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U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA: BALANCING

PRIORITIES (PART II)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST 

AND CENTRAL ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 26, 2006

Serial No. 109–186

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chair 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Vice Chair 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

YLEEM POBLETE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

YEVGENY GUREVICH, Professional Staff Member 

DAVID ADAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

LEE COHEN, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State .................................................... 1

Mr. Drew W. Luten, Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe 

and Eurasia, U.S. Agency for International Development ............................... 9

The Honorable James MacDougall, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 22

Ms. Elizabeth Dugan, Vice President, International Republican Institute ........ 26

Ms. Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate, Russian and Eurasian Program, 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ................................................... 32

Ms. Paula Schriefer, Director of Rights Programs, Freedom House ................... 41

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Richard A. Boucher: Prepared statement .................................... 3

Mr. Drew W. Luten: Prepared statement .............................................................. 11

The Honorable James MacDougall: Prepared statement ..................................... 23

Ms. Elizabeth Dugan: Prepared statement ........................................................... 29

Ms. Martha Brill Olcott: Prepared statement ....................................................... 36

Ms. Paula Schriefer: Prepared statement .............................................................. 44

(1)

U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA: BALANCING 

PRIORITIES (PART II) 

THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND CENTRAL ASIA,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:54 p.m. in room 

2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thaddeus McCotter 

presiding. 

Mr . MCCOTTER. I call this meeting to order. We apologize for the 

delay. We were voting. 

I would like to express the sentiments of the Chairwoman Ms. 

Ros-Lehtinen, who was called home to Florida for a family emergency, but could not be here. 

At this point, I would like to introduce the witnesses. We have 

the Honorable Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary for South 

and Central Asian Affairs; Mr . Drew W. Luten, acting assistant 

administrator, and Mr . James MacDougall, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense on panel 1. On panel 2, we 

have Ms. Paula Schriefer, Director of Programs, Freedom House, 

Ms. Elizabeth Dugan, vice president, International Republican Institute, and Ms. Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate, Russian and 

Eurasian Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

With that said, I would like to begin with the panel. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD A. BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr . BOUCHER. Thank you, sir. Mr . Chairman, thank for having 

us today. And if I can I have got a longer statement I would like 

to be entered into the record, if I could give you a brief version of 

the remarks? 

Mr . MCCOTTER. Without objection, I would like to have your remarks and all witnesses, if they have prepared remarks, entered 

into the record as well as those of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you, sir. This region is very strategically 

important to the United States. We are looking to support the development of fully sovereign, democratic and prosperous nations in 

Central Asia who cooperate with the United States and cooperate 

with one another to advance regional security and stability. The 

strategy rests on three integrated pillars: Security cooperation, 

2

commercial economic and energy interests, and political and economic reform. 

We see the three pillars as mutually reinforcing. General stability, in our view, requires a process of democratic change, and 

stability, in turn, provides for economic develop and prosperity. 

Thus we are determined to pursue all three sets of interests in a 

balanced way. The people of these countries deserve choices and be 

opportunities so they can exercise their independence, not by relying on one market or power but by having a variety of options. 

Simply put, our policy is to help them have options. 

The opening of Afghanistan has transformed that nation from an 

obstacle that separated south and Central Asia into a bridge that 

can connect the two, and that, in turn, opens up new and exciting 

possibilities. Our efforts to integrate south and Central Asia are 

aimed at helping the countries in the region prosper through trade, 

communications, and people to people contact. U.S. assistance is essential to achieving these policy goals. We are making an effort to 

think more regionally about our assistance efforts by increasing our 

regional allocations of Freedom Support Act funding and of our economic support fund. 

In fiscal year 2006, the U.S. Government has budgeted approxi- mately $170 million in assistance to Central Asia, focusing on 

building civil society capacity, promoting economic and democratic 

reform, and as I said, promoting regional security and regional integration. All the countries of Central Asia have as you know provided valuable support to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, whether it is through over flights or refueling supports or, in 

some cases, basic arrangements. 

In turn, our military assistance programs including international 

military education and training, have been essential tools in helping them modernize their forces and become interoperable with 

NATO partners. We are also actively working with all five governments as well as Afghanistan to put in place safeguards against 

trafficking and weapons of mass destruction and against trafficking 

in narcotics which is one threat to the region. 

The second set of policy priorities in Central Asia involves energy 

and commercial interests. One of our leading objectives is to fund 

greatly the expanded Afghan power grid with connections to energy 

sources in Central Asia. It is a winning solution for all of them, 

providing much needed energy to Afghanistan, serving as a major 

source out of future revenue for countries like Tajikistan and 

Kyrgyzstan. And we hope eventually expanding to the north into 

Kazakhstan and to the south down into Pakistan and India to really tie the power grids together of the region. 

A third pillar is promoting freedom through democratic reform. 

Our assistance programs support democratic and economic reform 

in Central Asia and continue to yield positive results in a challenging environment. We are helping to create better business environments, to reform education to bolster independent media, to encourage the rule of law, develop civil society, improve health care, 

fight corruption, develop democratic institutions, and support small 

and medium size enterprises. All these things contribute to the diversity of the society, contribute to a more open society, and contribute to economic growth. 

3

Fundamental to all this is education. We place special emphasis 

on education. People feel deeply about the need for education in 

order to build a better future, and supporting education is perhaps 

one of the best ways we can strengthen and keep our relationships 

with the people, even when government-to-government relationships get rocky. 

I would like to close by saying that of all the things I have just 

spoken about works toward a vision that Secretary Rice has articulated for a stable and democratic Central Asia that cooperates between its neighbors and cooperates in a broader region for the mutual benefit of all of us. These policy objectives are ambitious, but 

we cannot afford to fail. We know the threats of terrorism, of 

drugs, of trafficking, of weapons of mass destruction in this region. 

It is important that we succeed and we look forward to working 

with you in this very important effort. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Boucher follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD A. BOUCHER, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Madam Chairman and Members of the Committee: Thank you for inviting me 

here today to talk with you about our policy in Central Asia. I would like to briefly 

discuss the challenges we face and how we plan to overcome them in this strategically important region. 

The United States supports the development of fully sovereign, democratic and 

prosperous nations in Central Asia, cooperating with America and with one another 

to advance regional security and stability. Our strategy rests on three integrated 

pillars: security cooperation; our commercial and energy interests; and political and 

economic reform. We see these three pillars as mutually reinforcing. Genuine stability, in our view, requires a process of democratic change, and stability, in turn, 

provides for economic development and prosperity. Thus, we are determined to pursue all three sets of interests simultaneously in a balanced way. The people of these 

countries, strategically and individually, deserve choices and opportunities so that 

they may exercise their independence—not by relying on one market or power, but 

by having a variety of options. Our policy is to help them have options. 

The recent transfer of responsibility at the Department of State for the Central 

Asian states into our new Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs has provided 

a fresh perspective to our view on how these countries fit into the broader region. 

We have long sought to support efforts among these states to enhance regional cooperation in trade, energy and border security. Progress has been spotty, and at 

times has moved in reverse, due to border disputes or the unilateral imposition of 

border controls and restrictive trade regimes. Yet I am convinced that we are now 

seeing a new paradigm take shape, helped by a shift in the region’s strategic landscape. The opening of Afghanistan has transformed it from an obstacle separating 

Central from South Asia into a bridge connecting the two. And this in turn opens 

exciting new possibilities. 

The Central Asian states recognize that it is very much in their long-term economic and security interests to build linkages to the south that complement their 

existing ties to the north and west. They are used to conducting foreign policy based 

on the assumption that ‘‘bad things’’—drugs, terrorists, instability—come from the 

south, and must be stopped. But now, while these threats remain, Central Asians 

are increasingly looking south for trade partners, export markets and opportunities 

for security and law enforcement cooperation. 

Last October, when Secretary Rice visited Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 

Kazakhstan, she observed that their citizens see Afghanistan as a part of Central 

Asia. They understand they have a huge stake in Afghanistan’s future, just as we 

do. They understand that a stable Afghanistan, anchored in the broader region, will 

be good for their own future stability. And they see the potential economic benefits 

of reaching new markets to the south, in Pakistan and India. 

When I attended a conference on trade and development in Greater Central Asian 

in Kabul last month, I heard the same message and saw the potential for the Central Asian states to help break Afghanistan out of its geographic isolation and give 

it access to global markets. Our goal is to revive ancient ties between South and 

4

Central Asia and to help create new links in the areas of trade, transport, democracy, energy and communications. At the same time, we seek to preserve and enhance the ties of Central Asian countries to Europe, especially through organizations like NATO and its Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as the important interests Japan 

has in Central Asia. While we seek to expand the new relationship between Central 

and South Asia, we also recognize the well-established historical, cultural and linguistic ties between the countries of Central Asia and the rest of the former Soviet 

Union, including Russia and the growing relationship with China. In short, our efforts to connect South and Central Asia are aimed at helping all countries in the 

region to prosper through trade, communications, and people-to-people contacts. 

Prosperous countries that trade and share ideas are more likely to be stable, peaceful, and less vulnerable to the call of extremism. 

THE ROLE OF U.S. ASSISTANCE

To ensure a democratic and peaceful future for Afghanistan, we must address the 

dual challenges of narcotics trafficking and economic development. Unless we look 

for regional solutions to these challenges, the possibility exists that the Afghan 

economy will remain reliant on drugs and foreign assistance. To prevent this, we 

need to focus on building a sustainable economic system integrating Central and 

South Asian markets. 

Central Asia faces numerous threats to its stability, including Islamic extremism, 

a population that remains poor and has little economic opportunity, the post-Soviet 

legacy of authoritarianism, public perceptions of injustice, and high levels of corruption. As a consequence, nurturing both economic and democratic reform in the region is difficult, even daunting. Furthermore, the repressive and backward-looking 

authoritarian regimes in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan may further challenge our 

efforts to integrate the region and encourage reform and development. 

March 24 marked the one-year anniversary of the ‘‘Tulip Revolution’’ in 

Kyrgyzstan. Nine months ago, the Kyrgyz people held an election that, while failing 

to meet international standards, was judged by many to be the freest and fairest 

in Central Asia’s modern history. Since then, the people of Kyrgyzstan have worked 

hard to consolidate the gains of their democratic experiment. Democratic institutions remain fragile, however, pending constitutional, judicial and other reforms 

critical to ensuring the people of Kyrgyzstan overcome the challenge of organized 

crime and corruption to achieve democratic stability. 

Kazakhstan, an economic success story, is rapidly becoming one of the top energyproducing nations in the world. We look to Kazakhstan to be a true leader in the 

region by further advancing democratically, together with continued progress on 

economic development and infrastructure investment. 

U.S. assistance is essential to achieving our policy goals in Central Asia and is 

designed to address threats to stability while promoting long-term economic and 

democratic reforms. We are making an effort to think more regionally about our assistance efforts by increasing our regional allocations of Freedom Support Act funding and our Economic Support Funds, and we should focus more on agriculture, and 

other projects that serve people in the region directly. 

In order to support foreign policy goals in this quick-changing environment, we 

continuously evaluate our assistance strategies, adjusting programs to fit changing 

realities, and working to ensure that our programs are cost-effective. In Fiscal Year 

2006, the U.S. Government has budgeted approximately $170 million in assistance 

to Central Asia, focusing our efforts on building civil society capacity, and promoting 

economic and democratic reform and institutions. We also actively promote regional 

security through non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics cooperation. 

Security Cooperation 

All of the countries of Central Asia have provided valuable support to Operation 

Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan through over-flights, refueling support, and, in 

some cases, basing arrangements. We especially appreciate Kyrgyzstan’s support for 

the Manas Airbase to support Coalition operations. U.S. military assistance programs such as International Military Education and Training and Foreign Military 

Financing, have been essential tools in modernizing the regions’ military forces and 

creating NATO-interoperable partners. 

Central Asia is a geographic crossroads and therefore an attractive potential route 

for trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, missiles and other related technologies. We are actively working with all five governments as well as Afghanistan 

to put in place safeguards against such trafficking. Since their independence, the 

countries of Central Asia have also been an integral part of the United States’ nonVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:22 Aug 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\042606\27230.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
5

proliferation strategy. In fact, Kazakhstan was one of the first countries included 

in Nunn-Lugar Counter-proliferation assistance, and their cooperation with the 

United States is a benchmark. 

We are pleased that most of the countries of Central Asia have endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative, providing a strong deterrent to the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction. The Departments of State, Defense, and Energy provide nonproliferation assistance in Central Asia that engages former weapons experts in transparent, sustainable and cooperative civilian research projects. We also 

help deliver basic training and equipment to border guards and customs officials to 

detect nuclear materials transit and secure borders. In Afghanistan, we are developing the Border Management Initiative that will partner with the Government of 

Afghanistan and other international donors to develop integrated border facilities 

which will improve border security and increase government revenues from customs 

fees. 

In addition, we are working multilaterally to stop the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan through Central Asia to markets in Russia, Europe and beyond. The Central Asia Regional Information Coordination Center, being established in 

Kazakhstan, will play a crucial role in the fight against narcotics trafficking. 

Throughout the region, we have funded the construction of new border crossing 

checkpoints, including most recently two in Turkmenistan on the Iranian and Afghan borders, respectively. 

In Tajikistan we have a good partner in the fight against illicit narcotics. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Tajikistan boasts 

a very high narcotics seizure rate—the government seized over 2,300 kilograms of 

heroin and 1,100 kilograms of opium in 2005. Since the withdrawal of Russian Border Forces from the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border last year, we have intensified our 

assistance efforts with European Union partners to build and equip a network of 

outposts on that border and to ensure the border troops receive training, equipment, 

and salaries to do their jobs. In January of this year, with the assistance of our military forces in the region, we provided emergency assistance to Tajik border forces 

guarding the Afghan border during the long, cold winter. These efforts, together 

with assistance to the drug control agencies in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, are bolstering the capability to interdict traffickers of illicit materials and have already 

yielded positive results. 

Regional Integration 

The second set of our policy priorities in Central Asia involves our energy and 

commercial interests. To advance regional economic development and integration, 

we would like to have a strategic dialogue with the countries of the region, including 

Afghanistan. In partnership with multilateral development banks and other donors—we want to help build new links among the countries of the broader region 

and connect them more closely to the rest of the world. One of our leading objectives 

is to fund a greatly expanded Afghan power grid, with connections to energy sources 

in Central Asia. It’s a winning solution for both sides, providing much-needed energy to Afghanistan and serving as a major source of future revenue for countries 

like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 

Our vision includes new energy routes that will ensure the next generation of 

South and Central Asian entrepreneurs have access to the resources they need to 

prosper. We want to give South Asians access to the vast and rapidly-growing energy resources in Central Asia, whether they are oil and gas in Kazakhstan and 

Turkmenistan, thermal power in Uzbekistan, or hydropower in Tajikistan and 

Kyrgyzstan. This vision is within our grasp. Within the next few years, we expect 

to see private investment lead to the establishment of a 500 kilovolt power line 

transmitting much-needed electricity from Central Asia across Afghanistan to Pakistan and India. 

Our assistance can foster inter- and intra-regional energy trade, investment, and 

competition through technical assistance and coordination with relevant international financial institutions. Likewise, diversification of Central Asian economies 

and the growth of small- and medium-size enterprises outside the energy sector can 

help create new jobs in the region to extend prosperity. When possible, assistance 

programs should increasingly incorporate regional links, whether the focus is roads, 

energy, education, or even training exchanges to include participants from neighboring countries. 

Through diplomacy and assistance, we are already doing much to realize this vision. Afghan road improvements have dramatically reduced driving times, thus increasing regional trade. Next year’s opening of a U.S.-funded $36.5 million TajikAfghan bridge with customs and border security facilities on each side, linked to the 

Tajik national highway system by a Japanese-funded road rehabilitation project, 

6

will create a safe and reliable ground transportation link within the region. Central 

Asia has an abundance of existing and potential oil, gas, and electricity sources that 

the growing economies of South Asia need. Together with other donors, we are exploring ways to export electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 

India. 

We support establishing multiple, commercially viable pipelines and other new 

energy transportation routes, because the United States believes that diversification 

of energy transport routes to and from Central Asia increases stability and energy 

security, not just regionally but throughout the world. In June, the U.S. Trade and 

Development Agency will host a forum on the Central Asian electricity sector, which 

we hope will spur investment and promote further regional cooperation. We are also 

funding feasibility studies in energy, transportation, and telecommunications, and 

coordinating with the International Financial Institutions and other donors. 

Democratic and Market Reform 

The third key pillar of our strategy for Central Asia is to promote freedom 

through democratic and economic reform, because long-term stability comes from 

democratic governments that enjoy the trust of their people and that are accountable to them. To paraphrase President Bush, all people, given a free choice, will 

choose democracy over tyranny. We actively support democracy and civil society in 

the region not only because it is the right thing to do, but because it creates conditions that lead to greater political and economic opportunity. 

Our assistance programs supporting democratic and economic reform in Central 

Asia continue to yield positive results in a challenging environment by creating better business environments, reforming education, bolstering independent media, encouraging the rule-of-law, developing civil society, improving health care, fighting 

corruption, developing democratic institutions and electoral processes, and supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises. At the same time, we emphasize to 

the governments of Central Asia that repression and a lack of respect for human 

rights and religious freedom lead to political instability. The OSCE is an important 

agent for reform in the region, and we have also funded numerous programs in the 

region through their missions and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 

Rights. 

For regional links to flourish and for Central Asian economies to prosper, their 

governments must redouble their efforts to fight corruption and strengthen the ruleof-law. Ordinary people need to feel that government officials will not use their authority solely to enrich themselves. Similarly, foreign investors must feel confident 

in the rule-of-law before committing to large and risky ventures. Furthermore, the 

banking sector must be transparent, and provide access to credit and capital. Encouraging economic freedom means a welcoming investment climate, transparency, 

and consistent adherence to legal contracts, supported by equitable government enforcement and a strong, independent judiciary. We promote all these reforms with 

technical assistance to governments that demonstrate their willingness to reform. 

THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF EDUCATION

A well-educated population is key to freedom and long-term prosperity in Central 

Asia, and I strongly believe the U.S. can make a major contribution in this area. 

Across our region, people feel deeply about the need for education to build a better 

future. The challenge of assuring that there are adequate, quality schools and colleges that provide needed training is the preoccupation of our friends and of their 

governments. It is precisely because education is such a deeply held value and deeply felt need that I believe the United States should make it a central element of 

our regional dialogue. 

During my recent trip to the region, I visited the American University of Central 

Asia in Bishkek, and talked to some of its nearly 1200 students. I was impressed 

with what I saw. The school is a model of excellence for the region and I am proud 

that the United States was a key player in its founding and growth. Our support 

for the school dates back to 1993 and includes faculty development, administrative 

training, and financial support including a $10 million endowment. The State Department also provides full four-year scholarships for approximately 17 students 

from Turkmenistan to attend college. Supporting education is perhaps one of the 

best ways to strengthen and keep our relationships with the people even when government-to-government relationships may get rocky. 

We would like to build on this success story by extending our educational partnerships to elsewhere in the region. For example, we would like to see some of our 

friends in South Asia working with our Central Asian friends in the development 

of a regional business school or a regional journalism program. Such programs could 

attract students and faculty from across the region to develop skills and connections 

7

that will serve them in their home countries. In addition, there are tremendous opportunities to support training for Central Asia’s current and future government 

and business leaders in the premier education institutions of Pakistan and India. 

USAID is already developing a scholarship initiative to do exactly this, which is not 

only cost efficient but has tremendous potential to create links that last literally a 

lifetime. 

Another model worth citing is the ‘‘Bolashak’’ exchange program sponsored by the 

government of Kazakhstan that sends 3,000 young Kazakhs a year to study abroad. 

This program, administered by an American non-governmental organization with 

broad experience in organizing academic exchanges with the United States, provides 

an example of merit-based selection and a commitment to the country’s future that 

will hopefully be emulated by other Central Asian nations. 

There are other possibilities as well. The important point is that there is a serious 

need for more education in Central Asia. The people of the region know this, and 

we intend to work with them on this challenge. 

COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Kazakhstan: Regional Anchor 

The United States’ strategic partnership with Kazakhstan has gained momentum 

over the past year with the visits of Secretary Rice to Astana last October and by 

Agriculture Secretary Johanns and Energy Secretary Bodman this year. We expect 

that Vice President Cheney’s trip to Astana next month will further elevate our 

strong relations and pave the way for enhanced cooperation. Having undertaken extensive economic reforms, Kazakhstan has an opportunity to achieve stability by upholding standards of democracy and human rights. Kazakhstan can also play a leading role as an investor in regional infrastructure projects, including in Afghanistan. 

We are also working closely to ensure that Kazakhstan has multiple channels to 

bring its energy resources to world markets. 

Kazakhstan is emerging as a world leader in oil and gas production. U.S. companies have invested heavily there and would like to do more. Transport of energy resources to markets remains a challenge; we are working on securing the flow of oil 

from Kazakhstan’s North Caspian fields via tanker to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and encouraging Russia to agree on terms to expand the Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipeline. Kazakhstan, as well as Turkmenistan, could also be a new source 

of natural gas for European markets, particularly if a trans-Caspian gas pipeline 

were built. 

Kazakhstan still has major challenges to meet in democratic reform, as illustrated 

by its December 2005 presidential election, which fell short of OSCE standards. We 

have encouraged Kazakhstan to lead a new regional ‘‘corridor of reform’’ by working 

swiftly to implement democratic and additional economic reforms at home. We look 

forward to increased cooperation on democracy, including implementing OSCE recommendations for electoral reform. 

We support Kazakhstan’s goal of joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) 

and have been working with the Kazakhstani government toward that end. WTO 

membership will support Kazakhstan’s long-term growth by lowering barriers to 

trade and investment and establishing a system based on internationally recognized 

rules. 

Our assistance to Kazakhstan seeks to diversify its economic growth, both geographically and industrially, build momentum on democratic reforms. Our security 

and law enforcement programs continue to support Kazakhstan’s partnership in the 

Global War on Terror and improve its abilities to fight narcotics trafficking and protect its borders. Our energy and water programs support the development of regional energy markets and water-sharing. 

Kyrgyzstan: Reform for Democratic Stability 

Kyrgyzstan continues to have strong potential already embarking on a new era 

of democratic change, Kyrgyz leaders need to fulfill the promise of their ‘‘Tulip Revolution’’ last March and the presidential election last July through bold democratic 

and economic reform. Primary in importance are the twin problems of corruption 

and organized crime. The government must tackle these head-on if it wants to maintain credibility with its newly-engaged population and build a fully-thriving democracy. Additionally, we must assist the government in responding to the aspirations 

of Kyrgyz citizens for a better justice system and more economic opportunities, 

which will further help Kyrgyzstan to stabilize and better institutionalize their 

progress and reforms. 

Our assistance has been timely and targeted since March 2005. We initiated several new programs, including the U.S. Department of Treasury’s economic growth 

8

advisor to address emerging reform opportunities and provide much-needed technical assistance to the government. Similarly, the Millennium Challenge Corporation has selected Kyrgyzstan as a Threshold Country—the first to date in Central 

Asia. We are currently working with the government to develop a plan to combat 

corruption and implement wide-ranging judicial reforms, including the courts, police, and prosecutors. We also continue to support independent media, human rights 

protections, civil society, and electoral reform. 

Again, we look to our regional partners for assistance, and plan to encourage 

India, not only as a good neighbor, but also as a pillar of stability and the largest 

democracy in the world, to consider providing parliamentary assistance, as they are 

currently doing in Afghanistan. The OSCE is also an important ally in helping 

Kyrgyzstan strengthen its democratic institutions, implement electoral reform, and 

deepen the rule-of-law. Furthermore, we need to increase the range and scope of the 

American University of Central Asia, which already enrolls more than 80 Afghan 

students, and establish it as a regional center of academic excellence. 

We applaud the government of Kyrgyzstan’s current efforts and are committed to 

working with the Government and citizens of Kyrgyzstan to help advance the reforms necessary to participate. There is no question that we and all the countries 

of the broader region have a great stake in Kyrgyzstan’s success. 

Tajikistan: Civil War No More 

Tajikistan has transformed itself from being a civil war-ravaged state to having 

a stable country with strong economic potential. Today, Tajikistan is attracting outside investment, especially in the field of hydropower. Critical to fostering this positive arc of development is to continue to support democratic and economic reforms. 

Our assistance program to Tajikistan promotes democracy and the rule-of-law, 

strengthens security and law enforcement capabilities, develops the investment climate, and improves social services. In response to last year’s transfer of responsibility for the Tajik-Afghan border from the Russian military to the Tajik border 

guards, we are supporting a large program to help Tajikistan defend its borders 

from the transit of weapons of mass destruction, illicit drugs, trafficked persons, and 

potential terrorists. 

Tajikistan is in urgent need of investment in order to address its staggering poverty. Increasingly the Tajiks look toward Afghanistan as a land bridge to Indian 

Ocean ports and South Asian markets. We seek to stimulate such regional and 

intra-regional cooperation by working with International Financial Institutions and 

our European, Japanese and South Asian partners. 

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan: Sliding Backwards 

In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, we are dealing with difficult regimes that are 

holdovers from the obsolete model of Soviet central control and repression. In these 

very challenging environments, we must find creative ways to continue supporting 

the people who deserve the political choices and economic opportunities that their 

governments do not provide. We are giving crucial financial and moral support to 

the beleaguered non-governmental organizations and individuals who aspire to build 

civil society in these difficult environments. 

While doing this we need to maintain ties in areas of importance to us, such as 

improving border controls to combat drug trafficking and enhancing detection of nuclear material to prevent its use by terrorists. We also seek to strengthen our exchange programs where we can. Even though governments in both Turkmenistan 

and Uzbekistan actively attempt to thwart and stop these programs, it is important 

to provide these crucial educational opportunities to the talented students and professionals there. 

Turkmenistan is dominated by president-for-life Saparmurat Niyazov and the political and economic reform has been minimal or negative since independence. The 

government continues to commit serious abuses and its human rights record remains extremely poor. Opportunities for education and employment are in severe 

decline. We are pursuing a policy of focused engagement and careful cooperation 

with the government. 

We will continue to press the government for progress on freedom of religion, assembly and movement for its citizens. Simultaneously, we must provide the people 

of Turkmenistan with tools for progress and eventual reform, with special emphasis 

on educational and professional exchanges through non-governmental organizations 

and exchanges to the United States. 

In Uzbekistan we have continued to press for a broad relationship that includes 

attention to democracy, including human rights and political reform, security cooperation, including on terrorism, and economic cooperation, and we have made 

clear at the highest levels of the Government of Uzbekistan that our relationship 

9

should be based upon progress on all of these fronts, as laid out in our 2002 Strategic Framework Agreement. In response to the tragic events of Andijon in May 

2005, we have consistently called for an independent, international investigation 

into these events. We also undertook an immediate review of U.S. assistance to the 

central government, canceling many military, border security, and economic reform 

assistance programs and limiting others. Approximately $3 million of these funds 

were reprogrammed to support democracy and human rights programs. Unfortunately, the Uzbek government has so far refused to allow an independent investigation into Andijon, and has chosen to close down non-governmental organizations, 

independent media sources, and other civil society organizations. We continue to 

urge the Government of Uzbekistan to reverse its current path and to embrace reform as the only way to achieve long-term stability and to help realize the aspirations of its citizens. 

U.S. assistance programs in Uzbekistan focus on working directly with the people 

of Uzbekistan on human rights, micro-credit lending and agribusiness development, 

health and education reform, water use management, and community development. 

The Government of Uzbekistan has hampered the delivery of assistance by implementing banking regulations that slow or prevent the transfer of funds to non-governmental organizations. Many international and local non-governmental organizations have lost their accreditation to work in Uzbekistan, and many others have 

been harassed. 

Nevertheless, we should continue to engage the government of Uzbekistan where 

it is in our own interest to do so. Security, non-proliferation, narcotics smuggling, 

and law enforcement programs, when possible in the current political environment, 

advance key U.S. interests by addressing improved treatment of suspects and detainees, trafficking in persons and weapons, and the proliferation of nuclear and biological materials and expertise. 

CONCLUSION: ASSISTANCE SUPPORTING A REGIONAL VISION

The Secretary has articulated a vision for a stable and democratic Central Asia, 

cooperating between its nations and with the broader region for mutual benefit. In 

this future Central Asia, students and professors from Bishkek and Almaty can collaborate with and learn from their counterparts in Karachi and Kabul, legitimate 

trade can freely flow overland from Astana to Islamabad, facilitated by modern border controls, and an enhanced regional power grid stretching from Almaty to New 

Delhi will be fed by oil and gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and hydropower from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 

Our policy objectives for Central Asia are ambitious, but we can not afford to fail. 

As we pursue our security interests, commercial and energy interests, and democratic and market reform simultaneously, Central Asia can re-establish itself as a 

commercial and cultural crossroads with greater links to South Asia. Our support 

to this region is a key ingredient to Afghanistan’s stability as well, as to our own 

security. 

Madame Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you again for this opportunity to discuss this important region. I stand ready to take your questions.

STATEMENT OF MR. DREW W. LUTEN, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA, U.S. 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. LUTEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The past 15 years have 

yielded significant results in areas of opportunity in Central Asia. 

USAID’s activities are contributing to the creation and growth of 

small businesses, the development of civil society, reductions in the 

spread of infectious disease and advances in health reform, improve 

basic education in efforts to lessen the potential for human rights 

abuses. 

Nonetheless, many challenges persist. Within the materials that 

we have provided there are a number of charts that we produce 

and refer to in planning assistance. They illustrate the difficult 

challenges that the countries face. And I just would mention a few 

of them that indicate the nature of the problems, the nature of the 

challenges. One of these charts on economic and democratic reVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:22 Aug 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\042606\27230.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
10

forms, it is that one, shows that in the economic area while 

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have done relatively well in adopting 

market-oriented economic reforms, the other countries have not. 

With respect to democratic reform, all of the countries lag significantly in the policies that they have adopted in comparison to the 

other countries of the former Soviet bloc and Europe. 

Also economically, one of the challenges that they face is getting 

their economies back to a level of productivity as it stood in 1989. 

Real gross domestic product in these countries, in Kazakhstan, 

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which are all energy wealthy, only 

rates the level of GDP that they had in 1989 in the last 2 or 3 

years and the other countries are far behind still. 

The business environment in each of the countries is weak, not 

surprisingly cumulative direct foreign per capita investment is low. 

One of the things that is most troubling in terms of the challenge 

that these countries face and that we face in thinking about how 

we can support them are the declining health indicators across a 

number of the subjects. 

USAID sees its role in supporting transition and development of 

these countries as one that supports the larger interests of the 

United States. Assistance that helps counter-authoritarianism and 

economic stagnation, each of which provide the fuel for domestic 

unrest, religious extremism and terrorism, is critical to protecting 

United States interests in Central Asia and the nearby countries 

as well. 

We are at the point now where we are developing new country 

strategies for the five central Asian republics and as we do this in 

line with the vision that the Secretary has articulated, we will be 

looking for opportunities to expand regional integration with south 

Asia, particularly with respect to energy markets, but also with 

trade facilitation and health networking is also a possibility. 

As Secretary Boucher indicated, the work that we do in various 

areas is interrelated. So in our case, the support for the expansion 

of both political and economic freedom and for better governance go 

hand in hand, along with support for the institutions and experiences that make them possible. I would offer just a couple of comments that in the democracy sector while there have been challenges, particularly greater challenges in some of the countries, 

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are hard cases at present. 

In general, over the past 15 years, in large part, due to USAID’s 

efforts and the efforts of partners that we support, civil society 

which was virtually unknown 15 years ago has grown and become 

much more sophisticated across the region. 

In the economic sector, Kazakhstan has been the best performer 

and our program there has reached a new phase such that our development assistance or economic development is going to be 

shared. The government of Kazakhstan is going to share in the cost 

of that assistance and collaborate with us jointly in the design of 

that assistance. It is an important precedent. Then in the health 

and education sectors, we are not only helping with systemic reforms but we are working on programs that combat the threat of 

HIV/AIDS and helping the countries’ plan for prevention of 

Avianinfluenza, trying to help it not become an endemic in poultry. 

11

There have been many successes and there are certainly many 

areas of opportunity. There are many areas of challenge as we go 

forward. We will be focusing our resources on both opportunities 

and challenges. And we look forward to working with the Department and other parts of the administration and the Congress in 

looking for opportunities to link both what happened in Central 

Asia to South Asia and the rest of the region. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Luten follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DREW W. LUTEN, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, 

BUREAU FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION. 

Madame Chairwoman, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for 

the opportunity to testify on U.S. foreign assistance to the five Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. 

Since the overthrow of communist regimes in Europe and dissolution of the Soviet 

Union, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been charged 

with assisting the countries of Europe and Eurasia to make the transition from centralized, authoritarian control to sovereign nations governed on the basis of democratic, free-market principles. When this Committee crafted the FREEDOM Support 

Act (FSA) and Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act, it was with the 

goal of helping these countries develop the technical basis and managerial skills 

needed to redirect their resources toward open and participatory political and economic systems. USAID assistance has helped countries make tangible progress 

across Europe and Eurasia, including in the five republics of Central Asia. 

The past fifteen years have yielded significant results and areas of opportunity 

in Central Asia. Our activities are contributing to the growth of small business, civil 

society development, reductions in the spread of infectious disease and advanced 

health reform, improved primary education, better management of natural resources, and efforts to lessen the potential for human rights abuses and conflict. 

Nevertheless, many challenges persist—in developing democracies and promoting 

respect for human rights, encouraging economic growth, improving health, and increasing the quality of education. 

USAID’s principal goal within the Europe and Eurasia (E&E) region remains the 

establishment of functioning, effective democracies with open, market-oriented economic systems and responsive social services. As the following chart demonstrates, 

we see a correlation between countries’ performance in economic and democratic reform in the E&E region. Indeed, the very elements which enable a democracy to 

function, namely, participatory decision-making, transparency, rule of law, and good 

governance—are also conducive to a healthy business environment. It should come 

as no surprise that the highest performers in both of these areas are the Northern 

Tier states, several of which, namely, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and 

Poland, have graduated from USAID assistance to become members of the European 

Union and donor countries in their own right. On the other end of the spectrum are 

the low performers, comprised almost exclusively of the Eurasian states, of which 

the Central Asian Republics (and Belarus) occupy some of the lowest ranks. The 

data underscore the enormous challenges we face in assisting these states to narrow 

that gap by embracing real democratic and economic reforms.

12

THE GEOPOLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONTEXT. 

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the geopolitical and 

security importance of the post-Soviet states of Central Asia has increased markedly. Countering authoritarianism and economic stagnation, which provide the fuel 

for domestic unrest, religious extremism, and international terrorism, is critical to 

protecting U.S. interests in the region. 

Despite the many differences among these countries, there are some unifying 

themes of strategic importance to the United States Government:

• Central Asia’s strategic location, between South Asia, China, Russia, and Iran, 

ensures that its importance will continue to grow in the years ahead. What 

happens in Central Asia concerns not only Russia to the north, but also 

China, its eastern neighbor. Events in Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Iran, and 

the broader Middle East are also impacted by developments in the region.

• Central Asia is a critical source of energy. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 

Uzbekistan all boast substantial petroleum reserves. Turkmenistan is the second largest natural gas-producing country in the former Soviet Union. The 

country also ranks fourth worldwide—after Russia, the United States and 

Iran—with proven natural gas reserves totaling nearly 100 trillion cubic feet 

(Tcf). Uzbekistan currently possesses about 600 million barrels of proven oil 

reserves. Uzbekistan is the eighth-largest producer of natural gas in the 

world, but most of this is used domestically. Kazakhstan has large oil and gas 

reserves. Its giant, offshore Caspian Kashgan field is one of the most important petroleum finds in thirty years. The United States, as a significant energy importer, has a vital interest in ensuring that efficient export outlets are 

developed and that Central Asia emerges as an important source of energy 

in the years ahead, not just for the United States but for the world market. 

RESOURCE LEVELS AND COUNTRY PRIORITIES. 

Despite a growing acknowledgement of Central Asia’s strategic importance, USG 

assistance funding for the region has declined precipitously since a high point in 

2002, when Congress authorized major supplemental funding for Central Asia in 

recognition of its proximity to Afghanistan and pivotal role in the Global War on 

Terrorism. Indeed, today’s funding levels for USAID assistance to Central Asia 


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($73.9 million in FY06) represent a significant decrease from pre-9/11 levels ($93.8 

million in FY01.) 

Among the Central Asian Republics, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are the highest 

dollar recipients of USAID’s assistance, with $20.1 million and $22.5 million respectively in FY06. Kazakhstan has made considerable progress on economic reform 

while making inconsistent progress in its commitment to democratic reform. 

Kazakhstan is strategically important to the United States due to its geographic location and significant resources, growing U.S. investment, and relative openness to 

trade. 

Moreover, in Kazakhstan, we are entering a new phase of our development cooperation which involves the Government of Kazakhstan sharing in the cost of 

USAID managed economic development programs. The $40 million joint ($25M 

USAID; $15M GOKZ) Program for Economic Development calls for even closer collaboration in the formulation, delivery, and monitoring of programs. Aside from the 

greater impact we hope to achieve with this new approach, we also hope it will 

strengthen sustainability prospects and help pave the way for Kazakhstan’s own development assistance programs. 

Kyrgyzstan, the smallest of the republics, has distinguished itself through early, 

consistent, and aggressive economic reform and a commitment to and demonstration 

of democratization. In March 2005, the people of Kyrgyzstan took to the streets to 

signal their dissatisfaction with the Government’s manipulation of the electoral 

process; their efforts led to the popular ouster of autocratic President Askar Akayev. 

While the new Government has been slow to honor its election-year promises, particularly in the areas of anti-corruption, good governance, and constitutional reform, 

Kyrgyzstan remains the most open of the Central Asian Republics in both economic 

and political terms. It is important that the U.S. Government support Kyrgyzstan’s 

reform trajectory. To that end, USAID is coordinating closely with the Department 

of State and the Millennium Challenge Corporation to ensure that our resources are 

strategically allocated, mutually supportive, and conducive to our shared goal: helping the Kyrgyz Republic to achieve its full democratic, social, and economic potential. 

With roughly 64 percent of its population below the poverty line and the lowest 

GDP per capita in the region, Tajikistan’s socioeconomic indicators rival those of 

sub-Saharan Africa. Although still an authoritarian state, Tajikistan’s political system remains among the more pluralistic in the region. It is the only country in Central Asia with a legally-recognized Islamic opposition party, one which also holds positions in government. USAID has budgeted $15.6 million in assistance to Tajikistan 

in FY06 to support programming that promotes democratic, economic, and health 

reform and conflict mitigation. 

Uzbekistan, the largest of the five in terms of population, is important to regional stability due to its central location (it borders each of the republics and Afghanistan) and historic leadership role in Central Asian culture and religious life. 

Despite early signs of economic progress, the Government of Uzbekistan has 

backpedaled considerably in its commitment to real economic reform. The central 

government, led by former Soviet leader Islam Karimov, remains authoritarian. 

Relations between the United States and Uzbekistan have deteriorated significantly in the past year, partly as a result of the U.S. call for an independent inquiry 

into the Government’s response to a militant uprising in Andijan in May 2005, 

which left hundreds of civilians dead, according to reports. While regional sensitivities to U.S. democracy programs were already heightened following Kyrgyzstan’s 

Tulip Revolution in March 2005, the decline in our bilateral relationship postAndijan has enabled the Ministry of Justice to step up its campaign to force termination of those programs which the host government considers most threatening. 

These include programs in human rights, civil society development, and support for 

independent media. Despite these setbacks, USAID will continue to reach out to the 

people of Uzbekistan, whose support for our work remains unwavering. Meanwhile, 

we have found ways to continue our programs in such areas as health, agriculture 

and natural resource management, with limited disruptions. The FY06 budget for 

Uzbekistan is $13.1 million, which is aimed at consolidating economic and health 

reforms while promoting a more open society. 

Turkmenistan continues to receive the lowest level of funding in the region, $3.6 

million, despite its strategic importance. This level reflects the regime’s failure to 

institute a serious economic reform program and its totalitarian stand. Civil society 

groups face difficult registration rules and are closely monitored. Government cooperation to reform the health sector nevertheless remains strong and we will continue to push ahead to work with citizens that represent the future generation of 

leaders. 

14

USAID ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL ASIA. 

USAID’s operations in Central Asia are managed by a Regional Mission 

headquartered in Almaty, Kazakhstan, with satellite offices in the other four republics and in Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana. This approach has proven successful in 

overseeing five bilateral programs, and interacting with five U.S. Embassies 

through the mobilization of a wide range of technical expertise that can be applied 

throughout the region, achieving cost and management efficiencies. It has provided 

the flexibility needed to respond quickly to events in the region while applying lessons learned in five different programs. 

With our current assistance strategy set to expire in early September 2006, 

USAID is working in close coordination with the Department of State to prepare a 

new strategy for assistance to the region over the next several years. Unlike the current strategy, which covers all five republics in a single overarching document, the 

new strategies will be country-specific, reflecting the unique environments and challenges we face in each country. Next month, I will travel to Central Asia to conduct 

oversight of USAID’s programs in four of the five republics and participate in an 

Interagency Country Assistance Review (ICAR) in Uzbekistan. I would be pleased 

to offer my preliminary observations with the Committee upon my return and to 

share with you a copy of USAID’s final strategy for Central Asia once it has been 

approved. 

USAID’s development strategy for assistance to Central Asia rests on three mutually supportive pillars: (1) promoting a democratic culture; (2) bolstering economic 

growth and reform; and (3) facilitating social transition through more effective and 

equitable approaches to health and education. 

DEMOCRATIC REFORM: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND RESULTS. 

USAID’s approach to democracy assistance in Central Asia is based on promoting 

a strong democratic culture. With few indigenous democratic traditions, leadership 

in all five countries has historically tended towards autocratic and authoritarian 

methods of governance—with little understanding of citizen participation in political 

and governance matters. Overtly political civic organizations, political parties, and 

labor unions all continue to face strong resistance and even periodic repression from 

most Central Asian governments. Private television and radio stations still face significant degrees of state control and interference—except in Turkmenistan and 

Uzbekistan, where no such media exist. 

Most notably, civil society, virtually unknown at independence, has grown and become more sophisticated throughout Central Asia. Literally thousands of diverse citizen organizations are now thriving, and in some countries, playing increasingly 

vocal roles in political debates. USAID assistance has also been important in developing the management and technical skills of independent electronic media and in 

introducing civic education in secondary schools. 

Still, the past several years have seen significant backsliding or stagnation in 

Central Asia on key democracy indicators, such as the respect for a free press, judicial independence, and the conduct of free and fair elections. To meet this challenge, 

USAID focuses on strengthening civil society; bolstering independent media; protecting human rights; and promoting reform at the local levels. Where possible, we 

also work on political party development, enhancing the rule of law and elections. 

USAID’s activities in Central Asia increase dialogue between government and citizens by assisting institutions that inform and empower people. Civic organizations 

and civic advocacy programs provide means to advocate for good governance, accountability, transparency, rights protection, and democratic reforms. USAID focuses on informing and engaging citizens through independent television and radio 

stations. Lawyers and young people learn about democratic values through reformed 

legal curricula at law schools, democracy camps, simulated court trials and civic 

education. Several programs diffuse tensions that could cause conflict through community involvement in local economic development and joint community-local government councils. 

Despite some major setbacks, most notably, in Uzbekistan, USAID has achieved 

important results in its democracy programming in Central Asia. The following represents a sampling of our activities and achievements: 

Civil Society Promotion: 

• To strengthen local NGOs in each of the five republics, USAID’s Civil Society 

Support Program provides training, information, networking opportunities, 

and professional assistance through a network of civil society support centers. 

The program awards institutional grants to leading NGOs in specific sectors, 

and promotes advocacy at the national level. USAID also provides technical 

15

input for the development of a supportive legal network for NGO operations, 

as well as direct legal advice to NGOs. 

Human Rights & Rule of Law: 

• USAID’s ongoing support to local human rights defenders (HRDs) in 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and until recently, Uzbekistan, provides a critical 

protection network, technical training and access to legal resources at a time 

when HRDs are being targeted for questioning, arbitrarily arrested, or detained. Based on this collaboration, HRDs monitor the human rights situation 

to highlight significant issues and trends. In Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, 

HRDs have worked with local law enforcement to improve pre-trial detention 

conditions and address the most important local level human rights concerns.

• In Uzbekistan, USAID’s Open Dialogue program provides the opportunity for 

dialogue between law enforcement agencies and human rights defenders and 

has fostered collaboration on deaths-in-custody cases and forensic investigations. In collaboration with the U.S. Department of Justice, roundtables on 

issues such as habeas corpus have been held around the country.

• In Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, USAID has 

helped establish law clinics at local universities to provide pro bono legal advice and build practical skills of law students.

• In Kazakhstan, supporting the installation of video and audio court recording 

equipment in a pilot court to increase the transparency of court proceedings. 

The judiciary was so impressed with the results that they are planning to expand this system—with their own funds—to more than 100 additional courts. 

Civic Education: 

• USAID’s civic education program, active in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Tajikistan, encourages critical thinking skills within a broader framework of 

principles of good governance, democracy, and civic activism. In addition to 

supporting textbook development and teacher training in interacting teaching 

methodologies, the program also provides secondary school students with 

hands-on experience with democracy through extracurricular activities like 

student government, local government day and democracy summer camps. 

More than 100,000 students are reached each year through this program.

• Complementing this work, USAID also supports Street Law programs in all 

five Central Asian countries, which provide additional training on civic rights 

and responsibilities. These courses are typically taught by law school students, giving them an opportunity to increase their public speaking and training skills. 

Anti-Trafficking Programs: 

• To help combat trafficking in persons, USAID organizes public awareness 

campaigns and information hotlines, supports local NGOs that provide services to trafficking victims, and in several countries, we operate shelters for 

such victims. 

Support for Independent Media: 

• USAID’s media initiative, which is active in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 

Kyrgyzstan, and until recently, in Uzbekistan, provides training and assistance to improve the use of modern production technology and management 

techniques and update journalism quality in both print and broadcast media. 

In addition, a production fund encourages local programming, and legal advisors provide consultation to media outlets. Under a new initiative, USAID 

plans to support the broadcast of news and informational programming by 

satellite to expand access to information across the region. 

Local Government Reform: 

• USAID’s work in local government reform in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has 

resulted in an improved policy environment and strengthened the capacity of 

local authorities to organize public hearings, undertake strategic and financial planning, and manage public works and fee-for-service municipal enterprises. While Kyrgyzstan is the only country in Central Asia with democratically-elected mayors, Tajikistan has recently approved a strategy for decentralization which would include direct elections for mayors as well. 

Elections Assistance: 

• USAID has provided assistance for both parliamentary and presidential elections in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In Kyrgyzstan, USAID 

16

sponsored both international and domestic election monitoring, efforts to provide checks on the official results, including exit polls and a parallel vote 

count, the training of poll workers, and the use of indelible ink to prevent 

multiple voting. 

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND REFORM: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND RESULTS

USAID’s assistance in economic reform encompasses work in enterprise development; financial sector reform; trade facilitation; microfinance and banking sector reform; commercial law and accounting reform; financial sector reform; and economics 

and business education. We focus on these areas because in each country improvements in the overall business environment will be important to long-term prospects 

for economic growth. As the chart below indicates, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan rank 

relatively low in the World Bank analysis, and Uzbekistan is near the bottom of 

those countries surveyed. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are not included in the 

Bank’s survey but can also be assumed to be near the bottom.

Our results in each of these areas, especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are 

impressive: 

SME Development: 

• Since 2002, USAID has provided firm-level assistance to improve the competitiveness of over 1900 private enterprises throughout Central Asia. Business 

managers receive coaching to improve strategic planning, basic financial and 

management accounting, human resource management, operations and quality management, and market analysis. Results of this assistance has led to 

measurable increases in sales and productivity gains, expanded market linkages and trade relationships within the region and with neighboring countries 

including Afghanistan, and increased understanding of fundamental market 

principles necessary for growth of a thriving and diversified small and medium business sector. 

Financial Sector Reform: 

• Financial sector reform in Kazakhstan is one of USAID’s major successes in 

Central Asia. USAID has supported the introduction of corporate bonds, mortgage bonds, warehouse receipts, and other investment vehicles. The corporate 

bond market introduced in 2000 has grown to $2 billion in bonds in circulation. Mortgage-backed securities, introduced in 2002, now comprise $300 million in outstanding mortgage bonds. In partnership with the National Bank 


272300002.eps
17

and the Association of Financiers, USAID helped Kazakhstan develop a Law 

on Credit Bureaus. Adopted in July 2004, the law establishes the legal basis 

for the first comprehensive credit reporting system in the CIS. With technical 

assistance from USAID, seven local commercial banks and an international 

credit bureau operator, Iceland-based Credit Info, recently established the 

first credit bureau in Kazakhstan. The credit bureau will serve to further 

strengthen Kazakhstan’s financial sector and expand access to finance for citizens and local entrepreneurs. 

Trade Facilitation: 

• USAID provides assistance to governments and businesses in Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (and until recently Uzbekistan) to modernize their 

legal and regulatory frameworks for trade administration. This includes help 

to develop and introduce new Customs Codes that modernize customs procedures in accordance with the Kyoto convention and WTO agreements and 

principles. USAID has also worked to strengthen the dialogue between Customs and the private sector by supporting the establishment of Consultative 

Councils, which are used to discuss issues of concern to traders, transporters 

and other stakeholders. 

Microfinance and Banking Sector Reform: 

• Over the past five years, USAID has provided considerable financial assistance to strengthen the banking and microfinance sectors in four of the Central Asia republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 

This assistance has spanned from improvement of financial regulation and 

bank supervision to bring it in line with international standards, including 

the establishment of clear legal frameworks for the provision of microfinance 

and institutional strengthening of commercial banks and microfinance institutions.

• USAID’s work in microfinance has led to groundbreaking achievements, 

among them, the passage of legislation in several countries permitting a stable and consistent base for microfinance activities. Leading microfinance institutions in Kyrgyzstan, and the Kazakhstan Loan Fund were inspired by legislative reform and market prospects—and are now making plans to transform 

into microfinance banks. The sector has grown in the number and variety of 

market players. Commercial banks are now increasingly lending to micro and 

small businesses, which they previously considered too risky and costly. 

Microfinance institutions are recognized as full market players in the financial systems of these countries; and EBRD, an international financial institution, has even started lending to such institutions. 

Reduction of Business Constraints: 

• USAID provides assistance to governments and businesses in Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (and until recently Uzbekistan) to modernize their 

legal and regulatory frameworks for doing business and reduce the burden of 

government regulations on SMEs. This includes reforms in such key areas as 

business registration, licensing and permits, government inspections, land 

site acquisition and real estate construction and development. USAID has 

also built a large network of both government and private-sector partner organizations that actively tackle regulatory barriers to SME development at 

the local and national level in Kazakhstan. In the next four years, we are 

planning to roll out this partnership program to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 

Commercial Law Reform: 

• In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, USAID trains local judges and attorneys in the 

interpretation and proper application of commercial laws to promote the establishment of secure property rights, enforcement of contracts, and drafting 

of basic commercial legislation necessary for the operation of a market economy. For example, in March 2006, the Ministry of Justice launched a new 

movable property registry in Tajikistan with substantial technical assistance 

from USAID’s Commercial Law Project. Until now, lenders in Tajikistan have 

been unwilling to give credit against moveable property due to the lack of an 

efficient and reliable registration system. By increasing security of lending 

transactions, the registry will help small businesses obtain financing and reduce the interest rates on loans. 

Accounting Reform: 

• Through the implementation of its Certified International Professional Accountant (CIPA) program—the first, internationally recognized professional 

18

certification for accountants in the Russian language—USAID is helping to 

promote financial management, transparency, accountability, and professional 

values. The use of modern management accounting and uniform international 

standards will improve the competitiveness of the regions’ enterprises, allowing them to compete both internationally and domestically. To date, over 

54,000 exams have been issued and over 3,900 individuals have earned the 

entry level Certified Accounting Practitioner (CAP) or CIPA designation in 

Central Asia. 

Business Education: 

• Business and management education comprises a critical, albeit oft-overlooked, component of private sector development. Such assistance ensures 

that citizens receive education that is relevant to their participation in a market economy. USAID’s Business and Economics Education Program seeks to 

develop stronger linkages between businesses and universities, enabling the 

latter to become more flexible and responsive to the market requirements for 

educated professionals, and to improve career opportunities for graduates in 

their host countries and throughout the region. USAID funded Junior 

Achievement Program promotes the development of entrepreneurship and 

practical business skills at middle grade and high-school level to increase 

youth participation in the economy. 

SOCIAL TRANSITION: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND RESULTS

Among the least expected consequences of post-communist transformation in Central Asia was a decline in living standards for many and a stark erosion in the stock 

of human capital. As an example, the following chart depicts the decline in life expectancy at birth in Central Asia as compared to the Northern and Southern Tiers 

of Central and Eastern Europe; this trend holds for all other indicators in the social 

sector:

The evidence is impossible to ignore: rising morbidity and mortality due to infectious disease, weakened life expectancy, high unemployment, low wages, and the 

outward migration of individuals seeking better opportunities in Russia, where, as 

migrant workers, Central Asians are regularly subject to discrimination. To mitigate 

these concerns, our assistance in Central Asia is aimed at establishing viable social 

systems appropriate to market-oriented democracies. The first challenge is to halt 

serious health threats and reduce crises in education. We are meeting this challenge 

in Central Asia: 


272300003.eps
19

Primary Health Care Reform and Maternal and Child Health: At independence, 

the Central Asian countries inherited massive, inefficient health care systems that 

they are no longer able to support financially. In their current form, the region’s 

public health, service delivery, health finance, and medical education systems are 

unable to address a range of problems leading to falling life expectancy in the region. Physicians have not been well-prepared to provide high quality, evidence-based 

services that effectively treat the most common and urgent conditions that their 

people face. Preventive care measures are poorly funded, and few people understand 

their own role in and responsibility for taking care of their own health. USAID is 

working to improve the quality of health care in Central Asia by changing the way 

that care is given. A priority is to increase the use of primary care, provided at the 

local level and on an outpatient basis. USAID’s models of health reform are being 

continued and expanded by the Central Asian governments as they see the positive 

results of these interventions.

• USAID’s assistance has increased access to quality primary health care 

throughout the Central Asian region, establishing facilities that have trained 

more than 10,000 clinicians in family medicine and general practice.

• Our provision of training and contraceptives throughout Central Asia has 

helped significantly to reduce abortion rates throughout the region. A comparison of the 1999 Kazakhstan Demographic Health Survey (KDHS) and the 

1995 KDHS indicates a decline of 22 percent in the abortion rate.

• USAID has assisted the Governments of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and 

Uzbekistan in the design and implementation of National Health Reform 

Plans; a similar plan for Tajikistan is currently being developed with assistance from USAID-funded experts.

• USAID’s efforts have led four countries in Central Asia officially to adopt, for 

national use, the World Health Organization (WHO)—recommended Live 

Birth Criteria, paving the way for reductions in infant morbidity and mortality. To date, as a result of pilot activities to introduce the new criteria, 221 

infants have lived who otherwise would have been abandoned as dead.

• USAID has trained more than 12,000 clinicians in the Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses, the WHO strategy to reduce death, illness, and 

disability, and to promote improved growth and development among children 

under five years of age.

HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria: Seventy to ninety percent of HIV infection 

in Central Asia is linked to injecting drug use, primarily heroin. The same percentage of the world’s heroin comes from Afghanistan. While the USG has devoted considerable resources to poppy eradication in Afghanistan and border control support 

with Tajikistan, USAID’s Drug Demand Reduction Program is one of the few regional efforts to reduce demand for heroin. USAID’s efforts in this area are notable:

• Through our foreign assistance, USAID has helped establish eleven HIV sentinel surveillance sites in the region, thereby producing the first scientifically 

valid data on the course of the epidemic.

• With assistance from USAID, more that 76,000 Central Asian youths have 

been educated on the risks involved with drug use.

• We have used our assistance to leverage resources, such as assisting governments in the region to obtain $74 million in additional funding through 

grants from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 

(GFATM).

• USAID programs have assisted countries in the region to advance toward the 

World Health Organization (WHO) global goal of 85 percent treatment success for tuberculosis (TB). The current range of treatment success in Central 

Asia in USAID project sites is from 75.7 percent in Uzbekistan to 85.3 percent in Tajikistan.

• In Kazakhstan, where USAID has supported tuberculosis (TB) control efforts 

since 1998, TB deaths decreased 41.6 percent between 1998 and 2003, and 

the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention calculates that the USAIDsupported TB control strategy has saved more than 18,000 lives during that 

time.

• USAID has supported malaria prevention and control efforts in the region 

since 2000, resulting in an 84 percent decrease in malaria cases in the region 

between 2000 and 2005, and effective responses to outbreaks in Kyrgyzstan 

in 2002 and 2005. Governments in the region have been assisted to receive 

$11 million in grants to fight malaria from the GFATM.

20

USAID Efforts to Mitigate an Outbreak of Avian Influenza: In support of the 

President’s International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza, USAID has 

entered into partnerships with host country governments and the donor community, 

and is helping to lay the groundwork for an effective prevention and response strategy to outbreaks of avian influenza in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, where 

H5N1 was confirmed as the causative agent in an outbreak in poultry last year and 

another outbreak in wild birds earlier this year:

• Together with international donors, in early June USAID will support a regional conference in Kazakhstan on Avian Influenza Preparedness and Prevention with representatives from all the Central Asian countries and their 

neighboring country governments. The key objectives of the meeting are to 

learn lessons from past experiences with outbreak control management and 

preparedness planning (including risk communication), and to review countries’ responses and identify potential gaps for further assistance.

• With supplemental funding, USAID will provide technical assistance to all 

five Central Asian host country governments for surveillance, detection, laboratory testing, and animal and human outbreak management.

Basic Education: Education has a central role in the formation of human capital—

an essential component of economic growth and societal development. More than a 

decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the beginning of a transition 

to a market economy and democratic society, the Central Asian Republics face three 

broad challenges in the education sector: (1) maintaining previous educational 

achievements and slowing or reversing the process of deterioration that has taken 

place; (2) reforming educational systems so that they correspond to the market economy and democratic society; and (3) assuring access and equity to education for all 

groups, regardless of gender, ethnicity, and socio-economic standing. USAID’s education assistance in the area of primary and secondary education is designed to prepare young people with flexible skills necessary to work in a market economy. In 

addition to promoting greater parental and community involvement, our programs 

support in-service teacher training, the introduction of a more efficient model for 

funding schools, and the rehabilitation of dilapidated schools. 

While USAID began assistance in basic education only in 2003, much already has 

been accomplished:

• USAID-supported teacher training programs were officially recognized by the 

Governments in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as meeting the teachers’ mandatory professional development requirement. In Kyrgyzstan, the USAID 

core schools received the official legal status of teacher training provider, 

which allows them to offer paid services to other public and private entities.

• In Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, at the request of the governments, USAID introduced a new per-capita budget formula to improve equity 

and increase efficiency in the area of school finance. The new model will give 

greater autonomy to schools in managing their budgets, while the capitation 

principle will reward quality improvement by giving a higher budget to 

schools with a growing number of students. In Tajikistan, the pilot has already expanded with technical assistance from USAID and additional donor 

support from World Bank and other donors. In Kyrgyzstan, the Government 

plans to use the USAID pilot as a model for future expansion of per capita 

financing.

• Community cost sharing in school renovation projects, mostly in the form of 

labor, has been surprisingly high even in the poorest areas of Kyrgyzstan, 

Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, and in many cases, matched or even exceeded 

the value of USAID’s grant.

• In Turkmenistan, where the education system is in a state of crisis, more 

than 300 teachers have been trained in critical thinking methodology, and 

over 30,000 children have benefited from teacher and administrator training.

Higher Education: While the focus of USAID’s limited resources for education are 

at the primary level, the following constitute important examples of our commitment to higher education:

• One of USAID’s legacies in Central Asia is the establishment of the American 

University of Central Asia (AUCA), the region’s premier institution of higher 

learning, based in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. AUCA is a showcase of U.S. teaching 

methods, recently benefiting from an endowment of $15 million funded by 

USAID and the Open Society Institute.

21

• As a means to reduce corruption in higher education, in 2002, USAID helped 

to create a National Scholarship Test for high school graduates in 

Kyrgyzstan. The examination now serves as a basis for admission to higher 

education as well as the sole criterion for the administration of over 5,700 

state-sponsored scholarships. 

THE WAY AHEAD: CENTRAL-SOUTH ASIA REGIONAL INTEGRATION. 

In addition to focusing on our bilateral programs, USAID’s new strategy will pay 

special attention to opportunities for enhanced integration between Central and 

South Asia, in keeping with the goals articulated by Secretary Rice during her recent trip to the region and reiterated by my colleague, Assistant Secretary Boucher, 

in his testimony today. As the U.S. government aims to strengthen trade, transportation, communications, and energy links between Central and South Asia, USAID 

is taking a leadership role in the facilitation of cross-border trade and energy sector 

development. 

Energy Sector Development: Perhaps the greatest potential benefits of intra- and 

inter-regional collaboration lie in the energy sector, where better coordination is 

needed to (1) develop a transparent, commercial Central Asian electricity market; 

(2) enable the short and medium term export of power to Afghanistan; (3) build a 

reliable transmission system in Afghanistan; and (4) develop export capacity, a dedicated transmission system and a regulatory, contractual and security framework for 

trade and investment. 

Although energy is an important economic driver in Central Asia, the potential 

for electricity sector development is limited because of the lack of an effective regional electricity market and problems with energy sector transparency and governance. USAID/Central Asia will soon launch a $3.3 million Regional Energy Market 

Assistance Program (REMAP), a two-year project to improve the management of energy and related water resources through development of a transparent, reliable and 

commercially oriented regional electricity market. 

In the Afghan power strategy, high priority is placed on economically priced power 

imports from Central Asia. Without such imports, Afghanistan will not be able to 

meet the domestic power supply needs in the long term. USAID/Kabul is working 

with Agency counterparts in South Asia to develop electricity import agreements. 

Trade Facilitation: To foster greater regional trade in Central Asia, Secretary 

Rice announced in October 2005, as part of a larger USG initiative, a $400,000 

USAID trade facilitation program. The purpose of this program is to benchmark existing national customs procedures against international standards and best practices and identify opportunities to reduce transaction costs for business by harmonizing, strengthening and streamlining customs functions. It will be a vital complement to similar work in Afghanistan. USAID/Central Asia is also in the process 

of designing next generation programs that aims to reduce the regulatory and administrative burden for SMEs, facilitate trade, and provide assistance to the Central 

Asian countries to accede to the WTO or to meet their post accession commitments. 

CONCLUSION. 

In conclusion, we are proud of what we have accomplished over the last fifteen 

years in supporting Central Asia’s transition in the post-Soviet era. However, there 

is a still a great deal yet to accomplish. Central Asia’s historical legacy includes entrenched developmental problems. There is much more to do in creating legal and 

institutional frameworks for business and in developing democratic civil societies, 

effective economic choice, improved social services such as health and education, and 

personal freedom. Consequently, in Central Asia, significant technical assistance 

will continue to be devoted to helping countries establish the institutional, legal and 

policy underpinnings of market democracies. 

As new priorities emerge in other parts of the world, we urge the distinguished 

members of the House International Relations Committee to provide continued support to our programs in Europe and Eurasia. The geopolitical, security, and trade 

and economic importance of the region remains of vital interest to the United 

States, and our very close working relationships with the Coordinator’s Office in the 

Department of State allow us to program resources in a way that will be most responsive to these interests. 

Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. Without the support that this Committee and 

Congress have given us over the years, the progress that we have made in the region would not have been possible. In closing, I want to assure you of our continued 

commitment to achieving the noble goals Congress set out in the SEED and FREEDOM Support Acts, both within Central Asia and the broader E&E region.

22

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES MACDOUGALL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. MACDOUGALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to discuss United States policy on Central Asia. Central Asia 

is in the middle of a historic transition. The United States is in the 

position to help these countries as they orient themselves toward 

Western democratic and market-based economic principles, and I 

believe it is imperative that we do so. If I could reiterate what Assistant Secretary Boucher, our three sets of strategic interest in 

Central Asia, namely political and economic reform, energy and regional economic cooperation, and security are all interrelated and 

equally important. Given my responsibilities, I would like to focus 

a few minutes on the security aspects of our policy in Central Asia. 

Our core security goals in the region are threefold: To support 

the global war on terrorism; to strengthen regional border security; 

and reduce the risk of proliferation, particularly of weapons of 

mass destruction; and to promote and assist with defense sector reform. 

On the global war on terrorism, the United States is engaged in 

what has appropriately been called ‘‘the long war.’’ to prevail, we 

must find and destroy terrorists, bolster our own defenses, and particularly for this region, empower our partners to develop capabilities to isolate and expose terrorist groups and their means of support. Access to Central Asia supports ongoing combat and stability 

and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan. Because this part of 

the world is landlocked, we must rely on strategic airlifts to sustain 

large scale operations. That cannot be done without overflight and 

basing rights. Each country in the region has provided assistance 

to operation enduring freedom through bilateral arrangements for 

overflight, divert agreements, refueling rights, all critical to our operations in Afghanistan. 

Currently our relationship with Kyrgyzstan is particularly important and we are working hard to maintain our cooperative arrangements with them. We are currently renegotiating the terms of our 

use of facilities at Manas. These negotiations are complex and require determination and flexibility on both sides, but we are committed to a successful conclusion. 

The second core security goal is to secure the borders of the region from illicit trafficking including in WMD materials. We believe 

shutting down trafficking routes is essential to the long-term stability of both Afghanistan and the Central Asian region as a whole. 

Here we utilize cooperative threat reduction in counternarcotics 

funds to help countries build and modernize border crossing facilities, establish interdiction teams and other units. We train appropriate defense and military personnel and help modernize their 

equipment and facilities. 

Central Asia has emerged as a significant narcotics trafficking 

route. DOD, in cooperation with the Departments of State and Justice is helping to build central Asia’s capacity to combat the drug 

trade. We are training host nation counternarcotics enforcement 

personnel and refurbishing border security infrastructure in 

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In Tajikistan, we are also providing 

23

real-time communications capability that will enhance interagency 

coordination on counternarcotics operations. 

Thirdly, our core security goal in Central Asia is to transform the 

central Asian Soviet legacy defense establishments into modern institutions along the Euro Atlantic lines. Specifically, we envision 

interdependent Central Asian militaries that are firmly under civilian control, are subject to budget transparency and legislative oversight, are affordable in size to meet realistic security requirements. 

All five Central Asian states are members of NATO’s Partnership 

For Peace, PFP. Their participation in PFP events and exercises 

helps develop interoperability which, in turn, enhances their capabilities to participate in coalition and other operations. PFP mechanisms including the Individual Partnership Action Plan, or IPAP, 

are important tools to help these countries implement defense reform. Earlier this year, I would like to note that Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian state to develop and secure NATO approval for an individual partnership action plan. 

Contact between U.S. and foreign military officials promotes defense reform. Through bilateral defense consultations, states and 

National Guard partnerships and central command sponsored 

training conferences and other events, we are deepening personal 

and professional ties between the militaries of Central Asia and the 

United States, building, in effect, the next generation of leaders. As 

such, we strongly encourage young central Asian officers to participate in programs at the George C. Marshall Center for Security 

Studies. 

Mr. Chairman, we have vital interests, security, economic and 

political that will endure in Central Asia well after operations in 

Afghanistan have ended. These interests require our attention now. 

We believe we must continue to balance our approach based on 

where each country stands in the economic, political and security 

realms. I look forward to working with you, with this Committee 

and my colleagues in the Executive Branch to further U.S. interests in this important region. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. MacDougall follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES MACDOUGALL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Madame Chair, Congressman Ackerman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to discuss U.S. policy on Central Asia. 

The United States faces significant policy challenges in Central Asia. This region, 

made up of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, is 

now in the middle of an historic transition to fully independent, sovereign nations. 

We are in a position to assist these countries as they orient themselves toward western democratic and market-based economic principles, and it is imperative that we 

do so. Our policy is to help create a Central Asian region comprised of independent, 

sovereign pluralistic states that are territorially secure, free from external political 

domination, and economically engaged with international markets. 

A region comprised of secular Muslim states, Central Asia has a rapidly growing 

population, much of which lives with limited economic and political opportunities. 

Difficult domestic conditions are exacerbated by international trafficking—in weapons, narcotics, and people. In sum, much of Central Asia is subject to a dangerous 

mix of demographic, economic, social, and political pressures that could help foment 

terrorism and Islamic extremism. 

Alongside these challenges, however, are significant opportunities. First, Central 

Asia is home to ancient traditions of religious tolerance and scientific learning—traditions that can help shield it against extremism and create functioning examples 

of moderate Islamic states. Second, this region has proven economic potential. CenVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:22 Aug 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\042606\27230.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
24

tral Asia once made up the heart of the Silk Road. The prospect of regional economic dynamism still exists, especially given Central Asia’s vast energy reserves 

and strong agricultural potential. These natural resources, if invested wisely, can 

help revive that economic vitality and foster much-needed economic growth. Third, 

Central Asian governments recognize that the transnational threats of international 

terrorism and illicit trafficking endanger their own national security. As such, we 

have strong opportunities for cooperation as we continue to prosecute the Global 

War on Terror. 

The great policy questions of our time are all present in Central Asia—from combating terrorism to energy security; from supporting moderate Islam to promoting 

democratic development. 

CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY

The United States continues to pursue three sets of strategic interests in Central 

Asia, namely:

• Political and economic reform;

• Energy and regional economic cooperation; and

• Security.

We consider these objectives highly interdependent, mutually reinforcing, and 

equally important. Given my responsibilities, I will focus my attention primarily on 

the security aspects of our policy. But I would first like to briefly outline our goals 

in the other spheres. Additionally, I want to emphasize that we endeavor to pursue 

these different objectives simultaneously. No one objective trumps another. 

As Assistant Secretary of State Fried told this subcommittee in October, failure 

in one area will undermine the chance of success in another. Therefore, our efforts 

in these countries must be crafted by carefully balancing developments in each 

sphere. Naturally, our enthusiasm for broadening our security cooperation with 

Central Asia must be tempered by economic and political realities. Likewise, our 

disappointment with the pace of reform in the region does not change that fact that 

we have important security interests in Central Asia. 

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM

Political liberalization and economic development in Central Asia are key to the 

region’s long-term success. Lack of freedom from oppression and poverty breeds instability. Similarly, where a government lacks authority throughout its country’s 

territory, you will find predatory forces, both inside and outside the country, that 

seek to fill the vacuum, often in destabilizing ways. 

Economic opportunity and good governance are the long-term solutions to these 

problems. Terrorist groups will find few recruits within a population that has a vibrant economy and confidence in its governmental institutions. Regarding internal 

stability, no government has more legitimacy than one that is freely selected by its 

citizens. 

The Department of Defense (DoD) has fewer tools than other U.S. institutions to 

directly empower the forces of political and economic reform. Still, our defense reform efforts play a significant role in strengthening one of the basic foundations of 

democratic society—capable, civilian-controlled, and responsible defense establishments. 

ENERGY AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION

The economic vitality we seek to create in Central Asia can be promoted through 

regional cooperation and international investment. The U.S. government seeks to tie 

Central Asia into a regional web of economic cooperation and stability, with support 

from the international financial and U.S. commercial sectors. In this regard, I would 

like to highlight the important work being done by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Tajikistan. Their work building a bridge over the Pyanzh River at the Afghan-Tajik border is a prime example of DoD’s commitment to support projects to 

develop the economic infrastructure of the region. 

Central Asia’s energy sector needs increased investment. We must work to link 

up the impressive hydrocarbon and hydroelectric energy resources in Central Asia 

with regional and global energy markets. Further development of these resources 

and diversification of delivery routes from Central Asia—both economically beneficial to these countries—is a U.S. priority. 

SECURITY STRATEGY

We have three core goals for our security relationship with Central Asia:

25

• To support the Global War on Terrorism;

• To strengthen regional border security and reduce the risk of the proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and

• To promote and assist with regional defense sector reform. 

Global War on Terrorism 

The United States is engaged in what has been appropriately called ‘‘the long 

war’’. We are faced with a determined and amorphous enemy that operates internationally and leaves us few fixed targets. To prevail, we must find and destroy terrorists, bolster our own defenses, and empower our allies and partners to isolate and 

expose terrorist groups and their means of support. 

In greater Central Asia, our main focus is on supporting stability and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. This cannot be done without partners in the region. The 

most salient geographical fact of this part of the world is that it is land-locked. As 

a result, we need to rely on strategic airlift to sustain large-scale operations in the 

heart of the Asian landmass. And that cannot be accomplished without overflight 

and basing rights. 

Every country in the region has provided assistance in some form to Operation 

Enduring Freedom. Through bilateral arrangements, we have secured basing access 

and the overflight, divert, and refueling rights that have been critical to our ongoing 

operations in Afghanistan. 

Neighboring countries have consistently applied pressure on Central Asian governments to downgrade their cooperative relations with us, and this remains a constant challenge to regional security. In our view, every state with significant interests in the region benefits from stability in Afghanistan. That is why it is so important that Central Asian governments remain committed to supporting the development of a stable, secure Afghanistan. 

Until November 2005, our operations in Afghanistan were supported from airbases in Karshi-Khanabad (K2), in Uzbekistan, and Manas, in Kyrgyzstan. At the 

request of the Uzbek government we left Karshi-Khanabad and now rely on Manas 

for logistical support to U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. That is not to say 

that other options do not exist. However, I want to emphasize that our relationship 

with Kyrgyzstan is important and we are working hard to maintain our cooperative 

arrangements with them. We are in the process of renegotiating the terms of our 

use of facilities at Manas with the Kyrgyz government. We are committed to an expeditious conclusion of these negotiations, which will require determination and 

flexibility by both sides. 

Counterterrorism in Central Asia cannot solely be addressed in the context of Afghanistan. As I mentioned earlier, political and economic conditions in Central Asia 

potentially make the region susceptible to the rise of extremist movements. It is crucial that we act now to stem the tide by better preparing Central Asian governments to deal with these threats themselves. 

To that end, we work within our statutory authority to provide counterterrorism 

training and expertise to Central Asian defense and military officials. Where appropriate, we have also helped equip our partners with non-lethal defense articles, increasing their operational effectiveness and interoperability with multinational 

forces. DoD is not alone in this endeavor. We work with our State, Justice, and 

Homeland Security colleagues to build capacities in the defense and security sector 

establishments. 

In one prime example of the success of our counterterrorism efforts, DoD assistance helped establish Kazakhstan’s peacekeeping battalion, elements of which are 

currently serving a fifth rotation in Iraq. Originally tasked with ordnance disposal 

and water purification, this battalion has since begun training Iraqi security forces 

in these same tasks. Kazakhstan is one of three predominantly Muslim states with 

troops serving in Iraq, with Albania and Azerbaijan the other two. 

Non-Proliferation/Border Security 

Our second core security goal is to increase national capacities to secure borders 

(land, riverine, maritime, and airspace) from all types of illicit trafficking and the 

proliferation of materials for WMD. We believe that shutting down trafficking routes 

is essential to the long-term stability both of Afghanistan and Central Asia as a 

whole. To accomplish this, we utilize a variety of Cooperative Threat Reduction 

(CTR) and counter-narcotics (CN) funds to help countries build and/or modernize 

border crossing facilities, to establish interdiction teams and other military units, 

to train appropriate defense and military personnel, and to help modernize their 

equipment and facilities. 

Central Asia has emerged as an important trafficking route for Southwest Asian 

narcotics. The UN estimates that 30 percent of Afghan narcotics transit Central 

26

Asia on their way to Russia and Europe. Porous borders, scarce resources, and corruption constrain the Central Asian countries’ efforts to stem the drug trade. In addition, we continue to see some links between drug trafficking organizations, organized crime, and terrorist groups in the region. 

DoD, in cooperation with the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and the Drug Enforcement Agency, is helping to build 

the capacity of the Central Asian nations to combat the burgeoning drug trade in 

the region. In FY05, DoD dedicated $28M in supplemental CN assistance to Central 

Asia. In FY06, we requested $55M for CN capacity building in Central Asia. We are 

utilizing CN assistance to improve training for host-nation counter-narcotics enforcement personnel and to refurbish border security infrastructure in Tajikistan, 

Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. In Tajikistan, we are also providing a real-time 

communications capability that will enhance interagency coordination on internal 

CN operations. 

Regarding non-proliferation, let me say that keeping WMD out of the hands of 

terrorists must be our highest priority. We have been working hard on this front. 

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan have endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative. We are working with Kazakhstan to destroy WMD-related infrastructure. Additionally, we are helping Kazakhstan build a Caspian Sea 

monitoring and response capability. We also work with Uzbekistan to improve border WMD detection capabilities and to identify, safeguard, and destroy dangerous 

pathogens. 

Defense Reform 

Our third core security goal is to gradually transform Central Asia’s legacy Soviet 

defense establishments into modern forces along the Euro-Atlantic model. Specifically, we envision independent Central Asian militaries that are firmly under civilian control, are subject to budget transparency and legislative oversight, and that 

are affordable and sized to meet realistic security requirements. 

All five Central Asian states are Partnership for Peace (PfP) members. Participation in PfP events and exercises helps develop interoperability with U.S. and NATO 

forces, which in turn enhances these nation’s opportunities for participation in coalition operations. PfP mechanisms, including the Individual Partnership Action Plan 

(IPAP) and the PfP Planning and Review Process, are important tools to help them 

implement defense reform. Earlier this year, Kazakhstan became the first Central 

Asian state to develop and secure NATO approval for an IPAP. 

Additionally, DoD uses its extensive bilateral contacts to expose foreign military 

officials to U.S. values and policies. It is our belief that increased contact is essential 

to promote both the interest and the ability to enact reform in Central Asia’s defense establishments. Through bilateral defense consultations, State National Guard 

partnerships, and CENTCOM-sponsored training, conferences, and other contacts, 

we are working to deepen personal and professional ties between the militaries of 

Central Asia and the United States. Similarly, we strongly encourage and assist in 

the participation of young Central Asian officers and diplomats in courses at the 

George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies. We have strong interests in helping 

to build the next generation of leaders. 

CONCLUSION

Madame Chairman, we must continue to balance our approach based on where 

each country stands in the economic, political, and security realms. Supporting operations in Afghanistan is an important part of this balance. Additionally, we have 

vital interests—security, economic, political—that will endure long after operations 

in Afghanistan have ended, and they require our attention now. 

Thank you. I look forward to working with this committee and my colleagues in 

the executive branch in this important region.

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you. 

We have waited a long time. I suppose we can go to panel 2 now. 

I have some questions from the Chair and then I will have some 

of my own. 

STATEMENT OF MS. ELIZABETH DUGAN, VICE PRESIDENT, 

INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 

Ms. DUGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, and 

thank you for this opportunity to address you today. A little less 

than a year ago, I made a trip to Central Asia, and my flight was 

27

delayed into JFK, and so I missed the connection to Istanbul. So 

I presented myself to the airline representative to rearrange my 

itinerary, and she basically told me that she could get me to 

Istanbul, but that it would not be in time to make the onward connection to Bishket. And her recommendation to me was that perhaps I could drive there from Istanbul. I told her that I didn’t think 

she understood the geography involved. 

So I begin by commending the Committee for not only appreciating the geography of this far-flung and often forgotten region of 

the world, but for hosting this hearing to draw attention to the 

challenges and opportunities that exist there. It matters. Central 

Asia’s proximity to Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan highlights its strategic importance to the United States. Among other challenges, the 

region faces the potential for radical Islamist inroads into impoverished societies. So I am here today to make the case that Central 

Asia is worthy of democracy support efforts that are reinforced by 

our robust public diplomacy effort. 

Since 2003, the International Republican Institute has proudly 

implemented democracy building programs in Kazakhstan, 

Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, and we have built a nonpartisan reputation by organizing hundreds of training events and 

roundtable discussion in the three countries, all designed to advance democratic institutions and practices. But these three countries present diverse challenges to us. In a manner of speaking, 

they represent the good, the bad and the ugly. 

In the Kyrgyz Republic, I want to emphasize in particular the 

positive dynamic that occurs when funding, technical skills and an 

eager beneficiary are fused together. Thanks in large part to development assistance over the past 10 years the Kyrgyz Republic is 

the least authoritarian of the five former Soviet Central Asian republics. 

Over the last year the country has been taking steps in the right 

direction, albeit with some delays and setbacks. Here are the positive developments. An unhindered press, a vocal civil society, an 

open public discussion of national issues. In fact, IRI polling from 

a month ago shows that the population is generally positive about 

the development of the country. 

On major issues like unemployment, corruption and dealing with 

organized crime, though there is only limited progress. Additionally, there is the core issue of the country’s future form of government, a Parliamentary, Presidential or mixed system. So President 

Bakiev has decreed that a national referendum on the form of government will take place in late 2006 preceded by a massive public 

education campaign. 

At this stage, IRI polling shows that a majority of people are not 

aware of the coming constitutional referendum. And of those who 

are aware, 70 percent are not sufficiently informed to vote on it. 

Clearly much work needs to be done if the referendum is to be 

meaningful. And with USAID funds, IRI has developed information 

and training materials for political parties to spread throughout 

the country in this critical national education campaign. 

While the referendum may be its single political event of 2006, 

the need for development of political parties remains a top priority 

if the country is to have a stable political system. Debate over conVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:22 Aug 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\042606\27230.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
28

stitutional changes in 2005 focused on their importance, and by 

2010, it is possible that political parties will occupy at least half 

of the seats in a more robust Parliament that is endowed with increased legislative and oversight powers. This would be an unprecedented development in Central Asia. The way to achieve it, to 

echo Secretary of State Rice’s words of last October, stay the 

course. 

This is a critical time in the country’s development as an independent nation, and I cannot emphasize enough the key role that 

United States assistance plays in the Kyrgyz Republic. 

Uzbekistan presents a far different and rather dark and ugly picture. It’s tragic aftermath highlighted the fact that the country is 

effectively ruled by a dictator. Not one of the 220 members of the 

Parliament uttered a word of condemnation or dared question 

President Karimov’s deadly response to the demonstration there, 

reflecting the intolerance of public expression and the general absence of civil liberties in the country. 

What else is missing? Citizen participation in the political process, independent news media, legally registered opposition parties. 

All of this has created fertile ground for the appeal of radical 

Islam, which sees opportunity in the ideological and economic poverty that prevails in the country’s regions. Regressive policies, total 

suppression of opposing views and the virtual elimination of the 

civil society have closed off almost all channels of outside assistance, and effectively restricted the activities of organizations like 

IRI. So severely, in fact, that we have had to cancel training seminars and have lost valuable program time to tend to bureaucratic 

and cumbersome reaccreditation and registration process. 

The situation in Kazakhstan falls somewhere between the promise of the Kyrgyz Republic and the dire situation in Uzbekistan. 

Unlike their poorer neighbors, Kazakhstan’s natural gas and oil 

revenues have funded the countries’ robust economic development, 

and to some extent, its political and social development, making it 

less dependent on outside assistance. So we have seen Kazakhstan 

transition from a post Soviet republic to a semi-authoritarian, 

semi-free market country with quasi-independent political parties. 

In 2005, President Nazarbayev announced a national program of 

political reforms that is designed in theory to introduce local elections and self-government structures. In 2006, this message was reinforced with the creation of a new state commission on democratization. However, President Nazarbayev assumed the chairmanship of the Commission, which likely signals his intent to control 

it and certainly detracts from the Commission as a venue for real 

debate and free expression of democratic views and ideas. 

So it remains to be seen whether the expanded mandate of the 

commission is part of the President’s strategy for Kazakhstan to 

ascend to the OSCE chairmanship in 2009, or whether, in fact, it 

is a genuine step toward democratic reform. 

In Kazakhstan, IRI’s assistance has focused on political party 

strengthening and candidate training for local and Parliamentary 

elections. Percentages of candidates with party Parliamentary affiliation increased during the last 3 years, and we were very optimistic that steady progress was being made, but regressive tendencies and administrative interference with some of the parties 

29

have tempered the country’s political development. United States 

assistance to Kazakhstan must continue to help support political 

reform to the greatest extent possible. 

To conclude, in each Central Asian country, there exists at various levels a genuine desire for democracy assistance. The United 

States should encourage the region’s leaders to adhere to bilateral 

agreements, and it must also do a better public relations job of explaining America’s support for political and economic reform and 

participatory democracy. This fact is sometimes lost on pro-democracy groups that have little access to accurate information in this 

relatively isolated region and therefore feel ignored by the United 

States. If this perception persists, radical Islamists are ready to fill 

the void, and U.S. foreign interests will face yet another far flung 

and growing ideological foe. 

I thank you for your kind attention, sir. And I would like you to 

know and also for the rest of the Members of the Committee and 

staff to know that if you have an interest in our polling results in 

the Kyrgyz Republic, IRI is pleased to avail ourselves to separate 

briefings for you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dugan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. ELIZABETH DUGAN, VICE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL

REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE

Good afternoon, Madam Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on Central Asia, a region of the world that 

has not always received sufficient attention because of its distance and relatively 

short history of relations with the United States. Central Asia’s proximity to Iraq, 

Iran and Afghanistan highlights its strategic importance to the United States. 

Among other challenges, the region faces such issues as illegal drug routes from Afghanistan, large flows of migrant workers, and potential for Islamist inroads into 

impoverished societies still bereft of a post-Soviet national ideology. Consequently, 

I am here today to make the case that Central Asia is worthy of carefully crafted 

and funded democracy-support efforts that are reinforced by a robust public diplomacy effort. 

Fifteen years have elapsed since the countries comprising former Soviet Central 

Asia became independent. During this time, the region was the last to benefit from 

U.S. democracy assistance and still lags behind other former Soviet republics with 

respect to economic and political reforms. For years after the break-up of the Soviet 

Union, policymakers tended to treat the region as a whole. However, these countries 

are now sufficiently differentiated that they must be treated on the basis of where 

each stands in its development and relations with countries outside the region. This 

development dovetails with the International Republican Institute’s (IRI) approach 

to democracy building in the region since we began work there in 2003. 

Since that time, IRI has implemented democracy-building programs in three Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. Guided by 

a sense of cautious optimism, IRI has taken an equal-opportunity approach in its 

work: all democratically-oriented parties and groups are invited to benefit from IRI’s 

technical assistance. IRI has built a non-partisan reputation through organizing 

hundreds of training events and round table discussions in the three countries, all 

designed to advance democratic institutions and practices. 

Turning first to the Kyrgyz Republic, we note the positive dynamic that occurs 

when donor funds, sound technical skills and an eager beneficiary are fused together. Thanks in large part to development assistance from international, European and U.S. government-funded organizations during the past ten years, the 

Kyrgyz Republic is the least authoritarian of the five former Soviet Central Asian 

republics. With a population of five million, few natural resources and a continually 

struggling economy, Kyrgyzstanis generally have been open to outside assistance. 

Following the March 2005 events in which long-time and increasingly authoritarian 

President Askar Akaev was chased from power by disgruntled citizens, the country 

is taking steps in the right direction, albeit with delays and intermittent setbacks. 

Positive developments are an unhindered press, vocal civil society and open public 

discussion of national issues. Furthermore, in a region of authoritarian, one-man 

30

rule, the democratically-elected ‘‘tandem’’ of President Kurmanbek Bakiev and 

Prime Minister Feliks Kulov has remained intact despite a difficult first year. IRI 

polling shows that the population is generally positive about the development of the 

country. 

However, on major issues like unemployment, corruption and dealing with organized crime, there is only limited progress. President Bakiev has hesitated on fulfilling election promises about constitutional reform. Two Constitutional Councils 

formed in 2005 debated amending the national constitution to address the country’s 

political vulnerabilities, but they failed to reach a consensus or to sufficiently please 

President Bakiev. The core issue is the country’s future form of government: a parliamentary, presidential or mixed system. Subsequently, President Bakiev decreed 

that a national referendum on the form of government would take place in late 

2006, preceded by a massive public education campaign. At this stage, IRI polling 

shows that a majority of people are not aware of the coming constitutional referendum and of those who are aware, 70 percent are not sufficiently informed to 

vote on it. 

Clearly, much work needs to be done if the referendum is to be meaningful. Fortunately, the United States is assisting in the national education campaign. With 

USAID funds, IRI has developed ‘‘forms of government’’ information and training 

materials for political parties to disseminate throughout the country. Presently, IRI 

is sponsoring trips throughout the country for political party representatives to instruct their regional branches and the media on the basics of parliamentary, presidential and mixed systems. 

While the referendum is the Kyrgyz Republic’s signal political event of 2006, the 

need for development of political parties remains a top priority if the country is to 

have a stable political system. Debate over constitutional changes in 2005 focused 

on the importance of political parties, and by 2010, it is possible that political parties will occupy at least half of the seats in a more robust parliament that is endowed with increased legislative and oversight powers. This would be an unprecedented development in Central Asia, where one-man rule has disallowed checks and 

balances. 

The Kyrgyz Republic’s political transition is a long-term, generational process 

which requires steady U.S. support. Kyrgyzstanis are willing to learn and to 

progress. Democracy assistance there presents a relatively strong example of costeffective use of U.S. taxpayer dollars. IRI concurs with Secretary of State Rice’s 

message to Kyrgyzstanis during her short visit there last October: stay the course. 

This is a critical time in the country’s development as an independent nation, and 

I cannot emphasize enough the crucial role that U.S. assistance plays in the Kyrgyz 

Republic. We must do everything possible to help its citizens and their government 

build a more stable and democratic society. IRI will continue to be there to provide 

this essential piece of development assistance. 

Uzbekistan presents a far different and rather dark picture. The government’s 

mass shooting of civilians at a public demonstration in Andijon in eastern 

Uzbekistan almost one year ago put the country’s problems and backward direction 

into sharp relief. Andijon’s aftermath also highlighted the fact that the country’s 25 

million people are effectively ruled by a dictator: not one of the 220 members of the 

two-chamber parliament uttered a word of condemnation or dared question President Islam Karimov’s handling of Andijon. Since Andijon, independent activists 

have been jailed, hundreds of domestic and international organizations have been 

closed, and reform-minded Uzbekistanis have been silenced, isolated or forced into 

exile. 

The government’s deadly response in Andijon reflected its intolerance of public expression of grievances and the general absence of civil liberties. Citizen participation 

in the political process is severely limited due to a lack of legal standing for political 

opposition movements and parties, and no independent news media. There are no 

legally-registered opposition parties in Uzbekistan. The Karimov government has allowed five pro-government parties to hold seats in the parliament, but they have 

no independent capacity. In general, Uzbekistan operates on a Soviet-era model of 

centralized power and administrative command but with no social ideology to buffet 

the system. This has created fertile ground for the appeal of radical Islam, which 

sees opportunity in the ideological and economic poverty that prevails in the country’s regions. 

Regressive policies, total suppression of opposing views, and the virtual elimination of a civil society has closed off almost all channels of outside assistance. The 

Karimov administration has effectively restricted the activities of international organizations like IRI by enforcing new decrees and amendments to existing laws that 

are contrary to the U.S.-Uzbekistan Bilateral Agreement. Restrictions on foreign 

non-governmental organizations are so severe that IRI has had to cancel training 

31

seminars and has lost valuable program time to tend to bureaucratic and cumbersome re-accreditation and registration processes. 

While there is a genuine demand for IRI’s technical support throughout 

Uzbekistan, unfortunately there is no relief on the horizon for the country’s pro-reform groups. Moreover, since Andijon, Moscow and Tashkent have forged closer 

commercial, political and military ties. During a recent series of high-level Russian 

delegations to Uzbekistan, Russian officials have repeatedly confirmed their support 

for President Karimov’s handling of Andijon. Change may have to wait until a postKarimov generation begins to lead the country along modern, international norms. 

The situation in Kazakhstan falls somewhere between the promise of the Kyrgyz 

Republic and the dire situation in Uzbekistan. Like their Kyrgyz cousins, 

Kazakhstani political activists have taken advantage of U.S. development assistance 

with a relatively open attitude. However, such assistance has been carefully scrutinized by Kazakhstani authorities. Unlike their poorer neighbors, Kazakhstan’s natural gas and oil revenues have funded the country’s robust economic development 

and to some extent its political and social development, making it less dependent 

on outside assistance. For instance, while political parties still have not yet matured 

in Kazakhstan, they do not suffer from a chronic shortage of funds as do their counterparts in the Kyrgyz Republic. Kazakhstani political activists have shown themselves enthusiastic students of Western democratic principles and practices. 

With a population of 15 million, Kazakhstan has transitioned from a post-Soviet 

republic to a semi-authoritarian, semi-free market country with quasi-independent 

political parties and an elected lower chamber of parliament. President Nursultan 

Nazarbaev’s administration failed, however, to permit truly competitive elections 

both in 2004 and 2005, and to allow a free media, possibly endangering his country’s 

bid for the 2009 chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE). Additionally, persistent corruption has been progressively undermining past progress in political reform. Yet, OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Belgian 

Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht struck an optimistic note during his recent visit 

with President Nazarbaev, noting that the OSCE deems it ‘‘very important that it 

be headed by a country located to the east of Vienna’’ and positively appraising 

Kazakhstan’s democratization prospects and President Nazarbaev’s stated commitment to advance them. 

In 2005, President Nazarbaev announced a ‘‘national program of political reforms’’ 

that is designed, in theory, to introduce the election of regional governors and city 

mayors and establish local self-government structures. In 2006, this message was 

reinforced with the creation of a new State Commission on Democratization. However, President Nazarbaev assumed the chairmanship of the Commission, which 

likely signals his intent to control it and certainly detracts from the Commission as 

a venue for real debate and free expression of democratic views and ideas. It remains to be seen whether the Commission’s expanded mandate is part of President 

Nazarbaev’s strategy for Kazakhstan to ascend to the OSCE chairmanship or a genuine step toward democratic reform. 

In Kazakhstan, IRI’s assistance has focused on political party strengthening and 

candidate training for local and parliamentary elections. IRI has built a reputation 

with the parties as being objective and impartial. Percentages of candidates with 

party affiliation increased greatly during the last three years, and IRI was optimistic that steady progress was being made. However, regressive tendencies and administrative interference with some of the parties have tempered the country’s political development. Mass media remains largely controlled by media holding companies owned by the president’s family. Opposition newspapers are periodically sued, 

closed and reopened under other names. 

Going relatively unnoticed in Kazakhstan is the legal and illegal migration of 

hundreds of thousands of workers from other Central Asian and Caucasus countries. 

This trend presents a growing challenge to the country’s national security and internal stability. So far, the issue is not generating sufficient evaluation or discussion. 

U.S. assistance to Kazakhstan should help support political reform to the greatest 

extent possible. Our government must be ready to lend technical expertise to the 

various components of the democratization plan that the State Commission on Democratization recommends, and particularly for helping local municipalities establish self-government. As with the Kyrgyz Republic, a U.S. policy of steady democracy assistance will help Kazakhstan chart a course of democratization that will 

gradually become institutionalized and sustainable. 

In each Central Asian country there is, at various levels, a genuine desire for democracy assistance. To help desire become reality, the United States should encourage the region’s leaders to adhere to the letter and spirit of bi-lateral agreements. 

The United States must also, perhaps through the State Department’s public diplomacy initiative, do a better public relations job of explaining America’s support for 

32

popular political and economic reform and participatory democracy. It is imperative 

that civil society activists understand that IRI does not favor working with only a 

select few, but will consider assisting any democratically-oriented group that encourages citizen participation. This fact is sometimes lost on pro-democracy groups in 

a relatively isolated part of the world that have little access to accurate news and 

information and therefore feel ignored by the United States. If this perception persists, radical Islamists are ready to fill the void, and U.S. foreign policy will face 

yet another far-flung and growing ideological foe. 

In summary, the United States has critical interests in the countries of Central 

Asia and we have distinct challenges in each country. We must provide the financial 

assistance necessary to help Kyrgyzstanis continue their democratic transition. In 

Uzbekistan, the United States must insist on adherence to democratic principles 

and the rule of law. In Kazakhstan, we must remain engaged in the development 

of democracy. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you. Ms. Olcott. 

STATEMENT OF MS. MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Ms. OLCOTT. I wish to thank you for the opportunity to testify 

before you today. The States of Central Asia are of increasing importance for the United States, yet unfortunately, the opportunities 

that U.S. policymakers have for influencing developments in this 

region are relatively circumscribed. This is probably a product of 

how much, or more, frankly, how little foreign assistance is spent 

in this region which makes the threat of withholding funds unfortunately oftentimes a rather or relatively empty one. But even a 

decision to throw money at the regions problems would not turn 

most of these countries into viable democracies with market-based 

economies any time soon. Some of these countries have little need 

for outside assistance and their leaders perceive even less need for 

outside advice, while others still eschew assistance rather than accept what they see as unwanted foreign meddling. 

This gives U.S. policy makers little choice but to take a long-term 

perspective which we have heard from the various people from the 

administration that we are, in fact, doing. Trying to maximize the 

likelihood that these countries will eventually develop into democracies, but we need to do this in a way that is cognizant of the 

short and medium term threats that may come from this region. 

Let me make a few general points about some of these threats and 

some of the challenges we face with regard to democracy building, 

energy security, terrorism and organized crime. And then, in the 

question period, I will be happy to share some policy suggestions 

if there is time or interest. 

Speaking bluntly, for all their invocations of democracy, Central 

Asia’s leaders share few democratic values with United States leaders. None of these countries have much chance to develop into 

Western style participatory democracies until a new generation, 

one educated and socialized since the collapse of communism takes 

power. This creates real challenges for us, for as we have heard the 

real focus of U.S. policy has to get young people the educational 

and media access necessary to help facilitate their full participation 

in their own country and in the broader global community. And the 

political preconditions must be put in place to allow this more cosmopolitan generation to enter political life. 

33

Without this, there will never be a ruling elite that is competent 

in a democratic sense or an opposition that is necessary to check 

them. 

This creates for U.S. policy makers the chicken-and-an-egg dilemma. How do you get non-democratic leaders to establish the 

pre-conditions for democratic development? I would argue and we 

have heard that the model of a color revolution in this region has 

not worked out well. A peaceful or nonpeaceful popularly supported 

effort at regime change throughout this region in any of the countries of this region would not necessarily produce the kind of democratic outcome we would like to see. 

Here, I think the example of Kyrgyzstan is one that gives us 

cause for concern. For a year after their revolution, this society, the 

country seems more fragmented and potentially unstable than ever 

before, and I would argue that the long term survival of civil society institutions are still not assured. 

Then I would turn to the question of Kazakhstan, where I think 

the question of levers again becomes a really important one. I think 

the U.S. in its policy and the EU are giving the states of the region 

a clear choice. Accept United States and European norms, and you 

can participate as respected members of various European and 

international forums. Failing this you join the category of other 

states offered a more limited kind of friendship. And if you fail to 

behave at all you become pariah and rogue states. 

The drive for greater international acceptance provides reason 

for some optimism that the situation in Kazakhstan may continue 

to improve, given how much President Nazarbayev wants his country to chair the OSCE in 2009, a decision to be made in late 2006, 

and for which he has promised, and I will not reiterate the points 

my colleagues made, or the fact that the picture is still a very 

cloudy one. 

But I would argue, and I go through this at greater length in my 

testimony, the political drama in Kazakhstan is creating complex 

choices for Western leaders. 

There is naturally a desire to flatter the President of a country 

that has oil and gas reserves, but I would say that cannot be and 

will not be the focus of how the OSCE members make the decision. 

What I think is most crucial and what makes the calculus of decision making so difficult from the point of view of democracy building, is that I would argue that if Kazakhstan’s OSCE bid is turned 

down, then Nazarbayev may well decide it is much easier to abandon democratic reform, a position that he will find support from 

the Shanghai Corporation organization. And he will also find the 

same markets for his energy in this arena. Clients from the north 

and the east will come forward and buy any oil and gas that he 

is willing to ship to them. 

Let me leap quickly and just touch on some of the more difficult 

states. Let me say something about Uzbekistan. I think Washington, in my opinion, correctly decided on a much more cautious 

strategy in the post Andijian environment than did the EU member states. I think one of the payoffs was the Uzbek nuclear materials were successfully moved to Russia, in part, through international supervision that was arranged in large part through U.S. 

auspices. 

34

I am more concerned though that international concern over 

Uzbek human rights violations, a rightful concern, led to a diminished focus on developments in energy rich Turkmenistan. Here I 

would say the situation is even more desire. Government policies 

here are compromising the long-term prospects for political institution building. The state has all but destroyed the national education system and introduced restrictions on foreign contact and 

foreign study by all its citizens. Given the demographically small 

size of the Turkmen nation and how few people are actually able 

to study and live abroad, the prospects of a national revival in postNiyazov Turkmenistan are not very good. Fortunately, the Uzbeks 

have not taken similar steps to irrevocably destroy the human potential of the next generation which gives us reason for hope but 

maybe not for optimism. 

A few quick words about energy. I think it is important, and 

again I have written extensively about this in other settings, that 

Central Asia’s energy assets are vast but we should not exaggerate 

the role that they are likely to play in meeting United States and 

Western needs. No matter how enlightened, United States policy 

only have a marginal effect on minimizing Russian and Chinese 

presence in the region, as geography plus geopolitical pressure 

gives each more leverage than we are to employ. This is especially 

true for Kazakhstan which takes me back to the OSCE and the 

crucialness in some ways of that decision. 

Again, I can come back. I am running out of time. I do not want 

to belabor the transport issues. But I think that Kazakhstan has 

followed a policy of balance and prudence which has worked to 

their own advantage, which is one of the reasons they continue to 

ship so much oil through Russia. Cooperation with China is one we 

really have to be aware of. Unlike cooperation with the West, cooperation with China gives Kazakhstan some new transit options. 

Transit options that can piggyback on to the transit options from 

Russia. So it does not create the kind of either/or choice that Russia likes to depict the trans-Caspian pipeline as to ship greater 

quantities of oil through BTC. Again, I can come back to this. 

Chinese national oil companies are aggressively seeking to buy 

up all available assets in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 

Uzbekistan; and in fact, they have bought the same gas in 

Turkmenistan that the Russians have which will create a crisis in 

2009 because even Niyazov cannot sell his gas twice. 

For several of the landlocked states, selling through Russia is not 

a bad deal. This is particularly true for Uzbekistan. While the 

Uzbek President has depicted the turn to Russia as an energy investor as part of a country’s strategic reorientation, in reality, there 

has only been limited Western investment in Uzbekistan’s oil and 

gas sector since independence. So he is striking a lucrative deal 

with the only partner around. 

One thing about post-Niyazov Turkmenistan and then I will 

move. Niyazov’s Turkmenistan has been a difficult friend for Moscow, but I think Niyazov has benefited from the complex cash and 

barter transactions, personally benefited, that have been put in 

place which explains some of the difficulties of this relationship. 

The situation may change in post-Niyazov Turkmenistan, and cerVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:22 Aug 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\042606\27230.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
35

tainly, I think the United States must be an alert bystander to any 

succession struggle in order to help facilitate positive development. 

For now at least, I would argue that Turkmenistan remains an 

unstable potential economic partner for the United States as it remains an unattractive partner for Western oil and gas concerns, 

and I think we see this reflected in the difficulty of getting commercial partners in the trans African pipeline. 

Just a quick word about drugs and the criminalization of the 

economy through the region. If you are interested, I can come back 

to this. This is all in the testimony. 

One of the byproducts as we all know of the international campaign in Afghanistan is an increase in opium and heroin coming 

through Central Asia. One of the things this has produced is much 

greater, I would argue, it has created a capacity of criminal groups 

to insinuate themselves into governments in this region, and it has 

also put governments more in the business of facilitating criminal 

trade directly. The first model of criminal groups insinuating themselves has been more characteristic of Tajikistan and increasingly 

of Kyrgyzstan. Whereas the second model of governments who appear, and again you cannot get real information on this, but appear 

to be facilitating the trade directly would be Uzbekistan and 

Turkmenistan. 

I think we have seen some real success in the last few years in 

the efforts of the Tajik government to control the drug trade across 

their territory. I am concerned about the growing criminalization 

of what I see in Kyrgyzstan. 

Two, comments about extreme ideology and the crisis of confidence. I want to say one thing again I have written extensively 

on this on the threat of terrorist groups. This really creates a very 

difficult situation for the U.S. I would say as it is true in so many 

areas of the world, there are religiously-inspired terrorist groups 

targeting the governments of these regions, groups that consider 

themselves part of the global jihadist network. Some are derivative 

groups of the IMU, Islamic Movement, while others are locally 

based and have sprung up in the post September 11 world. These 

groups may or may not have external financial support; but more 

importantly the scale of the activities is sufficiently small that local 

business or political interests are capable of supporting them. Their 

potential for successful mobilization is not the result of financial 

means but of the popular dissatisfaction which makes this an ongoing problem. 

A more problematic case is the case of Hizb’ ut-Tahrir, problematic from the point of view of policy making, not in terms of global 

terrorism. The very nature of their goal is revolutionary, although 

it formally condones the use of violence. It is unclear whether their 

members are individuals are attracted to the use of violence to 

achieve their goal. The presence of HT throughout the region and 

I would argue that they are already operating openly in southern 

Kyrgyzstan, again, something we can come back to if there is interest, has worked to the advantage to the Islamic establishment 

more generally. And this is particularly true in Uzbekistan, where 

the degree of religious ferment within the clergy loyal to the regime 

has gone relatively unnoticed by outsiders. Islam remains one of 

36

the few bases of legitimacy for the Uzbek regime, be it that of 

Karimov or of his successor. 

I have argued elsewhere that Uzbekistan’s secular leaders do not 

fully understand the potential political dynamism of what they see 

as a largely conservative and traditional social force. Central 

agents religious revival although more radical in content than 

Western observers originally anticipate, need not be antithetical to 

U.S. interest. Although in a number of countries, it will slow and, 

in some cases, possibly even preclude the development of secular 

democracy. But it need not keep them from developing into 

participatory societies with free market economies. The greatest 

danger is not Islam or the nature of the region’s Islamic revival but 

how the leaders of these countries will orient themselves to these 

developments. On this question, as so many others, central Asia’s 

leaders may be undone by their own incompetence and vanity. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Olcott follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, RUSSIAN

AND EURASIAN PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

I wish to thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. 

The states of Central Asia are of increasing strategic importance for the U.S., yet 

unfortunately the opportunities that U.S. policy-makers have for influencing developments in this region are relatively circumscribed. This is partly a product of how 

much (or more frankly, how little) foreign assistance is spent in the region, which 

makes the threat of withholding funds a rather empty one. But even a decision to 

‘‘throw money’’ at the region’s problems would not turn most of these countries into 

viable democracies with market-based economies any time soon. Some of these 

states have little need for outside economic assistance, and their leaders perceive 

even less need for outside advice, while others will eschew assistance rather than 

accept what they see as unwanted ‘‘foreign meddling.’’

This gives U.S. policy-makers little choice but to take a long-term perspective, trying to maximize the likelihood that these countries will eventually develop into democracies. But US policy makers need to do so cognizant that developments in the 

short and medium term may create serious security challenges for the citizens of 

these countries, neighboring states, and perhaps, directly or indirectly, for the U.S. 

as well. 

A LACK OF SHARED VALUES

For all their invocations of democracy, Central Asia’s leaders share few values 

with U.S. leaders. None of these countries have much chance to develop into western-style participatory democracies until a new generation, one educated and socialized since the collapse of communism, takes power. When this occurs there is at 

least some chance that the ruling elite in these countries (and I am using this term 

quite broadly to include both the governing class and the political opposition), will 

have a value system largely shared with its U.S., European, and Japanese counterparts. 

In today’s Central Asia, it would still be a mistake to romanticize the prospect 

of a ‘‘color’’ revolution. A peaceful (or non-peaceful) popularly supported effort at regime change in the region would not necessarily produce a democratic outcome. A 

year after the virtually bloodless ouster of Kyrgyzstan’s President Askar Akayev, 

the country appears more fragmented and potentially unstable than before. Moreover the long-term survival of civil society institutions is still not assured. 

It is also not clear whether the west has gained or lost levers with which to influence the development of civil society. It is critical for the long-term success of the 

Central Asian states that young people get the educational and media access necessary for full participation in their own country and the broader global community. 

The political preconditions must be put in place to allow this more cosmopolitan 

generation to enter political life. Without this there will never be a ruling elite that 

is competent in the democratic sense, or the opposition necessary to check it. 

37

There is a ‘‘which came first, the chicken or the egg’’ dilemma here. How do you 

get non-democratic leaders to establish the preconditions for democratic development? In this light, too, the post-revolutionary situation is quite disappointing in 

Kyrgyzstan. President Kurmanbek Bakiyev seems even less eager to join ‘‘the community of Western democratic nations’’ than was his predecessor Askar Akayev during the ‘‘honeymoon period’’ of his presidency, when Akayev was delighted with flattering depictions of himself as the Kyrgyz Thomas Jefferson. Possibly this is because 

President Bakiyev holds a pessimistic view with regard to the political and social 

cleavages in his country, and its short and medium term economic prospects, which 

do not correspond to popular expectations. This means Bakiyev will seek any real 

or even illusory sources of investment in his country’s economy, asking unreasonably high rent for use of his airbase and trying to entice Russian firms into making 

multi-billion dollar investments in hydroelectric power plants in his country (instead 

of competing projects in Tajikistan). 

Given the Kremlin’s expectations about the need for—or even the appropriateness 

of—democratic reform, the Central Asian states are being given the opportunity to 

sign up for a very different kind of ‘‘group think’’ than that toward which the U.S. 

and the European Union are urging them. This is a big change from the early 

1990s, when at least on political institution building Russian and Western messages 

converged, with Yeltsin even attacking his own parliament in 1993 to defend democracy. 

Now that the messages are so divergent, the states of the region are being given 

a clear choice: accept U.S. and European norms (effectively the formal standards of 

the OSCE) and you can participate as respected members of these and various other 

European and international forums. If not, join the category of ‘‘other’’ states, at 

best fair-weather friends with a kind of ‘‘second-class’’ status, and at worst pariah 

or rogue states. 

Obviously, the U.S. would like to see all of the states in the region aspire to the 

first category. This is all the more true because absent their desire U. S. and European leaders have little hope of seeing positive short or medium term political 

change in any of these countries. 

The drive for greater international acceptance provides some reason for optimism 

that the political situation in Kazakhstan may continue to improve, given how much 

President Nursultan Nazarbayev wants his country to chair the OSCE in 2009. This 

decision will be made in late 2006, which explains why the Kazakh leader has promised further opening of the political process through the expanded introduction of 

local elected governments and continued judicial reform. But the picture is still far 

from a one-sided one. The 2005 presidential elections were the most competitive the 

region has seen, and Nazarbayev’s 91 percent vote did reflect his overwhelming popularity. But they also featured irregularities at the ballot-box, and more importantly 

an unequal playing field during the electoral campaign. This further handicapped 

an opposition already crippled by years of the president dominating the country’s 

media, much of which is owned by his family members. Nazarbayev lost further political credibility in western capitals when one of the country’s most prominent opposition figures—a younger figure from the ruling elite—was brutally murdered under 

mysterious circumstances that involved members of the internal security forces. The 

murder compounded the widespread perception that the opposition does not enjoy 

anything close to a level playing field either with regard to access to the media or 

in public life. 

The political drama in Kazakhstan is creating complex choices for Western leaders. There is naturally the desire to flatter the president of a country with vast oil 

and gas reserves, which are being developed in part by companies from one’s own 

country. Indeed the best way to get Kazakhstan over the threshold of political institution building necessary to sustain democratic development might well be to pretend it has accomplished more than it really has. For if Kazakhstan’s OSCE bid is 

turned down, then Nazarbayev might decide it is much easier to abandon democratic reform, a position that will find support from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which consists of Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). 

In an ideal world U.S. and European policy-makers would somehow convince 

Nazarbayev to delay Kazakhstan’s request to chair the OSCE until 2012, the end 

of his current term as president, giving him the chance of achieving his ‘‘crowning 

glory’’ and allowing the west to remain consistent with its own democratic values. 

But the Kazakh president, with eager potential energy clients to the north and east, 

may decide that he need not accept virtually guaranteed, but deferred, gratification. 

The choice will be a tough one, especially because there has been a reluctance to 

treat even the most ‘‘badly behaved’’ of the Central Asian countries as pariah states. 

In the case of Uzbekistan, Washington, in my opinion correctly, decided on a more 

cautious strategy in the post-Andijian environment than did the E.U. member 

38

states. And one of the payoffs was that Uzbek nuclear materials were moved to Russia, where they are subject to closer international supervision, under U.S. auspices 

(though the U.S. got no credit for this from the Uzbek media). 

International concern over Uzbek government human rights violations in Andijian 

has also led to a diminished focus on developments in energy-rich Turkmenistan. 

Here the situation is dire. Government policies are compromising the long-term 

prospects for political institution-building. The state has all but destroyed the national educational system and introduced restrictions on foreign contact and foreign 

study by its citizens. Given the demographically small size of the Turkmen nation, 

and how few people are actually able to live or study outside the country, the prospects of a national revival in post-Niyazov Turkmenistan are not very good. Fortunately the Uzbeks have not taken similar steps to irrevocably destroy the human 

capital of the next generation, which allows for hope, but not optimism. 

ENERGY SECURITY

Central Asian energy reserves are vast, but we shouldn’t exaggerate the role they 

are likely to play in meeting U.S. and Western needs. 

As you are all aware, transport is the greatest challenge. No matter how enlightened, U.S. policy will only have a marginal effect on minimizing Russian or Chinese 

presence in the region, as geography (even without the addition of geopolitical pressure) gives each more leverage. This is especially true for Kazakhstan. 

At a state-to-state level the Russians have often tried to be tough negotiators with 

the Kazakhs, slowing the initial construction of the CPC pipeline by several years. 

While the US and Azerbaijan are lobbying hard for Kazakhstan to commit large volumes of oil to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, Russia continues to make 

shipping higher volumes of oil across its territory problematic. Permission to expand 

CPC’s capacity was slow in coming and Transneft remains a tough negotiator during 

talks on transit fees and increased volume for Kazakh oil through its transit network. 

The ultimate profitability of the BTC pipeline, which cost over $2 billion to build 

and will require further expansion, may depend upon the volume of Kazakh oil on 

this route. Kazakhstan will commit some reserves to the BTC pipeline starting in 

2008, but remains reluctant to further antagonize Russia by agreeing to the U.S.-

proposed TransCaspian oil and gas pipelines. These would substantially increase 

the volume of Kazakh oil, which currently goes by freighter across the Caspian, that 

could be transported through BTC. Citing ecological concerns, Russia remains vociferously opposed to the proposed undersea routes. Given that off-shore development 

of Caspian reserves is going on without the existence of an agreed-upon legal regime 

among the five littoral states (Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and 

Kazakhstan), and the continued economic interdependence of the post-Soviet states, 

there is a good deal of prudence behind Kazakhstan’s actions. 

For much the same reason, Kazmunaigaz, the Kazakh state oil company, is eager 

to engage in projects with Russian firms, including Rosneft and Lukoil. The private 

Kazakh oil company Nelson Resources (rumored to have been partly held by members of the Nazarbayev family) was sold to Lukoil in 2005. Nazarbayev’s family remains active in Kazakhstan’s oil industry, and his son-in-law Timur Kulibayev is 

a frequent point of contact for Russian oilmen. 

Cooperation with China does allow Kazakhstan new transit options. The Chinese 

National Petroleum Company (CNPC) owns a controlling interest in 

Aktobemunaigaz, a production company in Western Kazakhstan. But Chinese ambitions vis-a-vis Kazakhstan extend a lot further. In 2003 China National Offshore Oil 

Corporation (CNOOC) and China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) 

made a bid to buy British Gas’ share of Kazakhstan’s massive off-shore Kashagan 

deposit, a bid that was blocked by the consortia partners. In the end the partners 

were forced to allow Kazakhstan’s own national company (Kazmunaigaz) to acquire 

half the BG stake and absorbed the other half themselves. CNPC did manage to 

acquire the small North Buzachi field, and then finally in 2005 CNPC purchased 

the assets of PetroKazakhstan, giving them the assets from the Kumkol field and 

shared control of the Shymkent refinery (with Kazmunaigaz). The Chinese have 

made a major financial commitment to securing oil from Kazakhstan, paying over 

$4 billion for PetroKazakhstan, and planning a pipeline which will run from Atyrau 

through Kenkiyak, on to Kumkol, Atasu, and then Alashankou on the Kazakh-Chinese border. By late 2005 two stretches were already operational and construction 

on the most expensive link, from Kenkiyak to Kumkol, had been authorized. 

China’s rise need not be at Russia’s expense, but might well contribute to Moscow, 

Astana and Beijing’s mutual advantage. Should Russia move forward with plans for 

a new pipeline to bring Western Siberian oil to China, there may well be extra caVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:22 Aug 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\042606\27230.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
39

pacity for Kazakh oil to move north to add supply to this route as well. But these 

developments would reduce the potential for some Kazakh oil fields, as yet undeveloped, to send exports westward. This need not be bad for the U.S. or Europe, for 

a China able to meet its energy needs might be a much less dangerous global neighbor. 

China is going to compete head on with Russia for access to Turkmenistan’s gas 

reserves. The Chinese have contracted to begin moving up to 30 bcm of Turkmen 

gas annually in 2009, through a pipeline which will go through Kazakhstan, linking 

up with the existing Bukhara-Tashkent-Almaty pipeline and extending it to the border as Alashankou. The Chinese are also negotiating to get Kazakh gas shipped 

along this route, or through a new pipeline from Ishim in Russia, to Astana, 

through Karaganda and eventually to Alashankou. It is hard to believe that the 

Chinese would support both options simultaneously, and Russia will lobby hard for 

the second route to be built first, as most industry analysts do not believe that 

Turkmenistan will have enough production to support contract obligations to both 

Russia and China. 

For several of these land-locked states selling through Russia is not such a bad 

deal. This is particularly true for Uzbekistan, which will be trading bad-paying customers in Central Asia for limited access to European markets. The Uzbeks and 

Russians negotiated a $1 billion, 35 year production sharing agreement to develop 

a number of very promising Uzbek deposits in 2004, including the Shakhpakhty 

field in the Ust Urt peninsula. The list of projects was expanded in 2005, when 

among others the Kandym-Khauzuk-Shady gas field in central Uzbekistan was 

added1. While Uzbek president Islam Karimov has tried to depict the turn to Russia 

as an energy investor as part of his country’s strategic reorientation, in reality there 

had been only limited Western investment in Uzbekistan’s oil and gas sector since 

independence. 

As one Uzbek diplomat said, given the existing transit challenges, no other investors would put money into Uzbekistan’s gas industry, let alone put these projects 

on a developmental fast track, save Russia. But Moscow’s interest in Uzbekistan’s 

gas seems to have sparked increased Chinese interest as well, with the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) signing a $600 million agreement with 

Uzbekneftegaz for some 23 smaller oil fields in the Bukhara area. Very little information has been made public about this agreement, but the location of these fields 

(near the main gas pipeline) suggests that Beijing is hopeful that there will be large 

amounts of associated gas available from these projects. 

Investing in Uzbekistan makes good sense for Gazprom, for they are able to share 

investment costs, and get virtually assured supply of gas, presuming Uzbekistan’s 

internal security risks can continue to be managed successfully. Although 

Uzbekistan’s gas reserves are smaller than those of Turkmenistan, it is still a larger 

gas producer, and despite some scandals involving the country’s gas industry, it is 

far more professionally run than that of Turkmenistan, where Niyazov’s cadre policy 

has led to revolving-door management. 

While Turkmenistan’s transport options may change in a post-Niyazov world, 

should a more market oriented and less erratic leader succeed him, Uzbekistan’s 

transport options will not change. The challenge will be to manage the threat of internal strife. The current agreements between the Uzbeks and Gazprom effectively 

bind Moscow to the Karimov regime, or to its designated successor. Much as 

Niyazov and his family are rumored to benefit from his arrangements with Russia, 

it is possible there has been some personal gain for the Uzbek ruling family in 

transport agreements with Russia. The president’s daughter, Gulnara Karimova, 

was responsible for much of the gas negotiation when she was posted to the Uzbek 

Embassy in Moscow. 

Niyazov’s Turkmenistan has been a difficult friend for Moscow (the question of 

just how difficult provokes speculation). The complicated cash and barter deals 

through which Moscow purchased Turkmen gas almost certainly benefited Niyazov 

and his family, as they appear to have been ‘‘silent’’ and sometimes not-so-silent 

partners (as with secondary trade of bartered items) in trade transactions. Moscow 

will aggressively seek to insure that Niyazov’s successor remains bound to Russia’s 

gas industry as well. 

While the situation may change in post-Niyazov Turkmenistan, and certainly the 

U.S. should be an alert bystander in any succession struggle to help facilitate positive developments, for now Turkmenistan is an unstable potential partner for the 

U.S. and an unattractive partner for major western oil and gas concerns. This is 

the major reason why the trans-Afghan pipeline project has proved difficult to realize, and would also complicate any plans to develop a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, 

even if Niyazov were to sign on with promised supply for the project. 

40

Russia’s ambitions with relationship to hydroelectric power are much like those 

in gas—sopping up Central Asia’s excess capacity creates new opportunities for 

using Russia’s reserves more profitability. The old Soviet grid system creates the potential for Central Asian energy to be used in nearby Russia, allowing excess Russian capacity to be exported to more lucrative markets. But maximizing investment 

in Central Asia’s enormous hydroelectric sector will not make good economic sense 

until RAO UES further consolidates its position within the Russian market. 

But Russia does not enjoy the same potential transport monopoly on Central 

Asia’s hydroelectric resources that it has on gas. This is an area where U.S. firms 

have a great interest as well, but they are going to have to work hard to secure 

control of the region’s most attractive projects. China is eager to buy up any and 

all surplus electric power. The Russians are interested in supplying this market, as 

are the Kazakhs, who are planning a joint project with China to develop a $4 billion 

coal-fired power plant at Ekibastuz, near the Russian-Chinese border. Kyrgyzstan 

also is interested in selling hydroelectric power to China. In both the Kazakh and 

Kyrgyz cases the hope is that such purchases might make China less aggressive 

about diverting upstream water that traditionally flowed into Central Asia. 

Tajikistan is attracted by the Chinese market, and even more by the prospect of exporting surplus energy to Afghanistan, and then on to the large markets in India 

and Pakistan. Such a project is particularly interesting to U.S. authorities. It would 

have a developmental impact in Afghanistan and would lead Tajikistan to diversify 

its resource ownership base beyond Russia. 

‘‘Foreign’’ interest, such as that of Iran, or of the U.S. company A.E.S., has 

sparked Russian activity in this sector, but in general Moscow has been able to play 

a waiting game, signing long-term contracts with signing bonuses that are partly 

based on debt forgiveness, and require minimal short term investment on the Russian side. 

They have also done a good job of getting the Kyrgyz and Tajiks to compete for 

Russian investment priority, which because of Oleg Deripaska’s purchase of hydroelectric dependent Turajunzade Aluminum works has gone largely to Tajikistan. In 

fact, Deripaska has created a dominating position for himself in Tajikistan, through 

his primary and secondary (largely in the Tajik service sector) investments. This 

does not preclude the U.S. developing an increasing position in Tajikistan’s economy, but given Russia’s multiple levers, the challenge is a difficult one. 

DRUGS AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF THE ECONOMIES OF THE REGION

One of the by-products of the U.S.-led international campaign in Afghanistan is 

the increase in opium and heroin coming through Central Asia in the last five years. 

This in turn has helped foster the criminalization of these economies. Two models 

are prevalent in the region, criminal groups insinuating themselves into the government, and governments facilitating criminal trade directly. This has had a more deleterious effect in some countries, like Tajikistan, and increasingly in Kyrgyzstan, 

than in others. In both these countries criminal groups have been able to suborn 

state authorities. The degree to which this has occurred in Kyrgyzstan has become 

shockingly apparent over the past year or so. 

We can only speculate on the scale of official collusion in the second set of states, 

for as narcotics interdiction programs have become more successful in Tajikistan 

(and they have, to credit of U.S. and U.N. sponsored efforts) the trade has moved 

more into Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where it appears that government officials 

may be actively facilitating this trade. But as this is a conclusion based on rumor 

and innuendo, it is hard to know how much to credit it, or how high up such collusion (or active involvement) may go. It is well known that terrorist and criminal 

groups have used the drug trade to facilitate their activities, but governments in 

the region have the same capacity and much greater ease in doing this. Moreover, 

the drug trade creates a ready source of money to facilitate patronage networks. 

THE THREAT OF EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES AND THE CRISIS OF COMPETENCE

This is an extremely important topic, and as I have written on it extensively, and 

testified on it in previous congressional hearings, I will make only relatively brief 

comment on it now, summarizing these earlier findings. 

As is true in so many areas of the world, there are religiously-inspired terrorist 

groups targeting the governments of this region, groups which consider themselves 

part of the global jihadist network. Some of these are derivative groups of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) whose formal remnants remain tied to al 

Qaeda. Others are more locally based and have sprung up in the post-September 

11 world. These groups may or may not have external financial support, but more 

importantly, the scale of their activity is such that local business (or political) interVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:22 Aug 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\042606\27230.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
41

ests are capable of supporting them. Their potential for successful mobilization is 

not the result of their financial means, but of popular dissatisfaction. 

A much larger and more problematic group is Hizb’ ut-Tahrir (HT), a clandestine 

(and throughout the region an illegal) radical Islamic organization, the avowed intention of which is to restore an Islamic caliphate. The very nature of its goal means 

the organization is revolutionary, and though it formally condones the use of violence (at least at the current stage), it is unclear whether its members—as individuals—are attracted to the use of violence to achieve their goals. The message of the 

group (at least as it is manifested in some of its writings in Central Asia) is often 

highly intolerant of western values, and some publications have been explicitly antiSemitic (in addition to anti-Israeli). 

But in many parts of Central Asia HT has become a major social force among the 

younger generation, and in parts of southern Kyrgyzstan it operates openly. It 

doesn’t seem to me that HT is capable of overthrowing the state anywhere in the 

region, but its social potential could be used by those eager to oust a regime (in 

Kyrgyzstan, in Uzbekistan, and maybe at some point in the future in Tajikistan; 

in Kazakhstan its potential is more locally confined, and in Turkmenistan it does 

not seem to be in evidence to the same degree). The presence of HT throughout the 

region has worked to the advantage of the Islamic establishment more generally, 

and this is particularly true in Uzbekistan, where the degree of religious ferment 

within the clergy loyal to the regime has gone relatively unnoticed by outsiders. 

Islam remains one of the few bases of legitimacy for the Uzbek regime (be it that 

of Karimov or of a successor), and, as I have argued elsewhere, Uzbekistan’s secular 

leaders do not seem to understand the potential political dynamism of what they 

see as a largely conservative and traditional social force. Central Asia’s religious revival, although more radical in content than western observers initially anticipated, 

need not be antithetical to U.S. interests, although in a number of countries it will 

slow (and possibly even preclude) the development of secular democracies. But it 

need not keep them from developing into more participatory societies, with free 

market economies. The greatest danger is not Islam, or the nature of the region’s 

Islamic revival, but how the leaders of these countries will orient themselves to 

these developments. On this question, as on so many others, Central Asia’s leaders 

may be undone by their own incompetence and vanity. 

SOME SUGGESTIONS

My testimony has focused on U.S. expectations more than U.S. policy, and created 

a sense of how relatively limited U.S. options may be. But in closing I would like 

to offer suggestions on some positive steps that we might take to enhance the 

chance of good outcomes in the future. I urge that we continue to provide foreign 

assistance to all of the governments of the region (regardless of their human rights 

records) for programs that the U.S. believes important for the development of civil 

societies and transparent economies in the region. Our ‘‘sticks’’ have been ineffective, so let us focus on the ‘‘carrots.’’ The U.S. should not support the mechanisms 

of repression, but it should support projects that address:

• Legal transparency in the economy, including laws protecting property, and 

the mechanisms of executing and securing foreign investment.

• Legal training, including legal education, and the training and retraining of 

judges, according to curricula that meet western standards

• English language training, with particular attention to rural areas

• Science and technology training in primary and secondary schools, with attention to rural areas

• Enhancing scholarship opportunities so that students from Central Asia can 

pursue higher education in the U.S.

• Increased attention to employment opportunities after degree completion, 

through local government supported employment ‘‘agencies’’ in country, and 

enhanced opportunities for employment in the U.S. for those from closed societies in the region.

STATEMENT OF MS. PAULA SCHRIEFER, DIRECTOR OF 

RIGHTS PROGRAMS, FREEDOM HOUSE 

Ms. SCHRIEFER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing us to 

participate in this panel as well. As an organization that monitors 

and analyzes information about the state of freedom around the 

42

world, as well as one that provides direct support to democracy activists and human rights defenders in many parts of the world, 

Freedom House is able to offer a somewhat unique perspective on 

the state of democracy and human rights in Central Asia. Our annual reports and surveys are informed and complemented by the 

direct experience of our on-ground staff, who have been working directly with human rights defenders and journalists in Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan and until recently, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 

According to the 2006 edition of Freedom in the World, our annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, Kyrgyzstan is the 

only country in Central Asia that has improved its ratings, bringing it into the category of those countries we refer to as partly free. 

And I would note relatively at the bottom of that category. 

And while Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have remained entirely 

stagnant on their poor rankings, Uzbekistan has slid to the very 

bottom of our scale of now free countries joining Turkmenistan and 

only six other countries in the entire world that freedom House 

ranks as the world’s very most repressive regimes. 

In an effort to save time I will quickly highlight the key findings 

of just two of these countries, the best and one of the worst, and 

the best and one of the worst, and the rest of those countries can 

be studied in more detail in the written testimony in the annex 

that we have presented with our full reports. 

I will start with Kyrgyzstan. According to the 2006 edition of 

freedom in the world, which evaluates the state of freedom during 

the 2005 calendar, year Kyrgyzstan received a five out of a worst 

possible seven in political rights and a four out of the worst possible seven in civil liberties. The holding as was mentioned before 

of reasonably free and competitive Presidential elections in July, 

modest improvements in freedom of the media, assembly and association, did leave Freedom House to upgrade Kyrgyzstan’s overall 

ranking to partly free for the first time since in 1999. 

Nonetheless, it is important to note that while the March 2005 

Tulip revolution did bring improvements in media and civil society 

freedoms, the country’s stability was by compromised throughout 

the year by divisions within the new leadership, corruption issues, 

and crime, as well as a worsening security situation and questions 

about whether or not the new government truly represents a break 

from the practices of previous administrations. 

Kazakhstan, actually, I think I will skip Kazakhstan. I think 

that has been covered fairly well by my colleagues. 

I will move to Uzbekistan, which, as I mentioned, is the only 

Central Asian country to actually decline in our freedom in the 

world ratings in Central Asia joining Turkmenistan at the bottom 

of the scale. This downgrade was largely due to the government’s 

violent suppression of mass demonstrations in the city of Andijian 

in May, in which hundreds of largely unarmed civilians were certainly killed, although the exact statistics are hard to tell, given 

the lack of access that journalists and others were given. 

Moreover, the aftermath of Andijian has produced as was mentioned by my colleague, an intensified onslaught by the government 

against independent media, civil society organizations, and human 

rights activists, particularly those with ties to Western governments or groups regarded as posing a potential challenge to the reVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:22 Aug 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\042606\27230.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
43

gime. Within the past 6 months alone, Uzbekistan has closed the 

local offices of the Eurasia Foundation, the UN High Commissioner 

for Refugees, the American Bar Association’s CEELI Program, and 

Freedom House claiming that organizations were disrupting the 

country’s internal affairs. In addition, RFE/RFL’s journalists have 

not been accredited. More importantly, some 200 domestic nonprofit organizations have been forced to shut down in this period. 

Given this relatively bleak picture in the region, what can and 

should be done? First, I think we should recognize that certainly 

outside influences do affect the behavior of these governments to 

some extent. Some of these influences serve to embolden authoritarian behavior, and others serve to deter backsliding and promote 

democratic progress. Russia’s own decline into a not free country 

and its reassertion of interest in the region certainly provides these 

governments with examples of laws and practices to increase control over civil society, repress media and political opposition, typically, under the excuse of national security interests. At the same 

time, our own sustained engagement, yes, long-term engagement, 

can and does have an influence on these countries as is seen in 

some of the examples I will provide. 

Pressure by the U.S. Government and the presence of international organizations have already been seen to help improve 

human rights and fundamental freedoms of association and speech 

in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. And the United States needs to ensure continuing support for courageous human rights defenders 

throughout the region. Protection and expansion of human rights 

has to be a centerpiece of all democracy efforts, not something seen 

as peripheral or marginal. 

How else can we do this? We need to address the free flow of information around the region. For instance, the private printing 

press in Kyrgyzstan supported by the U.S. Government proved a 

critical element in holding open and free debate and free press during the transition in Kyrgyzstan. Just as important is the role of 

radio and TV broadcasting, and we should look to how these critical outlets can be broadcast into Uzbekistan and other areas. 

Thirdly, we need to continue to facilitate a greater free flow of 

information across border linkages across the region among democracy activists, human rights defenders, nation think tanks and free 

press. We certainly recognize that our sustained engagement 

means difficult policy positions of the U.S. Government and our allies. The U.S. Government should be commended for its stand on 

human rights in Uzbekistan. The willingness to unequivocally call 

for an international investigation into the events of Andijian should 

be praised. However, since that time, we think that the United 

States policy should be further clarified with regard to our relations with this country. We do urge that the USG adopt further 

measures including targeted sanctions that might make it clear 

that we think that the Uzbek government and its financial and 

other backers are making the wrong decisions about the direction 

of the country and more importantly that make it clear to others 

in the country that the United States is still interested in supporting the Uzbek people, particularly those struggling for the 

right to engage in universally accepted rights. 

44

Finally, I want to note that the struggle for democracy in 

Kyrgyzstan is not complete. As the country reviews its own way 

forward, there are concerns about media freedom, corruption and 

needed constitutional reforms. The United States has to provide 

support to the government lead by President Bakiev, but it should 

on not do so unconditionally. There are reformers in Kyrgyzstan 

that should be invested in, while at the same time, support should 

be continued to watch dog groups and coalitions, such as the Voice 

of Freedom, who can effectively provide checks and balances on 

powers and advocate for legislative change. 

Finally, I just want to say with sustained engagement, particularly on the issue of human rights in support to those who defend 

these rights, the U.S. can still be a positive influence, which can 

help counteract internal authoritarian tendencies and the repressive examples of neighboring countries. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Schriefer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. PAULA SCHRIEFER, DIRECTOR OF RIGHTS PROGRAMS, 

FREEDOM HOUSE

As an organization that monitors and analyzes information about the state of freedom around the world, as well as one that provides direct support to democracy activists and human rights defenders in many parts of the world, Freedom House is 

able to offer a somewhat unique perspective on the state of democracy and human 

rights in Central Asia. Our annual series of reports and surveys on global freedom 

are informed and complemented by the direct experience of our on-ground staff who 

have been working directly with human rights defenders and journalists in 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and until recently Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 

Looking at a global picture, the expansion of freedom has been on a generally 

positive trajectory since 1972, when we first launched Freedom in the World, our 

annual survey of political rights and civil liberties around the world. Yet, while the 

general trend throughout the world has seen more and more countries joining the 

ranks of the Free and Partly Free countries according to our broad rankings, the 

countries of Central Asia have for the most part remained Not Free, maintaining 

fundamental restrictions on political rights and civil liberties, with only one exception. 

According to the 2006 edition of Freedom in the World, due out this summer, 

Kyrgyzstan is the only country in Central Asia that has improved its ratings to 

Partly Free. 

And while Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have remained entirely stagnate on their 

poor rankings, Uzbekistan has slid to the very bottom of our scale, joining 

Turkmenistan and only six other countries that Freedom House ranks as the world’s 

most repressive regimes (Burma, Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria). 

I will quickly highlight the key findings in each country, but a more detailed analysis of the current state of political rights and civil liberties in all five countries can 

be found in the annex to this testimony. 

Kyrgyzstan 

Freedom in the World ratings for 2005: 

Political Rights: 5

Civil Liberties: 4

According to the 2006 edition of Freedom in the World, which evaluates the state 

of freedom during the 2005 calendar year, Kyrgyzstan received a 5 out of a worst 

possible 7 in political rights and a 4 out of 7 in civil liberties. 

The holding of reasonably free and competitive presidential elections in July, and 

modest improvements in freedom of the media, assembly, and association led Freedom House to upgrade Kyrgyzstan’s overall ranking to Partly Free in 2005 for the 

first time since 1999. 

Nonetheless, while Kyrgyzstan may fare better than the rest of the region according to the FIW rankings, but it is still has a far to go before reaching actual ‘‘Free’’ 

status. Thus, while the March 2005 Tulip Revolution brought improvements in 

media and civil society freedoms, the country’s stability was compromised throughout the year by divisions within the new leadership, a worsening security situation, 

45

and questions about whether the new government represented a genuine break from 

the previous administration. 

Kazakhstan 

Freedom in the World ratings for 2005: 

Political Rights: 6

Civil Liberties: 5

Kazakhstan held its scores of 6 out of a worst 7 in political rights and 5 out of 

7 in civil liberties for the year 2005. 

During the months preceding the December 4, 2005, presidential election, the 

Kazakh government intensified pressure on the country’s civil society sector through 

harassment of, and attacks against, opposition activists and independent journalists. 

Throughout the year, members of the opposition alliance, For a Just Kazakhstan, 

faced threats and physical assaults, including the death of one opposition leader and 

the apparent abduction of another member’s daughter. Media outlets were subjected 

to intense pressures, with several being closed down, others being hit with law 

suits, and print runs being seized or refused altogether leading up to the election. 

The dominant role played by Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan’s political life led to a 

predictably overwhelming victory for the incumbent in an election that most international observers, including the OSCE, found did not meet democratic standards. 

While two potentially damaging draft laws to restrict NGO activity put forth by 

the parliament in June 2005 were ultimately struck down by the Constitutional 

Council as unconstitutional, the space for civil society to operate remains precarious. 

Tajikistan 

Freedom in the World ratings for 2005: 

Political Rights: 6

Civil Liberties: 5

Tajikistan also held its scores of 6 out of a worst 7 in political rights and 5 out 

of 7 in civil liberties for the year 2005. 

In a pattern similar to the one just documented leading up to the presidential 

election in Kazakhstan, the overwhelming political dominance of President 

Rakhmonov’s ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in Tajikistan ensured it an 

easy, and essentially uncontested, victory in the February 2005 parliamentary elections. 

Much like in Kazakhstan, the government continued to consolidate its power 

throughout the year by clamping down on the media, closing a printing house and 

two private television stations, and working to sideline perceived and actual political 

rivals. 

The judiciary is heavily influenced by the executive branch, police frequently conduct arbitrary arrests and beat detainees to extract confessions, and prison conditions are often life threatening due to overcrowding and lack of sanitation. 

Turkmenistan 

Freedom in the World ratings for 2005: 

Political Rights: 7

Civil Liberties: 7

Turkmenistan is a model repressive regime, receiving a lowest possible 7 in both 

political rights and civil liberties since 1993. President Niyazov continues to enjoy 

virtually absolute power over all branches and levels of government in 

Turkmenistan meaning that citizens have absolutely no ability to influence or 

change their government democratically. 

The state security services regularly monitor the activities of citizens and foreign 

nationals, severely limiting open and free private discussion. 

Freedom of speech and the press is severely restricted by the government. Specifically, the government controls all radio and television broadcasts and print media. 

Reports of dissenting political views are banned, as are even mild forms of criticism 

of the president. Subscriptions to foreign newspapers and magazines are forbidden, 

and foreign journalists have few opportunities to visit Turkmenistan. 

The judicial system is subservient to the president, who appoints and removes 

judges for five-year terms without legislative review. The authorities frequently 

deny rights of due process, including public trials and access to defense attorneys. 

Police abuse and torture of suspects and prisoners, often to obtain confessions, is 

widespread.

46

Uzbekistan 

Freedom in the World ratings for 2005: 

Political Rights: 7

Civil Liberties: 7

Uzbekistan, as the only Central Asian country to decline in the 2006 Freedom in 

the World ratings, joined Turkmenistan at the bottom of Freedom House’s ratings. 

This downgrade is due to the government’s violent suppression of a mass public 

demonstration in the city of Andijon in May in which hundreds of largely unarmed 

civilians were killed and the subsequent crackdown against independent media and 

the civil society sector. 

The aftermath of Andijon has produced an intensified onslaught by the government against independent media, civil society organizations, and human rights activists, particularly those with ties to Western governments or groups regarded as 

posing a potential challenge to the regime. 

Within the past six months, Uzbekistan has also closed the local offices of the 

Eurasia Foundation, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ABA CEELI, and 

Freedom House claiming that the organizations were disrupting the country’s internal affairs and citing as proof last year’s demonstrations in Andijan. Some 200 domestic nonprofit organizations have also been forced to shut down. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

So, given this relatively bleak picture, what can be done? 

First, we should recognize that outside influences do affect the behavior of these 

governments. Some of them serve to embolden authoritarian behavior and others 

can serve to deter backsliding and promote democratic progress. Russia’s own decline into a not-free country and its reassertion of interest in the region provides 

these governments with examples of laws and practices to increase control over civil 

society and repress media and political opposition, typically under the guise of national security. 

At the same time, our own sustained engagement can and does have a great influence on these countries, as seen in some of the examples I will provide. Pressure 

by the U.S. government and the presence of international organization has helped 

to improve human rights and fundamental freedoms of association and speech in 

Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan and the U.S. needs to ensure continuing support for 

courageous human rights defenders throughout the region. Protection and expansion 

of human rights has to be at the centerpiece of all democracy efforts—not something 

seen as peripheral or marginal. We have been dismayed that faced with budget cuts 

USAID has signaled its willingness to cut human rights programs first. This is a 

major strategic mistake. If not for the local advocacy efforts of over 100 civil society 

groups in Kazakhstan combined with international pressure, a much restrictive 

NGO law would have been enacted last year. Without the reporting of arrests, detentions, law suits, and administrative actions against political opposition, independent media outlets, and human rights defenders, many of these activists and organizations would remain in jail or afraid to raise their concerns, as is increasingly 

the case in repressive Uzbekistan. 

Secondly, we need to address the need for free flow of information around the region. The private printing press in Kyrgyzstan, supported by the US Government, 

proved as a critical element in holding open free debate and free press during the 

transition in Kyrgyzstan. Just as important is the role of radio and TV broadcasting, 

and we should look to how these critical outlets can be broadcast into Uzbek and 

other areas. The US needs to back such efforts, including fully condemning the pressure against RFE/RFL local journalists and operations. 

Thirdly, we need to facilitate more cross border linkages among democracy activists, human rights defenders, nascent think tanks, and free press. Together they 

will have a larger voice within regional and international fora, including the OSCE. 

The capacity of activists varies greatly across the region. With the help of activists 

in its neighboring countries, Uzbek activists might be assured that someone will 

transfer what is happening in their country to regional and international forums 

and that democracy and human rights does not fall outside of arrangements, agreements, and regional development. 

We recognize that our sustained engagement means difficult policy positions of 

the U.S. government and our allies. The U.S. government should be commended for 

its stand on human rights in Uzbekistan. The willingness to unequivocally call for 

an international investigation into the terrible events of Andijon should be praised. 

However, since that time, we believe that U.S. policy needs to be further clarified 

with regard to relations between our countries. The U.S. has not even gone so far 

as the EU in imposing travel sanctions. We therefore urge the USG to adopt further 

47

measures, including targeted sanctions, that make it clear that (1) we think that 

the Uzbek government and its financial and other backers are making the wrong 

decisions about the direction of the country and (2) make clear to others in the country that the U.S. is still interested in supporting the Uzbek people, especially those 

struggling for the right to engage in universally accepted rights. The U.S. government needs to demonstrate that it has not abandoned those on the ground, despite 

the restrictions on foreign organizations like Freedom House. 

Finally, the struggle for democracy in Kyrgyzstan is not over. As the country reviews its own way forward, there are concerns about media freedom, corruption, and 

needed constitutional reforms. The U.S. should provide support to the government 

led by President Bakiyev, but it should not do so unconditionally. There are reform 

minded elements within the KG regime, however, the country is increasingly unstable and may backslide. If KG does not continue down the path of general reform 

the lesson Central Asia is taking from the Tulip revolution is democracy that brings 

instability and chaos. There are reformers in KG that we should invest in, while 

at the same time, support watchdog groups and coalitions like Voice of Freedom who 

can effectively provide checks and balance on powers and advocate for legislative 

change. 

With sustained engagement, particularly on the issues of human rights, and support to those that defend these rights and keep open an operating environment for 

citizens to exercise their rights, the US can be the positive influence which counteracts both internal authoritarian tendencies and the repressive examples of neighboring countries.

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you. As we enter the question phase I 

would like to ask two questions that Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen 

has specifically asked to be posited to you, and after that, I would 

go to my colleague, Representative Chabot. The first question she 

would like to have answered is please comment on the recent request by the Kyrgyz government for a significant increase in rent 

for the use of their air base. Was the request prompted by Russia’s 

growing influence in Kyrgyzstan? I would let whoever cares to pipe 

up pipe up. 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think Jim and I probably both have to say something. Do you want to start? 

Mr. MACDOUGALL. Sure. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Chabot, as 

I mentioned in my statement, we are currently renegotiating the 

terms of our access in Kyrgyzstan at Manas Air Base. The terms 

under which we are operating there now were decided in 2001, late 

2001 after 9/11. And I think both sides recognize and agree that 

they need to be updated. Part of what has to be updated is the 

level of compensation, financial compensation we provide to the 

Kyrgyz government and private landholders to whom we lease land 

adjacent to the airport. So I think it is fair to say we will pay more 

than we have on prices based on 2001 terms. How much more remains to be the subject of this negotiation. 

As to what prompted the statements of the President, I think 

perhaps Assistant Secretary Boucher will comment on this, but I 

do not have any particular insight as to how much this might have 

been prompted by pressure from the Russians, the Chinese or anybody else. I think to be fair that would have to be something to ask 

the Kyrgyz side. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Sir, if I could just note, I think there is some recognition in Kyrgyzstan as well as in Russia and elsewhere, that 

having United States and coalition forces operating out of this base 

contributes to the war on terrorism, contributes to the security of 

all the people in region, stopping the flow of terrorists, helping with 

the stopping of the flow of drugs and things like that. To the extent 

it contributes to stability of the whole region, including for neighVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:22 Aug 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\042606\27230.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
48

bors like Russia, I think there is some recognition that it is in all 

our interests for us to continue the operations there. It is on that 

basis that we are discussing this with the Kyrgyz government. We 

want to stay. We think they want us to stay. 

As far as I can tell and I have not gone all the way back on this, 

I have only started watching this recently, that the motivations by 

and large coming from the Kyrgyz government has to do with financial cost to them of having the base there and the benefits they 

receive from it. They receive actually a lot of benefits to their economy. We are willing to increase the amount we pay for the cost of 

operating, having the base there and the land and things like that. 

So I hope we can work out an arrangement. We are certainly prepared to negotiate. They have used a variety of means to communicate to us that they want to get this done quickly and we are 

working on it to try to do that with them. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you. The second question she had was if 

the United States decides not to pay and our military forces are obligated to leave as they did from Uzbekistan, how significant would 

the implications be on our military operations in the region and in 

Afghanistan in particular? 

Mr. MACDOUGALL. The implications of us having to leave, to terminate operations at Manas would be significant. As I mentioned, 

this is a landlocked region, and we require overflight and then basing rights somewhere in the region. We need refueling rights, et 

cetera. There are other options we can pursue and we are certainly 

looking into those. We are talking to other countries but it would 

be a significant loss to our operations. Not to say we would stop 

doing what we are doing in Afghanistan, but it would be considerably more difficult without access to Kyrgyzstan. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you. Representative Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple 

of questions. I apologize for being late. I have three Committee 

hearings going on, and numerous things, and the votes kind of put 

everybody back. I apologize for not hearing your testimony. I intend to review it after the hearing. 

What strategy do we have to prevent Russia and China and especially Iran from seeking to dominate the region? Anybody who 

would like to take that on, we would be happy to hear from you. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Why don’t I start, sir? I think the first thing is 

that we do not see it as a competition with Russia and China. 

What we think is these countries need to be independent and they 

need to be able to exercise independent choices and a lot of what 

we do there is to give governments and peoples of the region the 

opportunity to make choices. Some of the pipeline arrangements 

that we have been instrumental in working out across from the 

Caspian to Turkey, some of the opportunities for export of power 

for example that we are working on in terms of exporting power 

to the south by electric lines to Afghanistan down into Pakistan. 

The roads systems, we are looking to try to develop from Almonte 

to Karachi. This gives these countries more choices, more places to 

sell their goods, sell their energy, more sources of supply. And it 

keeps them from being stuck and bottled up between two great 

powers, Russia and China. 

49

I think that is basically our role to give them options. Iran has 

a lot of activity in the region, some places more than others. A lot 

of it is commercial. Some of it is in the energy sector. They do 

scholarships and things like that. We follow this very closely. We 

keep in touch with other governments who watch what they are 

doing, and I guess you would say the basic effort is to work with 

them, counsel them, talk to them so everybody is careful that the 

kind of trouble Iran causes in other countries they do not start 

causing in this region. Iran is a neighbor to many of these countries. It has energy relationships and other relationships, historical 

ones, so we kind of understand there will be a neighborly relationship, but we also are well aware and try to make them aware of 

what Iran is up to in other places to try to make sure Iran does 

not start that sort of thing in this region. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Let me ask another question. I am interested in China’s growing economic influence in the region, in 

particular if you could comment on the implication of the recently 

finished China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline, and if you could perhaps go 

into that a little bit. 

Mr. BOUCHER. China has very large and growing energy needs, 

as we all know, and is looking to acquire energy in a lot of places, 

including Central Asia. They have had some limited imports in the 

past and the pipeline will certainly expand that. As a basic matter, 

I think it is probably good. Another option for export for the countries. It means that their sales are not all bottled up into one market or one company. There has been active competition, of course, 

to acquire oil resources in this region, not only the Chinese and 

Russians, but some places the American firms are involved. I know 

Indian firms are actively bidding on it. So I expect you will see that 

in the future, to develop multiple opportunities, multiple customers. 

Mr. CHABOT. Finally, I am concerned, and I know at that region 

it has a reputation relative to human trafficking, and I would like 

to know what our efforts have been to influence any or all of the 

countries over there to do what we can to prevent that ongoing 

practice from continuing. And again, I would open it up to anybody 

that would like to take it over. 

Mr. BOUCHER. First, we follow this carefully. We report on it. We 

raise it with governments. Who are actually in the process now of 

preparing our annual reports on trafficking in the region. And it 

is a matter of quite a bit of concern. We have seen some progress 

in some places. We have seen some progress in places like 

Uzbekistan, which is hard to do almost anything in, but it is something where we do pursue trafficking questions and try to get 

progress across the board throughout the region, including in difficult places like Uzbekistan. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you I just have a couple of questions. It 

was touched upon the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. I would 

like to hear more specifically how we view that entity, especially 

as I believe recently there was some talk, I think it was out of Russia, about the potential of Iran joining it. I would like to hear just 

some quick overview, because I am going to try to get you out of 

50

here by four, just a quick overview of that entity and its role within 

the region. 

Mr. BOUCHER. There are not many regional organizations within 

this region, and none of them have a whole lot of power and authority. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is one of the organizations that has been around for a while. It has subcommittees 

on various things, so it is a forum for discussion among the members. I know at various times, other countries have looked to participate. I think India and Afghanistan have looked at observer status in it. I do not know about Iran. That is something I would have 

to check on, unless Jim knows. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. I brought it up because I think Iran was allowed 

to observe their combined military exercises between China and 

Russia. I do not know how much discussion they were doing, but 

I know they were allowing Iran to observe. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Iran has observer status I am told. But we work 

with members of the organization. We have been rather displeased 

with some of the positions they have taken, we have made that 

clear. We try to talk to the members of the organization about 

ways they can enhance their cooperation without trying to squeeze 

out or make it more difficult for others. 

Mr. MACDOUGALL. On the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, I 

might note that the history of it, it was designed as an organization 

to settle border issues between China and the states of the former 

Soviet Union. What started out quite benign and actually had some 

success in settling these border issues. Uzbekistan joined in 2001, 

and it came under its current configuration of members. Since that 

time, there has been a lot of discussion on economic issues, which 

seems to make sense, there is a lot of economic issues that need 

to be resolved. Just recently in the last communique from last summer, in Astana, Kazakhstan, there was a statement that read in 

part, and I quote loosely, ‘‘The coalition forces fighting the war on 

terrorism should consider setting a date to terminate their basing 

in the region,’’ and this of course is of concern to us. We are following this organization very closely, they have a summit scheduled in Beijing, China to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the organization on June 15, and we are encouraging our partners in the 

region to move this organization in a direction that would be of 

positive result for the region but at the same time wouldn’t be antiWestern, anticoalition, anti-U.S., that sort of thing. We are hoping 

that is the direction the organization takes, but time will tell and 

we will naturally have to respond accordingly. 

Ms. OLCOTT. Can I say something? 

Mr. MCCOTTER. It is still a free country. 

Ms. OLCOTT. Can I say something about the China relationship 

on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? I think that one of the 

things that the states in this region are grappling with is looking 

for ways to manage their relationship with China, and they do a 

much better job, I think, on a bilateral basis of managing their relationship with Russia. We don’t always see it because the way 

they present it to us is that Russia is a bully, but I think that over 

the last several years, they have become more self-confident in 

their dealing with Russia and, I would argue, in some cases more 

successful. But all these states, I think, see that China is one that 

51

is harder to manage in the long term, and that is where I think 

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for the states in the region 

provides real advantages. You can also say it does some negative 

things, too, but it creates a forum in which Russia and China are 

present and the two can be played against each other. And people 

off the record from the region, diplomats from the region have 

talked about how they do this, so this isn’t me simply inferring it, 

I am not privy to the meetings, but I think that a fair amount of 

this really does go on. 

I think similarly that the organization really does serve, as I alluded to in the testimony and I talk about greater length in the 

testimony, it does create a balance. It does use something to use 

against us, to use against the Western organizations. And I think 

for some questions it is really a confusion for the leaders in this 

region because they are being told by states that they have to relate to that are really important to them, the United States-Europe 

on one side, Russia and China on the other. They are getting 

clashed in multiple value systems. And I think one of the things 

that they are trying to work out, and that obviously, we have to 

be even more sensitive to is helping them work it out in ways that 

are not directly conflictual be reinforce our set of values. But I 

think the organization is becoming an ever more important one for 

the countries of this region in part because China throughout the 

region is becoming a dominant economic player. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. You had said something earlier about what can 

be undone by their own vanity and incompetence. And I would 

argue that it is always very dangerous for a mouse to try to start 

a fight or pick sides between two separate elephants, because you 

generally tend to get squashed in the end. And it seems to me, too, 

that that sounds more like a Cold War definition of playing the 

great powers against themselves, and I find it fascinating that the 

West and United States were to try on one side, and then Communist China and the reStalinizing Russia are on the other side. 

It sounds like a very familiar refrain. But I appreciate that. Which 

brings me to our next question, and I am trying to get these last 

two out quick, especially in relation, you talked about China. 

There was talk of China bringing and buying up energy resources. Now, I won’t go into a diatribe about where I know they 

got a lot of that foreign investment money from. But my question 

would be, what are we doing both economically and in terms of democracy at the grassroots level in these countries of central Asia 

to start fostering the growth of a democratic society? Because it 

seems to me that when we talk about the next generation of leadership within those countries, the Berlin Wall was, what, 1989, the 

Soviet Union fell apart. And, at the end of the day, we have had 

a generation already, and I am just kind of curious as to how we 

can juxtapose what we are doing now to what we failed to do for 

that past generation that has already been missed. 

Ms. SCHRIEFER. Now, it is such an important question. I think 

that to look at sort of what we are doing to foster democracy in central Asia, it is helpful to look at democracy fostering efforts in other 

parts of the former Soviet Union closer to Europe. For instance, 

Ukraine, which of course had a number of advantages. It actually 

has the pull of eventually possibly being a member of the European 

52

Union, which of course Central Asia does not have, but it also has 

historical ties to Poland, some historical ties to democracy, et 

cetera. But I think that the success in Ukraine, and I think the 

Ukraine has been a success in the past year including the most recent election, has been that what you saw was a gradual mentality 

shift among the actual population who started to actually demand 

that the institutions that were supposedly set up to be democratic 

institutions eventually should actually function like democratic institutions, as opposed to just sort of fake institutions that would 

allow Ukraine access to Western trade agreements and into the 

sort of Western club of democracies. 

It is going to take a lot longer than that to create that mentality 

shift in central Asia, which is what is needed to really bring about 

democratic change. And that is why you hear everyone harping 

here about this sort of long-term approach. It is not just because 

NGOs want to keep themselves in business for a long time; it is 

a very realistic picture of what it is going to take to bring about 

to shift that mentality change in those countries. And it is happening. There are impressive networks of young people who are out 

there monitoring things that are being done who are working at 

the grass roots level who are directly interacting with local government officials, but it is going to be a few generations I think. And, 

again, given that Central Asia doesn’t have this pull of a European 

Union, given that it has got these players, Russia and China 

against each other as well as Russia and China against the West, 

it is a complex environment, but it means that we have to stay engaged and we have to be committed to staying engaged for the long 

term. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. I appreciate that, because that is the concern. 

We talk about democracy. Democracies to be functional have to be 

representative. But as we found out with Hamas, sometimes that 

doesn’t always work out to the advantage of the interests we would 

like to see pursued or promoted. 

Ms. DUGAN. Just to follow on quickly and echo the sentiments of 

my colleague from Freedom House. The Ukraine is perhaps the 

best example; Georgia is another one. Both of these are places 

where organizations like IRI and NDI worked for years and years, 

and in the face of people saying to us it is never going to happen 

here, forget about it, pack your bags and leave, still, they were 

wrong. And we knew that it would be a function of time and a 

function of a lot of hard work that is not particularly sexy and 

never shows up in any newspaper anywhere but puts in place very 

methodically, very incrementally those foundational blocks upon 

which strong democratic institutions can stand. And so perhaps it 

also presents to me an opportunity to appeal to Committee support 

for—and those of my colleagues from the administration for continued attention, especially in places like the Kyrgyz Republic, which 

is a place that can be looked at as a glass half empty, a glass half 

full. 

But to be honest with you, from our perspective this is an opportunity waiting to happen. We just need to be there to keep pumping oxygen into it. Thank you. 

Mr. LUTEN. I would just offer that in addition to the comments 

just made, that our support of the grassroots level in both demoVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:22 Aug 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\042606\27230.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
53

cratic development and economic development are pretty broadbased. We, for instance, in education, we work in business education, we support civic education. Currently there is a program 

under which more than 100,000 students in the region receive 

basic civics training across several countries. In the economics 

sphere, and again using the Ukraine example, direct support for 

what we would consider to be democracy promotion activities is important, but sustained support for helping develop decentralized 

power, helping to develop at the local level local reform, small business development, small business finance, better municipal administration, hospital administration, health care reform and education 

reform, to the extent that they represent good government, improve 

the relationship between what government does for its citizens 

rather than to them, all of that in addition to working with policy 

dialogue at the top, with all of these things together—hopefully we 

can, the time line is longer, but hopefully we will continue to 

progress toward the same type of results that we are seeing in 

other countries. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. That is heartening to hear. It truly is. And finally, it is kind of a simple question, central Asia seems to me to 

be at a crossroads, and certainly it is kind of in an ideological triangle and your efforts for which I am very grateful that you are 

doing. They are torn between radical Islam on one end; they are 

torn between totalitarianism/communism on another end, and they 

are torn between liberal Western democracy on another. And I 

would think that hopefully everything that you are trying to do will 

incline them more toward freedom and prosperity and liberal democracy over the long haul. 

Because my concern is that you have three separate types of governance that are now combating with each other ideologically in 

the vacuum of what was a pretty cut and dried Bolshevik experiment when it was the Soviet Union, it became bureaucratized over 

time. But now in that vacuum that has been created, we have been 

trying to fill with what we believe in and what we have experienced to be, in my mind, the greatest way and the greatest government in the face of the earth. Then you also see the rise of radical 

Islam. We already know the extent and the dangers of that. And 

you have also seen communism in the face of, I suppose almost 

more totalitarian fascist corporatism rising out of China. 

And these countries seem to me to be right in the mid of that 

triangle. So I just wanted to point that out. I will spare you a last 

question, and I just want to thank you for being here, thank you 

for your patience, thanks to all my colleagues who helped to make 

this experience so memorable for all of you, and thank you for what 

you are doing for our country. 

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

Æ