FILED

July 10, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

FORD CONSUMER FINANCE )

COMPANY, INC., )

)

Plaintiff/Appellee, )

) Davidson Chancery

VS. ) No. 95-2830-I

)

AMBROSE W.J. CLAY, ) Appeal No.

) 01A01-9610-CH-00481

Defendant/Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT

FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY

AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE IRVIN H. KILCREASE, JR., CHANCELLOR

For Plaintiff/Appellee: For Defendant/Appellant:

No Appearance Ambrose W.J. Clay

Pro Se

VACATED AND REMANDED

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
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O P I N I O N

This is an appeal involves a maker’s liability on a promissory note. The

Chancery Court for Davidson County, following a bench trial, awarded the holder of

the note a $27,523.47 judgment. The maker of the note appealed to this court and

then filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for

the Middle District of Tennessee. The maker of the note has now informed this court

that the debt arising from the judgment on the note has been discharged, relieving

him from further personal liability on the note. Because the judgment on the note is

now void by force of federal law, we vacate the judgment below and remand this case

with directions that it be dismissed. 

I.

In 1987 Ambrose W. J. Clay executed a promissory note for $19,381.51 with

Ford Consumer Finance Co. Inc.’s (“Ford”) predecessor, Associates Financial

Services, Inc. The note was secured by a deed of trust on a piece of real property

owned by Mr. Clay. After Mr. Clay defaulted on the note, Ford sued Mr. Clay in the

Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a judgment against him for the unpaid

balance of the note plus interest, costs, and attorneys fees as provided in the note.

Mr. Clay resisted the collection action by asserting that Ford was required to realize

on its collateral before proceeding against him personally for the debt.

Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court determined that

Ford was not required to proceed against the collateral before proceeding against Mr.

Clay for a personal money judgment. On the merits, the trial court found Mr. Clay

in default and awarded Ford a judgment for the unpaid balance of $23,933.45, plus

reasonable attorneys fees of $3,590.02 for a total judgment of $27,523.47.

Thereafter, on April 8, 1996, Mr. Clay appealed.

On November 12, 1996, Mr. Clay filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. As part of

that filing he sought discharge of any personal liability on the Ford note. Ford filed
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no action in the bankruptcy court contesting the dischargeability of its debt, and on

October 17, 1997, the United States Bankruptcy Court granted Mr. Clay a Chapter 7

discharge covering the Ford debt.

II.

The courts ordinarily decline to provide judicial relief in cases that do not

involve a genuine and existing controversy requiring the adjudication of present

rights. See State ex rel. Lewis v. State, 208 Tenn. 534, 537, 347 S.W.2d 47, 48

(1961); Dockery v. Dockery, 559 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). Thus,

cases must remain justiciable throughout the entire course of the litigation, and the

concept of mootness involves circumstances that render a case no longer justiciable.

See McIntyre v. Traughber, 884 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). A moot

case has lost its character as a present, live controversy, see McCanless v. Klein, 182

Tenn. 631, 637, 188 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1945), and a case will be considered moot if

it no longer serves as a means to provide some sort of relief to the prevailing party.

See McIntyre v. Traughber, 884 S.W.2d at 137; Massengill v. Massengill, 36 Tenn.

App. 385, 388-89, 255 S.W.2d 1018, 1019 (1952).

It is well-settled that a discharge in bankruptcy operates to void a debtor’s

personal liability for any judgment obtained prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.

See 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(1) (West 1993); In re Walls, 125 B.R. 908, 909 (Bankr. D.

Del. 1991); In re Freels, 79 B.R. 358, 361 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987);Conklin v. Iowa

Dist. Court, 482 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Iowa 1992). 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(2) further

provides that a Chapter 7 discharge operates to enjoin any act by a creditor to enforce

a pre-petition discharged debt as a personal liability of the debtor. Thus, by operation

of federal law, Ford may no longer pursue Mr. Clay personally for his debt under the

promissory note, and Ford’s judgment in the trial court may nevermore be employed

to reach Mr. Clay personally by garnishment, execution, or otherwise.

Since Ford’s judgment has been abrogated by Mr. Clay’s discharge in

bankruptcy, Mr. Clay no longer needs relief in this court from the judgment below.

Any additional relief this court could give would be tantamount to carrying coals to

Newcastle. This case no longer serves as a means to provide relief to Mr. Clay. The

ordinary practice when a case becomes moot on appeal is to vacate the judgment in
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the trial court and remand the case with directions that it be dismissed. See McIntyre

v. Traughber, 884 S.W.2d at 138. Consequently, we vacate the judgment below and

remand this case for dismissal of Ford’s complaint. We tax the costs of this appeal

to Ambrose W. J. Clay, no surety of record appearing.

______________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

CONCUR:

_______________________________

SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE

_______________________________

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE