PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

30 JANUARY 2013

RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL

LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, 

YORBA LINDA, CA
© David Rubinger/CORBIS
PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

30 JANUARY 2013

RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL

LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, 

YORBA LINDA, CA
2 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Israeli tank on the Golan
3

PARTNERS

INTELLIGENCE AND 

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Matthew T. Penney

WILLIAM E. COLBY AS DIRECTOR 

OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 1973-1976

Harold P. Ford

CIA’S MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE

AND THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Peter Nyren

TIMELINE

COLLECTION HIGHLIGHTS

SYMPOSIUM AGENDA AND 

SPEAKERS BIOGRAPHIES

4

6

14

26

34

38

52

© Henri Bureau.Sygma/CORBIS
4 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

The Historical Collections Division (HCD) of CIA’s Information 

Management Services is responsible for executing the Agency’s Historical 

Review Program. This program seeks to identify and declassify collections 

of documents that detail the Agency’s analysis and activities relating to 

historically signifi cant topics and events. HCD’s goals include increasing 

the usability and accessibility of historical collections. HCD also develops 

release events and partnerships to highlight each collection and make it 

available to the broadest audience possible. 

The mission of HCD is to: 

• Promote an accurate, objective understanding of the 

information and intelligence that has helped shape major 

US foreign policy decisions.

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refl ection on the impacts and effects arising from past foreign 

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and Collaboration.

HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS DIVISION

The History Staff in the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence fosters 

understanding of the Agency’s history and its relationship to today’s intelligence challenges by communicating instructive historical insights to the 

CIA workforce, other US Government agencies, and the public. CIA historians 

research topics on all aspects of Agency activities and disseminate their 

knowledge though publications, courses, briefi ngs, and Web-based products. 

They also work with other Intelligence Community historians on publication 

and education projects that highlight interagency approaches to intelligence 

issues. Lastly, the CIA History Staff conducts an ambitious program of oral 

history interviews that are invaluable for preserving institutional memories 

that are not captured in the documentary record.

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE
5

The Richard Nixon Foundation is a privately supported, non-profi t 

institution dedicated to educating the public about the life, legacy, and 

times of the Thirty-Seventh President. The Foundation supports exhibits 

and programs on the nine-acre Richard Nixon Presidential Library 

and Birthplace, a three-dimensional walk-through memoir featuring 

22 high-tech galleries, movie and interactive video theaters, the spectacular 

First Lady’s Garden, the President’s faithfully restored 1910’s birthplace, 

the magnifi cent full-size replica of the White House East Room, the 

fl ower-ringed memorial sites of President and Mrs. Nixon, and Marine 

One, the President’s helicopter.

As a performing arts center for public affairs, the Foundation’s year-round 

programming features national policy conferences, study groups, town 

meetings, school editor forums, and a continual schedule of distinguished 

speakers and authors from government, politics, the media, and public 

affairs. The Presidential Library is home to more than 42 million pages of 

documentation and material from Richard Nixon’s life in politics, as well 

as a nationally recognized research center, giving students and scholars 

the opportunity to study Richard Nixon’s legacy and historic presidency.

The Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum is the presidential 

library and fi nal resting place of Richard Milhous Nixon, the 37th 

President of the United States. Located in Yorba Linda, California, 

the library is one of twelve administered by the National Archives 

and Records Administration. From its original dedication in 1990 until 

becoming a federal facility on July 11, 2007, the library and museum was 

operated by the private Richard Nixon Foundation and was known as 

the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace. The 9-acre campus is located at 

18001 Yorba Linda Boulevard in Yorba Linda, California and incorporates 

the National Historic Landmarked Richard Nixon Birthplace, where 

Nixon was born in 1913 and spent his childhood. The facility is now 

jointly operated between NARA and the Richard Nixon Foundation.

The original Library & Birthplace was offi cially dedicated on July 19, 

1990. Former President Nixon and First Lady Pat Nixon were present, 

as were President George H. W. Bush, then the President of the United 

States, former President Gerald Ford, former President Ronald Reagan, 

and fi rst ladies Barbara Bush, Betty Ford, and Nancy Reagan. A crowd of 

50,000 gathered for the ceremony. At the dedication, Nixon said, “Nothing 

we have ever seen matches this moment—to be welcomed home again.”

THE RICHARD NIXON FOUNDATION

THE RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL 

LIBRARY & MUSEUM
6 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Nixon and Secretary of 

State Kissinger
7

To intelligence historians, the October 1973 

War is almost synonymous with “intelligence 

failure.” On 6 October the armies of Egypt and 

Syria attacked Israel, catching the Israeli and 

US Intelligence Communities by surprise. 

A US multi-agency postmortem in December of 

that year, declassifi ed in 2009, concluded that 

while the evidence of an Arab-initiated war had 

not been conclusive, the intelligence had been 

“plentiful, ominous, and often accurate.” 

The documents in this present collection attest 

that, for months before the war, the US Intelligence Community had received reports pointing 

to escalating Egyptian and Syrian hostilities. 

Contrary to conventional wisdom that analysts 

had not properly considered the evidence that 

war might be approaching, the archives show 

that the Intelligence Community received these 

reports—debated them and wrote about them. 

Analysts did consider that the Egyptian and 

Syrian military maneuvers might be more than 

just posturing. Analysts did entertain the idea 

that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat might 

initiate a confl ict that he knew he would lose 

militarily. But ultimately, the analysts judged 

that there would be no attack. Or as the December 

postmortem put it, the conclusions “were—quite 

simply, obviously, and starkly—wrong.” 1

As the Intelligence Community investigated, 

so did outside scholars. No fewer than four books 

on the confl ict were published in 1974. One 

scholar in 1975 remarked that he had cleared 

a space on his crowded bookshelf and labeled 

it “Kippur” in the anticipation of the coming 

literature. These early volumes attempted to 

recount the years of negotiation that preceded 

the war and the chronology of the war itself. The 

lack of warning was one of the themes, and 

remains so today. Edward R. F. Sheehan, in one 

of the early histories, The Arabs, Israelis, and 

Kissinger (1976), wrote that “The October war 

was a surprise to Dr. Kissinger—and to Israel—

though it should not have been.... He did not 

Matthew T. Penney

CIA Center for the Study of 

Intelligence, History Staff

INTELLIGENCE AND 

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR
8 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

• Over-reliance on Israel to know its own 

security posture. The US Intelligence 

Community tended to assume not only that 

Israeli intelligence would be aware of any 

major attacks planned against its territory, 

but also that Israel would plead for US 

assistance to counter them. Neither was the 

case, and it was diffi cult for US analysts to 

break with Israel’s judgments about its 

own security. 

• Preconceived notions. One of the most 

common themes in examinations of the 

October 1973 War strategic warning issue 

is the absence of dissent against some 

of the most deeply held truths. One such 

conventional wisdom was that the 1967 

Six-Day War had proven Israeli military 

superiority and Arab military inferiority to 

such an extent that the Arabs would avoid 

war at all costs. Another was that Arabs 

were tactically and strategically ill-suited 

for modern warfare and would not be able 

to fool analysts well enough to launch a 

surprise attack. 

• A plausible interpretation of the same 

evidence. It was a reasonable analytic 

conclusion, with precedence on its side, 

that Anwar Sadat’s aggressive rhetoric 

was a negotiating tactic to force Israel to a 

settled solution. Sadat had “cried wolf” at 

many points during the previous two years, 

threatening war if no peace agreement was 

reached with Israel. It was a reasonable 

interpretation of the same facts that the 

Arab military maneuvers near the Golan 

Heights and the Suez Canal were the same 

sort of readiness drills and exercises underway in years past.

• Faith in diplomacy. Since 1967, the United 

States had expected that diplomacy and 

uneasy stalemates would prevent the 

outbreak of another war. After 1971—a 

year Anwar Sadat warned was the “year 

of decisions” —had passed with no major 

decision, and after a series of negotiations 

had seemingly averted an Egyptian attack 

in May 1973, the United States expected that 

potential belligerents would yield.

ignore the evidence. Like the Israelis, and like 

the C.I.A., he misinterpreted it.” Passage of time 

and the release of once-classifi ed materials 

have affi rmed that statement. Yet even with 

some fi ne accounts of the 

war available at the time, 

points remained contested, 

and since then the war’s 

legacy has continued to 

be a subject of revision 

and reinterpretation. 

Not all US Government documents have been 

released (though this collection helps with that 

somewhat) and most of the Israeli holdings are 

still unavailable to researchers. In fact, a book 

review in 2001 commented that “It is still too 

early to understand this event,” a statement all 

the more remarkable when we consider that it 

only referred to the war itself and not its place 

in history. Even now we are seeing books with 

the ambitious claim of writing the history of the 

so-called Arab Spring. No doubt as time passes, 

the current regional unrest and changes in leadership will be subject to the sort of reinterpretations (and recriminations?) that major events of 

Middle Eastern history have engendered. 2

Because much of the scholarship and many of 

the newly declassifi ed documents in this collection attest to the intelligence failure, this article 

focuses on that topic. As intelligence historians 

know, intelligence failures can take different 

forms. A service or many services worldwide can 

be caught off guard by some major phenomenon 

or movement. The aforementioned Arab uprisings 

in the spring of 2011 serve as an example. 

An intelligence failure can be a tactical event, 

the planning and execution of which evaded 

collection efforts even when the intelligence 

services were well aware of the propensity for 

such attacks and when they had deployed intelligence resources to detect them. As some would 

have it, any terrorist attack anywhere is necessarily an intelligence failure. By any standard, 

the judgment as of 6 October was one. 

Since then, various attempts have been made 

to understand why and how the Intelligence 

Community concluded what it did. Some of the 

most common are summarized here:

“The October war was a surprise to Dr. 

Kissinger—and to Israel—though it should 

not have been.... He did not ignore the 

evidence. Like the Israelis, and like the 

C.I.A., he misinterpreted it.” 
9

• The “rational actor” fallacy. Western 

analysts tended to conclude (though not 

dismiss entirely) that neither Sadat nor Asad 

would initiate a war he expected to lose. 

A “rational actor” model can fail because 

what seems rational to the analyst—or 

generally rational in that analyst’s culture—

may not be rational to the actor in question. 

To Sadat and Asad, for example, it may have 

been irrational to attack Israel on a purely 

military basis, but it may have been rational 

to do so to restore Arab prestige or to force 

other countries to intervene and press for a 

settlement more favorable to the Arab side 

than if there had been no attack. 

• Organizational challenges within CIA.

For the Agency at least, part of the intelligence failure may be attributable to major 

organizational and personnel changes that 

had occurred just before the war. The new 

Director of Central Intelligence, William 

Colby, had initiated a major reorganization 

of the Agency’s intelligence estimative 

process, which was still in disarray in early 

October. At the same time, several of CIA’s 

most knowledgeable Middle East analysts 

and managers had left for other accounts 

and had been replaced by persons newer to 

the issue. 

The documents in this collection will, for the 

most part, underscore what has been publicly 

known and written about the war, with some 

new nuances, discussed below. That analysts 

believed no attack was coming is clear. On 

4 October, an Intelligence Community memorandum stated: “We continue to believe that an 

outbreak of major Arab-Israeli hostilities 

remains unlikely for the immediate future.” A 

particularly embarrassing passage, having been 

published the day the war began, said “neither 

side appears to be bent on initiating hostilities.” And from the same document: “For Egypt, a 

military initiative makes little sense at this critical juncture,” and “For...the Syrian President, 

a military adventure now would be suicidal.” 

Some of CIA’s intelligence reports demonstrate 

the fallibility of human intelligence. According 

to a Syrian offi cer, there was a Syrian build-up in 

the Golan Heights, but it was defensive. 3

TOP:

Israeli settlement in the 

occupied territories,

June 1973

LEFT:

An Egyptian soldier holding 

a portrait of President Sadat

© Hutton-Deutsch Collection/CORBIS
10 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

One of the more notable groups of documents is 

a series of CIA memorandum disseminations—

CIA intelligence reports—that went to a highly 

restricted audience from late September and 

early October 1973 on the Syrian build-up on the 

border of the Golan Heights. Unlike the ones discussed above, they are from the days just before 

the war. One from mid-September, described the 

Syrian military movements to the Golan Heights 

area as preparations for war disguised as 

training exercises. It also said that senior 

Egyptian and Syrian military personnel had met 

and planned “a joint Egyptian/ Syrian operation 

for which the movement of forces would occur 

under the guise of training.” Another, from late 

September, discusses not only the Syrian plans 

to attack but also the Syrian preparations for an 

Israeli counteroffensive once the war started. 

A third report, on 29 September, recounted: 

...a Syrian plan for a massive assault upon 

Israel involving at least four Syrian divisions. The 

proposed assault was to be launched upon the 

Golan Heights along a broad front 80 kilometers 

wide, and was aimed at occupying the Golan 

Heights up to the pre-June 1967 borders.... All 

Syrian units are expected to be in position by 

the end of September. Infantry Divisions 5, 7, 

and 9 have completed their deployment in their 

allocated sectors. Brigade commanders have the 

operations order now, and are briefi ng battalion 

commanders at their headquarters in secrecy. 

The fi ve-page memorandum dissemination 

stated the plans of Syrian units at the Division 

level and, in some cases, at the Brigade level. 

These reports, and the other indications that 

hostilities might break out, were insuffi cient to 

shift the analytic line to the position that war 

was imminent. 6

The documents from the crisis-management 

period beginning on 6 October show representatives of the US intelligence agencies, State 

Department, and White House functioning as 

a nexus of intelligence and statecraft in the 

form of the Washington Special Actions Group 

(WSAG), details of which are recounted in an 

accompanying article in this publication. The 

WSAG minutes from 6 October, which were 

released in redacted form in 2006, document the 

More interesting to the scholar are the documents that show the Intelligence Community 

grappling with reports that war might, in fact, 

be coming. In several, analysts considered signs 

that Egyptian and Syrian military maneuvers 

might be more than just exercises or gambits to 

prompt a settlement. Human intelligence reports 

from spring 1973 demonstrate that CIA sources 

had access to at least some of Syria’s plans to 

assault the Golan Heights. Other human intelligence that spring said of Egypt’s threats to 

attack: “Knowledgeable Egyptian observers... 

now believe Sadat is serious and that to consider 

that he is bluffi ng is unrealistic and naive.” The 

source conceded that Sadat’s preference was 

for a diplomatic solution but said that he would 

resort to hostilities should diplomacy fail. 4

In May 1973, CIA issued a National Intelligence 

Estimate, “Possible Egyptian-Israeli Hostilities: 

Determinants and Implications,” declassifi ed for 

this project, that draws on some of this reporting. 

The Estimate contained the following passages:

• “Sadat’s new campaign of threats to renew 

hostilities involved public and private 

statements.... are consistent with both 

preparations to fi ght Israel and with political/psychological efforts to stimulate 

diplomatic activity leading to settlement.”

• “The Egyptians believe deeply that 

progress toward solution of the Arab-Israeli 

problem on terms tolerable to Egypt can 

only come about through actions of the 

Great Powers.... If Sadat is once again 

disappointed, the temptation to resort to 

military action in order to force the US 

hand might prove irresistible.” 

• “Sadat himself could be trapped by 

building up an atmosphere of crisis to the 

point where failure to act militarily would 

seem to him more dangerous to his own hold 

on power than attacking and taking 

the consequences.” 

• “If Egypt does decide to initiate hostilities, 

it will do so in spite of the military consequences, rather than in hope of military 

gains.” 
11

conversation that can almost be imagined 

cinematically, as the participants discuss the 

policy implications of the events that have 

transpired over the course of the day: 

Mr. Schlesinger: How about a joint position on 

a cease-fi re?

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, but Israel won’t accept it until 

the Egyptians and Syrians are thrown out.... So 

our strategy is to go in with a ceasefi re, status 

quo ante resolution. We will let the military 

situation go on until all parties want to grab 

the resolution.

Mr. Schlesinger: Even Israel?

Mr. Kissinger: If it is done with the concurrence of 

Israel, they can’t very well ask us to pull it back.

Mr. Colby: If the Israelis have moved far ahead, we 

will have a bargaining point.

Mr. Kissinger: Even if Israel wins, we will stick to 

the resolution. If we can force Israel out of their 

forward position, it will be a good point with the 

Arabs—if Israel gets beyond the ceasefi re line.

Mr. Colby: Israel isn’t interested in territory 

this time. They’re interested in beating up the 

Arab forces.

Mr. Kissinger: This is a very critical period in 

our relations with the Soviets. If the Soviets get 

themselves into an anti-US or anti-Israel position, 

they can kiss [Most Favored Nation] and the 

other things goodbye (sic).” 7

The material on the period of the war itself 

attests to the range of issues, including tactical 

intelligence on the belligerents, US equities with 

Middle Eastern heads of state, the state of alert 

of other Middle Eastern militaries, the strategic 

interests of the United States vis-à-vis the 

Soviet Union, Muslim opinion internationally, 

the strength of the US dollar in global fi nancial 

markets, and the potential ramifi cations of a US 

energy shortage during the coming winter. 

Of course these documents do not settle every 

debate. Many were not declassifi ed for this 

release due to continuing sensitivities. The 

TOP:

Israeli Artillery fi res on 

Syrian positions, 12 October

LEFT:

Destroyed Syrian tank on 

the Golan Heights

© Bettman/CORBIS
12 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

materials in the release do not reveal the 

foreign sources from which Agency and other 

Intelligence Community entities obtained their 

information. They do not recount all of the 

secrets of Secretary of State Kissinger’s meetings with foreign heads of state as he sought 

to de-escalate the crisis. They do not settle the 

issue of whether Israel activated or pretended 

to activate its nuclear arsenal. One document 

from as early as 19 October stands out, however, 

for speaking to an issue that would prove an important part of the war’s legacy. It states that the 

war had “greatly strengthened President Sadat’s 

political position in Egypt and in the Arab World 

generally,” and that Sadat had “a respect and 

popularity that he never knew before.” 8

 It would 

be this reputation for Sadat that would enable 

him in the ensuing search for a peace agreement 

between the Arabs and Israelis.

What this collection of documents cannot 

do—nor can any collection of documents on a 

discrete event—is place the issue in context. 

