Pu rsu anttoFe der al Rul e o f Appe lla te Pro cedure * 43( c)( 2), Se cre tar y J ane t N apo lit anoofth e D epa rtmentof Homela nd Sec uri ty is aut oma tic all y s ubs tit ute d f or former Sec ret aryTo m R idg e; Assistant Secretary John T. Morton of the De par tme nt of Homela nd Sec uri ty is aut oma tic all y sub sti tut ed forfo rme r A ssi sta nt Sec ret aryMi cha el J. Gar cia ; a nd Field Office Director Chr ist oph er Sha nah an is aut oma tic all y s ubs tit ute d f or former Field Office Director Joh n P . C arb one as re spo nde nts inth is cas e. 05-2868-ag Perriello v. Napolitano 1 UNI TEDSTATE S COURT OF APPEALS 2 3 FOR THE S ECOND CIRCUI T 4 5 Aug ustTe rm, 20 08 6 7 (Ar gue d: Jun e 2 , 2 009 Dec ide d: Sep tember1, 20 09) 8 9 Doc ketNo . 0 5-2 868 -ag 10 11 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 13 14 SAVARIO PERRIELLO, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 18 -v.- 05-2868-ag 19 20 JANET NAPOLITANO; JOHN T. MORTON, Asst. 21 Secretary, United States Immigration and 22 Customs Enforcement; CHRISTOPHER SHANAHAN, 23 Field Office Director of New York City, 24 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 25 Department of Homeland Security; UNITED 26 STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, * 27 28 Respondents. 29 30 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 312

Bef ore : JAC OBS , C hie f Judg e, KEARSE an d S ACK , 1 2 Cir cui t Judg es. 3 4 Petitioner Savario Perriello seeks review of a December 5 17, 2004 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 6 finding him ineligible for relief from removal. P err iel lo 7 arg ues fo r termination of his removal proceedings pursuant 8 to 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) and a waiver of inadmissibility 9 pursuant to former Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c) . 10 The pe tit ionis de nie d. MATTHEW L. GUADAGNO (Ruchi 11 12 Thaker, Jules E. Coven, Kerry W. 13 Bretz on the brief), Bretz & 14 Coven LLP, New York, New York, 15 for Petitioner . 16 17 NATASHA OELTJEN, Assistant 18 United States Attorney (Sarah S. 19 Normand, Assistant United States 20 Attorney on the brief) for Lev 21 L. Dassin, Acting United States 22 Attorney for the Southern 23 District of New York, New York, New York , f or Res pon den ts. 24 25 26 DENNIS JACOB S, Chi ef Jud ge: 27 28 Petitioner Savario Perriello, a native and citizen of 29 Italy and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, 30 seeks review of a December 17, 2004 order of the Board of 31 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the August 30, 2002 32 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Robert D. WeiselUn les s o the rwi se not ed, al l c ita tio ns to sta tut es and 1 reg ula tio ns ref er to the cu rre nt ver sio ns as of the fi lin g of thi s o pin ion . 3 1 finding Perriello inadmissible and ordering him removed to 2 Italy. In re Savario Perriello, No. A 12 363 855 (B.I.A. 3 Dec. 17, 2004), aff’g No. A 12 363 855 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City 4 Aug. 30, 2002). Per rie lloar gue s f or termination of his 5 removal proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) and a 1 6 waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to former Immigration and 7 Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(c) . 8 We ack now led ge the si gni fic antha rds hipth at Per rie llo 9 andhi s f ami ly wil l f ace as a res ultofth e u nac cou nta ble 10 del ay in the de cis iontose ek his re mov al dec ade s a fte r h is 11 con vic tio n, andno twi ths tan din g h is evi den tlyla wfu l a nd 12 pro duc tiv e l ife inth e i nte rva l. No net hel ess , w e c onc lud e 13 tha t [ i] Per rie llois no t e nti tle d t o r eli ef und er 14 § 1 239 .2( f) (wh ichha s b eenre nde redve sti gia l b y r evi sio ns 15 to the INA), be cau se he has no t e sta bli she d p rim a f aci e 16 eli gib ili ty forna tur ali zat ion , a nd [ii ] t hathe is ba rre d 17 fro m r eli ef und er INA§ 212 (c) byvi rtu e o f § 511(a) of the 18 Imm igr ati on Actof19 90 (“I MMACT” ), Pub . L . N o. 101 -64 9, 19 § 5 11( a), 10 4 S tat . 