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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JEFFREY YEAW

(AC 36255)

Sheldon, Keller and Harper, Js.

Argued September 16, 2015—officially released January 12, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Britain, D’Addabbo, J.)

Ilana R. N. Ofgang, for the appellant (defendant).

Jonathan M. Sousa, special deputy assistant state’s

attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Brian Preleski,

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

HARPER, J. The defendant, Jeffrey Yeaw, appeals

from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury

trial, of three counts of attempt to commit assault in

the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a49 (a) (2)1 and 53a-59 (a) (5),2 and three counts of

attempt to commit assault of a peace officer in violation

of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-167c (a)

(1).3 On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial

court violated his due process rights when it failed to

order, sua sponte, a competency evaluation; (2) the

state adduced insufficient evidence to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he had the specific intent to commit all six counts he was charged with; and (3) the court

abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence

testimony concerning arrest warrants against him for

uncharged misconduct. We affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. In March, 2012, the defendant resided at the home

of his uncle, Richard Landry, located at 18 Peck Street

in Berlin. On the evening of March 8, 2012, the defendant

and Landry became involved in a verbal altercation,

which eventually escalated to the point where Landry

called the police. At approximately 10:30 p.m., Officers

Scott Calderone and Michael Silverio of the Berlin

Police Department were dispatched to Landry’s house

to respond to a domestic disturbance. The dispatcher

informed Calderone that a man on the back porch of

the house had a gun. Calderone and Silverio arrived at

the house at approximately the same time and observed

Landry, who was outside on the grass in between the

house and a church next door. Calderone shined his

spotlight on Landry and motioned for Landry to

approach him. Landry approached, identified himself,

and spoke with Calderone and Silverio. Shortly thereafter, Sergeant Mark Soneson arrived at the scene. All

three officers were in uniform, and all three officers

arrived in separate marked police vehicles.

After Landry called the police, the defendant—aware

that he had outstanding warrants—decided to flee Landry’s house. The defendant gathered some of his belongings, stepped out onto the front porch, and observed a

police vehicle outside of the house. He then reentered

the house, retrieved a firearm, turned off all of the lights

in the house, and returned to the front porch.

After speaking with Landry, Calderone, Silverio, and

Soneson concluded that they needed to enterthe house.

The officers proceeded to the rear of the house and

entered through the rear door. Upon entry, they realized

that all of the lights in the house were off and that the

house was completely dark. Soneson announced the

officers’ presence to the defendant, stating, ‘‘Jeff, it’s

the police department. Would you come out; we have
to talk to you.’’ When the defendant did not respond, the

officers, each of whom was carrying a lighted flashlight,

began to search the first floor of the house, proceeding,

room by room, from the rear of the house toward the

front. After inspecting several rooms at the rear of the

house, they entered a narrow interior hallway that led

to the front porch. The inside door between the hallway

and the front porch was closed. Silverio opened the

door with Soneson and Calderone behind him. Once

the door was opened, Silverio saw the defendant

crouched on the floor and holding a gun, which the

defendant pointed directly at him. Silverio promptly

yelled out, ‘‘gun,’’ and the defendant fired several shots.

Silverio quickly retreated and took cover in the home

office to his left. Calderone, who saw the muzzle flash

from the defendant’s weapon and felt a bullet whiz by

his head, ducked quickly into a room to his right and

across the hall from the home office. In the meantime,

Soneson, who ducked into the home office after Silverio, returned fire and struck the defendant at least

twice. The defendant was severely wounded, but

refused medical treatment at the scene, in the ambulance, and at the hospital. While first responders were

treating the defendant at the scene, the defendant

begged the officers to shoot and kill him. In the ambulance, the defendant ordered the treating paramedic to

leave him alone and let him die.

The defendant was charged with three counts of

attempt to commit assault in the first degree and three

counts of attempt to commit assault of a peace officer.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of

all six counts. The defendant subsequently was sentenced to a total effective term of forty-eight years incarceration. This appeal followed. Additional facts and

procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court abused its

discretion by failing, sua sponte, to order a competency

hearing. He argues that his competency was called into

question on numerous occasions, and that the court’s

failure to address his competency violated his due process rights. The state objects, arguing that the evidence

before the court did not raise a reasonable doubt about

the defendant’s competency, and thus the court had

no reason to address the defendant’s competency. We

agree with the state.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

disposition of this issue. On March 29, 2012—approximately three weeks after the incident at Landry’s

house—the defendant was interviewed by Detective

Matthew Gunsalus of the state police. During this interview, the defendant stated that while he was sitting on

Landry’s front porch on the day of the incident, he

attempted to shoot himself. He also stated that he would

not have minded if the police killed him at Landry’s
house, and that his intent that evening was not to surrender to the police.

At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel addressed

the court regarding the defendant’s mental state.

Defense counselrepresented to the court that the defendant ‘‘has some mental health problems,’’ and that he

believed ‘‘that there is some sort of compromise to [the

defendant’s] mental state.’’ At the conclusion of defense

counsel’s remarks, the defendant addressed the court

for forty-five minutes. During this address, the defendant accused the prosecutor of perjury, fabricating evidence, and tampering with witnesses; he accused the

state and its various political subdivisions of racketeering and other conduct allegedly designed to frustrate equal protection of the law and the administration

of justice; he accused Landry of nine crimes, including

assault in the first degree, attempted murder, and fabricating evidence; and he asserted that the Connecticut

Bar Association regulates the legal profession so as to

impede access to the courts and to further its own

interests. At no point during these proceedings did the

court order a competency evaluation.

The defendant claims that the court, sua sponte,

should have ordered a competency evaluation. Specifically, the defendant argues that (1) his expressed suicidal ideation during and immediately following the

incident with the police at Landry’s house; (2) his counsel’s representations that he suffered from ‘‘some mental health problems’’; and (3) his conduct during

sentencing, which he characterizes as ‘‘bizarre and incoherent,’’ all provided sufficient indicia of incompetency

such that the court should have inquired into his ability

to understand the proceedings against him. We

disagree.

‘‘We review the court’s determination of the defendant’s competency under the abuse of discretion standard. As this court has stated, [t]he trial judge is in a

particularly advantageous position to observe a defendant’s conduct during a trial and has a unique opportunity to assess a defendant’s competency.’’ (Footnote

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Edwards, 158 Conn. App. 119, 133–34, 118 A.3d 615,

cert. denied, 318 Conn. 906, 122 A.3d 634 (2015). ‘‘In

determining whether the trial court [has] abused its

discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of [the correctness of] its action. . . .

Our review of a trial court’s exercise of the legal discretion vested in it is limited to the questions of whether

the trial court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jordan, 151

Conn. App. 1, 32–33, 92 A.3d 1032, cert. denied, 314

Conn. 909, 100 A.3d 402 (2014).

The defendant failed to raise this issue at trial and,

accordingly, seeks to prevail on this unpreserved claim
pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d

823 (1989). ‘‘Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on

a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial

only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the

record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error;

(2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging

the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged

constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived

the defendant of a fairtrial; and (4)if subjectto harmless

error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond

a reasonable doubt. . . . The first two Golding requirements involve whether the claim is reviewable, and the

second two involve whether there was constitutional

error requiring a new trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 89–90, 905 A.2d

1101 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269, 127 S. Ct. 1491,

167 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2007); see also In re Yasiel R., 317

Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015) (modifying third

prong of Golding).

The state concedes, and we agree, that the first two

prongs of the Golding analysis are satisfied. We therefore proceed to a consideration of the third prong—

whether the alleged constitutional violation exists and

deprived the defendant of a fair trial. We conclude that

the defendant’s claim fails to satisfy the third Golding prong.

‘‘A defendant shall not be tried, convicted or sentenced while the defendant is not competent. . . . [A]

defendant is not competent if the defendant is unable

to understand the proceedings against him or her or to

assist in his or her own defense.’’ General Statutes § 54-

56d (a). ‘‘Although all defendants are presumed to be

competent . . . due process requires that a trial court

conduct an adequate hearing regarding a defendant’s

competency, once her competency has been sufficiently

called into question . . . . A trial court has an independent obligation to inquire, sua sponte, into a defendant’s

competency when there is sufficient evidence before

the court to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the

defendant can understand the proceedings or assist

in her defense.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Skok, 318 Conn. 699, 722, 122

A.3d 608 (2015). ‘‘Thus, [a]s a matter of due process,

the trial court is required to conduct an independent

inquiry into the defendant’s competence whenever he

makes specific factual allegations that, if true, would

constitute substantial evidence of mental impairment.

