IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

James Blystone :

:

v. : No. 745 C.D. 2016

: Submitted: September 30, 2016

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: January 19, 2017

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau 

of Driver Licensing (Department) appeals from the Order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Allegheny County (common pleas) that dismissed the appeal of James 

Blystone (Licensee)1from the suspension of his operating privileges under Section 

1532(c)(1)(iii) of the Vehicle Code2but reduced Licensee’s suspension from two 

 

1 By Order dated September 23, 2016, this Court precluded Licensee from participating 

in this appeal due to his failure to file a brief.

2

75 Pa. C.S. § 1532(c)(1)(iii). Section 1532(c)(1)(iii) provides, in relevant part, that:

The department shall suspend the operating privilege of any person upon 

receiving a certified record of the person’s conviction of any offense involving the 

(Continued...)
2

years to one year. On appeal, the Department argues that common pleas erred in 

reducing Licensee’s suspension based on the remoteness of two of his prior 

convictions because Section 1532(c)(1) of the Vehicle Code does not limit the 

look-back period for prior convictions under The Controlled Substance, Drug,

Device and Cosmetic Act3(Drug Act). For the following reasons, we reverse.

The facts are undisputed. On January 6, 2016, Licensee was convicted of 

violating Section 13(a)(16) of the Drug Act, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) (related to 

knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance by one 

not authorized under the Drug Act), on September 7, 2014. Licensee previously 

was convicted of violating Section 13(a)(16) of the Drug Act on: January 22, 1999

for a violation on August 15, 1998; July 3, 2001 for a violation on May 25, 2000; 

and October 9, 2013 for a violation on December 5, 2012.

4

 This being Licensee’s 

fourth conviction for violating the Drug Act, the Department notified him by letter 

mailed January 22, 2016 that it was suspending his operating privilege for two 

 

possession, sale, delivery, offering for sale, holding for sale or giving away of any 

controlled substance under the laws of the United States, this Commonwealth or 

any other state, . . . 

(1) The period of suspension shall be as follows:

. . . .

(iii) For a third and any subsequent offense thereafter, a period of two 

years from the date of the suspension.

Id.

3 Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 780-101—780-144.

4

These prior convictions resulted in the suspension of Licensee’s operating privilege

under Section 1532(c)(1) of the Vehicle Code for periods of: six months for the first offense; six 

months for the second offense (which should have been a one-year suspension); and two years 

for the third offense. Licensee appealed the two-year suspension, his appeal was dismissed by 

common pleas, and the two-year suspension was reinstated.
3

years, effective April 1, 2018, pursuant to Section 1532(c) of the Vehicle Code.

Licensee appealed the suspension to common pleas.

At the de novo hearing before common pleas, the Department submitted 

certified documents reflecting Licensee’s multiple convictions under the Drug Act 

and multiple suspensions of his operating privilege under the Vehicle Code, which 

were admitted into evidence. Licensee testified that he had not been in trouble 

since 2014, his license had been suspended since 2014, and he had not been 

driving while his license was suspended. (R.R. at 14a.) Licensee stated that he 

was doing what he was supposed to be doing and was ready to get his license back. 

Common pleas held that two of Licensee’s prior convictions were from 15 years 

ago, Licensee’s cases were “very old,” and it was “going to make it a one-year 

suspension,” “[w]hether the statute makes a differentiation or not.” (R.R. at 17a.) 

Therefore, common pleas dismissed Licensee’s appeal but reduced the suspension 

from two years to one year. 

The Department appealed and, at common pleas’ direction, filed a Concise 

Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure (Statement).

5

 In the Statement, the 

 

5

Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b). Rule 1925 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) Opinion in support of order.

(1) General rule.-- Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, upon receipt of the 

notice of appeal, the judge who entered the order giving rise to the notice of 

appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already appear of record, shall forthwith 

file of record at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the order, or for the rulings 

or other errors complained of, or shall specify in writing the place in the record 

where such reasons may be found.

* * *

(b) Direction to file statement of errors complained of on appeal; instructions 

to the appellant and the trial court.--If the judge entering the order giving rise 

(Continued...)
4

Department argued that common pleas erred by reducing Licensee’s suspension to 

one year because, unlike Section 3806(b) of the Vehicle Code,6 Section 1532(c) 

does not include a time restriction on what constitutes a prior conviction for

violating the Drug Act. (R.R. at 65a.) Common pleas issued an opinion in support 

of its Order, pursuant to Rule 1925(a), that acknowledged that Section 1532(c) 

“does not contain a time restriction for the look-back period.” (Op. at 2.)

However, common pleas noted that the look-back period for convictions for 

driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance (DUI) is limited to 

10 years, and held that two of Licensee’s Drug Act convictions occurred more than 

14 years ago and “the public safety purpose of the statute is not implicated when 

convictions that occurred over a decade ago are factored into the penalty to 

increase the license suspension.” (Id.) 

On appeal,7the Department makes the following arguments. Common 

pleas erred by reducing Licensee’s suspension from two years to one year based on

 

to the notice of appeal (“judge”) desires clarification of the errors complained of 

on appeal, the judge may enter an order directing the appellant to file of record in 

the trial court and serve on the judge a concise statement of the errors complained 

of on appeal (“Statement”).

Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a), (b).

6

75 Pa. C.S. § 3806(b). This section defined “prior offenses” for the purposes of 

imposing penalties under the Vehicle Code for driving under the influence of alcohol or a 

controlled substance, including a suspension of operating privileges under Section 3804(e), 75 

Pa. C.S. § 3804(e), as “includ[ing] any conviction . . . within the [10] years before the sentencing 

on the present violation.” 75 Pa. C.S. § 3806(b). Section 3806(b) was amended by the Act of 

May 25, 2016, P.L. 236, effective immediately, and continues to contain the 10-year look-back 

period, stating that “the prior offense must have occurred[] within 10 years prior to the date of

the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced . . . .” 75 Pa. C.S. § 3806(b)(i). 

7 Our review of common pleas’ “decision in a license suspension case is limited to 

determining whether [common pleas’] findings of facts are supported by competent evidence and 

whether [common pleas] committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion in reaching its 

(Continued...)
5

a conclusion that two of Licensee’s Drug Act convictions were too old. Had the 

General Assembly intended to exclude older Drug Act convictions from the 

enhancement provisions of Section 1532(c)(1)(i)-(iii), it could have done so and it 

is not for common pleas, or this Court, to add language to the statute. Mohamed v. 

Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 40 A.3d 1186, 1194-95 (Pa. 2012). 

Therefore, because the General Assembly did not include a 10-year look-back 

period in the plain language of Section 1532(c)(1), common pleas erred in adding 

one. 

Section 1532(c)(1)(iii) provides that “[t]he department shall suspend the 

operating privilege of any person upon receiving a certified record of the person’s 

conviction of any offense involving the possession, sale, delivery, offering for sale, 

holding for sale or giving away of any controlled substance under,” inter alia, the 

Drug Act, and that “[t]he period of suspension shall be . . . [f]or a third and any 

subsequent offense thereafter, a period of two years from the date of the 

suspension.” 75 Pa. C.S. § 1532(c)(1)(iii) (emphasis added). The Department 

bears the burden of proving the existence of the drug convictions, and it may meet 

this burden “by submitting into evidence its certified record of conviction.” Carter 

v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 838 A.2d 869, 872 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2003). “[O]nce [the Department] has introduced, via a certified record, evidence 

of a conviction, [it] has met its burden of production and established a rebuttable 

presumption that a conviction exists. Absent clear and convincing evidence[8]that 

 

decision.” Orloff v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 912 A.2d 918, 922 n.7 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2006) (citation omitted).

8

“‘Clear and convincing evidence’ has been defined as ‘evidence that is so clear and 

direct as to permit the trier of fact to reach a clear conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of 

the facts at issue.’” Mateskovich v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 755 A.2d 100, 

(Continued...)
6

the record is erroneous, this presumption becomes conclusive on the issue of the 

conviction.” Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Diamond, 616 A.2d 

1105, 1107-08 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). “To rebut a prima facie case established by a 

certified conviction record, the licensee must either challenge the regularity of the 

record, or introduce direct evidence showing that the record is incorrect and that 

the conviction was never entered.” Dick v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver 

Licensing, 3 A.3d 703, 707 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). 

Here, the Department presented certified documents showing that Licensee 

had been convicted four times for violating the Drug Act, thereby creating the 

rebuttable presumption that those convictions exist. Diamond, 616 A.2d at 1107-

08. Licensee did not present evidence challenging the regularity of those records, 

showing that the records were incorrect, or establishing that he was not convicted 

as described in the records. Accordingly, there was no clear and convincing 

evidence that those records were erroneous and, therefore, they became conclusive 

as to Licensee’s convictions. Dick, 3 A.3d at 707; Diamond, 616 A.2d at 1107-08. 

Therefore, by its express terms, Section 1532(c)(1)(iii) required that the 

Department suspend Licensee’s operating privilege for a period of two years.

Notwithstanding the language of Section 1532(c)(1)(iii), common pleas 

reduced Licensee’s suspension to one year. However, “where the language of a 

statute is plain and unambiguous, . . . courts may not set aside that language in 

order to pursue their own interpretation of what the legislature actually intended.” 

Dick, 3 A.3d at 708. It is well-settled that courts “have no authority to add or 

insert language into a statute” and should not, through interpretation, add a 

 

102 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (quoting Sharon Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd.

(Myers), 670 A.2d 1194, 1199 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996)).
7

requirement that the General Assembly did not include. Summit School, Inc. v. 

Department of Education, 108 A.3d 192, 199 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). “[W]here the 

legislature includes specific language in one section of a statute and excludes it 

from another, it should not be implied where excluded.” Pennsylvania State Police, 

Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement v. Prekop, 627 A.2d 223, 226 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1993). In reducing Licensee’s suspension based on the timing of two of his 

convictions, common pleas added a limitation to Section 1532(c)(1) that is not 

included in its plain language. If the General Assembly had intended to limit the 

look-back period for Drug Act convictions, it could have done so as it had for DUI 

convictions. However, the General Assembly did not create such a limitation and 

therefore, one should not have been implied or added by common pleas. Summit 

School, Inc., 108 A.3d at 199; Prekop, 627 A.2d at 226. Moreover, common pleas’

reliance on the “public safety purpose” of the Vehicle Code to incorporate a 10-

year limit on the look-back period was not warranted because enhanced suspension 

provisions have been found to serve many purposes. See, e.g., Plowman v. Dep’t 

of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 635 A.2d 124, 126-27 (Pa. 1993) (holding 

that the purposes of suspending a licensee’s operating privilege for violating the 

Drug Act is to “protect[] against [] the proliferation of drug use” and to deter drug 

use);9 Dick, 3 A.3d at 708 (reviewing the enhanced suspension provisions for 

multiple prior offenses for DUI under Section 3806(b) and stating that 

 

9

Plowman examined former Section 13(m) of the Drug Act, formerly 35 P.S. § 780-

113(m), which like Section 1532(c)(1) required the suspension of a licensee’s operating privilege 

based on a conviction for violating the Drug Act and included almost identical enhanced 

suspensions, including up to a two-year suspension for a third and subsequent conviction. 

Former Section 13(m) was repealed by Section 7 of the Act of June 28, 1993, P.L. 137, Section 

1532(c) was added to the Vehicle Code by Section 3 of the same act, and both were effective in 

60 days. 
8

“enhancements are justified on the grounds that a defendant, who has once had the 

benefit of the penal system, yet chooses to ignore that benefit and reoffend, merits 

harsher punishment than a first offender”); Lesko v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of 

Driver Licensing, 657 A.2d 1007, 1010 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (“The courts of this 

Commonwealth have consistently adhered to the principle that our legislature 

enacted [legislation to require the suspension of an individual’s operating privilege 

for a Drug Act conviction] to send a strong message that neither possession, nor 

use of illegal drugs, will be tolerated.”)

Accordingly, common pleas erred in reducing the period of Licensee’s 

suspension from two years to one year in contravention of the plain language of 

Section 1532(c)(1)(iii). We therefore will reverse common pleas’ Order reducing

the suspension of Licensee’s operating privilege from two years to one year, and

reinstate Licensee’s two-year suspension.

________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

James Blystone :

:

v. : No. 745 C.D. 2016

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing, :

Appellant :

O R D E R

NOW, January 19, 2017, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Allegheny County, entered in the above-captioned matter, is hereby REVERSED 

to the extent that it reduced the suspension of James Blystone’s (Licensee) 

operating privilege from two years to one year, and the two-year suspension of 

Licensee’s operating privilege is reinstated. 

________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge