Filed 2/3/22 P. v. Cook CA2/4

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TAVNER COOK,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B300807

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. SA090822)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Upinder S. Kalra, Judge. Affirmed.

John A. Colucci, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Blythe J. Leszkay and Yun K. Lee, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

After he was arrested pursuant to a warrant, appellant 

Tavner Cook was placed in a cell with two undercover agents and 

made incriminating statements. The trial court granted 

appellant’s motion to quash the arrest warrant, but denied his 

motion to suppress the statements appellant made in the cell 

because it found the arrest was independently supported by 

probable cause. After holding an in camera hearing with the 

investigating officer, the trial court also denied appellant’s 

motions to disclose the identities of the two undercover agents.

Appellant, who was convicted of second degree murder and

gang and firearm enhancements, contends the court erred by 

denying his motion to suppress his statements, holding an in 

camera hearing without the undercover agents present, and 

denying disclosure of the agents’ identities. He also argues that

the jury’s consideration of eyewitnesses’ level of certainty, as 

prescribed by CALCRIM No. 315, violated his due process rights. 

We reject appellant’s arguments and affirm the judgment. Law 

enforcement had independent probable cause to arrest appellant, 

the trial court did not err by holding an in camera hearing

without the agents present or denying appellant’s motion for 

disclosure of the agents’ identities, and appellant forfeited his 

instructional argument, which was also foreclosed by People v. 

Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644 (Lemcke).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

An amended information charged appellant and Najee 

Robinson with the March 8, 2015 murder of Delray Yarbrough

(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)).1 The amended information further 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise indicated.
3

alleged that the crime was committed for the benefit of, at the 

direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang 

(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), and that a principal personally used 

and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing Yarbrough’s 

death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(e)(1)). The amended information 

also alleged that appellant served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, 

subd. (b)).

Appellant’s first trial ended in mistrial after the jury 

hopelessly deadlocked. Prior to appellant’s second trial, the 

parties extensively litigated the admissibility of appellant’s 

statements, which were among the evidence not introduced at the 

first trial. We discuss those proceedings more thoroughly below. 

After the second trial, at which the statements were 

admitted, the jury found appellant guilty of second degree 

murder and found the gang and firearm allegations true. In a 

bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found the prior conviction 

allegation true. The trial court sentenced appellant to the 

required term of 15 years to life for the murder (§ 190, subd. (a)), 

plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm 

enhancement, which it expressly declined to strike. The trial 

court struck the prison prior, thus imposing a total sentence of 40 

years to life.

2 Appellant timely appealed. 

2 The trial court correctly recognized that the gang 

enhancement “really doesn’t add anything” in this case, because 

it required appellant to serve a minimum of 15 years on his 

indeterminate term of 15 years to life before becoming eligible for 

parole. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5).) 
4

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

I. Prosecution Evidence

A. The Incident

On the evening of March 8, 2015, Denisa Williams was 

sitting in her parked car on York Avenue in Hawthorne when she 

saw two men, whom she later identified as appellant and 

Robinson, walking up and down nearby driveways. Williams 

testified that “it looked like they were aggressive and looking 

anxious to do something.” They approached her car, and 

appellant said, “Hey, bitch, where you from,” which Williams 

understood to mean what gang was she from. Williams, a 

grandmother, told them she did not “gang-bang.” Appellant then 

walked away, towards a group having a barbecue outside a 

nearby apartment building. Robinson told Williams they were

“looking for someone,” then followed appellant to the barbecue. 

Williams responded that she was going to call the police. 

Williams got out of her car and called the police, but hung 

up before speaking to anyone. Shortly thereafter, Williams’s 

brother, Yarbrough, came over and asked Williams about the 

men. Williams told Yarbrough they were “gang-banging”; he told 

her to be careful. 

Shampon Beacham was attending a barbecue outside an

apartment building on York Avenue when he saw appellant and 

Robinson enter the building’s courtyard. Appellant immediately

approached a fifteen-year-old boy and asked where he was from. 

The teenager told appellant he was not from anywhere. 

Appellant then approached a group of people playing dominoes. A 

woman in the group asked appellant if he was the person who 

had thrown a brick through her family’s apartment window a 

week earlier. Appellant replied that he was, and said he would 
5

do it again. Appellant then asked, “What kind of party is this? 

It’s 118 hood.” No one responded; Beacham testified that “it got 

quiet.” Appellant and Robinson left the barbecue soon thereafter.

Appellant then encountered Williams and Yarbrough on 

the street. Williams testified that appellant told Yarbrough, in 

an “aggressive, anxious, [and] scary” tone of voice, “This is 118, 

cuz,” and asked where he was from. After Yarbrough responded 

that he did not gang-bang, appellant shook his hand and 

returned to the barbecue. A few seconds later, appellant came 

back and said, “That’s the bitch that said she was going to call 

the feds.” Appellant kept walking away, however, until 

Yarbrough said, “Let me know when you want that,” in his

direction. Williams understood Yarbrough’s words as a challenge 

to fight.

Appellant said “get the car,” and Robinson ran away, 

toward a nearby elementary school. Appellant then approached 

Williams and Yarbrough. Williams stood between Yarbrough 

and appellant, facing appellant. Yarbrough forcefully pushed her 

out of the way and onto the ground. Seconds later, Williams 

heard three or four gunshots and saw Yarbrough on the ground. 

Beacham also heard four gunshots, approximately five minutes 

after he saw appellant and Robinson leave the barbecue. 

Williams saw appellant walk away, toward the elementary 

school, and heard a car engine start. Yarbrough, who was 

dragging himself onto the sidewalk, told her to get down “‘cause 

they are turning around.” Williams saw a newer model metallic 

blue Nissan Maxima or Altima make a U-turn and drive toward 

them. The car stopped near them, and she heard the driver, 

Robinson, say “Oh, shit” before the car “took off” toward 120th 

Street.
6

Wesley Lett, a neighbor, saw and heard Williams and 

Yarbrough talking to a man using “elevated” voices. He heard 

someone say, “go get the car,” and saw another man walking up 

the street toward a car. Lett then heard three or four gunshots 

and ducked behind a parked car. When he peeked out, he saw 

the man who had been talking to Williams and Yarbrough 

walking briskly up the street; Yarbrough was crawling in the 

street. Lett also saw a bluish, newer model Nissan Maxima or 

Altima make a U-turn and drive slowly past Williams and 

Yarbrough; it then “took off” down 120th Street, after someone 

said “Oh, no.” Beacham, who had run inside when he heard the 

gunshots, also reported seeing a “dark-colored car” drive slowly 

down the street. Beacham went outside to help Yarbrough after 

he heard Williams yell that he had been shot. 

Paramedics transported Yarbrough to the hospital, where 

he died. Yarbrough sustained two gunshot wounds, including one 

to the left hip that fatally lacerated his femoral artery and vein.

The parties stipulated that the two bullets the medical examiner 

recovered from Yarbrough’s body were fired from a single firearm 

“consistent with a .380.” 

B. Investigation

Hawthorne police quickly arrived on the scene. They 

located three expended shell casings near where Yarbrough had 

been. The parties stipulated that the three shell casings were 

.380 caliber and were fired from a single firearm. Officer Jorge 

Martinez interviewed Williams, who described the two men, her 

interactions with them, and their car before leaving for the 

hospital. Officer Jesus Ceniceros spoke to Lett, who also 

described the men and their car. 
7

While Williams was at the hospital, she received a text 

message from her friend “Dove.” The message contained a 

picture of a cellphone displaying a photograph of appellant. Dove 

told Williams he had found the phone at the scene of the 

shooting. Williams told Dove he should give the phone to the 

police. When Williams returned to the scene around 11:00 p.m., 

she saw Dove; he told her that a man had given the phone to the 

police. Williams also showed the photograph on her phone to 

Officer Martinez and told him it depicted the shooter. 

Officer Martinez testified that, while he was at the crime 

scene, a man handed him a cell phone. Martinez opened the 

phone’s case and saw that the phone was turned on and logged 

into an Instagram account with the username “Ice2GC.”

Martinez scrolled through the Instagram account and saw 

approximately 30 to 40 pictures of the same man; Martinez 

identified the man as appellant in court. Sometime later, after 

11:00 p.m. that evening, Williams approached Martinez, told him 

she knew who the shooter was, and showed him the picture Dove 

had sent her. Martinez testified that the man in the photograph

was the same man featured in the Instagram account he had 

reviewed. 

Later analysis and data extraction of the phone recovered 

numerous photographs of appellant, many of which were 

admitted at trial. It also showed records of messages and calls, 

which aligned with T-Mobile records for a phone number 

belonging to appellant. 
8

Beacham met with Detective Ralph Hernandez of the Los 

Angeles County Sheriff’s Department on March 17, 2015.3

Beacham gave a description of appellant, including his distinctive 

neck tattoo. Beacham met with Hernandez again in July 2015, 

and selected appellant’s photo from a six-pack photo array. 

Beacham said he was “90 percent sure” appellant was the person 

who came to the barbecue. Beacham also identified appellant in 

court on multiple occasions, including at appellant’s second trial. 

Beacham said there was no doubt in his mind that appellant was 

at the barbecue. 

Williams also met with a detective in July 2015. She was 

unable to make an identification from a photo lineup. She 

identified appellant as the shooter during several court 

proceedings, however, including the second trial. She said she 

relied on the tattoo on his neck, and there was no doubt in her 

mind that he was the shooter. Appellant showed his neck tattoo 

to the jury. 

Hawthorne police sergeant Kevin Keus obtained and 

reviewed surveillance video from the elementary school near the 

crime scene. The videos, which were played for the jury, showed 

a dark-colored vehicle park near the school around 9:10 p.m. Two 

men exited the car and walked down York Avenue. Around 9:15 

p.m., a man ran to the car, entered the driver’s seat, and made a 

U-turn with the car. As the car drove down York Avenue, the 

other man tried to get in the car, but the car did not stop. That 

man walked down 118th Street between 9:16 and 9:17 p.m. 

3 Hernandez testified that the City of Hawthorne contacted 

the Sheriff’s Department for assistance with the homicide 

investigation. 
9

C. Arrest and Perkins4 Operation

On July 9, 2015, at Hernandez’s direction, Los Angeles 

County Deputy Sheriff Bryce Chalmers arrested appellant during 

a traffic stop. Appellant was driving a gray Nissan Altima at the 

time. 

After his arrest, appellant was transported to jail and 

placed in a cell with two civilian agents who had been briefed 

about his case. Appellant’s conversation with the agents was 

audio recorded, and excerpts were played for the jury. One of the 

agents asked appellant, “They know?” Appellant replied, “Yeah, 

they already got pretty much they, like . . . .” He continued, “they 

talking about a cellphone. They say they have video and all this 

other shit. Um, they say a K9 identified my car and shit like 

that.” One of the agents asked if appellant dropped his phone, 

and he said “Yeah.” The agent also asked if the police “got the 

burner,” which Hernandez testified was slang for a gun. 

Appellant said no; when the agent later asked if appellant had 

gotten rid of the burner, appellant said, “Yeah,” and later said, 

“everything gone.” 

Appellant also said no one was with him, that the police 

had refused to show him the video they claimed they had, and 

“they have to pinpoint me, man.” Appellant further stated, “They 

going to try to hit me with a deal.” When one of the agents asked 

appellant if he thought he could “beat” the charge, appellant 

responded, “Shit the phone—the phone is ugly. All this – shit, I 

4 Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292 (Perkins). In 

Perkins, the Supreme Court held that statements a defendant 

voluntarily makes to individuals he or she does not know are 

associated with law enforcement are admissible at trial. (Perkins, 

supra, 496 U.S. at p. 294.) 
10

lost that motherfucker.” Appellant later reiterated that the “the 

main thing” he was “worried about is just, like, the phone”; he 

also noted that the police had swabbed him for DNA, and said, 

“everything gonna be there.” 

D. Gang Evidence5

At the time of the incident, York Avenue was claimed by

two rival gangs, the 118 Gangster Crips and the Acacia Blocc 

Hustlers. The 118 Gangster Crips was actually an alliance of 

three different gangs, the 118 Ryda Gangster Crips, the Maddass 

Gangster Crips, and the Hawthorne Thug Family. The 118 

Gangster Crips’s primary activities included felony tagging, 

vehicle theft, drug sales, armed robberies, shootings, drive-by 

shootings, and murder. Several 118 Gangster Crips suffered 

criminal convictions in the years prior to the incident. 

The 118 Gangster Crips’s symbols included the letter G and 

a five-point star with the letter G in the middle; members often 

wore clothing with sports logos that had five-point stars. In 2007, 

appellant was stopped with two known Maddass Gangster Crips; 

he was photographed wearing a hat that had a star with a G in 

the middle. Other photographs showed appellant and others 

throwing Gangster Crips signs and wearing Dallas Cowboys 

clothing. Appellant’s older brothers were known 118 Ryda 

Gangster Crips with the monikers “Ice” and “Baby Ice”; 

appellant’s moniker was “Little Ice.” Hawthorne police detective 

Bradley Jackson testified that the Instagram user name “Ice2GC” 

was a reference to the moniker and the Gangster Crips. Jackson 

opined that appellant was a member of the 118 Gangster Crips in 

5 We summarize the gang evidence briefly, as it is largely 

irrelevant to the issues presented. 
11

2015.6 Based on a hypothetical that mirrored the facts of the 

instant case, Jackson further opined that the March 8, 2015 

shooting of Yarbrough was committed for the benefit of the gang. 

II. Defense Evidence 

A. Identification

Appellant called Detective Hernandez, who testified that he 

interviewed Williams several hours after the incident. At that 

time, she told him the shooter had been “completely” covered up 

such that she did not see any tattoos. Hernandez did not arrange 

a live line-up for identification purposes and did not investigate 

any other potential shooting suspects. He did not show Beacham 

or Williams a six-pack including appellant’s picture until after 

appellant was arrested in July 2015; Hernandez included 

appellant’s booking photo in the six-pack. 

Hernandez testified that he interviewed Niarobi Nelson, 

who was at the barbecue on March 8, 2015. An audio recording of 

the interview was played for the jury. Nelson told Hernandez 

that someone “banged on” her family at the barbecue and said he 

was the same man who previously threw a brick through their 

window. Hernandez showed Nelson a six-pack that included 

appellant’s photo in position five; she said the person in position 

six looked “real familiar.” 

Appellant called several witnesses who testified about 

various crimes committed by Shampon Beacham. 

Appellant also called an expert on eyewitness memory and 

suggestibility, Dr. Mitchell Eisen, Ph.D. Dr. Eisen testified that 

memory is not like a camera but is changeable and malleable. 

6 Another Hawthorne police detective, Keith Chaffin, 

opined that Robinson was a member of the Maddass Gangster 

Crips. 
12

Additionally, not all incidents are committed to long-term 

memory; gaps in memory are filled with inferences. Memories 

fade over time. Each time a memory is retrieved, new 

information may be added, and memory is “reconstructed and 

updated”; post-event information can thus lead to a change in 

memory. Traumatic stress affects the ability to process 

information, and can interfere with accurate identifications. 

“Witness conformity” may also occur when people discuss an 

event and their memories conform to one another. 

Dr. Eisen testified that the six-pack identification process 

can be suggestive. If the process is suggestive, quick and 

confident selection of a suspect is not associated with accuracy. 

“Post-identification feedback effect” can also cause witnesses to 

become more confident in their identifications over time. 

Additionally, it is not uncommon for witnesses to pick a photo 

resembling a perpetrator without actually recognizing him or her. 

In some cases, witnesses may be “100 percent certain” they are 

picking the right person, but are proven wrong by physical 

evidence. 

Given a hypothetical in which a witness received a photo of 

a person alleged by a friend to be the perpetrator right after the 

crime, Dr. Eisen opined that the witness’s identification would be 

affected by witness conformity. Given a hypothetical in which a 

witness described the perpetrator as having a neck tattoo and 

was then shown a six-pack in which only one person had a neck 

tattoo, Dr. Eisen opined that the lineup would be suggestive. 

B. Homeboy Industries and Gang Disengagement

Father Gregory Boyle, the founder of gang rehabilitation 

program Homeboy Industries, testified that appellant was a “core 
13

worker” at Homeboy Industries “a number of years ago.” In 2014, 

appellant traveled with Boyle to Washington, D.C. to give talks. 

Mary Ellen Burton was the chief of work readiness and 

training at Homeboy Industries. She testified that appellant 

entered Homeboy’s 18-month program in the summer of 2011 and 

successfully completed the program. Appellant was employed at 

Homeboy Industries until his July 2015 arrest. Burton testified 

that disengaging from a gang is a process, the goal of which is to 

stop criminal activity and find legal employment. Severing social 

ties with gang members is not absolutely required, and occasional 

social contact with gang members is not necessarily a concern. 

Christy Juarez, a case manager at Homeboy Industries, 

worked one-on-one with appellant from 2012 through 2015. 

Appellant participated in classes, education, and therapy. 

Appellant worked the morning of March 9, 2015, and had regular 

attendance at work until July 10, 2015. 

Mary Nalick, a mental health clinician at Homeboy 

Industries, testified that everyone at Homeboy Industries was 

involved in the gang disengagement process. The organization 

provided therapy to those who wanted it, but participation was 

not required. Nalick was appellant’s therapist from January 

2013 through June 2015. Appellant attended consistently. 

People who are disengaging from gangs may still socialize with 

gang members, wear gang colors, or throw gang signs; Nalick 

said the gang signs may be the “last to go.” 

Kimi Lent, a gang intervention specialist, testified about 

the “life cycle” of gang membership, from enrollment to inactivity, 

and different life events that can “push” or “pull” people out of 

gangs. People can become “inactive” in a gang and still socialize 

with gang members and identify with the gang. 
14

DISCUSSION 

I. Motion to Suppress

A. Background

Appellant was arrested pursuant to a “Ramey warrant” 

issued prior to the filing of a complaint and based upon probable 

cause. (People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263; Goodwin v. 

Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 215, 218; § 817.) The 

warrant was supported by an affidavit detailing an investigation 

into an unsolved 2009 murder in which appellant was a suspect. 

Though the affidavit was signed days before appellant’s arrest in 

July 2015, it made no mention of the March 2015 Yarbrough 

murder. Appellant moved to traverse the affidavit, quash the 

warrant, and suppress the statements he made during the 

Perkins operation as fruit of the poisonous tree. The prosecution 

filed a written opposition. 

