The Honorable Ike Skelton has represented the Fourth Congressional 

District of Missouri since 1977. He is currently the ranking Democrat

on the House Armed Services Committee and, as Chairman of the

Panel on Professional Military Education, helped implement the

provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 relating to joint education of the Armed Forces.

Whispers of Warriors

Essays on the New Joint Era

Ike Skelton—one of the most

knowledgeable experts in Congress on

defense—explores issues such as:

• Professional Military Education

• Joint and Combined Operations

• Military Leadership

• The Role of Congress in Defense

• Intelligence Support of Military Operations

• International Engagement

• The Importance of History for Military Professionals

• Coalition Operations and Technological Innovation

• Lessons from Desert One to the Balkans

• America’s Frontier Wars and Asymmetric Conflict

• Cultural Awareness Training for the Armed Forces

Cover 4 
Whispers of Warriors

Page iii—No Folio
Whispers of Warriors

Essays on the New Joint Era

by Ike Skelton

Page v—No Folio

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

2004
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are

solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense

Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release;

distribution unlimited.

Portions of this book may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided

that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy

of reprints or reviews.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Skelton, Isaac Newton.

Whispers of warriors : essays on the new joint era / by Ike Skelton

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1–57906–071–4

1. United States—Military Policy. 2. United States—Armed Forces. 3. Military art

and science. 4. World politics—1995–2005. I. Title.

UA23 .N5428 2004

355.4’6’0973—dc22

2004061085

First Printing, December 2004

NDU Press publications are sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office. For ordering information, call (202) 512–1800 or write to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government

Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. For GPO publications on-line access their Web site at:

http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/sale.html.

For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, consult the National 

Defense University Web site at: http://www.ndu.edu.

Page vi—No Folio
Contents

Foreword................................. ix

Michael M. Dunn

Preface ................................... xi

Chapter 1

Joint Professional Military Education:

Are We There Yet? ......................... 1

Chapter 2

Joint and Combined Operations in 

the Post–Cold War Era ..................... 13

Chapter 3

Taking Stock of the New Joint Era ........... 27

Chapter 4

Inspiring Soldiers to Do Better

Than Their Best........................... 37

Chapter 5

The Constitutional Role of Congress:

Lessons in Unpreparedness ................. 49

Chapter 6

Intelligence Support of Military Operations . . 71

vii
Chapter 7

International Engagement: Why We

Need to Stay the Course.................... 79

Chapter 8

Whispers of Warriors: The Importance of

History to the Military Professional ......... 85

Chapter 9

It Ain’t New: Joint Operations .............. 99

Chapter 10

Military Lessons from Desert One

to the Balkans ............................ 111

Chapter 11

America’s Frontier Wars: Lessons

for Asymmetric Conflict ................... 121

Chapter 12

You’re Not From Around Here, Are You? ..... 131

Chapter 12

Recommended Reading for

Military Professionals...................... 139

Chapter 12

About the Author ......................... 151

viii WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
Foreword

This collection of articles by the Honorable Ike Skelton represents the

author’s deep and abiding commitment to the Armed Forces of the

United States. As the ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services

Committee, he has been an acknowledged leader in defense affairs in a

lifetime of public service. As chairman of the panel on professional military

education, Mr. Skelton helped implement the provisions of the GoldwaterNichols Act of 1986, which had a profound impact on staff and war colleges.

As the National Defense University has grown into a center of excellence in

joint education, Congressman Skelton has been an active supporter of our

programs. In recognition of his efforts, the university awarded him its first

honorary degree, a doctorate in national security affairs, in 2001.

In his contributions to military journals, Mr. Skelton has demonstrated an understanding of military history, leadership, and education.

Many of those articles are gathered herein. They offer still-pertinent ideas

for meeting the challenges of the war on terrorism, enhancing jointness, and

transforming the military. The 12 articles, which appeared in the pages of

Aerospace Power Journal, Joint Force Quarterly, Military Review, Naval War

College Review, Parameters, and Strategic Forum, are published by the National Defense University both as a service to the military community and

as a tribute to their author.

Michael M. Dunn

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force

President

ix
Preface

I

n an essay I wrote a few years ago (chapter 8 of the current volume), I

reminisced about my childhood fascination with the hat that my father

wore as a sailor during World War I and how it connected me to his

military past, of which I am still so proud. Throughout my career as a

Congressman and as a proponent of joint professional military education,

I have come to view that hat as much more than a childhood curiosity:

that hat represents all of our pasts as Americans; it speaks of the countless

told and untold stories of warriors who have given so much to ensure our

freedom today and tomorrow.

Only by studying and reflecting on these stories of warriors can we

move securely into the future. This is why I have written a number of essays

in support of educating the joint warfighter strategically, operationally, and

historically. At the international level, the United States must remain engaged with allies and coalition partners in pursuing its strategic goals; at the

operational level, U.S. forces need to be trained in and aware of the cultures

of allies and enemies alike. A thorough mastery of military history, furthermore, is essential for any military professional because the past has important lessons to teach about warfighting skills, tactics, leadership, innovation,

and strategy. Effective commanders, I believe, are ones who can capitalize on

those skills in extreme and stressful situations to ensure the well-being of

their soldiers and successful accomplishment of their mission.

I have always been a strong advocate of teamwork, which is especially

important for the Armed Forces today as they train and fight to win the

war on terrorism. Because warfare changed so drastically after the end of

the Cold War, the needed emphasis on joint professional military education, especially at the mid- to senior-level military colleges, has never been

greater. The challenge continues to be how to maintain one’s warfighting

proficiency in the fast-paced, technologically advanced, multidimensional

battlefield on which we find ourselves. Indeed, future leaders must continue learning from the past to build an even more effective force that can

xi
deal with challenges such as urban warfare, weapons of mass destruction,

and ongoing operations.

This book is a compilation of articles written since the early 1990s,

most of which have been published in various professional military journals

to include Military Review and Joint Force Quarterly. In addition, I have

included as an appendix a recommended list of readings to enhance the

joint warfighter’s continuing professional military education. This volume

was made possible by the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU), which expressed interest in publishing,

under one cover, this series of articles. NDU Press—George Maerz, Lisa

Yambrick, and Dr. Jeffrey Smotherman—brought it to completion under

the supervision of Colonel Debra Taylor, USA, Managing Editor, and Robert

A. Silano, Director of Publications. I want to thank them all for their long

hours and hard work. Finally, thanks go to my colleague in the House of

Representatives, Jim Cooper, who co-authored chapter 12.

xii WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
Whispers of Warriors

Page xiii—No Folio
Joint Professional 

Military Education:

Are We There Yet?

I

n late 1987, the Panel on Military Education of the House Armed Services Committee began its review of joint education at the command

and general staff colleges of the four services. We issued our preliminary recommendations in November 1988 and our final 206-page report

in April 1989.1

The panel recommended the establishment of a two-phase joint specialty officer (JSO) education process as part of a wide-ranging series of

recommendations concerning intermediate and advanced professional

military education.

The panel recommended that phase one be provided to all students

attending a service intermediate college. We made this recommendation

because we strongly believed that officers of all four services at the

major/lieutenant commander and lieutenant colonel/commander ranks

should have an understanding of, if not expertise in, multiservice matters—jointness. Familiarity with doctrine, organizational concepts, and

command and control of the forces of each of the services was to be included in the curriculum of all four service intermediate schools. In addition, the students would be introduced to the joint world—the joint planning processes, joint systems, and the role played by service commands in

the unified command structure.

We recommended that phase two, the detailed, in-depth course of

study in the integrated deployment and employment of multiservice

forces, be accomplished at the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC), Norfolk, Virginia. The idea was that only the small percentage of intermediate

1

This chapter originally appeared as the lead article in Military Review (May 1992).
phase one course of study.

I am pleased to report that this key recommendation of our panel,

the establishment of a two-phase JSO education process, was enacted by

the Department of Defense. As proof, some of those now attending the

course of study at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

(USACGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, or at another service’s staff college will, upon graduation, proceed to Norfolk to attend the AFSC.

Service Expertise First

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act

of 1986 did much to promote the concept of jointness among the four

services. Likewise, our panel’s efforts have gone far in promoting jointness

in the area of professional military education. We realized that one of the

ways to promote better joint planning and joint operations was through

professional military education and the development of the JSO. (The

other important tool for improving joint operations is for the services to

sponsor more joint training exercises.)

However, we also recognized that the successful JSO first had to be an

expert concerning his or her respective service. While each of the four intermediate service schools now has a role in promoting joint education,

each one still has the primary function of educating officers to become

competent in their respective warfare specialties. The USACGSC, for example, must provide Army officers a firm foundation on the merging of

separate Army branch elements into integrated Army combined arms

forces that can conduct land warfare with the support of air and naval

forces. This is to be done at the operational level.

An Army officer must thoroughly understand the capabilities, characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses of Army forces. He or she must have

a very good understanding of the integration of combat, combat support,

and combat service support elements employed in the conduct of successful Army operations.

The opening shots of the air campaign during Operation Desert Storm

were fired by Army Apache attack helicopters. Their mission succeeded in

destroying a number of Iraqi early warning radar sites. The success of the

mission allowed coalition aircraft to surprise the Iraqi air defense forces on

the first night of the war. This was crucial in allowing the coalition air forces

to gain air supremacy. Their losses that first night over Iraq were zero.
sites with laser-guided Hellfire missiles, it was U.S. Air Force special operations aircraft, MH–53J Pave Low enhanced configuration helicopters,

that acted as pathfinders for the Army choppers. As General H. Norman

Schwarzkopf sought recommendations from his staff, Army officers

needed to understand the navigational limitations of the AH–64 Apache.

On the other hand, Air Force officers on the commander in chief’s

(CINC’s [combatant commander’s]) staff needed to know that Air Force

special operations Pave Low helicopters could provide the navigational

guidance lacking in the Army attack helicopters.

This example illustrates the requirement for JSOs on joint staffs to be

experts on their respective services. An Army infantry JSO would have

needed to understand the capabilities and, more specifically, the navigational limitations of Army AH–64s. Similarly, an Air Force fighter pilot

JSO would have needed to know that the Air Force had in its inventory not

only fixed-wing aircraft but also Pave Low special operations helicopters

able to help the Army AH–64s overcome their navigational limitations for

the crucial mission against the Iraqi early warning radars.

Jointness and Joint Education at the Command and

Staff Colleges

Our panel report listed the attributes of the JSO—a thorough knowledge of his or her own service, some knowledge of the other services, experience operating with other services, trust and confidence in other services, and the perspective to see the “joint” picture. Ultimately, a JSO must

“understand the capabilities and limitations, doctrine and culture of the

other services.”2

Joint education at the command and staff colleges of the four services

has come a long way since our panel began its work. Last year, we held hearings to assess the progress made by the various intermediate- and seniorlevel schools to implement the recommendations we had made. Prior to the

hearings, we asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to assess the implementation of these various recommendations. The GAO report on the

two Army schools (USACGSC and the U.S. Army War College) came out in

March 1991. It noted that the USACGSC had implemented or partially implemented 29 of 31 recommendations.3 The next month, the panel had the

opportunity to hear Major General John E. Miller, USACGSC deputy
CGSC Situation Report

The story on joint education at intermediate-level military educational institutions is a positive one, not simply for the Army but for all the

services. Each has in place a phase one course. At Fort Leavenworth, the effort has been one to include the phase one material throughout the six

blocks of instruction. I have had the opportunity to examine the curriculum from the previous academic year and can see the amount of time devoted to joint matters. My instincts tell me that the balance of instruction

between land-force capabilities and joint capabilities is about right. And I

believe that it is done in the proper fashion—more Army-specific courses

in the early part of the curriculum, with greater attention to joint issues toward the end of the course.

It would be interesting to hear from both faculty and students

whether they also believe the balance between Army and joint matters is

just about right. I am sure that if there are concerns about this issue, letters touching on the subject will appear in future issues of Military Review.

Those who would want to write me directly are encouraged to do so.

Another positive development at Fort Leavenworth concerns the increased number of sister service students attending USACGSC. Both the

Air Force and the Navy have increased the number of students at the

school. This academic year, the Air Force total was scheduled to reach the

80-student mark. This coming fall, the naval services will also reach the 80-

student mark (60 Navy and 20 Marine).

The Navy has been able to improve both the number and quality of

students at Fort Leavenworth because of our panel’s efforts to have the

Navy provide more line officers to other service intermediate and senior

schools. This was a cooperative endeavor on the part of both our panel and

the Navy. I believe that we have been successful. This means that there

should be a greater number of Navy officers in the seminar groups that

meet throughout the year at USACGSC.

Four years ago, not every seminar had a naval officer. Others that did

had officers who were either lawyers, supply officers, or others who would

never command a ship, a submarine, an aviation squadron, or some larger

combat formation.
for student and faculty mix of officers from the three military departments

were not followed. The first recommendation called for intermediate service schools to have student body mixes of two officers from each of the two

nonhost military departments in every student seminar. This was to be

achieved by academic year 1995–1996. So, at Fort Leavenworth, that would

mean that in each seminar there would be two Air Force officers and two

Navy officers (or one Navy officer and one Marine officer).4

Our faculty mix recommendation at the intermediate level called for

80 percent from the host school and 10 percent from each nonhost school

military department. We called for its implementation by academic year

1990–1991. By academic year 1995–1996, the comparable figures were to

have been 70 percent and 15 percent from the other two military departments.5 In both the student and faculty mixes, the recommendations of

our panel were relaxed by the Military Education Policy Document

(MEPD) issued under the guidance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff in May 1990. The MEPD sets guidance in the area of joint education.

While its recommendations set the minimum levels in the matter of both

student and faculty mixes, the USACGSC viewed those minimum levels

not as floors but as ceilings. While the situation of student and faculty

mixes is better today than it was 4 years ago, it is not as good as our panel

believes it could be.

Study of Military History

Another area that our panel report stressed was the study of military

history, especially in helping to develop strategists. In our visit to Fort

Leavenworth in 1988, the study of military history was confined to 51

hours and limited to the American experience of war in the 20th century.

Army officers, especially those who will rise to command at the corps or

theater level, need a thorough understanding of military history that

reaches back over the ages.

The recent war in the Persian Gulf exhibited elements of campaigns

fought in previous wars. I am confident that Schwarzkopf’s familiarity

with those campaigns, through his study of military history, helped him

design the strategy that resulted in the overwhelming victory of the allied

coalition over Iraq. The lessons for him to draw upon could be found in

military actions spanning more than a century.

The 6-week air campaign allowed American and coalition aircraft to

pound away at Iraqi installations and forces so that when the ground
a bombing campaign too early. During that amphibious landing, Marine

forces suffered heavy casualties because the island had not been hit hard

enough with air and naval gunfire.6

The placement of Army and Marine forces along the border between

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was reminiscent of Sir Bernard L. Montgomery’s

North African Campaign, which used deception to defeat the German

Afrika Korps at El Alamein.7 And, finally, the famous “left hook” that

struck with such force and surprise against the right flank of the Iraqi

ground forces may have derived its inspiration from our own Civil War. At

the Battle of Chancellorsville, General Robert E. Lee, too, dispatched forces

under General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson around the right flank of

General Joseph Hooker’s Union troops and routed them in a manner that

was daring and aggressive.8

These examples of how history may have been used in Desert Storm

simply underscore the point that a profound understanding of military

history is crucial for any officer attending the U.S. Army Command and

General Staff Officer Course at Fort Leavenworth. Since our panel visit in

early 1988, the course has broadened its study of military history to include 18th-century warfare. The seeds of future American military victories

can be found by plowing deeply the fertile soil of military history.

Military Education in the 1930s

During the Great Depression of the 1930s, in a far harsher budgetary

climate than that of today, all of the services found themselves reduced to

“pauperdom.” The sizes of the forces were drastically cut, and modernization programs were, at first, postponed and then canceled. The Army,

which during the Great War had numbered more than 2.3 million, was reduced to less than 138,000 by 1934. In a crisis, the Army could have fielded

1,000 tanks, all obsolete; 1,509 aircraft, the fastest of which could fly 234

miles per hour; and a single mechanized regiment, organized at Fort Knox,

Kentucky, led by horse-mounted cavalrymen who wore mustard

gas–proof boots. The United States had the 16th largest army in the world,

with Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Spain, Romania, and Poland possessing

larger armies.9

Too poor to train and equip their forces, the Army, Navy, and Marine

Corps took advantage of a difficult situation by sending their best officers

to various schools to study, teach, and prepare for the future. The Infantry
land; the Army War College in Washington, DC; and the Marine Corps

schools at Quantico, Virginia, experienced a renaissance.

It was during the interwar years, the “golden age” of American military education, that such renowned World War II military leaders as

George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Joseph Stilwell, Omar N.

Bradley, Chester W. Nimitz, Raymond Spruance, and Henry “Hap” Arnold

benefited from study at intermediate- or senior-level war colleges. William

F. “Bull” Halsey, Jr., who commanded the Central Pacific amphibious campaign against the Japanese during World War II, attended both the Army

and Naval War Colleges. Marshall taught at the Army War College and was

the assistant commandant of the Army Infantry School.

During this same period, the Marine Corps devoted considerable effort at Quantico, its seat of learning, putting together the doctrine of amphibious warfare used to such telling effect, from Guadalcanal to Okinawa,

in the Pacific campaigns of World War II. The naval-oriented Fleet Marine

Forces became the spearhead of the Navy’s Orange Plan, the basic outline

for executing a war against Japan, which was adopted in 1926. The best

summation for the period was made by Nimitz, who noted that the entire

Pacific campaign had been thought out and fought in the classrooms of

the Naval War College during the 1930s. The only unforeseen event was

the use of kamikaze suicide aircraft attacks on U.S. Navy warships during

the latter stages of the Pacific war. In short, we won the victories of the

1940s in the command and staff and war college classrooms of the 1920s

and 1930s.

Military Education in the 1990s

Shifting from the recent past to the more uncertain future, I want to

touch on the important task of educating our country’s military leaders,

present and future. A first-rate officer education program—from lieutenant to general—will prepare today’s military officers for tomorrow’s

challenges by providing them the most important foundation for any

leader—a genuine appreciation of history. I cannot stress this enough because a solid foundation in history gives perspective to the problems of the

present. And a solid appreciation of history provided by such a program

will prepare today’s military officers for the future, especially those who

decide to spend 30 years in one of the services. They will become this

country’s future strategists.
describes why our country needs strategists in each of the services and at

all levels. “We need senior generals and admirals who can provide solid

military advice to our political leadership,” he writes, “and we need young

officers who can provide solid military advice, options, details, the results

of analysis to the generals and admirals.” He lists three elements in an

agenda for action:

■ formal schooling

■ in-unit education and experience

■ self-development.10

In brief, the military student should learn the historical links of leadership and be well versed in history’s pivotal battles and how the great captains won those battles. Successful military leaders of yesteryear were

indebted to their military predecessors. Jackson’s successful Shenandoah

Valley campaign resulted from his study of Napoleon’s tactics, and

Napoleon, who studied Frederick the Great, once remarked that he thought

like Frederick. Alexander the Great’s army provided lessons for Frederick,

2,000 years before Frederick’s time. The Athenian general, Miltiades the

Younger, who won the Battle of Marathon in 490 BC, provided the inspiration that also won the Battle of El Alamein in 1942; the Macedonian,

Alexander the Great, who defeated the Persians at the Battle of Arbela in

331 BC, set the example for the Roman victory at Pydna 155 years later. The

English bowmen who won Crecy in 1346 also won Waterloo in 1815;

Alexander A. Vandegrift, Bradley, Montgomery, or Douglas MacArthur,

who won battles in the 1940s, might well win battles a century or so hence.

Thus, I believe that every truly great commander has linked himself to the

collective experience of earlier generals by reading, studying, and having an

appreciation of history.

A military career includes a lifelong commitment to self-development. It is a process of education, study, reading, and thinking that should

continue throughout an entire military career. Yes, tactical proficiency is

very important, but so too is strategic vision. That can only come after years

of careful reading, study, reflection, and experience. Those at the USACGSC

who finish their course of study should be aware of the natural yardstick of

4,000 years of recorded history. Thucydides, Plutarch, Sun Tzu, Carl von

Clausewitz, Napoleon, Alfred T. Mahan, and Sir Halford John Mackinder

have much to offer those who will become tomorrow’s future generals and

admirals. Today’s officer corps must be made aware of this inheritance.
by rank, and age by age... those are the title reeds of the commanders of

the future armies, and the secret of future victories.”11

A Joint School of Advanced Military Studies

As I survey the past 4 years, I see much progress that has been made

in fostering joint education at the four intermediate service schools and at

the AFSC. The recent publication of Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of

the U.S. Armed Forces, underscores the efforts of the services to promote

jointness.12 In many ways, our panel’s work simply reinforced and accelerated trends that had already been under way in the services.

Professional military education is an important element in the development of tomorrow’s senior military leadership. The Army established

its School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) in 1983 to provide the

Army with officers specially educated for military operations. It is expected that the graduates of this 1-year follow-on course of the intermediate command and general staff course will become the commanders and

general staff officers of the Army. Cross-pollination has worked to the extent that both the Marine Corps and Air Force have established equivalent

courses (the School of Advanced Warfighting for the Marine Corps and

the School of Advanced Airpower Studies for the Air Force).

One idea that merits serious study is the establishment of a Joint

SAMS course under the auspices of the AFSC. It would be similar to the

follow-on schools at Fort Leavenworth, Quantico, and Maxwell Air Force

Base, Alabama, but would have a joint focus. Such a school would seek applicants from graduates of the four command and staff colleges.

The details of such a course need to be worked out. Here are some

suggestions. The student body should initially be composed of 60 officers,

20 from each military department. They may even be AFSC graduates who

stay on for further study. Such a school would allow the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commanders to have a pool of officers

well grounded in the planning and conduct of joint operations. It would be

a course of study that would be added to rather than supplant the current

second-year courses found at Fort Leavenworth, Quantico, and Maxwell.

One advantage of such a course would be to have Navy participation.

In 1923, Major George C. Marshall, the future World War II Army

chief of staff, described the regular cycle in the doing and undoing of measures for the national defense. He observed that “we start in the making of
one of those changes in direction.

World conditions have changed, the Cold War is over. The challenge

now is to reduce the size of our military effort without putting at risk our

national security. There are still threats to American interests in the world

that cannot be ignored.

While Americans want a reduction in military spending, they do not

want to reduce spending in such drastic fashion that we risk undoing all the

hard work and money spent since 1980 in restoring the military. Americans

also understand George Washington’s wise counsel, “To be prepared for war

is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.”14 I am convinced

that they will support measures needed to maintain an adequate and credible national defense in order to preserve the peace that we enjoy today.

But these next few years for those in the military will be difficult ones

nonetheless. As we reduce the size of the services, professional military education should not be forced to take its “fair share” of the cuts. The fact is that

smaller forces will have to be more capable forces. That means continued

high levels of training and efforts to improve professional military education. Doing business in a joint fashion will become even more necessary.

Eisenhower got it right more than 30 years ago when, in a message to

Congress, he noted, “Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever.

If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements,

with all Services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparation

and organizational activity must conform to this fact.”15 Building on the

accomplishments of the past few years, the enactment of the GoldwaterNichols Act in 1986 and the greater effort in both service and joint professional military education will allow us to have a greater chance for securing a lasting peace.

Notes1 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee Panel on Military Education, “Report of

the Panel on Military Education,” 101st Congress, April 21, 1989.

2 Ibid., 55.

3 “Army: Status of Recommendations on Officers’ Professional Training,” briefing report to the

Chairman, Panel on Military Education, House Armed Services Committee (Washington, DC: U.S.

General Accounting Office, March 1991), 2.

4 “Report of the Panel on Military Education,” 128.

5 Ibid., 127.

6 Robert Leckie, “Strong Men Armed: The United States Marines Against Japan,” in Illustrated

History of World War II (Pleasantville, NY: Reader’s Digest, 1984), 236.
1861–1865 (New York: HarperCollins, 1997). 9 William R. Manchester, The Glory and the Dream: A Narrative History of America, 1932–1972

(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 6. 10 John R. Galvin, “What’s the Matter with Being a Strategist?” Parameters 19 (March 1989), 2. 11 “Report of the Panel on Military Education,” 12.

12 Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the United States Armed Forces (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1991). 13 George C. Marshall, “The Effect of School Histories on National Defense,” in Report of the

Tenth Annual Conference of the Association of Military Colleges and Schools of the United States, Washington, DC, 1923. 14 John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations (Boston: Brown, Little and Company, 1968), 461. 15 Edward C. Meyer, “The JCS—How Much Reform is Needed?” Armed Forces Journal International (April 1982), 84.
Chapter 2

Joint and Combined

Operations in the Post–Cold

War Era

Three years ago, prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, former

Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, General Colin L. Powell,

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and their respective staffs

crafted a new National Military Strategy.1 The new strategy envisioned the

end of the Cold War. It differed from the earlier Cold War strategy in many

ways. First, it saw the primary threat as regional rather than global. Possible

confrontations with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea occupied the attention of

planners rather than a possible world war with the Soviet Union. Second, the

new strategy also emphasized conventional forces rather than nuclear

weapons. For example, the Air Force reconfigured much of its bomber force

for conventional use in regional crises. Third, forward presence replaced forward deployment as one of the key policies by which to secure American interests around the globe. Overseas basing would be significantly reduced,

and intermittent presence would be increased. The American military would

become a primarily continental United States (CONUS)-based force, especially the Army and Air Force.

The base force, as articulated by Department of Defense (DOD) officials, accompanied the new military strategy and called for reducing the

size of all four military services.2 It envisioned roughly a 25-percent

reduction in the size of American military forces and the size of the

defense budget by the middle of this decade.

13

Author’s Note: I wish to express my gratitude to Major Mary F. O’Brien, USAF, for her insight and

research contributions in the preparation of this article, which was originally published in Military

Review (September 1993).
The New World Disorder

In the midst of these plans—in fact, on the same day that former

President George Bush was giving a major speech on the new National

Military Strategy in Aspen, Colorado—Iraqi armed forces invaded and occupied Kuwait on August 2, 1990.

The ensuing Persian Gulf War was a stunning victory. Sailors in the

gulf, soldiers and marines ashore, and airmen in the skies defeated a brutal foe. All of the world witnessed the great skill, determination, and professionalism of the American military. Among other things, the war

showed that our investment in quality people, tough training, and firstrate weapon systems, both combat and support systems, in the 1980s was

money well spent. Those who fought in the gulf helped write another

magnificent chapter in American military history.

Despite the end of the Cold War, the Kuwait invasion and the subsequent war revealed that the world was still a dangerous and uncertain

place. The kaleidoscope of the future is still unpredictable.

The end of the Cold War has been accompanied by a resurgence of

nationalism—in some places, militant nationalism. This resurgence poses

a major challenge to the established political and economic order. The disintegration of states—Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and Ethiopia—will

generate conflict about the distribution of assets.

This is the fourth great wave of state creation since the end of the

Napoleonic Wars in 1815. The first was in Latin America after the withdrawal of Spanish power; the second occurred in Europe and the Middle

East after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Turkish, and Russian empires. The third took place after World War II, when Britain, France, and

the Netherlands relinquished control of their respective empires, some

more willingly than others. The end of communist rule in what was the

Soviet Union marks the fourth great period of state creation. In short, the

world will not be a particularly stable place.

The fault lines of international security are shifting in many directions: Eastern Europe has now become Central Europe; Southwest Asia has

given way to Central Asia. The continued utility of military force for good

or evil has not been eliminated, nor have the principles of deterrence (conventional, as well as nuclear) lost strategic relevance. But the nonmilitary

aspects of security—social, economic, and political—will now assume

greater importance in the strategist’s appreciation of the forces at play.

14 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
The Services Reorganize

In the midst of these momentous political developments, the service

departments began their respective efforts to reorganize for the future.

Air Force

The Air Force issued its white paper, “Global Reach—Global Power,”

in June 1990.3 This visionary document outlined a strategic planning

framework for the Air Force in the post–Cold War era. Such venerable institutions as the Strategic Air Command, the Tactical Air Command, and

the Military Airlift Command passed into history. The Air Combat Command incorporated all the winged firepower of the service—fighter,

bomber, reconnaissance, command and control (C2), tactical airlift, and

rescue aircraft. Air mobility command acquired most of the mobility and

refueling assets—strategic transport aircraft, tankers, and medical evacuation aircraft. Other changes included the streamlining and elimination of

organizations. The Air Force will reduce the number of major commands

from 13 in June 1991 to 8 by October 1993.

More than a fundamental management reorganization of the Air

Force, “Global Reach—Global Power” symbolized a new way of thinking

for airmen. Artificial distinctions between tactical and strategic were done

away with, and airpower is now considered as a unified whole. At the same

time, the Air Force discovered some old truths that have been important

to the Army as an institution for many years—the importance of professional military education (PME) and, closely tied in with education, the

importance of doctrine.

Navy

The Navy, the service that traditionally has been most resistant to

change, has also responded to the end of the Cold War and its experience

in the Persian Gulf War with its own white paper, “. . . From the Sea.”4 Issued in September 1992, after about a year’s study, the new strategy incorporated two assumptions. First, the authors of the new strategy believed

that the United States and its allies would have uncontested control of the

seas. Second, they thought that most future military operations would be

“joint,” involving more than one service.

The document symbolized a new way of thinking for the Navy in a

number of respects. The focus for future operations has shifted from the

open sea to the coastlines of the world. In close cooperation with the

Marine Corps, the emphasis on littoral warfare “is a new doctrine that

marries Navy and Marine forces and priorities. . . . The Navy and Marine

POST–COLD WAR OPERATIONS 15
Corps will now respond to crises and can provide the initial, ‘enabling’ capability for joint operations.”5

Similar to the Air Force approach, the Navy also accompanied its

change in strategy with a change in structure. The staff of the Chief of

Naval Operations (CNO) was rearranged on a functional basis to mirror

the organization of the JCS. The new CNO organizations conform to the

JCS’ J–1 through J–8. Power has shifted from the three separate baronies—

air, surface, and submarine warfare—to the new N–8, the deputy CNO for

resources, warfare requirements, and assessments. Rather than dividing

budgetary resources into roughly equal shares as in the past, the new

arrangement allows one individual to control the money flow. As a result,

the Navy has already made plans to try to protect amphibious and carrier

assets by reducing the attack submarine fleet by half and retiring all 35

Oliver Hazard Perry–class frigates. Similar to the Army and Air Force, the

Navy has finally come to understand the importance of doctrine. It will establish a naval doctrine command to help smooth the integration of Navy

and Marine Corps forces in a joint power-projection role, building doctrine for expeditionary warfare.

Army

In many ways, the Army instituted a number of far-reaching changes

20 years ago, in the waning years of the Vietnam War. The outcome of that

bitter conflict was reflected in three crucial decisions that affected the

Army more than any other service—the end of the draft and beginning of

the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), the creation of the Total Force concept, and

the establishment of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC), Fort Monroe, Virginia.

Although many military leaders expressed great misgivings about the

AVF, by the early 1980s the services had finally learned how to make it

work. Recruiting high school graduates and paying them well helped create the Army of Excellence that proved itself in Panama and Iraq. The importance of the Total Force concept was also vindicated in the Persian Gulf

War. Since much of the Active Army combat support and combat service

support was found in the Reserve components (RCs), the requirement to

activate those forces helped bring along the support of the American

public. It worked just as Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams had designed it back in the early 1970s. And the third decision, the creation of

TRADOC, revealed the U.S. Army in the deserts of the Middle East

fighting with the synthesis of excellent people, first-rate equipment, and

top-notch military thinking for the employment of forces.

16 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
While less prone to issuing white papers showing the great changes it

is undertaking, the Army is indeed undergoing fundamental changes as it

shapes itself as a strategic force for the 21st century. The Army is coming

home. It will be primarily a CONUS-based force rather than the forwarddeployed force it was during the Cold War. In addition to substantial force

reductions that have produced the inactivation of four divisions and one

corps along with the consolidation of 51 war reserve stocks to 5, the Army

has recently issued the latest version of U.S. Army Field Manual (FM)

100–5, Operations, its bible. Understanding the new world in which it finds

itself, the Army has seen fit to include a chapter on “Operations Other

Than War.” One need only read today’s newspapers to see Army forces involved in such operations in Zagreb, Macedonia, Somalia, northern Iraq,

and Latin America to see the need to address such contingencies.

Although there is no Army version of “Global Reach, Global Power”

or “. . . From the Sea” that the service can point to as a blueprint for the future, FM 100–5 is a major step in the right direction. However, more needs

to be done to explain the Army’s future.

While each of the services is reorganizing for the post–Cold War era,

each understands that most military operations in the future will be joint,

multiservice efforts. This viewpoint has been underscored by the November 1991 release of Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed

Forces. This publication and the related effort to develop joint doctrine will

help the services to work more closely together in a period of declining

budgets and force structure. There will be room for leading thinkers from

each of the four services to offer their creative talents for melding the disparate ways the services think about the employment of their respective

forces. The recent publication of Joint Force Quarterly, under the auspices

of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, is still another indication that jointness has finally come of age.

While the services have been busy adjusting to the changing political

circumstances of the world since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has also been busy reviewing defense

policies. Earlier this year, as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Department

of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the chairman issued the latest report on “Roles, Functions, and Missions of the Armed Forces of the United

States.” Two considerations predominated in the effort to put together the

report: improving the way the Armed Forces fight, and saving money in

the process.6 The report noted the dramatic changes that have taken place

already: the creation of the U.S. Strategic Command; the elimination of

POST–COLD WAR OPERATIONS 17
nuclear weapons in the Army and Marine Corps; and the end of the requirement to maintain chemical weapons because of the signing by the

United States of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris in January

1993. The report also highlighted the savings that can take place by further

consolidation among the four services in the matter of depot maintenance

and flight training.

Other changes on the horizon include the creation of a unified command for all units of the four armed services based in the United States,

and the possible consolidation of space and strategic commands. Yet two

of the key issues that were raised by the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn, in a significant speech July 2, 1992, were not

addressed in the report of the chairman: the trade-offs between landbased versus sea-based power projection (Air Force bombers versus Navy

carriers) and the ambitious tactical aviation modernization programs of

the Air Force and Navy (four separate aircraft when there may be funds for

only two at most).7

Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in March

1993, Powell described the roles and missions report as “simply a snapshot of a continuous process of self-evaluation that occurs every day. The

Joint Staff will continue to examine other areas for possible consolidation or elimination.”8 The Joint Staff will not be the only group involved

in this effort. The Congress, think tanks, and other defense specialists

will also be studying the matter of roles and missions. The end of the

Cold War and the dramatic reduction in the size of U.S. military forces

have ensured that this issue will be around for the next few years. In

much the same way that the issue of defense reorganization took time to

gather steam in the 1980s—from 1982, when former Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff David Jones called for dramatic change, until late

1986, when the Goldwater-Nichols Act became law—it will take a few

years to deal with the issue of roles and missions.

Arrival of a New Administration

The arrival of any new administration in Washington signals

change. This is especially so with the election of President Bill Clinton,

who promised change during the campaign. He is the first individual

elected to the presidency born after World War II and the first President

to begin his term of office after the end of the Cold War. His choice of

Les Aspin, the former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, as secretary of defense meant that one of Washington’s leading

18 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
defense thinkers would now be in the position to institute many of the

changes he had promoted in his former position in Congress.

The new secretary signaled his effort to institute change almost immediately upon assuming office. He did so by redesigning the Office of the

Secretary of Defense (OSD) and choosing a high-powered team of seasoned defense intellectuals to assist him. OSD has always been considered

the weakest of the bureaucratic players at DOD, taking third place to the

uniformed service staffs and the newly strengthened joint staff. A second

and maybe more important effort was the “bottom up review” to chart the

course for national defense for the future. The secretary has given a series

of speeches explaining the overall effort of reducing defense spending and

force structure, yet maintaining an adequate defense capability to secure

American global interests.

One of the early trial balloons that got shot down quickly was the

proposed strategy to fight two regional wars on a sequential basis. Known

as “Win-Hold-Win,” the strategy called for fighting a first regional conflict

while essentially using air power to hold off a second adversary. Once the

first regional conflict was won, those forces would then be redeployed to

help win the second regional conflict.

Criticized, justly in my opinion, by some as “Win-Hope-Win” or

“Win-Hold-Lose,” the strategy seemed reminiscent of the mistake made by

President Harry S. Truman’s administration. In a major policy statement

at the National Press Club in early 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson

left South Korea outside the American defense perimeter in the Pacific.9

The House of Representatives compounded the mistake by rejecting (193

to 192) a defense assistance program that would have provided 500 Army

officers to supervise the equipping of South Korean troops.10

Joseph Stalin, dictating North Korean war plans, interpreted the

American statement as a green light to begin preparations to invade South

Korea. Obviously, the Truman administration had not intended, by way of

Acheson’s speech, to encourage North Korea to attack the south in its effort to reunify the peninsula. Yet that was the unintended consequence of

the speech.

Similarly, Aspin would not want to encourage a second regional adversary to attempt to take advantage of a situation in which American

forces were engaged in a regional conflict elsewhere. Why telegraph one’s

weaknesses? 

POST–COLD WAR OPERATIONS 19
Upon reflection, the secretary came to the same conclusion:

After much discussion and analysis, we’ve come to the conclusion that

our forces must be able to fight and win two major regional conflicts. . . . First . . . we don’t want a potential aggressor in a second region to believe that we’re vulnerable. Second, we want to be prepared

in case an adversary emerges with larger or more capable forces than

today’s regional powers.11

Equally important, the secretary has talked about the importance of

maintaining a strong peacetime presence of U.S. military forces around the

world. He recognizes the fact that such presence contributes to regional stability, sending the signal that the United States is committed to protecting

American and allied interests. And yet the dilemma we face is doing all this

with a military force structure that is shrinking. The secretary admits that

“creative thinking” will be needed. Some of the ideas being considered are

rotating Air Force squadrons to forward bases for limited periods; having

Navy ships, Air Force long-range bombers, and Airborne Warning and

Control System aircraft operate together as part of the same joint task force;

and conducting more but smaller military exercises with allies.

If nothing else, the new Aspin defense team is wrestling with some

very tough issues. The new DOD leadership realizes that as the American

military reduces in size it must maintain its readiness and remain a quality force, ready to fight. It has identified the three major challenges to

readiness:

■ maintaining good people in the military

■ keeping up training and maintenance

■ ensuring the proper esprit de corps.

Truth be told, the American military establishment is under great

stress. The reductions experienced by each of the services caused turbulence and uncertainty. In addition, the debate over removing the ban on

homosexuals serving in the Armed Forces has caused great anxiety

among those in uniform. And the recommendation in the proposed fiscal year (FY) 1994 defense budget not to include a cost-of-living allowance increase is penny wise and pound foolish and sends the wrong

signal to those in uniform. At the end of the day, I believe that the Congress will take action on homosexuals and pay, which will find favor

among the vast majority of servicemembers.

The new secretary made evident his commitment to readiness by the

appointment in May of a high-level readiness task force of eight retired flag

20 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
officers. Headed by former Army Chief of Staff General Edward “Shy” Meyer

and including former Army Vice Chief of Staff General Maxwell Thurman,

the group will help the secretary make sure that we do not return to the

‘‘hollow force” of the late 1970s. It is a move that I strongly support.

The two most successful secretaries of defense since World War II

have been two former members of Congress—Melvin Laird and Cheney.

The former helped maintain military strength at a time of reduction during a most difficult period, our extended withdrawal from Vietnam. The

second managed the difficult task of cutting forces while fighting a major

war in the Middle East.

They possessed a broad understanding of security issues along with an

intimate understanding of Congress. The current secretary has all the

makings of being able to follow in their footsteps and maybe even surpass

them. He, too, understands Congress every bit as well as his distinguished

predecessors. But his knowledge and understanding of security issues at the

outset of his appointment as secretary of defense far surpasses those of Laird

and Cheney when they assumed office. Aspin has spent more than 25 years

preparing for this opportunity, with service as a DOD analyst and later in

Congress. With the support of both the President and the Congress, both of

which I am confident he will get, he can help this country move toward a

substantially smaller military in reasonably good shape. It will be a very difficult task to accomplish, but if anyone can do it, Aspin can.

Proposals to Maintain and Strengthen the Military

Peering into the future is not easy, but some outlines on the horizon

are visible. First, we know that defense spending will continue to decline

over the next few years. Second, the world remains a dangerous place despite the disappearance of the Soviet Union, so the need for capable American military forces remains. Third, joint operations among the services

and combined operations with friends and allies will more and more characterize future American military efforts as we seek to maintain American

military power despite force reductions.

Among the various proposals to maintain military capability, I

would include the following. First, the Army needs to continue improving

the relationship between its Active and Reserve components. Much that is

positive has happened, including the Army’s Bold Shift initiative and the

Title XI Army National Guard Combat Reform Initiative in the FY 1993

Defense Authorization Act. More needs to be done, especially in the area

of reserve PME. If more responsibilities are to be placed upon RC forces,

POST–COLD WAR OPERATIONS 21
they must be provided greater opportunities to become more proficient

through PME.

An even greater opportunity awaits the Army if it views the RC combat units as a genuine asset to be developed rather than as simply another

requirement it must address. Such units could be fashioned as building

blocks to allow the Army to expand the number of divisions in case a hostile world-class military power arises over the next generation—a fascist

Russia or an expansionist China. Many Army personnel who are leaving

the service may be just the kind of people that the Army could place in

such RC units in order to have an officer and noncommissioned officer

corps made up of experienced personnel. The Army would do itself a great

service to look at another ground-oriented fighting force, the Marine

Corps, to copy some of the elements that have made the Active-Reserve relationship among marines a very healthy and effective one.

These are very difficult problems to address because of the RC time

constraints. Yet creative thinking combined with a positive attitude among

senior uniformed Army leaders are the ingredients necessary if progress is

to be made on these two important issues.

Second, ongoing efforts to make the Army and Air Force more mobile

and rapidly deployable, similar to the sea services, need to be maintained at

current tempo and maybe even accelerated. The Mobility Requirements

Study validated the C–17 program, reaffirmed enhancement of the ready

reserve force of transport ships, and called for 20 additional large roll-on,

roll-off ships. This would allow the deployment of one light and two heavy

Army divisions worldwide within 30 days. The formation of Air Force composite wings at Mountain Home Air Force Base (AFB), Idaho, and Pope

AFB, North Carolina, is the Air Force solution to finding new ways to prepare its forces for rapid deployment. Such forces train together at home like

they would fight when deployed overseas. The former, designated as an air

intervention wing, includes bombers, fighters, tankers, and C2 aircraft. The

latter is considered a battlefield support wing and includes fighters, close air

support aircraft, and tactical transports. It works closely with the Army’s

82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Third, PME needs to be stressed even more during a time of diminishing resources, especially joint PME. There is a need for both field experience and education among military officers. Sir William Francis Butler,

the noted 19th-century British soldier and author, said it well: “The nation

that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the

fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by

22 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
fools and its thinking done by cowards.”12 PME is central to the effort of

maintaining a first-rate officer corps.

Lord Ernest Rutherford, British nuclear physicist and Nobel Peace

Prize winner, was once quoted as saying,“We are short of money, so we must

think.” That is not a bad description of where the Armed Forces stand today.

Education stimulates thinking. The challenge in these next few months and

years will be not to cut education to such an extent that we actually find ourselves guilty of eating our own seed corn. Education, it must be remembered, is the foundation upon which the future is built. As Sir Francis Bacon

noted, “Knowledge is power,” and a strong military must have wise leaders

who have not suffered because of excessive cuts in education.

Finally, I caution this generation of military officers not to be complacent about the next war. Success sometimes is seductive. The great victory

won in the desert 2 years ago cannot be allowed to contribute to complacency in the years to come.

As a Nation, we emerged victorious from World War II in no small

measure because of the moral and intellectual strengths at the highest levels of the American officer corps. Unfortunately, after World War II, we became complacent. Strategic thinking atrophied after 1945. In the nuclear

age, many believed that the ideas and thoughts associated with classical

military history and strategy had been rendered obsolete. Maurice Comte

de Saxe, the famous French military analyst, noted that 

Few men occupy themselves in the higher problems of war. They pass

their lives drilling troops and believe this is the only branch of the

military art. When they arrive at the command of armies they are totally ignorant, and in default of knowing what should be done . . . they

do what they know.13

Doing what one knows, rather than what should be done, is a problem that many military commanders have faced throughout history. It is a

problem not unfamiliar to the American military in the recent past. I

would contend that in Vietnam the American military did what it knew—

fighting the conventional war that it had fought in World War II and

Korea—rather than knowing what to do, fighting the revolutionary war in

which it became engaged. It took 10 years to put together a strategy to win

the war. By that time it was too late. The patience of the American public

had come to an end.

The bitter experience of Vietnam, which resulted from a loss of

strategic vision, sent American military men back to the study of war and

military history. Students at the five command and staff colleges and the

POST–COLD WAR OPERATIONS 23
five war colleges are the beneficiaries of this renewed interest in the study

of war. For some, there has been much to catch up on. For all, however, this

educational opportunity has meant extensive reading, serious research,

written analysis, seminar discussions, and old-fashioned thinking.

The U.S. military must not lose the ability to fight the big war. In

light of the victory in the Persian Gulf War, I am reasonably confident that

it will maintain this ability. At the same time, however, the U.S. military

must devote more attention to the difficult problems posed by small

wars—or to use the more current phrases, low-intensity conflict and operations other than war. Over our short history, we have had difficulty dealing with unconventional warfare—in the late 1800s fighting the Indians,

early this century pacifying the Philippines, and most recently in Vietnam.

Operations other than war will pose similar difficulties.

As I look close to our shores, at Peru, Colombia, Haiti, and the drug

war, these are the kind of conflicts that will require more of our attention

in the years to come. Such conflicts have a military dimension, but they are

overwhelmingly political by nature. We have not understood this great

truth on previous occasions when we have involved ourselves in such

struggles. These will demand attention and efforts in the coming years.

We should have learned from history that wars—even major ones—

can come about when least expected. The peace and tranquility of a European summer in 1914 was suddenly shattered by an assassin’s bullet. The

world was ill prepared for the tragic events that followed. We must maintain a ready, modern, and sufficiently powerful military that can meet any

unexpected contingency.

We need to remind ourselves that, despite all the problems we have,

America is the richest and most productive nation in the world today. No

other nation comes close in terms of economic output, and none seems

likely to overtake us for at least a generation, if then. We have both the ability and the resources to continue leading the free world. All we need is the

will. Those who would pose a false choice between meeting our responsibilities abroad and meeting the needs of our people at home do our nation

a disservice. For the truth is, we either meet both responsibilities or we

shall meet neither.

In the post–Cold War era, leadership will not be easy. But the United

States will have a leading role to play far into the 21st century. Now is the time

to realize that taking the initiative is preferable to inaction, that leadership is

preferable to self-doubt, that securing the gains democracy has made in the

24 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
past decade is within our reach. We can do all this if we look upon the design

of the future not as a threat but as a challenge.

Notes1 John M. Collins,“National Military Strategy, the DOD Base Force, and U.S. Unified Command

Plan: An Assessment,” Congressional Research Service report 92–493S (Washington, DC: Library of

Congress Congressional Research Service, June 11, 1992). 2 Colin L. Powell, “The Base Force: A Total Force,” presentation to the Senate Appropriations

Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, September 25, 1991; John M. Collins, “U.S. Military Force

Reductions: Capabilities versus Requirements,” Congressional Research Service report (Washington,

DC: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, January 8, 1992). 3 Department of the Air Force, “The Air Force and U.S. National Security Policy: Global

Reach—Global Power” (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, June 1990), 17. 4 Department of the Navy, “. . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century”

(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, September 1992), 12. 5 Ibid., 2.

6 Colin L. Powell, “Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the

United States” (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1993). 7 Sam Nunn, “The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul the Services’ Roles and

Missions,” Congressional Record, July 2, 1992. 8 Colin L. Powell, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, March 30, 1993, 10. 9 William R. Manchester, The Glory and the Dream: A Narrative History of America, 1932–1972

(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 518–519. 10 Ibid., 519.

11 Les Aspin, remarks at the United States Air Force Senior Statesman Symposium, June 24, 1993. 12 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee Panel on Military Education, “Report of

the Panel on Military Education,” 101st Congress, April 21, 1989, 18. 13 Ibid.

POST–COLD WAR OPERATIONS 25
Chapter 3

Taking Stock of the 

New Joint Era

The American military came out of Vietnam demoralized if not

broken by the experience. The services all had serious problems,

including racial friction and drug abuse. Toward the close of the

conflict in Indochina, the Armed Forces instituted various far-reaching

changes. Some of them were forced on the services, others were initiated

from within the military. These changes included the end of conscription

and the introduction of the All-Volunteer Force as well as the Total Force

concept, plus a renewed emphasis on professional education for officers.

Decline and Rise

Change is never easy. The collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in

April 1975 ended a long national nightmare. As the military sought to reconstitute itself from inside out, it also had to deal with a nation that

wanted to turn away from things military. At the same time, the Armed

Forces confronted continuing challenges posed by the Warsaw Pact while

maintaining a substantial force structure but at the expense of readiness.

By 1980, however, defense spending was simply inadequate. The military had become a fundamentally hollow, unprepared force with ships

that were unable to sail, aircraft that could not fly, weapons disabled by

shortages of spare parts, personnel unsuited for service in the force, and

inadequate operational training. The tragedy of Desert One, the unsuccessful attempt to rescue our hostages from Teheran that resulted in the

death of eight marines, symbolized the state of disrepair to which the

Armed Forces had been reduced in the post-Vietnam period.

When he entered office in 1981, President Ronald Reagan convinced

Congress that defense cuts in the 1970s under Presidents Richard Nixon,

27

The original version of this chapter appeared in Joint Force Quarterly 3 (Winter 1993–1994).
Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter had left the Nation exposed. The humiliation of Iran holding Americans hostage for 444 days, along with the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan, convinced the public that change was required. Defense spending, which increased during the final years of the Carter administration, was raised substantially by the incoming Reagan administration.

Goldwater-Nichols

Early in the Reagan years, other changes affecting the military were

also taking place. Two articles published in 1982—by General David Jones,

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and by General Edward “Shy” Meyer, Army

Chief of Staff—made the same point. The defense establishment was in

need of substantial changes to improve the way it did business. So was

born what came to be known as defense reorganization, which culminated

4 years later with passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Goldwater-Nichols was fundamentally about rearranging power

among institutions within the Department of Defense (DOD)—namely, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, and the unified commands. It reduced the influence of the service chiefs and increased the power

of the Chairman and commanders in chief (CINCs), the commanders with

responsibility for employing U.S. forces in given theaters of combat.

It also helped simplify the chain of command. This occurred as a result of the 1983 House Armed Services Committee investigation of the

bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. Among other problems, the

committee found fault with a complicated chain of command. An example of how business was conducted before and after Goldwater-Nichols

helps to illustrate this finding. The chain of command during the Vietnam

war was anything but clear and simple. While Generals William C. Westmoreland and later Creighton W. Abrams ran the ground war in South

Vietnam, the Navy ran its own air operations over the North, as did the Air

Force. And while the Air Force ran tactical aircraft from headquarters in

Vietnam, the Strategic Air Command maintained its own chain of command through the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington for B–52 missions

against targets in the North. In other words, operational coordination was

a nightmare. American military leaders violated one of the fundamental

principles of war, unity of command.

Goldwater-Nichols corrected the problems of Vietnam by strengthening the authority of the theater commander. Thus, in the war in the Gulf,

the Commander in Chief of Central Command, General Norman

28 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
Schwarzkopf, commanded all forces in the theater whether Army, Navy,

Marine Corps, or Air Force. The military buzz word for this ability to fight

together in a unified fashion is jointness. Unlike the experience in Vietnam,

the effort was coordinated by a single commander in the theater running

the entire show. Goldwater-Nichols made this unity of effort possible.

Professional Military Education

The House Armed Services Committee Panel on Professional Military Education (PME) was established in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols1

and undertook the first comprehensive review of PME by Congress. Its

charter was to assess the military’s ability to develop strategists and to review joint education requirements under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. The panel’s findings appeared in a 206-page report that had two

major thrusts. One established a conceptual model in which each level of

schooling builds on previous levels and each college has a clear, fundamental teaching focus. The other urged resurrecting two joint colleges—

the National War College (NWC) at the senior level and the Armed Forces

Staff College (AFSC) at the intermediate level—to the prominence they

enjoyed in the early post–World War II period. Under this scheme, schooling at service colleges would precede joint education.

The principal recommendations focused on joint institutions, a proposed National Center for Strategic Studies (as a reconstituted NWC was

referred to) and AFSC. Numerous suggestions sought to strengthen these

institutions by combining greater operational competence at the military

level with sound, imaginative strategic thinking at the national level.

End of the Cold War

The Berlin Wall fell a few months after the House report on military

education was issued, and, shortly after that, Secretary of Defense Dick

Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell

crafted a new “national military strategy”2 that envisioned the end of the

Cold War. It differed from Cold War strategy in a number of ways. First, it

envisioned the primary threat as regional rather than global. Second, it emphasized conventional forces instead of nuclear weapons. Third, forward

presence replaced forward deployment as the key to protecting U.S. interests

around the globe. The military would be primarily U.S.-based, especially the

Army and the Air Force. Subsequently, the Base Force, articulated by the

Defense Department, spelled out the new military strategy.3 It envisioned a

25 percent reduction in both forces and funding by the mid-1990s.

TAKING STOCK OF THE NEW JOINT ERA 29
Service and Joint Reorganization

In the midst of these momentous developments, each military department began efforts to reorganize for the future, as did DOD as a

whole. The Air Force, for one, published a white paper entitled “Global

Reach—Global Power” in 1990, a visionary document that outlined a

strategic planning framework for the post–Cold War world.4 Venerable institutions such as the Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, and

Military Airlift Command passed into history. In their place the Air Combat Command incorporated all winged firepower—fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, command and control, tactical airlift, and rescue—in one

organization. The Air Mobility Command acquired most mobility and refueling assets: strategic transport, tanker, and medical evacuation aircraft.

The number of major commands was reduced from 13 to 8.

The Navy—regarded as the service traditionally most resistant to

change—also responded to the end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf

War in dramatic fashion by issuing a white paper in 1992, “. . . From the

Sea.”5 The result of a year-long study, it incorporated two assumptions:

America and its allies would control the seas, and most future military operations would be joint. This strategy symbolized a new way of thinking.

The focus of future operations shifted from open seas to coastlines. In concert with the Marine Corps, the emphasis on littoral warfare marries naval

forces and the priorities of both services.“The Navy and Marine Corps will

now respond to crises and can provide the initial, ‘enabling’ capability for

joint operations.”6

In many respects, the Army instituted a number of far-reaching

changes 20 years ago. The bitter outcome of Vietnam was reflected in three

crucial decisions that affected this service more than any other: the end of

the draft and beginning of the All-Volunteer Force, the creation of the Total

Force concept, and the establishment of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Recruiting high school graduates and adequately paying them built an Army of high-quality people.

TRADOC yielded great dividends. First-rate training programs, as symbolized by the National Training Center at Fort Irwin in California, and a renewed emphasis on PME helped produce combat leaders who had studied

war and were well prepared when called to action. Those officers responded

magnificently in Panama and in the gulf with campaign plans that produced

quick victories with few casualties. Although less prone to white papers than

other services, the Army is indeed undergoing fundamental change as it becomes “A Strategic Force for the 21st Century.” The Army is coming home; it

30 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
will be primarily based in the United States rather than forward deployed as

in the Cold War. Substantial force reductions have led to inactivating 4 divisions and 1 corps along with consolidating 51 war reserve stocks to 5.

As all the services reorganize for the post–Cold War era, each understands that most future operations will be joint or multiservice. This view

was underscored in 1991 by Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S.

Armed Forces. That document and the related effort to develop joint doctrinal publications will help the services to work more closely together in

a period of declining budgets and force structure. Leading thinkers in each

service can offer their creative talents toward integrating the disparate

ways the military thinks about employing forces. The publication in 1993

of the first issue of Joint Force Quarterly was another tangible indication

that jointness had finally come of age.

While the services were busy adjusting to the changed political circumstances in the world, the Chairman was also busy reviewing defense

policy. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, General Powell issued a report on roles, missions, and functions of the services in 1993. Two

considerations dominated the report: improving the way the Armed Forces

fight, and saving money in the process.7 The report noted the dramatic

changes that have taken place already: the creation of Strategic Command,

the elimination of nuclear weapons in the Army and the Marine Corps, and

the end of the need to maintain chemical weapons brought about by the

signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention in January 1993. The report

also highlighted savings from further consolidation among the services of

depot maintenance and flight training.

Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in March

1993, General Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, described the

roles and missions report as “simply a snapshot of a continuous process of

self-evaluation that occurs every day. The Joint Staff will continue to examine other areas for possible consolidation or elimination.”8 The Joint

Staff will soon get more help. The DOD Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1994 included a provision calling for the establishment of a commission

on roles and missions of the Armed Forces. It will have seven members appointed by the Secretary of Defense and will issue a report within a year of

its first meeting.

Jointness in the Post–Cold War Era

In September 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin reported the results of the long-awaited Bottom-Up Review. The review envisions a force

TAKING STOCK OF THE NEW JOINT ERA 31
that is smaller than the Base Force, and appears to cost 10 percent less, designed to fight two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously. Overall

active duty strength will decline from 1.6 million to 1.4 million. The force

level will allow for the permanent stationing of 100,000 military personnel

in Europe and 98,000 in the Pacific. To bolster the capability of a smaller

force, the Pentagon plans to add airlift and sealift, preposition Army

equipment in both the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia, develop and procure more precision guided weapons (especially antitank munitions), and

improve Reserve component forces.

If truth be told, I have serious reservations about the Bottom-Up

Review. Peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and other peacetime contingencies have increased dramatically in the brief period since

the end of the Cold War. Such operations impinge on the military’s ability

to carry out the national military strategy to fight two major regional conflicts. In addition, I question that the force described in the review can

fight two regional conflicts even if all U.S. involvement in peacekeeping

operations was terminated; the overall force is too small. The Bottom-Up

force is underfunded, overstretched, and verging on hollowness while a

declining defense budget pays for nondefense functions such as industrial

conversion, drug interdiction, and environmental cleanup.

As the size of the force decreases, so does our margin of error. As a

result, the requirement for greater jointness increases as a way to compensate for smaller forces. This growth in jointness takes two forms: greater

cooperation in the field and fleet among each service’s respective combat

forces, and greater attention to matters that concern two or more services

in the planning, research, and development phases of the acquisition

process. The former is the primary responsibility of the CINCs and the latter that of the Joint Chiefs working with the services. Airlift, prepositioning, sealift; command, control, communications, and intelligence; and

space, ballistic missile defense, and advanced munitions are just some of

the cross-cutting issues that must be addressed from a joint perspective

early in planning and research and development.

Atlantic Command

The return of units formerly deployed overseas to bases in this country means that a larger and more important segment of the overall defense

establishment will be stationed at home. Except for those forces attached to

Pacific Command, all other forces in the United States now come under U.S.

Atlantic Command (ACOM), which was established on October 1, 1993.

32 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
This was recommended in the Chairman’s 1992 “Report on Roles,

Missions, and Functions of Armed Forces of the United States” and is the

fourth such effort. There was Strike Command in 1961, Readiness Command in 1971, and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in 1980 (which

is now Central Command). While service parochialism undermined the first

two efforts, ACOM should succeed for two reasons: first, Goldwater-Nichols

gave unified commanders authority over component commanders that they

previously lacked, and, second, since 1986—especially after the Gulf War—

jointness has not only become fashionable but has also proven itself.

Joint Exercises

Prominent among the activities of the trend toward greater jointness are training exercises. ACOM is charged with the joint training of

forces based in the United States. Reductions in forces stationed abroad

make it crucial that the forces that reinforce regional commanders arrive

fully capable of operating as a joint team. The services had 5 months to

prepare for the Gulf War, and we must assume that any potential opponent learned from that experience not to give the American military time

to prepare for combat.

This is not an easy matter to work out. Service expertise comes first.

Service personnel—both officer and enlisted alike—must first become

skilled as soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. Service skills progress

from the individual to the unit. Much time, effort, and training is needed

to become combat ready, be it an infantry battalion, ship, or fighter

squadron. Finding time for both service and joint training is difficult. Balancing service and joint needs may require emphasis on service training

with field exercises and joint training with computer-aided staff exercises.

Advanced simulation technologies now exist that allow service and joint

staffs to participate in staff exercises from remote locations. This will result in improved joint interoperability.

There is still a requirement to conduct field exercises for forces that

normally do not work together: Army armor units supporting Marine

Corps infantry units, naval gunfire supporting Army forces, Air Force

tankers refueling Navy fighters, Army helicopters working with Navy

ships, and Navy attack aircraft providing close air support to Army and

Marine Corps units. These are just some of the activities that require joint

training exercises among the services.

At the same time, regional unified commands must also conduct

joint training exercises in theater. And forces deployed from the United

TAKING STOCK OF THE NEW JOINT ERA 33
States in the future will have to be well grounded in joint warfare fundamentals and better prepared to conduct combat operations on arrival in

theater. If we fail to train in peacetime, we will have to learn in wartime at

the high price of American lives.

Joint Doctrine, Training, and Education

Each service has come to understand the importance of doctrine, the

prescribed procedures and fundamental principles for conducting combat

operations. The Army established TRADOC 21 years ago. In 1993 the

Navy and the Air Force established doctrine centers at Norfolk Naval Base

and Langley Air Force Base, respectively.

As the importance of joint training increases in the post–Cold War

era, so does that of joint doctrine. The newly established Joint Warfighting Center (JWC) will promote both joint doctrine and training. It consolidates activities of the Joint Warfare Center at Hurlburt Field, Florida,

and the Joint Doctrine Center (JDC) already in Norfolk. Situated at Fort

Monroe, Virginia, JWC is responsible to the Chairman through J–7 (Operational Plans and Interoperability). ACOM will also play an important

role in evaluating, testing, and sequencing the development of joint doctrine by working closely with JWC.

Yet if current efforts to improve joint training and doctrine are to be

institutionalized and have a permanent impact, more needs to be done. At

present, JDC reviews recommendations for joint doctrine but does not

formulate it. The time has come to increase the stature and responsibility

of JDC by remaking it into a Joint Doctrine Command with a major role

in formulating doctrine.

Careful consideration must also be given to where JWC is located in

the Norfolk area. JDC is already there, as are TRADOC and the Naval Doctrine Command, ACOM, and AFSC, while the Air Force Doctrine Center

is nearby at Langley Air Force Base.

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President of the National

Defense University need to focus attention on the role of AFSC in this

whole effort toward greater jointness. The purpose of the college is to prepare students for immediate assignment to the unified commands or to the

Joint Staff. AFSC is intended to be a hands-on school, teaching students to

cope with the kinds of problems faced in joint assignments. The absence of

adequate wargaming facilities hinders AFSC in accomplishing its mission.

Placing JWC at the college would resolve this inadequacy. At the same time,

34 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
AFSC offers JWC a source of expertise for evaluating and developing joint

doctrine. Such a move would have a mutually reinforcing effect.

In 1923 Major George C. Marshall, the future Army Chief of Staff, described the regular cycle in the doing and undoing of measures for the national defense. He noted in a speech to the Military Schools and Colleges Association that “we start in the making of adequate provisions and then turn

abruptly in the opposite direction and abolish what has just been done.”

Today, we are in the midst of making one of those changes in direction.

World conditions have changed. Both forces and defense budgets

should be reduced. But President Clinton remarked at West Point in May

1993 that while “[defense] budget cuts . . . at the end of the Cold War were

necessary ... there is a limit beyond which we must not go.”9 He underscored that concern in an interview on the same occasion indicating that

he wanted “to send a cautionary note to the House and Senate... that we

have cut all we should right now.”10

The challenge now is to reduce the size of our military without putting our national security at risk. There are still threats to American interests in the world that cannot be ignored. Military power still counts in the

late 20th century and will in the 21st as well. The United States must maintain a ready, modern, and sufficiently powerful military to meet any contingency. As the military gets smaller, the necessity for the services to fight

as an integrated force increases.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower got it right more than 30 years ago

when he observed in a message to Congress that:

Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we

should be involved in war, we will fight in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparation and organizational activity must conform to this fact.

Those thoughts of a former President and five-star general should

guide both civilian and military leaders responsible for shaping the Armed

Forces of today for the missions of tomorrow.

Notes1 Panel members included Joseph E. Brennan, George Darden, Jack Davis, Jon Kyl, Solomon P.

Ortiz, Owen B. Pickett, John G. Rowland, and Ike Skelton (Chairman).

2 John M. Collins, “National Military Strategy, the DOD Base Force, and U.S. Unified Command Plan: An Assessment,” Congressional Research Service report 92–493S (Washington, DC: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, June 11, 1992).

3 Colin L. Powell, “The Base Force: A Total Force,” presentation to the Senate Appropriations

Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, September 25, 1991.

TAKING STOCK OF THE NEW JOINT ERA 35
4 Department of the Air Force, “The Air Force and U.S. National Security Policy: Global

Reach—Global Power” (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, June 1990). 5 Department of the Navy, “. . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century”

(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, September 1992), 12. 6 Ibid., 2.

7 Colin L. Powell, “Report on the Roles, Mission, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the

United States” (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1993). 8 Colin L. Powell, statement before the House Armed Services Committee, February 1993, 10. 9 Bill Clinton, remarks at the U.S. Military Academy commencement ceremony, New York

(May 23, 1993), in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 29, no. 22 (June 7, 1993), 997. 10 The Washington Times, May 30, 1993, A6.

36 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS

Page 36—Chapter 4 follows
Chapter 4

Inspiring Soldiers to Do

Better Than Their Best

Generally speaking, human beings have untapped reserves of

courage and perseverance. Sooner or later, everyone taps these reserves when illness, death, or life’s other trials and tribulations

strike. But the pressures on warriors and military leaders are infinitely

more demanding than on most individuals. To them, survival is incidental to mission accomplishment. Military leaders not only carry the burden

of making competent military decisions in what Carl von Clausewitz described as the “fog of war,” but they also must bear moral responsibility for

their soldiers’ lives. Commanders must carry intense physical and emotional burdens at the same time that they are trying to master their craft

intellectually. Conducting war is a craft, not a science, because nothing is

as intensely human or unpredictable. An analogy in civilian life is the

physician who spends many years undergoing academic training and education but, in the end, is confronted with a living, breathing human being

to heal, not a sterile laboratory experiment.

Most people possess a normal level of courage and resolution, which

is further developed in soldiers through effective indoctrination accompanied by tough, rigorous physical and intellectual training. It is the military

leader’s task to capitalize on this training and lead soldiers past the normal

point of human endurance and bravery systematically. Such leadership examples are more common than one might think; Nelson at Trafalgar,

Napoleon at Austerlitz, Stonewall Jackson at Shenandoah, or Slim in

Burma during World War II are just a few famous examples.

At the Line of Contact 

Let us focus instead on several commanders in less well-known situations. In these circumstances, the intellectual leader’s ability, exertion,

37

This chapter was previously published in Military Review (January–February 1996).
inspiration, or capacity to function under stress enabled soldiers to perform far beyond the point where a less-inspired commander would have

taken them. Such leadership takes place at the immediate line of contact,

where the fighting is the fiercest. It also takes place at intermediate levels

of command, where the commander is very visible but is not necessarily

wielding a sword, musket, rifle, or grenade launcher. Finally, it can be

found at the overarching level of high command, where senior officers’ vision, tone, or creativity often can lead to spectacular results in cases where

more pedestrian leadership would accomplish far less. This chapter examines some examples of each to instruct and inspire.

The Civil War

At times, leadership on the firing line does not inspire men to use

greater energy and dynamism, but rather restrains man’s natural tendency

to give way to fear under fire. Giving in to fear isolates the soldier mentally

and erodes the organization as a cohesive unit.

Consider the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1–3, 1863, which allows us to

focus on a “true man of iron”—Brigadier General Andrew A. Humphreys,

2d Division commander, III Corps, Army of the Potomac, on the pivotal

day of battle.1 During the battle’s second day, Major General Daniel Sickles, III Corps commander, unwisely pushed his corps too far forward from

the front lines of the Army of the Potomac. Sickles’ order created a salient

dangerously vulnerable to a Confederate Army flank attack. When the

Confederate assault came, Humphreys was ordered to pull his 4,000-man

division back nearly a mile, under fire, to avoid being totally isolated and

destroyed. Under enormous pressure from both front and flanks, he executed this desperate task. On horseback (one horse was killed under him)

and in full view of both his and the enemy’s soldiers, he rode up and down

the entire 1,000-yard division line, systematically ordering units to fire and

then slowly retreat. Some units successfully executed this dangerous and

complicated maneuver more than 20 times.

“Humphreys himself, according to one of his colonels, stayed at the

most exposed positions in the extreme front, giving personal attention to

all the movements of the division.”2 He had good brigade and regimental commanders under him, but action accounts clearly attest to

Humphreys’ personal control of the battle. He not only inspired his men

to keep fighting, but by his calmness and control, he kept an orderly retreat from turning into a rout. In an hour, 1,500 of Humphreys’ men

were killed or wounded, but the division stayed intact and ready to fight

when it completed its withdrawal.

38 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
Humphreys, a class of 1831 U.S. Military Academy graduate, was

older than most of his peers. He was fiery of speech, a meticulous dresser,

and exhibited a “personal fondness for battle.” After the Gettysburg battle,

he was assigned as General George G. Meade’s chief of staff. While no

doubt regretting the loss of his combat division, Humphreys brought the

same personal attention to detail and control to Union Army staff operations as he did to 2d Division command. At war’s end, he commanded II

Corps, replacing the legendary Major General Winfield S. Hancock, who

had suffered multiple wounds. Under Humphreys, II Corps never missed

a step, enjoying leadership no less capable than Hancock’s during the final

6 months of the war.3

World War II

Even in modern warfare, the presence of general officers at the right

time and place can provide a spark plug for success. On June 9, 1944, 3

days after D–Day, then Major General Matthew B. Ridgway’s 82d Airborne

Division launched a frontal attack across a narrow causeway bridging the

Merderet River in Normandy.4 With no maneuver room, the attack stalled

under intense German fire. U.S. vehicles and equipment blocked the

causeway, and hundreds of U.S. paratroopers—dead, wounded, or paralyzed by fear and indecision—lay alongside the road.

“In the midst of this slaughter, Ridgway appeared on the causeway

carrying his .30.06 rifle.”5 Ridgway, with his assistant division, regimental,

and battalion commanders, reversed the flow of men away from the attack

and across the causeway by exhortation, shouting, and physical coercion,

but most of all, by example. Ridgway personally attached a towing cable to

a disabled U.S. tank and, with the help of several soldiers, cleared a passage

through the wreckage. Led by other senior officers, the airborne soldiers finally fought their way down the causeway and across the river.

Action accounts leave no doubt that Ridgway’s personal example and

intervention saved the day and enabled those present to do “better than

their best.” His presence and bearing, amid confusion and paralysis, is as

good an example of courageous battlefield leadership as can be imagined.

This command ability led him to World War II corps command, U.S.

Eighth Army command, U.S. and United Nations (UN) Korean War forces’

command and, finally, to assignment as the U.S. Army chief of staff.

The Korean War

UN forces, primarily American and South Korean, reached the Yalu

River border between North Korea and China at two locations in late

INSPIRING SOLDIERS TO DO BETTER 39
November 1950, shortly before a massive and undetected Chinese communist force drove into the overextended UN front, inflicting one of the

most disastrous defeats in U.S. military history. One advance to the Yalu

was led by 21-year-old Army Second Lieutenant Robert C. Kingston, a K

Company platoon leader, 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division.6 On November 21, with his battalion thinly spread and

isolated 32 miles south of the Yalu, Kingston was ordered to move 10

miles north to a small town. A small force of antiaircraft artillery (AAA)

and machine guns, led by a first lieutenant, was added to Kingston’s 33-

man platoon. Because the AAA unit supported him, Kingston retained

command, even though the AAA leader outranked him. In brutal

weather, varying from 20 to 40 degrees below zero, this small force advanced as ordered. The next day, Kingston was ordered forward another

22 miles—his objective, the Yalu.

For 3 days, Kingston’s force was unable to go the distance, due to terrain, weather, and communist resistance. By this time, Kingston’s command included an engineer platoon, led by a first lieutenant; an artillery

forward observer first lieutenant; a tactical air control captain; and a heavy

mortar platoon, also led by a captain. The next day, a rifle company and

artillery battery—both commanded by captains—reinforced “Task Force

(TF) KINGSTON.”

Although the rifle company commander at first “assumed command,” it became quickly apparent that Kingston was in control. Within

hours, the captain told Kingston to command and that he, the captain,

would follow orders. By then, a major had also joined the task force, although his function remains unclear. Kingston’s force fought forward,

reached the Yalu and cleared a village on the riverbanks. Kingston himself

neutralized a house controlled by five Chinese defenders.

Within 2 days, along with the entire UN force, TF KINGSTON was

forced to retreat. All it left behind were a few lines in an official report and

“the personal triumph of a 21-year-old second lieutenant.” A combined

arms force, which under normal circumstances would be commanded by

a major or lieutenant colonel, had crystallized around the natural leadership of a young man who, by civilian standards, would have been considered too inexperienced for all but the most basic tasks. It is not surprising

that Kingston retired as a full general after serving two Vietnam combat

tours, working with the British Army Parachute Regiment in Malaya and

serving as the first commander in chief, U.S. Army Central Command.

40 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
Vietnam

Sometimes, a battlefield leader can do so much that it is virtually impossible to encompass it all in a short narrative. Such was the case of U.S.

Marine Corps Captain Jay R. Vargas, who commanded G Company, 2d

Battalion, 4th Marines, 3d Marine Division, near the demilitarized zone in

northern South Vietnam.7 From April 30 to May 3, 1968, Vargas led his

company in extraordinarily fierce combat against North Vietnamese

troops in the vicinity of Dai Do village. He maneuvered his company

under extremely heavy fire in offensive and defensive actions; personally

led an assault on Dai Do, killing several enemy troops; and calmed a nearhysterical, less-experienced fellow company commander over the radio,

which allowed his fellow commander to collect himself and resume effective command. While constantly under fire, Vargas personally resupplied

his marines with ammunition. He was wounded three times but concealed

his wounds to avoid evacuation.

Vargas, self-confident but without a touch of arrogance, was awarded

the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions. He provides a living example of a remark by former Marine infantry officer, now-retired

Brigadier General Thomas V. Draude, that “the kindest and gentlest are

also the bravest.”8

Intermediate Command

Several historical examples follow, illustrating how active senior

commanders, making decisions within range of enemy weapons, made the

difference between complete victory and catastrophic defeat.

Waterloo

British Field Marshal Wellington’s Waterloo command is particularly

notable because he commanded a coalition, of which fewer than half the

68,000 soldiers were British. The other troops were primarily Dutch, Belgian, and German.9

The battle seesawed so frequently that only select examples of

Wellington’s on-the-spot command decisions can be provided. When

Napoleon’s French troops threatened to overwhelm the stone farmhouse

at Hougoumont, Belgium, Wellington committed tactical reserves at the

precise time to prevent the collapse of this crucial anchor to the allied

right. A few hours later, when 18,000 French infantrymen came close to

breaking the allied center, Wellington ordered two British infantry

brigades forward to repel them. He personally directed British cavalry to

charge the unbroken, advancing French infantry after the British “thin red

INSPIRING SOLDIERS TO DO BETTER 41
line” had checked the initial French rush. Although it was dubious, even in

1815, to assume that cavalry could defeat infantry in good order, Wellington’s calculation was correct—the French broke.

After this, it was the British and their allies’ turn to hold against incessant French cavalry attacks.

The French cavalry advancing in thick waves of regiments, some of

which charged as many as 12 times that afternoon, boiled against and

around the British squares, threatening the integrity of the line, which

in places and at times was actually penetrated. Wellington was here,

there, and everywhere. Occasionally, he popped into a square—the

men opening ranks to let him in—and sat the charge out, uttering

brief words of encouragement the while.10

In the last chapter of the battle, Napoleon’s Imperial Guard—the

never-defeated elite arm of the French army—attacked in one last spasmodic attempt to crush Wellington’s exhausted troops. Wellington rode

along the battle line to reposition troops and steel them for the onslaught.

He ordered his leading units to open fire. Then, as the French recoiled

from their last, failed attack, he ordered the allies to pursue the beaten

French. The general assessment, 180 years later, is in accord with his own

remark, made one day after the battle: “By God, I don’t think it would have

done if I had not been there!’’11

The Civil War

Leadership at its best can result when a determined and morally courageous commander imposes his iron will on a battlefield where the issue is in

doubt and the results are far from clear. On May 7, 1864, after 2 days of ferocious and indecisive fighting, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant’s Army

of the Potomac faced General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in

the Wilderness, just south of the Rappahannock River.12 Union casualties

during those 2 terrible days totalled almost 18,000; Confederate dead or

wounded numbered roughly 12,000.13 Neither side held a positional advantage over the other when the fighting died down.

Over 3 years, the Army of the Potomac had grown numb to lost victories caused by weak, indecisive, and inexperienced commanders. Examples of the Army’s leadership problems include Brigadier General Irvin

McDowell at First Manassas (1861); General George B. McClellan during

the Seven Days (1862) and Antietam (1862); and Major General Joseph

“Fighting Joe” Hooker at Chancellorsville (1863). Hooker gave in to his

fears and led the Army of the Potomac back across the Rappahannock after

42 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
being confounded and intimidated by Generals Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson and Lee. In May 1864, Union soldiers no doubt felt that the army

would retreat as usual after being thrashed again by Lee’s veterans.

Yet on the night of May 7, 1864, Grant’s headquarters ordered the

Army of the Potomac to move.14 The direction was not immediately obvious to the rank and file. However, it would have been had they known that

Grant had already informed President Abraham Lincoln that he intended

to fight on the Wilderness line 

if it took all summer. . . . The road was crowded, and nobody could see

much, but as the men trudged along it suddenly came to them that

this march was different. Just then there was a crowding at the edge of

the road, and mounted aides were ordering: ‘Give way to the right!’

and a little cavalcade came riding by at an easy jingling trot—and

there, just recognizable, was Grant riding in the lead, his staff following him, heading south. . . . The Army had known dramatic moments

of inspiration in the past—massed flags and many bugles and broad

blue ranks spread out in the sunlight, with leadership bearing a drawn

sword and riding a prancing horse, and it had been grand and stirring. Now there was nothing more than a bent shadow in the night, a

stoop-shouldered man saying nothing to anyone, methodically making his way to the head of the column—and all of a moment the tired

column came alive, and a wild cheer broke the night and men tossed

their caps in the darkness. They had had their fill of desperate fighting, and this pitiless little man was leading them into nothing except

more fighting, and probably there would be no end to it, but at least

he was not leading them back in sullen acceptance of defeat, and

somewhere, many miles ahead, there would be victory for those who

lived to see it.15

When Grant skirted the Confederate lines and marched south, Lee

had to follow to avoid being flanked and having his lines of communications cut. From that moment, the Army of Northern Virginia was on the

strategic defensive, pressed remorselessly by Grant. Confederate Lieutenant General James Longstreet said of the Union leader, his West Point

classmate, he “would fight [the Confederacy] every day and every hour to

the end of the war.” The Army of the Potomac won the Battle of the

Wilderness because Grant refused to take counsel of his fears and uncertainties and commanded his forces accordingly.

INSPIRING SOLDIERS TO DO BETTER 43
High Command

There are few better illustrations of how a supreme commander’s

single-minded determination and professional competence can make a

difference—regardless of separation from his fighting soldiers by distance—than the following examples from World War I.

History has not been kind to General (later Marshal) Joseph Joffre,

the French army commander in chief during the first 2 years of World War

I.16 Conventional historiography has held that he was a dullard. Yet a close

examination of Joffre’s command of the 2-million-man French army during the first several weeks of World War I—August to early September

1914—demonstrates a tenacity, moral strength, and clarity of vision that

look even better as time goes by.

As the German juggernaut drove through Belgium and northern

France in August 1914 and the French army recoiled from its ill-conceived

Plan 17 offensives against the tactically and operationally superior Germans, Joffre remained imperturbable. His forces had been forced on the

defensive, yet they had not been routed and, in most instances, had retreated in good order. Joffre assembled strategic reserves from the AlsaceLorraine front, where the Germans had only conducted demonstration attacks. He moved these reserves to a line along the Marne River, just north

of Paris, for a possible counterstroke. There, he ruthlessly sacked army,

corps, and division commanders who failed to measure up under the

super-human strain of keeping a retreat from turning into a total collapse.

At the same time, his German counterpart, Field Marshal Helmuth

von Moltke, was suffering a crisis of confidence due to the stress of commanding the world’s first modern industrial war:

Thus the battle of France, absorbing the last energies of exhausted

armies, was still smouldering slowly away without a decision on the

battlefield. Perhaps the real, and... the most dangerous competition

was taking place in the two generals’ headquarters, between Joffre, that

huge, ruthless, self-confident, perhaps complacent man, and von

Moltke, visibly prostrate with worry, with his almost hallucinatory

awareness of all the moral and general issues at stake.17

It mattered nothing now, in this crude business of leadership in war,

that Joffre was an intellectual pigmy. Men trembled when his great

nostrils flared and his eyes blazed with fury; and this engine that had

kept the French going through catastrophe, was keeping them going

44 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
now. Equally it mattered nothing that von Moltke had a first-class intelligence and a brilliant staff record; he could no longer control his

army because he had lost control of himself.18

When Joffre launched the French army and the small British Expeditionary Force in a counterstroke against the Germans in early September,

the odds were still very even. The French had sustained hundreds of thousands of casualties—many more than the Germans—and were on the defensive everywhere. The Germans were equally exhausted from battle and

pursuit but still retained the initiative. Yet when the French counterattacked, “an unjustifiable failure of nerve and resolution on the part of

the German command,” flowing more than anything else from von

Moltke’s inadequacies, led to a German withdrawal. Like Grant in 1864,

Joffre refused to admit defeat and so drove his armies to victory.

A supreme theater of operations commander can also extract superior performance from his men and units through bold and innovative

operational planning and forceful execution of such plans. This happened

with British Field Marshal Sir Edmund Allenby’s final offensive against

the Turkish army in Palestine during September and October 1918, the

last of a series of operational offensives that ultimately drove Turkey out

of World War I.19

In the summer of 1918, British forces in Palestine possessed overwhelming superiority in infantry, horse cavalry (still very useful and effective as a mobile desert warfare arm), and artillery. Allenby’s initial plan for

a fall offensive against the Turks was conservative. In the plan, infantry divisions would penetrate the Turkish lines; then cavalry would pass through

the gap leading to a comparatively short-range pursuit of the withdrawing

Turks. A similar plan was proposed earlier by South African Lieutenant

General Jans C. Smuts, representative of the British government and the

Allied Supreme War Council, when he visited Allenby’s headquarters in

Palestine in early 1918.

However, by late August 1918, Allenby scrapped the conservative

concept and developed a bold, decisive plan to strike against the Turks in

Palestine. British forces would smash a deep, wide hole in the Turkish front

with infantry divisions, then three cavalry divisions would be unleashed

into a wide-ranging pursuit deep into the Turkish rear. The operational intent of this attack was to block almost all avenues of retreat for the Turks.

It involved the cavalry breaking free of its supply trains and living off the

land and demanded considerable powers of marching in extraordinarily

hot weather by the entire force.

INSPIRING SOLDIERS TO DO BETTER 45
Beginning September 20, 1918, this bold scheme worked brilliantly—

the Turkish front line was nearly annihilated. Three of Allenby’s cavalry divisions began a pursuit that, in 5 weeks, took the British force nearly 350

miles from the vicinity of Jerusalem to Aleppo in southern Turkey. The cavalry sustained only 650 casualties and captured nearly 75,000 Ottoman

prisoners. Allenby’s British, Australian, and New Zealand troops rose to the

occasion admirably. The British official campaign historian, writing later in

a private capacity, said of the first, more conservative plan: “It was a sound

enough scheme, but not a bold one, and it would have not led to the destruction of the Turkish armies.”20 In this case, the soldiers’ best was beyond

what they would have otherwise achieved due to the originality of their

supreme commander’s bold plan and his willingness to sacrifice security

and take risks to maximize his advantages.

Inspiring Soldiers

Much can be said about battlefield leadership—based on these examples—that has enabled men to do “better than their best.”

Professional Military Competence

Clearly, good leaders must be professionally competent in understanding the armed forces at their disposal and how to employ them best.

But professional military competence is a matter of character as well as intellectual ability. One dimension of professional competence is that leaders

must be able to do all this amid incredible moral, physical, and emotional

pressure and nagging uncertainty. Doing well at employing combined

arms on the exercise tables at the staff colleges is not enough. A good

leader must take into account the raw realities of battle, such as lack of

sleep, extreme temperatures, food shortages, disease, death, and imperfect

knowledge of enemy strategies and conditions. This is where iron will,

force of character, and self-confidence under stress play decisive roles. It

also illustrates why the increasing sophistication of the U.S. military training centers and facilities, which can replicate at least some of these stresses

during exercises, have done so much to improve the battle command and

combat capability of our forces and their leaders.

Overcoming Fear

Leadership most often involves keeping men from doing what is natural as much as it involves inspiring them to superhuman feats. Fear is

always present in battle, and most know their comrades are afraid. Upon

reflection, they know their commanders are afraid too. But if soldiers see

46 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
their commanders acting as if they know no fear and deciding with confidence what must be done, they will be motivated to stifle their own natural impulses toward fear and maximize their impulses toward acting

courageously in the face of danger. In other words, good leaders:

■ lead by doing. While those disposed to make decisions will sometimes be wrong, indecision in command is almost always fatal. All

leaders cited in this chapter were intellectually active and never hesitated to make decisions and carry them out. They only changed a

course of action when the situation demanded it.

■ take risks. Some of these risks are physical and threaten the commander’s own life and limb, as in most examples cited. Other risks

are taken in a quiet office or a warm, dry bed, which may be more

commodious than the average soldier’s pack and bedroll.

Frequently, the risks taken by high commanders can impose much

more terrible and exhausting strain than those taken by junior combat

leaders. The former have thousands of lives in their hands; the latter, comparatively few. The weight of responsibility always falls on the man at the

top—thus the familiar line of German Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg

about the 1914 Battle of Tannenberg, when the Imperial German army utterly defeated strong Russian forces. Hindenburg, who commanded the victorious German Eighth Army in the battle said, “I do not know who won

the battle of Tannenberg, but I know who would have lost it.”

So I return to my first point about willpower, endurance, and character. There is no reason to think the profession of arms attracts men and

women any less intelligent than those who pursue any other field of endeavor. But intelligence, and the professional competence that it can generate, must be exercised in a maelstrom of stress, confusion, and emotion,

for which there is no analogy anywhere else in human experience. When

this happens, the leader who can clarify the situation through his own resolution and impose order on disorder by the sheer willpower of his actions

will be the leader who can obtain “better than the best” from his soldiers.

It is this margin of effort that can make the difference between victory and

defeat on the battlefield.

Notes1 Most discussion of Brigadier General Humphreys is from Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, 2d ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), 123–124,

411–424; and Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), 135–136, 347–380. 2 Ibid., 413.

INSPIRING SOLDIERS TO DO BETTER 47
3 Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders (Baton Rouge: University of

Louisiana Press, 1964), 240–242. 4 Clay Blair, Ridgway’s Paratroopers: The American Airborne in World War II (New York: Quill

Books, 1985), 266–279. 5 Ibid., 275.

6 Martin Blumenson, “Task Force Kingston,” Army (April 1964), 50–60. 7 Keith W. Nolan, The Magnificent Bastards: The Joint Army-Marine Defense of Dong Ha, 1968

(Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994); William Weise, “Memories of Dai Do,” Marine Corps Gazette (September 1987), 42–55; unpublished “Narrative Description of Gallant Conduct” prepared in support of

Medal of Honor citation for Captain Jay Vargas, in Robert Goldich’s possession; and personal discussion and observation of then Lieutenant Colonel Vargas when he and Goldich attended the same National War College class, 1981–1982. 8 Remark made to the author sometime during 1991–1992. 9 The literature on Waterloo is enormous. This section is based primarily on Elizabeth Longford,

Wellington: The Years of the Sword (New York: Harper and Row, Co., 1969), 446–491; and David Howarth,

“Waterloo: Wellington’s Eye for the Ground,” John Keegan, “Under Fire: Wellington at Waterloo,” and

Correlli Barnett, “Playing into His Hands: Bonaparte’s Mistakes,” in Wellington Commander: The Iron

Duke’s Generalship, ed. Pady Griffith (Strettington, UK: Antony Bird Publications Ltd., in association

with the Wellington Museum, 1983), 91–138. 10 Keegan, 122. 11 Longford, 490. 12 Bruce Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1953), 90–92. 13 R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C.

to the Present (New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1970), 892. 14 Catton, 91–92.

15 Ibid.

16 Correlli Barnett, The Swordbearers: Supreme Command in the First World War (New York:

William Morrow and Co., Inc, 1964), 35–96; and Cyril Falls, The Great War, 1914–1918 (New York:

Capricorn Books, 1959), 37, 49–50, 63–73. 17 Barnett, The Swordbearers, 85. 18 Ibid.

19 Cyril Falls, Armageddon: 1918, 2d ed. (Annapolis, MD: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing

Company of America, 1979). 20 Ibid., 35.

48 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS

Page 48—Chapter 5 follows
Chapter 5

The Constitutional Role of

Congress: Lessons in

Unpreparedness

Congress is responsible for ensuring the Armed Forces are prepared to

preserve and protect the U.S. security. The key phrase in this statement is Congress is responsible. Under the Constitution, Article I, Section 8, it is the duty of Congress, not the President—let alone the secretary

of defense or the joint chiefs of staff—to determine the size and composition of our Armed Forces. Article I, Section 8, assigns to Congress the power

“To raise and support armies . . . provide and maintain a navy; [and] make

rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.”1

Therefore, it falls to Congress to ensure our military strength is adequate to defend the Nation and national interests. Indeed, there is no more

important duty for Congress than to provide for the common defense. We

have a duty to our fellow citizens today and to future generations of Americans. We must not squander, through shortsightedness and neglect, the

sacrifices that generations before us have made to secure the peace and security with which we are blessed. We must pass on the legacy of peace,

prosperity, and freedom bequeathed to us. Congress, therefore, is ultimately responsible for approving a strategy to guide U.S. military policy

and, above all, to establish a proper balance between national strategy and

resources available.

Shaping Military Strategy

Historically, Congress has often failed in this responsibility. Since the

end of the Cold War, many commentators have noted how badly the Nation has handled the aftermath of major 20th-century conflicts. Following

49

This chapter originally appeared in Military Review (July–August 1997) and was based on three

speeches given by Rep. Skelton to the 105th Congress.
World Wars I and II, Korea, and again after Vietnam, we allowed military

forces to deteriorate to a degree that cost us dearly in subsequent conflicts.

A speech made in 1923 by Army Major George C. Marshall decried a

similar pattern of failure even earlier in our history. Marshall, of course,

later became this century’s most distinguished American soldier and

statesman as Army chief of staff during World War II, secretary of state in

the early Cold War years, and secretary of defense during the Korean conflict. “[F]rom the earliest days of this country,” Marshall said “[the Regular

Army] was materially increased in strength and drastically reduced with

somewhat monotonous regularity.”2 Marshall felt it was perhaps understandable that there should be a reduction in the size of the military following a war, but the pattern was not quite so simple. Often, following a

war, the Active Army size increased above what it had been before the conflict. Then within a few years—or even within a few months—it decreased

below the prewar level. Marshall explained:

It appears, that when the war was over every American’s thoughts

were centered on the tragedies involved in the lessons just

learned. . . . So the Congress, strongly backed by public opinion, determined that we should be adequately prepared for the future, and

accordingly enacted a law well devised for this express purpose. However, in a few months, the public mind ran away from the tragedies of

the war and the reasons therefore and became obsessed with the magnitude of the public debt and the problem of its reduction. Forgetting

almost immediately the bitter lesson of unpreparedness, they demanded and secured the reduction of the Army, which their representatives had so recently increased for very evident reasons.3

This pattern was seen at the turn of the century, after the Nation had

just won a short, popular war against Spain. The pattern was repeated in

1917 where Marshall recalled seeing U.S. soldiers in France marching

through the ice and snow “without shoes and with their feet wrapped in

gunny-sacks”—Valley Forge all over again.4 Yet in 1923, the public had already forgotten the lessons of that war and the cost of unpreparedness.

Support for military expenditures quickly dissolved. Less than 20 years

later, the United States was engaged in an even more destructive global

war, for which we were, again, terribly unprepared.

Today, after the successful conclusion of the Cold War, we are well on

our way to repeating the same mistake of denuding ourselves militarily.

Today’s world is no less turbulent or dangerous than it was during the

Cold War. Regional threats, along with rising terrorism and the possibility

50 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons proliferation, should cause us

to keep up our guard.

What Is the Enemy?

I am frequently challenged by a question that has surely echoed before: “What is the enemy?” That question raises many others. Why continue to support more spending for defense when the Cold War is over?

Why plan for two major regional contingencies (MRCs) when a second

threat did not materialize during the Persian Gulf War? Why continue to

pursue expensive new advanced weapons when U.S. technology was so

dominant in Operation Desert Storm and when no other nation is spending nearly what we do on military hardware? Why keep a robust force

structure and a fair-size personnel level?

There are no clear and simple answers. Indeed, there were no clear

and simple answers in 1923. Any attempt to see into the future is like looking into a kaleidoscope. New patterns are constantly emerging; the only

constant is that the colors will remain the same. In viewing the future of

international affairs, we cannot foresee a “new world shape,” but we know

the colors are those of the human condition, including the character traits

and circumstances that lead men to war. The need to prepare for conflict

has not diminished merely because an era of conflict with a particular foe

has ended and a new era, of yet uncertain pattern, has emerged.

“What is the enemy?” I must honestly say there is no precise answer.

However, Congress will fail in its constitutional responsibilities if, once

again, it allows the Armed Forces to become unprepared. In fact, for two

reasons, a failure to support a strong military today would be even more

unfortunate, and more unforgivable, than in the past. First, the United

States is the only nation able to protect the peace. In the past, we were fortunate that our allies were able, often by the narrowest of margins, to hold

the line while we belatedly prepared for war. Otto von Bismarck once said,

“God protects fools and the United States.”5 Today, no one nation can prevent conflict from arising or respond decisively to a major threat. And,

while I trust in God, I believe God has given us the tools we need to keep

peace. It is our task to use them wisely.

Second, if we fail to maintain U.S. military power, the United States

and, indeed, the entire world may lose an unprecedented opportunity to

construct a lasting era of relative peace.

Our military strength is the foundation of a relatively secure international order in which small conflicts, though endemic and inevitable,

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF CONGRESS 51
will not decisively erode global stability. Our military strength is also a

means of preventing the growth of one or more new powers that could, in

time, constitute a threat to peace and evolve into the enemy we do not now

foresee. Therefore, the additional investment required to maintain our

military strength is disproportionately small compared to the ultimate

benefits. Harry Truman stated this clearly: “We must be prepared to pay

the price for peace or assuredly we will pay the price of war.”6 Truman’s assessment is no less true now than when he first spoke those words.

These two premises—that the United States alone is able to protect

the peace; and that adequate, visible U.S. military power may prevent new

enemies from arising in the future—are the cornerstones of a sound strategy for the years to come. These are the premises I use to evaluate the current reassessment of defense policy.

The QDR Strategy

What are the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) strategy process

and strengths, and how might they be improved? Although I will refer, at

times, to a draft QDR statement of strategy recently printed by Inside the

Army, it has not yet been officially released. Nonetheless, I refer to the draft

because it reflects the thinking within the Pentagon to date and is a good

start in defining military strategy for the future. However, I do not at all

agree with the judgment, which appears to be emerging from the QDR, that

the new strategy can be supported with a force smaller than the force determined to be necessary by the QDR’s predecessor, Secretary of Defense Les

Aspin’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review.

The key theme of the new strategy includes three principal elements. First, U.S. military forces must be able to shape the international

security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests. This requires

forward deployment of U.S. forces; various means of defense cooperation

with allies, including security assistance; and joint training with allies and

others. Second, we must be able to respond to the full spectrum of crises

when it is in our interest to do so, which requires the ability to execute the

full spectrum of military operations, including showing the flag to deter

aggression; conducting multiple, concurrent, small-scale contingency operations; and fighting and winning major theater wars, including the ability to prevail in two nearly simultaneous MRCs. Third, the force needs to

prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future. This requires

adequate size forces for air, sea, and land; increased investments in

weapons modernization; robust efforts to exploit the evolving revolution

52 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
in military affairs; and investments in research and development that

hedge against the evolution of unexpected, but potentially dangerous, developments in future military technology.

Some say this strategy statement will fail because it is not selective

enough in defining the challenges for which U.S. military forces should

prepare. Some might complain that U.S. military forces are used too often

in response to crises—such as Bosnia—that do not directly threaten U.S.

security. I sometimes agree with those complaints. Others, with whom I do

not agree, argue that the United States should give up the strategy of being

prepared to prevail in two, nearly simultaneous MRCs—now called major

theater wars—and instead prepare for one such conflict plus smaller peace

operations. Still others say we should focus less effort on current challenges to our security and devote more attention to preparing for potential future threats from a peer or near-peer military competitor.

The QDR draft strategy statement is preferable to any of these alternative views. From a commitment standpoint, the emerging QDR strategy

statement reflects that Presidents have long been able to commit large

numbers of troops to sometimes long-lasting operations abroad pretty

much as they see fit. President Bill Clinton has done so more than others,

but he is not alone in asserting his authority as commander in chief to undertake major new missions abroad. Since Presidents can define which

U.S. interests abroad are vital enough to require the commitment of U.S.

forces, the military must be prepared to perform an extraordinarily broad

range of operations short of war. It would be misleading, for military planning purposes, if a strategy statement identified only a narrow range of

missions, when in fact the military can be called on at any time to carry

out any imaginable mission while still preparing for major wars. Indeed,

the key flaw of the Bottom-Up Review is that it fails to take account of the

demands put on forces by missions other than the requirement to be prepared to fight two MRCs.

To give up the two-MRC requirement is a prescription for giving up

our superpower status. If we lack the ability to respond to a second crisis

after a first arises, in every case we would be hesitant in committing our

forces to action in the first instance. Would we really respond to Saddam

Hussein at the cost of critically weakening our deterrent posture in Korea?

That is a choice we should never have to make.

For those who would spend less on maintaining current readiness in

order to invest in future technology, I do not agree. Recent evidence reveals

the post–Cold War world as more turbulent than ever. We must be

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF CONGRESS 53
prepared to deal with today’s conflicts, or we may be critically weakened in

confronting future challenges.

A new strategy statement that calls for forces able to shape, respond,

and prepare would be a valuable contribution to the debate on U.S. military preparedness. It is a demanding strategy and, under current circumstances, one that will be challenging to fulfill. I am concerned that portions

of the QDR are at odds with the requirements implied by the new strategy

statement. Earlier this year, Secretary of Defense William Cohen assured

the National Security Committee that the QDR process would be driven

by strategy, not budget.

The new strategy, it seems, requires forces perhaps larger and certainly more flexible than the forces the Bottom-Up Review requires. The

QDR strategy maintains the requirement to prepare for two major theater

wars and recognizes the need to shape the environment, respond to lesser

crises, and prepare for the future. Yet it calls for cuts in force structure. Indeed, the draft strategy statement suggests more reliance on Reserve component (RC) forces and our allies.

These are merely transparent excuses for making reductions in forces

because of budget constraints, not strategy considerations. The bulk of RC

forces are already built into war plans in a wholly integrated fashion, and

other forces constitute a valuable strategic reserve. To depend on allies to

carry out our strategy is the height of folly. Dependence on allies might

force us to limit our strategic goals or make us hesitant to act. Also, it is not

clear we can depend on allies to provide quality troops compatible with

our own. We can and should expect allies to contribute in major conflicts—as they did during the Persian Gulf War—but we cannot afford to

assume allied participation when making our own plans. The strategy

emerging from the QDR is appropriately broad and demanding. The

QDR, however, should address frankly which forces and what weapon investments are needed to execute it.

Congress must not repeat the mistakes of the past—mistakes that led

to unpreparedness and battlefield disasters, such as the costly defeat at

Kasserine Pass in North Africa during World War II and the destruction of

Task Force SMITH during the Korean War. The price of unpreparedness is

paid for in blood and lives of young Americans. If we let security erode, we

may not have the strength to keep smaller-scale conflicts from weakening

international stability. I also fear that major new threats will evolve that

could have been prevented had we maintained our strength. Marshall’s

54 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
warning in 1923, though not heeded by his generation, should be heard by

ours. Congress must not fail in its responsibilities.

QDR Budgetary Issues

Once again, as in the past, Congress appears unwilling to pay the

price for peace. Since the mid-1980s, the Department of Defense (DOD)

budget has declined by 40 percent in real, inflation-adjusted dollars.

Weapons procurement funding has declined by 67 percent since 1985. We

are now spending one-third as much on new weapons as we did in the

mid-1980s. These reduced spending levels cannot continue without critically weakening our military capabilities. The proposed defense budget

does not restore even modest growth rates in military spending. On the

contrary, the administration’s recently proposed budget plan projects that

defense spending will continue down in fiscal year (FY) 1998.

The budget agreement announced in May allocates inadequate levels

for defense across the board—both in budget authority and budget outlays. More important for long-term planning purposes, the QDR is being

enacted on the assumption that defense budgets will be frozen at about

$250 billion per year. Therefore, the military services must conduct planning on the assumption that any real growth in costs must be offset by reductions in other programs. Avoiding growth in costs is unlikely if we are

to maintain a viable military.

The price of peace is small. The reluctance to support modest growth

in defense spending is all the more tragic because it is so unnecessary.

Looked at from a reasonable, long-term perspective, the price of peace

today is extraordinarily small. In 1997, the defense budget was 3.4 percent

of our gross domestic product (GDP). Under the new budget plan, by

2002, it will decline to 2.7 percent. As recently as 1986, defense spending

was over 6 percent of GDP, and even at its lowest level in the mid-1970s, it

was about 5 percent. Defense spending has declined to about 16 percent of

the Federal budget share, down from 25 percent in the mid-1970s and

1980s, and down from 42 percent in 1970.

Real growth in defense spending is necessary to maintain a wellequipped, high-quality, well-trained force. Suppose we were to allow military spending to decline to 3 percent of GDP and then grow at no more than

1 or 2 percent in real terms each year thereafter. At this spending level, the

defense budget would represent less than half the burden on the economy it

did at the end of Cold War. This is a disproportionately small price to pay

for the benefits we derive from having a force that can maintain a significant,

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF CONGRESS 55
visible U.S. military presence abroad, respond to crises across the spectrum

of conflict, and still prepare for future advanced technological challenges.

However, instead of trying to bolster public and congressional support

for so modest a defense burden, current leaders are trying to support its defense strategy with budgets that start out “two sizes too small” and that will

become tighter and tighter as the years go by. As mentioned, DOD strategy

articulated in the QDR is appropriately broad and demanding and is an improvement over the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. It recognizes that activities

short of major theater war impose great strains on the current force structure. This must be taken into account in shaping future forces.

The civilian leadership in the Pentagon is mandating force reductions in the QDR to find savings with which to finance a modest increase

in weapons modernization. Why this inconsistency? The QDR is actually

being driven by budget, not strategy. Force cuts have to be considered because budgets cannot support existing force levels as well as increase funding for new weapons.

I would support budget-driven force cuts as a one-time deal. My

concern, however, is that maintaining smaller forces with flat budgets will

lead to perpetual budget shortfalls, cuts in weapon procurement programs, reductions in maintenance and training, and pressures to cut forces

further. If current conditions continue, we will experience an erosion in

our military capabilities until, with our forces no longer present in key regions of the globe, we must forego responding to important threats to the

peace, which will encourage others to challenge us in strategic locations.

Need for Defense Budget Growth

It is ill advised for DOD to conduct planning based on flat budgets.

Until recently, DOD insisted that modest growth was necessary in the long

term. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry told the National Security Committee how DOD planned to reverse the decline in weapons procurement. Funding to “recapitalize” the force, he said, would come from

three sources:

■ The four rounds of military base closures, at considerable cost,

would soon begin to achieve savings, and the entire increment

would be used to boost procurement funding.

■ Savings from acquisition reform, though not assumed in the

budget, would also be allocated to procurement.

56 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
■ Modest growth in defense spending, then projected in administration plans, would also go for weapons modernization.

But how will we recapitalize the force now and in the future? How

much can we count on saving from infrastructure reductions, outsourcing, inventory cuts, and other efficiencies to substitute for a growth in

spending? Currently, DOD must reduce force levels in order to fund

weapons procurement.

Historically, we have not been able to support a force of a given size

with flat defense budgets. Recently, the Congressional Research Service did

a study that measured the trend in defense spending relative to the force

size from FY 1955, just after the Korean War, projected through the year

2000 under the administration plan. The study found that defense budgets have grown by about 1.7 percent per year in real, inflation-adjusted

prices per active duty troop.

For defense budget analysts, this is not a surprising finding. For

example, in the late 1970s, there was a debate over whether to increase

defense spending by 3 percent per year. The premise was that defense

budgets should increase in real terms over time for several reasons, one of

which was to keep quality people in the force by providing a quality of life

equal to that of the civilian sector. Also, the costs of modern, advanced

weapon systems grow from one generation to the next. For instance, each

generation of aircraft typically doubles in price, in real terms, compared

with the previous generation. Although the services have always hoped

that new weapons would be more reliable and cheaper to operate and

maintain, this has never been the case. Since weapon systems are designed

to maximize performance, operation and maintenance costs typically

grow in real terms.

If DOD believes that the long-term cost of doing business has

changed, it should explain why. A number of factors should make it more

difficult to limit cost growth. For one thing, we have not been able to reduce

the defense infrastructure size in proportion to cuts in the force size, and I

am doubtful Congress will approve another round of base closures in the

near future. That means we have to maintain a relatively large support

structure, which drives up costs relative to the force size. We must also try

to use technology to substitute for force size. Therefore, the capital investments required will be relatively large compared with the force size.

Moreover, with an all-volunteer force it is more important than ever

to protect the quality of life. In recent years, we have skimped on military

pay raises. Much military housing is in terrible condition, and we have only

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF CONGRESS 57
belatedly begun efforts to improve it. We have also deferred maintenance of

military facilities for many years, and the backlog of requirements will inevitably catch up with us. Also, we have projected savings in military health

care costs that will be extraordinarily difficult to achieve. Finally, requirements that the military comply with environmental regulations and with

health and safety norms are increasing costs in every sector of society.

So the requirement to conduct planning on the basis of a flat budget

is a prescription for perpetual underfunding of long-term defense requirements and the steady erosion of our military strength. Modest, steady, sustainable rates of real growth in military spending are necessary to maintain

a well-equipped, well-trained, high-quality force large enough to carry out

U.S. military strategy and protect U.S. national security interests.

Beware False Economies

For some, the notion that defense spending should grow over time

seems alien. However, the notion that defense budgets should increase follows straightforwardly from clear thinking about defense. The only proper

way to decide how much to spend on defense is to first decide on a military strategy that ensures national security. Then we must determine what

size force we need to support that strategy. Finally, we must calculate what

resources we need to ensure force quality.

Often, extraneous arguments about defense spending obscure this

clear line of thinking. One common argument against defense spending is

that today’s potential enemies appear to spend less than the United States.

The implication is either that threats are not so great as our planning assumes or that the U.S. military should be able to maintain its strength with

much less money. The flaws in such reasoning are legion. For one thing, to

maintain stability in their own regions, potential enemies must simply be

strong in only one area of military capability. However, possible challenges

to U.S. security interests come from so many different directions and in

such a wide variety of forms that the United States must maintain strong

military capabilities of all types. It must not be barely stronger than the

Iraqs of the world.

Fundamentally, it is not enough for those who want to cut military

spending to cite how much possible enemies spend. Instead, those who call

for cuts should identify specific aspects of U.S. military strength they

would give up. If they argue that North Korea is not as great a threat as U.S.

military planners assume, then we should consider whether or not to

weaken the U.S. military posture in Korea. Viewed from this perspective,

the argument is harder to sustain. Despite whatever North Korea spends,

58 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
our intelligence assessments tell us how threatening their military capabilities are. Anyone who looks closely at the situation is aware of how much

damage North Korean forces could wreak even if confronted by strong

U.S. and South Korean troops. Few, therefore, would want to encourage

aggression by weakening our deterrent posture. So an argument based on

North Korean or Iraqi or Iranian levels of military spending is irrelevant.

The real issues: What are the threats, and what U.S. posture is needed to

address them?

Another argument for cutting defense spending is that the United

States is spending about as much today on defense in inflation-adjusted dollars as it did during the Cold War. The assumption is clear—with the Cold

War over, we should be able to spend less. This argument is flawed. To maintain forces of a given size costs more over time because of the need to

improve the quality of life, pursue advanced technology, and operate

increasingly sophisticated weapons. The fact is that we have cut force size

substantially since the Cold War’s end. In 1987, the Active Duty force level

was about 2.1 million. Today, it is about 1.4 million—about one-third less.

A force this size understandably should cost more than a larger force did 25

or 30 years ago, but it is nonetheless substantially smaller and less costly than

a force of the size that would be necessary if the Cold War had continued.

Four Guiding Principles

How should we think about defense spending? How much is enough

for national defense? Two years ago, I prepared an alternative defense

budget that I believed would be adequate to maintain U.S. military

strength over the next 5 years. It calls for spending about $45 billion more

on defense than the administration was projecting. I still think that an alternative budget is wise. In light of the new QDR, however, I want to discuss four guiding principles Congress should apply in deciding “how

much is enough.”

Maintain Force Levels

We should not cut force levels further. Reports that the QDR may include a decision to reduce total defense end-strength by as much as

144,000 individuals disturb me. Such reductions are destructive because

they break faith with the men and women of the Armed Forces. Recent defense drawdowns have reduced total force levels by about one-third. This

reduction imposes an immense burden on military personnel. People

must change jobs more frequently to replace others who are leaving.

Reduction imposes an immense strain on the military education and

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF CONGRESS 59
training system, and often people must begin new jobs without complete

training. Reduction also makes the military personnel system brutally

competitive. The pressure to force people out often means a single mistake

can cost a good soldier his or her career.

Military planners call this “force turbulence.” It has caused great turbulence in people’s lives as well. I believe the Armed Forces have suffered

this turbulence long enough. For years we have told them the problems

would ease once reductions ended. We told them to “hang in there,” that

things would get better. It is not right to ask these people to go through another period of such turbulence.

For strategic reasons, we cannot afford to reduce force levels further.

The services are being strained to the breaking point. They must perform

multiple requirements imposed on them by the demands to be trained and

ready for two major wars and to be actively engaged in the multiplicity of

smaller operations that have proliferated since the Cold Was ended. Already the Army is short 40,000 support position slots. This means that to

conduct operations in Bosnia, support personnel must be taken out of

continental U.S.–based units in order to fill out deploying units. The support personnel left behind must then do twice the work they should just

to keep up. “Thinning” Army ranks further will inevitably make these

shortfalls worse.

Increase Weapons Modernization Funding

We should increase weapons investments enough to get back to a

steady-state replacement rate for major equipment items. Reportedly, a

key QDR goal is to find funds to increase weapons procurement substantially. For several years, the target has been $60 billion a year. This requires

a 33-percent increase above the $45 billion currently spent on procurement. I hope that the QDR will get there, though not at the cost of cuts in

force size. I am doubtful, however, that $60 billion a year will be enough.

Currently, the Air Force and Navy have about 3,000 fighter aircraft in

their inventories—2,000 in the Air Force and 1,000 in the Navy. If we assume a 20-year average service life for fighters—which is getting pretty

long in the tooth—we must buy 150 aircraft a year to maintain a steadystate replacement rate. For the past few years, we have bought about 28 to

42 fighter aircraft per year. By my calculations, we must increase aircraft

procurement by at least 400 percent to get to an adequate level.

The Navy needs a minimum of about 350 battle-force ships. If we assume an average service life of 35 years, we must buy 10 ships a year. Lately

60 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
we have been buying four or five, so we need to double shipbuilding budgets to get back to a steady-state replacement rate.

Add to those increases the need to raise spending modestly each year

to exploit new technology. What are we giving up by not modernizing as

fast as we should, and how will we adjust to projected shortfalls? We may be

able to keep some equipment going longer by pursuing upgrades instead of

new systems. We may be able to limit cost growth between generations of

new weapons by careful attention to cost, as reflected in the services’ plan

for the Joint Strike Fighter. All of these adjustments come at a price in reduced military strength. Compromises should be kept to a minimum.

Protect Military Readiness

We should not allow military readiness to decline. I am skeptical of

DOD budget plans that show operation and maintenance costs declining

in the future relative to force size. Base closures may produce some savings and better business practices, but it is unrealistic to expect training

costs to decline or to plan on reduced maintenance costs for major

weapon systems.

Improve DOD Business Practices

While improving DOD business practices can achieve some savings,

I am skeptical about claims that we can achieve large savings. It may be

true there is waste in defense business practices, but waste is not a line item

in the budget that we can easily eliminate. I am concerned that proponents

of revolutionary changes in government procurement practices are vastly

overstating the achievable savings.

These four principles—maintaining force levels, increasing weapons

modernization funding, protecting military readiness, and not overstating

savings from improved business practices—force me to conclude that currently projected defense spending levels are not enough. If defense spending

is not frozen at current levels, we will see the erosion of U.S. military

strength and, as a direct result, the slow decline of U.S. global leadership.

QDR People Issues

The men and women who serve in our Armed Forces, and the civilians who support them, are the most important resource the Nation has in

protecting its security. An ambitious strategy accompanied by inadequate

resources places tremendous strain on these people. It is easy to lose focus

when resources are tight. The money Congress provides for defense, the

weapons the services buy, the logistics infrastructure undergirding the

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF CONGRESS 61
force, the military doctrine strategists pronounce, the campaign plans

commanders devise—everything comes down to the soldier at the “point

of the spear.” Therefore, our Armed Forces men and women deserve sufficient materiel and moral support to allow them to do what we ask of them.

In peacetime, however, we often forget the costs of war and neglect to pay

the price of peace.

In assessing how we treat our people, I am torn between two strong

feelings: I am concerned that the pressures put on servicemembers and

DOD civilians are growing to the breaking point; and I do not want to discourage those who are willing to serve from joining the Armed Forces or

from staying in. On the contrary, I hope to encourage those who are willing and able to serve their country.

The fact that we are now at peace and no single enemy threatens us

does not mean military service is any less necessary or any less valued than

in the past. The burden of maintaining peace lies on the shoulders of those

who serve, and it is no less critical a mission than any soldier, sailor, marine, or airman has ever had before. The bottom line is we need the dedicated, patriotic people defense requires.

Focus on People

One of the things that most impressed me about former Secretary of

Defense Perry was his focus on people. When he became defense secretary,

he went to military bases around the world to talk with service people.

“Management by walking around,” he called it. A direct result of his walking around was renewed emphasis on improving quality of life.

For us who knew him to be a hardware expert, his focus on people was

greatly welcomed. The value of his focus on people was the message he sent

to the troops. It was noticed throughout the military and did much to prevent an unbridgeable rift between the administration’s civilian leaders and

the men and women in uniform. The example he set is one we in policymaking positions should take to heart. The U.S. military is a complex

human culture. We must always consider its human dimension in making

choices on strategy, budgets, programs, social rules and regulations, or any

other aspect of policy.

I believe it was a mistake that the QDR did not include a separate

panel on people. The QDR comprised six panels: strategy, force structure,

modernization, readiness, infrastructure, and intelligence. An integration

panel linked it all together.

62 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
So many of the issues the QDR addresses come down to people. For

example, what stresses and strains does strategy put on people, given the

force structure available to implement it? How does quality of life in the

military affect mission readiness? How does military training, education,

and leadership development affect the military ability to exploit new technology effectively? How will reductions in the defense infrastructure affect

morale? All QDR panels touched on people issues to some extent—but did

not address many critically important people issues. Do military people

understand how their jobs contribute to the common defense? How do the

changes in society as a whole affect the military—changes that include increasing opportunities for women, growing proportions of two-income

households, sexual harassment problems, and race-relations dynamics? Is

there, as many fear, a growing gap between military culture and civilian society, and how will this affect public support for national security and the

willingness of future generations of Americans to serve?

The answers to these questions have as much to do with national security as the budget size or the quality of new weapons technology. If the

pressures on our Armed Forces do not ease, the military may begin to lose

many of its best and brightest people. Those I have talked to often cite

three reasons why good people leave the force: the operations tempo

(OPTEMPO) is too high; they have concerns about their families; and they

are uncertain about the future.

Stretched and Stressed—High OPTEMPO

A most pressing issue is how current demands on the force are affecting troops. Two years ago, Lieutenant General Theodore Stroup, Army

deputy chief of staff for personnel, was asked what it was like for soldiers

who served in an Army that was then composed of 520,000 active duty

personnel. Soldiers, he said, were “stretched and stressed” by the demands

being put on them. When asked what the effect would be when the number dropped to 495,000 as was then planned, he answered, “stretched and

stressed all the more.”

Recently, DOD has proposed reducing the Army size to 475,000,

which the Army resists. Meanwhile, actual strength has eroded to about

490,000, even though the official end-strength target required by current

law remains at 495,000. It is widely reported that the QDR will reduce

Army end strength by 15,000 or more. So Army people will be “stretched

and stressed all the more.” At what point does all this stretching and stressing reach the breaking point?

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF CONGRESS 63
Each of the services faces the same issues. Recently, a senior Navy official testified before the National Security Committee about the difficulty

the Navy has had keeping forces on station as much as it had planned. In

large part, this is because the Navy, to its credit, rigidly tries to limit overseas deployments to 6 months and puts other constraints on the amount

of time units may be away from home. In the same testimony, however, the

official defended the decision to reduce the Navy end strength by 11,000 in

order to find money for equipment maintenance. The two issues cannot

be separated—as end strength declines, we can either increase personnel

deployment times, or we can reduce deployments, which means we cannot

fully support military strategy.

For those of us who frequently talk to people in uniform, this message comes across loudly. Last Thanksgiving, in Hungary, I visited soldiers

from Missouri and asked each of them how many military deployments

they had been involved in during current enlistment periods. Several had

two deployments, a few had three, and one sergeant had five.

Every time I visit the troops, I hear similar stories. I am convinced

that current measures do not adequately identify the extent of the problem. Even in the Navy, the pace of deployments for individual sailors is not

directly measured and limited. And in the other services, there is no systematic way to measure the extent of individual deployments, so we really

do not know how much stress we are putting on individuals.

Another thing the QDR does not address is how to measure the strain

put on individuals in the uniformed services and a means of controlling it.

I recently saw a draft list from the Air Force of some things we should be

measuring. It poses numerous questions, including the number of:

■ people who have temporary duty assignments of less than 90 days a

year; 90 to 120 days; over 120 days a year. If too many people deploy

on a constant basis, that is a sure sign of an excessive OPTEMPO.

■ people who work 40 to 45 hours per week; 45 to 55; over 55. Some

jobs require long hours, but if the trend over the whole force is up,

that is a major stressor.

■ aircraft crews that receive waivers of training-hour requirements. If

the trend is up, too many people are doing too many other things

than their primary jobs.

■ major exercises people are engaged in, on average, per year.

■ people who are delayed in meeting training qualification requirements for position upgrades.

64 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
■ enlisted personnel who are pursuing college degrees, and how many

officers are pursuing advanced degrees. How many of each fail to

complete course work? A decline in the number of people pursuing

advanced education is a good measure of stress on the force.

■ people who have accrued leave exceeding 60 days.

■ fathers who have missed a child’s birth due to a temporary duty

(TDY) assignment. How many have been assigned TDY within 30

days of a child’s birth?

The list is extensive. I am convinced measures such as these show a dramatic increase in all of the services’ OPTEMPO. Unless we can manage the

degree of strain put on the force and do something to control it, we will

have real trouble in retaining good people.

What are the causes of such apparent problems? To me, the root

cause is a tendency to underestimate requirements for military operations

while still preparing adequately for full-scale war. In the past, the military

services worried less about the impact of small-scale military operations

because the force was relatively large, so a small deployment was not felt.

Smaller military operations were also relatively rare. That is the main reason why current measures of stress on the force are inadequate.

Now the force is smaller, and military operations have become more

frequent and of longer duration. One calculation in this year’s Army Posture Statement is striking. Over the 40 years from 1950 to 1989, the Army

was engaged in 10 deployments. In the 7 years between 1990 and 1996, the

Army was engaged in 25 deployments. Meanwhile, the Army’s size declined by one-third and the budget dropped by 39 percent.

Aspin’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review did not come to grips with the

impact of a larger number of operations on a smaller force. The Review

simply assumed a force designed to fight two MRCs would be large and

diverse enough to handle any number of smaller operations. Only now are

the services beginning to understand why this Cold War thinking will not

do. For each Army unit deployed in an ongoing operation, four units are

needed in the force: one unit deploys; another prepares to deploy; a third

is coming off deployment; and a fourth is depleted because some of its

troops were drawn on to fill out a deployed or deploying unit.

Also, only a part of the Army is available for deployments due to

education and skills training requirements, in transit, or in support

functions and other troop positions. According to the General Accounting Office, 63 percent of Active Duty Army troops are deployable at a

given time. So, out of the 495,000 total, 312,000 troops are available for

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF CONGRESS 65
operations. By December, 1996, 35,800 Army troops were deployed,

mostly to Bosnia. This does not count the number of troops forwarddeployed in Korea. Multiply 35,800 by 4, and the number of troops

affected by deployments is 143,200, which is 46 percent of the deployable

force. The other 54 percent of the force is supposed to be training hard

to be ready to fight two major theater wars.

This is why I am concerned about the impact of further reductions

in Army force levels. At any one time, a large part of the Army is either involved in operations or is directly affected by them. Now the plan is to reduce further the overall number of personnel without reducing the number of divisions or missions. If the reductions come from division

strengths, some specialties will have even lower manning levels. I do not

believe DOD adequately understands the strains that further reductions

will put on the force.

So how can we resolve these problems? Each service has been

searching for ways to manage resources to meet the needs, but how successful are the solutions or, if successful for the present, how viable will

they be in the future? One solution has been to use RC volunteers to fill

out deployed units. A key issue here is, when will we reach the limit of

Reserve availability? Reservists willing and able to volunteer have come

forward already for one duty tour in either Haiti or Bosnia. There may

not be enough volunteers available in the future, and involuntary RC

mobilization would soon cause many Reservists to quit. Also, RC mobilization is expensive. Reservists receive full pay and benefits once activated. Congress continues to offset supplemental funding for military

operations with rescissions, forcing costs to be absorbed within the overall defense budget.

Another potential solution may be to reduce nondivision support

troop levels in order to fill out division slots, but too often we lose sight of

the fact that support personnel perform assignments critical to mission effectiveness. Intelligence collection, for example, is a support function, yet

operations cannot proceed without adequate, timely, and usable intelligence. Nor can operations proceed without supplies, medical care, or any

other basic services that support activities provide.

Military Families

The second reason for personnel leaving the services is concern for

their families. Today’s all-volunteer force is quite different from past draft

armies. People who choose the military as a career make up a larger share

66 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
of the force. This is a positive trend; sophisticated weapon systems require

highly trained professionals. Our Armed Forces set the standard to which

other nations aspire.

As a whole, troops are older than in the past. Today, 64 percent of Active Army personnel are married, and except for the Marine Corps, the

proportion is similar in the other services. The modern U.S. military cannot maintain its high quality without adequately taking care of military

families—“We enlist soldiers, we reenlist families.”

In the early days of the all-volunteer force, we did not adequately care

for families. Military pay levels eroded. Military housing and other facilities were in awful condition. Social problems that plagued the rest of society—including drug use and racial tensions—also affected the military.

Since then, attention to needs has improved dramatically. Pay raises in

1979 and 1980, and more attention to family needs, have been tremendously

beneficial. The military has led the way in responding to social problems.

However, I am fully aware of continued shortcomings. Strains on

military families are growing, and we are not doing as good a job as we

should in protecting them. Many of the strains, of course, are inherent in

the nature of military life. Military personnel are necessarily away from

home for extended periods of time. Military families move frequently,

making it difficult for spouses to build careers, which itself strains marriages. It is all the more important, then, that we devote special care and

attention to military families.

The most important correction needed is to limit OPTEMPO so military personnel are not away from their families for longer periods than

necessary. It is especially important that TDY be kept within limits. We

also need to ensure that military pay keeps up with civilian sector pay.

In addition, we must preserve some of the benefits military families

rely on. I am disturbed by proposals to eliminate commissaries and exchanges. Also, because of the military’s demands, it is critically important to

assist military families in having access to quality child care. We must also

protect quality health care. Military families care deeply about education for

their children, and we need to ensure the availability of the highest quality

education. One of the most important initiatives DOD has undertaken recently is improving housing. While some housing is very good, much of it is

not. I have seen housing with broken appliances, cracked walls, warped

floors, peeling tile, inadequate heat, and stopped-up drains—with very poor

responsiveness from maintenance staffs. This must change; we have to do it

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF CONGRESS 67
as quickly and efficiently as possible. The QDR will suffer from a major gap

if it does not address the military family quality of life.

Uncertainty and Turbulence

A third reason people leave the force is uncertainty about the future.

Many military people tolerate the stresses placed on them because they believe things will get better. If things do not get better, the best people could

throw in the towel and leave.

There has already been a defense drawdown that reduced active

component force levels by about one-third. This drawdown imposed immense burdens on military personnel. People had to move to new jobs

much more frequently because of the need to replace the large number of

people leaving the service. The drawdown imposed a strain on the military

education and training system and has made the military personnel system brutally competitive.

These factors directly affect people’s abilities to meet career goals. Officers cannot count on receiving the education they need to advance. The

amount of time officers spend in command assignments—where they can

learn their trade—has declined significantly. Officers once had 2 years of

previous command experience at lower levels before rising to battalion

command. Now they have 12 to 18 months. As a result, our officers are not

adequately seasoned, which sets them up for potential failure.

These changes, together with a high OPTEMPO, create much uncertainty about the future. Unless we stabilize the force, pay adequate attention

to training and education, and allow good people to progress through the

ranks in a predictable manner, the best people will not remain in the force.

Already, good people are leaving. It would be wrong to attribute the

exodus to external factors. For example, many say pilots are leaving in large

numbers because airlines are hiring again. That may be a factor, but not

the main one. The best people in the services will always be confident of

opportunities in the civilian sector. Those we want most to keep in the

force are precisely the people who can always find lucrative careers on the

outside. The issue, then, is not what lures people away, but what drives

them to leave. Good people do not sign up for the military as a career because they expect to make a lot of money—they need enough to provide

security for their families, but they are not going to be lured away simply

by higher salaries. Good people leave either because military service no

longer offers them the rewards they expected or because the burdens of

service have become too great.

68 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
Civil-Military Relations

There are other people issues the QDR should address. One is the

broad issue of civil-military relations. The issue has many aspects. There is

a widening cultural rift between those in the military and the civilian society they serve.

We ask a great deal of the people in uniform. Sometimes, we may expect too much. Failures in military conduct seen in sexual harassment allegations at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, or in the Tailhook

episode reflect a cultural gap that will continue to widen unless all parties

are careful in their judgments. When such issues arise, some military personnel react by criticizing civilian society for imposing too much on the

Armed Forces. “Outsiders” conclude that military culture itself is flawed.

In my opinion, both are wrong. Yes, I think there are failures within the

military, but I also believe the military can be counted on to identify and

correct its failures. No, I do not think the military can be exempted from

advancing social norms—including requirements for sexual and racial

equality. I also recognize that the military is not identical to civilian society. Congress has a special responsibility to take care of the military personnel from whom we ask so much. It is incumbent on us to close the gap

between military and civilian society before it grows into a gulf.

In this chapter I have called attention to the fact that Congress has

often failed in its responsibility to provide for the common defense and

that I fear we are again embarked on a course that will leave our forces illprepared for future challenges. I have also argued that a failure to maintain

military strength will encourage the evolution of new international threats

that otherwise would not arise to challenge U.S. security.

This is a strong, but sincere, message. It is one many will find difficult to accept. I have tried to make my point carefully, explain my reasoning, and use good facts and figures to support my conclusions. Sometimes,

however, an argument needs something stronger. This reminds me of a

passage in General Douglas MacArthur’s autobiography Reminiscences in

which he discusses a meeting he had with President Franklin D. Roosevelt

in the mid-1930s. MacArthur was then Army chief of staff, and he and Secretary of War George Dern were making an appeal to the President for

more defense spending. Secretary Dern, wrote MacArthur, quietly

explained the deteriorating international situation and appealed to the

President not to economize on the military. Roosevelt was unmoved and

reacted to Dern with biting sarcasm. Then MacArthur joined the argument, which became more and more heated. MacArthur explained that 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF CONGRESS 69
In my emotional exhaustion, I spoke recklessly and said something to

the general effect that when we lost the next war, and an American

boy, lying in the mud with an enemy bayonet through his belly and an

enemy foot on his dying throat, spat out his last curse, I wanted the

name not to be MacArthur, but Roosevelt. The President grew livid.

‘You must not talk that way to the President!’ he roared. He was, of

course, right, and I knew it almost before the words had left my

mouth. I said I was sorry and apologized. But I felt my Army career

was at an end. I told him he had my resignation as chief of staff. As I

reached the door his voice came with that cool detachment which so

reflected his extraordinary self-control. ‘Don’t be foolish, Douglas;

you and the budget must get together on this. . . .’ Neither the President nor I ever spoke of the meeting, but from that time on he was on

our side.7

I hope this Congress will not require an appeal like MacArthur’s to remember the lessons of the past—that the price of unpreparedness is paid

in war. The price of peace is much less. Therefore, let us treasure the Americans who wear our country’s uniform—let us appreciate them, encourage

them, but most of all, let us take care of them. After all, it is they who bear

the burdens of defending America’s most precious virtue—freedom.

Notes1 United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8. 2 George C. Marshall, address to Military Schools and College Association, March 1923. The

speech originally appeared in “Factors Contributing to Morale and Esprit de Corps,” by General L.R.

Gignilliant in 1923. 3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Quotation is attributed to Otto von Bismarck.

6 This quotation has been popularized over the years and is attributed to Harry S. Truman.

Truman actually said, “We can well afford to pay the price of peace. Our only alternate is to pay the

terrible cost of war.” Quote Magazine, August 5, 1951. 7 General Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 101.

70 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS

Page 70—Chapter 6 follows
Intelligence Support of

Military Operations

S

ome have described the 20th century as an epoch of total war for the

American people. The assertion has considerable justification. Two

world wars and the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf

have marked decisive points in our history. In addition to hot wars, we have

seen the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War, which required a massive investment in defense and the establishment of large military forces.

Combined, these conflicts—hot and cold—resulted in millions of

deaths, countless injuries, endless destruction, warped economies, disrupted families, and other misery. Yet the Nation and its allies survived. The

Armed Forces have redeemed the Wilsonian ideal of making the world safe

for democracy. Taking a long view, America and its allies did not for the

most part go to war in vain. U.S. security interests have been protected and

American ideals have set a global standard even in countries that fail to live

up to them. American shortcomings are real, but they pale in contrast with

those of powers that have met with defeat—Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan,

the Soviet Union, and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

Given the decisive impact of war in this century, no one should be

foolish enough to resort to combat unless it is unavoidable. Even the

young have seen enough—via television if in no other form—to know

about limited war. Most believe, however, that to avoid war or avert defeat

should war break out, we must be prepared to fight effectively.

We cannot predict the nature of warfare in the next century. But we

do know that we must prepare for an array of new contingencies. Technology is changing so rapidly that some observers refer to an emerging

military technical revolution. Many regard capabilities based around airlaunched precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and information systems as

71

This chapter is based on an article published in the spring 1998 issue of Joint Force Quarterly.
strategic planning. Although expensive and not a panacea, they can do extensive damage and minimize the loss of noncombatant lives.

Precision munitions, however, require reliable information: good intelligence. PGMs must be targeted exactly. The urgent need for precise intelligence to conduct operations—information superiority—underscores

the need to grasp the evolution of military intelligence. Notwithstanding

public fascination with covert operations mounted by the Central Intelligence Agency, most of the Nation’s intelligence effort is concentrated in

the Department of Defense. Aside from bureaucratic distinctions between

the national and the tactical level, intelligence support has become increasingly important for military operations in the post–Cold War world.

Because of its growing importance and the absence of debate on the

subject, it is useful to review the course of military intelligence from a peripheral concern of headquarters staffs to an integral component of every

combatant command down to the lowest tactical echelon. That evolution

reflects, in particular, the close relationship between intelligence capabilities and the effectiveness of aerial bombardment.

The Two World Wars

The intelligence arms of the Army and Navy date back to the last century, and Air Force intelligence was part of that service since its inception

in 1947. Much of the early intelligence work by the services focused on

gathering basic intelligence—order of battle, terrain, ports, and foreign

defense industries. It came from reports by attachés whose major qualification for assignment abroad was an independent income. Except during

World War I, much of the military intelligence effort could charitably be

described as superficial. Even the excellent analysis done by a handful of

cryptographers did not prevent the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

But intelligence did not initially occupy a significant role in one particular military technical revolution earlier in this century. Following the

lead of the Italian airpower theorist Giulio Douhet, military aviators sought

victory by attacking enemy industrial and political centers. These assaults

aimed at destroying the economy of a sophisticated nation without defeating its forces in the field. But airmen did not seriously analyze the nature and

location of key enemy facilities. Photographic surveillance was often an orphan; the emphasis was on acquiring and training to use bombers.
emergence of independent air forces, advocates of strategic bombing never

demonstrated that it alone could defeat an enemy. It was not precision attacks against German factories and transportation centers that characterized

the initial stages of the air campaign in Europe, but massive nighttime area

bombardment designed to break enemy morale. It proved frustrating to hit

targets with sufficient precision to knock out industries for significant periods. Without adequate fighter protection (especially early in the war), navigational capabilities, and intelligence data, the bombing of Germany was

largely directed at its urban population centers. Later, when air superiority

was achieved, daylight precision bombing of key targets contributed to the

Normandy invasion and the drive into Germany; but it did not preclude

bloody ground fighting. Moreover, postwar analyses of Allied bombing suggested that its effects were often inflated.

The success of bombing was limited by both aircraft and bombsight

capabilities as well as German opposition, but the availability of intelligence was also a critical factor. It was difficult to take usable photographs

at night, and reconnaissance by day was hazardous. Analysis of pressure

points in the enemy economy took time. Damage assessments were largely

casual and inaccurate. Intelligence analysts and operators were often at

loggerheads on bombing results.

The bombing campaign against Japan presented a somewhat different

challenge. Although its economy was highly developed, the Japanese industrial base was generally not concentrated in large, easily identifiable complexes but in small factories or homes. Intelligence clearly indicated that

Japan was preparing to counter a possible American landing on its home

territory with massive ground forces that would inflict horrendous U.S. casualties. Thus there was a persuasive case for area bombardment, and it was

undertaken in 1945 with ruthless efficiency against tinderbox cities such as

Tokyo, Osaka, and Kobe. The campaign reached a climax with atomic bomb

attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although Japan had been weakened by

military defeats and a highly effective economic blockade, airstrikes, especially the atomic bombs, hastened the end of the war. Civilian losses from

both conventional and atomic attacks were enormous.

Despite the limitations of air campaigns, there were advances in

military intelligence during World War II, including photographic

reconnaissance based on the work of George Goddard and other pioneers who adapted specially designed cameras for aircraft use. Careful
Combined American and British experts achieved great cryptographic

successes, setting a pattern for postwar collaboration.

The Cold War

The defense establishment was reorganized after World War II. The

National Security Act of 1947 created the post of secretary of defense, a

separate Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate allsource analysis and human intelligence collection. The late 1940s brought

fiscal austerity, and military intelligence atrophied along with other defense capabilities.

As part of the buildup in the wake of the Korean War, military intelligence agencies began to grow and acquire the organizational structure

that would make them major components of the Cold War military. New

and specialized agencies would emerge to deal with cryptography, photographic interpretation, and satellites; and an Intelligence Community was

organized under the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure collaboration and prevent expensive duplication of effort.

Much defense planning was based on increasing nuclear capabilities.

These weapons made it possible to design air campaigns that could realistically destroy an enemy industrial base along with virtually everything

else. The logic of nuclear warfare as it evolved, however, did not lead to a

widespread acceptance of its practical utility. Once nuclear parity was

reached, decisionmakers perceived that the use of nuclear weapons was inherently a worst case scenario and that, short of direct threats to the national survival, their military usefulness was strictly limited.

During the Cold War the Intelligence Community necessarily focused on the Soviet Union together with the Warsaw Pact countries and

Communist China. Concern over the military capabilities and intentions

of the communist world, especially after a nuclear strike on American territory became possible, led to the growth and technological sophistication

of U.S. intelligence. The requirement for accurate information on a secretive Soviet Union led to overflights by manned aircraft (in the wake of the

shootdown of a U–2 in 1960) and the development of satellites that could

peer into the deep recesses of communist territory with increasing discrimination beginning in the early 1960s. It became possible to calculate

accurately the number of Moscow’s intercontinental missiles and launch

platforms and assess Warsaw Pact intentions regarding the North Atlantic
The key recipients of intelligence were Washington decisionmakers—

the White House, the secretaries of state and defense, and the joint chiefs of

staff. Decision cycles were lengthy, and there was opportunity for exhaustive studies and voluminous national intelligence estimates.

Given the danger of nuclear war, intelligence support of military

forces engaged in limited wars, even in Southeast Asia, was largely a

byproduct of assets designed for superpower targets. Satellites might be

redirected for a time, reconnaissance aircraft assigned to tactical missions,

and signals from Third World countries exploited; but the emphasis—and

the organization and methods of intelligence agencies—remained on the

Soviet threat.

Bombing campaigns during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts failed

to accomplish all (or even most) of what their proponents predicted. For

various reasons it was deemed unwise in both wars to attack the sources of

industrial production since they were outside the theaters of operations—

in the Soviet Union or China. The primary effort was on interdiction and

tactical support to combat units. The outbreak of the Korean War required

a frantic effort to rebuild surveillance systems to enable allied forces to target North Korean facilities. While air superiority and the destruction of

the few strategic targets were accomplished early in the war, the effort to

interdict enemy supplies and reinforcements was limited by inadequate

targeting data and weaponry. Although airpower contributed significantly,

it did not isolate the battlefield, and the war dragged on for 3 years.

There was enormous debate during the Vietnam conflict over a

bombing campaign known as Rolling Thunder. Target selection by political leaders in Washington and political constraints on American strategy

hampered prosecution of the war. All sides were concerned that sophisticated and expensive aircraft were being used on minor targets such as individual trucks and small troop concentrations. But locating targets was

difficult. Aerial surveillance was hindered by triple canopy jungle, and the

effects of ground sensors were mixed. The extent to which interdiction actually reduced communist infiltration was widely disputed. Today, most

observers concede that the costly air campaign did not accomplish its

goals, at least until targets in Hanoi were struck in 1972.

The Armed Forces went through a difficult downsizing and readjustment in the years after Vietnam, but those years also saw the start of a

technological shift resulting from improvements in electronics and
focus of military planning remained on the threat posed by a Soviet

Union whose decline was not immediately apparent.

Since the mid-1980s, some of the most notable technological advances have occurred in the field of military intelligence, including lasers,

cameras, radars, sensors, miniature television links, e-mail, networked

computers, and new forms of communications equipment.

After the Cold War

The collapse of the Soviet Union revolutionized the geopolitical environment in which the Intelligence Community operates. Although nuclear

forces in the former Soviet Union must not be overlooked, most observers

believe the United States is likely to face challenges far different from those

of the Cold War. That means intelligence agencies that long focused on the

Soviet Union must now provide real-time tactical intelligence on places such

as Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia, and Iraq. This requires new collection and

communications systems as well as organizational flexibility that does not

come easily to any bureaucracy. Yet there are interesting continuities between intelligence today and that of the pre–Cold War era. Technological advances make it possible to accomplish missions once considered impractical.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was countered by a coalition led

by the United States. The dramatic victory in Desert Shield/Desert Storm reflected not only the changed nature of war but the emergence of advanced

and arguably revolutionary military technology. Capabilities developed during the Cold War, especially laser-guided PGMs, proved particularly useful

against Iraqi forces even though extensive adaptation and jury-rigging were

necessary. It was possible to identify and attack military (chiefly air defense),

industrial, and communications facilities, largely by crippling combat capabilities. The enemy was blinded by a precision air attack on its command

centers, but there was no direct attack on the Iraqi population. Air defense

networks were destroyed, columns of tanks were identified and reduced to

scrap metal, and Iraqi aircraft fled to Iran for safety. The air campaign

helped ensure that enemy resistance to the ground campaign was vastly

weakened and allied casualties were light. Despite media claims, airpower

alone did not achieve victory; the ground campaign was necessary to drive

Iraqi troops out of Kuwait.

For television viewers far from the battlefield, dramatic footage

caught laser-guided PGMs delivered exactly on target, occasionally entering
ordnance used, precisely striking targets demonstrated that the capabilities

propounded by airpower pioneers decades ago were realized on the battlefield. PGMs are costly and wars will still be fought “on the ground and in

the mud,” as General George C. Marshall commented, but these weapons

are nevertheless a major part of future warfare.

Looking Ahead

PGMs depend on precise intelligence. For a bomb to enter a window,

detailed information is needed on the use and configuration of the building. Obtaining it is not simple or inexpensive. While satellites, manned

reconnaissance aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) may offer

excellent overhead photography, not all targets are above ground. In addition, photography may not yield information on the interior. Other disciplines are necessary, including signals intelligence and human intelligence.

Analysts must combine disparate data from all collection sources and give

it to the decisionmaker within a definite timeframe. Hard decisions have

to be made regarding priorities; mapping the entire Earth would be prohibitive even for the world’s only superpower.

In a military technical revolution, innovations in weapons and equipment lead to new doctrine and organizations. Decades passed before the Air

Force became a separate service. Even then, many military leaders and civilian strategists failed to integrate airpower fully into planning and operations. Today, new intelligence technologies, organizational structures, and

the knowledge and skill to exploit them are being introduced simultaneously. A phenomenon of Desert Storm was the way in which informal liaison

among various echelons and stateside components supplemented formal

command patterns. This situation was especially noticeable when hardpressed intelligence officers in the Persian Gulf region established direct

links to Washington-level analysts by e-mail or secure telephone.

The Gulf War was a decisive victory that provided a host of lessons.

Leaving aside the absence of good intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s intentions before his invasion of Kuwait, there were unacceptable delays in

transmitting data and aligning various computer links. Reams of paper

were hand-carried within the theater because of inadequate transmission

capabilities. The accuracy of bomb damage assessments (BDA) was

controversial. The nature and extent of Iraq’s chemical weapons capabilities and programs were a mystery until long after the end of hostilities.
ligence during Desert Storm and incorporated its lessons into subsequent

operations, especially Bosnia. Interoperability and the connectivity of communications capabilities reportedly are greatly expanded. Procedures for

BDA have been examined. Efforts have been made to bring diverse elements

of the Intelligence Community together to support commanders, and better

links have been forged with the intelligence activities of foreign militaries.

But anomalies exist. Decades after Goddard’s work in configuring aircraft

with special camera systems, naval aviators in combat jets have used handheld cameras to photograph ground installations in Bosnia.

Mastering the lessons learned during Desert Storm as well as the infrastructure established to support U.S. and NATO forces in Bosnia are

only initial steps toward integrating intelligence into the post–Cold War

defense establishment. Concepts such as dominant battlefield awareness,

information superiority, and full dimensional protection may not adequately describe how forces will fight, but they are evolving in both Congress and the Pentagon. By all accounts, the military of the future will

demand more effective information and intelligence. This is a necessity

unless one plans to fight with obsolete technology, larger numbers of

troops, and more civilian casualties.

Careful employment of advanced weaponry based on sophisticated intelligence can permit attacks on military assets, decisionmaking headquarters, and communications networks without the area bombing of cities that

characterized World War II and was envisioned in the nuclear strikes of the

Cold War. They can launch planes or missiles against vital targets, not jungle trails or empty buildings. But there are unavoidable costs. Increased

intelligence may absorb a greater portion of the defense budget. In the

sprawling Intelligence Community, there are undoubtedly cases of waste

and duplication. At the same time, increased investments in advanced intelligence technologies are clearly in the national interest.

Page 78—Chapter 7 follows
International Engagement:

Why We Need to Stay 

the Course

Adecade ago, events took place in Europe and the Soviet Union that,

for the United States, were the beginning of the end of a long

struggle—a struggle that was characterized by terrible sacrifices in

Korea and Vietnam; by periods of great national confidence and occasional episodes of uncertainty; by debates in the halls of Congress that

were sometimes historic and solemn and sometimes partisan and shrill;

and, above all, by a widely shared sense of national purpose that endured

despite occasionally bitter internal divisions.

The constancy with which the United States carried out its global responsibilities over the long course of the Cold War is a great testimony to

the character of the American people and to the quality of the leaders who

guided the Nation through often trying times. In spite of the costs, in the

face of great uncertainties and despite grave distractions, our nation

showed the ability to persevere. In doing so, we answered the great question that Winston Churchill once famously posed: “Will America stay the

course?”1 The answer is, we did.

Today, we need to raise a similar question once again, but this time

for ourselves and in a somewhat different form. Today, the key question is

perhaps more challenging because it is more open-ended. It is, “Will we

stay engaged?”

Engagement, while not yet widely embraced as a characterization of

our basic global posture, seems to express quite well what we need to be

about today—that we need to be engaged in the world and that we need to

79

This chapter was previously published in Military Review (March–April 1999).
Engagement will not be easy to sustain. Indeed, as has become clear

in recent years, it will be as challenging to the United States to remain fully

engaged today as it was to stay the course during the Cold War for the following reasons:

■ We face challenges to our security that in some ways are more

daunting than those we faced during the Cold War.

■ It will often be difficult to reach domestic agreement on foreign

affairs because legitimate, deeply held values will often be hard to

reconcile.

■ We will have to risk grave dangers and pay a price to carry out our

responsibilities, and because of the costs, it will sometimes be

tempting to think that we would be more secure if we were more insulated from turmoil abroad.

■ We will have to struggle mightily not to allow domestic travails to

divert us from the vigilance that we must consistently pursue.

But our political system, which encourages open debate and constantly challenges leaders to rise to the demands of the times, gives us the

opportunity, if we are thoughtful and serious about our responsibilities, to

see where our interests lie and to pursue our values effectively. While engagement in the world may sometimes be difficult to sustain, it is nonetheless necessary. Moreover, it has succeeded in bolstering our security.

Engagement Is Difficult

Engagement is difficult, first of all, because it entails costs and carries

risks. In an age of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction, the United States faces particularly grave dangers. To quail in the

face of these risks would be far more damaging to our security than to

confront them—but we should not underestimate the dangers we face.

Engagement is also difficult because it requires us to make policy choices

in which values we hold dear are troubling to reconcile. Constructive engagement with China, for example, requires that we reconcile our deeply

held convictions about human rights abuses with our knowledge that a

policy of isolating China would be self-defeating.

Engagement with long-standing allies may also be turbulent at times.

Many, if not most, of our allies have not, for example, wholeheartedly supported our efforts to enforce sanctions on nations that we believe are
A related difficulty of engagement is what might be called the paradox of burdensharing—getting allies to do more often requires that we do

more as well. We will sometimes become embroiled in undertakings overseas that, at face value, cost us more than our immediate interests appear

to justify. The obvious example is Bosnia. The reason we must, nonetheless, be engaged is that our overarching interest in building effective security cooperation with our allies requires that we exercise leadership.

Engagement is also difficult for domestic political reasons. To be

blunt, no one gets elected by promising to devote a great deal of time and

attention to foreign affairs. Those in positions of responsibility must make

compromises, choose between alternatives that are often “bad” and “less

bad,” take risks to get things done, and bear the criticism if initiatives fail.

Finally, engagement is difficult because it is financially expensive. In recent years, it has been difficult to find the resources to meet obvious needs

in defense and foreign affairs because of pressures to reduce the budget

deficit. Now that the deficit has been brought under control, a part of the

discussion of budget priorities ought to be how to restore a reasonable level

of investment in meeting our international security requirements.

Engagement Is Necessary

Despite these difficulties, there is no alternative to continued, active

U.S. engagement in the world. We persevered in the Cold War precisely because we felt it was our responsibility as a nation to defend against tyranny.

In the name of that moral mission, we may sometimes have asked too

much of ourselves, and particularly of our sons and daughters in the military—but it was nonetheless a goal worthy of the American people.

Now we have a very different moral responsibility before us that is

equally important. Our responsibility now is to use our unchallenged position of global leadership in a fashion that will make the universal hope

for peace, prosperity, and freedom the norm of international behavior. If

the United States were not to try, at least, to use its current position of

strength to help construct an era of relative peace and stability, it would be

a moral failure of historic magnitude. More than that, to fail to exercise

our strength in a fashion that builds global cooperation would also, in the

long run, leave us weaker and more vulnerable to dangers from abroad.

We need to be engaged because only the United States can provide

the leadership necessary to respond to global and regional challenges to
we need to be engaged because our continued presence gives other nations

confidence in our power and reliability and makes us the ally of choice if

and when conflict arises. We also need to be engaged because only by actively shaping effective regional security systems can we create an environment in which nations that might otherwise challenge stability will instead

perceive a community of interests with the United States and with our regional allies. Additionally, we need to be engaged because only by recognizing and responding to the security concerns of other nations can we expect them to support our security interests and concerns. Cooperation

from other nations is essential to deter and defeat enemies who want to

undermine global order.

Not everyone agrees on the necessity for engagement. Some traditional champions of a strong national defense argue that engagement puts

too much emphasis on peacekeeping or humanitarian missions, which are

costly and not directly related to the overriding responsibility of U.S. military forces—to prepare for major conflicts.

For others, who believe the world ought to be more peaceful and less

militarized since the Cold War ended, engagement seems to emphasize security matters at the expense of other interests, including human rights,

fair trade practices, and environmental protection. Some even see engagement as a questionable rationale for continued high military spending in

a world with no direct, obvious U.S. threats.

Proponents of a strong national defense should reconsider their position in view of the compelling evidence that engagement is essential to our

military security. Similarly, those who believe that conflicts can be prevented

by promoting multilateral cooperation should understand that military engagement abroad is essential to build and enforce a more peaceful, cooperative world order in which our other interests and values can flourish.

Two points must be made:

■ Smaller-scale operations demand more resources than military

planners had assumed. The answer is not to foreswear such operations, but rather to acknowledge the resource demands and meet

those requirements.

■ It is important to be selective in making commitments and in using

the military. Above all, we need to ensure a balance between the interests we have at stake and the commitments we are making.
wake of the Cold War, we decided to maintain a permanent military

presence of about 100,000 troops in both Europe and Asia. These deployments, in retrospect, hardly appear excessive. On the contrary, our forces

in Europe, if anything, have been badly overworked. They have been involved in countless joint exercises with old and new allies and with former

enemies that have been critically important in building a new, cooperative

security order in Europe.

Engagement has also entailed a constant, rotational presence in the

Persian Gulf—a commitment which, we now should recognize, is on a par

with the commitments we have maintained in Europe and the Far East. It

has involved military intervention in Haiti, an ongoing peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, and literally dozens of smaller-scale military operations.

One thing should be clear: as long as we are actively engaged abroad, the

pace of military operations is likely to be much more demanding than

anyone had imagined a few years ago.

We in the Congress must keep this in mind when it comes to resourcing the military. Engagement costs money. This policy cannot be pursued

cheaply. We need a strong, well-resourced military to execute this strategy.

Engagement Has Succeeded

Perhaps the most important thing we need to keep in mind is that

the U.S. policy of engagement has been a success. Yes, we have suffered

some failures. No, we have not accomplished everything we might have

hoped. Yes, we have made some mistakes. But failures, shortcomings, and

mistakes are inevitable in international affairs—there has never been a

government in history that has not run into such difficulties.

Engagement is as centrally important to our security—and to the

prospects for peace in the world—as containment was during the Cold

War. Perhaps above all, the key issue is whether we will persist despite the

fact that the struggle to maintain relative international peace will never be

concluded. This is not a struggle we can see through to the end. It is,

nonetheless, an effort that we as a nation must continue to make.

Note 1 Winston Churchill, as quoted in Stewart Alsop, Stay of Execution: A Sort of Memoir (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1973).
Chapter 8

Whispers of Warriors:

The Importance of History

to the Military Professional

When I was a boy, every now and then my father would let me

wear his sailor’s hat. It was a very special keepsake, navy blue,

embroidered in gold thread, with the name of the ship he so

proudly served, USS Missouri, boldly emblazoned on the front. It was always a special occasion for me to wear that hat. When I wore it, I felt an

unusual connection to my father and the men with whom he served during World War I. It was as if whispers of warriors floated inside that hat—

whispers of important lessons learned through experience in battles past.

Perhaps spurred by stories from my father and keepsakes such as his

hat, I have maintained an abiding interest in the military and military history. In my capacity as the ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee in Congress, I work very closely with the military. Congress has a constitutional duty to raise and support armies and to provide

and maintain a navy. It is a grave responsibility. While authorizing and appropriating funds for the engines of war are important military roles of

Congress, ensuring our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen are mentally

prepared for the exigencies of war is a greater one. Congress must work

with the Armed Forces to ensure the strategic flame burns bright, that the

next generation of military leaders is capable and ready to assume the

mantle of generalship in the tradition of General George C. Marshall and

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.

When diplomacy fails, the fates of nations rest in the minds and

hands of their militaries. Paradoxically, the most grave course of action a

nation can undertake must be accomplished by a group unable to practice

regularly its profession. Sir William Francis Butler, the noted 19th-century

85

This chapter was originally published in Naval War College Review (Summer 2000).
British soldier and author, said that “the nation that will insist on drawing

a broad demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.”

While armies, navies, and air forces can train, conduct exercises and war

games, and shoot ordnance on instrumented ranges, for obvious reasons

they cannot fight in the name of preparedness.

Why Study History? 

All the great commanders have benefited from a strong foundation

in military history. Consider the words of a few of the masters of war:

Military history, accompanied by sound criticism, is indeed the true school of war.

—Henri Jomini

The study of military history lies at the foundation of all sound military conclusions

and practice.

—Alfred Thayer Mahan

[History is] the most effective means of teaching war during peace.

—Helmuth von Moltke (“the Elder”)

The science of strategy is only to be acquired by experience and by studying the

campaigns of the great captains. Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick, as well

as Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar, have all acted upon the same principles.

—Napoleon Bonaparte

Only the study of history is capable of giving those who have no experience of their

own a clear picture of what I have just called the friction of the whole machine.

—Carl von Clausewitz

When giants of warfare—the likes of Jomini, Mahan, the elder von

Moltke, Napoleon, and Clausewitz—agree universally on the importance

of history to the military officer, one must take notice.

Their message is clear. Through the study of history, military officers

can gain a semblance of experience in the art of war, even in the absence

of fighting. Within the written histories of battles and wars spanning three

millennia reside the experiences of the best and worst to practice the military arts in combat. Through history, the whispers of our forefathers are

brought to life. They tell the tales of great nations, how they rose, and why

86 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
they fell. They share secrets of war, from the painful, gut-wrenching decisions of commanders ordering men into harm’s way, to the less frenetic

and more rarefied analysis of grand strategy. They provide guidance in the

fighting arts, teaching tactics, and strategy. They tell about leadership, the

value of inspiration and courage, and warn of the follies of recklessness or

excessive caution. A student of military history can accumulate over 3,000

years of fighting experience at the price of time spent reading and analyzing the whispers of warriors past.

There are four practical lessons to be learned from the military professional by military history: fighting, generalship, innovation, and lessons

learned. Beginning with lessons in fighting, each of these topics will be addressed in turn.

Lessons in Fighting

From the whispers of warriors, students of military history can gain

an experiential foundation at all three levels of war—tactical, operational,

and strategic. Junior officers should focus on tactics. After tactics have

been mastered and as officers rise in seniority, they should also study the

operational and strategic levels of war.

Tactical

Army Field Manual 7–8, Infantry Rifle Platoons and Squads, states:

“Mission tactics require that leaders learn how to think rather than what

to think. It recognizes that the subordinate is often the only person at the

point of decision who can make an informed decision.”1

Tactics are based on doctrine, reinforced through repetition during

training, staff rides, and exercises, and ultimately proven in combat. Knowledge of doctrine and rehearsal of tactics are essential elements in learning

tactics. However, they still fall short in teaching a leader how to think in the

face of the friction and fog of war, against an enemy intent on killing him,

who comes to the battlefield with an entirely different set of weaponry, tactics, techniques and procedures, cultural motivation, and objectives. While

still only a substitute for combat experience, through history a leader can

learn the intricacies of how successful officers prevailed tactically against an

adversary or, conversely, why they failed. More important, a reader of history can learn the background behind tactics and understand their development, allowing him to execute them in the proper context or innovate in

the face of dynamic change. In short, a reader of military history learns how

to think about tactics rather than what to think.

IMPORTANCE OF HISTORY 87
General George S. Patton, one of America’s great tacticians, was an

avid reader of history. He studied tactics intensely, in concert with learning everything he could of potential adversaries. As early as 1909, while

still a cadet at the United States Military Academy, Patton wrote in his

personal notebook:

In order for a man to become a great soldier... it is necessary for him

to be so thoroughly conversant with all sorts of military possibilities

that when ever an occasion arises he has at hand without effort on his

part a parallel. To attain this end . . . it is necessary . . . to read military

history in its earliest and hence crudest form and to follow it down in

natural sequence permitting his mind to grow with his subject until

he can grasp without effort the most abstruse question of the science

of war because he is already permeated with all its elements.2

By the time World War II erupted, Patton was tactically primed and

ready. As Sun Tzu instructed, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a

hundred battles you will never be in peril,” Patton studied his adversaries

and their tactics as a matter of course. He maintained his study of the

enemy during the conduct of campaigns.

The 1944 breakout from Normandy illustrates this point. Bad

weather threatened to postpone an armywide general offensive against the

Saar-Moselle triangle. When the time for the “go, no-go” decision came,

Patton stuck to his order to attack. However, he fretted over his decision.

In his diary he wrote: “Woke up at 0300 and it was raining like hell. I actually got nervous and got up and read Rommel’s book, Infantry Attacks.

It was most helpful, as he described all the rains he had in September,

1914, and also the fact that, in spite of the heavy rains, the Germans got

along.”3 After learning that the Germans had managed in equally dreadful

weather during World War I, Patton was revitalized.

Tactical lessons abound in military history. A study of William Fetterman’s massacre in 1866 near Lodge Trail Ridge in Wyoming yields the

fundamentals of the ambush from its greatest practitioners, the American

Indians. The 1763 battle of Bushy Run, pitting American rangers and

British troops against the Indians, provides not only a daring example of

how to neutralize an ambush but also of how a complete envelopment and

certain rout can be turned into a victory via a bold counterattack. The

Revolutionary War battle at Cowpens in 1781 teaches a tactical application

of the layered defense, coupled with the importance of matching the tactic to the terrain and capabilities of the troops. The VII Corps’s textbook

flanking of the Iraqi defense in Desert Storm, reminiscent of Stonewall

88 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
Jackson’s smashing success against Joseph Hooker’s right flank at Chancellorsville in 1863, provides students of military tactics with proven examples of the flanking maneuver. Those who study and analyze such historical examples gain vicarious battlefield experience and also learn how

to think about tactics.4

Operational

In addition to learning how to think about operations, the student of

military history can learn warfare principles and enduring warfare themes

through study at the operational and strategic levels of war. As Sir A.P.

Wavell, British field marshal and viceroy of India, told his officers:

The real way to get value out of the study of military history is to take

particular situations, and as far as possible, to get inside the skin of a

man who made a decision, realize the conditions in which the decision

was made, and then see in what way you could have improved on it.

General Douglas MacArthur understood operational art and also the

principle of maneuver. His September 15, 1950, landing at Inchon—deep

behind North Korean lines, culminating in a hammer-and-anvil decimation of communist forces between Seoul and Pusan—stands as one of the

most brilliant and daring operations in the annals of warfare.5

MacArthur had firsthand combat experience to draw from in crafting the Inchon-Seoul campaign. He had orchestrated 87 amphibious assaults in the Pacific campaign against the Japanese during World War II.

MacArthur, however, also drew from history. As Army Chief of Staff in

1935, he advised that the military student “extends his analytic interest to

the dust-buried accounts of wars long past as well as those still reeking

with the scent of battle” to “bring to light those fundamental principles,

and their combinations and applications which, in the past, have been productive of success.”

MacArthur operationalized the words of Carl von Clausewitz, written 118 years earlier: “A swift and vigorous transition to attack—the flashing sword of vengeance—is the most brilliant point of the defensive.”

Strategic

Strategy is the domain of top-level decisionmakers, where military operations join with policy, politics, and national objectives. It requires a comprehensive understanding of national objectives and all means of national

power—military, diplomatic, and economic—as the precursor to linking

ends with means. Military history provides lessons in applied strategy.

IMPORTANCE OF HISTORY 89
Strategies employed in the conduct of war can be evaluated in terms of actual outcomes.

America’s most renowned naval thinker, Alfred Thayer Mahan, said

about strategy:

As in a building, which, however fair and beautiful the superstructure,

is radically marred and imperfect if the foundation be insecure—so,

if the strategy be wrong, the skill of the general on the battlefield, the

valor of the soldier, the brilliancy of victory, however otherwise decisive, fail of their effect.

Mahan’s words prophetically describe Germany’s failure in World

War II against Russia. Germany’s generals performed brilliantly. Her soldiers fought bravely and with great skill. Through blitzkrieg tactics, the

Germans won many decisive victories in battle. Yet all came to naught for

an ill-conceived strategy.

The roots of Germany’s strategic problems can be traced back to the

interwar years, when, paradoxically, they began a great military renaissance.

After World War I, General Hans von Seeckt, chief of the German army

command from 1920 to 1926, began a reformation of the German army, intent on correcting many of its World War I deficiencies. He began with training. He pushed the Army to adopt maneuver tactics, setting the stage for

blitzkrieg. He built an effective, independent-thinking noncommissioned

officer corps. Most important, he transformed officer training into officer

education. Officers learned the specifics of their branch, including tactics

and weaponry. They also studied subjects common to all branches, as well

as military history. Many scholars, however, have criticized the otherwise

stellar German officer training and education program for its lack of attention to grand strategy, politics, and economics.6 The Wehrmacht felt that

strategy was beyond its purview—instead, it focused on operational art.

The decades of dedication to the study of tactics, operations, and

military history nonetheless paid off when World War II erupted. Germany fielded an army with officers who were masters of tactics and operations. Not surprisingly, they prevailed at the tactical and operational

levels of war. However, their strategic prowess was not equal to their

expertise in operational art. They left strategic decisions up to their commander in chief, Adolf Hitler.

By the time the Germans invaded Russia in June of 1941, Hitler was

totally enamored with the blitzkrieg. After decisive blitzkrieg victories over

Poland and France, he was convinced that the Red Army would quickly

fold its tent once Operation Barbarossa began. But Hitler failed to grasp

90 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
the strategic differences between a war in Europe and a war in Russia. Russia was different—bitter cold in the winter, opening to the east in a widening expanse that had swallowed the likes of Napoleon. Russia would once

again trade space for time, which, coupled with her numerical superiority

and fierce fighting spirit in defense of her homeland, would ground the

lightning attack. Even with blitzkrieg tactics and great valor from its soldiers, the Wehrmacht failed to win Russia. Hitler would have done better

to listen to the warning whispers of Napoleon.

A student of strategic history learns why Pericles’ defensive strategy

failed against the Spartans. He better understands the failure of the Confederate strategy to demoralize the North and entice European intervention against General Winfield Scott’s Anaconda strategy.7 The military

scholar learns the conditions that necessitated a “Germany First” strategy

during World War II and to appreciate the economic and diplomatic sides

of war, as evidenced by the success of the containment strategy used

against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Lessons in Generalship

Generalship refers to the military skill of a high commander. In addition to knowledge of strategy, operations, and tactics, great generalship

requires personal courage in the face of danger, the ability to inspire and

move armies and fleets, and the ability to weigh risks and remain clearheaded in the face of chaos.8 Military history provides a wealth of case

studies in generalship.

Leadership

While the study of the campaigns of the great captains will yield lessons in fighting, the study of the great captains themselves can augment a

military officer’s knowledge of leadership. Their courage in the face of fire,

their inspirational exhortations, their bold and audacious actions, forever

stand as leadership examples, no matter the era or service affiliation.

The leadership styles of the great generals and admirals have been as

different as their names and personalities. From soft-spoken to loud and

booming, from conceptual thinkers to detailed planners, leaders have varied greatly in character and leadership styles. Although their styles have

defied condensation into a universal set of personality traits, students of

military history can hone their own styles from study of great captains

with styles similar to their own. From experience forged in battle, their

counsel on leadership is as important a part of their legacy as their results

in battle.

IMPORTANCE OF HISTORY 91
Superior leadership and martial wisdom alone do not complete the

skill required for generalship. In combination with leadership, pervasive

knowledge of strategy and tactics, and the trust and confidence of subordinates, the great captains also knew how to take appropriate risks. The

study of military history provides case studies in risk calculation in which

the gravest of stakes were on the line. As the great humanist Erasmus said,

“Fortune favors the audacious.” This statement applies to all of the great

captains. Contrarily, hardship curses the reckless and overly cautious.

The Audacious

Napoleon described Hannibal as “the most audacious of all, probably the most stunning, so hardy, so sure, so great in all things.” Hannibal’s

crossing of the Alps to attack the Romans in Italy, for which he is principally known, stands as perhaps the most audacious act in all of military

history. The trek was not without its costs. Hannibal lost almost half his

original force of 46,000 men and all but a few of the 38 elephants he

started with. Nonetheless, Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps also had its payoffs. Hannibal achieved a string of military successes against superior

odds, culminating in one of the most storied battles of all time—the battle of Cannae.

Two Roman double-consular armies met Hannibal on open ground

near Cannae. The Romans outnumbered Hannibal’s forces and looked to

outflank Hannibal on both sides. Hannibal aligned his troops in a crescent

formation, with the wings curved away from the Roman lines. The Romans attacked the Carthaginian infantry center, which gave way before

them, allowing the Roman infantry to encircle them. The Roman infantry,

sensing victory, closed in for the kill. On the wings, however, the

Carthaginian cavalry had defeated the Roman cavalry and maneuvered to

turn the crescent formation inside out to envelop the Roman infantry.

Hannibal’s army slaughtered the Roman armies. Hannibal had audaciously taken on a superior force and defeated it with a double-envelopment maneuver that is still studied today.

The Cautious

General “Fighting Joe” Hooker at Chancellorsville serves as an example of how excessive caution can turn an otherwise brilliant commander

into a beaten man. In the spring of 1863, the Confederates held 25 miles

of unbroken, fortified lines in Virginia, from Port Royal to Banks Ford.

Robert E. Lee still held Marye’s Heights in Fredericksburg, scene of

Ambrose Burnside’s earlier thrashing. Hooker realized that in spite of his

92 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
two-to-one superiority over the Army of Northern Virginia, another attack on Fredericksburg would end with the same devastating results. Instead, Hooker planned to flank Lee’s army by an upstream crossing of the

Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers with three corps, while holding Lee in

place with 40,000 men at Fredericksburg. The plan proceeded smoothly

until Union forces began to encounter resistance leaving the Wilderness

toward Fredericksburg. Thanks to J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry probes, Lee had

caught wind of Hooker’s plan and sent 50,000 men to take on Hooker. Lee,

an audacious general in his own right, dangerously split his force again,

sending Stonewall Jackson’s corps to flank Hooker’s right side. With Lee’s

forces split, Hooker had an opportunity to counterattack and crush the

Confederate forces. Instead, Hooker lost his nerve and cautiously ordered

a withdrawal to Chancellorsville. With that order, Hooker handed over the

reins of initiative to Lee, snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.

The Reckless

Everyone knows the story of Custer’s last stand and his headlong

reckless rush after the Indians. Another, lesser-known Indian battle, the

battle of Blue Licks, also serves to highlight the difference between reckless

and audacious action. In August 1782, a group of 182 Kentucky militiamen, led by Colonel John Todd and including members of the Boone family, was in hot pursuit of Indians who had attacked an American fort.9 One

officer, Major Hugh McGary, advised Colonel Todd to wait for reinforcements. Todd rebuked McGary for his timidity, a scorn that did not sit well

with the hotheaded company commander.

During the pursuit, Daniel Boone noticed the Indians were concealing their numbers by sharing tracks, yet making the trail very easy to follow. Boone smelled an ambush by a force he estimated at 500 Indians. The

rangers caught up to the Indians at the Blue Licks. Several Indian warriors

showed themselves at the top of the rocky hilltop. Boone knew the terrain.

At the top of the hilltop were wooded ravines that could shield an Indian

force from view. He advised breaking off the pursuit. McGary, still stinging

from Todd’s previous insult, called Boone a coward. He leapt onto his

horse, yelling, “Them that ain’t cowards follow me,” and recklessly charged

into the river toward the Indians. Colonel Todd and the rest of the rangers

followed. The Indians were indeed waiting in ambush, just as Boone feared.

The rangers suffered a devastating defeat, in which Daniel Boone lost his

son, Israel.10 Rather than provide inspiration at the decisive moment,

McGary had recklessly incited a charge outside of the proper context.

IMPORTANCE OF HISTORY 93
Inspiration

Military history smiles most brightly on its most brilliant generals

who were also monuments to inspiration. American military history has

many proud examples of inspirational leadership. John Paul Jones revitalized his badly beaten crew in the battle between the HMS Serapis and the

Bon Homme Richard with his reply, “I have not yet begun to fight,” to the

British call for surrender. Major General Anthony C. McAuliffe’s simple

yet defiant reply of “Nuts!” to the German demand for surrender at Bastogne steeled not only the hearts of the defending 101st Airborne and 10th

Armored Divisions but also the rest of the American army in northwest

Europe.11 Inspirational words coupled with courage, and the strong will of

a great captain, can turn the tide of battle. They can move men to victory

against superior odds, just as Lord Horatio Nelson’s signal that “England

expects that every man will do his duty” did for his fleet on October 21,

1805, at the battle of Trafalgar.

Study of the great captains yields the context and timing of tideturning remarks and shows the power of inspiration through the force of

their results. While few officers will ever find themselves in situations like

those of Jones off Flamborough Head, McAuliffe in Bastogne, or Nelson at

Trafalgar—with fewer still the headiness to articulate such elegant, fiery

prose in the midst of carnage—strong-willed officers must still be able to

buttress the fighting spirit of their troops and move them to action. Inspiration can mean the difference between victory and defeat.

Inspiration can also result from deed and attitude rather than words.

In Lord Moran’s The Anatomy of Courage, Surgeon Commander McDowell provides a compelling account of inspirational leadership, while also

noting its personal toll on the leader:

I saw the Captain of a ship drinking a cup of tea on the bridge in the

course of dive-bombing attacks that had gone on all day. While he was

drinking the lookout reported “Aircraft on the starboard bow, sir.” He

did not even look up. At “Aircraft diving, sir,” the Captain glanced up

only. “Bomb released, sir,” and the Captain gave the order “Hard astarboard,” and went on drinking his tea until the bomb hit the water

nearby. The reaction to this episode was a kind of hero-worship on

the part of everyone who saw it. When the bombing had ceased the

Captain went down to his cabin and when he was alone he wept.

94 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
Courage

Generalship requires courage—the strength to persevere in the face

of fear. Of all the military virtues, it is the most prized and highly rewarded. No man knows how he will react to the stresses of combat until

actually tested in battle. More likely than not, he will grapple with his own

fear of death, while trying his best to present a mask of courage. History

whispers the accounts of the great captains, who sometimes shared the fact

that they too had to overcome personal fear in the face of combat. In a

March 25, 1943, letter to his wife, Beatrice, Patton admitted, “I still get

scared under fire. I guess I will never get used to it, but I still poke along.”

Untested warriors can take solace in the fact that fear is normal, a precondition to courageous action.

Commanders must also have the moral courage to do what is right

in spite of popular sentiment or even orders. The whispers of the 109 civilians massacred at the Vietnamese village of My Lai at the orders of Lieutenant William Calley on March 16, 1968, still remind us of a higher duty

always to do what is right.

Lessons in Innovation

We must stay tuned to the whispers of history—they must not be

drowned out by crescendo of the present. As Sir Julian Corbett noted,“The

value of history in the art of war is not only to elucidate the resemblance

of past and present, but also their essential differences.” The development

of the German blitzkrieg between World War I and World War II illustrates

Corbett’s insight.

World War I defensive victories in battles such as Verdun, as opposed

to the slaughter of French soldiers in offensive operations, led the French to

believe that an impenetrable Maginot line would protect the French from

future aggression. The lesson learned by the French was right, that in World

War I the defense dominated. The Germans learned the same lesson. But

whereas the French adopted the lesson, the Germans adapted to it.

At the close of World War I, the Germans had some success with their

elite stormtroop units in overcoming the stalemate of static trench warfare.

They studied stormtroop tactics, looking for ways to improve them. While

the stormtroop units were able to take advantage of surprise and speed to

overcome enemy defensive positions, they still were short of the mobility

required to take advantage of their gains. During the years following World

War I, the Germans developed the blitzkrieg concept, a mobile form of

IMPORTANCE OF HISTORY 95
warfare that combined close air support with tanks and mechanized infantry, to shift the advantage back to the offensive.

Lessons in Lessons Learned

History teaches that every war is unique. “Lessons learned” typically

focus on what worked—and what did not—in the last conflict. History is replete with examples of militaries staying with successful technology and

doctrine from previous conflicts only to suffer disastrous results in the next.

History also teaches that there are no silver bullets in warfare. Multiple

means are necessary to address a spectrum of conflict that continues to expand with each evolution and revolution in warfare. The debate over the

utility of the atomic bomb after the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki is

a case in point. After the surrender of the Japanese in World War II, air extremists proclaimed that the atomic bomb rendered all other weapons and

forces obsolete.12 They argued that the dropping of the bomb at Hiroshima

and Nagasaki heralded the nuclear age, in which traditional forms of power

projection—to include the Army, Navy, and Marines—were relics of the

past. The atomic bomb could do it all—the Nation merely needed to invest

in bombers and A-bombs. An acrimonious debate culminated in 1949 with

a special House Armed Services Committee investigation.13

The committee report debunked the myth of the “one-weapon, easywar concept”; it was further underscored when the North Koreans attacked across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950. Strategic bombing with

atomic weapons was simply not an option. The Korean War was a bloody

conflict in which ground forces, supported by air and sea power, were the

final arbiters.

Conclusion

Serious study of history is essential to the development of exceptional military professionals. Napoleon, on his way to exile at Saint Helena,

probably summed it up best in referring to his own son’s education: “My

son should read and meditate often about history; the only true philosophy. And he should read and think about the great captains. This is the

only way to learn about war.”

On a personal note, I still have my father’s hat. I no longer wear it;

even so, I know the whispers of the past still reside within it. I remember

their lessons. My father’s hat reminds me....

96 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
Notes1 Field Manual 7–8, Infantry Rifle Platoons and Squads (Washington, DC: Department of the

Army, 1992), chapter 2, “Operations.”

2 Martin Blumenson, Patton: The Man Behind the Legend, 1885–1945 (New York: William Morrow, 1985). 3 Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940–1945 (New York: Da Capo, 1996). 4 To find out more about these battles, the following readings are recommended: Roy E. Appleman, “The Fetterman Fight,” in Great Western Indian Fights, ed. Potomac Corral of the Westerners (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960, repr. 1966), chap. 10; Mark M. Boatner, Encyclopedia of the

American Revolution (New York: David McKay, 1966); Thomas Fleming, “The Cowpens,” Military History Quarterly (Summer 1989), 56–67; Victor Davis Hanson,“Cannae,”Military History Quarterly (Summer 1990), 60–65; Alberto Bin, Richard Hill, and Archer Jones, Desert Storm: A Forgotten War (Westport:

Praeger, 1998); and Stephen W. Sears, Chancellorsville (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996). 5 For more on the Korean War, see T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1998).

6 James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 75–96. 7 Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the

United States of America (New York: Free Press, 1984), 161. 8 Napoleon advised that “the first quality for a commander in chief is a cool head, which receives a correct impression of things. He should not allow himself to be confused by either good or

bad news. The impressions which he receives successively or simultaneously in the course of a day

should classify themselves in his mind in such a way as to occupy the place which they merit, for reason and judgment are the result of the comparison of various impressions taken into consideration.

There are men who, by their physical and moral make-up, create for themselves a complete picture

built upon a single detail. Whatever knowledge, intelligence, courage and other good qualities such

men may have, nature has not marked them for command of armies or for direction of great operations of war.” 9 Isaac Newton Skelton III and Earl Franklin Skelton, Ike, This Is You (Washington, DC: n.p.,

1995), 132–141. 10 The author’s great-great-great grandfather, Squire Boone, was wounded in the thigh during

the battle. 11 S.L.A. Marshall, Bastogne (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1946). 12 Bertram Vogal, “A Reply to the Extremists,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1947),

545–547. 13 J. D. Hittle,“Korea: Back to the Facts of Life,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (December 1950),

1289–1297.

IMPORTANCE OF HISTORY 97
It Aint New:

Joint Operations

Unless history can teach us how to look at the future, the history of war is but a bloody

romance.

—J. F. C. Fuller

As ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, I rely

on the lessons of history to help me understand and reach decisions

about the future of the Armed Forces of today. Over the years, I

have discovered that most dilemmas the military faces are actually not new

issues. Frequently, I find similar situations from the past to use as guideposts to frame the issues of today.

Some national security professionals, both civilian and military, think

that a brand-new era of warfare is at hand. They believe that modern battles will be joint operations fought by loose coalitions of countries with various national interests. They also believe that U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force,

and Marine Corps forces will use controversial weapons produced by 21stcentury technological breakthroughs. In fact, true students of military history realize that these concepts—joint operations, coalition warfare, and

the integration of new technology—have their roots in battles of yesteryear.

They look to the past for lessons on how to fight today.

Joint Operations

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team. This was

important yesterday, it is essential today, and it will be even more important tomorrow.

—General John Shalikashvili

99

Author’s Note: I wish to express my gratitude to Major Mary F. O’Brien, USAF, for her insight and

research contributions in the preparation of this article, first published in Aerospace Power Journal

(Fall 2000).
ment of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Nothing could be further from

the truth, although our most recent well-known and successful joint operation—Desert Storm—owes a great deal of its success to that important

legislation. The truth is that the U.S. Armed Forces have a long tradition of

cooperation among the services in order to accomplish their missions.

One of America’s First Joint Operations: The Siege of Veracruz

For example, the siege of Veracruz in 1847 during the Mexican War

was the most successful of many joint operations during that war.1 This operation, planned and executed by the Army and Navy, represented the first

major amphibious operation in American history and the largest one conducted until World War II. Major General Winfield Scott, the senior Army

commander, developed a plan that was clearly joint in every sense of the

word. He placed great reliance on the Navy in order to execute his plan, including the unprecedented step of putting Army transports temporarily

under the command of Navy Commodore David Conner.2 General Scott

also created a joint procurement process and developed command and

control procedures to allow the Army and Navy to communicate with each

other during the operation. Army troops on the transport ships needed

small landing craft in order to get ashore, so Scott had “surfboats” specifically constructed for the amphibious assault. Although these vessels were

contracted through the Army quartermaster, a naval officer—Lieutenant

George M. Totten—designed them.3 In order to synchronize the Army and

Navy effort, General Scott and Commodore Conner worked out a new set

of signals for supporting fires, loading surfboats, and assaulting the beach

because the existing signals assumed an all-Army invasion.4 Once the Army

troops assembled onshore, the Navy brought guns and personnel off the

ships to Army emplacements in order to coordinate artillery efforts from

ship- and land-based artillery. The landing and successful siege at Veracruz

opened the way for more victories during the Mexican War, which resulted

in the acquisition of additional U.S. territories.

A Modern-Day Joint Operation: Desert Storm

Nearly 150 years after the siege at Veracruz, General Norman

Schwarzkopf of the U.S. Army commanded one of the most successful joint

military operations in history. He planned to maximize the military services’

unique capabilities at each stage of the campaign to defeat Iraq. The offensive

air campaign phase of Desert Storm integrated Air Force, Navy, Marine,
the ground-campaign phase. On [February 24] G–Day, U.S. ground forces,

consisting of two Army corps and a Marine expeditionary force, together

with coalition ground forces, assembled more than 200,000 soldiers to face

the Iraqis. Numerous ground-attack aircraft continued to bomb hostile artillery sites, armored units, supply vehicles, and troops. Naval forces also contributed to the ground offensive. Surface ships supported amphibious operations, and the USS Missouri (BB–63) and USS Wisconsin (BB–64)

bombarded Iraqi coastal positions and provided naval gunfire support to advancing troops.5

General Schwarzkopf was instrumental in keeping the joint effort on

track. When conflicts arose among the services over their roles,

Schwarzkopf adjudicated their differences. Early in the conflict, for example, he had to settle a disagreement between the Navy and Air Force concerning beyond-visual-range rules of engagement for attacking hostile aircraft.6 Fearing incidents of fratricide, the Air Force wanted a friendly

aircraft to make two types of independent verification of hostility before

its fighter aircraft launched air-to-air missiles. Since Navy aircraft could

conduct only one type of verification, they wanted an airborne warning

and control system (AWACS) aircraft to perform the second verification.

Otherwise, Navy fighters could not use the Phoenix air-to-air missile at

optimal range. The Air Force resisted using AWACS, believing that it did

not provide an accurate location of hostile fighters when they flew in proximity to friendly aircraft. When Vice Admiral Stan Arthur and Lieutenant

General Chuck Horner, the Navy and Air Force component commanders,

respectively, could not reach an agreement, they asked General

Schwarzkopf to make the final determination. He supported a modified

Air Force position that resulted in both Admiral Arthur and General

Horner continuing their good working relationship and respecting each

other’s viewpoints.7

One can examine the success of joint operations during Desert Storm

by considering the relationship among General Schwarzkopf, the supporting commanders in chief (CINC), and the service chiefs. U.S. Transportation Command provided the logistics to get the necessary troops and

equipment in-theater; U.S. Space Command warned of Scud missile

launches, and its Global Positioning System satellites facilitated operations; and the geographic CINCs provided air, sea, and ground forces from

their theaters. The service chiefs fulfilled their roles as force providers to
ploy these forces without trying to interfere in the command relationships

established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Coalition Warfare

There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies—and that is fighting

without them.

—Winston S. Churchill

The Department of Defense (DOD) has increased the emphasis on

training and fighting with our allies, especially since the end of the Persian

Gulf War. It is important to recognize that, because they lack either the

support of world opinion or the military capabilities to operate independently, few countries can fight alone. The need for countries to form alliances based on common national interests or security concerns has existed for millennia.

The Duke of Marlborough: Skilled at Coalition Warfare

John Churchill, the duke of Marlborough, acted as commander of

British, Dutch, Prussian, Danish, and other Grand Alliance forces during

the War of the Spanish Succession, fighting four battles successfully against

the French army from 1701 to 1712. For nearly 10 years, his personal

diplomacy effort, unusual at the time, was the driving force behind the

daunting task of keeping the incredibly fractious coalition together.

Churchill understood that face-to-face meetings with allied rulers and

ministers in Berlin, Vienna, and the Hague could prove more effective in

resolving difficulties and formulating plans than written communication.8

Because of his efforts, the allies gave him their confidence and trust as well

as control of their armies.

Churchill’s attempts to win over the members of the Grand Alliance

paid off for him years later while he prepared for his last campaign against

the French in 1711. When his enemies in England’s new Parliament

wanted to replace him, other leaders of the Grand Alliance spoke on his

behalf. The duke of Hanover and the king of Prussia threatened to withdraw their troops unless he remained in command, which led the rest of

the Grand Alliance to state their strong belief that he should continue to

be in charge. They saw him as their champion, especially since he had already led the alliance to victory in three battles against the French.9
tant, if not more so, than in the past. As the Supreme Allied Commander,

Europe, Army General Wesley Clark led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in its first military campaign, Operation Allied Force in

mid-1999. In addition to trying to convince Yugoslav leader Slobodan

Milosevic to pull his forces out of Kosovo, General Clark had to ensure

that internal differences among NATO countries concerning the conduct

of the campaign and the desired outcome did not pull NATO apart.

To General Clark, maintaining alliance cohesion during Allied Force

was just as important as avoiding casualties, targeting Serb forces and associated targets, and minimizing collateral damage.10 He had a difficult

time keeping his targeting strategy on track because every target required

unanimous approval of the allies, some of whom opposed the entire campaign or certain aspects of it. For example, Greece and Italy opposed an extended bombing campaign, France resisted plans for a naval blockade, and

Germany opposed any consideration of a ground war.11 General Clark had

to rely on his diplomatic skills to convince NATO allies of the need to escalate the campaign and to consider the possibility of a ground war. He

used personal phone calls and meetings to persuade them to reduce

bombing constraints in order to intensify the campaign, yet maintain allied consensus and cohesion.12

In an effort to obtain approval of two particularly important targets—the Yugoslav Interior Ministry and the headquarters of the Serbian

special police—General Clark personally briefed Javier Solana, NATO secretary general, on the intricacies of targeting. He included such details as

the blast radius of warheads and how the desired point of impact controlled whether the building would collapse inward or explode outward.

Clark thought it important to send a message by striking these targets during the first missions to Belgrade. The North Atlantic Council debated the

request but in the end left the final decision to Secretary General Solana,

who gave his approval a few days later.13

General Clark earned the admiration of NATO for his leadership in

the Balkans. During the change-of-command ceremony for General Clark,

Lord Robertson, Solana’s successor as NATO secretary general, praised

him for his “unique combination of military expertise, political knowledge, and diplomatic skill.”14 Lord Robertson went on to say that General

Clark was “the right man in the right place at the right time” to lead the
Allies with Unequal Military Capabilities Benefit from Unity

In addition to ensuring shared goals among the alliance nations,

coalition warfare involves another concern. In the year since the end of the

bombing over Serbia, the United States and the rest of the NATO countries

have had an opportunity to study the lessons learned from the first NATO

military operation. Among these many lessons, everyone emphasizes and

agrees that the European countries have fallen behind the United States

both militarily and technologically—a matter of great concern that NATO

will address over the next few years. Again, this situation is not new to us,

and we should not let it interfere with our reliance on our allies during

times of crisis. There was a time in American history when the opposite

was true—we Americans fielded the inexperienced, poorly equipped force

and had to rely on the superior capabilities of our European allies.

Specifically, the American Continental Army largely owed its victory

over superior British forces during the American Revolution to the military assistance of France, which sent officers, soldiers, gunpowder, and

ships to the Americans. The commander of French forces in America also

had a strong hand in shaping the objectives of the war. Jean-Baptiste-Donatien de Vimeur, comte de Rochambeau, argued for an attack on Lord

Charles Cornwallis in the south despite General George Washington’s desire to lay siege to New York instead.15 The comte de Rochambeau had already begun planning for a siege at Yorktown when he requested assistance

from the commander of the French fleet in the Caribbean. Admiral

François-Joseph-Paul de Grasse responded by canceling all other missions,

readying every ship, obtaining troops and field artillery, borrowing money,

and immediately setting sail for the American coast. The tremendous support for the operation at Yorktown convinced General Washington to

march his troops south instead of north to New York.

Meanwhile, the French defeated the British fleet off the Virginia

coast, ensuring that Lord Cornwallis would not receive the reinforcements

he urgently needed from New York. The allied army began preparations

for the offensive, supported by the accurate bombardment of the British

by the French cannoneers. American and French troops successfully attacked, forcing Lord Cornwallis to surrender. British reinforcements

arrived 5 days later, but the French fleet still controlled the Chesapeake.

The British returned to New York without engaging French forces.16 Despite the disparity in expertise, the American and French military efforts
technical expertise, and equipment.

Operation Allied Force: American Military Technology Pulls Ahead

It quickly became clear during Allied Force that U.S. military capabilities have dramatically pulled ahead of those of our European allies.

The Kosovo after-action report to Congress noted this gap, especially in

the areas of precision strike; mobility; and command, control, and communications.17 This forced the United States to conduct the majority of

the precision strike sorties, especially during the first days of the conflict

when the Yugoslav air defenses remained fully operational. As it became

clear to the NATO political and military leadership that the United States

would bear the brunt of the cost of the military effort, the allies agreed

that the Europeans would cover the majority of the cost of the peace enforcement and reconstruction efforts in Kosovo. Although the exact division of costs is the subject of spirited debate, the Europeans seem to be

living up to their promise.

Even though the United States led the military effort during Allied

Force, we could not have carried out the entire operation without assistance from our European allies, who provided personnel, equipment,

and—more important—political and diplomatic support. One should

also note that the United States benefited from use of the NATO allies’ military infrastructure, including military bases, airfields, and airspace. Although the B–2 bomber proved very effective in operating from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, aircraft usually must launch from a

location much closer to the theater in order to accomplish their mission.

For that reason, U.S. forces deployed to facilities in countries closer to

Kosovo and Serbia—such as Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain,

France, Hungary, and others.

However, the gap in military capability—certainly a reason for concern and a topic of discussion at the summit recognizing the 50th anniversary of NATO—could affect future alliance efforts. To reduce this gap,

NATO adopted the Defense Capabilities Initiative, which seeks to enhance

allied capabilities in deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; effective engagement; survivability of forces and infrastructure; and

command, control, and information systems. The overall goal is to improve interoperability between U.S. military forces and the rest of NATO.
—Franklin D. Roosevelt

DOD feels strongly, as do some Members of Congress, that other nations can overcome the technological advantage long enjoyed by the

United States if we do not continue to invest in research and development

and field the weapon systems resulting from these efforts. Counterarguments come from those who believe that, although we eventually will have

to modernize, our technological lead is so great now and for the foreseeable future that we can afford to take a breather from a policy of constant

modernization. Congress is charged with finding the balance between the

two sides. Unfortunately, this is not a simple exercise, and we will measure

the consequences of being wrong in the loss of America’s sons and daughters. I find it helpful to look to history to study another time when the

United States faced a similar situation.

The current debate concerning precision warfare and the role it

should play in future conflicts has a strong precedent in the integration of

the airplane into the U.S. military. Prior even to the debates about establishing the Air Force as a separate branch of the armed services, controversy existed over the capabilities and limitations of the airplane and the

role it should play. The airplane and precision-guided weapons are parallel issues almost 100 years apart, with consequences affecting doctrine, operations, tactics, and certainly, resource priorities.

Airplanes: Discovering Their Military Usefulness

The introduction of the aircraft to the U.S. military did not proceed

smoothly. Many political and military leaders failed to see the need to expend resources to develop military aviation to its fullest potential. After

World War I, Army leaders for the most part considered the airplane little

more than another form of reconnaissance and artillery, and the United

States did not follow Great Britain’s example in establishing a separate air

force. As the United States began to focus on domestic spending after the

war, Generals Henry “Hap” Arnold and William “Billy” Mitchell began a

public-relations campaign around the country to increase support for

funding the Air Service. The support generated by their demonstrations

forced the Navy to agree to a bombing test in 1921. After modifying the official rules of the test, Air Service pilots sank three captured German vessels, including the “unsinkable” battleship Ostfriesland. Two years later, the

Air Service successfully repeated the tests by sinking two obsolete American
In addition to demonstrating the potential military capabilities of the

airplane, early airpower advocates began to develop airpower theory, doctrine, and tactics. The Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Air Force Base,

Alabama, is generally credited with considering the early airpower theories

espoused by Mitchell, General Jugh Trenchard, and perhaps General Giullio

Douhet—and with establishing the first airpower doctrine developed in the

United States.18 This doctrine advocated precision, high-altitude, daylight

strategic bombardment against the enemy military-industrial complex.

However, its publication did not convince skeptics in Congress—or the

Army and Navy—of the usefulness of airpower. Only the success of actual

strategic-bombardment missions and support to the ground troops during

World War II convinced naysayers of the value of military missions for the

airplane—and of the need for an independent Air Force.

Surprisingly, remnants of the debate about the role of airpower and

its ability to play a decisive role in conflict continue in Congress and the

Pentagon today, despite the critically important airpower demonstrations

in both Desert Storm and Allied Force. The airplane now performs an extensive array of missions for all of the services, and I would not want to

fight an adversary without the best aircraft America can produce.

Precision-Guided Weapons: Living Up to Their Promise

Today, I see many similarities between the struggle for acceptance of

the airplane and the way the Armed Forces are integrating precisionguided munitions (PGMs) into the force structure. The effort to achieve

more accurate weapons began in World War I and approached modern capabilities with PGMs toward the end of the Vietnam War. However, not

until Desert Storm did the American public get a close-up view of the capability of PGMs. Increased emphasis on precision will drive changes in

military doctrine, operations, and tactics. Already, it is clear that we need

to make our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities

more responsive and accurate in order to support the efficient targeting of

precision-guided weapons. Other questions remain concerning their roles,

compared to that of traditional weapon systems, and the impact they will

have on other military concepts, such as maneuver.

Each of the services must examine the part of their warfighting doctrine that addresses precision-guided weapons and develop the best plan

for employing precision capability. They need to answer questions about

when to use these weapons and against what types of targets. They should
to our servicemembers, the unique importance of the target, or some

other factor. That done, the Pentagon must educate American leaders and

the general public about these new weapons. Just as education about the

airplane many years ago led to building the world’s greatest air force, so

does the Nation need to learn the capabilities and limitations of precisionguided weapons in order to understand why they represent a wise investment for the future.19

We need educational efforts not only to justify resources but also to

employ PGMs against critical targets effectively. For example, during

Desert Storm, coalition political and military leaders hesitated to allow the

bombing of high-value targets located in or near population centers.

However, after receiving briefings detailing the accuracy of PGMs, these

leaders felt more comfortable using them against targets in cities.20 As previously mentioned, General Clark gave the same types of briefings during

Allied Force in order to gain NATO consensus to bomb certain targets in

highly populated areas.

Conclusion

My study of history tells me that the challenges facing the military

today—and into the future—are not new. The U.S. military must continue to develop leaders who understand jointness in order to fight as a

joint force. This is important because the Nation needs the strength created when all of the armed services work together. In addition, because

America will continue to lead and participate in coalitions, the services

must prepare military leaders of tomorrow to operate comfortably in a

multinational environment. They must understand the different national

interests that may drive their counterparts and must recognize allied

military capabilities in order to get the most out of their contributions.

Finally, the United States cannot afford to integrate haphazardly new

technology into its force structure. We must look ahead in order to understand the potential implications of technology and to ensure that theory, doctrine, and strategy do not fall behind. One of the best ways for

future military leaders to prepare is to study military history. It might

surprise them to discover how much yesteryear has in common with

today. In other words—it ain’t new.
Quarterly 10 (Winter 19951996), 104.

2 K. Jack Bauer, Surfboats and Horse Marines: U.S Naval Operations in the Mexican War,

1846–48 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1969), 77–78.

3 Clark and Moseley, 108.

4 Ibid., 100.

5 U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to the Congress

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1992), 293. 6 P. Mason Carpenter, “Joint Operations in the Gulf War: An Allison Analysis” (thesis, School

of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, June 1994), 18–19. 7 Ibid.

8 J.R. Jones, Marlborough (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 138. 9 Winston S. Churchill, Marlborough: His Life and Times (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,

1968), 795. 10 Wesley K. Clark, “The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead,” Parameters 29, no. 4 (Winter 1999–2000), 7. 11 Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, “Kosovo Reconsidered: NATO’s Bombs and Belgrade’s Strategy—Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate,” International Security 24, no. 4 (Spring

2000), 34. 12 Dana Priest, “The Battle inside Headquarters,” The Washington Post, September 21, 1999. 13 Ibid.

14 Linda D. Kozaryn, “Europe Salutes Allied Force Commander,” American Forces Press Service,

May 4, 2000; accessed at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2000/n05042000_20005043.html>. 15 Stephen C. Danckert, “The Siege of Yorktown: Coalition Force,” Military Review 73, no. 1

(January 1993), 16. 16 Ibid., 20.

17 U.S. Department of Defense, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report: Report to

Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 31, 2000), 25. 18 James A. Mowbray, “Air Force Doctrine Problems: 1926–Present,” Airpower Journal 9, no. 4

(Winter 1995), 3. 19 Richard P. Hallion,“Precision Weapons, Power Projection, and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” USAF Air Armament Summit, Eglin Air Force Base, FL, May 26, 1999; accessed at <http://www.

airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Hallionpapers/precisionweaponspower.htm>. 20 Ibid.
Chapter 10

Military Lessons from 

Desert One to the Balkans

The performance of the Armed Forces has shown a marked improvement since its low point in the post-Vietnam era. Military

leaders have deliberately sought out and internalized lessons from

each succeeding conflict. The challenge for the next generation is learning

the lessons of these past operations and building an even more effective,

flexible force. These lessons include the following:

■ The military cannot pick and choose its missions. Their political

masters may well decide that national interests require the use of force

for more nontraditional missions or in situations that may be less

than ideally suited to military solutions.

■ Force protection is critical; high rates of casualties can erode popular

support and undermine the mission. On the other hand, excessive fear

of casualties can erode the morale of the Armed Forces. The key is forging American leadership that understands the military risks involved.

■ Commitments to our allies may draw us into conflicts where U.S.

national interests are limited, but where American leadership is essential to the vitality of the alliance.

■ Even a small operation conducted abroad requires an extraordinary range of well-trained forces, either highly deployable or already

in theater.

■ Despite successes, the Armed Forces must address a number of

challenges: urban warfare, weapons of mass destruction, tracking and

destroying mobile targets, the need for lighter, more deployable

forces, and the burden of ongoing operations.

111

The original version of this chapter was published as Strategic Forum 174 (Washington, DC: Institute

for National Strategic Studies, October 2000).
Military leaders are often accused, usually unfairly, of fighting the last

war. It would be a pretty poor general, however, who failed to learn from

what did and did not work when military plans were actually put to the test.

The task is to correct what went wrong and to build on what went right

without losing sight of the fact that conflicts in the future may be quite different from those in the past. It is the premise of this chapter that a careful

look at significant U.S. military operations over about the past 20 years—

roughly the period the author has served in Congress—can help shape answers to a surprisingly large number of contemporary issues in defense policy. What follows is a brief review of seven of these military operations,

followed by a discussion of some important lessons.

Iran (1980)

President Jimmy Carter authorized an audacious military operation

in April 1980 to rescue American diplomats held hostage in Tehran since

the previous November. Although the operation ended in disaster in the

Iranian desert at a site code-named Desert One, it ultimately had important

consequences. It prompted a great deal of public soul-searching about the

state of U.S. military readiness, and, perhaps most importantly, it marked a

turning point in popular support for military preparedness. The lessons of

Desert One also contributed to steps that Congress took in coming years to

strengthen special operations forces and clarify lines of command.

Lebanon (1982–1984)

U.S. Marines were sent to Lebanon in September 1982 as part of a

multinational force (MNF) in response to a worsening civil war. The failure

of the MNF mission, and the tragic loss of 241 marines when a truck bomb

was exploded at Marine headquarters in Beirut, imposed sobering lessons

on U.S. policymakers. The mission was ill-defined from the beginning. It

was not clear whether the MNF was a traditional peacekeeping force depending for its effectiveness on maintaining the consent of contending parties, or whether it was a peacemaking force empowered to compel adherence

to agreements more assertively. The rules of engagement governing the conduct of troops in the field were ambiguous, and actions necessary to protect

the force were not taken. As the security situation deteriorated, it should

have become apparent that the size and composition of the force were inadequate, but decisionmakers failed to rethink the nature of the mission and

instead allowed U.S. involvement to escalate incrementally.

112 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
The outcome of that mission shaped subsequent U.S. debates about

the use of military force. Lebanon was clearly at the forefront of Secretary

of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s thinking when, in November 1984, he articulated what came to be known as the Weinberger doctrine, laying out

six restrictive conditions on U.S. military action. Weinberger’s sharpest

critic was Secretary of State George Shultz, who in a series of three

speeches took issue with most of those conditions. Echoes of their exchange are heard frequently in debates over military operations.

Grenada (1983)

Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada was planned with virtually no advance warning and executed by diverse units with no opportunity to train

jointly before the operation began. Though it succeeded, it was not a

walkover. The operation suffered from shortcomings that cost lives. Intelligence was incomplete, and communications were often unreliable, particularly in coordinating air attacks and naval gunfire with ground operations.

Perhaps the most important lesson of Grenada is the value of bold,

concerted, aggressive military action, even in the face of incomplete intelligence and in spite of the certainty that some things will go wrong. In

this operation, aggressiveness contributed to a viable overall strategic

plan, which enabled American forces to perform very well in a very demanding operation.

Panama (1989–1990)

Despite some negatives, the main lessons of this operation against the

Panamanian Defense Force and General Manuel Noriega were overwhelmingly positive. The cohesiveness of Operation Just Cause demonstrated the

effectiveness of joint planning and command structures instituted following

enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Simultaneous, coordinated assaults, using forces from each of the services,

multiplied the impact of the whole operation. The action achieved a large

measure of tactical surprise. The fact that the initial, critical stages of the intervention were carried out at night was particularly significant. As one

commander noted, “We owned the night.” Unmatched night-fighting capabilities have constituted a major U.S. tactical advantage ever since. Panama

was clearly a case in which adequate force was applied to accomplish welldefined objectives with minimal casualties.

MILITARY LESSONS 113
Persian Gulf (1990–1991)

The Persian Gulf War demonstrated the remarkable reconstitution

of U.S. military power in the 15 years following an institutionally devastating failure in Vietnam. In all, 541,000 U.S. military personnel were

committed to Operation Desert Storm, along with some 200,000 allied

forces. Not surprisingly, given the size, complexity, and importance of the

conflict, the effort to draw appropriate lessons has been extensive, and it

continues to this day.

The most obvious conclusion is that no nation today can directly

challenge U.S. conventional military strength, and it would be folly to

try—a lesson our potential foes are certain also to have learned. Beyond

that, the conflict demonstrated the efficacy of precision munitions; the

success of stealth technology; the critical importance of air supremacy; the

advantages of night operations; the ability of air power, under the right

conditions, to disable an enemy command and control infrastructure; the

immense importance of sound military doctrine and operational tenets

derived from a careful study of past conflicts; the critical importance of

unified command; the advantages of a well-trained professional military

force; the value of attack helicopters, close support aircraft, and a number

of other platforms when used creatively and with a full understanding of

their potential vulnerabilities; the critical importance of information

dominance; and the absolute necessity of good diplomacy in managing relations with allies and in deflecting serious outside challenges to the cohesiveness of a broad coalition. On all these diverse matters, the critical lesson is to keep doing what we have been doing.

There are some other, more cautionary lessons to be learned, however.

The vulnerability of U.S. forces—and of critical allies—to weapons of mass

destruction was a matter of grave concern. In the end, deterrence seems to

have worked, but we need to consider whether it might fail in different circumstances. An immense effort was devoted to hunting down mobile missile launchers, but with no success at all. Desert Storm showed that much

work remained to be done to provide critical intelligence immediately and

directly to the forces that need it. While command and control arrangements worked very well by previous standards, air tasking orders had to be

put on paper and flown out to aircraft carriers every day—not the way, in

the information age, to carry out a complex, multidimensional campaign.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, before Operation Desert

Storm began, the United States and its allies had almost 5 months to build

114 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
up military forces in the region. No enemy in the future is likely to allow

us such a luxury.

Bosnia (1992– )

In June 1992, elements of the United Nations Protection Force were

deployed to Bosnia to help restrain a growing civil war. As the civil war

worsened and the situation deteriorated further, the United States had a

very difficult time deciding how much involvement its interests warranted.

Lack of American leadership risked weakening the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO). Until the last half of 1995, half-hearted NATO efforts at coercive diplomacy, including the use of “pin-prick” air strikes, accomplished almost nothing.

A more extensive application of air power in Operation Deliberate

Force, in contrast, was highly successful. Coupled with a Bosnian government ground offensive, it succeeded in forcing the Bosnian Serbs to make

critical territorial concessions at the negotiating table. With U.S. leadership, NATO finally managed to forge a peace agreement and salvage its

shaken credibility. The ongoing peace operation in Bosnia has also been

largely successful. Assurances that U.S. troops would be withdrawn within

a year were not realistic, however, and the operation now appears openended. Cuts in the size of the peacekeeping force and extensive use of reserves in Bosnia have had some effect in ameliorating the burden. But

Bosnia—and now Kosovo—remain costly commitments.

Kosovo (1998– )

With Yugoslav government violence against ethnic Albanians in

Kosovo mounting, on March 24, 1998, NATO began air strikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. President Clinton said that the objectives of

Operation Allied Force were to demonstrate NATO seriousness of purpose,

to deter an even bloodier offensive by Yugoslavia against innocent civilians

in Kosovo, and, if necessary, to damage seriously the Serbian military capacity to make war in Kosovo. Instead of capitulating, however, Yugoslav

forces intensified their operations in a massive ethnic cleansing campaign

to drive ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo.

In response, NATO progressively escalated the pace of its air attacks

and extended its target set. Target selection initially focused on airfields,

air defense, and military communications. Attacks subsequently were

expanded to military barracks and military equipment production facilities in Serbia, logistical support facilities and lines of supply throughout

MILITARY LESSONS 115
Yugoslavia, Yugoslav forces in Kosovo, electrical transmission facilities,

and television and other media outlets. Toward the end of the campaign,

there appears to have been an effort to attack economic targets of

particular value to Serbian leaders. Finally, on June 4, the Yugoslav government announced that it would accept a peace plan that called for an

immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of all Yugoslav military and other

security forces from Kosovo, deployment of an international peacekeeping force, and steps toward self-governance for Kosovo. On June 10, with

evidence that Yugoslav forces were withdrawing, bombing ceased.

From the beginning of the campaign, the military logic of Operation

Allied Force was a matter of intense, even bitter debate. In short, at least in

its inception, the Kosovo air campaign was an exercise in coercive diplomacy rather than a concerted effort to prevail through military action by

destroying the enemy capacity to wage war. And to the extent it became a

warfighting exercise, it was much more a war of attrition than a modern

U.S.-style application of decisive force. In this case, though, all of the attrition was on the other side. From the NATO point of view, this seems to

have been enough, since Milosevic ultimately relented. It was not, however, enough to protect the Kosovars from the depredations of Yugoslav security forces.

The Current Debate 

The value of reading and rereading history is not that old truths bear

repeating, but that historical understanding is always new. Real events are

always multifaceted and complex, and our perspectives on them always

change when we view them through the prism of more recent experience.

Looking back on these operations today turns out to be quite informative

in discussing a number of contemporary issues. While others may distill

different lessons from this brief review of recent military operations, here

are a few perspectives that seem particularly relevant to current concerns.

Use of Force

Debate over whether and under what conditions to undertake military action is nothing new. Ongoing debates over the use of force have

stirred in every administration and will likely have to be addressed anew

by every future government. Those who take absolute positions—especially in disputes along partisan lines—are likely to have to swallow their

arguments later. In debates about Bosnia and Kosovo, for example, some

have taken the Weinberger doctrine almost as gospel. According to that

doctrine, U.S. forces should be committed only when vital U.S. interests

116 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
are at stake, when the mission is clear, when force fully and demonstrably

adequate to accomplish the mission can be applied, and when public support is assured.

But that argument was vigorously disputed within the Reagan administration, particularly by then-Secretary of State George Shultz, from

the moment it was articulated. Moreover, the Weinberger doctrine clearly

did not prevail in later decisions on the use of force, even when Weinberger still led the Department of Defense.

For military commanders, the lesson is that they cannot pick and

choose what missions to prepare for. Political leaders may well decide that

national security interests require the use of force even in circumstances

that give military planners fits, or that detract from other priorities, or that

may cost lots of money at a time when funding is tight, or that risk unpredictable, bad consequences. This is not to say that commanders should

simply salute and say “can do” when given any job. Political decisionmakers, too, should have learned that missions should be defined as clearly as

possible. Adequate force should be applied. Force protection must be a

high priority. Military commanders should properly point up all these lessons, but they cannot expect political leaders to agree, as one commentator would have it, that “superpowers don’t do windows.”

Fear of Casualties

There has been a vigorous discussion recently about the effects a fear

of casualties may have on the ethos of U.S. military forces. Looking back a

few years—beyond Kosovo and Bosnia—confirms that this is a very serious issue. Aggressiveness of American military commanders has often

been critical to the success of the operations. Anything that might erode

the elan of U.S. fighting forces, therefore, ought to be troubling. It is also

true, however, that force protection is critically important. It was lacking

in Lebanon, with disastrous effects. And aggressiveness cannot be disconnected from a viable strategy for prevailing.

It is tempting to draw an obvious conclusion: if a mission is not sufficiently important to U.S. national interests to warrant risking casualties,

then it may not be worth doing at all, because casualties may erode popular support and cause the operation to fail anyway. But this is a bit too simple. Political leaders cannot avoid deciding on military action when public support is uncertain. Choosing a course of action that minimizes the

risk of casualties even at a cost to military effectiveness may not always be

unrealistic or unreasonable. The critical task is to accept risks when necessary and to avoid them when unnecessary, and to imbue U.S. military

MILITARY LESSONS 117
leaders, from the top of the chain of command to the bottom, with the

wisdom to know the difference.

Relations with Allies 

Relations with allies are never easy. Allies often perceive interests differently. And even when their interests and ours appear to coincide closely,

history, domestic politics, varying military capabilities, and personal relationships among national leaders will affect the prospects for cooperation.

One lesson of recent military operations is clear—the United States must

be militarily and diplomatically flexible enough to cooperate with allies as

much as possible, but also to act with limited allied support when necessary. As Winston Churchill put it so well: “There is only one thing worse

than fighting with allies—and that is fighting without them.”

Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo raise complex and controversial issues. One view is that the United States should not have become involved

in either place because U.S. interests were not sufficiently at stake to justify

the costs and risks of military action. But as Bosnia shows, when major allies have decided to act and the United States agrees with the goals of their

action, it is very difficult for the United States to wash its hands of responsibility. Clearly the Bush administration did not want to get involved in

leading a military campaign in Bosnia, and the Clinton administration

tried to avoid it for another 2 1

⁄2 years. Having offered support to the allies

in the first place, however, it became too difficult, perhaps even impossible,

to allow the cause to fail. Ultimately, American leadership proved necessary.

The lesson is that commitments to allies can draw the United States into

conflicts where direct U.S. interests are limited, but where our interest in

the continued vitality of the alliance may require American leadership. But

it is hardly a startling notion that alliances have costs as well as benefits.

Across-the-Board Strength

Even apparently limited military operations have required a very

broad range of well-trained and well-equipped forces. The interception

of the Achille Lauro hijackers, a minor exercise of force not discussed in

this chapter, was conceivable only because the United States had in place

an extraordinarily varied number of critical elements: a highly effective

global intelligence capability, including human intelligence and hightechnology means of collection; air combat forces that could be deployed

rapidly and flexibly; other air assets, including electronic warfare aircraft, already in place in the region to monitor sudden and unexpected

developments; sophisticated radar, able to pick out aircraft rapidly in

118 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
high air traffic already in place in the region; special operations forces

that could be deployed on immediate notice and transport aircraft able

to carry them 6,000 miles across the Atlantic; a global communications

network that allowed planners in Washington immediate access to intelligence and unbroken links to forces in the region; a history of engagement with many nations in the area that allowed timely contact with key

decisionmakers; and well-trained, well-motivated personnel in every one

of these critical operational areas. All of this is expensive—the Nation

cannot expect to have global reach on the cheap.

Things to Work On

While the United States has achieved a remarkable string of military

successes in recent years, a review of past operations also shows some vulnerabilities. To their credit, the military services have recognized and have

worked to correct a great many of them. Urban warfare is an obvious problem. Weapons of mass destruction may pose a disabling challenge to U.S.

power projection capabilities, as the conflict with Iraq shows. We need a

much deeper discussion of ways to ensure deterrence. Tracking down and

destroying mobile targets remains an unresolved, serious problem. Though

it may have been politically impossible to mount a ground operation in

Kosovo that could have forestalled ethnic cleansing, it is critically important,

nonetheless, to consider how a preemptive operation might have been

mounted. The Army deserves credit for its current focus on building more

deployable forces. Still, much remains to be resolved in determining precisely how lighter ground forces can accomplish critical missions.

An important unresolved issue is how to ameliorate the burden of

ongoing operations, such as those in the Persian Gulf, in Bosnia, and now

in Kosovo. Measures adopted to ease the burden have not gone far enough.

Clearly there needs to be a discussion of more radical changes, including

at least the strengthening of nonmilitary multinational institutions to take

on the chore of nation-building and even the establishment of an international constabulary force for ongoing peacekeeping missions. Such steps

have not been popular in Congress, but these or other measures need to be

reconsidered.

We’ve Done a Lot Right

Perhaps the most important lesson is simply that the U.S. military

has done a lot right. One can see in the conflicts reviewed here a progressive, substantial, lasting improvement in key capabilities, reflecting the

willingness of the U.S. military to seek out and absorb the lessons of each

MILITARY LESSONS 119
new operation. The few years between Grenada and Panama, for example,

witnessed improvements in command arrangements, operational planning, tactics and doctrine, training, and key technologies such as night vision equipment. The years between the Persian Gulf War and the Bosnia

and Kosovo air campaigns showed the maturation of precision-strike capabilities. The Army and Air Force have both learned the need to be more

readily deployable in an unpredictable global environment, and both are

reorganizing substantially to become more flexible.

Congress, too, has sometimes helped. It established an independent

Special Operations Command in 1987, an action that has been vindicated

by the continued critical importance of special operations forces in a host

of military actions since then, and by the marvelous performance of those

forces when called upon. Congressional passage of the Goldwater-Nichols

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 clearly helped to clarify and strengthen command arrangements.

The main praise for building an increasingly flexible and effective

force, however, must go to the military officers who rebuilt U.S. military

capabilities after the Vietnam War. This generation has now almost entirely reached retirement age. The task of the next generation of military

leaders is to learn as well as its predecessors learned from past conflicts.

120 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS

Page 120—BLANK—No Folio—Chapter 11 follows
Chapter 11

America’s Frontier Wars:

Lessons for Asymmetric

Conflict

I

n July 1755, Major General Edward Braddock, commander in chief of

all British forces in North America and a 45-year career soldier, was

killed along with 900 of his men by a smaller French and Indian force.

On his way to capture Fort Duquesne, Pennsylvania, Braddock had split

his force into two divisions. Because of the difficulty of crossing the

wilderness, they opened a distance of 60 miles between the “flying column” division of rapidly moving soldiers and a support column hauling

“monstrously heavy eight-inch howitzers and twelve-pound cannons”

completely unsuited to the terrain.

The lead column stretched a mile in length and was attacked on the

far side of the Monongahela River by Indians streaming along either British

flank and hiding within the forest they had long used as hunting grounds.

The British responded using traditional tactics—continuously trying to

form companies and return fire but only concentrating their number further for Indian attack. Braddock ordered forward the main body of his

troops, which then collided with retreating elements ahead. In the resulting

confusion, 15 of the 18 officers in the advance party were picked off. Still,

the remaining forces continued to fight the way they were taught: maintaining platoon formations and firing together even as they drew heavy fire

to the line from well-hidden Indians. It was not until Braddock himself was

shot in the back that the British broke in retreat, carrying off the body of

their commanding officer.1

121

This article first appeared in Military Review (September–October 2001).
Asymmetric Warfare: Yesterday and Tomorrow 

Why do I begin a discussion of tomorrow’s conflicts with an account

of a battle fought two and a half centuries ago? As an avid student of history, I believe it is critically important for us to understand that asymmetric warfare is not something new. In fact, it has been a recurring theme of

American military history and is familiar to many of today’s military officers. Many of its best historical examples come from the series of conflicts

we refer to collectively as the Indian Wars. Braddock’s defeat highlights as

many useful insights as contemporary examples of asymmetric action, like

Russian battles with the Chechens. Overcoming future challenges will require that we both understand the lessons from the past and develop

strategies and tactics appropriate to tomorrow’s battlefield.

While asymmetric warfare is not something new, it is very much in

vogue today in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. Given America’s

resounding success in that conflict, potential adversaries have learned

Iraq’s lesson that it is foolish to try to match us conventionally. Instead,

they are seeking ways to turn our strengths against us. This is the heart

of the concept of asymmetry, broadly defined by Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson of the U.S. Army War College: “In the realm of military

affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain

greater freedom of action.”2

Asymmetry on the Future Battlefield 

In operational terms, asymmetry derives from one force deploying

new capabilities that the opposing force does not perceive or understand,

conventional capabilities that counter or overmatch the capabilities of its

opponent, or capabilities that represent totally new methods of attack or defense—or a combination of these attributes.3 The U.S. Army Training and

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) now thinks of ways to characterize tomorrow’s asymmetric challenges.4 In considering its arguments, I was struck

again by the utility of lessons learned from earlier campaigns against Native

Americans such as Braddock’s defeat. So I have matched TRADOC insights

for the future with asymmetric examples from the past. Only by studying

the lessons of history are we likely to adapt to asymmetric challenges.

The TRADOC analysis begins by stressing the differences between

our current perception of the future operational environment and what is

likely to be true. Today, we think of close combat as involving deliberate

122 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
actions conducted at a tempo decided by the United States and characterized by the application of technology and systems that leave opponents virtually helpless to respond or retaliate. Therefore, the public expects military

operations to involve few casualties and precision attacks, secure our homeland, and be short-lived. On the contrary, potential adversaries will likely

choose to fight in ways that negate these expectations. Future close combat

will be much more dynamic and lethal, marked by greater intensity, operational tempo, uncertainty, and psychological impact. We cannot expect the

experience of the Gulf War to be repeated.

Likely Characteristics of Adversaries 

With this as a starting point, TRADOC has discussed attributes a potential enemy is likely to possess: greater knowledge of the physical conflict

environment, better situational awareness, a clearer understanding of U.S.

military forces, and an ability to adapt quickly to changing battlefield conditions. These attributes strongly mirror challenges for British, and later

American, soldiers in Indian campaigns of yesteryear.

The physical environment remains the defining variable of close

combat. For U.S. military forces, it is almost certain that future conflicts

will occur in regions where the enemy has a greater understanding of the

physical environment and has better optimized his forces to fight. A common characteristic of many Indian campaigns was the Indians’ superior

knowledge of the terrain. A great example of this was the attack on the

forces of Colonel Henry Bouquet during his march to relieve Fort Pitt,

Pennsylvania, during Pontiac’s War in August 1763. The Indians attacked

in an area of old growth forest, offering limited fields of fire, around Bushy

Run. They forced Bouquet’s forces back into a defensive position on a hilltop, attacking the position repeatedly but without waiting for a counterattack. Their detailed knowledge of the area allowed them simply to fade

into the forest, suffering few casualties.5 This is but one example of the advantages that accrued to many Indian tribes through the late 1800s.6

Opposing forces will also have greater situational awareness in future

conflicts. We should expect them to have human networks operating over

telephone lines or with cellular phones and using commercial imagery

systems. This will be critical, not only because the adversary can distribute

information quickly but also because crucial information will only be

available through human interaction. The United States, even with its

sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, will

have difficulty in complex settings unless it builds a more effective human

AMERICA’S FRONTIER WARS 123
intelligence capability in strategically important regions. Moreover, these

new adversaries will learn how to adapt not only technology but also tactics, formations, and operations in light of changing battlefield conditions

during the course of operations. Such adaptations will help them counter

a precision warfare strategy by creating uncertainty while also trying to

control the nature and timing of combat engagements.

During the war in Chechnya, the Chechens fought using few prepared positions, preferring instead, as Chechen vice president Zelimkhan

Yanderbaijev said, to “let the situation do the organizing.”7 They would

move from city to city to deny Russian maneuver and fire superiority and

would use the local population as cover for their activities.

Similarly, the Seminole Indians adapted continuously during the second Seminole War of 1835–1842. One noted historian puts it this way:

The second Seminole War did not follow the precedent set in earlier

Indian wars by producing a single dazzling stroke by a spectacularly

brilliant leader. No fewer than seven American commanders would

try and fail to bring the war to a successful conclusion. When confronted with superior firepower and at a tactical disadvantage, the

Seminoles simply dispersed into small bands and continued to fight a

guerrilla war...best suited to the terrain and their own temperament. Where other eastern Indians could usually be depended upon

to follow the rules of the game—to defend a fixed position and be

routed—the Seminoles . . . regularly rejected pitched battles and instead relied on ambushes and raids to bleed the Army, sap its strength,

and generally discourage its leadership.8

In the future, such an adaptive enemy would put additional pressure on U.S. ability to respond, as their battlefield successes would be

covered instantly by the global media, instantaneous communications,

and media coverage.

Finally, our future adversaries will almost certainly have greater

knowledge of U.S. forces than we will of theirs. We are the most studied

military in the world. Foreign states have regular military features and, in

some cases, entire journals (most notably Russia’s Foreign Military Review)

devoted to the assessment of U.S. military force structure, doctrine, operational concepts, and capabilities. All major U.S. Army field manuals (FMs)

and joint doctrinal publications are freely available on the Internet, and

many foreign organizations access them regularly. As an example, in April

2001 alone, the Center for Army Lessons Learned recorded 5,464 sessions

on its Web site from Europe and 2,015 from Asia. This access, combined

124 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
with their knowledge of battlefield terrain, greater situational awareness,

and adaptability, will make future adversaries far more menacing.

How Will They Fight? 

The essence of future asymmetric warfare is that adversaries will seek

to offset our air, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other technological advantages by fighting during periods of reduced visibility and in

complex terrain and urban environments where they can gain sanctuary

from U.S. strikes. This will also deny these areas and their inherent protective characteristics to U.S. forces, keeping us exposed and on the defensive.

U.S. forces will have to contend with greater uncertainty in the field

as adversaries mask the size, location, disposition, and intentions of their

forces. They will seek to convince U.S. commanders that they are using

conventional tactics while making us vulnerable to unconventional, adaptive, and asymmetrical actions.

At the same time, adversaries will use both old and new technologies

to great effect on the battlefield. They may use older technologies in

unique ways, as the Chechens did by buying commercial scanners and radios to intercept Russian communications. They will also try to acquire

advanced niche technologies like global positioning system jammers and

systems for electronic attack to degrade our precision-strike capabilities

significantly. Moreover, we must be prepared for adversaries to upgrade

software capabilities in the middle of an operation, potentially allowing

for a more networked opposition.

While some of the technology may be new, the Indian campaigns

again provide useful insights. Many Indian campaigns demonstrated the

effectiveness of asymmetric tactics in countering larger and better-armed

British and American forces. In fact, “Indian skulking tactics—concealment and surprise, moving fire, envelopment and, when the enemy’s ranks

were broken, hand-to-hand combat—remained the cardinal features of

Native American warfare” over a period of 140 years.9 The longevity of

their effectiveness shows how important it is to develop appropriate responses to asymmetric tactics.

One of the most successful Indian tactics was the ambush. Captain

William Fetterman’s massacre in 1866 near the Lodge Trail Ridge in

Wyoming left 92 American soldiers dead in a classic ambush some believe

was masterminded by Sioux leader Crazy Horse. A lesser-known battle, almost a century before, shows the effectiveness of the ambush, particularly

when matched with reckless leadership. At the Battle of Blue Licks in August

AMERICA’S FRONTIER WARS 125
1782, a group of 182 Kentucky militiamen, led by Colonel John Todd and

including Daniel Boone and members of his family, was in hot pursuit of Indians who had attacked an American fort. Boone noticed the Indians were

concealing their numbers by sharing tracks, yet making the trail easy to follow. He smelled an ambush by a force he estimated at 500 and advised

breaking off the pursuit until reinforcements could arrive. A more junior officer yelled, “Them that ain’t cowards follow me,” and recklessly charged

across the river toward several decoy Indians, with much of the force following him. The remaining Indians were waiting in ambush, as Boone had

feared, and delivered a devastating defeat to the rangers.10

Like Blue Licks, the Battle of Bushy Run not only shows the efficacy

of Indian raids until defeated by Bouquet’s brilliant feigned retreat and

flanking maneuvers; it also shows how an enemy can use deception effectively. The official history of Bushy Run says Bouquet’s forces were

engaged and surrounded by Indian forces at least equal in size to his

own. However, when I toured the battlefield, Indian recreators, who have

studied the battle extensively from the Indian point of view, maintained

that the Indians numbered no more than 90 and that the tactics they

used in the forest made their numbers seem larger. This disparity is a

good example of attempts to confuse conventional forces so that the size

of the opposing force is impossible to discern.

Finally, the Indian campaigns provide some excellent examples of the

role of technological advances in asymmetric campaigns. Noted historian

Armstrong Starkey emphasizes that the Europeans arrived in North America during a time of military revolution in Europe:

European soldiers brought the new weapons and techniques of this

revolution with them to North America and by 1675 had provoked a

military revolution of a sort among Native Americans, a revolution

that for 140 years gave them a tactical advantage over their more numerous and wealthier opponents.11

Specifically, King Philip’s War (1675–1676) was the first conflict in

which the Indians had modern flintlock firearms. This proved an important advantage because some of the American militias were only

equipped with matchlocks and pikes and because the Indians were excellent marksmen.12 More than 200 years after the Civil War, the same

faulty assumptions were still at work—namely, that the U.S. military retained unmatched technical advantages over its more primitive adversaries. At that time, the U.S. Government rearmed its forces with

breechloaders in place of magazine rifles—due to a bias against unaimed

126 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
shots and excessive use of ammunition—while the Plains Indians acquired such weapons by direct purchase and thus, in some cases, had superior arms in the 1870s. We must be on the lookout for technological

matches like these in our own future conflicts.

New Threats 

We have seen the great utility of examining historical conflicts

between Europeans and Native Americans to learn lessons about possible

future conflict. Yet there are two additional dimensions to asymmetric

warfare that must be mentioned—the threat of weapons of mass destruction, potentially used against the American homeland, and of cyberattacks

on U.S. military, government, and private information systems.

At the heart of asymmetry is the assumption that an adversary will

choose to attack the weakest point. In the case of the United States, asymmetric tools may well entail terrorist acts—with or without nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons—on the U.S. homeland designed to disrupt

deployments, limit access, erode public support, and take the fight to the

American people. In some respects, this homeland tactic is not new. Beginning with King Philip’s War, the New England Indians abandoned their traditional restraints and “prepared to wage total war on all of the colonists,

making no distinction between combatant and non-combatant.”13 Attacks

on Americans using weapons of mass destruction take these homeland tactics to a new level. Because of the devastation of these attacks and the

interest of many potential adversaries in acquiring these capabilities, the

United States must develop strategies for preventing and responding to

such an occurrence.

The cyberthreat now facing the United States is equally compelling

and risks both the effectiveness of U.S. forces on the battlefield and the

safety of private and government systems throughout the United States. Recent Joint Chiefs of Staff–directed cyberwarfare exercises such as ELIGIBLE

RECEIVER and ZENITH STAR showed how vulnerable command and

control networks are to cyberattacks, a prime asymmetric target given the

continued U.S. military reliance on information technology. Moreover,

there are now approximately 30 nations that have developed “aggressive

computer-warfare programs.”14

Again, there is a relevant Indian war complement to today’s challenges. Indians of the Southern Plains disrupted American efforts in the

West through unconventional means:

AMERICA’S FRONTIER WARS 127
The telegraph line, which once had commanded their awe, no longer

was mysterious. By 1882, the Apache had learned its function and its

method of operation. When they jumped the reservation, they would

cut the lines and remove long sections of wire, or they would remove a

short piece of wire and replace it with a thin strip of rawhide, so cleverly splicing the two together that the line would appear intact and the

location of the break could take days of careful checking to discover.15

This disruption foreshadows the potentially far greater problems from cyberattacks if we do not design strategy and tactics for dealing with this as

part of an asymmetric campaign.

Preparing for Asymmetric Attacks 

The first step in preparing to better meet tomorrow’s challenges is to

learn from the past. As the examples drawn here indicate, there is a rich history to be tapped in the early American experience. But there are many other

examples as well—Yugoslav partisans fighting the occupying Nazis or

Afghans against the Russians and Serbs in the recent North Atlantic Treaty

Organization operation in Kosovo. Military commanders must study history. Modern, technologically sophisticated warfare—with the asymmetric

challenges that accompany it—makes that requirement more true, not less.

Our forces must also be adaptive. Just as our adversaries will continuously change tactics and approaches to seek our weaknesses, so must we

be able to counter them through continuous adaptation. If we do not, we

risk the mistakes of the past. “While European military revolutions provided states with the means to project power into the interior of North

America, they did not provide troops with appropriate training and tactics

to succeed on the frontier.”16 Therefore, our forces, doctrine, and tactics

must continue to embrace agility and adaptability and prepare for a range

of missions. The Army continues to do so in its most recent doctrinal publications, FM 1 and FM 3–0.17 Efforts to address asymmetric threats must

also retain the unique American strengths—superior training, leadership,

and technology—that give us an edge against any potential adversary.

Finally, we must guard against arrogance. An account at the time of

Braddock’s defeat noted the irony that his preparations for the march to

Fort Duquesne were precise. He attended to every minute detail except

“the one that mattered most: Indian affairs.”18 He dismissed those Ohio Indian chiefs who might have been allies for his expedition as savages who

could not possibly assist disciplined troops. We must not fall into the same

128 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
trap of underestimating a potential adversary because of his different culture or seemingly inferior capability. To do so would be to repeat the errors of the past with potentially devastating future consequences.

Notes1 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North

America, 1754–1766 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 94–107. 2 Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition,

Background, and Strategic Concepts (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,

January 2001), 5. 3 This operational definition of asymmetry is drawn from my conversations with General

Montgomery C. Meigs, Commander of U.S. Army Forces, Europe, who is an excellent source for insights on operational art. 4 I am deeply indebted to General John Abrams and his staff, especially Colonel Maxie MacFarland at TRADOC, for many of the ideas presented here. In addition, I would like to thank Professors Graham Turbiville and William Robertson at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for their assistance with

the historical examples. Their help was invaluable in constructing this chapter. I am also grateful to

Erin Conaton, professional staff member with the House of Representatives’ Committee on Armed

Services, for her assistance with researching and writing this chapter. 5 Anderson, 547–563. 6 Jack C. Lane’s Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978)

notes that as a new surgeon in the Army Medical Department, Wood 

learned why the Apaches . . . proved to be the army’s most impervious foe in the 1870s

and 1880s. Perfecting guerrilla warfare to a fine art, the Apaches operated in small raiding parties rarely numbering more than 100 braves. The hardy warriors had developed

incredible stamina and a seemingly unlimited ability to endure with only the bare necessities for long periods in the almost impenetrable, barren mountains and deserts of

southern Arizona and northern Mexico. Organizing themselves into small bands, they

roamed the Arizona territory at will until, pursued closely by the army, they retired into

the strongholds of the Sierra Madre Mountains. To defeat such an enemy required exceptional leaders and men.

7 “Chechen Commander on Modern Separatism,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (January 22–28, 1999), 2. 8 John D. Waghelstein, “The Second Seminole War: Lessons Learned, Relearned and Unlearned,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement (Winter 1992), 4. 9 Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675–1815 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 167. 10 Isaac Newton Skelton III and Earl Franklin Skelton, Ike, This Is You (Washington, DC: 1995),

132–141. The author’s great-great-great grandfather, Squire Boone, was wounded during this battle. 11 Starkey, viii.

12 Ibid., 71–72.

13 Ibid., 72.

14 James Adams, “Virtual Defense,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2001), 102. 15 Odie B. Faulk, The Geronimo Campaign (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 46. 16 Starkey, 169.

17 U.S. Army FM 1, The Army (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2001);

FM 3–0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2001). 18 “The Journal of Captain Robert Chomley’s Batman,” May 20 and 23, 1755, cited in Anderson, 94. The rest of the account of Braddock’s defeat is largely drawn from Anderson, 94–107.

AMERICA’S FRONTIER WARS 129
Chapter 12

You’re Not From Around

Here, Are You?

Know thy enemy. That adage has been repeated since armies first

clashed on the field of battle. Understanding enemy intentions, tactics, and vulnerabilities is an essential part of warfare. But it is also

necessary to know your friends. Making enemies is easy, but it is harder to

acquire friends. The wrong approach to allied or occupied countries can

quickly create enemies.

The United States has not been an occupying power since the period

immediately following World War II. In Korea and Vietnam, where the

goal was fighting and leaving, sensitivity to local culture was important, although it was not a long-term concern. In Iraq, however, a cultural divide

brought to the fore issues that three generations of soldiers have considered only peripherally.

Operating in a foreign land can be a minefield. Few members of the

Armed Forces will be familiar with cultural traditions of the countries in

which they operate. Yet violation of local norms and beliefs can turn a welcoming population into vocal enemies.

Iraqis arrested by U.S. troops have had their heads forced to the

ground, a position forbidden by Islam except during prayers. This action

offends detainees as well as bystanders. In Bosnia, American soldiers angered Serbs by greeting them with the two-fingered peace sign, a gesture

commonly used by their Croat enemies. And the circled-finger “A–OK”

signal was a gross insult to Somalis. The military has enough to worry

about without alienating the local population.

131

U.S. Representative Jim Cooper (D–TN) co-authored this article, which will be published in Joint

Force Quarterly (Issue 36, forthcoming).
Afghanistan and Iraq

Though it may be premature to draw definitive lessons from

Afghanistan or Iraq, it is clear that the Armed Forces lack sophisticated

knowledge of foreign countries. That does not dishonor their performance; cultural awareness is not a mission-essential task—but it should be.

Winning a conflict means more than subduing an enemy. While the

U.S. military ran into trouble in the past, it was not because it lacked combat skills, personal courage, or the necessary resources. As operations in

Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated, the process of restructuring the

political order, economy, and social well being of an entire country is as

critical as defeating organized resistance. But it is cultural awareness that

helps determine whether a host population supports long-term American

military presence—and may determine the outcome of the mission.

It is uncertain whether the majority of the Iraqi people will support

the multinational efforts, which many see as responsible for the unrest. Rebuilding Iraq may hinge on drawing appropriate inferences from ethnic

and religious aspects of its culture—including tribal dynamics—and then

properly responding to them. Commanders in Iraq have stressed the importance of being aware of these elements of the security landscape.

The House Armed Services Committee held a hearing in late 2003

to examine the lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom at which Major General Robert Scales, Jr., USA (Ret.), highlighted the requirement for cultural awareness among both civilian and military personnel. His testimony emphasized that had American planners better understood Iraqi

culture, efforts to win the peace would have been more sound. Senior officials and commanders might have reached a different conclusion on the

willingness of Iraqis to welcome the U.S. military for an extended period

of reconstruction.

Events during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti further emphasized cultural differences:

The Army in general had little appreciation of Haitian history and

culture. Few planners knew anything about Haiti other than its basic

geography. In a combat operation, where overwhelming firepower

achieves objectives, sensitivity for the local population’s culture and

traditions clearly is not a top priority. In a peace operation such as

Uphold Democracy, however, knowledge of how a people think and

act, and how they might react to military intervention, arguably

becomes paramount. The U.S. military culture in general focuses on

132 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
training warriors to use fire and maneuver and tends to resist the

notion of culture awareness.1

The need for cultural awareness is not unique to the American military. Russian soldiers in Chechnya made cultural blunders in dealing with

local civilians who, once insulted or mistreated, either supported active resistance fighters or joined them. Moreover, Russian leaders realized that

they had underestimated the influence of religion in the region.

Cultural Awareness

Understanding the culture and social factors unique to the countries

in which Americans are most likely to be deployed will make the environment work to their advantage. On the lowest level, cultural awareness

means knowing enough about local culture to permit military personnel

to operate effectively. Along with linguistic capability, cultural awareness

can highlight political, social, and other characteristics of the operational

area. It can explain why local people may see things differently from Americans. It can enable troops on the ground to understand how their attitudes and actions directly influence mission success or failure.

The Armed Forces often operate as members of coalitions and

alliances. Nations cannot work together without recognizing their cultural

differences—where the other guy is coming from. That awareness becomes

even more important over time. It is not a touchy-feely or nice-to-have

social grace; it is basic intelligence on attitudes and potential actions of

host nations and coalition partners. Only such insights can enable the military to understand other cultures.

The Marine Corps’ 1940 manual on insurgency noted that:

The motive in small wars is not material destruction. It is usually a

project dealing with social, economic, and political development of the

people. It is of primary importance that the fullest benefit be derived

from the psychological aspects of the situation. That implies a serious

study of the people, their racial, political, religious, and mental development. By analysis and study the reasons for the existing emergency

may be deduced; the most practical method of solving the problem is

to understand the possible approaches thereto and the repercussion to

be expected from any actions which may be contemplated. By this

study and ability to apply correct psychological doctrine, many pitfalls

may be avoided and the success of the undertaking assured.2

Stability operations and postconflict reconstruction are among the

major challenges facing the military in the post–Cold War world. This was

YOU’RE NOT FROM AROUND HERE, ARE YOU? 133
clear even before Afghanistan and Iraq—two battlefronts in the global war

on terrorism.

The Army and Marine Corps have a history of conducting such operations under the rubric of low-intensity conflict and military operations

other than war. Operations in the Philippines from 1899 to 1903 and in

Haiti from 1994 to 1995 also offer examples of partial success in such efforts. Other than foreign area officers, defense attachés, and Special Forces,

there is insufficient cultural awareness and linguistic skill among commissioned and noncommissioned officers.

A combat brigade would not be deployed into hostile territory without maps. The beliefs of a culture are as critical as terrain features. The

unit should have the cultural coordinates as well as the geographical ones.

Defining the Need

Predeployment preparations must include cultural awareness training. Just as personnel are trained in specific tactics, they should be provided an understanding of the environment where they will operate. The

ability of deployed personnel to draw inferences from experience or study

could contribute decisively to the national strategy.

Scales describes the operational environment and importance of cultural awareness:

The image of sergeants and captains acting alone in the Afghanistan

wilderness and the sands of Iraq, innovating on the fly with instruments of strategic killing power, reaffirms the truth that today’s leaders must acquire the skills and wisdom to lead indirectly at a much

lower level. Today’s tactical leaders must be able to act alone in ambiguous and uncertain circumstances, lead soldiers they cannot

touch, think so as to anticipate the enemy’s actions—they must be

tactically proactive rather than reactive.3

The need for cultural awareness extends beyond the foxhole. Senior

officers must create an appropriate command climate. Civilian officials

need to be culturally aware in developing policy and strategy. They must

know that imposing American values on unwilling people in a foreign

country may have undesired strategic and operational consequences.

Deployed personnel must have sufficient awareness in theaters where

ambiguous and contradictory situations are the norm. And because of the

reliance on the Reserve components, they must have similar training.

At a minimum, training on cultural awareness should occur on two

levels. The first would be focused on planners. As an interim measure,

134 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
programs for flag and field grade officers would be appropriate, along

with greater emphasis on cultural awareness in curricula at both the staff

and war college level. As soon as practical, that training should be extended to all officers.

One report on the experiences of general officers who served in

Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti noted the need for additional training:

Greater emphasis must be placed on geopolitical and cultural training

for the Army’s officer corps. Such training must begin at the officer

basic course and continue at all levels of professional military education. Officers at all grades will benefit from such training because of

the likelihood that they will be involved in peace operations on multiple occasions throughout their careers.4

Training should be comprehensive and offered to both the Active and

Reserve components. The ideal program would reward continued learning

and require that officers get an early start on becoming indirect leaders.

Unit leaders would mentor their performance while undergoing instruction. Both the classroom and distance learning would stretch across career

assignments. The curriculum would be historically based and thoroughly

joint in nature.

The second tier involves language and area studies. Commissioned and

noncommissioned leaders must possess some language skills and understanding of nations to which they are deployed. This sort of training results

in street sense—knowing how to gather intelligence from local people. That

can only happen with cultural awareness. It is the level on which simple linguistic skills are essential: “Halt, lay down your weapon.” But it is better to

warn of the likely consequences of such interactions with locals.

Compared to education, training involves imparting specific skills. It

can be prepackaged and offered throughout a career. It is part of the daily

military routine. As one officer described his experience in Bosnia:

Specialists are assigned to ensure the commanders are politically astute, historically aware, and culturally sensitized. Unfortunately, this

information has no real conduit down to company and platoon levels, and perhaps most important, to the individual soldier. In most organizations of the conventional infantry force, there is no foreign area

officer or civil affairs officer who specializes in these matters to fill the

gap. Although it is vital for senior leaders to be well informed in these

facets of operations, it is often the company commander, platoon

YOU’RE NOT FROM AROUND HERE, ARE YOU? 135
leader, or squad leader who finds himself...dealing with the civilian

populace day by day.5

A Matter of Timing

Cultural awareness must be taught on the primary level. And

knowing your enemy should be accompanied by knowing your friends.

Moreover, educational and training programs should be focused on

those regions likely to pose threats to national security as well as cultures

vital to long-term strategic relationships.

Mandating cultural awareness training may appear a simple requirement, but implementing it is a daunting task. First, identifying which cultures to study and what level of proficiency to attain is demanding. There

is no one-size-fits-all answer to cultural awareness. Nonspecific theories

on cultural contexts can be detrimental, and generalizing cultural characteristics can be deceptive:

Americans are often direct in their conversations, expecting the truth

with no hint of deception. At the same time, Americans also tend to

be uncomfortable with silent moments. People in some other countries, though, may prefer not to be direct and may shift their eyes away

from the American. . . . a person who is reluctant to maintain eye contact is called shifty-eyed and arouses suspicion. But in some countries

an attempt to maintain eye contact may be perceived as a sign of aggression. Accordingly, in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and other Asian

countries, maintaining eye contact is not an acceptable behavior. On

the other hand, in Saudi Arabia, eye contact and gestures of openness

are important and could facilitate communications.6

Predeployment training focuses on the current military situation for

all the obvious reasons. But cultural awareness training must be accomplished on a regular basis and well in advance. Thus, that knowledge must

already be in place before it is time to go.

The national security strategy envisions a more assertively expeditionary military. Over the last two decades, extended coalition operations

have become the norm. This requires operational planning that recognizes

the importance of cultural awareness. If implemented, integrated training

to develop such awareness will have lasting, positive effects for plans, actionable intelligence, and the credibility of U.S. objectives. Experience

teaches that cultural awareness is a force multiplier. It is time to be serious

about enhancing our knowledge of today’s world. The Armed Forces are

busier than ever before, but they are not too busy to be culturally aware.

136 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
Notes1 Walter B. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, Intervasion:

A Concise History of the U.S. Army Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College, 1998), 188. 2 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1940), 18. 3 Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA (Ret.), letter to the Honorable Ike Skelton, June

12, 2003. 4 U.S. Institute for Peace, Alternative National Military Strategies for the United States (Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000), 6. 5 Joel B. Krauss, “Cultural Awareness in Stability and Support Operations,” Infantry 89, no. 1

(January/April 1999), 15. 6 Gary Bonvillian and William A. Nowlin, “Cultural Awareness: An Essential Element of Doing

Business Abroad,” Business Horizons 37, no. 6 (November/December 1994), 45.

YOU’RE NOT FROM AROUND HERE, ARE YOU? 137
Chapter 12

You’re Not From Around

Here, Are You?

Know thy enemy. That adage has been repeated since armies first

clashed on the field of battle. Understanding enemy intentions, tactics, and vulnerabilities is an essential part of warfare. But it is also

necessary to know your friends. Making enemies is easy, but it is harder to

acquire friends. The wrong approach to allied or occupied countries can

quickly create enemies.

The United States has not been an occupying power since the period

immediately following World War II. In Korea and Vietnam, where the

goal was fighting and leaving, sensitivity to local culture was important, although it was not a long-term concern. In Iraq, however, a cultural divide

brought to the fore issues that three generations of soldiers have considered only peripherally.

Operating in a foreign land can be a minefield. Few members of the

Armed Forces will be familiar with cultural traditions of the countries in

which they operate. Yet violation of local norms and beliefs can turn a welcoming population into vocal enemies.

Iraqis arrested by U.S. troops have had their heads forced to the

ground, a position forbidden by Islam except during prayers. This action

offends detainees as well as bystanders. In Bosnia, American soldiers angered Serbs by greeting them with the two-fingered peace sign, a gesture

commonly used by their Croat enemies. And the circled-finger “A–OK”

signal was a gross insult to Somalis. The military has enough to worry

about without alienating the local population.

131

U.S. Representative Jim Cooper (D–TN) co-authored this article, which will be published in Joint

Force Quarterly (Issue 36, forthcoming).
Afghanistan and Iraq

Though it may be premature to draw definitive lessons from

Afghanistan or Iraq, it is clear that the Armed Forces lack sophisticated

knowledge of foreign countries. That does not dishonor their performance; cultural awareness is not a mission-essential task—but it should be.

Winning a conflict means more than subduing an enemy. While the

U.S. military ran into trouble in the past, it was not because it lacked combat skills, personal courage, or the necessary resources. As operations in

Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated, the process of restructuring the

political order, economy, and social well being of an entire country is as

critical as defeating organized resistance. But it is cultural awareness that

helps determine whether a host population supports long-term American

military presence—and may determine the outcome of the mission.

It is uncertain whether the majority of the Iraqi people will support

the multinational efforts, which many see as responsible for the unrest. Rebuilding Iraq may hinge on drawing appropriate inferences from ethnic

and religious aspects of its culture—including tribal dynamics—and then

properly responding to them. Commanders in Iraq have stressed the importance of being aware of these elements of the security landscape.

The House Armed Services Committee held a hearing in late 2003

to examine the lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom at which Major General Robert Scales, Jr., USA (Ret.), highlighted the requirement for cultural awareness among both civilian and military personnel. His testimony emphasized that had American planners better understood Iraqi

culture, efforts to win the peace would have been more sound. Senior officials and commanders might have reached a different conclusion on the

willingness of Iraqis to welcome the U.S. military for an extended period

of reconstruction.

Events during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti further emphasized cultural differences:

The Army in general had little appreciation of Haitian history and

culture. Few planners knew anything about Haiti other than its basic

geography. In a combat operation, where overwhelming firepower

achieves objectives, sensitivity for the local population’s culture and

traditions clearly is not a top priority. In a peace operation such as

Uphold Democracy, however, knowledge of how a people think and

act, and how they might react to military intervention, arguably

becomes paramount. The U.S. military culture in general focuses on

132 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
training warriors to use fire and maneuver and tends to resist the

notion of culture awareness.1

The need for cultural awareness is not unique to the American military. Russian soldiers in Chechnya made cultural blunders in dealing with

local civilians who, once insulted or mistreated, either supported active resistance fighters or joined them. Moreover, Russian leaders realized that

they had underestimated the influence of religion in the region.

Cultural Awareness

Understanding the culture and social factors unique to the countries

in which Americans are most likely to be deployed will make the environment work to their advantage. On the lowest level, cultural awareness

means knowing enough about local culture to permit military personnel

to operate effectively. Along with linguistic capability, cultural awareness

can highlight political, social, and other characteristics of the operational

area. It can explain why local people may see things differently from Americans. It can enable troops on the ground to understand how their attitudes and actions directly influence mission success or failure.

The Armed Forces often operate as members of coalitions and

alliances. Nations cannot work together without recognizing their cultural

differences—where the other guy is coming from. That awareness becomes

even more important over time. It is not a touchy-feely or nice-to-have

social grace; it is basic intelligence on attitudes and potential actions of

host nations and coalition partners. Only such insights can enable the military to understand other cultures.

The Marine Corps’ 1940 manual on insurgency noted that:

The motive in small wars is not material destruction. It is usually a

project dealing with social, economic, and political development of the

people. It is of primary importance that the fullest benefit be derived

from the psychological aspects of the situation. That implies a serious

study of the people, their racial, political, religious, and mental development. By analysis and study the reasons for the existing emergency

may be deduced; the most practical method of solving the problem is

to understand the possible approaches thereto and the repercussion to

be expected from any actions which may be contemplated. By this

study and ability to apply correct psychological doctrine, many pitfalls

may be avoided and the success of the undertaking assured.2

Stability operations and postconflict reconstruction are among the

major challenges facing the military in the post–Cold War world. This was

YOU’RE NOT FROM AROUND HERE, ARE YOU? 133
clear even before Afghanistan and Iraq—two battlefronts in the global war

on terrorism.

The Army and Marine Corps have a history of conducting such operations under the rubric of low-intensity conflict and military operations

other than war. Operations in the Philippines from 1899 to 1903 and in

Haiti from 1994 to 1995 also offer examples of partial success in such efforts. Other than foreign area officers, defense attachés, and Special Forces,

there is insufficient cultural awareness and linguistic skill among commissioned and noncommissioned officers.

A combat brigade would not be deployed into hostile territory without maps. The beliefs of a culture are as critical as terrain features. The

unit should have the cultural coordinates as well as the geographical ones.

Defining the Need

Predeployment preparations must include cultural awareness training. Just as personnel are trained in specific tactics, they should be provided an understanding of the environment where they will operate. The

ability of deployed personnel to draw inferences from experience or study

could contribute decisively to the national strategy.

Scales describes the operational environment and importance of cultural awareness:

The image of sergeants and captains acting alone in the Afghanistan

wilderness and the sands of Iraq, innovating on the fly with instruments of strategic killing power, reaffirms the truth that today’s leaders must acquire the skills and wisdom to lead indirectly at a much

lower level. Today’s tactical leaders must be able to act alone in ambiguous and uncertain circumstances, lead soldiers they cannot

touch, think so as to anticipate the enemy’s actions—they must be

tactically proactive rather than reactive.3

The need for cultural awareness extends beyond the foxhole. Senior

officers must create an appropriate command climate. Civilian officials

need to be culturally aware in developing policy and strategy. They must

know that imposing American values on unwilling people in a foreign

country may have undesired strategic and operational consequences.

Deployed personnel must have sufficient awareness in theaters where

ambiguous and contradictory situations are the norm. And because of the

reliance on the Reserve components, they must have similar training.

At a minimum, training on cultural awareness should occur on two

levels. The first would be focused on planners. As an interim measure,

134 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
programs for flag and field grade officers would be appropriate, along

with greater emphasis on cultural awareness in curricula at both the staff

and war college level. As soon as practical, that training should be extended to all officers.

One report on the experiences of general officers who served in

Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti noted the need for additional training:

Greater emphasis must be placed on geopolitical and cultural training

for the Army’s officer corps. Such training must begin at the officer

basic course and continue at all levels of professional military education. Officers at all grades will benefit from such training because of

the likelihood that they will be involved in peace operations on multiple occasions throughout their careers.4

Training should be comprehensive and offered to both the Active and

Reserve components. The ideal program would reward continued learning

and require that officers get an early start on becoming indirect leaders.

Unit leaders would mentor their performance while undergoing instruction. Both the classroom and distance learning would stretch across career

assignments. The curriculum would be historically based and thoroughly

joint in nature.

The second tier involves language and area studies. Commissioned and

noncommissioned leaders must possess some language skills and understanding of nations to which they are deployed. This sort of training results

in street sense—knowing how to gather intelligence from local people. That

can only happen with cultural awareness. It is the level on which simple linguistic skills are essential: “Halt, lay down your weapon.” But it is better to

warn of the likely consequences of such interactions with locals.

Compared to education, training involves imparting specific skills. It

can be prepackaged and offered throughout a career. It is part of the daily

military routine. As one officer described his experience in Bosnia:

Specialists are assigned to ensure the commanders are politically astute, historically aware, and culturally sensitized. Unfortunately, this

information has no real conduit down to company and platoon levels, and perhaps most important, to the individual soldier. In most organizations of the conventional infantry force, there is no foreign area

officer or civil affairs officer who specializes in these matters to fill the

gap. Although it is vital for senior leaders to be well informed in these

facets of operations, it is often the company commander, platoon

YOU’RE NOT FROM AROUND HERE, ARE YOU? 135
leader, or squad leader who finds himself...dealing with the civilian

populace day by day.5

A Matter of Timing

Cultural awareness must be taught on the primary level. And

knowing your enemy should be accompanied by knowing your friends.

Moreover, educational and training programs should be focused on

those regions likely to pose threats to national security as well as cultures

vital to long-term strategic relationships.

Mandating cultural awareness training may appear a simple requirement, but implementing it is a daunting task. First, identifying which cultures to study and what level of proficiency to attain is demanding. There

is no one-size-fits-all answer to cultural awareness. Nonspecific theories

on cultural contexts can be detrimental, and generalizing cultural characteristics can be deceptive:

Americans are often direct in their conversations, expecting the truth

with no hint of deception. At the same time, Americans also tend to

be uncomfortable with silent moments. People in some other countries, though, may prefer not to be direct and may shift their eyes away

from the American. . . . a person who is reluctant to maintain eye contact is called shifty-eyed and arouses suspicion. But in some countries

an attempt to maintain eye contact may be perceived as a sign of aggression. Accordingly, in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and other Asian

countries, maintaining eye contact is not an acceptable behavior. On

the other hand, in Saudi Arabia, eye contact and gestures of openness

are important and could facilitate communications.6

Predeployment training focuses on the current military situation for

all the obvious reasons. But cultural awareness training must be accomplished on a regular basis and well in advance. Thus, that knowledge must

already be in place before it is time to go.

The national security strategy envisions a more assertively expeditionary military. Over the last two decades, extended coalition operations

have become the norm. This requires operational planning that recognizes

the importance of cultural awareness. If implemented, integrated training

to develop such awareness will have lasting, positive effects for plans, actionable intelligence, and the credibility of U.S. objectives. Experience

teaches that cultural awareness is a force multiplier. It is time to be serious

about enhancing our knowledge of today’s world. The Armed Forces are

busier than ever before, but they are not too busy to be culturally aware.

136 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
Notes1 Walter B. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, Intervasion:

A Concise History of the U.S. Army Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College, 1998), 188. 2 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1940), 18. 3 Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA (Ret.), letter to the Honorable Ike Skelton, June

12, 2003. 4 U.S. Institute for Peace, Alternative National Military Strategies for the United States (Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000), 6. 5 Joel B. Krauss, “Cultural Awareness in Stability and Support Operations,” Infantry 89, no. 1

(January/April 1999), 15. 6 Gary Bonvillian and William A. Nowlin, “Cultural Awareness: An Essential Element of Doing

Business Abroad,” Business Horizons 37, no. 6 (November/December 1994), 45.

YOU’RE NOT FROM AROUND HERE, ARE YOU? 137
Recommended Reading for

Military Professionals

Ambrose, Stephen E. Undaunted Courage: Meriwether Lewis, Thomas 

Jefferson, and the Opening of the American West. New York: Simon

and Schuster, 1996.

Ambrose augments information from the journals of both Lewis

and Clark with his personal travels along their route in this biography of Lewis. He chronicles the events of the “Corps of Discovery”

and assesses their military leadership and negotiations with various

native people.

———. The Victors: Eisenhower and His Boys: The Men of World War II.

Rockland, MA: Wheeler Publishers, 1999.

This book draws heavily from Ambrose’s biography of General

Dwight D. Eisenhower and several military histories that recount

the Allied push across the European continent in 1944–1945 from

the frontline trooper’s perspective.

Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of

Empire in British North America, 1754–1766. New York: Alfred A.

Knopf, 2000.

Anderson revisits the role that the Seven Years’ War played in the

American Revolution. He argues that the war was not merely a

backdrop to the Revolution but rather a critical event that forged

the tensions leading to the disintegration of the British Empire in

America.

Bamm, Peter. Alexander the Great. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968.

As a ruler who both inherited power from his father Philip and

acquired power by conquest, Alexander practiced tolerance and restraint in an attempt to invest his sovereignty over Persia with the

character of legitimacy.

139
Bonaparte, Napoleon. The Military Maxims of Napoleon. Edited by William

E. Cairnes and David G. Chandler. New York: Da Capo Press, 1995.

This is a distillation of the knowledge, intuition, and wisdom of history’s greatest military commander. Napoleon’s thought, theories,

and commentaries on war are presented in the form of accessible

and readable maxims with explanatory comments.

Brownlee, Richard S. Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy: Guerrilla Warfare in

the West, 1862–1867. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University

Press, 1958.

This history of the Confederate guerrilla warfare in the west from

1862 to 1867 filled a gap in the scholarship on the Civil War. As

early as 1862, the guerrillas dominated Missouri to such an extent

that the Union Army stationed 60,000 troops in the state to try to

control the violence—troops that could have served a better purpose if stationed elsewhere.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Peter Paret and

Michael Eliot Howard. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

This is the most significant attempt in Western history to understand war, both in its internal dynamics and as an instrument of

policy. Since its first appearance in 1832, this book has been read

throughout the world and has stimulated generations of soldiers,

statesmen, and intellectuals.

Cohen, Eliot A. Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in

Wartime. New York: Anchor Books, 2003.

Cohen examines the strategies of Abraham Lincoln, Georges

Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben Gurion and addresses broader questions about the tension between politicians

and generals in a wartime democracy. He argues that these men

were great wartime heads of state because they were able to finesse

a relationship with their military leaders that kept the balance of

power squarely in (their own) civilian hands.

Connell, Evan S. Son of the Morning Star: Custer and the Little Big Horn.

San Francisco: North Point Press, 1997.

Connell’s examination of the Little Big Horn is generally considered to be the most reliable account of the subject. He makes good

use of his meticulous research and novelist’s eye for the story and

140 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
detail to recreate the heroism, foolishness, and savagery of this crucial chapter in the history of the West.

The Constitution of the United States of America. Bedford, MA: Applewood

Books, 1995.

The founding document of American government is printed in its

entirety without notes or commentary.

Coram, Robert. Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War.

Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2002.

This is a deeply researched and detailed biography of John Boyd, a

crackerjack jet fighter pilot, a visionary scholar, and an innovative

military strategist. He wrote the first manual on jet aerial combat, was

primarily responsible for designing the F–15 and the F–16 jet fighters, was a leading voice in the post–Vietnam War military reform

movement, and shaped the successful U.S. military strategy in the

Persian Gulf War.

Creasy, Edward Shepherd. Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World: From

Marathon to Waterloo. New York: Da Capo Press, 1994.

This book, first published in 1851, is a classic account of famous

battles of the past 2,300 years that fundamentally changed the

course of world history. Battles under discussion include the battle

of Marathon, the victory of Arminius over the Roman legions

under Varus, the battle of Hastings, the defeat of the Spanish

Armada, and the battle of Waterloo.

Cronin, Vincent. Napoleon Bonaparte: An Intimate Biography. New York:

Harper Collins, 1990.

Cronin approached this book as a study of Napoleon’s character, an

attempt to “picture a living, breathing man.” Toward this end,

Cronin concentrates on events that throw light on Napoleon’s character. Military campaigns are only outlined, although civil matters

are dealt with in more depth.

DeBeer, Gavin Rylands. Hannibal: Challenging Rome’s Supremacy. New

York: Viking Press, 1969.

Acknowledging the difficulty presented by the absence of sympathetic primary sources about Hannibal—everything that is known

about him came from or passed through the hands of his enemies,

RECOMMENDED READING 141
the Romans—deBeer has produced an account of the leader of

Carthage and his role in preparing for the Second Punic War.

Eisenhower, John S.D. Yanks: The Epic Story of the American Army in World

War I. New York: Free Press, 2002.

Eisenhower presents the U.S. involvement in the war from the perspective of statesmen and generals. He focuses primarily on senior

officers, such as Douglas MacArthur, George Patton, and George

C. Marshall, and lesser-known figures like Charles Summerall.

Without denying the administrative problems and the casualties

caused by inexperience and improvisation, Eisenhower stresses the

high American learning curves at all levels.

Faragher, John Mack. Daniel Boone: The Life and Legend of an American Pioneer. New York: Owl Books, 1993.

Faragher reexamines the popular image of Daniel Boone and

argues that he is worthy of attention as a personification of the

westward movement rather than as an unlettered backwoodsman,

skilled hunter, and Indian fighter.

Fehrenbach, T.R. This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History.

Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 1994.

In this book, originally published in 1963 as This Kind of War: A

Study in Unpreparedness, Fehrenbach presents a broad view of

events in the Korean and international arenas and offers sharp insight into the successes and failures of U.S. forces. Partly drawn

from official records, operations journals, and histories, it is based

largely on the personal narratives of the small-unit commanders

and their troops.

Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark

Battle. New York: Penguin, 1992.

New translations of Japanese accounts, recently declassified documents, and strategies and tactics of both sides inform this record of

America’s first major offensive of the Pacific war. Frank evaluates

the adversaries’ strengths and weaknesses, stressing in particular the

shortcomings of the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Army. He argues

convincingly that Guadalcanal was the turning point in the Pacific.

142 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee. New York: Scribner, 1997.

This reissue of Richard Harwell’s 1961 abridgement of Freeman’s

1935 Pulitzer Prize–winning R.E. Lee chronicles all the major aspects and highlights of Lee’s military career and includes a new introduction by James McPherson.

Freeman, Douglas Southall, William J. Jacobs, and Richard Barksdale

Harwell. Washington: An Abridgement in One Volume by Richard

Harwell of the Seven-Volume George Washington by Douglas Southall

Freeman. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968.

This abridged text of Freeman’s Pulitzer Prize–winning biography

of Washington provides a much more easily read summary of

Washington’s life than the original series.

Freidel, Frank B. Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny. Boston:

Little, Brown and Company, 1990.

Freidel, whose four-volume biography of the young FDR concluded

with the launching of the New Deal, offers a one-volume complete

biography. It concentrates on Roosevelt’s Presidency, with public

events the consistent focus, and the private man left mainly alone.

Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs: Ulysses S. Grant. New York: Modern

Library, 1999.

Destitute and wracked by throat cancer, Grant finished writing his

memoirs shortly before his death in 1885. Today their clear prose

stands as a model of autobiography and is probably the best piece

of writing produced by a participant in the War Between the States.

Apart from Lincoln, no man deserves more credit for securing the

Northern victory than Grant, and this chronicle of campaigns and

battles tells how he did it.

Handel, Michael I. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. New York:

Frank Cass and Company, 2000.

This study is based on a detailed textual analysis of the classical works

on war by Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, Jomini, and Machiavelli. The central conclusion is that the logic of waging war and of

strategic thinking is as universal and timeless as human nature itself.

RECOMMENDED READING 143
Hibbert, Christopher. Nelson: A Personal History. New York: Da Capo

Press, 1996.

In this tale of Nelson’s life on and off the high seas, Hibbert illuminates the admiral’s personality, his personal and political friendships, his relationship with Sir William Hamilton, and his passionate love affair with Hamilton’s wife. Whether quarreling with

royalty, wooing beautiful women around the world, or winning

history’s most famous sea battles, Hibbert’s irascible Nelson is a

character for all times.

Holm, Jeanne M. Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992.

Holm has updated this standard work, originally published in 1982,

with material on the role of military women in the Grenada,

Panama, and Persian Gulf campaigns, along with a discussion of

the ongoing debate over the combat exclusion laws and draft policies relating to women.

Homan, Lynn M., and Thomas Reilly. Black Knights: The Story of the

Tuskegee Airmen. Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing Company, 2001.

Through interviews with Tuskegee airmen and their families, as

well as archival research, Homan and Reilly convey the organizational and personal struggles behind the Tuskegee experience. They

detail the training and war missions of the black airmen and the

hardships overcome in Europe as well as at home.

Houlahan, Thomas G. Gulf War: The Complete History. New London, NH:

Schrenker Military Publishing, 1999.

Using published Gulf War narratives and interviews with commanders, Houlahan has assembled a narrative of every Coalition

maneuver battalion through the war in an attempt to close the gap

between the reality of the war and the public perception of it.

Hubbard, Elbert. A Message to Garcia. Mount Vernon, NY: Peter Pauper

Press, 1983.

This short essay, set against the backdrop of the Spanish-American

War, has been translated into every major language and is the fifth

most widely distributed book in history. Military and business leaders alike have applied its theme—that a hero is a man who does his

job—to their endeavors.

144 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
Jenkins, Roy. Churchill: A Biography. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2001.

Jenkins’ mastery of British political history and his tenure as a

member of Parliament enrich this book, which adds much to the

vast library of works on Churchill. While acknowledging his subject’s prickly nature, Jenkins credits Churchill for, among other

things, recognizing far earlier than his peers the dangers of Hitler’s

regime. He praises Churchill for his leadership during the war

years, especially at the outset, when England stood alone and in imminent danger of defeat. He also examines Churchill’s struggle to

forge political consensus to meet that crisis, and he sheds new light

on Churchill’s postwar decline.

Kaplan, Robert D. Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan

Ethos. New York: Random House, 2001.

Kaplan extracts historical models and rationales from the works of

Machiavelli, Malthus, Hobbes, and others to advocate a foreign policy based on the morality of results rather than good intentions.

From these classics, he draws examples of exploiting military

might, stealth, cunning, and what he dubs “anxious foresight” in

order to lead, fight, and defeat adversaries who challenge the prevailing balance of power.

Keegan, John, ed. The Book of War. New York: Viking Press, 1999.

In this anthology of war writings, Keegan has collected some of the

best that has been thought and said about armed conflict over the

course of 25 centuries, beginning with Thucydides and concluding

with a British soldier’s comments about the 1991 Gulf War.

———. The Face of Battle. New York: Viking Press, 1976.

Keegan creates a realistic picture of the fears, pressures, and mechanics of fighting a battle, using Agincourt, Waterloo, and the

Somme as examples.

———. The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare. New York:

Penguin USA, 1990.

Keegan explores the changing nature of war at sea by dissecting

four crucial sea battles, each featuring a different type of warship:

Trafalgar (wooden sailing ships), Jutland (ironclad dreadnoughts),

Midway (aircraft carriers), and the Battle of the Atlantic

RECOMMENDED READING 145
(submarines). He focuses on how technology, tactics, strategy, and

training influenced combat operations in the battles.

MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval

Institute, 2001.

MacArthur’s supporters believe his genius for command and ability

to implement that command by strategy stand as landmarks in military history. His critics are not so kind, calling him a gigantic ego paying homage to himself in this book. This self-portrait is a moving

final testament to a life of service that began at West Point and continued in Vera Cruz during the Mexican uprisings and throughout

the world wars. Appointed Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in

the Pacific, MacArthur was the architect of the campaign to drive the

Japanese from their strongholds at Bataan, Corregidor, and New

Guinea. Although the autobiography was written more than 30 years

ago, it continues to be a valuable document of the period.

McCullough, David G. Truman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.

In this 1993 Pulitzer Prize–winning biography, McCullough evaluates Truman’s Presidency and argues that history has validated most

of his wartime and Cold War decisions. McCullough also devotes

considerable attention to defining Truman’s character and portraying him as not only a President, but also a man.

McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2003.

Published in 1988 to universal acclaim, this single-volume treatment of the Civil War quickly became recognized as the new standard in its field. McPherson combines a brisk writing style with an

admirable thoroughness. He covers the military aspects of the war

in all of the necessary detail, and also provides a helpful framework

describing the complex economic, political, and social forces behind the conflict.

Millet, Alan R. and Williamson Murray. A War to Be Won. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 2000.

The authors examine the Second World War from the operational

level, detailing strategy and tactics. They also discuss weapons development and production, as well as intelligence and deception,

including mistakes and successes on both sides.

146 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
Moore, Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. We Were Soldiers Once . . . and

Young: Ia Drang—The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam.

New York: Random House, 1992.

This book combines the memories of Moore, who commanded the

1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and Galloway, the only reporter present

during the 34-day battle against the Viet Cong at Ia Drang, with

more than 100 in-depth interviews with survivors on both sides.

The authors present Ia Drang as an archetype of a self-defeating

U.S. strategy that emphasized wearing down a determined and

skillful enemy on the battlefield. The result was an unacceptably

high level of American losses for the results achieved.

Morris, Donald R. The Washing of the Spears: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu

Nation. New York: Da Capo Press, 1998.

Filled with colorful characters, dramatic battles like Isandhlwana

and Rorke’s Drift, and an inexorable narrative momentum, this unsurpassed history details the 60-year existence of the world’s mightiest African empire—from its brutal formation and zenith under

the military genius Shaka (1787–1828), through its inevitable collision with white expansionism, to its dissolution under Cetshwayo

in the Zulu War of 1879.

Murtha, John P., and John Plashal. From Vietnam to 9/11: On the Front

Lines of National Security. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State

University Press, 2003.

Murtha, the first Vietnam combat veteran elected to Congress,

combines memories of his personal experiences with his analysis of

failures and successes in American policymaking decisions about

national security and foreign policy.

Prados, John. Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II. New York: Random

House, 1995.

This ambitious work is not simply a rundown of code-breaking

successes, but an astonishing demonstration of how the day-to-day

accumulation of knowledge can produce extraordinary results. Its

accounting of Japanese intelligence is unprecedented in detail. Its

reassessment of battles and campaigns is presented not just in terms

of troops or ships but in how the secret war actually played out.

RECOMMENDED READING 147
Ricks, Thomas E. Making the Corps. New York: Scribners, 1997.

Ricks combines his account of following a platoon of young men

through 11 weeks of Marine Corps boot camp with commentary

on what separates the demanding, disciplined culture of America’s

military elite from the more permissive culture of its civilian society. Ricks also examines how the corps is dealing with such critical

social and political issues as race relations, gender equality, and sexual orientation.

Scales, Robert H., Jr. Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America’s

Military. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003.

The author focuses on the land forces—the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps—in this attempt to anticipate how changes in geopolitics,

technology, and domestic politics will alter the character of future

wars. He maintains that America’s new age of warfare—“limited”

wars fought for limited ends and with limited means—began with

the Korean War and that lessons learned in each active conflict since

help to clarify America’s strategic direction and to codify a new and

uniquely American way of fighting limited wars.

Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. New York: Simon

and Schuster, 1990.

Since its publication in 1960, this monumental study of Hitler’s German Empire has been widely acclaimed as the definitive record of

the blackest hours of the 20th century. Shirer’s text offers an unparalleled and thrillingly told examination of how Adolf Hitler nearly

succeeded in conquering the world. With millions of copies in print

around the globe, it has attained the status of a vital and enduring

classic.

Sides, Hampton. Ghost Soldiers: The Forgotten Epic Story of World War II’s

Most Dramatic Mission. New York: Doubleday, 2001.

Sides interviewed participants of the rescue of 500 American and

Allied prisoners of war from Cabanatuan prison camp on the Philippine island of Luzon. This account intertwines the tale of these prisoners, who were survivors of the Bataan Death March in 1942, and

121 officers and men of the Army’s Sixth Ranger Battalion.

Slim, William Joseph, Viscount. Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in

Burma and India, 1942–1945. With a new introduction by David W.

Hogan, Jr. New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000.

148 WHISPERS OF WARRIORS
This is an updated version of the classic, definitive account of the

Burma campaign in World War II. It presents the history of the

victory against Japan in India by Field Marshal Slim, who led shattered British forces from Burma to India in one of the lesser-known

but more nightmarish retreats of the war, and the ultimate liberation of India and Burma from the Japanese Army.

Sugden, John. Tecumseh: A Life. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999.

Over 30 years in the writing, this is the first authoritative biography

of the principal organizer and driving force of Native American

confederacy. After watching other tribes fail in their bids to mimic

European society, the charismatic Tecumseh attempted to organize

a pan-Indian alliance to put down the European encroachers. He

was killed while fighting alongside the British in the War of 1812.

Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1986.

Written in China more than 2,000 years ago, this is the first known

study of the planning and conduct of military operations. These

comprehensive essays examine not only battlefield maneuvers, but

also relevant economic, political, and psychological factors. In addition to his translation, Griffith provides commentaries written by

Chinese strategists, plus several essays on topics such as the influence of Sun Tzu on Mao Tse-tung and on Japanese military

thought, the nature of warfare in Sun Tzu’s time, and the life of Sun

Tzu and other important commentators.

Vandiver, Frank E. Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977.

Feeling that Pershing’s World War I career has been adequately

covered in other biographies, Vandiver takes the approach of tying

Pershing’s youth to his later achievements and the part he played

in his time.

Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of United States

Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University

Press, 1977.

Weigley examines the evolution of American military strategy from

the Revolutionary War through Vietnam, defining the Civil War as

a watershed in the concept of strategy and offering a critical review

of the uses of sea and airpower and of strategy in a nuclear age.

RECOMMENDED READING 149
About the Author

Representative Isaac Newton (Ike) Skelton IV (D–MO) has represented Missouri’s Fourth Congressional District in Washington

since 1977. His district includes the state capital, Jefferson City,

much of the Ozark region of the state, and two major military installations—Fort Leonard Wood and Whiteman Air Force Base.

Mr. Skelton is a native of Lexington and a graduate of the Wentworth

Military Academy. He received A.B. and L.L.B. degrees from the University

of Missouri at Columbia, where he was named a member of Phi Beta

Kappa and the Law Review. Prior to his election to Congress, Mr. Skelton

served as Lafayette County Prosecuting Attorney, Missouri state attorney

general, and a Missouri state senator.

A leader in the House on defense issues, Congressman Skelton is the

ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee. As chair of

the committee’s Panel on Professional Military Education in 1987–1988,

he helped implement the education provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols

Act. Mr. Skelton is regarded by many as the godfather of joint professional

military education. In recognition of his contributions to military education, the National Defense University awarded him its first honorary degree as Doctor of National Security Affairs in 2001. As most of his district

is comprised of small towns and farming communities, Congressman

Skelton is also concerned about the issues of rural America. He is a former

chairman of the Small Business Subcommittee on Procurement, Tourism,

and Rural Development and the Congressional Rural Caucus.

Mr. Skelton is an Eagle Scout, member of Sigma Chi social fraternity,

Lions Club member, and vice chairman of the Board of Trustees of the

Harry S. Truman Scholarship Foundation. A member of the First Christian Church in Lexington, he and his wife Susie have three sons.

A lifelong student and avid reader of military history, Congressman

Ike Skelton is an author in his own right of numerous articles published in

professional military journals.

151
The Honorable Ike Skelton has represented the Fourth Congressional 

District of Missouri since 1977. He is currently the ranking Democrat

on the House Armed Services Committee and, as Chairman of the

Panel on Professional Military Education, helped implement the

provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 relating to joint education of the Armed Forces.

Whispers of Warriors

Essays on the New Joint Era

Ike Skelton—one of the most

knowledgeable experts in Congress on

defense—explores issues such as:

• Professional Military Education

• Joint and Combined Operations

• Military Leadership

• The Role of Congress in Defense

• Intelligence Support of Military Operations

• International Engagement

• The Importance of History for Military Professionals

• Coalition Operations and Technological Innovation

• Lessons from Desert One to the Balkans

• America’s Frontier Wars and Asymmetric Conflict

• Cultural Awareness Training for the Armed Forces

Cover 4