The Middle East had long been a conundrum for 

US policymakers who wanted to win the region’s 

proverbial hearts and minds for the Western 

side, but who struggled to do so given the US 

support for Israel. Almost from the outset, CIA 

had warned of the consequences in the Middle 

East should the United States back an Israeli 

state. On 28 November 1947, just fi ve weeks after 

its creation, the Agency issued a major analytic 

piece that said that “[i]n the event that partition 

is imposed on Palestine, the resulting confl ict 

will seriously disturb the social, economic, and 

political stability of the Arab world, and US 

commercial and strategic interests will be 

dangerously jeopardized.” 9

 The region was 

important to US policymakers for several other 

reasons: its vast energy resources, its placement on the land and sea transportation routes 

between East and West, the alignment of its 

leaders with the Great Powers, the emergence of 

Palestinian activity (which by 1972 had already 

prompted the United States and Israel to use the 

vocabulary of “the war on terror”), and the place 

of the war in the Middle East peace process. To 

CIA, an additional context of the October 1973 

War is that it was one of a series of events that 

cost the Agency great regard in Washington—

a tumultuous period in which revelations of 

TOP RIGHT:

Sadat and Kissinger

MIDDLE:

Meir, Nixon, and Kissinger at 

the White House

BOTTOM:

President Nixon meeting

with Arab Foreign Ministers 

at the White House, 

17 October 1973
13

5 NIE 30-73: Possible Egyptian-Israeli Hostilities: Determinants and 

Implications, 17 May 1973. Quote on Sadat’s new campaign, 3; 

quote on the Egyptians believing deeply, 4; Sadat himself could be 

trapped, 4; if Egypt does decide, 5.

6 CIA Intelligence Report, “Completed Deployment of Syrian Units for 

Assault upon Israel,” 29 September 1973, portions redacted, quote 

on p. 2.

7

 Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, Washington, 6 October 1973, 7:22–8:27 PM., 10.

8

 Weekly Review, 19 October 1973, 3. 

9

 CIA Offi ce of Reports and Estimates (ORE)-55, The Consequences 

of the Partition of Palestine,” 28 November 1947, 1.

10 DCI Memorandum, prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff, 

“The Performance of the Intelligence Community before the ArabIsraeli War of October 1973: A Preliminary Post-Mortem Report,” 20 

December 1973. Declassifi ed 4 March 2009, 4.

Agency improprieties and an intense climate of 

scrutiny brought, for several years, many of the 

Agency’s programs abroad to a halt. 

Perhaps one of the keenest insights from this 

document collection is from the December 

1973 postmortem, and one with which we can 

identify today: “[W]hat may seem so clear now 

did not, could not, 

seem so clear then.” 10

This seems a truth that 

would have a place 

in almost any retrospective, on the October 

War or otherwise. The intelligence business 

is a diffi cult one, especially if the standard 

is the accurate prediction of the future based 

on complex and sometimes illogical actors. 

The case of the October 1973 War is often 

studied in an attempt to learn from our past. 

We hope that this collection can facilitate that 

worthwhile endeavor.

1

 DCI Memorandum, prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff, 

“The Performance of the Intelligence Community before the ArabIsraeli War of October 1973: A Preliminary Post-Mortem Report,” 

20 December 1973; quote on plentiful and ominous, i; quote on 

starkly wrong, 4.

2

 Howard J. Dooley, “The Guns of October,” The Review of Politics 

Vol. 37 No. 4 (October 1975), 576-81, quote on 576. Edward R. 

F. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger: A Secret History of 

American Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Readers Digest 

Press, 1976), 30. David Tal, review of P. R. Kumaraswamy, ed., 

Revisiting the Yom Kippur War (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 

2000 in Reviews of Books, Vol. 23, No. 3: September 2001, 729. 

The Sheehan book drew on interviews with scores of participants 

to include Kissinger, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and Syrian 

President Hafez al-Asad. The book stirred a controversy of the sort 

familiar to us today over “leaks,” with two senior State Department 

offi cers reprimanded for their provision of information to Sheehan.

3 Combined Watch Report of the United States Intelligence Board, 

4 October 1973. Central Intelligence Bulletin, 6 October 1973, 

1 (neither side bent on initiating hostilities) and 2 (suicidal). 

Redacted CIA intelligence report, “Judgment [redacted] that Syrian 

Military Preparations are Defensive in Nature,” 3 October 1973, 2.

4 Syrian contingency plans, CIA Memorandum for the Secretary of 

State: CIA Assessment of Purported Syrian Military Preparations. 

Knowledgeable Egyptian observers, CIA Intelligence Report, “Views 

[Redacted] on the Probability that Egyptian President Sadat 

Seriously is Considering Launching Hostilities against Israel,” 

14 May 1973.

“The intelligence business is a diffi cult one, 

especially if the standard is the accurate 

prediction of the future based on complex 

and sometimes illogical actors.”
14 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Suez Canal Zone
15

THE YOM KIPPUR WAR OF OCTOBER 1973

A thorough search of the material issued prior to 

6 October [Egypt’s and Syria’s sudden attacks on 

Israel] has failed to turn up any offi cial statement 

from any offi ce or committed offi cer responsible 

for producing fi nished, analytical intelligence 

which contributed anything resembling a 

warning, qua warning. There was an intelligence 

failure in the weeks preceding the out break of 

war in the Middle East on 6 October 1973. . . The 

principal conclusions concerning the imminence 

of hostilities reached and reiterated by those 

responsible for intelligence analysis were-quite 

simply, obviously, and starkly-wrong.

Intelligence Community’s Postmortem, 

December 1973 1

Colby’s tenure as DCI began with a major intelligence failure. He had been Director less than a 

month when Egypt and Syria suddenly attacked 

Israel. Colby and the Intelligence Community 

did not alert policymakers that a renewed ArabIsraeli war was about to break out, nor did they 

forecast that the fi ghting might provoke a 

US-Soviet confrontation in the Middle East. 

Although Colby, CIA, and the Intelligence 

Community did lend the administration 

excellent crisis management support once the 

war was under way, their misreading of its 

outbreak heightened White House dissatisfaction with CIA and US intelligence, and did not 

get Colby off to a fl ying start as DCI.

That the sudden Egyptian-Syrian attacks 

had taken the intelligence and policymaking 

communities by surprise is beyond question. 

President Nixon, in his memoirs, recalled that, 

“as recently as the day before, the CIA had 

reported that the war in the Middle East was 

unlikely, dismissing as annual maneuvers the 

massive and unusual troop movement that had 

recently been taking place in Egypt.” 2 [less than 

one line not declassified] the Offi ce of Current 

Intelligence — the principal CIA offi ce passing 

tactical assessments of the crisis to the White 

House — agreed. He later remarked that he did 

WILLIAM E. COLBY AS DIRECTOR Harold P. Ford

OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

1973-1976
16 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

not recall anyone “anywhere in the Intelligence 

Community who defi nitely felt war would occur 

soon, or who markedly differed from the general 

consensus” that the early October crisis was 

simply another war scare such as they had seen 

repeatedly since May. 3

Colby’s recollection is similar: “It was obvious 

that the intelligence process had failed notably 

in this performance.” 4

 Henry Kissinger also 

agreed: “October 6 was 

the culmination of a failure of political analysis 

on the part of its victims. . . . Clearly there was 

an intelligence failure, but misjudgment was 

not confi ned to the agencies [CIA and DIA].” In 

Kissinger’s view, every policymaker knew all the 

facts. The problem was that the US “defi nition of 

rationality did not take seriously the notion 

of [the Arabs] starting an unwinnable war to 

restore self-respect. There was no defense 

against our own preconceptions or those of our 

allies.” 5

 Nor did the United States have a 

monopoly on poor intelligence performance. 

Israeli Lt. Gen. Haim Bar-Lev later stated that 

his country’s defense intelligence agency had 

erred: “The mistake lay in the evaluation of the 

intelligence data and not in the absence of 

accurate and reliable information.” 6

The Intelligence Community also failed to alert 

US decisionmakers to the related oil/fi nancial 

crisis that ensued between October 1973 and 

January 1974, when the Organization of Petroleum 

Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised oil prices by 

400 percent. As the US Senate’s Select Committee 

on Intelligence (SSCI) later stated, US intelligence analysis at the time was not as perceptive 

as public sources were on the possibility that 

the Saudis might use oil as a political weapon. 

By comparison, said this Congressional report, 

analysis within the Intelligence Community 

had tended to stress continuation of the status 

quo in Saudi policy toward the United States, 

examining the question of oil price levels within 

the context of a narrow supply and demand 

framework and displaying only limited integration of political and economic factors. The 

Agency’s response to these SSCI criticisms held 

that, because CIA’s analysts had not anticipated 

the Middle East war, they concluded that Saudi 

Arabia and the other Arab nations would not 

employ oil as a political weapon. 7

The Intelligence Community’s misreading of 

these questions had begun in the spring of 1973 

with the production of a National Intelligence 

Estimate (NIE), Possible Egyptian-Israeli Hostilities: Determinants and Implications. With no dissenting opinions, the USIB agencies had agreed 

that Sadat’s campaign of growing threats was 

one of psychological brinksmanship, undertaken 

chiefl y in “hope of inspiring US pressure on 

Israel.” The situation could get out of hand, the 

Estimate concluded, but substantial EgyptianIsraeli hostilities appeared “unlikely in the next 

few weeks.” Sadat did not yet appear committed 

to an attack on the Israelis, and, since Egypt’s 

military capabilities were so limited, the 

participation of other even less impressive Arab 

forces-such as those of Syria-on a second front 

would “matter little in military terms.” Egyptian 

forces, according to the NIE, probably could 

conduct small commando raids into the Sinai 

Peninsula, but did not have the capability to 

seize and hold any portion of it in the face of 

Israeli opposition. The only implications for the 

United States foreseen by the Estimate were 

those that would attend “another mauling” of 

the Arabs by the Israelis. 8

Substantially similar views marked the assessments prepared by Colby and the Intelligence 

Community, right up to the Egyptian-Syrian 

attacks of 6 October. No NIEs or SNIEs (Special 

National Intelligence Estimates) were requested 

or undertaken between the National Intelligence 

Estimate of May and the end of September. 

This refl ected the fairly relaxed view US intelligence had of the developing crisis. Finally, on 

30 September, worried by evidence of unusual 

concentrations of Syrian tanks on the Golan 

Heights, Henry Kissinger (who had become 

Secretary of State just a week earlier), tasked 

CIA and State’s INR to give him their immediate assessments, at the same time requesting a 

coordinated NIE. 9

Although production of this NIE was overtaken 

by events within a week, Colby and INR each 

gave Kissinger quick evaluations. As events 

turned out, however, these analyses also left 

“It was obvious that the intelligence process 

had failed notably in this performance.”
17

much to be desired. INR held that evidence concerning the military buildups in Egypt and Syria 

was inconclusive: although the possibility could 

not be excluded they might attack Israel in the 

near future, the chances of such were deemed 

“dubious.” 10 For the INR, CIA, and DIA assessments immediately before the Egyptian-Syrian 

attacks, CIA’s study concluded that Egyptian and 

Syrian military moves looked “very ominous,” 

but “the whole thrust of President Sadat’s activities since last spring has been in the direction 

of bringing moral, political, and economic force 

to bear on Israel in tacit acknowledgement of 

Arab unreadiness to make war.” 11

Following these rather calm immediate 

analyses of 30 September, CIA, INR, and the 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) made similar 

judgments right up to— and even after— the 

6 October Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel. On 

5 October, CIA concluded that, although large 

military exercises were under way in Egypt, the 

Egyptians “do not appear to be preparing for a 

military offensive against Israel.” Indeed the 

military preparations thus far, said CIA, “do not 

indicate that any party intends to initiate hostilities.” And, on the very day the Arabs attacked 

Israel, CIA estimated that neither the Egyptians 

nor the Syrians appeared bent on initiating 

hostilities. For Egypt to attack now, said this CIA 

study, would make little sense: “Another round 

of hostilities would almost certainly destroy 

Sadat’s painstaking efforts to invigorate the 

economy and would run counter to his efforts to 

build a United Arab political front, particularly 

among the less militant, oil-rich states. For the 

Syrian president, a military adventure now would 

be suicidal.” And later on 6 October, even after 

news of the outbreak of war had reached CIA, its 

Watch Committee could fi nd no hard evidence of 

a major, coordinated Egyptian-Syrian offensive 

across the Canal or in the Golan Heights area. 

Rather, the Watch Committee reported:

The weight of evidence indicates an actionreaction situation where a series of responses 

by each side to perceived threats created 

an increasingly dangerous potential for 

confrontation. . . . It is possible that the Egyptians 

or Syrians, particularly the latter, may have been 

preparing a raid or other small-scale action. 12

ABOVE: Egyptian forces 

cross the Suez Canal, 

7 October 1973

LEFT: Sadat and Mubarak 

go over war plans
18 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

much in pushing the Intelligence Community 

toward such needed improvements. 17

There were a number of reasons why US intelligence did not do a better job in anticipating 

the Egyptian- Syrian attacks on Israel in October 

1973. To an important degree, the Intelligence 

Community relied heavily on Israeli intelligence for data and judgments on the Middle 

East. Although the Israelis had previously been 

remarkably accurate, in this instance they were 

not. President Nixon was “stunned by the failure 

of Israeli intelligence. They were among the best 

in the world, and they too, had been caught off 

guard.” Henry Kissinger’s recollection is that 

“every Israeli (and American) analysis before 

October 1973 agreed that Egypt and Syria lacked 

the military capability to regain their territory by 

force of arms; hence there would be no war.” 19

[four lines not declassified]20 

There were many reasons why Israeli intelligence miscarried the coming attacks. In an 

earlier invasion false alarm in May 1973 when 

Israeli Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. David Elazar 

had predicted war, Israeli military intelligence 

leaders had disagreed. This judgment had 

heightened the intelligence offi cers’ credibility. 

In turn, these offi cers held stubbornly to certain 

questionable “lessons” learned from the 1967 

war: that Egypt would not attack until its air 

force had neutralized Israel’s, and that Israel 

would have at least 48 hours’ warning before

an invasion.

Since Secretary Kissinger had been prodding 

Israel toward peace negotiations its leaders did 

not want, they may have deliberately understated their degree of alarm about a surprise attack 

for fear that the White House would push them 

all the harder toward such negotiations. Such 

a thesis can be inferred from Kissinger’s own 

account: “The approaching [Middle East peace] 

diplomacy distorted the Israelis’ perspective 

as well. They acquired a vested interest in belittling Arab threats lest the United States use 

the danger of war as a pretext to press Israel 

for concessions.” 21

In addition, during the crucial week just before 

6 October, Israeli attention had been distracted 

Clearly, CIA and the Intelligence Community 

did not cover themselves with glory. Even worse, 

Lawrence Eagleburger (then a senior assistant 

of Kissinger’s) claims that “Henry reading some 

fairly raw intelligence came to the conclusion 

that Sadat was going to start a war before the 

Intelligence Community 

itself did, but too late 

all the same time.” 13

William Quandt (then 

a National Security 

Council staffer responsible for handling ArabIsraeli matters) explains that Kissinger’s greater 

degree of alarm came from earlier warnings 

Brezhnev had privately given him that the Arabs 

were serious and that war was coming. The 

problem was, Quandt states, Kissinger had not 

shared this back-channel insight with DCI Colby 

or the Intelligence Comrnunity. 14

A telling indicator that intelligence had not 

alerted policymakers to the imminent outbreak 

of war was the fact that, when the attack came, 

on Saturday, 6 October, Henry Kissinger was in 

New York at the UN, President Nixon was at Key 

Biscayne [less than one line not declassified] In 

all, this warning failure marked an inauspicious 

start for DCI Colby in a situation of enormous 

consequence for US crisis management, Israeli 

security, world oil supplies, and the threat of 

added Soviet presence in the Middle East.

That intelligence performed so poorly was all 

the more remarkable since before the October 

War, Andrew Marshall and Kissinger’s NSCIC 

Working Group had drawn some constructive 

lessons from scrutinizing several previous crisis 

situations. Concluding that, in those cases 

intelligence analysts had received too little 

information on policy-level intelligence needs, 

the Working Group also found there had 

been too much current intelligence reporting 

and– contradicting Nixon and Kissinger’s own 

expressed preferences-too little analytical 

perspective on the given developing crises. 15

Moreover, Marshall had called those fi ndings to 

Colby’s attention in May 1973, adding additional 

recommendations of his own. 16 In the event, 

however, the fi ve months from May to October 

proved too short a period for Colby to achieve 

 “Henry reading some fairly raw intelligence 

came to the conclusion that Sadat was going to 

start a war before the Intelligence Community 

itself did, but too late all the same time.”
19

By coincidence, CIA’s analytic capabilities in 

September-October 1973 were also in some disarray. Having disbanded the Offi ce of National 

Estimates, Colby had begun to replace it with 

a system of individual National Intelligence 

Offi cers (NIOs), whose new procedures were not 

yet effective. A number of personnel changes 

had recently been made, and some of the most 

knowledgeable Middle East analysts had moved 

to other jobs. In CIA’s Offi ce of Current Intelligence (OCI, the offi ce principally responsible 

for serving up current intelligence analyses to 

the White House), the [less than one line not 

declassified] chief was new to that area and 

had just returned from a year away on sabbatical. His boss [name not declassified] happened 

to be on leave the week before 6 October. Also, 

most of CIA’s DI offi cers had not had fi rsthand 

experience in the fi eld, or the opportunity to gain 

the up-close “feel” so necessary where available 

evidence is ambiguous. Furthermore, within 

the DI there was little integrated politicaleconomic analysis as such: its political analysts 

and economists tended to work independently 

of each other, a separation that contributed to 

CIA’s failure to anticipate OPEC’s use of oil as 

a weapon. Finally, although some DO offi cers 

were more concerned about a possible Arab 

attack than were their DI colleagues, they could 

not get the analysts to sound a stronger alarm in 

their assessments for the White House. 23

Then, too, as we have seen, Kissinger was in 

possession of certain sensitive intelligence that 

he did not share with the DCI or the Intelligence 

Community. Colby later told him, candidly, that 

he could have done a better job as DCI had 

the White House not cut him off from certain 

privileged data. “I fully understand the need 

for secrecy in our government on these delicate 

subjects,” he wrote, “although it is clear that 

the back channel in many instances is becoming the main channel, causing lost and even 

counterproductive motion, aside from anguish, 

among many not in the circuit.’’ 24 Such crucially 

important back-channel information included 

earlier warnings Brezhnev had given Kissinger 

of the Arabs’ serious intent, as well as private 

dialogue between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, and various private messages 

from Sadat. 25

by Palestinian terrorists’ attack on a train 

bearing Soviet Jewish emigres to Vienna 

(the “Schonau” affair), and by the subsequent 

negotiations for the release of those emigrants 

taken hostage. That crisis dominated the news 

in Israel, while Egyptian and Syrian matters 

were given back-page treatment. The terrorists in question were members of the Syrian 

controlled Sai’qa. It has never been established 

whether the timing of their terrorist attack was 

a coincidence or a deliberate act to divert 

Israeli watchfulness.

Moreover, the mastermind of the EgyptianSyrian invasions of Israel, President Sadat, had 

done a brilliant job of misleading the Israelis— 

and American intelligence. As Kissinger later 

wrote, Sadat “paralyzed his opponents with 

their own preconceptions.” 22 By orchestrating a 

false war scare in May, and then repeating more 

“scares” in the form of Egyptian and Syrian troop 

concentrations opposite Sinai and the Golan, 

Sadat lulled Israeli watchfulness. Hence Israeli 

and US intelligence judged the Arab military 

concentrations in the fi rst week of October to be 

simply more of the same. And, whether or not the 

Sai’qa terrorist attack was also part of a larger 

Egyptian-Syrian deception plan, Sadat had created a certain aura of “progress” in Arab-Israeli 

deliberations at the United Nations, a development that found an expectant Henry Kissinger 

there when the attacks on Israel occurred.

Colby and US intelligence were further harmed 

by the fact that, by October 1973, the President’s 

personal political crisis was far advanced, and 

much regular governmental access to the White 

House had diminished. Nixon’s attentions were 

so distracted that he did not himself participate 

directly, later in October, in the momentous 

late-night decision in which Kissinger and a 

rump session of the Washington Special 

Action Group (WSAG, discussed below) brought 

US armed forces to an advanced state of alert 

(DEFCON III) worldwide. In addition, the US 

intelligence and policymaking communities at 

the time were focusing on many issues other than 

Israeli-Arab tensions, such as the continuing 

Vietnam war, peace negotiations in Paris, SALT 

issues, and rapprochement with the People’s 

Republic of China.
20 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

TOP: 

Israeli Tanks move through 

the Sinai

MIDDLE LEFT: 

Soviet-made T-55 Tank

MIDDLE RIGHT: 

Israeli M-4 Sherman Tank

BOTTOM LEFT: 

Israeli bridge over the 

Suez Canal

© Hulton-Deutsch Collections/CORBIS
21

throughout the course of the war, as this Middle 

East crisis escalated to US-Soviet confrontation.

[one line not declassified] Colby set up special 

working groups that kept the White House 

abreast of fast-breaking events and provided 

Kissinger numerous short-term outlook studies 

and think pieces. Meanwhile, on a Community 

wide basis, Colby’s working groups integrated a 

rather large amount of special, compartmented 

intelligence, which gave Kissinger many particulars concerning battlefi eld developments 

and the various armies’ logistic situations. They 

also provided him prompt cartographic support, 

essential to the negotiations that eventually 

reduced the Middle East crisis fever. 30

Of particular service to US policymakers 

were the technical services performed by CIA 

specialists [less than one line not declassified]. 

These experts clarifi ed complicated geographic 

boundaries in the Sinai, furnished detailed data 

on certain cities where the cease-fi res under 

negotiation were designed to give the local 

disputants equal portions of land, and pointed 

out the differences between actual and claimed 

battlefi eld tank losses. In all, the intelligence 

particulars furnished by Colby’s working groups 

enabled Secretary of State Kissinger to call 

certain bluffs or attempted deceptions on the 

part of the Arab and Israeli disputants and thus 

strengthened his negotiating leverage as the 

mediator of the crisis. 31

Though surrounded by many other demands 

at the time, Colby personally played an active 

role in lending crisis management support 

to the Secretary of State. Meeting daily with 

Kissinger’s Washington Special Action Group, 

the DCI not only was the best prepared source 

of intelligence details, but also the offi cial to 

whom Kissinger turned for ordering specifi c 

intelligence needs concerning collection, clarifi cation, and analysis. Within CIA, Colby held 

daily informal meetings on the crisis with the 

DDI, the DDO, and the nascent NIO offi cers, 

where they discussed the day’s all-source take 

and shared their evaluations. These meetings 

kept the assessments sent to the White House 

as current and accurate as possible, ensured the 

personal input of the DCI, and prepared Colby 

Last, and perhaps most important, accurate estimates of Arab intentions suffered from certain 

preconceptions strongly held by many of the 

Intelligence Community’s analysts. These 

offi cers tended to denigrate Arab capabilities 

and to assume that past patterns of Arab military 

conduct would continue. Some of these analysts 

were also guilty of mirror imaging, in estimating 

that it “wouldn’t make [American] sense” for 

Sadat to launch an attack that he knew would 

probably not carry the day militarily but might 

advance the Arabs’ cause politically. “We had 

a bit of a mind set,” Colby conceded in 1975, 26

a conclusion with which many other observers 

have agreed. Kissinger later characterized the 

situation similarly, adding that the Arab attack 

on Israel had demonstrated the dangers inherent 

in the tendency of most intelligence services to 

fi t the facts into existing preconceptions and to 

make them consistent with what is anticipated. 27

The House’s, later Pike, investigating committee 

also attributed part of the problem in October 

1973 to analytical bias. In its view, one reason for 

the analysts’ optimism could be found in a 1971 

CIA handbook, which stated that the Arab 

fi ghting man “lacks the necessary physical and 

cultural qualities for performing effective military 

services.” The Pike committee concluded that, 

because the Arabs were thought to be so clearly 

inferior, another attack would be irrational and, 

thus, out of the question. 28 Finally, Robert Morris, 

a former NSC staffer, listed like reasons for the 

failure to anticipate the Egyptian-Syrian attack 

on Israel: “The worst common fl aw in the reading of the intelligence was an abiding cultural, 

perhaps racial, contempt in Washington and 

Jerusalem for the political posturing and 

fi ghting skills of the Arabs.” 29

THE PERFORMANCE OF INTELLIGENCE AFTER THE 

OCTOBER WAR’S OUTBREAK

Defi cient though they had been in sounding 

the alarm beforehand, DCI Colby and the 

Intelligence Community did render the policymakers excellent support once the EgyptianSyrian attacks had begun, which helped the 

White House’s crisis management of subsequent 

diplomacy, cease-fi res, and the diplomatic 

showdown with the USSR. This support applied 
22 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

for his many meetings with Kissinger and other 

top policymakers during the crisis. 32 Colby also 

commissioned the candid postmortem report on 

the performance of US intelligence before the 

outbreak of the war. 33

THE DEFCON III AFFAIR

The war crisis reached its apex, as far as US 

security interests were concerned, on the night 

of 24-25 October, in the now famous White House 

decision— made without President Nixon 

present— to bring US military forces to a higher 

alert status (DEFCON III) worldwide.

From an intelligence point of view, a number 

of developments had occurred by 24 October to 

justify top US policymakers careful scrutiny of 

the broader US-Soviet situation. A crisis had 

developed as the tide of the war defi nitely 

turned in Israel’s favor. Cease-fi res unraveled, 

Israeli forces threatened to annihilate Egypt’s 

3rd Army in the Sinai, and Moscow became 

suspicious that, despite Washington’s assurances, the United States would not or could not 

restrain the Israelis. [14 lines not declassified] 34

Atop these alarming reports came an extremely 

tough note to President Nixon from Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev threatening to dispatch 

Soviet troops to the Middle East unilaterally. 

Kissinger, Defense Secretary Schlesinger, JCS 

Chairman Admiral Moorer, White House Chief of 

Staff Alexander Haig, General Brent Scowcroft 

(Kissinger’s NSC deputy), and DCI Colby were 

the offi cers who participated in the rump session 

of the WSAG during the night of 24-25 October 

that resulted in the remarkable decision for a 

Defense Condition III (DEFCON III) alert. While 

they met, Nixon remained upstairs in the White 

House, although Kissinger conferred with him by 

phone before the group’s decision.

Many questioned, then and later, whether the 

decision for DEFCON III was based on legitimate alarms or whether it was an overreaction. 

There has also been speculation that the 

decision may have been politically motivated, 

at least in part, by the needs of a Watergatebeleaguered White House. 35 Colby considered 

that the DEFCON III decision had been justifi ed 

TOP: 

Soviet leader Brezhnev and 

President Nixon

RIGHT:

UN Offi cials on patrol
23

advances in coverage by special technical 

systems, as well as the acquisition of [less than 

one line not declassified] He broadened the 

responsibilities of the Intelligence Community’s 

watch function, to prevent a repeat of the situation 

that existed at the time of the October War’s 

outbreak— when the National Indications Center 

had had no explicit requirement to warn, only 

to watch, and the USIB’s Watch Committee had 

“degenerated into participation only by action 

offi cers rather than serious analysts or high offi -

cials.” 40 Colby also set in motion new initiatives 

that led ultimately to the creation of a Special 

Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning.

Colby was not successful, however, in changing 

Henry Kissinger’s proclivity for keeping sensitive 

information to himself. Despite the excellent 

crisis management support that Colby and the 

Intelligence Community contributed after the 

hostilities began, their failure to foresee the 

war’s out break hardened Nixon’s and Kissinger’s 

conviction that US intelligence was defi cient 

on many scores and further damaged Colby’s 

standing at this, the very outset of his tenure as 

DCI. His role thereafter remained that of a senior 

staff specialist to whom the White House looked 

for intelligence data and support, but not for 

interpretations of broader issues, to say nothing 

of policy recommendations. On most issues 

Colby had to deal with Kissinger’s deputy, Brent 

Scowcroft, and NSC staffers and was shut out 

from any meaningful, continuing access to the 

major policy players.

1

 Emphasis in the original. This postmortem was prepared at the 

request of Colby, made shortly after the sudden Egyptian-Syrian 

attacks on Israel had taken US intelligence by surprise. The 

postmortem’s text is given in Attachment to USIB-D-IS/21124, 

17 January 1974.

2

 Nixon, Memoirs, p. 920.

3

 [Name not declassifi ed] interview by Harold P. Ford, summary 

notes, Washington, DC, 2 April 1987 (hereafter cited as [Name not 

declassifi ed] interview by Ford, 2 April 1987)

4

 Colby, Honorable Men, p. 366.

5

 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 459 and 465.

6

 Lt. Gen. Haim Bar-Lev, as cited in CIA Warning Staff Study, The DCI’s 

and four days after that WSAG meeting, so 

informed Secretary Kissinger. 36 In his memoirs 

Colby explicitly supported Kissinger’s decision 

for the DEFCON III alert. Writing in 1978, Colby 

believed that Kissinger had not overreacted, 

inasmuch as Defense Condition III was the lowest level of US military alert, and the Strategic 

Air Command and a good portion of the Pacifi c 

Command were already at that level. 37 Ray 

Cline’s view of Kissinger’s role in the DEFCON 

III affair is less generous. “I have always looked 

on this as a kind of shell game, a superfi cial 

exercise,” he later stated. “That is, Kissinger 

knew what he wanted to do all along, had 

already decided to do it.” In Cline’s view, 

Kissinger only summoned Secretary of Defense 

Schlesinger and the others to give the decision 

the semblance of offi cial action. “I’ve heard that 

President Nixon was upstairs drunk that night.” 

Cline observed, “I don’t know that that’s a fact, 

but it is clear and we didn’t know it at the timehow far Nixon was out of things in those days.” 38

In retrospect, Colby held that the October 

Middle East War afforded a number of intelligence lessons. In his view, the experience 

demonstrated that the Intelligence Community’s 

collection machinery could be superb when 

focused as it had been in the latter days of the 

crisis, but that the real challenge for the future 

would be to make the analytic process function 

with the same degree of excellence. To accomplish this, Colby believed that more automatic 

challenge or variations to the consensus must 

be built into the analytical process. In addition, 

Colby pointed out, US intelligence before the 

war had suffered from a dearth of independent 

coverage and [less than one line not declassified] The intelligence provided the White House 

had been too much a CIA product. In the future, 

he concluded, the White House must more fully 

share privi1eged data with the DCI, while the 

full analytical weight of the entire Intelligence 

Community must be brought more directly to 

bear on policymaking considerations. 39

Colby subsequently made some progress in 

correcting these weaknesses. He stimulated 

more competitive analysis and greater analytic 

contribution by agencies of the Community 

other than the CIA. He also encouraged 
24 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Duty and Authority to Warn, 24 December 1985, (hereafter cited 

as DCI’s Duty and Authority to Warn), p. 7, CIA History Staff records, 

job 90B00336R, box 2. folder 16, CIA Archives and Records Center 

[Redacted text here] 

7

 US Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Collection, Production and Quality, US Intelligence Analysis and the Oil Issue,1973-1974: Staff Report, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 

December 1977 (hereafter cited as SSCI, Intelligence Analysis and 

the Oil Issue), passim.

8

 NIE 30-73, “Possible Egyptian-Israeli Hostilities: Determinants and 

Implications,”17 May 1973, passim.

9

 Kissinger often had no more regard for CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO) offi cers than he did for Directorate of Intelligence (Dl) 

or Offi ce of National Estimates analyses. For example, in an earlier 

Middle East war scare of May 1973, Kissinger telephoned and 

told a CIA offi cer that he wanted only the judgments of the DO, not 

those of “those DI bastards.” George Lauder, interview by Harold P. 

Ford, summary notes, Washington, DC, 3 March 1987 (hereafter 

cited as Lauder interview by Ford, 1987)

10 For the INR, CIA, DIA assessments immediately before the 

Egyptian-Syrian attacks, see Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 462-

467; Nixon materials, box 129, NSC fi les/HAK fi les; Sunday Times 

(London) Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War (New York: Doubleday, 

1974), p.104; CIA postmortem: US Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike committee): Hearings on US Intelligence 

Agencies and Activities: The Performance of the Intelligence Community, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 11, 12, 18, 25, 30 September and 7, 

30, 31 October 1975 (hereafter cited as Pike committee, Hearings, 

Intelligence Agencies and Activities), p. 637. During the months 

before the war, there had been a certain division of judgment within 

the State Department, so that some of its intelligence assessments 

were occasionally more alarmist than the above INR judgments. 

For example, shortly after the earlier NIE in May 1973, Ray S. 

Cline, INR’s Director, had given Secretary of State William Rogers 

a special memorandum that held the resumption of Arab-Israeli 

hostilities “will become a better than even bet” by autumn (Pike 

committee report, as cited in CIA: The Pike Report [Nottingham, 

England: Spokesman Brooks, 1977]. pp. 141-142. Although the 

House of Representatives voted not to publish the Pike committee’s 

report (as discussed in chapter II, below), a leaked version of the 

“Report” appeared in the New York Village Voice, and then was 

published in England- with an introduction by Phillip Agee- as CIA: 

the Pike Report). Cline has also claimed that at the last minute, on 

5 October, he prepared a private assessment for Kissinger that held 

that hostilities probably were imminent, but could not get this alert 

through to the Secretary before Egypt and Syria attacked Israel the 

next day (Cline interview by Ford, 31 March 1988). In any case, 

frictions with Kissinger, (discussed in chapter 2), led Cline to resign 

from State a few days later.

11 (London) Sunday Times Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War. See 

also CIA postmortem: Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 464,

12 CIA: The Pike Committee Report, 680-681; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 462-467; Top Secret documentation in Nixon materials, 

box 129, NSC fi les/HAK fi les.

13 Lawrence Eagleburger, to John Ranelagh, as cited in Ranelagh, 

The Agency: The Rise and Decline of CIA (New York: Simon and 

Schuster, 1986), pp. 582-583.

14 William Quandt, interview by Harold P. Ford, summary notes, 

Washington, DC, 4 May 1987 (hereafter cited as Quandt interview 

by Ford, 4 May 1987)

15 Jeanne W. Davis, Staff Secretary, National Security Council, 

Memorandum for the Attorney General, the Deputy Secretary of 

State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central 

Intelligence, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Studies of 

Intelligence Crisis Support,” 23 May 1973, CIA History Staff records, 

job 90B00336R, box 1, folder 15, CIA Archives and Records Center; 

NSCIC Working Group, Memorandum for National Security Council 

Intelligence Committee, “NSCIC Working Group Summary of 

Findings Regarding Intelligence Support in Crisis Situations and 

Recommended Actions,” 9 May 1973. CIA History Staff records, job 

90B00336R, box 1, folder 15, CIA Archives and Records Center.

16 Andrew Marshall, National Security Council, Memorandum for 

William Colby, DCI, subject not given, 22 May 1973 with two attachments: Marshall, Memorandum for Colby, “Areas for Discussion,” 

21 May 1973·, Marshall, Memorandum for the Record, “Additional 

Insights From the Three Crisis Studies,” 21 May 1973; all three 

memorandums fi led in CIA History Staff records, job 90B00336R, 

box 2, folder 16, CIA Archives and Records Center. Those fi ndings 

and recommendations held that US intelligence should place more 

emphasis on preparing personality studies of key foreign leaders; 

meeting the needs of top level US consumers; presenting confl icting 

estimative judgments; treating and communicating estimative 

uncertainties; improving intelligence personnel management and 

management training; rigorously evaluating the Community’s 

performance and product; preparing serious contingency planning 

before the possible crises; and developing broader, “less sheltered” 

views of world politics.

17 The Community’s performance in 1973 concerning possible 

Arab attacks on Israel contrasted sharply with the excellent alerts 

Helms’s CIA had earlier given the White House in the runup to the 

Six Day War in 1967. Helms considered that performance to have 

been “the fi nest, across-the-board execution of our mission at every 

level that I have seen in my twenty years with the Central Intelligence Agency” (Richard Helms, DCI, Memorandum for CIA’s Deputy 

Directors, 14 June 1967, CIA History Staff records, job 90B00336R, 

box 1, CIA Archives and Records Center. As a result of that performance Helms became a regular member of President Johnson’s 

Tuesday luncheons, that inner circle where LBJ and his closest 

advisers attacked the country’s principal questions of national 

security. Although Helms had a good deal less access to Nixon than 

he had to Johnson, he still fared better than Colby ever did.

18 Nixon, Memoirs, p. 920.

19 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 459.

20 William Colby, DCI, Memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, “Critique of Middle East Crisis,” 27 October 1973, CIA 

History Staff records, job 90B00336R, box 1, folder 15, CIA Archives 
25

31 Ibid.

32 DCI Morning Meeting Notes of 19, 23, 29 October, and 2 

November 1973. CIA History Staff record, job 90B00336R, box 1, CIA 

Archives and Records Center.

33 Intelligence Community postmortem. Henry Kissinger sent 

Colby a “Dear Bill” note, 25 February 1974, thanking him for this 

postmortem. Kissinger called that study ‘’an outstanding analysis 

of the Intelligence Community’s reaction and performance during 

a major world crisis. It was both dispassionately candid and broad 

in coverage and should prove to be a valuable management tool 

throughout the Community’’ (Nixon materials, box 210, NSC fi les/

Agencyfi les/CIA. Vol. VII).

34 [one line not declassifi ed] The 5 November issue of Aviation 

Week stated fl atly that the Soviets had sent two brigades of nucleararmed SCUD missiles to Egypt and that the US Government had 

satellite pictures to prove it. [one line not declassifi ed] A parallel 

study conducted within the NSC carried an even more alarmist tone 

(compartmented intelligence, Nixon materials, box 132 NSC fi les/

HAK offi ce fi les). [six lines not declassifi ed] 

35 Among the skeptics at the time was Australia’s Prime Minister, 

Gough Whitlam, who, when asked at a press club luncheon (8 

November) whether US bases in Australia bad been put on more 

than normal alert, answered: “I don’t know if they were put on 

alert. I wasn’t told. I believe the announcement was for domestic 

American consumption.” His remarks were noted, with anger, in the 

White House (see Top Secret documentation in Nixon materials, 

box 2, White House special fi les/staff and offi ce fi les). This DEFCON 

III nighttime episode took place just four days after Mr. Nixon’s 

Halloween Massacre: the departure of Messrs. Cox, Richardson, and 

Ruckelshaus. One interpretation at the time was that the Washington Special Action Group’s decision had been made at least in part 

to undercut any thought in the Kremlin that the White House was 

too paralyzed by Watergate to take decisive action on a crisis situation abroad.

36 Colby, Memorandum for Kissinger. “Critique of Middle East Crisis,” 

27 October 1973.

37 Colby, Honorable Men, p.367.

38 Cline, interview by Ford, 31 March 1988.

39 Colby, Memorandum for Kissinger, “Critique of Middle East Crisis,” 

27 October 1973.

40 The DCI’s Duty and Authority to Warn, p. 12. CIA History Staff 

records, job 90B00336R, box 2, folder 16, CIA Archives and Records 

Center.

and Records Center (hereafter cited as Colby Memorandum for 

Kissinger, “Critique of Middle East Crisis,” 27 October 1973). [13 

lines not declassifi ed] Syrian intentions was in fact produced by the 

CI Staff, not the NE Division. Rocca holds that this report evidently 

made no dent on the US Intelligence Community’s analysis and just 

“got lost somewhere in the shuffl e” (Raymond Rocca, interview by 

Harold P. Ford, summary notes, Washington, DC, 19 August 1987 

[hereafter cited as Rocca interview by Ford, 19 August 1987). 

Although the report in question was apparently an excellent one, 

it did not pinpoint just when the attacks might come. In any event, 

this was just one of many DO reports at the time, others of which 

subsequently proved to be wrong.

21 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 461.

22 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 460.

23 [Name not declassifi ed] DI offi cer, interview by Harold P. Ford, 

summary notes. Washington, DC, 2 April 1987 (hereafter cited as 

[Redacted text here] interview by Ford, 2 April 1987); [Redacted 

text here] ex-DI offi cer, interview by Harold P. Ford, summary notes, 

Washington, DC, 16 March 1987 (hereafter cited as [redacted text 

here] interview by Ford, 16 March 1987); Lauder interview by Ford, 

1987; [Name not declassifi ed] ex-Intelligence Community Staff offi -

cer, interview by Harold P. Ford, summary notes, Washington, DC, 31 

March 1987 (hereafter cited as [Name not declassifi ed] interview 

by Ford, 31 March 1987. DIA’s analyses were also harmed at the 

time because certain senior DIA estimators tended to accept Israeli 

evaluations uncritically and to override more cautionary judgments 

being made by some of DIA’s more junior analysts (several CIA 

offi cers, but especially [Redacted text here] interview by Ford, 31 

March 1987)

24 Colby, Memorandum for Kissinger, “Critique of Middle East Crisis,” 

27 October 1973.

25 Quandt, interview by Ford, 4 May 1987.

26 Colby statement made at a news conference that, as discussed 

in chapter 11, Colby called to explain why the Pike committee 

should not include certain sensitive (communications intelligence) 

data in the report it was preparing at the time. At this unique news 

conference, held in CIA’s auditorium, journalists raised a number of 

questions concerning the performance of US intelligence two years 

earlier in the Middle East war.

27 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 40.

28 CIA.: The Pike Report, p. 142

29 Robert Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 253.

30 Harold Saunders, former NSC Staff offi cer, interview by Harold P. 

Ford, summary notes, Washington, DC, 4 May 1987 (hereafter cited 

as Saunders interview by Ford, 4 May 1987); Quandt interview by 

Ford, 4 May 1987; see also Top Secret documentation in “Nixon 

materials, box 123, NSC fi les/HAK offi ce fi les; boxes 209 and 265, 

NSC fi les/Agency fi les; and boxes 664 and 665, NSC fi les/country 

fi les/ME.
26 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Fighting on the 

Golan Heights
27

CIA’S MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE 

AND THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Peter Nyren

Historical Collections 

Division, CIA

By about 0600 hours on the morning of 6 October 

1973, the fi rst indications started coming in that 

hostilities were about to break out in the Middle 

East. At that point, the Middle East Task Force 

(METF) was stood up and immediately began 

to coordinate the CIA’s and the Intelligence 

Community’s response to the crisis. A veteran 

manager in CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence—

the Agency’s analytic unit—was tasked with 

“organizing, staffi ng and monitoring operations 

of an around-the-clock task force.” Within two 

hours (by 1430), the METF was fully staffed and 

a work schedule put together.

One of METF’s primary responsibilities was to 

support the DCI and other high-level offi cials 

at meetings of the Washington Special Actions 

Group (WSAG), an operational subgroup under 

the National Security Council that served as 

the main policymaking body throughout the 

crisis. The METF’s first order of business on 

6 October: to prepare a special preliminary 

assessment for the DCI’s use at the WSAG meeting scheduled for 0900 that morning. At the same 

time, a Special Watch Committee meeting on the 

Middle East was scheduled to meet and Richard 

Lehman, both the Chief of the Interagency Watch 

Committee and the Director of CIA’s Offi ce of 

Current Intelligence (OCI)—the principal CIA 

offi ce passing tactical assessments of the crisis 

to the White House—asked the METF for updates 

on the crisis every half hour while the meeting 

was in progress. 

The METF’s primary product during the crisis 

was the Middle East Situation Report, or SITREP, 

published up to four times per day during the 

height of the fi ghting. The fi rst SITREP was 

sent to the typist at 0900 that day (Saturday, 

6 October). There would be a total of 125 SITREPs 

published during the crisis, with the last disseminated on 19 November 1973. The SITREPs were 

used at every WSAG meeting, serving as the 

main intelligence update for the principals and 
28 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

their staffs. Another function of the METF was to 

coordinate the large number of taskings levied 

on the Agency during the crisis, making sure 

that all taskings were delegated to the proper 

offi ces and analysts, and then tracked to make 

sure the assignment was completed on time. 

SATURDAY, 6 OCTOBER

On the fi rst day of fi ghting, the DCI returned 

from the WSAG meeting at 1040 and immediately called for a Special National Intelligence 

Estimate (SNIE) to be ready for a second WSAG 

meeting already scheduled later that day at 

1400 (or whenever Secretary of State Kissinger 

returned from New York). Drafting assignments 

were parceled out to senior analysts from the 

key DI Offi ces involved in the crisis—OCI, the 

Offi ce of Economic Research (OER), and the Offi ce of Strategic Research (OSR)—and the SNIE, 

entitled Arab-Israeli Hostilities and Their Implications, was completed in time for the meeting, 

which did not start until 1500. 

The DCI was a regular visitor to the Task Force, 

often to pass along what was said at the latest 

WSAG meeting downtown, or to pass along 

taskings that came up that day. At the end of a 

very long fi rst day of the crisis, for example, DCI 

Colby stopped by at 2110 to thank the members 

for their work and to let them know that the next 

WSAG meeting was scheduled for 1900 the next 

evening. He requested that talking points be prepared by 1600 for him to use to brief the WSAG. 

He said that he (and others) was especially 

interested in the following:

• Soviet intentions and movements 

(particularly military movements); 

• How long it might take the Israelis to push 

the Egyptians back across the Suez Canal; 

• Whether the Israelis will engage in air 

attacks on Cairo;

• How far will the Israelis go in the Golan 

Heights—will they just knock out men and 

materiel, or go all the way to Damascus?

ABOVE: 

Israeli tank crew

RIGHT: 

DCI William E. Colby
29

SUNDAY, 7 OCTOBER

By the next day, an OSR military analyst had 

written up a response to the questions and it was 

attached to the DCI briefi ng notes as an annex 

(see SITREP Number 8, as of 1700 EDT, 10/7/73). Sam 

Hoskinson (acting National Intelligence Offi cer, or 

NIO, for the Middle East) later reported that Colby 

was “ecstatic” over the annex to his briefi ng. 

The taskings were coming in to the Task Force 

hot and heavy in the early days of the fi ghting. 

On the evening of 7 October, the DCI called in to 

say he wanted answers on the following issues 

by 0900 the following morning (8 October):

• The Agency’s best judgment on a detailed, 

day-by-day military scenario for the next 

three to four days, i.e., how will the battle 

unfold, in as much detail as possible.

• How many Egyptian troops and how much 

equipment, by type, did they get across 

the canal? How did they get them over and 

where are they going?

• How many bridges did the Egyptians put up 

across the Canal? What is their status and 

how many are still in place?

• Soviet advisors: how many are there in 

Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, and what role are 

they playing?

• As precisely as possible, what are the 

losses (people and equipment) on all sides, 

Israeli and Arab?

A joint CIA-DIA paper (Arab-Israeli Confl ict: The 

Next Several Days, 10/8/73) was prepared and 

disseminated the next day.

MONDAY, 8 OCTOBER

The Task Force got some positive feedback on 8 

October when DCI Colby related how Secretary 

of State Kissinger, in that morning’s WSAG 

meeting, had held up a copy of the latest SITREP 

and said, “Have you all seen this?” When 

everyone nodded they had, he said, “Then we 

can dispense with the briefi ng.” By this time, 

two days into the crisis, the White House 

was operating from SITREP to SITREP, keeping 

Kissinger and Scowcroft 

briefed on the crisis. The 

Task Force was having 

to rush the printing of 

every daytime SITREP 

(at this stage SITREPs 

were issued at 0630, 1200, 1700, and 2230 every 

day) to meet their requirements. 

At 2235 on 8 October, the DCI called the METF 

requesting that the next morning’s SITREP 

include an annex paragraph or two addressing the question: To what extent can the Arabs 

and Israelis sustain the military effort in view 

of their supplies and logistics? (see Annex: Estimated Logistic Situation and Capabilities of the 

Middle East Combatants, in SITREP Number 14, 

10/9/73). He indicated that he fully recognized the 

diffi culties involved in responding to this and 

did not expect a defi nitive answer. He was 

simply curious whether the forward Egyptian 

and Syrian forces could be supplied and how 

much ammunition did they likely have with 

them during the initial attack.

WEDNESDAY, 10 OCTOBER

The DCI on 10 October requested a new assessment/estimate paper on how the war is likely 

to go, adopting the technique of having three 

different analysts take three different scenarios 

for the war and advocating them. Drafts were 

to be fi nished that evening, with revisions to be 

done the next day. It was noted in the METF Log 

that DCI Colby was scheduled to brief Congress 

the next morning (11 Oct) and that his briefer 

would use the lead section of that morning’s 

SITREP and then would update the rest of the 

briefi ng from the 11 October morning SITREP. 

FRIDAY, 12 OCTOBER

On 12 October, Assistant Secretary of State 

Sisco requested through State channels that all 

SITREPs include maps, with all places named 

in the SITREP indicated on the maps. The DI’s 

Offi ce of Basic and Geographic Intelligence 

(OBGI), the main provider of maps for DI products, was already closely involved in the work 

By this time, two days into the crisis, the 

White House was operating from SITREP to 

SITREP, keeping Kissinger and Scowcroft

 briefed on the crisis.
30 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

of the Task Force. Analysts of the Offi ce of 

Strategic Research (OSR), who produced the 

action portions of the SITREPs, took responsibility 

for providing all place names to OBGI as soon 

as possible in the drafting process to implement 

this directive.

SATURDAY, 13 OCTOBER

The WSAG met at 1045 and the DCI dropped by 

the Ops Center after the WSAG meeting to let 

the METF know he would be briefi ng at the next 

scheduled WSAG meeting, which was to gather 

the next morning (Sunday) at 0900. Specifi c items 

of interest to Colby were the following:

• Where are the Israelis going to go?

• What are Soviet intentions?

• Are reports of an Egyptian airborne move 

true and, if so, what effect could it have?

The DCI also requested that information on 

stocks of consumables (fuel, ammunition, etc.) 

for both the Arabs and Israelis—at the start of 

hostilities and the current situation—be included as soon as possible in a SITREP annex. 

The Offi ce of Economic Research (OER) provided 

a package of reports on oil shortages in 

combatant countries to be passed on to the DCI. 

SUNDAY, 14 OCTOBER

After the morning WSAG meeting, DCI Colby 

came by the Task Force to request briefi ng 

notes for the next meeting, scheduled for either 

0900 or 1100 the following morning. He requested 

a SITREP annex answering the following 

questions:

• How long can or will the battle on the 

Syrian front go on (2 days, 5, 10)?

• Will Israel press on all the way to 

Damascus, broaden the front to destroy 

Arab forces, or stabilize it?

• Assuming Israel can stabilize the Syrian 

front, how long will it take them to shift their 

main effort to the Sinai front? An annex 

covering the last question was published in 

SITREP No. 39 Annex II, as of 1130 EDT, 

15 Oct 1973.

The DCI also asked for a memo on reactions of 

the Japanese and Europeans to a general shutoff or cutback in Arab oil (OER with OCI support 

was tasked with this) and a memo on the impact 

of a stand-down of the Soviet airlift and of any 

US airlift. In addition to the morning WSAG, an 

NSC meeting had been scheduled for 1600.

MONDAY, 15 OCTOBER

Word came from the DCI and Sam Hoskinson 

that the immediate focus of the Task Force in the 

next few days should be in gauging Arab and 

Soviet reactions to US resupply of Israel.

• OCI was tasked with a memo (due by 0800 

on 16 October) on observed and probable 

Soviet reactions for the DCI to use as backup 

(and can also be used as an annex).

• CIA (and the Task Force) was to observe and 

analyze Arab oil developments, particularly 

in reaction to US resupply efforts. Hoskinson 

will levy a specifi c requirement on OER.

• OCI will write a memo documenting CIA’s 

assessment of when the Soviets knew about 

the impending hostilities, by 0800 Tuesday, 

for the DCI.

In addition to above items of interest, the DCI 

requested that the Task Force keep him abreast 

of signifi cant reports on the situation so that he 

will be knowledgeable about any report that a 

WSAG attendee might mention during a meeting. Hoskinson suggested the Task Force start 

keeping a Cable summary list and giving it to 

the DCI every morning and before each of the 

meetings he attended. One “good writer” from 

each shift should summarize, in three sentences, 

all interesting (quotable, remarkable, pungent) 

reports that come in, and the list of summaries 

is then delivered to Hoskinson every morning at 

0800. Subjects to focus on are Arab and Soviet 

reactions to US Airlift; Oil developments; and 

signifi cant (or unusual) battlefi eld developments. This operation was to be handled by the 

DI’s Central Reference Services.
31

TUESDAY/WEDNESDAY, 17-18 OCTOBER

Light days, with no meetings scheduled and 

little reporting. CIA and DIA analysts were 

scheduled to meet with DCI Colby at 1400 on 

18 October to discuss progress of the war. 

During the day on 18 October, word came from 

DCI Colby that the “losses” needed a new baseline, as nearly everybody thought CIA’s tank 

and personnel loss numbers were too high. OSR 

was tasked with putting it together; if possible, 

by the end of the day, so it could be used at the 

WSAG meeting scheduled for the morning of 

19 October. D/OCI Lehman asked that an OER 

oil analyst be available each morning at 0830 

to “pump him up” for the DCI Morning Meeting.

THURSDAY, 19 OCTOBER

A WSAG meeting is scheduled for 0930 on 

20 October and the DCI is slated to brief the 

House Armed Services Committee on Tuesday, 

24 October. At the WSAG held this morning, 

the CIA provided its updated losses table and 

late-breaking information of the hostages being 

held in Beirut. As a result of today’s meeting, 

OER and OCI have been charged with preparing a paper assessing the effect of oil cutbacks 

on Japan and Europe. In the afternoon, the TF 

spent two hours briefi ng Senator Jackson and 

his staff on the military situation and the Soviet 

role. At 2000, Sam Hoskinson dropped in to say 

the DCI met in the evening with Kissinger and 

(Defense Secretary) Schlesinger. Hoskinson said 

the fear in Washington now is that the Egyptian 

front is about to collapse. DCI Colby came in 

twenty minutes later to say the WSAG for the 

next morning was cancelled, but all charts and 

other material that had been tasked should still 

be prepared and delivered to the DCI’s offi ce as 

scheduled. In addition, the evening SITREP is 

to be sent to the White House, to the attention of 

Scowcroft for Kissinger (who was leaving Saturday morning on a trip to Moscow). According to 

the DCI, senior policymakers are most interested 

in Soviet reactions to today’s events, and this 

should be refl ected in all SITREPs over next day 

or two.

FRIDAY, 20 OCTOBER

The cancelation of the morning WSAG meeting 

brought little respite in the burdens placed on 

the Task Force. DDI Proctor came in early to 

announce that the DCI had decided that it would 

be useful to support Kissinger on his trip to 

Moscow with a cable telling him what would 

be the best cease-fi re lines to draw based on 

the terrain, social, and 

political considerations. OBGI would be 

the primary author of 

the study, but the Task 

Force was to call in 

OCI and OSR to 

assist. A rough draft 

was completed by 1800 and was sent to the 

White House for transmittal to Moscow. Sam 

Hoskinson asked that the annexes on Military 

and Non-Military Assistance by other Arab 

countries be updated by COB Monday so that 

the DCI can have the data for his appearance 

before the House Armed Services Committee on 

Tuesday. The DCI asked that the SITREP map 

on the Sinai show the dispositions of forces on 

both sides of the Suez Canal. The DCI also asked 

the Task Force to prepare a page-size map 

showing the disposition of the Soviet fl eet in 

the Mediterranean. 

SATURDAY, 21 OCTOBER

Sam Hoskinson was delighted with SITREP 

map on the Egyptian front. He thought it was 

just what the DCI wanted. Richard Lehman and 

General Walters (DDCI) dropped by about noon. 

Walters told the Task Force that he believes 

the Egyptians have had it and that they should 

break in the next couple of days. OBGI fi nished 

a graphic depiction of proposed cease-fi re lines 

between Israel and the two Arab countries. 

Lehman praised the members of the Task Force 

and was concerned about how much longer 

they could keep up the furious, round-the-clock 

pace. The DCI called at 1810 to say he had just 

received a call from General Scowcroft at the 

White House. Scowcroft told him that the US and 

USSR had agreed to sponsor jointly a resolution 

in the UN Security Council that would call for 

a cease-fi re in place. DCI Colby told the Task 

DDI Proctor came in early to announce that 

the DCI had decided that it would be useful 

to support Kissinger on his trip to Moscow with 

a cable telling him what would be the best 

cease-fi re lines to draw based on the terrain, 

social, and political considerations. 
32 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Force that he wanted to tell them the news fi rst 

before it is announced to the public. He also 

wanted to express his personal appreciation 

to the members of the Task Force because he 

believed they were of great help to Dr. Kissinger 

in reaching this agreement with the Soviets. 

He said he understood how hard members of the 

Task Force and those who supported it worked 

over the past two weeks.

MONDAY, 22 OCTOBER

The DCI requested that an Annex be prepared 

for the 2230 SITREP summarizing reactions to 

the UN cease-fi re resolution. The Annex should 

lead with reactions of the combatants in the 

War, reactions from other Arab states, China, 

European states, and important Third World 

countries. Lehman said that the DCI wanted a 

fi nal summary that would estimate how each 

country was likely to go in the future on the 

cease-fi re question. The Annex was to be given 

to Dr. Kissinger when he returned the next day 

(Tuesday). Lehman announced that the Task 

Force should be manned as usual on Tuesday 

morning, but that if a cease-fi re begins to take 

effect during the day, the number of personnel 

may be scaled down. 

Lehman called early in the morning to say that 

the DCI had ordered up a paper on the capabilities of the IC to monitor a cease-fi re. Analysts 

from OCI and OSR were called in to work on the 

paper (along with reps from the DS&T). A paper 

on the limitations of photography in monitoring 

a cease-fi re was completed by the end of the day 

and was typed up during the night to be held for 

the DCI in the morning. 

TUESDAY, 23 OCTOBER

The 1700 WSAG meeting was canceled, after all 

briefi ng materials were prepared. The meeting 

was rescheduled for Wednesday at 1000 and the 

materials will be held until then. DDI Proctor 

arrived to pass along a memorandum from 

the DCI relaying President Nixon’s and 

Dr. Kissinger’s praise and thanks for the work 

done by the Task Force to date (see memo from 

DCI Colby to Middle East Task Force, 17 October). 

TOP:

President Nixon presides 

over a meeting at the White 

House, October 1973

MIDDLE:

UN Checkpoint at 

Kilometer 101

RIGHT:

Israeli Troops inspect 

supplies for Egypt’s 

encircled Third Army
33

WEDNESDAY, 24 OCTOBER

The DCI called from the White House to inquire 

about reports of fi ghting on the East Bank of the 

Suez Canal. Available reporting was provided to 

Situation Room for passage to Colby. Reporting nature and origin of continuing fi ghting in 

southern Suez area is made diffi cult by lack of 

reliable sources. Lehman passed on to the DCI 

the memo prepared the previous night (De Facto 

Middle East Cease-Fire Lines and Alleged Violations). Colby used the memo in his discussion 

with SecDef Schlesinger. A senior OCI analyst 

is drafting a memo on post-cease-fi re probabilities in response to a tasking from this morning’s 

WSAG (memo is needed for Friday’s WSAG).

During the evening of 24 October, a routine 

night shift was “enlivened” by a number of 

phone calls from DCI Colby concerning Soviet 

activities in the Middle East. OSR analysts 

working the night shift were able to answer the 

Director’s questions. 

THURSDAY, 25 OCTOBER

OSR was tasked this morning to prepare a memo 

to recapitulate indicators to look for in identifying Soviet intentions to intervene in the Middle 

East. Analysts worked all day (in consultation 

with DIA) to complete the paper.

Following the WSAG, DCI Colby requested a 

memo be prepared on any evidence of Israeli 

subterfuge since the cease-fi re in the southern 

sector of the Suez Canal. There is widespread 

impression among WSAG members that the 

Israeli military was seeking to consolidate its 

gains around the Suez and the Egyptian Third 

Army while blaming the Egyptians for continued 

hostilities. The memo is to confi rm or correct that 

impression. 

FRIDAY, 26 OCTOBER

As of today, the 2230 SITREP is discontinued. 

More cutbacks expected on Monday. At 1600, a 

crash request came in from Ambassador Scali 

(at the United Nations) for an assessment of 

hostilities and whether Egypt had a serious case 

for complaint about cease-fi re violations. METF 

members prepared a draft, checked its judgmental 

portions with Lehman and Hoskinson, and had it 

delivered to the Ambassador in New York. TF 

members then briefed the assessment to DCI Colby, 

who passed it along orally to General Scowcroft at 

the White House, for Kissinger.

SUNDAY, 28 OCTOBER

OBGI is in the fi nal stages of drafting the memo 

on possible cease-fi re or settlement lines, which 

is due by 1600 on Sunday. OCI and OSR analysts 

went over the text and cleared it as is. Final memo 

was reproduced and collated in 25 copies for 

delivery to DDI Proctor at 0600 the next morning.

WEDNESDAY, 31 OCTOBER

Analysts and cartographers from OCI and OBGI 

worked through the day on Jordan-West Bank 

settlement proposals memo, which was delivered 

by the end of the day to Hoskinson for transmittal to 

Hal Saunders at NSC. Word came down that SITREPS 

would be required throughout Secretary Kissinger’s 

trip, which means the METF will continue at least 

two more weekends. The METF will also have to 

produce an abbreviated cable version to match 

Kissinger’s schedule.

The METF started to wind down in November as 

the focus shifted to monitoring the cease-fi re and 

getting an agreement 

signed between Israel 

and Egypt. SITREPs 

continued on a 

reduced schedule into 

November and the TF 

continued to operate, although on a reduced schedule. 

President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger recognized 

the outstanding work of the TF at the end of the 

17 October WSAG meeting, when the President called 

the principals to the Cabinet Room to express his 

appreciation for the excellent work which had been 

done in this crisis period. Secretary Kissinger also 

conveyed his appreciation, saying that the teamwork 

and effectiveness in this crisis was the best of any he 

had experienced. Despite the fact that the CIA had 

been criticized for getting it wrong in the months prior 

to the outbreak of hostilities, the work of the Agency 

during the crisis was seen as excellent, largely 

because of the work of the Middle East Task Force.

The METF started to wind down in November as 

the focus shifted to monitoring the cease-fi re 

and getting an agreement signed between 

Israel and Egypt.
34 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

OCTOBER 07

OCTOBER 07 OCTOBER 06

OCTOBER 06

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR TIMELINE

SEPTEMBER 13–NOVEMBER 16, 1973

SEPTEMBER 13 

Israel reportedly shoots 

down 13 Syrian jets 

in an air battle over 

the Mediterranean 

near Latakiya.

OCTOBER 03

Moscow gives orders to 

evacuate dependents 

in Egypt.

OCTOBER 06 

At around 1400 local, 

Egyptians and Syrians 

launch simultaneous 

attacks along the 

Suez Canal and Golan 

Heights.

Israeli Defense Forces 

begin to mobilize its 

forces at 1200 local.

Egyptians bridge the 

Suez Canal at 2 locations 

and were still putting 

forces across the canal 

at 1915 local.

SEPTEMBER 28

Two Arabs seize three 

Jews and an Austrian 

offi cial from a train 

carrying Soviet Jews 

emigrating to Israel. 

The hostages were taken 

to Vienna airport and 

later released after the 

Austrian government 

agreed to close transit 

facilities for Jewish 

emigrants.

OCTOBER 07

Syrian forces capture 

most of the southern 

portion of the Golan 

Heights. Syrians have 

3 infantry and 1 armored 

division on Golan 

Heights.

Egyptians move 400-500 

tanks east of the Suez 

Canal.

Israeli Defense Forces 

report that Israeli 

aircraft destroy 9 of the 

11 pontoon bridges.

Egypt demands that 

the United Nations 

Truce Supervisory 

Organization withdraw 

all observers from posts 

along the canal. There 

are 18 posts in total, 9 on 

the Egyptian side, 9 on 

the Israeli side.

09.13

10.06

10.07

10.07

10.06

SEPTEMBER 1973 OCTOBER 1973 OCTOBER 1973
35

OCTOBER 08

Israel launches its fi rst counterattack against Syria. 

450 sorties were fl own by the Israeli Air Force, and an 

estimated 300,000 soldiers were scheduled to be fully 

mobilized by noon this day. 

Israel regains most of the territory it lost to Syria in the 

Golan Heights.

Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov in Cairo announces 

that Moscow would deliver whatever was necessary 

for the resupply of Egyptian forces. 

Israel launches an air raid on Damascus; the attack 

struck the Soviet cultural mission in Damascus.

Egyptians are contained to a narrow area along the 

east bank of the Suez Canal.

The Syrian army re-occupies Qunaytirah, a regional 

capital in the Southern Golan captured by the Israelis 

in the 1967 war.

OCTOBER 10 

Washington authorizes 

an airlift of military 

supplies to Israel after 

the Soviet Union sends 

additional arms to 

Egypt. Israel recaptures 

most of the territory in 

southern Golan.

OCTOBER 12 

Heavy fi ghting on the Golan Heights dies down with 

Israeli forces about 12 miles beyond the cease-fi re line, 

however the forces are unable to achieve a decisive 

breakthrough on the road to Damascus.

OCTOBER 13

Jordan announces that its troops were fi ghting on the 

Syrian front.

OCTOBER 14 

In one of the largest tank battles ever fought, Israelis 

report over 200 Egyptian tanks destroyed and over 

400 enemy troops captured. Egyptians announce 150 

Israeli tanks and 24 aircraft destroyed.

10.08

10.08

10.08

10.08

10.10

10.14

10.12
36 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

OCTOBER 19

President Nixon formally 

requests from Congress 

$2.2 billion in aid for 

Israel.

OCTOBER 20

Saudi Arabia’s King 

Faisal announces an 

embargo of oil to the 

United States.

OCTOBER 20-21

Israeli forces reach 

within 10 miles of 

Damascus. Israeli 

forces encircle Egypt’s 

Third Army.

OCTOBER 22

Israel overtakes Syrian 

positions on Mt. Hermon

The United Nations 

Security Council calls for 

a cease-fi re.

OCTOBER 15 

Single Jordanian brigade 

is known to be in Syria, 

confi rming Jordan’s entry 

in the confl ict. 

OCTOBER 15-16

Between sunset and 

sunrise, Israeli forces 

successfully crossed the 

canal into Egypt proper.

OCTOBER 15-17

Heavy fi ghting at 

‘Chinese Farm.’ “So 

severe was the fi ghting 

and so great the losses, 

the Israelis were still 

clearing the wreckage 

three weeks after the 

cease-fi re.” 

OCTOBER 16

Israeli General Sharon 

establishes beachhead 

on Western Bank of the 

Suez. 

All of the major pipeline 

terminals in the eastern 

Mediterranean are 

closed, resulting in a 

loss of 2 million barrels 

of crude oil a day to 

Western Europe.

OCTOBER 17 

OAPEC announces 

decision to cut oil 

production by not less 

than 5% until Arab 

military and political 

demands are met.

State Department 

announces U.S. resupply 

efforts to Israel.

President Nixon hosts 

Arab foreign ministers 

from Algeria, Kuwait, 

Morocco, and Kuwait 

in Washington.

Tank battles continue 

and are characterized 

by Israeli General 

Michael Herzog as “the 

biggest armored clash in 

our military history.”

10.15

10.15

10.17

10.17

10.20

10.20

10.16

OCTOBER 1973
37

OCTOBER 23

Fighting continues 

despite cease-fi re. The 

UN Security Council 

restates the cease-fi re 

and calls for the dispatch 

of UN observers to 

the region.

OCTOBER 24

Fighting continues 

between Israel and 

Egypt. As a result, the 

Soviet Union threatens 

to send troops to support 

the Egyptians. The US 

puts its nuclear forces on 

alert (DEFCON III).

OCTOBER 28

Israeli and Egyptian military leaders meet at 

Kilometer 101 to implement a cease-fi re. It is the 

fi rst meeting between military representatives of 

the two countries in 25 years.

Israel agrees to permit delivery of non-military 

supplies to Egypt’s 3rd Army.

OCTOBER 29

The United Nations reaches Egyptian 3rd Army.

OCTOBER 30

Moshe Dayan announces agreement for POW 

exchange and to allow Egyptian 3rd Army to evacuate 

its wounded.

NOVEMBER 5

Arab oil producers 

announce a 25% cut in 

total oil production and 

threaten to cut an 

additional 5% a month 

until Israel withdraws 

from territory it captured 

in the 1967 war.

NOVEMBER 9

Secretary of State 

Henry Kissinger visits the 

Middle East.

Secretary of State Henry 

Kissinger announces 

cease-fi re plan; Egypt 

shoots down Israeli 

aircraft.

NOVEMBER 11

Israelis and Egyptians 

sign a cease-fi re agreement at Kilometer 101.

NOVEMBER 15-16

POWs are repatriated.

10.28

10.28

10.29

10.30

11.09

11.11

11.15

NOVEMBER 1973
38 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR
39

COLLECTION HIGHLIGHTS
40 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Israeli Thinking on a Peace Settlement with 

the Arabs. 1 December 1972. 31 pages.“Most 

Israelis, however, do not believe 1) that the 

Arabs are ready or really willing to make formal 

peace with Israel and 2) that even if willing, the 

Arab states would be able to swallow Israel’s 

considerable requirements for what Tel Aviv 

calls a ‘real peace.’”

The CIA Draft on Israeli Thinking on a Peace 

Settlement with the Arabs. 4 December 1972. 

1 page. “The CIA draft...is a competent but 

unexciting piece of work.... Having just read 

the paper, I cannot now think of anything I 

learned in it, and I am far from being an expert 

on Israel.... Perhaps it is asking too much of 

an analyst, but I would like to see a bit more 

speculation and construction of some alternative 

courses of action that the Israelis might take.”

Comments on the Egyptian Government Message of 1 February 1973. 1 February 1973. 

3 pages. “Egyptian Presidential Advisor Hafi z 

Ismail’s message...refl ects more clearly...on the 

subject of secret US-Egyptian talks the paranoia 

and cynicism of the Egyptian leadership regarding the sincerity and good intentions of the US 

Government with respect to the terms of a ‘just’ 

settlement of the Arab-Israeli confl ict. The Egyptians fi nd themselves torn between their hopes 

and their fears as they approach the hard, cold 

reality of negotiations on the basic problem that 

is eroding their political viability.”

Cable to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Washington, 

from Amb. Richard Helms, Tehran. Subject: 

Persian Gulf. 31 March 1973. 23 pages. An 

assessment of the stability of the Gulf countries, 

Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, based on the 

travels of an offi cer, “whose full-time activity will be devoted to travel plus day-to-day 

analysis of developments in the region.... This 

offi cer has just completed his fi rst trip through 

the Gulf area at my behest. We have discussed 

his fi ndings and have reached agreement on the 

assessment which follows. We have also made 

certain minor suggestions for action, ones that 

can readily be passed along through the NSC 

machinery.”

Cable to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Washington, 

from Amb. Richard Helms, Tehran. Subject: 

Egyptian Plea for US Mediation. 2 pages. 

6 April 1973. “According to Shah Zayyat said 

quote Egypt will accept the Rogers plan unquote. When Shah queried foreign minister as 

to why he was so concerned about settlement, 

Zayyat asserted that Sadat is in precarious 

domestic situation and that new leaders might 

take over Egyptian army at almost any time. 

Asked by Shah who these leaders might be, 

Zayyat hemmed and hawed, fi nally said quote 

Muslim Brotherhood unquote. Shah interpreted 

this to mean radical elements but admits Zayyat 

did not specifi cally say so. Nevertheless Shah 

was struck with Zayyat’s pleading tone.”

Israeli Raid on Lebanon: USSR Sees Terror as 

Hampering Peaceful Mideast Settlement and 

PRC Charges ‘Superpowers’ Aid Israeli with 

Weapons, Manpower. 18 April 1973. 5 pages. 

“Our current assessment of the Egyptian-Israeli 

military situation remains that we do not 

believe that an outbreak of fi ghting along the 

Suez Canal imminent. For some time, Sadat has 

followed a two-track approach of talking tough 

as a tactic to buttress his negotiating position 

and to keep up his image in the Arab world, 

while at the same time remaining prepared to 

search for a negotiated settlement. He may have 

begun to take his own talk more seriously, but 

we do not think he is at the point of decision on 

a military move against Israel.”

Egyptian Strategy (Intelligence Précis). 

Memorandum for the President from Henry A. 

Kissinger. Subject: Information Items. 1 May 

1973. 1 page. “Egyptian strategy during the 

recent UN Security Council debate on Israel’s 

Beirut raid provides one more indication of 

President Sadat’s intentions. Egyptian Foreign 

Minister Zayyat initially took a very hard line 

that would have forced us to veto the proposed 

resolution. At the last moment, however, the 

Egyptian tactics shifted...perhaps also as a 

signal to us that a full-scale confrontation 

was not desired at this point.... The Egyptian 

strategy suggests that President Sadat may 

want to see pressure on the US build steadily 

over a sustained period rather than to provide 

a confrontation prematurely.... Some military 
41

preparations have already begun, but as yet no 

one here sees a pattern of planning for a specifi c 

operation at a specifi c time. Although it does not 

now appear that Sadat has made a fi nal decision 

on his future strategy, he is clearly engaged in 

an effort to convince others that he has a realistic 

military option.”

Memorandum for Mr. Henry A. Kissinger from 

the Director of Central Intelligence, James R. 

Schlesinger. Subject: Soviet Anti-US 

Campaign in the Middle East. 2 May 1973. 

3 pages.“Although the Soviets have long maintained an overt policy against terrorism, we now 

believe they are covertly inciting hostility against 

US interests and personnel in the Arab world...

We are unable to determine the extent to which 

these Soviet covert activities have high level 

approval in the Kremlin. On the surface at least, 

their timing would seem inopportune in view 

of the forthcoming summit talks....”

President’s Thursday Briefing. 2 May 1973. 

2 pages. “Lebanese army elements and Fedayeen 

clashed at refugee camp sites at the rim of Beirut 

yesterday....The current clashes have followed 

renewed Lebanese army efforts...to crack down

on the Fedayeen in the wake [of] tensions 

following the recent Israeli raid against Beirut....

The question at this time remains whether 

the Fedayeen will choose to provoke full-scale 

confrontation....”

Assessment of Indications of Hostilities 

between the Arab States and Israel. 5 May 

1973. 7 pages. Includes cover memo from 

Director of Central Intelligence James R. 

Schlesinger to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger. “The 

pattern of Arab activity does not suggest 

that an outbreak of hostilities is likely before 

the UN debate on the Middle East in late May, 

and we doubt that Sadat will decide to try a major 

operation within the next six weeks. The moves 

that the Arabs have made, taken collectively, 

have the objective at this time of bringing 

maximum psychological pressure on the US and 

Israel. There is a danger that these moves will in 

the future develop some momentum of their own.”

Soviet Policy in the Middle East. 8 May 1973. 

12 pages. “There are serious problems for the 

Soviet in either war or peace in the area. War 

would require the choice of becoming directly 

involved and risking confrontation with the 

US, or staying out and seeing Israeli military 

superiority, which Moscow clearly recognizes, 

lead to another defeat for the Arabs. Peace 

would weaken a major reason for the Soviet 

presence, and the Arabs might give credit for 

its achievement to the US.”

DCI WSAG Briefing. Lebanon and the Middle 

East: The Prospects. 14 May 1973. 11 pages.

Talking points prepared for the DCI for the 

WSAG meeting. Topics include President 

Franjiyah’s options in the confl ict, the growing 

pressure for President Sadat to avoid hostilities, 

Egyptian military capabilities if Egypt opens 

hostilities, and how Israeli offi cials are responding to Egyptian threats to armed confl ict.

Views (Redacted) on the Probability that 

Egyptian President Sadat Seriously is 

Considering Launching Hostilities against 

Israel. CIA Intelligence Report. 14 May 1973. 

3 pages. “Knowledgeable Egyptian observers, 

contrary to views expressed for some time in the 

past that Egyptian President Sadat was bluffi ng 

in his threats to launch an offensive against 

Israel, now believe that Sadat is serious and 

that to consider that he is bluffi ng is unrealistic 

and naïve. This change in opinion is based on 

positive indications throughout the country that 

Sadat is making an all-out effort to complete all 

preparations both in the military and civilian 

efforts to reach the “appropriate” level of military preparedness.”

Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger from Harold 

H. Saunders and Richard T. Kennedy. Subject: 

WSAG Meeting on Lebanon and the Middle 

East Hostilities—Tuesday, May 15. 14 May 

1973. 29 pages. “The purposes of this meeting 

are: 1) to discuss in the context of general US 

contingency planning whether and how we 

should answer the Lebanese question about 

what the US would do if Syria intervenes in the 

present confrontation with the Fedayeen and 2) 

to assure that contingency planning on the possibility of a resumption of general hostilities in 

the Middle East is being actively updated.... The 

papers in this book are as follows: Tab I: Talking 
42 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

decided to resume hostilities. The latest offi cial 

Israeli estimate is that the probability is low and 

that his maneuvers are to support his and the 

Arab political position.”

Possible Egyptian-Israeli Hostilities: 

Determinants and Implications. National 

Intelligence Estimate. NIE 30-73. 17 May 1973. 

10 pages. “Believing that perpetuation of the 

present Middle Eastern situation is intolerable 

for himself and for Egypt; Sadat is pressing 

ahead with his campaign of threats in the hope 

of inspiring US pressure on Israel. This could, 

over time, get out of control. But substantial 

Egyptian-Israel hostilities appear unlikely in the 

next few weeks. The danger probably will rise if 

Middle East debates in the UN Security Council 

(early June) and the Nixon-Brezhnev summit (late 

June) pass without any results Sadat considers 

useful. The US and the USSR have some, but 

limited, leverage in the situation.”

President’s Monday Briefing. Israeli Reaction 

to F-4s to Saudi Arabia. 26 May 1973. 1 page. 

“Foreign Minister Eban...has informed the State 

Department that Israel is ‘all out’ against these 

sales....We can anticipate that the Israelis will 

argue that we will seem to be yielding to Arab 

oil pressures and will thereby encourage Arab 

feeling that such pressure offers an alternative 

to negotiating with Israel; that pending Israeli 

arms requests must be dealt with immediately; 

and that Israeli willingness to cooperate with the 

Administration on most-favored-nation treatment 

for the Soviet Union might be reconsidered.”

Memorandum to the Acting Secretary from INR, 

Ray S. Cline. Growing Risk of Egyptian Resumption of Hostilities with Israel. 31 May 1973. 

5 pages. “A recent National Intelligence Estimate 

30-73...concludes that ‘substantial EgyptianIsrael hostilities appear unlikely in the next few 

weeks’.... INR is inclined to state the case on the 

risk of hostilities for a political purpose with a 

little more urgency. If the UN debate of next week 

produces no convincing movement in the IsraeliEgyptian impasse, our view is that the resumption of hostilities by autumn will become a better 

than even bet, and that there is even a slight 

chance that Cairo may precipitate events before 

or during the June 18 Nixon-Brezhnev summit.”

points Tab II: Papers on the Lebanon Crisis Tab 

III: A paper describing present contingency 

plans for resumption of general hostilities...and 

contingency planning that should be done now.”

Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger from Harold H. 

Saunders. Subject: WSAG Meeting on Med East 

Tensions. 15 May 1973. 8 pages. “Probability 

is low that Sadat intends to renew hostilities as 

he realizes the severe consequences. Moreover, 

Sadat doesn’t really want to break the deadlock 

by force. He wants instead to bolster his own 

position (which renewal of fi ghting would 

defeat).”

President’s Wednesday Briefing. Haykal and 

Sadat on the Middle East Conflict. 15 May 

1973. 1 page. Note: Mohamed Hassanein 

Haykal [Heikal] was serving as editor-in-chief of 

Al-Ahram, Egypt’s most widely circulated daily. 

“After a lengthy period during which Haykal 

has written (only) on other topics or been silent, 

this week he returned to the Arab-Israeli problem...he does strike several noteworthy themes: 

The use of armed force must be backed by a 

strong domestic Arab front.... The Arab world 

continues to be divided and Arab leaders have 

not recognized important changes in the international system.... The focus of interest in the 

Middle East is shifting from the Suez Canal to 

the Persian Gulf.... In this new situation, the use 

of armed force is limited and should be seen as 

a last resort.... Haykal concludes by saying that 

on the Suez Canal there can be fi ghting...but it 

is in the Gulf that the real war will be waged...

Haykal is warning his readers not to believe 

that another round of the war of attrition can 

help Egypt. Instead, Egypt must develop a 

long-term strategy to mobilize the Arab world 

to use its unparalleled oil resources and fi nancial reserves to bring about a change in the 

current situation.”

President’s Wednesday Briefing. Inter-Arab Military Movements. 16 May 1973. 1 page. “The 

current assessment of these moves is as follows: 

1) They do not threaten Israel’s superiority.... At 

a minimum, however, CIA believes they could 

make it more diffi cult for Israel to prevent some 

air attacks....There is inconclusive evidence 

on the issue of whether President Sadat has 
43

taking a turn for the worse everywhere unquote....My point is that it behooves us to be 

more responsive to events in the area...and to 

be quicker and more fl exible in our response. 

An examination of just what American policy 

is achieving in the Arab part of the Gulf area 

might be interesting....”

Syria’s Middle East Role. National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum. 24 August 

1973. 4 pages. “Syria is no longer the erratic, 

coup-prone cockpit of inter-Arab politics that it 

was in the 1950s and the early 1960s. Multiple 

upheavals have helped to produce, and to 

mask, a thoroughgoing revolution in national 

institutions and attitudes. The new pattern 

that has developed in the past decade appears to have a number of durable elements.”

Demographic Aspects of the Arab-Israeli 

Dispute. Intelligence Memorandum. 

24 August 1973. 18 pages. “Since the 1967 

war a new problem has arisen; i.e., the 

demographic threat posed by Arabs living 

inside the cease-fi re lines. The threat stems 

from Israel’s control of about 1.5 million Arabs, 

those in occupied territories and in pre-war 

Israel itself, and from the almost inexorable 

intertwining of the two areas. In the future, the 

Arab population is apt to grow more rapidly 

than the Jewish population.... In absence of 

a peace settlement with the Arabs, a kind of 

territorial imperative operates in Tel Aviv. This 

being so, Jewish control inside the cease-fi re 

lines will come to depend more and more on 

either denying the Arabs political rights or 

goading them into leaving.”

The Arab-Israeli Handbook. Interagency 

Intelligence Memorandum. September 1973. 

184 pages. I. Political Situation and Developments, II. Military Situation, III. Advanced 

Weapons Development, Supplement: I. 

Military Aid from Communist Countries, II. 

Transportation and Production, III. The Soviet 

Mediterranean Squadron. Includes 7 tables 

and 16 maps. Glossary: Performance of 

Selected Arab and Israeli Military Equipment.

The Status of Soviet Relations with Egypt and 

the Palestinians. Intelligence Memorandum. 

June 1973. 6 pages. “The Soviets have tried 

but failed to convince the Palestinians to unify 

because it is more effective, to reject terrorism 

because it is counterproductive, or to discard 

their hopes of liquidating Israel because it is 

unrealistic. Meanwhile, Egyptian bitterness over 

repeated Soviet refusals to supply the type of 

military and diplomatic support it wants lingers 

on, as does disenchantment in Moscow over the 

lack of gratitude exhibited by its number-one 

aid recipient.”

Problems in the Persian Gulf. National Intelligence Estimate. NIE 30-1-73. 7 June 1973. 

30 pages. “The already great importance of 

the Persian Gulf region as a source of oil for the 

industrial world is certain to grow.... This paper 

assesses local pressure for change, the interests 

and actions of forces from outside the Gulf, the 

aims and policies of the USSR, the consequences 

of the large Gulf states’ efforts to fi ll the vacancy 

left by the end of the British protectorate, and 

likely developments over the next few years 

fl owing from the interaction of these elements. 

Finally, it assesses the implications for the US.”

Cable to Henry A. Kissinger, White House, from 

Ambassador Helms, Tehran. 7 July 1973. 

8 pages. “As Soviet arms pour into Syria and 

Iraq, Hussein has learned from his intelligence 

service that an attack for purpose of retaking Golan Heights was originally planned for 

June, has obviously slipped, but could occur at 

any time from now on. Jordanians have copy of 

actual military plan which has been coordinated 

with Egyptians.... It has also been coordinated 

with Iraq in the process of secret military talks 

between the two countries.... Of course, foregoing may be exaggerated, attack may never 

come, Syria may content herself with pressuring 

Lebanon on Fedayeen issue and leave Golan 

Heights alone....These thoughts are passed 

along to help keep the President and you up-todate on the mood hereabouts. It is easy to be a 

Cassandra. On the other hand it is equally easy 

to be lulled by up-beat reports and promises of 

action. One must clearly pay attention to the 

concerns of experienced leaders like the Shah 

and Hussein who see the Arab countries quote 
44 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Completed Deployment of Syrian Units for 

Assault Upon Israel. CIA Intelligence Report. 

29 September 1973. 5 pages. “Previous reports 

(redaction) have described details of a Syrian 

plan for a massive assault upon Israel involving 

at least four Syrian divisions.... All Syrian Army 

units are expected to be in position by the end of 

September.”

Syrian Military Intentions. Memorandum to the 

Secretary from INR, Ray S. Cline. 30 September 

1973. 2 pages. “There are reports that Syria is 

preparing for an attack on Israel, but conclusive 

evidence is lacking. In our view, the political 

climate in the Arab states argues against a 

major Syrian military move against Israel at this 

time. The possibility of a more limited Syrian 

strike—perhaps one designed to retaliate for 

the pounding the Syrian Air Force took from the 

Israelis on September 13—cannot, of course, be 

excluded. On September 26, during a visit to 

Israeli positions on the Golan Heights, Defense 

Minister Dayan stated, according to a Jerusalem 

broadcast, that Syria had massed hundreds of 

tanks and artillery pieces just beyond the Israeli 

lines in the area.”

CIA Assessment of Purported Syrian Military 

Preparations. Memorandum for the Secretary 

of State. 30 September 1973. 2 pages. “

A unilateral Syrian attack for the purpose of 

retaking and holding the Golan Heights has 

no hope of success. The defeat and destruction of the forces earmarked for the operation 

would cripple the Syrian Army, and would have 

profound consequences for the cautious and 

pragmatic President Asad.”

Syrian Military Movements toward Syrian-Israeli 

Cease-fire Line. CIA Intelligence Report. 

1 October 1973. 5 pages. “On 22 September 

1973, larger numbers of Syrian armored and 

artillery units were observed moving in the 

direction of the Israeli-Syrian cease-fi re line. 

The Syrian armor was positively identifi ed as 

Soviet T-62 tanks.... The Syrian public generally 

believes that the Syrian army may be getting 

ready to launch some sort of attack against 

Israeli positions in the Golan Heights in reprisal 

for the loss of 13 Syrian aircraft in the early 

September air battle.”

Memorandum for [Redacted] from William B. 

Quandt. Subject: Critique of Studies on Syria 

and Iraq. 13 September 1973. 4 pages. 

“Turning more precisely to these two studies, 

my overall judgment is that the NIAM on Syria

is quite well done, provides just about the 

amount of detail needed for background, gives 

some sense of political dynamics, but is overly 

cautious in speculating about future directions 

in Syrian policy. By contrast, I found the study on 

Iraq to be virtually worthless, containing little 

useful information, no sense of how the political 

system functions, and an excessive amount of 

concern with issues that are not necessarily 

central to Iraqi political life.”

Memorandum. The Cairo Summit and its 

Repercussions. 20 September 1973. 5 pages. 

“This memorandum will address the questions 

of a) what the reconciliation does to, or for, 

Sadat’s negotiating base, and b) how it will 

affect the Palestinians. Neither question can 

be considered in isolation from the other; the 

Palestinians’ situation, and Sadat’s attitude 

toward them, are major elements in the strength 

or weakness of his negotiating position. Even 

more important for Sadat’s negotiating position, 

of course, are the Israeli perception of what has 

occurred and Tel Aviv’s response. So far, this last 

has been negative.”

New Policy Directions in Egypt. Intelligence 

Memorandum. 25 September 1973. 10 pages. 

“Egypt is currently reorienting its approach to 

both domestic and international issues and 

enunciating a new ‘philosophy’ for President Sadat’s government. Basic Egyptian goals remain 

the same: domestically, to alleviate the severe 

economic diffi culties that plague the country 

and cause chronic discontent; internationally, to 

regain Egyptian territory from Israeli occupation. But Sadat is experimenting seriously with 

new or newly resurrected means to these ends.... 

Much of his effort will be fruitless. Many of his 

moves evoke a sense of déjà vu.... But a new set 

of circumstances both at home and abroad surrounds this latest effort, gives it a new impetus 

and seriousness of purpose, and offers it some 

hope of success.”
45

Arab-Israeli Hostilities and their Implications. 

Special National Intelligence Estimate. SNIE 

35/36-73. 6 October 1973. 32 pages. 

“Heavy fi ghting is almost certain to be short in 

duration—no more than a week. Neither side is 

logistically prepared for lengthy hostilities. 

The Israelis have the strength to blunt the 

Syrian offensive capability within a few days 

and, as quickly, to push the Egyptians back 

across the canal. Fighting on lesser scale, say 

an artillery duel across the canal, however, 

could be more prolonged.”

Soviet Policies in the Event of Imminent 

Egyptian Collapse. Intelligence Memorandum. 

6 October 1973. 8 pages. “For purposes of this 

paper, it is assumed that Egyptian forces face 

imminent and perhaps catastrophic defeat and 

that the ability of the Egyptian state to survive 

the defeat (and further Israeli military actions) 

is questionable. Soviet military options in the 

circumstances described are severely limited. 

Neither time nor resources will allow Moscow to 

infl uence decisively the course of the battle now 

being waged on both sides of the Suez....”

Washington Special Actions Group Meeting. 

Subject: Middle East. Summary of Conclusions. 

7:22 pm-8:27 pm. 6 October 1973. 16 pages. 

“Mr. Kissinger: ‘Yes, but Israel won’t accept it 

until the Egyptians and Syrians are thrown 

out. We’ll have the situation where a Security 

Council resolution will be used against the 

victim. This will teach aggressors that they can 

launch an attack, then call for a Security Council resolution for a cease-fi re and, if it is not 

accepted, call for its use against the victim. This 

makes the UN a completely cynical exercise. 

The Israelis will go to an all-out attack, get a 

ceasefi re resolution drafted, grab as much territory as they can, then accept the ceasefi re. If the 

Arabs were not demented, they will realize that 

in the long term, and I mean by Wednesday—If 

we can go in with a ceasefi re resolution which 

Israel can accept, then we could use it against 

Israel if necessary. And the Soviets won’t get the 

credit for stopping the fi ghting.’”

Judgment (Redaction) that Syrian Military 

Preparations are Defensive in Nature. CIA 

Intelligence Report. 3 October 1973. 3 pages.

“In his opinion, recently reported Syrian 

preparation on their front lines with Israel are 

defensive as opposed to offensive in nature.... 

The Syrian offi cer expressed serious fears of an 

Israeli attack into Syria.... But because of Syrian 

fears of an Israeli attack, this year the Syrians 

are sending their units to the front line, secretly 

if possible, and to tactically appropriate defensive positions. In other words, the Syrian offi cer 

stated, we are “massing” because of our fears.”

Combined Watch Report of the United States 

Intelligence Board. 4 October 1973. 1 page.

“We continue to believe that an outbreak of 

major Arab-Israeli hostilities remains unlikely 

for the immediate future, although the risk of 

localized fi ghting has increased slightly as the 

result of the buildup of Syrian forces in the vicinity of the Golan Heights. Egyptian exercise activity under way since late September may also 

contribute to the possibility of incidents.”

Israel-Egypt-Syria. Central Intelligence Bulletin. 

6 October 1973. 3 pages. “Both the Israelis 

and the Arabs are becoming increasingly concerned about the military activities of the other, 

although neither side appears to be bent on 

initiating hostilities.... Exercise and alert activities in Egypt are continuing, but elements of 

the air force and navy appear to be conducting 

normal training activity... A build-up of tanks 

and artillery along the Suez Canal, this cannot 

be confi rmed.... For Egypt, a military initiative 

makes little sense at this critical juncture of 

President Sadat’s reorientation of domestic and 

foreign policies.... For the normally cautious 

Syrian President, a military adventure now 

would be suicidal.”

Initiation of Middle East Hostilities. Memorandum from CIA Middle East Task Force. 

6 October 1973. 1000 EDT. 1 page. “The earliest 

confi rmed military activity (redacted) so far was 

a high-speed Israeli serial reconnaissance mission at 0654Z (0254 EDT, 0854 Cairo time) along the 

Suez Canal. The fl ight terminated at 0732Z.... The 

Egyptian naval command center at Alexandria 

ordered a ‘fi rst state of readiness’ at 1351 (1151Z).”
46 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Intelligence Estimate. Memorandum to Henry 

Kissinger from Brent Scowcroft. 8 October 1973. 

2 pages. “CIA and Defense have prepared an 

estimate...of how they see the current situation 

evolving over the short-term future. In short, 

they envisage heavy fi ghting over the next 2-3 

days as the Israelis turn the tide on both fronts, 

followed possibly by several days of mopping-up 

operations.”

UN: The Middle East. 8 October 1973. 2 pages. 

“There appears little chance for UN action on 

Middle East hostilities until ground positions 

are solidifi ed. The Security Council has thus far 

been unable to issue any cease-fi re call—either 

in formal resolution or in an appeal from its president—for lack of agreement on where cease-fi re 

lines should be drawn. Any proposal calling for 

a return to the positions of October 6 would be 

countered by a Soviet and non-aligned proposal 

for cease-fi re at the pre-June lines—either proposal would likely be vetoed.”

Highlights of the Middle East Situation. DCI 

Congressional Briefing. 10 October 1973. 

9 pages. “The Egyptians have established their 

force fi rmly on the eastern bank of the Suez 

Canal, forcing an Israeli admission that their 

ground forces have been unable to push them 

back. In the Golan Heights, despite heavy fi ghting, the Israelis have been unable to push the 

Syrians back beyond the 1967 cease-fi re line, and 

they admit that they have not broken the Syrian 

army. The ground is still contested however, and 

no clear-cut advantage is evident for either side.”

Noon Notes. Memorandum for the Secretary 

from the Situation Room. 11 October 1973. 

4 pages. “Israeli ground forces with strong air 

support continue to make some progress against 

Syrian forces in the Golan Heights area.... The 

Egyptians may be planning an amphibious 

attack on the Sinai coast south of Suez City to 

link up with armored units advancing from the 

north.... King Hussein’s desire to make a contribution to protecting the Syrian Army’s fl ank is 

refl ected in the redeployment of the 3rd Armored 

Division along his northern border.... Large 

elements of the Iraqi Army are reported to 

be deploying from their home garrisons to 

unknown destinations.”

Situation Report. Memorandum for Secretary 

Kissinger from Brent Scowcroft. 7 October 

1973. 8 a.m. 2 pages. “Fighting continued 

through the night on both fronts with the main 

new element being a broadened Israeli effort 

to stem Syrian and Egyptian gains early this 

morning; the Israelis also appear to be in an 

all-out counter-offensive however and the latest 

Defense attaché report from Israel (attached) 

indicates that, in fact, the Israelis are 

experiencing diffi culties.”

Cable to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, White House, 

from Amb. Helms, Tehran. 7 October 1973. 

2136Z. 3 pages. “Prime Minister Hoveyda, at 

Shah’s instruction, summoned me at 2315 local to 

read me cable to Shah from President Sadat.... 

Cable requests Shah to inform President Nixon 

that Egypt until now... has been ready to accept 

peace under certain conditions.... Sadat wants 

President Nixon to know that if Israel will evacuate all the territories occupied since June 5, 1967, 

Egypt will be ready to negotiate sincerely to 

place these territories under the control of the 

United Nations, or under the control of the four 

big powers, or under some other international 

control to be agreed. As for Sharm Al Sheikh, 

Egypt is prepared to accept international supervision of freedom of navigation through Gulf of 

Aqaba after Israeli withdrawal....Since Sadat 

offer set forth above struck me as somewhat improbable, I asked Hoveyda and his bilingual assistant to translate the cable for me three times.”

Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Next Several Days. Paper prepared jointly by CIA and DIA. 8 October 

1973. 15 pages. “The immediate objective of 

the Israelis has been to contain the attacking 

Arab forces while mobilizing their reserves. At 

the time the Syrians and the Egyptians launched 

their offensives, the Israelis were only a few 

hours into mobilization.... The outlook for the 

next few days is one of heavy fi ghting on all 

fronts. With the full weight of their forces behind 

them, the Israelis should now be able to turn the 

situation around on the Golan Heights by nightfall Tuesday. Pressing the offensive against the 

Syrians might take another day or two.”
47

peace settlement, saying that new conditions now 

exist in the Middle East in which the United States 

can use its infl uence to get negotiations off dead center, leading to a just and equitable peace. He stressed 

that the principles governing a settlement should be 

those of Resolution 242, to which the United States 

is fully committed. The implementation of these 

principles will require talk and negotiations. Neither 

side can afford to take an all-or-nothing stance.”

Moscow and the Middle East. 19 October 1973. 

6 pages. “Kosygin’s just-completed trip to Cairo 

is a mark of the high-stakes Moscow has in the 

Middle East war. It is not merely a matter of whether 

US or Soviet clients come out ahead on the battlefi eld.... The Soviets must consider what impact the 

war and their reaction to it will have on détente. 

Furthermore, they must consider not only how the US 

administration will feel about détente when the war 

is over, but how the US public and Congress will feel 

about it.”

The Middle East War, Brezhnev’s Position, and 

Détente. Memo. 19 October 1973. 10 pages. 

“The outbreak of war in the Middle East poses 

problems to the USSR so serious and immediate 

that the Soviet leaders probably are taking their 

current decisions in a fully collective fashion.”

The Arab Oil Cutback and Higher Prices: 

Implications and Reactions. 19 October 1973. 

19 pages. “Clearly such a production cutback, if it 

persisted for a number of months, would require 

some belt tightening. But the analysis shows that 

by moderate belt tightening and drawing down 

existing stocks of petroleum, we can avoid a 

serious crisis this winter.”

The Middle East War. Weekly Review. 19 October 

1973. 10 pages. “The continued strong showing

of Arab military forces has, at least for now, greatly 

strengthened President Sadat’s political position 

in Egypt and the Arab world generally. The fact 

that he launched a war marked by successes 

rather than immediate defeat has gained him 

respect and popularity that he never knew before. 

Even some of his former critics now acknowledge 

that he is a worth leader. The Egyptians have not 

yet suffered much from the fi ghting, and this has 

contributed to their new confi dence and pride in 

themselves and their leader.”

Reactions to Resupply of Israel by the US. 

14 October 1973. 12 pages. “Most of the Arab 

states are already committed, by public and private statement, to action hostile to US interests 

if the US undertakes to resupply Israel. The Arab 

oil producers in particular consider themselves 

committed to some form of ‘coordinated’ action 

against US interests....The Arab oil producers 

are currently discussing this possibility.... The 

intensity of the reactions could vary, depending 

on the visibility and magnitude of the resupply process, and on what kind of equipment 

is involved. The F-4 Phantom specifi cally has 

become in Arab eyes a symbol of technological 

superiority of the Israeli military; visible resupply of this aircraft would produce a maximum 

reaction.”

DCI Briefing for 15 October WSAG Meeting. 15 

October 1973. 8 pages. “Both sides admit that 

there was a major battle in the Sinai yesterday, 

but the results appear inconclusive. In addition, 

the Israelis claim to have made a naval attack 

last night on the Egyptian port of Ras Gharib—

an alleged commando staging area—in the 

southern Gulf of Suez. This was no doubt an 

effort to forestall any Egyptian landings in the 

southern Sinai.”

Moscow and the Coming of the Middle East 

War. 16 October 1973. 13 pages. “The weight 

of evidence strongly suggests that Moscow knew 

in late September that Egypt and Syria were 

considering the initiation of hostilities. By 

3 October, and probably only on that day, however, the Soviets apparently concluded that hostilities were imminent.... By 5 October the Soviet 

leaders probably expected war to break out at 

any time, but they may not have learned of the 

precise time of attack until immediately before it 

occurred. There is no evidence that Moscow was 

involved in the planning of the Egyptian-Syrian 

attack or that it encouraged it. Instead, during 

the months prior to the outbreak of the war, Moscow was concerned about its deteriorating position in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt.”

Memorandum of Conversation with Arab Ministers. 17 October 1973. 11:10 a.m. in the President’s Oval Office. 18 October 1973. 15 pages. 

The President then addressed the issue of a 
48 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

signifi cant improvement in US-Arab relations, 

even though it temporarily alleviates some of 

the diffi culties of those Arab states in which 

there remains a signifi cant motivation for 

preserving special relations with the US.”

Message for the President from President 

Sadat. 27 October 1973. 2 pages. “Up until 

now—1730 Cairo local time—the Egyptian party 

is being held by Israeli troops at a distance of 15 

kilometers from the site of the rendezvous and 

prevented from proceeding under the pretext 

that these Israeli troops have received no orders 

to let them proceed. On the other hand, elements 

of the International Force are since noon today 

stopped outside the city of Suez prevented from 

entering the city.”

Arms Supply Considerations for the Middle 

East. 30 October 1973. 24 pages. “The recent 

confl ict probably has caused a reevaluation 

by the Israelis as to the quantities and mix of 

military hardware they will need to remain the 

dominant power in the area. A greater compatibility with Arab military equipment holdings, 

particularly aircraft and tanks, as well as the 

standardization of new weapons will spearhead 

Israel’s resupply efforts.”

Soviet Nuclear Weapons in Egypt? 30 October 

1973. 7 pages. “Confi rmation of Scud-associated equipment at two different locations in 

Egypt adds seriousness to the evidence that 

Moscow introduced nuclear weapons into the 

Middle East. The Scud equipment...includes a 

transporter-erector-launcher unique to the Scud 

missile in an area near the Tura caves some 10 

miles south of Cairo, and two resupply vehicles 

at Cairo international airport, one of which is 

carrying a probably canvas-covered missile.”

The Cost to the USSR of the Arab-Israeli Wars. 

30 October 1973. 7 pages. “Preliminary 

analysis on the cost to the USSR of the recent 

Arab-Israeli war indicates that it will run about 

$1 billion if Moscow replaces all the Arab war 

losses. This is over twice the estimated cost 

of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Arab equipment 

losses are estimated to be at least 444 aircraft, 

1,774 tanks, 13 guided missile patrol boats and 

2 other small naval craft.”

Memorandum for USIB Principals on Post Mortem 

on Arab-Israeli Conflict. 23 October 1973. 

11 pages. “One of the promises we have made 

to the NSCIC was to undertake just such a study 

of an on-going crisis because of the inability 

experienced in previous efforts to reconstruct the 

actual chain of events, reports and actions by all 

players in the crisis. I believe this effort can be 

especially fruitful since a prime critic of intelligence community crisis response—Henry Kissinger—is giving us high marks. Thus we need 

not be defensive and should be able to produce 

a very objective critique. The warning aspect 

left a good deal to be desired and I think that is 

recognized in all agencies at this juncture.”

Memorandum to DDI from Director of Current 

Intelligence, Richard Lehman. 24 October 1973. 

3 pages. “Obviously, our performance since the 

opening of hostilities has been excellent and I 

see little need for much attention here. The postmortem should therefore concentrate on the two 

basic questions. Why did we fail to predict the 

Syrian and Egyptian attack? How accurate was 

our assessment of the relative military strengths 

of Israel and the Arabs? The problem will be to 

make a post-mortem honest. DDI and DIA (redaction) are exposed as being fully on the record 

against an attack. The collectors (redaction) in 

particular are taking their traditional position 

that the producers were given all the information and paid no attention to it. The story is a 

good deal more complicated than that, and such 

an attitude does not help to get at the truth.”

De Facto Middle East Cease-Fire Lines and 

Alleged Violations. 24 October 1973. 2 pages. 

“Due to the mobile tactics which the relatively 

small Israeli armored forces on the west bank 

employed, much of the ground may not actually 

have been occupied, and the tactical situation 

could be extremely fl uid. In addition, the Israelis 

had seized territory around Shallufa during the 

day, and fi ghting was still heavy near the ceasefi re deadline.”

Prospects For (A) US Relations with the Arab 

States Following a Cease-Fire (B) Meaningful 

Negotiations Between Arab States and Israel. 

Memo. 25 October 1973. 7 pages. “An effective 

cease-fi re of and by itself will not work a 
49

Status of Implementation of Six-Point Egyptian-Israeli Ceasefire Accord. CIA Intelligence 

Report. 12 November 1973. 4 pages. “The 

six-point Egyptian-Israeli ceasefi re agreement 

was signed on 11 November 1973 at a triangular 

table in a tent at Kilometer 101 on the CairoSuez road, with General Silasvuo of the United 

Nations, General Yariv of Israel and Major General Muhammad al-Gamazi of Egypt seated at 

the three sides of the table.... Very few Egyptian 

military personnel were in evidence of the signing, and these few appeared very subdued. On 

the other hand, Israeli military personnel, who 

were present in large numbers, exuded an air 

of confi dence verging on cockiness, with much 

rib-elbowing, joking and bantering. U.N. troops 

attempted to separate the Egyptian and 

Israeli sides but this effort quickly broke down 

and in the intermingling that ensued, small 

instances of civility were observable such as 

Egyptian and Israeli offi cers lighting cigarettes 

for each other.

Financial Aid to Egypt and Syria. 23 November 

1973. 3 pages. “The other Arab states have 

made fi nancial commitments of at least $2 billion in war aid to Egypt and Syria since the outset of hostilities on 6 October.... The full extent 

of such aid is not known, although conceivably 

it could amount to as much as $3 billion.”

Using Oil as a Weapon: Implications and 

Prospects for the Arab Oil Producing States. 

National Intelligence Estimate. NIE 1-73. 

23 November 1973. 26 pages. “The Arabs 

have fi nally used oil as a political weapon—

declaring an embargo against the US (and a 

few others) and instituting major production 

cuts to drive their point home.....Total production has been cut 25 percent, and the Arab 

producers threaten to go on cutting fi ve percent 

a month until Israel withdraws from all territory 

captured in 1967 and the rights of the Palestinians are restored. Until then; friendly countries

may buy Arab oil at the pre-October quantities; 

unfriendly countries get no Arab oil; neutral 

countries will have to divide up what is left.” 

Financial Aid to Egypt and Syria. 23 November 

1973. 3 pages. “A short narrative and table on 

Egyptian and Syrian fi nancial aid from other 

Possible Cease-Fire Lines in the Sinai and 

the Golan Heights, and a Discussion of the 

Jerusalem Situation. 30 October 1973. 

17 pages. “This paper presents alternative 

cease-fi re lines for Arab and Israeli forces in 

the Sinai and the Golan Heights, discusses the 

situation in Jerusalem, and briefl y comments 

on the Allon Plan. In selecting the positions and 

confi gurations of the lines, consideration has 

been given to pertinent terrain, economic, and 

sociological factors as well as to the current 

military and political situation. Together the 

proposed cease-fi re lines provide a possible 

basis for a phased withdrawal. Each line would 

pose problems of major proportions for US 

policy; these are not discussed in the paper.”

Proposals for Resolving the Status of Jordan’s 

West Bank. November 1973. 21 pages. “This 

paper presents background information on the 

Israel-occupied West Bank of Jordan and outlines some of the many proposals that have been 

put forward for the resolution of its problems. 

Some new proposals are also presented. Implementation of any of these plans, old or new, 

would pose delicate questions for US policy—

none of which is treated in the paper.”

Israel: Economic Impact of the War. November 

1973. 9 pages. “Israel has emerged from a 

month of war and uneasy cease-fi re in excellent fi nancial and economic condition.... In 

the longer term, the economic situation will be 

critically dependent on the political and military settlement, the amount and terms of arms 

purchases, the duration of the mobilization, and 

fi nally the expectations and will of the Israeli 

people.”

Soviet Troops in the Middle East. Cable for 

Secretary Kissinger from Brent Scowcroft. 

6 November 1973. 3 pages. “At the outbreak 

of hostilities in the Middle East, the Soviets had 

approximately 80 military advisors in Egypt, 

about 1400 in Syria and an estimated 550 in Iraq. 

In addition there were an unknown number of 

Soviet civilian technicians in Egypt, Syria and 

Iraq. Since the outbreak of hostilities, indications of changes in Soviet personnel in Egypt, 

Syria and Iraq have been noted as follows....”
50 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

The Performance of the Intelligence 

Community before the Arab-Israeli War of 

October 1973: A Preliminary Post-Mortem 

Report. December 1973. 32 pages. “There 

was an intelligence failure in the weeks 

preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East 

on 6 October. Those elements of the Intelligence 

Community responsible for the production of 

fi nished intelligence did not perceive the growing possibility of an Arab attack and thus did not 

warn of its imminence. The information provided 

by those parts of the Community responsible for 

intelligence collection was suffi cient to prompt 

such a warning. Such information (derived from 

both human and technical sources) was not 

conclusive but was plentiful, ominous, and 

often accurate.”

The World Oil Crisis: Economic and Political 

Ramifications for Producers and Consumers. 

National Intelligence Estimate. NIE 1-1-73. 

5 December 1973. 16 pages. “The Arab oil producers will be fl exible and selective in exercising their options, but they will insist on progress. 

We judge that the Arabs will maintain a squeeze 

on oil supplies until there is real progress on 

the negotiations, which includes substantial 

Israeli withdrawals from occupied territory....

The Middle East crisis has aggravated existing 

problems between the US and its allies across 

a broad spectrum. During negotiations and so 

long as the oil crunch is on, it will be diffi cult 

to enhance a sense of shared common interests 

among the US and its allies.”

The USSR and the Arab Oil Weapon. International Oil Developments. 7 December 1973. 

2 pages. “The oil weapon is purely Arab strategy. Although in the past the Soviet press has 

encouraged such action, all available evidence 

indicates that the USSR had no hand in the planning and implementation of the Arab oil supply 

cutbacks.”

Syria: Asad’s Position on the Eve of Negotiations. 15 December 1973. 2 pages. “As the 

Geneva peace talks approach, President Asad’s 

hold on power appears to be fairly fi rm. The war 

has bolstered his popularity at home, and he can 

probably count at present on the backing of key 

supporters, in many cases hand-picked, in the 

Arab countries....The other Arab states have 

made fi nancial commitments of at least $2 

billion in war aid to Egypt and Syria since the 

outset of hostilities on 6 October as indicated 

in the accompanying table. The full extent of 

such aid is not known, although conceivably 

it could amount to as much as $3 billion....

