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64–769 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 111–884 

GOVERNMENT PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO 

A TERRORIST ATTACK USING WEAPONS OF 

MASS DESTRUCTION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

AUGUST 4, 2010 

Serial No. J–111–106 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

(II) 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

BRIAN A. BENZCOWSKI, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JON KYL, Arizona 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BILL VAN HORNE, Democratic Chief Counsel 

STEPHEN HIGGINS, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, a U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland 1 

Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona .................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Baker, James A., Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC ..................................................................................... 5 

Beckham, Steward D., Director, Office of National Capital Region Coordination, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC ........................................................................... 6 

Fein, Glenn A., Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 3 

Frankel, Michael J., Executive Director, Commission to Assess the Threat 

to the U.S. from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, McLean, Virginia ..... 14 

Larsen, Randall J., Colonel, USAF (Retired), Executive Director, Commission 

on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, Washington, DC ...................................................................................... 12 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Steward D. Beckham to questions submitted by Senator Kyl ...... 20 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Baker, James A., Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC ..................................................................................... 22 

Beckham, Steward D., Director, Office of National Capital Region Coordination, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC ........................................................................... 27 

Fein, Glenn A., Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 31

Frankel, Michael J., Executive Director, Commission to Assess the Threat 

to the U.S. from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, McLean, Virginia ..... 41 

Larsen, Randall J., Colonel, USAF (Retired), Executive Director, Commission 

on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, Washington, DC ...................................................................................... 46 

(1) 

GOVERNMENT PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO A TERRORIST ATTACK USING 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 4, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in 

room SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L. 

Cardin, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Cardin and Kyl. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND 

Chairman CARDIN. Good morning, everyone. The Subcommittee 

on Terrorism and Homeland Security of the Senate Judiciary Committee will come to order. Our hearing today deals with Government preparedness and response to terrorist attacks using weapons 

of mass destruction. I particularly want to thank Senator Kyl for 

his interest in this subject. He has requested this hearing. I think 

it is an extremely important hearing for us to hold. It is obviously 

a subject we do not really want to talk too much about because it, 

quite frankly, is rather frightening. And I think all of us very much 

want to make sure that we do everything we possibly can to prevent a terrorist attack, any terrorist attack in this country, but 

particularly those that use weapons of mass destruction. 

The 9/11 attacks shocked the Nation as we witnessed the slaughter of thousands of Americans from all walks of life. The U.S. Government and the international community responded quickly and 

in unison to defend freedom and democracy from al Qaeda and terrorist organizations around the world. That struggle continues 

today against an enemy determined to strike again in the United 

States using more powerful and terrifying weapons. 

The 9/11 Commission wrote that, and I quote: ‘‘We need to design 

a balanced strategy for a long haul to attack terrorists and prevent 

their ranks from swelling while at the same time protecting our 

country against future attacks. We have been forced to think about 

the way our Government is organized. The massive departments 

and agencies that prevailed in the great struggles of the 20th century must work together in a new way so that all the instruments 

of national power can be combined.’’ 

2 

It has been nearly 9 years since the 9/11 attacks, and the U.S. 

Government has undergone a dramatic change. Congress created 

the Department of Homeland Security which involved the largest 

reorganization of Government since the creation of the unified Department of Defense after the end of World War II. We have created an array of new intelligence and law enforcement agencies designed to disrupt, prevent, and respond to a terrorist attack in the 

United States. We have seen a sharp increase in the amount of 

classified information and programs in the U.S. Government, which 

requires careful oversight by this Subcommittee, the Congress, and 

the courts. 

In today’s hearing we will examine one piece of our Government’s 

preparedness and response to a terrorist attack. Specifically, the 

Subcommittee will examine what would happen if the unthinkable 

happens: Terrorists are successfully able to launch an attack within the United States using a weapon of mass destruction. A weapon 

of mass destruction attack can occur through the use of chemical, 

biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. 

Before introducing our panelists, let me turn to the Ranking Republican Member, Senator Kyl, for any comments that he might 

wish to make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE 

STATE OF ARIZONA 

Senator KYL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, again, thank you 

for holding this hearing. 

Our preparedness for an attack by weapons of mass destruction 

is an issue of vital importance. Unfortunately, as you noted, with 

the passage of time it receives little attention. While unfriendly nations have had the ability to inflict great damage with weapons of 

mass destruction and terrorist groups have sought the capacity to 

do so for some time, our Government is not sufficiently prepared 

for such an attack. 

One threat to which the Government is particularly ill-equipped 

to respond is the threat posed by an electromagnetic pulse, or an 

EMP attack. When a nuclear weapon is detonated hundreds of 

miles above the Earth, the resulting radiation would react or interact with the Earth’s atmosphere to produce an electromagnetic 

pulse. The resulting EMP waves could cause severe damage to electronic devices, and just a single weapon could affect much of the 

United States. People aboard planes and those on life support systems at hospitals would be the first casualties. Without power for 

medical care, food refrigeration, gas pumps, water purification, the 

death toll could climb to staggering proportions. 

Unfortunately, a successful EMP attack would not require a high 

level of military or nuclear sophistication. A relatively crude nuclear weapon mounted on a Scud missile, for example, could be 

launched from a ship in U.S. waters and inflict massive damage on 

the United States. 

In 2001, Congress established a commission known as the EMP 

Commission To Assess the Threat to the United States From an 

EMP Attack. The Commission investigated the potential impact of 

such an attack and released its findings in 2004. Shortly thereafter, this Subcommittee held a hearing to review the Commission’s 

3 

findings and recommendations. Chief among them, the Commission 

concluded that several classes of potential adversaries, including 

terrorist groups, have or could acquire the capability to attack the 

United States with an EMP weapon and potentially inflict great 

damage. 

As the Commission stated in its report, ‘‘Depending on the specific characteristics of the attacks, unprecedented cascading failures of our major infrastructures could result. In that event, a regional or national recovery would be long and difficult and would 

seriously degrade the safety and overall viability of our Nation.’’ 

The Commission also found that the damage to our vulnerable 

infrastructure would be catastrophic and the recovery process 

would be lengthy and challenging. 

While there are many topics that will be discussed today, I look 

forward to hearing an update from our witnesses on the current 

risk we face from an EMP attack as well as the steps we may need 

to take and have taken to prepare for such an attack. And I hope 

the Subcommittee will continue to pursue this matter and do our 

part to ensure that the Federal Government can respond to such 

an attack or any other attack of weapons of mass destruction. 

Thank you. 

Chairman CARDIN. Thank you, Senator Kyl. 

Our first panel consists of three witnesses. On our first panel is 

Glenn Fine. Mr. Fine is the Inspector General of the Department 

of Justice. He has worked for the Department of Justice Office of 

the Inspector General since January 1995, which recently released 

a report entitled ‘‘Review of the Department’s Preparation to Respond to a WMD Incident,’’ which I am sure will be of great interest to this Committee. 

We also have on this panel James Baker. Mr. Baker is an Associate Deputy Attorney General at the Department of Justice with 

responsibility for national security matters. He began his career in 

the Department of Justice in the Criminal Division as a Federal 

prosecutor during the Clinton administration. 

And, last, we have Steward Beckham. Mr. Beckham is Director 

of the Office of the National Capital Region Coordination of FEMA 

and has 26 years of experience as a leader in both the public and 

private sector. As we know, the National Capital Region is one of 

the prime areas of concern and interest. 

We very much welcome all three of you here to the Committee. 

You may proceed as you wish. We will ask that you hold your comments to 5 minutes, and your entire statement will be made part 

of the record. 

Mr. Fine, we will start with you. 

STATEMENT OF GLENN A. FINE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. FINE. Thank you, Senator Cardin, Senator Kyl. Thank you 

for inviting me to testify about the Department of Justice Office of 

the Inspector General’s recent report regarding the Department of 

Justice’s readiness to respond to a potential weapons of mass destruction attack. 

The potential use of a WMD poses a serious threat to the United 

States. One of the greatest concerns is that a WMD would fall into 

4 

the hands of terrorists or that terrorists will develop their own 

WMD. 

Because of the importance of this issue, the OIG evaluated the 

readiness of the Department of Justice and its components to respond to a potential WMD attack. We also examined the readiness 

of Department field offices in the Washington National Capital Region to respond in a coordinated way to a potential WMD attack. 

In my testimony today, I will briefly summarize the findings of 

our report as well as the Department’s response to it. 

First, our report concluded that the FBI has taken appropriate 

steps to prepare to respond to a WMD attack. The FBI has developed a WMD Directorate to manage the FBI’s WMD operational response and other activities. 

The FBI has developed plans and handbooks to guide its staff in 

responding to a WMD incident. The FBI regularly participates in 

exercises and provides training specific to WMD incidents. 

In contrast to the FBI, however, we found that the Department 

as a whole did not have adequate policies or plans for responding 

to a WMD attack. We concluded that the management of the Department’s response program was uncoordinated and fragmented. 

In addition, we found that Department personnel other than in the 

FBI received little training in the unique requirements associated 

with responding to a WMD incident. 

While the Department and its components conducted some training on continuity of operations and all-hazards response, little of 

the training focused specifically on a WMD operational response. 

Planning specifically for a WMD incident is important because the 

actions taken to ensure public safety and security may differ from 

those taken when responding to an incident involving conventional 

explosives, for example. 

Under the National Response Framework, ESF–13, the Department of Justice is designated as the lead agency for coordinating 

the use of Federal law enforcement resources to maintain public 

safety and security if local and State resources are overwhelmed 

during an incident. The Department delegated the responsibility 

for implementing these activities to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms, and Explosives. However, we found that the Department 

and the ATF were not prepared to coordinate Federal law enforcement activities under ESF–13. Our conclusion was confirmed by 

ESF–13 staff, one of whom told us that in the event of a WMD incident ‘‘we are totally unprepared...right now, being totally effective 

would never happen. Everybody would be winging it.’’ 

Because the Washington area is a potential target for terrorists, 

we also examined the preparations of Department field offices in 

the region to respond to a WMD attack. 

In this region, Department components regularly work together 

to prepare to respond to various incidents that may occur during 

special events, such as Presidential inaugurations and visits by 

heads of state. However, outside of special events, only the FBI had 

a WMD response plan and had conducted WMD-specific training. 

When we asked officials from ATF, the DEA, and the U.S. Marshals Service in the National Capital Region if they were familiar 

with the FBI’s WMD response plan, they said they were not. Some 

officials were not even aware of ESF–13 or ATF’s role as the DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:06 Mar 09, 2011 Jkt 064769 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\64769.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
5 

partment’s coordinator in the event of an ESF–13 activation. This 

lack of awareness is problematic because it could inhibit a coordinated response and valuable time could be wasted in providing 

needed resources. 

Our report made five recommendations to help the Department 

better prepare to respond to a WMD incident, such as designating 

a person or office at the Department level with the authority to 

manage the Department’s WMD response program; updating WMD 

response policies and plans; and establishing effective oversight to 

ensure that the Department and its components maintain WMD response plans and participate in training and exercises. 

In response, the Department stated that the fundamental conclusions of our report were sound and that the Department concurred 

with all our recommendations. 

Since the report, the Department has created a committee, the 

Emergency Preparedness Committee, and five subcommittees to 

address emergency response issues throughout the Department, including WMD response issues. 

In general, we believe the Department is taking our report seriously, and the Department’s actions can help improve its preparedness to respond to a WMD attack. However, we believe it is essential that the Department aggressively and expeditiously address 

the deficiencies identified in our report so that it will be better prepared to respond if a WMD attack should occur. For our part, the 

OIG intends to continue to monitor the Department’s progress in 

this critical area. 

That concludes my prepared statement, and I would be pleased 

to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fine appears as a submission for 

the record.] 

Chairman CARDIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Fine. 

Mr. Baker. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES A. BAKER, ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kyl, and members 

of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here 

today on the Department’s role in responding to a WMD attack. I 

have submitted a written statement for the record. 

I would like to just make a few brief points in my oral remarks 

today and then respond to any questions that you might have. 

First, preventing terrorist attacks on the United States, including those that involve WMDs, is the highest priority of the Department of Justice. 

Second, should such an attack occur, the Department must be 

prepared to respond immediately and effectively in the aftermath 

of such an event. 

Among the various components of the Department of Justice with 

WMD-related responsibilities, the FBI has the lead in preventing 

such attacks from occurring and responding directly to such an attack should one occur. The Inspector General’s office has concluded 

that the FBI is generally well prepared to respond to a WMD attack. The Inspector General has also concluded that the rest of the 

6 

Department is not as well prepared as it should be to respond to 

a WMD attack. We agree with that conclusion. 

In addition, the Inspector General has made several recommendations on how we should improve the readiness of the Department to respond to a WMD attack. We agree with all of his recommendations. 

Currently, as he mentioned, we are in the process of implementing those recommendations, and my written statement describes in detail what we are doing, including the Committee that 

the Inspector General referenced. 

But let me be clear that we will not be satisfied unless and until 

the Department is fully prepared to respond appropriately to a 

WMD attack. The American people are entitled to expect nothing 

less. 

We are marshalling a great deal of resources on this issue. Further, we will put into place an organizational structure and oversight mechanisms to ensure that we maintain a proper state of 

readiness as long as the WMD threat persists. Unfortunately for all 

of us, we expect that to be a long time. 

We also look forward to working with the Subcommittee and the 

full Committee on all of the Department’s emergency preparedness 

issues, and we appreciate the opportunity to discuss those issues 

here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Baker appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman CARDIN. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Mr. Beckham. 

STATEMENT OF STEWARD D. BECKHAM, DIRECTOR, OFFICE 

OF NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION COORDINATION, FEDERAL 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BECKHAM. Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Kyl, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, I am Steward Beckham, 

Director of the Office of National Capital Region Coordination, 

NCRC. NCRC is located in the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. Thank you for inviting 

me to appear before you today to discuss preparedness in the National Capital Region. 

The NCR is the fourth largest metropolitan area in the United 

States, encompassing the District of Columbia and parts of Maryland and Virginia. Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress created NCRC to oversee and coordinate Federal programs 

for and relationships with State, local, and regional authorities 

within the NCR to enhance domestic preparedness. 

To fulfill its mission, NCRC has built and continues to foster 

strong partnerships and collaboration with State, local, and regional authorities in the NCR. As an example, I represent DHS 

and FEMA as a member of the Senior Policy Group. The Senior 

Policy Group is comprised of the homeland security advisers and 

chief emergency managers of Virginia, Maryland, and the District 

of Columbia. The Senior Policy Group plays a key role in sustaining a coordinated regional approach to homeland security and 

7 

in strengthening integrated decisionmaking and planning in the 

NCR. 

To ensure adequate and coordinated all-hazards and catastrophic 

planning, the NCR has invested in regional planners who work on 

a series of plans, including some that are relevant to a weapon of 

mass destruction event in the NCR. Further, NCRC has partnered 

with the Office of Personnel Management to draft the NCR Federal 

Concept Plan of Catastrophic Planning Assumptions in fiscal year 

2011. The CONPLAN will facilitate increased collaboration and integration of Federal planning efforts with those of State, local, and 

regional partners. Within FEMA, the National Continuity Programs Directorate, a sister office of NCRC, is the lead agent for 

continuity planning for the Federal executive branch, ensuring continuity of national essential functions under all hazards. NCP also 

provides continuity planning materials, training, and assistance to 

the NCR, as well as alert and warning information to the American 

public. 

Homeland security partners across the NCR also pursue coordinated communications and information sharing, equipment purchases, and training and exercises. This close alignment strengthens the region’s capabilities to address all hazards, including weapons of mass destruction. 

Examples of the NCR’s commitment to concerted action include: 

Regional interoperability, where the NCR is currently working on 

two infrastructure projects: the Interconnected Government Networks and the Data Exchange Hub. These two projects represent 

technology advancements that provide responders with the data 

they need, anytime and anywhere. 

Second, Metrorail Tunnel Response Operations. This program 

will provide emergency equipment caches at each underground 

Metro station and design the prototype for a tunnel rescue cart. 

Third, the NCR Syndromic Surveillance Network, ESSENCE, is 

a disease surveillance system that captures health department 

data to provide early detection capability. The system has been 

fully operational since 2004. 

Fourth, the NCR has installed an information-sharing system 

called LinX. This system links local, State, and Federal law enforcement data bases. Currently there are 25 NCR agencies participating. The NCR partnered with Baltimore and the Hampton 

Roads area to expand LinX and joined the three urban areas together in March of this year. 

FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security have provided 

over $600 million to NCR partners since the inception of the Department, through UASI, the State Homeland Security, and other 

grant programs. These programs support planning, training, equipment purchases, and exercises for WMD and all-hazards preparedness. This is in addition to significant preparedness efforts funded 

by the individual jurisdictions in the NCR. 

Additionally, NCRC and other SPG members have developed the 

NCR ‘‘First Hour Checklist’’ to guide coordinated actions during the 

initial response to an incident in the NCR. 

With NCR partners, the NCRC plans or participates in exercises 

and drills for both anticipated and unanticipated events. Exercises 

are administered and coordinated by the NCR Exercise and TrainVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:06 Mar 09, 2011 Jkt 064769 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\64769.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
8 

ing Operations Panel, known as ETOP. This group’s frequent planning and cooperation serves to integrate and strengthen all-hazards preparedness, whether for natural, man-made, or terrorist-related incidents. Such coordination will be essential in the event of 

a terrorist attack affecting the NCR using a weapon of mass destruction. 

In conclusion, NCRC’S established working relationships support 

broader FEMA efforts to maintain and enhance its relationships 

with State and local partners. During a response to an incident 

within the NCR, the NCRC would support FEMA Region III and 

the Federal Coordinating Officer by providing situational awareness and participating in the Unified Coordination Group. If needed, we would send agency representatives to operations or communications centers to facilitate information sharing. In the event of 

an incident in the NCR, NCRC stands ready to support FEMA’s 

core mission and our Federal, State, and local partners. 

Building on decades of regional collaboration, we work every day 

to build and sustain an integrated effort to prepare for, prevent, 

protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards, 

including WMD terrorism. 

Should an incident occur in the National Capital Region, FEMA 

has established a course of action to mobilize and coordinate a wellorganized response and recovery. 

Thank you for allowing me to testify, and I am happy to answer 

any questions that the Subcommittee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beckham appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman CARDIN. Well, let me thank all three of you for your 

testimony. 

Let me start, if I might, about the seriousness of what we are 

dealing with. If there was a successful terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction, it could not only cause a significant number of casualties, but it could very well compromise our infrastructure and ability to respond to the crisis. It would also create significant fear and panic within the community. And, therefore, it becomes even more critical to have clear leadership and clear control 

of the resources that are available for the response. 

Therefore, I would particularly interested, Mr. Fine, in your report as to where we are with a single person in command and the 

types of preparations that were being done, the update of the 

plans. And, quite frankly, it is rather disturbing, Mr. Baker, to see 

that 9 years after the 9/11 attack we still do not have in place the 

proper functioning plans in the event of a successful attack using 

weapons of mass destruction in the United States. 

So I understand they are good people, everybody is trying to do 

the right thing, and I mean that. The intentions here are clearly 

the right intentions. There are a lot of things going on in the Department of Justice. There are a lot of areas as far as protecting 

the safety of this country is concerned from all types of criminals 

and people who want to do harm. I understand that ATF has a lot 

of things that it needs to do and has been challenged a lot by what 

has been added to that responsibility by actions of Congress. 

But I really want to focus in on how we are going to implement 

this. I hear, Mr. Baker, your comments saying that you accept the 

9 

IG’s report and are moving toward implementing the five recommendations. Let me just give you a related issue. This Subcommittee held a hearing last week on passport fraud. It was not 

our first. We had several reports by Government agencies of failures, and when there were commitments made to correct that, they 

were not corrected. 

So how are we going to be—what assurances can you give us, 

Mr. Fine and Mr. Baker, as to how you will both be proceeding to 

make sure that these agreed-to recommendations are, in fact, implemented? 

Mr. FINE. Senator Cardin, I do think it is a critical issue, and 

I think it is important that we remain focused on this issue even 

as time goes on. As we get further and further from the 9/11 attacks, I think there has been a sense of complacency that has developed and that we need to be focused on this issue because, as 

you point out, the effects can be catastrophic. 

We saw that the Department had plans, but they had not followed through with the plans. We saw that the Department had 

designated the ATF as the lead agency for handling ESF–13 activation, but they had not provided resources and leadership and oversight. And that is what needs to happen here. We hope our report 

will have some impact on that, and we think that this hearing can 

have an impact on that. 

For our part, we will continue to monitor this. We will not simply 

do a report and then hope that the Department implements the 

recommendations. We will monitor the follow-up with the Department. We will ask for them to tell us exactly what they have done, 

exactly how they are going to implement the recommendations, exactly what the progress is. And we will follow through on a regular 

basis with updates of that, because we cannot let ourselves become 

complacent as time goes on. And we intend to follow through with 

the monitoring of the Department’s reaction and response to our 

report. 

Chairman CARDIN. Mr. Baker. 

Mr. BAKER. Yes, Senator, thank you. I guess just to follow up on 

that, that is definitely—I have worked with the Inspector General’s 

office now for many years on several different reports that they 

have prepared, reviewing activities that I have been involved in, 

and that has been my experience, that—they are very dogged in 

following up—issuing a report and then following up. And so they 

keep, you know, the agency’s feet to the fire on all these different 

things. And so that is one thing that I know will happen and that 

I know that the Inspector General makes regular reports to you. 

Obviously, the Committee having an interest in this, and the 

Subcommittee, I am sure there will be follow-up and there will be 

monitoring. You will be monitoring what it is that we do. 

But in addition to that, receiving the Inspector General’s report 

I can tell you was not a matter of happiness for the leadership of 

the Department. Obviously, the Attorney General and the Deputy 

Attorney General—it is filled by an acting person right now, Gary 

Grindler—are responsible for all the activities of the Department. 

The Acting Deputy Attorney General was not happy about receiving this report, and so I work directly for him, and he and our office are seized of this issue at this point in time, and we see it, I 

10 

think, based on the recommendations that the Inspector General 

made and, in addition, our own review of the Department’s readiness, as first and foremost a management issue. We need to do a 

better job of managing this issue. 

There are tremendous resources in the Department. There are 

extremely dedicated and conscientious people. But I think that the 

Department is a large place; there are many components that have 

different pieces of this as reflected in the report. The FBI has a 

critical piece of it and is actually well prepared to deal with this. 

But other components of the Department have responsibilities in 

this area, too, not only to respond to an attack should one occur 

and, for example, under ESF–13, to support State and local authorities. That is a critical responsibility that we have. We have to 

do that. But also we will have to be ready from a continuity of operations and continuity of Government perspective to carry on our 

business and to keep doing what it is that the Department of Justice does every day around the country should something happen, 

for example, as you have referenced in the National Capital area. 

So all I can say is that we are seized of it, the leadership of the 

Department is seized of it, and we commit to do a better job. That 

is what we have to do. 

Chairman CARDIN. Well, I thank you for that response. As you 

point out, it goes well beyond the implementation of these five recommendations. I think these five recommendations are a start, but 

it requires also, as you point out, the management structure, the 

commitment to keep this current and to fight off the danger of complacency as time goes on without incident. This issue may not be 

as front and center in the public’s attention as it needs to be within 

the Department. 

So I would just urge you to, first, Mr. Fine and Mr. Baker, keep 

us informed, this Committee, as to the implementation of the five 

recommendations so that we will expect regular reports as to the 

implementation of these five recommendations. But, Mr. Baker, as 

you point out, it does go beyond just the implementation of these 

recommendations. 

Mr. Beckham, I want to ask you a little bit about what is going 

on in the Nation’s capital. I am concerned about how well you are 

coordinated with the local governments. Prince George’s County, 

Maryland, and Montgomery County are part of the region directly. 

I guess I have two questions for you. How do you coordinate a potential attack in the capital region with the local governments? 

And is there a strategy for how that is handled? If the attack were 

to occur, for example, in Maryland, would there be a different expectation of the response from the Maryland partners? Or how is 

that coordinated? 

Mr. BECKHAM. Well, Senator, in terms of a WMD event, quite obviously it would be at the highest levels of the Federal Government 

in terms of the concern and the response. Our particular office, the 

NCRC, we work regularly with the homeland security advisers for 

the three State-level jurisdictions in the National Capital Region, 

so I would be reaching out in the first instance to the homeland 

security adviser for Maryland and giving him the appropriate information that we would have available, and not directly through my 

office, but I am certain that he would be in touch with those counVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:06 Mar 09, 2011 Jkt 064769 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\64769.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
11 

ty-level jurisdictions in trying to determine what their situation is 

immediately following the attack and what resources they need or 

what the condition is that is present at that time. 

Obviously, again, since it is such a high-level incident, the President and the Secretary of DHS would be intimately involved, and 

most likely within the first hour after an incident like that, the 

Secretary at a minimum would be hosting a call with the homeland 

security advisers in the region—and it may even be nationwide because of the severity and significance of the attack—and would be 

giving out the information that would be available to her at that 

time. And she may have already been briefed by other departments 

throughout the Government. 

Chairman CARDIN. Thank you. I am going to turn to Senator Kyl 

because it is my understanding that there may very well be a vote 

called in the next few minutes. If that is the case, I will leave as 

Senator Kyl is conducting his questioning, and when he has completed, he will take a brief recess, and we will reconvene as soon 

as I can get back from the vote. 

Senator KYL. Mr. Chairman, that is what I was just out in the 

anteroom communicating about, and it is now unclear when the 

vote will occur, which was supposed to occur in 2 minutes, but now 

it will probably be delayed a little bit. 

Chairman CARDIN. It is nice having someone from the leadership 

here. That is nice to know. 

Senator KYL. Well, now I hear that it may be any minute, so we 

will move on. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KYL. Mr. Beckham, again, my apology for having to step 

out. Given the catastrophic potential of an EMP attack, do you 

think that it should be included as one of the national planning 

scenarios? 

Mr. BECKHAM. My understanding is that at the Department 

level, the DHS level, that particular scenario is on the list of incidents for the Risk Analysis Division. I do not know exactly what 

level or, I should say, degree of preparation they have taken to 

date, but I do know it is on that list that they have. 

Senator KYL. Would you take back a concern on my part that it 

should be considered and planning should exist for a response and 

appropriate action for such an attack? 

Mr. BECKHAM. Yes, sir. I certainly will. 

Senator KYL. I appreciate it. 

Chairman CARDIN. Well, let me thank our witnesses. We will 

proceed then to the second panel. The record will stay open for 

questions from the Committee, and I would just ask you, in the 

event additional questions are asked, that you respond to them as 

promptly as possible. Once again, thank you all for your testimonies. 

Mr. BECKHAM. Thank you very much. 

Chairman CARDIN. Well, let me welcome our two witnesses on 

our second panel: Colonel Randall Larsen is Executive Director of 

the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Proliferation and Terrorism, also known as the WMD Commission. 

Before that appointment, he was the national security adviser to 

the Center of Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical 

12 

Center from 2003 to 2009. As a graduate of the University of Pittsburgh, I welcome you here today. 

We also have Dr. Michael Frankel, the former Executive Director 

of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from 

Electromagnetic Pulse Attack, also known as the EMP Commission. The EMP Commission is charged with identifying any steps 

that should be taken by the United States to better protect its military and civilian systems from EMP attack. 

We will start off with Colonel Larsen. 

STATEMENT OF COLONEL RANDALL J. LARSEN, USAF (RETIRED), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM, WASHINGTON, DC 

Colonel LARSEN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Kyl, thank you for—— 

Chairman CARDIN. You need to turn your microphone on. Thank 

you very much. 

Colonel LARSEN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Kyl, I am occasionally 

asked if testifying in the Senate is an intimidating thing. I said, 

‘‘It can be in some cases,’’ but to make sure I was not intimidated 

today, I decided to have a 6-foot-8 U.S. Army paratrooper sitting 

behind me. I am very proud to introduce Lieutenant David Lampin. 

He worked for us at the WMD Commission until he decided to join 

the army. I am very proud of his commitment to defend this Nation, and I am proud of all who serve in uniform today in this difficult long struggle. 

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman and Senator Kyl, I am not proud 

of the lack of progress in the field of biosecurity. I have been working in this field for 16 years. It is frustrating to watch this. Senators Graham and Talent on January 26th gave a report card from 

the WMD Commission for preparedness to respond to a biological 

act of terrorism. They assessed a grade of F. 

You need to remember, in 2008 in their Commission report, they 

said bioterrorism is the most likely WMD. That bothers me after 

16 years working in the field. 

My prepared statement has a lot of details about things you can 

take a look at. In my summary, I want to point out two things, because we could have all sorts of authorization bills and appropriation bills, and the executive branch can have strategies and policies. But if we do not get these two things right then nothing else 

is going to work. 

Senator Kyl, I assume you are a Cardinals fan, kind of following 

what they are doing in training camp. How many coaches do you 

suppose the Cardinals have? It is extraordinary in the NFL. You 

have a wide receiver coach. You have a running back coach. You 

have a quarterback coach. You have a linebacker coach. Actually, 

some of those have assistant coaches. And you have a training 

coach. All necessary to make a complex system work. 

How do you think the Cardinals would do this year if they did 

not have a head coach? That is the problem we have in biosecurity 

in America. Senator Talent made that very clear when we released 

the report card. More than two dozen Presidentially appointed, 

Senate-confirmed individuals with some responsibility for biodefense, not one has it for a full-time job, and nobody is in charge. 

13 

Now, some witnesses will sit here and tell you, well, you know, 

this biodefense is very complex. It is DOJ, it is HHS, it is DHS, 

it is DOD, it is EPA. Well, as a former military officer and Chairman of the military department National War College, I will tell 

you the most complex thing the U.S. military ever did was the Allied invasion of Europe in June 1944. That was pretty complex. Do 

you think you could have told General Eisenhower it is too complex 

for one man to be in charge? He would not have believed that, and 

neither would I. We will not see significant progress until we have 

someone in charge, until you can have one person come sit at this 

microphone with authority, responsibility, and accountability—because today you have to call two dozen people up here to figure out 

what is going on to do your oversight responsibility, make sure we 

are spending money the right way. 

The second thing that we have to get right are the fundamentals. 

Senator Cardin, I assume you are a Ravens fan. They have got 

probably one of the best defenses in the NFL, maybe one of the 

best ever. If Ray Lewis was sitting right here beside me today, here 

is what he would tell you. 

You know, in training camp right now, there are a lot of discussions going on. Should we have a 3–4 or should we have a 4–3? 

When are we going to use cover 2? On second and long, when do 

we go from the nickel package to the dime package? That is all 

very important technical details, the kind of details they spoke 

about in the first panel, all that kind of stuff. But if Ray were here, 

he would tell you, you know, if you do not have the fundamentals 

down—tackling and ward off blocks—then all that fancy stuff does 

not count. 

I do not think we have the fundamentals down, and the No. 1 

fundamental is for the senior political leaders at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue to understand the basic issue of biodefense. You 

cannot get the intelligence community up here to give you a briefing, and I explain that in my prepared statement, and I will be 

happy to address it in questions. 

What you need is a briefing by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Science and Technology on the Population Threat 

Assessment. Have your staff call Dr. Beth George. Senators Graham and Talent, if they were here today, they would tell you that 

is the most impressive and important briefing they had in 2 years 

on the Commission: Population Threat Assessment, Dr. Beth 

George. 

What that tells you is—is there any question what the intent is 

of al Qaeda to come here and kill a lot of Americans? The WMD 

Commission said bio is the best way to do it, easiest way to do it. 

What that Population Threat Assessment will tell you is what is 

possible. What could a team of six people do with $50,000 or 

$100,000? That is what you need to know. That is the best thing 

you can do. 

I will be happy to answer your questions. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Larsen appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman CARDIN. Thank you very much, Colonel Larsen. 

14 

I am going to apologize. I am going to go over and vote so that 

we can keep the hearing open, and I will be back, hopefully before 

Senator Kyl has completed his questioning. 

Senator KYL. Dr. Frankel. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. FRANKEL, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE THREAT TO THE U.S. 

FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) ATTACK, MCLEAN, 

VIRGINIA 

Mr. FRANKEL. Mr. Chairman, Senator Kyl, thank you for the opportunity to come testify today. My name is Mike Frankel, and I 

served as the Executive Director of the EMP Commission during 

the entire span of its activities. I should mention that I am actually 

a physicist and not a lawyer, so if I blow some of the nuances, I 

beg your indulgence in advance. 

The perspective of the EMP Commission was provided in our 

published reports. I do not want to go over them in any detail. 

What I would like to do today is simply briefly review some of the 

unclassified findings of the Commission, and in particular update 

you on the response to those findings by the Government. 

Now, electromagnetic pulse is associated with any above-the-atmosphere detonation of a nuclear weapon. And that includes nuclear weapons of even unsophisticated designs. Since it is a geometrical line-of-sight effect, a detonation at a height of a few hundred 

kilometers will effectively span the entire United States in its footprint. For assessment purposes, a Scud, which might reach an altitude of about 100 kilometers, is sufficient to encompass a good part 

of the eastern seaboard with all its great density of people and infrastructure. 

Such EMP has, in fact, been seen in the past briefly toward the 

end of the United States and Soviet Union testing experience when 

various electrical breakdowns were observed with high-altitude detonations, burnouts, power supply breakdowns, et cetera, et cetera. 

The EMP generated on the ground from such a detonation would 

not immediately damage a human being; indeed, a person will not 

even feel it. But it will affect all of the electronic circuitry which 

surrounds and sustains him. Depending on the severity of the exposure, many thousands of components may need replacement in the 

power grid. Indeed, it was the assessment of the Commission that 

the power grid was likely to collapse from the cumulative damage 

that would be incurred. 

Should that damage include numbers of high-voltage transformers, which are as big as a house and no longer manufactured 

in this country, recovery could take on the order of months to even 

years. 

I should mention that it is not only ground-based systems that 

are endangered by an EMP, but our entire low earth orbit satellite 

infrastructure would be in danger as well. This is because—not, if 

you will, because of a direct EMP interaction, but because of a 

high-altitude detonation artificially pumps the radiation belts 

which are already up there or creates new ones, and subjects satellites to environments they were not designed to survive in. This 

has already happened. In 1962, toward the end of our testing program, the STARFISH detonation above the atmosphere detonation, 

15 

about a mega ton or so, essentially swept the sky clean of all commercially known satellites at the time. They all died within 6 

months of the detonation, including Telstar, which was the first 

telecommunications satellite. 

What I would like to take my last minute or so discussing is the 

response of the Government. There it is, if you will, bipolar. The 

response of the military infrastructure to the findings and recommendations was very positive. Most of the recommendations 

were concurred with by the Department. They kind of squirmed at 

the notion that we would want extra reporting requirements, but 

pretty much all the substantive recommendations were accepted. 

An action plan was promulgated by the Secretary. Funds were 

palmed against it, and activities are ongoing. 

In contrast to that, the Department of Homeland Security for the 

civilian infrastructure recommendations, we could detect no resonance to the recommendations we directed at them. I would say the 

recommendations have simply languished. We could not find any 

individual or office at the confirmed level for which policy and direction for EMP matters was part of his portfolio. So there was no 

belly button, if you will, within the Department to address these 

significant issues. 

I think it was already mentioned that even though the Department has identified 15 national planning scenarios for disaster 

planning, including a nuclear scenario involving smuggling in of a 

weapon, there is no thought given to the notion that the very same 

device might be launched at altitude and used in an EMP mode, 

if you will. So they have got a good chunk of the nuclear problem 

which they are addressing, but there is a component of it they are 

simply not addressing. 

Protection of the Nation’s critical infrastructures from an EMP 

threat is both feasible and well within the Nation’s means and resources to accomplish. A number of these actions also reduce 

vulnerabilities to other serious threats to our infrastructures, thus 

giving forth multiple benefits. 

I would like to thank the Committee for this opportunity to 

present my views of this most important issue. I have provided expanded remarks to the Committee as part of the record, and I invite any questions you may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Frankel appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator KYL. Thank you very much, Dr. Frankel. 

In about 3 minutes, I will have to leave for the vote, too, and 

then we will recess, and Senator Cardin will come back. 

What I am going to suggest is that—I have got a couple questions that I can ask both of you for the record, but let me preview 

what they are. Both of you I think put your finger on a key problem that is obviously bugging you both, namely, lack of a specific 

person or group within the various agencies that are specifically responsible for dealing with these two threats. Biological probably is 

the most probable, as you have noted, Colonel Larsen, and an extraordinary amount of damage lasting months, as you said, to our 

entire country that could result in the event of an EMP attack, Dr. 

Frankel. We create commissions, and the work that is recVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:06 Mar 09, 2011 Jkt 064769 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\64769.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
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ommended is not followed up on, that your recommendations are 

languishing, as you say. 

So the question I am going to pose to both of you, and not to try 

to necessarily answer right here, but both of you have some familiarity with the workings of Government by virtue of your service on 

these commissions. What recommendations do you have for this 

Subcommittee to procedurally effect the result that you are trying 

to achieve? In other words, do you think that it would take reorganization legislation? I always am dubious of rearranging the deck 

chairs. Do you think that administrative action within the administration is necessary? Does it have to come from the very top, the 

President? 

In other words, both of you express some frustration that sensible recommendations have not fully been implemented because 

nobody is specifically in charge, and you must have some idea as 

to how we could solve that problem rather than just saying it is 

a problem. 

In 30 seconds each—and then I will have to go, and we will recess until Senator Cardin gets back—a quick response. 

Colonel Larsen. 

Colonel LARSEN. In the letter that Senators Graham and Talent 

sent to President Obama last year about this time, they said WMD 

is such a serious long-term threat, you should make the Vice President the top WMD coordinator for the Nation. 

There are only two people in this town that Cabinet Secretaries 

call ‘‘sir,’’ and the President is too busy. And he can also speak on 

equal to Governors. If the Vice President—not just this Vice President, but every Vice President, as long as we have a WMD problem, if that was his primary charge, that would fix a lot of problems. 

Senator KYL. He has got a lot of other responsibilities, too. He 

is in charge of—I have forgotten now—the jobs under the stimulus 

bill and in charge of the START Treaty and things like that. So 

does that still work? I mean, he also has a lot on his plate. 

Colonel LARSEN. Can you think of any job more important than 

protecting America from weapons of mass destruction? 

Senator KYL. No, I cannot. I am just posing—— 

Colonel LARSEN. Well, I know he is a busy man. It is about priorities. 

Senator KYL. OK. Good recommendation. 

Mr. Frankel. 

Mr. FRANKEL. Yes, what we found was that coming down from 

the top, direction from the top is just indispensable. We found 

many competent people within the various nooks and crannies of 

the DHS, some of them, in fact, knowledgeable, especially people 

who would come over from the National Communications System 

when it was absorbed into DHS. But without a requirement, without a direction from above, it is simply not going to happen. 

So it really has to be—I mean, I would suggest that the Secretary have a reporting requirement that would force him to appoint someone. It has to be at the confirmed level in order to make 

things happen within the Department. 

Senator KYL. Well, both of you raise a very difficult problem. I 

am working on it in two other specific areas I will not mention to 

17 

try to get—yes, there is a superficial commitment to a particular 

cause the Government has to address, and yet the depth of that 

commitment is highly questionable because there just does not 

seem to be the commander’s intent flowing down with sufficient 

robustness that everybody else gets the message. And specific people assigned to carry out the responsibilities, therefore, have the 

priority to do that. 

Let me recess the meeting. I will have some questions for the 

record, and then when Senator Cardin comes back, he can ask his 

questions and close the hearing. Thank you very much, both of you, 

for your testimony. 

The Committee is temporarily recessed until the call of the 

Chair. 

[Recess 10:54 a.m. to 10:56 a.m.] 

Chairman CARDIN. The Subcommittee will come back to order. I 

want to thank Senator Kyl for filling in there for a moment. 

I understand in response to one of his questions that, Colonel 

Larsen, you want to give the Vice President some more work to do. 

Colonel LARSEN. Those are your former colleagues. Actually Senators Graham and Talent wrote that letter to President Obama 

about this time last year, not just this Vice President but every 

Vice President, and maybe it would take some action by Congress 

or whatever. Maybe you would need a larger staff or whatever. But 

I cannot think of an issue more important to the defense of America than protecting us from WMD. And by the President making 

that gesture, the Vice President is in charge of this, as we said 

when you were not here, there are only two people in this town 

that every Cabinet Secretary calls ‘‘sir,’’ and the President is probably too busy. But the Vice President has a lot of political clout. 

He also speak on equals with Governors, which is very important 

in a lot of the homeland security things and WMD. 

So maybe that is a bridge too far. That is what Senators Graham 

and Talent said. I would say, my opinion was at least we need to 

have the Biodefense Policy Coordinating Committee back, bringing 

the very senior leaders into the White House to look at this. That 

was there in the Clinton administration and the Bush administration, and it went away in the Obama administration. 

There was also a Special Assistant for Biodefense in the Clinton 

and Bush administrations. There is not today. So if you cannot go 

to the Vice President, at least that level. 

Chairman CARDIN. It seems to me we are talking at two levels, 

because the Inspector General’s report was very complimentary of 

the FBI in the way that they have organized in regards to response 

to terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction. The Inspector General’s report points out that they have a person who is designated as the coordinator. They have done their training. They 

have taken this issue very seriously. That is not true in other agencies within the Department of Justice, and certainly not true within the Department of Justice generally. 

But the point that I think you raise, Colonel Larsen—I am sorry, 

Dr. Frankel, I did not hear your testimony, but I certainly know 

of your written remarks—is that you need an overall coordination. 

In addition to the agencies being adequately prepared, you need 

18 

the force and authority of the administration and the President behind this issue. And I think that is very well pointed out. 

The complexity here is that there are so many different types of 

weapons that could be used, and the unknown can be extremely 

frightening. I looked at the different scenarios, and the different 

scenarios predict the number of casualties from a few to huge numbers and the potential damage to our infrastructure from modest 

to extreme. So you really do need training. You need chain of command and you need training. 

One of the disappointing parts was that the ATF training missions so far have not been concerning weapons of mass destruction. 

They have had training missions, but not dealing with the potential biological weapons or nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction. 

So I understand your recommendation for having a manager, 

having a coach, having a person who is looked upon with a great 

deal of respect and authority to be able to bring the type of importance in all agencies, both public and private, to the response. 

Other than the point person in the administration, are there any 

other specific recommendations that either one of you would make 

that this Committee should be looking at so that we can be adequately prepared for any eventuality? 

Mr. FRANKEL. I had made some recommendations in my—or I 

had noted some what I felt were lacks in my expanded remarks. 

The national planning scenarios, for example, the Department of 

Homeland Security has identified concern over a nuclear event. 

They have expended billions of dollars, in fact, developing sensors 

meant to interdict such smuggling operations at ports. There is a 

great deal of attention being paid to the problem. 

It seems odd to us that a component of the nuclear problem is 

simply being ignored. The kind of EMP mode attack does not require the smuggling in with all the dangers that is required. It 

does not require very accurate aim. You just need to toss the thing 

up there, more or less. So there are certain advantages. I am not 

saying it is more likely or anything like that, but it is a component 

of the problem which simply seems to have been ignore, and we do 

not know what—we sent the letter to the Secretary asking him to 

augment the 15 planning scenarios or to augment the nuclear planning scenario to consider all of the nuclear scenarios. Have not gotten any particular response. And I think that goes to the other 

issue which was discussed while you were out for a moment: the 

lack of a belly button within the Department who has as part of 

his portfolio the setting of policy and direction for the Department. 

My own recommendation was not as ambitious as to engage the 

Vice President, though surely I would like to do that as well. But 

there are surely other ways of identifying at the confirmed level in 

the Department someone with authority who would have as part 

of his portfolio these particular issues. And we were simply unable 

to make any progress with DHS, and we believe that in large part 

it was because of that. It was nobody’s particular responsibility, 

and, therefore, recommendations languished. 

By the way, I would not even say that they were, you know, rejected. They were just—nobody dealt with them. 

Chairman CARDIN. Thank you. 

19 

Colonel LARSEN. Mr. Chairman, could I make a quick comment 

about EMP? The Commissioners did not specifically address EMP, 

but as the Executive Director, I had Dr. Peter Zimmerman do a 

study for me. He is former science adviser to the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee. His conclusions, from several months’ research agreed with most of what the EMP Commission said. But 

one thing that I think is being left out here is I think perhaps the 

most likely EMP threat to America is from that thermonuclear 

weapon out there at 93 million miles. We know that is going to 

happen. It is about 2 years until we are going to get a lot more 

solar activity? Whether we get a nuke and a Scud or something, 

I do not know if that is going to happen. Nobody can predict it. But 

I think an EMP from the Sun is more likely and the sort of damage 

the Commission is talking about and the sort of actions we need 

to take as a Nation to protect our electrical grid particularly, the 

sun can certainly do that, and there are several cases in history 

that I am sure it is in your testimony or report that I think we 

need to get that out. And it goes back to my point about fundamentals. If the senior leaders understand these issues better, then I 

think that they will take the actions as required. 

Chairman CARDIN. Well, I thank both of you. I think your comments have been extremely helpful. This is not the last of our Subcommittee’s interest or the Judiciary Committee’s interest or the 

Senate’s interest in the subject. This is a continuing oversight function that we hold very high on our priority list. Protecting Americans is our top priority, whether it is from terrorist threats or 

whether it is from other types of events. We know that we are not 

as prepared as we need to be. We saw that 9 years ago. We know 

we have made huge progress during the last 9 years. We have. We 

are better prepared today than we were before September the 11th. 

We know that. But we are not as prepared as we need to be, and 

it is still a work in progress. And I hope that this hearing will give 

us some of the information necessary to make sure that we do 

properly oversight the agencies that have this responsibility. 

The hearing record will remain open for 1 week for statements 

or additional written questions from members of the Committee, 

and if there are additional questions, we would ask our witnesses 

if they would respond as promptly as possible. 

With that, the Subcommittee will stand adjourned with our 

thanks to our witnesses. 

[Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submission for the record follow.] 

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