4 978 , 5 052 . Accordingly, the petition 20 is denied. 21Ef fec tiv e M arc h 1 , 2 003 , t he INS ce ase d t o e xis t. 2 The De par tme nt of Homela nd Sec uri ty has as sumed res pon sib ili ty forth e i mmi gra tio n f unc tio ns former ly per formedbyIN S. Se e Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 482 n.4 (2d Cir. 2008). 4 1 I 2 Per rie llofi rsten ter ed the Un ite d S tat es on Dec emb er 3 27, 19 61, wh en he was th irt eenye ars ol d. OnDe cember28 , 4 197 7, Per rie llowa s c onv ict ed by a j uryofAr soninth e 5 Sec ondDe gre e i n v iol ati on of NewYo rk Pen al Law§ 150 .15 6 andei ghtco unt s o f C rim ina l M isc hie f i n t he Sec ondDe gre e 7 in vio lat ionofNe w Y orkPe nal La w §14 5.1 0. Pe rri ell o w as 8 sen ten cedtoa term o f s eve n t o t wen ty- fiv e y ear s i n p ris on, 9 andhe se rve d s eve n y ear s b efo re his re lea se on par ole in 10 198 4. 11 After his release from prison, Perriello started a 12 business and contributed to his community. Per rie llo 13 mar rie d aUn ite d S tat es cit ize n i n 1 991 , a nd he has fo ur 14 Uni tedSt ate s c iti zench ild ren . Per rie lloan d h is wif e 15 ope rat e are sta ura nt in Hav ers tra w, NewYo rk. 16 On Nov emb er 28, 20 00, Pe rri ell o w as det ain ed at New ark 17 Air por t o n h is ret urnfr om a b rie f t riptoIt aly . The 18 Imm igr ati on andNa tur ali zat ionSe rvi ce (“I NS” ), ha vin g 2 19 dis cov ere d P err iel lo’ s 1 977 co nvi cti on, pa rol ed himin to the5 1 cou ntr y p end inga det erm ina tio n o f h is adm iss ibi lit y. On 2 Feb rua ry 13, 20 01, th e I NS iss ueda Not ice toAp pea r a nd 3 pla cedPe rri ell o i n r emo val pr oce edi ngs ba sedonhi s 1 977 4 con vic tio n f or a c rime i nvo lvi ng mor al tur pit ude . 5 Per rie lloadmit tedth e a lle gat ion s c ont ain ed in the 6 Not ice toAp pea r, butso ugh t t o a voi d r emo val byfi lin g a n 7 app lic ati on forna tur ali zat ionan d m ovi ng forte rmi nat ionof 8 his re mov al pro cee din gs pur sua nt to 8 C .F. R. § 1 239 .2( f), 9 whi ch permit s a n I J t o t erm ina te rem ova l p roc eed ing s whil e 10 an app lic ati on forna tur ali zat ionis pe ndi ng. The IJ 11 declined to terminate the removal proceedings and ordered 12 Perriello removed on August 30, 2002. The BIA affirmed on 13 December 17, 2004. 14 On Feb rua ry 22, 20 05, Pe rri ell o c hal len gedth e B IA’ s 15 dec isi on in a h abe as cor pus pe tit ion filed in the Southern 16 District of New York . Whi le the pe tit ionwa s p end ing , 17 Con gre ss ena cte d s ect ion10 6(a )(1 ) o f t he Rea l I D A ct of 18 200 5 ( “Re al ID Act ”), Pu b. L. No. 10 9-1 3, Div . B , 19 § 1 06( a)( 1)( B), 11 9 S tat . 2 31, 31 0, whi ch pro vid es that “a 20 petition for review filed with an appropriate court of 21 appeals . . . shall be the sole and exclusive means for 22 judicial review of an order of removal.” Th e d ist ric t c our tTh e c urr entte xt of the re gul ati on is: 3 An immigration judge may terminate removal proceedings to permit the alien to proceed to a final hearing on a pending application or petition for naturalization when the alien has established prima facie eligibility for naturalization and the matter involves exceptionally appealing or humanitarian factors; in every other case, the removal hearing shall be completed as promptly as possible notwithstanding the pendency of an application for naturalization during any state of the proceedings. 8 U .S. C. § 1 239 .2( f). 6 1 tra nsf err ed Per rie llo ’s hab eas pe tit iontoth is Cou rt 2 pur sua nt to Rea l I D A ct § 10 6(c ), whi ch requires that any 3 habeas petition [i] challenging an order of removal, and 4 [ii] pending in district court on the date of the Act’s 5 enactment, be transferred to the appropriate court of 6 appeals. 7 8 II 9 By virtue of 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f), an IJ may terminate 3 10 removal proceedings to permit an alien who has established 11 prima facie eligibility for naturalization to proceed to a 12 “final hea rin g” on a p end ingna tur ali zat ionap pli cat ion . 13 The BI A h as hel d, how eve r, tha t a n I J m ay notte rmi nat e7 1 rem ova l p roc eed ing s u nle ss the al ienha s o bta ine d a n 2 aff irm ati ve commun ica tio n f romth e D epa rtmentofHo mel and 3 Sec uri ty (“D HS” ) s tat ingth at the al ienis pr imafa cie 4 eli gib le forna tur ali zat ion . See In re Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. 5 Dec. 103, 106 (B.I.A. 2007) . Butno thi ng see ms to compel 6 DHS toma ke suc h ade termin ati on, le t a lon e t o i ssu e s ucha 7 commun ica tio n. Mo reo ver , i n m anyca ses (i ncl udi ng thi s 8 one ), DHS is pr ohi bit ed by sta tut e f romco nsi der inga 9 nat ura liz ati on app lic ati on (a pre requis ite tode termin ing 10 pri ma fac ie eli gib ili ty) wh ile re mov al pro cee din gs are 11 pen din g. Th e l aw, inef fec t, see ms to be cha sin g i ts tai l. 12 We review de novo Perriello’s claim that the IJ and BIA 13 erred as a matter of law in denying relief from removal. 14 See, e.g., Ibragimov v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 15 2007). But we owe deference to the BIA’s interpretation of 16 its own regulations, and the BIA’s interpretation will be 17 “controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 18 the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) 19 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bah v. Mukasey, 20 529 F.3d 99, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2008). 21 In order to analyze Perriello’s arguments and to 22 appreciate the anomaly that complicates the analysis, it isCourts with authority to naturalize aliens included 4 United States district courts and “also all courts of record in any State or Territory . . . having a seal, a clerk, and jurisdiction in actions at law or equity, or law and equity, in which the amount in controversy is unlimited.” 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1988). 8 1 necessary to describe the evolution of the statutes and 2 regulations relevant to this appeal. 3 A. Naturalization and Removal Law Before 1990 4 From 1906 until 1990, an application for naturalization 5 was reviewed in two stages. See Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 6 379, 385 (4th Cir. 2007); Admin. Naturalization, 56 Fed. 7 Reg. 50475, 50476 (Oct. 7, 1991). First, the Attorney 8 General considered the application and made a recommendation 9 to the naturalization court as to the alien’s prima facie 10 eligibility for naturalization. See 8 U.S.C. § 1446(a)-(d) 11 (1988). The second stage was a “final hearing” held “in 12 open court before a judge or judges.” 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a) 13 (1988). Under this system, courts were vested with 14 “[e]xclusive jurisdiction to naturalize persons as citizens 15 of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1988). 4 16 Until 1990, “naturalization authority and removal 17 authority were vested in different branches of government, 18 with naturalization being the province of the courts and9 1 removal the province of the executive acting through the 2 Attorney General.” Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229, 235 3 (2d Cir. 2008). Prior to 1950, this led to “both the 4 deportation and naturalization processes . . . proceed[ing] 5 along together until either petitioner’s deportation or 6 naturalization ipso facto terminated the possibility of the 7 other occurring.” Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540, 8 543 (1955). 9 In 1950, Congress put an end to this “race between the 10 alien to gain citizenship and the Attorney General to deport 11 him,” id. at 544, by enacting section 27 of the Internal 12 Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, § 27, 64 Stat. 13 987, 1015, reenacted without significant change by 14 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 15 § 318, 66 Stat. 163, 244 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 16 § 1429). That statute “afforded [priority to] removal 17 proceedings,” Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 239, and “prohibited 18 naturalization or the holding of final hearings on 19 naturalization petitions where deportation proceedings were 20 instituted,” Shomberg, 540 U.S. at 544. As a result, aliens 21 who had successfully navigated the first stage of the 22 naturalization process, and were thus prima facie eligible10 1 for naturalization, were in limbo because courts were 2 prohibited from conducting final hearings on their 3 applications. To provide such aliens access to court, the 4 BIA held, in Matter of B-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 713, 720 (B.I.A. 5 1955), that “there exists inherent authority in the Attorney 6 General to terminate deportation proceedings for the limited 7 purpose of permitting the alien to file a petition for 8 naturalization and to be heard thereon by a naturalization 9 court.” 10 In 1974, the BIA’s decision in Matter of B- was adopted 11 in the regulation now found at § 1239.2(f). The regulation 12 provided, in relevant part: 13 A[n immigration judge] may, in his 14 discretion, terminate deportation 15 proceedings to permit respondent to 16 proceed to a final hearing on a pending 17 application or petition for 18 naturalization when the respondent has 19 established prima facie eligibility for 20 naturalization and the case involves 21 exceptionally appealing or humanitarian 22 factors; in every other case, the 23 deportation hearing shall be completed as 24 promptly as possible notwithstanding the 25 pendency of an application for 26 naturalization during any stage of the 27 proceedings. 28 29 8 CFR § 242.7 (1974). 30 Soo n a fte r , in Mat terofCr uz, 15 I. & N. Dec . 2 3611 1 (B. I.A . 1 975 ), the BIA considered the regulation’s 2 requirement that an alien “ha[ve] established prima facie 3 eligibility for naturalization.” Id. at 236-38. The BIA 4 held that “neither [it] nor immigration judges have 5 authority with respect to the naturalization of aliens,” and 6 concluded therefore that the alien must establish “prima 7 facie eligibility” by adducing “an affirmative communication 8 from the [INS] or . . . a declaration of a court that the 9 alien would be eligible for naturalization but for the 10 pendency of the deportation proceedings or the existence of 11 an outstanding order of deportation.” Id. at 237. 12 B. Naturalization and Removal Law After 1990 13 With the passage of IMMACT in 1990, Congress 14 substantially reformed the naturalization process. Two 15 features of that reform are relevant to this case. First, 16 IMMACT eliminated “final hearing[s] . . . in open court,” 17 IMMACT § 407(d)(14), 104 St at. at50 44, and established that 18 “[t]he sole authority to naturalize persons as citizens of 19 the United States is conferred upon the Attorney General,” 20 id. § 401(a), 104 St at. at50 38 (co dif iedat8 U.S .C.IMMAC T p res erv ed a r ole fo r f ede ral co urt s i n t he 5 nat ura liz ati on pro ces s: “af terex hau sti ng adm ini str ati ve remedi es, [a n a lie n] maype tit ionfo r d e n ovore vie w i n t he dis tri ct cou rt. ” See Et ape , 4 97 F.3 d a t 3 86 (ci tin g 8 U.S .C. § 142 1(c )). An a lie n m ay als o s eekre lie f i n dis tri ct cou rt if DHS fa ils toac t o n ana tur ali zat ion app lic ati on wit hin12 0 d ays ofanal ien ’s examin ati on by an imm igr ati on off ice r. Se e 8 U. S.C . §14 47( b). Addi tio nal ly, nat ura liz ati on cou rts co nti nue toadmin ist er the oa th of all egi anc e t o n ew cit ize ns. S ee 8 U .S. C. § 1 421 (b) . 