alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §1929. Cadets; appointment as ensign

The President may, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint as ensigns in the Coast Guard all cadets who shall graduate from the Academy. Ensigns so commissioned on the same date shall take rank according to their proficiency as shown by the order of their merit at date of graduation.

(Aug. 4, 1949, ch. 393, 63 Stat. 508, §185; renumbered §1929, Pub. L. 115–282, title I, §110(b), Dec. 4, 2018, 132 Stat. 4212.)

#### Historical and Revision Notes

Based on title 14, U.S.C., 1946 ed., §15a–1 (May 25, 1943, ch. 99, 57 Stat. 84).

Said section has been divided. The proviso is incorporated in section 182 of this title. The other part is incorporated in this section.

The last sentence of this section is new as a statute; it makes statutory what has been the practice of years, and is similar to the third sentence of title 34, U.S.C., 1946 ed., §1057, applicable to graduates of the Naval Academy. 81st Congress, House Report No. 557.

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2018—Pub. L. 115–282 renumbered section 185 of this title as this section.
[No. 8405.]

#### McGrew v. Lamb.

1. Conveyance of *Lands'*— Not *Naming Any Grantee,*conveys nothing. (463, 464.)

2. Appeal and *Ereoe*— A *Correct Judgment,*will be affirmed, whether the theory of the court below was right or wrong. (464.)

*Error to Morgan District Court.*Hon. H. P. Burke, Judge.

Mr. James E. Jewel, for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Johnson & Robinson, and Mr. Walter S. Coen, for defendants in error.

Chief Justice Gabbert

delivered the opinion of the court.

*463Plaintiff in error commenced an action against defendants in error for a mandatory injunction to compel the defendant sheriff to issue him a certificate of redemption from a sale of lots under a special execution, and to cancel a quit claim deed purporting to convey the lots in question to defendant Goodman. At the conclusion of the testimony on the part of plaintiff, a motion by defendants for a nonsuit was sustained.

The only question necessary to determine is whether the testimony established that plaintiff had any interest whatever in the lots, for unless he had some interest, which under the statute relating to redemptions from execution sales would entitle him to redeem, the judgment should be affirmed. If he had any such interest it is by virtue of a deed executed by one Cook, in whom the title was vested, and delivered to a George T. Bennett with the name of the grantee blank. Bennett afterwards delivered this deed to S. W. Beggs in the same condition; and in which the name of the grantee never was inserted. Beggs was the grantor of plaintiff, and unless the above facts vested title in him, the title, according to the record, is in defendant Goodman. It is axiomatic that to every deed there must be at least two parties, one capable of conveying and the other of receiving, and that a deed without a grantee is practically no deed at all. Warvelle on Vendors, Sec. 481. Whether a deed which does not contain the name of a grantee is void, as held in some jurisdictions, need not be determined, for clearly it is invalid for any purpose, and does not pass any interest until the name of the grantee is inserted therein. *Allen vs. Withrow,*110 U. S. 119, 28 L. Ed. 90, 3 Sup. Ct. 517; *Lund vs. Thackery,*18 S. D. 113, 99 N. W. 856; 13 Cyc. 540. See also *Herr vs. Denver M. & M. Co.,*13 Colo. 406, 22 Pac 770, 6 L. R. A. 641, where the question is discussed to some extent.

The deed from Cook delivered to Bennett did not name a grantee. In this condition Bennett delivered it to Beggs, *464and the name of a grantee never was inserted, so that in the circumstances of this case Beggs never acquired any title and his deed to plaintiff conveyed nothing.

Other question are argued by plaintiff in error which in our opinion are without merit and need not be considered.

The learned trial judge appears to have decided the cause upon a question other than the one we have based our conclusion upon. . Whether his theory was right or wrong is immaterial when his conclusion was unquestionably correct. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

'Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Bailey concur.
# C_2015034EN.01002102.xml

| 2.2.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 34/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.2.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 34/21

---

Judgment of the General Court of 9 December 2014 — IRO v Commission

(Case T-69/10) (1)

1

((Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - Market for concrete reinforcing bars in bars or coils - Decision finding an infringement of Article 65 CS after the expiry of the ECSC Treaty on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 - Fixing of prices and payment terms - Limiting or controlling output or sales - Infringement of essential procedural requirements - Legal basis - Investigation of the case - Definition of the market - Infringement of Article 65 CS - Fines - Extenuating circumstances - Proportionality))

(2015/C 034/23)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Industrie Riunite Odolesi SpA (IRO) (Odolo, Italy) (represented by: A. Giardina and P. Tomassi, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented initially by R. Sauer and B. Gencarelli, subsequently by R. Sauer, R. Striani and T. Vecchi, acting as Agents, assisted by P. Manzini, lawyer)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application for annulment of Commission Decision C(2009) 7492 final of 30 September 2009 relating to a proceeding under Article 65 CS (Case COMP/37.956 — Reinforcing bars, readoption), as amended and supplemented by Commission Decision C(2009) 9912 final of 8 December 2009, in which the Commission imposed a fine of EUR 3,58 million on the applicant for infringement of Article 65(1) CS.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Industrie Riunite Odolesi SpA (IRO) to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Industrie Riunite Odolesi SpA (IRO) to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 100, 17.4.2010.

1

---
### §2102. Private enforcement

#### (a) In general

If any person violates section 2101(a) or (b) of this title or a rule under section 2101(c) of this title, any interested person may commence a civil action for injunctive relief restraining such violation, and for damages, in any United States District Court for a district in which the defendant resides, has an agent, transacts business, or wherever venue is proper under section 1391 of title 28. In any such action, the court may award the costs of the suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees.

#### (b) Trademark violations

If the violation of section 2101(a) or (b) of this title or a rule under section 2101(c) of this title also involves unauthorized use of registered trademarks belonging to a collectibles certification service, the owner of such trademarks shall have, in addition to the remedies provided in subsection (a), all rights provided under sections 34, 35, and 36 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1116, 1117, and 1118) for violations of such Act.

(Pub. L. 93–167, §3, Nov. 29, 1973, 87 Stat. 686; Pub. L. 113–288, §2(2), Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3281.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

The Trademark Act of 1946, referred to in subsec. (b), is act July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, also popularly known as the Lanham Act, which is classified generally to chapter 22 (§1051 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1051 of this title and Tables.

#### Amendments

2014—Pub. L. 113–288 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), inserted heading, substituted ", has an agent, transacts business, or wherever venue is proper under section 1391 of title 28" for "or has an agent", and added subsec. (b).

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section applicable only to imitation political items and imitation numismatic items manufactured after Nov. 29, 1973, see section 8 of Pub. L. 93–167, set out as a note under section 2101 of this title.
# C_2012013EN.01001301.xml

| 14.1.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 13/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.1.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 13/13

---

Judgment of the General Court of 23 November 2011 — Monster Cable Products v OHIM — Live Nation (Music) UK (MONSTER ROCK)

(Case T-216/10) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for Community word mark MONSTER ROCK - Earlier national mark MONSTERS OF ROCK - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Similarity of the goods - Similarity of the signs - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

2012/C 13/25

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Monster Cable Products, Inc. (Brisbane, California, United States) (represented by: W. Baron von der Osten-Sacken, O. Günzel and A. Wenninger-Lenz, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (represented by: R. Pethke, Agent)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervener before the General Court: Live Nation (Music) UK Ltd (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: S. Malynicz, Barrister, S. Britton and J. Summers, Solicitors)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervener before the General Court:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 24 February 2010 (Case R 216/2009-1), concerning opposition proceedings between Live Nation (Music) UK Ltd and Monster Cable Products, Inc.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Monster Cable Products, Inc. to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Monster Cable Products, Inc. to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 195, 17.7.2010.

1

---
### §1547. Rules and regulations; employees

In the performance of his functions and duties under the provisions of sections 1544 to 1548 of this title, the Secretary of Commerce is authorized—

(a) To prescribe, amend, and repeal such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary, and to accept contributions for carrying out the purposes of said sections; and

(b) To employ, subject to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, one special assistant and not to exceed five artists and illustrators.

(July 19, 1940, ch. 642, §4, 54 Stat. 774; Oct. 28, 1949, ch. 782, title XI, §1106(a), 63 Stat. 972; Pub. L. 93–193, §2, Dec. 19, 1973, 87 Stat. 765.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 18c of Title 16, Conservation.

Provisions of par. (b) authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to employ "without regard to the civil-service laws" were omitted as such employment is subject to the civil service laws unless specifically excepted by those laws or by laws enacted subsequent to Executive Order 8743, Apr. 23, 1941, issued by the President pursuant to the Act of Nov. 26, 1940, ch. 919, title I, §1, 54 Stat. 1211, which covered most excepted positions into the classified (competitive) civil service. The Order is set out as a note under section 3301 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.

"Chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5" substituted in par. (b) for "the Classification Act of 1949, as amended" on authority of Pub. L. 89–554, §7(b), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 631, the first section of which enacted Title 5.

#### Amendments

1949—Par. (b). Act Oct. 28, 1949, substituted "Classification Act of 1949" for "Classification Act of 1923".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Repeals

Act Oct. 28, 1949, ch. 782, cited as a credit to this section, was repealed (subject to a savings clause) by Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, §8, 80 Stat. 632, 655.

#### Transfer of Functions

Secretary of Commerce substituted for Secretary of the Interior in view of transfer of functions to Secretary of Commerce from Secretary of the Interior by section 2 of Pub. L. 93–193. See Transfer of Functions note set out under section 1544 of this title.
### §290d. Sale of standard reference data; cost recovery; proceeds subject to National Institute of Standards and Technology

Standard reference data conforming to standards established by the Secretary may be made available and sold by the Secretary or by a person or agency designated by him. To the extent practicable and appropriate, the prices established for such data may reflect the cost of collection, compilation, evaluation, publication, and dissemination of the data, including administrative expenses; and the amounts received shall be subject to the Act of March 3, 1901, as amended [15 U.S.C. 271 et seq.].

(Pub. L. 90–396, §5, July 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 340.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Act of March 3, 1901, as amended, referred to in text, means act Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 872, 31 Stat. 1449, which is classified generally to chapter 7 (§271 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.
Editorial Note on Part 28
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 28 appear at 76 FR 76873, Dec. 9, 2011.

§ 28.63 Closing the record. ( a ) When there is a hearing, the record shall be closed at the conclusion of the hearing. However, when the administrative judge allows the parties to submit argument, briefs or documents previously identified for introduction into evidence, the record shall be left open for such time as the administrative judge grants for that purpose.
( b ) Once the record is closed, no additional evidence or argument shall be accepted into the record except upon a showing that new and material evidence has become available which was not available despite due diligence prior to the closing of the record. However, the administrative judge shall make part of the record any motions for attorney fees, any supporting documentation, and determinations thereon, and any approved correction to the transcript.
[58 FR 61992, Nov. 23, 1993. Redesignated at 68 FR 69302, Dec. 12, 2003]
### §205j. Financial and administrative services; source and reimbursement

Financial and administrative services, including those related to budgeting, accounting, financial reporting, personnel, and procurement, and such other staff services as may be needed by the Board, may be obtained by the Board from the Secretary of Commerce or other appropriate sources in the Federal Government. Payment for such services shall be made by the Board, in advance or by reimbursement, from funds of the Board in such amounts as may be agreed upon by the Chairman of the Board and by the source of the services being rendered.

(Pub. L. 94–168, §11, Dec. 23, 1975, 89 Stat. 1012.)
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-10988

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

TONY JAY BREEDLOVE,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:10-CR-26-1

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and SMITH and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Tony Jay Breedlove appeals from his conviction of escape. He argues that

the evidence was insufficient to support the district court’s finding that he

committed the offense of possession of stolen mail while on escape status. The

finding that he committed this offense disqualified him from receiving a fourlevel downward adjustment to his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 2P1.1(b)(3), which applies to defendants who escape from halfway houses or

similar facilities. Within his sufficiency argument, he also contends that the

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 30, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 10-10988 Document: 00511525769 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/30/2011
No. 10-10988

Government violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) by arguing that his prior

stolen mail conviction was relevant to the issue whether he committed a stolen

mail offense while on escape status.

Breedlove did not raise his Rule 404(b) argument in the district court; our

review therefore is for plain error. See United States v. Williams, 620 F.3d 483,

488-89 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1534 (2011). Rule 404(b) does not

apply to sentencing proceedings. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3) (stating that the

Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing). Breedlove cannot show

error as to Rule 404(b), plain or otherwise.

We “review[] de novo the district court’s guidelines interpretations and

review[] for clear error the district court’s findings of fact.” United States v. Le,

512 F.3d 128, 134 (5th Cir. 2007). The district court makes factual findings at

sentencing under the preponderance of the evidence standard. United States v.

Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005). The facts as set out in the record were

sufficient for the district court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that

Breedlove knowingly possessed stolen mail inside a bag that was in his car when

he was arrested. On the facts found by the district court, Breedlove committed

the federal felony offense of possession of stolen mail while on escape status. See

18 U.S.C. § 1708. The district court did not err by denying Breedlove a

downward adjustment pursuant to § 2P1.1(b)(3).

AFFIRMED.

2

Case: 10-10988 Document: 00511525769 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/30/2011
# C_2006308EN.01000301.xml

| 16.12.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 308/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.12.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 308/3

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.4467 — Blackstone/PAI/United Biscuits)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2006/C 308/03)

On 12 December 2006, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition web site (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/ ). This web site provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes. |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition web site (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/ ). This web site provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes.

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32006M4667. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu) |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32006M4667. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)

---
###### Editorial Note on Part 900

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 900 appear at 67 FR 34602, May 15, 2002.

#### § 900.199 Does FTCA coverage extend to health care practitioners to whom staff privileges have been extended in contractor health care facilities operated under a self-determination contract on the condition that such practitioner provide health services to IHS beneficiaries covered by FTCA?

Yes, health care practitioners with staff privileges in a facility operated by a contractor are covered when they perform services to IHS beneficiaries. Such personnel are not covered when providing services to non-IHS beneficiaries.
# C_2007056EN.01003002.xml

| 10.3.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 56/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.3.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 56/30

---

Action brought on 2 January 2007 — Apache Footwear and Apache II Footwear v Council

(Case T-1/07)

(2007/C 56/60)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Apache Footwear Ltd (Guangzhou, China) and Apache II Footwear Ltd (Qingyuan, China) (represented by: O. Prost and S. Ballschmiede, lawyers)

Applicants:

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Defendant:

Form of order sought

| — | Annul Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006 of 5 October 2006 (1), imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain footwear with uppers of leather originating in the People's Republic of China and Vietnam as long as it imposes 16.5 % duty on imports of products manufactured by the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006 of 5 October 2006 (1), imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain footwear with uppers of leather originating in the People's Republic of China and Vietnam as long as it imposes 16.5 % duty on imports of products manufactured by the applicant;

1

| — | ask the Council to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

ask the Council to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By the present application, the applicants seek partial annulment, pursuant to Article 230(4) EC, of the contested regulation to the extent that it imposes definitive anti-dumping duties on their imports into the European Union.

The applicants advance three pleas in law in support of their claims:

First, the applicants submit that the Council, when examining whether the applicants met the criteria to be granted Market Economy Treatment (‘MET’), pursuant to Article 2(7)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (hereinafter, ‘the Basic Regulation’), violated the latter, as well as its obligation of motivation under Article 253 EC, insofar as it allegedly failed to examine whether the applicants were subject to significant state interference.

Second, the applicants claim that the Council, by refusing to take into account certain additional key information, violated its obligation of due diligence and proper administration, and consequently made a manifest error of appraisal.

Third, the applicants contend that the Council by refusing to exclude children's footwear from the scope of the measures at the stage of the definitive regulation, violated Article 21 of the Basic Regulation, its obligation of motivation under Article 253 EC and made a manifest error of appraisal.

---

(1)  OJ L 275, 2006, p. 1.

1

---
#### § 125.1 Promulgation.

This Part is prescribed and promulgated as the regulations governing the preservation of records by public utilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission and by licensees holding licenses issued by the Commission, to the extent and in the manner set forth therein.

[Order 617, 65 FR 48155, Aug. 7, 2000]