SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5483-16T3

HUDSON CITY SAVINGS BANK,

A federally chartered savings

bank organized and existing under

the laws of the State of Delaware,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAY J. LIN, 

his/her heirs, devisees, and personal 

representatives, and his, 

her, their or any of their successors 

in right, title and interest,

Defendant,

and

IRENE H. LIN, 

his/her heirs, devisees

and personal representatives, and his,

her, their or any of their 

successors in right, title and 

interest,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________________________

Submitted May 22, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Sumners and Moynihan.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

August 1, 2018
2 A-5483-16T3

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Somerset County, Docket 

No. F-029667-10.

Jay J. Lin, attorney for appellant.1

Parker McCay, PA, attorneys for respondent 

(Eugene R. Mariano, of counsel; Stacy L. 

Moore, Jr., on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this residential foreclosure matter, defendant Irene Lin 

appeals from July 21, 2017 orders denying her motions to vacate 

summary judgment granted to plaintiff Hudson City Savings Bank 

(HCSB); and for sanctions in lieu of opposition to HCSB's motion 

for entry of final judgment. We affirm.

In 2007, defendants executed a mortgage to HCSB to secure a 

$680,000 note.

2 Defendants defaulted three years later, and on 

May 28, 2010, HCSB, through its then-attorney, Zucker Goldberg & 

Ackerman (Zucker Goldberg), initiated foreclosure proceedings.

After HCSB's initial motion for summary judgment in 2011 was 

denied for procedural deficiencies, it refiled the motion in 

2013. The foreclosure proceedings, however, were stayed due to 

defendants' bankruptcy filing until the stay was vacated in 

 

1 Jay J. Lin represents his wife Irene Lin, and although he is a 

defendant, he is not a party to this appeal.

2 HCSB has since merged with and been succeeded by M&T Bank; 

there is no challenge to M&T Bank's rights as HCSB's successor.
3 A-5483-16T3

2015. Shortly thereafter, Zucker Goldberg filed for its own 

bankruptcy and HCSB retained current counsel.

In late 2016, HCSB moved again for summary judgment. 

Defendants were served the motion – at the same address they had 

been served at for the initial foreclosure complaint as well as 

all subsequent correspondence and filings – but did not submit 

opposition. On December 5, 2016, Judge Margaret Goodzeit 

entered an order, along with a written statement of reasons, 

granting HCSB's motion for summary judgment, striking 

defendants' answer as unresponsive, and returning the matter to 

the Office of Foreclosure as an uncontested foreclosure action.

Six months later, defendants filed a motion to vacate the 

court's summary judgment decision and a cross-motion seeking 

sanctions in lieu of opposition to HCSB's motion for entry of 

final judgment. In orders dated July 21, 2017, Judge Goodzeit 

denied the motions. In her statement of reasons, the judge 

initially noted that defendants' motion to vacate failed to 

specify the court rule they were relying upon but she treated it 

as a motion for reconsideration. Even though the motion was 

untimely under Rule 4:49-1 because it was filed well beyond

twenty days after the December 5, 2016 order sought to be 

reconsidered, the judge addressed and rejected the entirety of 

the motion's claims.
4 A-5483-16T3

Applying Rule 4:49-2, Judge Goodzeit declined to reconsider 

her summary judgment order because it was not based on plainly 

incorrect reasons, she had considered all evidence submitted, 

and there was no good reason to consider new evidence. The 

judge determined defendants' claim that HCSB was seeking 

foreclosure on a 2001 mortgage, and not the 2007 mortgage, was 

"without merit whatsoever." The judge found defendants' 

argument that Zucker Goldberg's bankruptcy prevented HCSB from 

obtaining foreclosure "is ill-conceived”; the law firm did not 

seek foreclosure, the bank did. And as for defendants'

bankruptcy, the judge found that the stay to prosecute the 

foreclosure proceedings was lifted, giving HCSB the right to 

move for summary judgment. The judge also determined that, even 

though all court records belied Jay J. Lin's claim that the 

summary judgment motion was served on defendants at the wrong 

address, there was no certification that the motion was not 

received – "such deficiency [being] the death knell to his 

argument." In sum, Judge Goodzeit found there were "no 

arguments, case law, or facts to warrant reconsideration of" the 

summary judgment order.

Turning to defendants' cross-motion, the judge, noting 

defendants' certification was "almost identical [to] their 
5 A-5483-16T3

motion to vacate summary judgment", reasoned that they "provide 

no basis to impose sanctions on [HCSB] whatsoever."

In conclusion, Judge Goodzeit maintained that both motions 

lacked merit as defendants did not "provide any case law or an 

iota of evidence" in support, suggesting their effort was "a 

misplaced attempt to delay the inevitable." 

Defendant argues:

[POINT] I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

ALLOWING PLAINTIFF AND ITS DEBT COLLECTORS 

VIOLATED THE AUTOMATIC STAY ORDER.

[POINT] II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

ALLOWING PLAINTIFF AND ITS DEBT COLLECTORS 

VIOLATED [THE] FDCPA.[3]

[POINT] III. THE COURT SHOULD RELIEVE THE 

TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 

DEFENDANT FOR REASONS OF FRAUD, 

MISREPRESENTATION, AND MISCONDUCT OF 

PLAINTIFF AND ITS DEBT COLLECTORS.

[POINT] IV. THE COURT SHOULD RELIEVE THAT 

TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 

DEFENDANT FOR REASONS OF THE JUDGMENT OR 

ORDER IS VOID.

[POINT] V. THE COURT SHOULD RELIEVE THE 

TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 

DEFENDANT FOR REASONS OF MISTAKE.

[POINT] VI. THE COURT SHOULD RELIEVE THE 

TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 

 

3 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 to 

1692p.
6 A-5483-16T3

DEFENDANT FOR REASONS OF NEWLY DISCOVERED 

EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD ALTER THE JUDGMENT.

(THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BELOW).

[POINT] VII. THE COURT SHOULD RELIEVE THE 

TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 

DEFENDANT FOR REASONS OF JUSTIFYING RELIEF 

FROM THE OPERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OR ORDER. 

(THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BELOW).

In her reply brief, she argues:

[POINT] I. THIS APPEAL MUST BE DECIDED 

ON THE MERITS.

[POINT] II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

ALLOWING PLAINTIFF AND ITS DEBT COLLECTORS 

VIOLATED THE AUTOMATIC STAY ORDER.

[POINT] III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

ALLOWING PLAINTIFF AND ITS DEBT COLLECTORS 

VIOLATED [THE] FDCPA.

[POINT] IV. THE COURT SHOULD RELIEVE THE 

TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 

DEFENDANT FOR REASONS OF FRAUD, 

MISREPRESENTATION, AND MISCONDUCT OF 

PLAINTIFF AND ITS DEBT COLLECTORS.

[POINT] V. THE COURT SHOULD RELIEVE THE 

TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 

DEFENDANT FOR REASONS OF THE JUDGMENT OR 

ORDER IS VOID.

[POINT] VI. THE COURT SHOULD RELIEVE THE 

TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 

DEFENDANT FOR REASONS OF MISTAKE.

[POINT] VII. THE COURT SHOULD RELIEVE THE 

TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 

DEFENDANT FOR REASONS OF NEWLY DISCOVERED 

EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD ALTER THE JUDGMENT.

[POINT] VIII. THE COURT SHOULD RELIEVE THE 

TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
7 A-5483-16T3

DEFENDANT FOR REASONS OF JUSTIFYING RELIEF 

FROM THE OPERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OR ORDER.

Defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to 

warrant discussion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and we affirm 

substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Goodzeit's 

cogent written decision.

Affirmed.