According to press accounts, some Arab money 

has been used to pay for Soviet arms.”

Saudi Arabian Financial Aid to Other Arab 

Countries, Prior to and Since the 6 October 

Hostilities. 27 November 1973. 1 page. “Prior 

to recent hostilities, Saudi Arabia provided at 

least $150 million annually in aid to other Arab 

countries. Most of this aid stemmed from Saudi 

commitments immediately after the June 1967 

war of about $100 million annually to Egypt 

and about $40 million annually to Jordan.”

Egyptian-Israeli Negotiations at Kilometer 

101. Central Intelligence Report. 28 November 1973. 9 pages. “Egypt is still hopeful that 

the ‘disengagement’ talks with the Israelis will 

lead to an effective interim agreement. Israel 

has stated a willingness to withdraw all 

Israeli troops to a line east of the Sinai Mountain 

passes but in return continues to insist that 

Egypt unilaterally reduce the armor of Egyptian forces left in the Sinai. Egypt believes 

that any reductions should be mutual.”

Syria’s Rulers and Their Political Environment. 7 December 1973. 11 pages. “Syria’s 

leaders are soldiers, socialists, and from the 

provinces rather than the big cities. They are 

also relatively young, mostly in their early forties.... The army has been the principal agent 

of political change in Syria...ruling directly or 

in association with political groups for most of 

that time.”

Brezhnev’s Political Position in the Wake of 

the Middle East War. 10 December 1973. 

3 pages. “Brezhnev seems to have weathered 

the Middle East Crisis well. In fact, public 

signs suggest that his political position has 

reached a new peak.”
51

armed forces, the security apparatus, and the Syrian Baath Party. Equally important to him is the 

continuing loyalty of an elite 10,000-man special 

security force commanded by his brother.”

The Impact of the 24 October US Alert on the Soviet Leadership. 20 December 1973. 16 pages. 

“Brezhnev and his colleagues appear to have 

reacted with greater concern and annoyance to 

President Nixon’s statements of 26 October, which 

focused public attention on the Soviet threat of 

unilateral intervention and the US alert, than they 

did to the alert itself. The implication of a Soviet 

back down almost certainly was the trigger.”

The Performance of the Intelligence Community 

before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: A 

Preliminary Post-Mortem Report. 20 December 

1973. 11 pages. “There was an intelligence 

failure in the weeks preceding the outbreak of 

war in the Middle East on 6 October. Those 

elements of the Intelligence Community responsible for the production of fi nished intelligence did 

not perceive the growing possibility of an Arab 

attack and thus did not warn of its imminence. 

The information provided by those parts of the 

Community responsible for intelligence collection 

was suffi cient to prompt such a warning. Such information ...was not conclusive but was plentiful, 

ominous, and often accurate.... Still, there is no 

gainsaying the judgment that, whatever the 

rationale, the principal conclusions concerning 

the imminence of hostilities reached and reiterated by those responsible for intelligence analysis 

were–quite simply, obviously, and starkly–wrong.”

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Overview and 

Analysis of the Conflict. Intelligence Report. 

September 1975. 123 pages. “Key fi ndings: 

Strategy. The Arabs had different goals and, 

consequently, different strategies. The Syrians 

wanted to liberate the Golan Heights and 

attempted to do so in one stroke. The Egyptians’ 

main goal was to achieve a political effect, and 

they therefore planned for a limited offensive. The 

Israelis, because of overconfi dence and because 

they failed to recognize that their occupation of 

the Suez Canal’s east bank deprived them of 

advance warning of an Egyptian attack, did not 

react to mounting evidence of Arab intentions.”
52 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

President Nixon gives 

a press conference, 

October 1973
53

PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

30 JANUARY 2013 ∙ 1:30–6:00 PM

1:00–1:05 WELCOME AND 

INTRODUCTION OF KEYNOTE

Paul Wormser

Acting Director, Richard Nixon 

Presidential Library

1:05–1:35 KEYNOTE ADDRESS

The Role of Intelligence in the 

Policymaking Process

Brent Scowcroft (invited)

Advisor to the President For 

National Security under Ford 

and Bush

1:35–2:05 FEATURED SPEAKER

Delivering Intelligence to The Policymaker

Andrew M. Liepman

Former Principal Deputy Director, 

National Counterterrorism Center

2:05–2:45 FEATURED SPEAKER

CIA Military Analysis during The 1973 War

Charles E. Allen

Former Under Secretary for 

Intelligence and Analysis, DHS

2:45–3:00 BREAK

3:00–4:15 PANEL #1

Role of Intelligence in the 1973 War, 

An Intelligence Analyst Perspective

Matthew Penney (chair)

CIA Historian

Richard Kovar

Former CIA analyst

Martha Neff Kessler

Former CIA analyst

Emile Nakhleh

Former CIA analyst

4:15–4:30 BREAK

4:30–5:45 PANEL #2

Intelligence and the 1973 War, 

A Policy Perspective

Peter Clement (chair)

Deputy Director for Intelligence 

for Analytic Programs, CIA 

William Quandt

Professor of Politics,University of 

Virginia; former NSC Senior Staffer

Greg Treverton 

Director, RAND Center for

Global Risk and Security

Emile Nakhleh

University of New Mexico

5:45–6:00 CLOSING REMARKS Peter Clement

RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
54 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Brent Scowcroft a leading expert on international 

policy, Brent Scowcroft served as the National 

Security Advisor to both Presidents Gerald Ford 

and George H.W. Bush. From 1982 to 1989, he was 

Vice Chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., 

an international consulting fi rm. In this capacity, 

he advised and assisted a wide range of U.S. 

and foreign corporate leaders on global joint 

venture opportunities, strategic planning, and 

risk assessment.

His prior extraordinary twenty-nine-year military career began with graduation from West 

Point and concluded at the rank of Lieutenant General following service as the Deputy 

National Security Advisor. His Air Force service 

included Professor of Russian History at West 

Point; Assistant Air Attaché in Belgrade, Yugoslavia; Head of the Political Science Department 

at the Air Force Academy; Air Force Long Range 

Plans; Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense International Security Assistance; Special Assistant 

to the Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and 

Military Assistant to President Nixon. 

Out of uniform, he continued in a public policy 

capacity by serving on the President’s General 

Advisory Committee on Arms Control, the 

President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, the 

President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 

Management and the President’s Special Review Board, also known as the Tower Commission. In recent years, General Scowcroft has 

served as a co-chair for both the Blue Ribbon 

Commission on America’s Nuclear Future and 

the National Academies of Science’s Committee 

on Science, Security, and Prosperity. He formerly 

served as the Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and was a member of the 

United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level 

Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

General Scowcroft currently serves on numerous 

corporate and nonprofi t boards. He has been 

recognized as a Distinguished Graduate of West 

Point, and earned his masters and doctorate in 

international relations from Columbia University.

William B. Quandt is the Edward R. Stettinius, 

Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia. 

He has been a member of the Department of 

Politics since 1994, and from 2000 to 2003 has 

also served as Vice Provost for International 

Affairs for the University. He teaches courses 

on the Middle East and American Foreign 

Policy. Prior to this appointment, he was a 

Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies 

Program at the Brookings Institution, where 

he conducted research on the Middle East, 

American policy toward the Arab-Israeli confl ict, and energy policy. 

Before going to Brookings in 1979, Dr. Quandt 

served as a staff member on the National 

Security Council (1972-1974, 1977-1979). He was 

actively involved in the negotiations that led 

to the Camp David Accords and the EgyptianIsraeli Peace Treaty. Dr. Quandt was also an 

Associate Professor of Political Science at the 

University of Pennsylvania, worked at the 

Rand Corporation in the Department of Social 

Science from 1968-1972, and taught at UCLA 

and MIT.

Brent Scowcroft (invited)

Advisor to the President For National Security 

under Ford and Bush

William Quandt

Professor of Politics,University of Virginia; 

former NSC Senior Staffer

SYMPOSIUM SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES
55

Charles E. Allen became a principal at the 

Chertoff Group after a distinguished career 

in the intelligence community. Mr. Allen spent 

more than 40 years at the CIA, and as the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection in 1998, he revolutionized the way the 

various national intelligence agencies coordinate and target their activities. In the same 

vein, he chaired the National Intelligence Collection Board, which united all intelligence 

agencies under common collection strategies. 

He also served as CIA’s National Intelligence 

Offi cer for Warning, Director of the National 

Warning Staff, National Intelligence Offi cer 

for Counterterrorism, and Deputy Chief for 

Intelligence of CIA’s Counterterrorism Center. 

He also directed the DCI Hostage Location 

Task Force, which focused on locating American hostages held by Hezballah in Lebanon.

During his tenure at the Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Allen served as Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis (2007-2009) 

and Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis and Chief of Intelligence (2005-2007). At 

DHS, Charles E. Allen developed the department’s intelligence architecture, integrated its 

intelligence activities and ensured that they 

were continuously aligned with the department’s evolving priorities. He also accelerated 

and expanded the department’s processes 

for sharing intelligence with state and local 

security and law enforcement offi cials.

Andrew Liepman is the former Principal 

Deputy Director at the National Counterterrorism Center, a position he held from June 2011 

to May 2012. Mr. Liepman previously served at 

the Deputy Director for Intelligence at NCTC 

from July 2006 until June 2011. 

Mr. Liepman has had a distinguished career 

in the Intelligence Community since he joined 

the CIA as an imagery analyst in 1982, spending much of his career on Middle Eastern 

issues. Before coming to NCTC, he served as 

deputy director of the CIA’s counterterrorism 

center. In that capacity, he assisted in running 

one of the CIA’s highest priority, most complex, 

and largest units. Mr. Liepman handled much 

of the policy coordination, congressional interaction, and interagency relationships in his 

capacity as Deputy. He also led the Agency’s 

Offi ce of Iraq Analysis for two years, and held 

a series of other high-level positions in the 

Directorate of Intelligence. He also worked 

in a variety of assignments outside the CIA, 

including time at the Department of State, 

the Nonproliferation Center, and the National 

Intelligence Council. 

Charles E. Allen

Former Under Secretary for 

Intelligence and Analysis, DHS

Andrew M. Liepman

Former Principal Deputy Director, 

National Counterterrorism Center
56 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Emile Nakhleh became a scholar in residence 

and then a senior analyst at the CIA, after twenty-six years of teaching at Mount Saint Mary’s 

University. His duties at the CIA, especially 

after 9/11, included briefi ng policymakers in the 

executive branch and members of Congress. He 

held a variety of key positions during his fi fteen 

years of service at the CIA, including Director of 

the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program 

in the Directorate of Intelligence and Chief of 

the Regional Analysis Unit in the Offi ce of Near 

Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Dr. Nakhleh 

was a founding member of the Senior Analytic 

Service and chaired the fi rst Senior Analytic 

Service Council. He was awarded several senior 

intelligence commendation medals, including 

the Intelligence Commendation Medal (1997), 

the William Langer Award (2004), the Director’s 

Medal (2004), and the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal (2006). 

Since retiring from the CIA in 2006, Dr. Nakhleh 

has been consulting with various US government 

agencies and departments on national security 

issues, particularly Islamic radicalization, 

terrorism, and the Arab states of the Middle East. 

His research has focused on political Islam in 

the Middle East and the rest of the Muslim world 

as well as on political and educational reform, 

regime stability, and governance in the greater 

Middle East. He has published frequently in the 

Financial Times. 

Martha Neff Kessler was an intelligence offi cer 

with the CIA from 1970 to 2000, working on the 

Middle East, South Asia, and terrorism. She held 

positions throughout the Directorate of Intelligence and served three times on the National 

Intelligence Council as the Director of CIA’s 

point person on the Middle East. For six years, 

she headed the Arab-Israeli Division and was 

liaison with US peace negotiators throughout 

the Madrid peace process. She was a fellow at 

the National Defense University’s War College 

where she published Syria: A Fragile Mosaic 

of Power. Martha was a guest scholar at the 

Brookings Institution where she contributed to 

the Middle Foreign Policy Journal. During her 

career, she was awarded the CIA’s Medal of 

Distinguished Service and the National Intelligence Community’s Medal of Achievement. She 

received numerous Outstanding Performance 

Awards during crises in Lebanon, the Gulf War, 

and the Iraq war and was also honored for her 

authorship of National Intelligence Estimates on 

the rise of religious extremism.

Ms. Kessler is currently serving as Ombudsman for the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Intelligence and Analysis Directorate. She also 

consults on Middle East and foreign intelligence 

issues and teaches courses on Islam, analytic 

techniques, and writing and briefi ng key US policymakers. After 9/11, she was called back into 

service with the CIA and spent another 10 years 

there, retiring for a second time in 2010. Over 

the past decade, Ms. Kessler has done special 

projects for the Director of National Intelligence 

and the FBI. She is a member of the Council on 

Foreign Relations and a member of the board of 

the Middle East Policy Council.

Emile Nakhleh

Research Professor, University of New Mexico

Former Senior Intelligence Offi cer

Martha Neff Kessler

Former CIA analyst on the 

Middle East and South Asia
57

Greg Treverton is a senior policy analyst at the 

RAND Corporation and director of the RAND 

Center for Global Risk and Security. He has had 

several leadership positions at RAND, including 

as director of the International Security and 

Defense Policy Center, associate dean of the 

Pardee RAND Graduate School, and director 

of the Intelligence Policy Center. Dr. Treverton’s 

recent work at RAND has examined terrorism, 

intelligence, and law enforcement, with a 

special interest in new forms of public–private 

partnership.

Before joining RAND in 1995 he served as vice 

chair of the National Intelligence Council, 

overseeing the writing of America’s National 

Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). He has been 

Senior Fellow and Director of the EuropeAmerica project and of the project on America’s 

Task in a Changed World at the Council on 

Foreign Relations in New York. He taught public 

management and foreign policy at Harvard’s 

Kennedy School of Government, and he has 

been an adjunct professor at Columbia’s School 

of International and Public Affairs. He was 

Director of Studies at the International Institute 

for Strategic Studies in London. He served 

earlier in the government, during the Carter 

Administration handling Europe on the National 

Security Council and on the Hill working for the fi rst Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

(the Church committee) in 1975-76. His latest 

books are Intelligence for an Era of Terror, 

Cambridge University Press, 2009; Film Piracy, 

Organized Crime and Terrorism, (with others) 

RAND, 2009; and Reorganizing U.S. Domestic 

Intelligence: Assessing the Options, RAND, 2008.

Dick Kovar began his long career at the Central 

Intelligence Agency in 1951 as an editor for the 

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, serving 

in Okinawa, Tokyo, Saigon, and West Africa, 

and on the headquarters staff of the FBIS Daily 

Report and Wire Service. He moved to the 

O/DDI in 1963 and served as assistant to four 

Greg Treverton

Director, RAND Center for 

Global Risk and Security

Richard D. Kovar 

Former CIA analyst and 

Chief of the Middle East Task Force

Peter Clement 

Deputy Director for Intelligence 

for Analytic Programs, CIA

Peter Clement was appointed Deputy Director 

for Intelligence for Analytic Programs at the 

Central Intelligence Agency in January 2005. He 

joined the agency in 1977 and spent much of his fi rst 25 years focused on the Soviet Union—in 

analytic and management positions, including Director of the Offi ce of Russian-Eurasian 

Analysis and as CIA’s Russia Issue Manager 

from 1997-2003.

Mr. Clement later was a PDB briefer for then 

Vice President Cheney and NSC Adviser Rice, 

and subsequently served as the DCI’s Representative to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations 

before assuming his current duties. Mr. Clement 

has been a member of the Council on Foreign 

Relations since 2001. He taught Russian history 

and politics for over ten years as an adjunct 

professor at DC area universities, and has 

published journal articles and book chapters 

on Russian foreign policy, Central Asia, and the 

Cuban missile crisis.

CIA Deputy Directors for Intelligence; during 

the 1960s he was the DDI’s special assistant on 

the Vietnam War. For several years he compiled 

and edited a comprehensive interagency weekly 

report on Vietnam for Cabinet-level recipients 

and oversaw the production of seminal reports 

for Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; 

later he testifi ed for the defense in the Westmoreland v. CBS et al. trial and edited four books 

and wrote several book reviews on intelligence 

aspects of the war. During the early 1970s he 

was chief of CIA’s Arab-Israel analysis branch 

and headed analytical task forces during the 

Syrian-Palestinian attack on Jordan in 1970 and 

the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Following a brief 

assignment as chief of the OCI Latin America 

division, he served as deputy chief of the Offi ce 

of Regional and Political Analysis, a reorganized current analysis offi ce, before becoming 

editor of the professional journal Studies in 

Intelligence and, as a rehired annuitant, chief 

editor of the National Intelligence Daily and an 

editor and briefer for the President’s Daily Brief. 
58 PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

DVD CONTENTS

The Historical Collections and Information Review Divisions of the Central Intelligence Agency’s 

Information Management Services have reviewed, redacted, and released a body of documents 

highlighting what the Central Intelligence Agency provided the Nixon Administration during the 

1973 Arab-Israeli crisis and war. The accompanying DVD contains more than 400 documents, some 

200 of which are either being made available to the public for the fi rst time or are being re-released 

with new material.

The material is organized into the following categories.

• Document Collection—Features intelligence assessments, National Intelligence Estimates, 

high-level memos, DCI talking points, and other reporting. To help put this material in 

perspective, we have also included non-CIA documents from the archives of the Nixon and 

Ford Libraries, including minutes from relevant Washington Special Action Group meetings 

on the 1973 War.

• Multimedia Files—Includes a photo slideshow and an interactive timeline featuring material 

from the Nixon Library’s AV archives and other sources.

• Background Material—Includes several assessments and overview articles on President Nixon’s 

use of intelligence and the Arab-Israeli crisis written by historians, leading experts, and student 

essayists from Claremont McKenna College.

This DVD will work on most computers and the documents are in .PDF format.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this 

booklet are those of the authors. They do not necessarily 

refl ect offi cial positions or views of the Central Intelligence 

Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. 

Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting 

or implying US Government endorsement of an article’s 

factual statements and interpretations.

PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

The Historical Review Program, part of the CIA Information Management Services, identifies, 

collects, and produces historically relevant collections of declassified documents.

These collections, centered on a theme or event, are joined with supporting analysis, 

essays, video, audio, and photographs, and showcased in a booklet plus DVD, and made 

available to historians, scholars, and the public.

All of our Historical Collections are available on the CIA Library Publication page located 

at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/ or contact 

us at HistoricalCollections@UCIA.gov.