At the same time he pleade d g uilty to posse ssion of marihuana
. He wa s sentence d to two 1 y e ars in p ri so n, imp os iti on of se nte nc e wa s su sp e nd e d an d he wa s p la c e d o n p ro batio n f or fi ve y e ars . Wie de su c c e ssf

ull y c omp le te d th a t pr ob a tio na ry te rm , a nd that of fe ns e is n ot b e fo re us . 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00325- CR

Da vid Edwin W ie de , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF CALDWELL COUNTY , 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRI CT

NO. 97-0 07, H ONO RAB LE FRED A. MO ORE, JUDGE P RESIDING

O P I N I O N
I n 1997, David W iede pleaded guilty to a cha rg e of posse ssion of methamphetamine and wa s sentence d to ten y ear s in prison; im position of the sentence suspended and he w as plac ed on probation for

ten y ear s. I n 2002, the State moved to re voke his probation, alleg ing that he had

1 violated the ter

ms of hi s probation by ag ain possessing methamphetamine a nd by failing to pay

fines
and fe e s. Wie de ple a de d n ot t ru e to a ll the a lle g a tio ns in t he State ’s mot ion and mov e d to s up pr e ss evidenc e obtained a s the result of an unlawful sear ch of his car . I n its written order, the court de nied Wiede’s motion, found all the State’s alle gat i o n s to be true, r evoked Wiede’ s probation, and sentenc ed him to eig ht y ear s in prison.2 On appe al, Wiede contends that the trial court err ed in r evoking his pr obation by two points of error

(1) that the district c ourt err ed b y admi tting into evidenc e the methamphetamine related to the new of

fense , and (2) that the district c ourt err ed by considering his f ailures to pay

fines and fe es bec ause the State waived those g rounds at trial. The State c ontends that the evide nce w as proper ly admitted, but conce des t hat i t waived at trial the administrative g rounds for r evocation and that th e c ourt

c on se qu e ntl y

e rr e d b y re vo kin g Wie de ’s pr ob a tio n on thos e g ro un ds
. B e c a us e we ho ld that the sea

rch of Wiede’s ca

r wa s an unr ea s o n ab l e s earch unde r the F ourth Amendment of the United States Constit ution, we will reve rse the judgme nt and re mand the ca use to the trial cour

t for fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s.
BACK GR OUND

The followingis a summary of testimony

from the combined hea

ring on the motion to s up pr e ss a

nd the mot ion

to r e vo ke pr ob a tio n. Th e he ari ngoc c ur re d o n two da

y s a we e k a pa rt
. At approximately

7:00 a.m. on April 17, 2002, motorist Roy Tambung a stopped at the T-inter section of Sieb er t Drive and F.M. 150 be hind an 18-whe el truck loa ded with sod. He waited while the truck turne d left onto F.M. 150. As Tambung a turne d rig ht onto F.M. 150, he saw Wiede’s ca

r pass by . Although he was unsure o f W i ed e’ s s p eed, he testified that the ca r wa s trave ling “ at least the speed li mit, at l east 60 miles an hour.” L ooking thr oug h his side view mirror, Tambu ng a watc he d a s Wie de c oll ide d w iththe tr uc k th a t ha d tu

rn e d o nto the ro a d in fr on t of him
. A photog raph of

the ac cident sce ne introduce d into evidence shows long skid mar k s ca u s ed by Wiede’s ca

r prior to the c ollisi on. The truc kdriver c ontinued driving as i f unaware the ac cident had
occur red. Ta mbunga stopped to chec k Wiede’s conditi on. Wiede’s head was bleeding and his armTa mbu ng a te sti fi e d th a t the un ide nti fi e d of fi c e r wa s po ssi bly a sh e ri ff ’s de pu ty or a Ky le 2 city policeman. Ta

mbunga testified that he wa s new to the a rea and did n o t k n o w the ar ea depar tments’ uniforms. He was certain, however, that the person was ne ither an e merg ency medical technicia n nor a state trooper. 3 appea red to have a c ompound frac ture. (Wiede later wa s found also to have a fracture d pelvis that require d a plate and mul tiple scre ws to mend.) Tambung a testi fied that Wiede was c onscious but dazed, in pain, and moaningocca sionally . A depa rtment of public saf

ety trooper stopped and c alled in the acc ident.

Tambung a re mained nea

r Wiede’s c ar a

nd saw him moving a

round and looking back
a t Tam bung a . At on e po int , Wied e ’s mov e me nts le d T a mbu ng a to b e lie ve he wa s g oin g to l ig ht a cig are tte. L eaning forwa

rd to dissuade Wiede from smoking , Tambung a sawWiede instead cupping
an item in his ha

nd and pushing it be tween the console and the front seat; Tambung a never saw the item. Another pe ace office r ar rived. Af

ter Wiede wa s rem o v ed fr o m t h e car and take n to an ambulance , Tambung a told the unidentified office r, “You may want to c heck the seat, beca use he was messing around w ith something there .” The off icer reach ed i n t o the ca

r and pulled out a

n 2 empty plastic bagless than t wo i nches square that Tambung a said was too small to be what Wiede ha d h e ld. Th e of

fi c e r r e a c he d in

a g a in a nd pu lle d o ut a larg e r pla sti c ba g that a pp e are d to c on ta in about a ha lf inch of a

n off- white powder
. Tambung a testified that a fter stopping he was never more than eig ht f eet f rom Wiede until the emerg ency medical tec hnicians moved Wiede to the ambulance. T ambung a did not hear the officers ask Wiede wher e he wanted his car taken. Tambung a testified that he did not see anyThe Court sustained Wiede’s he ar s ay o bjection to McGua irt’s testimony about what 3 Tambung a said. 4 officer sea

rch the car

afte r finding the bag g ies or wr ite down any thing on a form. Tambunga

was at the sce ne until the tow truck hooke d up to Wi ede’ s car .

DPS trooper Christopher McG uairt testified that he and other peac e off

icer s were driving to a training session in San Ma rcos when they

came upon the ac cident sce ne and stoppe d. (B e c a us e Mc Gu a ir

t is ba se d in F or

t Sto c kto n, he sto pp e d to se c ur e the sc e ne bu t di d n ot i nv e sti g a te the ac cident.) A fter T ambung a desc ribed the vehicle Wiede collided with, Mc Guairt drove on and stopped the truck dr iver, who was appar ently unawa re the collision had occ urre d; McGuairt a nd the truck re turned to t he scene. McGua irt said that Tambung a then told him and the unidentified of fice r something that prompted the other office r to r eac h into the car near the ce nter c onsole and re trieve 3 a plastic ba g contain i n g an o ff- white powder y substance. Mc Guairt testified that, based on T a mb u n g a ’ s s t a t e m e n t , t h e o f f i c e r l o o k e d o n l y b y t h e c o n s o l e an d

d i d n o ts e ar c h t h e c ar

g e n e r a l l y. Mc Gu a ir t, w ho wa s unf

a mil iar wi th t

he un if or ms o f l oc a l la

w e nf or c e me nt a g e nc ie s,
was unc erta in whether

the person who retrie ved the c ontraba nd was a deputy sheriff or an of fice r of another depar

tment. Ba sed on the pe rson’s uniform, ba dg e, sidea rm, and c onversation with other peac e off icer s, McGuair

t testified that the per so n wa s ei t her a n office r or imper sonating one; McGua irt was re asonably cer tain that the per son was an of fice r. On the sec ond day

of the he aring , McGua irt testified that the seve rity of t h e wreck g a ve him c on c e rn fo r Wi e de ’s he a lthand

we ll- be ing . M or e ov e r, Tambu ng a ’s state me nt ma de him suspect that the item stashed ne ar the console mig ht be a c ontrolled substance, that Wi ede mig ht be5

under the influence of that controlled substanc e, that medica l personnel tre ating Wiede would need to k no w w hat that su bs tan ce was , a nd that th e natur e of

the su bs tanc e c ou ld a ff

e c t c ivi l li a

bil ity reg ardingthe ac cident. Howe ver, he did not inform the m ed i cal personnel about the r ecove red substance, did not re mind the investigating of fice r to notify the medical pe rsonnel to test Wiede for controlled substanc es, and did not hea r the investig ating office r do so. DPS Trooper B rian Free man i nvestig ated the acc ident. He testified that the collision rende red Wiede’ s car inopera ble. Fr eema

n said that McGua irt g ave him a clear plastic bagsuspected of conta ining a powder

y controlled subst ance . Fr eema n testified that his supervisor c onducted a n inventory of the car , but the inventory repor t listed only the bag g ie seized from the car and did not list i tems in plain view in the ca r, such as the many

compac t discs that a frie nd of Wiede’s late r
re tr ie ve d. F re e man te sti fi e d th a t Wie de ’s ve hic le wa s to we d to an im po un d lo t, b ut n ot t o a

DPS f a c i l i t y. Wie de wa s ho sp ita lize d fo llo wi ng surg e ry and wa s c on c e rn e d th a t th e ite ms l e ft in his car mig ht be stolen. Wiede’s fr iend, David D u ggan, testified that he went to the lot wher e Wiede’s ca

r wa s towed and r emoved va luable items at W i ed e’ s reque st. Dug g an testified that he
remove d a compa ct disc play er, se vera l CDs, a CD chang er, a stereo sy stem, an amplifier , Snap-on too ls, Oa kle y sung la sse s, c lot

he s, a sil ve r r ing , a

g old c ha in, a nic e wi nter

c oat, b oo ts, tw o c re dit
car ds, and chang e. Dug g an testified that the items a ppear ed valuable and that Wiede tended to have top -o f- the -l ine po sse ssi on s.

T h e d i s t ri ct co u rt o ra l l y

d en i edt h e m o t i o nt o s u

p p re s s . T h e c o u rt h el d

t h at t h e d ru gs
we re not found pursuant to an inventory , but as part of an investig ation into what Wiede had6

c on c eal e d at th e sc e ne of thi s a c c ide nt. Al te rn a tiv e ly , th e c ourt c ite d th e of

fi c e r’ s r ole a s a community

car etake r as a

basis for the se arc h. Th e he ari ngc on tin

ue d o n th e mot ion to re vo ke . Wied e te sti fi e d, de nyingow ne rs hip or knowledg e of the drug s found i n his car . His former sister-in-law , Kathlee n Vann, testified that she had bor

rowe d the ca

r and, after

invoking he r rig ht not to testi fy , resc inded that invocation and testified that the methamphe tamin e fo u n d in the car was he rs. The district c ourt then found the alleg ation of methamphe tamine possession true a nd revoke d Wiede’s probation.
DI SCU SSIO N Wiede raises two points of error r eg ardingthe admission of evidenc e. He contends that the district court erre d by denying his motion objecting to the admission into evidence of the ba g g ie c on ta ini ngthe me tha mph e tamin e , c on te nd ingthat th e of fi c e rs la c ke d a

ny le g a l ba sis fo r t

he ir
war rantless sear ch of his vehicle. H e also a sserts that the State fa iled to establish a cha in of custody of the ba g g ie. I n r e vie wi nga ru lin g on a c ha lle ng e to t

he a dmi ssi on

of e vid e nc e , w e g ive a lmo st total defe renc e to the trial court’s determination of hi storical fa cts and re view the c ourt’s application of sea rch a nd seizure law de novo. Ba le nti ne v . S tat e , 71 S.W .3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
. Whe n th e tr ia l c ourt do e s no t make e xplic it fi nd ing s of his tor ic a l f a c ts, we re vie w t

he e vid e nc e in a l i gh tm o s tfa v o rab l e t o t h e t ri al co u rt ’s ru l i n g an d as s u m e t h at t h e t ri al co u rt m ad e i mp l i ci tfi n d i n gs of fact s upported in the re cord. Id
. We must aff irm the trial court’s ruling if it c an be upheld on any valid th eo ry o f l aw ap p licable to the c ase—e ven if the tria l court did not base its dec ision on the7

applicable theory
. State v. Stee lman , 93 S.W .3d 102, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Ro me ro v . S tat e , 800 S.W .2d 539, 543-544 (Te x . Crim. App. 1990).

On c e the de fe nd ant es ta

bli sh e s tha t a po lic e se arc h w a s n ot s up po rt e d b y a wa rr ant, the burde n shifts to the St ate to prove the rea sonablene ss of the sea rch a nd seizure. Ru sse ll v . S

tat e , 71 7 S. W.2d 7, 9-1 0 (Tex. Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ); Me nd oz a v . S tat e , 3 0 S. W. 3 d

5 2 8 , 5 3 1 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (bur den on State to prove reasona bleness of warr antless sea rch of vehic le). I t i s u n disputed in this case that Wiede wa s not arre sted and that the se arc h was
wa rr antl e ss. The dissent conte nds that we have failed to a dhere to the standard of revie w. I ndeed, the di ssent corr ectly

rec ites the standar d of re view for a probation revocation determination. See Or te ga v . S tate , 8 60 S.W. 2d

56 1, 56 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 93 , no pe t.) (b ur de n o f p ro of on state to show violation of conditions of probation as alleg ed in motion by preponde ranc e of the evidenc e and trial c ourt’s dete rmination review ed for abuse of discretion). H oweve r, the e vidence on which a trial c ourt bases its deter mination must be prope rly admitted in acc ordanc e with established se arc h
an d s ei z ure la

w. Se e Go rd

on v . S tat e , 4 S. W. 3 d

3 2 , 3 5 ( T e x. A p p . — E l P a s o 1 9 9 9 , n o p et.) (over lapping standards of revie w when c onsidering suppression of e vidence in decision to revoke probation); Sta te v . B ar

ne tt , 790 S.W .2d 662 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no pet.) (a pply ing sta

ndard of re view for

suppression in revoc ation of probation determination). B eca use the State only

relies upon Wiede’s possession o f m et h am phetamine a s g rounds for the revoc ation of probation, our deter mination of whether

the methampheta

mine was prope rly

admitted cont ro l s whether the trial court a bused its discretion in this case. See G ordon , 4 S.W .3d at 38.8 A number of possible justifications for the sear ch of Wiede’s c ar ha ve bee n advanc ed in the State’s brief, as well as by the dissent. The State a sserts that the natur e of the acc ident g ave po lic e pr ob a

b l e c a u s e t o ar r e s tW i e d e an d

s e ar c h h i s c ar

f o r e v i d e n c e e i t h e r

r e l a t i n g t o t r a ff

ic violations or other off

enses. The State and dissent also contend that the se arc h was va lid under the office r’s c ommunity

caret ak i n g fu n ction. The State c oncede s that police did not conduct a n inventory sear ch.
P r oba ble Ca use

Th e State c on te nd s th a t th e c ir c ums tanc e s at th e sc e ne pro vi ded proba ble c a us e to
sear ch Wiede’s c ar f

or evide nce r elated e ither to a tra ff i c o ff en s e or possession of a c ontrolled
su bs tanc e . A n o ff

ic e r m ay c on du c t a wa rr antl e ss se arc h of a moto r ve hic le if the of fi c e r h a s p ro ba

ble
cause to believe the ve hicle conta ins evidence of a c rime. Po we ll v . S tat e , 8 9 8 S.W.2d 821, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)
. Police office rs have the rig ht to se arc h an entire vehicle w hen they have probable cause to believe ther e is contra band in the vehic le but do not know wher e it is located. Un ite d S tat es v . R os s , 4 56 U.S
. 79 8, 82 5 ( 19 82 ). Pr ob a ble c a us e de te rm inatio ns in w arr antl e ss
sear ch situations are m ad e u s i ng the same standa rd as se arc hes involving w arr ants. W hiteley v

. W arden , 401 U.S. 560, 566 (197 1 ). To deter mine whether

probable cause exis ted to believe evidenc e of a

crime w ould be found in a c erta in place, we look at the totality of the c ircumstance s to deter mine if there is a subst antial basis for concluding that probable cause exis ted at the time of the questioned a cti on. Se e Ei se nh au e r v . S

tat e , 754 S.W .2d 159, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988),

ove r r uled on other grounds , He itm an v . S tat e , 815 S.W .2d 681, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).9

An offic er’ s inarticulate hunch, suspicion, or g ood faith is insufficient to constitute proba ble ca use. Br own v . S

tate , 481 S.W .2d 106, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
Tr affic offe nse

Th e State c on te nd s th a t Wie de ’s a pp are nt vio la tio n of

tr a ff ic laws pr ov ide d p ro ba

ble
cause to support his arre st, a nd there fore a sea

rch of his vehicle. The State asser ts that the evidenc e at the sce ne—the longskid marks, the damag e to Wiede’s ca r, the obser

vation that he wa s traveling around the speed limit of 60 miles per hour—pr ovided probable cause to be lieve that Wiede violated the re quirement that he control his spe ed sufficie ntly not to collide with another ve hicle ente ring the highw ay . See Te x. Tr ans p. Cod e Ann. § 5 45 .3 51 (b )( 2) (We st 1 99 9) ; se e als o id . § 543.001 (“A ny peac e off icer may arr est without warr ant a pe rson found c ommitt ing a violation of this subt itle.”). Court s p e rm it a

wa rr antl e ss s e arc h o f an a

uto mob ile inc ide nt t o th e arr e st o f i ts occupa nts. See New York v. Belton , 4 53 U. S. 4 54 , 4 60 -6 2 ( 19 81 ). Pr ob a ble c a us e fo r a n a rr e st e xists wher e, at that moment, fa cts and c ircumstance s within the knowledg e of the arr esting office r, and of wh ic h h e ha s r e a so na

bly tr us tw or thy inf or ma tio n, wo uld

wa rr ant a re a so na bly pr ud e nt p e rs on

in believing that a par

ticular person has committed or is committing a c rime. Se e Sm ith v . S tat e , 739 S.W .2d 848, 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). I t is irrele vant t hat t he arrest occurs immediately befor e or af ter the se arc h, as long as suffic ient probable cause exis ts for the off icer to arres t b ef

o re the
sear ch. W ill iam s v . S

tat e , 7 2 6 S
. W
. 2 d

9 9 , 1 0 1 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 8 6 ) ( ci t i n g Rawlings v. Kentucky , 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980)). Courts permit war rantless searc hes i ncident to arr est even if no arr est has10

occur red at the time of the sear ch, as long as the probable cause to support the arr est exist ed at the time of the sea

rch. Se e Ba lla rd

v . S tat e , 987 S.W .2d 889, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (admitting evidenc e fr om searc h of t ruck driven erratica lly by man wit h slurred speech and impaired ba lance , despite off

icer ’s statement that he did not form impression as t o cause of impairment and a bsence of arr e st) ; se e als o D

y ar v . S tat e , 59 S.W .3d 713, 716-17 (Te x . Ap p.—Austin 2001), aff’d , 125 S.W .3d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (admitting blood sample f rom intox icated pe rson pulled from
wre ckag e in one- car

acc ident and ar

rested in hospital). The sea rch in this case , howeve r, wa s not inc ident to an ar rest. Althoug h the sea

rch incident to a

rre st c an prec ede the arr est, the arr est must oc cur within the same encounte r. In Ba lla rd , the cour t of criminal appe als wrote:
Mo re ov e r, the fa c t th a t th e se arc h in c ide nt t o th e arr e st prece ded the formal custodial arre st b ya fe w m om e nts is of no conseque nce unde r Rawlings v. Kentucky , 4 48 U. S. 98 , 1 00 S. Ct . 2 55 6, 65 L
. Ed . 2 d 6 33 (1 98 0) (“ On c e [Rawl ing s] a dmi tte d o wn e rs hip of the siza ble qu anti ty of dr

ug s found in [the ] purs e , the po lic e c le arl y ha d p ro ba

ble cause to place [hi m] under a rre st. W here the formal arrest foll owed quickly on the he e ls o f t he c ha lle ng e d s e arc h o f [Ra wl ing s’ ] pe rs on , w e do no t be lie ve it p art ic ula rl y important that the sear ch pre cede d the ar rest rather than vic e ver sa.”)
726 S.W .2d at 101 (e mphases adde d). Bu t here there was no a rre st for the tra ffic violation a f ew
mom e nts a ft e r the se arc h or la te r a t the ho sp ita l. Th is s e arc h w a s n ot c on du c te d in c ide nt t o a n a rr e st. Nor did the proba

ble ca use for an ar rest, with o u t t h e ar

rest, provide rea son for a
war rantless searc h of t he car. Se e Kno wle s v . I owa , 525 U.S. 113, 114- 18 (1998). In Knowles , an I owa police office r stopped a dr iver for speedingand issued a citation rathe r than a rre sting the dr iver;11

the offic er the n sear ched the car , found marih u an a, an d arr ested the dr iver. The United States Su p r e me Co u rt h e ld th a t th e o f f ic e r d id n o t h a v e r e a s o n to s e ar c h th e c ar. Id . I owa c ourts had denied Know les’s motion to suppress, citin g an I o wa s t atute per mitti ng a sea

rch inc ident to the issuance of

a citation for

a tra ffic violation. Id . at 115. The Supreme Court conclude d that a sea rch inc ide nt t o a

rr e st i s p e rm iss ibl e on

tw o b a se s: (1 ) the ne e d to dis arm the su sp e c t in

or de r t o ta

ke him into custody , and ( 2 ) the ne ed to pre serve evidenc e for later use at trial. Id . at 11 7. Th e Sup re me Court found t hat neither basis was present i n the s ear ch of Knowles’s ca r. Id . at 117-18. Reg arding the nee d to preser

ve evide nce, the Court wrote:
Once Knowles wa s stop p ed for spe eding and issued a c itation, all the evidence nece ssary t o prosec ute that offe nse had be en obtained. N o further evidenc e of excessive spee d was g oing to be found either on the per son of the offe nder or in the passeng er c ompartment of the c ar. I owa ne vertheless argues that a “ sear ch incident to citation” is justified bec ause a suspect who is subject to a r outine traff ic stop may

attempt to hide or destr oy evidenc e r e late d

to h is id e n ti ty

( e . g . , a dr iv e r ’ s li c e n s e o r

v e h ic le r e g is tr a ti o n ) , or destroy evidence o f another, as y et undetec ted cr ime. As for the destruction of evidenc e re lating to identity , if a police of fice r is not satisfied with the identification fu rn ish e d b y

the dr ive r, thi s may

be a ba sis fo r a

rr e sti nghim

rathe r t ha n me re ly issuing a c itation. As for destroying evidenc e of othe r cr imes, the possibili ty that an of fi c e r w ou ld s tum

ble on to e vid e nc e wh oll y un re la te d to the sp e e din g of fe ns e se e ms remote.
Id . at 118. The Court re verse d the conviction and r emande d the ca use. Th e State ’s a tte mpt

to b a se the se arc h o n th e a lle g e d tr a ff ic vio la tio n make s thi s c a se strikingly simil ar to Knowles . A lth ou g h there was no c itatio n is su e d h e re , th e re a so nin g is applicable . The off

icer s had Tambung a’s ey ewitness testimony about Wiede’s failure to c ontrol the12

speed of his car, a

nd they could see the long s k i d m ar k s o n the roa d and the damag e to the ca r. Speeding offe nses under

the transpor

tation code a

re stric t liabilit y

offe nses. Nam Ho ai L e v . S tat e , 963 S.W .2d 838, 841 (Tex. App.—Corp us Christi 1998, pet. ref’d) . The State did not produce evidenc e or a

rticulate a ny rea son to believe that a sear ch of the car —particula

rly , the spac e betwe en the dr ive r’ s se a t and

the c e nte r c on so le —w ou ld p ro du c e a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e re le va nt t o th e of

fe ns e of fa iling to control spee d. The off icer must have proba

ble ca use to bel i eve that the car contains evidenc e of the crime unde r investig ation, not evidence of som e unrelated c rime. Po we ll , 98 S.W .3d at 827. Other offe nses The State a lternatively argues that proba

ble ca use exis ted to searc h the vehicle for a
c on tr oll e d

s u b s t an c e b a s e d

o nT a mb u n g a ’ s o b s e r

v a t i o no f W i e d e f u rt i v e l y h i d i n g a s m a l l o b j e c t. This fu rt ive g esture, c oupled with the nature of the a ccide nt, urg es the State, g ave the office rs pr ob a ble c a us e to b e lie ve that Wie de wa s d ri vin g wh ile int oxic ate d ( or un de r the inf lue nc e of so me substance) and that the hidden object was the intox icant. The State need not obtain a war rant prior to searc hing a

n automobile if probable cause exis ts to believe it contains contraband. Pe nn sy lv an ia v. Labron , 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996). The ref ore, w e look to see if the State prese nted evi d en ce
su pp or tin g pr ob a

ble c a us e to be lie ve that Wied e wa s e ith e r d ri vin g wh ile int oxic a te d o r o the rw ise in possession of contraba nd. Construing the e vidence most favora b l y t o the district court’s de cision, the police kn e w that a

by sta nd e r h a d s e e n th e inj ur e d d ri ve r of a wr e c ke d ve hic le re a c h ac ro ss his bo dy wi thWe do not question the r eliability of the infor

mation provided by

the by stander T ambung a. 4 Se e Ba le nti ne v . S

tat e , 7 1 S.W. 3d 76 3, 76 8 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Gu zm an v . S tat e , 955 S.W .2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (we g ive almost total defer ence to trial court’s de termination of cr edibi lity

and historical f

act) . Howeve r, we emphasize that Tambung a’s testimony is of limit ed v a l u e b e c a

u s e h e w i t n e s s e d

o n l y a f u rt i v e g e s tu r e an d

n o tc r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y. 13 his uninjured arm while police we re not watching and hide something smaller than his fist betwe en the driver’ s seat and the cente r console. Wiede was seriously injured, dazed, and moaningafte r the 4 collision. But there is no evidence that he showe d any signs of intox ication. Althoug h Wiede was driving at or a

bove the spe ed limit, there is no evidenc e that his driving b ef o re t h e collision was
err atic. The re is no evidenc e of any odors associate d with intoxication or drug possession emanating from Wiede or his ca

r. Ther e is no indication that any alcohol, drug s, or dru g para pherna lia wer e in plain view; the photo of the interior of the c ar shows only

clutter. B eca

use the off

icer who actua lly conducte d the sea

rch of Wiede’s ca

r wa s never

ident i fied a

nd did not testify , there is no evidenc e in the re cord a s to his actual motivation for the sea rch. The c ourt of cr iminal appeals has repe atedly held t hat a “fur tive g esture,” such as the
on e de sc ri be d b y

Ta mbu ng a , ma de wh ile a pe rs on is sto pp e d for a tr a ff ic of fe ns e do e s n ot e sta

bli sh probable cause for a sear ch. Se e Ho war d v . S tat e , 599 S.W .2d 597, 604-05 (Te x . Crim. App. 1979) (d ipp e d d ow n in

se a t to wa

rd ste e ri ngwh e e l w he n s top ped for failin g to u se tur n s ig na l) ; Bec k v. Sta te , 547 S.W . 266, 268-69 (Te x . Crim. App. 1976) (re ache d tow ar d g love compar tment when sto pp e d for fa ili ng to use tur n s ig na l) ; W

ils on v . S tat e , 511 S.W .2d 531, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (m ov e d h and be tw e e n seats wh e n stop pe d for ru nn ing re d li g ht) ; se e als o J e nk ins v . S tat e , 76 S.W .3d 70 9 (T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 20 02, p et. ref ’d ); Ra ms e

yv . S tat e , 8 0 6 S. W. 2 d

9 5 4 , 9 5 7 ( T e x. App.—Austin 1991, pet. ref ’d).14 The fa cts surroundingthe sea rch of Wiede’s ca

r ar e s im il a

r to those found insuffic ient to justi fy a sea rch in W ilson
. Wil son was pulled over by police for running a red light. W ilson , 511 S.W .2d at 532. As Wilson pul led over to the side of the road, the police office r witnessed Wilson make a move with his hand betwe en the two se ats. Id . The po l i ce s ea rc h ed wher e Wilson had moved hi s hand and discovere d contra band. Id
. Simi larly , Wiede committed the traff ic offe nse of failing to control speed w hen he co llided with the truck. While awaiting medical a ssistance, he
rea ched be tween the seat and console with a sm all unidentified obj ect in his hand. Movements like Wie de ’ s an d

W i l s o n ’ s , e v e nw h e nc o u p l e d w i t h a t r a f f i c o f f e n s e , ar e n o ts u

p p o rt i v e o f

p r ob a ble
cause to searc h a vehic le “be cause of the ambiguous a nd p o t en t i al l y

innocent natur e of suc h movements.” Ho war

d , 599 S.W .2d at 604. Mo re ov e r, we c ann ot co nc lud e that Wied e ’s g e sture , co up le d with a tr a ff ic a c c ide nt, constitutes “ suspicious c ircumstance s” that provided proba ble ca use for the sea rch. See Tex. Code Cr im
. P ro c . A nn . a

rt . § 14 .0 3( a )( 1) (We st Su pp . 2 00 4- 05 ); Dyar , 5 9 S. W. 3 d a t 7 1 6

- 1 7
. Se c ti on 14 .0 3( a )( 1) of

the c od e of

c ri min a l pr oc e dure on ly pr ov ide s th a t an o ff

ic e r m ay make an a

rr e st without fir s t o b ta in in g a w ar r an t w h e n th e r e ar e “ s u s p ic io u s c ir c u ms ta n c e s . ” T h e r e mu s t s ti ll be probable cause to make the a rre st. Se e Dy ar

v . S tat e , 125 S.W .3d 460, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Fur thermore , the re cord does not support a chara cter ization of t his collision as “suspicious.” Wi ede attempted but w as unable to stop his ve hicle when a hea vily loaded 18- whee l truck turned onto the road in fr ont of him; there is no evidenc e in the re cord tha t he was dr iving e rratically or that he w as in to xic a te d
. B y contra st, “suspicious circumstanc es” w ere found in Dy ar whe re a s even tee n- ye a r- old driver w as t aken to the hos pital afte r hi s car left the roa d and turne d upside down, police ha d been15

inf or me d th a t D y ar w a s e n ro ute to Ho us ton a ft e r “ pa rt y ing ” fo r Ne w Y e ar’ s E ve , D y ar a dmi tte d to drinking alcohol and dr iving, a nd he appe are d intox icated. Id . at 461-62. We also find no signific ant di ffe renc e betwe en Wiede’s f ailure to stop for the truck
an d th e f a il u r e to s to p f

o r a r e d li g h t in W

ilson
. Al though the United States Supreme Court has stated in dicta that ve hicles are “exposed to traff ic ac cidents that may

rende r all their c ontents open to public view,” Houghton , 5 26 U. S. at 39 3, we do no t r e a d th is c omm e nt, or any oth e r p re c e de nt, to establish a g ener al exception to the Four th Amendment’s proba

ble ca u s e re q u i reme nt for the investigation of t raf

fic a ccide nts. Se e Ne w York v . Clas s , 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (“ A citizen does not surrende r all the prote ctions of the F ourth Amendment by enter ing a

n automobile.”). We conclude that, even whe n viewed most fa vorably to the district court’s de cision, the totality of the circ umstances prese nted at the hear ing did not de monstrate that the unidentifie d police off i ce r h ad p robable cause to believe that Wiede’ s vehicle c ontained evide nce of a cr ime. Wi t h o ut any

additional evidenc e of intoxi cation or a nother c rime, Wiede’s fur tive g esture a fter colliding with the truc k amounts to only rea sonabl e suspicion not probable cause . Nor c an we
c umu la te thi s r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion

and a po lic e of fi c e r’ s d uty to i nv e sti g a te a

tr a ff ic a c c ide nt t o satisfy the Four th Amendment. The se arc h of a ve hicle by the police is per

mitted only

when ther e is p ro ba ble c a us e to b e lie ve the se arc h w ill un c ov er evi den ce of a cr ime or wh e n th e se arc h is jus tif ie d und e r o ne of

the fe w s pe c if

ic a lly e sta bli sh e d an d we ll de lin e a te d e xce pti on s to the F ourt h Amendment’s r equire ment of proba ble ca use. The traff

ic ac cident that tra

nsformed Wiede’ s furtive g e sture int o r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion

of c ri min a l a c tivity

c ann ot a lso e le vate re a so na ble su sp ic ion

to probable cause .16

Co m m unit y c ar e ta king

Absent proba

ble ca use, an of fice r’s wa rra ntless searc h may be justified as c onducted in the course of h i s co m m u n i t y car etakingfunction. Se e Lan e yv . S tat e , 117 S.W .3d 854, 858-59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The court of criminal appea ls has stated that a court may

consider e vidence dis c ov e re d b y

po lic e wh o s e arc h p ro pe rt y wi tho ut w arr ants wh ile a c tin g in the ir ro le s a s c omm un ity
car etake rs under three doctrines: the automobile impoundm ent/inventory doctrine, the emer g ency doctrine, a

nd the Cadydoctrine. Laney , 117 S.W .3d at 861. Havingestablished these exceptions to the Four

th A mendment require ment of proba ble ca use, howe ver, the court c autioned: “While we tod ay re c og nize the e xiste nc e of the c omm

un ity c are takin g fu

nc tio n in Te xas, we emph a size its
narr ow applica

bility .” W

rig ht v . S tat e , 7 S.W. 3d

14 8, 15 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); see also United States v. Robinson , 414 U.S. 218, 2 4 3 (1 9 73) (“ Ex ceptions to the wa rra nt require ment are not ta lis mans pr e c lud ingfu

rt he r j ud ic ia l in qu ir

y wh e ne ve r the y are inv ok e d
. . . b ut r a the r a re je a lou sly
and c are fu lly

dr awn .” ); Corbin v . S

tat e , 85 S.W .3d 272, 281 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (Cochra n, J. , c o n c u r r in g ) ( e me r g e n c y

s e ar c h mu s t n o t b e p rimarily mot iv a te d b y in te n t t o ar

r e s t a n d s e iz e evidenc e and it is essential that c ourts be ale rt to possibil ity of subterf

ug e). The S t at e an d t h e dis sent asser t that the sear ch wa s conducte d in the course of the of f ic e r ’ s c o mm

u n it y c ar e ta k in g f u n c ti o n : a s s is ti n g in Wi e d e ’ s me d ic a l c ar e an d inv e s ti g a ti ng an
acc ident. We will ex plore all three ty pes of community car etaking to see if there is support for the trial court’ s decision.

Un de r t he inv e nto ry do c tr ine , poli c e are pe rm itt e d to sea rc h impo un de d ve hic le s to make an inventory of i tems in the car i n order to protect the ow ner’ s proper ty , to protect the police17

from c l ai m s for lost proper ty , and to protec t the police fr om dang erous c ontents. Opperman , 428 U.S. at 369- 70, 375. Under the emer g ency doctrine, police may

conduct a

sear ch without a wa

rra nt if: (1) the of

fice r’s a ctions are totally

divorce d from the de t ec t i o n , i n v est iga tion, or acquisition of evidenc e, (2) there is an immediate, objec tively rea sonable belief that the sear ch is nec essar y in order to p ro te c t or

pr e se rv e lif

e or a vo id s e ri ou s in

jur y , a nd (3 ) t he sc op e of

the se arc h i s st

ri c tly circ umscribed by

the fa cts of the e merg ency . See Laney , 11 7 S. W.3 d at 86 1- 62 ; Go nz ale z v . S tat e , 148 S.W .3d 702, 708 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet. h.). I tems police d i scover in plain view during such a se arc h in response to a n emer g ency

are admi s s i b l e. See Laney , 117 S.W .3d at 863. By contra st, the Cadydoctrine a ddresse s almost ex clusively war rantles s s ea rches and seizures of vehicles a nd does not requir e an imminent threat to a specific person’ s well-being
. Id . at 86 1; see als o Cady v. Dom browski , 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1 973) (se arc h disabled ca r suspec ted of c ontaining g un permissible bec ause c ar w as “vulne rable to intrusion by vandals” ). F ir st, the State c on c e de s th a t no inv e nto ry wa s ma de . We the re fo re de c lin e to u ph old th e s e ar c h o f Wi e d e ’ s v e h ic le o n th e b a s is o f th e inv e n to ry doctrine. See als o A itc h v . S tat e , 879 S.W .2d 167, 172 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1994, pet. re f’d) (When police re move one item from ca r and f ail to compile list o f o ther va luable items in plain sight, item not remove d pursuant to an inventory .).

The rec ord also does not suppor t a pplication of the c ommunity car etakingemer g ency doctrine or

the Cadydoctrine. The Laney standard f o r a sea rch unde r the c ommunity car etaking
emer g ency doctrine was s et forth in the contex t of a se arc h of a home
. See Laney , 117 S.W .3d at 855 (se arc h o f p ri vate re sid e nc e ); Gonzalez , 1 4 8 S. W. 3 d a t 7 0 4 ( s e ar c h o f a p artm e n t)
. T he court of18

c ri min a l a pp e a ls h a s als o he ld t

hat th e e me rg e nc y

do c tr ine c an ju sti fy

the sto p o f a

mov ingve hic le based on c oncer

n for a n occupa nt. See W right , 7 S.W .3d at 151. Fa ctors in making a ca retaking stop of such a vehicle inc lude: (1) the nature a nd level of the di stress ex hibited by the individual; (2) the location of the individual; (3) w hether or not the individual was alone or had ac cess to assistanc e independe nt o f t hat offe red by the offic er; a

nd (4) to what ext ent the individual—if not assisted—prese nted a da

ng er to himself or othe rs. Id . at 152. We find these fa ctors ar e also re levant to our consider ation of whe ther the se arc h was pe rmissible in li g ht of the eme rg ency doctrine. We a pp ly an ob je c tiv e sta

nd ard of re a so na

ble ne ss, takin g int o a c c ount a ll o f t he fa c ts and cir cumstance s known to the police at the time of the sea rch. See Laney , 1 1 7 S. W. 3 d a t 8 6 2
. We independe ntly

scrutinize the fac ts without reg ard to the subjec tive conclusions of the police
. J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 722 S.W .2d 417, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). I n W right , a deputy sheriff stopped a car from which he ha d observe d Wright lea ning out of a re ar w indow and vomiting. Id . at 150. The de puty had see n no violations of law bef ore the stop, but testified that he stopped the c ar be cause he wa s conce rned f or Wright’ s safe ty

and wa nted to ensure that Wright was not beingassaulted or denied medic al attention. Id
. After the stop, the deputy noted odors indicatingconsumption of alcohol and marihuana , and saw a partially smoked marihuana cig are tte in pla in vie w on the console betwee n the front se ats. Id . The c ourt of cr iminal appea ls vacated t his Court’s reve rsal of the t rial court’s judgme nt and remanded f or ana ly sis of the applicability of t he four fac tors listed above. Id
. at 152. On rema nd, this Court determined that the stop did not meet the test set out by the cour t of criminal appe als. W

rig ht v . S tat e , 18 S.W .3d 245, 247 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref ’d). This Court wrote :19

Appellant wa s a passeng er in the rear seat of a car that was be ing dr iven in a lawf ul mann e r o n a

pu bli c hig hw ay . Ap pe lla

nt a pp e are d to be havin g so me g a str ic dis tr e ss, but in additi o n t o t h e d ri ver, the other pa sseng er in the c ar c ould have a ided and assisted appe llant. Nothing indica te d th a t a p pellant’s condition was a ny more ser ious than an upse t stomach. None of the car’s occupants indi cate d that they wer e in nee d of additional help. Nothing indicated that t h e deputy sheriff ’s assistance was nece ssary or that his help would add to the comfort or welfa re of appellant. Nothing su pp or te d a re a so na ble be lie f t

hat a pp e lla nt w a s a da ng e r t o h ims e lf

or to o the rs . The re asons for the stop give n by the officer w ere unrea sonably speculative and appea r to be no more than an attempt through hindsig ht t o j ustify the stopping a

nd detaining of appe llant. The totality of the c ircumstanc es d i d not justi fy officia l intrusion upon a ppellant’s constitutional rig ht to be secur e in his person. The stop and dete ntion of appellant was simply an unre asonable exercise of authority by the of fi c e r i n v iol a tio n o f a

