a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

April 2007 INFORMATION 

TECHNOLOGY

Numerous Federal 

Networks Used to 

Support Homeland 

Security Need to Be 

Better Coordinated 

with Key State and 

Local 

Information-Sharing 

Initiatives

GAO-07-455
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2007

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 

Numerous Federal Networks Used to 

Support Homeland Security Need to Be 

Better Coordinated with Key State and 

Local Information Sharing Initiatives 

Highlights of GAO-07-455, a report to the 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives 

The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice have 17 major networks 

that support their homeland security missions, including sharing information 

with state and local governments. Examples include DHS’s Homeland 

Secure Data Network and DOJ’s Justice Consolidated Network. The 

departments also have four system applications that use the Internet. Among 

the four are DHS’s Homeland Security Information Network—the 

department’s primary information technology system for sharing terrorism 

and related information—and DOJ’s Law Enforcement Online. While some

networks and applications are used solely within their respective 

departments, others are used both within the department and by other 

federal, state, and local agencies and the private sector. For example, of the 

17 networks, 9 are used only within their own department, and 8 are used 

within the department and by other federal, state, and local agencies. The

reported cost to develop, operate, and maintain these networks and 

applications in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 was $893.1 million. 

DHS is statutorily responsible for coordinating the federal government’s 

networks and related systems with state and local governments. Federal 

guidance directs DHS to foster such coordination and collaboration as a 

means to enhance information sharing and avoid duplicative efforts. Key 

practices to help implement the guidance include establishing joint 

strategies and compatible policies and procedures to operate across agency 

boundaries. However, DHS did not fully adhere to these practices in 

coordinating efforts on its Homeland Security Information Network with key 

state and local information-sharing initiatives. For example, it did not work 

with the two key state and local information-sharing initiatives (of the 

Regional Information Sharing System program) to fully develop joint 

strategies to meet mutual needs. It also did not develop compatible policies, 

procedures, and other means to operate across organizational boundaries. 

DHS’s limited use of these practices is attributable in part to the 

department’s expediting its schedule to deploy information-sharing 

capabilities after September 11, 2001, and in doing so not developing an 

inventory of key state and local information-sharing initiatives. 

DHS officials have efforts planned and under way to improve coordination 

and collaboration, including establishing an advisory committee to obtain 

state and local views on network operations. DHS also plans to coordinate 

its efforts with the Administration’s Information Sharing Environment 

initiative that aims to improve information sharing among all levels of 

government and the private sector. However, these activities have either just 

begun or are being planned. Consequently, until DHS develops an inventory 

of key state and local initiatives and fully implements coordination and 

collaboration practices, it is at risk that effective information sharing is not 

occurring and that its Homeland Security Information Network may be

duplicating state and local capabilities. This also raises the issue of whether 

similar coordination and duplication issues exist with the other homeland 

security networks, systems, and applications under DHS’s purview. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-455.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact David Powner 

at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. 

A key challenge in securing our

homeland is ensuring that critical

information collected by the

Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) and the Department of

Justice (DOJ) is shared in a timely

manner with federal, state, and 

local governments and the private 

sector. It is important that federal 

networks and associated systems,

applications, and data facilitate this 

vital information sharing. GAO was 

asked to (1) identify DHS and DOJ

networks and Internet-based 

system applications that support 

homeland security and (2)

determine whether DHS efforts 

associated with its Homeland 

Security Information Network are 

being coordinated with key state 

and local information-sharing

initiatives. GAO assessed the 

coordination between DHS and two

key state and local initiatives of the

Regional Information Sharing 

System program. 

What GAO Recommends

To improve coordination with state 

and local information sharing

efforts and avoid duplication, GAO 

is recommending, among other 

things, that DHS inventory key 

state and local initiatives, 

implement coordination and 

collaboration practices, and ensure

its efforts are consistent with the 

Administration’s informationsharing initiative. In its written 

comments, DHS concurred with

the above recommendations and 

noted actions it is taking to

implement them. 
Page i GAO-07-455 Information Technology

Contents

Letter 1

DHS and DOJ Networks and Internet-Based System Applications 

That Support Homeland Security 2

DHS Efforts to Coordinate Its Homeland Security Information 

Network with Key State and Local Information-Sharing

Initiatives 3

Conclusions 4

Recommendations 5

Appendixes

Appendix I: Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee on Homeland 

Security 7

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 73

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 77

Abbreviations

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOJ Department of Justice

HSIN Homeland Security Information Network

IT information technology

OMB Office of Management and Budget

RISS Regional Information Sharing System

RISSNET Regional Information Sharing System Secure Intranet

RISS ATIX Regional Information Sharing System Automated Trusted 

Information Exchange 

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Page 1 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

April 16, 2007 Letr

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Chairman

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

Dear Chairman Thompson:

One of the challenges in securing our homeland is ensuring that critical 

information collected and analyzed by the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) is shared in a timely 

and secure manner with a variety of parties within federal, state, and local 

governments, as well as the private sector. In 2005,1

 and more recently in 

January 2007,2 we designated homeland security information sharing as a 

high-risk area. Consequently, it is important that federal networks and 

associated systems, applications, and data facilitate this vital information 

sharing, and do so in a manner that produces effective information sharing 

among and between the various levels of government and avoids 

unnecessary and duplicative efforts. This is particularly crucial for DHS’s 

Homeland Security Information Network, which is the department’s 

primary information technology system for sharing terrorism and related 

information. To address these and related information sharing challenges, 

the Administration, in response to congressional direction, recently issued 

a plan to establish, in 3 years, an Information Sharing Environment. This 

initiative is intended to combine policies, procedures, and networks and 

other technologies that link people, systems, and information among all 

appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector.

This report responds to your request that we (1) identify existing and 

planned communications networks and Internet-based system applications 

within DHS and DOJ that support homeland security and (2) determine 

whether DHS efforts associated with its Homeland Security Information 

Network are being coordinated with key state and local informationsharing initiatives.

1

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 

2005).

2

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: January 

2007).
Page 2 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

On January 24, 2007, we provided this briefing to House Homeland Security 

Committee staff. This report transmits the presentation slides we used to 

brief the staff and recommendations that we made to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security and the Director, Office of Operations Coordination, 

who is responsible for managing the Homeland Security Information 

Network program. The full briefing, including our scope and methodology, 

is reprinted as appendix I. 

DHS and DOJ 

Networks and InternetBased System 

Applications That 

Support Homeland 

Security

The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice have 17 major 

networks that they use to support their homeland security missions, 

including sharing information with state and local governments. Examples 

include DHS’s Homeland Secure Data Network and DOJ’s Justice 

Consolidated Network. The departments also have four system 

applications that use the Internet. Among the four are DHS’s Homeland 

Security Information Network and DOJ’s Law Enforcement Online.

The networks and system applications range from top secret to 

unclassified. Of the 17 federal networks, 4 are categorized as either top 

secret or secret, 12 are categorized as sensitive but unclassified, and 1 is 

unclassified. All of the four system applications are categorized as sensitive 

but unclassified.

While some networks and applications are used solely within their 

respective departments, others are used both within the department and by 

other federal agencies, as well as state and local governments and private 

sector entities. Of the 17 networks, 9 are used only within their own 

department, and 8 are used within the department and by other federal, 

state, and/or local agencies. All four of the Internet-based applications are 

used both within the department and by other federal agencies, as well as 

state and local organizations. 

The total cost to develop, operate, and maintain these networks and 

applications in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, as reported by DHS and DOJ, 

was $893.1 million. Of this total, the networks accounted for the vast 

majority of the cost at $830.5 million. 
Page 3 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

DHS Efforts to 

Coordinate Its 

Homeland Security 

Information Network 

with Key State and 

Local InformationSharing Initiatives

DHS is statutorily responsible for coordinating the federal government’s 

networks and other communications systems, like the department’s 

Homeland Security Information Network, with state and local 

governments. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance 

requires DHS to foster such coordination and collaboration as a means to 

improve government performance, including enhancing information 

sharing and avoiding duplication of effort. Key practices to help implement 

the guidance include establishing joint strategies and developing 

compatible policies and procedures to operate across agency boundaries.

However, DHS did not fully adhere to these practices or guidance in 

coordinating its efforts on the Homeland Security Information Network 

with key state and local information-sharing initiatives. For example, in 

developing the system, the department did not work with the two key state 

and local initiatives, which are major parts of the Regional Information 

Sharing System program,3

 to fully develop joint strategies to meet mutual 

needs. In addition, it did not develop compatible policies, procedures, and 

other means to operate across organizational boundaries.

DHS’s limited use of these practices is attributable to a number of factors, 

including the department’s expediting its schedule to deploy informationsharing capabilities after the events of September 11, 2001, and in doing so 

not developing a comprehensive inventory of key state and local 

information-sharing initiatives. Consequently, the department faces the risk 

that, among other things, effective information sharing is not occurring. It 

also faces the risk that the Homeland Security Information Network may be 

duplicating state and local capabilities. 

DHS officials stated that the department has efforts planned and under way 

to improve coordination and collaboration. For example, it is developing an 

integration strategy to allow other entities’ applications and networks to 

more easily connect with its Homeland Security Information Network. In 

addition, the department is establishing a Homeland Security Information 

Network Advisory Committee, that includes state and local officials, whose 

charge is to advise the department on how it can better meet user needs, 

including examining DHS processes for deploying the Homeland Security 

3

This program is a nationwide initiative, operated and managed by state and local officials 

since 1974, to share criminal intelligence among stakeholders in law enforcement, first 

responders, and the private sector to coordinate efforts against crime that operates across 

jurisdictional lines. Funding for the program is administered through federal grant money.
Page 4 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

Information Network to the states as well as assessing what resources 

states already have and how DHS can leverage them. DHS also plans to 

coordinate its improvements efforts with the Administration’s initiative to 

establish the Information Sharing Environment. While these are steps in 

the right direction, they have either just begun or are being planned, with 

milestones for implementation yet to be defined. 

Conclusions DHS and DOJ have a vast array of major federal networks and Internetbased applications, reported to cost almost one billion dollars over the past 

2 years, that are key to these departments achieving their homeland 

security missions, including sharing information with state and local 

governments.

While DHS is responsible for coordinating these network and system 

efforts among federal, state, and local governments, it has not done so 

effectively with regard to its primary information-sharing system and two 

key state and local initiatives. This was due largely to the department’s 

hasty approach to delivering needed information-sharing capabilities; in 

doing so, DHS did not follow key coordination and collaboration practices 

and guidance or invest the time to inventory and fully understand how it 

could leverage state and local approaches. Consequently, the department 

faces the risk that effective information sharing is not occurring and that its 

Homeland Security Information Network may be duplicating existing state 

and local capabilities. DHS recognizes these risks and has improvements 

planned and under way to address them, but it has yet to establish dates for 

when the improvements will be fully completed and institutionalized. 

The limited use of the guidance and practices and the absence of an 

inventory raise doubt about whether DHS is effectively coordinating its 

Homeland Security Information Network efforts with all other key state 

and local information initiatives. DHS’s activities at the state and local level 

also raise questions about whether it has adequately addressed 

coordination and duplication issues with regard to the other federal 

homeland security networks and associated systems and applications 

under the department’s purview. Given what is at stake, it is extremely 

important that DHS authorities expeditiously address these issues and 

mitigate the associated risks. Further, in doing so, it is imperative to ensure 

that any and all efforts to address coordination issues are not done in 

isolation but rather in a manner that is consistent with implementation of 

the recently issued Information Sharing Environment plan.
Page 5 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the 

Director, Office of Operations Coordination, to ensure that the Homeland 

Security Information Network efforts are effectively coordinated with key 

state and local government information-sharing initiatives. This should 

include, 

• identifying existing and planned key state and local information-sharing 

initiatives and assessing whether there are opportunities for the 

program to improve information sharing and avoid duplication of effort;

• where there are opportunities, adopting and institutionalizing key 

practices related to OMB’s guidance on enhancing and sustaining 

agency coordination and collaboration, including developing 

documented policies and procedures to operate across organizational 

boundaries; and

• ensuring that its coordination efforts are consistent with 

implementation of the Information Sharing Environment plan.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security determine 

whether there are coordination and duplication issues with other homeland 

security networks and associated systems and applications. In each case 

where issues are identified, the Secretary should direct the appropriate 

department executive to ensure that the efforts are effectively coordinated 

consistent with our recommendation above.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In DHS’s written comments on a draft of this report, which were contained 

in a letter signed by the Director, Departmental GAO/Office of Inspector 

General Liaison, the department stated it agreed with our 

recommendations on identifying and inventorying key state and local 

initiatives, implementing coordination and collaboration practices, and 

ensuring its efforts are consistent with implementation of the Information 

Sharing Environment plan. In addition, DHS described actions it is taking 

to address each recommendation. However, these actions did not 

specifically include whether the department is to identify and inventory 

existing and planned key state and local information-sharing initiatives. As 

we stated in our briefing, without this inventory, the department will have 

limited knowledge of state and local initiatives and will continue to risk 

duplicating these capabilities.
Page 6 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

With regard to our recommendation on determining whether coordination 

and duplication issues exist with other homeland security systems, DHS 

said that it is still taking the recommendation under advisement and plans 

to provide an update to appropriate congressional committees and the 

OMB within 60 days of our report’s issuance. DHS’s comments are 

reprinted in appendix II. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary 

of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of OMB. 

Copies are also available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your office have questions on matters discussed in this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made 

key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

David A. Powner 

Director, Information Technology 

 Management Issues
Page 7 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee Apendxies

on Homeland Security ApendxiI

Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks Used to 

Support Homeland Security Need to Be Better Coordinated with 

Key State and Local Information Sharing Initiatives

Briefing to Staff

of the House Committee on Homeland Security

January 23, 2007
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 8 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

2

Overview

• Introduction

• Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

• Results in Brief

• Background

• Results

• Objective 1

• Objective 2

• Conclusions

• Recommendations

• Agency Comments

• Appendix I: Detailed Scope and Methodology

• Appendix II: Definitions and Descriptions
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 9 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

3

Introduction

One of the challenges in securing our homeland is ensuring that critical information 

collected and analyzed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 

Department of Justice (DOJ) is shared in a timely and secure manner with a variety 

of parties within federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector. 

It is important that federal networks and associated systems, applications, and data 

facilitate this vital information sharing, and do so in a manner that produces 

effective information sharing among and between the various levels of government 

and avoids unnecessary and duplicative efforts. This is particularly crucial for 

DHS’s Homeland Security Information Network, which is the department’s primary 

information technology system for sharing terrorism and related information.

To address these and related information sharing challenges, the Administration, in 

response to congressional direction, recently issued a plan to establish, in 3 years, 

an Information Sharing Environment that is to combine policies, procedures, and 

networks and other technologies that link people, systems, and information among 

all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector. 
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 10 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

4

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

As agreed, our objectives were to

• identify existing and planned communications networks and Internet-based 

system applications within DHS and DOJ that support homeland security, and

• determine whether DHS efforts associated with its Homeland Security 

Information Network (HSIN) are being coordinated with key state and local 

information-sharing initiatives.

For the first objective, we identified and analyzed descriptive data (e.g., type of 

network, estimated costs) on the major networks and Internet-based system 

applications identified by DHS and DOJ as being developed or operated and 

maintained by them in support of their homeland security missions.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 11 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

5

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

For our second objective, we analyzed the extent to which the development and 

use of DHS’s HSIN has been coordinated with two key state and local homeland 

security information-sharing initiatives: the Regional Information Sharing System 

Secure Intranet and the Automated Trusted Information Exchange, which are major 

parts of the Regional Information Sharing System program. We selected these 

initiatives based on our discussions with state and local officials (e.g., National 

Association of State Chief Information Officers, National Governors Association, 

and state fusion centers) and our review of available documentation.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 12 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

6

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

We assessed the extent of coordination and collaboration between DHS and the 

Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) program based on the requirements 

of the Homeland Security Act1 of 2002 and other federal guidance and best 

practices identified by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)2 and on prior 

GAO research and experience at federal agencies.3 In doing so, we also assessed 

how DHS and RISS ensured that this information was, among other things, 

relevant, reliable, and timely.

Details of our scope and methodology are provided in appendix I. We performed 

our work from February 2006 through December 2006, in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

For the purposes of this review, a network is defined as data communication links 

that enable computer systems to communicate with each other. Definitions and 

descriptions of this and other terms are provided in appendix II.

1Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002).

2 For example, Office of Management and Budget, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, Circular A-11 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 

2006) and Management of Federal Information Resources, Circular A-130 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2000).

3For example, GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005) and, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That 

Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: October 2005).
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 13 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

7

Results in Brief

Objective 1

Objective 1: DHS and DOJ Have Numerous Networks and Internet-Based 

System Applications That Support Homeland Security

The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice have 17 major networks that 

they use to support their homeland security missions, including sharing information 

with state and local governments. Examples include DHS’s Homeland Secure Data 

Network and DOJ’s Justice Consolidated Network. The departments also have four 

system applications that use the Internet. Among the four are DHS’s primary 

information-sharing system, HSIN, and DOJ’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO).

The networks and system applications range from top secret to unclassified. Of the 

17 federal networks, 4 are categorized as either top secret or secret, 12 are 

categorized as sensitive but unclassified, and 1 is unclassified. All of the four 

system applications are categorized as sensitive but unclassified.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 14 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

8

Results in Brief

Objective 1

While some networks and applications are used solely within their respective 

departments, others are used both within the department and by other federal 

agencies, as well as state and local governments and private sector entities. Of the 

17 networks, 9 are used only within their own department, and 8 are used within 

the department and by other federal, state, and/or local agencies. All four of the 

Internet-based applications are used both within the department and by other 

federal agencies, as well as state and local organizations. 

The total cost to develop, operate, and maintain these networks and applications in 

fiscal years 2005 and 2006, as reported by DHS and DOJ, was $893.1 million. Of 

this total, the networks accounted for the vast majority of the cost at $830.5 million. 
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 15 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

9

Results in Brief

Objective 2

Objective 2: Department of Homeland Security’s Efforts to Coordinate Its 

Homeland Security Information Network with Key State and Local 

Information-Sharing Initiatives Have Been Limited

DHS is statutorily responsible for coordinating the federal government’s networks 

and other communications systems, like HSIN, with state and local governments. 

OMB guidance requires DHS to foster such coordination and collaboration as a 

means to improve government performance, including enhancing information 

sharing and avoiding duplication of effort. Key practices to help implement the 

guidance include establishing joint strategies and developing compatible policies 

and procedures to operate across agency boundaries.

However, DHS did not fully adhere to these practices or guidance in coordinating 

its efforts on HSIN with key state and local information-sharing initiatives. For 

example, in developing HSIN, DHS did not work with the two key state and local 

initiatives, which are major parts of the RISS program, to fully develop joint 

strategies to meet mutual needs. In addition, DHS did not develop compatible 

policies, procedures, and other means to operate across organizational 

boundaries.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 16 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

10

Results in Brief

Objective 2

DHS’s limited use of these practices is attributable in part to a number of factors, 

including the department’s expediting its schedule to deploy HSIN capabilities after 

the events of September 11, 2001, and in doing so not developing a

comprehensive inventory of key state and local information-sharing initiatives. 

Consequently, the department faces the risk that, among other things, effective 

information sharing is not occurring. DHS also faces the risk that its HSIN system 

may be duplicating state and local capabilities. The department has efforts planned 

and under way to improve coordination and collaboration, but these efforts have 

either just begun or are being planned with implementation milestones yet to be 

defined.

We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security to ensure, 

among other things, that HSIN is effectively coordinated with key state and local 

government information-sharing initiatives. Such coordination should include 

identifying and inventorying key state and local initiatives. In addition, where 

opportunities exist for improving information sharing and avoiding duplication, the 

department should implement the key practices related to OMB’s guidance on 

agency coordination and collaboration and do so consistent with the President’s 

Information Sharing Environment plan.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 17 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

11

Background

Departments of Homeland Security and Justice

DHS and DOJ are two key federal departments involved in securing the homeland. 

DHS’s mission includes, among other things, leading the unified national effort to 

secure America, preventing and deterring terrorist attacks, and protecting against 

and responding to threats and hazards to the nation. As part of its mission and as 

required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, it is also responsible for 

coordinating efforts across all levels of government and throughout the nation, 

including federal, state, tribal, local, and private sector homeland security 

resources.

DHS’s mission is carried out by its various components, including the following:

x Customs and Border Protection

x Federal Emergency Management

Agency

x Immigration and Customs

Enforcement

x Secret Service 

x Transportation Security

Administration

x Coast Guard
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 18 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

12

Background

Departments of Homeland Security and Justice

The figure on the following slide shows these components’ organizational 

placement within DHS as well as other key components that make up the 

department.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 19 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

13

Background

Departments of Homeland Security and Justice

DHS Organizational Structure (simplified)
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 20 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

14

Background

Departments of Homeland Security and Justice

DOJ’s mission includes, among other things, ensuring public safety against threats 

foreign and domestic to our country and providing federal leadership in preventing 

and controlling crime.

DOJ’s mission is carried out by its various components, such as the 

• Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives;

• Bureau of Justice Assistance;

• Federal Bureau of Investigation; and

• Justice Management Division.

The figure on the following slide shows these components’ organizational 

placements within DOJ, as well as the other key components that make up the 

department.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 21 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

15

Background

Departments of Homeland Security and Justice

DOJ Organizational Structure (simplified)
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 22 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

16

Background

As we previously reported, DHS, DOJ, and other agencies rely extensively on 

information technology (IT), such as networks and associated system applications, 

to carry out their mission and support homeland security. Specifically, in September 

2004, we reported that DHS, DOJ, and other federal agencies identified 34 major 

networks that support homeland security functions—32 operational and 2 in 

development.4

We also reported that these networks in large part were used for information

sharing. Of the 34 major networks, 21 were single-agency networks designed 

solely for internal communications, and the remaining 13 were used to share 

information with other organizations, such as federal agencies, state and local 

governments, and private sector entities.

