United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 05-2747

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

LUIS TORRES-VELAZQUEZ,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Lynch, Circuit Judge,

Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

Luis R. Rivera-González by Appointment of the Court for

appellant.

Timothy R. Henwood, Assistant United States Attorney, with

whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, Nelson

Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate

Division, and Germán A. Rieckehoff, Assistant United States

Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

March 23, 2007
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STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge. Appellant Luis TorresVelasquez ("Torres") raises two objections to his criminal

sentence. Finding no ground for reversal, we affirm the sentence

imposed by the district court. 

Torres pled guilty, in a straight plea, to one count of

conspiracy to commit money laundering, under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h),

and one count of criminal forfeiture, under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1).

Torres's base offense level was calculated at 22, which included a

14-point enhancement corresponding to the value of the laundered

funds. At sentencing, the district court accepted the Presentence

Investigation Report's (PSR) recommendation of a two-level

reduction for playing a minor role in the offense, and a threelevel reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 

The court also imposed several enhancements. First,

finding that Torres knew the laundered funds were intended to

promote offenses involving the manufacture, importation, or

distribution of controlled substances, the court added a six-level

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(1). Second, the court added

a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for obstruction of

justice, based on the high-speed car chase that Torres instigated,

prior to his arrest. Third, a two-level enhancement was imposed

pursuant to the requirements of U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B). Torres

was sentenced at the lower end of the guideline range, to 120
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months in prison, three years' supervised release, and a $100

special assessment. 

As there was no plea bargain or stipulated version of the

facts in this case, we draw the following facts about Torres's

criminal conduct from the government's proffer at the change-ofplea hearing, the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, and

the facts relayed in the PSR. 

In 2003, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(ICE) began investigating the Colombian-based Juan Isidro TolozaPeña drug trafficking organization. As part of this investigation,

ICE targeted the organization's system of transferring drug

proceeds from Puerto Rico to the drug bosses in Colombia. On

August 17, 2004, Torres drove his two co-defendants, Jaime MendozaMedina and Emilio Mata-Soto, to a meeting with an undercover agent

in a parking lot in Caguas, Puerto Rico. At the meeting, the codefendants agreed that they would return to Caguas the next day to

hand off the currency to the undercover agent, who would then

launder the money and remit the funds to Colombia. Torres remained

in the car during the meeting and did not participate in the

discussions with the ICE agent regarding the plan. On the

following day, August 18, 2004, Torres again drove his two codefendants to the appointed location for the hand-off. Noticing

police activity in the area, the co-defendants proposed moving the

hand-off to a different town, Las Piedras. The undercover agent
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agreed to the change, and Torres began driving his co-defendants in

that direction. At that point, a marked police patrol unit,

working with the ICE investigators, attempted to stop Torres's

vehicle. As an officer approached the vehicle, Torres drove off.

The police pursued Torres, who led them on an extended high-speed

chase that ended when the vehicle crashed into a bakery in the town

of Juncos. A search of the vehicle turned up two large bags

containing $751,330 in U.S. currency of various denominations. 

The supervising undercover ICE agent testified at the

sentencing hearing that the procedures followed by Torres and his

co-defendants followed the modus operandi for "pick up" operations

for laundering drug proceeds in Puerto Rico. According to the

agent, typical features present in this case included: the

arrangement to transfer a large amount of money to a broker for

laundering; the request to conduct the transfer in a public place;

the extensive negotiations over where to transfer the money; and

the presence of several people at the hand-off, to provide

security. 

Torres's admitted involvement in the conspiracy was

limited to his driving of the co-defendants to the meeting on

August 17 and to the scheduled hand-off location on August 18.

There was no evidence that he spoke with the undercover agent or

otherwise arranged for the money's transfer. However, because he

pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, he admitted that he knew that
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the conspiracy was to launder the proceeds of illegal activity.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) ("Whoever, knowing that the property

involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some

form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a

financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of

specified unlawful activity."). 

In this appeal, Torres objects to two sentencing

enhancements. First, he contends that the six-level enhancement,

under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(1), was based on an erroneous factual

finding by the district court that he knew the laundered funds were

intended to promote offenses involving the manufacture,

importation, or distribution of controlled substances. Second, he

argues that the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §

2S1.1(b)(2)(B) was applied to him in violation of the sentencing

guideline commentary. 

As to the six-level enhancement, we review for clear

error the district court's factual finding that Torres knew the

money was related to the drug trade. See United States v. Brown,

450 F.3d 76, 80 (1st Cir. 2006). The district court's findings of

fact are conclusive on appeal unless we form "'a strong, unyielding

belief that a mistake has been made.'" United States v.

Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 740 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting Williams v.

Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 278 (1st Cir. 1993)). As to the two-level

enhancement imposed under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), because Torres
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failed to preserve this objection for appeal, we review that

enhancement only for plain error. See United States v. RiveraRodriguez, 318 F.3d 268, 278 (1st Cir. 2003). We will correct a

plain error only where it "seriously affects the fairness,

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United

States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2005). 

Torres argues that the six-level enhancement is clearly

erroneous because there was no "direct or circumstantial evidence

of knowledge" on his part. The sentencing guidelines direct a sixlevel enhancement where a person convicted of conspiracy to commit

money laundering "knew or believed that any of the laundered funds

were the proceeds of, or were intended to promote (i) an offense

involving the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a

controlled substance or a listed chemical." U.S.S.G. §

2S1.1(b)(1). Contrary to Torres's assertion, sentencing courts are

not limited to considering only the facts that the appellant has

admitted. See United States v. Bierd, 217 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir.

2000). Rather, courts may draw upon a broad range of evidence for

sentencing purposes, including factual findings set forth in a PSR

and testimony offered at the sentencing hearing. See id. 

Here, the evidence before the district court was

sufficient to support the finding that Torres possessed the

requisite knowledge for the six-level enhancement. The district

court noted that the evidence showed that the procedures followed
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by Torres and his co-defendants were typical of the modus operandi

of drug organizations operating in Puerto Rico. In addition, the

court found that Torres had "prior knowledge of the drug business"

because he had two previous drug convictions, for conspiracy to

distribute controlled substances and possession with intent to

distribute controlled substances. Finally, the court was persuaded

that the large quantity of cash involved in the scheme further

indicated that Torres knew the funds were related to the drug

trade. Given this suggestive evidence, we conclude that the

district court's finding of knowledge was reasonable and easily

survives our clear error review. 

Torres's second sentencing objection is that the court

erred in imposing a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §

2S1.1(b)(2)(B), which advises that: "If the defendant was convicted

under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, increase by 2 levels." Torres was indeed

convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, because he pled guilty to

conspiracy to launder money, under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). However,

Torres argues that the two-level enhancement should not be applied

in his case based on Application Note 3(c) of the commentary to

U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, which reads: "Subsection (b)(2)(B) shall not

apply if the defendant was convicted of a conspiracy under 18

U.S.C. § 1956(h) and the sole object of that conspiracy was to

commit an offense set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1957." Torres's

argument that the exception in Note 3(c) applies to him is plainly
Section 1957 criminalizes money laundering where the proceeds 1

derive from an unlawful activity, see 18 U.S.C. § 1957, while §

1956 criminalizes money laundering where the defendant knows that

the proceeds derived from an unlawful activity, see 18 U.S.C. §

1956. 

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incorrect. Granted, he meets the note's first requirement because

he was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). However, Torres does

not meet the note's second requirement because the sole object of

the conspiracy was not violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. Instead, 1

the object of the conspiracy, as laid out in Count One of the

indictment, was to violate the money laundering provisions codified

at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i). Therefore, the

exception contained in Note 3(c) does not apply to Torres, see

United States v. Adargas, 366 F.3d 879, 883 (10th Cir. 2004), and

the district court did not commit plain error in imposing the twolevel enhancement under § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B). 

Finding no merit in either of Torres's objections, we

affirm the sentence imposed on appellant by the district court.