In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-1553

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Dale W. Berthiaume,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 3:99CR000092-001--John C. Shabaz, Chief Judge.

Argued September 15, 2000--Decided December 1, 2000

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Kanne and Williams,

Circuit Judges.

 Williams, Circuit Judge. Appellant Dale W.

Berthiaume pleaded guilty to one count of

distributing methamphetamine in violation of 21

U.S.C. sec. 841(a)(1). After determining that

Berthiaume distributed 3,735 grams of

methamphetamine and that he possessed a firearm

during relevant conduct, the district court

sentenced Berthiaume to 212 months’ imprisonment.

Berthiaume appeals the district court’s

calculation of the drug quantity, its imposition

of a two-level upward adjustment for the

possession of a firearm and its denial of a

three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of

responsibility. Because we find that the district

court’s sentencing determinations were not

clearly erroneous, we affirm.

I

 After being arrested for selling methamphetamine

to a government informant, Berthiaume was

indicted for four counts of violating 21 U.S.C.

sec. 841(a)(1), which prohibits the distribution

of controlled substances, including

methamphetamine. Berthiaume pleaded guilty to one

count of the indictment and the remaining counts

were dismissed.

 At his sentencing hearing, Berthiaume contended

that, at a maximum, he was responsible for

selling 1,360.8 grams of methamphetamine. The

district court rejected Berthiaume’s contention
and found him responsible for distributing 3,735

grams, which set his base offense level at 34.

See U.S.S.G. sec. 2D1.1(c)(3) (1998). The district

court’s calculation included 225.14 grams

distributed during four controlled buys and found

during a search of Berthiaume’s residence, 675

grams from 1995 sales to Eric Cooke at 2 ounces

per month, 1,814.4 grams from 1996 sales to Cooke

at 4 ounces per month, and 1,020 grams from 1997

sales to Donald Neumann at 4 ounces per month for

9 months.

 Pursuant to sec. 2D1.1(b)(1) of the United States

Sentencing Guidelines, the district court

increased Berthiaume’s base offense level by two

for the possession of a dangerous weapon. The

court based this upward adjustment on Cooke’s

testimony that he gave Berthiaume a Ruger model

10/22 rifle as partial payment of an outstanding

drug debt and that it was not clearly improbable

that a Ruger .44 magnum caliber revolver found in

an unfinished open area of Berthiaume’s residence

was connected to Berthiaume’s drug trafficking.

Because Berthiaume claimed responsibility for

only one-third of the quantity of drugs found

attributable to him by a preponderance of

evidence by the court, the district court

concluded that Berthiaume frivolously contested

relevant conduct and denied him a three-level

downward departure for acceptance of

responsibility.

 On appeal, Berthiaume contests the reliability

of the testimony that the district court used in

calculating the quantity of drugs for which he

was accountable and in increasing his offense

level for the possession of a gun. Berthiaume

also challenges the court’s finding that he did

not accept responsibility for his conduct.

II

 Berthiaume faces an uphill battle. "This court

’gives great deference to a district court’s

sentencing determinations and is reluctant to

disturb the district court’s findings of fact

unless clearly erroneous.’" United States v.

Hickok, 77 F.3d 992, 1007 (7th Cir. 1996)

(quoting United States v. Hassan, 927 F.2d 303,

309 (7th Cir. 1991)). This standard applies to

the calculation of drug quantities, United States

v. Morrison, 207 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2000),

upward sentence adjustments, United States v.

Cain, 155 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 1998), and the

determination of whether the defendant has

accepted responsibility, United States v. Zehm,

217 F.3d 506, 515 (7th Cir. 2000). A reviewing

court may reverse a district court’s sentencing

conclusion only if after reviewing the record, it

is left with the firm and definite conviction
that a mistake has been made. United States v.

Galbraith, 200 F.3d 1006, 1011 (7th Cir. 2000).

A reviewing court gives special deference to

findings based upon credibility determinations,

which "’can virtually never be clear error.’"

Hickok, 77 F.3d at 1007 (quoting Anderson v. City

of Bessemer City, North Carolina, 470 U.S. 564,

575, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1512 (1985)).

A

 Berthiaume’s first challenge on appeal is to

the district court’s calculation of the quantity

of methamphetamine found attributable to him.

Berthiaume argues that Cooke’s testimony as to

the time frame of the sales and the quantities of

methamphetamine exchanged were inconsistent and

contradictory. "[A] sentencing court may consider

a wide range of information in making [the drug]

calculation, provided that this information

includes ’sufficient indicia of reliability to

support its probable accuracy.’" Morrison, 207

F.3d at 967 (quoting United States v. Robinson,

164 F.3d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir. 1999)).

 The district court’s calculation was based on

methamphetamine found in a search of Berthiaume’s

residence, and Cooke’s testimony and Neumann’s

statement regarding methamphetamine that they

purchased from Berthiaume. Cooke’s testimony

accounted for two-thirds of the drug quantity

ultimately found by the court as attributable to

Berthiaume. "[I]n circumstances where evidence of

relevant conduct significantly increase[s] drug

calculations, statements of a defendant’s

associates might require further testimony as

substantial indicia of reliability." Morrison,

207 F.3d at 967.

 Here, the reliability of Cooke’s testimony was

bolstered by the facts that he testified inperson at the sentencing hearing and his

testimony was corroborated by another witness.

Contrary to Berthiaume’s characterizations,

Cooke’s testimony was consistent. Cooke testified

that starting in March 1995 he obtained an ounce

of methamphetamine a couple of times a month from

Berthiaume, i.e., semi-monthly. Cooke also stated

that in May 1995 or after the arrest of Jeff

Jenetta, he obtained an ounce every couple of

weeks from Berthiaume, i.e., bi-weekly. Either

way you interpret these statements, Cooke’s

testimony amounts to his purchasing about two

ounces of methamphetamine a month from Berthiaume

in 1995. The district court used two ounces a

month in its calculation for 1995 drug sales.

 Furthermore, Cooke’s testimony as to the 1996

drug sales was corroborated by Brandon Hopkins,

a former customer of Cooke’s and a drug dealer.
Cooke testified that in 1996 he received two to

three ounces from Berthiaume every couple of

weeks, i.e., two to three ounces bi-weekly.

According to Hopkins, Cooke told him that Cooke

received about two to four ounces a couple of

times a month from Berthiaume, i.e., two to four

ounces semi-monthly. The district court used the

lower estimate--four ounces a month--in its

calculation of drug sales for 1996. In reaching

its conclusion, the district court specifically

stated that it had examined the testimony of

Cooke and determined it to be credible evidence.

The court also noted that it found Hopkins’

testimony to corroborate that of Cooke’s.

 As the factfinder, the district court was in

the best position to judge Cooke’s credibility.

And where, as here, Cooke’s testimony was

corroborated, we cannot say that we are left with

a firm and definite conviction that the district

court made a mistake by including drug quantities

based on Cooke’s testimony.

 Berthiaume also challenges the quantities that

Neumann claimed to have purchased from him as

unreliable. Neumann did not testify in-person at

sentencing, but his statements were proffered

through the testimony of Special Agent James Ohm.

Hearsay evidence is permissible at sentencing

where the rules of evidence do not apply.

Morrison, 207 F.3d at 967.

 Ohm testified that Neumann told him that he

purchased 1,020 grams of methamphetamine from

Berthiaume over a nine-month period. Although

Neumann’s statement was uncorroborated, at

sentencing, "the trial court is entitled to

credit testimony that is ’totally uncorroborated

and comes from an admitted liar, convicted felon,

[or a] large scale drug-dealing, paid government

informant.’" Galbraith, 200 F.3d at 1012 (quoting

United States v. McEntire, 153 F.3d 424 (7th Cir.

1998)). Accordingly, the district court’s

reliance on the sales to Neumann was proper, and

its calculation of the drug quantity attributable

to Berthiaume was not clearly erroneous.

B

 Berthiaume’s second challenge is to the district

court’s decision to increase his base offense

level for the possession of a weapon. Under the

sentencing guidelines, if a dangerous weapon

(including a firearm) was possessed during the

commission of an offense involving drugs, the

defendant’s base offense level must be increased

by two levels. See U.S.S.G. sec. 2D1.1(b)(1). The

government bears the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that the gun was

possessed during the commission of the offense or
relevant conduct. Cain, 155 F.3d at 843. But, the

government does not have to prove that the gun

was connected to the offense. Id. If the

government satisfies its burden, the burden

shifts to the defendant to show that it was

clearly improbable that the gun was connected to

the offense. Id.

 The government offered two bases upon which the

sentence enhancement could be applied. First, it

offered Cooke’s testimony that on one occasion he

sold a Ruger model 10/22 rifle to Berthiaume at

a discount in exchange for partial payment on a

drug debt. Berthiaume contends that the gun sale

was a strict cash transaction and was not

connected to the sale of methamphetamine. To

bolster his assertion, Berthiaume offered the

testimony of Randall Williamson, who was present

during a gun sale.

 Williamson testified that Berthiaume purchased

a gun from Cooke at Berthiaume’s home, but paid

the full amount in cash and did not give Cooke a

"drug credit." As the factfinder, the district

court was entitled to give Cooke’s testimony

greater weight than that of Williamson’s. See

Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S. Ct. at 1511

("Where there are two permissible views of the

evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them

cannot be clearly erroneous.") Accordingly, we

find no clear error in the district court’s

decision to increase Berthiaume’s base offense

level for the possession of a gun.

 Because only one weapon is needed to increase

the base offense level under the sentencing

guidelines, we do not need to determine whether

the court’s reliance on the government’s second

basis--that a gun found in Berthiaume’s residence

was possessed in connection with the offense--

was proper.

C

 The last ruling that Berthiaume challenges is

the district court’s decision to deny him a

three-level reduction for acceptance of

responsibility. He asserts that his denial of the

drug quantity found by the district court was not

evidence of frivolously contesting relevant

conduct but simply an indication of his desire

for his sentence to reflect the actual quantity

for which he was responsible.

 The sentencing guidelines allow a federal court

to reduce a defendant’s drug offense level "[i]f

the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of

responsibility for his offense. . . ." U.S.S.G.

sec. 3E1.1. However, application note 1(a) to that

section provides that the court may refuse to
grant the reduction if it finds that the

"defendant . . . falsely denies, or frivolously

contests, relevant conduct that the court

determines to be true. . . ."

 This circuit has held that it is permissible to

withhold an acceptance of responsibility

deduction from a defendant who denies relevant

conduct in the face of credible statements from

witnesses tying him to the offense. Zehm, 217

F.3d at 515. As discussed above, the district

court’s decision to find the testimony of Cooke

and the statement of Neumann credible was

supported by the record. Consequently, faced with

credible evidence that Berthiaume sold 3,735

grams and Berthiaume’s insistence that he only

sold 1,360.8 grams, we cannot say that the

district court’s finding that Berthiaume

frivolously contested relevant conduct was

improper. Accordingly, the district court’s

decision to refuse to reduce Berthiaume’s offense

level for acceptance of responsibility was not

clearly erroneous.

III

 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district

court’s sentencing decision.