NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 22-3257

__________

TYRONE K. WHITE,

Appellant

v.

TINA PAGOTTO, CEO; BETHESDA PROJECT INC; KE SMITH, PHA 

Representative; PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-03668)

District Judge: Honorable Chad F. Kenney

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 27, 2023

Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed August 2, 2023)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

PER CURIAM

Appellant Tyrone White appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing 

his amended complaint for failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b). 

For the following reasons, we will affirm.

In 2022, White filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 

the Rehabilitation Act, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, alleging that he 

suffered discrimination and retaliation related to his participation in a subsidized housing 

program managed by Bethesda Project, Inc. After granting White leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis, the District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a clear basis 

for a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and it granted White leave to file an amended complaint. White filed 

a “Statement of Claim,” which the District Court construed as an amended complaint. In 

that pleading, White argued that Bethesda Project, Inc. violated his equal protection 

rights by treating him differently from other similarly situated residents of various races

who received different case management services related to their social security or 

housing benefits. The District Court explained that White had failed to present a “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required 

by Rule 8 and had also failed to state a claim. This time, it dismissed the complaint with 

prejudice. White now appeals.
3

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of 

discretion the District Court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with the 

requirements of Rule 8, see Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 91 (3d Cir. 2019), 

and exercise plenary review over the dismissal for failure to state a claim, see Allah v. 

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

1

Whether Rule 8’s “short and plain statement” requirement is satisfied “is a 

context-dependent exercise.” W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 

85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010). “Fundamentally, Rule 8 requires that a complaint provide fair 

notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 92 

(cleaned up). In assessing whether a complaint complies with Rule 8, we “are more 

forgiving of pro se litigants for filing relatively unorganized or somewhat lengthy 

complaints.” Id. Meanwhile, as we have explained to White in affirming the dismissal of 

similar claims he has raised in the past, to survive dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), “a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, taken as true, to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” White v. Barbe, 767 F. App’x 332, 334 (3d Cir. 2019) 

(per curiam) (alteration omitted) (quoting Fleisher v. Standard Ins., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d 

1 To the extent that White’s appellate filings contain new arguments not raised in the 

District Court, we decline to consider them. See In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 

594 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that “we will not consider new claims for 

the first time on appeal”).
4

Cir. 2012)); see also White v. Bethesda Project Inc., 672 F. App’x 218, 219 (3d Cir. 

2017) (per curiam).

We conclude that the District Court did not err here. First, while White’s amended 

complaint listed a single defendant, it did not identify specific actions taken by the 

defendant in regard to his claims, nor did it present cognizable legal claims to which the 

defendant could respond on the merits. See Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93–94. Given how 

vague White’s pleading is, it is entirely unclear what actions the defendant took or what 

harm, if any, occurred as a result. 

Relatedly, we agree with the District Court that White failed to state a claim for 

relief. He sought to proceed under § 1983, but made no allegations showing that the 

named defendant, Bethesda Project, Inc., is a state actor. And even more fundamentally,

while White asserted an equal-protection claim, he failed to allege that the defendants

took any specific racially motivated actions or that any similarly situated people were 

treated differently from him. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d 

Cir. 2008) (explaining that a complainant’s factual allegations must be enough to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level).

2

2

In his initial complaint, White also alleged that the defendants discriminated against him 

on the basis of a perceived disability (despite that he was not disabled). We agree with 

the District Court’s conclusion that White failed to state plausible equal protection or 

disability discrimination claims because his allegations were conclusory and unsupported 

by clear facts.
5

In sum, despite being given multiple opportunities to do so,3 White failed to 

comply with Rule 8 or state a plausible claim for relief. Accordingly, we will affirm the 

District Court’s judgment.

3 The District Court also did not abuse its discretion by dismissing White’s action with 

prejudice. After White’s initial complaint was dismissed for failing to indicate specific 

and cognizable allegations, he was given the opportunity to submit an amended 

complaint. However, the amended complaint was even more conclusory and vague than 

its predecessor. We agree that it would be futile to allow him to file another amended 

complaint. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 

251 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that a district court must offer amendment when dismissing 

for failure to state a claim “unless doing so would be inequitable or futile”).