12 1 § 1 421 (a) ). To implement this shift in authority, IMMACT 5 2 streamlined the naturalization process and provided for 3 comprehensive review of applications by immigration officers 4 empowered to grant or deny naturalization. Id. 5 § 407(d)(13)(E), 104 Stat. at 5043 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 6 § 1446(d)); see also Etape, 497 F.3d at 385-86. 7 Second, IMMACT froze the processing of naturalization 8 applications while removal proceedings are pending. Before 9 IMMACT, the Attorney General had an unrestricted ability to 10 review naturalization applications notwithstanding the 11 pendency of removal proceedings: only courts were prohibited 12 from conducting “final hearings.” IMMACT, however, amended 13 § 1429 to provide that “no person shall be naturalized 14 against whom there is outstanding a final finding of 15 deportability . . . and no application for naturalization 16 shall be considered by the Attorney General if there is13 1 pending against the applicant a [removal] proceeding.” 2 IMMACT § 407(d)(3), 104 Stat. at 5041 (codified as amended 3 at 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (Supp. II 1990)) (emphasis added). 4 C. The Application of § 1239.2(f) After IMMACT 5 After IMMACT, courts considered the continued viability 6 of § 1239.2(f), as interpreted by the BIA in Cruz. Several 7 circuit courts of appeal questioned whether the BIA could 8 continue to rely on courts to issue declarations as to prima 9 facie eligibility for naturalization in light of the 10 language in § 1421(a) granting the Attorney General 11 exclusive jurisdiction over naturalization applications. 12 See, e.g., Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 341 (5th 13 Cir. 2007); De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 14 1047 (9th Cir. 2004); Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902, 15 907 & n.6 (6th Cir. 2004). And at least one circuit 16 questioned whether the Attorney General could consider 17 naturalization applications for the limited, administrative 18 purpose of terminating removal proceedings in light of the 19 bar in § 1429. Apokarina v. Ashcroft, 93 Fed. App’x 469, 20 470, 472 (3d Cir. 2004). 21 In 2007, the BIA reconsidered Cruz and overruled the 22 decision insofar as it contemplated that aliens would obtainIn19 97, IN S m ade te chn ica l c han ges toth e l ang uag e 6 of the re gul ati on aft er pas sag e o f t he Ill ega l I mmi gra tio n Ref orman d I mmi gra nt Res pon sib ili ty Actof19 96 (“I IRI RA” ), Pub . L . 1 04- 208 , D iv. C, 11 0 S tat . 3 009 , 3 009 -54 6 e t s eq. Spe cif ica lly , I NS rep lac ed the wo rd “de por tat ion ” w ithth e wor d “ rem ova l” in twopl ace s. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10367 (March 6, 1997). A lth oug h t he age ncyre vis ed the re gul ati on to ref lec t c han ges inII RIRA, it nev er rev ise d t he reg ula tio n i n r esp ons e t o I MMACT, an d t he reg ula tio n r ema ins in con sis ten t w ithth at sta tut e. 14 1 declarations from courts as to prima facie eligibility for 2 naturalization. Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 105. The BIA 3 concluded that courts no longer had jurisdiction to provide 4 such declarations, in light of § 1421. Id. 5 Nonetheless, the BIA reaffirmed its instruction that 6 “the Board and . . . Immigration Judges . . . require some 7 form of affirmative communication from the DHS prior to 8 terminating proceedings based on [an alien’s] pending 9 naturalization application.” Id. at 106. In doing so, the 10 BIA did not take into account IMMACT’s revisions to § 1429, 11 which limited administrative review of naturalization 12 applications while removal proceedings are pending. 13 Likewise, the Attorney General (and DHS) failed to conform 14 the antiquated language in § 1239.2(f), which has caused 15 inconsistency. In some cases (such as this one), DHS has 615 1 adjudicated naturalization applications while aliens have 2 awaited termination of their removal proceedings, 3 notwithstanding the bar in § 1429. See, e.g., Saba-Bakare, 4 507 F.3d at 339; Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 106-07. In 5 other cases, IJs have determined prima facie eligibility for 6 naturalization, notwithstanding the BIA’s holding in Cruz 7 that they lack jurisdiction to do so. See, e.g., Nolan v. 8 Holmes, 334 F.3d 189, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2003); Fretas v. 9 Hansen, No. 1:06CV1475, 2008 WL 4404276, at *1 (N.D. Ohio 10 Sep. 23, 2008). And in yet other cases, no determination of 11 prima facie eligibility has been made by anybody, leaving 12 aliens to pursue writs of mandamus in an effort to compel 13 DHS to produce “affirmative statement[s]” as to prima facie 14 eligibility. See, e.g., Sandoval-Valenzuela v. Gonzalez, 15 No. C 08-2361 RS, 2008 WL 3916030, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16 25, 2008); Escobar-Garfias v. Gonzales, No. 06-CV-103-BR, 17 2007 WL 281657, at *2 (D. Or. Jan. 26, 2007); Fuks v. 18 Devine, No. 05 C 5666, 2006 WL 2051321, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. 19 July 20, 2006). 20 One of these cases is edifying, at least to illustrate 21 the prevailing muddle. A writ of mandamus was sought “to 22 the Attorney General, ordering him to perform his legal duty16 1 and prevent different parts of the Department of Justice 2 from adopting conflicting view[s] of Cruz.” Fretas, 2008 WL 3 4404276, at *2. The alien sought this relief after DHS 4 concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Fretas’ 5 application because of § 1429, but nonetheless advised that 6 Fretas was not prima facie eligible for naturalization. Id. 7 An IJ had previously ruled that Fretas was prima facie 8 eligible for naturalization, but the BIA reversed, holding 9 that Cruz prohibited the IJ from making that determination. 10 Id. at *1. 11 D. Perriello’s Motion to Terminate Removal Proceedings 12 In this case, the IJ denied Perriello’s motion to 13 terminate the removal proceedings on the ground that he had 14 not obtained an “affirmative communication from [INS] 15 regarding [his] naturalization eligibility.” But the agency 16 could not provide an “affirmative communication,” because 17 § 1429 prohibited it from considering Perriello’s 18 naturalization application while removal proceedings were 19 pending. 20 The effect of IMMACT is that aliens can no longer do 21 what Perriello did in this case: apply for naturalization 22 after removal proceedings have commenced and then move forIn Nolan, 334 F.3d at 193-204, we considered the 7 petitioner’s prima facie eligibility for naturalization. In Nolan, neither party raised the question whether IMMACT limited our review, and the question therefore was not considered, let alone decided. Moreover, Nolan involved an application for naturalization under INA § 329, which exempts veterans who have served during periods of military hostilities from the bar in § 1429. See 8 U.S.C. § 1440(b)(1). We ne ed notde cid e o n t his ap pea l whet her , a nd in 8 wha t c irc ums tan ces , a n a lie n c oul d b ene fitfr om § 1 239 .2( f) if she ha s ana tur ali zat ionap pli cat ionpe ndi ng at the ti me rem ova l p roc eed ing s c ommenc e. 17 1 termination of the removal proceedings. Once removal 7 2 proceedings are in progress, DHS is barred by IMMACT from 3 considering an alien’s application; so it will be impossible 4 for an alien to establish prima facie eligibility for 5 naturalization. 