COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Huff, Judges Alston and Russell

IVAN RUCKER MEMORANDUM OPINION  BY v. Record No. 0931-17-4 JUDGE ROSSIE D. ALSTON, JR. APRIL 24, 2018 ALEXANDRIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND HUMAN SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA Lisa B. Kemler, Judge (Isabel Kaldenbach; Isabel K aldenbach, PLLC, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (James L. Banks, City Attorney; George McAndrews, Assistant City Attorney; Christopher T. Mays, Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.
Ivan Rucker (appellant) argues that the trial c ourt erred in t erminating his parental rights for four reasons: the trial c ourt 1) relied upon a document no t available to all parties; 2) applied the incorrect evidentiary sta ndard; 3) improperly found that th e Department of Community and Human Services (DCHS) provided ad equate services; and 4) incorr ectly found that DCHS provided the requisite evidence to support termination. We dis agree. B ACKGROUND Appellant and Jamillia Hansford (Hansford) are the biological p arents of a minor child, E.H. E.H. was born on June 19, 2015. After conducting an inve stigation, DCHS removed E.H. from Hansford’s care five days l ater. DCHS filed an emergency removal petition and affidavit with the Alexandria Juvenile and D omestic Relations District Co urt (J&DR court). The affidavit

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - documented that Hansford is infe cted with the human immunodefic iency virus (HIV) and may have transmitted the disease to E.H. Even so, Hansford does no t medicate herself or E.H. as directed. It was also alleged t hat Hansford has substance abus e issues and used marijuana while pregnant. And while residing at Al exandria Community Shelter ( ACS), Hansford left E.H. “unattended or with another resid ent at least four times after being instructed not to do so.” Hansford was also recently hospi talized for psychosis. It was also noted that appellant was incarcerated at the time E.H. was removed until October of 2015 . The J&DR court entered an order on June 25, 2015, finding that E.H. “would be subjected t o an imminent threat to life or health to the extent that sever e or irremediable injury would b e likely to result.” At the preliminary removal hearin g, the J&DR court made the sam e findings, awarded temporary legal custody to DCHS , provided visitation to Hansfor d, and entered a preliminary child protective order against Hansford on behalf of E.H. Hans ford objected to a finding of abuse or neglect, and an adjudica tory hearing was set for July 31, 2015. At that hearing, the J&DR court found that E.H. was abused or neglected. As a furth er incident of that hearing, the J&DR court also ordered appellan t to submit to a paternity test . Appellant signed the adjudicatory order seen and object ed, noting a “lack of evidenc e of abuse/neglect by [him.]” A dispositional hearing was s et for August 31, 2015. DCHS filed its foster care plan with the J&DR court with the goal of ret urn home and outlined services o ffered and concerns to be remedied by Hansford and appellant before return home was possi ble. At the dispositional hearing, the J&DR court transferred custod y of E.H. to DCHS and entered a final child protective order. The J&DR court revised the foster care plan to include relative placement as a concurrent goal, ordered Hansford and appellant to “utilize their best efforts” to comply with the plan, and directed DCHS to continue “to utilize reasonable efforts in- 3 - making appropriate service referral s.” A review hearing was se t for December 17, 2015. Appellant signed the orde r seen and objected to. On October 13, 2015, the paternity tes t established that the pr obability appellant was E.H.’s father was 99.99%. Appellantwas released from incarcer ation on October 15, 2015. At the foster care review heari ng, the J&DR court approved the foster care plan. The permanency planning hearing w as set for April 6, 2016. Appella nt signed the order noting that he “would like [E.H.] to be r eturned home sooner or . . . have overnight visits being with [Hansford].” On March 7, 2016, DCHS filed a peti tion requesting a permanencyplanning hearing within six months with the goal of “Return Home/Relative Placem ent.” DCHS filed a second petition on July 1, 2016 with adoption a s the revised goal. At the permanency planning hearing on October 31, 2016, the J&DR court te rminated appellant’s and Hansford’s parental rights regarding E.H and approved DCHS’s updated foster care plan. Ap pellant and Hansford appealed to the Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria (trial court). On January 5, 2017, Hansford filed addendums for protected identif ying