[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as In re Complaint of Wingo v. Nationwide Energy Partners, L.L.C. , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio5583.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -5583

I N RE C OMPLAINT OF W INGO , A PPELLANT , v . N ATIONWIDE E NERGY P ARTNERS ,

L.L.C., I NTERVENING A PPELLEE ; P UBLIC U TILITIES C OMMISSION OF O HIO , A PPELLEE
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as In re Complaint of Wingo v. Nationwide Energy Partners,
L.L.C. , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5583.]
Public Utilities—R.C. 4905.03 and 4905.04—P ublic Utilities Commission’s jurisdiction over customer’s cl aims against submetering company— Commission’s jurisdiction is defined by statute—Commission has jurisdiction over “public utilities” —Commission improperly adopted a jurisdictional test of its own maki ng to determine whether submetering company was a “utility” rather than applying the relevant legal standards provided in the jurisdictional stat ute—Order reversed and cause remanded. (No. 2019-0273—Submitted May 12, 2020—Decided December 9, 2020. )

A PPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission, No. 17-2002-EL-CSS.

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2 D E W INE , J. {¶ 1} This case involves a complain t filed with t he Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”) again st a company that provides sub metering services. Submetering involves buying gas, electric and other services from a public utility and then reselling those services to the ultimat e consumer. The PUCO dismissed the complaint, concluding that it did not have jurisd iction over the claims against the submetering company. {¶ 2} The PUCO’s jurisdiction is provi ded by statute, and broadly spe aking, it has jurisdiction over any business that is a “public utility .” See R.C. 4905.04. But in the decision below, the PUCO did not look to the statuto ry scheme to determine whether the submeterer is a public utility; instead, it applied a jurisdictional test of its ow n devising. This was improper. T he General Assembly writes the laws determining the PUCO’s jurisdiction, not the PU CO. Thus, we
reverse the PUCO’s dismissal of t he complaint and remand for th e PUCO to determine its juris diction based upon the jur isdictional statut e. I. Background {¶ 3} The underlying question in this matter is whether the PUCO has jurisdiction over claims about subm etering services provided by Nationwide Energy Partners, L.L.C. (“NEP”). Submetering is a practice in which an entity “engage[s] in the resale or redistribution of public utility se rvices.” In re the Commission’s Investigation of Submet ering in the State of Ohio , Pub. Util. Comm. No. 15-1594-AU-COI, Fourth rehearing entry, ¶ 4 (Jan. 9, 2019). Originally, submetering developed with an apartment owner, or other similarowner of a multiresidential complex, dividing up a common master bill so that e ach individual resident would pay for their share of the utilities used. Toda y, submetering is big business, with third-party resellers such as NEP providing subm etering services for multiple properties and landlords. These resellers make their profit largely becauseJanuary Term, 2020

3 they are able to purchase utility services at a wholesale price that is less than the resale price they charge to individual customers. 1 {¶ 4} Cynthia Wingo is one such customer. In September 2017, she fil ed a complaint with the PUCO allegi ng that as a condition of her apa rtment lease, she is required to purchase water, sewer, and electric services from N EP. 2 She asserted that although “NEP claims to bill residents and tenants at the residential rate charged by the host utility,” it does not offer services equiva lent to those received by direct customers of the utility. Because NEP is not subject to regulation by the PUCO, she alleged, it does not p rovide certain benefits and pro tections that a customer would receive if she contracted directly with a public utility. These include rebates and energy-efficiency measures offered by the h ost utility, certain emergency-assistance programs for lower-income residents, prote ctions against disconnections, and various other consumer-protection measures. {¶ 5} Shortly after filing an answer, NEP sought dismissal of Wingo’s complaint. NEP maintained that it is not a public utility and, consequently, is not subject to the PUCO’s jurisdiction. In order to evaluate this assertion, the PUCO

1. Background information on the history and practice of subme tering can be found in a host of materials. See, e.g. , Campo Corp. v. Feinberg , 110 N.Y.S.2d 250, 252, 279 A.D. 302 (1952) (describing the practice by landlords in New York City at the t urn of the twentieth century of purchasing electricity from a public utility at a wholesale rat e and reselling the electricity to their tenants at a retail rate); Manufactured Hous. Inst. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency , 467 F.3d 391, 394 (4th Cir.2006) (defining submetering as the p ractice of “property owners metering and billing their tenants for water purchased by the owners but distributed to and actually used by the tenants”); Nationwide Energy Partners, Who We Are , https://www.nationwideenergypartners.com/about (accessed Sept. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5FYY-WF82]; Gearino, Shocking Cost Investigation: Utility Middle Men Charge Renters Inflated Prices , Columbus Dispatch (Oct. 20, 2013), https://www.dispatch.com/news/20131020/shocking-cost-investigat ion-utility-middle-mencharge-renters-inflated-prices (accessed Sept. 23, 2020) [https ://perma.cc/M5TA-2ZNW].

2. Wingo’s complaint also included a claim that a natural gas company’s provision of submetering services also constituted the unr egulated provision of public-u tility services. That company did not choose to intervene in this appeal. As a result, we limit our analysis to Wingo’s claims made against NEP

.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 examined NEP’s activities and the services NEP provided to Wing o and her landlord under a test originall y set forth in a 1992 PUCO order (the “ Shroyer test”) and recently modified by the PUCO (the “modified Shroyer test”). See Pub. Util. Comm. No. 17-2002-EL-CSS, ¶ 64-68, 70-78 (Oct. 24, 2018). Usin g the modified Shroyer test, the PUCO concluded that NEP is not a public utility and dismissed Wingo’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Id . at ¶ 91. {¶ 6} Wingo twice applied for rehearing, but the PUCO denied her applications. Pub. Util. Co mm. No. 17-2002-EL-CSS, Second rehe aring entry, ¶ 1 (Feb. 6, 2019). She then filed an appeal in this court, raisin g six propositions of law—the fifth of which we previously dismissed for lack of juri sdiction. 157 Ohio St.3d 1518, 2019-Ohio-5289, 136 N.E.3d 1522.

II. The PUCO’s Jurisdiction Is Es tablished by Statute, Not by an AgencyCreated Test {¶ 7} In Wingo’s first proposition of l aw, she contends that the PUCO erred in concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In h er second and fourth propositions of law, she argues th at the PUCO erred in its appl ication of the law to the facts alleged in her compl aint and failed to adequately exp lain or support its
decision. Central to a resolu tion of each of these proposition s is a common issue:
whether determination of the PUC O’s jurisdiction is governed by statute or by a test of the PUCO’s own creation. Wingo asserts that the PUCO’s use of its own jurisdictional test, rather than the applicable statutory langu age, to determine whether NEP is a public utility was improper. We agree.
A. The PUCO’s Jurisdiction Is Defined by the General Assembly {¶ 8} The General Assembly has veste d the PUCO with the “power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate public utilities.” R.C. 4905.04; see also R.C. 4905.05; R.C. 4905.06. The PUCO “has no authority to act beyon d its statutory powers.” Discount Cellular, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. , 112 Ohio St.3d 360, 2007-January Term, 2020

5 Ohio-53, 859 N.E.2d 957, ¶ 51. Thus, whether the PUCO has juri sdiction in this case depends on whether N EP is a public utility. {¶ 9} The statutory scheme defines what is a public utility. R.C. 49 05.02 tells us that, with a handful of exceptions, a “public utility” is any entity that is
defined in R.C. 4905.03. That s ection, in turn, defines severa l types of public utilities, three of which are relevant to the services that NEP provides to Wingo:

(C) An electric light company, when engaged in the business of supplying electricity for light, heat, or power purposes to consumers within this state, including supplying electric transmission service for electricity delivered to consumers in this state, but excluding a regional transmission organization appro ved by the federal energy regulatory commission;
* * * (G) A water-works company, when engaged in the business of supplying water through pipes or tubing, or in a similar man ner, to consumers within this state;
* * * (M) A sewage disposal system company, when engaged in the business of sewage disposal services through pipes or tubin g, and treatment works , or in a similar manner , within this state.

