IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-785

No. COA21-455

Filed 6 December 2022

Guilford County, No. 20 JA 512

IN THE MATTER OF: J.N.J.

Appeal by Respondent-Mother from orders entered 22 July 2020, 29 July 2020, 

and 18 May 2021 by Judge Marcus A. Shields in Guilford County District Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 February 2022.

Mercedes O. Chut for Petitioner-Appellee Guilford County Department of 

Health and Human Services.

Kimberly Connor Benton for Respondent-Appellant Mother.

Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Collier R. Marsh, for the Guardian ad 

Litem.

JACKSON, Judge.

¶ 1 Respondent-Mother argues that (1) the trial court’s findings are insufficient 

because they merely restate allegations from the Petition and are unsupported by 

clear and convincing evidence; (2) the remaining supported findings do not support 

an adjudication of neglect and dependency; and (3) the trial court failed to make 

necessary constitutional findings in order to properly apply the best interest of the 

child standard. First, we hold that while some minor portions of the findings are 

unsupported and must be disregarded, the remaining portions are supported by clear 
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and convincing evidence. Moreover, despite mirroring language from the Petition, 

we are confident that the trial court used a process of logical reasoning when making 

its ultimate findings. Second, we hold that these findings support the conclusion that 

Jason1 was neglected and dependent, and therefore affirm the trial court’s order on 

adjudication. Lastly, because we hold that Respondent-Mother’s constitutional 

argument was not properly preserved for our review, we do not address its merits.

I. Background

¶ 2 On 28 July 2019, Respondent-Mother gave birth to Jason. The following day, 

a report was filed with the Guilford County Department of Health and Human 

Services (“DHHS”) originating this case because Respondent-Mother had other 

children in DHHS custody at the time. Due to his premature birth at 25 weeks, Jason 

remained hospitalized for treatment of various medical conditions. Jason was on a 

breathing tube and was consequently prohibited from being in contact with smoke, 

smoke particulate, and residue due to his respiratory condition. Jason’s home and 

any car he traveled in also had to be free of smoke residue. His doctors also required 

Jason to be supervised 24 hours a day, necessitating two full-time caretakers. 

Because Jason needed a tracheal tube and ventilator, both caretakers needed to be 

medically trained to care for him and use the necessary equipment.

 

1 The parties stipulate to the use of this pseudonym for ease of reading and to protect 

the child’s privacy. 
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¶ 3 On 30 July 2019, Social Worker R. Turner visited Jason and RespondentMother at the hospital. During the visit, Respondent-Mother admitted that she had 

other children in DHHS custody and did not have visitation with them. RespondentMother also told Social Worker Turner that she did not know who Jason’s father was 

and that she believed he was conceived at a party in Atlanta where she had sex with 

multiple people while intoxicated. DHHS was concerned about Jason’s medical 

issues, Respondent-Mother’s other children in custody, and the circumstances of 

Jason’s conception. Based on Respondent-Mother’s history with DHHS, Social 

Worker Turner was concerned about Respondent-Mother’s poor decision-making and 

lack of improvement after taking mandated parenting classes. 

¶ 4 Eventually, Respondent-Mother identified Jason’s father and provided his 

contact information to Social Worker Turner. Respondent-Father2 alleged that he 

had instructed Respondent-Mother to lie about Jason’s parentage, specifically 

instructing her to tell the story that she had engaged in unprotected sex with multiple 

people at a party. Respondent-Mother admitted to following Respondent-Father’s 

instruction and lying to DHHS.

¶ 5 In October 2019, Social Worker Young visited Respondent-Mother’s home to 

determine if it would be an appropriate home for Jason when he was released from 

 

2 Respondent-Father is not a party to this appeal.
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the hospital. At this visit, she discovered that Respondent-Mother was living with 

an unknown roommate and observed that the home smelled like incense had been 

burning, both of which concerned DHHS. Separately, a nurse who visited 

Respondent-Mother’s home also detected a “smoky smell.” A home visit was also 

conducted by Social Worker Turner for Respondent-Father’s home sometime in 

October. At this visit, Social Worker Turner observed multiple ashtrays, a glass bong, 

a tobacco smoke odor, and the odor of what could have been marijuana. Although 

Respondent-Father denied the bong belonged to him, he admitted to smoking 

cigarettes and marijuana.

¶ 6 A background check was conducted on Respondent-Father, and DHHS 

discovered multiple criminal convictions, including assault on a female, 

communicating threats, assault with intent to inflict serious injury, misdemeanor 

child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, resisting a public officer, 

assault with a deadly weapon on a government official, as well as various drug, 

larceny, and robbery convictions. Additionally, during the home visit, Social Worker 

asked Respondent-Father about a 911 call for a domestic disturbance, and he advised 

that an altercation occurred when the mother of another child of his discovered his 

involvement with Respondent-Mother. This altercation between Respondent-Father 

and the mother resulted in the 911 call, and the mother and her child moved out of 

the home.
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¶ 7 On 6 December 2019, Social Worker Turner and hospital staff met with 

Respondent-Mother and Respondent-Father to discuss Jason’s discharge from the 

hospital. Jason’s parents advised DHHS that they were not living together or in a 

relationship but would be co-parenting. DHHS was concerned with this 

arrangement, because Jason needed two caretakers living in the home with him to 

provide 24-hour medical care. Respondent-Father informed DHHS that he had not 

yet spoken with his employer about Jason’s needs or his work schedule and that he 

“sleeps really hard and has a difficult time with hearing alarms.” Social Worker 

Turner asked Respondent-Mother who Jason’s two caretakers would be if placed in 

her care, and Respondent-Father instructed Respondent-Mother not to answer the 

question. Respondent-Mother did not directly answer the question or identify anyone 

by name but vaguely indicated that she had “supports.” 

¶ 8 After the December meeting, Respondent-Father recommended his brother 

and sister-in-law as a potential placement option. However, the couple expressed 

that they were no longer interested in being caretakers for Jason due to their concerns 

with Respondent-Mother’s behavior and the possibility that they were moving to a 

new home. Social Worker Turner also contacted Respondent-Father’s mother, who 

advised that she could not be a placement option and did not have any other family 

members that could be considered for placement. At a later meeting between 

Respondent-Mother and Social Worker Turner, Respondent-Mother again failed to 
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provide other placement options.

¶ 9 Meanwhile, while Jason was hospitalized, the case for his sisters was still 

pending. A permanency planning hearing for Jason’s sisters was held on 20 

November 2019. The permanency planning order,3 entered on 9 December 2019, 

changed the primary permanent plan from reunification to adoption, with a 

secondary plan of reunification. The sisters remained in DHHS custody. The trial 

court found that the barriers to reunification were, inter alia: (1) the juveniles were 

afraid to return home; (2) Respondent-Mother’s inability to demonstrate what she 

learned in domestic violence classes; (3) Respondent-Mother’s inability to verbalize 

why her children came into DHHS custody or her role in that outcome; (4) 

Respondent-Mother’s minimization of the effects of domestic violence on her children; 

(5) Respondent-Mother’s admission that she had intercourse with an unidentified 

man at a party while intoxicated; (6) Respondent-Mother’s honesty; and (7) 

Respondent-Mother’s violation of a court order and failure to comply with her case 

plan.

¶ 10 The Petition and non-secure custody order for Jason were filed six months after 

his birth, on 30 January 2020, while he was still in the hospital. The Petition alleged 

 

3 At Jason’s hearing on adjudication, Judge Shields took judicial notice of the 

permanency planning order in Jason’s sisters’ pending case, in which he was also the 

presiding judge.
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that Jason did not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline, lived in an 

environment injurious to his welfare, and Jason’s parents were unable to provide for 

his care or supervision and lacked an appropriate childcare arrangement. At the time 

the Petition was filed, Respondent-Father had not completed any of the necessary 

training to care for Jason, and Respondent-Mother had completed some but not all of 

the training. Neither parent had an appropriate, smoke-free home, and the parents 

also had not provided an alternative, suitable two-caretaker home to meet Jason’s 

medical needs. 

¶ 11 At the first non-secure custody hearing in February 2020, both RespondentMother and Respondent-Father were prohibited from visiting with Jason because 

they admitted to smoking. At the second non-secure custody hearing in April 2020, 

Respondent-Mother was granted supervised visits with Jason at the hospital, 

provided she was smoke, particulate, residue, and odor free. She was not permitted 

to drive her car to the visit unless she provided DHHS with a receipt showing that it 

had been professionally cleaned and was smoke-free. Jason remained hospitalized 

until 28 April 2020, when he was placed in a foster home.

¶ 12 The hearing on adjudication was held over two days, on 5 June 2020 and 1 July 

2020. Two social workers, R. Turner and K. Young, testified on behalf of DHHS. On 

22 July 2020, the trial court adjudicated Jason a neglected and dependent juvenile. 

An amended adjudication order was filed on 29 July 2020 to correct the file number. 
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The trial court conducted a hearing on disposition on 12 February and 12 March 2021. 

On 18 May 2021, the disposition order was entered. Respondent-Mother timely filed 

a Notice of Appeal from the adjudication and disposition orders and an Amended 

Notice of Appeal to include the amended adjudication order.

II. Discussion

¶ 13 Respondent-Mother argues that (1) the trial court’s findings are insufficient 

because they merely restate allegations from the Petition and are unsupported by 

clear and convincing evidence; (2) the remaining supported findings do not support 

an adjudication of neglect and dependency; and (3) the trial court failed to make 

necessary constitutional findings in order to properly apply the best interest of the 

child standard. We address each argument in turn.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 14 For adjudications in abuse, neglect, or dependency cases, the standard of 

review is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence.

In re J.A.M., 372 N.C. 1, 8, 822 S.E.2d 693, 698 (2019). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-805

(2021). However, we do not review challenged findings that are unnecessary to 

support a trial court’s determination. See In re S.R.F., 376 N.C. 647, 654, 656, 2021-

NCSC-5, ¶ 16, 19. See also In re C.J., 373 N.C. 260, 262, 837 S.E.2d 859, 860 (2020) 

(declining to review challenged findings unnecessary to support the grounds for 

adjudication). Unsupported findings or portions of findings are disregarded, and we 
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review only the proper findings when determining whether the findings of fact 

support the conclusions of law. See S.R.F., 376 N.C. at 654, 656, 2021-NCSC-5 ¶ 16, 

19. Findings of fact supported by clear and convincing evidence are “deemed 

conclusive even if the record contains evidence that would support a contrary 

finding.” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379, 831 S.E.2d 305, 310 (2019). Conclusions of 

law are reviewed de novo. In re M.H., 272 N.C. App. 283, 286, 845 S.E.2d 908, 911 

(2020) (citation omitted).

B. Findings of Fact

¶ 15 Respondent-Mother argues that the trial court’s findings are insufficient 

because they merely restate allegations from the petition and are unsupported by 

clear and convincing evidence. While we agree that portions of the trial court’s 

findings are unsupported, we hold that the remaining supported findings are 

sufficient to support the trial court’s adjudication of Jason as neglected and 

dependent. 

¶ 16 The Juvenile Code provides that adjudication orders “shall be in writing and 

shall contain appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.” N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 7B-807(b) (2021). These factual findings “must be the specific ultimate facts[,] 

sufficient for the appellate court to determine that the judgment is adequately 

supported by competent evidence.” In re H.P., 278 N.C. App. 195, 202, 2021-NCCOA299, ¶ 23 (internal marks and citation omitted).
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¶ 17 Acknowledging the reality that trial courts in our State have “little or no 

support staff to assist with order preparation,” we have repeatedly held that 

it is not per se reversible error for a trial court’s fact 

findings to mirror the wording of a petition or other 

pleading prepared by a party. Instead, this Court will 

examine whether the record of the proceedings 

demonstrates that the trial court, through processes of 

logical reasoning, based on the evidentiary facts before it, 

found the ultimate facts necessary to dispose of the case. If 

we are confident the trial court did so, it is irrelevant 

whether those findings are taken verbatim from an earlier 

pleading.

In re J.W., 241 N.C. App. 44, 48-49, 772 S.E.2d 249, 253 (2015).

¶ 18 Here, the following relevant findings were not challenged by RespondentMother, are supported by clear and convincing evidence from the Record, and are 

therefore binding on appeal:

8. [Respondent-Mother] has two (2) other minor 

children who are not the subject of this proceeding . . . . 

The juveniles are currently in the custody of the Guilford 

County Department of Health and Human Services, 

pursuant to a Petition and non-secure custody order filed 

April 20, 2019, alleging neglect and dependency. The 

current plan for the juveniles was changed to adoption 

pursuant to a Permanency Planning Hearing on November 

20, 2019 with the Order for that hearing entered by the 

Court on December 11, 2019. Pursuant to that Order, the 

plan was changed to adoption based on [RespondentMother’s] lack of compliance with the majority of her case 

plan for those juveniles, which include the mother’s failure 

to successfully demonstrate improvement in her decisionmaking regarding parenting and relationships; the 

mother’s understanding of domestic violence; and the 
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mother’s ability to properly vet partners. The Court took 

judicial notice of the Permanency Planning Hearing Order 

entered on December 11, 2019 pursuant to the hearing held 

on November 20, 2019 in the companion sibling case.

. . .

11. No appropriate relative placements have been 

identified.

¶ 19 Respondent Mother, however, challenges Findings of Fact 14 through 27 of the 

trial court’s order on adjudication. Specifically, she argues that “Findings of Fact 

#14-27 are nothing more than mere reiterations of statements to [DHHS] and are not 

supported by the evidence, and there is no evidence the trial court used any logical 

reasoning to make its ultimate findings of fact.” While Respondent-Mother “does not 

deny [DHHS] presented some evidence” at the hearing, she takes issue with the fact 

that “[t]he court verbatim adopted its findings of fact from Exhibit A” and, in her 

view, “failed to use logical reasoning to make findings of the ultimate facts.” 

¶ 20 Omitting minor unsupported details, we hold that the following challenged 

findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence:

14. The Guilford County Department of Health and 

Human Services received a report on July 29, 2019. 

Reporter stated that [Respondent-Mother] gave birth to a 

newborn baby on July, 28 2019. Reporter stated that the 

infant was born at 25 weeks and will remain in the NICCU 

[sic] for a while. Reporter advised [Respondent-Mother] 

has other kids in the custody of GCDHHS. At that time, 

[Respondent-Mother] refused to give the name of the 

biological father.
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15. On July 30, 2019 Social Worker Turner went to the 

Greensboro Women’s Hospital and spoke with 

[Respondent-Mother] . . . . Social Worker Turner 

addressed the allegations and inquired about [RespondentMother’s] plan. [Respondent-Mother] advised that she 

currently has a foster care case with her two daughters 

. . . . [Respondent-Mother] shared that visitation was 

stopped by the Department . . . . Social Worker Turner 

asked for the name of [Jason’s] father, and [RespondentMother] stated that she honestly did not know because it 

could be one of several men with whom she had intercourse 

at a party in a different state during the holiday season of 

2018. Social Worker Turner requested any names or any 

information she could recall, and [Respondent-Mother] 

stated that she had no information.

16. On August 16, 2019, the Department held a Child 

and Family Team Meeting (CFT) . . . . During this meeting 

the issues discussed were as follows: (1) CPS report 

received on July 29, 2019; (2) newborn child was born with 

medical issues; (3) [Respondent-Mother’s] other children 

currently in DSS custody[;] and (4) safety concerns for this 

child. [Respondent-Mother] stated that she has worked her 

case plan, and her situation is not the same as when her 

other children came into custody. The Department was 

also concerned as to who the father is of this child. 

[Respondent-Mother] stated that she did not know who the 

father was . . . . [Respondent-Mother] gave [] names, one 

of which . . . she advised was the homeowner of where the 

party was where she became heavily intoxicated and 

engaged in sexual relations. [Respondent-Mother] stated 

that it was an emotional time for her as her children were 

taken into custody, so she went out on the town in Atlanta. 

[Respondent-Mother] appeared to know nothing about the 

men she slept with. [Respondent-Mother] stated that she 

just signed a lease to her new house. [Respondent-Mother] 

presented a copy of the lease. [DHHS] explained that the 

Department continues to be concerned about the choices 

that she is making and concerned about her not 
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demonstrating parenting skills that she has learned in her 

parenting classes. . . . [Respondent-Mother] is currently in 

therapy with Ms. [M.] Seeley and there have been concerns 

by the Department as to whether she is providing 

appropriate treatment to [Respondent-Mother]. 

[Respondent-Mother] was asked about the current status 

of her newborn and she advised that he is in the NICU born 

at 25 weeks, currently 28 weeks gestational. Not ready for 

discharge for 6 more weeks. [Respondent-Mother] was 

breast feeding. . . . [Jason was] on a breathing machine 

until he can breathe on his own. . . .

