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FEDERALISM AND DISASTER REPONSE:

EXAMINING THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

OF LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL AGENCIES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 19, 2005

Serial No. 109–46

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honoralee Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .................... 1

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From the 

U.S. Virgin Islands ............................................................................................... 64

The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania .................................................................................................... 56 

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State Washington ................................................................................................. 50

The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of North Carolina ................................................................................................. 66

The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Nevada .............................................................................................................. 63

The Honorable Katherine Harris, a Representative in Congress From the 

Stte of Florida ....................................................................................................... 12

The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York .......................................................................................................... 53 

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California ................................................................................................ 60

The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 13

The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida ..................................................................................................... 67

The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From the 

District of Columbia ............................................................................................. 56

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New Jersey ............................................................................................. 62

The Honorable Stevan Pearce, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New Mexico ...................................................................................................... 65 

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress From the State of 

Texas ..................................................................................................................... 67

The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 58

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California ................................................................................................ 45

The Honorable Lamar S. Smith, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 12

WITNESSES

PANEL I 

The Honorable Jeb Bush, Governor, State of Florida: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19
Page

IV

The Honorable Rick Perry, Governor, State of Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 30 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 31

The Honorable Janet Napolitano, Governor, State of Arizona: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 32 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 38

PANEL II 

The Honorable Roberts Eckels, County Judge, Harris County, Texas: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 68

The Honorable David G. Wallace, Mayor, City of Sugar Land, Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 76 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 79

The Honorable Audwin M. Samuel, Mayor Pro Tem, City of Beaumont, Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 86 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 88

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Billy Broomfield, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Mississippi: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4

The Honorable Johnny L. Dupree, Mayor, Hattiesburg, Mississippi: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3

The Honorable Vivian Juan-Saunders, Chairwoman, Tohono O’Odham 

Nation-Arizona: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 34

The Honorable Oscar G. Ortiz: 

Letter .....................................................................................................................

16
(1)

EXAMINING THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL 

AGENCIES 

Wednesday, October 19, 2005

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:14 a.m., in Room 345, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King [chairman of the 

committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives King, Smith, Linder, Lungren, Gibbons, 

Simmons, Pearce, Harris, Reichert, McCaul, Dent, Brown–Waite, 

Thompson, Sanchez, Markey, Dicks, Harman, DeFazio, Lowey, 

Norton, Lofgren, Jackson-Lee, Pascrell, Christensen, Etheridge, 

Langevin and Meek. 

Also present: Representative Poe. 

Chairman KING. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security will come to order. The committee is meeting today to hear 

testimony on federalism and disaster response, examining the respective roles and responsibilities of local, State and Federal agencies. And we are very privileged to have with us an—actually both 

panels of absolute ultimate expert witnesses as to confronting the 

hazards of nature, and, as Governor Bush unfortunately knows, 

perhaps confronting another, you know, terrible storm within the 

next several days. And it is especially appropriate that we have 

this certainly in the aftermath of Katrina and Rita, and now with 

another storm coming to Florida this weekend, it is essential. 

I believe that the committee should consider the whole issue of 

what the appropriate Federal response should be, what the obligations of State and local governments are, and how it is best to 

make this combination work. Obviously, your States have dealt 

with the wildfires and flash floods, mammoth hurricanes, tornados, 

and it is really the real-life experience that you can bring to the 

hearing today that we are really looking forward to. 

I also want to say especially to Governor Bush and Governor 

Perry to thank you for what your States have done in helping other 

States. Many people from Louisiana who have gone into Texas, and 

almost half a million Louisiana residents are now in the State of 

Texas; the fact that the Florida National Guard was so quick to go 

into Mississippi during Katrina really, I think, speaks volumes and 

shows that all of us are in this together. 

And I know I speak on behalf of all the members of the committee when we talk about the tremendous sorrow and destruction 
2

that was caused in Harris County, in Beaumont and Sugarland by 

Rita. And, Governor Perry, also I know Judge Eckels and Mayor 

Wallace and Audwin Samuel on the next panel, I really want to 

commend you for your dedication and hard work in recent weeks. 

And, of course, Governor Napolitano, it seems as a New Yorker—

by the way, we lost Governor Napolitano from New York many 

years ago, and so it is good to have you back at least for today. You 

and I can sort of talk the same language even though you have lost 

most of your good accent. But we do see you with the wildfires in 

Arizona, what you have to confront, and it is again the fact that 

all of you are here today is very significant. 

To me there are a number of issues we have to look into, and 

that is the extent of the Federal response, what it should be; what 

the role of the Federal Government should be ensuring that local 

governments are coordinated, that they are making adequate use 

of Federal funds, that there are plans in place at the State and 

local level to be coordinated with the Federal Government; and 

what role, if any, should the Federal Government play in addition 

to what it does today. 

I know the President has discussed the possibility of the greater 

use of the military. All of that, I believe, should be part of the hearing today. 

I—because of the caliber of our witnesses today, I am keeping my 

opening statement short. I will ask to have it inserted into the 

record. But I do want to get directly to the testimony of our witnesses because it is so important. And the first witness will be Governor Bush of Florida, and Congresswoman Harris has asked to 

make a few remarks introducing the Governor. Oh, I am sorry. The 

distinguished Ranking Member from Mississippi Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I look forward to the testimony. If you can give me about 5 minutes, we will get to it. 

Chairman KING. The Ranking Member can have as much as he 

wants. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome 

to our panel. 

I, too, am interested in federalism and Federal response that we, 

as a government, should adequately do. In the past 2 months, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have devastated much of the gulf coast 

of Alabama, Louisiana, Texas and my home State of Mississippi. I 

am always impressed by the spirit and resolve of the American 

people in a crisis. Faced with unthinkable circumstances, we saw 

many acts of heroism and compassion by first responders and average citizens. However, both hurricanes left us with many questions 

on our Nation’s preparedness and the role the Federal Government 

must play in disaster response. 

Our Federal Government failed the American people, who they 

were here to protect and serve, by not facilitating an organized and 

adequate response. As a former volunteer firefighter and local official, I know that response should be local, and the folks in Washington, D.C., sometimes forget that the Federal Government is here 

to make our communities as strong and as robust as they need to 

be. That means stepping up to the plate when communities are 

overwhelmed with natural disasters of national significance. 
3

I have spoken to local officials, mayors, firefighters and police 

throughout the Gulf coast, and have uniformly discussed the dysfunction and disconnects between the Federal Government and our 

first responder communities. I have here several statements, Mr. 

Chairman, I would like to have entered into the record: the mayor 

of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, Mayor Johnny Dupree; State representative Billy Broomfield. I have also testimony from the 

Tahono Nation in Arizona that I would like to also inject into the 

record. 

Chairman KING. Without objection. 

[The information follows:]

FOR THE RECORD 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAYOR JOHNNY L. DUPREE

As the Mayor of the City of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, a city about 70 miles from 

the Mississippi Gulf Coast, I witnessed first-hand the impact that a storm of 

Katrina’s magnitude could have on an in-land community and the effect that massive numbers of evacuees could have on a city without proper federal and state disaster support. 

The single most important thing I discovered after Katrina was that FEMA and 

state officials have not thought enough about how to support cities that are near 

enough to the scene of a natural disaster to be somewhat affected by it, but also 

far enough away that they will be a location to which large numbers of evacuees 

flee. 

Hattiesburg suffered damage from Katrina—including widespread loss of power 

and communications. Additionally, as the first major city in Mississippi north of the 

Coast, we were a prime location for evacuees to flee. As a result, even as our city’s 

infrastructure suffered from Katrina itself, we were faced with trying to help thousands of people in the worst of conditions. 

Although FEMA officials bragged about the way they had pre-positioned supplies 

before the storm’s impact, I found that the materials we needed to help thousands 

of evacuees in the first crucial days after Katrina’s landfall were not available. It 

does not seem that FEMA did a good job pre-positioning supplies to help communities directly on the Coast, but it certainly did not do a good job pre-positioning 

supplies for in-land locations that would house massive numbers of evacuees. 

Federal and state officials also failed to properly accept requests for resources or 

to monitor them once made. We would request items without always receiving a response as to whether they would be delivered. Sometimes items we requested would 

just show up without any notice they were arriving, which made it difficult to distribute them. In other cases, resources arrived very late. We requested 50 

portapotties a day after Katrina struck, but we did not receive them until 3 weeks 

later when we did not really need them anymore. 

Additionally, federal and state officials did not have an effective means for local 

officials to report the damage they were observing. Instead, these federal and state 

officials were often working in areas that were not necessarily the greatest in need. 

In addition to correcting these problems, I believe there are two other key things 

that can be done to improve federal and state response and coordination in a disaster. 

First, in the case of potential natural disasters we know are coming, such as a 

Category III or above hurricane approaching, there needs to be a genuine FEMA 

decision-maker on the ground ahead of time in communities that can be directly affected or that will be sites for evacuees. The FEMA official sent to Hattiesburg before Katrina struck could do little more than help us answer telephones. 

Second, the federal government needs to work more with state and local officials 

to develop evacuation plans for communities and the regions in which they are located, as well as the responsibilities for each of these levels of government in case 

the plan must be implemented. The Ranking Member of the Committee, Representative Bennie Thompson, has introduced legislation that would assist in evacuation 

planning, and I wholeheartedly endorse his proposal. 

Thank you for accepting my testimony. 
4

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. BILLY BROOMFIELD

As the Mississippi State Representative representing Moss Point, Mississippi, a 

town in Jackson County along the Mississippi Gulf Coast, I witnessed first hand the 

devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina and the lack of coordination by federal, 

state and other first responders afterwards. 

If I were to recommend a single thing that federal and state officials could do to 

better improve response to a disaster, it would be establish ongoing communications 

with local officials before and after the disaster occurs to the greatest extent possible. 

By ‘‘local officials,’’ I do not just mean the mayor or local head of emergency services. I believe disaster response efforts could also be well served if state and federal 

officials better worked with state representatives like me, along with city 

councilpeople, sheriffs, county supervisors, and others. We know our communities 

very well, and after a disaster, we are often the officials that are contacted for help 

by people who cannot find it elsewhere. I will give several examples of the problems 

I witnessed, and what could have been done differently if state and federal officials 

had contacted me. 

Although I represent several predominantly African American neighborhoods severely affected by the storm, I did not personally see any Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials until the Sunday almost a week after the Katrina 

struck. They were taking photographs of some destroyed residences along the waterfront, which struck me as a poor use of resources at the time considering there were 

several neighborhoods further from the beach that had severely damaged buildings 

that were still capable of being saved if help arrived quickly. If FEMA had returned 

any of my calls prior to then, or reached out to me on its own, I could have told 

the agency what neighborhoods could best be helped. 

FEMA and the Red Cross’s initial disaster response offices nearest Moss Point 

were located near the interstate, a long way from many of the minority and other 

neighborhoods severely affected by Katrina. When I held a meeting with the Red 

Cross in an African American neighborhood in order to discuss whether a new office 

could be located nearby in order to better serve the area, FEMA did not attend even 

though its officials were invited. 

Pascagoula, Mississippi, which is near Moss Point, had a Navy hospital ship 

docked nearby for several days after the hurricane. According to the ship’s commanding officer, it had treated 3,000 people since the storm. However, while I was 

on the ship discussing efforts with the commanding officer to bus in many of my 

constituents who still needed medical care, he received orders to move the ship. Apparently state officials had told the Navy the ship was no longer needed. I was 

standing right there—I could have told the federal or state officials making these 

decisions that it was still desperately needed. 

In the days after Katrina struck, there were also numerous volunteer doctors and 

other medical professionals who came to Moss Point to help, but were turned away 

for various reasons, such as being told that their medical licenses were not good for 

working in Mississippi. We desperately needed this help at the time. I am sure that 

state and federal officials could have worked out these problems if they had been 

willing to communicate better with one another or other elected officials, like myself, who could have encouraged the appropriate state authorities to provide whatever waivers were necessary. 

Even now, more than six weeks after Hurricane Katrina struck, I have not been 

able to get any FEMA officials to return my calls. I have received numerous questions and complaints from my constituents about everything from mobile home 

availability to the level at which their house needs to be rebuilt to qualify for loans 

for rebuilding. I could serve as a valuable tool for FEMA to communicate with many 

of these victims of the hurricane—if the agency would just return my call. Yesterday, I asked for Representative Bennie Thompson’s help to get FEMA to contact me. 

While I appreciate Mr. Thompson’s assistance, it should not have been necessary 

for a Congressman to intervene to get my calls returned. 

Finally, in addition to better reaching out to local officials before and after a disaster, I also believe that FEMA and other federal agencies could be of valuable assistance helping local communities, like Moss Point, develop and test evacuation 

plans. If Hurricane Katrina had struck my town head on, I am not sure that we 

would have adequately evacuated all our at-risk citizens ahead of time. Representative Thompson has introduced legislation requiring FEMA to help local communities 

with evacuation planning, and I wholeheartedly support this effort. 

Thank you for accepting my testimony.
5

Mr. THOMPSON. The Federal Government has the ability, assets 

and responsibility to help State and local governments respond to 

major disasters that overwhelm or threaten to overwhelm their resources. Anyone who has been a local official knows that it is absurd for the Federal Government to sit back and watch our towns 

struggle to respond to disasters of national significance. Indeed, the 

National Response Plan clearly lays out what assistance the Federal Government and DHS are expected to provide in the case of 

a catastrophic event. 

Mr. Chairman, I also have a copy of the DOD severe weather 

order that I would like to also enter into the record. 

Chairman KING. Without objection, it will be part of the record. 

[The information follows:]
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Mr. THOMPSON. With Hurricane Wilma potentially looming over 

the gulf coast, I am concerned. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses here today about 

how we can improve a broken system and ensure that State and 

local communities are protected whether from a natural disaster or 

a terrorist threat. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I look forward to the testimony. 

Chairman KING. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. 

And now, without any more delay. 

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. 

I am grateful to have been afforded the honor of introducing to this 

committee a man whose disciplined leadership and innovative governance have placed him in a league of his own. As Florida’s 43rd 

Governor, Jeb Bush has developed a well-earned repetition as a 

common-sense manager armed with uncommon and noble ability to 

steer his ship of state through the most trying of times. As a Floridian it is with respectful pride that I call him Governor. As an 

individual it is with an equal level of honor that I call him friend. 

Prior to the truest test of leadership skills, Winston Churchill 

noted even ordinary life and business involve the encountering of 

unknown factors and require some effort of the imagination, some 

stress of the soul to overcome them. In the course of his two terms 

in governance in office, Governor Bush has proven eminently qualified to exert an effort of the imagination and a stress of the soul. 

This prosperity was maintained even in the face of the destructively active 2004 hurricane season in which four devastating 

storms, including three of which hitting my district directly, challenged residents and public officials alike. Yet Florida was able to 

retain its position as the top travel destination in the world and as 

the Nation’s number one State in job growth for the past 3 years. 

This resilience was needed. 

Even with Hurricane Wilma approaching and through seven hurricanes, two tropical storms in the past 13 months, Governor Bush 

and his administration have displayed the qualities which I believe 

distinguish them as an emergency response team without peer. The 

lessons learned through congressional hearings and media reports 

echo what we as Floridians already know: Florida can serve the 

Nation as a model for State response to emergency situations. As 

the Governor of South Carolina stated when asked what he would 

do if his State was threatened by a hurricane he said, call Jeb. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KING. I thank the gentlelady. 

And now Congressman Smith will introduce Governor Perry. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, before I get to the formal introduction, let me say 

that in my judgment, not many elected officials emerged from the 

aftermath of Hurricane Katrina as genuine heroes, but I believe 

that Governor Perry is a hero given his actions after that hurricane. Texas welcomed hundreds of thousands of evacuees. Governor 

Perry immediately committed the State’s resources to make them 

feel welcome, and he did so not knowing where those resources 

were going to come from, only knowing that we had to help, and 

for that, as I say, I think he deserves to be called a genuine hero. 
13

Rick Perry was sworn in as the State’s 47th Governor on December 21, 2000. Prior to that he was Lieutenant Governor and also 

served two terms as Texas Commissioner of Agriculture. From 

1985 to 1991, he served in the Texas House of Representatives representing a rural west Texas district. 

Between 1972 and 1977, Governor Perry served in the United 

States Air Force, flying C–130 tactical airlift aircraft in the United 

States, Europe and the Middle East. He is a 1972 graduate of 

Texas A&M University, where he was a member of the Corps of 

Cadets. 

Governor Perry grew up in the small community of Paint Creek, 

60 miles north of Abilene, on his family’s farm and ranch. Rick and 

Anita Perry are the parents of two adult children. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to introduce 

the Governor of the largest State that does not consist of ice, Governor Rick Perry. 

Chairman KING. Since Texas always tries to be twice as big as 

everyone else, Congressman McCaul wants to say a few words. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is an honor to share in the introduction. And first I would like 

to say as accustomed as Texans are to bragging, I would like to 

brag a little bit about my Governor. You know, they say crisis 

brings out true leadership, and I think we saw that with this Governor. After the tragic events of Katrina, he welcomed nearly a 

quarter of a million of his neighbors to his home State, gave them 

clothes, food, shelter. It was the right thing to do, it was the compassionate thing to do, and I was proud to be a Texan. 

I remember visiting the emergency operation center when the 

Vice President came to Austin, and we went over the plan of what 

would happen if a Katrina hit the Gulf, the State of Texas. And 

they showed us these computer models of how it would literally 

cover the island of Galveston and flood Houston. Little did we 

know that about a week later we would be faced with that very 

threat. Fortunately it did not hit the most populated area of Texas, 

but fortunately the Governor implemented the evacuation plans 

along with the State and local officials. He did federalize the National Guard, and remarkably there was no direct loss of life due 

to the hurricane. 

My grandfather survived the 1900 Galveston hurricane. They 

found him in a tree. He climbed to the top of the tree, and he was 

rescued from that tree. Ten thousand people died in that hurricane. 

I think the fact that we survived with no one losing their life in 

that instance is a real tribute to your leadership, and I am proud 

that you are my Governor, and I am proud to call you my friend. 

Thank you. 

Chairman KING. Mr. McCaul, I don’t know if the gentlelady from 

Texas has recovered from Monday night’s baseball game yet, but 

if she has and would like to make some remarks, she is recognized. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Mr. Chairman, first of all, it is certainly an 

honor to share this podium with you as the new Chairman of the 

Homeland Security Committee, along with a very stellar and outstanding Ranking Member. I expect great work that we will proceed with. 
14

Governor Perry, you have to defend me. Obviously we know that 

both of us share the dream of go Astros, but with my colleagues, 

let me acknowledge all three of the Governors and specifically point 

to Hurricane Rita. 

I want to say to my colleagues that Texas was blessed and we 

are blessed even to be able to share our lives with Hurricane 

Katrina survivors. The Governor has opened up our home to them. 

I thank you for that. But watching the work that we were able to 

do together during Hurricane Rita, you in Austin and those of us 

at the transfer center, let me thank you for respecting the work of 

Mayor Bill White and Judge Robert Eckels and all of the local officials for the work that they did. I think if there is a stellar comment to be made about the work of the Governor’s office and our 

local community was that we, you, worked with them and their 

leadership. Let me thank you, and we look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman KING. I thank the gentlelady. 

The Ranking Member. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am 

happy to introduce Governor Napolitano from Arizona. She comes, 

as you know, with sterling credentials. She is Vice Chair of the 

NGA. She has made it her career to be a person of the people. We 

are excited to have her. We had an opportunity to have conversation earlier. I look forward to it. 

We want to welcome you. The camaraderie, Governor, you see 

here this morning, we do this every day. There is never a cross 

word on this committee. And so we look forward to the testimony. 

And, Mr. Chairman, if I might, I want to yield the balance of my 

time to the gentlewoman from California. 

Chairman KING. The gentlelady is recognized. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank my great 

colleague from the State of Mississippi, and I, too, want to welcome 

a good friend, Governor Napolitano from Arizona, as a daughter of 

parents who grew up on the Douglas, Arizona, and Nogales border, 

with plenty of family in Kearney and Tucson and Mesa and every 

place you can imagine in Arizona. I have had the pleasure of being 

out there to hear your people and how much they love you. And 

we love you also. We are glad that you are here, and we look forward to your testimony. 

I also want to add that this Governor’s State is one of only three 

States that has an accredited program in the emergency area. 

So we look forward to hearing your testimony this morning, Governor. 

Chairman KING. For those of you who didn’t get to make introductory statements, you will know that opening remarks can be inserted into the record. 

[The information follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SHEILA JACKSON-LEE

I thank the Gentleman from New York, the Chairman, and the Gentleman from 

Mississippi, the Ranking Member for holding this very necessary hearing today. The 

distinguished panel of witnesses will afford me a unique opportunity given that my 

District in Houston, Texas, represents a significant stakeholder with respect to both 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita respectively. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, never a disaster caused such a massive displacement of a U.S. population. Furthermore, never 
15

has the United States seen so vividly the exposure and vulnerability of displaced 

persons—primarily the poor, the infirm, and the elderly. We know from experience 

that disasters take their greatest toll on the disenfranchised, but the distressing television images of our citizens stranded without basic human necessities and exposed 

to human waste, toxins, and physical violence awakened the public health community to a frightening realization: given the ineffective response mechanisms that 

were in place, Katrina could become a public health catastrophe. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS to: prevent terrorist attacks 

within the United States; reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, 

natural disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and assist in 

the recovery from terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies. The 

act also designates DHS as ‘‘a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises 

and emergency planning.’’ Poor response time, leadership, competency levels, and 

recognition of the central needs of the people illustrate the fact that this Administration simply failed at implementing the Homeland Security Act and its legislative 

intent. All the finger-pointing in the world will not bring back the individuals who 

have perished as a direct result of the acts or the failure to act by the government 

in connection with the administration of disaster relief for Katrina and Rita. 

Relative to the border emergency that occurred at the Arizona-Mexico border, the 

Administration’s failure to maintain or to restore dollars to Arizona’s emergency 

medical response system proved detrimental when the state had to respond to this 

situation. The U.S. border with Mexico is some 2,000 miles long, with more than 

800,000 people arriving from Mexico daily and more than 4 million commercial 

crossings annually—clearly, this Administration was on notice that funding cuts 

would adversely affect prevention of the kind of emergency situation that befell Arizona. 

Local school districts are not under the jurisdiction of the City or County government. Even though FEMA, the City/County are assisting evacuees with housing, 

other than school districts making classroom space available, there is no coordinated 

effort to see to it that children’s education continues. The record-keeping is inadequate, and it is presumed that many of the Katrina evacuee school-aged children 

are not enrolled. We must immediately find ways in which the federal government 

can assist with communication when issues cross jurisdictional lines. 

Following Katrina, the American Red Cross used the Reliant Astrodome as a shelter. A shelter at the George R. Brown Convention Center was set up by the City 

of Houston with the help o faith-based organizations. Voluntary relief organizations 

were quickly included. Red Cross opened many smaller shelters across the region. 

However, there were times that no one had a complete list of open shelters. At the 

same time, the faith-based community generously opened their doors to evacuees. 

There is no single entity or resource that these organizations could turn to for information or for help. The federal government has a role in coordination, but it seems 

limited at this point. This body must hold a separate hearing in order to revisit the 

scope of this role and to assess whether additional statutory or other regulatory responsibility should be crafted. 

As Co-Chair of the Congressional Children’s Caucus, it continues to trouble me 

that my District’s Head Start providers have classroom space and funding to accommodate most of the evacuee’s children; however, there is no direct liaison to help 

identify the students who need enrollment. One of our Head Start representatives 

on the ground in Houston expressed an interest in receiving training on how to prepare for a natural disaster as well as policy briefings on suggested disaster response 

procedures. These issues are part of the evidence that our preparedness is severely 

lacking. 

A letter from the Honorable Mayor Oscar Ortiz of the City of Port Arthur accurately states the problem that we face: 

[We have been told that local jurisdictions are responsible for much of this care; 

however, we do not think it is realistic to believe that local jurisdictions can provide 

the quality of care needed for hundreds, even thousands, of evacuees for an extended 

period of time.] 

Today, we must let the record reflect that local jurisdictions need help, and they 

need it to be in place quickly and in adequate fashion! 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, again, I thank you and the panel of witnesses for their time, and I hope that the record created today will aid us in fixing 

the many problems that hinder our ability to adequately respond to both natural 

disasters in addition to terrorist attacks. I yield back.

[The information follows:]
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Chairman KING. And due to our time constraints today, we will 

need to move immediately to testimony from our witnesses. The 

Chair now recognizes the Governor of Florida, Governor Jeb Bush. 

And also if the witnesses can try to keep their remarks to 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEB BUSH, GOVERNOR, 

STATE OF FLORIDA 

Governor BUSH. You bet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congresswoman Harris, Congressman Meek, Congresswoman Brown-Waite, 

it is a delight to be with you all. The last time I was at this committee, I believe this same committee was convened in New York 

City after September 11, 2001, and we came to share the response 

at the local and State level to the attack on our homeland. And as 

I reflect back on that meeting, many of the same lessons learned 

from four hurricanes, three—excuse me, seven hurricanes now, two 

tropical storms and a hurricane that is approaching our State, over 

the last 13-1/2 months apply. 

The resources that local governments and State governments 

apply to emergencies have a direct, positive benefit to protecting 

our homeland as well, and so it is a joy to be here to talk about 

something that is important for the safety of our citizenry and also, 

I think, for the protection of our country. 

I have prepared remarks, but this morning when I woke up at 

4:00 to fly up here, I turned on the Weather Channel, which now, 

unfortunately, I seem to do more often than not, and I saw that 

Hurricane Wilma, the W storm—we are going to the Greek alphabet next—now a Category 5 storm, and in all likelihood will hit either the Florida Keys or southwest Florida hopefully not at Category 5 force by Saturday. So perhaps rather than tell you kind of 

in the esoteric or the abstract why this is important, maybe I can 

tell you what I have done this morning. 

The emergency operation center in Tallahassee has been activated. It will be working by tomorrow 24 hours-a-day. So have the 

emergency operations centers of all of the impacted areas from 

Tampa Bay on the southwest coast down to Collier County, as well 

as Monroe County. By 12:00 today, because we have our protocols 

established, uniquely depending on each county, evacuations, mandatory evacuations, will occur for visitors in the Florida Keys at 

noon today. We have contractual arrangements with every hospital 

in the State for them to evacuate when they are required to do so, 

and that process will begin in the Florida Keys by 1:00 today. 

Transport will be provided by the Florida National Guard, and 

emergency room service will be available for the Keys should a 

storm hit there. Other places will evacuate probably by Friday. 

Our special needs shelters, which we have expanded dramatically in the last 2 years, will be staffed in advance by dedicated 

public health nurses. We have learned lessons from the previous 

storms that it is important to pre-stage people. If we need to bring 

them in by Chinook helicopters, we have actually contracted already with the North Carolina National Guard to have Chinook 

helicopters be made available, so that we can have an immediate 

massive response to make sure that we save lives, as well as bring 

the recovery as quickly as possible to our State. 
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We have pre-staged ice and water in trucks that we control, that 

we contract with, in our own warehouses so that we can—and we 

have created actually—because of lessons learned, we now have 

points of distribution that we have designed for maximum 

through—put. We brought in logistics experts from the private sector to teach us how to do this. If Wal-Mart can do it, why can’t the 

government do it is kind of the question that I have been asking 

for the last 6 months, and, in fact, we can. So within 24 hours our 

hope is, depending on the magnitude of this storm, that in the impacted areas, in the pre-staged, pre-planned places and selected 

places designed and selected by the communities themselves, we 

will have points of distribution to provide water and ice and food 

and tarps for the residents of these impacted areas. 

We have pet shelters now, because we heard from our citizens 

that they weren’t leaving unless there was a place to take their beloved pets as well. And so those will be activated beginning probably tomorrow. 

This will be done in a joint command, by the way, with the 

FEMA representative in our State and our very able emergency 

management director making these decisions together. And you 

know, I have watched TV like the rest of America about the response to the storms of this year. I can tell you one thing. I appreciate FEMA’s ability to work with States and communities that are 

prepared and take this as a serious enterprise. We have never had 

a problem with FEMA responding in preparation for storms. There 

are things that we can all do better and FEMA can certainly do 

better as it relates to processing all of the voluminous paperwork 

that Governor Perry’s State and community and our States have to 

go through when there is a disaster. They can do a better job in 

a lot of different ways. But we appreciate the Federal response, 

and we appreciate the seamlessness of it, and if you were in Tallahassee today, you would see that the seamlessness works. 

And so I would urge you not to lose the bottom-up approach to 

preparing and providing relief for the citizens of our country. If this 

process is federalized, the innovation, the creativity, the sense of 

responsibility, the passion for service would subside, and the local 

knowledge that makes it more effective. 

I appreciate the chance to come, and I hope that you will be 

praying for the residents of the southwest coast of our State in the 

next few days as they prepare for the big storm that is coming. 

Chairman KING. Thank you very much, Governor Bush. 

[The statement of Governor Bush follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JEB BUSH

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee for allowing me to speak before you today. I appreciate the opportunity to share with you 

some of Florida’s learned lessons with emergency management and also provide you 

with some thoughts on how the federal response system could be enhanced. 

Florida learned a hard lesson about response and recovery after Andrew, a Category 5 hurricane, which stormed through South Florida in August of 1992. Hurricane Andrew was the most destructive of hurricanes in the United States. It was 

responsible for many deaths and caused $26.5 billion in damages. That catastrophic 

storm was a wake-up call for all Floridians. 

The improvements and investments made in the years since Andrew are the reason Florida was able to effectively respond to seven hurricanes and three tropical 

storms affecting our state in the past 14 months (Hurricanes Charlie, Frances, Ivan, 

Jeanne, Dennis, Katrina, Rita and Tropical Storms Bonnie, Ophelia, Tammy) and 
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is able to help our neighboring states in their time of need. We continue to learn 

lessons from our experiences and improve our system after each disaster. 

This is why I can say with certainty that federalizing emergency response to catastrophic events would be a disaster as bad as Hurricane Katrina. The current system works when everyone understands, accepts and is willing to fulfill their responsibilities. Florida’s system can be successful in states throughout the nation, without 

the federal government stepping on state’s rights. 

In fact, when local and state governments understand and follow emergency plans 

appropriately, less taxpayer money is needed from the federal government for relief. 

Cities, counties, states, the federal government and we as Americans need to accept 

responsibility for these disasters and learn our lessons. More importantly, if we do 

not apply the lessons learned to future disasters, the problems will continue to 

snowball and the disasters will become more costly—in the number of lives and the 

number of dollars.

Lesson learned: the bottom-up approach yields the best results. 

Just as all politics are local, so are all disasters. The most effective response is 

one that starts at the local level and grows with the support of surrounding communities, the state and then the federal government. The bottom-up approach yields 

the best and quickest results—saving lives, protecting property and getting life back 

to normal as soon as possible. 

Craig Fugate, our able Director of Emergency Management, says, ‘‘Response can 

be quick, cheap or perfect—pick one.’’ Florida invests substantial funding in planning and training for disasters so our response is as efficient as it can be when preparing for the unknown. But when a disaster strikes, our focus is on speed. Our 

goal is to respond quickly to needs of our citizens. Because our cities and state have 

a solid plan in place, our response capabilities are able to better serve our residents. 

Although we remember a lot of destruction and damage from last year’s unprecedented hurricane season, we also remember how Floridians united and worked as 

a team to overcome a crisis. County emergency directors, law enforcement officers 

and first responders remained on the job even after losing their own homes. After 

each storm, many of our doctors, nurses and health care workers left their own families to care for the hundreds of displaced residents in general and special needs 

shelters. Despite the impact the storms had on their own homes and families, these 

selfless individuals gave security, comfort and care to others in a time of need. 

Throughout all the storms, I was proud to be governor and witness first-hand how 

the worst of times brought out the best in Floridians. 

The current emergency response system plays to the strengths of each level of 

government. The federal government cannot replicate or replace the sense of purpose and urgency that unites communities working to help their families, friends 

and neighbors in the aftermath of a disaster. If the federal government removes control of preparation, relief and recovery from cities and states, those cities and states 

will lose the interest, innovation and zeal for emergency response that has made 

Florida’s response system better than it was a decade ago. 

Local officials should be responsible for emergency management; however, the federal government also plays an important role. The Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) should serve as a conduit to the tremendous resources available at 

the federal level. For example, communities may not have the expertise or wherewithal to provide temporary housing to thousands of displaced residents. It makes 

sense for FEMA to coordinate a temporary housing plan that can be implemented 

anywhere a disaster may happen in our country. 

The federal government is capable of providing access to equipment, manpower, 

programs and funds to meet the large, but temporary needs created by a catastrophic disaster. FEMA can also provide an invaluable service to state and local 

communities by coordinating the federal response to disasters. Knowing where to 

get help, especially in the maze of the big federal bureaucracy, ensures quick and 

effective results in the impacted area.

Lesson learned: a successful response depends on teamwork and a clear 

command structure. 

Florida’s emergency response team is made up of numerous agencies at all levels 

of government, charitable and faith-based organizations and private sector businesses. Members of the Florida National Guard and state law enforcement officers 

work side-by-side with local policemen and firemen. Volunteers with the Red Cross 

and Salvation Army join local community organizations, volunteer groups and 

churches, synagogues and mosques to provide aid and comfort to those in need. Hospitals, nursing homes and power companies are among the many business partners 

in our disaster planning, response and recovery. Once a storm is forecast for landfall 
21

in Florida, these groups put their disaster response-and-recovery plans into high 

gear. 

Florida’s team is led by a unified command, a partnership between the state and 

federal government to coordinate efforts, share resources, make decisions and provide direction with one voice. During a disaster, I designate Craig Fugate, Director 

of Emergency Management, to serve as the chief coordinating officer of our state response. I delegate statutory authority to him so he can do his job effectively and 

report directly to me. He works with all of the agencies in a way that fosters respect 

and loyalty. Perhaps more importantly, his colleagues, even those who may technically ‘‘outrank’’ him in our state bureaucracy, understand his role and support our 

mission as a team. 

Last year, FEMA designated Bill Carwile as the chief federal coordinating officer. 

Together, Craig and Bill, and all the officials from local offices to federal offices, 

worked as one, unified team and as a result, did a phenomenal job helping the people of Florida.

Lesson learned: local and state governments that fail to prepare are 

preparing to fail. 

Natural disasters are chaotic situations. But with proper preparation and planning, it is possible—as we in Florida have proved—to restore order, quickly alleviate 

the suffering of those affected, and get on the road to recovery. In Florida, we plan 

for the worst, hope for the best and expect the unexpected. 

Because critical response components are best administered at the local level, 

planning for disasters and emergencies also begins at the local level. In Florida, 

each county and municipality has a plan that covers every aspect of emergency 

management—before, during and after a disaster. Our year-round planning anticipates the needs and challenges of each community—well before a storm makes landfall. 

To ensure an efficient evacuation, plans to reverse traffic along major interstates, 

called contra-flow, have been developed and modeled where feasible. Shelters that 

provide medical care for the sick and elderly take reservations long before a storm 

starts brewing. Since 1999, Florida has been successful in reducing the deficit of 

hurricane shelter space by more than 50 percent. Twelve Florida counties now demonstrate a surplus of public hurricane shelter space. Due to retrofitting existing 

schools and public facilities, capacity within shelters is approximately 764,170 and 

by next year, shelter capacity will grow to 816,778 spaces. 

Practicing the plan is also important. We hold several statewide tabletop exercises 

a year to test the plan under different scenarios and most local governments do the 

same. Our first responders meet annually at the largest hurricane conference in the 

country to share new and innovative ways to respond to emergencies. Since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, emergency managers from Broward, Miami–Dade, and the 

Tampa region have briefed federal officials and me, reviewed plans, and identified 

ways to improve our local and state response system. After each storm, wildfire, 

drought, flood, other disaster or exercise, we hold a ‘‘hotwash’’ to discuss what went 

right and wrong. This is an important part of the cycle that continually allows us 

to improve.

Lesson learned: a successful response requires strong communication and 

coordination. 

When a serious storm threatens our state, the State Emergency Operations Center, the National Hurricane Center, regional weather services, state agencies and 

county emergency managers conduct numerous conference calls to share information, identify needs and plan the response. To ensure people get out of harm’s way 

in a safe and orderly manner, counties coordinate with each other and issue evacuation orders in phases. Additionally, some counties provide shelters for other counties. 

Communicating with the public is also important before a storm is forecast and 

after a storm makes landfall. One of the messages we frequently tell Floridians is 

that a storm is not just a skinny black line on the hurricane tracking map, meaning 

hurricanes do not only affect a small forecasted area, but a very vast area, so all 

residents need to be prepared. In communicating this and other messages, people 

listen and heed the directions of their trusted leaders. Providing accurate information immediately before and after a storm reassures citizens that its government is 

responding to their plight.

Lesson learned: the state needs to support—not supplant—local efforts. 

The leadership of the Florida state government meets regularly as a team to ensure each agency has an emergency response plan that can be executed in the event 
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of a disaster. Each agency plays a role in preparing, responding and mitigating disasters. 

Florida’s Department of Health, in coordination with federal, state and local officials, mobilize the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) to provide medical 

care in the aftermath of the storm. Our Department of Health also works together 

with the Department of Elder Affairs to ensure special needs shelters are open and 

prepared to care for Florida’s most vulnerable citizens. Following the storm, our 

healthcare agencies work together to transition patients, veterans and the elderly 

from shelters to stable, long-term care facilities. 

The Agency for Health Care Administration works with hospitals, nursing homes 

and assisted living facilities to assist in evacuation and relocation of sick and injured patients. The agency allows pharmacies to refill prescriptions early to ensure 

residents, including those on Medicaid, have medication to treat chronic illnesses 

such as diabetes, hypertension and heart conditions. 

Natural disasters can be very stressful events, causing high levels of anxiety and 

depression, and an increase in spouse and child abuse. The Department of Children 

and Families created Project Hope, and collaborated with FEMA and communitybased organizations, to provide short-term crisis counseling to those affected by the 

hurricanes. We also expanded the state’s Violence Free Florida campaign to develop 

and distribute domestic materials to organizations involved in the relief and recovery efforts. We asked government agencies, corporate and business leaders, professional associations and other organizations to establish or renew their ‘‘no tolerance 

for domestic violence’’ policies. 

Florida’s Department of Transportation lifts restrictions on weight limits for 

trucks so supplies can get where they are needed quickly. Immediately after the 

storms, transportation officials work with local officials to clear debris and reopen 

roads. Thanks to the speedy efforts of the Department and its contractors, travel 

and commerce returned to the Interstate 10 Bridge within three weeks after Hurricane Ivan washed out dozens of the massive spans that connect Pensacola to the 

rest of Florida and provide a critical transportation link across the nation from California to Jacksonville, Florida. 

The Department of Environmental Protection works with power companies to restore electricity to critical facilities, hospitals, schools, homes and businesses, as well 

as the impacted areas as quickly as possible. The Department works closely with 

petroleum companies and our neighboring states to maintain fuel supplies before 

the storms along major evacuation routes and after the storms for emergency response vehicles. Fuel distribution is based on the region’s priorities and is replenished as quickly as possible. 

Hurricanes impact every aspect of a community and we work quickly for individuals to have a return to normalcy. Education is a top priority in Florida, and it remains that way even when a hurricane makes landfall. Children attending school 

is a leading indicator of recovery. Officials with the Department of Education help 

county school superintendents reopen schools quickly. Last year, after many school 

bus drivers lost their homes and could not immediately return to work, the Florida 

National Guard stepped in and drove Florida’s children to school. 

Florida’s Agency for Workforce Innovation had its personnel on the ground shortly 

after last year’s disasters to offer unemployment assistance to people who lost jobs 

from the storms. Through their mobile one-stop centers they were able to bring assistance to the impacted areas to help claims be processed from impacted businesses. They were also able to provide job training and placement for workers whose 

employment was affected by the storms. 

Florida’s Small Business Emergency Bridge Loan Program provides funds for 

small businesses to make repairs, replace inventory and reopen for business quickly. 

Obtaining a loan through the U.S. SBA and waiting for an insurance claim to be 

processed can often be a slow process. These short-term, no interest loans are intended to ‘‘bridge the gap’’ between the impact of a major catastrophe and when a 

business has received insurance proceeds and secured other more long-term financial resources. These loans are critical to keeping businesses open and Floridians 

working while a company makes arrangements for more long-term financing. Florida has made approximately $50 million available for this loan program for the 

2004–2005 hurricanes. Historically the repayment rate has been approximately 90 

percent. 

Officials with our Secretary of State supported local Supervisors of Elections to 

ensure counties that lost all or many of their polling places could participate in the 

primary election held 18 days after Hurricane Charley tore through Southwest Florida. 

We also learned that government cannot respond alone. During last year’s hurricanes, the generous outpouring of support from the private sector filled the gaps left 
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by government. The Florida Hurricane Relief Fund, established after the first storm, 

raised and spent more than $20 million on relief efforts that could not be met by 

other volunteer, federal, state or local agencies.

Lesson learned: investing in the right tools enhances response capabilities. 

As the world learned from Katrina, receiving and providing accurate and timely 

information is essential to a successful response. Good intelligence about what is 

happening on the ground allows emergency managers to make decisions about what 

resources are needed and where they are needed most. Technology can improve our 

ability to share information when the electricity, phones and cell towers go out. 

Last year, Florida invested in a uniform statewide radio system that allows state 

and local first responders to communicate with each other during a crisis—regardless of the kind of radio system or frequency they use. Today, more than 200 local 

public safety dispatch centers in all 67 of Florida’s counties are equipped to connect 

first responders and law enforcement even if the radio systems they use on a daily 

basis are not compatible. Simultaneous conversations can be established quickly and 

seamlessly on a private network without disruption to normal operations. 

Technology, such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and mapping software, can 

improve our preparation and response in other ways. Identifying the likely path of 

storm surge and testing the impacts of wind speed on buildings provides a sound, 

scientific basis for evacuation plans. Knowing who needs to evacuate—as well as 

who does not—can greatly improve disaster planning, especially in large urban 

areas. The size of the evacuated population impacts nearly every aspect of emergency preparation, response, and recovery, such as managing traffic and gas supplies, ensuring adequate shelters, and even anticipating potential damage to accelerate recovery.

Lesson learned: prepared citizens make the difference. 

All Floridians play a role in preparing, responding and recovering from disasters. 

Before hurricane season starts, we encourage our residents to create a family disaster plan based on where they live and the survivability of their homes. Citizens 

know if the order comes from their local officials to evacuate, they may only need 

to travel tens of miles rather than hundreds of miles. Citizens that don’t need to 

evacuate—those that can safely shelter in place—are urged to secure their homes 

against potential damage and gather water, non-perishable food and necessary supplies to last them at least three days. This year, I partnered with the Federal Alliance for Safe Homes Inc. (FLASH), a non-profit organization, to develop a public 

service campaign in English and Spanish aimed at educating homeowners about the 

correct way to board up their homes against the high winds of a hurricane. Additionally, to encourage our citizens to prepare for hurricane season this year, Florida 

suspended the state sales tax for 12 days on disaster supplies, such as flashlights, 

batteries and generators. 

Individuals must also plan for the financial impacts of a catastrophic natural disaster, especially with regard to insurance. Last year, we enacted a law that simplifies homeowners’ insurance policies. Florida requires insurance companies to offer 

plain language policies with financial disclosures and a checklist of what is—and 

is not—covered by their policy. Florida also requires companies to offer policies that 

replace the actual value of the home rather than the amount of the mortgage. This 

provision is especially important in our fast growing state where property values are 

increasing by double digits annually. 

After Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the private reinsurance industry abandoned 

Florida. In response to this void, Florida established the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, which requires insurance companies to purchase reinsurance from the 

fund for protection against major disasters. Private insurance would not exist in 

Florida today without our established state catastrophe fund. 

After last year’s hurricanes, insurance companies received more than $3.6 billion 

from the Catastrophe Fund, stabilizing the Florida market and cushioning the impact of $21 billion in insurers’ losses from the 2004 hurricane season by pooling the 

catastrophic risk of hurricanes in Florida.

By providing reliable, affordable protection against catastrophic losses to insurers 

doing business in Florida, only one company went bankrupt from the most devastating hurricane season in our state’s history. In contrast, after Hurricane Andrew, at least nine insurers were rendered insolvent as claims mounted. Others left 

the market altogether. 

Those who prepare for a storm, by gathering their documents, protecting their 

home, stocking extra food, water, medication and other supplies and sheltering 

properly in place or evacuating in the proper amount of time, are better prepared 

to successfully overcome the impacts of a storm than those who are unprepared.
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Lesson learned: innovation born from disasters can improve daily 

operations. 

Last year, more than a million Floridians needed immediate access to public assistance. As a result, our Department of Children and Families launched a web 

based emergency system for people to apply and receive certain benefits, including 

food stamps. ACCESS Florida (Automated Community Connection to Economic 

Self–Sufficiency) is now a model for the nation. 

Automating the application system enabled the state to quickly provide $161 million in disaster aid to 1.3 million people in 27 Florida counties. These innovations 

were so successful they became the cornerstone of ACCESS Florida and optimized 

the Department’s efforts to modernize and improve the everyday delivery of public 

assistance for all Floridians. The new system saves taxpayer dollars while providing 

greater access and better service to the public.

Lesson learned: good plans can always be improved. 

Florida has made great strides in our hurricane response; however, no system is 

perfect. Each day we continue working to address needs, vulnerabilities and areas 

of weakness in our communities and states. 

Last year, we learned we could not wait until after the storm made landfall to 

launch our relief mission. Trucks of ice, water and food need to be ready to roll into 

impacted areas as soon as the skies clear and the winds die down. To further improve the system, we needed to know in advance where to deliver these critical commodities. This year, the state developed criteria and standard layouts for distribution sites to provide maximum throughput of supplies. The true measure of success 

is a strong logistics system that gets much-needed products off the trucks and into 

the hands of those affected as quickly as possibly. 

Using this guidance along with geography and population, counties pre-determined locations for these ‘‘points of distribution’’ or PODs. Depending on where a 

storm makes landfall and damage to the location, counties can activate one or more 

of these PODs within 24 hours of landfall. 

This year, we identified three priorities for improvement. First, continuing to improve evacuation plans to ensure we move our vulnerable population out of harm’s 

way. This includes those with disabilities, the elderly and medically dependent residents. Second, we must continue to improve upon our communication by ensuring 

sign language interpreters are available for our hearing-impaired community and 

translators are available for our Spanish and Creole speaking citizens. Third, we 

need to provide options for Floridians with pets. Families are hesitant to seek shelter if they cannot bring their pets with them. Providing alternatives ensures they 

evacuate when the order comes. 

Florida will continue building on lessons learned and will not accept the status 

quo. We have a responsibility to continue improving our response and recovery efforts as Florida continues to grow.

Lesson learned: Washington needs to improve FEMA’s response capability. 

Just as we have a role in preparing and responding to all hazards, the federal 

government also has a responsibility to understand and tailor its role to meet the 

needs of impacted states. As I have said, the State of Florida is very appreciative 

of the federal response that flows through FEMA to assist Floridians and our communities. It is important to note, if Florida had not prepared last summer, it would 

have looked like FEMA had not prepared. However, there are lessons learned from 

our shared experiences of the last 14 months that can enhance the agency’s effectiveness. 

I do not have a preference on whether FEMA is an independent agency or remains part of the Department of Homeland Security, however, when a disaster is 

declared, the FEMA director should report directly to the President, just like Craig 

Fugate, Florida’s Director of Emergency Management, reports directly to me. 

The divisions within FEMA that handle preparation, response, recovery and mitigation comprise a complete cycle of disaster. These four components need to be managed together as one unit. FEMA’s logistics program is broken and needs to be fixed. 

For example, to move one truck of ice last year, FEMA officials in Florida had to 

send a request to the regional office in Atlanta, who wrote a separate contract for 

each leg of the trip, who then sent it to the trucking company, who then sent it 

to the trucker on the ground in Florida. Having a strong tracking system that shows 

where trucks are, what they are carrying and when they will arrive at the destination is crucial. The process needs to be faster, more efficient and more direct. 

In terms of housing, last year, the program was slow to start because we could 

not gauge demand. FEMA needs a better plan to anticipate, identify and meet the 

housing demand. The current system requires several telephone interviews, which 
25

lack efficiency for someone who lost their home, is staying with friends, without cell 

phone coverage or needs to provide a ‘‘call back number.’’ 

The joint FEMA-Florida Long-Term Recovery office, ably led by Scott Morris, can 

serve as a model for the nation. The structure provides consistency in processing 

the volumes of paperwork for reimbursement. In the nine months before the Long–

Term Recovery office opened in Florida, we were reimbursed for less than $600 million of the billions we spent as a result of the 2004 hurricanes. In less than five 

months, the Long–Term Recovery team has brought more than 90 percent of eligible 

dollars to the state, totaling almost $2 billion. The average dollars sent to Florida 

per day have seen a near seven-fold increase and the office has written 100 percent 

of project worksheets for all 67 counties, while taking on three additional storms 

this season. 

Eligibility standards for financial assistance should be uniform across the nation. 

Aid to governments should be based on the impact to the community, not the size 

of the state. Currently, disasters need to meet a certain per capita cost statewide 

to meet eligibility requirements for financial assistance to repair and replace infrastructure. This process penalizes small communities in large states. Because of our 

size, damage from Katrina did not meet the threshold for program. Had the same 

amount of damage occurred in a state the size of Rhode Island, those citizens would 

have received aid. Additionally, once a state meets the threshold, then all of the 

damage becomes eligible. Lowering the threshold to one standard amount and requiring cities and states fund a certain level of repair—like an insurance deductible—might be a better approach. 

Rules should promote personal responsibility. Under the current process, two 

neighbors can both lose their homes in a hurricane. Both are homeless and both 

need help. Neighbor One demonstrated personal responsibility and acquired insurance to protect his home and business, making him ineligible for timely federal assistance. Neighbor Two neglected to purchase insurance, but is eligible for as much 

as $26,000 in cash assistance, a travel trailer for six months and maybe even a mobile home for a year and a half. To us, both people need help. In the eyes of FEMA, 

only the neighbor who did not prepare receives immediate help. The system assumes insurance companies will be able to settle claims quickly, which we learned 

from last year is not always possible. This needs to change. 

Rules should also promote responsible governing by providing incentives for governments to invest in preparation. Right now, the federal government provides a 

minimum of a 75 percent match for response and recovery. To provide incentives 

for upgraded emergency management capabilities and investment in preparedness, 

perhaps an 85:15 percent match would be more appropriate. Additionally, the federal government should not bail out communities that make poor planning decisions, have inadequate building codes and fail to invest in emergency management. 

Removing debris is a tremendous cost and can place a huge financial burden on 

communities. The debris left in Florida after last year’s storms was enough to completely fill, and then pile a mile high, five of Florida’s largest football stadiums. The 

rules for reimbursing debris removal from private property need to be clear and applied consistently.

Conclusion 

I am proud of the way Florida has responded to the hurricanes. Through the congressionally approved Emergency Management Assistance Compact, 725 first responders from 35 states aided Florida after the storms last year. This year, the 

Compact allowed Florida to provide much-needed relief to our neighboring states. 

Within hours of Katrina’s landfall, Florida began deploying more than 3,700 first 

responders to Mississippi and Louisiana. Today, hundreds of Florida National 

Guardsman, law enforcement officers, medical professionals and emergency managers remain on the ground in affected areas. Along with essential equipment and 

communication tools, Florida has advanced more than $100 million in the efforts, 

including more than 5.5 million gallons of water, 4 million pounds of ice and 

934,000 cases of food to help affected residents. 

Steve, a resident from Diamondhead, Mississippi, summed it up best. He wrote, 

‘‘The first responders I remember were Florida State Troopers. They have been 

nothing less than awesome. They brought us water, ice, food and most important, 

they brought truck loads of compassion, understanding and a wonderful attitude.’’ 

As you develop plans to improve our nation’s emergency management system, I 

ask that you consider Florida’s three guiding principles in emergency response. Our 

team knows them as Craig’s Rules: 

1. Meet the needs of the victims. 

2. Take care of the responders. 

3. See Rule 1. 
26

Rather than assume everything should be done at the federal level, our nation is 

much better off holding localities to higher expectations and improving FEMA. Taking away Florida’s ability to respond takes away our passion for creativity and service that makes us good first responders. 

Before Congress considers a larger, direct federal role, it needs to strengthen 

areas within FEMA and hold communities and states accountable for properly preparing for the inevitable storms to come.

Government works best in emergencies 

By: Bill Cotterell 

July, 11, 2005

Tallahassee Democrat 

Hanging around the state’s Emergency Operations Center, you get the feeling 

that this is how Gov. Jeb Bush would like Florida government to be all the time—

without the emergency, of course. 

Imagine putting all agencies into one big room. Just a few hundred people. Everybody busy and intensely focused on the task at hand. Golf shirts and windbreakers 

with agency names on them. Lots of high-tech computerized stuff. 

If Bush created a video game of state government, it would be sorted into 17 ‘‘support functions’’ and have big, colorful satellite maps overhead, just like the EOC. 

Instant teleconference hookups, yes; bureaucracy or paper-shuffling, no. 

If he could get rid of the acronyms the federal government loves so much and 

outsource half the operations, Bush might never want to leave the bunker near 

Southwood. 

Just as hard times bring out selfless qualities in family, friends and strangers, 

emergencies show the people of Florida what they’re paying taxes for. It’s state government at its best, everybody working together with no complaining or 

grandstanding. 

‘‘I’m inspired by the response that is underway right now,’’ Bush said after one 

of his weekend briefings on Hurricane Dennis. ‘‘I think people should expect people 

to respond the way they do, but it’s gratifying to see.’’

Hurricane preparation and response didn’t always run so well. When Hurricane 

Andrew hit in 1992, the command post was a bunch of offices in the Rhyne Building, where Gov. Lawton Chiles passed out paper maps and held briefings in a small 

Department of Community Affairs conference room. 

At the modern operations center this weekend, somebody crafted a little cartoon 

of Dennis the Menace with a muscular little twister following him. It flashed on the 

center screen, amid constantly changing satellite images and written updates on everything from evacuation shelters and generator supplies to animal safety and nuclear power plant status. 

Bush had almost all of his department heads on hand. Those who were missing—

probably because they were out in the field—sent their top deputies. Federal agencies, military units and representatives of the insurance and utility companies, Red 

Cross and Salvation Army all had seats at the big tables. 
27

That’s the drill. Hurricanes involve a lot of agencies you’d never expect to see. Department of Juvenile Justice Secretary Anthony Schembri, for instance, was there 

to decide about evacuating youthful offenders who can’t be left in danger but can’t 

be put in adult jails, either. 

During the past session, legislators said the work of state employees during last 

year’s four hurricanes justified a 3.6 percent pay raise. Actually, the fact that they 

didn’t get a raise last year—just a one-time $1,000 ‘‘bonus’’ that worked out to about 

$675 take-home pay—was reason enough for the 3.6 percent. 

But the sentiment was appropriate. Bush said it several times during the weekend. 

‘‘People across the state should know that their fellow Floridians are going to be 

by their side in the relief effort,’’ he said as the storm approached. ‘‘It includes a 

lot of people who are true quiet heroes in our state.’’

Think Locally On Relief 

By Jeb Bush 

Washington Post 

Friday, September 30, 2005; A19

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Americans are looking to their leaders for answers to the tragedy and reassurances that the mistakes made in the response will 

not be repeated in their own communities. Congressional hearings on the successes 

and failures of the relief effort are underway. 

As the governor of a state that has been hit by seven hurricanes and two tropical 

storms in the past 13 months, I can say with certainty that federalizing emergency 

response to catastrophic events would be a disaster as bad as Hurricane Katrina. 

Just as all politics are local, so are all disasters. The most effective response is 

one that starts at the local level and grows with the support of surrounding communities, the state and then the federal government. The bottom-up approach yields 

the best and quickest results—saving lives, protecting property and getting life back 

to normal as soon as possible. Furthermore, when local and state governments understand and follow emergency plans appropriately, less taxpayer money is needed 

from the federal government for relief. 

Florida’s emergency response system, under the direction of Craig Fugate, is second to none. Our team is made up of numerous bodies at all levels of government, 

including state agencies, the Florida National Guard, first responders, volunteer organizations, private-sector health care organizations, public health agencies and 

utility companies. Once a storm is forecast for landfall in Florida, all these groups 

put their disaster response-and-recovery plans into high gear. 

Natural disasters are chaotic situations even when a solid response plan is in 

place. But with proper preparation and planning, it is possible—as we in Florida 

have proved—to restore order, quickly alleviate the suffering of those affected and 

get on the road to recovery. 

The current system plays to the strengths of each level of government. The federal 

government cannot replicate or replace the sense of purpose and urgency that unites 

Floridians working to help their families, friends and neighbors in the aftermath of 

a disaster. If the federal government removes control of preparation, relief and recovery from cities and states, those cities and states will lose the interest, innovation and zeal for emergency response that has made Florida’s response system better than it was 10 years ago. Today’s system is the reason Florida has responded 

successfully to hurricanes affecting our state and is able to help neighboring states. 

But for this federalist system to work, all must understand, accept and be willing 

to fulfill their responsibilities. The federal government and the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency are valuable partners in this coordinated effort. FEMA’s role 

is to provide federal resources and develop expertise on such issues as organizing 

mass temporary housing. FEMA should not be responsible for manpower or a first 

response—federal efforts should serve as a supplement to local and state efforts. 

Florida learned many lessons from Hurricane Andrew in 1992, and we have continued to improve our response system after each storm. One of the biggest lessons 

is that local and state governments that fail to prepare are preparing to fail. In 

Florida, we plan for the worst, hope for the best and expect the unexpected. We understand that critical response components are best administered at the local and 

state levels. 

Our year-round planning anticipates Florida’s needs and challenges—well before 

a storm makes landfall. To encourage our residents to prepare for hurricane season 

this year, for 12 days Florida suspended the state sales tax on disaster supplies, 

such as flashlights, batteries and generators. Shelters that provide medical care for 

the sick and elderly take reservations long before a storm starts brewing. To ensure 

that people get out of harm’s way in a safe and orderly manner, counties coordinate 
28

with each other and issue evacuation orders in phases. Satellite positioning systems, 

advanced computer software and a uniform statewide radio system allow all of these 

groups and first responders to communicate when the phones, cell towers and electricity go out. 

The Florida National Guard is deployed early with clear tasks to restore order, 

maintain security and assist communities in establishing their humanitarian relief 

efforts. Trucks carrying ice, water and food stand ready to roll into the affected communities once the skies clear and the winds die down. Counties predetermine locations, called points of distribution, that are designed for maximum use in distributing these supplies. 

Florida’s response to Hurricane Katrina is a great example of how the system 

works. Within hours of Katrina’s landfall, Florida began deploying more than 3,700 

first responders to Mississippi and Louisiana. Hundreds of Florida National Guardsman, law enforcement officers, medical professionals and emergency managers remain on the ground in affected areas. Along with essential equipment and communication tools, Florida has advanced over $100 million in the efforts, including more 

than 5.5 million gallons of water, 4 million pounds of ice and 934,000 cases of food 

to help affected residents. 

I am proud of the way Florida has responded to hurricanes during the past year. 

Before Congress considers a larger, direct federal role, it needs to hold communities 

and states accountable for properly preparing for the inevitable storms to come.

———

HURRICANE 

K A T R I N A 

Florida’s Response

Florida aid committed to neighboring states to date: $138,329,353

• Mississippi: $136,577,345

• Louisiana: $1,752,008

Total Florida responders committed to date: 6,330

• Mississippi: 6,283

• Civilian: 5,785

• Florida National Guard: 498

• Entire US EMAC Response: 23,518 

• Louisiana: 47

• Civilian: 40

• Florida National Guard: 7

Emergency Operations Center Status: The State Emergency Operations Center 

remained at a full Level 1 activation for 17 days in response to Hurricane Katrina.

Florida First Responders: 2,165

• State and Local Law Enforcement Officers: 1,425

• State and Local Urban Search and Rescue Teams: 740

Florida Department of Health Medical Assistance Personnel: 556

• Doctors, nurses and support personnel: 416

• Emergency Medical Services personnel: 140

• Logistical Support Vehicles: 20 

Florida State Emergency Response Team Incident Command Officials: 215

• State and Local Emergency Management Officials: 194

• Mass Care Coordination Team: 21 Specialists 

Resource and Commodity Support Personnel: 2,261

Response Mission Support Personnel: 73

Agriculture and Animal Protection Personnel: 77

Florida Radio and Network Communications Specialists: 10

Volunteer and Donations Management Teams: 14

Florida Recovery Personnel: 20

Florida Public Information Officer Deployment Teams: 14

Florida Hazardous Material Teams: 9

Local Utility Personnel supporting drinking and wastewater programs in 

Mississippi: 101

Florida Department of Elder Affairs’ Community Responder Teams: 30

Florida Department of Transportation: 23

Florida Division of Forestry Support Missions:

• 217 Personnel 
29

• 46 Pickup trucks • 15 Vans • 11 SUVs • 1–30 KW Generator Trailer • 2 Dump trucks • 1 Mechanic truck • 1 Semi Unit • 2 Fuel Trailers

Essential commodities committed to impacted communities by Florida’s 

State Emergency Response Team or managed by Florida: 

• 954 trucks of water (768 State of Florida purchased) • 940 trucks of ice (457 State of Florida purchased) • Baby Food—8,438 cases; 10,318 cases of formula; 4,000 cases of juice • Ensure—2,100 cases • Juices—16,000 cases • Diapers—1,755 cases; bottle nipples—2,495 cases • 1,000-person self-contained Base Camp, including provisions for sheltering, feeding and hygiene needs of rescue workers, deployed to Stennis NASA Logistical Staging Area for emergency workers 

• 500-person Life Support Package for feeding and hygiene needs of rescue workers 

Urban Search and Rescue Teams 

• Logistical Staging Area and Points of Distribution material: • 154 Forklifts 

• 125 Pallet Jacks • 97 generators • 93—4,000 watt light tower sets • 25 pumps • 5 Field HVAC Units • 25 Truck Shuttle Fleet • 11 satellite data systems • 4 emergency deployable interoperable communications systems • 1 loading ramp • 2 Logistics Support Trailers • 110 Satellite Phones • 1 AM/FM Radio Station Tower

———

Supplemental Page 

Governor Jeb Bush 

Designated Representative: Nina Oviedo

Summary 

I appreciate the opportunity to share with you some of Florida’s learned lessons 

with emergency management and also provide you with some thoughts on how the 

federal response system could be enhanced. I can say with certainty that federalizing emergency response to catastrophic events would be a disaster as bad as Hurricane Katrina. The current system works when everyone understands, accepts and 

is willing to fulfill their responsibilities. Florida’s system can be successful in states 

throughout the nation, without the federal government stepping on state’s rights. 

More importantly, if we do not apply the lessons learned to future disasters, the 

problems will continue to snowball and the disasters will become more costly—in 

the number of lives and the number of dollars. • Lesson learned: the bottom-up approach yields the best results. • Lesson learned: a successful response depends on teamwork and a clear command structure. 

• Lesson learned: local and state governments that fail to prepare are preparing to fail. 

• Lesson learned: a successful response requires strong communication and coordination. 

• Lesson learned: the state needs to support—not supplant—local efforts. • Lesson learned: investing in the right tools enhances response capabilities. • Lesson learned: prepared citizens make the difference. • Lesson learned: innovation born from disasters can improve daily operations. 

• Lesson learned: good plans can always be improved. 

• Lesson learned: Washington needs to improve FEMA’s response capability. 

As you develop plans to improve our nation’s emergency management system, I 

ask that you consider Florida’s three guiding principles in emergency response: 

1. Meet the needs of the victims. 

2. Take care of the responders. 
30

3. See Rule 1. 

Rather than assume everything should be done at the federal level, our nation is 

much better off holding localities to higher expectations and improving FEMA. Taking away Florida’s ability to respond takes away our passion for creativity and service that makes us good first responders. 

Before Congress considers a larger, direct federal role, it needs to strengthen 

areas within FEMA and hold communities and states accountable for properly preparing for the inevitable storms to come.

Chairman KING. Now Governor of Texas, Governor Rick Perry. 

Governor. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICK PERRY 

Governor PERRY. Chairman King, thank you very much. It is an 

honor to be with you and the members of the committee, including 

my fellow Texans Lamar Smith and Sheila Jackson-Lee. And, yes, 

go Astros. And tonight Mr. Thompson will be—

Chairman KING. I would ask the Governor to confine his remarks 

to relevant topics, not the Astros. 

Governor PERRY. Oh, I am sorry. 

And I promise not to talk about any football from last week either. And, Michael McCaul, it is an honor to be with you. And, Michael, just one thing to make sure there is not any misinformation, 

I did not federalize the National Guard during our—we obviously 

used them substantially, but we directed them from Austin, Texas. 

And as we go through these remarks, that will become abundantly 

clear why I did not federalize them. 

And I want to testify before you today with a very clear point of 

view. I opposed the federalization of emergency response efforts to 

natural disasters and other catastrophic events. And I say this 

with absolutely no malice towards the Federal Government or the 

military, which can and should bring tremendous resources to bear 

in responding to catastrophes. I have the highest appreciation for 

the capabilities of our military partly because, as Lamar shared 

with you, I spent 4–1/2 years flying those aircraft and flying a 

number of those relief missions. I know what the military does 

best, and their expertise is in preparing for wars, fighting wars and 

winning those wars. The mission of our military is not that of a fire 

department or a police department or a hospital. It is not designed 

to be a first responder. Our firefighters, our peace officers, our 

EMS personnel, they respond to emergencies every day in our local 

communities. They know their communities best. They have done 

the emergency training exercises in those communities, and they 

can respond the quickest to the emergencies in their communities. 

I say leave first response to first responders. Leave decisionmaking 

in the hands of the local and the State leaders. And leave, for our 

military, the most important job that they have of fighting wars 

and keeping the peace. 

The idea of federalization raises many questions, first being perhaps the most important. You know, if, from the President right on 

down, we recognize that the Federal response may not have been 

as adequate as we would have liked to have seen during Katrina, 

you know, does that inspire confidence in a greater Federal role in 

the solution? And if the Federal Government takes this over, will 

they perform 150 emergency exercises in Texas over the next 4 

years, as we did over the last 4 years, while also attending to the 
31

needs of the other 49 States? Will the Federal Government take 

over responsibility for coordinating with our States 1,200 nursing 

homes, hundreds of hospitals concerning the evacuation of people 

with special needs? If the military creates a special division of first 

responders, will we have highly trained, well-equipped Federal 

troops unavailable for duty overseas as they wait for an emergency 

large enough to respond to? Would this not turn them into the 

equivalent of the Maytag repairman, waiting for the call when an 

emergency strikes at home, but underutilized as part of our main 

military mission at home and abroad? 

First responders must train together because they respond together. When you add a new layer of bureaucracy, decisionmaking 

becomes paralyzed. Decisions are placed in the hands of those who 

know less about the community, and miscommunication becomes 

rampant as lives hang in the balance. Think about it this way. 

When you call 911 because your loved one’s life is on the line, do 

you want an operator who knows your community, or do you want 

an operate or who lives in Washington, D.C.? 

The military’s most vital role in a disaster is to provide specialized heavy equipment, aviation assets and the personnel to operate 

them. The lesson of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is that while Federal resources are incredibly important, they are going to be very 

important to Jeb over the course of the next few days, no State or 

local community should wait on the Federal Government to act. 

We are responsible for the safety of our citizens before and after 

a natural disaster, and we are responsible for creating detailed 

emergency response plans and testing them. In Texas, we ran into 

challenges, and we had to adapt to rather unforeseeable circumstances. But most important to our response is that we had a 

clear chain of command. We had responsible local leadership. We 

had tested our capacity and our capabilities during training exercises, and we exercised and implemented a plan that did not depend on the Federal bureaucratic execution. And because of that, 

and despite the challenges that remain, I would call the Texas response to both hurricanes a success. 

In conclusion, let me just say that the discussion of federalizing 

emergency response makes me wonder what these mayors behind 

me, what Mayor Ortiz from Port Arthur, what Woodville Mayor 

Jimmy Cooley would say if they were told that the Federal Government would lead the response in the next major hurricane. And I 

think they would tell you to leave the resources and the manpower 

and the decisionmaking to the folks of Texas, and let Texans run 

Texas. 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman KING. Thank you, Governor Perry. 

[The statement of Governor Perry follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICK PERRY

Thank you Chairman King and members of the committee. I testify before you 

today with a clear point of view: I oppose the federalization of emergency response 

efforts to natural disasters and other catastrophic events. 

I say this with no malice toward the federal government or the military, which 

can and should bring tremendous resources to bear in responding to catastrophes. 

I have great appreciation for the capabilities of our military because I served for 

four and a half years. I know what the military does best: their expertise is preparing for wars, fighting wars and winning wars. 
32

The mission of our military is not that of a fire department or police department 

or hospital—it is not designed to be a civil first responder. 

Our firefighters, peace officers and EMS personnel respond to emergencies every 

day in our local communities. They know their communities best, they have done 

the emergency training exercises in those communities, and they can respond the 

quickest to emergencies in their communities. 

I say leave first response to the first responders, leave decision-making in the 

hands of local and state leaders, and leave for our military the important job of 

fighting wars and keeping the peace. 

The idea of federalization raises many questions, the first being perhaps the most 

important: 

If, from the President on down, we recognize the federal response was not adequate during Katrina, does that inspire confidence that a greater federal role is the 

solution? 

If the federal government takes this over, will they perform 150 emergency exercises in Texas over the next four years, as we did in the last four years, while also 

tending to the needs of the other 49 states? 

Will the federal government take over responsibility for coordinating with our 

state’s twelve hundred nursing homes, and hundreds of hospitals concerning the 

evacuation of people with special needs? 

If the military creates a special division of first responders, will we have highly 

trained, well-equipped federal troops unavailable for duty overseas as they wait for 

an emergency large enough for their activation? Would this not turn them into the 

equivalent of the Military Maytag Repairman, waiting for the call when emergency 

strikes at home, but underutilized as part of our main military mission at home and 

abroad? 

First responders must train together because they respond together. When you 

add a new layer of bureaucracy, decision-making becomes paralyzed, decisions are 

placed in the hands of those who know less about the community, and 

miscommunication becomes rampant as lives hang in the balance. 

Think about it this way: when you call 911 because your loved one’s life is on the 

line, do you want an operator who knows your community, or do you want someone 

at a switchboard in Washington, D.C.? 

The military’s most vital role in a disaster is to provide specialized heavy equipment and aviation assets and the personnel to operate them. 

The lesson of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is that while federal resources are very 

important, no state or local community should wait on the federal government to 

act. WE are responsible for the safety of our own citizens before and after a natural 

disaster, and WE are responsible for creating detailed emergency response plans 

and testing them. 

In Texas, we ran into challenges and had to adapt to unforeseen events. But most 

important to our response is that we had a clear chain of command, we had responsible local leadership, we had tested our capabilities during training exercises, and 

we implemented a plan that did not depend on the federal bureaucracy’s execution. 

Because of that, and despite the challenges that remain, I would call the Texas response to both hurricanes a success. 

In conclusion, the discussion of federalizing emergency response makes me wonder what local leaders like Port Arthur Mayor Oscar Ortiz, or Woodville Mayor 

Jimmie Cooley, would say if they were told the federal government would lead the 

response to the next major hurricane. I think they would tell you give us your resources and manpower, but let Texans run Texas. 

It would be a great mistake to do otherwise. Thank you.

Chairman KING. Now Governor Napolitano. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JANET NAPOLITANO 

Governor NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 

Members, members of the committee. It is a pleasure to be here 

with Governor Bush and Governor Perry. 

Arizona does not have hurricanes, but we do have large flash 

floods in the winter and huge forest fires in the summer, among 

many things that I have confronted as Governor. And I echo what 

Governor Bush and Governor Perry said. We operate an emergency 

operations center. We are able to activate that on a moment’s no-
33

tice. We have evacuation plans. We practice, practice, practice to 

make sure that when a catastrophe happens, things go smoothly. 

There is a Federal role, but the Federal role is not to lead that 

effort, it is to support that effort when the circumstances warrant. 

We learned lessons from the catastrophes and the disasters that 

happened in 2002 in Arizona. We had the Rodeo-Chediski fire; 

burned over 400,000 acres in northern Arizona, had to evacuate 

many communities. The fires cost over $150 million to suppress. 

We found out in the course of that fire that our communities up 

in the rural parts of the State did not have evacuation plans, and 

we did not have interoperability capability of communications 

among the many different departments that had to respond to the 

fire. 

Now every one of those communities has an evacuation plan. We 

have all practiced them, and we used some of the homeland security money we got from the Federal Government to purchase five 

vehicles that provide patch interoperability capability that we can 

drive anywhere in the State whenever a fire or other related disaster occurs. In fact, one of those vans was sent to Louisiana to 

help with interoperability problems in the aftermath of Katrina. 

We also want to make sure that priorities are properly set in 

light of the particular needs of a particular State, and I think the 

State Governors are in the best position working with their mayors 

and others to know what those needs happen to be. 

It is no surprise that the National Governors Association, the 

Governors of the States, Republican and Democrat alike, have 

issued a joint statement against federalizing emergency relief. And 

I think that statement is important, and I commend it to you for 

your attention. 

One of the things that I think this committee might want to 

focus on is preparation for emergency in two specifics ways. One 

is general preparation, the things you need to do all the time for 

whatever emergency, making sure you have evacuation plans, making sure you have taken care of your special needs citizens, making 

sure that you have dealt with problems like communications interoperability, and then to practice those plans over and over and over 

again. 

The second kind of preparation has to do with what Governor 

Bush is doing now. He knows a hurricane is coming to his State. 

He has some sense about the strength of that hurricane, and he is 

taking specific action to prepare ahead of time. In those areas, 

these are places where the Federal Government can team with the 

States in terms of preparation. But, again, the leadership must 

come from the State level. 

I don’t want to leave my testimony without mentioning a particular problem in our country for which I declared a state of emergency, and that is the situation at the border, because in its own 

way, that has been a disaster for us, and it is one where we request 

and need Federal help. We have now at the Tucson sector of the 

Arizona-Mexico border over 1,500 people being arrested per day. 

Those are the people they are finding. Several hundred people were 

found dead in the desert who had come across and been abandoned 

by the coyotes who brought them and then left in the desert to die. 

This is an area where homeland security and emergency relief com-
34

bine, because we cannot say that we have a secure country, we cannot say that we have a national homeland security plan without a 

secure border, and we have lost operational control of the border 

in Arizona. 

Let me close with several suggestions in response to the question 

presented for this hearing. First, I would ask the committee to respect the historical and constitutional authority of States and the 

Nation’s Governors in emergency situations. 

Second, I would ask that you look at restoring homeland security 

and emergency response resources that the Federal Government 

has actually cut in the last years. Homeland security resources to 

the State of Arizona have been reduced 35 percent in the last year, 

although I don’t think our incidences or our security issues have 

been reduced in the same level. The value of proper funding for 

preparation and practice in advance of an emergency cannot be underestimated. 

Third, I would ask this committee and the Congress to better 

evaluate and examine disaster threats such as the Federal levees 

in New Orleans and prioritize funding for those areas. Obviously 

securing the border must be a top funding priority here. 

Fourth, work with the States to obtain accreditation for State 

emergency preparedness plans. The accreditation process is extremely thorough and provides a mechanism for States to ensure 

they have covered all that is necessary. 

And last but not least, let us not forget the public health aspects 

of disaster and recovery and that they must be integrated into any 

response plan. Preparations or the lack thereof for the Avian flu 

help illustrate this point. 

Before I close, I would like to recognize the members of the 

Tahono O’odham Nation that are here with us today. This is an Indian reservation that actually covers 70 miles of the Arizona-Mexico border. Their statement is quite compelling in terms of their 

special needs, and I would hope the committee would pay special 

attention to that.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VIVIAN JUAN-SAUNDERS, CHAIRWOMAN, TOHONO O’ODHAM

NATION-ARIZONA

I. INTRODUCTION 

In the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Committee will examine the historical and constitutional roles and responsibilities of Local, State, and Federal governments in responding to disasters and other emergencies. The Committee will explore the issue of Federalism and disaster response, and the policy implications of 

expanding the Federal role with respect to disaster response. This statement is submitted by the Tohono O’odham Nation to apprise the Committee of the Nation’s 

unique emergency response role with regard to the 75-mile stretch of international 

border that the Tohono O’odham Reservation shares with Mexico, and to explain the 

impact of Federalism. Before addressing the specifics of these issues, this statement 

provides general background about the Nation and the historical background that 

created the Nation’s current border security crises.

II. BACKGROUND 

The Tohono O’odham Nation (‘‘Nation’’) is a federally recognized Indian Tribe in 

South Central Arizona with over 28,000 enrolled tribal members. The Tohono 

O’odham Reservation consists of four non-contiguous parcels totaling more than 2.8 

million acres in the Sonoran Desert, and is the second largest Indian Reservation 

in the United States. The largest community, Sells, is the Nation’s capital. The 75-

mile southern border of our Reservation is the longest shared international border 

of any Indian Tribe in the United States. 
35

As a federally recognized Indian Tribe, the Nation possesses sovereign governmental authority over its members and territory. Accordingly, the Nation provides 

governmental services to one of the largest Indian populations in America and is 

responsible for managing one of the largest Indian reservations in the America. 

Moreover, the Nation spends approximately $7 million annually from tribal revenues to meet the United States’ border security responsibilities. The Nation’s longest international border of any Tribe in the United States has created an unprecedented homeland security crises for America. 

Prior to European contact, the aboriginal lands of the O’odham extended east to 

the San Pedro River, West to the Colorado River, South to the Gulf of California, 

and North to the Gila River. In 1848 the United States and Mexico negotiated the 

terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which among other things, established 

the southern boundary of the United States. The Treaty placed the aboriginal lands 

of the O’odham in Mexico. In 1854 through the Gadsden Purchase, the United 

States and Mexico further defined the southern boundary by placing the boundary 

at its present location cutting into the heart of our aboriginal territory. Consequently, the boundary displaced our people on both sides of the international border bisecting O’odham lands and separating our people from relations, cultural sites 

and ceremonies, and access to much needed health care, housing, and transportation. Not surprisingly, neither the United States nor Mexico consulted with the 

O’odham during the Treaty negotiations in 1848 and 1854. Respect for the sovereign 

status of the O’odham was simply ignored. 

Unfortunately, the lack of consultation or input from the O’odham continued 

throughout the generations leaving the Nation with a modern-day border security 

crisis that has caused shocking devastation of its land and resources. The genesis 

of this crisis stems from the development and implementation of the U.S. government’s border policy in the last decade. Again, without the benefit of consulting with 

the Nation, federal border security policy was developed focusing on closing down 

what were considered to be key points of entry along the U.S. southern border. This 

policy was implemented by extensively increasing manpower and resources at ports 

of entry and located at popular entry points such as San Diego (CA), Yuma (AZ), 

and El Paso (TX), and therefore, created a funnel effect causing the flow of undocumented immigrants, drug traffickers, and other illegal activity to shift to other less 

regulated spots on the border. 

Consequently, because of the lack of border security resources and attention to the 

Nation, illegal immigration through the Reservation has become a prime avenue of 

choice for undocumented immigrants and drug trafficking activities traveling into 

the United States. This has created urgent challenges to protect against possible 

terrorists coming through a very vulnerable location on our Reservation. Although 

the Nation has neither the sufficient manpower nor the resources to adequately address this crisis, we continue to be the first line of defense in protecting America’s 

homeland security interests this highly volatile and dangerous region.

III. BORDER SECURITY CRISIS ON THE TOHONO O’ODHAM NATION 

The modern day consequences of the border security crisis facing the Nation is 

indeed devastating to our people, lands, culture and precious resources. While immigrant and drug trafficking have decreased on other parts of the southern border of 

the United States, levels have sky rocketed on the Nation causing a flood of crime, 

chaos and environmental destruction on our Reservation. By conservative estimates, 

over 1,500 immigrants illegally cross daily into the United States via the Nation’s 

Reservation. A Border Patrol spokesman recently reported that the Nation is in the 

‘‘busiest corridor of illegal immigration in the [America].’’ Tribal members live in 

fear for the safety of their families and their properties. Often times, homes are broken into by those desperate for food, water and shelter. It is no longer just Mexican 

nationals crossing the Nation’s reservation land. Over the last year, undocumented 

immigrants from Guatemala, Honduras, and Central America have been apprehended on the Nation. 

The Nation’s seventy-one member police force provides primary border security 

law enforcement services against the unrelenting and increasing traffic of undocumented immigrants and drug traffickers who cross our border to enter America. The 

Nation has sustained a loss of millions of dollars annually in manpower, health 

care, sanitation, theft and destruction of our property and lands from the relentless 

flow of illegal immigration. Equally devastating is the adverse impact on our cultural resources and traditions as our Tribal elders no longer gather ceremonial 

plants in the desert for fear of their safety. The Nation stands on the front line of 

this crisis but is inhibited from directly accessing funding and other resources from 

the Department of Homeland Security.
36

Consider the following statistics: 

• In 2004 alone, 111,264 entries into the Nation, resulting in 84,010 actual apprehensions. 

• Since October 2003, approximately 180,000 pounds of narcotics have been 

seized. 

• When combining federal and Tribal law enforcement efforts, more than 300,000 

pounds of illegal narcotics were seized on the Nation’s lands in 2004. 

• There are 160 known illegal crossings along the 75 mile shared border with 

Mexico—in 36 locations and there are no barriers at all. 

• In 2003, sixty-nine people died on the Reservation crossing the border, leaving 

the Nation to pay for the burial and related costs. The Nation pays for autopsy costs 

at $1,600.00 per body out of tribal police funds. 

• The Nation loses $2 million annually from its allocation of Indian Health Care 

funding due to emergency health care treatment of undocumented immigrants taken 

to our health clinic. 

• The Nation is forced to address the 6 tons of trash a day that is littered on the 

Nation’s Reservation by fleeing undocumented immigrants. This predicament has 

caused serious environmental problems and contributes to the 113 open pit dumps 

on the Nation’s Reservation that need to be cleaned up. 

Moreover, the Tohono O’odham Nation Police Department (TOPD) has stretched 

its resources to the limit and now spends over $3 million annually in tribal funds 

on homeland and border security law enforcement function and activities, more than 

half of its annual budget. To date, the Nation has spent more than $10 million dollars for these functions, which we believe are clearly federal responsibilities.

For example: 

• On an average day, every public safety officer in the TOPD spends 60% of 

his or her time working on border related issues. 

• In 2004, TOPD officers responded to over 6,000 calls for assistance with undocumented immigrant apprehensions; Border Protection estimates over 

111,000 individual apprehensions on the Nation’s lands in 2004. 

• Between 2002–2003, an estimated 1500 illegally crossed through the Nation 

each day. While apprehensions continue to rise, more than 700 additional undocumented immigrants are estimated to pass through the Nation every day 

undetected. In FY 2002–2004, the U.S. Border Patrol-Casa Grande Sector apprehended 166,514 undocumented immigrants on the Nation’s lands. 

• In 2002, 4300 vehicles were used for illegal drug and immigrant smuggling. 

A total of 517 stolen vehicles were recovered on tribal land. From 2003–2004, 

Tribal police investigated 15 vehicle crashes involving undocumented immigrants. 

• From January 2003 through mid-2005, 4380 abandoned vehicles were found 

on the reservation with 308 stolen vehicles used for criminal activities en route 

to Mexico. These vehicles were stolen in Tucson, Phoenix, and Chandler etc and 

used for illegal activity. 

• Between January 2003 and March 2004, 48 undocumented immigrant deaths 

from heat and exposure were investigated by Tribal Police. A total number of 

7 staff members are in the criminal investigations unit. 

Many other areas on the Nation, such as limited hospital and ambulance services, 

have been similarly negatively affected. Overall, the Nation expends $7 million of 

its tribal resources annually on services directly relating to border issues. Part of 

the expenditure relates to health care and environmental clean up services. When 

the Nation pays for federal responsibilities, we are unable to address education, 

health care, housing, roads, infrastructure priorities, to name a few. Below are a 

couple of key examples. 

• In 2003, the Indian Health Service (IHS)-Sells Service Unit spent $500,000.00 

on emergency health care services to undocumented immigrants, for example, 

for those at risk of dying from dehydration. These funds are not reimbursed to 

IHS and result in the inability of certain tribal members to receive health care 

services that are allocated for their benefit. 

• The Nation spends millions of dollars a year to pay for the 6 tons of trash 

per day left by undocumented immigrants and the Nation is faced with cleaning 

up the 113 open pit dumps on the Reservation. 

• 758 homes on the Reservation (20% of all homes on the Reservation) are without potable water and 1,393 (38% of all homes) are without a sewer or water 

system. Many of the residents at these homes use either hand-dug or agricultural wells for drinking water and are exposed to contaminants such as fecal 

coliform, arsenic and fluoride in excess of the federal Safe Drinking Water Act 
37

standards. The total need to construct suitable drinking water and waste water 

systems for these homes is estimated at $24.4 million. 

• The Nation has been forced to deal with all of these issues because we must 

protect our people and our lands. The Nation’s efforts are complemented by the 

Border Patrol, which recently increased its presence on the Reservation through 

the Arizona Border Control Initiative, for which support the Nation is thankful 

to have. We also acknowledge the efforts of Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano, 

who provided the Nation more than $100,000 in resources from additional funding the State received as a result of the Governor’s recent border emergency 

declaration. 

• However, our needs are overwhelming and we need immediate federal assistance and direct communications with the Department of Homeland Security on 

policy, funding and other important matters that affect our Nation. Unfortunately, the Nation has not received sufficient federal attention to address our 

law enforcement/border security activities. In the wake of the creation of the 

Department of Homeland Security, the increased federal funding for the Department, and the announcement of a number of federal initiatives to address 

homeland security challenges, the Nation has respectfully requested a seat at 

the table as well as the appropriate level of federal funding to support our efforts in providing homeland security for America. Again, we thank Governor 

Napolitano for her leadership and support in ensuring that we have a role in 

the State’s homeland security planning and grant distribution process. We commend her outstanding leadership and efforts to work with the Nation. We believe that the federal governments must step up to the plate and work directly 

with the Nation on addressing the border crises we face on a daily basis.

IV. BARRIERS TO SECURING FUNDING FROM THE HOMELAND 

SECURITY DEPARTMENT & LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS. 

In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist bombing and related events in 

the United States, the 107th Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 

(P.L. 107–296) authorizing the reorganization of existing federal agencies under the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) umbrella. This led to expanded border protection policies through the National Homeland Security Reorganization Plan. Once 

again, although these changes have had dramatic impacts on the Nation’s people 

and land, we were not consulted and have been inhibited from receiving direct funding for homeland security expenditures. 

Under the DHS organic legislation, Indian Tribes are not eligible to obtain direct 

funding for homeland security purposes. This barrier is particularly unfair to the 

Nation given the unique circumstances in protecting the 75-mile international border with Mexico on the Reservation. This lack of consultation and lack of access to 

direct funding has strained the Nation’s Government-to-Government relationship 

with the United States placing the Nation in a difficult and untenable position of 

having to react policy decisions as opposed to proactively working together in a unified fashion with the proper respect accorded to the Nation’s sovereign status. 

To improve the federal government’s emergency response and assistance to our 

border security challenges, Congress must take legislative action to authorize the 

Nation to obtain direct access to Homeland Security resources. We believe this approach will significantly improve our emergency preparedness and ability to response to terrorist threats that may occur in this vulnerable Southwest region. Specifically, the Nation supports the immediate passage of H.R. 1544, The Faster and 

Smarter Funding for First Responders which would accomplish the following: 

• Require states to consult with Tribes and ensure that Tribes are eligible to 

receive pass-through funding from states; 

• Allow Tribes to petition directly to the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) for funding (local units of government also have this right under H.R. 

3266). 

• Establish a pilot program for up to 20 ‘‘directly eligible tribes’’ (which can include a consortia of tribes) to receive direct funding grants each year from DHS, 

rather than through the states if the petitioning Tribes meets the following 

threshold eligibility criteria: (i) having administrative capability under P.L. 93-

638 to enter into self-determination contracts or compacts, (ii) employing at 

least 10 full-time emergency response or public safety personnel, and (iii) having a demonstrated level of threat as determined by its location on or within 

5 miles of an international border, near critical infrastructure, adjacent to a 

large metropolitan area or having more than 1,000 square miles of tribal land 

(roughly the equivalent of the state of Rhode Island). 

• Set aside for the 20 directly eligible Tribes collectively, at least 0.08 percent 

of the amount appropriated for first responder grants in a given year. 
38

• Authorizes Tribes which are not selected for direct funding, may apply to the 

DHS for direct funding in the event the State fails to award funding to the 

Tribe consistent with the state homeland security plan. 

We will continue to coordinate and collaborate our efforts through Arizona’s regionalized approach, and we are pleased that the Nation has been recently successful in securing funds through this process. However, the Nation is unlike any city 

or municipality in Arizona. As a constitutional matter, the Nation is a sovereign entity whose governance is separate from that of the State. Accordingly, the Nation 

supports H.R. 1544 which provides a meaningful government to government role to 

Indian Tribes having discrete homeland security concerns.

Similarly, the Nation supports the following provisions in H.R. 1320—Secure Borders Act, would be of particular significant and assistance to the Nation: 

• Section 151 would establish an Office of Tribal Security (OTS) within DHS 

to coordinate all of its homeland security efforts in Indian Country and to serve 

as an official point of contact within DHS for Indian Tribes. 

• Section 152 would transfer the Shadow Wolves from the Bureau of Customs 

and Border Protection (BCBP) to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE). This provision would keep the Shadow Wolves in tact as a 

distinct unit focused on identifying, following, and arresting illegal drug smuggler along the 75 miles of international border along and within the Nation. The 

Shadow Wolves better fit within BICE because their work is more similar to 

BICE agents who investigate and crack down on substantial drug smuggling operations. In recognition of the Shadow Wolves’ success, the provision also authorizes the DHS Secretary to establish additional BICE special units whose 

mission, similar to that of the Shadow Wolves, is to prevent the smuggling of 

illegal drugs, weapons and other contraband on Indian reservations, where such 

law enforcement is clearly needed. 

The Nation supports these legislative proposals because they will strengthen the 

homeland security capacity of the United States through a government-to-government relationship with Tribes to protect and secure America. Indian Tribes subject 

to the highest security risks and vulnerabilities should not be left out of the discussion to improve national security. 

Finally, the Nation proposes that the BCBP have an specific agreement relating 

to federal access on the Nation’s lands. BCBP is working on an memorandum of understanding with the Department of Interior governing federal access on public 

lands under Interior’s authority. In these discussions, the Bureau of Indian Affairs 

expressed its view that it cannot make decisions for Indian Tribes due to tribal sovereignty, and therefore recommended that BCBP enter into an agreement with the 

Nation governing federal access on our lands. We believe this approach would greatly improve coordination among law enforcement personnel as well as promote and 

foster better government to government relations. Because our territory is so vast, 

and given the recent boost in border security activities, the Nation believes it is imperative to have a written agreement which details our respective roles and policies, 

in addition to important tribal protocols that are otherwise unknown to law enforcement personnel inexperienced in working with Indian tribes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman 

Chairman KING. Thank you, Governor. 

[The statement of Governor Napolitano follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANET NAPOLITANO

Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and Committee Members, thank 

you for inviting me here today to speak about an issue foremost on the minds of 

all Americans: how the local, state and federal governments should respond to disasters and emergencies in our homeland. 

Less than two months ago, we saw the harrowing affects of Hurricane Katrina, 

and the human tragedy that occurs when the government response is delayed and 

disorganized. 

In its aftermath, every American is rightfully asking, what if another Hurricane 

Katrina happened in my community? Is the federal government meeting its responsibility in assisting my state prepare for a natural disaster or a terrorist attack? 

Will my government learn the important lessons of Hurricane Katrina? 

I applaud Congress for holding these hearings so we can learn from the lessons 

of Katrina. I am increasingly troubled, however, by suggestions that the federal government pre-empt the constitutional authority of states and the nation’s governors 

during an emergency. 
39

While the federal government is often a critical partner in disaster relief, it is the 

states that have historically responded well. State and local governments are in the 

best position to prepare for, respond to, and recover from emergency and disaster. 

Just last week, our nation’s Governors joined together—Republicans and Democrats—and with one voice called on the federal government not to undermine the 

authority and rights of states. 

I encourage all of you to read the joint statement we issued through the National 

Governors Association, and as vice chair of National Governors Association and 

chair of the Western Governors Association, I ask that you pay special attention to 

our state commanders-in-chief throughout this process. 

Governors have a particular relevancy in our nation’s response plans. Because of 

the continued critical role of the National Guard in emergency and disaster response, governors would have to be universally supportive of any changes to our nation’s response strategy, or the federal government would risk its ability to utilize 

the Guard. 

The Constitution is clear: when a National Guard unit assists in a primarily federal purpose under Title 32, it does so under the command and control of governors—not Congress or the President. 

When National Guard troops so admirably and capably responded to Hurricane 

Katrina and in the wake of the terrorist attacks September 11, they did so under 

the command and authority of governors. The law of the land demands that it stay 

that way. 

States also have a strong track record of working together during emergencies 

without federal involvement. 

Through the national Emergency Management Assistance Compacts, or EMACs, 

states have mutual aid agreements that direct emergency equipment and staffing 

to areas that need it most during a disaster. Because these agreements determine 

reimbursement and liability issues before a disaster strikes, states are able to deploy resources to other states quickly without the need to enter into a new agreement first. 

Katrina notwithstanding, states have a long and successful history in responding 

to natural and man-caused disasters. In Arizona, we have experienced many disasters, ranging from wildfires during the summer months to flash floods in the winter, 

and have learned lessons along the way. 

We have a long record of success in managing our relationship with the federal 

government, and coordinating a system that works well in fighting fires. 

In Arizona, if a wildland fire starts on state land, Arizona officials coordinate the 

efforts to fight the fire; if the fire grows beyond our capacity to suppress it, or we 

need additional assistance, we call on the U.S. Forest Service for help. It is a complex relationship, and there are many elements to fighting fires, but the system 

works. 

We also work with other states to fight fires. We frequently draw on resources 

from other states, and we often send experienced firefighting crews from Arizona 

elsewhere. 

Similarly, the Forest Service is the lead response agency in fighting fires on federal land in our state. If a fire starts on national forest land, it is the federal government that coordinates the fire suppression efforts, and calls on Arizona for additional assistance. 

Unfortunately, as federal budget cuts take hold, we find ourselves fighting with 

the federal government for reimbursement to the state for its fair share of costs in 

fighting fires on federal lands. 

While we have built a solid record of success, we have also had difficulties. Some 

of these disasters have been particularly devastating, but rather than re-inventing 

the wheel every time something goes wrong, we learn from our experience and understand how we can be better prepared next time. 

This is particularly true of the Rodeo-Chediski Fire in 2002—a fire that burned 

more than 450,000 acres, destroyed more than 400 structures including many 

homes, and cost more than $150 million to suppress. 

Arizona learned some tough lessons from that fire. Our emergency responders 

couldn’t communicate with each other, and communities caught in the middle of the 

fire did not have evacuation plans. 

Those communities have since developed evacuation plans, and Arizona’s fireprone communities are also working to remove hazardous fuels to lower the risk of 

fire. Further, we have purchased five incident command vans with interoperable 

communications capabilities that can travel wherever they are needed, allowing our 

emergency crews to communicate with each other during any incident. In fact, one 

of those vehicles was deployed to Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina. 
40

We learned our lessons, and are better prepared for future emergencies. That is 

the same approach the federal government should take: to understand what it did 

wrong, and to better prepare for the future. 

Rather than embarking on a course that could have many unknowable and unfortunate consequences, Congress should focus its attention on how the federal government can best team with states. That analysis should break into two parts: what 

the federal and state governments should do in advance of an emergency; and what 

they should do afterward. 

Pre-emergency has two aspects. First, there is general preparation for all different 

types of scenarios. Second, there is specific preparation when a known emergency 

is developing—such as in the days immediately preceding Katrina. In the wake of 

September 11, Congress initially understood that role, and provided states with resources to prevent and prepare for disasters. Those resources are how Arizona paid 

for the five mobile communications vans I mentioned a moment ago; they also paid 

for the Arizona Counter-Terrorism Information Center, a 24–7 intelligence gathering and dissemination center that links together representatives from the local, 

tribal, county, state and federal levels to detect and prevent acts of terrorism. 

Federal dollars also paid for critical capability-specific training and equipment 

along the Arizona-Mexico border, where we are at risk for a terrorist strike. We exercised a mutual-aid agreement with the Mexican State of Sonora in conducting a 

federally funded bi-national training exercise—simulating a WMD attack at the border—with 22 Mexican law enforcement, medical services and emergency management agencies and 50 local, state and federal agencies from the United States. 

We established interoperability capabilities in the four counties that border Mexico, trained more than 900 Mexican firefighters, medical responders and law enforcement officers, and developed the ability to communicate with Mexican authorities during an emergency. We will have interoperability capabilities in the entire 

state of Arizona by the end of 2006. 

In addition, we have also forged homeland security and preparedness partnerships with tribal governments—like the Tohono O’odham Nation—whose lands include 78 miles of porous international border. 

Our ability to handle a disaster along the border was tested just a few months 

ago when a train in Mexico derailed and spilled 10,000 gallons of sulfuric acid into 

the Santa Cruz River. Even though the spill occurred in Mexico, it contaminated 

the water that flows through the river into Arizona. 

Arizona’s local governments—from cities to counties to the state—responded to 

the disaster quickly and effectively, and worked with their counterparts in Mexico 

to avert what could have been a very dangerous situation. 

Arizona puts homeland security resources to good use. That’s why I am frustrated 

and disappointed that Congress and the Administration cut Arizona’s homeland security resources. The federal government cut our Homeland Security Grant Program 

resources by 36 percent, our Metropolitan Medical Response System by 50 percent, 

and our Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program by 22 percent, and failed 

to fund many worthwhile homeland security projects in other states. In terms of 

general preparation, having properly-funded emergency relief initiatives is key. 

In terms of specific preparation for known and anticipated crises, the federal government needs to participate more in joint planning with states to identify necessary assets and have them pre-positioned where they will do the most good. 

I am troubled that in recent years the federal government has severely limited 

our ability to fight the huge forest fires that have plagued the West. In March 2004, 

the federal government made available 33 heavy air tankers to states to fight fires, 

but just three months later—at the height of our fire season—none were at our disposal. There were many reasons for this, but none justifies the lack of pre-planning 

with the states and the timing of the decision to ground the air tankers. 

Once a disaster occurs the lead responsibility should reside with the states. One 

of the purposes of preparation and prevention is to develop an ongoing partnership 

between state personnel and their relevant federal counterparts. And, with specific 

respect to FEMA, governors need more, not less, authority to make decisions. 

Arizona is one of the states that received Katrina evacuees; we experienced firsthand FEMA’s total breakdown in providing any meaningful information regarding 

the status, welfare or destinations of those evacuees. 

I cannot leave the topic of preparation for known risks without discussion of the 

Arizona—Mexico border. Securing the international border is a federal responsibility, but time and time again the federal government has refused to provide the 

proper resources—and enough Border Patrol agents—to secure it. On average, 1500 

people are apprehended every day while attempting to cross the Arizona border illegally; that number obviously does not include those who are never caught. The Arizona-Sonora border is the gateway for more than half of the illegal cross-border ac-
41

tivity that occurs along the U.S.—Mexico border. In fact, of the 1.1 million Southwest border apprehensions in 2004, nearly half were apprehended in the Tucson 

Sector alone. While most of the people who cross seek to work in the United States, 

we have no way of knowing if some of those who cross seek to attack us. Congress 

must make it a priority to regain operational control of the border. 

I hope that one of the lessons we learn from Hurricane Katrina is that certain 

emergencies can be prevented or minimized, and that the best disaster response actually happens years before a first responder ever arrives on the scene. 

Aside from learning that lesson, there are many things this Congress should do 

to prevent and prepare for future disasters in the United States: 

• First, respect the constitutional authority of states and the nation’s governors 

in an emergency situation. 

• Second, restore critical homeland security and emergency response resources 

that the federal government has cut in recent years. The value of funding for 

preparation and practice in advance of a true emergency cannot be underestimated. 

• Third, better evaluate and examine disaster threats, such as the federal levees in New Orleans, and prioritize funding for those areas. Obviously, securing 

the border must be a top funding priority here. 

• Fourth, work with the states to obtain accreditation for state emergency preparedness plans. The accreditation process is extremely thorough and provides 

a mechanism for states to ensure they have covered all that is necessary. 

• Last but not least, the public health aspects of disaster and recovery must 

be integrated into any response plan. Preparations, or the lack thereof, for the 

avian flu illustrate this point. 

I appreciate your time and consideration, and am pleased to answer any questions 

you have at this time.

Chairman KING. Governor Bush, I want to assure you that the 

prayers of all Americans are with the people of Florida, for the people of Florida, especially those in the southwest, and we certainly 

wish you the very best as you confront this latest crisis. You detailed very systematically what you have already begun to do, how 

you are preparing for this weekend’s hurricane. Obviously it is 

based on past experience. It is constantly being updated. But as 

you know, the best plans, there is always glitches along the way. 

Something unexpected is going to happen. What other preparations do you make? For instance, what contact do you have with 

the Federal Government now as to what they will do, assuming 

something goes wrong, the storm goes a different way, some evacuation doesn’t work, some hospital can’t be evacuated or whatever? 

Are you in contact with representatives in the Federal Government 

now for the unexpected? 

Governor BUSH. Absolutely; including the President of the United 

States when appropriate. I mean, the Governors will have, during 

an emergency, have direct contact with the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the head of FEMA, the military. 

There is—what is interesting about hurricanes, or disasters, is that 

I think the rule book gets thrown-out about all the nooks and crannies of government at every level. And there is a unified command 

structure in our State, so for starters, in our emergency operations 

center we will have a FEMA representative, and we will have a 

Homeland Security representative, typically high level, typically 

the admiral from the regional Coast Guard that is based in Miami. 

And so we will have direct access to agencies of the Federal Government. 

And you are right. You can’t plan for every contingency in a disaster. Things happen. We prepare for the worst. We hope for the 

best, and then we expect the unexpected, and that is exactly what 

happens every storm. So we have a seamless relationship. We don’t 
42

expect, and if we don’t get, we push hard. We plan massively as 

well and worry about the paperwork later. That can get—you 

know, after the fact sometimes that may not look as pretty as you 

did when you make that decision, but when you are preparing for 

a storm where you know there is going to be major devastation, 

you don’t worry about that. 

And we have found that the problems with FEMA isn’t at this 

time—you know, the 2 or 3 days before the storm—the problem can 

be in the recovery phase, trying to get housing, trying to get individual assistance, dealing with creating a consistent reimbursement means for debris removal, which is a much bigger problem 

than you could ever imagine. The tonnage of debris that comes 

from a natural disaster of any kind is enormous. And so the bureaucratic part of FEMA becomes a problem in the recovery, not in 

the relief and preparation, in my opinion. 

Chairman KING. Governor Perry, with Rita what contacts or 

what lines of communication and coordination did you have with 

the Federal Government as you prepared and as the storm was beginning its onslaught? And did you feel that those lines of communication were adequate? 

Governor PERRY. Mr. Chairman, one of the—I think the keys is 

the preparation that is done prior to an event. And again, I can’t 

stress enough how important it is for those exercises to have been 

conducted, for that homeland security dollars to have been appropriately spent, for those State and local first responders to work together in exercises prior to, and I might add the Federal Government is in our State operation center working with us during those 

exercises. 

Chairman KING. Who is the Federal Government at that stage? 

Governor PERRY. The FEMA representative, the Air Force, the 

Army, the Navy, all of those Federal agencies that you would deal 

with, they game play with us on these exercises. I mean, they are 

occurring, and so the issue of is your communications there with 

the Federal Government, from our time that we have worked with 

them, yes. I mean, the fact of the matter is this isn’t—I mean, I 

will tell you that from a Texas perspective, we have had—with Rita 

in particular and with Katrina, our work with the Federal Government was good. You know, was it perfect? No. I mean, as you said, 

you throw out the play book. But the fact of the matter is it is at 

the local level, I think, where the first decisions have to be made, 

and that response is being made. 

Again, you know, I am not here to particularly criticize FEMA 

or criticize any of the other agencies of government, but, you know, 

the fact is that the less bureaucracy that we have to deal with in 

an emergency, the better. We operate just like Jeb and Florida in 

the fact that we ask for forgiveness later. We are going to not ask 

for permission today to go save the lives of our citizens, and as appropriately it should be. And, you know, we will work out the—any 

bureaucratic details later. 

