United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on Air and

Land Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Greater Synergies 

Possible for DOD’s 

Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance 

Systems 

May 2007 

 

GAO-07-578 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

May 2007

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 

Greater Synergies Possible for DOD’s 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Systems 

Highlights of GAO-07-578, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

The Department of Defense (DOD)

is experiencing a growing demand

for intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) assets to

provide vital information in support 

of military operations. Over the 

next 7 years, DOD plans to invest 

over $28 billion in existing and new 

airborne ISR acquisition systems.

This represents a marked increase

over prior ISR investments. 

Given the significant investments, 

GAO was asked to (1) evaluate

various ISR platforms for potential 

synergies and assess their cost and 

schedule status and the impact of 

any increases or delays on legacy

systems and (2) assess the 

effectiveness of ISR investment

decisions. To assess cost and 

schedule status, we reviewed 

programmatic and budget 

documentation. To evaluate

investment decisions, we collected

data on system capability, mission, 

and concept of operation and 

analyzed them for similarities. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that DOD 

(1) develop and implement an

integrated enterprise-level

investment strategy approach that

draws on the results of ongoing

studies and (2) report to the 

defense committees by August 1, 

2007, the results of the ISR studies 

and identify specific plans and 

actions it intends to get greater 

jointness in ISR programs. DOD

generally believes current 

initiatives will address our 

recommendations. 

DOD plans to invest over $28 billion over the next 7 years to develop, 

procure, and modernize 20 major airborne intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance systems. Nearly all of the systems in development have 

experienced cost growth or schedule delays. These problems have delayed 

the fielding of a warfighting capability and have resulted in program 

restructuring, cancellation, or unplanned investments in older legacy ISR 

systems. For example, problems in developing the Aerial Common Sensor 

affected three legacy programs, increasing their collective budgets by 

185 percent, or nearly $900 million. In many cases, GAO found that the 

newer ISR programs lacked a solid business case or a knowledge-based 

acquisition strategy before entering the development process. A good 

business case requires the manager to match the system requirements with 

mature technologies and a system design that can be built. This requires 

sufficient knowledge about the system gained through basic system 

engineering concepts and practices. 

Although it fights jointly, DOD does not always procure new systems jointly. 

Instead, each service typically develops and procures systems

independently. Opportunities exist for different services to collaborate on 

the development of similar weapon systems as a means for creating a more 

efficient and affordable way of providing new capabilities to the warfighter. 

GAO identified development programs where program managers and 

services are working together to gain these efficiencies and other programs 

that have less collaborative efforts and could lead to more costly stovepiped 

solutions. For example, the Navy and Army have collaborated successfully

on the Fire Scout, but in contrast, the Air Force and Army have not been as 

collaborative on the Predator and Warrior systems, as they each currently 

plan unique solutions to their similar needs. 

Developmental ISR Systems and Capabilities Planned 

Platforms 

Electrooptical/ 

Infrared 

Imagery 

Radar 

imagery Video

Communications 

signals 

Electronic 

signals 

Unmanned 

({); piloted, 

onboard 

operator (z) 

Aerial Common 

Sensor (ACS) 

9 9 9 9 z

Fire Scout (Army) 9 9 9 9 {

Warrior 9 9 9 9 {

E-10A 9 z

Global Hawk 9 9 9 9 {

Reaper 9 9 9 {

Space Radar 9 {

Broad Area 

Maritime 

Surveillance 

9 9 9 9 {

Fire Scout (Navy) 9 {

Multi-mission 

Maritime Aircraft 

9 z

EPX (formerly

Navy ACS) 

9 9 9 9 z

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-578.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Michael 

Sullivan, sullivanm@gao.gov, at (202) 512-

4841. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

Some ISR Development Programs Have Experienced Problems 

That Have Led to Cost Growth, Delays, and Additional 

Investments in Legacy Systems 7 

Opportunities Exist for Greater Collaboration across the Services’ 

ISR Programs 13 

Conclusions 18

Recommendations for Executive Action 19 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 19 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 24 

Appendix II System Descriptions 26 

Aerial Common Sensor 26 

Airborne Reconnaissance Low 26 

Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload 26 

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Aircraft System 26 

E-10A 27

EP-3 27

EPX 27

Fire Scout (Army) 28 

Fire Scout (Navy) 28 

Joint Surveillance, Target, Attack, Radar System 28 

Global Hawk 28 

Guardrail Common Sensor 29 

Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft 29

Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program 29 

Predator 29

Reaper 30

Rivet Joint 30 

Space Radar 30 

U-2 30

Warrior 31

Page i GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
Appendix III ISR Studies Under Way or Recently Completed 32 

Joint ISR Replacement Study 32 

U-2 Retirement Study 32 

Airborne ISR Requirements 32 

Optimization of ISR Capabilities 32 

Task Force on Integrating Sensor-Collected Intelligence 33 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 34 

Tables 

Table 1: Characteristics of ISR Programs Reviewed 5 

Table 2: Planned Investment in Airborne and Space ISR Systems 

from Fiscal Year 2007 to Fiscal Year 2013 6 

Table 3: Causes and Impacts of Cost and Schedule Growth 8 

Table 4: Fiscal Years 2004 and 2008 President’s Budget for the 

Army’s Guardrail Common Sensor and Airborne 

Reconnaissance Low and the Navy’s EP-3 11 

Figure 

Figure 1: U-2 Retirement and Global Hawk Fielding 12 

Page ii GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
Abbreviations 

ACS Aerial Common Sensor 

ARIES Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronics System 

ARL Airborne Reconnaissance Low 

ASIP Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload 

BAMS Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 

COMINT communication intelligence 

DOD Department of Defense 

ELINT electronic intelligence

EO electro-optical 

FMV full-motion video 

GRCS Guardrail Common Sensor 

IR infrared 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

MASINT measurement and signature intelligence 

MMA Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft 

MP-RTIP Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PA&E Program Analysis and Evaluation 

RJ Rivet Joint 

SAR synthetic aperture radar 

SIGINT signals intelligence 

SR Space Radar 

STARS Surveillance, Target, Attack, Radar System 

UAS unmanned aerial system 

USAF U. S. Air Force 

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

 Technology and Logistics 

USD(I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

VTUAV Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial 

 Vehicle 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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reproduce this material separately. 

Page iii GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

May 17, 2 ay 17, 2007

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jim Saxton 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jim Saxton 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Over the next 7 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest

over $28 billion to develop, procure, and modify 20 major airborne 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and maintain 

existing systems until the new ones are fielded. This planned investment 

represents a significant increase over past ISR investments and comes in 

response to threats that have emerged over the past decade and the high

priority commanders have placed on gathering battlefield intelligence. 

Over the next 7 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest

over $28 billion to develop, procure, and modify 20 major airborne 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and maintain 

existing systems until the new ones are fielded. This planned investment 

represents a significant increase over past ISR investments and comes in 

response to threats that have emerged over the past decade and the high

priority commanders have placed on gathering battlefield intelligence. 

Given the significant planned investment in ISR and DOD’s recent focus on 

its acquisition strategy, you asked us to review DOD’s ISR acquisition 

strategy. Specifically, we (1) evaluated various ISR platforms for potential 

synergies and assessed their cost and schedule status and the impact of 

any increases or delays on legacy systems (2) assessed the effectiveness of 

ISR investment decisions. 

Given the significant planned investment in ISR and DOD’s recent focus on 

its acquisition strategy, you asked us to review DOD’s ISR acquisition 

strategy. Specifically, we (1) evaluated various ISR platforms for potential 

synergies and assessed their cost and schedule status and the impact of 

any increases or delays on legacy systems (2) assessed the effectiveness of 

ISR investment decisions. 

To assess the cost and schedule status of ISR systems, we reviewed 

programmatic and budget documentation. To evaluate the effectiveness of 

decisions for planned investments, we collected information on system 

capability, mission, and concept of operation and analyzed the data for 

similarities. We also discussed the results of our analyses with officials at

the program office; Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters; the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and the Joint Chief of Staff for 

Intelligence. (For more on our scope and methodology, see app. I.) We 

conducted our work between June 2006 and April 2007 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

To assess the cost and schedule status of ISR systems, we reviewed 

programmatic and budget documentation. To evaluate the effectiveness of 

decisions for planned investments, we collected information on system 

capability, mission, and concept of operation and analyzed the data for 

similarities. We also discussed the results of our analyses with officials at

the program office; Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters; the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and the Joint Chief of Staff for 

Intelligence. (For more on our scope and methodology, see app. I.) We 

conducted our work between June 2006 and April 2007 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In addition to this report, GAO is conducting two related review efforts for 

the committee. These efforts will review and report on (1) DOD’s process 

to set requirements for ISR systems and (2) DOD’s process for integrating

unmanned aerial systems (UAS) into ongoing combat operations in 

In addition to this report, GAO is conducting two related review efforts for 

the committee. These efforts will review and report on (1) DOD’s process 

to set requirements for ISR systems and (2) DOD’s process for integrating

unmanned aerial systems (UAS) into ongoing combat operations in 

Page 1 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
support of ISR requirements. Two separate reports on these issues will be

provided later in 2007. 

Nearly all of the ISR development programs that we reviewed have 

experienced some cost or schedule growth. Cost and schedule growth in 

these programs is largely the result of a poor business case or acquisition 

strategy that failed to capture sufficient knowledge about the product 

technologies and design before committing to the development and 

demonstration of a new system. For example, the Global Hawk program—

which experienced a 261 percent cost growth—had significant overlap of 

technology maturation, design, and production. Significant delays in the 

delivery of some new systems, breaking the investment strategy (for the 

new and legacy systems to be replaced) established at the start of these 

acquisition programs, have required DOD to make additional unplanned

investments in legacy systems in order to keep them relevant and 

operational longer than planned. For example, the termination of the 

Aerial Common Sensor development contract resulted in a 5-year delay 

and the need to modify three legacy systems to keep them in the field 

longer than planned. The cost to keep these systems capable is estimated 

at $1.4 billion between fiscal years 2008 and 2013, an increase of nearly 

$900 million over previous estimates to do so. These unplanned 

investments represent opportunity costs that could have been used for 

other needs within DOD had the original Aerial Common Sensor 

acquisition strategy been based on more robust design knowledge. 

Results in Brief 

Among the ISR acquisition programs we reviewed, we found specific cases 

where the military services have successfully collaborated to provide 

capabilities to the warfighter more efficiently and affordably. For example, 

the Army and Navy programs on their own initiative collaborated 

successfully on the Fire Scout to use a single contract to buy common 

components that can save hundreds of millions of dollars. However, we 

also found cases where more collaboration is needed to achieve 

efficiencies in costs and schedule and to close gaps in capabilities. For 

example, despite similarities in the Air Force’s Predator program and the 

Army’s Warrior program, the two services have resisted collaboration, and 

the Army awarded a separate development contract to the same

contractor producing the Predator. Although the Army and Air Force 

agreed to consider cooperating on the acquisition of the two systems in 

January 2006, the services continue to struggle to agree on requirements. 

Through collaboration, the services could leverage knowledge early in the 

acquisition process and avoid or reduce DOD costs for design, new 

tooling, and manufacturing, and streamline contracting and acquisition 

Page 2 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
processes. DOD has numerous ISR studies, either recently completed or 

ongoing, and a pilot program to investigate portfolio management 

practices, but there have been no current actions to gain greater jointness 

in ISR acquisition programs. 

While DOD has numerous ISR studies, either recently completed or 

ongoing and including a pilot program to investigate portfolio management 

practices, there have been no substantive actions recently implemented to 

gain greater jointness in ISR acquisition programs. 

Therefore, we are recommending that DOD (1) develop and implement an 

integrated enterprise-level investment strategy approach that draws on the 

results of ongoing studies like portfolio management and (2) report to the 

defense committees by August 1, 2007, the results of the ISR studies and 

identify the specific plans and actions it intends to get greater jointness in 

ISR programs. DOD agreed with the first recommendation but believes 

that current initiatives will address it. We believe that many of the ongoing 

initiatives to achieve a greater integrated investment strategy approach for 

ISR are steps in the right direction but are concerned that they will not go 

far enough to address the problems that have occurred in DOD 

acquisitions for some time now. DOD also agreed to report the interim 

status on the portfolio management program by the above date but 

suggested moving the suspense date for reporting on the results of two 

other pertinent efforts to the end of the calendar year. We believe a full 

reporting in December 2007 would be useful if it includes DOD’s detailed 

plans. However, we believe an interim reporting to the committees on the

results and planned outcomes from completed studies should be provided 

to the committees by August 2007. 

ISR directly supports the planning and conduct of current and future 

military operations. ISR encompasses multiple activities related to the 

planning and operation of sensors and assets that collect, process, and 

disseminate data. Intelligence data can take many forms, including electrooptical (EO) and infrared (IR) images, full-motion video (FMV), images 

from a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), electronics intelligence (ELINT), 

communications intelligence (COMINT), and measures and signature 

intelligence (MASINT). These data can come from a variety of sources, 

including surveillance and reconnaissance systems that operate in space 

or on manned or unmanned systems. Data can also come from systems 

that are ground- or sea-based or from human intelligence teams. Table 1 

summarizes the ISR programs that we reviewed, 13 of which are in 

Background 

Page 3 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
development. (A brief description of each of the 20 programs we reviewed 

is provided in app. II.) 

Page 4 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
Table 1: Characteristics of ISR Programs Reviewed 

Imagery 

intelligence 

Signals 

intelligence 

Platform EO/IR SAR FMV

Wet 

film COMINT ELINT MASINT

Development 

(D)/Legacy (L)e

Unmanned ({); 

piloted, no

onboard 

operator (~);

piloted, onboard 

operator (z) 

Army 

Aerial Common Sensor 9 9 9 9 9 D z

Airborne Reconnaissance Low 9 9 9 L z

Fire Scout 9 9 9 9 D {

Guardrail Common Sensor 9 9 L ~

Warriora9 9 9 9 D {

Air Force 

Airborne Signals Intelligence 

Payloadb

9 9 D N/A

E-10Ad 9 D z

Global Hawk 9 9 9 9 D {

Joint Surveillance, Target, Attack, 

Radar System

9 L z

Multi-Platform Radar Technology 

Insertion Programc

9 D N/A

Predatora9 9 9 9 9 L {

Reapera 9 9 9 D {

Rivet Joint 9 9 L z

Space Radar 9 D {

U-2 9 9 9 9 9 L ~

Navy 

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 9 9 9 9 D {

EP-3 9 9 L z

Fire Scout 9 D {

Multi-mission Maritime Aircrafta9 D z

EPX (formerly Navy Aerial 

Common Sensor) 

9 9 9 9 D z

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

a

These systems also carry munitions. 

b

This is a payload being developed for deployment on the U-2 and Global Hawk. 

c

This is a payload being developed for deployment on the Global Hawk. 

d

The E-10A program was a technology development program until it was canceled in February 2007. 

e

Development refers to technology or systems development activities. 

Page 5 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
DOD plans significant investments in airborne ISR systems. For example, 

between fiscal years 2007 and 2013, DOD plans to invest $28.8 billion in 

the 20 systems we reviewed. (See table 2.) 

Table 2: Planned Investment in Airborne and Space ISR Systems from Fiscal Year 2007 to Fiscal Year 2013 

(Dollars in millions) 

Research and 

development Procurement Total

Army 

Aerial Common Sensor $1,452 $0 $1,452

Airborne Reconnaissance Low 23 193 216

Fire Scouta 0 0 0

Guardrail Common Sensor 4 547 551

Warrior 958 1,211 2,169

Air Force 

Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload 574 0 574

E-10Ab 259 0 259

Global Hawk 1,680 4,439 6,119

Joint Surveillance, Target, Attack, Radar System 745 945 1,690

Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program 393 0 393

Predator 205 2,261 2,466

Reaper 222 1,292 1,514

Rivet Joint 111 908 1,019

Space Radar 266 0 266

U-2 1 0 1

Navy 

EPX (formerly Navy Aerial Common Sensor) 997 0 997

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 2,319 0 2,319

EP-3 250 665 915

Fire Scout 117 509 626

Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft 5,364 111 5,475

Total $15,753 $13,081 $28,834

Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data. 

a

The Army does not break out Fire Scout costs separately. They are included as part of Future 

Combat Systems. 

b

The E-10A program was a technology development program until it was canceled in February 2007. 

Congress has also recognized the need in acquiring UAS. For example, it 

added funding between fiscal years 2003 and 2005 to enable the Air Force 

Page 6 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
to accelerate procurement of the Reaper UAS. Over those 3 years, 

Congress increased the Reaper budget over $70 million, directing the Air

Force to procure a total of 8 additional air vehicles. Similarly, the Navy 

Fire Scout budget was increased by $17 million in fiscal year 2006 to 

procure 2 additional air vehicles. In fiscal year 2003, the Global Hawk 

budget was increased by $90 million, primarily to develop advanced 

payloads for signals and imagery intelligence capabilities.1

Nearly all of the 13 airborne ISR programs in development that we 

reviewed have experienced some cost or schedule growth. 2

 Cost and 

schedule growth in these programs is largely the result of a poor business 

case or acquisition strategy that failed to capture sufficient knowledge 

about the product technologies and design before committing to the 

development and demonstration of a new system. Significant delays in the

delivery of some new systems, breaking the investment strategy (for the 

new and legacy systems to be replaced) established at the start of these 

acquisition programs, have required DOD to make additional unplanned

investments in legacy systems in order to keep them relevant and 

operational longer than planned. Delays in the Aerial Common Sensor 

(ACS) aircraft have required DOD to make additional unplanned 

investments in three Army and Navy legacy aircraft systems in order to 

keep them relevant and operational longer than planned. These additional 

investments, totaling about $900 million, represent opportunity costs that 

could have been used for other needs within DOD. 

Of the 13 airborne ISR programs in development, 1 has experienced 

significant cost growth and 9 have experienced schedule delays that range 

from 2 months to 60 months. Table 3 summarizes ISR programs that have 

encountered problems either in development or as they prepared to begin 

the system development and demonstration phase of an acquisition 

program. 

Some ISR 

Development 

Programs Have 

Experienced 

Problems That Have 

Led to Cost Growth, 

Delays, and 

Additional 

Investments in Legacy 

Systems

Cost, Schedule, and 

Performance Status of 

Airborne ISR Programs 

 1

The additional funding does not include DOD or service requests for supplemental funding

in fiscal year 2007 or 2008. 

2

All of these 13 programs are in technology development, or systems development and 

demonstration as defined by DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition 

System (May 12, 2003). The purpose of development is to reduce technology risk and to

determine the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system. 

Page 7 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
Table 3: Causes and Impacts of Cost and Schedule Growth 

System Problem encountered Impact

E-10A Uncertain need, immature technology, and 

funding availability 

Program canceled 

Aerial Common Sensor Requirements and design changes Development contract terminated, program being 

restructured, schedule delayed 60 months, and 

increased investments in legacy systems 

Global Hawk Concurrent acquisition, immature technology, 

and requirements and design changes 

Cost growth (261 percent in development), schedule 

delayed 36 months, program restructured, potential 

increased investments in legacy system 

Reaper Concurrent acquisition and immature technology Cost growth (13 percent in development) and schedule 

delayed 7 months 

Broad Area Maritime 

Surveillance 

Immature technology and funding availability Schedule delayed 39 months

Multi-mission Maritime 

Aircraft 

Immature technology None to date 

Army Fire Scout Business case dependent on another major 

acquisition program (Future Combat Systems)a

Schedule delayed 22 months

Navy Fire Scout Business case dependent on another major 

acquisition program (Littoral Combat Ship)a

Schedule delayed 3 months 

Space Radar Immature technology and requirements change Cost growth (18 percent in development), schedule 

delayed 8 months, and program restructured

Multi-Platform Radar 

Technology Insertion 

Program 

Acquisition strategy and funding dependent on 

other major acquisition programs (E-10A 

canceled and Global Hawk continues) 

Requirements changed and program restructured 

Warrior Concurrent acquisition strategy and immature 

technology 

Cost growth (21 percent in development); schedule 

delayed 9 months 

Airborne Signals 

Intelligence Payload 

Immature technology and design Schedule delayed 2 months 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

a

Due to delays in the Future Combat Systems and Littoral Combat Ship programs, the schedules for 

the Fire Scout programs were correspondingly delayed. These delays could occur again, even if the 

specific Fire Scout program was meeting its cost and schedule. 

b

EPX, the Navy’s replacement for its EP-3, was not included because it is a new program as of 

February 2007. 

Many of these programs began development without an executable 

business case and did not have a good acquisition strategy to capture 

critical system knowledge at the key decision milestones. Our work on 

best commercial practices has shown that before a company invests in 

product development, it should develop a sound business case—one that 

validates user requirements and determines that the concept can be

successfully developed with existing resources—to minimize the risks 

associated with such a commitment. For DOD, an executable business 

Page 8 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
case provides demonstrated evidence that (1) the warfighter need is valid

and that it can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the concept 

can be developed and produced with proven technologies, existing design 

knowledge, and available funding and time. To implement the business 

case, programs must develop a realistic acquisition strategy, one that 

includes critical program knowledge—such as technology maturity, 

system design, and manufacturing and production processes—at key 

points in the acquisition. DOD’s acquisition policy endorses a knowledgebased approach to acquisition and includes strategies to reduce 

technology, integration, design, manufacturing, and production risks.3

Global Hawk is an example of a program that failed to implement best 

practices for developing a new weapon system and encountered 

significant cost and schedule problems. It initially began with an 

incremental acquisition strategy that approached best practice standards 

for technology and design maturity. However, after development began the 

Air Force abandoned this strategy and radically restructured the program 

to develop and acquire a larger, more advanced aircraft that would have 

multimission capabilities (both signals intelligence and imagery 

intelligence sensors on the same aircraft). This new strategy called for 

concurrent technology development, design, test, integration, and 

production in a compressed schedule. As a result, the program has been 

rebaselined four times, the development schedule has been extended by 

3 years, and the program has experienced a substantial contract cost 

overrun. Development costs alone have increased over 260 percent. In 

addition, unit costs have increased to the point where statutory reporting 

thresholds were triggered, requiring DOD to recertify the fundamental 

program need to Congress.4

Impact of Delays on 

Legacy Systems 

The ACS and Global Hawk programs’ failures to develop an executable 

acquisition strategy have resulted in significant delays in delivering 

required capabilities to the warfighter at the time overall investment 

decisions were made. These delays will have significant implications for 

 3

DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 2003). 

4

10 USC § 2433 requires the Secretary concerned to report to Congress when a program’s 

unit cost increases by at least 15 percent over the current baseline estimate or increases by

30 percent over the original baseline estimate and requires the Secretary of Defense to 

carry out an assessment of the program and provide written certification to Congress when 

a program’s unit cost increases by at least 25 percent over the current estimate or increases 

by 50 percent over the original baseline estimate. 

Page 9 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
legacy systems. Specifically, the services must now make difficult 

decisions about investing in legacy systems to keep them operational until

the new systems have been developed and fielded. 

The Army’s termination of the ACS system development and 

demonstration contract could have significant cost, schedule, and 

performance impacts on three legacy airborne systems in the ISR 

portfolio—the Army’s Guardrail Common Sensor aircraft (GRCS) and 

Airborne Reconnaissance Low aircraft (ARL) and the Navy’s EP-3 aircraft. 

The Army and the Navy had planned a phased approach to field ACS and 

retire the legacy systems from the inventory with a minimal investment in 

maintaining legacy systems. In the fiscal year 2004 budget, the Army had 

planned for small investments in GRCS and ARL because it expected to

begin replacing them with ACS in 2009. In that same budget, the Navy’s 

request reflected its plan to modify the EP-3.5

 By the time DOD submitted

its fiscal year 2008 budget, both services recognized the need to keep 

legacy systems capable because the ACS development contract was 

canceled. Therefore, the budget included funding to keep these legacy 

systems operational for a longer period of time. 

Aerial Common Sensor 

Since the termination of the ACS development contract, the program has 

reverted to a technology development stage as the Army restructures the 

program. ACS is scheduled to restart system development and 

demonstration in 2009, 5 years later than the initial development decision.

Although the Army has not established a new date for initial operating 

capacity, that date is also likely to slip by 5 years to fiscal year 2014. The 

cost to keep GRCS and ARL mission equipment viable and the platforms 

airworthy during this time is estimated to be $562 million between fiscal 

years 2008 and 2013, an increase of $550 million over what had been

previously planned. Without these improvements, the systems will not 

remain capable against modern threats, possibly resulting in a gap in ISR 

capabilities on the battlefield. In addition, the platforms could not 

continue to fly during this time frame without increased structural and 

avionic modifications. 

The Navy had planned to replace its EP-3 with ACS and begin fielding the 

new system in fiscal year 2012. After the Army terminated the ACS 

development contract, the Navy considered remaining part of the Army’s 

 5

The Navy’s fiscal year 2004 budget did not include any funding for ACS because it was 

submitted before the decision to jointly acquire ACS with the Army. 

Page 10 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
development effort. However, according to Navy officials, the Chief of 

Naval Operations directed the Navy to proceed with a separate

development effort, designated the EPX. The Navy now plans to proceed 

with system development and demonstration in the fourth quarter of fiscal

year 2010. The Navy has not established a date to begin fielding the new 

system, but that is not likely to take place before 2017. This will be a 5-year 

slip in retiring the oldest EP-3 systems and will make modifications to 

those systems necessary so that they can remain in the field until the Navy 

achieves full operating capacity for its EPX. The Navy plans to invest 

$823 million between fiscal years 2008 and 2013 to modify the EP-3, an 

increase of 73 percent over the $475 million that was previously planned. 

Table 4 summarizes the budgetary impact of the delay in developing and 

fielding ACS on the legacy systems it was to replace. 

Table 4: Fiscal Years 2004 and 2008 President’s Budget for the Army’s Guardrail 

Common Sensor and Airborne Reconnaissance Low and the Navy’s EP-3 

Dollars in millions 

Program and appropriation

2004 

budget 

(2004–2009)

2008 

budget 

(2008–2013) Increase Percent

GRCS and ARL 

Development 0 $22,700 $22,700 N/Aa

Procurement $11,100 539,300 528,200 4,758

Total $11,100 $562,000 $550,900 4,963

EP-3 

Development 0 $215,429 $215,429 N/Aa

Procurement 474,600 607,700 133,100 28

Total $474,600 $823,129 $348,529 73

Total GRCS, ARL, and EP-3 

Development 0 $238,129 $238,129 N/Aa

Procurement 485,700 1,147,000 661,300 136

Total $485,700 $1,385,129 $899,429 185

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

a

Percent increase from zero is not calculated. 

The Air Force plans to replace the U-2 with the Global Hawk, but delays in

the Global Hawk program have contributed to the need to keep the U-2 in

the inventory longer than anticipated. In December 2005, the Air Force had 

planned to begin retiring the U-2 in fiscal year 2007 and complete the 

Global Hawk 

Page 11 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
retirement by fiscal year 2012. Although the next configuration of the 

Global Hawk (with limited signals intelligence capability) is scheduled for 

delivery in fiscal year 2009, it will not have the same capability as the U-2.

The version of the Global Hawk that plans to include a more robust signals 

intelligence capability is scheduled to begin deliveries in 2012. The Air 

Force is now developing a plan to fully retire the U-2s a year later, in 2013, 

and at a slower rate than in the 2005 plan. There are no funds in the budget 

beyond fiscal year 2006, but Air Force officials stated they intend to fund 

projects necessary to keep the U-2 capable. Figure 1 shows the rate at

which the Air Force had planned to retire the U-2 and the revised 

retirement plan compared to Global Hawk fielding. 

Figure 1: U-2 Retirement and Global Hawk Fielding

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Aircraft inventory

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Fiscal year

Current U-2 plan

Initial U-2 plan

Global Hawk

Page 12 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
Among the ISR acquisition programs we reviewed, we found specific cases 

where the military services have successfully collaborated and achieved 

savings of time and resources. The Army estimated that for its Fire Scout 

program, buying common components with the Navy Fire Scout program 

would save $200 million in development costs alone and that there were 

greater opportunities for savings. However, we also found cases where 

more collaboration is needed to provide greater efficiencies and jointness 

in developing more affordable new systems and to close gaps in 

capabilities. These programs include the potential for greater 

collaboration between the Navy Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 

(BAMS) and the Air Force Global Hawk programs, and the Air Force 

Predator and Army Warrior programs. 

In 2000, the Navy began development of the Fire Scout, a vertical takeoff 

and landing UAS for use on surface ships. At the same time, the Army

began concept development for its Future Combat Systems (FCS) 

program. 6 The Army Fire Scout was selected for the Future Combat 

Systems in 2003. Although these programs were not required to work 

jointly or collaborate, Army Fire Scout program managers contacted their 

counterparts in the Navy to determine whether efficiencies could be 

achieved through collaboration. 

Opportunities Exist 

for Greater 

Collaboration across 

the Services’ ISR 

Programs 

Army and Navy’s 

Collaboration on Fire 

Scout Has Achieved 

Efficiencies 

Officials from the two programs met several times to share information on 

their respective aircraft’s configuration, performance requirements, 

testing, support, and other issues. Initially the requirements for the two 

systems were quite different. For example, the Army’s UAS had four rotor 

blades and a larger engine, while Navy’s system had three rotor blades and 

a smaller engine. However, after discussions, the Navy officials 

determined that the Army’s Fire Scout aircraft would meet their needs and 

decided to switch to the Army’s configuration. Both services are buying 

common components, such as the air vehicle and flight components, 

under one contract. 

An Army program management official estimated that the savings to the 

Army in research and development alone would be about $200 million. 

As both programs mature, the official believes additional synergies and 

 6

The Army’s Future Combat Systems , a family of systems that will equip the Army’s 

transformational combat brigades, are composed of unmanned ground and air vehicles

(including the Fire Scout), networked combat and sustainment systems, and unattended 

sensors and munitions. FCS is about halfway through its development. 

Page 13 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
savings could be realized through contract price breaks on quantities and 

shared test assets, such as air vehicles, support equipment, and test 

components. Jointly acquiring common hardware under one contract will 

also reduce procurement administrative lead time and permit common 

design, tooling, and testing. Finally, future payload development, such as 

communications, sensors, and data links, could be procured jointly. 

In 2000, the Navy identified a mission need for a broad area maritime and 

littoral ISR capability and on the basis of a 2002 analysis of alternatives, 

the Navy decided to pursue a manned platform, the Multi-mission 

Maritime Aircraft (MMA), with an unmanned adjunct, BAMS. The Navy 

subsequently performed an analysis of alternatives for the BAMS program,

which identified several potential alternatives; foremost among them was 

the Global Hawk system. As a risk reduction effort, the Navy funded the 

Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration program in 2003. Working through 

the existing Air Force contract, the Navy procured two Global Hawk UAS 

and associated ground controls and equipment.7

 The demonstration 

program was expected to leverage the existing Global Hawk system to 

develop tactics, training, and techniques for maritime mission 

applications. 

The BAMS program is at a critical juncture. It released a request for 

proposals in February 2007 and plans to proceed with system development 

and demonstration in October 2007. If the Global Hawk (or another 

existing system like the Air Force Reaper) is selected, there are 

opportunities for the Navy to work with the Air Force and take advantage 

of its knowledge on the existing platform. Through collaboration, the Navy 

could leverage knowledge early in the acquisition process and avoid or 

reduce costs for design, new tooling, and manufacturing, and streamline 

contracting and acquisition processes. 

Despite similarities in the Predator and Warrior programs, the Air Force 

and Army have repeatedly resisted collaboration. The Air Force’s Predator 

is a legacy program that has been operational since 1995. Its persistent 

surveillance/full motion video capability continues to be a valued asset to 

Collaboration on Broad 

Area Maritime Surveillance 

Could Yield Similar 

Efficiencies 

Collaboration Slow to 

Occur on Warrior and 

Predator 

 7

The Navy acquired two older (RQ-4A) Global Hawk aircraft for the demonstration. These 

aircraft were configured with radar software that incorporates maritime search and inverse

SAR modes. 

Page 14 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
the warfighter. However, when the Army began in 2001 to define 

requirements for the Warrior, a system similar to the Predator, it did not 

fully explore potential synergies and efficiencies with the Air Force 

program. The Army did not perform an analysis of alternatives to explore 

other options to a new system; it cited the urgent need of battlefield 

commanders for the capability. In lieu of an analysis of alternatives, the 

Army conducted a full and open competition and awarded the contract to

the same contractor producing the Predator. Although the requirements 

for the Warrior were subsequently validated, reviewing officials from the 

Air Force and the Joint Staff raised concerns about duplication of an 

existing capability. 

Both Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have 

raised concerns about duplication between the two systems. During 

question and answer sessions at various Congressional hearings, members 

of Congress sought an explanation of the need for both systems. In 

addition, OSD commissioned an industrial capabilities study to assess 

whether the contractor for the Predator and the Warrior had sufficient 

capacity to produce both systems at the same time. While the study did not 

find any major production constraints, it concluded that the two systems 

were 80 percent common. In January 2006, the Army and Air Force agreed 

to consider cooperating on the acquisition of the two systems. However, 

progress to date in implementing the agreement has been limited due 

partly to differences in operating concepts for the two services. Unlike the

Air Force, the Army does not use rated pilots; it relies on technicians and 

automated takeoff and landing equipment. In addition, the Army uses 

direct-line-of-sight communications, while the Air Force uses beyond-lineof-sight communications. Despite these inherent differences, there are still 

many areas available for collaboration, including airframes, ground 

stations, and equipment.8

The Air Force and the Army are currently working to identify program

synergies in a three-phased approach: 

• First, the Air Force will acquire and test two of the more modern 

Warrior airframes. 

 8

The Air Force requires pilots who are formally trained and rated according to Air Force 

aeronautical standards. These standards include several levels of pilot training, experience, 

and military flying time. In contrast, the Army uses highly trained enlisted operators. Since 

most of its unmanned systems have automatic takeoff and landing capability, the Army 

does not require rated pilots to operate them. 

Page 15 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
• Second, the two services will compare their requirements for ground 

control stations and automated takeoff and landing. 

• Finally, the Army and Air Force plan to compare concepts of operation 

and training requirements for additional synergies. 

To date, the Army has coordinated the proposed approach through the 

Vice Chief of Staff level, but the agreement has not yet been approved by

the Department of Army. The Air Force is still working to resolve 

comments and concerns at lower organizational levels. In the interim, the 

Air Force has greatly increased the number of Predator aircraft it plans to

procure annually to meet the high demand from the warfighter for this 

capability, increased in part by the war on terror. Instead of buying 

7 Predator aircraft per year, as the Air Force had initially planned, it now

plans to buy 24 aircraft in both 2007 and 2008, as well as another 

22 aircraft as stated in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request. In total, 

the Air Force plans to buy 160 Predators between fiscal years 2008 and

2013.

9

The Air Force is currently seeking authority to become the executive agent 

for medium- and high-altitude UAS operating above 3,500 feet. As a part of

its efforts, in March 2007 the Air Force began a comprehensive study of all 

existing and planned (airborne and space-based) ISR systems. As 

executive agent, the Air Force believes it could improve the allocation of 

UAS, avoid duplication of separate service acquisition efforts by 

centralizing procurement, standardize downlinks, and control burgeoning 

bandwidth requirements.10 However, the Air Force still intends to procure 

two Warriors for testing, but details of a potential collaboration with the 

Army remain uncertain. 

Timing on the Army and Air Force’s collaboration is critical: The longer 

the services wait to collaborate, the lower the return. The opportunity to 

achieve synergies in design, manufacturing, and support will greatly 

 9

These quantities do not include those to be acquired as a result of additional funding

provided by Congress in earlier years or quantities associated with supplemental requests. 

10Bandwidth refers to the available frequencies to support the flight of a UAS and is needed

to support systems that control the flight of certain unmanned aircraft, to transmit data 

collected by payload sensors, and to interface with air traffic control centers. Because UAS 

and other weapons or communications systems, including manned aircraft, often operate

on the same frequency, certain frequencies can become congested and interference can 

occur. 

Page 16 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
diminish as the Warrior matures and more and more Predators are added 

to the inventory. 

DOD Efforts to Improve 

Collaboration 

The environment in which DOD operates has changed significantly since 

2001. In recognition of this, the department’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense 

Review described a vision that focuses on defining ISR needs based on the 

type of intelligence or sensor rather than on the platform that carried the 

sensor. Specifically, the department’s vision for ISR is to establish 

persistent surveillance over the battlefield and define ISR sensor needs in 

terms of the type of intelligence needed rather than the air, surface, or 

space platform in which they operate. Accordingly, the department 

initiated a number of studies aimed at reviewing ISR requirements and 

developing solutions either through new development programs or 

changes in current systems (see app. III for a brief description of these 

studies). While most of the studies have been completed, as of March 2007, 

DOD had released the results of only one—the Joint ISR study, which 

validated the requirement and confirmed the continued need for the 

Army’s ACS program. The results of the other studies have not been 

released outside of DOD, but according to DOD officials, several were 

briefed to senior leadership within OSD and the Joint Staff. 

One study DOD is undertaking has some promise to better manage the 

requirements for future ISR capabilities across DOD by applying a joint 

capability portfolio management concept to acquisition planning. This 

pilot program is a test case to enable DOD to develop and manage ISR 

capabilities across the entire department—rather than by military service 

or individual program—and by doing so, to improve the interoperability of 

future capabilities, minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and 

maximize capability effectiveness. However, the portfolios are largely 

advisory and will, as a first step, provide input to decisions made through 

the acquisition and budgeting process. At this point the capability portfolio 

managers have not been given direct authority to manage fiscal resources 

and make investment decisions. Without portfolios in which managers 

have authority and control over resources, DOD is at risk of continuing to 

develop and acquire systems in a stovepiped manner, and of not knowing 

whether its systems are being developed within available resources.11

 11 GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System 

Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-388 (Washington, D.C.:

Mar. 30, 2007). 

Page 17 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
In addition to the various studies previously initiated, two more studies 

were recently commissioned in February and March of 2007. The Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics requested 

that the Defense Science Board establish a task force to assess whether 

current and planned ISR systems provide sufficient support for U.S. 

military forces. The objectives of the study are to (1) determine what 

improvements are needed for ISR systems, (2) examine the balance and 

mix of sensors to identify gaps and redundancies, and (3) identify 

vulnerabilities, potential problems, and consistency with DOD network 

centered strategy. The Secretary also asked the task force to review the 

findings of previous studies as part of the assessment. In addition, the 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force recently began a comprehensive study of all 

existing and planned airborne and space-based ISR systems to determine 

their efficiencies and inefficiencies. The effort includes developing a plan

to increase interdependence of medium- and high-altitude UAS and 

establish the Air Force as the executive agent for all UAS in those regimes. 

A specific date for reporting the results of these two studies has not been 

established.

Many ISR systems suffer from the same cost, schedule, and performance 

problems as other DOD acquisition programs by failing to establish a good 

business case or capture critical product knowledge at key decision points 

before moving forward in the acquisition process. In some cases, the 

outcomes have been costly as legacy systems, once planned for an earlier 

retirement, must now stay in the inventory, requiring additional unplanned 

investments to keep them relevant and operationally ready until a new 

capability can be fielded. The funds spent to keep these systems viable 

represent opportunity costs that could have been used for other DOD 

priorities. GAO has made numerous recommendations in recent years to 

improve the acquisition process and get more predictable outcomes in 

major acquisition programs, and these would apply to the development of

ISR systems.

Conclusions 

Ideally, because of the warfighter’s universal needs for ISR information, 

determining requirements and planning for ISR acquisition programs 

should be based on a joint process that occurs at the enterprise level in

DOD to ensure economies and efficiencies based on effective joint 

solutions to the maximum extent possible. DOD has various studies in 

process that appear to have this as a goal for ISR, but for now it is not 

routinely happening. The portfolio management pilot program could 

potentially improve how DOD determines requirements and sets up new 

acquisition programs for ISR capabilities. However, the portfolios are 

Page 18 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
largely advisory, and the managers have no direct authority to make 

investment decisions. Without authority and control over investments 

there is the risk that nothing will change. At best for now, there are some 

acquisition programs that through their own initiative have garnered 

benefits from collaborative efforts. Others still choose a stovepiped 

approach to provide a unique system for the specific military service’s 

needs. 

While DOD has numerous ISR studies, either recently completed or 

ongoing, there have been no substantive actions recently implemented to 

gain greater jointness in ISR acquisition programs. Therefore, we 

recommend that DOD 

1. Develop and implement an integrated enterprise-level investment 

strategy approach that is based on a joint assessment of 

warfighting needs and a full set of potential and viable alternative 

solutions, considering cross-service solutions including new 

acquisitions and modifications to legacy systems within realistic 

and affordable budget projections for DOD. This strategy should 

draw on the results of ongoing studies, like the portfolio 

management pilot program, but should include the necessary 

authority and controls needed to ensure a single point of 

accountability for resource decisions. 