17. [I]n August . . . 2019, [Social Worker] Turner 

received an email from [Respondent-Mother] advising that 

she found the father of [Jason] and provided his contact 

information.

18. [I]n August . . . 2019, [Social Worker] Turner . . . met 

with [Respondent-Father] and collected a DNA sample to 

determine paternity. [Social Worker] Turner inquired 

about his plan for the child and any other placement 

options for him. [Respondent-Father] advised that he 

would be taking care of [Jason] and maybe [RespondentFather’s] mother, but he was not certain if she could. . . .

[Respondent-Father’s] criminal record . . . reflects various 

larceny and robbery charges as well as assault with a 

deadly weapon on a government official, resisting public 

officer, . . . contributing to the delinquency of a minor, . . . 

assault on a female, communicating threats, assault with 

intent to inflict serious injury, and misdemeanor child 

abuse.

. . .

21. . . . Social Worker Turner conducted a home visit 

with [Respondent-Father] and noted that the home had an 

odor of lingering smoke residue [and] that of cigarettes and 

what appeared to be marijuana. Social Worker Turner 

noticed various ashtrays . . . and a glass bong in a back 

room/den area of the home. [Social Worker] Turner 
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addressed the smoke odors and smoking paraphernalia. 

[Respondent-Father] denied owning the glass bong pipe 

but stated that he does engage in marijuana and cigarette 

use. Social Worker Turner inquired about the status of his 

relationship with [Respondent-Mother]. He advised that 

they were in [a]. . . relationship . . . . [Respondent-Father] 

advised that he knew [Respondent-Mother] was pregnant 

from the beginning of her pregnancy and he has always 

known that the child was his. . . .

22. On November 20, 2019, Social Worker Turner was 

informed that the plan for [Respondent-Mother’s] 

daughters had been changed to adoption due to 

[Respondent-Mother] being out of compliance with the 

majority of her case plan, including not being able to 

successfully demonstrate a change in improving her 

decision-making regarding parenting and relationships, 

understanding of domestic violence and properly vetting 

partners.

23. On December 6, 2019, a Child and Family Team 

meeting (CFT) was held at Wake Forest Baptist Hospital 

NICU. The attendees included: [Respondent-Father], 

[Respondent-Mother], . . . [R.] Miller- MD-Neonatology, [J.]

Kerth-Nurse Practitioner-Pediatric Pulmonology, [S.] 

Crabtree-Pediatric Pulmonology Attending . . . . The 

medical team advised of the child’s medical needs including 

a tracheal tube, a ventilator and ongoing developmental 

needs due to underdeveloped airways and his premature 

status. Medical Staff advised that there would need to be 

2 fully trained 24-hour caregivers prior to discharge. 

Restrictions included no smoking in the home, vehicles or 

smoke residue on the hands or clothes of anyone providing 

care for or being with [Jason]. [Respondent-Father] 

advised that he needed to take some time and consider the 

information and speak with his employer. He shared that 

he is a very hard sleeper and doesn’t hear alarms while 

sleeping . . . . During the CFT, [Respondent-Father] stated 

that he encouraged [Respondent-Mother] to be dishonest 
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with the Department about her initial story about [Jason’s] 

conception and naming the father. [Respondent-Mother] 

advised that this was true. Social Worker Turner inquired 

about the current status of their relationship and their 

plan for his care. [Respondent-Mother] advised that they 

were only co-parenting. Social Worker Turner asked what 

that meant and what that looked like . . . . Social Worker

Turner asked who the trained caretakers would be for 

[Jason] as [Respondent-Father] expressed his plan to care 

for him. Social Worker Turner asked whose home would 

be the primary residence and whether the other parent 

would join them at that home. [Respondent-Father] 

instructed [Respondent-Mother] not to answer Social 

Worker Turner. After the CFT was concluded, Nurse 

Merrill advised that when she visited [RespondentMother’s] home, there was a “smokey [sic] smell” that she 

would be working with [Respondent-Mother] on the smell.

24. [I]n December . . . 2019, a meeting was held with 

[Respondent-Mother] per her request . . . . The 

Department’s concerns were re-explained to [RespondentMother] as well as other placement options including 

transfer of custody to caretakers identified by [RespondentFather] and she was asked if she had any other placement 

options for the child and she advised she did not have any 

additional placement options.

25. . . . Social Worker Turner spoke with . . . 

[Respondent-Father’s] sister in-law and identified 

caretaker. [Respondent-Father’s sister in-law] advised 

that . . . she and her husband felt that there were too many 

concerns regarding [Respondent-Mother], and they would 

no longer [be] interested in being the caretakers for 

[Jason].

26. . . . Social Worker Turner called and spoke with . . . 

[Respondent-Father’s] brother and desired potential 

caretaker. [Respondent-Father’s brother] advised that he 

and his wife have decided to no longer be the caretakers for 

[Jason]. . . . [Social Worker] Turner asked if their mother 
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would be an option and [Respondent-Father’s brother] 

stated that they had not discussed it since she was caring 

for another grandchild and they did not want to add 

additional burdens to her[.]

27. . . . Social Worker Turner phoned . . . paternal 

grandmother of [Jason] and inquired about her interest 

and ability to be a possible caretaker and placement option 

for [Jason]. [She] advised that she would not be able to care 

for or be a placement option for [Jason].

¶ 21 Respondent-Mother relies primarily on In re H.P., 278 N.C. App. 195, 2021-

NCCOA-299, to support her argument that these findings, which closely track the 

language of Exhibit A to the Petition, are mere recitations that do not demonstrate 

that the trial court exercised logical reasoning. However, in In re H.P., this Court

held that the trial court did not “through the process of logical reasoning, find the 

ultimate facts necessary to dispose the case” where “no evidence to support the 

allegations in Exhibit A was presented at the adjudication and disposition hearing, 

and several of the allegations in Exhibit A could not be substantiated[.]” 278 N.C. 

App. at 204, 2021-NCCOA-299 at ¶ 26 (internal marks and citation omitted)

(emphasis added). In addition to many of the findings being “mere recitations” from 

the petition’s exhibit, this Court held that (1) “[f]our of the trial court’s findings 

expressly state that ‘there was not evidence’ to support other allegations the trial 

court found as fact in the adjudication order”; (2) “three other findings of fact by the 

trial court recognize that there was insufficient evidence to support the allegations 
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accepted as fact in other findings”; (3) many of the statements included in the findings 

“were not corroborated by any of the testimony given at the adjudication hearing”;

and (4) “[t]he contents of Exhibit A[,]” where the language was lifted for the findings 

of fact, “are contradictory on its face and, therefore, not competent evidence.” Id. at 

203-04, 2021-NCCOA-299 at ¶ 24-28.

¶ 22 Here, unlike in In re H.P., many of the allegations in Exhibit A to the Petition 

were supported by evidence presented at the hearing. At the hearing on adjudication, 

which spanned two days, DHHS presented the testimony of two social workers, one 

of whom corroborated many of the allegations in the Petition. Although some minor 

details from the Petition were not supported by testimony at the hearing, including, 

inter alia, specific dates, names of persons, and a handful of statements, these 

unsupported details, which were omitted from our recitation above, were not 

necessary to adjudicate Jason as neglected or dependent, as demonstrated further 

below. Moreover, unlike In re H.P., here, the findings of fact were not selfcontradictory and did not depend on allegations that lacked sufficient evidence.

¶ 23 We therefore hold that all of the above findings are supported by the social 

workers’ testimony at the adjudicatory hearing. Based on this evidence and the trial 

court’s detailed orally rendered judgment, “the record of the proceedings 

demonstrates that the trial court, through processes of logical reasoning, based on 

the evidentiary facts before it, found the ultimate facts necessary to dispose of the 
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case.” In re J.W., 241 N.C. App. at 48-49, 772 S.E.2d at 253. Because we are 

confident that the trial court used logical reasoning to reach its findings, “it is 

irrelevant whether those findings are taken verbatim from an earlier pleading.” Id. 

Further, because we do “not review challenged findings that are unnecessary to 

support the trial court’s determination[,]” and unsupported findings or portions of 

findings are similarly disregarded, In re S.R.F., 376 N.C. at 654, 656, 2021-NCSC-5

¶ 16, 19, we will review only the above findings when determining whether the 

findings of fact supported the trial court’s determination that Jason was neglected 

and dependent.

C. Neglect

¶ 24 A “neglected juvenile” is defined by statute as “[a]ny juvenile . . . whose parent, 

guardian, custodian, or caretaker does . . . not provide proper care, supervision, or 

discipline[,]” or “[c]reates or allows to be created a living environment that is injurious 

to the juvenile’s welfare.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15)(a), (e) (2021). “In neglect 

cases involving newborns,” or in Jason’s case as a medically fragile infant, “the 

decision of the trial court must of necessity be predictive in nature, as the trial court 

must assess whether there is a substantial risk of future abuse or neglect based on 

the historical facts of the case.” In re J.A.M., 372 N.C. 1, 9-10, 822 S.E.2d 693, 699 

(2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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¶ 25 “To adjudicate a juvenile neglected, some physical, mental, or emotional 

impairment of the juvenile or a substantial risk of such impairment as a consequence 

of the failure to provide proper care, supervision, or discipline is required.” In re R.B., 

280 N.C. App. 424, 432, 2021-NCCOA-654, ¶ 18 (internal quotation and citation 

omitted). See also In re Padgett, 156 N.C. App. 644, 648, 577 S.E.2d 337, 340 (2003) 

(“Where there is no finding that the juvenile has been impaired or is at substantial 

risk of impairment, there is no error if all the evidence supports such a finding.”). 

“Similarly, in order for a court to find that the child resided in an injurious 

environment, evidence must show that the environment in which the child resided 

has resulted in harm to the child or a substantial risk of harm.” In re K.J.B., 248 

N.C. App. 352, 354, 797 S.E.2d 516, 518 (2016) (citation omitted). A court “need not 

wait for actual harm to occur to the child if there is a substantial risk of harm.” In re 

D.B.J., 197 N.C. App. 752, 755, 678 S.E.2d 778, 780 (2009) (quotation and citation 

omitted).

¶ 26 The prior adjudication of a sibling as neglected may not, standing alone, 

support an adjudication of neglect. In re J.A.M., 372 N.C. at 9-10, 822 S.E.2d at 699 

(2019). Instead, additional factors must be present “‘to suggest that the neglect . . . 

will be repeated.’” Id. (citing In re J.C.B., 233 N.C. App. 641, 644, 757 S.E.2d 213 

(2014). A parent’s failure to correct the conditions that lead to the prior adjudication 

of neglect, including the failure to address domestic violence, may support the 
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likelihood of the repetition of neglect. See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843-44, 788 

S.E.2d 162, 167-68 (2016) (holding that the trial court’s findings regarding ongoing 

domestic violence in the home after the prior adjudication of neglect “support[ed] the 

conclusion that there would be a repetition of neglect based upon the juveniles’ living 

in an environment injurious to their welfare”) (cleaned up).

¶ 27 Here, the trial court adjudicated Jason neglected, as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 7B-101(15).

¶ 28 We are “required to consider the totality of the evidence to determine whether 

the trial court’s findings sufficiently support its ultimate conclusion that” Jason is a 

neglected juvenile. In re F.S., 268 N.C. App. 34, 43, 835 S.E.2d 465, 471 (2019). As 

described above, because of his premature birth, Jason was a medically fragile 

juvenile. Even when the Petition was filed six months after his birth, Jason remained 

hospitalized for his safety. Jason had difficulty breathing on his own, and hospital 

staff advised that in order for him to be released from the NICU, Jason needed two 

full-time caretakers medically trained to use and monitor his breathing equipment. 

Jason was not permitted to be near smoke odor, residue, or particulate in his home 

or transportation, which would interfere with his health and ability to breathe. 

Therefore, his caretakers had to be clean of smoke odor, residue, and particulate as 

well. 
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¶ 29 First, the trial court properly concluded that Respondents were unable to 

provide proper care and supervision for Jason. The trial court found that neither 

Respondent-Mother nor Respondent-Father had completed the necessary medical 

training to care for Jason at the time the Petition was filed. Although RespondentMother points out that she completed “some” of the training for Jason’s care during 

his six months in the NICU, this incomplete training was not sufficient for Jason to 

be discharged to her care. Moreover, even if Respondent-Mother had completed the 

necessary training, she would still not be capable of providing proper care on her own, 

as she did not have a second caretaker with the necessary medical training living in 

the home where she planned to raise Jason. Although Respondent-Mother indicated 

that she planned to “co-parent” with Respondent-Father, she refused to tell Social 

Worker Turner which home would be Jason’s primary residence or whether both 

parents would reside with Jason in the home. The trial court repeatedly found that 

no additional caretakers were presented by Respondent-Mother.

¶ 30 Second, the trial court properly concluded that Jason was neglected due to an 

injurious environment. Based on the trial court’s findings, Respondent-Mother’s 

home had a “smoky smell” when one of Jason’s nurses conducted a home visit, and 

Respondent-Father’s home also had a smoke odor and contained various smoking 

paraphernalia, including ashtrays and a bong. Both parents also admitted to 

smoking, which is why they were not permitted to visit with Jason. Therefore, had 
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Jason been allowed to return home to live with Respondent-Mother or RespondentFather, due to the presence of smoke odor and his respiratory condition, his home 

environment would result in a substantial risk of his physical impairment. 

¶ 31 In addition to the presence of smoke odor in Jason’s environment, RespondentMother repeatedly engaged in relationships with domestic violence and failed to learn 

from her parenting and domestic violence courses. As demonstrated by the 

adjudication of Jason’s siblings as neglected, Respondent-Mother’s history of poor 

decision-making and domestic violence contributed to Jason’s sisters being removed 

from her custody and recommended for adoption. Additionally, in Jason’s case, 

Respondent-Mother’s relationship with Respondent-Father was a concern to DHHS 

and the trial court. The trial court expressed concern that “based upon her previous 

history of domestic violence, and having taken classes for domestic violence and was 

in therapy, . . . that [Respondent-Mother] was able to conceive a child with someone 

she did not know all of the background, who had a violent history or tendencies 

related to violence, specifically had [an] assault on a female conviction[,]” in addition 

to a misdemeanor child abuse conviction. 

¶ 32 Although according to Respondent-Mother, Respondents were not in a 

relationship, the findings reflect that Respondent-Father instructed RespondentMother to lie to DHHS about Jason’s paternity, inventing the story about having 

intercourse with strangers at a party in Atlanta, and then further instructed 
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Respondent-Mother not to answer Social Worker Turner’s questions regarding their 

co-parenting plan. The trial court again expressed concern that Respondent-Mother 

“was able to be controlled by [Respondent-Father]” when “a component of the therapy 

is the Crossroads program in her other case, which identifies domestic violence skills, 

especially for battered women[,]” and Respondent-Father’s control over her “resulted 

in her telling the [D]epartment false information . . . , and [] it took her almost a 

month to tell the truth” about Respondent-Father’s paternity. The court further 

stated that Respondent-Mother “was unable to use the skills that she developed in 

her therapy and services provided to give truthful information or to assess intimate 

partners that she might come in contact with.” Given that Jason’s sisters were also 

removed from Respondent-Mother’s care over domestic violence concerns 

contributing to their injurious environment, these findings regarding RespondentMother’s involvement with Respondent-Father amply support a failure to address 

these concerns and a repetition of that neglect.

¶ 33 We therefore hold, in light of the trial court’s supported findings, Jason was 

properly adjudicated a neglected juvenile. 

D. Dependency

¶ 34 A “dependent juvenile” is defined by statute as a “juvenile in need of assistance 

or placement because . . . the juvenile’s parent, guardian, or custodian is unable to 

provide for the juvenile’s care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative 
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child care arrangement.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9) (2021). Therefore, a child is not 

dependent so long as there is one parent who can either care for the child or make 

appropriate alternative childcare arrangements for the child. In re Q.M., 275 N.C. 

App. 34, 42, 852 S.E.2d 687, 693 (2020). “Adjudicatory hearings for dependency are 

limited to determining only the existence or nonexistence of any of the conditions 

alleged in the petition.” Id. at 39, 852 S.E.2d at 691 (internal marks and quotation 

omitted). We have previously held that “the trial court must consider ‘the conditions 

as they exist at the time of the adjudication as well as the risk of harm to the child 

from return to a parent.’” In re F.S., 268 N.C. App. at 46, 835 S.E.2d at 473 (citation 

omitted). 

¶ 35 Here, the trial court found that Jason should be adjudicated “dependent, as the 

parents lack an appropriate child care arrangement,” and thereby concluded that 

Jason was dependent as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9). Because the trial 

court’s findings also addressed whether Respondents were “unable to provide proper 

care and supervision[,]” they supported the trial court’s adjudication of dependency. 

¶ 36 As described above, the trial court properly found that Respondents were 

unable to provide the proper care and supervision Jason needed in his medically 

fragile state, due to the dangers posed by the smoke odor in their homes, their 

inability to complete the necessary medical training, and their inability to articulate 
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how, in their plan to “co-parent,” that Jason would be supervised full-time in the home 

by two trained caretakers as medically required for his release. 

¶ 37 Likewise, the trial court properly found that the parents lacked an appropriate 

child care arrangement. Respondent-Father proposed his brother and sister-in-law, 

who later told Social Worker Turner that they were not willing to be Jason’s 

caretakers. Respondent-Father’s mother also indicated she did not want to be 

considered as a caretaker and that she had no other family interested. RespondentFather proposed no other possible caretakers. While Respondent-Mother vaguely 

indicated that she had “supports,” when asked for specific names by Social Worker 

Turner, she repeatedly failed to name any potential caretakers for Jason. Although 

Respondent-Mother argues on appeal that she suggested either her friend or sister to 

DHHS, social worker testimony demonstrated that neither Respondent-Mother’s 

friend or sister were approved by DHHS in the case involving Respondent-Mother’s 

other children, and therefore they were not considered in Jason’s case. Moreover, and 

more importantly, none of Respondent-Mother’s proposed arrangements accounted

for the two full-time, live-in caretakers that were medically required for Jason’s care, 

and this is adequately reflected in the trial court’s findings. 

¶ 38 Therefore, in light of the trial court’s supported findings, neither parent could 

care for Jason or make appropriate childcare arrangements for him, and Jason was 

properly adjudicated a dependent juvenile. 
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E. Constitutionally Required Findings

¶ 39 After adjudicating Jason neglected and dependent, the trial court found that it 

was “contrary to [his] health and safety to be returned to the custody of a parent” at 

that time, and that it was “in the best[] interest of the juvenile to remain in the legal

and physical custody of” DHHS. Respondent-Mother argues that the trial court 

incorrectly applied the best interest of the child standard in “awarding custody of 

Jason” to DHHS without first making a finding that Respondent-Mother was “unfit”

or “acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected rights” as a parent. 

Respondent-Mother contends that her constitutional argument is automatically 

preserved under N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1). We disagree. 

¶ 40 Parents have several constitutional protections arising from the Due Process 

and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Ninth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution, as recognized by our Supreme Court 

in Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 401, 445 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1994). However, 

[n]othing in Petersen serves to negate our rules on the 

preservation of constitutional issues. Thus, a parent’s 

argument concerning his or her paramount interest to the 

custody of his or her child, although afforded constitutional 

protection, may be waived on review if the issue is not first 

raised in the trial court.

In re J.N., 381 N.C. 131, 133, 2022-NCSC-52, ¶ 8. 

¶ 41 In In re J.N., our Supreme Court rejected an argument nearly identical to 
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Respondent-Mother’s. In that case, the respondent likewise argued that “the trial 

court erred by granting guardianship without first concluding that respondent was 

an unfit parent or had acted inconsistently with his constitutional right to parent[,]” 

and that this argument was “automatically preserved under N.C. R. App. P. 

10(a)(1)[.]” Id. at 132-33, 2022-NCSC-52 at ¶ 5-6. Our Supreme Court was not 

persuaded, and instead affirmed a unanimous decision from this Court, In re J.N., 

276 N.C. App. 275, 2021-NCCOA-76, ¶ 8 (unpublished), ultimately holding that, 

because the respondent “failed to assert his constitutional argument in the trial 

court[,]” despite the respondent’s opportunity to do so, he had not properly preserved 

his constitutional argument for appeal. In re J.N., 381 N.C. at 133-34, 2022-NCSC52 at ¶ 9-10. 

¶ 42 Here, like the respondent in In re J.N., despite the trial court affording all 

parties an opportunity to present closing arguments at the conclusion of each hearing, 

Respondent-Mother did not raise a constitutional argument at either the adjudicatory 

or dispositional hearings. DHHS acknowledged that while reunification was still the 

goal of Jason’s permanent plan, DHHS recommended that he remain in DHHS 

custody for his health and safety. Although Respondent-Mother argued, inter alia, 

that she was capable of providing a safe, permanent home for Jason and wanted faceto-face visitation with him, she did not at any point argue that leaving Jason in DHHS 

custody was a violation of her constitutional rights. Therefore, because Respondent-
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Opinion of the Court

Mother was afforded an opportunity to raise her constitutional argument at trial and 

did not do so, we conclude that she has waived this argument for our review.

III. Conclusion

¶ 43 Because the trial court used logical reasoning to make adequate factual 

findings, supported by clear and convincing evidence, that supported an adjudication 

of Jason as neglected and dependent, the trial court’s order on adjudication is

AFFIRMED.

Judge DIETZ concurs.

Judge MURPHY dissents by separate opinion.
No. COA21-455 – In re: J.N.J.

MURPHY, Judge, dissenting.

¶ 44 Though not addressed at length in the preceding opinion, I would first like to 

underscore the unprecedented nature of the Majority’s decision to base its 

determination, in any part, on findings of fact in an “orally rendered judgment” that 

does not appear in the trial court’s order. See supra ¶ 23. This is a remarkable 

departure from our ordinary review process which, having now been written into our 

precedent, will present an unworkable burden to future litigants challenging a trial 

court’s findings of fact—now, appellants must not only challenge findings committed 

to writing by the trial court, but also those the trial court declined to include in its 

order. While In re J.W. does allow for a degree of pragmatic leniency in our review, 

nowhere does it authorize us to upend the procedural norms of our abuse, neglect, 

and dependency jurisprudence by basing our review on findings outside the trial 

court’s written order.4 See In re J.W., 241 N.C. App. 44, 48-49, disc. rev. denied, 368 

N.C. 290 (2015),

¶ 45 Furthermore, while a trial court may quote a juvenile petition verbatim in its 

findings of fact without committing reversible error, it cannot do so at the expense of 

 

4 This is especially troubling given the stringency with which we typically limit the 

scope of our review on the basis that “unchallenged findings of fact are presumed to be 

supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re R.D.B., 274 N.C. App. 

374, 379-80 (2020). While I do not dispute the practical necessity of that procedural rule, it 

strikes me as profoundly unprincipled that we would underscore the formal importance of 

the trial court’s written findings of fact when individual appellants might benefit from 

flexibility and leniency, only to treat the same findings with flexibility and leniency when 

appellants might benefit from formality.
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having found the ultimate facts necessary to dispose of the case through a process of 

logical reasoning based on the evidentiary facts before it. When, on the other hand, 

a trial court’s findings of fact deviate from the evidence before it so significantly that 

whether its findings were based on logical reasoning becomes unclear, it reversibly 

errs. Here, in quoting the juvenile petition verbatim, the trial court based its 

reasoning in the adjudication order so heavily on information that was not presented 

to the trial court as evidence that the central logic of its position became 

compromised. This was reversible error, and I would remand for adequate 

factfinding.

BACKGROUND

¶ 46 As discussed by the Majority, Jason was born prematurely in July 2019 at 25 

weeks and was placed in the newborn intensive care unit (“NICU”) to address his 

health needs related to his underdeveloped respiratory system. The following day, 

the Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) received 

a child protective services report indicating that Jason was born prematurely and 

placed into the NICU, that he would remain there for some time, and RespondentMother had other children in the custody of DHHS.

¶ 47 One day later, at the hospital where Respondent-Mother had given birth, a 

DSS employee spoke with Respondent-Mother regarding the allegations in the report. 

Over the following six months, DHHS had several meetings with Respondent-Mother 
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and Respondent-Father, including two Child and Family Team (“CFT”) meetings.

Over the course of the meetings, DHHS determined that Jason was a neglected and 

dependent juvenile and, on 30 January 2020, filed a juvenile petition.

¶ 48 The trial court entered a non-secure Custody Order on 30 January 2020. After 

an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered its Adjudication Order on 22 July 2020, 

finding Jason to be neglected and dependent pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-807. See 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-807 (2021); see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-101 (2021). On 29 July 2020, the 

trial court entered its Amended Adjudication Order, with the only amendment being 

a change to the file number in the order. On 18 May 2021, the trial court entered its 

Disposition Order that ordered legal and physical custody of Jason remain with 

DHHS and kept him in his foster placement. Respondent-Mother timely appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶ 49 Respondent-Mother argues (A) the trial court erred in adjudicating Jason 

neglected because “it failed to make findings of fact based upon clear and convincing 

evidence”; (B) the trial court committed reversible error in adjudicating Jason 

neglected and dependent because it “failed to make necessary findings of fact, there 

was insufficient evidence to support the findings of fact, and the findings which are 

supported by the evidence are insufficient to support its conclusions of law”; and (C) 

the trial court “incorrectly applied the best interest of the child standard in awarding 

custody of [Jason] to [DHHS] without first finding [Respondent-Mother] was unfit or 
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had acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected rights as a parent.” I 

would remand on the basis of Respondent-Mother’s first argument and, as a result, 

would not reach her remaining arguments on appeal.

¶ 50 “The role of this Court in reviewing a trial court’s adjudication of neglect and 

abuse is to determine ‘(1) whether the findings of fact are supported by “clear and 

convincing evidence,” and (2) whether the legal conclusions are supported by the 

findings of fact[.]’” In re T.H.T., 185 N.C. App. 337, 343 (2007) (quoting In re Gleisner, 

141 N.C. App. 475, 480 (2000)), aff’d as modified, 362 N.C. 446 (2008). “If such 

evidence exists, the findings of the trial court are binding on appeal, even if the 

evidence would support a finding to the contrary.” Id.

¶ 51 However, as we discussed in In re H.P., the trial court’s findings of fact must 

display a “process[] of logical reasoning[] based on the evidentiary facts before it” that 

results in a finding of “the ultimate facts necessary to dispose of the case”:

The Juvenile Code provides that adjudication orders “shall 

contain appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.” 

[N.C.G.S.] § 7B-807(b) [(2021)]. Rule 52 of our rules of civil 

procedure mandates the trial court make findings of “facts 

specially and state separately its conclusions of law 

thereon . . . .” [N.C.G.S.] § 1A-1, Rule 52 [(2021)]. “[T]he 

trial court’s factual findings must be more than a recitation 

of allegations. They must be the specific ultimate facts . . . 

sufficient for the appellate court to determine that the 

judgment is adequately supported by competent evidence.” 

In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 97[] . . . (2002) (citing 

Montgomery v. Montgomery, 32 N.C. App. 154, 156-57[] . . 

. (1977)). It is “not per se reversible error for a trial court’s 
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fact findings to mirror the wording of a petition or other 

pleading prepared by a party . . . . this Court will examine 

whether the record of the proceedings demonstrates that 

the trial court, through processes of logical reasoning, 

based on the evidentiary facts before it, found the ultimate 

facts necessary to dispose of the case.” In re J.W., 241 N.C. 

App. 44, 48-49, . . . disc. review denied, 368 N.C. 290[] . . . 

(2015). “Ultimate facts are the final resulting effect 

reached by processes of logical reasoning from the 

evidentiary facts.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 97[;] . 

. . see also In re H.J.A., 223 N.C. App. 413, 418[] . . . (2012).

In re H.P., 278 N.C. App. 195, 2021-NCCOA-299, ¶ 23, appeal dismissed, 379 N.C. 

155 (2021). 

¶ 52 In that case, “the trial court made forty-seven findings of fact in the 

adjudication order”; however, “many of the findings of fact in the adjudication order 

[were] mere recitations of the allegations in Exhibit A that was attached to the 

juvenile petition.” Id. at ¶ 24. “Several of the trial court’s findings [were] verbatim 

recitations of the allegations in the juvenile petition. Four of the trial court’s findings 

expressly state[d] that ‘there was not evidence’ to support other allegations the trial 

court found as fact in the adjudication order.” Id. “Although not explicitly stated, 

three other findings of fact by the trial court recognize[d] that there was insufficient 

evidence to support the allegations accepted as fact in other findings.” Under the 

circumstances, we held that the findings of fact were mere recitations of allegations 

because there was no evidence presented to support the allegations otherwise. Id. at 

¶ 26. We also held “the trial court did not, through the process of logical reasoning, 
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find ultimate facts necessary to dispose of the case.” Id. (marks omitted).

¶ 53 The Majority correctly points out that, when reviewing the trial court’s 

factfinding, pragmatism requires that we do not review challenged findings that are 

unnecessary to support a trial court’s determination and that we review only the 

proper findings when determining whether the findings of fact support the 

conclusions of law. See supra ¶¶ 14, 17. However, I do not believe—as it is clear we 

did not believe in In re H.P.—that the limitation of our review to the dispositive 

features of the findings of fact frees the trial court from its duty to issue its orders 

above a minimum standard of clarity and coherence. The limitation of our analysis 

to the facts necessary to support the trial court’s determination is, as I understand it, 

an exercise in resolving factual disagreement; it operates similarly to surplusage in 

a criminal indictment, freeing the judicial system from the need to undo and redo 

procedures simply because a document was more specific than necessary. See State 

v. Bollinger, 192 N.C. App. 241, 246 (2008) (“Allegations beyond the essential 

elements of the crime sought to be charged are irrelevant and may be treated 

as surplusage.”), aff’d, 363 N.C. 251 (2009); see also Surplusage, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (“1. Redundant words in a statute or legal instrument; 

language that does not add meaning . . . 2. Extraneous matter in a pleading . . . .”).

¶ 54 Conversely, the trial court’s responsibility to “find ultimate facts necessary to 

dispose of the case” through a “process of logical reasoning” necessarily reflects a 
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concern not only for whether the facts found were actually supported, but also 

whether the trial court evaluated the case with adequate care and consideration. In 

re H.P., 2021-NCCOA-299 at ¶ 26. If it were truly the case that the trial court’s 

findings of fact could be upheld as liberally as the Majority claims, then this 

requirement would have virtually no meaning; any amount of disarray or patent 

absence of logic in a trial court’s factfinding would be tolerable as long as some subset 

of propositions cherry-picked from the document—no matter how small—could 

amount to a justification of the result. Whatever description may apply to such a 

scenario, it would not be a “process[] of logical reasoning . . . .” Id. 

¶ 55 Bearing the above in mind, I turn to Respondent-Mother’s specific argument 

on appeal. She contends that Findings of Fact 14 through 27 are “mere recitations of 

statements made to [DHHS] and are not supported by the evidence.” Here, the 

challenged findings of fact state:

14. The Guilford County Department of Health and Human 

Services received a report on [29 July 2019]. Reporter 

stated that [Respondent-Mother] gave birth to a newborn 

baby on [28 July 2019]. Reporter stated that the infant was 

born at 25 weeks and will remain in the NICCU [sic] for a 

while. Reporter advised [Respondent-Mother] has other 

kids in the custody of GCDHHS. At that time, 

[Respondent-Mother] refused to give the name of the 

biological father.

15. On [30 July 2019] [DSS employee] Turner went to the 

Greensboro Women’s Hospital and spoke with 

[Respondent-Mother] and observed the infant in the 
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incubator in the NICU with [Respondent-Mother]. [DSS 

employee] Turner addressed the allegations and inquired 

about [Respondent-Mother’s] plan. [Respondent-Mother] 

advised that she currently has a foster care case with her 

two daughters due to them being present during a domestic 

violence incident with her boyfriend at that time. [DSS 

employee] Turner inquired about [Respondent-Mother’s] 

case plan with her daughters, and [Respondent-Mother] 

stated that she has done everything that was required of 

her by the Department including domestic violence classes, 

drug reassessment classes, therapy and parenting classes. 

[Respondent-Mother] stated that she has not had contact 

with her abuser, she moved, changed her phone number 

and blocked him on all social media. [Respondent-Mother] 

shared that visitation was stopped by the Department 

because she asked her daughter how her father was doing 

and told her to tell him she said hello. [RespondentMother] received an email afterwards stating that she 

would no longer have visitation due to her mentioning the 

child’s father. [Respondent-Mother] explained her 

interpretation of the rules was that she was not supposed 

to ask about his visitation and did not know she could not 

ask anything or mention him at all; and because it was 

unclear, her visits were taken. [DSS employee] Turner 

explained that a Child and Family Team Meeting (“CFT”) 

would have to be scheduled to address the plan for the 

child. [Respondent-Mother] advised that she does not want 

[Jason] in foster care and would prefer for him to go to a 

family member and listed her sister . . . . [DSS employee] 

Turner asked for the name of [Jason’s] father, and 

[Respondent-Mother] stated that she honestly did not 

know because it could be one of several men with whom she 

had intercourse at a party in a different state during the 

holiday season of 2018. [DSS employee] Turner requested 

any names or any information she could recall, and 

[Respondent-Mother] stated that she had no information.

16. On [16 August 2019], the Department held a Child and 

Family Team Meeting (CFT) facilitated by Supervisor 
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Rhonda Oboh, present were: [DSS employee] Turner, 

Supervisor Sherline McLean, [DSS employee] Kimberly 

Young, Supervisor Rose Cromartie, [Respondent-Mother], 

Godmother [], maternal aunt . . . , friend . . . , friend . . . and 

friend . . . . During this meeting the issues discussed were 

as follows: (1) CPS report received on [29 July 2019]; (2) 

newborn child was born with medical issues; (3) 

[Respondent-Mother’s] other children currently in DSS 

custody[;] and (4) safety concerns for this child. 

[Respondent-Mother] stated that she has worked her case 

plan, and her situation is not the same as when her other 

children came into custody. The Department was also 

concerned as to who the father is of this child. [RespondentMother] stated that she did not know who the father was, 

there were the potential of 2 fathers. [Respondent-Mother] 

gave two names, one of which . . . she advised was the 

homeowner of where the party was where she became 

heavily intoxicated and engaged in sexual relations. 

[Respondent-Mother] stated that it was an emotional time 

for her as her children were taken into custody, so she went 

out on the town in Atlanta. [Respondent-Mother] appeared 

to know nothing about the men she slept with. 

[Respondent-Mother] stated that she just signed a lease to 

her new house. [Respondent-Mother] presented a copy of 

the lease. Ms. McLean explained that the Department 

continues to be concerned about the choices that she is 

making and concerned about her not demonstrating 

parenting skills that she has learned in her parenting 

classes. It was stated that at that time [RespondentMother] could not have unsupervised visits with her 

children in custody based on the last court hearing. The 

next court date was [23 October 2019]. The children had 

been in custody for 16 months, and [Respondent-Mother] 

had two violations since the children came into custody. 

[Respondent-Mother] was concerned that someone told her 

children that she had a new baby and she instructed the 

[DSS employee] and supervisor not to tell her children 

about the baby. Ms. McLean explained that [neither] she 

nor [DSS employee] Young told the children about the 
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baby. Ms. McLean asked [Respondent-Mother] if she told 

the therapist, Lisa Partin. [Respondent-Mother] stated no. 

[Respondent-Mother] is currently in therapy with Ms. 

Michelle Seeley and there have been concerns by the 

Department as to whether she is providing appropriate 

treatment to [Respondent-Mother]. [Respondent-Mother] 

was asked about the current status of her newborn and she 

advised that he is in the NICU born at 25 weeks, currently 

28 weeks gestational. Not ready for discharge for 6 more 

weeks. [Respondent-Mother] was breast feeding. He 

weighed 1 lb. at birth and at the time of this CFT, he 

weighed 2 lbs. 5 oz. with no special needs except for him 

being on a breathing machine until he can breathe on his 

own. [DSS employee] Turner sent a diligent efforts search 

for [the man identified as the potential father].

17. On [19 August 2019], [DSS employee] Turner received 

an email from [Respondent-Mother] advising that she 

found the father of [Jason] and provided his contact 

information.

18. On [27 August 2019], [DSS employee] Turner and 

Social Worker Supervisor Cromartie met with 

[Respondent-Father] and collected a DNA sample to 

determine paternity. [DSS employee] Turner inquired 

about his plan for the child and any other placement 

options for him. [Respondent-Father] advised that he 

would be taking care of [Jason] and maybe [RespondentFather’s] mother, but he was not certain if she could. [DSS 

employee] Turner asked about the status of the 

relationship with [Respondent-Mother] and he advised 

that they are in a relationship and had been for 

approximately 1 year. [DSS employee] Turner inquired 

about his criminal background and he advised that he has 

had several charges and convictions including assault on a 

female and was just released from prison not long ago. 

[Respondent-Father’s] criminal record dates back to 2003 

and reflects various larceny and robbery charges as well as 

assault with a deadly weapon on a government official, 
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resisting public officer, felony and misdemeanor probation 

violations, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, 

traffic violations, flee and eluding arrest, possession with 

intent to distribute marijuana, cocaine, and possession of 

marijuana charges, possession of firearm by felon, assault 

on a female, communicating threats, assault with intent to 

inflict serious injury, and misdemeanor child abuse.

19. On [17 September 2019], [DSS employee] Turner 

received the DNA test results which confirmed by 99.99% 

probability of paternity that [Respondent-Father] is the 

biological father of [Jason].

20. On [30 October 2019], [DSS employee] Turner called 

[Respondent-Father] after reviewing missed calls from the 

number provided for him, although the phone number ID 

reflected [Respondent-Mother’s] name. [DSS employee] 

Turner spoke with him and requested to visit his home. 

[DSS employee] Turner requested to visit his home on [1 

November 2019] at 1pm and [Respondent-Father] agreed. 

On [1 November 2019], [DSS employee] Turner and 

GCDHHS Nurse Brown went to the home for the 

appointment and discovered that no one was home.

21. On [7 November 2019], [DSS employee] Turner 

conducted a home visit with [Respondent-Father] and 

noted that the home had an odor of lingering smoke residue 

that of cigarettes and what appeared to be marijuana. [DSS 

employee] Turner noticed various ashtrays full of cigarette 

butts and a glass bong in a back room/den area of the home. 

[DSS employee] Turner addressed the smoke odors and 

smoking paraphernalia. [Respondent-Father] denied 

owning the glass bong pipe but stated that he does engage 

in marijuana and cigarette use. [DSS employee] Turner 

inquired about the status of his relationship with 

[Respondent-Mother]. He advised that they were in an on 

and off relationship over the last year. However, he 

advised that he “can’t deal with her and all that drama and 

attitude” and he is no longer in a relationship with her. 
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[DSS employee] Turner asked when he became aware that 

[Respondent-Mother] was pregnant and when he became 

aware that the infant might be his biological child. 

[Respondent-Father] advised that he knew [RespondentMother] was pregnant from the beginning of her pregnancy 

and he has always known that the child was his. He stated 

that [Respondent-Mother] called him one day stressing 

that the Department was repeatedly requesting the name 

of the father. He advised that he instructed [RespondentMother] to tell the Department that he is the father since 

it was the truth and they both knew he is the father.

22. On [20 November 2019], [DSS employee] Turner was 

informed that the plan for [Respondent-Mother’s] 

daughters had been changed to adoption due to 

[Respondent-Mother] being out of compliance with the 

majority of her case plan, including not being able to 

successfully demonstrate a change in improving her 

decision-making regarding parenting and relationships, 

understanding of domestic violence and properly vetting 

partners.

23. On [6 December 2019], a Child and Family Team 

meeting (CFT) was held at Wake Forest Baptist Hospital 

NICU. The attendees included: [Respondent-Father], 

[Respondent-Mother], Lee Daniels -Hospital [Social 

Worker], Rachel Miller- MD-Neonatology, Julie KerthNurse Practitioner-Pediatric Pulmonology, Shana 

Crabtree-Pediatric Pulmonology Attending, Theresa 

Merrill- RN CC4C Case Nurse Manager, Rykiell TurnerCPS [DSS employee], Susie Edwards-CPS Social Worker 

Supervisor[,] [and several family friends or relatives]. The 

medical team advised of the child’s medical needs including 

a tracheal tube, a ventilator and ongoing developmental 

needs due to underdeveloped airways and his premature 

status. Medical Staff advised that there would need to be 

2 fully trained 24-hour caregivers prior to discharge. 

Restrictions included no smoking in the home, vehicles or 

smoke residue on the hands or clothes of anyone providing 
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care for or being with [Jason]. [Respondent-Father] 

advised that he needed to take some time and consider the 

information and speak with his employer. He shared that 

he is a very hard sleeper and doesn’t hear alarms while 

sleeping. [Respondent-Mother] and her supports 

recommended that the child be placed in her care. The 

Department noted ongoing concerns and provided various 

options for the care and placement of [Jason]. During the 

CFT, [Respondent-Father] stated that he encouraged 

[Respondent-Mother] to be dishonest with the Department 

about her initial story about [Jason’s] conception and 

naming the father. [Respondent-Mother] advised that this 

was true. [DSS employee] Turner inquired about the 

current status of their relationship and their plan for his 

care. [Respondent-Mother] advised that they were only coparenting. [DSS employee] Turner asked what that meant 

and what that looked like, and [Respondent-Mother] 

advised that they communicate regarding [Jason’s] care 

and updates. [DSS employee] Turner asked who the 

trained caretakers would be for [Jason] as [RespondentFather] expressed his plan to care for him. [DSS employee] 

Turner asked whose home would be the primary residence 

and whether the other parent would join them at that 

home. [Respondent-Father] instructed [RespondentMother] not to answer [DSS employee] Turner. After the 

CFT was concluded, Nurse Merrill advised that when she 

visited [Respondent-Mother’s] home, there was a “smokey 

smell” that she would be working with [RespondentMother] on the smell.

