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### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

**C O U R T O F A P P E A L S**

BONNIE M. PARKS,

Plaintiff

- Appellee, FOR PUBLICATION September 18, 2018

9:05 a.m.

v No. 337823

Macomb Circuit Court Family Division

JOHN D. NIEMIEC, LC No. 1992

- 001206

- DP

Defendant

- Appellant.

Before: O’C ONNELL

, P .J., and C AVANAGH and S ERVITTO , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

In this domestic relations action, defendant , John D. Niemiec, appeals by delayed leave granted 1 the trial court ’ s order denying his motion to discharge unpaid child support owed for his

two children

. In 1992, t he Department of Social Services brought a paternity action against Niemiec over the paternity of his oldest child

. Niemiec acknowledged paternity, and t he trial

court entered an order of filiation. The trial court also ordered Niemiec to pay child support for

his two child ren , born in 1987 and 1989

. Over the next 1 2 years, plaintiff, Bonnie M. Parks,

soug ht to enforce the support order. B y 2004, Niemiec owed around $40,000 in unpaid support. In June 2007, the trial court temporarily suspend ed Niemiec’s support obligation because of his incarceration. Niemiec was released from prison in December 2016. In February 2017, Niemi e c asked the trial court to d ischarge the unpaid support , arguing that the statute of limitations barred

enforcement. The trial court rejected Niemiec’s argument and denied his motion to cancel the unpaid support. We affirm.

On appeal, Niemiec contends that the statutory limitati on s period for e nforcement of the support order has run. We d isagree

. We review de novo the legal questions of statutory interpretation and the application of a statute of limitations to undisputed facts

. O ’ Leary v

O ’ Leary , 321 Mich App 647, 651

- 652 ; 90 9 NW2d 518 (2017)

. “ The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the L egislature. ” Cox v

Hartman , 322 Mich App 292, 298 ; 911 NW2d 219 (2017) (quotation marks and citation

1 Parks v Niemiec , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 23, 2017 (Docket No. 337823).- 2

- omitted). “ We read the statutory l an gu ag e in context and as a whole, considering the plain and ordinary meaning of every word. ” O ’ Leary , 321 Mich App at 648 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “ If the statute ’ s language is unambiguous, judicial construction is not permitted. ” Sims v Verbrugge , 322 Mich App 205, 210; 911 NW2d 233 (2017)

.

A c ivil action to enforce a child support order is subject to a 10

- year statutory limitations period

. MCL 600.5809(4); People v Monaco , 474 Mich 48

, 54

- 55 ; 710 NW2d 46 (2006). For this reason, the trial court’s reasoning that no statute of limitations bar red recovery of unpaid support in a civil case was erroneous. Nonetheless, we affirm the trial court’s order because the statutory limitations period s w ere tolle d by the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction

.

The ten

- year statutory period of limitations to enforce a support order in a civil proceeding runs “from the date that the last support payment is due under the support order regardless of whether or not the last payment is made.” MCL 600.5809(4). Generally, the “ date that the last support payment is due ” is the child’s 18 th birthday

. Rzadkowolski v Pefley , 237 Mich App 405, 411 ; 603 NW2d 646 (1999). A statute of limitations is tolled when a complaint is properly filed or “[a]t the time jurisdiction over the defendan t is otherwise acquired.” MCL

6 00.5856 (a) and (b). Pertinent to this case, a trial court “has continuing jurisdiction over proceedings brought under ” The Paternity Act, MC L 722.711 et seq

., to change the amount of child support or to enfo rce a support order. MCL 722.720 (a) and (b).

In this case, it is undisputed that Niemiec’s oldest child turned 18 on December 25, 2005, and that his younger child turned 18 on May 21, 2 007. T he statutory limitations period s for recovery of unpaid support in a civil case for each child would have expired on December 25, 2015, and May 21, 2017, respectively. The statutory limitations period s were tol le d, however

, by the trial court’s con tinuing jurisdiction. The trial court began exercising jurisdiction in 1992 when it entered a judgment of filiation and a support order. The trial court continued to exercise jurisdiction by entering orders for Niemiec to show cause for failure to pay su pport, issuing multiple bench warrants and enforcement orders, and temporarily suspending Niemiec’s support obligation beginning in June 200 7 while he was in prison. Further, the suspension of Niemiec’s support obligation for the nearly ten years of his incarceration did not affect the tolling of the limitations period s because Parks had already sought to recover unpaid support numerous times long before either child turned 18. That temporary suspension merely reflected the trial court ’ s continuin g jurisdiction. Therefore, even after the statutory limitations periods began to run in

December 2005 and May 2007, respectively, they were tolle d by the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction. In sum, a lthough the trial court erred when it determined tha t no statute of limitations applied to civil proceedings to enforce a child support order , it nevertheless reached

the correct result because the trial court ’ s continuing jurisdiction in this proceeding tolled the

limitation s period s

. See Mich Ed Employee s Mut Ins Co v Karr , 228 Mich App 111, 115 n 1; 576 NW2d 728 (1998) (declining to “ reverse when the trial court reaches the correct result regardless of the reasoning employed”). Therefore, Niemiec remains liable for unpaid child

support in this civil pro ceeding

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- We affirm

.

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto