COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judg es Coleman, Frank and Senior Judge Hodges Argued at Salem, Virginia

TROY DYON TARPLEY MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 2890-98-3 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK APRIL 25, 2000 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF MARTINSVILLE Charles M. St one, Judge S. Jane Chittom, Ap pellate Counsel (Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Appe llate Defend er; Public Defender Commission, on briefs), for appellant. Leah A. Darron, Assi stant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. Troy Dyon Tarpley (appellant) ap peals his conv iction for grand larceny afte r a bench trial on December 9, 1998. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insuffic ient to su pport the conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial
court. I. BACKGROUND Appellant was a pa ssenger in a car dr iven and owned by William Bruce. There were two other passen gers in the car, Mike and Jose. Bruce drove th e car to an area know n as Koehler Hill inthe Rivermont Apar tment complex. Appellant and Mi ke exited the car. There was a group of ten to fifteen people assembled in the area. An unknown member of the group approached Bruce's car, reached into the car, and was "fussing " with Jose. Bruce exited the car to try to move the group away from th e vehicle. Bruce was attacked and knocked un conscious. Robert Smith, a resident of Rivermont Apartments, witnessed the fight and te stified that appellant was invo lved in the figh t in which Bruce was attacked. After Bruce was at tacked, Jose attempted to drive Bruce' s car away from the crowd and appe llant was a pass enger in the car. Jose drove the car onto a curb, and then appell ant took over as the driver of the ve hicle. Appellan t drove the car away from the scene of the fight, tu rned around, and drov e the car at a high rate of speed towards the exit to the apartm ent complex. Appellant testif ied that he took the car because he was afraid and he wanted to get he lp. Appellant did no t stop at his own apartment, his mother 's apartment, or an y other re sidents' apartments to seek help. Appellan t crashed into some trees as he exited the complex.
II. ANALYSIS Appellant chal lenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convic tion of grand la rceny. We find the evidence sufficient and affi rm the judgment of the trial court. "When an appeal ch allenges the sufficie ncy of the evidence, the evidence is viewed in th e light most favorable to the
- 2 -Commonwealth, granting to it all reason able inferences deducible therefrom. A ju dgment will not be distur bed unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the eviden ce." Ford v. Co mmonwealth , 28 Va. App. 249, 259, 503 S. E.2d 803, 807 (1998) (citatio ns omitted). "[L]arceny is the taking and carrying away of the go ods and chattels of another with intent to depr ive the owner of the possession thereo f permanently." Lund v. Commonwealth , 217 Va. 688, 69 1, 232 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1977). Under Code § 18.2-95, grand larceny includ es "larceny not from the person of another of goods and chattels of the value of $200 or more." Winston v. Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 746, 757, 497 S.E.2d 141, 147 (1998). In determining in tent [in a larceny case], "the factfind er may consider the conduct of the person involved and all the circumstances re vealed by the evidence." Wynn v. Co mmonwealth , 5 Va. App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 193, 198 (1 987). Indeed, "[t]he specific intent in the person's mind may, and often must, be inferred from that person's conduct and st atements." Martin v. Commonwealth , 13 Va. App. 524, 527, 414 S.E.2d 401, 402 (1992) (citing Hargrave v. Commonwealth , 214 Va. 436, 43 7, 201 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1974)). Welch v. Commonwealth , 15 Va. App. 518, 52 4, 425 S.E.2d 101, 105-06 (1992). In this case, there was credible evidence that appellant was involved in the fight in which Bruce was knocked unco nscious. Once Bruce was unconsci ous, appellant drove Br uce's car away from the scene at a high rate of speed. Appellant did not stop at any of the apartments to attempt to get help. Instead, he drove for
- 3 -the exit to the ap artment comple x. Such evidence is sufficient to show intent to perm anently depriv e Bruce of his vehicle. Appellant assert s on brief that he to ok Bruce's car out of necessity. In order to prove necessit y, the defendan t must show: "(1) a reasonable belief that the action was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened ha rm; (2) a lack of other adequate means to avoid the threaten ed harm; and (3) a direct causal relationship that may be reasonably antici pated between th e action taken and the avoidance of the harm." Buckley v. City of Falls Church , 7 Va. App. 32, 33, 371 S.E. 2d 827, 827-28 (1988). In this case, appell ant presented ev idence to th e trial court that he took Bruce's car because he was frig htened and wanted to escape from the group on Koehler Hill. The trial judg e rejected appellant's ev idence and convicte d him. On appe al, we will not disturb the tria l court's dete rmination of the evidence. For these reason s, we find the evidence sufficient to support appellant's co nviction for grand larceny and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court. Affirmed.

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