IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 347A23

Filed 22 March 2024

IN RE INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NOS. 22-073 & 22-395

ANGELA C. FOSTER, Respondent

This matter is before the Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-376 and -377 upon 

a recommendation by the Judicial Standards Commission entered on 21 December 

2023. The Commission recommends that respondent Angela C. Foster, a Judge of 

the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, Judicial District 18, be 

suspended for conduct in violation of Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(3), 3A(5), 3B(1), and 3C of 

the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the 

administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of 

N.C.G.S. § 7A-376. This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court 

on 15 February 2024 but determined on the record without briefs or oral argument 

pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 

2(c) of the Rules of Supreme Court Review of Recommendations of the Judicial 

Standards Commission.

No counsel for Judicial Standards Commission or respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The issue before the Court is whether District Court Judge Angela C. Foster, 
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respondent, should be suspended for violations of Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(3), 3A(5), 

3B(1), and 3C of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct—violations which 

amounted to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the 

judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b). Respondent entered 

a stipulation pursuant to Rule 18 of the Rules of the Judicial Standards Commission 

(Stipulation) in which respondent stipulated to the facts surrounding her conduct and 

the disciplinary recommendation that she be suspended for 120 days without 

compensation. 

On 7 July 2022, Commission Counsel filed a Statement of Charges against 

respondent in Inquiry No. 22-073. The charges alleged that respondent had engaged 

in conduct inappropriate to her office when she called the Wake County Magistrate’s 

Office on 3 March 2022. During the call, respondent utilized her judicial title to 

inquire about the custody status of her son without disclosing the familial 

relationship. Further, respondent yelled at the magistrate and demanded a bond 

reduction based upon inaccurate and incomplete information. 

Before Inquiry No. 22-073 was resolved, Commission Counsel filed another 

Statement of Charges against respondent in Inquiry No. 22-395 on 23 February 2023. 

The charges alleged that respondent had demanded, without notifying her chief 

district court judge, that an assistant district attorney (ADA) and a presiding 

magistrate close their administrative courtroom for her own use, despite an active 

administrative order mandating that it stay open. The conduct resulted in over one 
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hundred cases being continued. 

Respondent filed her answer to Inquiry No. 22-073 on 8 August 2022 and her 

answer to Inquiry No. 22-395 on 29 March 2023. On 27 July 2023, Commission 

Counsel and respondent entered into the Stipulation containing joint evidentiary, 

factual, and disciplinary stipulations as permitted by Rule 18 of the Rules of Judicial 

Standards Commission that tend to support the decision to suspend respondent. The 

Commission heard the matter on 11 August 2023, and the Stipulation was entered 

into the record without objection. The Commission initially rejected the Stipulation 

on 11 August 2023, but the Commission later accepted the Stipulation on 12 October 

2023. 

I. Recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission

A. Findings of Fact

The recommendation of the Commission contains the following stipulated 

findings of fact:

1. In Inquiry Number 22-073, the parties stipulate to the 

following facts:

a. On 3 March 2022, at 10:48pm, the Wake County 

Magistrates’ Office received a phone call from an 

individual listed as “Foster, Angela” on the caller 

identification. At the time, Magistrate Lauren May 

was on duty along with three other magistrates. 

b. Magistrate May answered this phone call. The 

person on the other end of the line identified herself 

as Respondent, indicated that she was a Guilford 

County District Court Judge, and inquired if a 

defendant named Alexander Pinnix was in Wake 
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County custody. Respondent appeared annoyed but 

did not seem to be directing it at Magistrate May at 

the time. At no point during this introduction did 

Respondent identify her relationship with Mr. 

Pinnix. 

c. After looking in their system, Magistrate May was 

able to confirm for Respondent that Mr. Pinnix was 

in Wake County custody on a $1000 secured bond. 

In response, Respondent began speaking loudly at 

Magistrate May and requested that she change Mr. 

Pinnix’s bond to a written promise to appear. 

d. Magistrate May was confused by Respondent’s 

response given that Respondent was not a Wake 

County judge but did not want to come across as 

rude, so she requested to put Respondent on a brief 

hold to look at Mr. Pinnix’s file. After reviewing the 

file, Magistrate May found that Mr. Pinnix was 

being held on Wake County charges of resisting a 

public officer and misdemeanor breaking or entering 

that had been sworn out before a Wake County 

magistrate with a bond set by a different Wake 

County magistrate. 

e. Before returning to the call, Magistrate May 

enlisted the assistance of her three colleagues who 

had been nearby her cubicle for an unrelated reason. 

All four magistrates concluded that based on their 

training and experience that Respondent had no 

reason to be involved with the case as an out of 

county judge and that the situation sounded 

strange. 

f. When Magistrate May returned to the call, she 

asked Respondent to explain her involvement with 

Mr. Pinnix’s case and provide a basis for changing 

the bond. As a result of Respondent’s response, 

Magistrate May explained that since she had not 

issued the charges or set the bond, she did not feel 

comfortable altering the bond of another magistrate. 
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g. Respondent then requested the telephone numbers 

of the magistrates who had been involved with Mr. 

Pinnix’s case so that she could call them at home and 

ask them to change the bond. Magistrate May 

declined to provide this information but suggested 

that Respondent could call Wake County Chief 

District Court Judge Ned Mangum to discuss the 

situation. Respondent became extremely angry at 

this suggestion, indicated that she would never 

dream of calling a district court judge at that time of 

night, and again demanded Magistrate May alter 

the bond. Magistrate May suggested that 

Respondent could wait until morning to call Judge 

Mangum, however this suggestion caused 

Respondent to become even more upset. By this 

point, Magistrate May’s three co-workers could hear

Respondent yelling through the phone receiver at 

her. 

h. Respondent continued requesting Magistrate May to 

change Mr. Pinnix’s bond by saying that Mr. Pinnix 

had court in Guilford County the following morning 

on 4 March 2022, for a child custody case and that 

he needed to be present because the court was going 

to take away his children if he was not. She 

explained that Mr. Pinnix could not miss this court 

appearance, that calling Judge Mangum in the 

morning would already be too late, and stressed that 

the bond need to be changed that evening. 

i. Magistrate May then muted the phone and again 

requested the assistance of the other magistrates. 

At their suggestion, Magistrate May offered 

Respondent her Chief Magistrate’s phone number. 

The phone call ended shortly thereafter. 

Respondent never contacted the Chief Magistrate 

regarding Mr. Pinnix’s bond that evening. 

j. Due to the strange nature of the phone call, the 

amount of personal information Respondent had 

about Mr. Pinnix, and how upset Respondent had 

become, Magistrate May and her colleagues decided 
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to look up Respondent on the internet. After a brief 

search, they learned that Respondent was Mr. 

Pinnix’s mother. At no point during the phone 

conversation did Respondent identify her familial 

relationship with Mr. Pinnix, but instead led 

Magistrate May to believe that Mr. Pinnix was a 

litigant in her courtroom. After making this 

discovery, Magistrate May wrote down her 

recollection of the phone call with Respondent and 

reported the incident to her Chief Magistrate. 

k. After investigating these claims, court documents 

showed that Mr. Pinnix did not have a history of 

failures to appear, nor did he have a Guilford County 

child custody case (or any other case) pending. 

l. The next morning, [4] March 2022, Magistrate 

Jordan Fly received a call from Respondent 

inquiring whether Mr. Pinnix was in the Wake 

County Detention Center. Magistrate Fly confirmed 

Mr. Pinnix was in the detention center under a 

$1000 secured bond, to which Respondent expressed 

surprise, stated she arranged for the bond to be 

posted, wondered why it was taking so long, and 

asked whether it was possible he was already 

released. Magistrate Fly again stated he was sure 

Mr. Pinnix was still in the Detention Center. During 

this call, Respondent did not identify herself as a 

judge or disclose the nature of her relationship to 

Mr. Pinnix. 

2. In Inquiry Number 22-395, the parties stipulate to the 

following facts:

a. Chief District Court Judge Teresa H. Vincent issued 

an Administrative Order on 22 July 2022, stating, 

“In High Point, administrative traffic court and 3B 

waiver court will be combined into courtroom 3B. 

The Courtroom 3B shall be open Mondays and 

Fridays from 8:30am until 12:30pm.” This 

Administrative Order was distributed to all High 

Point Courthouse employees, including judges, 
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when it went into effect. 

b. On 1 November 2022, Respondent alerted Judge 

Vincent by text that her assigned courtroom for 7 

November 2022, would not meet the needs of her 

Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Court session. 

Respondent was scheduled to address a case on this 

date where both parents were charged with the 

murder of their child. The parents, both in custody, 

could not be in the courtroom at the same time, 

which in turn required extra security and staff to 

conduct this hearing. Additionally, recording 

capability was required, which only some of the 

courtrooms in High Point were equipped with. 

c. In response to Respondent’s request, Judge Vincent 

provided the option for her to take over Courtroom 

3B once Administrative Court concluded as this 

courtroom could meet the needs of the hearing in 

question. Respondent replied expressing her 

concern that the courtroom would not be run “with 

the goal of finishing in an efficient manner.” Judge 

Vincent replied, “I am sure they will finish court as 

soon as they can in order to handle other tasks.” No 

other contingency plans were discussed. 

d. Before court began on 7 November 2022, at 

approximately 8:30am, Respondent came to 

Courtroom 3B and informed the assigned ADA that 

she might need his courtroom. In response, the ADA 

informed her of the number of cases on his docket 

and reminded her of Judge Vincent’s Administrative 

Order. During this conversation, the courtroom 

bailiff was nearby. Once Respondent left, the ADA 

made the magistrate presiding aware of the 

conversation then conducted the business of 

Administrative Court as usual. 

e. After this conversation, Respondent returned to her 

assigned courtroom, 201, and informed everyone 

there that they would be moving to Courtroom 4C, a 

superior court courtroom. This was done by 
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Respondent without first getting approval from 

Judge Vincent and the Senior Resident Superior 

Court Judge. 

f. While Respondent was holding her district court 

session in Courtroom 4C, the Superior Court Trial 

Court Administrator (“the TCA”) walked past and 

heard voices. When the TCA entered and realized 

what Respondent was doing, she asked why 

Respondent was there, to which Respondent replied, 

“Oh they didn’t tell you either. . . I needed to use this 

courtroom.” The TCA informed Respondent that she 

was not aware that anyone would be using the 

superior court courtroom then went to her office to 

call her supervisor, who in turn, informed Judge 

Vincent. 

g. At 9:37am, Judge Vincent confronted Respondent 

via text about her use of the superior court 

courtroom without permission, how that was not the 

plan they discussed, and ordered Respondent to 

vacate. Respondent responded claiming the bailiffs 

gave her permission to use this courtroom. When 

Judge Vincent asked the Sheriff’s Office about this, 

they denied providing Respondent with such 

permission. 

h. Respondent left Courtroom 4C and returned to 

Courtroom 3B at approximately 10:00am to inform 

the ADA she needed his courtroom. The ADA told 

Respondent that he still had a full courtroom, but 

she told him to vacate. The courtroom bailiff was 

nearby during this conversation. As a result, the 

ADA informed the presiding magistrate of his 

conversation with Respondent and they proceeded to 

close down Administrative Court. This consisted of 

handling any case the ADA had already begun 

addressing and informing the remaining citizens 

that their cases would be continued, which the ADA 

notated on his docket. This resulted in more than 

one hundred cases being continued without being 

addressed which caused frustration to many 
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members of the public. 

i. After Administrative Court closed, the presiding 

magistrate went directly to speak with Judge 

Vincent to advise her of the incident because he did 

not want to get in trouble for closing court early in 

violation of the Administrative Order. 

j. After speaking with the presiding magistrate, Judge 

Vincent confronted Respondent via text at 10:57am 

about her directing Administrative Court to shut 

down without Judge Vincent’s permission and in 

violation of her Administrative Order. Respondent 

denied this via text and stated that she only spoke 

to the clerk regarding the possibility of 

Administrative Court moving to Courtroom 4C, the 

superior court courtroom she did not have the 

authority to use, because they did not need the 

recording equipment. This allegation by 

Respondent could not be confirmed. 

3. In mitigation, the Commission found Respondent is 

remorseful for her actions in these matters and has 

accepted responsibility for her Code violations. 

4. In aggravation, the Commission found Respondent (1) 

was previously issued a censure by the North Carolina 

Supreme Court, In re Foster, 373 N.C. 29 . . . (2019), and 

(2) while on notice for Inquiry Number 22-073, 

Respondent engaged in the conduct outlined in Inquiry 

Number 22-395. 

B. Conclusions of Law

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Commission made the following 

conclusions of law:

1. Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct sets forth the 

broad principle that “[a] judge should uphold the 

integrity and independence of the judiciary.” To do so, 

Canon 1 requires that a “judge should participate in 

establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should 
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personally observe, appropriate standards of conduct to 

ensure that the integrity and independence of the 

judiciary shall be preserved.”

