COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Frank and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

TROY DYON TARPLEY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2890-98-3 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK 

 APRIL 25, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF MARTINSVILLE 

Charles M. Stone, Judge 

 S. Jane Chittom, Appellate Counsel (Elwood 

Earl Sanders, Jr., Appellate Defender; Public 

Defender Commission, on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

 Troy Dyon Tarpley (appellant) appeals his conviction for 

grand larceny after a bench trial on December 9, 1998. On appeal, 

he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the 

conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Appellant was a passenger in a car driven and owned by 

William Bruce. There were two other passengers in the car, Mike 

and Jose. Bruce drove the car to an area known as Koehler Hill in 
the Rivermont Apartment complex. Appellant and Mike exited the 

car. There was a group of ten to fifteen people assembled in the 

area. An unknown member of the group approached Bruce's car, 

reached into the car, and was "fussing" with Jose. Bruce exited 

the car to try to move the group away from the vehicle. Bruce was 

attacked and knocked unconscious. Robert Smith, a resident of 

Rivermont Apartments, witnessed the fight and testified that 

appellant was involved in the fight in which Bruce was attacked. 

After Bruce was attacked, Jose attempted to drive Bruce's car away 

from the crowd and appellant was a passenger in the car. Jose 

drove the car onto a curb, and then appellant took over as the 

driver of the vehicle. Appellant drove the car away from the 

scene of the fight, turned around, and drove the car at a high 

rate of speed towards the exit to the apartment complex. 

Appellant testified that he took the car because he was afraid and 

he wanted to get help. Appellant did not stop at his own 

apartment, his mother's apartment, or any other residents' 

apartments to seek help. Appellant crashed into some trees as he 

exited the complex. 

II. ANALYSIS 

 Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his conviction of grand larceny. We find the evidence 

sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 "When an appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, 

the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 

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Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences deducible 

therefrom. A judgment will not be disturbed unless plainly wrong 

or unsupported by the evidence." Ford v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. 

App. 249, 259, 503 S.E.2d 803, 807 (1998) (citations omitted). 

 "[L]arceny is the taking and carrying 

away of the goods and chattels of another 

with intent to deprive the owner of the 

possession thereof permanently." Lund v.

Commonwealth, 217 Va. 688, 691, 232 S.E.2d 

745, 748 (1977). Under Code § 18.2-95, grand 

larceny includes "larceny not from the person 

of another of goods and chattels of the value 

of $200 or more." 

Winston v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 746, 757, 497 S.E.2d 141, 147 

(1998). 

 In determining intent [in a larceny 

case], "the factfinder may consider the 

conduct of the person involved and all the 

circumstances revealed by the evidence." 

Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 283, 292, 

362 S.E.2d 193, 198 (1987). Indeed, "[t]he 

specific intent in the person's mind may, and 

often must, be inferred from that person's 

conduct and statements." Martin v. 

Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 524, 527, 414 

S.E.2d 401, 402 (1992) (citing Hargrave v. 

Commonwealth, 214 Va. 436, 437, 201 S.E.2d 

597, 598 (1974)). 

Welch v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 518, 524, 425 S.E.2d 101, 

105-06 (1992). 

 In this case, there was credible evidence that appellant was 

involved in the fight in which Bruce was knocked unconscious. 

Once Bruce was unconscious, appellant drove Bruce's car away from 

the scene at a high rate of speed. Appellant did not stop at any 

of the apartments to attempt to get help. Instead, he drove for 

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the exit to the apartment complex. Such evidence is sufficient to 

show intent to permanently deprive Bruce of his vehicle. 

 Appellant asserts on brief that he took Bruce's car out of 

necessity. In order to prove necessity, the defendant must show: 

"(1) a reasonable belief that the action was necessary to avoid an 

imminent threatened harm; (2) a lack of other adequate means to 

avoid the threatened harm; and (3) a direct causal relationship 

that may be reasonably anticipated between the action taken 

and the avoidance of the harm." Buckley v. City of Falls Church, 

7 Va. App. 32, 33, 371 S.E.2d 827, 827-28 (1988). 

 In this case, appellant presented evidence to the trial court 

that he took Bruce's car because he was frightened and wanted to 

escape from the group on Koehler Hill. The trial judge rejected 

appellant's evidence and convicted him. On appeal, we will not 

disturb the trial court's determination of the evidence. 

 For these reasons, we find the evidence sufficient to support 

appellant's conviction for grand larceny and, therefore, affirm 

the judgment of the trial court. 

 Affirmed. 

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