But, so, you know, I talked to the President a number of times 

prior to Rita hitting our coast and afterwards. You know, we talked 

to Secretary Chertoff and to—and I talked to Jeb. I mean, we 

called each other before Katrina actually. We had a conversation, 

and he called me and he said, listen, we are the bookends on this 
43

thing. And what—are we doing everything that we need to do to 

help the people in Alabama and Georgia and Mississippi and Louisiana? Because he said the fact of the matter is, he said we are 

perfectly suited, and he needed some things from us, some gasoline, 

and that had been disrupted from a previous storm, and so these 

Governors work together. And I think it is very important to realize that there is a lot of good communications. There is a heck of 

a lot more good that goes on than things that are bad. And it seems 

like there are some folks that want to focus on the bad. 

Chairman KING. Thank you very much. My time has expired. 

Ranking Member Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. And I appreciate the testimony of the witnesses. 

One of the things I would like to be very clear on is there is some 

discussion here in Washington that the Federal role in disaster 

preparedness should be expanded to become a primary role rather 

than a secondary role. Is it your testimony here today that, as Governors of your State, you reject that notion and assume the responsibility of disaster preparedness and response for your particular 

State? All three of you. 

Governor BUSH. Absolutely. I think if this responsibility is federalized, then that will be as big of a disaster as any natural disaster that hits our communities. 

Governor NAPOLITANO. We can’t do our jobs if it is federalized. 

Our job is to protect the safety and welfare of our citizens. We are 

on the ground there every day working with our first responders, 

our sheriffs, our fire Department, our police officers. Moving the 

locus and focus to Washington, D.C., would be a disaster. 

Governor PERRY. It would be a great mistake, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

Chairman KING. Gentleman from Texas Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Governor Perry, a lot of observers do feel that Texas did respond 

well to both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, both in the response to the disaster itself, as well as to meeting the needs of 

hundreds of thousands of evacuees. Why was Texas able to respond 

so quickly and appropriately, in your judgment? 

Governor PERRY. And I will be very brief because I am going to 

repeat myself, but it was because of the preparation and the appropriate coordination from our State emergency operation center. You 

are going to have the opportunity to talk to local officials from 

Beaumont and Jefferson County and from over in Sugarland, and 

I think you are going to hear that exact same story is that because 

of the preparation and the gaming out and the exercises that we 

went through, we were as prepared as you can be, and always 

knowing that there is going to be some curve ball thrown at you 

that you did not perceive. The idea that we were going to have 

evacuees from Louisiana to the numbers that we had, and then we 

had to evacuate those evacuees, I am not sure anybody put that 

one into the game book. But now we know how we would deal with 

this massive evacuation out of one of the most populous areas 

along the gulf coast. And we didn’t get it perfect. We learned, and 

we are analyzing and deconstructing that as we speak so that we 
44

can make it better the next time, because we know there will be 

a next time. 

Mr. SMITH. Governor Perry, in your prepared statement, in fact 

it was the second sentence of your prepared statement, you said, 

I oppose the federalization of emergency response efforts to natural 

disasters and other catastrophic events. That is pretty clear, and 

it sounds like all three Governors agree with that statement. And—

but my question is, that being the case, what do you think is the 

appropriate—when is it appropriate for the Federal Government to 

be involved, if ever, in natural disasters? 

Governor PERRY. I look at the military’s role. I think we need to 

be careful as we talk about the government’s role here. What I was 

making reference to is the military taking over as the first responder. That is the clear concern that I think all three of us 

share. But there is an absolute role for the Federal Government in 

a number of ways, obviously, but the military’s is to come in with 

their assets, with their transportation assets, with their personnel 

to operate that heavy equipment, et cetera, whether it is, you 

know, the removal of huge amounts of debris on the road so that 

the emergency responders can get in, and there are a lot of different roles that they play. But it is not to come in and be the first 

responder of the fire and police and people who have been working 

together for years, and they almost instinctively know what one is 

going to do and how those work together. 

The military’s role should be not unlike the National Guard or 

the Reserve’s role when we are in a conflict and the military has—

needs some assistance; then that is when we call up our National 

Guard and our Reserves to complement the military. I look at the 

Active Duty military as our Reserves in these disasters, and we 

will call them up when we need them. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Governor Perry. 

Governor Bush, do you tend to agree with that response? What 

do you think is the appropriate Federal role of the government 

when it comes to natural disasters? I assume it is pretty much in 

line with what Governor Perry said. 

Governor BUSH. It is. And there are unique things that can be 

accessed through the EMAS system, the Emergency Mutual Aid 

System that exists. Remember, in a Federal system, to put in perspective, we had 3,700, at the peak, 3,700 firefighters, police officers, National Guard, State law enforcement agents, fish and game 

folks, and public health people in mostly Mississippi, and some in 

Louisiana. That was the Federal response, because it was asked for 

by the Governor, mostly the Governor of Mississippi, some the Governor of Louisiana; it went through FEMA and through this mutual aid pact; we responded. 

We happened to be in better shape to do it, because you couldn’t 

get to Mississippi from Texas or from the north. The only way to 

get there was from the east. We had already mobilized because the 

storm could have hit our State. So we were the first responders literally in southern Mississippi. 

That is a federalist response, coordinated by the Federal Government. It worked. It worked really well. Ask the folks that—at least 

I have gotten a lot of comments about how much they appreciate 

the fact that there was that quick response in southern Mississippi. 
45

There are unique things that right now we are asking for, we are 

beginning to plan for. If the storm hits the Florida Keys, there is 

one way in, one way out. We are going to have to have a unique 

means of getting in there to make sure we do our search and rescue. That will probably be a Hoover craft. We don’t have Hoover 

crafts in State government. That is from the military, and the military is already beginning the process to see if it is possible to stage 

that in a way that would be helpful. 

That is the kind of response we asked for, and, again, we typically get it. I think the problem with the Federal response gets 

more burdensome in the recovery, not the preparation and relief 

part of this. When people are there in line, you know, waiting to 

get an SBA loan or trying to get public assistance or communities 

that may have a small budget that are overwhelmed by debris removal or having to build their infrastructure up and are trying to 

get reimbursed through FEMA, that is the place where I think 

there needs to be some work. It can get really frustrating is all I 

can tell you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Governor Bush. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KING. The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you all, governors, for being before us. The 

President just signed this week a Homeland Security appropriations bill, the spending monies for 2006, and in it he cut by half 

the State Homeland Security grant program, from $1.1 billion to 

$550 million, and he also cut the Urban Area Security Initiative, 

UASI, by over $120 million. 

Will this affect you at all? Will this affect your programs, governors, in particular for example, Governor Napolitano? You spoke 

about trying to get more of our agencies interoperable on communications equipment, et cetera. Do you think this will affect you at 

all? 

Governor NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman, yes, it 

will. It can’t help but not to. I think that what the Congress should 

look at is what is—what are the States doing and how do they need 

to be properly funded at the Federal level to do what we are asking 

the States to do? That means funding for all of the exercises that 

Governor Perry has discussed. That means funding for the right 

kinds of equipment so that as we preposition it before a hurricane 

or forest fire, we have that kind of equipment. It means really evaluating risks and funding for no able risks as well as those that 

may be unknowable. 

So from a State perspective, yes, it definitely will have an impact 

and not a good one. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Anybody else want to talk about what impact it 

might have? 

Governor PERRY. I would like to respond first and foremost. I 

don’t know what the rest of the Federal Government budget looks 

like, just because they cut back in one area doesn’t necessarily 

mean we are not going to have dollars flowing to the State of 

Texas. It is up to us to make those decisions and prioritize where 

those dollars are spent. If that is the only dollars that are going 

to be flowing to the State for the purposes of Homeland Security, 

then the obvious answer would be there might be some concerns 
46

there. But I would need more information about the total budgetary outlay for Homeland Security for those types of operations. 

When you just describe it as that is the only—

Ms. SANCHEZ. Governor, I was assuming you might know what 

types of production or what you are using those particular Homeland Security programs for in your State. 

Governor PERRY. The fact of the matter is we don’t know what 

the total budget is, Ms. Sanchez, and I think to try to talk about 

how a reduction in one line item is going to impact your entire 

State’s appropriation and your entire State’s activities relative to 

Homeland Security is inappropriate, and I can’t tell you without 

looking—

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Governor. I understand. Just for your 

own information, there were three law enforcement programs, including the COPS, which have significantly been scaled back, and 

one of the reasons that this administration has said they had done 

that is they were putting more monies into these times of programs 

in Homeland Security. So it came to me as somewhat of a surprise 

this was cut in this year’s bill. 

Governor Bush, do you have any comment on those particular 

programs, the State Homeland Security grant and the UASI programs? Do they affect your State at all? 

Governor BUSH. I don’t know, to be honest with you. You know 

what, in a perfect world, I think you probably hear this from governors a lot—

Ms. SANCHEZ. You just want the money and you want no strings 

attached? 

Governor BUSH. Exactly. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Governor Bush. 

I have another question. We understand that. 

Governor PERRY. Just for the record, Governor Napolitano agrees 

with that also. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I have a question in particular for Governor 

Napolitano, but you all are, in a sense, border States, maybe not 

Florida, but you certainly have this issue of ports and a lot of 

coastline where people may come in. I am the ranking member on 

the subcommittee here that deals in particular with border security 

and the Border Patrol, et cetera, and there have been several governors who have mentioned that this is a national security problem. 

So, my question is, in particular to Governor Napolitano, and if 

we have time, to the other two, I am not picking just on her, but 

she happens to have an ongoing problem of people coming across 

the Sonora Desert there, as does Texas, but we hear more of it 

coming out of Governor Napolitano’s area, we are looking at doing 

some immigration reform here in the Congress, maybe in this next 

2 months, maybe beginning with the whole issue of border security. 

Can you talk to me about the number of border patrol, what the 

problem is, what we vice president done at the Federal level, what 

you need to see? Not only from securing the border, but also what 

happens if we do nothing about the people who are already inside 

of the United States who may not have documents or have overstayed their documents for staying here. What problems does this 
47

cause you? What would you like for us to do here at the Federal 

level? 

Governor NAPOLITANO. Congresswoman, I would like the Federal 

Government to put more resources into the Arizona border, as has 

been promised now for many, many years. The resources were put 

in the San Diego-Tijuana area in Operation Gatekeeper, they were 

put into the El Paso–Juarez area in Operation Hold-the–Line, and 

the Arizona border was left unresourced and the traffic, quite 

frankly, moved into Arizona. 

The border has to be dealt with as a whole, the whole stretch of 

it, and we need more by way of resources there. We need Border 

Patrol agents north of the border. The County of Maricopa, where 

Phoenix is located, is the point of destination for literally hundreds 

of thousands people who are crossing on an annual basis. We have 

no Border Patrol agents to pick them up. They are caught and released. That is the policy, catch and release. So the rule of law is 

not being applied. That has to be a top priority. 

Accompanying that needs to be a thorough examination of our 

Federal immigration law and policy and how it should be changed 

to match the economic realities of today. 

Governor PERRY. Absolutely, if I could, Mr. Chairman, I would 

like to just give you some numbers, Mrs. Sanchez. Other than 

Mexicans, that is the individuals, OTMs, that is the biggest area 

of concern, not the biggest, it is one of the great areas of concern. 

From 2002 to 2005 in the Del Rio sector, the OTMs went up that 

were apprehended by 613 percent. In the McAllen area, the very 

far southern part of the Texas area, those numbers went up 429 

percent. The number of Mexican aliens that were apprehended 

stayed basically level. 

But we are seeing a huge problem with OTMs, and there is a 

very much a nonsensical policy today by Homeland Security to 

bring those people inwards 150 miles in the case of from the border 

of Texas to San Angelo, and release them on to that community 

without knowing who these people are, with the directions that he 

would want you to show up at a deportation hearing in X number 

of days and the fact of the matter is none of them show up. This 

is a real problem and it has to be dealt with. We need more technology, we need more Border Patrol agents, we need more dollars 

along the border to pay for the overtime for our law enforcement 

officials that are there. 

So, I think all of us share in the fact of the matter is with all 

due respect, the State of Texas has about 1,200 miles of that border 

to deal with, and in between those ports of entry is where a lot of 

those resources are going to have to be spent. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Governor BUSH. Well, while we don’t have a land border, we do 

have a significant border with the Caribbean and we also are the 

recipient of a tremendous number of people that cross the Texas 

and Arizona borders to come to pursue their dreams in our State. 

So I think protecting the homeland, one of the main ways that you 

could do that, I don’t know about all of the little programs you 

were talking about, this is an area where Border Patrol enforcement, more agents for the Border Patrol, not just in the southwest, 

not at the expense of the southwest, we certainly don’t want to do 
48

that, but including areas like Florida where we have seen a dramatic increase in the number of interdictions of people coming by 

boat. 

Then this is a dicey subject, but the treatment of illegal immigrants, their status, is something that can’t be ignored. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. You are talking about people who are already here 

who are working who might be part of the community. 

Governor BUSH. Which is part of your question. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. We can fortify the border. What does that do for 

the people inside? 

Governor BUSH. I think in turn for fortifying the border, 

strengthening the border, there needs to be some recognition of the 

fact that these are, by and large, most of these folks are hard-working people, they are working so that they can provide for their families. There needs to be a policy I think that respects them. Until 

we can control our borders, I doubt that that will be done in Washington, D.C. 

So I think the first step is the proper one we are talking about, 

but immediately to ignore the fact that we have millions of people 

here that don’t have documentation, that are making contributions, 

but they are not being recognized. That may be politically correct 

in this day and age, but I think it is important to recognize. 

Chairman KING. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. 

Chairman KING. I am always willing to indulge the lady. 

I would just note for the record that this is an ongoing debate 

that we do, but the amount of homeland security grants has actually increased over the last 4 years from $200 million to $1.7 billion, and there are some States who have not spent more than half 

the money that has been awarded to them from the Department of 

Homeland Security, and there is almost $6 billion in the pipeline. 

Again, this is debate that we have ongoing. 

I recognize the gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. Harris. 

Ms. HARRIS. Governor Bush, I wanted to ask you specifically 

about some the issues that we have faced in Florida, most notably 

the debris situation. 

What we have had from FEMA are a number of different rules 

and regulations, different types of issues that they have told us and 

that has made it very difficult on counties, particularly in my economically challenged counties like Hardy and DeSoto. So I wanted 

to ask you what you saw about the actual policies concerning debris removal? 

For us, what our experience was is that FEMA focused more on 

semantics, not on the sewage and waste that were overwhelming 

communities. In their clean-up processes, they instituted unworkable definitions and standards for what constituted gated communities, for what were movable and what was removable. It just got 

into a bureaucratic morass. 

From Tallahassee’s standpoint, we want to know you felt that 

you could deal with that better. It seemed like the rules continue 

to change daily. And the costs that were incurred and then the interest rates that were incurred, that small communities, small 

counties, had to borrow in order to accommodate what government 
49

had told them on the front end, what the Federal Government told 

them on the front end was going to be permissible. 

I would like to know what your thoughts are on that. 

Governor BUSH. I think this is a serious issue. There needs to be 

greater transparency and clarity in treatment of debris in Phoenix 

just as it should be treated in Orlando, just as it should be treated 

in Austin. I think the interpretation of these rules varies from community to community, which makes it hard to determine when you 

should pick-up debris and when you shouldn’t. 

The question of debris removal on private property, one would 

think that is a legitimate restriction. But you have many communities that have public functions but private streets. Those aren’t 

gated communities that you think of in affluent areas. In Florida, 

as you know, many of these gated communities are mobile home 

communities. Those are the ones hurt the most, but yet they 

couldn’t get the debris removed. I think having greater transparency and clarity of interpretation would be very important. 

Secondly, one of the problems that we face has been just getting 

the reimbursements done. The grind-it-out process which, Congressman, you are going to probably begin to hear about from your 

constituents increasingly because of Katrina, getting invoices 

through the process has been quite difficult. 

Thankfully, in Florida, Scott Morris came to be part of the longterm recovery effort in Orlando and made a commitment that he 

would deal with this issue and has done so. But it really required 

his effort. It shouldn’t be based on one individual. There ought to 

be systemic change, so that the reimbursement that we thank you 

for—and I haven’t expressed my thanks for the appropriation last 

year that saved our State—but for the supplemental that you provided made it possible for us to recover. 

Accessing that supplemental budget that you appropriated has 

been a challenge that we have now finally resolved. 

Going forward, I think there should be higher expectations of 

FEMA to get this process done quickly. 

Ms. HARRIS. On another note, and I would like all the governors 

to address this, we specifically had a hurricane summit this past 

week, then you commented on the idea that we have been discussing for some time on a national CAT fund. I really liked some 

of the ideas you had in terms of the accountability, that States 

should have their own CAT funds established first, some of the 

building code issues. 

Would you elaborate on some of your ideas concerning a national 

catastrophic fund? I would like to hear from Governor Perry and 

Governor Napolitano as well. 

Governor BUSH. In response to this notion of federalization of the 

emergency response, maybe a better approach would be to hold 

local communities and States to higher expectations. Part of that 

could be to create a culture of preparedness. One of the things we 

have done in our State to achieve that is we have a statewide 

building code that is the toughest in the country. It changes the dynamics of evacuations, it changes the dynamics of cost. It creates 

the possibility of having a private insurance market, which we still 

have. 
50

We created, after Andrew, a catastrophe fund that had $4.5 billion, I believe, of equity built up that had the capacity to borrow 

up to, I think, $18 billion to deal with these storms. That created 

another buffer. 

Given the fact we seem to be in an era where there are tremendous amounts of disasters going on, maybe I am so immersed in 

it, maybe it is not a typical, but it seems like there are more of 

these going on, and as we see the costs of these rise, perhaps it is 

time to consider a national catastrophe fund, and to opt into something like that, the Federal Government could perhaps require 

local and State governments to have preparation second to none, to 

have a State catastrophic fund to be able to buffer the private insurance market, and to create a culture of preparedness, which I 

think is essential for quicker recoveries. 

Governor PERRY. Just briefly, we have a State CAT fund, but the 

fact of the matter is with the cost of these catastrophes reaching 

the level they are today, it is certainly worth the debate and we 

would be open to discussing of the Federal catastrophic fund and 

then obviously it is always the strings attached with that. But we 

are certainly open to discuss that. 

Governor NAPOLITANO. Certainly it is an idea worth considering. 

We, too, have a State catastrophe fund. It goes by a somewhat different name, but that effectively is what it is. One of the things it 

does is advances costs that are really legitimately Federal costs because the Federal reimbursements come so tardily. So I think the 

notion of having a national fund with State funds and whatever, 

leveraging against each other, if we can clear up the paperwork, is 

well worth doing. 

Chairman KING. The gentleman from the State of Washington, 

Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. DICKS. I want to welcome the governors. I appreciate your 

testimony. 

What about the housing issue, Governor Perry in particular, and 

Governor Bush, since you have been faced with this? This is one 

that worries me, how do we get these people into the right temporary housing and how do we get them into permanent housing? 

Governor PERRY. Absolutely. Yesterday, in a meeting with Secretary Chertoff and his senior staff, we discussed that exact issue. 

We still have some 287,000 individuals in hotels and in motels and 

those types of rooms that are very expensive way to put folks up. 

One of the ideas that I laid out yesterday in some remarks was the 

concept of a housing voucher that could be used for either mortgage 

payments, particularly incenting people to go to VA, FHA, USDA 

type of housing, or for rent, but to put them in the responsible position of taking control of their lives, rather than keeping them in 

some type of this temporary housing that is incredibly expensive. 

Mr. DICKS. Is FEMA paying for that? 

Governor PERRY. Yes, sir, that is my understanding. It is $22 

million—excuse me, $11 million a day, a pretty expensive hotel bill. 

Mr. DICKS. Governor Bush, what is your experience after last 

year? 

Governor BUSH. Well, we had a frustrating experience. This is 

back to the recovery side of it. As I said, prevention and relief, I 

thought FEMA did a pretty good job. Recovery is difficult. FEMA 
51

had the responsibility of providing the housing and it just was slow 

coming, to be honest with you. 

We ended up I think with 12,000 mobile homes or mobile structures that, thankfully, many people now have gotten out of, although some continue to use. 

It is extraordinarily expensive, and there is really not an easy 

answer to a Katrina-like storm, where you are overwhelming the 

housing stock of a broad expanse of area. There is just not a place 

you can go in the United States and say order me up 200,000 manufactured homes. They are not in the inventory. So it will take an 

extended period of time. 

I think just if there could be a way for FEMA to perhaps challenge how they go through their process of determining if someone 

is eligible, speeding up that process, it would be very helpful. 

Eliminating some of just the uncertainties that—when someone 

has been hit by a storm, they have lost most of their assets typically. People that are most hurt don’t have a lot of assets to begin 

with or a lot of income. To try to go through the maze is extraordinarily difficult. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you very much. 

Could I ask one additional question here. On the military side of 

this, I am on defense appropriations and have been on the committee for a long time. The military isn’t excited about taking over 

this responsibility either, by the way. I wanted to ask you this. 

Both the Coast Guard, and I think, the active duty forces that had 

helicopters come in and did a lot of important relief work. Was that 

done under the leadership of the governors and your emergency 

people? 

Governor PERRY. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. So they weren’t acting independently of you. This was 

all coordinated with you? 

Governor PERRY. It came straight out of our State operating center. 

Mr. DICKS. There is no way you have that kind of equipment. 

Governor PERRY. We do have a substantial number of aviation 

assets in the Guard, a lot of Blackhawk helicopters, but those 

Coast Guard choppers that were doing the evacuations that you 

saw out of Louisiana, those were directed by their assets there. 

Mr. DICKS. To be honest with you, I don’t know who was in 

charge of Louisiana. I don’t know who was calling the shots there. 

We are still wondering that ourselves up here. 

Governor Napolitano, on Interior appropriations, we have jurisdiction over the forest fires in appropriations, and I am very interested to hear what you might want to say about what were the 

strengths and weaknesses in the response to these major forest 

fires that you have endured in Arizona? 

Governor NAPOLITANO. Thank you. We have developed a system, 

if a fire starts on State land, we are the first responder and we coordinate with the Forest Service to provide support. If it starts on 

Federal land, they are the first responder, we coordinate with 

them. One of the key things about forest fires is you may not know 

precisely when or where one is going to start, but you can pretty 

much predict the month you are going to start your fire season and 
52

you can pretty much predict the areas of your State where they are 

going to begin. 

Mr. DICKS. Did you have problems with the Federal response in 

terms of getting money back? 

Governor NAPOLITANO. Yes, indeed. When we are incurring Federal expenses for helping fight fires on Federal land, delay in reimbursement has been a real problem for the Forest Service. And a 

second real problem has been the lack of plan and coordination 

with the States on air tanker support for wildfire fighting. We were 

literally in the middle of a very, very bad fire season, then the forest season with no real prewarning to the States, grounded all 33 

of the large air tankers that are really your first wave of attack on 

a large fire. We still don’t have that situation worked out. So there 

are problems there in coordinating with the Forest Service. 

Overall, historically, it has been a good relationship, but in those 

particular areas, speed of reimbursement and air tanker support, 

problematic. 

Chairman KING. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to correct my introduction. It was the Texas National Guard, and it was not federalized. 

I don’t want to let one bad apple ruin the whole federalist 

scheme here. I think as you stated, let first responders be first responders. I think the Federal Government can provide the assets, 

the resources to help, but not take over the entire scheme. I think 

we had a situation in Louisiana where, quite frankly, there was a 

breakdown of communication and leadership, but yet that should 

not change our fundamental laws and Constitution. What Louisiana did raise was the issue of preparedness to not only Mother 

Nature as a terrorist, but to the terrorists themselves. 

I want to see if the panel would comment on that, how well prepared you feel in your States you are to a potential terrorist attack, 

and then as we talk about the border, which I know in my home 

State is an enormous issue, could you comment on whether you believe we need to declare a national State of emergency? 

Governor PERRY. That is a pretty broad set of questions, and I 

will try to hit them very quickly. 

I think Texas is as prepared as humanly possible for an event, 

whether it is man-made or whether it is natural disaster. Are we 

prepared for every eventuality? No. That is physically impossible to 

be prepared for everything. We know that. We learn every exercise. 

But the fact is that, again, I go back to if States have adequately 

used their Homeland Security dollars and other funds have funneled into their States for those purposes, and we were really 

thankful to the Federal Government for the dollars we received, 

and hopefully, as you audit our expenditures of those, that you will 

find that we have used them in an appropriate way and reflective 

of how we dealt with Katrina and Rita, and those 150+ plus exercises, that there is proof in the pudding, if you will. 

But our big concern, as you rightfully bring up, Michael, is the 

border, and it is the terrorist individual who we don’t know about. 

In those OTMs, Mrs. Sanchez, that have been apprehended in the 

State of Texas, we see people from countries like Iraq, Iran, Bangladesh, that tri-border region between Brazil and Argentina and 
53

Paraguay, that we know are al-Qa’ida hot beds. It is those individuals that cause us great concern. And the fact of the matter is, this 

catch and release program that you heard Janet, that is just the 

lingo of the industry, but that is a pretty accurate description of 

what they do. They are apprehended, taken inland and turned 

loose. If that policy does not change, there will be another terrorist 

attack on America that comes from that type of immigration policy. 

We must have the resources, we must have the border patrol, the 

technology. And I can’t overstate the presence—we have Operation 

Linebacker that is ongoing in Texas today that our sheriffs along 

the border have put together. It is following, not unlike Operation 

Stone garden which occurred in a couple of regional areas along the 

border. But it is that presence of uniformed individuals in particular that really stops, lowers, the amount of criminal activity 

that is ongoing. 

So, it is a very broad subject that you bring up, but the entire 

border region, from California all the way to Brownsville, is susceptible to—is a very porous border. It is a huge problem that we have 

to deal with as a country, because this just isn’t about Texas, Arizona and New Mexico and California. This is about the entire country that is being impacted by that type of open border. 

Governor NAPOLITANO. I think Governor Perry said it well. It 

really is resources to be deployed between the ports of entry further north, and the susceptibility is there. This must be a top priority of our Homeland Security effort. 

Governor BUSH. I think Florida is better prepared after September 11 than before. We were maybe better prepared than other 

States because of the fact we have more natural disasters. So the 

natural disasters actually, and how we respond to them it is a 

training process to keep local communities and the State focused 

on what is a huge priority for our State. So I think we are better 

prepared. 

But I guess what I try to tell the team that works so hard on 

this is success is never final, and that we constantly have to be upgrading how we prevent the damage of a natural disaster and how 

we prevent an attack on our country. Florida is a place that people 

move in and out of more than most places. So we are a logical place 

where there could be a terrorist attack, just given our coast and 

given our population. 

So we are trying to constantly upgrade our skills. One of the 

ways we have done a better job in the last 3 or 4 years is the communication between fire and police, the sheriffs and police departments. We have these regional security task force structures that 

demand more transparency and more communication. Then we are 

using technology to back it up with more interoperability. That has 

been a problem, I think, across the country. 

Chairman KING. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentlewoman from New York, Ms. Lowey. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank all three governors for appearing before us. It has been tremendously helpful. 

I want to switch the subject to the pandemic possible, let’s hope, 

not the reality of a possible pandemic flu. But first, I just wanted 

to comment briefly on Governor Bush’s last comment concerning 
54

interoperability, and Governor Napolitano talked about that as 

well. 

Unfortunately, the Federal Government’s office of interoperability really hasn’t shown much leadership, and for me, this has 

truly been unfortunate. Many of us have been talking about it for 

years with the Department of Homeland Security. I think it was 

Governor Napolitano that mentioned, I am not sure, one of you 

mentioned that you have an interoperable system in place. But 

what did happen in Louisiana, even if they did have an interoperable system in place, when the Federal departments came in, Federal agencies came in, they weren’t interoperable. 

What we have been calling for is not a prototype that every State 

has to have the exact equipment, but there should be standards, 

there should be RFPs sent out, and we haven’t done this on the 

Federal level. So I hope you will work with us to encourage more 

Federal activity and leadership in that area, and I congratulate you 

for what you have done in terms of interoperability. 

But I want to get to pandemic influenza preparedness, because 

I have been talking about a year. In hearings on April 12, before 

that in October, about the need for a Federal preparedness plan to 

deal with the possible influenza pandemic. I am pleased to learn 

that each of your States has begun working on this kind of preparedness plan. In fact, it makes me wonder why the Federal plan 

has been in draft form since last August, and we still don’t have 

a permanent Federal influenza plan. 

Now, I think we would all agree that we wouldn’t look to Michael 

Chertoff to be the Nation’s doctor, nor would we ask the CDC to 

train firefighters and police and EMS workers. 

Clearly, there is a role for multiple Federal agencies as well as 

State and local governments. But in my judgment, and I think the 

judgment of so many of us, we really need to plan ahead to make 

sure everyone is equipped and ready to coordinate an immediate 

response. 

For example, do you open the schools? Do you close the schools? 

Do you allow planes to fly intrastate? Does the President stop all 

flights? There needs to be a great deal of planning. 

So I was pleased to learn that you have begun to make these 

plans, and I would like you to perhaps give us some information. 

Where are you in your planning? Have you developed plans to 

date? I am sure if and when the Federal Government comes out 

with their final plan, you will amend your plans. But if you can 

give me an update, if, God forbid, a flu outbreak reaches our shores 

and your State, what is your understanding of your role in this scenario? Whoever would like to begin. What have you done, what 

kind of meetings have you held, what kind of—I am not sure if all 

that chat is you haven’t done anything. 

Governor BUSH. No, we were trying to figure out who gets to go 

first. I think I volunteered. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I appreciate that. What I would like to know is 

what have you done? Has there been any assistance from the Federal Government? 

Governor BUSH. Absolutely. We do table-top exercises for natural 

disasters—
55

Chairman KING. If I could intervene, we are going to be voting 

in about 25 minutes. I would ask if the governors can try to keep 

their remarks brief. Thank you, Governor. 

Governor BUSH. We train for these exercises. In fact, the public 

health issues are probably the highest priority for us, given the nature of our State. So what would happen if there was a pandemic 

in Florida, and Florida was a participant in it, would be the Secretary of the Department of Health, rather than the head of the 

emergency management team, would be the lead, but we would use 

the exact same structure that we have in place which is battle-tested. 

Through the departments of health in the 67 counties, in coordination with the CDC, there are protocols in place already to deal 

with these issues. 

There will be circumstances in the—God forbid if that happened—that wouldn’t be part of the plan that we have in place. But 

many of the same lessons learned from the hurricanes and preparing for emergencies would apply for this, as well. 

Again, I hope that this is something that is only theoretical, because it is just an enormously—it would be an enormous challenge. 

But there has been significant preparation in place. When this 

news came out, we had already had several briefings. The Secretary of the Department of Health has already begun the process 

of implementing the beginning parts of this plan to be prepared. 

Mrs. LOWEY. What does that mean? 

Governor BUSH. Again, to make sure—have 67 counties in our 

State; we have 67 health departments. All of them have to be part 

of a successful preparation. It simply means know what your plan 

is. Run through it. Make sure that the community partners in the 

hospitals, for example, in the emergency rooms, make sure that 

people know what their role is. Assure that—one of the key elements of this is to identify the flu as early as possible. There are 

places, whether it is schools or emergency rooms in hospitals or 

doctors offices, there are ways that you can do that if you have prepared for it in advance. That is what we are doing. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Governor Napolitano. 

Governor NAPOLITANO. Congresswoman, yes, we have worked on 

a flu plan, but a flu plan can apply to a number of other scenarios 

as well. But the kinds of preparation includes looking at who— 

Who we would require physical exams. How we would describe 

medicine and vaccine. How we would procure medicine and vaccine. 

How we would provide for transportation of medical and support 

personnel, if a particular area were particularly hard hit. Those all 

go into a flu plan, a disease plan, as it were. 

Just as in Florida, I think in most States it will be the State Department of health services that will be the lead agency coordinating with county health departments and providers in terms of 

providing the care. But another essential element, quite frankly, is 

the Department of Agriculture, because there is an animal kind of 

interface that you also have to look at. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I am glad you mentioned that. In fact, my colleague, Rosa DeLauro—

Chairman KING. Nita, we are really running out of time. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Let me just close—
56

Chairman KING. Actually, no. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Can I close with one other statement? 

Chairman KING. No, we are really out of time. We have many 

members and we only have 20 minutes to go. I hate to do this. This 

is the only time in my life, I have to shut the gentlelady off. 

I have discussed this with Congresswoman Sanchez. If we can 

limit the questions to a total of 3 minutes so we can try to get as 

many members to ask them, and if the governors would keep their 

statements within the 3-minute time period. 

Mr. Dent. 

Mr. DENT. Governor Perry, you obviously had an experience recently with a major evacuation of a large metropolitan area. My 

question to you is, what should the role of the Federal Government 

be in preparing and implementing an evacuation plan that is directed toward a major metropolitan area like Houston or Philadelphia or New York City? 

Governor PERRY. Right. I think what you will see is what happened in Houston and the surrounding Gulf Coast area will be a 

model, not a perfect model, but a model that will be, again, analyzed and deconstructed and talked about. We have a group already working on recommendations on how to do this better, to 

preposition fuel, to rest stops, to how you contra-flow highways. All 

of those issues are in front. 

I will just briefly conclude by saying that what happened in 

Texas is now a model that everyone can look at, whether you are 

in L.A. or New York or Atlanta or whatever major metropolitan 

area, and to start looking at all of the contingencies that occur and 

how to possibly make their plans better. 

Mr. DENT. As a quick follow-up, my district is less than 80 miles 

from New York City and the City of Philadelphia. My question is, 

what was the ability of communities that were receiving evacuees 

to absorb all those folks coming in? 

Governor PERRY. You saw some Herculean efforts by the local 

folks. Again, you have the opportunity with the next group of individuals to talk to those mayors and those county judges. Those are 

the people that really have the absolute best information. Again, it 

goes back to why you need to keep the first responders being the 

first responders, because these are individuals who have the real 

live experiences that can share with you exactly how they absorbed 

those people and how they were able to very quickly bring them in, 

shelter them, and now dispersing them after the fact. 

Mr. DENT. Can I quickly ask one last question? 

Chairman KING. Mr. Dent, we have to wrap up within one 

minute. 

Mr. DENT. Posse comitatus. Do you think we should reconsider 

it? 

Governor PERRY. No. 

Governor NAPOLITANO. No. 

Chairman KING. The gentlelady from the District of Columbia, 

Ms. Norton. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank the 

governors for their respective views. It has been very important. 

Let me get the red herring out of the room. I don’t think you will 

see a single member here that wants to federalize first responders. 
57

I want to assure you of that. President Bush has asked to me it 

seems a responsible question, and essentially that requested asked 

before Katrina and since is under what circumstances should the 

military be used. That is all we are interested in. 

It is about disaster response here. Not only natural disaster response. I just wanted to put the dilemma we face to you. Assuming 

that the State and local responses were as perfect as they could be, 

the preparation and execution, in Katrina, of course, there is the 

Emergency Assistance Act, Stafford Act. He used the military, my 

friends, every branch of the military there. We, of course, want to 

fix FEMA. I was surprised the gentlewoman—rather, at the governors’ response on FEMA, because I am on the subcommittee that 

has taken a lot of hits for not having calling FEMA in in 2004 

when we are told that four hurricanes in Florida had the handwriting all on the wall about problems in FEMA. So we bear responsibility for looking at what we can do to make all of this moot. 

But I think the reason the President has put this to us is that 

in any case, for example, a disaster could be a terrorist disaster, 

the information then the response could be totally in his hands or 

if not the response, the intelligence, the Northern Command, ladies 

and gentlemen, are already gaming on the theory that there would 

be circumstances where any local and State would be overwhelmed 

and where the military would be necessary, if you are serious about 

saving human lives. 

I want to know if you oppose the use of the Army, the Navy, the 

Air Force, every branch of the military as it was used in Louisiana, 

apparently with the approval of the Governor and it was also used 

in Mississippi. Would you oppose the use of the military if there 

were a terrorist attack? And do you think this committee ought to 

try to figure out what circumstances should lead to the use of the 

military in either of those situations? For me, that is the only issue 

before us today, frankly. 

Chairman KING. I would ask the witnesses to give the briefest 

possible answer they could. 

Governor BUSH. I do think this committee needs to look at the 

circumstances in which the military would play and the President 

would play a direct role and the military play the direct role. There 

are, God forbid, we would be in this circumstance where an overwhelming event of national importance could take place, where the 

intelligence and the information available would be provided the 

commander-in-chief and not a Governor or mayor. Again, God forbid that would happen. Under those circumstances, in some way it 

could be appropriate for direct action. But it should not be in natural disasters, where we have a responsibility and we should be 

held accountable for that responsibility to respond. 

Ms. NORTON. You don’t oppose the use of the military, with the 

Governor, as was done in Louisiana, or not? 

Governor BUSH. I do not oppose the military’s involvement in 

preparation and relief, so long as the Governor of the State is in 

charge of that effort. 

Chairman KING. Governor Perry? 

Governor PERRY. Briefly, there is an absolute military aspect to 

most disasters. The military, the active duty military, should be at 

the discretion of the local Governor. 
58

Ms. NORTON. The active duty Federal military? 

Governor PERRY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. With the permission of the local government? 

Governor PERRY. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. You don’t have any authority over the active duty 

military? 

Governor PERRY. The fact of the matter is with the State operations center shall the people who are organizing, we do work as 

a team. I think that is a very important thing to understand, is we 

do work as a team. If our State operations center says to the active 

duty C–130 crews that are sitting there waiting to move people 

with special needs, we need three C–130’s in Beaumont, Texas, at 

10:30 in the morning. 

Ms. NORTON. I am talking about the Army, Air Force and Marines. 

Chairman KING. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. Other 

members have waited a long time. 

Governor PERRY. The fact of the matter is we worked together. 

It can be the active duty Air Force, and they do, in fact, work with 

us. When we say this is what we need, yes, we go through the 

chain of command, but the fact of the matter is, that is the important part of this, is that realizing that we have this organizational 

chart and it is the States that would continue to be at the heart 

of the decisionmaking on where these assets would be placed. 

Chairman KING. Governor Napolitano? 

Governor NAPOLITANO. Very quickly, there is a role for the military, but it needs to be under the direction of the State Governor 

and in cooperation. That is exactly what we practice and prepare 

for, and we do use active duty military in these response plans, but 

we don’t cede control over the response to the Pentagon. 

Chairman KING. The gentleman from the State of Washington 

for 3 minutes. 

Mr. REICHERT. All three of you have commented on three major 

points, communication planning and joint exercises and practice. I 

want to focus just on the communication piece that was mentioned 

earlier, a two-part question for anyone on the panel who chooses 

to answer. 

One, how can the Federal Government help those States that do 

not have a statewide communication? If you were just setting up 

a system in your State and you all three have systems, as does my 

State, the State of Washington, what could the Federal Government do to help you or the State do that? 

The second part of the question would be do you have a plan in 

place that would, in case your communications systems totally collapsed? 

Governor PERRY. We do. In Texas, as a matter of fact, we have 

a substantial amount of satellite communications, the Texas task 

force 1 also has that type of capability. As a matter of fact, they 

were the first people in Louisiana with the ability to communicate 

because every land-based and cell tower was down in Louisiana, so 

those are already in place. We prepositioned them. 

If Jeb has the need for those over the course of the next three 

or four days, they will be prepositioned to the west of Florida to 

go in to assist. 
59

Chairman KING. Governor Napolitano. 

Governor NAPOLITANO. Thank you. The answer is we have an 

interoperability. We used our Homeland Security money not to create a statewide system of fixed assets, but to buy vans that you 

could literally drive anywhere, that Federal, State and local responders can all plug into. It is like having mobile patches that we 

can make available throughout Arizona, but, as I said, we made 

available in Louisiana. 

What you can do is work with States to help them develop strategies like that, if they haven’t done so already. 

Chairman KING. Governor Bush. 

Governor BUSH. Absolutely. The key to this is to have a robust 

system that is redundant. We have that, and it is mobile. It has 

been funded by State and Federal dollars. So Washington has done 

its part. Again, have I expressed my appreciation for the money 

you all have given us? 

Chairman KING. Yes, Governor. We know that. 

Governor PERRY. Mr. Chairman, let me just add one thing. The 

private sector plays a very important role in that also. For instance, our satellite trucks went into the Gulf Coast regions, 

Gycom, which is one of the local satellite trucks, to give us realtime pictures in the advent that we lost all of our electrical power. 

So the private sector also plays a very important role in this, as 

well as both the State and the Federal. 

Chairman KING. The gentlewoman from Texas is recognized for 

3 minutes. We have cut the time to 3 minutes because of the votes 

coming up, not that I have to remind you in particular, but I just 

thought I would do it. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is hard to count, 

but you have given me that number, and I do appreciate it very 

much. 

Let me, first of all, again, acknowledge the governors for their 

work and let me also acknowledge Michael Williams, who I have 

had the pleasure in the State of Texas to work with on the Texas 

Railroad Commission. For those uninformed about the processes of 

government in Texas, I commend you to—I have taken up about 30 

seconds—but I commend you to Texas history. In any event, it is 

a very important commission. We thank you very much for your 

leadership. 

You can tell we are troubled by this question dealing with Federal levels of help. Let me share my focus with you and raise some 

questions so that we can be appropriately instructive in our work. 

One, we agree, I believe, that you have heard no interest in federalizing local law enforcement. In fact, one of my questions at the 

end will be that we like to take the burden of border security, 

which is another point, off of the States and do the job we are supposed to do. 

But just noticing a White House declaration shortly after Hurricanes Charlie and Francis, I think in the fall of 2004, if I am correct, and Governor Bush, you have certainly, if you will, been tested. But the efforts were defined and definitive, if you will. 

He submitted a request for emergency funds to Congress to ensure response efforts in Florida and elsewhere continued without 

any interruption. The President announced he would submit a sup-
60

plemental request for approximately $2 billion to pay for the response and recovery efforts related to the hurricane, and the request for the first supplemental appropriation requests will total 

$2.2 billion that went to FEMA, primarily for emergency clean-up, 

et cetera. 

I also noted in your comments that you had talked about pre-deployment. Some of the other issues, about 100 trucks of water and 

280 trucks of ice are present and will arrive in Jacksonville staging 

area today. 900,000 meals ready to eat. I notice 7,000 cases of food. 

So we concede there is a prime role for the Federal Government. 

What I would appreciate hearing, I am going to first start with 

my own governor, because we did one of the most massive evacuations, Governor Perry. Can I ask you to place in there where an 

appropriate government role would have been? 

For example, the added fuel trucks along the freeway, the utilization you did of the National Guard, but whatever other resources 

you might have needed, ice and water down in port Arthur. Is 

there not a role in synergies am with you, and Governor 

Napolitano, would you answer that? I am not asking Governor 

Bush, because you laid it out for us. If there is time, I welcome you 

to answer that question as well, and comment on the need for Federal resources and border security. 

Chairman KING. Actually, there isn’t enough. I would ask Governor Perry and Governor Napolitano to answer questions as briefly as possible. 

Governor PERRY. Absolutely, there is a Federal response, and the 

coordination and its assets. It is those transportation assets, those 

heavy equipment assets, it is those fuel trucks. It is just the coordination of them. That is the important thing again that we can reiterate, the continual coordination between the State and the local 

and the Federal Government, and that is the real key to an evacuation, is having thought through all of those places where you need 

those individuals, where the bottlenecks are going to be, where you 

can use either the active duty or the military to direct traffic. It 

is a matter of managing those assets. 

Governor NAPOLITANO. I would agree with Governor Perry, although I would say that border security issue itself on an ongoing 

basis is a Federal responsibility and requires federally-trained and 

paid-for law enforcement at the border. But in terms of managing 

a disaster and how you interact with the military and other Federal resources, it is a matter of coordination. 

Chairman KING. The gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren. 

Mr. LUNGREN. With respect to the issue everybody has brought 

up, border security, I just might advise people that the bill the 

President signed yesterday, the fiscal year 2006 appropriations bill 

for first responders, specifically added money for more Border Patrol officers, more interior enforcement, more beds, so that we don’t 

have the OTMs caught and released. 

In reflection of that, or as a factor in that, it was the Congress 

that made the decision with respect to lesser money for the State 

Homeland Security Grant Program. We transferred some of the 

funds so that those things could be done in light of the fact that 

we discovered there are literally billions of dollars still in the pipe-
61

line from the previous two years that had not yet been spent. I 

would like that for the record. 

Secondly, and this is the question I would like to direct to you, 

when I was Attorney General of California, we dealt with fires and 

floods and earthquakes and riots and so forth and we dealt with 

the Federal Government on all levels, and we dealt with these 

issues. We never had a problem of where the Federal Government 

should be and where we should be. 

The problem that has really come out, and the big elephant in 

the room, is the fact that there was a failure of leadership, at least 

some of us think, at the State and local level, in Katrina. So some 

of the discussion here in Congress has been where does the Federal 

Government enter in? Not when under the Insurrection Act the 

Federal Government can use the military to subdue any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination or conspiracy as an 

exception to posse comitatus, but is there another level of decision 

that ought to be made by the Federal Government? 

That is, some members have come to me and said when we have 

a certain size hurricane, Category 5, we ought to assume that the 

Federal Government is going to come in. Others have said when we 

make a decision that there has been a certain amount of loss of 

life, then the Federal Government should come in. Others have 

said we ought to reserve the ability to make the judgment when 

there has been a failure of leadership at the Governor level or at 

the local level, that the Federal Government should then presume 

it can come in, using Federal forces, including active military, as 

first responders. That is the real issue here. 

I would like to have your response to that, because I feel very 

strongly that posse comitatus has served us well and that we 

should be very leery of giving a President that kind of authority. 

But I would like to ask the three of you to respond to that. 

Governor BUSH. I will start very briefly simply by saying that of 

the scenarios you described, that the only one that possibly would 

be appropriate is the last one, and it is not different than what 

happens—it hasn’t happened in Florida since I have been Governor, it may have happened in the past, where a mayor was derelict in their duties, and under our emergency powers, we have the 

ability to countermand a decision made by a mayor or county chairman that endangers the lives of the people of that community as 

it relates to maybe not evacuating when they are supposed to or 

something like that. 

The last thing that should happen though is to create a system 

where you enable bad behavior. We should be rewarding—we 

should make it a higher priority in every community, emergency 

response needs to be a higher priority, given the realities of the 

world we live in. And the more that the Federal Government assumes responsibility, the less likely it is that local first responders, 

local elected officials and governors, will feel compelled to make it 

their first priority. 

Chairman KING. Governor Napolitano, and then Governor Perry. 

Governor NAPOLITANO. I agree. As a former attorney general myself, the saying is bad cases make bad law, and I think changing 

the whole system because of one incident would be unwise. 
62

Governor PERRY. Here is what I think that the government can 

do, is the dollars, you have had 4 years to see whether or not the 

States had expended those Homeland Security dollars appropriately. I think that is one of the real keys for you to look at, each 

State, and I don’t know how you do that, you look at each State, 

see how those dollars have been spent, see if they are exercising 

and gaming out the types of events that could happen in those 

States and make a decision at that particular point in time. If they 

are not directing their States to these types of activities, then the 

public will respond appropriately to that Governor or to that mayor 

or to that doubt I judge, that you are not spending the money right 

to protect our citizens. 

Chairman KING. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from New Jersey, the Ranking Member of the 

Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee, Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have three questions, yes or no, from each and every one of you, 

and then a final question which I would ask Governor Bush to respond to, if you would. So this should go very quickly, like teeth 

extraction. 

Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, 

much of the Federal focus has been on preparing for and responding to terrorist attacks. Is the Department giving enough adequate 

focus, in your opinion, to natural disaster? Governor Bush? 

Governor BUSH. Yes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Governor Perry. 

Governor PERRY. Yes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Governor Napolitano. 

Governor NAPOLITANO. No. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. 

Second question is this: Does the Federal Government have a 

role in ensuring that each State has interoperable, better known to 

us in Paterson, New Jersey, as proper communications systems? Do 

you think that the Federal Government has a role? Governor Bush? 

Governor BUSH. Yes. 

Governor PERRY. Yes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Governor Napolitano. 

Governor NAPOLITANO. Yes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. All right. Thank you. 

The third question is this: Do you think—should the President 

have the ability to declare a disaster under the provisions of the 

Stafford Act and direct Federal aid without a State request? Governor Bush? 

Governor BUSH. I would say no just to keep it simple. 

Mr. PASCRELL. No. Okay. 

Governor PERRY. I will take a pass on that one. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Okay. 

Governor NAPOLITANO. No. 

Mr. PASCRELL. All right. Here is my final question. This is to you 

Governor Bush 

Governor BUSH. Is this like the $500 Jeopardy question? 

Mr. PASCRELL. You are doing very well so far. 

Governor BUSH. I don’t know where this is leading. 
63

Mr. PASCRELL. Do you think, Governor Bush, that FEMA—and 

you have had more experience here because of the disasters that 

have occurred in your State—do you think it should be extracted 

from the Department of Homeland Security? 

Governor BUSH. I don’t think it matters one way or the other. I 

think what matters is that the business practices of FEMA need 

to be reviewed and updated, and I think in an emergency the 

FEMA Director needs to report directly to the President of the 

United States, just as the director of emergency management who 

is embedded in a department in State government reports directly 

to me when there is a declaration of an emergency. 

Mr. PASCRELL. You said in your testimony, Governor, that the 

FEMA logistic program is broken, and I agree with you 100Rrcent. 

You gave an example. You gave an example of the ice that was 

supposed to get to Florida, and, you know, we don’t have the time 

for you to go through that whole example. It is right in your testimony. It would seem to me that we need to do something very substantial here to get FEMA up and going again, to give it teeth so 

that it is of value to you before and in preparation and afterwards, 

God forbid, if the catastrophe does happen. It would seem to me 

that we should look at your testimony here, and then we ought to 

be thinking and talking amongst ourselves as we should make 

some very fundamental changes with FEMA. It is not working, in 

my estimation. Thank you. 

Chairman KING. There has been a series of votes called, which 

means it is probably going to last over an hour. What we will do 

is try to go through two more questioners, and then we will have 

to excuse the panel. The committee will stand in recess subject to 

the call of the Chair for approximately 1 hour, and then we will 

resume with the second panel after that. 

The gentleman from Nevada Mr. Gibbons. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And to our Governors, thank you for being here today. We appreciate your testimony. 

My question would deal with the military, of course, serving on 

the Armed Services Committee. As you know, under State law, title 

32 gives each Governor control of the National Guard within their 

respective States. Title 10 controls Active Duty Forces. There is a 

provision to allow for activation of title 32, National Guard into the 

Active Duty Forces, but not vice versa. In other words, no title 10 

can go down to title 32. 

My question would be, I read with interest the New York Times 

dated October 11, the military proposes an Active Duty Force for 

relief effort. Now, in each of your jurisdictions, do you believe that 

Congress would be better suited to ensure that our National Guard 

Forces who deal primarily with first responders within their individual States should be better prepared and better equipped to deal 

with natural disasters, or do you feel that it is better for Congress 

to take that giant leap and create a new division within our military forces that would be an overriding singular entity to deal with 

natural disasters with the equipment and the kind of responses 

that you talked about earlier? 

Governor NAPOLITANO. My initial response without knowing the 

details is that, no, you want to work with your existing National 
64

Guards. There is a mechanism by which title—you can have a joint 

task force of title 32 National Guard married with title 10, and 

that happened at the national conventions last summer. That is 

how they managed the security at both the Democratic and Republican convention. You can do it under existing law. 

Mr. GIBBONS. But you would also agree that there is no legal jurisdiction and chain of command in title 10, too. 

Governor NAPOLITANO. No. You have to use the mechanism of 

the joint task force approach. But it has been used before. 

Governor PERRY. Yes, sir. You just have to coordinate, and we do 

that very well in Texas, and I think these, all these Governors 

work. But my statement that I talked about the Maytag repairman 

I think is what you are talking about. If you create an Active Duty 

military group that is sitting around waiting for the next disaster, 

they may sit 6 months out doing anything when they could be out 

serving the people, keeping the peace, you know, fighting the wars 

that the military is supposed to be doing. So I would certainly be 

opposed to creating a special military unit just for disasters. 

Governor BUSH. I agree. And I think enhancing the Guard is the 

way to go. We will have 1,000 guardsmen and women activated by 

tomorrow and 6,000 available for this storm, and they are citizen 

soldiers. They want to do this, and they do a darn good job. 

Mr. GIBBONS. And States can share resources through a memorandum of agreement between States for anything. 

Governor BUSH. Absolutely 

Chairman KING. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Donna Christensen. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have gone through several hurricanes, being from the Virgin Islands, both on the hurricane side and then FEMA side, and I will 

say that in the response to Katrina, I did not recognize FEMA at 

all, the FEMA that I am accustomed to. I am going ask a question; 

I guess one question is what I have time for. The National Response Plan outlines seven responsibilities of the Federal Government in a catastrophic event, and I consider Katrina catastrophic: 

mass care, housing, urban search and rescue, decontamination, 

public health, medical support, medical equipment, supplies, casualty and fatality management and public information. Is there 

any one of those seven in which you would give the Department or 

the Federal Government a C or better? Did you think that they 

met their responsibility? 

Governor NAPOLITANO. With relation to Katrina or other—

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Katrina. 

Governor NAPOLITANO. With relation to Katrina, no. 

Governor BUSH. I can only speak from the Florida experience, 

and as it relates to the emergency response, the first response, I 

would give FEMA strong grades. As it relates to recovery, I think 

there is a lot of work that needs to get done. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Even given the fact that there were people 

standing on bridges not being fed for 3 days? 

Governor BUSH. I am talking about the Florida experience, 

which, again, you know, I think you can’t grade FEMA based on 

that particular disaster where it is possible that the local and State 

response was inadequate. 
65

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. In my experience, FEMA is supposed to come 

in, the Federal Government is supposed to come in at the level at 

which the State is at capacity and fill in the gaps. One State is perhaps better prepared than another. FEMA should be coming in at 

the level at which that State has maxed out its capacity and build 

from there. Your State is well prepared. But through the coordination process they should be able to assess the capacity of the State 

and build up that capacity. 

Governor BUSH. I guess the number of employees in FEMA, 

there is 2,500 employees in FEMA. We had 3,700 people that went 

to the aid of people in Louisiana and Mississippi. Because this system is not a FEMA system, it is a Federalist system, there were 

people from all over the United States, and still are in these regions. And I am not sure that you can grade FEMA as an agency 

by itself based on the emergency system that we have in place. 

Governor PERRY. And I think the very key phrase that you used 

was that his State was prepared. And I think that is a very important aspect of this debate that we are having is there are some 

States that are very well prepared. There are some that aren’t. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. And FEMA should come in and build up the 

level of preparedness and the coordination of it. 

Governor PERRY. You have obviously had some good experiences 

with FEMA with the hurricanes that you have. As you said, that 

wasn’t the FEMA that you recognized. So I think the analysis of 

Katrina may be as much with the local level as it is with how do 

you make FEMA better. And the fact of the matter is if the Federal 

Government is perfect in its activation and its efforts, and the local 

is less than adequate, then you are going to have some problems. 

Chairman KING. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

There are about 6 minutes left in the vote, so I recognize the 

gentleman from New Mexico for 2 minutes. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, those yes or no answers, Mr. Pascrell. 

Governor Napolitano, you said that the border security is your 

real emergency, and that the national and the Federal Government 

is not doing enough. Are there any immigration enforcement-free 

zones either in Arizona or any locality in Arizona? 

Governor NAPOLITANO. Any what? 

Mr. PEARCE. Enforcement-free zones; that is, free spaces where 

immigrants can come without having any fears of having Federal— 

Governor NAPOLITANO. The answer is no. And, in fact, I signed 

legislation this year including— 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you. This is just a yes or no question. 

Governor Napolitano, you said that you would be greatly inconvenienced by the cuts that—in answer to Ms. Sanchez’s question. 

Are you aware that Arizona, according to the DHS spending report, 

has, fiscal year 2002, $28 thousand unspent; fiscal year 2003, $16 

million unspent; fiscal year 2004, $47 million; and fiscal year 2005, 

$40 million unspent, $131 million total unspent dollars nationwide? 

It was the same with all States, about $3 billion unspent. So we 

did go in and we cut the budget, but it is hard to see where you 

would be inconvenienced 

Governor NAPOLITANO. May I respond, please? Those monies 

have been allocated. 
66

Mr. PEARCE. Ma’am, I have got 2 minutes. You are either aware 

of it or you or not. Yes or no? 

Governor NAPOLITANO. You either want the information or you 

don’t want the information. Everything has been allocated. 

Mr. PEARCE. It has been allocated, but if it is like my State, we 

continually go things have been allocated back in 2002, but the 

checks never been written to the first responders. Thank you. 

Again, in the last of my 2 minutes, Mr. Chairman, looking at the 

national preparedness goal and national preparedness guidance, 

are you all aware that the Federal homeland security grants are 

going to be contingent on complying with those goals starting next 

year? Yes or no? 

Governor BUSH. Am I aware of that? 

Mr. PEARCE. Yes. Federal national preparedness goal. Are you 

aware that your Federal homeland security grants are going to be 

contingent on you all being in compliance with that? 

Governor BUSH. I am now. 

Mr. PEARCE. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman 

Chairman KING. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from North Carolina for 1–1/2 to 2 minutes, if 

you can try to wrap it up. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank each one of you for being here this morning. And, 

Governor Bush, in your written testimony you talk about the need 

for the Department of Homeland Security to consolidate preparedness response recovery mitigation in the one shop. I agree. I hope 

the Secretary is listening to that and he reads your testimony. 

We had Floyd in our State. I would share with each one of you 

as we talk about—I don’t want to get into what happened with 

Katrina and others other than to say when a State is overwhelmed, 

and we were in North Carolina, the military and others moved in. 

They were there and helped. We can prepare for hurricanes. As you 

well know, North Carolina has had a lot. But when you get overwhelmed, you need the Federal Government to be there as a partner, and then you move very quickly and respond immediately. 

And I won’t go there other than to say that. 

But let me ask you a question to answer as has just been followed up. What can FEMA and DHS do to enhance your States’ 

ability to respond quickly to a natural disaster or terrorist attacks? 

You know, currently a lot of our funds are focused on terrorism, 

but for many of you and our State, natural disasters may be greater than the terrorist attack. But for the individual at the end of 

the line, the first responder, it doesn’t matter which one comes. 

You have the same problem. 

Chairman KING. Could you answer it within 15 seconds? 

Governor NAPOLITANO. They can help with training, preparation 

and equipment. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Resources. 

Governor BUSH. And I think Governor Perry is correct that it is 

legitimate for you all to hold us accountable for how our homeland 

security dollars are being spent. You can spend this money in a 

way that does allow you to prepare for natural disasters at the 

same time that you are training and preparing for the defense of 

the homeland. 
67

Governor PERRY. Yes, sir. 

Let me just say it has been a real honor to be with you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman KING. Again, I will overlook the fact that in our prior 

meeting you did make some deprecating remarks about the Notre 

Dame-Southern Cal game. Mr. Lungren was very upset over that. 

But we will overlook that. 

Mr. MEEK. Mr. Chairman, 

Chairman KING. Mr. Meek. 

Mr. MEEK. Yes. I would just like 1 minute, if you can give it to 

me. 

Chairman KING. You can get 1 minute with no time for answers. 

Just total 1 minute. 

Mr. MEEK. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. 

Thank you all for being here today. I just basically have one 

question for you. A lot of you, I have heard your testimony, I have 

actually read your testimony about the importance of lessons 

learned so that we can all do better in the future. As it relates to 

Katrina and Rita, Governor, I know that you had a lot with traffic 

and a lot of things, but I look at this as being a member of the 

Homeland Security Committee as something that we really need to 

know more about, because it could be a terrorist attack and we 

need to evacuate a U.S. city, so we need to review this. And this 

book, this 9/11 Commission report, has helped to improve security 

here in America. We are asking for the same thing as it relates to 

an independent commission looking into Hurricane Katrina and 

Rita. 

I wanted to ask you all, do you believe that we need an independent commission of—a bipartisan, independent commission that 

is away from this Congress that can do the work to be able to find 

the success and failures in the recovery of Katrina at this particular time? 

Governor PERRY. I can save you a little money, and we will tell 

you everything that we did with Katrina and with Rita and no 

charge. 

Mr. MEEK. Governor Bush. 

Governor BUSH. I think Congress is more than capable of exercising its responsibilities in terms of an oversight over how to improve. 

Governor NAPOLITANO. I most respectfully disagree. I think the 

national public would have more credibility if there were an independent commission created as it was for 9/11. 

Mr. MEEK. Thank you. Thank you, Governors. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KING. Thank the Governors for their testimony. 

The committee stands in recess subject to the call of the Chair. 

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to the 

call of the Chair.] 

Chairman KING. The subcommittee will come to order. 

First of all, let me thank the witnesses for staying around. We 

had a very unfortunate situation with the votes today, and then 

Secretary Rice is speaking to Members of Congress, which is also 

cutting into the turnout here at the hearing. So I really want to 

thank you for being here, for staying with us. 
68

You certainly have valuable testimony to give. We look forward 

to it, and I have discussed this with Congresswoman Christensen. 

Congressman Poe has asked to introduce the guests today. He is 

not a member of the committee, so I ask unanimous consent that 

he be allowed to sit on the dais and conduct the introductions. 

Without objection. 

So ordered, Congressman Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you having this 

important hearing on appropriate roles of local State and Federal 

officials when it comes to disaster management and the response. 

As all of you know, Texas was recently hard hit by Hurricane 

Rita and this committee is indeed fortunate to hear from local officials in Texas, who just recently served on the front lines of that 

disaster. County Judge Robert Eckels, who was going to testify, has 

been asked to be over at the White House, so he will not be here 

this afternoon to testify. But his testimony is in the record. 

[The statement of Mr. Eckels follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT A. ECKELS

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am Robert Eckels, and I serve 

as the County Judge of Harris County, Texas. To clarify my role, a County Judge 

in Texas is the presiding officer of the Commissioners Court, the governing body of 

the county. I represent all the citizens of the third most populous county in the 

United States. 

Harris County is 1,756 square miles in area and home to 3.6 million residents, 

making it more populous than 23 states. There are 34 municipalities within the 

county, including the City of Houston, the fourth largest city in the country. More 

than 1.2 million people live in unincorporated Harris County and rely on the county 

to be the primary provider of basic government services. 

As County Judge, I am charged by statute with the responsibility for emergency 

management planning and operations for Harris County. Most departments within 

Harris County have emergency functions in addition to their normal duties and play 

key roles in our emergency operations strategy. All departments work together to 

coordinate services and prepare for an emergency or disaster. 

I want to thank the Committee for inviting me to testify on Federalism and Disaster Response. Because of my involvement in emergency management, I have had 

numerous opportunities to consider the best alternatives and I will try to make a 

case for the National Response Plan (NRP) because I believe it is the best way to 

respond in Harris County and in our region to catastrophic events. 

I also believe that there are situations that would call for a Federal response, 

such as military intervention, but only when circumstances prevent implementation 

of the NRP. I expect the more serious incidents to seriously strain our resources and 

capabilities and it would only be when we are overwhelmed to the point of failure 

that I could see asking for a Federal response to take over. Other than extreme situations, I believe that the best method of handling response is at the local level 

where we have first responders who are closest to the incident not only in proximity 

but in their training. No one knows Harris County better than those who live and 

work in Harris County. 

As we seek to make our communities more prepared for any kind of disaster and 

resilient to those disasters, it is clear that all government functions are interrelated. 

A healthy and robust community is better prepared for emergencies. I believe that 

local governments which work well together and work well with the state and federal governments in day-to-day operations, will work well together in times of 

stress. A number of issues stand out as we look at Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane 

Rita and there were a number of lessons learned as we responded quite differently 

to these two Incidents of National Significance.

Hurricane Katrina Response 

Harris County played a major role along with the State of Texas and, in fact, 

nearly every other state in the nation to address the short-term effects of the devastation of Katrina. Harris County provided shelter and comfort to Hurricane Katrina 

victims in what became the largest mass evacuation in US History at that a time. 

It is estimated that more than 373,000 evacuees came to Texas and more than 
69

150,000 came to Harris County alone. Our response was an unprecedented coalition 

of the Harris County government as well as the City of Houston, the State of Texas, 

the Federal government, the private sector, non-profit organizations, and citizen volunteers. The mission of the coalition was to provide temporary shelter, social services and relocation options for the citizens displaced by Hurricane Katrina. In less 

than a day a city was created which, at its peak, offered more than 27,000 people 

shelter, health care, child care, mental health services, housing assistance, travel 

vouchers, employment services, and much more. The population eventually became 

so large at the Reliant Park Complex that the US Postal Service assigned the complex its own zip code. 

Harris County and the greater Houston area is a caring community. We welcomed 

our neighbors in need when they had no where else to turn. Harris County through 

its Reliant Astrodome shelter and later expansions to our related venues absorbed 

the sudden shock of the exodus from Louisiana for a few days and gave the rest 

of the nation time to respond by creating more shelters. 

We had a plan and we executed the plan. It was not a plan for the Dome, but 

a plan for action. We learned as we went along, but the structure was sound and 

the people knew their roles and responsibilities. 

We dealt with problems and forces beyond our control and kept a giving spirit. 

I believe that the Katrina victims were a blessing to our city and that we are 

stronger today for our service to our neighbors.

Hurricane Katrina Houston Response Unified Command 

As we watched Hurricane Katrina intensify in the Gulf of Mexico after passing 

over Florida and approach New Orleans, it became clear that the threat was serious 

and growing. On Sunday, August 28, 2005, I visited with Jack Colley, the State Coordinator of Governor Rick Perry’s Division of Emergency Management (GDEM). He 

asked if the Reliant Astrodome was capable of housing potentially as many as 2,000 

evacuees, should the need arise. I assured him that we would do whatever necessary 

to make our facilities available. 

When the levees breached on August 30 and New Orleans began to flood, it forced 

the evacuation of the Superdome, where residents had gone for initial sheltering. 

I received a call at 3:00 a.m. on Wednesday, August 31, from Jack Colley asking 

me to implement our plan to open the Reliant Astrodome to evacuees who would 

be coming to us from the Superdome that night. The number of evacuees he expected grew to 23,750. 

At approximately 6:00 a.m. on August 31, 2005 we began to organize the Hurricane Katrina Houston Response Unified Command under the Harris County Emergency Management Basic Plan and the National Response Plan. We created a relatively flat unified incident command center in accordance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) at the Reliant Park Complex composed of the 

Federal government, the State of Texas, Harris County, the City of Houston, and 

non-governmental organizations. The Reliant Park Complex which includes the Reliant Astrodome, the Reliant Arena, and the Reliant Center is managed by SMG 

Management. Other non-governmental organizations include Aramark Food Services, which provided all food services in the Reliant Park Complex; Contemporary 

Services Corporation (CSC), which provided security; the Red Cross which provided 

shelter operations; and numerous other charitable organizations. 

We also recognized that with such a large number of evacuees, we would need 

to have a strong and unified communication to those housed in our facilities, to 

those evacuees in other shelters and motel and hotels in Harris County and in other 

parts of Texas and other states, to our volunteers, to our citizens, and to the news 

media covering the event. The Joint Information Center (JIC) was established in the 

Reliant Astrodome headed by a Public Information Officer who was responsible for 

unified coordinated communications, both internally to the unified command and externally. We established an extensive telephone system and created an Internet Web 

page at www.hcjic.org that contained situation reports, press releases, media alerts, 

and other critical command announcements. We had frequent press conferences 

each day and media updates to keep the public informed about developments and 

to share information. 

Another element of the JIC that gave us greater communication opportunities was 

the interoperable communication system that we have been developing in Harris 

and surrounding counties over the past 8 to 10 years. With a price tag in excess 

of $250 million, neither Harris County, nor most counties around the country, are 

capable of purchasing such a system as a replacement for existing systems. What 

we have done is to develop our communication system in stages to give us the ability to communicate across jurisdictional and disciplinary lines. We are currently 

working to expand our system geographically and to have more mobile communica-
70

tion devices and lap top computers/personal data assistants (PDA) with text and file 

transfer capabilities in the hands of our first responders. Our objective is to have 

streaming video capability so that first responders can send live video from the field 

back to incident command and better tactical decision-making can be done with real 

time information. With our system in the Reliant Park Complex we were able to 

respond to developing situations and bring in the correct professional and voluntary 

assistance to resolve problems as quickly as possible. 

It is very important for Congress to continue to fund state and local government 

efforts to evolve or transform existing system capabilities to achieve interoperability. 

I know that in our situation we can’t afford the downtime required to learn how 

to operate a new system, so we have chosen to make improvements in manageable 

bites that enhance rather than disrupt our capabilities. Congress and the federal 

agencies should create rules that set minimum standards but allow local government the flexibility to work within their means to achieve those standards. 

On September 20, 2005, at approximately 7:00 p.m. we announced that our mission had been completed and our unified command at the Reliant Park Complex was 

standing down after 21 days of around-the-clock operation. Lt. Joe Leonard of the 

US Coast Guard, who led the operation, said, ‘‘Our success is directly attributable 

to the strong personal relationships developed long before the Hurricane in Louisiana.’’ 

Many members of the Hurricane Katrina Houston Response Unified Command 

staff first worked as a team during the Tropical Storm Allison disaster that hit our 

community in June 2001. We learned a lot from responding to this disaster and 

then rebuilding our own community. We also developed those relationships over 

time by developing a coordinated emergency preparedness and response plan and 

then having serious and frequent training exercises to enable us to work the plan 

when incidents occur. These relationships were absolutely critical to the success of 

our mission. 

Developing and working a plan requires complete communication, coordination, 

cooperation, and even friendships between emergency managers and professionals 

at all levels of government. 

I urge Congress to continue to provide adequate funding to assist the funding provided by state and local governments as well as to provide incentives for thorough 

training and exercises for further improvements to the NRP. Lee Trevino, the great 

golfer, said it best, ‘‘The more you practice the luckier you get.’’

Based upon the risks facing a community, preparedness is ultimately defined differently in different areas of the country. Local leaders must determine the level of 

faith that their constituency have in their emergency response plan and improve it 

until citizens will follow the plan with the highest degree of confidence when an 

emergency arises. 

The current model of the NRP with uniform standards for training, equipment, 

and procedures among state and local governments can continue to work well. As 

more counties and municipalities operate under that plan and our capabilities increase over jurisdictional lines, first responders from Harris County could go to Florida or California or any other area of the country or first responder could come help 

us if we need it. The more interoperable our equipment is and the more common 

training we have the better our capability will be to respond under the NRP. 

We began housing evacuees in the Reliant Astrodome. It became apparent as the 

population grew that we could not safely house all of the evacuees that we expected 

in the Astrodome. The City of Houston’s fire marshal ordered us to cap the evacuee 

population in the Astrodome at 8,000. Houston’s mayor overrode his fire marshal 

and authorized up to 12,000 evacuees. Eventually the population inside the Astrodome would reach 17,500. As additional evacuees came in we included the Reliant 

Arena that housed 4,500 evacuees, while 2,300 were housed in the Reliant Center. 

The City of Houston opened the George R. Brown Convention Center downtown in 

order to handle 2,800 more. 

Evacuees received hot meals and plenty of liquids and were able to sleep on cots 

with blankets and pillows. They were given comfort packages that included basic 

toiletry needs and, importantly, they were able to take a hot shower for the first 

time in several days. They were comforted by volunteers and were able for the first 

time to begin to have a feeling that they were finally in a secure location. 

Not everything went as smoothly as I would have liked, but we were able to 

quickly adapt. Emergency planning coordinators in our Homeland Security & Emergency Management division had to learn on the fly what worked and what didn’t 

work. Our plan was evolving continuously. Our Unified Command and the Joint Information Center allowed us to reach decisions more easily and to communicate 

changes and adaptations more quickly. We arranged communications between evacuees not only within our compound, but also in the various centers around the coun-
71

try to expedite reunification of families. We accomplished this by establishing television viewing areas, telephone service areas, and Internet service areas. We also 

worked with airlines and bus companies to arrange tickets for travel to help families 

reunite. 

Because the county is the landlord of the Reliant Park Complex and we have an 

ongoing relationship with SMG Management who manages the complex, we were 

able to get the lights and air conditioning turned on immediately so we could began 

operations. The management team, with security assistance provided by CSC, was 

able to prepare various buildings within the complex and secure sensitive areas. 

Aramark, who already had the concession contract for the complex to provide food 

service, hired an additional 800 food service professionals in order to prepare meals 

to feed the masses when they arrived. We began food service on September 1 and 

continued until the mission was completed, having served some 450,000 meals.

Other County Departments Response to the Katrina Disaster 

This was truly an all county effort, and most of our county departments participated in the relief operation by assisting evacuees directly or supporting those that 

did. We are still assessing the expenses that were incurred and will know the extent 

of the reimbursement we will be seeking, but our estimates total more than $1 million for these departments in just the first two weeks of the operation. 

• Children’s Assessment Center—This agency supported the mental health 

needs of children at the Reliant Complex. Expenses include salaries, contract 

therapists and supplies. 

• Commissioners Precincts—Commissioner Pct .1, El Franco Lee; Commissioner Pct. 2, Sylvia Garcia; Commissioner Pct. 3, Steve Radack; and Commissioner Pct. 4, Jerry Eversole provided buses for various purposes including medical transport and taking individuals from shelters to other temporary housing. 

Pct. 1 supported various community-based shelter operations and also opened 

and operates two temporary shelters for evacuees having their own transportation. 

• Constables—All Constable Precincts provided security and related services 

for shelter operations that were not at the Reliant Park Complex. 

• County Attorney, Mike Stafford—Advised various agencies and officials on 

legal matters related to the operation. 

• County Library—The library system made computers available primarily 

for Internet access for evacuees seeking assistance and locating lost relatives. 

The library also provided library services to evacuees at the Reliant Center. 

• District Clerk, Charles Bacarisse—Assisted child support activities for evacuees by helping them get child support payments forwarded to the right location. 

• Domestic Relations—The Family Court Services Division has provided 

mental health assistance at the Reliant complex in partnership with Youth and 

Family Services. 

• Fire and Emergency Service—Provided fire protection services and fire 

prevention advice related to shelter operations. The Harris County Fire Marshal’s office was part of the operation command staff. 

• Hospital District—Our medical teams administered 10,000 tetanus shots 

and other inoculations as well as filling more than 15,000 prescriptions. The 

2,700 volunteer doctors and other medical professionals examined some 15,000 

patients in the Reliant Park Complex and another 10,000 at the George R. 

Brown Convention Center. 

• Housing and Community Development—Provided food, temporary shelter 

and related services to evacuees. 

• Information Technology Center—Provided support for computer and communications for shelter operations. 

• Juvenile Probation—95 staff members provided services for juveniles in the 

shelter effort 

• Medical Examiner—Provided services related to deceased evacuees. 

• Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management—Initially 

established operations and continued support service for incident command. 

• Protective Services for Children and Adults—Thirty of our clinical staff 

provided mental health and other social services at the Reliant Park Complex. 

• Public Health and Environmental Services—The Executive Director of 

HCPHES coordinated all medical operations conducted at the Reliant Park 

Complex. An additional 500 HCPHES staff performed approximately 15,000 

Katrina-related hours of service for many critical duties at the Reliant Park 

Complex around the clock. 
72

• Sheriff, Tommy Thomas—Coordinated security and provided law enforcement protection for the Reliant Park Complex. 

• Social Services—Provided transportation to and from the shelters at the Reliant Park Complex to the Harris County Housing Authority at Lantern Point 

for voucher applicants and then transported applicants to housing developments 

around the county. 

• Tax Assessor Collector, Paul Bettencourt—Provided personnel to the emergency management center, the County Judge’s office, the joint information center and other operations so service levels could be maintained. 

• Youth and Family Services Division—was a first responder to the social 

and emotional needs of Katrina victims evacuated to the Reliant Park Complex.

The Role of the Harris County Citizen Corps 

After the September 11 terrorist attack, President Bush called upon all Americans 

to dedicate at least two years of their lives—the equivalent of 4,000 hours—in service to others. He launched the USA Freedom Corps initiative to inspire and enable 

all Americans to find ways to serve their community and country. The Citizen Corps 

is a component of the Freedom Corps. In August 2002, I launched the Harris County Citizen Corps to create opportunities for individuals to volunteer to help their 

neighborhoods prepare for and respond to emergencies by bringing together local 

leaders, citizen volunteers, and the network of first responder organizations, such 

as fire and police departments. I believe the Citizen Corps is an integral part of our 

participation in the NRP and it allows us to respond to our own needs much quicker 

than could ever be possible under a Federal response. 

The Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) Program is a subset of the 

Citizen Corps. This program educates people about disaster preparedness and trains 

them in basic disaster response skills such as fire safety, light search and rescue, 

and disaster medical operations. Using their training, CERT members can assist 

others in their neighborhood or workplace following an event and can take a more 

active role in preparing their community. 

The program is administered by the US Department of Homeland Security as part 

of the National Response Plan for community preparedness. It was the Citizen 

Corps with some 7,000 volunteers, including more than 1,200 CERT members, that 

made our relief efforts possible. Our volunteers came from all walks of life and disciplinary backgrounds. They were organized, trained, and had already volunteered 

collectively more than 200,000 hours of community service. 

We realized that we were going to need at least as many, if not more, volunteers 

than the number of evacuees we were going to shelter. Estimates were enormous 

not only for Harris County but for the entire State of Texas. When the initial email was sent out to the Citizen Corps seeking volunteers at about 9:00 a.m. on August 31, we were overjoyed when we had 1,000 volunteers in the first hour and more 

coming in continuously. 

I can assure you that without these volunteers and tens of thousands more who 

came forward through the organization of Citizens Corps, we could not have responded to the disaster as we did. Volunteers were organized into teams, and the 

newly recruited volunteers were given orientation upon arrival and then assignments in all areas of service to the evacuees. I am particularly proud to report that 

our citizens in Harris County acted with courage, compassion, and unity. We had 

more than 60,000 volunteers come forward, and they were absolutely essential to 

the success of this operation. 

I have spoken to many volunteers who said that they experienced something during this operation that brought personal rewards far beyond their expectations. 

They accomplished the near impossible with kindness and compassion in a situation 

unparalleled in anyone’s experience. In the future I envision taking our Citizen 

Corps and CERT members to the next level by organizing them within many more 

neighborhoods so they are capable of being truly the first responders to an incident, 

while they await the arrival of professional first responders. In the role of neighbor 

helping neighbor, our CERT members and Citizen Corps volunteers will be able to 

communicate with incident command regarding situation reports on the ground and 

be prepared to assist neighbors who need help. I can see the Citizen Corps volunteers being able to assess the capabilities and needs of their neighbors in the event 

of a needed evacuation and being able to communicate those needs to the incident 

command to expedite evacuations more smoothly. A network like this could also provide a head-count and location of those who refuse to evacuate. 

I urge Congress to continue to provide the funding necessary to help us further 

develop our Citizen Corps, to develop Citizen Corps in more communities around the 

country, and to provide the funding for training of CERT members. Training and 

organization will be the key to our success. I would like to invite each of you to come 
73

to Harris County to see first hand how our Citizen Corps operates and to see where 

we are in our development and where we plan to be.

The Role of the Faith Based Community 

Organized through Houston’s Second Baptist Church (www.second.org) and its 

pastor, Dr. Ed Young, an interfaith ministry made up of a dozen denominations 

came together for Operation Compassion. Collectively they organized and provided 

Red Cross training for 43,500 additional volunteers. Of these, 17,300 volunteers 

served 109,613 meals in the George R. Brown Convention Center to the evacuees 

there. They also produced nearly 90,000 personal hygiene kits. 

Another organization, Interfaith Ministries of Greater Houston, (www.imgh.org) 

has organized a program called Neighbors 2 Neighbors 

(www.neighbors2neighbors.org), where volunteers are matched with evacuees who 

have found housing. Most of these people have no transportation, don’t know their 

neighborhoods or the city, and don’t know how to get their services started. The objective is to help them adjust to life in Harris County and their new surroundings. 

The Houston Area Pastors Council, Catholic Charities, and many other faith 

based organizations provided countless hours of service and opened their homes and 

places of worship to evacuees. This outpouring of volunteerism made it possible to 

serve evacuees at the Convention Center and to make them more comfortable as 

they worked through the process of seeking more permanent housing. This kind of 

community service through volunteerism is possible under the NRP and would be 

difficult to adequately coordinate without a coordinated local response. It may be too 

difficult to coordinate the level of volunteerism we realized in Harris County under 

a Federal response.

Corporate Community Giving 

Many Houston area corporations, from Fortune 500 to smaller regional companies, stepped into the forefront to support the Katrina relief effort. CenterPoint Energy provided IT support for the GRB Shelter operations, built showers for the 

George R. Brown Shelter, and helped start the transitional housing Task Force. Jim 

MacIngvale of Gallery Furniture provided the ‘‘Town Center’’ with recreational facilities from the YMCA for the Reliant Park shelters as well as thousands of cans 

of baby formula and other support. Tilman J. Fertitta of Landry’s Restaurants 

loaned helicopter support to supplement Houston Police Department aerial surveys. 

Continental Airlines offered air transport to reunite families. John Nau and Silver 

Eagle Distributing Co. provided thousands of cans of water for Katrina evacuees in 

Houston and in the Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama disaster zone. 

Maintaining support for a response infrastructure is difficult for local and state 

governments. For future events, the corporate community has business continuation 

plans and resources beyond those of local governments. Emergency preparedness is 

a high priority for the Houston area today, but that commitment could fall through 

the cracks as political leadership and priorities change. A ‘‘virtual organization’’ 

with a sustainable response capability could be built around the corporate community in Harris County and the greater Houston region. Future plans should include 

these community resources. Congress should look for ways to encourage corporate 

support for community preparedness.

Charitable Giving 

In addition to providing volunteers, faith based organizations, corporations and in- dividuals contributed more than $7 million to help Katrina victims. Those contributions made it possible to provide comfort to he victims and help them begin the long 

road of recovery. Houstonians and residents of Harris County brought, literally, 

mountains of clothes to help victims and brought toys and books for children. When 

volunteers got to know the victims better, they would bring some of their favorite 

things like cookies and other favorite dishes. 

Volunteers worked endless hours to help victims find family members and get information on the Red Cross and FEMA Debit Cards and other benefits. It was the 

volunteers and those who made contributions to Katrina victims who defined the 

character of our community, and I am overwhelmed with our spirit of caring and 

giving. 

City of Houston Mayor Bill White and I have established the Houston Katrina Relief Fund (www.houstonkatrinarelief.org) that will raise money to help evacuees and 

to transition them from shelters into the community.

Lessons Learned—Ways to Improve the National Response Plan

Pay for Regular Time for Reassigned Employees 

There are two strong disincentives for communities to accept evacuees that should 

be addressed and rectified. The typical disaster declaration will pay only for overtime for qualified first responders and other professionals. This is because the com-
74

munity where the disaster is declared would have normally paid the regular time 

of these workers and the overtime is extraordinary time caused by the disaster. In 

accommodating evacuees from another community our citizens had to forego the 

services of these qualified workers and yet pay for those services even though they 

were reassigned to serve the evacuee population. 

The Executive Director of the HCPHES demonstrated quite well what this means 

to our constituents. In a press release dated September 5, 2005 she informed the 

public that there would be delays in service while she and another 500 HCPHES 

professional staff members provided public health services to the evacuees at the 

Reliant Park Complex. She also advised the public that there would be a temporarily reduced staff at each of our five health clinics and that she anticipated there 

would be an increased number of individuals accessing the WIC program. She 

warned that residents who utilize our public health services may experience a 

longer than normal ‘‘wait-time’’ while staff responded to this relief effort, and she 

asked for patience while this inconvenience lasted. 

This concern applies not only to our public health workers, but also to all of our 

employees who participated in this operation. They were reassigned from normal 

duties, and those duties went unfulfilled, yet we still have to pay for that regular 

time. For example, the Harris County Sheriff’s Office incurred expenses for a little 

more than $1 million during the sheltering operation. Of that, about 80% or 

$800,000 was regular time that was paid by Harris County taxpayers even though 

these officers were not performing their regularly assigned duties. This is blatantly 

unfair to our citizens and is a serious disincentive to local governments to accept 

a request to host evacuees. 

I urge Congress and FEMA to recognize the need for an exception to existing policy and for Congress to provide sufficient funding to pay for regular time for reassigned workers. I hope that Congress and the Administration will recognize the fact 

that in this situation, Harris County’s response to Katrina, we acted more as a contractor for DHS under the National Response Plan and as such we should be fully 

compensated for our expenses in providing these services.

Pay for Lost Revenue from Cancelled Programs at Public Facilities 

It is also a strong disincentive for local governments to use their convention centers and other public facilities for evacuee shelters, because FEMA will not reimburse for lost income. Harris County, the City of Houston, and our enterprise funds 

lost millions of dollars in revenue that is needed to meet debt service schedules. Millions of dollars will be lost due to canceled events in the Reliant Park Complex and 

the George R. Brown Convention Center. Harris County’s convention center and 

sports venues are not supported by property or sales taxes. Our reimbursement 

schedules have been thrown off, and we may face penalties and additional interest. 

I urge Congress and FEMA to reimburse this loss of income.

Health Care 

At over $1 billion, Harris County’s single largest budget item is health care. The 

Houston region’s health care surge capacity is at its absolute limits. Louisiana, and 

to a lesser extent Alabama and Mississippi through the Katrina evacuees, as well 

as Beaumont, Port Arthur and east Texas through their Rita evacuees, have sent 

their most medically dependent to Houston. The ability to respond to a disaster depends on a robust system—and America does not have a robust health care 

system. 

The reasons are many and the subject of another hearing, but the Harris County 

Hospital District and the health care providers of our community were stressed before these disasters with high numbers of uninsured patients and uncompensated 

care. Some short term needs are addressed in my written remarks. In the long term, 

Katrina evacuees will continue to stress our overburdened system. A sustainable 

system to deal with long term needs and future disasters will require at least a 

statewide initiative and federal programs that support long term solutions.

Critical Infrastructure—

Critical infrastructure includes locally critical infrastructure, such as water, 

power, transportation and communications and nationally strategic infrastructure 

such as our refining and petrochemical complex which represents as much as 15% 

of the nation’s capacity. 

These local and national interests can coincide with each other. After Hurricane 

Rita, Baytown lost power to its water treatment and distribution system. It’s primary power supply was struck by lightning and its backup generator caught fire. 

This problem was well on its way to being solved, but they still had only four more 

days of water supply. It turned out that the pumps for the canal supplying 12 million gallons of water each day to Baytown had also lost their power supply in the 
75

hurricane. Upon further inquiry I learned that this canal supplied 80 million gallons 

a day to the ship channel refining industries for industrial processing as well. Without this process water, the refineries cannot produce gasoline for Maine, Connecticut, Michigan or California. This canal also supplies drinking water to Houston 

and other cities in the Houston area. The nation was faced with a possibility of a 

severe strain on refined petroleum production and over 600,000 people were faced 

with the loss of their primary water supply because of a power outage at a single 

pumping station. The problem appears to be resolved and appropriate federal agencies including the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security and the Corp of Engineers are all engaged. But the incident reinforces the need to identify potential single points of failure and build redundancy into systems. It also shows why a Member from the east coast should care about Houston’s requests for funds for security 

and resiliency in our critical infrastructure.

Evacuations and Transportation 

The gridlock in Texas during our evacuation in the face of Rita was unacceptable. 

My wife, Jet and our daughter, Kirby were caught in a traffic jam 20 miles long 

one hundred miles west of our home because a subcontractor did not get the memo 

to cancel a pavement overlay project. Precious hours were lost because of poor communications. The next day the construction was gone but the traffic jam was worse 

as conflicts as simple as a traffic light in a small town caused traffic to back up 

100 miles or more. 

The state plan had recently been updated and models showed that we could evacuate 1.2 million people from the coastal surge areas of Galveston, Brazoria and Harris Counties within 33 hours of a hurricane’s impact. What we did not anticipate 

was an additional 1.5 million people leaving the non-surge areas well in advance 

of the mandatory evacuation order for the coast. By the time we ordered the mandatory evacuation, the road system had ceased to function. 

Our medical examiner released a list of 31 people who died during the evacuation. 

Most had underlying medical conditions and it is not clear that they died as a result 

of the evacuation. However, these were the very people who most needed to evacuate the area to avoid the same result we saw in Louisiana where similar tragedies 

struck entire nursing homes. Any loss of life due to the stress of traffic congestion 

is tragic and our thoughts and prayers are with these families. 

In Texas, the evacuation occurs over long distances. Dallas is 220 miles from 

Houston, Austin 170 miles and San Antonio is 200 miles away. We will learn from 

Rita and build a better evacuation plan. 

And just as a robust health care system is necessary to successfully deal with a 

massive influx of patients from areas struck by disaster, so is a robust transportation system necessary to handle a mass evacuation. 

Louisiana’s initial evacuation prior to Hurricane Katrina reaching land went relatively smoothly, but less than half of those who needed to evacuate actually did. 

After the levees breached and evacuation entered its second phase, the faced similar 

problems to ours when the road capacity was diminished and the car count soared. 

Some evacuees from New Orleans spent 17 hours or more on busses to Houston 

after spending days on their roofs or standing on the side of the road or in the Superdome or Convention Center. Many had to stand the whole way and were sick 

from dehydration or exposure. 

Texas and the nation need support for the I–69 corridor, I–35 and I–45 running 

north from our coastal areas. Governor Rick Perry’s Trans Texas Corridor to finance 

new highway and rail capacity and our High Speed Rail coalition linking the East 

Coast through Atlanta and New Orleans with Beaumont, Houston, Dallas, Austin 

and San Antonio take on a whole new significance when we look at our experiences 

with Katrina. 

Interstate-10 which crosses our state and goes into New Orleans and on to Florida 

should be a priority corridor as well. These corridors are not only important for an 

evacuation every 10 years, but are critical to the economic vitality of the nation. 

They all serve America’s 2nd largest port in terms of total tonnage in Houston and 

link America’s major economic and population centers. Transportation infrastructure is vital to our nation’s economic health and critical to the success of the National Response Plan as well 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to thank you again for allowing me to discuss our experiences with the National Response Plan. I hope our 

experience can be helpful to other communities if they are called upon to respond 

to a disaster in this way. I hope those communities will benefit from the things that 

worked for us and that they can improve upon those things that did not. I also hope 

that Congress will not leave us out alone on the financial ledge and will be respon-
76

sive when we come back to tell you that we need reimbursement for Katrina and 

Rita related expenses.

Mr. POE. The county judge serves in Texas as what we would call 

the ‘‘county mayor’’ for Harris County, which is the fourth largest 

county in the United States. It includes Houston, Texas. 

We have also with us Sugar Land Mayor Dave Wallace. He and 

Judge Eckels were able to organize and plan the evacuation of Harris County and surrounding counties before Hurricane Rita hit and 

helped to bring about the orderly return of residents to the city 

after the hurricane passed. Over 2.5 million people evacuated from 

southeast Texas because of Rita. 

We also have with us one of my constituents, Councilman 

Audwin Samuel. He has been working with the mayor of Beaumont, Mayor Goodson, and they, working together, helped to evacuate the city of Beaumont. They worked with my office and FEMA 

and DOD to make sure that folks were able to get out of the city 

before Hurricane Rita hit. The city of Beaumont was very organized, and the city of Beaumont now has started to let residents 

return to that city. 

So I am glad that both of them are here today. I am glad they 

are able to come here to talk to you about their experiences and 

explain the important role of local government in the disaster management’s response. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KING. Thank you, Judge Poe. 

Let me again, at the outset, thank you for being here. All of us 

as Americans—no matter what part of the country we are from, we 

suffered with you. It is easy to suffer when you are thousands of 

miles away, but believe me, the hearts of America were with you. 

And also we are very thrilled, if you will, with the response of 

Texas, both of the government and the people, the way you really 

stood up and did everything that had to be done with Hurricane 

Rita. So I want to thank you for coming here today to share with 

us what you have learned, what you have done, and also what you 

have achieved and what lessons you can give us as far as the committee is concerned as we go forward and try to resolve this issue 

of federalism. 

So unless Congresswoman Christensen has any opening statement to make, I will ask Mayor Wallace if you would go first, and 

also welcome Mayor Samuel. Mayor Wallace, who again is the 

mayor of Sugar Land, Texas, but also testifying on behalf of the 

United States Conference of Mayors. 

Chairman KING. Mayor Wallace. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID G. WALLACE, MAYOR, 

CITY OF SUGAR LAND, TEXAS 

Mr. WALLACE. Thank you, Chairman King. As you indicated, I 

am Dave Wallace. The city of Sugar Land is in the southwest portion of the Houston region. The other gentleman testifying today is 

in the eastern portion of the city of Houston. 

And I am providing my comments here today, again, on behalf 

of the U.S. Conference of Mayors as a trustee and then also cochair 

of the Homeland Security Task Force, but also as a result of some 
77

comments, recent experiences on behalf of with Hurricane Katrina 

and also Hurricane Rita. 

I would like to focus on three particular areas today with my testimony. In all of these, I would like to start with the backdrop 

being the lessons learned as a result of Hurricane Allison in the 

Houston region. The entire region, the entire State, there were a 

number of lessons learned, a number of best practices that we were 

able to implement within our area, and so I do believe that we had 

a high level of preparedness. 

The first area I would like to talk about are issues on behalf of 

the U.S. Conference of Mayors, then move into the lessons learned 

with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and then move into what a 

broad group of cities are working with the Houston-Galveston Area 

Council on the creation of some regional logistic centers. On behalf 

of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, there are four issues I would like 

to start out discussing. 

The city of Sugar Land works very closely with the State of 

Texas in the chain of command. We work very closely in the flow 

of funds coming through the State, work quite effectively in the 

State of Texas. However, on behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, we continue to talk about enhanced direct funding, directly to 

the cities, because there are a number of cities, a number of States 

where we feel that that flow of funds can be improved. So on behalf 

of the Conference of Mayors we would like to find ways to speed 

that up. 

A second area—and we talked about this earlier this morning—

has to do with communication. We urge Congress to make expansion of the communications spectrum for public safety a congressional priority. 

The third area deals with enhanced transportation security. The 

U.S. Conference of Mayors supports advance notification of hazardous freight rail. We recognize that the manifest information for 

what is on these trains is very sensitive. We don’t want to see that 

manifest get into the hands of terrorists. 

At the same time, there are some commercial reasons. But nevertheless, Sugar Land is diligently working with Union Pacific to develop a pilot program for immediate disaster manifest notification. 

This notification model can be duplicated nationwide with the help 

of Congress and then other governors. 

The fourth issue is military involvement in disaster response and 

recovery. And the Federal Government does not currently provide 

911 related services, and I think the debate today is ‘‘Should they?’’ 

Now, the Federal Government has a tradition of involvement in 

certain disaster relief and hazardous response activities. The U.S. 

EPA, National Forest Service, Army Corps of Engineers, Coast 

Guard are the Federal agencies that more often than not coordinate activities with State and local agencies. More recently, the 

Stafford Act has broadened the military’s role in civil support, and 

the Insurrection Act allows the President to call forth troops during 

an insurrection or civil disturbance. Both of those issues were discussed earlier today. 

There are also events that require immediate military intervention and/or prestaging, such as weapons of mass destruction or 
78

other catastrophes, such as Katrina and Rita, where it was anticipated to overwhelm local and State response capabilities. 

The military can offer expertise in many areas that support disaster relief. Many of these are already included in my testimony. 

But the current legal paradigm is that the military is viewed as the 

resource of last resort deployed to restore order. 

Mayors favor a coordinated approach to deploying military and 

State assistance in response and recovery efforts. The role of first 

responders should always be filled by true first responders—the police, the fire fighters, the EMTs in our communities. 

Rather than confer lead agency status on the military, it would 

be helpful if the process that triggered Federal assistance were improved. Some of the lessons learned—I have got a number of lessons in my testimony; I am just going to cover three. One of them 

deals with the evacuation plan during Hurricane Rita. 

Again, there were a number of things that we have learned with 

Hurricane Allison. Many of those have been implemented. We can 

always continue to improve. And although the evacuation was successful and citizens of one of the Nation’s largest urban areas were 

moved to safety, there were some clear challenges. Many of those 

are listed in the testimony. 

Emergency plans proved inadequate for a disaster of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina; again, we heard that this morning. 

Despite the noble efforts of FEMA, Red Cross, faith communities, 

so many different organizations, I think many people were underprepared for the size and scope. 

And last, the general lessons learned: The mass evacuation and 

sheltering process that resulted from both hurricanes will provide 

a template for revision of plans for weapons of mass destruction 

and other events that may result in mass population relocation. 

Both events require seamless Federal, State and local coordination, 

and regional coordination proved invaluable in these incident experiences; and it is the regional approach that I would like to close 

with. 

This deals with the city of Sugar Land and the Houston-Galveston Area Council that have worked for the last 2 years to create 

a mechanism to enhance local first responder capabilities for natural and terrorist disaster. A summary of this regional logistic center concept is included in my testimony. The idea behind the concept was to establish a mechanism that would pool the resources 

of cities to deal more effectively with first responder activities during a major catastrophe, in short, a prepositioning of a cache of 

equipment. 

Enhancing local first responder capabilities is necessary because 

the Federal Government cannot be expected to mount a substantial 

emergency response for a period of 72 to 120 hours after a natural 

disaster of the magnitude of Katrina, Rita or a weapon of mass destruction. This critical logistic capacity gap could be fulfilled by this 

regional logistic center, developed and managed under local authority. 

The House and Senate Homeland Security Appropriations Committees recently stated support for the idea in their conference 

committee report that, in part, I would like to read. It stated that 

‘‘The conferees encourage ODP to review the use of logistic centers 
79

to consolidate State and local assets, provide life cycle management 

and allow for rapid deployment during an incident and allow for 

the sharing of inventories across jurisdiction. We urge Congress to 

encourage the Office of Domestic Preparedness to proceed without 

delay the concept and use of logistic centers. We also urge Congress 

to provide the funding this year for a demonstration program to establish and make operable a regional logistics center in the United 

States.’’ 

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to be here. I have provided a complete summary of the testimony that I have given and 

I have submitted that for the record. Thank you. 

Chairman KING. Thank you Mayor Wallace. Without objection 

your full statement will be made part of the record. 

[The statement of Mr. Wallace follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID G. WALLACE

Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson and Committee Members, I want to 

thank you for allowing me to submit written testimony. I am David G. Wallace, 

Mayor of Sugar Land, Texas. Sugar Land is a city of 71,000 people within our city 

limits, and a further 45,000 people within Sugar Land’s Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, situated in the southwest portion of the Houston-Galveston area. 

My written comments cover three areas of concern about emergency preparedness, 

response and disaster recovery. These comments originate from my recent experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita and events in Sugar Land, as well as from 

my experience serving as Co-Chairman of The U.S. Conference of Mayors Homeland 

Security Task Force. 

The Conference of Mayors will be holding a special meeting of Mayors and local 

emergency management personnel the week of October 24, 2005 to share recent disaster response experiences and further refine our thoughts on emergency response 

policy and the federal-state-local intergovernmental partnership. 

These written comments delivered this morning will be focused on three key areas 

of disaster event concerns: 

1. Emergency response and management issues and priorities identified by The 

U.S. Conference of Mayors. 

2. Key ‘‘lessons-learned’’ at the local government level from the Katrina and 

Rita natural disaster events. 

3. What a broad group of cities/counties are doing in conjunction with the Houston-Galveston Area Council (H-GAC) to establish and implement a Regional Logistics Center (RLC) to build local capacity to deal effectively with the immediate needs of a community following natural or terrorist disasters.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES AND PRIORITIES 

BEING DEVELOPED BY THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS 

The U.S. Conference of Mayors identified a number of first responder issues that 

are critical to local government. Four of the most important issues are discussed 

herein.

1. First Responder Funding—A Better Distribution System is Needed: Since 

the early days after September 11, 2001, the nation’s mayors have expressed serious concern with the system for coordinating preparedness and response to both acts of terrorism and natural disasters. 

Many mayors have positive working relationships with state and federal partners, 

as I do, but there was a real concern from the beginning that a complex, federal 

distribution system which involved various approval levels for first responder resources and training would be slow and result in serious delays in funding reaching 

high-threat, high-risk population areas. 

Unfortunately, the many surveys our organization conducted proved this to be the 

case. Time and time again, our surveys showed that money was not reaching our 

cities quickly. Federal restrictions and rules made it very difficult to spend on what 

was needed most, such as limitations on the use of overtime. 

By raising concern on this issue through the release of our studies, we were able 

to get the support from President Bush and former Secretary Ridge to examine why 

money was ‘‘stuck’’ in many states. The special Department of Homeland Security 
80

task force created to work on this effort came up with a number of meaningful recommendations, some of which, like a waiver from the Cash Management Act, have 

been implemented for new funding, although not for previously appropriated funding. 

But major changes to the current system still have not been implemented. I know 

that this Committee has been very concerned with the issue of the first responder 

funding and has been championing a number of changes to the program, including 

more regionalization of efforts. The U.S. Conference of Mayors has continued to support the concept of direct funding, and we would like to make the following recommendations: 

• Congress should ensure the restrictions and rules that govern the distribution 

and use of federal homeland security funds, such as limiting the use of funds 

for overtime, do not adversely affect the ability of cities and local areas to protect citizens. 

• Authorizing legislation should ensure that the waiver of the Cash Management Act, that has been approved by Congress for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, 

is made permanent, and made retroactive for fiscal years prior to 2005

• Congress should work with the Conference of Mayors to make other refinements needed to the first responder program

2. Communications Spectrum for Public Safety: Local government continues to identify 

the limited access to communications spectrum as a major impediment to effective first responder interoperability and public safety efforts. 

• We urge Congress to make expansion of the communications spectrum for 

public safety a Congressional priority 

• Congress can support local first responders by passing legislation to establish 

a firm date for the transition of analog broadcast to digital—hopefully by no 

later than December 31, 2006

• This is needed to avoid the dangerous congestion on existing voice channels 

that we experience today 

• It is essential to have this public safety access to enable deployment of advanced mobile technologies such as images and video to police and fire fighters 

in the field

3. Enhanced Transportation Security: This is an area characterized more by neglect than 

the development of thoughtful policy. 

• The recently adopted Homeland Security Appropriations bill includes only 

$150 million to protect a transportation system that generated over 9.6 billion 

trips in 2004

• Similarly, the potential for disaster with commercial rail freight is substantial 

• Sugar Land joined many Mayors in discussions concerning public safety 

and rail freight 

• The U.S. Conference of Mayors supports advance notification for hazardous freight rail. Mayors recognize that there are sensitive issues that 

need to be addressed, such as concern that terrorists might also mistakenly 

gain access to such information, and the freight rail carriers are apprehensive about sharing their client’s proprietary commercial information. We 

want to work with Congress and the Administration to address these issues 

so a system of advance notification can be implemented 

• Sugar Land is diligently working with the rail companies to develop a Pilot 

Program for Immediate Disaster/Manifest Notification 

• The process is such that if a derailment occurs in Sugar Land, a single phone 

call from our EOC/First Responders to the Dispatch Department for Union Pacific in Omaha, Nebraska would trigger an immediate and comprehensive manifest, by rail car number, to all the first responders dealing with the situation 

• This notification model can be duplicated nation-wide with help from Congress and the Governors

4. Military Involvement in Disaster Response and Recovery: The federal government, and more specifically the Department of Defense and the armed forces, does not currently provide 

9–1–1 related services, but should it? And, should federal authorities be given broader authority to be designated the lead agency in disaster response activities? 

The federal government has a tradition of involvement in certain disaster relief 

and hazardous response activities. To name a few, for example, the US EPA is the 

lead federal agency for hazardous and toxic substance response and clean-up. The 

National Forest Service has traditionally been the agency that addresses catastrophic forest fires. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers often participates in flood 

control activities at the local level. The U.S. Coast Guard has direct jurisdiction over 

disasters in ports and harbors. The federal agencies, in some of these circumstances, 
81

takes a lead role but more often than not, coordinates activities with state and local 

government agencies. 

The use of military armed forces to support civilian response, however, is conditioned by certain legal restrictions that define their possible activities. The military 

is precluded, except under certain circumstances, from conducting law enforcement 

operations in civilian setting under the Posse Comitatus Act. Posse Comitatus 

means ‘‘power of the county,’’ and is derived from the old west days of the sheriff 

having authority to raise a posse to pursue outlaws. 

More recently, the Stafford Act has broadened the military’s role in civil support. 

Under the Stafford Act, the military may engage in: 

• Debris removal and road clearance 

• Search and rescue (EMS) 

• Sheltering and feeding 

• Public information 

• Providing advice to local government on disaster and health/safety issues 

Under the Stafford Act the military may not engage in: 

• Traffic control 

• Security at non-federal facilities 

• Patrolling civilian neighborhoods except to provide humanitarian relief 

The Stafford Act requires the local government to make an assessment and declaration that local resources have been overwhelmed. The state must then make an 

assessment that state resources have been overwhelmed. The federal government 

may then take action and send resources. This time consuming process is frequently 

circumvented and informal calls are placed to state and federal agencies to activate 

resources while the declarations are processed. 

The Insurrection Act allows the President to call forth troops during an insurrection or civil disturbance. The Department of Defense Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civilian Disturbances, permits the military to intercede in local events 

without a Presidential Order. The Directive may be invoked if duly constituted authorities are unable to control the situation and circumstances preclude obtaining 

a Presidential Order, and the military action will prevent human suffering, save 

lives and/or mitigate great property damage. 

There are events of a certain nature that require immediate military intervention 

and/or pre-staging. For example: 

• The detonation of a nuclear device, such as a suitcase nuclear device, would 

be expected to render the local and state government incapable of mounting 

adequate disaster response 

• Widespread biological attack or disease outbreak would require national command and control measures be implemented 

• Mega catastrophes such as Katrina and Rita that could be reasonably anticipated to overwhelm local and state response capabilities

The military can offer expertise in many areas that support disaster relief: 

• Ability to mobilize large numbers of self-sufficient personnel 

• Advanced logistical operations support 

• Experience with command and control methodologies just now being implemented at the local level via NIMs 

• Capability to provide mass feeding, water, shelters and other support to disaster victims 

• Easily move across political boundaries 

• Provide specialized equipment and trained personnel to address incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) 

agents 

• Re-establish critical infrastructure including communications and mass care

The military does not routinely provide the following response and relief efforts: 

• Urban search and rescue 

• Firefighting 

• Civilian law enforcement duties (e.g., patrols, arrest, seizure) 

The military’s primary role is the provision of national defense and security. 

There is a natural question that arises—what impact would deployment of forces 

to overseas conflicts have on their availability to support disaster response. Furthermore, if local/state disaster response plans rely too heavily on the military does their 

mobilization for defense and national security leave local and state emergency plans 

vulnerable? It should be pointed out that terrorist DO NOT act at a time and place 

that is convenient to our national security. For example, if our military has resources deployed in foreign land fighting a war on terrorism, and a natural disaster 

occurs in the domestic USA that requires a significant deployment of military per-
82

sonnel and equipment, one should be prepared for a terrorist to plan an attack on 

assets in a more geographically vulnerable and less protected area. 

The current legal paradigm is that the military is viewed as the ‘‘resource of last 

resort’’ deployed to restore order. Because of the sheer magnitude of the hurricane 

events recently experienced, and because acts of terrorism may spring up during or 

in the wake of such natural disasters, it is natural that there is a discussion about 

the military in disaster response. 

Mayors favor a coordinated approach to deploying military and state assistance 

in response and recovery efforts. The role of first responder should always be filled 

by true first responders—the police, fire fighters, and EMTs in our communities. 

Rather than confer lead agency status on the military it would be helpful if the 

processes that trigger federal assistance were improved. 

Virtually every municipality has entered into ‘‘mutual aid’’ or ‘‘inter-local’’ agreements for first responder activities, debris removal, etc. However, as was seen with 

hurricanes Katrina and Rita, such agreements were rendered useless as ALL municipalities in the respective target region required full deployment of their personnel and assets. What should be explored is the ability of municipalities to enter 

into such ‘‘mutual aid’’ agreements with other cities/metro areas with geographic 

dispersion to enable regions to provide ‘‘real time’’ assistance and aid to the target 

region. 

Under the leadership of the co-chairman if the Homeland Security Task Force of 

the U.S. Conference of Mayors, Baltimore mayor Martin O’Malley is looking to formalize ‘‘inter-metropolitan’’ agreements with many of our member mayors and their 

cities. The U.S. Conference of Mayors is currently researching the benefits and 

logistical/legal issues surrounding such ‘‘inter-metropolitan’’ agreements. Nevertheless, a rough draft of the pertinent language of such agreement can be found attached hereto in Exhibit ‘‘A.’’ 

Clearly, the military should always be focused on fighting wars and winning 

peace. And the primary focus of Congress should be to help local first responders 

develop military like logistics capabilities to address the immediate needs of both 

natural and man-made disasters. 

KEY ‘‘LESSONS-LEARNED’’ AT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL FROM 

THE KATRINA AND RITA NATURAL DISASTER EVENTS 

The second area of testimony is derived from first-hand experience involving evacuation efforts related to hurricane Rita, and relief efforts for hurricane Katrina 

evacuees in the Houston-Sugar Land area.

1. Reverse Nine-One-One: Communicating with the Public During Hurricane Rita: Reverse nine-one-one is, simply stated, instead of citizens calling in to report an emergency, 

local government sends calls out to the citizens. In the case of hurricane Rita, Sugar Land arranged to 

have its contract 9–1–1 auto-dialer service send a taped message to its residents to encourage evacuation 

for those having medical or physical disabilities/impairments. This turned out to be not only partially effective, but also counterproductive to some extent. 

• It was determined that the contract ‘‘Reverse 9-1-1’’ service provider was also 

used by numerous cities, counties, etc. in the H–GAC area 

• The auto-dialer services were inundated by a myriad of city and county agencies sending similar messages 

• The queue of calls was so long that when Sugar Land placed its 12:00 Noon 

order for the call, it fell behind over 750,000 other ‘‘reverse 9-1-1’’ calls, and the 

‘‘emergency message’’ was not received by our residents until 8:00 to 9:00 PM, 

a full eight to nine hours later 

• Inasmuch as the weather patterns adjusted materially during such an eight 

to nine hours period, it is counter-productive to have the auto-dialer message 

sent out after the decision is made to halt the evacuation encouragement, and 

to suggest residents to shelter-in-place 

• Now the obvious response to this dilemma is to contract with numerous autodialer services to increase the rate of calls per minute.

2. Limited Evacuation Transportation Service Provider Capacity- Hurricane Rita: Many hospitals, nursing homes, hospices and other health care institutions housing or treating disabled patients have established contracts with emergency evacuation transportation service providers. 

Yet, many of these institutions found themselves waiting for services that came late or did not come at 

all. 

• When the list of emergency transportation service providers was examined it 

became clear that the overall list was relatively limited in the immediate region 
83

• It also became clear that the service providers had sufficient vehicles and personnel for limited evacuations, yet were ‘‘oversubscribed’’ in the case of a major 

disaster event where several institutions would be affected 

• The lesson-learned is to educate institutional consumers about contracting arrangements that go beyond the small-scale local evacuation need situations and 

ensure redundant capabilities 

• Where institutions are responsible for evacuating clients or patients, they 

should ask service providers to disclose their other client demands in a largescale disaster event

3. Evacuation Plan Lacking in Hurricane Rita: The decision to evacuate residents 

when hurricane Rita was about to hit land in the Texas gulf area was made by local governments, who 

have the responsibility for deciding what is best for their jurisdictions, and was led by Houston/Harris County. Although the evacuation was successful and the citizens of one of the nation’s largest urban areas 

were moved to safety, there were some clear challenges. • The regional evacuation plan had not been fully adopted by all affected local 

jurisdictions. 

• Police in small towns along the evacuation route were not as coordinated as 

possible in order to move traffic through their jurisdictions (i.e., a red light in 

Giddings, TX literally backed-up traffic to Brenham, TX.) 

• Construction on major highway routes caused immediate traffic problems • There were shortages of food, water and fuel supply on major evacuation 

routes. 

• These were all very important lessons learned in Texas from the Hurricane 

Rita evacuation, and I am confident these lessons will lead to immediate improvements in our ability to evacuate citizens during an emergency.

4. Media Coverage and Public Perception Exacerbated the Situation: Local 

government often relies on the media to help in emergency situations, but in the case of hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita, the massive media coverage ended up confusing the public. • Recent video and print media images of devastation along the Gulf Coast 

fueled the public’s perception of danger, resulting in an urge to flee the region 

ahead of the storm. This resulted in evacuation of areas in the region that are 

not normally required to evacuate during a hurricane 

• The media coverage presented dramatic predictions of widespread destruction 

resulting from a Category 5 hurricane thereby reinforcing the public’s urge to 

flee 

• Future calls for evacuation are likely to be met with skepticism and reluctance on the part of the public 

• The lesson-learned is that local government should re-evaluate the regional 

evacuation plan and continue to develop and improve a coordinated public education plan to ease public concern over the evacuation process

5. Hurricane Response and Recovery Issues—Hurricane Katrina: The state of 

Texas, in its efforts to provide care and compassion to its Gulf Coast Neighbors, offered to accept hurricane 

Katrina evacuees. Because of the emergency, ‘‘life saving’’ requirements, state and local officials were 

forced to make many decisions based on out-dated or incomplete information from federal partners, including FEMA, as well as the Red Cross. With better information, we could have adequately assessed the impact 

a sudden influx of people would have on local governments. 

• Inaccurate or insufficient information lead to adjustments in the normal procurement process, which may result in an inability of municipalities to obtain 

reimbursement for response, care and recovery expenditures 

• This may affect local government budgets and liquidity, and could adversely 

affect the business economics of vendors who came to the aid of the evacuees 

• If this is not dealt with fairly, and if new policies and procedures are not 

adopted to reflect such situations, then it may have a chilling affect on municipal mutual aid and disaster response efforts in the future.

6. Emergency Plans Proved Inadequate for a Disaster of the Magnitude of 

Hurricane Katrina: The events surrounding Katrina overwhelmed affected local governments, states 

and federal response agencies. 

• Notwithstanding the required time frames to mobilize personnel and equipment, FEMA appeared to be under-prepared for an incident of this magnitude 

• The Red Cross was overwhelmed with requests for shelters and could not 

staff or operate the number of shelters required in outlying areas 

• The efforts of good Samaritans (faith communities, service organizations, and 

other groups) were key to supporting evacuee needs. However, at times the effort was fragmented and lacked coordination 

• The lesson-learned was that disasters of great magnitude quickly overwhelm 

affected local governments, states and federal response agencies. Emergency 
84

plans and various assumptions contained in those plans must be examined for 

accuracy, adequacy, and be modified to address disasters of great magnitude.

7. General Lessons-Learned from the Hurricane Katrina and Rita Incidents: The mass evacuation and sheltering process that resulted from both hurricanes will provide a 

template for revision of plans needed to address bioterrorism, radiological dispersal devices, nuclear, and 

other events that may result in mass population relocation. Both events required seamless federal, state 

and local coordination. Regional coordination proved invaluable in these incident experiences. Working with 

the state, the region should move forward with the development and adoption of regional based emergency 

response plans. In fact, the state of Texas has performed such research and has previously developed a 

regional proposed plan for deployment of personnel and equipment in twelve pre-selected regions of the 

state (See Exhibit ‘‘B’’). 

THE HOUSTON-GALVESTON AREA COUNCIL—REGIONAL LOGISTICS 

CENTER (RLC) MODEL: BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY TO DEAL 

EFFECTIVELY WITH NATURAL AND TERRORIST DISASTERS 

Sugar Land and the Houston-Galveston Area Council (H–GAC) communities have 

worked for the last two years on developing a mechanism to enhance local first responder capabilities for natural and terrorist disaster events. The mechanism is referred to as a Regional Logistics Center (RLC). The H–GAC communities adopted 

a resolution in 2004 (See Exhibit ‘‘C’’ for the unanimously H–GAC Board approved 

concept) to support the establishment of an ‘‘all-hazards’’ logistics center that would 

service the region in a disaster event. Sugar Land and H–GAC convened a local/

regional government Summit in October 2004 to further develop the concept, and 

it garnered considerable political support. 

The idea behind the concept was to establish a mechanism that would pool the 

resources of cities to deal more effectively with first responder activities during a 

major catastrophe. While individual communities are adding to their disaster supplies and equipment inventories with homeland security federal financial assistance 

granted from Washington through the states, the scattered state of supplies and 

equipment, as well as the lack of military-like logistics support make their coordinated application less likely to be efficient and effective in the event of a major disaster. The RLC approach remedies that shortcoming by pooling some of those emergency response resources coupled with professional grade logistics management to 

a pre-positioned cache of equipment that is maintained and managed for a response 

ready deployment. 

Enhancing local first responder capabilities is necessary because the federal government can not be expected to mount a substantial emergency response for a period of 72 to 120 hours after a natural disaster of the magnitude of hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita, or in a WMD event where there is no warning. This is called the 

Critical Logistics Capacity Gap’’ period. This response Gap manifests itself in the time it 

takes to stage, transport and distribute life support commodities from sources outside the region. In the 

case of man-made terrorism events, this Gap extends to time required to assess the type of critical and 

sophisticated equipment needed for the identification, suppression and remediation. 

This Critical Logistics Capacity Gap could be fulfilled by Regional Logistics Centers developed and managed under local authority. An RLC or multiple RLCs would provide the metro region with 

the first responder supplies and equipment necessary to help the general population experiencing a major 

disaster during that critical 72 to 120 hours until state and federal relief can arrive on the scene to augment and replenish the local resources. The RLCs would continue to provide support for first responders 

during the post incident recovery period after state and federal aid arrives at the incident scene. 

The House and Senate Homeland Security Appropriations Committees recently 

stated support for the idea in their conference committee report. ‘‘The conferees 

note that there is no real-time exchange of information at the regional or 

interstate levels regarding equipment and supplies inventory, readiness, or 

the compatibility of equipment. The conferees encourage ODP to review the 

use of logistics centers to consolidate State and local assets, provide lifecycle management and maintenance of equipment, allow for easy identification and rapid deployment during an incident, and allow for the sharing of 

inventories across jurisdictions.’’ 

We urge Congress to encourage the Office for Domestic Preparedness in the 

Homeland Security Department to proceed without delay in reviewing the value and 

use of logistics centers. We also urge Congress to provide funding this year for a 

demonstration program to establish and make operable a number of Regional Logistics Centers in the Untied States. 
85

EXHIBIT ‘‘A’’ 

MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT 

WHEREAS, the cities of —————————— and —————————— (collectively the ‘‘parties’’) recognize the value and the potential need of assisting each 

other in the event of some emergency, and each city has personnel, equipment, and 

resources that could assist the other in an emergency, 

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows this ———— day of 

—————————————, 2005: 

1. In the event of an emergency as declared by the Mayor of one of the cities that 

is a party to this agreement, and upon the request of the Mayor of that city, the 

Mayor of the other city commits to send forthwith and without delay such public 

safety (fire and police), public works, transportation, and other personnel, equipment, and resources as may be of assistance to the city confronting an emergency. 

This obligation to provide assistance shall be subject to the right of any city sending 

resources to withhold resources to the extent necessary to provide reasonable protection for the safety and protection of its citizens. 

2. The city sending personnel, equipment, and resources to respond to an emergency in the other city agrees to bear the cost of its action pending the execution 

of any necessary contracts or other documents to seek reimbursement from any 

agency of the federal or state governments, including, without limitation, the Federal Emergency Management Administration, or any similar or counterpart state 

emergency management agency. The parties shall work together closely and cooperatively to obtain any federal or state reimbursement that may be available. In the 

event that reimbursement for some or all provided services is unavailable, the city 

sending personnel, equipment, and resources shall be entitled to request reimbursement from the other city and that city shall make a good faith effort to provide in 

a timely fashion reimbursement for all unreimbursed expenses. 

3. All personnel, equipment, and resources made available to a city confronting 

an emergency shall, while in the city confronting an emergency, operate under the 

command, control, and supervision of the appropriate responsible officials in the city 

confronting the emergency. 

4. Within 45 (forty-five) days of the parties’ execution of this mutual aid agreement, each city shall, to the extent necessary, modify or amend its respective emergency management plans to reflect the obligations set forth in this agreement. 

EXHIBIT ‘‘B’’

EXCERPT FROM STATE OF TEXAS REGIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAMS PRESENTATION TO THE 

GOVERNOR DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

Office of the Governor 

Synopsis: Establish Regional Incident Management Teams (IMT’s) to assist with command and control 

of large-scale terrorist attacks and/or natural/man-made disasters. The IMT’s will be comprised of fire, EMS, 

law enforcement, public works and public health professionals from multiple jurisdictions. Each team should 

have a minimum of 42 members for triple redundancy for each of the 14 positions. 

Summary: Establishing Regional (Type III) Incident Management Teams (IMT’s) will provide a cadre of 

highly trained, qualified, and experienced incident command officers and staff to support and complement 

the existing jurisdictional command staff during significant and long-term incidents. The IMT concept is 

applicable for managing any type of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) terrorist 

attack. This initiative is based on an ‘‘all-hazards’’ and unified command approach. As an added value, 

the regional IMT’s can provide command and control at natural and/or man-made disasters such as severe 

weather events (hurricane, floods, tornados, etc.), hazardous materials releases, civil unrest, public health 

emergencies, etc. The IMT concept is a national model and is utilized extensively for command and control 

of large-scale incidents under NIMS and Presidential Directive HSPD–5. 

The Regional IMT’s will be multi-disciplinary team comprised of approximately 42 

members from fire, emergency medical services, law enforcement, public works and 

public health professionals from the participating regional jurisdictions. This 42 person team allows for three deep in each of the 14 critical team positions. Each team 

member will be trained and certified in command and general staff or support positions. Regional IMT’s can be activated for local response through existing mutual 

aid agreements or by the DPS Disaster District Chairman. A full staffed team will 

entail approximately 14 positions (see slide). Individual Team staffing may vary as 

needed based on specific incident requirement. 
86

EXHIBIT ‘‘C’’

REGIONAL LOGISTICS CENTER CONCEPT (AS PRESENTED IN SEPTEMBER, 2004) 

The H–GAC region, through the leadership and cooperation of its local elected officials and first responder agencies, has made dramatic progress in enhancing homeland security preparedness, and the ability to respond to other hazards. Additional 

resources will continue to enhance local and regional capabilities. All Texas local jurisdictions continue to benefit from the Governor’s initiative and focus on homeland 

security, and an all hazards approach. 

These outstanding efforts and capabilities equip the region to meet many emergency response challenges. Some challenges, however, are inherently beyond the 

scope of even the best coordinated local efforts. Among those could be: a 9/11 magnitude terrorism event, multiple category 4 storms such as those that occurred in 

Florida, a major event in a remote location. Events of this type might quickly exhaust local resources, not only for specialized response equipment, but even for such 

common items as shovels or gloves. 

Critical supply needs for an unusually large or extreme emergency response event 

can be addressed through an Emergency Preparedness and Response Logistics Center, a ready store of equipment available if and when local stocks are in danger of 

being exhausted. Because the timing of a major event is unknown, as is the location, 

a public/private partnership could be developed to take advantage of capabilities already in existence in the military supply sector, and possibly access innovative financing, if necessary. 

Among the types of equipment that could be stocked in quantity at a logistics center are: • Specialized detection and metering equipment for radioactive and biological 

hazards. This equipment is expensive to acquire in quantity and must be calibrated and maintained. 

• Decontamination equipment and supplies in quantities for hundreds or thousands of persons. 

• Highly specialized and expensive equipment. • Basic tools and equipment to augment local resources and quickly replace 

local stocks as exhausted. 

The inventory of the prototype logistics center would be determined collaboratively through the efforts of appropriate officials of the Department of Homeland 

Security, State of Texas, local first responders and emergency managers. A process 

would be developed to allow agencies to quickly access logistics center stocks as 

needed. 

Next Steps 

• Obtain broad local government support for concept. 

• Develop support from State of Texas and Department of Homeland Security. 

• Request designated Federal authorization and appropriations. 

• Detail local plans and processes.

Chairman KING. And now Mayor Samuel, who is testifying not 

just on behalf of the city of Beaumont, but also on behalf of The 

National League of Cities. 

Mayor Samuel? 

STATEMENT OF HON. AUDWIN M. SAMUEL, MAYOR PRO TEM, 

CITY OF BEAUMONT, TEXAS 

Mr. SAMUEL. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member 

Thompson and members of the House Committee on Homeland Security for this opportunity to speak to you today. 

I am Audwin Samuel, Councilmember and Mayor Pro Tem of the 

city of Beaumont, Texas. I am pleased to testify on behalf of The 

National League of Cities. 

Our policy at The National League of Cities states that the local 

governments are the first levels of government to respond to most 

disasters and emergencies and must be regarded as the focal point 

of all disaster mitigation and recovery activities. Seamless integration with all levels of government is critical to prepare, respond 

and recover from natural or terrorist disaster. 
87

Beaumont, Texas, was exemplary in its planning and response to 

Hurricane Rita because there was a clear understanding of who 

was responsible, who had the authority to direct whom to do what. 

What Beaumont did correctly to evacuate over 300,000 individuals 

from our area, without the loss of life, was, we had plans under 

way for at least 4 days before Hurricane Rita made landfall. There 

were regular telephone conferences with key decision makers as 

well as Governor Perry’s office at least three times per day prior 

to the storm, during the storm and after the storm. 

Our command system went into effect with the county judge as 

the designated command chief. Affected industries were provided 

regular updates. A positive public-private sector relationship was 

critical. 

Entergy, the local utility company, provided necessary space for 

the repositioned command center when the storm veered on a more 

direct path toward Beaumont. They helped to provide generators 

when the Federal bureaucratic red tape frustrated our local officials. 

We had to consider the timing, the speed, the strength and the 

path of the storm, the evacuation of the special needs populations, 

the volume of traffic that we expected, and the unavailability of inland shelters already filled with evacuees from Katrina. 

Despite our careful planning, there were problems with our 

emergency communications systems. Local police, with their personal knowledge of our geographic layout of the city and the back 

roads had to be paired with other law enforcement agencies to 

serve as communication conduits to the State and other officials. 

Local and State first responders performed search and rescue of 

the community while the Federal officials established their staging 

site at Ford Park, which contained ice trucks, generators and other 

amenities. The city officials were upset to learn that the Federal 

officials at the staging site could not release the generators necessary to power up our city or the ice trucks to provide to our citizens until Washington approved the assessment process. In reply, 

our county judge made an executive decision to expend over 

$500,000 for generators. 

It became clear after the storm, that local authority was 

marginalized by the requirements out of Washington, not our regional command system or the Federal officials on the ground. 

Local governments must be prepared to be on their own for the 

first 48 to 72 hours before Federal assistance arrives to assist with 

a catastrophic event. Equally important, we need not a national, 

but a Federal homeland security response to catastrophic disasters. 

Here are seven National League of Cities recommendations to establish an effective, intergovernmental preparedness and response 

plan: 

One, Federal and State emergency management officials must 

work closely with and directly involve local officials in key decisions 

affecting Homeland Security, disaster preparedness, and response; 

Two, there must be adequate funding for local emergency preparedness, disaster planning, technical and regional training to 

allow the cities to tailor planning to the special circumstances and 

needs of their area; 
88

Third, Congress should adhere to the promise that was made in 

1997 to set December1, 2006, as a date certain for the broadcasters 

to vacate the spectrum by passing the Homeland Emergency Response Operations Act, H.R. 1646, which legislation is sponsored by 

Representatives Weldon and Harman, both esteemed members of 

this committee; 

Fourth, the Federal Government must also share information 

with local governments without jeopardizing national security. We 

should collect the data on the effects of disaster and the lessons 

learned from Katrina and Rita, then disseminate that analysis to 

aid State and local disaster related efforts; 

Fifth, the Federal Government should also provide assistance to 

State and local governments to help them conduct annual hazard 

and risk assessments to determine the vulnerability of particular 

areas or structures to disasters or terrorist acts based on historical 

and intelligence information. A unified, uniform emergency warning system should be developed to ensure that as people travel 

throughout the Nation, they will be informed of existing emergencies and advised how to respond; and 

Number seven and lastly, local governments should be supported 

in their efforts to encourage the public-private sectors to retrofit existing structures to reduce future losses from natural disasters, to 

locate new constructions outside of high-risk areas such as flood 

plains, coastal areas or near earthquake faults. 

In conclusion, Homeland Security is about relationships. Whether we are talking about responding to hurricanes or fires or the 

work of terrorists, clear delineation of responsibilities and trust are 

critical to deploying the response and recovery plan. Intergovernmental coordination will improve the preparedness and response to 

disasters and thereby mitigate the losses incurred, thus helping to 

maintain viable communities and an economically sound Nation. 

When we have a truly organized system to respond to emergencies, the Nation will realize a natural disaster does not have to 

be a national disaster. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee. 

May God bless each one of you, this committee and our great Nation. 

[The statement of Mr. Samuel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAYOR PRO TEM AUDWIN M. SAMUEL

Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson and members of the 

House Committee on Homeland Security for the opportunity to speak with you 

today. I am Audwin M. Samuel, Councilmember and Mayor pro tem of Beaumont, 

Texas. I am pleased to testify on behalf of the National League of Cities on ‘‘Federalism and Natural Disaster Response: Examining the Roles of Local, State, and 

Federal Agencies.’’ My remarks are based on my service as the Vice-chair of the 

Public Safety and Crime Prevention Policy and Advocacy Committee of the National 

League of Cities. Most importantly, I am also relying on my seventeen years as a 

council member in Beaumont, Texas—my beautiful city which recently experienced 

the fury of Hurricane Rita. 

The National League of Cities is the nation’s oldest and largest association representing municipal interests before the federal government—representing more 

than 135,000 locally elected officials in more than 18,000 cities of all sizes. Our largest member is New York City, NY with a population of 8 million and our smallest 

member is Vernon, CA with a population of 91. As the representative of the nation’s 

local leaders, the National League of Cities has a vital interest in clarifying the 

roles and responsibilities of local government and how the federal policies impact 
89

1The National Municipal Policy (NMP) contains the formally adopted positions taken by the 

organization on national issues. As a national membership organization, NLC focuses its policy 

positions on federal actions, programs, and proposals which directly impact municipalities. 

the stability of municipalities and their ability to deliver key services to America’s 

citizens and residents.

Beaumont, Hurricane Rita, and Intergovernmental Relationships: 

The National League of Cities (NLC) has adopted policy which states that ‘‘local 

governments are the first level of government to respond to most disasters and 

emergencies and must be regarded as the focal point of all disaster mitigation and 

recovery activities.’’ (2005 National Municipal Policy,1 § 6.01(A)) The highest priority 

of all levels of government in addressing disaster and terrorism issues should be 

prevention and mitigation. Mitigation saves lives and reduces injuries; reduces economic losses; maintains and protects critical infrastructure; and reduces the liability 

borne by local governments and elected officials. 

All in all, seamless integration with all levels of government is critical to prepare, 

respond, and recover from natural and terrorist disasters. The two most important 

questions that must be understood are: 

(1) Who is responsible for homeland security—whether natural or man-made? 

(2) Who has authority to tell whom to do what? 

Members of the Committee, Beaumont, TX was exemplary in its planning and response to Hurricane Rita because there was a clear understanding of who was responsible and who had authority. Plans were underway at least four days before 

Hurricane Rita made landfall in my city. As Mayor pro tem, I was among the city 

and county officials who joined Governor Perry’s office on regularly scheduled telephone conferences to discuss our incident management system. As the storm neared 

and a hurricane watch turned into a hurricane warning, the command system went 

into effect within the region. Specifically, the county judge, the designated command 

chief, took the helm and all the regional officials began to communicate and share 

their plans. 

There were three telephone conferences per day at 10:00 a.m., 3:00 p.m., and 

10:00 p.m. as of Tuesday before the storm. The regularly scheduled phone calls offered an excellent opportunity for everyone to familiarize themselves with the key 

decision makers—which included the surrounding mayors, county judge, state officials, Coast Guard, and the principle first responders. The command team received 

updates regarding the storm’s track and intensity, estimated time for landfall, and 

the location for the pre-positioning of the necessary emergency and response equipment. The affected industries and their representatives, although not part of the 

telephone conferences, were provided regular updates since the refineries in the 

area need advance notice to shut down. 

Direct communication among the regional command center continued as the storm 

intensified. When the storm veered more directly toward Beaumont, the regional 

command center was forced to relocate inland. Entergy, the local utility company, 

graciously provided the necessary space for the repositioned command center—a 

true public/private partnership. 

At 6:00 a.m. on Thursday, the county judge called for a mandatory evacuation of 

the southernmost part of the county, Sabine Pass, and then Port Arthur, the midcounty cities, then Beaumont at noon. The decision for mandatory evacuation came 

after many post-conference call breakout sessions. Let me state clearly, that the decision regarding evacuation rested with the county judge—the incident command 

chief who took into consideration the input of the area mayors. There were many 

discussions regarding the timing, speed, strength, and path of the storm before the 

mandatory evacuation was declared. Local officials also engaged in planning for the 

evacuation of vulnerable population by coordinating with the Coast Guard and other 

key players to airlift those with compromised health. 

Local officials were also in constant communication with the Department of Public 

Safety (state police) and county sheriff regarding how to deploy the evacuation. The 

volume of the traffic from the previous evacuations of Galveston, Chambers, and 

Harris Counties and the unavailability of inland shelters posed a great problem. 

Evacuees from Katrina were housed in the designated shelter areas which were 

about 70 to 80 miles from Beaumont. This forced many seeking shelter to have to 

drive 200 to 600 miles to find the next available shelters. Once the evacuation was 

in effect, the state played a more prominent role because of the use of state highways and traffic concerns. 

As the stormed intensified on Friday night and unleashed its fury on Saturday, 

the city was deserted. The regional command system remained in place, nevertheless. Devastation and darkness greeted me when I returned from Dallas late Satur-
90

day evening. A typical four-hour ride took seven hours because of the lack of gasoline along the interstate and the need to rely on secondary roads. The Coast Guard 

and some key FEMA officials (without their teams) were on hand. 

I was struck to learn, however, that despite our careful planning there were problems with our emergency communication systems. As the state police prevented people from reentering the city, their units had to be coupled with a Beaumont police 

or county sheriff because their communication system was not interoperable. The 

residents’ return home was prevented by downed power lines, uprooted trees and 

other damage. Local police, with personal knowledge of the geographic layout of the 

city and back roads, had to be paired with other law enforcement agencies to serve 

as communication conduits to the state and other officials. 

Local and state first responders performed search and rescue of the community 

while the federal officials established their staging site at Ford Park coliseum center, earlier used as the Katrina command operation center and evacuee site. The 

staging site contained ice trucks, generators, and other amenities needed to alleviate 

the plight of residents. The city hall, police stations and hospitals were without 

power and there was significant flooding near the underpasses of the highway. City 

officials were upset to learn that federal officials at the staging site could not release 

the generators necessary to power-up the city or ice trucks until Washington, D.C. 

approved the ‘‘assessment process.’’ Local officials who helped to pre-position the 

equipment before the storm had to, in some reported instances, put in new requests 

for generators. After the storm, however, local authority was marginalized by the 

requirement that Washington, D.C.—not the regional command system or federal officials on the ground—act as the final decision makers. 

The public’s frustration grew considerably on Sunday and Monday as they weathered the Texas heat without power, while generators and ice stayed in the trucks 

awaiting approval by Washington, D.C. In reply, the Jefferson County Judge, where 

Beaumont is located, made the executive decision to expend over $500,000 for generators. The local utility company, Entergy, also helped to provide generators. 

As our recent experience with Rita indicate, a clear understanding of who is responsible and who has authority to do what is key to an effective intergovernmental 

response. In our case, federal bureaucratic red tape prevented the county judge, who 

was the designated command chief, from making the decisions on the ground necessary to mobilize needed supplies.

Recommendations to Improve Intergovernmental Coordination 

Based on my Hurricane Rita pre-planning and recovery experience, I am now convinced more than ever that the local governments should be prepared to be ‘‘on their 

own’’ for the first 48 to 72 hours before federal assistance arrives to assist with a 

catastrophic event. Equally important, we need a national, not federal homeland security response to catastrophic disasters. Only a national effort will ensure that all 

levels of government participate in the disaster planning and recovery as full and 

equal partners. Listed below are the National League of Cities’ recommendations to 

establish an effective national preparedness and response plan: 

(1) An effective system must be developed to ensure that federal and state 

emergency management officials conduct substantive consultations with local officials to make key decisions affecting homeland security, disaster preparedness 

and response at the local level. NLC embraces efforts to develop a comprehensive national homeland security and disaster preparedness strategy because the 

likelihood of natural disasters and the potential for hazardous or radioactive 

material spills, pipeline accidents, large scale social disorders, and domestic and 

international terrorism require that all levels of government coordinate efforts 

to protect communities. This is why NLC has strongly urged that the Department of Homeland Security continue to have a central office for coordinating 

local and state domestic preparedness activities. Regional plans and cooperation 

must be fostered through this central office. It is also critical that local officials 

are afforded the maximum flexibility to use the federal and state technical and 

financial funds to meet the needs of their constituents. 

(2) There must be adequate funding for local emergency preparedness and disaster planning to allow a city to tailor planning to the special circumstances 

and needs of the area, particularly to areas with facilities and dense populations 

that have the potential to be terrorist targets or are prone to natural disasters. 

The federal government must also increase funding to local governments for 

preparedness and response, including processes to resolve equity issues in disaster relief efforts. Specifically, when multiple cities have been damaged by a 

disaster, a formula or waiver process should be available to allocate resources 

for disaster-related damage in a fair manner. 
91

Clearly, the transfer of funding from the from the Preparedness, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery Program at the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) has hampered recovery and response to Gulf State areas affected by 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. One such example is the transfer of $79 million 

from FEMA’s preparedness office to the operational programs of the Transportation Security Administration. Also, FEMA regional offices, which are central 

to effective intergovernmental communication, have experienced shortages in 

staffing levels which has left them with seventy-percent of authorized positions 

filled. These are the types of resource allocation and policy decisions that hinder 

cooperation among levels of government, as demonstrated by the shortcomings 

of the responses to areas impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

(3) Local governments must haveappropriate emergency communication systems. NLC policy calls for the federal government to take ‘‘immediate action to 

provide local governments with the broadcast channels needed to enhance their 

communications capabilities. . . . The federal government should encourage regional planning for public safety communication needs and address the current 

shortage of spectrum channels with a long-term plan that ensures available 

broadcast channels to meet future public safety needs across the nation.’’ (2005 

National Municipal Policy § 6.02(E)(2)) 

In the wake of the emergency communications problems experienced during and 

after Hurricane Katrina, NLC called on Congress to take immediate action on 

legislation that would set a firm date for television broadcasters to return the 

radio frequencies that have been set aside for public safety purposes. NLC has 

been a vocal advocate for legislation that would permanently clear broadcast 

spectrum for emergency communication since the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma 

City. In 1997, Congress promised first responders that the radio frequencies 

would be available to them by December 31, 2006. The 9/11 Commission’s Final 

Report concluded that the inability of these first responders to talk with each 

other and the congestion of the frequencies on the spectrum resulted in the significant loss of life on September 11, 2001. 

Members of the Committee, when first responders cannot talk to each other, 

lives are lost. This is why NLC has called on Congress to pass the Homeland 

Emergency Response Operations Act (HERO), H.R. 1646, sponsored by Representatives Weldon and Harman, both esteemed members of this committee. 

NLC is again appealing to you to do the right thing and pass legislation sets 

a date certain of December 31, 2006, or as close to that date as possible. 

(4) Local governments must be provided with the technical assistance and regional training devoted to disaster preparedness and response. This technical 

assistance should include the gathering and regular dissemination of information to local governments on general disaster issues and terrorist threats as 

well as specific disasters where they occur. 

(5) The federal government must also share the information with local governments without jeopardizing national security. Regions, as part of federal technical assistance efforts, should be encouraged to share resources and equipment 

needed for preparedness and response through mutual aid agreements and regional coordination. 

There also needs to be an extensive effort to expand and improve the relationships that exist among federal, state, local, and private sector personnel responsible for networking, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. Expertise can be pooled from national state and local government associations along 

with the professional associations for public health, public works, police and fire 

fighters, and the National Emergency Management Associations and its Homeland Security Consortium. Policy makers can also get valuable information from 

advisory groups and task forces from the Department of Homeland Security. 

(6) Knowing that improved safety from disasters in the future relies on what 

we can learn from the disasters of today, the federal government should collect 

data on the effects of disasters and lessons learned from Katrina and Rita and 

disseminate that analysis to aid state and local disaster-related efforts. Similarly, the federal government should provide assistance to state and local governments to help them conduct annual hazard and risk assessments to determine the vulnerability of particular areas or structures to disasters or terrorist 

acts based on historical and/or intelligence information. 

(7) A uniform emergency warning system should be developed to ensure that 

as people travel throughout the nation they will be informed of existing emergencies and advised how to respond. 

(8) Local governments should be supported in their efforts to encourage the public and private sectors to retrofit existing structures to reduce future losses from 
92

2Disaster Management: Improving the Nation’s Response to Catastrophic Disasters, Government Accountability Office, July 1993, page 9. 3 Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government 

Accountability Office, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 

House Committee on Energy and Commerce, September 28, 2005. 

natural disasters and to locate new construction outside of high-risk areas such 

as flood plains, coastal areas or on or near earthquake faults.

Conclusion 

The familiar mantra after every natural disaster or act of terrorism is that the 

nation needs to improve federal, state, and local coordination regarding preparedness, recovery and response. A 1993 report by the U.S. General Accountability Office 

(GAO) found that there was a need to ‘‘provide state and local governments with 

training specifically geared towards developing such necessary skills for responding 

to catastrophic disasters.’’ 2 However, despite the fact that GAO has published over 

120 reports on preparedness and response, it has found that ‘‘the extent to which 

many of our earlier recommendations have been fully implemented remains unclear.’’.3 What is clear is that Hurricane Katrina, and to some extent Rita, revealed 

the need for improved intergovernmental response to catastrophic disasters. 

Homeland security is about relationships—whether we are talking about responding to hurricanes and fires or the work of terrorists. Public servants at all levels 

of government cannot accomplish the goals of preparedness and response if they are 

not familiar with the people with whom they have to work and the area and the 

people they need to serve. The clear delineation of responsibilities and trust are critical to deploying the response and recovery plan. Intergovernmental coordination 

will improve the preparedness and response to disasters and thereby mitigate the 

losses incurred; thus helping to maintain viable communities and an economically 

sound nation. When we have a truly organized system to respond to emergencies, 

the nation will realize that a natural disaster does not have to be a national disaster. 

On behalf of the National League of Cities, I thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony on this most critical issue.

Chairman KING. Thank you, Mayor Samuel. 

Mayor Wallace, Mayor Samuel pretty much laid out a time line 

of what was done in preparation for Rita. Would that be similar 

also in Sugar Land? 

Mr. WALLACE. Identical. Actually, there were certain activities 

that we had to do from a flood control perspective where we started 

to bring the levels down in different lakes that we had, starting 

about a week prior to Rita hitting, and those were certain advances 

that we did. 

And again, there were a number of things from a preparedness 

perspective that all of the cities, I think, in the greater Houston, 

HGAC area, had learned as a result of Katrina. And so I think a 

lot of people started much earlier than some other cities might 

have done if it weren’t for Katrina. 

Chairman KING. Mayor Samuel, you mentioned that in addition 

to what is on paper and what is practiced as far as the plans, what 

is really important—or almost as important—are the personal relationships or the working relationships between the various levels 

of government and the various officials involved. 

In the off years or the off seasons, when you are not having hurricanes, what is the extent of those relationships? Like, do mayors 

in one city discuss this problem with one another? Are you in contact with people in the Federal Government? 

I mean, again, with whom in the Federal Government would you 

have regular contact when there are no hurricanes. 

Mr. SAMUEL. Well, in preparedness, we had disaster exercises 

which was coordination between officials from FEMA, the State 

and local governments, so I believe that because of the exercises 
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prior to the hurricane, as well as the exercise with Katrina, it allowed us to be better prepared when Rita came. 

Chairman KING. Do you feel the Federal Government has been 

cooperative, not just before and during, but actually in the off seasons, when there are no hurricanes, do you find the Federal Government willing to work with you? Are they a willing partner or 

a reluctant partner? 

Mr. SAMUEL. I believe they have been a willing partner. We have 

enjoyed the relationship with those officials that were in our area 

working with us. However, because of the staffing level, we believe 

that created some problems in FEMA. And in preparedness, it was 

a good job, response, there were some concerns; and it was because 

of the lack of local authority within the Federal agency that could 

have been better suited. 

I believe that is a lesson that was learned, not only from the 

local and State perspective, but also from the agency perspective. 

Chairman KING. Mayor Wallace. 

Mr. WALLACE. I would comment also particularly on the last portion from a FEMA preparedness standpoint. 

I think, prior to an event, the training exercises, all of those 

things, the relationships that we have between the cities, the counties, the State and the Federal Government, I think are very, very 

strong, and I think they work well. However, I think the recovery 

aspect could have been done better, and I think all of us are learning new things that we can do the next time—God forbid this were 

to happen again. 

But when FEMA arrived, when other—Red Cross, other folks 

came in, it appeared that the rules continued to change. People 

started operating—whether it was for public assistance issues, 

things of that nature, people were operating on one set of circumstances; and then a few days later that would change. And so 

there was a great deal of miscommunication that I think took place 

in that regard. 

And so I think, as we move forward, we need to look at that, refine it and make sure that that becomes policy. 

Chairman KING. Some of these red tape problems that you are 

talking about, have you seen any improvement from one hurricane 

to the next, or the same problems remain there? 

Mr. WALLACE. Well, I think, from a red tape perspective, you are 

talking about funding reimbursements, things of that nature. I believe that some of these issues were around with Hurricane Allison, 

because I know that there are still some dollars that are in the 

pipeline. 

Chairman KING. Things like the decision about the generators, I 

believe you said, that— 

Mr. SAMUEL. I can address that. 

One of the concerns we had, there were requisitions for generators. We knew that that would be a problem and a concern. We 

went out to Ford Park, and there were generators on trucks available and the specifications were absolutely what we needed. However, they could not be released until a full assessment was done, 

and the authority was given from Washington to release those generators. 
94

There were ice trucks. There were 12 on site. Ice ready, water 

ready, but they would not release it to our citizens until a full assessment was done. I personally made trips to one of the neighboring cities to load up my truck with water and ice to deliver to 

our constituents. And there is no reason that that should happen 

when it is right there. 

Chairman KING. Now, did you have similar problems in previous 

hurricanes? What I am getting at—is FEMA getting better or 

worse is, I guess, the question I am trying to get at. 

Mr. WALLACE. I think—again, I think in this particular case, I 

think that the magnitude of the storm in Katrina, followed up by 

the magnitude of the evacuation of those evacuees, which we talked 

about this morning, I think outstripped the capabilities of FEMA; 

and so whether or not they had policies and procedures in place for 

many of the agencies that were there, I think many of those got 

dwarfed just because of the magnitude. 

Mr. SAMUEL. And, Mr. Chairman, I believe that what Governor 

Perry stated has to be considered. This was not an ordinary situation. We had just come off the heels of Katrina. We had thousands 

of evacuees in our city and then we had to evacuate the evacuees 

as well as our own citizens. So this is a different situation. 

But I believe, in the preparedness, I think FEMA did a very good 

job in coming in to assist in preparation. 

The response, I think there are some areas that we all learned 

from and there have to be some adjustments. 

Chairman KING. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Ranking Member Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the testimony of our two panelists here today. 

Mr. Samuel, can you tell me whether or not Beaumont has an 

evacuation plan? 

Mr. SAMUEL. Yes, Beaumont has an evacuation plan that has 

been in place with our entire region. Our mayor, our county judge, 

as well as the other mayors in the surrounding cities all work together in the planning; and they go through the exercises for—in 

the event of a natural disaster or a planned disaster. 

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, we do; and again it is part of an overall evacuation plan for the region. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So, to your knowledge, most of the adjoining 

communities have this evacuation plan? 

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Now, do you know whether it is required, or is 

it just something that you have done on your own? 

Mr. WALLACE. I know from our perspective, as a member of the 

Houston-Galveston Area Council, we are required to participate in 

that overall evacuation plan. So it is required. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Samuel. 

Mr. SAMUEL. I am not sure if it is required, but I know that it 

has been a practice in our region to develop that evacuation plan. 

Mr. THOMPSON. And you think—and I would assume from your 

comments, both of you—that you deem this as something that is 

reasonable and practical and should be basically in place by all 

communities? 
95

Mr. WALLACE. Well, I think an evacuation plan should be. Again, 

I think there are a lot of lessons learned as it relates to the evacuation of the greater Houston area. And there are things that we are 

going to learn from this that we can implement the next time we 

have some type of an evacuation. 

In the city of Sugar Land, many of the folks leaving Galveston 

came right through the city of Sugar Land because the evacuation 

route is through our city. So we, as a pass-through community, not 

just evacuating our own citizens but as a pass-through community, 

had to deal with hundreds of thousands of cars that were going 

through streets that were just six-lane divided roads. So we were 

able to get that done in a 24-hour period. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Samuel, this FEMA person that you said 

that showed up in your town, what did they have authority to do? 

Mr. SAMUEL. Well, I am not sure how much authority they had. 

But one of the dire needs immediately after the storm was ice and 

water to those citizens that were still in the city, and they did not 

have the authority to release ice and water. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mayor Wallace, can you just—I guess what I am 

saying is, if the person that appeared in your community representing FEMA, did they have sole authority to make decisions? 

Or did they have to bump it up the ladder, and if they did, how 

long did it take to make decisions? 

Mr. WALLACE. The way I would like to respond to that is, within 

the first couple of days of FEMA being on the scene—I am going 

back to the Katrina situation, because on a daily basis we met with 

Judge Eckels, Mayor White and several others, including the 

FEMA representatives. 

The first few days, again, it was just trying to mobilize the people and trying to get them there, and there was a great deal of confusion. I think a lot of questions that were being asked, trying to 

get real-time decisions, needed to be—to go up the ladder. As time 

went by, that process got smoother and smoother, and it seemed 

that more apparent authority was granted to the people-on-the 

ground. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So would you say to us that for FEMA to be this 

robust agency responding to any natural disaster, that those individuals that become embedded in communities need to have the authority, real-time authority to make decisions? 

Mr. WALLACE. Clearly. And I also think that when we go back 

and do an analysis of the things that went well and things that 

went wrong, I think we need to go back and look at the policies 

as to what authority will be granted to those on-the-ground individuals. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I guess the only other situation is, is it too early 

for you all to start talking about reimbursement at this point? Or 

are you involved in it at this point? 

Mr. WALLACE. We have already submitted reimbursables to 

FEMA. 

Mr. SAMUEL. It is still too early. We still are attempting to recover. There is an enormous—there are tons of trash and debris. 

We are still attempting to clean up. We still don’t have full power, 

so there are—it is too early to make an assessment. 
96

Mr. THOMPSON. So I would assume from lessons learned in this 

situation, that as the emergency grew, people started responding 

better in terms of making decisions and other things. 

Mr. WALLACE. I think that that is definitely the case. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, I hope that if this continues 

to be the practice, we are in good shape. But at the next emergency, if it takes us 3 or 4 days to kind of get the system in place, 

we still have a problem. 

Now, I think our concern is, if the cavalry shows up, we want 

the cavalry to be ready to respond. And I mean, I would say that 

that is all our intent. 

Mr. WALLACE. If I might, sir, just from a local response, this is 

a group effort. It is not just FEMA, it is not local. It is the private 

sector. It is the faith-based communities, things of that nature. 

In less than a week within the city of Sugar Land, the Houston 

area, we had a couple of hundred thousand people in our community, thousands of people, just new kids going to school, things of 

that nature. And what we wanted to do as a private sector was put 

together a single-shop location where the evacuees could go to for 

many of the issues, whether it was housing, whether it was educational issues, reimbursement for medical needs, things of that 

nature. 

So I would encourage, as we continue to move forward, that that 

be one of the first things that the local community try to create and 

replicate a model that we have, because we literally in the first 

week were helping thousands of people a day that were coming 

through for medical needs, and in the first week we placed over 

500 jobs to people that were coming into our community. 

Again, it is not just a FEMA issue. I think it is an issue that we 

all learned a lot of new lessons. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Chairman KING. The gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Donna 

Christensen. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to 

follow up on the cavalry being ready when they show up. And it 

amazes me to hear some of the testimony, and I am particularly 

taken aback by the fact that the local authority was marginalized 

by the requirement of Washington, D.C. not the regional command 

system or Federal officials on the ground were the final decision 

makers. 

The issue of ice and generators, those things have—the procedure for dealing with ice and generators was something that has 

been used in disasters before. It was used, we learned about, in 

Hugo in 1989. We used it in Maryland in 1995 and in subsequent 

hurricanes. 

So it is just amazing to me how much of the experience and the 

institutional knowledge of FEMA has been lost over the years, so 

that when we have a disaster today, we have to reinvent the wheel 

and it has already been done and invented. We really shouldn’t 

have had to go there. 

Mr. Samuel, Mayor Samuel, you talked about—well, both of you 

did, really, about the coordinating meetings between the cities and 

the State, and they were happening two, three times a day. That 

is my experience with FEMA as well. 
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Were there those kinds of coordinating meetings two or three 

times a day that involved the FEMA command center near Washington with your local officials, happening from time to time before, 

during and after the storm? 

Mr. SAMUEL. Our experience, most communications with FEMA 

came about 2 ys after the storm. There was constant presence. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. But the coordinating meetings where you sit 

down and you look at what the problems are and you develop a 

plan to meet them—

Mr. SAMUEL. They were a part of the operation plans, yes. There 

were representatives from FEMA in our planning. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. And so you all were meeting on a daily basis 

or more than once a day? 

Mr. SAMUEL. Yes. 

Mr. WALLACE. And we were, as well, through our emergency operation center, on a daily basis about every 2 hours, particularly 

as we were getting closer to the onset of the storm from Rita’s perspective, where we plugged into the State’s direct—the Department 

of Homeland Security, FEMA was on those calls as well. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Then I don’t understand why the judge had 

to go and buy generators and ice. 

But, okay, one of the problems that we saw in Katrina was a 

communication problem. Everybody, different people were talking. 

Sometimes the messages were confusing. It was confusing the public and probably scaring the public, and the media kind of took control. 

It seemed as though both of you had that communications issue 

under control. How did you do it? How did you centralize? What 

did you do to have the city speaking with one voice, or were you 

able to do that? 

Mr. SAMUEL. Well, one thing we had to deal with, we had to deal 

with the guards that were preventing individuals from coming back 

into the city early on. We had to deal with State troopers throughout our city doing patrols. And one of the things—the interoperability was not there; therefore, we had to couple our local law enforcement officers, one officer with one of the State officers, in 

order for there to be clear communications because of the lack of 

a spectrum that they could all communicate on. 

That was somewhat creative in a means of maintaining clear 

communications for all entities. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. All right. Now, what about communicating to 

the public? 

Mr. WALLACE. I think from our perspective—let me also talk 

about it from a regional view. 

One of the things that benefits the greater Houston area is what 

I referred to earlier about the HGAC, the Houston-Galveston Area 

Council, because what that agency does is several counties that 

come together, where you have county judges, you have mayors, 

you have emergency responders, all coordinate; and at that point 

from a communication standpoint it is not trying to find who you 

are supposed to talk to, it is picking up the phone and communicating with the people that you know. 

So I think there was a level of preparedness as it relates to communicating with individuals on a daily basis. The city of Sugar 
98

Land is a suburb of Houston. Yes, that is a major TV market in 

the Houston area, but going into every single one of our homes is 

a local access channel, so on a daily basis we updated that. 

One of the areas that I indicated in my testimony that is of great 

concern and something that needs to be fixed is the reverse 911 capability. I think the reverse 911 capability is a wonderful tool if 

you want to alert a couple hundred homes about a hostage situation, tanker derailment and evacuation type of a situation. But 

when we made the decision at noon on Thursday to let our community know what the status was—and, remember, this is hours after 

we received a weather report saying 140-mile-an-hour winds in 

Sugar Land—we started to communicate with our public on a reverse 911. 

Everybody in the Houston region uses the same Reverse 911 

service provider. We were behind a queue of over 750 Reverse 911s. 

The people in our community got the emergency call at 9:00 that 

evening when we wanted to start it at 12:00. That is something 

that clearly needs to be fixed. And whether that is a bandwidth 

issue, whether that is having multiple service providers, those are 

things we need to definitely go back and look at. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KING. Thank the gentlelady. 

At this time he will get his full 5 minutes. The gentleman from 

Florida, the long-patient gentleman from Florida, Mr. Meek. 

Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the Councilman and Mayor for joining us here under the circumstances. 

I think you had an opportunity to hear some of the discussion 

that took place in the last panel with the governors. And I only had 

1 minute and because of the clock, not because of the chairman, for 

the vote that came up on the floor. But I think it is important for 

us to—and I was taking a look at your testimony. I think it is important for us to realize that after the aftermath of Katrina and 

Rita that there are a lot of lessons that we all learned from it. 

I can tell you one thing, that this is the first, you know—and I 

know the chairman is new being the chairman, but this is the first 

hearing that we have had that had anything to deal with the response, the good or the bad, to Hurricane Katrina and Rita. And 

I think, several months and several weeks afterwards, of course, 

we should have been on top of it earlier, but it goes to show you 

that this is beyond partisanship. This is about preparing the country for future events, need it be natural or need it be a terrorist 

event for us to be able to respond. 

Now I am creature of the State legislature in Florida. I was there 

for about 8 years prior to my arrival here. And I can tell you from 

watching the time of devolution of taxation on the Federal commitment—and I know that you represent your respective national organizations also. But as we look at devolution of taxation, we look 

at the lack of resources, we look at the priorities not being what 

they used to be. 

And so your presence here is important and I am glad that I was 

reading—Mayor Wallace, I was reading your statements here as it 

relates to first responders funding. I think that is important. 

Mr. MEEK. But I also think it is important to have the validation 

of what I call third-party validators. What I mean by third-party 
99

validators, when I asked the governors do you believe that it is important to be able to have an independent body outside of this political body to look at what went right, what went wrong, what can 

we correct, you have heard, I don’t need to repeat the responses, 

but definitely from the Texas Governor it was important, if I had 

more than a minute, I would have said I can help you save a lot 

of money. I will tell you what we learned. 

Well, that is the kind of attitude that got us into a levee situation. I am pretty sure fixing the levee in New Orleans was something like, oh, well, we are doing something, but we are not necessarily addressing it. 

We want to be make sure that local government has what it 

needs to be able to respond, since now you are being painted into 

the corner of being the responder to natural disasters. Catastrophic. 

So I think it is important to take this seriously, we take our partisan hats off, we take our regional hats off, and take our big city 

versus small city hats off, big States versus little States, because 

even looking at the budgets as it compares to Texas and Florida, 

compared to Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi, it doesn’t compare. So that means that the local governments, relating to the tax 

base, are running into the same issues. 

So I am saying all of this to say yes, there are going to be some 

delays in response, and, yes, it is kind of hard for folks that are 

elected to lead and be there for people in their time of need and 

at the same time say I would endorse an opportunity for all of us 

to be reviewed, not only on our job performance, but also on our 

responsibilities. 

Now, these are hurricanes that we saw coming. What happens 

when someone decides to show up in a town with a Greyhound bus 

with a dirty bomb and we are down at the diner drinking coffee, 

and the next thing you know, our constituents hear about it and 

there are all kinds of rumors out here? Oh, if you stay here 10 

more minutes, you are going to die. And you have to evacuate an 

entire city, or an entire county, or an entire State. What are we 

going to do? How do you respond? 

We have done top-off programs, in New York City and counties 

and the national organizations throughout this country. We had 

Hurricane Pat in New Orleans. We knew what the deal was. But 

the bottom line was it was when what we call here in the Congress 

under regular order. It wasn’t an independent commission to deal 

with this issue and raise these issues to the forefront so that we 

can be able to do something about it. 

That is what we need. It may sound small, but I am hoping that 

your perspective national organizations will call for an independent 

commission, a Katrina Commission, which is verbatim, which is a 

House bill that is now introduced here in the Congress, many 

members have signed on to it, 81 percent of Americans support it. 

But the bottom line is, this isn’t about who did and who didn’t or 

what have you, it is about saving lives, American lives. 

So I wanted to hear if there is any discussion within your national organizations that you represent, the League and the Council of Mayors, is there any discussion on how can we support or 

promote an independent commission outside of political bodies to 
100

be appointed to be able to ask the real questions of governors and 

mayors and emergency responders and hurricane preparedness 

people and individuals who carried out the top-off programs. Because I can tell you right now, with all due respect to the institution that I serve in and the voting card I carry in my wallet, we 

don’t have the ability to do it and then follow through on the task, 

because it was education for all Americans, and I hate to see local 

elected officials put in the posture it was. 

Why didn’t you do everything you were supposed to do when you 

were supposed to do it? It was your responsibility. Didn’t we say 

that? 

Or you didn’t send a letter to the Governor and the Governor 

didn’t send you a letter back, and the President said they didn’t receive a letter, but we were talking the whole time. What are you 

talking about? 

So we don’t have to get into that. If we can streamline it, take 

it out of that process, I think that is important. I think the League 

and the Council of Mayors and the Association of Counties and the 

State governors and all of these folks are missing a great opportunity, and the Federal Government, to be able to respond to all 

of the people that we represent here in the United States. 

Mr. WALLACE. I personally think it would be a grave injustice if 

we did not create some type of a document, whether it is an independent entity that creates it or whatever, to come up with what 

is the best practice. That is one of the things that the Conference 

of Mayors I know does quite well. Whenever I go to talk with a 

mayor, whether it is a 2 million population mayor or a 100,000 

population mayor, everyone shares. This is the best way we are responding to this issue. 

We start that process that you just defined Sunday evening, in 

a few days, here in Washington with the U.S. Conference of Mayors. So we are starting that to sit down and what are some of the 

things we can do better. We don’t want to create a situation of 

pointing fingers, that somebody did this or that wrong. We just 

want to improve. There are lives at stake. That is what is important, and how we can best improve our communities. We are going 

to start that process this coming Sunday. 

Mr. SAMUEL. The National League of Cities at this point has not 

taken a position as to whether or not there should be a bipartisan 

committee to evaluate it. But personally, I believe in order for us 

to not repeat some of the things we have done in the past, we have 

to make an assessment of what has been done and what we are 

doing now and move forward, whether it be a bipartisan committee, outside committee. But it has to be honest, straightforward 

communications to make sure the real issues are brought to the 

table so they can be identified and addressed. 

Mr. MEEK. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say in closing, sir, I think it is important that 

we continue to have oversight hearings on this very subject. The 

9/11 Commission, which, sir, you represent the area and you were 

dealt with a lot of the victims of that disaster, human disaster that 

was brought about, is that we have learned so much from it, intelligence is so much better because even though it took the Congress 

a year to create it, it helped this country protect itself and it is still 
101

helping us protect ourselves, because it put in front of the American people where we did not—where we were failing and what we 

were doing good in. 

I think it was important, an area of failing, I think it is important for us to be able to take this, the largest natural disaster, and 

especially if you put Rita into it, it is really the worst natural disaster that has ever hit this country in the history of our existence, 

and not learn from it. And I think the only thing that is stopping 

us, Mr. Chairman, from doing that, is the fact that someone may 

feel that somebody may say someone about someone or an administration or this person didn’t do it or an e-mail, all the silly stuff 

we are reading about in the paper. 

But meanwhile, back at the ranch, there were Americans waiting 

for 4 or 5 days, and we watched this happen, and we watched the 

loss of life and we watched the loss of property and we watched the 

disorganization, the world watched it, and we need to be able to 

learn from it. 

So it was a year before it was created, there were a lot of other 

people that came up with their own scenarios on what we should 

do and how we should do it. As you know, both intelligence committees came together and put forth a report. The 9/11 Commission 

was able to take the reports, the work that different organizations 

did, and put it together in a way that it can be useful to bring 

about a piece of legislation to the floor that we all voted on and 

the appropriations bill that many of us went to the White House, 

I didn’t get an opportunity to go, I mean, I was invited but I didn’t 

get an opportunity to go, to sign this Homeland Security appropriations bill, and some of the ingredients in that bill came out of that 

9/11 Commission. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for today’s hearing, okay, 

that we had the governors here and that we have these fine local 

elected officials here representing their national organizations. But 

for one member, I will be here to support future hearings under 

your leadership and under the ranking member’s leadership so we 

can protect America even more. 

Chairman KING. I look forward to continuing to work with you 

on that. I would also note that Chairman Reichert had a hearing 

in the subcommittee last week that dealt with this issue, and we 

will continue to hold hearings on this, at both at the committee and 

subcommittee level. 

With that, I recognize my good friend from Texas, Ms. JacksonLee. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would 

like to just pursue a line of questioning to both of my distinguished 

friends and colleagues from Texas, and might I say that having 

started in local government as a member of local government, elected official, City Council, I am well aware of the extensive burden 

that local officials do face. In fact, you are probably the first responders in terms of the community looking toward you. 

With that in mind, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a specific 

inquiry, Chairman King, to you, and to try to decipher where I believe that we can be most effective in this committee, and then I 

am going to pose some questions. 
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We have already had the jurisdictional mayhem, if I may define 

it as such, but the will of the leadership to establish a Katrina separate committee, and I realize that we are both respectful and sensitive to that delineation. However, I think that what we have 

heard these two panels say is a cry for the continued work of homeland security. 

Let me tell you how it can be done, to establish our base of investigation under the heading of Hurricane Rita, because there are 

distinctive issues that we can continue to look at that would help 

us in our preparatory work and our going forward work. Let me 

cite for you the way that I would suggest. 

First of all, I think some of the key elements that I saw being 

at the TranStar Emergency Center through the entire time of Hurricane Rita was the question of evacuation and the orderliness of 

evacuation. Therefore, I think it is important that we can look 

under Hurricane Rita to those issues. 

Let me also say an ongoing problem is how do you respond to 

overlapping natural disasters and/or man†made disasters, which is 

what we face in the State of Texas? We were already hosting, 

Beaumont, Port Arthur, Sugar Land, Houston, we are already 

hosting Hurricane Katrina survivors. Our hearts have already been 

poured out. Our volunteers. Your churches, mayor, I know, were 

filled. You are a faith community. 

Then came Hurricane Rita with our own constituency that compounded the impact. Right now we have some 40,000 to 50,000 in 

hotels that will eventually have to move out. We have cities that 

turned the lights out, I hate to say, in my own State, on evacuees 

that were coming. Why? Because there was not a state†wide Web, 

if you will, or connectedness, to say this is a system that is in 

place. 

So short of hoping that the insight that you have been given by 

staff will not counter what I think is a way to delineate the distinction of what our committee is doing, and we have two very able 

committees, including the full committee, the management committee my colleague chairs, or is ranking member with another colleague, and, of course, I think there has been established a new investigatory committee. 

I can tell you for one those of us from Texas we would like to 

be a guest on that kind of review, and that is not the kind of review that can really tie with Hurricane Katrina, because there are 

distinct issues that come to the receiving States who are then impacted by an incident or event. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I would welcome your studied response on 

that. I will turn to the witnesses because they might give you some 

greater insight to say that it is very important that are we have 

these kinds of hearings. 

Let me just go on this line of reasoning—

Chairman KING. If the gentlewoman yield, I can give a preliminary response. I have said all along that I intend this committee 

to go, I think the way idea find it, was right to the edge of Katrina. 

I think this morning’s hearings were an indication of that. Hopefully, we will not have to have hearings on Wilma, but the purpose 

is to learn whatever we can to deal with future Katrinas and do 
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it in such a way that does not interfere with others jurisdiction, but 

does go to the edge. 

I think today’s hearing was very wide ranging. It did not use 

Katrina as a base, but it used that also as the opportunity to go 

off into the issues addressed by Katrina. What staff counsel was 

mentioning to me is to let you know that next week there is going 

to be a subcommittee hearing on interoperability. 

So all these issues are being discussed. They all have relation to 

Katrina, not all, but many of them will, certainly the issues raised 

by Katrina, and that is my intention as the Chairman of the full 

committee. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Well, I am grateful for that, and to keep us 

truly pure in our jurisdiction, I am sure Rita would not mind me 

using her name. I say that not that we would have hearings on 

Wilma or someone else, but it represents a very good case study 

of what happens through the leadership of the ranking member 

and yourself. I appreciate it, and I would like to be able to offer 

some suggestions, particularly on this question of evacuation, 

which is a very, very difficult lesson to learn. 

If the gentleman would yield me additional time that I may just 

conclude? 

Chairman KING. I will yield the lady an additional 5 minutes. If 

we could finish in that 5 minutes, I would greatly appreciate it, for 

my own reasons. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. You are very kind, and I will do that, with 

great appreciation. 

Let me just, to both of you, say that I appreciate the U.S. Conference of Mayors and certainly the National League of Cities, but 

let me get to the point. 

Mario Wallace, would you please share how we could have been 

more helpful as we evacuated and gave the signal? Obviously, your 

governor was here. You were very keenly in collaboration with 

Judge Eckels, and might I just express my disappointment of his 

previous engagement and thank him publicly, Judge Robert Eckels 

of Harris County, and Mayor Bill White of Houston, for their coordinating actions together. 

But you were involved key to the evacuation issues. Tell us how 

the Federal Government and State Government might have been 

more effective in answering after the fact that long traffic jam, lack 

of gas, as you perceive it? 

Mr. WALLACE. Right. I think there are a number of things, again, 

that we can learn from this. The issues as it relates to fuel, the 

issues as it relates to water. There were a number of people that, 

of course, were stuck in traffic. My family included, once they evacuated that morning. So I think with the equipment that the Federal Government might be able to assist, and I think that was 

mentioned this morning, fuel tankers, water, ice, things of that nature, to assist, I think it would be helpful. I think some of the other 

issues as it relates to the evacuation process, I know that everybody had the perception of Hurricane Katrina on their mind. They 

saw the footage and it was a very frightening experience that I 

think everyone lived through. And when the discussion came out 

as far as sending the first two tiers out of Galveston and out of the 
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Gulf, I think everybody within the Houston area got on the roads, 

as opposed to it being in a staggered manner. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. If, for example, we had engaged the Federal 

presence, again in collaboration, meaning because they have the 

numbers, not, if you will, overcoming our first responders, but because they may have the logistical experience, would that have 

been helpful in evacuating individuals? 

Mr. WALLACE. I don’t know if it would have been helpful in the 

evacuation, because I know there were many people from the law 

enforcement, on the State level as well as local, and sheriffs, to assist in that process. Obviously the stretch of land was pretty significant, going all the way up through I think Buffalo or Columbus 

going north and then heading west on Interstate 10. So it was a 

very large area of land. 

I think it did take time just to get the cones out and just to go 

through the process of getting both of the roads going in one direction. So I am not sure whether the Federal Government could have 

assisted in that process. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. When you say the Federal Government, obviously you are talking about federalizing the National Guard or utilizing them, but also providing Reservists and other military personnel, which both Louisiana and Mississippi and Texas are 

blessed with a bounty of. So what I am suggesting to you, 

logistically with the ability of military to move people, would that 

have been helpful as you were eking to have those logistical procedures in place? 

Mr. WALLACE. I think as it relates to Rita, I don’t think it would 

have been helpful. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Let me say to the council member, I for one 

am aware of some of the strains that you had on your local community. Let me thank you, one, for what you did for Hurricane 

Katrina, and knowing that you had a number of residents, but also 

let me thank you for some of the leadership that I saw as a member of the Homeland Security committee visiting Beaumont and 

Port Arthur, in particular, your county judge and your mayor and 

certainly you and your leadership role. 

So the issue becomes, if you will, I did not see any 

predeployment. What I heard from, as we had a letter submitted 

in the record by Mayor Ortiz, no predeployment of water, no 

predeployment of ice, no ability to get food. One thing I noticed was 

that the FEMA meeting was at the Ford Arena. The Beaumont 

meeting was downtown. That doesn’t seem to be a coordinated scenario that would appropriately get the right response. 

So as the chairman gavels, would you answer for me whether 

predeployment would have been helpful and also whether or not 

military in the right way would have been helpful as well, getting 

things quickly to your area? 

Mr. SAMUEL. First let me preface any statements I might have: 

Anytime military assistance is called, I believe it should be on an 

as†needed basis. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Absolutely. 

Mr. SAMUEL. From discussions in retrospect to what has happened, there has been some conversations stating that a military 

presence could have been helpful in the evacuation process as we 
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move from dual directional traffic to single directional traffic, there 

was a lot of dangers that had to be considered and manpower became an issue. 

That could have been better handled or possibly handled with 

military presence. But, again, on an as†needed basis. 

So I believe there is definitely a need for a working relationship 

with the national, State and local governments, and there was a 

statewide web in place. However, it wasn’t taken under consideration when we prepared the statewide web, it wasn’t considered 

that we would be dealing with two sets of evacuees. So that complicated the issue. 

Also when we talk about evacuation, this particular storm, Rita, 

changed directions, or there were projections of different locations. 

Immediately Galveston County began to evacuate, Harris County 

began to evacuate. Then it came down to a lot of the traffic coming 

from South Texas was coming up the evacuation sites through 

Houston, even through but month. That complicated the issue 

when the storm took a turn toward Beaumont. 

So, yes, we are looking at what we did. A lot of things were done 

right. The military presence was critical to get our special needs 

people out once the storm changed and came toward Beaumont. We 

probably couldn’t have evacuate as well as we did had it not be 

been for the assistance in flying out those special needs patients. 

So there is a need. Where that comes into play, I think that is 

best left with the local decisionmakers working with the national 

government to make those decisions. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. They must be present and available for you to 

call on them? 

Mr. SAMUEL. Yes, and have the local authority in the Federal 

prisons to make decisions on the local level. 

Chairman KING. The gentlelady’s time has expired. I want to 

thank the witnesses for their testimony. I understand Judge Eckels 

has arrived. The hearing has gone on. 

Just so you know, Congressman Poe gave you a very fulsome introduction. 

Mr. ECKELS. My testimony has been submitted in writing, Mr. 

Chairman. I apologize for the conflict and being late. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Congresswoman Jackson-Lee thanked him 

very much as well for his great work. 

Chairman KING. And we take all of your compliments with great 

interest. So Judge Eckels, you are in great company if you can be 

complimented by Ms. Jackson-Lee. 

I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony. The hearing record will be open for 10 days for any members who have additional questions. I would ask if the witness could respond to those 

questions in writing. I want to thank the witnesses again, thank 

Ms. Jackson-Lee for being here, and without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:22 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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