alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §2771. Attendance at professional meetings

Coast Guard personnel may be directed to attend meetings of technical, professional, scientific, and other similar organizations and may be reimbursed for expenses thereby incurred at the rates authorized by law.

(Aug. 4, 1949, ch. 393, 63 Stat. 532, §471; renumbered §2771, Pub. L. 115–282, title I, §116(b), Dec. 4, 2018, 132 Stat. 4226.)

#### Historical and Revision Notes

It is believed that the authority contained in this section will greatly benefit the Government in providing better trained personnel. A similar provision was enacted for personnel of the Navy in 1946 (see title 5, U.S.C., 1946 ed., §421c). 81st Congress, House Report No. 557.

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2018—Pub. L. 115–282 renumbered section 471 of this title as this section.
Materials Not Included in

Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket

 Docket Number: FAA-2015-3983

 Directorate Identifier: 2015NM141AD

747-53A2452 --- 4/3/2003

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in FDMS Docket and Maintained in the 

Supplemental AD Docket

MAY BE VIEWED AT: Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate

Rules Docket

1601 Lind Ave. SW.,

Renton, WA 98057

425.227.1221

DURING THE HOURS OF: 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays.

Form Date: 03/05/2008
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1
 Written Statement of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  (a)
    
    the Form 10-Q Report of the Company for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2008
filed on the date hereof with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(b)
    
    information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ johann dreyerJohann DreyerChief Executive Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-6289

WILBUR E. COOK,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

JAMES GILMORE, Governor; RONALD ANGELONE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections;

EDDIE LEE PEARSON, Warden,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Jerome B. Friedman, District Judge.

(CA-99-2123)

Submitted: May 11, 2000 Decided: May 18, 2000

Before MURNAGHAN, LUTTIG, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Wilbur E. Cook, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Wilbur E. Cook appeals the district court’s order denying his

motion to compel in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West Supp. 1999) action.

We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order is

not appealable. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over

final orders, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541

(1949). The order here appealed is neither a final order nor an

appealable interlocutory or collateral order.

We dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. DEBORAH HALE SCHOTT, Defendant

Criminal Case No. 104-78

Superior Court of Guam

June 19, 1978

*531RAKER, *Judge*

DECISION

Defendant Deborah Hale Schott moved this Court May 31, 1978, to dismiss the charge against her on the grounds that (I) Guam Criminal and Correctional Code, § 28.50, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, (II) § 28.50 is unconstitutional as applied, and (III) Criminal and Correctional Code, Chapter 28, Article 2, denies equal protection of the laws.

Defendant’s first argument deserves little discussion since this Court has already determined that § 28.50 is not vague and overbroad. *People v. Daly,*1 Guam R. 520 (1978).

Furthermore, this Court is not willing at this time to decide that the state could *never*find conduct such as that of the defendant obscene. However, in the *Daly*decision the specific examples of conduct set forth in *Miller v. California,*413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973), were read into Chapter 28, Article 2, so as to define specific sexual conduct. Those examples read as follows:

> (a) Patently offensive representation or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.

> (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.

*532The People apparently misread the *Miller*and *Daly*decisions since they argue that the examples are “merely illustrative, and not the beginning and end of the obscenity area.” *Miller*required that an obscenity statute specifically define prohibited sexual conduct. True, the examples given in *Miller*were only illustrative of the type of conduct which could be specifically defined. However, where, as here, they have been adopted as specific examples of sexual conduct they *are*the beginning and end of the obscenity area. Sexual conduct not defined by statute cannot be criminal after *Miller.*

The defendant is charged with “pulling and snuggling a customer to her breast in a public place.” The most cursory reading of the *Miller*examples indicates that the defendant’s alleged act is not included. The complaint herein fails to state a charge under § 28.50.

It is not necessary to reach defendant’s third argument.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.

SO ORDERED.
### §3610. Relationship of statutory provisions to State and local laws

Nothing in this chapter may be construed to prevent or limit the authority of any State or local government to enact and enforce any law, ordinance, or code with regard to any condominium, cooperative, or conversion project, if such law, ordinance, or code does not abridge, deny, or contravene any standard for consumer protection established under this chapter. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, the provisions of this chapter, except for the application of section 3608 of this title and the prohibition included in section 3609 of this title as it relates to a lease with respect to which a cause of action may be established under section 3608 of this title, shall not apply in the case of any State or local government which has the authority to enact and enforce such a law, ordinance, or code, if, during the three-year period following October 8, 1980, such State or local government enacts a law, ordinance, or code, or amendments thereto, stating in substance that such provisions of this chapter shall not apply in that State or local government jurisdiction.

(Pub. L. 96–399, title VI, §611, Oct. 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 1679.)
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-1911

NING SHEN,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, 

at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, Chief District Judge. (3:16-cv-00001-GMG)

Submitted: May 02, 2018 Decided: July 9, 2018

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dallas Ian Hammer, ZUCKERMAN LAW, Tysons Corner, Virginia, for Appellant. 

William J. Powell, United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, Erin K. 

Reisenweber, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Dr. Ning Shen appeals the district court’s order dismissing her action against the 

Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Martinsburg, West Virginia. We have reviewed the 

record, as well as the parties’ briefing in this matter, and find no reversible error. See 

Hux v. City of Newport News, 451 F.3d 311, 315 (4th Cir. 2006) (a plaintiff’s failure to 

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext warrants summary 

judgment). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
### §1679. Findings and purposes

#### (a) Findings

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Consumers have a vital interest in establishing and maintaining their credit worthiness and credit standing in order to obtain and use credit. As a result, consumers who have experienced credit problems may seek assistance from credit repair organizations which offer to improve the credit standing of such consumers.

(2) Certain advertising and business practices of some companies engaged in the business of credit repair services have worked a financial hardship upon consumers, particularly those of limited economic means and who are inexperienced in credit matters.

#### (b) Purposes

The purposes of this subchapter are—

(1) to ensure that prospective buyers of the services of credit repair organizations are provided with the information necessary to make an informed decision regarding the purchase of such services; and

(2) to protect the public from unfair or deceptive advertising and business practices by credit repair organizations.

(Pub. L. 90–321, title IV, §402, as added Pub. L. 104–208, div. A, title II, §2451, Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–455.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior title IV of Pub. L. 90–321, May 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 164, as amended by Pub. L. 91–344, July 20, 1970, 84 Stat. 440; Pub. L. 92–321, June 30, 1972, 86 Stat. 382, which was set out as a note under section 1601 of this title, established a bipartisan National Commission on Consumer Finance to study the functioning and structure of the consumer finance industry as well as consumer credit transactions generally. The Commission was to submit a final report by Dec. 31, 1972, and was to cease to exist thereafter.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Pub. L. 90–321, title IV, §413, as added by Pub. L. 104–208, div. A, title II, §2451, Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–462, provided that: "This title [enacting this subchapter] shall apply after the end of the 6-month period beginning on the date of the enactment of the Credit Repair Organizations Act [Sept. 30, 1996], except with respect to contracts entered into by a credit repair organization before the end of such period."

#### Short Title

This subchapter known as the "Credit Repair Organizations Act", see Short Title note set out under section 1601 of this title.
<PAGE>   1

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.2



                                INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT



The Board of Directors
XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc. and Subsidiaries:



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements
(Nos. 33-72852, 33-34250, 33-91714, 333-30099, 333-53253, 333-71423, 333-81459,
333-84391, and 333-88807) on Forms S-3 and S-8 of American Mobile Satellite
Corporation of our report dated February 16, 2000, except for Note 14 which is
as of March 15, 2000, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of XM
Satellite Holdings Inc. and Subsidiaries (a development stage company) as of
December 31, 1998 and 1999 and the related consolidated statements of
operations, stockholders' equity (deficit) and cash flows for each of the years
in the three-year period ended December 31, 1999 and for the period from
December 15, 1992 (date of inception) to December 31, 1999 which report appears
in the December 31, 1999 annual report on Form 10-K of American Mobile Satellite
Corporation.

Our report, dated February 16, 2000, except for Note 14 which is as of March 15,
2000, contains an explanatory paragraph that states that the Company has not
commenced operations and is dependent upon additional debt or equity financings
which raises substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going
concern. The consolidated financial statements do not include any adjustments
that might result from the outcome of that uncertainty.



                                             /s/ KPMG LLP
                                             -----------------------



McLean, Virginia
March 30, 2000
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the accompanying Form 10-K/A No. 1 (the "Report") of
Glimcher Realty Trust (the "Company") for the period ended December 31, 2003, I,
William G. Cornely, Executive Vice President, Chief Operating Officer, Chief
Financial Officer, Treasurer and Trustee of the Company, certify, to the best of
my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:


         1.       The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.



Date: April 30, 2004                        /s/ William G. Cornely
      ------------------------              -----------------------------------
                                            William G. Cornely,
                                            Executive Vice President,
                                            Chief Operating Officer,
                                            Chief Financial Officer,
                                            Treasurer and Trustee


         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or
other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Glimcher Realty
Trust and will be retained by Glimcher Realty Trust and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

November 29, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

134228 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

MICHIGAN STATE EMPLOYEES Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, ASSOCIATION, RICHARD REID, Justices and TED WOLFGANG,

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v SC: 134228 

 COA: 273556 

Ct of Claims: 04-000163-MM 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 

and DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 

AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 10, 2007 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

l1119 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

November 29, 2007 

 Clerk
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUAN JOSE HERRERA-CABEZA,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 12-73017

Agency No. A072-131-472

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 18, 2014**

Before: LEAVY, FISHER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Juan Jose Herrera-Cabeza, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for 

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal 

from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum and 

withholding of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We 

 

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not 

precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for 

decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 28 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 12-73017

review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the 

standards governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID 

Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010). We review for 

abuse of discretion the agency’s denial of a motion to remand. Movsisian v. 

Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review. 

We lack jurisdiction to consider Cabeza’s past persecution claim because he 

did not raise it to the agency. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (no jurisdiction over legal claims not presented in administrative 

proceedings below). Further, Herrera-Cabeza does not raise any challenge to the 

agency’s dispositive finding that he failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of 

persecution, where he returned to El Salvador and lived without harm for over 

three years. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(issues not specifically raised and argued in a party’s opening brief are waived); 

see also Hakeem v. INS, 273 F.3d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[a]n applicant’s claim 

of persecution upon return is weakened, even undercut, . . . when the applicant has 

returned to the country without incident.”), superseded by statute on other grounds 

as stated in Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, we 

deny the petition as to Herrera-Cabeza’s asylum claim. 
3 12-73017

Because Herrera-Cabeza failed to establish eligibility for asylum, his 

withholding of removal claim necessarily fails. See Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 

1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Herrera-Cabeza’s 

request to remand where he did not establish prima facie eligibility for relief. See 

Ochoa-Amaya v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2007) (it is the petitioner’s 

burden to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
#### Peter J. Stura, *et al.,*Plaintiffs and Counter-Defendants-Appellees, *v.*Robert Krilich, Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff-Appellant.

(No. 71-29;

Second District

October 13, 1971.

*Rehearing denied November 18,1971.*

Rathje, Woodward, Dyer & Burt, of Wheaton, (Alfred E. Woodward and Gerald J. Brooks, of counsel,) for appellant.

Douglas C. Hancock, of Elmhurst, for appellee.

Opinion by

Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD.
§ 80.3 Movement of domestic animals that are positive to an official Johne's disease test. ( a ) *Movement of domestic animals for slaughter.* Domestic animals that are positive to an official Johne's disease test may be moved interstate for slaughter if: ( 1 ) The animals are moved directly to a recognized slaughtering establishment or to an approved livestock facility for sale to a recognized slaughtering establishment;
( 2 ) An owner-shipper statement that identifies the animals as positive to an official Johne's disease test accompanies the animals during the movement and is delivered to the consignee;
( 3 ) Each animal bears an official eartag; and
( 4 ) The animals are moved to the destination in one continuous movement without unloading.
( b ) *Other movements.* The Administrator may, upon request in specific cases, allow domestic animals that are positive to an official Johne's disease test to be moved interstate other than as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, under such conditions as the Administrator may prescribe in each case to prevent the spread of Johne's disease. The Administrator will promptly notify the State animal health officials of the States involved of any such action.
( c ) *Cleaning and disinfecting.* Each means of conveyance used to transport the animals must be cleaned and disinfected in accordance with § 71.6 of this chapter. The facilities in which the animals were maintained must be cleaned and disinfected in accordance with § 71.7 of this chapter.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-21143

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CLIPBERTO VALENCIA,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-98-CV-3081

USDC No. H-91-CR-39-04

--------------------

May 29, 2001

Before DAVIS, JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Clipberto Valencia, federal prisoner #59055-079, appeals

from the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, a petition that

was construed as a motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. We granted Valencia a certificate of appealability (COA)

on the issue whether the expiration of the limitations period to

seek relief pursuant to § 2255 may render § 2255 ineffective as

an avenue of relief on claims raise pursuant to Bailey v. United
No. 98-21143 

-2-

States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), allowing Valencia to seek relief

pursuant to § 2241.

Bailey was decided in 1995, before the limitations period

closed for Valencia to file a § 2255 motion. Valencia’s Bailey

claim therefore was not foreclosed by existing law during the

period when he could have filed a timely motion. The savings

clause of § 2255 therefore did not apply to Valencia’s case,

allowing him to proceed under § 2241. Reyes-Requena v. United

States, ___ F.3d ___, No. 99-41254 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2001), 2001

WL 197931 at *10.

AFFIRMED.