2. Canon 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct generally 

mandates that “[a] judge should respect and comply 

with the law and should conduct [herself] at all times in 

a manner that promotes public confidence in the 

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”

3. Canon 2B of the Code of Judicial Conduct instructs that 

“[a] judge should not allow the judge’s family, social or 

other relationships to influence the judge’s judicial 

conduct or judgment. The judge should not lend the 

prestige of the judge’s office to advance the private 

interest of others except as permitted by [the] Code; nor 

should the judge convey or permit others to convey the 

impression that they are in a special position to 

influence the judge.”

4. Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct governs a 

judge’s discharge of his or her official duties.

5. Canon 3A relates to judges’ adjudicative duties, with 

Canon 3A(3) requiring that a judge be “patient, 

dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, 

lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in the 

judge’s official capacity. . .” and Canon 3A(5) requiring 

that a judge “dispose promptly of the business of the 

court.”

6. Canon 3B pertains to judges’ administrative duties, 

with Canon 3B(1) requiring a judge to “diligently 

discharge the judge’s administrative responsibilities, 

maintain professional competence in judicial 

administration, and facilitate the performance of the 

administrative responsibilities of other judges and 

court officials.” 

7. Canon 3C concerns a judge’s duty to “disqualify him or 

herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality 

may reasonably be questioned. . .”
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8. Upon the Commission’s independent review of the 

stipulated facts in Inquiry Number 23-073 concerning 

Respondent’s conduct towards Magistrate May relating 

to her son’s bond, the Commission, by a unanimous 5-0 

vote of the hearing panel concludes Respondent:

a. failed [to] conduct herself at all times in a manner 

that promotes public confidence in the integrity and 

impartiality of the judiciary in violation of Canons 1 

and 2A of the Code;

b. allowed her family relationships to influence her 

judicial conduct or judgment in violation of Canon 

2B of the Code; 

c. failed to remain patient, dignified, and courteous to 

all individuals she deals with in her judicial capacity 

in violation of Canon 3A(3) of the Code; and

d. involved herself in a matter in which her 

impartiality could be reasonably questioned in 

violation of Canon 3C of the Code.

The Commission notes that Respondent conceded in the 

Stipulation these facts were sufficient to support the 

conclusions. 

9. Upon the Commission’s independent review of the 

stipulated facts in Inquiry Number 23-395 concerning 

Respondent’s conduct towards the ADA and presiding 

magistrate in Administrative Court, forcing the 

continuances of over one-hundred cases before they 

were able to be addressed, the Commission, by a 

unanimous 5-0 vote of the hearing panel concludes 

Respondent:

a. failed to conduct herself at all times in a manner 

that promotes public confidence in the integrity of 

the judiciary and impartiality of the judiciary in 

violation of Canons 1 and 2A of the Code;

b. prevented another judicial official from disposing 

promptly of the business of the court in violation of 
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Canon 3A(5) of the Code; and 

c. failed to diligently discharge her administrative 

responsibilities, maintain her professional 

competence in judicial administration, and facilitate 

the performance of the administrative 

responsibilities of other judges and court officials in 

violation of Canon 3B(1) of the Code.

The Commission notes that Respondent conceded in the 

Stipulation these facts were sufficient to support the 

conclusions. 

10.The Commission further concludes, and accepts 

Respondent’s admission, that the facts establish 

Respondent engaged in willful misconduct in office and 

conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that 

brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of 

N.C.[G.S.] § 7A-376(b). See also Code of Judicial 

Conduct, Preamble (“[a] violation of this Code of 

Judicial Conduct may be deemed conduct prejudicial to 

the administration of justice that brings the judicial 

office into disrepute.”). 

11.The North Carolina Supreme Court defined “willful 

misconduct in office” as “improper and wrong conduct of 

a judge acting in his official capacity done intentionally, 

knowingly and, generally in bad faith. It is more than 

a mere error of judgment or an act of negligence.” In re 

Edens[,] 290 N.C. 299, 305 (1976). The Supreme Court 

further held in In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235 (1977), while 

willful misconduct in office necessarily encompasses 

“conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or 

corruption,” it can also be found based upon “any 

knowing misuse of the office, whatever the motive.” Id.

at 248. . . . “[T]hese elements are not necessary to a 

finding of bad faith. A specific intent to use the powers 

of the judicial office to accomplish a purpose which the 

judge knew or should have known was beyond the 

legitimate exercise of his authority constitutes bad 

faith.” Id. 
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12. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission weighed 

Respondent’s pattern of abusing her power, the 

guidance provided by precedent set by the North 

Carolina Supreme Court, and Respondent’s willingness 

to accept responsibility for her actions. 

