UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6457

ROY HUNT, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

SANDHIR, M.D., Powhatan Correctional Center; THOMPSON, M.D.,

Wallens Ridge State Prison; LUCY DOSSETT, M.D., International

Radiology Group, LLC; STANFORD, Registered Nurse, Wallens

Ridge State Prison; COLLINS, Registered Nurse, Wallens Ridge

State Prison; CLARK, Registered Nurse, Wallens Ridge State

Prison; BROWN, Correctional Officer Sergeant, Wallens Ridge

State Prison; DAVID ROBINSON, Warden, Wallens Ridge State

Prison; FRED SCHILLING, Health Service Director; KING, M.D.;

A. WARREN,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

JOHN DOE, on 2/23/06 M.D., Powhatan Correctional Center; A.J.

UNKNOWN, on 2/2/06, M.D., Powhatan Correctional Center,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior

District Judge. (3:06-cv-00539-RLW)

Submitted: August 27, 2008 Decided: September 29, 2008

Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
2

Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished per

curiam opinion.

Roy Hunt, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Carlene Booth Johnson, PERRY LAW

FIRM, PC, Dillwyn, Virginia; Rodney Seth Dillman, HANCOCK, DANIEL,

JOHNSON & NAGLE, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia; Susan Bland Curwood,

Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Roy Hunt, Jr., appeals from the district court’s order

granting the various Defendants’ motions to dismiss and motions for

summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) suit, alleging

deliberate indifference regarding his fractured elbow. We affirm

the district court’s order as to all Defendants except for Dr.

Thompson. As to Thompson, we vacate the district court’s order and

remand for further proceedings.

Hunt’s complaint alleged that, after he fractured his

elbow, he received improper treatment at two different

institutions. With regard to Thompson, Hunt asserted that Thompson

took him off pain medication on April 30, 2006, and only resumed

his medication when he was ordered to by “Richmond” on July 16.

Hunt describes his pain as “unthinkable” and asserted that his

elbow was not healing, but instead was getting worse. He alleged

that he continued to seek medical treatment or medication to no

avail. In addition, Hunt alleged that Thompson refused him pain

medication, at least in part, because Thompson was annoyed that

Hunt had been transferred while he had an injury and upset that

Hunt had been filing grievances. Further, Hunt averred that, after

he reinjured his elbow in late July, he informed Thompson that he

had been unable to sleep, due to the severe pain, for four days.

In response, Thompson did not examine him and instead told him that

he would be seeing a orthopedic specialist and could take up the
4

issue with him. Finally, Hunt states that he told Thompson that

his elbow and knee braces had been confiscated by a nurse, that

they had been prescribed by other doctors, and that he was in pain

without them. Thompson allegedly responded that Hunt would have to

take that up with the nurse. The district court granted Thompson’s

motion to dismiss.

We review the district court’s decision to grant a motion

to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo. Brooks v. City

of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996). The factual

allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint must be accepted as true

and those facts must be construed in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244

(4th Cir. 1999). Although a complaint need not contain detailed

allegations, the facts alleged must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007).

We find that Hunt has sufficiently alleged that he

suffered from a serious medical need — a fractured elbow. See

Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that

broken hand is serious injury and permanent harm or “lingering

disability” could result absent proper evaluation, possible

realignment, and treatment). In addition, Hunt asserts that his

medical treatment was delayed based on non-medical reasons,

specifically that Thompson was inconvenienced and annoyed by both
*

On the ninth day, Hunt filed the instant complaint.

5

Hunt’s grievances and his initial transfer. See Monmouth County

Corr. v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346-47 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that

deliberate indifference can be shown when medical treatment is

delayed for non-medical reasons). Moreover, Hunt contends that,

after his fractured elbow was reinjured, he was not treated by

Thompson for at least nine days* causing him terrible pain and

rendering him unable to sleep. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t., 865 F.2d

198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989) (failure to treat dental problems for

three months); H.C. ex rel. Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080,

1086-87 (11th Cir. 1986) (three-day delay in medical treatment for

shoulder injury); Fields v. Gander, 734 F.2d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir.

1984) (failure to treat infected tooth causing “severe pain” for

twelve days).

Construing all the allegations in the complaint in the

light most favorable to Hunt, we conclude that Hunt has stated a

claim against Thompson for deliberate indifference to his fractured

elbow. He alleges that Thompson ended his pain medication because

he was irritated that Hunt had been transferred; that he delegated

the decision as to whether Hunt should be permitted to use

prescribed braces to a nurse; and that, when Hunt reinjured his

fractured elbow, Thompson did not treat him for at least nine days.

These allegations are sufficient to state a claim that Thompson

knew of Hunt’s injuries and chose to ignore them, or at least to
6

unnecessarily prolong Hunt’s pain. Accordingly, we vacate this

portion of the district court’s order and remand for further

proceedings. 

With regard to the remaining Defendants, we have

carefully reviewed the record and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district

court. See Hunt v. Sandhir, No. 3:06-cv-00539 (E.D. Va. Feb. 29,

2008). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART