United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Committee on Banking, 

Housing and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee 

on Security and International Trade and 

Finance, United States Senate 

INTELLECTUAL 

PROPERTY 

National Enforcement 

Strategy Needs Stronger 

Leadership and More 

Accountability 

Statement of Loren Yager, Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

April 12, 2007

 

GAO-07-710T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 12, 2007

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 

National Enforcement Strategy Needs 

Stronger Leadership and More 

Accountability 

Highlights of GAO-07-710T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Banking, 

Housing and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee 

on Security and International Trade and 

Finance, United States Senate 

U.S. government efforts to protect 

and enforce intellectual property (IP) 

rights domestically and overseas are

crucial to preventing billions of 

dollars in losses to U.S. industry and 

IP rights owners and to avoiding 

health and safety risks resulting from

the trade in counterfeit and pirated 

goods. IP protection and

enforcement cut across a wide range 

of U.S. agencies and a coordinating 

structure has evolved to address

coordination issues. First, Congress 

created the interagency National 

Intellectual Property Rights Law 

Enforcement Coordination Council 

(NIPLECC) in 1999. Later, in October 

2004, the Bush administration

initiated the Strategy Targeting 

Organized Piracy (STOP). 

GAO’s testimony focuses on (1) the 

effectiveness of NIPLECC and STOP 

as a coordinating structure to guide

and manage U.S. government efforts; 

and (2) the extent to which STOP 

meets the criteria for an effective 

national strategy. This statement is 

based on GAO’s November 2006 

report (GAO-07-74), which included 

an assessment of STOP using criteria

previously developed by GAO. In this 

report, we recommended that head 

of NIPLECC, called the IP 

Coordinator, in consultation with the

National Security Council and 

relevant agencies (1) clarify in the 

STOP strategy how NIPLECC will

carry out its oversight and

accountability roles and (2) take 

steps to ensure that STOP fully 

addresses the characteristics of a

national strategy. The IP Coordinator 

concurred with our 

recommendations. 

The current coordinating structure that has evolved for protecting and 

enforcing U.S. intellectual property rights lacks leadership and permanence,

presenting challenges for effective and viable coordination for the long term. 

NIPLECC has struggled to define its purpose and retains an image of 

inactivity among the private sector. It continues to have leadership problems 

despite enhancements made by Congress in December 2004 to strengthen its 

role. In contrast, the presidential initiative called STOP, which is led by the 

National Security Council, has a positive image compared to NIPLECC, but 

lacks permanence since its authority and influence could disappear after the 

current administration leaves office. While NIPLECC adopted STOP in 

February 2006 as its strategy for protecting IP overseas, its commitment to 

implementing STOP as a an effective national strategy remains unclear,

creating challenges for accountability and long-term viability. 

While STOP has energized agency efforts for protecting and enforcing 

intellectual property, its potential as a national strategy is limited since it 

does not fully address the desirable characteristics of an effective 

national strategy. For example, its performance measures lack baselines

and targets to assess how well the activities are being implemented. In 

addition, STOP is missing key elements such as a discussion of risk 

management and designation of oversight responsibility. For instance, 

the strategy lacks a discussion of current or future costs, the types or 

sources of investments needed to target organized piracy, and processes 

to effectively balance the threats from counterfeit products with the 

resources available. While STOP partially addresses organizational roles 

and responsibilities, it does not discuss a framework for accountability 

among the STOP agencies, such as designating responsibility for 

oversight. Agency documents clarify some of the key elements of an 

effective national strategy that were not incorporated into STOP directly; 

however, the need to consult multiple documents underscores the 

strategy’s lack of integration and limited usefulness as a management 

tool for effective oversight and accountability. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-710T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Loren Yager at 

(202) 512-4347 or yagerl@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to 

discuss our work on U.S. efforts to protect U.S. intellectual property (IP) 

rights. We appreciate the opportunity to further contribute to this 

discussion within the Congress. U.S. government efforts to protect and 

enforce intellectual property rights domestically and overseas are crucial

to preventing billions of dollars in losses to U.S. industry and IP rights 

owners and addressing health and safety risks resulting from the trade in 

counterfeit and pirated goods. IP protection and enforcement cut across a 

wide range of U.S. agencies and functions, as well as those of foreign 

governments, making coordination among all parties essential. Many of 

these efforts are coordinated through the interagency National Intellectual 

Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council (NIPLECC), created by

Congress in 1999, and the Strategy for Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP) 

initiated by the White House in 2004. While NIPLECC is a coordinating 

council, STOP is a strategy coordinated by the National Security Council. 