2. Report to the defense committees by August 1, 2007, the results of 

the ISR studies and identify the specific plans and actions needed 

and intended to make joint acquisition decisions in ISR programs

and improve the way it plans, buys, organizes, manages, and 

executes its ISR acquisition programs and operations. 

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The 

comments appear in appendix IV. 

DOD agreed that it can report the interim status of ongoing ISR studies to 

the committees by August 1, 2007, but suggested that delaying this 

reporting until December 31, 2007, would allow the department to include

the results of two pertinent studies now ongoing. We believe a full 

reporting in December 2007 would be useful if it includes DOD’s detailed 

plans on how it will achieve an integrated enterprise-level investment 

strategy for ISR including planned changes to policy and guidance, 

organization, and points of authority and responsibility. However, we 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 19 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
believe an interim reporting to the committees on the results and planned 

outcomes from completed studies should be provided to the committees 

by August 2007. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation to develop and implement an 

integrated enterprise-level investment strategy for ISR and stated that it

thought this process was well under way in existing department processes. 

However, it non-concurred with having a single point of authority and 

control for ISR resource decisions and provided a number of arguments as 

to why sufficient information was not included in the report to support 

this specific part of the recommendation. We continue to believe that our 

recommendation for an enterprise-level investment strategy with a single

point of accountability for resources decisions is necessary to maximize to 

the full extent efficiency and effectiveness in acquiring major acquisition 

systems. The Defense Science Board Summer Study on Transformation

reported in February 2006 came to similar conclusions: that the Secretary 

of Defense should assemble a small direct-reporting cell to create and 

maintain a metric-based, multiyear plan that specifies what is to be done, 

when, with what resources, and with what capability output.

12 It concluded 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

needs authority over architectures, resources, and personnel. Our other 

review efforts of the acquisition and requirements processes continue to 

show that DOD has not sufficiently improved the process to ensure crossservice redundancies are reduced or eliminated where possible. Therefore, 

without this single point of authority, limited defense resources are still 

not optimally used to develop and produce weapon systems. Our 

comments below address the specific arguments presented in DOD’s 

response to this report. 

We believe that many of the ongoing initiatives to achieve a greater 

integrated investment strategy approach for ISR are steps in the right 

direction but are concerned that they will not go far enough to address the 

problems that have occurred in DOD acquisitions for some time now. DOD 

suggests that the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

(JCIDS) has been implemented to identify joint warfighting capabilities. 

We agree that the JCIDS emphasizes a more joint approach to identifying 

and prioritizing warfighting needs. However, as reported in our March 30,

2007 report, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management 

 12DOD, Defense Science Board Summer Study on Transformation: A Progress 

Assessment, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2006). 

Page 20 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
Approach to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD’s 

Acquisition Outcomes, this system is still not working as planned. Despite 

the provisions of JCIDS, needs continue to be based on investment 

decision-making processes that do not function together to ensure DOD 

pursues needs that are not redundant. The Warrior decision is an example 

where the service chose to ignore the recommendations of the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council and proceeded with a unique program. 

DOD stated that its Portfolio Management Experiment supports this 

enterprise-level strategy, but it is still a pilot program and actual changes 

to the processes have not been identified to show how it will ensure more 

responsible and joint decision making for major acquisition programs. As 

pointed out in the report, while this seems like a good first step, portfolios 

are largely advisory and managers have not been given direct authority to 

manage fiscal resources and make investment decisions. Without this 

authority, DOD continues to risk stovepiped solutions that may overlap

and not be affordable within available resources. Furthermore, it seems 

within the last few years the real input from DOD leadership comes at the 

end of the year, right before the budget is supposed to go to Congress. In 

December each year a Program Budget document is issued by the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense that has included radical changes to major 

acquisition programs but without the transparency as to the detailed 

analysis and integrated investment planning that should have taken place 

to make these major investment decisions. 

In its response, DOD also states that a number of successes have occurred 

within the Unmanned Aerial Systems portfolio managed by the Office of 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

While there may be some successful UAS programs, there are also 

examples of large, important programs that have significantly exceeded

cost estimates and delivery dates. We believe that having a UAS portfolio 

is contrary to the direction of the Quadrennial Defense Review to get away 

from “platform”-based decisions and move toward “sensor”-based 

decisions. The Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board, as 

part of the JCIDS process, seems to be a more representative grouping of 

ISR programs than the UAS portfolio. We believe if properly organized 

based more on “sensor” requirements, then it would not be necessary to 

have both for ISR investment decision making. 

DOD states that we did not consider the department’s ongoing efforts to 

develop UAS and ISR Roadmaps that represent, according to them, 

enterprise-level strategies. While we did not review these as part of this 

review, GAO has ongoing work under a different engagement that is 

Page 21 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
looking at the ISR Roadmap. The initial conclusions from that review were 

presented to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Air and Land 

Forces in testimony on April 19, 2007.13 GAO testified that the ISR 

Roadmap was a noteworthy step in examining ISR capabilities but it does 

not represent a comprehensive vision for the ISR enterprise or define 

strategy to guide future investments. Furthermore, the ISR Roadmap is 

managed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence,

while the UAS Roadmap is managed by the Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. This difference 

emphasizes the need for a single point for ISR investment decisions within 

OSD. 

Finally, DOD states that the report does not recognize ground component 

requirements and operating concepts for multiple joint missions and that it

did not recognize the benefits of acquisition programs with unique 

requirements or the benefits of competition. We believe the report, as it 

relates to the decision to buy a unique platform for the Warrior, did 

recognize the difference in how the two services planned to operate the 

platforms. However, we do not believe that it necessarily excuses DOD to 

buy two different platforms to satisfy the warfighter’s expressed ISR 

requirement. Furthermore, we believe it has been the unique stovepiped 

solutions of the military services that have over time created unnecessary 

duplication and inefficient use of limited defense funding. As to 

competition, GAO has consistently expressed its belief that with proper 

controls and oversight competition is beneficial to price, reliability, 

performance, and contractor responsiveness in buying major weapon 

systems. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and 

interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available 

at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report or need additional information, 

please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were 

 13GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary Observations on 

DOD’s Approach to Managing Requirements for New Systems, Existing Assets, and 

Systems Development, GAO-07-596T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 2007). 

Page 22 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
Michael Hazard, Assistant Director; Dayna Foster; Rae Ann Sapp; Michael

Aiken; and Karen Sloan.

Michael J. Sullivan 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 23 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

This report examines the Department of Defense (DOD) development and 

acquisition of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

systems. The primary focus of this work is to identify practices and 

policies that lead to successful fielding of weapon systems to the 

warfighter at the right time and for the right price. Specifically, our 

objectives were to (1) evaluate various ISR platforms for potential 

synergies and assess their cost and schedule status and the impact of any 

increases or delays on legacy systems and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of 

ISR investment decisions. Our work was conducted between June 2006 

and April 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

We selected 20 major airborne ISR programs in technology or systems 

development, already fielded but undergoing significant upgrade, or 

operating in the field but due to be replaced by a system in development 

and one space-based program in technology development.1

 We considered 

a program in development to be major if DOD designated it as a major 

defense acquisition program or would be likely do so at Milestone B.2

 We 

considered systems already operating in the field as major if they played a

role in current operations. 

For the systems we selected, we obtained information on current or 

projected operational capabilities, acquisition plans, cost estimates, 

schedules, and estimated budgets. We analyzed the data to determine 

whether pairs of similar systems shared common operating concepts, 

capabilities, physical configurations, or primary contractors. We reviewed 

acquisition plans for programs in development to determine whether they 

had established sound business cases or if not, where the business case 

was weak. We reviewed cost and schedule estimates to determine whether 

they had increased and, where possible, identified reasons for the 

increases. For systems in development that experienced a schedule delay, 

we determined whether the delay had an impact on the legacy system to 

be replaced and, where possible, determined the cost or capability impact

of the delay. We assessed the reliability and validity of agency official-

 1

The Joint Staff identifies 31 core ISR systems; our review included 14 of them. We added 

two programs that are developing payloads for ISR systems and 4 more systems that were 

in development but were not part of the core group as of August 2006, when we established 

our list. 

