68,096 27,917 40,179 61,669 0.906 0.054 0.060

2002 Florida Indian River 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 739,016 55,991 25,196 30,795 7,062 0.126 0.010 0.076

2002 Florida Indian River 0.75 Salinity 739,016 55,991 25,196 30,795 65,019 1.161 0.088 0.076

2002 Florida Levy 0.50 Oxygen Depletion 674,528 18,789 5,971 12,818 1,896 0.101 0.003 0.028

2002 Florida Levy 0.50 Storm Surge 674,528 18,789 5,971 12,818 25,119 1.337 0.037 0.028

2002 Florida Levy 0.65 Freeze 10,150,065 466,511 191,271 275,240 2,456 0.005 0.000 0.046

2002 Florida Levy 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 10,150,065 466,511 191,271 275,240 107,828 0.231 0.011 0.046

2002 Florida Levy 0.65 Salinity 10,150,065 466,511 191,271 275,240 1,149,147 2.463 0.113 0.046

2002 Florida Levy 0.65 Storm Surge 10,150,065 466,511 191,271 275,240 358,614 0.769 0.035 0.046

2002 Florida Levy 0.70 Freeze 5,610,347 336,067 137,792 198,275 132,735 0.395 0.024 0.060

2002 Florida Levy 0.70 Other 5,610,347 336,067 137,792 198,275 53,227 0.158 0.009 0.060

2002 Florida Levy 0.70 Oxygen Depletion 5,610,347 336,067 137,792 198,275 122,388 0.364 0.022 0.060

2002 Florida Levy 0.70 Salinity 5,610,347 336,067 137,792 198,275 206,971 0.616 0.037 0.060

195
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Coverage Level and Primary Cause

Table 5.3

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year State County Name 

Coverage 

Level Description Liability Total Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Partial Loss Ratio

Partial Loss 

Cost Ratio

Earned 

Premium Ratio

2002 Florida Levy 0.70 Storm Surge 5,610,347 336,067 137,792 198,275 412,113 1.226 0.073 0.060

2002 Florida Levy 0.75 Freeze 2,503,029 198,597 89,370 109,227 74,191 0.374 0.030 0.079

2002 Florida Levy 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 2,503,029 198,597 89,370 109,227 16,252 0.082 0.006 0.079

2002 Florida Levy 0.75 Salinity 2,503,029 198,597 89,370 109,227 280,588 1.413 0.112 0.079

2002 Florida Levy 0.75 Storm Surge 2,503,029 198,597 89,370 109,227 414,822 2.089 0.166 0.079

2002 Virginia Northampton 0.50 Storm Surge 16,114,340 334,796 110,479 224,317 42,809 0.128 0.003 0.021

2002 Virginia Northampton 0.60 Disease, Aquaculture 3,745,267 104,867 37,752 67,115 51,607 0.492 0.014 0.028

2003 Florida Brevard 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 159,379 6,884 2,823 4,061 56,789 8.249 0.356 0.043

2003 Florida Brevard 0.65 Salinity 159,379 6,884 2,823 4,061 29,376 4.267 0.184 0.043

2003 Florida Brevard 0.75 Salinity 199,557 14,907 6,710 8,197 126,815 8.507 0.635 0.075

2003 Florida Dixie 0.65 Salinity 1,128,357 52,061 21,342 30,719 80,631 1.549 0.071 0.046

2003 Florida Dixie 0.70 Salinity 1,473,711 89,491 36,686 52,805 193,275 2.160 0.131 0.061

2003 Florida Dixie 0.75 Salinity 151,125 11,289 5,079 6,210 2,250 0.199 0.015 0.075

2003 Florida Indian River 0.70 Salinity 802,168 48,245 19,779 28,466 11,840 0.245 0.015 0.060

2003 Florida Indian River 0.75 Salinity 619,482 48,444 21,799 26,645 75,080 1.550 0.121 0.078

2003 Florida Levy 0.65 Salinity 4,776,480 219,837 90,131 129,706 238,339 1.084 0.050 0.046

2003 Florida Levy 0.70 Excess Wind 6,772,112 407,400 167,033 240,367 15,288 0.038 0.002 0.060

2003 Florida Levy 0.70 Salinity 6,772,112 407,400 167,033 240,367 413,495 1.015 0.061 0.060

2003 Florida Levy 0.75 Salinity 2,924,263 232,951 104,830 128,121 664,363 2.852 0.227 0.080

2003 Florida Levy 0.75 Storm Surge 2,924,263 232,951 104,830 128,121 49,245 0.211 0.017 0.080

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.50 Freeze 1,317,943 23,724 1,757 21,967 13,547 0.571 0.010 0.018

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.60 Freeze 378,526 9,383 3,379 6,004 4,288 0.457 0.011 0.025

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.65 Freeze 525,073 15,593 6,393 9,200 154,824 9.929 0.295 0.030

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.75 Freeze 32,490 1,667 750 917 16,861 10.115 0.519 0.051

2003 South Carolina Charleston 0.50 Storm Surge 483,762 9,807 3,039 6,768 77,599 7.913 0.160 0.020

2003 Virginia Accomack 0.50 Freeze 6,570,251 135,969 44,863 91,106 204,351 1.503 0.031 0.021

2003 Virginia Accomack 0.50 Hurricane 6,570,251 135,969 44,863 91,106 35,542 0.261 0.005 0.021

2003 Virginia Accomack 0.50 Storm Surge 6,570,251 135,969 44,863 91,106 35,542 0.261 0.005 0.021

2003 Virginia Northampton 0.50 Freeze 16,935,458 353,106 116,520 236,586 75,213 0.213 0.004 0.021

2003 Virginia Northampton 0.50 Storm Surge 16,935,458 353,106 116,520 236,586 183,178 0.519 0.011 0.021

2003 Virginia Northampton 0.60 Storm Surge 518,609 14,350 5,166 9,184 16,789 1.170 0.032 0.028

2004 Florida Brevard 0.65 Hurricane 71,663 5,418 2,222 3,196 16,492 3.044 0.230 0.076

2004 Florida Brevard 0.70 Hurricane 19,664 2,555 1,048 1,507 17,597 6.887 0.895 0.130

2004 Florida Brevard 0.75 Hurricane 33,210 4,537 2,042 2,495 26,119 5.757 0.786 0.137

2004 Florida Dixie 0.50 Hurricane 88,131 5,405 865 4,540 13,437 2.486 0.152 0.061

2004 Florida Dixie 0.65 Hurricane 336,546 32,652 13,388 19,264 22,792 0.698 0.068 0.097

2004 Florida Dixie 0.65 Storm Surge 336,546 32,652 13,388 19,264 1,877 0.057 0.006 0.097

2004 Florida Dixie 0.70 Hurricane 231,045 26,646 10,924 15,722 71,643 2.689 0.310 0.115

2004 Florida Dixie 0.75 Hurricane 33,496 4,010 1,804 2,206 16,619 4.144 0.496 0.120

2004 Florida Indian River 0.50 Hurricane 54,034 3,583 1,182 2,401 7,845 2.190 0.145 0.066

2004 Florida Indian River 0.70 Hurricane 131,936 14,919 6,119 8,800 28,894 1.937 0.219 0.113

2004 Florida Indian River 0.75 Hurricane 241,763 30,843 13,879 16,964 140,776 4.564 0.582 0.128

2004 Florida Levy 0.50 Hurricane 1,531,008 105,546 27,093 78,453 112,387 1.065 0.073 0.069

2004 Florida Levy 0.60 Hurricane 352,271 33,626 12,105 21,521 45,073 1.340 0.128 0.095

196
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Coverage Level and Primary Cause

Table 5.3

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year State County Name 

Coverage 

Level Description Liability Total Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Partial Loss Ratio

Partial Loss 

Cost Ratio

Earned 

Premium Ratio

2004 Florida Levy 0.65 Hurricane 953,667 101,504 41,616 59,888 239,651 2.361 0.251 0.106

2004 Florida Levy 0.70 Hurricane 704,520 80,786 33,122 47,664 79,944 0.990 0.113 0.115

2004 Florida Levy 0.75 Hurricane 522,523 69,800 31,410 38,390 165,231 2.367 0.316 0.134

2004 Florida Levy 0.75 Salinity 522,523 69,800 31,410 38,390 44,196 0.633 0.085 0.134

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.55 Disease, Aquaculture 117,018 2,446 881 1,565 55,788 22.808 0.477 0.021

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.65 Freeze 361,745 11,172 4,580 6,592 22,170 1.984 0.061 0.031

2004 South Carolina Charleston 0.55 Storm Surge 189,925 4,386 1,579 2,807 31,938 7.282 0.168 0.023

2004 Virginia Accomack 0.50 Freeze 3,036,943 54,473 4,287 50,186 254,995 4.681 0.084 0.018

2004 Virginia Accomack 0.55 Freeze 115,500 2,558 920 1,638 109,257 42.712 0.946 0.022

2004 Virginia Accomack 0.60 Freeze 1,069,488 25,874 9,314 16,560 275,937 10.665 0.258 0.024

2004 Virginia Accomack 0.65 Freeze 87,360 2,019 828 1,191 46,893 23.226 0.537 0.023

2004 Virginia Northampton 0.50 Freeze 12,032,932 222,438 73,037 149,401 250,864 1.128 0.021 0.018

2004 Virginia Northampton 0.50 Storm Surge 12,032,932 222,438 73,037 149,401 52,441 0.236 0.004 0.018

2004 Virginia Northampton 0.60 Freeze 2,858,219 62,412 22,468 39,944 31,546 0.505 0.011 0.022

2005 Florida Dixie 0.70 Hurricane 117,650 11,305 4,634 6,671 12,827 1.135 0.109 0.096

2005 Florida Dixie 0.70 Storm Surge 117,650 11,305 4,634 6,671 24,577 2.174 0.209 0.096

2005 Florida Dixie 0.75 Salinity 39,376 2,806 1,263 1,543 19,156 6.827 0.486 0.071

2005 Florida Levy 0.50 Storm Surge 1,095,768 65,269 7,077 58,192 19,570 0.300 0.018 0.060

2005 Florida Levy 0.65 Hurricane 1,347,780 99,753 40,901 58,852 16,340 0.164 0.012 0.074

2005 Florida Levy 0.65 Salinity 1,347,780 99,753 40,901 58,852 3,518 0.035 0.003 0.074

2005 Florida Levy 0.75 Hurricane 677,462 68,978 31,039 37,939 54,482 0.790 0.080 0.102

2005 Florida Levy 0.75 Other 677,462 68,978 31,039 37,939 53,007 0.768 0.078 0.102

2005 Florida Levy 0.75 Salinity 677,462 68,978 31,039 37,939 13,888 0.201 0.021 0.102

2005 Florida Levy 0.75 Tidal Wave 677,462 68,978 31,039 37,939 19,055 0.276 0.028 0.102

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.50 Disease, Aquaculture 622,953 10,289 406 9,883 108,936 10.588 0.175 0.017

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.65 Ice Floe 721,998 19,910 8,162 11,748 265,074 13.314 0.367 0.028

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.65 Storm Surge 721,998 19,910 8,162 11,748 6,264 0.315 0.009 0.028

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.70 Freeze 71,820 2,521 1,033 1,488 7,759 3.078 0.108 0.035

2006 Florida Levy 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 2,877,946 249,562 102,319 147,243 204,230 0.818 0.071 0.087

2006 Florida Levy 0.70 Storm Surge 517,629 50,722 20,797 29,925 89,869 1.772 0.174 0.098

2006 Florida Levy 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 726,128 76,407 34,384 42,023 69,320 0.907 0.095 0.105

2006 Florida Levy 0.75 Storm Surge 726,128 76,407 34,384 42,023 78,444 1.027 0.108 0.105

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.60 Freeze 586,440 15,484 5,574 9,910 92,591 5.980 0.158 0.026

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.60 Ice Floe 586,440 15,484 5,574 9,910 16,434 1.061 0.028 0.026

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.65 Freeze 385,067 13,141 5,386 7,755 3,377 0.257 0.009 0.034

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.65 Ice Floe 385,067 13,141 5,386 7,755 10,631 0.809 0.028 0.034

2006 Virginia Northampton 0.50 Hurricane 11,785,021 216,944 71,141 145,803 112,317 0.518 0.010 0.018

2007 Florida Levy 0.50 Oxygen Depletion 1,273,144 74,426 6,266 68,160 22,412 0.301 0.018 0.058

2007 Florida Levy 0.60 Oxygen Depletion 1,269,282 93,973 33,830 60,143 10,490 0.112 0.008 0.074

2007 Florida Levy 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 1,912,275 169,739 69,588 100,151 28,905 0.170 0.015 0.089

2007 Florida Levy 0.70 Oxygen Depletion 1,034,340 103,459 42,421 61,038 139,738 1.351 0.135 0.100

2007 Florida Levy 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 627,777 59,996 26,999 32,997 76,470 1.275 0.122 0.096

2007 Florida Levy 0.75 Salinity 627,777 59,996 26,999 32,997 92,998 1.550 0.148 0.096

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.50 Disease, Aquaculture 639,768 11,679 1,810 9,869 34,411 2.946 0.054 0.018

197
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Coverage Level and Primary Cause

Table 5.3

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year State County Name 

Coverage 

Level Description Liability Total Premium 

 Producer 

Premium Subsidy Indemnity Partial Loss Ratio

Partial Loss 

Cost Ratio

Earned 

Premium Ratio

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.50 Ice Floe 639,768 11,679 1,810 9,869 18,605 1.593 0.029 0.018

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.60 Freeze 543,024 13,332 4,798 8,534 3,940 0.296 0.007 0.025

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.65 Ice Floe 379,115 12,035 4,934 7,101 29,562 2.456 0.078 0.032

2007 Virginia Accomack 0.65 Freeze 915,707 27,950 11,460 16,490 22,680 0.811 0.025 0.031

2007 Virginia Accomack 0.70 Freeze 269,325 11,869 4,867 7,002 21,809 1.837 0.081 0.044

2008 Florida Brevard 0.65 Salinity 75,724 6,764 2,773 3,991 34,290 5.069 0.453 0.089

2008 Florida Indian River 0.70 Disease, Aquaculture 23,520 2,223 911 1,312 7,461 3.356 0.317 0.095

2008 Florida Levy 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 843,738 108,369 44,432 63,937 11,088 0.102 0.013 0.128

2008 Florida Levy 0.70 Salinity 405,614 40,837 16,742 24,095 69,505 1.702 0.171 0.101

2008 Florida Levy 0.70 Storm Surge 405,614 40,837 16,742 24,095 31,488 0.771 0.078 0.101

2008 Florida Levy 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 985,302 85,204 38,342 46,862 98,394 1.155 0.100 0.086

2008 Florida Levy 0.75 Salinity 985,302 85,204 38,342 46,862 93,794 1.101 0.095 0.086

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.50 Freeze 480,418 10,152 1,878 8,274 22,089 2.176 0.046 0.021

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.65 Freeze 391,049 14,524 5,955 8,569 38,936 2.681 0.100 0.037

2009 Florida Levy 0.50 Salinity 3,061,921 124,360 19,081 105,279 427,885 3.441 0.140 0.041

2009 Florida Levy 0.60 Salinity 151,200 8,981 3,233 5,748 147,838 16.461 0.978 0.059

2009 Florida Levy 0.70 Salinity 343,476 29,186 11,966 17,220 153,231 5.250 0.446 0.085

2009 Florida Levy 0.75 Salinity 735,767 59,316 26,692 32,624 599,471 10.106 0.815 0.081

2009 Virginia Accomack 0.65 Storm Surge 2,097,591 54,205 22,226 31,979 228,088 4.208 0.109 0.026

2010 Florida Brevard 0.65 Other 4,571 378 155 223 4,571 12.093 1.000 0.083

2010 Florida Levy 0.75 Freeze 141,531 13,591 6,116 7,475 49,790 3.663 0.352 0.096

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 470,521 13,955 5,723 8,232 18,658 1.337 0.040 0.030

2010 Virginia Accomack 0.60 Storm Surge 106,110 2,546 917 1,629 24,300 9.544 0.229 0.024

2010 Virginia Accomack 0.70 Freeze 182,070 6,070 2,490 3,580 28,771 4.740 0.158 0.033

198
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, Practice Code and Cause of Loss

Table 5.4

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year 

 Practice 

Code 

 Type 

Code Description Liability 

 Total 

Premium Indemnity 

Partial 

Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2000 22 80 Disease, Aquaculture 1,466,046 59,978 5,027 0.084 0.003 0.041

