UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

JOSE ESTUARDO 

CANO-MANZANERO, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States 

Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 13-9526 

(Petition for Review)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and BRORBY, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

 

 

 Petitioner Jose Estuardo Cano-Manzanero petitions for review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals’ (BIA’s) decision upholding the Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) 

denial of asylum and restriction on removal. We deny the petition for review. 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

October 16, 2013

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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I. Background 

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, illegally entered the United 

States in 2005.1

 Two years later, he appeared at a master calendar hearing before an 

IJ in Los Angeles, California, where he conceded removability. Later that year, he 

applied for asylum, restriction on removal, and protection under the Convention 

Against Torture (CAT). Venue was changed and in May 2010, Petitioner appeared 

before a new IJ in Salt Lake City, Utah. He reviewed Petitioner’s prior concession 

on the record and continued the hearing. At a subsequent preliminary hearing the IJ 

explained to Petitioner, in response to his inquiry, that if he wanted his brother to 

testify at his merits hearing, he would need to “file something” notifying the IJ of the 

witness “at least 15 days before [the] hearing.” Admin. R. at 187. Neither Petitioner 

nor his counsel did so. 

 In February 2011, a merits hearing was held before the new IJ. Petitioner 

testified that in Guatemala he had worked as a land-dispute mediator for the 

Commission of Conservation for Agreements of Peace, a non-governmental 

organization. Petitioner’s job was to visit communities where people were 

unlawfully squatting on national park land, inform them that their presence was 

illegal, and offer them options to relocate with the assistance of the Guatemalan 

 

1

 Petitioner’s wife, Helen Corina Mendoza, accompanied him and is a derivative 

petitioner. 
- 3 - 

government. He testified that he feared for his safety while performing his job and 

ultimately left Guatemala because he “received . . . death threats” related to his 

employment. Id. at 206. He described two specific incidents. 

 In May 2005, he visited a community called Arroyo Macaballero for work. 

While discussing with the local leaders their illegal occupation of the land, armed 

individuals came out of the jungle and threatened Petitioner with insulting language 

and obscene words. They told him to “abandon the place” and that they “were not 

interested” in the Guatemalan government’s options. Id. at 215. He and his 

colleagues were frightened by the threats and left. Petitioner did not suffer any 

physical harm and he did not report the incident to the police. He reported it to his 

supervisors though, and he believes that one of his supervisors reported it to the 

national civil police because those illegally occupying Arroyo Macaballero were 

forcibly evicted by the national civil police and the army. 

 Then, in mid-June 2005, Petitioner visited an area called Laguna del Tigre for 

work. He had been there before. He observed that although money was scarce in this 

community, many people had all-terrain vehicles, guns, and ammunition, and he 

suspected that they were involved with drug trafficking. During this visit, the 

community’s leaders did not come forward, so Petitioner relayed his message and the 

options available. “After about a half-hour” the people “became angry” and “started 

shooting” guns “in the air.” Id. at 224. He was told not to return and “heard 

people . . . say that” he would be “kill[ed].” Id. Petitioner and his colleagues ran to 
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their cars and safely departed. Petitioner reported the threats to the security for the 

national park reserves and the individuals illegally occupying Laguna del Tigre were 

forcibly evicted in August 2005. 

 Petitioner also testified that he and his wife received telephonic threats 

between late June 2005 and October 2005. The callers knew certain things about 

Petitioner and his family, such as when and where his children played, and the callers 

indicated that they intended to harm Petitioner and his family. Petitioner did not 

know the identity of the callers but said they “made [him] aware that they knew that 

[he] worked for . . . the Commission.” Id. at 233. Petitioner was afraid to report 

these calls to the police but did so in October 2005. The police took the report and 

asked him to make an additional report to the public ministry. Fearing retaliation 

from the callers, Petitioner chose not to make another report, and, in November 2005, 

he and his wife fled the country.2

 

 Finally, Petitioner testified that his wife’s sister (who was married to 

Petitioner’s brother) was killed in Guatemala in 2008. When asked whether her death 

had anything to do with his employment, Petitioner responded: “According to the 

police report, it was because they were stealing a computer from her.” Id. at 270. 

 At the close of the merits hearing, the IJ concluded that Petitioner had failed to 

establish eligibility for asylum, had therefore failed to meet the higher standard for 

 

2

 They left their two children with Petitioner’s mother until November 2007, 

at which time the children entered the United States illegally. Admin. R. at 266. 
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restriction on removal, and denied CAT relief, “to the degree that it is still sought.” 

Id. at 82. The BIA, like the IJ, expressed concern with Petitioner’s credibility and 

the asylum application’s timeliness, but the BIA did not deny the application on 

either of those bases; rather, it reached the merits and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal in 

a single-member decision, constituting the final order of removal. Ritonga v. Holder, 

633 F.3d 971, 974 (10th Cir. 2011).

3

 

II. Discussion 

 We review purely legal questions decided by the BIA de novo, but we review 

its factual findings under the substantial-evidence standard. Karki v. Holder, 

715 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 2013). Under this standard, “‘administrative findings of 

fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 

conclude to the contrary.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). 

 To be eligible for asylum, an applicant “must establish refugee status, which 

requires proof that his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting 

[him].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). One central reason means that the 

protected ground cannot have played a minor role in the applicant’s past treatment or 

fear of future harm. Id. at 800. 

 

3

 Petitioner did not specifically challenge the denial of CAT relief before the 

BIA, and he does not appear to be raising any CAT issues in this court. 
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A. Asylum and Restriction on Removal 

 Petitioner challenges the BIA’s denial of his application for asylum and 

restriction on removal, arguing that the BIA erroneously concluded that he had failed 

to demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. We 

disagree. 

Past Persecution 

 The BIA concluded that Petitioner had “not established a nexus between past 

persecution and his political opinion.” Admin. R. at 9.4

 The BIA found that rather 

than Petitioner’s political opinion, the people in Arroyo were motivated by “fear for 

their financial well-being if . . . forced to relocate,” and that the people in Laguna 

del Tigre were motivated by “fear[] that [Petitioner’s] efforts on behalf of the 

government would undercut their narcotics trafficking business.” Admin. R. at 9. 

Petitioner does not dispute those findings. Indeed, he ignores his burden of proving 

that his political opinion was a “central reason” for his “past treatment,” Karki, 

715 F.3d at 800-01. See Dallakoti v. Holder, 619 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th Cir. 2010) 

(“To reverse the BIA, the record must establish that any reasonable adjudicator 

would be compelled to conclude that one of the central reasons” those threatening the 

 

4

 Petitioner does not explicitly articulate his “political opinion” (imputed or 

otherwise) but asserts that his “persecutors believed that he shared the political 

opinion of the Guatemalan government in his attempts to convince them to relocate.” 

Pet’r Br. at 14. 
- 7 - 

petitioner “targeted [him] was because of his . . . political beliefs.”).5

 Instead, 

Petitioner takes issue with the BIA’s determination that the telephonic death threats 

he received and the callers’ detailed knowledge of his family’s daily life did not 

constitute past persecution under Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2003). 

In support, he contends that his family was “specifically targeted and threatened in an 

immediate and terrifying manner” and that “any person, especially a parent, would be 

absolutely terrified by the threats made.” Pet’r Br. at 15. 

 In Vatulev, this court held that “[t]hreats alone generally do not constitute 

actual persecution; only rarely, when they are so immediate and menacing as to cause 

significant suffering or harm in themselves, do threats per se qualify as persecution.” 

354 F.3d at 1210 (emphasis added). Here, the BIA acknowledged Vatulev’s

teachings and concluded that “even assuming [Petitioner] had established a nexus,” 

the threats Petitioner received “did not fall into the aforementioned category.” 

Admin. R. at 9. We concur. See Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 975 (observing that 

persecution “entail[s] more than just restrictions or threats to life and liberty” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Tulengkey v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1277, 1280-81 

(10th Cir. 2005) (observing that “denigration, harassment, and threats” are 

insufficient to establish persecution and finding no past persecution where alien was 

 

5

 Petitioner’s request that we remand “for the BIA to consider, in the first 

instance, whether” he “established a nexus to the past persecution [he] suffered and 

the future persecution [he] fear[s],” disregards the BIA’s explicit nexus finding and 

essentially asks this court to reweigh the evidence to find a nexus. Pet’r Br. at 15-16. 

This, we cannot do. Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1125 (10th Cir. 2007). 
- 8 - 

robbed, fondled, and suffered a minor head injury (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). Moreover, Petitioner does not challenge the BIA’s independently 

dispositive conclusion that he failed to demonstrate that any harm he had suffered 

was inflicted by the Guatemalan government or a group the government was 

unwilling or unable to control.6

 See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1194-95 

(10th Cir. 2005) (explaining that eligibility for asylum based on past persecution 

requires applicant to demonstrate past persecution was “committed by the 

government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling to control”). 

Accordingly, the BIA held that Petitioner failed to establish past persecution, and we 

are convinced that a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to find otherwise. 

Fear of Future Persecution 

 “Even without past persecution, [Petitioner] could still qualify for asylum by 

establishing a well-founded fear of future persecution.” Tulengkey, 425 F.3d at 1281 

(internal quotation marks omitted). For a fear of future persecution to be 

well-founded, it must be both “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Id. 

 

6

 In reaching this conclusion the BIA stated that Petitioner was not physically 

harmed in Guatemala, and it observed that “armed civil patrol, police, or armed 

forces forcibly evicted” those who refused to leave the illegally occupied land, which 

“clearly” demonstrates the Guatemalan government was responsive to Petitioner’s 

complaints. Admin. R. at 9. Similarly, the BIA concluded that Petitioner’s 

sister-in-law’s murder did not demonstrate that any harm Petitioner suffered or feared 

was being perpetrated by the Guatemalan government or by a group it was unable or 

unwilling to control. She “was the victim of a robbery. . . . [The Petitioner’s] 

wife . . . testified that her sister’s stolen property was returned, and one person was 

apprehended in connection with the crime.” Id. at 10. 
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“Fear of persecution is not well-founded if the applicant can avoid persecution by 

relocating to another part of the country and it would be reasonable to expect [him] to 

do so.” Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 977-78. 

 Petitioner’s fear-of-future-persecution claim relies on the threats outlined 

above and his sister-in-law’s murder. He argues that the BIA erred by not 

“specifically” assessing “under either the asylum or restriction on removal standard” 

his fear of future persecution, instead basing its decision on “the fact that Petitioner[] 

did not try to relocate to the capital city or to other cities.” Pet’r Br. at 18. But the 

BIA’s decision is perfectly sound. Where, as here, the BIA determines that an 

applicant cannot meet his burden of establishing that he could not reasonably relocate 

to another area within his country of nationality, and he does not controvert the 

BIA’s relocation finding, his “claim of a well-founded fear of future persecution 

necessarily fails,” Tulengkey, 425 F.3d at 1281. And, given the foregoing, we cannot 

conclude that a reasonable fact finder would be compelled to find a well-founded fear 

of future persecution. 

 Because Petitioner failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution 

under asylum standards, he necessarily fails to meet the higher standard for 

restriction on removal. Karki, 715 F.3d at 801. 

B. Due Process 

Finally, Petitioner argues that this case must be remanded because the BIA 

failed to address his argument that the new IJ denied him due process by failing “to 
- 10 - 

state for the record” that he had familiarized himself with the case pursuant to 

8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(b), and by not allowing Petitioner’s brother to testify at 

Petitioner’s merits hearing. Pet’r Br. at 12-13. Petitioner’s arguments are meritless. 

Cf. Niang, 422 F.3d at 1197 (When the BIA “has failed to address a ground raised by 

an applicant in support of [his] claim, we should . . .remand if the ground appears to 

have any substance” (emphasis added)). 

 “To prevail on a due process claim, an alien must establish not only error, but 

prejudice.” Alzainati v. Holder, 568 F.3d 844, 851 (10th Cir. 2009). Moreover, 

“[b]ecause aliens do not have a constitutional right to enter or remain in the United 

States, the only protections afforded are the minimal procedural due process rights 

for an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 

Arambula-Medina v. Holder, 572 F.3d 824, 828 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

 Here, although the new IJ failed to state on the record that he had familiarized 

himself with Petitioner’s case, there is no question that he had—among other record 

evidence, his twenty-five page oral decision is extremely detailed. Further, Petitioner 

does not identify any prejudice stemming from the IJ’s failure to comply with 

§ 1240.1(b), and without such, he cannot prevail on this due process claim. 

Alzainati, 568 F.3d at 851. See also Medrano-Boggs v. Holder, 485 F. App’x 873, 

874 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting petitioner’s claim that “the IJ deprived her of due 

process by failing to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(b)” because petitioner could not 
- 11 - 

demonstrate resultant prejudice). Nor can Petitioner prevail on his claim that he was 

denied due process when the new IJ refused to allow Petitioner’s brother to testify at 

Petitioner’s merits hearing. Petitioner did not explain to the BIA and he does not 

explain to this court what information his brother would have provided or how the 

absence of his testimony prejudiced Petitioner’s case, which is fatal to his claim, 

Alzainati, 568 F.3d at 851. See Pet’r Br. at 12 (asserting, without elaboration, that 

“the prejudice resulting from the . . . refusal to let this essential witness testify far 

outweighs any potential prejudice to the government”). 

III. Conclusion 

The petition for review is denied. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Stephen H. Anderson 

 Circuit Judge