4GAO, Information Technology: Major Federal Networks That Support Homeland Security Functions, GAO-04-375 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2004).
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 23 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

17

Background

Homeland Security Information Network

A key DHS application that we reported on in 2004 is HSIN.5 DHS considers HSIN 

to be its primary communication application for transporting sensitive but 

unclassified information. According to DHS, this network is an encrypted, 

unclassified, Web-based communications application that serves as DHS’s primary 

nationwide information-sharing and collaboration tool. It is intended to offer both 

real-time chat and instant messaging capability, as well as a document library that 

contains reports from multiple federal, state, and local sources. Available through 

the application are suspicious incident and pre-incident information and analysis of 

terrorist threats, tactics, and weapons.

The application is managed within DHS’s Office of Operations Coordination. The 

figure on the following slide shows HSIN’s and the office’s organizational 

placements within DHS.

5GAO-04-375.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 24 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

18

Background

Homeland Security Information Network

DHS Organizational Structure (simplified)
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 25 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

19

Background

Homeland Security Information Network

HSIN is composed of over 35 communities of interest such as emergency 

management, law enforcement, counterterrorism, individual states, and private 

sector communities. Each community of interest has Web pages that are tailored 

for the community and contain general and community-specific news articles, links, 

and contact information. The community Web pages also provide access to other 

resources such as the following:

• Document library. Users can search the entire document library within the 

communities they have access to.

• Discussion threads. HSIN has a discussion thread (or bulletin board) feature 

that allows users to post information that other users should know about and 

post requests for information that other users might have. Community 

administrators can also post and track tasks assigned to users during an 

incident.

• Chat tool. HSIN’s chat tool, known as Jabber, is similar to other instant 

message and chat tools—with the addition of security. Users can customize 

lists of their coworkers and send messages individually or set up chat rooms for 

more users. Other features include chat logs (which allow users to review 

conversations), timestamps, and user profiles.

More detailed information on HSIN is provided later in the briefing.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

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Background

Regional Information Sharing Systems Program

State and local governments have similar IT initiatives to carry out their homeland 

security missions, including sharing information. A key state and local-based 

initiative is the RISS program.

The RISS program is a nationwide initiative, operated and managed by state and 

local officials, to share criminal intelligence among stakeholders in law 

enforcement, such as federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies; 

first responders; and the private sector; to coordinate efforts against crime that 

operates across jurisdictional lines. Established in 1974, the program consists of 

six regional information analysis centers that serve as regional hubs across the 

country. These centers offer services to RISS members in their regions, including 

information sharing and research, analytical products, case investigation support, 

funding, equipment loans, and training. Funding for the RISS program is 

administered through a DOJ grant. Fiscal year 2006 funding for the program was 

about $40 million.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 27 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

21

Background

Regional Information Sharing Systems Program

The six regional centers are

• Western States Information Network,

• Rocky Mountain Information Network,

• Mid-States Organized Crime Information Center,

• Regional Organized Crime Information Center,

• Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network, and

• New England State Police Information Network.

The following figure shows the RISS program’s regional territories and 

corresponding centers.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 28 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

22

Background

Regional Information Sharing Systems Program

RISS Jurisdictional Map

a Western States Information Network. d Regional Organized Crime Information Center. b Rocky Mountain Information Network. e Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network. c Mid-States Organized Crime Information Center. f New England State Police Information Network.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

Page 29 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

23

Background

Regional Information Sharing Systems Program

Among others, RISS operates two key state and local information-sharing 

initiatives. The first is RISS Secure Intranet, which is commonly referred to as 

RISSNET; the second is the RISS Automated Trusted Information Exchange, or 

RISS ATIX.6

• RISSNET is intended as a secure network serving law enforcement agencies 

throughout the United States and other countries. Through this network, RISS 

offers services such as secure e-mail, document libraries, intelligence 

databases, Web pages, bulletin boards, and a chat tool. Created in 1996, 

RISSNET offers resources to member agencies across the nation and 

internationally.

• RISS ATIX offers services similar to those described in RISSNET to agencies 

beyond the law enforcement community, including executives and officials from 

governmental and nongovernmental agencies and organizations that have

public safety responsibilities. RISS ATIX is partitioned into 39 communities of 

interest, such as critical infrastructure, emergency management, public health, 

and government officials. Members of each community of interest contribute 

information to be made available within each community.

6Formerly called the Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 30 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

24

Background

Regional Information Sharing Systems Program

According to RISS officials, the RISS ATIX application was developed in response 

to the events of September 11, 2001, and initiated in 2002 as an application to 

provide tools for information sharing and collaboration among public safety 

stakeholders, such as first responders and schools. As of July 2006, RISS ATIX 

supported 1,922 users beyond the traditional users of RISSNET.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 31 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

25

Background

Regional Information Sharing Systems Program

RISS ATIX uses the technology of RISSNET to offer services through its Web 

pages. The pages are tailored for each community of interest and contain

community-specific news articles, links, and contact information. The pages also 

provide access to the following features:

• Document library. Participants can store and search relevant documents 

within their community of interest. 

• Bulletin board. The RISS ATIX bulletin board allows users to post timely 

threat information in discussion forums and to view and respond to posted 

information. Users can post documents, images, and information related to 

terrorism and homeland security, as well as receive DHS information, 

advisories, and warnings. According to RISS officials, the bulletin boards are 

monitored by a RISS moderator to relay any information that might be useful 

for other communities of interest.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 32 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

26

Background

Regional Information Sharing Systems Program

• Chat tool. ATIXLive is an online, real-time, collaborative communications 

information-sharing tool for the exchange of information by community 

members. Through this tool, users can post timely threat information and view 

and respond to messages posted.

• Secure e-mail. RISS ATIX participants have access to e-mail that can be used 

to provide alerts and related information. According to RISS, this is done in a 

secure environment.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 33 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

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Background

GAO Designated Information Sharing as High Risk

In January 2005, we identified7 establishing appropriate and effective information 

sharing mechanisms to improve homeland security as one of our high-risk areas to 

monitor. We also reported that while this area had received increased attention, the 

federal government still faced formidable challenges to sharing information among 

stakeholders in an appropriate and timely manner in order to minimize risk.

To aid with aspects of this challenge, we recommended in a October 2005 report8

that federal agencies with overlapping homeland security information-sharing 

responsibilities enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by adopting and 

implementing certain practices, such as establishing joint strategies and addressing 

needs by leveraging resources; developing compatible policies, procedures, and 

other means to operate across agency boundaries; and developing mechanisms to 

monitor, evaluate, and report on results.

Based on our research and experience, these practices are also relevant for 

collaboration between federal agencies and other levels of government (e.g., state, 

local). We also noted that until these coordination and collaboration practices are 

implemented, these agencies face the risk that effective information sharing will not 

occur.

7GAO-05-207.

8GAO-06-15.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 34 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

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Background

GAO Designated Information Sharing as High Risk

In March 2006, we reported9 on efforts by Congress and the Administration to 

address these challenges. In particular, we reported that in response to 

congressional direction, the President had initiated an effort to establish an 

Information Sharing Environment that is to combine policies, procedures, and 

networks and other technologies that link people, systems, and information among 

all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector. To 

assist in this effort, we recommended, among other things, that the Director of 

National Intelligence assess progress in implementing the Information Sharing 

Environment, identify barriers to achieving the environment, and propose any 

necessary changes needed to create the Information Sharing Environment. 

In November 2006, the Administration issued its plan for implementing this 

environment and described actions that the federal government intends—in 

coordination with state, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign partners—to carry 

out over the next 3 years.

9GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but 

Unclassified Information, GAO-06-385 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006).
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 35 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

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Results: Objective 1 Overview 

Major Homeland Security Networks

Objective 1: DHS and DOJ Have Numerous Networks and Internet-Based 

System Applications That Support Homeland Security

DHS and DOJ have 17 federal networks that they currently use to support 

homeland security functions. In addition, the departments reported that they also 

use the Internet, a publicly available network, via four of the departments’ 

applications to support these homeland security functions. The 17 federal networks 

are categorized as follows:

• 2 are top secret,

• 2 are secret, 

• 12 are sensitive but unclassified, and 

• 1 is unclassified. 

Of the 4 applications that use the Internet, all are considered sensitive but 

unclassified.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 36 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

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Results: Objective 1 Overview 

Major Homeland Security Networks

These federal networks and agency applications are used in some cases solely 

within their respective agency, while others are also used by other federal 

agencies, as well as state and local governments and private sector entities. 

Specifically, of the 17 federal networks, 9 are used solely within their agency, 8 are 

used both within their agency and by other federal agencies, 5 are used by state 

governments, and 4 are used by local governments. All of the Internet-based 

applications are used by other federal agencies and by state and local

governments.

As reported by the DHS and DOJ, the total cost to develop, operate, and maintain 

these networks and applications in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 is $893.1 million. Of 

this total, 

• networks account for $830.5 million, and 

• applications account for $62.6 million.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 37 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

31

Results: Objective 1 Overview 

Major Homeland Security Networks

The table below summarizes the information on these DHS and DOJ networks 

and Internet-based applications by information security categories, use within 

and outside the departments, and reported costs (in millions of dollars). 

Categories

Intra-agency and

Intergovernmental Reported cost

Top

secret Secret

Sensitive but

unclassified Unclassified Totals

Solely

intraagency

Federal

to

federal

Federal

to state

Federal

to local 2005 2006

DOJ Networks 1 1 4 – 6 3 3 2 2 $93.4 $157.7

InternetBased

Applications

–– 3 – 3 – 3 3 3 $15.3 $14.9

DHS Networks 1 1 8 1 11 6 5 3 2 $273.2a $306.2a

InternetBased

Applications

–– 1 – 1 – 1 1 1 $11.9 $20.5

Total number of networks and applications: 21 Total cost $393.8a $499.3a

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

aCosts for DHS’s C Local Area Network are not included in reported figures as the information is not publicly available.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Results: Objective 1 Overview 

Major Homeland Security Networks

The following slides provide, by information security categories (e.g., top secret, 

secret, sensitive but unclassified),

• each of the networks and Internet-based applications,

• a description of their functions, including

• how they support homeland security, and

• their use within and outside the department, and

• fiscal year 2005 and 2006 costs. 
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 39 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

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Results: Objective 1

Classified Networks: Top Secret

Summary Information and Description of Top Secret Networks

Network users

Top secret networks Intraagency Intergovernmental

Total

$50.4

Reported cost

(in millions)

Network name Description DHS DOJ

Other

federal

agencies

State Local FY

2005

FY

2006

C Local Area 

Network

This network, commonly referred to as the CLAN, is used within DHS to communicate top

secret information with the Intelligence

Community. It provides connectivity to the

Department of Defense’s Joint Worldwide

Intelligence Communications System to

access, receive, and share intelligence

information.

a

Not

publicly

available

Not

publicly

available

Sensitive

Compartmental

Information

Operational

Network

This network, also known as SCION, is used

to transport top secret counterterrorism data,

including intelligence and warning 

information. For example, it provides an

interface with the Department of Defense’s 

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications

System that allows Federal Bureau of

Investigation agents and analysts to

exchange top secret intelligence information

with other members of the Intelligence

Community.

a $15.1 $35.3

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

aAgency uses and is responsible for operating and maintaining the network.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 40 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

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Results: Objective 1

Classified Networks: Secret

Network users

Secret networks

Intra-agency Intergovernmental

Reported cost

(in millions)

Total

$87.7

$78.8

Network name Description DHS DOJ

Other

federal

agencies

State Local FY

2005

FY

2006

Federal

Bureau of 

Investigation

Network

This network, commonly referred to as the

FBINET, is a global-wide area network

used for communicating secret information,

including investigative case files and

intelligence pertaining to national security;

it also runs administrative applications.

a $29.1 $58.6

Homeland

Secure Data 

Network

Also known as HSDN, this network 

transmits homeland security data in 

support of activities including intelligence,

investigations, and inspections that are

classified at the secret level. HSDN 

provides secret connectivity to civilian

agencies and is to provide secret

connectivity in the future for civilian

agencies currently using the Department of

Defense’s Secret Internet Protocol Router

Network. For example, it is used to transmit

intelligence summaries, secure messaging 

and e-mail correspondence.

a b bb $46.2 $32.6

Summary Information and Description of Secret Networks

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

aAgency uses and is responsible for operating and maintaining the network. bAgency that uses the network.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 41 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

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Results: Objective 1

Sensitive But Unclassified Networks

Network users

Sensitive but unclassified networks Intraagency Intergovernmental

Reported

cost

(in millions) Total

$30.0

$24.1

Network name Description DHS DOJ

Other

federal

agencies

State Local FY

2005

FY

2006

Coast Guard 

Data Network

Plus

Commonly known as CGDN+, this network is used to

transmit information such as maritime-related law 

enforcement information and intelligence supporting

drug interdiction, maritime safety and security data,

vessel tracking data, search and rescue data,

environmental hazard data, border control data, and

emergency sealift management data.

a b $15.0 $15.0

Critical

Infrastructure

Warning

Information

Network

CWIN is used to transmit voice and data on

infrastructure protection, communication and

coordination, alert, and notification. In the event that

a significant attack disrupts telecommunications

networks or the Internet, the Critical Infrastructure

Warning Information Network is to provide secure

capability for communications across key

government network operations centers, the private

and public sectors, and trusted foreign partners.

According to DHS, it is the critical, survivable

network connecting DHS with the vital sectors that

are essential in restoring the nation’s infrastructure

during incidents of national significance.

a b b $12.1 $12.0

Summary Information and Description of Sensitive but Unclassified Networks

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

aAgency uses and is responsible for operating and maintaining the network. bAgency that uses the network.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 42 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

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Results: Objective 1

Sensitive But Unclassified Networks

Network users

Sensitive but unclassified networks

Intraagency Intergovernmental

Reported cost

(in millions) Total

$11.1

$121.7

$23.7

Network

name Description DHS DOJ

Other

federal

agencies

State Local FY

2005

FY

2006

Criminal

Justice

Information

Services

Wide Area

Network

This network is also known as the CJIS WAN. It is to

provide secure electronic connectivity to information on 

individuals, vehicles, and property associated with

crimes or terrorist organizations to state, local, tribal,

and federal law enforcement agencies. It is also used to

identify individuals from submitted fingerprints and to

exchange deoxyribonucleic acid information,

background check information, and criminal history 

information.

a b b b $5.5 $5.6

Customs

and Border 

Protection

Network

Commonly referred to as the CBP Network, this network

is used to transmit sensitive but unclassified data related

to Customs and Border Protection’s support of

homeland security functions, such as protecting the

nation’s borders from terrorists and regulating and

facilitating the lawful movement of goods and persons

across U.S. borders.

a $58.7 $63.0

DHS Core 

Network

Also known as the DCN, this network is used to transmit

sensitive but unclassified data related to DHS’s 

homeland security mission in areas such as customs

and border patrol, intelligence and warning, and

domestic counter-terrorism.

a $13.4 $10.3

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

aAgency uses and is responsible for operating and maintaining the network. bAgency that uses the network.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 43 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

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Results: Objective 1

Sensitive But Unclassified Networks

Network users Sensitive but unclassified networks

Intra-agency Intergovernmental

Reported cost

(in millions)

Total

$13.9

$61.0

$27.0

Network name Description DHS DOJ

Other

federal

agencies

State Local FY

2005

FY

2006

FBI

Unclassified

Network

Commonly known as UNet, this network is 

a national wide area network that provides

the Federal Bureau of Investigation with 

access to sensitive but unclassified

intelligence and law-enforcement sensitive

information. For example, it provides

bureau agents with access to secure mail 

and the Law Enforcement Online.

a $4.7 $9.2

Justice

Consolidated

Network

Also known as the JCN, this network is 

used to transmit, among DOJ components,

fingerprint, arrest records, and other data

relating to the investigation and prosecution 

of crimes and terrorist activities.

a b $30.0 $31.0

Justice Unified

Telecommunications

Network

This network, also known as JUTNet, is 

used for transmitting sensitive but

unclassified information (such as fingerprint

and arrest information) pertaining to the

investigation and prosecution of crimes and

terrorist activities. In addition, it supports

video-conferencing and certain voice over

Internet protocol services.

a b b b $9.0 $18.0

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

aAgency uses and is responsible for operating and maintaining the network. bAgency that uses the network.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Results: Objective 1

Sensitive But Unclassified Networks

Network users

Sensitive but unclassified networks Intraagency Intergovernmental

Total

$33.6

$5.9

$175.0

Reported cost

(in millions)

Network name Description DHS DOJ

Other

federal

agencies

State Local FY

2005

FY

2006

Immigration

and Customs 

Enforcement

Network

Also known as ICENet, this network supports

the data transmission needs of the DHS’s

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

component. For example, the major

programs dependent on this network include 

the Office of Investigations, the Detention

and Removal Office, the Federal Protective

Services Office, and the Intelligence Office.

a b b b $14.4 $19.2

Secret Service 

Wide Area 

Network

Commonly referred to as the Secret Service 

WAN, this network supports the homeland

security mission by providing security and

protection to our nation’s leaders and

financial systems.

a $2.8 $3.1

Transportation

Security

Administration

Network

This network, also known as TSANet, is a

global network used for security operations,

intelligence, and law enforcement information

sharing. For example, it is used to transmit

alerts, fingerprints, and information from the

Transportation Security Administration’s

mission-critical applications.

a b $70.0 $105.0

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

aAgency uses and is responsible for operating and maintaining the network. bAgency that uses the network.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 45 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

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Results: Objective 1

Sensitive But Unclassified Networks

Network users

Sensitive but unclassified networks Intraagency Intergovernmental

Total

$74.6

Report cost 

(in millions)

Network name Description DHS DOJ

Other

federal

agencies

State Local FY

2005

FY

2006

ONENet ONENet is a single network that is to use

dual carriers to support interoperability

and data sharing, in all DHS mission

areas, between all DHS components.

DHS is deploying ONENet to DHS

components. ONENet is to consolidate the

following seven networks: Coast Guard

Data Network Plus, Customs and Border

Protection Network, DHS Core Network,

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Switched Network, Immigration and

Customs Enforcement Network, Secret

Service Wide Area Network, and

Transportation Security Administration

Network.

a $34.6 $40.0

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

aAgency uses and is responsible for operating and maintaining the network.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Results: Objective 1

Sensitive But Unclassified Applications

Summary Information and Description of Sensitive but Unclassified Applications

Application users

Sensitive but unclassified applications

Intra-agency Intergovernmental

Reported cost

(in millions)

Total

$.5

$.3

Application

name Description DHS DOJ

Other

federal

agencies

State Local FY

2005

FY

2006

Bomb

Arson

Tracking

System

Commonly referred to as BATS, this

application is a partnership among DOJ,

the Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives’ Bomb Data Center, and

members of the nation's fire and post-blast

investigative communities. Its purpose is to

provide these organizations with a

comprehensive incident-based

information-sharing system.

a b b b $.2 $.3

eTrace The eTrace application is a Web-based

firearm trace submission system and trace

analysis module for use by approved law 

enforcement agencies. The purpose of the

eTrace application is to improve the

efficiency of the firearm tracing process

and provide for the secure exchange of

firearms trace-related information between

the law enforcement community and

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and

Explosives Bureau.

a b b b $.2 $.1

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

aAgency uses and is responsible for operating and maintaining the application. bAgency that uses the application.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

Page 47 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

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Results: Objective 1

Sensitive But Unclassified Applications

Application users

Sensitive but unclassified applications Intraagency Intergovernmental

Reported cost

(in millions)

Total

$32.4

$29.4

Application

Name Description DHS DOJ

Other

federal

agencies

State Local FY

2005

FY

2006

Homeland

Security

Information

Network

Also known as HSIN, this application provides

connectivity between DHS’s National

Operations Center, the National Center for

Real-Time Threat Monitoring, domestic incident 

management and information sharing—and

select private industry as well as the federal,

state, and local organizations responsible for or

involved in combating terrorism, responding to

critical incidents, and managing special events.

a b b b $11.9 $20.5

Law

Enforcement

Online

This application, commonly known as LEO, is a

real time on-line controlled access

communications and information-sharing data

repository. It supports an Internet-accessible

focal point for electronic sensitive but

unclassified communication and information

sharing with federal, state, local, and tribal law

enforcement agencies. For example, it contains

information about, among other things, antiterrorism, intelligence, law enforcement, and

criminal justice.

a b b b $14.9 $14.5

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

aAgency uses and is responsible for operating and maintaining the application. bAgency that uses the application.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Results: Objective 1

Unclassified Network

Summary Information and Functional Description of Unclassified Network

Network users

Unclassified networks

Intra-agency Intergovernmental

Reported Cost

(in millions)

Total

$12.0

Network name Description DHS DOJ

Other

federal

agencies

State Local FY

2005

FY

2006

Federal

Emergency

Management

Agency

Switched

Network

This network, commonly known as the FEMA

Switched Network, provides support for

emergency coordination of federal, state, and

local operations, disaster assistance, and

government recovery efforts. For example, it

is used to pass information on disaster

victims and logistics for disasters, in addition 

to normal business.

a $6.0 $6.0

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

aAgency uses and is responsible for operating and maintaining the network.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Results: Objective 2

Limited Coordination

Department of Homeland Security’s Efforts to Coordinate Its 

Homeland Security Information Network with Key State and Local 

Information-Sharing Initiatives Have Been Limited

As previously discussed, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires DHS to, 

among other things, coordinate the federal government’s homeland security

communications systems with all levels of government, including state and local. 

OMB guidance also requires DHS to foster such coordination and collaboration as 

a means to improving government performance, including enhancing information

sharing and reducing or eliminating duplicative programmatic and IT efforts.10 In

October 2005, we identified and reported on key practices related to OMB’s 

guidance that can help enhance and sustain agency coordination and 

collaboration.11 Examples of key practices cited include

• establishing joint strategies and addressing needs by leveraging resources;

• developing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate 

across agency boundaries; and

• developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results.

10OMB Circular A-11 and Circular A-130.

11GAO-06-15.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Results: Objective 2

Limited Coordination

However, DHS did not fully adhere to these practices in coordinating its efforts on 

HSIN with key state and local information-sharing initiatives. For example, in 

developing HSIN, DHS did not work with two RISS program initiatives to fully 

develop joint strategies to meet mutual needs. DHS’s limited use of these practices 

is attributable to a number of factors, including the department’s expedited 

schedule to deploy HSIN capabilities after the events of September 11, 2001, and 

in doing so, not developing an inventory of key state and local information 

initiatives. Until the department fully implements these coordination and 

collaboration practices and guidance, it faces the risk that effective information 

sharing is not occurring. 
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Results: Objective 2

Limited Coordination

First, while DHS officials met with RISS program officials to discuss exchanging 

terrorism related documents, joint strategies for meeting mutual needs by 

leveraging resources have not been fully developed. Specifically: 

• DHS did not engage the RISS program in ongoing dialogue to determine how 

resources could be leveraged to meet mutual needs. According to RISS 

program officials, they met with DHS on September 25, 2003, and January 7, 

2004, to demonstrate that their RISS ATIX application could be used by DHS 

for sharing homeland security information. However, communication from DHS 

on this topic stopped after the meetings with no explanation. DHS officials told 

us they could not remember having the meetings and attributed this to people 

in the meetings no longer being at DHS.

• While DHS initially pursued a limited strategy of exchanging selected terrorismrelated documents with the RISS program, the strategy has been impeded by 

technical issues and by differences in what each organization considers to be 

terrorism information. For example, the exchange of documents between HSIN 

and the RISS program stopped on August 1, 2006, due to technical problems

with HSIN’s upgrade to a new infrastructure. As of December 2006, the 

exchange of terrorism-related documents had not resumed. HSIN program 

management told us that they are currently working to fix this issue, and it 

should be resolved by February 2007.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Results: Objective 2

Limited Coordination

Second, DHS has not fully developed coordinated policies, procedures, and other 

means to operate across agency boundaries with the RISS program. For example:

• DHS did not work with the RISS program to develop coordinated policies, 

procedures, and other means for leveraging the RISS program’s available 

technological resources. According to the program manager, DHS now plans to 

develop coordinated policies with, among others, state and local entities.

However, DHS did not provide a date by when this will be done.

• Although an operating agreement was established to govern the exchange of 

terrorism-related documents, according to RISS officials it did not cover the full 

range of information available through the RISS program. 

Third, DHS did not develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on the 

results of these collaboration efforts. According to the HSIN program manager, 

DHS is working on providing a feedback mechanism by which users are able to 

report systems issues. DHS plans to implement this by February 2007.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Results: Objective 2

Limited Coordination

The extent of DHS’s adherence to key practices (and the resulting limited 

coordination) is attributable to the following:

• DHS was on a short schedule to deploy an information sharing application that 

could be used across the federal government in the wake of 9/11; in its haste, 

DHS did not develop an inventory of key state and local information initiatives. 

According to DHS officials, they currently still do not have a complete inventory

of key state and local information sharing initiatives. Consistent with this, DHS’s

Office of Inspector General recently reported that DHS developed HSIN in a 

rapid and ad hoc manner, and among other things, did not adequately identify 

existing federal, state, and local resources, such as RISSNET, that it could 

have leveraged.12

• DHS did not fully understand the RISS program. Specifically, DHS officials did 

not acknowledge the RISS program as a state and local based program with 

which to partner, but instead considered the RISS program to be one of many 

vendors providing a tool for information sharing. Further, DHS officials believed 

that the RISS program was solely focused on law enforcement information and 

did not capture the broader terrorism-related or other information of interest to 

the department.

12Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Office of Information Technology, HSIN Could Support Information Sharing More

Effectively, DHS/OIG-06-38 (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Results: Objective 2

Limited Coordination

Until DHS fully implements key coordination and collaboration practices, it faces 

the risk that effective information sharing is not occurring.

In addition, the department also faces the increased risk that it may be developing 

and deploying capabilities on HSIN that duplicate those being established by state 

and local agencies. There is evidence that this has already occurred with respect to 

the RISS program. Specifically:

• HSIN and RISS ATIX currently target similar user groups. DHS and the RISS 

program are independently striving to make their applications available to user 

communities involved in the prevention of, response to, mitigation of, and 

recovery from terrorism and disasters across the country. For example, HSIN 

and RISS ATIX are being used and marketed for use at state fusion centers13

and other state organizations such as emergency management agencies 

across the country.

13A fusion center is defined as a “collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the center

with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.”
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

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Results: Objective 2

Limited Coordination

• HSIN and RISS applications have similar approaches for sharing information 

with their users. For example, on each application, users from a particular

community—such as emergency management—have access to a portal or 

community area tailored to the user’s information needs. The community-based 

portals have similar features focused on user communities. Both applications 

provide each community with the following features:

• Web pages. Tailored for communities of interest (e.g., law enforcement, 

emergency management, critical infrastructure sectors), these pages 

contain general and community-specific news articles, links, and contact 

information.

• Bulletin boards. Participants can post and discuss information.

• Chat tool. Each community has its own online, real-time, interactive 

collaboration application.

• Document library. Participants can store and search relevant documents.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

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50

Results: Objective 2

Limited Coordination

• Beyond these collaboration tools, RISSNET also provides access to other law 

enforcement resources such as analytical criminal data-visualization tools and 

criminal intelligence databases.

• DHS and RISS state that their applications, the HSIN Law Enforcement portal 

and RISSNET, comply with part 23 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, 

which requires criminal intelligence systems to protect the individual privacy 

and constitutional rights of individuals.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

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Results: Objective 2

Improvements Planned and Under Way

According to DHS officials, including the HSIN program manager, the department 

has efforts planned and under way to improve coordination. For example: 

• The department is in the process of developing an integration strategy that is to 

include enhancing HSIN in a manner that allows for other applications and 

networks to better integrate information sharing capabilities by plugging in to 

HSIN, thereby allowing other federal agencies and state and local governments 

to use their preferred application and networks—such as RISSNET and RISS 

ATIX—for information sharing while allowing DHS to continue to use HSIN.

• The department is forming an HSIN Mission Coordinating Committee, whose 

role and responsibilities are to be defined in a management directive. 

Membership is to consist of DHS offices and components with operational 

missions involving information sharing, communication, and collaboration. The 

committee is also expected to, for example, work to ensure that all HSIN users 

are coordinated in information-sharing relationships of mutual value to them, as 

well as help define operational priorities for HSIN in support of DHS’s mission.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

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Results: Objective 2

Improvements Planned and Under Way

• The department has recently developed engagement, communications, and 

feedback strategies for better coordination and communication with HSIN. The 

strategies are expected to facilitate the HSIN program’s relationship with users 

by, for example, enhancing user awareness of applicable HSIN contact points 

and changes to the system.

• The HSIN program management office is being reorganized to help the 

department better meet user needs. According to the program manager, this 

reorganization has included the use of integrated process teams to better 

support DHS’s operational mission priorities as well as the establishment of a 

strategic framework and implementation plan for meeting the office’s key 

activities and vision. 
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Results: Objective 2

Improvements Planned and Under Way

• The program office is in the process of establishing a Homeland Security 

Information Network Advisory Committee. This is a panel of homeland security 

officials, including state and local officials, whose charge is to advise DHS on 

how the HSIN program can better meet user needs. According to the program 

manager, as part of this committee, DHS plans to examine its processes for 

deploying HSIN to the states, as well as to assess what resources states 

already have and how HSIN can coordinate with them.

• The program intends to coordinate these improvement efforts with the efforts to 

implement the Information Sharing Environment.

While these are positive steps designed to address shortfalls in the department’s 

coordination practices on HSIN, they have either just begun or are planned, with 

milestones for implementation yet to be defined. Until all the practices are fully 

implemented and institutionalized, DHS will continue to be at risk of not effectively 

sharing information.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

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Conclusions

DHS and DOJ have a vast array of major federal networks and Internet-based 

applications, reported to cost almost a billion dollars over the past 2 years, that are 

key to these departments achieving their homeland security missions, including 

sharing information with state and local governments.

