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**This TACAID includes legal opinion and analysis that does not necessarily reflect official U.S. government positions.

USINDOPACOM J06/SJA TACAID SERIES

TOPIC: AIR INTERCEPTS

BLUF

 Open-source reports reflect an emerging trend of concerning air interceptsi by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

against U.S. and allied aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace. 

 International law requires that air intercepts be executed safely and with due regard for all nations’ rights and 

freedoms in international airspace. 

 Despite these obligations, reports indicate that PLA aircraft have executed exceptionally close approaches; 

engaged in reckless or aggressive maneuvers; and breached safety of flight protocols. In contrast, U.S. forces 

routinely conduct flight operations safely and in accordance with international law.

WHY THIS MATTERS 

 These reports suggest an emerging pattern of behavior by the PLA that disregards international law and creates 

significant risks of mishap, collision, miscalculation, or loss of life. An unintended incident resulting from a 

dangerous air intercept could spark an international crisis. 

 This reported trend is likely an element of a broader campaign by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to exert 

jurisdiction within its excessive maritime claims in the South and East China Seas.

 If left unchecked, the PLA’s behavior could become a norm that erodes the force of international law; 

compromises the rules-based international order; legitimizes excessive claims; emboldens further noncompliance with international law and international safety norms; destabilizes the security environment across 

the Indo-Pacific; and foments risk of miscalculation.

DETAILED DISCUSSION

 Open-source reports reflect an emerging trend of concerning air intercepts by the PLA against U.S. and allied 

aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace. For example:

o In June 2022, Canadian news sources reported on a trend of unsafe PLA intercepts of its CP-140 Aurora patrol 

aircraft. Reports indicated that the Canadian aircrew experienced “over two dozen” intercepts “as close as 20 

to 100 feet,” including some where the Canadian aircraft had to change course to avoid a collision.ii All 

reported intercepts occurred in international airspace while the Canadian aircraft was monitoring compliance 

with United Nations (U.N.) Sanctions against North Korea that were approved unanimously by U.N. Security 

Council members including the PRC.

o In June 2022, a PLA J-16 fighter aircraft intercepted an Australian P-8 reconnaissance aircraft, maneuvered in 

front, and “released flares and chaff that entered at least one of the Australian aircraft’s engines.” Chaff is 

typically made of small pieces of aluminum, which can damage an aircraft engine.iii

o In December 2022, a PLA Navy J-11 fighter aircraft “flew in front of and within 20 feet of the nose of” a U.S. 

Air Force RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. The US aircraft was lawfully conducting routine operations in 

international airspace above the South China Sea. The PLA aircraft’s unsafe operation “caused the U.S. aircraft 

to take evasive maneuvers.”iv

1. Background
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o In May 2023, a PLA J-16 fighter aircraft performed an aggressive maneuver during an intercept of a U.S. Air 

Force RC-135 aircraft. The PLA pilot flew directly in front of the nose of the RC-135, forcing the U.S. aircraft to 

fly through wake turbulence. The RC-135 was conducting safe and routine operations over the South China 

Sea in international airspace in accordance with international law.v

 International law divides airspace between national airspace (i.e., airspace over a State’s land territory, internal 

waters, territorial seas, and archipelagic waters), which is subject to the sovereignty of a State, and international 

airspace, which is seaward of the territorial sea and not subject to the sovereignty of any State.vi

 International airspace includes airspace above the contiguous zone (CZ)vii, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ),

viii

and the high seas.ix

 In international airspace all States enjoy freedoms of navigation and overflight, and other internationally lawful 

uses related to these freedoms (such as surveillance operations).x

 The PRC is bound to these airspace regimes as a matter of customary international law and as a party to the U.N.

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Chicago Convention.xi

 The concerning air intercepts identified above occurred in international airspace against State aircraft that were 

exercising freedoms guaranteed by international law. Likewise, the intercepting PLA aircraft had no apparent legal 

basis to exercise jurisdiction or otherwise interfere with lawful flight operations in international airspace. 

 This does not mean, however, that air intercepts in international airspace are prohibited. To the contrary, State 

aircraft may lawfully intercept other State aircraft for purposes such as identification, verification, or escort –

provided the intercept occurs safely, professionally, and with “due regard” for those freedoms afforded to all 

States by international law.xii

 U.S. forces are trained to conduct air intercepts for lawful purposes, and to do so safely and professionally in 

accordance with international law, norms, and standards.

xiii

 

 The requirement to fly with due regard for other nations’ aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace is 

binding customary international law and codified in various treaty provisions.xiv

 In addition, the Chicago Convention requires States to comply with the requirements of “due regard” when 

intercepting civil aircraft. xv

 The U.S. Department of Defense and the PRC’s Ministry of Defense have agreed to Rules of Behavior for Safety of 

Air and Maritime Encounters (the “ROB”) in which both sides commit to operating consistent with the Chicago

Convention and its annexes when engaging in air-to-air encounters involving their State aircraft. The ROB also 

states that the two sides should implement in good faith the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) as it 

applies to air-to-air encounters referenced in the ROB’s air-encounters annex.

 Of note, both sides pledge in the ROB “to have due regard for the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and 

airspace by the other Side’s military vessels and military aircraft under international law.”

xvi

 U.S. forces adhere closely to ROB.

 Beyond the requirement to operate with due regard, there is no established international law regarding aerial 

encounters of State aircraft, but there are international norms and standards that preserve freedoms to use 

international airspace as well as ensure safety.

xvii

 With a membership of 190 of the 193 U.N. member nations (including the PRC), the International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, was established in 1947 for this specific reason. 

 ICAO codifies principles of international air navigation and establishes standards and recommended practices. 

When compatible with mission requirements, military aircraft that encounter each other should operate 

consistent with ICAO standards.

xviii

 

2. International Law and Due Regard

3. Safety and Professionalism
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**This TACAID includes legal opinion and analysis that does not necessarily reflect official U.S. government positions.

U.S. forces are trained in accordance with 

international law to conduct intercepts safely and 

professionally. All flight operations by U.S. forces are 

executed with due regard for the rights and freedoms 

enjoyed by all nations in international airspace. The 

above image depicts a routine and lawful air intercept 

conducted by U.S. F-22s and Canadian CF-18 fighters 

of two Russian TU-95 Bear bombers that operated in 

the Alaskan and Canadian Air Defense Identification

Zones in August 2019. 

Image Credit: NORAD via Twitter 

In May, 2023, a PLA J-16 fighter aircraft performed an 

aggressive maneuver during an intercept of a U.S. Air Force 

RC-135 aircraft. The above still shot (video linked below) 

shows the PLA pilot cutting directly in front of the nose of 

the RC-135, forcing the U.S. aircraft to fly through wake 

turbulence. The RC-135 was conducting safe and routine 

operations over the South China Sea in international airspace

in accordance with international law. USINDOPACOM 

Statement on Unprofessional Intercept of U.S. Aircraft over 

South China Sea > U.S. Indo-Pacific Command > 2015

 Among these standards, ICAO defines and outlines expected norms of conduct and procedures for executing air 

intercepts. Safe intercepts are typically characterized by controlled closure rates and stable station-keeping. 

Professionalism is characterized by proper airmanship and non-provoking maneuvers, without any overtly 

aggressive actions, words, or gestures.

xix

 ICAO recommends that states develop intercept methods according to a “standard method” designed to “avoid 

any hazard for the intercepted aircraft.” This includes “the need to avoid flying in such proximity to the 

intercepted aircraft that a collision hazard may be created.”xx

 Moreover, in accordance with the ROB, intercepts between PLA and U.S. aircraft must maintain a safe separation, 

which “in a specific circumstance is applied to the situation at the time and should not be used as the basis for 

determining safe separation in other circumstance.” xxi 

 This means that safety determinations are context-dependent and not necessarily tied to a specific distance 

between aircraft during an air intercept. 

 While the concepts of safety and separation are closely related, they are not determinative of one another – i.e. 

even if a larger separation distance were maintained, an air intercept could still be unsafe (e.g. erratic 

maneuvering, unnecessarily high speed of approach, etc.).

 The reported trend of concerning PLA intercepts raise questions about the PLA’s adherence to accepted norms 

and standards of safety and professionalism. 

GRAPHICS

 
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**This TACAID includes legal opinion and analysis that does not necessarily reflect official U.S. government positions.

PROPOSED COUNTER-LAWFARE APPROACH

**This section provides proposed language for incorporation into communication strategies**

 Recent reports demonstrate a trend of concerning air intercepts by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) against 

U.S. and allied aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace.

 International law requires that air intercepts be executed safely and with due regard for all nations’ rights and 

freedoms in international airspace. 

 PLA aircraft have reportedly executed exceptionally close approaches; engaged in reckless maneuvers; and 

breached widely accepted aviation norms and standards. In contrast, U.S. forces routinely conduct flight 

operations safely and in accordance with international law. 

 U.S. forces conduct air intercepts for lawful purposes, and do so safely and professionally in accordance with 

international law, norms, and standards 

 The PLA’s reported pattern of behavior disregards international law and creates significant risks of mishap, 

collision, or loss of life. 

 An unintended incident resulting from a dangerous air intercept could spark an international crisis. 

 To ensure the safety of pilots on both sides and prevent an international crisis, it is critical that the PLA participate 

in bilateral dialogue with U.S. forces consistent with the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement. 

 This reported trend is a symptom of a broader campaign by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to exert its 

excessive maritime claims in the South and East China Seas.

 The PLA’s reported behavior is inconsistent with a Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Department 

of Defense and the PRC’s Ministry of Defense regarding Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime

Encounters. 

 No member of the international community should be intimidated or coerced into giving up rights and freedoms 

guaranteed by international law. 

 If left unchecked, the PRC’s reported behavior could develop into a norm that erodes the force of international 

law; compromises the rules-based international order; legitimizes excessive claims; emboldens further noncompliance with international law and international safety norms; destabilizes the security environment across 

the Indo-Pacific; and foments risk of miscalculation. 

 Upholding international law and the rules-based international order is an enduring interest for the international 

community and one that is vital to peace, security, and prosperity. 

 USINDOPACOM supports and defends a free and open Indo-Pacific. USINDOPACOM seeks to preserve peace and 

stability, uphold freedom of the seas in accordance with international law, and oppose any attempt to use 

coercion or force to settle disputes. USINDOPACOM shares these deep and abiding interests with allied and 

partnered forces who champion a free and open Indo-Pacific supported by the rules-based international order.
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**This TACAID includes legal opinion and analysis that does not necessarily reflect official U.S. government positions.

i U.S. Joint Doctrine (JP 1-02) defines “air interception as to effect visual or electronic contact by a friendly aircraft with another 

aircraft. Normally, the air intercept is conducted in the following five phases: a. climb phase — Airborne to cruising altitude. b. 

maneuver phase — Receipt of initial vector to target until beginning transition to attack speed and altitude. c. transition phase —

Increase or decrease of speed and altitude required for the attack. d. attack phase — Turn to attack heading, acquire target, 

complete attack, and turn to breakaway heading. e. recovery phase — Breakaway to landing.”

ii Stephenson & Boynton, “Canada alarmed as Chinese fighter pilots ‘buzz’ Canadian planes over international waters” Global News, 

Canada, June 2022, https://globalnews.ca/news/8885980/canada-china-pilots-buzz-planes-asia/.

iii Lendon, “Chinese fighter jet 'chaffs' Australian plane near South China Sea, Canberra alleges” CNN, World, June 2022, 

https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/05/australia/australia-china-plane-intercept-intl-hnk-ml/index.html.

iv Ali, “Chinese jet came within 10 feet of U.S. military aircraft, U.S. says” Reuters, World, December 2022, 

https://www.reuters.com/world/chinese-jet-came-within-20-feet-us-military-aircraft-us-military-2022-12-29/. 

v U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “USINDOPACOM Statement on Unprofessional Intercept of U.S. Aircraft over South China Sea” U.S. 

Indo-Pacific Command, May 2023, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3410337/usindopacomstatement-on-unprofessional-intercept-of-us-aircraft-over-south-chi/. 

vi Department of Defense Law of War Manual, Section 14.2.1 Lateral Boundaries of Airspace, December 2016, 

https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20%20June%202015%20Updated%20

Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190 [hereinafter DoD Law of War Manual].

vii In a zone contiguous to the territorial sea, the coastal State may take necessary measures to prevent and punish infringement of 

its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea. The contiguous zone 

may not extend beyond twenty-four nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. See 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 8 Internal Waters, December 1982 [hereinafter UNCLOS].

viii Id. at Articles 55–57.

ix Id. at Article 87. 

x Pedrozo, “The Legal Framework Applicable to Intrusive Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations in the Air and 

Maritime Domains” International Law Studies, Volume 99, Page 849, https://digitalcommons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3030&context=ils. 

xi UNCLOS, Articles 39, 56, 58, and 87.

xii See “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air to Air Encounter” Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of 

America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to 

Strengthen Military Maritime Safety, Section 4, September 2015 [hereinafter Annex 3]; DoD Law of War Manual, page 924. 

xiii See Garamone, “Defense Leaders See Increase in Risky Chinese Intercepts” U.S. Department of Defense, June 2023, 

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3421766/defense-leaders-see-increase-in-risky-chinese-intercepts/.

xiv See Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (ICAO), Article 3(d) (as applies to civilian aircraft), July 2005. See also

UNCLOS, Article 87 (regarding the freedom of overflight on the high seas), Article 58 (regarding overflight in the exclusive economic 

zone of a State), Article 39 (regarding aircraft in transit passage), and Article 54 (archipelagic sea lanes passage). 

xv See ICAO, Rules of the Air, Annex 2, para. 3.8, July 2005. See also Annex 3, Section 1.

xvi See Annex 3, Section 1.

xvii Lt. Gen. Russell J. Handy, Reinforcing International Norms is Key for Ensuring Safety and Security, February 2016, 

https://ipdefenseforum.com/2016/02/air-intercept-safety/.

xviii Id. 

xix Id. 

xx ICAO, Rules of the Air, Annex 2, Attachment A, July 2005. 

xxi Annex 3, Section 4.