2000 22 80 Freeze 1,466,046 59,978 6,900 0.115 0.005 0.041

2000 22 80 Hurricane 1,466,046 59,978 140,284 2.339 0.096 0.041

2000 22 80 Salinity 1,466,046 59,978 263,518 4.394 0.180 0.041

2000 23 82 Disease, Aquaculture 16,048,482 672,821 200,731 0.298 0.013 0.042

2000 23 82 Excess Wind 16,048,482 672,821 25,740 0.038 0.002 0.042

2000 23 82 Freeze 16,048,482 672,821 34,173 0.051 0.002 0.042

2000 23 82 Hurricane 16,048,482 672,821 332,244 0.494 0.021 0.042

2000 23 82 Other 16,048,482 672,821 14,160 0.021 0.001 0.042

2000 23 82 Oxygen Depletion 16,048,482 672,821 344,641 0.512 0.021 0.042

2000 23 82 Salinity 16,048,482 672,821 554,367 0.824 0.035 0.042

2000 23 82 Storm Surge 16,048,482 672,821 39,984 0.059 0.002 0.042

2000 24 82 Freeze 11,091,810 250,408 107,806 0.431 0.010 0.023

2001 22 80 Freeze 1,198,498 67,953 11,642 0.171 0.010 0.057

2001 22 80 Hurricane 1,198,498 67,953 11,772 0.173 0.010 0.057

2001 22 80 Oxygen Depletion 1,198,498 67,953 18,448 0.271 0.015 0.057

2001 22 80 Salinity 1,198,498 67,953 71,006 1.045 0.059 0.057

2001 22 80 Storm Surge 1,198,498 67,953 183,184 2.696 0.153 0.057

2001 23 82 Hurricane 17,001,781 847,821 682,898 0.805 0.040 0.050

2001 23 82 Salinity 17,001,781 847,821 605,514 0.714 0.036 0.050

2001 23 82 Storm Surge 17,001,781 847,821 910,002 1.073 0.054 0.050

2001 24 80 Disease, Aquaculture 12,248,175 260,332 72,000 0.277 0.006 0.021

2001 24 80 Freeze 12,248,175 260,332 53,186 0.204 0.004 0.021

2001 24 82 Disease, Aquaculture 10,766,814 224,500 79,200 0.353 0.007 0.021

2001 24 82 Freeze 10,766,814 224,500 150,000 0.668 0.014 0.021

2001 24 82 Salinity 10,766,814 224,500 31,846 0.142 0.003 0.021

2002 22 80 Freeze 1,937,973 110,218 97,831 0.888 0.050 0.057

2002 22 80 Oxygen Depletion 1,937,973 110,218 44,401 0.403 0.023 0.057

2002 22 80 Salinity 1,937,973 110,218 450,074 4.083 0.232 0.057

2002 22 80 Storm Surge 1,937,973 110,218 77,423 0.702 0.040 0.057

2002 23 82 Freeze 25,665,858 1,329,504 113,148 0.085 0.004 0.052

2002 23 82 Other 25,665,858 1,329,504 63,542 0.048 0.002 0.052

2002 23 82 Oxygen Depletion 25,665,858 1,329,504 328,845 0.247 0.013 0.052

2002 23 82 Salinity 25,665,858 1,329,504 1,603,599 1.206 0.062 0.052

2002 23 82 Storm Surge 25,665,858 1,329,504 1,145,969 0.862 0.045 0.052

2002 24 80 Storm Surge 16,230,272 379,346 35,700 0.094 0.002 0.023

2002 24 82 Disease, Aquaculture 16,118,510 361,635 51,607 0.143 0.003 0.022

2002 24 82 Storm Surge 16,118,510 361,635 7,109 0.020 0.000 0.022

2003 22 80 Oxygen Depletion 789,460 44,897 22,062 0.491 0.028 0.057

2003 22 80 Salinity 789,460 44,897 29,661 0.661 0.038 0.057

2003 22 80 Storm Surge 789,460 44,897 49,245 1.097 0.062 0.057

199
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, Practice Code and Cause of Loss

Table 5.4

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year 

 Practice 

Code 

 Type 

Code Description Liability 

 Total 

Premium Indemnity 

Partial 

Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2003 23 82 Excess Wind 21,148,636 1,180,994 15,288 0.013 0.001 0.056

2003 23 82 Oxygen Depletion 21,148,636 1,180,994 34,727 0.029 0.002 0.056

2003 23 82 Salinity 21,148,636 1,180,994 1,805,803 1.529 0.085 0.056

2003 23 82 Storm Surge 21,148,636 1,180,994 77,599 0.066 0.004 0.056

2003 24 80 Freeze 14,493,649 323,681 113,007 0.349 0.008 0.022

2003 24 80 Hurricane 14,493,649 323,681 35,542 0.110 0.002 0.022

2003 24 80 Storm Surge 14,493,649 323,681 52,331 0.162 0.004 0.022

2003 24 82 Freeze 14,745,578 310,826 356,077 1.146 0.024 0.021

2003 24 82 Storm Surge 14,745,578 310,826 183,178 0.589 0.012 0.021

2004 23 84 Hurricane 1,774,328 188,998 497,745 2.634 0.281 0.107

2004 23 84 Salinity 1,774,328 188,998 40,209 0.213 0.023 0.107

2004 23 84 Storm Surge 1,774,328 188,998 31,938 0.169 0.018 0.107

2004 23 85 Hurricane 4,045,556 334,483 475,256 1.421 0.117 0.083

2004 23 86 Hurricane 286,206 18,839 23,654 1.256 0.083 0.066

2004 23 86 Salinity 286,206 18,839 3,987 0.212 0.014 0.066

2004 23 86 Storm Surge 286,206 18,839 1,877 0.100 0.007 0.066

2004 24 84 Freeze 5,918,514 113,096 444,966 3.934 0.075 0.019

2004 24 84 Storm Surge 5,918,514 113,096 52,441 0.464 0.009 0.019

2004 24 85 Disease, Aquaculture 15,676,738 313,765 55,788 0.178 0.004 0.020

2004 24 85 Freeze 15,676,738 313,765 546,696 1.742 0.035 0.020

2004 24 85 Hurricane 15,676,738 313,765 7,845 0.025 0.001 0.020

2005 23 84 Hurricane 492,548 48,594 5,168 0.106 0.010 0.099

2005 23 84 Other 492,548 48,594 53,007 1.091 0.108 0.099

2005 23 84 Salinity 492,548 48,594 3,518 0.072 0.007 0.099

2005 23 85 Hurricane 791,794 60,077 4,418 0.074 0.006 0.076

2005 23 85 Storm Surge 791,794 60,077 44,147 0.735 0.056 0.076

2005 23 86 Hurricane 3,872,225 257,082 74,063 0.288 0.019 0.066

2005 23 86 Salinity 3,872,225 257,082 33,044 0.129 0.009 0.066

2005 23 86 Tidal Wave 3,872,225 257,082 19,055 0.074 0.005 0.066

2005 24 84 Disease, Aquaculture 2,862,236 61,789 108,936 1.763 0.038 0.022

2005 24 84 Storm Surge 2,862,236 61,789 4,655 0.075 0.002 0.022

2005 24 85 Freeze 10,131,360 197,480 7,759 0.039 0.001 0.019

2005 24 85 Ice Floe 10,131,360 197,480 265,074 1.342 0.026 0.019

2005 24 85 Storm Surge 10,131,360 197,480 1,609 0.008 0.000 0.019

2006 23 84 Oxygen Depletion 343,166 44,853 36,070 0.804 0.105 0.131

2006 23 86 Oxygen Depletion 5,973,564 451,803 237,480 0.526 0.040 0.076

2006 23 86 Storm Surge 5,973,564 451,803 168,313 0.373 0.028 0.076

2006 24 84 Freeze 5,312,898 119,545 3,377 0.028 0.001 0.023

2006 24 84 Hurricane 5,312,898 119,545 3,401 0.028 0.001 0.023

2006 24 85 Freeze 14,276,824 297,979 92,591 0.311 0.006 0.021

2006 24 85 Hurricane 14,276,824 297,979 108,916 0.366 0.008 0.021

200
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, Practice Code and Cause of Loss

Table 5.4

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year 

 Practice 

Code 

 Type 

Code Description Liability 

 Total 

Premium Indemnity 

Partial 

Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2006 24 85 Ice Floe 14,276,824 297,979 27,065 0.091 0.002 0.021

2007 23 84 Oxygen Depletion 371,723 28,484 9,201 0.323 0.025 0.077

2007 23 85 Oxygen Depletion 764,948 71,288 38,070 0.534 0.050 0.093

2007 23 86 Oxygen Depletion 5,442,413 423,811 230,744 0.544 0.042 0.078

2007 23 86 Salinity 5,442,413 423,811 92,998 0.219 0.017 0.078

2007 24 84 Freeze 5,417,288 127,962 22,680 0.177 0.004 0.024

2007 24 85 Disease, Aquaculture 14,783,839 321,518 34,411 0.107 0.002 0.022

2007 24 85 Freeze 14,783,839 321,518 25,749 0.080 0.002 0.022

2007 24 85 Ice Floe 14,783,839 321,518 48,167 0.150 0.003 0.022

2008 23 84 Oxygen Depletion 699,715 94,923 59,276 0.624 0.085 0.136

2008 23 85 Oxygen Depletion 1,721,174 167,278 27,216 0.163 0.016 0.097

2008 23 85 Storm Surge 1,721,174 167,278 31,488 0.188 0.018 0.097

2008 23 86 Disease, Aquaculture 2,223,606 173,624 7,461 0.043 0.003 0.078

2008 23 86 Oxygen Depletion 2,223,606 173,624 22,990 0.132 0.010 0.078

2008 23 86 Salinity 2,223,606 173,624 163,299 0.941 0.073 0.078

2008 24 85 Freeze 20,124,846 471,548 61,025 0.129 0.003 0.023

2008 24 85 Salinity 20,124,846 471,548 9,802 0.021 0.000 0.023

2008 24 86 Salinity 46,410 3,843 24,488 6.372 0.528 0.083

2009 23 84 Salinity 877,010 41,800 242,788 5.808 0.277 0.048

2009 23 85 Salinity 1,122,451 60,088 202,215 3.365 0.180 0.054

2009 23 86 Salinity 2,348,973 124,619 883,422 7.089 0.376 0.053

2009 24 84 Storm Surge 4,951,475 95,592 199,368 2.086 0.040 0.019

2009 24 85 Storm Surge 18,580,585 352,295 28,720 0.082 0.002 0.019

2010 23 85 Freeze 11,946 1,410 8,134 5.769 0.681 0.118

2010 23 86 Freeze 208,510 15,733 41,656 2.648 0.200 0.075

2010 24 84 Freeze 3,077,565 62,576 12,362 0.198 0.004 0.020

2010 24 84 Other 3,077,565 62,576 1,997 0.032 0.001 0.020

2010 24 84 Storm Surge 3,077,565 62,576 24,300 0.388 0.008 0.020

2010 24 85 Freeze 18,829,024 346,356 16,409 0.047 0.001 0.018

2010 24 85 Oxygen Depletion 18,829,024 346,356 18,658 0.054 0.001 0.018

2010 24 86 Other 2,574 171 2,574 15.053 1.000 0.066

201
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Practice Code, Coverage Level and Cause of Loss

Table 5.5

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State Abbrev County Name 

 Practice 

Code 

 Type 

Code 

 Coverage 

Level Description Liability Premium Indemnity 

Partial 

Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2000 Florida Brevard 22 80 0.65 Salinity 209,076 9,033 82,690 9.154 0.396 0.043

2000 Florida Brevard 23 82 0.65 Disease, Aquaculture 227,401 9,823 12,782 1.301 0.056 0.043

2000 Florida Brevard 23 82 0.65 Excess Wind 227,401 9,823 25,740 2.620 0.113 0.043

2000 Florida Brevard 23 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 227,401 9,823 9,492 0.966 0.042 0.043

2000 Florida Brevard 23 82 0.70 Freeze 2,694 153 899 5.876 0.334 0.057

2000 Florida Dixie 22 80 0.50 Salinity 61,842 1,625 2,250 1.385 0.036 0.026

2000 Florida Dixie 22 80 0.65 Salinity 97,309 4,331 168,675 38.946 1.733 0.045

2000 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.50 Hurricane 629,419 16,555 28,365 1.713 0.045 0.026

2000 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.50 Oxygen Depletion 629,419 16,555 46,855 2.830 0.074 0.026

2000 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.50 Salinity 629,419 16,555 3,921 0.237 0.006 0.026

2000 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.55 Salinity 95,040 2,822 7,742 2.743 0.081 0.030

2000 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.65 Freeze 1,497,536 67,241 18,332 0.273 0.012 0.045

2000 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 1,497,536 67,241 64,798 0.964 0.043 0.045

2000 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.65 Salinity 1,497,536 67,241 356,619 5.304 0.238 0.045

2000 Florida Indian River 22 80 0.65 Disease, Aquaculture 164,775 7,394 5,027 0.680 0.031 0.045

2000 Florida Indian River 23 82 0.50 Disease, Aquaculture 37,180 970 9,749 10.051 0.262 0.026

2000 Florida Indian River 23 82 0.65 Disease, Aquaculture 1,659,580 73,820 178,200 2.414 0.107 0.044

2000 Florida Indian River 23 82 0.65 Hurricane 1,659,580 73,820 33,183 0.450 0.020 0.044

2000 Florida Indian River 23 82 0.65 Salinity 1,659,580 73,820 34,398 0.466 0.021 0.044

2000 Florida Levy 22 80 0.50 Salinity 223,904 6,115 5,279 0.863 0.024 0.027

2000 Florida Levy 22 80 0.65 Freeze 599,609 26,032 6,900 0.265 0.012 0.043

2000 Florida Levy 22 80 0.65 Hurricane 599,609 26,032 140,284 5.389 0.234 0.043

2000 Florida Levy 22 80 0.65 Salinity 599,609 26,032 4,570 0.176 0.008 0.043

2000 Florida Levy 22 80 0.75 Salinity 42,188 3,221 54 0.017 0.001 0.076

2000 Florida Levy 23 82 0.50 Hurricane 3,320,782 89,573 30,639 0.342 0.009 0.027

2000 Florida Levy 23 82 0.60 Oxygen Depletion 377,280 13,647 41,840 3.066 0.111 0.036

2000 Florida Levy 23 82 0.65 Hurricane 6,186,030 270,411 222,687 0.824 0.036 0.044

2000 Florida Levy 23 82 0.65 Other 6,186,030 270,411 14,160 0.052 0.002 0.044

2000 Florida Levy 23 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 6,186,030 270,411 81,407 0.301 0.013 0.044

2000 Florida Levy 23 82 0.65 Salinity 6,186,030 270,411 79,225 0.293 0.013 0.044

2000 Florida Levy 23 82 0.65 Storm Surge 6,186,030 270,411 39,984 0.148 0.006 0.044

2000 Florida Levy 23 82 0.70 Salinity 168,000 10,373 34,964 3.371 0.208 0.062

2000 Florida Levy 23 82 0.75 Freeze 1,360,800 103,145 14,942 0.145 0.011 0.076

2000 Florida Levy 23 82 0.75 Hurricane 1,360,800 103,145 17,370 0.168 0.013 0.076

2000 Florida Levy 23 82 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 1,360,800 103,145 100,249 0.972 0.074 0.076

2000 Florida Levy 23 82 0.75 Salinity 1,360,800 103,145 37,498 0.364 0.028 0.076

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 82 0.60 Freeze 924,891 23,269 13,822 0.594 0.015 0.025

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 82 0.65 Freeze 975,220 29,270 85,992 2.938 0.088 0.030

2000 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 82 0.75 Freeze 8,910 458 7,992 17.450 0.897 0.051

2001 Florida Brevard 22 80 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 19,652 850 18,448 21.704 0.939 0.043

2001 Florida Brevard 22 80 0.70 Hurricane 75,530 4,352 3,902 0.897 0.052 0.058

2001 Florida Brevard 22 80 0.70 Salinity 75,530 4,352 7,867 1.808 0.104 0.058

2001 Florida Brevard 22 80 0.75 Salinity 43,875 3,277 20,229 6.173 0.461 0.075

2001 Florida Brevard 23 82 0.65 Salinity 114,644 4,952 16,622 3.357 0.145 0.043

2001 Florida Brevard 23 82 0.70 Hurricane 1,058,461 61,180 375,430 6.136 0.355 0.058

2001 Florida Brevard 23 82 0.70 Salinity 1,058,461 61,180 77,578 1.268 0.073 0.058

2001 Florida Dixie 22 80 0.65 Salinity 69,764 3,068 - 0.000 0.000 0.044

2001 Florida Dixie 22 80 0.75 Storm Surge 26,325 2,170 5,108 2.354 0.194 0.082

202
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Practice Code, Coverage Level and Cause of Loss

Table 5.5

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State Abbrev County Name 

 Practice 

Code 

 Type 

Code 

 Coverage 

Level Description Liability Premium Indemnity 

Partial 

Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2001 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.50 Salinity 160,506 4,189 17,075 4.076 0.106 0.026

2001 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.50 Storm Surge 160,506 4,189 16,112 3.846 0.100 0.026

2001 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.65 Salinity 1,430,065 63,257 51,215 0.810 0.036 0.044

2001 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.70 Storm Surge 254,373 15,618 19,904 1.274 0.078 0.061

2001 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.75 Storm Surge 214,200 17,569 6,770 0.385 0.032 0.082

2001 Florida Indian River 22 80 0.70 Hurricane 61,334 3,793 3,990 1.052 0.065 0.062

2001 Florida Indian River 22 80 0.75 Hurricane 12,734 951 3,880 4.080 0.305 0.075

2001 Florida Indian River 22 80 0.75 Salinity 12,734 951 5,752 6.048 0.452 0.075

2001 Florida Indian River 23 82 0.65 Salinity 133,089 6,176 10,726 1.737 0.081 0.046

2001 Florida Indian River 23 82 0.70 Hurricane 1,305,850 76,734 174,317 2.272 0.133 0.059

2001 Florida Indian River 23 82 0.70 Salinity 1,305,850 76,734 129,779 1.691 0.099 0.059

2001 Florida Indian River 24 82 0.70 Salinity 127,400 7,224 31,846 4.408 0.250 0.057

2001 Florida Levy 22 80 0.65 Salinity 306,585 13,859 23,905 1.725 0.078 0.045

2001 Florida Levy 22 80 0.65 Storm Surge 306,585 13,859 - 0.000 0.000 0.045

2001 Florida Levy 22 80 0.70 Freeze 231,386 13,706 1,535 0.112 0.007 0.059

2001 Florida Levy 22 80 0.70 Salinity 231,386 13,706 8,736 0.637 0.038 0.059

2001 Florida Levy 22 80 0.70 Storm Surge 231,386 13,706 157,327 11.479 0.680 0.059

2001 Florida Levy 22 80 0.75 Freeze 228,638 18,128 10,107 0.558 0.044 0.079

2001 Florida Levy 22 80 0.75 Salinity 228,638 18,128 4,517 0.249 0.020 0.079

2001 Florida Levy 22 80 0.75 Storm Surge 228,638 18,128 20,749 1.145 0.091 0.079

2001 Florida Levy 23 82 0.50 Salinity 1,412,819 38,208 6,263 0.164 0.004 0.027

2001 Florida Levy 23 82 0.50 Storm Surge 1,412,819 38,208 42,941 1.124 0.030 0.027

2001 Florida Levy 23 82 0.60 Salinity 587,160 20,984 18,111 0.863 0.031 0.036

2001 Florida Levy 23 82 0.65 Hurricane 5,403,483 244,203 133,151 0.545 0.025 0.045

2001 Florida Levy 23 82 0.65 Salinity 5,403,483 244,203 157,496 0.645 0.029 0.045

2001 Florida Levy 23 82 0.65 Storm Surge 5,403,483 244,203 432,688 1.772 0.080 0.045

2001 Florida Levy 23 82 0.70 Salinity 3,973,410 237,236 58,690 0.247 0.015 0.060

2001 Florida Levy 23 82 0.70 Storm Surge 3,973,410 237,236 333,287 1.405 0.084 0.060

2001 Florida Levy 23 82 0.75 Salinity 529,862 43,504 61,959 1.424 0.117 0.082

2001 Florida Levy 23 82 0.75 Storm Surge 529,862 43,504 58,300 1.340 0.110 0.082

2001 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 82 0.50 Freeze 909,084 16,363 150,000 9.167 0.165 0.018

2001 Virginia Northampton 24 80 0.50 Disease, Aquaculture 8,519,140 164,600 72,000 0.437 0.008 0.019

2001 Virginia Northampton 24 80 0.60 Freeze 273,600 6,894 53,186 7.715 0.194 0.025

2001 Virginia Northampton 24 82 0.50 Disease, Aquaculture 7,215,122 138,259 79,200 0.573 0.011 0.019

2002 Florida Brevard 22 80 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 27,759 1,200 10,806 9.005 0.389 0.043

2002 Florida Brevard 22 80 0.70 Oxygen Depletion 27,300 1,548 24,040 15.530 0.881 0.057

2002 Florida Brevard 22 80 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 46,313 3,479 1,668 0.479 0.036 0.075

2002 Florida Brevard 23 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 224,061 9,681 64,740 6.687 0.289 0.043

2002 Florida Brevard 23 82 0.65 Salinity 224,061 9,681 32,137 3.320 0.143 0.043

2002 Florida Brevard 23 82 0.70 Salinity 605,150 34,313 112,659 3.283 0.186 0.057

2002 Florida Brevard 23 82 0.75 Salinity 293,475 22,204 27,965 1.259 0.095 0.076

2002 Florida Dixie 22 80 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 150,278 7,015 5,991 0.854 0.040 0.047

2002 Florida Dixie 22 80 0.65 Salinity 150,278 7,015 25,555 3.643 0.170 0.047

2002 Florida Dixie 22 80 0.75 Freeze 19,500 1,456 1,597 1.097 0.082 0.075

2002 Florida Dixie 22 80 0.75 Storm Surge 19,500 1,456 12,724 8.739 0.653 0.075

2002 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.60 Salinity 75,600 2,851 13,487 4.731 0.178 0.038

2002 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.65 Other 2,334,622 107,687 10,315 0.096 0.004 0.046

2002 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 2,334,622 107,687 10,575 0.098 0.005 0.046

203
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Practice Code, Coverage Level and Cause of Loss

Table 5.5

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State Abbrev County Name 

 Practice 

Code 

 Type 

Code 

 Coverage 

Level Description Liability Premium Indemnity 

Partial 

Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2002 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.65 Salinity 2,334,622 107,687 78,476 0.729 0.034 0.046

2002 Florida Indian River 22 80 0.70 Salinity 38,220 2,281 31,885 13.979 0.834 0.060

2002 Florida Indian River 22 80 0.75 Salinity 315,525 24,074 65,019 2.701 0.206 0.076

2002 Florida Indian River 23 82 0.70 Salinity 1,098,061 65,815 29,784 0.453 0.027 0.060

2002 Florida Indian River 23 82 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 423,491 31,917 7,062 0.221 0.017 0.075

2002 Florida Levy 22 80 0.50 Oxygen Depletion 28,568 803 1,896 2.361 0.066 0.028

2002 Florida Levy 22 80 0.65 Freeze 617,638 28,389 2,456 0.087 0.004 0.046

2002 Florida Levy 22 80 0.65 Salinity 617,638 28,389 299,909 10.564 0.486 0.046

2002 Florida Levy 22 80 0.65 Storm Surge 617,638 28,389 35,936 1.266 0.058 0.046

2002 Florida Levy 22 80 0.70 Freeze 222,167 13,675 79,969 5.848 0.360 0.062

2002 Florida Levy 22 80 0.70 Salinity 222,167 13,675 3,236 0.237 0.015 0.062

2002 Florida Levy 22 80 0.70 Storm Surge 222,167 13,675 28,763 2.103 0.129 0.062

2002 Florida Levy 22 80 0.75 Freeze 221,326 16,962 13,809 0.814 0.062 0.077

2002 Florida Levy 22 80 0.75 Salinity 221,326 16,962 24,470 1.443 0.111 0.077

2002 Florida Levy 23 82 0.50 Storm Surge 645,960 17,986 25,119 1.397 0.039 0.028

2002 Florida Levy 23 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 9,532,427 438,122 107,828 0.246 0.011 0.046

2002 Florida Levy 23 82 0.65 Salinity 9,532,427 438,122 849,238 1.938 0.089 0.046

2002 Florida Levy 23 82 0.65 Storm Surge 9,532,427 438,122 322,678 0.737 0.034 0.046

2002 Florida Levy 23 82 0.70 Freeze 5,388,180 322,392 52,766 0.164 0.010 0.060

2002 Florida Levy 23 82 0.70 Other 5,388,180 322,392 53,227 0.165 0.010 0.060

2002 Florida Levy 23 82 0.70 Oxygen Depletion 5,388,180 322,392 122,388 0.380 0.023 0.060

2002 Florida Levy 23 82 0.70 Salinity 5,388,180 322,392 203,735 0.632 0.038 0.060

2002 Florida Levy 23 82 0.70 Storm Surge 5,388,180 322,392 383,350 1.189 0.071 0.060

2002 Florida Levy 23 82 0.75 Freeze 2,281,703 181,635 60,382 0.332 0.026 0.080

2002 Florida Levy 23 82 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 2,281,703 181,635 16,252 0.089 0.007 0.080

2002 Florida Levy 23 82 0.75 Salinity 2,281,703 181,635 256,118 1.410 0.112 0.080

2002 Florida Levy 23 82 0.75 Storm Surge 2,281,703 181,635 414,822 2.284 0.182 0.080

2002 Virginia Northampton 24 80 0.50 Storm Surge 5,796,114 119,677 35,700 0.298 0.006 0.021

2002 Virginia Northampton 24 82 0.50 Storm Surge 10,318,226 215,119 7,109 0.033 0.001 0.021

2002 Virginia Northampton 24 82 0.60 Disease, Aquaculture 2,218,296 62,113 51,607 0.831 0.023 0.028

2003 Florida Brevard 22 80 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 38,078 1,644 22,062 13.420 0.579 0.043

2003 Florida Brevard 23 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 121,301 5,240 34,727 6.627 0.286 0.043

2003 Florida Brevard 23 82 0.65 Salinity 121,301 5,240 29,376 5.606 0.242 0.043

2003 Florida Brevard 23 82 0.75 Salinity 193,463 14,452 126,815 8.775 0.656 0.075

2003 Florida Dixie 22 80 0.65 Salinity 42,408 1,990 7,508 3.773 0.177 0.047

2003 Florida Dixie 22 80 0.70 Salinity 36,688 2,258 1,388 0.615 0.038 0.062

2003 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.65 Salinity 1,085,949 50,071 73,123 1.460 0.067 0.046

2003 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.70 Salinity 1,437,023 87,233 191,887 2.200 0.134 0.061

2003 Florida Dixie 23 82 0.75 Salinity 144,375 10,785 2,250 0.209 0.016 0.075

2003 Florida Indian River 22 80 0.70 Salinity 24,174 1,489 1,224 0.822 0.051 0.062

2003 Florida Indian River 23 82 0.70 Salinity 777,994 46,756 10,616 0.227 0.014 0.060

2003 Florida Indian River 23 82 0.75 Salinity 570,918 44,565 75,080 1.685 0.132 0.078

2003 Florida Levy 22 80 0.65 Salinity 240,845 11,097 5,360 0.483 0.022 0.046

2003 Florida Levy 22 80 0.75 Salinity 106,693 8,441 14,181 1.680 0.133 0.079

2003 Florida Levy 22 80 0.75 Storm Surge 106,693 8,441 49,245 5.834 0.462 0.079

2003 Florida Levy 23 82 0.65 Salinity 4,535,635 208,740 232,979 1.116 0.051 0.046

2003 Florida Levy 23 82 0.70 Excess Wind 6,604,010 397,091 15,288 0.038 0.002 0.060

2003 Florida Levy 23 82 0.70 Salinity 6,604,010 397,091 413,495 1.041 0.063 0.060

204
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Practice Code, Coverage Level and Cause of Loss

Table 5.5

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State Abbrev County Name 

 Practice 

Code 

 Type 

Code 

 Coverage 

Level Description Liability Premium Indemnity 

Partial 

Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2003 Florida Levy 23 82 0.75 Salinity 2,817,570 224,510 650,182 2.896 0.231 0.080

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 80 0.50 Freeze 734,305 13,218 13,547 1.025 0.018 0.018

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 82 0.60 Freeze 158,688 3,948 4,288 1.086 0.027 0.025

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 82 0.65 Freeze 249,717 7,416 154,824 20.877 0.620 0.030

2003 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 82 0.75 Freeze 20,520 1,053 16,861 16.012 0.822 0.051

2003 South Carolina Charleston 23 82 0.50 Storm Surge 483,762 9,807 77,599 7.913 0.160 0.020

2003 Virginia Accomack 24 80 0.50 Freeze 4,551,671 94,320 76,510 0.811 0.017 0.021

2003 Virginia Accomack 24 80 0.50 Hurricane 4,551,671 94,320 35,542 0.377 0.008 0.021

2003 Virginia Accomack 24 80 0.50 Storm Surge 4,551,671 94,320 35,542 0.377 0.008 0.021

2003 Virginia Accomack 24 82 0.50 Freeze 2,018,580 41,649 127,841 3.069 0.063 0.021

2003 Virginia Northampton 24 80 0.50 Freeze 5,687,112 118,443 22,950 0.194 0.004 0.021

2003 Virginia Northampton 24 80 0.60 Storm Surge 457,409 12,808 16,789 1.311 0.037 0.028

2003 Virginia Northampton 24 82 0.50 Freeze 11,248,346 234,663 52,263 0.223 0.005 0.021

2003 Virginia Northampton 24 82 0.50 Storm Surge 11,248,346 234,663 183,178 0.781 0.016 0.021

2004 Florida Brevard 23 84 0.70 Hurricane 16,538 2,217 15,566 7.021 0.941 0.134

2004 Florida Brevard 23 84 0.75 Hurricane 18,901 2,824 11,813 4.183 0.625 0.149

2004 Florida Brevard 23 85 0.70 Hurricane 3,126 338 2,031 6.009 0.650 0.108

2004 Florida Brevard 23 85 0.75 Hurricane 14,309 1,713 14,306 8.351 1.000 0.120

2004 Florida Brevard 23 86 0.65 Hurricane 71,663 5,418 16,492 3.044 0.230 0.076

2004 Florida Dixie 23 84 0.65 Hurricane 53,809 6,523 10,103 1.549 0.188 0.121

2004 Florida Dixie 23 84 0.70 Hurricane 25,512 3,784 4,429 1.170 0.174 0.148

2004 Florida Dixie 23 85 0.50 Hurricane 77,022 4,853 13,437 2.769 0.174 0.063

2004 Florida Dixie 23 85 0.65 Hurricane 214,487 21,571 12,689 0.588 0.059 0.101

2004 Florida Dixie 23 85 0.70 Hurricane 205,533 22,862 67,214 2.940 0.327 0.111

2004 Florida Dixie 23 85 0.75 Hurricane 33,496 4,010 16,619 4.144 0.496 0.120

2004 Florida Dixie 23 86 0.65 Storm Surge 68,250 4,558 1,877 0.412 0.028 0.067

2004 Florida Indian River 23 84 0.75 Hurricane 31,493 4,226 21,419 5.068 0.680 0.134

2004 Florida Indian River 23 85 0.70 Hurricane 117,235 13,225 28,894 2.185 0.246 0.113

2004 Florida Indian River 23 85 0.75 Hurricane 210,270 26,617 119,357 4.484 0.568 0.127

2004 Florida Indian River 24 85 0.50 Hurricane 8,397 529 7,845 14.830 0.934 0.063

2004 Florida Levy 23 84 0.50 Hurricane 261,310 21,836 35,529 1.627 0.136 0.084

2004 Florida Levy 23 84 0.60 Hurricane 92,477 10,376 12,499 1.205 0.135 0.112

2004 Florida Levy 23 84 0.65 Hurricane 423,946 51,128 231,859 4.535 0.547 0.121

2004 Florida Levy 23 84 0.70 Hurricane 237,392 30,961 32,324 1.044 0.136 0.130

2004 Florida Levy 23 84 0.75 Hurricane 334,639 46,557 122,204 2.625 0.365 0.139

2004 Florida Levy 23 84 0.75 Salinity 334,639 46,557 40,209 0.864 0.120 0.139

2004 Florida Levy 23 85 0.50 Hurricane 1,257,039 83,116 76,858 0.925 0.061 0.066

2004 Florida Levy 23 85 0.60 Hurricane 259,794 23,250 32,574 1.401 0.125 0.089

2004 Florida Levy 23 85 0.65 Hurricane 463,942 45,403 7,792 0.172 0.017 0.098

2004 Florida Levy 23 85 0.70 Hurricane 463,453 49,511 47,620 0.962 0.103 0.107

2004 Florida Levy 23 85 0.75 Hurricane 175,228 21,985 35,865 1.631 0.205 0.125

2004 Florida Levy 23 86 0.75 Hurricane 12,656 1,258 7,162 5.693 0.566 0.099

2004 Florida Levy 23 86 0.75 Salinity 12,656 1,258 3,987 3.169 0.315 0.099

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 84 0.65 Freeze 150,930 4,981 15,528 3.117 0.103 0.033

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 85 0.55 Disease, Aquaculture 81,675 1,633 55,788 34.163 0.683 0.020

2004 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 85 0.65 Freeze 210,815 6,191 6,642 1.073 0.032 0.029

2004 South Carolina Charleston 23 84 0.55 Storm Surge 137,532 3,300 31,938 9.678 0.232 0.024

2004 Virginia Accomack 24 84 0.50 Freeze 1,413,095 26,599 200,176 7.526 0.142 0.019

205
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Practice Code, Coverage Level and Cause of Loss

Table 5.5

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State Abbrev County Name 

 Practice 

Code 

 Type 

Code 

 Coverage 

Level Description Liability Premium Indemnity 

Partial 

Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2004 Virginia Accomack 24 84 0.55 Freeze 69,300 1,588 65,554 41.281 0.946 0.023

2004 Virginia Accomack 24 84 0.60 Freeze 74,340 1,807 19,445 10.761 0.262 0.024

2004 Virginia Accomack 24 84 0.65 Freeze 87,360 2,019 46,893 23.226 0.537 0.023

2004 Virginia Accomack 24 85 0.50 Freeze 1,623,848 27,874 54,819 1.967 0.034 0.017

2004 Virginia Accomack 24 85 0.55 Freeze 46,200 970 43,703 45.055 0.946 0.021

2004 Virginia Accomack 24 85 0.60 Freeze 995,148 24,067 256,492 10.657 0.258 0.024

2004 Virginia Northampton 24 84 0.50 Freeze 2,704,806 47,343 97,370 2.057 0.036 0.018

2004 Virginia Northampton 24 84 0.50 Storm Surge 2,704,806 47,343 52,441 1.108 0.019 0.018

2004 Virginia Northampton 24 85 0.50 Freeze 9,328,126 175,095 153,494 0.877 0.016 0.019

2004 Virginia Northampton 24 85 0.60 Freeze 1,818,264 44,416 31,546 0.710 0.017 0.024

2005 Florida Dixie 23 84 0.70 Hurricane 9,631 1,292 5,168 4.000 0.537 0.134

2005 Florida Dixie 23 85 0.70 Storm Surge 31,424 3,394 24,577 7.241 0.782 0.108

2005 Florida Dixie 23 86 0.70 Hurricane 76,595 6,619 7,659 1.157 0.100 0.086

2005 Florida Dixie 23 86 0.75 Salinity 39,376 2,806 19,156 6.827 0.486 0.071

2005 Florida Levy 23 84 0.65 Salinity 32,986 4,008 3,518 0.878 0.107 0.122

2005 Florida Levy 23 84 0.75 Other 72,011 10,759 53,007 4.927 0.736 0.149

2005 Florida Levy 23 85 0.50 Storm Surge 172,104 10,841 19,570 1.805 0.114 0.063

2005 Florida Levy 23 85 0.65 Hurricane 137,482 13,175 4,418 0.335 0.032 0.096

2005 Florida Levy 23 86 0.65 Hurricane 1,177,312 82,570 11,922 0.144 0.010 0.070

2005 Florida Levy 23 86 0.75 Hurricane 571,956 54,210 54,482 1.005 0.095 0.095

2005 Florida Levy 23 86 0.75 Salinity 571,956 54,210 13,888 0.256 0.024 0.095

2005 Florida Levy 23 86 0.75 Tidal Wave 571,956 54,210 19,055 0.352 0.033 0.095

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 84 0.50 Disease, Aquaculture 109,675 1,975 108,936 55.157 0.993 0.018

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 84 0.65 Storm Surge 178,133 5,225 4,655 0.891 0.026 0.029

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 85 0.65 Ice Floe 543,865 14,685 265,074 18.051 0.487 0.027

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 85 0.65 Storm Surge 543,865 14,685 1,609 0.110 0.003 0.027

2005 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 85 0.70 Freeze 71,820 2,521 7,759 3.078 0.108 0.035

2006 Florida Levy 23 84 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 198,034 25,666 36,070 1.405 0.182 0.130

2006 Florida Levy 23 86 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 2,679,912 223,896 168,160 0.751 0.063 0.084

2006 Florida Levy 23 86 0.70 Storm Surge 469,910 44,408 89,869 2.024 0.191 0.095

2006 Florida Levy 23 86 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 647,063 64,596 69,320 1.073 0.107 0.100

2006 Florida Levy 23 86 0.75 Storm Surge 647,063 64,596 78,444 1.214 0.121 0.100

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 84 0.65 Freeze 153,036 5,509 3,377 0.613 0.022 0.036

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 85 0.60 Freeze 505,764 13,158 92,591 7.037 0.183 0.026

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 85 0.60 Ice Floe 505,764 13,158 16,434 1.249 0.032 0.026

2006 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 85 0.65 Ice Floe 232,031 7,632 10,631 1.393 0.046 0.033

2006 Virginia Northampton 24 84 0.50 Hurricane 2,183,051 43,358 3,401 0.078 0.002 0.020

2006 Virginia Northampton 24 85 0.50 Hurricane 9,601,970 173,586 108,916 0.627 0.011 0.018

2007 Florida Levy 23 84 0.70 Oxygen Depletion 20,075 2,134 9,201 4.312 0.458 0.106

2007 Florida Levy 23 85 0.50 Oxygen Depletion 69,346 4,862 22,412 4.610 0.323 0.070

2007 Florida Levy 23 85 0.60 Oxygen Depletion 92,820 4,051 3,396 0.838 0.037 0.044

2007 Florida Levy 23 85 0.70 Oxygen Depletion 218,329 26,057 12,262 0.471 0.056 0.119

2007 Florida Levy 23 86 0.60 Oxygen Depletion 1,176,462 89,922 7,094 0.079 0.006 0.076

2007 Florida Levy 23 86 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 1,393,012 120,134 28,905 0.241 0.021 0.086

2007 Florida Levy 23 86 0.70 Oxygen Depletion 795,936 75,268 118,275 1.571 0.149 0.095

2007 Florida Levy 23 86 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 560,490 54,622 76,470 1.400 0.136 0.097

2007 Florida Levy 23 86 0.75 Salinity 560,490 54,622 92,998 1.703 0.166 0.097

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 85 0.50 Disease, Aquaculture 549,992 9,901 34,411 3.476 0.063 0.018

206
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Crop Year, County, Practice Code, Coverage Level and Cause of Loss

Table 5.5

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year State Abbrev County Name 

 Practice 

Code 

 Type 

Code 

 Coverage 

Level Description Liability Premium Indemnity 

Partial 

Loss Ratio

Loss Cost 

Ratio

Earned 

Premium 

Ratio

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 85 0.50 Ice Floe 549,992 9,901 18,605 1.879 0.034 0.018

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 85 0.60 Freeze 467,208 11,354 3,940 0.347 0.008 0.024

2007 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 85 0.65 Ice Floe 324,008 10,083 29,562 2.932 0.091 0.031

2007 Virginia Accomack 24 84 0.65 Freeze 514,994 14,918 22,680 1.520 0.044 0.029

2007 Virginia Accomack 24 85 0.70 Freeze 264,726 11,648 21,809 1.872 0.082 0.044

2008 Florida Brevard 24 85 0.65 Salinity 9,802 450 9,802 21.782 1.000 0.046

2008 Florida Brevard 24 86 0.65 Salinity 46,410 3,843 24,488 6.372 0.528 0.083

2008 Florida Indian River 23 86 0.70 Disease, Aquaculture 23,520 2,223 7,461 3.356 0.317 0.095

2008 Florida Levy 23 84 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 85,050 14,007 59,276 4.232 0.697 0.165

2008 Florida Levy 23 85 0.70 Storm Surge 90,164 10,711 31,488 2.940 0.349 0.119

2008 Florida Levy 23 85 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 40,163 5,314 27,216 5.122 0.678 0.132

2008 Florida Levy 23 86 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 84,873 7,808 11,088 1.420 0.131 0.092

2008 Florida Levy 23 86 0.70 Salinity 309,523 29,251 69,505 2.376 0.225 0.095

2008 Florida Levy 23 86 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 860,089 65,883 11,902 0.181 0.014 0.077

2008 Florida Levy 23 86 0.75 Salinity 860,089 65,883 93,794 1.424 0.109 0.077

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 85 0.50 Freeze 423,313 8,792 22,089 2.512 0.052 0.021

2008 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 85 0.65 Freeze 279,817 10,074 38,936 3.865 0.139 0.036

2009 Florida Levy 23 84 0.50 Salinity 735,310 31,189 119,439 3.830 0.162 0.042

2009 Florida Levy 23 84 0.70 Salinity 19,228 2,267 13,699 6.043 0.712 0.118

2009 Florida Levy 23 84 0.75 Salinity 122,472 8,344 109,650 13.141 0.895 0.068

2009 Florida Levy 23 85 0.50 Salinity 883,943 37,741 139,031 3.684 0.157 0.043

2009 Florida Levy 23 85 0.70 Salinity 121,552 11,596 22,952 1.979 0.189 0.095

2009 Florida Levy 23 85 0.75 Salinity 116,956 10,751 40,232 3.742 0.344 0.092

2009 Florida Levy 23 86 0.50 Salinity 1,442,668 55,430 169,415 3.056 0.117 0.038

2009 Florida Levy 23 86 0.60 Salinity 151,200 8,981 147,838 16.461 0.978 0.059

2009 Florida Levy 23 86 0.70 Salinity 202,696 15,323 116,580 7.608 0.575 0.076

2009 Florida Levy 23 86 0.75 Salinity 496,339 40,221 449,589 11.178 0.906 0.081

2009 Virginia Accomack 24 84 0.65 Storm Surge 663,000 17,244 199,368 11.562 0.301 0.026

2009 Virginia Accomack 24 85 0.65 Storm Surge 1,434,591 36,961 28,720 0.777 0.020 0.026

2010 Florida Brevard 24 84 0.65 Other 1,997 207 1,997 9.647 1.000 0.104

2010 Florida Brevard 24 86 0.65 Other 2,574 171 2,574 15.053 1.000 0.066

2010 Florida Levy 23 85 0.75 Freeze 11,946 1,410 8,134 5.769 0.681 0.118

2010 Florida Levy 23 86 0.75 Freeze 129,585 12,181 41,656 3.420 0.321 0.094

2010 Massachusetts Barnstable 24 85 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 366,816 10,637 18,658 1.754 0.051 0.029

2010 Virginia Accomack 24 84 0.60 Storm Surge 106,110 2,546 24,300 9.544 0.229 0.024

2010 Virginia Accomack 24 84 0.70 Freeze 22,050 848 12,362 14.578 0.561 0.038

2010 Virginia Accomack 24 85 0.70 Freeze 160,020 5,222 16,409 3.142 0.103 0.033

207
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Primary and Secondary Cause of Loss

Table 5.6

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year 

 Type 

Code Primary Cause 

 Primary 

Percent Secondary Cause Policy Count Indemnity 

2000 80 Disease, Aquaculture 100% - 5,027

2000 80 Freeze 100% 1 6,900

2000 80 Hurricane 70% Salinity 1 37,855

2000 80 Hurricane 100% 1 102,429

2000 80 Salinity 100% 6 263,518

2000 82 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 6 200,731

2000 82 Excess Wind 100% 1 25,740

2000 82 Freeze 100% 14 141,979

2000 82 Hurricane 100% 18 332,244

2000 82 Other 100% 1 14,160

2000 82 Oxygen Depletion 100% 14 344,641

2000 82 Salinity 100% 27 554,367

2000 82 Storm Surge 100% 1 39,984

2001 80 Disease, Aquaculture 100% - 72,000

2001 80 Freeze 100% 3 64,828

2001 80 Hurricane 100% 3 11,772

2001 80 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 18,448

2001 80 Salinity 90% Storm Surge - -

2001 80 Salinity 100% 8 71,006

2001 80 Storm Surge 100% 10 183,184

2001 82 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 1 79,200

2001 82 Freeze 100% 1 150,000

2001 82 Hurricane 100% 21 682,898

2001 82 Salinity 75% Storm Surge 1 32,539

2001 82 Salinity 90% Storm Surge 3 17,391

2001 82 Salinity 100% 38 587,430

2001 82 Storm Surge 100% 22 910,002

2002 80 Freeze 70% 1 2,456

2002 80 Freeze 100% 5 95,375

2002 80 Oxygen Depletion 60% Salinity 2 23,764

2002 80 Oxygen Depletion 100% 2 20,637

2002 80 Salinity 100% 18 415,808

2002 80 Salinity 100% Storm Surge 1 34,266

2002 80 Storm Surge 100% 7 113,123

2002 82 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 1 51,607

2002 82 Freeze 100% 2 113,148

2002 82 Other 100% 2 63,542

2002 82 Oxygen Depletion 60% Salinity 2 63,372

2002 82 Oxygen Depletion 70% 1 38,952

2002 82 Oxygen Depletion 100% 9 226,521

2002 82 Salinity 100% 55 1,603,599

208
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Primary and Secondary Cause of Loss

Table 5.6

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year 

 Type 

Code Primary Cause 

 Primary 

Percent Secondary Cause Policy Count Indemnity 

2002 82 Storm Surge 100% 26 1,153,078

2003 80 Freeze 51% Hurricane 1 22,950

2003 80 Freeze 100% 3 90,057

2003 80 Hurricane 100% 1 35,542

2003 80 Oxygen Depletion 100% - 22,062

2003 80 Salinity 100% 6 29,661

2003 80 Storm Surge 100% 3 101,576

2003 82 Excess Wind 100% 1 15,288

2003 82 Freeze 51% Hurricane 1 46,410

2003 82 Freeze 100% 7 309,667

2003 82 Oxygen Depletion 100% 2 34,727

2003 82 Salinity 70% Excess Wind 1 43,390

2003 82 Salinity 100% 66 1,762,413

2003 82 Storm Surge 100% 3 260,777

2004 84 Freeze 100% 9 444,966

2004 84 Hurricane 100% 37 497,745

2004 84 Salinity 100% 1 40,209

2004 84 Storm Surge 100% 4 84,379

2004 85 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 1 55,788

2004 85 Freeze 100% 11 546,696

2004 85 Hurricane 90% Oxygen Depletion 1 10,059

2004 85 Hurricane 100% 42 473,042

2004 86 Hurricane 100% 3 23,654

2004 86 Salinity 100% 1 3,987

2004 86 Storm Surge 100% 1 1,877

2005 84 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 1 108,936

2005 84 Hurricane 100% 1 5,168

2005 84 Other 100% 1 53,007

2005 84 Salinity 100% 1 3,518

2005 84 Storm Surge 100% 1 4,655

2005 85 Freeze 100% 1 7,759

2005 85 Hurricane 100% 1 4,418

2005 85 Ice Floe 100% 1 265,074

2005 85 Storm Surge 100% 2 45,756

2005 86 Hurricane 100% 4 74,063

2005 86 Salinity 100% 2 33,044

2005 86 Tidal Wave 100% 1 19,055

2006 84 Freeze 100% 1 3,377

2006 84 Hurricane 100% 1 3,401

2006 84 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 36,070

2006 85 Freeze 100% 1 92,591

209
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Primary and Secondary Cause of Loss

Table 5.6

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop Year 

 Type 

Code Primary Cause 

 Primary 

Percent Secondary Cause Policy Count Indemnity 

2006 85 Hurricane 100% 2 108,916

2006 85 Ice Floe 100% 2 27,065

2006 86 Oxygen Depletion 100% 4 237,480

2006 86 Storm Surge 100% 4 168,313

2007 84 Freeze 100% 1 22,680

2007 84 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 9,201

2007 85 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 1 34,411

2007 85 Freeze 100% 2 25,749

2007 85 Ice Floe 100% 3 48,167

2007 85 Oxygen Depletion 100% 3 38,070

2007 86 Oxygen Depletion 100% 7 230,744

2007 86 Salinity 100% 1 92,998

2008 84 Oxygen Depletion 100% 2 59,276

2008 85 Freeze 100% 2 61,025

2008 85 Oxygen Depletion 100% - 27,216

2008 85 Salinity 100% - 9,802

2008 85 Storm Surge 100% 1 31,488

2008 86 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 1 7,461

2008 86 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 22,990

2008 86 Salinity 100% 4 187,787

2009 84 Salinity 100% 3 242,788

2009 84 Storm Surge 100% 1 199,368

2009 85 Salinity 100% 4 202,215

2009 85 Storm Surge 100% 1 28,720

2009 86 Salinity 100% 12 883,422

2010 84 Freeze 50% Freeze - 12,362

2010 84 Other 100% - 1,997

2010 84 Storm Surge 100% 1 24,300

2010 85 Freeze 100% 1 24,543

2010 85 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 18,658

2010 86 Freeze 100% 1 41,656

2010 86 Other 100% 1 2,574

210
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Primary and Secondary Cause of Loss by County and Coverage Level

Table 5.7

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year 

 State 

Abbrev 

 County 

Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Coverage 

Level Primary Cause 

 Primary 

Percent 

 Secondary 

Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2000 Florida Brevard 80 0.65 Salinity 100% 1 82,690 

2000 Florida Brevard 82 0.65 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 1 12,782 

2000 Florida Brevard 82 0.65 Excess Wind 100% 1 25,740 

2000 Florida Brevard 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 9,492 

2000 Florida Brevard 82 0.70 Freeze 100% 1 899 

2000 Florida Dixie 80 0.50 Salinity 100% 1 2,250 

2000 Florida Dixie 80 0.65 Salinity 100% 2 168,675 

2000 Florida Dixie 82 0.50 Hurricane 100% 1 28,365 

2000 Florida Dixie 82 0.50 Oxygen Depletion 100% 4 46,855 

2000 Florida Dixie 82 0.50 Salinity 100% 3 3,921 

2000 Florida Dixie 82 0.55 Salinity 100% 1 7,742 

2000 Florida Dixie 82 0.65 Freeze 100% 1 18,332 

2000 Florida Dixie 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 100% 3 64,798 

2000 Florida Dixie 82 0.65 Salinity 100% 14 356,619 

2000 Florida Indian River 80 0.65 Disease, Aquaculture 100% - 5,027 

2000 Florida Indian River 82 0.50 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 1 9,749 

2000 Florida Indian River 82 0.65 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 4 178,200 

2000 Florida Indian River 82 0.65 Hurricane 100% 1 33,183 

2000 Florida Indian River 82 0.65 Salinity 100% 1 34,398 

2000 Florida Levy 80 0.50 Salinity 100% 1 5,279 

2000 Florida Levy 80 0.65 Freeze 100% 1 6,900 

2000 Florida Levy 80 0.65 Hurricane 70% Salinity 1 37,855 

2000 Florida Levy 80 0.65 Hurricane 100% 1 102,429 

2000 Florida Levy 80 0.65 Salinity 100% 1 4,570 

2000 Florida Levy 80 0.75 Salinity 100% - 54 

2000 Florida Levy 82 0.50 Hurricane 100% 4 30,639 

2000 Florida Levy 82 0.60 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 41,840 

2000 Florida Levy 82 0.65 Hurricane 100% 11 222,687 

2000 Florida Levy 82 0.65 Other 100% 1 14,160 

2000 Florida Levy 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 100% 2 81,407 

2000 Florida Levy 82 0.65 Salinity 100% 4 79,225 

2000 Florida Levy 82 0.65 Storm Surge 100% 1 39,984 

2000 Florida Levy 82 0.70 Salinity 100% 2 34,964 

2000 Florida Levy 82 0.75 Freeze 100% 1 14,942 

2000 Florida Levy 82 0.75 Hurricane 100% 1 17,370 

2000 Florida Levy 82 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 100% 3 100,249 

2000 Florida Levy 82 0.75 Salinity 100% 2 37,498 

2000 MassachusettsBarnstable 82 0.60 Freeze 100% 2 13,822 

2000 MassachusettsBarnstable 82 0.65 Freeze 100% 8 85,992 

2000 MassachusettsBarnstable 82 0.75 Freeze 100% 1 7,992 

2001 Florida Brevard 80 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 18,448 

2001 Florida Brevard 80 0.70 Hurricane 100% 1 3,902 

2001 Florida Brevard 80 0.70 Salinity 100% 2 7,867 

2001 Florida Brevard 80 0.75 Salinity 100% 2 20,229 

2001 Florida Brevard 82 0.65 Salinity 100% 2 16,622 

2001 Florida Brevard 82 0.70 Hurricane 100% 11 375,430 

2001 Florida Brevard 82 0.70 Salinity 100% 3 77,578 

2001 Florida Dixie 80 0.65 Salinity 100% - - 

2001 Florida Dixie 80 0.75 Storm Surge 100% 2 5,108 

2001 Florida Dixie 82 0.50 Salinity 100% 5 17,075 

2001 Florida Dixie 82 0.50 Storm Surge 100% 1 16,112 

211
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Primary and Secondary Cause of Loss by County and Coverage Level

Table 5.7

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year 

 State 

Abbrev 

 County 

Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Coverage 

Level Primary Cause 

 Primary 

Percent 

 Secondary 

Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2001 Florida Dixie 82 0.65 Salinity 100% 10 51,215 

2001 Florida Dixie 82 0.70 Storm Surge 100% 1 19,904 

2001 Florida Dixie 82 0.75 Storm Surge 100% 1 6,770 

2001 Florida Indian River 80 0.70 Hurricane 100% 1 3,990 

2001 Florida Indian River 80 0.75 Hurricane 100% 1 3,880 

2001 Florida Indian River 80 0.75 Salinity 100% 1 5,752 

2001 Florida Indian River 82 0.65 Salinity 100% 1 10,726 

2001 Florida Indian River 82 0.70 Hurricane 100% 7 174,317 

2001 Florida Indian River 82 0.70 Salinity 100% 3 161,625 

2001 Florida Levy 80 0.65 Salinity 90% Storm Surge - - 

2001 Florida Levy 80 0.65 Salinity 100% 2 23,905 

2001 Florida Levy 80 0.65 Storm Surge 100% - - 

2001 Florida Levy 80 0.70 Freeze 100% 1 1,535 

2001 Florida Levy 80 0.70 Salinity 100% - 8,736 

2001 Florida Levy 80 0.70 Storm Surge 100% 4 157,327 

2001 Florida Levy 80 0.75 Freeze 100% 1 10,107 

2001 Florida Levy 80 0.75 Salinity 100% 1 4,517 

2001 Florida Levy 80 0.75 Storm Surge 100% 4 20,749 

2001 Florida Levy 82 0.50 Salinity 90% Storm Surge 1 2,712 

2001 Florida Levy 82 0.50 Salinity 100% 1 3,551 

2001 Florida Levy 82 0.50 Storm Surge 100% 1 42,941 

2001 Florida Levy 82 0.60 Salinity 100% 1 18,111 

2001 Florida Levy 82 0.65 Hurricane 100% 3 133,151 

2001 Florida Levy 82 0.65 Salinity 75% Storm Surge 1 32,539 

2001 Florida Levy 82 0.65 Salinity 90% Storm Surge 2 14,679 

2001 Florida Levy 82 0.65 Salinity 100% 7 110,278 

2001 Florida Levy 82 0.65 Storm Surge 100% 10 432,688 

2001 Florida Levy 82 0.70 Salinity 100% 3 58,690 

2001 Florida Levy 82 0.70 Storm Surge 100% 7 333,287 

2001 Florida Levy 82 0.75 Salinity 100% 2 61,959 

2001 Florida Levy 82 0.75 Storm Surge 100% 1 58,300 

2001 MassachusettsBarnstable 82 0.50 Freeze 100% 1 150,000 

2001 Virginia Northampton 80 0.50 Disease, Aquaculture 100% - 72,000 

2001 Virginia Northampton 80 0.60 Freeze 100% 1 53,186 

2001 Virginia Northampton 82 0.50 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 1 79,200 

2002 Florida Brevard 80 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 60% Salinity - 10,806 

2002 Florida Brevard 80 0.70 Oxygen Depletion 60% Salinity 1 11,062 

2002 Florida Brevard 80 0.70 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 12,978 

2002 Florida Brevard 80 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 1,668 

2002 Florida Brevard 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 60% Salinity 1 47,120 

2002 Florida Brevard 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 17,620 

2002 Florida Brevard 82 0.65 Salinity 100% 1 32,137 

2002 Florida Brevard 82 0.70 Salinity 100% 1 112,659 

2002 Florida Brevard 82 0.75 Salinity 100% 1 27,965 

2002 Florida Dixie 80 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 100% - 5,991 

2002 Florida Dixie 80 0.65 Salinity 100% 6 25,555 

2002 Florida Dixie 80 0.75 Freeze 100% 1 1,597 

212
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Primary and Secondary Cause of Loss by County and Coverage Level

Table 5.7

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year 

 State 

Abbrev 

 County 

Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Coverage 

Level Primary Cause 

 Primary 

Percent 

 Secondary 

Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2002 Florida Dixie 80 0.75 Storm Surge 100% 1 12,724 

2002 Florida Dixie 82 0.60 Salinity 100% 1 13,487 

2002 Florida Dixie 82 0.65 Other 100% 1 10,315 

2002 Florida Dixie 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 100% 2 10,575 

2002 Florida Dixie 82 0.65 Salinity 100% 12 78,476 

2002 Florida Indian River 80 0.70 Salinity 100% 1 31,885 

2002 Florida Indian River 80 0.75 Salinity 100% 1 65,019 

2002 Florida Indian River 82 0.70 Salinity 100% 1 29,784 

2002 Florida Indian River 82 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 7,062 

2002 Florida Levy 80 0.50 Oxygen Depletion 60% Salinity 1 1,896 

2002 Florida Levy 80 0.65 Freeze 70% 1 2,456 

2002 Florida Levy 80 0.65 Salinity 100% 7 265,643 

2002 Florida Levy 80 0.65 Salinity 100% Storm Surge 1 34,266 

2002 Florida Levy 80 0.65 Storm Surge 100% 4 35,936 

2002 Florida Levy 80 0.70 Freeze 100% 1 79,969 

2002 Florida Levy 80 0.70 Salinity 100% 1 3,236 

2002 Florida Levy 80 0.70 Storm Surge 100% 1 28,763 

2002 Florida Levy 80 0.75 Freeze 100% 3 13,809 

2002 Florida Levy 80 0.75 Salinity 100% 2 24,470 

2002 Florida Levy 82 0.50 Storm Surge 100% 1 25,119 

2002 Florida Levy 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 70% 1 38,952 

2002 Florida Levy 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 100% 2 68,876 

2002 Florida Levy 82 0.65 Salinity 100% 26 849,238 

2002 Florida Levy 82 0.65 Storm Surge 100% 9 322,678 

2002 Florida Levy 82 0.70 Freeze 100% 1 52,766 

2002 Florida Levy 82 0.70 Other 100% 1 53,227 

2002 Florida Levy 82 0.70 Oxygen Depletion 100% 3 122,388 

2002 Florida Levy 82 0.70 Salinity 100% 6 203,735 

2002 Florida Levy 82 0.70 Storm Surge 100% 7 383,350 

2002 Florida Levy 82 0.75 Freeze 100% 1 60,382 

2002 Florida Levy 82 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 60% Salinity 1 16,252 

2002 Florida Levy 82 0.75 Salinity 100% 6 256,118 

2002 Florida Levy 82 0.75 Storm Surge 100% 8 414,822 

2002 Virginia Northampton 80 0.50 Storm Surge 100% 1 35,700 

2002 Virginia Northampton 82 0.50 Storm Surge 100% 1 7,109 

2002 Virginia Northampton 82 0.60 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 1 51,607 

2003 Florida Brevard 80 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 100% - 22,062 

2003 Florida Brevard 82 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 100% 2 34,727 

2003 Florida Brevard 82 0.65 Salinity 100% 1 29,376 

2003 Florida Brevard 82 0.75 Salinity 100% 1 126,815 

2003 Florida Dixie 80 0.65 Salinity 100% 1 7,508 

2003 Florida Dixie 80 0.70 Salinity 100% 1 1,388 

2003 Florida Dixie 82 0.65 Salinity 100% 7 73,123 

2003 Florida Dixie 82 0.70 Salinity 100% 10 191,887 

2003 Florida Dixie 82 0.75 Salinity 100% 1 2,250 

2003 Florida Indian River 80 0.70 Salinity 100% 1 1,224 

2003 Florida Indian River 82 0.70 Salinity 100% 1 10,616 

2003 Florida Indian River 82 0.75 Salinity 100% 3 75,080 

2003 Florida Levy 80 0.65 Salinity 100% 1 5,360 

2003 Florida Levy 80 0.75 Salinity 100% 2 14,181 

213
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Primary and Secondary Cause of Loss by County and Coverage Level

Table 5.7

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year 

 State 

Abbrev 

 County 

Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Coverage 

Level Primary Cause 

 Primary 

Percent 

 Secondary 

Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2003 Florida Levy 80 0.75 Storm Surge 100% 1 49,245 

2003 Florida Levy 82 0.65 Salinity 100% 11 232,979 

2003 Florida Levy 82 0.70 Excess Wind 100% 1 15,288 

2003 Florida Levy 82 0.70 Salinity 70%

 Excess 

Wind 1 43,390 

2003 Florida Levy 82 0.70 Salinity 100% 13 370,105 

2003 Florida Levy 82 0.75 Salinity 100% 18 650,182 

2003 MassachusettsBarnstable 80 0.50 Freeze 100% 2 13,547 

2003 MassachusettsBarnstable 82 0.60 Freeze 100% 1 4,288 

2003 MassachusettsBarnstable 82 0.65 Freeze 100% 3 154,824 

2003 MassachusettsBarnstable 82 0.75 Freeze 100% 1 16,861 

2003 South CarolinaCharleston 82 0.50 Storm Surge 100% 1 77,599 

2003 Virginia Accomack 80 0.50 Freeze 100% 1 76,510 

2003 Virginia Accomack 80 0.50 Hurricane 100% 1 35,542 

2003 Virginia Accomack 80 0.50 Storm Surge 100% 1 35,542 

2003 Virginia Accomack 82 0.50 Freeze 100% 1 127,841 

2003 Virginia Northampton 80 0.50 Freeze 51% Hurricane 1 22,950 

2003 Virginia Northampton 80 0.60 Storm Surge 100% 1 16,789 

2003 Virginia Northampton 82 0.50 Freeze 51% Hurricane 1 46,410 

2003 Virginia Northampton 82 0.50 Freeze 100% 1 5,853 

2003 Virginia Northampton 82 0.50 Storm Surge 100% 2 183,178 

2004 Florida Brevard 84 0.70 Hurricane 100% 2 15,566 

2004 Florida Brevard 84 0.75 Hurricane 100% 1 11,813 

2004 Florida Brevard 85 0.70 Hurricane 100% 1 2,031 

2004 Florida Brevard 85 0.75 Hurricane 100% 1 14,306 

2004 Florida Brevard 86 0.65 Hurricane 100% 2 16,492 

2004 Florida Dixie 84 0.65 Hurricane 100% 1 10,103 

2004 Florida Dixie 84 0.70 Hurricane 100% 2 4,429 

2004 Florida Dixie 85 0.50 Hurricane 100% 1 13,437 

2004 Florida Dixie 85 0.65 Hurricane 100% 4 12,689 

2004 Florida Dixie 85 0.70 Hurricane 100% 9 67,214 

2004 Florida Dixie 85 0.75 Hurricane 100% 1 16,619 

2004 Florida Dixie 86 0.65 Storm Surge 100% 1 1,877 

2004 Florida Indian River 84 0.75 Hurricane 100% 2 21,419 

2004 Florida Indian River 85 0.50 Hurricane 100% 1 7,845 

2004 Florida Indian River 85 0.70 Hurricane 100% 3 28,894 

2004 Florida Indian River 85 0.75 Hurricane 90%

 Oxygen 

Depletion 1 10,059 

2004 Florida Indian River 85 0.75 Hurricane 100% 4 109,298 

2004 Florida Levy 84 0.50 Hurricane 100% 4 35,529 

2004 Florida Levy 84 0.60 Hurricane 100% 1 12,499 

2004 Florida Levy 84 0.65 Hurricane 100% 10 231,859 

2004 Florida Levy 84 0.70 Hurricane 100% 3 32,324 

2004 Florida Levy 84 0.75 Hurricane 100% 11 122,204 

2004 Florida Levy 84 0.75 Salinity 100% 1 40,209 

2004 Florida Levy 85 0.50 Hurricane 100% 5 76,858 

2004 Florida Levy 85 0.60 Hurricane 100% 2 32,574 

2004 Florida Levy 85 0.65 Hurricane 100% 1 7,792 

2004 Florida Levy 85 0.70 Hurricane 100% 6 47,620 

2004 Florida Levy 85 0.75 Hurricane 100% 3 35,865 

2004 Florida Levy 86 0.75 Hurricane 100% 1 7,162 

214
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Primary and Secondary Cause of Loss by County and Coverage Level

Table 5.7

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year 

 State 

Abbrev 

 County 

Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Coverage 

Level Primary Cause 

 Primary 

Percent 

 Secondary 

Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2004 Florida Levy 86 0.75 Salinity 100% 1 3,987 

2004 MassachusettsBarnstable 84 0.65 Freeze 100% 2 15,528 

2004 MassachusettsBarnstable 85 0.55 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 1 55,788 

2004 MassachusettsBarnstable 85 0.65 Freeze 100% - 6,642 

2004 South CarolinaCharleston 84 0.55 Storm Surge 100% 1 31,938 

2004 Virginia Accomack 84 0.50 Freeze 100% 2 200,176 

2004 Virginia Accomack 84 0.55 Freeze 100% 2 65,554 

2004 Virginia Accomack 84 0.60 Freeze 100% - 19,445 

2004 Virginia Accomack 84 0.65 Freeze 100% 1 46,893 

2004 Virginia Accomack 85 0.50 Freeze 100% 3 54,819 

2004 Virginia Accomack 85 0.55 Freeze 100% - 43,703 

2004 Virginia Accomack 85 0.60 Freeze 100% 3 256,492 

2004 Virginia Northampton 84 0.50 Freeze 100% 2 97,370 

2004 Virginia Northampton 84 0.50 Storm Surge 100% 3 52,441 

2004 Virginia Northampton 85 0.50 Freeze 100% 4 153,494 

2004 Virginia Northampton 85 0.60 Freeze 100% 1 31,546 

2005 Florida Dixie 84 0.70 Hurricane 100% 1 5,168 

2005 Florida Dixie 85 0.70 Storm Surge 100% 1 24,577 

2005 Florida Dixie 86 0.70 Hurricane 100% 1 7,659 

2005 Florida Dixie 86 0.75 Salinity 100% 1 19,156 

2005 Florida Levy 84 0.65 Salinity 100% 1 3,518 

2005 Florida Levy 84 0.75 Other 100% 1 53,007 

2005 Florida Levy 85 0.50 Storm Surge 100% 1 19,570 

2005 Florida Levy 85 0.65 Hurricane 100% 1 4,418 

2005 Florida Levy 86 0.65 Hurricane 100% 2 11,922 

2005 Florida Levy 86 0.75 Hurricane 100% 1 54,482 

2005 Florida Levy 86 0.75 Salinity 100% 1 13,888 

2005 Florida Levy 86 0.75 Tidal Wave 100% 1 19,055 

2005 MassachusettsBarnstable 84 0.50 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 1 108,936 

2005 MassachusettsBarnstable 84 0.65 Storm Surge 100% 1 4,655 

2005 MassachusettsBarnstable 85 0.65 Ice Floe 100% 1 265,074 

2005 MassachusettsBarnstable 85 0.65 Storm Surge 100% - 1,609 

2005 MassachusettsBarnstable 85 0.70 Freeze 100% 1 7,759 

2006 Florida Levy 84 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 36,070 

2006 Florida Levy 86 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 100% 3 168,160 

2006 Florida Levy 86 0.70 Storm Surge 100% 2 89,869 

2006 Florida Levy 86 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 69,320 

2006 Florida Levy 86 0.75 Storm Surge 100% 2 78,444 

2006 MassachusettsBarnstable 84 0.65 Freeze 100% 1 3,377 

2006 MassachusettsBarnstable 85 0.60 Freeze 100% 1 92,591 

2006 MassachusettsBarnstable 85 0.60 Ice Floe 100% 1 16,434 

2006 MassachusettsBarnstable 85 0.65 Ice Floe 100% 1 10,631 

2006 Virginia Northampton 84 0.50 Hurricane 100% 1 3,401 

2006 Virginia Northampton 85 0.50 Hurricane 100% 2 108,916 

2007 Florida Levy 84 0.70 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 9,201 

2007 Florida Levy 85 0.50 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 22,412 

2007 Florida Levy 85 0.60 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 3,396 

2007 Florida Levy 85 0.70 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 12,262 

2007 Florida Levy 86 0.60 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 7,094 

2007 Florida Levy 86 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 100% 2 28,905 

2007 Florida Levy 86 0.70 Oxygen Depletion 100% 3 118,275 

215
Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Analysis of Cause of Loss Information by Primary and Secondary Cause of Loss by County and Coverage Level

Table 5.7

Clams

Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia

 Crop 

Year 

 State 

Abbrev 

 County 

Name 

 Type 

Code 

 Coverage 

Level Primary Cause 

 Primary 

Percent 

 Secondary 

Cause 

 Policy 

Count Indemnity 

2007 Florida Levy 86 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 76,470 

2007 Florida Levy 86 0.75 Salinity 100% 1 92,998 

2007 MassachusettsBarnstable 85 0.50 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 1 34,411 

2007 MassachusettsBarnstable 85 0.50 Ice Floe 100% 1 18,605 

2007 MassachusettsBarnstable 85 0.60 Freeze 100% 1 3,940 

2007 MassachusettsBarnstable 85 0.65 Ice Floe 100% 2 29,562 

2007 Virginia Accomack 84 0.65 Freeze 100% 1 22,680 

2007 Virginia Accomack 85 0.70 Freeze 100% 1 21,809 

2008 Florida Brevard 85 0.65 Salinity 100% - 9,802 

2008 Florida Brevard 86 0.65 Salinity 100% 1 24,488 

2008 Florida Indian River 86 0.70 Disease, Aquaculture 100% 1 7,461 

2008 Florida Levy 84 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 100% 2 59,276 

2008 Florida Levy 85 0.70 Storm Surge 100% 1 31,488 

2008 Florida Levy 85 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 100% - 27,216 

2008 Florida Levy 86 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 11,088 

2008 Florida Levy 86 0.70 Salinity 100% 2 69,505 

2008 Florida Levy 86 0.75 Oxygen Depletion 100% - 11,902 

2008 Florida Levy 86 0.75 Salinity 100% 1 93,794 

2008 MassachusettsBarnstable 85 0.50 Freeze 100% 1 22,089 

2008 MassachusettsBarnstable 85 0.65 Freeze 100% 1 38,936 

2009 Florida Levy 84 0.50 Salinity 100% 3 119,439 

2009 Florida Levy 84 0.70 Salinity 100% - 13,699 

2009 Florida Levy 84 0.75 Salinity 100% - 109,650 

2009 Florida Levy 85 0.50 Salinity 100% 3 139,031 

2009 Florida Levy 85 0.70 Salinity 100% 1 22,952 

2009 Florida Levy 85 0.75 Salinity 100% - 40,232 

2009 Florida Levy 86 0.50 Salinity 100% 3 169,415 

2009 Florida Levy 86 0.60 Salinity 100% 1 147,838 

2009 Florida Levy 86 0.70 Salinity 100% 3 116,580 

2009 Florida Levy 86 0.75 Salinity 100% 5 449,589 

2009 Virginia Accomack 84 0.65 Storm Surge 100% 1 199,368 

2009 Virginia Accomack 85 0.65 Storm Surge 100% 1 28,720 

2010 Florida Brevard 84 0.65 Other 100% - 1,997 

2010 Florida Brevard 86 0.65 Other 100% 1 2,574 

2010 Florida Levy 85 0.75 Freeze 100% - 8,134 

2010 Florida Levy 86 0.75 Freeze 100% 1 41,656 

2010 MassachusettsBarnstable 85 0.65 Oxygen Depletion 100% 1 18,658 

2010 Virginia Accomack 84 0.60 Storm Surge 100% 1 24,300 

2010 Virginia Accomack 84 0.70 Freeze 50% Freeze - 12,362 

2010 Virginia Accomack 85 0.70 Freeze 100% 1 16,409 

216
217

Evaluation of Clams Plans of Insurance

Appendix D: Analysis of Loss Experience By Day

Table of Contents

All data for the figures in Appendix D is contained in Appendix E.

Brevard County, Florida - Indemnity Dollars by Day (All Years) 218

Brevard County, Florida - Indemnity Dollars by Day (2004-2010) 219

Brevard County, Florida - Claim Counts by Day (All Years) 220

Brevard County, Florida - Claim Counts by Day (2004-2010) 221

Dixie County, Florida - Indemnity Dollars by Day (All Years) 222

Dixie County, Florida - Indemnity Dollars by Day (2004-2010) 223

Dixie County, Florida - Claim Counts by Day (All Years) 224

Dixie County, Florida - Claim Counts by Day (2004-2010) 225

Indian River County, Florida - Indemnity Dollars by Day (All Years) 226

Indian River County, Florida - Indemnity Dollars by Day (2004-2010) 227

Indian River County, Florida - Claim Counts by Day (All Years) 228

Indian River County, Florida - Claim Counts by Day (2004-2010) 229

Levy County, Florida - Indemnity Dollars by Day (All Years) 230

Levy County, Florida - Indemnity Dollars by Day (2004-2010) 231

Levy County, Florida - Claim Counts by Day (All Years) 232

Levy County, Florida - Claim Counts by Day (2004-2010) 233

Barnstable County, Massachusetts - Indemnity Dollars by Day (All Years) 234

Barnstable County, Massachusetts - Indemnity Dollars by Day (2004-2010) 235

Barnstable County, Massachusetts - Claim Counts by Day (All Years) 236

Barnstable County, Massachusetts - Claim Counts by Day (2004-2010) 237

Charleston County, South Carolina - Indemnity Dollars by Day (All Years) 238

Charleston County, South Carolina - Indemnity Dollars by Day (2004-2010) 239

Charleston County, South Carolina - Claim Counts by Day (All Years) 240

Charleston County, South Carolina - Claim Counts by Day (2004-2010) 241

Accomack County, Virginia - Indemnity Dollars by Day (All Years) 242

Accomack County, Virginia - Indemnity Dollars by Day (2004-2010) 243

Accomack County, Virginia - Claim Counts by Day (All Years) 244

Accomack County, Virginia - Claim Counts by Day (2004-2010) 245

Northampton County, Virginia - Indemnity Dollars by Day (All Years) 246

Northampton County, Virginia - Indemnity Dollars by Day (2004-2010) 247

Northampton County, Virginia - Claim Counts by Day (All Years) 248

Northampton County, Virginia - Claim Counts by Day (2004-2010) 249
Appendix D1

218

83

13

26

18

9

1

171

304

13

3

7

32

10

141

18

6

2

58

11

29

46

11

127

10 13

21

12

3

34

5

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350 8/1/99 7/15/00 8/15/00 9/15/00 10/1/00 10/10/00 9/12/01 9/15/01 10/15/01 11/19/01 1/1/02 1/9/02 5/9/02 6/1/02 7/22/02 8/1/02 8/15/02 9/16/02 10/7/02 7/1/03 7/28/03 8/1/03 9/15/03 6/3/04 8/27/04 9/1/04 9/4/04 9/21/04 9/12/08 8/31/10 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: Florida; County: Brevard

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D2

219

10

13

21

12

3

34

5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40 6/3/04 8/27/04 9/1/04 9/4/04 9/21/04 9/12/08 8/31/10 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: Florida; County: Brevard

Loss Years 2004-2010
Appendix D3

220

1 1 1 1 1 1

10

8

1 1 1 1 1

2

1 1 1

2

1 1

2

1 1 1 1

3

1 1

2 2

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11 8/1/99 7/15/00 8/15/00 9/15/00 10/1/00 10/10/00 9/12/01 9/15/01 10/15/01 11/19/01 1/1/02 1/9/02 5/9/02 6/1/02 7/22/02 8/1/02 8/15/02 9/16/02 10/7/02 7/1/03 7/28/03 8/1/03 9/15/03 6/3/04 8/27/04 9/1/04 9/4/04 9/21/04 9/12/08 8/31/10 Units Indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: Florida; County: Brevard

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D4

221

1 1

3

1 1

2 2

0

1

2

3

4 6/3/04 8/27/04 9/1/04 9/4/04 9/21/04 9/12/08 8/31/10 Units Indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: Florida; County: Brevard

Loss Years 2004-2010
Appendix D5

222

18

32

56

239

165

9

98

2

72

6

0

27

7

1

36

20 16

3 4

1 2 2

19

7

13

2

31

7

24

31

0

24

2

17

7

0

35

140

58

18

124

2

19

5

8

25

0

50

100

150

200

250

300 2/15/2000 3/15/2000 4/11/2000 5/1/2000 6/1/2000 6/2/2000 6/19/2000 7/15/00 10/18/2000 10/30/2000 12/24/2000 4/1/2001 5/1/2001 5/5/2001 6/1/2001 7/15/2001 7/25/2001 8/1/2001 9/1/2001 9/23/2001 2/2/2002 2/28/2002 3/1/2002 3/2/2002 4/15/2002 5/1/2002 6/1/02 6/10/2002 6/18/2002 7/1/2002 7/23/2002 10/24/2002 1/1/2003 4/1/2003 4/4/2003 5/1/2003 6/1/2003 7/1/03 8/1/03 8/15/2003 9/1/04 10/25/2004 7/15/2005 9/1/2005 10/10/2005 11/17/2005 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: Florida; County: Dixie

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D6

223

124

2

19

5

8

25

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140 9/1/04 10/25/2004 7/15/2005 9/1/2005 10/10/2005 11/17/2005 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: Florida; County: Dixie

Loss Years 2004-2010
Appendix D7

224

1

2

1

19

15

1 1 1

2

1 1 1 1 1

8

1

5

2

1 1 1 1

4

2

1 1

5

3

1

6

1 1 1 1 1 1

5

7

4

3

27

1 1 1 1

2

0

5

10

15

20

25

30 2/15/2000 3/15/2000 4/11/2000 5/1/2000 6/1/2000 6/2/2000 6/19/2000 7/15/00 10/18/2000 10/30/2000 12/24/2000 4/1/2001 5/1/2001 5/5/2001 6/1/2001 7/15/2001 7/25/2001 8/1/2001 9/1/2001 9/23/2001 2/2/2002 2/28/2002 3/1/2002 3/2/2002 4/15/2002 5/1/2002 6/1/02 6/10/2002 6/18/2002 7/1/2002 7/23/2002 10/24/2002 1/1/2003 4/1/2003 4/4/2003 5/1/2003 6/1/2003 7/1/03 8/1/03 8/15/2003 9/1/04 10/25/2004 7/15/2005 9/1/2005 10/10/2005 11/17/2005 Units Indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: Florida; County: Dixie

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D8

225

27

1 1 1 1

2

0

5

10

15

20

25

30 9/1/04 10/25/2004 7/15/2005 9/1/2005 10/10/2005 11/17/2005 Units Indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: Florida; County: Dixie

Loss Years 2004-2010
Appendix D9

226

34

108 108

10

181

132

6

41

32

7

30

65

31

51

1

4

100

78

7

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200 7/15/00 8/15/00 9/15/00 10/15/2000 9/12/01 9/15/01 10/15/01 10/23/2001 3/4/2002 6/1/02 7/1/2002 9/1/2002 8/13/2003 8/20/2003 8/29/2003 9/6/2003 9/1/04 9/4/04 8/19/2008 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: Florida; County: Indian River

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D10

227

100

78

7

0

20

40

60

80

100

120 9/1/04 9/4/04 8/19/2008 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: Florida; County: Indian River

Loss Years 2004-2010
Appendix D11

228

1

2

4

1

7

11

1 1 1 1

3

1 1

2

1 1

7

8

1

0

2

4

6

8

10

12 7/15/00 8/15/00 9/15/00 10/15/2000 9/12/01 9/15/01 10/15/01 10/23/2001 3/4/2002 6/1/02 7/1/2002 9/1/2002 8/13/2003 8/20/2003 8/29/2003 9/6/2003 9/1/04 9/4/04 8/19/2008 Units Indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: Florida; County: Indian River

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D12

229

7

8

1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 9/1/04 9/4/04 8/19/2008 Units indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: Florida; County: Indian River

Loss Years 2004-2010
Appendix D13

230

155

76

47

80

102

10144

98

22

53

25104

131138

1

38

424

2214

61

23816

325

25

3

599

78

145

23

41

4

37

81

442

52

102

37

261

240

331

48

121

4857

355133

184

4857

774

39

4

30

9686

3024

142

91611222

178

15

107

494356

10

48

75

15119

144

4458

7

42

137

90

1315

60

1723

142

71413

40

4

54

2028

497

184

22443714

54

2

92

14

90

21

140

43

6964

93

3

76

180

117

94

7079

3131

1,203

126

50

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400 1/20/2000 3/15/2000 6/2/2000 7/15/00 8/9/2000 9/15/00 9/27/2000 3/19/2001 4/30/2001 5/11/2001 7/15/2001 7/24/2001 8/11/2001 11/21/2001 1/6/2002 2/8/2002 3/10/2002 4/2/2002 5/1/2002 6/3/2002 7/13/2002 7/28/2002 8/26/2002 10/7/02 11/14/2002 1/3/2003 2/28/2003 3/17/2003 4/1/2003 5/1/2003 5/30/2003 7/1/03 8/1/03 9/9/2003 6/1/2004 8/13/2004 9/15/2004 6/5/2005 7/16/2005 10/1/2005 7/1/2006 11/14/2006 7/1/2007 8/7/2007 2/27/2008 8/1/2008 1/27/2010 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: Florida; County: Levy

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D14

231

40

4

54

20 28

497

18 4

22 4 4 3 7 14

54

2

92

14

90

21

140

43

69 64

93

3

76

180

11 7

94

70 79

31 31

1,203

126

50

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400 5/4/2004 6/1/2004 8/1/2004 8/6/2004 8/13/2004 9/1/04 9/4/04 9/15/2004 10/1/2004 5/1/2005 6/5/2005 7/1/2005 7/9/2005 7/16/2005 8/1/2005 9/1/2005 10/1/2005 1/21/2006 5/1/2006 7/1/2006 8/20/2006 9/1/2006 11/14/2006 11/16/2006 2/1/2007 7/1/2007 7/15/2007 8/1/2007 8/7/2007 10/7/2007 12/1/2007 2/27/2008 3/1/2008 5/1/2008 8/1/2008 5/13/2009 5/29/2009 1/27/2010 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: Florida; County: Levy

Loss Years 2004-2010
Appendix D15

232

11

22

4

5

1

2

11

2

1111

5

9

11

2

11

3

11

4

111

11

2

1

28

4

2

111111

21

2

111

6

10

13

1

5

1

2

1

3

1

8

11

28

1111

5

11

2

11111

8

1

2

11

3

111

2

11

22

4

2

1

2

8

2

33

1

3

5

11111

7

1

2

44

3

111111111

3

1

2

1

3

111111

9

111

2

4

11

33

1

4

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50 1/20/2000 3/15/2000 6/2/2000 7/15/00 8/9/2000 9/15/00 9/27/2000 3/19/2001 4/30/2001 5/11/2001 7/15/2001 7/24/2001 8/11/2001 11/21/2001 1/6/2002 2/8/2002 3/10/2002 4/2/2002 5/1/2002 6/3/2002 7/13/2002 7/28/2002 8/26/2002 10/7/02 11/14/2002 1/3/2003 2/28/2003 3/17/2003 4/1/2003 5/1/2003 5/30/2003 7/1/03 8/1/03 9/9/2003 6/1/2004 8/13/2004 9/15/2004 6/5/2005 7/16/2005 10/1/2005 7/1/2006 11/14/2006 7/1/2007 8/7/2007 2/27/2008 8/1/2008 1/27/2010 Units Indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: Florida; County: Levy

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D16

233

1 1

7

1

2

44

3

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

3

1

2

1

3

1 1 1 1 1 1

9

1 1 1

2

4

1 1

33

1

4

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50 5/4/2004 6/1/2004 8/1/2004 8/6/2004 8/13/2004 9/1/04 9/4/04 9/15/2004 10/1/2004 5/1/2005 6/5/2005 7/1/2005 7/9/2005 7/16/2005 8/1/2005 9/1/2005 10/1/2005 1/21/2006 5/1/2006 7/1/2006 8/20/2006 9/1/2006 11/14/2006 11/16/2006 2/1/2007 7/1/2007 7/15/2007 8/1/2007 8/7/2007 10/7/2007 12/1/2007 2/27/2008 3/1/2008 5/1/2008 8/1/2008 5/13/2009 5/29/2009 1/27/2010 Units indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: Florida; County: Levy

Loss Years 2004-2010
Appendix D17

234

81

3

11 13

150

127

20 17 21

4

22

56

279

109

30

93

34 34

14

4

39

22 19

0

50

100

150

200

250

300 1/10/2000 1/20/2000 1/27/2000 3/6/2000 1/1/2001 1/1/2003 1/15/2003 1/24/2003 2/21/2003 4/3/2003 1/1/2004 11/1/2004 1/1/2005 10/25/2005 2/1/2006 4/25/2006 1/29/2007 2/1/2007 2/6/2007 6/11/2007 1/15/2008 5/20/2008 1/1/2010 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: Massachusetts; County: Barnstable

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D18

235

22

56

279

109

30

93

34 34

14

4

39

22 19

0

50

100

150

200

250

300 1/1/2004 11/1/2004 1/1/2005 10/25/2005 2/1/2006 4/25/2006 1/29/2007 2/1/2007 2/6/2007 6/11/2007 1/15/2008 5/20/2008 1/1/2010 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: Massachusetts; County: Barnstable

Loss Years 2004-2010
Appendix D19

236

8

1 1 1 1

3

1 1 1 1

3

2

5

1

3

2

1

2

1 1 1 1 1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 1/10/2000 1/20/2000 1/27/2000 3/6/2000 1/1/2001 1/1/2003 1/15/2003 1/24/2003 2/21/2003 4/3/2003 1/1/2004 11/1/2004 1/1/2005 10/25/2005 2/1/2006 4/25/2006 1/29/2007 2/1/2007 2/6/2007 6/11/2007 1/15/2008 5/20/2008 1/1/2010 Units indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: Massachusetts; County: Barnstable

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D20

237

3

2

5

1

3

2

1

2

1 1 1 1 1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6 1/1/2004 11/1/2004 1/1/2005 10/25/2005 2/1/2006 4/25/2006 1/29/2007 2/1/2007 2/6/2007 6/11/2007 1/15/2008 5/20/2008 1/1/2010 Units indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: Massachusetts; County: Barnstable

Loss Years 2004-2010
Appendix D21

238

78

32

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90 2/22/2003 8/30/2004 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: South Carolina; County: Charleston

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D22

239

32

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35 8/30/2004 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: South Carolina; County: Charleston

Loss Years 2004-2010
Appendix D23

240

2

1

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5 2/22/2003 8/30/2004 Units indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: South Carolina; County: Charleston

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D24

241

1

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2 8/30/2004 Units indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: South Carolina; County: Charleston

Loss Years 2004-2010
Appendix D25

242

128

77

71

30

16

205

129

9

87

22

43

104

42

23 22

228

24

29

0

50

100

150

200

250 1/29/2003 2/12/2003 9/18/2003 1/1/2004 2/1/2004 2/6/2004 2/10/2004 2/12/2004 2/19/2004 2/24/2004 2/26/2004 4/27/2004 5/3/2004 3/7/2007 7/17/2007 11/17/2009 3/18/2010 8/26/2010 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: Virginia; County: Accomack

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D26

243

30

16

205

129

9

87

22

43

104

42

23 22

228

24

29

0

50

100

150

200

250 1/1/2004 2/1/2004 2/6/2004 2/10/2004 2/12/2004 2/19/2004 2/24/2004 2/26/2004 4/27/2004 5/3/2004 3/7/2007 7/17/2007 11/17/2009 3/18/2010 8/26/2010 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: Virginia; County: Accomack

Loss Years 2004-2010
Appendix D27

244

1 1

2

1 1

5

3

1

2

1 1 1 1 1

2

7

2 2

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 1/29/2003 2/12/2003 9/18/2003 1/1/2004 2/1/2004 2/6/2004 2/10/2004 2/12/2004 2/19/2004 2/24/2004 2/26/2004 4/27/2004 5/3/2004 3/7/2007 7/17/2007 11/17/2009 3/18/2010 8/26/2010 Units indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: Virginia; County: Accomack

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D28

245

1 1

5

3

1

2

1 1 1 1 1

2

7

2 2

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 1/1/2004 2/1/2004 2/6/2004 2/10/2004 2/12/2004 2/19/2004 2/24/2004 2/26/2004 4/27/2004 5/3/2004 3/7/2007 7/17/2007 11/17/2009 3/18/2010 8/26/2010 Units indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: Virginia; County: Accomack

Loss Years 2004-2010
Appendix D29

246

151

36

53

7

52

6

17

69

183

18

142

90

32

42

4

6

57 56

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200 6/5/2001 3/15/2002 6/14/2002 6/26/2002 9/17/2002 1/29/2003 5/21/2003 9/1/2003 9/18/2003 1/1/2004 2/1/2004 2/23/2004 2/25/2004 3/10/2004 9/1/04 9/4/04 8/24/2006 9/1/2006 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: Virginia; County: Northampton

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D30

247

18

142

90

32

42

4

6

57 56

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160 1/1/2004 2/1/2004 2/23/2004 2/25/2004 3/10/2004 9/1/04 9/4/04 8/24/2006 9/1/2006 Indemnity Dollars ($K)

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Dollars ($K)

State: Virginia; County: Northampton

Loss Years 2004-2010
Appendix D31

248

2

1 1 1 1 1 1

3 3

1

6

3

2

1 1 1 1

2

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 6/5/2001 3/15/2002 6/14/2002 6/26/2002 9/17/2002 1/29/2003 5/21/2003 9/1/2003 9/18/2003 1/1/2004 2/1/2004 2/23/2004 2/25/2004 3/10/2004 9/1/04 9/4/04 8/24/2006 9/1/2006 Units indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: Virginia; County: Northampton

Loss Years 2000-2010
Appendix D32

249

1

6

3

2

1 1 1 1

2

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 1/1/2004 2/1/2004 2/23/2004 2/25/2004 3/10/2004 9/1/04 9/4/04 8/24/2006 9/1/2006 Units Indemnified

Date of Loss

Clam Indemnity Counts

State: Virginia; County: Northampton

Loss Years 2004-2010
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

250

APPENDIX E

This is the data for figure 2 on page 20: Virginia clam production data

Year Number of clams Value of clams

1991 30 4

1995 44 7

1997 52 9

1998 71 11

2000 135 20

2003 140 20

2004 150 24

2005 178 27

2006 194 29

2007 212 28

2008 186 24

2009 145 22

This is the data for figure 3 on page 33: Cultivated clam pilot indemnity by cause of loss Florida, crop years 

2000-2003

Disease, Aquaculture - 2.0%

Excess Wind - 0.4%

Freeze - 2.5%

Hurricane - 11.3%

Ice Floe - 0.0%

Other - 0.7%

Oxygen Depletion - 7.6%

Salinity - 52.2%

Storm Surge - 23.2%

Tidal Wave - 0.0%

This is the data for figure 4 on page 33: Cultivated clam pilot indemnity by cause of loss Florida, crop years 

2004-2010

Disease, Aquaculture - 0.2%

Excess Wind - 0.0%

Freeze - 1.3%

Hurricane - 28.4%

Ice Floe - 0.0%

Other - 1.5%

Oxygen Depletion - 17.3%

Salinity - 44.4%
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

251

Storm Surge - 6.4%

Tidal Wave - 0.5%

This is the data for figure 5 on page 34: Cultivated Clam Pilot Indemnity by Cause of Loss

Massachusetts, Crop Years 2000-2003

Disease, Aquaculture - 0.0%

Excess Wind - 0.0%

Freeze - 100.0%

Hurricane - 0.0%

Ice Floe - 0.0%

Other - 0.0%

Oxygen Depletion - 0.0%

Salinity - 0.0%

Storm Surge - 0.0%

Tidal Wave - 0.0%

This is the data for figure 6 on page 34: Cultivated Clam Pilot Indemnity by Cause of Loss

Massachusetts, Crop Years 2004-2010

Disease, Aquaculture - 26.4%

Excess Wind - 0.0%

Freeze - 25.3%

Hurricane - 0.0%

Ice Floe - 45.1%

Other - 0.0%

Oxygen Depletion - 2.5%

Salinity - 0.0%

Storm Surge - 0.8%

Tidal Wave - 0.0%

This is the data for figure 7 on page 35: Cultivated Clam Pilot Indemnity by Cause of Loss

Virginia, Crop Years 2000-2003

Disease, Aquaculture - 23.9%

Excess Wind - 0.0%

Freeze - 39.2%

Hurricane - 4.2%

Ice Floe - 0.0%

Other - 0.0%

Oxygen Depletion - 0.0%

Salinity - 0.0%

Storm Surge - 32.8%

Tidal Wave - 0.0%
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

252

This is the data for figure 8 on page 35: Cultivated Clam Pilot Indemnity by Cause of Loss

Virginia, Crop Years 2004-2010

Disease, Aquaculture - 0.0%

Excess Wind - 0.0%

Freeze - 71.4%

Hurricane - 7.7%

Ice Floe - 0.0%

Other - 0.0%

Oxygen Depletion - 0.0%

Salinity - 0.0%

Storm Surge - 20.9%

Tidal Wave - 0.0%

This is the data for figure 9 on page 36: Cultivated Clam Pilot Indemnity by Cause of Loss

South Carolina, Crop Years 2000-2003

Disease, Aquaculture - 0.0%

Excess Wind - 0.0%

Freeze - 0.0%

Hurricane - 0.0%

Ice Floe - 0.0%

Other - 0.0%

Oxygen Depletion - 0.0%

Salinity - 0.0%

Storm Surge - 100.0%

Tidal Wave - 0.0%

This is the data for figure 10 on page 36: Cultivated Clam Pilot Indemnity by Cause of Loss

South Carolina, Crop Years 2004-2010

Disease, Aquaculture - 0.0%

Excess Wind - 0.0%

Freeze - 0.0%

Hurricane - 0.0%

Ice Floe - 0.0%

Other - 0.0%

Oxygen Depletion - 0.0%

Salinity - 0.0%

Storm Surge - 100.0%

Tidal Wave - 0.0%
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

253

This is the data for figure 11 on page 37: Clam indemnity counts state: Florida; county: Levy loss years 

2000-2010

Year

Month 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

January 1 2 24 13 0 0 1 0 0 0 4

February 1 0 8 3 0 0 0 1 2 0 0

March 4 2 24 6 0 0 0 0 4 0 0

April 0 5 9 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

May 4 7 4 9 1 1 2 0 1 34 0

June 8 0 10 10 1 1 0 0 0 0 0

July 4 48 32 7 0 3 1 2 0 0 0

August 3 2 7 8 10 1 3 10 1 0 0

September 17 1 2 3 48 1 1 0 0 0 0

October 0 1 4 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 0

November 0 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0

December 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

This is the data for figure 12 on page 38: Clam indemnity counts state: Massachusetts; county: Barnstable 

loss years 2000-2010

Year

Month 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

January 10 1 0 5 3 5 0 1 1 0 1

February 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 3 0 0 0

March 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

April 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0

May 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

June 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

July 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

August 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

September 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

October 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

November 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0

December 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

254

This is the data for figure 13 on page 39: Clam indemnity counts state: Virginia; county: Accomack loss 

years 2000-2010

Year

Month 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

January 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

February 0 0 0 1 14 0 0 0 0 0 0

March 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2

April 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

May 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

June 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

July 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0

August 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

September 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

October 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

November 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0

December 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

This is the data for figure 14 on page 50: Cultivated Clams Pilot Coverage Level Relativity Comparison

Coverage Level Relativities

Coverage Level

(%) Florida Massachusetts

50% 0.670 0.600

55% 0.770 0.690

60% 0.890 0.810

70% 1.140 1.290

75% 1.270 1.720

This is the data for figure 15 on page 52: Virginia clam prices

Year

Cents 

per 

pound

1991 13.3 

1995 15.9 

1997 17.3 

1998 15.5 

2000 14.8 

2003 14.3 

2004 16.0 

2005 15.2 
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

255

2006 14.9 

2007 13.2 

2008 12.9 

2009 15.2 

This is the data for the figure Appendix D1 on page 218: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: Florida; 

County: Brevard Loss Years 2000-2010

Date of

Loss

Indemnity Dollars

($thousands)

8/1/99 83

7/15/00 13

8/15/00 26

9/15/00 18

10/1/00 9

10/10/00 1

9/12/01 171

9/15/01 304

10/15/01 13

11/19/01 3

1/1/02 7

1/9/02 32

5/9/02 10

6/1/02 141

7/22/02 18

8/1/02 6

8/15/02 2

9/16/02 58

10/7/02 11

7/1/03 29

7/28/03 46

8/1/03 11

9/15/03 127

6/3/04 10

8/27/04 13

9/1/04 21

9/4/04 12

9/21/04 3

9/12/08 34

8/31/10 5
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

256

This is the data for the figure Appendix D2 on page 219: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: Florida; 

County: Brevard Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of

Loss

Indemnity Dollars

($thousand)

6/3/04 10

8/27/04 13

9/1/04 21

9/4/04 12

9/21/04 3

9/12/08 34

8/31/10 5

This is the data for the figure Appendix D3 on page 220: Clam indemnity counts State: Florida; County: 

Brevard Loss Years 2000-2010

Date of

Loss

Units Indeminified

8/1/99 1

7/15/00 1

8/15/00 1

9/15/00 1

10/1/00 1

10/10/00 1

9/12/01 10

9/15/01 8

10/15/01 1

11/19/01 1

1/1/02 1

1/9/02 1

5/9/02 1

6/1/02 2

7/22/02 1

8/1/02 1

8/15/02 1

9/16/02 2

10/7/02 1

7/1/03 1

7/28/03 2

8/1/03 1

9/15/03 1

6/3/04 1

8/27/04 1

9/1/04 3
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

257

9/4/04 1

9/21/04 1

9/12/08 2

8/31/10 2

This is the data for the figure Appendix D4 on page 221: Clam indemnity counts State: Florida; County: 

Brevard Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of

Loss

Units Indemnified

6/3/04 1

8/27/04 1

9/1/04 3

9/4/04 1

9/21/04 1

9/12/08 2

8/31/10 2

This is the data for the figure Appendix D5 on page 222: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: Florida; 

County: Dixie Loss Years 2000-2010

Date of Loss

Indemnity 

Dollars 

($thousand)

2/15/2000 18

3/15/2000 32

4/11/2000 56

5/1/2000 239

6/1/2000 165

6/2/2000 9

6/19/2000 98

7/15/00 2

10/18/2000 72

10/30/2000 6

12/24/2000 0

4/1/2001 27

5/1/2001 7

5/5/2001 1

6/1/2001 36

7/15/2001 20

7/25/2001 16

8/1/2001 3

9/1/2001 4

9/23/2001 1

2/2/2002 2

2/28/2002 2

3/1/2002 19
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

258

3/2/2002 7

4/15/2002 13

5/1/2002 2

6/1/02 31

6/10/2002 7

6/18/2002 24

7/1/2002 31

7/23/2002 0

10/24/2002 24

1/1/2003 2

4/1/2003 17

4/4/2003 7

5/1/2003 0

6/1/2003 35

7/1/03 140

8/1/03 58

8/15/2003 18

9/1/04 124

10/25/2004 2

7/15/2005 19

9/1/2005 5

10/10/2005 8

11/17/2005 25

This is the data for the figure Appendix D6 on page 223: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: Florida; 

County: Dixie Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of Loss

Indemnity 

Dollars 

($thousand)

9/1/04 124

10/25/2004 2

7/15/2005 19

9/1/2005 5

10/10/2005 8

11/17/2005 25

This is the data for the figure Appendix D7 on page 224: Clam indemnity counts State: Florida; County: 

Dixie Loss Years 2000-2010

Date of Loss Units Indemnified

2/15/2000 1

3/15/2000 2

4/11/2000 1

5/1/2000 19

6/1/2000 15

6/2/2000 1

6/19/2000 1
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

259

7/15/00 1

10/18/2000 2

10/30/2000 1

12/24/2000 1

4/1/2001 1

5/1/2001 1

5/5/2001 1

6/1/2001 8

7/15/2001 1

7/25/2001 5

8/1/2001 2

9/1/2001 1

9/23/2001 1

2/2/2002 1

2/28/2002 1

3/1/2002 4

3/2/2002 2

4/15/2002 1

5/1/2002 1

6/1/02 5

6/10/2002 3

6/18/2002 1

7/1/2002 6

7/23/2002 1

10/24/2002 1

1/1/2003 1

4/1/2003 1

4/4/2003 1

5/1/2003 1

6/1/2003 5

7/1/03 7

8/1/03 4

8/15/2003 3

9/1/04 27

10/25/2004 1

7/15/2005 1

9/1/2005 1

10/10/2005 1

11/17/2005 2

This is the data for the figure Appendix D8 on page 225: Clam indemnity counts State: Florida; County: 

Dixie Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of Loss Units Indemnified

9/1/04 27

10/25/2004 1

7/15/2005 1

9/1/2005 1
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

260

10/10/2005 1

11/17/2005 2

This is the data for the figure Appendix D9 on page 226: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: Florida; 

County: Indian River Loss Years 2000-2010

Date of Loss

Indemnity 

Dollars 

($thousand)

7/15/00 34

8/15/00 108

9/15/00 108

10/15/2000 10

9/12/01 181

9/15/01 132

10/15/01 6

10/23/2001 41

3/4/2002 32

6/1/02 7

7/1/2002 30

9/1/2002 65

8/13/2003 31

8/20/2003 51

8/29/2003 1

9/6/2003 4

9/1/04 100

9/4/04 78

8/19/2008 7

This is the data for the figure Appendix D10 on page 227: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: 

Florida; County: Indian River Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of Loss

Indemnity 

Dollars 

($thousand)

9/1/04 100

9/4/04 78

8/19/2008 7

This is the data for the figure Appendix D11 on page 228: Clam indemnity counts State: Florida; County: 

Indian River Loss Years 2000-2010

Date of Loss Units Indemnified

7/15/00 1

8/15/00 2

9/15/00 4

10/15/2000 1
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

261

9/12/01 7

9/15/01 11

10/15/01 1

10/23/2001 1

3/4/2002 1

6/1/02 1

7/1/2002 3

9/1/2002 1

8/13/2003 1

8/20/2003 2

8/29/2003 1

9/6/2003 1

9/1/04 7

9/4/04 8

8/19/2008 1

This is the data for the figure Appendix D12 on page 229: Clam indemnity counts State: Florida; County: 

Indian River Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of Loss Units Indemnified

9/1/04 7

9/4/04 8

8/19/2008 1

This is the data for the figure Appendix D13 on page 230: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: 

Florida; County: Levy Loss Years 2000-2010

Date of Loss

Indemnity 

Dollars 

($thousand)

1/20/2000 15

2/15/2000 5

3/1/2000 76

3/15/2000 47

5/1/2000 80

6/1/2000 102

6/2/2000 10

6/15/2000 14

7/10/2000 4

7/15/00 98

7/31/2000 22

8/1/2000 53

8/9/2000 25

8/14/2000 10

9/11/2000 4

9/15/00 131

9/17/2000 138

9/22/2000 1
CULTIVATED 

CLAM PILOTEVALUATION

Appendix E

262

9/27/2000 38

1/5/20014

3/1/20012

3/19/20014

4/17/2001 22

4/25/2001 14

4/30/2001 61

5/1/2001 23

5/8/20018

5/11/2001 1

5/31/20016

7/1/2001 325

7/15/2001 25

7/22/20013

7/23/2001 599

7/24/2001 78

7/25/2001 145

8/2/20012

8/11/20013

9/12/01 41

10/16/20014

11/21/2001 37

11/29/2001 81

1/5/2002 442

1/6/2002 52

1/15/2002 10

2/1/20022

2/8/2002 37

2/28/2002 261

3/1/2002 240

3/10/2002 331

3/11/2002 48

4/1/2002 121

4/2/2002 48

4/23/2002 57

4/24/2002 35

5/1/2002 51

5/31/2002 33

6/1/02 184

6/3/2002 48

6/15/2002 57

7/1/2002 774

7/13/2002 39

7/15/20024

7/23/2002 30

7/28/2002 96

8/1/02 86

8/2/2002 30
CULTIVATED 

CLAM PILOTEVALUATION

Appendix E

263

8/26/2002 24

9/1/2002 142

10/1/20029

10/7/02 16

10/22/2002 11

10/30/2002 22

11/14/20022

1/1/2003 178

1/2/2003 15

1/3/2003 107

1/8/2003 49

1/15/2003 43

2/28/2003 56

3/3/2003 10

3/15/2003 48

3/17/2003 75

3/25/2003 15

3/26/2003 11

4/1/20039

4/3/2003 144

4/15/2003 44

5/1/2003 58

5/15/20037

5/19/2003 42

5/30/2003 137

6/1/2003 90

6/3/2003 13

7/1/03 15

7/5/2003 60

7/15/2003 17

8/1/03 23

8/15/2003 142

9/8/20037

9/9/2003 14

9/17/2003 13

5/4/2004 40

6/1/20044

8/1/2004 54

8/6/2004 20

8/13/2004 28

9/1/04 497

9/4/04 18

9/15/20044

10/1/2004 22

5/1/20054

6/5/20054

7/1/20053

7/9/20057
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

264

7/16/2005 14

8/1/2005 54

9/1/2005 2

10/1/2005 92

1/21/2006 14

5/1/2006 90

7/1/2006 21

8/20/2006 140

9/1/2006 43

11/14/2006 69

11/16/2006 64

2/1/2007 93

7/1/2007 3

7/15/2007 76

8/1/2007 180

8/7/2007 11

10/7/2007 7

12/1/2007 94

2/27/2008 70

3/1/2008 79

5/1/2008 31

8/1/2008 31

5/13/2009 1,203

5/29/2009 126

1/27/2010 50

This is the data for the figure Appendix D14 on page 231: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: 

Florida; County: Levy Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of Loss

Indemnity 

Dollars 

($thousand)

5/4/2004 40

6/1/2004 4

8/1/2004 54

8/6/2004 20

8/13/2004 28

9/1/04 497

9/4/04 18

9/15/2004 4

10/1/2004 22

5/1/2005 4

6/5/2005 4

7/1/2005 3

7/9/2005 7

7/16/2005 14

8/1/2005 54

9/1/2005 2

10/1/2005 92
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

265

1/21/2006 14

5/1/2006 90

7/1/2006 21

8/20/2006 140

9/1/2006 43

11/14/2006 69

11/16/2006 64

2/1/2007 93

7/1/2007 3

7/15/2007 76

8/1/2007 180

8/7/2007 11

10/7/2007 7

12/1/2007 94

2/27/2008 70

3/1/2008 79

5/1/2008 31

8/1/2008 31

5/13/2009 1,203

5/29/2009 126

1/27/2010 50

This is the data for the figure Appendix D15 on page 232: Clam indemnity counts State: Florida; County: 

Levy Loss Years 2000-2010

Date of Loss Units Indemnified

1/20/2000 1

2/15/2000 1

3/1/2000 2

3/15/2000 2

5/1/2000 4

6/1/2000 5

6/2/2000 1

6/15/2000 2

7/10/2000 1

7/15/00 1

7/31/2000 2

8/1/2000 1

8/9/2000 1

8/14/2000 1

9/11/2000 1

9/15/00 5

9/17/2000 9

9/22/2000 1

9/27/2000 1

1/5/2001 2

3/1/2001 1

3/19/2001 1
CULTIVATED 

CLAM PILOTEVALUATION

Appendix E

266

4/17/20013

4/25/2001 1

4/30/2001 1

5/1/20014

5/8/2001 1

5/11/2001 1

5/31/2001 1

7/1/2001 11

7/15/20012

7/22/2001 1

7/23/2001 28

7/24/20014

7/25/20012

8/2/2001 1

8/11/2001 1

9/12/01 1

10/16/2001 1

11/21/2001 1

11/29/2001 1

1/5/2002 21

1/6/20022

1/15/2002 1

2/1/2002 1

2/8/2002 1

2/28/20026

3/1/2002 10

3/10/2002 13

3/11/2002 1

4/1/20025

4/2/2002 1

4/23/20022

4/24/2002 1

5/1/20023

5/31/2002 1

6/1/028

6/3/2002 1

6/15/2002 1

7/1/2002 28

7/13/2002 1

7/15/2002 1

7/23/2002 1

7/28/2002 1

8/1/025

8/2/2002 1

8/26/2002 1

9/1/20022

10/1/2002 1

10/7/02 1
CULTIVATED 

CLAM PILOTEVALUATION

Appendix E

267

10/22/2002 1

10/30/2002 1

11/14/2002 1

1/1/20038

1/2/2003 1

1/3/20032

1/8/2003 1

1/15/2003 1

2/28/20033

3/3/2003 1

3/15/2003 1

3/17/2003 1

3/25/20032

3/26/2003 1

4/1/2003 1

4/3/20032

4/15/20032

5/1/20034

5/15/20032

5/19/2003 1

5/30/20032

6/1/20038

6/3/20032

7/1/033

7/5/20033

7/15/2003 1

8/1/033

8/15/20035

9/8/2003 1

9/9/2003 1

9/17/2003 1

5/4/2004 1

6/1/2004 1

8/1/20047

8/6/2004 1

8/13/20042

9/1/04 44

9/4/043

9/15/2004 1

10/1/2004 1

5/1/2005 1

6/5/2005 1

7/1/2005 1

7/9/2005 1

7/16/2005 1

8/1/2005 1

9/1/2005 1

10/1/20053
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

268

1/21/2006 1

5/1/2006 2

7/1/2006 1

8/20/2006 3

9/1/2006 1

11/14/2006 1

11/16/2006 1

2/1/2007 1

7/1/2007 1

7/15/2007 1

8/1/2007 9

8/7/2007 1

10/7/2007 1

12/1/2007 1

2/27/2008 2

3/1/2008 4

5/1/2008 1

8/1/2008 1

5/13/2009 33

5/29/2009 1

1/27/2010 4

This is the data for the figure Appendix D16 on page 233: Clam indemnity counts State: Florida; County: 

Levy Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of Loss Units Indemnified

5/4/2004 1

6/1/2004 1

8/1/2004 7

8/6/2004 1

8/13/2004 2

9/1/04 44

9/4/04 3

9/15/2004 1

10/1/2004 1

5/1/2005 1

6/5/2005 1

7/1/2005 1

7/9/2005 1

7/16/2005 1

8/1/2005 1

9/1/2005 1

10/1/2005 3

1/21/2006 1

5/1/2006 2

7/1/2006 1

8/20/2006 3

9/1/2006 1
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

269

11/14/2006 1

11/16/2006 1

2/1/2007 1

7/1/2007 1

7/15/2007 1

8/1/2007 9

8/7/2007 1

10/7/2007 1

12/1/2007 1

2/27/2008 2

3/1/2008 4

5/1/2008 1

8/1/2008 1

5/13/2009 33

5/29/2009 1

1/27/2010 4

This is the data for the figure Appendix D17 on page 234: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: 

Massachusetts; County: Barnstable Loss Years 2000-2010

Date of Loss

Indemnity 

Dollars 

($thousand)

1/10/2000 81

1/20/2000 3

1/27/2000 11

3/6/2000 13

1/1/2001 150

1/1/2003 127

1/15/2003 20

1/24/2003 17

2/21/2003 21

4/3/2003 4

1/1/2004 22

11/1/2004 56

1/1/2005 279

10/25/2005 109

2/1/2006 30

4/25/2006 93

1/29/2007 34

2/1/2007 34

2/6/2007 14

6/11/2007 4

1/15/2008 39

5/20/2008 22

1/1/2010 19
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

270

This is the data for the figure Appendix D18 on page 235: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: 

Massachusetts; County: Barnstable Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of Loss

Indemnity 

Dollars 

($thousand)

1/1/2004 22

11/1/2004 56

1/1/2005 279

10/25/2005 109

2/1/2006 30

4/25/2006 93

1/29/2007 34

2/1/2007 34

2/6/2007 14

6/11/2007 4

1/15/2008 39

5/20/2008 22

1/1/2010 19

This is the data for the figure Appendix D19 on page 236: Clam indemnity counts State: Massachusetts; 

County: Barnstable Loss Years 2000-2010

Date of Loss Units Indemnified

1/10/2000 8

1/20/2000 1

1/27/2000 1

3/6/2000 1

1/1/2001 1

1/1/2003 3

1/15/2003 1

1/24/2003 1

2/21/2003 1

4/3/2003 1

1/1/2004 3

11/1/2004 2

1/1/2005 5

10/25/2005 1

2/1/2006 3

4/25/2006 2

1/29/2007 1

2/1/2007 2

2/6/2007 1

6/11/2007 1

1/15/2008 1

5/20/2008 1

1/1/2010 1
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

271

This is the data for the figure Appendix D20 on page 237: Clam indemnity counts State: Massachusetts; 

County: Barnstable Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of Loss Units Indemnified

1/1/2004 3

11/1/2004 2

1/1/2005 5

10/25/2005 1

2/1/2006 3

4/25/2006 2

1/29/2007 1

2/1/2007 2

2/6/2007 1

6/11/2007 1

1/15/2008 1

5/20/2008 1

1/1/2010 1

This is the data for the figure Appendix D21 on page 238: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: South 

Carolina; County: Charleston Loss Years 2000-2010

Date of Loss

Indemnity 

Dollars 

($thousand)

2/22/2003 78

8/30/2004 32

This is the data for the figure Appendix D22 on page 239: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: South 

Carolina; County: Charleston Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of Loss

Indemnity 

Dollars 

($thousand)

8/30/2004 32

This is the data for the figure Appendix D23 on page 240: Clam indemnity counts State: South Carolina; 

County: Charleston Loss Years 2000-2010

Date of Loss Units Indemnified

2/22/2003 2

8/30/2004 1

This is the data for the figure Appendix D24 on page 241: Clam indemnity counts State: South Carolina; 

County: Charleston Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of Loss Units Indemnified

8/30/2004 1
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

272

This is the data for the figure Appendix D25 on page 242: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: 

Virginia; County: Accomack Loss Years 2000-2010

Date of Loss

Indemnity 

Dollars 

($thousand)

1/29/2003 128

2/12/2003 77

9/18/2003 71

1/1/2004 30

2/1/2004 16

2/6/2004 205

2/10/2004 129

2/12/2004 9

2/19/2004 87

2/24/2004 22

2/26/2004 43

4/27/2004 104

5/3/2004 42

3/7/2007 23

7/17/2007 22

11/17/2009 228

3/18/2010 24

8/26/2010 29

This is the data for the figure Appendix D26 on page 243: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: 

Virginia; County: Accomack Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of Loss

Indemnity 

Dollars 

($thousand)

1/1/2004 30

2/1/2004 16

2/6/2004 205

2/10/2004 129

2/12/2004 9

2/19/2004 87

2/24/2004 22

2/26/2004 43

4/27/2004 104

5/3/2004 42

3/7/2007 23

7/17/2007 22

11/17/2009 228

3/18/2010 24

8/26/2010 29
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

273

This is the data for the figure Appendix D27 on page 244: Clam indemnity counts State: Virginia; County: 

Accomack Loss Years 2000-2010

Date of Loss Units Indemnified

1/29/2003 1

2/12/2003 1

9/18/2003 2

1/1/2004 1

2/1/2004 1

2/6/2004 5

2/10/2004 3

2/12/2004 1

2/19/2004 2

2/24/2004 1

2/26/2004 1

4/27/2004 1

5/3/2004 1

3/7/2007 1

7/17/2007 2

11/17/2009 7

3/18/2010 2

8/26/2010 2

This is the data for the figure Appendix D28 on page 245: Clam indemnity counts State: Virginia; County: 

Accomack Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of Loss Units Indemnified

1/1/2004 1

2/1/2004 1

2/6/2004 5

2/10/2004 3

2/12/2004 1

2/19/2004 2

2/24/2004 1

2/26/2004 1

4/27/2004 1

5/3/2004 1

3/7/2007 1

7/17/2007 2

11/17/2009 7

3/18/2010 2

8/26/2010 2

This is the data for the figure Appendix D29 on page 246: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: 

Virginia; County: Northampton Loss Years 2000-2010
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

274

Date of Loss

Indemnity 

Dollars 

($thousand)

6/5/2001 151

3/15/2002 36

6/14/2002 53

6/26/2002 7

9/17/2002 52

1/29/2003 6

5/21/2003 17

9/1/2003 69

9/18/2003 183

1/1/2004 18

2/1/2004 142

2/23/2004 90

2/25/2004 32

3/10/2004 42

9/1/04 4

9/4/04 6

8/24/2006 57

9/1/2006 56

This is the data for the figure Appendix D30 on page 247: Clam indemnity dollars ($thousand) State: 

Virginia; County: Northampton Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of Loss

Indemnity 

Dollars 

($thousand)

1/1/2004 18

2/1/2004 142

2/23/2004 90

2/25/2004 32

3/10/2004 42

9/1/04 4

9/4/04 6

8/24/2006 57

9/1/2006 56

This is the data for the figure Appendix D31 on page 248: Clam indemnity counts State: Virginia; County: 

Northampton Loss Years 2000-2010

Date of Loss Units Indemnified

6/5/2001 2

3/15/2002 1

6/14/2002 1

6/26/2002 1

9/17/2002 1

1/29/2003 1

5/21/2003 1
CULTIVATED CLAM PILOT EVALUATION

Appendix E

275

9/1/2003 3

9/18/2003 3

1/1/2004 1

2/1/2004 6

2/23/2004 3

2/25/2004 2

3/10/2004 1

9/1/04 1

9/4/04 1

8/24/2006 1

9/1/2006 2

This is the data for the figure Appendix D32 on page 249: Clam indemnity counts State: Virginia; County: 

Northampton Loss Years 2004-2010

Date of Loss Units Indemnified

1/1/2004 1

2/1/2004 6

2/23/2004 3

2/25/2004 2

3/10/2004 1

9/1/04 1

9/4/04 1

8/24/2006 1

9/1/2006 2