FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 07-50020 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  CR-02-00938-R-12

STEVE LOREN SCOTT, a/k/a SCOTTIE,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 8, 2011—Pasadena, California

Filed June 8, 2011

Before: Pamela Ann Rymer, Consuelo M. Callahan, and

Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

7521
COUNSEL

Gretchen Fusilier, Carlsbad, California, for the defendantappellant.

Anne M. Voigts, Assistant United States Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.

UNITED STATES v. SCOTT 7525
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Steve Loren Scott appeals his conviction and 220-month

sentence after being found guilty by a jury of one count of

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), for participating in violent acts

undertaken by the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang. We

affirm.

I

The Aryan Brotherhood (AB) is a violent prison gang that

started in California prisons but eventually spread to the federal prison system. Its members, most of whom are white prisoners, engaged in a conspiracy to use violence and traffic

drugs to maintain a position of power in prisons and to discipline other members. The gang operated under a “blood in /

blood out” rule, meaning one had to spill blood to become a

member and only left the AB when dead. The federal AB was

run by a three-man commission. A council, which had authority over day-to-day operations of a particular prison, reported

to the commission. 

Scott was a prospective AB member in 1992 while imprisoned at Leavenworth federal penitentiary. He allegedly

became a member after stabbing Ismael Benitez-Mendez, who

had attacked another AB member. Several years later, the AB,

including Scott, entered into a violent and deadly war with the

D.C. Blacks, another federal prison gang comprised of mostly

black inmates. The catalyst for the war was the attack on an

elderly white inmate at Marion prison around 1996 by Walter

Johnson (“Butch” or “Prince”), a member of the D.C. Blacks.

Soon thereafter, the AB commission, through commissioner

T.D. Bingham, sent a letter to members at the Lewisburg

prison declaring war. As a result, two inmates at Lewisburg,

who were members of the D.C. Blacks, were killed by the

7526 UNITED STATES v. SCOTT
AB. Around that time, Scott was appointed to head the business department of the AB.

As the war raged between the two prison gangs, Scott discussed with other members how to make and store weapons

and passed around a “hit list” of D.C Black members to

attack. He was also promoted and became a member of the

AB council. In 2000, during the ongoing war, Scott stabbed

Erving Bond, a black inmate, in the shower.

Six years later, Scott went to trial on the second count of

the indictment for conspiring to conduct the affairs of the AB

through a pattern of racketeering activity, including the overt

acts of murder and drug trafficking. At the start of trial, the

prospective jurors were asked to fill out a questionnaire

jointly prepared by the parties and during voir dire were asked

questions by the district court. The court excused jurors who

indicated they could not conscientiously perform their duty to

decide the case impartially, had heard anything during opening statements or the indictment that meant they could not be

impartial, or believed the case had to do with racism.

The court then gave preliminary jury instructions. Among

other things, it cautioned the jurors:

During the course of the trial, I may occasionally ask

questions of a witness in order to bring out facts

which may not be fully covered by the testimony.

You are not to consider my questioning of the witness, even if it may become lengthy, as an indication

of what I feel about the case in general or the testimony of that witness in particular. If I should make

any comments on the evidence, as the law permits

me to do, you may disregard any comment of mine

on facts in arriving at your own finding as to the

facts.

The court also explained that it might “admonish a lawyer

who out of zeal for the cause does something which is not in

UNITED STATES v. SCOTT 7527
keeping with the rules of evidence or procedure. You are not

to draw any inference against a side to whom an admonition

of mine may be addressed during the trial in this case.” It further asked the jurors not to take notes but instead “to give

your closest attention to the testimony and evidence of each

witness so that you can contribute your individual judgment

to your deliberations.”

The trial lasted about seven days. On the morning of closing arguments, the court gave the parties its proposed instructions. Scott’s counsel objected to having had only nine

minutes to review them and also objected to the exclusion of

proposed instructions on defenses to murder. The court denied

Scott’s objections regarding the defenses to murder, finding

there was no evidence to support those defenses. It then read

the instructions to the jury, including once again informing

the jurors they should not infer anything from the court’s

questions, admonitions to counsel, or evidentiary rulings.

During deliberations, the jury asked for an index of the

exhibits, a copy of the jury instructions, and the testimony of

witnesses Jimmy Lee Inman and Agent Michael Halualani.

The following morning, Inman’s testimony was read back but

Halualani’s was not, because it was unavailable. Soon thereafter, the jury returned its verdict, finding that Scott conspired

to murder Walter Johnson (“Butch” or “Prince”) and two

unnamed D.C. Black inmates.

The Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) calculated a base offense

level of 28 based on the RICO predicate offense of conspiracy

to murder, added three points pursuant to grouping rules due

to Scott’s conviction for three murders, and added one point

for a “crime of violence” enhancement. The PSR calculated

a total criminal history of 18 points, which included a prior

conviction for assaulting Erving Bond. That placed Scott in

criminal history category VI. Because he was deemed a career

offender, his criminal history category would have been VI

anyway. The Guidelines range was 210-240 months due to

7528 UNITED STATES v. SCOTT
RICO’s statutory maximum of twenty years. The district court

rejected Scott’s objections to the PSR, noting that they merely

reargued the merits of the case and adopted the PSR. Scott

was sentenced to 220 months in prison.

Scott timely appealed the conviction and sentence.

II

Scott seeks to overturn the jury’s verdict because the district court abused its discretion in limiting voir dire and crossexamination, in prohibiting juror note-taking, in refusing certain jury instructions, and in failing to make a preliminary

determination on the admissibility of co-conspirator statements. Scott also claims that the judge engaged in misconduct

through his interruptions and demeaning remarks aimed at

defense counsel.1

A

[1] The district court conducted the voir dire based on a

questionnaire previously completed by prospective jurors and

through additional follow-up questions as it saw necessary.

Scott now argues the district court abused its discretion in

refusing to ask certain additional questions proposed by him

that probed for juror bias regarding race. We will not disturb

a district court’s rejection of a defendant’s specific questions

unless the voir dire it conducts is “so unreasonable or devoid

of the constitutional purpose as to constitute an abuse of [ ]

discretion.” Haslam v. United States, 431 F.2d 362, 364 (9th

Cir. 1970); see also United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170,

1Scott also asks us to strike several statements in the Statement of Facts

in the government’s brief for being unsupported by references to the

record, as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28, because

they only refer to the PSR or the indictment. Rule 28 merely requires a

statement of facts to contain “appropriate references to the record,” and

both the PSR and indictment are part of the record on appeal. Fed. R. App.

P. 28(a)(7), (b). No portion of the government’s brief need be stricken. 

UNITED STATES v. SCOTT 7529
1181-83 (9th Cir. 1979). In the questionnaire and during voir

dire, the prospective jurors were asked about racial biases and

whether they felt they could not be impartial. The questions

Scott proposed were either repetitive of these questions or

could have added “fuel to the flames” in suggesting the presence of controversial issues. See Giese, 597 F.2d at 1183. We

are satisfied that the district court here properly exercised its

discretion.

B

Scott notes that on four occasions the district court refused

to let defense counsel ask questions on cross-examination that

pertained to the role of race in prisons, which was especially

harmful because the jury’s verdict was undisputedly based on

its finding that Scott harbored racial animus against blacks.

He claims the court abused its discretion in so limiting crossexamination and, accordingly, violated his rights under the

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and his due

process right to present his defense. 

[2] On most occasions, Scott was able to elicit testimony

from the witness regarding racial segregation in prison. The

questions that the district court prevented defense counsel

from asking were simply repetitive or far afield of the issues

in the case. See United States v. Brown, 936 F.2d 1042,

1048-49 (9th Cir. 1991). On another occasion, defense counsel’s questions on race were outside the scope of any testimony on direct examination. We have previously noted that

the district court “is responsible for determining the relevance

of a given topic and the extent of cross-examination to be permitted on that topic.” Id. at 1048. In prohibiting such questioning on a few occasions, the district court did not abuse its

discretion. See United States v. Vargas, 933 F.2d 701, 704

(9th Cir. 1991).

C

[3] Scott next challenges the district court’s decision to

prohibit juror note-taking. We have previously observed that

7530 UNITED STATES v. SCOTT
“[w]hether it is advisable to permit a jury to take notes is a

subject of some debate, and reasonable arguments are

advanced for and against the practice. The decision of

whether to allow the jury to take notes is left entirely to the

discretion of the trial court.” United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d

1374, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted),

overruled on other grounds by United States v. Norby, 225

F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000). We articulated a number of reasons

for prohibiting note-taking, “including concerns that jurors

would be distracted from observing witnesses, would record

the evidence selectively, or would rely on their own or other

jurors’ inaccurate notes.” Id. The district court here articulated

similar concerns in prohibiting note-taking.

Scott responds that his trial was especially complex or

lengthy. In support of this contention, he points to the jury

requests for an index of exhibits and read-backs of certain testimony. This argument is unpersuasive. Baker, in which we

held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

declining to allow juror notetaking, id., involved “one of the

lengthiest and costliest trials in this nation’s history”—it

“lasted over 16 months, produced over 30,000 pages of transcripts, and involved more than 250 witnesses,” id. at 1386.

Scott’s trial lasted less than seven days.

Nor did the jury’s inability to take notes result in a coerced

verdict, thus violating Scott’s due process right to full and fair

deliberation. There is no evidence that the jury’s verdict was

coerced. The jury deliberated for two days and convicted

Scott on only three of the eight charged overt acts. Scott

points to nothing in the record indicating that the jury was

ever deadlocked on the overt acts for which he was convicted,

or that the district court employed any coercive means to

break any deadlocks. See Harrison v. Gillespie, ___ F.3d ___,

2011 WL 546585, at *9-11 (9th Cir. Feb. 15, 2011) (en banc).

[4] The district court has very broad discretion in deciding

whether to allow note-taking, and it properly exercised that

discretion here.

UNITED STATES v. SCOTT 7531
D

[5] Scott also contends that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on his asserted defenses of mutual

combat and imperfect self-defense. Because Scott did not

request a mutual combat instruction in his amended proposed

instructions, nor object that the district court did not include

the instruction, we review for plain error. United States v.

Bear, 439 F.3d 565, 568-69 (9th Cir. 2006). Scott did not

present or rely upon the mutual combat theory at trial and,

thus, there was no error in the district court’s failure to give

the instruction sua sponte, much less plain error. Id.

[6] As to the imperfect self-defense instruction, there was

also no evidence in the record to support such an instruction.

See United States v. Echeverry, 759 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir.

1985). Scott asserted this defense in relation to his stabbing

of Erving Bond in the shower. For the racketeering activity of

stabbing Bond, Scott was charged under Missouri criminal

law, because the stabbing occurred in Missouri. Under Missouri law, this defense requires that Scott believed harm was

imminent. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031.1 (defining selfdefense as using force against another in the reasonable belief

of defending against the imminent use of unlawful force by

another); State v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 212, 220-21 (Mo. Ct. App.

2001) (noting that imperfect self-defense is merely selfdefense where defendant had an unreasonable belief that the

use of deadly force was necessary to protect himself or

another from serious harm). 

The only evidence that Scott presented to suggest that he

held such a view is Scott Cupples’s hearsay testimony that

Scott heard Bond sharpening a knife. Even accepting the truth

of this testimony would not render the harm imminent. See

State v. Young, 510 S.W.2d 732, 734-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974)

(no evidence of imminence where the deceased had hit the

defendant and threatened him two days prior to the shooting;

the defendant knew that the deceased’s reputation was that of

7532 UNITED STATES v. SCOTT
a killer; the defendant saw the deceased on the morning of the

incident at which time the deceased threatened “to get” him

that day; and the defendant met the deceased while walking

to his car).

Similarly, Scott argues the district court violated Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b) by failing to provide his

attorney with the jury instructions earlier, thus preventing his

attorney from intelligently formulating her closing argument.

Even assuming the district court failed to comply with Rule

30(b), Scott has not shown that his counsel’s closing arguments were prejudicially affected. See United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 1988). Scott fails to suggest

any way in which his closing argument would have been different if the court had provided the instructions earlier. In any

event, we have held a defendant was not prejudiced in more

egregious cases. See, e.g, United States v. McCown, 711 F.2d

1441, 1452 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Wycoff, 545 F.2d

679, 683 (9th Cir. 1976). Therefore, regardless of any error,

Scott has not shown prejudice.