. . . Substantial evidence is a term of art. Evidence

encompasses all information properly before the court,

whether it is in the form of testimony or exhibits formally admitted or it is in the form of medical reports

or other kinds of reports that have been filed with the

court. Evidence is substantial if it raises a reasonable

doubt about the defendant’s competency . . . . The

trial court should carefully weigh the need for a hearing
in each case, but this is not to say that a hearing should

be available on demand. The decision whether to grant

a hearing requires the exercise of sound judicial discretion.’’(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 21–22, 751 A.2d

298 (2000).

The defendant’s first contention concerns evidence

of his suicidal ideation. The defendant argues that his

statements to Gunsalus that he tried to shoot himself

at Landry’s house and that he would not have minded

if the police killed him, coupled with testimony adduced

at trial that he refused medical attention and begged

the police to shoot and kill him, constitutes substantial

evidence of suicidal tendencies. These suicidal expressions, the defendant argues, bespeak an incompetence

to stand trial. We disagree. Whatever suicidal tendencies the defendant may have had during or immediately

after the incident were not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about his competency to be tried and sentenced many months later. It is settled that ‘‘the test

for determining competence focuses . . . on whether

[the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult

with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as

factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’’

(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mordasky, 84 Conn. App. 436, 446, 853

A.2d 626 (2004). The incident at Landry’s house and

Gunsalus’ interview both took place in March, 2012.

Evidence in the defendant’s trial began on July 10, 2013.

Thus, the criminal proceedings against the defendant

took place well over one year after all of the cited

instances of suicidal ideation. Because there is no evidence in the record that the defendant was still burdened by suicidal thoughts during the proceedings, we

reject this claim.

The defendant next argues that his counsel’s representation that he ‘‘had mental issues’’ raised a reasonable doubt as to his competency. We disagree.

‘‘[C]ompetence to stand trial . . . is not defined in

terms of mental illness. An accused may be suffering

from a mental illness and nonetheless be able to understand the charges against him and to assist in his own

defense . . . . A fortiori, a finding of mental illness is

not required for a court to find a defendant incompetent

to stand trial.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Bigelow, 120 Conn. App. 632,

642–43, 994 A.2d 204, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 916, 996

A.2d 278 (2010). The record is devoid of any evidence

that would have called into question the defendant’s

ability to either understand the charges against him or

to assist in his defense.

We agree with the state that defense counsel’s comments regarding the defendant’s compromised mental

state were made for purposes of sentence mitigation.
The theme of defense counsel’s remarks during sentencing was that the defendant was a good family man, who

lived a purpose-driven life, but who fell on hard times.

These unfortunate circumstances, counsel continued,

were at least partially caused by his mental health problems: ‘‘[The defendant] engaged in his life in the most—

with the most purest of intent to be good at what he

did and to be a good father to his children. What we

do know [is] that he has some mental health problems.’’

After explaining these circumstances, defense counsel

stated: ‘‘So, I’m going to ask the court to—when you

impose a sentence to take that into account and provide

a measured response.’’4 Thus, when defense counsel

addressed the court, the purpose was to seek leniency,

not to highlight the defendant’s incompetency. We conclude that these statements did not raise a reasonable

doubt about the defendant’s competence.

Finally, the defendant argues that his conduct during

sentencing constituted strong evidence of his incompetency. During sentencing, the defendant accused the

prosecutor and Landry of various crimes, the state of

racketeering, and the Connecticut Bar Association of

corruption. The defendant argues that this behavior,

which he characterizes as ‘‘bizarre and incoherent,’’ was

substantial evidence of incompetency, which the court

failed to address and, thus, abused its discretion. We

disagree that these comments, however out of the ordinary, underscore a compromised ability of the defendant to understand the charges and proceedings against

him. To begin with, we reject the defendant’s contention

that the court failed to appreciate the content of his

comments. On the contrary, the record reveals that the

court was cognizant of the substance of the defendant’s

remarks, but considered them to be an indicator of

defiance rather than incompetence. Immediately after

the defendant spoke, defense counsel emphasized to

the court that the defendant ‘‘is an intelligent man who

has goodness and who, like I said earlier, wanted to

live his life in a certain way.’’ Defense counsel continued

by emphasizing that, notwithstanding these attributes

of intelligence and ambition, the defendant ‘‘is trapped

in a bad place where he’s seeking explanations to things

that haven’t gone right for him.’’ The court replied with

its own remarks and characterized the defendant as a

person who ‘‘appears to have a significant problem with

authority and authority figures.’’ This convinces us that

the court was mindful of the substance of the defendant’s remarks but did not believe, after listening to

him and observing his conduct and demeanor, that he

was incompetent.

