An Assessment of the Final Rule to Implement Vessel Speed 

Restrictions to Reduce the Threat of Vessel Collisions with North 

Atlantic Right Whales

Gregory K. Silber and Shannon Bettridge

U.S. Department of Commerce

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

National Marine Fisheries Service

NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-OPR-48

February 2012

An Assessment of the Final Rule to Implement Vessel Speed 

Restrictions to Reduce the Threat of Vessel Collisions with North 

Atlantic Right Whales

Gregory K. Silber and Shannon Bettridge

Office of Protected Resources

National Marine Fisheries Service

1315 East-West Highway

Silver Spring, MD 20910

NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-OPR-48

February 2012

U.S. Department of Commerce

John E. Bryson, Secretary

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Jane Lubchenco, Ph.D., Administrator

National Marine Fisheries Service

Samuel D. Rauch, Acting Assistant Administrator for Fisheries
ii

Recommended citation:

Silber, G.K. and S. Bettridge. 2012. An Assessment of the Final Rule to Implement Vessel 

Speed Restrictions to Reduce the Threat of Vessel Collisions with North Atlantic Right Whales.

U.S. Dept. of Commer., NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-OPR-48, 114 p.

Copies of this report may be obtained from:

Office of Protected Resources

NOAA, NMFS, F/PR2

1315 East-West Highway

Silver Spring, MD 20910

Or online at:

http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr
iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 10 October 2008 the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) published a “Final rule 

to implement speed restrictions to reduce the threat of ship collisions with North Atlantic right 

whales” (73 FR 60173). The rule requires that vessels 65 feet and greater in length travel at 10 

knots or less near key port entrances and in certain areas of right whale aggregation along the 

U.S. eastern seaboard, known as “Seasonal Management Areas”. Text in the preamble of the 

rule indicated NMFS’s intention to also develop a “Dynamic Management Area” program to 

protect unpredictably occurring aggregations of right whales whereby mariners would be 

requested, but not required, to avoid temporarily established areas or travel through them at 10 

knots or less. This “ship strike” reduction rule is set to expire five years from its effective date 

on 9 December 2013, before which NMFS was expected to develop ways to monitor and assess 

the rule’s effectiveness at reducing ship strikes of right whales.

To this end, NMFS convened a workshop in November 2008 to determine ways to measure the 

rule’s effectiveness. Among other things, the workshop concluded that regardless of the metrics 

developed to assess effectiveness, detecting meaningful biological effects of the restrictions

would be difficult prior to the five-year expiration. This conclusion, notwithstanding, the workshop developed four metrics, that when combined, might provide a characterization of a possible 

reduction in ship strike deaths, as well as mariner response to, and economic impacts of, the 

vessel speed restrictions. The workshop also indicated that given the time needed for the agency 

to consider actions prior to the expiration of the rule, a report assessing the effectiveness of the 

regulations should be developed for NOAA leadership by December 2011. This is that report.

The four areas of assessment identified in the 2008 workshop report, and discussed in this report 

are (1) possible changes in ship strike death rates (i.e., biological effectiveness); (2) changes in 

vessel operations in response to the regulations (i.e., mariner response); (3) a quantification of 

mariner outreach and education efforts, and (4) economic impacts resulting from the rule. 

Results of a separate study on voluntary mariner response to Dynamic Management Areas are

also discussed.

Results herein are based on statistical analyses of the occurrence of 55 large whale (all species of 

large whale) ship strike deaths or serious injuries over the course of 10 years. We also analyzed

literally hundreds of millions of remotely-sensed vessel Automatic Identification System data 

points used to characterize vessel operations and to assess the economic impacts represented in 

over one hundred thousand passages made by over 6,000 individual vessels within both Seasonal 

and Dynamic Management Areas. We also evaluated maritime community awareness-raising 

efforts that were coordinated by a number of NMFS personnel and mediated through hundreds of 

contacts using various print and broadcast media. 
iv

Summary of conclusions:

 Although these data sets (including both vessel operations and biological data) were 

substantial and the analyses thorough, our findings are inconclusive regarding the

biological effectiveness of the rule in achieving its objectives, because the time allotted 

(based on a sampling period of only two years given the timing of the expiration of the 

rule and to allow sufficient time to develop this report) to determine its biological 

effectiveness was simply too brief.

 A statistical assessment of the time needed to detect a change in the rate of ship strikes 

indicated that two years was an insufficient period to make a meaningful determination 

regarding a reduction in ship strikes. However, based on three separate statistical 

analyses, there may be “a meager amount of evidence” in support of a reduction in ship 

strike deaths and serious injuries of large whales; and at least five years are needed to 

detect substantial biological effects.

 Mariner compliance with the requirements of the rule was relatively low in 2009 and 

2010, but it exhibited a marked improvement in 2011. Compliance was consistently low

in “foreign-flagged” vessels.

 The outreach program used to inform the maritime community about vessel speed 

restrictions appeared to “blanket” the affected communities rather well. Although it was 

extensive in scope and a variety of communications outlets were employed,

improvements in the program, particularly with regard to “non-domestic” vessel 

operators, appears warranted.

 The maximum estimated total (i.e., direct and indirect) economic impacts resulting from

the vessel speed restrictions were $52.4M and $79.0M using 2009 and 2012 bunker fuel 

prices, respectively. These are revisions to the 2008 projected economic impact of

$137.3M. The new estimates assumed 100% compliance with the provisions of the rule 

and as such represent maximum economic impacts.

 Mariner adherence to voluntary speed restrictions within or avoidance of Dynamic 

Management Areas was minimal.

 The justification and reasoning for initially establishing vessel speed restrictions still 

stand. In addition, independent studies conducted since the rule was enacted indicate that

the probability of a struck whale being killed or seriously injured is reduced as vessel 

speed diminishes and further that NMFS’ vessel speed restrictions, in particular, are 

reducing the risk of fatal ship strikes or right whales. Therefore, the reasons for 

establishing speed limits and these more recent findings strongly suggest that the use of 

vessel speed restrictions should continue.

 Last, we provide suggestions about steps to improve the vessel-strike reduction program, 

including possible modifications to the provisions of the rule itself and various related 

aspects of the program that will enhance their value to right whale conservation.
v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank a number of contributors and our counterparts in NMFS who helped make this report

possible. These include Jeff Adams, Michael Asaro, Cheryl Bonnes, Kam Chin (Volpe 

Transportation Center), Tim Cole, David Cottingham, Laura Engleby, David Gouveia, Carliane 

Johnson (SeeJay Environmental), Kristin Koyama, Richard Merrick, David Phinney (Volpe 

Transportation Center), Barb Zoodsma, and the participants of the 2008 workshop on assessing 

the effectiveness of the rule. The USCG’s National Automatic Identification System program 

provides a wealth of information on vessel operations and has allowed us to make a number of 

conclusions contained herein.

TERM AND ACRONYM LIST

ACOE United States Army Corps of Engineers

AIS Automatic Identification System

BI Block Island

CCB Cape Cod Bay

COPPS Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving Letters

CSA Chamber of Shipping of America

DMA Dynamic Management Area

GPS Global Positioning System

GSC Great South Channel

IMO International Maritime Organization

ITU International Telecommunications Union

MMSI Maritime Mobile Service Identity

MOA Memorandum of Agreement

MOR Morehead City, South Carolina

MSR Mandatory Ship Reporting 

NAIS National Automatic Identification System

NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service

NC-GA Wilmington, North Carolina to Savannah, Georgia
vi

NEUS Northeast United States

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NOAA OLE NOAA Office of Law Enforcement

NOR Norfolk

NOVA Notices of Violation

NY-NJ Port of New York and New Jersey

ORP Off Race Point

PHI Ports of Philadelphia

SEUS Southeast United States

SMA Seasonal Management Area

SOG speed over ground

SOLAS [International Convention for the] Safety of Life at Sea

USCG United States Coast Guard

USN United States Navy

VHF very high frequency

WSC World Shipping Council
vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................. iii

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................1

I. Biological Studies: Assessment of the frequency of whale and vessel collisions 

on the U.S. eastern seaboard in the two years following implementation of the 

ship strike reduction rule.............................................................................................7

II. Human Behavior: Characterization of vessel operations in, and compliance 

with, vessel speed restriction Seasonal Management Areas in 2009, 2010, and 

2011...........................................................................................................................11

III. Mariner Awareness, Education and Outreach: Summary of actions to notify 

maritime communities about the vessel speed restriction rule .................................17

IV. Economic Impacts: Initial estimate of economic impact of the right whale ship 

strike reduction vessel speed restrictions..................................................................29

V. Dynamic Management Areas Compliance Analysis: Vessel operations in and 

around Dynamic Management Areas........................................................................33

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations.........................................................................37

LITERATURE CITED .........................................................................................................49

FIGURES..............................................................................................................................53

TABLES ...............................................................................................................................61

APPENDICES ......................................................................................................................64

1

INTRODUCTION

The greatest known anthropogenic threat to the recovery of the highly depleted North Atlantic 

right whale (Eubalaena glacialis) is at-sea collisions with vessels (for the purposes of the report, 

also called “ship strikes”) (Clapham et al., 1999; Kraus et al., 2005, NMFS, 2005; Knowlton and 

Brown, 2007). In a population believed to be comprised of 350-550 individuals, any mortality 

caused by human activity is cause for concern, especially if these threats are preventing the 

population from recovering from potential extinction. Over the 20-year period from 1986-2005, 

50 documented right whale deaths occurred, 19 of which were attributed to vessel strikes (the 

cause of death could not be determined in the majority of the other of the cases) (Knowlton and 

Kraus, 2001; Kraus et al., 2005; Glass et al., 2010). These are likely minimum counts because 

not all dead whales are detected particularly in offshore waters, and some detected carcasses are 

never recovered while those that are recovered may be in advanced stages of decomposition that 

preclude a definitive cause of death determination (Glass et al., 2010).

There is no evidence that the number of human-caused right whale deaths has diminished in 

recent years. An average of about two known North Atlantic right whale deaths and serious 

injuries from vessel strikes occurred annually in 2004 through 2008 (2008 being the most recent 

years for which peer-reviewed mortality counts are available) (Glass et al., 2010; Waring et al., 

2010). 

Right whales are more likely, per capita, to suffer a vessel strike than any other large whale 

species (Vanderlaan and Taggart, 2007). The factors contributing to their vulnerability to vessel 

strikes, although not fully clear, most likely relate to the species’ coastal distribution that exposes 

them to high density vessel traffic, their tendency to spend considerable amounts of time at the

surface, and that they tend to exhibit little or no vessel avoidance behavior (Terhune and 

Verboom, 1999; Nowacek et al., 2004). Avoiding an advancing ship, even if it was perceived as 

a threat (and there is no evidence for this), is not likely an inherent behavioral response for right 

whales (Ford and Reeves, 2008).

The endangered status of the right whale and the magnitude of vessel-strike threat to the species

in the Northwest Atlantic Ocean has prompted the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA) to develop and implement a number of management actions to reduce 

this threat (Bettridge and Silber, 2008; Silber et al., submitted). Among these actions were 

mandatory or recommended changes in vessel-routing practices (Silber et al., submitted), and

mandatory or recommended vessel speed restrictions (NMFS, 2004; NMFS, 2008). In particular, 

NOAA instituted regulations that restrict vessel speeds in certain areas and at certain times along 

the U.S eastern seaboard where right whales feed, migrate, socialize, and rear their young

(NMFS, 2008). 

The U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) Final Rule to reduce the severity and 

likelihood of vessel strikes to North Atlantic right whales went into effect on 9 December 2008

(73 FR 60173; 10 October 2008). The stated goal of the rule was “to reduce or eliminate the 

threat of ship strikes [of North Atlantic right whales] - the primary source of mortality in the 

endangered population.” It requires that vessels 65 feet and greater in length travel at speeds of 
2

10 knots or less near several key port entrances and in certain areas of right whale aggregation 

and along the U.S. eastern seaboard, known as “Seasonal Management Areas” (SMA) (Fig. 1). 

These SMAs are in effect during certain times of the year that correspond to right whale seasonal 

movement and aggregation patterns (Fig. 2). NMFS’s Office of Law Enforcement (OLE) is

responsible for enforcing the provisions of the vessel speed restriction rule. The U.S. Coast 

Guard (USCG) and others have taken a number of steps to assist in these efforts. 

As indicated in the preamble to the rule, a program of “Dynamic Management Areas” (DMA) 

was also established whereby temporary zones (15 days in duration, generally) are created 

around aggregations of right whales occurring outside of SMAs. Mariners are asked, but not 

required, to either avoid established DMAs altogether or travel through them at speeds of 10 

knots or less. This approach provides NMFS with complimentary measures aimed at protecting 

both predictable and recurring seasonal right whale presence as well as the option to react 

quickly to the occurrence of unexpected aggregations. The latter may be linked, for example, to 

shifting presence of right whale prey.

Vessel speed has been implicated as a principal causal factor in both the occurrence and severity 

of vessel-whale collisions, and therefore formed the basis for NMFS’s ship strike reduction 

measures. Studies indicate that vessel speed restrictions can reduce the probability of serious 

injury or death resulting from a vessel strike (Pace and Silber, 2005; Vanderlaan and Taggart, 

2007). Recent studies also indicate that the likelihood of occurrence of a strike is also lowered 

by reduced vessel speed (Gende et al., 2011); and that the size of the area around a ship’s hull in 

which a whale is drawn to the vessel (thereby increasing the exposure to a strike) and the 

magnitude of the impact involved in a whale-vessel collision is diminished by reduced vessel 

speed (Campbell-Malone, et al., 2008; Silber et al., 2010). Studies conducted since 

establishment of the vessel speed rule have contributed to a growing body of literature on this 

subject (Vanderlaan et al., 2009; Vanderlaan and Taggart, 2009; Gende et al., 2011; Lagueux et 

al., 2011; Wiley et al., 2011) indicating that lowered vessel speeds reduce the risk of fatal whale 

strikes. Of these, Lagueux et al. (2011) and Wiley et al. (2011) concluded that NMFS’s 2008 

10-knot vessel speed restrictions, in particular, reduced the risk of lethal strikes of right whale by 

38.5% and 56.7% in waters off the southeast U.S. coast and New England, respectively.

Therefore, the arguments used to establish vessel speed restrictions to reduce fatal strikes of right 

whales – and as backed by more recent studies – still support continued use of the restrictions.

The rule is set to expire five years from the date of its publication. NMFS indicated that it would

develop ways to monitor the effectiveness of the rule. Therefore, NMFS committed to (a) 

developing means to monitor the rule’s effectiveness, (b) assessing its overall effectiveness, and 

(c) preparing a report of the findings, which have been compiled as this report This is that

report.

Workshop to Assess the Effectiveness of the Final Rule 

Given the need to monitor the relative success of the rule, NMFS’s Office of Protected 

Resources convened a workshop in November 2008 to determine ways to assess the 

effectiveness of the vessel speed restrictions in achieving their goals (Silber and Bettridge, 2009; 
3

excerpts of this report (i.e., the Executive Summary, only, for the sake of brevity) are provided in

Appendix A). The goal of the workshop was to:

“develop a strategy, involving multiple components, to monitor and assess whether vessel 

speed regulations are achieving the rule’s intent of reducing the occurrence of ship 

strikes in right whales (i.e., whether the rule is “effective”).”

Among other things, the workshop concluded that:

“The final rule contains a provision that the regulations would expire five years after 

implementation. With regard to the expiration, the workshop concluded that at that time, 

NMFS would (a) re-issue the regulations, (b) modify the regulations, or (c) allow them to 

expire. Therefore, if the regulations are to be modified or re-issued by the December 

2013 expiration date through the rulemaking process, it will be necessary to have 

conclusions regarding effectiveness in hand for National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA) leadership by December 2011. As a result, data collection 

should start immediately and summaries and reports regarding the rule’s effectiveness 

should be available by December 2011.”

“Workshop participants agreed that the timeframe for implementing adequate and 

rigorous metrics is quite short. In fact, given the suite of variables contributing to ship 

strikes, detecting meaningful biological effects of the regulations would be difficult. 

Variables complicating a rigorous assessment of effectiveness include maritime 

commerce, oceanographic features contributing to shifts in whale distribution, and the 

rarity of a ship strike event. Much longer time series are typically needed to detect 

statistically meaningful effects. Nonetheless, within these rather arbitrary time 

constraints, workshop participants understood the charge to develop metrics, as 

possible.”

“Workshop participants agreed that NOAA will use four basic parameters to monitor 

effectiveness.”

These parameters are:

 Biological studies -- Assess the rate (using the time elapsed between) of known 

large whale ship strike deaths;

 Human behavior -- Quantify human response to provisions of the Rule using

Automatic Identification System (ideally, relying on a centralized network) to 

monitor vessel operations;

 Mariner awareness -- Enhance and quantify mariner awareness-raising efforts 

through education and outreach programs; and 

 Economics – To the extent possible, quantify economic impacts resulting from 

the conditions of the Rule.

Following the workshop, NMFS established programs to gather and analyze information in these 

areas. Results of these analyses are presented here. 
4

The goals of this report are to present the results of assessment studies conducted in the years 

since implementation of the Rule (December 2008 – 2011); to present summary conclusions 

from the studies; and to provide recommendations for possible future action with regard to ship 

strike reduction.

Content and Organization of the Report

Here, we present the results of five independent, but interrelated, studies. Findings are provided 

in four sections corresponding to the assessment tools identified by the 2008 workshop, and in 

one additional area: a characterization and assessment of industry response to the establishment 

of 66 DMAs. While the results of each of these studies have, or may also be, presented 

elsewhere by various authors as stand-alone papers, reports, or conference presentations, 

overview summaries of each are presented here. Each summary “chapter” is intended as a selfcontained analysis with various contributing authors that correspond to their particular expertise 

or their having conducted or contributed to a specific type of analysis.

We also include a “Conclusions and Recommendations” section that provides a discussion, in 

general terms, of ways to improve seasonal and dynamic vessel speed restriction management 

areas as conservation measures as well as recommendations about ways to improve aspects of 

the program such as monitoring and compliance, raising the awareness of maritime communities, 

and data collection. Taken collectively, this is an attempt to assess NMFS’s vessel speed 

restrictions, and the results may be applicable to other settings in which vessel strike reduction of 

whales is sought or related living marine resource conservation measures.

Specifically, this report contains the following summary papers: 

I. Biological Metric

“Assessment of the frequency of whale and vessel collisions on the U.S. 

eastern seaboard in the two years following implementation of the ship strike 

reduction rule”

II. Human Behavior: Automatic Identification System Monitoring of Vessel Compliance 

“Characterization of vessel operations in, and compliance with, vessel speed 

restriction Seasonal Management Areas in 2009 and 2010”

III. Mariner Awareness: Education and Outreach

“Summary of actions to notify maritime communities about the vessel speed 

restriction rule”

IV. Economic Impacts

“Initial estimate of economic impact of the right whale ship strike reduction 

vessel speed restrictions”

V. Dynamic Management Areas

 “Vessel operations in and around Dynamic Management Areas”
5

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

“Recommendations and considerations for reducing vessel strikes of right 

whales through a vessel speed restriction program.”

Literature Cited

Figures, Tables, and Appendices

7

I. Biological Studies: Assessment of the frequency of whale and vessel collisions on the 

U.S. eastern seaboard in the two years following implementation of the ship strike 

reduction rule

Gregory K. Silber and Richard M. Pace, III

The ultimate goal of the vessel speed restriction action is to enable population recovery by 

reducing deaths and serious injuries of whales resulting from vessel strikes. And, the goal of any 

assessment is to directly quantify a reduction – ideally, determined by direct counts – in actual or 

averted deaths from ship strikes. However, as noted above and elsewhere (e.g., Silber and 

Bettridge, 2009), quantification of trends in the occurrence of anthropogenic whale deaths using 

direct counts can be difficult if not impossible particularly when constrained by short sampling 

periods.

A number of alternative means conceivably may be used to assess a reduction in ship strike 

deaths. One is quantifying visual observations of imminent collisions that are somehow averted. 

However, recording such incidents will be few and would not be systematic because it involves

observers being located near the interaction at the time it occurs. A second means would be to 

directly quantify known whale ship strike death rates both before and after a measure is 

implemented. However, this, too, is difficult to measure directly because other unrelated and 

difficult to quantify processes may be at play (e.g., shifts in whale distribution, changes in 

numbers or locations of vessel transits) that may affect the number and rate of known ship strikerelated deaths (Silber et al., submitted). 

Although ship strikes are a significant fraction of the total number of annual large whale deaths 

and are a legitimate threat to the North Atlantic right whale population, they are actually 

relatively rare events and, therefore, sample sizes will always be small. This is compounded by 

an inability to reliably detect and ascertain the cause of all ship strike-related deaths. Therefore, 

long time series’ are needed to identify any trends in the occurrence of ship strike deaths. And, 

even if changes in the rate of ship strike deaths are detected, it may be difficult to attribute that 

outcome to a specific ship strike reduction action. Several studies have assessed the 

effectiveness of various ship strike reduction measures by evaluating likely correlates to risk, risk 

of lethality, and in determining probabilities associated with collisions and steps taken to reduce 

collisions (Vanderlaan and Taggart, 2007; Vanderlaan et al., 2009; Wiley et al., 2011), and 

whereas the studies are highly useful particularly in the absence of direct counts, they remain

indirect assessments.

The limitations identified above notwithstanding, NOAA recognized the need to assess the 

biological affect of the vessel speed restrictions (NMFS, 2008; Silber and Bettridge, 2009). The 

2008 workshop participants concluded that assessing the effectiveness of the rule was not 

possible in a relatively short period if it were based solely on detecting changes in the number of 

annual right whale deaths, so other means were sought. An alternative metric was developed and 

presented to the 2008 workshop, namely:
8

(a) Comparing periods both before and after the rule’s implementation by using a 100% 

sample of known ship strike deaths of all baleen whale species (i.e., not only right whales 

to which the rule was targeted) occurring along the U.S. east coast (i.e., not only those 

geographic areas within the rule’s SMAs); and 

(b) Conducting a statistical analysis of time elapsed between subsequent ship strike 

mortality events. 

Known ship strike deaths of all baleen whale species occurring in all areas (not only within 

SMAs) were to be examined to increase the overall sample size, accompanied by the reasoning 

that some species might, to some degree, also benefit from U.S. east coast ship strike reduction 

measures. 

The workshop participants agreed that the proposed metric should be used, noting that this 

approach would to some extent avoid the pitfalls identified above (e.g., brief sampling period, 

relatively infrequent occurrence of actual ship strike events). However, this metric has

limitations of its own. As noted in a report of the results (Pace, 2011; Appendix B), a statistical 

assessment of this approach was undertaken and the conclusion was that the two-year post-rule 

sampling period was simply too brief to detect a significant change in large whale ship strike 

deaths. The limited sampling period resulted primarily from the five-year “sunset” of the rule, 

and the need to generate this report.

Nonetheless, given that the rule went into effect in December 2008, the analysis described here 

included only U.S. east coast large whale ship strike deaths and serious injuries from 1 January 

2000 through 31 December 2010 (n = 58). The results of the analysis are provided in Appendix 

B; we provide a summary here.

Some central conclusions from a “Frequency of whale and vessel collisions on the US eastern 

seaboard two years post ship strike rule” (Pace, 2011) are:

 With regard to assessing overall effectiveness of the rule, the results are inconclusive. 

The time series is too brief;

 A standard classical statistical assessment of the time needed to detect a change in the 

rate of ships strikes indicates that two years (the selected sampling period given the 

timing of the expiration of the Rule) was an insufficient period to detect a change. For 

example,

o There is a 2.5% probability of detecting a 50% change in ship strike rates after 

two years (6.1% chance of detecting a 66% change);

o After 5 years, there is an 80% probability of detecting a 50% change (93% of 

detecting a 50% reduction after 7 years);

 These critical limitations notwithstanding, statistical testing was done using three 

separate tests. The results were:

o Largely inconclusive;

o A simple plot of the data indicates that 2005 was a very bad year for ship strikes, 

but statistical analysis do not support this; and
9

o In considering three separate analytical approaches, there is “a meager amount of 

evidence for an increase in the time between events post rule implementation.”

As for right whale deaths since the rule went into force, no right whale deaths or serious injuries 

are known to have occurred in times and locations in which SMAs were in effect or by vessels 

subject to the rule. Some, and as yet not peer-reviewed, observations indicate that one suspected 

ship strike-related right whale death occurred in the northern Gulf of Maine when SMAs were 

not in effect; another was struck and likely seriously injured by a sovereign vessel which was not 

subject to the rule.

11

II. Human Behavior: Characterization of vessel operations in, and compliance with, 

vessel speed restriction Seasonal Management Areas in 2009, 2010, and 2011

Shannon Bettridge and Gregory K. Silber

Introduction

This section provides a description of vessel operation patterns in Seasonal Management Areas 

(SMA). We collected and analyzed data on vessel types, speeds, number of trips and other 

features obtained from the USCG’s National Automatic Identification System (AIS) network – a 

system of shore-based receivers and relayers that provide information on vessel operations in 

nearly all U.S. coastal waters. 

This serves as a partial update and expansion of a 2010 report on the same subject (Silber and 

Bettridge, (2010); accessible at: http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/fr/fr73-60173.pdf), in this 

case evaluating vessel operations in 2009, 2010, and 2011. A number of the findings (e.g., 

number of vessel transits, proportions of trips by vessel type and flag state) and conclusions 

presented here are similar to the ones in the Silber and Bettridge (2010) report, notably, that 

adherence to the vessel speed restriction by maritime communities was not as strong as what 

might be expected in 2009 and 2010, although compliance appears to have markedly improved 

in 2011. The reasons for the early low compliance levels are not readily apparent and we only 

briefly address them here, leaving treatment of this to a later time and/or to be presented in 

subsequent publications. Instead, our goal here is to characterize vessel operations in SMAs. 

Except where otherwise indicated, all the AIS data acquisition, storing, parsing, and analyzing 

used in this study are the same as previously described in the 2010 report (Silber and Bettridge, 

2010). The reader is referred to that report for descriptions of data acquisition and analytical 

methods used.

Automatic Identification System (AIS): Its Purpose and Our Data Analysis

Originally conceived as a safety of navigation technology, the AIS sends Global Positioning 

System (GPS)-linked signals that provide for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore information transfer. 

A ship’s name, call sign, position, dimensions, speed, heading and other information are 

transmitted multiple times each minute via very high frequency (VHF) radio signals. The AIS 

network that we utilized works in an autonomous and continuous mode and is capable of 

handling more than 4,500 reports per minute and updating as often as every two seconds. The 

rate at which it provides this information (e.g., multiple location fixes and speed indications each 

minute) makes the AIS networks and its components a highly precise and cost effective means to

track vessel speeds and other vessel operations and to remotely sense activities of various 

maritime communities.

A suite of information, both dynamic (unique to a particular voyage) and static (constant for a 

given vessel), is embedded in the AIS signal. Dynamic information includes the vessel’s 

position, speed over ground, heading, and position accuracy, which are determined by 

continuous GPS-linked updates. Static information includes the vessel’s name, call sign, type, 

cargo, and Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) number (a unique number assigned to each 
12

vessel for safety at sea purposes). This information is entered by the operator upon initializing 

the system. 

NMFS Headquarters’ Office of Protected Resources has been acquiring AIS data feeds from the 

USCG National AIS. Data are downloaded and processed, under a Memorandum of Agreement 

(MOA), by the Department of Transportation’s Volpe National Transportation Systems Center 

(Volpe Center) and provided to NMFS as raw data and in summaries.

While providing a wealth of information about vessel operations, the system is not without 

limitations. For example, the range is limited. AIS vessel transponders typically operate with a 

range of coverage of about 20-40 nautical miles, but perhaps more in certain circumstances (e.g., 

up to hundreds of miles in ideal conditions), or essentially "line of sight". Reception distances 

are influenced by the height of the receiving antenna, and the signal may be momentarily 

compromised, or enhanced, by local meteorological conditions (e.g., electrical storms), 

atmospheric bounce, or other possible interferences (e.g., other radio signals). In addition, not all 

transmitted messages are flawless, mostly due to operator error in entering required information 

into the transponder. We have developed various ways of detecting and eliminating faulty 

transmissions (Silber and Bettridge, 2010) and a substantial number have been removed from the 

data set.

Although our analytical approaches are defined in the 2010 report, we provide some basic 

information here to help orient the reader for the purpose of interpreting our results. Every 

mention of vessel speed refers to the vessel’s “speed over ground” (SOG) as explicitly stated in 

the rule itself (as opposed to speed through the water) and as provided by the AIS signal itself. 

Information on “country of origin” and “vessel type” is encoded in the AIS message as 

established by International Maritime Organization (IMO) protocol and as entered by the 

operator. As to vessel type, the operator is limited to a finite number of designations, such as 

cargo, tanker, passenger, tow, pilot, tug, and sovereign. We also developed an “other” category 

that might include, for example, fishing vessels, sailing or pleasure craft, dredging, and diving 

vessels. Our reporting of vessel type information below correspond to these categories provided 

by the vessel operator (with the exception of “tow” and “big tow” which we combined into the 

single category “tow”). Sovereign vessels (those owned or operated by, or under contract with 

Federal entities) are not included in our analysis because these vessels are excluded from the 

provisions of the vessel speed rule. This vessel category may be the subject of subsequent 

analysis.

This monitoring program involves a substantial data set. As noted, vessels’ AIS transponders 

send a signal multiple times each minute; tens of vessels may be moving through active SMAs at 

any given time, representing several thousands of coastal transits per month. Given that AIS 

equipment is required by the IMO’s International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

(SOLAS) for most vessels and by the USCG for vessels in U.S. waters, we assume we are 

acquiring a full record of all vessels traveling in active SMAs, but we have no way to determine 

if all vessels with AIS carriage requirements adhered to those requirements. Given, however, 

AIS’s primary function is that of navigational safety, it is reasonable to assume that vessel 

operators would use the system; the USCG may also assess penalties if the system is not used. 
13

We therefore regard these as minimum, but reliable, counts of the number of vessel transits. 

And, because this data set is quite large we believe it enables us to accurately portray vessel 

operations in SMAs.

Thus, we provide a characterization of vessel operations in SMAs by summarizing information 

on vessel country of origin, speeds, by type, and overall compliance rates with the speed 

restrictions. This summary is for the period of January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2011.

By any measure (the number of records removed from analysis notwithstanding), we present 

information on a formidable fleet that traverses areas vital to the longevity of the right whale 

population. It appears that large vessels are nearly ubiquitous throughout the range of North 

Atlantic right whales, and a given individual whale may encounter tens of vessels each day, 

hundreds each year.

Results and Summaries

A total of 135,057 vessel transits were recorded and analyzed in active SMAs in 2009, 2010, and 

2011, comprising of tens of millions of individual location and speed data points. Of these, 

46,143 transits were removed from further analysis because they contained (primarily operator) 

errors. Thus, a total of 88,914 vessel trips were further analyzed and discussed here (Table 1).

Country of Origin

Considering all transits in all active SMAs, the ratio of foreign flagged to domestic vessels was 

1.7:1. This is generally consistent across all months except July when only the Great South 

Channel (GSC) SMA (see Terms and Acronyms List, and Table 1 for lists of acronyms for each 

of the SMAs) was active, where the ratio was 5:1. The majority of cargo and tanker vessels were 

foreign-flagged, while not surprisingly all tow and nearly all tug and pilot vessels were U.S. 

owned and operated. The highest proportion of foreign versus domestic vessels occurred in the 

GSC SMA, followed by the ORP SMA perhaps reflecting trans-Atlantic passages destined for 

Boston or New York; and the lowest number of foreign flag relative to domestic vessels occurred 

in the CCB and MOR SMAs (Fig. 3).

Vessel Type

Cargo vessels constituted the overwhelming majority of ship passages in all SMAs, comprising 

over 51% of all vessel transits, (and not including the “other” category, for the moment, were) 

followed by tanker vessels (14%), and tug and tow type vessels (10% each) (Table 2; Fig. 4). 

Cargo vessels were strongly represented in the NY-NJ, NOR NC-GA and SEUS SMAs, with the 

NC-GA complex having the highest number of cargo transits of all SMAs (Fig. 5).

The number of tanker vessel transits was higher, proportionally, in northern SMAs than in more 

southern SMAs, perhaps reflecting the propensity of refineries in the northeast region. The NCGA complex encompasses the primary ports supporting movement of goods to the U.S. south, 

which accounts in part for the volume represented here over single-port entrance SMAs.
14

Composition of Vessel Traffic in SMAs

Overall, the greatest vessel traffic volumes were in the NY-NJ, NC-GA and NOR SMAs (Table 

1). The NY-NJ SMA had the greatest number of transits (n = 22,989) followed by the NC-GA 

complex and the NOR SMA (n = 19,649 and n = 14,838 transits, respectively). The number of 

transits through the NY-NJ port complex dwarfs the others, despite the fact that the NC-GA 

SMA encompasses a number of large ports, including Savannah and Charleston; and considering 

the NOR SMA includes vessels servicing Baltimore, Hampton Roads, and other destinations 

within the Chesapeake Bay.

Tow-type vessels were common in the CCB SMA, reflecting the tug-and-barge industry utilizing 

the Cape Cod Canal as well as those vessels providing heating oil and other materials to Cape 

Cod communities and elsewhere in the northeast. These are typically slow moving vessels, a 

fact that is partly reflected in slower speeds in this area relative to other SMAs where other 

vessel types and higher speeds were observed.

Relative to the other SMAs, there were proportionally low numbers of vessels transiting through 

the ORP, GSC, and MOR SMAs. The ORP SMA is active for a relatively short period, which 

likely accounts for this pattern; but, overall, MOR appears to be one of the smaller volume ports

inside SMAs. The relatively low numbers reflected in the GSC SMA are more difficult to 

interpret given it is the largest (in area) of all the SMAs and is used by international vessels 

making port calls in Boston, New York, and elsewhere. Volume in this area may indicate that 

(a) vessels are utilizing the Traffic Separation Scheme servicing Boston, which lies outside the 

GSC SMA and/or they are routing around the Area To Be Avoided established in this area; (b) 

the relatively higher vessel volumes in SMAs other than the GSC is indicative of the level of 

many coast-wide (e.g., port-to-port) transits along the eastern seaboard, as opposed to transAtlantic passages; or (c) not all transmissions from vessels in the area are being captured given 

the limitations of the transmission ranges of the AIS signal (GSC is the farthest SMA from 

shore). Regardless, this is a key feeding area for right whales, which may involve relatively long 

residency times for the whales, and it is fortuitous that the traffic volume may be low in this area.

Vessel Speeds

There are a number of ways to characterize vessel speeds within SMAs. We examined the 

portion of each transit for which speeds were both below and above 10.0 knots and 12.0 knots as 

thresholds for characterizing speeds used on a particular trip. This approach provides a means 

for examining the relative “egregiousness” of violations of the speed restrictions (i.e., was the 

violator exceeding the speed limit for the majority of the trip or only a portion?). We assessed 

the “percent of the transit (distance) >10.0 knots” and “percent of the transit (distance) >12.0

knots” of each transit. We then determined, for each transit, whether most of the trip (>50%) 

was below or above these two speed thresholds. Thus, as general measures of “compliance”, we 

provide the distribution of vessels traveling (a) at or less than 10.0 knots/12.0 knots for the entire 

transit, (b) above 10.0 knots/12.0 knots for up to half of the transit, and (c) above 10.0 knots/12.0

knots more than half of the transit distance (Fig. 6). We then used this metric as a means to 

compare mariner compliance between years. 
15

We also quantified the “maximum speed over ground” achieved during each vessel transit 

through active SMAs. Although other types of metrics might more accurately capture the nature 

of the speeds used in these trips, this is a readily accessible metric and it does represent one 

measure of each transit. And, in the strictest interpretation of the rule, any speed in excess of 

10.9 knots within an active SMA constitutes a violation of the speed limit. We recognize that 

maximum speed may represent only a fraction of the entire transit, thus this measure may 

overestimate the overall speed of a given transit and upwardly bias summaries of speeds in all 

transits. However, to the extent that enforcement actions, or monitoring efforts for that matter, 

rely on any excessive speed above, say, 12 or 13 knots, as an indicator of “non-compliance”, 

maximum speed still serves as a measure of relative adherence to the restrictions.

In 2009, 32% (n = 9,198) of recorded transits exhibited maximum speeds at or below 10.9 knots 

for the entire transit; 58% (n = 16,363) were at or below 12.9 knots for the entirety of the transit. 

This increased slightly in 2010, when 36% (n = 10,584) transits had maximum speeds at or 

below 10.9 knots for the entire transit; 62% (n = 18,281) were at or under 12.9 knots for the 

duration of the transit. In 2011, 53% (n = 16,417) of recorded transits exhibited maximum 

speeds at or below 10.9 knots for the entire transit; 74% (n = 23,098) were at or below 12.9 knots 

for the entirety of the transit (Fig. 7). The most common maximum speed category represented 

was 10.0 (i.e., 10.0 - 10.9) knots; and the majority of all transits had maximum speeds between 

10.0 and 14.0 (i.e., 10.0 - 14.9) knots (Fig. 7). 

Cargo and pilot vessels exhibited the highest aggregate maximum speeds (with the most 

traveling in the 15-16 knot range) (Fig. 8). The majority of vessels in the “tug, tow, dredge”, and 

“other” categories exhibited peak aggregate speeds around 10 knots. With regard to those in the 

tug, tow, and dredge categories, such vessels travel around 10-12 knots routinely and regardless 

of vessel speed restrictions. Generally, domestic vessels had lower aggregate maximum vessel 

speeds than did foreign-flagged vessels; the latter tended to travel at maximum speeds of 12 

knots or greater (Fig. 9).

Another way to characterize vessel transits is by calculating mean speeds, although we 

acknowledge that there are inherent potential biases involved with this approach. For example, 

vessels may slow down to board a pilot or anchor within an SMA while waiting to enter port. 

Typically, vessels transmit AIS data throughout the entire voyage; therefore, in such instances 

the number of records with lower speeds would dominate the particular transit and average 

vessel speeds would be biased downward. A vessel may not have traveled at the mean speed for 

much of the transit, and even brief periods of elevated speeds would bias average speeds upward. 

Thus, average speeds may not always accurately characterize actual speeds for the entire trip. 

These considerations notwithstanding, we decided to quantify aggregate mean speeds to assess

general trends. Overall, passenger vessels had the highest mean speeds (11 knots) when 

travelling through SMAs, followed by cargo vessels (10.9 knots) and tankers (10.8 knots). Tow 

vessels had the slowest mean speeds (9.1 knots) (Fig. 10). The highest aggregated mean vessel 

speeds were recorded in the PHI and GSC SMAs, with an average above 11 knots per transit. 

The slowest aggregate mean speeds were recorded in the CCB SMA, with an average speed of 
16

9.9 knots in 2009 and 9.4 knots in 2010 – an area that is dominated by tug and tow vessels, 

which travel at lower speeds than other vessel types.

Trends in Vessel Speeds

We were interested in determining if aggregated vessel speeds diminished with time as 

awareness of the restrictions (including late 2010 enforcement actions -- see section III, below)

increased. When considering the portion of transits at or below 10.0 knots, we found that 21% 

of transits in 2009 were completely at or below 10.0 knots for the entire SMA transit. This rate

increased slightly to 22% in 2010 and to 33% in 2011. In 2009, 41% of transits were above 10.0 

knots for over half of the trip, declining to 37% in 2010 and to 22% in 2011. Thus, for this 

metric we observed an increase in compliance and perhaps an overall lowering of speeds by the 

entire fleet between the three years. 

When considering the maximum vessel speed attained during one transit, 68% of the trips in 2009 

exceeded 10.9 knots at some point. This figure decreased slightly to 64% in 2010 and decreased 

further to 47% in 2011. In general, we see an increase from 2009 to 2011 in the number of trips 

in which the maximum speed for each trip was below 13 knots, and a decrease in the number of 

trips in which the maximum speed for all or a portion of the trip was at 14 knots or greater. 

Compliance with Vessel Speed Restrictions

It is not clear why initial “compliance” with these regulations was relatively low. Contributing 

factors may be a lack of public recognition of the rule, disregard for it, or inadequate early 

enforcement. On the other hand, marked improvement in compliance in 2011 is likely 

attributable, at least in part, to 2010 enforcement actions. Regardless, there are almost certainly 

learning and acquisition phases to a requirement that substantially alters standard practices. With 

regard to foreign-flagged vessels and their operators infrequent port calls, language barriers, or 

simple lack of familiarity with domestic requirements may hamper acquisition and understanding 

of the significance and requirements of the rule.

NMFS developed and implemented an extensive mariner awareness-raising campaign that 

should have been adequate to notify every mariner transiting U.S. Atlantic coast waters about the 

requirements of this rule (see Chapter III for a description). Also, NMFS’ Office of Law 

Enforcement issued 149 outreach letters notifying vessel owners and operators of specific 

violations detected and informing them of the regulations and NOAA’s Office of General 

Counsel issued civil penalties to another 18 vessel owners and operators (7 were issued in late2010, the balance coming in late 2011). In collaboration with two large shipping industry 

associations, NMFS developed a program in which over 400 individual vessels were provided 

with monthly summaries of specific information (e.g., times, dates, locations, speeds) about their 

recent vessel operations in SMAs. This program began in 2010 and is ongoing. NOAA’s

Stellwagen National Marine Sanctuary developed a system of notifying mariners about vessel 

speeds in the sanctuary. Collectively, these actions almost certainly have had a substantial effect 

on vessel activities and compliance with restrictions in SMAs. We expect to examine these 

efforts more closely in subsequent analyses and will present the results elsewhere.
17

III. Mariner Awareness, Education and Outreach: Summary of actions to notify 

maritime communities about the vessel speed restriction rule

Shannon Bettridge, Cheryl Bonnes, Barb Zoodsma, and Gregory K. Silber

To effectively reduce the likelihood and lethality of vessel collisions, compliance with the ship 

speed regulations must be high. In turn, compliance with the regulations cannot be anticipated 

without first ensuring mariner awareness of the requirements of the regulations. In other words, 

before expecting high compliance rates with the vessel speed rule, information must be clearly 

delivered and correctly understood by affected maritime communities. To achieve this, NMFS 

and its partners launched an extensive outreach campaign in advance of the ship speed rule going 

into effect and while the regulations were in effect. We developed a program geared specifically 

to distributing information about the provisions of the regulation through as many outlets and 

media as possible. The goal was to provide information about the requirements of the rule to as 

many of the various affected elements of the maritime industry as possible, even if redundant.

While these actions to communicate the provisions of the rule to mariners were undertaken prior 

to establishing the rule and during the period it was in effect, we do not describe outreach efforts 

that began in 2006 including public scoping meetings, solicitation of public comment, Federal 

Register notices, coast-wide presentations in key ports, and other actions associated with 

NMFS’s Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Proposed Rulemaking, the draft and final 

Environmental Impact Statements, and related actions. Descriptions of these can be found in the 

Final Environmental Impact Statement to Implement the Vessel Operational Measures to Reduce 

Ship Strikes to the North Atlantic Right Whale (Anonymous, 2008; and at 

http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/shipstrike/archive.htm).

Characterization of outreach efforts

Although not a direct assessment of effectiveness, the 2008 workshop participants agreed it was 

essential to not only develop and implement an extensive program to inform all potentially 

affected entities about the requirements, but also to quantify NMFS’s efforts to do so. The 

workshop report recommended that NMFS monitor outreach efforts by quantifying, for example, 

the amount of material distributed and numbers of broadcasts made, and attempt to estimate the 

extent of the audience reached. 

Heeding the workshop recommendations, NMFS tracked awareness-raising efforts since October 

2008 directed at domestic and foreign flagged vessels, recreational boaters, fishermen, Federal 

agencies, whale watch vessels, passenger ferries, and other affected entities since October 2008. 

These actions are described below.

Navigational Aids

Beginning in the early 2000s, NMFS routinely published information in relevant U.S. Coast 

Pilot books on the threat of vessel strikes to sea turtles and large whales (right whales in 

particular), and other matters. The information is updated annually and information on the vessel 

speed restrictions was added in 2008/2009 and runs currently. The U.S. Coast Pilot is a series of 
18

nautical books that cover a range of information important to navigators of coastal and intracoastal waters and the Great Lakes. Issued in nine volumes, they contain supplemental 

information that is difficult to portray on a nautical chart, including Federal regulations 

applicable to navigation. Routinely updated by NOAA’s Office of Coast Survey readily 

available, each volume contains sections on local operational considerations and navigation 

regulations, followed by chapters that contain detailed discussions of coastal navigation. 

It is important to note that knowledge of requirements, precautions, and safety at sea provisions 

contained in U.S. Coast Pilots is a requirement for all vessels sailing in U.S. waters. Because 

carrying Coast Pilots is mandated and enforced by the USCG and NMFS Office of Law 

Enforcement (OLE), reason might suggest that these outlets, alone (perhaps as coupled with the 

rulemaking itself, accompanying changes in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, and

notification by shipping company parent organizations), would be sufficient to ensure mariner 

adherence to the requirements of U.S. law. Nonetheless, in the following sections, we identify 

additional steps taken to inform mariners and the general public about U.S. regulations.

As to those vessels sailing internationally, details of the ship speed rule are also articulated in 

Sailing Directions, a 42-volume American navigation publication prepared by the National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and a companion document, Notice to Mariners. These 

publications, used by mariners to plan international voyages, describe general features of ocean 

basins and country-specific information (such as military operational areas, pilotage 

requirements, regulations, search and rescue information, ship reporting systems) as well as 

features of coastlines, ports, and harbors. NMFS provides annual updates to these publications. 

Information appearing in Notice to Mariners and Sailing Directions is also generally 

incorporated into another international sailing guide, the United Kingdom’s Admiralty 

Publications. While these three publications are not required for passage in U.S. waters, they are 

widely distributed and highly regarded as an essential source of information on safety of 

navigation at sea.

SMA boundaries are not depicted on NOAA-produced paper or electronic navigational charts. 

Having this information shown directly on nautical charts would almost certainly further mariner 

knowledge of, and improve compliance with, the provisions of these regulations. This is a key 

shortcoming toward improving compliance. Although special notes to mariners about the vessel 

speed restrictions appear on the charts and are provided on the NOAA electronic navigational 

charts, these certainly are no substitute for the potency of chart-depicted speed requirements for 

inbound vessels in U.S. waters particularly those owned and operated by foreign entities.

Notices to Mariners

Information about vessel speed restrictions and locations of right whales is also provided to 

mariners through various official broadcast media, including Broadcast and Local Notices to 

Mariners, satellite-linked marine safety broadcasts, and NOAA Weather Radio. The NGA, in 

collaboration with NOAA and the USCG, publishes weekly Notices to Mariners, which provide 

corrections to navigational publications and nautical charts. The U.S. Notice to Mariners 

officially amends NGA and NOAA nautical charts with new information collected from many 

sources, among them the Local Notice to Mariners published by the various U.S. Coast Guard 
19

districts. The need to adhere to ship speed regulations are announced regularly via Local and 

Broadcast Notices to Mariners, particularly as they come into force seasonally. Periodic 

announcements about the rule are also made on NOAA Weather Radio broadcasts on specifically 

designated maritime radio frequencies. Broadcasts containing information about the speed rule 

are issued hourly (or as time permits) from Brunswick, GA, to Melbourne, FL, from 15 

November to 15 April, annually; and from Mamie, NC to Hardeeville, SC from 1 November to 

30 April, annually. 

Here again, all mariners are responsible for adhering to any information regarding navigational 

safety contained in the above-listed notices. Given that they are tailored regionally, the 

broadcasts would be received when mariners are in, near, or approaching SMAs. Thus, because 

this information is delivered by regionally-specific broadcasts that are routinely monitored by 

nearly all mariners and contain information that is required as a matter of port entry for safe 

navigation in particular waters, one might argue that these requirements, alone, would suffice in 

ensuring all mariners entering these areas are cognizant of what is required. (A significant gap is 

the omission of SMAs on NOAA’s nautical charts.) In addition, most mariners routinely 

monitor NOAA Weather Radio to assess local conditions while at sea and would, therefore, be 

expected to receive information about the requirements from that source.

Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems

Information is also provided to mariners on the ship speed rule via the Mandatory Ship 

Reporting systems (MSR). The MSR systems, jointly funded and operated by NMFS and the 

USCG, are aimed at increasing mariners’ awareness of the problem of ship strikes of right 

whales. Beginning July 1999, all commercial ships 300 gross tons and greater are required to 

report to a shore-based station when they enter two areas off the east coast of the United States: 

one in waters off Massachusetts and one off Georgia and Florida (Silber et al., submitted). The 

reporting system off Massachusetts operates year round, while the one off Georgia and Florida 

operates annually from 15 November to 15 April, which corresponds with periods of right whale 

occurrence in the region. Ship operators are required to report their vessel name, call sign, 

course, speed, location, destination, and route. 

message that provides specific (< 24 hours old) right whale sighting locations and guidance on 

sources for the latest information about and avoidance procedures that may prevent a collision. 

Thus, mariners receive updated information immediately and in real-time at the same time they 

enter areas of right whale aggregations. A total of 2,000-3,000 of these return messages are sent 

to vessels annually. 

When SMAs are in effect the MSR systems advise mariners to refer to navigational publications 

such as the U.S. Coast Pilot, Sailing Directions, and nautical charts for information on relevant 

regulations, and the boundaries of right whale critical habitats and SMAs. Because these 

systems are mandatory and the return message goes immediately and directly to mariners 

entering right whale aggregation areas, mariners are reminded in real-time of active SMAs. For 

more information on the MSR systems, see: http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/shipstrike/msr. 

Unlike the information contained in the U.S. Coast Pilot and Local and Broadcast Notice to 

Mariners, which includes precautions mariners are required to heed, information contained in the 
20

MSR outgoing message is advisory in nature (e.g., based on this information, mariners may or 

may not choose to alter their actions based on locations of recent right whale sightings). 

However, reporting into the system is required. Because reporting is mandatory, the USCG has 

cited, and will cite, mariners who fail to report into the systems. Therefore, each ship that 

reports (hundreds per year) receives the information directed to that specific vessel and in realtime in the same locations and times that some SMAs are in effect. For these reasons, one might 

reasonably expect mariners in these waters to be knowledgeable of the vessel speed restriction 

requirements, and might also expect these messaging systems to influence their actions in 

subsequent voyages into U.S. ports.

National Buoy Data Center Weather Buoy Web Sites

Notices regarding SMAs are also posted via National Buoy Data Center web sites for 90-100 

weather buoys stationed in waters off all eastern seaboard states and extending into some 

Canadian waters. Messages available to mariners seeking regionally-specific weather data are 

tailored regionally and may read something like “Caution: Right whales may be active in 

northeast waters year-round. Mandatory speed restrictions of 10 knots apply to vessels 65 feet or 

greater in specific areas and times along the US east coast. Voluntary speed restrictions may be 

in effect in other areas and times. For current information on speed-restricted areas, go to: 

http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/shipstrike”.

Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving (COPPS) Letters

NOAA recognized that mariners may not have been fully aware of the speed restrictions 

immediately after the rule took effect. Therefore, for approximately one year after enactment of 

the restrictions, NOAA’s Office of Law Enforcement (OLE) sent outreach letters, rather than 

citations, to vessels observed traveling in excess of the specified speeds. These letters (Appendix 

C) were part of OLE’s Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving (COPPS) program. 

The letters were informative rather than punitive but contained specific information on where 

and when violations occurred. Between September 2009 and March 2011, OLE issued 149 

COPPS letters (to over 57 companies or vessel owners). 

Separate analysis is underway to determine if the COPPS letter program and other actions, 

including some of those identified here, have had a specific and discernable effect on mariner 

compliance with the speed rule.

Notices of Violation (NOVA)

Following the first year of the rule’s implementation, NOAA’s Office of General Counsel began 

issuing Notices of Violation and Assessment of civil penalties (NOVAs), to some of the more 

egregious (by distance, speed, or frequency) violators. Between November 2010 and November 

2011, the owners and operators of 18 vessels were issued NOVAs with penalties ranging from 

$11,500 to $92,000 depending on the number of violations charged. NOAA’s Office of General 

Counsel anticipates issuing additional NOVAs as soon as investigations are completed and case 

packages are forwarded from NMFS’ OLE.
21

At-Sea Hailings

Through a program that ran from 2009-2011, USCG cutters directly hailed 46 vessels in SMAs 

that were exceeding the speed restrictions. Using VHF radio, cutter crews notified vessel 

operators of speed restrictions and requested that the vessel slow to appropriate speeds.

Electronic Mail Notifications and Monthly Summaries to Individual Vessels

Each time the various SMAs went into effect, NMFS and its partners sent numerous electronic 

mail reminders to mariners and a host of related or interested parties. Regular e-mail 

announcements were sent to distribution lists of 605 and 546 recipients maintained by NMFS 

Northeast and Southeast Regional Offices, respectively. These distribution lists include shipping 

agents, port authorities, scientists, non-governmental organizations, owners and operators of 

cruise lines, passenger vessel operators, pilots, among others. In addition, the State of 

Massachusetts, the Chamber of Shipping of America (CSA), the World Shipping Council

(WSC), the Maritime Administration (the Administration has jurisdiction over hundreds of 

commercial vessels), and Lloyd’s Registry sent electronic reminders to their members and 

distribution lists. NMFS also maintains a “rwsightings” e-mail address and when messages are 

sent to it, an automatic return e-mail is sent providing information on currently active SMA and 

DMAs. Collectively, these messages were routinely distributed to several thousand recipients.

In a separate program initiated by the shipping industry, NMFS worked collaboratively with the 

World Shipping Council and the Chamber of Shipping of America to directly provide feedback 

to shipping companies on the behavior of their individual ships in SMAs. This program, jointly 

developed by NMFS and these industry associations, enlisted specific companies who were 

given the option, and then voluntarily agreed, to participate in the program. In December 2010, 

NMFS began sending, once each month, reports to interested shipping companies (13 WSC and 

4 CSA companies, representing a total of ca. 400 vessels that regularly use U.S. east coast 

SMAs) providing the dates, locations, and speeds of their vessels as they traveled within SMAs. 

Vessel operations data were acquired through AIS and provided to companies in the form of an 

Excel spreadsheet, with one worksheet per vessel. Data fields, each line representing one trip 

through a SMA, included:

 Vessel name

 SMA name

 Speed over ground (in knots) upon entry

 SMA Entry time

 Maximum speed over ground (in knots) while in SMA

 Date and time when maximum speed over ground was reached

 Speed over ground (in knots) upon exit

 SMA Exit time

 Distance traveled within SMA (in nautical miles)

 Percent of SMA distance traveled at >10 knots

 Percent of SMA distance traveled at >12 knots

Between December 2010 and July 2011, 141 summary reports were sent by electronic mail to 

shipping companies (see Appendix D for a sample email). Although analysis of this program 
22

and other specific steps to improve compliance is underway and will be presented elsewhere, we 

believe that providing rapid turnaround information on individual transits to specific vessel 

operators will be an important means to improve compliance and might serve as a model in other 

settings. Overall, NMFS has received positive response from the industry on this program, and 

NMFS intends to continue the program for the foreseeable future, as resources allow.

Transit Speed Summaries provided by the Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary

Starting in 2009, the Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary and NMFS worked with the 

US Coast Guard, NOAA’s OLE, International Fund for Animal Welfare, and the maritime 

industry to provide information directly to shipping company owners about the speeds of their 

vessels transiting the Off Race Point and Cape Cod Bay SMAs, each of which overlap a portion 

on the sanctuary. In addition to highlighting the provision of the vessel speed restriction rule,

each letter contained a map showing:

 Vessel Name

 Date(s) and track of that vessel’s SMA transit(s), 

 speed histogram(s) for each of the vessel’s transits showing distance traveled in the SMA 

at speeds of <10 knots, 10.1-11 knots and >11 knots,

 percent of distance traveled in an SMA during which the vessel transit was out of 

compliance with the rule, and 

 an analysis of the vessel’s least compliant transit (if one existed) calculating how much 

time it would have taken for the vessel to transit the SMA at compliant speed (10 knots). 

Data were compiled using AIS data collected by receivers located around the sanctuary. Letters 

(192 in 2009 and 227 in 2010) were sent to company addresses provided by the USCG and the 

Massachusetts Port Authority.

Compliance Guides

In advance of the speed rule going into effect, NMFS developed and widely distributed a 

“Compliance Guide for Mariners” (Appendix E and 

http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/shipstrike/compliance_guide.pdf). This two-sided brochure 

includes maps, coordinates, and dates for the SMAs prescribed in the rule. It also provides 

relevant text from the rule, as well as website addresses for more information. The Compliance 

Guide is laminated to provide waterproof protection while at sea.

In addition to posting on its ship strike reduction website, NMFS distributed nearly 3,000 

laminated Compliance Guides to mariners through a number of outlets. The guides have also 

been distributed via electronic mail, downloaded from the NMFS website, and printed in other 

publications. These outlets included, among others:

 NOAA Office of Law Enforcement

 NOAA’s shipping and maritime liaisons, including its Navigational Managers 

program and industry liaisons working under contract with NMFS

 U.S. Coast Guard, including Local Notices to Mariners

 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
23

 U.S. DOT Maritime Administration (MARAD), reaching maritime labor unions (>50 

companies) and a fleet of commercial vessels under contract to the Administration

 Harbor and bar pilot associations

 Marine Exchanges, these are companies that work in conjunction with ports to 

facilitate safe and efficient activities in individual ports

 Lloyd’s Register (including ca. 2,000 companies, ca. 7,000 ships internationally)

 Maritime academies

 State police and natural resources agencies

 Shipping companies

 Shipping agents

 Whale watch companies

 Environmental organizations

 Local, regional, and national print and electronic news media

 Right whale protection notebook

Computer Training Resources

NOAA, in conjunction with the USCG and the North Atlantic Right Whale Recovery Plan 

Southeast Implementation Team and with input from the shipping industry, produced a 

computer-based, interactive guide and training resource for shipboard operations as they relate to 

avoiding ship-strike interactions with North Atlantic right whales. The guide, titled “A Prudent 

Mariner’s Guide to Right Whale Protection,” is available in CD-ROM format or for free 

download from the Internet (http://www.nero.noaa.gov/shipstrike/doc/mtr.html). It was updated 

in April 2009 to include information specific to the ship speed rule. Since spring 2009, NOAA 

has distributed more than 2,500 “Prudent Mariner” CD-ROMs. 

This interactive CD program provides educational and support information intended to raise 

awareness of shipboard operators in areas where North Atlantic right whales may be present. 

Focused on operations along the U.S. Atlantic coast, the program delivers crew training 

information about right whales, including an introduction to right whales, recommended 

navigational actions when operating in right whale habitat, a guide to reporting sightings of dead 

or injured right whales, an informative video presentation, and a short follow-up quiz. The 

program also includes guidelines for compliance with the Mandatory Ship Reporting systems

and a tool for submitting a report to the Mandatory Ship Reporting system. Review and 

knowledge of this information and having taken the follow-up quiz are required for all captains 

and crew of the entire cruise line industry.

Right Whale Notebooks and Merchant Mariner Education Module

NMFS has designed and distributed Shipboard Right Whale Protection Program Notebooks, 

which are binders of information for mariners about North Atlantic right whales. The binders 

contain: (a) Crew and Watchstander Training; (b) Sighting Information Sources and Collection; 

(c) Precautionary Measures for the Prudent Mariner; (d) “A Prudent Mariner’s Guide to Right 

Whale Protection” dvd, and (e) Mandatory Ship Reporting Requirements, Guidelines for 

Mariners Placards, and Compliance Guide for Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction Rule. 

Between January 2009 and August 2011, NMFS distributed 544 notebooks via 10 industry, 

trade, or private organizations and 18 federal or state agencies or their affiliates (Appendix F).
24

(In addition, NMFS personnel and shipping industry liaisons distribute materials (compliance 

guides and notebooks) at industry specific events and conferences which accounts for an 

additional 250 notebooks not included in Appendix F.) Notebooks are available upon request 

and at no cost.

The North Atlantic Right Whale Recovery Plan Northeast Implementation Team and a contractor

developed a merchant mariner education module on large whale ship strikes for maritime 

academy instructors in mariner safety, certification, licensing, or licensing upgrade courses to 

educate ship's captains. The self-contained, multi-unit module includes a Right Whale Ship 

Strike Curriculum Package with an Instructor’s Manual and two PowerPoint education modules 

intended to provide Federal, state, and international maritime academic and training institutions 

and fleet managers with, discussion notes, implementation strategies, resource materials, and 

student assessments on the prevention of ship strikes of North Atlantic right whales.

The modules’ lessons are geared toward use in courses on Voyage Planning, Bridge 

Management, Terrestrial and Coastal Navigation, Social Responsibility, Safety and 

Environmental Training, and Certification, Re-certification, and License Testing for mariners 

operating in coastal waters of the United States and Canada. The modules may also be used in 

sea semester training and fleet training scenarios. To date, the curricula were implemented at six 

mariner academies, including the USCG Academy, Maine Maritime Academy, Massachusetts 

Maritime Academy, Texas A&M University at Galveston, SUNY Maritime College, and the 

U.S. Merchant Marine Academy. These curricula are available free of charge upon request.

Trade Journal and On-line Articles 

NMFS staff prepared and published articles explaining the threats to right whales and the 

provisions of the rule. These were submitted to 31 different trade journals in the U.S. Of these, 

ten journals published a total of 23 articles about the rule between December 2008 and 

December 2009. The target audiences of the journals included maritime industry professionals, 

recreational power boaters and sailors, marine engineers, and commercial and recreational 

fishermen. The journals are published in the U.S., in English, and circulation was primarily to 

U.S. residents.

The vessel speed rule was also publicized through online media. At least 63 articles about the 

rule were published on the Internet by numerous news groups between October 2008 and March 

2011 (Appendix G). For many of these articles, NMFS staff was contacted by the authors to 

provide interviews.

Press Releases

NMFS, NOAA’s OLE, and USCG issued 7 press releases in advance of the rule’s effectiveness 

and again annually when SMAs were set to resume (Appendix H). These resulted in a number of 

stories on local and national broadcast and print media.
25

Events and Oral Presentations

NMFS and NOAA OLE staff took numerous opportunities to raise awareness about the rule, 

including providing oral presentations at conferences and public events. Public events included 

boat shows, whale festivals, industry meetings, conferences, and training sessions.

Between September 2008 and June 2011, NMFS staff gave at least 66 oral presentations on the 

rule to a combined audience of more than 2,500 individuals. Audiences included port operators, 

harbor safety committees, maritime associations, maritime exchanges, environmental 

organizations, and FM radio audiences, among others (Appendix I).

NMFS Ship Strike Reduction Web Pages

NMFS Office of Protected Resources regularly updated its ship strike reduction website with 

maps of active SMAs and DMAs (www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/shipstrike). Among other things, the 

ship strike reduction and large whale conservation website (Appendix J) provides links to the 

Federal Register notice announcing and explaining the final rule, the Compliance Guide, maps 

of all SMAs and DMAs, contact information for reporting a ship strike, information on other 

ship strike reduction efforts (such as routing measures and the Mandatory Ship Reporting 

systems) and related supporting documents. 

Two additional NMFS websites relay information about the speed rule: the Northeast Regional 

Office and Southeast Regional Office websites each contain web pages specific to right whale 

conservation and the prevention of ship strikes, http://www.nero.noaa.gov/shipstrike/ and 

http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/mm/rightwhales/rwconservation.htm, respectively. 

Summary

In sum, in addition to providing annual updates in the U.S. Coast Pilot, international navigational 

publications, e.g., Sailing Directions and Notice to Mariners, and USCG Local and Broadcast 

Notice to Mariners – which contain precautions and announcements for which mariners must 

heed as a matter of U.S. port entry - NMFS and its partners provided information about vessel 

speed restrictions through:

 Periodic, timely, and regionally-focused announcements issued on NOAA weather 

radio and NOAA weather buoy web sites;

 149 NMFS Office of Law Enforcement’s Community Oriented Policing and Problem 

Solving (COPPS) advisory letters going directly to vessel owners;

 18 NOVAs (containing multiple counts of violations) issued by NOAA’s Office of 

General Counsel;

 Annually, 2,000-3,000 automated outgoing messages sent directly to mariners 

entering right whale aggregation areas via the Mandatory Ship Reporting system;

 Several thousand recipients of reminders via e-mail distribution lists maintained by 

the World Shipping Council (WSC), the Chamber of Shipping of America (CSA), 

Maritime Administration, Lloyds List, NMFS’s Northeast and Southeast Regional 

Offices and shipping liaison officers;
26

 Monthly summaries reporting specific vessel operations (e.g., dates, times, and vessel 

speeds) in SMAs to WSC and CSA companies representing about 400 individual 

vessels;

 Reminder e-mails about DMAs and the opening of SMAs are sent to a distribution list 

of hundreds of maritime interest groups and individual recipients;

 Nearly 3,000 compliance guides distributed by harbor pilot associations, marine 

exchanges, maritime academies, shipping companies, environmental groups, whale 

watch companies, Lloyd’s Register, and several federal agencies;

 2,500+ interactive training CDs distributed;

 Over 550 Right Whale Protection Program notebooks distributed;

 Merchant Marine training curricula modules implemented in six merchant marine 

academies and provided free of charge via the Internet;

 Over 20 articles published in industry trade journals;

 Seven press releases;

 Over 60 oral presentations at meetings of, for example, port authorities, harbor safety 

committees, maritime associations, marine exchanges, environmental organizations, 

schools with total estimated audiences of over 2,500 individuals;

 Numerous spots, interviews, or stories appearing on local or national television or 

radio media;

 At least nine oral presentations or exhibits maintained at boat shows, public events, or 

scientific meetings; and

 Updates and reminders provided on several ship strike related web sites.

As discussed above, the effectiveness of the speed rule at reducing ship strikes is directly 

dependent upon compliance with its provisions, and compliance with the rule is in turn 

dependent upon mariner awareness. Given the inherent relationship between compliance with 

the rule and an awareness/understanding of it, NMFS and its partners distributed information 

about the ship speed rule as broadly, as often, and as clearly stated as possible. NMFS staff has 

solicited recommendations from the shipping industry on outreach venues and media and has 

pursued or developed modified outreach efforts accordingly.

We believe the mariner awareness program and actions taken within it to be quite 

comprehensive, in part because it includes outlets (e.g., U.S. Coast Pilots, the USCG’s Local and 

Broadcast Notice to Mariners) providing information that mariners are required to know and 

understand and to which they are expected to adhere, as well as a broad range of ancillary 

outlets, media, and targeted recipients. Given the breadth of this effort, we believe that a lack of 

knowledge about the restrictions can be ruled out as a source of observed low mariner 

compliance with the rule. We also believe aspects of this program may be a useful model for 

outreach programs contemplated for other maritime regulations. Nonetheless, we believe there 

are ways to improve this program (as identified in the “Recommendations” section, below). 

And, as noted in other sections of this report, compliance with the provisions of the rule has not 

been strong -- the reasons for this are not obvious. 

NMFS and its partners expect to continue to distribute outreach materials related to the vessel 

speed restrictions through as many media as possible and continue to seek opportunities to 
27

educate mariners about the rule. The agency will also ensure that messages and materials are 

kept updated and accurate, while also quantifying outreach and education efforts. Many NMFS 

and OLE staff in the Northeast Region, Southeast Region, and Headquarters carefully tracked 

outreach efforts associated with the speed rule. Without their assistance in maintaining these 

records, this summary would not have been possible. 

29

IV. Economic Impacts: Initial1estimate of economic impact of the right whale ship 

strike reduction vessel speed restrictions

Gregory K. Silber, Shannon Bettridge, Richard Blankfeld2, and Gerardo Ayzanoa

Issuance of the 2008 vessel speed restriction rule was accompanied by an Environmental Impact 

Statement (Anonymous, 2008) and an “Economic analysis for the Final Environmental Impact 

Statement of the North Atlantic right whale ship strike reduction strategy” (Nathan Associates, 

Inc., 2008). These reports provided estimates of expected direct and indirect costs as a result of

the ship strike reduction rule as it affects the shipping industry, commercial whale watch entities, 

passenger and fishing vessels, and associated maritime communities. These estimates also 

considered potential impacts to such things as intermodal (i.e., land-based) transport, ports, and 

associated businesses.

The 2008 workshop participants recognized that any action (e.g., continuation or modification) 

regarding the provisions of the rule needed to be accompanied by an updated analysis of the 

2008 economic analysis. They also recognized the value of any retrospective analysis of the 

impacts of the rule (as opposed to projections), because in the years following enactment of the 

rule, new data would be available from actual observation (or, at a minimum, updated and 

refined information) that would enhance any conclusions regarding economic effects. Further, 

whereas many aspects of the transport of goods and other elements of maritime activities may 

have remained relatively consistent since implementation of the rule, others may have changed. 

Thus, the workshop participants recommended that economic impacts be re-assessed because 

right whale conservation efforts should realistically be weighed against possible negative

consequences.

Assessments made in 2007/2008 (Nathan Associates, Inc., 2008) relied on 2003/2004 USCG 

data on vessel port calls, 2004 vessel operating costs, and 2008 fuel costs. The latter two, in 

particular, have changed in recent years and new data information was needed to revise the

estimates. 

An update to the 2008 estimates was performed under contract by the same analytical team. A 

report of their initial assessments of direct and indirect economic impacts is provided in 

Appendix K and a summary is provided here. A key data improvement is the availability of 

Automatic Identification System (AIS) vessel operation information. These data enable analysis 

of actual vessel speeds used rather than reliance on assumptions about expected at-sea speed 

capabilities (actual speed data were not available for the 2008 analysis), and a quantification of 

 

1 NMFS regards these as “initial estimates” because they may be subject to some refinement. For example, 

additional or updated information on passenger ferries may be added at a later date, and some values may change as 

new data are acquired. However, these changes, if any, are expected to have little overall effect on the estimates 

provided here. Therefore, NMFS regards these estimates as the best available at this time.

2

 Richard Blankfeld and Gerardo Ayzanoa are with Nathan Associates, Inc., 2101 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 

22201
30

the actual number and frequency of trips through SMAs in 2009, rather than estimates prepared 

from 2004 USCG port-call data. The analysis described here includes all of 2009 which 

provided operating information for 58,459 vessel transits through areas affected by the rule. Of 

these, 30,669 transits (52.5%) occurred during periods when the rule was in effect and 27,790 

transits (47.5%) in times when the rule was not in effect (Appendix K, Table 1). 

The goal was to estimate the economic impact to the shipping industry and overall economy 

from the full implementation of the rule. The analysis assumes 100% compliance with the rule

(see Section II for a discussion of compliance rates). That is, the analysis assumes that all 

vessels subject to the rule sail at a maximum speed of 10 knots within the restricted areas when 

they are in effect -- and as such represents the maximum economic impact on the shipping 

industry and general economy. 

The primary operational impact of the rule on the shipping industry is the extra sailing time 

caused when vessels limit their speed within SMAs. To make this estimate, the 10-knot speed 

limit was compared with the actual sailing speeds of vessels in 2009, by vessel type and size, for 

each area when speed restrictions were not in effect (

Table 3 and Appendix K, Table 2). Thus, estimates of the extra sailing time were calculated by 

subtracting the time required to sail through each restricted area in periods when the rule was not 

in effect from the time required at a sailing speed of 10 knots. This provides the most robust 

estimate for actual vessel operations and operating speeds without the influence of the rule. Only 

average vessel speeds of greater than 10 knots during non- rule periods were used for these 

calculations. 

The overall weighted average delay for all vessels was 0.30 hours (18 min) and ranged from 0.03 

hours (2 min) for towing vessels to 0.43 hours (26 minutes) for refrigerated cargo ships 

(Appendix K, Table 3). Consultant updates to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer vessel 

operating costs (Appendix K, Table 4) were prepared using the retrospective annual average 

price of bunker fuels for 2009 and current 2012 bunker fuel prices (Appendix K, Table 5). These 

estimates were then used to calculate the cost of the delays for each of the vessel types and sizes. 

The total estimated direct cost of the rule (assuming 100% compliance and thus the maximum 

estimated impact) was $22.0M and $34.8M for 2009 and 2012 bunker fuel costs, respectively 

(Appendix K, Tables 6 and 7).

The AIS data captures the vast preponderance of commercial maritime activity that would be 

subject to the speed restrictions and other operational measures. However, there are some 

market segments that also may be impacted by the speed restrictions. Those market segments or 

potential impacts include cumulative effect of multi-port strings for containerships; re-routing of 

southbound coastwise shipping, passenger time on ferries, and indirect economic impact of port 

diversions. Estimates of direct economic impacts to these segments or operations have been 

included in the analysis (Appendix K, Table 8). In addition, depending on the nature and 

significance of the direct economic impact, it is possible that implementation of the operational 

measures could have indirect economic impacts, including increased intermodal costs due to 

missed rail and truck connections, diversion of traffic to other ports, impact on local economies 

of decreased income from jobs lost due to traffic diversions. Estimates of these indirect costs 
31

have also been considered and included here in overall estimates of economic impact (Appendix 

K, Table 8), using both 2009 and 2012 bunker fuel prices.

Therefore, the maximum overall estimated direct and indirect economic impacts are $52.4M and 

$79.0M for 2009 and 2012 bunker fuel prices, respectively (Table 4). By way of comparison, 

the 2008 estimates (based on a number of assumptions3and less precise vessel speed

information) of economic impact was $137.3M (Nathan Associates, Inc., 2008). 

 

3

 Among other things, the 2008 estimates assumed a 100% compliance rate with DMAs which are voluntary. See 

Section V for a description of the DMA program.

33

V. Dynamic Management Areas Compliance Analysis: Vessel operations in and 

around Dynamic Management Areas

Jeffrey D. Adams, Gregory K. Silber, Michael J. Asaro, and Shannon Bettridge

Voluntary conservation measures have been used in a variety of marine living resource 

conservation efforts, including for the reduction of vessel collisions with endangered large whale 

species (Vanderlaan and Taggart, 2009; Wiley et al., 2011; Silber et al., submitted). These have 

included voluntary vessel routing measures (Vanderlaan and Taggart, 2009; Silber et al., 

submitted), voluntary speed advisories (M. McKenna, pers. comm.; Tejedor Arceredillo, et al., 

2008), and avoidance guidance for whale watch vessels (Wiley et al., 2008).

As indicated earlier in this report, as a counterpart to its mandatory vessel speed restrictions, 

NMFS developed a program whereby it could quickly respond with protective measures for right 

whale aggregations that occurred outside of historically predictable areas of occurrence by 

establishing Dynamic Management Areas (DMAs) that were finite in geographic scope and 

duration. The purpose was to provide protection to these whales, while also minimizing 

economic impacts to the maritime community imposed by areas in which vessel speed limits are 

required. Mariners were advised, but not required (i.e., voluntary compliance was encouraged) 

to either avoid DMAs or travel through them at 10 knots or less. By definition, these areas 

would be established immediately upon confirmation of right whale sighting locations and would 

expire 15 days after the date they were established. At the same time, NMFS created a program 

to monitor vessel operations in both required (in effect seasonally) and voluntary (in effect 

temporarily) vessel speed restriction zones using vessel AIS technologies. Here, we provide a 

brief summary of the results of a study of vessel operations within DMAs. The full results will 

be , or have been, provided elsewhere (Adams et al., 2011) and in submissions to the peerreviewed literature (e.g., Asaro, 2012).

Establishing DMAs

The onset of a DMA was triggered by a reliable sighting (derived primarily from systematic 

aircraft surveys for marine mammals) of three or more right whales in U.S. waters within a 75 

square nautical mile (nm) (138.9 km2) area, such that right whale density was greater than or 

equal to 0.04 right whales per nm2. This is consistent with a protocol suggested by Clapham and 

Pace (2001), and based on the assumption that whale groups at these densities would persist for 

an extended period. Additional (15 nm) buffer areas were then developed around the sighting 

location to account for potential whale movement and incorporated into a single polygon 

encompassing both the sighting location and its surrounding zone. Each DMA expired 15 days 

after the date of being established; however, if whale aggregations that met the density threshold 

persisted into the DMA’s second week, the DMA was extended for an additional 15 days. 

DMAs were not established in, and therefore did not overlap, with SMAs.

The maritime community was notified about the creation of a DMA in these ways: NOAA 

Weather Radio broadcast on a regular basis for the full duration of the DMA; USCG broadcast 

notice to mariners; an email distribution list (605 recipients of shipping industry liaisons and 

industry representatives, pilots associations, harbor masters, marine exchanges, etc); the 
34

Mandatory Ship Reporting automatic return message to vessels; postings on NMFS’ Office of 

Protected Resources ship strike web site and Northeast Fisheries Science Center interactive right 

whale sightings “mapper”; and an automatic return message sent to mariners requesting 

information by electronic mail.

Vessel Operations in DMAs

A total of 69 DMAs were established between December 2008 and June 2011 (we limited our 

analysis to those DMAs enacted prior to June 2011). Of these, 59 occurred in waters off New 

England and 10 off the southeast U.S. coast. All but one of the 59 DMAs established in New 

England waters were rectangular in shape, while those occurring in waters off Georgia and 

Florida tended to be irregular in shape due to their juxtaposition to existing SMAs, broadly 

distributed whale sighting locations, or other (e.g., oceanographic) features. Three of the 10 

DMAs off the southeast U.S. were omitted from the analyses due to their proximity to active 

SMAs, because the presence of an SMA might skew results with regard to the behavior (e.g., 

vessel speed) of vessel operators. The areas encompassed a combined estimated total of 905

individual whale sightings, although these included repeat sightings of the same individual 

whales that recurred in the same areas between or within the same years (Appendix L).

The 59 DMAs analyzed in northeast U.S. waters occurred in all months of the year, and most 

were established in November (n = 6), December (n = 9), and January (n = 8). The relative

frequency of the occurrence of DMAs throughout the year were influenced not only by the 

seasonal occurrence of right whales, but also by a varying amount of aircraft survey effort 

throughout the year and the DMA protocol itself which indicates that DMAs would not be 

overlain with established SMAs. Thus, the locations of DMAs may not necessarily be a true 

reflection of right whale occurrence in all locations and times, but they do reflect a substantial 

amount of right whale occurrence outside SMA boundaries.

We used vessel positions gathered from the USCG’s National AIS program to assess vessel 

operations within 66 DMAs. Vessel position information was aggregated into individual transits 

using methods similar to those described in Chapter II, above, and in Silber and Bettridge (2010). 

Unlike the SMA analysis, we did not limit the analysis to vessels over 65 feet (19m) because the 

2008 rule did not stipulate a vessel size or class. All speeds reported here refer to “speed over 

ground.”

Vessel transit speeds and routes were examined to determine if basic vessel operations changed 

in response to the DMAs. Specifically, transit speeds were analyzed to detect whether vessels

altered speed as they entered the DMAs. We limited analysis to transits that included at least 5 

nautical miles (nm) of travel both inside of the DMAs and in 10 nm buffers drawn around the 

DMAs. To ensure representative travel speeds, we limited the analysis to transits that had 

minimum speeds of 5 knots or greater. Vessel speeds inside DMAs and outside DMAs (i.e., 

buffers) were compared using paired t-tests for all vessels combined, as well as for cargo, tanker, 

and passenger vessels.

Vessel routes were also examined to quantify the number of transits that may have involved 

course alterations to avoid traveling through the DMAs. For vessels whose transits were located 
35

entirely within the 10 nm buffer, the first and last points of the transit were used to create line 

features. If the line features intersected the DMA, the transit was considered a potential 

avoidance transit (Appendix M). This analysis was conducted for transits initiated during the 

effective periods as well as the two-week periods directly preceding and following the effective 

periods.

Results and Discussion

A total of 3,324 transits that consisted of at least one nautical mile occurred within the DMAs 

during their respective effective periods. These transits were made by 1,100 individual vessels. 

The majority of the trips were made by tankers (n = 961), cargo vessels (n = 781), and tugs (n = 

370) (Appendix L).

We observed lower mean speeds in the active DMAs relative to the 10 nm buffer areas 

surrounding the active DMAs, but the differences were small (Appendix N). The largest 

difference was observed for passenger vessels, whose mean speed was 16.1 knots in the 10 nm 

buffers and 14.1 knots in DMAs (Appendix O). Mean speeds for all analyzed vessel types were 

above the requested maximum speed of 10 knots. Avoidance transits during the active periods of 

DMAs were detected for 18 of the 66 DMAs analyzed (Appendix P). For 11 of 18 DMAs with 

avoidance transits during the active period, avoidance transits were also detected in either the 

two-week period directly preceding and/or following the active period, suggesting that other 

factors (e.g., recommended vessel routes, traffic separation schemes, etc.) most likely play a role 

in the routes of the avoidance transits.

Although the DMA program may have had some tacit benefit in raising the awareness of 

mariners to the problem of right whale vulnerability to ship strikes, when measured by vessels 

either avoiding an area or restricting speed while in it, the DMA program likely had little or no 

impact in reducing the occurrence of ship strikes. The nuances of these data (e.g., perhaps with 

regard to adherence to the provisions of DMAs by certain vessels or certain vessel types, or in 

certain times or locations) will be explored further in subsequent analysis.

Voluntary measures have received considerable use in a variety of environmental issues 

(National Research Council, 2002; Morgenstern and Pizer, 2007). As a means to alter human 

behavior, voluntary approaches are generally preferable to regulatory actions (at least as a first 

tier approach), because the former do not require the development of potentially costly 

monitoring, policing, and penalty regimes, are less prone to litigation, and can promote 

innovation and solutions by the affected community (Khanna, 2001; Rivera and de Leon, 2004). 

However, in many cases in which voluntary approaches have been tried, they have not attained 

their intended goals.

As to large whale vessel strike reductions, voluntary measures appear to have been successful in 

some situations and relatively unsuccessful in others (Wiley et al., 2008; Vanderlaan and 

Taggart, 2009; Lagueux et al., 2011; Silber et al., submitted; M. McKenna4, pers. comm. 2011)

 

4 Megan McKenna, U.S. Marine Mammal Commission, Bethesda, MD. 
36

at least as success is measured by vessel operator adherence to the requested actions. Based on 

this study, we conclude that DMAs, as measured by mariner response to the voluntary measure, 

likely had only modest, if any, consequence in lowering the risk of vessel collisions with right 

whales.
37

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

Vessel speed restrictions were established in certain times and locations to reduce the likelihood 

of ship strikes of the highly depleted North Atlantic right whale. The restrictions were set to 

expire five years from the date of issuance (i.e., 9 December 2013) and in issuing the restrictions, 

NMFS indicated it would assess the effectiveness of the rule. It convened a workshop in 2008 to 

determine the means for doing so. NMFS has completed the analysis and herewith presents 

findings and considerations for next steps.

These results are based on statistical analyses of 55 large whale ship strike deaths or serious 

injuries having occurred over the course of 10 years; literally hundreds of millions of AIS data 

points used to characterize vessel operations and economic impacts represented in hundreds of 

thousands of passages taken by thousands of individual vessels both within and outside Seasonal 

and Dynamic Management Areas; and maritime community awareness-raising efforts organized

by a number of NMFS personnel and through hundreds of contacts using various print and 

broadcast media. Although these data sets were substantial, it is not possible at this time to make 

definitive statements about the biological effectiveness of the rule. The time allotted to 

determine the biological effectiveness was simply too brief.

Participants in the 2008 workshop indicated that several years was almost certainly too brief a 

period to determine if the vessel speed restrictions were effective in substantially reducing ship 

strikes – and that several years would not be sufficient to determine if recovery was being 

influenced at a population level. Nonetheless, NMFS set out to assess various aspects of the 

program although some of these (e.g., vessel monitoring) are only indirect measures of 

“effectiveness.” These constraints notwithstanding, we have found that certain conclusions, 

summarized below, can be made from these assessments.

Known ship strikes – Changes in the rate of whale ship strike deaths cannot be detected in two or 

three years. Using the method identified here, it may be possible to detect some rather large 

(e.g., a reduction of 30-60%) changes in five to seven years. Therefore, based on results 

presented here, definitive statements cannot be made about the effectiveness of reducing the 

occurrence of vessel strikes using vessel speed restrictions – longer time series are needed to 

better make such an assessment. 

Vessel operations – Strict adherence to 10 knot speed restrictions was unacceptably low, but it 

improved through time and there are signs that an across-the-board lowering of vessel speeds 

will continue. The improvements are most probably due to upgraded enforcement efforts and 

other specifically targeted efforts to improve compliance. Foreign-flagged vessels exhibited 

lower compliance rates than did domestically owned and operated vessels.

Outreach – Overall, hundreds of individual efforts were made to communicate or provide 

material to mariners and the maritime community. We believe this to be a highly comprehensive 
38

outreach effort (and may serve as a model for other programs), but there are ways in which it 

might be improved, more effectively reaching foreign flagged vessels, for example.

Economics – Actual economic impacts were substantially lower than projected in 2008. 

Revisions to the original estimates based on updates to such things as actual bunker fuel costs (in 

2009) and the use of 2009 AIS data to quantify (rather than estimate) vessel operations indicate 

that the economic impact was $52.4M ($79.0M using 2012 bunker fuel prices). The 2008 

projected economic impact was $137.3M. The revised estimates also assume 100% compliance 

(i.e., all trips in all active SMAs did not exceed 10 knots) and therefore should be regarded as the 

maximum economic impact on the shipping industry and general economy. 

Dynamic Management Areas - Mariner observation of voluntary speed restrictions or voluntary 

avoidance of DMAs was minimal. NOAA made extensive efforts to notify mariners about

DMAs, and although it is beyond the scope of our study to determine why adherence was low, 

we believe that the lack of adherence to the DMAs was due more to their voluntary nature than 

to a lack of awareness of the management zones. 

Recommendations and considerations for reducing vessel strikes of right whales 

through a vessel speed restriction program

The purpose of this section is to offer generalized suggestions about agency considerations if 

modifying the provisions of the vessel speed restriction rule and its related programs is 

warranted. Based on the results presented here, “lessons learned” in implementing the program, 

and other observations, we offer a number of recommendations about next steps and ways to 

improve the program to further right whale ship strike reduction. They are actions for 

consideration to further the goal of maximizing protection of right whales using the best

available science while also considering economic impacts to the shipping industry and other 

maritime communities. These suggestions will require proper vetting, in some cases further 

analysis, may require rulemaking, and will be subject to adequate funding. Some components of 

this program (e.g., outreach efforts, vessel monitoring) likely should be continued with only 

small modifications; while others (e.g., dimensions of SMAs) may need re-evaluation. Because 

a number of aspects of this program -- regulating vessel speed in large geographic areas; 

monitoring a regulation using AIS; and use of a precise and remotely-sensed technology to 

assess vessel compliance and economic impacts -- were novel and heretofore not attempted, they 

are not flawless, and we therefore also provide thoughts on ways to improve these systems and 

programs. 

A list of recommendations below is followed by a section that provides a discussion of, further 

information about, or justification for each recommendation.
39

List of Recommendations

Recommendations regarding modification of the vessel speed restriction rule

 Vessel speed – While it is not possible to make definitive statements about the 

biological effectiveness of the vessel speed regulations at this time, existing evidence

(based on studies appearing in the scientific literature both before and after 

enactment of the rule) is persuasive in indicating that vessel speed restrictions should 

continue as a means to reduce ship strikes of right whales. Therefore, NMFS should 

continue to use this tool as a means to reduce lethal vessel collisions with whales.

 Modification of the rule – Consideration should be given to modifying certain aspects 

of the regulation to enhance its capacity to reduce vessel strikes, while also giving 

strong consideration to economic and other impacts to various maritime 

communities.

 Size of SMAs – Consideration should be given to either expanding the sizes of the 

SMAs to encompass a large portion, if not all, of the recurring DMAs, or to 

establishing new SMAs.

 Vessel size – Consideration should be given to means to include smaller vessels in 

speed restrictions or other means to reduce strikes inflicted by small vessel classes.

 Dynamic Management Areas and Mandatory vs. Voluntary Measures

o To improve the conservation value of the DMA program, NMFS should 

consider (a) doing away with it altogether and focus these efforts on more 

pragmatic and effective means of reducing ship strikes, (b) making the 

conditions of dynamically managed areas mandatory for vessel operators, or 

(c) expanding mandatory SMAs into areas and in times where DMAs are 

predictably recurring.

o Possible limitations of both voluntary and mandatory measures as briefly 

addressed here should be considered when these types of measures are 

contemplated in the future. 

 Sovereign Vessels – Exemptions for sovereign vessels should be retained in any 

subsequent rulemaking for the reasons indicated in the rule, namely due to the need 

to avoid hindering efforts with regard to such things as national security, safety of life 

at sea, and other vital missions. However, all vessel operations under control of 

federal entities should be the subject of consultation under section 7 of the ESA if not 

already subject to an existing Biological Opinion. 

 Requested deviations from vessel speed restrcitions – In developing modifications to the 

vessel speed rule, the Office of Protected Resources should work with the Office of Law 

Enforcement, General Counsel, the shipping industry, and others to review and evaluate

existing exemptions in the rule (including for state law enforcement vessels) to determine 

if they should re-instated, modified, and/or streamlined in any way.

Recommendations regarding monitoring and compliance

 Monitoring –

o Maintain strong monitoring programs.

o Continue use of AIS, or a related system, preferably through a single, 

centralized system, for monitoring vessels.
40

o Anticipate and plan for analysis of reasonably long time series to monitor the 

rate of ship struck right whales – possibly using the metric used here. An 

assessment should be done and a report provided every five years regarding 

trends in right whale ship strike deaths and serious injuries and to assess 

elements of this program.

o Efforts to detect and necropsy right whale ship strike deaths should continue 

at appropriate levels to ensure adequate sample sizes for ongoing analysis.

o Aerial and shipboard right whale surveys should continue at appropriate 

levels to ensure proper notification to mariners of right whale locations (i.e., 

through the aircraft survey programs, MSR system) and to determine when 

and where to establish (or extend) DMAs. 

 Improving compliance –

o It is likely that enforcement programs are key to the success of this or any 

regulation, and adequate resources and plans for execution are essential.

o Emphasis should be placed not only on attempting to determine the causes of 

discrepancies in compliance between domestic- and foreign-flagged vessels, 

but in finding ways to improve compliance among international communities, 

in particular.

 Raising mariner awareness –

o An examination should be conducted, likely through a set of surveys of 

maritime communities, to determine whether outreach efforts are reaching 

their intended audiences, whether they have in fact resulted in a change in 

behavior of the recipient, and to ensure outreach efforts are cost-effective.

Discussion of Recommendations

Vessel speed

The use of vessel speed restrictions to reduce lethal vessel strikes of right whales was based 

largely on analysis by Laist et al. (2001), Pace and Silber (2005), and Vanderlaan and Taggart 

(2007). These studies, alone, indicate that the likelihood of serious injury and death in whales 

struck by vessels is diminished by reduced vessel speed. The latter two analyses indicate that the

probability of death or a serious injury to a struck whale is rapidly when vessel speeds are below 

12 knots diminished (and the probability decreases as speed decreases). Using this logic, vessel 

speed restrictions are being used in other locations to reduce the threat of ship strikes to large 

whale species (e.g., humpback whales in Glacier Bay, AK; fin and sperm whales in the 

Mediterranean Sea).

Based on probability analysis alone (e.g., Pace and Silber, 2005; Vanderlaan and Taggart, 2007), 

the vessel speed restrictions are expected to reduce lethal ship strikes – and they, alone, likely 

justify continuation of the restrictions – although it is not possible to demonstrate this statistically 

in restricted time frames. The original ideas and findings have been backed by additional, more 

recent studies.

Since enactment of the vessel speed rule, several studies have appeared in the peer-reviewed 

literature on this topic that appear to confirm these conclusions. Among them, Vanderlaan et al. 
41

(2009; right whales along the U.S. and Canadian eastern seaboard), Vanderlaan and Taggart 

(2009; right whales in Canadian waters), and Gende et al. (2011; humpback whales in Alaskan 

waters) concluded that vessel speed restrictions are effective in reducing the occurrence or 

severity of vessel strikes of right and other large whale species in various geographic locations. 

More specific to the context of this report, Lagueux et al. (2011) and Wiley et al. (2011) reported

that implementation of NOAA’s 2008 vessel speed restrictions have reduced the probability of 

lethal vessel strikes of North Atlantic right whales by 39% and 57% in waters off the southeast 

U.S. and off New England, respectively. In addition, Silber et al. (2010) found that both the size 

of the zone of influence (i.e., the area in which a whale is vulnerable to a strike or might be 

drawn into a strike) around the hull of a vessel, and acceleration (i.e., impact force) experienced 

by the whale, increases as vessel speed increases.

Therefore, based on these original results and conclusions having appeared in the peer-reviewed 

literature since the rule was enacted, we recommend that vessel speed restrictions be maintained 

as a means to reduce ship strikes. We further recommend that consideration be given to 

modifying certain aspects of the regulation to enhance its capacity to reduce vessel strikes, 

perhaps by increasing the scope, while also giving strong consideration to economic and other 

impacts to various maritime communities.

Modification of the rule

Provisions of the vessel speed rule include certain variables (e.g., vessel length, vessel speed) 

that, if modified, may increase their overall conservation value. For example, in its November 

2008 rulemaking, NMFS indicated that

“Based on available data, NMFS will consider adjusting the regulations. Such actions 

would be taken through additional rulemaking. Measures that NMFS could consider may 

involve vessel size, vessel routing (e.g., making recommended routes mandatory), vessel 

speed, making dynamically managed areas mandatory, and the size and duration of the 

areas where the restrictions apply.” 

Therefore, in keeping with the thinking that adjusting one or more of these variables may be used 

to further limit ship strikes, NMFS might consider modifying certain aspects of the regulation to 

enhance its capacity to reduce vessel strikes, while also considering economic impacts and 

related factors.

Dimensions of Seasonal Management Areas

With regard to SMA sizes and the locations of their boundaries, NMFS indicated in the Rule’s 

preamble that it would 

“...continue to monitor right whale sighting locations relative to these boundaries and 

may modify [the size of SMAs], as appropriate, if changes are warranted based on shifts 

in right whale occurrence or additional analysis.”

While such analysis has not been conducted for the purposes of this report, NMFS should 

evaluate the size and locations of the SMAs to determine if modifying their dimensions to 
42

enhance the extent of their protection is warranted. Establishment of these management zones 

was predicated on encompassing areas where right whales could reliably and predictably occur, 

while also limiting their size to minimize economic impacts to maritime communities. 

Analysis of the number, timing, and locations of DMAs (Asaro, 2012; Adams et al., this report) 

indicate that a relatively large number of DMAs have occurred regularly in certain locations in 

waters off New England. These studies suggest that to include a large number of right whale 

observations that have occurred incidentally outside SMAs, consideration should be given to 

either expanding the sizes of the SMAs to encompass a large portion, if not all, of the recurring 

DMAs, or to establishing new SMAs. In addition, Schick et al., 2009 concluded that hypothetical 

SMAs that extended to 30 nm from shore and around port entrances would provide more 

protection for migrating right whales than do the existing SMAs with 20 nm radii. Such studies 

and other sources, such as an evaluation of right whale sighting information obtained since 

implementation of the rule should be important assets in making determinations of the locations, 

timing, and size of SMAs, as counterbalanced against economic impacts, in future rulemaking.

Vessel Size

Decisions regarding the size of vessels to which the vessel speed restrictions would apply were 

based, in large part, on conventions adopted by the USCG, the International Maritime 

Organization, and the maritime community whereby many regulations and guidelines are based 

on vessel sizes of either 300 gross tons or 65 feet in length. Nonetheless, in its rulemaking, 

NMFS acknowledged the occurrence of vessel strikes of right whales by vessels less than 65 feet 

in length and that these vessels may pose a threat to right whales. Indeed, since implementation 

of the rule, one known vessel strike of a right whale occurred by a (sovereign) vessel that was 50 

feet in length. In its rulemaking, NMFS, therefore, indicated that it would 

“...continue to consider means, including future rulemaking, to address vessel classes 

below 65 ft (19.8 m). Additionally, in collaboration with other organizations, NMFS will 

continue to engage in education and outreach programs regarding right whale 

vulnerability to ship strikes specific to the recreational, fishing, and other coastal 

maritime activities that involve vessels less than 65 ft (19.8 m).”

As noted in the “Education and Outreach” paper contained in this report, NMFS has engaged in a 

number of awareness- raising efforts in regard to small vessels operation. These efforts may or 

may not be sufficient to limit strikes occurring in these vessel classes. Therefore, NMFS should 

consider means to include smaller vessels, if possible, in speed restrictions or other means to 

reduce strikes in such vessels.

One significant consideration in this regard is that adherence to rules and other activities by such 

vessel classes may be difficult to monitor. As noted, NMFS is currently monitoring vessel 

operations using AIS technologies; however, by international convention and USCG 

requirements, only vessels 65 feet or greater are required to carry AIS transmitters. Therefore, if 

smaller vessel classes are included, monitoring adherence to rules affecting these vessels would 

be difficult, and means to do so would need to be developed. In addition, smaller vessel classes 

include a wide variety of vessel types including self-, wind-, jet-propelled craft. Therefore, 
43

whereas these vessels may pose a threat to right whales, means to include them, including the 

consideration about, for example, appropriate vessel lengths and classes and means of 

propulsion, in ship strike reduction measures may be challenging.

Dynamic Management Areas and Voluntary vs. Mandatory Measures

In efforts to reduce lethal vessel strikes of whales, NMFS has taken a number of management 

actions – some requesting voluntary changes in vessel operations, some mandatory (e.g., vessel 

speed restrictions). Although the virtues of voluntary measures are not being specifically 

addressed here, some studies have indicated that voluntary changes to vessel operations to reduce 

strikes have been adhered to (in the case of recommended routes (Lagueux et al., 2011)) and an 

International Maritime Organization-endorsed Area To Be Avoided (Vanderlaan and Taggart, 

2009); while others have not (in the case of whale watch boats avoiding whales (Wiley et al., 

2008)). 

In its 2008 rulemaking, NMFS indicated it would:

“...monitor voluntary compliance with designated DMAs. If adherence is not 

satisfactory, NMFS will consider making them mandatory, through a subsequent 

rulemaking.”

The analysis of DMAs contained in this report (Adams, et al., above) about vessel operations and 

the relatively low adherence to vessel speed advisories within DMAs should be an important 

consideration in assessing whether DMAs should be made mandatory and whether the DMA 

program should continue at all. Bearing in mind, too, that our analysis indicates that even 

requisite changes in vessel operations (i.e., required vessel speed restrictions) are no guarantee 

that they will be adhered to and compliance will be automatic. Therefore, the limitations of both 

voluntary and mandatory measures should be considered when required or voluntary measures 

are contemplated in the future. 

Adherence to the conditions of DMAs is voluntary, and the number of vessels avoiding or 

traversing these areas at 10 knots or less, as recommended, is low. Therefore, to improve the 

conservation value of this program, NMFS should consider (a) doing away with the DMA 

program and focus these efforts on more pragmatic and effective means of reducing ship strikes, 

(b) making the conditions of dynamically managed areas mandatory for vessel operators, or (c) 

expanding mandatory SMAs into areas and in times where DMAs are predictably recurring.

Deviations from Requirements of the Rule

The existing Rule provides certain deviations from the provisions of the rule to those vessels 

subject to the vessel speed restrictions under adverse meteorological or oceanographic conditions 

that might jeopardize navigational safety. A ship’s captain can, based on local conditions and his 

or her judgment of those conditions and the safety of the vessel, deviate from the 10 knot speed 

restriction. Any such deviations and the justification for doing so must be properly documented 

in the ship’s logbook. NMFS continues to believe that allowing such deviations is necessary for 

the safety of life at sea, but NMFS also has reason to believe some vessel operators regularly 

deviate from the required ten knot speed limit when conditions do not require it. Therefore, in 
44

developing modifications to the vessel speed rule, the Office of Protected Resources should work 

with the Office of Law Enforcement, General Counsel, the USCG, the shipping industry, and 

others to review existing exceptions in the rule to determine if they should be re-instated, 

modified, and/or streamlined in any way and in such a manner to ensure navigational safety 

while also enhancing the conservation value of the restrictions. While some exceptions are 

probably necessary, there may be ways to improve how these are implemented and recorded.

Sovereign Vessels

Sovereign vessels – those vessels owned or operated by Federal agencies or through contract 

with Federal agencies – are not required to comply with provisions of the existing rule. This 

includes vessels operated by the U.S. Navy (USN) (and foreign sovereign vessels when they are 

engaging in joint exercises with the USN), the USCG, the Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE), 

NOAA, and several other agencies. The reasons for this, as stated in the 2008 rule, are 

“the national security, navigational, and human safety missions of some agencies may be

compromised by mandatory vessel speed restrictions.”

NMFS indicated further that:

“[h]owever, this exemption will not relieve Federal agencies of their obligations to 

consult, under section 7 of the ESA, on how their activities may affect listed species. 

NMFS acknowledges that a number of agencies already provide guidance to vessel 

operators and fleets with regard to conservation measures to protect right whales and 

other endangered species, as well as contribute to conservation efforts generally.”

We recommend that exemptions for sovereign vessels remain in place if subsequent rulemaking 

that is contemplated. The reasons for the exceptions remain. In addition, some federal entities 

such as the USN, USCG, and the ACOE either consult with NMFS under section 7 of the 

Endangered Species Act (ESA) in regard to their vessel operations, or operate under the 

provisions of existing ESA Section 7 Biological Opinions. In addition, for years, the USN and 

USCG have had standing orders for their Atlantic fleets to adhere, to the extent possible, to right 

whale ship strike reduction measures. These programs should be updated, if needed, and 

continued.

However, as noted above, text in the preamble of the rule indicates that NMFS would 

recommend that all federal entities operating in U.S. east coast waters to initiate consultations

under the ESA. In large part, these consultations have not occurred. Perhaps most notable is that 

vessel operations housed in various NOAA programs have not undergone consultation. A case 

in point is a right whale struck and perhaps seriously injured by a vessel operated under a NOAA 

National Marine Sanctuary program did not result in the initiation of a consultation. This track 

record needs to be improved. Therefore, we recommend, as previously indicated in the 2008 

Rule, that all vessel operations undertaken under control of federal entities (i.e., operations of all 

sovereign vessels) be the subject of consultation under Section 7 of the ESA if not already subject 

to an existing Biological Opinion, or re-initiated as new information related to the Opinion is 

received.
45

Monitoring

Strong monitoring programs provide mechanisms for improving conservation programs. We, 

therefore, recommend that attention be given to maintaining a strong vessel monitoring program

for both voluntary and mandatory measures.

Monitoring -- Vessels

With regard to monitoring vessel operations, and therefore compliance with the speed 

restrictions, we have found that the use of AIS has provided a comprehensive, cost-effective, and 

precise means to monitor vessel operations and we highly recommend AIS, or a related system,

be maintained for monitoring vessel operations (although new monitoring technologies should

also be considered as they are developed), preferably in a single, centralized network. In 

addition to providing a platform for a detailed analysis of vessel operations, this system has been 

compatible with the development of programs that provide feedback directly to vessel operators 

about their actions to improve compliance (this has been done in both conjunction with this 

program and by Wiley et al., 2011), and a means to supplement enforcement actions. In another 

program initiated by the World Shipping Council, NMFS has been working in collaboration with 

the Council and USCG in an attempt to use existing AIS outgoing messaging capabilities to 

provide immediate feedback to mariners that exceed 10 knot speed restrictions. Although 

initiated, the program may take several years to develop.

An AIS-based program has had a number of virtues. Data were collected remotely and costeffectively. For the analysis presented here and in a host of related analyses, NMFS relied 

heavily on the USCG’s established network of receiving stations. Although aspects of the 

USCG’s system are still under development (and some may be becoming obsolete and others

unfunded), it has been an invaluable resource to this program and any effort to continue or 

enhance it should be encouraged. Given the rate at which data are transmitted and the wealth of 

information they contain, the AIS is highly precise in assessing vessel positional and speed 

operations. And, as the 2008 workshop participants recommended, such a system would

logically be based on a centralized AIS network. There are, nonetheless, downsides to this 

system as well: the amount of incoming data for archiving, processing and analyzing is 

formidable and not all transmissions are flawless due primarily to operator error.

Monitoring -- Whale deaths and serious injuries 

As noted above, one to five years is not an adequate time to assess whether ship strike deaths 

have been lowered. Therefore, NMFS should anticipate and plan for analysis of reasonably 

long time series to monitor the rate at which right whales are struck by vessels. The metric 

described and used here (time elapsed between subsequent large whale ship strike deaths) is one 

very good possibility for ongoing monitoring, and there may be other related means to conduct 

this type of assessment. In addition, NMFS should plan on continuing these monitoring efforts 

and should provide a report every five years of right and large whale ship strike death and 

serious injury rates and trends. Related to this, efforts to detect and necropsy right whale ship 

strike deaths should continue at appropriate levels.
46

Improving Compliance and Improving Awareness

Compliance with the restrictions generally has been low – but, indications are that speeds across

all vessels sampled were trending lower by 2011 (see Bettridge and Silber, above). It is not clear 

why compliance rates were low and this matter should be the subject of additional study. This, 

and analysis that will be presented elsewhere, indicates that compliance improved among certain 

sectors of the shipping industry particularly when NMFS’ Office of General Counsel began to 

issue citations. (At the time of this writing more citations are being processed). Therefore, it is

likely that enforcement programs are key to the success of this or any regulation, and adequate 

resources and plans for execution are essential.

Our analysis (Bettridge and Silber, above) also indicates that compliance was notably lower in 

foreign-flagged vessels than was exhibited by those owned and operated by domestic entities. 

Here, again, the reasons for this are not clear and factors may include infrequent or irregular U.S. 

port calls, notifications having never reached operators of foreign flagged vessels, 

communications were received but not well understood possibly due to language barriers, a lack 

of understanding of U.S. regulations, or other reasons. Whatever the reason, emphasis should be 

placed on not only attempting to determine the causes of these discrepancies, but in finding ways 

to improve compliance in these segments of the shipping community. 

One clear first step toward improving compliance is that NOAA should work, immediately, to 

ensure vessel speed SMAs are depicted on NOAA’s paper and/or electronic charts. In addition, 

consideration should be given to the translation of some materials into other languages and/or the 

consideration of new outlets for distribution. Another approach to consider is wider distribution 

of articles in foreign trade magazines. As a related matter, federal agencies that own or operate 

vessels (including those under contract) should consult, or be encouraged to consult, with NMFS 

under the provisions of the Endangered Species Act regarding the operation of their vessels.

As noted above, NMFS has made efforts to communicate the requirements of the vessel speed 

restrictions to various maritime communities and through a variety of media. The goal was to 

blanket the affected communities as completely as possible. Viewed in terms of quantity and 

amount of coverage, we regard this program as highly successful. Indeed, the structure and 

scope of this effort may be a model for outreach programs for other regulatory actions. Although 

extensive in scope and coverage, one shortcoming of this effort is an assessment of whether the 

efforts have achieved desired outcomes.

Although not known with certainty, it is possible that compliance was improved by the extensive 

outreach program undertaken, and inasmuch as most material and broadcasts are produced and 

distributed relatively inexpensively, these may be highly cost-effective ways to alter vessel 

operations. Intuitively, among these, steps taken through customary or required media for those 

navigating in U.S. waters, U.S. Coast Pilots, Broadcast and Local Notices to mariners, for 

example, are likely the most effective in directly reaching the shipping industry. Mailings going 

directly to shipping companies with information about the operations of their vessels, 

specifically, likely were also strong motivators for vessel operators to understand and abide by 

the restrictions.
47

The agency has tracked and quantified its outreach efforts; however, the impacts of these efforts 

have had on relevant entities have not been determined and there may be ways to improve the 

program. NMFS has not conducted an analysis of whether (a) these various media outlets 

reached their intended targets, (b) once distributed, they reached actual vessel operators; or (c) 

they actually resulted in changes in behavior. Nor has an assessment been done to determine 

which of the individual outreach efforts have had the most (or most cost-effective) impact. The 

participants of the 2008 workshop discussed the possibility of performing a marketing survey to 

assess awareness about the rule. To date, no such survey has been conducted, but doing so 

(subject to funding availability) would be useful in determining whether outreach efforts were 

successfully targeting relevant affected entities, whether they were prompted in some way to 

respond, and if so, whether behavior actually changed; or conversely, whether the materials, 

approach, or outlets should be modified. Therefore, we believe it advisable to conduct a set of 

surveys to answer these questions as a means to improve the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 

of outreach efforts. 

49

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Vanderlaan, A.S.M. and C.T. Taggart. 2009. Efficacy of voluntary areas to be avoided to 

reduce risk of lethal vessel strikes to endangered whales Conservation Biology. 23:1467-

1474.

Waring, G.T., E. Josephson, K. Maze-Foley, and P.E. Rosel (eds.). 2010. U.S. Atlantic and Gulf

of Mexico Marine Mammal Stock Assessments – 2010. NOAA Technical Memorandum 

NMFS-NE-219.

Wiley, D.N., J.C. Moller, R.M. Pace, and C. Carlson. 2008. Effectiveness of voluntary 

conservation agreements: case study of endangered whales and commercial whale

watching. Conservation Biology 22: 450–457.

Wiley, D.N., M. Thompson, R.M. Pace III, and J. Levenson. 2011. Modeling speed restrictions 

to mitigate lethal collisions between ships and whales in the Stellwagen Bank National 

Marine Sanctuary, USA. Biological Conservation 144:2377-2381.
53

FIGURES

Fig. 1. Locations of vessel speed restriction Seasonal Management Areas (NMFS 2008)
54

Fig. 2. Dates of active SMAs. Shaded cells represent SMA in effect.

CCB ORP GSC BI NY/NJ PHI NOR MOR NCGASEUS

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sept

Oct

Nov

Dec
55

Fig. 3. Proportion of use of each SMA by domestic and foreign flag vessels in 2009, 2010, and 

2011.

Fig. 4. Distribution of vessel types transiting all SMAs in 2009, 2010, and 2011.
56

Fig. 5. Number of transits in each SMA by vessel type in 2009, 2010, and 2011. (Note: CCB, 

GSC, and ORP SMAs were collapsed into “NEUS” category for this figure because the numbers 

of transits in each of these SMAs were imperceptible given the scale of this graph.)
57

Fig. 6a. Proportion of transits in which vessel speed was at or below 10.0 knots for the entire 

distance; above 10.0 knots for 1-50% of the distance; or above 10.0 knots for 51-100% of the 

distance, for all SMAs in 2009, 2010, and 2011.

Fig. 6b. Proportion of transits in which vessel speed was at or below 12.0 knots for the entire 

distance; above 12.0 knots for 1-50% of the distance; or above 12.0 knots for 51-100% of the 

distance, for all SMAs in 2009, 2010, and 2011.
58

Fig. 7. Distribution of vessel speeds, as described by "maximum speed over ground" in all SMAs in 2009, 2010, and 2011.
59

Fig. 8. Distribution of vessel speeds through SMAs, displayed as a percent of the total transit, as 

a function of “maximum speed over ground” by vessel type.

Fig. 9. Maximum vessel speed as a function of country of origin, 2009, 2010, and 2011.
60

Fig. 10. Aggregate mean vessel speeds within all SMAs, 2009 and 2010.
61

TABLES

Table 1. Dates of active SMAs, number of days analyzed in each, and number of transits 

analyzed in each in 2009, 2010 and 2011.

Region Acronym Times “Active” Number of 

SMA days

Number of 

SMA 

transits 

analyzed 

2009

Number of 

SMA 

transits 

analyzed 

2010

Number 

of SMA 

transits 

analyzed 

2011

Total 

number 

of transits 

analyzed

Cape Cod Bay CCB 1 January – 15 May 135 718 748 594 2,060

Off Race 

Point

ORP 1 March – 30 April 61 217 235 214 666

Great South 

Channel

GSC 1 April – 31 July 122 410 539 632 1,581

Block Island BI 1 November – 30 

April

181 1,240 1,256 1,242 3,738

New York NY 1 November – 30 

April

181 7,651 7,660 7,678 22,989

Philadelphia PHI 1 November – 30 

April

181 3,857 3,910 5,068 12,835

Norfolk NOR 1 November – 30 

April

181 4,790 4,720 5,328 14,838

Morehead 

City

MOR 1 November – 30 

April

181 475 424 572 1,471

North 

Carolina to 

Georgia

NC-GA 1 November – 30 

April 181 6,172 6,743 6,734

19,649

Southeast U.S. SEUS 15 November – 15 

April

152 2,773 3,209 3,105 9,087

TOTAL 5,636 28,303 29,444 31,167 88,914
62

Table 2. Number of transits analyzed, by vessel type, in each of the SMAs in 2009, 2010, and 

2011.

SMA Passenger Pilot Cargo Tow Tug Tanker Other Total

CCB 4 0 61 601 992 143 259 2,060

ORP 12 0 276 47 53 243 35 666

GSC 108 0 564 20 10 489 390 1,581

BI 17 0 1,101 357 536 897 830 3,738

NY-NJ 631 165 9,570 3,020 2,579 4,647 2,377 22,989

PHI 203 31 4,409 1,927 1,839 2,247 2,179 12,835

NOR 254 9 10,857 673 640 774 1,631 14,838

MOR 15 0 194 94 279 115 774 1471

NC-GA 262 99 12,981 831 1,193 2,432 1,851 19,649

SEUS 768 2 5,161 1,071 434 577 1,074 9,087

Total 2,274 306 45,174 8,641 8,555 12,564 11,400 88,914
63

Vessel type 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100100-120120-150 150+ Total

Bulk Carrier - 11.1 11.2 11.9 9.6 11.4 11.0 10.7 11.2 11.9 12.4 11.3 11.5 10.8 - - 12.8 10.8 11.3

Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO) - 13.9 - - - - - 10.1 - - - - 9.8 - - 12.7 - - 10.6

Container Ship 12.5 13.0 14.1 13.6 13.1 14.9 14.5 13.9 14.0 13.9 14.4 13.9 13.6 14.1 - - - - 14.0

Freight Barge 9.4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9.4

General Dry Cargo Ship 11.5 11.4 13.8 12.3 12.9 12.2 12.6 11.2 12.3 12.9 10.7 - - - - - - - 12.3

Passenger Ship a/ 10.6 15.9 14.8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12.4

Refrigerated Cargo Ship - 14.8 14.7 15.0 - - 11.3 - 13.4 - 13.7 - - - - - - - 14.0

Ro-Ro Cargo Ship 8.3 13.3 13.6 14.3 13.7 13.2 13.9 15.3 13.4 14.3 13.6 13.4 - - - - - - 13.6

Tank Ship - 12.3 11.6 12.7 10.8 12.2 12.1 12.4 12.0 12.0 11.8 12.0 11.2 11.3 10.6 11.3 10.2 11.2 11.8

Towing Vessel 8.2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8.2

a/ Includes recreational vessels.

Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. from AIS data as described in text.

DWT Size Range (000s)

Impact 2009 2012

Direct economic impact 

Shipping industry vessels 21,976 34,776

Cumulative effect of multi-port strings 3,593 5,685

Re-routing of southbound coastwise shipping 1,298 2,054

Pasengers' time on passenger ferries 5,191 5,191

Whale watching vessels 1,336 1,336

 Subtotal direct economic impact 33,393 49,041

Indirect economic impact of port diversions 18,970 30,019

Total economic impact 52,363 79,061

Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates as described in text.

Bunker fuel prices of

Table 3. Average Vessel Operating Speed by Type and Size of Vessel for Areas Subject to Rule 

During Periods When Rule is Not in Effect, 2009 (knots)

Table 4. Total Economic Impact of Rule Using 2009 and 2012 Bunker Fuel Prices, ($000s).
64

APPENDICES

Appendix A Conclusions excerpted from “Report of a workshop on assessing the effectiveness 

of the right whale ship strike reduction rule” (Silber and Bettridge, 2009)

Report of a Workshop on Assessing the Effectiveness of the

Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction Rule

November 19-20, 2008

Silver Spring, Maryland

Gregory Silber

Shannon Bettridge

Office of Protected Resources

National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA

March 2009

Introduction

The U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) final rule to reduce the severity 

and likelihood of vessel strikes to North Atlantic right whales went into effect on 9 December 

2008 (73 FR 60173; 10 October 2008). The stated goal of the rule is “to reduce or eliminate the 

threat of ship strikes [of North Atlantic right whales] - the primary source of mortality in the 

endangered population”. The rule requires certain vessels to travel at 10 knots or less in certain 

areas of right whale aggregation and near several key port entrances along the U.S. eastern 

seaboard. One provision of the rule is that NMFS will develop ways to monitor its effectiveness 

in attaining its intended goal. The rule expires in 5 years. Therefore, within a few years, NMFS 

will need to (a) devise a way to monitor the rule’s effectiveness, (b) assess its overall 

effectiveness, and (c) generate a report of the findings.

On November 19-20, 2008, NMFS’ Office of Protected Resources convened a Workshop 

on Assessing the Effectiveness of the Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction Rule. The goal of the 

workshop was to develop a strategy, involving multiple components, to monitor and assess 

whether vessel speed regulations are achieving the rule’s intent of reducing the occurrence of 

ship strikes in right whales (i.e., whether the rule is “effective”). Appendix 1 is a list of 

workshop participants and the workshop Terms of Reference are provided in Appendix 2.
65

Workshop Conclusions

By way of summary, key workshop conclusions are provided here; background 

information and descriptions of principal discussions follow.

The final rule contains a provision that the regulations would expire five years after 

implementation. With regard to the expiration, the workshop concluded that at that time, NMFS 

would (a) re-issue the regulations, (b) modify the regulations, or (c) allow them to expire. 

Therefore, if the regulations are to be modified or re-issued by the December 2013 expiration 

date through the rulemaking process, it will be necessary to have conclusions regarding 

effectiveness in hand for National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) leadership 

by December 2011. As a result, data collection should start immediately and summaries and 

reports regarding the rule’s effectiveness should be available by December 2011.

Workshop participants agreed that the timeframe for implementing adequate and rigorous 

metrics is quite short. In fact, given the suite of variables contributing to ship strikes, detecting 

meaningful biological effects of the regulations would be difficult. Variables complicating a 

rigorous assessment of effectiveness include changes in maritime commerce, oceanographic 

features contributing to shifts in whale distribution, and the rarity of a ship strike event. Much 

longer time series are typically needed to detect statistically meaningful effects. Nonetheless, 

within these rather arbitrary time constraints, workshop participants understood the charge to 

develop metrics, as possible.

Workshop participants agreed that NOAA will use four basic parameters to monitor 

effectiveness.

1. Biological data

Only one metric can be used to statistically evaluate the rule's effectiveness given the 

short time constraints: through assessments of observed time lapses between known ship strike 

related deaths of all large whale species. Thus, the rates of known ship strike deaths and serious 

injuries, both before and after implementation of the regulations, will be compared statistically to 

determine whether the regulations have resulted in a reduced rate (as opposed to the actual 

number) of known ship strikes. Although the rule focuses geographically on waters inhabited by 

right whales, adequate sample sizes can only be obtained by using data on all large whale species 

ship strike deaths. Certain assumptions (e.g., constancy of detection effort) need to be assured.

Other measures, e.g., whale demographics, relative abundance, number of ship strike deaths, and 

scarring were discussed and considered not appropriate because much longer time series and 

larger sample sizes would be needed for sufficient statistical rigor. As a second component, 

NMFS will continue to collect and synthesize right whale sighting data to confirm that elements 
66

of the regulations (e.g., the size, time periods, and dimensions of Seasonal Management Areas 

(SMAs)), are on appropriate scales, or modify them as appropriate. Thus, NMFS might 

determine that the regulations could be more effective if dimensions of the SMAs were changed. 

Other measures, discussed below, constitute indirect assessments of effectiveness.

2. Human behavior

Mariner compliance rates are one measure of effectiveness. Therefore, NMFS will 

quantify mariner compliance with the regulations using Automated Identification System (AIS).

Receipt and analysis of ship-transmitted AIS data will allow precise quantification of the number 

of mariners that are exceeding 10 knots; NMFS will develop periodic summary reports of 

compliance. As a corollary to this, NMFS will use the same means to quantify mariner 

compliance with voluntary measures, such as Dynamic Management Areas and recommended 

routes established as protective measures for right whales.

3. Mariner awareness

To be effective, all segments of affected entities and industries need to be fully aware of 

the regulations. Therefore, NMFS will quantify the number of outgoing messages, printed 

material distributed, press releases, and direct communications with maritime industries and 

estimate the audiences reached and potential receivers of the information.

4. Economics

NMFS will assess potential economic impacts of the regulations by confirming, updating, 

and possibly improving economic impacts estimations made prior to implementation of the 

regulations. Conditions affecting shipping and other economic activities will be subject to many 

factors, including global and domestic economics. We will try to filter the effects of the 

regulation within the overall economic scenario.

Therefore, in sum:

NMFS’s program to assess the effectiveness of the ship strike reduction rule will consist 

of these components and conditions.

 Data collection should start immediately and synthesis and reports regarding the rule’s 

effectiveness should be available by December 2011.
67

 Biological:

o Ensure consistency of monitoring efforts

o Continue ongoing efforts to monitor large whale deaths known to have resulted 

from ship strikes

o Conduct statistical analysis of changes in rate of time elapsed between known 

large whale ship strike deaths

 Human behavior:

o Seek to develop or utilize a coast-wide centralized AIS monitoring system

o Provide periodic reports of mariner compliance

 Education and Outreach

o Monitor outreach efforts by quantifying, for example, the amount of material 

distributed, numbers of broadcasts made, and attempt to estimate audience 

reached

 Economic

o Gather data on economic impact of rule

o Conduct economic analysis for Environmental Impact Statement

 Related analysis

o Continue to gather and analyze right whale sightings and ship strike records to 

assess appropriateness of SMA dimensions; and number, size and compliance 

with DMAs
68

Appendix B Northeast Fisheries Science Center Reference Document 11-15 

Frequency of Whale and 

Vessel Collisions on the US 

Eastern Seaboard: Ten Years 

Prior and Two Years Post Ship 

Strike Rule 

by Richard M. Pace 

NOAA National Marine Fisheries Service Northeast Fisheries Science 

Center, 166 Water St., Woods Hole, MA 02543

US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Marine Fisheries Service 

Northeast Fisheries Science Center Woods Hole, Massachusetts 

August 2011
69

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 

Methods ......................................................................................................................................... 1

Results ............................................................................................................................................. 2 

Conclusions ..........................................................................................................................3 

Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... 3 

References Cited ............................................................................................................................. 4 

Appendix A. Classical Statistical comparisons .............................................................................. 9 

Appendix B. Classical Change Point Analysis ............................................................................ 11 

Appendix C. Bayesian Change Point Analysis ............................................................................ 12 
70

INTRODUCTION 

Protected species science programs are frequently asked to provide management advice based 

on imperfect data associated with occurrence rates of rare events such as strandings, road kills or 

other rarely detected mortalities. Ship strikes of large whales and right whales are such settings, and 

they are of particular interest because economically significant management actions have been 

enacted to hopefully reduce their occurrence. These measures are of unknown effectiveness while 

possibly causing annual industry costs ranging from tens of thousands to exceeding $100 million 

(shipping regulations). Following implementation of what have been termed “the Ship Strike Rules” 

(Federal Register 2006) which became effective 9 December 2008, the National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS) will likely be challenged to demonstrate the recovery benefits of these expensive 

conservation measures in terms of effectiveness measures (e.g. whales saved). An added question on 

the minds of managers, industry representatives and conservation organizations is, ”How long need 

actions be in place before we know if they are effective?” For the analyst, this entails evaluating a 

Poisson process of relatively rare events for significant decreases in rates of occurrence. Data on ship 

strikes include a highly scrutinized time series of dates when whale mortalities that resulted from 

whale-ship collisions were detected during 2000-2010. With only 8 years of data prior to 

implementation of the Ship Strike Rule, uncertainty about the status quo rate will still be large. 

Further, whale-ship collisions that produce whale deaths will likely not be eliminated by 

management actions. Therefore, it is the amount by which they may have been reduced concomitant 

with adherence to regulations that must be investigated. Herein, I examine the timing of detected ship 

strikes of large whales to see whether there has been any reduction in their rate of occurrence 

detected ship-strike related mortalities. I also provide some advice on increasing the length of the 

time series after rule enactment to detect different effect sizes. 

METHODS 

Serious injury and mortality data for large whale stocks in the US Atlantic were evaluated for 

evidence of collisions with ships from necropsy and gross observations reported to the Northeast 

Fisheries Science Center (NEFSC) (see Glass et al. 2009 for a description). From these data, I 

included all reports judged to be mortalities or serious injuries (hereafter mortalities) to fin 

(Balaenoptera physalus), sei (B. borealis), right (Eubalaena glacialis) and humpback (Megaptera 

novaeangliae) whales during the period 1 January 1999-31 December 2010. Strikes of each species 

should resemble a Poisson process, each with its own inherent rate, and because Poisson processes 

are summable, events pooled across species should also resemble a Poisson process. Using the 

discovery date associated with each strike, I calculated the time elapsed since the previous event, 

which I refer to as “waiting time,” and I refer to the times since the Ship Strike Rule went into effect 

as event times (events occurring prior to the rule were coded as negative event times). I first 

examined the waiting time data relative to fits of models of exponential waiting times. Competing 

models included, in descending order of complexity: 

1 Variable rates among years (i.e., 12 rates, 1 per year 1999-2010), 

2 2 rates, one prior to the rule and one after, and 

3 A single rate. 
71

Preliminary evaluations of similar data suggested that a more powerful approach at detecting 

changes may be to develop regressions of event times against order of occurrence, and to compare 

models with and without change points. I fit both classical linear models and their Bayesian 

counterparts to examine the evidence for a change in the rate of ship strikes since the implementation 

date of the Ship Strike Rule. Competing models included: 

1 a single slope (a constant ship strike rate) 

2 a fixed change point having 2 slopes on either side of the implementation date 

3 2 distinct regression models for before and after the rule, and 

4 a free-floating, single change point analysis with 2 slopes on either side of an arbitrary change 

date, where that date was also allowed to vary and achieve the bit fit. 

The latter 2 models were only evaluated in the Bayesian framework. All Bayesian models were 

evaluated using WinBugs (ver. 1.4.3) (Lunn, et al. 2000) and were structured with broad flat priors 

on all parameters (Carlin and Louis 2000). Model Selection was based on DIC, an information 

criterion similar to AIC for likelihood models (Spiegelhalter 2002). 

In addition to examining the available data on detected ship strike mortalities, I examined the 

potential to detect a change in rates of ship strikes using a set of simulation trials. Specifically, I 

estimated the mean of the exponential distribution that best fit the pre-Rule waiting times. I simulated 

sets (1000 each) of waiting times that would occur, if the estimated rate of occurrence of ship strikes 

were 66, 50 and 33% of the pre-Rule rate for 2, 5 and 7 years post implementation. I then tested the 

hypothesis that a change point model with rates differing before and after implementation of the rule 

(model 5 above) fit these simulated data better than a constant regression model (model 4 above). 

The percent rejections (alpha=0.05) were taken as measure of power to detect a true change for the 9 

combinations of 3 study durations and 3 effect sizes. 

RESULTS 

A total of 58 ship strikes of large whales that were deemed to be serious injuries or 

mortalities were included in NEFSC data during 1 Jan 1999 – 31 December 2010. These included 17 

humpback, 16 fin, 21 northern right, and 4 sei whales. The most consistent evaluation of these data 

occurred beginning in 2000 (TVN Cole, Pers. Comm.), so I limited analysis to event times starting 

with the first strike in 2000 (n=55). A simple plot of the data gives an appearance of heterogeneity 

among years with 2005 appearing as a particularly nasty one (Figure 1). However, there was no 

statistical support for heterogeneity in event waiting times among years (Appendix A). As with most 

biological data, waiting times between detected ship strikes appear somewhat more variable than 

those associated with a simple Poisson process (ship strikes per year). 

Comparing change point models for these data offered a meager amount of evidence for an 

increase in the time between events after rule implementation, which equates to fewer ship strike 

mortalities detected per annum. Based on AICc, the classical regression model with a fixed change 

after the rule (model 5 above) received weight of 0.75 vs. the single rate regression (model 4 above) 

weight of 0.25, with an estimated effect size of only 3 days longer between strikes after rule 

implementation (Appendix B). Similarly, only weak distinctions were possible among Bayesian 

change point models with DIC values of 64.7, 63.0, 63.2, and 53.3 (Appendix C) for single slope 
72

(model 4 above), two slopes on either side of the implementation date (model 5 above), 2 distinct 

regression models (model 6 above), and a free-floating, single change point analysis (model 7 

above), respectively (smaller values are better). The one exception was the free-floating change point 

model, which rather convincingly suggested that, if one change occurred in these data, it was a 

significant decrease in time between strikes starting in early 2004 (Appendix C; Figure 2). Using the 

Bayesian framework to evaluate the before and after rule model (fixed change point referred to as 

model 5 above), the estimated times between ship strikes were 62 days before the rule and 88 days 

after the rule (Figure 3). Although this effect size differed considerably from the classical framework 

estimates, the posterior distribution for the rate of mortalities after the ship strike rule was enacted 

included a relatively large amount of variance (Figure 3). 

Clearly there would be more power to detect change the large that change is and the longer 

the period of evaluation after the rule is enacted. In my simulations, correct detections of significant 

changes in times between ship strikes ranged from 1% when a 33% reduction in the rate of ship 

strikes occurred and post-rule monitoring existed for only 2 years to a 99.7 correct detection rate 

when a 66% reduction in ship strikes occurred and monitoring included 7 years of data after the ship 

strike rule was enacted (Table 1). 

CONCLUSIONS 

Based on the analysis of change points, there was only weak evidence to support an increase 

in the time between detected ship strike mortalities of large whales on the eastern U.S. seaboard after 

enactment of the Ship Strike Rule. Rates of detected serious injuries and mortalities of large whales 

resulting from ship-whale collisions appeared to show somewhat greater variability during the 11 

years evaluated than what might be expected by chance alone. The estimated size of the effect, if one 

existed, depended heavily on the frame work (classical regression or Bayesian MCMC) in which the 

time series of ship strike dates were evaluated. Due to the lack of a clear outcome from the evaluation 

of ship strike event times when coupled with the results of the simulation study, I suggest at least 5 

years of data be evaluated prior to passing judgment on the biological effectiveness of the Ship Strike 

Rule. 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

Data used in this paper come from numerous sources. A. G. Henry and T.V. N. Cole are 

largely responsible for collating and often evaluating the level of evidence from a report to determine 

if it warrants a serious injury and were it not for their diligence and consistent treatment of reports, 

my evaluation would have little meaning. Determinations of causes of mortality are due in large part 

to a few highly skilled biologists that form a part of the stranding network and were essential in 

developing these data. 
73

REFERENCES CITED 

Carlin, B.P. and T.A Louis. 2000. Bayes and empirical Bayes methods for data analysis. Second 

Edition. Chapman and Hall, New York, New York, USA. 

Federal Register. 2006. Endangered Fish and Wildlife; Proposed Rule to Implement Speed 

Restrictions to Reduce the Threat of Ship Collisions with North Atlantic Right Whales. 

71:36299-36313. 

Glass, A.H, T.V.N. Cole, M. Garron. 2009. Mortality and serious injury determinations for baleen 

whale stocks along the United States eastern seaboard and adjacent Canadian Maritimes, 

2003-2007 (2nd Edition). U.S. Department of Commerce, Northeast Fish Science Center 

Reference Document 09-04, 19 pp. 

Lunn, DJ, Thomas A, Best N, and Spiegelhalter D. 2000. WinBUGS -- a Bayesian modelling 

framework: concepts, structure, and extensibility. Statistics and Computing 10:325--337. 

Spiegelhalter, D. J., N. G. Best, B. P. Carlin, A. van der Linde. 2002. Bayesian measures of 

model complexity and fit (with discussion). Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 

Series B (Statistical Methodology) 64: 583–639. 
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Appendix C. Sample Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving (COPPS) letter.

On (insert date) your vessel (insert name) was allegedly operating in excess of the 10 

knot speed limit inside the (insert SMA here). 

This letter is an official reminder of regulations regarding the Ship Strike Reduction Rule 

found at 50 CFR 224.105 promulgated under the authority of the Endangered Species Act 

and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. All vessels greater than or equal to 65 feet 

operating in the (insert SMA and applicable dates here) must slow to speeds of 10 knots 

or less. Vessels may operate at a speed greater than 10 knots only if necessary to maintain 

a safe maneuvering speed in an area where conditions severely restrict vessel 

maneuverability. 

Atlantic large whales are protected under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (16 USC 

1361) and the Endangered Species Act (16 USC 1531). Violations of either act can result 

in civil penalties, criminal fines and/or imprisonment. The NOAA Fisheries Service 

Office of Law Enforcement investigates reported violations of the Marine Mammal 

Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act.

Additional information about the Ship Strike Reduction Rule can be obtained online at 

www.nero.noaa.gov/shipstrike or by calling Special Agent (name) at (phone)

Sincerely,

Name

Special Agent-in-Charge

NOAA Fisheries Service Office of Law Enforcement

(Name) Enforcement Division 

Appendix D. Sample Email to Shipping Companies.

Dear _______:

Attached is an Excel file that includes individual spreadsheets for each (Ship company) 

ship recorded in “Seasonal Management Areas” (SMA) along the US eastern seaboard in 

(month, year). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 

established vessel speed restriction zones in certain locations and times to reduce the 

threat of vessel collisions with North Atlantic right whales 

(http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/shipstrike/compliance_guide.pdf). NOAA's National 

Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is using AIS technologies to track vessel operations in 

these SMAs and has compiled monthly summaries of (Ship company) vessels that have 

transited through the active SMAs..
83

Appendix E. Compliance Guide for Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction Rule (available at 

http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/shipstrike/compliance_guide.pdf)
84
85

Appendix F. Shipboard Right Whale Protection Program Notebooks Distributed January 2009 –

August 2011.

Affiliation # Sent Date Sent

New York Maritime Outreach 2 1/15/2009

OMAO's Marine Operations Center 12 5/19/2009

US Shipping 14 6/1/2009

Georgia Ports Authority 5 6/19/2009

US Army Corps of Engineers 16 6/23/2009

(Individual) 1 7/17/2009

Sapelo Island National Estuarine Research Reserve 1 7/21/2009

Moran Shipping Agency 8 9/21/2009

Savannah Maritime Association 48 10/23/2009

Maritime Association of South Carolina 48 10/23/2009

Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit 48 10/30/2009

APL Maritime 8 11/1/2009

Stolt Tankers 107 11/4/2009

USACE- South Atlantic Division 1 12/22/2009

USACE- Wilmington District 1 12/22/2009

USACE- Savannah District 1 12/22/2009

USACE- Charleston District 1 12/22/2009

Liberty Marine Services Inc. 1 12/22/2009

JMTX Agents and Operators Comm 18 1/6/2010

Savannah Maritime Association 12 1/20/2010

JMTX Harbor Safety Committee 8 3/10/2010

Savannah Maritime Association 12 12/15/2010

SC Maritime Assn Operations 24 6/23/2011

Hapag-Lloyd (America) Inc. 20 6/27/2011

Meditarrian Shipping Company 50 7/11/2011

Merritt Island NWR 2 7/11/2011

Riverwalk 2 7/11/2011

Wild Treasure 13 7/11/2011

TFMarine, Inc. 12 8/15/2011

Jacksonville Marine Transportation Exchange 36 8/15/2011

(Individual) 12 8/15/2011
86

Appendix G. Articles published about the ship speed rule, October 2008 – March 2011.

Publication Title Date

High Beam Research Ship Strike Reduction Rule Aims to Protect North Atlantic 

Right Whales 10/8/2008

Defenders of Wildlife Groups applaud new rules to protect right whales, but condemn 

premature phase-out of rules after only five years 10/8/2008

gCaptain Reducing Speed to Protect Right Whales 10/9/2008

Marine Log NOAA sets speed limit to protect right whales 10/9/2008

Bangor Daily News New rules to protect North Atlantic right whales 10/11/2008

Marine Link Speed Kills Whales: Restrictions for East Coast 10/16/2008

The Maritime Executive A Snapshot into the Future: Voyage 231 of the Containership 

“Compliance” 10/16/2008

The Maritime Executive Speed Restrictions to Reduce Threat of Ship Collisions With 

North Atlantic Right Whales to Take Effect 10/16/2008

Science Daily Ship Strike Reduction Rule Aims to Protect North Atlantic 

Right Whales 10/20/2008

Journal of Commerce Whale Rule to Slow Ships 10/30/2008

New England Aquarium Ship speed limits take effect as whales begin dangerous 

migration along East Coast 11/1/2008

Trade Only East Coast Speed Limits Start Next Week 11/19/2008

Professional Mariner NOAA proposes speed limits to protect North Atlantic right 

whales 12/1/2008

Trade Only Right Whale Restrictions Now in Effect 12/3/2008

The Maritime Executive New Vessel Speed Regulations for U.S. East Coast Ports 12/4/2008

The Maritime Executive New Vessel Speed Regulations for U.S. East Coast Ports 12/4/2008

Sail Magazine Save the Whales 12/5/2008

Coosa Valley News Right Whales Has Hope in Georgia 12/8/2008

Star News Ships slow down to spare rare whales 12/8/2008

Softpedia Ships Must Now Avoid Right Whale Paths 12/8/2008

The Boston Globe Caution! Whale Crossing: Slow to 11 miles per hour 12/8/2008
87

Publication Title Date

The Boston Herald New speed limit designed to protect rare whales 12/8/2008

Central Maine Morning 

Sentinel Ships slow down to save whales 12/8/2008

NOAA Ships Must Slow Down to Protect North Atlantic Right Whales 12/8/2008

Atlanta JournalConstitution Ancient visitors follow instincts to Georgia 12/8/2008

High Beam Research Ships Must Slow Down to Protect North Atlantic Right Whales 12/8/2008

The Boston Globe As of today, right whales gain a right of way at sea, US rule 

takes effect to reduce ship speed 12/9/2008

Conservation Report MARINE MAMMALS: Right whale shuts down Cape 

Cod Canal 12/9/2008

Jacksonville Marine 

Transportation Exchange 

Website

NOAA Releases Compliance Guide for Speed Rule 12/9/2008

hamptonroads.com and 

pilotonline.com Large ships must slow down to limit risk to endangered whales 12/10/2008

Georgia Dept. of Natural 

Resources

Press Release 12/11/2008

National Data Buoy Center 

website Right whales active off the coast 12/22/2008

NGIA Special Notice to 

Mariners Notice to Mariners 01/09 1/1/2009

The Post and Courier Harbor pilots seek exemption from federal slow-down rule 2/18/2009

Village Soup (The 

Rockland Herald Gazette) Right whale rule sinks cruise ship visit 3/2/2009

USA Today (blog) Whales force Royal Caribbean cruise ship to abandon port call 

in Maine 3/4/2009

Bunkerworld.com US ports: Speed restrictions to protect whales 3/9/2009

Newsday.com Monitoring of rare whales near NY harbor ends 3/16/2009

Mariners Weather Log, 

April 2009: New Vessel Speed Regulations for U.S. East Coast Ports 4/1/2009

Port World US ports: Speed restrictions to protect whales 4/9/2009

The Maritime Executive NOAA Says Changes in Vessel Operations May Reduce Risk of 

Endangered Whale Shipstrikes 5/28/2009

Georgia Dept. of Natural 

Resources

Ship Strike Reduction Regulation Information 5/29/2009
88

Publication Title Date

Marine Link CG Reminder, Slow for Right Whales 5/29/2009

Soundings Vessels Operations Altered to Prevent Right Whale Strike 6/3/2009

Earth System Monitor New Regulations and Routing Measures to Protect Endangered 

Right Whales 7/1/2009

Professional Mariner Ship speed limit to protect whales goes into effect Sunday 10/30/2009

Marine Link Waters Changes in Vessel Operations Protects Whales 11/1/2009

Environmental Service 

News

Ships Sailing U.S. Atlantic Coast Must Slow for Whales 11/2/2009

Soundings Right Whale Restrictions Now in Effect 11/3/2009

Trade Only NOAA Puts Whale Compliance Rules Online 11/3/2009

The Maritime Executive U.S. Coast Guard Reminds Mariners to Slow Down to Protect 

Right Whales 11/4/2009

Saving Seafood Ships Sailing U.S. Atlantic Coast Must Slow for Whales 11/6/2009

Action News 9 Chilly Now But Soon to Change Again... "Crafternoon"... 

Mariners & Right Whales 11/9/2009

NBC New York Ship Speed Limit Again Proposed to Aid Endangered Whales 1/7/2010

BIMCO NOAA gets serious with issue of violation notices to Ships in 

Voluntary Right Whale Speed Restriction Zone 11/1/2010

Port World NOAA announces vessel speed restrictions to protect 

endangered right whales 11/4/2010

Examiner.com Right Whale seasonal management is in effect 11/3/2010

Inchcape Shipping 

Services North Atlantic Right Whale Migration and Calving Season 11/4/2010

Live Better Magazine Southeastern U.S. Right Whale Education and Conservation 11/7/2010

gCaptain Seven Vessels Accused of Violating Right Whale Rule 11/16/2010

Defenders of Wildlife Right Whale Protection Has Teeth 11/17/2010

West of England USA - Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction Rule 11/24/2010

Mondaq United States: No Speeding—You May Be Subject to a Whale 

of a Penalty! 3/9/2011
89

Appendix H. Ship Speed Rule Press Releases Issued December 2008 – November 2010.

Organization Title Date URL

NOAA Ships must slow down to 

protect North Atlantic right 

whales

12/8/2008 http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov

/pr/pdfs/shipstrike/pressrel

ease_effective.pdf

NOAA Ship strike reduction rule 

aims to protect North 

Atlantic right whales

8/8/2008 http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov

/pr/pdfs/shipstrike/finalrul

e_pressrelease.pdf

USCG Right Whale Ship Strike 

Reduction Rule Takes 

Effect Sunday

10/30/2009 http://coastguardnews.com

/right-whale-ship-strikereduction-rule-takeseffect-sunday/2009/10/30/

NOAA- OLE NOAA Office of Law 

Enforcement reminds 

mariners to slow down

11/9/2009 http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov

/pr/pdfs/shipstrike/speed_r

estrictions_southeast.pdf

NOAA NOAA: Ship Speed 

Restrictions to Protect 

Endangered North Atlantic 

Right Whales 

11/1/2010 http://www.noaanews.noa

a.gov/stories2010/201011

01_shipstrike.html

NOAA Heightened Mariner 

Awareness Requested 

During Right Whale 

Birthing Season

1/10/2010 NA

NOAA- OLE NOAA Enforces Right 

Whale Ship Strike 

Reduction Rule

11/16/2010 http://www.noaanews.noa

a.gov/stories2010/201011

16_rightwhale.html
90

Appendix I. Presentations on ship speed rule given November 2008 through June 2011.

Presenter Date Title of Presentation Name of Event # of 

Attendees Audience

Shannon 

Bettridge 9/1/2008

Ship Strikes and North Atlantic Right 

Whales Final Environmental Impact 

Statement and Ship Strike Reduction 

Measures Boston Port Operators Group 50 Ship operators in Boston

Shannon 

Bettridge 10/1/2008

North Atlantic Right Whale Ship Strike 

Reduction Efforts SEIT meeting October 2008 40

Southeast Implementation 

Team

Greg Silber 11/7/2008 Right Whale Ship Strike Rule 

North Atlantic Right Whale 

Consortium Meeting 100

Right Whale 

Conservationist

Shannon 

Bettridge 11/7/2008

North Atlantic Right Whale Ship Strike 

Reduction Efforts NGO Constituents Meeting 25

Environmental NGO 

groups in DC

Kristen Koyama 11/19/2008 Right Whale Update

Boston Port Operators Group 

meeting 25

Pilots, harbor masters, 

MASSPORT, USCG, 

fed/state agencies, tug 

companies, etc.

Kristen Koyama 12/9/2008 Right Whale Update

Southeastern MA port safety 

meeting 50

Pilots, harbor masters, 

passenger vessel industry, 

fed/state agencies, USCG,

local law enforcement, etc.

Don Lewis 12/9/2008 Discussed implementation of Speed rule

Meeting with Cumberland 

Sound Pilots 75 Cumberland Sound Pilots

Don Lewis 12/9/2008 Discussed implementation of Speed rule

Meeting with Amelia Maritime, 

Green Island Maritime, and 

Seaboard Line Agents 75

Commercial shipping 

companies

Don Lewis 12/10/2008 Discussed implementation of Speed rule

Jacksonville Harbor Safety 

Committee 75

Jacksonville shipping 

agents, St Johns Bar Pilots
91

Presenter Date Title of Presentation Name of Event # of 

Attendees Audience

Michael 

Henderson 12/11/2008 Right Whale Ship Strike Rule - 2 pg PDF

CG Sector San Juan Harbor 

Safety Mtg 30

Harbor pilots, port 

authority, 

city/commonwealth 

officials, USCG, CBP, 

ACOE

Kristen Koyama 12/11/2008 Right Whale Update

Rhode Island port safety 

meeting 50

Pilots, harbor masters, 

passenger vessel industry, 

fed/state agencies, USCG, 

local law enforcement, etc.

Michael 

Henderson 12/12/2008 Right Whale Ship Strike Rule - 2 pg PDF

USCG Sector San Juan Harbor 

Safety Mtg 40

Harbor pilots, port 

authority, 

city/commonwealth 

officials, USCG, CBP, 

ACOE

Michael 

Henderson 12/16/2008 Right Whale Ship Strike Rule - 2 pg PDF

Emailed PDF to distribution list 

for PR & USVI 65

My Navigation Mgr 

distribution list for PR & 

USVI

Barb Zoodsma 12/18/2008

R/W presentation to USCG 

Sector Jacksonville personnel 75 USCG

Don Lewis 1/7/2009 Update of R/W season and new rule

Jacksonville Agents and 

Operators Meeting 75

Jacksonville Agents and 

Operators

Don Lewis 1/8/2009 Update of R/W season and new rule Fernandina Maritime Exchange 75

Port Mariners and Vessel 

Operators

Michael 

Henderson 1/21/2009 Right Whale Ship Strike Rule - 2 pg PDF

Savannah Maritime Assn 

monthly mtg 25

Pilots, port authority, GA 

DNR, USCG, CBP, 

ACOE, commercial 

shipping

Michael 

Henderson 1/22/2009 Right Whale Ship Strike Rule - 2 pg PDF

CG Sector Charleston Harbor 

Safety Mtg 35

Pilots, port authority, GA 

DNR, USCG, CBP, 

ACOE, commercial 

shipping
92

Presenter Date Title of Presentation Name of Event # of 

Attendees Audience

Kristen Koyama 1/23/2009 Right Whale Update ME/NH Port Safety Forum 30

Pilots, harbor masters, 

fed/state agencies, 

passenger vessels, port 

authority, etc.

Michael 

Henderson 1/26/2009 Right Whale Ship Strike Rule - 2 pg PDF Tampa Bay Harbor Safety Mtg 40

Pilots, Ports of Tampa, 

Manatee, St. Pete, USCG, 

ACOE Cruise shipping & 

commercial

Michael 

Henderson 1/26/2009 Right Whale Ship Strike Rule - 2 pg PDF

Board of Directors - Tampa 

Propeller Club 18

Senior Tampa Bay 

maritime officials

Don Lewis 2/7/2009 Seasonal Update and Speed rule

JMTX Board of Directors 

Meeting 20

Senior Maritime officials 

in Jacksonville

Michael 

Henderson 2/11/2009 Right Whale Ship Strike Rule - 2 pg PDF Key West Maritime Mtg 75

Shannon 

Bettridge 2/18/2009

North Atlantic Right Whale Ship Strike 

Reduction Efforts MISNA 20

Marine Exchanges, 

Nationwide

Kristen Koyama 2/18/2009 Right Whale Update

Boston Port Operators Group 

Meeting 25

Pilots, harbor masters, 

MASSPORT, USCG, 

fed/state agencies, tug 

companies, etc.

Michael 

Henderson 2/19/2009 Right Whale Ship Strike Rule - 2 pg PDF

Port Everglades (FL) Harbor 

Safety Mtg 75

Harbor pilots, port 

authority, 

city/commonwealth 

officials, USCG, ACOE

Michael 

Henderson 2/20/2009 Right Whale Ship Strike Rule - 2 pg PDF

Port of Miami Harbor Safety 

Mtg 75

Harbor pilots, port 

authority, 

city/commonwealth 

officials, USCG, ACOE

Kristen Koyama 2/25/2009 Right Whale Update

Thames Maritime Coalition 

meeting 15 Port interests, fed/state reps
93

Presenter Date Title of Presentation Name of Event # of 

Attendees Audience

Don Lewis 2/25/2009 Seasonal Update and Speed rule

Jacksonville Maritime Strategic 

Planning Comm 10

Select maritime exchange 

members

Kristen Koyama 3/10/2009 Right Whale Update

Southeastern MA port safety 

meeting 50

Pilots, harbor masters, 

passenger vessel industry, 

fed/state agencies, USCG, 

local law enforcement, etc.

Don Lewis 3/11/2009 Seasonal Update and Speed rule

JMTX Harbor Safety 

Committee 30

Port Mariners and Vessel 

Operators

Kristen Koyama 3/12/2009 Right Whale Update

Rhode Island port safety 

meeting 50

Pilots, harbor masters, 

passenger vessel industry, 

fed/state agencies, USCG, 

local law enforcement, etc.

Shannon 

Bettridge and 

Todd Nickerson 

and Frank Sprtel 3/18/2009 Right Whale Ship Strike Rule

NY Harbor Safety, Navigation 

and Operations Committee 

Meeting, Staten Island, NY 75

Pilots, Shipping Cos., Port 

Authorities, NY DEC, 

Academia, USCG, etc. 

Kristen Koyama

Todd Nickerson 3/26/2009 Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction Rule

USCG Industry Day - Small 

Passenger Vessels 100

Small passenger vessel 

industry reps, incl. ferries, 

whale watch, charters, etc

Don Lewis 4/1/2009 Seasonal Update and Speed rule

JMTX Agents and Operators 

Committee 25

Vessel Agents and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 4/9/2009 Seasonal Update and Speed rule

Port of Fernandina Maritime 

Exchange 20

Port Mariners and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 5/14/2009 Update and new Outreach Materials

Board of Governors, Propeller 

Club Jacksonville 20

Senior Maritime officials 

in Jacksonville

Don Lewis 5/20/2009 Update and new Outreach Materials

JMTX Harbor Safety 

Committee 25

Port Mariners and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 7/1/2009 Update and new Outreach Materials

JMTX Agents and Operators 

Committee 25

Vessel Agents and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 7/9/2009 General Briefing and Outreach

Florida Association of 

Environmental Professionals 20

Environmental Compliance 

Professionals
94

Presenter Date Title of Presentation Name of Event # of 

Attendees Audience

Don Lewis 9/9/2009 Season Preparation and Outreach 

JMTX Harbor Safety 

Committee 25

Port Mariners and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 10/4/2009 Season Preparation and Outreach 

JMTX Agents and Operators 

Committee 25

Vessel Agents and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 11/4/2009 General Briefing and Outreach

Marine Information Services of 

North America 10

Marine Exchanges and 

Assn from around nation

Don Lewis 11/10/2009 General Briefing and Outreach

San Jose Rotary Club -

Jacksonville 60

Jacksonville Business 

People

Don Lewis 12/9/2009 Seasonal Update and Compliance

JMTX Harbor Safety 

Committee 25

Port Mariners and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 1/6/2010 Seasonal Update and Compliance

JMTX Agents and Operators 

Committee 22

Vessel Agents and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 1/20/2010 Seasonal Update and Compliance Savannah Maritime Association 40

Port Mariners and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 2/3/2010 Seasonal Update and Compliance

JMTX Board of Directors 

Meeting 20

Senior Maritime officials 

in Jacksonville

Rich Chesler 3/2/2010 Right Whale and the Ship Strike Rule Lagoon House in Palm Bay, FL 15 General Public

Don Lewis 3/10/2010 Seasonal Update and Compliance

JMTX Harbor Safety 

Committee 25

Port Mariners and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 4/7/2010 Seasonal Update and Compliance

JMTX Agents and Operators 

Committee 20

Vessel Agents and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 5/19/2010 Seasonal Wrap-Up and Compliance

JMTX Harbor Safety 

Committee 25

Port Mariners and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 6/2/2010 Seasonal Wrap-Up and Compliance

Port of Fernandina Maritime 

Exchange 20

Port Mariners and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 7/7/2010

Seasonal Wrap-Up and Compliance

Discussion

JMTX Agents and Operators 

Committee 20

Vessel Agents and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 9/8/2010 Season Preparation and Outreach 

JMTX Harbor Safety 

Committee 25

Port Mariners and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 10/6/2010 Season Preparation and Outreach 

JMTX Agents and Operators 

Committee 20

Vessel Agents and Vessel 

Operators
95

Presenter Date Title of Presentation Name of Event # of 

Attendees Audience

Don Lewis 12/8/2010 Season Update Intro Greg Schweitzer

JMTX Harbor Safety 

Committee 25

Port Mariners and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 12/15/2010 Season Update Intro Greg Schweitzer Savannah Maritime Association 35

Port Mariners and Vessel 

Operators

1/10/2011

Ship Strike Rule/ SMA Public Service 

Announcement WAMU Radio ? General public

Don Lewis 1/12/2011 Seasonal Update and Compliance

JMTX Agents and Operators 

Committee 20

Vessel Agents and Vessel 

Operators

Michael Asaro 2/16/2011 Presentation- RW Ship Strike Rule

Port of Boston Terminal/USCG 

Industry Day Event, Boston, 

MA 50

Vessel Agents and Vessel 

Operators

Michael Asaro 2/24/2011 Presentation- RW Ship Strike Rule

Maine/New Hampshire Port 

Safety Forum, Portsmouth, NH- 50

Vessel Agents and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 3/9/2011 Season Update with Barb Zoodsma

JMTX Harbor Safety 

Committee 25

Port Mariners and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 4/13/2011 Seasonal Update and Compliance

JMTX Agents and Operators 

Committee 20

Vessel Agents and Vessel 

Operators

Don Lewis 4/21/2011 General Briefing and Outreach

Leadership Nassau -

Community Dev. 25

Fernandina Beach Business 

Leaders

Don Lewis 6/23/2011

Seasonal Wrap-Up and Compliance 

Discussion

Maritime Association of South 

Carolina Operations Committee 30

Port Mariners and Vessel 

Operators Charleston
96

Appendix J. Screen shot of NMFS Office of Protected Resources Ship Strike Reduction Page. 

www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/shipstrike.
97

Appendix K. Initial Estimate of Economic Impact of the Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction 

Vessel Speed Restrictions

February 6, 2012

To: Greg Silber and Shannon Bettridge

NOAA/ NMFS/Office of Protected Resources

From: Richard Blankfeld and Gerardo Ayzanoa

Nathan Associates Inc.

Subject: Initial Estimate of Economic Impact of the Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction Vessel Speed 

Restrictions

1. Introduction

On December 9, 2008, the Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction Rule (Rule) issued by the U.S. National 

Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) went into effect. The rule requires certain vessels to travel at 10 knots 

or less in certain areas of right whale aggregation and near several key port entrances along the U.S. 

eastern seaboard.

This memorandum presents an initial assessment of the estimated economic impact of the Rule. In large 

measure, the economic impact assessment is based on the approach and analysis presented in the FEIS 

Report, Economic Analysis for the Final Environmental Impact Statement of the North Atlantic Right 

Whale Ship Strike Reduction Strategy prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. for NMFS in August 2008. 

Memorandum
98

There are several important data and analytical improvements; however that are incorporated in the 

present assessment that are further described herein.

2. AIS Data and Approach

A key data improvement is the availability of Automatic Identification System (AIS) that uses a Global

Positioning System-linked, very high frequency radio signal that provides for ship-to-ship and ship-toshore information transfer. It transmits the ship’s name, call sign, position, dimensions, speed, heading 

and other information multiple times each minute. The AIS signal provides a suite of information, both 

dynamic (that is unique to a particular voyage) and static (that is consistent for a given vessel). Dynamic 

information includes the vessel’s position, speed over ground, course over ground, heading, rate of turn, 

and position accuracy (< or > 10 m) which are determined by continuous GPS linked updates. Static 

information includes the vessel name, call sign, type, cargo, and its Maritime Mobile Service Identity 

(MMSI) number. Given the rate at which it provides this information, AIS is a precise means to remotely 

track vessel speeds and other vessel operations.

AIS transponders are required on certain vessel types that transit U.S. waters. These include: 1) all 

commercial tugs, barges, tow and similar vessels that are 26 feet in length or greater; 2) all passenger 

vessels (such as ferries and cruise ships) 150 gross tonnage or more; and 3) any commercial selfpropelled vessel that is 65 feet in length or greater, which consists of commercial fishing vessels, 

tankers, cargo ships, etc. 

The goal of the economic impact analysis is to estimate the impact on the shipping industry and overall 

economy from the full implementation of the Rule; it is not designed to identify actual industry 

compliance with the Rule. As such, the economic analysis assumes 100 percent compliance with the 

Rule and as such represents the maximum economic impact on the shipping industry and general 

economy. For these reasons, the economic impact analysis assumes that all vessels subject to the Rule 

sail at a maximum speed of 10 knots within the restricted areas and time periods. Using the AIS data, 

the 10-knot speed limit is then compared with the actual sailing speeds of vessels for each area during 

periods when the speed restrictions are not in effect.

We obtained access to the AIS for the areas relevant to the Rule for the full year of 2009 and for the first 

11 months of 2010 from the NOAA Office of Protected Resources. We then spent a significant effort to 

review the data and fill-in critical missing information for the economic analysis on vessel type and size. 

This was accomplished by matching various vessel identifiers such as the Maritime Mobile Service
99

Vessel type 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100 100-120 120-150 150+ Total

Bulk Carrier 274 248 206 134 312 229 559 251 277 351 235 699 161 3 20 18 3,977

Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO) 6 44 6 13 2 71

Container Ship 136 571 921 338 684 506 1,172 805 1,379 1,017 3,485 6,308 79 221 17,622

Freight Barge 112 13 125

General Dry Cargo Ship 351 454 415 265 223 102 82 117 186 100 4 2,299

Passenger Ship a/ 2,267 851 159 2,899

Refrigerated Cargo Ship 215 262 54 1 2 96 5 26 661

Ro-Ro Cargo Ship 131 201 928 1,516 931 778 176 79 211 24 317 22 5,314

Tank Ship 12 368 340 481 106 164 298 881 648 2,034 656 474 760 116 424 440 424 287 8,913

Towing Vessel 14,298 14,298

Other b/ 1,743 133 18 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,900

Total 19,050 3,086 3,291 2,860 2,079 1,864 2,059 2,485 2,680 3,452 4,839 7,039 1,544 511 427 442 444 305 58,459

a/ Includes recreational vessels.

b/ Includes fishing vessels, industrial vessels, research vessels, and school ships.

Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. from AIS data as described in text.

DWT Size Range (000s)

Identity (MMSI) number, call sign, and IMO number. In some instances, information on the type and size 

of vessel were confirmed based on the name of the vessel, length and cargo type. For vessels that the 

vessel type was known as well as the gross registered tonnage, the deadweight tonnage was estimated 

using the regression analysis described in the 2008 FEIS Report, Appendix A, Attachment 5. 

As a result of the AIS data review and analysis, we were able to obtain for 2009, operating information 

for 58,459 vessel transits through areas affected by the Rule. Of these, 30,669 vessel transits (52.5%) 

occurred during periods when the Rule was in effect and 27,790 vessel transits (47.5%) occurred during 

periods when the rule was not in effect. Table 1 presents the distribution of the total vessel transits by 

type and size of vessel.

Table 1. Total Vessel Transits by Type and Size for Areas Subject to Rule, 2009 (includes periods when Rule is in 

effect and not in effect)

3. Average Operating Speeds by Vessel Type and Size

Accurate information on current vessel operating speeds is clearly an important element for the 

determination of the economic impact of the speed restriction required by the Rule. The AIS information 

provides the most detailed and accurate information of vessels operating speeds for the areas subject to 

the Rule. For each area subject to the Rule, we have computed the average operating speeds by type 

and size of vessel for periods in 2009 when the Rule was not in effect. This provides the most robust 

estimate for actual vessel operations and average operating speeds without the influence of the Rule. In 

Table 2 below, we present the data by vessel type and size but summarized across all of the areas 

affected by the Rule. The fastest average vessel operating speed in these areas observed in 2009 was 

14.0 knots for containerships and refrigerated cargo ships. Within some vessel size categories, faster 

average speeds of 15.9 knots (passenger ships) and 15.3 knots (Ro-Ro cargo ships) were recorded. 
100

Vessel type 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100100-120120-150 150+ Total

Bulk Carrier - 11.1 11.2 11.9 9.6 11.4 11.0 10.7 11.2 11.9 12.4 11.3 11.5 10.8 - - 12.8 10.8 11.3

Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO) - 13.9 - - - - - 10.1 - - - - 9.8 - - 12.7 - - 10.6

Container Ship 12.5 13.0 14.1 13.6 13.1 14.9 14.5 13.9 14.0 13.9 14.4 13.9 13.6 14.1 - - - - 14.0

Freight Barge 9.4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9.4

General Dry Cargo Ship 11.5 11.4 13.8 12.3 12.9 12.2 12.6 11.2 12.3 12.9 10.7 - - - - - - - 12.3

Passenger Ship a/ 10.6 15.9 14.8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12.4

Refrigerated Cargo Ship - 14.8 14.7 15.0 - - 11.3 - 13.4 - 13.7 - - - - - - - 14.0

Ro-Ro Cargo Ship 8.3 13.3 13.6 14.3 13.7 13.2 13.9 15.3 13.4 14.3 13.6 13.4 - - - - - - 13.6

Tank Ship - 12.3 11.6 12.7 10.8 12.2 12.1 12.4 12.0 12.0 11.8 12.0 11.2 11.3 10.6 11.3 10.2 11.2 11.8

Towing Vessel 8.2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8.2

a/ Includes recreational vessels.

Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. from AIS data as described in text.

DWT Size Range (000s)

Vessel type 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100100-120120-150 150+ Total

Bulk Carrier - 0.16 0.15 0.29 0.11 0.19 0.19 0.10 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.12 0.17 0.17 - - 0.20 0.01 0.17

Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO) - 0.38 - - - - - 0.05 - - - - 0.02 0.13 - - - - 0.10

Container Ship 0.34 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.20 0.15 - - - - 0.18

Freight Barge 0.01 0.17 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.05

General Dry Cargo Ship 0.14 0.27 0.32 0.23 0.31 0.21 0.25 0.20 0.24 0.18 0.22 - - - - - - - 0.25

Passenger Ship a/ 0.07 0.13 0.25 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.10

Refrigerated Cargo Ship - 0.52 0.46 0.26 0.39 0.04 0.28 - 0.05 - 0.06 - - - - - - - 0.43

Ro-Ro Cargo Ship 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.10 0.11 0.24 0.14 0.09 0.22 - - - - - - 0.17

Tank Ship 0.05 0.12 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.13 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.20 0.10 0.23 0.17

Towing Vessel 0.03 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.03

Total 0.12 0.48 0.43 0.43 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.33 0.41 0.37 0.42 0.40 0.26 0.31 0.17 0.25 0.14 0.25 0.30

a/ Includes recreational vessels.

Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. from AIS data as described in text.

DWT Size Range (000s)

Table 2. Average Vessel Operating Speed by Type and Size of Vessel for Areas Subject to Rule During Periods 

When Rule is Not in Effect, 2009 (knots)

4. Average Delays due to Rule by Type and Size of Vessel

The primary operational impact of the Rule on the shipping industry is the extra sailing time incurred 

caused by vessels having to slow down within the restricted areas. Estimates of the extra sailing time 

were calculated by subtracting the time required to sail through each restricted area using the detailed 

average vessel operating speeds for that restricted area during periods when the Rule was not in effect 

from the time required at a sailing speed of 10 knots. Only average vessel speeds of greater than 10 

knots during non-Rule periods were used for these calculations. A summary across all restricted areas of 

the average extra time per vessel transit by vessel type and size is presented in Table 3. The highest 

average delay by vessel type is 0.43 hours (26 minutes) for refrigerated cargo ships. 

Table 3. Average Delays per Vessel Transit due to Rule by Type and Size of Vessel, 2009 (hours)
101

General Tanker Tanker General Tanker

cargo Container Bulk (double (single cargo Container Bulk (double (single

vessel ship carrier hull) hull vessel ship carrier hull) hull

 11,000 9,000 15,000 20,000 20,000 11,000 9,000 15,000 20,000 20,000

 14,000 14,000 25,000 25,000 25,000 14,000 14,000 25,000 25,000 25,000

 16,000 17,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 16,000 17,000 35,000 35,000 35,000

 20,000 20,000 40,000 50,000 50,000 20,000 20,000 40,000 50,000 50,000

 24,000 23,000 50,000 60,000 60,000 24,000 23,000 50,000 60,000 60,000

 30,000 28,000 60,000 70,000 70,000 30,000 28,000 60,000 70,000 70,000

 31,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 31,000 80,000 80,000 80,000

 35,000 100,000 90,000 90,000 35,000 100,000 90,000 90,000

 39,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 39,000 120,000 120,000 120,000

 42,000 150,000 150,000 150,000 42,000 130,000 150,000 150,000

 49,000 175,000 175,000 175,000 49,000 175,000 175,000

 55,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 55,000 200,000 200,000

 66,000 265,000 265,000 66,000 265,000 265,000

 82,000 325,000 325,000

Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Economic Guidance Memorandum 02-06, Deep Draft Vessel Operating Costs

Foreign flag U.S. flag

Tanker

5. Vessel Operating Costs at Sea by Type and Size of Vessel

The USACE prepares estimates of vessel operating costs to be used by planners in studies to determine 

the potential benefits of harbor improvement projects. Vessel operating costs include annual capital 

costs as determined by the replacement cost of the vessels and application of capital recovery factors; 

estimates of fixed annual operating costs such as for crew, lubricating materials and stores (supplies), 

maintenance and repair, insurance and administration; the number of operational days per year; and 

fuel costs at sea and in port.

The type and DWT size of vessels for which operating costs are reported by the USACE is shown in Table 

4 below. Vessel operating costs are presented separately for U.S. flag and foreign flag vessels, for five 

vessel types, and up to 14 vessel DWT sizes within a vessel type.

Table 4. Type and Size of Vessels for which USACE Reports Vessel Operating Costs (DWT)

We applied regression techniques to the USACE vessel operating cost data in order to match with the 

vessel size categories used in our analysis of U.S. East Coast vessel arrivals. A logarithmic equation was 

specified relating hourly operating costs at sea with vessel DWT for each of the vessel types used in this 

economic impact analysis.
102

Vessel type 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100 100-120 120-150 150+

Foreign Flag 2009 Hourly Operating Costs at Sea

Bulk Carrier 786 805 825 845 865 886 907 929 951 974 1,010 1,059 1,110 1,164 1,221 1,311 1,477 1,703

Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO) 826 846 866 887 908 930 952 975 999 1,023 1,060 1,112 1,166 1,223 1,282 1,377 1,551 1,789

Container Ship 788 888 1,000 1,126 1,267 1,427 1,607 1,809 2,037 2,294 2,740 3,474 4,405 5,584 7,080 10,107 - -

Freight Barge 485 594 728 892 1,093 1,339 1,641 2,010 2,463 3,017 - - - - - - - -

General Dry Cargo Ship 485 594 728 892 1,093 1,339 1,641 2,010 2,463 3,017 - - - - - - - -

Passenger Ship a/ 3,551 5,069 7,237 10,962 13,897 - - - - - - - - - - - -

Refrigerated Cargo Ship 1,774 1,997 2,249 2,532 2,851 3,211 3,615 4,071 4,583 5,161 6,166 - - - - - - -

Ro-Ro Cargo Ship 867 977 1,100 1,238 1,394 1,570 1,767 1,990 2,241 2,523 3,014 3,822 4,845 - - - - -

Tank Ship 960 978 996 1,015 1,034 1,053 1,073 1,093 1,113 1,134 1,166 1,210 1,256 1,304 1,353 1,431 1,570 1,755

Towing Vessel 960 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Other b/ 485 594 728 892 1,093 1,339 1,641 2,010 2,463 3,017 - - - - - - - -

Foreign Flag Jan 2012 Hourly Operating Costs at Sea

Bulk Carrier 1,180 1,209 1,238 1,269 1,300 1,332 1,364 1,398 1,432 1,467 1,522 1,597 1,677 1,760 1,847 1,987 2,242 2,593

Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO) 1,239 1,269 1,300 1,332 1,365 1,398 1,433 1,468 1,504 1,541 1,598 1,677 1,760 1,848 1,940 2,086 2,355 2,723

Container Ship 1,166 1,325 1,506 1,712 1,946 2,212 2,514 2,858 3,249 3,693 4,476 5,783 7,472 9,655 12,475 18,323 - -

Freight Barge 710 871 1,068 1,311 1,608 1,972 2,419 2,967 3,640 4,465 - - - - - - - -

General Dry Cargo Ship 710 871 1,068 1,311 1,608 1,972 2,419 2,967 3,640 4,465 - - - - - - - -

Passenger Ship a/ 5,299 7,784 11,432 17,902 23,132 - - - - - - - - - - - -

Refrigerated Cargo Ship 2,622 2,981 3,388 3,852 4,378 4,977 5,657 6,431 7,310 8,309 10,070 - - - - - - -

Ro-Ro Cargo Ship 1,282 1,457 1,657 1,883 2,140 2,433 2,766 3,144 3,574 4,062 4,923 6,361 8,219 - - - - -

Tank Ship 1,347 1,373 1,400 1,427 1,454 1,483 1,512 1,541 1,571 1,601 1,648 1,713 1,780 1,850 1,922 2,037 2,242 2,516

Towing Vessel 1,347 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Other b/ 710 871 1,068 1,311 1,608 1,972 2,419 2,967 3,640 4,465 - - - - - - - -

a/ Includes recreational vessels.

b/ Includes fishing vessels, industrial vessels, research vessels, and school ships.

Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. as decribed in text from data provided in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Economic Guidance Memorandum 05-01, 

Deep Draft Vessel Operating Costs and adjusted for bunker fuel prices reported by Bunkerworld for IFO380 and MDO for New York for the year 2009 and as of January 20, 2012.

DWT Size Range (000s)

A concern over the use of the USACE operating cost estimates is the variability of actual vessel operating 

costs due to the fluctuations in the price of bunker fuel. The USACE estimates include the assumed fuel 

consumption per day at sea for the primary propulsion and auxiliary propulsion for each vessel type and 

DWT size. The primary propulsion is assumed to use heavy viscosity oil while the auxiliary propulsion is 

assumed to use marine diesel oil. We updated the USACE vessel operating costs to reflect the average 

bunker fuel prices per ton for New York for using an annual average 2009 calculated from data reported 

by Bunkerworld. The average price for heavy viscosity oil for 2009 was $347 per metric ton and marine 

diesel oil was $685 per metric ton. The resulting estimates of vessel operating costs by type and size of 

vessel for 2009 are presented in Table 5. These estimated vessel operating costs for 2009 represent the 

best method to value the actual impact on the shipping industry of the Rule that year.

Table 5. Hourly Vessel Operating Costs at Sea for Foreign Flag Vessels by Type Size of Vessel Using Average 

2009 and January 2012 Bunker Fuel Prices

Table 5 also presents estimated hourly vessel operating costs using bunker prices of January 2012. Given 

that the future of bunker fuel prices is unknown, the January 2012 may represent the best estimate for 

vessel operating costs in future years. The price for heavy viscosity oil in New York for January 20, 2012 

was $672 per metric ton and marine diesel oil was $998 per metric ton.
103

Vessel type 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100100-120120-150 150+ Total

Bulk Carrier - 29 38 24 8 39 27 75 59 52 89 49 135 21 - - 12 4 663

Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO) - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2

Container Ship 18 153 332 93 207 247 617 503 854 646 3,072 6,551 76 314 - - - - 13,682

General Dry Cargo Ship 35 57 102 51 62 25 40 29 103 76 - - - - - - - - 580

Passenger Ship a/ 471 901 406 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1,777

Refrigerated Cargo Ship - 170 215 45 - - 64 - 7 - 21 - - - - - - - 522

Ro-Ro Cargo Ship 4 56 361 676 441 350 99 65 147 18 286 12 - - - - - - 2,514

Tank Ship - 74 50 108 13 39 46 236 131 454 147 104 121 12 69 93 46 75 1,817

Towing Vessel 279 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 279

Other b/ 132 8 - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 142

Total 939 1,450 1,503 997 731 700 895 908 1,300 1,246 3,615 6,715 332 347 69 93 59 78 21,976

a/ Includes recreational vessels.

b/ Includes fishing vessels, industrial vessels, research vessels, and school ships.

Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. from AIS data as described in text.

DWT Size Range (000s)

Vessel type 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100 100-120120-150 150+ Total

Bulk Carrier - 44 58 36 12 58 41 114 89 79 134 74 204 32 - - 19 5 1,000

Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO) - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2

Container Ship 26 228 500 141 318 383 966 794 1,362 1,040 5,017 10,903 129 542 - - - - 22,351

General Dry Cargo Ship 51 84 149 74 91 37 59 43 153 112 - - - - - - - - 853

Passenger Ship a/ 702 1,383 641 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2,725

Refrigerated Cargo Ship - 254 324 69 - - 100 - 10 - 34 - - - - - - - 791

Ro-Ro Cargo Ship 5 83 544 1,028 677 542 155 102 234 28 467 20 - - - - - - 3,887

Tank Ship - 104 71 152 19 54 64 332 185 642 207 147 171 18 98 132 66 107 2,567

Towing Vessel 392 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 392

Other b/ 194 12 - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - 208

Total 1,370 2,195 2,285 1,501 1,117 1,076 1,388 1,385 2,032 1,900 5,860 11,144 504 592 98 132 85 112 34,776

a/ Includes recreational vessels.

b/ Includes fishing vessels, industrial vessels, research vessels, and school ships.

Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. from AIS data as described in text.

DWT Size Range (000s)

6. Estimated Direct Economic Impact on Shipping Industry Vessels

The estimated direct economic impact on the shipping industry of the Rule in 2009 is presented in Table 

6. Across all restricted areas, the total direct economic impact is estimated $22.0 million. More than 62 

percent of the total direct impact incurred by containerships at $13.7 million, followed distantly by 

refrigerated cargo ships at $2.5 million and Ro-Ro cargo ships and passenger ships each at $1.8 million.

Table 6. Direct Economic Impact of Rule on Shipping Industry by Type and Size of Vessel, 2009 Using Average 

2009 Bunker Fuel Prices ($000s)

Table 7 presents the impact for 2009 vessel but using the average vessel operating costs based on 

January 2012 bunker fuel prices. The total direct economic impact increases to $34.8 million with 

containerships accounting for $22.4 million or 64.2 percent of the total.

Table 7. Direct Economic Impact of Rule on Shipping Industry by Type and Size of Vessel, 2009 Using 2012 

Bunker Fuel Prices, ($000s)
104

7. Total Economic Impact of Rule Including Other Market Segments and Indirect Economic 

Impact

The AIS data captures the vast preponderance of commercial maritime activity that would be subject to 

the speed restrictions and other operational measures. However, there are some market segments that 

may be impacted by the speed restrictions and other operational measures whose maritime activities 

are not adequately captured in the AISA data. In this section, we identify the most relevant of these 

market segments and discuss the potential economic impact. Those market segments or potential 

impacts include:

 Cumulative effect of multi-port strings for containerships

 Re-routing of southbound coastwise shipping

 Passenger time on ferries

 Indirect economic impact of port diversions

The economic impact for each of these elements is presented below5.

Cumulative effect of Multi-Port Strings for Containerships

Many of the vessels arrivals at U.S. East Coast ports occur as part of a “string” of port calls by the vessel. 

For containerships, ro-ro cargo ships and some specialty tankers these multi-port calls constitute a 

scheduled cargo service offered by the shipping lines. Other types of vessels may have multiple U.S. East 

Coast port calls as part of a coastwise cabotage service, for delivery of specialty chemicals or other 

products, or to lighten or top off in order to maximize vessel utilization. There are several reasons why 

the cumulative effect of multiple port calls at restricted ports could impact a vessel more than the sum 

of the individual direct impacts presented in the prior sections. First, the delays incurred from speed 

restrictions at one port when combined with speed restrictions at a subsequent port may diminish the 

ability of the vessel to maintain its schedule and could result in missed tidal windows. Second, even brief 

delays at arrival at the second port could result in increased costs for scheduled, but unused, port labor. 

Third, some shipping lines felt that the cumulative impact of three or four port calls at port areas with 

restrictions could cause them to rework vessel itineraries and could result in dropping of one of the port 

calls in order to maintain a weekly service without having to add an additional vessel to the service.

 

5

In the 2008 FEIS, other market segments such as commercial fishing, charter fishing and whale watching vessels 

were analyzed separately. However for this economic impact assessment, the availability of the AIS data permitted 

those market segments to be analyzed as part of the overall shipping industry analysis.
105

However, these cumulative factors will not affect every vessel making multiple port calls at restricted 

ports. Also the impact may vary from an 8-hour delay due to a missed tidal window to incurring charges 

for unused labor if a vessel is late arriving at the port.6It is realistic to assume that the shipping industry 

will revise their itineraries to account for the delays imposed by the speed restrictions and that 

occurrences of missed tidal widows will be rare. We have used an average additional delay of 11 

minutes for each containership transit that is part of a multi-port string to account for this cumulative 

impact.7The economic value of this additional time has been calculated for each port area based 

respectively on the average 2009 vessel operating and the January 2012 vessel operating costs for 

containerships. As shown in Table 8, the estimated impact for 2009 is$3.6 million and in 2012 $5.7 

million. 

Re-routing of Southbound Coastwise Shipping

Coastwise shipping or cabotage trade along the U.S. East Coast has always been an important segment 

of our nation’s maritime heritage. In recent years, attention has been focused on the further 

development of coastwise shipping (also referred to as short-sea shipping) as a means of reducing 

highway congestion on the Eastern Seaboard. Benefits of coastwise shipping also include lowering 

transport and environmental costs and reducing our demand for imported fuel. For these reasons, it is 

important that the speed restrictions not unduly affect the development of increased coastwise 

shipping.

However, for commercial and navigation purposes, it appears unlikely that the speed restriction would 

significantly affect coastwise shipping. Northbound vessels prefer to use Gulf Stream further offshore 

and benefit from the enhanced operating speed and fuel efficiency. Southbound traffic routes closer to 

the U.S. East Coast; generally within 7-10 nautical miles of the shoreline. However, during the proposed 

seasonal management periods, masters of southbound vessels would likely route outside of seasonal 

speed restricted areas incurring an overall increase in distance. This affects southbound vessels between 

the entrance to the Chesapeake Bay and Port Canaveral.

 

6 While tides occur on 12-hour cycle, it is assumed that a tidal window is open for 2 hours before and after high 

tide. This results in an 8-hour waiting period between tidal windows.

7

Only a small portion of vessel arrivals should be affected by this additional delay. It is assumed that 7.5 percent 

of vessels could be affected by as much as an additional 8-hour delay due to missing the tidal window. This results 

in an average additional delay per vessel of 36 minutes. 
106

The speed restrictions in the mid-Atlantic region are implemented for a radius of 20 nautical mile buffer 

around each port area for port areas north of Wilmington, NC.8 A continuous 20-mile buffer was 

implemented from Wilmington, NC through Savannah to the northern boundary of the Southeastern 

SMA. The additional distance incurred by southbound vessels would be 56 nautical miles. The economic 

impact for this extra sailing distance is estimated at $1.3 million using 2009 vessel operating costs and 

$2.1 million using January 2012 vessel operating costs.

Impact on Ferry Passengers

The proposed operational measures will have a direct economic impact on ferry passengers whose 

travel time will be increased due to the speed restrictions. As recognized by the U.S. Department of 

Transportation, time saved from travel may be devoted to other activities, such as remunerative work or 

recreation.9The USDOT guidelines recommend hourly values of travel-time savings to be used in all 

economic analysis of transportation regulatory actions. Specific values of travel time are recommended 

for local travel and intercity travel and whether the travel is for business or personal purposes. 

The USDOT guidelines recommend using the median household income (divided by 2000 hours) as the 

basis for valuation of intercity business travel time, and 70 percent of that value for intercity personal 

travel time. Hence, based on the 2000 Census data, they recommend hourly values of $21.20 for 

intercity business travel and $14.80 for intercity personal travel. We have updated the USDOT 

recommended values using 2005 data for median household income reported by the U.S. Census 

Bureau.10 Based on that data, the hourly value of intercity business travel time is $23.16 and intercity 

personal travel time is $16.21.

The estimated economic impact of proposed operational measures on Southern New England ferry 

passengers is presented in Table 8. The estimates are the same as those presented in the 2008 FEIS, as a 

 

8

The exception is the Block Island Sound speed restriction area that is configured as a rectangle with a width of 30 

nautical miles.

9

U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary of transportation, The Value of Travel Time: 

Departmental Guidance for Conducting Economic Evaluations, April 9, 1997 

http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/Data/VOT97guid.pdf and Revised Departmental Guidance, Valuation of Travel 

Time in Economic Analysis, February 11, 2003 http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/Data/VOTrevision1_2-11-03.pdf.

10 U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2005, issued August 

2006. http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf
107

separate analysis of the impact on ferry passengers was not conducted for this initial estimate of the 

economic impact of the Rule.

Estimated Indirect Economic Impact

Depending on the nature and significance of the direct economic impact, it is possible that 

implementation of the proposed operational measures could have indirect economic impacts. Potential 

indirect economic impacts include:

 Increased intermodal costs due to missed rail and truck connections 

 Diversion of traffic to other ports

 Impact on local economies of decreased income from jobs lost due to traffic diversions

There are many factors that influence a shipping line’s decision to call at specific ports. These include 

the adequacy and suitability of port facilities and equipment, the ability of the terminal operator to 

quickly turnaround the vessel, overall cargo demand, efficiency of intermodal transportation, port 

charges, and the port location relative to other ports and cargo markets. If cargo is to divert to other 

ports this would be because the total additional costs associated with those routes are less than the cost 

of vessel time due to delays at the current port. Hence it would be double-counting to also include any 

additional overland transport costs to the estimated impact already presented.

A good portion of a port’s traffic is often considered captive to that port. For cargoes that are destined 

for the port’s immediate hinterland, it does not make economic sense to call at a distant port and then 

to ship back to the port via expensive land transport. However, most ports also accommodate traffic 

that is not destined for its immediate hinterland but is through traffic that may have economically 

attractive routing alternatives. Port areas in the Northeast and northern parts of the mid-Atlantic region 

serve as gateways to the inland population centers and industrial areas such as western New York, 

western Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Michigan. These areas may be served via the Canadian 

ports of Halifax and Montreal without incurring delays caused by the right whale ship strike reduction 

measures.11 These Canadian ports currently compete with Northeast U.S. ports for cargo destined for 

 

11 Vessels may divert to other U.S. ports in addition to those diverting to Canada. While this is possible, for the 

total economic impact analysis only diversions to non-U.S. ports are included. For diversion to ports within the U.S. 

the negative economic impact for one U.S. port are offset by gains in another U.S. port. 
108

Impact 2009 2012

Direct economic impact 

Shipping industry vessels 21,976 34,776

Cumulative effect of multi-port strings 3,593 5,685

Re-routing of southbound coastwise shipping 1,298 2,054

Pasengers' time on passenger ferries 5,191 5,191

Whale watching vessels 1,336 1,336

 Subtotal direct economic impact 33,393 49,041

Indirect economic impact of port diversions 18,970 30,019

Total economic impact 52,363 79,061

Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates as described in text.

Bunker fuel prices of

the mid-eastern U.S. and the speed restrictions implemented in the U.S. and not in Canada could shift 

the current competitive balance to the advantage of Canadian ports.

The Maritime Administration (MARAD), an agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation has 

developed a Port Economic Impact Kit that allows users to assess the economic impact of port activity 

on a region’s economy. The MARAD Port Economic Impact Kit uses an adaptation of input-output 

analysis that is a widely established tool for undertaking economic impact assessments. The model 

calculates the total economic impacts or multiplier effect of deep-draft port industry and includes an 

indirect effect that reflects expenditures made by the supplying firms to meet the requirements of the 

deep-draft port industry as well as expenditures by firms stocking the supplying firms.The model also 

includes an induced effect that corresponds to the change in consumer spending that is generated by 

changes in labor income accruing to the workers in the deep-draft port industry as well as employment 

in the supplying businesses.

We have estimated the indirect economic of port diversions based on the detailed methodology 

described in the 2008 FEIS adjusted for the actual observed delays incurred in 2009 from the AIS data 

analysis and using the updated vessel operating costs for 2009 and January 2012. As shown in Table 8, 

the estimated indirect economic impact of port diversion for 2009 is $19.9 million and for January 2012 

it is $30.0 million. 

Table 8. Total Economic Impact of Rule Using 2009 and 2012 Bunker Fuel Prices, ($000s)

The total economic impact of the Rule including direct and indirect impacts is estimated at $52.4 million 

using 2009 vessel operating costs and $79.1 million using January 2012 vessel operating costs.
109

Appendix L. Number of transits by vessel type that had at least 1 nautical mile of travel within 

the DMAs during their respective effective periods.

DMA

# 

Whales

General 

Location

Area 

(nm2) Start Date End Date Tanker Cargo Pass. Pilot Tow Tug Other Total

NE_01 11

Jeffreys 

Ledge 1767 12/11/2008 12/25/2008 11 1 0 1 11 11 8 43

NE_02 43

Jordan 

Basin 1576 12/11/2008 12/28/2009 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 6

NE_03 3

Cashes 

Ledge 1356 12/11/2008 12/25/2009 21 3 0 0 0 0 0 24

NE_04 28

Jeffreys 

Ledge 1997 1/13/2009 2/10/2009 39 14 0 0 23 32 17 125

NE_05 3

Jeffreys 

Ledge 1605 1/16/2009 1/29/2009 32 21 3 0 20 19 10 105

NE_06 6

Northern 

Jeffreys 

Ledge 1448 2/11/2009 2/25/2009 14 6 0 0 5 7 3 35

NE_07 5

Southern 

Jeffreys 

Ledge 1456 2/11/2009 2/25/2009 27 18 0 0 3 5 5 59

NE_08 12

Great 

South 

Channel 2419 2/11/2009 2/25/2009 12 18 0 0 0 0 5 36

NE_09 3

Georges 

Shoal 1592 3/17/2009 3/28/2009 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

NE_10 5

Georges 

Shoal 1764 4/13/2009 4/25/2009 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1

NE_11 15

Cashes 

Ledge 1926 5/12/2009 5/27/2009 13 4 0 0 0 0 6 23

NE_12 3

Jordan 

Basin 1602 5/13/2009 5/27/2009 22 1 0 0 0 1 3 27

NE_13 44

Cashes 

Ledge 4391 6/2/2009 6/29/2009 41 30 8 0 1 0 21 102

NE_14 3

Cashes 

Ledge 4391 7/9/2009 7/21/2009 20 22 3 0 0 0 24 72

NE_15 5

Fippenies 

Ledge 1644 9/2/2009 9/16/2009 8 2 4 0 2 0 15 31

NE_16 26

Jeffreys 

Ledge 2124 10/15/2009 11/11/2009 18 5 11 0 17 17 30 98

NE_17 24

Jordan 

Basin 1918 10/22/2009 12/1/2009 49 2 1 0 1 0 4 59

NE_18 16

Cashes 

Ledge 2441 10/27/2009 11/10/2009 9 2 2 0 2 0 0 15

NE_19 41

Jeffreys 

Ledge 3661 11/10/2009 12/17/2009 71 15 6 0 7 10 37 148

NE_20 47

Cashes 

Ledge 3403 11/10/2009 11/24/2009 19 9 0 0 0 0 1 29

NE_21 27

Jordan 

Basin 4198 12/4/2009 12/19/2009 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 7

NE_22 37

Jordan 

Basin 3768 1/4/2010 1/15/2010 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

NE_23 13

Jeffreys 

Ledge 1887 1/5/2010 1/28/2010 34 6 0 0 10 13 10 73

NE_24 3

Nantucket 

MA 1527 2/1/2010 2/15/2010 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 7

NE_25 14

Nantucket 

MA 1922 3/8/2010 3/22/2010 1 0 5 0 1 0 1 8
110

DMA

# 

Whales

General 

Location

Area 

(nm2) Start Date End Date Tanker Cargo Pass. Pilot Tow Tug Other Total

NE_26 6

Great 

South 

Channel 1697 3/12/2010 3/24/2010 7 11 0 0 0 0 3 21

NE_27 8

Great 

South 

Channel 1941 3/22/2010 4/4/2010 15 19 10 0 1 0 1 47

NE_28 3

Nantucket 

MA 1566 4/14/2010 4/28/2010 0 0 15 0 1 0 5 22

NE_29 18

Block 

Island 886 4/22/2010 5/5/2010 25 16 2 0 9 33 25 115

NE_30 80

Block 

Island 1682 4/30/2010 5/5/2010 8 9 3 0 7 16 15 61

NE_31 11

Cashes 

Ledge 2460 5/24/2010 6/5/2010 20 10 2 0 0 2 12 46

NE_32 3

Jeffreys 

Ledge 1591 7/27/2010 8/9/2010 21 22 5 3 7 16 50 125

NE_33 4

Jeffreys 

Ledge 1591 8/9/2010 8/23/2010 26 19 9 4 8 11 55 135

NE_34 10

Jeffreys 

Ledge 1591 8/18/2010 9/1/2010 24 22 6 2 9 14 52 131

NE_35 6

Jeffreys

Ledge 1591 9/1/2010 9/14/2010 16 15 11 4 8 12 30 97

NE_36 4

Mount 

Desert 

Island 1707 9/13/2010 9/25/2010 5 1 8 0 0 0 0 14

NE_37 7

Jeffreys 

Ledge 1591 9/13/2010 9/27/2010 27 19 20 8 10 20 16 121

NE_38 10

Cashes 

Ledge 2308 10/14/2010 10/28/2010 13 1 6 0 0 0 7 27

NE_39 8

Jeffreys 

Ledge 1818 10/14/2010 10/28/2010 14 10 14 2 3 13 14 70

NE_40 4

Jordan 

Basin 1471 10/14/2010 10/28/2010 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 4

NE_41 14

Jeffreys 

Ledge 1818 10/28/2010 11/8/2010 10 4 2 0 2 6 6 33

NE_42 10

Jeffreys 

Ledge 3754 11/16/2010 11/27/2010 24 24 1 0 3 20 8 80

NE_43 14

Cashes 

Ledge 2760 11/16/2010 11/27/2010 7 9 0 0 0 0 2 18

NE_44 12

Jordan 

Basin 2447 11/16/2010 11/27/2010 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2

NE_45 7

Jeffreys 

Ledge 2299 11/29/2010 12/14/2010 15 2 0 0 5 9 8 41

NE_46 16

Jordan 

Basin 2413 12/1/2010 12/14/2010 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4

NE_47 4

Cashes 

Ledge 1683 12/1/2010 12/14/2010 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 10

NE_48 28

Cashes 

Ledge 4032 12/21/2010 1/2/2011 24 13 0 0 1 0 0 38

NE_49 5

Jordan 

Basin 1561 12/21/2010 1/2/2011 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 4

NE_50 3

Jeffreys 

Ledge 1579 1/4/2011 1/15/2011 15 5 0 0 2 6 2 31

NE_51 4

Cashes 

Ledge 1680 1/4/2011 1/15/2011 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

NE_52 8

Jordan 

Basin 2108 1/4/2011 1/15/2011 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
111

DMA

# 

Whales

General 

Location

Area 

(nm2) Start Date End Date Tanker Cargo Pass. Pilot Tow Tug Other Total

NE_53 3

Sandy 

Hook 1592 1/10/2011 1/23/2011 86 196 13 0 33 23 18 372

NE_54 5

East of 

Cape Cod 1612 2/25/2011 3/11/2011 11 28 21 0 0 1 1 64

NE_55 5

East of 

Nantucket 1813 3/15/2011 3/29/2011 3 6 0 0 0 0 1 10

NE_56 3

Nantucket 

Sound 899 4/27/2011 5/10/2011 0 1 18 0 5 6 8 39

NE_57 13

Martha's 

Vineyard 1995 5/2/2011 5/15/2011 8 12 10 0 13 19 18 83

NE_58 21

East of 

Cape Cod 648 5/3/2011 5/17/2011 13 22 0 0 1 0 10 52

NE_59 21

East of 

Cape Cod 1163 5/3/2011 5/17/2011 8 18 0 0 0 0 9 37

SE_01 16

Ponce de 

Leon Inlet 693 1/12/2010 2/5/2010 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 7

SE_03 19

Ponce de 

Leon Inlet 774 2/1/2010 3/24/2010 0 0 0 0 3 6 3 12

SE_05 33

Cape 

Canaveral 1476 2/22/2010 3/15/2010 12 35 29 0 34 14 13 138

SE_07 8

Palm 

Coast 673 1/12/2011 1/27/2011 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 3

SE_08 4

Palm 

Coast 635 1/31/2011 2/15/2011 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 4

SE_09 5

Palm 

Coast 404 2/24/2011 3/11/2011 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 4

SE_10 5 Brunswick 845 2/28/2011 3/15/2011 7 44 0 0 3 4 4 62

Totals 905 961 781 249 24 279 370 607 3324
112

Appendix M. Map depicting four avoidance transits that were detected during the active period 

of DMA NE 16.
113

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

DMA BUFFER

Cargo Vessels (during effective period)

Average Speed (knots)

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

DMA BUFFER

Passenger Vessels (during effective period)

Average Speed (knots)

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

DMA BUFFER

All Vessels (during effective period)

Average Speed (knots)

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

DMA BUFFER

Tanker Vessels (during effective period)

Average Speed (knots)

Appendix N. Box plots of mean average vessel transit speeds within the Dynamic Management 

Areas (DMA) and a 10 nautical mile buffer located outside of the DMAs. Red bars within the 

box plots represent the median of mean speeds and the green and red dots are mild and extreme 

outliers, respectively.

Appendix O. Mean vessel transit speeds (± standard errors) inside of active DMAs and 10 

nautical mile buffers located outside of DMAs.

Vessel Types n Buffers DMAs

All 1799 12.33±0.10 12.00*±0.09

Tanker 615 12.63±0.08 12.31*±0.09

Cargo 525 13.21±0.21 12.89*±0.19

Passenger 93 16.05±0.39 14.10*±0.39

Other 566 10.57±0.20 10.49±0.18

*mean speeds in DMAs were significantly lower (p < 0.05) than mean speeds in 10 nautical mile buffers
114

Appendix P. Counts of avoidance transits detected in DMAs during their active period and twoweek periods directly before and after the active periods. Only DMAs in which avoidance 

transits were detected during the active periods are included, and shading is used to highlight 

DMAs where avoidance transits were not detected in the two-week periods directly before and/or 

after the active periods.

DMA Vessel Type

Avoidance Transits

Before DMA During DMA After DMA

NE_04 Tanker 0 4 0

NE_07 Tug 1 1 1

NE_08 Tanker 1 1 0

NE_11 Tanker 0 1 0

NE_13 Tanker 0 1 1

NE_14 Tanker 0 1 0

NE_15 Passenger 0 3 1

Tanker 0 1 1

NE_16 Passenger 0 2 0

Tanker 0 2 0

NE_17 Passenger 0 1 0

NE_18 Passenger 0 1 0

Tanker 0 0 2

NE_31 Other 0 1 0

Tanker 0 0 1

NE_33 Tanker 0 1 0

NE_38 Passenger 0 1 0

NE_57 Cargo 1 0 0

Other 0 0 1

Pleasure 0 0 1

Sailing 0 0 2

Tanker 5 2 1

NE_58 Sailing 1 0 0

Tug 0 2 2

SE_03 Towing 0 0 1

SE_05 Cargo 0 1 0

Pleasure 0 0 1

Tug 0 1 1

SE_10 BigTow 1 0 0

Cargo 7 5 7

Dredging 1 0 0

Tanker 0 1 0