B. The PUCO Created Its Own Jurisdictional Test {¶ 10} In the proceeding below, the PUCO did not apply the statutory language. Instead, it looked to a test of its own making, the modified Shroyer test, to determine whether NEP is a public utility and therefore subj ect to PUCO jurisdiction. Some historical background about the test’s deve lopment is helpful
here.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 {¶ 11} The PUCO developed the original Shroyer test in a proceeding determining whether a trailer-par k owner who purchased water fr om the city of Delaware and charged tenants for the water they used was operat ing as a public utility. In re Complaints of Inscho v. Shroyer’s Mobile Homes , Pub. Util. Comm. Nos. 90-182-WS-CSS, 90-252-WS-CSS, and 90-350-WW-CSS, 1992 WL 9 37210 (Feb. 27, 1992). The test called for an evaluation of three qu estions: (1) whether the entity has “manifested an intent to be a public utility by availing [itself] of special benefits available to public utilities;” (2) whether th e utility service is available to the general public rather than to a specific class of residents; and (3) whether the provision of utility services is “ancillary” to the entity’s “primary
business.” Id

. {¶ 12} The modified Shroyer test that the PUCO used in this action has a more recent history. Beginning in December 2015, the PUCO unde rtook an investigation to develop a regulatory framework for the practic e of submetering in
Ohio. In re the Commission’s Investigation of Submetering in the State of Ohio , Pub. Util. Comm. No. 15-1594-AU-COI, ¶ 1 (Dec. 16, 2015). In i ts conclusions to the investigation, the PUCO sta ted that it had adopted the Shroyer test as the means by which it determined whether an entity is a public utility. In re the Commission’s Investigation of Submetering in the State of Ohio , Pub. Util. Comm. No. 15-1594- AU-COI, ¶ 16 (Dec. 7, 2016). And, as a result of its investiga tion, the PUCO announced it would apply the Shroyer test, with modifications, to entities engaged in submetering. Id . at ¶ 16-17. {¶ 13} The PUCO adopted two modifications to the Shroyer test, which substantially changed the inquiry into whether an entity is a p ublic utility. Most notably, the modified test creat es a presumption under the thir d prong that a reseller

is a public utility if it charges a customer more for utility ser vices than the customer would pay “the local public utility under the default service t ariff for the equivalent usage on a total bill basis.” In re the Commission’s Investigation of SubmeteringJanuary Term, 2020

7 in the State of Ohio , Pub. Util. Comm. No. 15-1594-AU-COI, Second rehearing entry, ¶ 49 (June 21, 2017). A rese ller can rebut this presump tion by showing that one of two safe harbors applies—either that (1) the reseller is “simply passing through its annual costs of providing a utility service charged by a local public utility” or (2) “the [r]eseller’s annual charges for a utility service * * * do not exceed what the resident would have paid the local public utili ty for equivalent annual usage, on a total bill ba sis, under the local public uti lity’s default service
tariffs.” Id . at ¶ 40. 3 {¶ 14} Applying this modified test to Wingo’s complaint, the PUCO determined that NEP is not a public utility. As to the first p rong, it found that NEP has not manifested an intent to be a public utility because it has not taken advantage of the special benefits available to public utilities, such as eminent domain. Pub. Util. Comm. No. 17-2002-EL-CSS at ¶ 64, 68. As to the second p rong, it concluded that NEP does not offer its services to the general public, but only to people living in a place where it has reached a n arrangement with the owner. Id . at ¶ 65, 68. As

3. The “default service tariff” refers to the rate that custom ers would pay if they purchased utility services directly from their local regulated utility based on t he utility’s standard rates as filed with and approved by the PUCO. See In re the Commission’s Investigation of Submetering in the State of Ohio , Pub. Util. Comm. No. 15-1594-AU-COI, Second rehearing entry, at ¶ 40, 49–50; Hull v. Columbia Gas of Ohio , 110 Ohio St.3d 96, 2006-Ohio-3666, 850 N.E.2d 1190, ¶ 25 (def ining tariffs as the rates filed with and approved by the PUCO). Not all cus tomers will pay this rate. Since the development of Ohio’s “energy choice” program over the last dec ade, consumers have had the option to purchase electricity fro m a variety of suppliers, som e of whom may offer a lower price than the local public utility. See PUCO, Choosing an Electric Supplier , https://puco.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/puco/utilities/electricity /resources/choosing-an-electricsupplier (accessed Sept. 28, 2020) [https://perma.cc/NQ8N-NKTP] ; PUCO, What Is Energy Choice Ohio? , https://energychoice.ohio.gov/Pages/About%20Choice.aspx (acce ssed Oct. 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YC3Y-5KMQ]; PUCO, How Are Electric Generation Rates Set? , https://puco.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/puco/utilities/electricity /resources/how-are-electricgeneration-rates-set (accessed Se pt. 25, 2020) [https://perma.c c/L2NF-CJWY]. Consumers who purchase from suppliers other than their local public utility s till have their electricity distributed to them by their local public utility and pay that local utility’s distribution costs. Thomas, Lendel & Park, Understanding Electricity Markets in Ohio , Urban Publications, Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University, 18-20 (Ju ly 2014), https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti cle=2270&context=urban_facpub (accessed Oct. 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/VZ4K-CHQS].S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 to the third prong, it found that NEP is not a public utility b ecause NEP simply passes through the cost of water and sewer services charged by the city of Reynoldsburg. Id . at ¶ 66. For the electric services, the PUCO accepted as tru e Wingo’s allegation that she paid more for a single month than s he would have if she were directly served by the local public utility, American Electric Power (“AEP”). It then utilized the second safe-harbor provision and concluded that, based on additional billing statements submitted by NEP, NEP’s charges to Wingo were less on an annual basis than she would have paid under AEP ’s default service
tariff. Id . at ¶ 74-78. {¶ 15} The question is whether the PUCO’s use of the modified Shroyer
test to determine the extent of its jurisdiction is appropriate

.

C. The PUCO’s Modified Shroyer Test Bears Little Relation to the Statutory
Scheme {¶ 16} In its original version—and used in the context for which it wa s developed (a trailer-park operato r apportioning water costs amo ng tenants)—the Shroyer test bore some connection to the statutory scheme. The inquir ies into (1) whether the trailer-park opera tor had manifested an intent to b e a public utility, (2) whether the trailer-park operator resold water to others outsid e of the trailer park, and (3) whether water resale was “ancillary” to the primary bu siness of operating a trailer park can all be connected to the statutory language—t hat is, whether the trailer-park operator was a “water-works company, * * * engaged in the business of supplying water through pipes or tubing, or in a similar man ner, to consumers within this state,” R.C. 4905.03(G). {¶ 17} In contrast, the PUCO’s modifications to the Shroyer test are remarkable for their almost com plete disconnect from the statut ory language. The third prong of the original test—whether utility services are “ ancillary” to the reseller’s primary bus iness—is grounded in the statutory langua ge. Thus, if metering services are completely ancillary to a business—say a building owner whoJanuary Term, 2020

9 simply passes on electricity costs as a convenience to its tena nts—it would seem fair to say that the landlord is not “an electric light company ” and is not “engaged
in the business of supplying electricity.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 4905.03(C). But, as modified, the third prong of the Shroyer test goes well beyond considerations whether utility-resale activities are ancillary to another busi ness. Instead, the modified test, with its presumption and safe harbors, focuses o n how much profit the reseller makes and whether the consumer is charged more tha n she would have been under the default-service-tariff rates. This is an inquir y that has nothing to do with the statutory language. {¶ 18} The PUCO argues this court’s decision in Pledger v. Pub. Util.

Comm. , 109 Ohio St.3d 463, 2006-Ohio-2989, 849 N.E.2d 14, affirmed i ts use of
the Shroyer test to determine if an entity is a public utility, and the PU CO further
assumes that this affirmation gives it the power to adopt the m odified Shroyer test as the means by which it determines if an entity is a public ut ility. But this position
is in error. {¶ 19} No decision of this court can give the PUCO the authority to wr ite its own jurisdictional rules. It is axiomatic that “where juri sdiction is dependent upon a statutory grant, this court is without the authority to create jurisdiction when the statutory language does not. That power resides in the Gen eral Assembly.” Waltco Truck Equip. Co. v. Tallmadge Bd. of Zoning Appeals , 40 Ohio St.3d 41, 43, 531 N.E.2d 685 (1988). {¶ 20} Moreover, we find nothing in Pledger that authorizes the PUCO to write its own jurisdictional rules. Pledger dealt with an apartment owner that charged tenants for the water used in their apartments. Pledger at ¶ 2. The water was purchased from the Akron Wate r Department, and the landlord simply billed tenants for the water they used at Akron’s rate, plus a 10 perc ent administrative charge. Id. When tenants filed a complaint, the PUCO applied the original t hreepart Shroyer test and determined it did not have jurisdiction and dismissed theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 complaint. Id . at ¶ 7. On appeal, the tenant s challenged the PUCO’s use of the third prong of the Shroyer test, arguing that the statutory text did not allow for consideration whether reselling utility services was “ancillary ” to the landlord’s primary business. Id . at ¶ 26. The tenants pointed to the phrase “in the business of” in the text of R.C. 4905.03 and argued that anyone who buys and sells utility services falls under PUCO’s jurisdiction. Id. This court disagreed with the tenants’ reading of the statute and affi rmed the PUCO. We explained:

Appellant’s argument ignores the fact that the noun “business” is followed in both statutory provisions by the preposition “of,” which is used to introduce words describing t he noun preceding it. A utility is not in the “business of” buyin g and selling an ordinary commodity or service. Instead, R.C. 4905.03(A)(8) [now R.C. 4905.03(G)] refers to the “business of supplying water through pipes or tubing, or in a similar manner,” and R.C. 4905.03(A)(14) [now R.C. 4905.03(M)] refers to the “business of [ providing ] sewage disposal services through pipes or tubing, and treatment wor ks, or in a similar manner.”

(Emphasis and third brackets added in Pledger .) Id. at ¶ 27. {¶ 21} Contrary to the PUCO’s suggestion, Pledger was decided based upon a textual application of the jurisdictional statute. This court rejected the challenge to the third prong of the Shroye r test precisely because it found the PUCO’s interpretation consistent with the jurisdictional statut e and the tenants’ interpretation inconsistent with the statutory text. Thus, Pledger stands for the proposition that any jurisdictiona l test used by the PUCO must be moored in the statutory language. Nothing in Pledger gives the PUCO the power to write jurisdictional rules that go bey ond the statutes drafted by the General Assembly.January Term, 2020

11 {¶ 22} In applying its modified Shroyer test, the PUCO is making a policy judgment about who it wants to regulate. “ Resellers ,” it is saying, “ as long as you don’t charge too much (as measured by de fault-service-tariff ra tes), we will leave you alone. We won’t even consider complaints filed against you. But cross that price line, and you are subject to our jurisdiction and our rules .” {¶ 23} The PUCO even acknowledges that its jurisdictional test is noth ing more than a policy judgment. It says the second safe harbor “i s justified because the resident can not [sic] be considered harmed by the submeter ed arrangement if the resident is paying the same amount as if the resident was s erved directly by the public utility.” Pub. Util. Comm. No. 17-2002-EL-CSS at ¶ 73. But whether someone is “harmed” isn’t a juris dictional question; it is a me rits question that can be answered only after it is determined that an activity falls within the PUCO’s jurisdiction. {¶ 24} This is not to say that the polic y judgment that the PUCO is ma king under the guise of defining its j urisdiction is unreasonable. After all, the PUCO, like all government entities, has finite resources. And, as fa r as consumer protection goes, it may be prude nt to leave alone resellers who keep their charges within certain limits and go after others who gouge their custo mers. But defining the parameters of the PUCO’s jur isdiction is up to the General Assembly, not the PUCO. And the jurisdictional pr ice-line drawn by the PUCO has no connection to the statutory language that defines its jurisdiction. {¶ 25} It may well make sense for the General Assembly to directly add ress the question whether entities who engage in submetering fall wi thin the PUCO’s jurisdiction. The jurisdictiona l statute doesn’t directly addr ess reselling, and at the time of its enactment, large-scale third-party-metering compani es did not exist. 4 But until it does so, the PUCO must apply the law that is on th e books. The fact

4. The jurisdictional statute dates from at least the 1950s. See 1953 Am.H.B No. 1, 125 Ohio Laws 7.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 that interpreting the statute may involve some complexity doesn ’t give the PUCO
license to write its own rules. {¶ 26} Thus, we remand this case for the PUCO to determine whether it has jurisdiction based upon the juri sdictional statute, not the mod ified Shroyer test. In doing so, the PUCO will need to apply R.C. 4905.03 and determin e whether NEP is an “electric light company,” “water-works company,” or “sewa ge disposal system company” “in the business of supplying” any of the cover ed services. Of particular significance in this inquiry are the meanings of the terms “an electric light company,” “water-works company,” and “sewage disposal sys tem company” and “in the business of” and “supplying,” and the application o f those terms to the facts of the case. The application of the relevant legal stand ards to the facts is one
that is best left to the PUC O in the first instance.

III. We Cannot or Need Not Consid er Wingo’s Other Propositions of Law {¶ 27} The remaining propositions of law can be addressed in short ord er. In her third proposition, Wingo claims that the PUCO erred by c onsidering matters outside of the pleadings in granting NEP’s motion to dismiss un der Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
NEP counters that consideration of matters outside of the plead ings is appropriate under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) on a motion to dismiss for a lack of subj ect-matter jurisdiction. In light of our remand to the PUCO to apply the proper jurisdictional test, this matter does not prese nt a live controversy. We trus t that on remand, the PUCO will apply the proper standards and make clear to the part ies the evidentiary framework under which it is operating. {¶ 28} In her sixth proposition of law, Wingo challenges the PUCO’s decision to grant rehearing sol ely for the purpose of extending its time to consider her rehearing application and attempts to use this case to make a generalized challenge to what she says is routine practice of the PUCO. Sh e points to R.C. 4903.10(B), which provides that “if the commission does not gra nt or deny such application for rehearing within thirty days from the date of f iling thereof, it isJanuary Term, 2020

13 denied by operation of law.” Win go and amicus curiae, Industri al Energy UsersOhio, which also advances the issue, may well have a legitimate complaint, but this appeal is not the appropriate vehicle for considering this ques tion. The injury that Wingo complains of—the PUCO’s granting itself an extension—is n ot one that can be redressed by a decision in her favor. See ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio , 139 Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, ¶ 7. Here, even if the PUCO erred by granting the extension, it did not change the outcome of the proceeding below. The PUCO’s decision to dismiss her complaint remained u nchanged. Thus, a ruling on the issue here could have no effect on the outcome of the case and is not properly before us.
IV. Conclusion {¶ 29} For the reasons stated above, we reverse the PUCO’s decision dismissing Wingo’s complaint and remand the cause for further h earing. Further, we direct the PUCO to apply the j urisdictional statute and not the modified Shroyer test, in assessing its jurisdiction.
Order reversed
and cause remanded.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F RENCH , and S TEWART , JJ., concur.

D ONNELLY , J., concurs in judgment only.

F ISCHER , J., dissents.

_________________ Whitt Sturtevant, L.L.P., Mark A. Whitt, and Lucas A. Fykes, f or appellant. Dave Yost, Attorney General, and John Jones and Robert A. Euba nks, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Michael J. Settineri, a nd Daniel E. Shuey, for intervening appellee. McNees, Wallace & Nurick, L.L.C ., Frank P. Darr, and Matthew R

. Pritchard, urging reversal for a micus curiae Industrial Energy Users-Ohio.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 _________________