### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 19-1308

U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

A NTHONY S HOCKEY , Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United Stat es District Court for the

Northern District of Indi ana, South Bend Division. No. 3:15-cr-00016-RLM-MGG-1 — Robert L. Miller, Jr. , Judge.

A RGUED O CTOBER 2, 2019

— D ECIDED O CTOBER 22, 2019

Before B AUER , R IPPLE , and H AMILTON , Circuit Judges

. B AUER , Circuit Judge. Anthony Shockey appeals from the district court’s order revoking his supervised release and imposing a 15-month prison sent ence. The district court found that Shockey not only used methamphetamine but alsopossessed it, a Grade B violation of one of his supervisedrelease conditions. Shockey challenges this classification.2 No. 19-1308

Because the district court re asonably could infer possession from use, we affirm the judgment. While on supervised release for possessing a firearm as afelon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Shockey tested positive for methamphetamine, which he later ad mitted using. Because Shockey violated the condition that he not use a controlled substance, 1 a probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervision. The officer prepared a “Summary Report of Violations” charging Shockey with a Grade B violation for conduct constituting an offense punishable by a prison term exceeding one year. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2). At his revocation hearing, Shockey asked the district court to find that he had merely used methamphetamine, rather than possessed it. (Use is a less serious Grade C that does not mandate revocation. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1)). His conduct, he argued, violated the requirement of his supervised-release condition to refrain from using drugs—a violation that is not a felony, but instead merely a Grade C violation of “any other condition of supervision.”
The district court rejected Shockey’s argument. It found that the Guidelines could not be “reasonably read to make this a Grade C violation”; the violatio n had to be “either a Grade A or a Grade B.” The court implic itly accepted the government’s reliance on United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir.

1 Condition 3 stated: “The defendant shall not unlawfully use any controlled substance, including marijuana, and sha ll submit to one drug test within 15 days of the beginning of supervision an d at least 2 periodic tests after that for use of a controlled substance.”No. 19-1308 3 2001), which held that marijuan a use supports an inference of marijuana possession. The dist rict court thus found that Shockey had both possessed an d used methamphetamine—a Grade B violation that corresponded to a sentencing range of 21 to 24 months in prison. The court sentenced him below that range to 15 months, acknowledgin g the need for a “significant period of incarceration” but recognizing that Shockey had stayed sober for 7 months befo re using methamphetamine and committed no other crimes. On appeal, Shockey maintains that the district court erred in classifying his violation as Grade B without finding that he violated any law prohibiting possession of a controlled substance that was statutorily pu nishable by more than a year in prison. Although it would have been good practice for the court to cite a specific statute, Shockey was entitled only to fair, written notice of the alleged conduct underlying his Grade B violation. See United States v. Lee , 795 F.3d 682, 686–87 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)). Here, Shockey was notified before the hearing by the probation officer in writing that he was alleged to have vi olated § 35-48-4-6.1 of the Indiana Code (titled “Possession of me thamphetamine”), and that thisconstituted a Grade B violation because the offense is punishable by more than one year in prison. Moreover, in the district court Shockey did not dispute th at possession of methamphetamine is punishable as such. Because the report plainly identified the statute that Shoc key was alleged to have violated and the district court resolved a ll issues of fact on the record, no error occurred. See United States v. Tapia , 610 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 2010).4 No. 19-1308 Shockey relatedly argues that his use of methamphetaminedid not require a finding that he also possessed methamphetamine. But he misapprehends the district court’s ruling. The
court did find that he possessed methamphetamine, which in Indiana is punishable by more than a year in prison. See Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-6.1, 35-50-2-7. The district court reasonably could infer possession from use. See United States v. Barnes , 883 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Trotter , 270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 2001) . “Inferring possession of a drug from the consumption of that drug is just as sensible as inferring, from the statement ‘I ate a hamburger for lunch,’ that the person possessed the hambur ger before wolfing it down.” Trotter, 270 F.3d at 1153.
AFFIRMED