This court’s holding in State v. Williams, 65 Conn.

App. 59, 782 A.2d 149, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 923,

782 A.2d 1251 (2001), is instructive. The defendant in

Williams claimed that statements he made concerning

a perceived police conspiracy against him highlighted

his incompetency to stand trial. The trial court found
that the defendant was competent, notwithstanding the

opinion of a psychiatrist to the contrary. This court

affirmed, holding in relevant part: ‘‘[t]he defendant’s

delusionary thoughts . . . such as his claim that the

police put some drug in the cup of coffee he was given

at the police station and his belief that the occupants

of his apartment building as well as the police were

conspiring against him, may well have been his way of

coping with the dire situation confronting him.’’ Id., 87.

Similarly, in the present case, the trial court reasonably

could have concluded that the defendant was coping

with a dire situation in which he perceived himself to

be a victim. The court’s opinion that the defendant

rejected authority was consistent with the defendant’s

comments, in which he meted out blame to the prosecuting authority, the state, the Connecticut Bar Association, and his uncle. In conjunction with defense

counsel’s assertion that the defendant was ‘‘seeking

explanations to things that haven’t gone right for him,’’

the court reasonably could have understood the defendant’s comments to highlight not a compromised ability

to understand the proceedings, but a scornful and defiant rejection of the state’s filing of charges against him.

We further disagree with the defendant’s characterization of his remarks as ‘‘incoherent.’’ Quite the contrary, certain of his statements, however ungrounded,

were very well organized, logical, and articulate. The

defendant accused the prosecutor and Landry, for

example, of a number of crimes, citing to specific sections of the General Statutes and supporting these accusations with relevant facts. This demonstrates, in our

view, a high degree of coherence, thought, and preparation, not to mention a thorough understanding of the

proceedings and the underlying facts. Indeed, immediately after the defendant addressed the court, defense

counsel emphasized to the court that the defendant ‘‘is

an intelligent man . . . .’’ Defense counsel’s endorsement of the defendant’s intelligence, coupled with his

failure to request a competency hearing, strongly suggests to us that there was no indication of an impaired

competency at trial or at sentencing. See State v. Monk,

88 Conn. App. 543, 550, 869 A.2d 1281 (2005) (‘‘[t]he

fact that the defendant’s counsel did not request a competency hearing is an indicator of the defendant’s competency’’).

Ultimately, ‘‘[t]he trial judge is in a particularly advantageous position to observe a defendant’s conduct during a trial and has a unique opportunity to assess a

defendant’s competency.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Connor, 292 Conn. 483, 523–24, 973

A.2d 627 (2009). We conclude that the court did not

abuse its discretion in not ordering a competency hearing, sua sponte. Accordingly, the defendant has failed

to prove that his due process rights were violated, and

his claim fails to satisfy the third prong of Golding.
II

The defendant claims next that the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to support his conviction

of each charge against him. The defendant was charged

with three counts of attempt to commit assault in the

first degree and three counts of attempt to commit

assault of a peace officer, one count of each charge for

each officer. He claims that the state adduced insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that he knew

that three officers were in the house when he fired his

weapon. The defendant argues that because attempt to

commit assault in the first degree requires proof that

he had the specific intent to injure each officer individually, because attempt to commit assault of a peace

officer requires proof that he had the specific intent to

prevent each officer from performing his duties, and

because there was insufficient evidence adduced to

establish that he knew Calderone and Soneson were in

Landry’s house, the defendant’s conviction should be

vacated in part. We disagree.

The following additional facts are pertinent to our

disposition of this issue. Calderone and Silverio arrived

at Landry’s house at approximately the same time, and

Soneson arrived a few minutes later. The officers did

not enterthe house immediately, but spoke with Landry

outside. Calderone illuminated the area with the spotlight affixed to his vehicle while the officers spoke with

Landry in front of the house. Additionally, two other

officers—Michael Manning and Brian Falco—arrived

at the scene before Calderone, Silverio, and Soneson

entered the house.5

After Landry called the police, the defendant

attempted to flee. Gunsalus testified that during his

interview with the defendant, the defendant stated that

when he proceeded to the front porch of the house to

flee, he ‘‘observed that there was a police vehicle out

in front of the residence.’’ Once the officers entered

the house, they realized that all of the lights in the house

were off and that the house was completely dark. They

decided not to turn the lights back on because they did

not wish to be backlighted, which could have jeopardized their safety. Instead, they decided to illuminate the

house using their flashlights, which both eliminated the

danger of being backlighted and afforded the tactical

advantage of being able to temporarily blind a target

by shining light in his or her eyes. Once Silverio opened

the door to the front porch and yelled, ‘‘gun,’’ the defendant opened fire. When asked how many shots were

fired by the defendant, Soneson testified that ‘‘I can

definitely say he fired four shots. I was reasonably certain he fired five . . . .’’