13.The Commission stressed that Respondent was 

censured for abusing her power in the courtroom in In 

re Foster, 373 N.C. 29 . . . (2019), then proceeded to 

abuse her power again by misleading and bullying a 

magistrate in an attempt to have her son released from 

custody notwithstanding her previous public discipline. 

Then, after being put on notice and charged by the 

Commission in that matter, Respondent again abused 

her power by disregarding instructions from her chief 

district court judge and a valid administrative order, 

forcing more than one hundred cases to be continued 

without being addressed so that she could use a 

courtroom for her own purposes. 

14.The Commission compared the facts at hand with those 

in In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. 418, [431–32] (2012), where 

the respondent judge was issued the longest suspension 

(75-days) in the Commission’s history for engaging in a 

pattern of transferring traffic tickets onto her dockets 

with the understanding that the tickets (issued to 

individuals including her friends, church members, law 

students, etc.) would be resolved by her with favorable 

outcomes. Similarly to Respondent, the respondent 

judge in that matter was also charged with engaging in 

a pattern of misconduct, entered a factual 

stipulation . . . . Id. [at 426.] . . . In conducting this 

weighing, the Commission determined that although 

the facts addressed in In re Hartsfield were arguably 

more severe than any of those in Respondent’s current 

or former matters to be addressed by the Court, 

Respondent’s repeated course of conduct over time 

called for a more severe sanction. 

15.However, similar to the comparative analysis the Court 

conducted in In re Hartsfield, the Commission also 

compared Respondent’s conduct to that addressed by 
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cases resulting in judges’ removals from office and 

found that Respondent’s conduct did not seem to rise to 

that level. See In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109 . . . (1978) 

(where the respondent judge (1) engaged in a pattern of 

addressing criminal cases without calendaring them, 

noticing the district attorney, or entering judgment in 

open court and (2) on several occasions, accepted money 

from defendants to “take care of” traffic citations); In re 

Martin[,] 302 N.C. 299 . . . (1981) (where the respondent 

judge (1) initiated ex parte communications with two 

twenty-one year old female defendants and attempted 

to force himself on them and (2) heard his own failure 

to stop at a stop sign case[ ]); In re Kivett, 309 N.C. 

635 . . . (1983) (where the respondent judge allowed his 

relationship with a bail bondsman, who provided the 

respondent judge with gifts and the use of his home for 

illicit sexual relations, to influence multiple court 

decisions); In re Badgett, 362 N.C. 482 . . . (2008) (where, 

after being censured and suspended in a prior case, the 

respondent judge made a defendant proceed pro se in a 

juvenile court hearing and ordered that defendant to 

pay spousal support despite the complaint not seeking 

it and turn over the keys of his truck to the Sheriff’s 

Office, after which the respondent judge lied to 

investigators and tried to suggest to a Sheriff’s deputy 

that they also lie); and In re Belk, 364 N.C. 114 . . . 

(2010) (where the respondent judge continued to serve 

on the board of directors for two companies despite 

receiving contrary ethics advice and, after his request 

to be relieved of his judicial duties to attend a board 

meeting was denied, confronted and yelled at his chief 

district court judge[ ]). 

16.The Commission also acknowledged that prior to 

legislative changes in 2006, the Court only had the 

authority to censure or remove a judge. N.C.[G. S.] § 

7A-377(b). Further, the Court has made it clear that 

the discipline imposed in any given case “will be decided 

upon its own facts.” In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 98 . . . 

(1978). 

17.As a result, the Commission concludes, and Respondent 
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agrees that a suspension of 120 days without 

compensation is appropriate balancing the 

aforementioned factors. 

18.The North Carolina Supreme Court in In re Crutchfield, 

289 N.C. 597 (1975)[,] first addressed sanctions under 

the Judicial Standards Act and stated that the purpose 

of judicial discipline proceedings “is not primarily to 

punish any individual but to maintain due and proper 

administration of justice in our State’s courts, public 

confidence in its judicial system, and in the honor and 

integrity of is judges.” Id. at 602.

19.The Commission and Respondent acknowledge the 

ultimate jurisdiction for the discipline of judges is 

vested in the North Carolina Supreme Court pursuant 

to Chapter 7A, Article 30 of the North Carolina General 

Statutes, which may either accept, reject, or modify any 

disciplinary recommendations from the Commission.

C. Recommendation 

Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Commission, 

by unanimous vote of the five Commission members that comprised this matter’s 

hearing panel, concurred in the recommendation to suspend respondent for a period 

of 120 days without compensation. 

II. Analysis 

The Court, upon recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission, has 

the authority and responsibility to discipline judges by issuing a public reprimand, 

censure, suspension, or removal of a judge “for willful misconduct in office, willful and 

persistent failure to perform the judges’ duties, habitual intemperance, conviction of 

a crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
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justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b) (2023). 

The purpose of our judicial standards system is “to maintain due and proper 

administration of justice in our State’s courts, public confidence in its judicial system, 

and the honor and integrity of . . . judges.” In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 602 (1975).

To that end, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice includes 

“conduct which a judge undertakes in good faith but which nevertheless would appear 

to an objective observer to be, not only unjudicial conduct but conduct prejudicial to 

public esteem for the judicial office.” In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 305 (1976) (quoting 

Geiler v. Comm’n on Jud. Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 284 (1973)). Further, 

conduct is prejudicial and constitutes willful misconduct when a judge intentionally, 

improperly, or wrongfully uses the power of the office with gross unconcern for his or 

her conduct and in bad faith. In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 301–02 (1978).

In reviewing recommendations of the Commission, the Court “acts as a court 

of original jurisdiction” and exercises independent judgment as to the disciplinary 

measures imposed on a judge. In re Badgett, 362 N.C. 202, 207 (2008) (quoting In re 

Daisy, 359 N.C. 622, 623 (2005)). Each case is decided solely on its own facts, In re 

Martin, 302 N.C. 299, 315–16 (1981), and the recommendation of the Commission is 

not binding on this Court, In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. 418, 428 (2012). This Court may 

adopt the Commission’s findings of fact if they are supported by clear and convincing 

evidence or may make its own findings. Id. In the same vein, this Court may adopt 
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the Commission’s recommendation or exercise independent judgment as to the 

appropriate sanction. In re Martin, 295 N.C. at 301. 

In this matter, we agree that the Commission’s findings are supported by clear 

and convincing evidence, and we adopt them as our own. By extension, we agree with 

the Commission’s conclusions that respondent’s conduct violates Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 

3A(3), 3A(5), 3B(1), and 3C of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, and is 

prejudicial to the administration of justice and brings the judicial office into disrepute 

in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b).

Our guidepost in determining the appropriate sanctions is the impact of the 

conduct on public confidence in our judicial system and ensuring the honor and 

integrity of judges who serve the people of this state. In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. at

602. The stipulations in this matter establish judicial conduct troubling enough to 

warrant suspension, and this Court has suspended judges where a pattern of 

problematic conduct has been identified. See, e.g., In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. at 426–

27, 431–32 (suspending a judge engaged in a pattern of transferring traffic tickets of 

friends and family to her docket with the understanding the tickets would be resolved 

with a favorable outcome). Here, respondent was also previously sanctioned for her 

conduct. In re Foster, 373 N.C. 29, 31-33, 40 (2019) (censuring respondent for holding 

a hearing without notice, placing a mother in jail without cause and then lecturing

the mother’s fifteen-year-old children in an effort to convince them to exercise 

visitation with their father). Further, while on notice of Inquiry No. 22-073, she 
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engaged in the conduct described in Inquiry No. 22-395. The stipulated conduct 

justifies the recommended discipline.

We appreciate respondent’s cooperation with the Commission during the 

pendency of these proceedings, her candor, her acknowledgment of responsibility for 

her conduct, and her completion of additional training on ethics and professionalism. 

Respondent recognizes that her conduct warrants disciplinary consequences and 

agreed to accept the recommended disciplinary action. Weighing the severity and 

extent of respondent’s misconduct against her acknowledgement and cooperation, we 

conclude that the Commission’s recommendation of a 120-day suspension is 

appropriate and supported by the Commission’s findings of fact and conclusions of 

law.

It is hereby ordered by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in conference that 

respondent Angela C. Foster be SUSPENDED for a term of 120 days without 

compensation for conduct in violation of Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(3), 3A(5), 3B(1), and 

3C of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and conduct prejudicial to the 

administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of 

N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b).