24. On [18 December 2019], a meeting was held with 

[Respondent-Mother] per her request and present were, 

CC4C Nurse Manager Merrill, [DSS employee] Turner, 

Social Worker Supervisor Susie Edwards, Foster Care 

[DSS employee] Kimberly Young, Program Manager 

Carole Allison, Foster Care Program Manager Karen 

Williamson, the father was not in attendance. The 

Department’s concerns were re-explained to [RespondentMother] as well as other placement options including 
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transfer of custody to caretakers identified by [RespondentFather] and she was asked if she had any other placement 

options for the child and she advised she did not have any 

additional placement options.

25. On [14 January 2020], [DSS employee] Turner spoke 

with . . . [Respondent-Father’s] sister in-law and identified 

caretaker. [Respondent-Father’s sister in-law] advised 

that although she still wanted to be the caretaker for 

[Jason], she and her husband felt that there were too many 

concerns regarding [Respondent-Mother], and they would 

no longer [be] interested in being the caretakers for 

[Jason].

26. On [23 January 2020], [DSS employee] Turner called 

and spoke with . . . [Respondent-Father’s] brother and 

desired potential caretaker. [Respondent-Father’s brother] 

advised that he and his wife have decided to no longer be 

the caretakers for [Jason]. [Respondent-Father’s brother] 

advised that he had not heard from his brother regarding 

any other plans. [DSS employee] Turner asked if their 

mother would be an option and [Respondent-Father’s 

brother] stated that they had not discussed it since she was 

caring for another grandchild and they did not want to add 

additional burdens to her. [DSS employee] Turner called 

[Respondent-Father] and was unable to leave a voicemail 

as it was not set up. [DSS employee] Turner sent 

[Respondent-Father] a text requesting that he contact 

[DSS employee] Turner to address a plan of care for [Jason] 

with no response as of [30 January 2020].

27. On [24 January 2020], [DSS employee] Turner phoned 

. . . paternal grandmother of [Jason] and inquired about her 

interest and ability to be a possible caretaker and 

placement option for [Jason]. [She] advised that she would 

not be able to care for or be a placement option for [Jason]. 

These findings are nearly identical to paragraphs 4 through 17 of Exhibit A of the 

juvenile petition, although the language has been updated in most places to remove 
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abbreviations. Additionally, of the three handwritten edits to Exhibit A, only one was 

incorporated into the findings of fact.

¶ 56 Bearing in mind the principles of In re: H.P., I agree with Respondent-Mother. 

Against a comprehensive review of the Record and the transcript of the adjudicatory 

hearing, a significant portion of these findings of fact are entirely unsupported by the 

evidence at the adjudicatory hearing. These unsupported aspects include, in 

significant part, Respondent-Mother’s alleged statements about the status of her case 

involving her daughters in Finding of Fact 15; the attendees of the Child and Family 

Team Meetings, the information regarding Respondent-Mother’s daughters and 

therapist Lisa Partin, Jason’s weights, and the reference to the diligent efforts search 

in Finding of Fact 16; the status of Respondent-Mother’s and Respondent-Father’s 

relationship, Respondent-Father’s statements regarding his criminal history, and 

several of the crimes included in his criminal record in Finding of Fact 18; the entirety 

of Findings of Fact 19 and 20; the status of Respondent-Mother and RespondentFather’s relationship, Respondent-Father’s statements concerning the relationship, 

and some of Respondent-Father’s statements concerning the false paternity story in 

Finding of Fact 21; some of the attendees of the CFT meeting, Respondent-Mother’s 

recommendation for the child’s placement, and the statement that there was a smoky 
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smell in Respondent-Mother’s home5 in Finding of Fact 23; the attendees of the 

meeting that Respondent-Mother requested in Finding of Fact 24; RespondentFather’s brother’s statements regarding other plans and the difficulty reaching 

Respondent-Father in Finding of Fact 26; and the dates provided in Findings of Fact 

17 through 22 and 25 through 27.

¶ 57 Here, like in In re H.P., I struggle to conclude that “the record of the 

proceedings demonstrates that the trial court, through processes of logical reasoning, 

based on the evidentiary facts before it, found the ultimate facts necessary to dispose 

of the case.” Id. at ¶ 23 (quoting In re J.W., 241 N.C. App. at 48-49). While “[i]t is 

not per se reversible error for a trial court’s fact findings to mirror the wording of a 

petition or other pleading prepared by a party,” the trial court’s findings of fact that 

mirror the juvenile petition in this case so frequently contain statements unsupported 

by evidence on the Record that they do not appear to reflect the trial court’s own 

“processes of logical reasoning.” Id. 

 

5 I note that there was some discussion of this statement by Nurse Merrill on crossexamination only. There was also some indication that the house smelled like incense from 

DSS employee Young; however, the allegations of the juvenile petition do not mention 

Respondent-Mother’s smelling of smoke other than in reference to Nurse Merrill. See In re 

A.B., 179 N.C. App. 605, 609 (2006) (emphasis added) (“Unlike in the dispositional stage, 

where the trial court's primary consideration is the best interest of the child and any 

evidence which is competent and relevant to a showing of the best interest of that child 

must be heard and considered by the trial court, evidence in the adjudicatory hearing is 

limited to a determination of the items alleged in the petition.”).
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¶ 58 Admittedly, this case is distinct from In re H.P. in two ways. First, the findings 

of fact did not undermine other findings of fact. Second, DHHS’s case was not limited 

to Exhibit A as DHHS presented the testimony of two DSS employees that included 

matters outside the scope of Exhibit A. Nonetheless, our task is to determine 

“whether the record of the proceedings demonstrates that the trial court, through 

processes of logical reasoning, based on the evidentiary facts before it, found the 

ultimate facts necessary to dispose of the case.” Id. (quoting In re J.W., 241 N.C. App. 

at 48-49); see also In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 97 (“Ultimate facts are the final 

resulting effect reached by processes of logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts.”). 

And, reviewing the findings of fact holistically, it did not.6 The findings of fact in the 

 

6 I also note that the facts of this case are similar to those of In re O.W. See 

generally In re O.W., 164 N.C. App. 699 (2004). In In re O.W., we reversed an adjudication 

order based on the respondent-mother’s argument that the trial court erred by failing to 

make ultimate findings of fact. The order in In re O.W. contained “twenty findings of fact, 

fifteen of [which] [were] a verbatim recitation of the facts stated in [the] petition for abuse 

and neglect, some of which [were] unsupported by any evidence.” Id. at 702. We noted that 

several of the findings of fact were simple recitations of what someone else had told the 

DSS and that there was a lack of clarity regarding whether the trial court found an event 

had occurred or found DSS concluded there was an injurious environment based upon what 

someone told them. Id. We held:

[T]he trial court’s findings are not “specific ultimate facts,” 

which are sufficient for this Court to determine that the 

adjudication of abuse and neglect is adequately supported by 

competent evidence. We remand this order to the trial court to 

make appropriate findings of fact, not inconsistent with this 

opinion. It is unnecessary for us to address the remainder of

[the] respondent’s [issues on appeal].
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trial court’s Amended Adjudication Order in this case were not “specific ultimate 

facts,” and the Record does not demonstrate “that the trial court, through processes 

of logical reasoning, based on the evidentiary facts before it, found the ultimate facts 

necessary to dispose of the case.” In re H.P., 278 N.C. App. 195, 2021-NCCOA-299 at 

¶ 23. As a result, I would remand this order to the trial court to make appropriate 

findings of fact based upon the evidence, and I need not reach the other issues on 

appeal.

CONCLUSION

¶ 59 The trial court’s Amended Adjudication Order quoted the language included in 

the juvenile petition verbatim, including information not presented at the 

adjudicatory hearing at any point and only presented in the juvenile petition. Due to 

the pervasive reference to information that was not presented at the hearing, I cannot 

conclude “that the trial court, through processes of logical reasoning, based on the 

evidentiary facts before it, found the ultimate facts necessary to dispose of the case.” 

Id. This constituted reversible error, and I would vacate the Amended Adjudication 

Order and related Disposition Order and remand for the entry of appropriate findings 

of fact based upon the evidence. Furthermore, for the reasons stated in the first 

 

 

Id. at 704.
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paragraph of this opinion, I would not allow the trial court’s “orally rendered 

judgment” to play any role in our review. 

¶ 60 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.