NARCOTICS INTERDICTION:

Remote Video Inspection System Deployment 

Goals Have Not Been Achieved 

OIG-02-033 January 15, 2002

Office of Inspector General

*******

The Department of the Treasury
Contents

RVIS Deployment Goals Have Not Been Achieved (OIG-02-033) Page 1

Audit Report....................................................................................................... 2

Results in Brief.................................................................................................. 3

Background....................................................................................................... 3

Finding and Recommendations........................................................................... 7

RVIS Was Not Deployed In Accordance With Schedule .................................. 7

Recommendation..........................................................................................13 

Appendices

Appendix 1: List of Planned RVIS Sites ........................................................ 15

Appendix 2: Objectives, Scope and Methodology.......................................... 16

Appendix 3 Management Comments............................................................18

Appendix 4: Major Contributors To This Report ............................................ 22

Appendix 5 Report Distribution ................................................................... 23

Abbreviations

APP Automated Port Program

Customs United States Customs Service

INS United States Immigration and Naturalization Service

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

RVIS Remote Video Inspection System 

SOP Standard Operating Procedures

The Accord The Canada-United States of America

Accord on Our Shared Border
OIG Audit

Report

The Department of the Treasury

Office of Inspector General

RVIS Deployment Goals Have Not Been Achieved (OIG-02-033) Page 2

January 15, 2002

Mr. Robert C. Bonner

Commissioner

U.S. Customs Service

The Remote Video Inspection System (RVIS) is a joint 

U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and 

U.S. Customs Service (Customs) initiative that evolved from The 

Canada-United States of America Accord on Our Shared Border. 

Through the use of video technology, Customs and INS planned to 

offer 24-hour per day border services by the year 2000 at 

22 border crossings that previously were closed during the evening 

and nighttime hours. It was anticipated that RVIS would facilitate 

the movement of low-risk travelers, while also ensuring border 

security.

We conducted this audit to evaluate Customs progress in 

implementing RVIS. We performed work from August 2000 

through May 2001 at Customs headquarters, and 23 remote 

northern border crossings in Maine, New York, North Dakota, and 

Montana. Some of the crossings that we visited were planned 

RVIS sites and others were not. A more detailed description of our 

objective, scope and methodology is provided in Appendix 1.
RVIS Deployment Goals Have Not Been Achieved (OIG-02-033) Page 3

Results in Brief

The goal of deploying RVIS at 22 locations by December 31, 2000, 

was not achieved. As of September 2001, only seven sites were 

capable of operating RVIS equipment. Poor contractor 

performance and a lack of strong oversight caused delays in the 

deployment of RVIS. Customs oversight was weak because 

Customs and INS did not function as “equal partners.” Customs 

deferred to INS to oversee RVIS development. We believe 

Customs needed to be more proactive. To correct 

RVIS deficiencies, we recommended that Customs and INS develop 

Standard Operating Procedures and enter into a Memorandum of 

Understanding (MOU) more clearly delineating roles and 

responsibilities.

Background

Remote Ports Along The Northern Border

Many small remote ports of entry along the northern border are 

only opened and staffed by Customs and INS officials 

8 to 12 hours per day. Travelers wanting to cross the border 

during the off hours are notified, via road signs, that they need to 

report to another port of entry (usually several miles away) where 

Customs and INS staff are on duty (see Figure 1 below). Although 

these small ports of entry are officially closed, most lack any 

physical barriers prohibiting crossing. Generally, orange cones are 

placed in the road indicating that the road is closed.
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Figure 1: Sign Approaching Port At Northgate, ND

Source: OIG Photograph

Remote Video Inspection System

Over the last several years, Customs and INS have been working to 

develop technology to allow local residents and frequent low-risk 

travelers to pass through these remote ports when Customs and 

INS staff are not on duty. Their efforts began in 1994 when 

Customs and INS initiated the Automated Port Program (APP).

In 1995, the United States and Canada entered into The 

Canada-United States of America Accord on Our Shared Border

(The Accord). Under The Accord, both countries agreed to 

promote trade, enhance enforcement efforts, and facilitate the 

movement of people.

From The Accord came RVIS, in which both countries agreed to 

implement technology-based services that would expedite the 

clearance of low-risk travelers and enhance security at remote 

northern border crossings. Specifically, The Accord declared that 
RVIS Deployment Goals Have Not Been Achieved (OIG-02-033) Page 5

both governments would offer 24-hour per day border services by 

the year 2000 to 22 pairs of small towns that previously were 

closed during the evening and nighttime hours. The number of 

ports providing RVIS service was later expanded to 27. Customs 

indicated this was done through an INS appropriation for FY 1998 

and that Canada never agreed to these additional locations. The 

RVIS ports are shown on the map below and listed in Appendix 1.

Figure 2: Map Showing RVIS Ports Along The Northern Border

Source: OIG Diagram

INS Oversaw The RVIS Contract

Although RVIS was to be a joint INS/Customs project, Customs 

officials stated that INS was congressionally mandated to take the 

lead on RVIS. As a result, INS was responsible for awarding and 

monitoring the RVIS contract.

RVIS Components

The RVIS that was developed by the INS contractor consisted of a 

validation system, pan/tilt/zoom video cameras, card readers, 

sensors, and two-way communication equipment. RVIS transmits 
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images of the person, the vehicle, documents and passengers to an 

inspector located miles away at the main monitoring, 24-hour port 

of entry. Inspectors trained in RVIS can examine all vehicle 

compartments (trunk, hood and backseat) and record license plate 

information. RVIS also includes a two-way speaker telephone for 

use whenever an inspector requires additional information or has 

questions for the traveler.

Figure 3: RVIS Equipment At Champlain, NY, Test Site

Source: OIG Photograph

Northern Border Alerts

Over the last 2 years, RVIS sites have been impacted by 

two Level One alerts. The first occurred in December 1999 when 

the Commissioner of Customs suspended the use of RVIS and 

staffed all northern border ports 24 hours per day. The alert status 

was rescinded in January 2000, except at the five border crossings 

that had operational RVIS equipment. These sites continued to be 

staffed 24 hours per day until March 1, 2001, when staffing was 

reduced at the five sites and RVIS was reactivated. The second 
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alert occurred as a result of the events of September 11, 2001. 

Once again, RVIS was suspended and border crossings were 

staffed 24 hours per day.

Finding and Recommendations

Finding 1 RVIS Was Not Deployed In Accordance With Schedule

The goal of deploying RVIS at 22 locations by December 2000 was 

not achieved. As of September 2001, only seven RVIS sites were 

capable of operating. The delays in deploying RVIS were caused 

by poor contractor performance, policy disagreements between INS 

and Customs, and a lack of strong oversight, as Customs deferred 

to INS to oversee implementation. To correct deficiencies, we 

recommend that Customs and INS institute Standard Operating 

Procedures and enter into an updated MOU with INS more clearly 

delineating roles and responsibilities. Of primary concern, given the 

current security situation, is a need to define under what 

circumstances, if any, non-enrolled travelers will be allowed to 

cross the border at RVIS sites.

Untimely Deployment Of RVIS

Our review disclosed that Customs and INS fell far short of the 

goal of having RVIS operating at the 22 remote ports of entry by 

the end of the year 2000. As of September 10, 2001 (prior to the 

Level One alert), RVIS was capable of being operational at only 

seven sites (Easton, Forest City, Monticello, and Orient, Maine; 

Pittsburgh, New Hampshire1; and Scobey and Whitetail, Montana). 

As mentioned earlier, there is now 24-hour staffing at these 

seven ports and other locations, and neither Customs nor INS are 

presently relying on RVIS as a primary inspection tool.

 

1

 While capable of operation the Pittsburg, NH, site would not initially be in use due to a lack of enrolled 

travelers. According to Customs officials, Customs and INS agreed to use RVIS at Pittsburg once an 

enrolled population was established. To make enrollment feasible, the port hours of operation were 

extended.
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Figure 4: Border Crossing at Orient, Maine

Source: OIG Photograph

The slow RVIS-implementation process was primarily attributable 

to equipment problems and the lack of timely contractor response.

Customs field personnel at all of the sites we visited stated that 

from the very beginning there were frequent problems with 

RVIS equipment. Equipment malfunctioned on a regular basis and 

spare parts were hard to obtain. There were no local 

sub-contractors authorized by the contractor to respond to 

problems affecting the RVIS sites. The contractor sent its staff to 

the remote field locations to examine the problems. However, 

Customs personnel were quick to point out that contractor 

responses were often untimely and ineffective.

RVIS hardware and software have had to be continually updated 

and modified. Customs field personnel noted that weather 

problems such as blustery winds, lightning strikes, and ice and 

snow, negatively impacted RVIS equipment. These conditions 

caused equipment to fail and required numerous modifications. 
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These modifications resulted in additional field-testing that further 

delayed RVIS implementation.

In addition to weather-related problems, RVIS installation was 

hampered by the lack of suitable telephone communication lines 

required to transmit the video images inherent in the system. The 

remote areas selected for the RVIS equipment often lacked 

adequate telephone transmission lines to effectively support the 

equipment. As a result, video presentations were often of poor 

quality and delays of up to 45 seconds in transmitting live pictures 

occurred. Also, field personnel were told the expense involved in 

upgrading these telephone lines was a major factor in the untimely 

deployment of RVIS.

In response to our draft report, Customs indicated that all locations 

have subsequently been upgraded to either dedicated T1 lines or 

satellite up-links. We were unable to verify this information.

Documents obtained from Customs substantiated the above 

statements made by Customs field personnel. These documents 

showed that INS officials criticized the contractor for failing to 

perform installations, retrofits, upgrades, and maintenance, in a 

timely manner. INS officials reported that the contractor was over 

a year and a half behind schedule on some site locations, and even 

after failing to meet original dates, the contractor was unable to 

adhere to a revised delivery schedule. The contractor admitted to 

doing a poor job of planning, estimating, scheduling and 

communicating, and assured INS that it would undertake remedial 

actions to address the criticisms and failure of its work. The 

contractor reported that, beginning in October 1998, over 

300 system changes had to be made.

In response to our draft report, Customs stated that the contractor 

had been replaced due to poor performance. Again, we were 

unable to verify this information.

Policy Disagreement

RVIS deployment has also been hampered by a policy disagreement 

between INS and Customs management regarding who should be 
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eligible for RVIS processing. As a result, the reactivation of RVIS, 

after the first alert, was delayed while INS and Customs attempted 

to arrive at some type of compromise.

Prior to The Accord, Customs and INS entered into an MOU for the 

APP. This agreement restricted automated port usage to low-risk 

travelers who had been screened for eligibility. Customs views 

RVIS as a program that should be restricted to local, pre-enrolled 

residents. However, INS personnel want other travelers to be able 

to cross the border under certain circumstances.

At the conclusion of the first alert, the Commissioner of Customs 

was against reactivation of RVIS if non-enrolled travelers were 

allowed to enter the country through RVIS-equipped border 

crossings. In a memorandum dated September 27, 2000, the 

Customs Deputy Commissioner informed the INS Deputy 

Commissioner that Customs would like to reactivate RVIS but on 

an enrollee-only basis. INS eventually agreed to reactivate RVIS in 

accordance with Customs position, but INS reserved the right to 

have its personnel process non-enrolled travelers under certain 

exigent circumstances.

Unequal Partners And Loose Oversight

The partnership of INS and Customs in the implementation of 

RVIS has been hampered by a lack of defined responsibilities. The 

MOU agreed to in 1994 did not address issues of accountability, 

poor contractor performance, and the resolution of operational 

disputes. In addition, no new agreement was entered into after 

The Accord. This has resulted in an unequal partnership, with 

Customs deferring to INS, particularly in the area of contractor 

performance.

For example, at numerous locations Customs personnel told us 

they had very little interaction with the contractor, and were often 

unaware of the current state of RVIS equipment or the extent of 

contractor support activities in their geographic areas. Though 

considered equal partners with INS, many field personnel felt that 

Customs was not actively involved, consulted or briefed by INS or 

its contractor.
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These statements were confirmed by the fact that we were unable 

to locate any documentation that Customs personnel routinely 

evaluated contractor performance. Also, we found no evidence 

that Customs and INS conducted formal, periodic evaluations of 

RVIS implementation or proposed alternatives to current operational 

difficulties.

In response to our draft report, however, Customs took exception 

to our statements and conclusions about port personnel having 

little interaction with the contractor and being unaware of 

contractor plans. Customs response indicated that as of 

February 2001 those locations with active RVIS were informed of 

the contractor’s plans. In addition, the draft report response said 

that Customs was given copies of the contractor’s status reports. 

Further, Customs said it found additional supporting documentation 

from 1997-1998 to support interaction between Customs and the 

contractor. None of these documents were available to us during 

our review and, in preparing the final report, we did not verify their 

existence.

Another example of loose oversight is the fact that neither INS nor 

Customs could provide us with valid and reliable cost data for 

RVIS. Because INS was given the lead in this program, we 

presume that INS incurred most of the RVIS expenditures. We 

believe that Customs and INS need to address this matter by 

sharing information on all contractor expenditures.

The Development Of Standard Operating Procedures 

Customs has begun to move toward addressing some of the RVIS 

deficiencies. Customs has drafted interim INS and Customs 

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) that address important 

matters such as (1) the exigent circumstances under which 

non-enrolled travelers may be processed, (2) joint local evaluations 

of RVIS performance, (3) daily system checks, and (4) data 

collection and sharing.

In fact, Customs said in its response to our draft report that 

exigent circumstances under which non-enrolled travelers may 
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cross the border have actually been defined and been in use since 

March 2001. The exigent circumstances include medical 

emergencies, hazardous weather conditions, minor children 

(5 years of age and under) traveling with an enrolled parent or 

guardian, and emergency or disaster relief workers in the 

performance of their duties. An appropriate supervisory official 

must approve any other considerations for humanitarian processing 

that are not addressed under the specified exigent circumstances.

SOP And MOU Needed

We endorse Customs efforts in developing the SOP and believe 

that this document should be finalized. In addition, we believe that 

the1994 MOU needs be upgraded to require Customs and 

INS personnel to meet periodically to discuss the current status of 

the RVIS program and to prepare written status reports covering 

issues such as contractor performance, milestones, training, and 

staffing. This will provide evidence to the contractor, to the public, 

and to Congress that INS and Customs are actively discharging 

their assigned responsibilities in this area.

We also believe that the MOU should address the issue of 

processing non-enrolled travelers. This issue is important under 

any circumstance, but in light of the events of September 11, it 

takes on extra significance.
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Recommendation

1. The Commissioner of Customs should ensure that Customs 

establishes Standard Operating Procedures and enters into an 

updated Memorandum of Understanding with the Immigration 

and Naturalization Service which, at a minimum, should include:

• A requirement for formal periodic written evaluations of 

the RIVS program by INS and Customs personnel. The 

evaluation should address the program’s current status 

on a number of issues and should include action plans 

that address those issues that may be hampering 

satisfactory performance.

.

• Specific guidelines covering exigent circumstances under 

which INS and Customs personnel would allow 

non-enrolled travelers to be processed at RVIS border 

crossings.

• The sharing of all information on contractor financial and 

human resource expenditures.

Management Comment. Customs has taken steps to address 

the issues identified in the report and said it agreed in general 

with the recommendations to update and finalize Standard 

Operating Procedures and a Memorandum of Understanding 

with INS, if RVIS is operational. Customs plans to discuss the 

future of RVIS with INS during the second quarter of FY 2002 

and, if both parties agree to resume RVIS operations, finalize 

Standard Operating Procedures during the third quarter of 

FY 2002. Customs further plans to finalize information sharing 

on contractor financial and human resources expenditures in the 

fourth quarter of FY 2002. By the first quarter of FY 2003, 

Customs plan to meet with INS to revise and update the 

Memorandum of Understanding.

OIG Comment. Under ordinary circumstances, we believe the 

implementation of our recommendations could be handled more 

expeditiously. However, considering that the future of RVIS 

remains uncertain, following the events of September 11, 2001, 
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and the subsequent increased staffing of the ports where RVIS 

was installed and/or planned, it seems reasonable that many of 

these decisions will take time to resolve. We consider this 

recommendation to have a satisfactory management decision 

pending completion of these actions.

As a further note, Customs response made numerous 

statements about certain details of RVIS planning and 

implementation that we were unable to verify. We want to 

note here that this information was not made available to us 

during our audit, despite our requests for information. For 

example, while we went to great lengths to obtain information 

about the contract history and oversight, we were not told 

during the audit that INS was the lead contractor as a result of 

a congressional mandate or that the contractor had been 

replaced due to poor performance. Had we known these 

details, we would have included this information in our report.

* * * * *

We would like to extend our appreciation to Customs for the 

cooperation and courtesies extended to our staff during the review. 

If you have any questions, please contact me at (617) 223-8640. 

Major contributors to the report are listed in Appendix 3.

/s/

Donald P. Benson

Regional Inspector General for Audit

.
Appendix 1

List Of Planned RVIS Sites

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ALASKA

Scagway

MAINE

Bridgewater (test site)

Easton

Forest City

Limestone (test site)

Monticello

Orient

MINNESOTA

Noyes

Pinecreek

MONTANA

Scobey 

Whitetail

Whitlash

Willow Creek Station

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Pittsburg

NEW YORK

Cannons Corner

Champlain (test site)

Churubusco

Jamisons Line

Mooers (test site)

NORTH DAKOTA

Ambrose

Carbury

Hansboro

Hannah

Maida

Northgate

WASHINGTON

Ferry

Nighthawk
Appendix 2

Objectives, Scope, And Methodology

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The objective of this audit was to determine whether RVIS has 

been an effective system in facilitating the movement of low-risk 

travelers while also ensuring border security at remote border 

crossings on the northern border. To achieve this objective we 

reviewed provisions of The Canada-United States of America 

Accord on Our Shared Border. We also reviewed a Customs and 

INS MOU on the Automated Port Program, RVIS operating 

manuals, Customs press releases, as well as pertinent 

congressional testimony by INS and Customs officials. We 

analyzed statistics pertaining to the processing of travelers at 

specific remote ports of entry.

We interviewed Customs field personnel at the following RVIS 

sites: 

Easton, Maine Ambrose, North Dakota

Monticello, Maine Scobey, Montana

Limestone, Maine Whitetail, Montana

Orient, Maine Mooers, New York

Forest City, Maine Champlain, New York

Bridgewater, Maine

We also visited remote border crossings and monitoring ports that 

are scheduled for future RVIS deployment as well as others that 

were not scheduled for RVIS. The locations visited were:

Opheim, Montana Northgate, North Dakota

Raymond, Montana Sherwood, North Dakota

Fortuna, North Dakota Antler, North Dakota

Noonan, North Dakota Westhope, North Dakota

Carbury, North Dakota Jamieson’s Line, New York 

 Houlton, Maine Cannons Corner, New York

We attempted to determine the amount of funds expended by 

Customs in the development and installation of the RVIS 

equipment. We reviewed evaluations conducted by INS and 

Customs personnel regarding contractor performance. We also 

spoke with Customs personnel at Customs Headquarters 

concerning RVIS effectiveness, the current status of the program, 

and its future deployment.
Appendix 2

Objectives, Scope, And Methodology

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Audit work was performed from August 2000 through May 2001. 

We conducted our audit in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards.
Appendix 3

Management Comments

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Appendix 3

Management Comments

RVIS Deployment Goals Have Not Been Achieved (OIG-02-033) Page 19
Appendix 3

Management Comments

RVIS Deployment Goals Have Not Been Achieved (OIG-02-033) Page 20
Appendix 3

Management Comments

RVIS Deployment Goals Have Not Been Achieved (OIG-02-033) Page 21
Appendix 4

Major Contributors To This Report

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Northeastern Region

Donald P. Benson, Regional Inspector General for Audit

Richard B. Tyler, Audit Manager

Thomas W. Mason, Auditor-In-Charge

Preston J. O'Toole, Auditor

Mark Ossinger, Auditor

.
Appendix 5

Report Distribution

RVIS Deployment Goals Have Not Been Achieved (OIG-02-033) Page 23

The Department of the Treasury

Office of Strategic Planning and Evaluations

Office of Accounting and Internal Control

U. S. Customs Service

Commissioner

Assistant Commissioner, Field Operations

Director, Evaluation Oversight, Office of Planning

Office of Management and Budget

OIG Budget Examiner