Implementation Guidance

for 10 CFR Part 37, “Physical 

Protection of Category 1 and 

Category 2 Quantities of 

Radioactive Material”

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

NUREG-2155, Rev. 1
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Implementation Guidance

for 10 CFR Part 37, “Physical 

Protection of Category 1 and 

Category 2 Quantities of 

Radioactive Material”

Manuscript Completed: January 2015

Date Published: January 2015

Prepared by: 

E. Bowden-Berry, M. Cervera, P. Goldberg, S. Hawkins, M. Horn,

K. Jamgochian, R. MacDougall, D. Piskura, G. Purdy, R. Ragland,

N. St. Amour, F. Sturz, and G. Warren

Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards

NUREG-2155, Rev. 1

iii

ABSTRACT

The intent of this technical report is to provide guidance on, and to assist applicants and 

licensees in, the implementation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)

Part 37, “Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material.” 

This document describes methods that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) finds

acceptable for implementing the regulations.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This NUREG contains information collection requirements associated with 10 CFR Part 37 that 

are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) approved these information collections under OMB control 

number 3150-0214.

Public Protection Notification

The NRC may neither conduct nor sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, an 

information collection request or requirement unless the requesting document displays a 

currently valid OMB control number.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................................iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS...............................................................................................................v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..............................................................................................................vii

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.........................................................................................ix

PURPOSE OF REPORT..............................................................................................................1

SUBPART A—GENERAL PROVISIONS....................................................................................3

§ 37.1 Purpose .........................................................................................................................4

§ 37.3 Scope.............................................................................................................................6

§ 37.5 Definitions ......................................................................................................................9

§ 37.7 Communications ............................................................................................................30

§ 37.9 Interpretations ................................................................................................................31

§ 37.11 Specific Exemptions.......................................................................................................32

§ 37.13 Information Collection Requirements: OMB Approval....................................................37

SUBPART B—BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS AND ACCESS AUTHORIZATION 

PROGRAMS. ...............................................................................................................................37

§ 37.21 Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Category 1 or

Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material ...............................................................38

§ 37.23 Access Authorization Program.......................................................................................46

§ 37.25 Background Investigations.............................................................................................66

§ 37.27 Requirements for Criminal History Records Checks of Individuals Granted

Unescorted Access to Category 1 or Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive

Material ..........................................................................................................................79

§ 37.29 Relief from Fingerprinting, Identification, and Criminal History Records 

Checks and Other Elements of Background Investigations for Designated 

Categories of Individuals Permitted Unescorted Access to Certain 

Radioactive Materials or Other Property.........................................................................90

§ 37.31 Protection of Information................................................................................................98

§ 37.33 Access Authorization Program Review ..........................................................................105

Annex A: Additional Guidance for Evaluating an Individual’s Trustworthiness and

Reliability for Allowing Unescorted Access to Certain Radioactive Material ................108

Annex B: Sample Consent Form for Background Investigations.................................................112

SUBPART C—PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS DURING USE.............................114

§ 37.41 Security Program ...........................................................................................................114

§ 37.43 General Security Program Requirements ......................................................................122

§ 37.45 Local Law Enforcement Agency (LLEA) Coordination and Notification..........................145

§ 37.47 Security Zones...............................................................................................................155

§ 37.49 Monitoring, Detection, and Assessment.........................................................................167

§ 37.51 Maintenance and Testing...............................................................................................182

§ 37.53 Requirements for Mobile Devices ..................................................................................188

§ 37.55 Security Program Review...............................................................................................194

§ 37.57 Reporting of Events .......................................................................................................197

Annex C: Examples of Reportable Suspicious Activities under 10 CFR 37.57(b).......................204
vi

SUBPART D—PHYSICAL PROTECTION IN TRANSIT .............................................................206

§ 37.71 Additional Requirements for Transfer of Category 1 and Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material..................................................................................206

§ 37.73 Applicability of Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material during Transit ...........................................................211

§ 37.75 Preplanning and Coordination of Shipment of Category 1 or Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material..................................................................................215

§ 37.77 Advance Notification of Shipment of Category 1 Quantities of Radioactive

Material ..........................................................................................................................224

§ 37.79 Requirements for Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material during Shipment.......................................................235

§ 37.81 Reporting of Events .......................................................................................................252

Annex D: Template for Advance Notifications of Shipments to the NRC of Category 1

 Quantities of Radioactive Material under 10 CFR 37.77(b) .........................................265

SUBPART E—[RESERVED].......................................................................................................267

SUBPART F—RECORDS ...........................................................................................................267

§ 37.101 Form of Records ..........................................................................................................267

§ 37.103 Record Retention.........................................................................................................268

SUBPART G—ENFORCEMENT.................................................................................................269

§ 37.105 Inspections...................................................................................................................269

§ 37.107 Violations .....................................................................................................................270

§ 37.109 Criminal Penalties ........................................................................................................272

APPENDIX A—CATEGORY 1 AND CATEGORY 2 RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS....................A-1
 vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The working group thanks the individuals listed below for assisting in the review and update of 

the report. All participants provided valuable insights, observations, and recommendations.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff

Bowden-Berry, Elva 

Cervera, Margaret 

Goldberg, Paul 

Hawkins, Sarenee 

Horn, Merri 

Jamgochian, Kris 

MacDougall, Robert 

Piskura, Deborah 

Purdy, Gary 

Ragland, Robert

St. Amour, Norman 

Sturz, Frederick 

Warren, Geoffrey

Organization of Agreement States

Harris, James (Kansas Department of Health and Environment) 

James, Stephen (Ohio Department of Health)

Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors

Costello, Frank (Pennsylvania Department of Health) 

Dansereau, Robert (New York State Health Department)

ix

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

AEA or Act Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

ALARA as low as is reasonably achievable

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

Ci curie

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

EPAct Energy Policy Act of 2005

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

GPS global positioning system

HR human resources

HSSM highway security-sensitive material

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IC increased controls

IDS intrusion detection system 

kg kilogram

LLEA local law enforcement agency

LVS license verification system

M&D manufacturing and distribution 

NLT no later than

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSTS National Source Tracking System 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PDF portable document format

PII personally identifiable information

Q&As questions and answers

RDD radiation dispersion device 

RED radiation exposure device 

RO reviewing official

RSO radiation safety officer

SGI Safeguards Information

SGI-M Safeguards Information-Modified (handling)

T&R trustworthiness and reliability

TBq terabecquerel

TCN transaction control number

TSA Transportation Security Administration

UPS United Parcel Service

1

PURPOSE AND INTRODUCTION

This document provides guidance to a licensee or applicant for the implementation of Title 10 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 37, “Physical Protection of Category 1 and 

Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material.” It is intended for use by applicants, licensees, 

and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff, and it will also be available to 

Agreement States. The approaches and methods described in this document are not 

requirements. The NRC considers them to be acceptable approaches and methods of 

complying with the requirements in Part 37. Approaches and methods that differ from those set 

forth in this guidance document are acceptable if they satisfy the requirements set forth in 10

CFR Part 37. Licensees are free to propose alternative ways for demonstrating compliance with 

these requirements.

This document provides guidance in the form of questions and answers (Q&As) for each section

(and each subsection, as applicable) of the regulation. Except for definitions under

10 CFR 37.5, “Definitions,” the section reference and its associated text appear in the box at the 

top of the page that begins each set of Q&As. A brief explanation of the rule text follows just 

below the box. The NRC intends the Q&As to provide guidance on the implementation of the 

rule language in the box. Q&As are provided for those definitions that are specific to 10

CFR Part 37.

An individual who accesses an electronic version of this guidance document can navigate more 

easily by clicking on the hyperlinks for each section listed in the Contents pages. Hyperlinks 

also appear in responses to the questions to enable the reader to go directly to source material 

or sections of rule text referenced in the responses.

Certain States, called Agreement States, have entered into agreements with the NRC that give 

them the authority to license and inspect byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials, in 

quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass, that are used or possessed within their borders. 

Any licensee or applicant, other than a Federal entity, that wishes to possess or use licensed 

material in one of these Agreement States should contact the responsible officials in that State 

for guidance on implementing the security provisions.

 3

SUBPART A—GENERAL PROVISIONS

§ 37.1, “Purpose”

§ 37.3, “Scope”

§ 37.5, “Definitions”

§ 37.7, “Communications”

§ 37.9, “Interpretations”

§ 37.11, “Specific Exemptions”

§ 37.13, “Information Collection Requirements: OMB Approval”
 4

§ 37.1, “Purpose”

This part has been established to provide the requirements for the physical protection 

program for any licensee that possesses an aggregated category 1 or category 2 quantity of 

radioactive material listed in Appendix A to this part. These requirements provide reasonable 

assurance of the security of category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material by 

protecting these materials from theft or diversion. Specific requirements for access to 

material, use of material, transfer of material, and transport of material are included. No 

provision of this part authorizes possession of licensed material.

EXPLANATION:

These regulations establish the security requirements for the possession, use, transfer, and 

transportation of aggregated category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive material.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Q&As): 

Q1: What is the purpose of Part 37?

A1: The regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 37, 

“Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material,” impose 

security requirements for the possession and use of category 1 and category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material. These regulations establish the objectives and minimum requirements that 

licensees must meet to protect against theft or diversion. The intent of these requirements is to 

protect the public against the unauthorized use of a category 1 or category 2 quantity of 

radioactive material by reducing the risk of theft or diversion of the material.

Q2: What is a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material?

A2: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) considers category 1 and category 2 

quantities of radioactive material to be risk significant, and these quantities refer specifically to

16 radioactive materials (14 single radionuclides and 2 combinations). These materials are 

americium-241 (Am-241), Am-241/beryllium, californium-252, curium-244, cobalt-60 (Co-60), 

cesium-137 (Cs-137), gadolinium-153, iridium-192 (Ir-192), plutonium-238,

plutonium-239/beryllium, promethium-147, radium-226, selenium-75, strontium-90 (Sr-90) 

(yttrium-90), thulium-170, and ytterbium-169. Irradiated fuel and mixed-oxide fuel are not

included even though they may contain category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive 

material; other regulations cover these materials. Table 1 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 

37 provides the thresholds for category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive material.

Q3: How do I know when I have an “aggregated” quantity of this radioactive material?

A3: See the Q&As related to the definition of “aggregated” under 10 CFR 37.5, “Definitions,”

and 10 CFR 37.47, “Security Zones.”
 5

Q4: What does it mean to say that “no provision of this part authorizes possession of 

licensed material”?

A4: This sentence simply clarifies that 10 CFR Part 37 only establishes requirements for the 

security of category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material. These requirements are 

separate from the requirements for the issuance of a license to possess these quantities of 

radioactive material. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 30, “Rules of General Applicability to 

Domestic Licensing of Byproduct Material,” establish generally applicable requirements for 

issuance of a license to possess byproduct material. In addition, required conditions for 

issuance of licenses for specific uses of byproduct material appear in 10 CFR Part 31, “General 

Domestic Licenses for Byproduct Material,” through 10 CFR Part 36, “Licenses and Radiation 

Safety Requirements for Irradiators,” and in 10 CFR Part 39, “Licenses and Radiation Safety 

Requirements for Well Logging.” Similarly, generally applicable requirements for the issuance

of licenses to possess special nuclear material appear in 10 CFR Part 70, “Domestic Licensing 

of Special Nuclear Material.” The list of radioactive materials of concern in Appendix A to 10

CFR Part 37 contains radioisotopes that are typically licensed under both 10 CFR Part 30 and

10 CFR Part 70. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 do not relieve licensees from compliance 

with these parts. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 merely establish additional requirements 

for the secure possession of a category 1 or category 2 quantity of these materials.

Q5: I’m a mobile radiographer licensed to possess 60-curie sources of iridium. These 

sources cannot easily be made into a weapon, and there are many better and more easily 

accessible choices for making a radiation dispersion device (RDD) or a radiological exposure 

device (RED). Why do I have to have a security program to secure this low-risk source?

A5: The NRC has determined that the category 2 thresholds for the radioisotopes listed in 

Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 37, including Ir-192, are the levels that warrant additional protection 

measures. In addition, an interagency task force established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 

(EPAct) concluded in its 2006 report to Congress and the President, entitled, “The Radiation 

Source Protection and Security Task Force Report” (Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML062190349), that the appropriate radioactive 

sources were being protected. The task force also concluded that the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct serves as an appropriate framework for considering 

which sources warrant additional protection. For its 2010 report to Congress and the President 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML102230141), the task force conducted a reevaluation of the list of 

radionuclides that warrant additional security and protection. The task force found “that the 

Category 1 and 2 quantities remain valid for sealed and unsealed sources as the list and 

threshold levels of radionuclides that could result in a significant RED or RDD event and 

therefore warrant enhanced security and protection.”
 6

§ 37.3, “Scope”

§ 37.3(a)

Subparts B and C of this part apply to any person who, under the regulations in this chapter, 

possesses or uses at any site, an aggregated category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive 

material.

EXPLANATION:

This section establishes which licensees are subject to Subpart B, “Background Investigations 

and Access Authorization Programs,” and Subpart C, “Physical Protection Requirements during 

Use,” of 10 CFR Part 37.

Q&As:

Q1: Who is covered by Subpart B, “Background Investigations and Access Authorization

Programs,” and Subpart C, “Physical Protection Requirements during Use”?

A1: Subpart B and Subpart C requirements apply to any licensee that possesses or uses an 

aggregated1 category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material at any site. This 

requirement includes a wide range of licensees, including the following:

• pool-type irradiator licensees

• manufacturer and distributor licensees

• medical facilities with gamma-ray stereotactic radiosurgery devices

• self-shielded irradiator licensees (including blood irradiators)

• teletherapy unit licensees

• radiographers

• well loggers

• broad-scope users

• radioisotope thermoelectric generator licensees

• fuel cycle licensees

• research and test reactors

• commercial power reactors

• some fixed gauge licensees

• licensees that ship or prepare for shipment a Category 1 or Category 2 quantity of 

 radioactive material.

For additional Q&As on the applicability of Subpart B, see those in 10 CFR 37.21, “Personnel 

Access Authorization Requirements for Category 1 or Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive 

Material.” For additional Q&As on the applicability of Subpart C, see those in 10 CFR 37.41(a).

Q2: Do 10 CFR Part 37 requirements apply to unsealed radioactive material, as well as 

material sealed in a source or device? For example, do the requirements apply to materials 

possessed by a nuclear laundry or radioactive waste processor?

1 As defined in 10 CFR 37.5, “aggregated” means accessible by the breach of a single physical barrier that would 

allow access to radioactive material in any form, including any devices that contain the radioactive material, when 

the total activity equals or exceeds a Category 2 quantity of radioactive material.
 7

A2: Yes. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 apply to both sealed and unsealed radioactive 

materials in quantities equal to, or greater than, category 2. No distinction is made between 

unsealed and sealed radioactive material when implementing 10 CFR Part 37 requirements.

For example, a nuclear laundry or radioactive waste processing licensee must implement these 

requirements if it possesses radioactive material in an aggregated quantity that meets or

exceeds a category 2 threshold.

Q3: How do I determine whether 10 CFR Part 37 applies to me?

A3: See the Q&As related to the definition of “aggregated” and category 1 and category 2 

quantities of radioactive material under 10 CFR 37.5 and 10 CFR 37.47.
 8

§ 37.3, “Scope” (continued)

§ 37.3(b)

Subpart D applies to any person who, under the regulations of this chapter:

(1) Transports, or delivers to a carrier for transport in a single shipment, a category 1 or 

category 2 quantity of radioactive material; or

(2) Imports or exports a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material; the 

provisions only apply to the domestic portion of the transport.

EXPLANATION:

This section establishes which licensees and activities are subject to Subpart D, “Physical

Protection in Transit,” of 10 CFR Part 37.

Q&As:

Q1: Who is covered by Subpart D, “Physical Protection in Transit”?

A1: Subpart D requirements apply to any licensee that transports, or delivers to a carrier for 

transport, a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material. A licensed importer or 

exporter of this material must comply with Subpart D and other applicable requirements in 10

CFR Part 37 only for the portion of the shipment carried out within the borders of the United

States or its territories.

Q2: Are there any modes of transportation not covered by 10 CFR Part 37?

A2: Yes. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 do not address air or water transport. The 

Federal Aviation Administration regulates the transport of radioactive material within airports 

and by air. The U.S. Coast Guard regulates the transport of radioactive material within ports 

and by waterway.

The rule also does not address “transshipments” of category 1 or category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material through the United States. Transshipments are shipments that originate in 

a foreign country, pass through the United States, and then continue on to another country.

The rule does not address the transport of spent fuel except for fuel in quantities of 100 grams 

(0.22 pounds) or less in net weight, exclusive of cladding or other structural or packaging 

material, and fuel that has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 1 gray (100 rad) per

hour at a distance of 1 meter (3.3 feet) from any accessible surface without intervening 

shielding. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 73, “Physical Protection of Plants and Materials,”

cover transportation of larger quantities of spent fuel. The regulations in 10 CFR 73.37,

“Requirements for Physical Protection of Irradiated Reactor Fuel in Transit,” establish 

requirements that apply to the transport of spent fuel quantities in excess of 100 grams that 

exceed the dose rate of 1 gray per hour.
 9

§ 37.5, “Definitions”

As used in this part:

Access control means a system for allowing only approved individuals to have unescorted 

access to the security zone and for ensuring that all other individuals are subject to escorted 

access.

Q&As:

Q1: Does this definition of access control also cover individuals with access to information

to be protected under Part 37.43(d)? 

A1: No. This definition covers only the control of access to security zones, which are defined 

below as any temporary or permanent area determined and established by the licensee for the 

physical protection of category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material. However, the 

requirements for access to protected information are similar to those for unescorted access to 

security zones. Personnel must be judged trustworthy and reliable and have a need to know in 

order to be granted access to information. 

Q2: Does an individual who complies with 10 CFR Part 37 requirements for unescorted 

access to radioactive material automatically comply with 10 CFR Part 37.43(d)

requirements for authorized access to protected information?

A2: No. For an individual who has been granted unescorted access to category 1 and 2

materials, SGI, or SGI-M, the licensee must also determine that he or she has a need to know

the protected information. For an individual who has not been granted unescorted access, the 

licensee must conduct a background investigation, determine that the individual is trustworthy

and reliable, and determine that he or she has a need to know the information.

Act means the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) (68 Stat. 919), including any amendments 

thereto.

This definition is not specific to 10 CFR Part 37.

Aggregated means accessible by the breach of a single physical barrier that would allow 

access to radioactive material in any form, including any devices that contain the radioactive 

material, when the total activity equals or exceeds a category 2 quantity of radioactive 

material.

Q&As:

Q1: Does the definition of aggregated include unsealed sources and bulk material?

A1: Yes. The definition includes radioactive material “in any form.” The intent is to include 

all material, whether it is in the form of a source (sealed or unsealed) or in a container of some 

sort, such as feed material that might be used to create a source.
 10

Q2: If I have one source with radioactive material that equals or exceeds a category 2 

quantity, is that source considered “aggregated” under this definition, even if I possess no other 

radioactive materials?

A2: Yes. Even if the licensee’s source is inside a device, it must be considered aggregated 

under this definition because it contains a category 2 or greater quantity of material that is 

accessible by the breach of a single physical barrier.

Q3: What is a physical barrier?

A3: Under 10 CFR 37.47(c)(1), a physical barrier is a natural or manmade structure or 

formation sufficient for the isolation of a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material 

within a security zone.

Q4: How does the term “bulk material” in the NRC’s definition of “aggregated” align with the 

U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) terminology for bulk packaging?

A4: The two terms are unrelated. The DOT regulation that uses this terminology applies 

only to the packaging and transportation of bulk material. It does not apply to the radiation 

safety or security of the material itself. The NRC considers bulk material to be radioactive 

material that is not a discrete source or a sealed source as these terms are defined in 10 CFR 

30.4, “Definitions.” Bulk material is radioactive material that is not encased in a capsule that is 

designed to prevent leakage or the escape of the material.

Q5: Does the “total activity” in the definition of aggregated refer to the activity of all the 

radioactive material the licensee possesses or just the activity that would be accessible by the 

breach of a single physical barrier?

A5: “Total activity” in this definition refers only to the activity of the radioactive material that 

would be accessible by the breach of a single physical barrier. A licensee may possess 

quantities of radioactive material with a total activity several times greater than the category 2 

threshold. However, a category 2 or greater quantity is considered “aggregated” only if it is 

located within an area isolated by a single physical barrier. The licensee may use or store 

material with radioactivity in category 2 quantities or greater at several locations. This material 

would not be considered aggregated as long as access to each location is controlled by at least 

one physical barrier.

Q6: When I’m storing radioactive material, does the phrase “physical barrier” used in the 

definition of “aggregated” apply to each storage container or to the area within which I’m storing 

these containers? May I count each drum as an independent physical barrier so that all the 

drums together need not be considered aggregated?

A6: The answer to these questions depends on the circumstances, including the quantity of 

radioactive material inside the storage containers. If a storage container contains a category 2 

quantity of radioactive material, the concept of a physical barrier is not a factor as applied by 10

CFR Part 37. The security zone established could be an area surrounding the single drum. If a 

licensee has several drums that contain radioactive material, the material in all the drums would

be added together to determine if, combined, they have a category 2 or greater quantity. The

drums by themselves should not be considered a physical barrier because the material could 

easily be removed from the security zone by tipping the drums over and then rolling them to an
 11

unsecured location. Thus, without additional barriers, material stored together in individual

drums would be considered aggregated. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 would apply if the 

licensee has a category 2 or greater quantity. However, if the lids to the drums are secured 

(e.g., padlocked or welded) and if the drums are individually secured to the floor with bolts, 

chains, or cables to prevent them from being easily removed, the sources would not be 

considered aggregated, and, therefore, 10 CFR Part 37 would not apply.

Q7: When I’m storing a category 2 or greater quantity of radioactive material in the form of 

multiple mobile devices inside a locked storage container or storage area, can each of these 

devices be considered a “physical barrier” under the definition of “aggregated”? If so, would the 

devices within that locked container or storage area be considered protected by at least two 

“independent physical controls” and meet the additional security requirement for mobile devices 

under 10 CFR 37.53(a)?

A7: The answer to both questions is no. The definition of “aggregated” specifically covers a 

category 2 or greater quantity of radioactive material “in any form, including any devices that 

contain the radioactive material [emphasis added].” The devices themselves cannot be 

considered independent physical controls because, for the purpose of unauthorized removal, 

access to a mobile device is effectively the same as access to the material inside the device. In 

this case, the “physical barrier” in the definition of “aggregated” is the locked container or the 

locked room or cage surrounding the area within which the licensee stores these mobile devices. 

If this locked container, room, or cage is the only physical barrier to gaining access to the

category 2 or greater quantity of material in the devices, this material is “aggregated” under this

definition and, therefore, under 10 CFR 37.53(a), the devices must be protected by at least one

additional independent physical control when they are not under the direct control and constant 

surveillance of the licensee.

Q8: When I’m transporting several devices that individually are less than a category 2 

quantity, but together are more than that, does the phrase “physical barrier” used in the 

definition of “aggregated” apply to each device or only to the shipping container I use to 

transport the devices? Can I count the individual devices containing the material as barriers

along with the shipping container, so that I would have more than one physical barrier and the

shipment would not have to be considered aggregated?

A8: No. The concept of physical barriers does not apply to transportation. If someone

steals a truck transporting sources, he or she would have access to all of the material,

regardless of any shipping container barriers. Subpart D requirements apply if the licensee

transports a category 2 or greater quantity of material in a single conveyance.

Q9: If I conduct my licensed operations on a sufficiently large site, can I use the physical 

distance between the locations of my devices or materials as a physical barrier so that I would 

not have to consider them aggregated?

A9: Yes. However, the necessary physical distance separating the locations in which 

materials or devices or both are used or stored will vary for each licensee, and the burden will 

be on the licensee or license applicant to show that this distance is sufficient to qualify as a 

physical barrier. To demonstrate compliance, the licensee would probably need to consider 

such site-specific factors as follows:
 12

(1) the continuous monitoring or integration of devices into the facility’s operation in such 

a way that the removal of such a device would provoke a prompt investigation and 

response

(2) the ease of moving its materials or devices or both

(3) the availability of tools and equipment, including vehicles, to accomplish this 

movement

(4) the likely minimum travel time from location to location

(5) the delay associated with these factors compared to the delay afforded by alternative 

physical barriers, such as a lock and chain or a lockable cage or room.

To avoid unanticipated delays or changes in a facility’s plans or operations, the licensee should 

consult its regulatory agency in advance about its intent to use physical distance as a physical 

boundary instead of waiting for an inspection to identify the issue. The licensee should also 

keep in mind that physical distance would not count as a physical barrier during the removal of 

sources from their devices for maintenance or replacement and when they are aggregated 

within a common physical barrier for temporary storage.

Q10: How far apart must my devices or materials be located for them not to be considered

“aggregated”?

A10: No single minimum distance between locations of materials or devices can or should be 

prescribed in a regulation applied to all licensees’ situations. As noted in the preceding Q&A, 

the licensee will have to identify the minimum distance that it believes should be counted as a 

physical barrier based on an analysis of site-specific conditions. The analysis will be subject to 

NRC inspection.
 13

Agreement State means any State with which the Atomic Energy Commission or the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has entered into an effective agreement under 

Subsection 274b of the Act. Non-agreement State means any other State.

This definition is not specific to 10 CFR Part 37.

Approved individual means an individual whom the licensee has determined to be 

trustworthy and reliable for unescorted access in accordance with Subpart B of this part and 

who has completed the training required by 10 CFR 37.43(c).

Q&As:

Q1: Is an individual approved for access to radioactive materials automatically approved for 

access to information to be protected under 37.43(d) as well?

A1: No. To be approved for access to protected information, such an individual would have

to meet the applicable requirements in Part 37.43(d) and would have to have a need to know

the information to perform his or her duties. Similarly, an individual approved for access to SGI 

would also have to have a need to have access to category 2 or greater quantities of

radioactive material to perform job-related duties to be approved for unescorted access to these

materials.

Q2: Who approves an “approved individual”?

A2: The rule requires a reviewing official (RO) designated by the affected licensee to approve

an individual for unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material.

The RO must determine that the individual seeking such access is trustworthy and reliable before

granting that individual unescorted access. See the definition of an RO below.

Q3: What does it mean to be “trustworthy and reliable”?

A3: See the definition of “trustworthiness and reliability” below and the Q&As pertaining to 10

CFR 37.25, “Background Investigations.”

Q4: What does it mean to “complete” the training required by 10 CFR 37.43(c)? Does an 

individual have to pass a test to have successfully “completed” the training?

A4: No. Testing is not required; however, evidence that the trainee took and passed a 

reasonable test of the knowledge, skill, or ability objectives of the training is one possible 

measure of the likelihood that he or she will be able to carry out his or her assigned security 

responsibilities. No individual subject to the training requirements may be permitted unescorted 

access to a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material before completing the 

training requirements appropriate for that individual’s potential job responsibilities. See the 

Q&As for 10 CFR 37.43(c).

Background investigation means an investigation conducted by a licensee or applicant to 

support the determination of trustworthiness and reliability.
 14

See the Q&As for 10 CFR 37.25, “Background Investigations.”

Becquerel (Bq) means one disintegration per second.

This definition is not specific to 10 CFR Part 37.

Byproduct material means—

(1) Any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in, or made 

radioactive by, exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or using 

special nuclear material;

(2) The tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or concentration of uranium or 

thorium from ore processed primarily for its source material content, including 

discrete surface wastes resulting from uranium solution extraction processes. 

Underground ore bodies depleted by these solution extraction operations do not 

constitute “byproduct material” within this definition;

(3) (i) Any discrete source of radium-226 that is produced, extracted, or converted after 

extraction, before, on, or after August 8, 2005, for use for a commercial, medical, or 

research activity; or

(ii) Any material that—

(A) Has been made radioactive by use of a particle accelerator; and

(B) Is produced, extracted, or converted after extraction, before, on, or after

August 8, 2005, for use for a commercial, medical, or research activity; and

(4) Any discrete source of naturally occurring radioactive material, other than source 

material, that—

(i) The Commission, in consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental 

Protection Agency, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and 

the head of any other appropriate Federal agency, determines would pose a threat 

similar to the threat posed by a discrete source of radium-226 to the public health and 

safety or the common defense and security; and

(ii) Before, on, or after August 8, 2005, is extracted or converted after extraction for 

use in a commercial, medical, or research activity.

This definition is not specific to 10 CFR Part 37.

Carrier means a person engaged in the transportation of passengers or property by land or 

water as a common, contract, or private carrier or by civil aircraft.
 15

Q&As:

Q1: Can a licensee be a carrier?

A1: Yes. Any person as defined in 10 CFR 30.4 may engage in transportation of radioactive 

materials as a common, contract, or private carrier.

Q2: What’s the difference between a “carrier” and a “transporter,” a term also used in this 

rule?

A2: No difference between the terms exists. For the purposes of this part, the NRC uses the 

terms interchangeably.

Category 1 quantity of radioactive material means a quantity of radioactive material meeting 

or exceeding the category 1 threshold in Table 1 of Appendix A to this part. This is 

determined by calculating the ratio of the total activity of each radionuclide to the category 1 

threshold for that radionuclide and adding the ratios together. If the sum is equal to or 

exceeds 1, the quantity would be considered a category 1 quantity. Category 1 quantities of 

radioactive material do not include the radioactive material contained in any fuel assembly, 

subassembly, fuel rod, or fuel pellet.

Category 2 quantity of radioactive material means a quantity of radioactive material meeting 

or exceeding the category 2 threshold but less than the category 1 threshold in Table 1 of 

Appendix A to this part. This is determined by calculating the ratio of the total activity of each 

radionuclide to the category 2 threshold for that radionuclide and adding the ratios together.

If the sum is equal to or exceeds 1, the quantity would be considered a category 2 quantity. 

category 2 quantities of radioactive material do not include the radioactive material contained 

in any fuel assembly, subassembly, fuel rod, or fuel pellet.

Q&A:

Q1: How do I determine whether I possess a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive 

material?

A1: The licensee should use the sum-of-fractions method, which is also known as the unity 

rule, to determine if it possesses a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material. 

The licensee may need to implement 10 CFR Part 37 requirements even if it does not possess 

any single source or single radionuclide in excess of a category 2 threshold. For combinations

of materials (including sealed sources, unsealed sources, and bulk material) and radionuclides, 

the licensee must include multiple sources (including bulk material) of the same radionuclide

and multiple sources (including bulk material) of different radionuclides to determine if the 

requirements apply. For the purposes of this calculation, the licensee must consider all the

radioactive material that it possesses at the site in question. The licensee may use the following 

formula for the unity rule to determine if it must implement the 10 CFR Part 37 requirements:
 16

R1/AR1 + R2/AR2+ Rn/ARn > 1.0

where:

R1 = total amount of radionuclide 1

AR1 = category 2 threshold of radionuclide 1

R2 = total amount of radionuclide 2

AR2 = category 2 threshold of radionuclide 2

Rn = total amount of radionuclide n

AR2 = category 2 threshold of radionuclide n and so on greater than or equal to1.0

If the sum of these fractions is greater than or equal to 1, the licensee possesses at least a 

category 2 quantity of radioactive material, and the 10 CFR Part 37 requirements would apply if 

this quantity is aggregated in a single location.

The licensee would use the same unity rule formula above to determine if it has a category 1 

quantity for purposes of implementing 10 CFR Part 37 requirements for the transport of such 

quantities. However, it would substitute the category 1 threshold value as the divisor for each 

radionuclide to be shipped. Category 1 thresholds in Appendix A to this report are 100 times 

the thresholds for category 2 quantities.

The terabecquerel thresholds are the regulatory standard and must be used in all unity rule 

calculations. The licensee must therefore convert any curie values in its license for sources and 

material to terabecquerel as follows:

n (terabecquerel) = N (Ci) x 0.037 terabecquerel (TBq) per curie

See the examples included below.

Example 1: The licensee possesses the following materials:

• 5 TBq of Co-60 (bulk material)

• 5 TBq of Co-60 (sealed source)

• 20 TBq of Ir-192 (sealed source)

The category 2 threshold is 0.3 TBq for Co-60 and 0.8 TBq for Ir-192. Using the

sum-of-fractions formula (R1/AR1 + R2/AR2 + Rn/ARn > 1.0) and dividing the total quantities of

Co-60 and Ir-192 by their category 2 threshold quantities produces 58 as the sum of fractions as

follows:

(5 TBq Co-60 + 5 TBq Co-60)/0.3 TBq + (20 TBq Ir-192/0.80 TBq) = 58

Because this sum is greater than 1, 10 CFR Part 37 requirements apply to this licensee. At a 

minimum, the licensee must apply the 10 CFR Part 37 requirements to the Co-60 and Ir-192 

sources because each source individually is considered a category 2 quantity. Depending on 

the location of the Co-60 in bulk form, the licensee may need to apply 10 CFR Part 37 

requirements if it stores that bulk material with either source or if it stores all the bulk material 

together at one location surrounded by one physical barrier. However, if the licensee stores the
 17

bulk material in several locations, such that each location contains less than 0.3 TBq with a 

physical barrier between locations, 10 CFR Part 37 requirements would not apply to the bulk 

material.

Example 2: The licensee possesses the following materials:

• 3 TBq of Sr-90 (bulk material)

• 0.5 TBq of Cs-137 (sealed source)

• 0.1 TBq of Am-241 (bulk material)

The category 2 threshold is 10 TBq for Sr-90, 1 TBq for Cs-137, and 0.6 TBq for Am-241. Using 

the sum-of-fractions formula (R1/AR1 + R2/AR2 + Rn/AR > 1.0) and dividing the total quantities of 

Sr-90 and Cs-137 by their category 2 threshold quantities produces 0.97 as the sum of fractions 

as follows:

(3 TBq Sr-90/10 TBq) + (0.5 TBq Cs-137/1 TBq) + (0.1 TBq Am-241/0.6 TBq) = 0.97

Because this sum is less than 1, 10 CFR Part 37 does not apply to this licensee. 

Example 3: The licensee possesses the following materials:

• 0.5 TBq of Cs-137 (unsealed source)

• 0.3 TBq of Am-241 (sealed source)

The category 2 threshold is 1 TBq for Cs-137 and 0.6 TBq for Am-241. Using the

sum-of-fractions formula (R1/AR1 + R2/AR2+ Rn/ARn > 1.0) and dividing the total quantities of

Cs-137 and Am-241 by their category 2 threshold quantities produces 1 as the sum of fractions

as follows:

(0.5 TBq Cs-137/1 TBq) + (0.3 TBq Am-241/0.6 TBq) = 1

Because this sum equals 1, 10 CFR Part 37 requirements may apply. If the licensee stores the 

two sources, 10 CFR Part 37 would apply. If the licensee stores the sources apart, each one 

protected by at least one independent physical barrier, 10 CFR Part 37 would not apply. See 

also the Q&As for definition of “aggregated.”

Commission means the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or its duly authorized 

representatives.

This definition is not specific to 10 CFR Part 37.

Curie means that amount of radioactive material, which disintegrates at the rate of 37 billion 

atoms per second.
 18

This definition is not specific to 10 CFR Part 37.

Diversion means the unauthorized movement of radioactive material subject to this part to a 

location different from the material’s authorized destination inside or outside of the site at 

which the material is used or stored.

Q&A:

Q1: What’s the difference between diversion and theft?

A1: Both diversion and theft involve the unauthorized movement of radioactive material to an 

unauthorized destination. When an adversary is actively transporting an offsite shipment away 

from its intended destination, the two are indistinguishable. The common dictionary meaning

of theft is the wrongful “taking and carrying away” or “removing” of property from its owner, 

implicitly requiring a movement off site. Also under these definitions, theft implicitly requires 

continuing possession of the stolen material. By contrast, diversion, as defined here, does not 

require either offsite removal or continuous possession. The diverter, for example, could

conceal the diverted material or device onsite and leave it for later misuse by either the

diverter or a colluding third party.

Escorted access means accompaniment while in a security zone by an approved individual 

who maintains continuous direct visual surveillance at all times over an individual who is not 

approved for unescorted access.

Q&As:

Q1: Does “accompaniment” mean that the escort must always be physically present when an 

individual who is not approved for unescorted access is in the security zone?

A1: Generally, yes, although an escort may monitor an unapproved individual remotely

(e.g., using a closed-circuit TV system) as long as the escort maintains continuous direct visual 

surveillance over the individual at all times. Under some circumstances, such as when a patient 

undergoes teletherapy, when actual physical accompaniment of such an unapproved individual 

is not allowed under the as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) principle, remote 

surveillance would be the only alternative. However, remote visual surveillance should not be

so remote as to interfere with the licensee’s ability to detect, assess, and respond immediately 

to an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of radioactive materials.

An escort may monitor a restroom break from outside the restroom by maintaining continuous 

surveillance of the entry door if there is only one entrance or exit and no windows or ventilation 

ducts that an individual could access.

Q2: Does “direct visual surveillance” mean the same thing as “line-of-sight surveillance”?

A2: No. The term “direct continuous visual surveillance” allows the use of video surveillance. 

Video surveillance would be appropriate in some, but not all, cases. For example, video 

surveillance of patients during a treatment would be appropriate, considering the ALARA 

complications of having the escort physically present in the treatment room.
 19

Q3: This definition of escorted access requires continuous direct visual surveillance only 

when an individual not approved for unescorted access is within a security zone. Aren’t there 

circumstances under which this surveillance might be necessary when an unapproved individual 

is on site but outside the security zone?

A3: The NRC does not require the licensee to maintain direct visual surveillance outside the 

security zone. The licensee, however, may choose to escort unapproved individuals in this 

manner in any area of the facility that it deems appropriate. The agency requires direct visual 

surveillance only in cases in which an unapproved individual has access to a category 1 or 

category 2 quantity of radioactive material, and the security zone is effectively the area within 

which such access is controlled.

Fingerprint orders means the orders issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or 

the legally binding requirements issued by Agreement States that require fingerprints and 

criminal history records checks for individuals with unescorted access to category 1 and 

category 2 quantities of radioactive material or safeguards information-modified handling.

Q&A:

Q1: Which particular fingerprint orders referred to in this definition do I need to know about 

for compliance with this rule?

A1: The existing licensees were issued NRC orders that require them to take fingerprints and

to obtain criminal history records checks of employees to determine their T&R for access to 

radioactive materials, SGI, or SGI-M. The intent of the rule’s definition here is to include other 

sources of fingerprinting and criminal history records check requirements, such as license 

conditions issued by the NRC or an Agreement State agency. A license applicant will need to 

meet the fingerprinting requirements in 10 CFR Part 37.

Government agency means any executive department, commission, independent 

establishment, corporation, wholly or partly owned by the United States of America, which is 

an instrumentality of the United States, or any board, bureau, division, service, office, officer, 

authority, administration, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government.

This definition is not specific to 10 CFR Part 37.

License, except where otherwise specified, means a license for byproduct material issued 

pursuant to the regulations in 10 CFR Parts 30 through 36 and 39 of this chapter.

This definition is not specific to 10 CFR Part 37.

License issuing authority means the licensing agency that issued the license, i.e., the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the appropriate agency of an Agreement State.
 20

This definition is self-explanatory and requires no Q&A.

Local law enforcement agency (LLEA) means a public or private organization that has been 

approved by a Federal, State, or local government to carry firearms and make arrests and is 

authorized and has the capability to provide an armed response in the jurisdiction where the 

licensed category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material is used, stored, or 

transported.

Q&A:

Q1: Must an LLEA be a government entity?

A1: No. The LLEA may be any security force, including a private one, if it has Federal, 

State, or local government authority to carry firearms and make arrests. University police could 

be considered an LLEA under the definition because some university police departments are a 

fully badged and sworn police force with the authority to make arrests and provide an armed 

response. A railroad’s police force with this authority also could be considered an LLEA.

See also the Q&As for 10 CFR 37.45, “LLEA Coordination and Notification,” especially Q3–Q5 

and A3–A5 for 10 CFR 37.45(a).

Lost or missing licensed material means licensed material whose location is unknown. It 

includes material that has been shipped but has not reached its destination and whose 

location cannot be readily traced in the transportation system.

This definition is not specific to 10 CFR Part 37.

Mobile device means a piece of equipment containing licensed radioactive material that is 

either mounted on wheels or casters, or otherwise equipped for moving without a need for 

disassembly or dismounting, or designed to be hand carried. Mobile devices do not include 

stationary equipment installed in a fixed location.

Q&As:

Q1: The increased controls (IC) orders applied additional security requirements to “portable,” 

as well as “mobile” devices. What’s the difference between portable and mobile devices for 

purposes of compliance with 10 CFR Part 37?

A1: No difference exists from the standpoint of compliance with 10 CFR 37.53, 

“Requirements for Mobile Devices.” The same security requirements apply to both. The 

definition of “mobile device” for this rule encompasses all devices that can be “hand-carried” that 

are mounted on wheels/casters or that are otherwise movable by an individual without additional 

equipment.
 21

Q2: If I have a category 1 or 2 quantity of radioactive material in a 55-gallon drum that isn’t

mounted on wheels or casters and can’t be carried by hand, would the NRC consider this drum a

“mobile device”?

A2: Generally, no, unless the drum was light enough to be turned on its side and rolled to 

an unauthorized location outside an established security zone. In most cases, a loaded

55-gallon drum would likely require a handtruck, forklift, or other equipment for removal from

its authorized place of use or storage. As good practice, the licensee should store the

handtruck, forklift, or other equipment for moving the drum in a location away from the storage

area.

Q3: If I have a category 1 or 2 quantity of radioactive material in a container that isn’t 

mounted on wheels or casters and that cannot be carried by hand, and if I secure it in a pickup 

truck bed or on a trailer, would the NRC consider this source or device “mobile”?

A3: Yes. The NRC would consider the source or device mobile because it would be 

“mounted on wheels” and “equipped for moving without a need for disassembly or dismounting” 

under this definition. A container or device on a pickup truck bed or on a trailer also would need 

to meet the requirement in 10 CFR 37.53(b). This subsection states that unless health and 

safety requirements for a site prohibit disabling the vehicle, the licensee must “utilize a method 

to disable the vehicle or trailer when not under direct control and constant surveillance by the 

licensee.” Licensees subject to this requirement may not rely on the removal of an ignition key 

to meet the requirement. (See the Q&As on 10 CFR 37.53.)

Movement control center means an operations center that is remote from transport activity 

and that maintains position information on the movement of radioactive material, receives 

reports of attempted attacks or thefts, provides a means for reporting these and other 

problems to appropriate agencies, and can request and coordinate appropriate aid.

Q&A:

Q1: Must the various functions of the “movement control center” be accomplished by one 

entity, or may these functions be accomplished by separate departments or personnel?

A1: The movement control center definition does not require the same department or 

personnel to carry out all the functions. It does require an operations center or base from 

which all the functions are handled. To ensure the necessary degree of coordination and 

effectiveness, carrying out the functions of the movement control center may be more effective 

under the control of a single organization managed by the individual who is responsible for the 

timely and effective execution of these functions. The primary purpose of the movement control 

center is to have staff members available who can immediately respond to an emergency and 

who can coordinate the required response. As specified by definition, movement control center 

functions must, at a minimum, include maintaining current shipment position information, 

receiving and sending reports, and requesting and coordinating appropriate aid.
 22

No-later-than arrival time means the date and time that the shipping licensee and receiving 

licensee have established as the time at which an investigation will be initiated if the 

shipment has not arrived at the receiving facility. The no-later-than arrival time may not be 

more than 6 hours after the estimated arrival time for shipments of category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material.

Q&As:

Q1: Does the no-later-than (NLT) arrival time apply to shipments outside the United States?

A1: No. An NLT arrival time must be established only for the domestic portion of a shipment 

for import or export (i.e., shipments with origins and destinations within the United States or its 

territories or possessions). These origins may include locations at which imported materials are 

cleared by U.S. customs authorities, and destinations may include terminal facilities for the 

export of the material.

Q2: The definition of NLT arrival time specifies that the NLT arrival time may not be more

than 6 hours after the estimated arrival time for shipments of category 2 quantities of radioactive 

material. What about category 1 quantities?

A2: The requirement for an NLT arrival time does not apply to shipments of category 1 

quantities of radioactive material. For these shipments, each licensee shipping the material 

must establish a movement control center that must monitor shipments 24 hours a day, 7 days 

a week. In addition, the movement control center must have the ability to communicate 

immediately with the appropriate law enforcement agencies in an emergency. See the related 

Q&As under 10 CFR 37.75, “Preplanning and Coordination of Shipment of Category 1 or 

Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material.”

Person means—

(1) Any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or 

private institution, group, Government agency other than the Commission or the 

U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] (except that the [DOE] shall be considered a

person within the meaning of the regulations in 10 CFR, Chapter I, to the extent that 

its facilities and activities are subject to the licensing and related regulatory authority

of the Commission under Section 202 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 

(88 Stat. 1244), the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978

(92 Stat. 3021), the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (96 Stat. 2201), and

Section 3(b)(2) of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 

(99 Stat. 1842)), any State or any political subdivision of, or any political entity within,

a State, any foreign government or nation or any political subdivision of any such 

government or nation, or other entity; and

(2) Any legal successor, representative, agent, or agency of the foregoing.
 23

This definition is not specific to 10 CFR Part 37.

Reviewing official means the individual who shall make the trustworthiness and reliability 

determination of an individual to determine whether the individual may have, or continues

to have, unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive materials

that are possessed by the licensee.

See the related Q&As for 10 CFR 37.23, “Access Authorization Program Requirements.”

Sabotage means deliberate damage, with malevolent intent, to a category 1 or category 2 

quantity of radioactive material; a device that contains a category 1 or category 2 quantity

of radioactive material; or the components of the security system.

Q&As:

Q1: Must I find both “deliberate damage” and “malevolent intent” in order to report an 

incident as sabotage? Can’t I presume malevolent intent if it’s clear that the damage

was deliberate?

A1: No. The licensee does not need to find both deliberate damage and malevolent intent

to report suspected sabotage. If the licensee has determined that the damage was deliberate,

it should not hesitate to report it as sabotage or vandalism, even if it has not yet found

convincing evidence that the damage was malevolent. If the damage appears to have been

deliberate and if it is severe enough to constitute an imminent and substantial danger to an

employee or any member of the public, the licensee should report it to the LLEA immediately

under 10 CFR 37.57(a), regardless of whether the damage might have been malevolent. If the

licensee or the employee who discovers the damage has reason to believe that it was

deliberate, the licensee should also report that it may be malevolent. In addition, regardless of 

any apparent malevolence, if the damage is severe enough to constitute an excessive radiation

exposure to an employee or any member of the public, the licensee must report it to the NRC or

appropriate Agreement State agency immediately under 10 CFR 20.2202, “Notification of

Incidents.” Note, too, that if a quantity of material greater than category 2 has been lost or

stolen, the licensee must report it to the NRC or appropriate Agreement State agency

immediately under 10 CFR 20.2201, “Reports of Thefts or Loss of Licensed Material,” 

regardless of whether the removal of the material was malevolent.

Q2: How can I determine, for the purposes of this part, that damage to material, a device,

or security system component was “deliberate”? How can I determine whether the damage

was “with malevolent intent”?

A2: To answer either question, the licensee should consider one or more of the

following possible questions about its discovery of the damage:
 24

• Could such severe damage have been accidental, or could it have been 

accomplished only by a trained individual who knew or should have known the 

safety or security consequences and how to avoid them? (If the licensee 

concludes that the damage was not accidental, it should also consider, at a 

minimum, the additional questions below.)

• Have other suspicious or unexplained instances of damage to material, devices, or

security equipment occurred in the past few weeks or months?

• Was the current incident immediately reported by the person who claims to have first 

discovered it?

• Was that person authorized to be at the site of the damage when it reportedly 

occurred?

• Was the damage severe enough to indicate that there was intent to degrade or 

disable the intended function of the damaged device or equipment?

• Does the damage affect safety or security?

• Does the damage appear to have required the efforts of more than one person?

• If the licensee is the first to discover the damage, does anything appear in the 

vicinity or elsewhere on the site to indicate an attempt to conceal the damage?

• Was there collateral damage to physical barriers or to monitoring or detection 

equipment necessary to permit successful forced access to the damaged material,

device(s), or security or safety equipment?

• Did this or any other security equipment have to be defeated to gain access to the

security zone?

• Is forced entry anywhere else on the premises, such as a broken window or 

jimmied door, evident?

• If the perpetrator(s) was discovered in the act, was he or she armed? Did he or she

resist or try to escape?

• Did the incident occur at night or during any other interval when the intruder 

could expect reduced security capabilities at the site?

• Could the perpetrator(s) have attained access to the security zone or security 

equipment without the help of a knowledgeable insider?

This list of questions is not exhaustive. Other circumstances may exist that prompt other kinds 

of questions to determine if the damage was deliberate or the intent was malevolent for the 

purposes of 10 CFR Part 37.
 25

Safe haven means a readily recognizable and readily accessible site at which security is 

present or from which, in the event of an emergency, the transport crew can notify and wait 

for the local law enforcement authorities.

Q&As:

Q1: Does a safe haven have to be approved by a Government entity, such as the State or 

local police? Do I have to get approval from anyone else, such as the owner or operator of a 

truck stop?

A1: No. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.75(a) only requires shipping licensees to identify safe 

havens during their preplanning for the shipment of a category 1 quantity of radioactive material.

Q2: Does “readily recognizable” mean that a truck transport crew has to be able to see a 

safe haven from the road?

A2: No. Although it would be preferable for the licensee to choose an easily recognized 

location, it may have to locate a safe haven in a forested area or on hilly terrain or to otherwise 

situate it in an area in which the physical features of the surrounding area may obscure all or

part of the site. To be “readily recognizable,” a safe haven only needs to be in a locale familiar 

enough to at least one member of the transport crew to enable him or her to know when the 

transport vehicle needs to turn or exit to reach the site and to know when the transport vehicle 

has arrived. This individual also should be able to guide local law enforcement or other 

assistance to the site by phone, if necessary.

Q3: Does “readily accessible” mean that the safe haven has to be along the road or right off 

an exit?

A3: No. Under this definition, a safe haven may be several miles from an exit or turnoff if it 

meets one of the definition’s other criteria by having security present or by providing a site from 

which, in an emergency, the transport crew can notify and wait for the LLEAs.

Q4: What kind of “security” has to be “present” to satisfy this definition of safe haven? Does 

this mean that law enforcement agency personnel have to be onsite?

A4: Neither security personnel nor law enforcement authorities need to be present at a site 

for it to serve as a safe haven. Obviously, there are advantages to having security present at 

the site of a safe haven. However, as noted in the definition, a safe haven also may be a site 

from which, “in the event of an emergency, the transport crew can notify and wait for the 

LLEAs.”

Q5: What does the NRC mean when it defines safe haven as a “site”? Does a safe haven 

have to have a fence or other kind of recognizable property boundaries and/or be some kind of 

facility, even if only a parking lot, to meet the NRC’s understanding of a “site”?
 26

A5: No. If the site is readily recognizable and readily accessible, it only needs to meet one of

the remaining two criteria in the definition: (1) it must be located in an area in which security

is present, or (2) it must be located in an area in which the transport crew can, in the event of an 

emergency, notify the LLEAs and more safely wait for them to arrive.

Q6: So, does this mean that a safe haven can be any place along the side of a road as long 

as there’s an emergency?

A6: No, the side of the road is not typically considered a safe haven. Under 

10 CFR 37.75(a)(2), as part of their preplanning prior to a shipment, the licensee must identify

safe havens and coordinate shipment information with the governor or the governor’s designee of 

any State through which the shipment will pass. A transport crew may well have no choice but to

pull to the side of the road in an emergency. However, this would not be a preshipment 

identified safe haven. Further security is not likely to be present at these emergency stops and it

may not be in an area where it is possible for the transport crew to notify LLEA and safely wait for 

LLEA to arrive.

Q7: What conditions en route would constitute an “emergency” requiring a safe haven under 

this definition? Would the NRC consider only a security incident, such as an armed attack or 

other malevolent interference with a shipment, to be an “emergency”? Or could an emergency 

be safety-related or a mechanical problem requiring a prompt repair?

A7: An emergency could be any of these conditions and also could include severe weather 

or the sudden illness or incapacitation of the driver or other member of the transport crew. The 

key characteristic of an emergency that requires a safe haven under this definition is that the 

condition must result in an unexpected stoppage of the shipment. See also the pertinent Q&As 

for 10 CFR 37.75.

Security zone means any temporary or permanent area determined and established by the 

licensee for the physical protection of category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive 

material.

Q&As:

Q1: What is the purpose of a security zone?

A1: A security zone is an area, defined by the licensee, that both isolates and controls 

access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material to prevent and detect

unauthorized access. The purpose of the zone is to define the area that contains the

quantities of material that must be protected. A security zone effectively defines the area

in which the licensee will apply the isolation and access control measures required by 10

CFR Part 37. Licensees must store and use all category 1 and category 2 quantities of

radioactive material only within a security zone.

Q2: Are the characteristics different for “permanent” and “temporary” security zones?

A2: Both types of security zones must meet the same requirements. See the Q&As for 10

CFR 37.47; 10 CFR 37.49, “Monitoring, Detection, and Assessment”; 10 CFR 37.51, 

“Maintenance and Testing”; and 10 CFR 37.53.
 27

State means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 

Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the 

Northern Mariana Islands.

This definition is not specific to 10 CFR Part 37.

Telemetric position monitoring system means a data transfer system that captures 

information by instrumentation and/or measuring devices about the location and status of a 

transport vehicle or package between the departure and destination locations.

Q&As:

Q1: How does the NRC define “departure” and “destination” locations?

A1: Although it is not defined in the rule, “departure” marks the location at which the carrier 

accepts the consignment of radioactive material for shipment and begins movement of the 

loaded transport vehicle. The location of departure is the site that is usually, but not always, 

controlled by the shipping licensee and from which the movement of the loaded transport 

vehicle begins. “Destination” denotes the location at which the receiving licensee accepts the 

shipment from the carrier and unloads, or authorizes the unloading of, the radioactive material 

specified in the accepted shipment documents from the carrier’s transport vehicle.

Trustworthiness and reliability are characteristics of an individual considered dependable in 

judgment, character, and performance, such that unescorted access to category 1 or 

category 2 quantities of radioactive material by that individual does not constitute an 

unreasonable risk to the public health and safety or security. A determination of 

trustworthiness and reliability for this purpose is based upon the results from a background 

investigation.

Q&As:

Q1: How can I or anybody really know whether an individual is “dependable” in judgment, 

character, and performance? What does the NRC mean by “dependable”?

A1: A judgment of any individual’s dependability is inherently qualitative and not readily 

amenable to objective measurement or evaluation. Each individual has a temperament, 

personal history, and other characteristics that require a licensee’s fairest subjective judgment 

about that individual’s dependability. But the scope of this judgment is limited. For the

purposes of this definition, the kind of dependability required is based on if the individual can be 

trusted and relied upon to comply with the licensee’s security requirements to sound an alarm 

whenever appropriate and to do no willful harm when he or she is permitted solitary access to

any location with an aggregated category 2 or greater quantity of radioactive materials. In 

addition, under 10 CFR 37.23(e)(1), the judgment must be based on information produced from 

a background investigation that satisfies the requirements in 10 CFR 37.25.
 28

In addition, note that the basis for a judgment about an individual’s dependability is limited to the 

information available at the time. However, if at any time between a licensee’s initial 

investigation and the 10-year reinvestigation the licensee receives information that would call

into question that individual’s dependability for the purposes of this part, the licensee should not 

hesitate to reevaluate the basis for its earlier judgment. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.23(e)(4)

specifically provides that an RO “may terminate or administratively withdraw an individual’s 

unescorted access authorization based on information obtained after the background 

investigation has been completed and the individual granted unescorted access authorization.”

Q2: What would constitute an “unreasonable risk” to the public health and safety or security 

for purposes of 10 CFR Part 37?

A2: An “unreasonable risk” in this context is a risk that, by granting the subject individual 

unescorted access to a category 2 or greater quantity of radioactive material, would result in 

theft, sabotage, or diversion of the material for a malevolent act that affects the public health 

and safety and the environment. See also the Q&As on 10 CFR 37.21; 10 CFR 37.23, “Access 

Authorization Program Requirements”; 10 CFR 37.25; 10 CFR 37.27, “Requirements for 

Criminal History Records Checks of Individuals Granted Unescorted Access to category 1 or 

category 2 Quantities of Radioactive”; and 10 CFR 37.29, “Relief from Fingerprinting, 

Identification, and Criminal History Records Checks and Other Elements of Background

Investigations for Designated Categories of Individuals Permitted Unescorted Access to Certain

Radioactive Materials or Other Property.”

Unescorted access means solitary access to an aggregated category 1 or category 2 

quantity of radioactive material or the devices that contain the material.

Q&As:

Q1: Is a patient who is alone inside the boundaries of a security zone for teletherapy, but 

monitored remotely, considered to have unescorted access?

A1: The patient is not considered to have unescorted access if the remote monitoring 

permits direct and continuous surveillance and an immediate detection, assessment, and 

response to any unauthorized activity. Patients undergoing radiotherapy would generally be 

considered “accompanied” if they are under remote, but nearby, continuous visual surveillance. 

These patients are also typically in rooms with radiation alarms that are closely monitored 

visually from an adjacent room, and they are under direct visual surveillance to permit the 

licensee to effectively detect, assess, and respond immediately to an actual or attempted theft, 

sabotage, or diversion.

Q2: When must a person who is alone inside the boundaries of a security zone, but 

monitored remotely, be considered “solitary”?

A2: To be considered “solitary” under this definition, the individual (1) must be 

unaccompanied by an approved individual while inside the boundaries of a security zone and 

(2) must not be under continuous direct visual surveillance at all times. (See the definition of 

“escorted access.”) Licensees must ensure that all individuals who meet these two conditions 

for solitary access are approved individuals.
 29

An unapproved individual who is solely under direct visual surveillance by an approved individual 

at a central monitoring station that is remote from the subject security zone should generally not

be considered “accompanied” under the definition of escorted access and, therefore, should be

considered sufficiently solitary to require escorting or closer surveillance. Remote visual 

surveillance should not be so remote that it interferes with the licensee’s ability to detect, assess,

and respond immediately to an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of radioactive

materials. For example, depending on the configuration of a site’s walls and doors, continuous

surveillance from an adjoining room could be considered “accompaniment” if the approved

individual who is continuously monitoring the unapproved individual could immediately warn that 

individual or could summon timely assistance nearby to prevent or stop an unauthorized act. 

However, by this same operational criterion, continuous visual surveillance from another floor or

a separate nearby building should not generally be considered “accompaniment,” especially if

other licensee personnel are not close enough to the unapproved individual to make a timely

intervention. For the same reason, remote surveillance from another offsite facility should not be

considered “accompaniment” for purposes of escorted access under similar operating

conditions.

United States, when used in a geographical sense, includes Puerto Rico and all territories 

and possessions of the United States.

Q&As:

This definition is not specific to 10 CFR Part 37.
 30

§ 37.7, “Communications”

Except where otherwise specified or covered under the regional licensing program as 

provided in 10 CFR 30.6(b), all communications and reports concerning the regulations in 

this part may be sent as follows:

§ 37.7(a)

by mail addressed to ATTN: Document Control Desk; Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation; Director, Office of New Reactors; Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards; or Director, Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident 

Response, as appropriate, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555-0001.

§ 37.7(b)

by hand delivery to the NRC’s offices at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

§ 37.7(c)

Where practicable, by electronic submission, for example, Electronic Information Exchange or

CD-ROM. Electronic submissions must be made in a manner that enables the NRC to 

receive, read, authenticate, distribute, and archive the submission and process and retrieve it 

a single page at a time. Detailed guidance on making electronic submissions can be

obtained by visiting the NRC’s Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by 

e-mail to MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by writing the Office of Information Services,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. The guidance 

discusses, among other topics, the formats the NRC can accept, the use of electronic

signatures, and the treatment of nonpublic information.

This definition is self-explanatory and requires no Q&A.
 31

§ 37.9, “Interpretations”

Except as specifically authorized by the Commission in writing, no interpretations of the 

meaning of the regulations in this part by any officer or employee of the Commission other 

than a written interpretation by the General Counsel will be recognized as binding upon the 

Commission.

EXPLANATION:

This definition is self-explanatory.

Q&As:

Q1: Does 10 CFR 37.9 mean I don’t have to comply with an NRC regulatory requirement 

unless and until its meaning has been interpreted in writing by the NRC General Counsel?

A1: No. The licensee must comply with all applicable regulatory requirements in 10 CFR

Part 37. This provision binds the Commission to a particular interpretation of its regulations only 

if the interpretation is written by the NRC General Counsel or is specifically authorized by the 

Commission in writing. The intent of this provision is to bind the NRC when the meaning of an 

NRC requirement is subject to differing and disputed interpretations. Having such a binding 

interpretation is not a precondition for the NRC’s or Agreement State’s enforcement of 

requirements with meanings that are plain or otherwise generally accepted. If a licensee has a 

question about the intended meaning of any requirement, and if this guidance does not clearly 

address its question, the licensee should make its question known to the NRC at its earliest 

convenience. The licensee may do so by contacting its nearest NRC regional office, listed in 10

CFR 30.6(b)(2).
 32

§ 37.11, “Specific Exemptions”

§ 37.11(a)

The Commission may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, 

grant such exemptions from the requirements of the regulations in this part as it determines 

are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and 

security and are otherwise in the public interest.

EXPLANATION:

A licensee may ask the NRC for an exemption from a requirement in 10 CFR Part 37, or the 

NRC can unilaterally decide to exempt a licensee from a requirement. The NRC can grant 

exemptions as long as they are “authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the 

common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest.”

Q&As:

Q1: If a licensee wants to request an exemption from any requirement of the regulations, 

what does the licensee need to submit?

A1: A licensee can request an exemption from 10 CFR Part 37 requirements. The licensee 

should submit an amendment request that identifies the regulatory requirement for which it is 

seeking an exemption. The amendment request should explain why the licensee is requesting 

an exemption from the regulatory requirement and how any proposed alternatives will meet that 

regulatory requirement.

The NRC will evaluate the request and will determine if an exemption is appropriate. The NRC 

will only grant exemptions that it determines are “authorized by law and will not endanger life or 

property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest.” It is the 

licensee’s responsibility to provide sufficient justification in support of its exemption request to 

enable the NRC to make its determination.

The NRC cannot grant exemptions from requirements mandated by law. For example, the NRC 

cannot provide an exemption from the fingerprinting and criminal history records check for 

unescorted access to category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive material because

fingerprinting and criminal history records checks are specifically required by Section 149 of the 

AEA, as amended by Section 652 of the EPAct.
 33

§ 37.11, “Specific Exemptions” (continued)

§ 37.11(b)

Any licensee’s NRC-licensed activities are exempt from the requirements of Subparts B and 

C of this part to the extent that its activities are included in a security plan required by Part 73 

of this chapter.

EXPLANATION:

NRC licensees may protect the radioactive material covered by 10 CFR Part 37 under a security 

plan developed under 10 CFR Part 73.

Q&As:

Q1: If a contract radiographer licensee with material under a 10 CFR Part 37 security plan 

performs work with that material at a temporary jobsite located at a reactor or fuel cycle licensee 

that has a security plan approved under 10 CFR Part 73, which plan would apply?

A1: The materials licensee’s 10 CFR Part 37 security plan would apply for the protection of 

the material. The materials licensee is responsible for meeting the requirements in 10 CFR

Part 37 and the licensee’s own security plan at a temporary jobsite, even if the temporary jobsite

is at a licensed reactor or fuel cycle facility. However, in addition to the requirements in the 

materials licensee’s security plan, the fuel cycle or reactor licensee also may impose other 

requirements to meet its security plan. For example, a contract radiographer licensee who 

brings a source onto a reactor site to conduct radiography activities may be subject to such 

additional reactor security requirements as personal and vehicle searches, access control to 

vital areas, and training.

Q2: If a 10 CFR Part 50 reactor licensee or a 10 CFR Part 70 fuel cycle facility is also 

licensed under its respective license to possess an individual source, such as a radiography 

camera that is at or above the category 2 threshold, would 10 CFR Part 37 requirements apply 

for the security of the source?

A2: The answer depends on the circumstances. If the licensee protects the source under its 

approved 10 CFR Part 73 security plan for the reactor area, it would be exempt from the

security provisions of 10 CFR Part 37 to the extent that its activities are included in a security

plan required by Part 73. If the source is in an area not covered by the 10 CFR Part 73 security

plan, the 10 CFR Part 37 provisions would apply. Similarly, for a 10 CFR Part 70 licensee, if

the licensee protects the source under its 10 CFR Part 73 security plan for the fuel facility, it

would be exempt from the 10 CFR Part 37 requirements to the extent that its activities are

included in a security plan required by Part 73. To ensure that all affected radioactive materials

are covered by a security plan, the reactor or fuel cycle facility licensee should document which

materials will be covered under 10 CFR Part 37 and which will be covered under 10 CFR Part 

73.
 34

Q3: Are activation products contained in, or part of, the reactor structure subject to 10 CFR 

Part 37?

A3: No. Activation products contained in the structure (such as the stainless steel lining of a 

reactor vessel, stainless steel bolts, or the reactor hull) would not be subject to 10 CFR Part 37 

as long as these materials remain an integral component of a reactor. However, upon 

decommissioning of the reactor, waste generated from decommissioning may be subject to 10

CFR Part 37 if the waste meets or exceeds a category 2 threshold. For example, shipments of 

decommissioned reactor components would be subject to Subpart D if their total activity met or 

exceeded a category 2 threshold and if they weighed less than 2,000 kg (4,409 lbs). See 10

CFR 37.11(c) below.
 35

§ 37.11, “Specific Exemptions” (continued)

§ 37.11(c)

A licensee that possesses radioactive waste that contains category 1 or category 2 quantities 

of radioactive material is exempt from the requirements of Subpart B, C, and D of this part. 

Except that any radioactive waste that contains discrete sources, ion-exchange resins, or 

activated material that weighs less than 2,000 kg (4,409 lbs) is not exempt from the 

requirements of this part. The licensee shall implement the following requirements to secure 

the radioactive waste:

§ 37.11(c)(1)

Use continuous physical barriers that allow access to the radioactive waste only through 

established access control points;

§ 37.11(c)(2)

Use a locked door or gate with monitored alarm at the access control point;

§ 37.11(c)(3)

Assess and respond to each actual or attempted unauthorized access to determine whether 

an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion occurred; and

§ 37.11(c)(4)

Immediately notify the LLEA and request an armed response from the LLEA upon 

determination that there was an actual or attempted theft, sabotage or diversion of the 

radioactive waste that contains category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material.

EXPLANATION:

This section exempts radioactive wastes that contain category 2 quantities or greater of 

radioactive material from the security requirements contained in Subparts B, C, and D of 10

CFR Part 37. Instead, the radioactive waste is subject to the security requirements contained in

10 CFR 37.11(c)(1) through 10 CFR 37.11(c)(4). However, if the waste contains discrete 

sources, ion-exchange resins, or activated material weighing less than 2,000 kg (4,409 lbs), the

requirements contained in Subparts B, C, and D apply.

Q&As:

Q1: What radioactive material does the NRC consider “waste” for purposes of 10 CFR 

Part 37?

A1: As defined in 10 CFR 20.1003, “Definitions,” “waste” means “those low-level radioactive 

wastes containing source, special nuclear, or byproduct material that are acceptable for

disposal in a land disposal facility.” For the purposes of this definition, “low-level radioactive 
 36

waste,” as defined in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 

(NUREG-0980, “Nuclear Regulatory Legislation: 111th Congress,” Volume 1, Number 9, “2nd 

Session,” issued January 2011, page 3-3), means “radioactive material that...is not classified as 

high-level radioactive waste, transuranic waste, spent nuclear fuel, or byproduct material, as 

defined in Section 11e.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [i.e., uranium mill tailings]....”

Q2: What types of radioactive wastes are exempt?

A2: Radioactive waste with diffuse category 1 or category 2 quantities, as opposed to 

discrete sources, is exempt only from the requirements in Subparts B, C, and D of 10 CFR

Part 37. These wastes are subject to the requirements in 10 CFR 37.11(c)(1) through 10 CFR

37.11(c)(4) in Subpart A, “General Provisions,” of 10 CFR Part 37. Radioactive waste that 

contains items, such as contaminated clothing, gloves, soil, or low specific activity waste, would 

be exempt from the requirements of Subparts B, C, and D. Radioactive waste that contains 

discrete sources, ion-exchange resins, and activated material that weighs less than 2,000 kg 

(4,409 lbs) are subject to the requirements of Subpart B, C, and D of 10 CFR Part 37.

Q3: When are activated material and component parts considered to be waste? If the walls

(concrete, steel, etc.) become activated during use, does 10 CFR Part 37 apply?

A3: Walls and component parts that become activated throughout their life are not 

considered to be waste until they are no longer useful for their intended purpose. The 

regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 do not apply to activated material in walls and components during 

the operating life of a reactor, hot cell, or accelerator. Once the licensee has begun 

decommissioning and is dismantling the facility, the rubble and removed components would be 

considered waste, and 10 CFR Part 37 would then apply.

Q4: Does the 2,000-kg (4,409 lbs) limit apply to the discrete sources and ion-exchange 

resins or just the activated material?

A4: This weight limit only applies to activated materials and does not apply to discrete 

sources and ion-exchange resins.

Q5: What is meant by discrete sources? Would a waste drum that contained multiple 

category 3 sources that add up to a category 2 quantity of radioactive material be exempt?

A5: Consistent with 10 CFR 30.4, a discrete source means a radionuclide that has been 

processed to purposely increase its concentration within a material for use in commercial, 

medical, or research activities. Waste that has been made radioactive incidentally by a process 

is not considered a discrete source. The drum would not be exempt because, in this example, it 

contains discrete sources. The licensee would need to protect the drum containing aggregated 

sources under 10 CFR Part 37.
 37

§ 37.13, “Information Collection Requirements: OMB Approval”

§ 37.13(a)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has submitted the information collection requirements 

contained in this part to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for approval as 

required by the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The NRC may not 

conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information 

unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. OMB has approved the information 

collection requirements contained in this part under control number 3150-0214.

§ 37.13(b)

The approved information collection requirements contained in this part appear in §§ 37.21,

37.23, 37.25, 37.27, 37.29, 37.31, 37.33, 37.41, 37.43, 37.45, 37.49, 37.55, 37.57, 37.71,

37.75, 37.77, 37.79, and 37.81.

EXPLANATION:

This definition is self-explanatory and requires no Q&A.

SUBPART B—BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS AND ACCESS AUTHORIZATION 

PROGRAMS

§ 37.21, “Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Category 1 or Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material”

§ 37.23, “Access Authorization Program Requirements”

§ 37.25, “Background Investigations”

§ 37.27, “Requirements for Criminal History Records Checks of Individuals Granted

Unescorted Access to Category 1 or Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material”

§ 37.29, “Relief from Fingerprinting, Identification, and Criminal History Records Checks 

and Other Elements of Background Investigations for Designated Categories of 

Individuals Permitted Unescorted Access to Certain Radioactive Materials or Other 

Property”

§ 37.31, “Protection of Information”

§ 37.33, “Access Authorization Program Review”
 38

§ 37.21, “Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Category 1 or Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material”

§ 37.21(a), “General”

§ 37.21(a)(1)

Each licensee that possesses an aggregated quantity of radioactive material at or above the 

category 2 threshold shall establish, implement, and maintain its access authorization program 

in accordance with the requirements of this subpart.

§ 37.21(a)(2)

An applicant for a new license and each licensee that would become newly subject to the 

requirements of this subpart upon application for modification of its license shall implement the 

requirements of this subpart, as appropriate, before taking possession of an aggregated 

category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material.

§ 37.21(a)(3)

Any licensee that has not previously implemented the Security Orders or been subject to the 

provisions of Subpart B shall implement the provisions of Subpart B before aggregating 

radioactive material to a quantity that equals or exceeds the category 2 threshold.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions require licensees to have an access authorization program. New license 

applicants and licensees newly subject to 10 CFR Part 37 must implement this program before 

taking possession of aggregated category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material. A 

licensee that has not previously implemented NRC security orders or has not been subject to 

the provisions of Subpart B must implement these provisions before aggregating radioactive 

material to a category 2 or greater quantity.

Q&As:

Q1: Who is required to have an access authorization program?

A1: Any licensee that possesses an aggregated category 1 or category 2 quantity of 

radioactive material at a facility must have an access authorization program under

10 CFR 37.21(a). For first-time license applicants or those who are seeking a license

amendment to authorize possession of an aggregated category 2 or greater quantity of 

radioactive material, this means that the access authorization program must be in place before 

the licensee may possess the aggregated material. It also means that if a licensee must 

implement a security plan under Subpart C or implement the provisions of Subpart D of 10 CFR 

Part 37 for such aggregated quantities, the licensee will need to have an access authorization 

program as well.

Q2: I do not currently possess a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive

material, but my license authorizes me to possess this quantity. Do I need to

implement an access authorization program?
 39

A2: No. If the licensee does not actually possess a category 1 or category 2 quantity of 

radioactive material, it does not have to implement an access authorization program. However, 

it does need to implement the program before it can take possession of that quantity and before 

it can aggregate the material at or above a category 2 threshold.

Q3: I am already authorized to possess, at several separate locations, radioactive material 

that adds up to more than a category 2 quantity, and I now need to aggregate this material at a 

single location. Will I need to implement an access authorization program?

A3: Yes. If a licensee plans to aggregate the material to a category 2 or greater quantity, it 

will need to develop and implement an access authorization program before it can aggregate 

the material. The licensee will need to conduct a background investigation, including 

fingerprinting, for anyone who will have unescorted access to the aggregated category 2 or 

greater quantity of radioactive material. These individuals will need to be approved for access 

before the material is delivered for aggregated storage at the single location. The licensee also 

should notify the appropriate NRC regional office that it will be implementing an access 

authorization program for the first time.

Q4: May I obtain an exemption from the access authorization program requirements if I

implement alternative physical or administrative controls and training?

A4: A licensee may apply for an exemption from an access authorization program 

requirement. The Commission’s discretion to grant an exemption from the access authorization 

requirements in Subpart B, however, is constrained by statute and a formal determination by the 

Commission. Under Section 149 of the AEA, the NRC must fingerprint “any individual” granted 

unescorted access to radioactive material subject to NRC regulation that the Commission 

determines to be “of such significance to the public health and safety or the common defense 

and security as to warrant fingerprinting and background checks.” The Commission has 

determined that unescorted access to material in category 2 or greater quantities requires 

fingerprinting and background investigations. The Commission will not grant an exemption for 

this statutory requirement.

The requirements in 10 CFR Part 37 are designed to provide defense in depth for the security of 

aggregated quantities of radioactive material. No single measure can provide the same level of 

protection as that of all security measures integrated into a compliant program. Therefore, if the 

licensee will be aggregating radioactive material into a category 2 quantity or greater, it must 

implement each applicable 10 CFR Part 37 requirement unless it can justify the need for an 

exemption and can obtain NRC approval.

Q5: Will I be subject to Subpart B and need to have an access authorization program if I

apply to amend my license to increase its possession limits to a category 2 or greater quantity?

A5: If a licensee plans to possess a category 2 or greater quantity of radioactive material that 

will be aggregated at one location, it must, under 10 CFR 37.21(a)(2), implement an access 

authorization program before obtaining the material. However, if the licensee plans to possess

the material in less than category 2 quantities at several locations, it does not need to establish 

or implement an access authorization program before obtaining the radioactive material.
 40

§37.21, “Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Category 1 or Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material” (continued)

§ 37.21(b), “General Performance Objective”

The licensee’s access authorization program must ensure that the individuals specified in 

paragraph (c)(1) of this section are trustworthy and reliable.

EXPLANATION:

This provision establishes the general performance objective of the access authorization 

program.

Q&As:

Q1: What is the objective of the access authorization program?

A1: The main objective of the access authorization program is to ensure that individuals who 

have unescorted access to a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material are 

trustworthy and reliable and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and 

safety or security of the material.

Q2: How can I protect against an insider threat?

A2: The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 require licensees to limit unescorted access to 

category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material to approved individuals. Under 10

CFR 37.25 and 10 CFR 37.27, a background investigation that includes fingerprinting and a

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal history records check must determine if an 

approved individual is trustworthy and reliable. In addition, under 10 CFR 37.43(c), the

licensee must provide training to its staff. This training should, among other things, enhance

its employees’ and contractors’ awareness of the requirements in 10 CFR 37.57(b) and 10

CFR 37.81(c) to assess and report, as appropriate, “any suspicious activity related to possible

theft, sabotage, or diversion” of category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material. 

Such activity could include unusual or suspicious behavior by employees or contractor

employees with routine access to areas of the site or equipment related to the control of

access to a security zone.

In addition, the rule establishes similar, but separate, controls on access to materials and 

access to information in security plans and procedures. Thus, a licensee may grant an 

approved individual unescorted access to the radioactive material while limiting or restricting 

that individual’s access to items, such as security system codes, monitoring system 

configurations, alarm system capabilities, and other information about the physical protection of 

the material. As with access to material, access to such information must be limited to 

individuals with a need to know who have been determined to be trustworthy and reliable.

These complementary, but independent, sets of restrictions may not prevent a determined 

insider; however, they will reduce the risk of an individual with malicious intent gaining or 

enabling others to gain access to the radioactive material.
 41

§ 37.21, “Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Category 1 or Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material” (continued)

§ 37.21(c), “Applicability”

§ 37.21(c)(1)

Licensees shall subject the following individuals to an access authorization program:

§ 37.21(c)(1)(i)

Any individual whose assigned duties require unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive material or to any device that contains the radioactive material.

§ 37.21(c)(1)(ii)

Reviewing officials.

§ 37.21(c)(2)

Licensees need not subject the categories of individuals listed in 10 CFR 37.29(a)(1) through

(13) to the investigation elements of the access authorization program.

§ 37.21(c)(3)

Licensees shall approve for unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material only those individuals with job duties that require unescorted access to 

category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material.

§ 37.21(c)(4)

Licensees may include individuals needing access to safeguards information-modified 

handling under 10 CFR Part 73 in the access authorization program under Subpart B.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions establish who is subject to the access authorization program.

Q&As:

Q1: Who is subject to the licensee’s access authorization program?

A1: Individuals subject to a licensee’s access authorization program include ROs and anyone

allowed unescorted access to a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material. 

Unescorted access is defined as solitary access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of

radioactive material or devices that contain this material. The term applies to anyone who is

unaccompanied while in a security zone by an approved individual who maintains continuous

direct visual surveillance at all times. (See the Q&As for definitions of “unescorted access” and 

“escorted access” in 10 CFR 37.5.) This would include an unaccompanied contract carrier or 

other contract service provider.
 42

The licensee may accept the background investigation conducted by other licensees, such as 

service providers, if it receives appropriate documentation. However, the licensee still needs to 

make the determination that the individual requires unescorted access at its facility and that it 

accepts the documentation from the other licensee. The licensee will need to verify basic 

identification information before it can grant unescorted access to the individual, and the 

individual must complete the training required by 10 CFR 37.23(a)(2).

For road shipments of category 1 quantities of radioactive material under 10 CFR 37.79(a)(1) of 

Subpart D, the access authorization program must also include vehicle drivers and 

accompanying individuals. Movement control center personnel and any individual whose 

assigned duties provide access to shipment information on category 1 quantities of radioactive 

material are subject to access authorization requirements in Part 37 for access to information 

protected under 37.43(d) or 37.77(f). These individuals may, but are not required to, be included

in the licensee’s 10 CFR Part 37 access authorization program.

Q2: Why do these individuals need to be subject to the access authorization program?

A2: Individuals who have unescorted access to a category 1 or category 2 quantity of 

radioactive material could pose a threat to the public health and safety or security because they 

could divert or steal risk-significant quantities of radioactive material or because they could aid 

others in the commission of such acts.

Q3: Am I required to subject all my employees to the access authorization program?

A3: No. If an unapproved individual has a job-related need to enter a licensee’s security 

zone(s), the licensee has the option to escort that individual and not make a T&R determination 

with respect to that individual. However, each escort and any other individual with the need for 

unescorted access will need to undergo fingerprinting and a background investigation under 10

CFR Part 37 or under a comparable access authorization program that meets the requirements 

in 10 CFR Part 37.

Q4: You note above that unescorted access is defined under 10 CFR 37.5 as “solitary” 

access. If an unapproved individual is alone inside the boundaries of a security zone, but 

monitored remotely, must he or she be considered “solitary” for purposes of the access 

authorization requirements of Subpart B?

A4: No. To be considered “solitary” under the definition of unescorted access under 10

CFR37.5, the person must be unaccompanied by an approved individual while inside the

boundaries of a security zone and must not be under continuous direct visual surveillance at all 

times. Remote visual surveillance can be considered an acceptable form of accompaniment if it is 

continuous and direct at all times; however, it should not be so remote that it interferes with the

licensee’s ability to detect, assess, and respond immediately to an actual or attempted theft, 

sabotage, or diversion of radioactive material. For example, depending on the configuration of a 

site’s walls and doors, continuous surveillance from an adjoining room could be considered 

“accompaniment” if the approved individual continuously monitoring the unapproved individual 

could immediately warn that individual or could summon timely assistance nearby to mitigate

the potential consequences of an unauthorized act. By this same operational criterion, 

continuous visual surveillance from another floor or a separate nearby building should not

generally be considered “accompaniment,” especially if other licensee personnel are not 
 43

near enough to the unapproved individual to make a timely intervention. For the same

reason, remote surveillance from another facility offsite should not be considered

“accompaniment” for purposes of escorted access under similar operating conditions.

Q5: May other individuals (e.g., contract physicians, physicists, laboratory staff, 

housekeeping, or security staff or other staff) not actually using the device or material be 

authorized unescorted access to a device or radioactive material in a category 2 or greater 

quantity?

A5: Yes. Other personnel (both licensee and nonlicensee) may have unescorted access to 

the security zone in which the licensee uses or stores the device or radioactive material if it has 

determined that such personnel need to have such access and have been approved after 

undergoing a background investigation that meets the requirements of Subpart B.

Q6: Do other individuals, such as contract physicians, physicists, housekeeping, etc., need 

to be fingerprinted even though they don’t work directly with the radioactive material?

A6: Yes. These other individuals must be fingerprinted unless their access to the security 

zone is always escorted. However, under 10 CFR 37.21(c), all personnel (both licensee and 

nonlicensee) must be fingerprinted and undergo a background investigation if they have job 

duties that require unescorted access to a security zone in which the licensee uses or stores 

materials.

Q7: If the aggregated radioactive material is in a secured area within a room, is a 

trustworthiness and reliability (T&R) determination still required for people who need access to 

that room?

A7: The answer to this question depends on how the licensee defines the security zone. If 

the room itself is established as the security zone, the licensee must determine if an individual 

with a need to work in that room is trustworthy and reliable unless he or she is escorted at all 

times when in the room. However, if the licensee establishes the security zone as a smaller 

secured area within the room, it would not have to determine if the individual is trustworthy and 

reliable to access that part of the room outside the perimeter of the security zone.

Q8: During a source disconnect, would an individual coming in to provide source retrieval 

services be subject to the access authorization program? If this service individual works for 

another company and [if] the company has performed a background investigation on the 

individual, may I accept that as adequate for my company?

A8: The answer is yes to both questions, unless the licensee escorts those individuals. 

During source retrieval operations, the licensee must escort individuals without a T&R 

determination but with a need for access. Alternatively, the licensee may accept a service 

provider licensee’s background investigation if it implements 10 CFR Part 37 requirements. 

However, the service provider must provide the licensee with a written verification of its 

employee’s T&R under 10 CFR 37.29(a)(13). The written verification from the service provider 

licensee must include the name of each employee who will be providing the service and a 

statement that the employee has been determined to be trustworthy and reliable in accordance

with the requirements in 10 CFR Part 37. The licensee must verify the identity of the employee 

and must document its determination basis.
 44

Q9: Would individuals transporting radioactive material be subject to the background 

investigation requirements?

A9: Yes. For shipments of both category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive material 

that the licensee itself is transporting, the individuals transporting the radioactive material would 

be subject to the access authorization program because they would have access to the material 

during shipment. However, for road shipments of category 1 and category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material, 10 CFR 37.29(a)(10) and 10 CFR 37.29(a)(11) relieve commercial drivers

and package handlers, respectively, from the background investigation elements of the access

authorization program. These individuals are subject to DOT security requirements.

Q10: In our operation, practically everyone knows at least something about expected 

category 1 shipments. Is a T&R determination required for everyone within the operation?

A10: No. However, the regulation in 10 CFR 37.43(d)(3) requires the licensee to make a T&R 

determination on every individual who is granted access to the security plan, implementing

procedures, or list of individuals who have been approved for unescorted access. 

Q11: Is the reviewing official subject to the access authorization program?

A11: Yes. The RO must undergo fingerprinting and a background investigation. See the

Q&As on 10 CFR 37.23(b) for additional information on ROs.

Q12: May additional employees (e.g., new hires or existing employees changing positions 

within the company) who did not have unescorted access under the fingerprinting orders be 

granted unescorted access to a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material without 

undergoing fingerprinting and a background investigation?

A12: No. Before being granted unescorted access to material, all employees identified by the 

licensee as requiring unescorted access must undergo fingerprinting and the background

investigation and must be determined to be trustworthy and reliable. The licensee may escort 

these individuals until a background investigation has been completed.

Q13: May a reviewing official who authorizes access to radioactive materials also approve 

individuals for access to SGI?

A13: Yes. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 73 require that an RO conduct the background 

check review but they do not specify who that individual must be nor list any qualifications for 

the position. A licensee may choose to use the same individual for SGI access under 10 CFR 

Part 73 and for unescorted access to materials under 10 CFR Part 37.

Q14: May service providers not associated with a manufacturing and distribution (M&D) 

license be provided unescorted access to a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive 

material at a customer facility?

A14: Yes. Service provider licensees may make a T&R determination for individuals who 

provide service at their customer’s facilities. Service provider employees who have not been 

determined to be trustworthy and reliable must be escorted by an employee of the customer 

who is authorized to have unescorted access to the radioactive material or to the device that 

contains it. See the Q&As on 10 CFR 37.29(13).
 45

Q15: Our industry is subject to three different Federal background check programs: Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the DOT; and the NRC. All three Federal 

agencies have different requirements, which can be very cumbersome, confusing, and costly. 

Must I establish yet another background investigation program simply to comply with 10 CFR 

Part 37?

A15: The need for a separate background investigation program for 10 CFR Part 37 will 

depend on the specific requirements of the other applicable Federal agency background 

investigation program(s). If a licensee has a background investigation program for other 

activities at its site, and if that program also complies with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 37, 

the licensee does not need to create a separate program for the radioactive material subject to

10 CFR Part 37. However, the licensee will need to document how it uses specific elements of 

existing programs to implement each 10 CFR Part 37 requirement and why it expects that these

elements will demonstrate compliance with each requirement.

Q16: Do individuals on an oil rig who actually manipulate the drilling tools have to be approved 

individuals for access control purposes under 10 CFR Part 37 if they are not employed by the 

licensee?

A16: No. They do not have to be approved individuals for access control purposes under 10

CFR Part 37 as long as an approved individual escorts these individuals or exercises direct 

control over the devices with radioactive material.
 46

§ 37.23, “Access Authorization Program Requirements”

§ 37.23(a), “Granting Unescorted Access Authorization”

§ 37.23(a)(1)

Licensees shall implement the requirements of this subpart for granting initial or reinstated 

unescorted access authorization.

§ 37.23(a)(2)

Individuals who have been determined to be trustworthy and reliable shall also complete the 

security training required by 10 CFR 37.43(c) before being allowed unescorted access to 

category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material.

EXPLANATION:

Each licensee must implement the requirements in Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 37 before granting 

an individual unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material.

An individual must also complete security training before exercising the unescorted access.

Q&As:

Q1: What additional NRC requirements must be met before allowing an individual 

unescorted access to a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material?

A1: In addition to the background investigation and determination of T&R, the individual must 

complete the security training required by 10 CFR 37.43(c) before being allowed unescorted 

access to the material. The individual must have an adequate understanding of his or her 

responsibilities. In addition, other applicable health and safety requirements may apply that the 

individual will have to meet before he or she is allowed unescorted access or can use the 

material.
 47

§ 37.23, “Access Authorization Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.23(b), “Reviewing Officials”

§ 37.23(b)(1)

Reviewing officials are the only individuals who may make trustworthiness and reliability 

determinations that allow individuals to have unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive materials possessed by the licensee.

§ 37.23(b)(2)

Each licensee shall name one or more individuals to be reviewing officials. After completing 

the background investigation on the reviewing official, the licensee shall provide, under oath 

or affirmation, a certification that the reviewing official is deemed trustworthy and reliable by 

the licensee. The fingerprints of the named reviewing official must be taken by a law 

enforcement agency, Federal or State agencies that provide fingerprinting services to the 

public, or commercial fingerprinting services authorized by a State to take fingerprints. The 

licensee shall recertify that the reviewing official is deemed trustworthy and reliable every

10 years in accordance with 10 CFR 37.25(b).

EXPLANATION:

Only ROs may make T&R determinations authorizing individuals to have unescorted access. 

ROs must themselves undergo background investigations, and the licensee must certify by oath 

or affirmation that the RO is trustworthy and reliable.

Q&As:

Q1: What is the role of the RO?

A1: The RO makes the T&R determinations for the licensee and determines who may be 

granted unescorted access authorization. Note that the IC fingerprinting orders refer to a T&R 

official as the individual who made determinations on an employee’s T&R. Unlike the RO, the 

T&R official did not have to be fingerprinted and subject to a background investigation. This rule 

closes that potential security gap by requiring a T&R determination for each RO.

Q2: Who can be a reviewing official?

A2: The licensee decides who is named as an RO. The RO may be the radiation safety 

officer (RSO), someone from the Human Resources (HR) department, or any other individual. 

To review the FBI criminal history records, the RO must be a licensee employee, not a 

contractor. Also, the RO must be authorized for unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive material or access to SGI or SGI-M, but the RO does not have to be 

actually granted access to the material.
 48

Q3: May the HR department be designated to perform the background investigations and be 

the repository for T&R determination records? If we have a process in place, may we continue 

to use that process? Does the RSO have to be involved?

A3: The review or record storage or both may be delegated to a licensee’s HR department or 

any other appropriate department, depending on its mission and available resources. 

Additionally, a licensee may use the information previously obtained through the hiring process 

or another background investigation process to support a T&R determination without having to 

reverify the information. However, the individual responsible for T&R determinations must also 

undergo fingerprinting and an FBI criminal history check, and the licensee must document the 

basis for concluding that its ROs are trustworthy and reliable.

The RSO does not have to be involved in T&R determinations. Because safety and security 

often go hand in hand, however, the RSO likely will need to be integrally involved in any 

implementation decisions.

Q4: Must individuals whose sole job duties are to determine eligibility for employment

(e.g., HR specialists) undergo a background investigation and be determined to be trustworthy 

and reliable?

A4: No. Only the RO must undergo a background investigation and must be determined 

trustworthy and reliable because an untrustworthy RO could approve access by other 

untrustworthy individuals as part of a conspiracy to steal, sabotage, or divert radioactive 

material. However, the T&R determination may use relevant information obtained and 

evaluated by HR personnel when determining whether to hire an individual. If the T&R 

determination is not made by the HR staff and if the licensee relies only on the HR staff to 

obtain information from the background check (e.g., employment history, education, and 

personal references), the HR staff does not have to undergo a background investigation.

Q5: How do I name an individual to be a reviewing official?

A5: The licensee needs to submit the individual’s name and fingerprints to the NRC. Either

a law enforcement agency, a Federal or State agency that provides fingerprinting services to the 

public, or a commercial fingerprinting service authorized by a State to take fingerprints need to 

be the one to take the fingerprints of the individual(s) under consideration for an RO. After 

completing the background investigation on the candidate RO and upon determining that he or 

she is trustworthy and reliable, the licensee must provide, under oath or affirmation, a 

certification that it deems the RO to be trustworthy and reliable. In accordance with 10 CFR

37.25, the licensee must also recertify that the RO is trustworthy and reliable every 10 years 

after his or her selection. Annex A, “Additional Guidance for Evaluating an Individual’s

Trustworthiness and Reliability for Allowing Unescorted Access to Certain Radioactive Material,”

at the end of the Q&As for this subpart provides additional guidance for evaluating an 

individual’s T&R for allowing unescorted access.

Q6: How do I provide the certification that the RO is deemed trustworthy and reliable?

A6: The certification should be provided under oath or affirmation to the NRC at ATTN: 

Document Control Desk, Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attn: Source 

Management and Protection Branch.
 49

The requirement to submit documents to the NRC under oath or affirmation may be satisfied by 

using a notary public to authenticate oaths or affirmations and to certify that the information 

provided is correct and true. 

An alternate method for complying with the oath or affirmation requirement is presented in the 

United States Code, Title 28, Section 1746 (28 U.S.C. § 1746). This method allows use of the 

following unsworn declaration to satisfy the oath or affirmation requirement:

I declare [or certify, verify, state] under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 

Executed on [date] [Signature]. 

Q7: If a licensee already has a T&R official or RO to comply with an NRC security order, may 

this individual continue to serve as the RO under 10 CFR Part 37?

A7: If the T&R official or RO required by an NRC security order has undergone fingerprinting

and a background investigation, he or she may continue to serve as the RO without further 

action. If the individual serving as the T&R official has not undergone fingerprinting and a 

background investigation, the licensee must complete these steps before he or she can make 

any additional T&R determinations.

Q8: Section 10 CFR 37.23(b)(2) requires that the fingerprints of the RO be taken by a law 

enforcement agency, a Federal or State agency that provides fingerprinting services to the 

public, or a commercial fingerprinting service authorized by a State to take fingerprints. This 

makes the licensee incur additional cost to travel to an authorized agency and fees to have the 

authorized agency take fingerprints. Why doesn’t the rule allow the RO to be fingerprinted by 

the licensee’s personnel?

A8: Because the RO has greater responsibility in the access authorization program and 

because he or she will be making the determinations to allow access, the NRC has determined 

that an independent entity must take the RO’s fingerprints to ensure that the identification 

provided matches the person being fingerprinted. This requirement ensures the correct 

identification of the individual submitting the fingerprints. Without this requirement, the RO 

could substitute as his or her own fingerprints those of another individual who is known not to 

have a criminal history or terrorist ties.

Q9: How do I know that a new applicant for RO duties isn’t someone who’s been denied 

unescorted access in some other State and has just come to me to get approval? Will the NRC 

or some other organization keep a registry of such applicants?

A9: If the licensee does an adequate employment history check and learns that the applicant 

worked for other licensees, it may be able to forestall this problem by specifically asking one or 

more of his or her most recent employers. If none of these previous employers are willing to 

provide information on previous denials of access authorization, the licensee may try to get 

information from friends, relatives, or other sources independent of the applicant’s references 

under 10 CFR 37.25(a)(6). The licensee also may ask the applicant in a personal interview and 

look for nonverbal cues that may indicate that he or she is lying or withholding relevant 

information. The NRC does not have a system to track individuals that have been granted 

unescorted access or to track those that have been denied.
 50

Q10: What if a licensee’s reinvestigation of its RO, or new information from any source at any 

time between reinvestigations, requires the licensee to revoke the RO’s access authorization? 

Do all of his or her T&R determinations on other individuals since the previous investigation 

need to be redone?

A10: The answer to this question will depend on the kind of new information that the licensee 

obtains about the RO. For example, a discovery that the individual is on a no-fly list for 

suspected collaboration with a known criminal or terrorist organization should warrant a review 

of all his or her past T&R determinations or at least those dating from about the time that he or 

she was first put on such a list. The licensee is responsible for ensuring that only trustworthy 

and reliable individuals are authorized to have access to radioactive materials. The licensee’s 

assessment of the extent of its potential security liability should include, but may not be limited 

to, such factors as the number of employees to whom the RO has authorized unescorted access

since his or her last background check; the licensee’s knowledge of the kinds and frequency of

social, financial, familial, or romantic contact that the RO has had with any of these employees;

and the timing of their access authorization approvals in relation to the timing of the event(s) that 

raised doubts about the former RO’s T&R.
 51

§ 37.23, “Access Authorization Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.23(b), “Reviewing Officials” (continued)

§ 37.23(b)(3)

Reviewing officials must be permitted to have unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive materials or access to safeguards information or safeguards 

information modified handling, if the licensee possesses safeguards information or 

safeguards information modified handling.

§ 37.23(b)(4)

Reviewing officials cannot approve other individuals to act as reviewing officials.

§ 37.23(b)(5)

A reviewing official does not need to undergo a new background investigation before being 

named by the licensee as the reviewing official if:

§ 37.23(b)(5)(i)

The individual has undergone a background investigation that included fingerprinting and a 

FBI criminal history records check and has been determined to be trustworthy and reliable by 

the licensee; or

§ 37.23(b)(5)(ii)

The individual is subject to a category listed in 10 CFR 37.29(a).

EXPLANATION:

ROs must be permitted unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive

materials or to safeguards information or safeguards information modified handling, if the 

licensee possesses this information. ROs may not approve other individuals to act as ROs. An

RO does not need to undergo a new background investigation if he or she has already been

determined trustworthy and reliable after a background investigation that included fingerprinting

and a criminal history records check.

Q&As:

Q1: When may an RO make T&R determinations to permit unescorted access by 

employees?

A1: The RO may make T&R determinations for any employee who requires unescorted 

access only after the licensee has completed the required fingerprinting, FBI criminal history 

records check, and background investigation of the RO and has certified to the NRC, under oath 

or affirmation, that she or he is trustworthy and reliable.
 52

Q2: May I appoint multiple ROs?

A2: Yes. A licensee may appoint multiple ROs; however, each RO must undergo 

fingerprinting, a background investigation, and an FBI criminal history records check, and the 

licensee must certify, under oath or affirmation, that each RO is trustworthy and reliable. To 

review FBI criminal history records, each RO must be a licensee employee, not a contractor.

Q3: 10 CFR 37.23(b)(4) prohibits a reviewing official from approving other individuals to act 

as reviewing officials. May the incumbent RO do anything related to a licensee’s nomination of 

another reviewing official, or is the incumbent barred from providing any support?

A3: An approved RO may conduct the other aspects of the background investigation 10 CFR

37.25 (a)(2) through 10 CFR 37.25(a)(7)) for an individual whom the licensee will nominate as 

an RO.

Q4: May a State official exempted under 10 CFR 37.29(a)(6) or 10 CFR 37.29(a)(7) serve as 

a reviewing official?

A4: Yes. An official qualifying for relief from fingerprinting and other background 

investigation requirements under this subsection may serve as an RO, as would an individual 

covered by any of the other categories of relief. However, such a scenario is not likely to occur

unless the official serves a State entity licensed by its Agreement State regulatory agency.

Q5: Why must ROs be permitted unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of 

radioactive materials?

A5: It is important that individuals making the final determination of T&R for others be 

trustworthy and reliable themselves. This means that ROs must undergo the same background 

investigation as individuals granted unescorted access, including fingerprinting and the FBI 

criminal records check. If the RO is not fingerprinted, a potentially exploitable vulnerability could 

be created in the security program. The NRC’s AEA authority to collect fingerprints only applies 

to individuals who have unescorted access to radioactive material. The RO must therefore be

permitted access to radioactive material to give the NRC the authority to require the collection of

his or her fingerprints for submittal to the FBI for processing.

However, the RO will not need to actually use the unescorted access if the licensee determines 

that the RO has no need for it to perform a job duty.
 53

§ 37.23, “Access Authorization Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.23(c), “Informed Consent”

§ 37.23(c)(1)

Licensees may not initiate a background investigation without the informed and signed 

consent of the subject individual. This consent must include authorization to share personal 

information with other individuals or organizations as necessary to complete the background 

investigation. Before a final adverse determination, the licensee shall provide the individual 

with an opportunity to correct any inaccurate or incomplete information that is developed 

during the background investigation. Licensees do not need to obtain signed consent from 

those individuals that meet the requirements of § 37.25(b). A signed consent must be 

obtained prior to any reinvestigation.

§ 37.23(c)(2)

The subject individual may withdraw his or her consent at any time. Licensees shall inform 

the individual that:

§ 37.23(c)(2)(i)

If an individual withdraws his or her consent, the licensee may not initiate any elements of the 

background investigation that were not in progress at the time the individual withdrew his or 

her consent; and

§ 37.23(c)(2)(ii)

The withdrawal of consent for the background investigation is sufficient cause for denial or 

termination of unescorted access authorization.

EXPLANATION:

Licensees may not begin a background investigation without the informed and signed consent

of the subject individual. The subsection also requires a licensee to inform the subject individual 

of his or her right to correct inaccurate or incomplete information and to have an opportunity to 

correct it before the licensee makes an adverse T&R determination. If an individual withdraws 

consent to a background investigation, the licensee may not begin any new element of that 

investigation.

Q&As:

Q1: What is informed consent?

A1: Informed consent is the individual’s authorization that allows the licensee to conduct the 

background investigation to determine if the individual is trustworthy and reliable. The licensee 

needs to explain to the individual that a background investigation is being conducted and then 

explain the potential consequences if the individual does not agree to the background

investigation. The signed consent shows that the individual has been provided the appropriate 

explanation and indicates his or her understanding that a background investigation will be 
 54

conducted. The signed consent must include authorization to share personal information with 

other individuals or organizations, as necessary, to complete the background investigation. 

Annex B, “Sample Consent Form for Background Investigations,” to Subpart B provides a 

template for a possible consent form that a licensee can adapt for its use.

Q2: For individuals who have already been granted unescorted access under the various 

orders, does a licensee need to go back and obtain informed consent?

A2: No. The licensee does not need to go back and obtain informed consent from these 

individuals unless they have not already undergone a background investigation that included 

fingerprinting and an FBI criminal history records check. The licensee must obtain an informed 

consent before starting any new background investigation and before a reinvestigation of any 

currently approved individual.

Q3: How do I obtain informed consent from an individual?

A3: The licensee should first explain the informed consent process to the individual either 

orally or in writing. The easiest way to obtain the informed consent is to have a form with the 

necessary information that the individual could read and then sign and date. Annex B provides 

a template for a possible consent form.

Q4: What should I do if an individual withdraws his or her consent and I’m in the middle of his 

or her background investigation?

A4: If an individual withdraws his or her consent, 10 CFR 37.23(c)(2)(ii) requires the licensee 

to inform the individual that withdrawal of consent for the background investigation is sufficient 

cause for denial or termination of unescorted access authorization. The licensee may finish

work on any elements of the background investigation that it had undertaken before the consent 

was withdrawn; however, the licensee cannot, under 10 CFR 37.23(c)(2)(i), initiate any 

additional elements that were not already in process.

Q5: If an individual withdraws his or her consent and I terminate the background 

investigation, may the individual be granted unescorted access to the material?

A5: No. If an individual withdraws consent for the background investigation and if that 

investigation is therefore never completed, the licensee would not have a basis for granting that 

individual unescorted access.

Q6: May an individual who initially withdraws permission for a background investigation, but 

later gives permission, be granted unescorted access?

A6: Yes. If the completed background investigation supports the determination, the 

individual may be granted unescorted access. The fact that permission was initially withdrawn 

would not, in itself, be sufficient grounds for denial.
 55

§ 37.23, “Access Authorization Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.23(d), “Personal History Disclosure”

Any individual who is applying for unescorted access authorization shall disclose the 

personal history information that is required by the licensee’s access authorization program 

for the reviewing official to make a determination of the individual’s trustworthiness and 

reliability. Refusal to provide, or the falsification of, any personal history information required 

by this subpart is sufficient cause for denial or termination of unescorted access.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions establish that individuals applying for unescorted access authorization must 

disclose their personal history information.

Q&As:

Q1: What is a personal history disclosure?

A1: The personal history disclosure is the information that the individual who is seeking 

unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material must provide. It 

is the type of information typically collected on an employment application. The information 

should include items, such as employment history, education, references, and any arrest record. 

It may also include, but is not required to include, information related to finances, such as 

bankruptcies. This information provides the RO with a starting point for the background 

investigation.

Q2: The information sounds like information provided for employment. May I use an 

employment application to gather the information?

A2: The information provided under a personal history disclosure is similar to information 

obtained by many companies in an application for employment. If the employment application 

contains adequate information, the licensee may use it for this purpose.
56 

§ 37.23, “Access Authorization Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.23(e), “Determination Basis”

§ 37.23(e)(1)

The reviewing official shall determine whether to permit, deny, unfavorably terminate, maintain, 

or administratively withdraw an individual’s unescorted access authorization based on an

evaluation of all of the information collected to meet the requirements of this subpart.

§ 37.23(e)(2)

The reviewing official may not permit any individual to have unescorted access until the 

reviewing official has evaluated all of the information collected to meet the requirements of 

this subpart and determined that the individual is trustworthy and reliable. The reviewing 

official may deny unescorted access to any individual based on information obtained at any 

time during the background investigation.

§ 37.23(e)(3)

The licensee shall document the basis for concluding whether or not there is reasonable 

assurance that an individual is trustworthy and reliable.

§ 37.23(e)(4)

The reviewing official may terminate or administratively withdraw an individual’s unescorted 

access authorization based on information obtained after the background investigation has 

been completed and the individual granted unescorted access authorization.

§ 37.23(e)(5)

Licensees shall maintain a list of persons currently approved for unescorted access 

authorization. When a licensee determines that a person no longer requires unescorted 

access or meets the access authorization requirement, the licensee shall remove the person 

from the approved list as soon as possible, but no later than 7 working days, and take

prompt measures to ensure that the individual is unable to have unescorted access to the 

material.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions establish requirements for ROs to grant, deny, or withdraw an individual’s 

unescorted access authorization. Licensees must document the reason that an individual is 

determined to be trustworthy and reliable and must maintain a list of individuals approved for 

unescorted access.

Q&As:

Q1: What information should the reviewing official use to determine that an individual is 

trustworthy and reliable?
57 

A1: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.23(e)(2) requires the RO to use all the information gathered 

during the background investigation to make a determination that an individual is trustworthy

and reliable. The NRC expects licensees to use their best efforts to obtain this information. The 

licensee may use information previously obtained during the hiring process to support the T&R 

determination without having to reverify that information.

The RO may deny unescorted access to any individual based on any information obtained at 

any time during the background investigation that calls into question the individual’s T&R. 

However, the licensee may not, under 10 CFR 37.27(b), base a final determination to deny an 

individual unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material solely 

on the basis of information received from the FBI involving (1) an arrest of more than 1 year old 

for which no information is available on the disposition of the case or (2) an arrest that resulted

in dismissal of the charge or an acquittal. A record on the disposition of the case may not exist 

because information on a dismissal or acquittal may not have been recorded. Annex A lists

some indicators that licensees should consider as potential T&R concerns.

Q2: How will we obtain all the information we need to complete a background investigation 

before granting unescorted access to an individual without a previous employment record 

(e.g., a recent high school or college graduate)?

A2: For new hires without an employment history, the licensee will need to rely more on 

other aspects of the background investigation, such as references. A lack of employment

history does not need to be a negative consideration in determining if an individual is deemed to 

be trustworthy and reliable and is given unescorted access to category 1 or category 2

quantities of radioactive material. The individual may be escorted until the licensee completes 

the background investigation and has made a determination on the individual’s T&R for

unescorted access.

Q3: Are managers subject to the same background investigations?

A3: Yes. If a manager has unescorted access to the radioactive material, he or she is 

subject to the same background investigation requirements.

Q4: What criteria do I use to determine trustworthiness and reliability?

A4: The NRC has not developed a set of criteria for determining T&R because no such list is 

likely to cover all licensees’ needs, and each licensee is in the best position to weigh the many 

considerations that must support such determinations. Therefore, the licensee is responsible

for making T&R determinations for all employees granted unescorted access. The background 

investigations under 10 CFR 37.25 are designed to identify past actions that might call into 

question an individual’s T&R. Annex A lists some indicators that licensees should consider as 

potential concerns. Although the licensee should review this annex in its entirety, the following 

indicators are provided for convenience:

• impaired performance attributable to psychological or other disorders

• conduct that warrants referral for criminal investigation or that results in an arrest or a

conviction

• indication of deceitful or delinquent behavior
58 

• attempted or threatened destruction of property or life

• suicidal tendencies or attempted suicide

• illegal drug use or the abuse of legal drugs

• alcohol abuse disorders

• recurring financial irresponsibility

• irresponsibility in the performance of assigned duties

• inability to deal with stress or the appearance of being under unusual stress

• failure to comply with work directives

• hostility or aggression toward fellow workers or authority

• uncontrolled anger, violation of safety or security procedures, or repeated 

absenteeism

• significant behavioral changes, moodiness, or depression

However, these indicators are neither meant to be all inclusive nor intended to be disqualifying 

factors. Licensees also may consider extenuating or mitigating factors in their determinations.

Q5: Are you requiring licensees to determine if employees are telling the truth?

A5: No. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.23(e)(1) only requires licensees to evaluate all the 

information collected to meet the requirements of this subpart and to document, under 10

CFR 37.23(e)(3), the basis for concluding whether reasonable assurance that an individual is 

trustworthy and reliable exists.

Q6: If someone has a drug or alcohol problem, does that automatically make him or her 

unreliable?

A6: No. A drug or alcohol problem does not, in itself, make an individual unreliable if

the individual has acknowledged the problem and is undergoing treatment.

Q7: How should the T&R determination for my employees be documented?

A7: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.23(e)(3) requires that the documentation include the

individual employee’s or applicant’s name and the basis for concluding if reasonable

assurance exists that he or she is trustworthy and reliable. The elements that the

licensee is required to consider in making its determination appear in 10 CFR 37.25. 

Because the basis for the licensee’s determination is also the result of a process, a good

documentation practice would include the criteria, procedures, and records that the

licensee used to support its determination; the date of this determination; and the name

and signature of the person responsible for making it. In cases for which the licensee

has been unable to obtain adequate information on an element, such as a character and

reputation determination, it should make this clear and should describe the efforts it 

made to gather the needed information.
59 

The type of documentation may include a facsimile, voice mail, e-mail records, letters, 

photographs, film, audio or video tape, notes to a file, or anything else that the licensee used to 

support its determination. The form of the documentation may be an original or copy, may be 

on paper, may be electronic, or may be other types of media as long as the record is legible for 

the required period and can be accessed. To discourage unauthorized alterations, electronic 

copies should, if possible, be read-only, such as those in portable document format (PDF).

Q8: If I can’t obtain all of the information required in 10 CFR 37.25, may I still grant the 

individual unescorted access?

A8: Yes. If the licensee concludes that the individual should still be authorized for unescorted

access based on other background investigation information, it may grant the individual 

unescorted access. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.23(e) requires the licensee to document the

basis for its decision to grant unescorted access. If a previous employer, educational institution,

or any other entity with which the individual claims to have been engaged fails to provide

information at least 10 business days after the licensee’s request, if such entities indicate an

inability or unwillingness to provide information, or if the licensee is unable to reach the entity, 

the regulation in 10 CFR 37.25(a)(7) requires the licensee to document that and to attempt to

obtain the information from an alternate source.

The licensee also has the option of escorting the individual and not making a T&R

determination.

Q9: If I’ve determined someone to be trustworthy and reliable, and that individual later takes 

the material for malevolent use, what actions are expected of me? What liability do I assume 

because of my T&R determination?

A9: If nothing in the background investigation caused a licensee to deny access and if the 

licensee did everything that was required, it would not be in violation of the access authorization 

requirements. The licensee must provide reasonable assurance that persons granted access 

are trustworthy and reliable. If the licensee fails to provide that assurance, it will be in violation 

of the 10 CFR Part 37 requirements, and the NRC will consider enforcement action. However, 

providing assurance means that the licensee has made a reasonable effort, as required by 10

CFR Part 37, to ascertain T&R and has documented its actions. As long as the licensee can 

show that it has made a reasonable good-faith effort, the NRC will not second-guess its 

decision.

Q10: Does the denial of unescorted access create legal liability for the licensee?

A10: Although the licensee should check the requirements of applicable State laws, the NRC 

does not consider a denial of unescorted access authorization to be a denial of employment. The

applicant may still work in areas of the facility outside of security zones or may perform escorted

work within the facility. A denial only prevents the employee from having unescorted access to a

category 1 or category 2 quantity of material.

Q11: How can we address the unique challenges related to establishing T&R for foreign 

nationals?
60 

A11: Determining the T&R of foreign nationals, including students, does pose special 

challenges. An evaluation of academic and other references (e.g., transcripts, college 

applications, and financial aid applications) may form part of the basis for a T&R determination. 

A visa, in and of itself, does not provide an adequate basis for determining that the individual is 

trustworthy and reliable.

Background investigations are required to verify and develop information that supports the basis 

for the T&R determination. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.25(a)(6) requires licensees to obtain 

independent corroborating information to the extent possible. The 10 CFR Part 37 requirements 

incorporate the phrase “to the extent possible” to communicate the expectation that licensees

will use their best effort to obtain the information required. However, if obtaining such 

corroborative information becomes impossible, and if the licensee concludes that the individual

should still be authorized for unescorted access based on other background investigation

information, it should be prepared to document its efforts to obtain the necessary information.

Q12: If I decide that one of my employees previously granted unescorted access to 

radioactive material should no longer have unescorted access, what actions can I take?

A12: The licensee should immediately revoke the individual’s unescorted access. The

licensee should document any change in access status with supporting information.

Q13: Does my list of individuals who have been granted unescorted access need to include all 

employees and contractors who have been denied unescorted access?

A13: No. The list only needs to include those individuals to whom the licensee has decided to 

grant unescorted access. The list is not intended to include unapproved individuals who must

be escorted.

Q14: Are there any other sources of information I should check before making a final 

determination on an individual?

A14: Yes. The licensee should check the NRC’s list of escalated enforcement actions issued 

to individuals. The list includes individuals who are prohibited from working with radioactive 

materials. This list appears on the NRC’s Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/ reading-rm/doccollections/enforcement/actions/individuals/.

Q15: How quickly must I remove an individual from my list of those approved for unescorted 

access after I’ve determined that he or she no longer requires it?

A15: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.23(e)(5) requires the licensee to remove such an individual 

from its approved list as soon as possible but not later than 7 working days after it has 

determined that he or she no longer requires unescorted access to the radioactive material 

subject to this part. In addition, the regulation in 10 CFR 37.23(e)(5) requires the licensee to 

take prompt measures to ensure that he or she is no longer able to have unescorted access.
61 

§ 37.23, “Access Authorization Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.23(f), “Procedures”

Licensees shall develop, implement, and maintain written procedures for implementing the 

access authorization program. The procedures must include provisions for the notification of 

individuals who are denied unescorted access. The procedures must include provisions for the

review, at the request of the affected individual, of a denial or termination of unescorted access

authorization. The procedures must contain a provision to ensure that the individual is 

informed of the grounds for the denial or termination of unescorted access authorization and 

allow the individual an opportunity to provide additional relevant information.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions establish requirements for written procedures for implementing the access 

authorization program.

Q&As:

Q1: Am I as a licensee required to have procedures for conducting background 

investigations?

A1: Although 10 CFR 37.23(f) does not specifically require procedures for conducting 

background investigations, it does require the licensee to develop, implement, and maintain 

written procedures for implementing the access authorization program as a whole. The NRC 

expects that the licensee would have procedures for conducting background investigations as 

an important component of the procedures for its access authorization program. For example, 

the regulations in 10 CFR 37.23(f) require that the licensee’s procedures enable applicants to 

review the outcome of its T&R determination, and under 10 CFR 37.23(e), the licensee’s 

determination must be based on information produced from a background investigation. The 

licensee’s procedures under this subsection must also address the notification of individuals 

denied authorization for unescorted access, must ensure that these individuals are informed of 

the grounds for the licensee’s denial or termination of unescorted access authorization, and 

must provide such individuals an opportunity upon request to review the licensee’s denial or 

termination and additional relevant information. Thus, the licensee should, as good practice, 

ensure that its procedures address its expectations for the performance and documentation of 

background investigations.

Q2: What procedures would you suggest for making T&R determinations?

A2: The NRC does not suggest specific procedures for making T&R determinations. 

However, licensees should generally consider developing procedures that address, among 

other things, how to conduct a background investigation; how to develop and document a

determination basis, the criteria for when the licensee would accept another company’s

findings, and what information the licensee needs to verify; how to reinstate an individual; how

to maintain the list of individuals approved for unescorted access; and how to withdraw an 

individual’s approved unescorted access. Procedures may differ in kind, sequence, structure,

and level of detail as long as they produce the kinds of information and documentation

required by 10 CFR 37.25 and 10 CFR 37.27.
62 

§ 37.23, “Access Authorization Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.23(g), “Right To Correct and Complete Information”

§ 37.23(g)(1)

Prior to any final adverse determination, licensees shall provide each individual subject to 

this subpart with the right to complete, correct, and explain information obtained as a result 

of the licensee’s background investigation. Confirmation of receipt by the individual of this 

notification must be maintained by the licensee for a period of 1 year from the date of the 

notification.

§ 37.23(g)(2)

If after reviewing his or her criminal history record an individual believes that it is incorrect or 

incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, correct, update, or explain anything in the 

record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. These procedures include direct 

application by the individual challenging the record to the law enforcement agency that 

contributed the questioned information or a direct challenge as to the accuracy or 

completeness of any entry on the criminal history record to the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division, ATTN: SCU, Mod. D-2,

1000 Custer Hollow Road, Clarksburg, WV 26306 as set forth in 28 CFR 16.30 through

16.34. In the latter case, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will forward the challenge 

to the agency that submitted the data and will request that the agency verify or correct the

challenged entry. Upon receipt of an official communication directly from the agency that 

contributed the original information, the FBI Identification Division makes any changes

necessary in accordance with the information supplied by that agency. Licensees must 

provide at least 10 days for an individual to initiate action to challenge the results of an FBI 

criminal history records check after the record being made available for his or her review. 

The licensee may make a final adverse determination based upon the criminal history 

records only after receipt of the FBI’s confirmation or correction of the record.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions require the licensee to give individuals the right to complete, correct, 

and explain the information gathered for the T&R determination before it makes an

adverse determination. The licensee must also allow these individuals the right to

challenge that information before it makes an adverse T&R determination.

Q&As:

Q1: Why must I provide an applicant for unescorted access authorization the right to 

“complete, correct, and explain” the information I obtained during a background investigation 

before I make a final adverse determination (i.e., deny unescorted access)?

A1: An individual is given the right to review the record before any adverse determination 

because the information that the licensee is relying on to make that determination must be 

complete, correct, and fully explained. The licensee does not want to make an adverse decision 

based on possibly incomplete or inaccurate information. Misinformation could be the result of a 

recordkeeping error, identity theft, or misidentification of another individual with the same or 
63 

similar name. An individual also may have been charged with an offense of some type and later 

have been found innocent or had the charges dropped, and the record might never have been 

updated to reflect this additional information. The individual might also be able to provide 

mitigating information that could be relevant to the licensee’s decision.

Q2: May any of the background investigation information be challenged?

A2: Yes. The individual may request clarification of any information that he or she believes is

incorrect. For some kinds of information, the individual may simply provide the licensee with 

what he or she believes is the correct information. The licensee may then consider the new 

information in its T&R determination process. However, the licensee should verify the corrected 

information, if possible.

Q3: What is the process for challenging criminal history records?

A3: If the individual believes that his or her criminal history records are incorrect or 

incomplete in any respect, he or she may initiate challenge procedures. These procedures 

would include direct application by the individual to the law enforcement agency that contributed 

the questioned information. An individual may also challenge the accuracy or completeness of 

any entry on the criminal history record by contacting the FBI at Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division, ATTN: SCU, Mod. D-2, 1000 Custer 

Hollow Road, Clarksburg, WV 26306.

Instructions for a challenge to the FBI appear in 28 CFR 16.30, “Purpose and Scope.” The FBI 

will forward the challenge to the agency that submitted the data and will request that the agency 

verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an official communication directly from

the agency that contributed the original information, the FBI Identification Division will make any 

necessary changes to the individual’s criminal history record.

The licensee may not make a final adverse determination based solely on the criminal history 

records until the licensee receives the FBI’s confirmation or correction of the record.

Q4: How long must I allow for an individual to challenge my findings before I make a final

determination to grant or deny authorization for unescorted access?

A4: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.23(g)(2) requires the licensee to allow at least 10 days for 

an individual to initiate action to challenge the results of an FBI criminal history records check, 

although it may allow more time. The licensee may use its judgment for other elements of the

background investigation. The implementation procedures for the licensee’s access 

authorization program should specify its timeframes for these challenges. In any case, the 

licensee may not make a final adverse determination based on the criminal history records until it

has received the FBI’s confirmation or correction of the record(s) that the individual has 

challenged.
64 

§ 37.23, “Access Authorization Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.23(h), “Records”

§ 37.23(h)(1)

The licensee shall retain documentation regarding the trustworthiness and reliability of 

individual employees for 3 years from the date the individual no longer requires unescorted 

access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material.

§ 37.23(h)(2)

The licensee shall retain a copy of the current access authorization program procedures as a 

record for 3 years after the procedure is no longer needed. If any portion of the procedure is 

superseded, the licensee shall retain the superseded material for 3 years after the record is 

superseded.

§ 37.23(h)(3)

The licensee shall retain the list of persons approved for unescorted access authorization for

3 years after the list is superseded or replaced.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions establish recordkeeping requirements for licensee access authorization 

programs.

Q&As:

Q1: What access authorization records am I required to retain?

A1: The NRC considers “documentation regarding the trustworthiness and reliability of 

individual employees” under 10 CFR 37.23(h)(1) to include all fingerprint and criminal history 

records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual’s file has been transferred, and all 

records from the other background investigation requirements under 10 CFR 37.25(a)(2)

through 10 CFR 37.25(a)(7). The licensee also is required to retain any written confirmations 

received from entities concerning a Federal security clearance under 10 CFR 37.29(a)(12), any 

written confirmations received concerning a favorably adjudicated criminal history records check 

under 10 CFR 37.29(b), and any written verifications received from service providers under 10

CFR 37.29(a)(13). The licensee must also retain a record of its determination bases (reasons 

for granting unescorted access or denying it) under 10 CFR 37.23(e)(3). The determination 

documentation must include the individual’s name and should include the criteria, procedures, 

and supporting documentation that the licensee used in the process of making the 

determination for each individual); the date of the determination; and the name and signature of 

the RO responsible for making it. The licensee also is required to retain copies of the 

implementation procedures. (See also the Q&As on 10 CFR 37.23(e).)

Q2: What form of documentation do I need to keep for the access authorization program? 

Must I convert my paper documents to a digital format?
65 

A2: No. The licensee may choose to scan paper and other documents into digital format for 

its own convenience and economy of storage space. This, however, is not a requirement. The 

form of the documentation may be an original or copy, may be on paper, may be electronic, or 

may be in other forms of media as long as the record is legible for the required period and can 

be accessed. To discourage unauthorized alterations, electronic copies should, if possible, be 

read-only, such as those in PDF.

Q3: What procedures do I need to keep for the access authorization program?

A3: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.23(h)(2) requires the licensee to retain copies of all the 

procedures necessary to implement the access authorization program, including procedures for 

obtaining written consent, conducting the investigation and reinvestigation, correcting the 

record, challenging a determination to deny authorization for unescorted access, and 

documenting the final determination.

Q4: Do I need to keep any information relating to the lists of individuals approved for 

unescorted access other than the lists themselves?

A4: No. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.23(h)(3) only requires the licensee to retain a copy of 

the list of individuals who have current unescorted access to the material. When a list is 

updated, the previous list must be kept as a record for 3 years. The licensee does not need to 

retain other list-related records, although it will need to retain background investigation and 

determination-basis-related records for each individual on the list.

Q5: Must I also keep a list of individuals who have been denied access?

A5: No. The fact that someone is not included on the access list means that they should not 

be granted unescorted access to the material, and a list of individuals who have been denied 

access is not necessary.

Q6: How long must the records be maintained?

A6: The licensee must maintain background investigation records for 3 years after the

individual no longer requires unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.23(e)(3) requires that these records also 

include those that provide the basis for the licensee’s determination on if an individual is 

trustworthy and reliable for unescorted access authorization. The licensee must maintain the 

list of individuals approved for unescorted access authorization for 3 years after the list is 

superseded or replaced. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.23(h)(3) requires the licensee to retain a 

procedure for 3 years after it has been replaced with a new or revised version.

Q7: If a facility closes and the license is terminated, does the licensee need to keep records 

for an additional 3 years?

A7: No. Once the Commission terminates a license for any reason, the licensee is no longer 

required under 10 CFR 37.103, “Record Retention,” to maintain its records for the access 

authorization program, and these records may be destroyed. (See also 10 CFR 37.31, 

“Protection of Information,” for requirements on the protection of personal information.)
66 

§ 37.25, “Background Investigations”

§ 37.25(a), “Initial Investigation”

Before allowing an individual unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material or to the devices that contain the material, licensees shall complete a 

background investigation of the individual seeking unescorted access authorization. The 

scope of the investigation must encompass at least the 7 years preceding the date of the 

background investigation or since the individual’s eighteenth birthday, whichever is shorter.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions establish the requirement to conduct a background investigation for individuals 

who need unescorted access to category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive material.

Q&As:

Q1: How far back in time must I look into an individual’s historical information as part of the 

background investigation?

A1: The scope of the investigation must encompass at least the 7 years preceding the date 

of the background investigation or since the individual’s 18th birthday, whichever is shorter. To 

the extent possible, the licensee should look into an individual’s history as far back as 

necessary to be satisfied that sufficient information is available to meet its criteria for 

determining T&R.

Q2: What are the components of a background investigation?

A2: A background investigation includes several components, including fingerprinting and an 

FBI identification and criminal history records check, verifications of the individual’s true identity, 

a review of information obtained about the individual’s employment history and education, and a 

character and reputation determination.

Q3: Why are background investigations and T&R determinations necessary?

A3: The background investigation is a tool to obtain information necessary to make

decisions about whether an individual is trustworthy and reliable and may be permitted

unescorted access to a category 2 or greater quantity of radioactive material. The licensee

must ensure that an individual who is seeking unescorted access to radioactive material is

dependable in judgment, character, and performance such that unescorted access by that

individual to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material does not constitute

an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety or security.

A T&R determination provides the licensee’s decision with reasonable assurance that the 

individual allowed unescorted access will not use the material for malicious purposes. This 

requirement goes beyond access control for radiation protection purposes and further limits 

access to only those individuals who have a legitimate need to access the licensed material or 

device.
67 

Q4: Are these background investigation requirements equivalent to those used in nuclear 

power plants?

A4: No. Nuclear power plants have additional requirements, such as a credit history check,

a psychological assessment, and a behavioral observation program to determine an employee’s 

T&R. (See 10 CFR 73.56, “Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power 

Plants,” and 10 CFR 73.57, “Requirements for Criminal History Records Checks of Individuals 

Granted Unescorted Access to a Nuclear Power Facility or Access to Safeguards Information.”)

Q5: How does a background investigation assure trustworthiness and reliability?

A5: No background check can provide total assurance that a person granted unescorted 

access will not use the material for malicious purposes. The required investigation, however, 

does provide information to determine with reasonable assurance that the individual is who he 

or she purports to be. It also provides the licensee with information about if the individual’s 

character, reputation, and behavior might be adverse to the safe and secure operation of its 

facility. A background investigation can provide the licensee with a reasonable basis to 

determine that allowing an individual to have unescorted access to the licensed material would 

not constitute an unreasonable risk of a malevolent use of radioactive materials.
 68

§ 37.25, “Background Investigations” (continued)

§ 37.25(a)(1)

Fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history records check in accordance with

10 CFR 37.27.

EXPLANATION:

This provision requires the background investigation to include fingerprinting and an FBI

identification and criminal history records check.

Q&As:

Q1: Why is the NRC requiring fingerprinting and a criminal history records check for 

individuals to have unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive 

material?

A1: Section 149 of the AEA requires fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal 

history records check for “any individual who is permitted unescorted access to radioactive 

materials or other property subject to regulation by the Commission that the Commission 

determines to be of such significance to the public health and safety or the common defense

and security as to warrant fingerprinting and background checks.” The Commission determined 

that category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive material are of significance to the public 

health and safety or the common defense and security. Therefore, individuals who have access 

to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material must be fingerprinted.

Fingerprinting an individual for an FBI criminal history records check is an important element of 

the background investigation. It can provide comprehensive information on an individual’s 

recorded criminal activities within the United States and its territories and on the individual’s 

known affiliations with violent gangs or terrorist organizations. It is one element of the 

determination of T&R. See the Q&As for 10 CFR 37.27 for more detail.

Q2: Why hasn’t the NRC established criteria for making a consistent determination on the 

finding of the fingerprint reports? Won’t this lack of criteria result in inconsistent approval or 

denial of unescorted access authorizations for people who are trustworthy and reliable?

A2: The NRC took a number of considerations into account when it decided not to provide 

specific criteria for making decisions about ROs and authorizing unescorted access. Because 

the individual circumstances of each applicant may vary significantly, each licensee needs the 

flexibility to establish its own program. In addition, because the information obtained from 

employment history and other background checks may vary widely and because licensees may 

not be able to obtain sufficient information to determine compliance with all criteria, the licensee 

may not be able to avoid having to apply its subjective judgment about an applicant in any case. 

Moreover, a single set of criteria for application to all cases may not be fair to some individuals 

who may otherwise be well qualified. For example, a criterion prohibiting the selection of a 

candidate with any criminal record that is less than 10 years old might disadvantage otherwise

well-qualified candidates whom a licensee might prefer after taking the candidate’s professional 
 69

qualifications, employment history, character references, and other more recent information into 

account. Because the particular circumstances of each individual may vary significantly, each 

licensee needs the flexibility to establish its own program and use its own criteria.

Although a licensee is allowed to apply criteria that may be inconsistent with those of other 

licensees, the application of these criteria does not necessarily result in unfairness. One size 

does not fit all. For example, some licensees may be more comfortable with someone who has 

a criminal record, whereas other licensees may decide that, with an ample availability of other 

qualified applicants, an applicant with such a record may be employable but should not be

allowed unescorted access to the licensee’s radioactive material. A criminal record does not, by 

itself, mean that an individual is not trustworthy and reliable. The individual may have 

acknowledged his or her mistake and may now be a model citizen. In addition, a licensee may 

allow an individual unescorted access, but it may implement additional measures to oversee

that individual.

The licensee is in the best position to decide what best fits its needs. Because each licensee 

will need to decide whether to trust an individual with its assets, it has the greatest stake in 

making a well-informed decision about the person best qualified to fill such a sensitive position. 

Thus, licensees should be allowed to develop their own criteria for these decisions.

Q3: May I use a contractor to process FBI criminal history record information to meet this 

requirement?

A3: No. In response to an NRC request for clarification concerning the use of contractors or 

other third parties for processing criminal history record information, the FBI analyzed the 

Commission’s AEA authority in 1997 and concluded that the use of private contractors by the 

NRC and its licensees to receive and process FBI criminal history record information is 

prohibited.
 70

§ 37.25, “Background Investigations” (continued)

§ 37.25(a)(2), “Verification of True Identity”

Licensees shall verify the true identity of the individual who is applying for unescorted access 

authorization to ensure that the applicant is who he or she claims to be. A licensee shall 

review official identification documents (e.g., driver’s license; passport; government 

identification; certificate of birth issued by the state, province, or country of birth) and 

compare the documents to personal information data provided by the individual to identify

any discrepancy in the information. Licensees shall document the type, expiration, and 

identification number of the identification document or maintain a photocopy of identifying 

documents on file in accordance with § 37.31. Licensees shall certify in writing that the 

identification was properly reviewed and shall maintain the certification and all related 

documents for review upon inspection.

EXPLANATION:

This provision requires background investigations to include verification of the individual’s true 

identity.

Q&As:

Q1: How does a licensee verify true identity?

A1: To verify the identity of an applicant for access authorization under this subsection, the 

employer must examine “official identification documents” to determine if they reasonably 

appear to be genuine and if they relate to the individual. The employer should compare the 

documents to information provided by the applicant. The employer should maintain document 

information and the certification of review as a record. The employer is not required to 

determine that the identification is authentic.

Q2: What documents may be used to verify identity?

A2: The licensee may use identity documents issued by a State or local government or by 

the Federal Government as long as they contain a photograph and information such as name, 

date of birth, gender, height, eye color, and address. These documents include passports, 

drivers’ licenses, and identification cards issued by Government entities. The licensee may use 

one or more of the documentation types required by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Service’s I-9 form, which applicants use to apply for eligibility for employment. The I-9 form 

contains a list of acceptable documentation types and is available at no cost at 

http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?

vgnextoid=31b3ab0a43b5d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=

db029c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD. For the complete list of allowable 

documents, see page 5 of the I-9 form. Note that items 10–12 in List B generally are not 

acceptable unless the licensee believes that it needs to authorize unescorted access for a 

minor. These types of documentation (e.g., nursery school records, report cards, and hospital 

records) are available only to an applicant under the age of 18 using the I-9 form who is unable 

to provide one of the other documents listed on this form.
 71

§ 37.25, “Background Investigations” (continued)

§ 37.25(a)(3), “Employment History Verification”

Licensees shall complete an employment history verification, including military history. 

Licensees shall verify the individual’s employment with each previous employer for the most 

recent 7 years before the date of application;

§ 37.25(a)(4), “Verification of Education”

Licensees shall verify that the individual participated in the education process during the 

claimed period.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions require verification of employment history and education as part of the 

background investigation.

Q&As:

Q1: Is the NRC defining 7 years of employment as “uninterrupted” service, or may there be 

breaks in service?

A1: There may be breaks in service. Under this subsection, however, a licensee must go 

back a minimum of 7 years unless the individual is younger than 25. (For an individual younger 

than 25, the licensee only needs to go back to the individual’s 18th birthday.) If the individual 

has gaps in his or her employment record, the licensee should attempt to determine why these 

gaps exist.

Q2: What kind of employment evaluation needs to be conducted if the employee has been 

with the licensee 7 years or more? Does the education verification need to be performed for a 

long-term employee?

A2: The licensee may use its own records of employment for an individual employed with the 

company more than 7 years; it does not need to check any previous employers. In addition, the 

licensee does not need to verify an individual’s education if such verification occurred more than

7 years ago. If the licensee performed the education verification as a part of the hiring process, 

it does not need to repeat this check.

Q3: What if a former employer refuses to provide the information I request?

A3: For interviews with past employers, the NRC understands that simple verbal 

confirmations of past employment and timeframe may be all the information a former employer 

is willing to provide on an individual. Although a simple confirmation of the nature and 

timeframe of past employment would not, by itself, enable a licensee to find an individual 

trustworthy and reliable, it would constitute independent corroboration of the accuracy of the 

individual’s information about that period of his or her employment.
 72

§ 37.25, “Background Investigations” (continued)

§ 37.25(a)(5), “Character and Reputation Determination”

Licensees shall complete reference checks to determine the character and reputation of the 

individual who has applied for unescorted access authorization. Unless other references are 

not available, reference checks may not be conducted with any person who is known to be a 

close member of the individual’s family, including, but not limited to, the individual’s spouse, 

parents, siblings, or children, or any individual who resides in the individual’s permanent 

household. Reference checks under this subpart must be limited to whether the individual 

has been and continues to be trustworthy and reliable.

EXPLANATION:

This provision requires the background investigation to include a determination of an applicant’s 

character and reputation.

Q&As:

Q1: What constitutes a character and reputation determination?

A1: This is similar to a reference check for employment. The following questions provide 

examples that the licensee should consider asking when conducting the reference check:

• Would the organization rehire the individual?

• Would it trust the individual with company assets?

• Does it consider the individual to be trustworthy and reliable?

• Has it ever witnessed anything in the individual’s behavior that would cause it to 

 question his or her reliability?

A licensee may take into account a number of different kinds of information from a number of

sources to make a determination about an individual’s character and reputation so long as the 

information is clearly pertinent to the individual’s likely conduct or behavior if he or she were 

granted unescorted access to any quantity of radioactive material subject to this part. In 

addition to records of any arrest or conviction as an adult or juvenile felon, examples of

considerations pertinent to an individual’s T&R may include, but need not be limited to, evidence 

of false or deceitful statements; loss of a license to drive; repeated high-speed traffic or other

violations indicating a reckless disregard for the safety or security of others; a recent

bankruptcy, foreclosure, repossession, or garnishment of income; repeated nonpayment of 

alimony, child support, or lawfully incurred financial obligations for periods of months; repeated

instances of personal harassment; or conduct or behavior that would violate any of the

licensee’s corporate or professional code of ethics or workplace conduct.

Q2: What criteria do I use to evaluate an applicant’s character and reputation?
 73

A2: The NRC has not developed a set of criteria for evaluating character and reputation 

because no such list is likely to cover all individuals’ circumstances or all licensees’ needs. 

Each licensee is in the best position to weigh the many considerations that must support such 

evaluations. In addition to the considerations listed in A1 above, Annex A includes some 

indicators of character and reputation that licensees should consider for what may be T&R 

concerns.

Q3: Reference checks under this subpart “must be limited to whether the individual has been 

and continues to be trustworthy and reliable.” What kinds of information are not to be 

considered relevant to an individual’s trustworthiness or reliability?

A3: The “not relevant” category includes information about ethnicity; religious affiliation; 

ideology or political affiliation; sexual orientation; or membership in any organization that does 

not advocate, perpetrate, or otherwise support violence against persons, damage to property, or 

criminal activities, including hate crimes. Otherwise, the licensee may consider information 

about any action, behavior, or conduct that is dishonest, deceitful, a conflict of interest or 

otherwise unethical, or a violation of any law relevant to an individual’s T&R.

Q4: This subsection provides that unless other references are not available, reference 

checks “may not be conducted with any person who is known to be a close member of the 

individual’s family, including, but not limited to, the individual’s spouse, parents, siblings, or 

children, or any individual who resides in the individual’s permanent household.” Does this 

mean that a licensee may not interview or seek information from any member of a subject 

individual’s family in the course of making a determination about that individual’s character or 

reputation?

A4: No. A licensee may contact family members as a reference check if no other references 

are available.
 74

§ 37.25, “Background Investigations” (continued)

§ 37.25(a)(6)

The licensee shall also, to the extent possible, obtain independent information to corroborate 

that provided by the individual (e.g., seek references not supplied by the individual); and

§ 37.25(a)(7)

If a previous employer, educational institution, or any other entity with which the individual 

claims to have been engaged fails to provide information or indicates an inability or 

unwillingness to provide information within a timeframe deemed appropriate by the licensee 

but at least after 10 business days of the request or if the licensee is unable to reach the 

entity, the licensee shall document the refusal, unwillingness, or inability in the record of 

investigation and attempt to obtain the information from an alternate source.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions require licensees to obtain to the extent possible background investigation 

information independent from that provided by the individual. Licensees must also document 

the refusal, unwillingness, or inability of a source to provide information.

Q&As:

Q1: What type of information is considered independent information to corroborate that 

provided by the individual?

A1: The licensee may obtain independent information through interviews with anyone who 

knows or previously knew the individual, such as teachers; friends; coworkers; neighbors; local 

members of a church, mosque, synagogue, club, or civic association of which the applicant is a 

member; or if no other references are available, family members. Although information obtained

from independent sources may not, by itself, suffice to enable a licensee to find an individual 

trustworthy and reliable, it would constitute independent corroboration of the accuracy of the

individual’s information about that period of his or her life. It may also provide information that 

could support a decision not to authorize unescorted access.

Q2: What should I do if an individual or entity contacted as part of a background investigation 

refuses to respond?

A2: If a previous employer, educational institution, or any other entity fails to provide 

information or indicates an inability or unwillingness to provide information in a timely manner, 

the regulation in 10 CFR 37.25(a)(7) requires the licensee to document the refusal, 

unwillingness, or inability to respond in the record of investigation. The licensee must then 

attempt to obtain confirmation of the applicant’s employment or education history or other 

personal associations from at least one alternate source.

Past employers are often hesitant to say anything about a past employee for fear of being held 

liable. If the licensee receives any input from a former employer or other reference (even if he

or she refuses to comment), you should document the conversation and take notes about what 
 75

the former employer or reference said. If attempts to contact the reference fail after several 

tries, the licensee should make a note of that as well. A licensee may ask the individual for the 

name of another coworker or a second-line supervisor who may be willing to provide 

confirmation of employment.

Q3: Won’t documenting my attempts to obtain information from uncooperative references 

and alternate sources of information under 10 CFR 37.25(a)(7) be excessive and time 

consuming?

A3: Not necessarily. Documentation may consist of an e-mail from such a reference or 

alternate source or a note to a file about an interview or phone conversation.

Q4: May I consider credit history as another source of “independent information” in 

evaluation of an applicant’s background?

A4: Yes. However, the licensee will need to comply with applicable State laws or local 

ordinances that prohibit employment discrimination based on credit history. Nothing in the NRC 

regulations prohibits a licensee from conducting additional types of checks, and the licensee 

may always use measures beyond the regulatory minimum required by the access authorization 

program.
 76

§ 37.25, “Background Investigations” (continued)

§ 37.25(b), “Grandfathering”

§ 37.25(b)(1)

Individuals who have been determined to be trustworthy and reliable for unescorted

access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material under the Fingerprint 

Orders may continue to have unescorted access to category 1 and category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material without further investigation. These individuals shall be subject to the 

reinvestigation requirement.

§ 37.25(b)(2)

Individuals who have been determined to be trustworthy and reliable under the provisions of

10 CFR Part 73 of this chapter or the security orders for access to safeguards information,

safeguards information-modified handling, or risk-significant material may have unescorted

access to category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive material without further

investigation. The licensee shall document that the individual was determined to be

trustworthy and reliable under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 73 of this chapter or a

security order. Security order in this context refers to any order that was issued by the

NRC that required fingerprints and an FBI criminal history records check for access to

safeguards information, safeguards information-modified handling, or risk-significant 

material, such as special nuclear material or large quantities of uranium hexafluoride.

These individuals shall be subject to the reinvestigation requirement.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions relieve individuals who have been determined trustworthy and reliable

under comparable NRC-required background investigations from further investigation.

Q&As:

Q1: If I have approved an individual for unescorted access under a previously issued NRC

security order, do I need to conduct a new background investigation?

A1: No. In addition, the licensee does not need to conduct a new background investigation 

for employees who were granted unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material or access to SGI under legally binding requirements issued by an 

Agreement State or the NRC. These previously approved individuals are considered to be 

grandfathered and, therefore, do not need a new background investigation to meet the new 

requirements. However, the individuals will need to undergo a reinvestigation 10 years after 

the initial determination, and that background investigation will need to meet 10 CFR Part 37 

requirements for the reinvestigation.

Q2: Do you have grandfather provisions for those who are long-term employees

regarding trustworthiness and reliability?
 77

A2: No. Long-term employees are not automatically grandfathered unless they have

previously undergone a background investigation as discussed in A1 above or unless they fall 

under one of the categories of individuals granted relief from elements of the background 

investigation. See the Q&As on 10 CFR 37.29 for additional information on who may be relieved

from fingerprinting.

Q3: I have an access authorization covered by 10 CFR Part 73. Do I need to reinvestigate 

individuals before I allow them to have unescorted access to category 2 or greater quantities of 

my material?

A3: No. If the licensee has a 10 CFR Part 73 access authorization program, it may 

grandfather an individual under 10 CFR 37.25(b)(2) if it documents that he or she was 

determined to be trustworthy and reliable under 10 CFR Part 73 or an NRC security order that 

requires fingerprints and an FBI criminal history records check for access to SGI, SGI-M, or 

risk-significant material, such as special nuclear material or large quantities of uranium 

hexafluoride.
 78

§ 37.25, “Background Investigations” (continued)

§ 37.25(c), “Reinvestigations”

Licensees shall conduct a reinvestigation every 10 years for any individual with unescorted 

access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material. The reinvestigation 

shall consist of fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history records check in 

accordance with § 37.27. The reinvestigations must be completed within 10 years of the 

date on which these elements were last completed.

EXPLANATION:

This provision requires background reinvestigations every 10 years.

Q&As:

Q1: Why is a reinvestigation required every 10 years?

A1: A reinvestigation every 10 years is necessary because an individual’s criminal history 

may change over time in a manner that can adversely affect his or her T&R. The 10-year clock 

begins on the day an individual was given unescorted access to the radioactive material.

Q2: What elements are included in the reinvestigation?

A2: The reinvestigation is not a complete check. It is limited to fingerprinting and the FBI 

criminal history records check; it does not need to include identification through employment 

verification or the character and reputation determination. However, if the reinvestigation finds 

new information about a potentially adverse change in the individual’s criminal records, the 

licensee may need to gather information from additional sources to consider whether to revise 

its previous determination about the individual’s character and reputation.

Q3: Must I do a reinvestigation of an individual who qualified under 10 CFR 37.29 for relief 

from fingerprinting and background investigations, such as an individual approved under 

another Federal security review program?

A3: The relief provided by 10 CFR 37.29 does apply to the reinvestigation; however, the 

licensee will need to check and document that the individual still meets the relief category. If the 

affected individual has an approval that is still valid under another Federal security review 

program, the licensee does not need to conduct a reinvestigation. However, the regulation in

10 CFR 37.29(a)(12) requires the individual who was approved under the other Federal security 

review program to make available the appropriate documentation that he or she has an active 

Federal security clearance, and the licensee must receive written confirmation from the agency 

or employer that granted the Federal security clearance or reviewed the criminal history records 

check.
 79

§ 37.27, “Requirements for Criminal History Records Checks of Individuals Granted 

Unescorted Access to Category 1 or Category 2 Quantities of

Radioactive Material”

§ 37.27(a), “General Performance Objective and Requirements”

§ 37.27(a)(1)

Except for those individuals listed in 10 CFR 37.29 and those individuals grandfathered 

under 10 CFR 37.25(b), each licensee subject to the provisions of this subpart shall 

fingerprint each individual who is to be permitted unescorted access to category 1 or 

category 2 quantities of radioactive material. Licensees shall transmit all collected 

fingerprints to the Commission for transmission to the FBI. The licensee shall use the 

information received from the FBI as part of the required background investigation to 

determine whether to grant or deny further unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive materials for that individual.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions require licensees to fingerprint individuals who are to be permitted unescorted 

access and to submit the fingerprints to the NRC for transmission to the FBI.

Q&As:

Q1: May I work directly with the FBI without having to process the fingerprints through the

NRC?

A1: No. The NRC does not have the authority to allow licensees to submit fingerprints 

directly to the FBI instead of submitting them through the NRC. Section 149 of the AEA 

requires that “fingerprints obtained by an individual or entity as required [in this section] be

submitted to the Attorney General of the United States through the Commission for identification 

and a criminal history records check.” The NRC recognizes that some licensees may work

directly with the FBI to process fingerprints to meet other requirements for criminal history

checks. However, to meet the requirements in 10 CFR Part 37, the licensee must still process 

fingerprints through the NRC to the FBI unless the individual is covered under a relief category

in 10 CFR 37.29.
 80

§ 37.27, “Requirements for Criminal History Records Checks of Individuals Granted 

Unescorted Access to Category 1 or Category 2 Quantities of

Radioactive Material” (continued)

§ 37.27(a), “General Performance Objective and Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.27(a)(2)

The licensee shall notify each affected individual that his or her fingerprints will be used to 

secure a review of his or her criminal history record and shall inform him or her of the 

procedures for revising the record or adding explanations to the record.

§ 37.27(a)(3)

Fingerprinting is not required if a licensee is reinstating an individual’s unescorted access 

authorization to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive materials if:

§ 37.27(a)(3)(i)

The individual returns to the same facility that granted unescorted access authorization 

within 365 days of the termination of his or her unescorted access authorization; and

§ 37.27(a)(3)(ii)

The previous access was terminated under favorable conditions.

§ 37.27(a)(4)

Fingerprints do not need to be taken if an individual who is an employee of a licensee, 

contractor, manufacturer, or supplier has been granted unescorted access to category 1 or 

category 2 quantities of radioactive material, access to safeguards information or 

safeguards information-modified handling by another licensee, based upon a background

investigation conducted under this subpart, the Fingerprint Orders, or 10 CFR Part 73 of

this chapter. An existing criminal history records check file may be transferred to the

licensee asked to grant unescorted access in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR

37.31(c).

§ 37.27(a)(5)

Licensees shall use the information obtained as part of a criminal history records check 

solely for the purpose of determining an individual’s suitability for unescorted access 

authorization to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive materials, or access to

safeguards information or safeguards information-modified handling.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions establish requirements for reinstatement of unescorted access authorizations 

and for the use of information from previous background investigations.
 81

Q&As:

Q1: Am I obligated to tell an individual why he or she is being fingerprinted?

A1: Yes. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.27(a)(2) requires the licensee to inform the individual 

that his or her fingerprints will be used to conduct a criminal history records check.

Q2: How should I inform the individual?

A2: The licensee may inform the individual orally or in writing. However, the licensee must 

obtain signed consent to conduct the background investigation. See also the Q&As on 10 CFR

37.23(c).

Q3: If an employee who has unescorted access quits and then returns, does the licensee 

need to fingerprint the individual again?

A3: If the employee has been gone for 365 days or less, had left under favorable conditions, 

and had previously undergone fingerprinting and an FBI criminal history records check, he or 

she will not need to be fingerprinted again. However, if the individual’s unescorted access had 

been terminated for cause, the individual will need to be fingerprinted again.

Q4: Do I need to obtain fingerprints of service provider licensees and other individuals who 

have been granted unescorted access by the service provider or other licensee?

A4: No. The licensee does not need to obtain fingerprints of individuals employed by a 

service provider licensee if that licensee meets the requirements in 10 CFR Part 37. Employees 

of these service provider licensees who work at a customer’s facility need not go through the 

customer’s process for determining T&R for granting unescorted access. Because the service 

provider licensee has already made its own determination of T&R for its employees, the service 

provider licensee may instead provide its customers with certification of an individual’s T&R for 

being granted unescorted access. However, the service provider licensee’s program must meet 

the requirements of Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 37. The licensee will still need to determine that 

the individual should be granted unescorted access and to document its basis. The licensee is 

not required to accept the service provider’s certification and can choose to escort the

individual(s).

Q5: May I use information obtained as part of a criminal history records check for other 

purposes?

A5: No. The licensee may use the information obtained under this part only to determine 

suitability for either access to SGI or unescorted access to a category 1 or category 2 quantity of 

radioactive material.
 82

§ 37.27, “Requirements for Criminal History Records Checks of Individuals Granted 

Unescorted Access to Category 1 or Category 2 Quantities of

Radioactive Material” (continued)

§ 37.27(b), “Prohibitions”

§ 37.27(b)(1)

Licensees may not base a final determination to deny an individual unescorted access 

authorization to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material solely on the basis 

of information received from the FBI involving:

§ 37.27(b)(1)(i)

An arrest more than 1 year old for which there is no information of the disposition of the case;

or

§ 37.27(b)(1)(ii)

An arrest that resulted in dismissal of the charge or an acquittal.

§ 37.27(b)(2)

Licensees may not use information received from a criminal history records check obtained 

under this subpart in a manner that would infringe upon the rights of any individual under the 

First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor shall licensees use the 

information in any way that would discriminate among individuals on the basis of race, 

religion, national origin, gender, or age.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions prohibit the use of certain background investigation information.

Q&As:

Q1: Why can’t I deny an individual unescorted access authorization based solely on FBI

information about an arrest that resulted in a dismissal or acquittal, or an arrest more than

1 year old for which there is no information on the disposition of the case?

A1: This misuse of such information would be a violation of NRC regulations and Federal 

law. Section 149(c)(2)(C) of the AEA requires that Commission regulations for the use of FBI 

criminal history records check information “ensure that no final determination may be made 

solely on the basis of information provided under this section involving...an arrest more than

1 year old for which there is no information of the disposition of the case; or...an arrest that 

resulted in dismissal of the charge or an acquittal.” Taking such action on an incomplete record

might unfairly penalize the individual. The charges may have possibly been dropped, or the

individual may have been found innocent, and the record was never updated to reflect the 

additional information.
 83

§ 37.27, “Requirements for Criminal History Records Checks of Individuals

Granted Unescorted Access to Category 1 or Category 2 Quantities of

Radioactive Material” (continued)

§ 37.27(c), “Procedures for Processing of Fingerprint Checks”

§ 37.27(c)(1)

For the purpose of complying with this subpart, licensees shall use an appropriate method 

listed in § 37.7 to submit to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Director, Division of 

Facilities and Security, 11545 Rockville Pike, ATTN: Criminal History Program/Mail Stop 

TWB-05 B32M, Rockville, MD 20852, one completed, legible standard fingerprint card

(Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ), electronic fingerprint scan or, where practicable, other 

fingerprint record for each individual requiring unescorted access to category 1 or category

2 quantities of radioactive material. Copies of these forms may be obtained by writing the 

Office of Information Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC

20555-0001, by calling 630-829-9565, or by e-mail to FORMS.Resource@nrc.gov. 

Guidance on submitting electronic fingerprints can be found at 

http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by calling 630-829-9565, or by e-mail 

to FORMS.Resource@nrc.gov. Guidance on submitting electronic fingerprints can

be found at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.

§ 37.27(c)(2)

Fees for the processing of fingerprint checks are due upon application. Licensees shall 

submit payment with the application for the processing of fingerprints through corporate 

check, certified check, cashier’s check, money order, or electronic payment, made

payable to “U.S. NRC.” (For guidance on making electronic payments, contact the

Security Branch, Division of Facilities and Security at 301-492-3531.) Combined payment

for multiple applications is acceptable. The Commission publishes the amount of the

fingerprint check application fee on the NRC public Web site. (To find the current fee

amount, go to the Electronic Submittals page at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html and see the link for the Criminal History Program under Electronic

Submission Systems.)

§ 37.27(c)(3)

The Commission will forward to the submitting licensee all data received from the FBI as

a result of the licensee’s application(s) for criminal history records checks.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions establish procedures for processing fingerprint checks.

Q&As:

Q1: Where do I submit the fingerprints for processing?
 84

A1: Under the AEA, the licensee is required to submit the fingerprints to the NRC, which 

forwards the fingerprints to the FBI for processing. If an individual comes under one of the

relief categories specified in 10 CFR 37.29, the licensee will not need to submit the

individual’s fingerprints to the NRC. A completed fingerprint card (Form FD-258) should be

sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Director, Division of Facilities and

Security, 11545 Rockville Pike, ATTN: Criminal History Program/Mail Stop TWB-05B32M,

Rockville, MD 20852.

Q2: How can I obtain more fingerprint cards?

A2: The licensee can request more fingerprint cards (Form FD-258) by writing to the

Office of Information Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 

20555; by calling 630-829-9565; or by submitting e-mail to forms.resource@nrc.gov.

Q3: What information do I need to include on the fingerprint card?

A3: Licensees need to include the following information on each fingerprint card:

• last name, first name, and middle name

• signature of person being fingerprinted

• residence of person being fingerprinted (e.g., nearest town, State or territory,

and zip code)

• date

• signature of the official taking the fingerprints

• address of the employer taking fingerprints

• reason for being fingerprinted (e.g., 10 CFR Part 37 regulatory requirement)

• aliases

• citizenship

• social security number and any of the other corresponding numbers requested 

on the card, if applicable (social security number only, no passport or other

identification numbers) (If the individual does not have a social security

number, leave this box blank.)

• date of birth

• place of birth

• sex

• race (e.g., A—Asian or Pacific Islander, B—Black, H—Hispanic/Latino, 

I—American Indian or Alaskan Native, or W—White)
 85

• height

• weight

• eye color (BLK—Black, BLU—Blue, BRO—Brown, GRY—Gray, GRN—

Green, HAZ—Hazel, MAR—Maroon, MUL—Multicolored, or PNK—Pink)

• hair color (BAL—Bald, BLK—Black, BLN—Blond, BLU—Blue, BRO—

Brown, GRY—Gray or Partially, GRN—Green, ONG—Orange, PNK—Pink, 

PLE— Purple, RED—Red or Auburn, SDY—Sandy, XXX—Unknown, or

WHI—White)

NRC licensees should use their NRC docket number in the field “YOUR NO. OCA.”

Agreement State licensees should use their two letter State abbreviation followed by a

dash and the licensee’s license number. For new license applications, an Agreement State

may not be able to provide a license number before license issuance. In this situation, the

Agreement State should create a unique identification number for the applicant to complete

the fingerprinting card (e.g., CA-123456). The number must be unique for each applicant

and must not be repeated once it is used. Incomplete fingerprint cards will not be

processed and will be returned to the licensee.

Q4: May I use fingerprint cards I obtain from my LLEA?

A4: No. Licensees cannot use cards from other sources because of past problems

with some of the cards.

Q5: Who may fingerprint my employees?

A5: The licensee should have its employees’ fingerprints taken by an authorized

official, such as a representative from an LLEA. An official authorized for this purpose

could also be available through private entities, contractors, or an established onsite

fingerprinting program. However, note that under 10 CFR 37.23(b)(2), the fingerprints of

the nominated RO must be taken by a law enforcement agency, a Federal or State

agency that provides fingerprinting services to the public, or a commercial fingerprinting

service that has been authorized by a State to take fingerprints.

With the exception of the RO, no limitation exists on who may take the fingerprints. 

However, if the licensee has fingerprints taken at a facility other than that of a recognized

Federal, State, or LLEA, it should ensure that the prints are taken legibly and that they 

match the identity of the individual named on the fingerprint card. In these cases, the

individual who takes the fingerprints should, at a minimum, do the following:

• Attend training on how to take fingerprints. (The FBI offers training to take 

fingerprints, or such training may be available from LLEAs and some

professional associations.)

• Verify the identity of the individual being fingerprinted by checking a

 Government-issued picture identification (e.g., a passport or driver’s license), 

and verify that the name on the card matches the Government-issued

identification.
 86

• Sign the block on the fingerprint card labeled “SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL

 TAKING THE FINGERPRINTS.”

Q6: Is there a fee associated with the NRC’s processing of the fingerprints?

A6: Since December 1, 2009, the fee to process each fingerprint card has been

$26. Because the fee changes occasionally, the licensee should check before

submitting its fee payment. The NRC publishes the amount of the fingerprint check

application fee on the its public Web site. (To find the current fee amount, go to the

Electronic Submittals page at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html and select 

the link for the Criminal History Program.) Additional fees may be charged by the entity

taking the fingerprints.

Fees for the processing of fingerprint checks are due upon application. The regulation in

10 CFR 37.27(c)(2) requires licensees to submit payment with the application for the

processing of fingerprints through a corporate check, certified check, cashier’s check, money

order, or electronic payment made payable to “U.S. NRC.” (For guidance on how to make

electronic payments, contact the Facilities Security Branch, Division of Facilities and

Security, at 301-492-3531). Combined payment for multiple applications is acceptable.

Q7: May the NRC waive the fee for processing the fingerprints?

A7: No. The NRC by law may not waive or reduce the fee for processing the

fingerprints. Subparagraph a.(3) of Section 149 of the AEA explicitly requires the costs of an

identification or records check to be paid by the individual or entity required to conduct the

fingerprinting.

Q8: What method of payment does the NRC accept?

A8: The NRC’s preferred method of payment is electronic payment through Pay.gov at 

http://www.pay.gov. The licensee can make payments through Pay.gov directly from its

credit or debit card. Licensees will need to establish a password and user identification

number before they can access Pay.gov. To establish an account, the licensee must send

its request to paygo@nrc.gov. The request must include the licensee’s name, address, 

point of contact, e-mail address, and phone number. The NRC will forward each request 

to Pay.gov, and someone from Pay.gov will contact the licensee with all of the necessary

account information.

Licensees that use Pay.gov must make payments for processing before submitting

applications for fingerprint checks to the NRC. Combined payment for multiple applications

is acceptable. Licensees must include the Pay.gov payment receipt(s) along with the

application(s).

For additional guidance on making electronic payments, contact the Facilities Security

Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, at 301-492-3531. The NRC also accepts checks, 

cashier checks, or money orders made out to the “U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission”

along with the submission of fingerprint cards. Fingerprint cards along with a Pay.gov

receipt, check, cashier check, or money order should be sent to the Division of Facilities

and Security, Mail Stop TWB-05 B32M, ATTN: Criminal History Program, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738.
 87

Q9: When making a payment to the NRC through Pay.gov for the processing of 

fingerprints, Pay.gov requires a TCN. What is a TCN, and what information should go in

this field?

A9: TCN stands for “transaction control number.” It is a tool that licensees can use to

track their submissions, and it may include as much identifying information as would be

useful for that purpose. For instance, licensees may include the names of one or more

individuals for whom payment is being made, the licensee’s name, and the date of

submittal. Because that field is on the Pay.gov form, the licensee may use the field for

individuals’ names or any other identifying information.

Q10: May I submit my fingerprint cards electronically to the NRC?

A10: Yes. Some licensees may choose to make arrangements to submit fingerprints 

electronically to the NRC. For many licensees, however, the cost of electronic

fingerprinting equipment may be prohibitive. To establish an electronic fingerprinting

program with the NRC, please contact the NRC’s Facility Security Branch at 301-492-

3531. Please note that under 10 CFR 37.7, electronic submissions must be made in a

manner that enables the NRC to receive, read, authenticate the sender, and forward the

submission to the U.S. Attorney General for FBI processing. The FBI will need to certify

any fingerprint equipment that will be used for the purposes of complying with the

fingerprinting requirements for quality and performance standards. The NRC and FBI 

systems are capable of receiving electronic fingerprint transmission specification

fingerprints, either Type 4 (rolled prints) or Type 14 (flat prints). A sample listing of FBIcertified fingerprint equipment is available at https://www.fbibiospecs.org/iafis/.

Q11: What happens to the fingerprint cards after the NRC receives them from the licensee?

A11: The NRC scans the fingerprint cards to transmit to the FBI electronically. The

agency retains and secures the cards for approximately 1 month and then the hard-copy

fingerprint information is destroyed after a month in accordance with federal guidelines. 

The NRC system keeps a record of all the submissions, but can only produce a copy of that 

record for a year; after a year, NRC cannot print out a copy.

Q12: Why might a fingerprint card be unclassifiable?

A12: Fingerprints may be unclassifiable for a number of reasons, including the following:

• Incomplete impressions were taken. (For example, the fingers were

not completely rolled from one side of the nail to the other.)

• The left and right hands were reversed on the fingerprint card.

• The same hand or finger was printed twice on the card.

• The fingerprints are not clear and distinct (e.g., smudged, uneven, or 

too dark or light).

• The fingers on the card are missing or are partially missing without 

an explanation.
 88

To avoid rejection of fingerprints by the FBI as “unclassifiable,” the individual who

takes the prints should ensure that they are of good quality and that they do not

include any of these deficiencies and should also follow the instructions on the back of 

the fingerprint card. Fingerprint cards with incomplete or missing information will be

returned to the licensee to provide complete information, thus resulting in a delay in

processing.

The FBI has provided guidance on taking fingerprints for submission to the agency at 

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/recording-legiblefingerprints/takingfps. This guidance also discusses special situations, such as

fingerprinting an individual with abnormalities of the fingers, thumbs, or hands, and the 

appropriate way to identify such situations on the fingerprint card. The guidance also

includes a checklist to verify that the fingerprint impressions meet the FBI’s requirements.

Q13: What are the next steps in the process if the FBI rejects a Form FD-258 (fingerprint 

card) because the fingerprints are not classifiable? What options are available to licensees

if, after multiple attempts, an individual’s fingerprints cannot be classified based on

conditions other than poor quality?

A13: If the initial fingerprint submission is returned by the FBI because the fingerprint 

impressions cannot be classified, the fingerprints may be retaken and resubmitted (i.e., a

new Form FD-258 via electronic submission) for a second attempt. The licensee will not be

charged for the resubmission if the licensee provides a copy of the FBI TCN or the FBI

response indicating that the fingerprints could not be classified. If the FBI is unable to

classify the second submission of fingerprints, the licensee may submit additional fingerprint

impressions for the individual as follows:

(1) The third fingerprint card submission will require payment of an additional

$26 processing fee.

(2) If the third submission is also returned as unclassifiable, the licensee may

submit a fourth set of fingerprints. An additional fee is not required because

the fee for the third submission includes one resubmission. As with the

second submission, the FBI response or TCN should be included, or the

submission may be treated as a new request and an additional fee may be

charged. Please note that a licensee may opt to take and submit the third

and fourth sets of fingerprints together to avoid a potential delay in the

response. If the third set is returned as unclassifiable, the NRC will 

automatically resubmit the fourth set.

(3) No further submissions will be required, and the licensee may consider the 

results of the name search-FBI identification and criminal history records

check as a component in determining trustworthiness and reliability.

The NRC will consider licensee requests for deviation from the above process for good

cause (e.g., a demonstrated history of difficulty providing classifiable fingerprints during

other fingerprinting programs or a documented medical condition or physical anomaly that 

can prevent the taking of readable prints). Licensees may submit a request for 
 89

consideration of alternatives and provide the basis for the need for an alternative process to

the NRC’s Facilities Security Branch in the Division of Facilities and Security (requests may

be made by phone at 301-492-3531 or mailed to:

Office of Administration

Division of Facilities and Security

Mail Stop TWB-05 B32M

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0012

Please note that requests for an alternative to the above process will not affect a licensee’s

responsibility to fingerprint individuals for unescorted access or to comply with the

trustworthiness and reliability requirements.
 90

§ 37.29, “Relief from Fingerprinting, Identification, and Criminal History Records 

Checks and Other Elements of Background Investigations for

Designated Categories of Individuals Permitted Unescorted

Access to Certain Radioactive Materials or Other Property”

§ 37.29(a)

Fingerprinting, and the identification and criminal history records checks required by

Section 149 of the AEA, as amended, and other elements of the background investigation

are not required for the following individuals prior to granting unescorted access to category 1 

or category 2 quantities of radioactive materials:

§ 37.29(a)(1)

An employee of the Commission or of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government who has 

undergone fingerprinting for a prior U.S. Government criminal history records check;

§ 37.29(a)(2)

A member of Congress;

§37.29(a)(3)

An employee of a member of Congress or Congressional committee who has undergone 

fingerprinting for a prior U.S. Government criminal history records check;

§ 37.29(a)(4)

The Governor of a State or his or her designated State employee representative;

§ 37.29(a)(5)

Federal, State, or local law enforcement personnel;

§ 37.29(a)(6)

State Radiation Control Program Directors and State Homeland Security Advisors or their 

designated State employee representatives;

§ 37.29(a)(7)

Agreement State employees conducting security inspections on behalf of the NRC under an 

agreement executed under Section 274.i. of the Atomic Energy Act;

§ 37.29(a)(8)

Representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) engaged in activities 

associated with the U.S./IAEA Safeguards Agreement who have been certified by the NRC;
 91

§ 37.29(a)(9)

Emergency response personnel who are responding to an emergency;

§ 37.29(a)(10)

Commercial vehicle drivers for road shipments of category 1 and category 2 quantities

of radioactive material;

§ 37.29(a)(11)

Package handlers at transportation facilities, such as freight terminals and railroad yards;

§ 37.29(a)(12)

Any individual who has an active Federal security clearance, provided that he or she makes 

available the appropriate documentation. Written confirmation from the agency/employer that

granted the Federal security clearance or reviewed the criminal history records check

must be provided to the licensee. The licensee shall retain this documentation for a period of

3 years from the date the individual no longer requires unescorted access to category 1 or 

category 2 quantities of radioactive material; and

§ 37.29(a)(13)

Any individual employed by a service provider licensee for which the service provider 

licensee has conducted the background investigation for the individual and approved the 

individual for unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive

material. Written verification from the service provider must be provided to the licensee.

The licensee shall retain the documentation for a period of 3 years from the date the

individual no longer requires unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of

radioactive material.

EXPLANATION:

This section identifies the categories of individuals who may be relieved from the background 

investigation elements. In addition, it establishes the conditions under which a licensee may 

accept a Federal agency security clearance or the T&R determination of a service provider 

licensee.

Q&As:

Q1: What is the basis for relieving individuals from fingerprinting and criminal history records 

check requirements?

A1: Under Section 149.b of Chapter 12 of the AEA, the NRC may, by rule, relieve individuals 

from the fingerprinting, identification, and criminal history records check requirements if it finds 

that such action is “consistent with its obligations to promote the common defense and security 

and to protect the health and safety of the public.”
 92

Q2: How may I determine if an individual has undergone a previous background investigation 

and falls under one of the categories listed in 10 CFR 37.29?

A2: For some categories of individuals, it will be obvious. For example, a police officer, an 

NRC employee, or State employee will have identification of some sort that identifies the 

individual and his or her employer so that no further checking will be necessary. For those 

categories of individuals for which it is not obvious, either the individual or the individual’s 

employer will need to provide documentation.

Q3: What type of documentation is necessary?

A3: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.29(a)(12)) requires documentation to consist of written 

confirmation from the agency or employer that granted a Federal security clearance or reviewed 

the criminal history records check. Documentation may be a confirmation letter that the named 

individual has a security clearance that meets the requirements of Subpart B and that was 

issued on a specified date. Documentation may also consist of a copy of the background 

investigation determination itself if the agency or employer provides it. To show that the service 

provider’s employee has undergone a background check under 10 CFR 37.29(a)(13), which is 

equivalent to that required under 10 CFR 37.25, the service provider licensee must provide the 

service recipient licensee a written communication that includes the name and identifying 

information of the employee who will be providing the service and an affirmation that this 

employee has been determined to be trustworthy and reliable in accordance with

10 CFR 37.25(a)(1) through 10 CFR 37.25(a)(7). To comply with these requirements, the 

service provider’s background investigation must include fingerprinting and an FBI identification 

and criminal history records check; verifications of the individual’s true identity, employment 

history, and education; and a character and reputation determination.

Q4: How long must I keep documentation records?

A4: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.23(h)(1) requires the licensee to keep the records for at 

least 3 years after the individual no longer requires unescorted access to category 1 or

category 2 quantities of radioactive material or, under 10 CFR 37.103, “Record Retention,” until 

its license is terminated, whichever comes first.

Q5: May emergency first responders, such as police and fire department personnel, be 

deemed trustworthy and reliable without a background check?

A5: Yes. The NRC, State radiation protection agencies, and local law enforcement officials 

are relieved from the background investigation elements for purposes of this requirement. In 

the event of an emergency, such as a fire or explosion, firefighters may be granted unescorted 

access for the purposes of controlling the emergency situation. Firemen are not provided relief 

from the background investigation for routine inspections that the fire department may conduct.

Q6: May properly qualified security equipment vendors and/or service providers be 

considered trustworthy and reliable and granted unescorted access to the radioactive material 

or devices containing the radioactive material?

A6: Yes. However, the vendor/service provider must meet the requirements in

10 CFR Part 37. Employees of the vendor/service provider licensees do not need to go

through the customer’s process for determining their T&R for unescorted access at a customer’s 
 93

facility; instead, if the vendor/service provider licensee has made its own determination of T&R

for its personnel, this licensee may provide its customers a certification of each employee’s T&R

for being granted unescorted access. However, the vendor or service provider’s program must 

meet the requirements in Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 37.

Q7: What does the NRC mean by “commercial driver” in 10 CFR 37.29(a)(10)?

A7: A commercial driver is someone who drives commercial vehicles for a living. For 

example, someone driving for FedEx or the United Parcel Service (UPS) is considered a 

commercial driver. The NRC will rely on DOT and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

programs for background investigations of these personnel. Note that this relief is only provided 

for individuals transporting category 2 quantities of radioactive material. A commercial driver 

transporting a category 1 quantity will need to undergo a background investigation. The NRC 

will not consider an individual who works for the licensee and drives a company truck between 

radiography jobs to be a commercial driver, and he or she will need to undergo a background 

investigation before having unescorted access to a category 1 or category 2 quantity of 

radioactive material.

Q8: Why are commercial drivers and package handlers relieved from undergoing 

background checks under 10 CFR Part 37?

A8: These individuals are typically outside the control of the licensee, and it would have no 

way of knowing or influencing who those individuals might be. The NRC will rely on DOT and 

TSA programs for background investigations of these individuals. Although the background 

investigation may not be identical to those required under 10 CFR Part 37, the NRC believes 

that the potential risk that a commercial driver or package handler might pose due to any 

difference in the background investigation is acceptably small.

Q9: If an individual falls under one of the categories listed for relief in 10 CFR 37.29, am I

required to grant the individual unescorted access to the material?

A9: No. The regulation in 10 CFR Part 37 does not require the licensee to grant unescorted 

access to any radioactive materials or other property subject to NRC regulations to any 

individual. The licensee still needs to decide whether to grant or deny an individual unescorted 

access independent of if he or she qualifies for relief from fingerprinting and other background 

investigation elements under one of the categories in 10 CFR 37.29. This section simply 

clarifies that a licensee may permit unescorted access to certain categories of individuals 

without performing a background investigation if these officials are otherwise qualified for 

access and have a demonstrated need for it. However, the licensee will need to conduct any 

training necessary under 10 CFR 37.43(c) before granting such individuals unescorted access.

Q10: Would State radiation control program directors or their designated State employee 

representatives be exempt from background checks under 10 CFR Part 37 even if their need for 

unescorted access is not security related, such as in a safety inspection?

A10: Yes. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.29(a)(6) relieves these officials from the background 

investigation elements.
 94

Q11: Am I required to allow an NRC or Agreement State inspector unescorted access?

A11: No. The regulations in 10 CFR 37.105, “Inspections,” which provide inspectors access 

to a licensee’s facilities and records, do not require the licensee to provide unescorted access. 

The licensee may always escort an inspector when he or she is in a security zone or is 

inspecting protected information.
 95

§ 37.29, “Relief from Fingerprinting, Identification, and Criminal History Records 

Checks and Other Elements of Background Investigations for

Designated Categories of Individuals Permitted Unescorted

Access to Certain Radioactive Materials or Other Property”

§ 37.29(b)

Fingerprinting, and the identification and criminal history records checks required by Section

149 of the AEA, as amended, are not required for an individual who has had a favorably

adjudicated U.S. Government criminal history records check within the last 5 years, under a

comparable U.S. Government program involving fingerprinting and an FBI identification and

criminal history records check provided that he or she makes available the appropriate

documentation. Written confirmation from the agency/employer that reviewed

the criminal history records check must be provided to the licensee. The licensee shall retain 

this documentation for a period of 3 years from the date the individual no longer

requires unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material. 

These programs include, but are not limited to:

§ 37.29(b)(1)

National Agency Check;

§ 37.29(b)(2)

Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) under 49 CFR 1572;

§ 37.29(b)(3)

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives background check and clearances 

under 27 CFR 555;

§ 37.29(b)(4)

Health and Human Services security risk assessments for possession and use of select 

agents and toxins under 42 CFR 73;

§ 37.29(b)(5)

Hazardous material security threat assessment for hazardous material endorsement to 

commercial drivers license under 49 CFR 1572; and

§ 37.29(b)(6)

Customs and Border Protection’s Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Program.
 96

EXPLANATION:

Individuals with a favorably adjudicated U.S. Government criminal history records check under a 

comparable Federal program within the last 5 years may be relieved from the 10 CFR Part 37 

fingerprinting and FBI criminal history records check. However, the licensee must conduct the 

other elements of the required background investigation.

Q&As:

Q1: What does it mean for an individual to have a “favorably adjudicated” U.S. Government 

criminal history records check?

A1: The licensee may consider an individual’s criminal history records check to have been 

“favorably adjudicated” if the individual is authorized under the applicable program to conduct 

the activity for which the check was made. The regulation in § 37.29(b) states that the 

adjudication must have been conducted within the last 5 years under a comparable

U.S. Government program involving fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history 

records check, such as those programs listed.

Q2: What does NRC consider a comparable U.S. Government program?

A2: A comparable U.S. Government program is one that requires an individual to submit 

fingerprints for an FBI criminal history records check. In most cases, the Government agency 

would issue an approval that could include an identification card or a specific approval to work in 

certain areas. Comparable U.S. Government programs include the following:

• National Agency Check

• Transportation Worker Identification Credential

• Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives background check and 

clearances under 27 CFR 555, “Commerce in Explosives”

• U.S. Department of Health and Human Services security risk assessments for 

possession and use of select agents and toxins under 42 CFR 73, “Select Agents 

and Toxins”

• hazardous material security threat assessment of a hazardous material 

endorsement to a commercial driver’s license under 49 CFR 1572, “Credentialing 

and Security Threat Assessments”

• U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Free and Secure Trade Program

Q3: What documentation must I have in order to accept the individual’s claim that he or she 

has been favorably adjudicated?

A3: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.29(b) requires the individual to make available 

documentation that his or her adjudication is currently valid, and the licensee must receive

written confirmation from the agency or employer that reviewed the criminal history

records check.
 97

Q4: May I grant unescorted access to category 2 or greater quantities of radioactive 

materials to an individual relieved from fingerprinting and criminal history investigation without 

any other checks?

A4: No. The licensee must still fulfill the requirements in 10 CFR 37.25(a)(2) through

10 CFR 37.25(a)(6) for other elements of the background investigation. These elements include 

a verification of true identity; a verification of employment and education; a character and 

reputation determination; and an acquisition and, to the extent possible, an evaluation of 

information obtained from sources independent of those provided by the individual. After 

completing these checks, the licensee may then grant unescorted access if the individual’s job 

duties require it.

Q5: When an individual has been favorably adjudicated under a “comparable

U.S. Government program” under 10 CFR 37.29(b), does this mean comparable to one of the 

programs listed under 10 CFR 37.29(b)(1) through (b)(6) above, or comparable to the 

background investigation requirements of 10 CFR Part 37?

A5: To be “comparable” for the purposes of 10 CFR 37.29(b), the program must include 

fingerprinting and an FBI criminal history records check.

Q6: Do I need to obtain a signed consent from an individual who has undergone a 

fingerprinting and a criminal history records check under a comparable Federal program?

A6: Yes. The licensee will need signed consent from an employee who has undergone 

fingerprinting and a criminal history records check under a comparable Federal program 

because it will still need to conduct the other elements of the background investigation required 

by 10 CFR 37.25. These other elements include verification of the individual’s true identity, 

employment, and education history and an evaluation of his or her character and reputation.

Q7: Must I do a reinvestigation of an individual who qualified for relief from fingerprinting and 

background investigations, such as an individual approved under another Federal security 

review program under 10 CFR 37.29(b)?

A7: The relief provided by 10 CFR 37.29 does apply to the reinvestigation, but the licensee 

will need to check and document that the individual still meets the relief category. If the affected 

individual has an approval that is still valid under another Federal security review program, the 

licensee does not need to conduct a reinvestigation.
98

§ 37.31, “Protection of Information”

§ 37.31(a)

Each licensee who obtains background information on an individual under this subpart shall 

establish and maintain a system of files and written procedures for protection of the record 

and the personal information from unauthorized disclosure.

EXPLANATION:

Licensees must establish and maintain a filing system and written procedures to protect from 

unauthorized disclosure records and personal information produced from background 

investigations under 10 CFR Part 37.

Q&As:

Q1: Are licensees required to protect information obtained during a background 

investigation?

A1: Yes. The collected information will likely contain personally identifiable information (PII) 

and should be provided only to authorized individuals. Under Section 149(c)(2)(D) of the AEA, 

as amended, the Commission is required to prescribe requirements for the use of background 

investigation information “to protect individuals subject to fingerprinting under this section from 

misuse of the criminal history records.” Accordingly, under 10 CFR 37.31(a), the licensee is 

required to establish and maintain a system of files and procedures to protect the information 

from disclosure to any unauthorized person. The licensee should, as good practice, store 

background investigation documentation in a locked drawer or file cabinet.

Q2: What does the NRC consider to be “unauthorized disclosure”?

A2: The NRC considers “disclosure” to be the providing of, either deliberately or 

inadvertently, any information obtained in a background investigation in accordance with this 

subpart by any means, including electronic means, such as facsimile, voice mail, or e-mail. Such

disclosure is “unauthorized” if the recipient of the information is not the subject individual, the

individual’s representative, an authorized representative of the NRC or an Agreement State 

agency, or an RO. (See 10 CFR 37.31(b).)

Q3: If I need to prepare an information protection program for my employees’ background 

investigation information, and I want someone other than the RO or other physical security staff 

(e.g., an information technology specialist) to prepare the program, do I have to conduct a full 

background investigation on that individual, even if he or she does not require access to 

radioactive material to perform a job duty?

A3: No. An individual who prepares an information protection program for the access 

authorization program is not required to undergo a background investigation.
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Q4: Should my procedures for information protection address the destruction of records?

A4: This section does not explicitly require that a licensee’s information protection 

procedures address the destruction of records, but this procedure would be a good practice, 

especially for PII. PII is information that can be used, by itself or in combination with other 

information, to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity. It includes personal information, such 

as an individual’s social security number; date and place of birth; mother’s maiden name; 

biometric records; and records of his or her education, financial transactions, and employment

or medical history. To prevent an unauthorized individual from gaining access to records 

containing PII, the licensee should destroy them by shredding, burning, pulping, degaussing, or

using a similarly irreversible method. For more information and guidance on protecting PII, an

OMB memorandum to Federal agencies entitled, “Safeguarding Against and Responding to the

Breach of Personally Identifiable Information,” dated May 22, 2007, may be useful. The 

licensee should also check for applicable State or local government requirements for PII

protection and destruction.
100

§ 37.31, “Protection of Information” (continued)

§ 37.31(b)

The licensee may not disclose the record or personal information collected and maintained to 

persons other than the subject individual, his or her representative, or to those who have a 

need to have access to the information in performing assigned duties in the process of 

granting or denying unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive 

material, or safeguards information or safeguards information-modified handling. No

individual authorized to have access to the information may disseminate the information to any

other individual who does not have a need to know.

EXPLANATION:

This provision restricts the disclosure or the re-dissemination of personal information collected 

under 10 CFR Part 37 background investigations.

Q&As:

Q1: Under what circumstances may I disclose the personal information obtained during a 

background investigation?

A1: The licensee may disclose the information to the subject individual, his or her 

representative, a duly authorized representative of the NRC or an Agreement State agency, or 

an individual with a need for access to the information to perform an assigned duty that supports 

a decision on unescorted access to a quantity of radioactive material subject to

10 CFR Part 37 or information protected under 37.43(d). If the licensee has a question about

whether an individual has a need to know the information, it should verify the need before

providing the information. A supervisor should be contacted to ensure that the request is

legitimate.

The licensee should, as good practice, ask the requestor to put the request in writing and to 

specify the nature of the information requested and should document the requestor’s need to 

know. State, local, or Federal law may also require disclosure for such purposes as criminal 

investigations.

Q2: How do I determine that another person requesting access to these records or personal 

information has a need to know?

A2: If it is not the individual or an NRC or Agreement State inspector, the licensee should 

inquire why the individual needs the information. The licensee may contact the individual’s 

supervisor to verify the need for the information. If the individual is from another company, the 

licensee must find out why he or she is requesting the information. In addition, the licensee 

must ensure that the request is legitimate and must determine if it will comply with the request. 

The licensee is not required to share information with other licensees.
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Q3: Do I need to document a need to know?

A3: The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 contain no specific requirements to document a need 

to know. The licensee, however, should consider this a prudent practice to enable it to 

demonstrate compliance with the requirement not to disseminate the information to any other 

individual who does not have a need to know.
102

§ 37.31, “Protection of Information” (continued)

37.31(c)

The personal information obtained on an individual from a background investigation may be 

provided to another licensee:

37.31(c)(1)

Upon the individual’s written request to the licensee holding the data to disseminate the 

information contained in his or her file; and

37.31(c)(2)

The recipient licensee verifies information, such as name, date of birth, social security 

number, gender, and other applicable physical characteristics.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions establish conditions under which a licensee may provide personal information 

that it obtained on an individual from a background investigation to another licensee.

Q&As:

Q1: May one licensee transfer personal information it obtained during an investigation to 

another licensee?

A1: Yes, the licensee may do so if the subject individual makes a written request to the 

licensee to transfer the information contained in his or her file.

Q2: If I receive background investigation information from another licensee, may I rely on 

that information, or must I re-verify it?

A2: Unless the information is older than the 10-year reinvestigation period, the licensee may 

rely on the information without re-verification. However, the regulation in 10 CFR 37.23(e)(3) 

requires the licensee to document the basis for concluding that each individual with unescorted 

access to category 2 or greater quantities of radioactive material is trustworthy and reliable.

The receiving licensee must verify information, such as the name, date of birth, social security 

number, gender, and other physical characteristics of the subject individual, to ensure that he or 

she is the person whose file has been transferred. The receiving licensee must ensure that the 

information transferred is for the correct individual. The receiving licensee may ask the 

originating licensee to provide information about distinguishing characteristics so that it can 

verify the individual. Such characteristics could include estimated height; birthmarks; scars; 

tattoos; missing or partially missing fingers or fingernails; and, if permissible under applicable 

laws and regulations, race and ethnicity.

Q3: Must I re-disseminate an employee’s background investigation information if he or she 

requests it?

A3: No. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 contain no such requirement. Sharing with 

another licensee the information that a licensee developed is entirely at its discretion.
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§ 37.31, “Protection of Information” (continued)

§ 37.31(d)

The licensee shall make background investigation records obtained under this subpart 

available for examination by an authorized representative of the NRC to determine 

compliance with the regulations and laws.

§ 37.31(e)

The licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history records (including data indicating 

no record) received from the FBI, or a copy of these records if the individual’s file has been 

transferred, on an individual for 3 years from the date the individual no longer requires 

unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material.

EXPLANATION:

Licensees must make background investigation records available to the NRC for its examination 

to determine compliance. Licensees must also retain all fingerprint and criminal history 

information that it received from the FBI on an individual for 3 years from the date that the

individual no longer requires unescorted access.

Q&As:

Q1: Does the NRC have a right to review the background investigation records?

A1: Yes. To determine compliance with applicable laws and regulations, an inspector or 

other authorized representative of the NRC may examine the background investigation records, 

and 10 CFR 37.31(d) requires the licensee to make them available for examination.

Q2: What background investigation records do I need to maintain for NRC inspection under

10 CFR 37.31(d)?

A2: This subsection requires the licensee to make available for the NRC’s examination 

“background investigation records obtained under this subpart.” This requirement would 

include, among other things, all records that must be maintained under 10 CFR 37.23(e) 

concerning the licensee’s basis for concluding if “reasonable assurance that an individual is 

trustworthy and reliable” exists. In addition, 10 CFR 37.23(h)(1) more generally requires the 

licensee to retain for 3 years “documentation regarding the T&R of individual employees.” The 

NRC considers this documentation to include, in addition to the fingerprint and criminal history 

records covered under 10 CFR 37.27(e) above, all background investigation records that the 

licensee must obtain under 10 CFR 37.25(a)(2) through 10 CFR 37.25(a)(6). In addition, 

10 CFR 37.29(b) requires the licensee to retain any written confirmations that it received

concerning a favorably adjudicated criminal history records check, 10 CFR 37.29(a)(12) 

requires the licensee to retain any written confirmations that it received from U.S. Government 

entities concerning a Federal security clearance, and the regulation in 10 CFR 37.29(a)(13) 

requires the licensee to retain any written verifications that it received from service providers.
104

Q3: What fingerprint and criminal history records do I need to maintain?

A3: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.31(e) requires the licensee to retain all fingerprint and 

criminal history records (including data that indicate no record) that it received from the FBI or a 

copy of these records if the individual’s file has been transferred.

Q4: How long do I need to keep background investigation and fingerprint and criminal history 

records on an individual?

A4: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.31(e) requires that if the licensee receives an individual’s 

fingerprint and criminal history file from another party, it must retain a copy of these records for

3 years from the date that the individual no longer requires unescorted access to category 1 or 

category 2 quantities of radioactive material. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.23(h)(1) requires the 

licensee to retain records on its determination of an individual’s T&R, including background 

investigation records, for 3 years from the date that the individual no longer requires unescorted 

access. However, if the licensee’s license is terminated before either of these retention periods 

elapses, the licensee, under 10 CFR 37.103, only needs to retain these records until the 

termination of its license.

Q5: According to 10 CFR 37.23(h), I need to keep records for 3 years. Since these records 

will contain information that needs to be protected, how do I properly dispose of them?

A5: The background investigation records will likely contain personal information that will be 

considered PII. Records containing PII should be destroyed, not just tossed in the trash, to 

prevent an unauthorized individual from gaining access to that information.
105

§ 37.33, “Access Authorization Program Review”

§ 37.33(a)

Each licensee shall be responsible for the continuing effectiveness of the access 

authorization program. Each licensee shall ensure that access authorization programs are 

reviewed to confirm compliance with the requirements of this subpart and that

comprehensive actions are taken to correct any noncompliance that is identified. The review 

program shall evaluate all program performance objectives and requirements. Each licensee 

shall periodically (at least annually) review the access program content and implementation.

§ 37.33(b)

The results of the reviews, along with any recommendations, must be documented. Each 

review report must identify conditions that are adverse to the proper performance of the 

access authorization program, the cause of the condition(s), and, when appropriate, 

recommend corrective actions and corrective actions taken. The licensee shall review the 

findings and take any additional corrective actions necessary to preclude repetition of the 

condition, including reassessment of the deficient areas where indicated.

§ 37.33(c)

Review records must be maintained for 3 years.

EXPLANATION:

Licensees must review and assess the effectiveness of their access authorization programs, 

take appropriate corrective actions, and maintain the records for 3 years.

Q&As:

Q1: How should I evaluate the “effectiveness” of my access authorization program to comply 

with NRC requirements for program reviews?

A1: The licensee should consider several things when evaluating the continued

effectiveness of its program. Specifically, the licensee should consider its ability to demonstrate 

compliance with all the applicable requirements in this subpart and to take comprehensive and 

effective actions to correct identified non-compliances. Most importantly, the licensee should 

keep in mind that continuing effectiveness is not a static condition. Continuing improvements 

are an essential part of an effective program.

To minimize the potential for overlooking an adverse condition, the licensee’s program reviews 

should address each applicable requirement of this subpart. These reviews should identify 

adverse conditions, non-compliances, and root causes and should provide corrective actions. 

The licensee also should follow up on the implementation of these actions and reassess their 

effect on the program. The hallmark of an effective program is not the absence of recorded 

adverse conditions or non-compliances; it is documented evidence that the licensee has made a 
106

diligent effort to find these problems and that it is continuing to reassess the effectiveness of its

actions to prevent problems from reoccurring. Ultimately, the most important indicator of an 

effective program is that the licensee is consistently able to identify and successfully address 

existing and emerging deficiencies.

Q2: How do I ensure that I will meet the requirement to review the access authorization 

program “at least annually”?

A2: Recognizing that some demands on a licensee’s time and resources are beyond its 

control, the NRC will consider that it is conducting a program review “at least annually” if it 

conducts such a review each year at about the same time of year, not to exceed 12 months.

Q3: Must I engage an outside contractor to conduct access authorization program reviews? 

If not, how may I ensure that the review isn’t conducted by the same people carrying out the 

activities being reviewed?

A3: Although hiring an independent party to conduct access authorization program reviews 

would be one way to demonstrate compliance, the regulation does not require it. Although selfassessments do have value and would meet the requirement, the licensee should try to avoid a 

situation in which individuals are reviewing their own work. If the licensee has a large enough 

staff, it could establish a review team of approved individuals to avoid self-reviews. This team 

could be led by an individual, such as the security official or RSO, who works outside the 

management chain of the licensee’s access authorization staff. If the licensee has separate 

programs at more than one location with a different RO at each location, another way to run a 

more arm’s length review would be to have the review team at one location review the program 

implemented by the staff of a different facility. Licensees also may choose to set up a review 

team through an industry association using participants from several independent member 

organizations to conduct program reviews.

Q4: Do I need to report to the NRC any noncompliance identified during an access 

authorization program review?

A4: No. The licensee does not have to report any noncompliance to the NRC unless a 

specific regulation required such a report to the agency.

Q5: What would the NRC consider a “condition adverse to the proper performance of the 

access authorization program”?

A5: The NRC will consider an adverse condition to be anything that, if not corrected, could 

impair the effectiveness of the licensee’s access authorization program or its continuing 

compliance with the requirements of this subpart. An example of an adverse condition might be 

a delay in the reevaluation of an employee’s T&R after receiving information about a felony 

arrest. Another example might be a failure to determine beforehand, under 10 CFR 37.31(b), 

the need to know of an unfamiliar individual who makes an initial request for the

re-dissemination of personal information about an employee. An adequate program review 

should never be limited to looking only for existing or imminent non-compliances. It should 

assess or reassess all conditions that may call into question the continuing effectiveness of the 

licensee’s access authorization program.
107

Q6: 10 CFR 37.33(b) requires the report resulting from a program review to recommend 

corrective actions “when appropriate.” When should I recommend corrective actions?

A6: At a minimum, a program review report should recommend one or more corrective 

actions for each noncompliance or condition “adverse to the proper performance of the access 

authorization program” identified as a result of the review.

Q7: What should I consider as “review documentation” for the purposes of this subsection?

A7: The licensee should retain the annual review report itself and any attachments or 

enclosures related to that report. Related records should include the membership and 

leadership of the review team, if applicable; a description of the management approval process 

for the annual report, if applicable; root cause analyses for identified non-compliances or 

adverse conditions; recommended corrective actions; evaluations of the effectiveness of past 

corrective actions; and other documents that were considered in the review. A good review 

documentation practice is to include minority views on issues in the report for which significant 

professional disagreement is present. The NRC does not expect the licensee to retain rough 

drafts of its annual access authorization program reviews, its meeting records, or the notes of 

each member of a review team.

Q8: How long should I maintain records of the program review?

A8: Records must be maintained for 3 years under 10 CFR 37.33(c).

Q9: Do I need to keep a paper copy of the program review or may I keep an electronic copy?

A9: The licensee may keep either a paper copy or an electronic copy as long as the record is 

legible for the required period and can be accessed. To discourage unauthorized alteration, the 

licensee should make electronic copies read-only if possible, such as by saving them in a PDF.
108

ANNEX A

ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATING AN INDIVIDUAL’S 

TRUSTWORTHINESS AND RELIABILITY FOR ALLOWING UNESCORTED ACCESS 

TO CERTAIN RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Each licensee is responsible for determining whether to grant an individual unescorted access 

to certain radioactive materials. The licensee shall allow only individuals who it has approved 

and documented as trustworthy and reliable to have unescorted access to a category 2 or 

greater quantity of radioactive material and devices containing that quantity. The licensee’s 

reviewing official (RO) makes the trustworthiness and reliability (T&R) determination based on 

the information collected during the background investigation. The RO must document the 

determination basis. Note that the guidance also can be used when information is received 

after an individual has been approved for unescorted access.

Unescorted access determinations require an evaluation of a person’s T&R. When a person’s 

life history shows evidence of unreliability or untrustworthiness, a licensee may question if that 

person can be relied on and trusted to exercise the responsibility necessary for working with 

risk-significant radioactive materials. The purpose of the T&R determination requirement is to 

provide reasonable assurance that those individuals are trustworthy and reliable and do not

constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety, including the potential to commit 

or aid theft or radiological sabotage. In evaluating the relevance of an individual’s conduct, the

RO should consider the following factors:

• the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct

• the circumstances surrounding the conduct, including evidence as to if it was 

deliberate

• the frequency and recency of the conduct

• the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct

• the extent to which participation in the conduct was voluntary

• the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes

• the motivation for the conduct

• the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress as a result of the conduct

• the likelihood of continuation or recurrence

Each case must be judged on its own merits, and the final determination remains the 

responsibility of the licensee. In every case, the RO must evaluate T&R based on an 

accumulation of information that supports a positive finding before granting unescorted access. 

Items to consider include the following:
109

• if the information collected is consistent and adequate

• if the applicant’s true identity can be reasonably verified by comparing applicant provided 

identification and personal history data to pertinent information from the background 

investigation and other data sources

• if inconsistencies identified by the licensee’s review or investigation are intentional, 

innocent, or an oversight

Willful or intentional acts of omission or untruthfulness could be grounds for denial of unescorted 

access. When a licensee submits fingerprints to the NRC, it will receive an FBI identification

and criminal history record since the individual’s 18th birthday. The licensee’s RO should 

evaluate that information using the guidance below. The licensee’s RO is required to evaluate

all available information in making a T&R determination for unescorted access to radioactive 

materials, including the criminal history records information pertaining to the individual. The FBI

identification and criminal history records check is used to determine if the individual has a 

record of criminal activity that indicates that the individual should not have unescorted access to 

radioactive materials subject to the requirements in 10 CFR Part 37. The licensee’s

documentation of each T&R determination for unescorted access to radioactive materials, which 

must include a review of criminal history information, must include the basis for the decision

made. Licensees should not make a final determination based solely on criminal history check 

information involving an arrest of more than 1 year old for which no information is available on

the disposition of the case or an arrest that resulted in dismissal or acquittal of the charge.

The criminal history records check is used to evaluate if the individual has a record of criminal 

activity that may compromise his or her T&R. Identification of a criminal history through the FBI 

criminal history records check or a discretionary local criminal history check does not 

automatically indicate unreliability or untrustworthiness of the employee. The licensee will have 

to judge the nature and recency of the criminal activity. The licensee may authorize individuals 

with criminal records for unescorted access to radioactive materials based on a documented 

evaluation of the basis for determining that the employee or applicant is reliable and trustworthy, 

notwithstanding his or her criminal history. The licensee’s documentation of each review of 

criminal history and other background checks information must include the decision-making 

basis. When evaluating the results of the criminal history records check, the licensee should 

consider, at a minimum, if the subject individual did the following:

• Committed, attempted to commit, aided, or abetted another individual who committed or 

attempted to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, sedition, or terrorism.

• Publicly or privately advocated actions that may be inimical to the interest of the United 

States, or publicly or privately advocated the use of force or violence to overthrow the 

Government of the United States or the alteration of the form of government of the 

United States by unconstitutional means.

• Knowingly established or continued a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, 

traitor, seditionist, anarchist, terrorist, or revolutionary; with an espionage agent or other 

secret agent or representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the 

interests of the United States; or with any person who advocates the use of force or
110

violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or the alteration of the form of

government of the United States by unconstitutional means. (Ordinarily, the licensee 

should not consider chance or casual meetings or contacts limited to normal business or 

official relations.)

Knowingly joined or engaged in any activity in sympathy with, or in support of, any 

foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of 

persons who advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent 

others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or 

any State or any subdivisions thereof by unlawful means or who advocate the use of 

force and violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or the alteration of 

the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means. (Ordinarily, the 

licensee should not consider chance or casual meetings or contacts limited to normal 

business or official relations.)

• Deliberately misrepresented, falsified, or omitted relevant and material facts from 

 documentation provided to the licensee.

• Had been convicted of a crime(s) that, in the RO’s opinion, indicates poor judgment, 

 unreliability, or untrustworthiness.

Licensees also may consider how recently such indicators occurred and other extenuating or 

mitigating factors in their determinations. Section 149.c.(2)(B) of the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, as amended, requires that the information obtained as a result of fingerprinting be used

solely for the purposes of making a determination as to suitability for unescorted access. Such 

a determination is not a hiring decision, and the NRC does not intend for licensees to use this 

guidance for such purposes. A determination that a particular individual is unsuitable for 

unescorted access does not necessarily mean that he or she is unsuitable for escorted access 

or for some other position that does not involve NRC regulated activities.

Consideration must be given to all information collected in making a T&R determination for 

unescorted access. Licensees must substantiate and document potentially disqualifying 

information obtained from confidential or unnamed sources and should not use this information 

as the sole basis to deny access authorization unless corroborated. Licensees should establish 

criteria that would disqualify someone from being granted authorized access. In every case, the 

licensee should evaluate T&R based on an accumulation of information that supports a finding 

with reasonable assurance. The licensee is responsible for making the T&R determination for

an employee who is seeking unescorted access. The T&R determination is designed to identify 

past actions pertinent to whether reasonable assurance of an individual’s future reliability exists.

In addition to the criminal history records check, licensees may want to consider if the subject 

individual has exhibited the following behaviors:

• impaired performance attributable to psychological or other disorders

• conduct that warrants referral for criminal investigation or results in an arrest or 

 conviction
111

• an indication of deceitful or delinquent behavior

• attempted or threatened destruction of property or life

• suicidal tendencies or an attempt at suicide

• illegal drug use or the abuse of legal drugs

• alcohol abuse disorders

• recurring financial irresponsibility

• irresponsibility in the performance of assigned duties

• inability to deal with stress or the appearance of being under unusual stress

• failure to comply with work directives

• hostility or aggression toward fellow workers or authority

• uncontrolled anger, violation of safety or security procedures, or repeated absenteeism

• significant behavioral changes, moodiness, or depression

These indicators are not meant to be all inclusive or intended to be disqualifying factors. 

Licensees also may consider extenuating or mitigating factors in their determinations.
112

ANNEX B

SAMPLE CONSENT FORM FOR BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS

I authorize and grant my consent to my employer, (insert company name) (hereinafter

or “the company”), to request the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), under Section 652

of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, to request criminal record information about me from the U.S. 

Attorney General, who will refer the request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I understand

that the purpose of this information is solely to enable the company to determine my

trustworthiness and reliability for unescorted access to a Category 2 or greater quantity of

radioactive material as defined in the NRC’s regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) Part 37, “Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material.” I understand that _(insert company name) must obtain 

my signed consent before any investigation or reinvestigation to determine my trustworthiness 

and reliability for such unescorted access.

I authorize and grant my consent to any authorized representative of _(insert company name) who

is conducting my background investigation or reinvestigation, as defined in 10 CFR 37.25, 

“Background Investigations,” to obtain any information related to my activities from individuals, 

schools, residential management agents, previous employers, criminal justice agencies, or other 

sources of information. This information may include, but is not limited to, my academic, 

residential, achievement, or performance information and information about my attendance, 

disciplinary, employment, and criminal history records.

I authorize the Federal Bureau of Investigation to disclose the record of my criminal history 

background investigation to my employer for the purpose of making a determination of my 

trustworthiness and reliability for unescorted access to a category 2 or greater quantity of 

radioactive material. I understand that before making any determination to deny me this 

unescorted access, _(insert company name) will provide me a copy of the information on 

which it intends to base that determination. I further understand that before a final adverse 

determination, my employer must give me an opportunity to correct any inaccurate or 

incomplete information that is developed during the background investigation.

I understand that I may withdraw my consent at any time and that after I do withdraw my consent, 

under 10 CFR 37.23(c) of the NRC’s regulations, _(insert company name) may not 

initiate any elements of the background investigation that were not in progress at the time that I 

withdrew my consent. I also understand that, under 10 CFR 37.23(c), the withdrawal of my 

consent for the background investigation is sufficient cause for denial or termination of any 

authorization for unescorted access.

I understand that, for previous employers and other sources of information, separate specific 

releases may be needed and that I may be contacted for such releases at a later date. I 

authorize custodians of records and other sources of information pertaining to me to release such

information upon request of the investigator or other duly authorized representative of the 

company regardless of any previous agreement to the contrary.
113

I understand that the information released by records custodians and other sources of 

information is solely for the purpose of making a determination about my trustworthiness and

reliability for unescorted access to the radioactive materials subject to 10 CFR Part 37 and that 

this information may be disclosed only as authorized by State or Federal law.

I understand that photocopies of this authorization and consent document with my signature

are valid and that this authorization will remain in effect as long as I am authorized to obtain 

unescorted access to the radioactive material subject to 10 CFR Part 37.

Signature (In Ink) Full Name (Type or Print Legibly) Date Signed

Other Names Used Date of Birth Social Security No.

Current Street Address

and Apartment No.

City and County State Zip Code Home Telephone No.
114

SUBPART C—PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS DURING USE

§ 37.41, “Security Program”

§ 37.43, “General Security Program Requirements”

§ 37.45, “LLEA Coordination and Notification”

§ 37.47, “Security Zones”

§ 37.49, “Monitoring, Detection, and Assessment”

§ 37.51, “Maintenance and Testing”

§ 37.53, “Requirements for Mobile Devices”

§ 37.55, “Security Program Review”

§ 37.57, “Reporting of Events”

§ 37.41, “Security Program”

§ 37.41(a), “Applicability”

§ 37.41(a)(1)

Each licensee that possesses an aggregated category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive 

material shall establish, implement, and maintain a security program in accordance with the 

requirements of this subpart.

EXPLANATION:

Each licensee that possesses an aggregated quantity of category 1 or category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material must have a security program.

Q&As:

Q1: What is the purpose of a security program?

A1: The purpose of a security program under 10 CFR Part 37 is to plan and document how 

the licensee will protect category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive material. The program 

specifies how features, such as training, access controls, detection and assessment methods, 

and response capabilities, will function together to mitigate the potential detrimental 

consequences to public health and safety and the environment.

Q2: What does it mean to have an “aggregated” quantity of radioactive material?

A2: The NRC considers radioactive material to be “aggregated” if someone could gain 

access to a category 2 or greater quantity by breaching a single physical barrier. “Aggregated” 

has the same meaning as “collocated” in the guidance for the IC orders. The regulations in 10
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CFR Part 37 use the term “aggregated” instead of “collocated” to avoid the confusion that could 

arise when several separate non-aggregated quantities of radioactive material are located at the

same site or inside the same facility.

Q3: Does 10 CFR Part 37 apply if I have two or more sources at the same location that, 

when added together, meet or exceed a category 2 threshold quantity?

A3: The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 apply when an additional physical barrier between the 

sources or devices is not present. In such a case, an intruder would only have to defeat one 

barrier to gain access to a category 2 or greater quantity of radioactive material. With only one 

common barrier, the sources or devices are considered aggregated, and the licensee will have

to develop and implement a security program. An example would be a high-dose afterloader 

with a backup source. Two sources stored in the same area behind a single barrier would be 

aggregated, and 10 CFR Part 37 would apply. In this same example of a high-dose afterloader 

and backup source, 10 CFR Part 37 would not apply if the licensee stores the backup source in 

a separate locked room or in a locked container that could not be removed, such as a safe. 

These would be considered additional barriers, and the afterloader and backup source would no 

longer meet the definition of “aggregated” because they would no longer be isolated by a single 

physical barrier.

Q4: How do I determine whether I possess a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive 

material?

A4: The licensee should use the sum-of-fractions method, also known as the unity rule, to 

determine if it possess a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material. The licensee 

may need to implement 10 CFR Part 37 requirements even if it does not possess any single 

source or single radionuclide in excess of a category 2 threshold. For combinations of materials 

(including sealed sources, unsealed sources, and bulk material) and radionuclides, a licensee 

must include multiple sources (including bulk material) of the same radionuclide and multiple 

sources (including bulk material) of different radionuclides to determine if the requirements

apply. For the purposes of this calculation, licensees must consider all the radioactive material 

they possess under their licenses at the location in question.

The licensee can use the following formula for the unity rule to determine if it has a category 2 

quantity and if it is required to implement 10 CFR Part 37 requirements:

R1/AR1 + R2/AR2+ Rn/ARn > 1.0 

where:

R1 = total amount of radionuclide 1

AR1 = category 2 threshold of radionuclide 1

R2 = total amount of radionuclide 2

AR2 = category 2 threshold of radionuclide 2

Rn = total amount of radionuclide n

AR2 = category 2 threshold of radionuclide n and so on greater than or equal to 1.0
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The licensee would use the same unity rule formula above to determine if it has a category 1 

quantity for purposes of implementing 10 CFR Part 37 requirements. It would need to substitute, 

however, the category 1 threshold value as the divisor for each radionuclide. The category 1 

thresholds in Appendix A are 100 times the thresholds for category 2 quantities.

The licensee must use terabecquerel thresholds in all unity rule calculations because 

terabecquerel is the regulatory standard. Therefore, the licensee must use the following formula 

to convert any curie values in its license to terabecquerel:

n (TBq) = N (Ci) x 0.037 TBq/Ci

See the Q&As for the definitions of category 1 and category 2 quantities in 10 CFR 37.5 for 

illustrative examples of the unity rule and terabecquerel conversion calculations.

Q5: If I have radioactive materials aggregated to a category 2 or greater quantity, what do I 

have to do to meet the separate requirements of 10 CFR 37.41(a)(1) to “establish,” to 

“implement,” and to “maintain” a security program?

A5: To “establish” the security program, the licensee must develop a written security plan 

that describes a strategy and a set of technologies and must develop measures that, when 

implemented with written procedures that are also required, will demonstrate compliance with 

each of the applicable requirements in Subpart C of this rule. Under § 37.41(c) below, the 

security program must, as appropriate, include the program features described in

10 CFR 37.43, “General Security Program Requirements”; 10 CFR Parts 37.45; 37.47;

37.49; 37.51; 37.53; and 37.55, “Security Program Review.” The specific measures that must 

be implemented under the security program should include, among other things, the 

establishment of security zones; the design and procurement of a physical protection system for 

monitoring, detection, assessment, and alarm/communication; the procurement of any 

necessary support services, such as a commercial security service between normal working 

hours; and coordination with affected LLEAs. The program must also include recordkeeping 

measures and must provide for the operation, testing, and maintenance of equipment and 

technologies that, when functioning as an integrated system with the other measures required 

under this section, are designed to effectively monitor and, without delay, detect, assess, and 

respond to an actual or attempted unauthorized access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material.

To “implement” the security program, the licensee must have trained necessary staff under

10 CFR 37.43(c) to follow its program procedures; must have installed and must be using all the 

access control measures or systems required under 10 CFR 37.43(a)(1)(ii); must have

completed initial LLEA coordination efforts under 10 CFR 37.45; must have installed the 

physical barriers protecting each security zone in accordance with 10 CFR 37.47; and must

have installed and must be using all the monitoring, detection, and alarm/communications 

systems required under 10 CFR 37.49. The licensee must also have placed into service all the

appropriate other measures, such as those for testing and maintenance under 10 CFR 37.51;

those for mobile devices under 10 CFR 37.53; those for reporting of events under 10 CFR

37.55; and those for program reviews under 10 CFR 37.57, “Reporting of Events,” that are 

required by this part and that the licensee will rely upon to meet the performance objectives of

10 CFR 37.41(b).
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To “maintain” the security program, the licensee must show that it has implemented and is 

continuing to fund the program’s access authorization and control, training, monitoring, 

detection, assessment, alarm and communication, and LLEA coordination activities and to

inspect, test, and repair the equipment installed to keep it functioning properly. The licensee will 

also need to periodically evaluate and update operating, training, and LLEA coordination

procedures and other measures required by this part, as appropriate, to address lessons

learned and to ensure the continuing compliance of the system that it has designed and 

implemented to meet the performance objectives of 10 CFR 37.41(b).

Q6: Must I have a security program for temporary jobsites?

A6: Yes. If a licensee has a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material at a 

temporary jobsite, it must have a security program that meets the requirements of 10 CFR

Part 37. However, this does not mean that the licensee must develop and implement a security

program specifically for each temporary jobsite. It only means that the licensee’s security plan 

under 10 CFR 37.43(a) must address the security of its category 1 or category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material while working at temporary and permanent jobsites. Additionally, when 

transporting radioactive material in such quantities to and from a temporary jobsite, the licensee 

must control access and must monitor, detect, assess, and respond to an actual or attempted 

theft, sabotage, or diversion. These measures against unauthorized access must also be 

applied when the transport vehicle is stopped at a hotel, restaurant, gas station, or other 

location. (See the Q&As on 10 CFR 37.79(a)(2).)

Q7: If I’m a licensed contract radiographer, and I must leave a radiography camera at 

another licensee’s or customer’s facility that provides its own site security, who is responsible 

for security? When I’m expected to leave a camera on site at an oil refinery, for example, who 

provides security there, and if the customer provides the security, how can I know whether the 

security satisfies 10 CFR Part 37?

A7: A licensee that possess radioactive material is responsible for its security and control, 

and the licensee must meet 10 CFR Part 37 security requirements in its own facility and in a 

customer’s facility. If the licensee chooses to store one of its devices at a customer’s facility, 

the licensee and the customer must ensure that they meet the applicable 10 CFR Part 37 

requirements. The licensee will need to evaluate if its customer’s physical protection program 

will comply with the applicable 10 CFR Part 37 requirements at the agreed storage location. In 

addition, the licensee and the customer should have a clear understanding of the licensee’s 

respective roles and responsibilities and the features of the customer’s security and control

program that must be relied upon to meet the applicable security requirements for the licensee’s 

device. The licensee should assess the customer’s security systems and measures against

those of its own program for implementing these requirements.
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§ 37.41, “Security Program” (continued)

§ 37.41(a), “Applicability”

§ 37.41(a)(2)

An applicant for a new license and each licensee that would become newly subject to the 

requirements of this subpart upon application for modification of its license shall implement 

the requirements of this subpart, as appropriate, before taking possession of an aggregated 

category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material.

§ 37.41(a)(3)

Any licensee that has not previously implemented the security orders or been subject to the 

provisions of Subpart C shall provide written notification to the NRC regional office specified 

in 10 CFR 30.6 of this chapter at least 90 days before aggregating radioactive material to a 

quantity that equals or exceeds the category 2 threshold.

EXPLANATION:

New license applicants and licensees newly subject to 10 CFR Part 37 must implement the 

requirements of Subpart C before taking possession of an aggregated category 1 or category 2 

quantity of radioactive material. A licensee that has not previously implemented the security 

orders or had not been subject to the provisions of Subpart C must notify the appropriate NRC 

regional office in writing at least 90 days before aggregating radioactive material to a quantity 

that equals or exceeds the category 2 threshold.

Q&As:

Q1: At what point in the process of transferring possession of radioactive material would I be 

considered to have “taken possession” of a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive 

material? Have I “taken possession” of a source under 10 CFR Part 37 when the carrier or

delivery service crosses my site boundary, for example? When the carrier has brought the

source into my facility building? When the source is in a permanent security zone on my site?

A1: The licensee is considered by the NRC to have taken possession of a category 1 or 

category 2 quantity of radioactive material when it has accepted the consignment of the material

from the shipper or transferring licensee and has assumed physical control of the material.

Thus, the licensee is considered by the NRC not to have taken possession when the shipper 

has crossed its site boundary or has brought the source into a building on its facility site unless it

accepts the consignment and assumes physical control of the material at that point on its

premises. At that point, if accepting the consignment causes the licensee to have aggregated

radioactive material in a category 2 or greater quantity, it must meet the requirements in 10 CFR 

Part 37. If the licensee orders new byproduct material that would put it over the category 2 limit 

for an aggregated quantity when it arrives at its facility, it should have established its security

program before it ordered the material, including the access authorization program required by

Subpart B.
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Q2: Would I be considered to have “taken possession” if the carrier delivers a shipment and 

then leaves without my having accepted the consignment?

A2: Yes. The licensee would be held accountable if the carrier left a shipment on the 

doorstep or loading dock. The licensee is responsible for making arrangements for receipt of

the shipment. However, this scenario, except in extreme or emergency circumstances, is highly 

unlikely. The shipping licensee is required, under 10 CFR 37.79(a)(3)(iii), to use a carrier that

requires a signature for receipt of category 2 shipments.

Q3: If I am receiving multiple deliveries of radioactive material, when would I be considered 

to have taken possession of an “aggregated” category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive 

material?

A3: The NRC would consider the licensee to have taken possession of an “aggregated” 

category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material when and if it places an accumulated 

quantity at or above the category 2 threshold behind a single physical barrier. If the licensee 

places one or more of these deliveries in a total quantity that is less than category 2 behind a 

separate, independent physical barrier, it is not taking possession of an “aggregated” quantity of 

material as defined in 10 CFR Part 37.
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§ 37.41, “Security Program” (continued)

§ 37.41(b), “General Performance Objective”

Each licensee shall establish, implement, and maintain a security program that is designed to 

monitor and, without delay, detect, assess, and respond to an actual or attempted 

unauthorized access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material.

§ 37.41(c), “Program Features”

Each licensee’s security program must include the program features, as appropriate, 

described in §§ 37.43, 37.45, 37.47, 37.49, 37.51, 37.53, and 37.55.

EXPLANATION:

This provision establishes the general performance objective of the security program and 

specifies the features it must include, as appropriate.

Q&As:

Q1: What does it mean for a licensee’s security program to be designed to detect, assess, 

and respond to an unauthorized access event “without delay”?

A1: The licensee must have a security program that enables it to detect unauthorized access 

to the security zone when it occurs, to determine whether the unauthorized access was an

actual or attempted theft, and to initiate an appropriate response right away. The objectives are 

to reduce the risk that the material will be stolen and used for an unauthorized purpose and, if it 

is stolen, to improve the likelihood of timely recovery or to mitigate potential consequences.

Q2: What’s the difference between “actual” and “attempted” unauthorized access? Wouldn’t 

the same kinds of measures apply to both?

A2: Yes. The same kinds of measures apply to both. Although the measures for immediate 

detection, assessment, and response to actual unauthorized access to radioactive materials 

also will be required for attempts to gain unauthorized access, licensees should be alert for 

covert actions in preparation for an attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion. For example, such

covert actions could include the theft and copying of keys to locked rooms or storage containers 

or the gaining of access to security codes for copying onto duplicate key cards. Licensees 

should therefore monitor, assess, and respond to actual or attempted unauthorized access to 

keys, security cards, codes, or other means that could be used in an attempt to gain 

unauthorized access to the material in a security zone.

Q3: Can licensees use measures required for radiation safety to comply with 10 CFR Part 37 

security requirements too?

A3: Yes. The licensee may use or modify systems used to control access to high-radiation 

areas, as required by 10 CFR Part 20, “Standards for Protection against Radiation,” or 

equivalent Agreement State regulations, or other detection and access control systems used for
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radiation protection for security purposes as long as the uses or modifications do not 

compromise the original safety purpose of these systems. Documentation should describe how 

these systems provide the required intrusion detection.

Q4: What are the principal requirements of a security program?

A4: The licensee must have a security program to continuously monitor and to immediately 

detect unauthorized access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material when 

the unauthorized access occurs. The program also must enable the licensee to determine if the 

unauthorized access is an actual or attempted theft and to initiate an appropriate response 

without delay. The detection system must be capable of detecting all reasonably foreseeable 

unauthorized access to the security zone, including breaches of barriers used to isolate and

control access to the protected radioactive material. It must also be capable of detecting an

unauthorized removal of protected material from security zones. Assessment can be done

either by automated devices or trained personnel who can initiate the appropriate response.

Licensees should consider the possibility of simultaneous alarms at multiple locations. The

program’s documentation must also describe the processes that the licensee will use to assess

and respond to unauthorized access.

A licensee’s security program must include a written security plan, implementing procedures, 

training, the use of security zones, the protection of information, requests for coordination with 

the cognizant LLEA(s), additional security measures for mobile devices (if applicable), testing 

and maintenance of security-related equipment, an annual program review, and incident 

reporting requirements. Each of these areas is discussed in more detail in the following Q&As.
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§ 37.43, “General Security Program Requirements”

§ 37.43(a), “Security Plan”

§ 37.43(a)(1)

Each licensee identified in § 37.41(a) shall develop a written security plan specific to its 

facilities and operations. The purpose of the security plan is to establish the licensee’s 

overall security strategy to ensure the integrated and effective functioning of the security 

program required by this subpart. The security plan must, at a minimum:

§ 37.43(a)(1)(i)

Describe the measures and strategies used to implement the requirements of this subpart;

and

§ 37.43(a)(1)(ii)

Identify the security resources, equipment, and technology used to satisfy the requirements 

of this subpart.

EXPLANATION:

Subject licensees must develop a written security plan with an overall security strategy to 

ensure the integrated and effective functioning of the security program. This subsection also 

specifies minimum contents of the security program.

Q&As:

Q1: Must licensees submit their written security plans to the NRC?

A1: No. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 do not require, and the NRC does not want, 

licensees to submit security plans or implementing procedures to the agency for review or 

approval. The security plan will be subject to NRC inspection.

Q2: What must a licensee’s security plan address?

A2: As noted in 10 CFR 37.43(a)(1), the plan must, among other things, include a 

description of the measures and strategies to implement the security requirements and to 

identify the resources, equipment, and technology used. As good practice in explaining its 

overall strategy, the licensee should ensure that its security plan describes any site-specific 

conditions that affect how it will implement the requirements. Security plans are important for

the implementation of a performance-based regulation. An adequate plan requires a licensee to 

analyze the particular security needs of its individual facilities and to explain clearly how it will 

implement its chosen security measures to ensure that they work together to meet the

applicable performance objectives.
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To ensure the integrated and effective functioning of the security program and to facilitate its

meeting the program review requirements in 10 CFR 37.33, the licensee also may consider 

describing, in the security plan, a process for identifying and implementing corrective actions or 

compensatory measures in the event of a failure of personnel or equipment to perform as 

specified or function as required.

One method for developing a security plan would be to structure the plan in accordance with 

Appendix II to IAEA’s implementing guide entitled, “Security of Radioactive Sources,” IAEA 

Nuclear Security Series No. 11, issued May 2009

(http://www- pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1387_web.pdf). 

Although Appendix II to the guide notes that “[t]he level of detail and depth of content [of a

licensee’s security plan] should be commensurate with the security level of the source(s) 

covered by the plan” and although not all of the recommended measures may apply to a given

licensee’s situation, the appendix establishes the recommended contents of a typical security

plan for the radioactive materials subject to 10 CFR Part 37. For easy reference, the following

list provides these contents:

• a description of the radioactive material, its categorization, and its use

• a description of the environment, building, and facility in which the radioactive 

material is used or stored and, if appropriate, a diagram of the facility layout and 

security system

• the location of the building or facility relative to areas accessible to the public

• local security procedures

• objectives of the security plan for the specific building or facility, including the 

following:

– the specific concern that will be addressed (e.g., unauthorized removal, 

destruction, or malevolent use)

– the kind of control necessary to prevent undesired consequences, 

including the auxiliary equipment that might be needed

– the equipment or premises that will be secured

• security measures that will be used, including the following:

– the measures to secure, provide surveillance, provide access control, 

detect, delay, respond, and communicate

– the design features to evaluate the quality of the measures against the 

assumed threat

• administrative measures that will be used, including the following:

– security roles and responsibilities of management, staff, and others
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– routine and non-routine operations, including an accounting of the 

source(s)

– maintenance and testing of equipment

– a determination of the trustworthiness of personnel

– the application of information security

– methods for access authorization

– security related aspects of the emergency plan, including event reporting

– training

– key control procedures

– procedures to address an increased threat level

– the process for periodically evaluating the effectiveness of the plan and 

updating it accordingly

– any compensatory measures that may need to be used

– references to existing regulations or standards

Q3: Can the security plan and implementing procedures be in the same document?

A3: Yes. However, any document or group of documents that contain both the security plan 

and its implementing procedures must meet the respective requirements in 10 CFR 37.41(a) 

and 10 CFR 37.41(b) for each of these program elements.

Q4: Is a licensee required to develop specific additional contingency plans for situations 

where a facility or site needs to evacuate staff due to an emergency, natural disaster, or other 

events where public health and safety are threatened?

A4: The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 do not specifically require a licensee to develop any 

contingency plans as such; however, contingency planning is considered a best practice in the 

development of security plans. The NRC encourages licensees to develop contingency 

planning as consistent with the intent of 10 CFR Part 37 and the security culture it seeks to 

promote. Because licensees are required to ensure the security and accountability of the 

radioactive material protected under this part, they should also consider measures to maintain 

this security and accountability in the event of an evacuation or other emergency situation. If 

developed, these plans should address things, such as floods, earthquakes, and tornadoes that 

have an increased probability of occurring in the area in which the facility or site is located.

Q5: Should the radiation safety office or officer be involved in the development or 

implementation of security plans and procedures?
125

A5: Although RSOs and their staff may not be the licensee’s experts in security, it should 

involve them because they can provide valuable insights for improving the consideration of 

safety and security risks in a system integrated way. The RSO or officer can also provide 

advice and analysis to ensure that the licensee is implementing security requirements in a 

manner that does not compromise safety.

Q6: Can a licensee with a security plan already in place for the increased controls orders be 

automatically exempted from requirements to develop and implement a new security plan under 

Part 37?

A6: No. The requirements in 10 CFR Part 37 do not automatically exempt the licensee from 

having a security plan. If the licensee has an existing security plan, it will need to check that the 

plan meets all the requirements for a security plan in 10 CFR Part 37. If it does meet the 

requirements, the licensee may continue to use its existing plan.

Q7: If I already have a high level corporate security plan in place that meets the 

requirements of 10 CFR 37.43(a), do I still have to develop and implement a separate security 

plan to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Part 37?

A7: No. As long as a preexisting site or corporate-wide plan meets the requirements of 

Subpart C in regard to the content of the security plan, the NRC would consider the plan 

acceptable, and the licensee would not need to develop a new plan. Each site would need to 

have a copy of the plan for implementation.

Q8: If I’m a licensee possessing a category 2 or greater quantity of radioactive material and I 

hire a service contractor licensed by the NRC or another Agreement State, do the requirements 

of the contractor’s security program govern the contractor employee when he or she is on my 

site, or must the employee comply with the requirements of my security program?

A8: The answer to this question depends on the ownership of the material. If the licensee 

owns the radioactive material or the devices that contain the material, such as in the case in 

which a hospital owns a gamma stereotactic radiosurgery device, its contractor would be 

governed by its security program. If the contractor owns the material or device, such as a 

radiography camera that the contractor brings to the licensee’s site, the contractor’s security 

requirements would apply to the use of that material or device and its control.
126

§ 37.43, “General Security Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.43(a), “Security Plan”

§ 37.43(a)(2)

The security plan must be reviewed and approved by the individual with overall responsibility 

for the security program.

EXPLANATION:

This definition is self-explanatory.

Q&As:

Q1: Who should be considered “the individual with overall responsibility for the security 

program”?

A1: The licensee can designate the individual. The individual can be the company president, 

chief executive, the RSO, or any other individual who has been designated as the responsible 

person for the security program. The individual responsible for the security of all the licensee’s 

category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material is the appropriate individual to provide 

written approval of the plan.
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§ 37.43, “General Security Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.43(a), “Security Plan”

§ 37.43(a)(3)

A licensee shall revise its security plan as necessary to ensure the effective implementation 

of Commission requirements. The licensee shall ensure that:

§ 37.43(a)(3)(i)

The revision has been reviewed and approved by the individual with overall responsibility for 

the security program; and

§ 37.43(a)(3)(ii)

The affected individuals are instructed on the revised plan before the changes are 

implemented.

EXPLANATION:

A licensee must revise its security plan as needed to ensure effective implementation. The 

individual with overall responsibility for the security program must review and approve any 

revision, and the licensee must instruct the affected individuals on the revised plan before it 

implements the changes.

Q&As:

Q1: How frequently should I revise my security plan?

A1: No predetermined frequency exists for the revision of the security plan. The licensee 

may want to revise its plan after the completion of the annual security program review so that

the revised plan addresses any recommendations. The licensee may need to revise its security 

plan (1) if it increases the quantity of radioactive material that it has aggregated at a given 

location, (2) if it moves the location of a storage area for an aggregated quantity, or (3) if it alters 

its facility in a way that could affect the security of its licensed radioactive material subject to this 

part. In addition, the licensee would need to revise its security plan before it changes the 

measures that it relies upon to comply with 10 CFR Part 37. For example, if the licensee plans 

to shift from direct surveillance to an offsite monitored alarm system, it would need to address 

that change in revisions to its security plan and procedures.

Q2: Who should approve revisions to the security plan under 10 CFR 37.43(a)(3)(i)?

A2: The individual who has overall responsibility for the security program must approve the 

revised security plan. As noted in the discussion of 10 CFR 37.43(a)(2), the approving 

individual may be the company president, chief executive, the RSO, or any other individual who 

has been given the responsibility for the security program.
128

Q3: 10 CFR 37.43(a)(3)(ii) requires me to ensure that “affected individuals” are “instructed” 

on the revised plan before the changes are implemented. How broadly or narrowly should I 

define “affected individuals”? Do I have to retrain all my employees and any service contractor 

employees before I can put any change in my security plan into effect?

A3: No. The licensee does not need to retrain all its employees or contractors before 

implementing a change in its security plan. The licensee must retrain only those employees 

whose responsibilities or job duties would be impacted.

Q4: 10 CFR 37.43(a)(3)(ii) also requires me to ensure that these affected individuals are 

“instructed” on the revised plan before the changes are implemented. What must I require of 

the “affected individuals” to show that they have been sufficiently “instructed”? Must all the 

affected individuals get a passing score on a proficiency exam or demonstrate the needed new 

skills before I can put the change into effect?

A4: No. The licensee does not need to require all the affected individuals to pass a 

proficiency exam or demonstrate mastery of the necessary skills before implementing a change 

in its security plan. Depending on the change, the instruction could include the reading of new 

procedures, a briefing on the new item(s), or on-the-job training. As with any training, the 

licensee needs to document that the training occurred. The licensee should consider the scope 

of the security plan revision in relation to the scope of each individual’s job duties to identify 

those individuals who may need to show a more measurable level of knowledge or skill to 

ensure the effective or timely implementation of the change in its security plan. A change that 

would affect the licensee’s policy on employee observation or on the reporting of suspicious 

activities may only require a briefing before its implementation. As a good practice to 

demonstrate compliance with this instruction requirement, the licensee should require the 

affected individual(s) to sign a statement that he or she has read, and is familiar with, the 

relevant portion of the security plan and procedures.
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§ 37.43. “General Security Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.43(a), “Security Plan”

§ 37.43(a)(4)

The licensee shall retain a copy of the current security plan as a record for 3 years after the 

security plan is no longer required. If any portion of the plan is superseded, the licensee 

shall retain the superseded material for 3 years after the record is superseded.

EXPLANATION:

This definition is self-explanatory.

Q&As:

Q1: If I’ve received a license amendment that reduces my possession limits to quantities 

below a category 2 threshold, and my prelicense amendment records are inspected a few 

months or a year later, am I still required to maintain these records for the rest of the 3-year 

period?

A1: Yes. The licensee must retain most records, including those preceding its license 

amendment, for 3 years. However, it must maintain some records until its license is terminated. 

In the case of the security plan, the licensee must retain the record for 3 years after the plan is 

no longer needed. The licensee may destroy all records related to 10 CFR Part 37 once its 

license has been terminated.

Q2: What does it mean for the security plan or any portion of it to be “superseded”?

A2: The NRC would consider the security plan to be “superseded” once a revision to the plan

has been approved. To be considered superseded, a plan can be completely revised or partially

revised. The licensee would need to retain a copy of the old security plan for 3 years or until 

license termination, if that occurs first.
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§ 37.43, “General Security Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.43(b), “Implementing Procedures”

§ 37.43(b)(1)

The licensee shall develop and maintain written procedures that document how the 

requirements of this subpart and the security plan will be met.

§ 37.43(b)(2)

The implementing procedures and revisions to these procedures must be approved in writing 

by the individual with overall responsibility for the security program.

§ 37.43(b)(3)

The licensee shall retain a copy of the current procedure as a record for 3 years after the 

procedure is no longer needed. Superseded portions of the procedure must be retained for

3 years after the record is superseded.

EXPLANATION:

Subject licensees must have written procedures that document how they will implement the 

security plan and other Subpart C requirements. The individual with overall responsibility for the 

program must approve, in writing, procedures and future revisions. The licensee must keep a 

copy of the current procedure as a record for 3 years after the procedure is no longer required.

If any portion is superseded, the licensee must keep the superseded material for 3 years.

Q&As:

Q1: Am I required to develop security procedures if I don’t actually possess a category 2 

quantity of material?

A1: No. A licensee only needs to develop security procedures if it possesses an aggregated 

quantity that meets or exceeds the category 2 threshold and must therefore implement a 

security program. If a licensee plans on obtaining additional radioactive material or on

relocating currently possessed radioactive material into an aggregated quantity that meets or 

exceeds the category 2 threshold, it must establish its security program before it can obtain or

relocate the material. This would include having the procedures in place.

Q2: What must a licensee’s security procedures address?

A2: Generally, the security procedures must address how the licensee will implement the 

applicable features required by Subpart C. Depending on the licensee and its operating 

requirements, these features would require its procedures (1) to address training, (2) to 

establish and maintain security zones, and (3) to establish the monitoring, detection, 

assessment, and response measures; maintenance and testing measures; the reporting of 

events; and the periodic review of the program.
131

The written procedures should address how the licensee will respond to a range of foreseeable 

events common to the type of license. Examples of such events could range from an 

inadvertent unauthorized access that would not require an LLEA response to a malevolent 

intrusion that would require LLEA intervention. These procedures should include, if applicable, 

provisions for immediate response, for after hour notification of LLEAs and the licensee 

individual responsible for security, for the handling of both radiation safety and security related 

types of emergencies, and for events at temporary jobsites.

Procedures should also address the roles of the licensee’s staff and, where applicable, its 

contractors. The licensee’s staff and contractors must have a clear understanding of their 

responsibilities and constraints in an emergency, along with step-by-step instructions and clear 

guidelines for whom to contact. However, note that when developing these security procedures, 

the licensee must not compromise facility operational safety, occupational safety, fire safety,

and emergency planning at the facility.

Q3: Is there flexibility built into the 10 CFR Part 37 implementation process?

A3: Yes. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 are purposely not prescriptive, which allows 

licensees to tailor programs to their specific facility and operations. Various approaches are 

available for licensees to meet the objectives of10 CFR Part 37, and no one solution exists for 

any material control challenge facing licensees. This guidance document provides examples of 

how licensees may meet 10 CFR Part 37 requirements. Licensees do not have to implement 

any of the examples in the guidance; each example describes only one acceptable method that 

licensees can use to comply with 10 CFR Part 37 requirements.

Q4: Who can approve implementing procedures?

A4: The individual considered to have overall responsibility for the licensee’s security 

program is the individual who must approve any security implementing procedures. (See

10 CFR 37.43(a)(2).)

Q5: What does it mean for the security procedure or any portion of it to be “superseded”?

A5: A procedure is superseded when a new version of the procedure has been issued. A 

procedure can be completely revised or partially revised to be considered superseded. The 

licensee would need to retain a copy of the old procedure for 3 years or until license termination 

if that occurs before then.
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§ 37.43, “General Security Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.43(c), “Training”

§ 37.43(c)(1)

Each licensee shall conduct training to ensure that those individuals implementing the 

security program possess and maintain the knowledge, skills, and abilities to carry out their 

assigned duties and responsibilities effectively. The training must include instruction in:

§ 37.43(c)(1)(i)

The licensee’s security program and procedures to secure category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive material and in the purposes and functions of the security measures 

employed;

§ 37.43(c)(1)(ii)

The responsibility to report promptly to the licensee any condition that causes or may cause

a violation of Commission requirements;

§ 37.43(c)(1)(iii)

The responsibility of the licensee to report promptly to the local law enforcement agency and 

licensee any actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive material; and

§ 37.43(c)(1)(iv)

The appropriate response to security alarms.

§ 37.43(c)(2)

In determining those individuals who shall be trained on the security program, the licensee 

shall consider each individual’s assigned activities during authorized use and response to 

potential situations involving actual or attempted theft, diversion, or sabotage of category 1 or 

category 2 quantities of radioactive material. The extent of the training must be 

commensurate with the individual’s potential involvement in the security of category 1 or 

category 2 quantities of radioactive material.

EXPLANATION:

Individuals implementing the security program must be trained. The training must cover the 

program and its procedures, the purpose and function of the security measures, and the 

individual’s responsibilities. The extent of the training must be commensurate with the 

individual’s potential involvement in radioactive material security.
133

Q&As:

Q1: What is the purpose of the training program?

A1: The purpose of the training program is to ensure that those employees who are 

responsible for implementing security measures know what is expected of them and know how 

to do their job.

Q2: What minimum elements must a training program include?

A2: A licensee’s training program should be evaluated against the Subpart C performance 

objective for ensuring that each individual with responsibility for any aspect of the security 

program has the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to carry out that responsibility 

effectively. Thus, the minimum scope of a training program should identify these individuals and 

identify the working knowledge, skill sets, and capabilities they need to carry out their assigned 

duties and responsibilities for effective implementation of the licensee’s security plan. Examples 

of appropriate subjects for training would include the controls that are in place to prevent 

unauthorized access to material, the purpose and functional requirements of the licensee’s

alarm and access control systems, notification procedures in the event of an unauthorized 

access for potential malevolent activities, and ways to confirm quickly and accurately if an

intrusion is likely to be intentional or accidental. In addition, an adequate program must train

employees to identify any “condition[s] that cause...or may cause a violation” of Commission 

requirements and to identify and report suspicious activities. An adequate program should also 

cover the operation of primary and backup communication systems for such reporting.

The licensee’s staff members must have a clear understanding of their individual responsibilities 

and constraints in an emergency, and training should provide step-by-step instructions and clear 

guidelines for what to do and for whom to contact. In addition, the training should provide

step-by-step instructions and clear guidelines on the proper performance of testing and 

maintenance activities. Training does not need to be in a classroom and can be performed as a

part of on-the-job training. Training may be organized by subject area as well. For example,

the licensee might train most of its employees on escort responsibilities and general alarm 

response. The licensee should train those employees who will be conducting surveillance on 

what to look for and how to respond when they see something unusual.

Q3: What “potential situations” involving theft, diversion, or sabotage should a licensee 

consider when determining who should be trained?

A3: A single set of potential security situations that would apply to every licensee’s individual 

security needs does not exist. Each licensee’s security plan should develop and evaluate a set 

of site-specific theft, diversion, and sabotage scenarios that could arise from the licensee’s 

particular operating requirements and worksite settings with sufficient probability,

consequences, or both to make it prudent for the licensee to address. The training program 

should address these scenarios. The licensee must evaluation potential situations for the

monitoring, detection, assessment, and response functions needed for a timely and effective

response; scenarios could include events ranging from an inadvertent unauthorized access that 

would not require an LLEA response to a malevolent intrusion that would. These procedures

should include provisions for immediate response, for after hour notification of LLEAs and
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licensee management, and for the handling of credible radiation safety problems that could 

result from postulated security emergencies. Where applicable, the licensee should also 

develop training requirements for security events at temporary jobsites.

Q4: The rule requires the extent of the licensee’s security training for affected individuals to 

be “commensurate with the individual’s potential involvement” in the subject material’s security. 

Should all individuals with a valid reason to be on site be considered to have “potential 

involvement” in a security emergency and, therefore, require training?

A4: No. Although it is good practice to provide some basic training to all employees

(e.g., details on how to respond to an alarm), only those individuals with security responsibilities 

must be trained. If an employee does not have unescorted access to the radioactive material, 

does not have access to any security information, and has no security duties, he or she may not 

need to receive any security training beyond the basics of safely responding to alarms. In 

addition, not all individuals need to receive the same level of training.

Q5: How should a licensee demonstrate that the individuals responsible for implementing the 

security plan have acquired the necessary “knowledge, skills, and abilities” to carry out their 

assigned duties and responsibilities “effectively”?

A5: Although testing is not required, one measure of the likelihood that a trainee will be able 

to carry out assigned security responsibilities is evidence that the trainee took and passed a 

reasonable test of the knowledge, skill, or ability objectives of the training. Another measure of 

the likelihood that an employee or contractor will be able to carry out assigned security 

responsibilities is evidence that he or she has successfully participated in a drill or exercise 

designed to test the integrated functionality of the entire security system, including monitoring, 

detection, assessment, and response. Using such system-wide drills or tabletop exercises, and 

notifying affected LLEAs of opportunities to participate in such training, can be an especially 

effective way for some licensees to train their personnel.

However, depending on the frequency and relative complexity of an individual’s assigned duties, 

adequate training can also be demonstrated through the daily or weekly conduct of that 

individual’s job. This could be especially true for some elements of refresher training. For 

example, if the individual is a security guard who makes regular checks on designated work 

locations or who must report the operating status of security equipment at specified intervals,

the employee’s routine fulfillment of these job duties may be sufficient evidence that he or she 

needs no further training in these duties, at least until new equipment, new technologies, or new 

procedures necessitate new training.
135

§ 37.43, “General Security Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.43(c), “Training” (continued)

§ 37.43(c)(3)

Refresher training must be provided at a frequency not to exceed 12 months and when 

significant changes have been made to the security program. This training must include:

§ 37.43(c)(3)(i)

Review of the training requirements of paragraph (c) of this section and any changes made to 

the security program since the last training;

§ 37.43(c)(3)(ii)

Reports on any relevant security issues, problems, and lessons learned;

§ 37.43(c)(3)(iii)

Relevant results of NRC inspections; and

§ 37.43(c)(3)(iv)

Relevant results of the licensee’s program review and testing and maintenance.

§ 37.43(c)(4)

The licensee shall maintain records of the initial and refresher training for 3 years from the 

date of the training. The training records must include dates of the training, topics covered, a 

list of licensee personnel in attendance, and related information.

EXPLANATION:

The licensee must provide refresher training at least every 12 months and when significant 

changes have been made to the security program. The subsection specifies what the refresher 

training must include and states that licensees must keep training records for 3 years.

Q&As:

Q1: How frequently should licensees provide refresher training?

A1: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.43(c)(3) requires the licensee to conduct refresher training, 

at a minimum, every 12 months. Licensees must also offer refresher training if the security 

program has changed significantly.
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Q2: What should be included in refresher training?

A2: Developers of refresher training should review the training requirements of

10 CFR 37.43(c)(1) and 10 CFR 37.43(c)(2) and should address any changes to the security 

program since the last training, any changes in the assigned responsibilities of individual 

trainees that would require new training, recent information on any relevant security issues or 

lessons learned, relevant results from the program review or any NRC inspections, and relevant 

operating experience from the maintenance and testing program for security systems or system 

components. In addition, a licensee should consider providing refresher training after a

security-related event so that affected or potentially affected employees can obtain a timely 

understanding of what happened and how to avoid or mitigate the consequences of a 

recurrence.

Q3: Under 10 CFR Parts 37.43(c)(3)(ii), (iii), and (iv), what things do the NRC consider

“relevant” for purposes of refresher training?

A3: The term “relevant” is a common term and, in this case, simply refers to items that are 

related to security. Among examples of items refresher training should include are areas in 

which the staff has had trouble following the security requirements, areas in which corrective 

actions have not been effective or lessons learned have not addressed root causes of past or 

potential security deficiencies and new actions are required, violations of 10 CFR Part 37 

security requirements or conditions adverse or potentially adverse to security that have been 

discussed in an inspection report, and measures necessary to fix any security issues that have 

been identified in the licensee’s program review or testing and maintenance results.

Q4: When we give LLEA representatives a copy of our security plan, do we have to test them 

on their understanding?

A4: No. A licensee may, at its discretion, provide a copy of its security plan to the affected 

LLEA for information. However, the licensee is not required to provide a copy, nor does the 

NRC expect it to train an LLEA on its security plan. The plan itself applies only to the licensee 

and its employees and contractors.
137

§ 37.43, “General Security Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.43(d), “Protection of Information”

§ 37.43(d)(1)

Licensees authorized to possess category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive

material shall limit access to, and unauthorized disclosure of, their security plan,

implementing procedures, and the list of individuals that have been approved for

unescorted access.

§ 37.43(d)(2)

Efforts to limit access shall include the development, implementation, and maintenance of 

written policies and procedures for controlling access to, and for proper handling and 

protection against unauthorized disclosure of, the security plan and implementing 

procedures.

§ 37.43(d)(3)

Before granting an individual access to the security plan or implementing procedures, 

licensees shall:

§ 37.43(d)(3)(i)

Evaluate an individual’s need to know the security plan or implementing procedures; and

§ 37.43(d)(3)(ii)

If the individual has not been authorized for unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive material, safeguards information, or safeguards

information-modified handling, the licensee must complete a background investigation to

determine the individual’s trustworthiness and reliability. A trustworthiness and reliability 

determination shall be conducted by the reviewing official and shall include the background 

investigation elements contained in 10 CFR 37.25(a)(2) through (a)(7).

EXPLANATION:

Licensees must limit access to, and unauthorized disclosure of, their security plans, 

implementing procedures, and lists of individuals approved for unescorted access. Licensees 

must have written policies and procedures for the control of access to those documents and for 

the proper handling of, and protection against, unauthorized disclosure.

Licensees must evaluate an individual’s need to know before allowing him or her access to the 

security documents. If the individual has not been authorized for unescorted access, he or she 

must undergo a background investigation to determine his or her T&R before being provided the 

protected information.
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Q&As:

Q1: What kinds of information are licensees required to protect under this subsection?

A1: Licensees are required to limit access to their security plans and implementing 

procedures to prevent unauthorized disclosure. Licensees also are required to limit access to 

their list of individuals approved for unescorted access. This includes the information contained 

in the protected documents.

Q2: Should I protect any forms of information other than hardcopies of sensitive information?

A2: Yes. The licensee should protect against any form of unauthorized disclosure of the 

protected information, including spoken and electronic disclosures.

Q3: Who is allowed access to this protected information?

A3: Licensees may only allow access to these documents to those individuals who have a 

need to know the information to perform their duties and who have been determined to be 

trustworthy and reliable based on the background investigation requirements that appear in 10

CFR 37.25(a)(2) through 10 CFR 37.25(a)(7). Licensee employees, agents or contractors, and 

employees of an organization affiliated with the licensee’s company (e.g., a parent company) 

may be considered employees of the licensee for access purposes.

If a licensee sees any indication that the recipient would be unwilling or unable to provide proper 

protection for its sensitive information, it should not authorize that individual to receive it. 

Licensees must also ensure that individuals who are not authorized to receive such information 

do not overhear conversations related to the substantive portions of the sensitive information.

Q4: If I have a documented basis for having found an individual to be trustworthy and reliable 

for unescorted access to radioactive material under 10 CFR 37.25(a), can that individual have 

access to my security plan and procedures without redundant additional screening?

A4: Yes. However, the individual must have a need to know the information.

Q5: If I need to hire a new employee that will need access to the protected security 

information, can I accept a current background investigation from another licensee for a 

prospective new hire transferring from that licensee?

A5: Yes. Licensees are encouraged to share information about the current security 

authorization of employees who are departing to work for another licensee not only for access to 

radioactive material but also for access to sensitive information. This sharing of information can 

spare all licensees from having to conduct unnecessary additional background investigations. 

However, the regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 do not require the sharing of access authorization 

information. Such background information can only be shared on a voluntary basis by mutual 

consent. The licensee will still need to document the basis for the determination. Assuming

that the existing background investigation is not older than 10 years, the licensee will not need 

to conduct a new reinvestigation.
139

Q6: What measures are required for adequate information protection?

A6: Licensees must develop, maintain, and implement written policies and procedures to 

ensure that only trustworthy and reliable individuals with a need to know are allowed access to 

security plans and procedures. See 10 CFR 37.43(d)(2). These policies and procedures must 

ensure the proper handling and protection of security plans and implementing procedures to 

protect against unauthorized disclosure. The licensee’s policies and procedures should do the 

following:

• Include a general performance requirement that each person who produces, 

 receives, or acquires the licensee’s sensitive information ensures that such 

 information is protected against unauthorized disclosure.

• Address how to protect sensitive information while in use, storage, and transit.

• Address the preparation, identification or marking, and transmission of 

 documents or correspondence containing the licensee’s security program 

 information.

• Address how access to the licensee’s security program information is to be 

 controlled.

• Include methods for the destruction of documents that contain security program 

 information.

• Include procedures for the use of automatic data processing systems that contain 

 security program information.

• Address the removal of documents from the licensee’s protected information 

 category when they become obsolete or no longer sensitive.
140

§ 37.43, “General Security Program Requirements” (continued)

§ 37.43(d), “Protection of Information” (continued)

§ 37.43(d)(4)

Licensees need not subject the following individuals to the background investigation elements 

for protection of information:

§ 37.43(d)(4)(i)

The categories of individuals listed in § 37.29(a)(1) through (13); or

§ 37.43(d)(4)(ii)

Security service provider employees, provided written verification that the employee has been 

determined to be trustworthy and reliable by the required background investigation in §

37.25(a)(2) through (a)(7) has been provided by the security service provider.

§ 37.43(d)(5)

The licensee shall document the basis for concluding that an individual is trustworthy and 

reliable and should be granted access to the security plan or implementing procedures.

§ 37.43(d)(6)

Licensees shall maintain a list of persons currently approved for access to the security plan 

or implementing procedures. When a licensee determines that a person no longer needs 

access to the security plan or implementing procedures or no longer meets the access 

authorization requirements for access to the information, the licensee shall remove the

person from the approved list as soon as possible, but no later than 7 working days, and take 

prompt measures to ensure that the individual is unable to obtain the security plan or

implementing procedures.

§ 37.43(d)(7)

When not in use, the licensee shall store its security plan and implementing procedures in a 

manner to prevent unauthorized access. Information stored in nonremovable electronic form 

must be password protected.

§ 37.43(d)(8)

The licensee shall retain as a record for 3 years after the document is no longer needed:

§ 37.43(d)(8)(i)

A copy of the information protection procedures; and
141

§ 37.43(d)(8)(ii)

The list of individuals approved for access to the security plan or implementing procedures.

EXPLANATION:

This section lists the classes of individuals who are exempt from licensee background 

investigations for the protection of security information. The licensee must store security plans 

and implementing procedures to prevent unauthorized access and must password-protect 

information stored in nonremovable electronic form.

Information protection procedures and the list of individuals approved for access to the security 

plan or implementing procedures must be kept as records for 3 years. Licensees that possess 

to be protected under 37.43(d) or 37.77(f) must protect it in accordance with 37.43(d).

Q&As:

Q1: Is anyone relieved from the background investigation elements?

A1: Yes. The same categories of individuals who have been relieved from the background 

investigation elements for unescorted access to the radioactive material are also relieved from 

the background investigation elements for access to security information. See also the Q&As 

on 10 CFR 37.29. Under 10 CFR 37.29(a), these categories include the following:

• an employee of the Commission or the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government 

 who has undergone fingerprinting for a prior U.S. Government criminal history 

 records check

• members of Congress

• an employee of a member of Congress or Congressional committee who has 

 undergone a prior U.S. Government criminal history records check

• the governor of a State or his or her designated State employee representative

• Federal, State, or local law enforcement personnel

• State radiation control program directors and State homeland security advisors or 

 their designated State employee representatives

• Agreement State employees who conduct security inspections on behalf of the

 NRC under an agreement executed under Section 274.i of the AEA

• representatives of the IAEA engaged in activities associated with the U.S./IAEA 

 Safeguards Agreement who have been certified by the NRC

• emergency response personnel who are responding to an emergency
142

• commercial vehicle drivers for road shipments of category 2 quantities of 

 radioactive material

• package handlers at transportation facilities, such as freight terminals and 

 railroad yards

• any individual who has an active Federal security clearance

• any individual employed by a service provider licensee for which the service 

 provider licensee has conducted the background investigation for the individual 

 and has approved the individual for unescorted access to category 1 or 

 category 2 quantities of radioactive material

Q2: How should a licensee protect sensitive information while in use, storage, and transit?

A2: The licensee should store the information in a locked cabinet, desk, or office. The 

licensee must password-protect information stored in nonremovable electronic form. Licensees 

must address how employees should protect the sensitive information while this information is in 

their possession, both at and away from work. Access to the keys, combinations, passwords, or 

other means used to secure the information needs to be limited to those persons authorized 

access to the information. Additional information on the protection of sensitive security-related 

information appears in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-31, “Control of Security-Related 

Sensitive Unclassified Nonsafeguards Information Handled by Individuals, Firms, and Entities 

Subject to NRC Regulation of the Use of Source, Byproduct, and Special Nuclear Material,” 

dated December 22, 2005 (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/regissues/2005/ri200531.pdf).

Q3: How should a licensee prepare, identify, mark, and transmit documents or 

correspondence containing the licensee’s security program information?

A3: A good practice is to prepare and mark licensee-generated security program information 

in such a manner as to ensure easy identification and proper handling. The front and back of 

folders that contain such information also should be marked for easy identification and proper 

handling.

Documents that do not, in themselves, contain security program information but are used to 

transmit one or more documents containing this information should be marked to indicate that 

security program information appears in the documents transmitted. Although security program 

information is not typically transmitted to the NRC, if a need for such transmittals exists, the 

licensee should mark them as follows: “Withhold from Public Disclosure in Accordance with 10

CFR 2.390.” The licensee should place these markings at the top and bottom of only the first 

page of the transmitted document.

Q4: What methods should a licensee use for destruction of documents containing security 

program information?

A4: A good practice is to destroy documents that contain this information using a method 

that will prevent reconstruction of the information. Documents may be destroyed by tearing 

them into small pieces or by burning, pulping, pulverizing, shredding, or chemical

decomposition. Similar methods may be used for film and microform media. (“Microform” is the 
143

generic term for any material on film or paper, such as a microfiche that contains a smaller

reproduction of a document for transmission, storage, reading, and printing.) Electronic media,

such as tapes, floppy discs, compact discs, digital video discs, and thumb drives, may be 

destroyed by shredding, smashing, burning, or chemical decomposition, and data on hard

drives and servers should be erased, or the drives reformatted, before submitting them for

recycling. (Note that regardless of the storage medium, the licensee should not send security 

program information to recycling without it being destroyed first.)

Q5: What methods should a licensee use to protect security information when using a 

data-processing system to store security program information?

A5: Individuals should protect the information during use by maintaining control and by 

ensuring that only individuals who have the “need to know” and who have been determined to 

be trustworthy and reliable have access to the information. One method that the licensee may 

use is to password-protect documents. The licensee also may use encryption techniques or 

place the documents on a restricted drive. Whatever method it uses, the licensee should 

describe the method in its information protection procedures.

Q6: When should a licensee remove documents from the licensee’s protected information 

category if they become obsolete or no longer sensitive?

A6: A licensee may remove documents from its protected information category when it no 

longer needs to have a security plan and procedures (i.e., when it no longer needs to possess 

an aggregated category 2 or greater quantity of radioactive materials). Until that time, all the 

information in the licensee’s security plan or procedures is unlikely to become obsolete or no 

longer sensitive. Neither the plan nor the procedures may be relieved from 10 CFR Part 37 

information protection requirements if they retain any sensitive information, and even the 

original versions of the plan and procedures are likely to retain some sensitive information until 

the licensee no longer needs to protect a category 2 or greater quantity of material.

Q7: What documents do I need retain under this section? How long must I retain the 

documents?

A7: The licensee must retain a copy of the procedures on information protection. It also 

must keep a copy of the list of individuals approved to have access to the security information. 

These records must be kept for 3 years after the record is no longer needed or until the NRC 

terminates the license as required by 10 CFR 37.103.

Q8: Will licensees need to handle SGI?

A8: Some licensees may be required to handle safeguards information or safeguards 

information modified handling. Licensees should review 10 CFR 73.21(a)(1)(i) and (ii) to 

determine if they have this type of information.

Q9: Would an engineer designing the security systems for a blood irradiator room need to 

undergo a background investigation to have unescorted access to the irradiator room when it 

contains radioactive material?
144

A9: Yes. If the engineer is allowed unescorted access to the security zone containing the 

irradiator, he or she would be subject to the access authorization program in Subpart B of 10

CFR Part 37 and would need to undergo a background investigation. If the irradiator room was 

situated such that the engineer would not need to enter the security zone or will be escorted 

while within the security zone, he or she would not be subject to Subpart B.

If the engineer needed access to protected security information, 10 CFR 37.43(d)(4)(ii) permits 

a licensee to accept written verification from a security service provider that the provider has 

conducted the background investigation required in 10 CFR 37.25(a)(2) through

10 CFR 37.25(a)(7) and has determined its employee to be trustworthy and reliable. This would 

permit the security service provider’s employee to have access to the protected information.

Q10: I have an employee who needs to know some components of my security plan to 

perform her job, but she doesn’t need to have access to the plan itself or implementing 

procedures. Does she need to undergo a background check to have access to parts of my 

security plan?

A10: Yes. An insider with even a limited knowledge of the security plan or its implementing 

procedures may be able to use this knowledge or convey it to others for malevolent purposes. 

For example, a security guard with access only to an alarm-response schematic or an 

information technology specialist with access only to a communication system for security 

personnel could significantly compromise the security of radioactive material against theft, 

sabotage, or diversion. In addition, if an employee has become familiar with the plan and 

procedures, the licensee may need to conduct a background investigation and make a T&R 

determination even if the employee does not have actual access to the document. An individual 

already approved for access to radioactive material would not need a reinvestigation; however, 

he or she would need to have some knowledge of the security plan or procedures to fulfill a job 

responsibility to be authorized access to any part of these documents.
145

§ 37.45, “LLEA Coordination and Notification”

§ 37.45(a)

A licensee subject to this subpart shall coordinate, to the extent practicable, with an LLEA for 

responding to threats to the licensee’s facility, including any necessary armed response. The 

information provided to the LLEA must include:

§ 37.45(a)(1)

A description of the facilities and the category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive 

materials along with a description of the licensee’s security measures that have been 

implemented to comply with this subpart; and

§ 37.45(a)(2)

A notification that the licensee will request a timely armed response by the LLEA to any actual 

or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of category 1 or category 2 quantities of material.

EXPLANATION:

Licensees must coordinate, to the extent practicable, with an LLEA for responding to threats to 

the licensee’s facility, including any necessary armed response. The licensee must provide a 

description of its facilities, radioactive materials, and security measures. The licensee must also 

state that it will request a timely armed response by the LLEA to any actual or attempted theft, 

sabotage, or diversion.

Q&As:

Q1: What kinds of LLEA coordination activities are required?

A1: The coordination activities could involve meetings, telephone conferences, plant tours, 

training in radiation protection, tabletop exercises, and other communications to provide 

information. As discussed in more detail in the subsequent Q&As for this section, the licensee 

must notify the LLEA that it will request an armed response to any actual or attempted theft, 

sabotage, or malevolent diversion of radioactive material. The licensee must also provide 

information about the facility, its radioactive materials, and the licensee’s current security 

measures. To facilitate a timely, coordinated, and effective response to a security incident, the 

licensee should verify site and LLEA contact information.

Q2: What is the purpose of the LLEA coordination?

A2: A timely and effective response to a security incident is part of an effective physical 

protection system. Because certain situations may necessitate an armed response, a strategy 

that is consistent in scope and timing with realistic potential vulnerabilities of the subject 

radioactive material should be coordinated well in advance with the LLEA. Another purpose of 

coordination is to provide the responsible LLEA with an understanding of the potential 

consequences associated with malevolent use of the radioactive material so that the LLEA can
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determine the appropriate priority of its response. The LLEA response would be necessary not 

only to interdict and disrupt an attempted theft or sabotage of the radioactive material but also 

for possible offsite coordination to protect public health and safety and to mitigate the potential 

consequences of a theft, sabotage, or malevolent diversion of radioactive material.

Q3: There are many different kinds of agencies responsible for providing security, including 

private security guard forces on the campuses of universities, hospitals, and other institutions. 

What kinds of law enforcement organizations should a licensee seek to coordinate with?

A3: The LLEA will need to be authorized by a Government entity to make arrests and to 

have the capability to provide an armed response. However, the LLEA does not need to be a 

municipal or a county police force. If a city or county hospital or State university campus police 

force is the nearest law enforcement agency to the licensee’s operation capable of providing an 

armed response and making arrests, that police force would meet the definition of an LLEA.

A licensee also will need to consider if the LLEA could provide the needed armed response at 

all times, day or night, 7 days a week. Some LLEAs are on duty only during specified hours; in 

such cases, the licensee will have to identify and coordinate with the closest LLEA able to 

provide an armed response and arrest perpetrators when the primary LLEA is off duty.

Q4: Can an onsite proprietary professional security force with trained and armed officers be 

considered an LLEA?

A4: No. A private security force cannot be considered an LLEA unless it meets the criteria 

for an LLEA as defined in 10 CFR 37.5. An onsite armed force may provide the initial licensee 

response, but the licensee must still coordinate with an offsite LLEA unless the onsite force is 

also authorized by a Government agency to bear arms and make arrests, as many university 

campus police forces are. The offsite LLEA should still be notified of incidents immediately to 

provide additional assistance if necessary and to enable the LLEA to assess the potential for 

offsite impacts and the need to notify other agencies.

Q5: If I have a written agreement with a third party service that provides off-duty local law 

enforcement agents on site at all times, would that be acceptable to demonstrate compliance 

with the LLEA coordination requirement?

A5: Even if the individual off-duty police officers working for the third-party security service 

are authorized to carry firearms, to make arrests, and to provide an armed response to a 

security incident at a licensee’s facility, the company itself would not qualify as an LLEA

because it must be approved as an agency by a Federal, State, or local government to carry out 

these duties. Thus, an agreement with such a third party to provide security for the licensee’s

site is not, in itself, sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the coordination requirement. The

licensee would still need to coordinate with an LLEA to request its assistance for either onsite or 

offsite support or both in the event of an attempted or actual theft, sabotage, or diversion. For 

example, the licensee would, among other activities, still need to coordinate with the LLEA

under 10 CFR 37.45(d) at least every 12 months or when changes to its facility design or 

operation could adversely affect the potential vulnerability of its material to theft, sabotage, or

diversion. The licensee may also want to consider whether and how the service provider’s

off-duty police officers could coordinate with their respective offsite LLEA employers in the event 

of a security incident at the licensee’s site.
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Q6: What kinds of information should a licensee provide to an LLEA for effective 

coordination?

A6: The information should include the important aspects of a licensee’s physical protection 

program and other factors that would aid the LLEA to appropriately prioritize and respond to an 

alarm or other request by the licensee for response. As a good practice, examples of 

information that a licensee could discuss with the LLEA include, but are not limited to, the 

following:

• types and quantities of devices and radioactive material possessed

• potential hazards associated with loss of control of the devices and radioactive

material

• specific facility information (i.e., contact information, floor plans, entrances, points

of egress, or other information)

• site-specific physical protection measures that the licensee employs to delay an 

adversary from gaining access to the radioactive material

• established protocol for contacting the LLEA in response to an event

• licensee and LLEA points of contact for plans to recover stolen material that has 

been removed to an offsite location

At a minimum, the regulation in 10 CFR 37.45(a) requires information for coordination activities 

to include a description of the facility; the quantity and type of radioactive materials; the security 

measures in place at the licensee’s facilities; and a notification that the licensee will request a 

timely and armed response to any actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of the 

licensee’s radioactive materials. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.45(c) requires the licensee to 

document its coordination efforts, including the dates, times, and locations of meetings and a list 

of licensee and LLEA staff members present at the meetings.

Q7: Does the NRC require a licensee’s security staff to have firearms?

A7: The rule does not require a licensee’s security staff to be armed, nor does it prohibit 

licensees from arming their security staff. The licensee must comply with applicable State and 

local law.

Q8: What does the NRC mean by coordinating with an LLEA “to the extent practicable”?

A8: The NRC recognizes that some LLEAs may be reluctant to engage in coordination 

activities with a licensee, and the agency added “to the extent practicable” to avoid putting 

licensees into noncompliance for actions that they cannot reasonably be expected to control. 

This phrase allows a licensee to remain in compliance with the rule when a LLEA will not 

participate in any coordination activities. The licensee can comply with this requirement simply 

by documenting, in accordance with 10 CFR 37.45(c), that it has initiated contact and has

periodically contacted the LLEA during the required timeframe, has provided information about 

its security needs and its intent to request an armed response, and has requested to

coordinate a response to a security incident involving a category 2 or greater quantity of 

radioactive materials.
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Q9: What should a licensee request as an adequate LLEA response to a threat to a 

licensee’s facility? For example, would a single officer with radio backup be sufficient, or is an 

entire SWAT team necessary?

A9: The LLEA will decide what is adequate and will respond as appropriate to the event 

based on the agency’s understanding of the situation and its potential consequences. One of 

the purposes of establishing liaison with the LLEA is to provide it an understanding of the 

potential consequences associated with the malevolent use of the radioactive materials subject 

to this rule so that the LLEA can appropriately determine the priority of its response. The LLEA 

response is necessary for offsite coordination to protect the public health and safety and to 

mitigate the potential consequences of the malevolent use of radioactive material.

Q10: Can LLEAs have access to the licensee’s physical protection information?

A10: The licensee is required to give an affected LLEA some physical protection information. 

The regulation in 10 CFR 37.45(a)(1) requires the licensee to provide “a description of its 

facilities and the category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive materials along with a 

description of its security measures that have been implemented to comply with this subpart.”

Q11: What are the LLEA’s responsibilities for protecting this sensitive information?

A11: LLEAs are not subject to NRC information protection requirements; however, they may 

be subject to other information protection requirements under State or local law. Under 10 CFR

37.29(a)(5), State, local, and other law enforcement authorities are members of occupational

groups deemed to be trustworthy and reliable by virtue of their employment status, and these 

authorities protect sensitive law enforcement information routinely in the course of their 

operations.

Q12: Would it be appropriate for a licensee to give a diagram of its facility to an LLEA?

A12: Depending on the size of the licensee’s facility and the location of the at-risk material, 

providing a facility plan to the LLEA may be appropriate. The purpose of coordination is to 

provide the LLEA with the information that it deems necessary to do its job in responding to 

potential malevolent acts that involve lost, stolen, or missing radioactive material from the 

licensee’s facility.

Q13: If a licensee is required to have an emergency plan under 10 CFR 30.32(i), can the 

licensee satisfy any of the requirements of 10 CFR 37.45 for LLEA coordination by complying 

with the emergency planning requirements of 10 CFR 30.32(i)(3)(xii)?

A13: Yes. The licensee can comply with the emergency planning requirements in 10 CFR

30.32(i)(3)(xii) to satisfy the requirements in 10 CFR 37.45 for LLEA coordination as long as its 

emergency plan specifically calls for LLEA coordination. The regulation in 10 CFR

30.32(i)(3)(xii) states, among other things, that an emergency plan under this section must

include “provisions for conducting quarterly communications checks with offsite response 

organizations...to test response to simulated emergencies.” The quarterly communications

checks must include “the check and update of all necessary telephone numbers.” Thus, if a 

licensee possesses at least a category 2 quantity of radioactive material and has an

emergency plan that complies with 10 CFR 30.32(i) and if the plan specifies the nearest

LLEA or LLEAs as “offsite response organizations” with which the licensee conducts

quarterly communications checks, the licensee may cite the plan as one component of its 

demonstration of compliance with the general requirement under 10 CFR 37.45(a) to
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“coordinate, to the extent practicable, with an LLEA for responding to threats to the

licensee’s facility.” These quarterly checks could also enable the licensee to demonstrate

compliance with the requirement in 10 CFR 37.45(a)(2) for “[a] notification that the licensee

will request a timely armed response by the LLEA to any actual or attempted theft, 

sabotage, or diversion,” and compliance with the requirement in

10 CFR 37.45(d) to “coordinate with the LLEA at least every 12 months.” Depending on the 

kinds of information in the emergency plan, it may also enable the licensee to comply with the

requirement in 10 CFR 37.45(a)(1) to provide to the LLEA “a description of the facilities and the 

category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive materials along with a description of the

licensee’s security measures that have been implemented to comply with this subpart.” 

However, the plan itself would not enable the affected licensee to comply with the notification

requirements in 10 CFR 37.45(b), the documentation requirements in 10 CFR 37.45(c), or the 

requirement in § 37.45(d) to coordinate with the LLEA “when changes to the facility design or 

operation adversely affect the potential vulnerability of the licensee’s material.”

Q14: Is there some method in place whereby an LLEA may become informed about 

radioactive materials and the licensee’s possession of such materials, including those in 

devices?

A14: Yes. The Federal Government through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

is actively working with LLEA organizations to improve their awareness and response 

capabilities across a wide variety of threats by providing information, training, and funds. 

LLEAs can obtain additional information about training from the National Domestic

Preparedness Consortium at http://www.ndpc.us/index.html, the local FBI Field Office Weapons

of Mass Destruction Coordinator at http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field, and the DHS National 

Network of Fusion Centers at http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers.

In coordination efforts with the LLEA, the licensee’s information should add to, and should help 

reinforce, the LLEA’s knowledge of radioactive materials and the potential risks associated with 

both their legitimate and malevolent uses. Licensees can invite the LLEA to attend their annual 

health and safety and security training sessions.

Q15: Do I have to conduct response exercises with my LLEA or otherwise train my LLEA?

A15: No. The licensee is not required to offer training to the LLEA. Exercising the response 

portion of the licensee’s security plan is a good practice, but it is not required. Some LLEAs 

may not be willing or able to participate, and the NRC also recognizes that requiring all

licensees to exercise their response plans may not be cost effective for small licensees with less 

complex security plans.

Q16: What are the LLEA coordination requirements for work at a temporary jobsite?

A16: The rule does not require a licensee to coordinate with an LLEA for work at temporary 

jobsites. However, licensees are not precluded from coordinating with the LLEA as an extra

margin of security for work at temporary jobsites. For licensees that routinely work at temporary 

jobsites for months at fixed locations, the licensee may want to identify and notify the closest 

LLEA for the benefit of both parties even though it is not required.
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§ 37.45, “LLEA Coordination and Notification” (continued)

§ 37.45(b)

The licensee shall notify the appropriate NRC regional office listed in § 30.6(a)(2) of this 

chapter within 3 business days if:

§ 37.45(b)(1)

The LLEA has not responded to the request for coordination within 60 days of the 

coordination request; or

§ 37.45(b)(2)

The LLEA notifies the licensee that the LLEA does not plan to participate in coordination 

activities.

EXPLANATION:

The licensee must notify the appropriate NRC regional office within 3 business days if the LLEA 

has not responded to its request for coordination within 60 days or if the LLEA notifies the 

licensee that it does not plan to participate in coordination activities.

Q&As:

Q1: Would an LLEA’s decision not to coordinate put a licensee into noncompliance with 

these coordination requirements?

A1: No. The NRC recognizes that it cannot exercise authority over LLEAs or any party over 

which a licensee has no control and over which the NRC has no legal jurisdiction. The NRC 

also recognizes that an LLEA may have good reasons, including resource limitations and the 

possibility of other coinciding incidents within its jurisdiction, for not engaging in coordination 

activities with a licensee.

Q2: What happens when an LLEA declines to coordinate with a licensee?

A2: A licensee must notify the NRC whenever an LLEA with jurisdiction over the licensee’s 

facilities declines to engage in coordination activities.

Q3: To trigger the requirement to notify the NRC, must a licensee have a written or oral 

statement from an LLEA stating that it does not plan to participate in coordination activities?

A3: No. Because the rule requires the licensee to notify the NRC if the LLEA has not

responded within 60 days to a licensee’s request for coordination, a licensee does not need to 

have an official statement from the LLEA that it does not plan to participate. The LLEA’s actions 

can demonstrate that the LLEA does not plan to coordinate with the licensee.

Q4: How should a licensee notify the NRC regional office to meet 10 CFR 37.45(b)

requirements?
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A4: The licensee may notify the NRC regional office by letter, facsimile, e-mail, or telephone. 

The regulation in 10 CFR 30.6 provides contact information. If the licensee contacts the NRC

by telephone, it should document the conversation so that it will have a record of the notification.

Q5: Some State or local jurisdictions may have a requirement that the initial response to any 

emergency involving radioactive materials must be provided by other than armed LLEA 

personnel, such as hazmat responders. How do I know whether such a requirement affects my 

LLEA’s response to a security incident?

A5: The licensee should ask the LLEA. A convenient time to ask could be during one of the 

licensee’s required interactions with the LLEA to develop or maintain effective coordination of 

responses to a security incident. If such a State or local requirement exists, the licensee should 

notify the designated first responder organization about the nature of its emergency response 

needs during a security incident so that unarmed and unsuspecting responders are not 

needlessly put in harm’s way. The licensee may also ask the hazmat or other designated first 

responder to coordinate with the LLEA to develop an agreed upon response protocol that would 

allow the licensee to contact the LLEA first for a response to a security incident involving its 

radioactive materials.
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§ 37.45, “LLEA Coordination and Notification” (continued)

§ 37.45(c)

The licensee shall document its efforts to coordinate with the LLEA. The documentation 

must be kept for 3 years.

EXPLANATION: 

Self-explanatory. 

Q&As:

Q1: Besides the documentation of meetings and correspondence, what other information on

LLEA coordination activities should a licensee document?

A1: A licensee should also document any written agreement or prearranged response plan 

with an LLEA if the LLEA is willing to enter into such an agreement or plan.

Q2: In cases where an LLEA has decided not to participate in coordination activities, how 

should a licensee document that it has made a good faith effort to coordinate with that LLEA? 

Must a licensee send all correspondence to such an LLEA by certified mail, UPS, or other 

third-party delivery method in order to produce a verifiable record?

A2: No. Using certified mail, UPS, or another third-party delivery method to document the 

licensee’s transmittal of a coordination request would be an acceptable way to comply with the 

requirement; however, the licensee does not need to use such methods if it keeps a copy of the 

dated letter, e-mail, or other correspondence and maintains records of calls to the LLEA.

Q3: Must a licensee maintain paper records of its LLEA coordination activities and 

correspondence? What about e-mails and other electronic communications, including digitized 

images, and documents generated on a computer?

A3: No. The licensee does not need to maintain records in paper form. As long as the 

record is legible and retrievable, the licensee can keep a reproduced copy, microform copy, or 

electronic copy. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.45(c) requires licensees to maintain records of 

LLEA coordination activities for a period of 3 years.
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§ 37.45, “LLEA Coordination and Notification” (continued)

§ 37.45(d)

The licensee shall coordinate with the LLEA at least every 12 months, or when changes to 

the facility design or operation adversely affect the potential vulnerability of the licensee’s 

material to theft, sabotage, or diversion.

EXPLANATION:

The licensee must coordinate with the LLEA every 12 months.

Q&As:

Q1: When should I coordinate with the LLEA concerning changes to my facility’s design or 

operation?

A1: The licensee should notify the LLEA as soon as possible after making any changes to the

facility design or operation that could affect the LLEA’s response to an incident. If possible, the

licensee should notify the LLEA before making such changes. In addition, a good practice is to

afford LLEA response personnel the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the facility

once any design or operating changes have been made.

Q2: I understand that I must coordinate with the LLEA at least every 12 months even if there 

are no significant changes to my facility’s design or operation. What topics or issues should I 

cover when I contact the LLEA in one of these 12-month coordination activities?

A2: The coordination may include, but should not be limited to, a discussion of any recent 

security developments since the licensee’s last coordination meeting, the potential 

consequences of any planned or potential changes in either its facilities or operations, or the 

LLEA’s capabilities or policies. Thus, the licensee should be prepared to review any security 

events or trends over the preceding 12 months that could have involved the LLEA and to review 

any security events or trends for which the licensee has taken or plans to take corrective action. 

The licensee should also be prepared to discuss any changes in its facility’s existing or planned 

security measures, policies, notification procedures, equipment, or other resources that could 

affect the LLEA’s response or ability to respond to an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or 

diversion of radioactive materials at the licensee’s facilities over the upcoming 12 months. An 

example of such a change would be a revision of the licensee’s security plan or procedures; a 

new monitoring, alarm, or communication system; or a decision to procure security services

from a commercial contractor.

The licensee should also discuss any changes in its LLEA point-of-contact information either at 

its facility or at the LLEA. In addition, depending on the licensee’s and the LLEA’s available 

time and resources, the licensee could offer the LLEA a tour of its facility or an opportunity to 

participate in planned drills or tabletop exercises or both activities.
154

Q3: Must I convene a face-to-face meeting for 12-month coordinations?

A3: No. Although a face-to-face meeting with LLEA officials would be desirable, the NRC 

understands that competing demands on the LLEA’s time may make such meetings difficult to 

arrange.

Q4: Who should participate in these coordination activities?

A4: At a minimum, participants on the licensee’s side should include the individual who has 

operating responsibility for implementation of the security plan or his or her designee and the 

individual that the licensee identified to the LLEA as its point of contact for coordination 

activities, if the two responsibilities are not assigned to the same person. If the participants 

need a prompt decision from an individual at a higher level of licensee management, that 

individual should attend. Depending on current demands for LLEA assistance, getting the 

desired LLEA representative to attend may be difficult; however, the licensee should, for 

consistency, try to ensure that at least the designated LLEA point of contact, if there is one, 

participates.
155

§ 37.47, “Security Zones”

§ 37.47(a)

Licensees shall ensure that all aggregated category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive 

material are used or stored within licensee-established security zones. Security zones may

be permanent or temporary.

EXPLANATION:

All aggregated category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive material must be used or 

stored within licensee-established permanent or temporary security zones.

Q&As:

Q1: How do I determine whether I possess an aggregated category 1 or category 2 quantity 

of radioactive material?

A1: The sum-of-fractions method, also known as the unity rule, is used to determine if the 

licensee possesses a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material. A licensee may 

need to implement 10 CFR Part 37 requirements even if it does not possess any single source 

or single radionuclide in excess of a category 2 threshold. For examples of unity rule 

calculations, see Q1 and A1 under the definitions of category 1 and category 2 quantities in

10 CFR 37.5 of Subpart A.

Q2: What is a security zone, and what is its purpose?

A2: A security zone is an area, defined by the licensee, that both isolates and controls 

access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material. The purpose of the zone 

is to define the area that contains the quantities of material that must be protected. A security 

zone effectively defines the areas in which the licensee will apply the isolation and access 

control measures required by 10 CFR Part 37. The licensee must use or store all category 1 

and category 2 quantities of radioactive material only within a security zone.

Q3: Can I use an area established for radiation safety to meet the requirements for a security 

zone? Can they be the same?

A3: Depending on the licensee’s safety and security needs, the boundaries of these two 

types of areas may differ or may be identical. Because the purpose of the security zones is 

different from the radiation safety purposes of the restricted areas and controlled areas defined 

in 10 CFR 20.1003, the security zone does not have to be the same as either of these areas; 

however, it may be the same.

However, because measures to control access are required for both radiation protection and 

security, a licensee does have the flexibility to use an area required for radiation protection 

purposes to fulfill the required functions of a security zone. The intent of 10 CFR 37.47 is to 

allow licensees flexibility in establishing access control and isolation in a manner that would 

allow reliance on existing systems and procedures, which are already in use for radiation

protection, for physical security. For example, consider a temporary well-logging operation

for which the regulations in 10 CFR 39.71, “Security,” require the licensee to have a
156

“restricted area” to “maintain direct surveillance...to prevent unauthorized entry.” A licensee

could define a security zone with the same boundaries as this “restricted area,” which is

defined in § 20.1003 as “an area, access to which is limited by the licensee for the purpose of

protecting individuals against undue risks from exposure to radiation and radioactive

materials.” In this case, the restricted area required for radiation protection may also serve to

provide security from exposure to this radiation.

Similarly, a radiographer could choose to define a security zone with the same boundaries as 

the “high radiation area” over which the regulations in 10 CFR 34.51, “Surveillance,” require 

radiography licensees to “maintain direct visual surveillance...to protect against unauthorized 

entry.” (As defined in 10 CFR 20.1003, a “high radiation area” is “an area, accessible to 

individuals, in which radiation levels from radiation sources external to the body could result in 

an individual receiving a dose equivalent in excess of a specified dose rate.”)

Q4: How does the NRC define a “temporary” security zone?

A4: The NRC considers a temporary security zone to be one established by the licensee to 

provide physical protection for a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive materials for a 

specified, limited expected time, which may be several minutes to several months, to 

accomplish a specified task.

Q5: How does a permanent security zone differ from a temporary one?

A5: A permanent security zone uses permanent barriers to provide isolation and to aid in 

controlling access to the material. These barriers may consist of fences, gates, free-standing 

walls for exterior areas, exterior or interior building walls, doors, locked windows, bars, or 

grillwork. The barriers or walls control access to the security zone through established access 

control points, deter and delay penetration by an unauthorized person or unauthorized people, 

and aid detection by providing an indication of forced penetration.

Temporary security zones do not need to have permanent barriers at their boundaries; however, 

licensees can use permanent barriers if they are available at the location of the work. The 

licensee may use other devices that warn passersby of the restricted nature of an area to

provide isolation of the material and the people using the material in a temporary security zone. 

The licensee can also accomplish access control through surveillance of the material, persons,

and area by an authorized individual.

Q6: If I’m an NRC licensee servicing a sealed source or other device in an Agreement State 

and my customer’s Agreement State regulatory agency hasn’t yet adopted 10 CFR Part 37 

compatible implementing regulations, am I still required to follow the 10 CFR Part 37 

requirements of my license?

A6: Yes. The licensee must follow the security requirements in its license and those of the 

Agreement State in which it works. Although the licensee will have to meet the requirements in 

its NRC license and its customer’s Agreement State license, the points at which these 

requirements apply may differ according to if and when possession of the source changes 

hands. For example, if the licensee is doing maintenance that does not require it to remove the

source and to take possession of it for offsite shipment, it will be subject to the applicable

access control, monitoring, documentation, and other requirements in its customer’s Agreement

State license. However, if the licensee brings a replacement source onto its customer’s site, the 

requirements of the licensee’s license apply along with those of the customer’s license, when
157

the licensee arrives onsite, until it has installed the replacement source in the customer’s device 

and has completed any remaining testing and maintenance required by its license and until the 

customer has taken possession of the source. In any case, both the licensee and the customer

must have a clear understanding from the outset about which one (the licensee or the customer)

is responsible for compliance with which requirement. For example, both entities should know 

which one is responsible for calling an LLEA in the event of a theft, sabotage, or diversion.

However, if the licensee’s Agreement State customer believes that compliance with the

licensee’s license would cause a violation of the customer’s license requirements, the licensee 

and the customer should contact the regional NRC office and the appropriate Agreement State

regulatory agency for further guidance.
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§ 37.47, “Security Zones” (continued)

§ 37.47(b)

Temporary security zones must be established as necessary to meet the licensee’s transitory 

or intermittent business activities, such as periods of maintenance, source delivery, and 

source replacement.

EXPLANATION:

Licensees must establish temporary security zones as necessary for time-limited or intermittent 

business activities, such as source maintenance, delivery, and replacement.

Q&As:

Q1: When should I establish a temporary security zone?

A1: The licensee should establish a temporary security zone whenever it has a periodic or 

unplanned short-term operating requirement for the use or storage of a category 1 or category 2 

quantity of radioactive material outside of a permanent security zone. Examples of such a 

requirement could include a need to repair, maintain, or calibrate a radioactive source or a 

device that contains a source at a location in which the licensee does not routinely use or store 

the source or device. The licensee should also establish a temporary security zone when it 

takes delivery of a source or device outside of its established permanent security zone. 

Additionally, work at a temporary jobsite will require the establishment of a temporary security 

zone at the jobsite.

Q2: How do I establish a temporary security zone?

A2: Although the licensee may be able to take advantage of permanent barriers if such 

barriers are available at the site, it may establish a security zone simply by keeping the area 

under direct supervision and control by an approved individual or individuals.

Q3: May I station someone who is not an approved individual outside a temporary security 

zone with a radio or other means of communication to notify people inside the zone about an 

impending intrusion?

A3: The rule does not prevent the licensee from using an unapproved individual to provide 

additional continuous direct surveillance; however, the regulation in 10 CFR 37.47(c)(2) does 

not allow the licensee to rely on any individual who has not been approved for unescorted 

access to be a monitor of access to a temporary or permanent security zone unless an 

approved individual monitors the unapproved individual. Allowing an individual who has not 

been determined trustworthy and reliable under this part to monitor a security zone without 

surveillance by an approved individual could provide an opportunity for insiders to compromise 

the security of the material.

Q4: How large should a temporary security zone be?
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A4: The rule does not specify the size of a security zone. Locations are configured 

differently and do not lend themselves to generically defined physical areas; the security zone 

concept permits significant flexibility for licensees to account for a range of site-specific 

concerns. The licensee will determine its physical dimensions on an individual basis, and these 

dimensions can change based on operating status and security needs. The security zone may 

be as small as a locked cabinet or as large as a warehouse area.

Q5: If I routinely work in a large plant facility and move frequently from one location to 

another within the same facility, do I have to establish a different temporary security zone for 

each location, or can I consider the whole facility to be a temporary security zone that 

encompasses all my onsite work locations?

A5: The licensee’s decision about the proper size of the temporary security zone is its alone 

to make, because only the licensee can know the conditions at the site and the requirements of 

its work. However, in making its decision, the licensee will need to consider the basic 

performance requirements for establishing a security zone. (See 10 CFR 37.47(c).) The 

regulation in 10 CFR 37.47(c) requires the licensee to isolate the subject radioactive materials 

to allow unescorted access only to approved individuals, using either direct control of the

security zone by approved individuals at all times, continuous physical barriers that allow access 

to the security zone only through established access control points, or a combination of

continuous physical barriers and direct control. For example, if the facility is small enough to

provide continuous physical barriers that allow access only through an established access 

control point that the licensee controls, it may be able to consider the entire facility a temporary 

security zone. For those spaces in which the licensee will be using its source or device 

between access-controlled permanent zones, its temporary security zone does not need to be 

any larger than the space in which it needs to control access.

Q6: How do I meet 10 CFR Part 37 requirements for controlling unescorted access to a 

temporary security zone if I’m at a temporary jobsite that doesn’t have such continuous physical 

barriers as lockable doors?

A6: When work needs to be done inside a temporary security zone that does not have 

physical barriers or special equipment, a licensee could meet the requirements for controlling 

unescorted access by having the material, persons, and area within the zone under the direct 

control of approved individuals at all times.

Q7: When would a temporary security zone have to be considered permanent?

A7: The rule does not specify a time limit by which a temporary security zone must become 

permanent; however, 10 CFR 37.47(b) does require a temporary security zone “necessary to 

meet the licensee’s transitory or intermittent business activities, such as periods of

maintenance, source delivery, and source replacement.” Most licensees will probably have a 

business interest in maintaining temporary security zones for only a limited time because the 

cost of isolating radioactive material behind permanent physical barriers is likely to be cheaper 

than the labor cost of maintaining continuous direct surveillance.
160

§ 37.47, “Security Zones” (continued)

§ 37.47(c)

Security zones must, at a minimum, allow unescorted access only to approved individuals 

through:

§ 37.47(c)(1)

Isolation of category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive materials by the use of 

continuous physical barriers that allow access to the security zone only through established 

access control points. A physical barrier is a natural or manmade structure or formation 

sufficient for the isolation of the category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material 

within a security zone; or

§ 37.47(c)(2)

Direct control of the security zone by approved individuals at all times; or

§ 37.47(c)(3)

A combination of continuous physical barriers and direct control.

EXPLANATION:

Security zones must allow unescorted access only to approved individuals by either isolating the 

radioactive materials with continuous physical barriers that allow access only through

established control points, by controlling the security zone directly by approved individuals at all 

times, or by using a combination of physical barriers and direct control.

Q&As:

Q1: For the purposes of 10 CFR Part 37, what is an “approved individual”?

A1: As defined in 10 CFR 37.5 of this part, an approved individual is an individual whom the 

licensee has determined to be trustworthy and reliable in accordance with Subpart B of this part 

and who has completed the training required by 10 CFR 37.43(c).

Q2: For the purposes of 10 CFR Part 37, what is a “continuous physical barrier”?

A2: A continuous barrier must limit access to the security zone only through one or more 

established access control points. The continuous barrier should have no openings other than 

access control points, including windows, large enough to allow a person to enter the security 

zone and bypass the access control point. For example, a wall should be continuous from the 

floor to the structural ceiling, and openings (such as vents) that are equal to or greater than

96 square inches, whereby the smallest dimension is equal to or greater than 6 inches, should

have metal grates, bars, expanded metal (i.e., an industry term for a screen made of steel or

similarly strong metal through which an observer can see activities inside or outside an

enclosure), or some other barrier that cannot be removed from outside the security zone.
161

Q3: If I need to use locks, what controls are required to limit access to the keys to my 

facilities?

A3: The licensee must limit access to the keys to locks for security zones and category 1 or 

category 2 materials or devices within those zones solely to those individuals who must have 

access to perform their assigned tasks and who have been determined trustworthy and reliable 

in accordance with Subpart B. However, a better security practice is to avoid relying on keys to 

control access to the security zone. Key control becomes more difficult as time passes 

(especially for large institutions) as more duplicate keys are made for newly approved 

individuals. The same is true for the control of lock combinations over time. Key cards, cipher 

locks, or some other type of electronic access control device should be used where feasible 

instead of keyed or combination locks. Additionally, each approved individual should have a 

unique access code. With these devices, the licensee can delete the access code after an 

individual no longer requires access to the security zone or when a key card is lost or stolen.

Q4: Does 10 CFR Part 37 require that locks for different rooms be rekeyed to different keys 

or combinations?

A4: No. However, different keys or lock combinations for different rooms would improve 

security by making it more difficult for an adversary to aggregate radioactive material into a 

category 1 or category 2 quantity. The licensee must determine how it will control access to the 

facility.

Q5: Shouldn’t the features of a device containing a category 1 or category 2 quantity of 

radioactive material be given credit for providing some isolation for purposes of access control?

A5: No. The NRC wrote the requirements for 10 CFR Part 37 with full awareness of the 

features of devices that licensees commonly use and the quantities of licensed material these 

devices typically contain. The devices are designed to limit access to the sources for radiation 

protection purposes, whereas the regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 also require the control of 

access to devices that contain the radioactive material. The requirements were designed to 

provide a defense-in-depth strategy for the protection of radioactive material in category 1 or 

category 2 quantities. No single control can provide the same level of protection as the 

combination of controls required by 10 CFR Part 37.

Q6: Self-contained irradiators have shown themselves to be very safe for day-to-day use 

without operators having access to the radioactive material. Controlling access to this material 

is generally much easier than controlling access to the irradiator itself. Are the 10 CFR Part 37 

requirements expected to address access to the radioactive material or to the irradiator?

A6: Both. To address potential misuse with malevolent intent, the NRC designed the 

requirements for 10 CFR Part 37 to control access to both the radioactive material and the 

irradiator by controlling access to the security zone. The NRC has engaged the expertise of 

national laboratories that have shown that these devices may be vulnerable to theft, sabotage,

or diversion under certain scenarios. For this reason and for the possibility that a trained insider 

could assist malevolent acts, the NRC has determined that certain additional security measures

are necessary in the current threat environment. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 require a 

layered, defense-in-depth approach to enhance the security of radioactive material in category 1 

and category 2 quantities. No single measure can provide the required security for this material; 

therefore, a licensee must implement all applicable 10 CFR Part 37 requirements unless the

licensee requests, and the NRC approves, an exemption.
162

Q7: Can the requirements for controlling access be waived if compliance is overly 

burdensome?

A7: A licensee may seek, and the NRC may grant, an exemption from any NRC requirement 

on a case-by-case basis; however, the NRC is unlikely to grant relief from an access control 

requirement simply because the licensee considers it burdensome.

Q8: What if a licensee’s truck carrying a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive 

material breaks down and must be towed to a shop for repairs, and the repair shop doesn’t

allow licensee personnel into the repair bay to keep the onboard security zone under continuous 

surveillance?

A8: The licensee must still meet the applicable requirements of 10 CFR Part 37 to ensure 

that the sources and their shielding devices are not removed. In this case, an approved 

individual could lock the truck, remain at the shop, and keep the truck in sight to control and 

maintain constant surveillance of licensed material. Alternatively, the licensee could remove the 

device and maintain control of the material until the truck is repaired or until the source(s) can

be returned to a licensed facility.

Q9: Can the requirements of 10 CFR 37.53 for independent physical barriers for mobile 

sources be used to control access and prevent an unescorted individual from entering a room 

where a radioactive source is located?

A9: No. The intent of 10 CFR 37.53 is not to achieve total access control but to provide 

additional delay in removing a mobile device from the facility, temporary jobsite, or vehicle. For 

mobile devices, delay barriers are required in addition to the access controls required by 10

CFR 37.47. Without the additional barriers, a portable or mobile device could more easily be 

stolen, sabotaged, or diverted.

Q10: If I have a room with a conventional door lock and entry alarms, what else do I need for 

an effective security zone?

A10: To protect against unauthorized access to, and removal of, material behind conventional 

door locks with entry alarms, the licensee may need to consider additional means, such as 

guards, closed-circuit television, or motion detectors. The specific system and the means to 

protect material is left to the licensee’s discretion; however, to meet 10 CFR Part 37 

requirements, the licensee should consider reasonably foreseeable actions by adversaries and 

the methods that they could use to gain unauthorized access. For example, walls should be 

continuous from floor to ceiling. Vents and other openings equal to or greater than 96 square

inches, whereby the smallest dimension is greater than 6 inches, should have metal grates, 

expanded metal, bars, or some other barrier that cannot be removed from outside the security

zone. For additional technical guidance on the capabilities and applications of different access

control system technologies, the licensee may refer to NUREG-1964, “Access Control Systems: 

Technical Information for NRC Licensees,” issued April 2011.

Q11: For facilities that may store radioactive materials or devices, such as dosimetry 

calibrators, outside a protected area, what constitutes an adequate physical barrier? Would an 

unlocked concrete container be adequate, for example, if it could not be

opened without the use of a mobile crane?
163

A11: The adequacy of a barrier around a storage area would depend on site-specific factors 

that the licensee should consider. For example, these factors should include the configuration 

of the storage area and whether it abuts and uses the perimeter fence at the site boundary; the

proximity of the radioactive materials to the fence and their vulnerability to theft or diversion; and 

the proximity of other means of access, such as vehicles, cranes, ladders, or other tools that

could readily be used to defeat the barrier.

In assessing the adequacy of any physical barrier, the licensee should consider, as generally 

good practice, its contribution to an integrated security system designed to provide defense in 

depth through effective detection, assessment, and response to a security event without delay. 

The licensee is responsible for ensuring that any barrier will perform as designed to enable the 

security zone as a system to meet the performance objective of isolating the material and 

allowing access only through established access control points under 10 CFR 37.47(c)(1). The 

licensee may also want to consider if a barrier could delay intruders sufficiently to contribute to 

the overall security program’s ability to meet its performance objective of detecting, assessing, 

and responding to an actual or attempted unauthorized access “without delay” under 10 CFR

37.41(b).

Q12: How do I meet 10 CFR Part 37 requirements for controlling unescorted access to a 

temporary security zone if I’m at a temporary jobsite that doesn’t have physical barriers or 

special equipment, such as lockable doors?

A12: A licensee could meet the requirements for a temporary security zone simply by keeping 

the area under ‘‘direct supervision’’ by authorized personnel.
 164

§ 37.47, “Security Zones” (continued)

§ 37.47(d)

For category 1 quantities of radioactive material during periods of maintenance, source 

receipt, preparation for shipment, installation, or source removal or exchange, the licensee 

shall, at a minimum, provide sufficient individuals approved for unescorted access to 

maintain continuous surveillance of sources in temporary security zones and in any security 

zone in which physical barriers or intrusion detection systems have been disabled to allow 

such activities.

EXPLANATION:

Licensees must provide sufficient individuals approved for unescorted access to maintain 

continuous surveillance of category 1 quantity sources when physical barriers or intrusion 

detection systems (IDSs) have been disabled.

Q&As:

Q1: When are special additional measures for category 1 quantities of radioactive material 

required?

A1: During equipment maintenance or source receipt, installation, replacement, or 

preparation for shipping, tamper-indicating devices and other intrusion detection equipment 

typically must be disabled to permit the device to be opened without tripping alarms. After 

replacement, the removed sources must be prepared onsite for shipment back to the 

manufacturer or for storage and eventual disposal. These nonroutine operations during a time 

when devices for detecting theft or diversion are disabled require additional measures to 

compensate for the temporary increase in vulnerability.

Q2: Does the approved individual who must perform the continuous surveillance of the 

source replacement or maintenance work have to remain on duty for the duration of the work?

A2: No. An approved individual must perform the continuous surveillance; however, he or 

she does not need to be the same individual for the duration of the work. If the original 

approved individual who is observing the work must be relieved, the second observer must 

begin surveillance before the original observer departs.
165

§ 37.47, “Security Zones” (continued)

§ 37.47(e)

Individuals not approved for unescorted access to category 1 or category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material must be escorted by an approved individual when in a security zone.

EXPLANATION:

An approved individual must escort an individual who has not approved for unescorted access 

when he or she is in a security zone.

Q&As:

Q1: What is an escort’s responsibility?

A1: The objective of escorting is to maintain effective control of access to protected 

radioactive material, including access by unapproved individuals who require access to a 

security zone to perform their duties. The escort must maintain continuous surveillance of the 

escorted individual(s) and must carry out assigned responsibilities for detection, assessment, 

and response as required. The purpose of the escort is to ensure that escorted individuals 

perform their duties as intended and do not misuse their access to the protected radioactive 

materials. Procedures for escorts should be tailored to each facility’s operations. Licensees 

should consider limiting the number of people assigned to an escort to avoid degrading the 

escort’s effectiveness in completing other assigned safety and security responsibilities.

Q2: Do licensees have to visually distinguish (e.g., with badges) all individuals who have not 

been granted unescorted access?

A2: No. This is not a requirement; however, licensees should consider methods for 

distinguishing individuals approved for unescorted access from those requiring escort. For 

example, those individuals approved for unescorted access to category 2 or greater quantities of

radioactive material could wear colored badges or other identifying articles. Colored badges or

identification cards may be appropriate for a larger organization, whereas simple face recognition

may be appropriate in a smaller one. The ability to visually distinguish approved individuals from 

those who require escort is considered a best security practice, although other ways to

distinguish these individuals may be available, such as by electronically coded badges. In any

case, the method used to distinguish individuals who require escort should help facility personnel 

in the early detection and timely assessment of unauthorized access incidents.

Q3: Can we assume that patients can be granted unescorted access during treatments?

A3: No. Patients who are being treated with devices containing category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive material must be escorted. The escort does not need to be physically 

with the patient in the treatment room; however, he or she can observe from outside the room. 

The licensee should restrict patients’ access to loaded teletherapy devices during their treatment

with these devices, and the licensee must comply with 10 CFR Part 37 requirements. The

licensee should not permit patients access to areas in which radioactive material is stored 

without being escorted by approved individuals.
166

Q4: Must an escort always maintain line-of-sight surveillance of an unapproved individual in 

a security zone?

A4: No. However, the escort must maintain “direct continuous visual surveillance,” which he 

or she may conduct using video surveillance in some, but not all, cases. For example, video 

surveillance of patients during a treatment is appropriate; however, video surveillance in which 

the “escort” is in another building would not be appropriate.

Q5: Must the escort always be physically present when an individual who is not approved for 

unescorted access is in the security zone?

A5: Generally, yes. However, an escort may monitor an unapproved individual remotely 

(e.g., using a closed-circuit TV system or a window into the room) as long as the escort 

maintains continuous visual surveillance over the individual at all times. Under some 

circumstances (e.g., when a patient undergoes teletherapy), remote surveillance might be 

preferable to the actual physical accompaniment of an unapproved individual.

Q6: How can a single individual, such as a medical technologist assigned to be an escort, 

maintain “direct control” of the security zone sufficiently to prevent an incident or even raise an 

alarm in the event that someone is armed and intent upon gaining access to radioactive 

material?

A6: An absolutely assured method to prevent a determined, well-conceived, and

well-equipped effort to gain unauthorized access to radioactive material does not exist. The 

purpose of the escort is to identify, assess, and respond if possible to the unauthorized activities 

by a visitor or another individual who has not been granted unescorted access. The escort 

should also observe behavior that may suggest an interest in defeating the security system. For 

example, the escort should notice if the visitor shows an unusual interest in the system, 

equipment, and procedures used to protect the security zone.
 167

§ 37.49, “Monitoring, Detection, and Assessment”

§ 37.49(a), “Monitoring and Detection”

§ 37.49(a)(1)

Licensees shall establish and maintain the capability to continuously monitor and detect 

without delay all unauthorized entries into its security zones. Licensees shall provide the 

means to maintain continuous monitoring and detection capability in the event of a loss of 

the primary power source, or provide for an alarm and response in the event of a loss of

this capability to continuously monitor and detect unauthorized entries.

EXPLANATION:

Licensees must continuously monitor and detect without delay all unauthorized entries

into security zones. The licensee must maintain a continuous monitoring and detection

capability whenever the primary power source is lost, or the licensee must provide for an

alarm and response when the capability to continuously monitor and detect unauthorized

entries is lost.

Q&As:

Q1: Is there a need to provide security monitoring for locations other than windows, doors, 

and access ways?

A1: Yes. The detection system must be able to detect all reasonably foreseeable 

unauthorized access to the security zone, including breaches of barriers used to isolate and

control access to the protected radioactive material. This capability may require security

monitoring beyond that installed on windows, doors, and access ways.

Q2: If a licensee opts to provide an alarm system for a loss of the primary power source

for monitoring and detection systems, must the system be calibrated to alarm for power

surges, brownouts, or other anomalies in the electricity supply system? What would

constitute a “loss” of the primary power source? What other sources of information can I 

use for monitoring and detection methods and equipment?

A2: The licensee should calibrate an alarm system for a power source impairment to trip

for power surges, brownouts, and other anomalies that would cause a loss of the monitoring

or detection system’s functionality. A licensee should consider a “loss” of its primary power

source to be any anomaly that impairs the ability of a monitoring or detection system to

perform as expected. If the licensee chooses instead to use an alternate or auxiliary power

source, such as a gasoline-fueled generator, the alternate power source should be set to

power the monitoring and detection system automatically.

Q3: What other sources of information can I use for monitoring and detection methods

and equipment?
 168

A3: For additional technical information on the capabilities and applications of different 

backup power intrusion detection technologies, the licensee may refer to NUREG-1959, 

“Intrusion Detection Systems and Subsystems: Technical Information for NRC 

Licensees,” issued March 2011. For technical information on the capabilities and

applications of various access control systems, the licensee may refer to NUREG-1964.
169

§ 37.49, “Monitoring, Detection, and Assessment” (continued)

§ 37.49(a)(2)

Monitoring and detection must be performed by:

§ 37.49(a)(2)(i)

A monitored intrusion detection system that is linked to an onsite or offsite central monitoring 

facility; or

§ 37.49(a)(2)(ii)

Electronic devices for intrusion detection alarms that will alert nearby facility personnel; or

§ 37.49(a)(2)(iii)

A monitored video surveillance system; or

§ 37.49(a)(2)(iv)

Direct visual surveillance by approved individuals located within the security zone; or

§ 37.49(a)(2)(v).

Direct visual surveillance by a licensee designated individual located outside the security 

zone.

EXPLANATION:

The licensee must perform monitoring and detection by either a monitored IDS linked to a 

central monitoring facility, electronic intrusion detection alarms that will alert nearby facility 

personnel, a monitored video surveillance system, or direct visual surveillance.

Q&As:

Q1: Would implementation of an area monitor connected to a silent alarm, key card access 

to the area, and a video monitoring system be adequate for meeting 10 CFR Part 37 

requirements?

A1: The regulation was designed to allow licensees flexibility to choose methods that work 

best in each licensee’s specific circumstances; therefore, the adequacy of a system will depend 

on the system’s capabilities and site-specific requirements. It is the licensee’s responsibility to 

choose monitoring and detection methods and technologies for effective compliance with the 

requirements of this section. The licensee can accomplish effective detection and monitoring in 

different ways tailored to different facility-specific operating conditions. The licensee’s choices 

must also ensure that it has dependable means in place to transmit information between and

among the various components used to detect and identify an unauthorized intrusion, to inform 

the licensee security staff, and to summon the appropriate responder.
170

Q2: May I use a less-sensitive monitoring system during the routine workday? May I rely on 

visual inspection by approved individuals during the normal workday and a system depending 

on an offsite monitoring facility at night?

A2: The licensee can meet detection and monitoring requirements by using electronic 

devices, visual monitoring, or a combination of these methods. However, the chosen method(s) 

must be effective in providing the required capability of immediate detection, assessment, and 

response. Personnel must be trustworthy and reliable, trained in appropriate security 

procedures, equipped for reliable communications, and capable of meeting the immediate 

detection requirements. Electronic devices must be capable of alerting trained onsite or offsite 

facility personnel upon first detection of an intrusion. Visual monitoring must also be capable of 

alerting trained assessment and response personnel without delay. For additional technical 

guidance on the capabilities and applications of different IDS technologies, the licensee may 

refer to NUREG-1959 or NUREG-2166.

Q3: If a licensee uses electronic intrusion detection alarms, what minimum performance 

should these devices be capable of?

A3: To meet the requirements of 10 CFR 37.49(a)(2)(ii), a licensee must use intrusion 

detection alarms that will alert nearby facility personnel of unauthorized access to the security 

zone. These alarms may be visual (e.g., strobe lights); however, if the licensee relies on 

audible alarms to fulfill this function, the sound of these alarms should be distinguishable from 

other alarms and should be at least 65 decibels above ambient background noise level at the

farthest location of a responder. (See DOE M 5632.1C-1, “Manual for Protection and Control of 

Safeguards and Security Interests,” dated July 15, 1994, page 55.) If the licensee decides to 

use magnetic switches on doors and windows as part of an intrusion alarm system, the NRC 

considers the use of balanced magnetic switches a best practice because these switches are 

more difficult for an adversary to defeat. If the licensee uses motion detectors, it must use 

enough detectors to cover all potential entrance and egress points for radioactive material from 

the security zone. To meet the intent of 10 CFR 37.49(a), the detection system must be

capable of detecting reasonably foreseeable unauthorized access to the security zone,

including breaches of barriers used to isolate and control access to the protected radioactive

material. The licensee’s security plan should explain how any method used to alert facility

personnel will be reliable and effective in permitting immediate detection on a continuous basis. 

For additional technical guidance on the capabilities and applications of different IDS

technologies, the licensee may refer to NUREG-1959 or NUREG-2166. 

Q4: May I use silent alarms, as some experts recommend, for duress situations?

A4: The licensee may use silent alarms to meet the requirement in 10 CFR 37.49(a)(2)(i) for 

a monitored IDS linked to an onsite or offsite central monitoring facility. The licensee may 

deploy silent alarms in the immediate vicinity of the security zone in addition to the intrusion 

detection alarms to respond to situations in which anyone threatens or assaults another 

approved individual once inside the security zone. Silent alarms for such duress situations can 

give responders the advantage of surprise and can provide an additional increment of time to

assess and more effectively intervene. However, if the licensee does choose silent alarms to 

comply with 10 CFR 37.49(a)(2)(ii), it must continuously monitor them by direct visual 

surveillance or a monitored video or audio surveillance system connected to a central 

monitoring station.
171

Q5: May I use radiation safety monitoring and detection systems for material security 

purposes?

A5: Yes. The licensee may use these systems if their use does not adversely affect 

radiation safety. To comply with this part, the licensee may use, for example, any monitored 

motion detection systems or alarms used to control access to high-radiation areas or other 

alerting systems used for radiation protection. The licensee may also modify these systems but 

only if the modifications do not compromise the equipment’s original safety purpose. For 

example, the licensee should not relocate an integrated motion detection and alarm system 

originally installed at one location for radiation safety purposes to serve a security zone if the 

relocation would diminish the system’s sensitivity at its original location. Radiation detection 

alarms would generally not enable the licensee to detect intrusions as required by 10 CFR

37.49(a)(2)(ii; however, the licensee may use these alarms to comply with the requirement in 10

CFR 37.49(a)(3) to detect the unauthorized removal of radioactive material from a security 

zone. The licensee’s security plan should describe how any radiation safety systems used for

security purposes will provide the required intrusion or removal detection without impairing

these systems’ performance or functionality for radiation protection.
 172

§ 37.49, “Monitoring, Detection, and Assessment” (continued)

§ 37.49(a)(3)

A licensee subject to this subpart shall also have a means to detect unauthorized removal 

of the radioactive material from the security zone. This detection capability must provide:

§ 37.49(a)(3)(i)

For category 1 quantities of radioactive material, immediate detection of any attempted 

unauthorized removal of the radioactive material from the security zone. Such

immediate detection capability must be provided by:

§ 37.49(a)(3)(i)(A)

Electronic sensors linked to an alarm; or

§ 37.49(a)(3)(i)(B)

Continuous monitored video surveillance; or

§ 37.49(a)(3)(i)(C)

Direct visual surveillance.

§ 37.49(a)(3)(ii)

For category 2 quantities of radioactive material, weekly verification through physical 

checks, tamper indicating devices, use, or other means to ensure that the radioactive

material is present.

EXPLANATION:

Licensees with category 1 quantities of material must provide immediate detection capability 

through electronic sensors linked to an alarm, continuous monitored video surveillance, or 

direct visual surveillance. Licensees with category 2 quantities must ensure that the material is 

present through use, tamper-indicating devices, physical checks, or other means.

Q&As:

Q1: What does NRC mean by the requirement in 10 CFR 37.49(a)(3)(i) that my

detection capability be “immediate”?

A1: The common dictionary meaning of “immediately” is “at once, instantly, without any 

intervening time.” Thus, the licensee’s detection system must be capable of alerting it of

any attempted unauthorized removal of radioactive material from the security zone instantly

and without delay.

Q2: To meet the additional requirement of 10 CFR 37.49(a)(3)(i) for immediate detection

of an attempted removal of a category 1 quantity of material from a security zone, can a

licensee rely only on its main sitewide intrusion detection system linked to a monitoring

facility?
 173

A2: No. This requirement is in addition to the requirement to detect, assess, and respond

to unauthorized access to the security zone. Methods that the licensee may use to meet the 

requirement to detect removal include, but are not limited, to the following:

• an alarming, electronic, tamper-indicating device

• radiation detectors that will alarm when the material is removed from a security 

zone

• continuous visual surveillance by an approved individual

If a licensee uses electronic, tamper-indicating alarms, the alarm should be capable of

alarming either when an attempt is made to remove a category 1 quantity of radioactive

material from a device or when an attempt is made to remove the device itself. The tamperindicating alarms should be armed at all times, except during periods of maintenance.

If a licensee decides to use alarms that will alert nearby facility personnel to unauthorized 

access to the security zone, the audible alarm should be distinguishable from other alarms

and should be at least 65 decibels above ambient background noise level at the farthest

location of a responder. (See page 55 of DOE M 5632.1C-1.) The licensee’s security plan

should explain how any method used to detect unauthorized removal will be reliable and

effective in providing immediate detection on a continuous basis.

Q3: Would licensees with continuous staffing on site, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week still 

be required to implement 10 CFR Part 37 requirements for immediate detection of a removal?

A3: Licensees will still be required to implement 10 CFR Part 37 requirements; however, 

they may be able to take credit for staffing, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to meet some of 

these requirements. The licensee can consider having staff members who can identify anyone 

without a clear work-related duty to be near a protected device and who will immediately call

for assistance when needed as part of its response to the unauthorized removal of radioactive 

material.

Q4: May I use approved individuals to monitor for unauthorized removals of category 1 

material if these individuals are moving about constantly and may not always be watching

the area under access controls?

A4: The licensee may use any of a number of methods to detect an unauthorized removal; 

however, the method that it selects must meet the 10 CFR Part 37 requirements to respond 

immediately to any actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of protected radioactive 

material. Thus, if the licensee relies upon approved individuals to detect removal immediately, 

as required by 10 CFR 37.49(a)(3)(i), at least one individual must be observing at all times, 

unless another approved individual is escorting an unapproved individual in the affected

security zone. However, no one method of monitoring may be right for all licensees.

Q5: Would periodic checking by a trained security guard meet the requirement for

“immediate detection” of an actual or attempted removal of a category 1 quantity? Why would

15 minutes not permit an adequate response to an alarm?
 174

A5: As noted earlier, “immediate” is commonly defined as “instant” or “without delay.” 

Although trained individuals can be used to monitor and immediately detect, assess, and 

respond as required, periodic checks, even those at intervals shorter than 15 minutes, will not 

meet the immediate detection requirement. Immediate detection is essential to reduce the

risk that an adversary will be able to remove the material even if he or she is able to gain 

unauthorized access to it. Immediate detection is also essential to enhance the likelihood of 

recovering the material before it can be misused or to mitigate the consequences of misuse 

even if the adversary is able to remove it from its authorized location.

Q6: Is there any way to monitor without an alarm system?

A6: Trained individuals may be used to fulfill some requirements in 10 CFR Part 37; 

however, to comply with the requirement in 10 CFR 37.49(a)(1) to “maintain the capability to 

continuously monitor and detect without delay all unauthorized entries into...security zones,” a 

licensee must maintain this capability 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. An appropriate method of 

monitoring, detection, and assessment should also provide a dependable means to transmit 

information between the various components used to detect an unauthorized intrusion, to

inform security staff, and to summon the appropriate responder. An integrated alarm system 

may be the most cost-effective method to provide such continuous compliance.

Q7: Can a partial exemption from 10 CFR 37.49 be granted to licensees at extremely

remote locations, such as offshore and wilderness sites, where access is limited and

communication difficult?

A7: Any licensee may request an exemption from any NRC requirement; however, a 

licensee seeking an exemption from immediate detection requirements solely on the basis of 

remoteness would need to address the potential security risks of such relief. Remoteness may 

allow an intruder to gain undetected and unauthorized access more readily than in more 

populated environments. An additional lag in communications about an unauthorized removal 

may also provide advantages to an intruder’s planning to steal or sabotage material. Licensees 

must therefore meet all applicable 10 CFR Part 37 requirements unless the NRC approves an 

exemption request. If a licensee does request an exemption from a 10 CFR Part 37

requirement because of remoteness or the difficulty of timely communication, the licensee must 

justify the request and should propose compensatory measures to mitigate the consequences

of not meeting the specified requirement. The NRC will evaluate exemption requests on a

case-by-case basis. See the Q&As for 10 CFR 37.11.

Q8: Could radiation detection equipment connected to a silent alarm be used to alert 

local law enforcement of an attempted theft of radioactive material?

A8: Yes. Depending on the configuration of shielding surrounding the radioactive

source and other factors, radiation meters could be a means to detect and alert an LLEA of

an attempted theft of radioactive material. However, a licensee would be prudent to avoid 

overreliance on any single method for detecting an unauthorized removal of radioactive 

material. The NRC designed the requirements for 10 CFR Part 37 to provide defense-indepth strategy, and the NRC expects licensees to consider all credible scenarios when

developing and implementing a security program to implement the requirements in 10

CFR Part 37.
 175

Q9: If a licensee with a category 2 quantity of radioactive material does not use the material 

weekly or make weekly physical checks to verify its continuing presence, what “other means” 

may this licensee use to detect the removal of a category 2 quantity of radioactive material 

under 10 CFR 37.49(a)(3)(ii)?

A9: The intent of the provision for “other means” to detect the removal of a category 2 

quantity of material is to give the licensee flexibility to use the method that works best for its 

facility. Although electronic sensors for detecting the removal of a category 2 quantity of 

material are not required, the licensee should consider, as good practice, the application of 

these devices to category 2 quantities, where feasible, for immediate detection capability. For 

additional technical guidance on the capabilities and applications of different intrusion detection 

system technologies, the licensee may refer to NUREG-1959 or NUREG-2166. 

If a licensee decides to use an electronic, tamper-indicating device for detecting the removal of 

a category 2 quantity of material, the NRC recommends that the system be designed to silently 

or audibly alarm on any attempt to remove a device or a source from its device. The licensee 

should arm the tamper-indicating alarm at all times, other than those for equipment 

maintenance or calibration. The licensee’s security plan should also explain how any method 

used to detect the unauthorized removal of a category 2 quantity of material will be reliable and 

effective in meeting the requirements in 10 CFR 37.49(a)(3).
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§ 37.49, “Monitoring, Detection, and Assessment” (continued)

§ 37.49(b),“Assessment”

Licensees shall immediately assess each actual or attempted unauthorized entry into the 

security zone to determine whether the unauthorized access was an actual or attempted 

theft, sabotage, or diversion.

EXPLANATION:

A licensee must assess each actual or attempted unauthorized entry into a security zone 

immediately to determine if there was an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion.

Q&As:

Q1: Can a licensee use automated devices to assess an intrusion and alert an LLEA?

A1: Yes. The licensee can use these devices if it is able to meet the requirements in

10 CFR Part 37. Assessment may be done by either automated devices or trained personnel 

who can initiate the appropriate response; however, in either case, the assessment must enable 

the licensee to request assistance and to begin any other mitigating measures immediately. 

Depending on the security system, the layout of security zones, and the design capabilities of

the sensors, automated devices or systems may be programmed to summon LLEA assistance 

automatically in response to an intrusion alarm. The security plan and implementing procedures

must describe how the licensee would assess and respond to unauthorized access. In

developing its plan and procedures, the licensee should consider the possibility of simultaneous 

alarms at multiple locations.

Q2: Can licensees perform their own vulnerability assessment and change Part 37 time 

requirements for detection and response?

A2: Licensees are welcome to conduct vulnerability assessments as a good practice; 

however, they may not change the rule’s time requirements for detection and response 

unilaterally. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 require licensees to detect, assess, and respond 

to any reasonably foreseeable unauthorized access to the security zone “without delay,” and the

LLEA must be notified as soon as possible. If, for some reason, a licensee cannot comply with

a specific requirement or if the licensee believes that the requirement is counterproductive, it 

should inform the NRC and request an exemption. The exemption request should propose

compensatory measures to mitigate the consequences of not meeting the specified

requirement.

Q3: Must I summon LLEA assistance in response to any intrusion alarm?

A3: No. The licensee must assess the situation immediately to determine if the alarm 

signals an actual or attempted intrusion and must decide if the intrusion justifies LLEA 

involvement. However, in certain instances, the licensee may determine in advance that an 

alarm from an electronic, tamper-indicating device calls for an automatic summons to the LLEA;

however, not summoning an LLEA for every unauthorized intrusion would be good practice. 
177

Such intrusions could be either unknowing or inadvertent, and it would be counterproductive to 

request LLEA assistance automatically for such insignificant security events as an inadvertent 

activation of an alarm. Frequent alerts to the licensee’s LLEA(s) are likely to result in a delayed 

or inadequate response to a real security incident.
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§ 37.49, “Monitoring, Detection, and Assessment” (continued)

§ 37.49(c), “Personnel Communications and Data Transmission”

For personnel and automated or electronic systems supporting the licensee’s monitoring, 

detection, and assessment systems, licensees shall:

§ 37.49(c)(1)

Maintain continuous capability for personnel communication and electronic data transmission 

and processing among site security systems; and

§ 37.49(c)(2)

Provide an alternative communication capability for personnel, and an alternative data 

transmission and processing capability, in the event of a loss of the primary means of 

communication or data transmission and processing. Alternative communications and data 

transmission systems may not be subject to the same failure modes as the primary systems.

EXPLANATION:

Licensees must maintain continuous capability for personnel communication and electronic data 

transmission and processing among site security systems. Licensees must also provide 

alternative personnel communication and data transmission and processing capabilities in case 

the primary means is lost. Alternative systems may not have the same failure modes as primary 

systems.

Q&As:

Q1: What do I have to do to “maintain continuous capability” under 10 CFR 37.49(c)(1)??

A1: The licensee must have a dependable means to transmit information to all the various 

components involved in the detection and assessment of an intrusion, including the appropriate 

responder, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The licensee may use land-line telephones, 

automatic dialers, cellular phones, pagers, radios, and other similar modes of communication to

fulfill this requirement. When using more than one person for detection and assessment, the

licensee must also provide a means for the various monitoring personnel to communicate with

each other.

Q2: What personnel communications and data transmission systems are subject to the 

requirement for an alternative capability?

A2: The licensee must have an alternative capability for any primary system of 

communication or data transmission and processing that it relies upon to meet requirements. 

The alternative means must be able to provide continuous communication or data transmission 

capability. The licensee could use land-line phones, automatic dialers, cellular phones, pagers, 

radios, and other similar modes of communication to fulfill this requirement as long as they are 

not subject to the same failure mode as the primary systems that they must replace. For
179

example, a radio or cellular phone could be considered as a backup to a land-line phone. 

However, an alternative cell phone system may not rely on the same cell tower and 

transmission system as the primary cell phone system.

Q3: To comply with the requirement that the alternative communication system not be

subject to the same failure mode, may a licensee use a different cell phone service as a backup 

to a primary cell phone service?

A3: Yes. However, the licensee will need to show that the alternative cell phone service 

does not use the same satellite communications system, signal processing, or receiving tower 

as the primary service.
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§ 37.49, “Monitoring, Detection, and Assessment” (continued)

§ 37.49(d), “Response”

Licensees shall immediately respond to any actual or attempted unauthorized access to the 

security zones, or actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of category 1 or

category 2 quantities of radioactive material at licensee facilities or temporary jobsites. For 

any unauthorized access involving an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of

category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material, the licensee’s response shall

include requesting, without delay, an armed response from the LLEA.

EXPLANATION:

Licensees must respond immediately to any actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of 

category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material or unauthorized access to the security

zones at licensee facilities or temporary jobsites. The licensee must request an armed LLEA

response without delay.

Q&As:

Q1: What do I need to do if I detect an intrusion into a security zone?

A1: The licensee’s response would depend on its assessment of the purpose of the 

intrusion; however, a response is required without delay. If the licensee assesses that the 

intrusion is an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive material, it must notify and request an armed response from the 

appropriate LLEA immediately, followed soon after by a call to the NRC Operations Center at 

(301) 816-5100. An immediate response by the licensee would permit a more timely response 

from law enforcement, thereby reducing the consequences of the incident.

The licensee’s decision to call the LLEA and the NRC would depend not only on its assessment 

of the intent of the unauthorized access but also on if the area in which the breach occurred is 

an area that it had previously determined was in need of monitoring to meet the NRC’s physical

protection requirements. Thus, the licensee’s assessment and response to an intrusion alarm in 

the business office section of its facility could be entirely different from its assessment and

response to an intrusion alarm in a radioactive material storage area if the two areas are not 

adjacent.

Q2: Could radiation detection meters connected to a silent alarm be used to alert local law 

enforcement of an attempted theft of radioactive material?

A2: Yes. The licensee could use radiation meters as part of a system to alert an affected 

LLEA of an actual or attempted theft of radioactive material if this method is acceptable to the 

LLEA. The rule is designed to provide a defense-in-depth strategy for radioactive material 

security, and the NRC expects licensees to consider other measures for requesting LLEA 

assistance if such assistance would also be necessary.
181

Q3: Since licensed facilities are also broken into to obtain equipment items other than 

radioactive materials, would coordination require licensees to summon the LLEA every time 

there is a break-in?

A3: No. The licensee’s decision on if it should call the LLEA would depend on what areas, 

as determined by the licensee, need to be controlled for access to the radioactive material and 

would depend on the licensee’s assessment of the intent of the unauthorized access. A 

licensee’s assessment and response to an intrusion alarm in a conference room or office supply 

storage area could be entirely different from its assessment and response to an intrusion alarm 

in a security zone for a radioactive materials storage area.

Q4: Do I have to conduct response exercises with my LLEA?

A4: No. Exercising the response portion of a licensee’s security plan is a good practice; 

however, it is not required. Some LLEAs may not be willing or able to participate, and the NRC 

also recognizes that requiring all licensees to exercise their response plans may not be cost 

effective for small licensees with less complex security plans. However, licensees’ security 

programs may benefit from exercising their response plans with their affected LLEA(s).
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§ 37.51, “Maintenance and Testing”

§ 37.51(a)

Each licensee subject to this subpart shall implement a maintenance and testing program to 

ensure that intrusion alarms, associated communication systems, and other physical 

components of the systems used to secure or detect unauthorized access to radioactive 

material are maintained in operable condition and are capable of performing their intended 

function when needed. The equipment relied on to meet the security requirements of this part 

must be inspected and tested for operability and performance at the manufacturer’s

suggested frequency. If there is no manufacturer’s suggested frequency, the testing must be 

performed at least annually, not to exceed 12 months.

EXPLANATION:

A licensee must implement a maintenance and testing program to ensure that intrusion alarms, 

associated communication systems, and other physical components of their detection systems 

remain operable and can perform their intended function when needed. Inspection and testing 

must be performed at the manufacturer’s suggested frequency or at least annually if the 

manufacturer has no suggested frequency.

Q&As:

Q1: What minimum measures should a licensee implement for a maintenance and testing 

program?

A1: A licensee should do the following:

• Identify all alarms, communication systems, and other physical components 

necessary to secure radioactive materials or to detect unauthorized access to

them.

• Specify the intended function of each component identified in the program and 

the minimum performance required to fulfill that function.

• Specify the test(s) that it will conduct on each component and identify the 

minimum quantitative or qualitative test results that are required for finding the 

component operable and capable of performing its intended function.

• Identify the testing equipment that it will use and prescribe any device-specific 

procedures necessary for the use or maintenance of this equipment.

• Identify the measures that it will apply to ensure that the testing equipment used 

in the program will perform in service as expected.

• Prescribe procedures for the routine maintenance of each intrusion alarm, 

communications system, and physical component of both the system used to

secure the subject radioactive material and the system used to detect 

unauthorized access.
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• Require a written record for each test and maintenance activity performed on the 

 security or detection system.

Q2: Do I have to inspect and test my facility’s security systems every month or every quarter 

year to meet this requirement?

A2: No. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.51(a) requires the licensee to conduct inspection and 

testing for operability and performance needs at the manufacturer’s suggested frequency. If the 

manufacturer has no suggested frequency, the licensee must perform the testing at least 

annually, not to exceed 12 months. However, regular daily or weekly use may confirm the 

operability and performance of some components, such as personnel and data communications 

systems.

Q3: Must I test and maintain every intrusion detection system or other security system on my 

facility site? If I determine that a detection or security device is unnecessary to meet 10 CFR 

Part 37 requirements, but still keep it energized, must I keep testing and maintaining it?

A3: No. The licensee is required to test and maintain only those components that it relies 

upon to meet the security requirements of this part for Category 2 or greater quantities of 

radioactive material. Because the regulation in 10 CFR 37.49(c)(2) also requires the licensee to 

provide alternative communication capabilities for transmitting personnel and data and for 

processing in the event of a loss of the primary capability, it must also test and maintain the 

systems for these alternative communication capabilities.

Q4: What’s the difference between maintaining a system or component in operable condition 

and ensuring that it is capable of performing its intended function when needed? Would 

licensees have to administer different tests for performance than for operability?

A4: The need for different tests would depend on the intended function of the system or 

component and on if that function of the system or component could be fulfilled if the system or 

component were only in operable condition. For example, the licensee would generally not

need to subject a locking deadbolt on a door that isolates radioactive materials to any additional 

testing as long as it could lock and unlock the door when necessary. However, an intrusion

alarm might be considered “in operable condition” if it can be turned on and made to produce an 

audible sound, but it would not necessarily be “capable of performing its intended function” if it

could not reliably detect the movement of an intruder with sufficient sensitivity at a given 

distance or if it could not produce a sound of sufficient volume to be audible at the nearest work 

area equipped to assess and respond.

Q5: What kinds of tests for intrusion alarms would be acceptable for demonstrating 

compliance?

A5: The licensee should refer to the manufacturer’s recommended testing protocol, if one is 

available, for each system or piece of equipment subject to testing and maintenance under 10

CFR 37.51. For additional guidance on IDS testing and maintenance, the licensee may also refer 

to Chapters 8.6 and 8.7 of NUREG-1959. Chapters 9.4 and 9.5 of this NUREG report also cover

testing and maintenance for backup power sources.
184

Q6: What should a licensee consider to be an “associated communication system” subject to 

testing and maintenance? Would a closed-circuit television monitoring system be considered a 

communication system, even if it’s intended primarily for the timely detection of an intrusion?

A6: The NRC considers a communications system to be “associated” if it fulfills any function 

essential for the operability or performance of the security or detection system as a whole, not 

just for the performance of intrusion alarms. For the purposes of this section, the NRC 

considers a “communication system” to be any device or network of devices used to transmit 

voice, video, data, or other information from a person or machine at one location to a recipient 

person or machine at another. This device could include a land-line phone, a walkie-talkie 

system, or a cell phone. A closed-circuit television monitoring system could also be considered 

a communication system within the meaning of this definition even if the system also performs 

monitoring or detection functions. An alarm system that incorporates motion-sensing devices 

could also be considered a communications system even if it also performs monitoring and 

detection functions. However, in either case, the testing and maintenance requirements in this 

section would apply because 10 CFR 37.51 applies to systems for securing radioactive 

materials and to systems for detecting unauthorized access to these materials. Any system 

designed to perform multiple functions would be subject to this section as long as one of the 

system’s functions supported either security or detection. For this example, the communication 

system comprises the lines or cabling that allows transmission of the data from the

closed-circuit television cameras to the recipient monitoring station. Such data lines or cabling 

is also subject to testing and maintenance.

Q7: Specifically, what “other physical components of the system” used for securing or 

monitoring access to radioactive material would be subject to the requirements for testing and 

maintenance? Aren’t all “components” of these systems inherently “physical”?

A7: To enable licensees to identify physical components of security systems other than 

alarms and communications systems, the NRC is using the word “physical” to distinguish 

tangible material components, such as architectural structures and equipment, from system 

“components” that comprise human beings and their actions, including the plans and

procedures that govern those actions. Thus, for a system that secures category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive material from unauthorized access within a security zone under 10 CFR

37.47(c)(1), any other component should be considered an “other physical component” if it

meets the following two criteria:

(1) It is not otherwise integrated into an alarm or communications system, nor is it an 

employee or contractor performing security-related work at the licensee’s site.

(2) Its intended function supports the isolation of these radioactive materials by the 

use of continuous physical barriers that allow access only through established 

access control points.

Examples of “other physical components” of security systems may thus include walls, doors, 

remotely operated doors, ceilings, floors, windows, storage containers, shielding, scales, 

mounting bolts, fasteners, key card systems, locks, keys (if applicable), emergency

alternate-power generators, and lighting.
185

Correspondingly, a component of a system used to maintain the capability to continuously 

monitor and detect, without delay, all unauthorized entries into its security zones under 10 CFR

37.49(a)(1) should be considered an “other physical component” if it meets the following two 

criteria:

(1) It is not otherwise integrated into an alarm or communications system, nor is it an 

employee or contractor performing security-related work at the licensee’s site.

(2) Its intended function supports the continuous monitoring and immediate detection 

of all unauthorized entries into the licensee’s security zone(s).

Examples of “other physical components” of detection systems may include video surveillance 

cameras and monitors, night-vision devices, motion sensors for self-illuminating floodlights, and 

tamper-indicating devices that are not otherwise integrated into an alarm or communication 

system. If a licensee opts to provide an alarm system for a loss of the primary power source for 

monitoring and detection systems, that system is also an example of an “other physical 

component” subject to testing and maintenance. If the licensee chooses instead to use an 

alternate- or auxiliary-power source, such as a gasoline-fueled generator, that alternate-power 

source would also be subject to testing and maintenance. See Q2 and A2 for

10 CFR 37.49(a)(1) above. The NRC recognizes that not all physical barriers will need to be 

“tested” in the sense of the term commonly understood to involve a rigorous, documented 

administration of specified evaluation procedures under controlled and often nonroutine 

conditions. The purpose of testing in this regulatory context is to confirm that the subject 

system component is operable and is capable of performing its intended function when 

necessary.

The licensee can use a number of methods to obtain confirmation that the subject system 

component is operable and is capable of performing its intended function when necessary; not 

all of these methods require the quantitative methods often associated with instrumentation and 

testing protocols. The operability of some physical barriers, such as keys, key cards, doors, 

walls, windows, two-way mirrors, and floors, is regularly and satisfactorily confirmed in the 

course of routine operations. The NRC recognizes that the licensee may not be able to test the 

performance capability of many physical barrier system components, such as tamper-indicating 

devices and jersey barriers, as security barriers without risking or resulting in a degradation of 

their performance. Other barriers, such as the locked entrance to a panoramic irradiator, serve 

a safety function for which testing could complicate the ALARA principle of radiation safety. In 

these cases, the NRC does not expect a licensee to conduct testing for a physical barrier’s 

performance if the test itself could compromise either radiation safety or the future performance 

of the component or system.

Q8: Will testing and maintenance have to be performed by approved individuals meeting the 

access authorization requirements of Subpart B?

A8: No. However, individuals who are not approved for unescorted access will need to be 

escorted when they are performing maintenance or testing activities within a security zone.
186

Q9: Will testing equipment need to be secured within a security zone?

A9: No. If the testing equipment is susceptible to tampering by an insider, keeping this 

equipment within the security zone could be a practical way for some licensees to control 

unauthorized access to this equipment; however, the NRC recognizes that, for space, 

operational, and other considerations, storage of security-sensitive testing equipment inside a 

security zone may not be feasible. In such cases, the licensee should consider other ways to 

control access to this equipment, such as a locker with a key pad, controlled key, key card, or 

combination lock.

Q10: What do I have to do to have an acceptable testing and maintenance program for my 

intrusion detection system (IDS)?

A10: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.51(a) requires the licensee’s program to cover the testing 

and maintenance of all IDSs that it relies upon to detect unauthorized access to radioactive 

material. The program must ensure that these systems and components are maintained in 

operable condition and are capable of performing their intended function when necessary. To 

maintain functionality, the licensee must periodically test the IDS and must perform 

maintenance on malfunctioning components. The NRC considers the testing program

acceptable if the IDS operates in a manner consistent with the licensee’s physical security plan. 

The licensee must test the entire IDS or components of the IDS at the frequency specified by

the manufacturer or at least annually. The licensee may choose to test the entire IDS or 

components of the IDS throughout the 12 months of the testing cycle.
 187

§ 37.51, “Maintenance and Testing” (continued)

§ 37.51(b)

The licensee shall maintain records on the maintenance and testing activities for 3 years.

EXPLANATION:

Maintenance and testing records must be kept for 3 years.

Q&As:

Q1: What kinds of records of maintenance and testing activities should a licensee maintain?

A1: For each maintenance activity, a record should identify the following items:

• the name(s) of the person(s) who performed the maintenance

• the date that the maintenance was performed

• the component(s) or system(s) on which the maintenance was performed

• the purpose of the maintenance, identifying, as appropriate, the deficiencies in 

operability or performance

• any maintenance activities needed to remove any deficiency in the operability or 

performance of the component or system

For each testing activity, a record should identify the following items:

• the name(s) of the person(s) who performed the testing

• the date of the testing

• the component(s) or system(s) tested

• the purpose of the testing

• the performance expected to fulfill the component’s or system’s intended

function

• the results of the testing

• any maintenance activities needed to remove any deficiency in the operability or 

performance of the component or system
188

§ 37.53, “Requirements for Mobile Devices”

§ 37.53

Each licensee that possesses mobile devices containing category 1 or category 2 quantities 

of radioactive material must:

§ 37.53(a)

Have two independent physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure the material from 

unauthorized removal when the device is not under direct control and constant surveillance by 

the licensee.

EXPLANATION:

Mobile devices containing category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material must have 

two independent tangible barriers to secure the material when the device is not under direct 

control and constant surveillance.

Q&As:

Q1: What is the performance objective of the requirement for two independent physical 

controls against the unauthorized removal of radioactive material when it’s not under direct 

control and constant surveillance?

A1: Because mobile devices can often be easily concealed and transported, they are 

particularly vulnerable to attempted theft or diversion. A mobile device could even be removed 

before the licensee has an opportunity to respond to an intrusion. Therefore, the objective of 

this requirement is to delay an attempt to steal the device by making it harder to steal. 

Achieving this objective would provide additional time for the licensee to detect, assess, and 

respond to an attempt by notifying an LLEA if necessary.

Q2: What does the NRC mean by “independent” physical controls?

A2: For purposes of compliance with this requirement, an “independent” physical control 

does not rely on any other system to deter or delay unauthorized removal of the radioactive 

material when the mobile device containing it is not under the licensee’s direct control and 

constant surveillance. Such a physical control must provide a barrier against unauthorized 

removal, regardless if any other barrier or system is disabled.

Examples of three independent physical controls used for category 1 or category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material in a mobile device at a licensed facility are as follows:

(1) storage of the device inside a locked storage shed within a secured outdoor area, 

such as a fenced parking area with a locked gate

(2) storage of the device in a room with a locked door within a secured building

for which access is controlled by a separate lock and key or by a security guard
189

(3) storage of the device inside a locked, nonportable cabinet inside a room with a 

locked door if the building is not secured

Examples of two independent physical controls used when the licensee secures the radioactive 

material in or on a transportation vehicle are as follows:

(1) storage of the mobile device in a container that is physically attached to a vehicle 

with the container secured by two separate chains or steel cables, each of which 

is locked and separately attached to the vehicle in such a manner that the 

container cannot be opened without the removal of both of the chains or cables

(2) storage of the device in a container inside a locked trunk, camper shell, van, or 

other similar enclosure with the container physically secured to the vehicle by a 

locked chain or steel cable in such a manner that the container could not be 

opened and the mobile device removed without both breaking into the enclosure 

on the vehicle and removing the chain or cable

Examples of two independent physical controls used at a temporary jobsite or at a location other 

than a licensed facility or a licensee’s vehicle are as follows:

(1) storage of the mobile device inside a locked building in a locked nonportable 

structure with the device physically secured by a locked chain or steel cable to 

the nonportable structure in such a manner that the device could not be 

removed without removing the chain or cable2

(2) storage of the device in a locked garage within a locked vehicle or physically 

secured by a locked chain or steel cable to a disabled vehicle in such a manner 

that the device could not be removed without removing the chain or cable

For large mobile devices on wheels that are used inside a facility, a variety of other independent 

physical controls, including the following, may accomplish additional delay:

• speed bumps too large for the device to traverse on the facility floor

• elevated doorway thresholds

• protective storage enclosures

• channels in a floor large enough to catch the device’s wheels

• fixed or retractable bollards

• wheel locks, including steering wheel locks (made of hardened material) that 

require a key or special tool to release

• a hardened chain and lock that cannot be easily cut

2 Note that a construction trailer, sea container, or parked and locked truck should not be considered a nonportable 

structure. See the Q&As below and those for the definition of “mobile device” in 10 CFR 37.5.
190

However, these additional physical controls for security purposes should not compromise 

safety. If improperly implemented, some of the suggested controls, such as elevated door 

thresholds and channels in a floor, may compromise occupational safety, and a licensee that 

intends to use such controls should address these issues.

Q3: Does this section require two physical barriers in addition to the physical barrier required 

for the security zone, or does a barrier for a security zone count as one of the two required 

barriers?

A3: A barrier for a security zone may count as one of the two required barriers if it is 

independent of the other barrier and has not been defeated (e.g., for lock replacement or the 

servicing of a key card device). Although the two barriers may be of the same type, such as a 

locked room within a locked room, the barriers have different purposes that contribute to 

defense-in-depth security. The tangible barriers required by 10 CFR 37.53 are to secure the 

material from unauthorized removal when the device is not under the licensee’s direct control 

and constant surveillance. The security zones required by 10 CFR 37.47 must control 

unescorted access, and licensees may control unescorted access by using continuous physical 

barriers that allow access to a security zone only through established access control points. A 

physical barrier for a security zone could control access to radioactive material and secure it 

from unauthorized removal; however, it must serve both purposes simultaneously and may not 

rely upon any other measures, such as the remote monitoring of the security zone entrance, to 

fulfill both functions.

Q4: If mobile devices are stored in one room, does that mean the licensee has an 

aggregated quantity of radioactive materials?

A4: The regulation provides that licensees must consider radioactive materials aggregated if 

the following criteria apply:

• Their total quantity at a single location equals or exceeds a category 2

quantity using the sum-of-fractions method. See the Q&As on the definition

of “aggregated” in 10 CFR 37.5.

• Breaching a common physical security barrier (e.g., a locked door at the 

entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the radioactive material or 

devices that contain the radioactive material. See the Q&As on physical 

barriers in 10 CFR 37.47.

For example, if the licensee stores several mobile devices—each of which is below the 

category 2 quantity threshold—in one room without any physical barriers between them, these 

devices would be considered aggregated if their combined activity equaled or exceeded the 

category 2 threshold.

Q5: If I have a category 1 or 2 quantity of radioactive material in a container that isn’t

mounted on wheels or casters and can’t be carried by hand, and I secure it in a pickup truck bed 

or on a trailer, would the NRC consider this source or device “mobile”?

A5: Yes. The NRC would consider the source or device mobile because the device would be

“mounted on wheels” (i.e., the truck/trailer wheels) and “equipped for moving without a need for 

disassembly or dismounting” under the definition of “mobile device.” A container or device on a
191

pickup truck bed or on a trailer would also subject the truck or tractor to the requirement in

10 CFR 37.53(b) for disabling the vehicle when the licensee does not have the container or 

device under direct control and constant surveillance. See the Q&As on 10 CFR 37.53(b).

Q6: If I have a radiography camera or other mobile device with a category 1 or 2 quantity of 

radioactive material, under what conditions would that device meet the exclusion for “stationary 

equipment installed in a fixed location” under the definition of “mobile device”?

A6: Under this definition, the device would need to be welded, bolted, or otherwise affixed to 

an immovable piece of equipment, such as an assembly line, in a manner that would require the 

disassembly and dismounting of additional equipment before the device could be moved. The 

device could also be excluded as “stationary equipment installed in a fixed location” if it were 

chained or cabled to a stationary piece of equipment and secured with a lock; however, the 

licensee would need to control access to the combination, key, password, or other means of 

unlocking the lock.
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§ 37.53, “Requirements for Mobile Devices” (continued)

§ 37.53(b)

For devices in or on a vehicle or trailer, unless the health and safety requirements for a site 

prohibit the disabling of the vehicle, the licensee shall utilize a method to disable the vehicle 

or trailer when not under direct control and constant surveillance by the licensee. Licensees 

shall not rely on the removal of an ignition key to meet this requirement.

EXPLANATION:

Unless health and safety requirements for a site prohibit the disabling of vehicles, the licensee 

must disable them when they are not under direct control and constant surveillance. Licensees 

may not rely on the removal of an ignition key to meet this requirement.

Q&As:

Q1: What are acceptable methods to disable a vehicle or trailer when it is not under direct 

control and constant surveillance by the licensee?

A1: The objective of the vehicle-disabling requirement is to delay unauthorized removal of a 

device by stealing the vehicle on which it is secured. Examples of acceptable vehicle-disabling 

methods would include trailer hitch locks, wheel locks (“boots”), or methods to disable the 

vehicle’s engine. The licensee cannot consider the removal of a standard key from a vehicle’s 

ignition sufficient for disabling a vehicle’s engine because a vehicle can be started without the 

key using, for example, a duplicated key or hot-wiring techniques. Many current advances in 

ignition and key technology may provide for additional barriers that would cause delay in 

accessing the radioactive material. An example is a key implanted with an electronic chip that is 

only recognizable to the computer programmed in the vehicle. Only this key, and not a 

duplicated key, would be able to start the vehicle. A licensee with this key system may request 

an exemption from 10 CFR 37.53(b) for that specific vehicle; however, the licensee would need 

to address the possibility of hot-wiring or other techniques to defeat the system. A similar 

disabling function may also be provided by biometric recognition systems when they become 

commercially available. Such technologies, which allow a vehicle to be operated only by a 

means that is not easily defeated, would be considered an appropriate means to disable a 

vehicle. However, the licensee should not rely on deflating the tires as an effective

immobilization technique because an adversary could easily re-inflate them with an air pump or

pressurized gas cartridge.

Q2: When a device in or on a vehicle is not under the licensee’s direct control and constant 

surveillance, this paragraph requires the licensee to disable the vehicle “unless health and 

safety requirements at a site “prohibit” such disabling. What kind of health and safety 

requirements at a site would the NRC deem to “prohibit” vehicle disabling?

A2: The facility or site requirements or procedures would need to specify that vehicles 

cannot be disabled or that they need to remain accessible for immediate relocation in an 

emergency. The regulation will not require the disabling of a vehicle or trailer at any site at 
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which a known or reasonably foreseeable operational hazard, such as an explosion, fire, or

release of a toxic substance, could require an individual to operate the vehicle immediately

to escape or to mitigate the hazard.

Q3: Does the requirement to secure mobile devices mean that all trucks will need an alarm 

system when they carry a device containing a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive 

material?

A3: No. However, if the truck is left unattended, the licensee must have a way to monitor 

and immediately detect, assess, and respond to an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or 

diversion. An alarm system is an acceptable method.

Q4: Can 1/8-inch wire cables be used to secure a radiography camera instead of chains? Is 

the lock then more of a vulnerability than the cable?

A4: Yes. The licensee may use a heavy-duty twisted steel wire cable instead of a chain to 

secure mobile devices. Ideally, the wire should be thick enough so that it can only be removed 

with a heavy-duty cable cutter (i.e., thickness greater than a 1/8-inch or 2-millimeter No. 10 

wire). However, any system is only as effective as its weakest component, and other 

components of the securing mechanism, including the lock, will need to have similar strength 

such that it too would require a heavy-duty bolt cutter for removal (typically, a tensile force of

2,000 pound-force and a shackle-cutting force test of 4,000 pound-force). Regulatory

Guide 5.12, “General Use of Locks in the Protection and Control of Facilities and Special 

Nuclear Materials,” issued November 1973, and NUREG-2166, “Physical Security Best 

Practices for the Protection of Risk-Significant Radioactive Material,” may provide some

useful information.

Q5: Can two or more barriers with separate locks that share the same key or lock 

combination qualify as “two independent physical controls” as stipulated in the requirement for 

securing mobile devices?

A5: Yes. Two or more barriers with separate locks that share the same key or lock 

combination could qualify as “two independent physical controls.” Whether separate locks use 

the same or different keys or combinations is an aspect of the licensee’s access control

program and does not determine if two barriers can be considered as “two independent physical 

controls.” Despite the number of keys or combinations used, the most important test for

ensuring that two independent physical controls exist is that each barrier is separate from the

other and that neither relies upon the other to perform its intended function. The same guidance 

applies when considering barriers to determine if material is aggregated. NUREG-2166, 

“Physical Security Best Practices for the Protection of Risk-Significant Radioactive Material,” 

may provide useful information.

An important aspect of a licensee’s physical protection program is controlling access at the 

licensee’s facility. If a key-based system is used, it is essential that the licensee distribute the 

keys only to personnel who have been granted unescorted access and who have a need for 

access to perform their assigned duties. The licensee must ensure that those individuals who 

are part of its physical protection program understand the importance of their roles and 

responsibilities for controlling access, especially if these individuals control combinations or 

keys that secure material.
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§ 37.55, “Security Program Review”

§ 37.55(a)

Each licensee shall be responsible for the continuing effectiveness of the security program. 

Each licensee shall ensure that the security program is reviewed to confirm compliance with 

the requirements of this subpart and that comprehensive actions are taken to correct any 

noncompliance that is identified. The review must include the radioactive material security 

program content and implementation. Each licensee shall periodically (at least annually) 

review the security program content and implementation.

§ 37.55(b)

The results of the review, along with any recommendations, must be documented. Each 

review report must identify conditions that are adverse to the proper performance of the 

security program; the cause of the condition(s); and, when appropriate, recommend 

corrective actions and corrective actions taken. The licensee shall review the findings and 

take any additional corrective actions necessary to preclude repetition of the condition, 

including reassessment of the deficient areas where indicated.

§ 37.55(c)

The licensee shall maintain the review documentation for 3 years.

EXPLANATION:

Each licensee must review its security program’s content and implementation at least annually. 

Each review report must identify adverse conditions and the causes of each condition. When 

appropriate, the report must recommend corrective actions and review corrective actions taken. 

The licensee must review the report’s findings and must take any additional corrective actions 

and reassessments necessary to preclude recurrence of the adverse condition(s).

Q&As:

Q1: How should a licensee evaluate the “effectiveness” of its security program to comply with

NRC requirements for program reviews?

A1: A licensee should consider several things when evaluating the continuing effectiveness 

of its security program. Specifically, it should consider its ability to confirm compliance with all 

the applicable requirements in this subpart and to take comprehensive and effective actions to 

correct identified noncompliances. However, most importantly, the licensee should keep in 

mind that continuing effectiveness is not a static condition. Continuing improvements are an 

essential part of an effective program. To minimize the potential for false negatives, the 

licensee’s program reviews must address each applicable requirement of this part. These 

reviews should identify adverse conditions, noncompliances, and root causes and should 

provide recommended corrective actions. The licensee should follow up on the implementation 

of these actions and reassess their impacts. Therefore, the hallmark of an effective program is 

not the absence of recorded adverse conditions or noncompliances. It is the documented

evidence that the licensee has made diligent efforts to find problems and that it is continuing to 

reassess the effectiveness of its actions to prevent them from reoccurring.
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Q2: What does the NRC mean by its requirement to review the security program content and 

implementation “at least annually”?

A2: Recognizing that some demands on a licensee’s time and resources are beyond its 

control, the NRC will consider that the licensee is conducting a program review “at least 

annually” if it conducts the review each year at about the same time of year. The licensee will 

comply if it reviews its program at regular intervals not to exceed 12 months.

Q3: Must a licensee engage an outside contractor to conduct security program reviews?

A3: No. Although hiring an independent party to conduct security program reviews would be 

one way for licensees to demonstrate compliance, the regulation does not require it. However, 

the licensee should, to the extent possible, try to avoid a situation in which the implementers of 

the program and their supervisors are reviewing their own work. If the licensee has a large 

enough staff, it could establish a review team of approved individuals led by an individual, such 

as the RO for access authorization decisions, who works outside the management chain of the 

licensee’s security staff. If the licensee conducts activities with category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive material at more than one location with a different security staff at each 

location, it could have the review team at one location review the program implemented by the 

staff of a different facility.

Q4: Does a licensee need to report to the NRC any noncompliance identified during a 

security program review?

A4: No. However, in accordance with the regulation, the licensee must “ensure...that 

comprehensive actions are taken to correct any noncompliance that is identified” by the review. 

The licensee must also document the corrective actions taken and “take any additional 

corrective actions...to preclude repetition of the condition.” This documentation must be made 

available for NRC inspection.

Q5: What would the NRC consider a “condition adverse to the proper performance of the 

security program”?

A5: The NRC would consider, as an adverse condition, any occurrence or continuing state 

that degrades or could degrade, if it is not corrected, the ability of the physical security system 

to detect, or respond to, an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of a category 1 or 

category 2 quantity of radioactive material without delay. An example of an adverse condition 

might be a breach in a physical barrier, a missing or misdirected motion detector, or a door that 

fails to latch and lock itself when closed. An adequate program review should never be limited 

to looking only for existing or imminent noncompliances. It should assess or reassess all 

conditions that may call into question the continuing effectiveness of the licensee’s security 

program.

Q6: The regulation requires the report resulting from a program review to recommend 

corrective actions “when appropriate.” When should a licensee recommend corrective actions?

A6: The rule does not specify particular conditions for which corrective action is required; 

however, a program review report should, as prudent practice, recommend at least one 

corrective action for each noncompliance or “condition adverse to the proper performance of the 

security program” identified as a result of the review.
196

Q7: What should a licensee consider as “review documentation” for the purposes of this 

subsection?

A7: The licensee should retain the approved final version of its annual review report and any 

attachments or enclosures related to that report. Related records should include the 

membership and leadership of the review team (if applicable), a description of the management 

approval process for the annual report (if applicable), root cause analyses for identified 

noncompliances or adverse conditions, recommended corrective actions, evaluations of the 

effectiveness of past corrective actions, and other documents that were considered in the 

review. Review documentation should also include minority views on issues in the report on 

which significant professional disagreement was present. The NRC does not expect a licensee 

to retain meeting records, the notes of each member of a review team, or rough drafts of its 

annual security program reviews.

Q8: This section introduces the term “radioactive material security program.” Is there a 

difference between this term and the term “security program” for the purposes of this section?

A8: No. Both refer to the security program required by 10 CFR Part 37.
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§ 37.57, “Reporting of Events”

§ 37.57(a)

The licensee shall immediately notify the LLEA after determining that an unauthorized entry 

resulted in an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of a category 1 or category 2 

quantity of radioactive material. As soon as possible after initiating a response, but not at the 

expense of causing delay or interfering with the LLEA response to the event, the licensee 

shall notify the NRC Operations Center ((301) 816-5100). In no case shall the notification to 

the NRC be later than 4 hours after the discovery of any attempted or actual theft, sabotage, 

or diversion.

EXPLANATION:

A licensee must notify the LLEA immediately after determining that an unauthorized entry 

resulted in an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of radioactive material. The 

licensee must also notify the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible (not later than

4 hours after discovery) but not at the expense of causing delay or interfering with the LLEA

response to the event.

Q&As:

Q1: The regulation requires a licensee to notify the LLEA immediately after initiating “an 

appropriate response” to an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of a category 1 or 

category 2 quantity of radioactive material. What kind of response by the licensee would the 

NRC consider “appropriate”? Under what circumstances, if any, would an armed licensee 

response before the arrival of the LLEA be considered appropriate?

A1: As soon as the licensee has determined that an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or 

diversion is in progress, an appropriate licensee response pending the arrival of LLEA 

assistance would depend on the licensee’s assessment of the intruder’s intent and his or her 

ability to carry out theft, sabotage, or diversion. A single unarmed individual who has only made 

an unauthorized entry at the perimeter of a security zone may call for a different response than 

the intrusion of several armed individuals who had removed, or who were about to remove, a 

category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material. The appropriateness of the licensee’s 

response should also consider the applicability of the licensee’s written procedures to the actual 

circumstances. For example, these procedures could require the licensee to consider the 

proximity of the intrusion to the target material, the quantity of material at risk of sabotage or 

unauthorized removal, the quality and quantity of any remaining physical barriers to the removal 

of the material or the escape of the intruders, and if the physical barriers are likely to delay the 

intruders sufficiently for the anticipated arrival of the LLEA. The regulation does not require a 

licensee’s security staff to be armed for its response to be deemed appropriate. A decision to 

arm a facility’s security personnel is solely up to the licensee and would depend on applicable 

State laws.
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Q2: The regulation requires the licensee to notify the NRC Operations Center “as soon as 

possible” after initiating a response, “but not at the expense of causing delay or interfering with 

the LLEA response to the event...[and] in no case...later than 4 hours after its discovery.” What 

would the NRC consider to be causes of delay or interferences with the LLEA’s response 

sufficient to justify a licensee decision to postpone notifying the NRC?

A2: Any justification for postponing a notification to the NRC would depend on the 

circumstances of the event. Perhaps the most compelling justification would be a situation 

requiring a licensee to devote all available resources to restoring its facility to a

safe condition or to protecting individuals from actual or threatened physical harm, as in the case

of a fire or explosion, or from an armed hostage-taking event. An ongoing attempt to steal the

material or use it for sabotage could also require the licensee to assist the LLEA before or after

its arrival. A similar necessity for the licensee’s assistance could be the threat of a bomb hidden

somewhere on the facility site. Under such circumstances, the responding licensee staff could

be justified in postponing notification of the NRC until the LLEA had determined that the 

licensee’s assistance in the response is no longer required. However, if an employee of the 

licensee outside of its onsite security staff became aware of the emergency and was not 

immediately needed to help the security staff respond to the event, the NRC would expect that 

employee to notify his or her management and would expect the licensee to notify the agency

as soon as possible. The same would be true if the licensee discovered an apparent theft of a 

category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material after the fact; the NRC would expect

the licensee to notify it immediately after notifying the LLEA and initiating measures to ascertain 

if the missing material was still on the premises. However, the NRC can envision none but the 

most extreme and unusual circumstances to justify delaying a notification of more than 4 hours

after the discovery of any attempted or actual theft, sabotage, or diversion.

Q3: To avoid an NRC notice of violation after the event, would I have to obtain confirmation 

from the LLEA that a delay in the licensee’s notification of the NRC was necessary to avoid 

delaying or interfering with the LLEA’s response?

A3: No. However, the licensee is not prohibited from seeking the LLEA’s endorsement of its 

decision to delay NRC notification. The NRC would take the LLEA’s judgment into account; 

however, the agency’s determination of compliance or noncompliance with this notification 

requirement would rest principally on an assessment of the specific facts and circumstances of 

the situation, not on the LLEA’s judgment.

Q4: Should notification to the LLEA be made by a radiographer at a temporary jobsite if a 

device is stolen from the temporary jobsite?

A4: Yes. The licensee should contact the LLEA that can provide the most prompt and 

effective response. (See also the Q&As for 10 CFR 37.45(d) and 10 CFR 37.49(d).)

Q5: When I determine that an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of radioactive 

materials has begun, what information must I report to what organization (the NRC or LLEA)?

A5: In the event of any actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of radioactive 

material protected under 10 CFR Part 37, the licensee must notify the LLEA immediately, 

followed soon afterward by a call to the NRC Operations Center at (301) 816-5100. Telephone

calls to notify the NRC should be made as prompt as possible but not at the expense of causing 

delay or interfering with the LLEA’s response to the event.
199

The licensee’s notification to the LLEA should provide, at minimum, a basic “who, what, when, 

and where” description of the event. To facilitate a timely and effective LLEA response, the 

licensee should also answer any follow-on questions from the LLEA. For example, these 

questions could request information on landmarks at the affected facility’s location; an estimate 

of the kinds and quantities of radioactive material that could be affected and a description of the 

type of container for the material (e.g., a stationary or a mobile device or another type of 

container); the number of intruders believed to be involved and available information about their 

weaponry, equipment, and apparent objectives; the location(s) of the unauthorized activity

within the facility and the closest safe access point for incoming LLEA personnel; a description 

of the physical barrier system deployed to isolate the radioactive materials from unauthorized

access; and a summary description of the licensee’s other security measures and resources

available to assist LLEA responders. The licensee may give information to the LLEA on its 

physical protection of radioactive materials without violating the information protection 

requirements in 10 CFR 37.43(d).

The licensee’s notification to the NRC should provide, at minimum, a basic “who, what, when, 

and where” description of the event. Depending on the NRC’s need for additional information, 

the licensee could also provide some of the information already provided to the LLEA. For 

example, this information could include the number of intruders believed to be involved and 

available information about their weaponry, equipment, and apparent objectives; a description of 

the physical barrier system deployed to isolate the radioactive materials from unauthorized 

access; and a summary description of the licensee’s other security measures and resources 

available to assist responders. However, for either kind of agency notification, the licensee 

should consider the known and potential needs of the recipient agency for mission-related 

information and should address these issues, if possible, beforehand in its security plan and 

procedures. The licensee should also consider that compliance with these notification 

requirements will not relieve it from making other reports, as required by other State or local 

laws.

Q6: Since facilities are also broken into in order to obtain equipment or valuables other than 

radioactive materials, do licensees need to notify the LLEA and the NRC Operations Center 

every time there is a break-in?

A6: No. The regulation does not require a licensee to request LLEA assistance and to notify 

NRC offices except in response to an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of a 

category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material. Thus, the licensee’s decision on 

whether to call the police and affected regulators would depend on an assessment of whether 

the intent of the detected break-in was to perpetrate an unauthorized use of the radioactive 

material. This assessment of intent could, in turn, depend, among other things, on the proximity 

of the detected intrusion to any security zone that the licensee has established to isolate the 

radioactive material from unauthorized access. A licensee’s assessment and response to an 

intrusion alarm in an office supply stockroom could be entirely different from its assessment and 

response to an intrusion alarm in the radioactive materials storage area. However, the NRC 

would expect the licensee’s security plan and procedures to address ways to distinguish an 

actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of the subject radioactive material from a breakin for other purposes. Although the licensee would probably still call the LLEA for a break-in to

the office area, it would not need to notify the NRC unless radioactive materials were involved.
200

Q7: If someone reports lost or missing category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive 

material, how would the NRC respond?

A7: If such an incident occurs, the NRC will expect the licensee to implement the appropriate 

elements of its security plan. The NRC will also monitor the situation to ensure that the licensee 

is taking the appropriate actions to locate and recover the missing material. The National 

Response Framework requires the NRC to notify and coordinate with other Federal agencies as 

needed.
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§ 37.57, “Reporting of Events” (continued)

§ 37.57(b)

The licensee shall assess any suspicious activity related to possible theft, sabotage, or 

diversion of category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material and notify the LLEA as 

appropriate. As soon as possible but not later than 4 hours after notifying the LLEA, the 

licensee shall notify the NRC Operations Center ((301) 816-5100).

EXPLANATION:

A licensee must assess any suspicious activity related to the possible theft, sabotage, or 

diversion of radioactive material and must notify the LLEA as appropriate. The licensee must 

also notify the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible, but not later than 4 hours after 

notifying the LLEA.

Q&As:

Q1: Why am I required to report suspicious activities to the NRC?

A1: The reporting of suspicious activities is important for evaluating the threat against 

licensed facilities and material. The NRC reviews individual notifications of suspicious activities 

to evaluate if potential preoperational activities (i.e., multiple events at a single site or multiple 

events at multiple sites) may be part of a larger plan and to integrate this information with other 

agencies in the homeland security and intelligence communities. The NRC is not asking 

licensees to actively gather intelligence but instead to report information that they believe is 

relevant to the security of their facility or activity. The reporting requirements provide a 

consistent means of communicating this information to the NRC.

Q2: Do I need to call the NRC after the LLEA for issues not related to my licensed activities 

with radioactive materials?

A2: No. The licensee does not need to contact the NRC for such issues unless it concludes 

that these issues could affect the security or safety of its materials (e.g., if the licensee discovers

an unauthorized weapon, drugs, or other contraband inside a controlled area). The NRC 

broadly worded both the regulations and guidance in this area to provide licensees flexibility.

Q3: Where can I find additional guidance on what the NRC considers suspicious activities 

that should be reported?

A3: Annex C, “Examples of Reportable Suspicious Activities under 10 CFR 37.57(b),” to 

Subpart C provides examples of activities that could be considered suspicious activities; 

however, these are not all-inclusive examples. Each licensee is responsible for developing and 

periodically reassessing its own criteria for identifying suspicious activities based on local 

conditions, recent events, and lessons learned by others. For this purpose, licensees may find 

the Safeguard New York publication of the New York State Division of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Services useful because it provides examples of suspicious activities and indicators

for heightened surveillance. In addition, a more exhaustive analysis can be found in a 2006
202

University of Arkansas study, funded by the National Institute of Justice, entitled, “Pre-Incident

Indicators of Terrorist Incidents: The Identification of Behavioral, Geographic, and Temporal 

Patterns of Preparatory Conduct,” issued March 2006. Numerous other sources are available 

on and off the Internet as well.

Q4: If I don’t think an unusual activity is “suspicious” and don’t report it, and it turns out to be 

related to a security incident, will I be in violation of this requirement?

A4: No. The NRC recognizes that judgments about what is “suspicious” are inherently 

subjective and are often influenced by personal experience and community history. After an 

event, it is more important that the licensee learn from it and take measures to prevent its 

reoccurrence than it is to assign individual blame. For this reason, the licensee must report, 

even if after the fact, any unusual but seemly nonthreatening activity that, in retrospect, is found 

to have been a precursor to an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion. The NRC, law 

enforcement agencies, and the intelligence community need this information to help identify the 

likely perpetrators of similar tactics in the future and to integrate as much credible evidence as 

possible into a pattern that might indicate an ongoing adversary strategy. Prompt licensee 

reporting of suspicious activities also enables the NRC to alert other licensees to look for similar 

activities as possible early indicators of a pending attack.

Q5: What if one of my employees or contractors thinks everything is suspicious and 

frequently reports any nonroutine activity as suspicious? How can I discourage over-reporting 

that could have the counterproductive effect of making my LLEA(s) less inclined to respond?

A5: The licensee can develop criteria for identifying suspicious activities based on Annex C 

and any other pertinent sources, including one or more of those cited above. The licensee 

should incorporate these criteria into its site security procedures, should make these procedures 

available to all facility staff and contractors, and should require all observers of suspicious 

activities to refer to the procedures in after-action reports. Depending on the size of the 

licensee’s workforce and on the possibility of unwanted chilling effects on reporting, the licensee 

can also require a first observer to report to the site security officer or his or her designee before 

reporting to the LLEA and the NRC. In addition, note that 10 CFR 37.57(b) does not require the 

reporting of all activities that might at first appear suspicious; the regulation requires reporting

“as appropriate,” which allows licensees to investigate before deciding if the activity warrants 

reporting.
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§ 37.57, “Reporting of Events” (continued)

§ 37.57(c)

The initial telephonic notification required by paragraph (a) of this section must be followed 

within a period of 30 days by a written report submitted to the NRC by an appropriate method 

listed in § 37.7. The report must include sufficient information for NRC analysis and 

evaluation, including identification of any necessary corrective actions to prevent future 

instances.

EXPLANATION:

The licensee must submit a written report within 30 days to the NRC for its analysis and 

evaluation. The report must identify any necessary corrective actions.

Q&As:

Q1: Other than identifying “any necessary corrective actions,” what, at a minimum,

should a licensee’s written report on a security incident contain in order to provide “sufficient 

information for NRC analysis and evaluation”?

A1: The content and detail of the report would depend on a number of considerations, 

including the nature and severity of the security incident, whether it was a first occurrence or a 

reoccurrence and if it has a significant potential to recur, the adequacy of the licensee’s 

monitoring efforts, the timeliness of the initial detection, the accuracy of the assessment, and 

the timeliness and potential effectiveness of the measures implemented in response to the 

incident. If the incident had occurred for the first time, the report should discuss whether the 

licensee’s security plan and procedures had anticipated the incident. In addition to an 

identification of corrective actions, the report should describe the data and analyses that 

supported the licensee’s identification of the root and significant contributing cause(s) of the 

incident and should explain how these data and analyses supported the licensee’s selection of 

corrective actions identified. If the incident was a recurrence of a similar incident, the report 

should briefly describe past corrective actions and the findings of past reassessments and

should identify likely reasons that the past corrective actions have not prevented a recurrence of 

the condition. The report should then explain the basis for the licensee’s determination that the

proposed new or revised corrective actions or that changes in the licensee’s implementation of 

these actions are likely to prevent a recurrence of the condition or to mitigate its effects.
204

ANNEX C

EXAMPLES OF REPORTABLE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES UNDER 10 CFR 37.57(b)

A licensee should not consider security events reported under 10 CFR 37.57(b) as performance 

failures; instead, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) considers timely and 

comprehensive communication of matters relating to threats, attacks, or suspicious activities a 

vital component of its efforts to assess the current threat environment. Because adversaries of 

the United States have demonstrated an ability to attack multiple independent targets, timely 

reporting of nonthreatening, but suspicious, activities is important to the NRC, law enforcement 

agencies, and the intelligence community in their efforts to integrate potential adversary plans, 

intentions, and suspicious event reports into a current threat assessment. Prompt reporting of 

actual or imminent hostile actions permits the NRC to execute its strategic missions of 

communicating to senior Federal officials and other licensees about hostile actions against the 

facilities and activities that the agency regulates, thereby protecting public health and safety, the 

common defense and security, and the environment.

In accordance with 10 CFR 37.57(b), the licensee should report the following security-related 

events involving suspicious activity that may indicate preoperational surveillance, 

reconnaissance, or intelligence-gathering activities directed against licensees or their facilities:

• an individual(s) with nonroutine interests or inquiries related to security measures; 

personnel or vehicle entry points and access controls; or vehicle barrier systems, 

including fences, walls, or other barriers

• an individual(s) conducting unapproved photographing or videotaping of licensed 

facilities

• suspicious attempts to recruit or compromise employees or staff and licensee 

contractors, who are knowledgeable of key personnel, facilities, or systems, into 

providing security information

• an individual who loiters for no apparent purpose in areas in which he or she

could gather intelligence or could perform preoperational reconnaissance

• an individual who displays suspicious behavior (e.g., fleeing, moving quickly away from 

the licensee or certificate-holder personnel, or unexpected vehicular movement)

• an individual who is secretively sketching, making a map, or taking notes on the facility

• an individual who is eliciting information from security or other site personnel on security 

systems or vulnerabilities

• unusual challenges to security systems that could represent attempts to gather 

information on system performance or personnel or equipment response actions
 205

• unauthorized attempts to probe or gain access to the licensee’s business secrets 

 or other sensitive information or to control systems, including the use of social 

 engineering techniques (e.g., impersonating authorized users)

• theft or suspicious loss of official company identification documents, uniforms, or 

 vehicles necessary to access plant facilities

• use of forged, stolen, or fabricated documents to support access control or 

 authorization activities

• unusual attempts to obtain information or documents related to site security 

 training, techniques, procedures, or practices

• discovery of Internet site postings that make violent threats related to specific 

 licensed facilities or activities

• unusual threats or terrorist-related activities that become known to facility

 security or management involving (1) unusual surveillance, probing, or reconnaissance, 

 (2) attempts to gain unauthorized access, (3) attempts to gain access to, or acquire,

 hazardous or dangerous materials, unusual use of materials, or (5) financing to support 

 terrorist activities

• stated threats against the licensee’s facility or staff, unless the licensee determines that 

 the threats are unsubstantiated

• unsubstantiated bomb or extortion threats that are considered to be related to 

 harassment, including those that represent tests of response capabilities or 

 intelligence-gathering activities or an attempt to disrupt facility operations

• fires or explosions of suspicious or unknown origin

• the unauthorized operation, manipulation, or tampering of radioactive material 

 in quantities of concern or the unauthorized operation, manipulation, or 

 tampering of security-related structures, systems, and components that could 

 prevent the implementation of the licensee’s protective strategy

• the intentional cutting of wires that does not affect the facility or security 

 operations

• the modification of security equipment that renders the equipment inoperable

• the overt changing of equipment or control settings

The NRC does not consider this list to be exclusive or exhaustive. Additionally, licensees 

should evaluate an event that is not reportable under this requirement for reporting or recording 

under the other provisions of 10 CFR Part 37.
 206

SUBPART D—PHYSICAL PROTECTION IN TRANSIT

§ 37.71, “Additional Requirements for Transfer of Category 1 and Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material”

§ 37.73, “Applicability of Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities 

of Radioactive Material during Transit”

§ 37.75, “Preplanning and Coordination of Shipment of Category 1 or Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material”

§ 37.77, “Advance Notification of Shipment of Category 1 Quantities of Radioactive

Material”

§ 37.79, “Requirements for Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material during Shipment”

§ 37.81, “Reporting of Events”

§ 37.71, “Additional Requirements for Transfer of Category 1 and Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material”

A licensee transferring a category 1 or category 2 quantity of radioactive material to a 

licensee of the Commission or an Agreement State shall meet the license verification 

provisions listed below instead of those listed in 10 CFR 30.41(d) of this chapter:

§ 37.71(a)

Any licensee transferring category 1 quantities of radioactive material to a licensee of the 

Commission or an Agreement State, prior to conducting such transfer, shall verify with the 

NRC’s license verification system or the license issuing authority that the transferee’s 

license authorizes the receipt of the type, form, and quantity of radioactive material to be 

transferred and that the licensee is authorized to receive radioactive material at the location 

requested for delivery. If the verification is conducted by contacting the license issuing 

authority, the transferor shall document the verification. For transfers within the same 

organization, the licensee does not need to verify the transfer.

§ 37.71(b)

Any licensee transferring category 2 quantities of radioactive material to a licensee of the 

Commission or an Agreement State, prior to conducting such transfer, shall verify with the 

NRC’s license verification system or the license issuing authority that the transferee’s 

license authorizes the receipt of the type, form, and quantity of radioactive material to be 

transferred. If the verification is conducted by contacting the license issuing authority, the 

transferor shall document the verification. For transfers within the same organization, the 

licensee does not need to verify the transfer.
207

§ 37.71(c)

In an emergency where the licensee cannot reach the license issuing authority and the 

license verification system is nonfunctional, the licensee may accept a written certification by 

the transferee that it is authorized by license to receive the type, form, and quantity of 

radioactive material to be transferred. The certification must include the license number, 

current revision number, issuing agency, expiration date, and, for a category 1 shipment, the 

authorized address. The licensee shall keep a copy of the certification. The certification must 

be confirmed by use of the NRC’s license verification system or by contacting the licenseissuing authority by the end of the next business day.

§ 37.71(d)

The transferor shall keep a copy of the verification documentation as a record for 3 years.

EXPLANATION:

Before transferring category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material, the shipping 

licensee must verify that the transferee’s license is valid. The licensee can conduct this 

verification by using the NRC’s license verification system (LVS) or by contacting the agency 

(the NRC or Agreement State) that issued the transferee’s license. The licensee must maintain 

verification documentation for 3 years.

Q&As:

Q1: Is verification of the transferee’s license necessary?

A1: Yes. The regulations in 10 CFR 37.71 require the licensee to verify that recipients of 

category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material are licensed and are authorized to 

receive them. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.71(a) requires the verification to occur before the 

radioactive material is actually transferred. Verification is not required for transfers within the 

same organization or company.

Q2: What information needs to be verified?

A2: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.71(a) requires the licensee to verify that the transferee’s 

license authorizes receipt of the type, form, and quantity of radioactive material that will be 

transferred. For transfers of category 1 quantities of radioactive material, the shipping licensee 

must also verify that the receiving licensee is authorized to receive radioactive material at the 

address requested for delivery.

Q3: How does a licensee conduct the verification?

A3: The licensee could conduct these verifications by using the NRC’s LVS or, if the system 

is not available, by contacting the license-issuing authority (i.e., the NRC or the appropriate 

Agreement State agency). Licensees should contact the appropriate NRC regional office to 

verify the validity of NRC licensees. Information on Agreement State contacts appears on the 

NRC Web page at http://nrc-stp.ornl.gov/asdirectory.html. Use of the LVS when it becomes

available will be the preferred method for license verification.
208

Q4: May I use a fax or e-mail to verify the validity of a license, or just keep a copy of the 

recipient’s license on file?

A4: No. Neither facsimile nor e-mail provide the positive identification needed for verifying

the validity of a license because an individual can alter an electronic image of the license to

change its possession limits, authorized location of use, or even the name of the person who

received the license. Keeping a copy of the recipient’s license on file also is inadequate for 

verifying the validity of a license because the license could be amended or terminated. The

licensee shipping the material would not know that the intended recipient’s license was no

longer valid. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.71(a) requires the licensee to use the LVS or to

contact the regulatory agency (the NRC or Agreement State) to verify that a license is valid

before shipping category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material to a domestic

company.

Q5: What is the License Verification System?

A5: The LVS is a new Web-based NRC system designed to enable users to verify 

electronically the validity of a license issued by either the NRC or an Agreement State. Use of 

the LVS is the preferred method for license verification. If the system is not available, licensees 

would need to contact the appropriate licensing agency. More information will be available once 

the system is fully developed and operational.

Q6: If the licensee is transferring the material to DOE or to an entity that does not have an 

NRC or Agreement State license (e.g., for exporting the material), does it still need to verify the 

transfer?

A6: No. The license verification requirement is only applicable if the licensee is transferring 

category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material to a licensee of the NRC or an 

Agreement State. License verification is not required to transfer material to DOE or to any other 

Federal entity that does not have an NRC or Agreement State license. However, licensees 

exporting material would need to meet the requirements in 10 CFR Part 110, “Export and Import 

of Nuclear Equipment and Material,” for checking the documentation that the recipient has the 

necessary authorization under the laws and regulations of the importing country.

Q7: Why are there differences between the category 1 and category 2 verification 

requirements?

A7: Because category 1 quantities of radioactive material are of greater concern than 

category 2, the regulation in 10 CFR 37.71(a) subjects the licensee that is transferring 

category 1 quantities to the additional requirement of verifying that the receiving licensee is 

authorized to receive radioactive material at the address requested for delivery.

Q8: When should a licensee document the verification, and how should it be documented?

A8: The rule only requires documentation if the shipping licensee (the licensee sending the 

licensed material) conducts the verification by contacting the NRC or Agreement State

license-issuing authority. If the licensee uses the LVS, the system will save the record; the

licensee would not need to keep further documentation. If the licensee contacts the licenseissuing authority, it should document the communication. If the contact was by phone, the

licensee should prepare a note to file that contains information on the transfer (i.e., the company

name, the license number, the material being transferred, and the address for category 1
209

shipments), the date of the communication, and the name of the individual at the licensing

agency. If conduct of the communication was done by e-mail or facsimile, the licensee should

retain a copy of the e-mail or facsimile from the licensing agency.

Q9: If I can’t reach the regulatory agency or access the LVS to verify that the recipient of my 

shipment is licensed to receive and possess the material, do I have to postpone the shipment 

until I obtain the verification?

A9: No. The rule provides an alternative that allows licensees to ship in situations in which 

the regulator cannot be reached or the LVS is inaccessible. Under 10 CFR 37.71(c), the 

shipping licensee may obtain a written certification from the receiving licensee noting that it is 

authorized to receive the requested radioactive material. The certification must include the 

license number; current revision number; issuing agency; expiration date; and, for a category 1 

shipment, the authorized address. The shipping licensee must follow up with LVS or the 

license-issuing authority by the end of the next business day to confirm that the recipient’s

license is valid. A copy of the certification must be retained. The licensee can fax or e-mail the 

certification, and receipt of the certification through the mail is not necessary.

Q10: If I rely on the recipient licensee’s certification to ship material under the provisions of

10 CFR 37.71(c) for emergencies, what do I do if I discover that the recipient’s license is not 

valid for the transfer after the shipment has been sent?

A10: First, the licensee should contact the regulatory agency to determine if the recipient’s 

license authorizes the shipment. If the licensee used the LVS, the system may not have yet 

updated the information to reflect a license amendment. If the regulatory agency confirms that 

the recipient is not authorized to receive the material, the licensee should discuss, with the 

regulatory agency, what actions should be taken. One possible action is to contact the carrier to 

determine if it has delivered the shipment. If it has not, the licensee may be able to request that 

the carrier return the shipment. If the shipment has been delivered, the licensee may need to 

notify the LLEA at the licensee’s location and the NRC’s Operation Center. Another possible 

action is for the recipient to request a license amendment that would authorize the radioactive 

material in question.

Q11: Do I need to verify a transfer if I am sending the material to another location within the 

company?

A11: No. For transfers within the same organization, the licensee does not need to verify the 

transfer.

Q12: What should I do if I receive an unusual order?

A12: The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 do not require a shipping licensee to notify its 

regulatory agency of an unusual order. The licensee should, however, as good practice, 

carefully review orders from unfamiliar entities, even if their licenses and possession limits can 

be verified. Similarly, the licensee should, as good practice, carefully review an order from a 

previous recipient licensee if the order appears unusual compared to previous shipments to that

licensee in regard to the type, form, destination, and quantity of material that will be shipped. 

Unusual orders raise heightened security concerns, including attempts to obtain radioactive 

materials, and shipping licensees should take appropriate precautions. These precautions 

include contacting the receiving licensee or the governing regulatory authority or both.
210

Q13: Typical source or device manufacturer and distributor licensees could ship 50 to 60 

sources a day to user licensees in many different jurisdictions. An M&D licensee could thus be 

making 50 or 60 calls a day—or more, if the M&D licensee hasn't gotten an immediate response 

on its first call—to get the regulatory authority’s verification for each shipment. The same 

problem could arise for user licensees returning these sources or devices to the M&D licensee; 

every single user licensee would have to call the appropriate Agreement State or NRC office to 

verify that the M&D licensee is authorized to receive the sources. Is verification necessary for 

each shipment, even for returns to the M&D licensee?

A13: Yes. Verification of each shipment is necessary. One of the recommended actions of 

the 2006 “Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report” was that the NRC 

consider imposing “additional measures to verify the validity of licenses, before transfer of

risk-significant radioactive sources, on all licensees authorized to possess category 1 and 2 

quantities of radioactive material” (Action 4-1, page xxvii, pages 48–50). The NRC agrees with

the recommended action and maintains that verification of the intended recipient’s license 

before transfer is important to enhance the security of the material by validating the licensee’s

legitimacy. Using the LVS instead of calling the regulatory agency should significantly reduce 

the burden and should allow 100-percent validation of licenses before the transfer of category 1 

or category 2 quantities of radioactive material. The Radiation Source Protection and Security

Task Force is an interagency task force mandated by the EPAct.
211

§ 37.73, “Applicability of Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material during Transit”

§ 37.73(a)

For shipments of category 1 quantities of radioactive material, each shipping licensee shall 

comply with the requirements for physical protection contained in §§ 37.75(a) and (e); 

37.77; 37.79(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c); and 37.81(a), (c), (e), (g) and (h).

§ 37.73(b)

For shipments of category 2 quantities of radioactive material, each shipping licensee shall 

comply with the requirements for physical protection contained in §§ 37.75(b) through (e);

37.79(a)(2), (a)(3), (b)(2), and (c); and 37.81(b), (d), (f), (g), and (h). For those shipments of 

category 2 quantities of radioactive material that meet the criteria of § 71.97(b) of this

chapter, the shipping licensee shall also comply with the advance notification provisions of §

71.97 of this chapter.

§ 37.73(c)

The shipping licensee shall be responsible for meeting the requirements of this subpart 

unless the receiving licensee has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit physical 

protection required under this subpart.

§ 37.73(d)

Each licensee that imports or exports category 1 quantities of radioactive material shall 

comply with the requirements for physical protection contained in §§ 37.75(a)(2) and (e);

37.77; 37.79(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c); and 37.81(a), (c), (e), (g), and (h) during the domestic 

portion of the shipment.

§ 37.73(e)

Each licensee that imports or exports category 2 quantities of radioactive material shall 

comply with the requirements for physical protection during transit contained in §§

37.79(a)(2), (a)(3), (b)(2), and (d); and 37.81(b), (d), (f), (g), and (h) during the domestic 

portion of the shipment.

EXPLANATION:

This section establishes which provisions apply for shipments of category 1 and category 2 

quantities of radioactive material. The shipping licensee is responsible for meeting the 

requirements unless the receiving licensee agrees in writing to assume responsibility. For ease 

of reference, see the table below.
a) ( 5

7. 37

§

2) () a( 5

7. 37

§

b) ( 5

7. 37

§

c) ( 5

7. 37

§

d) ( 5

7. 37

§

e) ( 5

7. 37

§

77 . 37

§

1) () a( 9

7. 37

§

2) () a( 9

7. 37

§

3) () a( 9

7. 37

§

1) () b( 9

7. 37

§

2) () b( 9

7. 37

§

c) ( 9

7. 37

§

) a( 18. 37

§

b) ( 18. 37

§

c) ( 18. 37

§

d) ( 18. 37

§

Category 1 

shipments

x x x x x x X x x 

Category 2 

shipments* x x x x x x x X x x 

Domestic 

portion of 

Category 1 

imports/ 

exports

x x x x x X x x 

Domestic 

portion of 

Category 2 

imports/ 

exports

x x x x x 

212

Applicability Table for Subpart D Requirements

*For shipments of category 2 quantities that meet the criteria of 10 CFR 71.97(b), the shipping licensee must also comply with the adv

notification provisions of 10 CFR 71.97, “Advanced Notification of Shipment of Irradiated Reactor Fuel and Nuclear Waste.”
213

Q&As:

Q1: Would Subpart D requirements apply to a shipment of two or more packages if each 

package contains less than a category 2 quantity but in aggregate equals or exceeds a 

category 2 quantity?

A1: Yes. Each NRC licensee must meet the requirements in Subpart D for any radioactive 

material quantity that meets or exceeds a category 2 quantity regardless of how many individual 

packages may be in the shipment. This question assumes that the material in the two or more 

individual packages aggregates to a category 2 quantity, and the regulation in 10 CFR 37.73(c) 

provides that “[f]or shipments of category 2 quantities of radioactive material, each shipping 

licensee shall comply” with the requirements in Subpart D referenced in this subsection. 

Because this provision applies to all shipments and does not refer to the number of packages in 

each shipment, a licensee cannot avoid meeting these requirements by partitioning the total 

shipping quantity into multiple packages on the same vehicle. An adversary (including an 

insider) in control of the transport vehicle would have unauthorized access to the total quantity

of radioactive material in the shipment.

Q2: Which licensee is responsible for meeting the requirements of Subpart D?

A2: Generally, the shipping licensee is responsible for meeting the requirements in

Subpart D. However, the receiving licensee may choose to agree, in writing, to arrange

for the required in-transit physical protection measures. In that case, the licensee that receives 

the shipment would be responsible for compliance with the physical protection requirements of

this subpart.

Q3: During what portion of the shipment are the security requirements applicable for 

category 1 or category 2 quantities of imports?

A3: The category 1 and category 2 import requirements are applicable only from the point 

that the material enters the United States (i.e., the domestic portion of the shipment after the 

package clears U.S. Customs and Border Protection).

Q4: For material being exported, is the licensee required to follow the security requirements 

for the entire trip?

A4: No. The licensee is responsible only for following the security provisions for the 

domestic portion of the trip until the shipment comes under the jurisdiction of a

Government agency (e.g., the Federal Aviation Administration, or DHS) at a port, 

border crossing, or airport.

Q5: Do the security provisions for category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive 

material apply during the time when shipments are placed in interim storage at the shipping 

licensee’s facility awaiting pickup?

A5: Yes. The security provisions do apply. Licensees that ship category 1 or category 2 

quantities should ensure that any interim storage is minimized or, when it cannot be avoided, 

that required security provisions are met.
214

Q6: Do the security provisions apply to transshipments?

A6: No. The security provisions of Subpart D do not apply to transshipments of category 1 

or category 2 quantities of radioactive material. Transshipments are shipments that are 

originated by a foreign entity in one country, pass through the United States, and continue on to 

a recipient in another country.
215

§ 37.75, “Preplanning and Coordination of Shipment of Category 1 or Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material”

§ 37.75(a)

Each licensee that plans to transport, or deliver to a carrier for transport, licensed material 

that is a category 1 quantity of radioactive material outside the confines of the licensee’s 

facility or other place of use or storage shall:

§ 37.75(a)(1)

Preplan and coordinate shipment arrival and departure times with the receiving licensee;

§ 37.75(a)(2)

Preplan and coordinate shipment information with the governor or the governor’s designee of 

any State through which the shipment will pass to:

§ 37.75(a)(2)(i)

Discuss the State’s intention to provide law enforcement escorts; and

§ 37.75(a)(2)(ii)

Identify safe havens; and

§ 37.75(a)(3)

Document the preplanning and coordination activities.

EXPLANATION:

Each licensee that ships category 1 quantities of radioactive material must conduct preplanning 

and coordination activities with the receiving licensee and with each State that the shipment 

crosses.

Q&As:

Q1: What happens if a shipment has to be rerouted during transport because of bad weather 

or other developments that neither I nor my carrier can control? How can I be sure in advance 

of the States that my category 1 shipment will pass through and that I’ll need to coordinate with 

under this subsection?

A1: The licensee can be reasonably sure about the alternative routes for a shipment

because the carrier is subject to Federal DOT regulations under 49 CFR 97.101, “Requirements 

for Motor Carriers and Drivers,” on highway-route-controlled quantities of radioactive materials. 

These regulations require carriers to minimize the shipment’s time in transit and to use a 

preferred route, which is defined as “an Interstate System highway,” unless a State-routing 

agency designates an alternative route. To ensure its compliance with 10 CFR 37.75(a)
216

requirements for the preplanning and coordination with States through which the shipment will 

pass, the licensee should, as good practice, ensure that its shipment contract with the carrier 

clearly obligates the carrier to also comply with these requirements when an unusual event,

such as a blizzard, requires the rerouting of the shipment through a State other than those along 

the originally planned route.

Q2: What type of documentation is required under 10 CFR 37.75(a)(3)?

A2: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.75(a)(3) requires licensee to document the preplanning and 

coordination activities required by 10 CFR 37.75(a)(1) and 10 CFR 37.75(a)(2) for shipments of 

category 1 quantities of radioactive materials. The shipping licensee should therefore document 

any phone conversations or e-mail communications that it has with the receiving licensee to 

include the names of the individuals participating in the call or e-mail communications, a general 

description of the shipment, and the departure and arrival times. The shipping licensee should 

also document any interactions with the governor’s designee to include the names of the 

individuals participating in the call or e-mail, the route-affected States’ decisions on escorts, the 

safe havens identified, and any other information that the licensee considers pertinent to 

document compliance with the requirements in this subsection.

Q3: What does the NRC consider to be a safe haven?

A3: A safe haven is defined as “[a] readily recognizable and readily accessible site at which 

security is present or from which, in the event of an emergency, the transport crew can notify 

and wait for the LLEAs.” For additional discussion of this definition, see the pertinent Q&As 

under 10 CFR 37.5.

Licensees should use the following criteria to identify safe havens for shipments:

• The safe haven is near the route (i.e., readily available to the transport vehicle).

• Security from local, State, or Federal assets is present or is accessible for a 

 timely response.

• The site is well lit, has adequate parking, and can be used for emergency repair 

 or for waiting for the LLEA response on a 24-hour basis.

• Additional telephone facilities are available if the communications system of the 

 transport vehicle fails to function properly.

• Possible safe haven sites include Federal sites that have significant security 

 assets, such as military-base gates or guarded agency parking lots; secure 

 company terminals; State weigh stations; State welcome stations or rest areas; 

 scenic overlooks or visitors’ centers; truck stops with secure areas; and LLEA 

 sites, including State police barracks.

Identifying safe havens is the licensee’s responsibility. If a licensee is having difficulty 

identifying a safe haven, it can contact the NRC, the appropriate Agreement State agency, or 

State or local law enforcement officials.
217

Q4: Must I have more than one safe haven for a category 1 quantity shipment? How many 

should I identify?

A4: The rule does not specify a minimum number of safe havens for any shipment, but the 

shipping licensee and carrier have an important interest in identifying available places to stop 

along the route on which the transport vehicle could securely remain or safely wait for

assistance.

Q5: How far apart should these safe havens be? Is there a minimum distance for which at 

least one safe haven is required?

A5: The rule does not specify a minimum distance between safe havens. The NRC 

recommends 50 miles. However, the agency recognizes that safe havens at that interval may 

not be available in some more remote areas. In most areas, commercial truck stops, service 

stations, State weigh stations, welcome stations, rest areas, and paved scenic overlooks or 

visitor parking for historic sites should provide ample alternatives to shipment preplanners and 

coordinators.

Q6: Is there a list I can refer to of approved safe havens?

A6: No. However, if a licensee is having difficulty identifying a safe haven, it may contact the

NRC, the appropriate Agreement State agency, or State or local law enforcement officials.

Q7: If a State imposes other transportation security requirements outside the scope of

10 CFR Part 37, do I have to meet those, too?

A7: Yes. Unless any DOT requirement under Chapter 49, “Transportation,” of the Code of 

Federal Regulations preempts those security requirements, any State may apply additional 

requirements beyond those necessary for Agreement State compatibility under 10 CFR Part 37 

while the shipment is within the State’s borders. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 do not 

preempt other State requirements that may be applicable, such as State police escorts for 

radioactive material shipments. Licensees must comply with these State requirements and the 

requirements of the NRC or the Agreement State agency with jurisdiction.
218

§ 37.75, “Preplanning and Coordination of Shipment of Category 1 or Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material” (continued)

§ 37.75(b)

Each licensee that plans to transport, or deliver to a carrier for transport, licensed material that 

is a category 2 quantity of radioactive material outside the confines of the licensee’s facility or

other place of use or storage shall coordinate the shipment no-later-than arrival time and the

expected shipment arrival with the receiving licensee. The licensee shall document the

coordination activities.

EXPLANATION:

Licensees shipping category 2 quantities of radioactive material must coordinate the expected 

arrival time and the NLT arrival time with the receiving licensee.

Q&As:

Q1: If I’m a shipping licensee, how soon after I “plan to transport” must I coordinate with a 

receiving licensee?

A1: The licensee may begin its coordination activities with the receiving licensee at any time 

after it has decided to ship the material. However, under this subsection, the licensee must 

complete these activities before it can transport the material or before it consigns the material to 

a carrier for transport. The licensee does not need to begin coordinating with the receiving 

licensee as soon as it confirms an incoming order or decides to transfer the material.

Q2: What does it mean to “coordinate,” and how much is enough?

A2: Under this subsection, the licensee only needs to contact the receiving licensee and to 

establish an expected arrival time and NLT arrival time for the shipment. This coordination can 

be as simple as sending an e-mail stating that the shipment is expected to arrive via FedEx by 

noon, for example, on a specified date and that the NLT arrival time is 6 p.m. on that day. 

Although this coordination is the only kind required, the licensee and the recipient licensee are 

free to negotiate any other understandings, such as times and methods of communication; 

contact information for the carrier; contact information for LLEAs through which the shipment will 

pass; or any other information that both parties agree would better enable them to anticipate,

and to be prepared for, sources of delay or would otherwise better enable them to make the 

shipment as incident-free as possible. Coordination may be done by phone, facsimile, e-mail,

or face-to-face meetings; however, the licensee must document this activity and the agreements

that it produces, as required by this subsection.

Q3: We have two facilities and need to ship a category 2 quantity of radioactive material from 

one facility across town to the other. Do we still need to “coordinate” an estimated and a NLT 

arrival time, even though we’re coordinating with ourselves?

A3: If the licensee’s shipping and receiving facilities operate under different licenses and if 

the licensee is using a commercial carrier to transport the material, coordination must be done 

like it is in all cases involving different licensees. If the licensee’s transferring and receiving
219

facilities are operating under the same license and if the licensee is providing its own 

transportation, coordination with the receiving facility is not required. However, the licensee 

may want to consider some elements of coordination, such as having the shipping facility notify 

the destination facility of the shipment’s departure and its estimated arrival time, if it believes 

that such coordination might be prudent because, for example, the two facilities are separated 

by property or roads that are not under its control.

Q4: We are part of a university and plan to ship a category 2 quantity of radioactive material 

from one facility to another on the same campus. Do we still need to coordinate an estimated 

and NLT arrival time between the two onsite facilities? What if the two facilities operate under 

different licenses?

A4: Facilities on the same site that operate under the same license do not need to 

coordinate even if the facilities are not at contiguous locations and even if the material has to 

cross or travel on a public road that crosses the site. However, if the shipping and receiving 

facilities are different licensees, they must coordinate the estimated and NLT arrival time 

because possession of the material will be transferred from one licensee to another.

Q5: Does an industrial radiographer carrying a camera containing a category 2 quantity 

sealed source have to coordinate under this section to transport the source from a company site 

to a temporary jobsite or from one temporary jobsite to another?

A5: A licensed industrial radiographer is not subject to these coordination requirements for 

either kind of shipment because the radiographer is required to maintain control of a mobile 

source at all times, and transfer of the source from one licensee to another at the company site 

or at either of the temporary jobsites does not occur.

Q6: What is meant by NLT arrival time?

A6: As defined in 10 CFR 37.5 of this rule, NLT arrival time means “the date and time that 

the shipping licensee and receiving licensee have established as the time at which an 

investigation will be initiated if the shipment has not arrived at the receiving facility.” Licensees 

do not have to begin an investigation if the shipment does not arrive by the estimated arrival 

time. For a category 2 shipment, the NLT arrival time may not be more than 6 hours after the 

estimated arrival time. The NLT date and time effectively requires verification that the shipment 

arrived within the expected timeframe. If the shipment has not arrived by the agreed upon NLT 

arrival time, the shipping licensee must trace the location of the shipment and must decide 

whether to report to affected law enforcement authorities an unusual occurrence that could lead 

to a theft or diversion of the material.

Q7: What types of records are required to document coordination activities?

A7: The last sentence of this subsection requires a licensee to “document the coordination 

activities” required to coordinate the shipment NLT arrival time and the expected shipment 

arrival with the receiving licensee. The shipping licensee should document any phone 

conversations or e-mail correspondence with the receiving licensee, including the names of the 

individuals participating in the calls or correspondence and the agreed upon estimated arrival 

time and NLT arrival time. The licensee may print or store e-mails electronically, and it should 

maintain a copy of any facsimile and the confirmation information.
220

Q8: Am I allowed to use the NSTS as a method to fulfill the preplanning and coordination 

requirements of 10 CFR 37.75(b)?

A8: No. Although the National Source Tracking System (NSTS) is used, among other

things, to track transfers of radioactive materials that are subject to the reporting requirements in 

Appendix E, “Nationally Tracked Source Thresholds,” to 10 CFR Part 20, the NSTS is not 

designed for the kind of detailed interactions that are necessary for effective preshipment 

planning and coordination. For example, the NSTS does not track estimated or NLT arrival 

times; it only tracks the dates of estimated and actual arrivals. Reporting is not required until 

after the transfer has been made. This deadline alone could make the NSTS useless for 

determining when and whether to begin tracing a missing shipment. In addition, the NSTS does 

not require the reporting of shipments that include bulk material or that comprise several 

category 3 quantities that add up to a category 2 quantity. Thus, the NSTS does not cover all 

shipments that are subject to 10 CFR Part 37 requirements.

Q9: I’m an NRC licensee shipping a category 2 quantity of material to an Agreement State 

licensee, and that State’s regulatory agency hasn’t yet adopted the new regulations required to 

implement 10 CFR Part 37. 10 CFR 37.75(c) requires the receiving Agreement State licensee 

to notify me if the shipment hasn’t arrived by the NLT arrival time, and I’m required under

10 CFR 37.79(c) to investigate “immediately” if the shipment has missed that deadline. But if 

the receiving licensee is operating under existing Agreement State regulations, it isn’t required 

to notify me when a shipment misses its NLT arrival time. Will I be in violation of my NRC 

license if I don’t start investigating by that time?

A9: This should not be an issue. The security orders issued by the NRC and the legally 

binding requirements issued by the Agreement States require licensees to confirm receipt of 

transferred radioactive material; if the recipient licensee does not receive the material at the 

expected time of delivery, it must notify the originator and assist in any investigation. This 

notification would actually occur earlier than the notification required by 10 CFR Part 37.
221

§ 37.75, “Preplanning and Coordination of Shipment of Category 1 or Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material” (continued)

§ 37.75(c)

Each licensee who receives a shipment of a category 2 quantity of radioactive material shall 

confirm receipt of the shipment with the originator. If the shipment has not arrived by the

no-later-than arrival time, the receiving licensee shall notify the originator.

EXPLANATION:

The receiving licensee must confirm receipt of a shipment with the shipping licensee. The 

receiving licensee must also notify the shipping licensee if the shipment has not arrived by the 

NLT arrival time.

Q&As:

Q1: When must the receiving licensee confirm to the shipping licensee that the shipment has 

arrived?

A1: For a category 2 quantity, the receiving licensee should strive to notify the shipping 

licensee as soon as practicable after the shipment has arrived. It must, however, report that the 

shipment has not arrived by the agreed upon NLT arrival time. The definition of NLT arrival time 

in 10 CFR 37.5 states that this interval may not be more than 6 hours after the estimated arrival 

time. If the shipment arrives on time, confirmation by the delivery service (e.g., FedEx, DHS, or 

UPS) may be acceptable if the shipping and receiving licensees have agreed to this method 

during their preplanning and coordination discussions.

Q2: How should the receiving licensee notify the shipping licensee?

A2: The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 do not specify a particular way for the receiving 

licensee to notify the shipping licensee. The receiving licensee may contact the shipping 

licensee by phone, e-mail, or facsimile. The licensees should decide on the method of 

notification that they will use during their preplanning and coordination activities.

Q3: Am I allowed to use the NSTS as a method to fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 37.75(c)

to confirm receipt of the category 2 shipment and notify the shipping licensee if the shipment 

has not arrived by its NLT arrival time?

A3: No. The use of NSTS will neither meet the requirement in 10 CFR 37.75(c) to notify the 

shipping licensee of the receipt of a shipment nor meet the requirement to report to NSTS. A 

report to the NSTS is a report to a system; it does not notify the shipping licensee of the receipt 

of a source.
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§ 37.75, “Preplanning and Coordination of Shipment of Category 1 or Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material” (continued)

§ 37.75(d)

Each licensee, who transports or plans to transport a shipment of a category 2 quantity of 

radioactive material, and determines that the shipment will arrive after the no-later-than 

arrival time provided pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, shall promptly notify the 

receiving licensee of the new no-later-than arrival time.

EXPLANATION:

If a shipment is delayed, the shipping licensee must notify the receiving licensee promptly of any 

new NLT arrival time.

Q&As:

Q1: How “promptly” must a category 2 shipping licensee notify the receiving licensee if the

NLT arrival time must be changed?

A1: The shipping licensee’s notification should be as soon as practicable to avert a needless 

alarm by the receiving licensee under 10 CFR 37.75(c) when the shipment is not delivered by 

the originally established NLT arrival time. More specifically, notification should be as soon as 

practicable after the driver or other authorized member of the transfer crew determines that the 

category 2 shipment in question cannot be safely expedited enough to arrive before the NLT 

arrival time. (The requirement for an NLT arrival time does not apply to shipments of category 1 

quantities of radioactive material.)
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§ 37.75, “Preplanning and Coordination of Shipment of Category 1 or Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material” (continued)

§ 37.75(e)

The licensee shall retain a copy of the documentation for preplanning and coordination and 

any revision thereof as a record for 3 years.

EXPLANATION:

This definition is self-explanatory.

Q&As:

Q1: What kinds of preplanning and coordination documents must a licensee retain to satisfy 

this recordkeeping requirement?

A1: For shipments of category 1 quantities of radioactive materials, the regulation in

10 CFR 37.75(a)(3) requires licensees to document the preplanning and coordination activities 

required in 10 CFR 37.75(a)(1) and 10 CFR 37.75(a)(2). The shipping licensee should 

therefore document any phone conversations or e-mail communications that it has with the 

receiving licensee, including the names of the individuals participating in the call or e-mail 

communications, a general description of the shipment, and the departure and arrival times. In 

addition, the shipping licensee should document any interactions that it has with the governor’s 

designee, the names of the individuals participating in the call or e-mail, route-affected States’ 

decisions on escorts, safe havens identified, and any other information that the licensee 

considers pertinent to document its compliance with the requirements in this subsection. (See 

also Q3 and A3 for 10 CFR 37.75(a) above.) To document preplanning and coordination 

activities for shipments of category 2 quantities of radioactive material, the shipping licensee 

only needs to retain records of the expected arrival time and NLT arrival time. The record

should contain the receiving company’s name and general information concerning the shipment. 

(See also Q7 and A7 for 10 CFR 37.75(b) above.)
224

§ 37.77, “Advance Notification of Shipment of Category 1 Quantities of

Radioactive Material”

§ 37.77

As specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, each licensee shall provide advance 

notification to the NRC and the governor of a State, or the governor’s designee, of the 

shipment of licensed material in a category 1 quantity, through or across the boundary of the 

State, before the transport, or delivery to a carrier for transport of the licensed material 

outside the confines of the licensee’s facility or other place of use or storage.

EXPLANATION:

Licensees must provide advance notification to the NRC and the governor of any State (or the 

governor’s designee) of a shipment of a category 1 quantity of licensed material that passes 

through or across the boundary of the State.

Q&As:

Q1: What constitutes an “advance notification” for the purposes of this requirement?

A1: An advance notification is a communication to the NRC and the governor (or governor’s 

designated official) of an affected State that a shipment of a category 1 quantity of radioactive 

material will be made into or within that State’s jurisdiction on a set date at a best estimated 

time. The communication must be written, must follow the procedures in 10 CFR 37.77(a), and 

must contain the information specified in 10 CFR 37.77(b). The licensee may send the 

communication by mail, e-mail, or facsimile. Annex D, “Template for Advance Notifications of

Shipments to the NRC of category 1 Quantities of Radioactive Material under 10 CFR 37.77(b),” 

to this subpart provides an example of an advance notification template that would satisfy the 

NRC.

Q2: Are advance notifications required for any category 2 shipments?

A2: No. Advance notifications are not required for shipments of category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material unless the shipment falls within the scope of 10 CFR 71.97(b) or unless it is 

an export or import shipment that requires notification under 10 CFR 110.50(c).

Q3: Where does a licensee obtain contact information for the governor’s designee?

A3: A list of the contact information for the governor’s designees is published annually, 

typically in July or August, in the Federal Register. The 2011 update appeared on

October 31, 2011. An updated list is posted on the NRC Web site at

http://nrc-stp.ornl.gov/special/designee.pdf. Copies may also be obtained by contacting the 

Director, Division of Materials Safety, States, Tribal, and Rulemaking; Office of Nuclear Material 

Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. However, note that the currently available list

provides governor-designated contact information only for spent nuclear fuel shipments, and the

contacts for 10 CFR Part 37 shipments may not be the same. The NRC will add contact 

information for 10 CFR Part 37 shipments to the latest available listing.
225

Q4: Whom must the shipping licensee notify?

A4: The licensee must notify the NRC and each State through which the shipment will 

pass, including the State of the destination. If an Agreement State agency issued the license,

the licensee must notify that agency and each State through which the shipment will pass,

including the destination State and the NRC.

Q5: Does the NRC share advance notification information about a shipment with other 

agencies?

A5: Yes. When the NRC receives advance notification information, it may share the 

information with other affected Government agencies, such as DOT and DHS.
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§ 37.77, “Advance Notification of Shipment of Category 1 Quantities of Radioactive

Material” (continued)

§ 37.77(a), “Procedures for Submitting Advance Notification”

§ 37.77(a)(1)

The notification must be made to the NRC and to the office of each appropriate governor or 

governor’s designee. The contact information, including telephone and mailing addresses, of 

governors and governors’ designees is available on the NRC Web site at http://nrcstp.ornl.gov/special/designee.pdf. A list of the contact information is also available upon 

request from the Director, Division of Material Safety, State, Tribal, and Rulemaking 

Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Notifications to the NRC must be to the NRC’s

Director, Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident

Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. The notification 

to the NRC may be made by e-mail to RAMQC_SHIPMENTS@nrc.gov or by fax to

301-816-5151.

§ 37.77(a)(2)

A notification delivered by mail must be postmarked at least 7 days before transport of the 

shipment commences at the shipping facility.

§ 37.77(a)(3)

A notification delivered by any means other than mail must reach the NRC at least 4 days 

before the transport of the shipment commences and must reach the office of the governor or 

the governor’s designee at least 4 days before transport of a shipment within or through the 

State.

EXPLANATION:

Advance notifications of a shipment must be made in writing and postmarked 7 days before the 

shipment begins. Notifications delivered by any other means than mail must reach the office of 

the governor or the governor’s designee at least 4 days before transport within or through the 

State.

Q&As:

Q1: Why does the mail notification requirement differ from that of other notifications?

A1: Mail delivery is not instantaneous; additional time is required to allow the mail notification 

to reach the appropriate party by the date required for other means of delivery. Under

10 CFR 37.77(a)(3), this delivery date is “at least 4 days before the transport of the shipment 

commences” for a notification to the NRC and “at least 4 days before transport of a shipment

within or through the State” for a notification to a governor or governor’s designee. To make the
227

arrival of the notification by this date more likely to occur, the licensee must send a mailed 

notification sufficiently early—postmarked at least 7 days before the shipment commences—to

allow the recipient to receive it when he or she would have received it if it was sent by other 

means, such as by facsimile or e-mail.

Q2: Does a licensee have to mail the advance notification via the U.S. Postal Service?

A2: No. A licensee is not required to use the U.S. Postal Service. It may use other delivery 

services, such as FedEx or UPS.

Q3: What “other means” of advance notification besides the U.S. Postal Service or a 

commercial delivery service would be acceptable under 10 CFR 37.77(a)(3)?

A3: A licensee may also fax or e-mail notifications. However, if the licensee uses a facsimile 

or e-mail for this purpose, it should first verify the correct facsimile number or e-mail address 

with the recipient. The licensee should also confirm receipt of the message with its intended

recipient so that both parties will know if the information has gone to an unauthorized third party. 

Although an NRC licensee may use any of the delivery methods discussed above, the agency 

recommends e-mail for NRC notification because its Headquarters Operations Center is staffed

24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and it will be able to confirm receipt of the notification in short 

order.

Q4: As a result of the office reorganization dissolving the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental 

Management Programs, it appears that 10 CFR 37.77(a)(1) is out of date. If that’s 

the case, how is the contact information referenced in 10 CFR 37.77(a)(1) obtained? 

A4: The language in 10 CFR 37.77(a)(1) states that a list of the contact information is

available upon request from the Director, Division of Intergovernmental Liaison and

Rulemaking, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. As a result of the 2014 office 

reorganization, the contact information is updated as follows: Director, Division of Material 

Safety, State, Tribal, and Rulemaking Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.
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§ 37.77, “Advance Notification of Shipment of Category 1 Quantities of Radioactive

Material” (continued)

§ 37.77(b), “Information To Be Furnished in Advance Notification of Shipment”

Each advance notification of shipment of category 1 quantities of radioactive material must 

contain the following information, if available at the time of notification:

§ 37.77(b)(1)

The name, address, and telephone number of the shipper, carrier, and receiver of the 

category 1 radioactive material;

§ 37.77(b)(2)

The license numbers of the shipper and receiver;

§ 37.77(b)(3)

A description of the radioactive material contained in the shipment, including the 

radionuclides and quantity;

§ 37.77(b)(4)

The point of origin of the shipment and the estimated time and date that shipment will 

commence;

§ 37.77(b)(5)

The estimated time and date that the shipment is expected to enter each State along the 

route;

§ 37.77(b)(6)

The estimated time and date of arrival of the shipment at the destination; and

§ 37.77(b)(7)

A point of contact, with a telephone number, for current shipment information.

EXPLANATION:

This provision lists the information that must be provided in an advance notification of shipment.

Q&As:

Q1: What information must be included in an advance notification?
229

A1: Each licensee is expected to make a good-faith effort to provide all the information 

required by 10 CFR 37.77(b) available when it makes the initial advance notification. However, 

the licensee must provide any information that is not available at the time of the initial 

notification in a revised notification under 10 CFR 37.77(c)(1) as soon as the information 

becomes available but before the commencement of the shipment. Annex D to this subpart 

provides an example of an advance notification template that would satisfy the NRC.

Q2: What if I don’t have all the shipment information listed in this subsection? Should I make 

the notification with the information I have, and provide the outstanding information when I’m 

able to obtain it?

A2: Yes. A shipping licensee may make the initial notification with the information available 

at that time. The remaining information must be provided in a revision notice as soon as the 

information becomes available.

Q3: If I don’t have all the shipment information listed in this subsection before the scheduled 

shipment, can I still ship on the date originally specified in my first advance notification, or must I 

delay until I can provide all the information?

A3: The licensee may ship the radioactive material on the date originally specified in its first 

advance notification if the only shipment information still missing is the exact quantity of 

radioactive material that will be shipped. Prior operating experience has shown that, in some 

cases, the exact quantity of radionuclides that will be shipped is the information that is most 

likely unknown until shortly before the shipment. However, before commencement of the 

shipment, the shipping licensee must provide all of the information required by this subsection, 

including the quantity of material being shipped.

Q4: Must the “point of contact...for current shipment information” under 10 CFR 37.77(b)(7)

be someone accompanying the shipment?

A4: No. The point of contact should, in fact, not be someone accompanying the shipment 

because communication to that person could be lost during an accident or security incident. 

The point of contact should be someone with access to the information on the shipment that is 

available at the movement control center, as it is defined in 10 CFR 37.5.
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§ 37.77, “Advance Notification of Shipment of Category 1 Quantities of Radioactive

Material” (continued)

§ 37.77(c), “Revision Notice”

§ 37.77(c)(1)

The licensee shall provide any information not previously available at the time of the initial 

notification, as soon as the information becomes available but not later than commencement of

the shipment, to the governor of the State or the governor’s designee and to the NRC’s Director 

of Nuclear Security, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

§ 37.77(c)(2)

A licensee shall promptly notify the governor of the State or the governor’s designee of any 

changes to the information provided in accordance with paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) of this 

section. The licensee shall also immediately notify the NRC’s Director, Division of Security 

Policy, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555 of any such changes.

§ 37.77(d), “Cancellation Notice”

Each licensee who cancels a shipment for which advance notification has been sent shall 

send a cancellation notice to the governor of each State or to the governor’s designee 

previously notified and to the NRC’s Director, Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear 

Security and Incident Response.

The licensee shall send the cancellation notice before the shipment would have commenced

or as soon thereafter as possible. The licensee shall state in the notice that it is a

cancellation and identify the advance notification that is being cancelled.

EXPLANATION:

The shipping licensee must notify each of the previously notified States and the NRC if the 

schedule for a shipment is revised or cancelled.

Q&As:

Q1: What should a licensee do if the shipment of a category 1 quantity is cancelled?

A1: If the shipment is cancelled, the shipping licensee must notify the States to which the 

initial advance notice had been sent and the regulatory agency (the NRC or Agreement State 

agency) with jurisdiction in the State of origin of the shipment. Notifications to the NRC may be

made by e-mail to RAMQC_SHIPMENTS@nrc.gov or by fax to 301-816-5151.
231

Q2: What should a licensee do if the shipment schedule of a category 1 quantity is revised?

A2: If the shipment schedule is revised, the shipping licensee must notify the State through 

which the shipment is passing and the States that the shipment is scheduled to enter for the 

remainder of its itinerary.

Q3: Under 10 CFR 37.77(c)(2), how “promptly” must a category 1 shipping licensee notify 

the governor of the State or the governor’s designee of any changes in the shipment 

information provided in the first advance notification or any new information not previously 

available?

A3: The shipping licensee should notify any affected State’s governor or designee without 

delay. More specifically, assuming that there is no change in the names, addresses, or 

telephone numbers of the shipper, carrier, or receiving licensee or no change in the shipping or 

receiving licensees’ license numbers, the shipping licensee should notify any affected State’s 

governor or designee as soon as it discovers or is advised of the following changes:

• A change is made in the description of the radioactive material that will be 

 shipped, including the radionuclides or quantity.

• A change is made in the shipment’s point of origin or estimated time or date of 

 commencement.

• A change is made in the estimated time or date that the shipment is expected to 

 enter each State along the route. (For example, notification of a 6-hour delay in 

 the estimated entry time should be made; however, notification of a 15-minute 

 delay is not necessary.)

• A change is made in the estimated time or date of arrival of the shipment at the 

 destination. (For example, notification of a 6-hour delay should be made; 

 however, a 15-minute delay is not necessary.)

• A change is made in the name or telephone number of the point of contact for 

 current shipment information.

Notification of any changes in shipment information en route should take place as soon as the 

driver or other authorized member of the transfer crew determines and informs the movement 

control center of a change in this information. Prompt notification of significant schedule 

changes is particularly important if a State plans to provide an escort for the shipment.

Q4: Under 10 CFR 37.77(c)(2), the licensee must also notify the NRC “immediately.” Is 

there a meaningful difference between notifying a governor or governor’s designee “promptly” 

and notifying NRC “immediately”?

A4: No. The NRC considers the words to be interchangeable for the purposes of 10 CFR 

Part 37.

Q5: What mechanism should a licensee use to notify the States and the NRC of revisions or 

changes in the shipment information?
232

A5: The rule does not specify a mechanism for notifying the States and the NRC of revisions or

changes in the shipment information. Each licensee therefore may use the method that works

best for it. However, for cancellations, the licensee must “send a cancellation notice.” 

Correspondences that are e-mailed, faxed, or written are acceptable methods. The States and

the NRC must receive the cancellation notice before commencement of the shipment or as soon

as possible thereafter to provide time for a State to cancel any planned escorts. A telephone call 

sometimes may be necessary to ensure timely receipt of the notice.

Q6: Why do I have to notify the governors or their designees and the NRC under

10 CFR 37.77(c)(2) if information about the shipment changes during the shipment?

Q6: The notification to governors allows States to be aware of shipments in their

jurisdictions, to provide escorts if they consider them necessary, and to respond to any incidents 

that require a State response. The notification to the NRC provides information that allows the 

NRC and other Federal agencies to respond in the event of an incident.

Q7: Other than the requirement to notify NRC of any revision or changes to the advance 

notification, are any other notifications required?

A7: No. However, one voluntary good practice would be helpful—that is, to notify the NRC of

the shipment’s actual arrival or departure times if these differ from the original advance 

notification. As noted above in Q5 and A5 for 10 CFR 37.77, the NRC shares information about 

shipments of category 1 quantities of radioactive material with other Federal Government 

agencies, such as DOT and DHS. Confirmation of actual shipment departure and arrival dates 

would enable the NRC staff to provide more accurate data for the tracking and current status of 

these shipments without having to make assumptions or without having to contact the shipper

by telephone to get updates. Notification to the NRC within 24 hours of the actual departure 

and arrival dates should be sufficient for this purpose.
233

§ 37.77, “Advance Notification of Shipment of Category 1 Quantities of Radioactive

Material” (continued)

§ 37.77(e), “Records”

The licensee shall retain a copy of the advance notification and any revision and cancellation 

notices as a record for 3 years.

EXPLANATION:

This definition is self-explanatory

Q&As:

Q1: For purposes of this record retention requirement, what constitutes a “revision” of an 

advance notification? Do I have to retain records of revisions for typos?

A1: The licensee should retain a record of any notification revision that it considered 

important enough to send to the NRC and the affected State. For example, the licensee should 

consider an error in one of the digits for a shipment date or time to require a revision of the initial 

notification. The licensee therefore would retain this type of revision. However, the licensee 

would not need to issue a revised notification to correct a misspelling of a common word if the 

misspelling does not have the potential to cause confusion.

Q2: When does the 3-year clock start for the required retention of an advance notification 

document?

A2: The licensee should start the document retention period on the date that it sent the 

notification.

Q3: If I have to cancel a planned shipment by phone to assure that I give the NRC or State 

official notice as soon as possible, how should I document that phone call?

A3: If the licensee has to provide a revision or cancellation notification by telephone to the 

NRC or State official, it should record the date and time of the call, the name of the caller, the 

name of the person called, and the purpose of the call (revision or cancellation.) To meet the 

requirement to “retain a copy” of these revision and cancellation notices, the licensee should 

keep this documentation of the conversation in electronic or hardcopy form for 3 years after the 

date of the call. The NRC encourages the licensee to notify the agency by e-mail.
234

§ 37.77, “Advance Notification of Shipment of Category 1 Quantities of Radioactive

Material” (continued)

§ 37.77(f), “Protection of Information”

State officials, State employees, and other individuals, whether or not licensees of the 

Commission or an Agreement State, who receive schedule information of the kind specified 

in § 37.77(b) shall protect that information against unauthorized disclosure as specified in §

37.43(d) of this part.

EXPLANATION:

Schedule information for shipments of category 1 quantities of radioactive material is considered 

to be sensitive, and anyone receiving the information must protect it in accordance with

10 CFR 37.43(d).

Q&As:

Q1: What do the information protection requirements in 10 CFR 37.43(d) specify?

A1: See 10 CFR 37.43(d) and the related questions and answers section of this document.

Q2: Who is required to protect the schedule information?

A2: Any individual who receives the schedule information or any other sensitive 

information must protect it in accordance with the requirements in 10 CFR 37.43(d).

Q3: What do I need to do, if anything, to ensure that those to whom I provide shipment 

schedule information comply with Part 37.43(d) requirements to protect it?

A3: The NRC recognizes that licensees have no control over the use or misuse of this 

information by persons whom they are required to notify. Accordingly, the NRC or an affected 

Agreement State agency will not hold a licensee responsible for the compliance of others. If the

licensee uses a delivery service (e.g., FedEx or DHL Express) or other commercial carrier 

(e.g., EnergySolutions, AATCarriers, or Edlow International) to transport its radioactive material, it 

should make sure that the carrier understands its responsibility to protect shipment-related

information.
235

§ 37.79, “Requirements for Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2

Quantities of Radioactive Material during Shipment”

§ 37.79(a), “Shipments by Road”

§ 37.79(a)(1)

Each licensee who transports, or delivers to a carrier for transport, in a single shipment, a 

category 1 quantity of radioactive material shall:

§ 37.79(a)(1)(i)

Ensure that movement control centers are established that maintain position information 

from a remote location. These control centers must monitor shipments 24 hours a day,

7 days a week, and have the ability to communicate immediately, in an emergency, with the 

appropriate law enforcement agencies.

§ 37.79(a)(1)(ii)

Ensure that redundant communications are established that allow the transport to contact 

the escort vehicle (when used) and movement control center at all times. Redundant 

communications may not be subject to the same interference factors as the primary 

communication.

§ 37.79(a)(1)(iii)

Ensure that shipments are continuously and actively monitored by a telemetric position 

monitoring system or an alternative tracking system reporting to a movement control center. 

A movement control center must provide positive confirmation of the location, status, and 

control over the shipment. The movement control center must be prepared to promptly 

implement preplanned procedures in response to deviations from the authorized route or a 

notification of actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to the theft, loss, or diversion 

of a shipment. These procedures will include, but not be limited to, the identification of, and 

contact information for, the appropriate LLEA along the shipment route.

§ 37.79(a)(1)(iv)

Provide an individual to accompany the driver for those highway shipments with a driving 

time period greater than the maximum number of allowable hours of service in a 24-hour 

duty day as established by the Department of Transportation Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration. The accompanying individual may be another driver.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions establish the security requirements for shipping category 1 quantities of 

radioactive material by road.
236

Q&As:

Q1: When is the use of a movement control center necessary under 10 CFR 37.79(a)(1)?

A1: To meet the requirements in 10 CFR 37.79(a)(1)(i), any licensee that ships category 1 

quantities of radioactive material by road must either establish or use a carrier that has 

established movement control centers that maintain position information from a location remote 

from the transport vehicle or trailer. The control centers would be required to monitor shipments 

on a continuous and active basis 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and must have the ability to 

communicate immediately in an emergency with the appropriate law enforcement agencies.

The movement control center must provide positive confirmation of the location of the shipment, 

its status, and the individuals who are in control of the shipment, and it must be prepared to

implement preplanned procedures in response to deviations from the authorized route or to a 

notification of actual or attempted theft or diversion or suspicious activities related to the theft,

loss, or diversion of a shipment. These procedures include the identification of, and contact 

information for, the appropriate LLEA along the shipment route.

Q2: What is meant by “active” monitoring?

A2: A movement control center is monitoring on an active basis whenever it employs a 

method for tracking a shipment that provides the capability for the control center operators to be 

immediately aware if a shipment has deviated from the shipping plans. For example, the 

movement control center must have the capability to be immediately aware if (1) the shipment 

deviates from the planned route, (2) any unscheduled stops occur, or (3) any scheduled stops 

take longer than expected.

Q3: Where can the movement control center be located? Does it need to be on the 

licensee’s property?

A3: The movement control center may be located at either the licensee’s or a third party’s 

site; however, it must be a stationary facility, not a mobile vehicle. Regardless of location, the 

movement control center must be able to monitor the category 1 shipment at all times and to 

communicate with appropriate law enforcement agencies should the need arise.

Q4: Why are redundant communications necessary, and what must these redundant devices 

or systems be able to do under 10 CFR 37.79(a)(1)(ii)?

A4: Redundant communications must mitigate an interruption caused by either natural 

events, such as storms, or deliberate actions, such as signal jamming, that may cause 

communications to be lost on the primary communication device. One or more additional 

communication devices must be available to operate independently from the primary device, 

thereby minimizing the possibility that whatever disabled the primary device will also affect the 

redundant devices. Redundant communications must be in place at all times to allow the 

transport vehicle to contact the movement control center and nearest LLEA if assistance is 

needed. An escort vehicle is not required. If the licensee uses an escort vehicle, however, it 

must also be able to communicate with the transport driver and the movement control center. 

The redundant communication method must not be subject to the same interference factors as 

the primary communication method. To meet this requirement, the licensee must ensure that 

the two systems do not rely on the same hardware or software (e.g., cell tower or proprietary 

network) to transmit their signal.
237

Q5: What is a “telemetric position monitoring system” under 10 CFR 37.79(a)(1)(iii)?

A5: A telemetric position monitoring system is a data transfer system that captures, by 

instrumentation or other measuring devices, information about the location and status of a 

transport vehicle or package between the departure and destination locations. The gathering of 

this information permits the remote monitoring and reporting of the location of a transport

vehicle or package. Systems that use radiofrequency identification or satellite-based global 

positioning technologies are examples of telemetric position monitoring systems.

Q6: Is a global positioning system (GPS) required?

A6: No. For category 1 material, continuous and active monitoring of shipments is required 

without regard to the technology that provides these capabilities. Continuous and active 

monitoring means that at any time while the shipment is en route, the licensee must know the 

shipment’s whereabouts. Not specifying a particular technology provides licensees flexibility to 

design a continuous and active monitoring system that meets their unique circumstances.

A GPS would be considered an acceptable method.

Q7: When is a second individual needed for the shipment under § 37.79(a)(1)(iv)?

A7: The licensee must provide an accompanying individual for the shipment when the driving 

time period is greater than the maximum number of allowable hours of service in a 24-hour duty 

day, as established by the DOT Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. (See

49 CFR Part 395, “Hours of Service of Drivers.”) This security measure provides reasonable 

assurance that the material will be protected from theft or diversion when it is stationary and in

emergency situations in which the driver must stop or leave the vehicle. The accompanying

individual may be another driver.

Q8: What should the driver and a second accompanying individual do during the shipment of 

a category 1 quantity?

A8: The driver or the accompanying individual, or both, should periodically call the movement 

control center to provide a verbal status of the shipment and delivery. Each individual should

maintain constant visual surveillance of the surrounding environment during transport. If the

driver requires a break and stops the transport vehicle, either the driver or the accompanying

individual should maintain constant visual surveillance of the immediate environment of the

transport vehicle while it is not in motion. At least one of the individuals should periodically walk

around the transport vehicle while it is not in motion to help confirm that there are no apparent 

safety- or security-related issues associated with the vehicle. In addition, the periodic walk

around should include visual surveillance of the surrounding area to confirm that there is no

evidence of tampering with the contents of the vehicle or no unusual or suspicious activity in the

immediate vicinity. Note that the accompanying individual should undertake the communication 

and surveillance measures discussed above if the driver is sleeping during the break.
238

§ 37.79, “Requirements for Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2

 Quantities of Radioactive Material during Shipment” (continued)

§ 37.79(a)(1), “Shipments by Road” (continued)

§ 37.79(a)(1)(v)

Develop written normal and contingency procedures to address:

§ 37.79(a)(1)(v)(A)

Notifications to the communication center and law enforcement agencies;

§ 37.79(a)(1)(v)(B)

Communication protocols. Communication protocols must include a strategy for the use of 

authentication codes and duress codes and provisions for refueling or other stops, detours, 

and locations where communication is expected to be temporarily lost;

§ 37.79(a)(1)(v)(C)

Loss of communications; and

§ 37.79(a)(1)(v)(D)

Responses to an actual or attempted theft or diversion of a shipment.

§ 37.79(a)(1)(vi)

Each licensee who makes arrangements for the shipment of category 1 quantities of 

radioactive material shall ensure that drivers, accompanying personnel, and movement 

control center personnel have access to the normal and contingency procedures.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions require the use of written normal and contingency procedures for shipping 

category 1 quantities of radioactive material by road.

Q&As:

Q1: Under 10 CFR 37.79(a)(1)(v), each licensee that makes arrangements for the shipment 

of category 1 quantities of radioactive material must develop written “normal” and “contingency” 

procedures. How do I decide what I should address in my “normal” procedures and what should 

go into my “contingency” procedures?

A1: Normal operating procedures should describe activities conducted to meet regulatory 

requirements that would be applicable under expected routine operating conditions. Examples 

of such activities include refueling and comfort stops, meal stops, and a routine check-in. 

Contingency procedures should identify issues that could interfere with compliance during the 
239

preparation for transport or during the actual transport of the radioactive material. Examples of 

such interferences include bad weather, suspicious activities, mechanical breakdown, road or 

bridge closures, detours, accidents, and acute illness. Contingency procedures should

address appropriate actions for both anticipated aberrant situations and those that licensees

previously encountered during the transport of radioactive material or storage incident to

transport.

Q2: 10 CFR 37.79(a)(1)(v)(A) requires my procedures for category 1 shipments to address 

“notifications to the communication center and law enforcement agencies.” What kind of events 

must I develop notifications for, and what means of communications must I use (i.e., satellite 

phone, cell phone, e-mail, text messaging, or two-way radio)?

A2: The licensee’s procedures must address notifications for all normal and contingency 

conditions covered by the procedures. The licensee decides on its choice of communications 

technology. However, the licensee should bear in mind that e-mail and text messaging may not 

be conducive to communication without delay in the event of an emergency.

Q3: 10 CFR 37.79(a)(1)(v)(B) requires me to develop communication protocols for

category 1 shipments that, among other things, include “a strategy for the use of authentication 

codes and duress codes and provisions for refueling or other stops, detours, and locations 

where communication is expected to be temporarily lost.” What are acceptable methods for 

authentication and duress codes and acceptable technologies for applying them?

A3: An acceptable protocol may use a number of methods and technologies or combinations 

of them for duress and authentication codes. The rule does not specify which methods and 

technologies to use because the optimum strategy may differ from licensee to licensee. 

However, in choosing a strategy for authentication and duress codes, a licensee should

consider the purpose of each. The purpose of an authentication code is to enable a licensee to 

confirm that the radioactive material remains in the physical possession of an authorized

employee of the licensee or carrier or an authorized representative of the NRC, an Agreement

State agency, or an LLEA. The purpose of a duress code is to enable a licensee to confirm that 

the individual at the offsite location who initiated the communication or who is responding to the

licensee’s or communication center’s call is not being forced to provide false information.

For example, to frustrate any attempt by an unauthorized individual to delay an investigation or 

to call off an ongoing recovery effort prematurely, the licensee should be able to confirm through 

its pre-established authentication protocol the true identity of the employee, regulatory agency 

representative, or law enforcement officer reporting from an offsite location. This authentication 

may be accomplished by using an agreed upon separate radio frequency or alternative 

communication method, by asking the caller to appear before a video camera on the vehicle to 

display a photo identification badge, by asking for the correct answer to one or more agreed 

upon questions, or by using a combination of these methods.

Questions should require specific responses that are either of a personally distinguishing nature 

(e.g., the name of a first pet) or otherwise not so intuitively obvious that an adversary could infer 

the correct response. Similarly, the licensee or carrier may use one or several of these 

techniques in combination in a pre-established protocol or code word or phrase to signal that 

the driver or accompanying individual is under duress (e.g., at gunpoint or within lethal range of

an explosive). The duress code should permit the driver or accompanying individual to

introduce the code on his or her own initiative without prompting, and it may involve seemingly
240

mission-related technical questions and answers, apparently offhand remarks, or some other 

conversational technique. The purpose of the duress code should be to enable the offsite

individual to signal without arousing suspicion that he or she is making a false report under 

threat by an adversary who is not visible or who is obviously malevolent to licensee or call 

center personnel.

Q4: Under 10 CFR 37.79(a)(1)(v)(C), my communications protocols for category 1 shipments 

must address “loss of communications.” What constitutes such a “loss of communications”? A 

loss of a minute’s duration? A loss of a half-hour? One dropped call? Two or more dropped 

calls? Would static be considered “a loss of communication”?

A4: The NRC considers a loss of communication to be any curtailment in the availability of, 

impairment in the timeliness of, or degradation in the clarity of a message such that the intended 

recipient of the message is unable to understand it or to receive it when needed. Only a

shipping or receiving licensee, a movement control center operator, or a transport crew can 

determine what constitutes a loss of communications in the context of the importance and

urgency of the message for safe and secure delivery of the material. Therefore, the rule leaves

this determination to those who are best able to make such a determination under the operating 

conditions that prevail during the shipment. These conditions necessarily frame any decision on

when to switch from the primary to an alternate communications system.

To determine what should be considered a loss of communication, the licensee should identify 

foreseeable normal and contingency scenarios and should consider their likely urgency in 

deciding how many times the communications center, driver, or escort should try to restore the 

primary means of communication before resorting to the secondary means. For example, in an 

accident or a security emergency, there should be no delay in resorting to the secondary means 

of communication. The protocol should also allow the communicator to take the severity of

static into account and the perceived urgency of a situation in determining the extent to which 

the degradation of communication clarity justifies switching to the alternate communication

technology.

Q5: As a shipper of category 1 quantities under 10 CFR 37.79(a)(1)(vi), I have to “ensure” 

that drivers, accompanying personnel, and movement control center personnel have access to 

the normal and contingency procedures. How do I “ensure” that drivers, transport crew 

members, and movement control center staff have adequate access? If I give them hardcopies 

of the protocols, am I in violation if one of them loses the hardcopy and forgets to replace it 

before an inspection?

A5: The NRC understands that limits exist on the extent to which a licensee can “ensure” 

that drivers, transport crew members, and movement control center staff actually use the 

licensee’s procedures for normal and contingency conditions. However, a licensee can take 

certain measures to demonstrate compliance with the requirement to “ensure” that these 

individuals “have access” to these procedures. Possible measures could include, among 

others, requiring (in the shipping contract) that the carrier’s driver, the accompanying individual, 

and the movement control center staff sign a statement before commencement of the shipment 

that they have in their possession a copy of these procedures and have read them. Another

measure could include another clause in the shipping contract with a similar signoff procedure 

that requires the driver to keep a copy of the procedures in the glovebox or in another readily 

accessible location inside the vehicle. The licensee could also offer and encourage the training 
241

of the carrier’s employees who are responsible for category 1 shipments in the shipping 

licensee’s procedures. In addition, the shipping licensee could deliver the procedures to the 

carrier’s movement control center using a commercial delivery service before the first shipment 

and could retain a receipt for documentation.
242

§ 37.79, “Requirements for Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2

 Quantities of Radioactive Material during Shipment” (continued)

§ 37.79(a)(2)

Each licensee that transports category 2 quantities of radioactive material shall maintain 

constant control and/or surveillance during transit and have the capability for immediate 

communication to summon appropriate response or assistance.

§ 37.79(a)(3)

Each licensee who delivers to a carrier for transport, in a single shipment, a category 2 

quantity of radioactive material shall:

§ 37.79(a)(3)(i)

Use carriers that have established package tracking systems. An established package 

tracking system is a documented, proven, and reliable system routinely used to transport 

objects of value. In order for a package tracking system to maintain constant control and/or 

surveillance, the package tracking system must allow the shipper or transporter to identify 

when and where the package was last and when it should arrive at the next point of control.

§ 37.79(a)(3)(ii)

Use carriers that maintain constant control and/or surveillance during transit and have the 

capability for immediate communication to summon appropriate response or assistance; and

§ 37.79(a)(3)(iii)

Use carriers that have established tracking systems that require an authorized signature prior 

to releasing the package for delivery or return.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions establish this part’s security requirements for shipping category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material by road.

Q&As:

Q1: I possess a category 2 quantity of radioactive material and transport it without using a 

commercial carrier service. What are the physical protection requirements for road shipments of

these quantities of material?

A1: A licensee that does not use a commercial carrier and that transports by road itself 

category 2 or greater quantities of material must meet the requirements in 10 CFR 37.79(a)(2). 

To comply with 10 CFR 37.47(a), the licensee must establish a security zone around the 

radioactive material and may use the transport vehicle as the security zone boundary. The 

regulation in 10 CFR 37.47(c) requires the licensee to limit access to the security zone to 

authorized individuals. In addition, the regulations in 10 CFR 37.49 require the licensee to 
243

monitor, detect, assess, and respond to any unauthorized access. The licensee will also need 

to comply with the preplanning and coordination requirements in 10 CFR 37.75 and with the 

investigation and reporting requirements in 10 CFR 37.81 if a shipment is lost. For those 

shipments of category 2 quantities of radioactive material that meet the criteria in 10 CFR

71.97(b) of this chapter, the shipping licensee must also comply with the advance notification 

provisions of that section.

Q2: What requirements do I have to meet when I deliver a category 2 quantity of radioactive 

material to a carrier to ship in a single shipment?

A2: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.79(a)(3)(i) requires the licensee to use a carrier that has an 

established, documented package tracking system that reliably enables it, as the shipping 

licensee, to know the last location of the package, the time that it was at that location, and the 

time that it should arrive at the next control point. To meet this requirement, the carrier’s 

tracking system should enable the licensee to see the chain of custody for the package and 

should show who is accountable for the package at each stage of the trip so that the licensee or 

the carrier can promptly determine if the shipment is lost or missing. The tracking system must 

also require an authorized signature before the release of the package for delivery or return.

The regulation in 10 CFR 37.79(a)(3)(iii) requires the licensee’s carrier to maintain constant 

control and surveillance during transit and to have the capability to summon an armed LLEA

response or other emergency or urgent assistance immediately when necessary.

Q3: If I’m not using an established nationwide delivery system like DHL Express, FedEx, or

UPS, what can I do to ensure that my carrier has the equivalent tracking capabilities?

A3: The licensee should ascertain in advance if the carrier maintains a package-tracking 

system with a reliable on-demand capability to ascertain the last location and current status of 

the shipment. If the licensee’s carrier does not have such a capability, the licensee must either 

require it as a condition for shipment or find another carrier that meets the requirements in

10 CFR 37.79(a)(2) and 10 CFR 37.79(a)(3) and meets other applicable provisions of this part.

Q4: What must a package control system for a category 2 shipment be able to do to 

“maintain constant control and/or surveillance”? Would I be in violation if there are any lapses 

or interruptions?

A4: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.79(a)(3)(i) clarifies the performance requirements for

“constant control and/or surveillance” by stating that, for a package tracking system to maintain 

these capabilities, the system “must allow the shipping licensee or transporter to identify when

and where the package was last and when it should arrive at the next point of control.” Thus, 

although the licensee should take all reasonable measures to prevent or minimize tracking 

system malfunctions, it will not be in violation if the carrier’s package control system is not able 

to pinpoint the location of the shipment moment by moment in real time.

Q5: 10 CFR 37.79(a)(2) requires me to maintain constant control and/or surveillance “during 

transit.” When does “transit” begin and end for the purposes of this requirement?

A5: In general, transit begins when the organization with physical control over the material 

begins to move it off site. Unless the licensee itself takes the material off site to the carrier for 

shipment, transit begins when the carrier accepts the consignment of radioactive material for 
244

shipment and begins moving the loaded transport vehicle. Transit ends when the receiving 

licensee accepts the shipment from the carrier and unloads or allows the radioactive material to 

be unloaded at the agreed upon destination.

Q6: What kind of equipment must I use to “have the capability for immediate communication”

under 10 CFR 37.79(a)(2) to summon help? Satellite phones? Cell phones? Laptops for

e-mails? Text messaging? Two-way radios? How “immediate” must this communication be?

A6: The rule does not specify any particular communications technology. That choice is left 

to the licensee’s discretion. However, the licensee or carrier must ensure that its chosen 

technology permits “immediate communication to summon appropriate response or assistance,”

the same as under 10 CFR 37.79(a)(3)(ii). Cell or satellite phones and two-way radios meet this 

requirement. The use of e-mail or text messaging does not meet the requirement because the 

licensee or carrier cannot always be certain that the message has been received and because 

the message could remain unopened too long to enable an immediate response.

Q7: Do I have to have a backup communications system to maintain the capability for

“immediate communication”?

A7: A backup system is not required for transfers of category 2 quantity shipments. 

However, such a system could provide a greater degree of assurance that the licensee or 

carrier will be able to maintain its capability for immediate communication in the event of a 

malfunction or damage to the primary communications system.

Q8: What’s the difference between “response” and “assistance”?

A8: The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 generally use the word “response” to denote a 

response by law enforcement personnel to an apparent or actual security event or a response 

by trained emergency services personnel to prevent or mitigate any collateral safety impacts of 

a security event. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 use “assistance” to denote other kinds of 

emergency or urgent conditions under which the transport crew or vehicle(s) requires outside 

help, such as towing or roadside repair service, to avoid or minimize an unplanned delay in the 

shipment. The NRC has used both words in 10 CFR 37.79(a)(2) and 10 CFR 37.79(a)(3) to 

signify that the licensee or carrier must have the capability for immediate communications for 

both security- and nonsecurity-related incidents.

Q9: Under 10 CFR 37.79(a)(3)(iii), licensees must use carriers with tracking systems that 

require an “authorized signature” before the package can be released for delivery or return. 

How will I know that an individual who signs the shipping papers for a package is

“authorized”?

A9: The individual should be an employee or contractor of the receiving licensee. Because 

that individual is subject to reassignment and may be unknown to the licensee, the licensee, as 

good practice, should request that the carrier ask for Government- or licensee-issued photo 

identification to verify the individual’s identity and company-issued documentation to verify that 

the individual works for the receiving licensee or its contractor.
245

§ 37.79, “Requirements for Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2

 Quantities of Radioactive Material during Shipment” (continued)

§ 37.79(b), “Shipments by Rail”

§ 37.79(b)(1)

Each licensee who transports, or delivers to a carrier for transport, in a single shipment, a 

category 1 quantity of radioactive material shall:

§ 37.79(b)(1)(i)

Ensure that rail shipments are monitored by a telemetric position monitoring system or an 

alternative tracking system reporting to the licensee, third party, or railroad communications 

center. The communications center shall provide positive confirmation of the location of the 

shipment and its status. The communications center shall implement preplanned procedures 

in response to deviations from the authorized route or to a notification of actual, attempted, or 

suspicious activities related to the theft or diversion of a shipment. These procedures will 

include, but not be limited to, the identification of, and contact information for, the appropriate 

LLEA along the shipment route.

§ 37.79(b)(1)(ii)

Ensure that periodic reports to the communications center are made at preset intervals.

EXPLANATION:

These provisions establish the security provisions for shipping category 1 quantities of 

radioactive material by rail.

Q&As:

Q1: What are the physical protection requirements for rail shipments of category 1 quantities 

of radioactive material?

A1: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.79(b)(1)(i) requires licensees to ensure that rail shipments 

are monitored either by a telemetric position monitoring system or an alternative tracking system 

that meets certain criteria for reporting to a licensee, a third party, or a railroad communications 

center. The communications center must provide positive confirmation of the shipment’s status 

and location. Each center must also be prepared to implement preplanned procedures to

respond to deviations from the authorized route, a notification of an actual or attempted theft or 

diversion of a shipment, or any suspicious activity near the shipment. The procedures must 

also identify and provide contact information for the appropriate LLEA in each jurisdiction along 

the shipment route. Rail shipment tracking provides the means for a communications center to 

immediately report an unusual occurrence that could lead to the theft or diversion of the 

material. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.79(b)(1)(ii) requires the shipping licensee to ensure that 

the communications center makes periodic reports at preset intervals.
246

Q2: What is a telemetric position monitoring system?

A2: A telemetric position monitoring system is a data transfer system that captures, by 

instrumentation or by other measuring devices, information about the location and status of a 

transport vehicle or package between the departure and destination locations. The gathering of 

this information permits the remote monitoring and reporting of the location of a transport

vehicle or package. Systems that use radiofrequency identification or satellite-based global 

positioning technologies are examples of telemetric position monitoring systems.

Q3: What’s the difference between a railroad communication center and a movement control 

center for transport by road?

A3: The two types of centers fulfill equivalent communications functions. The NRC refers to 

“railroad communication center” because that’s the accepted railroad industry term for the 

railroad-related entity that carries out the functions that correspond to those of a movement 

control center.

Q4: Also under 10 CFR 37.79(b)(1)(i), the communications center must implement 

preplanned procedures in response to “deviations” from the authorized route. What constitutes 

a “deviation”?

A4: A deviation from the authorized route would be any redirection to another rail spur or rail 

line when the railroad communications center was not aware that the switch was to be made. 

This could include a relocation of a train within a rail yard if the relocation could adversely affect 

the ability of the railroad to locate the shipment or to provide required security.

Q5: 10 CFR 37.79(b)(1)(ii) requires licensees to ensure that periodic reports to the 

communications center are made at preset intervals. What must I do if one of these reports is 

late? How long should I wait before taking action?

A5: The licensee’s shipment contract with the highway carrier or railroad should require its 

movement control or communications center to notify the licensee immediately if a call from its 

transport crew is delayed by more than a half of the prearranged reporting interval. The 

licensee should contact the LLEA immediately if the movement control or communications 

center cannot establish communications with the transport crew.
247

§ 37.79, “Requirements for Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2

 Quantities of Radioactive Material during Shipment” (continued)

§ 37.79(b), “Shipments by Rail” (continued)

§ 37.79(b)(2)

Each licensee who transports, or delivers to a carrier for transport, in a single shipment, a 

category 2 quantity of radioactive material shall:

§ 37.79(b)(2)(i)

Use carriers that have established package tracking systems. An established package 

tracking system is a documented, proven, and reliable system routinely used to transport 

objects of value. In order for a package tracking system to maintain constant control and/or 

surveillance, the package tracking system must allow the shipper or transporter to identify 

when and where the package was last and when it should arrive at the next point of control.

§ 37.79(b)(2)(ii)

Use carriers that maintain constant control and/or surveillance during transit and have the 

capability for immediate communication to summon appropriate response or assistance; and

§ 37.79(b)(2)(iii)

Use carriers that have established tracking systems that require an authorized signature prior 

to releasing the package for delivery or return.

EXPLANATION:

This requirement establishes the security provisions for shipping category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material by rail.

Q&As:

Q1: What are the physical protection requirements for rail shipments of category 2 quantities 

of radioactive material?

A1: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.79(b)(2)(i) requires a licensee that is shipping category 2 

quantities of radioactive material by rail to have, at minimum, the capability to contact the 

shipping carrier and to determine the approximate location of the shipment. Such licensees 

must also use a carrier that has a documented, proven, and reliable package tracking system 

that allows the shipping licensee or carrier to identify when and where the package was when 

the train last reported and when it should arrive at the next point of control. The regulation in 10

CFR 37.79(b)(2)(ii) requires the carrier to maintain constant control and surveillance during 

transit and to have the capability for immediate communication to summon an appropriate

response or assistance. In addition, the carrier must, under 10 CFR 37.79(b)(2)(iii), require an

authorized signature before releasing the package for delivery or return.
248

Q2: What must a package control system for a category 2 shipment be able to do to 

“maintain constant control and/or surveillance”? Would I be in violation if there are any lapses 

or interruptions?

A2: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.79(b)(2)(i) clarifies the performance requirements for 

“constant control and/or surveillance” by stating that, to maintain these capabilities, the package 

tracking system must allow the shipping licensee or carrier “to identify when and where the 

package was last and when it should arrive at the next point of control.” Thus, although the 

shipping licensee should take all reasonable measures to prevent or minimize tracking system 

malfunctions, the licensee will not be in violation if it is unable to pinpoint the location of the 

shipment moment by moment in real time.

Q3: Section 37.79(b)(2)(ii) requires me to maintain constant control and/or surveillance

“during transit.” When does “transit” begin and end for the purposes of this requirement?

A3: Transit begins when the carrier accepts the consignment of radioactive material for 

shipment electronically or in writing and begins to move the loaded transport vehicle. Transit 

ends when the receiving licensee accepts the shipment from the carrier electronically or in 

writing and unloads or allows the radioactive material to be unloaded at the agreed upon 

destination.

Q4: What kind of equipment must a carrier have to “have the capability for immediate 

communication” to summon help? Laptops for e-mails? Text messaging? Two-way radios? 

How “immediate” must this communication be?

A4: The rule does not require any particular communications technology. The carrier has 

the discretion to choose the type of communication equipment that it will use to summon help 

under 10 CFR 37.79(b)(2). However, the carrier’s chosen technology must permit 

communication without delay. Cell or satellite phones and two-way radios meet this 

requirement. The use of e-mail or text messaging does not meet this requirement because the

carrier cannot always be certain that the message has been received and because the message 

could remain unopened too long to enable an immediate response.

Q5: Does my carrier have to have a backup communications system to maintain the

capability for “immediate communication”?

A5: A backup system is not required; however, such a system could provide a greater 

degree of assurance that the carrier will be able to maintain its capability for immediate 

communication in the event of a malfunction or damage to the primary communications system.

Q6: What’s the difference between “response” and “assistance”?

A6: The regulation in 10 CFR Part 37 generally uses the word “response” to denote a 

response by law enforcement personnel to an apparent or actual security event or a response 

by trained emergency services personnel to prevent or mitigate any collateral safety impacts of 

a security event. The regulation in 10 CFR Part 37 uses “assistance” to denote a response to 

other kinds of emergency or urgent conditions under which the transport crew requires outside 

help, such as towing or on-location repair service, to avoid or minimize an unplanned delay in 

the shipment. The NRC has used both words in 10 CFR 37.79(b)(2) to signify that the licensee

or carrier must have the capability for immediate communications for both security- and 

nonsecurity-related incidents.
249

Q7: Under 10 CFR 37.79(b)(2)(iii), licensees must use carriers with tracking systems that 

require “an authorized signature” before the package can be released for delivery or return. 

How will I know that an individual who signs the shipping papers for a package is “authorized”?

A7: The individual should be an employee or contractor of the receiving licensee. Because 

that individual is subject to reassignment and may be unknown to the licensee, the licensee, as 

good practice, should request that the carrier or railroad ask for Government- or licensee-issued 

photo identification to verify the individual’s identity and company-issued documentation to verify 

that the individual works for the receiving licensee or its contractor.
250

§ 37.79, “Requirements for Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2

 Quantities of Radioactive Material during Shipment” (continued)

§ 37.79(c), “Investigations”

Each licensee that makes arrangements for the shipment of category 1 quantities of 

radioactive material shall immediately conduct an investigation upon the discovery that a 

category 1 shipment is lost or missing. Each licensee that makes arrangements for the 

shipment of category 2 quantities of radioactive material shall immediately conduct an 

investigation, in coordination with the receiving licensee, of any shipment that has not arrived 

by the designated no-later-than arrival time.

EXPLANATION:

The shipping licensee must investigate immediately if a category 1 quantity shipment is lost or 

missing or if a category 2 quantity shipment does not arrive by the NLT arrival time.

Q&As:

Q1: How should I decide that a shipment of my category 1 quantity of radioactive material is 

lost or missing?

A1: If the carrier’s telemetric position monitoring system or the railroad’s communications 

center cannot tell where a licensee’s shipment is within a few minutes after the licensee asks for 

a status of its shipment, and if the licensee is not confident that the tracking and

communications systems are functioning normally, it should consider the shipment lost or 

missing. Additionally, if the licensee cannot reach the transport crew after a missed check-in, it

should assume that the shipment is missing.

Q2: What should an investigation of a lost or missing category 1 quantity shipment include?

A2: The scope of an investigation will depend on the circumstances of the lost or 

unaccounted for material, the shipment’s transportation mode, and the contingency procedures. 

The licensee should coordinate its investigation with the carrier. The investigation should 

include, but should not be limited to, the following actions:

• Determine the time and location of the last transport crew check-in.

• Determine where communication was lost.

• Determine where tracking was lost.

• Confirm that the equipment is working properly.

• Contact the escort if one was being used.

Q3: What should I do if my category 2 shipment does not arrive by the NLT arrival time?

A3: If the licensee is a receiving licensee, it must notify the shipping licensee in accordance 

with 10 CFR 37.75(c). In addition, the receiving licensee should cooperate in the investigation 

that the shipping licensee is required to conduct. If the licensee is the shipping licensee, it must 

immediately begin an investigation to determine what happened to the shipment.
251

Q4: What should an investigation of a lost or missing category 2 quantity shipment include?

A4: The shipping licensee should contact the carrier to determine the shipment’s last known 

location. The shipping licensee should work with the carrier to determine the shipment’s current 

location. If the carrier cannot determine the location of the shipment, the shipping licensee 

should contact the NRC Operations Center to inform it that a category 2 shipment is lost or 

missing. The shipper should continue to work with the carrier to locate the shipment; however,

if the shipment is still missing after 24 hours of the initial notification, the licensee again must 

contact the NRC Operations Center.
252

§ 37.81, “Reporting of Events”

§ 37.81(a)

The shipping licensee shall notify the appropriate LLEA and the NRC Operations Center ((301) 

816-5100) within 1 hour of its determination that a shipment of category 1 quantities of 

radioactive material is lost or missing. The appropriate LLEA would be the law enforcement 

agency in the area of the shipment’s last confirmed location. During the investigation required 

by § 37.79(c), the shipping licensee will provide agreed upon updates to the NRC Operations 

Center on the status of the investigation.

EXPLANATION:

The shipping licensee must notify the LLEA and the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour after 

determining that a shipment of category 1 quantities of radioactive material is lost or missing.

Q&As:

Q1: When must a licensee make notification that a category 1 shipment is lost or missing?

A1: When a licensee determines that a shipment of a category 1 quantity of radioactive

material is lost or missing, it must notify the LLEA in the area of the shipment’s last confirmed 

location within 1 hour and must then notify the NRC Operations Center. Notification to the NRC 

should be as prompt as possible, but not at the expense of causing a delay or interference with 

the LLEA response to the event. Although 10 CFR 37.81(a) sets 1 hour as the maximum time 

for a “lost or missing” notification of a category 1 quantity shipment, the licensee should notify 

the LLEA as soon as the carrier has completed its first unsuccessful attempt to locate the 

material and has confirmed that its inability to trace it was not a result of human error or a 

malfunction of the system for monitoring the position of the shipment.

Q2: How can I know when a category 1 shipment is lost or missing?

A2: The regulations in 10 CFR 37.79(a) and 10 CFR 37.79(b) require the licensee to ensure 

that shipments are continuously and actively monitored by a telemetric position monitoring 

system or an alternative tracking system that reports to a movement control center for road 

shipments or a railroad communication center. In addition, the regulations in 10 CFR 37.79(a) 

and 10 CFR 37.79(b) require the licensee to ensure that both types of centers provide positive 

confirmation of the location, status, and control over the shipment.

Thus, if the licensee complies with these requirements, it should have no trouble in readily 

ascertaining if a category 1 shipment is lost or missing. If the transport crew has not checked in 

at the required frequency or if the tracking system indicates that the shipment is not on the 

approved route and the licensee has not heard from the transport crew, the licensee should 

begin an immediate investigation to determine what is happening. If the licensee’s attempts to 

contact the transport crew are unsuccessful (using both the primary and backup communication 

systems), the licensee should assume that something is wrong and should report to the LLEA 

and the NRC. In addition, if the licensee is shipping a category 1 quantity of material by road 

and if it wants to enhance the speed and authenticity of its carrier’s confirmation of a lost or
253

missing shipment, the licensee could request that its carrier adopt one or more of TSA’s 

voluntary security action items for highway security-sensitive materials (HSSM). Appendix B on 

TSA’s Web page lists category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive materials from IAEA’s 

Code of Conduct list as Tier I HSSM, which TSA defines as commercial motor vehicletransported materials “whose potential consequences from an act of terrorism include a highly

significant level of adverse effects on human life, environmental damage, transportation system

disruption, or economic disruption.” The following two voluntary practices for Tier I HSSMs,

among others in TSA’s Appendix A list of security action items, could facilitate a timely 

determination that licensed material is lost or missing:

(1) Panic Button Capability. Employers should implement means for a driver to 

transmit an emergency alert notification to dispatch. “Panic button” technology 

enables a driver to remotely send an emergency alert notification message either 

through the use of satellite or terrestrial communications or the remote panic 

button to disable the vehicle.

(2) Tractor and Trailer Tracking Systems. Employers should have the ability to 

implement methods for tracking the tractor and trailer throughout the intended 

route with satellite- or land-based wireless GPS communications systems or 

both. Tracking methods for the tractor and trailer should provide current position 

by latitude and longitude. Geofencing and route-monitoring capabilities allow

authorized users to define and monitor routes and risk areas. If the tractor or 

trailer deviates from a specified route or if it enters a risk area, an alert 

notification should be sent to the dispatch center. An employer or an authorized 

representative should have the ability to remotely monitor trailer “connect” and

“disconnect” events. Employers or an authorized representative should have the 

ability to poll the tractor and trailer tracking units to request a current location and

status report. The trailer position reporting frequency should be configured at not 

more than 15-minute intervals.

These voluntary practices would also facilitate timely notifications under this section.

Q3: How frequently should the licensee provide updates to the NRC Operations Center?

A3: The licensee should provide updates when it receives new information. In addition, the 

licensee should discuss with the NRC, on a case-by-case basis, what the frequency of updates 

should be because the frequency will depend on the circumstances of the lost or missing 

shipment.
254

§ 37.81, “Reporting of Events” (continued)

§ 37.81(b)

The shipping licensee shall notify the NRC Operations Center ((301) 816-5100) within

4 hours of its determination that a shipment of category 2 quantities of radioactive material is 

lost or missing. If, after 24 hours of its determination that the shipment is lost or missing, the 

radioactive material has not been located and secured, the licensee shall immediately notify 

the NRC Operations Center.

EXPLANATION:

The shipping licensee must notify the NRC Operations Center within 4 hours of the 

determination that a shipment of category 2 quantities of radioactive material is lost or missing 

and must call the center after 24 hours if the shipment has not been located.

Q&As:

Q1: When must a licensee make notification that a category 2 shipment is lost or missing?

A1: The concept of lost or missing licensed material is neither new nor unique to 10 CFR Part

37. In summary, if the licensee does not know where the material is and cannot readily locate it,

it should consider the material lost or missing. The licensee is allowed reasonable time to

attempt to trace a shipment. A licensee is not required to make the notification when a shipment 

has not arrived by the NLT arrival time. The shipping licensee is required to begin its 

investigation at that point in time. If the investigation does not discover the location of the 

material, the licensee must notify the NRC. A licensee can take a reasonable amount of time to 

conduct the investigation; however, the investigation should not last several days. The licensee 

needs to use some judgment in making the determination that the investigation has taken long 

enough and that the NRC needs to be notified.

Once the licensee determines that the shipment is lost or missing, it must notify the NRC 

Operations Center within 4 hours of such a determination. In addition, the licensee must 

immediately notify the NRC Operations Center if, after 24 hours from its determination that the 

shipment was lost or missing, it still cannot determine the location of the material.
255

§ 37.81, “Reporting of Events” (continued)

§ 37.81(c)

The shipping licensee shall notify the designated LLEA along the shipment route as soon as 

possible upon discovery of any actual or attempted theft or diversion of a shipment or 

suspicious activities related to the theft or diversion of a shipment of a category 1 quantity of 

radioactive material. As soon as possible after notifying the LLEA, the licensee shall notify the 

NRC Operations Center ((301) 816-5100) upon discovery of any actual or attempted theft or 

diversion of a shipment or any suspicious activity related to the shipment of category 1 

radioactive material.

EXPLANATION:

The shipping licensee must notify the designated LLEA along the shipment route upon 

discovery of any actual or attempted theft or diversion of a shipment or upon discovery of 

suspicious activities related to a shipment of category 1 quantities of radioactive material. After 

notifying the LLEA, the licensee must notify the NRC Operations Center.

Q&As:

Q1: This subsection requires me to notify an LLEA along the route as soon as possible “upon 

discovery” of any actual or attempted theft or diversion of a shipment or suspicious activities. 

Does this mean I must report whatever a member of the transport crew “discovers” as soon as 

he or she reports it without first trying to confirm whether it is what the individual thinks it is?

A1: No. However, the licensee should immediately assess if the reported event or activity—

or the signal that it received from an alarm or monitoring device—requires LLEA assistance 

without delay. For example, an explosion on or around the transport or escort vehicle, gunshots 

nearby in an urban or suburban area or other setting where hunting is prohibited, or the image

of an armed individual on the licensee’s or the carrier’s monitoring screen would indicate the 

need for an immediate LLEA response and should be reported immediately.

Q2: What would a licensee be required to do if there is an attempt to steal or divert a 

category 1 shipment?

A2: For shipments of category 1 quantities of radioactive material, a licensee that discovers, 

under 10 CFR 37.81(c), an actual or attempted theft or diversion of a shipment or any 

suspicious activity related to a shipment must notify the designated LLEA along the shipment 

route as soon as possible. After notifying the LLEA, the licensee must notify the NRC 

Operations Center at (301) 816-5100. The NRC Operations Center will notify other affected 

States and the agency’s Federal partners, as appropriate.
256

Q3: What types of activities should be considered “suspicious”?

A3: TSA guidance for private or contract carrier employees lists a number of activities

that may be considered suspicious. The licensee could require its carrier to make its

employees aware of the following suspicious activities:

• discovery of any unknown articles found in, on, or around company vehicles

• unauthorized persons photographing company vehicles or locations or both

• carriers being followed by other vehicles for extended periods of time

• carriers being asked inappropriate questions about the licensee’s business 

 related to security, products, delivery schedules, or any other information

 that seems suspicious

• reports or observations of commercial vehicles parked in unusual locations,

 such as fields, vacant warehouses, or other secluded areas

• unauthorized persons loitering in areas in which company vehicles

 are loading/unloading, parked, or serviced

TSA guidance for independent or owner-operated truck drivers offers the following

related additional examples of suspicious activities:

• anyone who inquires too much about what the carrier is hauling, where it

 is going, or what the intended route is

• vehicles following the carrier for extended periods of time

• persons observing parking areas for trucks and automobiles repeatedly

 cruising through those areas

• requests to stop for alleged accidents or breakdowns that cannot be seen

• anyone approaching the carrier seeking a ride for himself or herself or for

 another person

• an unattended vehicle parked in or on critical infrastructure (e.g., a tunnel

 or bridge) or in a location that seems out of place

• anyone avoiding a security checkpoint

• obviously altered signage on a vehicle

• missing license plate(s) or other unique markings on a vehicle
257

For example, if the truck driver notices suspicious activity, he or she should proceed in 

accordance with the employer’s established security policies and procedures. If the driver has 

any doubt in regard to suspicious behavior, he or she should report to his or her supervisor.

The lists above are not exhaustive; however, they provide examples of actions that could be 

considered suspicious. The licensee is responsible for evaluating activity to determine if it is 

suspicious or not.
258

§ 37.81, “Reporting of Events” (continued)

§ 37.81(d)

The shipping licensee shall notify the NRC Operations Center ((301)-816-5100) as soon as 

possible upon discovery of any actual or attempted theft or diversion of a shipment, or any 

suspicious activity related to the shipment, of a category 2 quantity of radioactive material.

EXPLANATION:

The shipping licensee must notify the NRC upon discovery of any actual or attempted theft or 

diversion of a shipment or suspicious activities related to a shipment of a category 2 quantity of 

radioactive material.

Q&As:

Q1: This subsection requires me to notify the NRC as soon as possible “upon discovery” of 

any actual or attempted theft or diversion, or suspicious activities related to a shipment of a 

category 2 quantity. Does this mean I must report whatever my carrier has “discovered” as 

soon as the carrier reports it without first trying to confirm whether it is what the carrier thinks it 

is?

A1: No. The regulation in 10 CFR 37.81(b) requires the licensee to notify the NRC 

Operations Center ((301) 816-5100) within 4 hours of its determination that a shipment of 

category 2 quantities of radioactive material is lost or missing. This timeframe should allow the 

licensee to gather sufficient information to decide if there actually have been suspicious 

activities or an actual or attempted theft or diversion.

Q2: What would a licensee be required to do if there is an attempt to steal or divert a 

category 2 shipment?

A2: The regulation in 10 CFR 37.81(d) requires a licensee that discovers an actual or 

attempted theft or diversion of a category 2 quantity shipment or any suspicious activity related 

to a shipment to notify the NRC Operations Center at (301) 816-5100 as soon as possible.

Q3: What types of activities should be considered “suspicious”?

A3: See Q3 and A3 for 10 CFR 37.81(c).
259

§ 37.81, “Reporting of Events” (continued)

§ 37.81(e)

The shipping licensee shall notify the NRC Operations Center ((301) 816-5100) and the 

LLEA as soon as possible upon recovery of any lost or missing category 1 quantities of 

radioactive material.

EXPLANATION:

The shipping licensee must notify the NRC and the LLEA upon recovery of any lost or missing 

category 1 quantities of radioactive material.

Q&As:

Q1: What constitutes “recovery” for purposes of this notification?

A1: The licensee can consider lost or missing licensed material recovered only when it is 

again in the physical possession of, or in a location otherwise under the control of, an 

authorized employee of the carrier, the shipping or recipient licensee, an authorized State or

Federal agency, or an LLEA that is able to prevent or deter unauthorized access to the material.

Q2: How can I know that the individual reporting the recovery of a lost or missing category 1 

shipment is the person he or she says she is and not an adversary trying to trick me into calling 

off my search?

A2: To frustrate any attempt by an unauthorized individual to call off an ongoing recovery 

effort prematurely, the licensee should try to confirm the true identity of the employee, regulatory 

agency representative, or law enforcement officer who is reporting from an offsite location. If

the vehicle has an onboard video camera, the licensee may accomplish this confirmation by 

asking the caller to appear before the camera and display a photo identification badge. If the 

vehicle does not have an onboard video camera, a licensee could confirm the identity of an 

employee by using its pre-established authentication code, by asking the employee to use an 

agreed upon separate radiofrequency or alternative communication method, by asking for the 

correct answer to one or more agreed upon identifying questions, or by using a combination of 

these. Questions should require specific responses that are either of a personally distinguishing 

nature (e.g., the name of a first pet) or otherwise not so intuitively obvious that an adversary 

could infer the correct response.

To confirm the true identity of a regulatory agency representative or law enforcement officer who 

claims to have recovered the lost or missing material in cases in which the vehicle does not

have an onboard video camera to verify this claim, the licensee could ask the individual to 

describe the location and to wait with the material until additional law enforcement assistance 

arrives. If the individual says that his or her current location is unsafe, the licensee may ask for

the address or distinguishing landmarks of the alternate location and tell the individual to wait for 

assistance at that location while it directs the nearest operating LLEA to the new location. If the

individual claims to be a law enforcement officer, the licensee could ask the responding LLEA to 

verify the individual’s employment or to refer it to a number at which it can obtain such
260

verification. If the individual claims to be a regulatory agency representative, the licensee could 

look up or call information for the agency’s toll free number to verify his or her employment. The

individual’s responses to the licensee’s requests for more information may not provide the

positive identification that it needs; however, incorrect or misleading information may signify that

the individual is not the official he or she claims to be. If the licensee suspects a false identity, it

should try to keep the individual on the phone and silently alert a colleague if possible (e.g., with 

a handwritten note) to contact the responding LLEA out of the caller’s earshot. This might

enable the LLEA to work with the phone service provider to identify more accurately the caller’s

current location and direction of travel.

The licensee or carrier should also use its pre-established duress code to confirm that an offsite 

interlocutor is not being forced (e.g., at gunpoint or within lethal range of an explosive) to submit 

a false report. The code should permit the offsite individual to introduce it on his or her own 

initiative without prompting and may involve seemingly mission-related technical questions and 

answers, apparently offhand remarks, or some other conversational technique to enable the 

offsite individual to signal without arousing suspicion that he or she is making a false report to 

licensee or call center personnel under threat by an adversary who is not visible or who is 

obviously malevolent. See also Q3 and A3 for 10 CFR 37.79(a)(1)(v)(B).
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§ 37.81, “Reporting of Events” (continued)

§ 37.81(f)

The shipping licensee shall notify the NRC Operations Center ((301) 816-5100) as 

soon as possible upon recovery of any lost or missing category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material.

EXPLANATION:

The shipping licensee must notify the NRC upon recovery of any lost or missing category 2 

quantities of radioactive material.

Q&As:

Q1: Should licensees make notification that a lost or missing category 2 shipment has been 

found?

A1: Yes. The licensee must notify the NRC Operations Center when a lost or missing 

shipment of category 2 quantities of radioactive material has been located. An Agreement State 

licensee notifies the Agreement State. This notification would be considered an update of the 

initial notification.

Q2: Can I notify the NRC Operations Center by any other means than telephoning?

A2: Yes. The licensee can fax a notification to the NRC Operations Center at 301-816-5151.
262

§ 37.81, “Reporting of Events” (continued)

§ 37.81(g)

The initial telephonic notification required by paragraphs (a) through (d) must be followed 

within a period of 30 days by a written report submitted to the NRC by an appropriate method 

listed in § 37.7. A written report is not required for notifications on suspicious activities 

required by paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section. In addition, the licensee shall provide one 

copy of the written report addressed to the Director, Division of Security Policy, Office of 

Nuclear Security and Incident Response. The report must set forth the following information:

§ 37.81(g)(1)

A description of the licensed material involved, including kind, quantity, and chemical and 

physical form;

§ 37.81(g)(2)

A description of the circumstances under which the loss or theft occurred;

§ 37.81(g)(3)

A statement of disposition, or probable disposition, of the licensed material involved;

§ 37.81(g)(4)

Actions that have been taken, or will be taken to recover the material; and

§ 37.81(g)(5)

Procedures or measures that have been, or will be, adopted to ensure against a recurrence 

of the loss or theft of licensed material.

EXPLANATION:

The licensee must submit a written report to the NRC within 30 days of an initial report of lost or 

missing material or attempted or actual theft or diversion of a shipment of category 1 or

category 2 quantities of radioactive material.

Q&As:

Q1: What level of detail should I provide in my 30-day written report on an event?

A1: The appropriate level of detail would depend on a number of considerations, including 

the nature and severity of the security incident, whether it was a first occurrence or a 

reoccurrence, and whether it has a significant potential to recur, the adequacy of the licensee’s 

monitoring efforts, the timeliness of the initial detection, the accuracy of the assessment, and 

the timeliness and potential effectiveness of the measures implemented in response to the

incident. In addition to an identification of corrective actions, the report should describe the data
263

and analyses that support the licensee’s identification of the root and significant contributing 

cause(s) of the incident and should explain how these data and analyses support the licensee’s 

selection of corrective actions identified. If the incident was a recurrence of a similar incident, 

the report should briefly describe past corrective actions and the findings of past assessments 

and should identify likely reasons that the past corrective actions did not prevent or mitigate a 

recurrence of the condition. The report should then explain the basis for the licensee’s 

determination that the proposed new or revised corrective actions or changes in the licensee’s 

implementation of these actions are likely to reduce the probability of a recurrence of the 

condition or to mitigate its effects.
264

§ 37.81, “Reporting of Events” (continued)

§ 37.81(h)

Subsequent to filing the written report, the licensee shall also report any additional substantive 

information on the loss or theft within 30 days after the licensee learns of such information.

EXPLANATION:

After filing the 30-day report, the licensee must report any additional substantive information on 

the loss or theft within 30 days after it learns of such information.

Q&As:

Q1: What would be considered to be “additional substantive information”?

A1: Examples of additional substantive information would include information not previously 

reported to the NRC that has been gathered since the previous report was made. If the 

licensee could not complete its investigation within the 30-day limit for the initial report, the 

subsequent report would need to provide the final findings.

Q2: Would I have to report as “additional substantive information” something I “learned of” 

through TV, radio, or print news? Through Wikipedia or some other Internet source? From an 

LLEA representative?

A2: No. The licensee would not necessarily need to report as substantive information 

something that it learned through television, radio, print news, or Internet sources. The fact that 

information is available does not mean that the information is correct or that it would be of 

interest to the NRC. The information provided by an LLEA representative might be considered 

substantive, depending on the content. The licensee should use judgment in deciding if the 

information obtained from any source would be of interest to the NRC.
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ANNEX D

TEMPLATE FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATIONS TO THE NRC OF SHIPMENTS OF 

CATEGORY 1 QUANTITIES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL UNDER 10 CFR 37.77(b)

Notification Date: 

Shipping Identification (unique identifier): 

Notification Revision Number: 

Shipper (include name,* address,* and name of the point of contact and telephone number):*

Shipper’s License Number* (and import or export license, when applicable): 

Type of Shipment (domestic, import, export, or transshipment): 

Point of Origin* (include address and name of the point of contact and telephone number):

Recipient (consignee) (include name,* address,* name of the point of contact, and telephone 

number):

Recipient’s License Number:* 

Radioactive Isotope:* 

Estimated Activity* (preferably in terabecquerel): 

Description of Shipment (e.g., physical form and number of sources or flasks or containers):*

End Use of Shipment:

Carrier(s) (include name,* address,* and name of the point of contact, and telephone number*):

Planned Date* and Time* of Shipment Departure and Confirmation of Shipment Actual

Departure Date* and Time*: 
266

Planned Date* and Time* of Shipment Arrival and Confirmation of Shipment Actual Arrival Date*

and Time*:

Routing Information:

Mode(s) of Transportation: 

Estimated Time and Date That the Shipment Is Expected To Enter Each State along the Route*:

For Import/Exports Include Point of U.S. Entry or Departure:* 

Point of Contact, with a Telephone Number for Current Shipment Information*:

* This symbol indicates that the information is required by 10 CFR 37.77(b). The other items 

are voluntary but are requested by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to enable it 

to provide more accurate and detailed information for any emergency response.

Note that the preferred notification method to the NRC is through the Operations Center by

e-mail or facsimile at least 4 days before the scheduled shipping date. The notification to the

NRC may be made by e-mail to RAMQC_SHIPMENTS@nrc.gov or by fax to (301) 816-5151. 

Shippers should coordinate with States as indicated in 10 CFR 37.77(a). The NRC requests 

that the shipper also notify the agency with a confirmation of the departure date within 1 day 

after the actual shipment departure and with a confirmation of the arrival date within 1 day after 

the actual arrival.

Under 10 CFR 37.77(c)(1), any change in the shipment information supplied above must be 

provided to the States and the NRC as soon as the information becomes available but before 

the commencement of the shipment. Under 10 CFR 37.77(c)(2), notification of changes to the 

shipment schedule while the shipment is in transit must be made immediately to the NRC 

Operations Center and the appropriate States.
 267

SUBPART E—RESERVED

SUBPART F—RECORDS

§ 37.101, “Form of Records”

§ 37.103, “Record Retention”

§ 37.101, “Form of Records”

§ 37.101

Each record required by this part must be legible throughout the retention period specified by 

each Commission regulation. The record may be the original or a reproduced copy or a 

microform, provided that the copy or microform is authenticated by authorized personnel and 

that the microform is capable of producing a clear copy throughout the required retention 

period. The record may also be stored in electronic media with the capability for producing 

legible, accurate, and complete records during the required retention period. Records, such 

as letters, drawings, and specifications, must include all pertinent information, such as 

stamps, initials, and signatures. The licensee shall maintain adequate safeguards against 

tampering with, and loss of, records.

EXPLANATION:

Licensees are required to keep records that are legible for the length of the retention period.

Q&As:

These provisions are not unique to 10 CFR Part 37; therefore, no questions and answers are 

provided.
268

§ 37.103, “Record Retention”

§ 37.103

Licensees shall maintain the records that are required by the regulations in this part for the 

period specified by the appropriate regulation. If a retention period is not otherwise specified, 

these records must be retained until the Commission terminates the facility’s license. All 

records related to this part may be destroyed upon Commission termination of the facility 

license.

EXPLANATION:

Licensees are required to maintain records required by the regulations until the Commission 

terminates the license, unless the regulations specify a retention period.

Q&As:

Q1: If 10 CFR Part 37 does not specify how long to keep a record, is the licensee required to 

keep it? If so, for how long?

A1: If the regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 do not specify the length of record retention for a 

particular record, the licensee must retain the record under this section until the Commission 

terminates the facility license.
 269

SUBPART G—ENFORCEMENT

§ 37.105, “Inspections”

§ 37.107, “Violations”

§ 37.109, “Criminal Penalties”

§ 37.105, “Inspections”

§ 37.105(a)

Each licensee shall afford to the Commission at all reasonable times opportunity to inspect 

category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material and the premises and facilities 

wherein the nuclear material is used, produced, or stored.

§ 37.105(b)

Each licensee shall make available to the Commission for inspection, upon reasonable 

notice, records kept by the licensee pertaining to its receipt, possession, use, acquisition, 

import, export, or transfer of category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material.

EXPLANATION:

The NRC has the right to inspect the licensee’s facilities, including all licensee-maintained 

records that pertain to its receipt, possession, use, acquisition, import, export, or transfer of 

radioactive material.

Q&As:

These provisions are not unique to 10 CFR Part 37; therefore, no questions and answers are 

provided.
 270

§ 37.107, “Violations”

§ 37.107(a)

The Commission may obtain an injunction or other court order to prevent a violation of the 

provisions of—

§ 37.107(a)(1)

The AEA, as amended;

§ 37.107(a)(2)

Title II of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; or

§ 37.107(a)(3)

A regulation or order issued pursuant to those Acts.

EXPLANATION:

The NRC may obtain a court order to stop someone from violating the regulations.

Q&As:

None. The NRC Enforcement Manual is the implementing guidance for the agency’s 

enforcement program. For additional information on the manual and for links to related 

documents, click on http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/guidance.html. The

NRC Enforcement Manual provides guidance consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy,

which establishes the general principles that govern the enforcement program. For additional 

information on the NRC Enforcement Policy and for links to related documents, click on 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.
 271

§ 37.107, “Violations” (continued)

§ 37.107(b)

The Commission may obtain a court order for the payment of a civil penalty imposed under

Section 234 of the AEA:

§ 37.107(b)(1)

For violations of—

§ 37.107(b)(1)(i)

Sections 53, 57, 62, 63, 81, 82, 101, 103, 104, 107, or 109 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 

as amended:

§ 37.107(b)(1)(ii)

Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act;

§ 37.107(b)(1)(iii)

Any rule, regulation, or order issued pursuant to the sections specified in paragraph (b)(1)(i)

of this section;

§ 37.107(b)(1)(iv)

Any term, condition, or limitation of any license issued under the sections specified in 

paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section.

§ 37.107(b)(2)

For any violation for which a license may be revoked under Section 186 of the AEA, as 

amended.

EXPLANATION:

The NRC may obtain a court order to force someone to pay a civil penalty for violating the 

regulations.

Q&As:

None. The NRC Enforcement Manual is the implementing guidance for the agency’s 

enforcement program. For additional information on the manual and for links to related 

documents, click on http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/guidance.html. The

NRC Enforcement Manual provides guidance consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy,

which establishes the general principles that govern the enforcement program. For additional 

information on the NRC Enforcement Policy and for links to related documents, click on 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.
 272

§ 37.109, “Criminal Penalties”

§ 37.109(a)

Section 223 of the AEA, as amended, provides for criminal sanctions for willful violation of, 

attempted violation of, or conspiracy to violate any regulation issued under Sections 161b,

161i, or 161o of the Act. For purposes of Section 223, all the regulations in Part 37 are issued 

under one or more of Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o, except for the sections listed in

paragraph (b) of this section.

§ 37.109(b)

The regulations in Part 37 that are not issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o for the 

purposes of Section 223 are as follows: §§ 37.1, 37.3, 37.5, 37.7, 37.9, 37.11, 37.13, 37.107, 

and 37.109.

EXPLANATION:

Anyone who willfully violates, attempts to violate, or conspires to violate the regulations can be 

criminally prosecuted.

Q&As:

None. The NRC Enforcement Manual is the implementing guidance for the agency’s 

enforcement program. For additional information on the manual and for links to related 

documents, click on http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/guidance.html. The

NRC Enforcement Manual provides guidance consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy,

which establishes the general principles that govern the enforcement program. For additional 

information on the NRC Enforcement Policy and for links to related documents, click on 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.
A-1

APPENDIX A

CATEGORY 1 AND CATEGORY 2 RADIOACTIVE

MATERIALS

Radioactive Material Thresholds

Table A-1 provides the thresholds for Category 1 and Category 2 quantities of

radioactive material.

Table A-1. Category 1 and Category 2 Radioactive Material Thresholds*

RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL CATEGORY 1 

(TBq)**

CATEGORY 1 

(Ci)

CATEGORY 2 

(TBq)

CATEGORY 2 

(Ci)

Americium-241 60 1,620 0.6 16.2

Americium-241/Beryllium 60 1,620 0.6 16.2

Californium-252 20 540 0.2 5.40

Cobalt-60 30 810 0.3 8.10

Curium-244 50 1,350 0.5 13.5

Cesium-137 100 2,700 1 27.0

Gadolinium-153 1,000 27,000 10 270

Iridium-192 80 2,160 0.8 21.6

Plutonium-238 60 1,620 0.6 16.2

Plutonium-239/Beryllium 60 1,620 0.6 16.2

Promethium-147 40,000 1,080,000 400 10,800

Radium-226 40 1,080 0.4 10.8

Selenium-75 200 5,400 2 54.0

Srontium-90 1,000 27,000 10 270

Thulium-170 20,000 540,000 200 5,400

Ytterbium-169 300 8,100 3 81.0

*See the discussion below under “Calculations concerning Multiple Sources or Multiple Radionuclides.”

**The terabecquerel values are the regulatory standard. The curie values specified are obtained by converting 

from the terabecquerel values. The curie values are provided for practical usefulness only.

Calculations concerning Multiple Sources or Multiple Radionuclides

The licensee must use the “sum-of-fractions” methodology to evaluate combinations of 

multiple sources or multiple radionuclides when determining if a location meets or exceeds the

threshold and is thus subject to the requirements in Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) Part 37, “Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities

of Radioactive Material.”
A-2

I. If multiple sources of the same radionuclide or multiple radionuclides are aggregated at

a location, the licensee must determine the sum of the ratios of the total activity of each of

the radionuclides to verify whether the activity at the location is less than the category 1 or

category 2 thresholds in Table A-1, as appropriate. If the calculated sum of the ratios, using

the equation below, is greater than or equal to 1.0, the applicable requirements of this part 

apply.

II. First, determine the total activity for each radionuclide from Table A-1. This determination is 

done by adding the activity of each individual source, the material in any device, and any loose 

or bulk material that contains the radionuclide. Then, use the equation below to calculate the 

sum of the ratios by inserting the total activity of the applicable radionuclides from Table A-1 in 

the numerator of the equation and the corresponding threshold activity from Table A-1 in the 

denominator of the equation. The licensee must perform the calculations in metric values

(i.e., terabecquerel); the numerator and denominator values must be in the same units.

��

R1

AR1

+

R2

AR2

+

Rn

ARn

� ≥ 1.0

n

1

,

where:

R1 = total activity for radionuclide 1

R2 = total activity for radionuclide 2

Rn = total activity for radionuclide n

AR1 = activity threshold for radionuclide 1

AR2 = activity threshold for radionuclide 2

ARn = activity threshold for radionuclide n

EXPLANATION:

Appendix A establishes the thresholds for category 1 and category 2 radioactive materials.

Q&As:

See the Q&As on the definition of category 1 and category 2 radioactive materials (10 CFR

37.5).





UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

------------------

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
NUREG-2155, Rev. 1 Implementation Guidance for 10 CFR Part 37, “Physical Protection of Category 1 

and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material”