R ive rb e n d S ta b le s, L L C ha s o n ly t w o m e m b e rs , M ic h a e l D a n ie l an d S te p h e n D a n ie l. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE Ja nuary 9, 200 8 S es sio n
HOL LY THRASH ER v. RI VERBEND STAB LES, L LC, ET AL 

### .

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 06C-97 Walte r K urtz, Judge

No. M2007- 01237-COA-R 3-CV - F iled May 21, 2008

Plaintiff a ppeals the summary dismiss al of her c omplaint arising out of the death of her T ennesse e Wal kin g Ho rs e wh ile the ho rs e wa s b e ingtr a ine d at Riv e rb e nd Sta ble s, L L C. Pl a int if

f f ile d s uit claiming the horse die d as a r esult of th e defe ndants’ neg lige nce a nd g ross neg lige nce. T he trial court dismissed the complaint upon a f in d i n g t h at t he cla ims of neg lige nce w ere barr ed by the
e xcu lpator

y pr ov isi on s in the pa

rt ie s’ wr itt e n ag re e me nt an d Pl a int if f h a d f a ile d to make out a

pr ima fac ie claim of gross neg lige nce. F inding the e x culpatory ag ree ment enfor cea

ble and the e vidence fails to establish a g enuine issue of materia l fac t conce rni n g t h e claims for gross neg lige nce or re c kle ssn e ss, we a ff

ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , P.J ., M.S., and ANDY D. B E NN E TT , J ., joined.

Kirk L . Clements, Goodlettsvill e, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Holly

Thrashe r.
Michael H. J ohnson and M. Kristin Selph, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellees, River

bend Sta ble s, L L C, St e ph e n D anie l and Mic ha e l D a

nie l.

OP IN ION

I n Fe b ru ary

of 2004, Holly

Thrashe r (“ Plaintiff”) be g an boar ding he r Tenne ssee Walking Ho rs e , L ola , at Riv e rb e nd Sta ble s, L L C fo r t

ra ini ngpurp os e s. Whe n Pl a int if f b e g an b oa

rd ingL ola 1 at Riverbend, she executed an A g ree ment that contained the following clause :
6. Riverbend a

nd its employ ees, owners a nd ag ents shall not be liable to Owne r or any of Owne r’s guests for a

ny neg lige nt conduct or ma l fe as an ce o f any sort, including a

ny persona l injury

or prope rty damag e (includingthe injury
or de a th o f a

ho rs e ). Owne r a g re e s to ind e mni fy and ho ld h arm le ss-2- Riv e rb e n d

f r o man y s u c hl i a b i l i ty
. Inth e e v e n ta

c l a i mi s f

i l e d a g a ins t Riv e rb e nd , O wn e r a g re e s to ind e mni fy Riv e rb e nd fo r a ll los s a nd dama g e s, including r easona

ble attorne y

fee s, resulting from the f iling of a ny such
c la im. On August 18, 2005, Michael Daniel, a R iverbe nd trainer and member

of the L L C, attache d L ola t o an equine exercise mac hine known as a “hot walke r.” River

bend had pur chase d this machine two wee ks ear lier from Robert Nelms, who had use d the machine with approxim ately thirty horses per da y prior to the sale

. Whil e attached to the m achine , L ola bec ame spooke d and lung ed for war d, imp a lin g he rs e lf

wi th a le a d b ar t hat e xten de d fr om the ma c hin e . T ra g ic a lly , L ola die d a s a re su lt.
Plaintiff filed suit on J anuar y 13, 2006, ag ainst Riverbend Stables, L L C, St even D aniel, and Mic ha e l D anie l ( c oll e c tiv e ly , “ De fe nd ants ” ) cla im ingthat D e fe nd ants we re ne g lig e nt, g ro ssl y ne g lig e nt, and

re c kle ss i n th e tr a ini ngand bo ard ingof

he r h or se . F oll ow ingdis c ov e ry , D e fe nd ants filed a motion for summar y judgme nt claiming, inte r a lia , that the exculpatory clause relieve d them of lia bil ity

. Af

te r a he ari ngon

the mot ion , th e tr ia l c ourt g ra nte d D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on , s umm ari ly dismiss ing a ll of Plaintiff’s claims. Specifica lly , the trial court found that “[r]ely ing on the fa ctors enumer ated in Olson v. Molzen , 558 S.W .2d 429, 431 (Tenn. 1977) , [t ]he Ex culpatory Clause in the Def endants’ c ontrac t relieve s them from all neg lige nce.” Fur ther, “[t] he contra ct also is not void as ag ainst public policy .” As to gr oss neg lige nce, the trial court he ld that there w as no evide nce that the Def endants’ a ctions were wanton, willful, o r showed a consc ious disreg ard f or the saf ety of oth e rs and

the re fo re Pla int if

f h a d f a ile d to sh ow t hat th e al le g e d a c ts o r o mis sio ns of De fe nd ants constituted g ross neg lige nce. Acc ording ly , the claim of g ross neg lige nce w as summarily dismiss ed. This appea l followed.

S T ANDARD OF REVIEW
Th e iss ue s w e re re so lve d in the tr ia l c ourt up on

summa ry jud g me nt. Sum mary

jud g me nts do not enjoy a presumption of correc tness on appea l. BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Co. v. Johnson , 100 S.W. 3d 20 2, 20 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) . T his c ourt mus t make a fr e sh de te rm inatio n that th e re qu ir e me nts of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have be en satisfied. Hu nte r v . B ro wn , 955 S.W .2d 49, 50-51 (Te nn. 1997). We c on sid e r t

he e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble to t he no n- mov ingpa

rt y and re so lve a ll in f e r e n c e s in th a t p arty ’ s favor

. S tovall v. Clarke , 1 13 S.W. 3d 71 5, 72 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; Godfrey v

. Ru iz , 90 S.W .3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002) . When review ing the evidenc e, we first deter mine whether fa c tua l di sp ute s e xist. I f a fa c tua l dis pute e xists , we the n de te rm ine wh e the r the fa c t is mate ri a l to the claim or de fense upon which the summary judgme nt is predicate d and whe ther the disputed f act cre ates a g enuine issue f

or trial. By rd

v . H all , 84 7 S.W. 2d 20 8, 21 4 (Tenn. 19 93); Rutherford v. Polar Tank Trai ler, Inc ., 978 S.W .2d 102, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Summary judgme nt is appropriate wher e a pa rty establishes that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that a judg ment may be re ndere d as a matter of law. Te nn. R. Civ. P . 56.04; Sto v all , 113 S.W .3d 721. Moreove r, it is proper in virtually all civil c ases that can be resolved on the basis of l eg al i ssues alone, By rd v . H all , 8 47 S.W. 2d

a t 21 0; Pe nd

le ton v . M ill s , 73 S.W .3d 115,-3-

121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); howeve r, i t is not appropriate when g enuine disputes re g ardingmateria l fact s exis t. Tenn. R. Civ. P . 56.04. The pa rty seekinga summary

judgme nt bear s the burden of de mon str a tin g t hat no g e nu ine dis pute s o f m ate ri a l f a c t e xist a

nd that th e pa

rt y is e nti tle d to judgme nt as a m at t er of

law. Go dfr e

yv . R uiz , 90 S.W .3d at 695. Summary judgme nt should be g rante d at t he trial court level when the undisputed fac ts, and the inferenc es re asonably drawn from the un dis pute d f

a c ts, su pp or t on e c on c lus ion , w hic h is the pa rt y se e kin g the summa

ry jud g me nt i s entitled to a judgme nt a s a matter of law. Pero’s Steak

&Spaghetti House v. Lee , 90 S.W .3d 614, 62 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; W

ebber v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 49 S.W .3d 265, 269 (Tenn. 2001) . The court must take the strong est leg itimate view of the evidence in favor of t he non-moving par ty , allow
a ll r e a so na

ble inf e re nc e s in favo r o f t

hat pa rt y , d isc ard a ll c ounte rv a ili nge vid e nc e , a nd , if the re is
a dis pute a s to any

mate ri al fact

or if the re is a

ny do ub t a s to the e xiste nc e of a mate ri a l f

a c t, summary judgme nt cannot be grante d. By rd v . H all , 8 47 S.W. 2d

a t 21 0; EV

COCor p. v . R os s , 528 S.W. 2d 20 (T e nn . 1 97 5) . T o b e e nti tle d to summa ry jud g me nt, the mov ing pa

rt y mus t a ff ir mativ e ly neg ate an essential element of the non-moving party ’s claim or e stablish an aff irmative def

ense that conclusively

defe ats the non-movingparty ’s claim. Cherry v. W illiams , 36 S.W .3d 78, 82-83 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2000).

A N A L Y SIS Plaintiff presents two issues. F irst, Plainti ff c ontends the exculpatory clause i s void as ag ainst public policy

. Second, P laintiff contends g enuine issues of mater ial fac t exi st as to whether Def endants’ c onduct constituted g ross neg lige nce.
E XC UL PA TOR Y C LA U SE
I t is well established in Tennesse e that “subject to cer tain exceptions, parties may contra ct that one shall not be liable f or his neg lige nce to a

nother.” Olson v. Molzen , 5 5 8 S. W. 2 d 4 2 9 , 430 (T en n

. 1 9 7 7 ) ( ci t i n g Moss v. Fortune , 340 S.W. 2d 90 2 (T e nn . 196 0) ). Th e re are , h ow e ve r, pu bli c policy exceptions to thi s g ener al rule. Id

. As the Supreme Court e x plained in Olson , c e rt a in profe ssional relationships, such as those with doctors or l awyers, require a g reater re sponsibili ty and, there fore , a re lease from liability of t he professional’s neglig ence would be “obnoxious.” Hende rson v. Que st Expeditions, Inc. , 1 7 4 S

. W

. 3 d 7 3 0 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Olson , 558 S.W .2d at 430). The Supreme Court identified criter ia to consider when dete rmining whether an exculpatory provision is contra

ry to public policy

. Hende rson , 1 7 4 S

. W

. 3 d at7 3 2 (c i t i n g Olson , 558 S.W .2d at 431). Criteria to be considere d include: [a.] I t conce rns a business of a ty pe g ener ally thought suitable for public r egulation. [b.] The pa

rty seekingexculpation is enga g ed in p er forming a se rvice of g reat i mp o rt an c e t o th e p u

b l i c , w h i c hi s o f

t e na m a t t e r o f p r a c t i c a l n e c e s s i ty

f o r so me members of

the public.-4-

[c.] The pa

rty holds himself out as willing to per form this service for a ny member of the public who see ks it, or at least for any member c oming within ce rtain established sta nd ard s. [d.] As a result of the essential natur e of the service , in the economic se tting of the transac tion, the party

invoki ng exculpation possesses a dec isive advanta g e of ba rg a ini ngstr e ng th a g a ins t any me mbe r o f t

he pu bli c wh o s e e ks his se rv ic e s. [e.] In exercising a superior barg aining power the party confr onts the public with a
s t an d ar d i z e d

a dh e s i o nc o n tr a c to f

e x c u l p a t i o n , an d m ak e s n o p r o v i s i o nw h e r e b y a purc ha se r m ay

pa y a dd iti on a l r e a so na

bl e fee s and

ob ta in p ro te c tio n a g a ins t neg lige nce. [f. ] F ina lly , a s a

re su lt o f the tr ans a c tio n, the pe rs on or pr op e rt y of the purc ha se r i s place d under the control of the se ller, subject to the risk of car elessness by the seller
or his a g e nts

. Olson , 558 S.W .2d at 431. I t is not necessar y that all six criter ia b e present. Russell v. Bray , 116 S.W .3d 1, 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). A n exculpatory ag ree ment may be deemed offensive, a nd thus void, if less than all six of the c riteria a re pr esent. Id

. (c i t i n g Olson , 558 S.W .2d at 431).
The a pplication of the fore g oing c riteria, how ever , is to be “limited to sit uations involving a contract with a professional pe rson, rather than a trade sman.” Id. (c i t i n g Olson , 558 S.W .2d at 430; Parton v. Mark P irtle Oldsmobile-Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc

. , 730 S.W .2d 634, 636 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (stating “we do not think the Supreme Court intended the [ Olson ] rule to be applied to transa ctions by what the Court ter

med ‘tra desmen in the mar ket place .’”) ).
Plaintiff contends the Olson public policy exception to the e nforc eability of an e x culpatory provision applies in this case be cause Def endants a re pr ofessionals. This contention is based primarily on the holding in Russell v. Bray that a “home inspector” is a profe ssional, not a trade sman, and the e x culpatory

provision was he l d t o b e unenforce able. 116 S.W.3d at 6. The Ru sse ll court conclude d that home inspectors w ere not like automobile mechanic s or ot her tradesmen beca use, as th e co urt s t at ed , h o m e in s p ec t o rs “a re n o tp er fo rm i n g hands-on tasks to createor repair a product .” Id. (e mph a sis a dd e d. ) T he c ourt we nt o n to con c lud e that home ins pe c tor s, lik e many pr of e ssi on a ls, “sell t h eir expe rt analysis and opini on .” Id. (empha sis added.) The court a lso found it significa nt that Tenne ssee r egulates home in s p ectors and re quires home inspec tors to hold “a contr actor ’s license or a prope r ce rtification or me mbership.” Id.

W e, h o we v er , b el i ev e t h e p u b l i c p o l i c y e x c e p t i o n d o es n o tap p l y t o th i s ca s e. Al th o u gh De fe nd ants may

po sse ss a g re a t de a l of

e xpe rt ise in b oa

rd ingand tr a ini ngho rs e s, we fi nd

the duty owed by Def endants for the service s at issue here is not equivalent to the public duty a doctor owes her patient or a lawy er ow es his client.-5-

The Fede ral District Court i n the matter of Teles v. Big Roc k Stables, L.P. , 419 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1008 (E.D. Te nn. 2006) came to a simil ar conclusion. The District Court f ound that owner s and oper ators of hor se stables do not f all under the public policy exception prohibiting exculpatory clause s. As the cour

t expl ained:

I t is well s ettled i n Tenne ssee that parties may contra ct t hat one shall not be liable for his neg lige nce to a

nother but that s u ch o t her sha ll assume the risk incident to such neg lige nce. Moss v. Fortune , 340 S.W. 2d 90 2 (T e nn . 196 0) . Thi s rul e is sub je c t to exception. A party

cannot c ontrac t away

his liability for willful or g ross neg lige nce. Mem phis & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Jones , 39 Tenn. 517 (1859)

. Ne ith e r c an a p ar ty cont r a ct aw ay liability if t he duty unde r which he acts is a public one

. Cin c inn ati , Ne w Orle an s & Te

x as Pa c ifi c Ry . Co. v . S

au lsb ur y , 90 S.W

. 624, 626 (Tenn.1905) ; Carolina, C linchfield & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Unaka Springs Lumber Co. , 170 S.W . 591 594 (Tenn.1914) ; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. , 175 U.S. 91 (1899).
The e x istence of

a publi c duty which would disallow g iving effe ct to an exculpatory provision is determined by look i n g at seve ral fa ctors. I f the ser vice pr ovided is the ty pe whic h ma

y g e ne ra lly

be su bje c t to pu

bli c re g ulatio n th e n th e duty pr ob a bly exis ts. Sm ith v . S

ou the rn Be ll , 3 6 4 S. W. 2 d 9 5 2 , 9 5 8 ( T e n n

. Ct

. Ap p

. 1 9 6 2 )

. O ther fa c tor s in c lud e the de gree to wh ic h th e se rv ic e is o f p ra c tic a l ne c e ssi ty fo r s ome me mbe rs of

the pu bli c , wh eth er the s e rv ic e is o ff e re d to any

me mbe r o f t

he pu bli c who see ks it or qualifies for it, whether one par ty has g reater ba

rg aining power

than
me mbe rs of

the g e ne ra l pu

bli c , w he the r i n e xer c isi ngthat ba rg a ini ngpo we r, the pa

rt y prese nts a standar dized “adhesion” contra ct m aking no provision where by protec tion
a g a ins t ne g lig e nc e may be ob ta ine d, or wh e the r the pe rs on or pr op e rt y of on e pa rt y is placed unde r the c ontrol of the other

. Olson v. Molzen , 55 8 S

. W

. 2 d 4 2 9 , 431 (Tenn. 1977)

. Particularly offe nsive in T ennesse e ar e exculpation contra cts executed by persons in prof

essional vocations. Id. at 432.

An aly zing th e fac ts o

f th is c as e un de r the

for e go ing ru le

s, thec ou rt f

ind s th at a ho rse stable generally, and the service s provided in this case spe cifically, are gov erned by the general rule and do not fall under the exc eption prohibiti ng exc ulpatory clauses

. Teles , 419 F. Supp. 2d at 1007-08 ( emphasis adde d.) We, theref

ore, c onclude that the se rvice s at issue here do not fa l l u n d er the exception prohibiting e x culpatory

clause s. A cc o rd ingly , we a ffirm the tria l court’s de termination that the
e xcu lpator

y c la us e c on ta ine d in

the a g re e me nt bet ween Pla int if f a nd Riv e rb e nd

Sta ble s, L L C, i s enfor cea ble. As a c onsequenc e, Plaintiff’s cla im of ordi n ar y n egli g ence is barre d by the par ties’s ag ree ment.-6- G RO SS N EG LI G EN CE
In addition to assertinga cla im of o rd i n ar y neg lige nce, Plaintiff a sserted a claim that Def endants we re “ g rossly

neg lige nt, and re ckless in the tra ining a nd boardingof her

horse.” The parties’ ag ree ment bars Plaintiff’s claim of ordinary or g ener al neg lige nce, how ever , it does not bar a cla im of g ross neg lige nce. See J ones v. Tenn

. R i der

s Inst ruction Program , No. M2006-01087- COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL3936 3 0 , at *1 n.3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2007) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 ap p l i ca t i o nfi l ed ) ( ci t i n g Buck ner v. Varne r , 793 S.W .2d 939, 941 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that
an e xcu lpator

y c la us e in a c on tr a c t “ wi ll n ot o pe ra te to pro tec t a par

ty wh o is g uil ty

of g ro ss neg lige nce” )).
The trial c ourt summarily dismiss ed the cl ai m of g ross neg lige nce ba sed on the following fi n d i n g:
The Plaintiff fa iled to show that the allege d acts or omissions of Riverbend Stables constitute g ross neg lige nce a nd that the Plai n t i ff

. . . failed to show a conscious neg lect of duty . Fur

ther ther e is no evidence that the D efe ndants’ ac tions were wanton, willful, or showe d a consc ious disreg ard f or saf ety of others.

T h e Co urt p arti c u la

r ly a ls o r e li e s u

p o nth e n e wc a s e of Jon es v. Te nn esse e Ri de rs Inst r u ction Program, Inc. , 2007 WL393630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). T here fore , pursuant to T.R.C.P. 56, t he Def endants have demonstrated that there are no g enuine issues of mater ial fac t . . . .”
Pla int if f c on te nd s th e summa

ry dis mis sa l of h e r c la im o f gro ss n e g lig e nc e wa s e rr or be c a us e the re e xists a

g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t a s to wh e the r D e fe nd ants ’ c on du c t c on sti tut e d g ro ss neg lige nce.
In order to preva il on a claim of g ross neg lige nce, a plaintiff must first establish that the defe ndant eng ag ed in c onduct that amounts to or dinary neg lige nce. See Menuskin v . W illiams , 145 F.3d 755, 766 ( 6th Cir. 1998). In addition to proving that the def endant ha s committed a neg lige nt act, the pla intiff must prove that the ac t was “done with utter unconc ern f or the saf ety of others, or
on e do ne wi th s uc h a

re c kless di sre gard for

the ri g hts of

oth e rs that a

c on sc iou s in dif

fe re nc e to conseque nces is implied in law.” Ru ff v

. Me mp his Lig

ht, Ga s, an d W

ate r D iv ., 619 S.W .2d 526, 528 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 8 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Odum v. H aynes , 494 S.W .2d 795, 807 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972))

. Gr os s n e g lig e nc e is d e fi ne d a s “ a c on sc iou s n e g le c t of

duty or a ca llo us ind if fe re nc e to conseque nces” or “such entire want of care as would raise a pre sumption of a conscious indiffe renc e to conseque nces.” Jones , 2 0 0 7 W L 3 9 3 6 3 0 , at* 2 (c i t i n g Buck ner v. Varne r , 793 S.W .2d 939, 941 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1990) ; Tho ma so n v . W ay neCou nty , 611 S.W .2d 585 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); Sampley v . Aulabaugh , 589 S.W .2d 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979))

. The e vidence upon which Plaintiff re lies is found in the aff idavits of her two e x pert witnesses, Paul Walk er an d R i ch ar dMoores. Paul Walker testified that he had not “se en a hotP urs uant t o R est at em ent (Seco nd ) of T o rt s § 5 2 0 , A b no rma l l y D angero us A ct i vi t i es, t he f o l l o wi ng f

act o rs are 2
t o b e c on s i de r e d t o d e t e r mi n e w h e t h e r a n a c t i v i t y i s ab n or ma l l y da n g e r ou s : ( a ) e x i s t e n c e of a h i g h de g r e e of

r i s k of s om e h a rm to the p e rs o n , l a n d o r c h a ttels o f o the rs ; (b ) like liho o d tha t t h e ha rm th a t r e su lts fro m it w ill b e gr e a t; (c ) in a b ili ty t o el i mi nat e t he r i s k by t he exe r ci s e of r eas onabl e car e; ( d) e xt ent t o whi ch t he act i vi t y i s not a mat t er of comm on us age ; (e ) in a p p ro p ria te n e ss o f t h e a c tivity t o the p la c e w h e re it is ca rr ie d o n ; an d ( f) e x te n t to w h ic h it s v a lue to the c o m m u n ity i s o ut weighed b y i t s d angero us at t ri b ut es. R est at em ent (Seco nd ) of T o rt s § 52 0 (19 7 7 ).
-7- walker that has a le ad bar

at che st level that is less than forty (40) year s old.” He f

urther stated that

“ [a] ho t w a lke r t

hat ha s a ba r b e low he a d le ve l is ve ry

da ng e ro us ” and

tha t “ [g ]ive n th e fa c ts surr ound ing the de a th of L ola , he r de a th wa s a fo re se e a ble re su lt and

sh ou ld h ave be e n f

or e se e a ble to any profe ssional trainer.” Plaintiff’s other e x pert, Richar d Moores, testified that he had never seen a hot walke r, other than the one at issue, that had a lea d bar at chest leve l. Moores also stated that he would never put a horse on this hot walker and, in his professional opinion, the hot walke r wa s “inher ently

dang erous.”
The fa ct the hot walke r wa s forty or more year s old is n ei t her r eleva nt nor materia l to the issue of g ross neg lige nce. T he fa ct neither expert would use this hot walker is also of no conseque nce to the issue of g ross neg lige nce. The ex perts’ testimony that the hot walker

was ve ry dang erous or

inhere ntly

dang erous is re levant and material to the i ssue of g ross neg lige nce. Whether the experts ’ opi nions as to the inhere nt dang er of this hot walker is sufficie nt to prove a c laim of g ross neg lige nce r equire s further examination.

An a c t whic h othe rw ise wo uld be no thi ng mor e tha n simp le ne g lig e nc e may amou nt t o g ro ss neg lige nce if

the defe ndant’s neg lige nt conduct also involves a da ng erous instrumentality

. Cook v. Spinnaker's of Rivergate, Inc ., 878 S.W .2d 934 , 938 (Tenn. 1994) (drivingwhile intox icated) ; ac c or d Phelps v. Magnavox Co. , 497 S.W .2d 898, 906 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) (supply ing e lectric ity). Her e, Plaintiff has pre sented proof that the hot walker

was inher ently

dang erous. There is, however , no proof in the rec ord that Def endants conduct, other than the mere use of the hot w al k er , was ne g lig e nt i n a

ny mann e r. Thus , Pl a int if

f c on te nd s th a t D e fe nd a

nts we re g ro ssl y

ne g lig e nt b e c a

us e they used the hot wa lker to train L ola. Thus, Plaintiff is asking this court to hold, as a matter of la

w, that Def endants’ non- neg lige nt use of an inhere ntly dang erous device constitutes gross neg lige nce. I f we oblige d Plaintiff in this manner , we would se t a pre cede nt that persons ar e strict l y l i able f or injuries resulting fro m t h e non-neg lige nt use of an inhe rently dang erous de vice. We dec line the invitation to establish s uch a pr ece dent.

In T e nn e sse e , a

pe rs on wh o e ng a g e s in an “ ult

ra ha zar do us a c tiv ity

” is s tr ic tly

lia ble to t ho se 2 who ar e injured a s a re sult of such activity , without the need of proof that the de fenda nt’s conduct constituted g ross neg lige nce. See England v. Burns Stone Co., Inc ., 87 4 S. W.2 d 3 2, 37 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 93 ); see also Leathe rwood v . W adley , 121 S.W .3d 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) ( holding that if the def endant e ng ag ed in an ultra hazardous ac tivity , “[t] he neg lige nce o r ca re ex erc ised by the d ef en d an t i n ca rryi n g o u t s ai d ac t i v i ty i s i rr el ev an t ”) (c i t i n g Miller v. Alman Constr. Co. , 666 S.W .2d 466, 468 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983))

. There is, howeve r, no known authority in Tennesse e that stands for the pr oposition t hat a pe rson is strictly liable to those injured as a r esult of the def endant’ s nonneg lige nt use of an inhe rently dang erous de vice.-8-

Pow e r t oo ls, su c h a s an e le c tr ic sa w, are inh e re ntl y da

ng e ro us but th e me re fa c t so me on e is in ju r e d b y an o th e r ’ s u s e o f

ane le c tr ic s awis n o t s u f f ic ie n t t o s u s ta in

a c la im th a t t h e d e f e n d an t’ s non-neg lige nt use of the dange rous t ool constituted g ross neg lige nce. Moreover , wea pons, such as g uns or kni ves, can be dange rous devices if not proper ly used, however, the mere fac t one is injured by ano the r’ s u se of

a g un or kn if e is i ns uf fi c ie nt, sta

nd ing a lon e , to est a

bli sh that the de fe nd ant’ s u se of the gun or knife c onstitut ed g ross neg lige nce.
An a c t w hic h o the rw ise wo uld be no thi ng mor e tha

n s imp le ne g lig e nc e may

amou nt t o g ro ss n e g l i g e n c e i f

th e d e f e n d an t ’ s n e g l i g e n tc o n d

u c ta l s o i n v o l v e s a

d an g e r o u s o r

l e th a l i n s tr

u m e n t a l i ty. See Cook, 8 78 S.W. 2d

a t 93 8; see also Phe lps , 497 S.W .2d at 906. Plaintiff has pre sented suff icient
e vid e nc e to c re a te a

dis pute of

mate ri a l f

a c t c on c e rn ing the inh e re nt d ang e r p os e d b y De fe nd ants ’ use of the hot wa lker to train L ola; howeve r, Plaintiff has provide d no evidenc e of any other neg lige nt conduct by

Def endants. As we stated ear lier, to pr evail on her c laim of g ross neg lige nce, Pla int if f m us t f ir st e sta bli sh , o r i n th is c a se create a dis pute of

fa c t, t hat th e de fe nd ant e ng a g e d in conduct that a

mounts to ordinary

neg lige nce. Se e Me nu sk

in , 145 F.3d at 766. Be cause Plaintiff has failed to c reate a dispute of fac t c oncer ning the first element of a cla im of g ross neg lige nce, by failing to p ro vid e e vid e nc e up on wh ic h to ba se a

fi nd ingthat D e fe nd ants e ng a g e d in ne g ligent c on du c t, Def endants a re e ntitled to sum mary judgme nt a s a matter of law. We theref ore a ffirm the summar

y dismiss al of Plaintiff’s c laim of g ross neg lige nce.
I N C ONCL US I ON The judg ment of the trial court is affir med, and this matter is re manded with costs of a ppeal assessed a g ainst Plainti ff.

___________________________________ FRANK G. CL EMENT, JR ., J UDGE