At a hearing on the motion, affiant Detective Hernandez 

testified that law enforcement decided to seek an arrest warrant 

based on the 2009 murder because they had a Perkins operation 

set up and “wanted to stimulate conversation about the 2009 

murder.” Hernandez also previously testified, during an in 

camera hearing that ultimately was disclosed to the defense, that 

“we also felt that we had PC for the ’09 murder, and we figured 

why arrest him on the 2015 and start the clock. Let’s see what 

we can get, and then keep ticking and continue our 

investigation.” The “face page” of the resultant arrest warrant 

stated that it was for “MURDER, 187 P.C., a felony”; it did not 

specify either the 2009 or the 2015 murder. Hernandez testified 

that the face page was the only page of the warrant transmitted 

to the gang surveillance unit that ultimately arrested appellant 

during a traffic stop on July 9, 2015. The deputy who arrested 
15

appellant told appellant he was being arrested for the 2015 

murder, which led Hernandez and other officers to “change[ ] 

[their] strategy” and question appellant exclusively about the 

2015 murder. 

The trial court granted appellant’s motion to quash the 

arrest warrant. It also found “there is no good faith.”7 At a 

subsequent hearing, the court considered whether there was “an 

independent probable cause basis separate and apart from the 

warrant.” The parties stipulated that the court, which had 

presided over appellant’s first trial, could consider testimony

from that trial “regarding what evidence existed prior to 

[appellant’s] arrest.” The parties did not present any further 

evidence, but both orally argued the issue. 

The court concluded that the arrest was supported by 

independent probable cause. It explained that its first 

consideration was whether “this is objective versus subjective.” 

Citing Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813 (Whren), 

the court determined that officers’ subjective intentions are not 

relevant, so long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify 

the action. The court accordingly concluded that its finding that 

the officers lacked good faith in obtaining the arrest warrant “has 

no application for this analysis[,] . . . whether there was [sic] 

independent objective facts known to law enforcement collectively 

to support a finding of probable cause that Mr. Cook was guilty of 

the 2015 homicide in question . . . .” 

The court then summarized the facts known to law 

enforcement at the time appellant was arrested in July 2015. 

These included eyewitness descriptions of the perpetrator that 

7 We quote the court’s oral statement; a written order to 

which the court also referred is not in the appellate record. 
16

matched appellant’s appearance; surveillance video and 

eyewitness descriptions of a getaway car that was the same 

model as the car appellant was driving at the time of his arrest; 

the cell phone obtained near the crime scene that contained 

numerous photographs of appellant; the photograph of appellant 

Williams received from Dove and showed to Martinez on the 

night of the crime; and Williams’s assistance in preparing a 

composite drawing of the perpetrator that resembled appellant. 

Considering the “totality of those facts together,” the court was 

“convinced that those facts constitute a fair probability; in other 

words, the person of reasonable caution would entertain a belief 

Mr. Cook was the killer.” The court accordingly concluded that 

“the People have met their burden, established probable cause for 

the felony arrest [of] Mr. Cook in 2015. This is independent 

probable cause separate and apart from the arrest warrant that 

this court quashed.” The court therefore denied appellant’s 

motion to suppress the statements he made to the Perkins agents 

in the jail cell. 

B. Analysis

Appellant contends the trial court misapplied Fourth 

Amendment case law and erroneously denied his motion to 

suppress. He argues that “the independent source rule does not 

save the arrest,” the arrest “cannot be saved because the officers 

could have gotten a proper warrant,” “Whren does not save the 

arrest and the subjective belief of the officer for making the 

arrest is relevant,” and the “flagrant ruse of the illegal warrant 

mandates reversal.” Respondent argues that the court properly 

denied the motion to suppress because the arrest was supported 

by probable cause independent of the quashed arrest warrant. 
17

“‘The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling 

on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial 

court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by 

substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so 

found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.’” (People v. 

Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 719.) We consider the correctness of 

the trial court’s ultimate ruling on the motion, not the correctness 

of the trial court’s reasons for making the ruling. (People v. 

Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 145.) 

“The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the people 

to be secure in their persons, . . . against unreasonable searches 

and seizures.’ Because arrests are ‘seizures’ of ‘persons,’ they 

must be reasonable under the circumstances.” (District of 

Columbia v. Wesby (2018) 138 S.Ct. 577, 585-586.) Arrests must 

be supported by either a valid arrest warrant or probable cause. 

(People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673.) “Probable cause 

exists when the facts known to the arresting officer would 

persuade someone of ‘reasonable caution’ that the person to be 

arrested has committed a crime.” (Ibid.) The arresting officer’s 

subjective state of mind is not relevant to the existence of 

probable cause. (Devenpeck v. Alford (2004) 543 U.S. 146, 153; 

see also Whren, supra, 517 U.S. at pp. 812-813.) Moreover, the 

crime supported by probable cause need not be the crime for 

which the person was arrested. “The fact an officer may place a 

person under arrest for the wrong offense does not invalidate the 

arrest and require exclusion of evidence seized incident to the 

arrest, if the officer nevertheless had probable cause to arrest the 

person for another offense.” (In re Donald L. (1978) 81 

Cal.App.3d 770, 775.) “[T]here is no requirement that the offense 
18

upon which the police make an arrest be ‘related’ to the offense 

for which probable cause to arrest is found to exist.” (People v. 

Rodriguez (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1254 (Rodriguez).)

There also is no requirement that the arresting officer 

personally have specific knowledge of the nature and extent of 

the probable cause. (People v. Ramirez (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 

1548, 1555.) “It is well settled in California officers can make 

arrests based on information and probable cause furnished by 

other officers.” (Id. at p. 1553.) “[W]hen police officers work 

together to build ‘collective knowledge’ of probable cause, the 

important question is not what each officer knew about probable 

cause, but how valid and reasonable the probable cause was that 

developed in the officers’ collective knowledge.” (Id. at p. 1555.)

Here, the deputy who arrested appellant told appellant he 

was being arrested for the 2015 murder. The facts as found by 

the trial court—which the parties essentially stipulated were 

supported by substantial evidence—support a finding of probable 

cause to arrest appellant for that crime. The Hawthorne Police 

Department and the Sheriff’s Department collectively knew at 

the time that Williams and Beacham had seen and described a 

perpetrator matching appellant’s description, including the neck 

tattoo described by Beacham. The car appellant was driving

matched witness descriptions and surveillance video of the car 

seen at the crime scene. The cell phone turned into law 

enforcement depicted numerous photographs of appellant, and 

one of the photographs on the phone was the same as the 

photograph sent to Williams and identified by her as the shooter. 

These facts would persuade someone of reasonable caution that 

appellant committed the Yarbrough shooting. 
19

We reject appellant’s argument that the arrest was invalid 

because officers could have gotten a “proper warrant.” Probable 

cause, not the ability to obtain a warrant, is the relevant 

touchstone here. “When the arresting officer has probable cause 

to arrest for a felony, and the arrest is not made inside a 

residence, the arrest is valid even though made under an invalid 

arrest warrant.” (People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 392, 

disapproved on another ground by People v. Williams (2010) 49 

Cal.4th 405, 459.) We also reject appellant’s assertion that the 

court erred because it erroneously applied the “independent 

source doctrine,” which “allows admission of evidence that has 

been discovered by means wholly independent of any 

constitutional violation.” (Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 

443.) We review the trial court’s ruling, not its rationale. (People 

v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 145.)

Appellant further contends that “the subjective belief of the 

officer for making the arrest is relevant,” and it is an 

“overstatement to say that what is in the mind of an arresting 

officer is wholly irrelevant.” Yet Whren explicitly states that 

“[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause 

Fourth Amendment analysis.” (Whren, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 

813.) Appellant urges us to instead apply the “apt precedent” of 

Agar v. Superior Court (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 24, which he 

accurately asserts “held that it must first be established that the 

police officer believes the crime has been committed before the 

issue of probable cause. . . arises.” Agar’s continuing validity 

after Whren has been called into question. (Rodriguez, supra, 53 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1265-1266.) But even assuming Agar remains 

valid, it is inapplicable here: the deputy who arrested appellant 

told appellant he was being arrested for the 2015 murder, 
20

thereby demonstrating his own belief that the 2015 murder had 

been committed. 

Relying on a different People v. Rodriguez (2006) 143 

Cal.App.4th 1137, appellant also argues that the “flagrant ruse of 

the illegal warrant mandates reversal.” In People v. Rodriguez,

evidence adduced at the defendant’s motion to suppress hearing 

suggested that the police officers who stopped his car may have 

fabricated the reason for the stop. (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 

143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1141.) Because the officers searched the

defendant’s car pursuant to an outstanding arrest warrant, the 

trial court denied the motion to suppress without making any 

factual findings about the reason for the stop or the officers’ 

credibility. (Id. at p. 1142.) The court of appeal reversed and 

remanded with directions for the trial court to determine whether 

the asserted reason for the stop, a broken brake light, was 

credible. It further directed that “if the trial court finds the 

officers’ justification for stopping defendant’s car was a ruse it 

must suppress the evidence of the drugs obtained in the 

subsequent search.” (Id. at pp. 1148-1149.) The court 

emphasized that there was “credible evidence the officers may 

have invented a justification for the traffic stop in order to have 

an excuse to run warrant checks on the driver and passenger,” 

and more troublingly and flagrantly, may have perjured 

themselves in court by testifying otherwise. (Id. at pp. 1143-

1144.) 

Appellant asserts that People v. Rodriguez controls here, 

because “the police were found to have lied.” Appellant provides 

no record citation for this finding, which does not appear in the 

appellate record. The appellate record states only that the trial 

court “granted the motion to quash the search [sic] warrant” and 
21

found “there is no good faith.” Even if the police did lie in 

connection with their efforts to obtain the arrest warrant for the 

2009 murder, there is no indication that they lied, fabricated 

evidence, or used any ruses in connection with the 2015 murder. 

To the contrary, Detective Hernandez testified he shifted the 

focus of the Perkins operation from the 2009 murder to the 2015 

murder after the arresting officer told appellant he had been 

arrested for the 2015 murder. As discussed above, the trial court 

properly found that probable cause supported the arrest for the 

2015 murder, notwithstanding any deficiencies in the arrest 

warrant. People v. Rodriguez accordingly is distinguishable.

II. Agents’ Identities and In Camera Hearing 

A. Background 

Appellant filed a motion requesting disclosure of the 

Perkins agents’ identities pursuant to section 1054.1 and Brady v. 

Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, both of which require the 

prosecution to disclose exculpatory information to the defense. At 

a pretrial hearing, the trial court concluded that appellant had 

made a prima facie showing that disclosure was warranted, and 

said it would conduct an in camera hearing with law 

enforcement. The court overruled appellant’s objections that 

neither his counsel nor the agents would be present at the 

hearing. The court permitted appellant’s counsel to prepare 

written questions for the court to ask during the hearing; counsel 

submitted 79 questions. 

After reviewing the Perkins recordings and transcripts, the 

trial court concluded that most of appellant’s proposed questions 

were not relevant to exonerating appellant or showing that the 

agents were material witnesses. The court nevertheless gave 

appellant’s counsel an opportunity to highlight the issues and 
22

discuss her questions in camera. The trial court then held the in 

camera hearing with Detective Hernandez, after which it found: 

“The People have rebutted the prima facie showing made by the 

defense that the informants were material witnesses. In 

particular, the court notes that the informants did not participate 

in the alleged crime, were not percipient witnesses to the alleged 

crime, and they do not otherwise have evidence that would aid 

the defense. [¶] In other words, disclosure is not essential to a 

fair trial. [¶] Accordingly, the court will sustain the privilege 

asserted by law enforcement regarding the identity of the 

informants utilized in the Perkins operation.” 

Appellant’s counsel renewed her request for disclosure of 

the agents’ identities during trial, asserting it was “more 

material than they were before.” The trial court again denied the 

request. 

B. Analysis 

Appellant contends the trial court erred by holding an in 

camera hearing without the agents present. He further suggests 

the hearing should not have been conducted in camera, because 

the agents “had direct contact” with him during the Perkins

operation and thus were not “confidential.” Appellant requests 

that we review the transcript of the in camera hearing to 

determine if the trial court erred in denying disclosure. 

Respondent agrees that we may review the transcript; it offers no 

further argument on the issue. 

Section 1054.18 requires the prosecution to disclose to the 

defense certain categories of evidence in its possession, including 

8 Although the court’s ruling suggests it considered the 

matter under Evidence Code sections 1040 through 1042, which 

address a public entity’s privilege to refuse disclosure of 
23

“[t]he names and addresses of persons the prosecutor intends to 

call as a witness at trial,” “[s]tatements of all defendants,” “[t]he 

existence of a felony conviction of any material witness whose 

credibility is likely to be critical to the outcome of the trial,” and 

“[a]ny exculpatory evidence.” (§ 1054.1, subds. (a), (b), (d), (e).) 

“That discovery obligation is qualified, however, by section 

1054.7, which authorizes a trial court to deny, restrict or defer 

such disclosure on a showing of good cause.” (People v. Thompson

(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1105.) “‘Good cause’ is limited to threats 

or possible danger to the safety of a victim or witness, possible 

loss or destruction of evidence, or possible compromise of other 

investigations by law enforcement. [¶] Upon the request of any 

party, the court may permit a showing of good cause for the 

denial or regulation of disclosures, or any portion of that showing, 

to be made in camera. A verbatim record shall be made of any 

such proceeding.” (§ 1054.7.) If the court grants the relief 

requested by the prosecution, “the entire record of the showing 

shall be sealed.” (Ibid.)

“‘We generally review a trial court’s ruling on matters 

regarding discovery under an abuse of discretion standard.’ 

[Citations.] The proper exercise of a trial court’s discretion under 

section 1054.7 does not violate a criminal defendant’s 

confrontation or due process rights.” (People v. Thompson, supra, 

1 Cal.5th at p. 1105.) 

We have reviewed the transcript of the Perkins operation 

and the sealed transcript of the in camera hearing contained in 

informants’ identities, appellant does not cite these provisions. 

He instead frames the issue exclusively as one of discovery under 

section 1054.1; he makes no contention that the court erred in 

any application of the Evidence Code. 
24

the appellate record. The trial court properly exercised its 

discretion here. 

Appellant cites People v. Ruiz (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1485

(Ruiz) in support of his assertion that the agents’ presence at the 

hearing was “essential,” but that case is inapposite. In Ruiz, the 

defendant sought disclosure of the identity of a confidential 

informant who witnessed the drug transaction at issue in the 

case. (Ruiz, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1487.) While 

acknowledging that “there is no general requirement that an 

informant must be present or testify at an in camera hearing on a 

motion to disclose the informant’s identity,” the court concluded 

the informant’s testimony “was essential in this case because 

defendant had established the CI was an eyewitness to the 

alleged drug transaction.” (Id. at p. 1489.) The agents here were 

not percipient witnesses to the shooting incident. They also were 

not confidential informants of the sort discussed in Ruiz; the 

record indicates that law enforcement provided them with 

information relevant to the case, not the other way around.

