alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-10-00137-CR

DONALD AUSTIN MARTIN APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

------------

FROM THE 355TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOOD COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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A jury convicted Appellant Donald Austin Martin of possessing with intent 

to deliver more than four but less than two hundred grams of methamphetamine 

and possessing more than four ounces but less than five pounds of marijuana. 

See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.112(a), (d), 481.121(a), (b)(3) 

(Vernon 2010). The jury assessed Martin’s punishment at fifty years’ 

confinement and a $10,000 fine for the methamphetamine offense and twenty-

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

four months’ confinement and a $10,000 fine for the marijuana offense. The trial 

court sentenced him accordingly.

Martin’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw 

as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel avers that, 

in his professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief and motion 

meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional 

evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for 

relief. 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). This court informed Martin that he 

may file a pro se brief, and he has done so.2 Martin has also filed a ―Motion to 

Suspend a Rule,‖ a ―Motion for Leave to File a Reply Brief,‖ and a ―Motion for a

[Bledsoe] Hearing to Excuse Appellate Counsel Ottaway and Appoint New 

Counsel.‖ The State declined to submit a brief in response to the Anders brief.

Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on 

the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this 

court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record. See 

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State,

904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may 

we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–

83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

 

2Martin raises two issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and two 

issues challenging the enhancement allegations.
3

We have carefully reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, and each of the 

issues raised by Martin in his pro se brief. We agree with counsel that this 

appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record that 

might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–

28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, 

deny as moot Martin’s ―Motion to Suspend a Rule‖ and ―Motion for Leave to File 

a Reply Brief,‖ deny Martin’s ―Motion for a [Bledsoe] Hearing to Excuse Appellate 

Counsel Ottaway and Appoint New Counsel,‖ and affirm the trial court’s 

judgments.

BILL MEIER

JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; MEIER and GABRIEL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: December 2, 2010
# C_2012355EN.01002601.xml

| 17.11.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 355/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.11.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 355/26

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Judgment of the General Court of 3 October 2012 –Yilmaz v OHIM — Tequila Cuervo (TEQUILA MATADOR HECHO EN MEXICO)

(Case T-584/10) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the Community figurative mark TEQUILA MATADOR HECHO EN MEXICO - Earlier national and international word marks MATADOR - Relative ground for refusal - No likelihood of confusion - No similarity of the goods - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

2012/C 355/55

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Mustafa Yilmaz (Stuttgart, Germany) (represented: initially by F. Kuschmirek, and subsequently by F. Stangl, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervener before the General Court: Tequila Cuervo, SA de CV (Tlaquepaque, Jalisco, Mexico) (represented by: S. Salvetti, lawyer)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervener before the General Court:

Re:

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 13 October 2010 (Case R 1162/2009-2), concerning opposition proceedings between Mustafa Yilmaz and Tequila Cuervo, SA de CV.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Holds that it is unnecessary to adjudicate on the action in so far as it seeks the annulment of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 13 October 2010 (Case R 1162/2009-2) in so far as it accepted registration of the mark applied for in respect of ‘alcoholic beverages’; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Holds that it is unnecessary to adjudicate on the action in so far as it seeks the annulment of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 13 October 2010 (Case R 1162/2009-2) in so far as it accepted registration of the mark applied for in respect of ‘alcoholic beverages’;

| 2. | Dismisses the action as to the remainder; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

| 3. | Orders Mustafa Yilmaz to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by OHIM and by Tequila Cuervo, SA de CV. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders Mustafa Yilmaz to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by OHIM and by Tequila Cuervo, SA de CV.

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(1)  OJ C 55, 19.2.2011.

1

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**EXHIBIT 21.1**

**Subsidiaries of Registrant**

U.S. Subsidiaries

Chronimmune Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Human Organ Science, Inc.XenoStat, Inc.

Foreign Subsidiaries

IMTIX-SangStat Austria GmbHIMTIX-SangStat B.V.IMTIX-SangStat GmbHIMTIX-SangStat S.A.S.IMTIX-SangStat, S.L.IMTIX-SangStat S.r.l.IMTIX-SangStat (Switzerland) GmbHIMTIX-SangStat (UK) LimitedSangStat Atlantique S.A.S.SangStat Canada, Ltd.SangStat Luxembourg S.à.r.l.SangStat Medical International CaymanSangStat Netherlands B.V.SangStat Spain S.L.SangStat U.K., Ltd.
# C_2010346EN.01003203.xml

| 18.12.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 346/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.12.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 346/32

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 7 October 2010 — Asociación para la Calidad de los Forjados (ASCAFOR), Asociación de Importadores y Distribuidores del Acero para la Construcción (ASIDAC) v Administración del Estado, Calidad Siderúrgica SL, Colegio de Ingenieros Técnicos Industriales, Asociación Española de Normalización y Certificación (AENOR), Consejo General de Colegios Oficiales de Aparejadores y Arquitectos Técnicos, Asociación de Investigación de las Industrias de la Construcción (AIDICO) Instituto Tecnológico de la Construcción, Asociación Nacional Española de Fabricantes de Hormigón Preparado (ANEFHOP), Ferrovial Agromán SA, Agrupación de Fabricantes de Cemento de España (OFICEMEN), Asociación de Aceros Corrugados Reglamentarios y su Tecnología y Calidad (ACERTEQ)

(Case C-484/10)

()

2010/C 346/54

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Referring court

Tribunal Supremo

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Asociación para la Calidad de los Forjados (ASCAFOR), Asociación de Importadores y Distribuidores del Acero para la Construcción (ASIDAC)

Applicants:

Defendants: Administración del Estado, Calidad Siderúrgica SL, Colegio de Ingenieros Técnicos Industriales, Asociación Española de Normalización y Certificación (AENOR), Consejo General de Colegios Oficiales de Aparejadores y Arquitectos Técnicos, Asociación de Investigación de las Industrias de la Construcción (AIDICO) Instituto Tecnológico de la Construcción, Asociación Nacional Española de Fabricantes de Hormigón Preparado (ANEFHOP), Ferrovial Agromán SA, Agrupación de Fabricantes de Cemento de España (OFICEMEN), Asociación de Aceros Corrugados Reglamentarios y su Tecnología y Calidad (ACERTEQ)

Defendants:

Question referred

Question referred

Can the exhaustive provisions contained in Annex 19 to Royal Decree No 1247/08 of 18 July 2008, in conjunction with Article 81 thereof, relating to the granting of official recognition of labels of quality be considered to be excessive and disproportionate to the objective pursued and to involve an unjustified restriction which renders the recognition of the equivalence of certificates more difficult and to be an obstacle to or a restriction of the marketing of imported products contrary to Articles 28 and 30 EC?

---
§ 1301.41 Purpose and scope. ( a ) The provisions of this subpart are intended to implement the requirements of section 3(a) of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552b, consistent with the purposes and provisions of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. 831-831dd.
( b ) Nothing in this subpart expands or limits the present rights of any person under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) and the provisions of Subpart A of this part, except that the exemptions set forth in § 1301.46 shall govern in the case of any request made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act and Subpart A to copy or inspect the transcripts, recordings, or minutes described in § 1301.47.
( c ) Nothing in this subpart authorizes TVA to withhold from any individual any record, including transcripts, recordings, or minutes required by this subpart, which is otherwise accessible to such individual under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) and the provisions of Subpart B.
( d ) The requirements of Chapter 33 of Title 44 of the United States Code shall not apply to the transcripts, recordings, and minutes described in § 1301.47.
Exhibit 5.1

                      WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI                              PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION                                 650 PAGE MILL ROAD                       PALO ALTO, CALIFORNIA 94304-1050                     TELEPHONE 650-493-9300 FACSIMILE 650-493-6811
JOHN A. JOIN ARNOT WILSON - RETIRED

March 2, 2001

 

Solectron Corporation777 Gibraltar DriveMilpitas, California 95035

RE: Registration Statement on Form S-8

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We have examined the Registration Statement on Form S-8 to befiled by you with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about March2, 2001 (the "Registration Statement") in connection with the registrationunder the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, of 20,000,000 shares of yourCommon Stock under the Amended and Restated 1992 Stock Option Plan. Such sharesof Common Stock are referred to herein as the "Shares" and such plans andcompensation agreements are referred to herein as the "Plan". As your counsel inconnection with this transaction, we have examined the proceedings taken and arefamiliar with the proceedings proposed to be taken by you in connection with theissuance and sale of the Shares pursuant to the Plan.

It is our opinion that, when issued and sold in the mannerdescribed in the Plan and pursuant to the agreements which accompany each grantunder the Plan, the Shares will be legally and validly issued, fully-paid andnon-assessable.

We consent to the use of this opinion as an exhibit to theRegistration Statement, and further consent to the use of our name whereverappearing in the Registration Statement and any amendments thereto.

 

Very truly yours,

/s/ WILSON, SONSINI, GOODRICH & ROSATI                   Professional Corporation
#### NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY AND FRANKIE C. CRUZ, Plaintiffs v. JOSE P. QUITUGUA & JUANITA P. QUITUGUA, Defendants

Civil No. 129-74

Superior Court of Guam

October 27, 1976

BENSON, *Judge '*

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Plaintiffs appeared by its attorney, Mr. E. R. Crain and the Defendants also appearing by its attorney, Mr. Mark Cowan. After trial the case was then submitted for decision.

The parties stipulated that Plaintiff company had issued a policy of collision insurance on the car of Frankie C. Cruz; that an accident occurred on September 15, 1973, between the car of Frankie C. Cruz and the car owned by Juanita P. Quitugua; that Plaintiff company expended $627.50 in fulfillment of its obligation to Frankie C. Cruz for the repair of his car; that Frankie C. Cruz had subrogated Plaintiff company to his rights against Defend*357ants, that the amount of $75.00 had been paid by Juanita P. Quitugua to Frankie C. Cruz, and therefore Frankie C. Cruz was dismissed as a party Plaintiff.

The trial was had on the issues of liability for the accident and whether there had been an accord and satisfaction.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The car owned by Juanita P. Quitugua was being driven by Jose P. Quitugua, her son, at the time of the accident.

2. The car owned by Frankie C. Cruz was being driven by Lourdes Cruz, his wife, at the time of the accident.

3. At the time of the impact, Defendant’s car had been travelling excessively fast and was out of control.

4. Just prior to the accident the car of Frankie C. Cruz was being driven slowly. It was entirely within its proper lane of travel at the time of the impact.

5. Defendant, Juanita P. Quitugua, paid to Frankie C. Cruz’s wife $75.00 on September 29, 1973. The payment was made by the check admitted as Exhibit 1. This sum corresponded to the deductible portion for which Frankie C. Cruz was obligated according to the terms of his policy.

6. When Defendant paid, she knew it was Frankie C. Cruz’s portion of the payment for repairs; that the insurance company would pay the remainder. She did not .know the total cost of repairing Frankie C. Cruz’s car. Although statements may have been made by Frankie C. Cruz to Juanita P. Quitugua indicating a release of her, she made the payment knowing the insurance company had an interest in the matter.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendants for $627.50 with costs.

*358JUDGMENT

This cause came on regularly for trial on the 20th day of September, 1976, before the Honorable Richard H. Benson, Judge, presiding, sitting without a jury. The plaintiffs appeared by their attorney, Mr. Robert Shoecraft, and the defendants appeared by their attorney, Mr. Mark Cowan, and evidence both oral and documentary having been presented by both parties and the cause having been argued and submitted for decision and the court having made and caused to be filed its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs have judgment against Jose P. Quitugua and Juanita P. Quitugua, jointly and severally in the amount of $627.50 together with costs of this action.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the report of Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period
ended December 31, 2008 (the "Report"), I, Mike Heather, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



|                  |  |                                                      
|----------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------------
|February 17, 2009 |  | /s/ MIKE HEATHER Mike Heather
Chief Financial Officer

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QuickLinks
# C_2013009EN.01001601.xml

| 12.1.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 9/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.1.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 9/16

---

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 8 November 2012 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Hamburgisches Oberverwaltungsgericht — Germany) — Atilla Gülbahce v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg

(Case C-268/11) (1)

1

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - EEC-Turkey Association Agreement - Decision No 1/80 of the Association Council - Article 6(1), first indent - Rights of Turkish workers duly registered as belonging to the labour force - Retroactive withdrawal of a residence permit)

2013/C 9/24

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Referring court

Hamburgisches Oberverwaltungsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Atilla Gülbahce

Applicant:

Defendant: Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Hamburgisches Oberverwaltungsgericht — Interpretation of Article 10(1) and Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 of the Association Council of 19 September 1980 on the development of the EEC-Turkey Association — Grant to a Turkish worker, spouse of a national of the host Member State, of a residence permit of limited duration and a work permit of unlimited duration — Withdrawal, with retroactive effect on grounds of the separation from his spouse of which the competent authorities were not informed, of decisions extending the duration of the residence permit — Conditions for basing the right of residence on Article 10(1) of Decision No 1/80, in the light of the work permit of unlimited duration

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The first indent of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 of the Association Council of 19 September 1980 on the development of the Association set up by the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, signed in Ankara on 12 September 1963 by the Republic of Turkey, on the one hand, and by the Member States of the EEC and the Community, on the other, and concluded, approved and confirmed on behalf of the Community by Council Decision 64/732/EEC of 23 December 1963, must be interpreted as precluding the competent national authorities from withdrawing the residence permit of a Turkish worker with retroactive effect from the point in time at which there was no longer compliance with the ground on the basis of which his residence permit had been issued under national law if there is no question of fraudulent conduct on the part of that worker and that withdrawal occurs after the completion of the period of one year of legal employment provided for in the first indent of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80.

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(1)  OJ C 269, 10.9.2011.

1

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§ 1313.110 Self-evaluation. ( a ) The agency shall, by August 24, 1987, evaluate its current policies and practices, and the effects thereof, that do not or may not meet the requirements of this part, and, to the extent modification of any such policies and practices is required, the agency shall proceed to make the necessary modifications.
( b ) The agency shall provide an opportunity to interested persons, including handicapped persons or organizations representing handicapped persons, to participate in the self-evaluation process by submitting comments (both oral and written).
( c ) The agency shall, until three years following the completion of the self-evaluation, maintain on file and make available for public inspection: ( 1 ) A description of areas examined and any problems identified, and
( 2 ) A description of any modifications made.
### SUBCHAPTER I—REGULATION OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES IN CONNECTION WITH PAY-PER-CALL SERVICES
### §7002. Exemption to preemption

#### (a) In general

A State statute, regulation, or other rule of law may modify, limit, or supersede the provisions of section 7001 of this title with respect to State law only if such statute, regulation, or rule of law—

(1) constitutes an enactment or adoption of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act as approved and recommended for enactment in all the States by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1999, except that any exception to the scope of such Act enacted by a State under section 3(b)(4) of such Act shall be preempted to the extent such exception is inconsistent with this subchapter or subchapter II, or would not be permitted under paragraph (2)(A)(ii) of this subsection; or

(2)(A) specifies the alternative procedures or requirements for the use or acceptance (or both) of electronic records or electronic signatures to establish the legal effect, validity, or enforceability of contracts or other records, if—

(i) such alternative procedures or requirements are consistent with this subchapter and subchapter II; and

(ii) such alternative procedures or requirements do not require, or accord greater legal status or effect to, the implementation or application of a specific technology or technical specification for performing the functions of creating, storing, generating, receiving, communicating, or authenticating electronic records or electronic signatures; and

(B) if enacted or adopted after June 30, 2000, makes specific reference to this chapter.

#### (b) Exceptions for actions by States as market participants

Subsection (a)(2)(A)(ii) shall not apply to the statutes, regulations, or other rules of law governing procurement by any State, or any agency or instrumentality thereof.

#### (c) Prevention of circumvention

Subsection (a) does not permit a State to circumvent this subchapter or subchapter II through the imposition of nonelectronic delivery methods under section 8(b)(2) of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act.

(Pub. L. 106–229, title I, §102, June 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 467.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Oct. 1, 2000, with exceptions relating to record retention and certain loans, see section 107 of Pub. L. 106–229, set out as a note under section 7001 of this title.