# FILED July 10, 1998 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Cou rt Clerk 

## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE ) COMPANY, INC., ) ) Plaintiff/Appellee, ) ) Davidson Chancery VS. ) No. 95-2830-I ) AMBROSE W.J. CLAY, ) Appeal No. ) 01A01-9610-CH-00481 Defendant/Appel

lant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CHAN CERY COURT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE THE HONORABLE IRVIN H. KILCREASE, JR., CHANCELLOR
For Plaintiff/Appellee : For Defendant/A ppellant : No Appearance Ambrose W.J. Clay Pro Se



## VACATED AND REMANDED

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE-2- 

## O P I N I O N Thi s is an appeal involves a maker’s liability o

n a promissory no

te. Th e Chancery Court for Davidson C ounty, following

a bench trial, awarded

the holder of the note a $27,523.47 judgment. The maker of the note ap peal ed to this court and then filed a

Chapter 7 bankruptc

y petition in the United State s Bankruptcy Court f or the Middle District of

Tennessee. The

maker of the note ha

s now informed this court that the debt arising from the judgment on the note h as been discharged, reli eving himfrom further per

sonal liability on the no

te. Because

the judgment on the note is now void by force of fed

eral law, we v

acate the judgment b

elow and remand thi s case with directions th at it be dismissed. I. In 1987 Ambrose W. J. Clay executed a pr omissory note for $19, 381.51 with Ford Consumer Finance Co. Inc.’s (“Ford”) predecessor, Associates Financial Services, Inc. The note was secu red by a deed of trus

t on a piece of rea

l prope rt y owned by Mr. Clay. After Mr. Clay defaulted on the note, Ford sued Mr. Clay in the Chancery Courtfor Davidson County se eking a judgment against him f

or the unpaid balance of the note plus inter est, costs, and at

tor neys f ees as provided in the note. Mr. Clay resisted the c

ollection action by

asserting that Ford was required to realize on its collateral be

fore proceeding against him personally f or the debt. Both parties moved for s ummary judgment. T

he trial c ourt d etermined that Ford was not required to proceed against th e collateral before proceeding against Mr. Clay for a personal mon ey judgment. On the merits, the tr ial court found

Mr. Clay in default and awarded Ford a judgment for the unpaid balanc

e of $23,933.45, plu s reasonable

attorneys fees of

$3,59 0.02 for a total judgm ent of $27,523.47. Thereafter, on April 8, 1996, Mr. Clay appealed.

On November 12, 1996,

Mr. Clay filed a

petition for Chapter 7 bankr

uptcy in the United States Bankruptcy C ourt for the Middle D

istrict of Tennessee. As part of that filing he sought dischar ge of any personal lia

bility on the

Ford note. Ford filed-3-

no action in the bankrup

tcy court contesting t

he dischargeability of

its debt, and

on October 17, 1997, the United States Bankruptcy Court granted Mr. Clay a Chapter 7 discharge covering t

he Ford debt. II. The courts ordinarily de cline to provide ju

dicia l relief in cases t

hat do not involve a genuine and existing controversy requiri ng the adj udication of present rights. See Stat

e ex rel. L ewis v. State , 208 Tenn. 534, 537 , 347 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1961); Dockery v. Doc

kery , 55 9 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tenn. Ct . App. 1977). T hus, cases must remain justicia ble throughout the enti

re course of the litiga

tion, and the concept of mootness involves circumstances that render a case no longer justiciable. See McIntyre v. T

raughber , 884 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tenn. Ct. App . 1994). A moot case has lost its charact

er as a present, live controversy, see McCanless v. Klein , 182 Tenn. 631, 637, 188 S.W. 2d 745, 747 (1945), and a case will

be considered moot if itno longer serves as a m eans to provide some so

rt of relief to the

prevailing party. See McIntyre

v. Traughber , 884 S.W.2d at 13 7; Massengill v. Mass engill , 36 Tenn. App. 385, 388-89, 255 S.W.2d 1018, 1019 (1952). Itis well-settled tha

t a discharge in

bankruptc y operates to void a debtor’s personal liability for any judgm ent obtained prior to

the debtor’s bankruptcy f iling. See 11 U.S.C.A.§ 524(a)(1) (West 1993); In re Walls , 125 B.R. 908, 909 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991); In re Freels , 79 B.R. 358, 361 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987); Conklin v. Iowa Dist. Court , 482 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Iowa 1992). 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(2) f urther provides that a Chapter 7 disc harge operates to e

njoin any act by

a creditor to enforce apre-petition discha

rged debt as a person

al liability of the

debtor. Thus,by operation of federal law, Ford may no longer pursue Mr. Claypersonally for his debt under the promissory note, and Ford’s jud gment in the trial court m

ay nevermore be

employed to reach Mr. Clay personally by garnishment, execution, or otherwise. S ince Ford’s judgment has b een abrogated by Mr.

Clay’s discharge i

n bankruptcy, Mr. Clay no longer needs relief in this court from the judgm ent below. Any additional relief t

his court could give w

ould be tantamount to car rying coals to Newcastle. This case no longer serves as a means t

o provide relief to Mr. Clay. The ordinary practice when a case becomes moo t on appeal is to vaca

te the judgment in-4-

the trial court and

remand the case w

ith directions that it be dismissed. See McIntyre v. Traughber , 884 S.W.2d at 138. Consequently, we v acate the judgment b

elow and remand this case f

or dismissal of Ford’s complaint. We tax the costs of this appeal to Ambrose W. J.Clay, no surety of r ecord appearing.

______________________________ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE CONCUR:

_______________________________ SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE

_______________________________ BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE