Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023 Page 1 of 19

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Susan D. Rayl

Aaron J. Harshman

Morgan B. Brading

Harshman Ponist Smith & Rayl

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

Catherine E. Brizzi

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Theodore J. Canonge, Jr.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 25, 2023

Court of Appeals Case No.

22A-CR-2451

Appeal from the 

Hendricks Superior Court

The Honorable 

Mark A. Smith, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

32D04-2105-F3-8

Opinion by Judge Foley

Chief Judge Altice concurs.

Judge May dissents with separate opinion.

Foley, Judge.

[1] Theodore J. Canonge, Jr. (“Canonge”) challenges the denial of his motion to 

suppress evidence obtained from a vehicle search, where law enforcement 
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brought in a K-9 unit during a traffic stop and the dog alerted to the presence of 

contraband. He argues that the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment 

because law enforcement prolonged the traffic stop and otherwise lacked

independent reasonable suspicion to conduct the dog sniff. Because we 

conclude that law enforcement had independent reasonable suspicion to 

conduct the dog sniff, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Canonge faces four drug-related charges stemming from the discovery of 

contraband in a vehicle he was driving. Canonge moved to suppress evidence 

obtained from a search of the vehicle. At a hearing on Canonge’s motion, the 

State presented evidence about a traffic stop conducted on April 22, 2021. The 

evidence included testimony from the officer who conducted the traffic stop, 

Officer Kevin Roach of the Avon Police Department (“Officer Roach”), and

the officer who later brought his K-9 partner to the traffic stop, Officer Steven 

Kaspryzk of the Avon Police Department (“Officer Kaspryzk”). The evidence 

also included footage from a camera installed in Officer Roach’s police vehicle.

[3] Officer Roach testified that he saw the driver of a Chevy Malibu commit 

multiple traffic violations, including changing lanes without proper signaling. 

He decided to conduct a traffic stop. When Officer Roach activated the lights 

of his patrol vehicle, he noticed “three (3) occupants moving about in the car, 

reaching in various locations and then continuously looking back at [his] patrol 

vehicle.” Tr. Vol. II p. 13. When the Chevy Malibu pulled over and stopped, 

Officer Roach “saw movements continue inside the vehicle,” with the 
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“occupants reaching around[.]” Id. at 14. Officer Roach saw the occupants 

engaged in these movements “a few times at least.” Id. at 17. From Officer 

Roach’s vantage point, it seemed as though the occupants were “reaching 

down, across, . . . like in the floorboard area[.]” Id. at 18. As Officer Roach 

approached the vehicle, he observed “backpacks at the floorboard[.]” Id.

[4] Before Officer Roach reached the front window to speak with the occupants, he 

noticed that the driver—Canonge—was already “reaching over” to hand 

documents to Officer Roach. Id. at 17. It seemed to Officer Roach that

Canonge was “try[ing] to accelerate [sic] the stop” or “expediate [sic] the stop.” 

Id. When asked to clarify why it seemed as though Canonge “was trying to 

expedite the stop,” Officer Roach said: “It’s unusual for . . . a driver to present 

documentation before I even address them.” Id. Officer Roach testified that he 

had conducted “around five hundred” traffic stops. Id. at 12. Reflecting on that

experience, Officer Roach remarked: “I don’t believe I’ve had another traffic 

stop where I have experienced that.” Id. at 17. Officer Roach also noted: 

“[S]ometimes [the driver] may have [the documentation] in their hands, but 

they are not reaching over to hand it [to] me before I address them.” Id.

[5] Officer Roach took the documents from Canonge and asked the front-seat 

passenger for his identification. The front-seat passenger complied with the 

request. However, Officer Roach observed that the passenger “wouldn’t make 

eye contact” with him and “didn’t speak . . . when [Officer Roach] was talking 

to him[.]” Id. Officer Roach thought that the front-seat passenger’s conduct 

was “a little unusual.” Id. He also noticed that the front-seat passenger was 
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“smoking a new cigarette, pretty rapidly,” which he “kn[e]w to be indicative of 

a stressful situation for someone.” Id. at 14. Officer Roach turned his attention 

to the backseat passenger, who “seemed really nervous” and was sitting 

completely still in “a statute[-]like state.” Id. at 17. Officer Roach requested 

identification and, before that passenger “had the opportunity to answer,” 

Canonge “interjected” and said that the passenger was a minor. Id. at 15.

[6] Officer Roach returned to his vehicle and began “running identification, vehicle 

information, things of that nature.” Id. His investigatory steps included a

criminal-history check through Indiana’s MyCase system, which revealed “a 

couple of drug charges” between Canonge and the other adult occupant. Id. at 

17. While Officer Roach was using the computer and “conducting [his] typical 

procedure with a traffic stop,” he contacted officers with K-9 partners to inquire 

about availability for a dog sniff. Id. at 34. One officer was Officer Kaspryzk, 

who was addressing a roadside hazard. Officer Kaspryzk said he would bring 

over his K-9 partner after finding someone else to address the hazard. Officer 

Roach began writing a warning “to fill time until [Officer Kaspryzk] got there.” 

Id. at 33. Officer Roach testified that he typically gave verbal warnings. When 

asked why he prepared a written warning on this occasion, he said: “I was 

waiting for an officer . . . the K-9 officer to arrive to conduct the sniff. So, in the 

meantime I was occupying my time by writing the warning.” Id. at 25.

[7] Officer Kaspryzk arrived about thirteen minutes later, which was about twentyone minutes into the traffic stop. When Officer Kaspryzk arrived, Officer 

Roach exited his patrol vehicle and directed Canonge and the others to step out
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of the Chevy Malibu. Officer Kaspryzk then walked around the vehicle with a

K-9 unit certified in detecting the odors of methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, 

ecstasy, and marijuana. The dog gave a positive alert at the rear driver’s side 

door. At that point, Officer Roach searched the vehicle, locating items that he 

suspected consisted of cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana.

[8] In lieu of oral arguments, Canonge and the State submitted briefs concerning 

the motion to suppress. Thereafter, on August 3, 2022, the trial court denied

the motion. On September 6, 2022—more than thirty days later—Canonge 

moved to certify the order for interlocutory appeal. Following a hearing, the 

trial court granted the motion to certify. This Court later accepted jurisdiction.1

1 In a footnote, the State directs us to Appellate Rule 14(B), which governs discretionary interlocutory 

appeals. The State points out that where a motion to certify was not filed within thirty days of the 

interlocutory order and the trial court intends to grant the motion, the trial court “shall make a finding that 

the certification is based on a showing of good cause” and “shall set forth the basis for that finding.” Ind. 

Appellate Rule 14(B)(1)(a). Asserting that the trial court did not identify good cause in granting Canonge’s 

belated motion to certify, the State directs us to caselaw for the proposition that, under the circumstances, we 

have discretion to dismiss the interlocutory appeal. Notably, the State falls short of requesting dismissal, 

potentially because—as Canonge points out in his Reply Brief—the CCS entry associated with the hearing on 

Canonge’s motion to certify shows that the State “d[id] not object” to the motion. Appellant’s App. Vol. II

p. 11. Moreover, although the State directs us to noncompliance with aspects of Appellate Rule 14(B), it is 

not as though the State claims we lack jurisdiction. To the contrary, the State suggests that dismissal would 

be on “non-jurisdictional grounds” based on Canonge’s failure “to file a timely motion to certify” or “assert, 

and have the trial court find, good cause for a belated motion[.]” Appellee’s Br. p. 6 n.1.

Ultimately, because the trial court certified its interlocutory order and this Court later accepted jurisdiction, 

we are satisfied that we have jurisdiction to resolve this appeal. See App. R. 14(B) (“An appeal may be taken 

from . . . interlocutory orders if the trial court certifies its order and the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction 

over the appeal.”) & 5(B) (generally providing that “[t]he Court of Appeals shall have jurisdiction over 

appeals of interlocutory orders under Rule 14”). Further, because the State did not object to the motion to 

certify and does not directly seek dismissal, we elect to reach the merits. See, e.g., Cardosi v. State, 128 N.E.3d 

1277, 1284 n.3 (Ind. 2019) (noting the appellate preference to resolve cases on the merits whenever possible).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023 Page 6 of 19

Discussion and Decision

[9] According to Canonge, the trial court should have granted the motion to 

suppress evidence because the traffic stop resulted in an unreasonable seizure, 

contrary to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2

[10] The Fourth Amendment provides the right to be free from “unreasonable

searches and seizures”—a right that applies in Indiana because of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961). To 

safeguard this right, evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or 

seizure is generally excludable at trial. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 

U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963) (recognizing that evidence may be excluded as “fruit of 

the poisonous tree”). A defendant may seek to exclude evidence by challenging 

the constitutionality of a search or seizure through (1) a pre-trial motion to 

suppress or (2) a timely objection at trial. Ind. Criminal Rule 2.7(B). In this 

case, Canonge is appealing the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence.

[11] When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence obtained through a warrantless 

search or seizure, the State bears the burden of proving the warrantless search 

or seizure was constitutional. Edwards v. State, 759 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ind. 

2001). In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial 

court’s proximity to the evidence by “construing conflicting evidence in the 

2 A traffic stop also implicates protections in Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. See Marshall v. 

State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019). Here, Canonge exclusively relies on the Fourth Amendment in 

challenging the denial of his motion to suppress.
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manner most favorable to the ruling.” M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 331 (Ind. 

2016). In conducting our review, we also consider “substantial and uncontested 

evidence favorable to the defendant.” Id. (quoting Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 

362, 365 (Ind. 2014)). Evaluating the evidence in this way, we decide de novo 

the legal question of whether the search or seizure was constitutional. Bunnell v. 

State, 172 N.E.3d 1231, 1234 (Ind. 2021); M.O., 63 N.E.3d at 331.

[12] Canonge asserts that the traffic stop resulted in an unconstitutional seizure 

because law enforcement prolonged the traffic stop to bring in the K-9 unit and 

conduct a dog sniff. Canonge contends that the prolongment was improper 

because law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the dog sniff.

[13] A traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Marshall v. State, 117 

N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019). For a traffic stop to comply with the Fourth 

Amendment, a police officer must have a lawful basis to initiate the stop, which 

includes “observ[ing] a driver commit a traffic violation.” State v. Keck, 4 

N.E.3d 1180, 1184 (Ind. 2014). Even if there is a lawful basis to initiate the 

stop, the Fourth Amendment does not condone indefinite seizure. See generally, 

e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). Indeed, “a seizure that is 

lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of 

execution”—including the length of the seizure—“unreasonably infringes 

interests protected by the Constitution.” Id. “[T]he tolerable duration of police 

inquiries . . . is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission[.]’” Rodriguez v. United 

States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). In the traffic-stop context, that mission is to 

“address the traffic violation that warranted the stop . . . and attend to related 
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safety concerns[.]” Id. All in all, “[a]uthority for the seizure . . . ends when 

tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—

completed.” Id. Therefore, although a police officer “may conduct certain 

unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop,” the officer generally 

“may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop[.]” Id. at 355.

[14] One potential unrelated check is to bring in a K-9 unit to conduct a dog sniff. 

See id.; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408–09 (noting that conducting a dog sniff generally 

does not amount to an unreasonable search). In this context, “[t]he critical 

question . . . is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues 

a ticket, . . . but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—

‘the stop[.]’” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357. In carrying out the traffic stop, an

officer must act with reasonable diligence. See id. Thus, “[i]f an officer can 

complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of ‘time 

reasonably required to complete [the stop’s] mission.’” Id. (quoting Caballes, 

543 U.S. at 497) (alteration in original). Nonetheless, if the traffic stop is 

prolonged to conduct a dog sniff, the seizure is not per se unconstitutional. See 

id. Rather, the prolonged seizure is permissible as long as the officer has

“reasonable suspicion . . . to justify detaining an individual.” Id. at 355.

[15] Because we resolve this appeal on other grounds, we need not decide whether 

Officer Roach prolonged the traffic stop so that Officer Kaspryzk could arrive 

with his K-9 partner. That is, assuming arguendo the traffic stop was prolonged, 

we focus on whether there was reasonable suspicion to conduct the dog sniff. 
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Cf., e.g., Kane v. State, 976 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 n.1 (Ind. 2012) (declining to reach 

an appellate argument when ultimately resolving the appeal on other grounds).

[16] When an officer briefly detains a person for investigative purposes—e.g., to 

conduct a dog sniff—the Fourth Amendment “is satisfied if the officer’s action 

is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity ‘may be 

afoot[.]’” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States 

v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). “[R]easonable suspicion is an ‘abstract’

concept that cannot be reduced to ‘a neat set of legal rules[.]’” Kansas v. Glover, 

140 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 (2020) (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274). “[T]he essence 

of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances—the whole 

picture—must be taken into account.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 

(1981). Ultimately, “[b]ased upon that whole picture[,] the detaining officer[] 

must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular 

person . . . of criminal activity.” Id. at 417–18. Put differently, “[t]he Fourth 

Amendment requires ‘some minimal level of objective justification’” to support

detaining the individual. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 

U.S. 210, 217 (1984)). Further, to have reasonable suspicion, the officer “must 

be able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized 

suspicion’” or “hunch.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

[17] As officers appraise the evolving circumstances, they may “draw on their own 

experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions 

about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an 

untrained person.’” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418). 
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They may also apply ordinary common sense, drawing on “information that is 

accessible to people generally, not just some specialized subset of society.” 

Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1190. “A determination that reasonable suspicion 

exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 534 

U.S. at 277. For example, an encounter with law enforcement might present 

conduct “susceptible of innocent explanation” when the conduct is viewed in 

isolation. Id. Yet, when “[t]aken together,” the totality of the circumstances

“suffice[] to form a particularized and objective basis” to make detention 

“reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 277–78.

[18] All in all, the necessary level of suspicion “is considerably less than proof of 

wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, which 

involves only “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found,” id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Indeed, “[t]he 

reasonable suspicion inquiry ‘falls considerably short’ of 51% accuracy[.]’” 

Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1188 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274). In short: “To be 

reasonable is not to be perfect[.]” Id. (quoting Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 

54, 60 (2014)) (alteration in original). And by requiring reasonableness—rather 

than insisting on perfection—the Fourth Amendment gives officers “fair leeway 

for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.” Heien, 574 U.S. at 61

(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).

[19] In challenging the denial of his motion to suppress, Canonge generally focuses 

on the observations Officer Roach included in his probable cause affidavit, 

directing us to favorable testimony indicating that the affidavit “would be a 
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better resource than [Officer Roach’s] memory at the time of the hearing[.]” 

Appellant’s App. p. 11. We must decline Canonge’s invitation to reweigh any 

conflicting evidence and, instead, consider the totality of the circumstances.3

[20] As to the totality of the circumstances, Officer Roach testified that he saw

movements in the vehicle that began when he activated his police lights and 

continued when the vehicle stopped. To Officer Roach, the occupants seemed 

to be reaching toward the floorboard area while looking back toward Officer 

Roach. Video evidence corroborates the observations of movement, showing

Canonge turned backward, at one point bent down and no longer visible

through the rear windshield. Ex. A at 1:15–1:20. Officer Roach not only saw 

movements directed toward the floorboard, but also noticed at least one 

backpack there. Next, before Officer Roach approached to engage the 

occupants about the reason for the traffic stop, he saw that Canonge already 

had his arm extended to hand over documents. This conduct struck Officer 

Roach as unusual because, after conducting 500 or so traffic stops, no one else 

had seemingly tried to expedite a traffic stop in this manner. Furthermore, at 

one point, Canonge interjected to respond on a passenger’s behalf, as though 

Canonge was trying to control and expedite the encounter with Officer Roach. 

Canonge engaged in this conduct while the other passengers—who Officer 

3 Because we resolve this case on other factors, we disregard evidence that Officer Roach consulted MyCase 

and discovered that the adult occupants of the vehicle at one point had undefined “charges” against them. 

We leave for another day whether this type of evidence supports a reasonable suspicion determination.
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Roach had just seen “reaching around” in the vehicle—seemed nervous. Tr. 

Vol. II p. 14.

[21] Canonge focuses on whether there are potential innocent explanations for the 

observed conduct. For example, he argues that any “concern about the 

occupants’ nervousness when being pulled over by police does not give rise to 

reasonable suspicion because it is understandable that they would be nervous.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 13. We note, however, that although “nervousness alone 

may not support reasonable suspicion,” nervousness “may be considered 

alongside other circumstances to support such a finding.” Guthery v. State, 180 

N.E.3d 339, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. In any case, we do not 

disagree with Canonge’s suggestion that, taken individually, each of Officer 

Roach’s observations may not give rise to reasonable suspicion. But a 

reviewing court does not consider these observations in isolation. See id. at 349.

[22] Canonge compares his case to Wilson v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2006), trans. denied and Powers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2022). As for these types of comparisons, the United States Supreme Court has 

cautioned that caselaw is not necessarily instructive due to differences in the 

“factual ‘mosaic’ analyzed for a reasonable-suspicion determination” that 

“preclude one case from squarely controlling another[.]” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 

275 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698 (1996)). Here, the cited

cases are distinguishable in that, although each involves evidence of 

nervousness, neither involves evidence that a person reached toward a 
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container when the officer approached. Indeed, the Powers Court specifically 

noted the record “d[id] not reveal furtive movements[.]” 190 N.E.3d at 446.

[23] Ultimately, Officer Roach observed specific behavior that, taken together, gave

him a particularized and objective basis to suspect that criminal activity was 

afoot. Viewing those collective observations in light of Officer Roach’s 

professional experience—as we must—it was reasonable for Officer Roach to 

seize the occupants of the vehicle for a short time longer to conduct the

minimally intrusive investigatory dog sniff. Thus, we conclude that the totality 

of the circumstances—the whole picture—provided reasonable suspicion to 

prolong the traffic stop to conduct the dog sniff. Cf. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277 (“A 

determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the 

possibility of innocent conduct.”). Canonge’s arguments to the contrary 

amount to requests to reweigh conflicting evidence, which we must decline. 

Cf., e.g., Reply Br. p. 12 (“Officer Roach admitted that what he described as 

‘furtive movements’ really was [that] ‘their bodies were moving,’ and he merely 

presumed that movement to be reaching.” (quoting Tr. Vol. II pp. 27–28)).

[24] Because any prolongment of the traffic stop was supported by reasonable 

suspicion, the otherwise-lawful seizure was “reasonable within the meaning of 

the Fourth Amendment.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277–78. Therefore, the trial court 

did not err in denying the motion to suppress.

[25] Affirmed.
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Altice, C.J., concurs.

May, J., dissents with separate opinion.
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May, Judge, dissenting.

[26] I respectfully dissent. I would expressly hold Officer Roach unreasonably 

prolonged the traffic stop so that a dog sniff could occur, and I disagree with the 

majority’s decision to simply assume the stop was prolonged without 

addressing the issue. In addition, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that 

sufficient reasonable suspicion arose during the traffic stop to justify holding 

Canonge until a dog sniff could be performed. Therefore, I would reverse the 

trial court’s denial of Canonge’s motion to suppress. 

1. Length of Traffic Stop

[27] In Illinois v. Caballes, the Supreme Court of the United States explained that “a 

seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its 

manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the 

Constitution.” 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837 (2005). A traffic stop 

“justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can 

become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to 

complete that mission.” Id. “[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to 

handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s 

shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348, 350, 135 

S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015). 

[28] “The burden is on the State to show the time for the traffic stop was not 

increased due to the canine sweep.” Wilson v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In contrast to Caballes, where one officer performed the 
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dog sniff while the second officer wrote a traffic citation, 543 U.S. at 406, 125 S. 

Ct. at 836, Officer Roach held Canonge for approximately twenty minutes 

before a K-9 officer arrived, a longer period than the approximately ten to 

fifteen minutes Officer Roach testified a traffic stop typically takes. In addition, 

while Officer Roach ultimately did not issue any ticket to Canonge, Officer 

Roach testified that he only began writing a warning ticket “to fill time until 

[Officer Kaspryzk] got there.” (Tr. Vol. II at 33.) He began preparing the 

warning ticket not in reaction to Canonge’s traffic violation but because he 

“was waiting for an officer . . . the K-9 officer to arrive to conduct the sniff.” 

(Id. at 25.) Where an officer explicitly admits the writing of a ticket was 

pretextual, I would explicitly hold that officer unreasonably prolonged the 

traffic stop beyond the time necessary to address the reason for the stop. See

Wilson, 847 N.E.2d at 1067 (holding officer unreasonably prolonged traffic stop 

when he finished writing the warning tickets but continued to detain driver to 

allow police dog to arrive); see also Powers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 440, 445 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2022) (holding officer detained driver and passenger beyond the time 

necessary to complete the purpose of the traffic stop).

2. Reasonable Suspicion

[29] Nonetheless, as the majority notes, a prolonged traffic stop is not per se 

unconstitutional if the officer has reasonable suspicion to justify detaining the 

individual. Slip op. at ¶ 14. As we explained in Crabtree v. State:

The reasonable suspicion requirement of the Fourth Amendment 

is satisfied if the facts known to the officer at the moment of the 
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stop are such that a person of reasonable caution would believe 

that the action taken was appropriate. In other words, the 

requirement is satisfied where the facts known to the officer, 

together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, 

would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal 

activity has occurred or is about to occur. Reasonable suspicion 

entails something more than an inchoate and unparticularized 

suspicion or hunch, but considerably less than proof of 

wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.

762 N.E.2d 241, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (internal citation and quotation 

marks omitted). 

[30] Because, in my opinion, the evidence rises to nothing more than an inchoate 

and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, I disagree with the majority’s 

conclusion that Officer Roach had reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic 

stop to conduct the dog sniff. In Wilson, we held the officer did not have 

reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop even though the officer observed 

that the driver “was ‘very nervous.’ His ‘hands were shaking’ and he was 

‘having trouble getting his license and vehicle registration.’” 847 N.E.2d at 

1066 (internal citation to record omitted). Likewise, in Powers, we held the 

officer lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong a traffic stop even though both 

the driver and passenger exhibited “nervous behavior.” 190 N.E.3d at 446. 

[31] Here, while Officer Roach stated “[t]he passenger in the back seemed really 

nervous,” (Tr. Vol. II at 17), Officer Roach also testified that he did not observe 

any signs of drug use by anyone in the vehicle. He did not smell any illegal 

substances or observe any threatening movements. The occupants of the 
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vehicle also were not sweating, fumbling with materials, or visibly shaking. 

One of the things Officer Roach found unusual, which the majority relies upon 

in concluding that there was reasonable suspicion, was that “before Officer 

Roach approached to engage the occupants about the reason for the traffic stop, 

he saw that Canonge already had his arm extended to hand over documents.” 

Slip op. at ¶ 20. However, I see absolutely nothing suspicious in a motorist 

having ready the documents the motorist knows the officer is going to request 

for inspection. It also is not unusual that occupants of a vehicle will look back 

after an officer turns on his patrol lights or that some movement will occur 

inside the vehicle as the motorist retrieves those documents. 

[32] The majority distinguishes Wilson and Powers by stating “that, although each 

involves evidence of nervousness, neither involves evidence that a person 

reached toward a container when the officer approached.” Slip. op. at ¶ 22. 

There is nothing unusual about having a backpack or laundry detergent 

container in one’s vehicle, nor is it suspicious to access or rearrange those items 

or similar items while driving. Even though Officer Roach answered 

affirmatively when asked if he saw “furtive movements,” Officer Roach 

clarified that what he saw was the occupants’ “bodies were moving” and he 

assumed they were reaching for something. (Tr. Vol. II at 27-28.) He could not 

see the occupants’ hands, and thus, he did not actually observe them concealing 

anything. See B.R. v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1173, 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)

(“Neither shaking nor being visibly nervous is ‘furtive.’ To establish that a 

suspect has engaged in furtive movements, the act must connote evasion or 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023 Page 19 of 19

concealment.”). Body movement around a container cannot be all that is 

needed to transform an ordinary traffic stop into a situation where the officer 

has reasonable suspicion of drug possession. Such a holding dramatically 

lowers the bar of what is required for an officer to indefinitely detain a motorist 

pending the arrival of a K-9 officer. As our Indiana Supreme Court observed in 

State v. Quirk, “a combination of irrelevant conduct and innocent conduct, 

without more, cannot be transformed into a suspicious conglomeration.” 842 

N.E.2d 334, 343 (Ind. 2006). That, I fear, is what the majority does here, and 

therefore, I would hold that Officer Roach did not have the requisite reasonable 

suspicion to prolong the traffic stop of Canonge, and I would reverse the trial 

court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.