While DHS is responsible for coordinating these network and system efforts among 

federal, state, and local governments, it has not done so effectively with regard to 

its primary information-sharing system and two key state and local initiatives. This 

was due largely to the department’s hasty approach to delivering needed

information sharing capabilities; in doing so, DHS did not follow key coordination 

and collaboration practices and guidance or invest the time to inventory and fully 

understand how it could leverage state and local approaches. Consequently, the 

department faces the risk that effective information sharing is not occurring and that 

its HSIN system may be duplicating existing state and local capabilities. DHS 

recognizes these risks and has improvements planned and under way to address 

them, but it has yet to establish dates for when the improvements will be fully 

completed and institutionalized. 
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

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Conclusions

The limited use of the key coordination and collaboration practices and guidance 

and the absence of an inventory raise doubt about whether DHS is effectively

coordinating its HSIN efforts with all other key state and local information initiatives. 

It also raises the issue of whether similar coordination and duplication issues arise 

with the other federal homeland security networks and associated systems and 

applications under the department’s purview. Given what is at stake, it is extremely 

important that DHS authorities expeditiously address these issues and mitigate the 

associated risks. Further, in doing so, it is imperative that any and all efforts to 

address coordination issues not be done in isolation but rather in a mode that is 

consistent with implementation of the recently issued Information Sharing 

Environment plan.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

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56

Recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director, Office 

of Operations Coordination, to ensure that HSIN efforts are effectively coordinated 

with key state and local government information sharing initiatives. This should 

include

• Identifying existing and planned key state and local information sharing

initiatives and assessing whether there are opportunities for the HSIN program 

to improve information sharing and avoid duplication of effort. 

• Where there are opportunities, the department should adopt and institutionalize 

key practices related to OMB’s guidance on enhancing and sustaining agency 

coordination and collaboration, including developing documented policies and 

procedures to operate across organizational boundaries. 

• Ensuring such efforts are consistent with implementation of the Information 

Sharing Environment plan.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

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Recommendations

We also recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security determine whether 

there are coordination and duplication issues with other homeland security 

networks and associated systems and applications. In each case where issues are 

identified, the Secretary should direct the appropriate department executive to 

ensure that the efforts are effectively coordinated consistent with our 

recommendation above.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

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Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this briefing, DHS officials, including the HSIN program 

manager, agreed with our findings and recommendations. They also provided

technical comments, which we have incorporated in this report, as appropriate.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Scope

For our first objective, our work focused on the17 major networks and 4 Internetbased applications that were identified as being developed or operated and 

maintained by the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice in support of 

homeland security.

Our second objective focused on the extent to which the development and use of 

DHS’s Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) has been coordinated with 

two key state and local homeland security information-sharing initiatives: the 

Regional Information Sharing System Secure Intranet (RISSNET) and the 

Automated Trusted Information Exchange (RISS ATIX). We selected these 

initiatives based on our conversations with state and local officials who identified 

these systems as being key to homeland security information sharing and our 

review and analysis of available documentation that showed a similar assessment.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Methodology

For objective one, we

• assessed the current state (e.g., cost) of these networks by interviewing 

department officials and reviewing documentation;

• identified and analyzed descriptive data on the networks, such as type of 

network topography, primary users, estimated costs, and future plans; and

• used the homeland security mission areas described in the National 

Strategy for Homeland Security;14

• verified via the agencies the accuracy of the data about their networks 

(however, we cannot ensure that agencies reported on all applicable networks 

and Internet-based applications) and

• included information about publicly acknowledged classified networks but did 

not collect or include classified information about these networks.

For agency data that we did not substantiate, we have made appropriate attribution 

indicating that data’s source.

14Published in July 2002.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

For objective two:

• We reviewed documentation and interviewed DHS officials and state and local 

officials, including RISSNET and RISS ATIX executives, to assess the level of 

coordination and collaboration among them as DHS develops the HSIN. In 

doing so, we also assessed how these officials ensured that this information

was relevant, reliable, and timely and made available for management decision 

making and internal reporting.

• We assessed the extent of coordination and collaboration between DHS and 

the Regional Information Sharing System program based on the requirements 

of the Homeland Security Act15 of 2002 and other federal guidance and best 

practices identified by the Office of Management and Budget16 and prior GAO 

research and experience at federal agencies.17 In doing so, we

• asked DHS officials to provide the plans, policies, and procedures they 

used to identify key information-sharing initiatives; and

• assessed DHS’s efforts to identify and address its information-sharing 

needs by leveraging resources and avoiding the creation of duplicative 

information applications.

15Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002).

16For example, Office of Management and Budget, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, Circular A-11 (Washington, D.C.: June 

30, 2006) and Management of Federal Information Resources, Circular A-130 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2000).

17For example, GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005) and, Results-Oriented Government: Practices

That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: October 2005).
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

• We assessed the number and types of contacts (e.g., meetings, conferences) 

the parties had in collaborating on these efforts in order to understand whether

• mutual needs and identification of joint strategies, expectations, constraints, 

and interfaces were discussed;

• compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across 

agency boundaries were established;

• memorandums of understanding or related documents were signed in order

to reinforce agency accountability for collaboration and use mechanisms to 

monitor, evaluate, and report on results.

We conducted our work at Department of Homeland Security and Department of 

Justice headquarters in Washington, D.C., as well as Regional Information Sharing 

Systems offices in Newton and West Chester, Pennsylvania. We also interviewed 

officials at state and local organizations such as the National Association of State 

Chief Information Officers, the National Governors Association, and officials from 

state fusion centers. We performed our work from February 2006 through 

December 2006, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

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Appendix II 

Definitions and Descriptions

For purposes of this review, we used the following definitions:

• The term ‘‘homeland security information,” as defined by the Homeland 

Security Information Sharing Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. 482(f)(1), means any 

information possessed by a federal, state, or local agency that

• relates to the threat of terrorist activity;

• relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity;

• would improve the identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist or 

terrorist organization; or

• would improve the response to a terrorist act.18

• Networks are data communication links that enable computer systems to 

communicate with each other.

18This act was enacted into law as sections 891 through 899 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security

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Appendix II

Definitions and Descriptions

The term network refers to the data communication links and the network elements 

such as routers and switches that enable these computer systems to communicate 

with each other. 

• A network in a small geographic area is known as a local area network; most 

organizations have one or more local area networks at each of their offices.

• Wide area networks connect multiple local area networks within an 

organization that is dispersed over a wide geographic area.

• The term network also refers to virtual private networks, which are 

communication systems that use public networks to securely transport private 

intra- and interorganizational information.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

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Appendix II 

Definitions and Descriptions

Computer systems are connected to local area networks and wide area networks 

and are often connected to the Internet.
Appendix I

Briefing Provided to Staff, House Committee 

on Homeland Security

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Appendix II 

Definitions and Descriptions

Information Security Categories

• Top Secret applies to classified information the unauthorized disclosure of 

which could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to 

national security.19

• Secret applies to classified information the unauthorized disclosure of which 

could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security.19

• Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) is a generic term used to describe 

information that does not meet the standards established by executive order for 

classified national security information but that an agency nonetheless 

considers sufficiently sensitive to warrant restricted dissemination.

19Executive Order 13292: Further Amendment to Executive Order 12958, as Amended, Classified National Security Information (Mar. 25, 2003).
Page 73 GAO-07-455 Information Technology

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security

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Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security

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Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security

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Appendix III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

In addition to the contact named above, the following also made key 

contributions to this report: Gary Mountjoy, Assistant Director; Barbara 

Collier; Joseph Cruz; Matthew Grote; Joanne Landesman; and Lori 

Martinez. 

(310839)
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