UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4933

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY GENE TRAPPIER,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. 

(4:09-cr-00340-TLW-1)

Submitted: July 18, 2011 Decided: September 28, 2011

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Russell W. Mace, III, THE MACE FIRM, Myrtle Beach, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States 

Attorney, Jimmie Ewing, A. Bradley Parham, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Anthony Gene Trappier appeals his convictions and 322-

month sentence after he entered a conditional guilty plea to one 

count each of possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or 

more of heroin and 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and possession of a firearm in 

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 

U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(A) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011). Trappier 

asserts that the judgment should be vacated because: (1) his 

guilty plea was unknowing and failed to comply with Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11 because he was unaware that he qualified as a career 

offender; and (2) the district court erred when it denied his 

suppression motion. Trappier has also filed a motion to file a

pro se supplemental brief with this Court. We deny Trappier’s 

motion and affirm.

We conclude that the district court did not err when 

it denied Trappier’s suppression motion. In reviewing the 

district court’s denial of Trappier’s motion, we review the

district court’s factual determinations for clear error and any 

legal determinations de novo. United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 

586, 589 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3374 (2010).

Because the district court denied Trappier’s motion, we construe

the evidence “in the light most favorable to the government.” 

Id. 
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The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the 

people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and 

seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This guarantee 

requires that arrests and “searches be conducted pursuant to a 

warrant issued by an independent judicial officer.” California 

v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). There are “a few 

specifically established and well-delineated exceptions[,]” 

however. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991)

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

For instance, an officer can make a warrantless arrest 

if he has probable cause to believe that the person has 

committed, or is committing, a felony in his presence. See

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976). Assuming a 

warrantless arrest is lawful, police may conduct a full search 

of an arrestee’s person and personal items in his possession and 

control. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 

(1973) (holding that a search incident to arrest requires no 

additional justification).

Probable cause “to justify an arrest [without a 

warrant] means facts and circumstances within the officer’s 

knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or 

one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances 

shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is 

about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 
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31, 37 (1979). Moreover, whether police had probable cause is 

determined by the “totality of the circumstances.” Maryland v. 

Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). 

“The substance of all the definitions of probable 

cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt . . . and that 

the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the 

person to be searched or seized[.]” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). Moreover, officers may “draw on 

their own experience and specialized training to make inferences 

from and deductions about the cumulative information available 

to them that might well elude an untrained person.” United 

States v. Johnson, 599 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir.) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 

358 (2010).

Trappier asserts that the district court erred when it 

denied his suppression motion because: (1) police lacked 

probable cause to conduct a warrantless arrest and search of his 

person on October 8, 2008; and (2) an October 16, 2008 traffic 

stop of the vehicle he was driving was unconstitutional because 

it was initiated based on an anonymous and uncorroborated tip. 

We have reviewed the transcript of Trappier’s suppression 

hearing and conclude that the totality of the facts and 

circumstances known by the agents on October 8, 2008, provided a 

reasonable basis for their belief that Trappier was in 
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possession of illegal narcotics; accordingly, Trappier’s 

warrantless arrest on that date passes muster under the Fourth 

Amendment. Similarly, we conclude that given the agents’ 

knowledge that Trappier’s driver’s license was suspended, the 

agents had probable cause to effect the traffic stop that 

resulted in the discovery and seizure of additional narcotics on

October 16, 2008. Accordingly, we discern no error in the 

district court’s decision to deny Trappier’s suppression motion.

We also reject Trappier’s assertion that although he 

was informed of the statutory mandatory minimum and maximum 

sentences he faced during his Rule 11 hearing, his plea was 

unknowing and involuntary because the district court did not 

inform him he might qualify as a career offender. Although Rule 

11 requires a district court to notify a defendant during the 

plea colloquy “of all potentially applicable statutory minimum 

and maximum sentences[,]” it “does not require courts to inform 

defendants of the applicable Guidelines sentencing ranges[.]” 

United States v. Hairston, 522 F.3d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 2008). 

The district court informed Trappier that the drug 

charge to which he was pleading guilty required a statutory 

mandatory minimum sentence of ten years and carried a maximum of 

life in prison, and that the weapons charge required a minimum 

sentence of five years and carried a maximum of life in prison, 

and that the sentence on the weapons charge had to run 
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consecutively to any sentence imposed on the drug charge. 

Trappier indicated that he understood. Accordingly, the 

district court complied with Rule 11 and nothing more was 

required. 

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment. We 

also deny Trappier’s motion to file a pro se supplemental brief.*

 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 * Trappier’s ineffective assistance claim raised in his pro 

se brief is not addressed because counsel’s alleged 

ineffectiveness does not conclusively appear on the record. See

United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 223, 239 (4th Cir. 2006) 

(reiterating that this Court will only address an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal “if the lawyer’s 

ineffectiveness conclusively appears from the record”).