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i 

87–856 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–93] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST 

FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 25, 2014 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 25, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request for Missile Defense Programs .................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 25, 2014 ........................................................................................ 27 

TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 2014 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 2 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Bunn, M. Elaine, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and 

Missile Defense Policy, Department of Defense ................................................ 5 

Mann, LTG David L., USA, Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, United States Strategic Command ..... 3 

Syring, VADM James D., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency ..................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bunn, M. Elaine ................................................................................................ 83 

Mann, LTG David L. ........................................................................................ 36 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 31 

Syring, VADM James D. .................................................................................. 54 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Chart used by Mr. Rogers ................................................................................ 95 

Washington Post editorial board statement, March 2, 2014 ......................... 96 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 101 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 111 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 114 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 105 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, 

Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 25, 2014. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:32 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. This committee will come to order. 

When this President was elected he promised to reset with Russia, suggesting that the previous administration was to blame for 

a negative relationship with Russia as well as the rising of the seas 

and various other straw men. To support that reset, he slashed our 

missile defenses, which Russia has never liked. He didn’t trade 

them to Russia. The President gave them away for nothing. This 

isn’t the third site which everyone, including our allies, found out 

about in the middle of a September night in 2009. 

He also canceled the Multiple Kill Vehicle [MKV] program, the 

Kinetic Energy Interceptor, and the Airborne Laser and other programs. He didn’t test the mainstay of the GMD [Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense] fleet for 5 years. He has slashed the missile defense budget from a projected $9.4 billion to $7.8 billion in just 1 

year. Prior to ever proposing the sequester, the President cut more 

than $3.7 billion out of Missile Defense Agency budgets, and then 

pleads poverty when it comes to our East Coast site to protect the 

United States from an Iranian ballistic missile program, which the 

Intelligence Community has consistently warned could reach maturity by 2015. 

If you look at the missile defense budget over time, which you 

can do on the TV monitors around the room—are those up—you 

will realize that the fiscal year 2015 budget request proposal by the 

administration is actually the lowest since the Clinton administration’s fiscal year 2001 budget, which was prior to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] treaty. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 95.] 

Mr. ROGERS. But we have a reset with Russia. And, of course, 

today we see the results of this reset on the ground in Ukraine. 
2 

We see increasing signs of Putinist intervention in Estonia and 

Georgia. And the President, where is he? He is deploying additional 

U.S. forces to hunt down African warlords before he even sent 

promised MREs [meals, ready to eat] to the Ukraine. If you had 

told me in 2009 that this is where we would be in 2014, with another 21⁄2 years of what passes for leadership ahead of us, I would 

have told you not in America. No American President would ever 

surrender our responsibility to lead in favor of leading from behind. 

We are here today dealing with the President’s fiscal year 2015 

missile defense budget request. We have come full circle. The President will propose the policies he wants, but he can’t get them funded unless we let him. As chairman of this subcommittee, I want to 

make it clear he will get no help from me. Weakness is a choice. 

I choose peace through strength. That is why my colleagues Ted 

Poe and Joe Heck join me in introducing a bicameral resolution 

with Senator Rubio calling on the President to declare Russia to be 

in violation of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, something we have reportedly known about for years. 

We simply cannot allow Vladimir Putin to continue to think he 

can get away with whatever he wants without consequences, as he 

is doing today in Ukraine and elsewhere. To the witnesses, let me 

be clear these remarks and my concerns do not rest with you. Admiral and General, your lifetime of service is a credit to your Nation and we owe you a debt of gratitude to you and your families. 

Ms. Bunn, I have reviewed your bio and know that you are here 

today out of a sense of service to our Nation, and I thank you. 

But the present trajectory is all too reminiscent to me of earlier 

years of failed leadership and retrenchment. My reading of history 

informs me that each previous era was followed quickly by a devastating, and likely avoidable, war. I don’t know that this time will 

be any different, but with unanimous consent I will add my full 

statement for the record. 

And with that, I recognize my good friend and colleague, Mr. 

Cooper, from Tennessee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

TENNESSEE, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thought you sounded 

better with the mic off. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. COOPER. And I am very glad that you did not read your entire statement. Because if it was like what we heard, I only shudder at the consequences. This must be an election year. I thought 

that statement, from my good friend, was needlessly alarmist and 

partisan. You know, I yearn for the days when Americans pulled 

together and politics stopped at the water’s edge, especially in moments of uncertainty and some crisis around the world. 

I think it is a serious mistake to just have a political policy of 

blaming everything on the President. I hope that the chairman 

read the memo. Because in the committee memo it says things like 

phase four of the planned deployment of 2020 is now terminated. 
3 

And the committee’s own memo says as a result of congressional 

budget actions. The President can be faulted for many things, but 

some parts of the missile defense budget are actually increased 

substantially. 

And for the chairman to blame sequestration on the President, 

saying that he proposed it, sequestration was never intended to go 

into effect. The congressional supercommittee was supposed to 

come up with a sensible solution to our budget problems, and yet 

we still have no solution. So regardless of the needless partisan 

fighting here, I think it is a mistake to make broadside charges, 

like the President virtually ignoring threats around the world. Give 

me a break. 

We are all Americans, we all want a stronger country, we all 

want a strong missile defense, and we all should pay for it. So I 

hope my colleagues, particularly on the majority side, will help us 

figure out to pay for the defense they brag about so much. Because 

we have short-funded defense for a long time, and also hamstrung 

the Pentagon by not allowing the Pentagon the flexibility to put 

money where it needs to be put. 

So I hate to make a statement like this, Mr. Chairman, but you 

were a little bit out of bounds, I thought, in your remarks. So let’s 

have a better tone for the remainder of the hearing. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank my friend and colleague from Tennessee. 

Lieutenant General Mann, you are recognized for your opening 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF LTG DAVID L. MANN, USA, COMMANDER, 

JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC 

COMMAND 

General MANN. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, 

other members of the subcommittee, thank you for your continued 

support of our soldiers, civilians, and their families. This is my first 

appearance before this subcommittee, and it is an honor to appear 

before you today to discuss the importance of missile defense for 

our Nation and the need to maintain these capabilities in the face 

of a maturing threat and declining budgets. 

Today, I would like to briefly discuss global missile defense operations in the Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces 

Strategic Command’s role as a force provider. To accomplish our 

assigned missions, we have three core tasks. First, to provide 

trained and ready missile defense forces today. Secondly, to build 

future missile defense forces and capabilities for tomorrow. And 

third, to develop future technologies for the day after tomorrow. 

In addition, I would like to outline the role of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense as an 

operational integrator on behalf of Strategic Command. We execute 

four tasks in support of these responsibilities. First, to synchronize 

operational planning. Secondly, to support ongoing operations in 

asset management. Third, to integrate training and exercises and 

test activities. And finally, to advocate for future capabilities. 

This subcommittee’s continued support of missile defense and of 

our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, and civilians, who develop, deploy, and operate these missile defense capabilities is ex-
4 

tremely essential. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to talk about 

the importance of missile defense, and look forward to answering 

any questions that you may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Mann can be found in the 

Appendix on page 36.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you, General, and thank you for your service. 

Admiral Syring. 

STATEMENT OF VADM JAMES D. SYRING, USN, DIRECTOR, 

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 

Admiral SYRING. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking 

Member Cooper, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I 

greatly appreciate the opportunity to testify in front of you today. 

Our budget request for fiscal year 2015 will support the warfighter 

and needs of the combatant commanders by continuing the development of the integrated ballistic missile system to protect our Nation, deployed forces, allies, and international partners from an 

ever-increasingly capable enemy ballistic missile. 

My highest near-term priority remains the successful GMD intercept flight test of the CE [Capability Enhancement]-II Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle [EKV]. In January of 2013, we conducted a 

highly successful non-intercept flight of the CE–II EKV. The EKV’s 

performance exceeded our expectations and confirmed that we are 

on the right path to return the GMD system to rigorous flight testing. I am confident that we have fixed the problem we encountered 

in the December 2010 test, and look forward to conducting FTG– 

06b intercept tests this summer. 

Sir, I am also optimistic we have identified the root cause of the 

intercept failure of the first generation EKV last July. In FTG–07, 

the CE–I kill vehicle and the GBI [Ground-based Interceptor] did 

not separate from the booster’s third stage. We have accounted for 

the issue in our preparations for the upcoming flight test, and are 

working towards a correction to the entire fleet before the end of 

this year. 

With this budget, we will maintain our commitment to build out 

homeland defenses from 30 to 44 GBIs, and take steps significantly 

to redirect the GMD program and up our homeland defense. In 

2015, we will begin to redesign and approve the GBI EKV. The 

new EKVs will be more producable, testable, reliable, cost-effective, 

and eventually replace the kill vehicle used in our GBI fleet. Because we believe that improving our discrimination capability will 

improve the overall performance of our existing homeland defense 

we will begin development of long-range discriminating radar, with 

deployment planned in 2020. 

The new long-range, mid-course tracking radar will provide persistent coverage and improved discrimination capabilities against 

threats to the homeland from the Pacific theater. Our budget request continues our strong support of regional defense initiatives, 

and includes investments in our future advanced capabilities. Continuing efforts to improve the performance of the Aegis weapons 

system, we will procure 30 Standard Missile Block IB guided mis-
5 

siles in fiscal year 2015, plus advanced procurement for a 

multiyear procurement request in fiscal year 2016. 

We plan to increase the SM–3 delivery rate in the out-years. In 

fiscal year 2015, we will also procure 31 interceptors for THAAD 

[Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] and, pursuant to our agreement with the Army, fund additional TPY–2 radar spares and an 

additional THAAD battery. Phase two and phase three of the European Phased Adaptive Approach are on schedule and will meet the 

Presidential mandate for deployment. 

The Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania, will be integrated 

into the Yukon command and control network, tested, and operational by December 2015 to support phase two. This budget also 

supports continued procurement of equipment for Aegis Ashore in 

Poland, which is planned to be operational in a 2018 timeframe. 

The SM–3 Block IIA, under co-development with the Japanese government, and an upgraded version of the Aegis weapons system are 

also both on schedule and available for deployment in 2018. 

We are preparing for Aegis Ashore flight tests at the Pacific missile range facility in Hawaii this year and again in 2015. In 2015, 

we plan to conduct 15 flight tests. We will continue to test elements of the system to demonstrate that they work before they are 

fielded. Our advanced technology investments will enable us to deploy a future BMDS [Ballistic Missile Defense System] architecture 

more capable of discriminating and killing reentry vehicles with a 

high degree of confidence. It is vital that we provide the 

warfighters the most advanced, cost-effective, and reliable weapons 

systems they need to do their jobs. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee’s 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Syring can be found in the 

Appendix on page 54.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you, Admiral. 

And Ms. Bunn, the floor is yours to summarize your statement. 

STATEMENT OF M. ELAINE BUNN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE 

POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Ms. BUNN. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the 

opportunity to testify today on the Department’s fiscal year 2015 

budget request. And I do want to thank all of you for your contributions in providing for the common defense. 

Missile defense is a critical national security priority, both for 

the protection of the United States and for the defense of our deployed forces and our allies. I would like to submit my full written 

statement for the record, but I will highlight a few key points now, 

if I could. 

Our first missile defense policy priority is the defense of the 

United States against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack. 

We currently have coverage of the U.S. homeland against potential 

ICBM attacks from states like North Korea and Iran. To ensure 

that we stay ahead of the threat, we are taking several steps to 

strengthen our homeland defense posture. We are deploying 14 additional interceptors in Alaska and a second missile defense radar 
6 

to Japan, and requesting funding for the development of a radar 

that, when it is deployed in Alaska, will provide persistent sensor 

coverage and improved discrimination capabilities against threats 

to the homeland from North Korea. 

Also for homeland defense, as Admiral Syring mentioned we are 

initiating a redesign of the kill vehicle for the Ground-based Interceptor. Investment in the next generation kill vehicle for the GBI 

is especially important, considering the issues associated with the 

current kill vehicles that were discovered during testing. As directed by Congress, MDA [Missile Defense Agency] is also evaluating four potential locations in the United States for additional 

interceptors. 

Conducting the evaluation and the associated environmental impact statement process will shorten the construction timelines associated with deployment of a new missile site. We have not made 

a decision to build an additional missile field in the United States. 

While an additional missile defense site could be used to improve 

our homeland defenses in the future, our highest funding priorities 

are focused on improving interceptor reliability and performance 

along with improving sensor coverage and discrimination for homeland defense. 

Strengthening our regional missile defense posture is also a key 

policy priority. We are continuing to implement regional missile defenses that are tailored to Europe, to the Middle East, to Asia-Pacific. Our focus is on developing and fielding capabilities that are 

mobile and capable of being redeployed, as necessary, to address 

the threat. We are also encouraging our allies and partners to acquire missile defenses and to strengthen operational missile defense cooperation. 

Our missile defense deployments to Europe are especially important for reassuring allies of our commitment to the security of the 

NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Alliance. We already 

maintain a missile defense ship presence in the eastern Mediterranean, along with a radar deployed in Turkey; those have been 

there since 2011. And our plans to deploy Aegis Ashore sites to Romania in 2015 and Poland in 2018 are, as Admiral Syring said, on 

schedule. 

With regard to talks with Russia on transparency and cooperation, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, in violation of international 

law, led to the suspension of our military-to-military dialogues, including DOD [Department of Defense] civilians. And we have subsequently not continued to engage Russia on the topic of missile defense. 

In summary, we have made very significant progress deploying 

missile defenses and cooperating with allies and partners, but we 

cannot afford to stand still. The President’s budget request reflects 

our goal of retaining the flexibility to adjust and enhance our defenses as the threat and technologies evolve. Thank you for inviting 

me here today. 

And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bunn can be found in the Appendix on page 83.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you, Ms. Bunn. And I will start off with the 

questions. 
7 

Admiral Syring, I am concerned with Russia’s behavior threatening our allies, including the illegal invasion of Ukraine and its 

violation of the INF Treaty. Are you concerned about those things? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you tell me what is the organic capability of 

the Aegis Ashore to detect cruise missiles? 

Admiral SYRING. It is currently not configured for cruise missiles. 

It is configured against the ballistic missile defense threat. 

Mr. ROGERS. What would be the capability if we deployed the 

SM–2s and the SM–6s at those sites, in addition to the SM–3s? 

Admiral SYRING. Again, sir, it hasn’t been designed for the SM– 

2. As you know, we have a seaborne capability with SM–2s and 

SM–6s that is possible. Sir, I would have to defer to Policy or State 

Department on that needed capability. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the functional difference? 

Admiral SYRING. Essentially, the software, with a minor hardware addition. 

Mr. ROGERS. You made reference in your testimony, and Ms. 

Bunn confirmed, that you are on time for the Romania and Poland 

Aegis Ashore sites. If the President were to come to you and say 

I need you to step that up, as a consequence of the Ukrainian activity by Russia, would you be able to, if he gave you the money, if 

money was not the issue, to step that up and make it happen 

quicker? 

Admiral SYRING. We have analyzed that. It can be done quicker 

if money were available. But the budget request supports a 2018 

fielding at this point. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. I support the additional funding of the GMD 

program that you have requested for a new redesigned kill vehicle 

and new investments in discrimination. Absent these investments, 

however, the GMD system is actually being cut in your fiscal year 

2015 budget. Why? 

Admiral SYRING. If I can, sir, talk about the overall—I will talk 

about the GM program, but let me put it in the overall homeland 

defense category. In terms of—you and I have had many discussions on the need to improve our homeland defense. And that includes increasing our discrimination capability, increasing our longrange radar capability, getting started with the redesign of the 

EKV; all fundamental parts of homeland defense. 

And those were marked increases in this year’s budget. And the 

GM budget did go down slightly. But with the addition of the EKV 

and the other aspects of homeland defense, I am confident we are 

on solid footing. That said, a big part of what I will do, and have 

been doing, is looking inside the fundamentals of the GM program, 

the first of which was the EKV development which I recommended 

and then the Department supported. 

There are other aspects of the GMD program that I will be looking at in the 2016 budget submission for increased funding. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are we making sufficient investments to pay for the 

life cycle, maintenance and aging and reliability for this 10-yearold system which, as you know, was deployed with a 20-year design 

life? 

Admiral SYRING. Not as much as I would like. 
8 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. And finally, Admiral Syring, and then I will 

yield and, hopefully, have a second round of questions. But I do 

want to ask you, your budget request for 2015 includes funding for 

several important new initiatives for homeland missile defense, including a new long-range radar, new discrimination systems, and 

a new homeland defense kill vehicle. What happens to these investments if the sequestration returns in 2016, as is currently the law 

of the land? 

Admiral SYRING. Everything would be put back on the table for 

reconsideration and, possibly, stopped. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

On that depressing note, I will yield to my friend and colleague, 

Mr. Cooper, from Tennessee. 

Mr. COOPER. The chairman and I actually get along very well. 

We had a nice breakfast together, talking about submarines. It is 

amazing to me that I was blindsided by his statement. And also, 

I think, the tone is just unfortunate. But rather than prolong that, 

I think it is important that the public get the facts. Of course, we 

in a democracy operate at a disadvantage because other nations 

don’t have hearings like this and they don’t air their dirty laundry 

to the world and they don’t express disagreements. 

I hope that the public understands that, you know, we can have 

as strong a defense as we want to have, but just got to pay for it. 

Not borrow the money from China, as we have been doing. And in 

terms of getting more money for projects, the Pentagon testified for 

us, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and 

the Comptroller, that currently, in the Pentagon, we have 25 percent surplus capacity. And this Congress, this committee, refuses 

to allow the Pentagon to do anything about that because those 

bases are located in particular Members’ districts. 

So people who complain about a shortage of funding, and then 

don’t allow the Pentagon to prioritize, are people who are not willing to fund our warfighters overseas and at home, should stop complaining. This budget—you know, we wish it could be better, and 

it can be better if Congress has the gumption to vote for a better 

or stronger budget. Left unsaid in the chairman’s remarks is the 

last three tests of Ground-based Interceptors have failed, and we 

have to acknowledge that. 

And that doesn’t mean it is a bad program. When America ventured into rocketry, many of our missiles failed. But we solved 

those problems. We are a can-do nation and, as the admiral testified, we will solve this problem. I hope your confidence is not misplaced right now because the next test is, what, in June? So—— 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COOPER. So, you know, I want to be an optimist about. But 

the GAO [Government Accountability Office] and others have reported that, you know, we should—and I think the admiral supports this, we should fly before we buy. Don’t get a pig in a poke. 

This idea of concurrent development has stung this committee and 

stung the American taxpayer for a long time. So we want to be as 

strong as we can be, but there are certain limits to technology so 

far. And let’s push those limits, let’s make it happen. 

Everyone wants to do all they can for Ukraine and the good folks 

over there right now, but we have to be prudent and thoughtful in 
9 

the way we propose interventions. And this is not a foreign policy 

committee. We should be an enabling committee to allow the Pentagon to have the weapons systems and the troops that it needs. 

Someone once said that sequestration was worse than any enemy 

attack that had ever been launched on us because it hit so many 

points in Pentagon programs that no enemy could have been that 

innovative, that creative, that forceful to disrupt so many of our 

operations. 

Well, this committee has the power to start stopping that mess 

if we have got the gumption to do so. So I appreciate the witnesses 

being here. I hope that we can limit the political talk during an 

election year. Everyone on this subcommittee, to my knowledge, is 

for a strongest possible missile defense. You know, we will make 

that happen. And quibbling over this or that does not really 

strengthen the country. 

I yield the balance of my time. 

Mr. ROGERS. We really are good friends. You ought to hear me 

and my wife if you think this is bad. Who is next? 

Mr. Franks of Arizona is recognized for 5 minutes for any questions he may have. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, 

Ms. Bunn, for being here and your contribution to the country. And 

Admiral Syring and General Mann, I want to say a special gratitude to you and all of the people in uniform. I think that your station in this arsenal of freedom is almost impossible to overstate in 

its importance. So many people across the world may not realize 

it, but we all owe you a debt of gratitude for your commitment to 

the peace and security, really, of the whole world. And I am grateful to you. 

With that, I have to go on record here as associating myself very 

vigorously with the chairman’s opening statement. Some of the debates that he outlined not only were on target, in my judgment, but 

far preceded any election year. And sometimes the importance of 

facing mistakes presently is to, hopefully, prevent repeating them. 

And so I want to go on record that way. 

Admiral Syring, today we see the smallest budget request for 

missile defense in the 5 years that this President has submitted a 

budget to Congress. And if one were only to look objectively at our 

budget, I think he or she would think that the world is much more 

safe and that the ballistic missile proliferation is not rampant and 

at historic levels. But putting aside my own personal feelings about 

what I believe to be an extremely dangerous trend, I am curious 

about the future of ballistic missile defense. 

We have a request for only $13 million for directed-energy technology. And can you tell the committee what other promising technologies the agency is working on, and what is the best hedge 

strategy, and what about the amounts we are spending today for 

limited ballistic missile defense? And how we best can prepare for 

the future to include the new EKV and the MKV. 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, let me cover all that at once. And I will 

string this together in a coherent explanation. The $13 million that 

you spoke about is really the work that is going on at the two facilities that are doing our experimentation: MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] Lincoln Lab, and DARPA [Defense Advanced 
10 

Research Projects Agency], which are teamed; and then Lawrence 

Livermore out on the West Coast. They are working on two very 

promising technologies in the solid-state laser arena. 

And it is technology, it is high-end technology. To do what they 

are doing, with an eye towards someday how do you package that 

into something that could be put into an airborne platform or a 

sea-based platform, it is a very, very difficult problem. They are 

both making progress. The DPALs—diode-pumped alkali laser system—out at Livermore is tested to 4 kilowatts. It will be to 10 kilowatts by the end of 2015. 

MIT has made a little bit more progress, but for a different reason—and I will explain that—is at 20 kilowatts with a plan to scale 

to 30 by the end of—30 kilowatts by the end of 2015. It is somewhat paced by funding, unfortunately. But the reality of the budget 

is such that the technology is moving in line with where the budget 

is in terms of technology can only move so fast. We could go faster, 

but we are moving at the pace of demonstration, at this point. 

It is new inventions. It is critical to where we want to be, both 

for discrimination technology in terms of being in the hundreds of 

kilowatt regime, to the high-end, high-power laser hard kill capability, which we need to be at a megawatt, or higher even, which 

we demonstrated on an airborne laser. So there is seed work going 

on there. There is work, as well, in the classified arena, which I 

can’t speak today about but would be happy to talk to you and the 

committee about that in a more substantial manner. 

Certainly, lasers and laser technology is where we want to be 

from a discrimination standpoint. And I would submit, down the 

road, to change the cost equation on cost-per-kill on the hard kill 

side, as well. So I agree with that. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. 

Admiral SYRING. There—if I can, just one more, sir. There is also 

a lot of other classified programs that I can explain off-line. 

Mr. FRANKS. I look forward to that. 

Mr. Chairman, some of us—and I know you are, as well—concerned very much about the sequestration. And just for the record, 

that was indeed proposed by our President. And there are many of 

us on this committee that voted against that simply because we 

were afraid that, indeed, the sequestration would take place. And 

this makes it difficult, I know, for multiyear procurement authority. 

And related to the SM–3 IB, Admiral Syring, why is this multiyear procurement authority from the Congress in fiscal year 2015 

so important? 

Admiral SYRING. Very important for us to get the production 

quantities up. You and I have discussed that we, ideally, want to 

be at 52 interceptors per year from a manufacturing standpoint. 

Obviously, our request this year is less than that. But I would just 

urge the committee to look at our fiscal year 2013 and 2014 budget 

requests, and the timing of those contract announcements, in total. 

In terms of in the last few months we have put 33, plus up to 50, 

interceptors under contract in the last 6 months or so. 

So 83 or 84 interceptors. These 30 will be added to that by the 

end of the year. So in a period of 15 months we will have put under 

contract over 100 interceptors. And as you know, sir, that was 
11 

paced by some of the technical development problems that we had 

with the divert system. And we are past that, and confident that 

we are in a stable baseline, and ready for a multiyear. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. I would like to go back to the directed energy; a significant reduction year to year, down to 14. I 

personally have thought this would be something that we should 

be spending substantially more money on and we ought to be advancing it for reasons that we have discussed and probably ought 

not go into in great detail here. But I am looking at this, and wondering if we were to move $10 

million from another part of your account to directed energy—for 

example, delay the purchase of a missile for a month, 2 months— 

and put in directed energy, what would that mean to that missile 

program if we were to switch around and add another $10 million 

or, let’s say, $15 million to the $14 million that is there. 

Admiral SYRING. Every—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So which program would you like to cut by $15 

million? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, as you know, every interceptor, as I told 

Mr. Franks, is important to the warfighter, at this point. We are 

trying to get our interceptor quantities up for both that and SM– 

3 at rates that we are not yet to. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay, so we don’t go to interceptors. Where would you like to take $15 million? 

Admiral SYRING. Can I take that for the record? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. No. 

Admiral SYRING. If I can, sir, just answer the—I will answer the 

question directly, in terms of there is a pace to technology maturation here on both of the concepts that we are pursuing. And throwing—I don’t want to say ‘‘throwing’’—adding more money could 

help a little, but not a lot. And as long as we stay on track to demonstrate this by the end of 2015—and I gotta tell you, sir, both concepts are promising for different reasons—as long as you hold me 

to that, and I make the goal of where I said I was going to be by 

the end of 2015, I think we are on the right track here. 

The scaling and packaging is the next big hurdle that we are 

looking at in parallel. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So there is no program—so every other program 

is more important than—a few moments ago you said you could 

and would put more money into it if you could—had that money 

available. So every other program is more important than this one, 

than adding money to this one. 

Admiral SYRING. The pace at which we are moving, and the— 

where we are with the experiments and the tests that are going on, 

are driven more by the technology than money at this point. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. You and I are going round and round, 

and we are not going to get to a conclusion. But the information 

I have is that another $10 million to $15 million would substantially advance this program. 
12 

General MANN. Congressman, if I—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. General, it looks like you want to jump into 

this. 

General MANN. Well, I would just like to add, as you know the 

Army is also involved in directed-energy technologies. And we have 

already successfully tested a 10-kilowatt system back in December, 

currently about to do another joint test of that 10-kilowatt system 

in May down in Florida. In addition, we are looking at taking that 

technology, which right now has a range of a little bit more than 

5 miles—and it is really primarily focused against cruise missiles, 

UAVs, counter rockets, artillery mortars, and whatnot. 

We are looking at taking that technology and, hopefully, being 

able to mature it, as Admiral Syring is talking about, to a 50-kilowatt capability that will give us extended range. So—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is that—please continue. 

General MANN. So I just wanted to add that in addition to what 

the Missile Defense Agency is working on we also, internal to the 

Army, are also looking at that because of the nature of the threat 

out there; cruise missiles, UAVs and the RAM [rocket, artillery, 

and mortar] threat that is out there. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is your technology different than the two technologies that Missile Defense is pursuing? 

General MANN. It is solid state, it is directed. His is a little bit 

looking at a higher level, looking at a different threat set than 

what we are looking at. We are really looking at a lower-level 

threat set. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think there is—we have three different technologies, then. Raising the question of three different technologies 

because the Army wants to do it different than Missile Defense, or 

is it something different in the technology, some reason why we 

have—why we are pursuing three different technologies? 

General MANN. I would say, and I will defer to Admiral Syring, 

I think that the premise of the technology as far as being directed 

energy is pretty much the same. But we are looking at different 

threat sets. And taking out an air-breathing threat, or taking out 

a ballistic missile is a lot different than taking out a mortar. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I understand that, but that is not where my 

question is going. I am out of time, but I want to find out why we 

have three different technologies and whether we might want to 

choose one or the other—or one of them, and move forward with 

that at some point in the near future. 

I will let it go at that. I am past time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Go now to the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for his 5 

minutes of questions. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral Syring or 

General Mann, how important is it that we keep moving forward 

on an East Coast site to stem the threat of an Iranian attack? 

General MANN. I will go ahead and start, because Admiral 

Syring has been getting a lot of love in here up front here. So—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. That is true. We love him. 

General MANN. You know, obviously, by having an East Coast 

site it does provide dispersal of our systems, rather than just being 
13 

a Greeley or at Vandenberg Air Force Base, having a third site will 

basically disperse the arsenal, number one. Number two, because 

of the location of the East site it gives us more battle space or more 

decisionmaking time for threats emanating out of the Middle East. 

So from that standpoint, that is also additive. 

And third, it is more—pardon the vernacular—more arrows in 

the quiver. We have more capability, not necessary—or, excuse me, 

more capacity, not more technological capability. And so as a result, we have more of an ability to address a raid-size threat that 

might be used against the U.S. 

Mr. LAMBORN. With that in mind, from the operational perspective that you just gave us, should we be doing more from a planning and budget perspective? I mean, the administration is going 

along with what Congress has directed it to do, but no further. 

Should we, and could we, be doing more? 

General MANN. We could always do more. I think if you are looking for my recommendations, Congressman, I would say that dealing pragmatically with the budget the way it is, I think that the 

best investment for the taxpayer is to increase our sensor capability and discrimination. That, right there—and increasing the reliability of EKVs. That is where, if you were asking for my recommendation, that is where I would put the next dollar. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral, do you or, Ms. Bunn, do you have anything to add to that? 

Admiral SYRING. The warfighting advantage was well-explained 

by General Mann. We, obviously, agree with that entirely. In terms 

of are we doing enough, the work that we started with the four— 

the downselect of the four sites, and all of the EIS [environmental 

impact statement] work that is going to go on over the next 2 

years, is setting the stage for a decision if the Department were to 

make that decision. And that has got to play out. 

We are aggressively—we are on an aggressive EIS timeline, if 

you compare it to history. And there is a lot of work that has to 

go on in terms of site surveys, all of the town halls, everything that 

will go on in parallel. I think you will see the combatant commanders debate this requirement and debate the need. And I think 

General Jacoby and Admiral Haney will be in a good position to 

address that next year. 

I think that we are—I think, as General Jacoby testified, we are 

setting ourselves up in time for a decision. And you have heard me 

talk about the need to think near-term, mid-term, and far-term. 

And I have always characterized the mid-term as the 2020 timeframe. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. 

Ms. Bunn. 

Ms. BUNN. I think it has been well-addressed, and I would agree 

with—— 

Mr. LAMBORN. Then let me ask you a question. Are we doing 

enough against potential Chinese threats, including cruise missiles 

or submarine-borne ballistic missiles? 

Ms. BUNN. As far as defense of the homeland, our homeland defense is geared toward states such as North Korea and Iran. With 

regard to regional missile defense, China does have a number of 
14 

short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. And that is part of why 

we are going forward in the Asia-Pacific. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, and I didn’t mean, you know, hundreds of 

missiles. I meant a rogue missile or an unauthorized or accidental 

launch is what I was referring to. 

Ms. BUNN. Yes, sir. We haven’t designed against missiles from 

Russia or China. But if there were an accidental or unauthorized 

launch, we would do what we could to defend against it. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

being here. I would ask each of you to respond to this question. 

Has the improved missile defense of ballistic missile systems made 

cruise missiles more attractive to our adversaries? And if you could 

also just give your—give us your current assessment of the cruise 

missile threat. 

General MANN. Thank you, Congressman. I think it is fair to say 

that cruise missile technology is being looked at by a number of nations. Nine right now are currently producing this capability. I 

think 20 more are looking into this kind of technology. So I think 

it is fair to say that cruise missile technology is something that 

many nations are looking at. And, as a result, you know, we also 

are looking at our defenses against that. 

Right here in the National Capital Region [NCR], as you know, 

we are about to put the joint attack cruise missile defense elevated 

sensor, that Aerostat [Tethered Aerostat Radar System] there at 

APG, at Aberdeen Proving Ground, to do a test on behalf of 

NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] to look at how do we do 

a better job of sensing an incoming cruising missile and being able 

to defeat it, utilizing some of the systems that we have around this 

area like the NASAMS [National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile 

System] missile, for instance. 

So that is one of the things that we are looking at right now, at 

how do we bolster up, in terms of the NCR, our ability to address 

that threat. I talked earlier about high-energy laser technologies. 

And that is something that the Army is also looking at in terms 

of countering the cruise missile threat that might be out there. So 

this is definitely an area that many countries are looking into. 

Admiral SYRING. I would just add to the general’s point that I— 

from a ballistic missile standpoint, which is my job, I don’t see any 

of that threat deescalating in favor of cruise missile threat. I see 

these both increasing at a very rapid pace. 

Ms. BUNN. I would agree that we don’t want ballistic missiles to 

be a free ride for a potential adversary, nor cruise missiles either. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. Also, understanding that you are performing environmental impact statements for four potential sites, 

what is the rough-order estimated cost of the East Coast missile 

defense site? 

Admiral SYRING. The estimate that we have gone on record is in the rough order of $3 billion to $4 billion, which would include the 

site and 20 interceptors. Now, that will be refined as we study, in 
15 

more detail, the four sites that we are looking at. And that cost estimate will be submitted as part of the contingency plan updates 

that we provide the Congress over the next 2 years. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I want to ask all of you this question. Is one successful flight intercept sufficient to give us sufficient confidence to 

invest additional billions of dollars in deploying and procuring 14 

additional GBIs? 

Admiral SYRING. Let me take that, and then General Mann, from 

a deployment standpoint, can address the warfighter confidence 

with deployment. As the chairman has said, as the ranking member has said, the last three flight tests are—we are 0-for-3 in terms 

of intercept tests. 

Mr. JOHNSON. They were what? 

Admiral SYRING. Zero-for-three in the last three intercept tests 

that were conducted. The history of this program is that in intercept tests in the GM program it is actually 8 for 16; 15 if you count 

it somewhat different. The CE–I, and I won’t throw too much configuration jargon here, but the oldest version that was deployed 

first was actually 3-for-3 before the last failure in July. So 3-for4 of that version. 

What we are talking about in terms of that is one of the three 

past failures, there were two failures in a row of the new one, of 

the new configuration. One failed because of the lock wire missing, 

and one failed because of excessive vibration in the inertial measurement unit. Both very mechanical in nature. The first one, obviously, quality in nature. So your point is, if we go and test again 

this summer what does that mean in terms of our confidence to 

continue production and deployment of the missile. 

And I will let General Mann ask the—answer the deployment 

question. But if you think about sort of the new version, with the 

corrections, was flown back in January of 2013 very successfully. 

It was a non-intercept flight, but we put it in space and put it 

through its paces. This will be the intercept test, this summer, of 

that configuration. 

And in this year’s budget request there are three more intercept 

tests scheduled for 2015, 2016, and 2017, of the latest configuration. And I would say all of those will be the benchmarks of confidence for the warfighter to deploy the system. 

General MANN. Congressman, I agree with General Jacoby’s assessment. We have confidence in the current capability. Do we 

need to do more? Do we need to continue to do the necessary testing? Yes. But we have confidence in the operational employment, 

the rules of engagement that we would use that would address 

maybe some reliability or some uncertainty associated with the 

system. 

I think what is key is that, as Admiral Syring was talking about, 

is that we sustain a make-sense test program, from year to year, 

we maintain that. Make sure that has the predictability that it 

needs. That we continue ongoing efforts to redesign or to upgrade 

the current EKV, as well as looking at leap-ahead technologies. So 

don’t know if that answers your question. 

But I think that the way ahead is pretty well stated. We will see 

what happens with this test coming up. And also, as Admiral 
16 

Syring stated, before last summer’s CE–I failure they had three 

successful intercepts right before that. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one quick comment 

in defense of our chairman. I believe our chairman cited the Washington Post’s March 2nd editorial that had the heading ‘‘President 

Obama’s Foreign Policy is Based on Fantasy.’’ And I just want to 

underscore the fact that the Washington Post is certainly not up 

for reelection, and they certainly are not seen as being partisan 

against the President. 

So considering that they are—that their comments are consistent 

with our chairman, I believe that it is certainly important for him 

to raise the issues as to how the policy of the administration affects 

the issues that are within the jurisdiction of this subcommittee. I 

would like to ask, if the chairman has not, that that editorial be 

entered into the record of this hearing. 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 96.] 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Bunn, we had a chart that was up that said 

that this is the budget request for missile defense represents the 

smallest missile defense budget request since Bill Clinton was 

President. I was reading your bio. It struck me, and it seems, and 

I hope I am not mistaking this. But I was reading all the different 

positions that you have. It seems that your position, which now includes missile defense policy, that the last time that you had a title 

that also included the words ‘‘missile defense policy’’ was the Clinton administration. Is that correct? 

Ms. BUNN. Yes, sir. That was the last time. The first time was 

in the Reagan administration, and then the George H.W. Bush administration. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, sometimes things repeat themselves. What 

disturbed me about that was, when I read the conclusion to your 

statement, it says, ‘‘The ballistic missile threat to the United States 

or our allies and partners, and to our forces overseas, is evolving. 

And we continue to grow and adapt our homeland and regional 

missile defense posture and international cooperation to address 

it.’’ 

Now, from my perspective in looking at that chart, and where we 

have been and where we are going, I mean, we were going to be 

at a position where the Alaska missile field was complete and there 

were going to be GBIs, ground-based, forward deployed in Europe. 

This administration cut completing the Alaska field, and then cut 

the forward base missiles that was to be the third site. Do we have 

any request for the implementation of what had been the phase 

four of the Phased Adaptive Approach by the administration? 

Ms. BUNN. Sir, when I said—talked about the growth, I was referring to the additional 14 interceptors that we have decided to 

deploy. 

Mr. TURNER. To where? 

Ms. BUNN. For the—for homeland defense. 

Mr. TURNER. Where are they deployed? 
17 

Ms. BUNN. They will be deployed in Alaska. 

Mr. TURNER. But those are the ones that were already scheduled. 

So you can’t say you are growing something, when you have cut it 

and then you decide to put back a portion, but not all, of what you 

cut. So my question to you was, is there any budgetary request 

that includes funding of any portion of the implementation of what 

was phase four, the Phased Adaptive Approach? 

Ms. BUNN. No, sir—— 

Mr. TURNER. No, there is not. 

Ms. BUNN. The replace—— 

Mr. TURNER. So we don’t grow, we actually only have a replacement of missiles that the Bush administration had proposed, correct? You can turn your mic back on. I am not finished. 

Ms. BUNN. Sir, they had originally wanted 14 more. A decision 

was made to go toward defending Europe against Iranian threats. 

And so that was—funding was—— 

Mr. TURNER. So the answer is just yes, right? I mean, just—— 

Ms. BUNN. The answer is yes. 

Mr. TURNER. Right, right. So you haven’t grown it. You first cut 

the missiles in Alaska, then you cut the forward deployed missiles, 

then you are going back and putting some more in Alaska. And 

that is still not a net growth. We are still behind. You say we cannot afford to stand still. We are not, we are moving backwards. 

I appreciate the analysis that we had on the third—what the— 

excuse me, the East Coast missile defense, gets us. And there are 

terms that people banter around on validated military requirement. And I wanted you to help us on that. Because it seems to 

me there are only three ways to criticize this. That there is no 

threat, we don’t need it yet, and money. And I think we can resolve 

all those. 

But then they throw in this validated military requirement. Admiral Syring, could you please describe what validated military requirement is, and tell us how does that relate to any MDA system 

for the Phased Adaptive Approach for SM–3 to an interceptor, any? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. As you know, MDA is not under the 

JCIDS [Joint Capabilities Integration Development System] process and the joint staff requirements process. When I talk about a 

validated requirement in missile defense terms, I am think—I am 

talking about a requirement that is on the STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] priority capability list or the NORTHCOM integrated priority list. And if there is a requirement that is in there 

that talks to, for example, the East Coast missile site that, to me, 

is a requirement. 

And we can go back to those lists and we can trace things that 

we are building, systems that we are providing, to those requirements in the capabilities list. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that our debate 

continues to be on the issue of threat and timing and money. Because I think anybody who has had any of the classified briefings 

on this know that the threat is there, the timing is now, and the 

dollars need to be placed there by this Congress. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. And just for the record, I 

know I have had this conversation with both General Mann and 

Admiral Syring in private, but I very much support directed energy 
18 

and I support what Mr. Garamendi was talking about a little while 

ago. And if, in fact, it is just a matter of y’all needing some more 

money, I hope you will let us know. Because we may not be able 

to get you to find it, but we will figure out a way to find it. Because 

I think that is the future, and I would like to see us be aggressive 

in pursuing that technology. 

Oh, Mr. Brooks. He came back. I am sorry. The chair now recognizes Mr. Brooks for any questions he may have. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Syring, on virtually all major missile defense and strategic missile programs, such as PAC–3, Aegis, THAAD, and Minuteman, testing is typically conducted multiple times a year to ensure ongoing reliability and operational readiness. However, since 

the inception of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program, 

testing occurs sometimes less than once a year. And, unfortunately, 

testing seems to be driven more from problems that arise instead 

of catching issues that could be caught long before they arise if a 

more robust testing program was in place. 

Do you agree that the more testing we do on a more frequent 

basis would help the GMD system? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BROOKS. Why? 

Admiral SYRING. Testing is the ultimate graduation exercise to 

the systems that we are fielding. And ground-based testing is necessary, but not sufficient. Ideally, sir, you are absolutely right. 

That we want to be, you know, out in front and testing the new 

capabilities, new reliability improvements that are added to graduate them to the fleet. And that is where we want to be on an annual basis, at a minimum. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, what is holding us back from conducting a 

more robust testing program? 

Admiral SYRING. Technical issues on the new interceptors was 

the biggest reason for the delay. And you know when I came in as 

the director my priority was to go back and get a CE–I interceptor 

flight-tested as soon as possible, and we did that. 

Mr. BROOKS. Is funding an issue with respect to those technical 

issues? 

Admiral SYRING. Funding is always an issue, and we are always 

prioritized. But I can assure you that we didn’t go any slower because of funding to resolve the technical issues. 

Mr. BROOKS. All right, thank you. 

General Mann, please switch hats for a moment to your hat as 

commander of space—excuse me, Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command. Why is the Conventional Prompt Global Strike capability important? 

General MANN. Congressman, that capability provides us the 

ability to strike anywhere in the world in under an hour. And don’t 

necessarily need to have a forward-deployed element that is out 

there to be able to do that. It also allows us to address time-sensitive targets or targets that are fleeting. I would say it also provides a capability if we were to enter anti-access or area-denial environment, where the lodgment or the forward operating bases may 

be contested. So it does provide a capability to be able to address 

some of those issues. 
19 

Mr. BROOKS. I have been informed the Navy is evaluating the 

basing of such capabilities on submarines. Do you support that 

view? 

General MANN. Congressman, I know that, you know, the Navy 

is looking at this technology. What I can tell you is, my command, 

as you know, very, very proud of the efforts of the folks there in 

Redstone as well as Sandia Labs on our successful test that took 

place back in November 2011. And we are encouraged, we are on 

track to execute the August test. 

And then from there, you know, we will take direction from OSD 

[Office of the Secretary of Defense] as to where they want to go. 

I do know that the Navy is looking at this. They are looking at it 

in terms of the size configurations and how it could possibly be 

placed on different platforms. 

Mr. BROOKS. And this is a question for any of you. How much 

does America spend on Ground-based Midcourse Defense? 

Admiral SYRING. We have spent—and, Mr. Chairman, if I can 

just check this for the record—$24 billion to date, $30 billion by 

2019. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 101.] 

Mr. BROOKS. How about in the last fiscal year how much was 

spent? Do you know offhand? 

Admiral SYRING. In fiscal year 2014 it was roughly a billion dollars. With all of the homeland defense improvements in this year 

budget we are at $1.3 billion. 

Mr. BROOKS. The reason I mention that is that there was some 

discourse about BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment]. And certainly, to the extent BRAC can be more efficient, that is something 

Congress ought to consider. But at the same time, it seems like 

that is a drop in the bucket when you look at $750 billion a year 

that this government is spending on means-tested welfare or 

wealth transfer programs. 

And I would submit that is a place that perhaps we need to be 

looking at in order to help prevent the degradation of our national 

security capabilities. Or perhaps look at the $40 billion to $50 billion a year we spend giving away to foreign entities money, again, 

that we have to borrow that we can’t pay back to give it away. And 

so as we are looking at BRAC, I would hope that the members of 

this committee and the Members of Congress generally would also 

look at all these much more glaring expenses that, at least to me, 

are a lesser priority than funding our national security. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. And I am impressed, Admiral Syring, that you remember those numbers, those spending 

numbers. That was pretty good. 

I only have one question left, and that is for Ms. Bunn. As you 

know, this committee, in its report to accompany the fiscal year 

2014 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] directed DOD 

and the Department of State to provide the full report on its dealings with Russia on the U.S. missile defenses. We have a responsibility to our constituents to understand what has been proposed. 

Especially when we understand, as was just confirmed, that the 
20 

Obama appointees had sought to provide Russia classified information on our missile defenses. 

I understand that the Department of Defense is offering to brief 

us, and that may be sufficient. But I see nothing about the State 

Department responding. Why is that? 

Ms. BUNN. Congressman, when—in December, when the Under 

Secretary for Policy came to brief Chairman McKeon and others, 

there was a State Department representative with him. He briefed 

them on the MDA presentations that had been used with Russia. 

We have now compiled others. As you know, you have gotten a recent letter saying perfectly willing to come and brief on those, as 

well. 

I suspect that State will be with us. And otherwise, you would 

have to ask the State Department. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay, thank you. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking member for any questions 

he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to 

yield to my friend from Texas, who has been here waiting at the 

hearing for some time, if Mr. Veasey would like to use my time. 

Mr. VEASEY. Is this the appropriate time to ask about the missile 

defense? That is what I wanted to talk about. Okay, yes. 

I wanted to ask you about requests for missile defense funding. 

How did that fare in the fiscal year 2015 budget request? 

Admiral SYRING. We were successful in the Department request- ing 7—just under $7.5 billion. 

Mr. VEASEY. Okay. Were your requests prioritized? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. VEASEY. They were. Okay. 

Admiral SYRING. And I would just add, very strongly supported 

by the Department. 

Mr. VEASEY. Okay, good. Good. Do we—and I wanted to also 

ask—and I think that either one of you can answer this particular 

question about the left-of-launch. And I wanted to know, do we 

have sufficient intelligence to inform left-of-launch options? 

General MANN. I think that is an area that I think all the combatant commanders would agree is an area that we need to continue to improve our capabilities for left-of-launch. You know, obviously this is a policy issue. But in terms of the ISR [intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance], improving our ISR abilities to be 

able to see where threat systems are at or located on the battlefield, I would say this is an area, obviously, that we can always do 

better. 

Admiral SYRING. I can just add, I think you heard, for the record, 

from General Jacoby that he would—that that is at the top of his 

priority list is increased indications and warning capability. 

Ms. BUNN. And I would add that we need a mix of capabilities 

to deal with adversary ballistic missiles. Part of that has to do with 

missile defense, and part of that has to do with other capabilities 

for strike. And the intelligence ability, the ability to find and fix 

those, is one that we—is very important. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, is recognized. 
21 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been an interesting discussion here. And Admiral Syring, I assure you the 

last thing I want to do is to keep hammering on you or put you 

in an awkward position in any way. But we have, I think, what is 

it, about 30-plus Aegis-capable ships and a test site in Hawaii. And 

we have Ashore sites coming online in Romania and Poland, I 

think it is. They are on time in 2015–2018, both of those? 

Admiral SYRING. Correct, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. And with all of these avenues to defend from, the 

fact remains that we have cut more than 90 SM–3 IBs out of the 

FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], and more than 20 in this 

year’s budget alone. And I—you know, I want you to know I understand that this is a challenge that has been forced upon you. But 

in the ways that you—in the way that you feel that you can, can 

you give us any guidance to this committee as to why these cuts 

should take place? 

And can we work together to try to maybe right this ship if we 

are under—giving less rounds than we may need, at some point, 

to justify—not only justify, but to populate these new avenues of 

these sites that are coming online? 

Admiral SYRING. Thank you, Mr. Franks. As you know—and I 

will talk to the total quantity here in just a second—as you know, 

we also requested advanced procurement in this year’s budget, 

which will set the stage for the multiyear procurement request in 

2016 through 2019. And the goal—negotiation goal, objective—is to 

get as close to 52 per year through the multiyear procurement savings, which have to be at least 10 percent, and we are hoping to 

be more like 15 to 20 percent to get the quantities back up towards 

52. 

And, sir, it was a balance of risk this year. And I explained this; 

we were late to award the 13 quantity, we just awarded the 14 

quantity. The 15 quantity will be added on. If you look at those 

three together it is 115 missiles in a period of 15 months. And 

given the other priorities in the budget, sir, that was a choice that 

was made to get the homeland defense initiative started. 

Mr. FRANKS. I don’t question your choice at all. It does underscore the need to try to head off the sequester in 2016. Let me— 

let my final question be to all of you here. Just one general comment. What do you believe you need most from us now? What is 

the most important thing that we can do to empower you to do the 

jobs that you are so capably already doing? 

General MANN. Address sequestration. Obviously, predictability 

in terms of funding. And as Admiral Syring has articulated, as far 

as priority the best use of taxpayer dollars, I would say the support 

for long-range discrimination as well as to maintain confidence in 

our GBIs that we have up there, as well as leap-ahead technologies. 

Mr. FRANKS. That is a really good answer. Okay. 

Admiral SYRING. I am comforted by your support, by the committee’s support, with our sensoring and discrimination effort that 

needed to get started to make the best use of the interceptors we 

have, sir, as we have discussed. And I just ask for that continued 

support. The second part is advanced technology and support to 
22 

continue to accelerate those efforts, some of which we can’t talk 

about here. 

But I agree with you entirely in terms of we can’t just keep 

building bigger and bigger missiles. At some point we have got to 

bring that technology along. And it has got to be disruptive. 

Mr. FRANKS. Ms. Bunn. 

Ms. BUNN. Instead of talking to hear myself talk, Congressman, 

I will just say amen and amen. 

Mr. FRANKS. That is a good answer. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin for any questions he may 

have. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

our panel for being here today. And I apologize I was not here earlier. That is the downside of this job, you have to be in five places 

at the same time all at the same time. But thank you for your testimony. And I know that was a pretty robust discussion on directed 

energy so I won’t delve back into that area. 

But I would like to ask a question with respect to acquisitions 

and procurement. So in May 2013 GAO had concluded that despite 

some progress, and I quote: ‘‘MDA has undertaken and continues 

to undertake highly concurrent acquisitions. While some concurrency is understandable, committing to product development before requirements are understood and technologies are mature, or 

committing to production and fielding for development is complete, 

is a high-risk strategy that often results in performance shortfalls, 

unexpected cost increases, schedule delays and test problems. It 

can also create pressure to keep producing to avoid work stoppages,’’ end quote. 

So previous EKV development and deployment have been 

rushed, with deployment preceding operationally realistic testing. 

How will MDA reduce acquisition risk for the development of the 

new common kill vehicle [CKV]? 

Admiral SYRING. First, Congressman, good to see you, sir. We 

agree with the GAO’s assertion on concurrency. And we have taken 

action to rectify that within the Missile Defense Agency, where 

every program today is required to address concurrency in the execution briefs that I receive quarterly. In terms of what areas of concurrency do you have, how are you managing them, what risks do 

you have and what are you going to do to decouple efforts, if 

required. 

You can’t ever manage in a zero concurrent nature in a program 

that is unaffordable and will never deliver. It is a matter of managing that concurrency and understanding it. Specifically to your 

question on the EKV–CKV, I can assure you—I have told people 

this—we have one chance to get it right. And circumventing the 

system engineering, design cycle, prototype testing, and qualification will not happen. There is a very rigorous process that is followed for properly engineered missile systems. 

I have got a lot of experience with the Aegis development and the 

Standard Missile, in particular, that history of following that process. And I assure you that it will be followed in the EKV development. 
23 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral, I appreciate those assurances. I know the committee’s going to want to continue to follow 

this closely. So thank you for your work in that. 

I will ask one question, I think, that hasn’t been asked on directed energy in this respect to requiring collaboration with partners. Are there opportunities for collaboration with partner nations 

in directed-energy research? And if so, can you outline what those 

are, both current and future? 

Admiral SYRING. Currently, none. There are opportunities which, 

as we flush those out over the next few months to a year, we will 

get back to you on. But there are several opportunities abroad that 

we are thinking through. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay, very good. Thank you all for the work you 

are doing. I am going to stop there. I will yield back the balance 

of my time, and I appreciate you all being here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Huntsville, Alabama, 

Mr. Brooks, for any additional questions he may have. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Bunn, do you know why Dr. Miller, the previous Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, sought approval to release MDA’s velocity at burnout information to Russia? 

Ms. BUNN. Sir, what Dr. Miller asked for was an assessment of 

the risk of doing so. They provided that—MDA provided that analysis, and it was not released. 

Mr. BROOKS. Why did he seek that assessment? 

Ms. BUNN. It was part of the efforts that have gone for several 

administrations to convince the Russians that our missile defense 

capabilities in Europe don’t pose a threat to their strategic deterrent. The talks, where we keep saying we are not going to accept 

limits, the Russians keep seeking limits. We were looking for other 

ways to address this without seeking limits. So that was the reason. 

Mr. BROOKS. Do you support such a release of MDA’s velocity at 

burnout information to Russia or any other potential foe of the 

United States of America? 

Ms. BUNN. Given the risk assessment that MDA did, I would not. 

Mr. BROOKS. And Admiral Syring, did you approve a release of 

the velocity at burnout data at any point in time? 

Admiral SYRING. No, sir. 

Mr. BROOKS. And was that a part of the assessment that Ms. 

Bunn has just finished testifying to? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BROOKS. And why would a foe of the United States of America find that velocity at burnout information of value? 

Admiral SYRING. Let me try to answer that unclassified. And if 

I need to go classified, I would ask that I come see you about that. 

It gets to methods and means of employment that could be derived 

from such equations. 

Mr. BROOKS. And this would be a question for any of the three 

of you that wish to answer. Do you have a judgment as to whether 

the release of velocity at burnout information, in any way, shape 
24 

or form, has the potential to undermine America’s national security 

capabilities, in particular with respect to missile defense? 

Admiral SYRING. In my view, yes, and the uncertainty of where 

that information would go. And, my firm recommendation not to release it. 

Mr. BROOKS. General Mann, do you have an opinion? 

General MANN. I agree. 

Mr. BROOKS. And Ms. Bunn? 

Ms. BUNN. As I said, given the risk assessment that MDA produced, I would not favor releasing that. 

Mr. BROOKS. All right, thank you. 

Ms. BUNN. Same—— 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Garamendi, for a second round of questions if he has any. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You are going to be doing another test firing, Admiral. If it 

doesn’t work, what is plan B? 

Admiral SYRING. If it doesn’t work, it could fail for many different reasons. And we will go through that as we do with every 

failure. An analysis of what failed and why it failed. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So plan B is to continue to pursue the current 

technology. 

Admiral SYRING. The success or failure of this test this summer, 

as I have talked to you, sir, about is in no way going to change my 

decision or recommendation to pursue the redesigned EKV. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. There was a question raised earlier about 

this new missile defense site somewhere on the East Coast. And I 

thought I heard one, or maybe two of you—Ms. Bunn and maybe 

Admiral—or General, I am not sure which of the three of you, say 

that the current array of missiles provide adequate protection from 

the present and known threats from Iran and North Korea. Is that 

correct? 

General MANN. Yes, Congressman. It does provide a limited defense against threats emanating from North Korea and Iran. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Now you used a qualifying word there, so let’s 

go at that word ‘‘limited.’’ What do you mean by that? 

General MANN. Excuse me. Given their current capability, it does 

provide the protection. But we all know that these countries are 

continuing to increase their arsenal and their technology. And 

down the road, they might reach a point in terms of numbers, just 

the numbers of missiles that they could employ that it could overwhelm the system. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. 

General MANN. Down the road. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So now the solution there might be to increase 

the number of missiles in Vandenberg and Alaska? Or to have a 

new missile defense site? 

General MANN. Or it could be to also continue to increase the reliability and the effectiveness of the current fleet, too. And that 

would also have an operational employment aspect to it. And that 

is the reason why we support the Missile Defense Agency’s current 
25 

approach in terms of increasing the effectiveness and the efficiency 

of the current systems, as well as looking ahead. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So there are multiple ways of going at this problem of increased capability by Iran and North Korea and, I suppose, somebody else out there that might come along. And that 

might be to make a better kill system. One that is more accurate, 

more agile. And increase the number of missiles at the present site. 

It seems to me the system that you have set up—correct me if I 

am wrong, now—is one in which you want to first make sure you 

know what is going on. 

And this is the increased capacity of the radar systems. That 

that is the high priority. Get that done so you know what is coming 

in. Secondly, develop a missile that actually will work, that has 

multiple capabilities. And then make a decision about adding to the 

existing number of missiles and, possibly, an additional missile 

site. Is that the track you are on? 

General MANN. I would add to that, Congressman. I would add 

to that. I think also it gets back to—and I think some of the—I 

think General Jacoby also highlighted the importance of making 

sure, in terms of indications and warning, that we continue to work 

on our ability to locate threat systems. I think that is really the 

first step. To make sure that, number one, we are able to identify 

those threat platforms that are out there. 

And, in addition to increasing our sensor, our ability to discriminate, to be able to find the target within a threat complex. And 

then to be able to utilize the GBIs now, and in the future, in the 

most efficient means possible. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And that is the track that is in the current 

budget. 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. With the exception of directed energy. 

Admiral SYRING. There are aspects of directed energy that we 

need to spend some time with in a classified forum so I can complete—give you the complete picture. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I will yield back my time. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking member for any questions 

he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. I thank the chair. I just wanted to thank the witnesses not only for their testimony, but for their hard work every 

day in defending America. I think the most important single word 

that was uttered in this hearing was uttered by General Mann in 

response to, I think, Mr. Franks’ question of what we could do to 

help you do your work better. 

And basically, you said sequestration. Get rid of sequestration. 

So I hope the committee heard that testimony, and I hope this committee will act to eliminate sequestration. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Any other questions from any members? Okay, I hear none. And 

I completely echo the ranking member’s statement. I have made it 

clear to the chairman of the full committee and to our House leadership that it is my number one priority to see sequestration, defense sequestration in particular, rolled back and eliminated. I 
26 

think it is going to do great damage to this country. So, hopefully, 

we will be successful. But I can assure you it is a top priority of 

mine over the next year so—while we navigate these waters. 

But thank you all again for your time and your expertise and 

your service to our country. And with that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:51 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 25, 2014 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 25, 2014 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS 

Admiral SYRING. In fiscal year (FY) 2015, the Department of Defense is requesting $1.003 billion (B) for Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation activities, and $146 million for GMD operations and 

maintenance for a total of $1.149B in FY 2015. Over the Future Years Defense Program, when GMD procurement, the Sea-based X-Band Band Radar, and the planned 

procurement of the long-range discrimination radar are included the total budget 

from FY2015 to 2019 is $7.048B. [See page 19.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 25, 2014 

(105) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. Have you been briefed on Russia’s missile defense capabilities? Do 

you believe Russia intends for them be used against U.S. missiles? 

General MANN. I am familiar with intelligence assessments of Russia’s missile defense capabilities. Russia’s missile defense capabilities consist of both fixed and mobile systems. Current fixed ballistic missile defense systems are designed to counter 

an intercontinental ballistic missile force and would be employed to defend major 

population centers around Moscow. Russia also maintains a mobile ballistic missile 

force designed to defend against shorter range tactical ballistic missile systems. 

Just as ballistic missile defense is an integral part of U.S. military strategy, I believe that Russia maintains ballistic missile defensive capabilities for similar reasons. When under the threat of a ballistic missile attack by any nation, including 

the United States, Russia must be expected to employ its defensive capabilities to 

protect its interests. 

Mr. ROGERS. What would you worry about if Turkey acquired a Chinese missile 

defense system? Why would you not want that system to be connected or networked 

with U.S. systems? What if the system was established as an ‘‘indigenous’’ system, 

but clearly was comprised of Chinese technology and systems? 

General MANN. The Department is committed to the deployment of Ballistic Missile Defense System assets that enhance missile defense capabilities within the European region and the NATO missile defense initiative. If Turkey acquires a Chinese missile defense system, my concern is its impact to our coalition operations and 

the compatibility between our forces. Efforts continue to ensure future interoperability of U.S. contributions to the NATO capability. However, it is the Department’s position that the Chinese missile defense system cannot be interoperable 

with NATO due to the potential risks and vulnerabilities associated with either the 

Ballistic Missile Defense System or the NATO missile defense initiative. 

Mr. ROGERS. The National Missile Defense Policy Act of 1999 requires that we 

deploy national missile defenses capable of defending the United States from ‘‘accidental or unauthorized’’ ballistic missile attack, among other attacks. Can you 

please tell me, are we protected from an accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile 

attack from a Chinese ballistic missile submarine, which, as you know, the Chinese 

are now deploying? If not, when will we? 

General MANN. It is difficult to provide a specific assessment. The Ballistic Missile 

Defense System is not designed to counter peer or near-peer ballistic missile 

threats. The level of residual capability to defend against such an incident would 

be influenced by the degree of indications and warnings, the location of the launch 

and target impact area, and the accessibility of sensors and interceptors. Upon request, further details could be provided via a classified session or paper. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please switch hats to your hat as Commander of Army Space and 

Missile Defense Command. Why is the Conventional Prompt Global Strike capability important? 

I understand the Navy is evaluating the basing of such a capability on submarines. Do you support such studies? How would SMDC remain involved during 

such consideration? 

General MANN. An operational Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) system 

would provide the National Command Authority a conventional munitions capability 

to address strategic and time sensitive targets in areas without forward deployed 

forces. I support OSD’s continued effort to develop and field a CPGS capability. Per 

OSD’s direction and guidance, I anticipate that USASMDC/ARSTRAT will continue 

to support technology development as the CPGS capability matures. 

Mr. ROGERS. Two administrations, including the current one, supported forwarddeployed missile defense sites in Poland to provide added and needed protection of 

the homeland. Those homeland defense deployments have now been cancelled. Have 

we replaced them in any way? 

What could an East Coast missile defense site provide you to defend the United 

States? 

Why is it important to continue planning for such a deployment? 

General Mann, as the warfighter, do you have an opinion? 

General MANN. As outlined by the Secretary of Defense in March 2013, steps were 

taken to bolster homeland defense. The Department is increasing capacity and capability to its homeland defense architecture with the programmed increase of 14 additional Ground-based Interceptors as well as the development of advanced kill vehicle 
106 

technology. These initiatives and Missile Defense Agency’s design and development 

of a Long Range Discrimination Radar will serve to provide an enhanced level of 

protection against a limited ballistic missile defense attack. 

While a decision to deploy a third interceptor site on the U.S. East Coast has not 

been made, an operational site would disperse inventory and increase both ground 

based interceptor capacity and battlespace, e.g., provide more decision time. While 

a third site does provide enhanced homeland defense capabilities, it is not the top 

operational priority. Improving our sensor capabilities, to include persistent discrimination and enhanced tracking of threat missiles, as well as improving the 

ground based interceptor reliability are higher ranking Warfighter priorities. 

In my opinion, it is prudent for the Missile Defense Agency to complete the environmental impact statements at the four potential U.S. interceptor sites, which will 

reduce the operational timeline in the event the Nation decides to field a third site. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are you developing missile defenses to defend the Navy, in particular our carrier battle groups, from China’s ‘‘carrier killer’’ ballistic missile 

(known as the DF–21D)? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. It appears the fiscal year 2014 budget request cuts your directed en- ergy budget to approximately $13 million. Can you tell me, is this a sufficient budget request in your opinion? Does this budget request match the potential for directed 

energy to be a game-changing missile defense technology? How much of this program’s budget request is focused on missile kill or intercept? 

Admiral SYRING. All of MDA’s budget request for directed energy is focused on 

missile kill or intercept. MDA fully supports the PB15 President’s Budget request 

for Directed Energy. Funding at the requested level is sufficient and matches the 

potential for directed energy to be a game-changing missile defense technology by 

supporting the key demonstrations for two promising directed energy technologies, 

Diode Pumped Alkali Lasers at LLNL and Fiber Combining Lasers at MIT/LL. 

We will base our PB16 budget submission on data and progress of these two demonstration programs. Both laboratories achieved record high output powers (20 kW 

for MIT/LL and 4 kW for LLNL) for their respective technologies this past year. 

Each program is now progressing towards higher power demonstrations to satisfy 

MDA’s knowledge point objectives. We are canvassing industry for both near-term 

and far-term directed energy solutions. We are requesting industry proposals under 

MDA’s Advanced Technology Initiatives Broad Agency Announcement for an airborne demonstration of a multi-kilowatt-class laser. The near-term demonstration 

will reduce risk for a full scale system capable of killing a missile. Additionally, 

there are multiple uses for this technology at lower power levels. 

Mr. ROGERS. Have you been briefed on Russia’s missile defense capabilities? Do 

you believe Russia intends for them be used against U.S. missiles? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. You stated at the hearing that the question of the advisability of the 

release to Russia of velocity-at-burnout data ‘‘gets to methods and means of employment that could be derived from such equations.’’ Please elaborate, including by 

classified response if necessary. 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I support the additional funding in the GMD program that you’ve 

requested for a new redesigned kill vehicle and new investments in discrimination. 

Absent those investments, however, the GMD system is actually being cut in your 

fiscal year 2015 budget. Why? In other words, this budget is requiring GMD to do 

much more but without an adequate topline increase. 

Admiral SYRING. Excluding discrimination improvements for Homeland Defense 

and redesigned Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, the GMD ‘‘program specific’’ FY 2015 

funding was reduced from President’s Budget (PB) 2014 to PB 2015 to provide funding for additional Homeland Defense discrimination capabilities and long-range 

radar capabilities funded in other Agency program elements which will enhance the 

capability of the GMD system. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are we making sufficient investments to pay for life-cycle maintenance and aging and reliability for this 10-year-old system, which, as you know, was 

deployed with a 20-year design life? 

Admiral SYRING. The FY 2015 budget request supports sustainment of the GMD 

program. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) acknowledges the need to look into all 

aspects of the GMD program to include life-cycle maintenance, aging and reliability 

and is prioritizing requirements and funding within available resources during the 

FY 2016 budget development process. 
107 

Mr. ROGERS. What investments do we need to make? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is for official use only, and is retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. The missile defense budget request includes $175 million to conclude 

the Iron Dome agreement with Israel. I also understand the Israelis are requesting 

a $176 million plus-up for Iron Dome for fiscal year 2015. Do you support this plusup? 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) supports the President’s fis- cal year 2015 budget request of $176 million. We believe the Israeli request for additional funds is premature. 

Since contracts for the production and U.S. co-production for Iron Dome are 

awarded by Israel, MDA has no privity of contract associated with U.S. co-production of Iron Dome components. However, MDA is aware that no co-production contracts between U.S. and Israeli industry have been awarded. Therefore, there is 

nothing to substantiate the Israeli claim of a higher U.S. industry production cost 

and higher non-recurring engineering costs. 

U.S. and Israeli industry are finalizing a teaming agreement covering co-production of Iron Dome components. MDA understands that this agreement will contain 

language that indicates U.S. industry costs will not exceed Israeli industry costs by 

five percent on any component; otherwise procurement of that component would revert to Israeli industry. U.S. industry believes that it can demonstrate the ability 

to meet cost targets for nearly all Iron Dome components once contracts are awarded. 

Finally, the Israeli assertion that the U.S.-Israeli currency exchange rate necessitates additional funding is counter to the Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation. It is not feasible to continually adjust international agreements 

based on a fluctuating currency exchange rate. 

Mr. ROGERS. What would you worry about if Turkey acquired a Chinese missile 

defense system? Why would you not want that system to be connected or networked 

with U.S. systems? What if the system was established as an ‘‘indigenous’’ system, 

but clearly was comprised of Chinese technology and systems? 

Admiral SYRING. The possibility of Turkey acquiring a Chinese made missile defense system is a concern. In our opinion, without full technical insight, NATO will 

not likely allow the Chinese system to be connected to the NATO BMD system due 

to concerns about cyber-related issues that stem from the possibility of a Chinese 

system connecting to a NATO system. 

Even if the Turks acquire an ‘‘indigenous’’ system that is clearly comprised of Chinese technology and systems, without full technical insight, we believe that it will 

still not likely meet the strict standards that are required to be connected to the 

NATO system. 

Mr. ROGERS. The budget proposal for Fiscal Year 2015 includes a proposal that 

MDA assume responsibility as the technical authority for Integrated Air and Missile 

Defense programs. Can you please describe how this will occur and why it was necessary, from your perspective? 

Can you please, with this technical authority, provide your views on the utility 

of the Air Force’s 3DELRR system and whether other planned service systems can 

perform this mission? 

Admiral SYRING. On October 1, 2013, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) was assigned responsibility as the single technical authority for integrated air and missile 

defense (IAMD). We will leverage the MDA system engineering process as described 

in BMDS Systems Engineering Plan. We will lead and manage engineering activities in collaboration with the Services in a Joint Systems Engineering Team chaired 

by MDA. This team will provide recommended technical requirements for inclusion 

in the IAMD technical baseline which includes related specifications and interface 

control documentation. The Services will continue to maintain configuration control 

over their Service-specific baselines and will ensure that those baselines reflect requirements defined by the IAMD technical authority. 

The Department of Defense has been developing air and missile defense capabilities for more than two decades; however, the development of a joint force that can 

operate in an integrated and interoperable manner has not been realized due to the 

challenges associated with the integration. A single authority for the development 

of technical requirements and coordinated development of air and missile defense 

solutions will enhance the DOD’s ability to integrate across the Military Departments. 

The Air Force’s 3DELRR system provides surveillance capability that can contribute to the future air picture and track air breathing targets. MDA’s focus to date 

has been on assessing options for integrating sensors across the Services by using 

Service descriptions and data for each of the sensors. 
108 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you please describe the planning and evaluation that is underway to consider whether any of the 14 GBIs that will be procured starting next year 

will be two-stage GBIs? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Your predecessor, General O’Reilly, testified in 2009 that MDA was 

going to deploy 30 GBIs and it was going to continue the production of 14 GBIs on 

contract to maintain the ability to produce additional GBIs for testing, refurbishment, future upgrades, etc. We support the Department’s decision to now deploy 

those 14 GBIs in response to the North Korean threat, but what about testing, refurbishment, and future upgrades of the currently deployed systems? Is that funded 

in the FY15 budget request? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, the President’s Budget 2015 request funds testing, refurbishment, and future upgrades of the Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs). The budget 

request funds GBI component testing and refurbishing currently deployed GBIs to 

test and improve their reliability including specific upgrades to the fleet to correct 

issues identified with the FTG–06a flight test failure. It also funds a total of six 

GBI intercept flight tests from fiscal years (FY) 2015–2019, maintaining a test cadence of at least one flight test per year of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 

system. We have also requested $99.5 million in FY 2015 to redesign and improve the GBI 

exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV). The redesigned EKV will be built with a modular, open architecture and designed with common interfaces and standards, making upgrades easier and broadening our vendor and supplier base. The new EKVs 

will improve reliability and be more producible, testable, reliable, and cost-effective 

and eventually will replace the kill vehicle on our current GBI fleet. We are currently assessing concepts, acquisition options, and timelines to test and field the redesigned EKV. Our goal is to begin flight testing the redesigned EKV in FY 2018. 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you please shed light on whether MDA is still considering multiyear procurement or other efficient procurement processes and authorities for procuring these GBIs? How much money could be saved from such procurement approaches? 

Admiral SYRING. Given the status of the GBI flight test program, I believe multiyear procurement authority is premature at this time. The Missile Defense Agency’s 

(MDA) President’s Budget 2015 request includes $150 million beginning in fiscal 

year (FY) 2016 for the procurement of Ground Based Interceptors (GBI). We are 

evaluating various procurement approaches that could potentially result in substantial savings over the Future Year’s Defense Program; however, it is too early for us 

to identify potential cost savings. 

Mr. ROGERS. The National Missile Defense Policy Act of 1999 requires that we 

deploy national missile defenses capable of defending the United States from ‘‘accidental or unauthorized’’ ballistic missile attack, among other attacks. Can you 

please tell me, are we protected from an accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile 

attack from a Chinese ballistic missile submarine, which, as you know, the Chinese 

are now deploying? If not, when will we? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I am concerned by Russia’s behavior threatening our allies, including 

the illegal invasion of Ukraine and its violation of the INF treaty. Are you? 

Admiral Syring, can you tell me, what is the organic capability of Aegis Ashore 

to detect cruise missiles? What would the capability be if we deployed SM–2s and 

SM–6s at those sites in addition to SM–3s? 

Admiral Syring, you stated at the hearing that the Aegis Ashore system is not 

currently configured for cruise missile defense and that the functional difference is, 

‘‘essentially, the software, with a minor hardware addition.’’ Please provide the following: 

1. A detailed explanation of those software and hardware additions and costs 

and schedules to make those changes if directed to do so. 

2. Coverage charts showing cruise missile defense of Europe from Aegis Ashore 

sites so configured. 

3. Coverage charts showing that coverage along with coverage Aegis BMD ships 

at projected operating areas in Europe. 

4. Coverage charts showing cruise missile defense coverage from Aegis BMD 

ships deployed in Asia at their normal operating areas. 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. This is a painfully tight budget environment and I appreciate you’ve 

done the best you could with what you were given. Can you please tell me, if you 
109 

had an extra dollar, would you look at the deployment of an East Coast radar to 

aid in the defense of the homeland from the Iranian ballistic missile threat? 

What investments will be required to use Cobra Judy to add to the missile defense sensor coverage of the United States along the East Coast? 

Same question but to SBX. 

Admiral SYRING. The deployment of an East Coast radar would provide for a more 

robust defensive capability. The specific benefits of a large X-band radar located on 

the East Coast are attached. The benefits are based on analysis presented in a 2012 

briefing to the House Armed Services Committee. Because of threat developments 

and the results of ongoing studies, an East Coast radar may be part of our future 

sensor architecture requirements. 

The Missile Defense Agency is updating the 2012 analysis for a new report required by Section 235 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2014. The new report will address sensor capabilities, including relocatable landand sea-based capabilities. We will provide an updated response upon completion of 

the report. Cobra Judy is no longer available for integration into the Ballistic Missile Defense System. The Navy removed the vessel from service and it is being sold 

for scrap. The costs for relocating the Sea Based X-band radar (SBX) to the East 

Coast follows: • Assume SBX returns to full operation (i.e., no longer in Limited test support 

status) • Include $17.1 million (M) in fiscal year (FY) 2015 to move SBX by heavy transport vessel • Include an off-shore support vessel ($30M/year). Resupply would be conducted 

from the nearest port 

Full Operations Atlantic (Base Year 2014 $M) 

FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 Total 

135.7 141.7 146.9 125.8 112.6 135.1 797.8 

Mr. ROGERS. Two administrations, including the current one, supported forwarddeployed missile defense sites in Poland to provide added and needed protection of 

the homeland. Those homeland defense deployments have now been cancelled. Have 

we replaced them in any way? 

What could an East Coast missile defense site provide you to defend the United 

States? 

Why is it important to continue planning for such a deployment? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes. On March 15, 2013 the Secretary of Defense announced a 

series of steps the United States is taking to stay ahead of the challenge posed by 

Iran and North Korea’s development of longer-range ballistic missile capabilities. 

Specifically, the Secretary committed to shifting resources from the terminated SM– 

3 IIB program to fund the deployment of 14 additional GBIs as well as the development of advanced kill vehicle technology to improve the performance of future GBIs. 

These steps enable added protection against missiles from Iran while also providing 

additional protection against the North Korean threat. 

There has been no decision made to pursue a potential future Continental United 

States (CONUS) interceptor site (CIS). However, such a site would provide increased battlespace and capacity but it would come with significant materiel and 

service support costs. 

The Department is preparing a CIS contingency plan and conducting an Environmental Impact Statement in accordance with section 227 of the Fiscal Year 2013 

National Defense Authorization Act. Preparation of an EIS and contingency plan 

would reduce the time required to field a CIS, should a decision be made to do so. 

Mr. ROGERS. From a policy perspective, can you please help me understand why 

we deploy missile defenses to protect our aircraft carriers from Chinese ballistic 

missiles but we do not deploy missile defenses to protect our cities from Chinese 

nuclear missiles? 

Ms. BUNN. We have the capability to protect our aircraft carriers from ballistic 

missiles in order to ensure freedom of action and the ability to project power around 

the globe to protect U.S. interests. 

The DOD is committed to ensuring defense of the U.S. homeland against limited 

long-range missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. With regard to China and Russia, our homeland missile defenses are not designed to 

counter their advanced long-range missile capabilities because defending against the 

quantity and quality of their ICBMs would be technologically impractical and cost 
110 

prohibitive. We remain confident that Chinese and Russian ballistic missile attacks 

on the U.S. homeland are deterred by other means. Despite not being capable of 

coping with large-scale Chinese or Russian missile attacks, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system would be employed to defend the United States 

against limited missile launches from any source. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why does Russia deploy missile defense? Why does it have a nuclear-armed missile defense? Have you been briefed on Russia’s missile defense 

modernization plans? Does Russia design its missile defense systems with U.S. nuclear forces in mind? Is Russia deterred from building more advanced missile defenses out of a concern for upsetting the ‘‘strategic balance’’ between the U.S. and 

Russia? 

Ms. BUNN. Russia has long deployed missile defenses around Moscow; we presume 

it is to protect Russian leadership from U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles. My 

understanding is that Russians view the Russian system as not upsetting the strategic balance because it complies with the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 

even after the United States withdrew from the Treaty. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is it important Poland buy an interoperable NATO system as it considers such a procurement for its air and missile defense tender? Do you agree that 

the procurement of U.S. systems offer Poland an opportunity to obtain state-of-theart technology and to strengthen bilateral relations? 

Ms. BUNN. It is important that the missile defense system Poland procures be 

interoperable with the NATO ballistic missile defense system. 

While we would naturally prefer that Poland procure a U.S. system, the United 

States recognizes Poland’s right to purchase whatever missile defense system it 

chooses to purchase. If they choose to procure a U.S. system, doing so would provide 

Poland the best state-of-the art missile defense capability, would strengthen our bilateral relationship, and would ease integration with U.S. national systems and the 

NATO BMD architecture. 

Mr. ROGERS. What would you worry about if Turkey acquired a Chinese missile 

defense system? Why would you not want that system to be connected or networked 

with U.S. systems? What if the system was established as an ‘‘indigenous’’ system, 

but clearly was comprised of Chinese technology and systems? 

Ms. BUNN. The possibility of Turkey acquiring a Chinese-made missile defense 

system is a concern. Without full technical insight, NATO will not likely allow the 

Chinese system to be connected to the NATO ballistic missile defense system due 

to cyber-related concerns. 

Even if Turkey acquires an ‘‘indigenous’’ system that is largely composed of Chinese technology and systems, without full technical insight, we believe that it would 

still not likely meet the strict standards that must be met before any missile defense 

system could be connected to the NATO system. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Commander of Northern Command has outlined a series of tests 

and experiments of a homeland cruise missile defense. Do you support this initiative? What countries are the principal threats? 

Do you agree with the Commander that Russian cruise missiles pose a rising 

threat? 

Why is it that we deploy defenses against Russian cruise missiles, which may be 

nuclear-capable, but not Russian ballistic missiles? 

Ms. BUNN. Yes, I support those initiatives by the Commander of USNORTHCOM. 

I am happy to discuss this further in a classified setting. 

The ballistic missile defenses deployed for the protection of the U.S. homeland are 

designed to counter a ballistic missile attack from states such as North Korea and 

Iran. Development and fielding of a system to address the numbers and sophistication of Russian and Chinese long-range ballistic missiles would be technically impractical and prohibitively expensive. 

Mr. ROGERS. According to the GAO, ‘‘although the dates MDA plans to declare 

technical capability for EPAA have not changed, the capability to be delivered and 

the understanding of its performance is more limited than initially planned.’’ Ms. 

Bunn, please explain what is going on here. Can you please provide the committee 

this week the detailed technical requirements for the EPAA? 

Ms. BUNN. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is intended to protect U.S. forces and NATO European populations and territory from ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East. 

The first EPAA phase became operational in 2011. The next two phases remain 

on schedule with supplemental upgrades to be delivered as they are developed, tested, and deployed. That means there will be an operational missile defense site in 

Romania in 2015 and another site in Poland in the 2018 timeframe, along with the 

deployment of more capable versions of the Standard Missile-3 interceptor. 
111 

Planned evolutionary upgrades for elements of the ballistic missile defense system 

are typical for any deployed system, and delivery of upgrades will not negatively affect the ability of each element to remain fully operational. 

I defer to Admiral Syring for the detailed technical requirements for U.S. missile 

defense capabilities in Europe. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is the Administration considering a NATO common pool of SM–3 

interceptors should the European Allies upgrade their ships with the SM–3 capable 

launchers and radars? 

Ms. BUNN. The Administration is open to all options that could enhance European 

missile defense. Discussions about the creation of a Standard Missile (SM)-3 interceptor pool have taken place at NATO. The United States has encouraged Allies to 

make contributions to NATO missile defense and would welcome Allied contributions to a common interceptor pool. To date, no NATO European country possesses 

surface combatants capable of firing SM–3 interceptors, and no NATO European 

country has announced plans to modify its ships to do so. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. After three back-to-back flight intercept tests (two CE–II and one 

CE–I failures), are you confident we have a reliable and effective missile defense 

system? 

General MANN. Yes. Although we have experienced a series of unsuccessful tests, 

the Warfighter remains confident in our operational capability to defend against a 

limited ballistic missile attack. Our confidence is based on the successful results of 

the previous CE–I flight tests, the January 2013 non-intercept controlled flight test 

of the CE–II ground-based interceptor, the present operational employment guidelines, and the Missile Defense Agency’s ongoing testing, modifications, and failure 

review board results. 

Mr. COOPER. With North Korea and Iran developing additional capabilities, are 

we staying ahead of the threat or are we currently catching up to the threat? Can 

we reliably stay ahead of the threat? 

General MANN. The Ballistic Missile Defense System currently provides the capability to defend the homeland against a limited ballistic missile attack from either 

country. As their ballistic missile abilities mature, we must continue to enhance key 

system components, such as sensor discrimination capabilities and the reliability of 

the exoatmospheric kill vehicle, to remain ahead of the intercontinental ballistic 

missile (ICBM) threat. Predictable resources, the correct test cadence, and focusing 

on the most urgent priorities, will greatly assist in outpacing a limited ICBM threat 

to the homeland. 

Mr. COOPER. Where would you spend your next dollar? 

General MANN. Improving our sensor capabilities is the Warfighter’s highest Ballistic Missile Defense System priority. Persistent sensor discrimination and enhanced tracking capabilities will provide immediate qualitative improvements for 

countering ballistic missile defense threats. The next Warfighter priority is increasing ground-based interceptor reliability by redesigning the exoatmospheric kill vehicle. 

Mr. COOPER. Please explain the rationale for focusing on midcourse defense, rather than boost-phase missile defense? 

General MANN. The Missile Defense Agency developed and deployed mid-course 

systems because the technology was more mature than boost-phase systems and 

provided the Warfighter earlier capabilities to counter a limited ballistic missile 

threat. The effectiveness of boost-phase systems is currently limited by intelligence 

challenges and exacerbated by the short reaction time required to counter the threat 

missile. Presently, mid-course defense affords more time to track the threat, make 

threat assessments, perform discrimination missions, and engage the target than 

that of a boost-phase defense system. The Missile Defense Agency, as well as each 

Service, continues to pursue and develop technologies, such as high energy lasers, 

that have potential for future boost-phase applications. 

Mr. COOPER. Why is it in U.S. interests for the EPAA to be a U.S. contribution 

to NATO? What would be the impact for U.S. and NATO security if a NATO country 

suffered a missile attack from Iran? 

General MANN. The United States is committed to common defense through Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides that an attack on one is an attack 

on all. The United States is contributing the European Phased Adaptive Approach 

(EPAA) to missile defense not only to protect Allied cities, but also to protect deployed U.S. military personnel and U.S. citizens abroad. 
112 

Mr. COOPER. How did your requests for missile defense funding fare in the FY15 

budget request? Were your requests prioritized? 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) President’s Budget (PB) 

2015 requests were prioritized and well-received. Our PB 2015 submission fared 

well especially given the Department’s tight budget constraints. 

Mr. COOPER. After three back-to-back flight intercept tests (two CE–II and one 

CE–I failures), are you confident we have a reliable and effective missile defense 

system? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, I am confident that we have a reliable and effective missile 

defense system. Based on our analysis of the data from the successful January 2013 

non-intercept controlled flight test of the CE–II GBI (CTV–01), we plan to conduct 

FTG–06b, an intercept flight test, this summer. CTV–01 demonstrated the successful dampening of the vibration environments that affected the navigation system 

and resulted in the failure of the FTG–06a mission conducted in December 2010. 

FTG–06b will demonstrate the ability of the CE–II EKV to discriminate and intercept a lethal object from a representative ICBM target scene. The FTG–07 failure 

investigation is nearly complete. Once the investigation is concluded, we will take 

steps to make any fixes to the fleet that need to be made for both the CE–I and 

CE–II EKVs. 

Mr. COOPER. Will you commit to neither deploy nor procure additional groundbased interceptors (GBIs) until we have a successful flight intercept test? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes. I strongly support fly-before-you-buy acquisition. The Missile Defense Agency plans to conduct a successful intercept flight test of each GBI 

configuration before procuring or deploying such a configuration. 

Mr. COOPER. With North Korea and Iran developing additional capabilities, are 

we staying ahead of the threat or are we currently catching up to the threat? Can 

we reliably stay ahead of the threat? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. COOPER. Where would you spend your next dollar? 

Admiral SYRING. I support the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2015. The 

present BMDS design and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) represent a performance plateau that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) investment strategy for EKV 

is formulated to overcome. The MDA investment goals reduce the cost of kill vehicle 

(KV) production; improve reliability, capacity, and capability at all inventory levels; 

forestall obsolescence against the evolving threat; and maximize common standards 

and technology across all future interceptor programs. 

The MDA systems engineering process is based on allocating integrated BMDS requirements that balance capability and feasibility across weapons, sensors, and 

Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications. Consistent with this 

process and our strategy for improving the robustness of our Homeland defense capability, the MDA will engineer and allocate integrated system requirements that 

will drive balanced and integrated BMDS development activities for improved discrimination and sensor capabilities. These activities executed in parallel include development of the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), improved discrimination algorithms and fire control, air and space Electro Optical/Infrared capabilities, 

and the Next Generation Kill Vehicle. 

Mr. COOPER. What are the highest priority improvements being sought in the redesigned EKV? 

Admiral SYRING. The priority for the redesigned exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) 

is to improve reliability and be more producible, testable, reliable, and cost-effective 

in order to eventually replace the kill vehicle on our current Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) fleet. The redesigned EKV will be built with a modular, open architecture, designed with common interfaces and standards, making upgrades easier and 

broadening our vendor and supplier base. We are currently assessing concepts, acquisition options, and timelines to test and field the redesigned EKV. Our goal is 

to begin flight testing the redesigned EKV in fiscal year (FY) 2018. 

Mr. COOPER. Is there a boost motor production gap? What is the acquisition strategy for the 14 additional boosters for test and stockpile reliability starting in 2018? 

And would accelerating production of boosters before confirming the new CBAU 

booster works add to the existing acquisition risks, and would it even be needed to 

avoid any potential production break? 

Admiral SYRING. No production gap is projected. In addition to the planned 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) booster motor buys, the Missile Defense 

Agency (MDA) Targets Program has also started to procure similar configurations 

of these same motors as a reliable launch vehicle for their varied target requirements. 
113 

For the additional 14 interceptors, acquisition strategies are under consideration. 

The MDA will propose an acquisition strategy this summer for the additional 

Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs). 

The Consolidated Booster Avionics Upgrade (CBAU) obsolescence and reliability 

upgrade effort is primarily focused on the avionics portion of the boost vehicle. The 

rocket motors themselves are not part of the boost vehicle CBAU, their acceleration 

(or even their slowdown) would not increase acquisition risks. Accelerating booster 

production for the additional 14 GBIs is not necessary to fill a production gap but 

would have the potential to unnecessarily ‘‘age’’ the booster motors and increase 

storage costs. 

Mr. COOPER. Please explain the rationale for focusing on midcourse defense, rather than boost-phase missile defense? 

Admiral SYRING. The Ballistic Missile Defense Elements that intercept in the midcourse phase were more mature and ready for testing, production, and deployment 

than boost-phase systems. The Missile Defense Agency has taken the approach of 

identifying and developing new technologies which could scale up from laboratory 

experiments; and design concepts which, if successfully demonstrated, could make 

future directed energy and kinetic energy boost phase intercept concepts both feasible and affordable. The MDA’s President’s Budget (PB) 2015 request continues 

this approach with significant funding allocated for unclassified and classified programs that have potential for boost phase applications in the future. 

Mr. COOPER. Do we need to develop 2-stage interceptors earlier rather than later? 

Why/why not? 

Admiral SYRING. No. Employing 2-stage ground based interceptors (GBI) is under 

consideration as part of the Department of Defense (DOD) directed Homeland Defense Analysis of Alternatives (HLD AoA). The HLD AoA is directed by the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Programs Evaluation. Combatant 

Commands and the Joint Staff are participating. After completion of the HLD AoA 

in late 2014, senior leaders will review the alternatives. Development and employment of 2-stage GBIs are scheduled for flight testing in FY 2019 and FY 2020. This 

is consistent with the current Missile Defense Agency Integrated Master Test Plan. 

Mr. COOPER. Why is it in U.S. interests for the EPAA to be a U.S. contribution 

to NATO? What would be the impact be for U.S. and NATO security if a NATO 

country suffered a missile attack from Iran? 

Admiral SYRING. The U.S. European Phase Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is needed 

to defend against the Iranian ballistic missile threat (capable of striking deployed 

forces, allies, and partners in Europe). Moreover, EPAA has been recognized as the 

U.S. contribution to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ballistic missile defense at the Lisbon (2010) and Chicago (2012) Summits. I defer U.S.-NATO security 

issues to OSD Policy. 

Mr. COOPER. After three back-to-back flight intercept tests (two CE–II and one 

CE–I failures), are you confident we have a reliable and effective missile defense 

system? 

Ms. BUNN. As a policy official who is often briefed by those who develop and operate the system, I am confident that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system 

can defend the United States against a limited intercontinental ballistic missile attack. 

Mr. COOPER. Will you commit to neither deploy nor procure additional groundbased interceptors (GBIs) until we have a successful flight intercept test? 

Ms. BUNN. Yes; in keeping with the Administration’s policy priority to ensure that 

new capabilities undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic operational 

conditions before they are deployed, I will not recommend the procurement or deployment of additional interceptors until there is a successful intercept test. 

Mr. COOPER. With North Korea and Iran developing additional capabilities, are 

we staying ahead of the threat or are we currently catching up to the threat? Can 

we reliably stay ahead of the threat? 

Ms. BUNN. To date, neither North Korea nor Iran has demonstrated the capability 

to target the United States successfully with a long-range missile delivery system; 

however, North Korea’s successful Taepo Dong-2 space launch in December 2012 

and Iran’s repeated space launch attempts demonstrate a commitment by both regimes to continue their pursuit of such a capability. The decisions announced by 

Secretary Hagel in March 2013 related to DOD’s planned improvements to the 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system as well as the other initiatives reflected in the President’s Fiscal Year 2015 budget would help to ensure our ability 

to maintain our advantageous position relative to the North Korean and Iranian 

long-range missile threats to the homeland. DOD assesses the state of the North 

Korean and Iranian missile programs continually and, as a matter of policy, remains committed to staying ahead of the threat posed by these programs. 
114 

Mr. COOPER. Where would you spend your next dollar? 

Ms. BUNN. My highest missile defense priority is ensuring the effectiveness and 

reliability of our homeland missile defenses. To that end, my next dollar of missile 

defense spending would be focused on addressing the reliability issues associated 

with the interceptor kill vehicle, and improving our sensors and discrimination capability. 

Mr. COOPER. Please explain the rationale for focusing on midcourse defense, rather than boost-phase missile defense? 

Ms. BUNN. The United States is pursuing technologies that would address or mitigate most phases of ballistic missile flight. In addition, we are also looking at options left of launch. However, the technology and operational concepts associated 

with midcourse intercepts are the most mature. The Administration’s focus on deploying proven and cost-effective missile defenses to protect the U.S. homeland, as 

well as our deployed forces and Allies, has led to a concentration on the most mature systems that have been tested under operationally realistic conditions. 

In addition, intercepts in the midcourse phase of flight allow for missile defense 

elements to be placed farther from the adversary. This is advantageous for two reasons. First, many of the missile defense elements can be placed on U.S. or Allied 

territory where it can be more easily defended and operated on a more permanent 

basis. Second, because the midcourse phase of flight is generally longer and happens 

later than the boost phase, it allows more time to identify a ballistic missile launch, 

then to track and engage the missile effectively. 

Mr. COOPER. Why is it in U.S. interests for the EPAA to be a U.S. contribution 

to NATO? What would be the impact be for U.S. and NATO security if a NATO 

country suffered a missile attack from Iran? 

Ms. BUNN. The United States is committed to common defense through Article 5 

of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides that an attack on one is an attack on 

all. The United States is contributing the European Phased Adaptive Approach 

(EPAA) to missile defense not only to protect Allied cities, but also to protect deployed U.S. military personnel and U.S. citizens abroad. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do you need additional funds for an East Coast site contingency 

in FY15? Why/why not? 

General MANN. I support Section 227 of the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense 

Authorization Act that directs evaluation and environmental impact assessments of 

potential U.S. missile defense sites. From a Warfighter’s perspective, there is no 

need for additional funding in Fiscal Year 2015. Should a decision be made to field 

a third U.S. site, there will associated personnel and support costs. The Department 

will plan and request these necessary resources through the authorization and appropriations process. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What efforts are you pursuing to strengthen homeland missile 

defense? 

General MANN. Both the U.S. Army and the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), as a component of the U.S. Strategic Command, are continuing efforts to strengthen homeland missile defense capabilities. 

Within the Army, we provide trained and ready missile defense forces and capabilities to address today’s homeland defense requirements. These forces constantly 

rehearse threat scenarios and participate in missile defense exercises and wargames 

to ensure they maintain their high state of readiness. The Army also continues to 

pursue missile defense technologies and to provide critical testing assets. 

At JFCC IMD, we continue to collaborate across the military enterprise to increase the integration of existing capabilities in order to maximize efficiency and effectiveness to protect the homeland. Specifically, we work in partnership with U.S. 

Northern Command, the Missile Defense Agency, and the other Combatant Commands to synchronize operational-level missile defense planning, identify and address gaps and deficiencies within the system, conduct operations support and asset 

management for missile defense forces, and to integrate Joint ballistic missile defense training, exercises, and test activities. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. General Mann, the primary benefit of a potential East Coast site, 

if deployed, would be ‘‘increased battle space.’’ 

What is the primary benefit of increased battle space? Would increased battle 

space make missile defense more efficient? If so, how? Would increased battle space 

make missile defense more effective? If so, how? Is the increased battle space merely 
115 

more time to fire at incoming targets, or more time to evaluate the results of intercept attempts? 

Is the Missile Defense Agency seeking to obtain or improve its ‘‘shoot-look-shoot’’ 

capability? What are the priorities for attaining or improving this capability? ? 

Would increased battle space contribute to improving a ‘‘shoot-look-shoot’’ shot doctrine? 

What are the Missile Defense Agency’s plans for deploying the necessary sensors, 

such as an X-band radar, and discrimination scheme that are necessary for a shootlook-shoot shot doctrine against a Middle East threat? Without better sensor capabilities, what would the value of an additional site be, especially in comparison with 

improving the existing sites and interceptors? 

General MANN. A third operational missile defense site would augment and disperse present ground-based interceptor inventory and increase battlespace. The additional time provides the Warfighter increased operational flexibility to assess a 

ballistic missile event, react to unusual engagement conditions, and apply the most 

current data to the engagement. 

Increased battlespace does enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of countering 

ballistic missiles. Increasing available reaction time can lead to the optimal intercept location of a threat missile and provides additional decision time to assess the 

results. The end result of increased battlespace is more efficient and effective use 

of the ground-based interceptor inventory. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do you need additional funds for an East Coast Site contingency 

in FY15? Why/why not? 

Admiral SYRING. We support the President’s PB15 budget request. No additional 

funds are required for this activity in fiscal year (FY) 2015. The FY 2014 Department of Defense Appropriations Act provided $20 million to fund the Continental 

United States Interceptor Site study, contingency plan and Environmental Impact 

Statement. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What will a 10% increase in homeland missile defense funding 

provide? How will it help increase confidence in an effective homeland missile defense system? 

Admiral SYRING. The program of work supported by the fiscal year (FY) 2015 

President’s Budget (PB) request is sufficiently resourced to accomplish the Agency’s 

mission to defend the homeland against a limited ballistic missile attack. An additional 10 percent would be allocated to top priority areas including improving the 

exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) and improving sensor discrimination. A redesigned EKV would enhance homeland defense by improving the reliability, availability, maintainability, testability and producibility of this key component. Additional investment in sensor discrimination would enhance the ballistic missile defense architecture’s ability to discriminate and kill a reentry vehicle with a higher 

level of confidence and thereby significantly improve Warfighter shot doctrine. Both 

of these improvements are funded in the FY 2015 PB request and additional resources would be used to accelerate currently planned efforts. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What efforts are you pursuing to strengthen homeland missile 

defense? 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) President’s Budget 2015 request continues to support extensive improvements to homeland missile defense, including the following: 

• Deployment of 14 additional Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) at Ft. Greely to 

achieve 44 operational GBIs by 2017 

• Fielding a second AN/TPY–2 radar in Japan 

• Discrimination improvements for homeland defense including development and 

deployment of a long range discrimination Radar, and near-term and mid-term 

discrimination initiatives 

• Upgrade/redesign of the GBI exoatmospheric kill vehicle to improve reliability 

• Supports the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Return to Intercept program, 

identifying and correcting across the fleet the failures from the FTG–06a and 

FTG–07 flight tests 

• Continued GBI component testing and refurbishing of currently deployed GBIs 

to test and improve their reliability 

• Continued construction of the GBI In-Flight Interceptor Communication System 

(IFICS) Data Terminal (IDT) at Fort Drum, New York 

• Continued operation of the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar, and AN/TPY–2 radars 

• Continued procurement of THAAD interceptors 

• Procurement of THAAD equipment for an additional battery by 2019 

• Preparation of a contingency plan and Environmental Impact Statement for a 

potential future Continental United States Interceptor Site 
116 

• Continues missile defense upgrades of the Early Warning Radars in Clear, 

Alaska and Cape Cod, Massachusetts 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Admiral Syring, the primary benefit of a potential East Coast 

site, if deployed, would be ‘‘increased battle space.’’ 

What is the primary benefit of increased battle space? Would increased battle 

space make missile defense more efficient? If so, how? Would increased battle space 

make missile defense more effective? If so, how? Is the increased battle space merely 

more time to fire at incoming targets, or more time to evaluate the results of intercept attempts? 

Is the Missile Defense Agency seeking to obtain or improve its ‘‘shoot-look-shoot’’ 

capability? What are the priorities for attaining or improving this capability? ? 

Would increased battle space contribute to improving a ‘‘shoot-look-shoot’’ shot doctrine? 

What are the Missile Defense Agency’s plans for deploying the necessary sensors, 

such as an X-band radar, and discrimination scheme that are necessary for a shootlook-shoot shot doctrine against a Middle East threat? Without better sensor capabilities, what would the value of an additional site be, especially in comparison with 

improving the existing sites and interceptors? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do you need additional funds for an East Coast Site contingency 

in FY15? Why/why not? 

Ms. BUNN. The requested funding for site evaluation and environmental impact 

studies at the locations identified by the Missile Defense Agency is sufficient. Funding for any additional activity with regard to an additional missile field in the 

United States would be premature at this time. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What will a 10% increase in homeland missile defense funding 

provide? How will it help increase confidence in an effective homeland missile defense system? 

Ms. BUNN. The program of work supported by the fiscal year (FY) 2015 President’s Budget (PB) request is sufficiently resourced to accomplish the missile defense mission of defending the homeland against limited ballistic missile attack. An 

additional 10% would be allocated to top priority areas including improving the exoatmospheric kill vehicle (KV) and improving sensor discrimination. A redesigned 

EKV would enhance homeland defense by improving the reliability, availability, 

maintainability, testability and producibility of this key component. Additional investment in sensor discrimination would enhance the ballistic missile defense architecture’s ability to discriminate and kill a reentry vehicle with a higher level of confidence, and therefore should allow NORTHCOM to use a more efficient allocation 

of interceptors in the future. Both of these improvements are funded in the FY 2015 

PB request, and additional resources would be used to accelerate currently planned 

efforts. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What efforts are you pursuing to strengthen homeland missile 

defense? 

Ms. BUNN. We are committed to ensuring the reliability and effectiveness of the 

current Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system through testing and addressing reliability issues with the interceptor kill vehicle. 

In addition, the refurbishment of Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely, Alaska, is underway, and the budget request includes funding for the emplacement of additional 

Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs) at Fort Greely, for a total of 44 deployed interceptors by the end of 2017. 

We are also on track to deploy a second forward-based missile defense radar in 

Japan. This deployment will provide improved early warning and tracking of missiles launched from North Korea at the United States. 

The budget request includes funding for a redesigned kill vehicle that will improve the reliability and effectiveness of the GMD system. The redesigned kill vehicle will improve the reliability and performance of the GBI, and will be easier to 

build, upgrade, and maintain than the current versions. 

The President’s Fiscal Year 2015 Budget request also includes funding for development of a Long-Range Discrimination Radar. This radar would provide persistent 

sensor coverage and improve discrimination capabilities against threats to the 

United States from North Korea. 

We are conducting Environmental Impact Studies for a potential third missile site 

in the United States to field additional interceptors if required. 

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