2

Milestone B is the initiation of an acquisition program as defined by DOD Instruction 

5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 2003). 

Page 24 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

provided and third-party data by discussing the data with officials from 

multiple agencies at varying levels of responsibility. We also discussed the 

results of our reviews and analyses with program office officials; Army, 

Navy, and Air Force acquisition and requirements officials; the Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and the Office of the Joint 

Chief of Staff for Intelligence. 

Page 25 GAO-07-578 Defense DOD Acquisition Policy
Appendix II: System Descriptions 

Page 26 GAO-07-578 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix II: System Descriptions 

Aerial Common 

Sensor 

The Army is planning to develop the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) as an 

airborne ISR and target acquisition system and is designing it to provide 

timely intelligence data on threat forces to the land component

commander. The platform will be a piloted business jet and will carry a 

suite of sensors to collect information on electronics and communications 

signals, optical and infrared images, measures and signatures, and 

synthetic aperture radar (SAR) images. Four onboard intelligence analysts 

will operate the mission equipment, but with the appropriate connectivity, 

the system can perform its mission with just the flight crew. The ACS will 

replace the Guardrail Common Sensor and the Airborne Reconnaissance 

Low airborne systems and will coexist with current systems until it is 

phased in and current systems retire. The Army has not established a date 

for initial operating capacity. ACS was to have replaced the Navy EP-3 as 

well. However, the Navy recently decided to pursue its own development 

program and expects to enter system development in 2010. 

Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) is composed of communications 

intelligence and imagery intelligence sensors and onboard operators in a 

piloted aircraft. The current inventory includes two configurations; one 

with a complete communications sensor package capable of intercepting 

and locating radio emissions and providing reports to appropriate 

commanders and intelligence-processing centers on the ground. The more 

capable version combines communications and electro-optical (EO) 

sensors and SAR with moving target indicator onto one aircraft. The ARL 

will eventually be replaced by ACS. 

The Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP) is a signals intelligence 

(SIGINT) sensor being developed for use on multiple Air Force platforms. 

It is a part of Air Force efforts to modernize its SIGINT processes by 

developing an Air Force-wide capability for performing SIGINT. ASIP 

sensors will be developed for use on the legacy U-2 and Rivet Joint 

manned aircraft. It will also be used on legacy and developmental 

unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to include the MQ-1 (Predator) and RQ-4B 

Global Hawk. The details about its capabilities are classified.

The Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS is scheduled to begin 

systems development in October 2007. The BAMS system will be landbased and provide a high-altitude, persistent ISR capability to the fleet and 

joint forces commander. BAMS will conduct continuous maritime and 

littoral surveillance of targets. As part of the Navy’s maritime patrol and 

Airborne 

Reconnaissance Low 

Airborne Signals 

Intelligence Payload 

Broad Area Maritime 

Surveillance Aircraft 

System
Appendix II: System Descriptions 

reconnaissance force, it will operate independently or in conjunction with 

the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) and EP-3/EPX signals 

intelligence platform. Because the BAMS has not yet begun system

development, vehicle design and sensor payload decisions have not been 

finalized, but will include active imaging radar, passive optical imaging, 

and limited signals collection capability. Its projected initial operational 

capability is 2013. 

The E-10A Program originally consisted of three primary elements: the 

aircraft, the radar, and the battle management command and control 

system. The aircraft proposed for the E-1OA was the Boeing 767 jet 

aircraft. The radar was to be the Multi-Platform Radar Technology 

Insertion Program, an advanced radar that provides capability for cruise 

missile defense through air moving target indicator as well as enhanced 

ground moving target indicator. The program was reduced from a 

technology development program to a demonstration effort. The 

demonstration effort was focused on assessing the newer radar, which will 

also be used on the Global Hawk UAS. However, the Air Force recently 

canceled the demonstration effort. 

The EP-3E Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronics System 

(ARIES) II is the Navy’s only land-based SIGINT reconnaissance aircraft.

It is a legacy aircraft based on the Navy’s Orion P-3 airframe and provides 

fleet and theater commanders worldwide with near-real-time tactical

SIGINT. It uses sensitive receivers and high-gain dish antennas to perform

its mission. The Navy had planned to replace this aircraft with the Army 

ACS because the EP-3 airframe is aging and has a limited life span. 

Drawdown of the EP-3E aircraft was scheduled to begin in the 2012 time 

frame but may be extended. Delays in ACS development contributed to the 

Navy’s recent decision to pursue its own replacement for the EP-3. 

The EPX is the Navy’s replacement for its aging EP-3. In late summer 2006, 

after a study on joint ISR requirements had been completed, the Navy and

Army concluded that there were significant requirements differences 

between the two services. As a result, the Chief of Naval Operations 

directed the Navy to recapitalize the EP-3 to provide multi-intelligence 

capability. While requirements for the EPX have not been fully established, 

it will be a multi-intelligence platform and will include communications 

and electronics intelligence capability, optics, and radar. EPX is part of the 

maritime patrol and MMA and BAMS.

E-10A 

EP-3 

EPX 

Page 27 GAO-07-578 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: System Descriptions 

The Army Fire Scout is being developed as one of the UAS within the 

Future Combat Systems. As part of this system of systems, the Fire Scout 

is designed to support air-ground operations and reconnaissance, 

surveillance, and target acquisition missions. It will employ SAR with 

moving target indicator, EO sensors and a laser rangefinder/designator, a 

tactical signals intelligence package, and the joint tactical radio system

communications suite. The Fire Scout is designed to take off and land in 

unimproved areas to directly support brigade combat team operations. Its 

initial operating capability is tied to the Future Combat Systems, which is 

planned for December 2014. 

The Navy Fire Scout, or the vertical takeoff and landing unmanned aerial

vehicle system, (VTUAV), entered systems development in February 2000. 

The Fire Scout is designed to provide ISR as well as targeting data and

damage assessments to tactical users. It is capable of autonomous vertical 

takeoff and landing on aircraft carriers as well as unprepared landing 

zones. The Fire Scout includes EO/IR sensors, a laser designator system, 

and a common automatic recovery system. The modular payload approach 

also includes the tactical control system, tactical common datalink, and a 

mine detection system. Its initial operating capability is planned for 

October 2008. 

Joint Surveillance, Target, Attack, Radar System (STARS) is a joint Air 

Force and Army wide area surveillance attack radar system designed to 

detect, track, and classify and support the attack of moving and stationary 

targets. Joint STARS is a legacy platform first used in the 1991 Gulf War. 

It has been used extensively in support of Operations Enduring and Iraqi 

Freedom. The Joint STARS fleet of aircraft is currently being modified 

with new communication and navigation equipment, and the Air Force is 

developing advanced mission capabilities and identifying low-cost 

emerging technologies for future use. In addition, the Air Force intends to

replace Joint STARS engines to make the platform more reliable and 

reduce operating and support costs. Finally, the Air Force had originally 

intended to place Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program 

(MP-RTIP) on Joint STARS but decided not to when it chose to go forward 

with the E-10A, which was subsequently canceled. 

The Global Hawk is a high-altitude, long-endurance UAS designed to 

provide near-real-time high-resolution ISR imagery. It employs a SAR, 

ground moving target indicator, and EO/IR sensors. After a successful 

Fire Scout (Army) 

Fire Scout (Navy) 

Joint Surveillance, 

Target, Attack, Radar 

System

Global Hawk 

Page 28 GAO-07-578 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: System Descriptions 

technology demonstration, the Global Hawk entered development and 

limited production in March 2001. Production of the initial seven (RQ-4A) 

aircraft is complete. The larger, more capable version (RQ-4B) includes an

advanced signals intelligence payload and improved radar technologies. 

Initial operational capability is planned for September 2007. 

Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) is an airborne signals intelligence 

collection location and exploitation system in the current inventory that 

provides near-real-time signals intelligence and targeting information to 

tactical commanders. The system integrates a communications 

intelligence sensor and precision geolocation of signals. The platform is a 

small, piloted aircraft with no onboard analysts. The Army plans on 

eventually replacing GRCS with the ACS. 

The Navy’s MMA is part of the broad area maritime family of systems. The 

MMA was initially planned to interoperate with the BAMS UAS and the 

ACS. The MMA is intended to replace the Navy’s P-3C Orion system. Its 

primary role will be that of anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, and it

will have some ISR capability. The Navy plans for the aircraft to achieve 

initial operational capability in 2013.