E

As part of the government’s case-in-chief, several former

AB members testified about Scott’s participation in the gang.

After several had testified, the district court instructed the jury

that it first must determine whether a conspiracy existed

before considering the statements of the co-conspirators.2 The

court’s instruction indicates, according to Scott, that the district court erroneously delegated to the jury the task of determining the admissibility of co-conspirator statements.

2The court’s instruction stated, in part, “But once you have made the

determination from the evidence that a conspiracy existed and who the

members are, you can then, and only then, use all of the statements made

by an alleged co-conspirator against any of those persons you find to also

have been conspirators.” 

UNITED STATES v. SCOTT 7533
[7] It has been long-established that a judge must make the

initial determination about the existence of a conspiracy that

would allow for the admission of co-conspirator statements.

See United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 848 (9th Cir. 1976);

see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987);

Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). However, we are satisfied from reading

the record that the district court understood it was required to

make the initial determination about the existence of a conspiracy that would allow for the admission of co-conspirator

statements. See King, 552 F.2d at 848. For example, in ruling

on Scott’s motion in limine to exclude the co-conspirator

statements, the court stated: “Well, again the question is during the trial as to whether or not these statements with reference to the conspiracy and I can’t make that determination

until I hear the evidence of conspiracy and then instruct the

jury, as I often do, as to how they are to treat statements of

other members of the conspiracy with reference to the conspiracy itself.” Furthermore, we may assume the district court

found a prima facie case of conspiracy where it submits, as it

did here, the conspiracy case to the jury. See United States v.

Federico, 658 F.2d 1337, 1343 n.6 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing

Giese, 597 F.2d at 1198), overruled on other grounds by

United States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir.

1984) (en banc).

[8] Finally, the district court’s instruction was not erroneous, for it merely provided the defendant with unnecessary

double protection. See id.; see also United States v. Lutz, 621

F.2d 940, 946 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated in part by

Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181; United States v. Peralta, 941 F.2d

1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 1991).

F

[9] Scott seeks to overturn his conviction on the ground

that the trial judge committed misconduct by interrupting and

directing derogatory comments at defense counsel. We will

reverse a trial court for excessive judicial intervention only in

7534 UNITED STATES v. SCOTT
cases of actual bias, which Scott does not allege, or if “the

judge’s remarks and questioning of witnesses projected to the

jury an appearance of advocacy or partiality,” and the alleged

misconduct had a prejudicial effect on the trial. Shad v. Dean

Witter Reynolds, Inc., 799 F.2d 525, 531 (9th Cir. 1986)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Before a

jury’s verdict will be overturned because of the conduct of a

trial judge in rebuking or punishing an attorney or otherwise

intervening in the proceedings, it must appear that the conduct

measured by the facts of the case presented together with the

result of the trial, was clearly prejudicial to the rights of the

party.” United States v. Bennett, 702 F.2d 833, 836 (9th Cir.

1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The assessment is

to be made, moreover, in light of the evidence of guilt.” Id.

[10] Here the trial transcript indicates that the district judge

interrupted and admonished defense counsel over a hundred

times during the course of a week-long trial. At times, the

judge suggested that the defense counsel knew that she was

acting improperly or was “smirk[ing].” The district court

judge also criticized defense counsel for failing to “give th[e]

jury [ ] credit for brains,” failing to treat jurors as though they

could “count” and “read,” and deliberately wasting the jury’s

time. In several instances the trial judge also engaged in

extensive questioning of both defense and government witnesses. 

[11] Although many of the judge’s comments and interventions were inconsistent with standards of judicial decorum,

we nevertheless conclude that they did not rise to a level that

requires reversal. First, the record indicates that the majority

of the district court’s comments to defense counsel were pursuant to the court’s supervisory role, in that they were aimed

at stopping defense counsel from engaging in irrelevant,

repetitive, or otherwise improper questioning or editorializing.

