[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-10784

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-20543-CMA

EDWIN ROSETE REGANIT, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

DIRECTOR, US CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 

DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP 

AND IMMIGRATION SERVICE MIAMI DISTRICT OFFICE, 

Linda Swacina, 

KENDALL FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP 

AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 

Andrew Davidson, 

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(February 25, 2016)

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JULIE CARNES, and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Defendants, who are the Department of Homeland Security and related 

entities, denied Plaintiff Edwin Rosete Reganit’s application for naturalization. 

Plaintiff sought review of this denial in district court, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1421(c).

1 The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. Plaintiff 

now appeals, arguing that the district court erred by characterizing him as an alien 

crewman, which thereby rendered him statutorily ineligible to become a United 

States citizen because it meant that he had not been lawfully admitted for 

permanent residence. After careful review, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The parties stipulated to the following facts. Plaintiff, a native and citizen of 

the Philippines, entered the United States on May 27, 2001, with a C-1/D2 visa to 

work on board a ship owned by Discovery Cruise Lines. Plaintiff worked as a 

 1 Section 1421(c) of Title 8 of the United States Code states that, “A person whose application 

for naturalization . . . is denied, after a hearing before an immigration officer . . . may seek 

review of such denial before the United States district court for the district in which such person 

resides.” 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). 

2 A C-1/D visa is a dual visa. A “C-1” visa is given to a nonimmigrant alien who is in 

“immediate and continuous transit through the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(C). A 

“D” visa is given to a nonimmigrant alien serving aboard a vessel or aircraft “who intends to 

land temporarily and solely in pursuit of his calling as a crewman and to depart from the United 

States with the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived or some other vessel or aircraft.” Id.

§ 1101(a)(15)(D)(i); see also Matter of G-D-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 82, 83 (BIA 2009). 

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butcher on the ship for approximately two weeks before becoming ill. 

Approximately one more week passed, and because Plaintiff was still sick, 

Discovery Cruise Lines began the process of arranging for him to de-board the ship 

to receive medical assistance in the United States. On June 29, 2001, Plaintiff was 

granted a temporary medical parole into the United States, valid only until July 28, 

2001, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). 

When Plaintiff de-boarded the ship, employees of Discovery Cruise Lines

escorted him to a doctor in Miami and remained with him at a hotel until he 

returned to the ship. After returning to the ship, Plaintiff worked for approximately 

one more week. However, because he was still ill, Discovery Cruise Lines once 

again arranged for him to see a doctor in Miami. But while in Miami, Plaintiff 

resigned from his position on the ship and Discovery Cruise Lines then arranged 

his travel back to the Philippines. 

Plaintiff, however, did not return to the Philippines, as he should have done. 

Instead, he remained in the United States, and later he married his current wife, 

Aileen, in 2002. In 2005, Aileen filed an I-130 petition for alien relative on behalf 

of Plaintiff and Plaintiff filed an I-485 application for adjustment of status to that 

of a lawful permanent resident based on his marriage to a United States citizen. 

On his adjustment of status application, Plaintiff stated that his last entry into the 

United States was on May 27, 2001, and that his status upon entering was C-1. 

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On June 13, 2006, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(“CIS”) granted Plaintiff’s application and his status was adjusted to that of a 

lawful permanent resident. Upon becoming a lawful permanent resident, Plaintiff 

traveled outside of the United States multiple times between 2007 and 2012. He 

showed his lawful permanent resident card to immigration authorities each time he 

re-entered the United States. 

On March 4, 2011, Plaintiff applied to become a United States citizen. 

Discovering that Plaintiff had been admitted to the United States as a crewman, 

CIS determined that its approval of his adjustment of status application in 2005 had 

been in error and that, as a result, Plaintiff was not statutorily eligible to adjust 

status to that of a lawful permanent resident. Stated another way, because Plaintiff 

could not show that he had been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, he did 

not meet all of the requirements necessary to become a naturalized citizen. 

Accordingly, CIS denied his application for citizenship and after Plaintiff

appealed, it affirmed its denial of Plaintiff’s application. 

B. Procedural History

In February 2014, Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) 

against the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; the Acting Director 

of the CIS; the District Director of the Miami District of CIS; the Director of the 

Kendall Field Office of CIS; and the Attorney General of the United States, in their 

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official capacities. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants 

violated his rights under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the 

Administrative Procedures Act by denying his application for naturalization. 

Plaintiff later moved for summary judgment. He argued that 

notwithstanding his initial entry into the United States as only a crewman, he was 

eligible for adjustment of status based on his temporary medical parole into the 

United States on June 29, 2001. From that premise, he further contended that he 

was thereafter properly granted lawful permanent resident status, meaning that he 

met this requirement for becoming a United States citizen.

3

 Defendants also 

moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff’s admission to the United 

States on a crewmen visa precluded any adjustment of status to that of a lawful 

permanent resident, thereby rendering him statutorily ineligible for naturalization. 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The 

district court concluded that the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c), which bars 

alien crewmen from adjusting status, in conjunction with the federal regulation 

governing the parole of alien crewmen, 8 C.F.R. § 253.1, mean that Plaintiff’s 

temporary medical parole did not alter his status as a crewman. Because Plaintiff 

could not establish that he was lawfully admitted for permanent residence based on 

 3 Alternatively, Plaintiff also argued that even if he was not lawfully admitted for permanent 

residence based on his medical parole, he was subsequently admitted for permanent residence 

when he later traveled outside of the United State and gained re-entry as a lawful permanent 

resident. The district court rejected this argument, and Plaintiff does not challenge this ruling on 

appeal. 

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this medical parole, he failed to meet the statutory requirements for naturalization. 

This appeal followed. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. United 

States v. Jean-Baptiste, 395 F.3d 1190, 1192 (11th Cir. 2005). The burden is on 

the party moving for summary judgment to establish that no genuine issue of 

material fact exists. Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 341–42

(11th Cir. 2012). We view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor 

of the non-moving party. Id.

B. Applicable Law

“American citizenship is a precious right.” Costello v. United States, 365 

U.S. 265, 269 (1961). An individual who seeks to obtain naturalized United States

citizenship must comply with the statutory requirements for naturalization. See 

Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505–06 (1981). These requirements 

require, among other things, that the alien show he was lawfully admitted for 

permanent residence in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). 

The term “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” is defined as “the 

status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in 

the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws.” 8 

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U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). To be “lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” an

alien’s adjustment to lawful permanent resident status must be “in compliance with 

the substantive requirements of the law.” Savoury v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 449 F.3d 

1307, 1313–18 (11th Cir. 2006). For that reason, we have held that an alien whose 

status was mistakenly adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident was not an 

alien lawfully admitted for that purpose. See id. (concluding that an alien was not 

eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility based on a mistaken adjustment of status 

done in violation of the substantive requirements of the law). 

In order for an alien to adjust status to that of a lawful permanent resident, 

the alien must: (1) have been “inspected and admitted or paroled into the United 

States”; (2) apply for adjustment of status; (3) be eligible to receive an immigrant 

visa and be admissible to the United States; and (4) have an immigrant visa 

immediately available to him at the time of filing. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). 

Alien crewmen, however, are explicitly barred from adjusting to lawful 

permanent resident status. Id. § 1255(c). An alien crewman is defined as “a 

person serving in any capacity on board a vessel or aircraft.” Id. § 1101(a)(10). 

Moreover, the definition of immigrant excludes “an alien crewman serving in good 

faith as such in a capacity required for normal operation and service on board a 

vessel . . . who intends to land temporarily and solely in pursuit of his calling as a 

crewman.” Id. § 1101(a)(15)(D)(i). 

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The INA provides that the Attorney General may, in his discretion and on a 

case-by-case basis, parole an alien into the United States temporarily for 

humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). 

C. Plaintiff was not Statutorily Eligible for Naturalization 

In order for Plaintiff to have been statutorily eligible for naturalization, he 

must show that he was lawfully admitted for permanent residence. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1427(a). But alien crewmen are barred from adjusting to lawful permanent 

resident status. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(20), 1255(c); see also Savoury, 449 F.3d at 

1313–18. And there is no dispute that Plaintiff was an alien crewman on board a 

cruise ship who was issued only a crewmen visa for purposes of entry into this 

country. There is also no dispute that after his arrival, Plaintiff was granted a 

temporary medical parole into the United States under § 1182(d)(5) to obtain 

treatment for an illness that had arisen while he was working on the ship. 

Consequently, this case turns on a matter of first impression in our Court: whether 

Plaintiff’s grant of medical parole under § 1182(d)(5) altered his crewman status. 

We conclude that it did not. 

