NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

GLEN EDWARD BOYD, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0624 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2022-091383

The Honorable Jay R. Adleman, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Glen Edward Boyd, Tucson

Plaintiff/Appellant

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph J. Branco, Angela D. Lane, Courtney R. Glynn, Sean M. Moore

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Maricopa County Attorney’s Office

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Rebecca A. Banes, Claudia Acosta Collings

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees State of Arizona

FILED 6-27-2023
BOYD v. STATE, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Plaintiff Glen Boyd appeals from the dismissal of his claims 

against defendants State of Arizona, Arizona Department of Juvenile 

Corrections (ADJC) and the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office for failure 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because Boyd has shown 

no error, the judgment is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Boyd’s complaint alleges that in 2001 while he was in ADJC 

custody as a minor, he “was lured into a[n] illegal sexual relationship with” 

ADJC Correctional Officer “Jennifer Suave/Jurn/Loe.” In 2006, after Loe

confessed to the illegal conduct, an ADJC investigator interviewed Boyd. 

After giving his account of the events, Boyd alleges the investigator said he 

was “the victim of a crime” of sexual abuse. Boyd alleges the investigator

explained that the decision to prosecute would be made by the Maricopa 

County Attorney’s Office and that Boyd “was told if she’s convicted, I will 

get the chance to tell the judge what I want to see happen to her.” Boyd 

alleges Loe was charged with two “counts of unlawful sexual conduct; 

correctional employee; person in custody.” Loe later pled guilty to one

count of solicitation to commit unlawful sexual conduct with a person in 

custody, in 2007, and was placed on probation for five years. 

¶3 In late 2020, after learning of a change to the potentially 

applicable statute of limitations, see Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 12-

514 (eff. May 27, 2019), and believing he may have a claim for damages, 

Boyd filed a previous civil suit. Boyd alleges that, as part of that previous 

civil suit, he first learned of Loe’s charges and guilty plea. 

¶4 In March 2022, Boyd filed this action claiming defendants had 

violated his victim’s rights under the Arizona Constitution and Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure by not informing him of Loe’s charge and plea.

Defendants separately moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the 

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office and ADJC were non-jural entities, that 
BOYD v. STATE, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

Boyd was not eligible to pursue his claims under the Arizona Constitution 

and that Boyd’s claims were time-barred. Boyd moved to amend his 

complaint to add as defendants the Director of the ADJC as well as the 

Maricopa County Attorney. Boyd also sought to add violations of the 

United States Constitution in his amended complaint. 

¶5 Before ruling on the motion to amend, the court granted both 

motions to dismiss finding that ADJC and the County Attorney’s Office 

were non-jural entities incapable of being sued, Boyd failed to file a notice 

of claim within the applicable time limit and his claim was time-barred. The 

court also found that Boyd failed to state a claim upon which relief could 

be granted under the Victims’ Bill of Rights. Boyd timely appealed from the 

entry of a final judgment. This court has jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 

9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and -

2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim, this court assumes the truth of all well-pleaded facts alleged 

in the complaint. Fidelity Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. State, 191 Ariz. 222, 224 ¶ 4 

(1998). To prevail on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the 

moving party must establish that the claimant would not be entitled to relief 

under any set of facts susceptible of proof. Id. This court reviews de novo 

an order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim. Coleman v. City 

of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355 ¶ 7 (2012).

1

¶7 This case is distinct from Boyd’s claim for damages for sexual 

assault against Loe, the State and the ADJC and this decision has no effect 

on his appeal pending in that case. In this case, Boyd is not seeking damages 

relating to the sexual assault but instead seeks damages for alleged 

violations of his rights as a victim. “Crime victims’ rights in Arizona are 

protected by our constitution, by statute, and by court rule.” State v. Nichols, 

224 Ariz. 569, 571 ¶ 7 (App. 2010). These rights are found in the Victims’ Bill 

1 Independent of the Victims’ Bill of Rights analysis below, the County 

Attorney’s Office and the ADJC are non-jural entities incapable of being 

sued. “[A] governmental entity may be sued only if the legislature has so 

provided.” McKee v. State, 241 Ariz. 377, 384 ¶ 28 (App. 2016). No statute 

provides that either the ADJC or the County Attorney’s Office may be sued. 

Compare A.R.S. §§ 41-2801 through -2833 and A.R.S. §§ 11-531 through -539 

with A.R.S. § 23-106(A) (“The [industrial] commission may, in its name, sue 

and be sued.”).
BOYD v. STATE, et al.

Decision of the Court

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of Rights (VBR), Ariz. Const. art. II, § 2.1, the Victims’ Rights 

Implementation Act (VRIA), A.R.S. §§ 13-4401 through 4443, and Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 39. To state a claim for damages under these 

provisions, an individual must first demonstrate that he or she is a “victim” 

as defined in the VBR. See Nichols, 224 Ariz. at 571 ¶ 8 (noting that, although 

both VBR and VRIA have provisions defining “victim,” the constitutional 

definition in the VBR controls). Accordingly, to properly seek damages 

under these provisions, Boyd must first show that he is a “victim” under 

the VBR.

¶8 The VBR defines a “victim” as 

a person against whom the criminal offense has 

been committed or, if the person is killed or 

incapacitated, the person’s spouse, parent, child 

or other lawful representative, except if the person 

is in custody for an offense or is the accused.

Ariz. Const. art. II, § 2.1(C) (emphasis). As Boyd concedes, more than a 

generation ago, the Arizona Supreme Court declared that “[t]he 

constitution clearly and unambiguously exempts those ‘in custody for an 

offense’ from victim status.” Stapleford v. Houghton, 185 Ariz. 560, 562 (1996). 

¶9 Boyd argues the voters could not have intended for the 

exception to apply to a minor being held in custody at ADJC. But “where a 

constitutional provision is clear, no judicial construction is required or 

proper.” Pinetop-Lakeside Sanitary Dist. v. Ferguson, 129 Ariz. 300, 302 (1981). 

Accordingly, under the express terms of the VBR, because Boyd was in 

custody at the time, he was not entitled to seek money damages. Therefore, 

the superior court did not err in finding his complaint failed to state a claim 

upon which relief could be granted. 

¶10 Boyd next argues that this provision of the VBR violates his 

rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as alleged in this 

motion to amend his complaint. However, claims for monetary damages 

from constitutional violations can only be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

See Wilkie v. State, 161 Ariz. 541, 545 (App. 1989). Neither Boyd’s complaint 

nor proposed amended complaint purport to bring a Section 1983 claim. 

Moreover, Boyd has not alleged the incarcerated person exception deprives 

him of any specified right under federal law. Citing various federal court 

decisions, Boyd argues he has a federal “constitutional right to be protected 

from being sexually assaulted by a guard.” See Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 

544, 554 (8th Cir. 2007). As applicable here, however, the incarcerated 
BOYD v. STATE, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

person exception does not negate or undercut such a federal constitutional 

right; instead, it is a limit on the rights to which he is entitled under 

Arizona’s VBR. See Ariz. Const. art. II, § 2.1(A). Thus, Boyd’s claims under 

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution 

fail. For these reasons, the court did not err in denying his motion to amend, 

because such an amendment would have been futile. See Walls v. Ariz. Dep’t. 

of Pub. Safety, 170 Ariz. 591, 597 (App. 1991).

¶11 Boyd argues defendants are bound by the ADJC 

investigator’s claimed statements that Boyd was a victim and may be called 

to testify. However, Boyd cites no legal authority supporting such a 

position and has therefore waived such argument. See MacMillan v. 

Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 591 ¶ 33 (App. 2011). Nor has Boyd shown how 

such statements would bind this court from concluding he is not a victim 

under the VBR. See Nichols, 224 Ariz. at 572 ¶ 12 (designation as a victim is 

a question of law reviewed de novo). A misstatement of law by the ADJC 

investigator does not change the restrictions of the VBR. Boyd has not 

shown that the investigator’s statements mean that defendants waived this 

issue.2

CONCLUSION

¶12 The judgment is affirmed.

2 Given this holding, this Court need not and expressly does not address 

Boyd’s arguments on the timeliness of his notice of claim and whether his 

claim is time-barred by the statute of limitations.