8 6 Perriello argues that it is unnecessary for him to 7 obtain a statement from DHS, because IJs and the BIA may 8 make prima facie determinations as to eligibility for 9 naturalization. Perriello is mistaken for two reasons. 10 First, the BIA determined in Hidalgo that it and IJs 11 lack jurisdiction to make prima facie determinations of 12 eligibility for naturalization. The BIA’s conclusion is 13 consistent with § 1421(a), which states that “[t]he sole 14 authority to naturalize persons as citizens of the United 15 States is conferred upon the Attorney General.” We owe18 1 deference to the BIA’s conclusions about the scope of its 2 jurisdiction under the immigration laws, and the BIA’s 3 holding is neither “plainly erroneous [n]or inconsistent 4 with the regulation.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (internal 5 quotation marks omitted). 6 Second, the plain language of § 1429 prohibits the 7 Attorney General from considering naturalization 8 applications while removal proceedings are pending, and we 9 have held that “district court authority [under 8 U.S.C. 10 § 1447(b)] to grant naturalization relief while removal 11 proceedings are pending cannot be greater than that of the 12 Attorney General,” Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 240. It would be odd 13 if the Attorney General and district courts were barred from 14 considering naturalization applications while removal 15 proceedings are pending, yet the BIA and IJs--who have no 16 jurisdiction over such applications in any case--were not. 17 Perriello also argues that this Court should not 18 interpret the regulation in a way that restricts its benefit 19 to aliens. But it is not a judicial role to save a 20 regulation that now conflicts, at least in part, with the 21 underlying statute. As reflected in federal court decisions 22 around the country, the failure of DHS to amend § 1239.2(f)Perriello points out that DHS’s denial of his 9 naturalization application (while his appeal was pending before the BIA) was without prejudice, and argues that the willingness to leave open the prospect of future proceedings amounts to an affirmative statement that he is prima facie eligible for naturalization. Accordingly, he contends that the BIA should have remanded his motion for termination of the removal proceedings to the IJ for further consideration. But especially considering that DHS was prohibited from ruling on Perriello’s naturalization application while removal proceedings were pending, denial without prejudice does not signify a ruling on prima facie eligibility one way or another. 19 1 has made for considerable confusion. It is for DHS or 2 Congress to reconcile the regulation with the INA. 3 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of 4 relief under § 1239.2(f), on the ground that Perriello has 5 not (and cannot) establish prima facie eligibility for 6 naturalization. 9 7 8 III 9 Per rie lloal so cla ims th at he is eli gib le fora wai ver 10 of ina dmi ssi bil itypu rsu anttofo rme r I NA § 2 12( c). T hat 11 sec tio n p rov ide d t hat : 12 Ali ens la wfu llyadmit tedfo r p erm ane nt 13 res ide nce wh o t emp ora ril y p roc eed ed 14 abr oadvo lun tar ilyan d n ot und er an ord er 15 of dep ort ati on, an d who are re tur nin g t o 16 a l awf ul unr eli nqu ish ed dom ici le of sev en 17 con sec uti ve yea rs, ma y b e a dmi tte d i n t he 18 dis cre tio n o f t he Att orn ey Gen era l20 1 wit hou t r ega rd to the pr ovi sio ns [se tti ng 2 for th var iou s g rou nds fo r e xcl usi on] . 3 4 Bui tra go- Cue stav. I. N.S ., 7 F .3d29 1, 292 (2 d C ir. 19 93) 5 (qu oti ng 8 U .S. C. § 1 182 (c) ). 6 How eve r, the cl ass ofal ien s e lig ibl e f or rel iefun der 7 § 2 12( c) was na rro wedbyIMMAC T §51 1(a ), 104 St at. at50 52, 8 whi ch pre clu des anal ienwh o h as “be en con vic tedofan 9 agg rav ate d f elo ny andha s s erv ed a t ermofimpri sonmen t o f 10 at lea st 5 y ear s” fro m r eli ef und er § 2 12( c). I n 11 Bui tra go- Cue sta , w e r ule d t hat§ 511 (a) ap pli es 12 ret roa cti vel y t o a lie ns con vic tedofag gra vat ed fel oni es 13 bef ore th e s tat ute wa s e nac ted . 7 F .3dat29 5. “[ T]h e 14 pla in lan gua ge of the st atu te ind ica tes a con gre ssi ona l 15 int entth at § 5 11 app ly ret roa cti vel y.” I d. 16 Per rie lloar gue s t hatun derRe str epov. Mc Elr oy, 36 9 17 F.3 d 6 27 (2dCi r. 200 4), hi s r eli anc e o n t he con tin uin g 18 ava ila bil ityof§ 212 (c) du rin g t he per iodbe twe en his 19 rel eas e f rompr iso n a nd the en act men t o f §51 1(a ) p rec lud es 20 the re tro act ive ap pli cat ionof§ 511 (a) inhi s c ase . 21 Res tre po hel d t hatambig uit y i n t he Ant ite rro ris m a nd 22 Eff ect ive De athPe nal ty Actof19 96, Pu b. L. No. 10 4-1 32, 23 110 St at. 12 14- -wh ichba rre d c ert ainal ien s, inc lud ingth ose 24 con vic tedofag gra vat ed fel oni es, fr om obt ain ing§ 212 (c)Restrepo itself did not involve § 511(a), presumably 10 because “[t]he record d[id] not indicate the length of [Restrepo’s] term of imprisonment.” 369 F.3d at 630 n.1. Also, Restrepo was convicted in 1992 and INS initiated removal proceedings in 1996, id. at 630, which was too soon for the agency to rely on § 511(a). 21 1 rel ief --p rec lud es ret roa cti ve app lic ati on of tha t s tat ute to 2 ali ens wh o d ela yedpr oac tiv elyse eki ng § 2 12( c) rel ief 3 bec aus e t heybe lie vedsu ch rel iefwo uldbe av ail abl e i n t he 4 fut ure . 369 F. 3d at 638 . 5 Res tre po is of no hel p t o P err iel lo, be cau se we hel d i n 6 Bui tra go- Cue stath at § 5 11( a) unambi guo usl y a ppl ies 7 ret roa cti vel y. 7 F. 3d at 295 ; s ee als o S ing h v . Muka sey , 10 8 520 F. 3d 119 , 1 23 (2dCi r. 200 8) (pe r c uri am) (r est ati ng 9 Bui tra go- Cue sta ’s hol din g “ tha t t he pla in lan gua ge of IMMACT 10 ind ica tes a con gre ssi ona l i nte nt tha t §51 1 a ppl y 11 ret roa cti vel y” (in ter nal qu ota tio n m ark s a nd bra cke ts 12 omi tte d)) ; T homv. As hcr oft , 3 69 F.3 d 1 58, 16 3 n .7 13 (ob ser vin g t hatRe str epoha d n o i mpa ct on Bui tra go- Cue sta ’s 14 hol din g w ithre spe ct to ali ens co nvi cte d a fte r t ria l); Re id 15 v. Hol mes , 3 23 F.3 d 1 87, 18 8 ( 2d Cir . 2 003 ) ( percu riam) 16 (no tin g t hatBu itr ago -Cu est a “ cle arl y e sta bli she d t hat 17 § 5 11( a) of the Immig rat ionAc t o f 1 990 co uldbe ap pli ed 18 ret roa cti vel y t o a lie ns who se cri min al con vic tio ns pre -da tedBe cau se Per rie llowa s c onv ict ed aft er a j urytr ial , 11 we exp res s n o v iewas toth e p oss ibl e r etr oac tiv ityof § 5 11( a) to ali ens wh o w ere co nvi cte d p urs uan t t o p lea agr eement s. Se e 8 C. F.R . §12 12. 3(f )(4 )(i i) (“An a lie n i s notin eli gib le forse cti on 212 (c) re lie f o n a cco untofan agg rav ate d f elo ny con vic tio n e nte redpu rsu anttoa ple a agr eementth at was ma de bef ore [t he ena ctmentof § 5 11( a)] .”) . 22 1 the st atu te’ s e nac tme nt” ). Wh en a s tat ute is un amb igu ous , 2 we are bo undbyth e c lea r i nte nt of Con gre ss. S ee Lan dgr af 3 v. USI Fi lm Pro ds. , 5 11 U.S . 2 44, 28 0 ( 199 4) (ho ldi ng tha t 4 cou rts mu st def er to exp res s c ong res sio nal pr esc rip tio ns in 5 det erm ini ng the re tro act ivi ty of civ il sta tut es) . We 6 con clu de tha t Rest rep o i s i nap pli cab le to an ali en con vic ted 7 of an agg rav ate d f elo ny at tri al whois ba rre d b y §51 1(a ) 8 fro m o bta ini ng § 2 12( c) rel ief . 11 9 For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied.