United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Air and Land Forces, Committee on 

Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

DOD Needs a Joint 

and Integrated 

Investment Strategy 

April 2007 

 

GAO-07-415 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2007

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated 

Highlights of GAO-07-415, a report to the Investment Strategy 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Air and Land 

Forces, Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives

The Department of Defense (DOD)

plans to invest $109 billion in its 

tactical air forces between 2007

and 2013. Long term, DOD plans to

replace aging legacy aircraft with 

fewer, more expensive but more 

capable and stealthy aircraft. 

Recapitalizing and modernizing

tactical air forces within today’s 

constrained budget environment is 

a formidable challenge. DOD has 

already incurred substantial cost

and schedule overruns in its 

acquisition of new systems, and 

further delays could require billions 

of dollars in additional investments

to keep legacy aircraft capable and 

sustainable. 

Because of the large investments 

and risk, GAO was asked to review

investment planning for tactical

aircraft. This report describes the 

current status of DOD’s new 

tactical aircraft acquisition 

programs; identifies current 

impacts on legacy aircraft 

modernization programs and 

retirement schedules; and assesses 

DOD’s overall investment plan for 

tactical aircraft. 

What GAO Recommends

To achieve better outcomes in

acquisition programs and 

investment planning, GAO 

recommends that DOD (1) take

decisive actions to shorten cycle

times in developing and delivering 

new weapon systems and 

(2) develop an integrated and 

affordable enterprise-level 

investment strategy for tactical air 

forces. 

DOD’s efforts to recapitalize and modernize its tactical air forces have been 

blunted by cost and schedule overruns in its new tactical aircraft acquisition 

programs: the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the Air Force F-22A, and the Navy

F/A-18E/F. Collectively, these programs are expected to cost about 

$400 billion—with about three-fourths still to be invested. The JSF program, 

which is expected to make up the largest percentage of the new fleet, has 

more than 90 percent of its investments still in the future. Increased costs

and extended development times have reduced DOD’s buying power, and 

DOD now expects to replace legacy aircraft with about one-third fewer new 

aircraft compared to original plans at each program’s inception. 

The outcomes of these acquisition programs directly impact existing tactical

aircraft systems. Until new systems are acquired in sufficient quantities to 

replace legacy fleets, legacy systems must be sustained and kept 

operationally relevant. Continual schedule slips and reduced buys of new 

aircraft—particularly in the F-22A and JSF programs—make it difficult for 

program managers to allocate funds for modifying legacy aircraft to meet 

new requirements or to set retirement dates for legacy aircraft. Lengthening 

the life of legacy systems also impacts DOD’s new tactical aircraft 

acquisition programs. DOD has become increasingly concerned that the high 

cost of keeping aging weapon systems relevant and able to meet required 

readiness levels is a growing challenge in the face of forecast threats and 

reduces the department’s flexibility to invest in new weapons. 

DOD’s tactical aircraft investments are driven by the services’ separate 

acquisition planning. Moving forward, these plans are likely unexecutable 

given competing demands from future defense and non defense budgets. The 

EA-6B—providing tactical radar jamming capabilities for all services and one 

of the few examples of a joint asset—is also expected to be replaced by 

separate and unique aircraft for each of the services. Without a joint, DODwide strategy for tactical aircraft investments, it is difficult to identify 

potential areas where efficiencies might be achieved or where capability 

gaps might occur in DOD’s tactical aircraft acquisitions. 

Planned Changes in Tactical Aircraft Inventories 

Inventory 

2006

Inventory 

2025 

Inventory 

reduction

Percent 

reduction

Air Force 2,500 1,800 700 28%

Navy & Marine Corps 1,200 900 300 25%

Total 3,700 2,700 1,000 27%

Source: DOD data, GAO analysis. 

Note: These numbers are approximate to show relative changes in amounts. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-415.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Michael J. 

Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or 

sullivanm@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 3

New Acquisition Programs Are Spending Significantly More Dollars 

and Delivering Fewer Tactical Aircraft Later Than Originally 

Planned 7

New Acquisition Costs and Delays Have Made Resourcing 

Decisions for Legacy Systems Reactive and Less Efficient 13 

A Joint Enterprise- Level Investment Strategy for Tactical Aircraft 

Is Lacking As Services Plan Independently 20 

Conclusions 33

Recommendations for Executive Action 34 

Agency Comments and Our Response 35 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 38 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 39 

Appendix III Tactical Air Forces Funding Fiscal Years 2006 to 

2011 43 

Appendix IV A Summary of Tactical Aircraft Systems Ongoing 

and Future Efforts 44 

Appendix V GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements 78 

Related GAO Products 79 

Page i GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Tables 

Table 1: New Aircraft Replacing Legacy Fleets 5 

Table 2: New Systems Acquisition Costs and Quantities 8 

Table 3: Changes in Acquisition Quantities for New Tactical 

Aircraft Systems 9 

Table 4: Changes in Key Outcomes of New Tactical Systems 11 

Table 5: Total Investments in New and Legacy Tactical Aircraft 

from Fiscal Years 2007 to 2013 13 

Table 6: Air Force Legacy Aircraft Modernization Costs 17 

Table 7: Navy Legacy Aircraft Modernization Costs 19 

Table 8: Changes in Tactical Aircraft Inventories Fiscal Years 2006 

to 2025 21 

Table 9: F-22A Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget 47 

Table 10: Navy JSF Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget 51 

Table 11: Air Force JSF Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget 51 

Table 12: F/A-18 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget 55 

Table 13: EA-18G Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget 58 

Table 14: A-10 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget 61 

Table 15: F-15 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget 64 

Table 16: F-16 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget 67 

Table 17: F-117A Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget 69 

Table 18: EA-6B Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget 74 

Table 19: AV-8B Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget 77 

Figures 

Figure 1: DOD Investment in Tactical Air Forces 6 

Figure 2: Original Planned and Current Procurement Quantities for 

New Tactical Aircraft 10 

Figure 3: Operating Costs per Flying Hour for Air Force Tactical 

Aircraft 15

Figure 4: Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Aircraft Force Structure 23 

Figure 5: Air Force Tactical Aircraft Force Structure 25 

Figure 6: Projected Budgets for Tactical Aircraft 29 

Figure 7: F-22A Raptor 45 

Figure 8: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 48 

Figure 9: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet 52 

Figure 10: EA-18G Growler 56 

Figure 11: A-10 Warthog 59 

Figure 12: F-15A/B/C/D Eagle and F-15E Strike Eagle 62 

Figure 13: F-16 Fighting Falcon 65 

Page ii GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Figure 14: F-117A Nighthawk 68 

Figure 15: F/A-18A/B/C/D Hornet 70 

Figure 16: EA-6B Prowler 72 

Figure 17: AV-8B Harrier II 75 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

ICAP III Improved Capability electronic suite modification 

IOC initial operational capability 

JCIDS Joint Capabilities, Integration, and Development System 

JSF Joint Strike Fighter 

OSD Office of Secretary of Defense 

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 

RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 

STOVL short field take-off and vertical landing 

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Page iii GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

April 2, 2007

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Over the past three decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent 

$534 billion to develop, procure, and modify its tactical air forces. Tactical 

air forces are critical to achieving and maintaining air dominance during 

combat operations and account for a significant share of the defense 

dollar. After procuring large numbers of fighter and attack aircraft in the 

1970s and 1980s, DOD shifted its emphasis to procuring bombers, 

airlifters, and other systems. DOD now seeks to recapitalize and 

modernize its tactical air forces to ensure the total force has sufficient 

capabilities and capacity to meet operational requirements today and in 

the future. Over the next 20 years, DOD plans to replace several thousand 

aging tactical aircraft with a substantially smaller number of more 

expensive but more capable and stealthy new aircraft, while continuing to

modify and sustain its current fleets in order to keep them operationally 

viable until sufficient numbers of the new systems are fielded.

Over the past three decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent 

$534 billion to develop, procure, and modify its tactical air forces. Tactical 

air forces are critical to achieving and maintaining air dominance during 

combat operations and account for a significant share of the defense 

dollar. After procuring large numbers of fighter and attack aircraft in the 

1970s and 1980s, DOD shifted its emphasis to procuring bombers, 

airlifters, and other systems. DOD now seeks to recapitalize and 

modernize its tactical air forces to ensure the total force has sufficient 

capabilities and capacity to meet operational requirements today and in 

the future. Over the next 20 years, DOD plans to replace several thousand 

aging tactical aircraft with a substantially smaller number of more 

expensive but more capable and stealthy new aircraft, while continuing to

modify and sustain its current fleets in order to keep them operationally 

viable until sufficient numbers of the new systems are fielded.

Recapitalizing and modernizing tactical air forces to meet the warfighter’s

needs within today’s constrained budget environment is a formidable 

challenge. Our work in this area has shown that DOD has incurred 

substantial cost increases and delays in its acquisition of new systems. 

Further delays in delivering these aircraft, cost increases, and cuts in 

quantity could easily occur, meaning billions of dollars in additional 

investments could be needed to keep current (legacy) aircraft both 

capable and sustainable for longer periods of time than currently planned.

Recapitalizing and modernizing tactical air forces to meet the warfighter’s

needs within today’s constrained budget environment is a formidable 

challenge. Our work in this area has shown that DOD has incurred 

substantial cost increases and delays in its acquisition of new systems. 

Further delays in delivering these aircraft, cost increases, and cuts in 

quantity could easily occur, meaning billions of dollars in additional 

investments could be needed to keep current (legacy) aircraft both 

capable and sustainable for longer periods of time than currently planned.

Because of the costs, complexities, and interrelationships of the tactical 

air forces, and the need for greater insight, the Chairman of the Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee, House Committee on Armed Services, asked 

GAO to look at DOD’s investment planning for recapitalizing and 

modernizing its tactical fighter and attack aircraft force portfolio. This 

report addresses (1) current risks for DOD’s new tactical aircraft 

acquisition programs; (2) impacts on legacy aircraft modernization 

programs and retirement schedules; and (3) the extent to which DOD has 

Because of the costs, complexities, and interrelationships of the tactical 

air forces, and the need for greater insight, the Chairman of the Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee, House Committee on Armed Services, asked 

GAO to look at DOD’s investment planning for recapitalizing and 

modernizing its tactical fighter and attack aircraft force portfolio. This 

report addresses (1) current risks for DOD’s new tactical aircraft 

acquisition programs; (2) impacts on legacy aircraft modernization 

programs and retirement schedules; and (3) the extent to which DOD has 

Page 1 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
developed an overall investment plan for future tactical aircraft that 

addresses capability gaps, limits redundancies, and considers the timing 

and affordability of planned actions. To conduct our work, we evaluated 

new acquisition and legacy modification plans, budgets, retirement and 

delivery schedules, and results to date for recapitalizing and modernizing 

tactical air forces. We analyzed Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps plans 

and processes for establishing force and capability requirements and 

reviewed joint efforts and initiatives to look at integrated DOD-wide 

solutions. We also drew extensively on work conducted under other GAO 

engagements concerning weapon systems and force structure. We 

performed our work from June 2006 through March 2007 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I 

further discusses this report’s scope and methodology. 

During the next 7 years, the military services plan to spend about 

$109.3 billion to acquire about 570 new tactical aircraft and to modernize 

hundreds of operational aircraft. Substantial cost increases, schedule 

delays, and changes in requirements have significantly reduced 

procurement quantities of new aircraft. For example, since its start, the 

development period for the F-22A doubled, threat conditions changed, 

new ground attack and intelligence-gathering requirements were added, 

and its unit costs more than doubled, resulting in a steady decline in the 

number of aircraft the Air Force can now procure. Similar conditions and

risk of poor outcomes seem to be emerging for the Joint Strike Fighter 

(JSF). The JSF is the linchpin for future modernization efforts because of

its sheer size and plans to replace hundreds of operational systems in all 

three services. However, its development costs have increased by 

$31.6 billion since 2004, and procurement and delivery schedules are 

slipping. 

Results in Brief 

Funding needs and plans for new and legacy aircraft are by nature 

interdependent. Legacy systems must be sustained and kept operationally 

relevant until new systems complete development and are ready to replace 

them. If quantities of new aircraft are reduced and/or deliveries slip further 

into future years, significantly more as yet unplanned money will be 

required to sustain, modernize, and extend the life of legacy systems to 

ensure that the total force is both capable and sufficient in numbers. 

Uncertainty about new systems costs and deliveries makes it challenging 

to effectively plan and efficiently implement modernization efforts and 

legacy retirement schedules. Over the next seven years, the services are 

investing an average of about $1.7 billion per year on legacy modifications,

but there are large pent up demands—billions more—for unfunded 

Page 2 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
requirements and potential life extension programs identified by program 

officials. Officials said the time is approaching when hard decisions on 

retiring or extending the life of legacy aircraft must be made.

Looking forward, DOD does not have a single, comprehensive, and 

integrated investment plan for recapitalizing and modernizing fighter and 

attack aircraft. Lacking an integrated DOD-wide view of requirements, it 

is difficult to determine the extent of capability gaps and shortfalls, or, 

alternatively, duplication of capability. Rather, each military service 

operates largely within its own stovepipe to plan and acquire the resources 

needed to fill its individual force structure construct. In the Air Force’s 

case, it is the forces deemed necessary to fill its air and space 

expeditionary wings; for the Navy, its carrier strike forces; and for the 

Marines, its expeditionary forces. Collectively, the services have 

underperformed to date in terms of delivering aircraft within desired costs 

and quantities, and future plans are likely unaffordable within projected 

funding levels. Individual service plans are largely dependent on favorable 

assumptions about the cost, quantity, and delivery schedules for new 

acquisitions and the ability to increase and sustain future funding levels 

substantially above current levels. These favorable assumptions are not 

realistic when juxtaposed with projected decline in future federal 

discretionary spending (including defense investment accounts), 

continued operational support requirements for the global war on terror, 

and looming start-ups of other big-ticket defense items, such as a strategic 

tanker aircraft and next generation long-range strike systems, competing 

for the same funds. Recent efforts to examine joint requirements on an 

integrated, DOD-wide basis have not significantly affected service plans 

and investments. 

In order to recapitalize and sustain capable and sufficient tactical air 

forces that reflect what is needed and affordable from a joint service 

perspective and that has high confidence of being executed as planned, 

GAO is recommending that DOD (1) take decisive actions to shorten cycle 

times in developing and delivering new tactical aircraft and (2) develop an

integrated enterprise-level investment strategy for tactical air forces. 

Tactical air forces are critical to achieving and maintaining air dominance 

during combat operations. These forces include Air Force, Navy, and

Marine Corps fixed-wing fighters and attack aircraft with air-to-air combat, 

Background 

Page 3 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
air-to-ground attack, and defense suppression1

 missions, and related 

equipment and support activities. These forces operate in the first days of 

a conflict to penetrate enemy air space, defeat air defenses, and achieve 

air dominance. This allows follow-on ground, air, and naval forces 

freedom to maneuver and attack in the battle space. Once air dominance is 

established, tactical aircraft continue to vigorously and persistently strike 

ground targets for the remainder of the conflict. Some tactical aircraft are 

also essential to protect the homeland by defending against incoming 

missiles or enemy aircraft. 

Current operational tactical aircraft (referred to as legacy systems) are the 

Air Force’s F-15, F-16, F-117A, and A-10 systems and the Navy and Marine

Corps F/A-18, EA-6B, and AV-8B. Most of these aircraft were purchased in

the 1970s and 1980s and are considerably aged as measured by the number 

of flying hours accumulated by an aircraft compared to its estimated life 

expectancy. Weapon systems also tend to cost more to operate and 

maintain as they age. To meet national defense security requirements, 

DOD sustains its legacy fleets and also modernizes some with new 

capabilities and enhanced structures to keep aircraft operationally viable 

until new systems can be delivered in sufficient quantities and the legacies 

can be retired. 

DOD is continuing efforts to recapitalize its tactical air forces (replace 

legacy with new) by acquiring and fielding the Air Force’s F-22A, the 

Navy’s F/A-18E/F and EA-18G, and the joint service F-35 Joint Strike 

Fighter (JSF) weapon systems. Recapitalization plans began 20 years ago

with the start-up of the F-22A program and are now expected to take 

another 20 years or more to fulfill culminating with the final JSF 

procurements. The JSF is being developed in three variants for the U.S. 

and allied forces.2

 The Air Force’s version, a conventional take-off and 

landing aircraft, is intended to replace the F-16 and A-10 and complement 

the F-22A. The Navy’s carrier-capable version is intended to replace 

F/A-18C/D aircraft and complement the F/A-18E/F. The Marines Corps is 

acquiring a short field take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant to 

 1

Defense suppression is the neutralization, destruction, or temporary degradation of enemy

air defenses, either by physical attack with munitions or by electronic means to jam and 

confuse enemy radar. 

2

JSF is being developed jointly with eight other nations: United Kingdom, Italy, the

Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Norway. 

Page 4 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
replace its AV-8B and F/A-18D fleets. Table 1 shows the new aircraft with 

the legacy systems they are expected to replace.

Table 1: New Aircraft Replacing Legacy Fleets 

New tactical aircraft Legacy aircraft to be replaced

Joint Strike Fighter F-16 & A-10 (Air Force) 

F/A-18C/D (Navy) 

F/A-18D & AV-8B (Marine Corps) 

F-22A F-15C/D (Air Force) 

F/A-18E/F F/A-18A/B/C (Navy)

EA-18G EA-6B (Navy)

Source: DOD. 

Tactical Air Forces Costs Tactical air forces account for a significant share of the defense budget. 

DOD spends billions of dollars every year to develop, procure, and 

modernize its tactical air forces. Figure 1 shows the trend in actual and 

projected investment over the 36-year period from fiscal year 1976 to 2011. 

To reflect the trend in relative buying power, we normalized the data to

express costs in fiscal year 2007 dollars. The total investment for research, 

development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement during this 

time period approaches $1 trillion in constant dollars. The figure illustrates 

the large investments throughout the 1980s when most of the legacy fleets 

were acquired and the subsequent decrease in investment during the 1990s 

as DOD focused on other procurement priorities. The rise in investment 

starting in the mid-1990s reflects the build up and acquisition of the new 

systems. This data does not include another $3.3 billion requested by DOD 

for tactical aircraft in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental and fiscal year 

2008 budget request for the Global War on Terror. 

Page 5 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Figure 1: DOD Investment in Tactical Air Forces 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

In billions of fiscal year 2007 constant dollars

Fiscal year

Source: DOD historical budget data.

Procurement

RDT&E

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

199820002002

2004

2006

2008

2010

In addition to the large expenditures for development and procurement, 

the services spend billions more annually to operate, support, maintain, 

and man the tactical air forces. Over the past decade, the tactical air forces

share of the total defense budget has stayed remarkably consistent, 

annually receiving about 11 to 12 percent of the total DOD budget and 

about 15 to 16 percent of the investment appropriations. DOD 

programmed a total of $331.6 billion for personnel, operations and 

maintenance, military construction, and acquisition costs for the tactical 

air forces for fiscal years 2006 to 2011, an annual average of $55.3 billion. 

Appendix III shows the breakdown by military service and by 

appropriation. 

Page 6 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Midway through a 40-year effort to recapitalize and modernize its tactical 

air forces, DOD’s efforts have been blunted by relatively poor outcomes in 

its cornerstone new acquisition programs. Increased costs, extended 

development times, requirement changes, and budget pressures have 

reduced DOD’s buying power, and DOD now expects to replace legacy 

aircraft with about 1,500 fewer new tactical aircraft than it had originally 

planned—a reduction of one-third. Additionally, delivery of these new 

systems has lagged far behind original plans, not only delaying the fielding

of capabilities to the warfighter, but also increasing operating and 

modernization costs to keep legacy aircraft relevant and in the inventory

longer than expected. 

DOD’s recapitalization plans center on the acquisitions of the JSF, F-22A, 

F/A-18E/F, and its electronic attack variant, the EA-18G. Collectively, these 

programs are expected to cost about $400 billion—with almost threefourths still to be invested—to acquire about 3,200 aircraft (see table 2). 

Through the end of fiscal year 2006, Congress has appropriated about 

$111 billion, and the services have taken delivery on 480 new aircraft. 

Table 2 also shows that about 72 percent of the expected investment and 

85 percent of the planned procurement quantity is in the future. The F-22

and the F-18 series acquisition programs are expected to be mostly 

completed over the next five years, but the JSF program is only halfway 

through development with procurement starting in 2007 and continuing 

until 2034. With most of its program still ahead, its sheer size, and its 

tri-service impact, the JSF is, in many ways, the linchpin of DOD’s 

tactical aircraft future. 

New Acquisition 

Programs Are 

Spending Significantly 

More Dollars and 

Delivering Fewer 

Tactical Aircraft Later 

Than Originally 

Planned 

DOD Plans for New 

Aircraft and Their 

Implications for the Total 

Force 

Page 7 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Table 2: New Systems Acquisition Costs and Quantities 

(In millions of current year dollars) 

Prior years

Investments 

FY07-11 To complete Totals

JSF Costs $24,796.7 $41,688.1 $209,974.1 $276,458.9

Qty 1 202 2,255 2,458

F-22A Costs $50,224.7 $12,375.3 $0.0 $62,600.0

Qty 123 60 0 183

F/A-18E/F Costs $34,891.8 $9,592.8 $0.0 $44,484.6

Qty 352 110 0 462 

EA-18G Costs $1,429.2 $7,177.0 $564.6 $9,170.8

Qty 4 82 4 90 

Totals Costs $111,342.4 $70,833.2 $210,538.7 $392,714.3

Qty 480 454 2,259 3,193

Percent Costs 28% 18% 54%

Qty 15% 14% 71%

Source: Selected Acquisition Reports, Dec. 31, 2005. 

Note: F/A-18E/F and EA-18G costs include prorated shares of development costs for the Active 

Electronically Scanned Array Radar, funded in its own Navy program. 

Increased costs, schedule delays, and budget pressures have combined to 

decrease procurement quantities of new tactical aircraft. Total quantities 

have been reduced by one-third compared to original plans at each 

program’s inception (see table 3). 

Page 8 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Table 3: Changes in Acquisition Quantities for New Tactical Aircraft Systems 

Aircraft 

Original

Qty

Current 

Qty

Decreased

Qty

Percent

decrease

JSF 2,988 2,458 530 -18%

F-18 1,000 552 448 -45%

F-22 750 183 567 -76%

Totals 4,738 3,193 1,545 -33%

Source: DOD data, GAO analysis. 

Note: Current F-18 quantities include 462 F/A-18E/Fs and 90 EA-18G electronic attack variant. 

The cumulative impacts of delayed deliveries and reduced quantities on 

the total force (see fig. 2) have slowed the recapitalization of the legacy 

force and made it more expensive to modernize, operate, and maintain. 

Collectively, this means that the warfighters will have fewer of the newest 

and most capable aircraft throughout the recapitalization period. With 

fewer buys of new systems, legacy aircraft will make up a larger 

proportion of the future force and for a longer period of time than 

originally envisioned. Although legacy aircraft are still very capable—and 

will be expected to remain so through upgrades and life extension 

efforts—they are becoming increasingly more expensive to operate and

maintain. Service officials are confident that new systems will provide 

improved capabilities compared to legacy systems they replace, but worry 

whether the numbers of aircraft acquired are sufficient to meet national 

security requirements at an acceptable level of risk. They are also 

concerned with managing risks using legacy systems in the near- and 

mid-terms. 

Page 9 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Figure 2: Original Planned and Current Procurement Quantities for New Tactical Aircraft 

Cumulative aircraft orders

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Development plan

2005 plan

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

20142015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

Cost, Schedule, and 

Performance Issues for 

New Acquisition Programs 

Over the years, our extensive reviews of DOD’s major weapon system 

acquisitions have usually found positive outcomes when programs follow 

the evolutionary, knowledge-based strategy espoused by the best practices 

of leading commercial firms and now established in DOD policy. This 

includes establishing a solid business case that accurately and realistically

matches available resources (technologies, money, expertise, and time) to 

warfighter needs. The Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment 

report in January 2006 also found that a disciplined business approach was 

needed to improve DOD’s weapon system acquisition process. One 

particular and key practice recommended was for time-certain 

development programs—delivery of the first unit to operational forces 

within about six years from the Milestone A decision point.3

 We have

usually found poorer outcomes—significant cost increases, reduced 

 3

A project enters technology development at Milestone A. The purpose of this phase of

development is to reduce technology risk and to determine the appropriate set of 

technologies to be integrated into a full system. 

Page 10 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
procurement quantities, and schedule delays—in programs not following 

these practices. For example, immature technologies, design problems, 

and changes in threats and requirements underpinning the original 

business case, contributed to major cost increases for the F-22A program, 

a doubling of its years spent in development, and a sharp reduction in 

quantities deemed affordable. We are concerned that the JSF is on a 

similar risky path with highly concurrent plans to begin production while 

still early in development and with little testing completed. On the other 

hand, the F/A-18E/F program is employing a more evolutionary approach 

and is experiencing better cost and schedule outcomes. We have some 

concerns that its new electronic attack variant, the EA-18G, is pursuing a 

too-aggressive and more concurrent strategy, increasing its risks of poor 

program outcomes in the future. Table 4 summarizes outcomes to date on 

these four tactical aircraft programs. 

Table 4: Changes in Key Outcomes of New Tactical Systems 

Development 

cost changes

Quantity

reductions

Program unit 

cost increases

Cycle time 

delays

F-22A 47% 465 186% 27 mo.

JSF 29% 408 33% 23 mo.

F-18E/F (5)% 538 36% 12 mo.

EA-18G 8% 0 4% 0 mo.

Source: DOD data, GAO analysis. 

Notes: Outcome measures compare costs and plans established at the start of system development 

with current costs and plans. 

Cycle time delays show added months required to reach initial operational capability.

An overview of key observations on each new system follows. More details 

on each system’s mission, program status, major work activities, and 

funding are provided in appendix IV.

• The F-22A “Raptor” needs a new business case that more accurately 

and realistically supports the changed conditions and the program of 

record, including justification for additional investments of $6.3 billion 

to incorporate more robust ground attack and intelligence-gathering 

capabilities. There is a 198 aircraft difference between the Air Force’s 

stated need for 381 aircraft and the 183 aircraft the Office of Secretary 

of Defense (OSD) says is affordable. We have previously recommended 

that DOD develop a new business case for the F-22A program before 

further investments in new aircraft or modernization are made. DOD 

has not concurred with this recommendation, stating that an internal 

Page 11 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
study of tactical aircraft has justified the current quantities planned for 

the F-22A. Because of the frequently changing OSD-approved 

requirements for the F-22A, repeated cost overruns, significant 

remaining investments, and delays in the program we continue to 

believe a new business case is required and that the assumptions used 

in the internal OSD study be validated by an independent source. 

• The JSF “Lightning II” acquisition strategy’s high degree of concurrent 

development and production weakens its business case and poses 

substantial risks for cost overruns, schedule slips, and late delivery of 

promised capabilities to the warfighter. The program has contracted to 

deliver full capabilities for the three different variants in a single-step, 

12-year development program and plans to begin production in 2007 

with immature technologies, incomplete designs, undemonstrated 

system integration, and little knowledge about performance and 

producibility. Costs have increased another $31.6 billion from the fiscal 

year 2004 rebaselined amount. Due to affordability pressures, DOD is 

beginning to reduce annual procurement quantities; recent plans 

indicate a 28 percent decrease in maximum annual buy quantities 

compared to last year’s program of record. 

• The F/A-18E/F “Super Hornet” program adopted a more evolutionary 

and less risky approach, having substantial commonality with its 

predecessor C/D models and leveraging previous technology. Planned 

upgrades incrementally add new capabilities, some of which are having 

performance problems and delays according to OSD testers. Over half 

of the planned fleet has been delivered, and some have been used in 

combat. The mature and stable production program is on its second 

multiyear contract and is delivering aircraft ahead of the contract 

schedule and within cost targets. 

• The EA-18G “Growler” is the newest program and shares the same 

F/A-18F platform, but incorporates airborne electronic attack

capabilities. Its acquisition schedule is very aggressive and concurrent. 

Only two of its five critical technologies are fully mature to best 

practice standards even though the program is well into development 

and plans to start producing electronic attack-capable aircraft this year.

OSD’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation also cites its 

aggressive schedule to achieve an initial operational capability and 

special risks in integrating the electronic attack capabilities onto the 

F/A-18F platform. 

Page 12 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
The problems and delays encountered by the new tactical aircraft 

acquisition programs have direct and significant impacts on legacy 

systems plans and costs. Funding needs and plans for new and legacy 

aircraft are by nature interdependent, and decisions to sustain, modernize, 

or retire legacy systems are largely reactive to the outcomes of new 

systems. The military services accord new systems higher funding priority, 

and the legacy systems tend to get whatever funding is remaining after the 

new systems’ budget needs are met. If new aircraft consume more of the 

investment dollars than planned, the buying power and budgets for legacy 

systems are further reduced to remain within DOD budget limits. 

However, as quantities of new systems have been cut and deliveries to the 

warfighter delayed, more legacy aircraft are required to stay in the 

inventory and for longer periods of time than planned, requiring more 

dollars to modernize and maintain aging aircraft. Table 5 summarizes 

budgeted investments (development and procurement funding) for new 

and legacy systems. Over the next 7 years, DOD plans to invest about 

$109.3 billion in tactical aircraft to acquire about 570 new systems and 

modernize hundreds of legacy systems. 

New Acquisition 

Costs and Delays 

Have Made 

Resourcing Decisions 

for Legacy Systems 

Reactive and Less 

Efficient 

Table 5: Total Investments in New and Legacy Tactical Aircraft from Fiscal Years 2007 to 2013 

(In millions of dollars) 

New systems

Investments 

FY 2007-2013

Legacy systems

Air Force 

Investments

FY 2007-2013

Legacy systems

Navy/Marines

Investments

FY 2007-2013

JSF $60,418.6 A-10 $2,026.8 F/A-18A-D $3,527.9

F-22A $16,665.2 F-15A-D $2,667.8 E/A-6B $634.1

F/A-18E/F $13,083.6 F-16 $2,400.1 AV-8B $403.1

EA-18G $7,466.1 F-117A $16.0

Total new 

systems 

$97,633.5 Total legacy 

Air Force 

$7,110.7 Total legacy 

Navy/Marines

$4,565.1

Source: DOD data, GAO analysis. 

Notes: The Navy consolidates budgets for the F-18 series aircraft; accordingly, investment amount 

shown above for the new E/F models includes some development funding for the legacy A-D models, 

and the investment amount for the legacy models includes some modification funding for the new 

models. 

Total investments also include $3,320.0 million for tactical aircraft funding requested in the pending 

Fiscal Year 2007 Global War on Terrorism supplemental and the Fiscal Year 2008 Global War on 

Terror budget requests. 

Uncertainty about new systems costs and deliveries makes it difficult to 

effectively plan and efficiently implement modernization efforts and legacy 

retirement schedules. With unpredictable quantities and delivery 

schedules of the new systems, program managers for legacy aircraft are 

Page 13 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
challenged to balance reduced funds for modifications with requirements 

to keep legacy systems operational and relevant longer than they had

planned. Stable retirement plans are critical to effective management and 

efficient resource use, but in this environment retirement plans keep 

changing. Program managers are hard-pressed to allocate funds or set 

sunset schedules4

 for legacy fleets until the outcomes of new acquisitions 

are known. Furthermore, the longer the services retain legacy systems in 

their inventories, the more money they will need for operation and 

maintenance costs in order to keep legacy aircraft operational and 

relevant. DOD has become increasingly concerned that the high cost of 

keeping aging weapon systems relevant and able to meet required 

readiness levels is a growing challenge in the face of forecast threat 

capabilities and is depleting modernization accounts, reducing the 

department’s flexibility to invest in new weapons. 

Operating costs per flying hour for Air Force legacy systems are shown in 

figure 3. It illustrates that operation and maintenance costs typically 

increase as weapons systems age. It also shows the relatively high 

operating costs for the F-117A, a factor in the decision to retire that fleet 

early. Some officials believe that operating costs for new systems will be 

less expensive than the legacy systems they replace, but others challenge 

that notion, citing such factors as the higher technology, stealth 

characteristics, and private sector support arrangements. 

 4

Sunset schedules can be impacted by a statutory prohibition (10 U.S.C. 2244a) on making 

modifications to a weapon system within five years of its planned retirement. 

Page 14 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Figure 3: Operating Costs per Flying Hour for Air Force Tactical Aircraft 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Dollars in thousands

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

F-16 A-10 F-15 F117

Since legacy programs typically receive less funding than requested, 

program managers must prioritize and fund first those modifications that 

are absolutely necessary—ones that are related to safety of flight or that 

will cause the aircraft to be grounded. As a result, there are large pent up 

demands of unfunded requirements the warfighters report as necessary to

meet their mission requirements. Current estimates for unfunded 

modernization and sustainment requirements on legacy systems total 

several billions of dollars. The services are considering substantial service 

life extension programs and additional modernization enhancements for 

several of the legacy fleets, but many of these costs are not reflected in

current programmed budgets or have yet to be estimated. 

Some of these issues and concerns about legacy systems are not new, but 

perhaps have gained more immediacy because of their interdependency 

with the large scale new systems recapitalization efforts. GAO has 

Page 15 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
previously reported on the condition, program strategies, and funding for 

key existing DOD weapon systems, including tactical aircraft. Our 2005 

report5

 found that the military services had incomplete long-term 

strategies and funding plans for some systems, in that future requirements 

are not identified, studies are not completed, funding for maintenance and 

upgrades was limited, or replacement systems were delayed or not yet 

identified. We recommended that DOD reassess and report annually on its

near- and long-term programs for key systems until replacements are 

fielded. DOD partially concurred to reassess programs stating that it 

already does this in its planning, programming, budgeting, and execution

process. It did not concur that additional annually reporting to Congress of 

this information was necessary as they stated the annual budget 

submission already includes a balanced overall program within available

resources. 

The Air Force Is Increasing 

Investments in Legacy 

Systems to Keep Them 

Relevant and Capable 

The Air Force plans to invest more than $7.1 billion from fiscal year 2007 

to 2013 to modernize legacy aircraft (table 6). These investments are 

heavily influenced by the ability of the Air Force to complete its 

recapitalization strategy for the F-22A and the JSF aircraft as currently 

planned. Further reductions in quantities and delays in delivering these 

new aircraft will impact the number of legacy aircraft retained and the 

amount of time they must remain in service. Future investments beyond 

those shown, including service life extension efforts costing billions of 

dollars, may be required to keep legacy fleets relevant and operational 

longer. Officials said the time is approaching when hard decisions on 

retiring or extending the life of legacy aircraft must be made.

 5

GAO, Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Identify and Address Gaps and Potential Risks 

in Program Strategies and Funding Priorities for Selected Equipment, GAO-06-141

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 25, 2005). 

Page 16 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Table 6: Air Force Legacy Aircraft Modernization Costs 

(In millions of current year dollars) 

Prior Two

Years

Investments 

FY07-13 Totals

A-10 $225.4 $2,026.8 $2,252.2

F-15 (all series) $630.5 $2,667.8 $3,298.3

F-16 (all series) $985.4 $2,400.1 $3,385.5

F-117A $59.0 $16.0 $75.0

$1,900.3 $7,110.7 $9,011.0

Source: DOD data, GAO analysis. 

The following provides an overview of key observations on the Air Force 

legacy systems. Additional details on these systems are in appendix IV. 

• The Air Force will retain the A-10 “Warthog” fleet in its inventory much 

longer than planned because of its relevant combat capabilities—

demonstrated first during Desert Storm and now in the ongoing Global 

War on Terror. However, because of post-Cold War plans to retire the 

fleet in the early 1990s, the Air Force had spent little money on major 

upgrades and depot maintenance for at least 10 years. As a result, the 

Air Force faces a large backlog of structural repairs and 

modifications—much of it unfunded---and will likely identify more 

unplanned work as older aircraft are inspected and opened up for 

maintenance. Major efforts to upgrade avionics, modernize cockpit 

controls, and replace wings are funded and underway. Program 

officials identified a current unfunded requirement of $2.7 billion, 

including $2.1 billion for engine upgrades, which some Air Force 

officials say is not needed. A comprehensive service life extension 

program (if required) could cost billions more. 

• F-15 “Eagles” will not be fully or as quickly replaced by F-22As as 

planned. For years, the Air Force modification efforts and funds have 

been concentrated on about half the fleet—the number projected as 

required to complement the new F-22A aircraft. With the F-22A 

quantities now reduced, more F-15s need to be modernized and 

retained for longer periods of time. Officials identified near-term 

unfunded requirements of $2.3 billion and much more if life extension 

efforts are needed. The newest F-15E aircraft with enhanced strike 

capabilities will be retained even longer. The Air Force deferred the 

start up of a major radar upgrade effort costing $2.3 billion, and 

program officials identified another $1.7 billion in unfunded 

Page 17 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
requirements to address avionics, structural, and engine concerns 

among other efforts proposed for the F-15E. 

• Newer F-16 “Falcon” aircraft may be needed to stay viable and 

operational longer due to JSF schedule delays and deferrals. The F-16 

fleet consists of several different configurations that were acquired in a 

long and successful evolutionary program. The Air Force has invested 

billions over the years to upgrade capabilities, engines, and structural 

enhancements needed to achieve its original life expectancy of 

8,000 hours. The program office estimated $3.2 billion in unfunded 

requirements, including radar upgrades to the aircraft capable of 

suppressing enemy air defenses, the Air Force’s only platform for that 

mission. Significant unknowns exist about extending the life beyond 

8,000 hours should that be necessary. This makes any additional JSF 

schedule delays, deferrals, and cost growth very problematic for the 

overall Air Force fighter structure. 

• The Air Force plans to retire the F-117A “Nighthawk” stealth fighter in 

fiscal years 2007 and 2008, stating that there are other more capable

assets that can provide low observable, precision penetrating weapons 

capability. Program Budget Decision 720, dated December 2005, 

directed the Air Force to develop a strategy to gain congressional 

support for this plan. Program officials estimate that the drawdown of 

the fleet and the shutdown of government and contractor offices and 

facilities would cost approximately $283 million. There is currently no 

funding allocated for these retirement costs of the F-117A. This cost 

does not include storage and maintenance of the fleet after such a 

retirement. 

Plans for Navy and Marine 

Corps Legacy Systems Are 

Evolving and Likely to 

Require More Funding 

The Navy plans to invest about $4.6 billion in its legacy tactical aircraft 

over the next seven years (table 7). Officials are relying heavily on the 

acquisition of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the JSF as planned to 

complete its recapitalization strategy. Delays in the JSF program could 

require additional modifications beyond those already budgeted for the 

F/A-18C/D and AV-8B aircraft. Work on EA-6B aircraft is dependent on the 

timely delivery of the EA-18G Growler, its naval replacement, and on 

evolving Marine Corps plans for its future electronic attack capability. 

Page 18 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Table 7: Navy Legacy Aircraft Modernization Costs 

(In millions of current year dollars) 

Prior Two

Years

Investments 

FY07-13 Totals

F/A-18 (all series) $1,106.6 $3,527.9 $4,634.5

EA-6B $254.4 $634.1 $888.5

AV-8B $119.9 $403.1 $523.0

$1,480.9 $4,565.1 $6,046.0

Source: DOD data, GAO analysis. 

Note: The Navy consolidates budgets for the F/A-18 series; funding above includes some 

procurement modification funding for the new F/A-18E/F as well as the legacy F/A-18A/B/C/D aircraft. 

The following provides an overview of key observations on the Navy and

Marine Corps legacy systems. Additional details on these systems are in 

appendix IV.

• The F/A-18C/D “Hornet” fleet may be given extra life to ameliorate a 

fighter shortfall projected by Navy officials. Service officials are 

considering efforts to extend the life of the legacy aircraft until

replaced by the JSF. A service life assessment effort to be completed 

in December 2007 will determine the feasibility, scope of work, and 

total costs for extending the life of the system. A preliminary estimate, 

including the costs of the assessment, is about $2 billion, but officials 

said that number could very well increase substantially as the

assessment progresses and cost estimates mature. Also included in the 

above estimate is the Center Barrel Replacement to eliminate 

structural limitations caused by cracking in the central fuselage. This 

effort is about half completed and will cost about $970 million. A Naval 

Air Systems Command official said they could very well identify 

additional modifications and structural work required beyond what is 

funded. Further delays in JSF could exacerbate problems. 

• The Navy will retire its EA-6B “Prowler” aircraft by 2013 and replace

them with the new EA-18G, but the Marine Corps’s future plans are still 

evolving. The Navy will transition its most capable aircraft to the 

Marines who will operate and maintain them until retirement. The 

Marine Corps had planned to retire its EA-6B fleet starting in 2015, but 

officials said plans could change depending on the transition of aircraft 

from the Navy and that they may need to keep these aircraft in the 

inventory longer depending on the JSF delivery schedule. The Marine 

Corps has not yet made firm plans as to its future electronic attack 

capability and is considering employment of the JSF and other assets. 

Page 19 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
The Marine Corps has requested a total of $379 million in the fiscal year 

2007 global war on terrorism supplemental and the fiscal year 2008 

global war on terror request to upgrade an additional 18 EA-6Bs with 

the Improved Capability III electronic attack suite and for other 

modernization enhancements. 

• The Marine Corps wants to replace its entire AV-8B “Harrier” fleet with 

the JSF STOVL aircraft as expeditiously as possible. The Harrier—the 

original STOVL aircraft—is costly to maintain, and has a relatively high 

attrition rate. Program officials have budgeted very little future funds 

for Harrier modifications, but delays in JSF deliveries and possible 

cutbacks in quantity may require some redirection. Harriers may need 

to be retained in inventory longer than expected, but officials have not

determined the extent of work required, nor the potential cost. 

Between 1994 and 2001, the majority of AV-8Bs were remanufactured 

with new fuselages to add structural life and to accommodate night 

attack modifications and a higher performance engine. Currently, five

day attack aircraft are being upgraded to night attack capability, and 

two training aircraft are being refurbished. 

DOD does not have a single, integrated investment plan for recapitalizing 

and modernizing its tactical air forces. Rather, each service independently

develops its requirements and programs its resources to size and shape its 

individual force structure. These plans to date have underperformed in 

terms of higher acquisition costs and fewer quantities delivered, and 

officials from each service forecast near-term and future shortfalls in the 

capabilities and numbers of aircraft. Moving forward, projected plans are 

likely unaffordable given competing demands from future defense and 

nondefense budgets. 

A Joint EnterpriseLevel Investment 

Strategy for Tactical 

Aircraft Is Lacking As 

Services Plan 

Independently 

Efforts to build a more joint position continue with some promise, but 

recent studies did not significantly impact service acquisition plans. 

Without a joint, integrated investment strategy for tactical aircraft that 

plans and addresses requirements on a DOD enterprise-wide basis, it is 

difficult to evaluate the efficacy and severity of capability gaps or, 

alternatively, areas of redundancy. Also, it is difficult to fully account for 

and assess real and potential contributions from other current and future 

non-tactical systems providing similar capabilities, including bombers, 

missiles, and unmanned aircraft. 

Page 20 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
The national defense strategy, which comes from an enterprise level in 

DOD, requires the services to be able to successfully and simultaneously 

defend the homeland, win two overlapping major contingencies, operate in

forward locations around the world to deter aggression, and handle lesser 

operations as needed such as humanitarian and peace-keeping missions. 

Defense strategy continues to evolve with an increased emphasis on the 

“long war”—the Global War on Terror--and other asymmetric operations

and a reduced emphasis on major theater combat and conventional 

adversaries. 

Services Plan Tactical 

Aircraft Investments 

Independently 

While OSD and the joint staff provide oversight and may make 

adjustments, each military service is primarily responsible for assessing 

tactical aircraft requirements, sizing its force structure, developing 

investment plans, and programming resources to meet its individual 

assignments within the total national defense policy requirements.6

 The 

future forces planned by the military services will be smaller than today’s 

force, but more capable and stealthier, according to officials (see table 8). 

Even so, Service officials are forecasting shortfalls in force structure 

capabilities and numbers throughout this period. 

Table 8: Changes in Tactical Aircraft Inventories Fiscal Years 2006 to 2025 

Inventory 

2006

Inventory 

2025 

Inventory 

reduction

Percent 

reduction

Air Force 2500 1800 700 28%

Navy & Marine Corps 1200 900 300 25%

Total 3700 2700 1000 27%

Source: DOD data, GAO analysis. 

Note: These numbers are approximate to show relative changes. 

Two important factors in sizing and shaping forces are the types of forces

and systems needed (capabilities) and the overall size of the force to meet 

operational demands (capacity). This means maintaining a force structure 

that not only has modern systems with advanced capabilities to meet 

projected threats, but also has enough assets to cover assigned targets, 

threats, and territories. Each Service also wants to size their force 

 6

While aircraft investment budgets are consolidated at the Department of the Navy level, 

the Navy and Marine Corps largely plan independently to fill individual force structure

requirements. 

Page 21 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
structure to enable them to employ rotational plans that cycle force 

packages through sequential phases of active deployment, return from 

deployment to reconstitute, and preparation for the next deployment. 

The Navy sizes and shapes its tactical fighter requirements to fill 10 

carrier strike forces. Each future force would comprise 44 aircraft— 

24 F/A-18 E/Fs and 20 carrier capable Joint Strike Fighters—with 

equivalent capabilities and a mix of stealthy and non stealthy aircraft. 

EA-18Gs will also be assigned to carriers to provide tactical jamming 

support for the strike force. 

Department of the Navy Future 

Tactical Aircraft Plans 

Marine Corps fighter squadrons are attached to Marine expeditionary units 

and are sized and positioned to provide direct fire support and protection

to front-line forces and reinforcements. The future Marine Corps combat 

air force is tied to success of the JSF acquisition program as officials plan

to have an all-JSF force in the future. The future force will also have 

40 percent fewer aircraft assigned to each infantry battalion.

In 2003, the Department of the Navy began implementing a tactical air 

integration plan to address affordability concerns. The plan was aimed at 

more closely integrating Navy and Marine Corps strike fighter inventories, 

in effect managing tactical air assets as a common pool. The Navy 

projected net savings of $18.5 billion through fiscal year 2021 by reducing 

the number of operational legacy fighters required and, in turn, the 

number of new aircraft needed for recapitalization. This reduced future 

procurement plans by 409 JSFs and 88 F/A-18E/F aircraft. At the same 

time, it was recognized that integration would increase operating and

maintenance costs because the smaller number of aircraft would need to

be maintained at higher rates of readiness in order to meet emergency

surge deployments. 

Actual and planned inventory levels for combined Navy and Marine Corps 

tactical aircraft from fiscal year 1990 through fiscal year 2025 are shown in 

figure 4. The Department of the Navy tactical aviation forces peaked in the

early 1990s at about 1,800 aircraft and shrunk to about 1,200 by 2006, 

principally through retirement of the A-6 fleet and beginning draw downs 

on the F-14 fleet. By 2025, the total tactical inventory is slated to decrease 

another 300 aircraft, or 25 percent (refer back to table 8). Therefore, the 

total inventory in 2025 is projected to be one-half the inventory in the early 

1990s. Legacy aircraft would be virtually replaced by the more capable

new systems.

Page 22 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Figure 4: Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Aircraft Force Structure 

Number of aircraft

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

JSF

EA-18G

F/A-18E-F

F/A-18A-D

F-14A-D

EA-6B

AV-8B

A-6E

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

20082010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

20222024

Shortfalls Forecast by Navy and Marine Corps Officials 

Navy officials are projecting persistent future shortfalls in both legacy and 

new FA-18 aircraft. The amounts of the shortfall vary depending on two 

key variables—the rate of procurement on the Joint Strike Fighter and 

service life estimates for F/A-18s. Navy and Marine Corps officials told us 

that buying the JSF at the current planned rate—requiring a ramp-up to 

50 aircraft per year by fiscal year 2015—will be difficult to achieve and to

afford, particularly if costs continue to increase and schedules slip. 

According to one study, a likely scenario assumes acquiring fewer JSFs 

annually and achieving a modest increase in flying hour life for legacy 

F/A-18C/Ds; this scenario would project shortfalls starting in 2010 and 

peaking at 167 legacy strike fighters by 2017. Navy officials also project a 

shortfall of 131 F/A-18E/Fs by 2024 based on estimated usage, attrition, 

and assuming an increase in flying hour life from 6,000 to 9,000 hours. 

Options to erase these shortfalls include buying more new aircraft and 

extending the life of legacy aircraft. 

Page 23 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Marine Corps officials project a near-term shortfall in the AV-8B fleet 

ranging from 8 to 14 aircraft between fiscal years 2006 to 2011. Erasing this 

shortfall after 2011 depends upon acquiring the JSF STOVL in the numbers 

and time frames currently planned. According to officials, a one-year slide

in the JSF schedule increases the shortfall by approximately three aircraft

per year. As a result, the fleet would need to examine squadron structure 

and additional reductions to aircraft would be expected to negatively 

impact deployment capabilities. 

The Air Force sizes its tactical air forces to meet warfighting requirements. 

In order to fill peacetime defense needs, the Air Force schedules ten air 

and space expeditionary forces, the planned organizations of Air Force 

aircraft, personnel, and support for operations and deployments. These 

individual force constructs are applied against rotational national security 

requirements. The Air Force’s future plan for combat aircraft that is 

believed affordable is termed the programming force and is shown in 

figure 5. 

Department of the Air Force 

Future Tactical Aircraft Plans 

This plan assumes buying the 183 F-22As deemed affordable by OSD and 

the current program of record for the JSF, but with a slowdown in fielding. 

The programming plan projects the total number of tactical aircraft 

decreasing by about 700 aircraft--from 2,500 currently to about 1,800 in 

2025 (refer back to table 8). This plan continues the overall decline in

inventory since 1990 when the Air Force fielded about 4,000 tactical

aircraft. The programming force shows significant quantities of A-10 and

F-15C/D/E aircraft remaining in the force by 2025 with phased drawdown 

of all F-16s. The 2025 force is now projected to be roughly 60 percent new 

systems and 40 percent legacy systems. This is a significant shift from 

earlier projections which had planned on an almost all new force. This 

shift reflects changes due to the cuts in total F-22A purchases and the 

reduced annual buys of JSF with consequent slowdown in fielding. 

Page 24 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Figure 5: Air Force Tactical Aircraft Force Structure 

Number of aircraft

Source: DOD data, GAO analysis.

JSF

F-22

F-117

F-16

F-15E

F-15

A-10

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

Shortfalls Forecast by Air Force Officials 

Officials at Air Combat Command--the requirement-setting command that 

supports the warfighter--told us that the programming (funded) force is 

not sufficient to meet national security requirements at acceptable levels 

of risk. According to these officials, the funded program would support 

only 100 combat aircraft (tactical fighters and bombers) in each air and 

expeditionary force compared to 150 aircraft today. While the new 

systems are expected to provide improved capabilities compared to the 

legacy systems they replace, officials do not think the force would have 

sufficient capacity to cover future security needs with acceptable risks. 

Air Combat Command develops another force plan known as the vision 

force (later reworked into a planning force by Air Force headquarters) that 

the requiring command believes provides the right mix and numbers to 

meet future needs at an acceptable level of risk. This plan would procure 

the full complement of JSFs and the Air Force’s stated requirement for 

Page 25 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
381 F-22As, which would allow a full operational squadron to be assigned

to each of the 10 air and space expeditionary forces. Under this plan, 

almost all legacy aircraft would be retired by 2025 with the exception of 

the F-15E, the latest model in the F-15 series that has an enhanced strike

capability. This plan is not constrained by resources, and command 

officials estimated it would cost more than $100 billion over the funding 

levels currently expected through 2025. 

Affordability of LongRange Plans Is 

Questionable 

Looking forward over the next 20 years, DOD’s collective tactical aircraft

recapitalization plans are likely not affordable as currently planned. 

Acquisition strategies and plans assume favorable assumptions about cost

and schedule and the ability to sustain funding at high levels over a 

considerable period of time. Historically, however, costs increase; 

quantities are reduced; and delivery schedules are delayed. The JSF 

program represents 90 percent of the investments to go for new tactical 

aircraft and projected plans are likely unaffordable given projected future 

budget constraints and competing demands. 

First, plans for new systems are based on conservative estimates of future 

cost growth to complete the programs but optimistic estimates on the 

availability of future funding, production rates, and quantities of new 

aircraft delivered to the warfighter on time. While it is understandable to

project that programs will execute to cost and quantity targets as planned,

the prevailing and historical evidence suggests otherwise. In 1997 we 

reported7

 that the historical average cost growth of major acquisition 

systems was at least 20 percent. Our annual assessment of weapon 

systems8

 continue to show today that many programs cost more, take 

longer to develop, and deliver fewer assets than planned. While the 

F/A-18E/F program has generally executed to schedule, the F-22A did 

not, and we believe the recent cost escalation and potential delays in 

production indicate that the JSF is on a similar path. Air Force and Marine

Corps officials told us that the planned maximum procurement rates for 

the JSF will be very difficult to sustain and there are already pressures to

reduce or delay procurement before it even begins. The fiscal year 2008 

budget has reduced near-term quantities and current planning projections 

 7

GAO, Aircraft Acquisition: Affordability of DOD’s Investment Strategy, 

GAO/NSIAD-97-88, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8, 1997). 

8

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 

GAO-07-406SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007). 

Page 26 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
suggest that the Air Force will significantly reduce annual procurement 

quantities midterm in the program and defer these aircraft to later years, 

extending the procurement period by 7 years. 

Second, the tactical aircraft plans do not consider billions in potential 

added costs for legacy systems. As discussed earlier in this report, 

substantial service life extension programs and additional modernization 

enhancements are under serious consideration for many of the legacy 

fleets. Some of these costs are not reflected in current programmed 

budgets or have yet to be estimated. For example, the Navy is considering 

options to extend the life of its F/A-18 fleets, but has not yet developed 

comprehensive cost estimates. An initial estimate is for $2 billion, but an 

official told us the cost will likely be much larger. The Air Force is now 

planning to keep the A-10 in inventory for a longer period of time, but the 

full costs to extend the life are not known, and some other potential costs,

including $2.1 billion to improve the engines, are not funded. One estimate 

for extending the A-10’s life in total was $4.4 billion. We also learned that 

$283 million to retire the F-117A during fiscal years 2007 and 2008 has not

yet been funded, and given officials’ comments about unstable divestiture 

schedules and changing retirement dates, it may be the case that other 

programs have also not factored in retirement costs to close contractor 

facilities and government programs. Furthermore, as legacies remain in 

the operational force longer, substantial funding for additional 

sustainment costs and annual operating and maintenance costs will be 

necessary, particularly if plans to defer JSF procurements are 

implemented. 

Third, tactical aircraft plans will face increasing competition for the 

defense dollar from other new procurements and from continuing costs 

for the Global War on Terror. DOD is planning the start-up of several 

big-ticket items including a new strategic tanker aircraft, a next generation 

strike aircraft, unmanned aircraft, and other more transformational 

programs. Projected costs for ongoing military operations in the Global 

War on Terror will continue to put pressure on defense investment 

accounts and are also expected to increase the share of the total budget

going to ground forces which could decrease the share for aviation 

programs. Flat or lower funding levels and future systems that can 

perform the same or similar tactical air missions may substantially alter 

the ultimate mix, timing, and rate at which combat aircraft are acquired. 

Page 27 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Fourth, any questions on affordability must be viewed in a larger context

relative to federal spending, demographic trends, and impacts on 

discretionary funding. The Comptroller General testified9

 last year on the 

nation’s unsustainable fiscal path and its large and growing structural 

deficit due primarily to known demographic trends, rising health care 

costs, and lower federal revenues as a percentage of the economy. Federal 

discretionary programs, including defense spending, will face serious 

budget pressures. Even so, defense programs are commanding larger 

budgets. Over the past 5 years, the department has doubled its planned 

investments in new weapon systems from about $700 billion in 2001 to 

nearly $1.4 trillion in 2006. 

The Congressional Budget Office evaluated the long-term implications of 

defense plans and determined that current investment plans would require 

sustained funding levels at higher real (inflation-adjusted) amounts than 

since mid-1980s, due to sustained purchase of new equipment, increased 

costs for new capabilities, increased operations and maintenance costs for 

aging legacy systems, and costlier new systems. At the same time, the 

Congressional Budget Office notes that increased medical and operating 

support costs competing for the defense dollar and national demographic 

trends will continue to put pressure on federal discretionary spending. 

Figure 6 illustrates the affordability challenge. It contrasts DOD’s 

optimistic future-funding plans with a more conservative estimate. DOD’s 

plan (top-line in figure 6) assumes funding levels well above historical 

amounts. The spike in funding required starting in 2008, clearly shows the 

typical bow wave effect in which weapon system budget requirements 

tend to move to the right (delayed to future years) as programs fail to 

receive full funding or do not execute as planned. DOD’s projections show 

an optimistic bent that tactical aircraft procurement will be able to 

significantly increase its share of defense funding, exceeding historical 

levels when many project flat or falling funding levels. The lower line 

(shaded portion of fig. 6) assumes funding at the same level as fiscal year 

2006 carried forward with annual inflationary increases. This more 

conservative projection is in line with historical experience. Our analysis 

of future-year defense plans indicates that the military services in total and 

the tactical aircraft procurement in particular have received similar shares 

of the defense dollar over time, a finding that argues against a strategy that

 9

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Get Better Results on Weapons Systems 

Investments, GAO-06-585T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 5, 2006).

Page 28 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
requires a substantial increase in order to succeed. The gap between the 

lines thus represents DOD plans that are likely unaffordable. 

Figure 6: Projected Budgets for Tactical Aircraft 

Dollars in billions

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

DOD fiscal year 2007 future years defense program plus growth

GAO projection fiscal year 2006 plus growth

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

20132014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Efforts to Build Forces 

from a Joint Perspective 

Continue, but Recent 

Studies Have Not Had 

Substantial Impacts on 

Acquisition Plans 

DOD continues broad efforts to improve jointness and bring a more 

integrated cross-service perspective to its plans and programs. There are 

promising, but still rather new efforts to enhance capabilities-based 

planning and portfolio management that could be used to better integrate 

and hone joint tactical aircraft requirements. However, recent efforts to 

apply jointness to tactical aircraft have not had much direct impact on 

service investment plans and strategies. We also note that one of the few 

mission capabilities that have been provided jointly, the tactical airborne 

electronic attack mission carried out by the EA-6B, is now expected to be

replaced in the future by separate and unique aircraft for each of the 

services. 

DOD has several promising efforts to enhance jointness and bring a 

capabilities-based approach to defense investments. The Joint 

Capabilities, Integration, and Development System (JCIDS), portfolio 

New Planning Efforts Show 

Promise 

Page 29 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
management, and other initiatives are evolving mechanisms designed to 

bring top commanders’ needs up-front and take a more joint, enterprisewide view of requirements and funding decisions. Continuing efforts to 

develop joint capabilities-based assessment and planning methodologies 

will be essential to understand contributions to the warfighter, develop 

DOD-wide priorities, and craft investment strategies to mitigate shortfalls 

or eliminate duplication.

JCIDS is a major, but relatively new initiative to shift from a servicecentric focus on individual acquisition programs to a more top-down and 

joint view of warfighting capabilities and effects. JCIDS is intended to 

involve a wide range of stakeholders, including combatant commanders, in 

identifying capability needs and alternative solutions. JCIDS introduces 

new methodologies intended to foster jointness and groups warfighting 

needs into eight functional areas based on warfighting capabilities—such 

as, force application, battle-space awareness, and focused logistics10—that 

cut across the military services and defense agencies. JCIDS process 

emphasizes early attention to the fiscal implications of newly identified 

needs, including identifying ways to pay for new capabilities by divesting 

the department of lower priority or redundant capabilities. Our recent 

report11 discusses JCIDS and other steps DOD is taking to better identify 

and prioritize joint warfighting needs, but finds that DOD’s service-centric 

structure and fragmented decision-making processes hinder successful 

implementation. 

Another promising and related initiative is joint capability portfolio 

management. The intent is to manage groups of like capabilities across the 

enterprise to improve interoperability, minimize capability redundancies 

and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness. This would help build 

budgets around a set of capabilities instead of traditional military 

accounts. The idea is to take a more joint look at what capabilities 

combatant commanders and warfighters need, as opposed to the current 

more service-centric way in which the services independently buy and 

field capabilities they deem important. By shifting the focus from servicespecific programs to joint capabilities, DOD should be better positioned to

 10The other capability areas are command and control, net centric warfare, force 

management, force protection, and joint training. 

11GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System 

Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-388 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 30, 2007). 

Page 30 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
understand the implications of investment and resource trade-offs among 

competing priorities. In September 2006, DOD management selected four 

test cases for experimentation with the joint capability portfolio 

management concept. Depending on this outcome, tactical aviation would 

appear to be an excellent candidate for portfolio management by crossdecking similar capabilities in each service. Although the implementation 

of these portfolio management initiatives seems to have the potential for 

improving interoperability and minimizing capability redundancies and 

gaps, DOD still has a long way to go before the effectiveness of this 

capability-based planning and management effort can be determined. 

The Air Force is also implementing a new “associate wing” concept that is

similar in its aims as the Navy-Marine Corps integration effort. Associate 

wings would pair up active and reserve component units to share the same 

aircraft and facilities, while retaining separate chains of command. Rather 

than each unit’s operating and maintaining its own wings, the two would 

now operate and maintain just one wing in common. While still very new, 

the expected outcomes would be reduced inventories, reduced operating 

costs, and fewer future replacements needed. 

Despite the Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) and other studies, there

are many unanswered questions about whether services can achieve 

overarching goals for modernizing aging tactical aircraft fleets. In 

testimony on the results of the department’s 2006 QDR, the Secretary of 

Defense stated that continued U.S. air dominance depends on a 

recapitalized fleet. Surprisingly, however, DOD’s 2006 QDR report, issued 

in February 2006, did not present a coherent joint investment strategy for 

tactical aircraft systems that addressed needs, capability gaps, 

alternatives, and affordability. The Joint Strike Fighter, the largest aircraft 

acquisition program, was not mentioned and the F-22A only in relation to

multi-year contracting. The QDR report did include some non prescriptive 

direction for joint air capabilities, emphasizing systems with greater range 

and persistence, larger and more flexible payloads, and the ability to 

penetrate and sustain operations in denied areas. 

Joint Studies Have Not Been 

Very Directive 

In a 2005 testimony,12 we suggested that the QDR would provide an 

opportunity for DOD to assess its tactical aircraft recapitalization plans 

and weigh options for accomplishing its specific and overarching goals. By 

 12GAO, Tactical Aircraft: F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Plans and Implications for 

Tactical Aircraft Modernization,GAO-05-519T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2005). 

Page 31 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
not specifically addressing these issues, the DOD missed an opportunity.

With limited information contained in the QDR report, many questions are 

still unanswered about the future of DOD’s tactical aircraft modernization 

efforts. 

In addition, DOD conducted a joint air dominance study that looked at 

current acquisition plans and capabilities. While it validated the need for 

three JSF variants, the study did not receive wide services support. Air 

Force officials said they submitted their own recommendations that were 

not adopted. Another consultant study, directed by the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense and intended to replicate the Navy-Marine Corps integration 

effort on a DOD-wide basis, also appears not to have had much direct 

impact on altering service acquisition plans going forward. 

In conducting military operations, U.S. and allied aircraft can be at great 

risk from enemy air defenses, such as surface to air missile systems. The 

airborne electronic attack mission employs specialized aircraft to 

suppress, destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy radars and 

communications and is a critical enabler to successful tactical air 

operations. Because these specialized aircraft protect aircraft of all 

services in hostile airspace, the electronic attack mission crosses 

individual service lines. DOD considers airborne electronic attack to be a 

key capability for many contingencies and predicts increasing roles and 

missions for aircraft with these capabilities. Since 1995, the EA-6B has 

been DOD’s only tactical standoff radar jammer aircraft and has provided 

support to all services during numerous joint and allied operations against 

both traditional and nontraditional threats. 

Joint Tactical Radar Jamming 

Mission May End 

This capability—one of the few examples of a truly joint asset shared by 

the military services—is now expected to diminish, to be replaced by

separate and unique aircraft for each of the services. Concerned about a 

gap in defense suppression capabilities as a consequence of increasing 

modernization of enemy air defenses and aging of the EA-6B, DOD 

conducted an analysis of alternatives for airborne electronic attack. The 

May 2002 report concluded that the EA-6B inventory would be insufficient 

to meet DOD’s future needs and identified many potential platform 

combinations to address capability shortfalls. DOD adopted a system-ofsystems approach in which a multitude of systems are needed to provide 

required capabilities across the electronic spectrum. The report stated that 

before a service can begin a formal acquisition program, services decisions 

should consider whether one service will provide DOD’s core capability 

and whether it would reside in a single platform. 

Page 32 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Subsequent to the report, the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps each 

decided to develop individual and unique electronic attack capabilities to 

replace the EA-6B in the stand-off tactical jamming role. The Navy is 

developing the EA-18G, but plans to procure only enough to support its 

carrier strike forces. The Air Force initially proposed a modified B-52 for

the standoff radar jamming role. With OSD concurrence, the Air Force 

cancelled this program because of its high estimated costs, and is now 

considering other options. In the near-term, the Marine Corps will 

continue to use upgraded EA-6B aircraft, but anticipates using in the 

future an electronic attack-capable Joint Strike Fighter integrated with 

unmanned aerial systems. There is an OSD directed study underway to 

validate the services’ requirements. 

While DOD continues to tout joint capabilities, it is a concern that one 

area of success is being curtailed. A September 2004 memorandum of 

understanding between the military services and joint staff stated that the 

Navy expeditionary EA-6B squadrons will decommission between fiscal 

years 2009 and 2012 to be replaced by indigenous Navy, Air Force, and 

Marine Corps electronic attack capability. DOD continues to assess 

requirements and options. 

Tactical air recapitalization and modernization is a costly and very 

challenging enterprise, requiring a delicate and dynamic balancing of 

funding, fielding schedules, and retirement plans between new system 

acquisitions and legacy aircraft to ensure that current and future forces 

can meet national security requirements at reasonable levels of risk. New 

tactical aircraft programs, for the most part, have not adequately employed

evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition strategies—resulting in 

escalating costs that undercut DOD’s buying power, reduces aircraft 

purchases, and delays delivering needed capabilities to the warfighter. 

Because funding needs and plans for new and legacy aircraft programs are 

interdependent, cost, schedule, or performance problems experienced in

acquiring new systems cause perturbations in modernization costs and 

retirement schedules throughout the operational fleets. Dependent largely 

on the future course of the Joint Strike Fighter, legacy programs are 

placed in reactive modes with uncertain and changeable future 

requirements, unstable retirement plans, and potential unfunded 

requirements in the billions of dollars. While the services strive to reduce 

war-fighting risks by fielding new systems and limiting investment in 

legacy systems, they are faced with increased prices and schedule risks for 

new aircraft while maintaining aging, capability-limited legacy aircraft. In 

the past, we have recommended the department use an evolutionary 

Conclusions 

Page 33 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
acquisition approach to develop weapon system programs coupled with a 

process that ensures at the start of development that requirements have 

been reduced to match mature technologies, a feasible design, and a 

reasonable expectation of available funding. While the department’s 

acquisition policy has included such practices, DOD has not fully 

embraced the use of these practices as it executes current acquisition 

programs. 

Despite DOD’s repeated declaration that recapitalizing its aging tactical 

aircraft fleet is a top priority, the department does not have a single, 

comprehensive, and integrated investment plan to adequately craft joint 

priorities, identify critical capability gaps, and allocate scarce funds. 

Instead, planning has been separately done by the services. Each military 

service independently plans and resources individual programs that, 

collectively, are likely unaffordable and that make it difficult to identify 

and quantify DOD-wide capability gaps or duplication. DOD needs to bring 

overall tactical aircraft investments into line with more realistic, long-term 

projections of overall defense funding and the amount of procurement 

funding expected to be available for aircraft purchases, and then establish 

and adhere to a plan that is militarily justified and can be executed within 

that amount. Efforts to improve joint capabilities-based planning and to 

manage tactical air assets as a portfolio should be encouraged. 

In order to recapitalize and sustain capable and sufficient tactical air 

forces that reflect what is needed and affordable from a joint service 

perspective and that has high confidence of being executed as planned, 

we are making two recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. The 

Secretary should 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• take decisive actions to shorten cycle times in delivering needed 

combat capabilities to the warfighter including 

• adopting a time-certain development cycle that can deliver an 

increment of new capability within 5 to 6 years after the start of 

system design and development; and 

• reassessing requirements for ongoing weapon system acquisition 

programs to identify ways to reduce requirements and speed up

delivery of initial capabilities; and 

• develop an integrated enterprise-level investment strategy that

• is based on a joint assessment of warfighting needs and a full set of 

potential and viable alternative solutions, considering not only new 

Page 34 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
acquisitions but also modifications to legacy aircraft to achieve this 

balance within realistic and affordable budget projections for DOD; 

• strikes a balance between maintaining near-term readiness and 

addressing long-term needs; and 

• considers the contributions of bombers, long range strike aircraft, 

unmanned aircraft, missiles, and other weapons currently in the 

inventory and those planned that can be employed to attack the 

same type targets as the tactical aircraft. 

DOD concurred with both recommendations in written comments on a 

draft of this report. These comments appear in appendix II. They also 

provided technical comments that we incorporated in the final report as

appropriate.

Agency Comments 

and Our Response 

Regarding our first recommendation that DOD take decisive actions to 

shorten cycle times in developing and delivering weapon systems, DOD 

stated that this is consistent with a major initiative of the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics intended to put 

military capability into the hands of the warfighters faster and more 

affordably. The Department is also pursuing other efforts supporting such 

actions, including acquisition personnel pay incentives, acquisition policy 

changes, focused research and engineering investments in technology, and 

revised, earlier in-process reviews of requirements and proposed solutions 

by OSD and Joint Staff. At the same time, however, DOD stated that 

aircraft development is a highly complex engineering challenge and that it

would be unreasonable to uniformly apply a six year cycle time to 

complex programs like the JSF. 

We think that it is precisely because of complexity that programs like the 

JSF could stand to benefit most from adopting a more evolutionary 

acquisition process to develop and evolve weapon systems through small, 

time-phased development increments. DOD’s history of substantial cost 

growth and extended development times for major weapon systems 

acquisitions were factors driving recent policy changes to require a more 

knowledge-based evolutionary process with time-phased development 

increments—key recommendations also in the Defense Acquisition 

Performance Assessment report. We note that the JSF’s predecessor, the 

F-16 fighter program, delivered an initial increment of capability to the 

warfighter within about 4 years after development began and then 

successfully delivered 2,200 aircraft with incremental improvements as 

technology became available over the span of about 30 years. We believe 

this alternative, less risky and more evolutionary approach is feasible and

Page 35 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
still available to the JSF as it seeks to develop multiple variants to 

recapitalize aging tactical fleets involving three services and international 

partners. 

Regarding our recommendation that DOD develop an integrated and 

affordable enterprise-level investment strategy for tactical aviation, DOD 

concurred but stated it already had elements of such a strategy. Officials 

cited key decisions to invest in fifth generation systems such as the JSF 

and F-22, prudent life extension programs for selected legacy aircraft, the

Joint Air Dominance study conducted during the 2006 QDR, and new 

processes—the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

and portfolio management—as bringing integrated capabilities-based 

approaches in formulating a tactical aircraft investment strategy. We

agree that the Department is making strides toward an integrated 

enterprise-wide investment strategy but that key processes are still in their 

beginning stages and that annual budget decisions are still primarily driven 

on a service-centric, weapon system-specific basis. The new Joint 

capability portfolio management initiative is a reaction to the current 

environment in which the services independently budget, buy, and field

capabilities. It has the potential to bring a joint warfighter, cross-service 

view and disciplined budgeting over sets of mission area capabilities, but 

test cases for experimenting and proving the concept are just beginning. 

The 2006 QDR had the potential, but did not present a coherent joint 

investment strategy that addressed needs, capability gaps, alternatives, 

and affordability. These are critical, but now largely missing, elements to 

the comprehensive and integrated investment strategy we are

recommending. 

Page 36 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps, and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. 

Copies will also be made available to others upon request. In addition, the 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions 

concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Sincerely yours, 

Michael J. Sullivan 

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 37 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix I: Scope and Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Methodology 

To determine current risks and future plans for DOD’s new tactical aircraft 

acquisition programs, we evaluated plans, budgets, delivery schedules, and 

results to date on the JSF, F-22A, F/A-18E/F, and EA-18G. We compared 

cost, schedule, and performance data to prior estimates to identify 

significant changes and their causes. We discussed concerns and emerging

issues with officials from the program offices, the requiring commands, 

and service headquarters. To limit impacts on the services and leverage

our work, we drew extensively upon prior and ongoing GAO engagements 

on the JSF, F-22A, and EA-18G. 

To determine impacts on legacy systems and retirement schedules, we 

reviewed work content and funding requirements for ongoing and 

projected modernization and sustainment projects for tactical aircraft. We

discussed future plans for legacy systems, retirement schedules, and the 

degree they have been affected by cost, schedule, and performance 

outcomes for new acquisition systems. We compiled lists of unfunded 

requirements and estimates of costs for service life extension programs. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has developed an integrated 

investment plan for future tactical aircraft, we analyzed Air Force, Navy, 

and Marine Corps plans and processes for establishing force and capability 

requirements, the factors used to size and shape future force structure to 

meet national security requirements, and how capability gaps or 

redundancies are addressed. We reviewed OSD and joint staff 

responsibilities and processes for exercising program management and 

oversight of service programs and new initiatives intended to improve 

enterprise planning and look for integrated DOD-wide solutions. 

In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed officials 

from the F-22A System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 

Ohio; F/A-18 System Program Office, Patuxent River, MD; program offices 

for Air Force legacy systems, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; 

program offices for Navy and Marine Corps legacy systems, Patuxent 

River, MD.; Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, VA; Naval Air 

Systems Command, Patuxent River, MD; Navy, Marine Corps, and Air 

Force headquarters offices, OSD, and Joint Chiefs of Staff offices, 

Washington, D.C. We performed our work from June 2006 through March 

2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

Page 38 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 39 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 40 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 41 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 42 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix III: Tactical Air Forces Funding Appendix III: Tactical Air Forces Funding Fiscal Years 2006 to 2011

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2011 

Dollars in thousands 

Air Force 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006-2011

Military construction $380,760 $296,077 $533,027 $913,709 $754,934 $358,505 $3,237,012

Military personnel $9,355,951 $9,570,892 $9,594,455 $9,788,140 $10,017,144 $10,345,118 $58,671,700

Operations and 

maintenance 

$12,776,725 $13,019,158 $13,640,801 $13,698,510 $14,196,380 $14,428,658 $81,760,232

Procurement $7,587,576 $7,321,053 $9,841,779 $10,671,089 $10,104,223 $10,379,510 $55,905,230

Research, 

development, test, 

and evaluation

$5,909,282 $6,170,332 $5,840,288 $5,288,475 $4,624,294 $3,588,672 $31,421,343

Navy

Military construction $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0

Military personnel $1,157,408 $1,181,013 $1,197,863 $1,234,087 $1,273,850 $1,302,516 $7,346,737

Operations and 

maintenance 

$2,027,062 $1,922,443 $1,945,247 $1,901,132 $1,941,628 $1,922,958 $11,660,470

Procurement $5,990,828 $5,977,071 $7,820,351 $11,419,657 $11,461,509 $10,081,260 $52,750,676

Research, 

development, test, 

and evaluation

$2,871,719 $2,626,234 $2,147,384 $1,480,793 $1,231,906 $893,068 $11,251,104

Marine Corps 

Military construction $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0

Military personnel $1,543,652 $1,571,905 $1,637,699 $1,701,146 $1,755,634 $1,816,020 $10,026,056

Operations and 

maintenance 

$906,053 $820,374 $849,582 $884,860 $880,779 $882,676 $5,224,324

Procurement $709,064 $508,526 $441,031 $220,030 $239,761 $245,740 $2,364,152

Research, 

development, test, 

and evaluation

$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0

Total DOD 

Military construction $380,760 $296,077 $533,027 $913,709 $754,934 $358,505 $3,237,012

Military personnel $12,057,011 $12,323,810 $12,430,017 $12,723,373 $13,046,628 $13,463,654 $76,044,493

Operations and 

maintenance 

$15,709,840 $15,761,975 $16,435,630 $16,484,502 $17,018,787 $17,234,292 $98,645,026

Procurement $14,287,468 $13,806,650 $18,103,161 $22,310,776 $21,805,493 $20,706,510 $111,020,058

Research, 

development, test, 

and evaluation

$8,781,001 $8,796,566 $7,987,672 $6,769,268 $5,856,200 $4,481,740 $42,672,447

Grand Total $51,216,080 $50,985,078 $55,489,507 $59,201,628 $58,482,042 $56,244,701 $331,619,036

Source: DOD’s 2007 Future Years Defense Program. 

Page 43 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft Appendix IV Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts : A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

This appendix provides more details on new and legacy tactical aircraft to

expand upon summary information provided in the body of this report. We 

include a brief description of each aircraft’s mission, program status, and 

our observations on program execution and outcomes. Where applicable,

we also highlight recent GAO work on some systems. The appendix also 

includes a funding table for each aircraft that consolidates the budget 

requests in the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget, the Fiscal Year 2007 

Global War on Terrorism Supplemental, and the Fiscal Year 2008 Global 

War on Terror request. The budget information in these tables is expressed 

in current (then year) dollars and the totals may not add exactly because 

of rounding. The fiscal year 2007 funding shown in these tables has been 

appropriated by Congress except for the supplemental requests. 

Page 44 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Figure 7: F-22A Raptor

Initial operational capability: December 2005 

Total quantity to be procured: 183

Current inventory: 78

Source: DOD.

The F-22A is the Air Force’s next generation air superiority fighter and 

incorporates a stealthy and highly maneuverable airframe, advanced

integrated avionics, and a supercruise engine. It will replace or 

complement the F-15 as the Air Force’s primary air-to-air fighter and was 

originally intended to counter threats posed by the Soviet Union. The Air 

Force has decided to add more robust air-to-ground and intelligencegathering capabilities not previously envisioned at program start, but now 

considered necessary to increase its utility. 

Demonstration and validation began in October 1986 and system 

development in June 1991. Low-rate initial production was approved in 

August 2001 and full-rate production in March 2005. The first production 

aircraft was delivered in June 2003 and, as of October 2006, 78 aircraft had 

been delivered to the operational forces. The program of record is to 

acquire a total of 183 aircraft at a total cost of $62.6 billion. The Air Force 

plans to complete procurement in 2010 under a multiyear contract. 

Mission 

Program Status 

Initial operational capability was declared in December 2005. In its 

December 2006 annual report, DOD’s Director of Operational Test and 

Evaluation has determined that the F-22A is operationally effective in the

air-to-air mission role and in the air-to-ground mission against fixed targets 

using the Joint Direct Attack Munition. The aircraft is not yet operationally 

Page 45 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

suitable due to reliability and maintainability deficiencies. Operational 

users report that the aircraft has performed excellently in military 

exercises against representative threats and represents a large advantage 

over the F-15. 

The Air Force is implementing a modernization and reliability 

improvement program and plans to invest another $6.3 billion to develop 

and integrate more robust ground attack, intelligence-gathering, and other 

new capabilities. Formally established in 2003, the F-22A’s modernization 

program is currently being planned for three increments of increasing 

capability to be developed and delivered over time, from fiscal year 2007 

to 2013. Additional modernization is expected, but the content and costs 

have not been determined or included in projected budgets beyond 2013. 

GAO Observations The Air Force’s current stated need is for 381 F-22As. However, because of 

past cost overruns and current budget constraints, OSD states that 183 are 

all that is needed and affordable. This leaves a 198-aircraft gap with the Air 

Force’s stated need. We have reported on F-22A issues for many years and

have recommended that a new and executable business case be prepared

that more accurately and realistically supports the current program of 

record and which resolves a capability gap between what the Air Force

requires and what DOD can afford.1

 During the more than 20 years the 

aircraft has been in development, the conditions underpinning the original 

business case substantively changed—threat and employment plans 

changed, costs increased, the development period doubled, and new 

mission requirements were added. Without a new relevant business case—

on the appropriate number of F-22As for our national defense—it is 

uncertain whether additional investments in the modernization program 

are advisable. 

The Air Force is working with the contractor to fix structural deficiencies 

on the F-22A. Fatigue testing identified cracks in the aircraft near the 

horizontal section tail of the aircraft. The Air Force is planning

modifications to strengthen the structure to get the 8,000-hour service life. 

The Air Force estimates the costs to modify 72 F-22As will be 

approximately $124 million. These modifications will not be fully 

implemented until 2010. 

 1

The latest report is GAO, Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Present a New F-22A Business 

Case before Making Further Investments, GAO-06-455R (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2006). 

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At the start of modernization, all three critical technologies essential to 

achieving capability requirements were considered mature by best 

practice standards. Since that time, however, the program added three 

additional critical technologies, all of which are immature. Immature and 

untested technologies, as the program pushes forward, significantly 

increase the risk of poor cost and schedule outcomes. 

Table 9: F-22A Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of dollars) 

 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 Total

FY 2008 Budget

RTD&E $472.5 $743.6 $666.8 $510.3 $417.3 $512.0 $495.8 $3,827.3

Procurement 3,385.4 3,579.4 3,673.0 45.9 46.9 0 0 10,730.6

Modifications 145.6 281.9 345.6 337.9 433.3 271.4 291.6 2,107.3

Supplemental

RDT&E 0 0 0

Procurement 0 0 0

Modifications 0 0 0

Total $4,003.5 $4,604.9 $4,685.4 $894.2 $897.4 $792.4 $787.4 $16,665.2

Source: DOD budget data. 

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Figure 8: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 

Initial operational capability (planned): March 2012 (Marines), March 2013 (Air Force & Navy) 

Total quantity to be procured: 2,458

Current inventory: 1 (test aircraft) 

Source: DOD.

The JSF program goals are to develop and field an affordable, highly 

common family of stealthy, next-generation strike fighter aircraft for the 

Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. allies. The carrier suitable variant 

will provide the Navy a multirole, stealthy strike aircraft to complement 

the F/A-18E/F. The conventional take-off and landing variant will primarily 

be an air-to-ground replacement for the Air Force’s F-16 and the A-10 

aircraft, and will complement the F-22A. The short take-off and vertical 

landing (STOVL) variant will be a multi-role strike fighter to replace the 

Marine Corps’ F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft. 

The JSF program is DOD’s most costly aircraft acquisition program. DOD 

estimates that the total cost to develop and procure its fleet of aircraft will 

be $276 billion, with total costs to maintain and operate the JSF adding 

another $347 billion over its life cycle. It is also DOD’s largest cooperative 

development program. Eight partner countries are providing funding for 

Mission 

Program Status 

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system development and demonstration: Australia, Canada, Denmark, 

Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. 

Concept demonstration began in November 1996. The program entered 

system development and demonstration in October 2001 and is expected 

to run through fiscal year 2013. Manufacture and assembly of test aircraft 

is continuing, and first flight of the Air Force’s variant occurred in 

December 2006. Overall, the cost estimate to develop the JSF has 

increased from $34.4 billion in 2001 to $44.5 billion in 2005—about 

29 percent. Procurement costs have increased from $196.6 billion in 2001 

to $231.7 billion in 2005—about 18 percent. Since program start, JSF 

quantities have been reduced by 530 aircraft. Current estimated program 

acquisition unit costs are about $112 million, a 38 percent increase since 

2001. 

GAO Observations We recently issued our third annual report on the JSF acquisition.2

 The 

development team has achieved first flight and has overcome major design 

problems found earlier in development. However, the current acquisition

strategy still reflects very significant risk that both development and 

procurement costs will increase and that aircraft will take longer to deliver 

to the warfighter than currently planned. Even as the JSF program enters 

the midpoint of its development, it continues to encounter significant cost 

overruns and schedule delays. As a result of the program reporting a 

Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach, a new baseline was established in 2004 

with additional costs of $19.4 billion; since then, estimated costs to 

complete the acquisition have increased another $31.6 billion. OSD cost 

analysts are concerned about worsening cost performance and believe the 

cost to complete the program will further escalate. The program has also 

experienced delays in several key events, including the start of the flight 

test program, delivery of the first production representative development 

aircraft, and testing of critical missions systems. 

Our past reports have found that the acquisition program is not following a 

knowledge-based evolutionary approach that places it at risk of continued 

poor program outcomes. The degree of concurrency between development 

and production in the JSF’s acquisition strategy includes significant risks 

for cost and schedule overruns or late delivery of promised capabilities to

 2

GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain, GAO-07-360 

(Washington D.C.: Mar. 15, 2007). 

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the warfighter. For example, at the time of the low-rate initial production

decision, only one aircraft will have flown; less than 1 percent of the flight 

test program will have been completed; and none of the three variants will 

have a production representative prototype built. The 7-year flight test 

program of more than 11,000 hours of testing just began in December 2006.

It will not be until 2011 that a fully capable, integrated JSF is scheduled to

begin flight testing. By that time, DOD expects to have committed to buy 

103 production aircraft for $20 billion. Therefore, almost all of critical 

flight testing remains to confirm the aircraft will indeed deliver the 

required performance. Manufacturing and technical problems can delay 

the completion of the flight test program, may necessitate design changes, 

increase the number of flight test hours needed to verify the system will 

work as intended, and affect when the capabilities are delivered to the 

warfighter. 

DOD appears to be taking some actions to lessen funding risk—the ability 

to sustain funding in times of austere budgets or against competing 

priorities. DOD’s plan in 2006 assumed extremely high annual funding 

rates averaging $14 billion between 2012 and 2023. This is an extremely 

large annual funding commitment that carries a correspondingly high level 

of funding risk as the program moves forward and must annually compete 

with other programs for the defense dollar. Due to affordability pressures, 

DOD is beginning to reduce procurement budgets and annual quantities. 

The recently released fiscal year 2008 defense budget shows declining

procurement quantities for the first years of production. To meet future 

constrained acquisition budgets, Air Force and Navy officials and planning

documents suggest a decrease in maximum annual buy quantities from 

160 shown in the current program of record to about 115 per year, a 

28 percent decrease. While this will reduce annual funding requirements, 

it will also stretch the procurement program at least seven years to 2034, 

assuming buy quantities are deferred rather than eliminated. 

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Table 10: Navy JSF Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of dollars) 

 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 Total

FY 2008 Budget

RTD&E $2,163.9 $1,707.4 $1,548.9 $1,045.3 $1,065.9 $745.6 $663.7 $8,940.7

Procurement 124.5 1,317.1 1,809.0 3,608.0 3,422.7 5,675.7 5,647.2 21,604.2

Modifications 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Supplemental

RDT&E 0 0 0

Procurement 0 0 0

Modifications 0 0 0

Total $2,288.4 $3,024.5 $3,357.9 $4,653.2 $4,488.6 $6,421.2 $6,311.0 $30,544.9

Source: DOD budget data. 

Table 11: Air Force JSF Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of dollars) 

 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 Total

FY 2008 Budget 

RTD&E $2,132.9 $1,780.9 $1,541.2 $1,146.0 $789.1 $975.2 $734.9 $9,100.1

Procurement 648.5 1,461.7 1,906.3 2,457.3 3,544.1 4,914.1 5,222.6 20,154.6

Modifications 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Supplemental

RDT&E 0 0

Procurement 389.0 230.0

Modifications 0 0

Total $3,170.4 $3,472.6 $3,447.5 $3,603.3 $4,333.2 $5,889.3 $5,957.5 $29,873.7

Source: DOD budget data. 

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Figure 9: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet 

Initial operational capability: September 2001 

Total quantity to be procured: 462 

Current inventory: 290 

Source: DOD.

The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program was approved as a major 

modification in the F-18 series in May 1992. It is a twin engine, single- and 

two-seat, multi-mission tactical aircraft designed to perform fighter escort,

interdiction, fleet air defense, and close air support missions. The 

F/A-18E/F is replacing the F/A-18A/B/C, has improved range and payload, 

and is less detectable. In addition to the procurement quantity of 462 E/F 

aircraft, the Navy is also procuring 84-90 airframes for the EA-18G 

program (total acquisition up to 552 aircraft). 

Development began in 1992, procurement in 1996, and initial operational 

capability was declared in September 2001. Through fiscal year 2006, the 

Navy has taken delivery of 272 aircraft and has 210 aircraft on a 5-year 

Mission 

Program Status 

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multiyear contract.3 The Navy has received an unsolicited draft proposal 

for a third multiyear contract that would complete the planned program. 

Navy officials believe this could reduce unit costs, but told us to be 

effective the contract would need a quantity higher than the 70 aircraft 

remaining to be bought. This would seemingly require an increase in Navy 

buys or the addition of potential foreign military sales.4

Super Hornet aircraft have flown over 340,000 hours by the end of 

December 2006 and have been employed in combat operations. The Navy

originally planned to buy 1,000 aircraft, but the quantity was reduced to 

548 by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, expecting to transition more 

quickly to the JSF, but with provisions for additional procurement if the 

JSF is delayed. In 2003, the quantity was further reduced to 462 when a 

study showed closer integration of Navy and Marine Corps aviation fleets 

would provide greater efficiency for common assets. 

GAO Observations The F/A-18E/F acquisition program is mature and has had relatively good 

procurement cost and schedule outcomes. One substantive reason for 

good outcomes is the low risk, evolutionary acquisition strategy adopted.

The E/F variant is part of the F/A-18’s family of aircraft that has gradually 

upgraded capabilities since delivery of the original F-18 in the late 1970s. 

It has substantial commonality with its predecessor C/D models and 

leveraged previous technologies. For example, the initial release of the E/F 

models incorporated the avionics suite from the C/D models with 

provisions for upgrades to occur subsequent to the basic air vehicle 

development. Planned upgrades to the F/A-18E/F continue to

incrementally add capabilities. Current production is phasing in block 

upgrades including the active electronically scanned array radar, advanced 

crew station, network-centric operation, and time-critical strike 

modifications. Navy program officials cited that, for the past three years, 

full rate production aircraft have been consistently delivered up to 

3 months ahead of schedule, that the program is mature, and its current 

costs remain well-defined and within targets. 

 3

This multiyear procurement contract, the program’s second of this contract type, includes 

154 F/A-18E/F and 56 EA-18G airframes for a total of 210.

4

There are currently seven foreign counties that have F/A-18A/B/C/Ds in their fleets: 

Australia, Canada, Finland, Kuwait, Malaysia, Spain, and Switzerland. 

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While platform production and fielding has been successful, the December 

2006 report of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation identified 

ongoing tests and deficiencies in several of the aircraft’s major systems, 

including radar, defensive countermeasures, and weapons. The report 

states it is paramount that all systems interoperate properly in order to 

allow for optimal operational effectiveness and suitability. 

The program has reported two Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) breaches 

in unit cost since 1999, but these are attributable more to external factors 

than to system development, production, or management problems. The 

first breach occurred in 1999 when the procurement quantity was 

significantly reduced by the QDR. The second breach occurred in 2005 

when the quantity was again reduced. Also, the OSD Comptroller decided 

to break out program reporting for the EA-18G aircraft separate from the 

E/F models. In doing so, common support costs for both programs were 

budgeted in the E/F program. 

Prior to this review, we last reported on the E/F program specifically in

our 2003 annual weapon systems’ assessment.5

 At that time program 

officials noted that the aircraft demonstrated two to three times the quality 

of the F/A-18C/D and have provided measurable improvements to 

squadron readiness. In addition, all F/A-18E/F preplanned upgrades 

continued to track to their program schedules. Program officials also 

stated that the active electronically scanned array radar program 

continues to execute as planned, and the program received the first 

engineering and manufacturing development unit in 2003. 

 5

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, GAO-03-476 

(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003). 

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Table 12: F/A-18 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of dollars) 

FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 Total

FY 2008 Budget 

RTD&E $39.3 $44.9 $66.3 $66.3 $61.0 $52.1 $35.4 $365.3

Procurement 2,560.7 2,135.4 1,780.5 1,986.0 1,708.1 1,604.7 201.2 11,976.6

Modifications 424.7 441.9 460.2 480.4 510.6 521.9 529.6 3,369.3

Supplemental

RDT&E 0 1.5 1.5

Procurement 16.0 725.7 741.7

Modifications 96.8 60.8 157.1

Total $3,137.4 $3,409.7 $2,307.0 $2,532.7 $2,279.7 $2,178.7 $766.3 $16,611.5

Source: DOD budget data. 

Note: This table includes all F/A-18 series budget data as the Navy consolidates investment funding 

for all models. Procurement funds requested are for the purchase of the new F/A-18E/F, while 

RDT&E and modification funds include amounts for both new and legacy F/A-18A/B/C/D aircraft. 

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Figure 10: EA-18G Growler

Initial operational capability: 2009 (planned)

Total quantity to be procured: 84-90 

Total current inventory: 0 

Source: DOD.

The EA-18G is the replacement for the Navy’s EA-6B Prowler and will 

provide carrier strike forces with electronic attack and tactical jamming 

capabilities to defeat enemy air defenses and to protect strike fighters and 

the carrier group. Derived from the combat proven F/A-18F aircraft, the 

EA-18G incorporates advanced airborne electronic attack avionics for the 

suppression of enemy air defenses, including accurate emitter targeting for

employment of onboard weapons such as the High-Speed Anti-Radiation 

Missile. 

The two-seater EA-18G airframe is about 90 percent common with the 

F/A-18F airframe and is procured under the same multiyear contract. The 

two models diverge at a point in the production line and airframes 

destined to be Growlers receive the electronic attack subsystems. System 

demonstration and design was about 70 percent complete by October 

2006. Two test articles were delivered in 2006 and first flight was in August 

2006. The low-rate initial production decision is scheduled for late April 

Mission 

Program Status 

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2007 and initial operational capability is planned for the last quarter in 

2009. 

The Navy is proposing to reduce the total quantity of EA-18Gs from 90 to 

84. The reduction is a result of re-evaluating inventory requirements in 

association with the Navy’s fiscal year 2008 budget and the application of 

tiered readiness, as well as a reduction of four aircraft from the first lowrate production buy. The Navy expects to receive its first EA-18G in 2009. 

GAO Observations We reported in 2006 on the EA-18G’s acquisition schedule for integrating 

the electronic attack subsystems.6

 Our analysis showed that the program 

was not fully following the knowledge-based approach espoused in best 

practices and DOD’s acquisition guidance, thus increasing the risk of cost 

growth, schedule delays, and performance problems. None of its five 

critical technologies were fully mature when system development started, 

and, at the time of our review, flight testing hadn’t begun. The Navy 

proposed buying one-third of the total quantity as low-rate initial quantity

aircraft based on limited demonstrated functionality. We recommended 

DOD consider outfitting additional EA-6Bs with the improved electronic 

suite for an interim capability, which would allow the restructuring of 

EA-18G production plans to begin procurement after full functionality was 

demonstrated. 

This year, our follow on review as part of our annual assessments of major 

weapon systems determined that progress has been made but that three of

the five critical technologies are still not fully mature to best practices 

standards with production slated to start in 2007.7

 Flight testing is 

underway and, until full functionality is demonstrated, there are risks of 

redesign and retrofit. Fifty-six aircraft are already on the F-18 multiyear 

contract, most procured as low-rate initial production aircraft based on 

limited demonstrated functionality. A fully functioning Growler, one that

meets or exceeds the upgraded EA-6B capability, will not complete 

operational testing until January 2009, 20 months after production starts 

and after more than one-third of the total fleet has already been bought. 

 6

GAO, Electronic Warfare: Option of Upgrading Additional EA-6Bs Could Reduce Risk in 

Development of EA-18G, GAO-06-446, (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2006). 

7 GAO-07-406SP. 

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Navy officials agree that EA-18G’s schedule is aggressive, but disagreed 

with our overall assessment of the EA-18G. Officials reported that the 

program has been stable since its schedule was developed in 2003 and is 

meeting or exceeding all cost, schedule and performance parameters. 

Furthermore, officials stated that some technologies are evolutionary 

upgrades of systems previously tested on its EA-6B aircraft with 

demonstrated effectiveness. We note, however, that these technologies are 

in new environments with form and fit challenges, including space 

constraints, which could impact performance and ultimate design. The 

December 2006 annual report from the Director of Operational Test and 

Evaluation stated that the schedule remains aggressive with plans to fully 

assess risk areas to achieve initial operational capability in fiscal year 

2009. The Director reported that the primary risks include the integration 

of multiple components of the electronic attack system onto the F/A-18E/F

platform and the operator workload for the two-man crew in missions 

currently performed by the four-person EA-6B aircraft. 

Table 13: EA-18G Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of dollars) 

 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 Total

FY 2008 Budget 

RTD&E $372.1 $272.7 $135.2 $72.3 $45.2 $36.7 $28.3 $962.5

Procurement 669.8 1,427.6 1,652.7 1,352.9 707.9 242.6 0 6,053.5

Modifications 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Supplemental

RDT&E 0 0 0

Procurement 450.0 0 450.0

Modifications 0 0 0

Total $1,492.0 $1,700.3 $1,788.0 $1,425.1 $753.1 $279.3 $28.3 $7,466.1

Source: DOD budget data. 

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Figure 11: A-10 Warthog 

Date first deployed: March 1976 

Current inventory: 356 

Average age: 25.3 years

Source: DOD.

The A-10 was the first Air Force aircraft specially designed for close air 

support of ground forces. It is a simple, effective and survivable twinengine jet used against all ground targets, including tanks. Officials cite 

exceptional combat results during Desert Storm and the Global War on 

Terror. Some aircraft are specially equipped for airborne forward air 

control. 

Because of the A-10’s relevant combat capabilities—demonstrated first 

during Desert Storm and recently in the Global War on Terror—the Air 

Force now plans to keep it in the inventory longer than anticipated. How 

long and with what upgrades is also dependent on whether the JSF aircraft

are delivered on schedule. The Air Force is pursuing several major 

modifications to upgrade systems and structures on the A-10 fleet. A major 

re-winging effort is planned for 2007 through 2016 that will replace the 

“thin skin” wings on 242 aircraft at an estimated cost of $1.3 billion. This 

effort will help to extend the A-10’s service life to 16,000 hours. Precision 

Mission 

Program Status 

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Engagement modernizes cockpit controls and upgrade avionics and 

weapons. All 356 aircraft in the force are slated to receive the Precision 

Engagement suite. Total cost to complete the modification is estimated to 

be $420 million. 

GAO Observations Significant investments are underway and others planned or proposed to 

modernize 356 A-10s and to extend service life from 8,000 to 16,000 flying

hours in order to achieve the goal of keeping the aircraft in service until

2025 or later. However, because of post-Cold War plans to retire the 

aircraft starting in the early 1990s, the A-10 fleet received no money for 

major modifications or programmed depot maintenance during the 1990s. 

As a result, the Air Force is now faced with a very large backlog of 

maintenance, structural repairs, and extensive modifications to modernize 

the A-10 fleet and keep it viable. Officials have begun major upgrades to 

modernize the cockpit and major subsystems and to replace the wings on 

most of the fleet. Officials are also finding that as older aircraft are 

inspected and opened up for modification, additional and more costly 

structural and sustainment work is being identified beyond initial plans.

Even with the higher priority accorded the aircraft, program officials 

identify at least another $2.7 billion in unfunded requirements.8

 Chief 

among these are an engine upgrade program estimated at $2.1 billion. It is

intended to provide the A-10 with significantly improved engine 

capabilities. However, the proposal was deferred by the requiring 

command because of limited funding and higher warfighter priorities. The 

Air Force’s Fleet Viability Board, which assesses aging aircraft fleets and 

recommends to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force whether 

aircraft should be retired or continued in service, recently determined that 

the A-10 is still viable and validated many of the modifications and repairs 

already underway. The Board recommended funding this engine upgrade 

in order to extend the A-10’s service life until 2030. The Board’s 

assessment identified mission limitations due to insufficient thrust to 

maximize survivability in the current threat environment with existing 

engines. Although agreeing that the engine upgrade would be desirable if

funds were available, the requiring command continues to defer this 

program as a lower priority. We note that the Air Force has requested 

 8

We obtained another preliminary estimate that suggests a service life extension program

for the A-10 could cost $4.4 billion, which may include some of these unfunded 

requirements. 

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development funding of $230 million for the engine upgrade program in 

the 2008 supplemental request. 

Table 14: A-10 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of dollars) 

 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 Total

FY 2008 Budget 

RTD&E $31.9 $2.0 $0 $3.0 $0 $0 $0 $36.9

Procurement 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Modifications 106.9 161.7 145.6 306.0 274.5 268.9 268.9 1,532.5

Supplemental

RDT&E 10.0 230.0 240.0

Procurement 0 0 0

Modifications 217.4 0 217.4

Total $366.2 $393.7 145.6 309.0 $274.5 $268.9 $268.9 $2,026.8

Source: DOD budget data. 

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Figure 12: F-15A/B/C/D Eagle and F-15E Strike Eagle 

Date first deployed: July 1972 (F-15A), April 1988 (F-15E)

Current inventory: 493 (F-15A/B/C/D), 224 (F-15E)

Average age: 23.4 years (F-15C/D), 14.5 years (F-15E)

Source: DOD.

The F-15A/B/C/D Eagle is a single- and two-seat, twin-engine, all-weather

tactical fighter designed to gain and maintain air supremacy over the 

battlefield. The F-15E Strike Eagle is a two-seater dual-role fighter 

designed to perform air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. An array of 

avionics and electronics systems gives the F-15E the capability to strike 

targets at low altitude, day or night, and in all weather. 

The Air Force has a number of ongoing improvement efforts for the F-15 

fleet, including 

Mission 

Program Status 

• helmet mounted cueing system, 

• a new identification friend-or-foe system, 

• various computer upgrades, and 

• new radar for the F-15E 

The Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System is planned for several DOD 

systems and provides pilots the capability to aim weapons and sensors by 

looking at the intended target. The new friend-or-foe identification system 

will solve obsolescence issues, add capability, and be upgradeable for the 

future. Computer upgrades also resolve obsolescence issues, enhance onPage 62 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
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board computers, and improve avionics performance. The F-15E model 

will receive the improved active electronically scanned array radar. 

GAO Observations For years, modernization efforts and funding for the F-15C/D aircraft had 

been concentrated on about half the fleet—178 aircraft of its total 

inventory of 391. These were the number of aircraft the Air Force 

projected was needed to provide sufficient force structure to meet defense 

requirements and to complement the F-22A. That projected number was 

predicated upon the Air Force receiving its full F-22A stated requirement 

of 381 aircraft. However, due to affordability, the Air Force now faces a 

198 aircraft shortfall in the quantity of F-22As it is slated to receive. As a 

result, officials expect more F-15C/Ds need to be modernized and retained

for longer periods than planned. Originally planned for retirement by 2015, 

the Air Force now needs to keep substantial numbers of F-15C/D aircraft 

operational to 2025 and perhaps beyond. 

A multi-staged improvement program for the 178 aircraft, including recent 

upgrades of the engines and radar, is mostly complete. Officials identified

near-term unfunded requirements on these aircraft totaling $2.3 billion, 

including new radars and countermeasure sets. In addition, potential 

service life extension efforts on the fleet and backlogged unfunded 

requirements to modernize aircraft in addition to the 178 may be needed 

but the full costs have not been identified. 

The Air Force also plans to keep 224 F-15Es in service beyond 2025. These 

are the newest F-15s with enhanced strike capabilities. The major 

upcoming upgrade effort on the F-15E is a radar modernization program to 

add active electronically scanned array radar. Estimated to cost 

$2.3 billion, the Air Force has delayed funding for this effort and now plans 

to start procurement in 2010. Program officials identified unfunded 

requirements totaling about $1.7 billion, including upgraded radar warning 

receivers, helmet mounted cueing system, and long-term sustainment 

efforts to address electrical, structural, and power plant concerns to keep

the aircraft viable for another 25 or more years. 

Page 63 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Table 15: F-15 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of dollars) 

 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 Total

FY 2008 Budget 

RTD&E $137.5 $101.3 $186.4 $165.6 $120.0 $120.8 $123.2 $954.8

Procurement 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Modifications 164.3 19.2 58.2 256.6 336.6 287.2 148.5 1,270.6

Supplemental

RDT&E 0 97.5 97.5

Procurement 0 0 0

Modifications 192.0 152.9 344.9

Total $493.8 $370.9 $244.6 $422.2 $456.6 $408.0 $271.7 $2,667.8

Source: DOD budget data. 

Page 64 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Figure 13: F-16 Fighting Falcon 

Date first deployed: January 1979

Current inventory: 1317

Average age: 16.7 years

Source: DOD.

The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a single engine multi-role fighter with full airto-air and air-to-ground combat capability. It provides a relatively low cost, 

high-performance weapon system for the United States and allied nations.

The F-16 currently comprises more than half of the Air Force’s fighter 

force. The fleet includes several different configurations or blocks. The 

newest blocks incorporate the high-speed anti-radiation missile targeting 

system, the Air Force’s only platform specifically for the suppression of 

enemy air defenses. 

The Air Force is not currently purchasing any new F-16’s, but the 

contractor is still producing them for foreign sale. The production is slated 

to continue past 2009 to accommodate recent sales. If the Air Force were 

to buy new aircraft, officials estimated that it would cost $380 million for 

development and about $50 million per aircraft procured. 

Mission 

Program Status 

Page 65 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

The Air Force has a number of ongoing improvement efforts for the F-16,

including 

• structural airframe modifications, 

• avionics and capabilities upgrades, 

• engine service life extension program, and 

• new engines for some F-16 models. 

Falcon STAR is an effort to modify the airframe to allow the F-16 to reach

the original 8,000 hours estimated for its flight life. Due to increased 

workload and weight that exceed the original specifications of the aircraft, 

the F-16 must be structurally modified to compensate for the increases. A 

number of common avionics and capabilities upgrades are necessary to 

provide increased processor speed and memories, color displays, and 

incorporate the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System. The F110 engine 

service life extension program addresses safety, reliability and 

maintainability concerns and new engines for the Block 42 aircraft will 

provide needed thrust improvements. 

GAO Observations With over 1,300 aircraft, the F-16 fleet comprises more than one-half the

Air Force’s fighter and attack forces. The fleet includes several different 

configurations that were acquired and upgraded in evolutionary fashion 

over a considerable period of time. Reduced annual buy quantities on the 

JSF and deferred deliveries to the warfighter means that F-16s slated to be 

replaced by the JSF and retired will need to remain operable and relevant 

for additional years. Already investing several billions of dollars to keep 

the fleet operable, improve capabilities, and sustain it to meet its original 

expected service life, a preliminary unfunded cost estimate to increase the 

life expectancy of the newer fighters is $4.5 billion. 

Without improvements, almost 90 percent of the fleet would exceed design 

limits on engines by 2010. High usage, increased stresses, and more weight 

than planned threatened to cut life expectancy in half. Significant 

unknowns exist about extending the life beyond 8,000 hours should that 

be necessary. This makes any additional JSF schedule delays, deferrals, 

and cost growth very problematic for the overall Air Force fighter 

structure. 

If it becomes necessary to enable the newest F-16 aircraft to reach a 

10,000 flying hour life, a program official estimated an additional cost of 

$2.2 billion for structural enhancements. The program office also 

identified another $3.2 billion in unfunded requirements, including radar 

Page 66 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

upgrades to aircraft capable of suppressing enemy air defenses. The oldest

F-16s are to be retired over the next few years, and the Air Force has 

halted modifications and funding for these aircraft. 

Table 16: F-16 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of dollars) 

 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 Total

FY 2008 Budget 

RTD&E $152.0 $90.6 $113.8 $117.6 $108.6 $110.7 $112.9 $806.2

Procurement 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Modifications 366.4 329.3 292.4 234.4 202.6 72.3 41.2 1,538.6

Supplemental

RDT&E 0 55.3 55.3

Procurement 0 0 0

Modifications 0 0 0

Total $518.4 $475.2 $406.2 $352.0 $311.2 $183.0 $154.1 $2,400.1

Source: DOD budget data. 

Page 67 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Figure 14: F-117A Nighthawk

Date first deployed: 1982

Total current inventory: 55

Source: DOD.

The F-117A Nighthawk is the world’s first operational aircraft designed to 

exploit low observable stealth technology. This precision strike aircraft 

penetrates high-threat airspace and uses laser-guided weapons against 

critical targets. 

As part of its transformation plans, the Air Force proposed retiring the 

F-117A aircraft in 2007 and 2008, stating that there are other more capable

assets that can provide low observable, precision penetrating weapons 

capability. Program Budget Decision 720, dated December 2005, directed 

the Air Force to develop a strategy to gain congressional support for this 

plan. Congress has agreed, with certain limitations, mandating that the Air 

Force retire F-117As in “pristine” storage in case the aircraft would need to 

be recalled into service. 

Mission 

Program Status 

Page 68 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Program officials estimate that the drawdown of the fleet and the 

shutdown of government and contractor offices and facilities would cost 

approximately $283 million. However, there is currently no funding 

allocated for these retirement costs of the F-117A. This cost does not 

include long-term storage and maintenance of the fleet after such a 

retirement. 

GAO Observations

Table 17: F-117A Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of dollars) 

 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 Total

FY 2008 Budget 

RTD&E $14.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 $14.0

Procurement 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Modifications 2.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.0

Supplemental

RDT&E 0

Procurement 0

Modifications 0

Total $16.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 $16.0

Source: DOD budget data. 

Page 69 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Figure 15: F/A-18A/B/C/D Hornet 

Date first deployed: November 1978

Current inventory: 662

Average age: 20.8 years (A), 22.5 years (B), 15.0 years (C), 14.4 years (D)

Source: DOD.

The F/A-18A/B/C/D is an all-weather fighter and attack aircraft also known 

as the Hornet. It is a single- and two-seat, twin engine, multi-mission 

fighter/attack aircraft that can operate from either aircraft carriers or land 

bases. The F/A-18 fills a variety of roles: air superiority, fighter escort, 

suppression of enemy air defenses, reconnaissance, forward air control, 

close and deep air support, and day and night strike missions. 

The major modification effort ongoing is the Center Barrel Replacement to

eliminate structural limitations caused by cracking in the central fuselage.

This effort is expected to cost about $970 million. During scheduled 

inspections of the aircraft, the Navy also identified cracks in the wing 

structure in about 40 percent of the aircraft. These could cause safety of 

flight issues in the future but are not thought to be serious enough at this 

time to ground the aircraft or to require immediate repair. 

Mission 

Program Status 

Page 70 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

The F/A-18s are the backbone of the naval tactical aircraft fleet, but are 

quickly running out of service life. The Navy plans to soon retire the A and 

B models, and the Marine Corps plans to transition entirely to the JSF for 

its future strike force. The Navy’s modernization efforts are focused on the 

remaining 421 F/A-18C/D aircraft. The Navy has an ongoing assessment of 

the service life of this aircraft that is expected to be completed in 

December 2007. At this time, it is not clear as to the need for or extent of 

future modifications, but a Naval Air Systems Command official said the 

assessment could very well identify additional modifications and 

structural work required beyond what is funded. Further delays in JSF 

could exacerbate funding shortfalls to sustain and modernize the 

operational fleet. 

GAO Observations

While the F/A-18C/D legacy aircraft are currently meeting both the Navy’s 

and Marine Corps’s force structure requirements and readiness levels, 

inventory reductions though the Navy-Marine Corps tactical aircraft 

integration plan, JSF delays, and better defined structural limits of the 

F/A-18C/D have created a shortfall starting in 2011 in the number of 

aircraft that Navy officials project as needed to support its war-fighting 

plans. One option the Navy is considering would be the purchase of 

additional F/A-18E/F models to resolve this shortage. 

Another option under consideration is extending the life of its F/A-18C/D 

fleets to mitigate projected shortfalls. The full cost of the life extension 

program is not known at this time. The service life assessment effort to be 

completed in December 2007 will determine the feasibility, scope of work, 

and total costs for extending the life of the system. Current estimate for 

extending service life, including the costs of the assessment, is about 

$2 billion, but officials said that number could very well increase 

substantially as the assessment progresses and cost estimates mature. 

Concerned over the looming gap in the Navy’s inventory, in May 2006, the 

Senate Committee on Armed Services recommended that the Navy 

consider buying more F/A-18E/Fs to mitigate any possible shortfall in 

aircraft until JSF aircraft are delivered. 

Note: Budget information for the F/A-18A/B/C/D is included earlier in this 

appendix with the discussion of the F/A-18E/F (see table 12, p. 50). The 

Navy consolidates investment budgets for all models of the F-18. 

Page 71 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Figure 16: EA-6B Prowler 

Date first deployed: May 1968

Current inventory: 107

Average age: 24.3 years

Source: DOD.

 

The primary mission of the EA-6B Prowler is the suppression of enemy air

defenses in support of strike aircraft and ground troops by interrupting 

enemy electronic activity and obtaining tactical electronic intelligence 

within the combat area. The Prowler is a long-range, all-weather aircraft 

with advanced electronic countermeasures capability, and enhances 

combat survivability of strike force aircraft and weapons by denying,

delaying, and degrading the acquisition of friendly forces by enemy air 

defense systems. Both the Navy and Marines maintain Prowler assets. 

In 1995, the EA-6B was selected to become the sole tactical radar support 

jammer for all services after the Air Force decided to retire its fleet of 

EF-111 aircraft. This decision resulted in increased use of the EA-6B, as 

the Prowler provided airborne electronic attack capability during 

numerous joint and allied operations since 1995. The Navy plans to start 

Mission 

Program Status 

Page 72 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

retiring its EA-6B in 2008 and replace it with the EA-18G as its core 

airborne electronic attack component. The Marine Corps had expected to 

retire their EA-6B assets in 2015, but that could change as future plans for 

its replacement are still evolving. 

Three significant upgrades to the EA-6B are 

• the Improved Capability electronic suite modification (ICAP III), 

which provides the EA-6B with greater jamming capability; 

• an upgrade to the aircraft’s current electronic pods, which improves 

frequency band capability; and 

• replacement of the wing center sections of the entire fleet and outer 

wing panel replacement on portions of the fleet. 

The ICAP-III modification includes the addition of software to allow the 

EA-6B to automatically pinpoint enemy signals and better receive and 

utilize data. Aircraft not receiving ICAP III are having the current 

electronic attack systems upgraded. Funding to replace the wing center 

sections was added by Congress. To date, 114 wings have been procured 

and 100 have been installed on aircraft. In addition forty-seven EA-6Bs are 

also in need of an outer wing panel replacement; Navy officials said that 

the first four pairs have already been delivered, and procurement will be 

ramped to 18 sets per year in order to receive deliveries through 2008. 

GAO Observations In 2006 GAO reported9

 that, as a result of DOD’s decision to move to an 

electronic attack system of systems, the EA-6B would be able to meet the 

defense suppression needs of the Navy until 2017 and those of the Marine 

Corps until 2025 if the aircraft were fitted with the ICAP-III electronic suite 

upgrade. Because the EA-18G’s five critical technologies were not fully 

mature and posed a costly risk for design changes, GAO recommended 

that DOD consider outfitting additional EA-6Bs with the ICAP III suite, 

which would allow the Navy to slow EA-18G low rate production until its 

technologies become fully mature and functionality demonstrated. 

The Navy and Marine Corps operate the EA-6B, which provides electronic 

attack support DOD-wide at this time. The EA-6B has been upgraded over 

time to increase its reactive jamming capability. The most important ongoing effort to the EA-6B is the ICAP-III electronic suite modification, 

 9

GAO-06-446. 

Page 73 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

which provides more rapid emitter detection, selective reactive jamming, 

and expanded coverage. The Navy has two squadrons currently deployed 

with ICAP-III and plans to equip a total of 15 of its EA-6Bs with the 

ICAP-III suite. The Navy plans to start decommissioning the EA-6B from 

its fleet starting in 2008 and retire all aircraft by 2013, replacing them with 

the new EA-18G that will provide electronic attack support to its carrier 

strike forces. 

The Navy will start transferring aircraft to the Marine Corps in fiscal year 

2010 and complete transfers in 2013 with delivery of the ICAP III aircraft.

The Marines Corps planned to retire its EA-6Bs by 2015, but officials said 

plans could change depending on the transfer schedule and that they may 

need to keep these aircraft in the inventory longer depending on the JSF 

delivery schedule. The Marine Corps has not yet made firm plans for its 

future electronic attack capability and is considering employment of the 

JSF and unmanned aircraft systems. We note that the Marine Corps has 

requested a total of $379 million in the fiscal year 2007 and 2008 global war 

on terror requests to upgrade an additional 18 EA-6Bs with the ICAP-III 

suite and for other modernization enhancements.

Table 18: EA-6B Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of dollars) 

 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 Total

FY 2008 Budget

RTD&E $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0

Procurement 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Modifications 48.8 30.6 33.7 32.8 33.3 37.5 38.1 254.8

Supplemental

RDT&E 0 0

Procurement 0 0

Modifications 178.6 200.7 379.3

Total $227.4 $231.3 $33.7 $32.8 $33.3 $37.5 $38.1 $634.1

Source: DOD budget data. 

Page 74 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Figure 17: AV-8B Harrier II 

Date first deployed: January 1985 

Current inventory: 134

Average age: 10.4 years

Source: DOD.

The AV-8B Harrier II is a short field take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) 

jet aircraft that deploys from naval ships, advanced bases, and 

expeditionary airfields. Its mission is to attack and destroy surface targets

and escort friendly aircraft, day or night, under all weather conditions 

during expeditionary, joint or combined operations. The Harrier is 

responsible for conducting close air support, armed reconnaissance and 

air interdiction, offensive and defensive anti-air warfare, including combat 

air patrol, armed escort mission, and offensive missions against enemy 

ground-to-air defenses. The first Harrier squadron is expected to be 

replaced by the JSF starting in fiscal year 2011. 

The AV-8B, a more powerful and longer range model, than its predecessor 

the AV-8A, was introduced in 1985. The AV-8Bs were originally designed as 

day attack only aircraft, but some were later upgraded to add night attack 

and radar capabilities. The night attack and radar upgrades enhance the 

pilot’s ability to locate and destroy targets under various weather 

Mission 

Program Status 

Page 75 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

conditions and at night. Some of the AV-8Bs received an upgrade to 

enhance night attack with improved multimode radar in 1991-1992. 

Between 1994 and 2001, the majority of AV-8Bs were remanufactured with 

new fuselages to add structural life to the airframe and to accommodate 

the new radar upgrade. 

Currently there are several on-going efforts to add capabilities and 

improve sustainment for the AV-8B until replaced by the JSF, including 

• remanufacturing 5 old, day attack aircraft to receive the night attack 

capability and refurbishing 2 training aircraft; 

• using a more accurate method to track the useful life of the aircraft; 

and 

• continuing efforts to improve sustainment through a readiness 

management plan for the airframes and an engine life management 

plan. 

The AV-8B was originally designed to last for 6,000 flying hours. This 

estimate was based on engineering fatigue projections on a 20 year service 

life, flying 300 hours per year, on very rigorous mission profiles. However, 

the aircraft have typically not been flown in such stressful flight envelopes 

and the Marines estimate they will be able to exceed the original 

6,000 hour service life and maintain an additional 66 aircraft in service 

through 2015. In addition, the Marine Corps plans a set of modifications, 

largely unfunded, that would add important capabilities by 2012 or later to

enable the Harriers to be more effective in future threat environments. 

GAO Observations The AV-8 aircraft was DOD’s first STOVL system. The aircraft is costly to 

maintain and has a relatively high attrition rate. The Marine Corps has 

134 AV-8Bs in its current fleet and plans to replace them all with STOVL 

JSFs by 2025. The new fuselages increased the estimated service for the

AV-8Bs from 6,000 to 9,000 flight hours. Further, the AV-8Bs have not been

used as vigorously as mission profiles used to project its useful life and 

officials believe that the fleet can remain in inventory well beyond the 

expected delivery dates of the JSF, if necessary. 

Ongoing and planned modernization efforts are minimal. The Marines are 

upgrading five AV-8Bs that did not get previous upgrades so that they will

now have the night attack capability, and refurbishing two training aircraft

In fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps began repairs on four aircraft 

damaged during combat operations using supplemental funding. As 

another step to mitigate potential slips in JSF production, officials are also 

Page 76 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft 

Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts 

increasing the amount of depot level maintenance on the AV-8B fleets to 

ensure sufficient numbers are available and capable. The Harrier is 

scheduled to remain in service until at least 2021, but its retirement is 

dependent upon the delivery of the JSF. 

Table 19: AV-8B Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of dollars) 

 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 Total

FY 2008 Budget 

RTD&E $21.7 $17.4 $26.3 $14.8 $12.5 $12.7 $12.9 $118.1

Procurement 0 3.0 3.4 3.4 0 0 0 9.9

Modifications 57.5 37.5 51.7 37.3 29.2 23.0 22.6 258.8

Supplemental

RDT&E 0 6.4 6.4

Procurement 0 0 0

Modifications 9.9 0 9.9

Total $89.9 $64.3 $81.4 $55.5 $41.7 $35.7 $35.5 $403.1

Source: DOD budget data. 

Page 77 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
A

A

ppendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff 

cknowledgements 

Page 78 GAO-07-415 

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgements 

Michael J. Sullivan (202) 512-4841 

Principal contributors to this report were the Assistant Director 

Michael Hazard, Bruce Fairbairn, Marvin Bonner, Erin Clouse, 

Matthew Lea, Sara Margraf, Robert Miller, and Karen Sloan. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
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(120564) Page 81 GAO-07-415 Tactical Aircraft Investment Strategy
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