No. 229, November 2007 Strategic Forum 1

The United States and European Union (EU) 

are natural partners in the global war on terror, 

but cooperation, although absolutely necessary, 

is inherently difficult. Primary responsibility 

for most European counterterrorism policies 

remains with the separate governments of the 

27 EU countries, which has presented coordination problems both within the EU and between 

the United States and European Union. Asymmetries in capacities and perceived vulnerabilities 

affect how different member states address 

counterterrorism. Institutional dynamics—not 

only among the various EU institutions but also 

between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO)—influence the degree of 

cooperation as well.

The EU has made progress generally as a 

result of the shock of actual or attempted terrorist attacks. Because Europe has been both a 

terrorist launch pad and a target in its own right, 

EU governments tend to focus on preventing 

terrorist attacks at home rather than fighting 

terrorists abroad.

Nevertheless, over the past 6 years, the 

United States and European Union—despite 

different historical traditions, legal approaches, 

and capabilities—have demonstrated an ability 

to work together. The key is to remain cognizant 

of the different dimensions (such as military, 

diplomatic, and financial) related to countering terrorism, as well as the time horizons. The 

tactical-operational considerations should 

not impede the longer-term strategic goal of 

delegitimizing terrorism as an instrument for 

political change.

One of the major concerns is that the 

threat crosses not only borders but also sectors. 

To date, the major terrorist attacks in Europe 

have been against soft-target transportation 

infrastructure, but critical information systems, 

energy distribution networks, and food supplies 

also are vulnerable.

A multilevel, multisectored approach 

may represent one answer to this situation. 

The United States should continue to pursue 

avenues of cooperation where appropriate at 

the national, EU, and NATO levels. Dialogue has 

the potential of building trust among stakeholders, which is the key to taking effective actions 

against terrorists.

Natural Partners?

The United States and European Union 

(EU) are natural partners in the global war 

on terror, but bureaucratic, cultural, and 

tactical differences threaten to hinder progress. 

Multilateral counterterrorism cooperation is 

inherently difficult because the degree of threat 

perception and capabilities to fight terrorism 

vary significantly among the different actors. 

Even if Americans and Europeans agree on 

the need to fight global terrorism, especially 

after clear evidence (for example, the 9/11, 

3/11, and 7/7 terrorist attacks), there may be 

a lack of consensus on the mix of causal or 

aggravating factors, as well as what steps to 

take to overcome those factors. One thing that 

everyone does seem to agree on is that this is a 

fight no country can undertake alone.

The United States recognizes the challenge ahead and is working with partners, 

including the European Union (member states and institutions), in all areas of 

counterterrorism. As then–Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism Henry Crumpton told the 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 

2006, “Dealing with the threat from violent extremism . . . requires that we and our 

partners wage a traditional campaign using 

our judicial, law enforcement, financial, 

military, and diplomatic resources.” He went 

on to say that this effort would not be easy 

or quick or one in which the United States 

could succeed on its own: “Countering violent extremism involves a world-wide effort. 

It will last decades, if not longer.”1

Legacies of the Past

Europeans are quick to note that they 

had been dealing with terrorism long before 

September 11, 2001. The British confronted 

the Irish Republican Army, the Spanish fought 

the Basque separatists, and Germans struggled with the Baader Meinhof gang, to mention just a few of the more famous examples. 

However, many of these counterterrorist efforts 

were different from the current circumstances 

in two respects: national approach and political end. In the pre–September 11 environment, Europeans approached counterterrorism generally on a national basis against 

primarily (although not exclusively) national 

groups with defined (even if unrealistic) political ends. Moreover, the main goal for these 

groups was not to inflict mass casualties but 

to incite fear and move the national government to a particular political end.2

 Strategic Forum No. 229

November 2007

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

The European Union: Measuring 

Counterterrorism Cooperation

by David T. Armitage, Jr.
2 Strategic Forum No. 229, November 2007

Changes since the end of the Cold War 

have forced European governments to recognize the need to cooperate at a regional rather 

than a national level. First, implementation 

of the Single Market during the late 1980s 

and early 1990s introduced the concept of free 

movement of goods, people, services, and capital. If internal borders within Europe were to 

be broken down, then external borders surrounding Europe needed to be strengthened.

Second, globalization—advances in 

communications and transportation—made 

it easier than ever before for people to transit Europe. Globalization also made it easier 

for small groups, including nonstate actors, 

to organize. A significant difference between 

pre– and post–September 11 has been the 

transnational nature of terrorism. Al Qaeda is 

a global network.

Third, geopolitical events—the first Gulf 

War, collapse of the Soviet Union, and Balkan 

wars—increased the level of organized crime 

by disrupting societies and creating opportunities for exploitation in ungoverned areas. 