pp e lla nt’ s c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts
. Id
. Apply ing the W rig ht fa c tor s to thi s c a se , w e a c kn ow le dg e that Wie de wa s se ri ou sly injured and in ne ed of me dical attention. Howe ver, at the time of the search, W iede was outside of his vehicle a

nd in the car e of e merg ency medical pe rsonnel who wer e prepa ring to take him to the hospital. Thus, the W

rig ht fa c tor s w e ig h to wa

rd a fi nd ing that the se arc h wa s unr e a so na ble be c a us e Wiede was not alone , had ac cess assistance other than that offe red by

the offic er, a

nd did not present a dange r t o himself or others. See W right , 7 S.W .3d at 152. Althoug h Trooper McGua irt expl ained that he believed that Wiede might be under the influence of drug s, and that medica l p er s onnel tr e a tin g Wie de sh ou ld k

no w o f t he po ssi bil ity

that Wie de wa s und e r t

he inf lue nc e of dr ug s, we lim it our consider ation to the fac ts known to the office r, not his subjective conc lusions. See J ohnson , 722 S.W .2d at 419. McGua irt did not inform the medical p ersonnel of the possibilit y Wiede was intox icated, did not tell anyone else to tell them, and did not know whether any one tol d them. There is also no evidence that the unidentified officer who conducted t he search shared the se conc erns, thatT h e d i s s e n tc o n t e n d s t h a tw e f a i l t o d e f e r t o t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s a s s e s s m e n to f c r e d i b i l i t y. 5 Howeve r, the trial c ourt could not have made a cre dibilit y

deter mination rega rd i ng the offic er’ s motivation for the sea

rch be cause the offic er w ho actua lly conducte d the sear ch wa s not identified and did not testify
. 20 the emer g ency

medical pe rsonnel believe d Wiede was i n t ox icated a nd asked of

fice rs to look for drug s in the vehicle, or

that Wiede’s demeanor or the appeara nce of his car sug g ested he was unde r the influenc e of a

ny controlled substanc e. The fac t that there w as no attempt to rela y the information g ained throug h the sea

rch to medic al per sonnel belies the State’ s assertion that the se arc h was conducte d out of conc ern f or Wiede’s we lfare
. S

e e P r o v o s t v . Stat e , 63 1 S. W. 2 d 1 7 3 , 1 7 5 ( T e x. 5 App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, pet. ref ’d) (sea rch of home was not justified out of conce rn for fire inside when police first ca lled the district attorney and dela y ed entr y until af ter fir e depa

rtment had exti ng uished fire ).

The dissent c o n t en d s t hat the sea rch of Wiede’s ca

r wa s conducte d incident to the perf ormanc e of a

bonafide community

car etakingactivity . I t claims “[t] here i s n o re ad y test for determ ining r easona

bleness [of a sea

rch] other than by

balanc ing the need to se arc h ag ainst the i n v as i o n t h at t he sea

rch e ntails.” Se e Cam ara v . M un ic ipa l Co ur t , 3 8 7 U
. S. 5 2 3 , 5 3 4

- 3 5 ( 1 9 6 7) (wa rra nt require d for a dminist rative se arc h of private dwelling ). Citing the dissenting opinion of one judge of the court of criminal appea ls, the dissent se eks to de termine whether the sea rch of Wiede’s
car was permissible as community car etakingby

balanc ing the public interest fur there d by the sea rch ag ainst Wiede’s right to privacy in his vehicle. See W

right , 7 S.W .3d at 155 (Mey ers, J., diss enting ). Al tho ug h th e se int e re sts are ba lanc e d in e xami nin g wh e the r a se arc h is justi fi e d und e r a c omm un ity
car etaking exception, we do not do so on an ad hoc basis. This delicate ba lance is refle cted in the21

sta nd ard s se t fo rt

h in the “ fe w sp e c if

ic a lly e sta bli sh e d and

we ll- de lin e a te d e xce pti on s” to t he F ourt h Amendment’s g ener al require ments of a w arr ant and pr obable c ause. Mince y v. A rizona , 4 37 U. S. 38 5, 39 0 ( 19 78 ); Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). F urthermore, Judge Me y ers prese nted his b al an ci n g approa ch as a n alternative to the majority opinion’s “totality

of the circ umstances” test which established the W rig ht f a c to r s d is cussed above. Se e W rig ht v . S tat e , 7 S.W. 3d a t 15 3. We t

he re fo re pr e sume that th e c ourt of c ri min a l app e a ls co ns ide re d an d s pe c if ic a lly
re je c te d e sta

bli sh ingsu c h a

sta nd ard in c omm un ity c are takin g c a se s. I n the context of revie wing a sear ch under the emer g ency

doctrine w e must determine whether : (1 ) t he off

icer ’s ac tions were totally divorce d from the de tection, investig ation, or
a c qu isi tio n o f e vid e nc e , ( 2) the re wa s an imme diate , obje c tiv e ly re a so na ble be lie f that the se arc h is
nece ssary in order to pr otect or pr eser ve life or avoid serious injury , and (3) the scope of the sea rch was strictly

circ umscribed by

the fa ct s o f t h e eme rg ency . See Laney , 117 S.W .3d at 861-62; Gonzalez , 1 4 8 S. W. 3 d

a t 7 0 8
. A lt

h o u g h th e d is s e n t s tate s th a t t h e s e ar c h w a s in c id e n t t o the community

car etakingfunction, we find no specif ic and articulable f

acts whic h support that
a sse rt ion . T he me tha

mph e tamin e wa s not dis c ov e re d in pla in v ie w w hil e po lic e we re in t he c ours e of assisting Wiede; he had alr eady been removed from the car. Nor does the record support that the
sear ch wa s part of a

n investigation of the ac cident. The office rs did not canva s the entire ve hicle for information, but only conducte d a narrow searc h for an item that a witness informed them he saw Wiede hide. Nothing in the rec ord indicate s that the offic ers ha d an y rea son to believe that the unidentified item had a

ny rela t i o n s h i p to the cause of the a ccide nt prior to discoveringthat it was methamphetamine. See W ong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (sea rch unlawful at22

its inc e pti on may no t be v a lid a te d b y wh a t it tur ns up ); Carv e r v . S

tat e , 7 4 6 S. W. 2 d 8 6 9 , 8 7 2 ( T e x. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1988, pet. re f’d) (sea rch “ must be justified by

what is known to police office rs at the in c e p ti o no f th e s e ar c h an d

c an n o t b e ju s ti f

ie d b y e v id e n c e s e iz e d

a s a r e s u lt o f the
se arc h o r a

rr e st” ). At

be st, the of

fi c e rs c ou ld o nly

sp e c ulate that the hid de n ite m wa s r e le va nt t o th e ir leg itimate com m u n i t y ca retaking f unction. Se e J

