NO. 07-11-0443-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AMARILLO 

PANEL C 

JULY 11, 2012 

______________________________ 

JAMELLE ANTOINE PARKER, APPELLANT 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

_________________________________ 

FROM THE 242ND DISTRICT COURT OF SWISHER COUNTY; 

NO. B 4273-09-08; HONORABLE ED SELF, JUDGE 

_______________________________ 

Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 In 2009, pursuant to a plea bargain, Appellant, Jamelle Antoine Parker, was 

granted deferred adjudication for aggravated assault with an affirmative finding on use 

of a deadly weapon,1

 assessed a $1,500 fine and placed on community supervision for 

five years. On September 8, 2011, the State filed an amended motion to proceed with 

an adjudication of guilt alleging that Appellant had violated six of the terms and 

conditions of community supervision. Following a hearing on the State's amended 

 

1

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2011). 
2 

motion at which Appellant entered a plea of true to the State's allegations, the trial court 

found that Appellant violated the terms of community supervision as alleged by the 

State, adjudicated him guilty, and proceeded to the punishment phase. Following the 

presentation of punishment evidence, the trial court sentenced Appellant to fifteen years 

confinement and increased the fine assessed to $5,000. In presenting this appeal, 

counsel has filed an Anders2 brief in support of a motion to withdraw. We grant 

counsel=s motion and affirm the judgment as modified. 

In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies he has conducted a 

conscientious examination of the record and, in his opinion, the record reflects no 

potentially plausible basis to support an appeal. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 

744-45, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 

(Tex.Crim.App. 2008). Counsel candidly discusses why, under the controlling 

authorities, the appeal is frivolous. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 

(Tex.Crim.App. 1978). Counsel has demonstrated that he has complied with the 

requirements of Anders and In re Schulman by (1) providing a copy of the brief to 

Appellant, (2) notifying him of his right to file a pro se response if he desired to do so, 

and (3) informing him of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In re 

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408.3

 By letter, this Court granted Appellant an opportunity to 

 

2

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). 

3

Notwithstanding that Appellant was informed of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review 

upon execution of the Trial Court=s Certification of Defendant=s Right of Appeal, counsel must comply with 

Rule 48.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure which provides that counsel shall within five days 

after this opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the opinion and judgment together with 

notification of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 

n.22 & at 411 n.35. 
3 

exercise his right to file a response to counsel=s brief, should he be so inclined. Id. at 

409 n.23. Appellant did not file a response. Neither did the State favor us with a brief. 

DECISION TO ADJUDICATE--STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appeal from a trial court's order adjudicating guilt is reviewed in the same 

manner as a revocation hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) 

(West Supp. 2011). When reviewing an order revoking community supervision imposed 

under an order of deferred adjudication, the sole question before this Court is whether 

the trial court abused its discretion. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 

(Tex.Crim.App. 2006); Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); 

Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983). In a revocation 

proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

probationer violated a condition of community supervision as alleged in the motion. 

Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). If the State fails to meet its 

burden of proof, the trial court abuses its discretion in revoking community supervision. 

Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 494. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a 

revocation, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. 

Jones v. State, 589 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). Additionally, a plea of true 

standing alone is sufficient to support a trial court=s revocation order. Moses v. State, 

590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). 

Appellant was indicted for striking an individual with a motor vehicle and causing 

bodily injury. He entered a plea of guilty to the charged offense and executed a 
4 

Stipulation of Evidence and was granted deferred adjudication. Just over a year after 

Appellant was granted deferred adjudication, the State filed a motion to proceed and 

later filed an amended motion to proceed. At the hearing on the amended motion, 

Appellant entered a plea of true. Additionally, the trial court heard testimony from 

Appellant and his community supervision officer. Their testimony established that 

Appellant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision. We conclude the 

State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellant violated the terms and 

conditions of his deferred adjudication community supervision and the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in adjudicating him guilty of the original offense. 

We have independently examined the entire record to determine whether there 

are any non-frivolous issues which might support the appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 

U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409;

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). We have found no such 

issues. See Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.Crim.App. 1969). After reviewing 

the record and counsel=s brief, we agree with counsel that there are no plausible 

grounds for appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). 

COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY'S FEES

Once a criminal defendant has been found to be indigent, he is presumed to 

remain indigent for the remainder of the proceedings unless a material change in a 

defendant's financial resources occurs. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.04(p) 

(West Supp. 2011). Furthermore, it is well established that in order to assess attorney's 
5 

fees in a judgment, order revoking community supervision, or order adjudicating guilt, a 

trial court must determine that the defendant has the financial resources that enable him 

to offset in part or in whole the costs of legal services provided. See Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. Ann. art. 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2011).4

 See also Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 

555-56 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010). Additionally, the record must reflect some factual basis 

to support the trial court's determination. See Barrera v. State, 291 S.W.3d 515, 518 

(Tex.App.--Amarillo 2009, no pet.); Perez v. State, 280 S.W.3d 886, 887 (Tex.App.--

Amarillo 2009, no pet.). 

This Court recently concluded in Wolfe v. State, No. 07-10-0201-CR, 2012 Tex. 

App. LEXIS 5368, at *10-11 (Tex.App.--Amarillo July 6, 2012, no pet. h.), that the 

evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's assessment of attorney's fees as 

court costs, even though payment of those fees had been a condition of appellant's 

community supervision. See also Armstrong v. State, No. 07-09-0091-CR, 2011 Tex. 

App. LEXIS 6637, at *3 (Tex.App.--Amarillo Aug. 17, 2011, no pet.) (not designated for 

publication) (modifying the trial court's judgment to delete the assessment of attorney's 

fees due to insufficient evidence without making any distinction between attorney's fees 

the defendant agreed to pay as a condition of his community supervision and additional 

attorney’s fees assessed at adjudication). 

Here, the clerk's record reflects the trial court appointed counsel to represent 

Appellant during the phase in which he was granted deferred adjudication, again at the 

adjudication of guilt phase, and again to pursue this appeal. Because the record 

 

4

All article references herein to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Annotated are to West Supp. 2011. 
6 

demonstrates that Appellant was indigent immediately prior to each time attorney's fees 

were awarded, we presume he remained indigent at the time of each award. 

Furthermore, because there is no evidence in the record of a change in Appellant's 

financial resources that would enable him to offset in part or in whole the costs of legal 

services provided to him at any time we conclude the special finding contained in the 

Judgment Adjudicating Guilt which orders him to pay $750.00 for court-appointed 

attorney's fees agreed to as part of his previous plea bargain is improper. 

Because no objection is required to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 

regarding a defendant's ability to pay, Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 555-56, and there is no 

evidence to support the order for Appellant to pay attorney's fees, the proper remedy is 

to delete that order. 

CONCLUSION

The judgment adjudicating guilt is modified to delete the trial court's special 

finding ordering Appellant to pay $750.00 for court-appointed attorney's fees. In lieu 

thereof, the judgment of the trial court is modified to add the following provision beneath 

the heading "Furthermore, the following special findings or orders apply": "As used 

herein the term 'court costs' does not include court-appointed attorney's fees." As 

modified, the trial court's judgment is affirmed and counsel's motion to withdraw is 

granted. 

 Patrick A. Pirtle 

 Justice 

Do not publish.