Scholars have observed the linkages between 

terrorist groups and organized criminal entities. For example, in Spain, al Qaeda raised 

funds from credit card schemes.3

 In Belgium, 

forged passports and smuggled diamonds 

were used for money laundering. In Germany, 

privacy laws were exploited to store contraband. In Italy, counterfeit couture raised 

funds for locals, and Russian and Albanian 

mafia groups smuggled people into the United 

Kingdom.4

 These developments also heightened the risk that small groups would be in 

a position to inflict mass casualties through 

unconventional means.

Finally, demographic dynamics have 

made Europe a home for a growing percentage 

of Muslims, whose assimilation into European 

societies has raised difficult challenges. 

Clearly, a sense of alienation within parts of 

the Muslim community may foster grievances 

that radicals can readily exploit to encourage 

a disaffected few to become homegrown 

terrorists. The ability of Europeans to deal 

effectively with these seemingly disparate 

situations has become crucial. As experts have 

noted to Congress, Europe has become both 

a terrorist launch pad (as in the 9/11 attacks) 

and a target in its own right (the 3/11 and 

7/7 attacks).5

 Moreover, as the United States 

adjusted its homeland defenses, making 

it harder for terrorists to attack the Nation 

directly, Europe itself became more vulnerable. 

At the same time, the longer Europeans 

squabbled among themselves or delayed 

improving their own domestic security, the 

longer the United States remained vulnerable.6

Thus, the dynamic was set in place where trust 

was needed, and yet recriminations across the 

Atlantic seemed to erode that trust.

Reacting to Terror

Since 9/11, the European Union has 

made progress in fighting terrorism primarily 

as a result of the shock of actual or attempted 

attacks. The most notable are the March 2004 

Madrid train bombings, July 2005 London 

bombings, August 2006 plots in the United 

Kingdom and Germany, and the thwarted July 

2007 attacks in London and Glasgow. Before the 

September 2001 attacks, the EU had no common definition of, or penalties for, terrorism. 

The main focus at the time was how best to 

allow EU citizens to take full advantage of the 

Single Market and the Schengen area.7

 However, 

9/11 was a wake-up call for EU member states. 

The power of external shock revealed how vulnerable the organization was internally, and the 

European Union responded with relative speed. 

In December 2001, member states agreed to 

a common definition of terrorism.8

 They created a common list of terrorist organizations 

and a clearinghouse for freezing terrorist assets. 

They agreed to strengthen the European Police 

Office (Europol) and to introduce a common 

European arrest warrant. In December 2003, 

the EU produced a European Security Strategy 

that listed the main threats to the continent: 

terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, regional and/or ethnic conflict, 

state failure, and organized crime.

These accomplishments notwithstanding, momentum soon lagged. The European 

arrest warrant, agreed in December 2001, 

was not actually adopted by all member states until 2004. Even then, there were 

problems. In February 2005, the European 

Commission noted that 11 of the then-25 

member states had made mistakes when 

transposing the arrest warrant into national 

law. The cultural and bureaucratic differences between law enforcement/police and 

intelligence approaches, as well as fears 

that EU institutions were encroaching upon 

national sovereignty, limited further cooperation. Unanimity was required in the terrorist 

clearinghouse, meaning that a single member state could prevent Hamas or Hizbollah 

from being put on the list.

The March 2004 terrorist attacks in 

Madrid reenergized Europeans to renew coordinated action against terrorism. EU member states established a Counterterrorism 

Coordinator, former Dutch Deputy Interior 

Minister Gijs de Vries. Answering to the member states, de Vries was responsible for streamlining the EU’s counterterrorism instruments, 

assessing the terrorist threat in Europe, and 

monitoring member-state implementation 

of EU-mandated legislation. However, member states equipped him with only a token 

staff and budget and no operational authority.9

 After 3 years in the job, de Vries stepped 

down in March 2007. The post was vacant for 

over 5 months before EU members appointed 

former Belgian Justice Minister Gilles de 

Kerchove to the job in mid-September. The 

Situation Center took on additional responsibility to provide information and analysis on 

EU-wide terrorist threats. The Brussels unit is 

small, comprised mostly of experts seconded 

from national governments. Implementing the 

Dr. David T. Armitage, Jr., is an Adjunct Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic European arrest warrant, which had stalled in 

Studies at the National Defense University.

a significant difference 

between pre– and post–

September 11 has been 

the transnational nature 

of terrorism
No. 229, November 2007 Strategic Forum 3

the capitals of several member states, gained 

new momentum.

The July 2005 London bombings were 

an additional wake-up call. The fact that the 

suicide bombers were homegrown added a 

new and disturbing dimension to European 

efforts. The EU developed a counterterrorism strategy in November 2005. Prominent in 

the strategy is the need to combat the radicalization and recruitment of terrorists. In 

December 2005, the EU published its Action 

Plan on Combating Terrorism, which is a 

detailed matrix of activities, with a goal of 

measures to be taken, deadlines, and appropriate EU entities responsible.

The thwarted August 2006 plots in 

the United Kingdom, as well as the one in 

Germany, reminded Europeans that they 

were still quite vulnerable to attack. The 

plot in Germany was particularly troublesome because, in contrast to the United 

Kingdom and Spain, the German government had been strongly against the war in 

Iraq. This made clear that jihadist attacks 

in Western Europe were not solely a function of each country’s policies on support 

of the United States in the Middle East. 

No one was immune. At a September 2006 

Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting, 

EU president Finland urged fellow member states to create an instrument that 

would provide common principles for storing information from video surveillance of 

major traffic junctions.10

The botched July 2007 attacks in 

London and Glasgow introduced a new element because the alleged attackers were 

middle-class physicians and did not fit the 

standard terrorist profile. German Interior 

Minister Wolfgang Schäuble stated in a July 

Der Spiegel magazine interview, “The fact is 

that old categories no longer apply.” He also 

warned that “we could be struck at anytime.”11 

In early September, German authorities disrupted a plot to cause major destruction 

to airports and U.S. military facilities in 

Germany, reinforcing Schäuble’s point.

A “Fight,” Not a “War”

Primary responsibility for most European 

counterterrorism policies remains with the 

separate governments of the 27 EU countries, 

a situation that has presented coordination 

problems both within the EU and between the 

United States and EU. It is clear from reading almost any EU document that Europeans 

regard terrorism as primarily a criminal, not 

a military, act.12 A review of the EU Action 

Plan on Combating Terrorism reveals that the 

emphasis is on legislation to criminalize terrorism. So-called Framework Decisions are 

the main instruments for such legislation. In 

contrast to economic and trade legislation, 

where the European Commission has significant power, counterterrorism falls under the 

so-called Third Pillar of Justice and Home 

Affairs. Framework Decisions are made by the 

national ministers (usually Justice or Interior), 

and unanimity is the rule.

Unlike the United States, which 

views counterterrorism with a heavy 

external dimension (the global war on 

terror), EU member states are much 

more focused on the internal dimension. The lead agencies in counterterrorism are not the defense ministries, but 

rather the interior and justice ministries. 

Interior and justice ministers are at the 

center of European counterterrorism 

policies. They and their respective intelligence services take the lead on disrupting terrorist networks. The European 

Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has 

very little direct connection to counterterrorism. From the European Security 

Strategy standpoint, the ESDP emphasis is on regional conflict stabilization 

and reconstruction, peacekeeping, ruleof-law, and humanitarian missions. The 

idea that European military personnel 

would be used to guard European soil 

(in a homeland defense function) has 

little resonance in European capitals for 

both historical and political reasons.13

EU member states are interested 

in protecting their critical infrastructure and are pursuing policies to do 

so. Guarding approaches is the province of EU Transport Ministers. They 

are the ones to agree on measures 

to protect airports, including screening of luggage for potential explosives. 

The EU created the Agency for the 

Management of External Borders (FRONTEX). 

Located in Warsaw, FRONTEX’s Finnish 

Director Ilkka Laitinen oversees national border guard training, risk analysis, technical 

and operational assistance to member states, 

and external border management.

EU member states are aware that Islamist 

extremists pose a potential threat but have 

different ways of dealing with the problem. 

Muslims in certain European countries continue to feel alienated or disaffected even after 

living there for years.14 A recent study of 242 

jihadi terrorists in Europe concludes that more 

that 40 percent were born in Europe and an 

additional 55 percent were raised in or were 

long-term residents of Europe.15 A mini-summit of EU Justice Ministers was held in London 

on August 16, 2006, to discuss new security 

Table 1. Muslim Populations in the European Union

Member Population Muslims % Muslim

State (millions) (millions) Population

Cyprus 0.9 0.2 17.8

Bulgaria 7.5 0.9 12.0

France 60.4 5.0 8.3

Netherlands 15.8 1.0 6.3

Denmark 5.3 0.3 5.1

Sweden 8.9 0.4 4.5

Austria 8.1 0.4 4.3

Germany 82.0 3.5 4.3

Belgium 10.2 0.4 3.9

United Kingdom 58.6 1.6 2.7

Spain 39.4 1.0 2.5

Slovenia 2.0 0.1 2.5

Italy 57.6 1.0 1.7

Greece 10.6 0.1 1.3

Romania 22.3 0.2 0.9

Czech Republic 10.3 0.0 0.0

Estonia 1.4 0.0 0.0

Finland 5.2 0.0 0.0

Hungary 10.1 0.0 0.0

Ireland 3.7 0.0 0.0

Latvia 2.4 0.0 0.0

Lithuania 3.7 0.0 0.0

Luxembourg 0.4 0.0 0.0

Malta 0.4 0.0 0.0

Poland 38.7 0.0 0.0

Portugal 10.8 0.0 0.0

Slovakia 5.4 0.0 0.0

EU TOTAL 482.1 16.1 3.3

Sources: Statistical Office of the European Communities, British 

Broadcasting Company, and Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook 

2007.
4 Strategic Forum No. 229, November 2007

measures. At a press conference afterward, 

EU Commissioner for Justice, Freedom, and 

Security Franco Frattini recommended blocking Web sites that “incite to commit terrorist actions.” While stressing that he favored a 

European Islam, Frattini also suggested that 

imams should be trained to “incorporate 

European values in their teachings.”16

However, dealing with Muslim minority populations within Europe will be particularly problematic because of uneven 

distribution of Muslims among the member 

states and the political and religious sensitivities involved (see table 1). The origins of 

Muslim populations in EU states also differ (British Muslims generally are from 

South Asia, German Muslims from Turkey, 

and French Muslims from North Africa). 

Geographic proximity to North Africa leads 

several southern European countries to feel 

more vulnerable. One proposal put forward 

by the Europeans was to develop a “nonemotive lexicon” for discussing issues “in 

order to avoid linking Islam to terrorism.” 

Yet in the same paragraph, the EU strategy 

talks about encouraging the “emergence 

of European imams” and engaging with 

“Muslim organizations and faith groups 

that reject the distorted version of Islam put 

forward by al Qaeda and others.”17

In any event, European officials generally 

have shied away from a public debate over the 

long-term solution of integrating and assimilating these populations into their societies.18

The very notion that the current threat may be 

internal, combined with their previous experience with domestic terrorism in the 1970s and 

1980s, led Europeans to consider the domestic 

criminal law framework.

Institutional Dynamics

Institutional dynamics also play a role. 

Asymmetries in perceived vulnerabilities 

affect how different EU member states support addressing the problem at the EU level. 

Moreover, the primary institutional link for 

the United States remains NATO. Table 2 

shows the progress made toward counterterrorism by NATO and the EU. Not surprisingly, the NATO elements fall mainly in the 

military/homeland defense dimension, while 

the EU efforts are broader in scope. However, 

the progress on the EU front is quite uneven. 

Numerous efforts included in the Action Plan 

are rhetorical, with implementation continuing to fall to the member states, often stalled 

in national assemblies.

There also are tensions within the EU 

institutions themselves. The relationship 

between the Council Secretariat, Presidency 

country, and Commission is only one aspect. 

Within the Commission, there are coordination challenges among the various 

Commissioners: Franco Frattini (Justice, 

Freedom, and Security), László Kovács (taxation; combating fraud and counterfeiting), 

and Charlie McCreevy (internal market and 

head of the Financial Action Task Force on 

Money Laundering).19 Moreover, the increase 

in the number of autonomous EU agencies (for 

example, FRONTEX, Europol, the European 

Judicial Cooperation Unit [Eurojust], and 

European Data Protection Supervisor) has the 

potential of complicating coordination simply 

because of new bureaucratic actors seeking to 

define their roles and missions.

Prospects for Cooperation

What are the prospects for transatlantic 

counterterrorism cooperation? The following 

section discusses the potential based on the 

different dimensions of counterterrorism and 

analyzes where the prospects are brighter, or 

where further work needs to be done.

NATO EU

Military / Homeland Defense

Guarding Approaches/Border Control Standing Naval Force Mediterranean/

Operation Active Endeavor

FRONTEX/Schengen Information System 

II/EU Transport Council/SAFEMED

Air/Missile Defense Theater Missile Defense Program/

Air Command and Control System

EU Military Staff/

Military Committee

Consequence Management Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response 

Coordination Center/

Senior Civil Emergency Planning 

Committee

Counterterrorism Coordinator/

Commission–6th Framework Program for 

Research to Support Civil Protection/

Central Crisis Coordination System

WMD Nonproliferation Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) 

Virtual Center of Excellence/NBC Battalion

Common Foreign and Security Policy 

(CFSP)/ WMD representative

Critical Infrastructure Commission/Counterterrorism 

Coordinator/Justice and Home Affairs 

(JHA) Ministers

Law Enforcement / Intelligence

Organized Crime Counterterrorism Coordinator/JHA 

Ministers/Europol/Eurojust

Terrorist Networks Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit/

Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism

Counterterrorism Coordinator–EU Action 

Plan/EU Joint Situation Centre/Trevi 

Group/Europol

Terrorist Finance/Money Laundering Europol/JHA Ministers/Commission

Immigration/Asylum JHA Ministers/Commission

Biometrics/Data/Privacy Protection European Parliament/FRONTEX/

Commission/EU Data Protection 

Supervisor

Diplomacy / Hearts and Minds

Preventing Radicalization/Recruitment Commission/Counterrorism Coordinator–

EU Action Plan

Democracy Promotion CFSP/Commission–European 

Neighborhood Policy

Sources: NATO, EU, Department of Defense

Table 2. NATO and EU Counterterrorism Efforts
No. 229, November 2007 Strategic Forum 5

Military Cooperation. NATO’s 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

continues to be an area where the United 

States and its allies have consensus on the 

need to remain engaged. However, such cooperation and commitment have been tested in 

recent months, and continued participation 

cannot be taken for granted. Public unease 

over casualties among NATO troops and 

Afghan civilians has put pressure on some governments not to renew their ISAF mandates or 

to recast their roles toward training and noncombat functions. The European Union has 

begun an ESDP police mission in Afghanistan, 

which will be linked to ISAF operations.

In Europe, the Alliance has made progress in the area of homeland defense, including guarding approaches to NATO borders 

(especially maritime), upgrading air defense 

capabilities, and improving coordination in 

consequence management.20

Diplomatic Cooperation.

There are three main areas where Americans 

and Europeans should focus: democratic values 

and the rule of law, the Middle East, and Iran. 

These areas, while distinct, are not unrelated.

Promoting economic liberalization and 

democracy is crucial for achieving a longterm solution to the fight against terrorism. 

Respect for human life and the rule of law 

are the foundations of modern Western society. Diplomatic efforts to find peaceful solutions to intractable conflicts and to support 

democratic movements through the development of legitimate institutions remain a hallmark of U.S. foreign policy and a goal for 

U.S.–EU cooperation. According to the 2006 

U.S. National Security Strategy, “In the world 

today, the fundamental character of regimes 

matters as much as the distribution of power 

among them. The goal of our statecraft is 

to help create a world of democratic, wellgoverned states that can meet the needs of 

their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.”21

Muslim extremism feeds on illegitimate and ineffective governance within 

the Islamic world. Thus, the United States 

and EU have a shared interest in promoting the development of governments in the 

Muslim world that are representative and 

respectful of their people.22 Therefore, we 

should continue the practice of working 

together to encourage good governance, help 

other countries build sound administrative 

and judicial institutions, and cooperate in 

areas where there are weak or failing states. 

Supporting and reinforcing these concepts 

at home will reinforce the legitimacy of promoting them abroad.23

Finding diplomatic solutions to the problems in the Middle East represents a second area 

where the United States and European Union 

can work together. Solving the conflict between 

the Israelis and Palestinians would not eliminate the threat of transnational terrorism, 

but it might go a long way toward diminishing recruitment and radicalization. As the EU 

Counterterrorism Strategy states, “[W]orking to 

resolve conflicts and promote good governance 

and democracy will be essential elements of the 

Strategy . . . in order to address the motivational 

and structural factors underpinning radicalization.”24 In this regard, the Bush administration’s 

recent initiative to assume a more activist stance 

on Israeli-Palestinian issues and to launch a 

major international peace initiative later this 

year should be seen as a positive step forward.25

Finally, dealing effectively with Iran has 

the potential of reducing tension in the Middle 

East. The United States and EU can lessen the 

threat of terrorism by persuading Tehran that 

supporting terrorist groups such as Hizbollah 

is inconsistent with Iran’s long-term interest in gaining respect and participating in 

the international system. Americans and 

Europeans must also work together to curb 

Iranian nuclear activities, which would reduce 

the threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Those desired goals are much easier said than done, however, and we may not 

reach transatlantic agreement on the right 

mix of sticks and carrots. Still, this is a case 

where the United States has carrots (restoring 

diplomatic relations) and the EU has sticks 

(sanctions owing to Iranian dependence on 

European investment and trade). Getting Iran 

policies right has never been more important.

Homeland Security and 

Law Enforcement. A balance must be 

found between protecting society at large from 

terrorist attack and preserving the civil liberties 

of individuals that form the foundation of modern Western civilization. It would be facile to 

suggest that there is a stark transatlantic rift on 

this issue, where Americans ignore civil liberties 

and the Europeans uphold them. According to 

the latest Transatlantic Trends survey, European 

and American views toward civil liberties are 

remarkably close. In fact, Europeans support 

greater government authority than Americans 

with respect to surveillance cameras and monitoring bank transactions, while they have about 

the same views as Americans with respect to 

monitoring Internet communication and phone 

calls.26 There are valid differences between the 

ways that Americans and Europeans treat and 

protect personal information. EU countries tend 

to have formal systems and a tradition of independent data protection supervisors. Europeans 

also seem more receptive to privacy intrusions 

by allowing for national identity cards, a notion 

that many in the United States would consider 

to be an unacceptable infringement of their privacy rights.27 The EU itself has been wrestling 

with the issue of data protection within Europe. 

Analysts and scholars on both sides of the 

Atlantic hold a range of views on the subject, 

and the debate no doubt will continue.

Despite the different traditions and 

approaches to data privacy, the two sides have 

succeeded in reaching agreements on data 

protection regimes that still allow for counterterrorism cooperation. Shortly after the 

September 2001 attacks, the United States and 

EU formed a counterterrorism task force that 

included liaisons between the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation and Europol. In December 

2001, the first Europol Agreement, involving 

strategic information exchange, was signed. 

A second Europol Agreement for even closer 

cooperation was signed in 2002. The U.S. and 

solving the conflict 

between the Israelis and 

Palestinians would not 

eliminate the threat of 

transnational terrorism, 

but it might go a long 

way toward diminishing 

recruitment and 

radicalization
6 Strategic Forum No. 229, November 2007

of the different dimensions related to terrorism, 

as well as the time horizons. The tactical-operational considerations should not impede the 

longer term strategic goal of delegitimizing terrorism as an instrument for political change.

U.S. and EU perspectives on counterterrorism strategies tend to converge in at least 

seven areas:

■ the scope of the terrorist threat

■ the illegitimacy of terrorism as a form 

of political behavior

■ vulnerabilities caused by globalization

■ the need not only to disrupt but also 

to dismantle terrorist organizations over the 

longer term

■ a role for the United Nations and 

international partners

■ the importance of conflict resolution, 

governance, and democracy

■ the importance of resolving the 

Israeli/Palestinian conflict.31

While such convergence is reassuring, that 

fact alone provides no guarantee of success. The 

real test will be to align these diagnostic and 

prescriptive elements of counterterrorism policy within the rubric of an agreed transatlantic 

strategy that applies resources effectively.

One of the major concerns is that the 

terrorist threat crosses not only borders but 

also sectors. Thus, what is needed is a multilevel, multisector approach that also includes 

public/private and interagency cooperation. 

According to one expert, as much as 80 percent of Europe’s critical infrastructure is in 

the hands of the private sector.32 While private entities are focused on protecting their 

own particular assets, terrorists may be able to 

exploit vulnerabilities in the seams. Achieving 

such cooperation will be difficult because 

infrastructure owners may be reluctant to 

share information, believing that such disclosure would increase their exposure to attack.

The terrorist risk varies among sectors. 

To date, the major terrorist attacks in Europe 

have been against easily targeted transportation infrastructure. As one security expert 

commented recently in Brussels, “While the 

transport infrastructure was the most vulnerable, it was almost impossible to protect, 

EU Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) 

and Extradition Treaty were signed in June 

2003.28 The MLAT allows for the use of new 

techniques, such as joint investigative teams 

and video conference technology to take testimony from foreign-located witnesses, possibly reducing the risk of critical evidence or 

information slipping through the bureaucratic 

cracks. It also sets out limitations on the use 

of personal data.

Along with the MLAT, the U.S.–EU 

Extradition Treaty formalizes an institutional framework for law enforcement relations with the European Union. The treaty 

replaces several older bilateral treaties 

that did not cover modern offenses such as 

money laundering.

Other agreements include an October 

2006 agreement with Eurojust that will 

permit greater transatlantic cooperation in 

prosecutorial matters. In 2004 and again 

this year, Washington and Brussels overcame their differences to reach an accord 

on so-called passenger name record 

data in a manner that will allow the 

Department of Homeland Security to do its 

job of defending the United States while 

respecting the privacy rights of individuals.29 As European Commissioner Frattini 

said at an April 2007 meeting with U.S. 

officials in Berlin:

The transatlantic security partnership is 

particularly strong in the area of justice, 

freedom, and security. . . . At a time of 

global threat from international terrorism, 

security issues play a significant role in the 

cooperation between the EU and the United 

States. In order to overcome these challenges 

together, we must closely coordinate our 

efforts, share information, and cooperate on 

law enforcement as much as possible.30

The United States and EU agreed to hold 

a Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial twice a 

year. Moreover, there is an ongoing dialogue 

covering border and transportation security. 

These dialogues help the respective parties 

develop standards for travel documents, information-sharing, and cargo screening.

Intelligence. An integral part of 

counterterrorism cooperation is having the 

right information to prevent and disrupt 

potential attacks. If antiterrorism protection and emergency response fundamentally are local, then information-gathering 

and information-sharing must be global. 

Information-sharing is important both 

from an operational and analytical perspective, but the best cooperation often is 

concealed from public exposure for many 

self-evident reasons. Exchanging analytic 

views and providing mechanisms for sharing information without compromising 

sources and methods will be the main challenge for improving transatlantic cooperation in this sphere.

Financial. In the financial 

arena, the scope and potential for cooperation remain robust. Combating terrorism 

finance is critical to reducing the resources 

available to terrorist operations. The United 

States and EU should continue the informal dialogue encompassing major legislative and regulatory issues. Such a dialogue 

includes expert-level exchanges, workshops 

on protecting charities from terrorist abuse, 

developing best practices in investigations/

prosecutions, and improving effectiveness of 

designations. Greater coordination among 

international institutions is an important 

component of this approach.

Conclusion

Over the past 6 years, the gap between 

European and American threat perceptions has 

narrowed, and the recognition that the United 

States and Europe—despite different historical 

traditions, legal approaches, and capabilities—

must work together for the common defense has 

become clear. The key is to remain cognizant 

tactical-operational 

considerations should 

not impede the strategic 

goal of delegitimizing 

terrorism as an 

instrument for political 

change
No. 229, November 2007 Strategic Forum 7

for the governed to select their leaders and participate in decisionmaking. A just society is better and more stable than an unjust 

one.” Ultimately, Brimmer argues, “Our security policies must not 

degrade these features, which are central to what makes our society worth defending in the first place.” Brimmer, “From Territorial 

Security to Societal Security,” 31.

24 Council of the European Union, “The European 

Union Counterterrorism Strategy,” November 30, 2005, 7, 

available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/

st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf>.

25 White House press release, “President Bush 

Discusses the Middle East,” July 16, 2007, available at <www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/print/20070716-

7.html>. See also U.S. Consulate, Jerusalem, “Launch of the 

Middle East Investment Initiative Program,” July 25, 2007, 

available at <www.state.gov/r/us/pubs/89320.htm>. 

26 German Marshall Fund of the United States, 

Transatlantic Trends—Key Findings 2006, 8, available at 

<www.transatlantictrends.org>.

27 John Bellinger III, “Reflections on Transatlantic 

Approaches to International Law,” remarks at the Duke 

Law School Center for International and Comparative Law, 

November 15, 2006.

28 For more on transatlantic police cooperation during this period, see John Occhipinti, “Policing Across the 

Atlantic: EU–U.S. Relations and Transnational Crime-Fighting,” 

Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs (May 2005).

29 See European Union joint press release, “The EU 

and United States reach agreement on Passenger Name 

Record (PNR) data,” July 23, 2007.

30 German EU Presidency press release, “EU and US discuss freedom of travel and data protection for transatlantic passengers, agree on counterterrorism cooperation,” April 5, 2007, 

available at <www.eu2007.de/en/News/Press_Releases>.

31 The White House, The National Strategy for 

Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: The White House, 

February 2003); Council of the European Union, “The 

European Union Counterterrorism Strategy.”

32 Eric Luiijf, “Defending Europe’s Vulnerable 

Infrastructure,” Security and Defence Agenda Monthly 

Roundtable, Brussels, October 2, 2006.

33 Miodrag Pesut, “Defending Europe’s Vulnerable 

Infrastructure,” Security and Defence Agenda Monthly 

Roundtable, Brussels, October 2, 2006.

34 The particular extent to which the United States 

should pursue cooperation with multilateral institutions might 

vary. For example, Nora Bensahel argues that Washington 

should continue bilateral cooperation in the military and intelligence spheres but should pursue multilateral cooperation in 

law enforcement and financial areas. See Nora Bensahel, The 

Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, 

and the European Union (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003).

as it was an ‘open system’ with 5,000 km of 

track.”33 Information systems, energy distribution networks, and food supplies also are critical sectors. The Internet is an open system as 

well, which terrorists have been keen to exploit 

(through recruitment, communication, fund 

raising, and operational planning).

Layered approaches represent one answer. 

Going beyond best practices will need to be 

emphasized, too. The United States should 

continue to pursue avenues of cooperation at 

the national, EU, and NATO levels.34 Dialogue 

has the potential of building trust among 

stakeholders—both public and private—

which is key to taking the kinds of actions 

needed to fight terrorism.

Notes

1 Henry A. Crumpton, “Islamist Extremism in Europe,” 

statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

Subcommittee on European Affairs, April 5, 2006, 2.

2 That is not to imply that current transnational terrorist networks such as al Qaeda lack political objectives, but 

rather to emphasize the contrast in the scale of casualties. 

3 Fernando Reinares, “Hacia una caracterización 

social del terrosimo yihadista en España: implicaciones en seguridad interior y acción exterior,” ARI 34/2006 

(Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internationales y 

Estratégicos, 2006).

4 Interviews with EU officials, Brussels, May 31, 

2006. Also see “The Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism: 

Initial Findings” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, August 2004).

5 Robin Niblett, “Islamic Extremism in Europe,” 

statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

Subcommittee on European Affairs, April 5, 2006; Crumpton, 

statement; and Daniel Benjamin, “Islamic Extremism in 

Europe,” statement before the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs, April 5, 2006.

6 Jonathan Stevenson, “How Europe and America Defend 

Themselves,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (March/April 2003), 76.

7 When the Amsterdam Treaty came into force in May 

1999, the Schengen Agreement became part of the legal and 

institutional framework of the EU for dealing with asylum/

migration, visa policy and rights of third-country nationals, 

immigration policy, and external border controls. All members of the EU–15 (except the United Kingdom and Ireland) 

participate fully in Schengen. Because of certain Nordic agreements, Norway and Iceland also are Schengen members. 

Switzerland, although not an EU member, joined Schengen in 

2005. The new EU member states are expected to participate 

in Schengen beginning in 2007. The actual date has been an 

area of contention for technical and political reasons.

8 In December 2001, EU ministers reached political 

agreement on a common definition of terrorism and minimum sentences for various terrorist acts. See Justice and 

Home Affairs Council 2396 Conclusions, December 6–7, 2001, 

available at <www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/

docs/pressData/en/jha/DOC.69187.pdf>. The EU defined 

terrorism in part as individuals or groups who commit or 

threaten to commit murder, kidnapping, or hostage-taking for the purpose of intimidating a population, coercing a 

government, or destroying the political, economic, or social 

structures of a country.

9 Interview with EU official, Brussels, May 31, 2006.

10 Finland EU Presidency press release, “Changing 

Nature of Terrorism Requires a Continuing Response from EU 

Security Authorities,” September 21, 2006.

11 “Terrorism Interview with German Interior Minister 

Wolfgang Schäuble,” Der Spiegel (July 9, 2007), available at 

<www.Spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,493364,00.html>.

12 Degree/proximity of an attack may influence the 

terminology used. Since the foiled July 2007 terror attacks 

in London and Glasgow, some European security officials 

are beginning to concede that conventional law enforcement 

techniques may be insufficient to defeat al Qaeda. I thank 

Leo Michel for raising this point.

13 Italy may be an exception. I thank Col Anne 

Moisan, USAF (Ret.), for this point.

14 For example, see U.S. Department of State, Office 

of Research, “Spanish Muslims Do Not Feel Deeply Rooted in 

Spain,” October 11, 2005. In the survey, 8 in 10 Muslims in 

Spain said that they had personally experienced racism and 

discrimination due to their ethnicity or religion.

15 Edwin Bakker, “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe, Their 

Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They Joined the 

Jihad: An Exploratory Study,” Clingendael Institute, January 2007.

16 Honor Mahony, “EU Set to Tighten Security 

Measures Across the Bloc,” EUobserver.com (August 17, 2006), 

available at <http://euobserver.com/9/22240/>.

17 Council of the European Union, “The European 

Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment 

to Terrorism,” November 24, 2005, 4, available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st14/st14781-re01.en05.pdf>.

18 Esther Brimmer, “From Territorial Security to 

Society Security: Implications for the Transatlantic Strategic 

Outlook,” in Transforming Homeland Security: U.S. and 

European Approaches, ed. Esther Brimmer (Washington, DC: 

Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006), 31.

19 Europolitics, “Frattini Wrests Control of Data Protection 

from McCreevy,” March 9, 2005, accessed at <http://eisnet.eis.be>.

20 Center for Technology and National Security Policy/

Institute for National Strategic Studies, Special Report, 

Transatlantic Homeland Defense (Washington, DC: NDU 

Press, May 2006), available at <www.ndu.edu/inss/press/

CTNSP-INSS/spl-rpt.pdf>.

21 The White House, The National Security Strategy 

of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White 

House, March 2006), 1.

22 The phrase is originally by then–Secretary of Defense 

Donald H. Rumsfeld referring to Iraq, but it captures concisely 

the political challenge typical of the Islamic world more generally. I thank Joe McMillan for pointing out this formulation.

23 As Esther Brimmer states, “Democracy is a fundamental component of creating a just society providing a mechanism 

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at www.ndupress.edu.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of 

international security affairs and defense studies. Through an 

active outreach program, including conferences and publications, 

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

James A. Schear David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press
8 Strategic Forum No. 229, November 2007

Trans-American Security: 

What’s Missing?

Luigi R. Einaudi

(Strategic Forum No. 228, September 2007)

Moving the U.S.–ROK Alliance into the 

21st Century

(INSS Special Report, September 2007)

The Country Team: Restructuring 

America’s First Line of Engagement

Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr.

(Strategic Forum No. 227, September 2007)

The Comprehensive Approach Initiative: 

Future Options for NATO

Friis Arne Petersen and Hans Binnendijk

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 58, 

September 2007)

Privatizing While Transforming

Marion E. “Spike” Bowman

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 57, 

July 2007)

China’s ASAT Test: Motivations and 

Implications

Phillip C. Saunders and Charles D. Lutes

(INSS Special Report, June 2007)

Responding in the Homeland: A Snapshot 

of NATO’s Readiness for CBRN Attacks

Michael Moodie and Robert E. Armstrong with 

Tyler Merkeley

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 56, 

June 2007)

Counterintelligence and National 

Strategy

Michelle Van Cleave

(School for National Security Executive Education Report, April 2007)

Sino-Japanese Rivalry: Implications for 

U.S. Policy

(INSS Special Report, April 2007)

Preventing Balkan Conflict: The Role of 

Euroatlantic Institutions

Jeffrey Simon

(Strategic Forum No. 226, April 2007)

The Future Nuclear Landscape

Paul I. Bernstein, John P. Caves, Jr., and 

John F. Reichart

(Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional Paper 5, 

April 2007)

I-Power: The Information Revolution and 

Stability Operations

Franklin D. Kramer, Larry Wentz, and Stuart Starr

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 55, 

February 2007)

Can Deterrence Be Tailored?

M. Elaine Bunn

(Strategic Forum No. 225, January 2007)

Other recent titles from 

NDU Press

For on-line access to NDU Press publications, go to: ndupress.ndu.edu