information-confidential pursuant to Code § 20-121.03 regarding her parental capacity a ssessment. Hansford’s counsel signed the addendum on her behalf. The trial took place on May 2-3, 2017. DCHS attempted to admit the J&DR court’s orders terminating Hansford’s a nd appellant’s parental rights a nd approving the foster care plan. Hansford objected, and appellant j oined, arguing that this was a de novo hearing, and that the trial court was required to mak e independent findings, and that the evidentiary standard for the termination proceeding was clear and convincing, not preponderance. The trial court sustained the objection and did not admit the orders. DCHS also attempte d to admit Hansford’s parental capacity assessment, conducted by Dr. Christopher Bishop. Appe llant objected, arguing he did- 4 - not have access to the assessmen t. DCHS responded that the J&D R court did not allow appellant access because Hansford asserted her right to privacy but would grant access if he “could show a compelling need for it.” Furth ermore, DCHS argued that appella nt did not suffer prejudice as the assessment pertained to H ansford. In addition, DCHS filed a confidential addendum with the trial court. The trial court stated that appellant would need to establish that he would suffer prejudice if the assessment wa s admitted. The trial court foun d that Hansford would have to consent to give appellant access and then accepted DCHS’s repre sentation that the assessment minimally referenced appellant . Appellant next argued that he would suffer prejudice because he would not have the opportunity t o cross-examine Dr. Bishop and that the trial court would have access to a document he does not. He further argued that a the me of DCHS’s case is that appellant “does not understand [Ha nsford’s] mental health issue s” and that the assessment contains relevant information. D CHS responded that appellant c ould have subpoenaed Dr. Bishop. The trial court rule d that it would only consider Hansford’s assessment against her and would allow appellant to cro ss-examine Dr. Bishop if necess ary. The assessment was provisionally admitted. Appellant was not authorized to view the document. DCHS presented its evidence. DCH S established that Hansford an d appellant were ordered to comply with DCHS’s fo ster care plan which required t hem to participate in services and remedy conditions requiring E.H .’s removal. DCHS explained , as stated in the affidavit, that removal was necessary “to ensure [E.H.] receives appropriate ca re and attention, has stability and [that] all of her needs are me t.” The conditions requiring E.H .’s removal were: “Hansford’s lack of employment, homelessness, quest ionable mental health and rec ent psychiatric hospitalizations[,] poor decision m aking and [E.H.’s] need for daily medication and routine medical care.” After E.H.’s pa ternity was established and uponappellant’s release from incarceration, DCHS offe red appellant case management services, family engagement services,- 5 - referrals, follow-up services, aparental fitness evaluation, t he Fathers In Touch program, visitation, and parenting educat ion. Appellant received vocati onal services and housing assistance through ot her entities. Appellant completed the Fathe rs in Touch program, underwent a m ental health evaluation and a parental capacity assessmen t, and attended visitation. D r. Mohamed Mansaray conducted appellant’s parental capacity assessment. According to Dr. Man saray, while appellant “has a great desire to be a parent a nd obviously cares about the wellb eing of [E.H.],” Dr. Mansaray concluded appellant presents a m oderate risk of abuse and negle ct to E.H. Appellant “holds expectations of [E.H.] that exc eed her developmental capabiliti es” and “downplayed the difficulty that may arise fro m []Hansford’s ongoing struggles w ith mental illness.” Ultimately, his “ability to react a ppropriately to stressors, emotionally c onnect, obtain stable employment, establish secure housing, and dem onstrate judgment effectively must improve in order for [the] risk to be decreased.” Dr. Mansaray suggested that appellant b e offered an individual parenting coach, a substance abuse assessm ent, individual counseling, and marital counseling. Appellant refused to undertake a substance abuse assessment, individual c ounseling, and marital counseling. The evidence produced at trial established that even though bot h appellant and Hansford participated in services, DCHS gr ew increasingly concerned abou t appellant’s and Hansford’s ability to parent E.H. Hansfor d assaulted appellant in Novembe r of 2016. Hansford was required to provide updates on her physical health but failed t o do so and remained noncompliant in taking her medication. In supe rvised visitations, appellant and Hansford were provided two parenting coaches; one focused on improving E.H.’s development and one focused on improving attachment. Initially, appellantand Hansford were engaged. H owever, it was unclear whether coachings were being applied outs ide of supervised visitations. Hansford’s mental health issues- 6 - presented themselves more acute ly over time. During visitation s, Hansford would become “enraged.” This resulted in appe llant walking out of visitatio ns. This pattern became more frequent. Later in March of 2016, a ppellant and Hansford arriv ed at DCHS for a meeting seemingly under the influence. In late April of 2016, appellant req uested to participate in Hansford’s mental health treatment. Hansford refuse d, “start[ing] a . . . regress[ion i n appellant’s and Hansford’s progress during visitation].” Later that month, one of the parenting co aches provided cues to be implemented with E.H. Appellant encouraged Hansford to apply them. Hansford refused. An argument ensued. Appellant exited the home, leaving E.H. behin d with Hansford. Hansford became “verbally threatening.” T he coach concluded the session . While leaving, the coach “knocked” into E.H. Hansford shout ed obscenities at the coach. Visitation was temporarily moved to DCHS. The development-or iented coach stopped providin g services during visitation and worked with E.H. at daycar e. Even though encouraged to vis it E.H. at daycare, only Hansford took advantage of tha t opportunity on one occasion. I n May of 2016, Hansford was hospitalized for menta l health reasons under a temporary detent ion order. There was a concern that Hansford was not taking her psychotropic medication as dir ected. DCHS advised appellant and Hansfor d that it was considering ado ption as a goal for E.H. in June of 2016. Subsequent visitations “were very emotionally -laden. . . . [Hansford’s] mental health issues began to present mo re intensely,” and appellant b egan to disengage. He either was not present for the entire vis itation, would retreat to the bedroom during visitations, or be on his phone. DCHS employees testified that although appellant did no t need to have a working knowledge of Hansford’s specific mental condition, it was hoped that he would appropriately tend to E.H. to minimize the imp act of Hansford’s mental health issues on E.H. Appellant was unable to do so. At one session, a ppellant was directed to rem ove E.H. when Hansford was- 7 - decompensating. Appellant refus ed, responding that E.H. would “have to get used to that.” In addition, Hansford caused distur bances at DCHS on two occasions during July of 2016. In August of 2016, DCHS informed appellant and Hansford that te rmination of parental rights was being considered. The regression in appellant’s andHansford’s progress continued. On September 22, 2016, appellant fe ll asleep during visitation. Hansford became agitated, and a DCHS employee had to seek “add itional help to ensure everybody’ s safety.” Hansford confessed to being arrested mor e than once for hitting appellan t. In November of 2016, Hansford assaulted a DCHS employ ee and attempted to assault ano ther; she was involuntarily taken for a mental health evaluation. At the scene, appellant indicated that Hansford was “bi-polar and not taki ng her medication.” H ansford was then te mporarily hospitalized in December of 2016 for psychosis. In January of 2017, Hansford w as involuntarily hospitalized after exhibiting manic behavior; she made suicidal statements and “laugh[ed] to herself when nobody else was talking.” The attachment-focused parenti ng coach testified that while the re were positive moments among appellant, Hansford, and E.H., neither parent progressed to a point where they could form a healthy attachment with E.H. A ppellant developed negative re sponses to coaching, and Hansford was unable to put E.H .’s needs above her own. In addi tion, neither parent was able to grasp that if one parent was unabl e to meet E.H.’s needs, the o ther must compensate. Regarding employment, Hansford w as employed from the summer of 2015 until March
2016. Regarding living arrangements, pr ior to E.H.’s removal, Hansfor d lived at ACS. She was then housed at the Carpenter She lter. Appellant was separately housed there after being released. Hansford was asked to leave i n November of 2015 for not complyi ng with shelter rules-there were times when she was unemployed and she interacted with othe r residents aggressively.- 8 - Appellant was asked to leave following a positive drug screen i n the early months of 2016. The Transitioning Adults into Living Successfully (TRAILS) program, through New Hope Housing, helped Hansford find an apartment . She was asked to leave due to noise complaints in July of 2016. TRAILS then helped her secure an apartment at Landmark T owers where appellant lived with her. She left that res idence in November of 2016. She no w resides at ACS. Appellant and Hansford, two weeks prior to tri al, appeared together at the Ca rpenter Shelter inquiring about housing. Regarding relative placement, D CHS investigated one possibilitybut found the individual was not a viable option. It was also noted that E.H. w as not developing as she should be

. At the conclusion of DCHS’s case, appellant made a motion to st rike arguing that DCHS petitioned for termination unde r Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C) butdid not present clear and convincing evidence regarding: abuse and neglect under (B), pr ior efforts of DCHS to prevent E.H.’s removal under (B), of the conditions under (C), and part icipation in services provided under (C). Appellant contended he complied with services but D CHS did not provide him those Dr. Mansaray recommended. Appell ant also indicated he was unaw are of Hansford’s mental health issues. Hansford also made a motion to strike, arguing that the J&DR court’s finding of abuse and neglect alone did not s atisfy the evi dentiary burden before the trial court. Hansford also argued that termination w as not in the best interests of E .H. In response, DCHS contended that the evidence provided satisfie d the requirements under both subsections. Appellant refu sed some services offered and disengaged from those he did participate in. Pursuant to s ubsection (C), appellant and Hans ford had more than a year to substantially remedy conditions and did not do so. The trial court denied both motions to strike.- 9 - Appellant testified. The parties stipulated that he was “full- time or close to full-time employed consistently throughout [th e course of this case].” R egarding housing, appellant testified that he and Hansford lived together until the day bef ore trial when Hansford became irate and left the apartment. Appellant asserted he wanted to “stay away from [Hansford]” and focus on E.H. Appellant testifie d he only missed visitations a nd did not visit E.H. at daycare because he believed both he and Hansford were required to atten d together. At the conclusion of appellant’s case, Hansford renewed her mot ion to strike and appellant joined. The trial cour t denied the renewed motion to strike. The trial court terminated appell ant’s and Hansford’s parental rights, found that the requirements of Code § 16.1-283(B)(1 ), (B)(2), and (C)(2) were met, that the evidence was clear and convincing, and approved DCHS’s foster care plan. The tria l court indicated E.H. had been in foster care for almost two y ears, substantial progress had n ot been made to warrant additional time, and ruling otherwise would not be in the best interests o f E.H. In its permanency planning order, the trial court also found t hat DCHS made reasonable eff orts “to reunite the child with []her parents” and noted terminati on of parental rights was in the best interests of E.H. In its involuntary termination order, the trial court te rminated paren tal rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B)(1), (2) and (C)(2). Now comes this appeal.
A NALYSIS “[I]t would be unfitting to not ackno wledge that ‘[t]he termina tion of parental rights is a grave, drastic and irreversible action.’” Farrell v. Warren Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 59 Va. App. 375, 400, 719 S.E.2d 329, 341 (2012) (quoting Helen W. v. Fairf ax Cty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991)). “When revi ewing a decision to terminate parental rights, we presume th e [trial] court ‘thoroughly weigh ed all the evidence, considered the- 10 - statutory requirements, and ma de its determination based on the child’s best interests.’” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 265-66, 616 S.E. 2d 765, 769 (2005) (quoting Fields v. Dinwiddie Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 7 , 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005)). “[Trial] courts are vested wit h broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interes t.’” Thach v. Arlington Cty. Dep’ t of Human Servs., 63 Va. App. 157, 168, 754 S.E.2d 922, 927 (2014). When the determination i s based on evidence heard ore

tenus , the trial court’s decision “i s entitled to great weight and ‘ will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evi dence to support it.’” Id. at 168-69, 754 S.E.2d at 928 (quoting Logan v. Fairfax Cty. D ep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)). Further, the evidence must be considered “in the light most favorable to the party prevailing in the [tr ial] court.” Tacke tt v. Arlington Cty. De p’t of Human Servs., 62 Va. App. 296, 303, 746 S.E.2d 509, 513 (2013).
A. T HE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RELYING ON TH E A SSESSMENT

. Appellant contends that the tria l court erred when it relied ona document not available to all parties. Appellant framed t his as an issue of due process in that being denied access to Hansford’s parental capacity asse ssment inhibited appellant in developing his defense. “[I]n a bench trial, the trial [c ourt] is presumed to disregard prejudicial or inadmissible evidence, and this presumption will control in the absence of c lear evidence to the contrary.” Pierce v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 609, 616, 625 S.E.2d 785, 7 89 (2007) (quoting Hall v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 892, 902, 421 S.E.2d 455, 462 (1992) ( en banc )). “When a state infringes upon a pa rent’s constitutional right to the companionship of his . . . child in order to protect t he child from abuse and neglec t, it must satisfy the mandates of procedural due process.” Wright v. Alexandria Div. of Soc. Ser vs., 16 Va. App. 821, 829, 433 S.E.2d 500, 505 (1993) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 751 (1982)). “Therefore, if- 11 - the state seeks to sever the pa rent-child rela tionship, the sta te is required to pr ovide the parent with ‘fundamentally fair’ proc edures in the termination proceed ing.” Id. “Code § 16.[1]-283 complies with the constitutiona l mandate of procedural due proc ess.” Id. at 830, 433 S.E.2d at 505. “The requirements of the due pr ocess clause are satisfied if a party ‘has reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present his claimor defense, due regard being had to the nature of the proceeding a nd the character of the rights which may be affected by it.’” Eddine v. Eddine, 12 Va. App. 760, 763, 406 S.E.2d 914, 916 (19 91) (quoting Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930)). “The ‘practicali ties and pa rticularities of the case’ must be considered in determining whether these requirements are reason ably met.” Id. (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). Assuming it was error, it was harmless. “In Virginia, non-cons titutional error is harmless ‘[w]hen it plainly appears from the record and the evidence giv en at the trial that the parties have had a fair trial on the merits a nd substantial justice has beenreached.” Andrews v. Creacey, 56 Va. App. 606, 625, 696 S.E.2d 218, 227 (2010) (quoting Code § 8 .01-678). “If, when all is said and done, [it is clear] that the error did not influence the [t rial court], or had but slight effect, . . . the judgment should stand.” I d. (quoting Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 260, 546 S.E.2d 778, 731-32 (2001)). When the objection arose, the trial courtrequested that the parties argue whether appellant would suffer pr ejudice. After ruling that ap pellant would not be granted access to the assessment, the trial court noted it would only c onsider Hansford’s assessment against her and provided appell ant the opportunity to cross-exa mine Dr. Bishop if necessary. Witnesses testified extensively about Hansford’s mental health issues in relation to appellant’s ability to parent E.H. There is no evidence that the trial cou rt improperly relied on Hansford’s

assessment.- 12 - Turning to appellant’s due proce ss rights, as previously state d, the trial court requested argument on possible prejudice. When it ruled on appellant’s a ccess to the assessment, it accepted DCHS’s representation that Hansford’s assessment minim ally referred to appellant and indicated appellant would have t he opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Bishop if necessary. In consideration of all of these cir cumstances, the trial court co mplied with any applicable mandates of due process.

B. T HE TRIAL COURT EMPLOYED THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD , AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DCHS PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

. Appellant next contends that the trial court relied on the inco rrect evidentiary standard in terminating his parental rights and had insufficient evidence t o make that determination. “We first note that ‘absent cl ear evidence to the contrary in t he record, the judgment of a trial court comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the l aw was correctly applied to the facts.’” City of Newport News D ep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Winslow, 40 Va. App. 556, 561, 580 S.E.2d 463, 465 (2003) (quoting Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977)). There is nothing w ithin the record to suppor t that the trial court applied the incorrect evidentiary standard i n this termination proceeding. To the contrary, the trial court clearly recognized the standa rd it was bound to apply. It rule d DCHS met its burden under Code § 16.1-283(B)(1), (2), and (C) and noted that the evidence was clear and convincing. Code § 16.1-283 establishes the procedures and grounds under which a court may order the termination of residual paren tal rights. The statute provides a s follows, in relevant part: B. The residual parental rights of a parent or parents of a ch ild found by the court to be neglected or abused and placed in fost er care as a result of (i) court c ommitment; (ii) an entrustment agreement entered into by the pare nt or parents; or (iii) other voluntary relinquishment by the parent or parents may be terminated if the court finds , based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child and tha t:- 13 - 1. The neglect or abuse suffere d by such child presented a serious and substantial th reat to his life, health or development; and 2. It is not reasonably likel y that the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated so as t o allow the child’s safe return to his parent or parents with in a reasonable period of time. . . .
* * * * * * * C. The residual parental rights of a parent or parents of a ch ild placed in foster care as a result of court commitment, an entrustment agreement entered in to by the parent or parents or other voluntary reli nquishment by the parent or parents may be terminated if the court finds , based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child and tha t:

* * * * * * * 2. The parent or parents, w ithout good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substa ntially the condi tions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical , mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. . . . Winslow, 40 Va. App. at 561-62, 580 S.E.2d at 465-66 (quoting C ode § 16.1-283(B)(1), (B)(2), and (C)(2)). Regarding the best interests of E.H., “[t]his Court has [recog nized] that ‘there is no simple, mechanical, ‘cut and dr ied’ way to apply the best inter ests of the child standard.’” Eaton v. Washington Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 66 Va. App. 317, 331, 785 S.E.2d 231, 238 (2016) (quoting Bristol Dep’t of Soc . Servs. v. Welch, 64 Va. App. 34, 48, 764 S.E.2d 284, 291 (2014)). “The question must be resolve d . . . in light of the facts of e ach case.” Id. (quoting Toombs v. Lynchburg Div. of Soc. Servs., 223 Va. 225, 230, 288 S.E.2d 405 , 407 (1982)). In determining what is in the bestinterests of the child, a [t rial] court must evaluate and consid er many factors, including the ag e and physical and mental condition of the child or children; the age- 14 - and physical and mental condition of the parents; the relations hip existing between each parent and each child; the needs of the c hild or children; the role which each parent has played, and will pl ay in the future, in the upbringing and c are of the child or children ; and such other factors as are necessary in determining the best int erests of the child or children. Id. (quoting Harrison v. Tazewell Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 42 Va. App. 149, 161, 590 S.E.2d 575, 581-82 (2004)). Appellant was not involved in E.H .’s life until October of 201 5 when E.H. was already approximately four months old. Whi le it was clear that appella nt expressed interest in parenting E.H., he was unable to appropriate ly respond to E.H. when Hansf ord’s mental health issues manifested. Appellant would abandon E.H. and exit the home. T his resulted in E.H. being left with Hansford as she continued to unravel. DCHS employees note d that appellant had not learned to minimize the impact of H ansford’s mental health issu es on E.H. A DCHS employee also testified that appellant did not progress to a point where he formed a healthy attachment with E.H. And according to his pare ntal capacity report, Dr. M ansaray noted appellant presented a moderate risk of abuse and neglect to E.H. In addition, appe llant’s housing situation was in flux despite his stable financia l state. Although appellant te stified that he now desires to focus on E.H., he and Hansford were livin g together and intended to r aise E.H. together until the day before trial. After being info rmed that DCHS was considering a doption, appellant developed negative responses to coaching and ultimately disengaged. He d id not visit E.H. in daycare. Further, E.H. is developmenta lly delayed. The trial court had credible evidence and was not plainly wrong when it ruled that termination was in E.H.’s best interests. We need not reach appellant’s contention that the trial court had insufficient evidence to make the abuse and neglect finding to terminate pursuant to Cod e § 16.1-283(B). Appellate courts “decid[e] cases ‘on the best and narrowest ground availa ble.’” McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620, 626 n.4, 701 S.E.2d 58, 61 n.4 (2010 ). “We have previously- 15 - upheld terminations under bot h . . . as well as under one or ei ther of the individual subsections.” Winslow, 40 Va. App. at 563, 580 S .E.2d at 466. Unlike subsect ion (B), a finding of abuse and neglect is not a requirement under (C)(2). Acco rdingly, Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) speaks “retrospectively”-the focus of t he inquiry is whether “the pare nt . . . ‘ha[s] been []willing or []able within a reasonable period of time . . .’ to ‘remedy sub stantially’ the conditions which led to the foster care placement.” Id. at 562-63, 580 S.E.2d at 46 6. Witness testimony demonstrated that appellant could not provide E.H. with “appropriate care an d attention,” “stab ility,” and could not meet all of her needs. Appe llant could not parent E.H. app ropriately when Hansford’s mental health issues manifes ted. Although he could financiallyprovide for E.H., appellant did not create a stable environment for E.H. because he remained in a relationship with Hansford and his housing situation was constantly in flux. In addition, app ellant participated in some services, refused to participate in othe rs, and then disengaged from serv ices he did participate in. The trial court had credible ev idence and was not plainly wron g when it relied on these circumstances to justify its findings. Because the evidence wa s sufficient to uphold termination under (C)(2), we need not address whether subsection (B) was sa tisfied.
C. T HE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT DCHS PROVIDED REASONABLE AND APPROPRIATE SERVICES TO A PPELLANT

. Appellant next argues that he w as not provided adequate service s pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C). Both Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C) state t hat the “[trial] court s hall take
into consideration the efforts made to rehabilitat e the parent or parents by any . . . agencies prior to the child’s initial placement in foster care.” (Emphasis ad ded). Subsection (B) “does not require that [DCHS] offer any ser vices to a parent before reque sting termination of the parent’s rights.” Farrell, 59 Va. App. at 408-09, 719 S.E.2d at 345. “ Subsection (C) . . . require[s] provision of [reasonable and appropr iate] rehabilitative servic es before termination because they do not begin with a prior findi ng of abuse or neglect.” Eaton, 66 Va. App. at 329, 785 S.E.2d at- 16 - 237-38 (quoting Farrell, 59 Va . App. at 409, 719 S.E.2d at 346) . It is important to note that the trial court must make these determinations based upon clear and convincing evidence. Toms, 46 Va. App. at 275, 616 S.E.2d at 774. Appellant cites Thach v. Arlington Cty., 63 Va. App. 157, 754 S .E.2d 922, in asserting that DCHS did not provide adequa te services. In Thach, allegat ions of abuse and conditions involved Thach (the child’s biolog ical mother). The issue was whether Mendoza (the child’s biological father) was required to remedy those conditions “if he was not the cause of those conditions or living in the home when the conditions occurred.” Id. at 163, 754 S.E.2d at 925. The Department of Human Services’ (DHS) primary focus was on providing T hach with services . . . [, and ] DHS’s only recommendations for Mendoza were to complete parenting classes and participate in home-based services. DHS was also concerned that Mendoza, because of his lack of awareness with respect to Thach’s limitations, was unable to protect [the child] from neglect. Id. at 171-72, 754 S.E.2d at 929. This Court noted that although Mendoza did not make “substantia l progress” within the twelve-month window, “significant progress” was made. Id. at 1 72, 754 S.E.2d at 929. In addition, in Thach, this Court not ed that services were not off ered to Mendoza until the child was in foster care for eleven months . This Court emphasized that s ervices were offered “one month shy of the expiration of the statu tory period,” which this Cour t believed was an underlying factor for the trial court’s decision t o delay the termination hearing . This Court found that Mendoza completed parenting classes, the evaluation, and began home-bas ed services and that DHS expressed “no concerns about Men doza’s ability to care for [the child] on his own.” Id. This Court then reversed the trial court’s termination of Mendoza’s parental rights, finding the trial court did not have clear and convi ncing evidence to support its determination. Id. at 173, 754 S.E.2d at 930. The trial court fu rther found that Mendoza prov ided a “satisfactory home for [the- 17 - child’s] younger brother, and the neglectful parent had been re moved from the equation.” Id. It necessarily follows that Thach i s distinguishable. Here, the t rial court denied appellant additional time to correct his shortcomings and recognized that services were provided much earlier than those provided to Me ndoza. Finally, the trial cou rt further found that appellant did not demonstrate the relative progress accomplished by Mendoza i n the Thach case. Even more significant, DCHS remained concerned about appellant’s ability to parent. Pre-removal efforts consisted of DCHS receiving reports regardi ng Hansford. DCHS undertook an investigation. In light of the reports, its inves tigation, and the age of E.H., DCHS removed E.H. from Hansford’s care. Post-removal efforts, pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C ), included providing appellant with case management services, family engagement services, referrals , follow-up services, a parental fitness evaluation, the Fath ers In Touch program, visitation, and parenting education. He received vocational services and housing assistance through oth er entities. Dr. Mansaray recommended: an individual pare nting coach, substance abuse tr eatment, and individual counseling. Appellant refused t o undergo individual counseling , marital counseling, and substance abuse-rela ted services. Appellant took issue with no t being offered services recommended by Dr. Mansaray in addition to vocational and housi ng services. While DCHS provided him and Hansford shared p arenting coaches, it did not offer those other services because appellant indicated he did not need them, he did not wa nt them, or that he was receiving them from other agencies. Appe llant disengaged during visitati ons which is where the parenting coaching occurred. DCHS “is not re quired ‘to force its service s upon an unwilling or disinterested parent.’ ” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 130, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (quoting Barkey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 662, 670, 347 S.E.2d 188, 192 (1986)). The trial court generally- 18 - noted that DCHS met the require ments of the statutes. Thus, th e trial court implicitly found that DCHS provided “reasonable and adequate” services. The trial court had credible ev idence and was not plainly wrong in its determination.
C ONCLUSION The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Hansford’s assessment. If it did, the error was harmless. Further, appellant’s due process rights were not violated because the trial court ruled consistent with any applicable due process re quirements. The trial court applied the correct evidentiary standard s when terminating appellant’s parental rights, and its conclusions were supported by credible evidence and were not pl ainly wrong. Furthermore, DCHS was not required to provide appellant services prior to E. H.’s placement in foster care. Finally, regarding the services t hat were provided to appellant while E.H. was in foster care, the trial court had credible evid ence to support its finding and wa s not plainly wrong in its determination. Thus, we affirm the trial court. Affirmed.