1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r: ___

____ ____ ____ 3 Fi lin g D at e: A ugus t 29 , 201 6 4 N O. 34, 261 5 STA TE OF NE W MEX ICO, 6 Pl ai nti ff

-Appe llant, 7 v

. 8 TAYLOR E., 9 Child-Appellee. 10 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF DO ÑAAN A C OUN TY 11 M ar ci E. Be ye r, D ist ri ctJu dg e 12 He ctor H . B alderas, Attorney Ge neral 13 Santa Fe , N M 14 W alter H art, Assistant Attorney Ge neral 15 Albuquerque, N M 16 fo r Appe llant 17 Bennett J. Ba

ur, C hief Public De fender 18 J.K . T heodos ia Johns on, A ssistant Appellate D efender 19 Santa Fe , N M 20 for Appellee1 OPIN ION

2 VA NZ I, Jud ge. 3 { 1} T ay lor

E

. ( Ch ild ), aj uve nil e on p ro ba tio n, m ad e inc ri m inatin g state m en ts to 4 hi s p r o b a t i o n o f

f i c e r t h a t j e o p a r d i z e d h i s p r o b a t i o n a ry s t a tu s . I n r e s pons e to a 5 su bs eq uent p et iti on t o r ev oke his pr oba tio n, Ch ild m ove d to sup pr es s th ose 6 state m en ts, c ont en din g t ha t they w er e ina dm iss ibl e be ca

use the S ta te pr of

fe re d no 7 ind ep en de nt e vid en ce of the a dm itt ed

c ondu ct a nd n o evi de nce t

ha t the pr oba tio n 8 officer had advised Child of his rights u nder the De linqu ency Ac t (the A ct), NMS A 9 1978 , §§ 32A- 2-1 to - 33 ( 1993 , as am ended through 2016 ), of t h e N ew Mexico 1 0 Ch i l d re n ’s Co d e. Th e S t at e c h al l en g es t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s ru l i n g t h at Ch i l d ’s 11 in cri m in at in g s ta te m en ts m us t b e su pp res se d. We rev ers e. 12 BACKGRO UND 13 { 2} In201 1, w he n C hil d w as a lm ost fo ur tee n y ears old , the S ta te f ile d a 14 de lin que nc y

pe tit iona lle gin g t ha t he ha d c om m itt ed aba tte ry a ga ins t a hou se hol d 15 m em be r. Ch ild

ple ad ed no con te st and , pur suant to a cons en t dec re e, w as pla ce d on 16 supervised p robation for six m onth s subject to c ertain term s and condi tions , w ith an 17 au tom at ic six -m onth e xte nsi on. L es s th an a y ear af te r Ch ild sig ne d th e ag re em en t 18 stating th e te rm s and c ondi tio ns o f pr oba tio n, the S ta te f ile d ape tit ionto re voke 19 Ch ild ’ s pr oba tio n, a lle gin g th at Ch ild ha d vi olate d sp ec if

ic c ondi tio ns o f the2

1 pr oba tio n a gr ee m en t; i. e. , by dr ug tra ff ic kin g, po ss es sio n of

dr ugs an d dr

ug 2 para phe rn al ia , r

unni ng aw ay , a nd b ei ng unsuc ce ssf ull y dis ch ar ge d f

ro m tr eatm en t 3 fo ste r care . Ch ild ple ad ed no con te st, an d the dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d an or de r re voki ng 4 Child’s probation

. The order com m itted C hild to the Children, Youth a n d Fa m ilies 5 De partm ent (CY FD ) for two y ears, but ordered t h at t h e com m itm ent be suspend ed 6 and that, pursuant to Section 32 A- 2-19(B)(2), Child be placed o n probation subject 7 to ter m s an d c on di ti on s fo r a p eri od no t t o e xc eedtwo y ears . 8 { 3} T he te rm s and c ondi tio ns o f pr oba tio n w er e m em or ia liz ed in a pr oba tio n 9 agreem ent (the A greem ent) signed byChild and his juvenile probation officer (JPO ), 10 am ong oth er s. T he A gr ee m en t l ist ed tw en ty c ondi tio ns, inc lud ing that C hil d w oul d 11 atte nd s ch ool w ith no un- ex cu se d a bse nc es ; tha t he w oul d no t us e or pos se ss a lc ohol , 12 drugs , d ru g paraphernalia, or w eapons; and th at he w ouldnot comm it any act 13 fo rb idd en by law . T he A gr ee m en t a lso pr ovi de d th at Ch ild ’ s JP O c oul d pe ri odi ca lly 14 vis it Ch ild ’ s ho m e, sc hool , or w ork si te , a nd c oul d se ar chCh ild ’ s pe rs on and p ro pe rty 15 if t he JPO d eem editne ces sa ry . 16 { 4} A m onth before his probation period was to expire, C hil d violated several 17 co ndi tio ns o f the A gr ee m en t. Bas ed on a r ep ort by

Ch ild ’ s JP O , the S ta te f ile d a 1 8 pe t i t i o n t o r e v o k e p r o b a t i o n , a l l e g i n g t h a tC h i l dh a dt w i c e f a i l e dt o a t t e n ds c h o ol 19 “ w ithno un- ex cu se d a bsence s” ; tha t he w as “ iss ue d aCl as s I II f or Batte ry a ft er he3

1 w as inv ol ve d in a p hy sic al c onf ro ntatio n w itha nothe r stu de nt” ; tha t he w as in 2 poss ession o f a pipe in his pocket; and that he adm itted to hi s JPO that he had sm oked 3 “ spi ce ” (a sy

nth et ic canna

bin oid ) tha t m or

nin g and had

be ensm oki ng s pic e on a

da ily 4 ba sis

. T he r ev oc at ionpe tit ionc ont ai ned no al lega tio n th at Ch ild ha d c om m itt ed a 5 “ de lin que nt a ct , ” nor

doe s th e re co rd

r ev ea l tha t C hil d had beenarr es te d f or a ny of 6 the conduct alleged in th e re vocation p etition, or that a delinquency petition wa s filed 7 al le gin g th at

Ch ild ha d c om m itt ed ade lin que nt a ct

ba se d onthe c ondu ct

a lle ge d in 8 the r ev oc at ionpe tit ion

. 9 { 5} Pr ior

to the pr oba tio n r ev oc at ionhe ar ing , Ch ild f ile d am oti on t o su

ppr es s hi s 10 adm iss ion s to the JP O that he ha d sm oke d sp ic e, a rg uin g th at the y w er e ina dm iss ibl e 11 unde r Se ct ion 32A -2 -1 4( G ) of the A ct be ca use the St at e fa il ed to pr ovi de 12 co rr obor at ing e vid en ce of Ch ild ’ s sp ic e use a nd b ec au se the JP O f ai le d to giv e 13 M ira nda warnings and /or recitations required b y Section 32A-2-14(D ) before 14 qu es ti on in g h im

ab ou t h is po ss es si on an d u se of s pi ce. 15 { 6} Chil d’s JPO , Ro sc io S ar m ie nto , the sol e w itn es s a t the sup pr es sio n he ar ing , 16 testified that Child’s “ m other” called her and reported th at Chi ld had been suspend ed 17 fr om sc hool be ca

use a n of fi ce r ha d se enhim

in poss es sio n of a pip e. I n r es pons e, Ms

. 18 Sarm iento set up a m eeting with Chi ld for the following day , which she described as 19 “ al m ost

li ke ar out ine m ee tin g. A nytim e the re ’ s an inc ide nt w ith one of the [ ch ildre n,4

1 I] tr y to ca ll them in as so on a s po ssi ble

. ” A s sh e ge ne ra lly doe s insuc h si tuatio ns, 2 Sarm ie nt o m etwit h C hi ldat h er o ffi ce. 3 { 7} A t the m ee tin g, Sarm ie nto as ke d Ch ild the sa m e ty pe s of r out ine que sti ons she 4 as ks h er

c lie nts f oll ow ing an inc ide nt tha t m igh t af fe ct the ir pr oba tio nary status

. F or 5 exam ple, she asks about the issue or incident, how they are doing in school , what led 6 up to th e incident, w hether they are having p roble m s at hom e, whether they are 7 “ cl ean, ” an d w he the r the y a re usi ng dr

ugs. In ad dit ion to the se que sti ons, S ar m ie nto 8 as ked C hil d a

bout the pip e an d dr

ug u se . A lth oughhe ini tia lly sa id h e w as c le an , 9 Ch ild la te r adm itt ed that he had use d dr ugs. S ar m ie nto te sti fi ed

that sh e did

not giv e 1 0 C h i l da n y M

ira nda w ar

nin gs b ef or e que sti oni ng h im

about hi s dr ug use ; tha t sh e 11 w oul d have don e so only if ane wc harg e w oul d be f

ile d; and tha t sh e did

not be lie ve 12 th atth ere wo ul d b e a n ew ch arg e ag ai ns t Ch il d i n t hi s i ns ta nc e. 13 { 8} T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d C hil d’ s m oti on t o su ppr es s. T he or de r co nt ai ns no 14 fa ct ua l f ind ing s and s ta te s on ly that “ [a] ny

of [ Ch ild ’ s] state m en ts m ad e to 15 [Sar m iento] o n Septem

ber 17, 2014 related to this cause are hereby suppressed17 Se ct ion32A -2 -1 4( G ) pr ovi de s, “ A n e xtr ajud icia l a dm iss ionor c onf es sio n 1 18 m ad e by the ch ild out of co urt is ins uf fi ci en t to supp ort a fi ndi ng that the child 19 com m itted the delinq uent acts alleged in the petition unless it is c orroborated by other 20 ev ide nc e. ” Ch ild

c onc ed es that this pr ovi sio n “ is n ot a ba sis f or sup pr es sin g a 21 st at em en t.” Acc or di ng ly, we do no t ad dr es s t he po in t. 5 1 pur suant t o S ec tio n 32 A -2 -1 4( G )

. . . , Se ct ion32A -2 -1 4( C) [, a nd] S ec tio n 32 A -2

- 1 2 14( D ). ” T his appe al f

oll ow ed

. 3 STA ND AR

D O F REVIE W 4 { 9} “ A m ot io n t o s up pr es s e v i d e n c e in vo lv es a m ix edqu es ti on of f actan d l aw.” 5 Sta te v . V

ande nbe rg , 200 3- N MS C- 030, ¶ 17, 134 N

. M. 566 , 81 P

. 3d 1 9. “ T hus, our 6 re vie w. . . inv olv es tw o part s: the f ir st i s a factu al que sti on, w hic h w e re vie wf or 7 subs tantial evidence; the second is a legal questio n, which we reviewde novo.” Id

. 8 A s no te d, the dis tr ic t c ourt m ad e no w ri tte n f ind ing s of

f ac t t o su ppor t i ts d ec isi on t o 9 su pp res s C hi ld ’s in cri m in at ory st at em en ts to hi s J P O

. I n s uc h c irc um st an ces , we 10 generally

drawall infere nces and indu lge all presum ption s in favor of the district 11 co urt’ s r

uli ng i n c ondu ct ing our

de nov o a ssess m en t of

w he the r the c ourt c or

re ct ly 12 ap pl ie d t he law. Se e Sta te v . Ny sus , 200 1- N MC A -1 02, ¶

18, 131 N

. M. 338 , 35 P

. 3d 13 993 (“ O n a

ppe al , we loo k to w he the r the laww as c or re ct ly appl ie d to the f

ac ts and 14 rev ie w th e ev id en ce i n t he li gh t m os t fa vo rab le to su pp ort th e d eci si on reac he d b el ow, 15 re sol vin g a ll co nf

lic ts and ind

ulg ing al l inf

er en ce s in supp ort of that de ci sio n. ”)

. T he 16 re le vant f

ac ts are und isp ute d.17 Child m akes no argum ent that the Ne w Mexico Constitu tion p rovides broader 2 18 protection than the United States C onsti tutio n in these circum stances. W e theref ore 19 as su m e wit ho ut de ci di ng th atbo th affo rdequa l pro te ct io n in th is co nt ex t. Se e Sta te 20 v. Gom ez , 199 7- N MS C- 006, ¶ 22, 122 N

. M. 777 , 932 P

. 2d 1

.

6 1 { 10} The q u estion whether M ira nda applies in these circum stances requires 2 ap pl ic at io n o f la w to th e fac ts an d i s re vi ewedde no vo . See Sta te v . Ni eto , 200 0- 3 N MS C- 031, ¶

19, 129 N

. M. 688, 12 P. 3d 442 (a ppl y ing de novo re vie w of que sti on 4 w he the r the re w as ac ust odi al int er ro ga tio n r equir ing M

ira nda w ar

ning s)

. W e al so 5 rev ie w de n ov o t he qu es ti on whe th er th e di st ric t co ur t co rrec tl y ap pl ie d t he Act. See 6 State v. A nto nio T. , 2015-NMS C-019, ¶ 12, 352 P.3d 1172 (stating that statut ory 7 interpretation is a questio n of law that is reviewe d de novo ). 8 DISC US SION 9 { 11} The question presented is whether the failure of Child’s JPO to give “ M ira nda ” 10 w ar nin gs b ef or e que sti oni ng C hil d a ft er she le ar ne d of his sus pe ns io n fro m

sc hool 11 because an officer had seen him in poss ession o f a pipe re ndered Child’ s inculpato ry 12 state m en ts t o th e JP O ina dm iss ibl e in C hil d’ s pr oba tio n r ev oc at ionpr oc ee din gs. 2 13 Be low , Ch ild

r el ie d no t on ly

on the A ct but al so o n lawa ddr es sin g th e ri ght s of a dul t 14 pr oba tio ne rs und er

the f ed er al co nst itu tio na l M ir an dar ule

. H er e, both part ie s r el y on 15 au tho ri ty

a d dr e s s ing c onst itu tio na l pr ote ct ion s a ga ins t se lf -i nc ri m inatio n ava ila

ble to 16 j uve nil es a nd ad

ult pr oba tio ne rs , as w el l a s c er ta in r equir em en ts f

or the appl ic at ion7

1 of the c onst itu tio na l Mir an da ru le

. T he part ie s are le ss than pr ec ise in dis tin gui shi ng 2 be tw ee n th e co nst itu tio na l M ir an dar ule a nd the “ Mi randa ” pr ote ct ion s ava ila ble 3 unde r the A ct , but the A ct its el f re fe re nc es the “ co nst itu tio na l r igh ts” of j uve nil es ( see 4 Se ct ion s 32 A -2 -1 4C , D ), a nd C hil d re lie s on tho se pr ovi sio ns on appe al

. Ina ddi tio n, 5 N ewMe xic o c ourts h av e co nsi de re d c onst itu tio na l M ir an daj ur isp ru de nc e in 6 de te rm ini ng the sc ope of pr ote ct ion s a ga ins t se lf

-i nc ri m inatio n availa

ble to ad ult 7 probation ers and to j uveniles su bje ct to the Act. And th e i s s u e i n this case arises 8 be ca use our S upr em e Co urt ha s not de fi nit ive ly de lin eate d the sc ope of the pr ote ct ion 9 ag ai nst se lf -i nc ri m i na tio n ava ila

ble to j uve nil es in thi s c ont ex t. F or the se r ea sons , a nd 10 be ca use the ru le Ch ild advoc at es , if a cc ep te d, w oul d have pr of ound c onse que nc es f

or 1 1 t h e a d mi n i s t r a t i o n o f

N e wM e x i c o ' s j u v e n i l e j u s t i c e s ys t e m, w e c o n s i d e r i n s o me 1 2 d e t a i l th e c o n s t i tu t i o n a l M i r a n d a r u l e , t h e r e l e v a n t p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e A c t , a n dth e a i ms 1 3 a n do p e r a t i o n o f

t h e j u v e n i l e p r o b a t i o n s ys t e m. 14 A . Th e F ed er al Mi ran da Ru le D o es Not B ar Ad m issio n of C hild’s 15 Incrim inating Stat em ents in a Pr obation Re vocation Proce eding 16 { 12} Mir an da v. A riz ona , 384 U. S. 436 (196 6), e stablish ed the feder al constitut ional 17 rule that incrim inatory statem ents m ade by

a cr im i n al s uspect during “ custodi al 18 interrogation” b y law enforcem ent m ay not be adm itted into evidence in a cr im inal 19 pr oc ee din g un le ss the pr ose cu tio n de m onstrate s that suf fi ci en t pr oc ed

ur al sa fe guard s8

1 we re em

ploy ed to protect the susp ect’ s Fifth Am endm ent privilege against self2 in cri m in at io n. Id

. a t 44 4. T he r

ule is sum

m ar iz ed a s f oll ow s: 3 [T ]he pr ose cu tio n m ay not use state m en ts, w he the r ex cu lpator y or 4 inc ulpat or

y , ste m m ing f ro m c ust odi al int er

ro ga tio n of

the de fe ndant 5 unl es s it

de m onstrate s th e use of proc ed ur al sa fe guard s e ff ec tiv e to 6 secure the privileg e ag ainst self-incrim ination . B y custodial 7 interrogat i on , w e m e a n qu e st i on i ng i ni t i at ed by

lawenforce m ent officer s 8 af

te r a pe rs on ha s be en take n in to c ust ody or oth er w ise de pr ive d of

his 9 fr ee dom

of a ct ionin an y sig nif

ic an t w ay . . . . Pr ior to any que sti oni ng, 10 the pe rs on m

ust be w ar ne d th at he ha s ar igh t t o r em ai n sile nt, that any 11 statem ent he does m ake m ay be used as evidence against him , and that 12 he ha s ar igh t t o the pr es en ce of a n a tto rn ey , e ith er

r et ai ne d or

appoi nte d. 13 T he de fe ndant m ay w ai ve effe ctua tio n of

the se r igh ts, pr ovi de d th e 14 waiv er i s m ad e v ol un ta ril y , kn owi ng ly andin te ll ig en tl y . 15 Id

. (fo ot no te om it te d)

. 16 { 13} M

ira nda defined “ custodi al i n t errogatio n” as “ questio ning initiated bylaw 17 enforcem ent officer s after a person has bee n taken into custodyor otherwise deprived 18 of his free dom of actio n in any signi ficant w ay .” Id

. I t i s se ttl ed

that a sus pe ct is not 19 “ in c ust ody ” an d M

ira nda ’ s r equir em en ts d o no t a ppl y unl es s “ a sus pe ct ’ s f re ed om 20 of action is c urtailed to a degree associated with form al arr est.” B er ke m er v. M

cC art y , 21 468 U

. S. 420 , 440 ( 1984 ) (i nte rn al quot at ionm ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed ); see Ni eto , 22 2000 -N MS C- 031, ¶

¶ 20- 21 ( statin g th es e requir em en ts and tha t “ [c ] ust ody is 23 de te rm ine d obj ec tiv el y , not f ro m the sub j ec tiv e pe rc ep tio n of

a ny of the m em be rs to 24 the int er

vie w ” an d ho ldi ng tha t M ira nda w arnings w er e not r equir ed w he re f ac ts 25 showed routine, non-custod ial police questio ning ).9

1 { 14} M

in ne so ta v. M

urph y , 465 U

. S. 420 ( 1984 ), e sta bli she d th at M

ira nda ’s 2 re q uirem ents do no t apply to a probationer’ s statem ents m ade during an interview 3 w ithhis pr oba tio n of

fi ce r, r ea soni ng, int er

a lia , that the de fend an t “ w as not ‘ in 4 cu sto dy ’ fo r pur

pos es of r ec ei vin g M

ira nda protection sin ce there wa s no form al 5 arre st or restraint on fre edom of m ovem ent of the degree a ssociated wit h a form al 6 arre st.” M

urph y , 465 U. S. at 4 29-31 (internal q uotatio n m arks and citations om itted). 7 E m pha siz ing th at the de fe ndant w as not und er a rr es t w he n he m ad e inc ri m inatin g 8 statem ents to his probation officer and wa s free to leave after th e m eeting, the Court 9 sai d t hat“ [ a ] d i f

f e r e nt que st i onw ou l d be p r e se nt e d i f [ t he d e f e nd a nt ] h a d be en 10 int er vie w ed by his pr oba tio n of

fi ce r w hil e be ing he ld i n po lic e custo dy or by the 11 police them selves in a custodial setti ng.” Id

. at 429 n.5. T he Court also recognized 12 that so m e que sti ons put to a pr oba tio ne r co uld be re le vant to pr oba tio nary status but 13 “ pose[] no realistic threat of incr im ination in a separate crim inal proceeding” and that 14 “ a state m ay

validly insi s t on answers to even incrim inating question s, and hence 15 sensibl y

adm inister its pr o b at i o n sy stem , a s long as it rec ogni zes that the required 16 an sw er s m ay

not be u se d in a cr im ina l pr oc ee din g and thus el im inate s th e thr eat of 17 incrim ination .” Id

. a t 43 5 n. 7. F ed er al lawthu s r ec ogni zes that so m e inc ri m inatin g 18 state m en ts tha t are ad m is sib le in pr oba tio n r ev oc at ionpr oc ee din gs m ay be10

1 ina dm iss ibl e in p ro ce ed ing s to a dj udi cate c ri m ina l lia bil ity on a c harg e fo r w hic h th e 2 pr oba tio ne r ha s be enpr ose cu te d. 3 { 15} T his dis tin ct ionis im portant an d w ar

rants em pha sis : In a cr im ina l pr ose cu tio n, 4 the de fe ndant h as be enc harg ed w ithhavin g e nga ge d inc ri m ina l c ondu ct , a nd the 5 purpos e of the procee d i n g i s t o determ ine the defendant’ s crim inal liability . I n 6 co ntr as t, the r es pond en t i n apr oba tio n r ev oc at ionpr oc ee din g is an in di vi dua l w ho 7 ha s a lr ea dy

be enad j udi cate d li ab le f

or c ri m ina l c ondu ct , ha s be enpla ce d on 8 p r o b a t i o n a s a r e s u l t o f t h a t c o n du c t a n d a s a n a l t e rn a t i v e t o i m p r i s o n m e n t , a n dis 9 sub se qu en tl y

all eg edto ha ve vi ol at edon e o r m or e co ur t-i m po sed ( an d us ua lly

a gr ee d10 upon ) co ndi tio ns o f that pr oba tio n. O ur S upr em e Co urt ha s recogniz ed that a 11 determ ination to revoke probation constitu tes an adj ustm ent of a previously im posed 12 se nt en ce, rat he r th an an ad jud ic at io n o f cri m in al li ab il it y . See State v. Lopez , 200 7- 13 N MS C- 011, ¶

12, 141 N

. M. 293 , 154 P

. 3d 6 68 (“ By f ai lin g to c om

ply w ithpr oba tio n 14 co ndi tio ns, a de fe ndant d em onstrate s th at c le m en cy

is not appr opr ia te be ca

use he or 15 she is not willing or ab le t o be rehabilitated. It follows that the court m ust have broad 16 power to adj ust a defendant’ s sentence by revoking p robation when necessary .” ). 17 { 16} Co nsi ste nt w iththi s di sti nc tio n be tween pr oc ee din gs i nvol vin g an a lr ea dy 18 co nvi ct ed

ind ivi dua l and o ne be ing pr ose cu te d to de te rm ine c ri m ina l l ia bility on a 19 new c harge, the United State s Suprem e Court has held that, w hile loss of liberty m ay11

1 result in both ty

pes of proceedings, few er protections ar e warranted for t h e f o rm er 2 cat eg ory

of p ro ceed in gs . See Morrissey v. Bre wer , 408 U

. S. 471 , 480 , 484 -9 0 ( 1972 ) 3 ( e x p l a i n i n g t h a t “ t h e r e v o c a t i o n o f p a r o l e i s n o t p a rt o f a c r i m i n a l p r o s ec uti on, a nd 4 thu s th e fu ll panopl y

of r igh ts d ue ade fe ndant i n su chapr oc eedi ng doe s no t a ppl y 5 to p ar ole r ev oc at ion s” a nd th at “ [r ] ev oc at ionde pr ive s an in div idu al , not of the 6 ab sol ute li be rty

to w hic h e ve ry

c iti ze n is e nti tle d, but

onl y of the co ndi tio na l l ibe rty 7 pr ope rl y

de pe nde nt o n ob se rv an ce of spe ci al paro le r es trict ions” ; ho ldi ng tha t this 8 los s of li be rty r equir es that the paro le e be a cc or de d c er ta in d ue pr oc es s pr ote ct ion s, 9 but no t the full panopl y of constitut ional protection s avail ab l e in a crim inal trial); 10 G agno n v . Sc arpe lli , 411 U

. S. 778 , 782 ( 1973 ) (e xpl ai nin g that “ [p ] ro ba tio n 11 revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a crim inal prosecution , but do es 12 re sul t i n alos s of

li be rty ”; hol din g th at

pro ba tione rs a re e nti tle d to the sam e due 13 pr oc es s pr ote ct ion s a s Morrissey spe ci fi ed fo r paro le es ). T he due pr oc es s pr ote ct ion s 1 4 s p e c i f i edin Mor rissey do n ot i nc lud e M ira nda ’s req ui rem en ts

. See Morrissey , 408 15 U

. S. a t 48 4- 90; Stat e v . Gu t i er rez , 199 5- N MC A -0 18, ¶ 3, 119 N

. M. 618 , 894 P

. 2d 16 395. 17 { 17} The United States Suprem e Court has also held that, in th e co n t ex t of a 18 “ pr oc ee din g to de te rm ine w he the r a m ino r is a ‘ de lin que nt’ an d w hic h m ay r es ult in 19 com m itm ent to a st at e institut ion[,] ” “ the constitu tional privi lege against self-12

1 incrim ination is applicable in the case of j uveniles as it is with respect to adults.” In 2 re G aul t , 387 U

. S. 1, 44, 55 ( 1967 ). T he Co urt “ ha s no t y et he ld tha t M

ira nda applies 3 w ithf ull f or ce to ex cl ude e vid en ce obtai ne d in viol at ionof it s pr osc ri pti ons fr om 4 co nsi de ratio n inj uve nil e pr oc ee din gs, ” al tho ugh it has m ad e that a ssu m pti on w ith out 5 de ci di ng th e is su e. Fare v. Michael C. , 442 U

. S. 707 , 717 n. 4 ( 1979 ). T he Co urt ha s, 6 how ev er , desc ribe d G aul t as treating a juvenile “ delinqu ency ” proceeding as 7 “ func tio na llya kinto a cr im ina l tri al ” an d st at ed that “ [a ] j uve nil e ch ar ge d w ith 8 v i o l a t i o n o f

ag e n e r a l l y a

p p l i c ab l e s t a t u t e i s d i f

f e r e n t l y s i tu a t e df

r o m an a l r e a d y9 co nv ic te d p ro ba ti on er o r pa ro le e, an d i s en ti tl edto a hi gh er d eg ree o f pr ot ect io n.” 10 G agno n , 41 1 U.S. at 78 9 n .12

. G aul t it se lf a lso e m pha siz ed that “ w ha t w e hol d inthi s 11 opi nio n w ithr eg ar d to the pr oc ed ur al r equir em en ts at the a dj udi cator y sta ge ha s no 12 ne ce ssary

appl ic ab ili ty

to oth er ste ps o f the j uve nil e pr oc es s. ” 387 U

. S. a t 31 n. 48. 13 { 18} T he Co urt ha s w ar ne d th at M

ira nda ’ s re qui re m en ts m ay not be e xte nde d ina 14 m an ne r that “ w oul d c ut [ M ira nda ’s] ho ld in g . . . co m pl et el y l o o s e f

ro m it s o wn 15 ex pli ci tly

state d r at ion al e” a nd “ im pose th e bu rden s a sso ci at ed w iththe r

ule of 16 M ira nda on the j uve nil e j ust ic e syst em an d the pol ic e w ith out se rv ing the int er es ts 17 t hatr ul e w a s de si gn e d si m

ul t a ne ou sl y

t o pr ot ect. ” Fare , 442 U. S. at 723 (internal 18 quot ation m arks and citation om itted).13

1 { 19} Appl y ing the f

or eg oin g pr inc ipl es to the r ec or d be fo re us, w e se e no b as is t o 2 hol d, a s am atte r of

f ed er al c onst itu tio na l l aw , that the fa ilure of Ch ild ’ s JP O to giv e 3 M ira nda w ar

nin gs t o C hil d be fo re que sti onin g him about the inf orm at ionshe 4 re ce ive d f

ro m Ch ild ’s m ot he r—th at

Ch ild ha d be ensus pe nde d f

ro m sc hool f or 5 poss es sin g a pip e—

re nde rs Ch ild ’ s in cr im inatin g st at em en ts t o hi s JP O r eg ar din g hi s 6 spi ce use ina dm iss ibl e in a pr oba tio n r ev oc at ionpr oc ee din g. 7 { 20} A s an in iti al m atte r, w e note th at th e U nit ed S ta te s S upr em e Co urt ha s no t 8 ex te nde d M

ira nda ’ s requirem ents “ bey ond th e scope of th e holdin g in the M ira nda 9 case itself[ ,] ” and observe the co n s t ra i n t that “ a [s] tate m ay not im pose greater 10 restrictions as a m atter of fe de ral c onst itu tio nal

lawwhen [ the United States 11 Suprem e] Court specifically ref rains from im

posin g them .” F

are , 442 U

. S. a t 71 7 12 (a lte ratio n, int ern al quot at ionm ar ks, a nd c itatio n om itt ed ). Co nsi ste nt w iththe se 13 pr inc ipl es , w e ha ve not e xte nde d M

ira nda ’s req ui rem en ts , as a m at te r of fed eral law, 14 be y on d t he bo un da rie s s etby the Uni te d S ta te s Su pr em e Co ur t. 15 { 21} Fo r ex am

ple , thi s C ourt ha s pr ev iou sly r ec ogni ze d th at M

ira nda warnings are 16 “ re qui re d to dis sip at e the ove rb eari ng c om pul sio n c au se d by

iso la tio n of a suspe ct

in 17 pol ic e cu sto dy ” an d th at “ cu sto dia l i nte rr oga tio n and pro ba tio n inte rv ie w s ar e re ad ily 18 distin guish able for purposes of Fifth A m endm ent analy sis.” Gu t i errez , 199 5- N MCA19 018, ¶¶ 12, 13 (al t erations, internal quotation m arks, and citation om itted). I n14

1 G ut i e rr ez , we quo te d a s f oll ow s M urph y ’s ra t i o n al e f

o r r ej ec t i n g th e p ro b at i o n er ’s 2 arg um en t in tha t c as e that M ira nda applied to bar adm issio n of the incrim inatory 3 statem ents he m ade to his probatio n officer : 4 Cu sto dia l arr es t i s sa id t o c onve y to the sus pe ct

am es sa ge that he ha s no 5 ch oic e but

to subm it to the of

fi ce rs ’ w ill a nd t o con fes s. I t i s un lik el y 6 that a

pr oba tio n in te rv ie w , a rr an ge d b yappoi ntm en t a t a m utu al ly 7 convenient ti m e, wo u l d give rise to a sim ilar im pression. Moreover, 8 cu sto dia l arr es t thr ust s an in div idu al int o an unfa m ili ar a tm osph er e or 9 an int er

ro ga tio n en vir onm en t cr eate d fo r no pur pose oth er

th an to 10 su bju ga te the ind ivi dua l t o th e w ill of his e xa m ine r. Many

of the 11 psy ch olo gic al plo y s di sc uss ed in M ira nda ca p i t a l i ze o n t h e s u s p ec t ’s 12 unf

am ili ar ity wit h the of

fi ce rs a nd the e nvi ro nm en t. T he c oe rc ion 13 inherent in custo dial interrogation d erives in l ar g e m easure f rom an 14 int er

ro ga tor ’ s in sinua tio ns th at the int er ro ga tio n w ill c ont inu e unt il a 15 co nf

es sio n is obt ai ne d. S inc e [the defe ndant] w as not phy sic al ly 16 re str ai ne d and c oul d have le ft the of fi ce , an y co m

pul sio n he m igh t have 17 fe lt fr om

the poss ibi lity that te rm inatin g the m ee tin g w oul d have le d to 18 revocation of probation wa s not com parable to the pressure on a susp ect 19 w ho i s pa inf

ull y a w ar e that he li te ra lly

c an not e sc ape a p er sis te nt 20 custodi al interrogator. 21 Gutierrez , 1995 -N MC A -0 18, ¶ 13 ( al te ratio ns o m itt ed ) (quot ing M urph y , 465 U. S. 22 at 433 ); se e M

urph y , 465 U

. S. at 433 (“ [T he de fe ndant’ s] re gul ar m ee tin gs w ithhis 23 pr oba tio n of

fi ce r shou ld h av e se rv ed to fam ili ar iz e him w ithhe r an d he r of

fi ce a nd 24 to i nsu la te hi m

f ro m psy ch olo gic al int im idatio n th at m igh t ov er

be ar his de sir e to 25 claim the privilege.”)

. 26 { 22} In Sta te v . H

erm osi llo , 20 14 -NMCA- 10 2, ¶¶12 -1 3, 3 3 6 P .3d44 6, we 27 ex pla ine d th at

“pr oba tion is an act of c le m en cy

w iththe goa l of

e duc at iona nd15

1 re habil itatio n” a nd tha t “ [a ] lth ough a pr oba tio ne r doe s no t l ose the pr ivi le ge a ga ins t 2 s e l f

- i n c r i m i n a t i o n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S up r e m e C o u rt h a s r e f u s e d t o e xte nd t he 3 requirem ents of M

ira nda w ar

nin gs t o pr earr an ge d rout ine pr oba tio n in te rv ie w s w ith 4 probation officer s.” H erm osi llo inv olv ed

apr oba tio ne r’ s in cr im inatin g st at em en ts 5 m ade during a hom e visit by a probation offi ce r, who w as acc om panied by

a law 6 en fo rc em en t of

fi ce r, pu rsuant t o an a gr ee d- uponpr oba tio n c ondi tio n r equir ing the 7 de fe ndant t o pr om

ptl y answ er the doo r, inv ite the vi siting of fi ce rs ins ide , a nd 8 co op erat e wit h t he m . Id

. ¶¶ 4- 5. T he pr oba tio n off ic er ha d not orig ina lly planne d to 9 visit th e defe ndant bu t decided t o do so because the defe ndant “ had recently been 10 testing p ositiv e for dr

ugs.” Id

. ¶ 5. N oti ng tha t “

M urph yinf orm s us that a

r out ine vis it 11 of apr oba tio ne r by

his pr oba tio n of

fi ce r . . . doe s no t or din ar ily pr es en t a Fi fth 1 2 Amen d m en t s i tu at i o n t h at wi l l b e re co g n i ze d as an i n -c u s t o d y i n t erro g at i o n [, ]” 13 H erm osi llo , 2 0 1 4

- N M C A

- 1 0 2 , ¶ 1 9 , w e e x p l a i n e d , i n t e r

a l i a , t h a tu n s c h e du l e dh o me 14 vis its w er e spe ci fi ca lly au th or iz ed by c our t or de r an d a gr ee m en t and tha t, havin g 15 pr ev iou sly te ste d posi tiv e fo r dr ugs at of fi ce vis its , the de fe ndant “ co uld r ea sona bly 16 ex pe ct t ha t hi s pr oba tio n of fi ce r m igh t c ondu ct

ahom e vis it to i nve sti ga te the se 17 violatio ns.” Id

. ¶ 26. “ A t the out se t,” we sa id, “ the pr oba tio n of fi ce r kne w[ the 1 8 d ]e f e n d a n th a dr e c e n t l y t e s t e dp o s i t i v e f o r dr u g s a tp r i o r

o f f i c e v i s i t s , a n dt h e h o me 19 visit was specifically

undertaken to inv estigate these prior violatio ns.” Id

. ¶ 31. T hus,16

1 w e he ld tha t M

ira nda ’ s re qui re m en ts did not appl y , notw ith standi ng the pr es en ce of 2 law enforcem ent and that the defendant was placed in handcuffs during the enc ounter. 3 H erm osi llo , 201 4- N MC A -1 02, ¶ ¶ 28- 33; see State v. Ponce , 20 04 -N MC A -1 37, 4 ¶¶ 37 -3 8, 136 N

. M. 614 , 103 P

. 3d 5 4 ( statin g th at , a lth oughthe iss ue w as not 5 pr es erv ed , M

ira nda warnings w ere not required where probationer was not arr ested 6 “ fo r ind ep en de nt c ri m ina l a ct ivi ty , but f or br ea ch of

the no- al co hol c ondi tio n of his 7 pr oba tio n w hic h w oul d r es ult , a t w or st, in a re voc at ion of [ the d] ef en dant’ s pr oba tio n, 8 not in new crim inal charges” and the defe ndant was n ot questio ned “ in a setting th at 9 could be character ized as unfam iliar or an interr ogation environm ent”). 10 { 23} On th is r ec or d, non e of the f ac tor s tr igg er ing M

ira nda ’ s protections are 11 im plicated, nor does Ch ild argue to the contrary . The facts establish that Child was 12 no s tr an ge r to the j uve nil e pr oba tio n sy ste m , havin g pr ev iously be enpla ce d on 13 pr oba tio n and h av ing that pr oba tio n r ev oke d. T he m ee tin g at w hic h Ch ild m ad e the 14 inc ri m inatin g st at em en ts o cc ur re d a t a pla ce f am ili ar to him —hi s JP O ’ s of

fi ce —and 15 w as “ al m ost lik e a ro uti ne m ee tin g” at w hic h the JP O as ke d Ch ild the sam e ty

pe s of 16 ro uti ne que sti ons she a sks he r cl ie nts f oll ow ing a n in ci de nt tha t m igh t a ff ec t the ir 17 probation ary

status. Wh i l e th at m eeting tookplace at the JP O’ s request, such 18 m ee tin gs are spe ci fi ca lly auth or iz ed

und er the A gr ee m en t, and Ch il d shou ld h av e 19 ex pe ct ed

that m ee tin gs w ithhis JP O wo ul d oc cur in the or din ar y c our se of

his17

1 p ro b at i o n , i n cl u d i n g m ee t i n g s t o d i s cu s s re p o rt s o f co n du ct th at m i g h ti m p ac tCh i l d ’s 2 pr ob at io na ry

st atus . 3 { 24} Ina ddi tio n, the m ee tin g too k pla ce be ca use Ch ild ’ s m oth er

ha d in fo rm ed

the 4 JPO that C hild h ad been suspend ed from school for pos session of a pipe. Child had 5 pr ev iou s l y

v i o l a t e dh i s p r o b a t i o n b y b e i n g i n p o s s e s s i o n o f dr u g s a n ddru g 6 para phe rn al ia , a m ong oth er

thi ngs. F or

thi s r ea son al one, Ch ild c oul d r ea sona bly 7 ex pe ct that hi s JPO m ight a sk h im about dr ug p oss es sio n and u se . T he re is no 8 evidence that the m eeting invo lved pol ic e p re sence, isolation , or confinem ent, let 9 alone custod ial interrogation ini tiated by lawenforce m ent tantam ount to a form al 10 ar re st o r of c oe rc ionby

the JP O w he n sh e que sti one d Ch ild ab out his co nduc t. T he 11 JP O’ s q ue st io ns were ask ed in fu rth eran ce of her rol e as Ch il d’s p ro ba ti on off ic er. No 12 w ar nin gs w er e re qui re d by

the f ed er al M ira nda rule. 13 B. Th e A ctP ro vid es Gr ea te r P ro te ct ion s T ha n Doe s t he F ed er al Mi ran da 14 Rul e But It D oes Not R equir e JPO s to Give Stat utory Warnings in t he 15 Circ um stances P resent ed He re 16 { 25} As best w e understand it, Child’ s st at ut or y argum ent is as follows: (1)w henever 17 a JP O “ sus pe ct s” that a j uve nil e pr oba tio ne r ha s c om m itted an ac t tha t m igh t 18 constitu te a new delinqu ent act as w ell as a basis for probation revocation, the JPO 19 m ay not que sti on the j uve nil e ab out that a ct w ith out f ir st a dvi sin g th e j uve nil e of 20 his/h er c onsti tutio nal ri g h t s and obtain ing a kno wing, intelligent, and volunt ary18

1 w ai ve r of

tho se r igh ts; ( 2) a JP O ’ s fa ilure to giv e tho se w ar nin gs r en de rs ina dm iss ibl e 2 in a pr oba tio n r ev oc at ion he ar ing an y inc ulp at or y state m en ts m ad e by

the j uve nil e to 3 the JPO. While it is clear that the A ct does provid e m any greater p ro t ections than 4 tho se a ff

or de d to a dul ts, inc lud ing gr eate r pr ote ct ion s th antho se a ff or de d by the 5 fe de ra l M

ira nda rule, t he Ac t and the related re gulatio ns and rules also reflect 6 di st in ct io ns be twee n d el in qu en cy pro ceed in gs an d p ro ba ti on rev oc ation pr oc ee din gs, 7 and between law enforcem ent officer s and JPOs that bear significantlyon the proper 8 i n t er p re t at i o n o f t h e A ct ’s re qu i re m en t s i n t h i s co n t ex t . B ef o re ad d re s s i n g t h e A ct ’s 9 te xt, w e out line the standard s gu idi ng and i nf orm ing our

int er pr et at ionof

it s 10 req ui rem en ts

. 11 1. P ri nc ip le s of

S ta tu to ry C on st ru ct ion 12 { 26} “ Statutory

interpretation is an issu e of law , which we reviewde novo.” Sta te 13 v. D av is , 200 3- N MS C- 022, ¶ 6, 134 N

. M. 172 , 74 P

. 3d 1 064. “ T he te xt o f a statut e 1 4 or r u l e i s t h e p r i m a ry , e s s e n t i a l s o u r c e o f i t s m e a n i n g . ” N M S A 1 9 7 8 , § 1 2 -2 A -1 9 15 (1 997)

. “ Whe n astatut e co nta ins langua ge w hic h is c le ar a nd una m

big uous , w e m

ust 16 gi v e effect to that language and refr ain from further statutory

interpretation.” Sta te 17 v. R iv era , 2004-NMS C-001, ¶ 1 0 , 1 3 4 N. M. 768, 82 P. 3d 93 9 (alteration, internal 18 qu ot at io n m ark s, an d c it at io n o m it te d)

.19

1 { 27} H ow ev er , the “ be gui lin g si m pli ci ty” of

the pla in- m eanin g r

ule “ m ay m as k a 2 host of r ea sons w hy

astatut e, ap pare ntl y cl ear an d un am big uous on i ts f

ac e, m ay f or 3 one r ea son or

a nothe r giv e ri se to le git im at e (i

. e. , non fr ivo lou s) dif fe re nc es of

opi nio n 4 concerning t h e s t at ute’ s m eaning.” Id

. ¶ 11 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks and c itatio n 5 om itted). “ In such a case, it is part of the essence of j udicial respons ibilityto search 6 fo r an d e ff

ec tuate the le gis la tiv e int en t— the pur po se or obj ec t— unde rl y ing the 7 statute.” Id

. ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks and c itatio n om itt ed ). T he li te ra l m eanin g of 8 a statu te a lso doe s no t c ontro l “ w he n su cha n a ppl ic at ionw oul d be absur d, 9 unreason ab l e, or otherwise inappropriate. ” R iv era , 200 4- N MS C- 001, ¶ 13; see 10 A tc his on, T. & S. F

. R y. Co

. v. To wn of Silve r City , 193 6-NMS C-036, ¶ 13, 4 0 N. M. 11 305, 59 P

. 2d 3 51 ( “ Canons of c onstru ct iona re but

a ids in de te rm ini ng l eg isl at ive 12 int en t and are not

c ontro lli ng i f the y

le ad to a co nc lus ion , w hic h by th e te rm s or 13 charac ter of the legislation m anifestly wa s not in tended.” ( citation om itted)). 14 { 28} A m ong oth er

c onsi de ratio ns, “ w e cl ose ly e xa m ine the ove ra ll str

uc tur e of the 15 statut e w e ar e int er

pr et ing , a s w el l a s th e part ic ular statut e’ s f unc tion w ith in a 16 com prehensive legislativ e schem e[. ] ” R iv era , 200 4- N MSC -0 01, ¶ 13 ( ci ta tio n 17 om itted). “ [W ] henever pos s i ble we m ust read differ ent legislative enactm ents as 18 ha r m onio us ins tead of as contradicting one another.” Id

. (al te rat ion , int er

na l qu otatio n 19 m ar ks, a nd c itatio n om itt ed ). A nd w e m ust c onstru e a statut e “ so tha t no part of the20

1 statute is rendered surplus age or superfluous.” St at e v. Ja vi er M. , 200 1- N MS C- 030, 2 ¶ 32, 131 N. M. 1, 33 P.3d 1 (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted). 3 2. The A ct, Re gulations, and Ru les 4 { 29} T he A ct

ha s se ve ra l st at ed

pur pose s, inc lud ing the f

oll ow ing : 5 A

. co nsi ste nt w iththe pr ote ct ionof the pub lic int er es t, to 6 re m ove f

ro m c hil dr enc om m itt ing de lin que nt a ct s th e ad ult 7 co nse que nc es of cr im ina l behavio r, but to sti ll hol d c hil dr enc om m itt ing 8 d el i n qu en tac t s ac co u n t ab l e f o r t h ei r a ct i o n s t o th e e x t en t o f th e c h i l d ’s 9 age, education, m ental and phy sical conditio n, background and all oth er 10 re le vant f

ac tor s, a nd to p rov ide a pr ogram of supe rv isi on, c are and 11 re habi litati on , inc lud ing r eh ab ili ta tiv e res ti tutionby the c hil d to the 1 2 v i c t i m s o f t h e c h i l d ’ s d e l i n qu e n t a c t t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t he c hil d is 13 re as ona

bly able to do s o; 14 B. to p ro vi de ef fe ct ive de te rr en ts t o a ct s of j uve nil e 15 de lin que nc y , inc lud ing a n e m pha sis on c om

m uni ty -b as ed

a lte rn at ive s; 16 C. to s tr en gth enf am il ie s and t o su cc es sf ull y r ei nte gr at e 17 ch il dr en in to ho m es an d c omm un it ie s[ .] 18 Section 32A-2-2 (e m

phasis add ed). 19 { 30} T he A ct

de fi ne s “ de lin que nt a ct ” as “ an actc om m itt ed by ac hil d th at

w oul d 20 be de sig na te d a s ac ri m e unde r the lawif c om m it ted by

a n a dul t, ” Se ct ion32A -2

- 2 1 3 (A ), an d“ d el i n qu en tch i l d ” a s “ a c h i l dwh o h as co m m i t t ed a d el i n qu e n tac t [, ]” 22 Se ct ion32A -2 -3 (B ). O the r te rm s ar e def ine d by re gul at ion s prom ulg at ed und er the 23 Ac t (am ong o ther stat

ut e s) , i nc ludin g the following: “ Adj udication ” m eans “ a j udicial 24 determ ination that a juvenile has com m itted a delinqu ent act .” 8.1 4.2 .7(B ) NMAC21

1 (e m pha sis a dde d)

. “ A dj udi cator y he ar ing ” m eans “ ch ildre n’ s c ourt heari ng to de ci de 2 whether the evidence supp orts the allegations of a petition, i. e. , whether a de lin que nt 3 act h a s b e e n c o mmi t t e d

. ” 8

. 1 4

. 2

. 7 ( C ) N M A C ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d )

. “P e t i t i o n ” me a n s “a 4 le ga l d oc um en t i n wh ic h t he st at e fo rm al ly alle ge s t he cli en t t o b e a d el in qu en t . . . 5 due to the com

m issio n of a de lin que nt a ct (s ) , or o f a fam il y

su bjec t t o F INS.” 6 8.14.2. 7(W ) N MAC (em phasis add ed). “ Juvenil e probation” m eans “ a court-order ed 7 sanc tio n and d isp osi tio n w hic h pla ces an adj udi ca te d c lie nt u nde r th e supe rv isi on 8 and care of

a juvenile prob ation officer .” 8.14.2. 7(T) NMA C (e m phasis add ed). 9 “ Juvenil e probation officer ( JPO) ” m eans “ a d epartm ent staff per son who[] provides 10 co urt- or de re d and i nf orm al supe rv isi on f

or c lie nts

. ” 8. 14. 2. 7( U ) N MA C ( em pha sis 11 ad de d)

. “ Pr oba tio n” m eans “ a court -o rd er ed sanc tio n and d isp osi tio n th at pla ces an 12 adj udi ca te d c lie nt u nde r th e [] supe rv isi on a nd c are of a [JPO ]. ” 8 .14 .2.7 (Z) NMAC 13 (em ph as is add ed ). “ Pr el imina ry in qu iry (PI)” re fers to “ a co nf eren ce b et ween th e JP O, 14 clien t , an d p ar ent or guardian to assess whether a r efer ral to the [children’ s court 15 attorney

(CCA )] shoul d be m ade to file a de lin que nc y pe tit ion .” 8.1 4.2 .7(Y) NMAC 16 (em phasis add ed). 17 { 31} Se ct ion32A -2 -7 (A ) of the A ct

pr ovi de s th at

“ [c ] om pla int s all eg ing 18 delinqu encyshall be refe rred to p r obation services, which shall conduct a pre lim ina ry 19 inq uir yto de te rm ine the be st i nte re sts of the c hil d and o f the pub lic w ithr eg ar d to a ny22

1 ac tio n to be take n. ” (E m phas is add ed ); see Ru le 10- 211( A ) N MR A ( “ Pr ior to the 2 filing of a pe tit ion allegin g delinq uency , prob at ion services shall com plete a 3 pre lim ina ryinq uir

yin accordance with the Children’ s Code.” (em phasis add ed)). 4 Section 32A-2-7(B) states, in part, that “ [a] t the com m encem ent of the pre lim ina ry 5 inq uir y , the part ie s sh al l be a dvi se d of the ir ba sic r igh ts pur suant t o S ec tio n 32 A -2

- 6 14 ” an d t ha t “ [t]he ch il d s ha ll be in fo rm edof t he ch il d’s ri gh t t o re m ai n s il en t.” 7 Se ct ion32A -2 -7 (B ) (e m pha sis a dde d) ; see 8. 14. 2. 9( B) N MA C ( statin g th at “ [a ] t the 8 co m m en ce m en t of

the pre lim ina ryinq uir

y , the [ JP O ] sha ll advis e the c lie nt, pare nt, 9 gu ard ia n, o r cu st od ia n o f th e cl ie nt ’s bas ic rig ht s” an d e nu m erat in g t ho se rig ht s)

. 10 { 32} T he A ct ’ s pr ovi sio ns c onc er nin g “ba sic r igh ts” a re de s c r i b e d i nS e ct ion32A -2

- 11 14. Subsection A states, “ A child subject to the provisi ons of the .

. . Ac t is entitled 12 to th e sa m e b as ic rig ht s as an adul t, exce pt as otherwise provided in the Children’s 13 Co de, inc luding

rig hts pro vi de d bythe

. . . A ct , ex ce pt a s ot he rw ise pro vi de d in the 14 Ch ild re n’ s C ode

. ” Se ct ion32A -2 -1 4( A ) (e m pha sis ad de d)

. S ec tio n 32 A -2 -1 4 a lso 15 pr ovi de s, 16 C. N o pe rs on s ub ject to the pr ovi sio ns o f the

. . . A ct wh o is 17 all eg ed

or s uspe ct ed

of be ing a de lin que nt c hil

d sha ll be int er

ro ga te d or 18 que sti one d wi tho ut fi rs t advi sin g th e ch ild of the c hil d’ s co nst itu tio nal 19 rig

hts and securing a knowing, intelligent and volun tary wa iver. 20 D

. Be fo re a ny state m en t or con fe ssi on m ay be intro duc ed a t a 21 tr ia l or

he ar ing wh en a c hil

d is all eg ed to be a de lin que nt c hil d , the state 22 shall pr ov e thatthe s t a t e m e nt o r c on f e ss i ono f f e r e d i n e vi de nc e w as23

1 el ic ite d on ly

a ft er akno w ing , int el lig en t and vo lu ntar y w ai ve r of

the 2 ch ild ’ s co nst itu tio nal rig hts w as obt ai ne d. 3 Sect io n 3 2A- 2- 14 (C), (D) ( em ph as is ad de d)

. 4 { 33} Se ct ion 32A -2 -1 4( E ) lis ts fa ct or s to b e co nsi de re d inde te rm ini ng whe the r the 5 ch ild “ know ing ly , int el lig en tly an d volunt ar ily w ai ve d th e ch ild ’ s r igh ts[

. ] ” Se ct ion 6 32A-2-14(F), althoug h not ap p l i cabl e in the case bef ore us, provides that 7 “ [n ] otw ith standi ng any oth er pr ovi sio n to the c ontrary , no c onf es sio ns, state m en ts o r 8 adm iss ion s m ay be intro duc ed ag ai nst ac hil d un de r the a ge of

thi rt ee n y ears on the 9 al le gatio ns o f the pe tit ion ” an d th at “ [t ] he re is a reb ut ta bl e pr es um pti on tha t any 10 co nf es sio ns, state m en ts o r adm iss ion s m ad e by a ch ild thi rt ee n or

f ourte eny ears old 11 to a pe rs on in a pos iti on o f au tho ri ty a re ina dm iss ibl e. ” Se ct ion32A -2 -1 4( G ) state s, 12 “ A n e xtr aj udi ci al ad m iss ionor c onf es sio n m ad e by

the c hil d ou t of

c ourt i s 13 insufficient to supp ort a finding that the child c omm itted the delinquent acts alleged 14 in th e p et it io n u nl es s i t i s co rro bo rat edby oth er e v i d en ce.” Se ct io n 3 2A- 2- 14 (L) 15 pr ovi de s, “ A pe rs on af fo rd ed ri ght s unde r the

. . . A ct sha ll be a dvi se d of tho se r igh ts 16 atth atpe rs on ’s firs t ap pe aran ce b efo re t he co ur t o n a pe ti ti on un de r th atact .” 17 { 34} Se ct ion32A -2 -5 of the A ct spe ci fi ca lly

a ddr es se s j uven ile p ro ba tio n and 18 paro le

. A m ong oth er

thi ngs, it pr ovi de s th at

“ the de partm en t” ( CY FD ) sha ll pr ovi de 19 juv en il e p ro ba ti on an d p aro le ser vi ces , see § 32A- 2- 5( A ), a nd h as “ the pow er a nd 20 duty to: ”24

1 (1 ) re ce ive a nd e xa m ine c om pla int s a n d a lle ga tio ns tha t a

c hil d 2 is a

de lin que nt c hil d fo r the purp ose of c onsi de ri ng b eg inn ing a 3 pr oc ee din g purs uant t o th e pr ovi sio ns o f the

. . . A ct ; 4 (2 ) m ak e ca se r ef er ra ls f or se rv ic es a s a

ppea r appr opr ia te or 5 de sir ab le ; 6

. . . . 7 (4 ) supe rv ise an d assis t a c hil d pl ac ed

on p ro ba tio n or 8 supe rv ise d r el ea se or und er s up ervi sio n by

c ourt or de r or

by the 9 de pa rtment[ .] 10 Se ct ion32A -2 -5 (B ); see 8. 14.2

. 16 N MA C ( statin g ta sks pe rf orm ed c onc er nin g 11 pr oba tio n and s upe rv ise d r el ea se ). T his se ct ionspe ci fi es that “ [a ] j uve nil e pr oba tio n 12 an d paro le of

fi ce r doe s not ha ve the pow er s of a law en fo rc em en t of fic er.” Se ct ion 13 32A-2-5(C) (em

phasis add ed). 14 { 35} Se ct ion32A -2 -2 4 st at es : 15 A

. A c hil d onpr oba tio n in ci de nt t o an a dj udi catio n a s a 16 delinqu ent child who violates a term of the probation m ay be proceeded 17 ag ai nst

in a pr oba tio n r ev oc at ionpr oc ee din g. Apr oc eedi ng to re voke 18 pr oba tio n sh al l be be gun by fi lin g in the or igi na l proc ee din g a pe tit ion 19 sty le d as a “ pe tit ion to re voke pr oba tio n”

. Pe tit ion s to r ev oke pr oba tio n 20 sha ll be sc re en ed , r ev ie w ed a nd p re pare d inthe sam e m an ne r an d sh al l 2 1 c o n t a i n t h e s a me i n f o rmat i o n a s p e t i t i o n s a l l e g i n g d e l i n qu e n c y. 22 Pr oc ed

ur es of the .

. . A ct

r eg ar din g takin g in to c ust ody a nd d et en tio n 23 sha ll ap ply . The pe tit ionsha ll state the te rm s of pr oba tio n a lle ge d to 24 ha ve be envio la te d and the f ac tua l ba sis f

or the se a lle ga tio ns. 25 B. T he standard of pr oof in pr oba tio n r ev oc at ionpr oc ee din gs 26 sha ll be e vid en ce be y ond a re as ona ble doubt and the he ar ing s sh al l be 27 be fo re the co ur t without aj ur y . I n a ll oth er

r es pe ct s, pr oc ee din gs t o 28 revoke probation s hall be governed bythe procedures, rights and d uties 29 ap pli ca

ble to pro ce ed ing s on a de lin que nc y pe tit ion

. I f a ch ild

is fo und25

1 to h av e vio la te d ate rm of the ch ild ’ s pr oba tio n, the co urt m ay e xte nd the 2 period of probation or make any other j udgm ent or dispo sition that 3 would have been appropriate in the original di spos ition of the case. 4 Ru le 10- 261 N MR

A sim ilarl y

state s, in pe rt ine nt p ar

t: 5 B. Re voc at ion of Pro ba tio n. I f the c hil d f ai ls t o f ulf ill the 6 te rm s or

c ondi tio ns o f pr oba tio n, the ch ildre n’ s co urt a tto rn ey m ay f ile 7 a pe tit ionto re voke pr oba tio n. 8 C. Re voc at ionP ro ce dur e. P ro ce ed ing s to r ev oke pr oba tio n 9 sha ll be c ondu ct ed in the sam e m an ne r as pr oc ee din gs o n peti ti ons 10 alleging delin quency . T he child whose probation is soug ht to be revoked 11 sha ll be e nti tle d to a ll ri ght s th at ac hil d a ll eg ed

to be de lin que nt i s 12 en tit le d to und er lawa nd the se r

ule s, e xc ep t tha t: 13 (1 ) no preliminar y inquiry sh all be condu cted ; 14 (2) the hearing on the petiti on shall b e to the court 1 5 w i t h o u taju ry; 16 (3 ) the pe tit ion sha ll be sty le d as a “ Pe tit ion to R ev oke 17 Probation” and shall state the term s of probation alleged to have been 18 vi ol at edan d t he fact ua l b as is forth es e al le ga ti on s[ .] 19 Rule 10-261(B), ( C) ( em phasis add ed). 20 3. C on st ru ct ion 21 { 36} O ur

r ev ie wof

the A ct , r eg ulati ons, a nd r ule s le ad s us to co nc lud e that the 2 2 L e g i s l a tu r e i n t e n d e d t h a t t h e s t a tu t o ry r i g h t t o w a r n i n g s a s s e rt e d b y C h i ld i s no t 23 tr igg er ed

by the c ir cu m stanc es pr es en te d he re . W e ex pla in. 24 { 37} T h e A c t ’s p r o v i s i o n s c o n c e rn i n g “b a s i c r i g h t s ” b e g i n s w i t h t h e s t a t e me n t , “A 25 child sub

j ect to the provisio ns of the . .

. Ac t is entitled to th e sam e basic rights as an 26 adul t, exce

pt as otherwise provided in the Children’s Code, includ ing rig hts pr ovided26

1 bythe

. . . A ct

, e xc ep t as oth erwi

se pro vi de d in the Ch ild

re n’ s C ode

. ” Se ct ion32A -2

- 2 14( A ) (e m

pha sis a dde d)

. T he pr ovi sio ns o f the A ct ( an d th e re gul at ion s and r ule s) 3 co ns is te nt ly qu al ify req ui rem en ts wit h sp eci fic refe ren ces to “ de li nq ue nc y ,” 4 “ de lin que nc y

pe tit ion , ” “ de lin que nt a ct,” an d “ de lin que nt c hil d, ” em plo y ing tho se 5 te rm s to li m it the ap pli catio n of ce rt ai n re qui re m en ts. T he se te rm s are de fi ne d by the 6 A ct , r eg ulatio ns, a nd r

ule s to m ean ac ts that “ would be designated as a cr ime under 7 the lawif

c om m itt ed by a n a dul t, ” Se ct ion32A -2 -3(A) (e m pha sis a dde d) ; a c hil

d 8 de te rm ined to ha ve c om m itt ed suc h a ct s, S ec tio n 32 A -2 -3 (B ); co m pla int s a lle gin g 9 suc h ac ts, Se ct io n 3 2A- 2- 7( A ); pe tit ion s alleging such acts, 8.14.2. 7(W ) N MAC ; 10 Ru le 10- 211( B) ; and proc ee din gs to determ ine whether a child has com m itted such 11 acts, 8.14.2. 7(B), (C) NMA C. 12 { 38} T he A ct

r equir es that “ [a ] pe rs on a ff or de d r igh ts unde r th e . . . A ct sha ll be 13 advis ed

of tho se r igh ts at t

hat pe rso n’

s firs t appe aran ce be

for e the c ourt

on a pe tit ion 14 under that act.” Se ct i o n 32A-2-14(L) (em phasis add ed). As to out-of-court 15 circum stances, the Ac t provides, “No person subj ect to the provisi ons of the

. . . Ac t 16 wh o is a lle

ge d or sus pe cted of be ing a de lin que nt c hil

d s h a l l b e i n t e rr o g a t edor 17 que sti one d w ith out

f ir st a dvi sin g th e ch ild

of the c hil d’ s co nst itu tiona l right s a nd 18 securing a k n o wing, intelligent and vol untary wa iver.” Sec tion 3 2A-2-14(C) 19 (e m pha sis a dde d)

. T hus, the A ct re qui re s that a ch ild “ w ho i s a lle ge d or

sus pe ct ed

of27

1 being a delinq uent child” m ay not be questi oned un less the questio ner fir st advises 2 the c hil d of

his or he r “ co nst itu tio na l r igh ts” a nd s ec ur es “ a know ing , int el lig en t and 3 vo lu nt ary waiv er” o f th os e ri gh ts

. Id

. Bu t the A ct

is al so c le ar t ha t this w ar nin g 4 req ui rem en t d oe s n ot ap pl y ge ne ral ly to an y on e “ su bjec t t o t he pro vi si on s o f th e . . . 5 Ac t,” which a j uvenile prob ationer is, but only wher e a c hild “ is alleged or suspected 6 of being a delinqu ent child.” Id

. 7 { 39} T his li m itati on is a lso e vid en t i n th e pr ovi sio ns o f the A ct , r eg ulatio ns, a nd 8 ru le s con cern in g and de fin in g “pr el im in ary in qu iry.” As no te d, Se ct io n 3 2A- 2- 7( A) 9 pr ovi de s th at

“ [c ] om pla int s allegin g delinq ue n cysha ll be r ef er re d to pr oba tio n 10 services, which shall conduct a pre lim ina ryinq uir y to det er m ine the be st int er es ts o f 11 the child and of the pu blic with regar d to any action to be taken.” Id

. ( em pha sis 12 ad de d) ; see Rule 10-211(A) ( “ Prior to the fil i n g o f a pe tit ion allegin g delinq uency , 13 probation services s h al l com plete a pre lim ina ryinq uir yin ac co rd an ce w iththe 14 Children’ s Code.” (em phasis add ed)); 8. 14.2.7(Y ) N MAC (defining “ [p] relim inary 15 inquir y ( PI )” a s “ a co nf

er en ce be tw ee n th e JP O , c lie nt, and pare nt o r guard ian to 16 assess whether a

ref erra l to the C CA shou ld be m ade to file a de lin que nc y pe tit ion ”). 17 { 40} Se ct ion32A -2 -7 (B ) re qui re s th at st at uto ry

w ar nin gs b e giv ena t “ the 1 8 co m m en ce m en t o f t h e p re l i m i n ary i n qu i ry[. ]” S ec t i o n 3 2 A- 2 -7 (B ) ( s t at i n g t h at “ [a ]t 19 the c om

m en ce m en t of the pr el im inary inquir y , the part ie s sh al l be a dvi se d of the ir28

1 ba sic r igh ts p ur suant t o Se ct ion 32A -2 -1 4” and tha t “ [t ] he c hil d sh al l be inf orm ed of 2 the c hil d’ s r igh t t o r em ai n si le nt” ); see 8. 14. 2. 9( B) N MA C ( statin g th at “ [a ] t the 3 co m m en ce m en t of the pr el im inary inquir y , the [J PO ] sha ll advis e the cl ie nt, pare nt, 4 guardian, or custodian of the client’ s basic rights” and enum erat i n g t h o se rights). 5 A ga in, the A ct

is cl ear that the w ar

nin g r equir em en ts do not ap ply ge ne ra lly

to 6 an y one sub

j ec t to the A ct , but onl y at the co m m en ce m en t of

apr el im inary

inquir y to 7 determ ine “ whether a re ferr al to the CCAshoul d be m ad e t o file a delinqu ency 8 pe tit ion

. ” 8. 14. 2. 7( Y ) N MA C; see § 32 A -2 -7 (A ). A nd R ule 10- 261( C) (1 ), appl ic ab le 9 to j uve nil e pr oba tio n, pr ov id es that “ no pr el im inary inquir y sha ll be c ondu ct ed ” in 10 co nn ect io n wi th a pe ti ti on to rev ok e p ro ba ti on . (Em ph as is ad de d.) 11 { 41} The A ct is equally clear that the requirem ent that t h e St at e “prove that [a] 12 state m en t or

c onf es sio n of fe re d ine vid en ce w as e lic ite d on lya ft er akno w ing , 13 int el lig en t and v oluntary w ai ve r of

the ch il d’s cons tit

uti ona l r igh ts w as obt ai ne d” 14 ap pli es onl y

in pr oc ee din gs i nvol vin g an a llegat ionthat the c hil d is ade lin que nt 15 child, and not generally to any one subject to the A ct. Section 32A-2-14(D ). 16 { 42} A lth oughthe re is no d oubt that the L eg isl at

ur e inten de d th e A ct

to pr ovi de 17 ce rt ai n pr ote ct ion s to ch ildre n gre at er than those the law af fo rd s to a dul ts ( inc lud ing 18 ev en gre at er p ro te ct io ns to y ou ng er ch il dr en , see § 32 A -2 -1 4( F) ), the re is al so no 19 doub t tha t the A ct ’ s text ind ic at es ale gis la tiv e int en tio n to m ak e ce rt ai n pr ote ct ion s29

1 av ai la ble onl y w he re ac hil d is sus pe ct ed or a lle ge d to be ade lin que nt c hil d. T he se 2 te xtu al li m itatio ns— an d th e re sul t th at st ate m en ts i na dm iss ibl e in a pr oc ee din g to 3 ad j udi cate c ri m ina l l ia

bil ity m ay sti ll be a dm iss ibl e in a

pr oc eed in g to de te rm ine 4 w he the r a pr oba tio ne r ha s vi olate d c ondi tio ns o f pr oba tio n—are r at ion al a nd e nti re ly 5 co nsi ste nt w iththe c onst itu tio na l l aw co nc er nin g c ri m ina l de fe ndants , pr oba tio ne rs , 6 an d j uve nil es . 7 { 43} A s d i s c u s s e d ab o v e , t h e l a w r e c o g n i z e s a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n a 8 pr oc ee din g to de te rm ine w he the r ana lr ea dy c onvi ct ed in di vi dua l ha s vi olate d a 9 conditi on of probation , warranting an adj ustm ent of a previously im posed sent ence 10 (i n j uve nil e parl an ce , “ dis posi tio n” ), an d a pr oc ee din g to de te rm ine c ri m ina l l ia bil ity 11 on a ne w cha rg e; di ffer en ces reco gn iz ed b y N e w Mex ic o c ou rts

. Se e, e . g. , Lopez , 12 2007 -N MS C- 011, ¶

12 ( “ By fa ili ng to c om

ply w ithpr oba tio n c ondi tio ns, ade fe ndant 13 de m onstrate s th at

c le m en cy

is not appr opr ia te be ca

use he or she is not

w ill ing or

able 14 to b e rehab il it at ed

. I t f oll ow s th at

the c ourt m

ust have br oa d po w er

to ad j ust a 15 de fe ndant’ s se nte nc e by re voki ng p ro ba tio n w he n ne ce ssary . ”) ; Gutierrez , 199 5- 16 N MC A -0 18, ¶

3 ( not ing that pr ote ct ion s ava ila ble in paro le a nd pro ba tio n r ev oc at ion 17 pr oc ee din gs d o no t i nc lud e M ira nda ’s req ui rem en ts ). 18 { 44} T he lawc onc er nin g f ed er al c onstituti ona l pr ote ct ion s f or j uve nil es a lso 19 recognizes that constitu tional protect i o n s afforded j uveniles in delinqu ency30

1 pr oc eed in gs m ay

no t b e av ai labl e to an al read y -co nv ic te d ju ve ni le pro ba ti on er. See 2 G agno n , 411 U

. S. at

789 n. 12 ( de sc ri bin g G aul t a s t r e a t i n g aju v e n i l e “ d e l i n qu e n c y” 3 pr oc ee din g a s “ fu nc tio na lly a kinto a cr im ina l tri al ” an d st at ing that “ [a ] j uve nil e 4 charged w ith vio lation of a generally applicable statute is differe ntly situated from an 5 al re ady -c onvi ct ed

pr oba tio ne r or

paro le e, a nd i s e nti tled to a hig he r de gr ee of 6 pr ote ct ion ”) ; G aul t , 387 U

. S. a t 30 n. 48 ( em pha siz ing that “ w ha t w e hol d inthi s 7 opi nio n w it h reg ar d to the pr oc ed ur al r equir em en ts at the a dj udi cator y sta ge [ to 8 de te rm ine de lin que nc y ] ha s no ne ce ssary ap pli ca bil ity to othe r ste ps o f the j uve nil e 9 pr oc es s” ). 10 { 45} T he A ct ’ s text

ua l lim itatio ns ar e al so c onsi ste nt w iththe pur pose s of pr oba tio n 11 and the role of the JPO in serving th ose purpos es, r eflec ted in the langu age of the A ct 12 an d re gu la ti on s as we l l a s t h e cas e la w di sc us se d abo ve . Se e, e . g. , Lopez , 200 7- 13 N MS C- 011, ¶

8 ( “ T he L eg isl at

ur e ha s gr ante d di str ic t c ourts the pow er to re voke 14 pr oba tio n w he n a pr oba tio n co ndi tio n is vio la te d be ca use re habil itatio n, w hic h is the 15 prim ary

goal, is not being achieved.”); R iv era , 2004 -N MSC- 001, ¶ 24 (“ The prim ary 16 goa l of

pr oba tio n, w hic h is de fe ndant re habil itatio n, m ay be de fe at ed by de lay ing the 17 co mm encem ent of a defe ndant’s probationary sentence pending app eal. ”); 18 H erm osi llo , 2014-NMC A- 102, ¶ 12 (“ [P] robation is an act of clem ency with the goal 19 of educ at io n a nd reh ab il it at io n[ .] ”).31

1 { 46} The A ct’ s stated purpos es i nclude “ provid[in g] a program of supervision , c are 2 an d r eh ab ili ta tio n[

. ] ” Se ct ion32A -2 -2 (A ). The r eg ulatio ns d ef ine “ j uve nil e 3 probation ” as “ a court-order ed sanction and d ispos ition which places an adjudicated 4 cl ie nt unde r the su pe rv is iona nd c ar e of a[ JP O ] , ” 8. 14. 2. 7( T ) N MA C, a nd d ef ine 5 “ JPO” as “ a departm ent staff per son who[] pro v i d es court-ordere d and inform al 6 supervisio n for clients.” 8.14.2. 7(U) NMA C. The A ct, m oreover, expressly states that 7 a JPO “ does not have the powers of a law enforcem ent officer .” Sec tion 3 2A-2-5(C ). 8 W e thi nk i t e vid en t th at th e pr im ar y r ole of the JP O is to s upe rv ise j uve nil e 9 pr oba tio n e r s i n s e rv i c e o f t h e A c t ’ s s t a t e d p u r p o s e o f “ p r o v i d [ i n g ] a p r o g r a m of 10 supe rv isi on, c ar e and re habil itatio n, ” Se ct ion 32A -2 -2 (A ), a nd tha t the te xt o f Se ct ion 11 32A -2 -5 (C ) re fl ec ts a l eg isl at ive int en tio n th at the JP O pe rf

orm ar ole in the j uve nil e 12 j ust ic e sy ste m

se parat e and

dis tin ct f ro m that of lawe nf or ce m en t, adis tin ct ion 13 co nsi ste nt w ithoth er

statut es pr ovi din g th at

r eh ab ili ta tio n is the pr inc ipa l du ty of 14 pr ob at io n a nd pa ro le off ic ers . See R ay os v. Sta te exre l. N. M

. D ep ’t of Co rr. , 201 4- 15 NMC A- 103, ¶ 19, 336 P. 3d 42 8 (i n t erp re ting th e adult Probation and Parole A ct), 16 cert. quas hed , 20 15 -NMCER T-00 7, 3 68 P.3d2. 17 { 47} Ch ild ’ s c ont en tio n th at “ [J PO s ] ar e c l e ar l y

l aw e n f o r c e m e n t ” i s s e lf

-s er vin g and 18 contrary

to the statuto ry

and regulatory

provisio ns dis cussed above. And th e broad 19 ru le Ch ild advoc at es co uld , in m ost ci rc um stanc es , unde rm ine , r athe r than se rv e, the32

1 supe rv iso ry

a nd r eh ab ili ta tiv e func tio ns of j uve nil e pr oba tio n. Ch ild c ont en ds tha t i f 2 a JPO “ susp ects” a j uvenile prob ationer of having com m itted an act in violation of a 3 pr oba tio n a gr ee m en t tha t m igh t a lso c onst itu te ade lin que nt a ct , the JP O m ay not 4 que sti on the j uve nil e ab out that a ct wi th ou t fi rs t pr ovi din g st at uto ry w ar nin gs, a nd 5 that a JP O ’ s f ai lur e to g ive tho se w ar nin gs r en de rs inadm is si bl e in a pr oba tio n 6 re voc at ion he ar ing inc ulp at or y state m en ts m ad e by the j uve nil e to the JP O

. T ha t r ule 7 is n ow he re sug ge ste d, le t alo ne state d, in the A ct , re gul at ion s, or ru le s. T he ine vit ab le 8 co nse que nc e of

suc h ar ule , m or eo ve r, w oul d g en eral ly tr an sf orm the r el at ion shi p 9 be twee n t he juv en il e p ro ba ti on er an d t he JPO i nt o a n a dv ers ari al on e. 10 { 48} Alm ost any questio n a JPO asks in the course of supervisin g a probation er has 11 the pot en tia l to el ic it aninc ulp at or y state m en t. A nd the JP O m ay have no i de a at

the 12 m om en t the que sti on i s a ske d w he the r the pr ob ation er ’ s r es pons e m igh t be 13 incrim inatory

as to a “ delinqu ent act” or m erely a basis for probation revocation that 14 does not am ount to a d elinquent act. Ac cordingly , if the broad rule Child advocates 15 w er e ad opt ed , the JP O w oul d be r equir ed to giv e statut or

y w ar nin gs at the 16 com m encem ent of every

encounter with the probationer, ther eby m aking every

such 17 encounter an adversaria l o n e. Nothing in th e A ct suggests that the Le gislature 18 in te nd edsu ch a res ul t b e b ro ad ly ap pl ie d in all pro ba ti on vi ol at io n p ro ceed in gs . To 19 the c ontrary , our

r ev ie wof the A ct , r eg ulatio n, a nd r ule s le ad s us to co nc lud e that the33

1 L eg isl at

ur e int en de d th e re la tio nshi p b e tw e e nj uv e n i l e p r o ba tio ne r an d JP O to be non 2 adve rs ar ia l, a nd c hose to dr awthe li ne s and d ist inc tio ns embo di ed in the te xt t o 3 re fl ec t tha t i nte nti on. 4 { 49} O ur

c onc lus ionis not

a lte re d by

S ec tio n 32 A -2 -2 4( B) ’ s st at em ent th at ( w ith 5 ce rt ai n li m ite d e xc ep tio ns that are not r el ev an t he r e ) “p r o c e e d i n g s t o r ev oke pr oba tio n 6 sha ll be gov er

ne d by the pr oc ed

ur es , ri ght s and d

uti es appl ic ab le to pr oc ee din gs o n 7 a de lin que ncy pe tition ” or the sim ilar state m en t i n R ule 10- 261( C) , “ [p ] ro ce ed ing s 8 to r ev oke pr oba tio n sh al l be c onduct ed in the sam e m an ne r as pr oc ee din gs o n 9 pe tit ion s a lle gin g de lin que nc y . ” T he w or d “pr oc ee din g” a s it appl ie s inlawis 10 ge ne ra lly

und er sto od to r ef

er to “ a law sui t, inc lud ing a ll ac ts and e ve nts be tw ee n th e 11 tim e of

c om m en ce m en t and the e ntr y of j udgm en t[ , ] ” m or e comm on ly , “ [a ] ny 12 procedural m eans for seekin g redress fr om a tribunal or agency .” P roc ee din g , Black’ s 13 Law D ictiona ry (1 0the d. 201 4)

. T hus, w e unde rs tand the se state m en ts in the A ct a nd 14 ru le to re fe r to the m an ne r in whic h tr ia ls and h eari ngs ar e co nduc te d inc ourt and n ot 15 to ev en ts tak in g p la ce b efo re t he co m m en cem en t o f a co ur t p ro ceed in g. 16 { 50} Ina ddi tio n to r ea din g th es e pr ovi sio ns a cc or din g to th e or din ar y m eanin g of 17 “ pr oc eed in g,” see B ettini v. City of Las Cruces , 1971 -N MS C- 054, ¶ 6, 82 N

. M. 633 , 18 485 P.2d 967 (stating that “ [s] tatutory words are presum ed to be used in th eir ordinary 19 an d us ua l se nse ”) , w e se e no indi catio n that the L eg isl at ur e int en de d this state m en t34

1 in S ec tio n 32 A -2 -2 4( B) to ove rr ide e ve ry li m itatio n to “ de lin que nc y , ” “ de lin que nt 2 ac t, ” an d “ de lin que nt c hil d” w e hav e pr ev iou sly ide nti fi ed

. A nd e ve n if

the te xt o f the 3 A c t ( a n d t h e r e g u l a t i o n s a n d r u l e s ) w e r e n o t p l a i n b u t a mb i g u o u s , s t a tu t o ry4 co nstru ct ionpr inc ipl es r equir e that w e “ co nsi de r the pol ic y im pli catio ns of

the 5 various cons tructions o f the statute[, ] ” R iv era , 2004-NM SC -0 01, ¶ 14; interpret 6 “ dif fe re nt l eg isl at ive e na ctm en ts a s harm oni ous ins te ad of a s c ontra dic tin g on e 7 another,” id. ¶

13 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks an d ci ta tio n om itt ed ); co nstru e a statut e 8 “ so that no part of the statute is rendere d surplu sage or superfluous[,] ” Ja vi er M. , 9 2 0 0 1-NMS C-030, ¶ 32 ( internal quot ation m arks and citation om itted); “ rej ect[] a 10 fo rm al ist ic an d m ec hanic al statut or y c onstru ct ionw he n th e re sul ts w oul d be absur d, 11 unreasonable, or contrary to the spirit of the statute[,] ” Sta te v . Sm ith , 2004-NMS C12 032, ¶ 10, 136 N

. M. 372 , 98 P

. 3d 1022 ; an d “ favor . . . an int er pr et at ion dr ive n by

the 13 statut e’ s ob vio us s pir it or r ea son” if

ad he ren ce to the li te ra l w or ds w oul d le ad to 14 “ injustice, absurdity

or contradiction,” Sta te v . T ruj illo , 200 9- N MS C- 012, ¶ 21, 146 15 N

. M. 14, 206 P.3 d 125 (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and c itatio ns o m itt ed ). T he se 16 considerations m andate a reading of Section 32A-2-24(B) and Rule 10-261(C) that 17 applies onl y

to the co n d u ct of court proceedings, consistent with the ordinary 18 m ean in g o f “ pr oc eed in g.”35

1 { 51} W e ar e aw are of statem ents in prior cases to the effe ct that “ an allegation of a 2 j uvenile prob ation vio lation is treated as if it w ere a char ge brough t in a delinqu ency 3 proceeding.” St at e v. Tr evo r M. , 201 5- N MC A -0 09, ¶ 7, 341 P

. 3d 2 5 ( al te ratio n, 4 int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks, a nd c itatio n om itt ed ); State v. Erickson K. , 20 02 -NMCA5 058, ¶ 15, 132 N. M. 258, 46 P. 3d 1258 (sam e). Those decisions, however , a ddressed 6 onl y the c ondu ct

of c ourt pr oc ee din gs, dis cu ssi ng the appl ic ab ili ty of the r ule s of 7 evidence (Er i ckson K. ) an d th e ri ght of c onf ro ntatio n ( Tr evo r M. ) at

apr oba tio n 8 re voc at ion pro ceed in g. Erick son K. ess en ti al ly ackn owl ed ge d a s m uc h, ci ti ng Sect ion 9 32A-2-24 as s tating that “ probation revocation proceedings [are] to be conducted as 10 out l i ne d i n S e c t i on 32A- 2-16[,] ” w hich gov erns the “ [c] ondu ct of hear ings.” E ric ks on 11 K. , 200 2- N MC A -0 58, ¶ 16; see § 32 A -2 -1 6. N ei the r ca se , m or eo ve r, a ddr es se d r igh ts 12 applicable be

for e the c om

m en ce m en t of

apr oba tio n r ev oc at ionpr oc eedi ng o r 13 inv olv ed

a n a sse rt ed

r igh t tha t w oul d bur de n th e adm ini str at ionof the j uve nil e 14 pr ob at io n s y st em

as wo ul d t he bro adrul e ad vo cat edby Chi ldin th is cas e. Cf

. F are , 15 442 U

. S. a t 7 23 (warning tha t M ira nda ’ s r equir em en ts m ay not be e xte nde d ina 16 m an ne r that “ w oul d c ut [ M ira nda ’s] ho ld in g . . . co m pl et el y l o o s e f

r o m it s o wn 17 ex pli ci tly

state d r at ion al e” an d “ impose the bur de ns a sso ci at ed w iththe r

ule of 18 M ira nda on th e j u v e n i l e j u s t i c e s y s t e m an dt h e p o l i c e w i t h o u ts e rv i n g t h e i n t e r e s ts36

1 that r ule w as de sig ne d si m

ult an eo usl y

to pr ote ct ” (i nte rn al quo tati on m arks a nd 2 citation om itted)). 3 { 52} Insum , appl y ing w el l- se ttl ed pr inc ipl es of

statut or y c onstru ct ionto the f

ac ts 4 in this c as e, w e co nc lud e that the br oa d r ule a dvoc at ed

by Ch ild is not r equir ed by the 5 Act, reg ul at io n, o r ru le s. See R iv era , 2004-NMS C-001, ¶¶ 15-24 (construin g NMSA 6 1978 , S ec tio n 31 -1 1-1(A ) (1 988) in lig ht o f, int er a lia , it s hi sto ry , ba ck gr ound , 7 func tio n w ith in the c om pr eh en siv e statut or

y sc he m e, inc lud ing the state ’ s se nte nc ing 8 s ch em e and probation st atutes em phasizing constructive rehabilitation and general 9 pol ic y co nsi de ratio ns an d co nc lud ing that the se fa ct or s co m pe ll ed a diff

er en t 10 co ns tru ct io n fr om

th atsu gg es te d b y

“ [a] lit eral read in g o f Sec ti on 31 -1 1- 1(A ) [w hic h] 11 wou ldser io us ly und erm in e” re habi li ta ti ve go al s)

. 12 { 53} W e al so c onc lud e that the und isp ute d f ac ts e sta bli sh tha t the inf

orm at ion 13 Ch ild ’ s JP O ha d w he n sh e ar range d the m ee tin g at

w hic h C hil d m ad e the state m en ts 14 he m oved to su ppress—reported to her by Child’ s m other, not law 15 enforcem ent— we re t h at Child had been sus pended from school because an officer 16 ha d seen hi m in po ss es sio n of apip e an d th at

the JP O did

not be lie ve the re w as a 17 basis f

or “ a new charge, ” i.e. , a delinqu ent act form ing the basis f ora d el i n quency 1 8 p et i t i o n , t h at wa s s ep ar at e a n dd i s t i n ct fr o m a p ro b at i o n re v o ca t i o n p e t i t i o n . We 19 em pha siz e that the re is no e vid en ce that the JP O a rr an ge d f or the m ee tin g be ca

use she37

1 “ sus pe ct ed ” that C hil d ha d c om m itt ed a ne w de lin que nt ac t, as oppo se d to a vio la tio n 2 of a condition of his probation , and that th e re vocatio n petition did no t allege that 3 Child ha d com

m itted a new delinquent act but onlythat Child had vi olated several 4 conditi ons of his probation. Lawenforce m ent was not p re s ent when the JPO 5 que sti one d C hil d a

bout wh at Child ’ s m oth er ha d r ep orte d to he r. N or is the re a ny 6 ev ide nc e that the of

fi ce r w ho h ad

se enCh ild

in poss es sio n of

apip e ar re ste d hi m , or 7 that a pe titio n was c onsi de re d or pot en tia lly

be ing f ile d a lle gin g ane wc harg e of 8 de lin que nc y

ba se d onthe c ondu ct

c ite d inthe r ev oc at ionpe tit ion

. 9 3. Case Law Sup ports Ou r Inte rpre tation of t he A ct 10 { 54} O ur

int er pr et at ionof

S ec tio n 32 A -2 -1 4 is supporte d by r ec en t de ci sio ns o f our 11 Suprem e Court that m ake clear that, althoug h Section 3 2 A- 2 -14 provid es broad 12 pr ote ct ionf

or j uve nil es sus pe ct ed

or a lle ge d t o ha ve c om

m itt ed ade lin que nt a ct , 13 th os e p ro te ct io ns are l im it edby the Act’s t ex t. 14 { 55} In Ja vi er

M . our S uprem e Court af

firm ed its und erstanding th at “ [c] ustod ial 15 int er ro ga tio n oc curs w he n ‘ anind ivi dua l i s sw ep t f ro m f am il iar sur

ro undi ngs int o 16 pol ic e cu sto dy , sur

ro unde d by an ta goni sti c fo rc es , an d subj ec te d to the te ch nique s of 17 persuasion so that the indiv idual feels un der com pulsi on to speak,’ ” 2001-NMSC18 030, ¶ 15 ( al te ratio ns o m itt ed ) (quot ing M ira nda , 384 U. S. at 461); that “ [c] ustod ial 19 int er ro ga tio n w as the e sse nti al pr ed ic at e to the Co urt’ s de ci sio n in M ira nda [, ] ” id.38

1 ¶ 42; a nd tha t “ [i ] n th e ab se nc e of c ust odi al int er

ro ga tio n an of

fi ce r is n ot 2 constitu tionallym andated to giv e any warnings.” Id

. Whil e co nc lud ing that M ira nda 3 did not appl y to the pol ic e of

fi ce r’ s de te nti on o f the c hil d inthat c as e b ecause the 4 detention “ did no t rise to the status of a custodial in terrogation[,] ” id. ¶ ¶ 21- 23, the 5 Co urt he ld tha t S ec tion 32A -2 -1 4( C) doe s no t r equir e that a c hil d “be sub

j ec t t o 6 custodi al interrogation in order to be afforded the right to be advised of his o r her 7 constitu tional right s prior to poli ce questionin g[,] ” Ja vi er M. , 200 1- N MS C- 030, ¶

29, 8 because “ Section 32A-2-14 i s not a m ere codification of M ira nda , but w as intended 9 ins te ad to pr ovi de c hildr en with gr eate r statut or y pr ote ct ionthan c onst itu tio na lly 10 m andated.” Ja vi er

M. , 20 01 -NMSC -0 30 , ¶ 32

. 11 { 56} Si gn ifi can tl y , Ja vi er M. a lso m ad e cl ear that S ec tio n 32 A -2 -1 4’ s pr ote ct ion s 12 are lim ited. Se ction 32 A- 2-14(C) “ onlyprotects against a child’ s stat em ents which 1 3 ar e m ad e du ri n g an i n v es t i g at o ry d et en t i o n i n re s p o n s e to a p o l i ce o f f i c er ’s 14 que sti oni ng tha t c oul d no t be m er e adm ini str at ive que sti ons an d th at is int en de d to 15 co nf irm or dis pe l the of

fi ce r’ s su sp ic io ns tha t the c hil d is or ha s c om m itt ed a 16 de lin que nt a ct [, ] ” an d w he re ac hil d is sub j ec t to such inve sti ga tor

y de te nti on, S ec tio n 17 32A -2 -1 4( C) r equir es the of fi ce r to a dvi se the c hil d, pr ior to que sti oni ng h im , onl y 18 of hi s ri gh t t o re m ai n s il en t an d t ha t an yth in g h e sa y s m ay be us edag ai ns t h im

. Javier 19 M. , 2001-NMS C-030, ¶¶ 40-41. Sec tion 3 2A-2-14’ s protections, m oreover, are39

1 tr igg er ed

onl y “ in tw o c ir cu m stanc es : ( 1) af te r fo rm al ch ar ge s ha ve be enf ile d a ga ins t 2 a ch ild ; and ( 2) w he n ac hil d is se iz ed pur suant to an in ve sti ga tor y de te nti on and n ot 3 free to leave.” Ja vi er

M. , 20 01 -NMSC -0 30 , ¶ 38

. Ja vi er M. c onclu de d that the 4 L eg isl at

ur e did not int en d to “ ha m

per the tr ad iti ona l f

unc tio n of

pol ic e of fi ce rs in 5 inv es tig at ing c ri m e[ , ] ” an d r ej ec te d apr opos ed “ standard

of r equir ing w ar

nin gs 6 w he ne ve r anoff

ic er as ks a

que sti on whic h is li ke ly to le ad to aninc ri m inatin g 7 response” as “ a standard [that] undu ly burdens a police officer’ s required duties.” Id

. 8 ¶ 39. I t a lso he ld tha t “ [a ] s a pr er equis ite to re qui ri ng tha t a c hil d be a dvi se d of

his or 9 he r ri ght s unde r Su

bse ct ion (C ), the [c ] hil d m ust be ei the r ‘ al le ge d’ or

‘ sus pe ct ed ’ of 10 being a de lin que nt c hil d .” Id

. ¶ 34 ( em pha sis a dde d) ; see § 32 A -2 -1 4( C) ( “N o pe rs on 11 subj ec t t o the provi sio ns o f the

. . . A ct w ho i s a lle ge d or

sus pe ct ed

of be ing a 12 de lin que nt c hil d sh al l be int er ro ga te d or ques tio ne d wi tho ut fi rs t a dvi sin g th e ch ild 13 of the child’s c onsti tutio nal rights and securing a knowing, intelligent and vo luntary 14 wa iver.” ). 15 { 57} In s um , t he a na ly sis in Ja vi er M. m ak es cl ea r t h at Se ct i o n 3 2 A- 2 -1 4 (C )’s 1 6 re qui re m e n t s a r e t r i g g e r e d , n o t b y a J P O ’ s s u s p i c i o n t h a t a p r o b a t i o n e r m a y ha ve 17 vio la te d ac ondi tio n of pr oba tio n or

w he re the ch ild is al le ge d in a re voc at ionpe tit ion 18 to h av e done so, but onl y w he re a law en fo rc em en t off ic er que sti ons a chi ld b as ed on 19 a sus pic ionthat th e ch il d has c om m itt ed a“ de lin que nt a ct ” or

w he re the c hil d is40

1 al le ge d to ha ve do ne so in a de li nq ue nc y pe ti ti on . Se e Ja vi er

M. , 200 1- N MS C- 030, 2 ¶ 47 (“ By en ac tin g S ec tio n 32 A -2 -1 4, w e co nc lud e that the L eg isl at ur e int en de d to 3 ex em pt c hil dr enf

ro m the ge ne ra l r

ule of se lf inv oc at ion by re qui ri ng tha t c hil dr enbe 4 re m ind ed

of the ir r igh t no t t o in cr im inate the m se lve s and b e advi se d of the 5 co nse que nc es of

w ai vin g th at

r igh t. A cc or din gly , w e co nc lud e that w he n a c hil d is 6 subj ec t t o an inv es tigato ryde te nti on , lawe nfo rc em en t m ust advis e the ch ild

of his or 7 h e r r i g h tt o r e mai n s i l e n tan dth a ti f t h e r i g h ti s wa i v e da n yth i n g t h a tt h e c h i l ds a ys 8 c a n b e u s e d a g a i n s tt h e m i n a n y de lin que nc y he ari ng . ” (e m

pha sis a dde d) ). T o th e 9 ex te nt C hil d c ont en ds tha t Ja vi er M. m an da te s th e ru le he a dvoc at es , he is m ist ak en . 10 A s di sc uss ed ab ove , law en fo rc em en t did not que sti on Ch ild an d w as not e ve n pr es en t 11 when the JPO que s t i o n ed Ch i ld. N or does this case require us to decide whether 12 Ch ild ’ s st at em en ts w oul d be a dm iss ibl e in a de lin que nc y

pr oc ee din g, a s di sti nc t f

ro m 13 a pr oba tio n r ev oc at ionpr oc ee din g. 14 { 58} Ch ild

c ite s Antonio T. , 2015-NMS C-019, ¶ 20, in supp ort of his contentio n that 15 “ [t] here are no exceptions based on which State actor e licited the statem ent or at w hat 16 ty pe of pr oc ee din g: if

the c hil d w as sus pe ct ed of ade lin que nt a ct

a nd n ot f

re e to 17 le av e, the S ta te m

ust alw ay s pr ov e a v o l u nt ary, kn owi ng , and in te ll ig en t wai ve r.” 18 Ch ild ’ s r el ianc e on Antonio T. is als o m is pl aced un de r th e fac ts in th is cas e.41

1 { 59} In Antonio T. , tw o te ac he rs e sc orte d th e ch ild , a s e v en te en -y ear- old

hig h sc hool 2 student , to the assistant principal’s o ff i ce on the suspi cion that he had cons um ed 3 al co ho l. Id

