J-S12041-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOHN QUEBEDO 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1412 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 10, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0000879-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 9, 2024

John Quebedo (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after the trial court convicted him of carrying a firearm without a 

license and carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia.1 We affirm.

The trial court summarized the underlying facts as follows:

On November 22, 2020, Officer James Robertson (“Officer 

Robertson”) was on patrol when he received a dispatch call 

regarding a male slumped over the steering wheel of a vehicle 

parked at the southeast corner of 12th and Dickinson Streets. 

Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”)[,] 12/6/2021[,] at 11-12. Upon 

arrival at the location[,] Officer Robertson saw the car matching 

the dispatch information [and] “noticed that there was air coming 

from the muffler ... and ... the brake lights were on.” Id. at 13. 

Upon approach[,] he saw ... Appellant leaning forward over the 

steering wheel, his eyes closed, [and] the vehicle’s gear was in 

“drive” with Appellant’s foot on the brake. Id. Officer Robertson 

initially tapped on the window with his flashlight “a couple of 

times” to get Appellant’s attention and “see if he was okay[,]” but 

there was no response. Id. He further attempted to awaken

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106(a)(1) and 6108.
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Appellant by yelling and banging on the windows of the vehicle 

until [Appellant] finally responded and lowered the windows of the 

car. Id. at 14-15. From the passenger side window, the [o]fficer 

observed the handle of [a] handgun beneath Appellant’s right leg 

and the seat. Id. at 16. Upon observing the firearm, Officer 

Robertson ordered ... Appellant out of the car and placed him into 

custody. The firearm ... was recovered [from] the vehicle. Id. at 

17.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 9/6/23, at 2.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with the aforementioned 

offenses, as well as receiving stolen property and persons not to possess 

firearms.

2

 After conducting a non-jury trial on December 6, 2021, the trial 

court convicted Appellant of carrying a firearm without a license and carrying 

a firearm in public in Philadelphia. On February 10, 2022, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 5 to 10 years of incarceration.

Appellant did not file post-sentence motions or a direct appeal, but 

requested the reinstatement of those rights in a petition he filed pursuant to 

the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. The 

Commonwealth did not object, and the trial court granted the request. See

N.T., 1/3/23, at 3-5; TCO at 1.

3

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2 The Commonwealth withdrew the charge for receiving stolen property, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3925, and the trial court acquitted Appellant of persons not to 

possess firearms, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105. N.T., 12/6/21, at 3, 70.

3 At the PCRA hearing, the court specified that “[p]ost-sentence motions will 

be reinstated, as well.” N.T., 1/3/23, at 5. However, the court did not address

post-sentence rights when it entered the order. Order, 1/3/23 (single page) 

(stating that appellate rights were reinstated nunc pro tunc and advising 

Appellant he had 30 days to appeal). This Court has found a breakdown occurs 

when a court misadvises an appellant about appeal rights. See 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On January 10, 2023, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion challenging 

the weight of the evidence. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607. The motion was denied 

by operation of law. Order, 5/10/23. Appellant subsequently filed a timely 

notice of appeal and Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement.

Appellant presents the following question for review:

Whether the trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s PostSentence Motion [claiming] the guilty verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence because [Appellant] was asleep in a 

parked car that did not belong to him and the police found a 

gun that was not registered to him.

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence. Therefore, Appellant

“concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict[,] but questions 

which evidence is to be believed.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 106 A.3d 

742, 758 (Pa. Super. 2014). We have explained: 

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact who 

is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to 

determine the credibility of the witness. An appellate court cannot 

substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we 

may only reverse the [trial] court’s verdict if it is so contrary to 

the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. Moreover, where 

the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate 

court’s role is not to consider the underlying question of whether 

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, 

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Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 498 (Pa. Super. 2007). Such 

breakdown may excuse an untimely filed notice of appeal. Id. at 499. Here, 

we deem this appeal to be timely because a breakdown occurred when the 

court failed to include language about post-sentence motions in its order. 

See, N.T., 1/3/23, at 5; see also TCO at 1.
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appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably 

abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Dixon, 276 A.3d 800, 802 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation 

omitted).

“Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the 

evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to 

the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial 

court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 546 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation 

omitted). “One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new 

trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the 

weight of the evidence.” Id.

To convict Appellant of carrying a firearm without a license, the 

Commonwealth had to prove Appellant “carrie[d] a firearm in any vehicle” or 

“carrie[d] a firearm concealed on or about his person ... without a valid and 

lawfully issued license.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a). To convict Appellant of 

carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, the Commonwealth had to prove 

Appellant carried a firearm “at any time on the public streets of Philadelphia

without a license.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108. 

Appellant admitted he did not have a license to carry a firearm. N.T., 

12/6/21, at 41; see also id. at 40 (Commonwealth presenting certificate of 

non-licensure as Exhibit 3). In addition, the parties stipulated that the firearm 

recovered from the car was an operable “Beretta model PX4 Storm 9mm 
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Luger.” Id. at 39 (Commonwealth presenting firearm examiner’s report as 

Exhibit 2). Appellant does not dispute these facts. Appellant’s argument is 

that “facts demonstrating [Appellant] was unaware of the gun at issue are 

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with 

all facts is to deny justice.” Appellant’s Brief at 10.

Appellant emphasizes he was asleep when police found him “in a 

stationary car,” and neither the car nor the handgun were registered to him. 

Id. at 10-11. Appellant stresses that he and Officer Robertson both “testified 

that [Appellant] was passed out as the result of fentanyl....” Id. at 13. 

Appellant maintains he “was high at the time of the police interaction and did 

not have knowledge of his surroundings.” Id. at 14. Further,

[Appellant] explained that he had ingested fentanyl and was 

asleep or passed out and therefore unaware of the handgun next 

to him in the car. [Appellant] testified that before he fell asleep, 

he had been fixing a car radio for a woman named Taylor and her 

“sugar daddy” John. Significantly, the gun at issue is registered 

to a man named John.

Id. at 16.

According to Appellant, “the main inconsistency between the officer’s 

testimony and [Appellant’s] testimony is whether [Appellant] was aware of 

the gun in the car.” Id. at 13. Appellant claims “[b]ecause both parties 

testified [Appellant] was passed out as the result of fentanyl, [Appellant’s] 

testimony that he was unaware of the handgun should be given greater weight 

under the circumstances.” Id.
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The Commonwealth responds that the “evidence overwhelmingly led to 

the logical conclusion that [Appellant] was aware of the illegal gun and it was 

under his control.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 5. Our review reveals no abuse 

of discretion by the trial court.

Two witnesses testified at trial: Philadelphia Police Officer James 

Robertson and Appellant.

Officer Robinson stated that he “walked up on the passenger side of the

vehicle and [] observed [Appellant] leaning forward over the steering wheel 

with his eyes closed.” N.T., 12/6/21, at 13. Officer Robertson began “banging 

on the window and yelling into the car for [Appellant] to wake up.” Id. The 

officer explained:

Once [Appellant] woke up he spent a few seconds staring forward. 

He did look over at m[e,] then looked to the front of the vehicle 

again. I continued to bang on the window and say, Hey, are you 

okay, what is going on here, to which I got no response from him, 

[he] just continued looking around. Eventually I was able to get 

him to put his windows down so I could talk to him without the 

barrier of the window in the way.

***

[O]nce [Appellant’s] windows were down I told him to put the 

vehicle in park. I was concerned about him not realizing that he 

was in drive and I didn’t want his foot to slip off the brake pedal 

to either injure myself or my partner or slide forward and hit the 

vehicle in front of him which he was able to do. And when he had 

done that and moved his foot off of the brake adjusting his seat, 

I observed a handgun underneath his right leg between his leg 

and the seat itself.
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Id. at 15-16. Officer Robertson described the gun as “underneath 

[Appellant’s] leg, but on the seat. So it was like sandwiched between his leg 

and the top of the seat.” Id. at 16.

After Officer Robertson testified, Appellant’s counsel motioned for a 

judgment of acquittal. Id. at 40-41. Counsel asserted that the 

Commonwealth “established [Appellant] didn’t have a license to carry, but 

other than that they haven’t established anything else.” Id. at 41. The trial 

court denied the motion on the basis that there was “enough evidence 

certainly for a fact finder to consider on all charges.” Id. at 42.

Appellant testified next. He explained that the car where Officer 

Robertson found him belonged to Appellant’s friend, “Taylor.” Id. at 46-48. 

Appellant stated there “was something wrong with [the car’s] brakes,” and he

stayed in the car while Taylor and her boyfriend “went to get brake fluid.” Id.

at 48-49. According to Appellant, he had ingested fentanyl and was 

“extremely high” at the time. Id. at 48, 50. Appellant repeatedly denied 

knowing there was a gun in the car. Id. at 50.

The trial court did not find Appellant credible. As the trial court 

explained:

Appellant’s arguments denying ownership of the firearm and 

vehicle are immaterial to the factual circumstances and applicable 

law; he was the sole occupant behind the wheel of a running

vehicle, seated directly upon a firearm[,] and did not have a 

license to carry on a Philadelphia public street. The vehicle 

location, Appellant’s position, and proximity to the firearm, 

establish Appellant’s “knowledge of the existence of the firearm”

as well as his intent and power to control it. The evidence 

demonstrates “a nexus between the accused and the item 
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sufficient to infer that the accused had the power and intent to 

exercise dominion and control over it.” Commonwealth v. 

Peters, 218 A.3d 1206, 1209 (Pa. 2019).

TCO at 4-5.

The trial court concluded “there is no merit to Appellant’s challenge to 

the weight of the evidence,” because the verdict “was not so contrary to the 

evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Id. at 5 (citing Commonwealth 

v. Brown, 648 A.2d 1177, 1189 (Pa. 1994)). Appellant essentially argues 

that he was an innocent bystander. The trial court’s discussion of the legal 

elements of constructive possession explains why the court, as fact-finder, 

rejected Appellant’s contention. We cannot conclude “the trial court palpably 

abused its discretion” in denying Appellant’s weight claim. Dixon, supra. 

Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 5/09/2024