IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

LAWRA KASSEE BULEN, AN 

INDIVIDUAL, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

ROB LAUER, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND 

STEVE SANSON, AN INDIVIDUAL, 

Res ondents. 

No. 81854 

FILED 

APR 2 9 2022 

EVIZABEIN A. BROWN 

CLERK, NPREME COURT 

BY 

DEPUTY C.)-l-tE. RK 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is an appeal from a district court order granting a special 

motion to dismiss in a torts action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark 

County; Trevor L. Atkin, Judge.1 

Appellant Lawra Kassee Bulen filed a defamation complaint 

against respondents Rob Lauer and Steve Sanson alleging that they 

authored and published numerous false statements about her in two 

articles and a video. Respondents moved to dismiss the action pursuant to 

Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute, NRS 41.660. After holding a hearing, the 

district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. 

Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes require the district court to 

undertake a two-prong analysis when reviewing a special motion to dismiss. 

See NRS 41.660(3)(a)-(b). First, the moving party must demonstrate that 

the claims against him are based on protected good faith communications. 

'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument 

is not warranted. 

;-; 3(943 
See NRS 41.660(3)(a); see also NRS 41.637 (defining good faith 

communications protected under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes). This 

requires the moving party to show that his alleged conduct constitutes good 

faith communications under "one of the four categories enumerated in NRS 

41.637 and 'is truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood."' 

Delucchi v. Songer, 133 Nev. 290, 299, 396 P.3d 826, 833 (2017) (quoting 

NRS 41.637). If the moving party "makes this initial showing, the burden 

shifts to the plaintiff to show 'with prima facie evidence a probability of 

prevailing on the claim."' Shapiro v. Welt, 133 Nev. 35, 38, 389 P.3d 262, 

267 (2017) (quoting NRS 41.660(3)(b)). 

As to the first prong of the analysis, Bulen does not dispute that 

the statements were directly connected with an issue of public interest and 

made in a public forum. See NRS 41.637(4) (providing that a "good faith 

communication" includes "[c]ommunication[s] made in direct connection 

with an issue of public interest . . . in a public forum"). Rather, Bulen 

argues that respondents did not demonstrate that the challenged 

statements were either true or made without knowledge of their falsity. We 

agree with the district court that respondents met their burden. Not only 

did respondents provide the district court with declarations made under 

penalty of perjury affirming that, to the best of their knowledge, the 

challenged statements were either true or they had no knowledge as to 

whether they were false at the time of publication, the challenged articles 

also cited, and sometimes embedded images of, their sources.2 See Stark v. 

2To the extent Bulen argues the district court should have allowed her 

discovery to show that respondents knew their statements were false, we 

2 
Lackey, 136 Nev. 38, 43, 458 P.3d 342, 347 (2020) ([A]n affidavit stating 

that the defendant believed the communications to be truthful or made 

them without knowledge of their falsehood is sufficient to meet the 

defendant's burden absent contradictory evidence in the record."); see also 

Abrams v. Sanson, 136 Nev. 83, 90, 458 P.3d 1062, 1068 (2020) (noting that 

statements in an article were protected good faith communications because 

the author included the original source in the article, "thereby allowing 

average readers to evaluate the veracity of the statements based on their 

source). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in finding 

that respondents showed that their statements were good faith 

communications protected by Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes. See Coker v. 

Sassone, 135 Nev. 8, 10, 432 P.3d 746, 748-49 (2019) (reviewing a district 

court order resolving an anti-SLAPP motion de novo). 

We further conclude that the district court did not err in finding 

that Bulen failed to show that she had a probability of prevailing on her 

decline to consider such argument because she did not request discovery 

below. See NRS 41.660(4) (Upon a showing by a party that information 

necessary to . . . oppose [a special motion to dismiss] is in the possession of 

another party or a third party and is not reasonably available without 

discovery, the court shall allow limited discovery for the purposes of 

ascertaining such information."); see also Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 

Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (providing that an argument not raised 

in the district court is "waived and will not be considered on appear). We 

also reject Bulen's suggestion that she should have been permitted to 

discover the identity of respondents unnamed sources. See NRS 49.275 

(explaining that news reporters cannot be required to disclose their 

sources); Toll v. Wilson, 135 Nev. 430, 435, 453 P.3d 1215, 1219 (2019) 

(holding that an online blog is not excluded from the news shield statute 

solely because it is digital). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) I947A aello 

3 
claims. As a preliminary matter, Bulen did not demonstrate that each of 

the challenged statements were false, which is an element of her defamation 

claim. See Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 118 Nev. 706, 714, 57 P.3d 82, 

87 (2002) (Defamation is a publication of a false statement of fact."). And 

while Bulen provided evidence disproving two of the challenged statements, 

she failed to demonstrate that respondents knew those statements were 

false when they published the articles. See Williams v. Lazer, 137 Nev., 

Adv. Op. 44, 495 P.3d 93, 100 (2021) (concluding that statements were not 

made in bad faith absent a showing that the tortfeasor "knew the 

statements were false when she made them"). Moreover, Bulen did not 

dispute that several of the challenged statements were true or publicly 

discoverable, see M & R Inv. Co., Inc. v. Mandarino, 103 Nev. 711, 718-19, 

748 P.2d 488, 493 (1987) (rejecting invasion of privacy claim.s where the 

alleged tortious conduct "did not constitute a publication of private facts, 

but rather, a publication of public facts"); and she failed to support her 

challenges to their publication with relevant authority. See Edwards v. 

Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 

(2006) (providing that an appellant must "present relevant authority[ ] in 

support of h[er] appellate concerne). Bulen therefore failed to show with 

prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on her defamation and 

invasion-of-privacy claims. We therefore conclude that the district court did 

not err in granting respondents anti-SLAPP motion and dismissing Bulen's 

complaint.3Lastly, while we caution appellant's counsel that a continued 

3Bulen does not challenge the district court's conclusion that she did 

not meet her burden regarding her other claims. Accordingly, we limit our 

4 
failure to cite to the appendix could result in the imposition of sanctions, see 

NRAP 28(e)(i), (j), we decline respondents request to impose sanctions now. 

Based on the foregoing, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.4 

'''S:LC14"426114.1.7C.J. 

Parraguirre 

, Sr.J. 

Hardesty 

cc: Hon. Trevor L. Atkin, District Judge 

Kristine M. Kuzemka, Settlement Judge 

Brandon L. Phillips, Attorney at Law, PLLC 

Richard F. Scotti 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

consideration to her defamation and invasion-of-privacy claims. See Powell 

v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 

(2011) (Issues not raised in an appellant's opening brief are deemed 

waived."). 

4The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the 

decision of this matter under a general order of assignment. 

5