an ic e k v . S tat e , 6 3 4 S. W. 2 d

6 8 7 , 6 9 1 n . 1 1 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 82 ) ( int

ru sio ns up on

fo ur th a me ndme nt r ig ht t o p ri va c y to b e de te rm ine d “b y the fa c ts, not by rumor, suspicion, or g uesswork” ). Considering the totality of the c ircumstance s, the rec ord does not support a c onclusion that the offic er’ s sear ch of Wiede’s car was (1) totally divorce d from the d e t e c t i o n, inv e sti g a tio n, or a c qu isi tio n o f e vid e nc e or that ( 2) the re wa s an im me diate , o bje c tiv e ly
rea sonable belief that the sea rch w as nec essar

y in order to pr otect or pr eser ve life or avoid serious injury
. See Laney , 117 S.W. 3d a t 86 1- 62 ; Gonzalez , 148 S.W .3d at 708. The mer e fa ct that Wiede was in a tra ffic a ccide nt and made a furtive g esture, absent any evidenc e indicatingthat he wa s under the influenc e of a

drug , does not support a finding that the sea rch w as justified under the emer g ency doctrine. See Laney , 1 17 S.W. 3d a t 86 0; W

right , 18 S.W .3d at 247 (re asons g iven for stop we re
unrea sonably

speculative and appe ar to be an attempt to justify stop in hindsi g ht). The rec ord also does not suppor t the view that this sear ch wa s permissible under the di st inc t Cady community car etakingexception. I n Cady , the United States Supreme Court
a c kn ow le dg e d th a t lo c a l po lic e “ fr e qu e ntl y inv e sti g a te ve hic le a c c ide nts in w hic h the re is n o c la im of c ri min a l li a

bil ity and e ng a g e in wh a t, fo r wa

nt of a be tte r te rm , may be de sc ri be d a s c omm un ity
car etakingfunctions, totally divorce d from the detec tion, investig ation, or acquisition of evide nce relating to the violation of a cr iminal statute.” Cady , 4 13 U. S. at 44 1. Th e c ourt of c ri min a l a

pp e a lsThe dissent attempts to expand the Cady exception by eng ag ing in a balancing test betwee n 6 Wiede’s privac y

interest and the interest in the sea rc h
. No co u rt has cha

rac terized the Cady exception as a s i m ple, ca se-by -ca se bala ncing test and we decline to do so. Nor does the Cady ex ce p t i o n p r o v i d e agen er al au t h o ri t y t o s ea rc h a v eh i cl e i n v o l v edi na t ra ff i c a cc i d en t
. Al t h o u gh police have a duty

to respond to a tra ffic a ccide nt, rende r ai d , and investig ate its ca use, the Cady 23 distinguished the Cady doctrine from the closely related emer g ency community car etakingdoctrine beca use the Cady doctrine ( 1) does not require an off icer to be ac ting only

to preser ve or pr otect life or avoid ser ious injury

and (2) appli es p ri m ar i l y to searc hes and se izures of vehicle s. Laney , 117 S.W .3d at 861. I n Cady , an intox icated police office r was involved in a car acc ident i n an o t h er jurisdiction and lapsed into a c oma. 413 U.S. at 435-36. P o l i ce t o we d h is car to a n ung uarde d private g ara g e and later sea rche d the ca

r looking for the se rvice revolve r t hey believed the injured office r wa s require d to c arr y ; the sear cher s instead discovere d evidenc e of a murder c ommitt ed by the i njured officer
. Id
. a t 43 6- 37 . T he Sup re me Court he ld t hat, w he re the tr

un k o f a n a uto mob ile
rea sonably

believed to c ontain a g un was vulner able to i n t ru sion by vandals, the se arc h was not
unrea sonable within the mea ning of the Four th and Four

teenth Amendme nts. Id . at 448. Th e se arc h of Wie de ’s ve hic le is e a sil y dis tin g uis ha

ble fr om Cady . As we note d
ear lier in this opinion, t he re cord doe s not support the conclusion that the nar row sea rch of only one
ar ea i n the vehicle was “ totally divorce d from the de tection, investig ation, or ac quisiti on of evidenc e.” Se e id . at 441. Even if a sear ch for

drug s was permissible, the office r’s belief that the Wie de ’s ve hic le c on ta ine d d ru g s w a s, a t b e st, sp e c ulativ e . F ur the rm or e , th e fe ar t

hat a sma ll q ua nti ty of dr ug s may re ma in hid de n in an un g ua rd e d c ar d oe s n ot r a ise the same c on c e rn s f or pu bli c sa fe ty that motivated the offic ers in Cady to searc h for a gun. We theref ore r ejec t the contention of the 6do c tr ine on ly app lie s to tho se po lic e a c tio ns tha t are in f ur the ra nc e of the le g iti ma te c omm

un ity car etakingfunction and “ totally divorce d from the de tection, in v e s ti g a ti o n , o r a c q u is ition of e vidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Cady , 413 U.S. at 441.

24 State and the dis se nt that th e se arc h o f Wi e de ’s ve hic le wa s ju sti fi e d und e r t he of fi c e rs ’ c omm

un ity
car etakingfunction.

Be cause the State did not establish that there w as either probable cause to support the
se arc h o f Wi e de ’s ve hic le , o r t hat the searc h w a s ju sti fi e d und e r a n e xce pti on

to t he F ourt h Amendment’s pr obable c ause r equire ment, we hold that the tria l co u rt abused its di scre tion by ad m i t t i n g the methampheta mine into evidence . The a dmission of the methamphetamine undoubtedly

contributed to the de cision to revoke Wiede’ s probation. The e rror in its admiss ion was thu s h arm fu l. Wiede asser ts, the State conce des, and w e ag ree that t h e d i s t ri ct court erre d by
re vo kin g Wie de ’s pr ob a tio n f or fa ilure to p ay

fi ne s and fe e s b e c a us e the State wa ive d th os e g ro un ds
. Be cause the rema ining issue conce rning inadequate proof of the cha in of custody

of the me tha mph e tamin e wo uld

no t r e qu ir e any

g re a te r r e lie f, we ne e d n ot a dd re ss i t.
CO NC LU SION Th e c ourt e rr e d b y a dmi tti ngthe me tha

mph e tamin e in to ev ide nc e . T he c ourt a lso
e rr e d b y re vo kin g Wie de ’s pr ob a tio n fo r fa ilure to p ay fi ne s a nd fe e s b e c a us e the State wa ive d th os e25

g rounds. Acc ording ly , we reve rse the district c ourt’s orde r re voking Wiede’ s probation and r emand the ca use for further proce eding s not inconsistent with t his opinion.

Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Patterson: Opinion by J ustice B . A. Smith; Dissenting O pinion by J ustice Patterson Reverse d and Remande d Filed: January

21, 2005 Publis h