. ¶ ¶ 2, 4. T he pr inc ipa l ques tio ne d the ch ild ab out his poss es sio n of a lc ohol 4 in the pr es en ce of

the stu de nt r es our ce of

fi ce r, a ce rt if

ie d lawe nf

or ce m en t of

fi ce r in 5 fu ll un ifo rm . Id

. ¶ 4. Whil e the pr inc ipa l qu es tio ne d th e ch il d, as king th e kin ds o f 6 que sti ons she ro uti ne ly as ke d in pe rf orm ing he r j ob e nf

or ci ng d isc ipl ine a t the sc hool , 7 th e o ffi cer p rep ared a br eat h a lc oh ol tes t a f ew feet away

fro m th e ch il d. Id

. ¶ 5. 8 Althoughthe o ff

i ce r u s u al l y qu es t i o n ed s tu d en t s s u s p ec t ed o f d ri n k i n g al co h o l b ef o re 9 adm ini ste ri ng a br eath te st, he j ust lis te ne d be ca use the pr inc ipa l a ske d qu es tio ns h e 10 wou ldha ve ask ed

. Id

. The child adm itted that he had cons um ed alcohol, that h e had 11 br ough t the al co hol to sc hool in a pla sti c bot tle , an d that he ha d dis pose d of the bottle 12 in a ba th ro om

tra sh can . Id

. 13 { 60} While the officer adm inistered the breath test, the r esults of which corrob or at ed 1 4 t h e c h i l d ’ s c o n f

e s s i o n , t h e p r i n c i p a l s e a r c h e d t h e c h i l d ’ s b a c k p a c k a n df

ounda 15 po ck et kn ife

. Id

. ¶ 6. A t the pr inc ipa l’ s r eque st, the of fi ce r se ar ch ed fo r the pla sti c 16 bo tt le bu t co ul d n ot fin d i t. Id

. ¶ 7. Whe n he ret urne d, he a dvi se d th e ch ild of his 17 co nst itu tio na l M

ira nda rig ht s. Id

. T he c hil d th en an swer ed the of fi ce r’ s qu es tio ns 18 ab ou t t he kn ife bu t re fu se d t o a ns wer h is qu es ti on s ab ou t al co ho l co ns um pt i o n. Id

. 19 The statem ents the child m ade in response to the p rin cipal’ s questio ns were42

1 docum ented in the officer ’ s police report under the heading “ investig ation.” Id

. T he 2 state la te r ch ar ge d th e ch ild w ithpos se ssi on o f al co hol ic b ev erag es by am ino r— a 3 de li nq ue nt act

. Id

. ¶ 3. In his subs eque nt d el inque nc y pr oc ee din g, the c hil d m ove d to 4 supp re ss h is i nc ulp at or y state m en ts o n th e gr ound that the y w er e el ic ite d w ith out

a 5 know ing , int el lig en t, a nd v oluntary w ai ve r of his r igh t to rem ai n si le nt, c iti ng S ec tio n 6 32 A-2 -1 4( D). Antonio T. , 201 5- N MS C- 019, ¶ 8. 7 { 61} O ur

S upr em e Co urt r ev er se d th e di st ri ct c ourt’ s de ci sio n ( af

fi rm ed by thi s 8 Co urt) de ny ing the m oti on, hol din g th at “ a sc hool of fi ci al m ay

ins ist that a c hil d 9 an sw er que sti ons f

o r p ur p o s es of sc hool dis ci pli nary

pr oc ee din gs” but

that st at em en ts 10 el ic ite d by

asc hool of

fi ci al “ in the pr es en ce of a law en fo rc em en t of fi ce r m ay not be 11 use d a ga ins t the ch ild in a de lin que nc y pr oc ee din g un le ss the c hil d m ad e a know ing , 12 intellig ent, and vo luntary wa iver of his or her

statutory right to rem ain silent.” Id

. ¶ 3 13 (citing Section 32A-2-14(C), (D )). Th e Court concluded that the officer’ s “ m ere 14 presence during [the principal’ s] questio ning of [the child] subjected [ the child] to an 15 inv es tig at or

y de te nti on tha t tri gger ed

the statut or

y pr ote ct ion s pr ovi de d by

S ec tio n 16 32A-2-14(C) and (D) .” Antonio T. , 201 5- N MS C- 019, ¶ 11 . Ac cord ing ly , S ec tio n 17 32A -2 -1 4( C) r equir ed the of fi ce r “ to adv ise [the ch ild ] that he had a ri ght to r em ai n 18 sil en t, a nd tha t i f [the ch ild ] w ai ve d the ri ght , an ythi ng he sai d coul d be us ed a ga ins t 19 him in crim inal delinqu ency proceedings[,] ” and the officer ’ s failure to do so before43

1 the pr inc ipa l qu es tio ne d th e ch ild in his pr es en ce r en de re d th e ch ild ’ s in cr im inatin g 2 st at em en ts in ad m is si bl e u nd er Se ct io n 3 2A- 2- 14 (D). Antonio T. , 201 5- N MS C- 019, 3 ¶ 11. 4 { 62} T he Co urt m ad e cl ear that, a lth oughthe pr inc ipa l su spe ct ed the ch ild of

be ing 5 int oxi cate d a t sc hool a nd tha t this c ondu ct c onst itu te d “ a sc hool dis ci pli nary vio la tio n 6 that w oul d a lso r en de r him ade lin que nt c hil d[ , ] ” the pr inc ipa l’ s su spi ci on and 7 inv es tig at ionint o th e ch ild ’ s a lc ohol c onsum pti on w er e ins uf

fi ci en t t o tr igg e r

S e c tio n 8 32A-2-14(C), “ because [the principal] is neither a lawenforce m ent officer nor wa s 9 she acting as an agent of lawenfo rc emen t.” Antonio T. , 201 5- N MS C- 019, ¶ 24. 10 “ Q uesti oni ng a

c hil d f or sc hool dis ci pli nary

m atte rs is dis tin gui sha ble f ro m 11 que sti oni ng a

c hil d f or sus pe ct ed

c ri m ina l w ro ngdo ing [, ] ” the Co urt e xpl ai ne d, a nd 12 “ [b ] ec au se m ai nta ini ng s ec ur ity a nd o rd er

in school s r equir es ac er ta in d eg re e of 13 fl ex ibi lity

in sc hool dis ci pli nary pr oc ed ur es , w e re co gni ze the va lue of pr es er vin g th e 14 inform ality

of the student-t ea ch er relationsh ip.” Id

. (em phasis, alteration, internal 15 quot ation m arks, and citation om itted). T he principal “ wa s entitled to act on her 16 sus pic iona nd c om

pe l answ er s f

ro m [ the c hil d] f

or the pur poses of sc hool 17 discipli ne[, ] ” and “ [a] bsent any agency relationship betwee n school officials andlaw 1 8 e n f o r c e m e n tau t h o r i t i e s , i n t e rr o g a t i n g [ t h e c h i l d ] a l o n e i n h e r o f f i c e ab o u ts c h o ol 19 discipli nary

m atters w ouldnot have const ituted an inv estigatory detention.” Id

.44

1 { 63} Se ct ion 32A -2 -1 4( C) w as tr igg er ed in Antonio T. , not because a school official 2 suspe ct ed

a nd i nve sti ga te d c ondu ct in vio la tio n of

sc hool r ule s, but be ca use the 3 presence of law enforcem ent during a school o fficial’ s questio ning about the cond uct 4 of a j uvenile that th e lawenforce m ent officer knew constituted a de l i n q u en t act 5 “ cr eate d ac oe rc ive a nd a dve rs ar ia l e nvi ro nm en t tha t do es not nor m al ly e xis t duri ng 6 int er ac tio ns be twee n sc hool of fi ci al s and s tud en ts[ , ] ” 2015 -N MS C- 019, ¶ 25; 7 “ converted t h e school dis ciplinary interrogation int o a crim inal investi gatory 8 d et en tion,” id. ¶ 26; and granted the law e nforcem ent officer “ acce ss to evid ence 9 necessary to prosecute crim inal delinq uent behavio r[, ] ” id. ¶ 27. T he Court 10 em phasized that its h oldin g “ shou ld not be construed to require school adm inistrators 11 to a dvi se ac hil d of

hi s or he r ri ght

to re m ai n si le nt i n or de r to u se inc ri m inatin g 12 statem ents elicited from the child against th at child in schoo l discipli nary 13 proceedings.” Id

. ¶32; s e e St at e v. Tyw ay ne H. , 1997-NMC A- 015, ¶ 13, 123 N. M. 14 42, 933 P

. 2d 2 51 ( “ [T ] he re is a sharp dis tin ct ionbe tw ee n th e pur pose of a se ar chby 1 5 as c h o o l o f

f i c i a l a n das e a r c h b y ap o l i c e o f f i c e r . T h e n a t u r e o f

a. . . s e a r c h b y a 16 school auth ority

is to m aintain o rd er and discipl ine in the schoo l. T he nature of a 17 search by a p olice officer is to obtain evidence for crim inal prosecution s.” ( internal 18 qu ot at io n m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d) ).45

1 { 64} Co n t r a r y to Ch il d’s ap pa ren t as su m pt io n, Antonio T. does not require 2 su ppr es sio n of

Ch ild ’ s in cu lpator

y state m en ts t o hi s JP O in pr oba tio n r ev oc at ion 3 proceedings. Indeed, the reasoning of Antonio T. suppo rts our conclusio n that 4 state m en ts ina dm iss ibl e in a de lin que nc y

pr oc ee din g m ay

non ethe le ss b e adm iss ibl e 5 i n a p ro b at i o n re v o ca t i o n p ro ce ed i n g . I tal s o s up p o rt s o u r co n cl u s i o n t h at t h e J PO ’s 6 que sti oni ng i n th is c as e w as in furthe ranc e of he r non- adve rs ar ia l su

pe rv iso ry r ole 7 an d no t f

or the pur pose of co lle ct ing ev ide nc e to be u se d to sup port a ne wc harg e of 8 a delinquent act. H owever , the r ationale of Antonio T. will need to be addressed 9 w he re the JP O ’s i nq ui rie s w er e pr om pte d by ar eque st f

ro m lawe nf or ce m en t, the 10 fa ct s e sta

bli sh tha t the JP O w as ac tin g as an age nt of law en fo rc em en t to in ve sti ga te 11 a newdelinqu ent act, or if lawenforce m ent wa s present during th e questioni ng of a 12 ch ild

. I n th at ci rcum stanc e, w he the r state m en ts m ad e by ac hil d are a dm iss ibl e in a 13 ne wde lin que nc y

pr oc ee din g w ill inv olv e a dif fe re nt ana ly sis

. T his c as e doe s no t 14 require us to decide whether Child’ s statem ents would be adm issib le in a delinquency 1 5 p ro ce ed i n g ; t h e r e co rd s h o ws t h at l aw en fo rc emen tp l ayed n o ro l e i n th e J PO ’s 16 questio ning of Chi ld; and the JPO te stified that at the tim e of the questionin g, no new 17 cr im ina l c harg e w as c ont em plate d. 18 { 65} Under the r

ule Child advo cates, because a c hild m ight be susp ected or a lleged 19 to h av e co m

m itt ed a de li nq uent a ct , de pe ndi ng o n hi s or he r an sw er

to al m ost

a ny46

1 que sti on a JP O m igh t as k, the JP O m ust always tr eat e ve ry

c hil d a s if

he or she m igh t 2 be sus pe ct ed

of h av in g com

m itt ed ade lin que nt a ct , the re by tr an sf orm ing a 3 relation s h i p i ntended to be rehabilitative, at least in part, into an adversarial 4 relationship betwee n law e nforcem ent an d s u spect. I f this is what the L egislature 5 int en de d, it woul d no t have w ri tte n th e A ct a s it did

. T he re w oul d be no p oin t, f or 6 exam ple to a provisio n stating that j uvenile prob ation officers do not have the powers 7 of law en fo rcem en t o ffi cers . 8 { 66} W e co nc lu de th atfid el it y to leg is la ti ve in te nt in th is in st an ce re qu ire s t ha t we 9 int er pr et the A ct in a m an ne r that pr es er ve s, rathe r than ign or es , the li ne s pr ev iou sly 10 dr awn by

the L eg isl at

ur e in d isting uis hin g de lin que nc y f ro m pr oba tio n r ev oc at ion 11 and the role of a JPO from the role of a law enforcem ent officer , and the lin es 12 previousl y

draw n in the case lawconcerning the circum stances required to trigger 13 Section 32A-2-14. R espect for these distinctions requires no m ore than acceptance 14 that som e incrim inating statem ents that m ay be inadm issib le in delinqu ency 15 proceedings (to a djudicate crim inal liability on a charge f or which the probationer has 16 not be enpr ose cu te d) ar e adm iss ibl e in p ro ba tio n r ev oc at ionpr oc ee din gs. T his r es ult 17 is rational and consi stent with the Act’ s text and prior case law. W e d o not h old th at 18 a JP O is ne ve r re qui re d to giv e w ar nin gs unde r the A ct , onl y that, un der the47

1 circum stances presented here, the JPO’ s failure to give warnings did no t render 2 Ch ild ’ s incr im inator

y state m en ts ina dm iss ibl e in a prob at ion re voc at ionpr oc ee din g. 3 CON CLU SION 4 { 67} W e rev ers e an d re m an d. 5 { 68} IT IS S O ORDERE D.

6

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 7 LI N D A M . V A N Z I, Ju dg e 8 WE CO NCUR:

9

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 10 M IC HA EL D . BU ST A M A N TE , Ju dg e

11

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 12 TI M OT HYL. GA R C IA , Ju dg e