We first address Plaintiff’s argument that he shed his “alien crewman” status

under the INA once he became ill on board the ship and was allowed to 

temporarily de-board for purposes of receiving medical treatment. Plaintiff

concedes that his initial entry in May 2001 was as a crewman, but he contends that 

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by de-boarding temporarily in June 2001 to receive medical treatment, he ceased 

“pursuit of his calling as a seaman.” Yet, in determining whether an alien should 

be classified as a crewman, we have stated that “the focal issue is whether [the 

alien] entered the United States in pursuit of his calling as a seaman.” Parzagonis 

v. I.N.S., 747 F.2d 1389, 1390 (11th Cir. 1984). The Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“BIA”) has further explained that it “examine[s] an alien’s visa and the 

circumstances surrounding his entry into the United States to determine if he 

entered as a crewman.” Matter of G-D-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 82, 85 (BIA 2009). 

For the sake of this discussion, we will assume that a non-crewman alien 

who was medically paroled into the United States under § 1182(d)(5)(A) might

later be eligible to adjust status. But the applicable statutes and regulations do not 

permit an alien crewman to bypass the statutory bar on his adjustment of status 

merely by the fortuity of a subsequent medical parole to treat an illness arising 

while serving as a crew member. Section 253.1(e) of Title 8 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations governs the parole of alien crewmen. That provision states 

that an alien crewman without a conditional landing permit and in need of medical 

treatment or observation may be paroled into the United States pursuant to 

§ 1182(d)(5). 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(e). But an alien granted such parole is to remain in 

the custody of the agent of the vessel, and the vessel is to cover the expenses of the 

medical treatment. Id. 

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Reading this regulation together with § 1255(c)—which clearly bars alien 

crewmen from adjusting to lawful permanent resident status—we conclude that an 

alien crewman granted medical parole pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(e) does not 

cease being a crewman and thereby rid himself of the statutory bar on adjustment 

of status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c); 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(e). In fact, the BIA has stated 

that Congress intended “to bar all occupational seamen . . . who have relatively 

easy access to the United States [and] have used the seaman route to enter the 

United States for permanent residence.” Matter of Goncalves, 10 I. & N. Dec. 277, 

279 (BIA 1963). Nothing in the applicable statutes imply that an alien crewman 

who has been admitted as such, but who subsequently receives a medical parole 

while working on board a ship, thereby becomes eligible for adjustment of status. 

Indeed, in the present case, it is clear that Plaintiff’s medical parole was 

obtained in pursuit of his calling as a seaman. See Parzagonis, 747 F.2d at 1390; 

Matter of G-D-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 85. Having received only a crewmen visa, 

Plaintiff fell ill while working on board the Discovery Cruise Lines ship. 

Consistent with the federal regulation governing the parole of alien crewmen, 

Discovery Cruise Lines arranged for Plaintiff’s medical parole and his subsequent 

doctor’s visits, and stayed with him at a hotel in Miami. See 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(e). 

Notably, Plaintiff did in fact return to the ship after his first doctor’s visit. And 

once he decided to quit his position as a crewman, Discovery Cruise Lines 

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arranged for Plaintiff’s travel home to the Philippines. In short, Plaintiff’s visa and 

the circumstances surrounding his entry into the United States establish that he was 

a crewman throughout the applicable period of time. 

Plaintiff also argues that the district court erroneously interpreted 8 C.F.R. 

§ 253.1(e) to mean that an alien paroled into the United States will remain an alien 

crewman forever. The district court, however, did not make such a 

pronouncement. Instead, it considered all of the circumstances surrounding 

Plaintiff’s entry in 2001 in reaching its conclusion that his entry was in pursuit of 

his calling as a seaman.

4

 See Matter of G-D-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 85. 

We are also not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that the policy reasons for 

barring alien crewmen from adjustment of status ceased to exist once he was 

allowed to seek temporary medical care while serving on board the ship. Given 

their “relatively easy access to the United States,” alien crewmen who have been 

admitted for the limited purpose of pursuing their occupation are prohibited from 

taking advantage of this access to later adjust status. See Matter of Goncalves, 10 

I. & N. Dec. at 279; 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(e). Again, Plaintiff was able to obtain a 

temporary medical parole, which expired on July 28, 2001, only because he had 

first been granted entry as an alien crewman. 

 4 The BIA has determined that an occupational crewman is not barred from adjustment of status 

if the alien’s most recent admission into the United States was not in pursuit of his calling as a 

seaman. See Matter of Rebelo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 84, 85–86 (BIA 1968) (concluding that an alien 

was not barred from adjustment of status because, although he was occupationally a crewman, 

his most recent entry into the United States was as a visitor for pleasure).

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In summary, because Plaintiff was a crewman when he entered this country, 

he cannot establish that he was lawfully admitted for permanent residence. See 8 

U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(20), 1255(c). As a result, Plaintiff does not meet the statutory 

requirements for naturalization. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). Accordingly, the district 

court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district 

court. 

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