INFORMATION 

SHARING

DHS Is Assessing 

Fusion Center 

Capabilities and 

Results, but Needs to 

More Accurately 

Account for Federal 

Funding Provided to 

Centers

Report to Congressional Requesters

November 2014

GAO-15-155

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-15-155, a report to 

congressional requesters

November 2014

INFORMATION SHARING

DHS Is Assessing Fusion Center Capabilities and 

Results, but Needs to More Accurately Account for 

Federal Funding Provided to Centers

Why GAO Did This Study

Fusion centers play a key role in 

sharing threat information among all 

levels of government and the private 

sector. Federal agencies support these 

centers by providing personnel, 

funding, and other assistance. GAO 

was asked to assess how federal 

agencies are accounting for ongoing 

support provided. 

This report addresses the extent to 

which (1) DHS has helped centers 

assess capabilities and address gaps, 

(2) the federal government has defined 

its expectations for centers and 

assessed their contributions to 

homeland security, (3) federal 

agencies have deployed personnel to 

centers, and (4) DHS grant reforms 

have improved accountability for 

federal funds that support centers. 

GAO analyzed the results of center 

assessments, documents on center 

expectations, guidance for deploying 

personnel, and grant requirements. 

GAO also interviewed DHS and FBI 

officials who work with centers, and 

directors, staff, and deployed 

personnel at 10 of 78 fusion centers. 

GAO selected centers based on 

geographic location and other factors. 

Interviews are not generalizable, but 

provided insights on center capabilities 

and federal support provided. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that FEMA develop 

a mechanism to verify that states act in 

accordance with proposed guidance, 

when implemented, to help ensure that 

data on fusion center projects are 

sufficiently accurate to provide a 

reliable accounting of the total amount 

of federal grant funding provided to 

centers. DHS concurred.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is helping state and major urban 

area fusion centers assess baseline capabilities—such as the ability to receive, 

analyze, and disseminate threat information—and address capability gaps 

through an annual assessment process, resources it provides to centers to 

mitigate gaps, and an exercise program to evaluate capabilities in practice. 

Results of the 2013 annual assessment show that centers achieved an average 

score of about 92 out of 100, which generally indicates that centers have policies 

and procedures in place to implement key information sharing activities. The 

scores do not reflect if these activities have resulted in specific homeland security 

impacts. All 10 fusion center directors GAO contacted said that the annual 

assessment is a useful tool to identify capabilities and monitor progress.

Since 2004, the federal government has issued guidance and related documents 

that define its expectations and key roles for fusion centers and also has taken 

steps to assess their contributions to homeland security. For example, DHS has 

developed 45 performance measures to help assess fusion center contributions, 

which generally align with attributes of successful measures. The measures 

include outputs—such as the number of intelligence products—and outcomes, 

such as how products have influenced key partners’ security decisions. 

In 2013, federal agencies deployed a total of 288 personnel to fusion centers. 

The two agencies that provide the most support—DHS’s Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis (I&A) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—have 

developed nationwide guidance to help these agencies make fusion center 

support decisions and generally identified key roles and responsibilities for 

personnel deployed to centers. Other DHS components, including U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, have not 

developed such guidance and generally defer to field-level management to make

deployment decisions. However, in September 2014, DHS issued guidance that 

is designed to assist federal agencies in planning and tracking resource 

deployments to fusion centers.

DHS reforms to the Homeland Security Grant Program are helping to ensure that 

grant funds intended for fusion centers are used to build or sustain baseline 

capabilities, but DHS cannot accurately account for federal funds provided to 

states to support these centers. Specifically, in fiscal year 2011, the Federal 

Emergency Management Administration (FEMA)—the lead DHS agency 

responsible for grant funding—began to require that grant requests for fusion 

centers identify specific capabilities that proposed projects are to address. FEMA 

also requires that state grantees biannually report the amount of federal funds 

spent on fusion center projects. However, after further review of data provided to 

GAO, FEMA determined that states inaccurately categorized about $60 million in 

projects as related to fusion centers in 2012. Thus, FEMA could not reliably 

report on the amount of federal grants used to support centers, which is needed 

to help inform future investment decisions. FEMA is developing guidance to help 

grantees better categorize fusion center projects and improve the reliability of 

grant reporting, but an additional mechanism to verify that states act in 

accordance with the guidance could help FEMA ensure that projects are properly 

classified and more accurately account for grant funding provided to centers.

View GAO-15-155. For more information, 

contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-6510 or 

larencee@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Letter 1 

Background 6

DHS Performance Program Helps Fusion Centers Assess 

Capabilities and Address Gaps, and DHS Has Plans to Further 

Evaluate Capabilities through Exercises 10

Federal Agencies Have Defined Fusion Center Expectations and 

Developed Measures to Assess Homeland Security 

Contributions 17

Federal Agencies Reported Deploying 288 Personnel to Fusion 

Centers in 2013 and Generally Defined Roles and 

Responsibilities 26

Grant Reforms Are Helping DHS Track Fusion Center Projects, 

but DHS Cannot Accurately Account for Total Funding Provided 

to Centers 37

Conclusions 42

Recommendation for Executive Action 43

Agency Comments 43

Appendix I Summary of Fusion Center Performance Measures 46

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 49

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 51

Tables

Table 1: Excerpts of Fusion Center-Related Laws, Policies, and 

Guidance, 2004 through 2013 18

Table 2: Examples of Fusion Center Performance Measures by 

Outcome Category 23

Table 3: Examples of Fusion Center Performance Measures by 

Output Categories 24

Table 4: Summary of Roles and Responsibilities for Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Personnel Deployed to 

Fusion Centers 29

Contents
Page ii GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Table 5: Summary of Outcome and Output Measures, 

Implementation Status, and Results for the National 

Network of Fusion Centers 46

Figures

Figure 1: Goals and Objectives in the National Strategy of Fusion 

Centers 20

Figure 2: Number of Federal Personnel Agencies Reported 

Deploying to Fusion Centers, Fiscal Years 2011 through 

2013 27
Page iii GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Abbreviations

AOR area of responsibility

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOJ Department of Justice

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Administration

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act of 1993

HSGP Homeland Security Grant Program

I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IRS Internal Revenue Service 

ISE Information Sharing Environment 

NFCA National Fusion Center Association

NSI Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative 

P/CRCL privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties 

PM-ISE Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment 

SAR Suspicious Activity Reporting 

SHSP State Homeland Security Program 

SLPO State and Local Program Office

SLTT state, local, tribal, and territorial

UASI Urban Area Security Initiative

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

November 4, 2014

Congressional Requesters

Homeland security incidents, such as the bombings at the Boston 

Marathon in April 2013, emphasize the importance of developing a 

national capability to efficiently and expeditiously gather, analyze, and 

disseminate law enforcement, homeland security, and terrorism 

information. Since 2001, 49 states and many major urban areas have 

established fusion centers to help improve the sharing of information 

among state, local, tribal, territorial, federal, and private sector entities.1

We have designated the sharing of terrorism-related information as high 

risk because of the significant challenges the federal government faced in 

sharing this information in a timely, accurate, and useful manner.

As of June 2014, the National Network of Fusion Centers (National 

Network) consisted of 78 centers and the partnerships and collaborative 

efforts formed within and among them. While state and local governments 

own and operate these centers, many federal partners—including the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice 

(DOJ)—have supported fusion centers by providing resources in various 

forms, such as training, technical assistance, funding, and personnel. 

Within DHS, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is the lead 

component with responsibilities for sharing terrorism-related information 

with all levels of government and the private sector. I&A’s State and Local 

Program Office (SLPO) serves as the focal point for fusion center 

coordination.

2

 

1

In general, fusion centers provide a mechanism for multiple federal, state, and local 

entities to collaborate and share resources, expertise, and information with the goal of 

maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to all hazards, including 

criminal or terrorist threats. See 6 U.S.C. § 124h(j)(1).

We 

have since monitored federal efforts to implement the Information Sharing 

Environment (ISE)—an approach that is intended to serve as an 

overarching solution to strengthening the sharing of terrorism-related 

2

Terrorism-related information sharing remained a high-risk area for our February 2013 

update. See, GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 

2013), for the most recent update. Every 2 years, at the start of a new Congress, we call 

attention to agencies and program areas that, according to our audits and evaluations, are 

of high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most in need of 

transformation. 
 

Page 2 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

information among federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, international, and 

private sector partners.3 The National Network of Fusion Centers is a key 

part of this effort. Since 2007, we have conducted multiple reviews 

addressing fusion center activities and operations. For example, in 

September 2010, we reported that federal agencies were helping fusion 

centers build and sustain capabilities and protect privacy—but could 

better measure results—and recommended that DHS take steps to 

implement standard performance measures for centers.4

You asked us to assess federal efforts to support fusion centers and 

account for resources provided. This report addresses the extent to which 

(1) DHS has helped centers assess capabilities and mitigate potential 

capability gaps through the Fusion Center Performance Program, (2) 

federal agencies have defined expectations for fusion centers and 

assessed homeland security contributions, (3) federal agencies have 

deployed federal personnel to fusion centers and defined their roles and 

responsibilities, and (4) DHS grant management reforms have improved 

accountability for federal funds that support fusion centers.

DHS concurred 

and has taken steps to address this recommendation. DHS has since 

established a Fusion Center Performance Program to assess center 

capabilities, mitigate potential capability gaps, and help justify investment 

requests. Since 2011, DHS has also initiated grant management reforms 

to improve the department’s ability to account for federal funds that 

support fusion centers.

To address all four objectives, we visited 10 fusion centers in 7 states and 

interviewed center directors; staff, such as analysts and grants 

administrators; and federal personnel supporting the center.5

 

3

See 6 U.S.C. § 485.

We selected 

these centers based on a range of factors, including geographic location, 

staffing levels, and extent of federal support. The results of our interviews 

are not generalizable to all fusion centers nationwide, but they provided 

4

See, GAO, Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Helping Fusion Centers Build and 

Sustain Capabilities and Protect Privacy, but Could Better Measure Results, GAO-10-972 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2010). 

5

We visited state fusion centers in New Jersey, Wisconsin, Delaware, and Washington, 

and major urban area centers in Philadelphia, Milwaukee, Chicago, Los Angeles, San 

Diego, and Orange County, California. 
 

Page 3 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

valuable information and perspectives on fusion centers activities and 

operations.

To address the first objective, we analyzed strategic planning documents 

and other guidance to identify Fusion Center Performance Program goals 

and objectives. We analyzed assessment results—including the 2010 

Baseline Capabilities Assessment of Fusion Centers and the National 

Network of Fusion Centers: Final Reports for years 2011, 2012, and 

2013—to determine the extent to which the assessments identify gaps in 

baseline capabilities and mitigation actions. We also reviewed a sample 

of individual assessment reports from the fusion centers we visited to 

determine the extent to which the reports included recommendations to 

address potential capability gaps and to identify progress made since the 

previous year’s assessment. The reports we reviewed are not 

generalizable to all fusion center assessments conducted nationwide, but 

provided insights on the assessment process. Further, we interviewed 

senior officials and program managers from SLPO regarding the criteria 

and methods used to conduct the assessments, validate results, and 

report progress, and determined that data related to the annual 

assessments were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. We 

also interviewed directors of the 10 fusion centers we visited and the 

President of the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA) to obtain 

perspectives on the value of the assessments and how the results are 

utilized.6

To address the second objective, we analyzed relevant laws, strategy 

documents, and federal guidance that address the federal government’s 

information-sharing responsibilities to fusion centers and the centers’ 

expected results. Documents analyzed include the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act),7 the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007

(9/11 Commission Act),8

 

6

The National Fusion Center Association is an organization that represents and provides 

an independent consolidated voice for state and local fusion centers.

the National Strategy for Information Sharing, 

Fusion Center Guidelines, Baseline Capabilities for State and Major 

Urban Area Fusion Centers, and the National Prevention Framework. 

7

Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016(b)(2), 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-70 (2004) (codified as amended 

at 6 U.S.C. § 485).

8

Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. 266, 317-324 (2007) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 124h). 
 

Page 4 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Regarding contributions to homeland security, we analyzed fusion center 

performance measures and assessed them against criteria that GAO 

developed in connection with work related to the Government 

Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).9

To address the third objective, we analyzed I&A, CBP, ICE, and FBI 

strategies, policies, and plans to identify criteria and guidance associated 

with making deployments. We also reviewed provisions of the 9/11 

Commission Act that call for federal agencies to help support and provide 

staff to fusion centers. Further, we analyzed the results of the Fusion 

Center Federal Cost Inventory to determine the number of personnel 

deployed from each federal agency.

We also interviewed 

SLPO officials regarding the development and definitions of these 

measures. Further, we interviewed other federal stakeholders—including 

headquarters program officials and field personnel from I&A, U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—to 

determine the extent to which these agencies have developed 

expectations for fusion centers and assessed how centers help support 

the agencies’ homeland security missions. We selected these agencies 

because they had the most personnel deployed to fusion centers during 

fiscal year 2013.

10

 

9

GAO, Tax Administration, IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season 

Performance Measures,

To assess the reliability of data on 

federal deployments and funding to fusion centers, we reviewed standard 

operating procedures related to collecting these data and interviewed 

DHS officials who maintain the data to determine how they ensure the 

accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined that the federal 

deployment and funding data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

our report. We also interviewed headquarters officials from I&A, CBP, 

GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C. Nov. 22, 2002). As part of this 

work, GAO developed nine key attributes to use as criteria for assessing performance 

goals and measures. GAO developed these attributes based on a combination of 

previously established GAO criteria, GPRA, and the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 

1998, as well as related performance management literature. Among other reasons, 

GPRA was enacted to hold federal agencies accountable for achieving program results. 

Among the elements identified by the act as a leading practice is the development of 

applicable performance measures.

10The Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory provides the Office of Management and 

Budget and the Program Manager of the ISE with an inventory of all federal funding that 

agencies report was expended and the personnel deployed that are dedicated to support 

the National Network of Fusion Centers.
 

Page 5 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

ICE, and the FBI, as well as federal personnel deployed to the 10 fusion 

centers we visited to (1) identify the range of activities personnel 

performed; (2) assess the extent to which agencies defined personnel’s 

roles, responsibilities, and expectations; and (3) determine what, if any, 

performance criteria existed to hold deployed personnel accountable for 

expected results. We also interviewed directors and other fusion center 

officials at the 10 locations to obtain their views on federal support to the 

centers.

To address the fourth objective, we analyzed Federal Emergency 

Management Administration (FEMA) guidance related to the Homeland 

Security Grant Program (HSGP) to identify reforms that are intended to 

improve accountability for federal funds that support fusion centers.11 We 

also reviewed grant requests for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 from the 10 

centers we visited, and data provided by FEMA on the amount of DHS 

grant funding provided to support fusion centers in fiscal years 2011 and 

2012. We determined that FEMA data on the amount of federal funding 

provided to fusion centers was unreliable, a conclusion we discuss later in 

this report. We interviewed fusion center directors and FEMA grant 

management officials to discuss the HSGP and related processes—

including FEMA’s recent changes to grant requirements—and determine 

how fusion centers utilized annual center assessments to identify and 

prioritize grant projects. We also interviewed FEMA officials to determine 

the steps they take to monitor the reliability of data reported by grantees 

and compared these steps with related controls outlined in Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government.

12

We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 through October 

2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 

11FEMA manages the HSGP, which awards funds to states, territories, and urban areas to 

enhance their ability to prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from 

terrorist attacks and other major disasters. The HSGP is the primary DHS grant program 

that allocates federal funds to help support fusion centers.

12GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
 

Page 6 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

The federal government recognizes fusion centers as assets that are 

critical to enhancing homeland security because they coordinate the 

gathering, analysis, and dissemination of law enforcement, homeland 

security, public safety, and terrorism information.13 Centers also serve as 

focal points for the two-way exchange of information between federal 

agencies and state and local governments. As of June 2014, there were 

78 fusion centers across the United States, the District of Columbia, and 

U.S. territories that collectively make up the National Network. These 

include centers that are statewide or broad in jurisdiction—such as those 

operated by state police—and regional centers that usually cover large 

cities with substantial populations and numerous critical infrastructure 

sites, which may be operated by a city or county law enforcement or 

emergency management agency.14

Recognition as a fusion center within the National Network generally 

requires that the governor of the state make this formal designation; a 

state or local governmental agency oversees and manages the center; 

the center has plans and procedures to function as a focal point for 

sharing law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and terrorism 

information; and the center has achieved requisite baseline capabilities as 

DHS—on behalf of federal interagency partners—determines through an 

annual assessment of each fusion center’s capabilities. A state or local 

law enforcement official generally serves as the center director, but nonlaw enforcement contract personnel can also serve in this capacity as 

determined by the applicable agency that owns and operates the center. 

Analyst positions within these centers often make up a substantial portion 

of the staffing and typically include a combination of state, local, and 

federal personnel.

While each center engages in core information-sharing functions—

namely, the receipt, analysis, gathering, and dissemination of threat-

 

13See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. §§ 482(f) (defining “homeland security information”) and 485(a)(5) 

(defining “terrorism information”). For purposes of this report, homeland security 

information and terrorism information are referred to collectively as terrorism-related 

information.

14As of June 2014, 49 states (all except Wyoming) and the District of Columbia had 

established fusion centers.

Background

Fusion Centers
 

Page 7 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

related information—some centers focus more broadly on “all-crimes” or 

“all-hazards,” in addition to terrorism and homeland security information. 

Fusion centers can issue a combination of situational awareness and 

analytical products—such as daily or weekly bulletins on criminal or 

intelligence information and intelligence assessments—which, in general, 

provide reporting on an emerging threat, group, or crime. Centers 

primarily create these products for law enforcement entities and other 

partners within their jurisdiction, such as owners and operators of critical 

infrastructure. Fusion centers also collect and process tips and leads as 

part of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI), and 

provide outreach and training to the private sector and other 

governmental partners.15

The 9/11 Commission Act required that the DHS Secretary establish a 

DHS State, Local and Regional Fusion Center Initiative and that—in 

coordination with representatives from fusion centers and the states—the 

department take certain actions to support the initiative.

16 For example, 

the act requires the Secretary to support federal efforts to integrate fusion 

centers into the ISE, assign personnel to centers, incorporate fusion 

center intelligence information into DHS information, provide training, and 

facilitate close communication and coordination between the centers and 

DHS. The law also requires the Secretary, in consultation with the 

Attorney General, to establish guidelines for fusion centers that include 

standards that fusion centers must address.17

 

15The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative is a joint collaborative 

effort by DHS; the FBI; and state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners. 

This initiative provides law enforcement with another tool to help prevent terrorism and 

other related criminal activity by establishing a national capacity for gathering, 

documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing SAR information.

These include, for example, 

that centers collaboratively develop a mission statement, identify 

expectations and goals, measure performance, and determine center 

effectiveness; create a collaborative environment for the sharing of 

intelligence and information among federal, state, local, and tribal 

16See 6 U.S.C. § 124h(a)-(b). Specifically, the DHS Secretary was to establish the DHS 

State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative in consultation with the Program 

Manager for the Information Sharing Environment and the Attorney General, as well as 

DHS’s Privacy Officer, Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and Privacy and Civil 

Liberties Oversight Board. 

17See 6 U.S.C. § 124h(i).

Federal Support to Fusion 

Centers
 

Page 8 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

government agencies, the private sector, and the public, consistent with 

guidance from the President and the Program Manager for the 

Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE); and offer a variety of 

intelligence and information services and products.18

Within DHS, I&A’s SLPO is responsible for providing a link among the 

fusion center; the intelligence community; and state, local, and private 

sector partners.19 Other DHS and DOJ components can also deploy 

either part-time or full-time personnel to fusion centers to support center 

operations and serve as liaisons between the fusion center and federal 

components.

In September 2008, DHS and DOJ jointly published the Baseline 

Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, which the 

agencies developed in collaboration with the PM-ISE and other federal, 

state, and local officials. This document identified the capabilities 

determined necessary to achieve a national, integrated network of fusion 

centers and detailed the standards necessary for a fusion center to be 

considered capable of performing basic functions by the fusion center 

community. In 2010, fusion center directors, in partnership with the 

federal government, distilled the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major 

Urban Area Fusion Centers into priorities, including four Critical 

Operational Capabilities:

• receive: ability to receive classified and unclassified information from 

federal partners.

• analyze: ability to assess local implications of that threat information 

through the use of a formal risk assessment process.

 

18In April 2005, and in accordance with the Intelligence Reform Act, the President 

designated a Program Manager—within the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence—to, among other things, plan for, oversee implementation of, and manage the 

ISE. 

19 The intelligence community is comprised of 17 member agencies that carry out the 

federal government’s intelligence collection and dissemination efforts. See 50 U.S.C. § 

3003(4).

Fusion Center Baseline 

Capabilities and 

Assessment Process
 

Page 9 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

• disseminate: ability to further disseminate that threat information to 

other state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector entities within 

their jurisdiction; and

• gather: ability to gather locally-generated information, aggregate it, 

analyze it, and share it with federal partners as appropriate.

In September 2010, federal, state, and local officials completed the first 

nationwide assessment of fusion centers to evaluate center capabilities 

and to establish priorities for federal government support. The 

assessment process focuses on measuring fusion center implementation 

of the four Critical Operational Capabilities, as well as four additional 

Enabling Capabilities (privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections; 

sustainment strategy; communications and outreach; and security). Since 

2011, DHS has taken the lead to manage and implement the annual 

assessment process as a core component of its broader Fusion Center 

Performance Program. The other two components of the performance 

program are DHS activities to further develop capabilities and mitigate 

gaps, as well as an exercise program to evaluate fusion center 

capabilities in practice, called the Fusion Center Readiness Initiative.

While fusion centers are state and locally owned, the federal government 

has continued to provide federal grant funding to support center 

operations, in part because the government expects the National Network 

of Fusion Centers to be a key player in sharing information. The fiscal 

year 2013 Homeland Security Grant Program guidance also identified the 

maturation and enhancement of fusion centers as one of five priority 

areas for HSGP funding. The HSGP consists of three separate programs, 

two of which states and local jurisdictions have primarily used to help fund 

fusion centers—the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and the 

Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI).20

 

20Under the SHSP, each state receives a level of funding determined through a formula 

grant allocation based on three factors: minimum amounts established by statutory 

mandate; DHS’s risk methodology, and anticipated effectiveness of proposed projects. 

The UASI program addresses the planning, organization, equipment, training, and 

exercise needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas. FEMA allocates these funds on 

the basis of risk and anticipated effectiveness. The third grant program, Operation 

Stonegarden, provides approximately $50 million each year to facilitate cooperation and 

coordination among stakeholders to secure U.S. international borders. Fusion centers 

have received only a small proportion of grant funding through Operation Stonegarden.

These grant programs are not 

Federal Grants to Fusion 

Centers
 

Page 10 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

specifically focused on, or limited to, fusion centers and the fusion centers 

do not receive direct, dedicated funding from DHS. Rather, a state 

administrative agency—the state-level agency responsible for managing 

all homeland security grants and associated program requirements—or 

an urban area’s working group, which has similar responsibilities, 

determines the amount of grant funding a fusion center receives. A fusion 

center typically contributes to the development of a state’s federal grant 

application by providing information on how the center will use the 

proposed funding it requests, called an investment justification.

DHS Performance 

Program Helps 

Fusion Centers 

Assess Capabilities 

and Address Gaps, 

and DHS Has Plans 

to Further Evaluate 

Capabilities through 

Exercises
 

Page 11 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

As the cornerstone of DHS’s efforts to evaluate how fusion centers are 

meeting designated standards for the four critical capabilities and four 

enabling capabilities, the fusion center annual assessment process is 

serving to assess and monitor capability development for both individual 

fusion centers and the National Network.21 To determine capability 

scores, each fusion center completes an online questionnaire that 

addresses multiple attributes for each of the eight capabilities, for a 

collective total of 50 individual attributes.22

SLPO completed its third iteration of the annual assessment process in 

2013, and released its annual report of the aggregate findings from this 

assessment in July 2014. Results of the 2013 assessment indicate that 

fusion centers are continuing to increase overall capability scores, and 

many are nearing full achievement of the 50 individual attributes that the 

assessment uses as evaluation criteria. Specifically, the average overall 

capability score reported for the National Network was 91.7 out of 100 in 

2013.

For example, the “gather” 

capability is composed of 8 total attributes, which include questions to 

determine if the center has a documented process to manage tips and 

leads and has identified standing information needs from DHS entities, 

among other partners. These attributes form the basis by which DHS 

assesses each fusion center’s progress from year to year. The highest 

possible score that each fusion center can receive is 100 points.

23

 

21 In addition to assessing fusion center capabilities, the annual assessment process is 

used to assess fusion center performance. Additional information on DHS’s efforts to 

measure fusion center performance and homeland security contributions is provided later 

in this report.

This score represents an improvement of about 3 points from the 

2012 average score of 88.4 and continues an upward trend from the 

average national score of 76.8 identified in 2011. These increases reflect 

that fusion centers are continuing to take steps to achieve designated 

capabilities and mitigate gaps identified in prior years. However, scores 

also decreased for 1 or more of the capability attributes for 15 centers in 

2013, a fact that, according to SLPO officials, highlights the importance of 

continued monitoring through the annual assessment.

22In some cases, a single question is asked to determine whether a fusion center has 

achieved an attribute and, in other cases, two or more questions are required to make this 

determination. DHS also conducts a validation process that includes data review and a 

structured interview with fusion center directors to help ensure consistency and minimize 

data discrepancies.

23The 2013 assessment data cover the time period from August 2012 through July 2013. 

Fusion Center 

Assessment Process Is 

Systematically Assessing 

Capabilities and 

Monitoring Progress; Most 

Centers Are Achieving 

Baseline Capabilities
 

Page 12 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

The overall assessment scores represent fusion centers’ progress in 

establishing designated baseline capabilities—such as implementing

specified policies and procedures—but the scores may not reflect 

improvements in overall performance or homeland security contributions. 

That is, the assessment questions are intended to capture the extent to 

which each fusion center—regardless of size or staffing level—has met 

baseline capabilities to receive, analyze, gather, and disseminate 

information. However, the actual output of products and services can vary 

considerably by center based on risk environment, resource levels, or 

other factors. For example, 11 individual attributes constitute the 

“analyze” capability, and represent a broad range of activities, such as 

having developed an analytical production plan, the ability to access 

subject matter experts, and being able to contribute to local and national 

threat assessments. A center may report the successful completion of 

such activities and improve its overall assessment scores, but the scores 

do not reflect if the center effectively administered these activities or if 

they resulted in any considerable impact. For example, developing an 

analytical production plan may not equate to effectively meeting the plan’s 

targets or producing the types of reports identified therein. This highlights 

the importance of further validating these capabilities through other 

mechanisms, such as the Fusion Center Readiness Initiative and targeted 

performance metrics, which we discuss later in the report. Nevertheless, 

the annual assessment process reflects a mechanism for systematically 

assessing existing baseline capabilities and gaps, and provides fusion 

centers an indicator of their progress in achieving baseline capabilities. 

SLPO program management officials noted that they intend for other 

efforts, including the recent development of additional performance 

measures, to help capture the extent to which centers are achieving 

intended results and supporting the federal government’s homeland 

security mission.

All 10 directors of the fusion centers we visited stated that the annual 

assessment program is an effective process to evaluate their capabilities 

against a uniform standard, and serves to identify potential opportunities 

for improvement. For example, directors identified specific actions that 

their fusion center took to address an individual attribute and improve the 

center’s capability score, such as developing a plan, policy, or developing 

additional mechanisms to disseminate alerts. In general, the directors we 

spoke with stated that the administrative requirements for completing the 

assessment were reasonable and that center staff could generally 

complete these steps in a few days. In addition to assessing capabilities 

and related gaps, 2 directors noted that the assessment can serve as an 

effective mechanism to familiarize a new director with the center, given
 

Page 13 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

the relatively frequent turnover in directors across the National Network.

24

Two directors also said that they use the assessment results to brief 

center management, such as state homeland security directors, on center 

operations, and that these results provide information on progress the 

center made toward achieving baseline capabilities. Further, 5 of the 10 

directors we interviewed specifically noted the DHS requirement to utilize 

the assessment results to inform annual federal grant funding requests. 

Generally, the directors reported that while the grant requests are 

routinely focused on maintaining existing capabilities through analytical 

staff positions and technology platforms, the requests may also target the 

development of plans or other actions necessary to address attribute 

gaps, as applicable. 25

With the average assessment score now at almost 92 percent—and 

many centers achieving the highest possible score of 100—SLPO officials 

stated that the assessment process is unlikely to drive significant new 

capability development. The majority of the fusion centers that we visited 

had achieved scores of over 95 percent, and in 2 cases, center directors 

did not plan to address the 1 or 2 remaining attributes required for a 

perfect score because they said the cost and administrative burden 

outweighed the benefit. One example cited was requiring fusion centers 

to verify that recipients received all products as intended.26

Although fusion centers are continuing to mature and are beginning to 

maintain high scores, SLPO officials said that they do not plan to change 

the current assessment process or any of the individual attributes to 

potentially capture additional capabilities. The officials noted that the 

current process and attributes remain important to help monitor and 

These 

directors continued to support the overall assessment process, but they 

acknowledged that their focus would likely shift to maintaining existing 

capabilities rather than trying to achieve new capabilities to close any 

remaining gaps.

 

24The 2013 assessment report noted that director turnover averaged 34 percent in 2012 

and 2013, but this figure is expected to be reduced to about 14 percent in 2014.

25Additional information on how fusion centers use assessment results to inform grant 

requests is provided later in this report.

26According to SLPO officials, this attribute remains important to help ensure effective 

product dissemination methods and help determine if products are meeting the needs of 

the customers.
 

Page 14 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

sustain existing capabilities and protect against possible backsliding as 

fusion center directors turn over and fusion center funding becomes more 

constrained. These officials also noted the importance of maintaining a 

common standard that all fusion centers can achieve, regardless of size, 

staffing, or location. Moreover, the officials said that they plan to maintain 

the existing assessment questions to ensure direct comparability of 

results from year to year. Finally, as discussed later, DHS uses the 

assessment to collect data to measure progress according to certain 

performance measures.

As the second key component of the Fusion Center Performance 

Program, SLPO conducts activities to identify common capability gaps 

across the National Network and provides resources for fusion centers—

such as technical assistance and document templates—to help centers 

address and mitigate these gaps. Within the annual assessment report, 

SLPO provides a summary of findings regarding National Network 

capability scores and progress made, and includes data-informed 

recommendations that are intended to address commonly identified gaps. 

SLPO also includes specific recommendations for each of the eight 

capabilities, as well as several overall areas identified as needing 

improvement. For example, the 2012 report highlighted the need to 

identify analytical products that meet specific information needs, as well 

as expanded involvement in local government bodies to promote 

improved collaboration. As part of information collection efforts during the 

annual assessment process, SLPO officials noted that they also solicit 

feedback regarding the quality and effectiveness of federal support 

activities, such as training and technical assistance, received over the 

previous 12 months. According to officials, SLPO uses this information to 

help develop the suite of mitigation resources to be provided in the 

following year.

According to program documentation, the gap mitigation resources are 

intended to help fusion centers address gaps in capabilities and enhance 

the knowledge and skills of fusion center personnel. These resources 

include a combination of guidance and reference materials, as well as 

targeted training and technical assistance programs. Two key documents 

comprise the gap mitigation resources—the Gap Mitigation Guidebook

and an annual publication of Gap Mitigation Activities. The guidebook 

notes that this resource is intended to assist fusion centers in developing 

and implementing plans, policies, or standard operating procedures for 

each of the critical operating capabilities. It includes plan templates and 

reference materials that DHS intends to help fusion centers define and 

Fusion Center Directors 

We Contacted Found DHS 

Technical Assistance and 

Other Resources to 

Mitigate Gaps Helpful
 

Page 15 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

document key business processes, such as the protection of privacy and 

civil liberties. The Gap Mitigation Activities is a dynamic document 

informed by both the annual assessment results and feedback DHS 

receives from fusion centers. For example, the 2013 Gap Mitigation 

Activities “menu” included a total of over 60 activities identified to 

enhance or sustain fusion center capabilities across each of the core 

capabilities. Specific resources identified include a combination of new 

and existing activities intended to enhance and support capability 

development, including staff exchange programs, risk analysis and 

product feedback templates, and training and technical assistance 

designed to educate fusion center personnel on specific subjects, such as 

basic intelligence analysis.

All 10 fusion center directors we visited said that they were aware of 

DHS’s annual Gap Mitigation Activities—such as its listing of analytical 

training courses and exchange programs—and the 6 directors that 

discussed participation in these activities said they were effective. Three 

directors also specifically referenced the Gap Mitigation Guidebook and 

said that they utilized a template or other written reference materials 

contained within the document. In addition, several fusion center directors 

said that they routinely interact with directors from other centers and one 

noted they were most likely to address any identified capability gaps by 

obtaining an example of a plan or policy from another center, or inquiring 

about their approach to addressing a capability. In general, our interviews 

with fusion center directors and SLPO headquarters officials indicate that 

SLPO routinely provided outreach and communications to these fusion 

centers regarding the mitigation support resources that are available.

The Fusion Center Readiness Initiative is a core component of the Fusion 

Center Performance Program, but it remains in the early stages of 

development largely because of staffing challenges. According to DHS

program documents, this initiative includes the establishment of an 

annual exercise program that is intended to provide fusion centers an 

opportunity to apply and evaluate capabilities in an operational context. 

According to DHS officials, the exercise program is intended to help 

define capability improvement priorities and identify investment focus 

areas, as well as provide support and functional consistency across the 

National Network. The officials noted that limited progress has been 

made in developing an exercise program since 2012 because of 

challenges in hiring a candidate to fill a key program management 

position. However, the officials said that this position was successfully 

staffed in June 2014.

DHS Has Not Yet Fully 

Implemented an Exercise 

Program to Further 

Evaluate Fusion Center 

Capabilities, but Is 

Planning Additional 

Actions
 

Page 16 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Although the Fusion Center Readiness Initiative is not fully implemented, 

DHS has taken steps to conduct several drills and exercises involving 

fusion centers in recent years. For example, in August 2012, SLPO 

facilitated an exercise incorporating 7 fusion centers and other partners, 

including representatives from FBI, CBP, and the Transportation Security 

Administration. This day-long exercise included four objectives that 

collectively targeted each of the fusion centers’ critical and enabling 

capabilities. The after-action report identifies 18 individual corrective 

actions and includes implementation details, such as the entity 

responsible for taking the action and the expected time frame for 

completion.

According to SLPO officials, efforts are underway to schedule and 

coordinate additional fusion center exercises. Specifically, the officials 

noted that they plan to conduct exercises under the readiness initiative 

every 2 years with participation from a group of 7 to 10 fusion centers. 

The officials said that the longer-term vision is to conduct up to three 

exercises per year—as well as drills addressing specific analytical 

capabilities and communications. SLPO officials also noted the 

importance of aligning these activities with DHS’s National Exercise 

Program.27

Officials from the 10 fusion centers we visited also reported that centers 

often participate in exercises and drills sponsored by a combination of 

other federal, state, and local partners. The scope and purpose of these 

exercises varied and ranged from full-scale exercises simulating a realworld threat scenario to routine drills validating communication and alert 

notification procedures. Fusion centers also reported on their participation 

in such exercises as part of publications the centers develop to identify 

key products and services provided to centers’ partners over the year.

 

27The DHS National Exercise Program includes criteria that call for exercises to generally 

serve to support at least one of the following key objectives: (1) exchange intelligence, 

information, data, or knowledge to enable timely and informed decision making prior to 

and during an incident that threatens the security of the nation; (2) identify threats and 

hazards and share prompt, reliable, and actionable risk information with the public; (3) 

establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process, 

capable of identifying, prioritizing, and delivering resources across all hazards and lead 

federal agency authorities; and (4) establish and maintain plans, authorities, 

responsibilities, and coordination capabilities.
 

Page 17 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Over the past decade, Congress has enacted laws and federal agencies 

have issued guidance and related documents that help to define 

expectations for fusion centers, which have evolved from high-level 

guidance focused on terrorism-related information sharing to more 

specific guidance that defines expectations for fusion center capabilities, 

operations, and functions. For example, provisions of the Intelligence 

Reform Act, as amended, recognize that state and local partners have a 

role in the sharing of terrorism-related information. In 2005, as states and 

localities began to create centers, DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE issued 

more specific guidance to fusion centers through Fusion Center 

Guidelines that recommended procedures for establishing and 

maintaining centers, training personnel, and producing privacy and civil 

liberties policies. In conjunction with the guidelines, in 2008, DOJ’s Global 

Justice Information Sharing Initiative issued Baseline Capabilities for 

State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, which further clarified 

expectations for fusion center capabilities and management and 

administrative functions, such as those related to the collection, analysis, 

and dissemination of information.28 Based on our analysis of the collective 

laws and federal agency guidance issued to date, federal agencies have 

defined expectations for fusion centers related to their role in informationsharing activities.29

 

28The Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative serves as a federal advisory committee 

to the U.S. Attorney General on justice information-sharing issues.

Table 1 highlights excerpts from selected laws and 

policies.

29In addition to federal guidance, the performance measures and targets discussed later in 

this report also help define expectations and the results fusion centers are to achieve.

Federal Agencies 

Have Defined Fusion 

Center Expectations 

and Developed 

Measures to Assess 

Homeland Security 

Contributions

Federal Agencies Have 

Developed a Combination 

of High-Level Strategic 

Guidance and Specific 

Capability Expectations for 

Fusion Centers
 

Page 18 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Table 1: Excerpts of Fusion Center-Related Laws, Policies, and Guidance, 2004 through 2013 

Year 

Federal law, 

policy, or guidance Information sharing and fusion center-related provisions and requirements 

2004 Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004a

The act requires the President to ensure that an Information Sharing Environment 

provides and facilitates the means for sharing terrorism information among all 

appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities, as well as the private sector, through 

the use of policy guidelines and technologies.

 

2005 Fusion Center Guidelinesb The guidelines provide direction on establishing and operating fusion centers at the 

federal, state, and local levels, and specifically outline18 recommended elements for 

fusion centers, such as creating a collaborative environment for information and 

intelligence sharing across law enforcement, public safety agencies, and the private 

sector, as well as the development of a mission statement and goals for the centers. 

The guidelines are also intended to improve consistency among the many different 

state and local fusion centers, enhance coordination, strengthen regional and national 

partnerships, and improve fusion center capabilities.

 

2007 Implementing Recommendations 

of the 9/11 Commission Act of 

2007

The act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security—in consultation with the Program 

Manager for the Information Sharing Environment and the Attorney General, among 

others—to establish a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) State, Local, and 

Regional Fusion Center Initiative that will, among other things, provide operational and 

intelligence advice and assistance as well as management assistance to fusion centers, 

and facilitate close communication and coordination between the centers and DHS. The 

act also requires the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, to establish 

guidelines for fusion centers to, among other things, develop mission statements, 

identify expectations and goals, measure performance, and determine effectiveness.

c

2007 National Strategy for Information 

Sharing: Successes and 

Challenges in Improving 

Terrorism-Related Information 

Sharing

As part of the National Strategy for Information Sharing, the federal government 

recommended that fusion centers achieve a baseline capability level and become 

interconnected with the federal government and one another. The strategy also 

designated fusion centers as vital assets critical to information sharing and antiterrorism 

efforts, and as the primary state and local focal points for the receiving and sharing of 

terrorism-related information.

2008 Baseline Capabilities for State 

and Major Urban Area Fusion 

Centers

The baseline capabilities, a supplement to the Fusion Center Guidelines, identifies the 

abilities needed to achieve a national, integrated network of fusion centers and details 

the standards necessary for a center to be capable of performing basic functions. The 

baseline capabilities also define standards for fusion centers, including management 

and administrative functions, information gathering, recognition of indicators and 

warnings, and processing of information, intelligence analysis and production, and 

intelligence and information dissemination.

2012 National Strategy for Information 

Sharing and Safeguarding 

The National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding highlights priorities for 

fusion centers that include the implementation of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 

Reporting Initiative (NSI)—a decentralized, distributed system for sharing terrorismrelated information—and expanding training and outreach for the initiative to other 

public safety entities. The strategy also specifically notes that the National Network of 

Fusion Centers is to achieve the critical operational capabilities and enabling 

capabilities to serve as focal points for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of 

threat-related information.

2013 National Prevention Framework The National Prevention Framework outlines the capabilities necessary to avoid, 

prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism. The document identifies the 

National Network as a coordinating structure to assist in achieving those capabilities.

Source: GAO analysis of fusion center-related guidance and policies. | GAO-15-155
 

Page 19 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

a

See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016(b)(2), 118 Stat. at 3665 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 

485(b)(2). See also 6 U.S.C. § 485(a)(5) (defining “terrorism information”).

b

The Department of Justice (DOJ) Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative and DHS’s Homeland 

Security Advisory Council collaborated to develop the Fusion Center Guidelines and first issued the 

guidelines in 2005 to help resolve interoperability and communication issues with centers at the state, 

regional, and federal levels and provide guidance in relation to the collection, analysis, and 

dissemination of terrorism-related intelligence.

c

See 6 U.S.C. § 124h.

The NFCA—in collaboration with other state, local, and federal entities—

developed a national strategy that builds upon federal guidance to further 

outline key roles and priorities of the National Network from the fusion 

center perspective.30

The NFCA strategy notes that the development of a national strategy has 

been a long-standing priority for state and local partners and the July 

2013 Majority Staff Report on the National Network of Fusion Centers

also called for this strategy.

Among the elements included in the strategy is an 

overview of the current status of the network; the network’s roles in 

supporting information-sharing activities; and future goals, objectives, and 

initiatives that the network is to carry out to support national security over 

the period defined by the strategy, 2014 to 2017. The NFCA strategy was 

issued in July 2014. The NFCA President noted that the strategy is 

intended to help standardize how fusion centers function across the 

network and further clarify the standards established in the baseline 

capabilities guidance related to the analysis and dissemination of 

intelligence information, among other things. The strategy also provides 

specific examples that outline the network’s contributions to national 

security and the types of services fusion centers provide to state, local, 

and federal partners, among others. For example, the strategy discusses 

the centers’ role in vetting information in support of the NSI and also 

providing analysis that increases the value of analytic products centers 

produce.

31

 

30NFCA, 2014-2017 National Strategy for the National Network of Fusion Centers (July 

2014).

The majority staff report recommended that 

federal agencies develop a national strategy to help enable the fusion 

center national network to reach its potential and sustain the network over 

time. The strategy contains four goals and associated objectives that 

31 Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, Majority Staff Report on 

the National Network of Fusion Centers (Washington, D.C.: July 2013). 

Stakeholders Have 

Developed a National 

Strategy That Also 

Addresses Fusion Center 

Expectations
 

Page 20 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

outline a broader set of activities the National Network expects to 

accomplish over the next 3 years, as figure 1 illustrates.

Figure 1: Goals and Objectives in the National Strategy of Fusion Centers

a

The Fusion Center Guidelines defines the fusion process as the management of the flow of 

information and intelligence across levels and sectors of government and private industry.
 

Page 21 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

The strategy also identifies 37 specific initiatives that support the goals 

and objectives that further highlight efforts that the National Network 

expects to complete over the 3 years. For example, 1 initiative related to 

goal 4 is to work with federal partners to establish a minimum level of 

engagement and expectations that are uniform and consistent across all 

regions and field offices related to access to data systems.

In addition to the recommendation that centers themselves articulate a 

national strategy, the majority staff report also called for federal agencies 

to develop a federal strategy that explains how and why the federal 

government engages with fusion centers. The NFCA President also noted 

that a federal strategy could, among other things, provide fusion centers 

with a better understanding of the methodology federal agencies use to 

deploy personnel to centers and standardize centers’ access to federal 

data systems. SLPO officials said that DHS does not plan to develop a 

federal strategy, since they believe this information currently exists in the 

various strategy and guideline documents already issued. However, DHS 

is currently working in coordination with DOJ to develop a Federal 

Framework for Supporting the National Network of Fusion Centers that a 

senior I&A official said is intended to help summarize the collective 

federal efforts guiding support to fusion centers. The official also noted 

that the framework will include efforts related to assessment and 

performance programs, resource allocations, governance processes, and 

analytic standards, among others. In technical comments provided on a 

draft of this report, DHS noted that the federal framework document will 

also include strategic objectives and priorities, in addition to identifying 

current efforts. DHS added that a draft of this updated approach was 

presented to the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council and the 

Fusion Center and Suspicious Activity Reporting Subcommittee of the 

Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee for 

feedback in September 2014.32

 

32Established in 2004, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council is made up of 

members representing law enforcement and homeland security agencies from all levels of 

government and is an advocate for state, local, and tribal law enforcement and their efforts 

to develop and share criminal intelligence for the purpose of promoting public safety and 

securing the nation. The Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee is 

responsible for advising the President on, among other things, developing policies and 

standards necessary to establish, implement, and maintain the ISE and includes 

representatives from DOJ and DHS. See 6 U.S.C. § 485(g) (establishing an Information 

Sharing Council, the responsibilities of which were subsequently subsumed by the 

Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee).
 

Page 22 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

In coordination with fusion centers and federal partners, DHS has 

developed 45 performance measures designed to capture standardized 

data to assess the impact and contribution of fusion centers on 

information sharing and homeland security. DHS initially reported on five 

measures in the 2012 fusion center assessment report. For example, one 

measure included the number of suspicious activity reports that fusion 

centers submit to the FBI that result in the initiation or an enhancement of 

an FBI investigation.

To build upon these five initial measures, in 2013, DHS began an effort to 

develop a “logic model” that graphically depicts how fusion center inputs 

(e.g., funding and personnel), processes (e.g., activities and initiatives), 

outputs (e.g., products and services), and outcomes (e.g., effect or 

results) relate to one another. According to DHS’s performance measures 

definition guide, the logic model was used to develop an additional 40 

performance measures, and collectively, the 45 measures are intended to 

determine the impact of fusion centers and homeland security 

contributions.33 The guide notes that, using the logic model, 24 of the 

measures are defined as outcome measures, which are grouped into six 

outcome categories, examples of which are illustrated in table 2.

 

33DHS, Performance Measure Definitions Guide, Measuring the Performance of the 

National Network of Fusion Centers (Washington D.C.: April 2014).