Insofar as the judge’s rebukes pertained to this kind of conduct, they were within his discretion to ensure the orderly and

efficient presentation of evidence and to control the pace of

UNITED STATES v. SCOTT 7535
trial. Shad, 799 F.2d at 531. Neither did the trial judge’s questioning of witnesses exceed the bounds of propriety. A district

judge has the undeniable authority to examine witnesses and

call the jury’s attention to important evidence. Id. Even in

cases where a district judge’s “questioning was not marked by

complete indifference [and instead sometimes was] quite

pointed and intemperate,” reversal was not required. Kennedy

v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 702, 709 (9th Cir.

1990) (as amended), overruled on other grounds by Act

Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993).

Here, although the judge’s questioning was pointed, it was

generally for the purpose of “clarifying the evidence, confining counsel to evidentiary rulings, controlling the orderly presentation of the evidence, and preventing undue repetition of

testimony.” United States v. Mostella, 802 F.2d 358, 361 (9th

Cir. 1986). Moreover, because the trial judge’s questioning

comprised less than 20 pages of a 1291-page trial transcript,

it did not preempt counsel’s examination. See Kennedy, 901

F.2d at 709 (concluding that when a trial judge’s questioning

filled only eight pages of a 400-page trial transcript, the

“court [did not] dominate questioning of the witnesses so as

to preempt counsel’s function”). 

[12] Most important, the district court judge gave a series

of curative instructions to the jury regarding the conduct at

issue here. The judge stated that his questioning of witnesses

should not be taken as an indication of how he felt about the

case in general or the testimony of any witnesses. He further

explained that he might “admonish a lawyer who out of zeal

for the cause does something which is not in keeping with the

Rules of Evidence or procedure,” but that the jury should “not

[ ] draw any inference against a side to whom an admonition

of mine may be addressed.” The judge also instructed the jury

that “trial cannot be treated as a popularity contest nor should

it be used to measure or compare the skill or cleverness of the

lawyers involved.” Juries are presumed to follow jury instructions, Brown v. Ornoski, 503 F.3d 1006, 1018 (9th Cir. 2007),

and such instructions can “alleviat[e] any appearance of

7536 UNITED STATES v. SCOTT
impartiality the judge’s questioning may have conveyed,”

Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 710. 

[13] In light of the district court judge’s extensive curative

instructions, the strength of the evidence of Scott’s guilt on

the offenses for which he was convicted, and the jury’s independence in rejecting five of the alleged predicate acts, we

conclude that Scott was not prejudiced by any improper conduct on the judge’s part, either individually or in the aggregate. See United States v. Morgan, 376 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th

Cir. 2004) (holding that the trial judge’s misconduct at trial

did not prejudice the defendant in light of the court’s curative

instructions); see also United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d

1350, 1358 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that while charges of judicial misconduct are not “dismissed lightly,” and although a

few of the judge’s remarks were “sharp, even sarcastic,” they

did not warrant a new trial).

III

Scott also appeals his sentence, arguing the district court

violated his Sixth Amendment rights by increasing his sentence based on acquitted overt acts, erroneously found his

offense was a “crime of violence,” applied the incorrect base

offense level, and failed adequately to articulate the reasonableness of the sentence.

A

[14] Scott argues the district court violated his Sixth

Amendment rights by increasing his sentence under the

Guidelines for overt acts for which he was not convicted.

Nothing in the record indicates the district court relied on

such overt acts at sentencing. Regardless, Scott’s Sixth

Amendment right could not have been violated because his

sentence was lower than the statutory maximum authorized

for crimes for which he was convicted—240 months under

RICO. See United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d 654, 657 (9th

UNITED STATES v. SCOTT 7537
Cir. 2007) (“[T]he constitutional propriety of a sentencing

court’s consideration of conduct which underlay an acquitted

charge existed before creation of the Guidelines and continues

to exist today.”).

[15] Scott attempts to distinguish Mercado by arguing that

the overt acts were part of one count—Count Two—on which

Scott went to trial. That is, while a court may consider acquitted counts under Mercado, all the overt acts here were part of

one count. Mercado, however, agreed “with the proposition

that the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing does not violate the Constitution.” See id. (emphasis added). Therefore,

the district court’s alleged use of acquitted conduct did not

violate the Constitution.

B

[16] The district court here looked behind the RICO conviction and considered the underlying predicate offenses in

determining whether Scott’s offense qualified as a crime of

violence. It was proper for the court to do so. Application

Note 2 to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 requires that the focus of the

inquiry in making a “crime of violence” determination be on

the conduct for which Scott was convicted. See United States

v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (RICO conviction

will qualify as career offender predicate offense if the activities encompassed pose a serious potential risk of violence);

see also United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1350

(9th Cir. 1997) (RICO conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberies is a crime of violence under Juvenile Delinquency Act).

The jury’s verdict makes clear that Scott’s conviction was for

conspiracy to murder, which falls squarely within the definition of “crime of violence.” See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) & cmt.

n.1 (noting “crime of violence” includes conspiracy to murder).

Scott nevertheless argues that the district court’s characterization of his crime as a “crime of violence” violated his Sixth

7538 UNITED STATES v. SCOTT
Amendment right because there was no opportunity for the

jury to consider it. As we explained above, no Sixth Amendment rights were violated because Scott was sentenced within

the statutory maximum.

Scott contends that the court’s determination also violated

his Fifth Amendment right to due process because there was

no opportunity to defend against the finding at trial, and the

district court never indicated the standard of proof employed

for the finding. We have previously rejected this argument,

noting that the “crime of violence” determination is a legal,

not factual, one. See United States v. Brown, 417 F.3d 1077,

1079-80 (9th Cir. 2005).

Scott is correct that the district court merely adopted the

PSR’s “crime of violence” determination. This was sufficient.

See United States v. Tam, 240 F.3d 797, 803-04 (9th Cir.

2001) (if the district court adopts the PSR, this court treats it

as the district court’s findings).

C

The district court applied a base offense level of 28, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2E1.1 and 2A1.5. Section 2E1.1, which

covers RICO conspiracies, requires courts to apply the greater

of 19 and the offense level applicable to the underlying racketeering activity. Scott was convicted of the underlying racketeering activity of conspiracy to murder three persons. Section

2A1.5 governs conspiracy to commit murder, and sets a base

offense level of 28, which the district court properly used. 

[17] Scott responds that the base level of 19 should apply

because he was convicted under state law but the jury did not

state whether it convicted him under Colorado, Missouri, Illinois, or Kansas conspiracy statutes. That is, because the

underlying state statute is unclear, the second option under

§ 2E1.1 should not be available. Application Note 2 to

§ 2E1.1 states: “If the underlying conduct violates state law,

UNITED STATES v. SCOTT 7539
the offense level corresponding to the most analogous federal

offense is to be used.” There is no indication that a prerequisite is determining which state law was violated. The special

verdict form indicates the jury found him guilty of conspiring

to murder under state law, so the district court properly analogized to the federal offense of conspiracy to murder.

D

Lastly, Scott challenges his sentence by arguing that the

district court failed to articulate the reasonableness of its sentence, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and failed to give

a statement of reasons for its sentence, as required by 18

U.S.C. § 3553(c). Where, as here, the district court decides

simply to apply the Guidelines, doing so usually will not

require lengthy explanation. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.

338, 356 (2007); United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992-93

(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The sentencing court’s responsibility is to address specific arguments tethered to § 3553(a)

raised by the defendant. Carty, 520 F.3d at 992. Scott raised

several challenges in his sentencing memorandum, and the

district court rejected many of them by properly noting that

they were merely “rearguing the matter of the case.” As to the

other arguments, we are satisfied by the record as a whole that

the district court in adopting the PSR considered them and

simply found them unpersuasive. See United States v.

Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2009); Tam,

240 F.3d at 803-04.

[18] With respect to a statement of reasons under

§ 3553(c), we have held that a “within-Guidelines sentence

ordinarily needs little explanation unless a party has requested

a specific departure, argued that a different sentence is otherwise warranted, or challenged the Guidelines calculation itself

as contrary to § 3553(a).” Carty, 520 F.3d at 992. Scott was

sentenced within a properly calculated Guidelines range; the

PSR explained in great detail the calculations and responses

to objections; and Scott did not argue for a sentence outside

7540 UNITED STATES v. SCOTT
the Guidelines. No detailed explanation by the district court

was necessary.

AFFIRMED.

UNITED STATES v. SCOTT 7541