The MP-RTIP is a family of scalable, advanced radars that are being 

developed for the RQ-4B Global Hawk and the E-10A. The Air Force 

funded the sensor development under the E-10A budget line as a separate

item. The radar is currently in system development and demonstration. 

However, in February 2007, the Air Force removed funding for the E-10A 

radar development program starting in fiscal year 2008. The Air Force still 

intends to develop the radar for the Global Hawk and begin fielding the

sensor by 2011. 

The Predator is a medium-altitude long-endurance UAS. The Predator 

began as an advanced concept technology demonstration program and has 

been operational since 1995. Originally designed as a persistent ISR 

platform, it was modified in 2001 to carry two Hellfire missiles. The 

Predator employs EO/IR sensors, laser designator, day/night cameras that 

produce full motion video of the battlefield, and can be configured to carry 

SAR. Used as an armed reconnaissance system, the Predator also has a 

multi-spectral targeting system with Hellfire missile targeting capability. 

The Air Force has begun an effort to develop and integrate signals 

Guardrail Common 

Sensor 

Multi-mission 

Maritime Aircraft 

Multi-Platform Radar 

Technology Insertion 

Program 

Predator 

Page 29 GAO-07-578 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: System Descriptions 

intelligence capability on the Predator. To accelerate this effort, the Air 

Force increased this budget by a factor of almost 6 in fiscal year 2008. 

The Reaper (formerly Predator B) is a multirole medium- to high-altitude

endurance UAS. Its primary mission is a persistent hunter-killer for small 

ground mobile or fixed targets. Its secondary mission is to gather ISR data. 

It will use EO/IR sensors, laser rangefinder/designator, and SAR, and will 

carry ordnance such as the Joint Direct Attack Munitions and Hellfire 

missiles. The Reaper entered systems development in February 2004. Its 

initial operating capability is planned for 2009. The Air Force has begun to

examine the feasibility of incorporating signals intelligence capability on 

the Reaper.

Rivet Joint (RJ) is a reconnaissance aircraft in the current inventory that 

supports theater- and national-level consumers with near-real-time onscene intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination capabilities. The 

aircraft is an extensively modified C-135 with a suite of onboard sensors, 

which allows the mission crew to detect, identify, and geolocate signals 

throughout the electromagnetic spectrum. The mission crew can then

forward gathered information in a variety of formats to a wide range of 

consumers via the system’s extensive communications suite. The interior 

seats 34 people, including the cockpit crew, electronic warfare officers, 

intelligence operators, and in-flight maintenance technicians. The first 

versions of the system were deployed in 1964, but have undergone 

extensive upgrades to both the platform and mission equipment. The Air 

Force does not have any plans to replace the system. 

Space Radar (SR) is an Air Force-led, joint DOD, and intelligence 

community program to develop a satellite to find, identify, and monitor 

moving or stationary targets under all weather conditions on a nearly 

continuous basis across large swaths of the earth’s surface. As envisioned, 

SR would generate volumes of radar imagery for transmission to ground-, 

ship-, air-, and space-based systems. Initial capability is planned for 2017. 

The U-2 provides continuous day-and-night, high-altitude, all-weather 

surveillance and reconnaissance in direct support of U.S. and allied 

ground forces. It is a single-engine and single-seat ISR aircraft. The U-2 is

capable of collecting multisensor, photo, EO/IR, and radar imagery as well 

as collecting SIGINT data. It can downlink all data except wet film. The Air 

Reaper 

Rivet Joint 

Space Radar 

U-2 

Page 30 GAO-07-578 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: System Descriptions 

Force proposed to begin retiring the U-2 in 2007. However, Congress 

disagreed with the decision and prevented retirement in 2007. Congress 

also directed the Air Force to first certify that the capability was no longer 

required. In March 2007, the Air Force revised the schedule from removing 

the U-2 from the inventory and proposes doing so at a slower rate than 

before beginning in fiscal year 2008. The Air Force is not requesting 

funding for the U-2 past 2007, but it is not clear whether the Air Force has 

provided the certification that Congress requested. 

The extended range, multipurpose Warrior UAS began systems 

development in April 2005. It will operate with manned aviation assets 

such as the Apache helicopter and perform missions including

reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition/attack. It is being 

developed to satisfy the Army’s requirement for a UAS that is dedicated to

the direct operational control of its field commanders. The Warrior is 

designed with an automatic takeoff and landing system, full motion video 

capability, tactical signals intelligence payload, multirole tactical common 

data link, EO sensors, SAR/ moving target indicator, Ethernet 

communications capability, and redundant avionics. Its initial operational 

capability is planned for 2010. 

Warrior 

Page 31 GAO-07-578 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: ISR Studies 

Rec

Under Way or 

ently Completed 

Page 32 GAO-07-578 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix III: ISR Studies Under Way or 

Recently Completed 

Program Decision Memorandum III, dated December 2005 directed that 

several studies be undertaken.1

 Those studies included the following. 

The Army and Navy, in coordination with the Air Force, Joint Staff, Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy, Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence (USD(I)), and Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), were 

directed to conduct a study of joint multi-intelligence airborne ISR needs, 

focusing on trade-offs among manned and unmanned airborne platforms 

and how those trade-offs translate into requirements for recapitalizing the 

Army, Navy, and Air Force legacy systems. The participants were directed

to identify any resources in addition to the fiscal year 2006 President’s 

budget program of record to sustain the Army and Navy aircraft until they

can be replaced. The study was completed in late summer of 2006 and 

concluded that the requirements for the ACS were still valid. 

The Strategic Command, in coordination with the Air Force; Navy; Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

(USD(AT&L)); USD(I); and PA&E were directed to review the Air Force’s 

Global Hawk acquisition and U-2 retirement plan and determine if highattitude, long-endurance, multi-intelligence ISR requirements will be 

satisfied during the transition. The findings were briefed within the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in early fall 2006. 

USD(I), in conjunction with the Joint Staff, services, and PA&E was 

directed to develop a methodology to migrate to a capability-centric focus, 

instead of a platform-centric focus, for determining combatant 

commander and joint task force airborne ISR requirements. Results were 

briefed within OSD in early fall 2006. 

These studies were recently commissioned: 

On March 5, 2007, the Air Force Chief of Staff announced the start of a 

comprehensive study of all existing and planned ISR systems—both 

airborne and spaced-based—to consider the efficiencies and inefficiencies 

Joint ISR 

Replacement Study 

U-2 Retirement Study 

Airborne ISR 

Requirements 

Optimization of ISR 

Capabilities 

 1

Several other studies were commissioned but information related to them is classified and 

cannot be summarized here. 
Appendix III: ISR Studies Under Way or 

Recently Completed 

in the theater and global warfighting templates. As part of this broad 

effort, he advocated that the Air Force immediately become the executive

agent for medium- and high-altitude UAS. The expected benefits from the

study and executive agent concept include improving distribution of 

intelligence assets across all theaters and components, avoiding 

duplication of acquisition efforts, standardizing UAS operations and 

downlinks, and controlling ballooning bandwidth requirements. The 

results of the study will include a comprehensive plan to optimize ISR 

capabilities, due in late April 2007. 

In February 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics requested that the Defense Science Board 

establish a task force to assess whether current and planned ISR systems 

provide sufficient support for U.S. military forces.2

 The primary objective 

is to determine what improvements are needed in carrying out the tasks 

associated with ISR systems. A second objective is to examine the mix and 

balance of ISR sensors to identify gaps and redundancies. The task force 

was also asked to examine current and planned systems for 

vulnerabilities, new opportunities and potential problems, and consistency 

with department strategy for networked operations. Finally, the 

memorandum also asked the task force to review the results of a number 

of studies, initiated by OSD and completed in the fall of 2006, following the 

completion of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Several of these 

studies are summarized in this appendix. The tasking memorandum did 

not include time frames for completion of the study or for reporting the 

results. 

Task Force on 

Integrating SensorCollected Intelligence 

 2

The Defense Science Board is composed of members designated from civilian life by the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and advises the 

Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on

scientific, technical, manufacturing, acquisition process, and other matters of special 

interest to DOD. 

Page 33 GAO-07-578 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 34 GAO-07-578 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-07-578 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-07-578 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

(120559) Page 37 GAO-07-578 Defense Acquisitions
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