DHS Has Developed New 

Performance Measures to 

Assess Fusion Center 

Contributions to Homeland 

Security
 

Page 23 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Table 2: Examples of Fusion Center Performance Measures by Outcome Category

Outcome category Performance measure examples

Enriched Partnerships and DecisionMakingPercentage of key customers reporting that fusion center products and services influenced 

their decision making related to threat response activities within their area of responsibility.

Enhanced Threat and Domain 

Awareness

Percentage of key customers reporting that fusion center products and services resulted in 

increased situational awareness of threats within their area of responsibility.

Better Targeted Information 

Gathering, Analysis, and 

Dissemination

Percentage of fusion center analytic products tagged to Homeland Security Standing 

Information Needs.a

More Effective Law Enforcement 

Activities

 

Number of suspicious activity reports vetted and submitted by fusion centers that result in a 

Terrorist Screening Center watchlist encounter.b

Improved Systemic Intelligence 

Capability

 

Percentage of state, local, tribal, and territorial fusion center analysts with Homeland 

Security Information Network (HSIN) Intel accounts who log into HSIN Intel at least once a 

month.

Improved Support to Operational 

Response

c

Percentage of federally designated special events in which fusion centers played a direct 

role.

Source: DHS Performance Measure Data. | GAO-15-155

d

a

Homeland Security Standing Information Needs refers to the all-threats and all-hazards information 

needs of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), federal, state, local, and private sector 

stakeholders and homeland security partners.

b

The Terrorist Screening Center, a multi-agency organization administered by the FBI, was 

established to organize and consolidate the government’s approach to terrorism screening and to 

provide for the appropriate and lawful use of information related to terrorist in the screening process.

c

HSIN Intel is one of the primary information systems DHS supports to post and share sensitive but 

unclassified intelligence information between fusion centers and federal partners.

d

The events can include activities of national significance such as the presidential inauguration, 

national political conventions, or planned events at the state and local levels that may require federal 

support. Fusion centers can supply operational support and monitoring for special events within their 

area of responsibility.

According to the guide, 21 of the 45 measures, also based on the logic 

model, are intended to capture the outputs of key fusion center functions 

and quantify the number of products or services delivered as a result of a 

process, such as situational awareness reporting. Examples of such 

measures are shown in table 3.
 

Page 24 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Table 3: Examples of Fusion Center Performance Measures by Output Categories 

Output category Performance measure examples

Intelligence and Information 

Products and Services

Number of situational awareness products that fusion centers develop and disseminate.

Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil 

Liberties Protections

Percentage of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties audit findings for which fusion centers 

took corrective actions.

Strategic Plans and Budgets Percentage of fusion centers that develop an annual report providing updates on progress in 

achieving strategic goals and objectives.

Communications Policies and 

Systems

Number of programmatic briefings, tours, and other engagements.

Security Policies and Systems Percentage of state, local, tribal, and territorial fusion center personnel requiring secret 

clearances who have them, or have submitted requests for them to the appropriate granting 

authority.

Source: DHS Performance Measure Data. | GAO-15-155

We assessed SLPO’s 45 performance measures against criteria for 

successful measures that GAO developed in connection with work 

conducted on the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.34

Specifically, the criteria include key attributes developed to assess 

performance goals and measures based on a combination of previously 

established GAO criteria, GPRA, and the IRS Restructuring and Reform 

Act of 1998, as well as related performance management literature.35

According to the Performance Measures Definition Guide, data obtained 

from responses to DHS’s annual assessments of fusion centers will 

provide information to implement some of the 45 measures. Data for 

other measures will come from internal DHS offices, other federal 

Our 

analysis showed that, collectively, the fusion center performance 

measures are generally aligned with the successful attributes. For 

example, among other attributes, the measures are aligned with DHS’s 

goals and missions, are clearly stated, appear objective, and cover the 

core activities of the program. While the new measures do not currently 

incorporate performance targets, as our prior work suggests, SLPO 

officials stated that they plan to analyze data collected for the measures 

in 2013 to establish baseline targets for future years.

 

34GAO-03-143. 

35The nine key attributes identified include (1) linkage, (2) clarity, (3) measureable targets, 

(4) objectivity, (5) reliability, (6) coverage of core program activities, (7) limited overlap, (8) 

balance, and (9) government-wide priorities.
 

Page 25 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

agencies—such as the FBI—and other fusion center partners, including 

the National Governors Association and state homeland security 

advisors. SLPO implemented 34 of the 45 performance measures as part 

of the 2013 fusion center annual assessment and plans to implement the 

remaining 11 measures in future assessment cycles as additional data 

collection mechanisms are established.

Since all of the new performance measures have not yet been fully 

implemented, it is too early to determine how these measures collectively 

will help assess fusion center contributions to homeland security. For 

example, 10 of the 11 performance measures that were not implemented 

as part of the 2013 annual assessment are intended to assess outcomes 

of fusion center activities related to enhancing homeland security, and 

SLPO has not yet developed methodologies for collecting the data. An 

example of an outcome measure not yet implemented is the percentage 

of key customers—including state homeland security advisors—reporting 

that fusion center products and services resulted in increased situational 

awareness of threats within their area of responsibility. According to 

SLPO officials, these measures are still in development since limitations 

currently exist to collect data to implement them, but they are taking steps 

to overcome these limitations. For example, some measures require DHS 

to put additional data collection requirements into place or develop new 

systems. Appendix I contains a summary of fusion center performance 

measures and their implementation status.

The 2013 annual report on fusion centers contained results for the 34 

measures that SLPO had implemented and noted that over 98 percent of 

fusion centers provided data related to all 34 measures.36

 

36DHS, 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers, Final Report (Washington D.C.: June 

2014).

The report also 

highlighted specific measures that show the National Network’s 

contributions to federal homeland security efforts. For example, the report 

noted that fusion centers developed about 6,000 products in 2013 and 

linked 2,250 (37.5 percent) to Homeland Security Standing Information 

Needs. The report also noted that fusion centers issued 275 collaborative 

products with federal partners in 2013, a 7.4 percent increase from 256 in 

2012.
 

Page 26 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

The 2013 annual assessment’s focus on performance measures reflects 

that DHS and the National Network are taking steps to better capture key 

results and outcomes of fusion center activities and their overall 

contributions in support of the homeland security mission.

SLPO produces an annual Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory report 

that shows the number of federal personnel agencies report that they 

deployed to fusion centers—either full- or part- time—as well as the nonpersonnel support agencies provided. Figure 2 shows the number of 

personnel federal agencies reported deploying to fusion centers from 

fiscal years 2011 through 2013.

Federal Agencies

Reported Deploying 

288 Personnel to 

Fusion Centers in 

2013 and Generally 

Defined Roles and 

Responsibilities

Federal Agencies 

Reported Deploying 288 

Personnel to Fusion 

Centers in 2013
 

Page 27 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Figure 2: Number of Federal Personnel Agencies Reported Deploying to Fusion 

Centers, Fiscal Years 2011 through 2013

a

The 2011, 2012, and 2013 Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory reports state that, in each year, 

these agencies deployed the following number of personnel to fusion centers: Drug Enforcement 

Administration (3) in each year; Federal Protective Service (1), (1) and (5); U.S. Coast Guard (1), (1) 

and (5); and U.S. Secret Service (4), (3) and (4); respectively. All personnel reported were deployed 

in full- or part-time positions to support fusion center activities.

The Federal Resource Allocation Criteria—issued by the PM-ISE—

defines the general criteria that federal departments and agencies are to 

use when making deployments and other resource allocations to fusion 

centers.37

 

37 PM-ISE, Information Sharing Environment: Federal Resource Allocation Criteria, ISE 

Guidance ISE-G-112 (Washington D.C.: June 3, 2011).

For example, the criteria note that the governor of the state 

must designate the fusion center as an official state center and the center 

must participate in the baseline capabilities annual assessment process. 

While the criteria provide high-level guidance to federal agencies, they 
 

Page 28 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

can develop additional criteria to inform deployment decisions, such as 

how closely the missions of the fusion center and agency align. For fusion 

centers where agencies have not deployed federal personnel, agencies 

can provide support through off-site personnel or liaison representatives, 

who can provide access to federal data systems, among other things. 

Federal agencies can also provide non-personnel resources to fusion 

centers, such as training, technical assistance, participation in exercises, 

security clearance administration, and travel. According to federal cost 

inventory reports, federal agencies provided fusion centers with nonpersonnel support totaling about $32.8 million in fiscal year 2011 and 

about $18 million in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. The 2012 report lists 

several factors that contributed to the reduction in federal funding 

between the fiscal years, including continuing federal agencies’ budget 

reductions and agencies transitioning from the initial costs of developing 

data systems to maintaining the systems.

As of June 2014, I&A had deployed a total of 74 intelligence officers to 

fusion centers across the National Network, as well as 9 regional 

directors to manage officer activities. As of this date, I&A had also 

deployed a total of 6 intelligence analysts to centers, as well as reports 

officers that collectively cover every fusion center in the network.38 I&A 

has developed general guidance that defines the roles and 

responsibilities for each of these deployed positions, as shown in table 4. 

 

38DHS considers the number of reports officers that are deployed to fusion centers to be 

sensitive information, and therefore we did not include this information in this report. 

I&A Has Developed 

Guidance for Deploying 

Personnel to Fusion 

Centers, although Specific 

Roles and Responsibilities 

Depend on Center Needs 

and Capabilities
 

Page 29 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Table 4: Summary of Roles and Responsibilities for Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Personnel Deployed to Fusion 

Centers

Intelligence officer roles and responsibilities

Intelligence analyst roles and 

responsibilities

Reports officer roles and 

responsibilities

Manage relationships with state, local, and federal 

partners within the officer’s area of responsibility

Work with fusion centers, state and 

local partners, and Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) 

components to develop tailored 

intelligence products that support 

operational missions and senior 

management

Work with state and local partners to 

identify and report information that 

meets DHS requirements for reporting 

unevaluated or raw intelligence 

information to the intelligence 

community

Provide a national intelligence perspective to support 

state, local, and other center partners at the fusion 

centers

Develop production goals and write 

finished intelligence products that 

meet fusion center partners’ and 

DHS’s mission requirements, including 

analytic support to special event threat 

assessments, among other products

Support fusion center efforts to develop and 

implement the capabilities necessary to execute the 

intelligence cyclea

Lead collaboration efforts on joint 

analytic production with DHS and 

intelligence community partners in 

support of fusion center mission 

requirements

 

Facilitate DHS efforts to manage, track, and monitor 

the execution of fusion center capabilities via the 

annual fusion center assessment process

Provide training and other support to 

help ensure that fusion center analysis 

adheres to intelligence community 

tradecraft standardsb

Represent DHS in intelligence and information 

sharing activities with state and local officials—such 

as governors, mayors, and state homeland security 

advisers—as well as with federal entities, including 

the FBI and DHS component field offices, among 

others

Facilitate the incorporation of state 

and local intelligence needs into 

DHS’s Program of Analysis and 

analytic production planningc

 

Serve as the lead DHS I&A representative and team 

leader at the center for other I&A personnel assigned 

to the area of responsibility, which can include 

intelligence analysts

Use domestic and DHS-wide 

databases, such as the Homeland 

Security Information Network, to 

provide analytical support to the 

intelligence community, state and local 

partners, and DHS

Source: GAO analysis of I&A documents. | GAO-15-155

a

The intelligence cycle, as defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), is the process of 

developing unrefined data into polished intelligence for policymakers to use. Six steps constitute the 

intelligence cycle: requirements, planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, 

analysis and production, and dissemination.

b

I&A is to follow the same tradecraft standards as the rest of the intelligence community, which are 

detailed in Intelligence Community Directive Number 203—Analytic Standards (June 21, 2007). The 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence uses these standards to evaluate DHS intelligence 

analysis products, as well as those from other members of the intelligence community.

c

DHS’s Program of Analysis is a tool used to plan, manage, and evaluate analytic production; 

increase understanding of homeland security issues; and address customer needs.
 

Page 30 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Intelligence officers perform a range of activities at fusion centers 

depending on the center’s size, maturity, capabilities, and needs. For 

example, at a smaller center we visited, the intelligence officer’s activities 

included training local intelligence analysts on basic analytic techniques 

and helping to develop and produce intelligence products. At two large 

fusion centers we visited that had their own experienced intelligence 

analysts, the intelligence officers focused on performing more extensive 

outreach with government and private sector partners and reviewing local 

analysts’ finished intelligence products prior to dissemination. According 

to intelligence officers at 2 of the 10 centers we visited, regional directors 

that supervise intelligence officers allow them flexibility to support the 

fusion center in the capacity that best benefits center operations.39

In addition, intelligence officers also stated that regional directors and I&A 

management communicate expectations to intelligence officers through 

oral discussion and employee performance plans. These plans describe 

expectations across a broad set of competencies that include 

accountability for results, communications, critical thinking, engagement, 

and collaboration, among others. According to intelligence officers and 

regional directors we interviewed, these plans also provide a mechanism 

to identify specific performance goals for the intelligence officer based 

upon the needs and objectives of the fusion center. For example, 

according to a performance plan template that we reviewed, an 

intelligence officer’s goal is to facilitate the fusion centers’ execution of the 

intelligence cycle. To address this goal, the officer can perform research 

and identify analytical training opportunities for the fusion center and 

advocate and facilitate the production of joint analytic products with other 

centers, among other things.

According to 7 of the 10 of the fusion center directors we interviewed, 

intelligence officers have helped the center develop analytic capabilities. 

For example, 3 directors noted that officers participate in and arrange 

intelligence training for the local intelligence analysts at the fusion center. 

At 1 fusion center, the director emphasized the importance of having the 

intelligence officer on-site to bring DHS and broader nationwide 

perspectives on intelligence to the fusion center. One other director noted 

that the intelligence officer provided the center with a connection to other 

 

39DHS has deployed nine regional directors across the country to supervise intelligence 

officers deployed at fusion centers. These directors are also responsible for supporting 

fusion centers and facilitating execution of the intelligence cycle.

Intelligence Officers
 

Page 31 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

DHS components in the area of responsibility. Officers also served as a 

conduit to DHS headquarters personnel and subject matter experts to 

respond to inquiries on issues such as the annual fusion center 

assessment process. According to 1 fusion center director, intelligence 

officers also benefit the center by maintaining effective relationships with 

external stakeholders such as InfraGard members and the area 

Protective Security Advisor program.40

I&A has deployed intelligence analysts to fusion centers on a limited 

basis. Until February 2014, I&A had deployed one analyst to both the Los 

Angeles and San Diego fusion centers. The local intelligence officer 

supervises the analysts but officials within I&A’s Analysis Directorate also 

manage these analysts. According to senior I&A officials at headquarters, 

these embedded analysts work with fusion centers to provide training and 

detailed analytic work in accordance with tradecraft standards. For 

example, one standard requires analysts to explicitly identify the critical 

assumptions on which analytic work is based.41

 

40InfraGard is an FBI-sponsored initiative designed to bring together representatives from 

the private and public sectors to help protect our nation’s critical infrastructure from 

attacks by terrorists and criminals. The protective security advisor is a critical 

infrastructure protection and vulnerability mitigation subject matter expert who provides 

DHS with perspectives on risks to critical infrastructure within the regional and local levels. 

Critical infrastructure comprises vital assets, systems, and networks that if incapacitated 

or destroyed could have an adverse impact on the nation’s security, economy, public 

health, or safety. 

In February 2014, I&A 

initiated a multi-phased pilot project to expand the number of analysts 

deployed to fusion centers and, as of June 2014, had deployed an 

additional five analysts to centers for 90-day rotations. In October 2014, 

I&A officials said that they were reviewing the results of the pilot in order 

to inform future resource and deployment planning decisions. Senior 

officials within I&A’s Analysis Directorate noted that they considered

several factors in selecting fusion centers to participate, including the 

center’s 2013 fusion center assessment results, access to informationsharing systems and databases, partnerships with local DHS components 

and other federal agencies, and the sharing of common threat priorities 

between the center and I&A. Officials said that they are also considering 

41 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive Number 

203—Analytic Standards (Washington D.C.: June 21, 2007).

Intelligence Analysts and 

Reports Officers
 

Page 32 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

deploying analysts to additional fusion centers and expanding the 

deployments to 2-year rotations.42

DHS has also deployed reports officers to fusion centers to primarily 

collect raw intelligence and develop intelligence information reports—

formerly known as homeland intelligence reports—which are intended to 

address the intelligence community’s information requirements. In a 2012 

report, congressional staff raised concerns about fusion center 

intelligence reporting not being timely or of sufficient quality.43 According 

to senior I&A officials, in response to these concerns, I&A modified 

procedures for reporting intelligence and training reports officers. For 

example, according to one regional director, to enhance the quality of 

reporting, DHS restricted the development and reporting of intelligence 

information reports to reports officers. Before this change, I&A intelligence 

officers, among others, were involved in producing homeland intelligence 

reports for DHS and the intelligence community, which the congressional 

report notes were, in some instances, unrelated to terrorism and 

outdated, among other things. One supervisory reports officer we 

interviewed said that the goal is to standardize the reporting and approval 

of intelligence reports before releasing them to I&A for further review and 

then on to the intelligence community. One other reports officer said that 

I&A also enhanced training for reports officers by increasing the training 

itinerary from 2 to 3 weeks, in part to spend more time on certain issues—

such as cyber security analysis—and place additional emphasis on the 

quality of reporting over the quantity of reports generated. I&A expanded 

the reports officer training as part of an officer certification program, which 

includes supervised on-the-job training as well as an assessment of an 

officer’s reporting for compliance with standards.

 

42For additional information on DHS intelligence analysis activities, see GAO, DHS 

Intelligence Analysis, Additional Actions Needed to Address Analytic Priorities and 

Workforce Challenges, GAO-14-397 (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2014).

43 United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Federal Support for and Involvement in 

State and Local Fusion Centers (Washington D.C.: Oct. 3, 2012).
 

Page 33 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

As of June 2014, the FBI had deployed 94 intelligence analysts, special 

agents, and others to 58 fusion centers, and had installed its secure data 

system (FBINet) at 51 centers.44

• the fusion center mission aligns with the FBI’s mission, particularly 

related to counterterrorism—for example, both organizations share 

information on terrorism-related activities;

While local field office management 

makes deployment decisions, FBI headquarters developed guidance in 

August 2011 that contains several factors local management is to 

consider when deciding the type of engagement the office will have in 

supporting a fusion center. These factors include the extent to which

• FBI management participates in the fusion center governance 

structure;

• the fusion center operates in an accredited secure work environment 

and has a process to receive, handle, store, and disseminate 

classified information;

• the fusion center is capable of receiving, analyzing, disseminating, 

and gathering information that contributes to the understanding of the 

current threat environment; and

• the fusion center immediately shares all emerging, terrorism-related 

information with the FBI, such as suspicious activity reports.45

In addition to this overarching guidance, in February 2013, the FBI 

developed guidance identifying the key roles and responsibilities of FBI 

personnel assigned to work with fusion centers.46

 

44The FBI Network (FBINet) is the FBI’s primary system for communicating secret 

information, including intelligence pertaining to national security.

As noted in the 

document, this guidance is intended to provide additional policy and 

governance to the field and facilitate uniformity across the FBI while 

recognizing that individual roles and responsibilities may vary based on 

fusion center maturity, operational capability, and other factors. The FBI 

has identified three types of engagement levels it uses to support fusion 

centers: enhanced (interaction with centers on a regular and reoccurring 

basis), basic (interaction with centers on a liaison to part-time basis), and 

liaison (no dedicated resources but FBI maintains an information sharing 

45 FBI, FBI Electronic Communication, FBI Engagement with State and Major Urban Area 

Fusion Centers (Aug. 1, 2011).

46 FBI, FBI Electronic Communication, Fusion Center Initiative; Roles and Responsibilities 

for Personnel Assigned to Fusion Centers (Feb. 28, 2013).

FBI Headquarters Has 

Developed Guidance to 

Help Its Field Offices 

Determine the Level of 

Engagement They Should 

Have with Fusion Centers
 

Page 34 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

relationship with the centers).47 As of July 2014, of the 78 total fusion 

centers in the National Network, FBI data showed that 38 centers 

received enhanced support, 20 centers received basic support, and 19 

centers received liaison support.48

At all 8 of the fusion centers we visited that had FBI personnel deployed, 

FBI field office management—generally an assistant special agent-incharge—were involved in the decision to support fusion center activities 

with personnel and non-personnel resources. Managers at 2 fusion 

centers said that they also provide guidance and oversight to deployed 

intelligence analysts and agents regarding their roles and responsibilities, 

and define general expectations in analysts’ and agents’ performance 

work plans. The FBI tasks personnel deployed to fusion centers with 

various duties, which can include performing liaison services with federal, 

state, local, and private sector partners; reviewing suspicious activity 

reports for dissemination to fusion center partners; briefing DHS and 

fusion center personnel on threats; and collaborating with DHS and fusion 

center staff to develop joint products. FBI officials noted that specific roles 

and responsibilities for deployed staff also depend on factors such as the 

size and maturity of the fusion center. For example, at 1 larger center with 

an established history of FBI engagement we visited, an FBI supervisory 

intelligence analyst managed the fusion center’s intelligence unit, which 

consisted of about 35 intelligence analysts. At a smaller center, the FBI 

intelligence analyst was primarily involved in vetting suspicious activity 

reports. Among the responsibilities identified by other FBI analysts we 

spoke with included providing center personnel with intelligence 

information to enhance situational awareness, intelligence briefings to 

fusion center leadership, and analysis for the fusion center’s tactical 

efforts.

 

47In general, the FBI defines the enhanced engagement level as having a regular and 

ongoing presence in the fusion center, mission overlap, FBINet connectivity, and FBI field 

office and fusion center personnel working together on joint activities and products. Basic 

engagement can range from liaison support to part-time attendance in the fusion center 

and may include sharing classified assessments and intelligence information reports, in 

addition to joint analytic activities. At the liaison level, there is an established channel for 

sharing information, but FBI resources are not dedicated to the fusion center and joint 

activities are limited. 

48The FBI documents we reviewed did not assign an engagement level for 1 fusion center.
 

Page 35 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Fusion center directors at all 10 of the locations we visited generally 

viewed engagement with the FBI as beneficial to the center. For example, 

officials at 1 center noted that access to FBINet was particularly helpful to 

determine if persons of interest had been the subject of any prior 

investigations. Officials at another center noted that their relationship with 

the FBI is working well since issues related to how the center vetted tips 

and leads before submitting them to the FBI for processing have been 

resolved. Specifically, this center now embeds personnel on a rotational 

basis with the FBI unit that reviews these tips and leads. At another fusion 

center, where the FBI’s engagement included a management role in the 

center’s intelligence unit, center officials said that the bureau recognizes 

the overall value that the center provides in supporting intelligence 

activities.

CBP and ICE headquarters officials said that local field office 

management independently makes staff deployment decisions. The 

officials noted that management generally bases decisions on existing 

relationships with fusion center personnel and management interpretation 

of shared mission goals with the center, rather than headquarters-level 

guidance.49

According to our interviews with headquarters and field office 

representatives, roles and responsibilities for deployed CBP and ICE 

personnel can include activities similar to those performed by I&A and FBI 

personnel—such as providing liaison support for fusion center operations, 

access to component data systems, and investigative case support—

while also supporting the components’ own missions. For example, a 

CBP supervisory official we interviewed said that the primary 

responsibilities of one such deployment included an individual supporting 

the activities of a task force consisting of fusion center partners, as well 

as engaging with the DHS intelligence analyst that was deployed to the 

For example, one CBP field office determined that because it 

shared information with the fusion center on issues of mutual interest in 

the southwest region of the country—such as border security—and both 

the field office and center provided investigative leads to state, local, and 

federal law enforcement partners, among other things, the field office 

would deploy an officer to the center.

 

49The 2011 Fusion Center Cost Inventory shows that CBP and ICE had each deployed 24 

personnel to fusion centers, which was the third most personnel deployed, behind I&A and 

the FBI. 

CBP and ICE 

Headquarters Rely on 

Field Office Management 

to Make Deployment 

Decisions; CBP 

Headquarters Is 

Developing Additional 

Guidance
 

Page 36 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

center to develop intelligence products. An ICE intelligence analyst we 

interviewed said that, in addition to performing ICE-related work priorities, 

the analyst’s key roles within the center included coordinating 

investigative activities and providing data in support of the center’s 

investigative unit.

CBP and ICE headquarters officials said that they have not created 

guidance to date for field office management to consider when making 

deployment decisions primarily because field offices are decentralized 

units with the authority to make such decisions independent of 

headquarters management. However, in June 2014, CBP headquarters 

officials said that they are developing a strategy to assist the agency in 

determining the most appropriate locations and mechanisms to provide 

personnel support to fusion centers and other CBP partners. The officials 

noted that CBP expects to complete the strategy in fiscal year 2015. 

According to the officials, the strategy will include several elements, 

including (1) a listing of all existing CBP partnerships with fusion centers 

and other agencies, (2) a matrix to evaluate current and potential future 

partnerships against CBP mission needs and operational requirements, 

and (3) training and equipment requirements to ensure consistency 

across all partnerships.

ICE headquarters officials did not plan to develop additional guidance to 

help govern field office personnel deployments. However, DHS is taking 

additional actions to provide departmental components with information 

on the support priorities and personnel requirements of individual fusion 

centers. For example, I&A conducted a survey of fusion centers in 2010—

and a follow-up data call in 2012—to help identify fusion center needs for 

DHS component personnel to meet the centers’ operational mission and 

requirements. Further, according to a senior I&A official, the forthcoming 

Federal Framework for Supporting the National Network of Fusion 

Centers is to include information related to federal resource allocations to 

fusion centers and is intended to respond, in part, to the efforts called for 

by the NFCA. DHS also issued the Implementation Guidance for the 

Federal Resource Allocation Criteria Policy in September 2014. 

According to the document, this guidance is designed to assist federal 

agencies in planning and tracking resource deployments. Among the 

elements included in the guidance are recommended best practices for 

collecting data on support resources provided to fusion centers. These 

suggested practices are intended to promote additional consistency 

across federal agencies and help provide more comprehensive 

information on the overall federal investment in fusion centers.
 

Page 37 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

In fiscal year 2011, FEMA initiated a requirement that each fusion center 

complete DHS’s annual baseline capabilities assessment to be eligible for 

HSGP funding, and federal officials began reviewing the grant requests to

ensure that proposed projects target the achievement or sustainment of 

identified capabilities. Since that time, FEMA and SLPO officials have 

collaborated to help ensure that each fusion center grant request 

incorporates the results of the annual assessment as part of the 

investment justification. Specifically, HSGP grant guidance calls for each 

fusion center investment justification to describe the investment; identify 

how the investment supports state or urban area homeland security goals 

and objectives; explain capability gaps that the investment is intended to 

address; and describe the outcomes the investment is to achieve, among 

other things.

Since fiscal year 2012, the grant guidance also requires the investment 

justification to further identify the specific capabilities and assessment 

attributes that the proposed projects are intended to address. According 

to SLPO officials who are responsible for reviewing these investment 

justifications, the guidance requires narrative statements that support the 

justifications to include explicit references to the capabilities covered 

within the annual fusion center assessment. The officials stated that they 

review each justification to ensure that these narratives adequately 

address any identified capability gaps. SLPO officials also noted that the 

narratives have improved from year -to -year based upon feedback 

provided to grantees, including that FEMA rejected some requests until it 

received additional information.

Our review of the fiscal year 2013 investment justifications for the 10 

fusion centers we visited showed that the narratives routinely referenced 

Grant Reforms Are 

Helping DHS Track 

Fusion Center 

Projects, but DHS 

Cannot Accurately 

Account for Total 

Funding Provided to 

Centers

Grant Reforms Are 

Helping DHS Ensure That 

Requests for Federal 

Funding to Support Fusion 

Centers Are Aligned with 

Expected Capabilities
 

Page 38 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

targeted capabilities, with most of the narratives focusing on sustaining 

existing capabilities rather than initiating new ones.50 For example, the 

most common areas targeted for funding were maintenance and 

upgrades of existing technology platforms and sustainment of current 

staff positions. DHS officials stated that sustainment of existing 

capabilities would likely be the area of emphasis going forward but noted 

that these narratives would remain helpful to identify network trends and 

needs, particularly as funding becomes further constrained. While our 

review indicated that many of the supporting narratives within the 

investment justifications lacked explicit details—potentially, in part, 

because of the focus on sustainment of existing staff positions and 

technology systems rather than new capabilities—these grant 

requirements and corresponding review procedures provide a mechanism 

to help ensure that requested fusion center projects are addressing the 

achievement of identified baseline capabilities.51

In September 2010, we reported on Congress’ interest in knowing the 

amount of federal funding going to support fusion center operations.52

However, in the past, DHS generally, and FEMA more specifically, have 

had challenges in tracking this amount because of the way FEMA 

captured funding data in its systems. Moreover, a 2012 congressional 

committee report cited concerns regarding DHS’s ability to provide 

adequate oversight of its financial support for fusion centers.53

Historically, FEMA relied upon a keyword search of its grant management 

system to identify likely fusion center projects and related funding. 

According 

to FEMA grant management officials, FEMA initiated a new grant 

requirement for the 2012 grant cycle in part to address these concerns 

and help ensure more reliable reporting on fusion center grant funding in 

the future.

 

50 Each investment justification can include up to 10 individual projects.

51FEMA is in the early stages of implementing a new grant reporting tool that is designed 

to capture additional project-level information in the investment justifications, which we 

discuss in greater detail later in this report. 

52GAO-10-972. 

53Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Federal Support for and Involvement in State and 

Local Fusion Centers (Washington D.C.: Oct. 3, 2012). 

FEMA Has Improved 

Tracking of Federal Grants 

for Fusion Centers, but 

Data on Total Levels of 

Federal Funding Remain 

Unreliable
 

Page 39 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

However, according to the 2012 committee report, depending on the 

keywords searched, FEMA estimated that grant funding provided to 

fusion centers from 2003 through 2010 ranged from $289 million to as 

much as $1.4 billion.54 Subsequently, FEMA initiated a new requirement 

for the fiscal year 2012 grant cycle that called for states to submit a 

separate investment justification for all fusion center projects requested to 

be funded through the HSGP. As part of this justification, FEMA requires 

grant applicants to categorize individual fusion center projects among six 

designated spending categories—equipment, exercises, management 

and administration, organization, planning, and training. FEMA is to 

capture this information in its grant management system, which is to allow 

FEMA to account for aggregate spending in these individual areas across 

the National Network. FEMA also requires states to specifically identify 

fusion center projects—via a check mark—on all subsequent reports that 

these entities submit to FEMA every 6 months, providing the status of 

project implementation.55

FEMA’s 2012 grant requirements represent an improvement over 

keyword searches in identifying fusion center projects and funding, but 

the data are unreliable, as grantees have incorrectly categorized many 

projects. Specifically, in response to our request, FEMA provided data 

indicating that states obligated approximately $124 million of DHS grant 

funding to support fusion centers across the network in fiscal year 2012. 

However, upon further review of the individual project descriptions that 

states reported, FEMA and SLPO officials determined that states 

incorrectly categorized many fusion center projects. These include cases 

in which projects supported broader capabilities not directly related to 

fusion centers—such as emergency management positions—as well as 

those that were not specifically supporting center operations. For 

example, one urban area reported obligating $14 million to a fusion center 

for automated license plate readers and video surveillance equipment, 

although the center will be one of a number of system users. Given that 

FEMA identified that the $124 million estimate contained non-fusion-

 

54We did not assess the reliability of these reported data but evaluated the most recent 

FEMA data available for the purposes of this report.

55Following the award of a grant, state grantees must provide FEMA with updated 

information on project obligation amounts every 6 months in order to show implementation 

progress. States submit this information to FEMA through biannual strategy 

implementation reports. This reporting requirement is for all DHS grants and not unique to 

fusion center grant funding.
 

Page 40 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

center-related projects, the figure is unreliable for quantifying total federal 

grant funding provided to support fusion center operations in 2012. As an 

alternative estimate of fusion center grant funding, SLPO officials 

provided us with data on annual fusion center budgets that they collected 

via the annual assessment process. According to these data that fusion 

center directors reported, centers received approximately $60 million in 

DHS grant funding to support their operations in fiscal year 2012.56

To address this issue, FEMA is planning additional efforts to help states 

better categorize fusion center projects and improve the reliability of grant 

reporting. Specifically, for grant awards issued prior to fiscal year 2014, 

FEMA plans to provide supplemental guidance to grantees in advance of 

the next reporting period, which ends on December 31, 2014. According 

to FEMA officials, this guidance will direct grantees to reassess specified 

projects to determine if they are properly identified as supporting fusion 

centers. Additionally, the FEMA officials plan to introduce a series of 

questions within the FEMA grant reporting system by the end of calendar 

year 2014 to help grantees assess if designated projects should remain 

categorized as support to fusion centers. These combined efforts, if 

implemented as proposed, could provide grantees with information they 

need to make revisions to incorrect categorizations and help address data 

reliability issues.

We 

did not independently evaluate the reliability of this estimate; however, an 

SLPO official stated that the $60 million estimate was generally consistent 

with the amount remaining from the $124 million figure provided once 

non-fusion-center-related projects were subtracted.

As proposed, the efforts discussed above could also serve to support the 

overall enhancement of project-level reporting that FEMA is currently 

implementing, in part, to address our prior recommendations. Although 

these efforts are not specific to fusion centers, we reported in February 

2012 that FEMA lacked visibility over project-level details—particularly 

within the SHSP and UASI grant programs—and we recommended that 

DHS collect project information with sufficient detail to identify potential 

 

56Since we reported on federal support to fusion centers in 2010, the proportion of federal 

funding to support operations has decreased. For example, self-reported state data 

collected as part of DHS’s annual assessment of fusion centers show that, in 2010, fusion 

centers covered about 60 percent of their operational budgets with federal funding and the 

remaining with state or local funding. However, data show that in 2012, centers covered 

about 38 percent with federal funding.
 

Page 41 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

duplication.57 DHS concurred with this recommendation and, beginning 

with the 2014 grant cycle, FEMA started implementing a project-based 

application and reporting process that is intended to help improve 

oversight for individual projects. FEMA plans for this initiative to be fully 

implemented for fiscal year 2015.58

The combined efforts of additional guidance and implementation of 

project-level reporting may help states better categorize fusion center 

projects, improve the reliability of grant reporting, and enhance oversight 

of the projects. However, FEMA does not have plans to specifically 

review state reporting to ensure that grantees act in accordance with the 

proposed guidance—such as using the drop-down menus as intended—

and take steps to revise any misclassified fusion center projects. It is 

important that projects be accurately categorized, as FEMA uses these 

data to determine the overall level of federal investment in fusion centers. 

FEMA officials stated that overall grant monitoring efforts are expected to 

help improve the reliability of fusion center funding data, but they noted 

that only a sample of fusion centers will be targeted through these 

processes.

FEMA officials reported that this 

process is intended to help ensure that FEMA receives more 

comprehensive information from state grantees about project objectives 

and overall implementation progress.

59

 

57See GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs Better Project Information and Coordination 

among Four Overlapping Grant Programs,

While sampling remains a reasonable approach for FEMA to 

conduct monitoring across the large number of HSGP projects 

implemented annually, this approach is not likely to provide FEMA with 

sufficient visibility over fusion center projects because each state reports 

information independently and any actions taken by one state to 

GAO-12-303 (Washington, D.C., Feb. 28, 

2012).

58This electronic tool requires applicants to complete narrative statements and make 

selections from a series of menus to capture the key characteristics and status of 

individual projects. With respect to fusion centers, FEMA officials noted that these projectlevel enhancements are expected to allow DHS to track expenditures against investment 

justification requests and identified capability gaps, per the annual assessment process. 

59 FEMA is currently in its second year of conducting a risk-based monitoring approach to 

evaluate the information states provide through biannual reports. According to FEMA, this 

approach includes a baseline review of each project to identify potential challenges to 

grant success such as grantee organizational weaknesses, complexity of projects, and 

concerns related to timeliness or accuracy of reporting. A small subset of these projects 

are then to be selected for a detailed review based on several factors, including the dollar 

amount of the project and known issues with, or visibility of, the project.
 

Page 42 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

recategorize projects are not generalizable to others. Given the past 

problems related to data reliability and FEMA not knowing why states 

may have initially miscategorized fusion center projects, additional actions 

beyond the monitoring efforts currently planned are important. According 

to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, monitoring is 

important not only to assess the quality of performance over time but also 

to ensure that audit findings are promptly resolved.60 Development of a 

specific mechanism to ensure that states act in accordance with the 

forthcoming guidance could provide FEMA reasonable assurance that 

fusion center projects are properly classified and accurately account for 

total grant funding provided to centers. Such a mechanism could include, 

for example, having SPLO officials review those projects that states 

identify as supporting fusion centers to verify that states have accurately 

done so in accordance with the guidance. SPLO officials are in a position 

to conduct this review based on their knowledge of the results of the 

annual center assessments, input from DHS representatives at fusion 

centers, and other means. Developing a mechanism to ensure that states 

act in accordance with the proposed guidance could provide DHS, 

congressional, and other decision makers with more accurate information 

on the level of federal investment in centers to help decision makers 

determine future levels of investment.

As focal points within states and urban areas for the receipt, analysis, 

gathering, and dissemination of law enforcement, homeland security, and 

terrorism information, fusion centers are uniquely situated to help 

enhance the national threat picture and help protect the country. As these 

centers continue to mature, it remains important for DHS to identify the 

results that centers are achieving and how federal agencies can help 

support and leverage these centers. The recent expansion of 

performance measures is a positive step in this process, as are plans to 

move forward with additional exercises to further evaluate fusion center 

capabilities. DHS grant funding also remains an important component of 

federal support to fusion centers, but to date, FEMA has not been able to 

accurately account for and report on the amount of funds it has provided 

to centers. FEMA’s proposed efforts to help ensure that grantees provide 

more accurate information on fusion center projects remain critical to 

improving reporting, but implementation of a specific mechanism to verify 

 

60 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

Conclusions
 

Page 43 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

that states have acted in accordance with the forthcoming guidance 

would further help ensure that these efforts are achieving their intended 

purpose and fusion center grant reporting is reliable.

To help provide reasonable assurance that data states report on the 

amount of federal grant funding used to support fusion centers is reliable, 

we recommend that the FEMA Administrator implement a mechanism to 

verify that states act in accordance with the proposed grant reporting 

guidance, when implemented. 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ for review and 

comment. In its written comments, summarized below and reprinted in 

appendix II, DHS concurred with the recommendation and described 

actions planned to address it. In addition, DHS provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate. On 

October 27, 2014, DOJ’s Audit Liaison Group informed us via email that 

the department did not have any comments on our draft report.

DHS concurred with our recommendation that FEMA develop a 

mechanism to verify that states act in accordance with proposed 

guidance to help ensure that data reporting on the amount of federal 

grant funding used to support fusion centers is reliable. Specifically, DHS 

said that beginning in January 2015, FEMA—in coordination with I&A as 

appropriate—will review all fusion center projects to determine whether 

state reported expenditures are actually in support of a designated fusion 

center. In the event that the review identifies discrepancies, DHS said that 

FEMA will work with grantees to obtain additional clarification. In addition, 

DHS noted that any grantees currently scheduled for monitoring in fiscal 

year 2015 will receive an in-depth review of all fusion center projects, to 

include an examination of project progress, impediments to timely 

completion, and verification of funding data provided by the state. If fully 

implemented, DHS’s planned efforts will address the intent of the 

recommendation.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security; the Attorney General, the Commissioner of Customs and Border 

Protection, the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and 

appropriate congressional committees. The report is also available at no 

charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments
 

Page 44 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix III. 

Eileen R. Larence

Director

Homeland Security and Justice
 

Page 45 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

List of Requesters

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper

Chairman

The Honorable Tom Coburn, M.D.

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul

Chairman

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Summary of Fusion Center 

Performance Measures

Page 46 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

This appendix provides a summary of performance measures that the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—in consultation with other 

partners—has established for the National Network of Fusion Centers. 

DHS grouped the performance measures by six outcome and five output 

categories. Table 6 shows a description of measures, their 

implementation status, and aggregated performance results across the 

National Network, as reported in the 2013 National Network of Fusion 

Centers, Final Report.

Table 5: Summary of Outcome and Output Measures, Implementation Status, and Results for the National Network of Fusion 

Centers

Performance measures description

Implementation

status 

Performance

results

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-defined outcome measures

a

Enriched partnerships and decision making

Percentage of key customers reporting that fusion center products and services are 

timely for mission needs

Implemented 87.8%

Percentage of key customers reporting that fusion center products and services are 

relevant

Implemented 83.5%

Percentage of key customers who indicate they are satisfied with fusion center support Implemented 87.7%

Percentage of key customers reporting that fusion center products and services 

influenced their decision making related to threat response activities within their area of 

responsibility

Not implemented ——- 

Number of law enforcement, fire service, and emergency medical services entities with 

Fusion Liaison Officers

Implemented 11,572

Enhanced threat and domain awareness

Percentage of states whose fusion centers report involvement in Threat and Hazard 

Identification and Risk Assessment

Implemented 92.5%

Number of DHS Intelligence Information Reports originating from information received 

and validated by a fusion center

Not implemented —— 

Number of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) intelligence information reports 

originating from information received and validated by a fusion center

Not implemented —— 

Percentage of key customers reporting that fusion center products and services 

resulted in increased situational awareness of threats within their area of responsibility

Not implemented —— 

Better targeted information gathering, analysis, and dissemination

Percentage of fusion center analytic products tagged to Homeland Security Standing 

Information Needs

Implemented 19.3%

Percentage of fusion center analytic products tagged to fusion center Standing 

Information Needs

Implemented 34.1%

Appendix I: Summary of Fusion Center 

Performance Measures
Appendix I: Summary of Fusion Center 

Performance Measures

Page 47 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Performance measures description

Implementation

status 

Performance

results

More effective law enforcement activities

a

Number of suspicious activity reports vetted and submitted by fusion centers that result 

in the initiation or enhancement of an investigation by the FBI

Implemented 193

Percentage of requests for information from the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) for 

which fusion centers provided information for a TSC case file

b

Implemented 63.6%

Number of suspicious activity reports vetted and submitted by fusion centers that result 

in a TSC Watchlist encounter

Implemented 134

Improved systemic intelligence capability

b

Number of analytic products co-authored by at least one fusion center and at least one 

federal agency

Implemented 211

Number of analytic products co-authored by two or more fusion centers Implemented 115

Number of DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis analytic products that cite 

information originating from fusion centers

Not implemented —— 

Number of fusion center analytic products that cite source information originating from 

Intelligence Community (IC) products or reports

Not implemented —— 

Number of fusion center analytic products that cite source information originating from 

at least one other fusion center’s products or reports

Not implemented —— 

Percentage of state, local, tribal, and territorial fusion center analysts with Homeland 

Security Information Network (HSIN) Intel accounts who log into HSIN Intel at least 

once a month

Not implemented —— 

Improved support to operational response

Percentage of federally designated special events in which fusion centers played a 

direct role

Implemented 48.6%

Percentage of federally declared disasters in which fusion centers played a direct role Implemented 42.9%

Percentage of state declared disasters in which fusion centers played a direct role Not implemented —— 

Percentage of recommendations identified through Fusion Center Readiness Initiative 

exercises acted upon and addressed by the specified fusion center(s)

Not implemented —— 

DHS-defined output measures

Intelligence and information products and services

Number of situational awareness products developed and disseminated by fusion 

centers

Implemented c 27,592

Number of analytic products developed and disseminated by fusion centers Implemented c 5,994

Number of threat tips and leads processed by fusion centers Implemented 77,378

Number of fusion center searches conducted on suspicious activity reporting (SAR) 

within the Nationwide SAR Initiative—SAR Data Repository

Implemented c 69,212

Number of suspicious activity reports submitted by fusion centers Implemented 5,883

Number of responses to fusion center-to-fusion center requests for information Implemented 18,714

Number of responses to federal requests for information Implemented 47,069

Number of responses to requests for information from agencies within fusion center 

area of responsibility

Implemented 228,892
Appendix I: Summary of Fusion Center 

Performance Measures

Page 48 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Performance measures description

Implementation

status 

Performance

results

Privacy, civil Rights, and civil liberties (P/CRCL) protections

a

Percentage of fusion centers that conduct a P/CRCL compliance review based upon 

the compliance verification tool

Implemented 92.3%

Percentage of fusion centers that conduct P/CRCL audits Implemented 80.8%

Percentage of P/CRCL audit findings for which fusion centers took corrective actions Not implemented —— 

Percentage of fusion center P/CRCL officers who received P/CRCL training for their 

position

Implemented 94.7%

Percentage of fusion centers that provide annual P/CRCL training to all fusion center 

staff

Implemented 97.4%

Percentage of fusion center analytic products reviewed by P/CRCL officers for P/CRCL 

issues

Implemented 57.0%

Strategic plans and budgets

Percentage of fusion centers that develop an annual report providing updates on 

progress in achieving strategic goals and objectives

Implemented 56.4%

Percentage of fusion centers providing all performance data for the Fusion Center 

Performance Program

Implemented 98.7%

Communications policies and systems

Number of programmatic briefings, tours, and other engagements Implemented 5,117

Number of open records inquiries (e.g. Freedom of Information Act requests) 

responded to by fusion centers

Implemented 222

Security policies and systems

Of the fusion centers that fall under DHS’s purview, percentage of fusion centers that 

undergo an annual security compliance review based on DHS standards

Implemented 100%

Of the fusion centers that participated in the DHS’s, Security Compliance Review during 

the assessment period, percentage of findings identified in the review report for which 

fusion centers took corrective actions within the timeframe identified

Implemented 96.4%

Percentage of state, local, tribal, and territorial fusion center personnel requiring secret 

clearances who have them or have submitted requests to the appropriate granting 

authority for them

Implemented 92.0%

Source: GAO analysis of DHS’s 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report and the Performance Measures Definitions Guide. GAO-15-155

a

DHS did not report data on individual fusion center’s performance results in the 2013 National 

Network of Fusion Centers Final Report. Instead the data collected on performance measures were 

aggregated to report the performance of the National Network in total.

b

DHS states that results for these performance measure are based on preliminary data.

c

For these performance measures, DHS counted products that were written by fusion centers.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 49 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 50 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance
Page 51 GAO-15-155 Fusion Center Performance

Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact named above, Eric Erdman (Assistant Director), 

Eric Hauswirth, Ryan Lambert, Thomas Lombardi, Linda Miller, Marvin 

McGill, and Jessica Orr made significant contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(441164)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov. 

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.