Appellant’s reliance on Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 

683 and People v. Lanfrey (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 491 is similarly 

misplaced. Appellant did not confess to the crimes during the 

Perkins operation, and nothing in the lengthy audio recordings 

and transcript suggested a reasonable possibility that the agents 

could give evidence on the issue of guilt that might result in 

appellant’s exoneration. 

III. CALCRIM No. 315

A. Background

The identity of Yarbrough’s shooter was a key issue at trial. 

Both Williams, who was unable to identify appellant in a photo 

array, and Beacham, who selected appellant’s photo with “90 
25

percent” certainty, testified that they had “no doubt” appellant 

was the shooter. Appellant, who presented a defense of mistaken 

identity, introduced evidence that barbecue attendee Nelson was 

unable to identify him and expert testimony that witnesses who 

claim to be certain of a perpetrator’s identity may nevertheless be 

incorrect. 

The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 315, 

“Eyewitness Identification,” which provided the jury with 15 

questions to consider when evaluating eyewitness testimony 

identifying appellant as the perpetrator, including “How certain 

was the witness when he or she made an identification?” The 

instruction also stated, “The People have the burden of proving 

beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who 

committed the crime. If the People have not met this burden, you 

must find the defendant not guilty.” Appellant did not object to 

or request modification of the instruction. 

B. Analysis 

Appellant now contends CALCRIM No. 315 violated his due 

process rights. He argues that recent scientific research has 

shown that a witness’s level of certainty is not predictive of the 

witness’s accuracy, and instructing the jury to consider the 

witnesses’ levels of certainty “gave the State an unfair advantage

and thus made Appellant’s trial fundamentally unfair.” 

Respondent contends this argument is forfeited due to appellant’s 

failure to object, and was rejected on the merits in Lemcke, supra, 

11 Cal.5th 644. Appellant, who requests that we excuse his 

forfeiture, replies that Lemcke is distinguishable. 

“A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo. 

[Citation.] An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury 

instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction 
26

accurately states the law. [Citation.] In reviewing a claim of 

instructional error, the court must consider whether there is a 

reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s instructions caused 

the jury to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution. 

[Citations.] The challenged instruction is viewed ‘in the context 

of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine 

whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the 

instruction in an impermissible manner.’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.)

We agree with respondent that appellant forfeited his claim 

of instructional error by failing to object below. (People v. 

Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 461-462; People v. Rodriguez

(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 194, 199-200.) We further agree that the 

claim is foreclosed by Lemcke. 

In Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th 644, the Supreme Court 

rejected the precise argument appellant raises here. It held that 

“nothing in CALCRIM No. 315’s instruction on witness certainty . 

. . operates to ‘lower the prosecution’s burden of proof.’” (Lemcke, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 657.) It further concluded that “the 

instruction does not direct the jury that ‘certainty equals 

accuracy,’” or direct the jury to presume an identification is 

accurate if a witness is certain about it. (Ibid.) “Instead, the 

instruction merely lists the witness’s level of certainty at the time 

of identification as one of 15 different factors that the jury should 

consider when evaluating the credibility and accuracy of 

eyewitness testimony. The instruction leaves the jury to decide 

whether the witness expressed a credible claim of certainty and 

what weight, if any, should be placed on that certainty in relation 

to the numerous other factors listed in CALCRIM No. 315.” 

(Ibid.)
27

The Lemcke court also found that any correlation between 

certainty and accuracy suggested by the instruction was 

ameliorated by the defendant’s presentation of expert testimony 

refuting that inference. (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 657-

658.) Appellant presented similar testimony by the very same 

expert. (See id. at pp. 650-652 [summarizing Dr. Eisen’s 

testimony], 658.) The court also instructed the jury with the 

same “[a]dditional instructions” that the Supreme Court 

concluded “undercut [the] contention that the certainty language 

lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof” (ibid.): those directing 

the jury “that it was required to consider the testimony of the 

expert witness, that the prosecution retained the burden to prove 

[appellant’s] identity . . . beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 

witnesses sometimes make honest mistakes.” (Id. at p. 647.) 

CALCRIM instructions on all those topics were given in this case. 

(See CALCRIM Nos. 220 [Reasonable Doubt], 226 [Witnesses], 

315 [Eyewitness Identification], 332 [Expert Witness 

Testimony].) Appellant’s assertion that Lemcke is 

distinguishable on unspecified grounds is not persuasive. 

DISPOSITION 

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

WILLHITE, ACTING P.J. CURREY, J.