In my statement today, I will address two topics on IP enforcement: (1) the 

effectiveness of NIPLECC and STOP as a coordinating structure to guide 

and manage U.S. government efforts; and (2) the extent to which STOP 

meets the criteria for an effective national strategy. I am aware, Mr. 

Chairman, that you have co-sponsored proposed legislation to address 

some of the shortcomings of the current coordinating structure which 

impede effective IP enforcement and coordination.

1

 In my statement today

I will include some observations on how the proposed legislation 

addresses key weaknesses we have identified in our past work on IP 

enforcement. 

 1

In February 2007, Senators Evan Bayh and George Voinovich, through the Congressional 

Committee on the Judiciary, submitted proposed legislation in Senate Bill 522, titled the 

“Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Act”. The bill aims to “safeguard the economic 

health of the United States and the health and safety of United States citizens by improving 

the management, coordination, and effectiveness of domestic and international intellectual

property rights enforcement....” 

Page 1 GAO-07-710T
To address these issues, I have drawn on completed GAO studies,2

particularly a report that we completed on STOP and NIPLECC last fall. 

We examined NIPLECC and STOP official documents and reviewed the 

legislative history of NIPLECC. Our November 2006 study assessed the 

extent to which STOP serves as a national strategy for combating trade in 

counterfeit and pirated goods by using the six desirable characteristics of 

an effective national strategy developed in previous GAO work.3

 GAO has 

used this methodology to assess and report on the administration’s 

strategies relating to combating terrorism, restructuring DOD’s global 

force posture, and rebuilding Iraq.4

 National strategies with these desirable 

characteristics offer policymakers and implementing agencies a 

management tool that can help ensure accountability and more effective 

results. I should also mention that we have a number of other studies soon 

to be published that are also related to IP enforcement. These include (1) a 

study that we have completed for Senator Voinovich focusing on IP 

enforcement at the U.S. border, and (2) additional work on a Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) program called the “in-bond system” that allows 

goods to transit the United States and enter U.S. commerce at a port other 

than the port of arrival. In conducting the GAO studies, we have 

performed work at multiple U.S. agency headquarters in Washington, D.C., 

and at U.S. ports of entry and agency field offices. In addition, we met with

representatives from multiple industry associations and companies that 

are affected by IP violations, such as manufacturing, entertainment, luxury 

goods, and pharmaceutical industries. We also met with the head of 

NIPLECC, the IP Coordinator, to obtain information on steps taken to 

implement the recommendations presented in our November 2006 study. 

We also examined the March 2007 STOP document — the most current 

 2

See GAO, Intellectual Property: Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP) Requires

Changes for Long-term Success, GAO-07-74 (Washington, D.C.: November 2006). GAO, 

Intellectual Property: Initial Observations on the STOP Initiative and U.S. Border Efforts

to Reduce Piracy, GAO-06-1004T (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006). GAO, Intellectual 

Property: U.S. Efforts Have Contributed to Strengthened Laws Overseas, but Challenges 

Remain, GAO-04-912 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8, 2004). 

3

GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National

Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). 

4

GAO, Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are Needed

to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global Posture Restructuring, GAO-06-852, 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2006); and Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National 

Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, GAO-06-788 (Washington, D.C.: June 28,

2006). 

Page 2 GAO-07-710T
strategy document. All work was conducted in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards. 

The current coordinating structure for U.S. protection and enforcement of 

intellectual property rights lacks clear leadership and permanence, 

hampering the effectiveness and long-term viability of such coordination.

Created in 1999 to serve as the central coordinating structure for IP 

enforcement across federal agencies, NIPLECC has struggled to define its 

purpose, retains an image of inactivity within the private sector, and 

continues to have leadership problems despite enhancements made by 

Congress in December 2004 to strengthen its role.

5

 In addition, in July 

2006, Senate appropriators expressed concern about the lack of 

information provided by NIPLECC on its progress. In contrast, the 

presidential initiative called STOP, which is led by the National Security

Council, has a positive image compared to NIPLECC, but lacks 

permanence since its authority and influence could disappear after the 

current administration leaves office. Many agency officials said that STOP 

has increased attention to IP issues within their agencies and the private

sector, as well as abroad, and attribute that to the fact that STOP came out 

of the White House, thereby lending it more authority and influence. While 

NIPLECC adopted STOP as its strategy for protecting IP overseas in 

February 2006, its commitment to implementing STOP as a successful 

strategy remains unclear, creating challenges for accountability and longterm viability. For instance, although NIPLECC’s most recent annual 

report describes many STOP activities, it does not explain how the 

NIPLECC principals plan to carry out their oversight responsibilities 

mandated by Congress to help ensure a successful implementation of the

strategy. In addition, the STOP strategy document has not been revised to

mention NIPLECC’s oversight role. 

Summary 

STOP is a first step toward an integrated national strategy to protect and 

enforce U.S. intellectual property rights, and it has energized agency 

 5

In December 2004, Congress augmented NIPLECC’s capabilities in the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 2005. The act called for NIPLECC to (1) establish policies, 

objectives, and priorities concerning international IP protection and enforcement; 

(2) promulgate a strategy for protecting American IP overseas; and (3) coordinate and 

oversee implementation of the policies, objectives, and priorities and overall strategy for 

protecting American IP overseas by agencies with IP responsibilities. The act appropriated 

$2 million for NIPLECC’s expenses through the end of fiscal year 2006. It also created the

position of the Coordinator for International Intellectual Property Enforcement, also 

known as the “IP Coordinator,” to head NIPLECC. 

Page 3 GAO-07-710T
efforts. However, we found that STOP’s potential as a national strategy is 

limited because it does not fully address important characteristics of an 

effective national strategy. For example, its performance measures lack 

baselines and targets to assess how well the activities are being 

implemented. In addition, the strategy lacks a risk management 

framework and a discussion of current or future costs – important 

elements to effectively balance the threats from counterfeit products with 

the resources available. Although STOP identifies organizational roles and 

responsibilities with respect to individual agencies’ STOP activities, it does 

not specify who will provide oversight and accountability among the 

agencies carrying out the strategy. While individual agency documents 

include some key elements of an effective national strategy, they have not 

been incorporated into the STOP documents. This lack of integration 

underscores the strategy’s limited usefulness as a management tool for 

effective oversight and accountability by Congress as well as the private 

sector and consumers who STOP aims to protect. 

In our November 2006 report on this subject, we made two 

recommendations to clarify NIPLECC’s oversight role with regard to STOP 

and improve STOP’s effectiveness as a planning tool and its usefulness to 

Congress: First, we recommended that the head of NIPLECC, called the IP

Coordinator, in consultation with the National Security Council and the six 

STOP agencies, clarify in the STOP strategy how NIPLECC will carry out 

its oversight and accountability responsibilities in implementing STOP as 

its strategy. Second, we recommended that the IP Coordinator, in 

consultation with the National Security Council and the six STOP 

agencies, take steps to ensure that STOP fully addresses the 

characteristics of an effective national strategy. 

In its response to our recommendations, the IP Coordinator said his office 

planned to review them and identify opportunities for improvement based

on those recommendations, where appropriate. Our discussions with the 

IP Coordinator, in preparation for this testimony, indicated that NIPLECC 

has taken some steps to address GAO’s recommendations, such as 

working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to understand 

agencies’ priorities and resources related to IP enforcement. The proposed 

legislation at the forefront of discussion today proposes changes that 

address weaknesses we found in the current coordinating structure. The 

proposed legislation eliminates NIPLECC and creates a new coordinating 

structure called the Intellectual Property Enforcement Network, with 

leadership emanating from the White House under the auspices of the 

Office of Management and Budget. Although past congressional action

also required NIPLECC to develop a strategic plan, the current legislation 

Page 4 GAO-07-710T
requires the new coordinating structure to prepare a strategic plan that 

addresses key elements of an effective national strategic plan, building in

mechanisms for accountability and oversight. These changes are 

consistent with the key findings of our report. 

Intellectual property is an important component of the U.S. economy, and 

the United States is an acknowledged global leader in its creation. 

However, the legal protection of intellectual property varies greatly 

around the world, and several countries are havens for the production of 

counterfeit and pirated goods. Technology has facilitated the manufacture 

and distribution of counterfeit and pirated products, resulting in a global 

illicit market that competes with genuine products and complicates 

detection and actions against violations. High profits and low risk have 

drawn in organized criminal networks, with possible links to terrorist 

financing. The public is often not aware of the issues and consequences 

surrounding IP theft. Industry groups suggest that counterfeiting and 

piracy are on the rise and that a broader range of products, from auto 

parts to razor blades, and from vital medicines to infant formula, are 

subject to counterfeit production. Counterfeit products raise serious 

public health and safety concerns, and the annual losses that companies 

face from IP violations are substantial. 

Background 

Given the increasing threats to America’s economy, health, and safety, U.S. 

government agencies have undertaken numerous efforts to protect and 

enforce intellectual property rights, and a structure to coordinate these IP

enforcement efforts evolved. In 1999, Congress created the interagency

National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council 

(NIPLECC) as a mechanism to coordinate U.S. efforts to protect and 

enforce IP rights in the United States and overseas.

6

 In October 2004, the 

Bush Administration announced the Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy 

(STOP) to “smash criminal networks that traffic in fakes, stop trade in 

pirated and counterfeit goods at America’s borders, block bogus goods 

around the world, and help small businesses secure and enforce their 

rights in overseas markets.” Although both NIPLECC and STOP were 

created to improve the United States’ IP enforcement and protection 

efforts, they were established under different authorities – NIPLECC as a 

congressional mandate and STOP as a presidential initiative led by the 

 6

NIPLECC was established under Section 653 of the Treasury and General Government 

Appropriations Act, 2000 (Pub. L. No.106-58), 15 U.S.C. 1128. 

Page 5 GAO-07-710T
White House under the auspices of the National Security Council. Table 1 

compares NIPLECC and STOP. 

Table 1: Comparison of Features of NIPLECC and STOP 

Features NIPLECC STOP

Origin Congressional mandate, 

September 1999 

White House initiative, October 

2004 

Leadership • Coordinator for International 

Intellectual Property 

Enforcement (IP Coordinator)

• Co-Chairs from USPTO and 

Justice report to Coordinator 

• National Security Council 

Dedicated

funding 

$2 million (for fiscal years 2005 and 

2006) 

$900,000 (for fiscal years 2007) 

None 

Dedicated staff As of October 2006: Seven (IP 

Coordinator, 4 staff members and 2 

detailees) 

As of April 2007: Five (IP 

Coordinator, 4 staff members and 1 

detailee)

None 

Meetings Quarterly Monthly

Source: GAO.

STOP and NIPLECC share similar goals, including coordination of IP 

protection and enforcement, and involve nearly the same agencies. 

NIPLECC’s membership is designated by statute and includes specific 

positions by agencies, whereas agencies that participate in STOP overlap

with NIPLECC members, but do not designate any specific positions. (See 

figure 1.) 

Page 6 GAO-07-710T
Figure 1: Primary U.S. Government Agencies and Entities Supporting U.S. Intellectual Property Rights 

Copyright

Office

Department

of

Homeland

Security

Department

of

Commerce

International

Trade

Administration

USPTO Criminal

Division FBI

Bureau of

Economics

&

Business

Affairs

United

States

Attorney’s

Office

Department 

of Health & 

Human

Services

Department

of

Justice

Office of the

U.S. Trade

Representative

Department

of State

U.S.

International

Trade

Commission

Customs

&

Border

Protection

Food & Drug

Administration

STOP agency

Entities that house NIPLECC principals

Bureau of

International

Narcotics

Law

Enforcement

Immigration

& Customs

Enforcement

Source: GAO.

Note: NIPLECC is required to consult with the Register of Copyrights on copyright law enforcement 

matters. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, while not an original member, was reported as a 

member of NIPLECC in the council’s fifth annual report issued in September 2006. 

The U.S. government has a coordinating structure for IP enforcement, but 

the structure’s effectiveness is hampered by a lack of clear leadership and 

permanence, and despite some progress, it has not been developed in a 

manner that makes it effective and viable for the long term. NIPLECC and 

STOP form the central coordinating structure for IP enforcement across 

federal agencies. However, NIPLECC continues to have problems in 

providing leadership despite enhancements made by Congress, and 

STOP’s authority and influence, which result from its status as a 

presidential initiative, could disappear after the current administration 

leaves office. While the current IP enforcement coordinating structure has 

contributed to some progress – particularly in increasing attention to IP 

enforcement domestically and abroad through STOP – NIPLECC’s 

commitment to implementing STOP as a strategy remains unclear, creating 

Lack of Leadership 

and Permanence 

Hampers 

Effectiveness and 

Long-Term Viability of 

IP Enforcement 

Coordinating 

Structure 

Page 7 GAO-07-710T
a challenge for effective accountability and the long-term viability of IP 

enforcement. 

NIPLECC and STOP 

Originated Under Different 

Authorities 

In 1999, Congress created NIPLECC to coordinate domestic and 

international intellectual property law enforcement among U.S. federal

and foreign entities. The council’s membership is designated by statute 

and includes six federal agencies. The Commissioner of Patents and 

Trademarks (USPTO) and Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division 

from the Department of Justice serve as NIPLECC’s co-chairs. NIPLECC’s 

authorizing legislation included no specific dollar amount for funding or 

staff. Congress also required NIPLECC to report its coordination efforts 

annually to the President and various Congressional committees.7

Our September 2004 report noted that NIPLECC had struggled to define its 

purpose, had little discernible impact, and had not undertaken any 

independent activities, according to interviews with both industry officials 

and officials from its member agencies, and as evidenced by NIPLECC’s 

own annual reports.8

 From 1999 through the end of 2004, NIPLECC 

produced three annual reports that did little more than provide a 

compilation of individual agency activities. We also concluded in our 2004

report that if Congress wished to maintain NIPLECC and take action to 

increase its effectiveness, it should consider reviewing the council’s 

authority, operating structure, membership, and mission. 

Congress addressed NIPLECC’s lack of activity and unclear mission in the 

2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act in December 2004. The act called

for NIPLECC to (1) establish policies, objectives, and priorities concerning 

international IP protection and enforcement; (2) promulgate a strategy for 

protecting American IP overseas; and (3) coordinate and oversee 

implementation of the policies, objectives, and priorities and overall 

strategy for protecting American IP overseas by agencies with IP 

responsibilities. It also created the position of the Coordinator for 

International Intellectual Property Enforcement, also known as the “IP 

Coordinator,” to head NIPLECC. The IP Coordinator is appointed by the 

President and may not serve in any other position in the federal 

 7

NIPLECC is required to report annually to Committees on Appropriations and on the

Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives. 

8

GAO-04-912. 

Page 8 GAO-07-710T
government. The co-chairs for NIPLECC are required to report to the IP 

Coordinator. 

Unlike NIPLECC, STOP from its beginning has been characterized by a 

high level of active coordination and visibility. In October 2004, the 

President launched STOP, an initiative led by the White House under the 

auspices of the National Security Council, to target cross-border trade in 

tangible goods and strengthen U.S. government and industry IP 

enforcement actions. STOP members are the same agencies that house 

NIPLECC members, except that STOP includes the Food and Drug 

Administration. According to a high-level official who participated in the 

formation of STOP, the initiative was intended to protect American 

innovation, competitiveness, and economic growth. It stemmed from the 

recognition that U.S. companies needed protection from increasingly 

complex and sophisticated criminal counterfeiting and piracy. As part of 

STOP, agencies began holding meetings, both at working levels and higher, 

to coordinate agency efforts to tackle the problem. 

STOP is viewed as energizing U.S. IP protection and enforcement efforts 

and is generally praised by agency officials and industry representatives. 

The IP Coordinator stated in congressional testimony that STOP has built 

an expansive interagency process that provides the foundation for U.S. 

government efforts to fight global piracy. Several agency officials 

participating in STOP said that it gave them the opportunity to share ideas 

and support common goals. Many agency officials with whom we spoke 

said that STOP had brought increased attention to IP issues within their 

agencies and the private sector, as well as abroad, and attributed that to 

the fact that STOP came out of the White House, thereby lending it more 

authority and influence. One agency official pointed out that IP was now 

on the President’s agenda at major summits such as the G8 and European

Union summits.9

 In addition, most private sector representatives with 

whom we spoke agreed that STOP was an effective communication 

mechanism between business and U.S. agencies on IP issues, particularly 

through the Coalition Against Counterfeiting and Piracy (CACP), a crossindustry group created by a joint initiative of the Chamber of Commerce 

and the National Association of Manufacturers. 

 9

The G8 is an annual summit that involves nine countries, including Canada, France, 

Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States. The European

Commission President is also a G8 member. 

Page 9 GAO-07-710T
IP Enforcement 

Coordinating Structure 

Lacks Clear Leadership 

and Permanence 

The structure that has evolved to coordinate U.S. efforts to protect and 

enforce IP rights, NIPLECC and STOP, lacks clear leadership and 

permanence. Our November 2006 report noted that, despite the reenergized focus on IP enforcement as a result of STOP, the ambiguities 

surrounding NIPLECC’s implementation of STOP as a strategy create 

challenges for the long-term viability of a coordinated federal IP 

enforcement approach. While NIPLECC adopted STOP as its strategy for 

protecting IP overseas in February 2006, its commitment to implementing 

STOP as a successful strategy remains unclear. For instance, it is not clear 

how NIPLECC will provide a leadership role in implementing STOP. While 

NIPLECC’s most recent annual report describes many STOP activities and 

the IP Coordinator’s direct involvement in them, it does not explain how 

the NIPLECC principals and the IP Coordinator plan to carry out their 

oversight responsibilities mandated by Congress to help ensure successful 

implementation of the strategy. In addition, while the current STOP 

strategy document (March 2007) states that the NIPLECC annual report 

provides details on interagency collaboration to achieve STOP goals, 

STOP does not mention NIPLECC’s oversight role or articulate a 

framework for oversight and accountability among the STOP agencies 

carrying out the strategy.

Although Congress enhanced NIPLECC’s powers through the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, we found that NIPLECC retains 

an image of inactivity within some of the private sector. For example, 

representatives of almost half of the 16 private sector groups with whom

we spoke expressed the opinion that NIPLECC was inactive or a 

nonplayer. In addition, representatives from 10 of these groups were 

unclear about NIPLEC’s role, and many said that they were unclear about 

the difference between NIPLECC and STOP. In July 2006, Senate 

appropriators expressed concern about the lack of information provided 

to Congress by NIPLECC on its progress. 

In contrast with NIPLECC, agency officials and members of the private

sector attribute STOP’s effectiveness to its status as a White House 

initiative and its resulting authority and influence. However, it lacks 

permanence since it is a presidential initiative and may disappear after the 

current administration leaves office. Furthermore, while agency officials 

we interviewed generally considered STOP to be the U.S. government’s IP 

strategy, NIPLECC officials have sent mixed signals about effectively 

implementing STOP. One official representing NIPLECC said that the 

STOP strategy should have goals and objectives, including metrics to 

measure progress about which the IP Coordinator should report. However, 

Page 10 GAO-07-710T
a NIPLECC representative from another agency told us that this document 

was a fact sheet that accounted for administration efforts rather than a 

strategy. Similarly, a NIPLECC representative from a third agency was 

skeptical about whether STOP should be assessed as NIPLECC’s strategy. 

Finally, the IP Coordinator stated in March 2006 congressional testimony 

that STOP is NIPLECC’s strategy; however, he also told us that STOP was 

never meant to be an institutional method for reporting priorities and 

metrics to the President or Congress, or to manage resources. 

STOP is a first step toward an integrated national strategy for IP 

protection and enforcement and has energized agency efforts. However, 

we found that STOP’s potential as a national strategy is limited because it 

does not fully address important characteristics that we believe would 

improve the likelihood of its long-term effectiveness and ensure 

accountability. We found that some strategy documents belonging to 

individual STOP agencies supplemented some of the characteristics not 

fully addressed in STOP; however, the fact that they have not been 

systematically incorporated into STOP limits its usefulness as an 

integrated strategy to guide policy and decision makers in allocating 

resources and balancing priorities, and does not inform the private sector 

and consumers that it aims to protect. 

Improvements 

Needed to Achieve an 

Effective National IP 

Enforcement Strategy 

Page 11 GAO-07-710T
While national strategies are not required by executive or legislative 

mandate to address a single, consistent set of characteristics, GAO has 

identified six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. It 

is important that a national strategy contain these characteristics because 

they enable implementers of the strategy to effectively shape policies, 

programs, priorities, resource allocations, and standards so that federal 

departments and other stakeholders can achieve the desired results. 

National strategies provide policymakers and implementing agencies with 

a planning tool that can help ensure accountability and effectiveness. 

Current IP Enforcement 

Structure Does Not Meet 

All the Characteristics of 

an Effective National 

Strategic Plan 

We found that STOP partially addresses five of the six characteristics and 

their key elements. Figure 2 provides the results of our analysis and 

indicates the extent to which STOP addresses the desirable characteristics 

of an effective national strategy.10

 10For full details of GAO’s analysis of characteristics of an effective national strategy, see 

GAO-07-74. 

Page 12 GAO-07-710T
Figure 2: Extent to Which STOP Addresses GAO’s Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy 

1a. The impetus that led to the strategy being written, such as a statutory requirement, mandate, or key event

1b. The strategy’s purpose

1c. Key terms, major functions, mission areas, or activities the strategy covers

1d. The process that produced the strategy, (e.g., what organizations or offices drafted the document, 

whether it was the result of a working group, or which parties were consulted in its development)

2a. The problems the strategy intends to address

2b. The causes of the problems

2c. The operating environment

2d. The threats the strategy is directed toward

2e. Discusses the quality of data available, e.g., constraints, deficiencies, and “unknowns”

3a. Addresses the overall results desired, i.e., an “end-state” 

3b. Identifies strategic goals and subordinate objectives

3c. Identifies specific activities to achieve results

3d. Priorities

3e. Milestones

3f. Output-related and outcome-related performance measures

3g. The process to monitor and report on progress

3h. The limitations on progress indicators

4a. The cost of the strategy

4b. The sources (e.g., federal, state, local, and private) of resources or investments needed

4c. The types of sources or investments needed (e.g. budgetary, human capital, information technology, 

research and development, contracts) 

4d. Where resources or investments should be targeted to balance risks and costs

4e. Resource allocation mechanisms

4f. How risk management will aid implementing parties in prioritzing and allocating resources

5a. Who will be implementing the strategy

5b. Lead, support, and partner roles and responsibilities of specific federal agencies, departments, or 

offices (e.g., who is in charge during all phases of the strategy’s implementation)

5c. Which organizations will provide the overall framework for oversight and accountability

5d. How they will coordinate both within agencies and with other agencies

5e. The process for how conflicts will be resolved

6a. Addresses how the STOP! strategy relates to each agency’s strategies, goals, and objectives

Source: GAO.

Fully addresses Partially addresses Does not address

Purpose

Scope

Methodology

Problem 

definition

Goals and subordinate 

objectives

Activities

Performance 

measures

Resources and 

investments

Risk management

Organizational roles

and responsibilities

Coordination

Risk assessment

1. Purpose, scope, methodology 

2. Problem definition and risk assessment

3. Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures

4. Resources, investments, and risk management

5. Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination

6. Integration 

Page 13 GAO-07-710T
STOP addresses goals and activities but lacks important elements for 

assessing performance. 

• Although STOP identifies five main goals,11 it does not consistently 

articulate their objectives and is missing key elements related to assessing 

performance such as priorities, milestones, and a process for monitoring

and reporting on progress. For example, under its goal of pursuing 

criminal enterprises, STOP clearly lists objectives such as increasing 

criminal prosecutions, improving international enforcement, and 

strengthening laws. Whereas STOP does not articulate clear objectives for

its goal of working closely and creatively with U.S. industry. Also, STOP 

activities include implementing a new risk model to target high-risk cargo 

but do not specify time frames for its completion. Although STOP cites 

output-related performance measures12—such as the USPTO STOP hotline 

receiving over 950 calls during fiscal year 2005 and a 45 percent increase in 

the number of copyright and trademark cases filed from fiscal year 2004 to

fiscal year 2005—these figures are presented without any baselines or 

targets to facilitate the assessment of how well the program is being 

carried out. In addition, STOP cites outcome-related performance 

measures for only few of many activities included in the strategy.13

STOP does not address elements relevant to resources, investments, or 

risk management, limiting the ability of decision makers to determine 

necessary resources, manage them, and shift them with changing 

conditions. 

• STOP does not identify current or future costs of implementing the 

strategy, such as those related to investigating and prosecuting IP-related 

crime or conducting IP training and technical assistance, nor does it 

identify the sources or types of resources required. While the strategy 

states that “American businesses lose $200 to $250 billion a year to pirated 

and counterfeit goods,” it does not provide a detailed discussion of the 

economic threat to U.S. businesses. Further it does not discuss other risks 

 11STOP’s goals are to: (1) empower American innovators to better protect their rights at 

home and abroad; (2) increase efforts to seize counterfeit goods at our borders; (3) pursue

criminal enterprises involved in piracy and counterfeiting; (4) work closely and creatively 

with U.S. industry; and (5) aggressively engage our trading partners to join our efforts. 

12An “output measure” records the actual level of activity or whether the effort was realized 

and can assess how well a program is being carried out. 

13An “outcome measure” assesses the actual results, effects, or impact of an activity 

compared with its intended purpose. 

Page 14 GAO-07-710T
such as potential threats to consumer health and safety from counterfeited

products or discuss how resources will be allocated given these risks. 

STOP partially addresses organizational roles, responsibilities, and 

coordination but lacks a framework for oversight or integration. 

• STOP does identify lead, support, and partner roles for specific activities. 

For example, it identifies the White House as leading STOP and indicates 

partnering roles among agencies, such as the joint role of the Department 

of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and 

the Department of Justice’s FBI in running the National Intellectual 

Property Rights (IPR) Center. However, STOP does not discuss a process 

or framework for oversight and accountability among the agencies 

carrying out the strategy. Although STOP discusses specific instances of 

coordination among member agencies, it lacks a clear and detailed 

discussion of how overall coordination occurs. For instance, there is no 

mention of STOP meetings, objectives, or agendas. 

• We found that the STOP strategy does not consistently articulate how, as a 

national strategy, it relates to the strategies, goals, and objectives of 

federal agencies that participate in STOP. For example, under its goal of 

pursuing criminal enterprises, STOP does not discuss how the objectives 

of the Department of Justice’s task force might be linked to the goals and 

objectives found in other agency IP enforcement strategies such as the 

Department of Homeland Security’s ICE and CBP. It is important that 

STOP not only reflect individual agencies’ priorities and objectives but 

also integrate them in a comprehensive manner, enhancing collaboration

among the agencies and providing a more complete picture to policy 

makers with oversight responsibilities. While some of these elements of a 

national strategy are addressed in individual agency documents, the 

absence of clear linkages and the need to consult multiple agency 

documents underscores the strategy’s lack of integration and limits the 

usefulness of STOP as a management tool for long-term effective oversight 

and accountability. 

In our November 2006 report on this subject, we made two 

recommendations to clarify NIPLECC’s oversight role with regard to STOP 

and improve STOP’s effectiveness as a planning tool and its usefulness to 

Congress. We recommended that the IP Coordinator, in consultation with 

the National Security Council and the six STOP agencies, clarify in the 

STOP strategy how NIPLECC will carry out its oversight and 

accountability responsibilities in implementing STOP as its strategy. In

addition, we recommended that the IP Coordinator, in consultation with 

the National Security Council and the six STOP agencies, take steps to 

GAO Recommended 

Actions to Improve IP 

Leadership and 

Accountability Among U.S. 

Agencies

Page 15 GAO-07-710T
ensure that STOP fully addresses the six characteristics of a national 

strategy. 

We provided the agencies that participate in STOP and NIPLECC with a 

draft of the report for their review and comment and received written 

comments from the U.S. Coordinator for International Property 

Enforcement (IP Coordinator). In his comments, the IP Coordinator 

concurred with our recommendations, stating that his office planned to 

identify opportunities for improvement based on those recommendations. 

Our discussions with the IP Coordinator, in preparation for this testimony, 

indicated that the Office of the U.S. Coordinator for International Property 

Enforcement has taken some steps to address GAO’s recommendations. 

For example, the IP Coordinator has been working with the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) to understand agencies’ priorities and 

resources related to IP enforcement. In addition, the council has been 

coordinating with the Department of State and USPTO to examine the 

U.S.’s training portfolio and identify areas where capacity building and 

more training is needed overseas. The IP Coordinator stated that no steps 

have been taken with regard to changing the accountability framework 

under NIPLECC since, he believes, this is addressed through regular 

reporting to Congress via annual reports and testifying at hearings, and 

meetings with federal agencies involved in IP enforcement and the private

sector. 

The Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Act under discussion today 

proposed by Senators Bayh and Voinovich recommends changes that may 

help address weaknesses we found in the current coordinating structure 

and the national IP enforcement strategy as well as improve coordination 

with private sector and international counterparts. 

The legislation eliminates NIPLECC and creates a new entity called the 

Intellectual Property Enforcement Network (IPEN), to coordinate 

domestic and international IP enforcement efforts among U.S. agencies. 

The membership of IPEN involves most of the same agencies that are 

currently members for NIPLECC, and like NIPLECC, has an Intellectual

Property Enforcement Coordinate appointed by the President. A clear 

difference between IPEN and NIPLECC, however, is that the leadership 

emanates from the White House. Under IPEN, the Deputy Director for 

Management of the Office of Management and Budget would serve as the

chairperson for the network. While GAO does not have an opinion on 

whether OMB is the appropriate agency to coordinate IP enforcement and

protection, we believe it is important to note that IPEN retains the 

Page 16 GAO-07-710T
authority and leadership most valued under STOP— the role of the White 

House in providing leadership and authority. 

The legislation addresses weaknesses we identified in the current national 

strategy by requiring the development of a strategic plan within 6 months 

from the date the bill is enacted, and updated every 2 years following. The 

requirements of the strategic plan, as laid out in the bill, include 

performance measures and risk analysis along with other key elements for 

oversight and accountability that we have identified as important to an 

effective national strategic plan. 

The challenges of IP piracy are enormous and will require the sustained 

and coordinated efforts of U.S. agencies, their foreign counterparts, and 

industry representatives to be successful. As we pointed out Mr. 

Chairman, NIPLECC’s persistent difficulties create doubts about its ability 

to carry out its mandate – that of bringing together multiple agencies to 

successfully implement an integrated strategy for IP protection and 

enforcement that represents the coordinated efforts of all relevant parties.

STOP has brought attention and energy to IP efforts within the U.S. 

government, however, as a presidential initiative, STOP lacks permanence

beyond the current administration. This poses challenges to its long-term 

effectiveness because STOP depends upon White House support. In 

addition, STOP does not fully address the desirable characteristics of an 

effective national strategy that we believe would improve the likelihood of 

its long-term viability and ensure accountability. This limits its usefulness 

as a management tool for effective oversight and accountability by 

Congress as well as the private sector and consumers who STOP aims to 

protect. As we have pointed out, the Intellectual Property Rights 

Enforcement Act under discussion today addresses key shortcomings of 

the current IP coordinating structure that we have identified, including 

establishing a clearer leadership and framework for accountability. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased

to respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee 

may have at this time. 

Should you have any questions about this testimony, please contact Loren 

Yager at (202) 512-4347 or yagerl@gao.gov. Other major contributors to 

this testimony were Christine Broderick, Adrienne Spahr, Nina Pfieffer, 

Shirley Brothwell, and Jasminee Persaud. 

Conclusions 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

(320502) Page 17 GAO-07-710T
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