‘‘In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we

apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence

in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.
Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom

the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the

cumulative force of the evidence established guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . This court cannot

substitute its own judgment for that of the jury if there

is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. . . .

‘‘While the jury must find every element proven

beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, each of the basic

and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need

not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is

reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a

basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted

to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether

the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the

defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged

beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

‘‘On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether

there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports

the jury’s verdict of guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Allan, 311 Conn. 1, 25, 83 A.3d 326

(2014). ‘‘[I]n [our] process of review, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists,

in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial

rather than direct. . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes

guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 147, 869 A.2d 192 (2005).

The defendant claims that the state failed to present

sufficient evidence that he knew that all three officers

were in the house and, therefore, that he intended to

fire upon all three officers. Specifically, the defendant

argues that insufficient evidence was adduced to prove

that he knew that Calderone and Soneson were in the

house. In support of this position, the defendant relies

on testimony that Soneson and Calderone were positioned behind Silverio, with Soneson standing approximately five feet behind Silverio and Calderone

positioned in between the other two and to their right.

The defendant also relies on evidence in the record that

the hallway in which the officers were standing was

very narrow, that the house was completely dark, and

that the officers were using their flashlights with the

intention to blind him. The defendant claims that the

state presented no evidence that he was aware that

Calderone or Soneson were behind Silverio in this dark

and narrow hallway, and, therefore, that the state did

not prove beyond a reasonable doubt his specific intent

to attempt to commit the substantive crimes against

each of them. We disagree.
It is settled that attempt is a specific intent crime.

‘‘[A] person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime

if, acting with the kind of mental state required for

commission of the crime, he . . . intentionally does or

omits to do anything which, under the circumstances

as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned

to culminate in his commission of the crime. Proof of

an attempt to commit a specific offense requires proof

that the actor intended to bring about the elements of

the completed offense. . . . Moreover, to be guilty of

attempt, a defendant’s conscious objective must be to

cause the result which would constitute the substantive

crime.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155, 169–70, 891

A.2d 897, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 821, 127 S. Ct. 131, 166

L. Ed. 2d 36 (2006). ‘‘Intent is a question of fact, the

determination of which should stand unless the conclusion drawn by the trier is an unreasonable one. . . .

[T]he [jury is] not bound to accept as true the defendant’s claim of lack of intent or his explanation of why

he lacked intent. . . . Intent may be, and usually is,

inferred from the defendant’s verbal or physical conduct. . . . Intent may also be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. . . . The use of inferences

based on circumstantial evidence is necessary because

direct evidence of the accused’s state of mind is rarely

available. . . . Intent may be gleaned from circumstantial evidence such as the type of weapon used, the

mannerin which it was used, the type of wound inflicted

and the events leading up to and immediately following

the incident. . . . Furthermore, it is a permissible,

albeit not a necessary or mandatory, inference that a

defendant intended the natural consequences of his

voluntary conduct.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Andrews, 114 Conn. App.

738, 744–45, 971 A.2d 63, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 901,

975 A.2d 1277 (2009). With respect to the substantive

offenses in the present case, ‘‘[a]ssault in the first degree

is a specific intent crime. It requires that the criminal

actor possess the specific intent to cause serious physical injury to another person.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Sivak, 84 Conn. App. 105, 110, 852

A.2d 812, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 916, 859 A.2d 573

(2004). ‘‘The requisite intent for assault of a peace officer is the intent to prevent the peace officer from performing his duties rather than the intent to cause the

resulting injury.’’ State v. Jones, 96 Conn. App. 634,

639, 902 A.2d 17, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 919, 908 A.2d

544 (2006).

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for

the jury to conclude that the defendant had the specific

intent to both injure all three officers and to prevent

them from performing their duties. To begin with, we

are mindful of the principle that ‘‘[t]he defendant’s state

of mind at the time of the shooting may be proven by
his conduct before, during and after the shooting. Such

conduct yields facts and inferences that demonstrate

a pattern of behavior and attitude toward the victim by

the defendant that is probative of the defendant’s mental state.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Bennett, 307 Conn. 758, 766, 59 A.3d 221 (2013). With

respect to the defendant’s conduct before the shooting,

our review of the record shows that the defendant had

numerous opportunities to observe several officers outside of the house. The defendant told Gunsalus that he

proceeded onto the front porch in an attempt to flee,

where he ‘‘observed that there was a police vehicle out

in front of the residence.’’ The defendant’s statement

that ‘‘there was a police vehicle,’’ suggests that he only

saw one vehicle. (Emphasis added.) Calderone and Silverio both testified, however, that they arrived at

approximately the same time as each other: Calderone’s

exact words were that ‘‘[Silverio] was ahead of me and

I was directly behind him.’’ (Emphasis added.) There

was also testimony that Soneson arrived ‘‘within a few

minutes upon’’ Calderone’s arrival. Calderone testified

that he activated his spotlight in front of the house

when the officers engaged Landry, demonstrating to

the jury that the area where the officers who responded

congregated was well lit and visible. The jury could

have inferred that the defendant had an opportunity

from his position on the front porch to observe several

police officers and identify them as such, because the

three officers who entered testified that they were in

uniform and arrived in separate marked police cars.

Because the house is not very large,6 because Calderone

testified that the officers did not enter until after they

spoke with Landry, and because the area where the

police congregated was well lit and visible from the

front porch, the jury reasonably could have concluded

that by the time the defendant had returned to the front

porch after arming himself, he had the opportunity to

observe and identify more than one police officer congregating outside of the house.

After speaking with Landry, Calderone, Silverio, and

Soneson entered the house through the rear entrance.

Once inside, Soneson announced, ‘‘it’s the police department. Would you come out; we have to talk to you.’’ The

jury could have inferred that Soneson’s announcement

that ‘‘we have to talk to you’’conveyed to the defendant

that more than one officer was in the house. (Emphasis

added.) The officers testified that they illuminated the

dark house with flashlights, and each officer had his

own individual light. They also testified that they used

flashlights for a tactical advantage; if the defendant

appeared, they would be able to blind him. There is

no evidence, however, that the defendant was in fact

blinded when he encountered the police. None of the

officers testified that they were able to blind the defendant, and the defendant did not testify.

The evidence also supports the jury’s determination
that the defendant identified each officer inside the

house when he opened fire. Immediately after he

opened the door, Silverio yelled out, ‘‘gun.’’ The jury

could have inferred that the defendant understood this

to be a communication to other officers in the house.

The quantity of shots fired also supports the jury’s verdict. Soneson testified that he was certain that the

defendant fired at least four shots, and that he was

reasonably certain the defendant fired five. The jury

reasonably could have concluded that the defendant

identified three officers and fired enough shots to harm

and/or impede each of them.

The defendant stresses that the officers’ positioning

in the narrow hallway made it doubtful that he could

see each of the officers. In particular, the defendant

relies on Soneson’s testimony that he was five or six

feet behind Silverio and that he did not have a clear view

of the defendant. The defendant argues that because

Soneson did not have a clear view of the defendant, it

is likely that the defendant did not have a clear view

of Soneson, and therefore did not know he was there.

However likely or unlikely the defendant was to have

viewed Soneson in the house was a determination for

the jury to make, which we do not lightly disturb. On

appeal, this court is ‘‘limited to determining whether

the inferences drawn by the jury are so unreasonable

as to be unjustifiable. . . . [T]he inquiry into whether

the record evidence would support a finding of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt does not require a court to

ask itself whether it believes that the evidence . . .

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morgan, 274 Conn.

790, 801, 877 A.2d 739 (2005). The evidence shows that

the defendant was in close proximity to the officers:

each officer testified that the defendant was in a

crouched position in front of the door leading to the

front porch. Each officer carried his own flashlight,

which the jury could have inferred made all three of

them individually visible to the defendant in the dark

house. And there is evidence that the defendant fired

at least four and possibly five shots, more than enough

to harm or impede three individuals. With respect to

the officers individually, the defendant clearly saw Silverio: he fired at him immediately after the door was

opened. Additionally, the bullet from the defendant’s

first shot whizzed by Calderone’s head before he had

an opportunity to take cover. The jury could have

inferred that the defendant was aiming for Calderone

on the basis of this trajectory. And once Soneson

returned fire, he, or at least his gun, would have been

visible to the defendant as well. On the basis of this
evidence, we cannot say that no rational juror could

reach the conclusion that the jury in the present case

did.

In sum, there was sufficient evidence from which

the jury could have concluded that the defendant (1)

observed more than one officer congregating outside

of the house, (2) saw three officers at various points

once the door was opened, or at the very least, three

separate flashlights, and (3) fired enough shots to harm

each of the officers. The cumulative impact of these

facts supports the jury’s determination that the defendant had the requisite intent to commit all six crimes

of which he was convicted. See State v. Padua, supra,

273 Conn. 146–47. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s conviction on each count.

III

The defendant next claims that the court improperly

admitted, over his objection, evidence of warrants

against him. The defendant argues that this evidence

was unduly prejudicial because the warrants pertained

to remote instances of uncharged misconduct. We

disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. On July 11, 2013, the second day of trial, the

state notified the court that it intended to call Gunsalus

as a witness. The defendant responded with an oral

motion in limine, seeking to preclude Gunsalus from

testifying about certain statements the defendant made

during their interview in March, 2012. Specifically, the

defendant argued that the state intended to elicit testimony from Gunsalus that the defendant stated that he

was aware of outstanding arrest warrants against him.

The defendant argued that these statements were

unduly prejudicial and irrelevant because the warrants

were old and pertained to instances of uncharged misconduct.

The court heard Gunsalus’ proposed testimony outside of the jury’s presence. The following testimony

was elicited:

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And I know that you talked to [the

defendant] about the evening in question here and in

connection with that when you talked to [the defendant], did you talk to [the defendant] about a point in

time where he made a decision to gather up some of

his personal effects and leave the home on Peck Street

in Berlin?

‘‘[Gunsalus]: Yes, sir.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And what did [the defendant] tell

you about that?

‘‘[Gunsalus]: He had reported that he was aware that

Mr. Landry had contacted 9-1-1; that he was on the rear

porch of the residence; and that he was going to gather

some items to leave the residence. During that time
or following that, he went to that front porch and he

observed a police vehicle at the front of the residence

on the street at which time he went back inside to the

residence or the main portion of the residence and

retrieved a firearm.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And did [the defendant] describe

to you his knowledge of any legal problems that he had?

‘‘[Gunsalus]: He did.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: What did he tell you?

‘‘[Gunsalus]: He had reported that he was aware of

the fact that there were outstanding arrest warrants

for him.’’

The defendant objected to this testimony on the

grounds that the warrants in question were remote and

related to uncharged misconduct. The state argued that

Gunsalus’ testimony should be admissible on the

ground that the defendant’s statement constituted an

admission relevant to his motive. The court agreed with

the state and denied the defendant’s motion in limine

on that ground, reasoning that ‘‘the knowledge that

there existed arrest warrants for the defendant [was

on] his mind. . . . The court believes that that goes to

state of mind at the time of the police entry and it also

goes to motive.’’ Subsequently, the state elicited this

testimony from Gunsalus before the jury.

On July 16, 2013, during its instructions to the jury,

the court gave the following limiting instruction:

‘‘[T]here was testimony presented by [Gunsalus] that

[the defendant] indicated to him that [the defendant]

was aware that there were outstanding warrants for

him. That information that the defendant was aware

thatthere were outstanding warrants for him was admitted solely to show or establish the defendant’s intent

and/or motive.

‘‘That information is not admitted to prove the bad

character of the defendant or the defendant’s tendency

to commit criminal acts. You may not consider such

evidence as establishing a predisposition on the part

of the defendant to commit any of the crimes charged or

to demonstrate a criminal propensity. You may consider

such evidence if you believe it and further find that it

logically, rationally and conclusively supports the issue

for which it is being offered by the state, but only as

it may bear on the issue of the defendant’s intent and/

or motive.

‘‘On the other hand, if you do not believe such evidence, or even if you do, if you find that it does not

logically, rationally, and conclusively support the issue

for which it is being offered by the state, the defendant’s

intent and/or motive, then you may not consider that

testimony for any other purpose.’’

‘‘The principles guiding our review of a trial court’s

decision to admit prior uncharged misconduct evidence
are well settled. Evidence of a defendant’s uncharged

misconduct is inadmissible to prove that the defendant

committed the charged crime orto show the predisposition of the defendant to commit the charged crime.

. . . Exceptions to this rule have been recognized, however, to render misconduct evidence admissible if, for

example, the evidence is offered to prove intent, identity, malice, motive, a system of criminal activity or the

elements of a crime. . . . To determine whether evidence of prior misconduct falls within an exception

to the general rule prohibiting its admission, we have

adopted a two-pronged analysis. . . . First, the evidence must be relevant and material to at least one

of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions.

Second, the probative value of such evidence must outweigh the prejudicial effect of the other crime evidence.

. . . Since the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence is a decision within the discretion of the trial

court, we will draw every reasonable presumption in

favor of the trial court’s ruling. . . . We will reverse a

trial court’s decision only when it has abused its discretion or an injustice has occurred.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Milan, 290

Conn. 816, 830–31, 966 A.2d 699 (2009).

Applying these principles to the present case, we

conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion

when it admitted Gunsalus’ testimony. With respect to

the first prong—whether Gunsalus’ testimony related

to one of the exceptions to the general rule precluding

evidence of prior uncharged misconduct—we agree

with the state that this testimony was relevant to the

defendant’s motive. The evidence showed that the

defendant was motivated by a desire to escape apprehension by the police. By the defendant’s own admission, his knowledge of outstanding warrants against

him drove him to flee after Landry notified the authorities. Gunsalus testified at trial that the defendant stated

‘‘that during the course of the police officers’ searching

the residence, his intent was not to surrender.’’ Because

the defendant’s concerns about outstanding warrants

illuminate a motive to escape, and because the jury

reasonably could find that this motive to escape galvanized the defendant to fire upon the officers, we conclude that the court’s determination that this evidence

was relevant was not an abuse of discretion.

We also agree that the probative value of Gunsalus’

testimony outweighed the prejudicial effect. ‘‘The test

for determining whether evidence is unduly prejudicial

is not whether it is damaging to the defendant but

whether it will improperly arouse the emotions of the

jury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Franko, 142 Conn. App. 451, 465, 64 A.3d 807, cert.

denied, 310 Conn. 901, 75 A.3d 30 (2013). The court

took appropriate measures to ensure the jury’s emotions would not be improperly aroused. The evidence

was admitted for the limited purpose of its relevance
to the defendant’s motive or intent and the substance

of the warrants was not admitted into evidence. Additionally, the court gave precise and detailed limiting

instructions to the jury. ‘‘It is axiomatic that a jury is

presumed to have followed a court’s limiting instructions. . . . [I]nstructions limiting the use of the misconduct evidence [serve] to minimize any prejudicial

effect that it otherwise may have . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kantorowski, 144 Conn. App. 477, 492, 72 A.3d 1228, cert.

denied, 310 Conn. 924, 77 A.3d 141 (2013). Accordingly,

we conclude that the court acted within its discretion

to admit testimony concerning the defendant’s outstanding warrants.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is

guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental

state required for commission of the crime, he . . . (2) intentionally does

or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them

to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of

conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.’’

2 General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of assault in

the first degree when . . . (5) with intent to cause physical injury to another

person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means

of the discharge of a firearm.’’

3 General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is

guilty of assault of public safety . . . personnel when, with intent to prevent

a reasonably identifiable peace officer . . . from performing his or her

duties, and while such peace officer . . . is acting in the performance of

his or her duties, (1) such person causes physical injury to such peace

officer . . . .’’

Although § 53a-167c was recently amended by our legislature; see Public

Acts 2015, No. 15-211, § 15; those amendments have no effect on our resolution of this appeal.

4 Defense counsel repeated this sentiment after the defendant spoke:

‘‘[T]here is some sort of compromise to [the defendant’s] mental state. I

hope that we’re able to connect with him to address these issues. This is

not where he wants to end up. He wanted to be like the rest of us are, at

a home, raising kids and doing what we love to do for a living. So with that,

I would ask the court to take that into account. I would ask the court to

understand or to put into perspective . . . that he’s trapped, it seems to

me, he is trapped in a bad place where he’s seeking explanations to things

that haven’t gone right for him.’’

5 Neither Manning nor Falco entered the house, and neither testified at

trial.

6 The jury was shown photographs of the interior and exterior of the house.